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Commitment Problems: Understanding Variation in the Frequency of International Conflict Management Efforts

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Commitment Problems:

Understanding Variation in

the Frequency of International Conflict Management Efforts[1]

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Abstract

Why do some militarized interstate disputes involve multiple third party attempts to resolve the dispute, while others seemingly end before movement towards peace is possible? This paper examines third party commitment to international conflict resolution. I argue that a third party's commitment reflects strategic interests, barriers to entry and the conflict's prospects for peace, which encourage third party involvement while having a dampening effect on their commitment. I also explore the role of bias in management onset and third party commitment. Analysis of conflict management in militarized interstate disputes from 1946 to 2001 offers significant support for the hypotheses.

Third party management of militarized interstate disputes exhibits great variation in occurrence, duration, activities, and outcomes. Consider the role of the United States. The 1979 Camp David Accords, which ended the Yom Kippur War (the most mediated war of the 1970s), were a direct result of President Jimmy Carter's commitment to rejuvenating the Middle East peace process.[3] He visited heads of state, held exploratory meetings, and took a comprehensive, multilateral approach before convening the well-fated international conference. The Camp David Accords resulted from eighteen months of intense diplomatic efforts and a long term commitment to bringing peace (Princen 1991). The ramifications of this commitment are vast: creating a long-standing peace between Egypt and Israel and demonstrating to other Arab states that negotiations with Israel are possible. The US effort contradicts other instances of third party management, such as that by President Soglo of Benin in the 1994 Ghana-Togo border dispute, which was neither successful nor followed by additional attempts (by either the managing state or another party), and the Algerian foreign minister's 1990 attempted resolution of the border conflict between Mauritania and Senegal, which was also a singular and unsuccessful attempt.

Why did the US, even in the face of seemingly insurmountable challenges, remain committed to resolving the Middle East conflict? After Henry Kissinger's bilateral efforts and shuttle diplomacy, why did President Carter rejuvenate the efforts that eventually lead to normalized relations between Egypt and Israel (Dhanani 1982)? Conversely, why do other managers quickly abandon their posts? These cases highlight an element of conflict management about which we understand very little: why are some efforts to manage militarized interstate disputes characterized by multiple third party attempts, reflecting the third party's commitment to conflict resolution, while others seemingly end before movement towards peace is possible?

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[3] The US was also involved in managing the conflict before the Carter presidency, with Henry Kissinger taking a more incremental, bilateral approach characterized by shuttle diplomacy.

This paper explores the relationship between conflict management initiation and conflict manager commitment to resolving interstate conflicts. Exploring third party commitment and intent is particularly important if we believe the engagement process has implications for a third party's ultimate performance (Beardsley 2011). Third parties strategically select the conflicts they manage; we must first understand manager motivations before attempting to explain conflict outcomes (Greig 2005, Beber 2012). While some third party efforts represent a long-term steadfastness to reestablishing peace, those actors simply paying lip service to domestic or international pressures are unlikely to remain committed, making durable peace improbable. Understanding intent thereby leads us closer to understanding why we observe particular outcomes.

I argue that we can further understand interstate conflict management activities by accounting for the factors that influence third party involvement and the fact that these circumstances often have an inverse effect on third party commitment. Thus, the very conditions that have been shown to make third party involvement more likely, such as trade interests, alliance ties and geographic proximity, actually discourage the involvement of committed managers. Further study of intervention patterns reveals important information about third party commitment. I argue that a third party's commitment reflects strategic interests, barriers to entry and prospects for peace, which encourage involvement while having a dampening effect on commitment. Understanding which third parties are likely to be committed and which conflicts attract committed managers is therefore partially the result of uncontrollable factors present in the conflict. More interesting, however, is the important role that relationships between the third party and disputants play. While third parties with strong ties to the disputants have been shown to intervene more frequently (Melin 2011, Greig 2005, Crescenzi et al. 2011), these results also

show an inverse effect on committed third party efforts. I argue that this is because third parties that must overcome higher barriers to entry, such as distant or unaligned states, are undertaking a greater burden by becoming involved. The fact that they become involved at all signals conflict resolution's salience and reflects a higher commitment to conflict resolution than those with lower costs of entry. These third parties are in for the long haul.

The argument presented here has important implications for understanding conflict management failures. Existing scholarship attributes failure to third party tactics (Favretto 2009, Kydd 2006), dispute characteristics (Gartner and Bercovitch 2006), inconsistencies between mediator and disputant preferences (Beardsley 2008, 2011) and mediator selection (Beber 2012). Building on the work highlighting the persistent selection effects and inconsistency problems in mediation, I show conflict resolution attempts frequently involve third parties with limited commitments, thereby explaining why many such efforts are unable to create a lasting peace. In exploring commitment, I highlight the circumstances under which third parties are likely to remain involved and generate agreements.

I begin by reviewing the international mediation literature as it relates to third party motivations and commitment, and then offer a theoretical explanation of third party commitment. I employ selection models to test my arguments on the Third Party Intermediary data and show that many of the factors that increase the likelihood of intervention do actually decrease third party commitment. I conclude with potential policy implications and extensions of these findings.

A COMMITMENT TO UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Conflict management, in its various forms, has received considerable scholarly attention.[4] Of all the scholarship on mechanisms of conflict management, mediation, as a voluntary and peaceful means of addressing conflict, has received the most extensive focus. I seek to build upon this literature as it has one of the most well established research findings and offers important theoretical insights for conflict management processes. We know that mediation begets mediation. That is, a history of mediating a conflict encourages the same state to mediate the conflict once again (Greig 2005, Regan and Stam 2000). While these repeat efforts tend to occur in the most serious conflicts, which are not easily resolved, we have yet to establish an understanding of the underlying processes present in these situations. A promising answer lies in the blossoming scholarship on persistent selection effects and inconsistency problems.

Much of the mediation scholarship published in the last decade points to the importance of third party's strategic choices and the implications of these choices for mediation occurrence and outcomes. This work argues that examining only outcomes, the understandable focus of the majority of earlier work, produces a selection bias (Gartner and Bercovitch 2006, Greig 2005, Beber 2012). Since the factors motivating third parties to act as conflict managers also affect the outcomes of their actions, we must first understand why third parties became involved as mediators before evaluating the impact of their efforts. The logic behind the selection argument is that third parties strategically account for the probability of success before acting, and scholars have shown that success can influence a third party's strategy selection (Owsiak 2014) and successive attempts to mediate (Böhmelt 2013). Research on mediator selection, however, focuses on the occurrence or non-occurrence of mediation events. I argue that, to fully

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[4] I define conflict management as any course of action taken by a non-disputant aimed at either preventing the further escalation of the conflict or resolving it completely (Dixon 1996, Butterworth 1978). The majority of the existing literature examines mediation, peacekeeping, and economic sanctions separate of one another, ignoring the presence of foreign policy substitutability (see Dixon 1996, Regan 2000, Frazier and Dixon 2006b). I use the terms conflict management and intervention interchangeably.

understand mediation and its outcomes, we must consider third party intentions and the breadth of third party management activities. More specifically, we must take into account whether third parties are willing to remain involved to fully resolve the conflict. While some third party efforts represent a long-term steadfastness to reestablishing peace, many actors are simply paying lip service to domestic or international pressures. Exploring third party intent is particularly important if we believe the engagement process has implications for a third party's ultimate performance. Explaining how third party intervention occurs moves us closer to understanding why we observe particular outcomes. If a third party only engages in "cheap talk" to satisfy domestic or international pressure, the third party is unlikely to remain committed, making durable peace improbable.

Also with important implications for understanding third party commitment is work on the inconsistency problem in mediation (Beardsley 2008, 2011). Beardsley brings to light what he refers to as "the mediation dilemma," which is a tradeoff between short-term peace and long-term stability. Mediation risks the relapse of conflict after a brief period of peace. However, avoidance of mediation risks imminent brutality. In other words, although the disputants seek third party assistance as a means of reducing their immediate barriers to successful bargaining, they do so at the risk of decreasing their durability of any peaceful arrangements that are reached. This is because when combatants rely more on a third party, they become less capable of maintaining the peace themselves. Beardsley's work highlights the salience of the divergence in third party and disputant motives. While interveners are interested in reducing the spillover costs from the dispute and shaping the international and regional order in their favor, disputants find mediation attractive as a stalling tactic, for gaining recognition, to provide a veneer of cooperation, as a low-cost management tool, and to reduce their adversary's flexibility in

negotiations. This framework has important implications for the long-term outcomes of settlements generated with the assistance of third parties, since mediators are more prone to push for what is more easily attainable and to promote incomplete peace terms that put off the most difficult choices to the future. It also has important implications for understanding third party commitment, as we know that involvement does not necessarily signal a commitment to conflict resolution.

This paper contributes to the literatures on selection effects and inconsistency problems in conflict management thereby shedding additional light on third party strategic motives. I offer three main contributions to the literature. First, I offer a first attempt to explore variation in third party commitments, showing that the likelihood that a third party maintains a continued presence in a conflict increases when some progress is being made, yet not all issues are settled. These circumstances encourage the third party to remain involved since they are invested in the outcome and have seen positive results. Second, I seek to link the theoretical underpinnings of the mediation literature to understand conflict management more broadly. As different conflicts may initiate similar responses and there are multiple responses to comparable conflicts (Most and Starr 1984, 1989), I examine the substitutable choice of employing economic intervention, verbal management, diplomatic efforts or peacekeeping. By doing so, I am able to further our understanding of the third party decision process: inquiring into the causes of various management techniques rather than singularly focusing on one management method. Finally, I offer a theoretical model and empirical tests that explore the role that selection effects play in third party commitment. Third parties are more likely to act when involvement is low-cost. However, committed third parties are willing to overcome costly barriers to entry to settle disputes. I empirically show that many of the circumstances that encourage third parties to

initially intervene have a dampening effect on third party commitment. I now explore third party

commitment and offer a theoretical explanation for its presence.

DEFINING THIRD PARTY COMMITMENT

Third party conflict management entails non-disputant activities conducted to facilitate the

peaceful resolution of a dispute. The actions that characterize such activities vary from verbal

appeals to mediation and the deployment of peacekeeping troops. Following previous scholars

(Owsiak 2014, Melin 2011), I view these varied strategies as substitutable foreign policies.

While much of the conflict management research explores a single management method at the

expense of others, creating a comprehensive understanding of how third party management

attempts develop requires acknowledging the linkages between these activities (see Dixon 1996,

Regan 2000, Frazier and Dixon 2006b). This analysis therefore explores commitment in light of

the varied roles a third party can play as a conflict manager.

While the occurrence of third party conflict management is rare[5], committed efforts are

even more so. Conflict resolution frequently requires a major third party effort over the duration

of the dispute, and the conflict manager must willingly absorb opportunity and reputational costs,

as well as more tangible monetary costs. Thus, while initial involvement may be low-cost,

enabling cheap-talk efforts, resolving a conflict often requires a significant commitment on the

part of the third party.

This paper represents an effort to capture and understand conflict manager intentions.

There are various ways to conceptualize commitment; I focus on commitment as a dedication to

resolving a conflict peacefully. As initiating intervention does not obligate the third party to

resolving the conflict, continued involvement remains a voluntary process. Commitments may be

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[5] Melin (2011) reports state-led conflict management activities in 2.5% of militarized interstate disputes, Owsiak (2014) reports 85% of MIDs receive no third party management.

highlighted (or misrepresented) with public pledges and promises. In terms of revealing actor intentions, however, actions truly do speak louder than words. I therefore treat third party actions as signals of their intentions and commitment.[6] These signals can be interpreted through a variety of third party actions and reactions, such as third party intervention techniques, repeat efforts, and duration of involvement. For example, repeat efforts, which occur when the same third party engages in more than one attempt to resolve the same conflict, signals a clear commitment to the conflict and its resolution. However, a single effort may last a long period of time, such as the above example of Carter's mediation between Egypt and Israel. Similarly, repeated management of the same conflict by different third parties captures a broader, more global commitment to conflict resolution. That the conflict has attracted the efforts of multiple third parties might underscore the conflict's strategic importance. For example, the European Community, the United States, as well as the United Nations managed the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. That multiple parties are willing to act highlights the fact that international actors see these cases as urgent to resolve. Not all conflict resolution attempts are equal.

This paper focuses on the number of third party efforts as a signal of commitment.[7] Involvement entails both costs (in terms of time, energy and resources) and risks (of developing a reputation of being weak and ineffective should their attempts fail). The costs and risks related to intervention (Touval 2003) compile with multiple efforts. This has a dampening effect on third party efforts that is reflected in the data: just under half of third party efforts are singular attempts lacking follow up efforts (see Table 1). In deciding to engage in multiple management

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[6] The actions represent observable measures of third party intentions. As managers have private information and incentives to misrepresent their commitment, statements about commitment are not useful for scholars. Clearly exceptions to these observable actions exist, as with Norway's entrapment in the Sri Lankan peace process. The same challenges exist when considering the role of third parties in conflict prevention, as these efforts are much more likely to generate an agreement (Bercovitch and Gartner 2009, Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991).
[7] Alternate measures of commitment were tested as a robustness check and can be found in the Appendix.

efforts, third parties signal their commitment to resolving the conflict: the benefits of conflict resolution outweigh the costs of multiple management efforts. As intervention is not applied to cases at random, I first attempt to address the factors that affect the likelihood of intervention onset and then attempt to explain third party commitment.

INSERT TABLE 1 HERE

THE INVOLVEMENT-COMMITMENT PUZZLE

Third party intervention is not exclusively driven by the presence of an international conflict. The occurrence of management varies by third party management supply and disputant demand. How can we understand a third party's initial involvement and commitment as a conflict manager? I argue a third party's decisions result from third party barriers to entry and interests, as well as the conflict's prospects for peace.

Barriers to Entry and Interests

Initiating a conflict management effort frequently means overcoming barriers to entry, which involve the political risks associated with intervention. How willing is a state to risk its reputation, absorb costs, and forego involvement elsewhere to manage a conflict? Conversely, interests in a conflict can draw a third party into involvement, as voluntary involvement requires sufficient interests in the dispute and disputants to motivate a third party. Barriers to entry and interests have an inverse relationship on conflict management onset and commitment. Third parties with low barriers and high interests are most likely to intervene, since doing so does not require significant third party sacrifice. Involvement will undergo less public scrutiny when expected, routine, or low cost, especially for cases in which intervention may further third party interests. However, such scrutiny is likely to occur if involvement drags on and requires greater resources, making these actors more likely to "drop out" as conflict managers. Conversely, states

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that must overcome more significant obstacles before intervening are less likely to do so; these third parties have a lower baseline prospect of involvement. States that manage a conflict despite significant barriers to doing so are likely to be committed to resolving the conflict. For intervention to occur in such cases, the conflict must be salient to the third party. In contrast to low barrier and high interest situations, the process of overcoming high barriers will involve scrutiny; questions about national interests and costs will be addressed early in the decision process, thereby establishing the salience and necessity of involvement. Hence, while these third parties are less likely to act, they are more likely to be committed if they do so.

In other words, low barriers to entry and interests have a *positive* selection effect on the likelihood of intervention and a *negative* selection effect on commitment. While third parties with few barriers to entry are more likely to engage in conflict management (positive selection effect), they are less likely to launch multiple efforts (negative selection effect). In contrast, third parties that intervene despite high barriers to entry are more committed and therefore more likely to engage in multiple efforts.

Which actors have a stake in the dispute that encourages them to intervene? Alliance and trade ties signal that the third party may have interests in resolving the conflict. Such ties highlight both strategic interests, which have been shown to increase the likelihood of mediation (Terris and Maoz 2005), as well as an ability to influence disputants (Rauchhaus 2006, Princen 1995, Kydd 2007, Walter 2002). Interests are a function of how tightly the third party and disputants are connected through common interests and threats, which are reflected in alliance ties (Morrow 2000, Leeds 2003, Smith 1995). Alliances are a formal way for countries to exhibit affinity. Defense alliances, which promise support to an attacked target, are usually formed due to a common threat. This means that a conflict threatening an alliance member will also threaten

its alliance partner, increasing the conflict's salience and incentivizing intervention. Even if the conflict does not threaten an allied third party, it may alter the threatened state's ability to uphold the agreement terms. Thus, third party allies intervene to protect the alliance and ensure that the signatory is able to fulfill its obligations.[8]

Alliances also signal an ongoing relationship among states and therefore lower barriers to entry. Because alliances represent costly commitments to cooperate in security and military affairs (Russett and Starr 1981, Levy 1982), all alliances require some degree of foreign policy coordination between the signatories (Morrow 1991, 2000). Since lines of communication between allies are established, intervention costs are lowered. Alliances are shown to incentivize involvement (Morrow 1994, Favretto 2005, Fearon 1997) and alter third party mediation decisions (Regan 2000, Crescenzi et al. 2005).

Trade ties offer another way to think about barriers to entry and interests. Third parties with strong trade ties to the disputants will have lower barriers to entry and threatened interests, as the potential for a conflict to disrupt trade will increase a third party's desire to see the conflict resolved. Thus, third parties with an economic relationship to disputants have an incentive to intervene to protect economic interests and preserve existing markets. Trade partners also are in a better position to use financial leverage to put pressure on the disputants to accept an agreement. Regional economic ties have been shown to motivate intervention in civil wars (Kathman 2011), and bilateral trade increases the probability of external intervention in interstate disputes (Regan and Aydin 2006).

Geographic proximity is another way to consider interests and barriers to entry. The effects of a militarized conflict are not usually confined within borders, as militarized conflict

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[8] In the event that war evokes an alliance treaty, state leaders are expected to fulfill their commitments (Leeds, Long, and Mitchell 2000). In such cases, alliances can be a transmission mechanism for the spread of conflict (Kadera 1998) and provide incentives for the third party to join as an additional disputant (Melin and Koch 2010).

often results in regional economic destabilization by undermining trade and commerce and has the potential to spread political instability. Since these costs disproportionately affect geographically proximate states, nearby states have an increased interest in minimizing the costs a proximate conflict imposes. As the risk of war diffusion can also threaten regional foreign policy interests, intervention offers nearby states one way to protect their interests. Proximate third parties manage conflicts more quickly (Melin 2011), mediate between enduring rivals (Greig 2005), intervene militarily in civil wars (Kathman 2010), and mediate civil wars (Greig and Regan 2008).

While encouraging involvement, trade and alliance ties, as well as proximity, do not create an incentive structure that promotes the use of multiple management efforts. Although alliances are technically binding, they are essentially unenforceable contracts with breaching states facing only limited recourse (Crescenzi et al. 2012). While an alliance may draw a third party into conflict management, it does not increase the likelihood of multiple efforts. Third parties that act out of alliance obligations may actually be less likely to be committed managers than those who act for some other reason. The presence of an alliance is symbolic, leading to initial action but not necessarily commitment. Third parties without symbolic ties to the disputants will be unlikely to become involved at all, and if they get involved, it signals an important dispute and increases their commitment to management. Third parties connected to disputants through an economic relationship are also unlikely to act multiple times due to the economic concept of elasticity of substitution. While this term typically refers to the responsiveness of buyers of a good to price changes (i.e. if the price of beer goes up, how inclined people are to substitute it), it is useful to think of elasticity of substitutions across trading partners as well (Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig. 2008). That is, a trading partner's conflict

may lead a county to seek new markets for their goods. As long as switching trading partners is unproblematic, a state has less of a stake in any bilateral trading relationship. Thus, while trading partners may initially intervene to maintain their supplies and market, they often have other options should the conflict require multiple efforts. We see a similar trend in the role of proximity. Refugee flows, economic downturns and political spillover may subside over time, having a lessening effect on neighbors as a conflict continues. We can therefore expect that third parties with strategic geographic proximity, trade interests, and alliance ties are more likely to engage in intervention but less likely to be committed.

Hypothesis 1: *States with low barriers to entry and high interests are more likely to manage a conflict but less likely to engage in multiple management attempts.*

This has implication for the role of bias, which has been a source of major debate in the mediation literature. While bias can increase the third party's credibility (Savun 2005, Kydd 2003), the disputants may view the third party as untrustworthy (Rauchhaus 2006, Smith and Stam III 2003). I expect that the exercise of convincing the disputant without a relationship to the third party of the third party's credibility raises the barriers to entry, increasing the likelihood that only the most committed third parties become involved under these circumstances. Similarly, unbiased states- those states without trade, alliance, or geographic ties to the disputants- must overcome higher costs of entry and are therefore less likely to intervene. Since involvement is not costless, however, third parties must consider a conflict salient before voluntarily involving themselves in an already difficult situation (Beardsley 2010, Melin and Svensson 2009). While these actors do not have ties through which they might influence the disputants, conflict management still occurs when leverage is absent (Beardsley 2009). A third party without ties intervening under such circumstances signals that conflict resolution is

important to them. These third parties will therefore be more committed to conflict resolution than those with lower costs of entry. I therefore expect to find that unbiased third parties- those distant states that lack trade and alliance ties- are less likely to intervene but more likely to engage in multiple efforts.

Hypothesis 2: Unbiased states are less likely to manage a conflict but more likely to engage in multiple management attempts.

Baseline Prospects for Peace

According to Ambassador James Pardew, a senior member of the US team that negotiated the Dayton Agreement ending the 1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Ohrid Agreement, which prevented a likely costly civil war in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2001, the most important factor in resolving a conflict "is the underlying will of the parties to reach a solution in which compromises are required of all sides" (Pardew 2012). Third parties consider disputant cooperativeness and the probability that their efforts will be effective before becoming involved (Bercovitch 2002, Touval and Zartman 2001). What Fortna (2004b) terms the "baseline prospects for peace" (referred to as contextual effects by Gerner and Schrodt 2001, called selection effects by Gartner and Bercovitch 2006) are characteristics of the situation over which present actors have little control but that provide the context within which the policymaker acts, such as the dispute issue, management and conflict history. These distinguish *ex ante* the conflicts that are hard to terminate from those more amenable to settlement (Gartner and Bercovitch 2006, Gerner and Schrodt 2001).

Third parties become involved when they expect their efforts will succeed. While some cases are easily resolved without third party involvement (Gartner and Bercovitch 2006), third parties prefer to act when they expect to be effective should the need for outside involvement

arise (Terris and Maoz 2005). Greig and Diehl (2012) show that 92% of mediation cases are followed with another attempt. A history of third party involvement signals both international interest in the conflict and also increases the likelihood of successful outcomes, as previous management efforts build on one another. Previous work shows that mediation in the previous year encourages future attempts but that the outcome of the previous effort has no effect on the choice to become involved (Clayton and Gleditsch 2013). Third parties are less likely to become involved when there is no previous work upon which to build.

Successive conflict management attempts are likely related to one another, as previous efforts can provide issue clarification and even agreement to future deliberations. Owsiak (2014) shows that so-called "conflict management trajectories" are rare, as there is a 50-50 probability of a follow up management attempt, but that successive attempts are related to one another. Third parties that take action despite the absence of previous efforts on which to build signal information about both the conflict (this is likely a challenging case or others would have become involved) and the third party's commitment (a third party willing to be the first to act in a case is likely more committed than those building on the efforts of others). In such cases, where the prospects for peace are low and costs of engaging are raised, we can expect committed conflict managers to act.

Hypothesis 3: *States are more likely to manage a conflict but less likely to engage in multiple management attempts if there were previous third party interventions, regardless of previous outcomes.*

Ending a conflict frequently requires third parties to engage in multiple management efforts. I argue a third party's decision to intervene and commitment are the result of interests and barriers to entry, as well as baseline prospects for peace. In the next section, I employ

selection models to show that many of the factors that increase management occurrence have an inverse effect on multiple management efforts.

DATA AND ESTIMATION

I test the empirical implications of my hypotheses with a dataset of post-World War II third party conflict management efforts. To test my theoretical argument, I examine conflicts coded in the Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes data (Maoz 2005) and intervention events using the Third Party Intervention data (see Mullenbach and Dixon 2006, Frazier and Dixon 2006a). This generates a dataset that includes information on both international conflicts and conflict management efforts.[9]

Case selection for this study has important implications. First, it is likely that conflict severity has important implications for third party involvement and commitment. We know that as severity increases, the additional costs encourage disputants to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict (Regan and Stam 2000, Zartman 2000a, Greig 2001). Conversely, low-level backroom conflicts are neither likely to attract the attention of third parties nor necessitate third party involvement. Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs hereafter) are both visible and costly, thereby encouraging third party involvement. Second, a focus on interstate conflicts means that issues of sovereignty are not involved. It is likely that sovereignty poses a barrier to entry causing a selection effect in civil wars: those who act despite domestic nature of conflict are more likely to be committed. Civil wars likely face different barriers to settlement (for example, they often involve ethnic conflicts, which are indivisible and harder to resolve, see Svensson

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[9] While other data on third party efforts exist, I am convinced these are the most comprehensive to date. For example, while the *Issue Correlates of War* data certainly contribute to our understanding of third party efforts in territorial and maritime conflicts, it currently only includes territorial, river and maritime claims in the Western Hemisphere.

2007).[10] We can therefore expect that civil disputes would have different trends in third party commitment. Grieg and Dielh (2012) show that civil conflicts have a greater propensity for repeated mediation than do interstate conflicts (they show 6.4% of civil conflicts and 3.5% of international conflicts are mediated by the same mediator six or more times). Finally, this analysis focuses on state-led conflict management efforts. The pool of potential conflict managers includes actors with varied affiliations, including those acting as independent individuals, under a state banner, and those with international and nongovernmental organizations. I focus my analysis on state-sponsored intervention for both theoretical and empirical reasons. As states are both the dominant actors in world politics and the most frequent conflict managers, there are ample cases to examine. It is also likely that state interests differ from those of other third parties (see Melin, Gartner, and Bercovitch 2013 for a more in depth discussion on state-led mediation).[11]

Since analyzing all actors in the international system as possible conflict managers yields a staggering number of observations and inhibits both data collection and analysis, I establish a population of potential managers based on theoretical arguments about the third parties that are mostly likely to act (Beardsley 2006, Frazier and Dixon 2005, Greig 2005). While non-state actors and international organizations engage in significant conflict management efforts, I limit

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[10] Previous research has found that the causes of third party involvement have significant differences in these conflicts due to issues of sovereignty and legitimacy (Melin and Svensson 2009). Since these authors show third party involvement in civil conflicts to be politically costlier, we can expect that third parties are likely to discontinue involvement at a higher rate in these cases than in cases of interstate conflict. While the theoretical argument about the role of interests and barriers and prospects for peace is applicable to the intrastate setting, expanding the empirical tests to include non-state actors poses a significant challenge, as these actors do not have ready measures of alliances and trade ties.

[11] While creating an overarching theoretical argument and empirical test of management commitment is valuable, it is likely that non-state conflict managers have different costs and benefits associated with management activities. Empirically testing the implications of my theory on non-state actors would require treating them as the sum of their member states, an unrealistic assumption. Greig and Diehl (2012) show that state-led mediation accounts for about 38% of mediation efforts, which is the same percentage that international and regional organizations had.

my analysis to state-led efforts for both theoretical and practical reasons.[12] I define potential

intermediaries as actors that meet at least one of the following criteria, coded using Politically

Relevant Dyads (Maoz 1996): (1) are major or regional powers, which have the resources and

the responsibility to intervene, (2) are geographically contiguous states and therefore interact the

most with, and are disproportionately affected by, a neighboring conflict, or (3) have a

reputation as a conflict manger[13] and have exhibited a willingness to act as an intermediary. As I

am interested in the factors that influence outside states to become involved and remain

involved, the unit of analysis is the dispute-third-party-year. Looking at each potential conflict

manager annually allows for variation in the relationship among the parties, the characteristics of

the conflict, and the prospects for peace across time.

Model Selection and Outcome Variables

Intervention efforts that produce either positive or negative results create an atmosphere

that discourages repeated intervention attempts. Conflict management efforts that fail to produce

any agreements or changes in disputant behavior do little to reward third party efforts and offer

few incentives for future efforts. Successful management efforts, though producing a more

desirable outcome, have the same dampening effect on third party involvement. That is, third

parties that successfully generate a settlement extinguish the demand for conflict management, as

settled conflicts do not require third party intervention.[14] This was the case in President Mobuto

of Congo-Kinshasa's 1966 mediation that resulted in Burundi and Rwanda agreeing to disarm

(his efforts went from November 18, 1966 to March 20, 1967), and in the Kuwaiti mediated

agreement settling a 1992 border dispute between Qatar and Saudi Arabia (which took place

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[12] In the Dixon and Frazier data, 302 of 789 (or 38 percent) third party efforts include state actors.
[13] These are actors who have previously managed any conflict, where management includes a wide range of third
party activities (see Frazier and Dixon 2006a for definitions and coding).
[14] The exception to this is when the third party is charged with helping to uphold the settlement as a sort of third
party guarantor (Fortna 2004a).

October 23, 1992). The likelihood that a third party maintains a continued presence in a conflict

increases when some progress is being made yet not all issues are settled. These circumstances

encourage the third party to remain involved since they now have a stake in the outcome and

have seen some of their efforts come to fruition. Similarly, the disputants are likely to be

receptive to renewed talks, as progress has been made and a relationship with the third party has

been established. The third party has started to build trust and rapport, increasing the likelihood

of additional involvement and its success (Rubin 1992, Bercovitch and Gartner 2006).

The theory highlights the dependence between management onset and third party

commitment. This dependence creates challenges for econometric estimation, since third parties

become less likely to intervene as the time required for generating an agreement increases. When

success is likely, third parties are more willing to become involved (Terris and Maoz 2005).

However, as conflicts become more difficult to resolve and require greater commitment from a

third party, the likelihood of management occurring decreases. This pattern results in truncated

data. Third parties act when they expect to be successful and avoid involvement in more

challenging conflicts. This selection effect should diminish the effect of interests and barriers to

entry on third party commitment, which is observed when running OLS regression.[15] The

Heckman selection model allows for the possibility of correlation in the equations' errors,

thereby allowing us to account for the selection problem. The theory predicts both that ties and

conflict characteristics affect management onset and that ties and prospects for peace affect third

party commitment. That management predictors differ from those of commitment provides an

exclusion restriction necessary to identify the Heckman model.[16] The first stage of the model

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[15] See appendix.

[16] Sartori selection models offer one way of avoiding the inclusionary requirement ((Sartori 2003)). However, there
is no way to cluster across cases, meaning any results employing this modeling technique on cross national time
series data would produce biased results due to autocorrelation.

predicts whether ***Onset*** occurs and a third party takes any action towards resolving the conflict

(coded dichotomously, see Mullenbach and Dixon 2006 for further description),[17] and the

second predicts ***Commitment,*** the number of third party management attempts.[18] While scholars

such as Greig and Regan (2008) model selection in the mediation process, I am interested in the

commitment of third parties to resolving the conflict. I therefore include a variety of third party

activities, ranging from verbal appeals, to mediation and peacekeeping (see Frazier and Dixon

2006). Table 2 summarizes the variables included in the analysis.

<div align="center">***INSERT TABLE 2 HERE***</div>

Explanatory Variables: Measuring Interests and Barriers[19]

The following measures capture third party barriers to entry and interests:

Biased/ Unbiased Alliance Ties: The presence of a formal alliance is the most obvious and

measurable indicator of a cooperative relationship between states, signaling shared interests

between a third party and disputants (Morrow 2000). Since alliances increase salience and

decrease barriers to entry, I expect allies are likely to intervene but not to be committed. I

employ the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions dataset (Leeds et al. 2002) measure. The

variable is coded 1 if the third party has a defensive or offensive alliance with one (biased) or

both (unbiased) disputants and 0 otherwise. No alliance ties is the comparison category.

Biased/ Unbiased Trade Interests: Trade ties increase conflict salience and decrease barriers to

entry as a manager. Just as trade levels affect international conflict by reducing the willingness of

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[17] The appendix includes frequencies of each management type. Due to the large literature focused on explaining mediation, I ran the same model on mediation onset and commitment. The results and a discussion are included in the appendix.

[18] I run the same model on a different measure of commitment, the duration of third party involvement. These results are presented and discussed in the appendix. I have chosen to present predictors of the number of management attempts since committed third parties will likely employ multiple methods until the conflict is resolved.

[19] Out of concern for possible high correlation among the measures of interests, I ran a correlation matrix. While the majority of the measures are between .01 and 5% correlated, *Democratic Ties* and *Alliance Ties* are 23% correlated. While this level of correlation is not concerning, running separate models generates similar results. A correlation matrix is available to reviewers upon request.

both sides to fight (Morrow 1999), trade should increase a third party's incentives to intervene. If a conflict continues, trade interests become less relevant, as any feared effect on them is likely to have already occurred. States with trade interests at stake are therefore likely to intervene but are not likely to be committed. I employ a dichotomized version of Barbieri's international trade data (1996).[20] The variable is coded 1 if the third party has above the mean level of trade with one (biased) or both (unbiased) disputants and 0 otherwise.

Distance: This measures the minimum distance between third party and disputant capitals, according to the Gleditsch and Ward measure (2001).[21]

Explanatory Variables: Measuring Prospects for Peace

I employ the following measures of the prospects for peace:

Previous Third Party Success: Previous third party-generated agreements show that the disputants are willing to work with a third party, which is likely to increase management occurrence. This is a dummy variable based on the TPI (Mullenbach and Dixon 2006) measure of short-term agreement. The variable is coded 1 if there have been successful efforts to manage the conflict in the previous year and 0 otherwise. No previous third party involvement is the comparison category.

Previous Third Party Failure: Similarly, previous management efforts that failed to generate an agreement may still signal a willingness to involve a conflict manager. Having worked with a third party to help resolve the conflict should increase a third party's likelihood of intervening. This is a dummy variable based on the TPI data (Mullenbach and Dixon 2006).

Controls

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[20] This variable is the sum of the value of merchandise that State A or B (a disputant) imports from State C (the third party) plus the value that State C imports from State A or B in millions of current US dollars.
[21] Since I hypothesize proximate states' management decisions are based on the negative externalities of conflict, I also tested an interaction of this variable with the presence of refugees. The interacted measure did not change the results, which are available upon request.

Force Used: Third parties consider their ability to influence disputants before mediating (Regan and Stam 2000, Young 1967, Zartman 2000b). If the conflict has involved the use of force, it both attracts outside attention and signals the need for third party management. This is a dichotomous variable measuring the use of force (Maoz 2005).

Prior Disputes: Since reoccurring conflicts can be especially destabilizing, these conflicts are more likely to gain international attention and involvement. This measure is used to capture the dynamics of relationships that involve recurrent conflict, thereby acknowledging that conflicts are not unrelated episodes. This variable measures the presence of previous disputes between the conflicting parties (Maoz 2005), which I expect to increase management occurrence.

Log of Current Dispute Days: Longer disputes allow third parties more time to manage the conflict with multiple efforts. Previous research shows that mediation is more likely to occur in long conflicts (Greig 2005, Greig and Diehl 2006). I therefore control for the logged number of days that the conflict has been ongoing.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The results from the sample selection model of intervention *Onset* (in column 1) and *Commitment* (in column 2) are presented in Table 2. These empirical results provide substantial support for my arguments that interests, barriers and peace prospects encourage initial intervention efforts while dampening subsequent attempts.

INSERT TABLE 3 HERE

Measures of third party interests and low barriers, which I expect to increase management occurrence and decrease the probability of subsequent attempts, generally perform as expected. Third parties with biased and unbiased alliance ties are significantly more likely to intervene compared to third parties without alliance ties. Alliances encourage intervention onset, which is

in line with findings on conflict management in MIDs (Owsiak and Frazier forthcoming), mediation in civil wars (Greig and Regan 2008) and the role of alliances in conflict expansion (Melin and Koch 2010, Kadera 1998).[22] Alliances provide incentives for outsiders to become involved in a conflict (Smith 1996, Gibler 2000, Morrow 1994). Conditional on intervention occurrence, biased allies are significantly less likely to engage in multiple third party efforts. If a third party intervenes, conflict managers with biased alliance ties are less likely to engage in a multiple efforts than those without alliance ties. Put differently, those that lack alliance ties to disputants are more likely to be committed conflict managers.

While non-disputants with trade interests in the dispute are not significantly more likely to act as a conflict manager, they are less likely to be committed when they do get involved. The lack of relationship between trade interests and management onset is in line with research showing that trade partners use economic sanctions as opposed to diplomatic or verbal techniques (Melin 2011). As this analysis is on neutral management efforts, states with trade ties may prefer other, one-sided intervention techniques. Substantial research shows that trade interests increase the probability of conflict management (Crescenzi et al. 2005) and foreign assistance (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998) and decrease offers to mediate in civil wars (Greig and Regan 2008) but has no impact on US military interventions (Regan 2000).

As expected, greater trade interests decrease a third party's commitment: states with trade interests are less likely to engage in multiple management efforts than those without them. This negative relationship is likely a reflection of elasticity of substitution, as some trade interests are easily replaced or moved, enabling third parties to adjust their trading partners to avoid the negative effects of conflict. Such shifts would thereby reduce a third party's incentives to

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[22] As a robustness check, I included various types of alliances in the analysis. Offensive alliances, non-aggression pacts, and neutrality agreements all had similar relationships with the outcomes variables to those reported.

become involved in multiple management efforts. Going beyond basic trade measures may be necessary before we can fully understand the relationship between trade and management efforts (Crescenzi 2003).

As expected, closer third parties are significantly more likely to manage conflicts, in line with previous findings on the importance of geopolitical interests (Crescenzi et al. 2005, Kathman 2010). The same states, however, have lower levels of commitment. Third parties with strong geographic ties are more likely to intervene but less likely to engage in multiple management attempts. A clear pattern emerges within my results: factors that increase intervention onset decrease third party commitment.

The prospects for peace are also reflective of this pattern of inverse causality. Previous conflict management efforts encourage future efforts, regardless of their outcomes. Disputants with a history of failed third party-generated agreements are more likely to attract third party managers, as are previous successes. Third parties are less likely to remain committed to resolving the conflict when management has previously failed. Management history has an important effect on the outcome of subsequent efforts (Greig 2005, Zubek et al. 1992). Since third parties consider the likely effectiveness of their efforts before getting involved (Bercovitch 2002, Touval and Zartman 2001), only committed third parties intervene when there have not been any previous efforts.[23]

When accounting for interests, barriers to entry and prospects for peace, the controls for costs of conflict offer support for findings that more costly conflicts are more likely to be

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[23] I also explored the role long-term outcomes play in intervention onset and commitment. This measure of outcome evaluates assessment of the primary intervention goal is met a year after the end of the intervention. For example, if a mediation effort was to assist in negotiating a ceasefire and the mediation effort created a ceasefire that has been upheld for at least 12 months, this is considered a successful result. I find that evaluating the long-term outcome of the management effort has no effect on either the onset of intervention or the third party commitment. Results are reported in the appendix.

managed. Third parties are more likely to intervene in a conflict involving force. Similarly, the

control for dispute days is significant. Longer conflicts are more likely to attract third party

efforts. These results echo existing findings on costs and mediation (Regan and Stam 2000,

Young 1967, Zartman 2000b) and ongoing militarized disputes (Greig 2005). I also find that

third parties are more likely to manage a case with prior conflicts, although this result is not

significant. That prior disputes have no significant effect on management occurrence may also

reflect that the variable does not account for the large variation in the number of casualties across

conflicts.[24] The measure of previous conflicts may also capture enduring rivalries; however, a

history of violent conflict is shown to increase the probability of mediation (Greig 2005).[25]

The model also provides evidence that selection exerts both strong statistical effects (rho

is significant, confirming the need for a censored modeling approach) and important substantive

effects. Controlling for selection reveals the influence of key factors on third party commitment.

Alliance ties, proximity, previous conflict management and agreement failures all encourage

management onset, whereas third parties tied to the dispute through trade interests, alliances or

geographic location are unlikely to remain working with the disputants. This findings speaks to

recent work showing that the incentives to resolve a conflict are different from the incentives to

become involved as a mediator (Beber 2012, Beardsley 2011).

This research offers insights into the causes of intervention occurrence and the role these

causes have on third party commitment to conflict resolution. While conflict management is a

popular avenue of exploration, third party commitment to conflict resolution is largely ignored. I

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[24] I would ideally control for the number of casualties that have occurred when the third party considers intervention, an appropriate ex-ante measure is not available at this time. Available casualty measures capture conflict totals, an ex-post measure of information unavailable to would-be interveners.

[25] As a possible alternative hypothesis, I considered the possibility of a "Somalia effect," whereby a manager might be driven away by fatalities. While robustness checks reveal a negative correlation between third party fatalities and multiple management attempts, the correlation is insignificant.

find that several of the characteristics known to increase the probability of intervention also attract committed third parties. When the prospects for peace are high, third parties are more likely to act towards resolving the conflict. The findings concur with and extend previous research on whether third parties get the "easy" or "difficult" cases (Terris and Maoz 2005, Gartner and Bercovitch 2006). Third parties are also both more likely to act and to remain involved as a manager when the management facility is high, which is in line with findings that the nature of the management effort influences its outcome (Frazier and Dixon 2006a, Regan 1996). Finally, costlier conflicts are more likely to attract third party management, as has been found in previous mediation research (Terris and Maoz 2005).

The circumstances that encourage intervention occurrence do not lead to committed third parties, however. When a third party faces high barriers to entry, they are less likely to act as a conflict manager; states that overcome such impediments are more committed. The role of alliances, trade ties, and geographic proximity are examined in terms of effects on mediation outcomes (Rauchhaus 2006, Princen 1995, Kydd 2007, Walter 2002), but the effects on third party involvement and multiple efforts has remained largely overlooked.[26] As most studies of conflict management focus on the characteristics of the conflict, the disputants, and the management effort, the literature has ignored a significant portion of the conflict management puzzle.

CONCLUSION

The conflict management process is more complex than the simple examination of outcomes or involvement captures. Rather, conflict management represents a multifaceted process involving a third party's selection and implementation of a policy and a reevaluation of

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[26] For a study that addresses the role of this relationship in the intrastate conflicts, see Greig and Regan (2008). Melin and Svensson (2009) examine how this relationship impacts mediation occurrence in intrastate wars compared to interstate ones.

that policy. Furthermore, third parties often engage in repeat efforts to resolve a conflict. I focus not only on initial intervention, but also on the process that occurs after the onset of management. While these decisions are not independent of the difficulty of resolving the conflict (Gartner and Bercovitch 2006), they also result from third party interests, barriers to entry, and prospects for peace.

One of the most significant and original contributions of this work is to evaluate third party commitment. Third parties waging half-hearted efforts in response to calls for action do not represent true conflict resolution efforts and are unlikely to generate lasting agreements. However, the literature examining the occurrence of management includes these limited efforts by lumping them with those of committed third parties. A unified model of management onset and commitment recognizes the inverse role that bias and management history play in this process.

I argue that a third party's involvement and commitment is a product of interests, barriers to entry, and prospects for peace. While third parties that face lower barriers to entry are more likely to intervene, they are unlikely to be committed to conflict resolution. Initial action is relatively easy for those with low barriers to entry, and action does not require significant third party sacrifice. States that manage a conflict despite significant barriers, however, are revealing information about their commitment to conflict resolution.

The theoretical arguments and empirical findings presented here suggest the time has come to move beyond the role bias plays in conflict management. Biased and unbiased states have similar patterns in terms of third party involvement and commitment. Those states without direct ties to the disputants, however, have significantly different patterns of management. Ties may encourage states to initially become involved, but states without ties are more likely to take

on the burden of multiple management efforts. I also demonstrate that while many of the characteristics that help us understand the occurrence of conflict management give us information about the third party's commitment to resolution, the effects are not straightforward. The fact that third parties with high entry costs still intervene signals a salient dispute and reveals a high commitment to resolving the conflict. This explains the observation that conflict management is correlated with short-lived agreements. While partially the result of third parties getting difficult cases (Gartner and Bercovitch 2006), many third parties engage in cheap talk, making a one-time effort to resolve the conflict and quickly withdrawing should that effort fail. Conversely, high barriers to third party entry may mean some conflicts gain the attention of third parties who are committed to resolving the conflict while others do not. These findings suggest future research should focus on identifying when and why each particular causal relationship prevails. The work presented here is a first step; more research is needed. Commitment is a difficult concept to capture both theoretically and empirically. While this research represents one attempt to do so, our knowledge of third party intentions will certainly be furthered with additional conceptualizations and measures. Another interesting avenue for further research would explore variation in commitment across third party actors (do non-state actors have different levels of commitment than state managers?) and in the context of intrastate conflict (Are third parties more or less committed in cases of civil war?). Additionally, future scholarship should explore the role third party commitment has on management outcomes. An understanding of this process has important policy implications and improves our knowledge of "best practices." While the conflict management process is extremely complex, addressing these issues increases our understanding of a topic of great consequence.

Table 1. Number of Interventions in Same MID by Same Third Party

Number of Intervention	Number of Third parties of this Type*	Relative Frequency
1	165	48.25
2	40	11.70
3	27	7.89
4	13	3.80
5	12	3.51
6	12	3.51
7	7	2.05
8	8	2.34
9	13	3.80
10	4	1.17
11	5	1.46
12	11	3.22
13	2	.58
14	2	.58
16	2	.58
17	2	.58
18	2	.58
20	2	.58
23	2	.58
24	2	.58
25	1	.29
26	1	.29
28	2	.58
29	1	.29
31	1	.29
33	1	.29
39	1	.29

*Total = 342.

Table 2. Variables Used in Analysis

Variable	Mode	Mean	Standard Deviation

(Selection) Onset
   0) No Intervention
   1) Intervention
	0	.015	.121

(Outcome) Commitment 1-39 Intervention Efforts	1	.018	.482
Interests & Barriers			

(IV1) Biased Alliance Ties
   0) No or Unbiased Alliance Ties
   1) Defensive or Offensive Alliance to One
     Disputant
	0	.136	.343

(IV2)Unbiased Alliance Ties
   0) No or Biased Alliance Ties
   1) Defensive or Offensive Alliance Ties to Both
     Disputants
	0	.006	.074

(IV3) Biased Trade Ties
   0) No or Unbiased Trade
   1) Above Mean Trade Ties to One Disputant
	0	.049	.112

(IV4) Unbiased Trade Ties
   0) No or Biased Trade
   1) Above Mean Trade Ties to Both Disputants
	0	.013	.111

(IV6) Distance 0-11860 miles	439	3207.721	2191.217
Prospects for Peace			

(IV5) Previous Third Party Success
   0) No Previous Third Party Agreement or No
     Previous Involvement
   1) Previous Third Party Agreement
	0	.002	.049

(IV6) Previous Third Party Failure
   0) No Previous Third Party Failure or No
     Previous Involvement
   1) Previous Third Party Involvement without
     Agreement
	0	.007	.082

Controls			

Force Used
   0) No Use of Force
   1) Use of Force
	0	.003	.057

Prior Disputes
   0) No Prior MID between Disputants
   1) Prior MID between Disputants
	0	.811	.391

Log of Current Dispute Days 7.09-9.69 days	7.367	7.53	.317

As a test of multicollinearity, I checked for correlation among the explanatory variables. The highest level of correlation was between those states with biased and unbiased alliance ties. At .18, multicollinearity was not a cause for concern.

Table 3. Sample Selection Model of Intervention and Commitment in Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1946-2001+

	Y1: Onset	Y2: Commitment
Interests & Barriers		
Biased Alliance Ties	0.3075***	-0.7526***
	(0.0746)	(0.2188)
Unbiased Alliance Ties	0.3099*	-0.0955
	(0.1646)	(0.6471)
Biased Trade Ties	0.0808	-0.5028**
	(0.0866)	(0.2197)
Unbiased Trade Ties	0.0964	-0.6576**
	(0.1535)	(0.3321)
Distance	-0.0001***	0.0002***
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Prospects for Peace		
Previous Third Party Success	1.1920***	1.5144
	(0.2319)	(1.3139)
Previous Third Party Failure	0.8887***	-1.3159**
	(0.1955)	(0.5155)
Controls		
Force Used	1.7990***	
	(0.1476)	
Prior Disputes	0.0645	
	(0.0672)	
Log of Current Dispute Days	0.2338***	
	(0.0841)	
Constant	-3.9034***	4.5871***
	(0.6356)	(1.0493)
N (observations)	81349	
N (censored)	80142	
N (uncensored)	1207	
Rho	-0.9013***	
	(0.1698)	

+ Heckman selection model clustered by dispute. Standard error in parentheses; significance tests are one tailed,*p≤.1 **p≤.05; ***p≤.01 No Alliance, No Trade Ties, and No Previous Third Party Involvement are the comparison categories.

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Appendix

Separate Models of Intervention Onset and Commitment

Interests & Barriers	Logit Model of Onset	OLS Regression of Commitment
Biased Alliance Ties	0.7375***	-0.9569**
	(0.1826)	(0.4231)
Unbiased Alliance Ties	0.4937	1.2283
	(0.3628)	(0.7903)
Biased Trade Ties	0.1677	-1.2030***
	(0.2155)	(0.4071)
Unbiased Trade Ties	0.3539	0.2100
	(0.3397)	(1.4520)
Distance	-0.0002***	0.0001
	(0.0000)	(0.0001)
Prospects for Peace		
Previous Third Party Success	2.0506***	3.3390**
	(0.3542)	(1.3867)
Previous Third Party Failure	1.8668***	0.3292
	(0.3888)	(0.5739)
Controls		
Force Used	3.1086***	
	(0.1696)	
Prior Disputes	0.1709	
	(0.1912)	
Log of Current Dispute Days	0.6028***	
	(0.2068)	
Constant	-8.6055***	1.2881***
	(1.5912)	(0.2885)
N	81304	1189

Clustered by dispute; standard error in parentheses; significance tests are one tailed,*p≤.1 **p≤.05; ***p≤.01; No Alliance, No Trade Ties, and No Previous Third Party Involvement are the comparison categories.

Variation in Third Party Conflict Management Activities, 1945-2001

Intervention Method	Number of Interventions of this Type*	Relative Frequency
Ceasefire Appeal or Demand	49	14.33
Negotiations Appeal or Demand	68	19.88
Troop withdrawal Appeal or Demand	8	2.34
Offer to Facilitate Negotiations	12	3.51
Offer to Facilitate Negotiations	35	10.23
Offer to Mediate Negotiations	12	3.51
Good Offices	33	9.65
Mediation	97	28.36
Conciliation	2	.58
Arbitration	2	.58
Humanitarian Assistance	17	4.97
Boundary Delimitation/ Demarcation	1	.29
Repatriation Assistance	2	.58
Military Observation	3	.88
Preventative Peacekeeping	1	.29

*Total = 342.

Sample Selection Model of *Mediation* Onset and Commitment in Militarized Interstate Disputes

	Y1: Onset	Y2: Commitment
Interests & Barriers		
Biased Alliance Ties	0.3023***	-0.4823**
	(0.0839)	(0.1915)
Unbiased Alliance Ties	0.1429	0.7356
	(0.1726)	(1.3294)
Biased Trade Ties	0.1651*	-0.5886**
	(0.0987)	(0.2408)
Unbiased Trade Ties	0.1930	0.4836
	(0.1290)	(1.2992)
Distance	-0.0001***	0.0001
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Prospects for Peace		
Previous Third Party Success	1.1248***	1.3854
	(0.2089)	(1.2959)
Previous Third Party Failure	0.9553***	-0.8351**
	(0.2075)	(0.3391)
Controls		
Force Used	1.6257***	
	(0.1313)	
Prior Disputes	0.1648	
	(0.1020)	
Log of Current Dispute Days	0.2399**	
	(0.0946)	
Constant	-4.0283***	1.8606**
	(0.7543)	(0.7308)
N (observations)	63053	
N (censored)	62085	
N (uncensored)	968	
Rho	-0.2547***	
	(0.0936)	

+ Heckman selection model clustered by dispute. Standard error in parentheses; significance tests are one tailed,*$p \leq .1$ **$p \leq .05$; ***$p \leq .01$ No Alliance, No Trade Ties, and No Previous Third Party Involvement are the comparison categories. Onset codes the offer or occurrence of mediation, as coded by the Third Party Intermediary data (Frazier and Dixon 2006). Duration is a count of mediation occurrences.

The above model reveals limited changes from estimating onset and commitment in intervention broadly defined. Biased alliances ties and distance are no longer significant in the outcome model, and previous failures discourage future efforts. More importantly, however, the variables shown to encourage mediation occurrence continue to deter future efforts. This finding is support both with correlations and the negative and significant rho.

Alternate Measure of Commitment: Duration

	Y1: Onset	Y2: Duration
Interests & Barriers		
Biased Alliance Ties	-0.2082	-36.8816**
	(0.1446)	(17.6012)
Unbiased Alliance Ties	0.5165	-0.3593
	(0.3415)	(13.7542)
Biased Trade Ties	0.2207	-40.8189**
	(0.1999)	(18.2702)
Unbiased Trade Ties	0.4475*	-43.0287
	(0.2407)	(26.7639)
Distance	0.0000	0.0052
	(0.0000)	(0.0075)
Prospects for Peace		
Previous Third Party Success	1.9151***	3.9147
	(0.2044)	(27.5698)
Previous Third Party Failure	1.3390***	-13.7147
	(0.3160)	(17.1964)
Controls		
Force Used	9.2674***	
	(0.1295)	
Prior Disputes	0.3932**	
	(0.1972)	
Log of Current Dispute Days	-0.1062	
	(0.1929)	
Constant	-2.8318*	23.0137
	(1.4814)	(16.0224)
N (observations)		81349
N (censored)		81040
N (uncensored)		309
Rho		0.0876**
		(0.0370)

 + Heckman selection model clustered by dispute. Standard error in parentheses; significance tests
are one tailed,*$p \leq .1$ **$p \leq .05$; ***$p \leq .01$ No Alliance, No Trade Ties, and No Previous Third Party Involvement are
the comparison categories. Duration outcome variable measure the number of days a third party attempt lasts,
ranging from 1 to 2112 days.

The above model offers an alternative measure of third party commitment. While the results are
not as strong, many of the patterns hold. Alliance ties are no longer significant predictors on
management onset, but biased third parties with biased ties are still significantly less likely to be
committed. Unbiased trade ties now encourage third party involvement, and unbiased trade ties
remain significantly and negatively related to management duration. Third party previous
failures are not correlated to management duration. Rho remains significant, so we can reject the
null hypothesis that that management occurrence and duration are independent. This outcome
variable is correlated to the one used in the paper (*Commitment)* at .13.

Long Term Outcome of Previous Efforts

	Y1: Onset	Y2: Commitment
Interests & Barriers		
Biased Alliance Ties	0.3005***	-0.8371***
	(0.0727)	(0.2278)
Unbiased Alliance Ties	0.2451	0.3442
	(0.1662)	(0.6531)
Biased Trade Ties	0.0794	-0.4036*
	(0.0884)	(0.2262)
Unbiased Trade Ties	0.1547	-0.0680
	(0.1368)	(0.5206)
Distance	-0.0001***	0.0002***
	(0.0000)	(0.0001)
Prospects for Peace		
Previous Intervention Success	0.4687	-0.7706
	(0.6682)	(1.8125)
Controls		
Force Used	2.1084***	
	(0.1190)	
Prior Disputes	0.0528	
	(0.0606)	
Log of Current Dispute Days	0.3022***	
	(0.0695)	
Constant	-4.3859***	4.9641***
	(0.5262)	(1.1017)
N (observations)	81349	
N (censored)	80147	
N (uncensored)	1202	
Rho	-0.9792***	
	(0.1689)	