Document Type

Article

Publication Date

10-2013

Publication Title

Fisheries Research

Volume

147

Publisher Name

Elsevier

Abstract

This paper explores empirical evidence as well as a theoretical model of fisheries in the Black Sea which have become depleted as a result of both environmental degradation and overexploitation. We examine overfishing and the optimal fish catch, and derive Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) from a game theory perspective by using agent risk profiles. We explain how risk-averse fishers may choose to fish at unsustainable levels, even though it may reduce their overall fish catch in the long run. Risk attitudes of artisanal fishers within the frameworks of expected utility and prospect theories also have implications on risk aversion and non-cooperation. We explore how social norms between fishers could encourage cooperation in fishing at sustainable levels, but finds that these norms and information networks have not developed enough in the Black Sea to be effective.

Comments

Author Posting. © 2013, Elsevier. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of Elsevier for personal use, not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in Fisheries Research, Volume 147, October 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.fishres.2013.06.011

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.

Included in

Business Commons

Share

COinS