9-1-2005

Understanding Post-independence Visions of Economic Prosperity in Algeria through the Mirror of the Second Napoleonic Empire

Kay Adamson

Glasgow Caledonian University

Recommended Citation

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Quinlan School of Business at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economies by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.

© 2005 the authors
Understanding post-independence visions of economic prosperity in Algeria through the mirror of the Second Napoleonic Empire.*

Kay Adamson
k.adamson@gcal.ac.uk
Glasgow Caledonian University, UK

JEL Classifications:  F2, B3, B4
Key Words: Saint-Simonians, Economic Policy – past and present, Algeria

Abstract
This paper explores how a study of economic policy-making in Algeria during the period of the Second Napoleonic Empire helps to provide an understanding of economic policy choices post-independence in 1962. In particular, it shows that the separation between the private and the public sector of the economy was always unclear, and that this essentially ambivalent character reflected a post-1789 search by the French state for a variety of means to create a dynamic modern capitalist economy.

Introduction
The following discussion is motivated by the question – why was it that the political independence of Algeria in 1962 did not bring about the degree of social and economic emancipation that contemporary activists as well as its observers had assumed would accompany political independence? It is therefore concerned with two moments of Algerian history. The first of these moments is that period in the mid-19th-century, more or less delimited by the Second Napoleonic Empire, when the economic infrastructure of modern industrial France was largely put in place, and the different ways in which that process impacted on Algeria. The second of these moments, that is continuously present but only discussed in fragments, begins with independence from France in 1962. This is concerned with the vision held by the protagonists for post-independence economic prosperity that then influenced the nature and character of both the subsequent economic and political regimes. Although, this is at one level, an argument about the effectiveness of post-independence economic policy-making; it is also an exploration of the various ways in which the multiple interactions between ex-colonial powers and their ex-colonies create economic and political structures that reflect this. Consequently, the core of the discussion concerns economic development in Algeria and France during the Second Napoleonic Empire.

The idea that contemporary economic and political structures have to be read within a framework of ideas that predate present realities can be illustrated by the roles played by the Saint-Simonians and Saint-Simonian ideas in both 19th-century France and 19th-century Algeria. The choice of Saint-Simonism is not accidental because the figure who was its inspiration, Claude-Henri Saint-Simon [1] was an influential economic and social thinker of the French revolution and post-revolutionary period who took the view that the French Revolution had proceeded at such a hectic pace on the political front that the economy had been left behind. Moreover, Saint-Simon’s vision of the economic future of France was one
where investment should be concentrated in manufacturing and industry, and it would follow the example set by England, which he considered to be the route to future French prosperity. As a result, he saw the most pressing task of the post-1789 Revolution to be to construct an economic framework that would be capable of sustaining the political one it had already created. The tension that Saint-Simon was writing about, in the first quarter of the 19th century, is not only observable in 19th-century France but is one that is equally applicable to post-1962 Algeria. It also can account for the absence of consensus in the making of economic policy in Algeria leading to an oscillation in policy-direction between an emphasis on agriculture and an emphasis on industrial development. One final factor, although it is not discussed in any detail here, is the personalized nature of power and politics in France, and how such personalized power has influenced the politics of economic decision-making processes both in France and in Algeria [2].

Saint-Simon’s observation that there was an imbalance between political revolution and economic transformation in post-1789 France is also a useful means of understanding the post-independence states. This is not because any one thought that independence from the colonial power would bring about instant economic growth, nevertheless it was thought that without political independence, economic prosperity for colonial peoples was impossible, a view that had obtained international recognition through the establishment of a series of international agencies, and more particularly the United Nations. It was the UN’s 1948 declaration that set the context within which colonial independence could be sought and legitimated. However, although independence may have brought different parties together to achieve a unified political goal, it did not guarantee that these parties would agree on either the political framework or what might constitute the economic road to prosperity afterwards. Post-1789 governments in France had shown how difficult it was to establish a political and economic regime that was stable; the post-1917 Soviet state would illustrate how difficult it was to achieve economic growth without losing political freedoms. The impact of World War II on the European colonial empires not only favoured their demise but also led towards the choice of a path to prosperity that can be broadly defined as anti-capitalist. Such a choice was seen to provide the means for the restitution to the people of the losses they had sustained during colonization. In Algeria, this translated into the state control of all major economic activity, and yet central to the design of this project were people and ideas from the ex-colonial power. Even so, the critique of both and its practice was largely formulated on the basis of it as a re-enactment of the Soviet experiment (Raffinot/ Jacquemot 1977) whereas the the roots of the thinking of one of its main architects - François Perroux, can be traced back to the Saint-Simonian ideas of the early 19th – century (Ionescu, 1976), and the principles for the organization of economic activity in state companies ‘fits’ comfortably within the parameters of the ‘société commanditaire de l’industrie’ that they had proposed in the 1820s.

It is a curious fact of the 19th-century that while industrial capitalism slowly began to become the dominant mode of economic organization, as it did so, alternative economic and political models flourished. Furthermore, it is a characteristic of these models that they often shared the same ideological roots as the practices to which they were opposed. This might mean, as in the case of the Saint-Simonians, support for the colonial project in Algeria, seeing in it the prospect of a new world of infinite opportunity, but also advocacy of the formation of alternative communities such as that led by Enfantin at Ménilmontant [3]. What those communities represented then as much as they do now, were attempts to find new and authentic ways to realize the new society that the revolution promised. Such imaginings were also fuelled by a fascination with 19th-century America because to its outside observers, it seemed that it had found a way to combine revolution with economic growth. The best known
of the French observers and visitors to explore the lessons that post-1776 America could offer post-1789 France, was Alexis de Tocqueville who travelled to America in 1831. He would later carry out a similar fact-finding mission to Algeria in 1841, that would be published as *Travail sur l’Algérie* [4]. Another visitor was Michel Chevalier whose visit to America in 1833-4 was made explicitly for the purpose of seeing what economic lessons could be drawn from the American experience and therefore implemented not only on mainland France, but also in colonial Algeria. In other words, Algeria has to be seen as integral to the evolution of thinking on both the economic and the political modernization of 19th-century France. What it was believed that she offered to France’s economic development, and in particular its transformation into a modern industrial state, was the virgin territory that had served so well the economic and political ambitions of the early American settlers.

It is because of the difficulties that the post-independence Algerian state has experienced at the economic level, and which have been replicated at the political and social levels that the approach chosen poses the questions through the mechanism of an examination of 19th-century colonization. It is almost self-evident that the difficulties post-independence Algeria has faced, reflect the pull of forces at the political level where solutions to economic problems often have to be designed to satisfy popular demands whether at the political or the social level, but which have nevertheless deleterious economic consequences. Examples were the state nationalisation measures and the land redistributive policies even if the latter seemed a rational response to the mass departure of the European colons who had been its owners [5]. However, the importance of land to post-independence political and economic policy-making, was because it also possessed an ideological importance that derived from the beginning of the disembarkation of the French army in 1830 through the various changes of government in the 19th-century and into the 20th-century. As a result, just as land had lain at the heart of colonial government’s strategies for transforming Algeria into France’s America; even if for most of the early period of colonization, the colonial government found it very difficult to persuade Frenchmen and women to migrate as agricultural workers to Algeria, so it lay at the heart of post-independence Algeria’s ideology of restitution.

However, the distance between capitalism and socialism depends in many ways on what it is one understands capitalism to be. Two recent writers approach this question from different perspectives: Ellen Meiksins Wood (2002) and Liah Greenfield (2001). Wood’s discussion of the ‘origin of capitalism’ aims to show that there are a number of alternative ways to organize an economy that do not amount to capitalism, that is, an economy where the market is not the principal driving force but simply an opportunity that may be taken advantage of, even if her analysis indicates why it has become increasingly difficult for an economy to operate otherwise. Greenfield shows that in 18th- and 19th-century France, capitalism was viewed ambivalently, and that this ambivalence has persisted, epitomized by the continuing pejorative use of the word ‘capitalist’. Both Greenfield’s and Wood’s studies of what is capitalism, also provide a way of understanding why economic policy in colonial and post-independence Algeria has oscillated between the favouring of agriculture (colonial period: Bugeaud; post-independence: Boumediene’s 1974 Agricultural Reform Programme, Bouteflika’s 2004 injection of cash into agriculture); and a more Saint-Simonian style industrial economy (colonial period: Napoleon III; post-colonial: the adoption of state companies).

Consequently, despite their different positions on the outcome of these developments, both Wood and Greenfield, although they point to the fact that economies do not in practice operate in precisely the same ways as other factors mediate the final economic forms, nevertheless end up arguing that once capitalism has established its hold somewhere, its own
logic means that all must follow. The aim in this discussion has not been as such to contest this as a possibility but it has sought to pose it as a question where how one reads the particular play of forces in 19th-century France makes a difference to how one understands the relationship between economy, politics, ideas and institutional structures through which these were expressed and therefore how they affected Algeria. It is for this reason it is being argued that a useful methodological framework for a critique of this project can be found in the writings of Walter Benjamin who pointed out that:

‘as soon as it becomes the signature for the course of history in its totality, the concept of progress is associated with an uncritical hypostatization rather than with a critical placing into question.’ (Benjamin 1983-4: 27, N13, 1)

Benjamin attributed this tendency, in part to the influence of ‘the doctrine of natural selection’, a ‘doctrine’ which in a number of ways as Lorcin (1995) has argued, was a key element in the manner in which Algeria’s population was described and categorised. The idea of progress then, is based on an assumption that there exists a certain distance between the different parties. The argument that this paper makes is that in terms of the Algerian experience, this distance was not a certainty. It was rather made up of fragmented parts that came together in particular combinations, that reflected constant changes in the relationship between the colony and the metropole. Inspired by Benjamin’s methodological concerns, and his study of nineteenth-century Paris, this paper explores how these developments influenced the unfolding of the French colonial project in Algeria.

The Colonial Economy in Algeria from 1840 to 1870

Having suggested that lessons can be drawn about post-1962 Algeria from what took place during the Second Napoleonic Empire, this section explores in more detail how those developments touched Algeria beginning with Prosper Enfantin who was a member of the 1840-42 Scientific Commission on Algeria. Enfantin’s description of Algeria was of a country without towns, and therefore a place where the construction of the great cities that are associated with economic life there today, that is Algiers, Oran, Bône (Annaba), Sidi-Bel-Abbès, Philippeville (Skikda) were only achieved by a French colonial presence. The significance of this view was that it meant that from the beginning of the colonial period, the city was constructed as a European space. The dynamic character of life in the city, about which Enfantin was ambivalent but which was recognised by Blanqui (1840) was to be experienced only by the new European migrants. However, despite its dynamic character, there was also a darker side, namely Governor-General Bugeaud’s expulsions of Muslim Algerians from the cities as it created a vacuum that opened up the city to property speculators who made money, acquiring and selling properties to the new European migrants (Blanqui, 1840 : 27-28, 35). In the long term, it was another means for maintaining the city as primarily a place for Europeans. If the city was constructed as European space, the colonial economy was also built on the idea, reflecting both the understanding of and the accompanying desire to pursue US-style growth, that Algeria was a place of vast empty spaces that could be occupied preferably by French settlers but if not, by other European migrants.

Enfantin provided the initial source of inspiration for the Saint-Simonians in Algeria, and he would always retain his interest in the affairs of the colony. However, it was other Saint-Simonians who played important roles in colonial development in Algeria not least because
several members of the 1840-42 Scientific Commission to Algeria were Saint-Simonians resident in Algeria. However, perhaps the most important, was Henri Fournel, as he was head of Mining Services in Algeria from 1842 to 1848. This made him instrumental in both the organization of, and the carrying out of the geological and mineralogical exploration of Algeria. The result of his work would be the publication between 1850 and 1854 of a two volume study plus an atlas entitled *Richesse minérale de l’Algérie* which then became the standard work of reference for potential investors such as Paulin Talabot (Emerit, 1941: 182). After his return to France, Enfantin inspired several Algerian projects, such as founding the journal *L’Algérie, courrier d’Afrique, d’Orient et de la Méditerranée* in 1844. It involved Enfantin, Carette, Warnier and Louis Jourdan, and was intended to be a weapon in the campaign against Bugeaud’s policies, with their emphasis both on the use of military power and on the development of local military autonomy (Emerit, 1941: 127-35). The project is also interesting because the original idea was to publish a journal in Arabic which would be addressed to Algeria’s Muslim population and which would act as a quasi-government organ, the aim being that it would ‘teach the Algerians about the laws, manners and industry of Europe’ (Emerit, 1941 : 128)[6].

A more significant long-term project was the joint foundation with Jules Talabot, Warnier and Carette in 1845, of an association to exploit Algeria’s forests. The associates made two applications to Marshal Soult, the Minister of War, for permission to have a forty-eight year option on some 9 million hectares of forest in the basin formed by the lakes of El Malah, Oubeira and Touja in Eastern Algeria; and then later in the year, one of seven to eight thousand hectares in the area around Bou-Merzoug, again in Eastern Algeria. In addition, Enfantin made an individual application for a concession around Beni-Saleh and Keseuria in the province of Constantine (D’Allemagne, 1935 : 136-8). However, it was two years before the Ministry of War responded negatively, stating that the situation in Algeria was insufficiently secure to allow for this kind of enterprise. Whilst direct exploitation of the forests was ruled out, nevertheless the application in Algeria of the 1827 Forest Code that had originally been set up to provide for the re-growth of French forests after the 1789 Revolution, involved the continual enclosure of forests and the exclusion of native Algerians. It meant that the French state became the primary owner of the forests, not only excluding native Algerians in the same way as any private owner but also illustrating a tendency to elide distinctions between the private and the public. In 1849, Enfantin founded the Société générale de colonisation de l’Algérie. It was liquidated one year later because of a lack of funds, nevertheless, the idea of a general company with its hint of the ‘société commanditaire’ of the early days of Saint-Simonism, and whose purpose was the planning, organizing, financing and executing of a development programme, was significant enough to be picked up later by Paulin Talabot and to lay the foundations of the idea that the way ahead lay in state solutions to economic problems. Ultimately, it was the involvement of the Talabot brothers in Algeria that had the most significant as they undertook the same kind of entrepreneurial role there as they did in France. Their involvement began with Jules Talabot’s acquisition of the iron ore concession at Mokta el-Hadid, as it became the foundation stone of the Talabot industrial and financial empire in Algeria economy, while also helping to finance activities in France. Under the Empire, the Talabot brothers proceeded with a progressive concentration of most of the permits in the region around Bône at Mokta el-Hadid (Gille, 1970 : 236). However, their capacity to fully exploit their concessions was limited until the discovery and commercialization of the Bessemer process [7] which after 1860 made it possible to use Algerian iron ore in their furnaces in France (Gille, 1970 : 236).
In addition to the Compagnie des Mines de Mokta-el-Hadid (Mining Company of Mokta el-Hadid), finally established in 1865, the more significant of the companies created by the Talabot brothers in Algeria during the Second Empire, were the ‘Société de transports maritimes à vapeur’, also created in 1865, and the ‘Société générale des chemins de fer d’Algérie’ which was created in 1862 and which took over, at the request of Napoleon III, the work of an earlier railway building company (Gille, 1970 : 203-4; Rey-Goldzieguer, 1991 : 453). The centrality of Algeria to Talabot’s business empire is clearly demonstrated with the foundation of the bank, ‘Société générale’ and its Algerian counterpart, the ‘Société générale algérienne’ in 1866. The aim was to provide Algeria with a 100 million francs of credit in six years. Talabot also thought that his ‘Société générale algérienne’ would provide the essential economic tools for the colony’s economic development (Gille, 1970 : 236). It was also very much a Saint-Simonian project reflecting as it did a common heritage with Enfantin’s failed ‘Société générale de colonisation de l’Algérie’. Talabot’s proposals and his industrial activities in Algeria were supported by the Emperor who also held the view that it was only through the development of economic institutions such as these that it would be possible to create a modern industrial economy for France. This viewpoint gained favour between 1859 and 1860 when Chasseloup-Laubat was Minister. As a result the Emperor would give material support to Talabot’s activities by providing Société générale algérienne with a subvention of 100 million francs which was used by Talabot to fund the construction of the furnaces at Alelik, near Bône (Rey-Goldzieguer, 1991 : 456). Thus once again, private capital initiatives were being supported by the state.

Talabot’s activities in Algeria were also aided by his Saint-Simonian connections and in particular, Henri Fournel who had drawn up the geological map of Algeria and who retained numerous contacts amongst the colonial administration, for example, Carette, now Prefect in the Constantine region. As a result, Talabot and his brothers had access to the best information on mineral resources in Algeria. Following a visit to Algeria in March 1867 with by Louis Frémy, governor of Crédit foncier of France, Talabot was able to commence the construction of the roads between Oran and Algiers and between Algiers and Constantine; as well as improve facilities at the ports of Algiers, Oran and Philippeville (Emerit, 1941 : 310). However, whilst their infrastructural activities were successful, Talabot’s banking operations experienced various setbacks primarily due to a series of natural disasters in the period 1866-67. They included a plague of locusts, an earthquake, a cholera epidemic, drought and subsequent famine. The effect of these disasters was that ‘Société générale’ found itself not only having to provide loans to the colons but also to advance money to the tribal ‘douars’ (Emerit, 1941 : 310-11). The overall weaknesses in the banking and financial system meant that ‘Société générale algérienne’ became overextended. It was also never quite able to shake off the losses that were incurred as a result of the 1866-67 disasters so that further financial difficulties in 1877, resulted in Government intervention to provide support and it was transformed into the ‘Compagnie algérienne’ (Emerit, 1941 : 312). Nevertheless, it did not become a public institution, instead it remained within the labyrinth of the Talabot group of companies’ holdings.

If Talabot represented Saint-Simonian industrial capital in Algeria, other Saint-Simonians would continue to look to Algeria for opportunities to fulfil their dream of a new society. One such individual was Emile Barrault who had been one of the party of Saint-Simonians who had travelled with Enfantin, to Egypt in 1833, and who in 1835, had published Occident et Orient (Charléty, 1965 : 199). In 1848, he would head a convoy of approximately 800 people for a colonizing project near Blidah. The project can be seen as a response to the ideas and proposals which Pierre Leroux (himself a former Saint-Simonian) and others were putting to
the Assembly, as a means by which to deal with unemployment in metropolitan France. These involved various work creating projects, of which the most famous were the National Workshops [8]. Consequently, unemployed factory workers were offered the equivalent of a house, land and tools if they chose to go to Algeria, in this instance under the overall charge of Barrault. There were some forty-two centres created in Algeria at this time aimed at welcoming potential French emigrants. Although the actual size of his project was vague and Enfantin was unenthusiastic, Barrault went ahead, writing to Arlès-Dufour that ‘In my view, Algeria is the promised land of the chosen people, that is the socialist people’ [9]. Once in Algeria, Barrault visited a number of Saint-Simonian sympathisers including Warnier, with whom he bought a property in the area of Algiers for 1500 francs. Barrault, and his brother Alexis, would subsequently make the other proposals for Algeria’s economic development. For example, in 1853, they proposed the creation of cotton plantation company, and in 1855, an agricultural credit bank. This has echoes of Enfantin’s own unsuccessful General company for the colonization of Algeria and Talabot’s later successful General Company. However, neither of these projects were realized as neither the Barrault brothers nor Warnier had the necessary capital.

The first steps to systematically encourage emigration to Algeria were begun, as Barrault’s project indicates, during the brief period of the Second Republic. In an attempt to resolve the problems of unemployment at home, the Assembly voted a sum to assist the urban poor to emigrate. Behind this policy lay Leroux’s vision that France could build a socialist society in Algeria through the migration of her citizens but it was also premised on that idea that the colony was one large empty space. Paradoxically again, Leroux, who was opposed to the military presence in Algeria was acting as the advocate of a scheme which would result in the displacement and dispossession of native Algerians. Furthermore, the desire of the Deputies of the new republic to solve their unemployment problem, did not necessarily mean that they shared the same vision of what kind of regime the colony should have nor that what vision they did have, was in the best interests of all the colony’s inhabitants. What the new Republic did do was to vote in September 1848, a sum of five million francs to provide assistance in the acquisition of land in Algeria to 12,000 potential colons on concessions of 2 to 12 hectares. A list was set up for potential migrants to register and some 80,469 people registered their interest but of this number no more than 10,000 would finally make their way to Algeria where they would find conditions much harsher than they imagined (Rey-Goldzeiguer, 1991 : 416).

However, if the Second French Republic had been interested in Algeria as a destination to which could be sent their urban poor; the Second Empire was generally hostile to the ‘small’ colonization of the “yellow gloves” and particularly under Chasseloup-Laubat, it would favour what was termed ‘major colonization by private companies with financial means and technology’ (Spillman, 1975 : 22-3)[10]. Amongst the beneficiaries of Chasseloup-Laubat’s policy would be the Compagnie Genevoise and Société Générale in the Constantine area, the Société des Lièges of the Hamacha in the North Constantine area and the Société de l’Habra et de la Macuta in the Oran area. This kind of large-scale colonization characterized the Second Empire. For example, in 1853, the ‘Société genevoise’ of Setif acquired 20,000 hectares in the Setif area, and it would subsequently ask the Empire for some 900,000 hectares in order to settle 150,000 Swiss and German migrants. However, despite their ambitious plans, they would only acquire 50,000 hectares and only settle 51 colons (Rey-Goldzeiguer, 1991 : 423-4). Even so, as Jordi and Planche (1999) illustrate for the city of Algiers, European population growth in the towns was steady throughout the nineteenth century, despite the occasional spurt. It was also for its numbers, a cosmopolitan population as it included not only French
but also Spanish, Italian and Anglo-Maltese migrants. This can best be illustrated by Algiers where two quarters of the city, were populated primarily by migrants of Spanish origin, that is Bab el-Oued and cité Bugeaud. However, although the Empire encouraged willing migrants, it also used deportation to the colony of Algeria as a means to rid itself of its political opponents (for example, after the 1851 coup d’état) and certain groups of ‘undesirables’ such as prostitutes.

The European emigrant population in Algeria would continue to grow throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century. However, it was a population which despite the numerous incentives which have been described tended towards a settlement in the towns and cities. The 1863 Senatus-Consulte had slowed down the pace of agricultural colonisation but without impeding the general growth of the European population. Throughout the century, this population would be almost equally divided between emigrants of French origin, and emigrants from other European countries, particularly Spain and Italy. Between 1847 and 1851, the European population doubled and continued increasing until 1860. However, these figures were also subject to fluctuation, as for example with the deportees of 1851-2, many would return to France at the end of their sentence. There is also the problem that the various schemes for agricultural settlement tended to be presented as capable of absorbing far larger numbers of settlers than they ever actually accommodated. The Barrault project was one example of this phenomenon. Although the number of European settlers did not attain the figures sometimes projected, nevertheless the European population in Algeria by 1851 had reached 131,000 (66,000 of whom were of French origin) ; and at the time of Napoleon III visit in 1865, it had grown to 192,546 (about 107,000 or 56% of whom were of French origin). At the same time, the size of the Army of Africa was 76,000. In 1857, almost 60% (112,000) of the European population lived in the towns whilst the sixty-eight agricultural villages created during the period of Randon’s Governor-Generalship would house a European population of no more than 15,000 settlers. At one level these numbers are significant but at another, they indicate that despite the vision of Algeria as France’s America, Algeria was a colony that was subject to the limitations on its independence that imposed.

Although 1860 was the date when Michel Chevalier’s Treaty on Free Trade was signed with Great Britain, and Blanqui had earlier championed in his 1840 report on the economic situation in Algeria, the creation of free ports along the lines of Britain’s port of Singapore. In fact, the Anglo-French Treaty on Free Trade was interpreted in Algeria in somewhat limited terms, by a liberalization of the protectionist regime set up in 1851. The promulgation of the 17th July 1867 law that introduced a degree of commercial freedom through the mechanism of treating metropole and colony as an integral unit did not accord the same freedoms to external markets. This was owing to the belief that in order to aid the development of metropolitan industry itself, the metropole had to have a privileged access to the Algerian market (Rey-Goldzeiguer, 1991 : 457). Even so, Thobie (1991 : 556) records that only 5.6% of total French commercial movement flowed between Algeria and France, even though of the colonial possessions, Algeria accounted for almost 60% of both exports and imports between France and her colonies. Furthermore, these measures were not viewed by all metropolitan producers as entirely beneficial. In particular, the wine growers of the Midi viewed free trade as a potential threat to their opportunities to export to Algeria, as one of the agricultural crops which was being successfully planted there, was the vine. However, in spite of the growth of the colon population, the economic balance sheet for Algeria was less certain and Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, a contemporary critic of the colonial venture in Algeria, wrote in 1887 just after the French occupation of Tunisia, that ‘The history of Algeria for France is a lengthy, costly and
painful experience that ought to throw a light on the kind of dire methods to avoid in our new possession’ (P. Leroy-Beaulieu, 1887 : vi)

**Conclusion**
The paper has sought to explore the myriad of ways in which the colonial project during the period of the Second Napoleonic Empire interconnects with developments in France and subsequently post-1962 policy-making. In doing so, it has illustrated the significance not only of a group of ideas, generally known under the rubric of Saint-Simonism, but also of the people associated with both the development of these ideas and their practice. It has also argued that there are aspects of France’s economic project in this period which despite their referencing to the US experience were uniquely French and that these reflect an ambivalence in France about how the political and the economic should be linked. Finally, the fact that this ambivalence has deep roots has profoundly influenced subsequent policy-making in Algeria.

**Acknowledgements**
* School of Law & Social Sciences, Glasgow Caledonian University, UK An earlier version of this paper was presented at The Twenty-fifth Annual Meeting of The Middle East Economic Association (MEEA), Allied Social Science Associations, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. January 7-9, 2005, and I would like to thank everyone there for their comments. I would also like to thank the British Academy for providing a travel grant (OCG-39565) to attend the meeting.

**Endnotes**
1. Claude-Henri Saint-Simon (1760-1825) plays a major role in the development of 19th-century political economy. His influence is also found in sociology (Auguste Comte), history (Adolphe Thiers) as well as politics and government. See Adamson (2002 : 117-128) for a fuller discussion of the content of these ideas.
2. This applies equally to Napoleon III as it does to General Charles de Gaulle or to President Jacques Chirac, and is well captured in Marx’s *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon*, Marx’s classic account of the autocratic nature of power.
3. The power of the idea of ‘community’ embodied by Ménilmontant has meant its reuse today by the African-American saxophonist living in Paris, Steve Potts who has put together a band of the unemployed, Rmistes, & young people & called it the ‘Ménilmontant Street Band’ (*Le Monde*, 25.12.2003).
6. ‘instruirait les Algériens sur les lois, les mœurs et l’industrie de l’Europe’. It was also intended to publish biographies of famous men of the Maghreb, Algerian folktales and poetry.
7. This was the process invented in 1855 by the British industrialist, Sir Henry Bessemer which transformed cast iron into steel.
8. For a detailed discussion of the *Ateliers nationaux*, see Donald Cope McKay (1933), *The National Workshop. A Study in the French Revolution of 1848*, Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press. There were in essence a response to the demand for the ‘right to
work’ which the economic crises of the mid-1840s had created. McKay argues that as the Ateliers nationaux, they were in fact a reflection of a more radical proposal which had been made by Louis Blanc for Ateliers sociaux, hence one of the reasons why there was a certain ambiguity in their purpose.


10. This information is taken from Spillman, G (1975), Napoléon III et le Royaume Arabe de l’Algérie, Paris : Académie des Sciences d’Outre-Mer. I am grateful to Dr Michael Brett for drawing my attention to this pamphlet which brings together, some difficult to obtain primary material, in particular, correspondence between some of the principal actors in the policies of the Second Empire in Algeria.

11. ‘L’histoire de l’Algérie est pour la France une expérience prolongée, coûteuse, pénible, qui doit nous éclairer sur la méthode funeste à éviter dans notre possession nouvelle.’

References


Kay Adamson,
Division of Social Sciences,
School of Law & Social Sciences,
Glasgow Caledonian University,
City Campus, Glasgow G4 0BA

Email:  k.adamson@gcal.ac.uk