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Education Language Policy Process in Multilingual Societies: Global Visions and Local Agendas in India, Nigeria and Unesco

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Completing a dissertation involves several people whose roles are often difficult to define. As with this dissertation research, writing a befitting acknowledgment here runs the risk of ambiguity since the often unnoticed services of the several people that shaped the overall outcome of my work are not easily captured in words. Thus, it is with profound respect that I acknowledge, in no specific order, some of these vital forces behind my intellectual and moral growth through this dissertation process.

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To Mom, Lolo Catherine E. Odugu
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ABSTRACT

In linguistically heterogeneous societies, language planning constitutes core institutional practice for maintaining social cohesion as well as unique cultural identities. This critical sociolinguistic and comparative analysis examines education language policy process in India, Nigeria and UNESCO to understand the entrenchment of marginalizational language policies in spite of recent paradigm shifts in relevant scholarship. These include the shift from monolingualism to multilingualism as ideal for individuals and societies, perception of multilingualism no longer as a problem but a resource, heightened interrogation of ideological and political dimensionalities of language decisions in society, and an intensification of commitment to language policy and planning through international consensuses and programmatic initiatives often associated with UNESCO.

While previous studies emphasize official state action and view language policy as “finishable” text, this dissertation research uses multi-site, cross-national ethnographic data from government and non-government entities to demonstrate that education language policy is fundamentally an ongoing dynamic process that draws various players with unequal bargaining power into constant negotiations of social identity and reconfigurations of the politics of social control. It illustrates the often muted historical provenience of current language policy issues in multilingual societies.
In addition, by noting that language policies in India and Nigeria are simultaneously stymied and constantly changing, this research shows that education language policy in multilingual societies defies any unitary theoretical categorization, partly due to the complexities, dilemmas and paradoxes associated with the various issues it entails. Further, it argues that understanding education language policy in multilingual societies requires multiple shifting theoretical lenses that map onto the actual policy processes. Two broad theories – hegemony and mutual interactionism – used here as heuristics for explicating education language policy processes highlight this need for an integrative and flexible conceptual mapping of language policymaking in multilingual societies.

Underlying this simultaneous stagnation and change are strong networks of various policy agents with a corresponding tendency toward disjunction and decoupling. The same (national and international) institutional structures that propel policy consensuses through networks also provide mechanisms for disjunction and decoupling. To make sense of this structural paradox, I propose a recalibration of major concepts, and an expansion of the conceptual boundaries, of education language policy studies beyond the current state-centered approach. Doing this helps dispel several popular misconceptions about language policy in multilingual societies, especially those pertaining to political sensitivity, resource limitation, and power constraints, and also paves way for re-imagining formal education for the future.
CHAPTER ONE

ENDURING ISSUES, DYNAMIC PROCESSES IN EDUCATION LANGUAGE

Policy in multilingual societies

Human social organization largely depends on communication through language. Those invested in the organization of societies constantly make decisions about language, its function, status and structure. In linguistically heterogeneous societies, language planning constitutes core institutional practice for maintaining social cohesion as well as unique cultural identities (Joseph, 2004; Tollefson, 2002). With the emergence of modern nation-states and the rise of state-run mass education in the nineteenth century, language planning, especially in education, has become a staple of public policymaking in highly populated multilingual societies (Williams, 2008; Ricento, 2006). The colonial conditions of state formation in most of these societies (especially in Africa and Asia) further complicates the exigencies of education language policies in ways that continue to generate fierce intellectual recriminations, social tensions and cultural struggles.

Education language policy (henceforth ELP) in multilingual societies is indeed a rallying point for local, national and international interests in negotiating political and
economic development, national unity, and cultural identity. In the last fifty years, scholarship on language policy and planning\(^1\) has witnessed paradigm shifts: from monolingualism to multilingualism as an ideal for individuals and societies, perception of multilingualism no longer as a problem but a resource, and heightened interrogation of ideological and political dimensionalities of language decisions in society (Ricento, 2000a). There has also been an intensification of commitment to language policy and planning through international consensuses and programmatic initiatives often associated with UNESCO and other international organizations (see Brock-Utne & Skattum, 2009). These developments in language policy and planning scholarship and expansion of “global” educational visions notwithstanding, actual language policies and linguistic behaviors of most multilingual societies in Africa and Asia remain largely unchanged for over half a century now. This dissertation research is inspired by an interest to understand why particular language policy frameworks and language behaviors persist in spite of academic and political rationales for change.

In trying to understand this problematique, my early review of literatures in this field revealed an overwhelming focus on policy as a finished product of government action (Ricento, 2006; Ibekwe, 2006; Alidou, 1997). As yet, not much is known about the processes of ELP development and the various (especially non-governmental) actors

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\(^1\) In this dissertation, I use language policy and planning and ELP as language policy fields distinct only in scale: Language policy and planning is a broader umbrella of language planning (often through policies) in society while ELP refers to language planning specifically in education. Accordingly, I conceive ELP as part of language policy and planning, albeit arguably the most contentious.
involved in these processes. Consequently, this dissertation research departs with two
interrelated assumptions: first, that ELP is an ongoing dynamic conflict-laden process
and second, that this (ELP) process involves various actors (in and outside governments)
whose roles are both unequal and non-negligible. Guided by these assumptions and
interested in explicating the problematique stated above, this research explores
qualitative – largely ethnographic – evidences from two highly multilingual societies
(India and Nigeria) and UNESCO to examine processes of education language
policymaking and intersections of global visions (about multilingualism) and local
(educational) agendas on national ELPs.

Why India and Nigeria—and UNESCO?

As highly populated and richly multilingual societies, India and Nigeria are
particularly suitable contexts for a comparative analysis of ELPs that interrogates the
workings of local educational interests with those of international organizations, such as
UNESCO. India and Nigeria are E9 countries both with very high and educationally “at
risk” populations. With about 3.5 billion inhabitants, E9 countries together account for
more than half the world’s populations and face the overwhelming majority of global
educational challenges (UNESCO, 2006). Next to China, India is the most populous
nation on earth, and Nigeria is the most populated nation in Africa. Nearly 70% of the

\[2\] E9 was formed by governments of nine high-population countries (Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Egypt,
India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria and Pakistan) with most need for achieving the EFA goals by 2015. Together, these countries constitute more than half the world’s population. See UNESCO (2006).
world’s illiterates live in these nine countries. Development-oriented initiatives, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Education For All (EFA), which work to increase access to and gender parity in high quality basic education and literacy, target E9 countries.

Although all E9 countries are multilingual, Nigeria and India have the largest number of languages with the most complicated ELP issues.\(^3\) Implied in the rationale that the multilingual populations of India and Nigeria are educationally “at risk” is the assumption that ELPs are partly responsible for, and critical to, understanding and addressing educational needs (Brock-Utne & Skattum, 2009; Djité, 2008; Brock-Utne, 2002; 2000a; 2000b).\(^4\) Moreover, both countries were shaped by similar historical oppositional movements in the Islamic Arab world and Christian Europe. Indeed, they were the most populous British colonies when UNESCO was established in November 1945. As will be shown, UNESCO’s engagement with language policies in multilingual societies often involved Nigeria and India.

\(^3\) The only exception to this is Indonesia, which has 726 living languages (Lewis, 2009). However, unlike India and Nigeria, the official language of Indonesia is Indonesian, a standardized Mayan language spoken by nearly 100% of the population. Indonesians also typically speak one or more regional language, but the popularity of the official language arguably makes Indonesia’s ELP conditions significantly less problematic than Nigeria’s and India’s.

\(^4\) It is problematic to talk about unmet educational goals without addressing the critical theoretical questions of “whose goals” and “whose education” is meant to achieve them? Brock-Utne’s (2000b; 2000a) Whose Education for All and Education For All in Whose Language? capture how language is implicated in the politics of international educational visions and achievement goals especially in multilingual societies.
Of all international organizations invested in educational development worldwide, UNESCO arguably commands the most legitimacy as an intellectual resource in national language policymaking. Advocacy for multilingualism is a grounding commitment of UNESCO’s bid for equality; its founding principles (enshrined in Article 1 of the 1945 UNESCO Constitution) condemn discrimination on the grounds of, among other things, language (UNESCO, 2004; UNESCO, 1982). Driven by the needs of emerging multiethnic nations created through amalgamation of distinct ethnolinguistic societies by colonial governments, the logic of UNESCO’s early multilingualism advocacy was two-pronged: first, to promote indigenous languages as media for cultural authenticity and identity, and second, to manage multiple languages as a factor for national development. ELP was to play a central role through mother-language education. With what Joseph Lo Bianco (2003) termed the “inevitability and contraction of pluralism”—the simultaneous integration of economies and technology with massive population mobility—older language needs now meet new global socioeconomic conditions and trigger renewed efforts in advocacy for multilingualism (p. 286). Part of this new commitment can be traced to the emergence and

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5 UNESCO has recently used the term “mother language” instead of earlier popular terms like vernacular language or mother tongue. Recent UNESCO initiatives like the International Mother Language Day (IMLD) reflect this shift. Yet, “mother tongue” continues to be the preferred term in relevant academic scholarship (Herrlitz, Ongstad, & van de Ven, 2007; Rao, 2000). Besides the descriptive rationale of appropriately characterizing these linguistic codes as languages (and not “tongues”), the shift from “tongue” to “language” reflects the advocacy nature of recent research on indigenous language rights. In this research, I employ this preferential term of “mother language”, unless where “mother tongue” better captures the tenor of the argument being made.
popularization of research on endangered languages and language extinction (King, Schilling-Estes, Fogle, Lou, & Soukup, 2008; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000; Grenoble & Whaley, 1998). UNESCO is at the forefront of this campaign for intensifying global initiatives for multilingualism.

From the onset, UNESCO’s multilingualism initiatives targeted centralized policymaking as critical avenues for informing local linguistic practices. Her involvement in national policymaking in India and Nigeria is amplified by recent widespread campaigns against language endangerment and the corollary demand for indigenous language rights in education occasioned by linguistic exclusionary practices (May, 2006; Paulston & Heidemann, 2006; Bamgbose, 2000). As its commitment to multilingual education grows, controversies over ELP’s impact on language rights, national identity, and international educational goals increasingly came to characterize the constantly shifting policy landscapes in which UNESCO and other education stakeholders operate (Brock-Utne & Skattum, 2009; Brock-Utne, 2002). Arguably, with growth in access to formal education, continuing language inequities will undermine education’s capacity to effect fundamental social change intended by global educational visions.

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6 Different ELP scholars use the acronym, MLE, in reference to different conditions, including “multilingual education” (Skutnabb-Kangas, Phillipson, Mohanty, & Panda, 2009) and “minority language education” (Veltman, 1983). Although the “multilingual education” use is more popular in ELP scholarship, I have chosen to use “mother-language education” and “multilingual education” to avoid the potentials for confusion of acronyms. While multilingual education refers to education in multiple languages, mother-language education describes education in learners’ first language(s). Both are conceptually distinct but interrelated in practice, especially in multilingual settings.
If the link between education and development assumed in global initiatives and local agendas is valid, addressing the persistence of language issues in education continues to be an imperative of public policy in the twenty-first century. In multilingual societies, language issues in education persist in two interrelated ways: “language education” (LE) concerned with the teaching of a specific language as a school subject, and “language of instruction” (LOI) in most school subjects (Bourne & Reid, 2003). While the former requires professional training, the latter does not. In countries like India and Nigeria, non-professionals (i.e., teachers who have not received professional training in foreign languages) are usually not proficient enough in foreign languages to use them in teaching various subjects effectively (Qorro, 2009). Both are conceptually distinct, but interlinked; the distinction between LOI and LE is often blurred in policy and practices, since enforcing policy that provides for instruction in a language requires formal education in the same language, at least in teacher preparation (Mazrui, 2008). Language policies in education extend beyond instructional practices to other formal, non-formal and informal activities. I use the term “education language policy” here to capture public decisions on all forms of language use in schooling, including but not exclusively for instructional purposes.

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7 Mazrui makes this point in a presentation at an Africa Special Interest Group (SIG) meeting, during the 2008 annual conference of Comparative and International Education Society (CIES) in New York.

8 Other scholars use “educational language policy”, (see Tollefson, 2002; Ibekwe, 1997), a related term with similar meaning.
Enduring Issues of Education Language Policy in Multilingual Societies

Recent efforts to understand how language, culture and education relate to socioeconomic development especially in less industrialized postcolonial multilingual societies (Brock-Utne & Skattum, 2009; Djité, 2008; Rassool, Canvin, Heugh, & Mansoor, 2007) result partly from the disappointments in post-WWII development studies (Steiner-Khamsi, 2009; Farrell, 1997). Particularly, researchers are concerned about the role of language in mediating educational access and opportunity, since language use in multilingual societies reflects, and indeed shapes economic, political and social inequalities (Brock-Utne & Skattum, 2009; Djité, 2008; Phillipson, 2006; Wolfson & Manes, 1985; Das Gupta, 1970).

Despite overwhelming evidence from psycholinguistics and cognitive sciences in support of mother-language education and multilingual education (Jessner U., 2008; Kroll & de Groot, 2005; Fafunwa, Macauley, & Sokoya, 1989), education in countries like India and Nigeria continues to favor of foreign languages. Supports for mother-language education and multilingual education raise critical questions about language as a tool of social control since they can be reinterpreted as new strategies to maintain the social, economic and political advantage of dominant groups; European languages, such as English, continue to be the most honorific and politico-economically viable linguistic

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9 Gita Steiner-Khamsi’s keynote address delivered during the Midwestern conference of the Comparative and International Education Society in Kent, October 23, 2009 under the title, “Comparison as a Policy Tool in an Era of Globalization” examined trends in Development studies and International studies within Comparative Education scholarship.
code, and (for multilingual education/mother-language education critics) we should advocate more, not less European languages. While multilingual education/mother-language education advocates consider this a misinformed critique, the pervasive demand for foreign languages signals growing awareness of the linkages of language, power and inequality central to critical sociolinguistics’ perspective on ELP (Tollefson, 2002).

Ambivalence to mother-language education and multilingual education underscores the highly complex and politicized linguistic contexts of language policymaking capable of revealing the processes through which contested ELPs persist, as well as the manifest intentions and latent meanings embedded therein (Bamgbose, 2009; Crossely, 2009). As Tollefson (2002) points out, ELP documents cannot be taken on face value since public debates about language often preclude alternatives and makes official state positions on language seem as the natural conditions of social systems, instead of politically contrived options. This signals the need for ELP scholars to learn to critically “read” language policies by understanding the social and political implications of particular language decisions within specific historic conditions.

Understanding ELP processes in multilingual societies, such as India and Nigeria, continues to be critical and timely for several reasons. First, the imaginary (ethnic) bases of “modern” civic nation (Anderson, 1991) underscore the contingency of language as social unifier and its capacity to engender collective identity and social tension (Joseph,
2004; Bucholtz & Hall, 2004; Gumperz, 1997; Smith A. D., 1991). To make this point clearer, the world’s population of approximately 6.9 billion belongs to only 194 or so sovereign states but share about 6,909 languages, 445 of which are in India and 521 in Nigeria (see U.S. Census Bureau, 2011 for world population statistics; U.S. Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 2009 for data on independent nations in the world; Lewis, 2009 for data on languages of the world). Fewer than 4 percent of these 194 States are nation-states where ethnic national boundaries coincide with political State boundaries to create a sort of monoethnic nation (Jacob & Beer, 1985; Connor, 1972). As such, most nations are multi-ethnic, multicultural and multilingual with social inequities grounded in or amplified by the politics of ethnonational identity. Moreover, less than 100 of these 6,909 or so languages are official since 120 countries adopt English, French, Spanish or Arabic as official language, and only about 50 countries have their own indigenous official languages, 15 percent of which have two or more (with some sharing the same indigenous language). Even when we add these 45 indigenous languages, only about 1.5 percent of the world’s living languages are formally recognized (Williams, 2008). As Williams notes, this situation is even more grim given that only one percent of the world’s languages are used by over half a million speakers and only about 10 percent by over 100,000. Currently, hundreds of languages have no adolescent speakers, a trend that continues to grow (Williams, 1995). Reactions to language-based inequities and linguistic diversity issues are expressed variously, ranging from grassroots
language mobilization by the Ibibios of Southeastern Nigeria (Williamson & Ozo-mekuri, 2003) to “fast- unto-death” suicide advocacy for (Telugu) language-based territorial separation in Madras (now Chennai), India (Mitchell, 2009). As I argue in Chapter Eight (in concert with Mitchell’s analysis of south India), the political valence of language is important because it mirrors changes in wider society in ways that alter language itself.

Second, the circumstances in which international organizations emerged heralded an internationalization of ethical consciousness encapsulated in human rights declarations intended to bring all peoples under the protection of mutually shared and collectively enforced moral bonds. UNESCO’s mother-language education and multilingual education advocacy encodes the principles of this international ethical landscape – equality freedom, fairness and non-discrimination – in her ELP initiatives. For instance, advocacy for mother-language education and multilingual education serves to revive endangered languages, foster ethnolinguistic cultural identity, enhance academic achievement and secure political stability. Indeed, UNESCO conceives multilingualism in education as both an instrumental and a self-contained goal. On one hand, by promoting cultural identity and instilling values of justice as fairness (Rawls, 2001), mother-language education minimizes the conditions of inequities that fuel social and political conflicts, thereby installing “the defenses of peace” in “the minds of men” (UNESCO, 2004, p. 7). On the other, the ecological needs of linguistic-cultural diversity – an extension of the logic of biodiversity – demands mother-language education as an
end in itself (Skutnabb-Kangas, 2006). Both the instrumental and the self-contained goals coincide in pursuit of multilingual ELPs.

Third, recent growth in immigration and the restructuring of nation-states by processes associated with globalization\(^\text{10}\) create cross-cultural encounters, which signal new waves and forms of multilingualism that invite revisions of language policies in education. While the meaning and conditions of globalization continue to unfold, we witness greater academic evidential consensus supporting mother-language education and multilingual education, increased resource commitment by national and international agencies, stronger vigilance against language marginalization and amplified grassroots participation in policy making, and yet continued ambivalence or outright resistance to ELP changes in India and Nigeria. As this study reveals, contestations about ELPs persist partly due to pervasive lack of shared understanding about the implications of mother-language education and multilingual education and misconceptions about ELP processes. As already suggested, a spate of scholarship shows cognitive, social, and psychological benefits for mother-language education and multilingual education,\(^\text{11}\) which language policy and planning experts use to recommend

\(^{10}\) The extent to which globalization (as a process) restructures the status of nation-states is still debated among social scientists. However, the fact of massive immigration and the demands it places on national education policymaking is hardly in question. For a broad review of issues associated with globalization, see Held & McGrew, (2007). For specific argument about how globalization affects the capacity of nations to act autonomously, see political economic analyses of global inequalities by Jonas Pontusson (2005) and Glenn Firebaugh (2003).

\(^{11}\) The term “mother language” in “mother-language education” is problematic as a research construct since, among others, it may not be the language of the child’s immediate environment. “Mother tongue”,
ELP changes in multilingual societies (Brock-Utne & Skattum, 2009). However, the norm in India and Nigeria, as in most multilingual societies, is “marginalizational” multilingualism that supports only select few languages of dominant groups in society.

Prominent explanations of the above are both epistemic and economic. For one, it is inexcusable in professional linguistic circles to hold that certain languages are less capable in some respects than others or that users of one language are different in abilities than others. Outside academe however, this theoretical understanding lacks relevance especially among peoples who live the social inequality, educational challenges and economic disadvantages of language inequities, and therefore have strong stakes in ELPs (Hymes D. H., 1996). In addition to this epistemic divide, exiguousness of economic resources for policymaking, training teachers, developing educational materials, and language interventions are major challenges to poor nations. Both epistemic and economic explanations can also be politically motivated negotiation devices; lack of linguistic awareness might be a problem of “voice” than ignorance, and resource limitation an issue of management than availability.

Language issues in India and Nigeria endure as three interrelated dilemmas of education policymaking related to (a) multilingualism and academic achievement, (b) language and social identity, and (c) language extinction. As noted above, experts show that multiple language competence disposes the individual to more advanced cognitive

“language of immediate environment” and “first language” have been used to describe the language a child masters first. What is critical is that it is the language the child masters first and is most familiar with. These may be multiple languages different from the parents’ or school languages.
functioning measured by academic achievements. Mother-language education and multilingual education requires not only policy provisions that are inclusive of all languages but also equitable distribution of adequate resources for the development of educational materials and teacher preparation in these languages. However, with few notable advances in the official recognition and integration of indigenous languages in education, ELPs in India and Nigeria remain largely discriminatory of “minority” languages. While cogent from cognitive and social justice standpoints, this assessment is shortsighted; it facetiously assumes that language policies are (or should be) driven solely by evidence-based research findings and moral values of equality and justice. Considerations of cognitive and social justice implications of ELP do not always override other issues, such as political expediency. It is paradoxical that although knowledge about and moral commitment to mother-language education and multilingual education seem to have grown, discriminatory ELPs remain deeply entrenched in India and Nigeria.

Second, the social purpose of education in fabricating homogeneous national identities in postcolonial India and Nigeria deploys the rhetoric of social cohesion and national unity (Sarangi, 2009; Simpson & Oyètádé, 2008; Das Gupta, 1970). On an uneven political landscape with power imbalances struck along ethnonlinguistic

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12 The notions of “minority” and “majority” language, often gauged by the population of speakers, have been a powerful tool for language policy practices with telling implications for linguistic imperialism; yet their intellectual or moral validity are weakened in societies where some languages with less speakers occupy higher official status than those with more speakers, a condition pervasive in most post-colonial nations given the non-voluntary conditions of ethnonlinguistic amalgamations through which they were created.
boundaries, such rhetoric invokes assimilationist rationalizations that incite resistance and lead to concerted assertions of exclusive ethno-cultural and linguistic identity.

Attempt to use Hindi as a unifying language signaled an imminent Hindi hegemony from northern India that provoked reassertions of ethnolinguistic identity in the south. Similarly, “minority” ethnic groups in Nigeria mobilized around language identity at the selection of Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba – the languages of politically dominant ethnic majorities – as official national languages. National unity and ethnic-cultural identity are not necessarily incompatible educational goals, but struggles for ethnic dominance and inequitable redistribution of economic resources that frequently infuse ELP debates in India and Nigeria pit them as polar opposites. Ironically, as Nigeria and India mirror early Western ideals of political homogeneity, Europe and North America increasingly become characterized by ethnic and cultural heterogeneity (Nash, 2010; Hall, 2000).  

A third dilemma issues from recent concerns with language extinction due to decline in use, which results partly from the popularization of major world languages. As most world languages, such as English, gain popularity and represent greater economic and political opportunities, perceived decline in the usefulness of minority languages produce shifts in ethnonlinguistic affiliation and ultimately engender massive reduction in vitality of most Nigerian and Indian languages. Preserving cultural identity through indigenous language education is simultaneously accompanied by clamor for English-

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13 Ethnic and cultural heterogeneity does not ipso facto imply equal rights/status among all social blocs. Yet the notion of “national identity” has become less an issue of homogeneity in countries whose demographic contours are being redrawn by massive immigration and mobility of peoples.
only schooling. Martha Qorro (2009) suggests that the insistence among parents and policymakers on the use of foreign languages for instruction limits access to quality education and benefits the bureaucratic bourgeoisie of multilingual societies and their foreign allies.

The larger context of these dilemmatic conditions is, according to neo-institutionalists, an internationalization of educational norm (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997). Critics of neo-institutionalism argue that this is no more than a shortsighted orchestration of common features of education whose actual meaning varies extensively with context (Charle, Schriewer, & Wagner, 2004). In addition, the political promises of democracy and the economic demands of capitalism – both embodying apparently contradictory values of freedom and equality – pressure education to play often irreconcilable roles: if freedom should allow individual choices, equal competition, and free association, education’s capacity to produce equal outcomes is arguably questionable, especially given unequal baseline opportunities. On a global scale, education’s capacity to effect fundamental social change is still not fully understood. In less industrialized multilingual countries, language policymaking in education reflects these uncertainties.

The intractability of language issues in India and Nigeria mirrors the problematics of two broad historical policy approaches to social integration central to social identity:

14 Comparative education experts disagree on the reality, nature and processes of global educational isomorphism. For criticisms of neo-institutionalism, see Schriewer, (2004a; 2004b), Anderson-Levitt (2003), and Steiner-Khamsi (2004).
assimilation and accommodation. Through the distribution of economic resources, management of political participation, and opportunities for social development, language policies impel linguistic groups to either shed their ethnic language for a mainstream language or retain their ethnic language as part of a diverse linguistic pool. Determining the effectiveness of both processes is complicated; while some members of a group resist assimilation, others willingly detach from ethnic group affiliation to integrate to the mainstream. Since members of the same social group voluntarily seek to acculturate into cultures vehemently resisted by their fellow group members, both encouraging and objecting to assimilation can be viewed simultaneously as ethnocentric subjugation, discriminatory and/or oppressive. Whatever the expectation and outcome, formal education remains the tool most frequently deployed in managing political, economic and social interests of ethnically heterogeneous societies through language use. In India and Nigeria, ELPs are critical instruments for the legitimation of knowledge and stratification of curriculum that ultimately determine wider economic, political and social rewards around which state institutions, cultural groups and international agencies negotiate the politics of social control.

However, there is an inherent problem with the notion of multilingualism that underlies ELPs in India and Nigeria. Multilingualism is not merely the presence of multiple languages in individuals and/or societies. It is the functional relationships of these languages at the individual or societal levels that defines and differentiates one
form of multilingualism from another (Mohanty A. K., 2006). Indeed, these relationships are determined culturally by the individual, socially by the community, and politically by the state (Annamalai, 2001). Determining the cultural, social, and political functions of languages is not the exclusive domain of political decision making; all three overlap and engage in an ongoing network of interaction. Their outcomes vary in time and place with shifts in larger social forces. Yet, E. Annamalai (2001) insists that the political determination of function profoundly impacts the nature of multilingualism on all three spheres. The political dimension is expressed in language policy and planning and executed through language development policies intended to equip languages for new functions. This approach to language policy and planning assumes that formal development of a language must precede its actual use in novel situations. Yet, linguists inform us that language develops by use, not formal policy (Annamalai, 2001).

Accounting for development by use requires repositioning the individuals and language communities at the foreground of language policy and planning. Instead of a bureaucratic-controlled top-down technocratic exercise that views policy as “finishable” text, language policymaking involves diversified ongoing activities of individual users and language interest groups whose actions are meaningful only within shifting social conditions. Often conflict-ridden, the dynamic processes of ELP formulation involves the constant and ongoing interaction of various actors whose motivations and bargaining resources vary as extensively as the language needs and social conditions they engage
with (Adrey, 2009). A major thesis of this research is that the relative lack of success of this top-down technical approach to language policy and planning issues from the reluctance to integrate individual and community language users in policymaking and analyses. Where provisions are made for language user participation in policymaking, the overarching framework still remains technocratic, and language policy and planning scholarship focus overwhelmingly on the political dimension. Current education language policymaking in India and Nigeria and the constantly evolving complex issues they generate can be seen from this broader framework of policy, not merely as finished text of political action but more as dynamic processes of social negotiations.

**Education Language Policy as Dynamic Process**

The tendency in existing empirical studies of and public debates over language policy and planning and particularly ELP of multilingual societies to represent policy as self-contained products of government activities (Brock-Utne & Skattum, 2009; Tollefson, 2002) has two legitimate but problematic dimensions. First, it articulates policy as fixed and completed. Such studies rely heavily on analysis of official policy documents to outline their implications for educational practices, and to link policy provisions to variables like academic performance, economic resources, political interests, social identity and language rights (see Sarangi, 2009; Brock-Utne, 2009; Tollefson, 2002; Beer & Jacobs, 1985). Experts in this genre are not incognizant of policy changes and revisions. However, the focus is typically not on the general process or
specific mechanisms of change but the product of the process (Herriman & Burnaby, 1996). To study ELPs becomes to dissect official statements of state apparatuses regarding languages in education, their rationale, and implications for society.

The second dimension is that policymaking is the exclusive prerogative of government and its associate organs. May (2008; 2001) argues that while language decisions occur at multiple levels, any analysis of minorities language issues must focus on the nation-state as the major actor. This genre studies government actions as primary sources and uses questionnaires and interviews to collect data on the activities of bureaucrats, politicians and consultants, most of whom are officials of ministries of education, various state commissions or government-sponsored language institutions (Austin, 2009; Abbi, 2009). The goal of research here is to understand the motives and rationales that undergird specific policy decisions and to situate the analysis within broader political conditions in which these policies are formulated. Based on the constitution of each country, Nigeria’s National Policy on Education (NPE) and India’s National Policy on Education (NEP) remain rich sources for this kind of research. Viewing ELPs this way is legitimate, however, it simplifies a rather complicated and ongoing dynamic process in which policy texts and institutional actors are only partly prominent. As will be argued later, focusing solely on the official aspects of policymaking has the capacity of strengthening governments’ control over ELPs and correspondingly discouraging non-government actors.
As its point of departure, this research approaches ELPs as dynamic and ongoing processes. It articulates policy not as a finished (or “finishable”) product accessible primarily or exclusively through policy texts, but as a viable instrument in a constantly changing and continuously evolving process of negotiation among multiple uneven players. Official policy documents are displaced as sole primary sources and reconstituted as one of the many dynamic tools for, not finished products of, political, economic, social and cultural transactions. In interrogating the activities of relevant actors, I seek explanations for the motives behind stated official policies, and also the relationships among the varied actors, the tools they wield in pursuits of diverse goals, and the ultimate outcomes they produce.

One major implication of a process approach to ELP research is that its scope widens to include various government and non-government actors. It rejects definitions that restrict language policy and planning to activities of government, its agencies and authoritative bodies with public mandate for language regulation (Ager, 1996; Cooper, 1989). This is not to deemphasize or downplay government’s role in policymaking. As state theory informs us, the state continues to function as the critical actor in educational planning and management (Carnoy, 2006). However, interpreting state actors as monolithic entities with unified purpose and organized action ignores the interpenetrations of government institutions by individuals and groups with conflicting interests (McGinn & Street, 1999). As debate over the denationalizing proclivities of
globalization continues, a solely state-centered approach to ELP research becomes rather anachronistic.

**Conceptual Caveats: Globalization, Postcolonialism and the Global-Local Divide**

One task of this dissertation—associated with “global” visions and “local” agendas in ELP—is complicated by its conceptual overlap with globalization scholarship and postcolonial discourse. The massive economic, social, political, cultural, ideological, and imaginary transformations that characterize globalization evolve and interlace in ways that defy any neat delineations of international, national, and local boundaries as analytic categories of sociological inquiry. Globalization’s denationalization propensities witness the inhabitations of “global” structures within national, regional, and local spaces, and vice versa (Sassen, 2007; MacLeod, 2001). These transformations, or at least the ways they have been portrayed in social science scholarship, invite constant reinterpretations to better understand the shifting identities of the international, the national, the regional, the local, and the unnamed spheres of “global” transactions.

Particularly, “nation” is not an exhaustive category for analyzing international networks. Its utility as a unit of analysis appears to be increasingly limited due to globalization’s tendency to undermine the autonomy of nations as legitimate rational actors by uncoupling activities, processes, entities and forms of social organization from nation-states (Sassen, 2007; Jones A. , 2006; Sassen, 2003). Further, education language policymaking is not simply national activities. It draws individuals and collectivities
(including International and other Non-Governmental Organizations, INGOs/NGOs) into arenas of multilevel negotiations. Within a postcolonial context, the dislocation of the state complicates centralized educational initiatives arguably tied to socioeconomic development. Yet, nations are the pivotal point of convergence for ELPs activities; even regional and local ELPs are managed through national entities, since decentralization requires a centralized control mechanism to succeed. Sassen (2003) insists that denationalization of national territory must be treated with caution and not understood in a simplistic way as a wholesale displacement of the national scale to the global. Globalization appears to be producing “re-scaling dynamics”, which cuts across institutional sizes and encasements of territory resulting from the formation of nation-states (Jones A., 2006).

It is possible theoretically to discuss “global”—“local” linkages in ELP outside globalization discourse since the existence of such networks predates globalization as construed in the past few decades. But the utility of globalization as an organizing discursive framework is critical. The forces featured as elements of globalization generally predate the discourse itself (McGrew, 2007). Even when those elements are contemporary—and this is usually those of intensity, not actual existence of structural or institutional infrastructures of global linkages—their origins are traceable to temporal phenomena antedating recent discourse on globalization. Indeed Bayly’s (2004; 2002) exploration of “archaic” globalization (contrasted to “modern” globalization) seeks to
bring primeval forms of transcontinental networks under recent globalization discourse, a project consistent with efforts at “decentering” world history. Under this approach, globalization is detached from its original association with progressive integration and interdependence of modern world economy and ascribed to historical inter-regional and intercontinental impacts of agrarian empires of the early modern world (Callinicos, 2007). So, although India’s and Nigeria’s relationships with UNESCO and other international actors precede current talks about globalization, they reflect globalization’s trans-temporal discourse.

Accommodating old processes in a new (globalization) discourse enables us to reexamine several assumptions about the structure and functioning of social organizations in ways that appropriate ever-expanding pluralities and visibility of local landscapes. Paradoxically, this new discourse generates homogenizing categories that occlude and frequently sabotage the active participation of the local in processes of knowledge production. This paradox is clearly expressed in Appadurai’s (2000) loaded idea that there is a “disjunction between the knowledge of globalization and the globalization of knowledge” (p. 4). At issue here is that as an uneven economic process, globalization generates fragmented and uneven redistribution of the same material resources for learning, teaching and cultural criticism necessary for establishing
democratic research communities capable of producing globally balanced knowledge.\textsuperscript{15}

Issue of inequality inherent in globalization intersects with postcolonial critics’ demand for dismantling current conditions of hegemony that underpin Western scholarship. In this light, Appadurai’s (2000) discussion of “globalization from below” (or “grassroots globalization”) calls for a revision of research criteria to accommodate valid “local” knowledge that does not conform with stringent conditions of newness, validation by a preexisting scholarly community, and systematicity characteristic of Western academe. Postcolonial scholars insist that bridging the local-global divide requires a conscious adoption of the standpoint of the local, since the global is inseparable from and intricately tied with the local (Canagarajah A. S., 2005; Bhabha, 2005; Mignolo, 2000). Recent ELP studies privilege this local perspective as a primary locus of analysis, and as such reposition research on the actual arena of policy activities (Canagarajah A. S., 2005).

The design of this research builds on this new vista by adjusting its prism around the local as a primary focal point instead of a secondary or ancillary arena of state-dominated ELP processes. According to Canagarajah (2005), local and global arenas are definable relative to contexts: local may refer to classrooms, minority language groups, minorities, and ethnic communities; local may also refer to minority language communities, or to local social groups around the world. In addition, the stance of the local group is defined relative to its social and political identities.

\textsuperscript{15}Social scientists are not fully agreed on whether in its entirety, globalization as an economic process is uneven or produces more economic inequalities. At issue here is the claim that the participation of “periphery” societies in most economic decisions that affect them is still minimal and controlled by more powerful western societies and institutions (Callinicos, 2007; Reinert, 2004). While the impact of globalization on inequalities unfolds and continues to be debated, Appadurai’s argument suggests that there is less doubt about the West-centric nature of the intellectual systems through which knowledge and ideas about globalization are generated and disseminated.
grassroots organizations, or institutions within the periphery of centralized political control. Global may vary from dominant Western intellectual discourses and institutions to powerful nation-states and organizations like the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO). This research focuses on multiple agents as primary local sites of diversified policymaking activities. Governments and political institutions feature as one, but not the sole (or primary) arena of ELP activities. Other arenas include academe and its institutions, language activists and their language communities, and the media. In profiling UNESCO’s complex role as both global and local actor, I emphasize how the global inhabits and therefore is reconstituted as the local, thereby complicating the interlocking and shifting identities of policy agents. This emphasis on shifting affinities permits interpretations of ELP activities as multi-scalar: government entities, scholars, language activists and NGOs can equally function as global and local forces depending on the context. Although this fluidity precludes any neat conceptual categorization that should help clarify the intent and interests of each actor, it also eschews the simplistic and unproblematic demarcation between local and global entities as unified rational ELP arenas.

Restating the Research Problem

It is obvious from the discussion so far that this study is not interested simply in the stated formal procedures of education language policymaking often enshrined in dicta of political establishments and superintended by bureaucrats and elected public
officials. Though vital, this formal dimension alone is incapable of informing us about the reasons particular overarching framework of policymaking persists for nearly a century or so even in the face of real or virtual strong political and intellectual rationales for change. For answers, we must turn to a wider range of data involving various institutional and individual agents whose roles in the policy process are less visible and largely unscripted.

Such an expansive yet integrated framework as used in this study provides the grounds for addressing the questions associated with why multilingual countries such as India and Nigeria continue to maintain strikingly similar ELPs that affords unequal and differential statuses to languages whose users and communities are supposedly equal citizens of the state. Put differently, what mechanisms permit the persistence of “marginalizational” ELPs when the political appeals of democracy, social demands of cultural identity, economic structural requirements of diversity, and humanistic necessities of intellectual, moral and psychological developments of the individual and society in an increasingly globalizing world suggests otherwise? By extrapolation, what democratic processes are responsible for the institutionalization of non-democratic relationships? What principle of social diversity, cultural equality and holistic human development work to enforce social homogeneity, permit cultural subordination and the persistence of ELPs developed within and for the benefit of colonial establishments?
Posing these broader polemical questions permit us to reformulate the questions of ELP scholarship in terms of who policy agents are broadly speaking; what language behaviors of which people they target under what conditions; what means are at their disposal for what intended goals; what policy-making procedures do they follow and to what ultimate end. The nature of ELPs in multilingual societies (as an international phenomenon) requires that our investigation be essentially cross-national on one hand and integrate the role of salient international organizational players on another. Specifically, what role has the emergence of global visions on education (and indeed culture, politics and economy) played in the ways localities (national and local) negotiate their educational agendas?

As I argue later in Chapter Eight, understanding global and local forces that enable or disable marginalizational ELPs requires theoretical exploration of how organizational behaviors conduce to linguistic practices. Specifically, how do various ELP actors respond to the emergence of international systems of legitimation, which encourages “universal” norms, while engaging the peculiarities of local ELP conditions? To the extent such universalistic norms continue to accommodate ELPs that marginalize indigenous and minority languages, the concept of decoupling offers a conceptual prism for explicating tendentious consensus-building and disjuncture by ELP actors. Institutional theories reveal that organizational behaviors are mostly exogenously constituted (in response to external norms and quest for legitimacy) not primarily
endogenous rationales pertaining to internal needs (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997). Thus, institutional models often fail to provide operational strategies for addressing internal needs, leading to loose coupling or decoupling with external (or in this case, international) regimes of legitimacy. Understanding ELP process therefore calls for examining decoupling practices: how and why do policy stakeholders enter consensuses guided by voluntary networks while maintaining a sustaining gap between those consensuses and actual practice (Delucchi, 2000)?

For our investigation to address the original broad issues, it must dig deeper than these descriptive concerns, including decoupling practices, to probe the operational dynamics within and among all levels of institutional and individual agents (national, local, international) whose actions bear on the ELPs of multilingual societies. It must also seek data directly on the multilevel and multiple layers of transactions out of which ELPs are borne. By extending beyond governmental actors and prioritizing primary data through direct encounter with ELP actors in their actual setting, this study addresses not only the “what” and “how” of language policymaking (purely descriptive questions) but also the “why” (a purely analytic exercise) underpinning the processes. Accordingly, it positions itself to contribute to comparative understandings of ELP and theoretical developments about language policymaking in multilingual societies. While theory formulation is not the primary purpose of this study, any comparative analysis focusing on a cogent academic concern that resonate beyond specific geographic, cultural and
intellectual boundaries is likely to contribute in some ways to theoretical understanding of its subjects and generalization to contexts other than those studied. I would be profoundly gratified if in the end, this study contributes to our knowledge about and understanding of any aspect of decision making about language in the education of millions of people who live in multilingual societies.

**Significance and Relevance of Study**

Formulating the significance of this study to language policy and planning scholarship invites us to revisit its basic warrants. Since the present study builds on the immense accomplishments of previous studies while attempting to illuminate areas that still lack clarity, it is important to restate its process approach to and expanded view of ELP in multilingual society. As already argued, previous language policy and planning studies tend to overemphasize the position of government as the critical (or sole) ELP actor even as it attempts to expose power imbalances emanating from language decisions. New developments in subaltern studies are increasingly critical of this tendency to assign normative status to government and dominant discourses.

In their recent work, Kapoor and Shizha (2010) invite us to jettison imageries of dominated people (such as the “indigenous”, or “local”) as the exotic “other” demanding protection from mainstream institutions. Local people do not occupy a temporally “primitive” aboriginal state of “abject being” from which they must *move*, through state protectionist apparatuses, to a more advanced “right-bearing” state of
subjectivity (Ghosh K., 2010). Correspondingly, “protectionist” proclamations of the state and/or international organizations must be seen not necessarily as gratuitous legal exceptions to a tolerable but fundamentally peripheral “other”, but as victories won by indigenous peoples over the exploitative excesses of neoliberal state machineries. While not placing the state and its institutions in total disfavor, this research approaches local arenas as legitimate sites for ELP with equal credibility as state agencies.

Also, it advances the argument of seeing ELP as an ongoing dynamic process in which various agents with unequal resources and bargaining potentials must constantly adjust their negotiation strategies to unfolding conflict-laden social conditions. Conceptions of language policy and planning as a process are not completely new, although most scholars limit their inquiry to Europe and rarely focus on education as a critical site for language policy and planning practices (Adrey, 2009; Ager, 1996). Experts on language policy and planning maintain that although multilingualism is associated with language diversity, it is fundamentally different across societies especially between Europe and the post-colonial countries of Africa and Asia (Mohanty A. K., 2006; Annamalai, 2001). The present studies advances the significance of this process orientation by interrogating multilingualism in highly populated and richly multilingual nations (India and Nigeria). The implications of the findings suggest that a process approach to language policy and planning and ELP studies is even more cogent and applicable in multilingual societies with greater educational needs.
Besides these basic outlines, the present study rectifies some sustained critique to earlier models of language policy and planning studies, especially that of Cooper (1989). Some critiques have shown that Cooper’s model is not unproblematic as it over-relied on a correspondence theory of validity, which belies notions of objectivity (Moore, 2000). Moore argues that “descriptions are inevitably selective because they are interpretative” (p. 36); the criteria for selecting and ascribing significance to connections among actors, behaviors, people, process, etc., evidence researchers’ own interestedness and perspective. An important argument of this study is that the hermeneutic requirement for problematizing the complex interaction between the interpreting subject and interpreted object on the one hand and the phenomenological reconstruction of truth in terms of points of view on the other, which underlie Moore’s critique of Cooper’s model, need not lead to total deconstruction of knowledge.\(^\text{16}\)

Recent postmodernist and feminist perspectives on truth and reality, which rekindles this deconstructionist proclivity, actually impels us to understand how researchers (as producers of knowledge) and the consumers of their knowledge are invested in interpretive cycles, and how their respective roles can be made more explicit. By showing the need and possibilities for this foregrounding of researchers’

\(^{16}\) The hermeneutic and phenomenological problems related to “interpretation” and “truth” respectively have been variously addressed in the hermeneutical and phenomenological traditions of Georg Hans Gardamar, Martin Heidegger, and Kwasi Wiredu. Although the notion of truth as objective is rejected, articulating truth as opinion does not necessarily uphold extreme epistemological permissiveness where “anything goes”. For further reading, see Wiredu (1980), Heidegger (Heidegger, 2001), and (Gadamer, 2008).
position and role, this study implicitly underscores the potentials of bridging the gap between theory, policy and practice by paying close attention to the ways researchers themselves are caught in the same social dilemmas of language choices they address. Through their own language choices, language policy and planning scholars potentially undermine the credibility of their academic knowledge. By offering a critical perspective on the political potentials of ELP studies, this study demonstrates that insofar as language decisions are hardly about languages but about language communities and users (Oakes, 2001), and insofar as ELP scholars are language users, their work are never neutral but part of a knowledge production system that work to unveil as well as perpetuate social control through language behaviors.

Using a variety of conflict theories to explain the logic of ELP in multilingual societies captures political and economic conditions of inequality embedded in the social cartography of India and Nigeria. Mapping social relation linguistically (what I call “linguistic social cartography”\textsuperscript{17}) through education exposes underlying ideological operations that shape choices and actions on languages (Ricento, 2000a) that are often neglected in language policy and planning studies. Central to this approach is the problematics of power imbalances reflected in contests over political participation, 

\textsuperscript{17} Cartographic explorations of linguistic phenomena take different forms: in development sciences, it attempts to map language function neurologically and to understand how the brain process linguistic and non-linguistic (say, numeric) inputs (Lubin, Pineau, Hodent, & Houdé, 2006); in linguistics, it is concerned with mapping the territorialization and geo-expansions of languages, as seen in the works of Greenberg, (1972) and Guthrie (1967-9; 1970). I use linguistic social cartography to illustrate the interconnectedness of linguistic phenomena to larger social relations.
economic control and cultural identity (Adrey, 2009; Benedikter, 2009; Brock-Utne & Skattum, 2009; Djité, 2008; May, 2006; Canagarajah A. S., 2005; Moore, 2000). Elites’ control of institutional apparatuses of policymaking is pitted against disenfranchised language communities and advocacy groups with exiguous resources but solid resolve for effective language mobilization. Powerful foreign powers and institutions of the Western hemisphere are listed as external beneficiaries, whose control of processes of knowledge production on the functions and statuses of language empowers indigenous elites and advances their dominance over vital economic means (Qorro M. A., 2009). I argue that this class structure dualism is simplistic; the individual who is the basic unit of this elite contra non-elite relationship interpenetrates both spheres of activities at multiple levels (local, national and international), reconfiguring each as their roles change and affiliations shift. As language policy and planning research become more and more activist-oriented, especially with the popularization of critical sociolinguistics (Tollefson, 2002), ELP studies need theoretical revision that unbundle the shifting dynamics of significant ELP actors and unpack the complexities of their actions (Skattum & Brock-Utne, 2009).

Such revisions need to go beyond the focus on ELP documents since they inform us not only about provisions for languages, their functions, and language communities, but also serve as proximate pointers to the specific mechanisms and general processes through which they were formulated. Not entirely normative texts that encapsulate
objective standards of language conditions and uses, language policy documents can be read as contestable proposals (or to borrow Moore’s words, “factive text”) around which wider social forces frame ongoing political, economic and social exchanges (Moore, 2000). As such, policy documents point us to actors who are directly or indirectly, remotely or proximately (even distally or proximally) engaged in policy negotiations and formulation in and outside government institutions. Following Moore’s poststructuralist and postmodernist critique of Cooper’s model, I interpret policy texts and associate documents as well as data from what Moore describes as “policy elites”—elite policymakers in and outside government (including researchers)—not as facts that represent actual reality but as loaded constructs of dynamic dialogic processes involving a host of participants under varying social conditions. By privileging such critical interpretation of data, I intend to foreground the lived experiences of relevant policy actors and close the gap often imposed by researchers between what people say and the actual circumstances in which it is said, as well as the actual conditions of their lives (Smith D. E., 1990). It also enables participants to encounter, engage and challenge the researcher and the implicit interests s/he embodies. Through this, I hope the researcher’s role in the ELP process in which s/he is inextricably entangled becomes a clearer and more consistent voice capable of informing the educational practices s/he passionately engages.
Overview of Research

To analyze ELP from a process perspective that localizes policymaking on multiple arenas, I employ Cooper’s (1989) model to investigate what actors attempt to influence what (language) behaviors of which people under what conditions and by what means, through what decision-making process intended for what ends, and producing what effects in India, Nigeria, and UNESCO (also see Ager, 1996). This broad multidimensional question directs us to more specific ones: What are the operational dynamics of these eight elements on the local, national, and international levels, and how do they interact/network? What are the education language policymaking framework(s) in India, Nigeria and UNESCO and how have these changed or persisted since the mid-twentieth century? What implications arise from the operational dynamics of identified “actors”, “behaviors”, “people”, “conditions”, “means”, “processes”, “ends”, and “effects” and their outcomes in understanding education language policy processes in multilingual societies?

The first question above from Cooper’s (1989) model is purely descriptive. However, it renders the necessary substantive platform for the explanations and theorizations sought in the subsequent questions. To situate these explanations disciplinarily, I examine (in Chapter Two) developments in language policy and planning and ELP scholarship - using Ricento’s (2000a) historical review of the field – since the mid-twentieth century. These include the shift from monolingualism to multilingualism,
perception of multilingualism as a resource and not a problem, and emphasis on the ideological and ecological dimensions of language critical for understanding human agency in ELP processes. The goal of this review of language policy and planning/ELP literature is to underscore scholarly rationales for changes in actual ELPs and educational practices of multilingual societies.

In Chapter Three, I discuss the theoretical anchorage of this research on critical sociolinguistics with a poststructuralist leaning. I envision language as a discourse tied to systems of knowledge production through which power asymmetries are established and maintained. To understand ELP processes, I look at how the linkages of power and knowledge embody and instrumentalize language through education. By demonstrating this linkage of power and knowledge through/in language, I intend to show that understanding the persistence of current ELPs invites us to rethink (and revise) relationships among social actors not merely from a dualistic notion of hegemony but one that accounts for the mutual interactions of social agencies.

Chapter Four presents the methodological position of this study in three parts. In the first part, I explain the rationale for and interpretation of critical ethnography as the major methodological orientation, guided by my positionality – epistemologically and historically. Further, I show how I translate these methodological and epistemological positioning into actual data collection strategies (or methods). In the second part, I describe the study sites, outlining the criteria for selecting locations, participants and
their respective institutions. This section is guided by the assumption that ELP processes are not localized in government institutions alone, and offers justification for the overall comparative case studies design of this study. The third part explains the data collection processes, and is intended to take the reader on an excursion through the multi-site encounter with data.

The findings of this study are contained in three chapters: Chapters Five, Six and Seven respectively on India, Nigeria and UNESCO. Chapters Five and Six are similar in structure and (a) unveil often neglected historical grounds for current ELP processes, and (b) report findings on interviews and observation. The first part uses data from document analyses to argue that in India and Nigeria, historical forces are not bygone realities consigned to the past but actual lived experiences that shape language behaviors and ELP decisions at all levels. The second part relies on interview and observation data to report findings related to the specific research questions. Here, I articulate participants’ feedback in the form of vignettes framed around three central issues of this research. In Chapter Seven, I briefly outline some comparative themes between India and Nigeria and examine UNESCO’s role in ELP processes of multilingual societies. I argue that UNESCO has maintained a pro-multilingual education position since its inception but have had marginal success in transforming ELPs in countries like India and Nigeria.
In Chapter Eight (the last chapter), I discuss the findings in the preceding three chapters, make some conclusions remarks and outline future directions for studies in this area. Following one of the basic assumptions of this study, I propose an expansion of the scope of scholarship in language policy and planning and ELP to offer a conceptual space that will accommodate broader social forces in ELP processes. Further, I show how such an expansion allows us specifically to account for the historical dimensions of the findings reported in preceding chapters. I revisit the notion of ELP as an ongoing dynamic process and attempt to reconcile the notion of process with the pervasive lack of change in ELPs in India and Nigeria. To do this, I highlight the inherent complexities, dilemmas and paradoxes as well as the networks and disjuncture inscribed into the operational logics of change and stability as part of ELP process. I deploy the arguments of coupling/decoupling, central to organizational studies to explicate this relationship.

In this chapter also, I use these findings and discussions to suggest future directions in language policy and planning/ELP scholarship. I make a case for a major distinction between two scopes of language policy decisions. This distinction is informed by some ongoing conceptual confusions and inconsistencies in scholarship on language policy and planning and ELP revealed by the findings of this study. Finally, following the advocacy inflection of language policy and planning and ELP studies, I suggest a number of implications that arise from the findings of this study and the ways they can be
appropriated in the field. My goal is to show that the significant of this (and indeed other similar studies) stretch beyond theories and make strong statements about educational practices in multilingual societies as a whole. These therefore, open avenues to future research issues.
CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF LITERATURE: IDEOLOGY, ECOLOGY, AGENCY, AND THE EVOLUTION OF THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON LANGUAGE POLICY SCHOLARSHIP

The outpouring of scholarship in language policy and planning and ELP in the last half century that has given rise to a huge body of interdisciplinary scholarship, a direct consequence of heightening awareness of language issues in society, correspond with massive program initiatives from international organizations, national governments, local communities and trans-territorial entities. Within academic circles, dissatisfactions with the inadequacies and revisions of earlier research on (and their corresponding policies and practices) have led to some major conceptual shifts since the 1960s. First, earlier view of multilingualism as an obstacle to intellectual and socio-economic and political development, which led to the promotion of monolingualism as ideal for the individual and society has long been reversed; experts now believe multilingualism entails cognitive, social and psychological benefits that can translate into societal development.\(^{18}\) Second, earlier recommendation of foreign European

\(^{18}\) The debate over multilingualism and monolingualism yielded controversial concepts like “semilingualism” (inadequate competence in L1, L\(_n\) as a result of L2 acquisition) and counter concepts such as “multicompetence”. For a brief review of this debate, see MacSwan (2000) and Cook (1992).
languages and a stable diglossia to “developing” nations as linguistic requisites for modernization has been reversed in favor of indigenous languages. Experts show that not only do multilingual learners outperform their monolingual counterparts; the cognitive and social benefits of multilingualism are maximal when learning begins in learners’ first language(s) or mother language.\(^{19}\)

Third, earlier perspectives on language as an autonomous abstract system and language policy and planning as purely technical (thus neutral) have given way to a view of language as fundamentally social and revealed the political and ideological underpinnings of language policy and planning scholarship and policymaking. As such, experts in the field now pay closer attention to the ways their work help to perpetuate linguistic and other social conditions of subordination.

Engaging in what Ricento (2006) calls “historical archeology” on language policy and planning research permits us to clarify what language policy and planning scholars study, how they engage their subject matter and the goal of their investigations. Such an historical review reveals the spectrum and varied perspectives of language policy and planning research. More than purely academic exercises, these studies are driven by actual language issues emerging from major social changes of the twentieth century and the epistemological evolution they herald in language-related disciplines. Since language

\(^{19}\) As reflected in recent initiatives like UNESCO’s International Mother Language Day (IMLD), the term “mother language” is now used instead of earlier popular terms like “vernacular language” or “mother tongue” to appropriately categorize these linguistic codes as languages (not “tongues” “dialects” or “vernaculars”). Yet, “mother tongue” continues to be the preferred term in relevant academic scholarship (Herrlitz, Ongstad, & van de Ven, 2007; Rao K. V., 2000), the advocacy nature of such research on indigenous language rights notwithstanding.
policy and planning research has been largely need-driven, language policy scholarship on/in Africa and Southeast Asia contributes immensely to the theoretical architectonic and cumulative intellectual products of language policy and planning studies. An additional goal of this chapter, therefore, is to examine the constellation of perspectives from the said historical archeology of research on language policy and planning that are most relevant to ELP in India and Nigeria. I argue that most language policy and planning research on Africa and Southeast Asia merges theoretical and methodological rigor with social advocacy. The extent to which these changes in language policy and planning scholarship and corresponding program initiatives have seen similar changes in actual ELPs of multilingual societies is a major concern of this study. Following language policy and planning/ELP scholarship on Africa and Asia, I demonstrate—in line with Ricento (2000a)—how recent theoretical perspectives converge on three overlapping and interdependent issues of ideology, ecology and agency, which are traceable to interdisciplinary research in the social sciences and humanities.

Interdisciplinarity have come to define language policy and planning research because of its eclectic theoretical foundations and primarily due to the intricate imbrications of language in all aspects of social life. Covered in this literature review are works from an array of social science disciplines and humanities. Yet, language policy and planning research itself is a branch of sociolinguistics as well as a subcategory of several research fields. Specifically, sociolinguistics and political science play preeminent roles in the theoretical and methodological developments of language policy and
planning research and practice (Ager, 1996). This unavoidable interdisciplinarity reinforces the difficulties in formulating and lack of necessity for a grand theory of language policy and planning. Examining the diverse theoretical perspectives arising from this multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary scholarship on language policy and planning is the focus of the next section.

**Theoretical Perspectives on Language Policies and Planning**

Research and practice in ELP is conceptually grounded on language policy and planning research. Historical and theoretical perspectives on language policy and planning encapsulate a wide range of scholarship on language in relation to several aspects of society: political development (Sarangi, 2009; Ricento, 2000a; 2000b; Weinstein, 1990), social identity (Joseph, 2004), economic growth (Rassool N., 2007; Webb, 2002), and social justice (Williams, 2008; Edwards, 1984). While ELP studies address decisions about language in education, most language policy and planning scholars see schools as major sites for negotiating language issues in society (Tollefson, 2002). My review of historical and theoretical perspectives in ELP is cast on this broader language policy and planning domain.

**Evolution of Theoretical Perspectives on Language Policy and Planning**

The first language policy and planning researcher to use the term “language planning” in scholarly literature, Einar Ingvald Haugen (1959), defined it as
the activity of preparing a normative orthography, grammar, and dictionary for the guidance of writers and speakers in a non-homogeneous speech community. In this practical application of linguistic knowledge we are proceeding beyond descriptive linguistics into an area where judgment must be exercised in the form of choices among available linguistic forms (p. 8)

Half a century later, the scope of current language policy and planning studies has expanded beyond Haugen’s orthographic, grammatical and lexical codification, and researchers have expanded their disciplinary grounds beyond sociolinguistics to draw on political theory, critical theories and postmodernism (Pennycook, 2006; Schmidt S. R., 2006; Tollefson, 2006; Ager, 1996). Indeed, changes in LLP research reflect broader twentieth-century epistemologies of structural-functionalism, critical theory and postmodernism. Whether from critical theory or postmodernist perspectives late twentieth-century researchers have come to question popular assumptions that guided earlier language policy and planning analysis. Yet, language policy and planning studies continue to reflect the tension between theoretical and applied knowledge inherent in Haugen’s formulation. The question facing language policymakers and researchers now is not so much about how to develop languages—a purely technical issue—but about “which languages to develop for what purposes” (Hornberger, 2006, emphasis is mine). This philosophical and ethical question illustrates how language issues embroiled in fundamental problems of social identity, economic development and cultural politics of multilingual nations continue to define and complicate the quest for language policy and planning theory in the last half century of the field’s history.
Early Language Policy and Planning as Social Practice and Academic Enterprise

Decisions about language in society have been an ongoing part of human societies for centuries. For instance, following King John’s loss of Normandy in 1204—a loss that forced him and successive kings to concentrate their possessions in Britain—the 1348 Statute of Pleading required that English be used in British law courts. In France, the elite dialect of *francien* became the standard language for the developing territory through occasional decrees (such as the 1539 Edict of Villers-Cotterêts) but primarily through ideological and cultural domination that often included military conquest (Ager, 1996). Similar decrees, ideological and cultural shifts were responsible for the popularization and decline of Latin as lingua franca throughout the Roman Empire. Recent language policy and planning studies have focused more on linguistic issues of newly independent nations mostly in Africa and Asia, as well as Western nations witnessing increased immigration after World War II. This chapter therefore, focuses more on the literature produced from this recent language policy and planning work.

Early interest on language policy issues in the mid twentieth century led to a series of conferences, major research projects and cross-disciplinary publications. Following Haugen’s pioneering work in the late 1950s, sociolinguists called attention to a new problem—that of national languages in new multilingual states—to which modern linguistics experts have not been able to address their scholarly interests
Some important works emerged in the 1960s and sparked more interest in this field. Notable among them are Guxman (1960), Ray (1963; 1961), Haugen (1966a; 1966b), and Havránek (1963). The 1966 Airlie House Conference in Virginia organized by the Committee on Sociolinguistics under SSRC, which gave rise to Fishman, Ferguson, & Das Gupta’s (1968) publication, called attention in sociolinguistic circles to the “language problems of developing nations”. Countries like Canada and Ireland engaged in studies of language policy issues facing their respective governments (see Rubin & Jernudd, 1971).

Other seminal works emerged from language policy and planning researches and conferences: *Can Language be Planned?* (Rubin & Jernudd, 1971) from case studies of India, Israel, Indonesia and Sweden conducted in the 1960s by Das Gupta, Fishman, Rubin and Jernudd respectively;\(^{20}\) *Language Planning Processes* (Rubin, Fishman, Jernudd, Das Gupta, & Ferguson, 1977) from an expert meeting in Honolulu, part of the Ford Foundation-funded project in Israel, Indonesia and Sweden (Hornberger, 2006; Paulston & Tucker, 1999). In addition, the Ford Foundation funded other language policy and planning research projects in “developing” nations, such as the *Ife Primary Project in Nigeria* (Fafunwa, Macauley, & Sokoya, 1989). Poor outcomes in policy-oriented socioeconomic transformational governance forced language policy and planning researchers to rethink and critique their work. For instance, while Cobarrubias and

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\(^{20}\) These studies were conducted as part of the International Research Project on Language Planning Processes funded by the Ford Foundation in the 1960s.
Fishman’s (1983) report on progress in language planning was cautiously optimistic, Rubin (1983) completely problematized the so-called rational model of language policy and planning. By the turn of the century, early optimism about language policy and planning as effective means for socioeconomic development and national unity turned into caution (and sometimes cynicism) about the capacity of such policies to engender “modernization” and potential for stagnating development and engendering social disintegration (Sarangi, 2009; Ricento, 2006; 2000a).

**Phases in Language Policy and Planning**

Ricento (2000a) analyzes the evolution of language policy and planning since World War II along three phases, typified by macro sociopolitical events and processes at the national or supranational levels, epistemological currents driving research, and strategic ends to which language policy and planning analysis were directed. The first phase is characterized by macro sociopolitical conditions of decolonization, epistemological currents of structuralism, and pragmatic commitment to nation building through strategic statewide policymaking. Due to the exigencies of colonial independence and imagined sociopolitical and economic transformations of new nations, numerous Western sociolinguists were engaged in language policymaking in newly independent states. Structural linguists saw developing nations both as arenas for transforming their knowledge into practice and sites for developing theories and models of language planning (Fishman, 1968). Most works focused on developing typologies...
and approaches to language planning such as Haugen’s (1966a) language planning model and Kloss’ (1966) typology of multilingualism (Ricento, 2000a). Specific language policy and planning studies are found in Fishman, Ferguson and Das Gupta (1968) and Rubin and Jernudd (1971).

Grounded on modernization epistemologies, Western sociolinguists perceived multilingualism as an obstacle to nation-building and “modernization”.\textsuperscript{21} Experts’ consensus that linguistic homogeneity was necessary for modernization and Westernization\textsuperscript{22} framed status planning around selection of a national language, usually major European languages of colonial administration. Following this one-language/one-country standard, most countries selected English or French for use in formal and specialized domains and indigenous languages elsewhere. Western sociolinguists assumed that this stable diglossia facilitated “Westernization” in the West and therefore is necessary for similar social changes elsewhere (Fishman, 1968a). The prescription for successful nationhood and development entailed cultural and linguistic unity, and only “developed” or “developable” languages with standardized, written forms adaptable to technological and social advancements were fit to serve as national language (Ricento, 2000a).

\textsuperscript{21} The term “modernization” is a loosely-defined compound term that lacks accurate descriptive referents, often used coterminously with “development”, to represent the sociopolitical and economic progress and advances in science and technology imagined by newly independent “developing” nations. For a review of the tenets of modernization, see Inglehart & Welzel (2005).

\textsuperscript{22} Part of the ambiguities of the term “modernization” is (or has led to) its problematic use as a synonym for Westernization, the conferral (through imposition or voluntary adoption) and imbibing of Western cultural and intellectual norms by non-Western societies.
Language policy and planning experts and practitioners viewed language planning as apolitical technical exercise in generating and applying theories to straightforward problems in a pragmatic fashion. Fishman’s (1968) distinction between “new developing” and “old developing” nations led to the notion that linguistic problems of countries, such as India and Pakistan, are unique because of their long literary traditions. Language planners only need to modernize these classical languages through corpus planning to meet the demands of Western science and technology and to foster widespread literacy, participation and unity. New nations (e.g., Nigeria) were more problematic, since no single indigenous language or diglossic bilingualism was immediately feasible. For Fishman, the ideal in both old and new nations was an importation of new European languages, and the modernization of classical standard languages (in old nations) where importation is not possible (Ricento, 2000a; 2000b).

Thus, while theoretical linguists believed that all languages were equal, most experts involved with language policy and planning developed language hierarchies based on relative suitability for national development. Inadvertently, this model of language planning enhanced the dominance of European languages and reproduced (or at least, mapped neatly onto growing) economic, political and social inequalities tied to earlier linguistic differences. Although early language policy and planning researchers were often critical of their work and the complexity of language planing, their critiques remained within the modernization framework and largely failed to capture the ways in
which their activities sabotaged their proposed goals of progress and unity (Ricento, 2000a).

The second phase of language policy and planning evolution is characterized by the failure of modernization, emergence of critical sociolinguistics and a strategic concern with access and participation in social processes, particularly education, politics and economy (Ricento, 2000b). In spite of the hype about policy-driven socioeconomic, political and scientific-technological progress on the one hand, and optimistic positivist postulations of stages of modernization and national development on the other (Rostow, 1963; Hutmacher, 2001), the developing world remained largely dependent on the West and witnessed significant political instability (Gordon, 1992). Foreign dependence led to the idea of neocolonialism (Nkrumah, 1965), the notion that direct colonial control did not end but only gave way to new forms of economic and political subjugation of the South (Miller, Vandome, & McBrews, 2009; Satre, 2001; Barongo, 1980).

Motivated by the competition for economic, cultural and ideological control that defined the Cold War, world powers paradoxically called for democratization of new independent nations but supported rogue and despotic regimes (Gordon, 1992). Further, dismantling early postcolonial democracies created what Herbamas (1975) called “legitimation crisis” for many elite-run governments, and conduced to social stratification (often along ethnolinguistic lines) through patronage clientelism and military control (Gordon, 1992). The role of language, culture and ethnicity in this
process is well-documented (Bassey, 1999; Pennycook, 1994; Said, 1993; Phillipson, 1992).

Language planners and analysts responded with self-reflexive criticism, noting the inherent limitations and potential negative effects of modernization and developmental paradigms that guided their work. Further, they challenged the assumed neutrality of language planning exercises (Cobarrubias, 1983; see Hornberger, 2006; Ricento, 2000). Besides the political interests of language policy and planning exercises and the limitations of modernization theories, Ricento (2000a) argues:

To the extent that language planning theory was thought of as a branch of resource management, it was bound to fail...given the complexity of the task, the countless and uncontrollable variables involved, the difficulty of evaluating the effectiveness of policies, and the virtual impossibility of engineering society in nations with long and complex colonial histories (p. 14).

Not only were language planners and analysts applying limited and problematic models, the linguistic issues they engaged were much more complex than they understood. Language policy and planning research focus gradually shifted to examining how language policy and planning efforts complicate the social conditions they intend to address (see Hymes, 1996).

The failure of modernization policies in the developing world was only one factor driving this self-reflexivity. As Ricento (2000a) shows, advances in linguistics and related social sciences prompted experts to rethink and problematize the assumptions underlying language policy and planning research. One such development was the
sustained attack on autonomous linguistics as a paradigm for linguistic studies.

Autonomous linguistics, following Sassure’s (1986) and Chomsky’s (1957; 1965) works, views language as a discrete and finite system characterized by standard grammars. In challenging autonomous linguistics, terms such as “native speaker”, “mother tongue”, and “linguistic competence” fell in disfavor (Fasold, 1992; Paikday, 1985). Scholars argued that the assumptions of autonomous linguistics mirror the epistemological contraptions of positivism (Mühlhäusler, 1996; 1990; Sankoff, 1988; Le Page, 1985; Harris R., 1981). Diglossia, a linguistic condition that was previously accepted as neutral and necessary for modernization—following the monolingual ideal—came under criticism as “an ideological naturalization of sociolinguistic arrangements” that perpetuated social inequalities through language policies (Woolard & Schieffelin, 1994, p. 69; Ricento, 2000a).

Positioning social inequality at the center of language policy and planning analysis conflated with the preponderance of critical theories in analyzing language policy and planning research and practice (see Hymes, 1996; Luke, McHoul, & Mey, 1990; Wolfson & Manes, 1985). The focus shifted from status planning and issues of “standardization”, “graphization”, and “modernization” to the economic, social and political impact of language contacts and the policies they generated (Ricento, 2000a). Previously, the

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23 Autonomous linguistics is often pitted against cognitive linguistics. The notion of “autonomy” itself has multiple interpretations, some of which are not necessarily incompatible with cognitive linguistics (see Taylor, 2007). Of interest here is that autonomous linguistics encapsulates several assumptions of language as a socially decontextualized discrete system of codes susceptible to technical analytical manipulation.
formal structures and functions of language were the major preoccupation of linguists and language policy and planning analysts since mid century—a system whose primitive elements were symbols, such as $\Sigma$ (= sentence), $N$ (= Noun), $NP$ (=Noun Phrase) and $Aux$ (=Auxilliary), analogous to mathematicians’ $x$ and $y$ or logicians’ $p$ and $q$ (Taylor, 2007). Critical approaches to language policy and planning rejected this notion of language as an independent system susceptible to objective analysis and arrangement, and sought reconceptualizations of linguistic analysis that prioritized complex social elements of human societies. Put simply, policies that relied on criteria of numbers of speakers or suitability for modernization in assigning “High function” to dominant European languages and “Low functions” to indigenous languages “tended to perpetuate socioeconomic assymetries based on education”, access to which was internally controlled by local elites, and externally shaped by regional and global interests (Ricento, 2000a, p. 16).

The third phase in Ricento’s (2000) “historical archeology” of language policy and planning is characterized by what he calls a “new world order”, the epistemology of postmodernism, and commitment to “linguistic human rights”. This new world order is marked by massive population migrations, resurgence of national ethnolinguistic identities, and the concomitant and converse emegence of regoinal coalitions (e.g., the

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European Union), which draw local and regional languages into competition with supranational languages, such as English and French. Additionally, according to one interpretation, the globalization of capitalism positions the media of dominant nations as effective tools for what Gramsci calls “cultural hegemony” and an intensification of neocolonial control (Said, 1993).

Reactions to these developments in language policy and planning circles varied. First, language extinction received enormous attention (Krauss, 1998; Hale, et al., 1992; Krauss, 1992). That 95% of the world’s population speak only about 100 of the world’s 6,000 languages became a major concern of language policy and planning researchers and practitioners. Language endangerment experts applied two distinct perspectives to their research. The first, an ecological perspective, compares cultural and linguistic diversity to biodiversity, and argues that both are mutually interdependent (Maffi, 2005; Harmon, 1996; 1995). Taking ecological sustainability as reference point, linguistic ecologists consider indigenous languages necessary for the transmission of technical aspects of traditional knowledge about plants, animals and other species critical to the conservation of biodiversity (Skutnabb-Kangas, 2002).

Further, extrapolating the logic that diversity enhances adaptability while uniformity endangers species due to inflexibility and inadaptability (Baker, 2001), linguistic and cultural diversity are complementary requisites for sustainable advancement of human social ecology. Accordingly, preserving (and indeed, nurturing) global linguistic diversity becomes a condutio sine qua non, ceteris paribus, for global
ecological sustainability. Critics apply the same logic of ecological conservation to argue that extinction of species (and languages) are “natural” and therefore unavoidable phenomena of social and ecological evolution. Language policy and planning experts who claim to know what is best for language communities are therefore guilty of the same paternalism underlying the imperialism they berate (Ladefoged P., 1992).25

A second perspective on language endangerment called for linguistic rights as a separate category of protectable human rights. Championed by critical theorists and postmodernists, linguistic human rights emerged from the postulation of linguistic imperialism (Phillipson, 1997; 1992). The term “linguistic imperialism” encapsulates the numerous activities that embody the ideological and structural asymmetrical relationships of the North and the South under an overarching framework of cultural, economic and political domination that interlock with language. In this schema, language is a means through which inequalities of power and resources are enacted and perpetuated. The ultimate outcome is marginalization and “linguicism” through ideological apparatuses and direct language legislations.

To protect indigenous groups and their languages from linguistic and other forms of imperialism, Phillipson (1992) proposes the promotion of linguistic human rights as a proactive political and moral imperative. Some critics however, argue that Phillipson’s work lacks sufficient empirical evidence. Others, including those who share his critical

25 For a critical response to Ladefoged’s (1992) critique of the ecological perspective on linguistic diversity, see Dorian (1993).
theory lens, argue that the assumptions and conclusions of Phillipson’s model are monolithic, and that by allowing no alternative explanations and outcomes in language contact, it is too deterministic (Conrad, 1996; Davies, 1996). Davies further argues that Phillipson’s thesis is not falsifiable: a critic may present evidences where indigenous language communities chose to use a dominant language, but Phillipsonians’ ready-made response is that such language communities have been conditioned through cultural imperialism to make such choices. As such, this model denies indigenous communities the capacity for active agency while mirroring the paternalism it criticizes (1997; 1996).

Indeed, some critical applied linguists with postmodernist bias instantiate the tendency of linguistic imperialism to yield paradoxical outcomes, arguing that the ideologies tied to, say, English, can result in support for and/or restrictions of indigenous languages (Canagarajah A. S., 2000; Pennycook, 2000; Canagarajah A. S., 1999; Pennycook, 1994). Thus, the notion of individual or societal agency in transforming aparatuses of imperialism into tools of resistance and affirmation of cultural identity serves as a major conceptual innovation as well as obstacle in understanding ideological means of social control through language. The ways ideology shapes language policy and planning research and practice has been well investigated (see Ricento, 2000a). Specifically, Woolard and Schiefelin (1994) examine the ways in which ideology and language have been used in anthropology, sociolinguistics and cultural studies. For language policy and planning experts influenced by the critical social theories of
Habermas, Foucault and Giddens, the linkages between ideology and power in modern states and their tendency to legitimize dominant social groups or discourses is the most salient analytic task of language policy studies. Since, this third phase was still in its formative stage when Ricento’s (Ricento, Ideology, Politics and Language Policies: Focus on English, 2000a) work appeared, I examine some important developments in language policy and planning over the past ten years and the lessons they bear for the evolution of theoretical perspectives in language policy. Most of these developments have remained along the lines highlighted by Ricento and other historical commentators of the late twentieth century.

**Recent Theoretical Developments in Language Policy and Planning**

Major developments in the social sciences and the sociopolitical, economic and cultural conditions of language contact continue to shape language policy and planning research and practice in the twenty-first century. Disenchantment with earlier modernist approaches to language policy and planning studies, and the self-reflexivity of critical theory and postmodern epistemology, demand that language policy and planning experts step back and examine the role of their work in perpetuating inequalities through language policies and linguistic practices. Paradoxically, this critical approach works to increase the awareness about language issues (including endangerment and linguistic rights) that call for urgent actions. Consequently, the tension between theory and practice remains deeply entrenched in language policy and
planning activities. As Ricento (2006) argues, the “desire to effect social change is what
drives the research agenda, rather than theory building for its own sake” (p. xi). This
interface between theory and practice however, accounts for the vitality and
unpredictability that continue to define the field to date.

The first decade of the twenty-first century witnesses two significant
developments in the field: proposal of an integrative language policy and planning
framework, and emerging emphases on ideology, ecology, and agency. Both
developments emanate from the critical theoretical and postmodernist critiques, as well
as the theory-practice tension of language policy and planning scholarship alluded to
above. Specifically, they signal growing disinterest in specific theories and a (coagulation
of) focus on broader conceptual paradigms (ideology, ecology, and agency) that
characterize language policy research and activities.

Integrative Framework for Language Policy and Planning

To understand the emergent integrative framework on language policy and
planning, a quick review of earlier frameworks is important. Early sociolinguistic works
on language policy, following Haugen’s (1959) formulation, were engrossed in
orthographic, grammatical and lexical codification. Language planners worked to
develop languages to fit the expectations of socioeconomic progress. However, before
embarking on language development, planners had to decide on which languages to
develop as well as justify the purpose and political expediency of their choice. As the
scope expanded, two interrelated types of language policy and planning—status planning and corpus planning—emerged. In status planning, a language or its variety is (re)allocated to functional domains in society relative to other languages and domains. Heinz Kloss (1968), the first to use this typology, and William Stewart (1968) developed four criteria for status planning: language origin (indigenous or imported), degree of standardization (availability and extent of development of formal norms for “correct” usage), juridical status (official position in society), and vitality (proportion of users relative to say, the population) (Edwards, 1996). Although related, status planning is not necessarily determined by or intended for language prestige. It simply represents decisions about the position of a language or its varieties relative to other languages or varieties in specified domains.

Corpus planning involves language development through prescriptive interventions on the form or structure of a language intended at generating an “adequate” standard (Wardhaugh, 2008; Ferguson G., 2006; Fishman, 2006; Kloss, 1968). Its focus is standardization, graphization, and modernization (Liddicoat, 2005). Standardization, the process by which a language variety takes precedence over other varieties, confers the status of “supra-dialect” on the choice variety, and frequently leads to sociopolitical and cultural inequality. Graphization involves the selection, modification or development (when non-existent) of scripts and orthographic conventions for a language. Modernization refers to the “lexical and stylistic development of a language for its expansion into hitherto unused domains”
(Hornberger, 2006, p. 30; Wiley, 2003; Ferguson C. A., 1996; Christian, 1988). Unlike status planning which was a prerogative of local political institutions of policy and administration, corpus planning enlisted international linguistic expertise.

In the late 1980s, Robert Cooper (1989) proposed a third type of language policy and planning, acquisition planning, in addition to the status/corpus varieties. Acquisition planning underscores attempts to influence the allocation or distribution of language usually through education. Typically integrated within the entire language policy and planning process, acquisition planning introduces to the society through education, the products of the decisions about the status and corpus of the language. Rather than disparate processes, the typology of language policy and planning represents interrelated exercises that progress under varying limiting conditions.

A different approach to language policy and planning distinguishes “policy” from “cultivation” as separate categories for typological distinctions of language policy and planning activities (Neustupny, 1974). Whereas the “policy” approach attends to statewide status-planning issues on a macro level with emphasis on the distribution of languages, the “cultivation” approach addresses corpus planning issues at the micro language community level, and emphasizes ways of speaking and writing concerned with literary dimensions (Hornberger, 2006). Although not perfectly matched, these binary sets of distinctions of status/corpus and policy/cultivation provide elements of a language policy and planning conceptual matrix articulated by Haugen (1966b; 1983; see Hornberger, 2006).
Using Haugen’s interpretations, Nancy Hornberger (2006) argues for an integration of the different typologies and approaches in language policy and planning research and practice. Graphically, this integrative model includes a six-cell matrix with status planning, corpus planning and acquisition planning on one axis, and policy planning approach and cultivation planning approach on the other (Hornberger, 2006). The first axis address issues of language use (status), users (acquisition) and the language itself (corpus). The second axis focuses on the form (policy approach) and function (cultivation approach) of language. The following is a brief enumeration of the focus of each combination of both axes:

1. The focus of status (policy) planning is officialization, nationalization, standardization of status, and proscriptions about uses of language or its varieties. Status (cultivation) planning attends to issues of revival, maintenance, spread, interlingual communication (both on the international and intranational levels).

2. Acquisition (policy) planning addresses issues relating to language groups, such as education (and schooling), literacy, religion, mass media and work. For acquisition (cultivation) planning, the focus is on reacquisition, maintenance, shifts as well as issues related to foreign and/or second language and literacy.

3. In corpus (policy) planning, issues of standardization of corpus, standardization of auxiliary code as well as graphization constitute the core concerns. This also includes issues of codification of the form of a language, a purely linguistic aim. Corpus (cultivation) planning refers to the modernization of languages for new functions,
including the lexical and stylistic features. More, it involves the renovation (including establishing new forms to take up old functions), purification, reform, stylistic simplification and terminological unification of language. Here, language planners are committed to the elaboration of the language’s function, a semi-linguistic aim (Hornberger, 2006).

The grounds for an integrative framework issues from the logic that the types of and approaches to language planning in and of themselves are not ideologically or politically oriented. It is the goals assigned to language policy and planning activities that determine the direction of change envisioned, and therefore shape their political and ideological potentials (Hornberger, 2006). In addition to standardization, graphization and modernization goals of corpus (and cultivation) planning, language policy and planning now encompasses an array of goals that vary extensively in societies. These goals cut across the different types and approaches to language planning. Besides those listed by Nahir (1984; 1977), Hornberger (2006) lists revival, maintenance, spread, and interlingual communication as goals of status cultivation through increased functional use. Others goals of corpus cultivation include lexical modernization, purification reforms, stylistic simplification and corpus unification.

Not only are these goals intertwined, their vast and growing number illustrates the diversified and mutating conditions driving language planning. Hornberger (2006) argues that no matter what the goal, language planning “proceeds best if pursued along several dimensions at once” (p. 32). In his chapter on “Corpus planning and status
planning: Separates, Opposites or Siamese twins?” Fishman (2006) demonstrates the intricate connections of approaches to language planning that underlie simplistic distinctions taken for granted in sociolinguistic circles. The complexity of the language policy and planning context makes it difficult to determine an adequate initial goal in a successive list of interrelated goals. Thus, language planning activities are usually (and most effective when) engaged in jointly (Fishman, 1979). For instance, to select a language as national official language but provide no writing system and standardized grammar, and no incentive or opportunity for its use as school language will be a policy exercise in futility. However, if conferring official status on a language is followed by opportunities and incentives for it to be learned in all domains (school, work, and all arenas of inter-lingual communication), while furnishing an adequate standardized writing system and modernized lexicon, the entire exercise will fecundate effectiveness of the language policy and planning process (Hornberger, 2006).

An integrative model that attends to the six dimensions depicted in this framework, proponents argue, will enhance effectiveness in language policy and planning processes, especially given the indeterminacy of the planning sequence and complexity of linguistic conditions in society. However, this integrative model assumes that these goals are often well defined, even in a complex and indeterminate linguistic context. Further, this model assumes that the stated goals of language planning, even if well defined, are the major determinants or core commitments of language policy and planning activities.
As I argue presently, the political situatedness and ideological orientations of language policy and planning constrain actors from clearly articulating and pursuing the competing and often ill-defined goals various language policy stakeholders embody. As Hornberger (1994) argues, language planning never occurs in a vacuum, especially with regard to other languages. Language planning requires value judgment (Haugen E., 2006) by individuals constrained by disciplinary bias and/or interests. The inevitability of value judgment about languages and bias explain critical theorists’ concern about the ideological and political investments of language policy and planning activities. Current emphasis on ideology, ecology and agency in language policy and planning studies reflect this critical theoretically informed approach to language policy and planning, especially in multilingual nations.

**Ideology, Ecology, and Agency in Language Policy and Planning**

Recent cutting edge language policy and planning research addresses the potentials of language planning in advancing social change (Hornberger, 1998; McCarty & Zepeda, 1998; Freeman, 1996) as well as its limitations (Moore, 2000; Fettes, 1998; Schiffman, 1996; see Ricento, 2000a). Current work in this field marks growing consensus on revising earlier positivistic assumptions about language and technical approaches to language planning. Earlier works assume that a language is a code with various *forms* (written, spoken, standard, non-standard, etc.), *functions* (often expressed in terms of domains and relative status in society), and *value* (as a medium of
exchange, with particular material and non-material attributes) (Ricento, 2006). Critical linguistic theorists and postmodernists challenge this view of language as a fixed code, and argue that language users rely on their previous communicative experiences in similar circumstances, on similar topics and with similar interlocutors. The notion of systematicity underlying the idea of language as a fixed code is only an illusion arising from this *sedimentation* or partial settling of frequently used communicative forms into temporary subsystems (Pennycook, 2006; Hooper, 1998). It is therefore, not languages that exist but discourses that may be shared by overlapping linguistic communities (Ricento, 2006).

Shaped by social theorists, especially Foucault, discourse – as used by critical theorists and postmodernists in language policy and planning studies – is not apolitical and ahistorical. It constitutes “systems of thoughts composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the subjects and the worlds of which they speak” (Lessa, 2006). This construction of subjects and their worlds underscores asymmetric power relations entailed in the ideological dimensionality of language policy and planning. As the following analysis indicate, the role of ideology—its construction and use in the ascription and achievement of language status, and the resistance and reconstruction it invites—remains constantly interrogated in language policy and planning circles.

Understanding the ideological commitment of language planning to the maintenance of inequalities and subjugation marks only a prelude to the role of
ideology in language policy and planning. As Sonntag (2000) demonstrates with the case of pro-English vs. anti-English and pro-Sanskritized vs. pro-Hindustani North India, ideology informs, but does not determine policy. Viewed from a purely political lens, the role of ideology in language planning is very complicated. For instance, the Anglicist support of English medium education and the Orientalist favor of education in indigenous languages appear ideologically opposed, yet both were designed to facilitate trade and maintain social control of the native population (Pennycook, 2000). In South Africa, the attempt to use indigenous languages in education, following the Bantu Education Act of 1953, which drew massive resistance and counteractive clamor for English, signals the unpredictability and historicalness of ideological influence on language planning and (re)construction of discourse. In his analysis of the mixed outcomes of the ideological supports for and resistance against English in South Africa, Ridge (2000) notes that “an emphasis on English and an emphasis on African languages can be racist and dehumanizing. By the same token, both can be liberatory and affirmative” (p. 164). For Ricento (2000a) therefore, “[D]ifferent language policies may share a common underlying ideology, and similar language policies may derive from competing ideological orientations” (p. 3).

The notion of ideology here is purely political. A Foucauldian critique rejects ideology (especially its Marxist formulation), because “it always stands in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to count as truth” (Foucault, 1984, p. 60). Accordingly, postmodernists eschew the pursuit for truth and instead seek
explanations for how discourse produces and sustains truths. For postmodernists, “truth” and “knowledge” are plural (i.e., we can only speak of “truths” and “knowledges”), contextual, and historically constructed through discourse. Yet, although instructive, the epistemological underpinnings of postmodernism can lead to self-destructive anti-rational conclusions (Epstein & Carroll, 2005). While the notion of ideology as fundamental to language policy and planning is contested, the significance of power differentials that issue from attitudes about language and linguistic communities, how these translate into policies and social practices of, and the resultant shifts in language forms, functions, and value, continue to shape current scholarship on language planning.

To the extent that planning and policies shape language shifts, an ecological perspective on language policy and planning implicates the complexity of ideological elements in language policies. The application of the logic of biodiversity to cultural and linguistic diversity is complicated by the varied and often conflicting outcomes of language ideologies. In the South African case referenced above, there are ample evidences that speakers of local languages shifted to English, and that subsequent generations may no longer speak the original (local) language (or use it only in restricted domains) due to policies promoting colonial languages. However, it is also true that English was adopted by the African National Congress (ANC) in the struggle against

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26 Although their critique of the postmodernism focuses on its deviation from epistemological mappings of the field of Comparative Education, Epstein & Carroll (2005) locates the intellectual foundations of postmodernism in German Idealism and Heideggerian thoughts, and expose postmodernism’s anti-intellectual implications that are insidious to the possibilities of knowledge.
apartheid (Ricento, 2006). Given that language contacts are historically situated, ideologies demanding for the use of indigenous languages can conflict with those requiring the use of dominant languages to challenge power relations, which endanger native languages and social forms.

An analysis of the role of ideology and ecology, therefore, invites us to reject as simplistic certain critical theoretical grand narratives, such as the role of “big” languages (e.g., English) in annihilating minority languages (Ricento, 2006). Moreover, the notion of linguistic imperialism (Phillipson, 2006) assumes that English (and other dominant international languages) is a discrete code shared by various linguistic communities worldwide. Yet, a postmodernist critique suggests that the term “Englishes” is a more accurate descriptor, since it captures hybrids of the language, which reflect processes of borrowing, mixing and styling with other languages or discourses (Ricento, 2006). In themselves, ideology and the ecological perspective are insufficient in explaining or revising the limitations of earlier ultra-positivistic approaches without losing salient lessons accumulated in language policy and planning research of the past half century.

Ricento (2000b) suggests that the key variable that separates the earlier positivistic paradigm and technicist approaches from the more recent critical and postmodern perspectives, is agency. The role of individuals and groups in making decisions about language use, attitudes and values in society is critical to understanding the role ideology plays in language planning as well as establishing grounds for linguistic
human rights on the logic of ecology and biodiversity. As Ricento (2000a) states, the most important and unanswered question of language policy and planning is

Why do individuals opt to use (or cease to use) particular languages and varieties for specified functions in different domains, and how do those choices influence – and how are they influenced by – institutional language policy decision-making (local to national and international)? (p. 23).

Interrogating agency permits us to unpack the loaded constructions of power asymmetry inherent in ideological orientations to language policy and planning, while addressing the substantive issues regarding the need for linguistic and cultural diversity that underlie the ecological perspective. Further, questions about agency open ways to articulate the broader conceptual landscape of language policy and planning for addressing core questions of network/interaction dynamics that produce or reinforce political domination, economic control, and cultural and social changes resulting from language contact.

The centrality of agency to this renewed emphasis on ideology and ecology is a conceptual anchorage that runs through various theoretical perspectives in language policy and planning since the mid twentieth century. It is not merely the conditions of political, economic, and cultural asymmetries characterizing the world but more the roles of different individuals and groups in establishing and maintaining these asymmetries that mark language policy and planning research and practice as conflict-laden and power-prone. It is on this issue of agency that ideological orientations to language policy and planning and possibilities of ecological sustainability must be
grounded. In this light, I argue that theoretical perspectives in language policy and planning studies fall into two broad categories: hegemony and mutual interaction, both of which serve as overarching narratives within which the different (even conflicting) paradigms can be situated and interpreted. I use them as heuristic devices for approaching language policymaking in Nigeria and India.
CHAPTER THREE
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: LANGUAGE, POWER, AND SOCIAL RELATIONS, AND THE HEURISTICS OF HEGEMONY AND MUTUAL INTERACTIONISM

There is no overarching theory of [language policy] and planning

Ricento, Language Policy\textsuperscript{27}

Language is a reality-creating social practice

Fowler, Power\textsuperscript{28}

In 1968, participants in a conference on the “language problems of developing nations” sponsored by the Committee on Sociolinguistics of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) pointed out that the recurrence and significance of language problems in developing societies calls for a theory of action and overt techniques (Fishman, Ferguson, & Das Gupta, 1968; Fishman, 1968). For anyone seeking an overarching language policy and planning theory, the idea that none exists half a century later will be obviously disappointing. Thomas Ricento’s (2006) remark however, illustrates the

\textsuperscript{27} An important claim of Ricento’s (2006) Language Policy: Theory and Practice is that there is no overarching theory of language policy and planning due largely to the complexity of issues of language in society. The lack of a theory of sociolinguistics is now a common starting point of critical sociolinguistic analysis (Mesthrie, 2000).

\textsuperscript{28} The notion that language does not merely reflect society but creates social realities is a canon of critical discourse analysis and illustrates the entanglements of language and power in the enactment of social relations.
complexity and varieties of issues relating to language in society that make the
development of such a theory rather elusive.

The etymological origins of the term “theory” illustrate this difficulty. The word
“theory” supposedly originates from a number of Greek terms: *theoria* (θεωρία),
“contemplation” or “speculation”; *theōros* (θεωρός), “spectator”; and *thea + horan* (θέα
+ ὄραν) "a view" + "to see", essentially "looking at a show". Instead of *thea*, it also traces
from the term *to theion* (το θείον), "divine things", which suggests the idea of
contemplating the divine organization of the cosmos. Etymologically, theory represents
proposition(s) on an understanding of the world as a whole and/or its material and non-
material phenomena, and underscores (a) the endless possibilities of human
interpretation, (b) inevitability of observer’s bias, and (c) the varied arrangements and
manifestations of cosmological realities. Language issues in society however, are not
readily amenable to empirical manipulations that permit comprehensive language policy
and planning theorizations with generalizable utility. Any discussion of theoretical
frameworks in language policy and planning and ELP, by implication, must be loose and
broad.

To be sure, language policy and planning research and practice build on some
specific language theories, such as Chomsky’s (1965) proposition that humans possess
neurologically wired capacity for language controlled by a language acquisition device
(LAD), or Fishman’s (1991) Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (GiDS), which
attempts to predict the chances of survival for minority or regional languages based on eight stages of strength relative to a competing more dominant language (Ricento, 2006). However, these theories only address a specific type of linguistic phenomenon that cannot explain language policy and planning in most contexts. As yet, no single theory (or congeries of theories) exists for understanding, explaining and/or predicting language policy and planning in most societies. Rather than an examination of some grand theory (of language policy as such) capable of explicating language decisions in varying contexts, my primary goal in this chapter is to review some strands of theoretical perspectives on language and society (particularly in relation to power and knowledge) that guide recent language policy and planning research.

The diversity of data (including research issues, settings, and data sources) in this study warrant an eclectic and interdisciplinary framework that allows sufficient flexibility in navigating the imbricated analytic terrain this research requires. As such, I locate the present research within the theoretical framework of critical sociolinguistics (with emphasis on the interplay of language and power), aspects of poststructuralism and critical social theories of language, ideology, and power. Specifically, I build on the notion of symbolic domination in Bourdieu and his formulations of “habitus”, “capital”, “field”, “linguistic market”, and linguistic and cultural capital. This study also builds on Foucault’s discourse on language and on power, Kristeva’s (1983) transitional notion of “subject-in-process”, Derrida’s “deconstruction” of “binary oppositions”, and the
poststructuralist challenge to basic assumptions of Western thought and culture. In outlining critical sociolinguistics as a challenge to structural linguistics, I note Voloshinov’s (and/or Bakhtin’s) critique of Saussure’s emphasis on the fundamental unit of language, the sign. To show the linguistic dimensionalities of discourse, I highlight Fairclough’s critical sociolinguistics, which connects analysis of samples of language or “text” with a conflict interpretation of society.

Critical sociolinguists have devoted a lot of attention to the notion of “domination”, and I argue, using the works of James Scott on resistance and Michael Halliday’s “anti-society” and “anti-language”, that equally important are “struggle” and “resistance” against symbolic domination. Although some of these authors, such as Bourdieu, Foucault and Gramsi, are not professional linguists their works are seminal contributions to various academic fields and has enormous influence on critical sociolinguistic scholarship. I position these discussions under the notions of power and agency in social relations using the conceptual framework of hegemony as well as recent critical theories (mostly pertinent to postcolonial theory) that I call mutual interactionism.

While V. N. Voloshinov and Mikhail Bakhtin are discussed as different authors in sociolinguistic circles, some analysts believe they are actually the same person. The Soviet scholar of the early twentieth century is believed to have been forced to adopt a pseudonym to publicize his unorthodox views (Mesthrie, 2000).
Language, Knowledge and Power in Social Relations

The critical turns in language policy and planning studies (see Chapter Two) offer conceptual guides for rethinking language as core to power relations. Following Saussure’s (1986) distinction between langue and parole, structuralists saw language as an impersonal system of signs distinct from speech acts. The significance of Saussure’s pure structuralist approach to language was that the linguistic sign, which is a combination of signifier and signified, is entirely arbitrary. There is no inherent link between the signifier “dog” (spelled d-o-g in English) and a concept of the four-legged mammal it signifies. The same canine creature is called “kuuta” (spelled कुत्ता in Hindi) and “ụgọdu” (in Enugu Ezike variety of Igbo). In arguing that the link between the “word” and the “concept” is not necessary but based on socially accepted conventions within a speech community, structuralists extrapolate a generalized and abstract characterization of society with no interest in subgroup divisions. Consistent with the structuralist cannon, Chomsky (1965) saw language as an innate abstract universal code. Some psychoanalysts even view linguistic realizations as necessary channels for grasping human consciousness (Lacan & Wilden, 1968).

Sociolinguists and poststructuralists have come to challenge this decontextualization of language from social realities. Unlike Saussure, Voloshinov (1986/1973) and Bakhtin (1981) emphasize the ideological nature of the sign. Voloshinov (1986) argues that “the forms of signs are conditioned above all by the social
organization of the participants involved and also by the immediate conditions of their interaction” (p. 21). As such, linguistic sign becomes arenas for social (class) struggle, “open to different orientations and evaluations in the social world” (Mesthrie, 2000, p. 322). Bakhtin (1981) captures this contest-laden social dimensionality of linguistic sign in his notion of “heteroglossia”, a multiple orientation to or open-endedness of language characterized by the coexistence and reciprocal exchanges between several “voices” or linguistics and social orientations in a speech utterance (Mesthrie, 2000). Such polyphonic and semantic possibilities are downplayed or opposed by dominant classes in attempts to “universalize” the sign.

With poststructuralists and sociolinguistics, I view language as a discourse inseparable from social constructions and representations of meaning that inform productions and reproductions of relational power asymmetries. Although poststructuralists’ views are vast and often incompatible, most agree that the signifying practices of society are arenas of struggle, and that linguistic communities are heterogeneous spaces marked by claims to truth and power (Byrd Clark, 2008; Norton, 2000). As Bakhtin (1981) notes, language is not neutral but overpopulated with others’ intentions, making considerations of the social, political, and cultural context of individuals imperative in understanding language and metalanguage as expropriation practices.
The notion of language as discourse is a major concern of discourse analysis in its challenge to traditional linguistics practice of analyzing artificial abstract single sentences (McCarthey, 1991). Starting with Zellig Harris’ (1970; 1952) works, which called attention to the linkages between texts and their social context, discourse analysis has expanded classical linguistics concerns to a wider range of formal and informal, verbal and non-verbal communicative forms and situations (McCarthey, 1991). Foucault’s (2002) discourse on language, which extends Heidegger’s thoughts, underscores the inextricability of language from context. Heidegger argued that we do not control language but that “language speaks through us” and that we are bound to employ preexisting forms and meanings when we communicate. Foucault deploys Heidegger’s position to argue that not just language but entire discourse provides what can or cannot be said or understood in communicative contexts. Indeed, Foucault’s constitution of the subject projects the human being as an “empty entity”, who lacks a unique consciousness or personality, but is rather the intersection point of a number of “discourses”.

Foucault uses the term “author function” to illustrate how everything an “author” writes is not necessarily authored so to speak; the author (or author function) is “produced” by the discourse on language, which determines the meaning embodied in the author’s “text”. As a medium of power, discourse produces subjects whose

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30 Discourse analysis has been influenced in Britain by the works of systemic functionalists, such as Michael A. K. Halliday (1973), and in the US by ethnomethodologists, such as Goffman (1985) and Gumperz & Hymes (1972).
capacities for enacting communicative conditions are limited by the discursive space. Since “in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed” (Foucault, 1972, p. 216), discourse operates by “rules of exclusion” and “is controlled in terms of objects (what can be spoken of), ritual (where and how one may speak), and the privileged or exclusive right to speak of certain subjects (who may speak)” (McBride, n.d.). Language as a discourse is politically disposed and therefore ethically sensitive. The implication of Foucault’s notion of the subjects as an “empty entity” implies that understanding the self, as a speaking subject, requires a study of language and discourse.

We may not completely accept Foucault’s idea of a totally decentered human subject, since discourses are essentially unstable and subject to change; competing or conflicting discourses originate and operate within the same social space. Foucault acknowledges this in his later work when he shifts to the view that subjects are “constituted not by discourse but by relations of power, which forms the ultimate principle of social reality (Mesthrie, 2000). I pay particular attention to the ways in which language functions as a mechanism of social control, one that places different levels of constrains on ELP actors. Moreover, ELP is as much an exercise on language as on the speakers and language communities entangled in broader social transactions.

31 Discourse here refers to a person-oriented sort of “conversational management” distinct from the more grammatical approach. The former pertains to rule-/norm-setting about ways of behaving, interacting, thinking, valuing, speaking, believing, reading, writing and so forth [Gee, 1990], that instantiate particular roles according to and by specific groups of people, while the later is concerned with explicating continuous speech beyond the level of sentences (Mesthrie, 2000).
More importantly, language is both the tool and raw material for ELP since it is perpetually locked into the complex social transactions of policymaking. This metalinguistic conundrum necessitates a critical perspective since language policymaking is interwoven with an inchoate set of constantly evolving political, economic, cultural, and ideological interpersonal as well as institutional processes.

Language as a discourse operates by creating social categories corresponding to traits purportedly common to an ensemble of individuals (Byrd Clark, 2008). Although social categorizations erect imagined communities (see Anderson, 1991) such as ethnicity, upper class, religion, and so on, they both formalize social differences and constitute viable tools for managing such differences through ELPs. One distinctive formulation of social categorization, Bourdieu’s (1977a; 1982; 1984; 2001) social reproduction theory, illustrates the centrality of language as a form of symbolic capital operative in the competitive dynamics of society in regulating access to political, economic, social and linguistic resources. Language functions to create linguistic symbols as identity markers that distinguish insiders from outsiders, and to mobilize linguistic communities around “shared” interests. In Bourdieu’s formulation, it is through language that the assemblage of sensibilities (habitus) and capitals (cultural, social and economic) come to define an agent’s position in a norms-governed social setting (field). Habitus refer to the set of transposable sensibilities acquired from a class-based childhood upbringing, which dispose us to function in ways characteristic of our
social position. While habitus shapes social behaviors, it does not determine them; Bourdieu shows that social actors make choices, not follow preset rules, even if social norms condition those choices in line with social positions.

Habitus shapes linguistic choices through the operation of “sanctions” and “prices” tied to linguistic behaviors. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) argue:

Any speech act or any discourse is a conjecture, the product of the encounter between, on one side, a *linguistic habitus,* that is a set of socially constituted dispositions that imply a propensity to speak in certain ways and to utter determinate things...and on the other side, a *linguistic market,* i.e., a system of relations of force which impose themselves as a system of specific sanctions by determining the "price" of linguistic products (p. 145).

Market – or “structured space of positions” (Bourdieu, 1991) – constitutes “fields” hierarchically structured around the kinds or amounts of “capitals” (social, economic, symbolic, and linguistic) an individual possesses. The legitimacy of any language as capital depends on its position in a market that has its own structures and norms, and the “value” attached to such linguistic products. Indeed, these linguistic products are not equally valued, and the resources for acquiring them not evenly distributed. Languages are linguistically but not socially equal (Bourdieu, 1977b); and the production, maintenance and reproduction of such social hierarchies depend on institutions (such as education), which in themselves are markets. Indeed, for Bourdieu, education enjoys a monopoly in the reproduction of linguistic markets. It facilitates the conversion of one form of capital to another; educational qualification (cultural capital)
can be transformed into high prestige (symbolic capital) and/or lucrative employment (economic capital).

Decisions about language in education are critical insofar as they shape educational outcomes as resources for competitive markets. ELPs must be viewed as negotiations of power since for Bourdieu, language is not merely a communicative tool but a medium of power through which individuals pursue their interests and display their competences; in every speech act, a person not only seeks to be understood but also to be recognized, respected, obeyed, indeed, legitimated (Bourdieu, 1977a). Since those who control language resources also control the its market as they establish norms for valuing (or devaluing) particular language practices, ELPs represents a transaction of what Bourdieu (1991) calls “symbolic power”, an invisible power (which functions with “communicative economy” to install “symbolic domination”), that should not be mistaken for symbolic capital.

As I discuss in the next section, the notion of power here appeals to the concept of hegemony à la Gramsci. For Gramsci, hegemony and symbolic domination function by inserting the market norms of a particular group as universal. By accepting these norms as fixed, the dominated collaborates with and reproduces the mechanisms of their domination. However, like Foucault (1980), I argue that power is not monolithically concentrated or unilineally administered. Foucault draws a link between power and knowledge, and shows how knowledge and belief systems (i.e., discourses) gain
momentum (and therefore power) as more and more people buy into them, establishing thus ideas of “right” and “wrong”, “normal” and “deviant”, indeed, a common knowledge (or hegemony). Being covert, power is devoid of any concrete form but occurs as a locus of struggle that is at one time available to all yet permitting social control. This makes resistance essential to the notion of power.

Works such as James Scott’s (1985) *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, show that resistance (like domination) does not always take overt, calculated or even conspiratorial and readily visible forms but often operates in disguise. His analysis of peasant-landlord relationships in rural Malaysia challenges the element of symbolic domination (in Bourdieu) or cultural hegemony (in Gramsci), which holds that domination functions by eliciting consent, complicity or false consciousness from the dominated. Peasants appear to be skilled at alternating “onstage” (i.e., direct interaction with landlords) and “offstage” (interaction with fellow peasants outside the immediate influence of the landlord) linguistic performances that install subtle forms of resistance against their subjugation. Having one “face” for the “oppressor” and another for fellow “oppressed” (to borrow normative terms of psychology of oppression), enables subordinate groups to develop codes not only for coping with but also for subverting specific instances and general structure of domination. Thus, a form of political correctness transforms the operation of power and resistance beyond compliance-/complicity-based notions of hegemony.
Another emphasis on the subversive element of domination appears in Halliday’s
(1978) coinage of, “anti-society” to refer to groups who reveal their opposition to
dominant society by developing alternative social organizational forms, including
language. The most obvious example of such anti-society is the underworld social
resistance movements often organized as a pseudo-society in antagonism to
mainstream society (Mesthrie, 2000), which became popularized in several countries
that have experienced systemic inequalities. As Mesthrie (2000) shows, other forms
include the 1960s “hippy” movement of the west in the US and the Rastafarian culture.
Both embody a voluntary “drop-out” status relative to the mainstream and evolve a
culture and language that challenges dominant cultural norms. Halliday (1978) describes
the substitution of old words with new ones in “anti-language” (especially in areas
crucial to the anti-societies’ identity) as “relexicalization”. Mesthrie (2000) shows how a
vast population of criminals who lived off the wealth of dominant Elizabethan England
evolved a lexicon, “pelting speech”, with relexicalizations such as “laws” (strategies of
theft), “lift” (one who steals a package), and “marker” (one to whom a package is
handed). For Halliday, anti-language is characterized not only by relexicalizations but
also “over-lexicalization”, the tendency to use numerous substitute words for one
mainstream word – as in the case of the Kolkata underground language that has twenty-
one words for “bomb” and forty-one for “police” (Mallik, 1976). Cumulatively, such
alternative linguistic forms establish resistance and rebellion against domination as well
as function to humor and maintain secrecy among the “underdog”. While resistance is essential to notions of domination, it would be inaccurate to ascribe oppositional duality to Foucault’s argument (in terms of power-resistance), since such binaries burden power with localization.

Like Foucault, my interest on the power-knowledge nexus focuses on the operation of what he calls institutional “apparatus” and its “technologies” and how strategies of force support and are supported by types of knowledge (Foucault, 1980). Knowledge itself is generated by discourse, seen as a system of representation or rules and practices that “provide a language for talking about – a way of representing the knowledge about – a particular topic at a particular historical moment” (Hall, 2001, p. 72). Indeed, discourse is about the production of knowledge through language. Like Foucault, my view of language as a discourse extends beyond the purely linguistic to overcome the traditional structuralist distinction between *language* (what one says) and *practice* (what one does). In the subsequent section on hegemony and mutual interactionism, I show how (as social actors) we all participate in language and practice, which (re)produce systems of knowledge and power that maintain social control. Connecting to earlier argument (in Chapter Two) about agency, I argue that insofar as power asymmetries continue to be defined by agency, hegemony and mutual interaction must not be seen as oppositional but complementary.
Before turning to this section, it is important to clarify how my research aligns with poststructuralism, since its tenets are vast and hardly reconcilable. Structuralists’ theoretical obsession with binary oppositions, such as langue and parole, signifier and signified, synchrony and diachrony (Sturrock, 2003) draws poststructuralists’ critique along two lines: first, that structures are not self-sufficient but invite alternative interpretations; and second, that binary oppositions are problematic since (unlike structuralists’ tendency to position them as hierarchies), they are mutually interdependent. To grasp the meanings intended by these binary impositions, poststructuralists engage in what Derrida (1997) calls “deconstruction” – the practice of demonstrating contradictory meanings, and therefore susceptibility to various interpretations, of any text.

Poststructuralist critiques of structuralism reflect postmodernist disavowal of objective truth and universal cultural narratives. However, Derrida (1991) argues that deconstruction is both an “antistructuralist gesture” and a “structuralist gesture” insofar as it is concerned with structure. My use of poststructuralism here does not abide postmodernist rejection of truth. I believe that the distinctions between intellectual traditions (structuralism vs. poststructuralism; traditionalism vs. progressivism; etc) are exaggerated since there is significant conceptual overlap among these systems. Indeed, among other commonalities, the belief in critique and reason as a ground for

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32 Epstein and Carroll (2005) offer a sustained counter-critique to postmodernism’s challenge to objectivity.
understanding is a shared epistemological trait of these intellectual traditions (Griffiths, 1998).

Consistent with Bourdieu’s and Foucault’s interrogation of mechanisms of knowledge production that perpetuate asymmetrical power relations through language, I concede that dominant (often Western) conceptual categories that have informed ELP practices in multilingual societies invite serious critique. While such narratives appear consistent with binary distinctions (e.g., “dominant” vs. “subordinate”) that fit hegemony theories (although they tend to limit the agency of some subordinate actors), it is possible to reinterpret social relationships to capture the mutual interactions of agents without necessarily obscuring power imbalances. Contrary to structuralist thesis, this interpretation privileges a transitional notion of social actors as agents “in process” or “in crisis” (Kristeva, 1983). For Kristeva (2002), “if language is a dynamic process then the subject is a dynamic process….always in a constant process of oscillation between stability and instability...continually being constituted...as an open system” (p. xviii). The discursive practices through which knowledge and power emanate are intrinsically dynamic and ongoing, drawing the subject in its constant evolution.

**Hegemony and Mutual Interactionism in Education Language Policy Process**

The extent to which individuals and collectivities assume active or passive roles in processes of social changes determines the relevance of hegemony and mutual interaction as conceptual prisms for understanding social relations. I operationalized
hegemony theories and mutual interactionism as two dominant explanatory narratives, each integrating a congeries of similar postulations, hypothesis, or theories that articulate the exercise of power in processes of social change. Central to these two broad explanatory narratives is the construction, distribution and exercise of power. While the inevitability of mutuality in social interactions alludes to even distribution of power, it does not necessarily preclude hegemony at all levels of social relations. Thus, hegemony and mutual interactionism must not be viewed as polar opposites respectively characterizing unequal and equal social conditions of power distribution and exercise. Mutually interacting agencies in ELP processes often provide ample space for unequal exchanges. ELP processes of multilingual societies particularly invite various actors with uneven bargaining powers to complicated and constantly changing arenas of social transactions.

Growing from politico-economic theorizations of the late nineteenth century, hegemony broadly represents an outward linear flow of “forces” from power centers to receptive peripheral spaces. The forms of these forces vary and interconnect, integrating economic, cultural, political, and epistemic structures. One outcome in education is a homogenized international landscape partly captured by institutional isomorphism (see Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997). Mutual interactionism assumes that policies are shaped by multiple factors in constant webs of interactions.

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33 Institutional isomorphism is not necessarily consistent with hegemony theories since it does not include the intentionality or conspiracy implicated in hegemony theories.
While both explanatory narratives are popular in the social sciences, especially political science, economics, and international relations (Burchill, et al., 2009), the intersection of language policy and education with political development (Weinstein, 1990) makes both narratives suitable for investigating ELP processes.

Although critical theorists and some postmodernists view Development Studies and particularly language policy and planning as an extension of Western dominance through academic scholarship and international institutional mechanisms of policymaking, they also embody similar assumptions (about the systematicity, replicability, verifiability and approval of/recognition by a community of experts) common in Development Studies (Appadurai, 1996). The efforts of critical theorists, postmodernists, and postcolonial theorists to uncover and challenge hegemonic relations can be interpreted as what Paulo Freire considers “false generosity” (Friere, 1993/2000). A major critique of hegemony theories is that it assumes the passivity of the “dominated”, and often imposes a Manichean duality on social realities.

The active participation of indigenous peoples and “peripheral societies” in enacting conditions of subordination complicates hegemonic accounts of social processes, and calls for an examination of the mutually interacting roles assumed by agents especially in policymaking and practice. Yet, emphasis on the mutual interaction of agentic forces potentially disguises the ways cultural values and politico-economic pressures shape the choices of active agents. Thus, the various bodies of knowledge
relevant to understanding how language policymaking in multilingual societies—
Development Studies, Postcolonial Theory, Critical Theory, Postmodernism,
Globalization, etc—embody interpretive possibilities for hegemony and mutual interactionism. In what follows, I examine how hegemony and mutual interactionism have been theorized in social science scholarship. I illustrate their suitability as heuristics for ELP analysis especially in multilingual postcolonial settings.

Hegemony Theories

Power management in social organization creates structural and systemic imbalances that formalize dominance and permit theorizations of hegemony as valid explanation of sociality. Its fundamental elements are articulated in anti-colonial scholarship (Rodney, 1973; Fanon, 1963), dependency theory (Ghosh B. N., 2001; Amin, 1976), international relations theories such as classical realism (Morgenthau, 1948), as well as Marxism (Marx, Engels, & Levitsky, 2000/1890).

As a postulate or theory of political action hegemony was popularized in the twentieth Century by the Marxist social theorist, Antonio Gramsci (1891 – 1937); the provenance of its basic tenets however, is evident in classical thoughts (Fontana, 2000). It evolved within the theoretical and historical controversies central to Marxism and Leninism. Originally developed by orthodox Marxism to designate the political leadership of the working class in a democratic revolution, hegemony in Gramsci (1971) emerged as an analytic tool to account for the improbability of the supposed ineluctable
socialist revolution predicted in traditional Marxism. In Gramsci’s formulation, hegemony fecundates dominance not necessarily through the wielding of brute force but particularly through a hegemonic culture that transforms bourgeoisie values into commonsense values of the entire society. As a result, a consensus of culture emerges through which the working class identifies their wellbeing with that of the bourgeoisie and correspondingly works to maintain the status quo of upper class capitalist dominance.

Cultural hegemony found more acute and explicit expression in international relations through the politico-economic postulation of Hegemonic Stability Theory developed by Krasner (1999; 1985; 1978) and Kindleberger (Kindleberger, 1996; 1972) and advanced by recent political economists (Keohane, 2005). Hegemonic Stability Theory accepts as a given the problem of collective action first formulated in definitive analytic terms by Mancur Olsen. Olsen (1965) argues that with large groups, collective interests do not necessarily conduce to rational choices and collective goal-directed action; it rather engenders a situation where less capable (or poor) individuals abdicate their responsibility to contribute to the provision of public good (a “free rider” strategy), leaving the burden to more capable (resource-endowed) individuals. The inevitability of these capable leaders is used to justify the need for a hegemon.

Within the context of the internationalization of political economy, HST identifies the regulation and institutionalization of trade and finance as public good. Following the
logic of collective action, a hegemon whose motivation is the provision for and satisfaction of personal (national) interests is required to lead the regulation and institutionalization of international political economies. Within this framework, the United States and allied nations, starting from the Bretton Woods system, are believed to instrumentalize international politico-economic institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the United Nations (UN) and UNESCO, in establishing an international order through which a hegemonic culture imbrued with western values is spread to remote national and local spaces.

Hegemony’s mainstream operational mechanism elicits consent by manipulating ideological apparatuses such as schooling and the media, through which it inculcates dominant values and ideas of normalcy. As such, dominated populations embody, propagate, and perpetuate this hegemonic order by conceding to an ascribed subordinate status, which legitimizes the superiority of the hegemon. Ascribing active agency in this scheme is problematic: on the surface, the dominated voluntarily participates in the hegemonic system, and is not only content with but also willing advocates of/under its suzerainty. From a critical perspective however, the agency of the dominated is engineered, defined, and manipulated by the hegemon. Gransci (1971) suggests that hegemony relies on coercion in the face of objection to its established etiquette. Yet, the reproduction and maintenance of hegemonic order depends on the purported “willingness” and acquiescence of the ruled to the conditions of subjugation.
As shown in the findings section of this research, India and Nigeria have long histories of external influences that produced regimes of subordination. During the colonial era, concerns about external political and economic interference and quests for statist self-determination defined notions of hegemony. As newly independent states continued to operate on institutional dictates of Western political and economic systems, postcolonial theory sought to uncover a newly emergent African bourgeois that worked to perpetuate and benefit from extant colonial installations. It further sought to clarify the complicity of this new African bourgeois (often referred to as “petite bourgeois” to signify its relative subordinate status to European/colonial bourgeois) with world powers and international organizations in entrenching neocolonial structures (Ekeh, 1975). The dialectic between these two bourgeois blocs functions as legitimation processes whose target is ordinary citizens of dominated societies. The alleged voluntarism of these ordinary citizens formalizes international institutions as well as local elite political actors as legitimizing agencies of national and local public policy practices.

Following the idea of a “world culture of schooling” (see Anderson-Levitt, 2003), UNESCO’s international educational interventionism can be interpreted as an exercise in hegemonic cultural reproduction. The actual popularization of ELP in multilingual states (that were originally created through colonial amalgamation), implicates UNESCO’s language initiatives. Nations are endorsed to the extent their institutions embody values
and ideals stipulated on the international arena. UNESCO’s role in the continued expansion of “international languages” including English and French therefore undercuts the credibility of its indigenous language programs and makes it vulnerable to postcolonial criticisms.

“Postcolonial” here overstretches its strict semantic connotation as the period after formal colonialism and independence; indeed, hegemony is predicated on neo-colonial relationships often transmogrified into elusive institutional structures that disguise mechanisms of subordination. It articulates diverse movements that go beyond any specific point in history, issue, or place, including colonialism, anti-colonial nationalist theorizations and hybridity (for discussions of hybridity, see Bhabha, 2005; Prakash, 1992). Thus, the identity of the postcolonial, released as it were, from the fixities of regionalization and temporalization characteristic of Third World-focused development studies, becomes discursive not structural (Hoogvelt, 1997; Dirlik, 1994).

Yet, not all scholars agree with this elastic discursive depiction of the postcolonial (Shohat, 1992). Shohat’s critique raises questions regarding the ahistorical and universalizing deployments of “post-colonial”, and its depoliticizing implications.

Critiques of postcolonial and Marxist-oriented Gramscian (or even neo-Gramscianism) theorizations lend to versions of social theory that complicates the “oppressor-oppressed” duality inherent in hegemony. Indeed, critical versions of hegemony do not leave completely unquestioned the implied polarity of colonized vs.
colonizer, First World vs. Third World, “developed” vs. “underdeveloped” (and lately “developing”) worlds. For instance, neo-Granscianism’s rejection of the separation of subject and object, and its adoption of “a dialectical understanding of reality as a dynamic totality and a unity of opposites” (Overbeek, 2000, p. 168), has led to a dialectical interpretation of hegemony and counter-hegemony in ways that are consistent with, and integrate core elements of classical Marxism into, globalization discourse.

Like classical Marxism, this new formulation reemphasizes the ontological primacy of social relations of production. Additionally however, it accommodates the fluidity of the interlocking relationships of agency and social structures central to globalization discourse. The implications of such formulations for agency and responsibility, when applied to language policy analysis, is compounded by the varied ways ELPs are enacted in different multilingual societies, much the same way colonial relationships varied with contexts. Shifting and unpredictable, social relations (of power distribution and exercise) must seek additional explanation in more robust conceptual frameworks that accommodate, but extend beyond the apparent duality of, hegemony.

**Mutual Interactionism**

Whereas less extreme versions of hegemony theories reject or avoid the determinist dichotomization of colonial categories into binaries, mutual interactionism makes the problematization of such dichotomization a point of entrance to globalization
and postcolonial discourse. As already noted, the explicative functionality of hegemony and mutual interactionism intersect in postcolonial theory, globalization discourse, and development studies, an intersection made possible due to the destabilization of disciplinary fixities in social theory. Early postcolonial studies employing this dichotomizing framework insist on regional, temporal, and thematic delineation that target the indigenous colonized and rarely the frequently conflicting colonial categories and projects. Regionalization and temporal circumscription depict colonial interests and programs as unified and unproblematic, pitting a unified colonized against a homogeneous colonizer. Such neatly demarcated and clearly defined polarity occludes the intersections of imperial categories as well as the divergence and inconsistence of colonial interests and programs. By questioning the neatness of this demarcation and clarity of its definitions, recent postcolonial critiques seek to understand the various outcomes of social relations shaped by complex interactions of multiple actors whose roles shift with time and context.

Building on the works of Malinowski, Andre Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein, Ann Stoler (2002), embarks on an anthropology of colonialism that lucidly portrays this critical approach that defies and muddles the neat demarcations and distinctions of colonial categories. This line of thought demonstrates how shifts in colonial frontlines resulted not from clearly articulated capitalist, imperialist conspiracies and/or from well organized anti-colonial resistances, but more from the intricate interactions of multiple
players often with inadvertent outcomes. The bifurcation of colonial categories still provides useful analytic tools, and the politics of postcolonial discourse continue to produce texts that assume a shared European mentality, what Stoler (2002) called the “sentiment of a unified, conquering elite” (p. 23). Yet, she insists that rather than fixed this notion of the colonizer and colonized is a historically shifting pair of social categories that require a more careful analysis.

To argue that the colonial political agenda is “self-evident” and issue from clearly defined European political configurations fails to capture the actual politico-cultural environments occupied by colonial Europe itself. Thus, colonial programs became more or less an adventure of different forms of European realities that produced new configurations (or reconfigurations) of a European life distinct from the intricate economic, cultural, intellectual, religious, and social realities of Europe and that of the colonies. Demonstrating this “reconfiguration” of cultural politics, Stoler shows how the management of sexual intimacies and the culture of family environments interacted with and reshaped the changing ideas of race, class, national identity, and notions of Europeanness.

Situated more squarely within globalization discourse, mutual interactionism articulates and builds on the clarification of global networks not only in terms of nested spaces but more as multi-scalar landscapes (Sassen, 2007; 2003). Multiple layers of social organization and ideological structuring span, trespass, and even interlace the
global and the local (see Held & McGrew, 2007). Although some scholars describe this social organizational matrix in terms of nested spaces best framed as overlapping concentric spheres of interlocking influences from the local through the national, regional to the "global" (MacLeod, 2001), the interactions engineered thereof are hardly lineal or unidirectional—flowing from core global centers to receptive peripheries. The diverse refractions of multiple forces of global economic, social, political and cultural transformations characterizing globalizations (see Appadurai, 1996) proceed along disparate lines, interlacing, diverging, converging, and distending to/at sometimes inscrutable angles and limits (Sassen, 2007; 2003). Indeed, the idea of globalization as a new form of capitalist imperialism (consistent with hegemony theories) is grounded on the notion of linear uninterrupted and “unscaleable” linkage between the international and the local. Mutual interactionism focuses on how multiple forces operational at different institutional levels interact to produce results ascribable to all actors to varied degrees. The mutuality of the interactions intersects with the multilayered nature of the behaviors of relevant individual and institutional actors. ELP thus results from mutually constitutive elements of active interaction on the national and international levels.

The convolutions of globalization processes and the involution of several actors in policymaking within those processes appeal to mostly institutionalized social structures distinct from, but dependent on non-institutionalized mirco-level
relationships and dynamics. Globalization’s structural or institutional anfractuosities emerge from and/or produce myriad labyrinths of small-scale interactive units whose diversity, inconsistencies and irregularities scuttle academic formulations of macro theories of globalization. Recognizing the incongruities and the non-negligibility of these micro-interactive units localizes the notion of “grassroots globalization” (Appadurai, 2000) within mainstream globalization discourse. Anchored on these micro-scalar forms, mutual interactionism finds expression in the sociological perspective of symbolic interactionism (SI). Unlike hegemony theories’ appeal to macro conditions, symbolic interactionism addresses the subjectivity of meaning and the situationality of the negotiations out of which major social forces emerge.

The provenance of symbolic interactionism (SI) trace to German sociologist Marx Weber (1864-1920), American philosopher George H. Mead (1863-1931), sociologist Charles Horton Cooley (1864-1929), John Dewey, and William James. Although they did not use the coinage “symbolic interactionism”, these early proponents emphasized the subjective meaning of human behavior, interactive social processes, and pragmatism, the conceptual pillars of SI. It was however, Herbert Blumer (1969), Mead’s student at the University of Chicago, who coined the term and articulated earlier strands of thoughts into a cohesive theoretical statement.

For Blumer, SI rests on three simple premises, that: (a) human beings act towards things on the basis of the meanings that these things have for them; (b) such
meanings derive from, or arise out of, social interactions between people; and (c) these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretive process used by the person in dealing with the things encountered (Blumer, 1986, p. 2). Blumer’s idea that the meaning of reality is not inherent in reality itself but constructed through a meaning-making process is an attack on behavioral psychology’s objectivism. Yet, it is the interactivity and sociality of this meaning-making process—an inherently interpretive process—that defines the essence of SI. Interactionists view human beings as pragmatic actors who continually adjust their thoughts and behaviors to the actions of others (or the meaning they make thereof). Interpretation implies denoting actions symbolically, and treating the actors and the self as symbolic objects. Since human groups and society “exist in action” (Blumer, 1986, p. 6), and actions (and the reactions they inform) are only meaningful within an interactive and interpretive framework, explaining the outcomes of human actions and reactions must return, not to the actions themselves but the socially constructed meanings and constantly modified interpretations of the actors.

Applying symbolic interactionism to the asymmetries of power relations in society and to group interaction is problematic. First, the fluidity of interpretative intersubjectivity denies us the opportunity to trace the root of an action as a single strand of an intricate communicative labyrinth. For instance, if in reaction to a "misconstruction and inaccurate interpretation of an action “x”, an actor engages in an
action “y”, to what extent is “x” responsible, causally speaking, for “y”? Simplistic though, this question strikes at the core of the problematics of attributing agency in explaining social relations and their outcomes.

Indeed, an offshoot of symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, raises the question about how people’s engagement in interactive situations create an illusion of a rationally constructed shared social order and meaning, even when they don’t understand each other’s often differing perspectives. Ethnomethodologist Harold Garfinkel (1967) uses “breaching experiments”, which study people’s reaction to an experimenter who violates simple, commonly accepted everyday norms, to expose the complexity of this problem. Recent varieties of ethnomethodology focus on conversation analysis that attempt to reveal unscripted rules through which turn-taking and other conversational maneuvers are governed and managed (Sacks & Jefferson, 1992; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974). While ethnomethodological studies demonstrate the existence of commonly shared social codes, they reveal these norms and the behaviors they inform as largely routine, unreflective and precarious. Unlike the resourceful actor of SI, constantly engaging in meaning-making, modifying, interpreting, ethnomethodology reveals uncritical perfunctory adherents of social norms.

34 In “breaching experiments”, an experimenter breaks commonly held social rules, such as offering to pay more than the posted price for an item, tipping a police officer in appreciation of being issued a driving violation ticket, or haggling with a bus driver over city transit fare. In themselves, these actions are not irrational, and might, given specific contexts, be logically more defensible than the social norm it breaches. People’s reactions to this violation are observed; the strength of this response is taken as an indication of the strength of the violated norm. For more on breaching experiments, see (Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction, 1982; Garfinkel, 1967).
As previously noted, mainstream hegemony theories appeal to macro structures, mutual interactionism to micro-level processes. Ethnomethodology however, targets the social practices that produce these structures. It permits us not simply to profile the socioeconomic status, racial/ethnic background, national origin, or even intellectual (or ideological) affiliations of actors involved in social transactions out of which ELPs are borne, but the interactive processes through which people enact norms that define particular socioeconomic, political, nationalist, and ideological statuses. Such socially constructed identifiers, embedded in interactive dynamics, must be the focus of studies interested in the mechanisms that construct and maintain power imbalances and conditions of subordination.

**Hegemony and Mutual Interactionism as Heuristics for Education Language Policy Analysis**

Using hegemony and mutual interactionism as explanatory narratives, each comprised of a loose aggregation of conceptual formulations sharing some common features, is particularly suited to ELP analysis in multilingual settings. First, its units of analysis are detached from the stability attached to definitions of socioeconomic, political, ideological, racial/ethnic, and nationalist statuses. The roles of ELP agents are never fixed; the exigencies of cultural and linguistic diversity, the realities of an increasingly globalizing world, and the intricate cultural, political and economic dimensions of global terrorism herald increasing permutations of shifting identities.
New realities of globalization alter what Homi Bhabha calls the “comforts and continuities of tradition”, and force upon us, “the responsibilities of cultural translation”, a fact that continues to perplex social scientists especially in the West (Huddart, 2006, pp. 112-113). Kevin Robins’ (1999) commentary on Britain is worth quoting to some length:

Older certainties and hierarchies of British identity have been called into question in a world of dissolving boundaries and disrupted continuities. In a country that is now a container of African and Asian cultures, the sense of what it is to be British can never again have the old confidence and surety. Other sources of identity are no less fragile. What does it mean to be European in a continent coloured [sic] not only by the cultures of its former colonies, but also by American and now Japanese cultures? Is not the very category of identity problematic? Is it at all possible, in global times, to regain a coherent and integral sense of identity? Continuity and historicity of identity are challenged by the immediacy and intensity of global cultural confrontations. The comforts of tradition are fundamentally challenged by the imperative to forge a new self-interpretation based upon the responsibilities of cultural translation. (p. 27)

This disruption of cultural continuities, which requires of academia a detachment from older fixities and stabilities of sociologic categories, has enormous import on how we define ELP agents and processes. For instance, the “West versus the rest” or “First World contra Third World” dichotomy must account for the infusion of the West and First World with Third World cultures and marginal identities. However, it must also evolve new tools to monitor the reconstitution and emergence of new hegemonies.35

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35 Cultural diversity in the Occident typically generate two reactions: the first is a defensive reassertion of ethnic absolutism and ethnocentrism by members of dominant ethnic groups who feel threatened by the
Thus, while mutual interactionism enables us to focus on the interaction dynamics of social transactions through which ELPs are negotiated by various actors, it opens windows for vigilant surveillance of reemergence of hegemonic practices through unstable shifting identities.

A second import of hegemony theories and mutual interactionism as heuristics for ELP analysis ties to their suitability for examining processes. The central assumption of this research – that ELP is more an ongoing process than a finished product - calls for data on the interaction dynamics of policy actors. Such data must also be embedded in the actual contexts in which actors engage in the process, shifting contexts that are only partly linguistic, but essentially political, cultural, economic and ideological.

Engaging ELP agents in their actual contexts in a process-oriented investigation amplifies the problem of bridging micro processes and macro structural mappings of social relations. This problem of scale is a gray dividing line between hegemony theories and mutual interactionism. While hegemony accommodates accounts of micro-level processes that establish regimes of subordination, its major appeal is to macro-structural processes. On the other hand, mutual interactionism addresses primarily micro-level exchanges that produce varied outcomes of social relations, while remaining attuned to institutional mechanisms of collective action. Globalization commentators inform us however, that the fluidity and instability of global networks are made possible increasing presence of other cultures, a reaction based on cultural racism; the second is the formation of new identities best characterized by hybridity (see Hall, 2000).
by an interpenetration of these micro and macro entities (Sassen, 2007; 2003). The same macro institutional structures that inhabit local policy spaces experience a deep penetration and constant alteration by micro-level policy actors and processes. Encountering ELP agents in their actual contexts is a simultaneous ingress into a confluent, not divided, micro and macro landscape.

Another problem associated with using hegemony and mutual interactionism as broad explanatory narratives is the multiplicity of identities ELP actors represent. Classical hegemony theories emphasize economic, class and cultural rationales for subordination. Even mutual interactionism’s capacity to isolate these identities is limited by its prioritization of subjective meaning-making mechanisms. Building on the logic of intersectionality theory proposed in feminist scholarship by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1995; ) and advanced by Patricia H. Collins (1998; 2000), I interrogate how the various categories of social identity interact on multiple and simultaneous levels. The goal is not to demonstrate which specific factor (socioeconomic status, political ideology, economic interests, cultural values, etc) impinges the most on ELP processes. Rather, it is to illuminate the ways these forces interact within and among individuals and collectivities to produce micro and macro patterns of negotiation and social transaction in which ELPs are embedded. Overall, this analytic framework allows us to investigate the ways in which hegemony operates within the matrices of mutual interactions and/or how
mutually interacting activities resist, disrupt, and yet maintain hegemonic structures across multiple levels.
...representing Others is always going to be a complicated and contentious undertaking

Madison, *Critical Ethnography*

Representing social realities is contentious because we are entangled in our subject; the researcher is part of the social realities s/he investigates. This inescapable entanglement invites us to declare our position (or in qualitative research parlance, “positionality”) and to subject that positionality to constant critique. Like historical functionalists, I reject the objectivists’ claim to decontextualized universal “truth” as well as extreme postmodernist tendencies to disavow the possibility of truth.36

Consistent with constructionist perspectives (see Gage & Berliner, 1998; Phillips, 1995; Noddings, 1990), I view knowledge as constructed, constantly evolving, non-monolithic, and socially mediated through language, be it spoken, written, gestured or signed (Byrd Clark, 2008). Knowledge thus constructed shares in the erection, dismantling and perpetuation of asymmetrical power relations. As such, I subject my positionality to

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36 Epstein and Carroll (2005) show how historical functionalism avoids the epistemological implications of positivism and relativism in comparative education research.
critical reflection. Critical self-reflexivity, while central to the methodological approach I select, does not guarantee or necessitate the liberatory element of critical theory.\footnote{Critical theorists, such as Horkheimer (1982) consider emancipation a core element of critical theory, a characteristic is shares with some critical ethnographic approaches to research. For a discussion of critical theories, see Bohman (2005).}

This two-part chapter addresses how my epistemological positioning and critical reflexivity translate to a methodology that guides the research design and strategies I use to address my research questions. As such, it starts with a restatement of the research questions, reviews of the comparative case design and critical ethnographic methodology, discussions of the data collection methods (interviews, observation and document analysis) and data analysis protocol, and a review of the conceptual and methodological limitations of this study. The second part briefly describes the research settings and data sources (with synopses of research sites in Appendix A), to justify the link between the basic assumptions of this study, the theoretical grounds and methodological choice. The part also gives a site-by-site description of the data collection process. My goal is to provide a well-rounded insight into the data that inform the findings and analyses rendered in subsequent chapters.

**Research Design, Methodology and Strategies**

Since researchers are socially located entities whose personal biographies shape the issues they study, the ways they reconstruct them into researchable questions, and the methodological route they take to address them (Rampton, 1992), I preface this
section with a restatement of my research questions. To understand ELP processes in multilingual societies, I probe the multidimensional activities, interactions, and wider contexts of various individual and institutionalized policy actors in India, Nigeria and at UNESCO, which collectively constitute the ongoing social transactions about language as a vital tool for social organization, for control and for dissent. From a specifically critical theory lens, I explore the entrenchment of language-related systems of subjugation and institutional mechanisms for abrogating as well as maintaining them. Assuming the politics of social control enacted through languages decisions as revocable this study interrogates social conventions and formal processes in which ELPs are embroiled. By situating this study within broad language policy and planning/ELP scholarships it seeks to expand understanding, through theoretical revision, about ELP processes in multilingual societies. Accordingly, the questions of this research build on, but expand Cooper’s (1989) model:

1. With regard to education, what actors attempt to influence what (language) behaviors of which people under what conditions and by what means, through what decision-making process intended for what ends, and producing what effects in India, Nigeria, and UNESCO (see Ager, 1996; Cooper, 1989)? What decisions are made about language in education, who makes those decisions, why and how are those decisions made, what conditions generate decisions about language in
education, what resources are utilized (or not utilized), what stated goals do these
decisions target, and what ultimate effects do they create?

2. What are the operational dynamics of these eight elements (actors, behavior,
people, conditions, means, process, ends and effects) on the local, national, and
international levels, and how do they interact/network? What functions (including
actions and inactions, changes and stabilities, and manifestations) define identified
“actors”, “behaviors”, “people”, “conditions”, “means”, “processes”, “ends”, and
“effects” as significant elements of education language policymaking in India,
Nigeria and UNESCO? How, where and why do these functions overlap and interact
or otherwise (i.e., disjointed)?

3. What are the education language policymaking framework(s) in India, Nigeria and
UNESCO and how have these changed or persisted since the mid twentieth
century? What has been the general approach to and outcomes of education
language policymaking, and how and why have they changed or persisted over
time? What accounts for change in education language policymaking in India,
Nigeria and UNESCO?

4. What implications arise from the operational dynamics of identified “actors”,
“behaviors”, “people”, “conditions”, “means”, “processes”, “ends”, and “effects”
and their outcomes in understanding education language policy processes in
multilingual societies? What empirical evidences can we draw from these elements
of education language policymaking in enhancing theoretical and practical
understandings of language and education within multilingual social contexts?

Collectively, the four sets of questions above set us to interrogate: what (i.e.,
elements or components) constitutes education language policymaking as a process,
how do these operate, what changing or stable outcomes do they yield, and how can
answering these questions in India, Nigeria and UNESCO help us understand similar
issues in other multilingual societies?

These questions call for in-depth and detailed multidimensional analyses of rich
qualitative data from the two comparative cases in focus: India and Nigeria. More, it
invites a specifically critical perspective in exploring the issue of agency, ideology and
ecology embedded in these ELP contexts. This cross-case/comparative case approach
employs critical ethnography as the overarching methodology that guides data
collection and analytic strategies. Data collection strategies integrate in-depth face-to-
face interviews and participant observation of ELP agents’ real life contexts with
document analysis. Data analyses deploy a general combination of direct interpretation
and categorical aggregation (Stake, 1995). Interview and observation data analyses
specifically follow two coding procedures of grounded theory—open coding, axial
coding and selective coding—and of phenomenological analysis. In what follows, I
explain these methodological choices and their use in addressing my research issues.
Comparative Case Design

Comparative case or cross-case analysis is a special kind of case study that involves multiple cases. Although comparative, this model must not be confused with the comparative methodological element of Comparative Education or associate disciplines like comparative politics, comparative economics and so forth. Whereas cross-case or comparative case analysis is subsumed in the case study approach, case study is only one methodological option available to Comparative Education researchers. In applying conceptual and methodological frameworks, and intellectual tools of history and the social sciences to understanding international issues of education that resonate beyond specific boundaries (Epstein, 2008; 2004), expert comparativists bring a uniquely comparative lens to their studies, one that colors every aspect of their professional enterprises. Comparative case analysis, therefore, is one alternative approach in comparativists’ research toolkit.

Although a common strategy in comparative research, the choice of case study is not essentially methodological; it is rather a choice about what to be studied (Stake, 2005). To choose case study is to make a decision about the locus of research, one that identifies the kind or aspect of the cosmos to best encounter and understand the issues of the research. As Schwandt (2007) states, it shifts the center stage of research from variables to the case itself. Whereas a variable-centered research is selective, incorporating only those variables germane to the research question, a case study is
holistic. It allows the investigator to retain “the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (Yin, 2009, p. 4). Indeed, Yin (2009) indicates that the case study method is driven fundamentally by the desire to understand complex, not isolated, social phenomena. Case study is preferable in investigating social phenomena when relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated (as in experimentation) and when subjects are contemporary, not past (as in historical analysis) (Yin, 2009). While historical analysis and case study methods overlap, the possibility for direct observation and systematic interviewing in case study offer additional sources of evidence that extend beyond the conventional boundaries of historical analysis (Yin, 2009; Huang, 1997). The unique strength of case study, therefore, is its “ability to deal with a full variety of evidence—documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations—beyond what might be available in a conventional historical study” (Yin, 2009, p. 11).

Case studies target in-depth knowledge of the particular (Schwandt, 2007; Stake, 1995), but the quest for verstehen does not preclude all possibilities of knowledge with relevance beyond the specific research settings. By defining comparative education as the application of the “intellectual tools of history and social sciences to understanding international issues of education” (p. 373), Epstein (2008) offers a definitive schema for welding the universal in positivism with the particular in relativism, thus locating both verstehen and generalizability within the normative boundaries of comparison. Blending

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38 The German word verstehen hardly permits precise translation, “understanding” being the closest. As developed by Dilthey, verstehen or “intuitive insight” is a hallmark of relativist epistemology, and provides the inspiration for historical functionalists such as Kandel (Epstein & Carroll, 2005).
the ideographic and nomothetic maps a theoretical and methodological path for cross/comparative case design. Cross-case analyses, in which the locus of investigation stretches to multiple cases (Miles & Huberman, 1994), respect the integrity of each particular while building a framework for comparison (Rossman & Rallis, 2003). For Stake, (2005), comparison is “a grand epistemological strategy, a powerful conceptual mechanism, fixing attention to one or a few attributes” (p. 457). Cross-case analyses are significant because they are instrumental. Stake (2005) makes a distinction between intrinsic case studies, undertaken for interest in the particular case as such; instrumental case studies, which are “examined mainly to provide insight into an issue or redraw a generalization”; and multiple or collective case study, an extension of instrumental case study to multiple cases (p. 445). The cases in a multiple case study are illustrative of a pre-given issue, concept or problem (Schwandt, 2007). However, they are not necessarily selected based on the sampling logic of representativeness but because the detailed information they provide illuminates one or more aspects of an issue. To that end, cross-case design deploys the rationale of purposefulness, not randomization, and is essentially a design decision (Yin, 2009).

In this study, the pre-given issue is ELP processes that arguably continue to suppress identities and subjugate language users even as they seek to emancipate, and empower; the cases, far from representative, offer detailed information for understanding the issue. India and Nigeria fit what Heath (1972) categorizes as
“developing” nations suited for investigating complex language issues using case studies. I operationalized both countries as multiple instrumental cases through which more generalizable and theoretical knowledge about ELPs can be constructed. Both countries share a peculiar colonial heritage particularly in the areas of language and education. British colonial agents understood the peculiar similarities between India and Nigeria in terms of high population, complex demography, and linguistic diversity, and readily transferred ELPs developed in one country to the other.

The choice of indigenous languages for lower education and English for higher education and official state functions, a highly polemical outcome of the bitter Orientalist contra Anglicist controversies of the 1830s over the content and medium of Western formal education in colonial India (Evans, 2002; Mohanty P. , 2002; Pennycook, 1998), quickly extended to Nigeria and ultimately to other colonies. As agents of the British colonial imperium, Fredrick Lord Luggard and Thomas B. Macaulay, through the educational policies they advocated, remain popular colonial figures in India as in Nigeria. The intersection of both countries’ colonial history will be addressed in Chapter Five. Since independence, both India and Nigeria feature in international assessments as

39 Most accounts of the Orientalist-Anglicist controversy, especially those of a polemical nature, focus on Thomas B. Macaulay’s famous Minute of 1835. In this minute, Macaulay advocated the creation of a class of anglicized Indians who would serve as cultural intermediaries between the British and their Indian subjects (Evans, 2002). Education was the institution for producing this petit bourgeois class, and English language was its tool. While the masses received a basic education in indigenous languages, with minimal functional literacy in English (sufficient only to make them pliable docile subjects), the “indigenous elite” would receive higher education in English. For a fuller discussion of this colonial ELP in India, see Evans (2002), Mohanty (2002) (2002), Pennycook (1998), and in Nigeria, Bassey (1999), Phillipson (1992), Phillipson (2006).
educationally “at risk” due to lags in access, quality and gender parity as well as their high population and multilingualism.\footnote{International assessments are not unproblematic, or neutral. The universality of educational standards employed, for instance, in the EFA monitoring report, and the dearth of reliable data plague international assessments and their credibility as tools for educational decision-making.}

Given the complex histories of both cases, I try to ensure that there is no trade-off between in-depth understanding of each case and comparison. Stake (2005) suggest that “[W]ith concentration on the bases for comparison, uniqueness and complexities will be glossed over. A research design featuring comparison substitutes \textit{(a)} \textit{the comparison for (b) the case} as the focus of the study” (p. 457, emphasis in original). Yet, this concern is based on a perverse notion of comparison—as merely descriptive. Stake noted earlier that “comparative description” is the opposite of the “thick description” used by Geertz (1973) to describe his ethnographic method (Stake, 2005, p. 457).

Description is only a starting point for comparison. Although some early comparative studies were descriptive, the hallmark of comparative education scholarship has since shifted from pure description to rigorous analysis (Epstein, 1983). Compromising depth and uniqueness depends more on methodological choices and analytic protocols of specific studies, not merely on the comparative case design. Stake (2005) appears to understand this when he notes that the “illustration of how a phenomenon occurs in the circumstances of several exemplars can provide valued and trustworthy knowledge” (p. 459). Whatever its descriptive, holistic, heuristic and inductive value as comparative cases of a broader social realities, cross-case analysis necessarily demand
methodological eclecticism and analytic rigor. This methodology, *critical ethnography*, is critical to the extent it reflexively problematizes the positionality of all participants in this study, including that of the investigator; it is ethnographic inasmuch as it is immersed in, prioritizes, and is interpretive of the actual ELP processes and real-life experiences of the people it professes to study.

**Critical Ethnography**

Critical ethnography grew out of discontent with traditional positivist-oriented ethnography whose superficial portraits of indigenous cultures as simplistic, crude, and perverse legitimated colonial domination and in time fell into disfavor (Davis, 1999). Although 20th century revisions of traditional ethnography remained purely positivist, embodying assumptions of neutrality, objectivity and “value-free” positionality, relativism gradually gained popularity and intellectual legitimacy, and succeeded (but not surpass) positivism (Epstein, 2008). As relativism sought to recognize and contemplate subjective human experience, contingencies of truth claims, value-laden inquiry, and local knowledge and vernacular expressions as substantive analytical frameworks (Madison, 2005), the tenets of critical ethnography emerged.

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41 Traditional ethnographical studies, built on nineteenth-century anthropology and British functionalism, can be seen in works such as James Frazer’s (1900) *The Golden Bough*. Dismantling this tradition started with the genuine, even if unreflexive, oppositions to cultural evolutionism and ethnocentrism by Bronislaw Malinowski (Malinowski, 1945; 1926) in Britain and Franz Boas (1931; 1928) in the US, and later blossomed into Radcliffe-Brown’s (1958) structural functionalism and the Chicago School of Ethnography in British Anthropology and American Anthropology respectively. For a brief historical overview of the emergence of critical ethnography from traditional ethnography, see Madison (2005).
Consequently, the significance of critical ethnography draws from its tendency to challenge conventional ideological images inherent in, and the “symbolic violence” of, conventional research by exploring the possibilities of alternative meanings (Thomas, 2003). As Thomas points out, this does not imply that critical ethnography is necessarily opposed to, or rejects, conventional ethnography, since both share a common conceptual base. What distinguishes them, in Thomas’ view, is not so much an “act of criticism” but an “act of critique”. Criticism signals a dissatisfaction and complaint over a given state of affairs with no obligation to dig underneath and challenge their surface appearance. By contrast, critique assesses “how things are” with an added premise that “things could be better” if we examine the underlying sources of conditions, including values on which our complaints are based (Thomas, 2003, p. 46). As such, critical ethnographic studies bring a reflective dimension to the theory and practice of ethnography as a form of intellectual inquiry and social action. Broadly, critical ethnography aims to change awareness about specific social institutions or practices, and/or life itself. Its critique of “mainstream” western categories often relies on juxtaposition of Western practices against others, to reveal and problematize assumptions embedded in both.

Theoretically, critical ethnographic studies draw from cultural Marxism, critical theory, cultural studies, postmodern critiques, feminist and postcolonial theories. Its theoretical relevance to studies of power relationships and the politics of social control,
and the proclivity to a conflict model of social analysis, lead critics to suggest that critical ethnography amounts to no more than a reductionist oversimplified oppressor-oppressed model (Hammersley, 1992). However, critical ethnographic studies are theoretically diverse and methodologically flexible, and cannot be condensed into any simplistic unitary set of features. Rather, they reflect (a) a disavowal of the notion of the ethnographer as a detached, neutral participant observer with a value-free lens into social realities; (b) a focus on specific social practices or institutions instead of an entire culture; (c) an emancipatory, instead of a purely descriptive goal; and (d) a “self-referential form of reflexivity that aims to criticize the ethnographer’s own production of an account (Schwandt, 2007, p. 51). My use of critical ethnography as a methodological guide for this comparative case design abides these four elements.

That the researcher is not detached from the research—a point that aligns with Heidegger’s notion of the “world-yielding role of language” (Singh, 1993) and Foucault’s author function bases of language as discourse: humans are not merely shapers and determiners of their experiences but also subjects of those experiences, continuously entangled in and shaped by them (Thomas, 1993, p. 4)—emphasized the researcher’s ethical responsibilities to the researched and need for self-referential reflexivity. This self-referential reflexivity build on two conditions: first, it is iterative, spanning the entire research process; second, it is open to a mutual inter-reflectivity between and among participants—researcher and researched. An investigator that is equipped to
critically examine the positionality of all participants in the research (researcher and researched) still suffers a limitation of a unitary perspective, since all such critique—introspection an extrospection—are filtered through the singular lens of the researcher. A more robust condition of reflexivity ought to invite the researched to be reflective of their roles as well as those of the researcher.

At issue here, is the need for dialogue: an open, reciprocal, flexible, and iterative, communicative process guided by political equipoise. Indeed, since the researcher is co-constructor of the knowledge embodied in the research enterprise, it is only through this open dialogic reciprocity—one in which all actors are equally capable of and responsible for equiponderating multiple positionalities—that self-reflexivity can serve to maintain the multiplicity of voices and perspectives as represent the actual lived experiences under investigation. Accordingly, it affords all participants space to “change and be changed” and establishes grounds for the complex development of diverse voices (Canagarajah S., 2004; Carspecken, 1996). On the one hand, the demands of positionality directs our attention to our subjectivity not as an exclusionary introspection, but in a way that requires us to “direct our attention beyond our individual or subjective selves” to seeking how “our subjectivity in relation to the Other informs and is informed by our engagement and representation of the Other” (Madison, 2005, p. 9, emphasis in original). On the other hand, we permit ourselves to be penetrated by the Other in the same process of mutual negotiation of meaning.
Declares Madison (2005): “I contend that critical ethnography is always a meeting of multiple sides in an encounter with and among the Other(s), one in which there is negotiation and dialogue toward substantial and viable meaning” (p. 9). Dwight Conquergood (2002a; 2002b; 2000; Beyond the Text: Toward a Performative Cultural Politics, 1998) frames this mutual negotiation of meaning as “dialogic performance.” Akin to a dramaturgical analytic metaphor (Hare, Blumberg, & Goffman, 1988), dialogic performance captures the organic and real-life context within which the investigator and other participants mutually question and challenge one another, interrogating the interpretations each brings to the dialogue. In light of this, the data collection and analytic protocols involve a dialogic interplay between the participants and investigator engaged in genuine and ongoing quest for and inquiry into social processes into which they are variously entangled. In reporting the data gathering procedures and findings, I outline this openness, reciprocity and attendant vulnerability.

**Methodological Strategies: Interview, Participant Observation, Document Analysis**

A phenomenological investigation (Rossman & Rallis, 2003) of ELP actors’ real-life experiences (actions and inactions, interactions) calls for interpretive and constructivist approaches to historically embedded data (Creswell, 2003; Crotty, 1998). The methodological strategies—interviewing, participant observation, and document analysis—of this study embody interpretivism as fundamental elements of their logic.
In-Depth Interviewing: Dialogic Interface with Data

The data sought in this study, as noted in Chapter One, are not fixed, stable, detached and finished; they are organic, dynamic and essentially unstable. Accessing these data requires a flexible strategy adaptive to this shifting and often “vamping” character of ELP activities and process analysis. The purpose of in-depth interview is not necessarily to obtain unproblematic answers to questions for hypothesis testing or evaluation, but to understand the experiences of other people and the meaning they make of those experiences (King & Horrocks, 2009; Seidman, 2006). Although we are unable to understand others perfectly by entering into their stream of consciousness (Schütz, 1967), in-depth interviews open a unique window into aspects of their world—real and reconstructed—that ordinarily fall outside the marginal boundaries of observation and survey. Interviewing assumes that the rational and communicative dimensions of humans are mediated through language and demonstrates that humans, as social beings, know about and are aware of their experiences, and are capable of communicating this knowledge and awareness. As Bertaux (1981) puts it, unlike physical elements, “if given a chance to talk freely, people appear to know a lot about what is going on” (p. 39). From a critical ethnographic perspective, open dialogues of in-depth interviews guarantee the centrality of the voices of those researched.

Although not limited to strictly verbal forms, dialogue depends on and is amplified by direct face-to-face forms of linguistic exchange. Orality makes available to
the dialogic encounter other vehicles for communication absent in decontextualized texts. The distinction I make here between oral and other linguistic (particularly literacy) forms is consistent with Lisa Delpit’s (2006) distinction between literacy and orality. Delpit shows that literacy, as studied by most scholars (such as David Olsen, Walter Ong, Ron and Suzanne Scollon, Jack Goody and Dan Watt) “communicates a message solely through a text, through the word” (p. 96). By contrast, orality not only transmits messages through words (i.e., the text), but by factors such as the relationship of the individuals talking, where the interaction is taking place, what prior knowledge and/or understanding participants bring to the communication encounter, gestures used, speakers’ ability to adjust messages if the audience does not understand, intonation, facial expressions, and so forth. As Delpit puts it, this is “the con (meaning ‘with’) in context” (p. 96).

Direct oral interview acknowledges the need for text, but does not accept decontextualized text as supreme. Visiting ELP actors in India, Nigeria, and Paris immersed me in the real life contexts of the actors and provided access to, unmediated personal encounter with participants. I approach interviews already equipped with a studied familiarity with the works of some of the participants (mostly members of the academe) on ELPs. Engaging them in a dialogue, however, confirmed the notion that decontextualized texts alone conceal the full meaning of the con-text. It allowed me to encounter their thoughts not merely as fixed and finished ideas to which I can return
repeatedly in the text, but more as their constantly evolving understanding of complex and ever-changing social phenomena. Indeed, this evolutionary nature of knowledge and understanding explains why dialogue resists conclusions (Madison, 2005) and ELP is a process. Dialogue—an ongoing, never-ending process available through direct oral interview—is core to critical ethnography. That participants’ ability to recall and accurately (and willingly) report their experiences is not guaranteed in all dialogues, I approach interviewing not as a journalistic tool to reconstruct “accurate” or “objective” portraits of ELP processes retrospectively but to construct a deeper understanding of this process by appreciating participants’ narratives.

My use of interview obliges a constructionist perspective, for as Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) argue, an “interview is literally an *inter view*, an *inter*change of views between two persons conversing about a theme of mutual interest” (p. 2, emphasis in original). The knowledge targeted here is mostly concerned with the co-construction meaning and not conveyance of facts (King & Horrocks, 2009). This process focuses on the knowledge as much as on the participants; the alteration between the knower as interactive agents and the knowledge they produce is analogous to the image/background visual model of Gestalt perception (see Figure 1) (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). In the next part of this chapter, I describe how the interview process built on earlier dialogues and observations of the social contexts in which participants
operated. Before that, I discuss how participant observation fit as an integrative part of the interview process.

**Figure 1. Gestalt Image/Background Visual Model**

The famous visual Goblet-Face image Danish Psychologist, Edger Rubin used this famous image to illustrate the figure-ground phenomenon, an aspect of the Gestalt law of Prägnanz. Core to this perceptual phenomenon is the idea that in perceiving a visual field or reality, some objects take a prominent role (the figures) while others recede into the background (the ground) (Rubin E., 2001). The foreground-background relationship is a conceptual mainstay of hermeneutics (Seraqueberhan, 1994)

**Participant Observation: Strategic Plot for Integrated Interview Experience**

As noted earlier, orality and direct interview foregrounds additional forms and elements of interaction (such as facial expressions, gestures, and so forth), which might be inaccessible through decontextualized texts. Equally important is the larger physical space and social context within which the interviewees function. Without attending to the contextual piece, an investigator risks detaching participants’ thoughts and actions from the actual circumstances and empirical conditions that shape their ideas and values (Moore, 2000; Smith D. E., 1990). I use participant observation as an integral part
of a two-sided innovative method that mirrors participants’ actual world of meaning, a world not compartmentalized into exclusively oral or visual codes but rather integrates various forms and sources of data.

The two sides to participant observation: the physical and social space of the interviewee and the comportments they display during the interview process, create a rich holistic experience and comprehensive social text. The location of, style, and size of buildings, dress code, organization of office space, and so forth, as well as the interviewee’s body and verbal languages, together constitute sources upon which the interview data are generated. In addition to the participants’ social contexts, I record how my role as investigator is shaped by the physical conditions of my travels and visit: the locations and facilities of my hotel, experiences with public transportation, the form and language(s) of public signage, personal encounters with people on the streets, trains, taxis, restaurants, local businesses, and so forth. Using participant observation here instead of observation is deliberate and nuanced. Not only do I, as an ethnographer, occupy the same naturalistic environment of and take part in some of the activities engaged in by my research participants, which is the fundamental requisite for participant observation (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002); my participation in the specific interactions contribute to the knowledge I appropriate as research data.
Document Analysis: Mining the Historical, Engaging the Substance

The third major arm of my methodological toolkit is document review. I make a distinction here between review of scholarly literature in ELP and language policy and planning (through university library networks) and exploration of extensive archival and primary documents available in the study sites. An enormous amount of archival and primary documents exist in India, Nigeria and UNESCO, which contain immense data on ELP that can be the subject of a separate research on the evolution of ELPs. Such documents serve as vital reference points for social science research that are frequently ignored in the research reports they inform (Prior, 2008). In themselves, texts represent what Lindsay Prior (2008) calls “conduits of communication” that bring, an author and a reader into an interactive setup through which meaningful messages are shared. Placed in the historic and social contexts out of which they are borne, they embody even rich materials for understanding, not only themselves but broader issues. Texts can therefore be interpreted as historically and politically grounded.

In mining these documents, I pay attention to their complexity and varieties, including books, reports, maps, letters and so forth. Importantly, texts are not only composed but can also be destroyed, censored, and forged (Prior, 2008). In addition to what they reveal (through simple analytic approaches like content analysis or more sophisticated ones, such as discourse analysis), texts are critical for what they conceal and the ways they correspond or align with each other and other contemporaneous
social texts. More than repositories of unquestioned and unproblematic information, they reflect the positionality of their creators and the diverse contexts out of which they arise and are managed or preserved. My approach to document analysis—including the ways documents are selected, read and/or analyzed—represents a purposeful quest for information and critical inquiry into the data about ELP processes of multilingual societies.

**Data Analyses Protocol**

Analyses of interview data follow two multi-phase procedures. First, each interview process is succeeded by a *Daily Interpretive Analysis* (DIA) (Wood, 2000). The purpose of the DIA is to produce a *preliminary* organization and interpretation of the information collected during my interviews (Andrews, Carpenter, DellaVilla, & Olver, 2007; Wood, 2000). In the DIA, I record major issues raised during the interview process, describe striking elements of the context (including insights I gained while in dialogue with the participants) and tentative inferences and/or concerns arising thereof. Although interviews were audiorecorded, and I took notes during the interviews, reflecting on the dialogue and the ways issues connect to the overall objectives of the research immediately after each interview is a fundamental (even if preliminary) aspect of the analytic process.

DIA is critical for protecting the extreme fragility of interview data; since the interview data extend beyond the recorded oral exchanges, the passage of time makes
it increasingly difficult to reconstruct the entire information and exchanges (Wood, 2000). With time, even highly structured and well-taken notes and audiorecorded materials appear decontextualized and difficult to interpret if not guided by rich descriptive information about the dialogue. Even more fragile are those momentary flashes and insights about how a participant’s idea connects to a larger theme or concept in the investigative process. The information furnished in the DIA is not necessarily valid or unproblematic; it is rather a provisional interpretation meant to inform subsequent data analysis. Consistent with the entire research process as ongoing, flexible and unfolding, the very act of writing the DIA becomes a potentially critical learning tool that forces me to reflect on and inform subsequent data collection processes with lessons learned from previous ones (Wood, 2000). Composing a DIA was time consuming; I struggled to avoid a tradeoff between writing a comprehensive DIA and allowing sufficient time for additional interviews. Since the DIA enhances my reflection on and organization of successive interviews, they progressively engendered richer and more informative (and not merely more numerous) interviews.

The next phase in interview data analysis, transcription of audiorecorded materials, deserves only cursory mention here, but for its conceptual implications for the present research. Elinor Ochs (1979) points out that transcription is theory; it is not a straightforward conduit to the “reality” of any given interaction, but “the outcome of a series of theoretical decisions and assumptions about how to represent talk as text”
(Gibson, 2010, p. 133). Qualitative research analysts utilize three major forms of transcription, each representing a different degree of attention to phonetic details. In *cleansed* transcripts, only the essences of conversations are paraphrased. Common grammatical errors and verbiage of oral interaction are edited into coherent sentences that convey the author’s meaning.

Alternatively, a transcript may contain *just the words* of the interview interaction. In this case, all words are transcribed in the structure they were spoken. A third option, the *Jeffersonian* transcription, involves attending to all words and phonetic details, pauses, overlap, tonal inflections, emphasis, and so forth (Gibson, 2010; Charmaz, 2006; Nevile, 2004). I therefore view transcription, not simply as a disconnected technical exercise that renders data more amenable to analysis, but as a critical theoretical phase of the analytic process (Acton, 2003). In transcribing the data, I follow the Jeffersonian model to enable me to account for the possible impacts of linguistic difference between the investigator and other research participants. While English was the choice language for interviews, participants possess markedly varied forms of standard and nonstandard English language. The texts integrated in the analysis come from “cleansed” versions of the Jeffersonian transcripts. Yet, I move back and forth among the cleansed and Jeffersonian transcripts, and the original audiorecording, to confirm the validity and consistency of my data and the interpretations they bear. This dual transcription process helps to ensure that the focus
on phonetic details does not detract, as Gibson (2010) warns, from the interview’s content or broader context.

I analyze interview data using three coding procedures of grounded theory – open coding, axial coding and selective coding – and interpretative phenomenological analysis. The first analytic step however, is to identify critical instances in the text. Critical instances are passages, sentences, phrases or whole pages of the transcript that stand out either from reading the text minutely (i.e., line-by-line) or from an overview standpoint (Strauss A. L., 1987). Open coding requires generating categories based on the interview data by linking particular passages, sentences, and phrases from the interview transcripts to abstract conceptual labels.

Axial coding involves selecting, refining and positioning each category generated in open coding to create linkages between the categories. Through axial coding, these categories are refined and amalgamated to fit a broader categorical structure. With selective coding, I systematically organize core categories around thematic structures. Identifying a core category (or categories) and themes is critical for linking the analyses to, or generating, theory (Strauss A. L., 1987). To allow for an encompassing grasp of possible interpretive categories, my analysis targets sociologically constructed and in vivo codes generated through the broader investigative context and those from participants’ direct expressions. My goal here is to build an analytic framework with generalizable theoretical utility. As Rossman and Rallis (2003) suggests, coding is “the
formal representation of analytic thinking” through which data is linked to conceptual issues (p. 286).

Although the design of the present study is not grounded theory, the choice of analytic tools of grounded theory (Glaser & Stauss, 1967) is deliberately tied to problems associated with using explanatory narratives as heuristic. The overwhelming presence of hegemony and mutual interactionism as broad, even if unacknowledged, conceptual mapping of ELP and language policy and planning research tempt this analysis to impose existing categories on the data. By deploying an analytic tool particularly suited to the unmediated emergence of conceptual categories from the data, I avoid hegemony and mutual interactionism as exclusive criteria for determining what are significant ideas or “critical instances”. I first approach the data with an open mind and only examine associations between the data and heuristics after generating categories and themes from the data coding. To be sure, I make no pretence about the heuristic significance of both explanatory narratives in positioning this study within broader ELP and language policy and planning studies. Therefore, open, axial, and selective coding targets the emergence of categories and theoretical constructs that are congruent and/or incongruent with either or both narratives, and they open space primarily for the emergence of new narratives, even if a hybrid of existing ones.
The final part of my analytic toolkit, interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA),\(^{42}\) draws out an important analytic dimension that (a) ensures the unmediated emergence of meaning and categories from the data, (b) highlight the significance participants attach to their experiences and activities in the ELP process, and (c) address the critical component of this study’s design. The purpose of IPA is to penetrate participant’s experiences and the meaning they make of those experiences. Being phenomenological, IPA addresses these experiences; being hermeneutical, it pursues the intricate interpretive structure through which participants make meaning of their experiences. Thus, I try to make meaning of both participants’ experiences and also the meaning they make of their experiences, a move that requires a double hermeneutic process (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009). Since IPA ideally avoids a priori imposition of hypothesis on data, I reflect upon and “bracket” (that is, suspend) any preconceptions about the data, focusing rather on the participants’ experiential universe of meaning making. As such, I constantly shift back and forth between participants’ major claims and my own meaning of those claims. Building on the coding process, I sift significant statements to generate “meaning units” out of which develops an “essence” description (Creswell, 2003; Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Moustakas, 1994) and theoretically useful

\(^{42}\)IPA is a fairly recent analytic contraption in qualitative research—first in psychology, but spreading to other disciplines (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009), IPA grows from the phenomenological, hermeneutical and idiographic traditions of Edmund Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Schleiermacher, and Hans Georg Gadamer (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009).
analysis. These structures provide a triangulation model for cross-referencing data to ensure accuracy and validity.

Data analysis stretch beyond the verifiable empirical data on participants’ current and past engagement with the ELP process to their reflections on past experiences. These data generated in the context of verbal and non-verbal interactions during data collection is treated as a rich text for understanding participants’ positions and meaning-making. Consistent with linguistic research conceptualization of the whole interview as a coherent text that yields data not only from the responses of the interviewee but also the interview structure and questions, I analyze the entire process as a certain type of conversation with features of this genre of integrative dialogue and participant observation (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). Typical of qualitative analyses, sufficient interpretative and explanatory space is allowed for the emergence of unanticipated results.

**Deconstructing Spaces and Framing Agents as Data Sources**

Understanding the sites for this study traces to the rationale that ELPs have serious educational and social implications especially in multilingual societies, a rationale relevant to Nigeria and India’s membership in the E9 countries—the most populated countries of the world with grim prospects in educational achievements, judging by international assessments (such as EFA’s country records on enrolment,
quality, gender parity, and so forth). Besides these international assessments, internal needs drive constant debates and consternation over the use of language by policymakers and educational practitioners for establishing segregated and unequal schooling (Skutnabb-Kangas, Phillipson, Mohanty, & Panda, 2009; Mohanty A. K., 2006; Emenanjo, 1990). One telling issue of these debates is that, over half a century after the end of colonialism, the ELP used by colonial agents to establish a Westernized ruling elite and a purportedly pliable subordinate polity continues to hold sway in the democratic societies of India and Nigeria. A second equally vexatious issue is that, while language policy and planning/ELP experts recommend mother-language education-multilingual education, language policymakers remain largely unwilling (or at best, reluctant) to comprehensively revise this Macaulayan colonial ELP. In this part of this chapter, I describe my research sites, data sources and the data collection procedures.

Localizing the Inquiry: Research Sites as Education Language Policy Spaces

Except for someone already familiar with the politics of public policy and the evolution (and devolution) of multilingualism in India and Nigeria, the choices of Delhi, Abuja, Lagos, Ibadan, and Paris as sites for studying language policymaking might not appear immediately obvious. In spite of being the nations’ capitals (in the case of Abuja

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43 Starting from 2005, the EFA Global Monitoring Report identifies language of instruction as a crucial pedagogical concern for multilingual societies, stressing the need for early mother-tongue and multilingual education (UNESCO, 2005).
and New Delhi) and among the most developed cities, these sites are hardly the only locales for ELP decision-making. Indeed, the thinking that most ELP decisions occur on the grassroots, which often contain sundry local and international interests and agents—a manifestation of glocalization\(^{44}\)—is precisely the underlying logic of this research’s integrative design. The cities of my research contain constellations of different agents—government and non-government, institutional and non-institutional, collective and individual—whose roles in the ELP process variously shape language choices and educational practices of many. By their mere concentration around operational institutions of governments (such as education ministries, parliamentary and congressional houses, educational policy councils, and government-sponsored academic institutes), these agents paradoxically challenge but also confirm the significance of state apparatuses in ELP processes. Yet, this proximity and the fluidity of resources exchanges among government and non-government entities (such as local and international non-governmental organizations (I/NGOs), advocacy groups and activists, and international organizations) make for administrative expediency.

With evident burgeoning cosmopolitan habiliments, New Delhi and Abuja are respectively home to the Department of Higher Education in the Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD) and the Federal Ministry of Education (FME), arguably

\(^{44}\) Glocalization is a portmanteau concept for “globalization” and “localization” that illustrates the inhabitations or embodiments of the “global” in and by the “local”. For further reading on glocalization as a sociological concept, see Khondker (2004a; 2004b) and Robertson (2010). In their work *Imagining Multilingual Schools: Languages in Education and Glocalization*, Ofelia García, Tova Skitnabb-Kangas, and María Torres-Guzmán (2006) demonstrate the relevance of this concept to multilingualism in education.
the government entities most directly involved in the ELP process. Other ministries with “clout” in language development and policies, especially the Indian Ministry of Culture and Nigerian Ministry of Culture and Tourism, share the same administrative geography in New Delhi and Abuja with the MHRD and the FME respectively. So do governments’ academic councils, such as India’s National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) and the Nigerian Educational Research and Development Council (NERDC), which are active participants in the ELP process. Abuja and New Delhi are also home to major public universities—University of Abuja and Delhi University, respectively—which enjoy visibility in official circles due to their vantage proximity to central government institutions.

This foregoing argument of proximity, although logical in terms of administrative expediency, does not imply that other locales in India and Nigeria lack major government and non-government ELP agencies. Lagos, Nigeria’s capital until 1991, still retains some federal government institutions, satellite offices of Abuja headquarters, parastatals, and major universities. Among them are NERDC and University of Lagos, with nationally acclaimed professors of linguists that actively participate in the ELP process. The National Institute for Nigerian Languages (NINLAN), located in Aba, a bustling southeastern city, constitutes another federal entity involved in the ELP process. The University of Ibadan, a short distance south of Lagos, is Nigeria’s premier university, with expert linguists whose works shape the public discourse on language in
education. In India, language institutes are spread around the country, the most notable being the Central Institute for Indian Languages (CIIL) in Mysore and the Central Institute of English and Foreign Languages in Hyderabad. While Aba, Mysore, Hyderabad and many other localities are major sites for critical ELP activities, they lack the assortment of various players in language policy processes that characterize Abuja, New Delhi, Lagos, Ibadan, and (in the case of UNESCO) Paris.

Data for this research come from the following sites located in the cities described above: ministries of education (Department of Higher Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development [MHRD], New Delhi, and Federal Ministry of Education [FME], Abuja); universities (University of Delhi [DU], University of Lagos [UNILAG], University of Ibadan [UI]); government councils on education development (National Council of Educational Research and Training [NCERT], Nigerian Educational Research and Development Council [NERDC]); Language Institutes and Academies (National Institute for Nigerian Languages [NINLAN], Central Institute for Indian Languages [CIIL]); linguistic associations (Linguistic Association of Nigeria [LAN], Linguistic Society of India [LSI]); non-governmental organizations and grassroots movements (Babs Fafunwa Center for Yoruba Language Engineering [BAFCYLE], Pratham); international organizations (UNESCO: Headquarters, Paris, Field Offices and National Commissions, Abuja and New Delhi); independent language activists. See Appendix A for synopses of research sites.
From Research Site to Participants

The nature of the questions and the design of this study call for purposeful sampling (Seidman, 2006; Patton M. Q., 1989). The goal of purposeful sampling—what other methodologists refer to as purposive sampling (Johnson & Christensen, 2008) or criteria-based selection (LeCompte, Preissle, & Tesch, 1993)—is to select cases and samples from which to obtain in-depth information about the issues under study. Contrary to the probability logic of random sampling in quantitative analysis, which targets empirical generalizations, purposeful sampling seeks cases and participants that deepen understanding about specific issues of the research (Patton M. Q., 2002). Patton (2002) argues: “[the] logic and power of purposeful sampling lie in selecting information-rich cases for study in depth. Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the inquiry” (p. 230, emphasis in the original).

Techniques in purposeful sampling vary depending on the specific rationale for using this strategy and the criteria for selecting cases. Decisions about rationale and selection criteria are not arbitrary; they are driven partly by studied familiarity with literature in the research field and also by reasoned calculations that include judgments about conceptual frameworks, methodological structure, and empiestemological grounds of the study. From the existing battery of typological options (Lodico, Spaulding, &
Voegtle, 2010; Creswell, 2007), I combine the maximum variation, typical case, and snowball types of purposeful sampling.

With maximum variation, I select participants with the greatest possible diversity of characteristics or experiences in the ELP processes studied (Lodico, Spaulding, & Voegtle, 2010). The idea of “greatest possible diversity” is measured against the scope of this study and not an infinite estimation of possible ELP experiences in all possible multilingual settings. Maximum variation sampling justifies the selection of participants from the various sites listed above.

Using the typical case type of purposeful sampling, I identify an initial set of participants who possess the specific characteristics or experiences representative of the individual’s institution as an ELP actor. For instance, at the education ministries, I enlist individuals most directly involved with or responsible for language policy decisions. They in turn help to identify and nominate other individuals with relevant experiences to the ELP process. This third strategy reflects the snowball element of my tripartite purposeful sampling. Given that most institutional sites are complex landscapes where individuals occupy shifting and interconnected positions, participants directly responsible for language policy decisions work with, and therefore nominate others, for the study.

Although participation is voluntary, sample selection is discriminatory in terms of participants’ involvement in the policy process. Experience in the ELP process is
measured in terms of official institutional position, such as government policymakers at India’s Department of Higher Education at MHRD and at Nigeria’s FME. Both ministries have language divisions entrusted with ELP activities. Although some of the participants are bureaucrats employed by the government, others are politicians elected into transient offices with stipulated terms. Other participants include university-based and independent scholars (mostly, but not all, linguists) who provide much needed expertise on language issues to the ministries and other policy bodies. These serve as policy consultants, some with prior employment at the ministries. Among them are independent scholarly actors whose works as policy analysts and critics significantly shape public opinion and academic discourse on language policies. Some of these scholars have long records of accomplishment in expert consultancies and professorships at foreign universities in Africa, North America and Europe. Other participants, mostly from the academe, are language-oriented social activists representing local or regional constituencies. The positions of these activists straddle an unstable balance between “elite” academics and “disenfranchised” grassroots actor, a position that, at best, define their identities as fluid and their roles as shifting. The visibility of academic experts and activists through the mass media showcases their public involvement in ELP processes.
Characterizing Data Sources as Multilayered and Interpenetrative

The synoptic portraits of institutional data sources for this research (see Appendix A) underscore the diversity of ELP agents working along multiple layers, which, although operationally distinct, allows the interpenetration of individual players. Unless the actual relationships of these multiple layers and different institutional and individual agents are unbundled, understanding the policies that emerge as a result of their dynamic networks and the mechanisms that account for their formulation and perpetuation, remains, at best, fragmentary.

A few characteristics of the participants in this study, as evident from the above descriptions, are worth noting. First and most outstanding is their multidimensional perspective and postionality. Only very few participants represent a unitary perspective on the ELP process. For those, a strong commitment or attachment to a particular language (or language group) or linguistic course stretch their otherwise unitary perspective to multiple (and sometimes wider) latitudes. A second characteristic that follows from the first is that most of the participants trespass institutional boundaries as they penetrate the multiple structures to which they are affiliated. For some, these interpenetration of multiple institutional structures are simultaneous, as when a member of the academe holding active professoriate also works as a grassroots actor and international consultant. For others, it is successive, with the individual occupying some positions at one time and another at a different time. While multidimensional and
multi-positional actors transport the complex of their professional knowledge and disposition about language across different institutions, they also adjust the accoutrements of these knowledge and dispositions to specific institutional cultures and norms. Such adaptation of intellectual toolkits to the demands of particular policy arena shapes what the individual emphasizes or deemphasizes in the process. The next chapters address this embodiment of multiple cultural norms by individual policy actors, and how such normative mosaics trigger different, sometimes conflicting, impulses that shapes the policy process.

A third characteristic is that nearly all participants have some background in academia. Even those with explicit bureaucratic offices have some academic background. This presents a particular conceptual perplexity since, as already noted, some language policy and planning/ELP experts blame the lack of correspondence of theory to policy and practice on epistemic divides between language policy and planning scholars and educational (including policy) practitioners, one that emphasize the lack of understanding (on the part of non-experts) of current research findings in the field (Baldauf & Luke, 1990). Most analysts believe that there is a need for guiding philosophy and full understanding of the complexity of language issues among policymakers (Watts, 1997). If most significant players in the ELP arena enter language policymaking from the academe, their work should expectedly embody the theories and best practices their academic knowledge. However, while most have an academic background, not all are
experts in linguistics or other language related fields. More, as Ricento’s (2000a)
historical analysis of language policy and planning scholarship implies theorizations
about language and society are still evolving; current evidence suggests that the
principles guiding most policies and practices of the past half century are misguided and
misinformed. Academics themselves therefore do not agree on what constitutes
language policy and planning/ELP theory or “best practices”.

A final characteristic issues from a distinction in terms of the motives driving
participants’ involvement in the ELP processes, a characteristic best represented as a
continuum. On one end are participants with strong personal commitment to language
as a dynamic element of human identity that shapes the structure and development of
societies. This interest in language generally led to or grew from school experiences,
whether through multilingual basic education and/or graduate studies in a language-
related field. A further distinction is possible for this group of participants: while some
perceive language as their primary target, others view it as a tool for addressing social
needs. For the former are often committed to corpus planning while the latter, status
planning. This distinction underscores an emphasis, not polarity. Indeed nearly all
participants acknowledge the need for a comprehensive and integrated approach to
language policymaking, while emphasizing one or more aspects of the process. The
concern with developing local languages for use in schools, scientific discourse, public
services and so forth, acknowledges the asymmetric relationship between, say, English-
only and indigenous language schools, or between dominant and non-dominant ethnolinguistic groups.

On the other end of the continuum are participants whose involvement in ELP processes is predicated on interests and commitments other than in/to language. The most notable of this group are bureaucrats and employees of governments (and their agencies) as well as UNESCO. Unlike the former, the educational and work experiences of the latter have been in fields other than language. This however, does not make them less informed about or effective ELP actors, especially since language policymaking is not exclusively a linguistic exercise but is rather deeply entangled in ongoing political, social, economic and cultural exchanges. Such participants’ views are thus, vital to studies of ELP processes.

The use of purposeful sampling in this study deliberately works to avoid the narrow focus of earlier language policy and planning and ELP studies on governments as the exclusive policymaker, and on policy texts. This study’s sample represents a wide array of backgrounds that captures the multilayered and multidimensional nature of ELP processes in multilingual societies. As I discuss in the next section, the data collection process necessarily requires flexibility and rigor to ensure that the multiplicity of perspectives is adequately represented. This data collection process is essentially dialogic, reflexive, and continually interpretive. In the next chapter, I examine this dialogic, reflexive and interpretive interface with data.
Data Collection as Dialogic, Reflexive and Interpretive

In this last section of this chapter, I discuss the actual data collection process: in-depth interviews, participant observation, and document review. I provide a loose chronological account of my encounter with data from gaining access to the analysis phase. The goal of this chapter is to take the reader through a careful excursion of my research trips to India, Nigeria and France, and thus position them as readers to better grasp, critique, and problematize the findings, analysis and conclusions I report in subsequent chapters. Actual data collection for this study occurred in three phases spanning a 12-month period, from January 2009 to January 2010. During this period, I engaged over fifty (50) potential participants (out of which a total of 32 participated) in ongoing communications through direct contact and electronic means, and collected extensive interview and textual data from multiple sites that bear on the ELP processes of India and Nigeria, as well as UNESCO’s role in these processes. Although multisite policy research can be particularly useful especially for optimizing theoretical applicability and generalizability (Herriott & Firestone, 1983), it multiplies the data collection tasks and amplifies the challenges associated with gaining access and managing the data collection process.

Gaining Access to and Engaging Data Sources

During earlier visits to Nigeria in the summer of 2007 and 2008, I explored potential sites for investigating language policymaking, focusing at government
ministries, universities and non-governmental agencies. These explorations involved informal site visits and communications with various individuals. During these years, I kept a constantly updated list of language policy agents in India, Nigeria and at UNESCO. The institutions and individuals on the list, gleaned mostly from scholarly literature in language policy and planning, professional networks (especially through the Comparative and International Education Society, CIES), and local media reports, became my preliminary source for sample selection. Having fulfilled all requirements, and obtained the approval of Loyola University Chicago’s Institution Review Board (IRB) (see Appendix B) I recruited participants by sending invitation letters (see Appendix C) through the mail, following it up with email and airmail letters and telephone calls. Subsequently, I obtain individual participants’ informed consent to participate in this study (see Appendix D). After thorough examination of the suitability of the individuals and study sites for the purpose of this study, and assembling preliminary data about their respective institutional and personal backgrounds in ELP processes, I started data collection in April 2009 in India, continued with Nigeria, and ended in July 2009 in Paris.

45 The Council of Regents at Loyola University Chicago, through the Office of President, generously provided part of the funding for these earlier research trips.
New Delhi, India

Initial contacts with the DHE were through email and phone communications with the Minister of State for Human Resource Development. I obtained most of the contact information for this early stage of communication online through the institutions’ respective websites. Subsequently, officials at the MHRD contacted me, and following the Minister’s gracious approval linked me to both the educational policy and language sectors of the ministry. Obtaining an official invitation from MHRD, which was required for a scientific research visa to India, was however delayed due to the active engagement of relevant ministry personnel in election activities. Initial communications with the Program Specialist for Education and Education Program Assistant at UNESCO’s New Delhi Field Office as well as University of Delhi were equally through email and airmail letter (see Appendix C) and telephone. Retrospectively, I deeply appreciate the various challenges of establishing fresh contacts, but more, the participants’ graciousness in accommodating my study in their already hefty work schedule.

Equipped with the list of target participants gleaned from language policy and planning research on India and professional networks, I arrived to India in April 2009 and set about soaking in the rich and complex cultural and social landscape while immediately embarking on the data collection process. Two MHRD participants helped both in locating some potential participants on my list, mostly known experts in

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46 Several earlier attempts to establish contacts with the MHRD, University of Delhi, and other institutions in India through the Indian Consulate in Chicago proved abortive even after meetings with the Indian Consul General, who I met during his visit to Loyola University Chicago in fall 2008.
language policy studies, and in identifying new ones, including CIIL, LSI, NCERT, Pratham, independent language activists, and academics at University of Delhi. Although I had no prior assurance that additional participants would be recruited through MHRD, this development was not accidental but part of the snowball purposeful sampling design of this study.

Their graciousness notwithstanding, I was reflexively cognizant of how MHRD participants’ help in contacting (and sometimes, introducing me to) other ELP actors eased the ice-breaking process and simultaneously (at least potentially) distanced me from new participants. Given that language policymaking occurs in contested and highly politicized public and private spaces, potential ELP actors might interpret perceived affiliation or identification with an institution or individual as “taking sides”, a condition that can potentially limit my possibilities of gaining access to or credibility and trust with individuals who represent oppositional camps to the government. As I engage individual participants, I work consciously to manage the effects of this unavoidable double-edged character of the snowball strategy by clearly explaining the goal of my research project, my positionality, and the sampling technique responsible for their recruitment.

As I discuss presently, interviews occur in three sequential phases with each phase focusing on specific category of issues: participant’s background, experience in ELP process, and reflection on their experiences. I started preliminary interviews a day after I arrived in New Delhi, conducting an average of three interviews per day. In the
three-week period I spent in New Delhi, I conducted intensive in-depth dialogic interviews with thirteen (13) participants, with a total of 36 interviews sessions in nearly 50 hours (excluding extensive exchanges of ideas through lengthy phone conversations between interviews).

While most interviews occurred in three sessions, some took only one session often due to the relative limited scope of the interviewee’s experiences in ELP processes and/or scheduling difficulties. With very few exceptions, interviews sessions lasted over two hours with some stretching to over four hours. All interviews took place in participant’s offices or homes (for those with no immediate institutional affiliations, or depending on interviewees’ convenience). Only the interview with the SIL participant was held at the UNESCO office, although as I indicate in later chapters, this SIL representative does not hold an office at, but works very closely with, UNESCO. One participant who lives in a another city, over 700 km (445 miles approx.) from New Delhi offered several long sessions of telephone interview.

While scheduling interviews, I allotted sufficient time to explore the location and physical structure in which participants work. Although not a systematic part of the research design or data collection strategy, I often queried the local citizens (e.g., taxi and rickshaw drivers and local traders) about prevailing social conditions to obtain anecdotal data that may enhance interview dialogue. My fair familiarity with the social landscape relieved participants of the frequently frustrating efforts to explain every
cultural and social nuance, allowing the dialogue to delve deep into more substantive issues. Observing and recording the physical and social contexts in which participants worked and enacted their roles as ELP agents provided immense contextual materials for situating and analyzing the raw data they provide.

In addition to the interviews and corollary observations, I accessed library and bookstore materials at the University of Delhi, NCERT, UNESCO and MHRD, to collect textual and archival materials that bear on the ELP process. At NCERT’s Bookstore, I was able to purchase the National Curriculum Frameworks for teaching Indian languages, English, and other relevant areas, which served to ground my conversations with participants representing the perspectives of the Government of India, NCERT and MHRD. Participants from Pratham provided me with samples of toolkits used in the ASER survey as well as copies of all ASER annual reports since 2007. They also provided me with Asha Sarangi’s (2009) edited book on language and politics in India, a book that provided substantial analytic tools for interrogating the political dimensionality of ELP processes.

Through the DHE and UNESCO National Commission, I obtained vital minutes of meetings and internal reports that provide useful information for explicating UNESCO’s relationship with other Indian institutions with stake in language policymaking. Some independent activist participants provided numerous archival and current textual materials critical for understanding historical landmarks in language policymaking in
India as well as the internal workings of the ELP process. In addition, most provided various personal works containing their scholarly positions on the subject. While I left India with an extensive amount of data, I was acutely aware that I have only scratched the surface of an immensely complicated and vastly rich site for research in multilingualism. For instance, due to timing and resource constraints (in spite of accommodation provisions by MHRD participants) I was unable to visit CIIL in Mysore, a critical site for any language-related study in India. Fortunately, the CIIL Director was in New Delhi for a different purpose and available for a brief dialogue.

**Abuja, Lagos and Ibadan, Nigeria**

Since during my earlier visits I had already met some potential participants in Nigeria, my first official mailed invitation and follow-up email and airmail letters and telephone contacts were relatively less challenging. Besides, being a Nigerian citizen eliminated most bureaucratic protocols required of foreign researchers regarding visa issuance. As with India, my use of maximum variation, typical case, and snowball sampling strategies targeted ELP agents from a wide variety of backgrounds, building on cascading layers of references from initial participants. With a few important additions, participants recruited through the FME and UNILAG recommendations matched those on my preliminary list and dispelled my fear of a skewed sample. The problem of skewedness is most telling when randomization and population representativeness is central to the research design (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2007) yet selecting samples
that do not robustly capture the target experiences of purposeful sampling defeats the logic of the strategy and impairs the research as a whole. Matching refereed ELP actors with my preliminary list became a useful serendipitous validity check.

Besides major current players in Nigeria’s (and indeed international) language policy and planning, I identified three arch patriarchs of language policy and education development in Nigeria whose experiences date to the colonial era. These prominent language policy and planning figures, whose individual careers span over half a century of work with successive regimes in Nigeria, international organizations, professoriate at local and foreign academic institutions, and non-governmental and professional agencies, played key roles in the development of UNESCO’s interest and position on language, formulation of national educational policies, and overall development of the educational system. As such, their varied comparative perspectives provide vital historical architectonic for situating crucial moments in the evolution of ELP in Nigeria and around the world. These patriarchs remain largely untapped historical sources for academic scholarship and social practice on the evolution of language policy and planning.

My data collection in Nigeria started at the FME in Abuja, covering both the language sector and the policy division of the ministry. Although distinct, both offices are operationally interdependent. Interviews at the FME, UNESCO Field Office, and UNESCO National Commission lasted for two weeks, with an average of three interview
sessions each weekday. At UNESCO Field Office, I interviewed upper-level administrative officers as well as program specialists in the education and culture sectors. I also visited NERDC (located 70km/43 miles away from the Federal Secretariat in an isolate and largely unoccupied area), which, as I point out in the synopses, serves as research organ of the FME. I spent the following two-week period in Lagos and Ibadan at UNILAG, UI and NERDC.

Similar to India, all interviews took place at the participants’ offices or residences. Due to scheduling conflicts (but strikingly similar to India), discussions with one participant from the northern part of the country, who is also a prominent player in Nigeria’s ELP and language policy and planning scholarship, were over the phone. I was particularly struck by the participants’ flexibility and sacrifices to accommodate my demanding scheduling requests. Reflexively, I acknowledge their thoughtfulness to not only the project but also regarding their understanding of my resource limitations. As experts in cross-national empirical inquiry, they were genuinely curious about my insistence on a multi-site study that required physical presence for data collection without major research funding. Their concern with this resource challenge was clearly demonstrated in the ways they adjusted their regular work schedule to my data collection timetable, a gesture I know contributed in no mean measure to the success of this project.
Each interview lasted between one and four hours, with one to three sessions per participant depending largely on the extent of their experiences in the ELP process and their availability. At UNILAG, I had a brief and unplanned meeting with about five fulltime academic staff of the Faculty of Education with whom I was exploring other research partnerships. Although initially unintended, this meeting provided important facts and materials that informed and enriched my dialogue with individual participants during the interview sessions. Ideas from this meeting also featured at other phases of this research, particularly as I was thinking through the data as part of the DIA. In the four-week period, I collected a huge amount of interview data from twelve (12) major participants, totaling over 50 hours of audio-recorded materials. While not a part of the original research design, the extensity of data from Nigeria and India are very similar and allow for greater comparability.

Observational data, recorded through notes, photographs and videos provide a critical social text for embedding my analysis. These observation data, scripted into the interview sessions, proved to be critical indicators of larger political configurations that condition the performances of ELP actors and thus determine language policymaking practices. I integrate this physico-social determinacy of language policy practices in the analysis I run and results I report in subsequent chapters. Suffice it to note here that I use the term physic-social to denote the congeries of physical and social structures such as building (including size, location, style, etc), integration to or exclusion from other institutions, transportation system, communication gadgets, and so forth, in which participants work. This is therefore distinct from its use in Eriksonian (1950) physicosocial psychology to conceptualize a theory of personality development.
while in India, the UNESCO Field Office is located independently; in Nigeria, it is integrated into and occupies a massive structure shared by other UN agencies. Nigeria is among the nations in which a new UN initiative (of administrative integration) is being piloted. Yet, while the Indian office is located along other similar-sized structures in a largely residential neighborhood, the UN House in Abuja stands poignantly on an independent plot at the end of a strip that has, among others, the US Embassy—a definitive statement about security consciousness. I interpret these physico-social conditions not accidental but determinants of ELP actors’ actions and interactions with other institutions, including the “local” citizens.

Among the vital archival and contemporary document I accessed are policy texts from NERDC’s Lagos office and useful reports from UNESCO’s Field Office. The NERDC documents include the most recent version of the NPE and other language related curricular materials for the nation’s schools. Strikingly similar to India, NERDC spearheads the development, publication and dissemination of curricular materials to all Nigerian schools. Teachers and school administrators are required to procure and utilize such materials in their regular instructional and administrative practices.48

48 While en route to the NERDC main office in Abuja, I serendipitously met a multilingual elementary school teacher on her way to purchase these curricular materials from NERDC with whom I had a long conversation about how she and her colleagues perceive these instructional syllabi and NERDC’s operation as well as issues of multilingualism on the classroom level. Although it is beyond the scope of this present study, investigating the operations of NERDC and NCERT as shapers of curriculum, and the ways their activities are transformed in classroom settings, will provide useful insight into educational developments in Nigeria and India.
UNESCO Headquarters, Paris, France

My primary contact with the UNESCO Secretariat in Paris came through professional networking during a reception organized by Loyola University Chicago’s Center for Comparative Education (CCE) and the Comparative and International Education Graduate Students Association (CIEGSA) at the 2009 Comparative and International Education annual conference in Charleston, North Carolina. Earlier attempts to reach particular officers through email addresses listed on the respective UNESCO program sector websites were only marginally successful. The individual, a former staff member at the UNESCO Secretariat with extensive background in UNESCO’s language policy initiatives, became my first participant and served as a conduit for initial direct contacts with other participants at the Education, Culture, and Policy program areas of the headquarters. This first participant also linked me to a high profile official of the Nigerian Delegation to UNESCO, a prominent scholar and active player in language policy and planning. Having received an official invitation from the Nigerian Permanent Delegation to UNESCO, the UNESCO Archives, and several individuals working in ELP initiatives, I resumed data collection in Paris in mid June 2009.

With few exceptions, interviews with the UNESCO Headquarters’ participants occurred only in single sessions that lasted between one and three hours. All participants currently work in a major program or administrative sector directly involved with UNESCO’s language initiatives, particularly in education and culture. They
developed normative standards, based on long-standing scholarship in specialized
domains (some of which are funded by or through UNESCO), and in concert with the
General Conference and Executive Council. Although they are authoritative officers in
their respective sectors, the participants represent individual perspectives, a point some
participants stressed with profound emphasis. Indeed, one participant insisted on
participating only in an official capacity to avoid trespassing stipulated boundaries
within which UNESCO employees manage internal information. I am therefore conscious
of the ways choices involved in navigating this insider-outsider lines of interaction
impinge on the dialogic process but also expose the political dimensions of the
Organization’s bureaucracy, issues that I interrogate in my data analysis. While
participation in an official capacity permits me to report the findings as a UNESCO’s
official stance, it also cordons the participant from a more intimate dialogue out of
which deeper meanings and interpretations of events and their experiences can be
constructed in the interview process.

Interviews at the Nigerian Permanent Delegation are part of the UNESCO
Headquarters data collection procedure. However, the information they provide is
relevant to the Nigerian language policy and planning and ELP context. Although the
permanent delegations of Member States are part of the Headquarters, it is possible to
structurally position the Nigerian Permanent Delegation outside the UNESCO
Secretariat. Indeed, the Permanent Delegation is located at a different facility than the
main Secretariat complex, and is an extension of the Nigerian government representing the country at UNESCO. As a liaison between UNESCO and Nigeria, it is a critical site for investigating relationship dynamics between the Organization and the country and buttresses UNESCO as an intergovernmental entity whose legitimacy depends on those of Member States collectively. Thus, the ELP experiences and scholarship of my participant at the Nigerian Permanent Delegation fit a dual mould relevant to analysis of international networks in ELP processes.

During the two-week period of data collection in Paris, I spent an average of four hours per day pouring over archival materials at the UNESCO Archives. These textual data include reports, minutes of the meetings held by the General Conferences and the Executive Council, reports of expert committees and special commissions, telegrams between Permanent Delegations and their respective countries, official publications on specialized issues (including language diversity and multilingualism in education), internal memos regarding the Organization’s operations, and so forth. The Archivist graciously allowed me to generate and retain electronic copies of all relevant documents. From seven (7) interviewees, I collected a total of 23 hours of interview data. All interviews were in participants offices at the Secretariat or the Nigerian Permanent Delegation. As with their Indian and Nigerian counterparts, the UNESCO participants were very accommodating with their time and schedule, and profoundly
hospitable. My encounters with them therefore became even more insightful beyond
the specific scope of my study.

Data Collection Protocols: Dialogic Interview as Dynamic Interactive Tool

The central data collection strategy for this study is a three-phase, sequential
interview thematically structured to capture multiple layers of participants’ background,
experiences and reflections on language policymaking. Themed interviews normatively
target in-depth information and are intended to minimize the limitations of structured
interviews associated with maintaining strict order in content and sequence.
Accordingly, the semi-structured interview protocol (see Appendix E for full version and
Appendix F for an abridgement)\(^49\) features items organized around the following three
overlapping and interconnected themes.

Focused Life History: Participant Profile, Historical and Social Context

The first phase of the interviews, focused life history, aims to give the researcher
and interviewee good understanding of each other’s background (including historical
and social context). This phase of the interview seeks to understand participants’ basic
family history (such as place of origin and cultural identity), educational experiences,

\(^49\) Appendix F is an abridged version of Appendix E. Participants received the abridged version prior to the
interview to guide their thinking about the themes. While some participants received this protocol before
the interview date, others received it only shortly before the interviews. A few preferred not to use the
protocol. This variation is partly due to difficulties associated with scheduling and communication. Since
this study’s design methodologically permits follow-up interviews and email communication, I believe this
variation does not compromise the quality and comparability of data collected.
languages spoken and ethno-linguistic affiliation, professional affiliations and networks locally and internationally (especially those likely to expand their cultural horizon), institutional affiliation, current and previous work experiences and other official positions relevant to ELP. My target here is to learn about the participant as a person through their own portrait of themselves, and to ensure that they possess relevant background and experiences in language policymaking. As such, it plays the dual role of familiarization and sampling validity check.

A second critical target of this phase is to build trust. Since I envisioned the interview as an interactive relational space, gaining participants’ trust is crucial for the success of the dialogic process into which we are drawn. Not only do I work to gain participants’ trust, I pay attention to my need of trusting that they represent the experiences for which they were recruited and are willing to engage in dialogues that probe their personal and professional life history. It is logical to assume that participants’ willingness is implied in their consent to participate in the first place. However, my experiences during the early stages of participant recruitment suggest that as political and politicized entities, individuals especially within governments and big institutions can perceive their role as information gatekeeper, working to protect institutional image by presenting scripted feedbacks on sensitive issues such as language. In such cases, willingness to participate in a dialogue is an effort not to engage in the quest for understanding but to disengage the investigator from critical sites of
information that purportedly offends the political sensibilities and public image of the institutions.

With two exceptions, all participants demonstrated willingness to participate and an enthusiasm about the research project that helped engender deep trust between the interviewee and myself as co-explorers. In the two exceptions, already noted in the previous section, a participant insisted only on representing official documented positions of the institution, declining to provide information on personal experiences beyond those scripted by her organization. I include information from this participant in my analysis and results, identifying where necessary, the inferences that can be drawn from the varying conditions under which the data were generated.

One strategy I found particularly effective in establishing trust and learning about the participants is to initiate this process of dialogic exchange by narrating my own life history, responding implicitly to the questions I pose to participants. My portrait of myself is posed as a response to the question: “how this project came about and why I am interested in education language policymaking in multilingual societies”. Without using a uniform formal script, I explained my ethno-linguistic and cultural background as a multilingual Igbo from Enugu Ezike in the southeastern part of Nigeria, who grew up in the small university town of Nsukka (the site of University of Nigeria Nsukka), attended all English schools (some of which prohibited students from speaking any other language but English), experienced multiple languages in different domains.
such as the home environment, church, school, public media, playground, etc), and mastered different unbalanced language skills (reading, writing, listening and speaking) in several indigenous and foreign languages. Participants often followed my cue, narrating their early life experiences with and awareness of multilingualism, education, employment and other engagements in language policymaking. As such, I typically did not follow the question in a strict sequential order as presented in the protocol, but adjusted follow-up items based on what areas I considered needed follow up, clarification or additional information.

Experience in Education Language Policy

During the second phase of the interviews, I invited participants to share their experiences on language policymaking, and specifically ELP, based on the biographic portraits of themselves they painted in the first phase. The flow of this part of the interview process varied slightly depending on the nature of the individual participant’s background and specific experiences. I also adjusted the interview protocol to suit variations in contexts, especially regarding structural, operational and name differences among the institutions in which the Nigerian, Indian, and UNESCO Paris participants worked.

While individual-level data on language proficiency is not part of this study, it is noteworthy that most Nigerians have uneven skill level in different aspects of language. For instance, an individual might be highly proficient in spoken forms of indigenous language but literate only in English (even when their oral skill in English is very low). I know that although I am highly proficient in oral English and oral Igbo, I write with more facility in English than Igbo, partly because all my formal education—where I have done most of my writing—has been in English.
Overall, the second phase of the interview adhered to a general format. Having identified the ways in which they are players in ELP process, I invited participants to identify other actors in the language policymaking arena they work in. Here, I sought to revalidate the rationale behind my sample selection and the breadth of the participant backgrounds it captured. Subsequent topics are a breakdown of the first research question into specific dialogic units, including the following: What languages and language behavior feature in the policymaking process? What aspects, areas and levels of education does policymaking target? Under what conditions are decisions about language in education made? What periodization does policymaking follow? What specific procedures, through what mechanisms, and at the expense of what means, are ELPs formulated within specific institutions? What goals and effects does the policymaking process intend to establish? Through what mechanisms are ELP processes monitored and/or regulated; and so forth? Each dialogic unit contains several suggested follow-up ideas, which reflect my earlier analysis of language policy and planning scholarship in multilingual societies (see Appendix E and Appendix F).

Conversations with participants often dug deep into the specifics of their ELP experiences, exploring not only their roles but the roles of other participants. Since most participants are passionate about and deeply engaged in language policymaking issues, having them talk about their work proved quite an exciting exercise. I got a sense that most participants enjoyed this unusual opportunity to discuss their activities and
appreciated the fact that someone shared their interest in language policymaking and took the work seriously enough to travel across different continents in search of a deeper understanding of ELP issues than are presented in policy texts. I was particularly struck by how deeply passionate most participants are to language issues in general and how profoundly committed they are to the day-to-day activities that are part of larger debates and negotiations on language policies. Language policy activities for them are not noncommittal exercises of career in public service but rather deeply personal engagements to which many are willing to commit additional resources than are available through their institutions.

By focusing on the central theme of experience in ELP process, I positioned my investigation to lay the descriptive framework for the primary analytic questions of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA), which seeks to understand participants’ experiences in order to interrogate the meanings and interpretations they make of those experiences. Addressing their experiences first helps participants articulate their activities in ways that make them interpretatively manipulable, and prepares them for the third phase of the interview process. Retrospectively, it was difficult to keep participants from engaging in some sort of reflection on their experiences. Although this is the focus of the third phase, I did not make any concerted effort to inhibit any dialogue that fit under reflection. However, I deliberately ignored opportunities to lead the conversation in directions covered in the third phase. Rather, I made notes to myself
and often explicitly notified participants that I intend to return to issues of reflection in the next phase. Such overlaps between phases were much easier to navigate when there was only one (instead of three) interview session, or when the second and third phases were held consecutively on the same day.

Reflection and Inter-Reflexivity on Experiences in Education Language Policy

In the third phase of the interviews, I invite participants to reflect on their experiences, following the deep explorations in the second phase and their backgrounds. Further, I prompt participants to interrogate the meaning I make of the experiences they shared. Engaging in this inter-reflexivity enables both participants in this dialogic process (the participant and the researcher) to examine our shared understanding of the data being generated and the meanings we make individually through our dialogue. I found reflection a critical exercise that helped ensure that I do not lose the deep meanings or miss the significance of events due to our entrapment in the discursive practices of language as social performances.

While reflection and inter-reflexivity focused on information from the first two phases, it surprisingly unveiled new information critical for understanding the ELP process. This unearthing of new, often critical information, strengthened my conviction that a separate thematic session was important for understanding participants’ experiences on the one hand, and their interpretation of those experiences on the other. It is in reflection over experiences, following probing questions, that patterns of
meaning, lines of convergences and divergences, latent symbolisms, and significations of arbitrariness emerge, take shape, and inform new understandings.

Using reflection topics in the interview protocol and notes, I prompted participants to reflect on the ways their works are being influenced by other ELP actors and the overall relationship with other language policy stakeholders. I also ask them to reflect on how their roles have shaped the policy process. Additionally, I press participants to reflect on the possible ways in which the ELP process could be restructured and to examine these new possibilities in the light of current realities, such as the actual conditions under which their language policy activities take place. Although revelatory on the surface, this question is critical to understanding the specific challenges, implicit interests, and context-bound limitations of the ELP process that participants encounter.

I invite participants to a space where they exercise judgment on what the target, conditions, and procedures of ELP ought to be, and why (if different from actual situations, as always was the case) language policymaking has not progressed in those directions. Further, participants evaluate the productivity of their exercises by judging whether language policymaking achieves its stated goals and purposes. The frequent long pauses, facial expressions and verbal reactions suggested that participants wrestled with the issues and were thoughtful in trying to contrast the real with the ideal, the actual ELP process they worked in and an imaginary one they desired. As some informed
me, this reflection phase was beneficial to them as practitioners in thinking through their actions frequently to ensure that they are facilitative of their stated goals.

All interview sessions typically ended with an exploration of ideas or issues that we may not have addressed or that require additional clarifications, an exercise that often generated interesting dialogues. Several participants used this opportunity to probe into my personal interests in the project, often wondering why I would go to such great trouble as travel to different countries for a dissertation project, especially with no external funding. This became an opportunity for me to rethink my own investment in language issues and inform participants that my quest for knowledge goes farther than the completion of a degree requirement. Others inquired about, and sometimes problematized the framework of my study and my methodology. Often, these were signs of genuine lack of awareness about the striking similarities and interesting differences between Nigeria and India as multilingual societies, a mistaken assumption that this study treats UNESCO (an international organization) as a case similar to India and Nigeria (nations), and lack of familiarity with comparative and international education scholarship. Discussions here revealed to me that every social discursive context (including academia, government, international organizations and so forth) possesses a certain set of unique cultural norms even in the face of striking similarities. Our dialogue therefore focused more on navigating these minutiae cross-cultural boundaries.
Rethinking Research Design: Conceptual and Methodological Limitations

Having designed this study, written about my methodological strategies and engaged in the data collection process, I am in a position to retrospectively examine my study’s design, methodological toolkit and field experiences to explore lessons I can pull from them. To be sure, my concluding chapter integrates these retrospective reflections in formulating future directions for my research. Addressing some of these issues at the end of this methodological section appears appropriate to me, since it provides readers a direct connection to the ideas and experiences on which they build.

The first thing that strikes me from my data collection experiences is how deeply passionate people are about issues that otherwise might appear as a merely academic or technical exercise. The tendency to think and write about language issues in society, from an academic or a bureaucratic standpoint, with apparent disconnect belies the immense emotionality and passion they command among individuals that work in fields and who engage in constant decision making about the place and effects of language on individuals and communities. Nearly all participants in this study were acutely aware that their actions shaped the educational and ultimate life experiences of millions of people with whom they may never have direct contact, and therefore expressed a sense of urgency in addressing the various issues related to language and education. Yet, all stakeholders in areas involving language do not equally share this sense of urgency and passion. Encounter with participants in this study compelled me to think seriously about
the urgency most issues require and led me to rethink my commitment to some form of
action research. I hope participating in this study is equally beneficial to participants in
addressing the many issues they face.

Directly linked to the foregoing is the extent to which I benefited from the
generosity of the participants who had no specific incentive or rewards for participating
in this study. I was roundly humbled by the sacrifices participants voluntarily made to
ensure that my work was successful; all participants adjusted their calendars to
accommodate my scheduling requests and some waited in their offices for several hours
(sometimes well into the evening) for me to finish with a previous interview. Others
went out of their way to contact prospective participants, allowed me to use their
telephone or computers when necessary, and assisted with logistical challenges such as
local transportation. Most striking was the hospitality of my Nigerian and Indian
participants who, with no exception, offered a snack and/or drink almost as soon as I
walked into the office or home, a gesture I think is not unconnected to entrenched
cultural values even in an otherwise Westernized system. A Nigerian participant insisted
on providing me N3,000 (about $20.00) for local transport. Another participant at a
university in Nigeria insisted on providing a full lunch. In torrid weather conditions
(especially in India where the temperatures were well above 110°F) and with busy
schedules that require covering large distances in short periods, these were welcome
and deeply appreciated gestures.
This hospitality became to me a symbolic enactment of the dependency of most academic research on the generosity and personal sacrifices of field practitioners and the people who constitute research subjects. I was particularly struck by how much sacrifice participants had to make to comply with the demands of a project I designed with the contraptions of scholarly expertise, without their initial input. Yet, this hospitality also signaled the dependence of field practitioners on the exercise and products of academic research. This interdependence of educational research and practice (whether policymaking, teaching and/or administration), although rarely investigated (Saunders, 2007), is foundational to educational development around the world. My encounter with participants therefore strengthened my commitment to seeking synergistic alliances between people that otherwise occupy secluded blocs of research, policy and practice.

I regret that I was unable to spend more time at each site and with each participant to collect additional data. While this may suggest a willingness to importune and to take advantage of participants’ generosity, it is my conviction that understanding language issues in society require long periods of extensive data collection. Spending more time as a participant observer with longer periods of dialogue with ELP agents will, I believe, reveal patterns hidden from the most perspicacious investigator who spent only a short period. Most participants expressed this understanding, inviting me for a longer period of study, an invitation I intend to honor as soon as the resources are
available. A few important ELP actors were unavailable during the period of this data collection. With an extended period, accommodating more participants will increase the chances of capturing the extensive multiplicity of experiences on language policymaking.

Another important issue pertains to the use of electronic media in recording interactions with participants. As noted earlier, all interviews were digitally audio-recorded. While audio-recorded data allow the investigator to return to each interview session long after it was conducted, it is incapable of capturing participants’ non-verbal language and the physical setting in which dialogues occur. An increasingly popular option for qualitative researchers is audio-video recording (Hindmarsh, Heath, & Luff, 2010). With advances in digital technology, video techniques can play a distinctive role in collecting empirical data especially where physical external behaviors are in focus. Its capacity to integrate audio makes it particularly suitable to ethnographic studies and interviews in which the investigator highlights all forms of language, including non-verbal expressions. It has the capacity to reveal elusive phenomena that would remain hidden to audio recording and the most avid note-taker.

In spite of its advantages, there are major pitfalls with audio-video recording. Besides, the technical and time consuming issues of setting up camera, selecting positions and lighting, and operation, as well as the attendant ethical challenges, video-recording equipment often present an additional persona in the research setting that
distracts participants. Some researchers report that participants often turn to and 
address the camera as if it was a person (Byrd Clark, 2008), an issue that can have deep 
implications for the quality and validity of data collected. Hindmarsh, Heath and Luff 
(2010) insist that researchers must evaluate this problem of reactivity on a case-by-case 
basis, deciding on the nature of the problem and its impact on the quality of the data.

In a study with purposefully sampled participants most of who occupy significant 
positions in governments, academic institutions and international organizations, video 
recording appears rather impractical. The limited time and resources for this study does 
not allow for correction in the event of overwhelming reactivity distraction that impairs 
the quality and validity of the data. More, as public figures participating in this study on 
individual basis, video recording places another layer of ethical challenge for 
participants’ regarding confidentiality and potentially limits their openness and ability to 
delve deep enough in exploring their experiences. Additionally, that the subject— 
language in society—is imbricated in larger political, social and economic conditions of 
society makes participants especially sensitive about the political implications of the 
potential uses of video recording. When compared to its advantages, the potential 
damage of audio-visual recording outweighs benefits to the research project or 
participants.

To be sure, audio recording can present similar difficulties although to a lesser 
degree. The presence of an audio-recording devise or the awareness that a dialogue is
being recorded can be distracting. However, given advances in digital audio-recording technology, the device I use for this study is highly sensitive (making it capable to record fine audio inputs from long distances) yet small enough to disappear easily into the background of interview setting. This helped to minimize the reactivity and distraction problem. Yet, since ELP research calls for different kinds of data from a wide range of contexts, audio-visual recording might provide useful tools for capturing social texts that expand our understanding of decision making about language in multilingual societies. These issues now form part of the corpus of my thinking about research especially on ELP.

One principal warrant for this study is methodological; it builds on the limitations of previous research focus on ELP outcomes and implementation. A policy process analysis requires a longitudinal multi-phase mixed method approach. However, the capacity of this study to capture ELP process longitudinally is limited. Yet, data from in-depth interview, participant observation and primary documents, including minutes from meetings and reports of defunct committees, contemporaneous media reports and other relevant texts, offer insight into participants’ current, but also past, activities in the policy process. The underlying assumption that ELP practices is an ongoing negotiation process (with a policy outcome representing an end of previous and a beginning for future negotiations) mollifies this need for temporally defined longitudinality.
More, investigating India, Nigeria and UNESCO presents an obvious problem of comparability. Unlike India and Nigeria, UNESCO is not a country and arguably lacks the geopolitical, economic and social trappings of statehood. In combining countries and an international organization as major units of analysis, I do not overlook this fundamental distinction, nor do I trivialize its analytic and methodological implications. On the contrary, I view this distinction as a methodological strength and departure from statist orientations in language policy and planning and ELP research. One fundamental claim of this study is that ELP is not necessarily and exclusively concentrated on the state and its institutions.

The corollary is that subnational and supranational entities must not be relegated to a secondary position contingent on the operations of national agencies in ELP analysis. The cultural, economic, political, social, and intellectual transactions that constitute language policymaking occur within and between national, subnational and supranational entities. The need to integrate these multiple scales of influence, instead of prescriptions/proscriptions and implementation, is even more pronounced with the policy process. As pointed out earlier, this is not a promulgation of anti-statism or a rejection of the centrality of nation-state as a major unit of sociologic inquiry. As such, the core cases in this study are Nigeria and India; data from UNESCO are brought to bear on these cases the same way federal governmental, local, non-governmental and individual entities bear on the cases. In a sense, therefore, the central claim here is that
with regard to the ELP process, central state governments and institutions do not exhaust the meaning and functionalities of the nation.

Another issue, which ties into the status of UNESCO in this study, relates to the ways this research contributes to theories about networks and relationship dynamics of international, national institutions and local entities in ELP processes. For one, UNESCO’s network stretches to a larger community of nations than India and Nigeria, a complex labyrinth of networks that shape language decisions in both countries. For instance, ELP processes in India and Nigeria necessarily have to reckon with decisions of UNESCO’s General Assembly, which is constituted by nations and interests that vary significantly with those of these two countries. Internal inter-national transactions that occur between individual national delegations to UNESCO are even less amenable to academic investigation. Integrating the interests and activities of these nations, even if merely through the instrumentality of UNESCO, is far beyond the scope of this research, which promises theoretical relevance that resonates with this multitude of nations. However, the explicit issue of this study is not the formulation of universally applicable theories of international relations but rather the application of a process approach to the use of theory in analyzing international and national networks on ELP. The applicability of any theoretical contribution of this study to other cases will depend on the nature of the questions being asked, the methodology used and purpose of the investigation as a whole. Studying policy spaces whose multilingual profiles significantly
coincide will most likely share better from similar theoretical frameworks, and those
that differ can also benefit even if by negation.

Furthermore, education language policies in multilingual settings—like most
other policies—are multivariate in origin and determination. Cultural, social, political
and economic forces perceived on the national and international levels have been
chiefly — even if unevenly — responsible for education policy shifts. Attempting to
capture the factors that shape ELP processes in their entirety might be preposterous for
a project with significant time and resource limitations. Yet, networks between
international, national, and local institutions do not exhaust these multiple factors.
Moreover, although power dynamics are essential to policy processes and international
relations (see Burchill, et al., 2005; Morgenthau, 1948; Carr, 1939), limiting analysis of
ELP discourse to power dynamics undermines other possible explanations. This is
particularly compelling since international networks typically extend beyond education
policy domains. The questions driving this study are framed broadly to permit
alternative explanations to hegemony and mutual interaction — the reasoned choice
heuristics of this study.

Another issue worth noting it that nations are not exhaustive units for analyzing
ELP activities and the international networks they involve. Their utility as units of
analysis appears to be increasingly constrained by globalization’s tendency to
undermine the autonomy of nations as rational actors (see Held & McGrew, 2007).
Further, ELP discourse is not simply about national activities. It draws individuals and collectivities (including Non-Governmental Organizations) into arenas of diversely-framed negotiations. The focus on nations underscores their pivotal position as the converging point for all international and local stakeholders on official policy practices.

A final issue relates to my positionality and its ethical implications. As already noted, that the researcher is not detached from the research – a point that aligns with Heidegger’s notion of the “world-yielding role of language” (Singh, 1993) and Foucault’s author function bases of language as discourse: humans are not merely shapers and determiners of their experiences but also subjects of those experiences, continuously entangled in and shaped by them (Thomas, 1993, p. 4) – emphasized the researcher’s ethical responsibilities to the researched. This ethical responsibility, noble and genuine, conceals the logic of paternalism. It vests on the critical ethnographer, the power and instrumental positionality for social change, a “salvific” and “civilizing” logic deployed to uphold colonial control peoples. Addressing this ethical responsibility, Thomas (1993) makes the following distinction: “Conventional ethnographers generally speak for their subjects, usually to an audience of other researchers. Critical ethnographers, by contrast, accept an added research task of raising their voice to speak to an audience on behalf of their subjects as a means of empowering them by giving more authority to the subjects’ voice (p. 4). Since critical ethnography approaches its study with an explicit
theoretical framework, it assumes that “dominated” groups desire, welcome, and/or approve of their purported role as mediators of social change.

It is possible, and indeed the professed responsibility of the critical ethnographer to ascertain the consent of the research participants about this mediatory role as well as the mechanisms through which it is enacted. A critical ethnographic framework precludes any imposition of predetermined solutions and emancipatory practice on any repressed groups. Thus, what is problematic is not the process through which this mediative role is played, but the *a priori* designation of the critical ethnographer as mediator of social change, a task woven into the theoretical and methodological fabric of their research. It has the tendency of inscribing the need for emancipation or erecting “straw men” against which action must be taken. It also has the capacity to obscure the critical ethnographer from any processes of social change that does not integrate the accounts or positionality of an involved external-insider investigator. Any liberatory social process that does not include the critical ethnographer’s role falls outside the boundaries of its inquiry.

This study does not claim to explicitly emancipate or give voice to the participants in any process of social change. Retrospectively, I have no evidence to show that this research offered my participants any form of liberation in a conventional sense. I, however, was empowered through acquiring a new vista for rethinking my beliefs and assumptions about ELP practices. As a student of, and an active player in, the ELP
landscapes of multilingual societies, not only has my understanding been expanded, my legitimacy as an expert has been enhanced. The dialogue created by my interaction with the research participants might ultimately prove emancipatory, especially as I share the fruits of this investigation with them.
CHAPTER FIVE

HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF EDUCATION

LANGUAGE POLICIES PROCESS IN INDIA

...nothing is “obviously true” of India as a whole

Wolpert, S. A., A New History of India

In the preceding chapters, I set out the rationales for and broader framework of this research. I also detailed the methodological principles and specific strategies guiding my engagement with data. In this and the next two chapters, I report findings from document analysis, interviews and observations, guided by the original research questions, analytic protocol, and reflection on language policy and planning scholarship. As the results show, the original research questions evolved and were transformed as data collection proceeded. This attests to the dialogic nature of the study’s design and sustains the thinking that ELP research in multilingual societies mirrors the complications and twists characteristic of real life linguistic experiences of individuals and language communities.

Originally designed with the title, “International Networks in Multilingual Education Language Policy Discourse: A Comparative Process Analysis,” this study
proposed to explore the networks emerging from the linkages of local, national, regional and international language policymaking processes. It targeted data not only on institutional operations but also individual relationships that play into ELP as an ongoing dynamic process explicable through the explanatory devices of hegemony and mutual interactionism. However, as my dialogic interface with data and participants proceeded in the field, new forms of operations, patterns of relationships and complexity of social realities began to emerge and called for a rethinking of the direction of the study and nature of data I sought. My Daily Interpretive Analysis (DIA), discussed in Chapter Four, revealed that networks, though significant, capture only a fragment of a broader language policymaking process. To explore these networks in any particular logical fashion would require ripping reality out of its context, a common methodological concern against which ethnographic (and indeed most qualitative research) designs are set. To avoid this error of decontextualization while integrating these evolving operations, relationships and complexities, I modified the issues of this research to reflect the wider breadth and complications of ELP in India, Nigeria and UNESCO.

Under the new title, “Education Language Policy Process in Multilingual Societies: Global Visions and Local Agendas in India, Nigeria and UNESCO”, I interrogate ELP processes, noting the historical foundations of contemporary sociolinguistic realities. Guided by the assumption that language policymaking is never static but an ongoing process, this study finds that developments in ELPs map onto longstanding
legacies of linguistic social relations. This fundamentally complex linguistic social cartography serves as a framework for unbundling pervasive misconceptions about the nature of and issues in language policymaking and forces us to rethink several assumptions that have shaped scholarship in language policy and planning and ELP for decades. Using mostly document analysis, I report findings on how multilingualism originates from wider historical and social realities that continue to define contemporary ELP debates. I show how in spite of their distinct histories (although with significant commonalities in colonial experiences), India and Nigeria continue to advance similar ELP frameworks. Each historical narrative constitutes a background for findings from current interviews and observations on contemporary ELP processes in India (Chapter Five), Nigeria (Chapter Six) and UNESCO (Chapter Seven). To make interview and observation results more comprehensible and reflective of participants’ voices, I present them in the form of short vignettes encapsulating central themes that emerge from data coding. Themes from these vignettes expose the complexity of multilingualism in both countries and the inadequacy of unitary explanation of ELP processes.

Stating the complexity of multilingualism in India and Nigeria is a platitudinous necessity. It is platitudinous because most historical and sociolinguistic commentaries on the subject make the complexity of multilingualism in multilingual societies a point of departure and/or central subject matter. These works point out that in linguistically
heterogeneous societies, the complexity of language differs markedly from the relatively simplistic multilingualism associated with demographically diverse but functionally homogeneous Western societies (Brock-Utne & Skattum, 2009; Mohanty A. K., 2006). To be sure, Western societies have been home to linguistic diversity for over a millennium, with several language edicts predating modern nations (Ager, 1996). Most European societies, however, managed to be both formally and operationally monolingual until recent rise in global immigration. By contrast, even those linguistically heterogeneous societies with extreme forms of formal monolingualism – adopting only one language for the entire society – remain functionally multilingual, with the majority of the population speaking several languages and only a few sharing the same (official) language.

Although this distinction is clear from current research in the field, interrogating the complexity of multilingualism in linguistically heterogeneous societies is also necessary for any new research that aims to understand the nature of linguistic practices and social relations in such societies. As Wolpert’s quote above suggests about India as a whole this complexity is so ingrained that any account of multilingualism in India (or Nigeria) cannot neglect it. Indeed, an implication one can draw from Wolpert’s claim is that any account of multilingualism in India (or Nigeria) that aims to be comprehensive enough to capture all linguistic social practices essentially runs the risks of being too voluminous and/or inaccurate. My primary goal in this chapter is not to
render a “comprehensive” and/or “accurate” account of multilingualism in India (and in the following chapters, Nigeria and UNESCO respectively), but to construct a historically oriented sociolinguistic narrative of the background to current ELP processes in both countries.51

The purpose of the historical narratives here are twofold. First, while most language policy and planning studies mention these historical events, they locate them as bygone events relegated to dusty memories and useful only in interpreting past ELP activities. My findings show that even the most primordial historical events still have currency in contemporary ELP processes. Second, most reference to history in ELP studies emphasize the impact of European colonialism. My findings indicate that while European colonial projects were crucial, they were not the origins or the only shapers of language decisions in the past and current ELP processes. Building mainly on historical narratives and archival primary sources from India, Nigeria and UNESCO, I report these findings on the origins and social conditions of language cohabitation, the policies they have engendered and the questions they embody. The goal is to show that current politics of language policy are rooted in a host of larger social forces that predate European influences, and that the British did not create but contributed immensely to ethnic and linguistic diversity and rivalries in Nigeria and India.

51 Unless otherwise stated, the remarks on this introductory section apply to Chapter Five on the historical background to multilingualism and education language policy in Nigeria. They also lay the groundwork for Chapter Six, which considers the overlaps and uniqueness of India and Nigeria as multilingual (and ELP) settings and UNESCO’s role in language policymaking in both countries.
Multilingualism in India and Nigeria is occasioned both by the co-existence of many distinct linguistic communities and the appropriation of foreign languages on the one hand, and is marked by Islamic and Western colonial influences (among others external factors) from the Arab world and Europe respectively. Historically composed of migrant populations, India and Nigeria witnessed early diverse ethnolinguistic interactions that actively constituted language as a political element of and tool for social organization. Yet, language interaction occurs within wider historically mapped social conditions. It is to these historically situated social conditions of language interaction that I turn shortly.

**Conceptual Considerations for Historical Narratives of India and Nigeria**

Constructing any history of India and of Nigeria is possible due to accumulations of historical evidences and methodological innovations in history during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Early histories of both countries bemoan the dearth of credible historical evidences especially of early civilizations (see Keay, 2000; Davidson, 1966; Majumdar & Pusalker, 1951). Legitimate though, this remark is problematic in that it construes historical evidence solely as literary text. In India, historical texts became available in the thirteenth century AD when partisan writers keen on chronicling Islamic conquests started profiling Muslim rule in northern India (Majumdar & Pusalka, 1951). Although writing developed much earlier in Africa, it was not until the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries that historical texts on West-African civilizations appeared through
Islamic historians and geographers like Ibn Khaldun (Fage & Tordoff, 2002). This apparent drawback notwithstanding, detailed histories of both countries continue to grow. This has been possible due to the painstaking efforts of professional historians in teasing out the past, even chronologically, from less articulate objects like coins, random inscriptions and tidbits of oral traditions (Keay, 2000). About Indian historians, Keay lauds: “The ingenuity of those scholars who from rocks and runes, bricks and rubrics, have wrested one of the oldest and richest civilisations constitutes something of an epic in itself” (p. xviii).

Ingenuity accounts for, or at least contributes to, a larger historiographic methodological innovation. Numismatic and epigraphic adroitness are not sufficient for constructing histories however; they require an expansion of methodological boundaries of and revision of criteria for historical analysis to accommodate novel interpretations of non-traditional evidences. Serge Gruzinski (2001) brilliantly represents an expression of this new approach to history in his creative interrogation of images and extant sources to deepen our understandings on early Western imperial projects in Mexico. In his Images at war and The Conquest of Mexico, Gruzinski (2001; 1993) demonstrates the efficacy of anchoring this new theory of history, inscribed in the very act of narration, on one of the most powerful elements of imaginary representations: the image. Provocative interpretations and sweeping analyses such as Gruzinski’s controversial image of Our Lady of Guadalupe, Mexico’s revered religious and national
icon superimposed with the head of Marilyn Monroe, forces us to rethink our assumptions about what qualifies as credible historical data as well as the systematicity of the analytic process.

If the use of ingenuous means and evidences for historical interpretations invite methodological innovation, its historiography necessitates epistemological evolution in the art and science of history. Traditional historical evidences and the emphasis on text echoes positivist epistemology with an empiricist bias. Within this framework, the essence of historical analysis rests in recapturing the past as such and prioritizes a correspondence theory of truth. Epistemologically, it attempts accurately reconstruct the ontological foundations of the past as it actually occurred. Its evidences are data of experiences, of events as they occurred, of the agency of the actors, and of the outcomes of both. Aping the methods of the physical sciences, this approach to history applies strict “scientific” procedures in ways that purportedly allow for self-evidential revelation of past events from systematically organized data. The role of the “unbiased” historian is therefore to discover in this “scientific” manipulation of evidences the true verifiable realities about the past.

Yet, as Majumdar and Pusalka (1951) articulate, historians do not always have the luxury of direct access to the past qua tale. Nor do they need one. Viewed through the optic of deconstructionism (Munslow, 2006), the process of analysis that transforms
historical evidences into facts, relies heavily on “emplotments”\(^\text{52}\) that privilege the historian’s epistemological framework. The essence of this deconstructionist approach, narrative, departs with the historian’s reasoned assemblage of evidences to fit a particular construction of the past – as narrated (Munslow, 2006). Indeed, historical analysis thrives on synchronism of evidences. Yet, even with horological accuracy and homological consistency, these evidences are often hypothetical or contrived (Keay, 2000).\(^\text{53}\) Historical “facts” of sociologic, cultural and linguistic diversity in India and Nigeria becomes in themselves products of history as narrative, an emplotment of present day historicization. Since this approach defines historical analysis as a mode of scholarly inquiry and not merely an option in a battery of methodological alternatives, understanding the historic-social conditions of language interaction in India and Nigeria reflects a positioning of evidences intended to foreground a particular narrative of the past and its linkage to the present.

**India: Historical Origins of Diversity and Multilingualism**

To tie modern India’s multilingualism to her history is to show how indigenous

\(^{52}\) The idea of “emplotment”, central to the deconstructionist approach to historical analysis (Munslow, 2006), highlights the significance of the framework historians bring to their narrative, which shapes what “evidences” they select and the ways historical data is assembled sequentially to privilege a narrative or storyline, not others.

\(^{53}\) I use *horological* accuracy and *homological* consistency to capture two interrelated features of historical analysis: measuring the chronological order and timing of events, and the sequential consistency of those events within the specified time. Both features are central to determining the credibility of any historical narrative.
populations mixed with migrants, invaders and colonizers since c.1700 B.C., although it is still debated who these indigenes, invaders and migrants were and who their descendants in today’s India are. A historical portrait of demographic diversity, however, cannot fully account for the complexities of language interactions that mark multilingualism in India. As noted early in this chapter, multilingualism in India is more than an aggregation of languages (Mohanty A. K., 2006). More, migration – internal or external – and politico-territorial conquests are shaped by and therefore expressions of larger social processes hardly determined by, but intricately tied to, language. In briefly outlining India’s demographic diversity historically, I consider the roles of politics, religion, economic interests and cultural identity in decisions and practices about language functions. As with most histories of India, evidences of rich linguistic heritage have not always been the most significant, with most historians emphasizing architectural data (Keay, 2000) more than any other form of evidence. Although constructing India’s history is a multidisciplinary enterprise, the preeminent attention to archeological legacy and other forms of evidences can limit the visibility of rich linguistic data and complicate any attempt at a historical narrative of multilingualism in that country.

The origin of modern India is dated around 3000 BC to the flood mythology.

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54 As shown in the “Aryan invasion” controversy (see SarDesai, 2008, pp. 44-49), the question of the indigenous people of India to whom the Harappan civilization is attributed is still contested among historians, with political undertones in current cultural identity conflicts and linguistic tensions. Of more interest here is the idea that whoever these people were, they ultimately encountered inward migration, invasion and/or colonization.
recorded in *Satapatha Brahmana*, one of the many appendices to the ancient sacred hymn, *Vedas*. Dating back to the first millennium BC and composed in classical Sanskrit’s devanāgarī scripts, the Vedas is one of the oldest evidences of India’s literary heritage from which most histories of India before c. 500 BC derived (Keay, 2000).\(^{55}\) According to the flood myth, Manu, an equivalent of Biblical Noah, while washing his hands one morning accidentally scooped up a tiny fish from a river who begged him for protection from larger predatory fish saying: “Rear me. I will save you”. Manu obliged and reared the fish first in a jar, and as the fish grew, in a pond and then sea. This fish advised Manu to build a ship to escape an impending flood to the northern mountains. Again, Manu obliged. When the flood started as predicted, Manu tied his ship to the fish’s horn (it must have been a swordfish) and moved up the mountain from where he descended only after the flood subsided. Today the northern mountain slopes are called Manoravataram, meaning Manu’s descent (Keay, 2000; Pusalker, 1951).\(^{56}\)

Myths are modest in their effectiveness as historical interpretative devices. Manu’s flood helps point to a new progenitor of humankind, marking off a new world of order from an old one of chaos through the instrumentality of a naturally occurring

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\(^{55}\) Devanagari (देवनागरी), also called Nagari (the name of its parent writing system) is a left-to-right-oriented abugida alphabet system used as main scripts for Hindi, Marathi and Nepali languages of India and Nepal and employed in numerous other languages. It has also become the main script of Sanskrit since the 19th century.

\(^{56}\) The Flood account is recorded in the *Satapatha Brahmana*, one of numerous almost prolix appendices to the Vedas. Keay’s (2000) account of the Flood is adapted from Pulsaker’s (1951) rendition of *Satapatha Brahmanain* in *The History and Culture of the Indian People*, Vol. 1.
phenomenon and the karmic symbolism of kindness and its reward. Although surprisingly areligious (given the profound religiosity of the Indian cosmography), the flood myth finally received a religious significance as the Hindu god, Lord Vishnu rises in prominence as the preserver of the world in Hindu pantheon (Keay, 2000).

Using elaborate computations, some historians date Manu’s Flood to 3012 BC, exactly the year our current era, the Kali Yug in Indian cosmology started and Manu became a great king and law-giver. Others argue that 3012 BC dates not the Flood but the great Bharata war fought in the territory of today’s Delhi, as recorded in Mahabharata, another ancient Sanskrit epic with roughly 100,000 stanzas (Keay, 2000). As Keay documents, excavations of one of Mesopotamia’s ancient civilizations in Iraq evidence an immense inundation around 3012 BC that corroborate the Flood account. Yet, this controversy signals the inherent uncertainties about horological accuracy and the complicated nature of historical interpretations. India’s Sanskrit literary tradition provides numerous other accounts of floods after Manu’s around which later excavations like the Harappan are chronologically interpreted. Together, these excavations and a rich literary tradition set out the canvas on which the subsequent convoluted tapestry of social organizations in India is cast.

The link from Manu’s mythological progeniture to Harappa and later civilizations is Stone Age hunter-gatherer communities scattered throughout regions like Bihar, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. Excavations in Baluchistan at
Mehrgarh village around the Indus River show evidences of agriculture and
domestication of animals by 7000 B.C. (Walsh, A Brief History of India, 2007; 2006).

Earlier histories of India linked these communities to later civilizations recorded in
Sanskrit texts until the discovery of Harappan civilization in the 1820s, when a runaway
soldier of the East India Company army chanced upon some of its ancient ruins in
Haripah. Excavations of the Punjab city of Harappa started in 1921. That of Mohenjo-
daro in Sind started a year later. Both connected excavations testify to an elaborate
prehistoric “Indus valley civilization” that transformed historical interpretations of
India’s archeological antiquity. Although elaborate, the Harappan finds include no
decipherable texts from which insights into its people can be built. What appears to be a
system of writing among the Harappans, which include about four hundred letters (each
presumably representing a word), has remained undecipherable even with the most
advanced technologies. Challenged with the uncertainty of this archeologically verifiable
civilization, historians have continued to rely on Sanskrit literatures for the life, culture,
and language of the Harappans.

Sanskrit composers referred to themselves as “arya” (hence Aryan), but make no
obvious acknowledgment of the Harappans in any Vedic text. Historians believe that the
Aryans (a term that later signified “civilized” or “noble”), a tribal community from the
Iranian plateau, migrated to India with a language, culture and religion strikingly similar
to today’s Iranians (Walsh, 2007). Information about the Aryans comes mostly from the
Rig-Vedas, a Vedic sacred text of religious hymns composed by the Aryans. By 1500 B.C., tribal communities of the Indo-Aryans were well established in the Punjab regions and gradually spread their influence through the Vedas and trade networks east and west.

Following Mountstuart Elphinstone, a scholar and administrator of the British East India Company and author of the 1874 History of India, considerable doubt exist as to whether the Indo-Aryans were migrant and invader communities or indigenous to India (Walsh, 2006; Keay, 2000). That no Vedic text, obsessed as they are with historical documentation, acknowledges the Harappans or their descendants casts serious doubt on who India’s aboriginal inhabitants and later migrants or invaders were. A result is a dual account that has led to an indigenity contra “migration/invasion” controversy with strong linguistic dimensionalities. Ultimately, the Harappan (through its excavations) and Aryan (through Sanskrit traditions) civilizations constitute a geographically and chronologically overlapping but irreconcilable foundations of Indian history and demographic diversity (Keay, 2000).

The Indo-Aryan migration-indigenity controversy has retooled the politics of cultural identity and originality claims central to India’s caste society, one that Walsh (2006) indicates arises from efforts to explain linguistic similarities between the Sanskrit and the European and Iranian languages. The British used the migration theory to justify its colonial rule over an “inferior” Indian “race” since the Indo-Aryan’s migration was
held to have led to racial degeneracy of the migrants into an impure version of the original Aryan ancestry shared with Europeans. Paradoxically, German Nazis used this logic of common Aryan origin to include Indians among the master race that should rule the world. In the 20th and 21st centuries, upper caste Brahman Hindu nationalists capitalized on Elphinstone’s doubt of the migration/invasion theory to argue that the Aryans originated in India, developed the Harappan civilization, and spread westward to create Indo-European languages. Lower caste Dalits (or “Untouchables”) have challenged this explanation, arguing that the Dalits originated the Harappan civilization that was destroyed by Aryan invaders, progenitors of Brahmins (Walsh, 2006). This ongoing historically rooted debate reveals the intricate connection of language to struggles for cultural identity and political legitimacy in India and how today’s ELPs bear sharp imprints of this older indigenity controversy (Walsh, 2007).

As the Indo-Aryans spread into the Ganges River valleys between 1200 and 400 BC, their tribal communities transformed into territorialized dynasties with trade networks stretching north, east, west and south. Between this time and the early centuries AD, India experienced military invasions and was home to religious and linguistic heterodoxy. As Walsh (2007) indicates, public rivalries and debates among several competing religious communities characterized life in northern India at the threshold of the new millennium. In addition, Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism and other

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57 Alexander the Great (of Macedon) conquered the Persian Empire around 331 B.C. and extended their conquest to India until his death in Mesopotamia in 323 B.C., the event of which brought his military campaign to an abrupt end (Walsh, 2006).
religions including Christianity became widespread in India with more territorialized and advanced politico-social organizations.

As sociopolitical and religious heterodoxy grew, India became characteristically multilingual. Based on Sanskrit accounts, Indians share a common Indo-Aryan language base. By 500 AD, the two “elegant” and “refined” forms of the Sanskrit (the oral Vedic Sanskrit and the textual classical Sanskrit) had spread through dynastic rules such as Mauryan and Gupta (SarDesai, 2008). However, ordinary speech in northern India used “inelegant” and “unrefined” vernaculars called Prakrits, generally attributed to low castes and women. By 600 A.D. Prakrits were already replaced in northern India by regional vernaculars like Hindi, Marathi, Gujarati, Bengali and other contemporary Indian languages. Other Dravidian languages like Tamil, Kanarese, Telugu, and Malayalam became popular in southern India. Thus, as far back as the early centuries AD India was already richly multilingual with elites and most common people using multiple vernaculars and the Sanskrit (Walsh, 2006).

Islam entered India in the seventh century AD through Central Asia as part of the fierce Muslim conquest heralded by the firm establishment of the Islamic Empire under a caliphate based in Baghdad. Traces of Islamic presence in Southern India date back to c. 630 AD with early nautical trade networks of Muslim travelers (Elliot, 1867-1877). India’s encounter with Islam is historically credited to four major Muslim invasions: (a) Arabs’ conquest of Sind in 712; (b) Muhammad of Ghanzi’s invasions and subsequent
conquest of Punjab, 1000–1026; (c) the Sultanate dynasties of Delhi, 1206–1526; (d) Babar’s invasions and Mughal rule, 1526–1858. Although India previously had mostly commercial ties with Arabs prior to the spread of Islam, the 712 invasion and conquest of Sind (then under the Hindu, Dahir, rulership) and nearby city of Multan by prince Kasim’s army from Iraq marks the birth of several centuries of significant India–Arab relationships. The consequent relative political stability of early Muslim occupation was followed by violent raids from the Turkish Ghanzi kingdom and later the establishment of a sultanate in Delhi in 1208.

Except for a short period of about thirty years when the Delhi Sultanate extended to the entire Indian subcontinent Muslim rule was territorially and politically conscribed. Even where they were most active, Muslim rulers often considered adherents of other religions like Hindus, Buddhists, and Jainists as “people of the book”, a category reserved in Islam for people of other major “learned” religions like Jews and Christians. They were thus accorded the status of *zimmis* or “protected people”, even if within the political framework of military occupation. Further, with established territories in India, Muslims were still strongly tied to the centers of Islamic dominion in the Arab world, recited the *Qur’an* in Arabic (since no authentic translation existed), visited Mecca when possible, and shared the close bond of a common brotherhood, Islam (SarDesai, 2008). Enforcing religious or cultural homogeneity was both unnecessary and impossible. Consequently, India under Muslim rule was home to
mutually interacting religions, cultures, and particularly languages. One notable
evidence of these interactions was the spread of the Indian numerals and decimal
system: through Arab scholars particularly in Europe, Indian numerals and decimals
known to Arabs as tarikh-i-hind spread throughout Europe as Arabic numerals (SarDesai,
2008). The overall significance of Islam in India’s history stems from the political and
cultural consolidation of the subcontinent prior to and during Muslim rule. At the
threshold of European encounters an Indian subcontinent — rich in history, vast in
landscape and diverse in culture and language — had emerged.

Vasco da Gama’s fleet docked in Calicut around present-day Kerala on May 20,
1498 in search of “Christians and spices”, making the Portuguese the first European
explorers of India. As part of the relentless Atlantic explorations of Prince Henrique of
Portugal, more known as Henry the Navigator (1394–1460), and authorized by the Papal
Bull of 1492, which confirmed the Church’s quest for Christian alliances in India – a
strategy contrived to combat Islamic expansion – da Gama opened the Indian seaboard
to massive European influx (SarDesai, 2008; Markovits, A History of Modern India, 1480-
1950, 2004). By 1503, the Portuguese had built its first fort in Cochin, and two years
later appointed a viceroy for what it called Estado da India, “State of India” (Keay, 2000).
Though vehemently resisted by well-established Hindu and Muslim Empires, the
Portuguese, with more advanced guns, took over Goa and subsequently set up a

58 The date May 18 is not conclusive. Other historians suggest that da Gama arrived Calicut on May 18,
1498. This two-days difference is considered insignificant to the analysis here.
fortified maritime empire in India.

The Portuguese’s influence in India is undoubtedly tied to their vast trade network, Christian missionary evangelism and military campaigns. But even by 1580, when Portugal acceded to the Spanish Crown, their volume of trade accounted for only about 6 to 7 percent of the entire inter-Asian trade network that percolated India.

Under Akbar’s Mogul empire and a century after the Portuguese’s arrival, the Dutch and English East India Companies were established. In 1616, a Danish company followed, and by 1719, Swedish company was in operation. As European mercantile interests converged around trading companies, political and economic rivalry added to a bustling subcontinent of diversity. Markovits (2004) argues that for students of Indian history, “Europe is too often the tree that hides the forest”; the significance assigned to Europeans’ activities “must not overshadow the economic activity of Indian business circles” that remained the bastion of political and social life in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (p. 133). The vastness and success of the Mogul empire had profound cultural and linguistic implications.

As the Mogul empire declined after the death of Emperor Aurangzeb, the English, through the East Indian Company, gained control over Bengal and embarked on widespread territorial annexation. Having acquired diwani, which conferred on them the right to collect taxes and administer civil justice, the Company took on a complex process of political conquest that put the English in real control of Bengal from where
British supremacy spread for over half a century (Markovits, A History of Modern India, 1480-1950, 2004). Although the Muslim state of Mysore and Hindu confederacy of Marathas militarily resisted the British, by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries both were weakened and eventually overpowered. The British’s oppressive taxation, repressive administration and judicial practices, and exploitative domestic trade regulations have been the subjects of historical and postcolonial scholarship (see Markovits, 2004). Markovits warns however, that the success of British conquest is not a natural consequence of a more global “European expansion”; factors peculiar to the Indian context were major determinants. Different from military technology superiority, these factors include the transformation of East India Company into a viable economic machinery and military despot with politico-territorial implications; the French–English conflict in the south that triggered the assault against Mysore and Marathas; and effective organization of the Company’s army (Markovits, 2002).

The Indian State put in place by the East Indian Company had fractious relationships with the Indian societies, which precipitated crises of legitimacy and widespread revolts. By 1857, the Sepoy Revolt shook the foundations of British rule, leading to the abolishment of the Company and transfer of India under the British Crown as a colony. In the close to hundred years that followed, India experienced economic, political and cultural transformations under British colonial rule. Christianity became more widespread and joined the league of popular religions enjoyed by
Hinduism and Islam. Orientalism appeared and a plethora of vernacular literatures became more popularized.

Endemic agrarian agitation continued as nationalist movements (often with a strong linguistic character) rose to challenge British colonialism during its second century (1858–1950). The founding of the Indian National Congress in 1885 foreshadowed three subsequent anti-British movements after the First World War: the Rowlett Satyagraha in 1919, the Non-Cooperation of 1920–1922, and the civil disobedience of 1930–1934. These movements paved the path for confrontations and negotiations with the British, and finally Independence in 1947. Through this period, a quarter of the Indian population lived as subjects of varied princely authorities not directly under British rule but over whom the colonial authorities retained some control. Social conditions differed among these princely states, with some experiencing famine and others enormous economic progress and as such the impetus for internal peasant migration consequently grew (Markovits, 2004). Although they disappeared at independence, the impact of these princely authorities through this massive peasant movement is evident in the cultural and particularly linguistic heterogeneity of India. At independence, India has become a vast and complex social landscape lush with uncharted cultural and linguistic diversity and viable political and economic vivacity. The new State of India, in attempts to instill an “All India” identity heavily relies on language policy and planning (among other public policy tools) as essential to the management of
multilingualism and multiculturalism.

Today, India (or *Bharat*, its alternative name as listed in the Constitution) is a massive triangular landmass stretching south below the main Asian continent.\(^5\) Bordered by water on three sides (including the Bay of Bengal to the east, Arabian Sea to the west and Indian Ocean to the south), India is characteristically diverse geographically with the Himalayan mountains including the world’s highest peak, Mount Everest; the Indus-Ganga-Brahmaputra plains and several rivers that cut through the mostly flat terrain; the Thar Desert, a southwestern extension of the Indus-Ganges plain; the Eastern and Western Ghats; and the Peninsular plateau (SarDesai, 2008).

Comparatively, today’s India is geographically about three-quarters as large as Europe (including Russia) but over double Europe’s population. Whereas Europe has forty-seven countries, India is one sovereign state with an immensely diverse population united around certain shared religious, cultural and social values, beliefs and practices (Walsh, 2007).

Amid this diversity an “All India” identity has been crystallized and solidified in the aftermath of anti-British colonial resistances and Independence struggles. The Republic of India is a federal parliamentary democracy with twenty-nine autonomous states and six centrally administered Union Territories whose Chief Executive – often a lieutenant governor – is appointed by the Central or Union Government. Delhi, the

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\(^5\) Bharat is a short form for *Bharatvarsha*, a Hindi word that means “the land of Bharata”. Bharata was a famous Indian king in the ancient times (SarDesai, 2008).
capital was centrally administered until 2004 when it became a state, though with some restrictions.

**State, Language and Education: Multilingualism and Schooling in India**

Modern Indian leadership is acutely cognizant of the significance of language for harmony and disharmony as is evinced by current political configurations. While considering geographical contiguity, economic viability, socio-cultural distinctiveness, caste, religion and class allegiances, early nationalist leaders redrew territorial boundaries of Indian states primarily on the basis of language. As such, all Indian states are linguistically territorialized (i.e., states were reorganized to reflect linguistic boundaries), first in 1956 as partial fulfillment of the State Reorganization Commission’s (SRC) recommendation, and continuing until 2000 with the addition of Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Uttarakhand (Sarangi, 2009). While all states are linguistically territorialized, not all languages are politically institutionalized to form a state. An obvious implication is an uneven language status assignment that continues to feed the discourse on linguistic imperialism and hegemonic social relations among linguistic communities.

Joseph Schwartzberg (2009) outlines the historical trajectory of administrative changes heralded by post-1956 clamor for linguistic state and linguistic-territorial reconfigurations. This process both revealed and induced a language hegemony and linguistic minority rationale in the politics of independent India. Indeed, the partitioning
of the colonial subcontinent into India and Pakistan during Independence was also a
division between Hindi and Urdu languages that reasserted the centrality of language in
Indian politics. But this partitioning is not merely between two homogeneous societies,
Urdu Pakistan and Hindi India; India’s richly diversified demography stretches its
dynamic multilingualism down to the districts. Pattanayak (1990; 1984) and Mohanty
(2006) tell us that if we draw a straight line from Kanyakumari in the southernmost tip
of India to the northern extreme of Kashmir, and mark off every five or ten miles, we
will find that there is no break in communication between two consecutive points.
Virtually all Indian societies are fundamentally and functionally multilingual.

The 2009 U.S. Census Bureau’s Population Clocks estimate places India’s
population at 1.17 billion, making up one sixth of the world’s population and the second
most populous nation in the world, after China. Indians speak a wide variety of
languages often difficult to number. The first authoritative census of Indian languages,
Sir G. A. Grierson’s 1891 *Linguistic Survey of India* (LSI), identified 179 languages and 544
dialects (Mahapatra, 1990). The 1951 census records 845 languages and dialects. In
1961, the census records 193 classified languages and 1,652 mother tongues. In the
2001 census, the languages were reduced to 122 with 234 mother tongues (India, 2010).

*Ethnologue*, the official documentation of languages of the world published by the

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60 The official source of population data in India is the decennial census of India, conducted every 10
years. The most recent Census of India was conducted in February and March 2001 with a population
record of almost 1.1 billion. More frequent estimates are however, available: The World Bank: 1.14 billion
Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) records 452 languages for India, 14 of which have no known speakers (Lewis, 2009). Although these numbers vary widely, they all agree that most Indian languages belong to four major language families: Indo-Aryan (or Indo-European) consisting of about 54 languages spoken by approximately 70% of the population; Dravidian with 20 languages spoken by 22% of Indians; Austro-Asiatic (or Austric) with 20 languages and Tibeto-Burman (or Tibeto-Chinese) with 98 languages accounting for the rest of the population. It is noteworthy however, that in a multilingual setting, the logic of summation does not apply since the same individuals speak different languages and belong to various linguistic groups.

Arriving at an accurate number of languages in India is problematic. Most estimates are still based on Grierson’s 1891 and later 1927 LSI. Grierson however, warns that the LSI is partly based on estimations and does not cover the entire India; Hyderabad, Mysore, Madras and Burma (which is no longer part of India) were not included. More recent census-based numbers are inaccurate for similar reasons; part of the population was excluded in the 2001 census due to the cancelation of results for places like Mao-Maram, Paomata, and Purul subdivisions of Senapati district of Manipur (Abbi, 2009). Difficulties of distinguishing between languages and dialects compound this challenge. Using census reports to catalog language is particularly error-prone. Given its standard strategy of self-reporting, individuals whose need for ethnolinguistic affiliation often vacillates between dominant groups to indigenous advocacy
communities tend to claim different languages and/or dialects during different censuses, even when they hardly speak any. Any inventory of Indian languages is therefore, at best, an estimate. Such estimates however have been used variously for legislative and educational purposes.

According to Article 246 of the Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution, legislative powers in India is shared between the Central Government (Parliament) and state governments (State Legislature) by means of three “Lists” that specify subjects about which each have power to make laws: the Union, the State and the Concurrent Lists. Both Central and State governments have control over the Concurrent List, with the power of the Central Government superseding that of the state in any event of repugnancy (Singh P., 2008). Education was initially under the State List until in 1976 during the 42nd Amendment Act when it was moved to the Concurrent List as part of political power brokerage during the defunct tumultuous Indira Gandhi administration (Ghosh S., 2009; Tiwari, 2006). Today, language remains a major element of Indian education legislations.

In a move that asserts India’s sovereignty and nationhood, Article 343(1) of the Indian Constitution controversially instituted Hindi as official national language and English as its subsidiary or secondary associate. This instituted the famous Munshi-Ayyangar formulation, which recommends Hindi in the Devanagari script and English as official languages, in an effort to resolve intense debates over a portended Hindu
hegemony. English was to be phased out gradually after fifteen years, a process that is yet to start over half a century later. Since states were created on the basis of dominant regional languages, Article 345 provides for states to choose their own official language. Under this provision, North-Eastern states and some union territories have paradoxically declared English their official language (Sarangi, 2009). The Constitution also instituted several protective safeguards for linguistic minorities, including the right to administer education and to preserve cultural heritage in indigenous languages of linguistic minorities. As part of its linguistic minority protectionist pose, the Indian government established the Central Institute of Indian Languages (CIIL) in 1969 to coordinate the development of Indian languages (SarDesai, 2008). CIIL was to work out the essential unity of Indian languages through scientific linguistic scholarship, contribute to the enrichment of languages and facilitate emotional integration of Indian peoples. CIIL therefore serves as an institutional outlet for scholastic expressions of constitutional provisions on language.

In addition to its language provisions, the Indian Constitution includes an Eighth Schedule (ES) for the recognition of various languages and their communities in the areas of administration, education, economy, and social discourse. Under the ES, the 1950 Constitution offers only fourteen languages an official status at the regional level: Assamese, Bengali, Bodo, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri, Malayalam, Marathi, Oriya, Panjabi, Tamil, Telugu, and Urdu. Paradoxically, although English is an official
national language it is not included in the ES. Debates over the Official Language Amendment Bill of 1967 precluded the inclusion of non-Indian languages in the ES. Sindhi and Sanskrit were also included. With the Seventy-First Amendment of the Constitution in 1992, Konkani, Manipuri, and Nepali were included. In 2004, following the 100th Constitutional Amendment of December 2003, Dogri, Maithili, and Santali were added bringing the total to twenty two (Constitution of India, 2008; Sarangi, 2009). With the exception of Manipuri and Santali, all ES languages are from the Indo-Aryan (14) and Dravidian (4) families.

Indo-Aryan languages are spoken in the “Hindi Belt” (or “Cow Belt”) by over 75 per cent of the population. ES’ focus on languages belies dialectical variations within each language and raise serious questions of equity and linguistic identity. For instance, Hindi has over fifty “dialects” the majority of which do not use the mandated Devanagari script (see Table 1). The result is a hierarchically structured language status matrix that map onto ethnic, caste and political divides (see Table 2). Critics charge that these constitutional provisions are contradictory: although it supports linguistic reconfiguration of states on the basis of dominant languages, it excludes relatively dominant languages from the ES and includes less dominant ones (Abbi, 2009; Sarangi, 2009).
Table 1. Scheduled Languages in Descending Order of Speaker Strength (2001 Census)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. No.</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Persons who returned the language as their mother tongue</th>
<th>Percentage of total population**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>422 048 642</td>
<td>41.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Bengali</td>
<td>83 369 769</td>
<td>8.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Telugu</td>
<td>74 002 856</td>
<td>7.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Marathi</td>
<td>71 936 894</td>
<td>6.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>60 793 814</td>
<td>5.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>51 536 111</td>
<td>5.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Gujarati</td>
<td>46 091 617</td>
<td>4.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Kannada</td>
<td>37 924 011</td>
<td>3.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Malayalam</td>
<td>33 066 392</td>
<td>3.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Oriya</td>
<td>33 017 446</td>
<td>3.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>29 102 477</td>
<td>2.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Assamese</td>
<td>13 168 484</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Maithili</td>
<td>12 179 122</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Santali</td>
<td>6 469 600</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Kashmiri</td>
<td>5 527 698</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Nepali</td>
<td>2 871 749</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Sindhi</td>
<td>2 525 485</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Konkani</td>
<td>2 489 015</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Dogri</td>
<td>2 282 589</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Manipuri*</td>
<td>1 466 705</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Bodo</td>
<td>1 350 478</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Sanskrit</td>
<td>14 135</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


** The percentage of speakers of each language for 2001 has been worked out on the total population of India excluding the population of Mao-Maram, Paomata and Purul subdivisions of Senapati district of Manipur due to cancellation of census results.

N - Stands for negligible.
Table 2. Language Hierarchy in India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>National Official Language Hindi, English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Scheduled Languages Hindi, Bengali, Telugu, Marathi, Tamil, Urdu, Gujarati, Kannada, Malayalam, Oriya, Punjabi, Assamese, Maithili, Santali, Kashmiri, Nepali, Sindhi, Konkani, Dogri, Manipuri, Bodo, Sanskrit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Dialects or Variants of Scheduled Languages Hindi alone has over 50 dialects or mother tongues. Other scheduled languages have numerous dialects or variants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Non-Scheduled Language Over 430 languages (or 334, according to the 2001 Census of India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Dialects or Variants of Non-Scheduled Languages Several hundreds of dialects (or mother language) not clearly documented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Unrecognized Languages Mostly undocumented languages</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data are from the 2001 Census of India and Ethnologue, (see Lewis, [2009]).

Inserted in the hierarchies of caste, class, religion, and gender relationships of Indian societies, the constitution constitutes a political compromise of linguistic minority rights it is sworn to protect. Granville Austin (2009) has characterized the constitutional solution as a “half-hearted compromise” and the ES, anachronistic. Linguistic minority and tribal group movements have come to progressively inscribe in their agenda concerns about linguistic domination cast against caste and tribal community relations that frequently take advantage of constitutional privileges. Such privileges and
prohibitions translate to differentials in educational provisions.

During British colonial rule, education was administered in English. The ascendancy of English in the postcolonial context is associated with rationales of modernization of political culture and democratization of the polity. Immediate post-independence education commissions—the Radhakrishnam Commission of 1947 and the Kothari Commission of 1964 to 1966—recommend the use of Indian languages even at the higher education levels. But anxiety over national integration and consequent need for a “link language”, the economic and political viability of English, and the ascribed honorific value of foreign languages have worked together to ensure the continuity of English as the most valued language of education. The education ministry, in an attempt to encourage indigenous languages in schools and abate language related education conflicts, instituted a nominally laudable “Three Language Formula” (TLF) as a pragmatic tentative resolution of intractable concerns regarding medium of instruction.

The TLF seeks to accommodate three major interests: those of separate group identities (mother tongue and/or regional languages if listed in the ES); national identity and unity (Hindi); and administrative efficiency and technological progress (English). First introduced by the Central Advisory Board of Education in 1957 and modified by the Kothari Commission, TLF provides for the following as media of instruction in Indian schools: (a) mother tongue or regional languages; (b) Hindi (in non-Hindi areas) or any other (preferably southern) Indian language (in Hindi areas); and (c) English or any other
modern European language (see Viswanatham, 2001; Daswani, 2001; Table 3). Yet TLF works against ES languages not designated as regional languages such as Urdu, Sindhi and Sanskrit, and increases the “burden” of learning more languages on linguistic minorities whose languages are not listed in the ES or designated regional languages; they have to learn at least one language in addition to the stipulated three (Sarangi, 2009). As will be discussed in Chapter Five and the results section, some scholars have proposed a Four Language Formula in response to the dilemma invited by the TLF (Abbi, 2009). What is more intriguing is that although sociopolitical, economic and educational activities in India bespeak a quest for international integration and foreign influences, official documents on language and education makes no obvious reference to internationalism. The rationale for English language in schools is purely domestic – administrative efficiency and technological progress – two processes that, although expressly internal, tie intrinsically to international arenas.

Table 3. The Three Language Formula Provisions for Hindi and non-Hindi states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Hindi States</th>
<th>Hindi States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. A language listed in the ES (as <em>mother tongue/regional language</em>)</td>
<td>1. Study Hindi (as <em>mother tongue/regional language</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Study Hindi (as <em>language of national identity and unity</em>)</td>
<td>2. Study Modern Indian language especially from south India (as <em>language of national identity and unity</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Study English or any Modern European language (for <em>administrative efficiency and technological progress</em>)</td>
<td>3. Study English or any Modern European language (for <em>administrative efficiency and technological progress</em>)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
By the 1980s, close to sixty Indian languages were used in school curriculum, most of them as media of instruction especially at the primary level. Higher levels of education use progressively fewer languages (Annamalai, 2001). As of 2006, about 104 languages are used for radio broadcasting and adult literacy programs. Some 87 languages are used in print media (Mohanty A. K., 2006). Although difficult to catalog with exactitude, the number of school languages continued to grow in the 21st century. 61

As the fabric of India’s societies is woven in diversity, so are its schools enveloped in dynamic multilingualism. However, according to the position paper of the National Focus Group on Teaching of Indian Languages, which was published as part of the National Curriculum Framework of 2005, most Indian schoolchildren come to school with multilingual competence and begin to drop out partly because schools fail to relate to their home and neighborhood languages (NCERT, 2006). At all grassroots levels, India is functionally multilingual. Related issues of educational quality and equality, linguistic right and language endangerment, cultural identity and global peace delineate the discursive and ethical universe around which international educational initiatives coalesce.

61 In his 2001 publication, E. Annamalai states that about forty-seven languages are used in schools. Yet, Chaturvedi & Singh documented as much as fifty-eight in 1990. It is not likely that this indicates a decline in the use of indigenous languages in schools (since between 1990s and 2001, more languages have been added in the ES and tribal mobilization around indigenous language grew). It however demonstrates the difficulty of accurately enumerating languages in a country as vast and complex as India. Besides, most of the data reported in Annamalai’s 2001 book are based on earlier publications in the 1980s. Ajit Mohanty’s (2006) work does not attempt to give any figure probably due to this uncertainty.
As unique and convoluted as India’s multilingual landscape is, it bears some similarities with Nigeria. Yet, both countries are very unique in the ways multilingualism has evolved through their respective histories. In the next chapter, I examine multilingualism in Nigeria to unveil the constitution of its diversity and education language policies. I note the ways the history of multilingualism in Nigeria reflect the similar macro social forces and historical events that shaped linguistic diversity in India and how those forces unfolded in very distinct ways. Viewing linguistic diversity in India and Nigeria from a historical perspective permits us to explore the ways current language policies issue from longstanding traditions and experiences of various communities across the world.

**Education Language Policy Process: Results from Interviews and Participant Observation in India**

To understand the findings from this study, it is crucial that we return to the central problematique guiding the four sets of research questions (RQ). As I note in Chapter Four, a summative restatement of the research questions points us to: what (i.e., elements or components) constitutes education language policymaking as a process, how do these (ELP process elements) operate, what changing or stable outcomes do they produce, and how can interrogating these issues in India, Nigeria and UNESCO expand our conceptual understanding of education language policymaking in multilingual societies as a whole? Since this broad questions undergird my engagement
with participants in this study, and shape the substantive and procedural elements of my data exploration, presenting my findings from participants’ responses privileges the same overarching problematique.

Guided by the DIA and using themes from my analytic protocols (open coding, axial coding and selective coding, and the phenomenological interpretation), I reconstructed three interview cases that illustrate central issues in the research questions as vignettes. These cases represent the various backgrounds of Indian participants whose individual identities often interweave multiple institutional, social and linguistic backgrounds. Using these vignettes, I present the findings along three interconnected aspects of the research questions: (a) what constitutes education language policymaking as a process? (RQ1); (b) what are the operational dynamics of ELP elements? (RQ2); and (c) change and stability in ELP outcomes (RQ3). The fourth element of the research question pertaining to conceptual implications of these findings will be addressed in Chapter Eight as part of my discussions and conclusions. Following these vignettes, I outline central themes that emerge from the data. I preface these vignettes with a summary of the key findings from India.

Key Research Findings from India: A Summary View

A founding rationale for this study is that the overarching ELPs frameworks in India have remained largely unchanged since Independence, the intellectual, political and cultural pressures to the counter notwithstanding. Findings from this study confirm
this ELP “fixation”, with ninety percent of participants emphasizing that the overall ELP framework of India remains the same since after Independence. Besides this explicit statement by most participants, data coding also reveals a corollary and apparently contradictory finding: ELP processes in India are characterized by dynamic changes and active developments. Fixation (or according to one participant, being “stuck”) suggests a lack of change. To find dynamic changes in a “fixated” or “stuck” process raises fundamental analytic questions. As Chapters Eight shows, this apparent contradiction is a definitive character of ELP as a process.

My findings from India also confirm an assumption of this study: that ELP processes are not an exclusive preserve of government policymaking apparatuses, even if the state plays a central role. This finding is two-pronged: first, while most participants characterize the government as elitist (building on India’s traditional caste system), there is a lack of consensus on the actual meaning and implications of elitism and social stratification in the ELP process. By confirming pervasive social inequalities tied to ELPs, participants offer useful clues to understanding class struggles and hegemonic relationships in emerging democracies. Second, there is a lack of congruence among the numerous institutional and/or individual ELP agent in India regarding their interests, views about language, and impact on ELP; major differences abide among diverse actors (“government”, “scholarly experts”, “grassroots”, etc). While not too surprising (given the basic assumptions of this study), this lack of congruence points to another set of
findings concerning the complications of ELP processes. ELP decision making in India is heavily laden with paradoxes, dilemmas and complexities that critics of current ELPs frequently overlook or gloss over.

Another key finding of this study is that while academic experts identify government and grassroots as the “field” in which ELP changes must be sought, other participants show that academic experts, international organizations, and independent activists are all entangled in same ELP processes and therefore are equally “sites” for change. What emerges is a mutual externalization of potential sites for changes in ELP processes by various actors representing different interlocking backgrounds. Finally, data from India uncovers thick networks among ELP agents (especially facilitated by international organizations and academic experts) that form the basis of consensuses. However, these networks, which create ample opportunities for cooperation and exchange, also contain structural mechanisms for enormous disconnects among groups and from ELP consensuses. As I discuss later, each of these results encapsulates numerous conceptual issues that can contribute to deeper understanding of ELP processes in multilingual societies.

Vignettes of Education Language Policy Process

Interview cases selected for these vignettes do not individually or collectively capture the findings of this study in their entirety since each participant brought a unique perspective (in scope or depth) to this research. They however, illustrate central
themes that emerge from data analysis. Like vignettes, I use them as “cover designs” or “graphic illustrations” that invite us to deeper analysis. Additionally, they provide direct access to participants’ voices as they wrestle with thorny issues associated with their engagement in their respective ELP processes. To capture the salience and breadth of their ideas, I present data from multiple interviews with the same participant as responses from one interview session. While the vignettes try to capture participants’ responses under broad interrogative themes, the responses featured actually come from different questions spanning a range of issues. Using the coding strategies mentioned earlier has allowed me to hyperlink several sets of ideas to produce condensed cohesive thematic responses. Several ideas and details not included in these vignettes will be reflected in the discussion sections in Chapter Eight.

Of the three vignettes featured, two are from the academe. Only one still works in the academic system; the other works for government institutions, I/NGO and international organizations. The third represents grassroots or independent activist perspectives. Two of the participants have extensive international experiences and reflect local, national and international perspectives. All participants featured in these vignettes are still actively engaged in their respective ELP contexts. Both participants with extensive international experiences received graduate level education overseas and one held professoriate positions in Western academic institutions. While each participant featured in these vignettes embodies loaded histories that bear on the
research issues, revealing detailed descriptive information will likely provide clues capable of violating the contractual commitment of this project to protecting participants’ confidentiality and anonymity. All names are thus fictional. Besides, for the same reason of confidentiality I have left out biographical data on the participants (which should have constituted a brief introduction to each vignette) that otherwise would be critical in situating their responses. Like all other participants, they are multilingual (functioning fluently in several languages, ranging from three to twelve languages) and belong to one or more ethnolinguistic group. Ethnolinguistic group membership does not necessarily signify ethno-nationalist attachment. Such identity is ascribed simply on the basis of participants’ claimed original language and cultural heritage.

“Rajiv”
(Scholar and with international ELP experiences)
It’s a fairly complex system...but depends on who governs...

What Constitutes education Language Policymaking?

On Actors: Rajiv believes that education language policymaking is the prerogative of the government. However, it is shaped by who make up this government. Although the government determines what ELPs hold, local actors have proven to be highly formidable forces in the policy process. “Education, as you know, is in the Concurrent List, and the Union Government has the power to override States’ decisions. A lot of the people that technically influence the policy in India belong to institutions
controlled or funded by the Union Government”. So, “even in the absence of direct compulsion, the [Union] government has its ways of getting its will”. That said, grassroots people “through political mobilization have always exerted pressures on their local, state or even central government in ways that forces government to alter its decisions”.

On Behaviors: “Language policy is about every aspect of language, reading, writing, oral, listening, everything”. But all of them do not attract equal attention in policy formulation; “the reading and writing aspects are paramount because they have physical forms [text]. This is also the most targeted by major corporate interests like publishers...”

On People: For Rajiv, education in India has always been an elitist venture. Recent “[ELPs] target minority languages for the most part. They are the ones always being considered for the language schedule”. Rajiv also argues that while it appears that the focus is on minority language groups, “local people have managed to put constant pressure on Hindi as a dominant language. Resistance against Hindi and other dominant regional languages steadily puts them on the radar. But those languages have come to stay, nobody will remove them from the scheduled list; all they can do is include more and more languages. And interestingly, another paradoxical twist is that the same Hindi [and other dominant regional languages by implication] suffers from similar hegemonic dominance by English due to popular demand for English in schools”.
On the End of ELP Processes: Contemplating several claims regarding the end goals societies attempt to reach through ELP, especially national integration, Rajiv disagrees: “I don’t think there is a goal of national unity. We provide that through other things. But the national goal is to create an educated manpower for economic wellbeing and for development. Even individuals who make choices about which languages to use are doing so for economic opportunities and development”.

On Actual Effects: When asked if the ELP process achieves this goal, Rajiv affirms: “Of course….go back to that ridiculous 6% literacy in 1901; in 2001 about 65% of the population is literate. And of course, those numbers don’t tell us a lot because it is again formal education. But ultimately, the number of schools has increased, the number of universities has also increased, the employment opportunities have increased...so, there’s been economic development at all levels, individual and national”.

What are the operational Dynamics of ELP Elements?

Rajiv notes that “the government forms commissions that look into educational matters, and these commissions also look into language policy. You can find most of the positions of government commissions in their reports, and the more successful ones,

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62 Earlier in the interview, Rajiv had made reference a 1901 survey of literacy in India, which found that only 6 percent of Indians are literate. As he argues, this low statistic was inaccurate since its data was derived from individuals with western formal education and neglected the majority of Indians literate in Indian languages.

63 Rajiv refers to the fact that the 65% literacy also refers only to those with formal western education and still does not account for the majority of the society.
that’s, those ones government didn’t reject or sidetrack for one reason or another, the more acceptable ones you will find in documents like NCERT’s curriculum framework. In fact you can determine the kind of activities and effectiveness of any commission based on who the ruler is and the prevailing political conditions”. He adds, “UNESCO people don’t really play a direct role; they try to influence policy from the sideline by organizing conferences and workshops to bridge gaps. But they don’t play that much of a role in a place like India”.

**Changes and Stability in ELP Outcomes**

“The Indian society has always been highly multilingual. Language policies have generally reflected the history of the country, by that I mean the political, religious, cultural, economic and even demographic histories of the country. Each historical period bears an imprint of the political and social conditions of its time. India has had a succession of languages of the rulers who came from outside...we’ve had Arabic in certain parts of the country, I would say for about 300 years, then Persian over a fairly large part of the country under the Mogul rule for about 600 [years], and then English for about 200 – 300 years, English in a larger area. But at no time have any of these languages been the language of grassroots communication; they’ve only been language of administration, of governance, of prestige and of power”. Regarding contemporary ELPs, Rajiv notes that while India is highly multilingual, a lot of people (including the government) have taken an approach to multilingualism as a problem since
Independence. But that is changing now with the 2005 curriculum frameworks that adopted a more positive view of multilingualism. Paradoxically, the demand for English is also on the rise even as the government is acknowledging Indian languages more and more”. In the long run, “it is a fairly complex linguistic situation and people have been functioning like that for centuries; that is normal”.

“Shuklar”  
(Scholar, independent activist and grassroots consultant)

...the hegemony of elitism is still alive and well.

What Constitutes Education Language Policymaking?

On Actors: Shuklar provides a class structuralist perspective – a pervasive feedback from nearly all participants – on several issues here: “Since independence the powerful elite has dictated policy on language. The only exception is when grassroots language movements of the masses demanded introduction of regional language as a means of education, and also during election times when politicians use the people’s language. Otherwise, language policies in India are always formulated by the powerful elite with a lot of influence from the Indian bourgeois capitalist...and that is why the promised switch to Indian languages after independence could not take place, even when the regional language movements were able to force the issue of their own languages being recognized. However, recently a totally new set of forces are operating; and these are the forces of neoliberal capital. So now, it is the linkage between the
interests of neoliberal capital, the global market and the information technology. There are two ways grassroots mobilization can influence the government: one is through elections and the other is by taking to the streets through non-violent protests. The bureaucrats have very little power; they follow the dictates of their bosses, the elites. To say that ‘the bureaucrats are primarily responsible for ELPs would be wrong; if the political leadership wanted any policy to pass and for the masses to be involved in their governance, they will immediately get bureaucrats and whoever else to get it done. We see this clearly in elections; they produce all election materials in Indian languages because they know that’s what the people want”. He concludes: “the hegemony of elitism is still alive and well”.

**On Behaviors, People and Conditions:** Shuklar’s argument about elitism and hegemony is loaded; they are applicable to understanding what (language) behaviors, the people targeted by education language policymaking and the conditions under which such policymaking unfold. He points out that “the government doesn’t want the people to be informed because if the people are informed about government practices, they will demand changes the elite are not prepared to make. So they use language as a way to fence the masses out. Any form language takes is affected. That is why government conducts its affairs in English and provides shabby and incomprehensible translations in Hindi. They only use Indian languages when conditions favor them, like I said, during elections and those times when refusing the masses demands harms their
political and elite interests. That’s why I now work with the grassroots level to try and sensitize them about what is happening so they can demand for their right, their constitutional right. It is their constitutional right, and we tell them: ‘teach us sciences, teach us mathematics, but in our own language; it is our right.”

**On Means, Decision-making Process, Ends and Effects:** “One of the reasons elite control persists is that they have put themselves in charge of the means of production and the sources of livelihood of the masses, so the masses are always dependent on them... And that is also why they are not ready to give up that control. This is the character of elites everywhere. The interesting thing is that Indian elites and neoliberal capitalists are controlled by Washington [D.C.] and London. Their decisions are dictated from US and Europe. But they gladly comply with the dictates of the West because they themselves are beneficiaries. To understand this process, you have to look at the patterns of economic changes in the West and how that relates to what is happening in India and other societies, including your own country Nigeria. The activities of the government are nothing but an implementation of external demands from which they benefit.” He concludes, “In the end, who suffers? The poor masses, the lower classes and children. But ...this hegemony will be broken someday; people are becoming more informed and developing creative ways to resist elite control”.
What are the Operational Dynamics of ELP Elements?

“I have worked in different government commissions on education and we have been discussing this language issue for decades. I have also worked with grassroots people for over thirty years. My experience with the government has been very frustrating. They spend a lot of time and money organizing committees and expert bodies, but when experts come out with reports that will benefit the people they discredit the experts and kill their ideas. If an idea threatens their elite interest, irrespective of language, religious, or territorial background, they collectively suppress it. Sadly most academic experts have joined ranks with the political leadership to produce shoddy scholarship that justify their activities. The problem with the grassroots is that they are fighting a losing battle: how can you fight elite control with tools they control [English]? That’s why we keep telling them to insist on their own language. If the knowledge systems that governs India are indigenous, all our leaders will lose their legitimacy and claim to superiority; they will be forced to listen to the masses.”

Changes and Stability in ELP Outcomes

“Nothing has changed since Independence. People fought for independence from the British with the idealistic hope of reclaiming their societies. Little did they know that they were merely transferring hegemonic control from the British to home-grown colonialists. That is neocolonialism; you become a slave in your own society, to your own kin, because they are complicit with the same system that subjugated them
for hundreds of years. It is undeniable that the Indian society has been going through a lot of transformations, especially with the boost in IT. Interest in local languages has always been there among the masses. That’s why when people say that people’s interest in local languages are growing, I tell them: ‘you are wrong. People have always been interested in their languages; you are the one just realizing it of late’. The problem is that the masses have to find new tools for political action as social conditions change. Mass mobilization takes a lot; they need leaders, leaders outside the government because our politicians are rulers, not leaders. The masses have shown that they can force government to change its position. You see this in the many concessions they have won especially with minority groups like the Dalits and other lower class people. Yet, they have not been able to get government to change its larger oppressive language policies”, which continues to promote majority languages at the expense of minority ones.

“Panchali”
(Scholar, government-affiliated expert and consultant to I/NGOs, and UNESCO)
Language policymaking in India has always been an issue of compromise...never permanent resolution.

What Constitutes Language Policymaking as a Process?

On actors: Panchali reechoes the centrality but non-exclusivity of government’s role in ELP process. “When it comes to the actual policymaking, Government of India plays a major role. Inside the government the agencies most concerned [with ELP] are
NCERT and CIIL both of which are part of MHRD, although they answer to different offices. CIIL has a wider perspective on linguistic issues than NCERT or SCERT. However, both NCERT and SCERT have more official mandate and draw some information from CIIL. Depending on the nature of policymaking issue you also have a lot of expert consultants mostly from universities and other higher institutions. States play a major role both on the Union and state levels; they are the ones that interpret and apply centrally decided policies. Government brings a lot of people from and agencies together in policymaking. Outside Government of India level, States have their own protocols. Then you also have local communities, independent agencies, international organizations like UNESCO, departments and colleges, language institutes, expert associations: all these people in one way or another engage in the discussions about language policymaking and most of them serve in government policymaking at various levels. Language policy in India is a very wide playing field.”

**On behaviors and people:** Panchali states that ELP process is political. Here, I find Bourdieu’s writing on language very interesting. This has a lot to do with the processes of marginalization of the languages of the people: [ELPs] are not dependent on the number of people who speak a particular language; they depend on the power those people have. In fact in this country, English is still the minority language, yet it’s the most powerful language. So, you can see how this politics impinges on the policies. Of course, when you talk to people in government, they tell you that it is by
demography – which language is spoken predominantly in a particular province or region. Actually, the Office of Registrar General of India maintains statistics of language speakers. But we have cases where a language with less number of speakers is included in the Eighth Schedule when others with more speakers are marginalized. It is only recently that NCERT officially recognized the need for a child’s home language. In the report on Indian Languages, you’ll find a reflection saying that the language which people speak at home should be reflected in the classroom. So if a child is speaking a word in a different way, or if he’s using a rural term or a dialect, you cannot say that it is a low status language. Every dialect is a respectable language. So the stated policy is that a child’s language should be promoted and gradually the transition will occur from the home language to the standardized language. But there has been a great political pressure within Hindi [upper class] to ignore the various spoken dialects of Hindi. The current policy says that the different forms in which Hindi is spoken should all be utilized in the primary years for making children more confident, more comfortable in the school, so they can gradually learn the standardized variety. But this is only a new perspective NCERT is offering, and their new textbooks utilized such words and many phrases which are not in the standardized language. But NCERT has suffered a lot of criticisms for doing this. So, those who make these decisions in government don’t always agree with such changes. When you go to the level of implementation, the situation is even worse. It is pure politics..."
**On the End of ELP process and actual effect:** Unlike participants who focused on collective goals and aggregate outcomes (such as national unity, economic development, cultural identity, etc), Panchali emphasizes individual-level goals and effects without explicitly outlining how this translates to society-level changes. About the intended goals of her ELP work, she argues, “we look for a society where children acquire the basic language skills in their mother tongue in the initial days and slowly acquire those of state language and English too, which is very possible, easier and smoother if mother tongue is mastered first... Our main intention is to strengthen the basic skills of children: language skills, mathematical skills, exploratory skills in science, and critical thinking skills. If those are strengthened, language doesn’t remain an issue. They can function in English at par with anybody in the world. And they will be more original in their thinking because they have mastered their first language first. And if you strengthen these basic skills at the primary level, no child will struggle.” Panchali’s submissions here suggest a modernization assumption – that the individual is an atom of society and that developing the individual will cumulatively create a critically informed society. As to whether ELP process in India actually produces these effects, Panchali argues that it might be premature to measure any outcomes with useful accuracy: “the only visible positive change in [ELP] is only partially established and still very recent; when up to ninety-five percent of the people don’t realize this [ELP goal], I think there are major limitations that make measurement of outcomes impractical, and
there are much more to be done. ELPs must be simpler and concrete to be understood by the masses. Current language policy still doesn’t talk about language or education very clearly and in simple enough language that everybody understands. Currently, language policies are still in jargons; policymakers uphold the Three Language Formula [TLF], but it doesn’t mean anything; it’s just like ABC for a non-English child. The TLF makes the language situation in India look simplified. Language policy should be in people’s language. Only then is it lived and we can measure its effects. Right now, there remains a huge gap between what policy says and what people know and do.”

**What are the Operational Dynamics of ELP Elements?**

Panchali indicates that different stakeholders play different roles. She outlines three different ways academic research features as part of these operational dynamics: “NCERT undertakes a lot of research by itself. It also assigns [and funds] research to university-based faculty on specific topics.” Although NCERT has about four hundred academic experts and technical faculty at the central office in New Delhi and five centers around the country constantly engaged in policy-oriented research, it still enlists the expertise of non-NCERT researchers at universities around the country. Thus, in addition to research conducted by NCERT faculty and those assigned to external experts, “the Ministry [MHRD] also commissions NCERT and funds it to conduct particular research projects. The most recent case is the assessment of the teaching of English language in government schools in all states. Often, these research projects involve the
collaboration of faculties inside and outside NCERT and universities”. Panchali positions this policy-oriented research role of NCERT within a political space: “you have to understand that NCERT researchers play only a nuanced role and does more of theorizing than influence actual policy. Their writings are hardly understood or even read by many both within government bureaucracies and grassroots actors. They are more academic than political in a sense and often get involved to the extent they’re offered an opportunity” by the political leadership. For Panchali, the same applies to numerous other institutions and ELP actors. The outcome is “differentiated activities going on at the same time at different levels – local communities mobilizing and putting pressures on their political leaders, states embarking on their own policy initiatives, sometimes UNESCO works with states or local communities directly aside from the central government. Because their goals are never the same, their activities are not always well coordinated.” Such differentiation, divergence of goals and consequent lack of coordination of ELP activities characterizes the operational dynamics of ELP processes in India.

Changes and Stability in ELP Outcomes

“First of all, you have to understand that policy is not just on paper”, Panchali argues; “it is what people decide to do about language. As a consultant, each time I visit different states and enter a classroom, I see different language policies of India at work. It could be a ‘learning to read’ or ‘reading to learn’ program, or what we call ‘Read
well/Write well’. These policy initiatives are different in different states and even different districts. So there are a lot of policy changes on this level. However, if you are talking about policy changes on the central level, nothing has changed. The Indian Constitution has not changed its position on the languages in the Eighth Schedule. The Three Language Formula still holds also. But it doesn’t mean the same thing to everybody. So when you work with different states or districts, you have to adapt to the premises they have set for their language policy...otherwise, you run into a lot of problem. Language policy in India is very political and a lot of disagreements exist also.” Panchali’s remarks reecho the central ideas of stability and dynamic change as central to ELP processes in India.

Emergent Issues in Vignettes of Results from India

As the vignettes bear out the key findings reported earlier encapsulate a congeries of issues that require deeper exploration in the light of existing ELP scholarship. In anticipation of the discussions and corresponding conclusions, the following emergent issues are worth noting. First, that ELP processes entail ongoing activities of numerous and diversified stakeholders on one hand, and that government institutions play a key (but not exclusive) role in these processes require that we interrogate what specific roles are played by which ELP agents. Such interrogation ought to clarify how different changing needs and conditions reflect on the ELP process and their outcomes. Second, while nearly all participants resort to elitism as a character of
political leadership in explaining social inequalities tied to language, they do not all agree on the meaning and specific effects of elitism. For some, hegemony is a fixed character of multilingual societies. For others, hegemonic relations are gradually giving way, through an entrenchment of democratic norms, to less social inequalities. Yet, for others, the fundamental elements of elitism have remained unchanged even if their specific expressions take new forms determined by wider social processes.

Third, to understand the forces that shape ELP processes requires interrogating the criteria for selecting and promoting particular languages and language policy initiatives and not others. Two explanations appear from the results above: a functionalist argument uses demographic criteria that prioritize numerical majorities over qualitative linguistic relations; a conflict perspective deploys hegemonic criteria to assess the relative political power of language communities and interests groups. It is crucial that elitism and hegemonic control are associated more with governments (and now, global neoliberal capitalism and powerful media). A fourth issue arising from these findings therefore, is how talk about government as a monolithic entity fits references to various groups and interests within government, a logic that can be extended to other institutional or collectivist ELP stakeholder.

Fifth, the vignettes above are indicative of a tendency to define the stated goals and actual effects in both aggregate and individualistic terms. Societal outcomes such as national unity, economic development, political stability and cultural preservation are
distinct but not inconsistent with individual outcomes, such as mastery of basic literacy, numeracy and critical thinking skills. Indeed, the arguments of structural functionalism upon which modernization theories are based, identifies the individual as the atom of society. Individual level changes are held to cumulatively result in societal outcomes. To make sense of participants’ positions here will require interrogating the intersections of structural-functionalist analysis of social change with those of conflict theories since both are grounded on modernist principles (Kubow & Fossum, 2007). In Chapter Eight, I discuss these issues with more detailed textual evidences from the findings presented here in thematic clusters.
CHAPTER SIX
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO MULTILINGUALISM AND EDUCATION

LANGUAGE POLICY PROCESS IN NIGERIA

The future of education in Nigeria will in the long run hinge on whether the schools belong to the people...[and whether] Nigerian education reflects the culture of the Nigerian people⁶⁴

Fafunwa, History of Education in Nigeria

Following the structure of Chapter Five, I present in this chapter (a) historical backgrounds to multilingualism in Nigeria using document analysis, and (b) findings from interviews and observations about the ELP process. I guide these reports with the research questions and methodological toolkits of this study. Constructing historical narratives of ELP in India and Nigeria calls for painstaking efforts and rigorous attention to historical data for two opposing reasons: there exists an enormous amount of archival and contemporary historical records on language and education in India, and conversely very few such works in Nigeria. While historians in India must account for the various interpretations the enormity of their data lend to, their counterparts in Nigerian

⁶⁴ For the purpose of this research, it is critical that we reformulate Fafunwa's (1974) remark: “The future of education in Nigeria will hinge on whether the schools belong to the peoples...[and whether] Nigerian education reflects the culture – and languages – of the Nigerian peoples.” Pluralizing “peoples” and emphasizing language aspect of culture highlights a central theme of this chapter: that current education in Nigeria is gradually departing from its inherently multilingual and multicultural roots.
struggle to find original works with sufficient historical significance. At the root of these two conditions is the existence of a longstanding literary tradition in India more than in Nigeria. The long history of India’s Sanskritized Vedas and other religious texts is well documented (Ramaswamy, 2009; SarDesai, 2008; Walsh, 2007) and has been briefly discussed in Chapter Two. The less known history of literacy in Nigeria requires a brief attention here.

**Nsibidi: An Ancient Literary Tradition in Nigeria**

About half millennia before the advent of Europeans in West Africa, there already existed a writing system in today’s southeastern Nigeria, the *Nsibidi*. Although its exact origin is unknown, early commentaries suggest that Nsibidi originated among and was popularized by the Igbos and widely used by neighboring Ibibio, Efik, Igbo, and the Ejagham peoples in the southeast (Macgregor, 1909; Dayrell, 1910). An ideographic writing system with abstract ideas, empirical information, and mystical knowledge encoded in a set of graphic symbols, the Nsibidi was a widespread literary practice often with cultic associations.

The symbols that make up the Nsibidi ideogram (see Table 4) are aesthetically compelling and often encoded in ancient art pieces and artistic forms like calabashes, masks, clothes, and so forth. However, it does not correspond to any one spoken language. Rather, its symbols represent abstract concepts, actions, rituals and materials deployed as communicative codes across different languages. As such, individuals
studied in the Nsibidi could communicate and share ideological expressions across mutually unintelligible languages with relative facility. While individual multilingualism – the capacity of an individual to master and function in multiple languages – arguably predates any known literary tradition in Nigeria, the Nsibidi, unlike most other writing systems of the world, was intrinsically multilingual both in syntax and semantics.

Table 4. Some Marriage-related Nsibidi Symbols and their meaning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Married man and woman in love</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Married man and woman in love with pillow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Married love with pillows for head and feet—a sign of wealth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Quarrel between husband and wife. This is indicated by the pillow being between them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Violent quarrel between husband and wife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>One who causes a disturbance between husband and wife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>A woman with six children and her husband; a pillow is between them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Two wives with their children (a), of one man (b), with the roof-tree of the house in which they live (c). The tree is put for the whole house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>A house (a) in which are three women and a man. The dots have no meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Two women with many children in the house with their husband</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Several records of Nsibidi symbols come from European anthropologists and explorers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The symbols and meanings above come from Rev. J. K. Macgregor’s (1909) notes. That the Nsibidi produced no original and well popularized texts other than traditional artifacts highlights two issues I raise below that constrained its evolution: the unavailability of textual writing (and ultimately printing) as an exclusive literary practices, and the absence of metalanguage—a language for talking about the Nsibidi as a literary tradition.
Early accounts suggest that the nearly one thousand Nsibidi symbols bear no semblance to any other script, and can be gestured in the air or written on the ground as communicative codes, pigmented onto the skin as tattoos, and often engraved on houses and art forms such as masks, musical instruments and textiles. Comparable ideographic systems, such as the Àrokò and Tusona (or Sona), and incantation systems like the Mmomomme Twe and Ogede developed in other West African societies around the same time (Ogunleye, 2006). The idea that the Nsibidi was restricted to the religious cult system, who relied on its mystical codes to control commercial relations with other societies and economic activities of ancient states as well as maintain social and political order (Gregersen, 1977), has remained a popular explanation as to why the Nsibidi did not evolve into a popular and widespread literary tradition.

While commanding, this explanation must be taken with some caution since it is well documented that the traditional African world was intrinsically and profoundly religious (Mbiti J. S., 2003; 1999; Onwubiko, 1991) such that religion served more as an integrative force than an exclusionary practice of a “secret” cult. To understand the forces that constrained the Nsibidi from developing a widespread social script for literary activities, one must look beyond the African religious cosmology. It is more likely that the unavailability of easily procurable writing materials (comparable to the papyrus, Pergamum and parchment, and paper) on the one hand and the absence of a metalanguage for generating an awareness of and discourse on language as a social
practice on the other, played critical roles. Although understanding the evolutionary pattern of the Nsibidi or comparable writing systems is not the central task here, exploring the specific factors responsible for the flourishing of some writing systems and the decline of others would be crucial to the preservation of current world languages and a more robust global literary evolution.

Even the Nsibidi remained popular among the initiated religious cult members it did not precipitate a highly structured classist society with social statuses and privileges defined by caste hierarchies similar to India. Unlike India it did not lead to the development of any recorded literary works such as the Vedas to which historians can turn for direction in assembling historical facts. With the advent of Islamic and European commercial contacts and the consequent expansion into slave trade and colonialism, other literary traditions supplanted the Nsibidi and precluded further potential developments. Indeed, Gregersen (1977) suggests that most West African scripts, unlike their North African counterparts, seem to be attempts to imitate Latin or Arabic writing. Whether this claim, which is not substantiated by Gregersen, holds for any West African script is a likely subject of academic investigation. As to the Nsibidi, Macgregor (1909) insists that it “originated amongst the great [sic] Ibo tribe... a great artisan tribe [whose] smiths are to be met in every village...and wherever a smith goes he carries with him the knowledge of nsibidi” (p. 209, emphasis in original). The lack of original classical texts or a body of work in the Nsibidi system (comparable to the Vedas) and the later shift to
Arabic and Western literary traditions partly account for the relative lack of attention to this ancient system in contemporary scholarship on language, education and literacy even among the Nigerian academe.

Historians of traditional education in the societies that make up Nigeria often take as their point of departure, the combination of age-graded formal and informal structures of education that start in early infancy lasting through the lifetime. In his *History of Education in Nigeria*, Babs Fafunwa (1974) outlines seven cardinal goals of such an education: physical training, character (or moral) development, inculcation of respect for elders and peers, intellectual development, vocational training, disposition for active community participation, and preparation to promote cultural heritage.

Fafunwa argues that critics of traditional education, most of who contend that (a) its goals are limited since it is often addressed only to the child’s immediate society, and (b) it is conservative and conforming, in that it does not dispose the child to challenge or resist undesirable aspects of the culture, fail to appreciate the functionality of such education and the fact that other educational systems of the time in Europe, Asia and the Americas were no less limited and conservative.

As other historians after him, Fafunwa lays out the basic frameworks of traditional, Islamic and Western education in Nigeria. What is lacking however, is a historical portrait of the role of language in the process of educational development of traditional societies. Very little (if anything) is known about the use of the Nsibidi or
comparable system in traditional educational practices such as discussed by Fafunwa. Like India, a degree of multilingualism characterizes the linguistic environment out of which these education systems arose, as distinct from most European societies from which later formal education were borrowed (Brock-Utne & Skattum, 2009; Mohanty A. K., 2006; Annamalai, 2001; Akinnaso, 1993; Adekunle, 1972). It is therefore, important to examine the historical contexts of education out of which these complex linguistic arrangements developed.

In the following section, I probe into the origins and broader social conditions of language cohabitation, the policies they have engendered and the issues they invite. Similar to India, I show that current politics of language policy are rooted in a host of larger social forces that predate European influences, and that the British did not create a previously nonexistent but contributed immensely to ethnic and linguistic diversity and rivalries in Nigeria. As with India, multilingualism in Nigeria arises from the co-existence of many distinct linguistic communities and the appropriation of foreign languages, which are marked by Islamic and Western colonial influences from the Arab world and Europe respectively.

**Nigeria: Origins of Diversity and Linguistic Heterogeneity**

Unlike India whose sub-continental identity emerged much earlier in the country’s history, Nigeria’s history is scripted within the broader context of African history. It calls for an inquiry into patterns of migration, trade and political organizations
in this cradle of humanity dating about 2 million years. Although the oldest of all human
societies, Africa’s history as a whole and those of the complex and vastly different
societies of which it is composed have hardly been recorded at all; their studies are just
beginning. With little writing and scattered archeological finds, historians are left with
scanty evidences out of which intricate histories are worked out. Certainly, this requires
ingenuity and concerted diligence on the historian’s part. Yet it indicates the magnitude
of bias and latitude of interpretive interestedness according to which histories of
ancient African societies must be cautiously read. As Elizabeth Isichei (1997) suggests,
the difficulty here is that “there is an infinite number of possible African histories” (p. 3),
and historians who explore African societies are necessarily faced with the variety of
accounts.

Of course, “[A]ll history is ideological, because all history reflects the concerns of
the individuals and societies which produce it. What is remembered, and, where
possible, recorded is what is felt to be of enduring importance” (Isichei, 1997, p. 7).
Most authoritative histories of Africa are thus avowedly skewed to the historian’s
interests (Fage, 2002). Having framed history from a deconstructionist purview, as
narrative, historians’ interestedness presents less of a conceptual problematic.
Postcolonial and critical theories, however, challenge the fabrication and reproduction
of superiority–inferiority models of knowledge and power made possible by history as
narrative and seek a containment of hegemony through historical revisionism (Schmidt & Walz, 2010; Reid & Lane, 2004; wa Thion’o, 1986).

The origins of the societies that make up today’s Nigeria are linked to the earliest human civilizations in Africa through migration. Historical evidences of man’s origin first appeared with Dr Louis Leakey’s Olduvai Gorge excavations in northern Tanzania starting in 1931, which dated the evolution of modern man at 1½ to 2 million years (Leakey, 1971). It was however, between c. 35000 and 8000 BC that the distinction between Neanderthal (in North Africa) and Rhodesioid (south of the Equator) appeared with physiognomic variations that formed the grounds for the sociological formulation of the modern concept of “race” (Fage & Tordoff, 2002). Historians have since crafted numerous rich accounts of pristine “Black” civilizations in East Africa. Evidences of Blacks further south are not as old as in East Africa mostly due to the inhospitable climate to skeletal preservation. It is in the southern Nigerian town of Igbo-Ukwu that the only skeletal remains of Blacks appear dating about 9000 BC, and there are suggestions of Caucasoid habitations in this area around the same time (Fage & Tordoff, 2002). The migratory processes leading to this southward habitation of the continent are tied to the cultural innovations and technological advances of c. 10 000 BC that ended the Stone Age and ushered what historians have labeled Neolithic Revolution (Fage & Tordoff, 2002). Subsequent to this revolution, writing was invented followed by metallurgy.
Historians disagree on whether Blacks in West Africa all migrated from humanity’s northeastern origin or are indigenous to the region. Mapping migratory patterns, as a tool to determine the origins of West African Blacks, rely on linguistic classification especially of the Niger-Congo and Bantu language families. Malcolm Guthrie’s (Guthrie, 1970; 1967-9) extensive studies of the Bantu languages indicate that Blacks originated from West Africa, creating a unique civilization of metal works and complex political institutions, and only encountered migrants from the northeast later. But historians agree more with the American linguist Joseph H. Greenberg (Greenberg, 1972) who through his bold effort to classify all African languages posits a linkage between the northwestern Bantu to the West African Sudanic languages. This linkage was determined more by a southward drift of people from West Africa than a reverse movement (see Fig. 2.3 for map of African language families – p. 6 of Fage, 2002 [awaiting copyright permission]). Southward migration accounts, most of which come from early centuries AD Arab geographers, travelers and historians, such as Ibn Khaldun in the fourteenth century, indicate that these migrants were not the first inhabitants of West Africa. With only dispersed archeological finds, the utility of this linguistic determinacy of origin is hypothetical; the conflict over indigenous linguistic rights implied here (akin to the “migration/invasion contra indigenuity” contest over prehistoric Harappan India) signals the effectiveness of history in shaping contemporary language policy debates.
Some historians date the earliest evidence of indigenous habitation of today’s Nigeria to the Late Stone Age with records of the first human remains in Iwo Eleru rock shelter in southwestern Nigeria around 9000 BC (Falola & Heaton, 2008). By the seventh century BC, iron technology was evident in Taruga near Abuja in the middle belt of today’s Nigeria and constitutes the center of what has been known as Nok culture – a widespread metallurgical civilization in the Jos plateau that represents one of the earliest evidences of modern societies in Nigeria (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Nok had trade networks with the well established monarchical kingdoms of Ghana and Kanem north-east of Lake Chad as well as the western Yoruba to the west. Fage (2002) suggests that new states were created through a branching out of more established ones in quest of economic and political expansion. Although not known to earlier historians, Thurstan Shaw’s excavations at Igbo-Ukwu in southeastern Nigeria bear ample evidence of an established economically vibrant and independent Igbo state much before ninth century AD (Fage & Tordoff, 2002; Isichei, 1997). Contrary to earlier thinking that there was no monarchical tradition among the Igbos, the Igbo-Ukwu finds of a civilization distinct from Yorubaland and Hausaland corroborates the hypothesis of Blacks origin in West Africa. Yoruba kingdoms, well established in Oyo and Ife, were believed to have spread southeast to establish today’s internationally famous Benin kingdom (Falola & Heaton, 2008). From the regions of Lake Chad, Hausaland spread westward to establish the Borno and several other small but stable kingdoms.
One ethnic group anthropometrically distinct from others in the north (and indeed all of modern Nigeria) and who speak a West Atlantic language was the Fulani, a Saharan pastoralist migrant tribe. Often mistakenly lumped into one Hausa ethnicity (and reason for the recent Hausa/Fulani ethnic descriptor), some Fulani only settled in urban areas across the country, mostly in the north, as commercial hubs for their majority mobile cattle-herder population. Around the Benue-Niger river confluence were the Jukun state to the north, the Igala kingdoms to the south and the Nupe to the west. The Igbos established numerous densely populated societies across the entire southeast—stretching southward to Owerri and Umuahia, west to Anambra and north to Enugu—marked by democratic polities and commercial exchanges with the Cameroons, Yorubas and the northern Sudanic states through the Hausa trade routes. The democratic nature of Igbo societies is chiefly responsible for the idea that prehistoric Igbos lacked monarchical traditions (Falola & Heaton, 2008).

Although to varying degrees, these states were politically stable, economically viable and linguistically distinct. That most of them were walled cities however, is suggestive of conditions of hostility invited by the expansion of economic and political interests of more established states, such as the flourishing Mali and Goa empires (Fage & Tordoff, 2002). The advance of Islam to northern Nigeria added a religious dimension that further entrenched political and economic tensions among the established West-African states in the new millennium. Most of early West Africa was pagan with a wide
variety of religio-cultural traditions. Religion was deeply interwoven with all aspects of life, and integrated the living and ancestor, animate and inanimate in a holistic worldview (Mbiti J. S., 2003; 1999). Humans, animals, and the physical world were all parts of an integral natural order guided seamlessly by divine laws ritualized in religious customs. The introduction of Islam’s monotheism, which preached belief in the one and almighty Allah for “both kinsmen and strangers was treasonable”, and most West Africans believed that “the ancestral religion of the people must be reaffirmed” (Fage & Tordoff, 2002, p. 188).

Although Islam was already present in the Kanem-Bornu empires by the eleventh century through Arab traders, it was the famous 1804 jihads of the Fulani Shehu Usuman dan Fodio (1754-1817) that established a Muslim empire in northern Nigeria (Falola & Heaton, 2008; Fage & Tordoff, 2002; Webster, Boahen, & Idowu, 1967). The resistance and ultimate defeat of the staunchly pagan Hausaland expanded the Hausa (and now Muslim) dominance southward to Abuja and later to parts of the Benue territories and Igalaland. A strategic plan by the Usuman jihads installed a political administration that reconfigured Hausa states and replaced Hausa aristocracy with a predominantly Fulani aristocracy. For the new administrative setup to succeed, the Fulani aristocracy needed alliance with traditional Fulani clan leaders and old Hausa families. The consolidation of Fulani and Hausa often through intermarriages and

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65 For a short note on Jihad as an Islamic religious duty expendable for proselytization, see Webster, Boahen & Idowu (1967) and Fage & Tordoff (2002).
political rewards solidified Muslim rule in the north but with a definite Hausa flavor. For instance, Hausa became the language of administration and everyday communication written in Arabic script (Fage & Tordoff, 2002). With its Caliphate installed in Sokoto or Gwandu, the Muslim empire was governed through emirs whose powers derived from itself and who controlled political and economic activities throughout Northern Nigeria and its fringes. Muslims’ efforts to infiltrate the rest of today’s Nigeria were mostly unsuccessful due to harsh local resistance and eventual influx of Europeans.

In the southwestern and southeastern parts of the country, economic activities expanded as Igbos and Yorubas tapped the Atlantic coastlines and the Benue and Niger rivers. During and after the Nri kingdom which witnessed its heights around 1100 – 1400, small-scale Igbo states continued to thrive and served as hubs of economic activities linking different parts of today’s Nigeria. Part of the significance of the Igbos is that “[L]anguage and the findings of archeology suggest that ‘the Igbo’ have lived in much their present homes from the dawn of human history (Isichei, 1997, p. 246). As an elder from Mbaise poignantly informs an interviewer in 1972: “We did not come from anywhere and anyone who tells you we came from anywhere is a liar. Write it down” (Ogbaa, 1999, p. 83; Isichei, 1997, p. 246; Onwubiko, 1991). In time, these stable states embarked on political and territorial annexation to bolster their security and

66 These words of an Mbaise elder have become a popular epigraph to most historical accounts of the origin of the Igbos; his instruction to “write it down” bespeaks of frustration with suggestions that the Igbos were a migrant society that originated elsewhere and an attempt to put the question to rest. For further analysis of this interview, see Onwubiko (1991).
economic roles (Isichei, 1997). At the dawn of European exploration of West Africa, southeastern and southwestern parts of what became Nigeria were politically stable, economically viable and culturally diverse.

The conflict between Christians and Muslims over the North African coastlines led to contests over trade routes connecting southern Europe to India through the Indian Ocean and West Africa through the Atlantic. The need to expand commercial, political and economic control in southern Europe was mutual and drew Dutch, English, French, Portuguese and Spanish powers into harsh battles with a well-established Islamic world. The Portuguese led the exploration of the Gold Coast, erecting its first fort, São Jorge da Mina (St. George of the Mines)—now known as Elmina Castle—in 1482 around the Atlantic coastal region of today’s Accra, Ghana. Gradually, trans-Atlantic trade shifted commercial routes between West Africa and the rest of the world. The old Muslim-controlled trade route across the Sahara through North Africa and the Mediterranean to the Near East and southern fringes of Europe, which consisted of three distinct channels (Davidson, 1966) had positioned northern Nigerian at the center of the major economic channels. With the advent of Atlantic commerce, economic networks with the rest of the world shifted to the trade routes controlled by the southwestern and southeastern coastal regions, thus positioning the Yorubas, Igbos and

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67 The expansion of European interests was heralded by a widening of geographical horizons aided by new technologies (the compass, astrolabe and knowledge of astronomy) which led to a more accurate, positive and comprehensive representation of the world map than the mappae mundi of the Middle Ages (Fage & Tordoff, 2002).
smaller southern states at the helm of economic development. This shift was to become a significant factor in the religio-political rivalry that was to ensue between northern Muslim and southeastern and southwestern Christian Nigeria.

After a succession of different European occupations of West African coastlands and aggressive competition over an increasing trans-Atlantic slave trade—a trade that can be characterized as the most ignominious commercial venture in human history—the British established full control of the Gold Coast, setting up an embryonic colonial government. The history of trans-Atlantic slavery is long and complicated, and a few points are worth noting here. First, the number of Africans taken from their West African homeland to the Americas significantly constrained population growth and possibly led to depopulation.\(^6\) Second, that West Africans’ encounter with Europe only started with the slave trade is largely unsubstantiated; however the nature and volume of this trade relationship exploded with trans-Atlantic slave trade, ultimately paving way for shifts in power relations and racist ideologies. Third, Europeans’ strategies for capturing Africans included banditry, kidnapping, trickery and war, and exploited existing divisions among well established independent, if small, West African states. Historians still disagree on the long-term impact trans-Atlantic slavery had on West

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\(^6\) Estimations of the number of Africans taken as slaves to the Americas and Europe range between 11 million and 100 million; the wide range being accounted for by the lack of actual data on the mostly undocumented four centuries of trade.
Africa’s political, economic and cultural climate.⁶⁹ What is hardly debated is that it exacerbated the insecurity and inter-state antagonism, which weakened most West African states and ultimately came to define the onset of colonialism.

By the middle of the millennium, most of the societies comprising today’s Nigeria were fully formed into vibrant economic, political and cultural centers with commercial networks sustained by the Niger-Benue tributaries. In addition to the various Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa nations, numerous smaller but stable states interspersed major segments of this densely populated West-African region. Further south, the Calabar or Efik kingdom connected the Igbo heartland to the Atlantic, including the states of Annang, Akamkpa, Efik, Eket, Ibibio, Ikom, Ogoja, Opobo (now Ikot Abasi), Oron, and stretching west to Cameroon and the offshore island of Fernando Po (now Equatorial Guinea). Northwest of Igboland, the Igalas and their neighboring Idomas established thriving states with distinct polity (Isichei, 1997). The Hausas that occupied the north spread westward from Lake Chad to the fringes of the Mali Empire. The histories of even smaller states are less known today. Each kingdom and constituent states possessed rich diversity and wide dialectical variations of one or more languages that often implied mutual unintelligibility of sparsely located dialects. As insecurity generated by trans-

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⁶⁹ Some historians have accurately noted that slavery as a phenomenon did not originate with the trans-Atlantic slavery, and that the practice continued in most parts of Africa well into the nineteenth century (Placeholder12). We must however, make a distinction between the small-scale slaveholding practices of traditional societies and the institutionalization of large-scale international commerce in “humanware” and the consequent brutal conditions of life to which Africans were subjected under the slave economies of the US, Europe and Caribbean Islands.
Atlantic slave trade spread, the political and economic stability of these states weakened and paved way for further European political incursions. Early European settlers and missionaries grappled with this cultural and linguistic diversity. But the north–south antagonism and the vitiated conditions of southeast and southwest states sabotaged and ultimately eroded strong possibilities of consolidated resistance against European inroads into the West African region.

Following the intensification of European economic competition and the consequent “scramble for Africa” supervised by the Berlin Conference (or Congo Conference) of 1884-1885, the British claim to parts of the West African region was acknowledged by their European state competitors. On January 1, 1862, Lagos Island was annexed as a colony of Britain with H. S. Freeman as its first governor. As the British made further inroads into the hinterlands, they named most of the Calabar states an Oil Rivers protectorate, later renamed Niger Coast protectorate with Calabar as capital. After the British overthrew Oba Ovonramwen of Benin in 1897, the Niger Coast protectorate was merged with the Lagos colony to form the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in 1900. The north had also been declared a protectorate. Early British activities in Nigeria were mostly commercial but their motives unfolded into a more complicated political and cultural imperialist program.

Assigning degree of significance to motives for Europeans colonial programs – economic, political or purely imperialist – merely displays interpretive idiosyncrasies
among historians. Whatever their motive, Europeans sparked new political agitation linked particularly to the British colonial strategy of “divide and rule”, and administrative principle of Indirect Rule (Kew & Lewis, 2010; Crowder, 1964). The logic of Indirect Rule was to install conquered and/or complicit African political institutions as the basic administrative apparatuses of colonial government. In Nigeria, major military action was necessary for the British to overcome active resistance from the flourishing states of the Gold Coast, and as Fage and Tordoff (2002) shows, “British rule was established... primarily by force” (pp. 412-413). Military conquest necessarily had to give way to Indirect Rule as the choicest colonial administrative strategy. Historians proffer several explanations for the choice of indirect Rule: shortage of British staff in the colonies; quest for cheap administrations; determination to continue colonial British administration in the face of unfavorable climate in the region; the need to maintain traditional systems as a tool for quelling Africans’ spirited opposition to colonial rule; the argument that it was a logical inference from the British idea of “protectorate” at the time (Nwabughuogu, 1981).

Anthony Nwabughuogu (1981) forcefully argues that contrary to the above arguments, Indirect Rule was first installed in Northern Nigeria primarily through politico-ideological propagandism in the British mainland by self-interested British colonial actors. It would later be extended to some part of southern Nigeria in early 1900s and by 1920s to the entire country. Unlike the North, the success of colonial
administration in southern Nigeria was measured by economic progress and social
development (especially in transportation and communication) that enlisted
predominantly educated Africans instead of the political order Indirect Rule was meant
to instill. Indeed, Lord Laggard’s campaign for Indirect Rule was a politico-ideological
apologetic in defense of failed economic and social development in the north under his
administration as High Commissioner. For instance, when southern protectorates and
Lagos Colony were turning out huge profits for the colonial government, the Northern
Protectorate relied on imperial grants-in-aid and subsidies from Southern Nigeria for its
operations. Nwabughuogu (1981) indicates that according to the Northern Nigeria
Annual Report for 1905–1906, Northern Nigeria received £405,500 in aid from Britain,
and £75,000 from Southern Nigeria in 1905.

Luggard was acutely aware of this south–north divide; he wrote in a 1920 report
on the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria that

[T]he North, largely dependent on the annual grant from the Imperial
Government, was barely able to balance its budget with the most
parsimonious economy, and was starved of the necessary staff, and
unable to find funds to house its officers properly. Its energies were
concentrated upon the development of the Native Administration...
(Lugard, 1968, par. 5)

His aggressive defense of this socioeconomic condition and the consequent focus on
political administration through Indirect Rule led to the amalgamation of Northern and
Southern Nigeria in 1914. As Governor General, Luggard imposed the Indirect Rule
strategy on the rest of the new country. The establishment of Nigeria as a country bore
these twin polarizing feature: differential economic and social development between the North and the South, and the imposition of Indirect Rule to parts that have functioned very effectively without it. The southern parts of Nigeria appear to have retained an image of the North as both an economic burden and a political tyrant. These laid the contemporary framework for the north–south dichotomy in Nigeria’s public policy including education.

Southern Nigeria came under greater international influence resulting in disproportionate expansion of Western educational, economic and political developments than in the North, with Christianity taking deep roots in the deepest parts of the societies. The hangover of this disproportionate rate of development was a new factor to retool old conflicts between the actively Muslim North and mostly Christian South. The British colonial strategy of divide et impera—divide and rule (or divide and conquer)—served to further balkanize the North and South and distilled ethnic sensibilities that became a corollary condition for religion–infused political and economic competitions in Nigeria (Kew & Lewis, 2010). By the mid-twentieth century, Nigeria’s demand for political independence from the British reechoed independence struggles across the entire colonial world.

On October 1, 1960, Jaja Wachukwu, an Igbo and first Speaker of the Nigerian Parliament received Nigeria’s Freedom Charter from Princess Alexandra of Kent with Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of the North as first Prime Minister. After Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe
of Southern Igboland was elected Nigeria’s first President, political tensions mounted leading to the setup and disruption of several successions of governments. The transition from distinct independent states to “One Nigeria” was not smooth as political parties quickly mapped neatly onto ethnic affinities and further intensifies the North–South conflicts already deepened due to differentials in economic and political developments. Much of today’s public policy in Nigeria reflect regional and ethnic divides whose identity are taken for granted and historical significance rarely interrogated. The three major ethnic groups, Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba have maintained dominance in national politics, each enjoying shifting allegiances from smaller ethnicities. Yet, “Hausa”, “Igbo”, “Yoruba” are mere descriptively convenient terms. Earlier in history, there was hardly a pan-Hausa, pan-Igbo or pan-Yoruba consciousness, except probably for victims of the trans-Atlantic slave trade (Isichei, 1997). Colonial experiences have worked to intensify tension across regional and ethnic lines creating strong collectivist consciousness that define public discourse at all levels.

**Official Language and Education in Multilingual Nigeria**

Nigeria has never engaged in a comprehensive language planning and therefore does not have a separate language policy. Any language planning has remained largely peripheral to mainstream nation-building exercise (Oyetade, 2003). Nigeria’s blueprints for language are outlined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (from 1951 to 1999), the National Policy on Education (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2004) and
the 1988 Cultural Policy for Nigeria. Sections 55 and 97 of the 1999 Constitution states respectively that: “[T]he business of the National Assembly shall be conducted in English, and in Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba when adequate arrangements have been made therefore” (p. 29), and that “[T]he business of a House of Assembly shall be conducted in English, but the House may in addition to English conduct the business of the House in one or more other languages spoken in the State as the House may by resolution approve” (p. 43). The largely unquestioned ascendancy of English indicates not merely a weak public will to supplant colonial institutions but a political compromise intended to appease linguistic minorities whose ethnolinguistic sensibilities were reawakened by the officialization of Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba, the language of the three most dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria.

Building on this constitutional provision, Section 1(10) of the 2004 National Policy on Education (FME, 2004) endorses Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba as official Nigerian languages. It also includes French as a second official language (next to English) to aid interaction with neighboring Francophone countries. More, NPE provides for the first three years of education in the language of a child’s immediate environment. In Section 4 and Section 5, the policy lists English, French and Arabic as official languages to be taught early in schooling with English continuing as the primary language of education

70 The decision to include French as an official language in Nigeria is not an unproblematic move simply intended to foster better relationships with neighboring Francophone countries. As I argue in the results sections, there are strong political undertones to this decision that overshadow its stated goals and continue to impede any meaningful implementation.
from the fourth year. Overall, Nigeria endorses a hierarchy of languages intended to match variations in the population of their speakers: (a) English (main official language), French (second official language) and Arabic (effective only in Muslim communities); (b) Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba (as official Nigerian languages); (c) regional languages of non-Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba states used by majority of the population in the corresponding regions and as official languages subordinate to English, (d) over 520 indigenous languages whose official status can only be inferred – but hardly realized – from the provisions of Section 97 of the 199 Constitution; and (e) pidgin or “broken” English, which has received no official recognition (see Table 5).

Table 5. Language Hierarchy in Nigeria¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>National Official Language English, (French and Arabic)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Official Nigerian Language Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Regional Languages Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba, Fulfulde, Efik, Kanuri, Tiv, Ijo, Edo, Nupe, Igala, Idoma, Gwari, Kaje, Ibibio, etc**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Indigenous Language Over 520 languages whose official status can only be inferred from the Constitution; they are largely considered “minority” languages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Unofficial Lingua Franca Pidgin English</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ This table is adapted from Akinnaso (1993). Since this publication, some major changes have occurred on the language scene, such as the officialization of French and the creation of 6 new states.

*French was given an official status in the NPE in 2004, and has been used more for international relations (with Francophone countries) and foreign language learning. Arabic has been the official language of Islam and Qur’anic pedagogy in Nigeria. Its use is largely restricted to Northern Nigeria.

**With the creation of more states (36 states plus the Federal Capital, Abuja since 1996) new languages are emerging as regional languages used in public administration and mass media within the state.
The democratic issues of inequity and disenfranchisement invited by the marginalization of “minority” languages have been actively contested within and outside the academia (Oyetade, 2003; Akinnaso, 1993). It has been argued that over 75% of Nigeria’s 150 million people speak one or more of the three major Nigerian languages (Akinnaso, 1993). The accuracy of this figure is in much doubt since they are based on census data and estimations, and more regional “minority” languages now gain greater recognition on the basis of this language population criterion. This and the cognitive implication of English-only education have been discussed in Chapter Two and Chapter Three. Suffice it to note that in spite of the mother tongue-based educational provision, English remains the language of education in Nigeria starting from kindergarten. Parents’ clamor for English as an honorific tool for economic advancement is partly responsible for this condition. Similar to most other countries however, the government’s reluctance in pursuing comprehensive language policy for educational practice helps perpetuate this educationally deleterious language condition. Overall, education in Nigeria has gradually departed from its multilingual and multicultural roots, with indigenous educational systems almost completely giving way to increasing demand for Western formal schooling.
Education Language Policy Process: Results from Interviews and Participant Observation in Nigeria

The historical narrative of the origins of multilingualism as a background to current language policy issues in Nigeria constitutes a conceptual space for rendering this study’s findings from interviews and participant observations in the field. To better position these findings schematically, it is crucial that we return to the central problematique guiding the four sets of research questions (RQ). As I note in Chapter Four and in reporting findings from India, a summative restatement of the research questions points us to: what (i.e., elements or components) constitutes education language policymaking as a process, how do these (ELP process elements) operate, what changing or stable outcomes do they produce, and how can interrogating these issues in India, Nigeria and UNESCO expand our conceptual understanding of education language policymaking in multilingual societies as a whole? Findings reported here are outputs from data analysis, reconstructed as vignettes of three interview cases that illustrate central issues in the research questions.

These vignettes present the findings along three interconnected aspects of the research questions: (a) what constitutes education language policymaking as a process? (RQ1); (b) what are the operational dynamics of ELP elements? (RQ2); and (c) change and stability in ELP outcomes (RQ3), with the fourth element of the research question (on the conceptual implications of these findings) addressed in Chapter Eight. Following
these three vignettes, I briefly outline central themes that emerge from participants’
responses. I preface these vignettes with a summary of the key findings from Nigeria.

Key Research Findings from Nigeria: A Summary View

This study reveals striking similarities between India and Nigeria in their ELP
processes, their territorial distance (and disconnect), unique histories and cultural
differences notwithstanding. However, similarities in broad language policy frameworks
believe notable differences in the evolution and actual conditions of ELP processes
between both countries. With regard to this study’s grounding claim that the
overarching ELPs frameworks in India and Nigeria have remained largely unchanged
since Independence in spite of enormous intellectual, political and cultural pressures for
change, this study confirm that ELP in Nigeria is “fixated” on colonial and immediate
post-colonial policies. Similar to India, this study also reveals that the ELP process is
characterized by constant changes on various levels, an apparently contradictory finding
relevant to understanding ELP as a process.

Findings from Nigeria also confirm that ELP processes are not exclusionary
government policymaking prerogatives but integrate various players with widely varying
backgrounds, interests, and negotiating power. While the demarcation between a
dominant elite class and a non-dominant populace (characteristic of hegemony
theories) is fuzzy, blurred by policy actors’ tendency to trespass interconnected ELP
spaces, such Marxist class distinction is much less evident in Nigeria than India. Due to
the absence of caste-like social stratification in Nigeria, participants’ accounts of
hegemonic relationships in ELP processes privilege ethnic, religious, and economic
stratifications implicated in the recent colonial exigencies out of which the country
emerged as a nation-state. If the preexistence of jātis\textsuperscript{71} in India was approved the elitist
structure of British colonial programs, the absence of similar social stratification in
Nigeria served as partial justification for its installation. Ultimately, pervasive conditions
of social inequalities in Nigeria, as in India, can be tied to ELP practices of various
unevenly placed language policy stakeholders. Accordingly, there is a lack of congruence
among various institutional and individual ELP actors regarding their interests, views
about language, and impacts on language policymaking, a finding consistent with the
complexities, paradoxes and dilemmas inherent in ELP processes.

Nigerian participants show clear signs of what I have called externalization of
potential sites for in ELP process, a form of “finger-pointing” in which ELP actors locate
the problem of ELP processes outside their own institutional spaces. Such
externalization practices occur in spite of strong institutional and individual networks
and the interpenetration of ELP spaces by various actors. As these findings and my

\textsuperscript{71} Jāti (or Jāt) is used interchangeably with caste. Caste system in India is defined by the existence of
endogamously hereditary social groups (or classes) called jātis. Each “jāti” is composed of exogamous
lineages or clans, the gotras. Individuals from different gotras can intermarry but not outside their jāti,
which defines their social statuses with clearly defined restrictions. Often associated with Hinduism
(although practiced by adherents of other religions, including Muslims and Christians), caste practices are
still pervasive in India especially in rural areas where over seventy percent of Indians live, government’s
constitutional proscriptions and democratic changes in larger cities notwithstanding. It is noteworthy that
no Hindu religious text endorses caste-based discrimination. For a historical perspective on caste system
in India, see (Singh E. , 2009).
discussion in Chapters Eight show, these networks also give enormous room to disjuncture.

Vignettes of Education Language Policy Process

The findings presented in the vignettes below are not exhaustive in their thematic coverage or details. Rather, they are summative accounts detailing (mostly in the words of participants and from my field notes), my findings on the central questions of this research. Additional data that bear on these themes are integrated in the discussion in the following chapter. As in the previous chapter, I select data from multiple interviews with the same participant, even if their thoughts are presented as responses from the same interview session. These are thematic responses generated through hyperlinks of several ideas that emerged from the coding strategies mentioned earlier.

Of the three vignettes, two feature participants from the academe; one with an extensive international experience, the other working for the government. While the third holds a professoriate position at a university, he represents an independent and grassroots-oriented perspective shaped by vast experience in institutional ELP networks. Two of the participants obtained at least one graduate degree from and/or held a professoriate position at a western university. Since all participants featured here are still actively engaged in ELP processes and are well known, all names are fictional and identification information disguised to protect confidentiality. Suffice it to note that all
participants are multilingual, with functional fluency in three to seven languages belonging to one or more ethnolinguistic group in Nigeria. There was no measure of the extent to which membership in one ethnolinguistic group disposes a participant to ethno-nationalist attachments.

“Omadaja”  
(Nigerian scholar with extensive international experience)

*Everyone’s language is their majority language*

**What Constitutes Education Language Policymaking?**

**On Actors:** Omadaja argues that “when you talk about language policy, you talk about the government. Even when the British were still here, they were the ones setting policy on language for schools. The first language policy in education in independent Nigeria was formulated by a committee that came out of the 1969 government conference in Kaduna. But you know, in Nigeria, language is very sensitive and everyone is fired up when the issue of language is raised. Because of that, there are a lot of influences from many quarters, the academic, local chiefs and traditional rulers, language teachers’ associations, even newspapers”. She further points out that “even the 1969 conference was initiated and masterminded by academics, Fafunwa and Awokoya and others”. According to Omadaja, there are a host of actors that play a role on ELP processes. However, “it is the government that commissions the expert groups and committees that formulate the policies and the Ministry of Education are at the
center, with NERDC and other government institutions”. She points out that international actors (especially UNESCO, the Ford Foundation and other agencies) also wield significant influence.

**On Conditions:** Omadaja reflects on the social conditions relevant to ELP processes: “Nigeria is very diverse and there are a lot of group tensions especially between ethnic groups and religions. I really can’t say that social tension is the most significant condition that forces the government to formulate or reformulate language policy. It is academic experts who discuss these things on the academic level and gradually both the government and the people begin to react. So the academics serve as a bridge. Even on the state level, people like Professor Kay Williamson was major figure in the Rivers area. More recently, grassroots people are more and more sensitive to their languages. For instance, the Urhobo people have been able to promote their language even to the national level”.

**On Means:** “Generally the government promotes the three languages, Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba; at least they support publication in those languages and support universities that train teachers in those languages. Otherwise, it depends on how much resources the language group has. The Urhobo example I gave you was successful because they were able to mobilize financial support from within. I even learned of a chief that taxed his people to promote their language, just to tell you how deeply involved the grassroots are becoming”.

On Decision-making Process: Omadaja draws out an important issue regarding the dialectical cycle of ELP processes when she notes: “You have to understand that language issues in society never ends. So long as we have different language groups in one country there will always be a group that is not satisfied with the language policies. It doesn’t have to be a minority group, after all, the group that influences the policy most are the dominant group not the minorities; minorities are often more reactionary to the dominant groups’ policies. Of course, government is always run by the powerful elites and they’re not ready to create equal opportunities for all languages”. Further, Omadaja argues that “even before you finish with one policy initiative, there are already forces pushing for its revision or change. Small things like who the federal ministry [of education] appoints to help formulate the policy can be a dividing issue for some people. That is why if you look at the NPE [National Policy on Education], you see constant changes; it is never static”.

On Ends and Effects: Omadaja’s assessment of ELP end goals in Nigeria is diverse and integrative. “The broad goals include a lot of things, like economic development, national unity, international integration, especially with this recent flare of globalization, political stability, cultural preservation, improving learning, and all sorts of things. But again, you have to remember that language policy can mean different things to different people depending on where they are coming from. Take for example; a language community group fighting to preserve their language will hardly make the argument of
national or international integration – even though they’re not necessarily opposed to cultural preservation. So it depends”. Omadaja continues: “Now, whether these goals are well stated or even whether they’re the actual goals the policymakers intend to achieve is a totally different story. Also when you think of the effects our language policy has had, it is very difficult to estimate. It probably requires a lot of study, but that will be hard because, how are you going to separate other factors to tell exactly what effects can be attributed to language policies. The one thing that is undeniable is that grassroots people are getting more and more involved in their language and demanding official recognition in school, at the same time, the demand for English is also rising. That tells you how complex this is. In fact, if you ask me, I’ll say the goals and ultimate outcomes depend on which regime in government is pursuing which policy, whether it was a military regime like when Abacha introduced French as the second official language, and also what other conditions shape people’s choices of which language to use. But I can guarantee you that you will not find one single answer that covers all.”

What are the Operational Dynamics of ELP Elements?

Omadaja’s responses here reflect the complexities and paradoxes alluded to in earlier sections: “...there is always a lot going on in the area of language policy....I just told you how the government does their own thing, how policy goes through expert committees, [different levels of] plenary committees and then NEC [National Education Commission]. This process involves a lot of consultation and
meetings and activities at the local, state and national levels. This is on the side of the government. Now, when you look at the academic side, they too have their own activities, conferences, consultations, research, work with local communities and even advocacy with government too; like next week, we [a language association Omadaja belongs to] are going to Abuja to meet with the minister and try to tell him to pay serious attention to this mother-language issue. Some of us too have our own networks with international agencies too. When you look on the side of the local people, and this is from my personal experiences conducting research across the entire country, they have a lot of activities, meeting with chiefs, campaigns, you know, a lot of grassroots kinds of activities”. While the nature of the activities varies for different policy arena and group of actors, Omadaja points out that “one thread that connects all of them is that there are a lot of interactions going on. Even during the first NPE, the Kaduna conference, there was a lot of involvement of the civil society; grassroots NGOs are now networking among themselves to say ‘what are you people doing in the Yoruba side, maybe we can learn, or what are the Igbos doing that the Idomas can copy’; and I think that some of us have been very instrumental to that process, look at the Kay Williamson case I told you, although you could argue that she was successful because she was a foreigner, but she was very influential at many levels.
Changes and Stability in ELP Outcomes

“When you talk about change, I’ll say ‘yes’ and ‘no’. Yes because, look at the NPE, initially it focused only on the three [Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba languages]. Now it has added others. The revision they are preparing now, I think, will include another one. And then people are getting more and more involved with their language. Before, many people wanted to stick to this colonial thing [English], but now they are refocusing on their own languages too. But then you ask: why are we still where we are? If you look at it, the government has been very reluctant to accept and promote all languages equally. They only say every child should learn [in] the language of their environment, but they promote only Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba, in addition to English. Even those three are not promoted very well, it is only English. Look at the Constitution; it says states are free to use their own languages but allows only the three in the National Assembly. It is even recently that we started talking to state Houses of Assembly that ‘look, you can’t abandon your languages totally like that and leave the citizens disconnected from their government’. And many states have now started using their language at least one day in the week for the activities of the House; Lagos is doing it, Anambra too. Northern states have always been at the forefront of using native languages. So, it is a gradual process. Things are constantly changing, but the larger framework of the government remains the same since colonial times. You know, what we have now is still the same colonial policy that says use vernacular—that’s what they called it then, vernacular with a
smirk]—only in early primary and then switch to English. We keep harping, that it’s hurting our kids and people are not learning well and are abandoning their languages and culture, but the government pays a deaf ear. Maybe when more pressures come from grassroots and all corners of the country are ringing with the same demand, then maybe they will listen. For now, they’re sticking with the old official policy.

“Uroko”
(Nigerian scholar and government policymaker)

When it comes to policy provisions, the government has done what it can do. But you cannot achieve unity by supporting only a few languages

What Constitutes Education Language Policymaking?

On Actors, Behaviors, People, and Conditions: Like most participants, Uroko positions education language policymaking within the realm of government. Other players contribute to a more or less extent depending on how close they are to government. However, he notes that “this is only true with regard to formulating policy documents. When it comes to implementation – what languages do people actually use and how do people make those decisions – the government plays a very insignificant role. Majority of the people doesn’t even know that there is a government policy or that they can play a role in formulating it; they just do their own thing.” According to him, international organizations like UNESCO provide more of an intellectual support through conferences and workshops or technical assistance. They can suggest but they don’t
dictate what we do.” Uroko also confirms that a great deal of grassroots linguistic awareness and activities are on the rise especially among minority language groups. “Some of them”, he says, “are being considered for the current NPE revision. Most of our current revisions are on those minority languages because they are the ones not recognized yet.” While he acknowledges that several social conditions lead to policy revision, since no new policy has been considered since after Independence, he notes that “recent initiatives are evidence-based and most were donor-driven. For example, we had the Girls Education Project sponsored by DFID. So, before we started, DFID advised us that there is need to develop a national policy on gender in basic education. We did that. Same with HIV/AIDS; first there was a National HIV/AIDS policy, and since education is one of the vehicles for preventing HIV/AIDS in the long run we formulated an HIV/AIDS in Education Policy. Now there is a national ICT…and we’re developing a national ICT in Education policy. So, there are always developments on the national level that require an education policy component. Technically, any citizen can submit a memo introducing a policy initiative but we don’t see much of that.

On Means, Decision-making Process, Ends and Effects: Uroko details the processes of policymaking focusing mainly on the movement of policy ideas from expert groups who draft a policy document to several plenary committees and finally to the National Education Commission, and sometimes the Presidency. The policy division is funded by the government, although the language section receives additional support
from the French government (often through the Nigerian French embassy). “The stated goal of our ELP is for national unity, although there are also issues of political stability, international integration and development.” However, he continues “as you can see, we have not achieved that national unity yet, although I have to say that if not the way this country has been managed, things could have been worse. There are many dividing lines among the people. But the country is not that united. You cannot achieve unity by supporting only a few languages. But again, those are the more developed ones and you have to go from somewhere. It is not a perfect condition. Plus, you must realize that we have very limited resources to develop all languages at the same time. Worse still, most languages are not united; they fight over which dialect or variety to use. It’s not always that government is against the people; the people themselves are against each other. So you have to tread carefully”.

**What are the Operational Dynamics of ELP Elements?**

The policy process itself is a combination of top-down and bottom-up approach. The government ultimately makes the policy but it tries to carry everyone along by sending experts to the grassroots, state and regional levels to get people’s views. But...when the government is not very stable, that can be a problem; this is the third minister we have had in about two years. The way the system operates is the same for all policy areas. But a lot depends on the people involved; there are a lot of interpersonal communication and networking that go on here. As you can see, you were
referred to my office by [another colleague]. If the personalities don’t match, things can get stuck and even abandoned. A lot of the influences happen due to personality agreements and networking. Even UNESCO that has all the technical knowledge, their agreements with Nigeria are not binding laws; they have no way of enforcing any consensus they reach with Nigeria. States or local governments are also the same, when they don’t like a policy they can refuse to implement. That’s why we try to bring everyone along throughout the formulation process because you can’t force them to implement what they don’t like. The ministry doesn’t even have enough resources for its basic needs let alone to send teams to schools and local governments to force them to implement. The closest we have come is with UBEC and SUBEBs because they have annual monitoring report and they send teams to survey conditions in schools.”

**Changes and Stability in ELP Outcomes**

Uroko agrees with most other participants that “the changes we have seen are in terms of revisions of the old policy. The general framework is still the same and Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba continue to be promoted especially in the respective regions more than the other languages. He insists: “when it comes to policy provisions, the government has done what it can do. The constitution allows all groups to use their languages. People say that the government doesn’t provide the same resources for their languages as they do to the major languages, but how do you think the government can do that when it has not solved its most basic problems. For instance, ASUU is on strike now and the
minister has been shuttling to Aso Rock [presidential villa] for meetings. Now everything is on hold here till the ASSU issue is resolved. Part of the problem is what I told you earlier about divisions among language groups themselves. Look at the northern region, everybody accepts Hausa as lingua franca even though they have hundreds of languages there. In most parts of the country, small pockets of languages keep forcing to promote their own language and thinks the regional language is dominating them. It is not domination; it is just that they have more speakers than the smaller languages. Now, when government sees this and how politically divisive and sensitive language can be, they try to stay away and say ‘let the sleeping dog lie’.”

“Agbaji”
(Scholar, independent activist and grassroots actor with ELP network experience)

If a policy for local development...[and] empowerment is not available in local languages, what are you developing?

What Constitutes Education Language Policymaking?

On Actors, Behavior, People, Conditions, Means and Effects: Agbaji echoes the conviction that government is a critical ELP stakeholder whose actions shape those of other players. However, he highlights an important perspective, one that places grassroots and academics’ role as contingent on those of the government. He admits that government, as a representative of the body politic, has sole responsibility of enacting and ensuring the implementation of policies (including on language). However, “the people have been waiting but the government hasn’t done anything [different]. So
the people now have to act; they have to take laws into their hands and when they start
developing their language and using it in all domains, the government will now want to
be part of it.” Indeed, Agbaji argues that at issue here is not simply formulating but also
implementing policy, two processes he argues are complementary and inseparable:
“Nigeria has had a provisional policy, the NPE, for a long time. But age long
policymaking, policy adjustment, policy revision, and so on, without having the will to
follow it up [through implementation] has led to a lot of discontent among the people.
In fact, our language policy has been adjusted several times, and even without
implementation you see it adjusted again. I was thinking you adjusted something after
you must have seen some failure. But the policies are never tested to see their
loopholes before another government comes in and starts ‘adjusting’ and ‘perfecting’.
So now the people are tired and discontent with this status quo of ‘running but no
movement’. ” Deploying the logic of elitism, Agbaji argues that elite-controlled
“government distances the populace from the governance process by the controlling
language of the tools for mass political participation: the Constitution and policy
documents such as the NPE, the Federal Road Safety Regulations, and so forth.” He is
concerned that the private sector and the Nigerian market has taken cue from the
government; nearly all locally and foreign manufactured products (including
medications) are packaged and marketed in foreign languages. Dissatisfied with this
condition, grassroots actors, Agbaji argues, are prepared to commit enormous individual and community resources to developing and using their languages.

**What are the Operational Dynamics of ELP Elements?**

Agbaji is aware of normative government policymaking procedures, especially regarding the formation of expert bodies. He however, focuses on the activities of local NGOs and individual language activists as reflective of a changing language policy and planning and ELP landscape. These activities come in three fundamental ways: providing technical services (especially in translation), government-targeted policy advocacy, and grassroots mobilization. Referring to an opportunity for translation services to the governments, Agbaji describes how his local NGO “bid for Federal Government project to translate the Public Procurement Act of Nigeria into Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba...advertised in a national newspaper [Tribune], and has been shortlisted for that project. In addition, just last week, we started working on the LEEDS document...the Local Economic Employment and Development Strategy of the Oyo State Government. If a policy for local development through empowerment is not available in local languages, what are you developing? They call it State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy, and it’s not in the people’s language, whom are you empowering? And this is at the local level. So we wrote the government of Oyo State requesting to translate the document into Yoruba; we said, ‘if it is truly meant for the grassroots, then it should not be in *oyimbo* [English].” Agbaji comments on the advocacy nature of these efforts: “We
are constantly working for using the native language for increased citizen participation in the development process, especially in translating all policy documents and the laws of the state into local languages...because it is criminal for you to convict someone by a law that is not even available in the local language since interpreters are not competent. Why not make the law available in the language so people can ask questions and so on. So we are actively advocating with the government to make sure that all state laws are translated. Not only that, we must make sure that all these multinationals making industrial products...even prescription drug...will make products available in local language, we’ll insist on making bylaws in the State. Since the House of Assembly has started using the local language now, it will not be difficult them to say: “Bournvita [a popular beverage made by Cadbury], must write instructions in Yoruba, the language of the people using the products’. So it’s a kind of language revolution. There must be language activists who will really tackle this matter frontally.” Agbaji talks extensively about efforts to sensitize traditional rulers, most of who have been drawn into the English-language demand, to seek language policies directed at local needs in local languages.

**Changes and Stability in ELP Outcomes**

Agbaji acknowledges that as a result of some of the efforts he (and his colleagues) are making and other grassroots activities, there have been some changes in the directions they envision. As he states, “things are changing bit by bit.” Part of this is
the recent decision of many state Houses of Assembly to use native languages in conducting the Houses’ businesses at least once a week. In addition, Agbaji acknowledges strong grassroots demand for English, a condition he believes is partially due to local academic linguists’ complicity in institutional support for English. Yet he sees some changes in grassroots orientation to the use of their languages as a result of some of these advocacy and mobilization activities. He argues: “Every discipline has two roles, both academic and social. Language as a discipline has an academic side, and we have given ample space to language in education at the universities. But it also has a location in the society; there is a social role for every discipline, which functions to galvanize some people into action. This is what produces results. The academic role often ends in conferences, but we must ask in practical terms now, ‘how does this benefit the masses?’ This is a complementary role. Overemphasis on the academic role has contributed to the decline of local languages…and that’s why everybody feels that speaking English is a fanciful thing; it is the “in-thing”. You know, the argument of the elites will always be that English is a window to the world. Well, nobody ever contended that. But you need window to our people first before you think of window to the world. But we know that government agents and the elites will always continue this way because they’re benefiting from alienating the people through language policies. The more they keep the people ignorant, the better for them; that is what justifies their legitimacy and puts money in their pockets…they’re able to do a lot because people are
unaware. They only get people involved when they need them. Once they use them for their selfish purpose, they shut them off. This is the essence of the issue. This is why the government is not doing anything about the role of language in educating the people...and in raising awareness. So, our first target is to try to change the mindset of our people because if you really want to make any inroad into social advancement through grassroots participation, you have to change mindsets. As a result, we now started organizing elaborate celebration of the [UNESCO] Mother Language Day since 2007. And this has been producing some effects in terms of people wanting to use their own language starting with kindergarten schools where English is normally used with no regard to its cognitive consequences. A lot of people are getting involved and we see some changes. But the government is still lagging behind; their policies are still the same.”

Emerging Issues from Vignettes of Results from Nigeria

The vignettes above encase a congeries of loaded themes the discussion (in the following chapter) of which requires some brief preliminary comments here. Earlier in this section, I highlighted some convergences in the findings between Nigeria and India: (a) government is a central but not exclusive ELP actor, (b) the relationship between government and non-government ELP actors cannot be explained from a purely Marxist standpoint since the distinction between elites and the populace is blurred by movements of various actors across institutional boundaries, (c) various ELP
stakeholders are hardly in concert about the meaning of language and/or education, the relative role of relevant actors, and their interests in the ELP process, (d) partly due to these lack of congruence and the contradictions characteristic of most ELP stakeholders’ activities, ELP processes are entangled in a host of complexities, dilemmas and paradoxes, (e) these lack of congruence and the complexities, dilemmas and paradoxes exist in spite of rich networks among ELP stakeholders, one that generates avenues for disjuncture, (f) in spite of the inadequacies of a purely conflict theory explanation, social inequalities tied to ELP processes are still pervasive. I also suggested ways in which Nigeria and India are different. A comparative discussion of these findings in both countries will be revisited in the following chapter.

Two additional emergent issues are worthy of note here. First, while some participants suggest that grassroots mobilization around the use of native languages results from their discontent with governments’ continued “marginalizational” or “alienating” ELP practices other participants believe that interests in indigenous languages have always been strong. This requires that we further explore in what ways such interests existed, persisted or were expressed even in latent forms. Moreover, we must examine how such expressions of interest and the rationale they embody stand against popular reasons offered for governments’ inability to engage in comprehensive ELP reform (such as exiguousness of resources, lack of centralized statutory control in a federal system, and so forth). Second, following the charge that academics are complicit
in the perpetuation of English language dominance, we must explore the ways academic scholarship intersect with political rationales in ELP processes, not only in government institutions but also the grassroots. Indeed, how are the knowledge (academic or otherwise) generated in academe mediated to other ELP spaces and what are their effects. These constitute parts of the discussions in Chapter Eight.
CHAPTER SEVEN
MULTILINGUALISM AND EDUCATION IN INDIA AND NIGERIA AND

THE ROLE OF UNESCO

It is axiomatic that the best medium for teaching a child is his mother tongue. Psychologically, it is the system of meaningful signs that in his mind works automatically for expression and understanding. Sociologically, it is a means of identification among the members of the community to which he belongs. Educationally, he learns more quickly through it than through an unfamiliar linguistic medium. But...it is not always possible to use the mother tongue in schools and, when possible, some factors may impede or condition its use.

UNESCO, The Use of Vernacular Languages

As an organization, UNESCO’s formal position on ELP is well established (UNESCO, 2007; 2003; 1953). However, as a large institution with various units and operational structures, UNESCO’s relationship with and role in ELP processes of Nigeria and India have not been uniform. Its various structures often adapt to local needs and conditions, which determine the ways the organization’s influences are mediated. That UNESCO’s success depends on its capacity to adapt its normative principles to local exigencies highlights the significance of historical forces in ELP processes, a main argument of the last two chapters. In this section, I examine how UNESCO’s role in ELP

72 UNESCO’s support for mother language education was well established early in its history, as this 1953 report indicates. This report issues from previous research and expert consultations on language issues. While mother-tongue education and multilingual education are now commonly acclaimed within and outside academe, they were very unpopular in the middle of the twentieth century. UNESCO’s position must be understood as radical at its time. For more details on UNESCO’s original position on mother language education, see UNESCO (1953), and for a more recent position, UNESCO (2007; 2003).
processes has evolved as an organization since its establishment in 1945, and in India and Nigeria (not simply as Member States but as highly populated complex multilingual societies with strikingly similar educational needs). In discussing the evolution of UNESCO’s role in ELP processes I rely heavily on archival materials from UNESCO’s Archives in the Paris Secretariat. Next, I use the same analytic tool of vignette (as in preceding two chapters) to present findings from my interviews and observations at UNESCO headquarters, and to show that UNESCO, as Nigeria and India, is entangled in similar political, epistemological and cultural complexities that define ELP processes. I also discuss a few comparative inferences possible from the historical portraits of India and Nigeria in the previous chapters briefly as well as ways in which UNESCO’s role maps onto the ELP processes of India and Nigeria. These discussions serve as a prelude to the discussions in Chapter Eight.

**UNESCO and Multilingual Education Policies in Multilingual Societies**

UNESCO and indeed other international organizations like the United Nations (its parent organization), the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) were established in mid twentieth century on account of several factors the foremost of which are post WWII reconstruction needs and exigencies of nation-building in Europe and North America, as well as numerous emerging ex-colonies. They were intended as “global” institutional responses to an “era of imperialism, economic fluctuations and collapse, and massive violence” that beleaguered the first half of the twentieth century
Earlier attempts to institutionalize international allegiance in the immediate aftermath of the First World War had failed, and anxiety over a possible third war was high (Mason & Asher, 1973).

Europe’s capacity to hold complete political and military control over its cross-continental empires was significantly undermined first by anti-colonial insurrections and second, the impact of WWII. However, what most defined the motives and justified the activities of UNESCO was the emergence of an international moral obligation to underprivileged populations (Jones & Coleman, 2005). Even when domestic economic and political interests were paramount, international ethical responsibility appeared as a collective rationale for instituting supranational agencies whose legitimacy transcended, yet depended on powerful nation-states. My narrative of UNESCO’s interest in multilingualism focuses on her commitment to nation-building in emerging ex-colonies whose checkered histories entangled the international communities in a complex web of moral bond. Nearly all ex-colonial state was multiethnic. As such, harnessing multiple languages in unstable polities seeking unified identity was a strategic imperative and moral responsibility of the era.

As noted in Chapter One, language appeared as a top priority of UNESCO from the cradle. The Constitution that instituted UNESCO, which was signed on November 16, 1945 and ratified in November 4, 1946, includes language as one of the categories of distinction against which human rights will be protected, the rest being race, sex and
religion (UNESCO, 2004). UNESCO’s commitment to language (and specifically minority indigenous languages) in the first period of its existence culminated in an interim report on the use of vernacular languages in education submitted to the United Nations Special Committee on Information meeting in Geneva in October 1951 (UNESCO, 1982). UNESCO’s activities consisted of organizing conferences, meetings and seminars and commissioning research projects. This interim report contains results from the implementation of resolution 9.311 of 1950, which in turn was consistent with resolution 329(10) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly during its fourth session in December 1949 regarding the use of vernacular languages in education (United Nations, 1949; UNESCO, 1950, 1982). These resolutions addressed specifically the conditions of then non-self-governing territories; it would soon apply to the promotion of “mother tongue” in newly independent nations and extend to issues of free access to education and participation in national development.

Virtually all sessions of the UNESCO General Assembly dealt with language issues, as documented by the report of the Special Committee on *Unesco’s Contribution to the Promotion of Mother Tongue as an Instrument of Education and Culture*. At the climax of colonial independence in the 1960, UNESCO organized series of conferences

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73 In resolution 329(10), the UN General Assembly recommends the promotion and use of indigenous language in education within non-governing territories, and further invites UNESCO to undertake a study of possible measures for speedy mother language education (United Nations, 1949, p. 41). As a reaction, in resolutions 9.311 reached in 1950 in Florence, the UNESCO General Assembly instructed “the Director-General to undertake an overall study of the question of indigenous or national languages of native populations as vehicles of instruction in schools” (UNESCO, 1950, p. 63).
such as the 1961 Conference of African States on the Development of Education in Africa held in Addis Ababa; the 1964 Conference of African Ministers of Education in Abidjan; the 1964 Regional Conference on the Planning and Organization of Literacy Programs in Africa also in Abidjan; and the 1965 Conference of World Ministers of Education on the Eradication of Illiteracy held in Tehran. UNESCO’s activities have increased ever since and target specifically issues associated with the use of mother language in education, such as transcription of oral traditions, preparation and production of educational materials, teacher preparation and government policies.

Starting from the 1970s, UNESCO organized regional intergovernmental conferences (in Africa: Accra, 1975; Lagos, 1976, and later in Latin America: Bogotá and Colombo, 1978; Mexico, 1979 and Harare, 1982) that were strategically poised to move mother tongue promotion beyond mere policy statement to public action and educational practice (UNESCO, 1982). Guided by modernization epistemologies UNESCO’s language advocacy was linked to the role of the social sciences in national development as exemplified by the 1974 symposium in Nairobi (Mbiti P. M., 1974). These efforts led to the publication and circulation of important documents like *Anthropology and Language Science in Educational Development* whose purpose was to promote interdisciplinarity in mother language-based education advocacy. Additionally

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74 For details on this symposium on “Integrated Social Science Approach to Development Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa” organized by UNESCO in Nairobi, Kenya on December 2 – 6 1974, see Mbiti (Mbiti P. M., 1974).
UNESCO dispatched experts as consultants to aid countries in developing language policies and executing operational projects that enhance mother tongue education (UNESCO, 1982). These activities expands further with recent enactments of international educational visions, particularly EFA and MDGs. Due to several reasons, these efforts have hardly produced expected outcomes especially in richly multilingual countries like Nigeria and India where despite the presence of some dominant indigenous languages, the population of minority indigenous languages are substantial and therefore non-negligible in educational planning.

For one, language often has different connotations for UNESCO, her consultants and national policymakers on the one hand, and for ordinary citizens on the other. To linguists whose expertise are enlisted by UNESCO and national governments as policy consultants, the formal characteristics of language have a priority in determining how it is categorized; but to the ordinary speaker, language carries a more symbolic signification through which the self is identified within complex social and political relationships (Khubchandani L. M., 2001). Acknowledging this difference, an Advisory Group of Consultants convened at the UNESCO House in Paris between July 19 and 23, 1971 admits that “language can be many things at the same time: a person’s basic means of communication, his mark of cultural identity and an instrument for ordering and interpreting the world around him” (UNESCO, 1972, p. 3). The final document of this meeting, which covered UNESCO’s view on the role of linguistics and sociolinguistics
in language education and policy does not state how this variation can be managed in actual policy processes. Rather, it suggests that national education language planning, especially when it co-opts the services of international specialists, should bring such specialists to work in collaboration with national expert linguists and sociolinguists whose knowledge of and familiarity with the cultures are intimate. But as Khubchandani (2001) suggests, such national expert linguists perceive language differently from ordinary language users, a variation that distorts responses to language surveys provided through census data upon which education language policymakers work.

The ways in which their roles in the political economics of academic freedom as well as their ties to specific ethno-linguistic groups potentially (or actually) constrain these expert consultants, most of whom are from or have professional ties in the respective countries they work, requires rigorous interrogation. Suffice it to note that UNESCO, through representational networks of national plenipotentiaries, consultants and researchers, who serve as filters of policy impulses, has direct though not necessarily formal impact on national education language policies explicable in diplomatic and symbolic terms. As plenipotentiaries, national ambassadors to UNESCO engage in official binding transactions. Diplomatically, national delegations to UNESCO may represent either or both national and international interests in the policy process. Thus, depending on the context, the plenipotentiary can represent national voices in international forums and/or serve to sell UNESCO’s ideas and goals to national
governments – assuming that both are different. The roles of consultants and UNESCO commissioned researchers are even more complicated. As “external insiders”, they represent their own professional expertise but within loosely scripted set of norms. Overall, what factors determine the nature and direction of influences on ELPs of multilingual societies is likely context-dependent and yields to deeper analysis.

Symbolically, UNESCO represents an international force of global reckoning; and alliance with the organization is considered a positive mark of integration and recognition within the world community. In this symbolic sense, adherence to UNESCO’s policy recommendations is considered (mostly by nation-states) a desirable signifier of international alignment, an argument foisted in support of and against institutional isomorphism (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997). The use of networks of expert linguists with strong regional or national research portfolios (such as C. J. Daswani, Ayo Bamgbose, and Niyi Akinnaso) and national plenipotentiaries demands closer study as a window into the actual flow of ideas and forces across national and international borders.

Theoretically one can distinguish the commitment to mother-language education from that of multilingualism. In multilingual societies, promoting education-language

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75 James A. Banks (1998) uses “external-insider” to characterize foreign researchers who have adopted the perspective of the studied indigenous context and are perceived by indigenes as an “insider”. My use of “external insider does not include this adoption of indigenous perspective and/or by indigenes. Rather it reflects the shifting positions of indigenous or foreign researchers and policy consultants whose perspectives may or may not vary from those of the indigenes as a result of their affiliation or familiarity with an “external” world.
policy implies *ipso facto* support for multilingualism. Researchers and professional linguists including psycholinguistic suggest that both multilingualism and early mother-language education are cumulatively and simultaneously facilitative of cognitive and psychosocial development. That India and Nigeria are yet to engage in a comprehensive ELP reform in spite of demands from the citizens, academics and international agencies is indicative of the complications of multilingualism in education on the one hand, and the political and economic exigencies of education policymaking in multilingual societies on the other. Understanding the breadth of social forces that impinge on language decisions helps explicate ELP processes, not only in Nigeria and India but also at UNESCO, since the organization continues to play an active role in the ELP processes of both countries. In what follows, I use vignettes to report my findings from UNESCO headquarters, and to show the political, epistemological and cultural complexities surrounding the organization’s role in ELP processes.

**Vignettes of Education Language Policy Process at UNESCO**

Although UNESCO does not share equal status with India and Nigeria as comparative cases in this study, the organization’s role in ELP processes can be examined using the same set of questions around which previous vignettes were framed. Articulating the research issues into three summative questions: (a) what constitutes education language policymaking as a process? (RQ1); (b) what are the operational dynamics of ELP elements? (RQ2); and (c) change and stability in ELP
outcomes (RQ3), helps sustain my focus on the broader issues of this study while adapting data collection to specific contexts. Although the two vignettes below feature participants working in different sectors of the organization, their academic and professional background are similar and highly relevant to ELP issues. Both participants have graduate-level education and experience on the national level as UNESCO technical staff on aspects of ELP processes both in Africa and Southeast Asia. At the headquarters, they are part of the core frontline staff responsible for coordinating sector-level programming at UNESCO. As such, they occupy a vantage position for articulating structural linkages between UNESCO and countries like Nigeria and India.

“Ruby”
(Academic expert and international ELP consultant)

As an organization comprised of political entities, UNESCO has gradually departed from its intellectual mandate and have become highly political.

What Constitutes Education Language Policymaking?

On Actors, Behaviors, People, and Conditions: Ruby points out that “UNESCO is nothing but the aggregation of representatives from its member states supported by a handful of staff at the secretariat. So the decisions reached by the organization must be seen as a political act of the member states. Granted, UNESCO tries to bring together academic experts from different regions and bridge the gap between researchers, policymakers and practitioners. However, when it comes to policy it is the member
states through their representatives that count.” She continues: “each country is different and their representatives will inform you better about language conditions in their countries. What you have to keep in mind is that all governments are not equally committed to their peoples’ welfare. To get an insight into the actual language conditions, you have to look deeper at those directly or indirectly affected by the language policies, that’s the people themselves.”

**On Means, Decision-Making Process, Ends and Effects:** “UNESCO draws most of its credibility from the UN and the member states. On an intellectual platform, it gets a lot of clout by creating dynamic networks of academic experts who contribute the core of what makes up UNESCO’s normative standards. Unfortunately, these academic experts are part of the political network and also part of UNESCO as a political entity. All activities here [at UNESCO] are highly politicized because the people involved represent political establishments. As an organization, UNESCO has changed over time and progressively departed from its intellectual cooperation mandate...everything more or less is political, even these consensus decisions. UNESCO originally saw itself both as a standard setter and a knowledge broker...and also tried to be an operational program developer, taking actions in countries, which is too contradictory a position: a small organization like UNESCO cannot carry out field work in countries and operate programs; it doesn’t have the technical capacity or the staffing and the resources to do that...so it wavers back and forth. I’m not sure if it was ever purely one thing or another.
But the notion of having a place to come together and build the defenses of peace in the minds of men, as the constitution says, through better understanding. That’s why one works in education, science and culture: to build international understanding and peace in the minds of men, not because intrinsically education is a good thing but for the purpose of understanding based on dialogue. That was the original idea, but it has shifted from that intellectual mandate and become a highly politicized arena.”

**What are the Operational Dynamics of ELP Elements?**

“Apart from the official procedures of formulating consensuses, there is a lot of internal negotiations and lobbying going on between representatives of countries. So, to understand how things operate at UNESCO, you have to look at those behind-the-doors negotiations because those are what shapes whatever academic experts bring to the table. The organization itself does not have the capacity or mechanisms to enforce compliance to normative consensuses; their influence is only moral and intellectual.”

When a government is driven by ideological and economic interests, Ruby argues, “it is hard to mount sufficient moral pressure on its policy processes, especially when you are equally politically-driven. That is why you see a lot of talk around here and nearly no action on the country level. I challenge you to produce any substantive evidence of a major development in the language of education that was informed by UNESCO’s influence alone especially in the last few decades. If UNESCO has to fulfill its original
intellectual mandate, it must rethink its position; and it doesn’t seem to me that anyone is thinking in that direction yet.”

**Changes and Stability in ELP Outcomes**

Ruby argues that in addition to its internal organizational issue, UNESCO’s capacity to act on its positions on language is limited by the fact that language issues are highly explosive politically. “Taking normative position on language unleashes a pack of problems because the member states that will enter these consensuses know they are either incapable or unwilling to keep them. That is why I think that taking a normative position on language rights in education will never happen at UNESCO; if it does, member states will most likely neglect them and continue their current policy practices.

If there have been any changes in the organization since its inception, it has been in the departure from its original intellectual mandate. And so long as UNESCO remains this politicized, its capacity to have any real impact on policy or practice, not only in education but all its sectors, will be very minimal and circumstantial. For now, it continues to rely on the capacities of its field offices staff to work out ways of influencing things on the national level. That too, depends largely on who is in the field office and how they navigate the country’s political culture. As an organization, there is no systematized way to ensure that its consensuses produce desired outcomes.”
“Sanders”

(Academic expert and UNESCO consultant with national-level ELP experience in Africa)

What Constitutes Education Language Policymaking?

On Actors, Behaviors, People, and Conditions, Decision-Making Process, Ends

and Effects: Like other UNESCO participants, Sanders concedes that education language policymaking comprises a host of international, national and grassroots actors who typically do not speak to each other. He argues: “the point is that we know who the actors are within governments, international organizations and so on…but that doesn’t tell us everything about the policymaking process. We need to be a bit clear on that, and this is something UNESCO is thinking about right now: you often get language policies made for education based on broader policy [or constitutional provisions] on languages in the country. So the education sector gets so far with their policies as are possible within this larger framework…and often legislations come up against policies in other ministries and or with change in political leadership. Ultimately, this often creates barriers between entities that should be working together otherwise. So, there are pockets of decisions in separate and disjointed sections, and people then say, ‘on what basis would I be involved’ [in a larger ELP process], so there is no wider framework. This happens on the subnational level, within governments, and internationally. There is a few now in Africa who make reference only to their own…although sometimes, these are not really policy but simply a statement. So I think there is a need to work on
bringing all these people together to talk to each other especially if you’re looking at language in education...there is a need to work with different kinds of policymakers. Who they are depends on the context, but you certainly need to have all the departments in development involved, including the civil society, different sectors of government, state agencies, NGOs, international actors, and so forth. Of course in large federal countries like India and Nigeria, you need a lot more participation from local, state and federal levels. In India of course, there is more or less languages per state than Nigeria and then you’ve got minority languages and tribal languages in India too. So I think communities must be involved in processes of policymaking although how and what role they play is a different and more interesting issue. Ultimately, they rely on government to create space for some kind of policy dialogue...Papua New Guinea is a striking case where communities are given the bases on which to get involved. Of course, this reveals the boundary between policy and implementation as a little bit fluid because it is on the community level that actions are taken. UNESCO’s role has been to bring these different people together to dialogue on common interests about which opinions and levels of awareness differ enormously.”

**What are the Operational Dynamics of ELP Elements?**

Sanders argues that operationally, UNESCO’s impact on national-level ELP processes occur along two interrelated channels that rely heavily on academics who provide evidence-based research for policymaking; one is very formal, the other
informal. “The first happens when member states adopt a convention – that happened recently in the Culture Sector with the ‘Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions’ (2005) and ‘Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage’ (2003). Those are then put out to member states for ratification; and by ratifying it they are not only agreeing to it but accepting to implement the convention. If they fail to, then UNESCO, through its monitoring mechanisms, tries to intervene where necessary. But the binding force of the convention that compels implementation comes from the fact that at least up to thirty member states have ratified it. So that shows you that such conventions stand on the basis of national ownership not just on international dicta – that doesn’t work, never has, never will. The second channel is a less formal process in that they do not lead to conventions or signed declarations but consensuses on a framework of action like the Dakar framework [for action on EFA]. In this case, governments sign up to it morally, not officially or legally. On the one hand, UNESCO administers conventions with all the mechanisms available through meetings and ratification processes, which are very formal processes. On the other hand, UNESCO coordinates and brings people together, keeps the momentum going, and tries to persuade, and tries to address the balance when people forgets, when the issue is a consensus. So, this is a more moral and intellectual persuasive role. Indeed, in education, I don’t think there are any conventions yet; only consensuses. Academics play important role in both, since they
help formulate the terms of both conventions and consensuses. Often, it’s a process of negotiating a text...countries know that it’s a binding text and they would be asked to ratify it if it is a convention. So, they invest a lot of political and other resources to adapt it to their needs to avoid becoming the sore thumb in the monitoring process.”

Changes and Stability in ELP Outcomes

Sanders notes that although there have been major changes in the academic world since its establishment, UNESCO’s overall framework on ELPs have remained the same. “Although it’s not the latest, there is a good continuity between UNESCO’s earlier positions and its current frameworks. It is really amazing that in 1953, when a lot of scholars had a completely different view of multilingualism and we were deeply in the colonial period of most African peoples, UNESCO took a very different approach that has remained the same till today. It was a very unconventional position at the time. So, in that sense there is a lot of stability and continuity with UNESCO’s [ELP] role. But on the national levels, a lot has changed depending on the specific context. Here, I think there has been more of a regional impact than international. UNESCO Bangkok for instance has done a lot of work and has materials on multilingual education with a whole series or advocacies kits and case studies of best practices and guidelines on language in education even at the universities. Changes in the ways UNESCO has impacted national ELP processes occur more through the important contribution of such regional activities. Of course, it is a different question trying to assess how that has impacted India or
whether there has been any seepage from Asia to Africa. UNESCO’s influence usually works through regional levels simply because one of UNESCO’s policies is simply to bring people together, including other international agencies.” It is not very clear whether regional influence is an organizational strategy adopted by UNESCO as a whole. What is more important is that UNESCO’s interests in national ELPs goes beyond mere policy formulation. As Sanders put it, “a key concern of UNESCO [is] that national policies are not always implemented. That’s an absolute key concern. May African countries have policies but there is only partial implementation. In some countries there is hardly any implementation. Mali is trying, Senegal is trying, Burkina Faso is trying... but overall, this is an issue. When you get down to the local level where the schools are located, you encounter a whole new set of issues. Some schools may offer [the official language policy], others may not. There are also a lot of non-formal agencies and programs, which may or may not offer it. So here we see a new set of dynamics because sometimes people on the local level may actually be more positive in supporting and implementing multilingual policies in education without any reference to any government intervention. In a sense, they’re not doing it because the government mandates it but just that government’s policy happens to coincide with their own policy, which are shaped by their real experiences and needs. In most parts of the world, students are required to learn at least three languages. I know this is the case at least in India and Nigeria. You go to the eastern part of Nigeria and some Igbo communities may see the
need to use more than three without any reference to or even knowledge about the government’s policy. The point is ELPs can be implemented on the grassroots level almost without reference to the national level, let alone international level. This is why I think civil society is a crucial element to policymaking, and UNESCO sees that. And because you have other channels through which the civil society can access ideas and resources without recourse to the national government, it becomes complicates. For instance international agencies like Save the Children and SIL International are very active in Africa and India and have shown that things can be done at the local level, that is, influencing policy from the bottom. But I have to agree that these other international agencies, such as SIL are less active in a country like Nigeria, but where they work, they do enable people to see possibilities and leverage that experience into not just policymaking but policy implementation. What we are talking about here is not making policies because an international agency says they should be made. UNESCO is very sensitive about that and tries to bring everyone to the table, including local communities because no implementation is feasible without their cooperation especially in highly multilingual countries, such as India, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Bangladesh, and so forth. The positive changes we have seen with regard to implementation grew from strong partnership between government and local people not only because of resources – in terms of teacher training, curricula development, educational materials and so forth that determine how students learn – but because
content must come from those who know and can systematize local knowledge. And those people are in the communities, not always in government offices.”

Issues from Vignettes of Interviews at UNESCO

As an organization, UNESCO is fundamentally distinct, structurally speaking, from nation-states. With regard to ELP processes however, UNESCO appears to share common features with multilingual societies, which renders its role in national policymaking paradoxical. First, UNESCO’s organizational structure (as an entity comprised of distinct political units with self interests) mirrors sectional (i.e., ethnic, linguistic, cultural and political) divides that make up India and Nigeria as multilingual nations. As such, both the “national” and the “international” are characterized by overlapping political pluralities. To understand ELP processes, we must therefore interrogate how factional (ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural) politics on the national level play into political fabrications of normative standards at UNESCO that are ultimately redirected to the national and local spaces as international benchmarks for education language policymaking.

A second and corollary issue has to do with the absence of enforcement mechanisms in organizations whose main commitment is the formation of consensuses through networks. Is the absence of such mechanisms a requisite for the formation of international networks – since nation-states are arguably unlikely to enter into networks with statutory capacity to undermine its autonomy as an independent political entity –
or is it a strategic avenue for decoupling? Or both? These issues are crucial to understanding not only UNESCO’s actual role in national ELP processes but more importantly, the organization’s overall legitimacy as an intellectual beacon whose original mandate revolves around knowledge brokerage and norm setting. The role of academic expertise is worth serious consideration here since it is paradoxically positioned as both necessary and ancillary (even secondary) to political leadership.

Comparatively, UNESCO’s overall support for multilingualism in national ELP remains strong and stable since the mid-twentieth century. While “stability” and “continuity” characterize ELPs in both UNESCO and in Nigeria and India, the organization’s support for multilingualism in education stands sharply at odds with both countries’ continued adherence to ELPs that promote only a few languages. Because their overall ELP frameworks remain largely unchanged, UNESCO and both countries manage to simultaneously share the character of stability while differing in the actual ELPs they respectively adhere to. Indeed, this tension establishes its own stability where Nigeria and India continue to be active players at UNESCO but reluctant to adhere to norms established under the organization. The stability of this disjuncture invites closer analysis. As the next section suggests, these issues shape the ways UNESCO’s central position on multilingualism in education is mediated to national policymaking and implementation arenas.
Multilingualism and Education in India and Nigeria: A Comparative Overview

The narratives of the origins of language diversity and current ELPs in India and Nigeria are hardly comprehensive or exhaustive. However, they permit two very important conclusions. First, the internal mobility of India’s population has produced an inherently multilingual polity whose students are typically proficient in multiple indigenous languages. Indian societies down to the blocks and districts are functionally multilingual in indigenous languages with uneven standing (Mohanty A. K., 2006). In Nigeria, multilingualism in indigenous languages is more common in densely populated and constantly growing urban areas and around language borders. Most Nigerians are trilingual, typically in English, an indigenous language and Pidgin English. Others are proficient in additional Nigerian language(s). Thus, while one may find an unbroken chain of functional multilingualism from one Indian community to another, throughout the country, (Pattanayak, 1990, 1984; Mohanty, 2006), most rural communities in Nigeria remain functionally monolingual (and often mono-dialectical), even if with significant population proficient in English and local language. Put simply, the linguistic fabric of Indian societies is more multilingual than Nigeria’s although Nigeria has comparatively more languages and less population size. This multilingualism dynamics is reflected in the respective country’s ELPs.

76 As noted in the previous chapter, Pidgin English is not recognized on any official level in Nigeria although it is spoken by nearly half of Nigeria’s 140 million people. Indeed, not until recently did Pidgin English start receiving scholarly attention as a separate language from English and indigenous languages (Elugbe, 2004; Faracals, 1996)
Second, governments’ ambivalence to a comprehensive language planning, unwillingness to challenge the dominance of English, and promotion of language policies and linguistic practices that marginalize most native languages, plays into citizens’ popular demand for foreign languages, especially English. Democratic demand for increased mass political participation paradoxically provides individual and grassroots actors the auspicious social conditions that drive English-only education and bolsters ELP stakeholders’ reticence to language reform. Yet, popular demand for English occurs simultaneously with grassroots mobilization around indigenous language rights and recognition. The possibility of each translating into effective political action depends largely on mass perception of foreign and indigenous languages as beneficial or conflictual to individual and group interests on the one hand, and citizens’ capacity to create political movements through annexations of disparate language mobilization efforts on the other. The number of citizens aware of the implications of and committed to multilingualism in education is critical to possibilities of change.

Although Nigeria is only about 12% of India’s population, it has about 75 more languages than India. Hypothetically therefore, Nigeria has much higher multi-linguistic population density (MPD), with an average of about 2,500,000 users per language in

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I coin the concept of Multilingual Population Density (MPD) here as a numeric function of the number of people per unit of multilingualism, that is, the relative number of people speaking a set of languages. Unlike unit geographic areas used for human population density measurements, languages are not exhaustible and cannot lead to some form of linguistic “overcrowding”. However, it is likely that the number of people (and communities) sharing a particular set of languages can potentially shape outcomes.
India compared to 260,000 users per language in Nigeria. Since the languages are not equally distributed among the population, rigorous empirical studies are required to test the effect (if any) of differential in MPD on awareness of and action on language policies and linguistic practices. What is clear however is that the sheer larger population of multilinguals in India is likely generates mass political awareness and actions capable of engendering language policy and ELP reform. On the contrary, that more Indians have multiple native languages as first languages increases the likelihood of mother-language education in India than Nigeria. Whatever the relative impact of levels of awareness about the cogency of multilingualism to education on actual ELP processes, official state policies have left much unresolved and have sometimes complicated the issues they were set to address.

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries’ inter–ethnic and class encounters in India and Nigeria under similar European influences cumulatively precipitated paradoxical effects. First, redrawing political boundaries to create new amalgam nations worked to erase or at least restructure the cultural, economic, political and linguistic configurations of earlier societies. Yet, the politics of the new amalgam nations have also worked to reemphasize the same ethnic and class identities it was intended to erode, leaving intact a strong attachment to the cohesiveness of old states. The logic of ethnic affiliation and interethnic alliances still define national and regional politics in public policy and linguistic practices. The idea of MPD therefore deserves serious academic consideration.
India and Nigeria (Barrington, Bosia, Bruhn, Giaimo, & McHenry Jr., 2010; Kalu, 2008; Wilkinson, 2006; Rudolph, 2006). However, ethnicity in India and Nigeria is fluid and problematic since it often overlaps with unstable categories, such as religion, social class, political ideology and territory.

The intersection of cultural and linguistic differences with class distinctions further complicates the fluidity of ethnicity and caste especially in India. Like India, Nigeria contains strong religious, territorial and ideological identity differences that constitute platforms for political alliances. As the unique features of group identity (such as culture, political and economic institutions) gave way to European models, language became the most visible marker of social (ethnic, religious or class) identities in the new nations. Its political cogency is played out in public institutions like education. Redrawing ethnic boundaries to create new nation-states often required not only merging but also breaking up social (ethnic, religious and linguistic) groups. Any geo-ethnic mapping of West Africa and India will reveal that the Hausas make up part of the Republic of Niger to the north of Nigeria and as far as Ghana to the west; Yorubas live in the Republic of Benin; and Urdu Muslims remain completely deterritorialized in India after the Pakistan cessation. Such cross-border ethnic and class affiliations become visible and surge mostly during political, religious and economic conflicts that broil across specific national borders. Overall, the creation of amalgamated nation-states has disrupted official configurations of earlier societies but continues to promote
attachment to them. These detachment-reattachment dynamic shapes ELP policy processes.

A second corollary effect is that new nations required a new and previously nonexistent collective national identity that essentially supplants “old” ethnic ones, but the logic of national unity offers strong rationale against which advocates of ethnic purity strove. Socio-psychological attachment to old ethnolinguistic cleavages is therefore reinforced by and thrives on pushes for national unity. Indeed, ethnic groups often support campaigns for national identity and political cohesion to the extent such campaigns (and the corresponding proximity to central political control) are exploitable for ethnic or other sectionalist interests.

Third, contacts with the Muslim world and Europe has worked to destabilize and reinvigorate ethnic units by introducing a religious trichotomy of Christianity and Islam to indigenous religions in ways that distorts and retools political, economic and cultural developments. Religion complicates ethnic unity and conflicts in many ways. For one, adherents of one faith trespass on ethnic and social class lines to protect religious identities. In Nigeria, the Yorubas are more or less equally divided between Christianity and Islam. Yet, while Yoruba Muslims are arguably more likely to associate more Northern Muslims as their Christians do with the Igbo Christians in the East, ethnic ties weakens but does not supplant the potentials for such religious reconfiguration of political affinities. With greater educational and economic advancement in the
Southeast and Southwest and political control in the North, ethnicity and religion turned into unstable categories deployed in service of shifting individual and collective interests. Participants in this study argue that religion (and specifically Islam and Christianity) is not nearly a major determining variable as ethnicity. For instance, a shared Islamic religious heritage (between the North and the West) was not strong enough to stop the highly controversial annulment of June 12 1993 election that has installed a major ethnic antagonism between Yorubas and Hausas. With caste as an additional issue peculiar to India, the fleeting triumvirate of religion, ethnicity and political economics in both countries complicates language policies and practices in education and muddles the neat demarcations researchers and professionals employ in addressing linguistic issues (Manor, 1996).

Arguably, the most paradoxical of all conditions precipitated by India’s and Nigeria’s history of linguistic diversity is that while ELP stakeholders are acutely aware of the complications and educational demands of multilingualism there continues to be a deep ambivalence about and sometimes vehement resistance against comprehensive language policies. Like the metaphorical “elephant in the room”, multilingualism defines every aspect of social life but is carefully avoided as a major public policy issue on the centralized levels.\(^{78}\) Agitations by activists and academics are treated as normal dissensions of stable democratic polities requiring no major political response. The

\(^{78}\) I return to this issue of ambivalence or resistance towards centralized ELP reform in Chapters Eight.
status of English language further mitigates communicational and functional conflicts among indigenous languages capable of rousing comprehensive language policy reform. An internally motivated political action on language in education is therefore unlikely in India and Nigeria. External motivations have grown with international educational visions like the EFA and MDGs. As the history of UNESCO’s advocacy for multilingualism shows, global development initiatives build largely on the new international ethical regime that emerged in the twentieth century. International actors are however limited by domestic conditions in their capacity as influential ELP agents. Advancing international educational normative consensuses within constraining local conditions largely characterizes much of UNESCO’s activities in India and Nigeria. As part of a larger global multilingual landscape Nigeria and India fall sharply under the prism of international language policy advocacy that targets the development of all languages through institutionalized public policy initiatives. As I have shown, UNESCO remains a prominent player in international efforts to sensitize national actors to an integrative ELP process in which each language is developed and protected both as an end in itself and as a tool for facilitating individual cognitive and linguistic benefits of schooling, social and political stability, national economic advancement and cultural pride. Consistent with the arguments of the previous two chapters (on India and Nigeria), these various goals of education language policymaking issue from concerns about the potentials of language for social mobilization and its ideological implications
for hegemonic relations (the logic of linguistic imperialism), and the ecological concerns of linguistic diversity, which deploys the logic of biodiversity to protecting languages from extinction. UNESCO and other associate agencies continue to serve as channels through which these frameworks filter from academic circles to arenas of policy and practice. Yet, the organization mirrors similar paradoxical and political issues that define ELP processes in Nigeria and India. In the next chapter, I rely on additional evidences from this study to interrogate the numerous conceptual and practical issues arising from the findings in this and last two chapters.
CHAPTER EIGHT

STYMIED POLICIES AND DYNAMIC PROCESSES: DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

ON EDUCATION LANGUAGE POLICY

Multilingualism is more than the presence of many languages in a person, a community or a country. It is the functional relation between the many languages in each of these spheres that defines multilingualism and its nature and differentiates one multilingualism from another

E. Annamalai, Managing Multilingualism in India

...on the issue of education language policy, we are stuck...

Indian scholar (personal interview)

As a preliminary analytic recast of ELP as a process, following the findings reported in preceding chapters, I propose a recalibration of normative tools and units of analysis for ELP research in a way that first, slightly “decenters” images of policymaking as exclusive government exercise, and second, repositions it to accommodate a broader range of social realities inextricably entangled in language decision making of multilingual societies at large. Such a conceptual expansion allows us to better situate often neglected historical variables as significant contemporary determinants of ELP processes. Historical forces in ELP processes are not often bygone realities but persist in various forms that may (or may not) differ from previous events. Further, expanding the tools and scope of language policy research enables us to explicate ELP processes as
simultaneously stymied and dynamic. Within this wider conceptual space that centralizes language policy decisions beyond state institutions, we can fit the various changes and stabilities (or pressures for and resistance against change) in the larger ELP framework. Before engaging in some concluding remarks about conceptual (and policy) reconsiderations and future directions in ELP research, I preface this section with caveats to aid attempts to understand the arguments I propose.

**Key Considerations for Understanding Research Findings**

Education language policymaking in India and Nigeria is fundamentally enigmatic in aims, operations, and outcomes because it is characterized on all fronts by contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas. As such, ELP processes resist singularity of explanation; no single set of variables can generate an analytic framework comprehensive enough to account for all phenomena that shape language decision making in multilingual societies with significant consistency unless its remains purely descriptive. In a sense, one consistent character of the analyses in this chapter is that they are revelatory of the inherent inconsistencies of ELP processes. One must therefore seek analytic robustness in multiple explanations in which series of variables are assembled and constantly reorganized along different logical strands. Obviously, an assemblage of all such possible explanation may not yield a cohesive analytic structure (the same way several functional units can be assembled into a system). Collectively they elucidate various interrelated dimensions and forms assumed by the ELP process.
The impossibility of arriving at a singular explanation of ELP processes, arguably, issues from the ambiguities and complexities surrounding linguistic and social realities in multilingual societies. Being multicultural and diverse, Nigeria and India contain linguistic social conditions that often appear mutually incompatible; nearly any characterization of all linguistic phenomena encounters non-negligible outliers that force one to seek new or additional explanations since linguistic phenomena both define and are embedded in larger social realities with strong historical origins.

Yet, that ELP processes of multilingual societies defy unitary analysis does not imply that the explanations I offer here are only tentative, requiring further exploration of and protracted interface with data to construct more authoritative dicta. Indeed, my contention is that contradictions and complexities are fundamental characters of all levels of language decision making in multilingual societies and that scholarly inquiries will benefit more by seeking these multiple and often conflicting explanations. This is not a particularly novel argument (Sonntag, 2002), yet knowledge of ELP processes appears to be stunted partly due to increasing awareness of these inconsistencies of linguistic phenomena and the analytic frameworks scholars bring (Ricento, 2006). While some experts like critical sociolinguists find twentieth-century functionalist framework of modernization conceptually inadequate and ideologically imperialist, alternative hegemony explanations of linguistic imperialism have failed to adequately grasp the incompatibility of language decisions within larger social landscapes (Ricento, 2006;
2000a). The field of language policy research thus, needs to explore multidimensionality and diversity as essential elements of their explanations. To contribute to this exploration of new paradigms, I outline two senses of ELP process that emerge from this study. I also reestablish the historical origins to/and contemporary issues of language policymaking within this redefined ELP spaces. I do not attempt to document all ELP activities and conditions, but to outline and illustrate major themes with specific examples when useful to establish the different dimensions and forms ELP processes take.

Redefining the Conceptual Map of Education Language Policy

One intriguing and frequently recurrent remark by the Indian and Nigerian participants, especially academic experts and bureaucrats, is that their respective countries have no national language policy. Although accurate, such remarks reveal a pervasive misconception of policy as exclusively formal, explicit, and statist (i.e., enacted by a central government authority). Revealingly, these same participants often engage in thoroughgoing discussion of language decisions ensconced in the respective country’s constitution and NPE documents. What is at issue here therefore is not their lack of awareness of language decisions but a more fundamental question of what qualifies as policy.

I already noted academic experts’ tendentious treatment of language policy as appropriately the intervention of an official authority on language practices. In the post-
independent era of nationism, the State, represented by central, state and local governments and their associate agencies appear as the most authoritative bodies responsible for language policies (Tsui & Tollefson, 2007). Not only do governments enact policies through planning and management, they also provide public resources for language practices such as producing educational materials, official documents, public signage, and mass media in the prescribed languages. Such explicit formal intervention, which often constitutes a core element of nationism, has been widely critiqued by several scholars as determinants of language practices in multilingual societies (Sarangi, 2009; Awobuluyi, n.d.; Emenanjo, n.d.).

Formal action however, covers only a fragment of language policies; language decisions are part of the dynamics of social life spanning individual and collective domains and involving explicit and implicit (intentional and unconscious) goal-oriented enactments of linguistic behaviors. Various language communities, cultural groups, territories, professional bodies, and so forth, identify with specific language needs and adopt corresponding linguistic practices. The central governments of India and Nigeria respectively have constitutional provisions for language in various domains of society. Yet, in India’s capital and hub of the Hindi Belt, New Delhi, local communities continue to use varieties of Hindi different from the prescribed Sanskritized form much as private

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79 Nationism as used mostly in sociolinguistics refers to the practical concerns of running a nation. It is distinguished from nationalism, the emotional beliefs and attachments to national identity (Simpson & Oyétádé, 2008; McKay, 2003; Fishman, 1968c).
schools deliver an English-only curriculum even to children of language policymakers.

Similar examples abound in Nigeria.

The sites for language policy can be messy. As Spolsky (2004) reports, about 125 nation states mention language in their constitution, with about 100 of them ascribing formal status to one or more as official or national languages. Besides, sector-level government organs, such as education, culture, and economy, produce enormous documents providing for language practices in these domains. However, in no one of these nations do the policy provisions apply effectively to all spheres of society intended by the constitution.

Moreover, various groups and collectivities have sought formal recognition of their languages for official use in specified domains. Indeed, the history of multilingualism in India and Nigeria is dotted with demands for recognition of indigenous languages. In some cases, a language community demands recognition of its language only to abandon it after officialization even in the same domains they advocated for. A handy example is the Boro tribe of northeast India during the language uproar of the 1970s, a case I examine further in the next chapter. Explicit formal language policies, whether enacted by statist authorities (e.g., central, provincial or local governments) or by non-statist entities (e.g., interest groups, cultural and linguistic communities) do not often apply with equal effectiveness to the intended linguistic environments partly because most language policies depict a homogenizing tendency
for inherently heterogeneous contexts, and make common provisions for various
smaller groups with varying sociolinguistic needs and enormous capacities for unique
language practices.

However, not all language policies are formally enacted by an established
authority. Many countries and local communities do not have formal language policies
that guide social practices; the nature of their language policies must be derived from
their actual language practices (Spolsky, 2004). The tendency for simultaneous
integration and disconnect of language policy at various domains issues from the nature
of language decisions and the character of language practices in society. Changes in
linguistic diversity and language practices occur as a result of changes in society. As
such, decisions about language practices require social policy rather than language
policy as such (Spolsky, 2004).

As a domain-specific form of language planning, ELP shares this character for
simultaneous integration and disconnect. India and Nigeria have formal ELPs on the
national, state and local levels. Yet, major ethnolinguistic groups have effectively
challenged these and successfully instituted a separate language policy within their
communities. Recognizing such local actions, the Indian Government has added such
languages in the list of official languages in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution, and
the Nigerian Government, in the NPE, with each country providing constitutional
safeguards to legitimate its actions. Such ethnolinguistic communities and schools with
perceived linguistic needs and/or actual language (mostly dialectical) variations different from those of larger ethnolinguistic group pursue separate ELPs than the formal stipulations of governments. In numerous cases, such smaller communities and educational practitioners are unaware of official ELP provisions and therefore adjust their language practices to their own unique and changing social and educational needs.

The foregoing suggests the need for a conceptual distinction between a narrow and a broad (or strict and loose) sense of ELP. While the narrow sense (the domain of formal state authority), often exclude non-state policy actions, the broad sense includes a wider range of policy initiatives (including the state action). Stretched to an extreme, the broad sense admits all educational contexts as sites for language policies, intentionally or not. Since ELPs build directly on actual language practices resulting from larger social and historical conditions, the tendency for one policy site to overlap with or disconnect from others depends on a host of social, political, economic, cultural, and ideological factors. That multilingualism and ELP are entangled in broader historical social, political, economic, cultural, and ideological forces is both descriptive (insofar as it states obvious realities) and analytic (as drawing out linkages frequently ignored in language policy scholarship). Expanding the scope of ELP discourse better accommodates such historical considerations and illustrates how ELP stakeholders simultaneously embody and deploy historically-grounded forces in the policy process.
Historical Considerations in Contemporary Education Language Policies in India and Nigeria

Nearly all commentaries on the history of language diversity in India and Nigeria record that multilingualism in both countries predates European incursions and British colonial rule, with most pointing to earlier Muslim Arab (and for India, Persian) influences (Benedikter, 2009; Sarangi, 2009). While the notion that multilingualism is not a recent fabrication of European colonial expeditions is well established, the provenance of the complexity of language diversity, which extends far beyond the Arabic and Persian influences, remains largely unexplored in language policy studies. These primeval forces survive long histories and persist in the forms of social class tension and indigeneity debate (in India) and ethnic and religious rivalries (Nigeria) that continue to shape ELP processes.

The salience of social class and caste systems in the management of language diversity in India is well recorded (Benedikter, 2009; Pantham & Mehta, 2006; Brass, 2005; Pattanayak, 1990). There has always been an abiding link between education, language and social class in India. All Indian participants in this study acknowledge that education in India has always been elitist given the caste system. Through their ownership of the Veda and monopoly of its associate rituals, the Brahmins exercised ideological and intellectual dominance over the highly classist Vedic society. The rich oral Vedic curricula of traditional Indian education available to the Brahmins led to
careers in the Hindu priesthood, medicine, engineering, law, military, literary professions, and so forth. However, secular education with a central aim of literacy was available to the mercantile class whose need for recordkeeping was distinct from the provisions of the oral Vedic education. Providing linguistically differentiated education to neatly defined social classes remains an abiding legacy of India’s history. While recent advances in democratic liberalism and federalism undermine the stringency of class-defined education by eroding statutory provisions and legal enforcements of discriminatory practices since Independence, the intricate overlaps of caste hierarchies with ethnicity, tribal units or “Adivasi”, religious sects, territorial mappings and economic class create new fluid social categories for upholding and resisting various forms of “minority” identity, including linguistic.

These constantly shifting and imbricated social categories hark back to the Indo-Aryan Invasion controversy regarding India’s first inhabitants, discussed in Chapter Five. Although this controversy has been clarified academically it continues to bolster minority resistance against Hindi (and Indo-Aryan language) dominance and infuse ELP debates. Eschewing Sanskrit terms such as “Atavika” (forest dwellers) and “vanavāsī” or “Girijans” (hill people), political activists coined the word “Adivasi” (which in Devanagari script literally means “original inhabitants”) in the 1930s as a linguistic “symbolismic” stance on the indigenity contest and resistance against Hindi dominance (Barnes, Gray, 80 The Adivasi” refers to the heterogeneous set of tribal and ethnic groups considered aboriginal to India. The word is a politically useful construct since it emphasizes that although minority, these groups are indigenous to India.)
& Kingsbury, 1995). Adivasi, an umbrella term for the heterogeneous set of ethnic, tribal and indigenous communities considered the autochthonous inhabitants of India, continue to occupy a minority status with widespread aboriginal populations in states such as Andra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, West Bengal and Mizoram, as well as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.  

As independence struggle strategies weakened British colonial control, the Adivasis, most of whom saw the British rule as a welcome emancipatory force against established regimes of subjugation, rekindled their cultural struggles particularly against linguistic hegemony. Independence from British colonial rule for India, at least from the majority-minority frame of reference, was thus never built on a neatly demarcated Indian “Us” and British “Them”, but of a complicated politico-social quagmire defined by shifting alliances and ideological conflicts (Schaeffer, 1999).

In Nigeria, the historical significance of forces driving current ELP practices is less poignant. Probably the most abiding historical processes were the emergence of linguistically unique ethnicities with strong economic ties and the territorialization of religion. Some historians of Africa characterize the relationship among most sovereign states of the West African subregion as that of hostility, although there is little historical

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81 For further reading on the various ways the “Adivasi” has featured in major social (and linguistic) debates in India, see Lok Sabha Debates of June 10 1995 and The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi: Satyagraha in South Africa.
evidence in support of this thesis except the archeological finds of solid walls around highly centralized cities that suggest massive public investment in defense (Fage & Tordoff, 2002). Early societies however, were not all centralized; some early states representing major modern ethnicities (such as the Igbo) ran highly decentralized political systems (Falola & Heaton, 2008). More, most centralized empires with strong military machinery (e.g., the Kanem northeast Lake Chad) suffered significant internal opposition and consequent divisions (Falola & Heaton, 2008). That decentralized polities continued to thrive even after the advent of European colonialism suggests that military campaigns and warfare were not as widespread and thus had little impact on the region since smaller states would have either integrated into larger centralized ones or suffered decimation. Additionally, the existence of strong economic ties with expansive commercial routes stringing the southernmost fringes of today’s Nigeria via the northern Hausa states to the North African and Arab world suggests that harmonious conviviality was probably the norm, even if with sporadic skirmishes.

While any claim to an internecine history of West Africa must be interpreted with caution, the advent of Muslim Arab and Christian European exploration of West Africa gave vent to religiously tainted conflictual ethnic relationships that define the politics of language in Nigeria between the North and the South. Religio-ethnic frays are not limited to a North-South divide; 350 to 450 ethnicities with varying sizes, popularity and degrees of prominence in national politics share in Nigeria’s richly contested social
space out of which language policies emerge both as state action and local practices (Okezie-Offoha, 1996).

Post-independence language planning in India and Nigeria was necessarily froth with ambiguities and political tensions (Sarangi, 2009; Sonntag, 2002; Fafunwa B. A., 1974; Das Gupta, 1970). As participants in this research point out, current language policies in both countries were borne out of delicate political circumstances in which safeguarding fragile social stability was prioritized over thoroughgoing deliberations on sensitive issues like language. To begin with, national politics was controlled by a wide range of ideologically positioned and pragmatically driven individuals whose sentiments varied from demand for a total restructuring of the defunct colonial systems to reflect indigenous practices (including discarding English language) and a commitment to maintaining colonial structures run no longer by the British but mostly Western-educated indigenous elites. Among these groups are ethnic separatists pitted against nationalists. Western-educated elites also were not a homogeneous group with common interests; while graduates of University of London and affiliate University College of Ibadan (later University of Ibadan) and other British colleges embodied a typically prudish Victorian attitude, a new crop of “free thinkers” mostly from U.S.
universities heralded a “progressive” spirit committed to breaking British colonial
conventions and exploring new approaches to running the new fragile nation.\textsuperscript{82}

One Nigerian participant, “Komo”, a contemporary of Nigeria’s first president,
Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (who masterminded the erection of University of Nigeria Nsukka)\textsuperscript{83}
reflects on two instances of such frequent differences in approach that is worth noting.
As faculty dean of Education at University of Nigeria Nsukka, the participant’s proposal
for an evidence-based comprehensive review of the Nigerian education system opposed
on two fronts mainly by the mostly British-educated members of the National Council
on Education (NCE), the apex policymaking body on education. First, the idea of
reviewing education bespoke a frontal indictment on the ensconced British system then
considered the hallmark of educational excellence. Second, Komo’s corollary proposal
for a nation-wide survey of Nigerians’ educational needs (including “illiterates”, as non-
Westernized Nigerians with no western formal schooling were stylized) was perceived
as an indignity to the professional expertise of these NCE board members. If any review

\textsuperscript{82} As some of my participants who were major players in Nigeria’s transition from colonialism to
Independence argue, most influential early Nigerian leaders, including Nigeria’s first president, Dr.
Nnamdi Azikiwe, were educated in the United States, and represented a different way of thinking than
the British.

\textsuperscript{83} Like Nnamdi Azikiwe, this participant had plans and networks to establish American-styled Nigerian
higher education institutions in contrast to the British system (While Azikiwe was interested in a
University of Nigeria Nsukka, the participant and several colleagues worked on erecting the West African
College of Science and Technology in Minna). The participant remembers sharing their blueprints with
Azikiwe as they both returned to Nigeria on ship after the participant’s graduate studies in the US. Azikiwe
graduated from University of Pennsylvania in 1933.
was necessary, they, the experts, were competent enough to do it without advice or suggestions from “illiterates”.

Previously as a young graduate under consideration for the position of Secretary of the nascent Institute of Education at the then University College of Ibadan in the mid-1950s, the participant was asked by a panel of 16 British board and one Nigerian registrar to explain which was “better” between the British and the American systems of education. Komo attempted to obviate the obvious trap by abstaining from any comparison, but described the breadth and narrowness of the American and British systems respectively and their corresponding purposes. When informed by the panel that he was to help establish an Institute of Education similar to London, the participant insisted: “we must be here to use our knowledge of the British, the American, the India, the French, the Portuguese, and other systems to evolve a Nigerian Institute of Education” (personal interviews, May 25, 2009).

These biographical anecdotes hardly capture the breadth of the social conditions of Independence and post-independence politics, but they portray the ideological posturing and polemics of the immediate post-colonial exigencies that shaped early ELPs in India and Nigeria. Indeed, ideological blocs and interest groups splintered on hot

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84 The participant, who was a professor of education, would respond: “Sir, I don’t know about the rest of you but I’m not competent to speak for others. I’d rather have others speak for themselves. When they tell us what they want, we can put it in the kind of framework that will help the country”. It took the measured intervention of Professor Stephen Oluwole Awokoya, then Chief Federal Adviser on Education to the Nigerian government, to sustain the participant’s proposal pending subsequent NCE meetings at which was birthed the National Curriculum Conference of 1969 out of which Nigeria’s National Policy on Education was formulated.
button issues such as the role of English versus indigenous languages (given the impending dominance of Hindi in India and Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba in Nigeria), restructuring of governments, constitution of central politics and bureaucracies, and sundry issues requiring linguistic considerations. Initial attempts to foist Hindi on multilingual India triggered widespread resistance and sharpened a North-South divide that continue to elicit strong emotional reactions from non-Hindi and Hindi speakers alike (Benedikter, 2009). Similar uproar attended the constitutional legitimation of Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba as Nigerian national languages (Emenanjo, 1990).

A spate of work now exists on the complicated politics of post-independence language policymaking in India and Nigeria, noting the centrality of linguistic concerns to political integration (Benedikter, 2009; Sarangi, 2009; Das Gupta, 1970; Okehie-Offoha & Sadiku, 1996). As Das Gupta (1970) notes, the role of language in political integration must be seen in the context of the dynamic processes of social mobilization and organizational development since the dynamics of interactions among language groups are more significant in understanding integrational mechanisms than the static array of multiple languages. Interaction among language communities and the shifting alliances struck by their representatives account for the political tensions and linguistic compromises associated with the partitioning of India and Pakistan and the creation of states in India on purely linguistic grounds as well as the Nigeria-Biafra secession attempt and consequent integration.
Language policymakers’ tasks were further complicated by the simultaneous and paradoxically strong nationalist (deeply anti-colonial) movements and widespread demand for English language. In India, nationalist sentiments set against symbols of colonial rule saw to the selection of Hindi as official national language and the decision to drop English after 15 years by the Constituent Assembly (CA) in the 1950 Constitution. Concurrently, popular demand for English as an honorific code and identity marker with potential socioeconomic and political benefits on the one hand, and a perception of English as ideologically neutral in a religio-ethnic linguistically charged post-independence milieu on the other, forced the CA to retain English as an associate official language to Hindi. Similar ethnolinguistic recriminations stultified the proposed disuse of English in 1965 (Benedikter, 2009); not only was the plan to discontinue the use of English not actualized, it has been replaced by a growing demand for English-only ELPs especially in areas largely populated by minorities.

Partitioning India and Pakistan on the basis of religion (following Hindu-Muslim conflicts), and subsequent reconfiguration of Indian states along linguistic demographic lines, hardly abated language-related political conflicts but rather further complicated post-independence efforts at nation building for two well documented reasons. First, although Pakistan absorbed 64 million of the subcontinent’s Muslim population, over 36 millions remained in India (Das Gupta, 1970). Since the Jinnah-led Muslim League and the Aligarh movement identified Urdu as a politico-linguistic symbol of Muslim
separatism (although the majority of Urdu speakers who are from Uttar Pradesh remained in India post partitioning, and only about 7% of Pakistanis spoke Urdu), the widening tension between Hindi and Urdu – a linguistic reflection of the Hindu-Muslim religious tension – continued to define India’s language policies and shape the experiences of Urdu speakers, especially Urdu-speaking Muslims in India (Das Gupta, 1970). Das Gupta’s authoritative treatment of the linguistic conflicts of India’s national development eloquently reveals the politically controversial convolutions of language, politics, religion and ideology in post-independent processes. My Indian participants corroborate Das Gupta’s views, noting how governments’ effort to purge the prescribed Sanskritized Hindi of all Urdu terms that has infiltrated Hindi in common usage set off resistance within the Hindi-speakers themselves. According to one of the participants, to the vast majority of India’s Hindustani speakers and most of the deterritorialized Urdu-speaking Muslims, standardization (or enforcement of the Sanskritized version of Hindi) is nothing but a political camouflage for measured subjugation over Urdu.

The second complication following the creation of states in India on linguistic bases was that while regional languages such as Assamese, Bengali, Chhattisgarhi, Gujarati and Oriya gained independence from Hindi, they paradoxically became symbols of hegemony over other regional languages. Minority language groups’ accentuated demand for their languages and for English can be explained by the rise of anti-regional language resistances (Benedikter, 2009; Sarangi, 2009; Das Gupta, 1970). In all, India’s
language policymaking (as was its entire nation building efforts), which was defined by two politically charged conflicting tendencies – the nationalistic concern for India’s normative multicultural and multilingual identity on one hand, and the pervasive concern for unity, security and administrative efficiency on the other (Chakrabarty, 2008) – further complicated the linguistic landscape in which various stakeholders enact their respective ELPs.

Defined by strikingly similar concerns with protecting cultural and language diversity as well as upholding a secure and stable national identity, Nigeria’s post-independent politics infused by religion and ethnicity confounded language policymaking on national and local levels. Early in the First Republic under Tafawa Balewa in the 1960s, Sir Ahmadu Bello, then Sarduana of Sokoto, embarked on a vigorous religious expansionism campaign that sharpened the ethnic and religious characters of Nigerian politics (Adogame, 2005). National politics wore a definitive ethnic and religious mark, with party lines drawn along a largely Hausa-Fulani North (under a conservative Muslim Nigerian People’s Congress, NPC), the predominantly Igbo Southeast (represented by a Christian-dominated National Convention of Nigerian Citizens, NCNC), and a Yoruba Southwest (ruled by a left-leaning and mostly Christian Action Group, AG). Resistance against Hausa as national language, part of a vehement effort to curtail Bello’s Islamic expansionism, intersected with the preexisting socioeconomic divide between the north and south. As religio-ethnic politics shaped the
creation of states by breaking up existing Eastern, Northern, and Western regions (leading to military coups and countercoups and ultimately to the secession attempt by Biafra), regional ethnicities and language groups grew in prominence with increased control over regional politics and local policies. Thus, selecting English as the official language and selecting Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba as national languages were merely an early political compromise among major ethnic groups, with little attention to regional and “minority” languages.

Ever since, English has continued to serve as an ideologically neutral unifying force for muting serious language questions. Yet the pragmatic utility of English never removed its symbolic hegemony over indigenous languages nor mitigated its disproportionate socioeconomic and political advantage. Moreover, unlike India with a rich literary tradition, Nigeria’s lack of a classical literacy culture encouraged the popularity of English over native languages. My participants note that over 40% of Nigerian’s population speaks English as against less than 5% in India. Overall, current ELPs in both countries are complicated and deeply rooted in religious, ethnic, cultural and economic politics of Independence but with prehistoric provenience. These

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Accurate statistics on the population of English-speakers in Nigeria and India are not available due partly to the unreliability of census records. While guarded/stingy estimates put the figure at 10% for Nigeria and 5% for India (van Gelderen, 2006), others suggest that Nigeria has more English speakers than the United Kingdom (Romney, 2006), or over 40% of the population. Yet, others argue that the number of English speakers in India is more than Australia’s total population, and the same as New Zealand’s population for Nigeria’s English speaking population (Bagaulia, 2005). Whatever the figure, the data in this study reveal that the proportion of English speakers is higher among the Nigerian population than India, and that the population of English speakers is in sharp odds with the respective country’s language policies.
complications explain participants’ recurrent reference to the ELP process as “stuck”. In the next section, I subject this idea to critical examination and show how analysis fit the expanded view of language policymaking beyond state agencies.

While these historical occurrences are well documented, they are often treated as bygone events that affected, and thus only useful to understanding, ELP processes of their time (Sarangi, 2009; Das Gupta, 1970). Findings from this study however, show that they continue to shape contemporary ELP processes. Indeed, failure to resolve most historical “irregularities” account for relevant actors’ apparent incapacity for organized comprehensive ELP reform. Current ELP studies can shed more light on their contemporary subjects by avoiding this amnesia and refocusing on these extant historical realities.

**Education Language Policy: Stymied Policies, Dynamic Processes**

Earlier, I noted that most participants in this study accurately argue that Nigeria and India do not have a national language policy, if policy is construed narrowly as a formal position and explicit pronouncement – particularly in textual forms – of the government on language statuses and functions. I also noted that these participants often engaged in in-depth discussion on language decisions, especially in education, an indication that they are aware of the respective government’s position on language issues. A corollary argument that emerges from further exploring the implications of these two claims is that early language policies and ELPs in India and Nigeria enacted in
the immediate aftermath of colonial independence has remained stranded for decades.

An Indian scholar captures this sentiment:

As far as the educational language policy is concerned the Kothari Commission report of 1966, which has a section on language policy, is the first full-fledged report on education in India. In the last 40 years and more, we’ve actually not done anything different than what the Kothari commission did. There has not been any kind of major review or rethinking; it is only the analysis of the fact that we have not been able to do anything. [There has not been] any shift or rethinking...at least formerly speaking. All you see are action programs on the Three Language Formula. My general understanding is that on the issue of education language policy, we are stuck in a kind of repetitive process (personal interview, June 3, 2009, emphasis added).

To illustrate the point that language policymaking is “stuck”, the scholar argues that language issues are ever present since the immediate post-colonial period when the TLF (Three Language Formula) emerged as a tentative political compromise. As she points out, the “idealistic” desire of getting rid of English after 15 years has not been seriously revisited ever since. The linguistic partitioning of India school system between English-medium private schools and regional language public ones (distinct from mother-language education) invites equally urgent attention, even as the country debates a “Rights to Education Bill”. Since higher education is almost exclusively in English, regional and state differences in language requirements produce a linguistically

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86 With mother language-based education, students receive instruction in their first language(s). However, most government schools in India offer instructions in regional or a variety of a majority language that is quite distinct from most students’ first language(s). While not enjoying the benefits of pure M-LE, these students also have late access to English language, which most parents believe is crucial for upward mobility. There appears to be a condition of double alienation that, according to the Indian scholar referenced above, requires serious policy consideration.
variegated student body (with some students highly proficient in, and others with no prior exposure to, English), all receiving instruction in English. Educators face additional challenges with the dearth of scholarly materials in native languages. English-proficient students therefore have a major linguistic advantage over their indigenous language peers, even as the country professes to encourage the use of indigenous languages.

Even governments’ recent pro-multilingual education stance found in NCERT’s NCF did not amount to a comprehensive ELP reform but still envisions a transition to regional and foreign languages. In addition to changes as the NCF’s, there are several other grassroots level educational initiatives with strong language policy components. These initiatives are part of a larger discourse on language that testifies to a pervasive desire for a comprehensive reform on linguistic diversity, even as governments and major institutional ELP stakeholders remain evasive to centralized policy. What accounts for this conflicting tendency to action and inaction at multiple levels of ELP process?

Disincentives for Comprehensive Language Reform: Issues of Pragmatic Compromise, Dynamic Developments, and Grassroots Compensation

This research yields three broad preliminary explanations of this passive evasion of centralized language policy reform. First, existing policies were hurried political compromises aimed as safeguards for the fragile stability of post-independence nation-building exercises. A purely political argument with pragmatic inflections, this reasoning implies that political exigencies take precedence over and determine language issues.
However, it fails to explain how language is located at the core of politics. For India (and Nigeria too), relationships among language communities and the intersections of language, religion, ethnicity, gender, economic interests and ideology are the cornerstones of politics. Second, language issues in both countries are never static; changes in language contingencies and evolving relationships among language groups signal the continuing political salience of language in ways that dissuade centralized reform. Although this argument is mainly sociologic and focuses on post-independence developments, it has far-reaching historical significance. A third argument is that the need for centralized ELP reform has been substantially reduced by language policymaking and practices on the regional, state and local levels. The diversity and multiplicity of multilevel ELP initiatives reflect the inherent incongruities and irreconcilable needs of various language communities.

Since the first political argument is a substantive part of the previous section, I focus more on the last two arguments in this section. Suffice it to note that a recurrent theme in my dialogue with participants is that due to the immediate exigencies of Independence, existing national ELPs in both countries are “half-hearted compromises”, to use Austin’s (2009) words, which continue to haunt contemporary linguistic practices in education. Yet, language realities and their attendant ethnic, religious, economic, political and cultural dimensionalities have not been static or steadily stable on the
national, regional, state, local and even international levels in the approximately half century since Independence.

Various forms of language-oriented cultural movements with different kinds of demands and approaches have emerged since the nineteenth century and remained central to Indian and Nigerian politics and public discourse. Demands have ranged from script reform to linguistic purism, standardization of a language or dialect, official recognition, and use as media of instruction (Sarangi, 2009; Djité, 2008; Das Gupta, 1970; Fafunwa B. A., 1974). As part of a development trajectory for “developing nations”, linguistic cleavages are politically generated cleavages (Das Gupta, 1970) with revivalist tendencies requiring trans-generational language loyalties prompted by collectivist consciousness around the idea of progress. The political salience of language differs with place and time, and with the dynamics of various forces acting on the specific contexts (Sonntag, 2009). As a consequence, there have been moments of relative calm and of widespread conflict. Writing about such relative calm in the 1970s India, Paul Brass (1999) suggests that several published studies of various aspects of language issues in India arrived at a consensus that the major linguistic issues were resolved. The nationally significant regional language conflicts of the 1980s and 1990s (Sonntag, 2009) would prove Brass’ conclusion inaccurate or at least only partially tenable.
As well, ending the Nigeria-Biafra civil war of 1967–1970 by reunifying the country and proclaiming a “One Nigeria” did not end but rather compounded tense ethnolinguistic and religio-political relationships between the north and the south. While the intersections of ethnicity with religion, culture, politics and language confound political and sociological analysis that attempt to isolate the remote factors of such skirmishes, language remains a core identity marker in functionally heterogeneous but fundamentally balkanized society. Some participants in this study, who have been victims of northern conflicts, have ample anecdotes of situations in which fluency in Hausa with dialectical precision served as a linguistic symbol of membership necessary for escape from potentially fatal violence.

On a larger scale, since Nigeria’s major ethnic groups are surrounded by hundreds of smaller “minority” groups, interethnic alliance between the major and neighboring ethnicities has been a mainstay of Nigerian politics. As such, geopolitical mappings in terms of the South-East, North and West representing the Igbos, Hausas and Yorubas respectively belie the heterogeneity and diversity within each regional bloc. In the post Nigeria-Biafran war era, punitive geopolitical reconfigurations aimed at undermining cohesiveness among the Igbos (the defunct Biafra) through separatist zoning practices led to the emergence of “Igbo-speaking” as an alternative designation to the previous “South-East”. The implication of this strategic political coinage was that it probably enabled smaller ethnolinguistic groups on the borderline Igbo communities
to emphasize their unique identity distinct from the Igbos, contrasting assimilative coincidences in language with more genuine and indisputable claim to separate genealogy (Kalu, 2008). Such smaller ethnolinguistic groups learned to emphasize their marginal status in regional affairs by deploying the logic of marginalization\textsuperscript{87} popular in Nigeria’s politics to reestablished smaller linguistic blocs through which national politics unfold often to the detriment of the entire region. The cumulative impact was a weakening of social cohesion and political significance originally fostered by linguistic ties.

Northern hostilities and politically motivated regional balkanization are hardly exhaustive of the various ways linguistic diversity is deployed as a strategic political tool that indirectly stalls any attempt at comprehensive language policy reform. However, they both illustrate conflicting tendencies: first, the Nigerian government’s typical response to civil conflict is to accentuate symbols of national unity under the “One Nigeria” banner, and second, major political actors in these governments often deploy language as a veritable divisive tool for the strategic management of political participation and group representation. Together, both tendencies work to deter any meaningful efforts at addressing linguistic diversity as a centralized policy need.

\textsuperscript{87} The fundamental problem of marginalization in Nigeria illustrates the demand for participation in national politics on the bases of ethnic, linguistic, geographic and even religious representativeness, with the dominant discourse suggesting that the North has usurped national politics more than the West and even much less the Southeast. Kalu (2008) argues that there are different versions of the marginalization logic spanning the entire country and serving various conflicting political interests.
Sonntag’s (2009) discussion of the political salience of language in the north Indian states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh corroborate the argument that the evolution of language issues since Independence has not been uniformly stable or explosive across regions and time. Both states are significantly similar in their historical background, cultural heritage, linguistic composition and economic development. However, language issues have been more prominent in Uttar Pradesh than Bihar, with strong political implications for the states and the country as a whole. Collectively, these developments signal to central governments that language issues are still potentially explosive and must be treated cautiously.

The last argument regarding governments’ guarded ambivalence to centralized language policy reform is the vibrant and dynamic language policy initiatives on the regional, state and local levels that work to diminish the perceived need for a comprehensive reform. One of the most prominent and relatively effective initiatives with far-reaching linguistic implications is the Sar Siksha Abiyan (SSA), the Indian version of the Education For All initiative. Through this program, district or block education authorities – the smallest administrative units of Indian education – work in collaboration with international agencies (including UNESCO and UNICEF) and I/NGOs to develop educational programs that are submitted to MHRD technical support group.

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88 As Sonntag (2009) notes, it can be argued that partitioning affected Uttar Pradesh more severely than Bihar, both states form part of the historic-cultural Hindi Hinterland. Both states have significant dialectical differences and are among the most economically backward states in India (although Bihar may be considered poorer when only two are compared).
through the Chief Consultant for Pedagogical Improvement for approval and funding. As
the Consultant notes, the program has provided structural channels for mother-
language education advocacy and for providing formal schooling simultaneously in
multiple languages of students’ actual linguistic repertoires.

The SSA was instrumental to the recent NCF’s change to pro-multilingual
education stance (NCERT, 2006) through a vast coalition of differentiated grassroots,
regional and international actors. Such successes bolsters communities seeking official
changes in local language condition to explore grassroots-level initiatives with global
visionary anchorage (such as the SSA) as a more viable alternative to demanding for a
nationwide ELP reform.

Deference to NCERT’s NCF or MHRD’s supervision is limited since states are
largely responsible for their specific educational (including language) policies. As several
participants suggest, moving education to the Concurrent List\(^89\) limits the central
governments’ statutory authority over states’ ELP packages. One outcome has been a
growing tendency for “tribal states” as well as non-tribal ones like Chhattisgarh to
declare an English-only LOI or introduction of English starting from early elementary
grades. In one striking case, the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, who is from the lowest
stratum of the society’s caste system (the “untouchables”), insisted on the introduction

\(^89\) Legislative responsibilities in both India and Nigeria are divided between the central governments and
states along three “Lists”: Union List, State List and Concurrent List. The Union government has exclusive
control over all legislative items listed under the Union List just as states control items on the State List.
The Concurrent List is controlled by both central and state governments, with states deferring to central
government in cases of repugnancy.
of English from the first year of elementary school in the state soon after assuming office as Chief Minister. This can be viewed as part of the strengthening of tribal movements, especially among the “untouchable” Dalits in India. An English-only ELP supported by a prominent untouchable is likely to calm the group’s demand for national recognition of indigenous languages.

In Nigeria, similar examples abound. According to the participants, the Ibibios of southeastern Nigeria have effectively generated grassroots mechanisms for the use of Ibibio in schools, ultimately compelling the government to include it in the West African Educational Council (WAEC) examination mandatory for high school graduation and college entrance. In the Ibibio case, language development was fundamentally a local initiative that did not necessarily build on global visions like India’s SSA. Around the same old Calabar kingdom in southeastern Nigeria, a traditional ruler demanded additional local taxation for the development of educational materials in indigenous languages. Yet, collective actions on language have not been uniform or unidirectional. Ijaw language was prominent on the national stage during the colonial and immediate post-independence era. However, there has been a noted decline in prominence and use of Ijaw outside of the region especially with the creation of new states that disconnected Ijaw from mainland Igbo. Another southeastern language, Efik, was one of four Nigerian languages used for the British Cambridge Exam (the others being Hausa,
Igbo, and Yoruba). In the past few decades, Efik speakers have had to struggle to stabilize the decline of the language and restore its national prominence.

**Interrogating Explanations of Stagnancy and Dynamic Activities in Education Language Policy Processes**

A common thread runs through these disparate efforts at language development in India and Nigeria: collective actions of committed individuals and the availability of resources (especially intellectual and financial) are major determinants of the direction and vibrancy of language policymaking and practices on the grassroots level. Generally, resource endowed communities with strong political representation have successfully facilitated the process of language decisions in ways that shift ELP tasks from central to local levels. As such, successive political regimes in India and Nigeria have successfully deferred or totally ignored language policymaking on the national level. Alternatively, they have issued successive revisions of the original post-independence ELPs with subtle changes and minor increases in the coverage of the diverse linguistic landscape of the respective countries. They have also continued to broker small-scale language policy decisions and petit compromises with smaller administrative units (e.g., states and local communities) and programs entities (e.g., SSA) without a comprehensive framework for decentralization.

As preliminary explanations, the three broad reasons proposed above unveil several questions that require deeper exploration: why is passivity or inaction a
pragmatic strategy for governments in addressing pervasive demand for comprehensive language reform and widespread language policy differentiations on the regional, state and local levels? What specific manifestations of the complexities and dilemmas inform the political volatility of large-scale language decisions in multilingual societies? Which political conditions permit coupling and decoupling of ELP practices? How do pervasive networks give rise to endemic disjuncture among coalitions of ELP stakeholders at various levels? What variables must be considered if governments and other major actors have to embark on a comprehensive language reform that will provide the linguistic framework for educational practices? More importantly, they illustrate the dynamic nature of ELP activities (i.e., as a process) in which particular decisions and policy enactments are only tentative transactional tool for a wider ongoing and constantly evolving process.

Education Language Policy as Dynamic Ongoing Process: Ground Perspectives

Reacting to a question on the conditions and structures of ELP in India, a top-level SSA administrator remarks: “it is a struggle and in no way a rosy and easygoing road. It is very tough”. In one interview session, this participant uses the words “struggle”, “fight”, “battle”, “tough” (and “tough struggle”), “strife”, and other terms suggestive of grinding effort nearly a hundred times to characterize personal experiences and those of associates engaged in the ELP activities. Other participants representing diverse institutional, educational and professional backgrounds variously
echo this theme of struggle and laborious effort in their characterization of the ELP process. Often couched in terms of “frustration” and “disappointment”, these sentiments frequently came from those who have worked the longest in language policymaking. I noted that even outright failures and recurrent dissatisfaction have not dissipated their commitment to ELP processes. Indeed, their indefatigability reflected on the fact that they have continued to work in the field, most of them for several decades and some since prior to colonial independence.\(^90\)

A fundamental question that arises here is: what accounts for such resilience and hope when successes are few and far apart? While numerous hypothetical explanations are possible, a corollary theme that emerges from deeper data exploration provides an analytic link between the idea of “struggle” and ELP as a process. Nearly all participants that view ELP processes as struggle also see policymaking as dynamic and ongoing at all levels. An academic expert with a wide range of experiences at local, governments and UNESCO levels notes: “language policy in India is very dynamic; it is never static, always full of exciting activities and frequent surprises...it is a complicated and ongoing process” (personal interview, May 06, 2009). For one Nigerian participant, “this [language policymaking] in postcolonial multilingual societies is very convoluted and

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\(^{90}\) There is a methodological problematique (of comparability) with analyzing persistence in language policymaking since such an analysis fails to account for those who may have withdrawn from language policymaking due to frustrations and disappointments. The perspectives of those who persisted and those who did not are required for any balanced understanding of resilience in language policymaking. While this does not violate the purposeful sampling logic of this study, the inference I draw from the perspectives of these individuals corroborates the original argument of ELP as process and not static.
dynamic. To say that language policymaking is dynamic and complex simply states the obvious” (personal interview, June 9, 2009). Although they do not have uniform ideas on what “dynamic” means as an attribute of language policymaking, these participants share a few common beliefs regarding its elements.

The word “dynamic” captures multiple dimensions of ELP as process. First, it denotes the vibrant activities and vigorous motions (often expressed in debates, deliberations and public campaigns) characterizing specific actions that collectively constitute language policymaking. While formal debates that appear in academic publications and mass media outlets are easier to document and analyze, tracking less formal ones that occur through personal interactions and face-to-face communications require more rigorous efforts and direct dialogue with relevant actors. On the grassroots, frequent outbursts of interethnic conflict grow out of and lead to further vigorous debates on language. Expert advisory committees and institutionalized commissions that formulate governments’ positions on language generally mirror the debates and polemics of pockets of communities and larger society constantly engrossed in linguistic controversies. The substance of these debates, which range from determining what is a language or dialect, to choosing the appropriate language of textbooks and classroom instruction, the relative status of English to native languages, the proper role of government and local communities in language decision making, and official recognition of a language, are caught in and inform a larger public discourse that
extends beyond language and specific national boundaries. An SSA staff argues: “a lot of debates and dialogues are taking place now, and at the same time we live in a world which affected by terrorism, religious fracas – inter-/intra-religion and inter-caste fighting, a lot of dirty politics... So these debates occur in a highly polluted world” (personal interview, April 22, 2009). Reference to extra-national conflicts and terrorism fit into a global framework of relative social instability where national politics and foreign policies are largely defined by anti-terrorism controversies – a reality as global as it is local to India and Nigeria.

Another dimension to the dynamism of ELP as a process relates to its evolitional nature characterized by constant change. The absence of a comprehensive national language policy does not mean that stakeholders’ activities have been mostly sterile. A director at NCERT reflects on the effectiveness of organized political action, as partly responsible for the progressively pro-native language stance of the Indian government and paradoxically the simultaneous increased demand for English-medium education by regional and grassroots constituencies: that even frequent visitors to India will be amazed at the rapidity of change witnessed in the country’s ELPs. The general framework of pro-indigenous language contra pro-English and a more recent integrative attitude (i.e., pro-multilingualism) have remained prominent over the decades. However, the manifestations of each attitude in actual ELP decisions continue to change and vary with context. Regional constituencies that fought for the recognition of their
languages are now reverting to English as they face increasing pressures and resistance from local communities against regional language dominance. Such paradoxical evolution of conflicting interests define linguistic relationships between the central government, states and local communities whose constantly changing political conditions and language needs reflect on the inconsistencies of language decisions.

Indeed, the political salience of language is a historical outcome of a constantly changing social landscape. Some scholars interested in language inequalities trace this changing character to primordial phases of sociolinguistic developments. For instance, Lisa Mitchell (2009) shows how “specific languages have gone from being understood and portrayed as natural features of particular local landscapes and environments to being experienced as inalienable attributes of human beings” (Mitchell, 2009, pp. 13-14). Part of this transformation in which language ceased to be regarded primarily as a locally available resource and began to refigure as a foundation of individual identities is the emergence of language association and movements as organized political action. Thus, that nothing stays the same with regard to language policymaking and that different communities constantly adjust their linguistic practices to prevailing conditions is a manifestation of the complexity of larger public discourse and the nature of language as a condition for sociality.

ELPs in multilingual societies are better cast as temporary compromises among competing interests with conflicting outcomes that constitute subjects of ongoing and
future debates and political transactions. Seen from this dialectical prism with cyclic resurgence of ELP needs, the tendency to alter policy positions frequently, and the possibilities of major progress as well as reversals, all become normative. Further, this framework is consistent with the partial inactivity at the national level and the vibrancy of grassroots (i.e., regional, state and local) language policymaking initiatives negotiated through small-scale compromises with national and international entities. The mutual coexistence of stagnancy and change in ELP processes cumulatively result from and precipitate a number of striking dilemmas, complexities and paradoxes evident in the findings reported in previous chapter.

Complications and Complexities in Education Language Policy Process

A recurrent theme in my discussion so far is that contemporary language policy decisions have major historical signification mediated and perpetuated through the institutionalization and territorialization of certain traditional cultural practices associated with caste, religion, ethnicity, and so forth. Although language is arguably older than most traditional cultural practices, it takes on new forms as social conditions evolve and novel conventions take on deeper cultural symbolism and normative social status. The ways such changes enable or disable actual or putative bases for social organizations illustrate the nature of ethnicity (and nations) as imaginary creatures with instable identity (Anderson, 1991; Smith, 1991). Historical practices similar to those associated with ethnicity, religion and caste, which are part of the British colonial
legacies, are now undergoing such social transformations through which temporal contingencies take on deeper cultural symbolisms that elicit strong emotional responses. For one, questions of total retrospective social transformation that is restorative of a pre-colonial past has been abandoned to postcolonial struggles in pursuit of more “pragmatic” concerns of statecraft. Responding to forces of global integration has furnished India and Nigeria with more rationale for retaining and increasingly buying into Western social systems with the sociopolitical “currencies” of unresolved colonial past.

The argument here warrants clarification: increased integration into global epistemic, economic, political and cultural forms has come to define statecraft exercises of most multilingual post-colonial nations. However, the apparatuses of such integration are the same problematic and unresolved contingencies of post-colonial independence and statehood. Most ex-colonies – certainly Nigeria and India – avoided comprehensive social reform during independence, opting for patchy compromises that deployed colonial structures as a politico-economic requisite for social stability. Given that the societies that make up India and Nigeria are fundamentally culturally unique and linguistically varied, operating as one nation with a common interest (on the basis of unresolved structural contingencies responsible for the formation of these states) in pursuit of global-oriented nationhood is sharply at odds with their diverse origins as different peoples.
Caught in this quandary – one in which different peoples attempt to function as “one nation” with a commonly shared destiny while leaving unresolved the problematic rationales and mechanisms of their formation as “one nation” – public and private actors exhibit simultaneous desire for national unity and division, an endemic love for Western products and attachment to cultural sensibilities, in fact, they live in what is now normatively defined in subaltern studies and postcolonial theory as liminal hybridity (Bhabha, 2005). Cultural hybridity is evident in the persistence of colonial mentalities, or “kolo mental”, to borrow the lyrical coinage of Nigerian pop culture rendered in Pidgin English. Adulation for nearly anything Western percolates the Nigerian and Indian social consciousness and continues to transform foreign social practices into hybrid indigenous cultural forms through internalized imageries of the “Other”.

In education, the structuring of the school system, teacher training, curriculum, educational materials, classroom pedagogical practices, and language use continues to mirror an image of the indigenous as inferior to a Western superior model. It is challenging to confront the consequent widespread acculturation especially on the grassroots and rural levels when institutional deference to Western social systems is

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91 The concept “kolo mental” is used derisively to depict the uncritical mimicry of foreign cultural practices, such as the self-stylized coinages of Nollywood and Bollywood after their American counterpart, Hollywood. The word “mental” in “kolo mental” specifically signifies not only an individual social consciousness but also “insanity”, an illustration of the irrationality of aspiring for cultural practices whose real value and essence are either irrelevant or completely contradictory to the local conditions in which they are imported.
strong. To many in India and Nigeria, familiarity with and access to the Occident (especially through international travel), Western formal education, proficiency in foreign (European) languages, and other accoutrements of material wealth and social capital now represent unquestioned markers of success that bestow enormous prestige and social privileges to the bearer.

One Indian participant paints a trans-generational portrait of the educational manifestation of this acculturative tendency in a rather emotional and polemic fashion:

[M]any people get into public service [that operate on Western principles] become kings and rulers in society. This is typical of the colonial model. So many of them don't realize the importance of the “common people”; they don't recognize everybody's existence, identity and dignity. They want to rule as somebody ruled over them and they have imbibed those skills. So...many people working for the so called education do injustice to it by not understanding the basic principles of education and of learning. In the process it is children who suffer the most, children being so innocent and helpless. Teachers also carry this same agenda, believing in certain norms and figures in a very rigid manner and rejecting that children bring experience, aspirations and interests to learning... (personal interview, April 21, 2009, emphasis is mine).

On the linguistic dimensionality of such “colonial mentality”, he further critiques the monolingual framework of colonial education that continues to define formal schooling in post-colonial multilingual societies:

The belief in many people that one must think and talk in English is very problematic... But many people believe that thinking and articulation solely in English is the only way to learn. In that process, they lose originality in thinking and in those basic skills that education should strengthen: language skills, mathematical skills, exploratory skills in science, and critical thinking skills. This type of education [that tries to
imitate everything foreign] is highly mechanical. It definitely promotes rote learning, less thinking and a pseudo-confident articulation; that is, saying things loudly and confidently without understanding and meaning. Again, I think this is a colonial imposition. They’re very difficult to change because so many people carry the age old cultural baggage, making them think that change is a bigger challenge... (personal interview, April 21, 2009)

The acculturative tendencies and cultural hybridity of post-colonial societies is well documented in subaltern studies in the past half century (Nayar, 2008; Kuortti & Nyman, 2007; Burke, 2005; Bhabha, 2005; Green, 1996), although their signification for education language policymaking requires more rigorous attention. What is less articulated is why and how acculturation occurs and what specific mechanisms account for its operations. Epstein’s (1971) study of “internal” colonial relations between the politically and economically dominant Europeanized mestizos of the Peruvian highlands and the relatively disadvantaged indigenous Indian population offers a theoretical script for explicating broader acculturative processes within and beyond colonial and post-colonial settings. His “filter effect” hypothesis suggests that contrary to commonsensical expectation, people farther from cultural centers are more likely to acculturate and to imbibe dominant cultural norms.

Filter effect overturns the logic of proximity and learning by association popularized by behaviorism. Extrapolating from this Peruvian case, it is arguable that Indian and Nigerian populations, most of whom have limited direct experience with the Western world, learn to admire and crave Western cultural practices due to this logic of
converse effect of proximity (i.e., the farther people are from cultural centers, the more attracted they become to cultural norms from those centers). Proximity to ascendant cultural centers exposes people not only to admirable but also unpleasant aspects of the cultures. Indeed, it is not accidental that most anti-colonial strategists were indigenes of colonies whose first-hand experience of Europe as students in European and American universities exposed the darker sides of Western cultures that often lay invisible to people in the colonial frontiers.

An important element of the filter effect theory is the mediative role schooling plays in filtering “undesirable” aspects of dominant culture. In the Peruvian context in Epstein’s study, “government-controlled schools function to screen out unpleasant aspects of the dominant culture and are acculturative to the degree that they are effective in carrying out this function” (Epstein, 1971, p. 201). While schools constitute the most significant mediator (or “filter”) of dominant cultures in the Peruvian case, other institutions, such as the electronic and print media, organization of government, economic programs and sundry social structures, function as collective apparatuses that selectively transmit images of the West as superior, and simultaneously reproduces of non-Western images as inferior. In line with Gramsci’s cultural hegemony (see Chapter Three), the operations of such filters no longer require the active agency of Westerners or any external force; Westernized indigenes, now transformed into dominant cultural blocs, effectively reproduce images of “the West” contrary to “the Self” and impose
such imageries and their attendant categories, through their domination of public discourse and control of mechanisms of knowledge production (such as schools, mass media, and publications) on the social consciousness of societies. While this ultimately perpetuates the desirability of the foreign “Other” and disdain of self as a native, it makes full Westernization unattainable and the indigenous “self” inescapable.

Whatever its theoretical import, acculturation plays a definitive role in the broader social context in which education language policymaking in India and Nigeria occurs. Institutionalized actors are trapped in this ideological space of cultural hybridity much as grassroots agents whose language practices set the tone of language policies. Policymakers and ELP stakeholders therefore, are not culturally neutral nor do they possess monocultural or coherent multicultural identities. The liminality of hybridity is not uniform or stable; although processes of indigenization and externalization work effectively to domesticate certain foreign cultural forms, operating on (or navigating) two different existential planes often generate complexes. As a social mental space, the liminality of hybridity produces what Mazrui (1998) calls Afro-Saxons, or in the words of Oliver Onwubiko (1991), “half de-Africanized and half-Europeanized” individuals caught between multiple conflicting cultural currents that are at ones traditional, Occidental, recently “global”, and often incompatible. ELP policies enacted under such conditions bear an imprint of the identity crises and distortions of social meaning emblematic of post-colonial contexts.
Additional complexities abound in India and Nigeria whose persistence hobbles the ELP process. Language policymaking generally requires basic political stability. In countries with numerous lines of fission, any form of imposition exacerbates political tension and renders collective decision making tedious. Nigeria and India maintain a significant degree of political stability in spite of frequent eruptions of violence and substantive concerns with corruption. Several participants in India and Nigeria appear astounded by these countries’ capacity to hold together in spite of several valid and ever-present reasons for division. A top official of the New Delhi UNESCO Field Office articulates this surprise:

Nigeria, India and [other post-colonial multilingual countries] have something in common that issues from their former colonial status: their cultural and linguistic diversity. Just imagine the problems associated with producing educational, mass media, publications, and so forth in thirty major regional languages, let alone all the minor languages and dialects. Ironically, English is regarded as the lingua franca...with its obvious colonial legacies. And you wonder how these countries hold together when you’ve got so many things that obviously create differences. But somehow they have survived. India has more than survived... it’s has thrived. It is quite impressive to see over 700 million people participate in elections and believe in a federal system when the fact is that over half the people can’t even understand each other... But somehow, it all hangs together perhaps due to a mix of cultural or religious forces of cohesion. In India, Hinduism is a great social control mechanism since everybody has their own place...But still, you have a polyglot sort of population where everybody is different. So, they’ve got two choices: either wipe each other out or find some way of getting along, and most of the time, they’ve gotten along although occasionally terrible things happen. (personal interview, April 28, 2009).
The temptation to evaluate political developments and social stability in countries like Nigeria and India from an ultra-Western standpoint ignores the inherent multiplicity of lines of division and the territorialization of differences that distinguish multilingual and multicultural (ex-colonial) societies from most monolingual and unicultural European polities. External commentators on these countries insist that in India and Nigeria “democracy works really well” (as one Indian participant who is of European origin puts it). Different interest groups effectively exploit their differences in entrenching democracy as a participatory exercise and political tool for managing intergroup differences. Even with cries of corruption and mismanagements of the electoral process, participatory democracy largely accounts for regional and local detachments from any mechanical homogenizing efforts and the maintenance of deep-rooted territorialized cultural and linguistic diversity.

A challenge arising from the relative successes and stability of India and Nigeria is that such it offers the political space for increased differentiation. It permits regional, state and local educational actors to detach from central governments’ provisions of early mother-language education and later instruction in foreign languages, resulting in a growing demand for English in public schools. More, it allows language groups like the Boro of Assam in India to demand education in the Boro language up to the tertiary level while states like Jammu and Kashmir institutionalize English even at earlier primary grades. This makes centralization of educational standards and outcomes illusive in a
country where internal mobility makes standardization a necessary safeguard against marginalization in employment and other socioeconomic opportunities. One Indian scholar highlights this differentiation:

...Kerala and West Bengal states are governed by a communist party. India is the only country in the world where communist parties participate in democratic elections and get elected. Indeed, the communist governments of those states at once deleted the name of Mahatma Gandhi from school textbooks... (personal interview, April 29, 2009).

Led by the Communist Party of India (Marxist), CPI(M), coalition governments in the states of Kerala, West Bengal and Tripura remain fundamentally communist since Independence to date. Political stability is tenuous if there is a tradeoff between political equilibrium and the democratic principle of equity in societies where sensitivity to inequality is a recurrent trigger for social conflicts and inter-group tensions. Comparative cases abound in Nigeria: while the federal legal system reflects a Western legal philosophical background, nine out of 36 states instituted the Sharia Islamic legal system between 2000 and 2009, with an additional three adopting it for parts of the Muslim populations. Given the controversial dictates of Sharia, that these northern states – Zamfara, Kano, Sokoto, Katsina, Bauchi, Borno, Jigawa, Kebbi, Yobe, Gombe, Niger and Kaduna – continue to coexist with the rest of the nation, even with recurrent conflicts, is a clear evidence of political stability in Nigeria.

The potential for political stability and participatory democracy to engender differentiation highlights a common misconception about the nature of institutional
language policy stakeholders, such as governments and international organizations, as homogeneous entities. There is a tendency in language policy and ELP scholarship to treat governments as unitary establishments with a common purpose and a set of homogeneous functionaries. Whether language policy decisions are meant to maintain the status quo, reform state institutions or completely transform society (Weinstein, 1990), governments are often treated as unitive actors with clearly defined goals pursued harmoniously by relevant functionaries. Specific governments are often characterized as “conservative” or “liberal”, “leftist” or “right-wing”, “elitist” or “populist” with numerous ideological possibilities along several political spectrums (see Brock-Utne & Skattum, 2009; Djité, 2008; Kaplan & Baldauf, 2007; Brock-Utne, 2002), each believed to be unified around the corresponding ideology. The capacity of governments to act authoritatively and the tendency for scholars to define them on the basis of such actions make the practice of unifying categorization tempting even if it fails to untangle the inherent ambiguities of government entities.

Governments and non-governmental entities alike are hardly monolithic; they allow for enormous internal diversity and ideological differentiation. This is particularly true of highly diversified multicultural and multilingual polities, such as India and Nigeria. In both countries, governments are made up of coalitions of interests groups and political ideological blocs represented by individuals whose actions are affected by a wide range of personal and social forces. In their analysis of educational decentralization
McGinn and Street (1999) critiqued the notion that governments are unitary or monolithic and distinct from individuals or groups within society. For them, governments are “complex systems of competing groups and factions whose members are both within the government and external to it” (p. 120). Moreover, individuals cannot be completely separated from but are integral to the structures and processes of government. By implication, this view abandons the commonsensical logic of decentralization, which emphasizes the sovereignty of the individual consumer – a logic that equates democracy with individualism. It adopts the view that even in democratic systems decentralization is not intended to increase individuals’ participation as such but that of certain individuals or groups. Thus, decentralization is about shifting the locus of authority and control, not the devolution of power from centralized to local or individual actors.

This “one group versus another” thesis allows the authors to explain the otherwise inexplicable contradictions of government decision making. Like governments, non-governmental entities are not monolithic, a point McGinn and Street ignores in the conceptual mapping of their analysis of the Peruvian, Chilean and Mexican cases. They argue that educational policies (in this case, that of decentralization) are promoted by some groups and resisted by others, both within the government, often in pursuit of their interests. Yet, in discussing the Mexican case, they illustrate how a dissident faction in the national teachers union (i.e., the National
Coordinator of Educational Workers, CNTE) broke ties with their parent National Union of Educational Workers (SNTE) and effectively negotiated improvements in the educational system that the SNTE was reluctant to or incapable of accomplishing. Intra-group factions appear to be an inherent feature of social groups and collective action whether in or outside governments. One Nigerian participant reflects this argument when he notes that government’s inaction in policy reform issues partly from internal dialectical divisions and competitions among regional languages (see Chapter Six).

The basis of the idea that groups are not often monolithic and do not always act rationally in pursuit of a common interest is well articulated in Mancur Olson’s (1971) seminal work, Logic of Collective Action: Public Good and the Theory of Groups. Contrary to the conventional wisdom of his time, Olson argues that individual members of a group attempting to provide public good through collective action often tend to “free ride” on the efforts of others unless selective incentives are provided to motivate participation. This logic of collective action illustrates the primacy of personal interests and variable social conditions, over membership to a group, in defining and acting towards “common” interests. Put simply, individuals assembled around a common interest (such as government employment, membership in a linguistic community, or academe) also possess interests that differ markedly in other ways. This is particularly

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92 The notion of public good in political science and economic research has two central characters: they are non-excludable (i.e., one individual cannot reasonably prevent another from consuming the good), and they are non-rivalrous (i.e., one individual’s consumption of the good does not affect another’s, and vice versa) (Olson, Logic of Collective Action: Public Good and the Theory of Groups, 1971).
true in India and Nigeria, where preexisting lines of division shape how individual and
groups enter or break alliances. Thus, while many people might be passionate about
language issues, divisions on specific language policy and ELP abound among intra-group
factions. A Nigerian professor of education and linguistics illustrates this with the
dialectical differences among the Igbos: “The official “Central Igbo” is really nobody’s
dialect, but the Anambra area, and even the Enugu, Nsukka, Abakaliki and Enugu-Ezike
people associate it with Owerri or Imo dialects. So they resist it and insist on their own
dialects”. Strong emotional ties to languages that lead to inter-group conflict potentially
impede collective ELP action. For an adviser to the Indian government,

Language is so intimate to everybody because the whole cultural beliefs
and growth centers on it, and it is bound to face several types of
challenges. Wherever there is an innovative experiment related to
language pedagogy, it is bound to face the maximum number of hurdles
than any other subjects because it is so close to everybody’s heart. As
such, the whole politics in the society centers on language somehow.
Indeed, no multilingual society can thrive without the politics of
language. (personal interview, May 5, 2009)

He further argues that in most cases, individuals and groups do not openly acknowledge
their actual position and often exhibit strong hypocritical tendencies:

I will tell you something I might not be allowed to say officially. In the
bureaucratic circle, many people don’t believe in [mother-language
education]. They believe in and promote English as the language of
schooling. So when you try to advocate mother tongue-based education,
especially when development partners are present, many people attend
and voice their support. And we appreciate that. But when it comes to
real practice, they will not give a full-fledged support. Such [hypocrisy] is
also part of the process...so you have to be very careful in dealing with
different individuals and groups. Ultimately, whoever shows a little bit of
sensitivity and interest, we try to exploit that opportunity. Since it is the
education secretary in the ministry who approves these [SSA] initiatives
in the Project Approval Board meetings, we try to be very careful so that
dissenters will not stop it; they may not support it individually by
advocating it publicly, but at least they will also not oppose us. (personal
interview, May 6, 2009)

The loaded arguments above illustrate the sensitivity with which actors in and
outside governments navigate intra-group differences and alliances. While constant
negotiations and dialogue among various interest groups are essential to the language
policymaking process, success in getting governments or other stakeholders to adopt a
particular stance requires committed people capable of building coalitions in ways that
satisfy divergent interests. A Nigerian participant echoes this belief and recalls that in an
official gathering in 2008, the Honorable Minister for Education lamented that Nigeria
has no national language policy. Capitalizing on this public statement, several individuals
in the ministry initiated talks with interests groups in and outside FME, including the
Minister, to set up the infrastructure for a national language policy. The effectiveness of
such talks depends largely on the capacity of these individuals to satisfy multiple
conflicting interests and build alliances across a wide social and public policy settings.

It is difficult to ascribe specific interests to particular groups partly because
interests change constantly and fluid group boundaries overlap. However, such interests
are strong enough to produce widespread defection even among academic experts who
share common scholarly beliefs about language. An Indian academic expert who worked
for long periods in and outside government institutions and grassroots organizations
describes one such defection. As member of the Central Advisory Board on Education (CABE) in 2005, he proposed a “common school system” for all Indians, arguing that every school should be a mother-language-based neighborhood school, and that there should be a central educational policy applicable to all schools and students throughout the country irrespective of class, caste or religion. In such schools, children will be exposed to the same curriculum and educational standard “with no regard to whether the child belongs to a Member of Parliament, the Prime Minister or to a beggar of the streets of Delhi” (personal interview, April 23, 2009). The 2005 CABE members was mainly from the academia with over 30 scholars, in addition to education ministers from all 35 States and Union territories, chairpersons or the heads of state education institutions (such as the University Grant Commission, NCERT, All India Council of Technical Education, AICTE) and many others. Convinced that a coalition of academic experts is critical in advancing the common school agenda, my participant obtained fellow scholars’ support for the proposed common school. However, these scholars withdrew their support during the CABE deliberation and decision-making.

To explain defection in the ELP processes of India and Nigeria requires some speculation, since each case is different and shaped by a unique set of constantly changing variables. For the common school proponent in question, this case illustrates the unitive force of elite action. Like politicians, academics in India occupy a social cadre of elitism distinct from the “uneducated” and the educated non-professionals, such as
civil servants and skilled workers. In India, elitism often intersects with the caste system to produce a class of “experts” whose social privileges and legitimacy are determined not merely by their academic expertise but more by their membership to particular groups or social classes. As another Indian scholar corroborates, “religion is not a variable that matters. It may be important for proselytization, but not for language or economic development” (personal interview, April 20, 2009).\textsuperscript{93} The common school proponent notes that elitism in India is chiefly constituted by the ruling class, which is the Hindu upper caste. Yet the mindset of the Hindu upper caste is identical to that of the Muslim and the Christian upper classes. Upper caste interests cut across religious barriers. As such, academics who collectively endorse the principles of equity and quality in education also oppose a corresponding school reform proposal when its purposes are at odds with social class interests.

Although deeply entrenched social factors such as social class, nature of social institutions, and the legacies of British colonialism are crucial to understanding the ELP as a process in India and Nigeria, the nature of language as an educational policy issue shapes the ways in which these factors operate. There is a tendency for ELP stakeholders to perceive language as core to education (and indeed, the functioning of societies) and simultaneously as marginal to educational development. Several

\textsuperscript{93} Most Indian participants believe in the preeminence of social class over religion as a unifying force for collective action. As a prominent Indian scholar argues, when Indian Muslims go to the Middle East as laborers, the local Muslims don’t consider them their equal because they’re Muslims just as Christians from Africa are not considered equals in the West simply because they are Christians. In Nigeria however, it appears that the fecundity of religion is engendering collective action is particularly strong.
participants point out that language is foundational to humans’ capacity to ratiocinate, to function in society and to survive as a species. On this level, ELPs are strategic instruments for resolving fundamentally linguistic social conditions. Simultaneously, language is treated as a marginal compartmentalized code that deserves attention to the extent it helps address more fundamental broader social issues.

Both ideas about language as an end and a tool pervade the Indian, Nigerian and UNESCO ELP processes and diminish the chances of relevant stakeholders sharing similar views about their primary subject. UNESCO’s various language programs illustrate these two senses of and lack of shared conceptions of language. To preserve endangered languages the Culture Sector deploy the logic of language as intrinsic to human dignity and survival. Protecting languages from extinction is thus a moral imperative with language survival as its self-contained goal. The Education Sector however, pictures language as a tool for enhancing learning and understanding. Here, it is one of the manipulable variables for maximizing the benefits of formal education. In this sense, language is secondary to more primary issues of access, gender parity, funding, resource availability, and so forth. Arguably, building and getting everyone to school precedes issues about what language to teach them in. Access to education becomes a higher priority than language, especially LOI. Such major educational concerns take on deeper meaning and assume vital importance in societies facing economic crisis, natural disasters and social conflicts. However, this does not explain
what role language plays in setting the conditions that keep children away from schools and create economic crises or conflicts in the first place, nor does it explain our notion of education as learning that occur only in schools. Both the UNESCO Culture and Education sectors operate within a larger framework in which the organization seeks to utilize all possible tools to install the defenses of peace in the minds of people, since “war begins in the minds of men” (UNESCO, 2004).

To ELP stakeholders therefore, language can simultaneously occupy the core of human existence and survival and also represent a marginal instrument for addressing more important social issues. In international discourse, language occupies the same position as gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic class, religion, remoteness and so forth that collectively lead to marginalization in education and raise complex questions about the potential tension between group identity on one hand, and social and economic aspirations on another (UNESCO, 2010). Thus, even when ELP stakeholders agree on a specific course of action (say, in support of early mother-language education), the actual reasoning behind and ultimate objective of their consensus vary significantly. Once these underlying reasons and objectives become incompatible, existing consensus quickly disintegrates. It can be potentially dangerous to assume that all supporters of mother-language education policies share the same interests or possess a common understanding about language or education. Thus, any existing coalitions are only temporary, awaiting reconfigurations of interests for new alliances to emerge and
corresponding consensuses to develop. In multilingual societies like Nigeria and India, it is not sufficient to disclose who supports or opposes specific ELPs and why; one must explore the deeper meanings that shape those choices, and interrogate how ideas about the nature and role of language undergo constant change and modifications.

Uncovering Dilemmas and Paradoxes: Problematic Logics of Education Language Policymaking

Were the complications and complexities highlighted in the previous sections the only clogs in the wheel of education language policymaking, ELP stakeholders’ actions and scholarly analyses of the ELP process would be less convoluted. However, numerous dilemmas and paradoxes pervading the ELP process make coherent collective policy action improbable and complicate ELP scholarship. The most outstanding of these dilemmatic and paradoxical conditions relate to the dominance of English over indigenous languages and the relationships among indigenous languages, both illustrating the logic of hegemony.

In Nigeria and India, support for and opposition to English language define ELP stakeholders’ framing of hegemonic relationships. Paradoxically, English is viewed both as a language of oppression and of liberation. On one hand, the status of English as a colonial legacy continues to generate anti-colonial resentments and fuel the discourse on social self determination. Problematically, Nigeria (and to an extent, India), are fabrications of the same colonial system to be overturned by currents of self
determinacy. On another hand, English is now a symbol of liberation for the numerous “marginalized” social groups. In India, the caste system continues to entrench inequalities and social injustices. While inter-group inequality was not as institutionalized in Nigeria prior to colonialism, ethnic, religious, class and political differences in post-colonial Nigeria are core frameworks for social injustices. Marginalized groups in India and Nigeria have embraced English as a strategic tool for resisting local hegemonic controls of more dominant social groups. As such, a simultaneous desire for and distrust of English characterizes the ELP process in both countries.

Additionally, various ELP stakeholders believe that English impedes learning much as others believe that it facilitates learning. Psycholinguistic arguments driving most of mother-language education advocacy show that not only do children learn (and perform) better (in all academic domains) in their first language, they also master subsequent languages with greater facility than students who start schooling in a foreign language (UNESCO, 2010; Brock-Utne & Skattum, 2009; Fafunwa, Macauley, & Sokoya, 1989). Yet, ELP stakeholders agree that in spite of its hegemonic connotation, English has positioned itself as a global language of knowledge. Learning English thus opens doors to knowledge systems otherwise inaccessible within the confines of native languages.
Proponents of mother-language education insist that this apparent contradiction disappears when one: (a) dispels the erroneous implication that mother-language education advocacy is anti-English; (b) considers that starting schooling in a child’s first language facilitates, not impedes, mastery of English; and (c) understands that the real threat to this global intellectual exposition through English lies in the insistence on early primary English-medium schooling (see Brock-Utne & Skattum, 2009). That this message is yet to percolate the ELP processes bespeaks the distancing of academic scholarship in language policymaking and the disjuncture of academic wisdom and actual practices. More, experts in this area emphasize that for children to reap the full dual benefits of early mother-language education and multilingual education (i.e., advanced cognitive functioning and facility with L2, L_n acquisition), they must have highly qualified teachers in their mother tongue and in English, and adequate educational resources and learning conditions (such as books, low teacher-student ratio, and so forth), conditions that only a handful of Indian and Nigerian students enjoy. Thus, even when language policymakers concede that early mother-language education is beneficial, there is reason to believe that merely switching to an indigenous LOI will not override the implications of other unsatisfied educational needs. The issue therefore is whether early English-medium education yields better outcomes than poorly provided early mother-language education, an issue worthy of serious academic attention. I return to this issue
later in this and subsequent sections. What is crucial is that there exists a pervasive conflict of ideas about English as an impediment to and facilitator of learning.

The issues here are not purely cognitive or academic; they have telling social dimensions. English’s dual functions as a language of power and of knowledge paradoxically dispose it to simultaneously facilitate hegemony and counter-hegemony. The political power of English enables elites and the educated class to establish and perpetuate socioeconomic dominance through linguistic divergence from the masses (Myer-Scotton, 1990). Rejecting English as a language of domination becomes as compelling a counter-hegemonic strategy as mastering it with the aim to gain access into and challenge the dominant class and their mechanisms of social control, both processes of which are very palpable in India and Nigeria. More importantly, learning English potentially opens students to intellectual worldviews that help challenge hegemonic systems. As noted about the states of Kerala, West Bengal and Tripura, exposure to Marxist thoughts continue to define the Indian political landscape in organized forms. In Nigeria, such exposure elicits less organized but equally formidable resistance against regimes of domination. An Indian scholar argues:

...this [dual conflicting role of English] is the plight of Indian scholars, particularly feminist scholars. I teach a course on feminism but I cannot find a good writing on Patriarchy in Hindi. I only find a few translations. So my students who are fluent in English end up getting a lot more materials than students who cannot read English. Although they can be useful, one cannot depend entirely on translations. That is the reality when one has deal with these competing demands on the grounds. (personal interview, May 5, 2009)
It appears therefore that if ending hegemonic relations and installing equality and social justice are non-negotiable social purposes, English might be a necessary bitter pill that gives dominated groups access to institutional mechanisms of social control (such as politics, education, economy, media, and so forth) and exposes them to wider discourse on counter-hegemony ideologies and strategies. Reconciling resistance against and demand for English in any coherent ELP process presents telling challenges.

Balancing these conflicting interests is further complicated by the fact that decisions about language often receive secondary attention to what education policymakers consider more primary educational concerns. A Nigerian ELP stakeholder at the FME uses a machine metaphor to illustrate this point:

Government is a big and complex machinery that constantly handles many crucial issues. When it is faced with issues of oil crisis, economic downturn, ASUU strike, and other “fires on the mountain”, presenting issues of language policy appears ridiculous to the government. But when constant demands from all angles puts language issues on the front row as an urgent political priority, then it receives serious attention. (personal interview, June 17, 2009)

Yet, as another participant notes, addressing language policy as an urgent political issue constrains policymakers from embarking on a thorough and far-reaching examination of the vast implications of language decisions. A more common practice evident in current ELPs is to fabricate a quick compromise intended to pacify immediate political interests.

The discussion above on the contradictory political and intellectual importations of language, which so far has largely focused on English, has a domestic side. Most
minority linguistic groups whose activities often significantly impact official policies on language resist the imposition of dominant regional languages such as Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba (in Nigeria) and Hindi, Assamese, Telugu and Urdu (in India). Central to the logic of this resistance is anti-hegemonic sentiments over potential subjugation by dominant ethnic, caste, and religious groups. As illustrated by the aforementioned action of the Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister (and several other states with vast minority populations), demand for English is a common resistance strategy of minority linguistic groups. Implicitly however (and sometimes explicitly), such groups still install the same linguistic hegemony they oppose in the dominant indigenous languages. The view of an Indian scholar on this is worth noting at some length:

To begin with, English was not a major interest in India’s language policymaking because the understanding was that English has to be done away with eventually. The hope was that all Indians will learn Hindi. But given the very mechanical way in which the TLF was formulated, most of the issues continue today. When Hindi rulers tried to make Hindi the national language, there were violent protests especially in southern states, such as Tamilnadu. This set back forced policy makers to be more innovative in formulating a language policy [the TLF] in a way that doesn’t look like Hindi is being imposed on all the people whose regional language is not Hindi. Interestingly, English doesn’t suffer that kind of resistance; nearly everybody wants to learn English. But if the government were to pronounce that English will be made national language, nationalists all over the country will protest against it. However, English has become a very important language without being declared the national language. You cannot correspond with Central government at the national level in any other language but English. Nobody says that English is a national language and nobody will ever say such a thing. But in fact if tomorrow there is an announcement of this type, people will be up in arms against that policy decision. The reality is that indirectly, through the back door, English has acquired the
importance of more than a national language in India. (personal interview, April 27, 2009)

From a sociological standpoint, Indians are resisting hegemony but also clamoring for it, challenging language dominance while demanding it, protesting against linguistic impositions but also embracing it. What is more revealing is that, according to the participant cited above, English will receive the same fate of opposition were it to be given the same national language status as Hindi. In Nigeria, English has indeed received such official status and appears to have tentatively brokered peace among dominant and minority languages, and calmed fears about dominance by ethnic and religious majorities. Yet, even with the logic of indigenization\textsuperscript{94} English continues to be a symbol of double oppression, first through British colonial infrastructures, and now through elite social, political and economic control. The widespread resistance against majority indigenous languages and demand for English creates a disjuncture between stated political purposes and actual linguistic practices. It deploys a tool of hegemony in opposition to hegemony. As I argue in the next part of this chapter, such disjuncture and decoupling, pervade ELP processes and constrain the possibilities of coherent collective language policy action.

\textsuperscript{94} Some experts on world Englishes argue that like Christianity, English passes through a process of indigenization in which former British colonies (and recently, non-British colonies like Rwanda) adopts the language and transforms it into a local linguistic code with minor variations. One major problem with this argument is that English in those countries (India more than Nigeria) is still spoken as first language by less than half the population (Herbemas, 1975). The degree to which English can be considered an indigenous language in India and Nigeria is still questionable (Nkrumah, 1965)
Network, Disjuncture, Decoupling and the Education Language Policy Process

If education language policymaking in multilingual societies is trapped in complexities, dilemmas and paradoxes that incapacitate decision making efforts, how is any ELP decision possible? What mechanisms account for ELP stakeholders’ relative success in navigating the complications of language policymaking as new policy initiatives, consensuses, and linguistic practices emerge. I argue in previous sections that although impulses for centralized language policy reform continue to be resisted at multiple levels and ELP process consequently remains stymied, India and Nigeria still witness momentous language policy decisions and activities at all levels. Even central governments that have remained reluctant to embark on a nation-wide multilingual ELP continue to transact small-scale consensuses with different linguistic communities and interest groups at the dictates of larger political demands. On the grassroots level, ELP decisions and activities are more vibrant through the SSA/EFA and minority language initiatives in both countries. Given the pervasive contradictions in all language policymaking arenas, how can one explain coherent action?

To address this question, we can first discern commonalities across cases by viewing the actual experiences of individuals actively responsible for specific language policy actions and the particular conditions in which they function. One common thread linking all cases of successful ELP action is the primacy of the individual and the coalitions and networks they form. If there is any issue on which all participants agree, it
is that the success or failure of any ELP initiative depends on the capacity of committed individuals to harness personal, institutional and social resources in pursuit of well defined policy goals. Crucial here is the individual’s personality and ability to navigate multiple overlapping cultural spaces imbued with conflicting norms. Ability to adjust to multiple cultural, institutional and social spaces enables an individual to build (and trade) credibility and consequently establish coalitions of interests that collectively advance specific ELP initiatives.

Underscoring the centrality of the individual in ELP processes does not necessarily minimize the role of institutions and social groups as critical language policy actors. It is axiomatic that institutions and social groups are meaningless entities (as ELP actors) without the individuals that occupy and operate through them. Institutions and social groups play an important role since their tendency to confer a certain form of legitimacy provides individual actors initial grounds and resources for establishing credibility. One international consultant in India emphasized this point regarding UNESCO’s role in India’s ELP process:

...there have been people in this [UNESCO] chair that could not function effectively because they hit the wall due to cultural or personality conflicts they could not handle... you need to have some credibility first. Of course there are institutional pathways for doing that, but as a consultant observing different people in different positions, I believe the crucial things is not so much these institutional agreements between say MHRD, UNESCO and other agencies; the personalities of the people working in these institutions are much more important... (personal interview, May 4, 2009)
While the symbioses of individuals and their institutions or social groups ensure constant mutual exchange of personal and structural resources, individuals constitute the atomistic channels through which such exchanges are transacted in ways that translate into language policy action. Inferentially, such exchanges are not always positive but can yield undesirable outcomes. An individual’s personality can work to tarnish institutional image and undermine the credibility of other institutionalized actors much the same as affiliation with unpopular agencies magnifies an individual’s challenge in establishing credibility with competing entities. The vagaries of individual and institutional interactions take a particular form – of simultaneous network and disjuncture.

On Network and Disjuncture

Committed individuals and the coalitions they form do not work independently; they are part of larger sets of loose international, national and local networks arising from the intersection of interests and need to exchange ideas and resources. In India and Nigeria, different agencies (discussed in earlier chapters) constantly modify their relationships on language policy issues, and as such each language policy network is unique and temporal. As loose structures with no binding obligations, ELP networks evolve depending on the nature and specific circumstances of particular policy initiatives. Such historical circumstances determine which agencies enter or exit what networks and which individuals within them are most suited to the specific policymaking
activities. In addition to the stakeholders already discussed in earlier chapters, India and Nigeria have numerous local, state-level and regional agencies that form part of these loose networks formed around domain-specific ELP issues.

Although India and Nigeria are rich network sites for language policymaking, UNESCO epitomizes the logic and operations of networks in ELP processes. Michael Omolewa (2007) offers a crisp summary of UNESCO’s organizational structure and operational strategies as a network and a promoter of networks. Organizationally, the link between UNESCO’s Central Secretariat, constituted by representatives from Member States; Field Office (including Cluster Office and Regional Bureaus); and National Commissions set up the basic network infrastructure for dialogue among nations and among each nation’s governments, non-government bodies and citizens. Through these structural units built over its half century of existence, UNESCO has succeeded in establishing strong partnerships with various non-governmental, social, cultural, economic, political and academic bodies.

According to Omolewa (2007), the rationale for such massive structural network is that it permits UNESCO to build consensus through mutual exchanges and constant dialogues that constitute the lifeblood of its conferences, workshops, seminars, and expert meetings. The outcome of such networks has been programmatic entities and international conferences, such as the 1949 World Conference on Adult Education in Elsinore, Denmark, with subsequent meetings in Montreal, Canada that saw to the
establishment of the International Council for Adult Education (ICAE) headquartered in Ontario. Another such important outcome is the meeting of Ministers of Education of African Countries (MINEDAF), first in Addis Ababa in 1961, which later gave rise to several networks of Ministers of Education in various sub-regions of Africa, professional organizations such as the African Distance Education Association (ADEA) and teacher professional groups. As Omolewa indicates, these bodies have become critical players in generating ideas and resources expended on national and local ELP processes.

UNESCO is also committed to promoting networks outside of the organization. Omolewa argues that UNESCO discovered early in its history that it did not have a monopoly over networks as a strategy for promoting dialogue through meetings and workshops. Indeed, as an international organization, UNESCO was not the first to attempt cross-national networking, as evident in the education network prefigured by the League of Nations in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, the International Institute of International Cooperation that heralded UNESCO’s formation, and numerous earlier international conferences, such as the conference on education held in July 1876 in Philadelphia (Fuchs, 2007; 2004). Accordingly, UNESCO shares in other international networks that bear on language policy processes. One of the most recent and widely popular networks in which UNESCO participates is the EFA-FTI (Education For All–Fast Track Initiative), a global partnership between donor and
“developing” countries committed to the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of universal primary education by 2015.

Their effectiveness in promoting consensus through dialogue notwithstanding, networks are fundamentally problematic in that they often have no actual binding mechanisms for ensuring compliance to consensuses. With no enforceable compliance framework, consensuses quickly become mere ceremonial conventions with little or no real impact on the issues around which networks are convened at enormous financial, time, and other costs to individual members. Further, it is difficult to understand whether members of international (or even national) networks readily consent to politically sensitive contentious agreements primarily because they are aware of the network’s incapacity to enforce compliance or simply due to genuine commitment to the issue of such consensuses. Phillip W. Jones and David Coleman (2005) argue that this problem of translating lofty ideals into actual practices has been a constant contentious debate in UNESCO since its birth.

Over the decades since World War II, scores of multilateral consensuses that emerge through established networks and allow for disjuncture ultimately install decoupling as normative practices of international and national public policy, including ELPs. Nigeria and India for instance are signatory to UNESCO’s policy on education in a

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95 The concept of decoupling has various meanings in different fields. In organizational studies, especially within neo institutionalism, it refers to the gap between formal policies and actual practices. As used here, decoupling is a strategy in organizational behavior that exploits the weaknesses of institutional
multilingual world, which recommends mother-language education until a child is proficient and literate enough in that language before additional foreign (English, in the cases here) languages are introduced gradually (UNESCO, 2003). Consistent with this provision, both countries have constitutional provisions for early primary mother-language education. However, they have invested enormous resources in the development and advancement of majority languages and almost none to minority languages.

In several instances, government agencies have worked to resist or slow grassroots efforts to develop and use their own languages in schools. Nigeria’s NPE prescribes mother-language education only in the first three years of primary schooling after which there is a sharp switch to English as medium of instruction, a phenomenon known as “early exit” (contrasted with “late exit”) in bilingual studies (Skutnabb-Kangas, Phillipson, Mohanty, & Panda, 2009 (Thomas & Collier, 2002)). In India, mother-language education is prescribed only for the first two years, with a subsequent switch to regional language or English depending on states’ provisions. As the Ife Six-Year Primary Project findings show, three years or less of mother-language primary education are insufficient for a child to master their first language(s) before proceeding to additional languages (Fafunwa, Macauley, & Sokoya, 1989). Moreover, the unavailability of quality mother-language and multilingual education teachers, networks to create and maintain a divide between formally endorsed ELP positions and actual linguistic practices. For discussions on decoupling in education, see Delucchi (2000).
educational materials in indigenous languages, and a host of other critical resources, make this three-year benchmark less realistic of its proposed goals. Ultimately, both countries’ ELPs fall deeply short of the standards they set through UNESCO.

Equally striking is the fact that both India and Nigeria have no set framework for ensuring the effective implementation of their ELPs. In India, this is partly because constitutionally decisions about education were originally states’ sole responsibility, as enshrined in the 1950 Constitution that put education under the “State List”. Since 1980, however, education has been moved to the “Concurrent List”, giving both states and the central government shared right over educational decision making (Khubchandani, 2008). In Nigeria, education has been on the Concurrent Legislative List since the terminal stages of colonialism, as seen in the 1951 Macpherson Constitution (Fabunmi, 2005). Both the 1979 and 1999 Constitution places education on the Concurrent List. Besides non-statutory recommendations (such as NCERT’s NCF) and specific state- or community-based program interventions (e.g., the SSA in India or the approval of Ibibio for WAEC in Nigeria), the national government still has no binding framework for ensuring the implementation of ELP provisions in schools. It is noteworthy that less than half of Indian students are covered by and have access to NCERT curriculum frameworks. In both countries, the commodification of English language has popularized private for-profit English-only schooling. A Director at NCERT
and professor of education argues that this figure, though grim, marks an improvement from the recent past:

The NCF itself is a tremendous act of innovation that has created a huge impact lately. In 2004 only 3% of India’s children were using the textbooks produced by NCERT. Today, that number has increased to 30%, and not only in elite schools. So improvement of quality of educational materials is a very clear indication of NCERT’s impact on the system. And same can be said on NCERT’s impact on teacher training processes. (Personal interview, May 6, 2009)

Although reliable educational statistics are not readily available, many participants record that the rest of India’s students attend either state schools, which use curricula provisions from State Councils of Educational Research and Training (SCERT), or private (aided and non-aided) institutions. Private institutions have become increasingly popular in India as demand for English-medium instruction rises.

The NCERT Director explains that this kind of educational differentiation and tendency for decoupling issues from the country’s political systems:

India runs a federal system...and government is very complicated: there are 28 State Governments with a considerable autonomy in education. NCERT is a federal institution sitting in Delhi. The only authority that it has in relation to states is moral, not statutory. Indian education as a whole is not run with a statutory authority since states are allowed to take their own decisions. The job of the central ministry is to morally persuade the states to try new ideas. And this is where NCERT comes into the picture. (Personal interview, May 6, 2009)

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96 The most recent All India Educational Survey conducted by NCERT in September 2002 does not contain disaggregated data on student enrolment to Union Government, State and Private schools across the country. For an Atlas on School Education from the 7th All India School Education Survey, see NCERT (NCERT, 2004).
A Nigerian professor of education and linguist who studies ELP implementation on the local levels laments the lack of centralized coordination between central, state and local governments in enforcing language policies and the contingency of compliance on unstable local conditions in Nigeria:

…the provision was always there for States and communities to use their languages. But compliance was generally low and nonexistent in some areas. However, as people become more conscious about the importance of their own language for education and the threats of linguistic extinction, they become more proactive. Recently, particularly Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC) and some EFA-related programs emphasize linguistic developments at the lower levels. In states with heightened awareness, State Governments become more interested in developing these languages. Some State Houses of Assembly, which have a big stake in language, have started using local languages in the Houses, even if only one day in a week – a development that is very good for grassroots democracy. In the southeast, Anambra State not only voted to use Igbo in the State House of Assembly; they also included a General Studies curriculum in primary and secondary schools that require students to pass Igbo language. But this is a recent awakening on the state level. Northern states have generally been more inclined to using Hausa since the First Republic. However, these linguistic awakening on the state or local levels, which is the main engine driving language policy implementation, are few and far apart. We haven’t seen much with Local Government Areas which are often linguistically homogeneous. As consultants, we encourage them to stop lamenting governments’ inaction and take responsibility for the fate of their own language. Of course, this would be different if Nigeria had a national language policy with clear implementation framework for all parts of the country. (Personal interview, June 10, 2009)

As the federal agency most invested in ELP implementation, UBEC monitors educational activities at the classroom level in all 36 states and the federal capital. The most recent UBE monitoring report for 2006/2007 however, contains no data on
language use in classrooms, although it documents things like teachers’ preparation of lesson notes and use of instructional aids, student motivation, teacher-student relationship and so forth as well as major challenges, areas of required improvements and recommendations (UBEC, 2008). In defense of the report, a UBEC officer argued that while the Commission has potential for improvement, it operates under the principle that “education for all is the responsibility of all,” a program maxim clearly printed on the cover of the UBE monitoring reports.

Decoupling in ELP processes is not only associated with national entities; indigenous language groups as well as regional and state institutions frequently deploy it as a strategic response to extreme and potentially divisive linguistic developments. Grassroots participants in this study all agree on the lack of awareness among teachers on the local levels about formal ELPs and implementation resources. The mutual invisibility between centralized language policymakers and local practitioners in education reinforces institutional actors’ reluctance toward comprehensive policy action and also relieves school-level actors from the obligation to comply with government ELPs. Thus, constitutional provisions for early mother-language education are generally ignored in the widespread demand for English.

Strong Consensus, Weak Compliance, and The Logic Of (De)Coupling

Why do the same institutions and groups that advocate particular language policies readily abandon actual implementation of what they profess? Indeed, why do
systems decouple? What systemic logic permits international, national and local language policy agencies to operate individually and collectively as rational, intellectually honest, morally committed, and politically democratic entities while simultaneously engaging in pervasive decoupling practices? The scope of this question expands beyond language policy and ELP discourse, since decoupling, as an organizational behavior, is not limited to language issues or education *per se*. I examine some possible explanations and their import to ELP studies.

**Decoupling as Pragmatic Management: The Logic of Legitimacy**

The question of *why do systems and organizations decouple* has preoccupied organizational theorists in various fields for decades. Some researchers argue that decoupling enables institutions and groups to gain legitimacy with their external constituents and simultaneously retain significant internal flexibility for addressing pragmatic concerns (Krücken & Drori, 2009; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Since the end of the World War II, international agencies like UNESCO have established themselves as intellectual and moral forces of legitimacy. Besides diplomatic relations with Member States UNESCO maintains symbolic ties with other international, national and local education bodies with which it trades legitimacy. Since UNESCO represents an international force of global reckoning, most ELP actors in India and Nigeria consider alliance with UNESCO a mark of legitimacy. Symbolically, therefore, adherence to UNESCO’s ELP norms implies a desirable signifier of international alignment.
Indeed, Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez (1997) and Ramirez and Boli (1987) suggest hypothetically that any unknown society in a previously undiscovered island will upon "discovery" (i.e., exposure to the "international community" of nations and organizations) restructure to create political, economic and social institutions - including education – similar to those of other nations and consistent with normative standards of international organizations, such as UNESCO. That the rush to adopt UNESCO’s policy prescription – soon after this island society is “discovered” and begins to buy into the desirability mindset of international affiliations – will occur “naturally” and not necessarily by direct external forces is indicative of a self-reflexive impulsion to “belong” to and be recognized (i.e., legitimated) by established global systems.

International institutions do not have a monopoly on legitimacy. Indeed, UNESCO is functionally invalid without the endorsements of Member states on the one hand and the United Nations on the other. Jones and Coleman (2005) argue that UNESCO’s survival is a product of its formal status in the UN system as the lead agency in multilateral education, even with the absence of the US (1984-2003) and the UK (1985-1998), vehement Western critiques, organized assaults to its universality and severe budgetary constraints. Local language policy actors also perceive state, regional international entities as sources of credibility and legitimacy. ELP agents constantly trade legitimacy with other policy stakeholders depending on their relative (or perceived) credibility and importance.
Decoupling as Class Structural Management: The Logic of Elitism

Theorists offer other explanations as to why organizations decouple. Some scholars argue that decoupling can constitute an organizational strategy that serves the interests of powerful leaders and elites (Westphal & Zajac, 2001). Using theories of hegemony and mutual interactionism as heuristic devices for this study disposed me (in dialoguing with participants) to high sensitivity to issues of class structure. The discourse on elitism appears as a central theme around which most participants explain specific forces that account for the actual conditions of education language policymaking and linguistic practices in Nigeria and India. Comparatively, sensitivity to elite control is more accentuated in India because of the longstanding caste system and history of elitism. In his partial explanation of the slow progress in the advancement of mother-language and multilingual education across India, the NCERT Director offers a perspective on the entrenchment of elitism in society:

[India] is a highly segmented society with tremendous inequality within and between socioeconomic classes. That inequality is reflected in the school system itself: the NCF states right from the beginning that we have a society which has very significant inequalities that are reflected both in the resources available in the three types of schools and also in the hegemony of English, which is inherited from the colonial times. The attempt is to make the system gradually more capable of serving children of all sections of society, but in an inherently unequal social order. That should not be surprising to anyone; politics can never compensate for social inequalities. Social inequalities are entrenched in the economic, social, cultural conditions of society. (Personal interview, May 4, 2009, emphasis is mine)
While all participants agree that elite interests significantly influence ELP outcomes, not all believe that it is necessarily scripted into the ontological fabric of all human societies in ways that not only stultifies the logic of political equality but render the pursuit of social welfare meaningless. To attempt to justify this ontologizing of social inequality, one must distinguish between equality (an issue of uniformity and sameness) and equity (an issue of fairness and impartiality) (Hutmacher, 2001). Central to the logic of elitism is the claim that dominant political and economic members of society exploit mechanisms of public policy to ensure class differentiation and the maintenance of their dominance.

Another Indian scholar and prominent ELP actor argues that elitism is not a necessary outcome of normal social and individual differences; it is a historic fabrication whose internal operational principle of selective (or exclusivist) self-preservation is destructive and contradictory to equity and social justice. For him, while politics bestow legitimate power, the attachments of economic privileges to political control of social institutions result in what Myers-Scotton (1990) calls “elite closures” – the establishment and maintenance of political power and economic privileges through language choices. By setting up and maintaining social boundaries, the elite ensures that it possesses a unique linguistic repertoire different from other members of society, positively evaluates such linguistic repertoire (thereby linking them to systems of social and economic rewards), and resists the development of alternative codes capable of
challenging or overriding its control. The Indian scholar further argues that since independence, this elite control has bolstered by the Indian bourgeois capitalist in dictating ELPs, except during elections and/or when oppositional regional language movements emerged. Even then, elites yield only to pockets of linguistic concessions to pacify the masses and maintain the social stability necessary for their dominance. During elections, control of economic incentives help elite interests to maintain political power by illegitimate reward transactions between public office seekers and voters.

It is thus, not an accident that while successive governments profess to embark on educational programs aimed at equalizing or at least minimizing social class differences, elite schools in India, which serve as models of “good” education to many public and private educational institutions, continue to cater mostly to the children of wealthy elites. High tuition and selective admission requirements appear to be normal but serve as gate-keeping barriers against students whose parents’ socioeconomic statuses are predetermined by the elite-controlled social systems of education, employment and justice.

At issue here is what Ralph H. Turner (1960) calls “sponsored mobility”. Turner proposes a distinction between “contest” and “sponsored” mobility as a framework for understanding educational access and opportunities in the United States and England. Turner characterizes the US system as “contest mobility” in which access to elite status is an open contest, as contrasted to “sponsored mobility” in which elite status is given
on bases other than open competition and merit (Carter, 2002). Turner’s meritocratic model is central to US (and global) education dating back to Thomas Jefferson’s distinction between “artificial aristocracy” and “natural aristocracy” in his 1779 “Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge” (see Rury, 2009; Fraser, 2001). Several educational writers have argued however, that meritocracy is a mythical disguise for perpetuating inequities and elite control; meritocracy functions only as a principle but fails to level the playing ground for educational actors especially those of minority groups (McNamee & Miller, 2009).

The thesis of elite control is not new in language policy and ELP scholarship; any commentary on language policy in multilingual societies, especially those with a Marxist twist, must address the ways in which language practices map onto existing social class, economic, political, cultural, ethnic and religious divides. While one might disagree with the notion that inequity is a necessary operational principle of society, pervasive inequalities lend credence to Marxist critiques. India and Nigeria have ample lower class/caste individuals in prominent political and economic institutional positions, as exemplified by the aforementioned Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister (who comes from India’s lowest caste).

From a critical theory purview, having a handful of lower class/caste persons in public offices does not correspond to equal representation and hardly compensates for the widespread marginalization practices, an argument that features frequently in
analyses of the significance of Obama’s presidency for African Americans and minorities in the US (Hill, 2009). Additionally, having a few lower class/caste individuals in prominent public offices can serve the logic of decoupling, since elite-controlled public institutions can interpret that as a fulfillment of the mandate of political and economic equity and thus reject programs intended to impact grassroots realities. While it is logical to assume the existence of elite groups in all strata of society, having lower caste/class individuals in prominent political and economic positions marks a clear departure from previously institutionalized and legally enforced systems of segregation and oppression in many societies.

**Interest Divergence and Political Volatility: An Integrative Logic of Contingency**

It is not feasible for a single explanation to completely account for decoupling in all ELP processes. Some scholars have offered explanations other than those presented above. For example, Tilcsik (Forthcoming) contends that decoupling allows organizations to avoid implementing decisions that are technically rational and/or ineluctable but ideologically conflictual to organizational beliefs. To understand decoupling, we need an integrative explanatory model capable of accounting for variations in ELP activities without losing its conceptual coherence. In addition to explanations above, I suggest the logic of interest divergence and political volatility, both essential for understanding the tension between macro politico-social stability and micro economic and social interests.
As a public policy subject, language is politically volatile. A UNESCO expert and staff of the Paris Secretariat poignantly states: “The reason [UNESCO and most multilingual nations] do not have language policy is because language policy is a politically explosive issue. Through its lens, you can filter nearly all social inequality issues like marginalization, oppression, poverty, and so forth” (personal interview, June 8, 2009). The idea that any decision on language invites political conflicts, notwithstanding whose interests are served, is as widespread as it is problematic. One Indian participant remembers that as a member of an expert committee on the 1986 NPE, their recommendation for a more comprehensive ELP reform was rejected by the government because “any change [to the existing TLF] is fraught with danger”. The actual policy is ‘let the sleeping dog lie’”. He continues: “even the 2005 [NCF] talks about mother tongue in a hushed tone” (personal interview, April 23, 2009). The head of MHRD’s Language Division corroborates this sentiment:

We do not review language policies because we have a lot of language bias in the country. So whatever the status quo is the Government’s position; whatever has been done has been done. What we focus on is developing the scheduled languages and making sure people follow the existing policy. (Personal interview, April 24, 2009)

It appears therefore, that institutionalized, mostly government, actors (or the elite, if viewed from the classist prism) and major international agencies avoid critical questions about language policies primarily to avert its potential for precipitating political instability.
Interest divergence and political volatility

In different sections of this dissertation, I have noted the political sensitivity of language policies and the ELP process. Broadly speaking, the idea that language policy is politically explosive arises from the hackneyed fact that multilingual societies play host to sharply divergent and often conflicting group interests. These divergent interests have been the subject of serious political, social and intellectual conflicts that shape the respective societies and occupy public historical repertoires. The Hindi-Urdu/Hindu-Muslim divide that led to the partition of India and Pakistan, with grave human, economic and political costs, and the Biafran episode of 1967–70, as well as numerous language-related conflicts since then, signal the potential volatility of language to social and political systems that remain fragile since Independence.

Language policy’s political sensitivity is not limited to its propensity to engender social conflicts and political instability, often associated with violent oppositions among language groups and between their governments. Participants in this study underscore that language is richly politicized for non-linguistic interests. As ethnic majorities, the Hindi-Belt, much as the Hausas, Igbos and Yorubas, frequently exploit their languages to political ends. Schooled on the political efficacy of language, minority groups have deployed language in constructing identity blocs around which they pitch claims of marginalization and demand greater economic and political participation. ELP actors
concede that engaging other institutionalized actors require political adroitness and a capacity for political posturing.

Another dimension to language policy’s political sensitivity is that institutions and individual policymaking agencies are political entities. The point here is most illustrative by UNESCO, since it often stands as the most legitimate intellectual authority on ELP issues. UNESCO is run by representatives of Member States, often appointed (rarely elected) by their respective governments. As one UNESCO insider points out, over the years, UNESCO has witnessed a decline in the professional expertise of representatives within those program areas that define her mandate: education, culture, and science. Increasingly, permanent delegates are appointed on the basis of their diplomatic expertise, political networks, and/or bureaucratic profiles. These diplomatic representatives frequently confer with and defer to their governments on specific policy issues at UNESCO. As such, the deliberations of UNESCO’s General Conference, its Executive Council and associate programs must be viewed primarily as political exercises and negotiations between national political entities. In such negotiations, existing political relationships between prominent national actors take precedence over intellectual understanding and holistic value of and specific considerations about language in the education of multilingual societies.

To be sure, UNESCO can boast an enormous international network of intellectuals in any of these three program areas. UNESCO as a network fosters constant
assemblages of experts in various fields from across the world whose expertise in their fields and particular regions of interest constitute crucial intellectual resources for the organization. However, the capacity of academic experts to fulfill this intellectual role is undermined by two problems. First, enlisting scholars does not require and hardly relies on the recommendations of communities of experts, such as professional or academic organizations. It is unlikely that relying on professional and academic organizations for enlisting experts will ensure that the most qualified experts are enlisted since academic organizations themselves can be highly politicized (Aby & Kuhn IV, 2000; Simon, 1994). Delegates of Member States, Field Offices, national commissions, UNESCO affiliates, and existing internal networks provide the primary channels for enlisting experts. A UNESCO insider laments that cronyism has come to play a major role over an independent, rigorous, and open process that ensures coverage of the breadth of the most up-to-date knowledge in the respective fields.

A second and more serious problem is that academic experts at UNESCO only draft policy documents and make recommendations that are deliberated upon (and ultimately approved or rejected), by politically defined Member State. Only representatives of Member States possess legitimate authority to make decisions on policy issues. A typical instantiation can be found in the development of one of UNESCO’s most recent authoritative position papers on multilingualism, *Education in a Multilingual World* (UNESCO, 2003).
As the Director of the Education Language Policy section of UNESCO’s Secretariat explains, UNESCO commissioned a consultant to draft a position paper on education in multilingualism. The draft, which was reviewed by the program specialist in education, was presented to a group of scholars assembled in expert meetings. Through workshops and deliberations, these expert bodies agreed on a final draft that was presented to the General Conference for review and approval. It is here that authoritative positions were taken with modifications to the original draft validated by the experts. As with most national policies the academy at best becomes an intellectual handmaiden of a political class. Since this expert body is selected through highly politicized processes, and their resolutions subject to diplomatic deliberations of political institutions, moving beyond mere conventions and consensuses from which member states can decouple has been a big hurdle for UNESCO.

Similar processes attend all levels of ELP on the national and local levels. Participants in this study agree that as with UNESCO, academic experts enlisted by governments are often those who share common interests with prominent political actors, or are simply connected to systems of patronage. According to a UNESCO insider,

...the political nature of UNESCO people has contributed to the decadence of the organization...and with a lot of love for the organization and desire to make it better; I say it is pretty decadent. There is a lot of reusing and re-inviting the same people over and over again... The same people who have stayed in particular positions in the organization for a
long time often don’t renew their own knowledge and tend to rely heavily on people they already know or with who they have already been working in several capacities for years. So there is really not a very active knowledge renewal within. And then you have a body of retired “experts” that are well connected who continue to get involved in nearly all program areas... (personal interview, June 25, 2009)

This strong indictment from an insider resonates with commonly shared sentiments of many participants at the UNESCO Secretariat, Field Offices and national commissions. Yet, it is starkly at odds with popular beliefs that UNESCO embodies the most authoritative intellectual position on ELP issues. For most actors in India and Nigeria, UNESCO is a norm setter whose role in national ELP processes is mostly intellectual and technical. A UNESCO staff member agrees that while UNESCO ideally sets standards on language in education, “the handling of the normative instruments that are monitored by UNESCO’s governing body (i.e., the Executive Council) is political, not independent and rigorous.”

New Global Forces in Education Language Policy Processes

To explain ELP processes in India and Nigeria, one must turn not to one but multiple explanations that are individually insufficient but arguably robust enough collectively to account for most of the complexities and contradictions inherent in the language policymaking of multilingual societies. In addition to the ones discussed above, an Indian ELP expert argues that the workings of the various factors of ELP processes must now reckon with a totally new set of forces: those of the linkages among the
interests of neoliberal global capital, the global market, and information technology. National, regional and local ELP actors are now incapable of acting independently, as new sets of questions and resources emerge from global social, economic and political transactions. This suggests problematic relationships characteristic of ELP processes: while national (including regional and local) actors often function as elites with control over political and economic resources, they are transformed by new global forces into pseudo victims in a world in which India and Nigeria continue to be perceived (for both valid and questionable reasons) as “developing countries”. It strikes at the core of agency, awareness and volition: what are the roles of Nigerian and Indian ELP actors in the operations of neoliberal capital, global market and information technology? And, to what extent are their actions well informed and voluntary?

Two immediate tentative but incompatible answers equally appeal to the logic of hegemony. First, to suggest that their roles are comparatively insignificant and/or that they are uninformed or unwilling actor corroborates the global hegemony thesis, which suggests that transnational corporations (TNCs) and powerful national governments work to extend cultural, economic, political and social dominance over the rest of the world (Ikenberry, 2007; Mead, 2003). To argue alternatively that they are indeed well informed, willing and significant actors who are complicit with other global forces in the exploitation of local populations merely extends the geography of hegemony from the “global” to the national. Globalization theorists however, note that the term global has
no territorial referent distinct from the national and local arenas of social, economic, political and cultural activities, hence glocalization. A third option is to completely discard the hegemony thesis, along with its conspiracy undertones, and seek understanding of how new transnational forces interact with older ones, and how this interaction shapes the decisions of individual ELP actors as well as the overall development of language policymaking in multilingual societies.

Whatever the constellation of forces that drive ELP processes in its current rhizomic and contradictory directions, we as researchers are left with the question of what the future of education language policy in multilingual societies looks like. If history is instructive in any meaningful way, it might be safe to suggest that no significant alteration is likely to occur in the current approach to education language policymaking in India and Nigeria, as both countries continue to utilize current ELP mechanisms. However, academic scholarship is not merely descriptive; our data permit some inferences regarding alternate lines of development that both countries – and indeed other similar societies – can explore.

**Mapping the Future of Education Language Policy**

To embark on a conceptual cartography of the future of ELP in multilingual societies, following from the findings and discussions in preceding sections, requires that one either demonstrates how the intrinsic contradictions and dilemmas of ELP processes can constitute useful policymaking tools or engages them as real obstacles. As
with all aspects of language policymaking in multilingual societies, any course of action almost always invites complications. The submissions I make in this section are therefore guided by cautionary optimism. To create a framework for the major arguments of this section, I propose a distinction between policy formulation and policy formation as a general conceptual guide for future ELP research. I argue that future language policy and ELP researches would yield more actionable outcomes if their concerns extend beyond policy formulation to formation.

More specifically, I examine some popular misconceptions surrounding ELP processes in multilingual societies. The wide popularity of such misconceptions even in the face of contradictory evidences is indicative of the tendency for ELP and language policy agencies to compartmentalize social realities and to focus on one aspect of public policy at a time instead of the whole. This invites critical questions regarding what an expansive and integrative approach to ELP would entail not only for language but also the entire structures and systems of formal education as we know it.

Policy Formulation and Policy Formation: A Wider Conceptual Prism

Attached to the concept of policy, the terms “formulation”, “development”, “design”, “construction”, “creation”, “planning”, “fabrication”, “building”, and “formation” feature in professional ELP scholarship as popular (often interchangeable) descriptors for a wide range of activities and processes that collectively represent language policymaking in one or more ways. Their coverage includes activities of
government proclamations and corresponding program designs, legislations and constitutional provisions on language, institutional decision on linguistic practices, collective actions of linguistic communities on language issues, language debates, negotiations between and among partners and stakeholders over linguistic issues, deliberations on linguistic choices, and the drafting, publishing of position papers on language-related issues by international, national, local or multilateral entities, and so forth (Adrey, 2009; Sarangi, 2009; Orman, 2008; Ricento, 2006; Tollefson, 2002; Webb, 2002; Bamgbose, 1991).

The problem with this conceptual confusion is that even as the field grows and witnesses an immense flourishing of scholarly publications, language policy and planning and ELP studies to date lack clearly defined and widely accepted terms for talking about distinct activities and processes that constitute their subject matter. As a result, each term invites new definitions and reinteritations depending on the interpreter’s disposition, ultimately opening ways for misrepresentations. For instance, that two authors use the same terms “policy design” or “policy formulation” does not necessarily mean they are both addressing the same issues. While this is arguably unsatisfactory academic practice, it is particularly undesirable in a field whose subjects are laden with serious complications and ambiguities.

As an initial response to this problem, I propose a distinction between policy formulation and policy formation as two broad categories under which many of the
activities and processes of language policymaking can be situated, at least for analytical manipulability. I conceptualize policy formulation as the technical exercise of constructing institutional positions on language issues and subsequently transforming those decisions into textual forms capable of dissemination. Several issues emerge from this definition. First, being technical, policy formulation processes are scripted. Language policy institutions often have well specified procedures about the policymaking process, including what actions are required of whom under which conditions and in expense of which resources. Prescriptions also include the timing and periodization of each phase of the policymaking process. While such provisions are often encapsulated in constitutional or legislative documents, official documentation is not necessary for formal stipulation of ELP formulation protocols. Sometimes, institutional memory preserved by and handed down through generations of institutional actors crystallizes a set of procedures for ELP formulation. Later, I explain these scripted procedural provisions by the Nigerian and Indian governments.

A second element of policy formulation is that it is relatively rigid, permitting minimal deviations from and flexibility of set protocols. Common features of this set process include the appropriate office or officer to which new policy proposals, which often adhere to strict specifications (in terms of textual or oral presentation), must be submitted, the protocols for constituting a committees or commissions, the step-by-step progression to authoritative bodies and offices, and the procedures for publication
(mainly in digital and/or print forms) and dissemination. As such, policy formulation is fundamentally bureaucratic in design. Numerous policy initiatives fall into disfavor due to deliberate bureaucratic neglect of or unknowing failure to follow the rudiments of these institutional protocols.

Following from the above is a third element of policy formulation: its popularity in government and major institutional circles as against language communities and non-institutionalized interest groups. The kind of bureaucratic activities described above are often associated with governments and their organs who are authoritative embodiments of social organizations such as nations and states. The Nigerian and Indian governments as well as UNESCO Secretariat are good instances of the institutionalization of ELP as bureaucratic practice. It is specifically this tendency to a scripted set of overt institutional behaviors and activities that attract popular attention to governments and their agencies as the site for language policymaking. As I noted in the previous section about the relationship of indigenous and foreign languages, it is unimaginable for a government to initiate a policy formulation process considering English as the official national language in India without evoking widespread violent opposition, just as upholding one local language (say Hausa) as Nigeria’s official language would. Yet, the Indian government continues to operate solely in English with shabby translations into Hindi, the official national language, without raising any meaningful public outcry, an issue I return to later. Institutional bureaucratic processes
therefore, take on a unique persona distinct from but part of the ELP policy formulation process. The success of policy formulation depends largely on institutional cohesiveness and internal capacity to match bureaucratic consistency with wider systemic social stability.

Loosely, ELP formulation in India follows a set of procedures, uniform across departments, for the bureaucratic management of government affairs. ELP proposals from any of the institutions, agencies or individuals must be submitted to MHRD’s language division, which forwards it to an independent Project Planning Commission (PPC) alongside a feasibility study and Detailed Project Report (DPR). Formulating such initiatives, and conducting a feasibility study and writing a DPR often involve some sort of collaborative effort between MHRD and autonomous organizations most of which are language-based expert bodies (i.e., Hindi Autonomous Organizations, Sindhi AU, and so forth). After PPC’s review, the proposal goes to the finance ministry for fiscal evaluation and approval. For low-cost projects, typically running in a few million US dollars, the approval of the finance ministry is sufficient, otherwise the proposal is sent to the Cabinet of 16 Ministers of State for individual review and subsequently a collective approval.

In Nigeria, ELP initiatives technically can come from any Nigerian citizen, group or institution. However, most initiatives filter through international agencies, such as DFID, UNICEF, and UNESCO, as well as institutes, associations and individuals affiliated
to the FME. The Policy Division of FME commissions a situation analysis research to examine the actual conditions expected to be addressed by any new policy initiative and also to set a baseline for calibrating expected implementation outcomes. Typically, members of academe with longstanding affiliation to government institutions are regular consultants to whom the FME commissions such studies. After the feasibility study, the FME commissions a group of experts to write a draft of the policy in the light of the baseline findings. The completed draft is submitted to the Joint Consultative Committee on Education-Reference (JCCE-Reference) for deliberations.

JCCE-Reference is constituted by State Directors of Education (SDO) and State Universal Basic Education Boards (SUBEBs) officers, NGO representatives, and academic experts most of whom were involved in drafting the policy document under consideration. After review, JCCE-Reference, which is headed by the Head of the section in which the policy is being drafted (such as Adult Education, Curriculum and Instruction, or Special Education under which language is located, etc), forwards the document with comments to the JCCE-Plenary meeting of a wide range of stakeholders from the national, state, local and international levels. These include SUBEBs officers, NGOs, Language Associations, academic experts from universities and institutes, and so forth. JCCE-Plenary is headed by the FME Permanent Secretary. After deliberations, JCCE-Plenary forwards the proposal to the National Council on Education (NCE), the apex policymaking body at the FME chaired by the Minister of Education and attended by
State Commissioners of Education from the 36 states and the Federal Capital. NCE approval is needed for the successful passage of a policy initiative. When such policy overlaps with other ministries, the FME minister in collaboration with other ministries forwards the approved policy to the Federal Executive Council for approval. If a policy contains aspects requiring legislation, the President presents those aspects to the National Assembly for deliberation and passage into law. As evident from the above, ELP formulation is highly scripted and formalized.

Policy formation by contrast is less susceptible to definition because the activities and processes it encapsulates vary widely with only loose conceptual linkages. To hazard a tentative definition, it is the broad and complex social transactions and negotiations out of which all kinds of language decisions and linguistic practices emerge. One of the most important distinguishing characteristics of language policy formation is the wide breadth of its scope. It encompasses the dynamic, conflict-laden set of processes involving interactions among various actors with varying motives and uneven bargaining potentials (Adrey, 2009). Unlike policy formulation whose procedures are scripted, policy formation processes derive their essence and protocols from the peculiarities of specific language needs and attendant social conditions. Some such conditions require debates and deliberations, other call for outright social protests and riots; collectively, they represent actual responses to the real or perceived changes in
languages and their communities of speakers that define language discourse and struggles at various levels of society.

Because the defining conditions vary widely and each set of activities and processes are unique, depending on the form relevant agents impose on them, ELP formation resists rigidity. To be sure, language policy formulation exercises, which adhere to rigidly set scripts, also allow for some flexibility across policymaking initiatives without necessarily altering the guiding rudiments. Yet, while flexibility is an unimportant contingency of ELP formulation exercises, the fundamental operational force of ELP formation lies in its fluidity, flexibility and dynamism. ELP formation therefore, begs for constant redefinition in context, relying on the contingencies of specific language policy needs and the activities of relevant agents for maintaining these fundamental operational mechanisms. To conceptualize ELP formation processes as varied and flexible does not imply that their activities are haphazard or chaotic since any variations and inconsistencies in the actions of relevant actors issue directly from the divaricated and complicated nature of language issues in society to which these activities are addressed. Thus, in ELP formation, rationality – as a descriptor of public action – breeds or at least permits inconsistencies.

Unlike ELP formulation, language policy formation is not necessarily institutionalized; it accommodates but is not limited to institutional activities. By implication, its domain of operation is larger than any government, inter-governmental
or other institutional frameworks. For that reason, ELP formulation fits into, even if
distinct from, language policy formation. Following the logic of scale, ELP formulation is
only one of the varied exercises and processes – probably the most prominent in terms
of visibility in public discourse – that constitute the broader scope of language policy
formation. As such, the nature of debates outside institutional circles, such as those
among language communities, freelance academics and activists, often features in
institutionalized arenas of policy formulation the same way ELP formulation exercises
constitute subject matters of wider non-institutionalized debates and negotiations.
Conceptually, this dyadic scalar distinction positions competing ideologies and both
institutional and non-institutional negotiation exercises at the core of language policy
formation processes, thereby creating a dynamic analytical framework for examining
various forms of discursive, legal, institutional, and cultural struggle at each stage of
language policymaking, from policy formulation down to actual patterns of language
attitudes and practices (in terms of policy acceptance or rejection) at grassroots levels,
and vice versa (Adrey, 2009).

If the distinction between ELP formulation and ELP formation holds, it is
reasonable to make a further distinction, on the basis of the data from this research,
between the specific subject matter of both layers of activities. In ELP formulation, the
primary concern is language as such, and insofar as it is a central concern of education.
ELP documents make explicit statements about language and specific linguistic codes for
educational practices. Although larger issues of social, political, cultural and economic concerns often feature as prominent element of ELP formulation debates and negotiations, the primary subject of the policy formulation exercises is language.

For ELP formation, the focus is on social relations in which language serves as the critical mediator. As a system of meaning-making and communication codes, language primordially does not entail politicization as a necessity since it was simply a natural feature of particular local landscapes and environments (Mitchell, 2009). Language’s political sensitivity grows out of the exigencies of social relations that necessitate the transformation of linguistic codes into inalienable attributes of a person and marker of social and cultural identity with strong emotional value capable of eliciting collective political action. It is to these social relations marked by inequities, conflicts, and various opportunities that one must turn to understand the primary subject matter of ELP formation. The distinction on subject matter recognizes an earlier argument in previous chapters regarding approaches to language as an end on the one hand and an instrument on the other.

Distinguishing between the subject matters of ELP formulation and ELP formation implies a differentiation in goals and objectives. For ELP formulation the specific objective is to construct a policy framework that, if appropriately implemented, should determine language practices within specified domains, specifically education. Engaging in ELP formulation without producing a policy (often in textual forms) can be
validly considered a failure of the process. By contrast, the specific objectives of ELP formation exercises depend on the contingencies of each process. Their varied goals however, ultimately converge around addressing social relational issues with linguistic dimensionalities. That these goals hardly bring permanent resolutions to language issues in society illustrates the shifting nature and inherently complicated character of social relations and the complex ways in which they entangle language and their users.

Making a distinction between ELP formulation and ELP formation offers much needed conceptual clarity in language policy discourse since, unlike most academic fields, language policy and ELP scholarship enormously impact actual linguistic practices and ELP formation as a whole. By implication, this is an invitation to experts to rethink definitions of the activities and processes they study. Granted, this is a daunting challenge because the mutating and shifting character of these activities and processes defy easy categorization. However, it is arguably a worthy intellectual pursuit to contribute to clarifying, not compounding, these inherent complexities and contradictions of language policymaking.

Consistent with the design of this study, the distinction between ELP formulation and ELP formation emphasizes the expansive scope of language policymaking and illustrates the conceptual problematics of treating institutional action as the primary arena for language policymaking and non-institutional processes as secondary or ancillary exercises. Such misconceptions (both within and outside academe) misdirect
significant ELP actors and potentially dissipate the capacities for informed language policy actions at all levels. I address a few other popular misconceptions and potentially damaging assumptions about language policymaking as a public policy imperative of multilingual societies.

Unpacking Misconceptions: Problematic Logics of Politics, Resources, and Power

Popular misconceptions about the roles of politics, resources, and power, which pervade ELP discourse in India and Nigeria, warrant serious attention since they potentially limit the capacity of several ELP actors from exploring rational policy options. Taken on face value and linked to a number of other equally misleading but popular assumptions of academic and social discourse, these misconceptions appear as credible explanations of ELP formation issues. It was particularly enlightening to witness different participants wrestle with these issues with equal support for and arguments against each. Thus, in showing these assumptions as problematic, I rely heavily on data from this study.

On Education Language Policy Formation as Politically Explosive

In the previous section, I argue that one of the possible explanations of decoupling and the relative inactivity of institutionalize (especially government) ELP agents is that language policy is politically explosive. Several government actors and numerous other ELP agents with similar views deploy this argument as a rationale for
inaction (or maximum caution, when inaction appears an ill-advised option). Two
government-affiliated participants make this case poignantly: to both, the slow progress
and infrequent actions of governments in pursuit of ELPs capable of equalizing
educational inequities are not only justified but should be interpreted as major progress
given the political sensitivity of language policy decisions. The tenor of this argument is
that “government is doing its best”, and any further ELP action harbors great potentials
for political and social disintegration.

Another participant challenges this interpretation, and illustrates the
problematic nature of such positions by highlighting the language practices of the Indian
government itself. Although India’s official national language is Hindi, the Government
of India transacts its day-to-day business primarily in English. In deference to
constitutional provisions, translations into Hindi are provided however, by poorly
equipped and inadequately trained personnel. The following conversation with the
participant (P) illustrates this point.

P: All Government of India documents have to be translated into
Hindi. And the Hindi translations are done in such an awful
manner that it is incomprehensible.
I: May I interrupt you briefly. Isn’t Hindi supposed to be the actual
official language with English as an associate official language?
P: You ask out of good knowledge. You’re absolutely right.
I: So one would expect that the documents should first be written in
Hindi and then translated into English.
P: No No No No. I wish you were right (a cynical chuckle). That is not
the story. The opposite is the case. All Government of India
documents are first written in English and then translated into
Hindi, not by the author of the documents. They’re sent into a special translation cell with a lot of very poorly equipped people, who neither understand the subject nor the language, employed by the government just to translate materials. The same person who translates educational documents also translates document on specialties areas such as mining and engineering. It makes no difference what the subjects of documents are or what area of specialty they come from. So, often the ideas are misunderstood and therefore badly translated; in fact it’s almost humorous to see translations coming out of Government of India Ministries. They are simply unusable. In fact, the Constitution of India is available in Hindi. I can put my entire credibility at stake when I say that nobody can understand the Hindi Constitution without taking aid from the Constitution in English language. That shows you how so badly done it is. So it becomes a matter of joke even amongst Hindi speakers that, if you want to read our Constitution in Hindi, keep the English Constitution on the side for reference. And this is true; you will have to do that. We’ve now lost the ability to translate and make illustriously clear any document from English into Hindi in a simple straightforward forthright manner, and I think this is true of other languages too. We have to write in certain complicated way that renders the text incomprehensible. Hindi, as national language becomes a matter of joke. There is an attitude that “we don’t read or write in Hindi; Hindi is not good enough for daily administrative bureaucracy”. So we keep reiterating and reinforcing what Lord Macaulay wrote in 1835 (personal interview, May 12, 2009).

Granting my interviewee’s submissions, it requires a unique assemblage of evidences and an unusual logic to concede that the government is “doing its best”. One possible, even if pejorative, explanations offered by the interviewee is that embarking on lucid translations or more importantly, writing in the comprehensible Hindi that Hindi speakers are conversant with, will increase the ordinary citizens’ access to and understanding of government operations. However, massive citizen awareness and
visibility of government activities work against the interest of organized political control since, as one other participant notes cynically “no government, democratic or otherwise, want their masses to be capable of very informed and educated choices” (personal interview, May 11, 2009).

Looking at the evolution of language issues in Nigeria and India, it is striking that institutionalized inaction or hesitancy in comprehensive ELP formulation has not completely eliminated language related social conflicts. Often, they have exacerbated conflicts not only between language communities but also political blocs, leading to less, not more, stability. However, until the alternative of comprehensive ELP reform is explored, this argument will remain hypothetical at best; it is hypothetically possible that massive ELP reform will precipitate social conflicts of an unprecedented dimension. The same argument applies to the support for inaction; there a strong prospect that it will not. The choice of inaction or reluctance therefore, is not, and cannot be justified on any empirical estimation of potentials for social instability until comprehensive ELP reform is attempted.

**On Exiguous Resources Limitations**

The second misconception relates to the popular argument that exiguousness of resources for society-wide ELP limits the capacity of institutional actors to embark on such reforms (Chaklader, 1990). A striking corollary is the continued categorization of many post-colonial multilingual societies, such as India and Nigeria, as “developing
countries” (contrasted with “developed countries”); a popular set of analytic concepts I argue lacks any useful descriptive accuracy or logical credibility inasmuch as it embodies a fundamentally flawed definition of “development” as an achievable state instead of an ongoing dynamic process (see Bagaulia, 2005).

The descriptive appeal of the term “developing country”, even with all its pejorative connotations, is that there continues to be clear evidences of “poverty” and “poor living standards” often captured in the now clichéd “living on less than one/two dollar a day” reports of social science scholarship and popular media. That such platitudinous reports often fail to account for the reliability of international data (most of which are estimated for “developing countries”), the cultural relatives (especially between individualistic and communitarian societies) and microeconomic calculations of economies of scale (both of which have strong implications for the local value of the dollar), and other major sociopolitical variables (such as corruption and graft), lay beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to note that suggesting the idea of a “developing country” having limited resources to address urgent political or social needs is often presented as a self-evident truth requiring no empirical justification. To what extent India and Nigeria fits the same category as poor “developing nations” with all other such countries is better left to econometric assessments.

A UNESCO expert at the Paris Secretariat makes a strong case about this argument of exiguous resources:
...on the language issue, I just had reason to look at that the recent document from the Executive Board...they want to start looking at language rights too and this will mark the beginning of a new phase of language policy at UNESCO. And I think it’s a very dangerous one. To begin with, I don’t think that UNESCO is rigorous enough to monitor its normative instruments at all levels for many reasons. But more importantly, I don’t think most countries, especially African countries, want to talk in policy terms about language rights. The countries that are dealing with multilingualism in policy terms and in legislation do not have the resources to do that; every person I’ve spoken to from the ministry of education in Africa says “No, we can’t do anything more about more official languages at this time, we haven’t been able to do well enough with what we’ve done”. So I’m a bit worried that UNESCO might for the wrong reasons start taking normative positions on language rights and language in education rights. Promoting that without thinking of the implications would be a pretty dangerous option, much larger than would be useful or practical. Unfortunately nobody in the organization really knows where we’ve already come. A lot of these things were discussed already in the 60s and 70s and people at some point decided they weren’t practical and moved on. But institutional memory is lacking.... (personal interview, June 15, 2009, emphasis is mine).

A prominent Nigerian scholar and ELP analyst at the UNESCO Secretariat concurs, arguing that it is unrealistic to use all indigenous languages in education. However, he points out that instead of governments deciding on how many and which languages should be used in schooling, it should open a national dialogue through which ordinary citizens can contribute ideas about linguistic decisions for their communities. It is not clear how such a dialogue will proceed in a country with significant divisive forces and ethnic bias. Yet, the idea of a national dialogue appears noble and feasible.

While the above institutional amnesia prognosis by the UNESCO staff may hold, that the argument about lack of resources comes from a highly competent UNESCO staff
and member of the academia with long experience in language policy of multilingual nations is highly indicative of the popularity of this claim. To respond to it, I return to data from this research, this time from another UNESCO insider and academic expert with many years of experience in ELP program analyst within the organization and on the grassroots level in different African countries. For him, the issue is not with making the policies but with implementing them. And the inability to implement ELP has little to do with resources, as evidenced in the case of Papua New Guinea. He argues:

The problem is not policy, the problem is implementation; these are mostly policies on paper. Look at Papua New Guinea, which has the largest number of languages in the world with nearly 850 languages, and uses about 400 of them in education. So when other countries like Nigeria and India say it’s impossible to use all their languages, I tell them “you have a lot more resources and much fewer languages than Papua New Guinea”. Now they might be doing it partially and shakily with the means they have, but they’re doing it, and they have made a good connection with it. And that’s crucial... If you make policies because international agencies say so, then the impulse for implementation is nearly nonexistent. The issue is that in highly multilingual countries, India, Nigeria, and Papua New Guinea, you need to have some strong partnership between government and local people not only because of resources, most of which can come from the grassroots, but also because education in local languages has huge implications for how you learn, who teaches you, how your system is organized and crucially, the content (personal interview, June 15, 2009).

Establishing a framework for comparing the issue of resource limitations in Papua New Guinea (PNG) to those in Nigeria and India is not necessary for highlighting the fundamental argument here: that with a population of barely 6.7 million and nearly 850 languages, PNG appears to have expressed a greater willingness to engage in a
wider ELP than Nigeria and India with 150 million and 1.1 billion population (and only 527 and 452 languages) respectively. Judging by their 2009 GDP estimates - $13.734 billion for PNG, $341.572 billion for Nigeria, and $ 3,526.124 trillion for India (IMF, 2010) – PNG does not appear to have any reasonable economic advantage.

An Indian scholar offers another compelling challenge to the exiguous resources thesis by comparing the Indian government’s investment in language with those of the Indian movie industry stylized Bollywood. On the resource limitation claim, he remarks:

...actually there is a counter view: look at our world of films from Bombay, the Bollywood. When they adopt English movies, they have to use dubbing. And I’m amazed at the quality of dubbing into Hindi. It’s so wonderful; beautiful. You never even get the idea that it is a translation. So if Bollywood can do it, why can’t the Government of India? Bollywood does it because they have to make sure that it is marketable and that people will love it. But the Government of India is not bothered. It already has a political interest: they have to do it because the Constitution has ordered it; they are not interested in helping people to understand. They don’t want the masses to understand (personal interview, May 12, 2009).

To elaborate this point, he offers a striking example:

Another example is the Right to Education Bill pending in the Parliament, the first Right to Education Bill presented to the Parliament, which in the next couple of weeks the new Government will debated over or dismiss. The Bill was presented in the Parliament in December last year, but till date, it is not available in Hindi or any other Indian language. The Right to Education Bill aimed at providing fundamental rights to all children of India for education, is available today only in English. It is also available on the Parliament’s website, only in English. And this is not simply because bureaucrats don’t want it translated. If the political leadership wanted this document to be understood by the masses, they will immediately produce the texts in Hindi and other Indian languages (personal interview, May 12, 2009).
As I show in the next section, there are ample evidences to question the claim that governments lack the material resources for comprehensive ELP reform. A rather simplistic but instructive argument is that the Nigerian and Indian societies already function in a highly multilingual milieu. Any comprehensive ELP action is unlikely to create needs that are currently non-existent or capable of placing excessive demands on the countries’ resources. It might require however, harnessing current resources already exploited by language communities and various governments to address the linguistic needs of the larger societies. At the center of this issue is the tendency for governments and big institutions to pompously assume responsibilities far beyond its capacity and therefore hinder the organizational role of planning that constitute their mandate, which when adequately exercised, draws out enormous resources from various spheres of society to address needs citizens deal with on daily basis with little or no centralized framework. I return to this issue in later sections.

On Lack of Statutory Authority in Linguistic Federalism

The third misconception relating to the issue of power has to do with the lack of statutory authorities capable of providing the framework for enforcing compliance. As shown in previous chapters, this issue of power has international as well as national and local dimensionalities. In a linguistic federalism in which diversity is exploited in serving and preserving differences, the capacity of ELP agents bound by democratic principles to
enforce the implementation of any comprehensive language policy reform package is arguably limited to the extent there are constitutional safeguards for diversity. Several participants from UNESCO, NCERT, NERDC, and the academia reference this argument repeatedly, arguing that ELP institutional relationships with the ordinary citizens and language users are moral and symbolic with persuasion as its operational strategy.

Several other participants disagree. Like in the arguments of politics and resources, the idea that current ELP activities by institutional and non-institutional agents represent a maximum limit beyond which additional actions are impossible or unreasonable is, according to many participants in this study, largely misguided. One of such participant who has worked in the government as well as various grassroots settings in India remarks:

When the Congress Party or the BJP produces their election materials, they don’t produce them in English. They produce them in original Hindi, and original Tamil and Telugu… These are very powerful, very special, very extensive, and creative productions meant to captivate the minds of the audience. They do a good job in using the languages people speak to communicate with them and seek their mandate through votes. But the same people who form the Governments after elections embark on bad translations and sometimes no translations of materials that should inform the political actions of the same citizens who elected them on the basis of negotiations transacted in local languages. The same people who were able to produce perfect materials with very powerful and special messages in Hindi, Telugu, Tamil and so forth during election campaigns also do a bad job at translation after they become the government; the same people preside over the lack of availability of the Right to Education Bill in any Indian languages five or six months after it was presented to the Parliament of India (personal interview, May 12, 2009).
A Nigerian scholar and grassroots actor corroborates this argument, noting an apparent break in communication between the government and the governed. He argues:

What we have seen over the years is a gradual break in communication between the government and the people. This is essentially a break in vertical communication between the governing elite and the grassroots. What we are left with is merely a horizontal communication: elite to elite in English, grassroots to grassroots in their mother tongue. Once this vertical gap becomes institutionalized and normalized, it deals a dangerous blow on development. That explains why we have been more or less static over the years since independence. And as this vertical break in communication becomes normalized, it spreads like a virus. Look at a local government Councilor and the legislators in the House of Assembly who goes on campaign trails all over the towns and villages singing songs, dancing, and using local proverbs to mobilize people. Once elected and they get to the House, they abandon the language of campaign alongside their long promises to the people and start using English. Where lays accountability? The ordinary people are ultimately distanced from their government. No matter how poor their English is, it is fashionable for [government officers] to speak in English even if their understanding is very limited. But during the campaign, mother tongue was a viable linguistic tool for manipulating local interests: the fact that political mobilization occurs only in their mother tongue and language accountability is low creates disconnect between the rulers and the ruled (personal interview, June 8, 2009).

If the absence of statutory authority undermines institutionalized ELP formation, it is clearly unnecessary for political mobilization. Increased investment in the moral authority and persuasiveness of institutionalized agencies coupled with the legitimate
power incumbent on public positions are arguably potentially useful but largely neglected resources for ELP formation. That the same institutionalized actors who make the claims of political explosiveness, exiguous resources and lack of statutory authority, readily exploit other viable avenues for mobilizing collective action leaves much in question regarding the legitimacy of these claims. As such, these popular assumptions invite critically reexamination in language policy and planning and ELP scholarship in light of the contingencies of specific cases or completely jettisoned as inconsistent and problematic.

A final misconception – regarding the appropriate characterization of grassroots action – requires brief examination here. Although they do not fit perfectly under the rubric of power, resource, and politics, the pervasiveness of certain ideas about grassroots participation in ELP formation underscores the need for language policy and planning and ELP scholarship to be critical in its interrogation of commonly shared assumptions about language policymaking especially when representing agents whose actions are critical to the ELP formation processes but whose actual voices are least heard in ELP analysis.

Apart from those who saw grassroots collective actions as major determinants of developments in ELP formation, participants in this research generally characterize grassroots participation along three broad categories: linguistically uninformed actors, poorly organized groups with an acute tendency to act against their own interests, and
passive but resilient bearers of the oppressive conditions unleashed from the center-hold of elite control. A Nigerian ELP pioneering scholar and longtime consultant at UNESCO summarized the first two characterizations thus:

…the issue is one of bottom-up/top-bottom approach to language policymaking that is a staple in language policy debates within the academia. The problem with involving the grassroots is one of knowledge. You must ensure that when you involve the grassroots, their preferences are based on informed and thoughtful consideration of information. The case of South Africa is instructive: here is one country that has demonstrated democracy in many ways, including in the problems of language policy and language policy in education. They have a requirement within the educational policy framework, that if in the meeting of parents and teachers in a particular school, a percentage of the people say we want “X” language to be used for teaching, it must be accepted. It is hard to think of anything better in terms of democratic practice. But what do you find in practice? You assemble the people and they unanimously say, “We want English”. We’ve gone through democracy but people are acting against their own interests, at least from the point of view of academic research. Well there is a difference between informed choice and uninformed choice (personal interview, June 8, 2009).

The two-prong argument here – that grassroots actors are largely unaware linguistically, and therefore tend to act contrary to the dictates of their interests – has been well documented in language policy and planning and ELP scholarship (Quorro, 2009). Nearly all participants in this study agree to some extent that grassroots actors are more likely to choose English over indigenous languages as the medium of formal school instruction, even when they actively galvanize political movements around linguistic lines. As already discussed in the previous chapters, this tendency is one of the
major paradoxes of ELP formation in highly diverse multilingual societies, such as India and Nigeria.

The third characterization of grassroots participation – as resilient agents who passively endure political, economic, cultural and social onslaughts from the ruling elites – comes from another Nigerian scholar in a rather comical fashion:

The saying that “when you’re pushed to the wall, you fight back,” does not apply in Nigeria. When people are pushed to the wall, they scale the fence and continue running. And the government will say, “Ah... they still get energy,”...and they still pursue them. And people will say, “This man never tire.”...and you wonder where they get their energy from...

(personal interview, June 8, 2009, emphasis is mine)

Although this metaphor hardly requires interpretation, it is useful to highlight a few important elements: First, by “running” instead of “fighting back”, grassroots actors continue to accept undesirable conditions mediated through language, which are meted out by their respective oppressive governments. By the same token, refusing to “fight” emboldens the government to stay perpetually in “pursuit” by amplifying its exploitative exercises. “Running” becomes a metaphor for “passivity” as “fighting” symbolized active engagement and confrontation in a self-deterministic fashion against an excessively exploitative and unaccountable political regime.

All three characterizations of the grassroots appear logical and consistent with data, even from this study. What appears missing is the voice of the grassroots actors

97 The two italicized constructions are in Nigerian Pidgin English meaning “these people still have energy”, and “this man never gets tired”. I report them in this original form since they capture not only the humor of the metaphor but also relay the surprise at the unexpected behavior of “scaling the fence” instead of “fighting back”, and resilience in continuing to “run” endlessly with the government in perpetual pursuit.
themselves in explaining their behavior. Analyzing the perspectives of numerous local actors require that we reexamine or at least calibrate these characterizations. From this point of view, a fourth characterization is possible, one that problematizes the roles of institutionalized agents and indeed the entire ELP formation processes. According to this perspective, grassroots actors are savvy and bold ELP actors richly informed not only by the wisdom of academic scholarship, the meretricious quibbles of politicians, the vague promises of international agencies, and complicated alliances with fellow grassroots actors, but also by their assessment of the actual choices and personal actions of the various players with whom they engage in the ELP formation processes.

Numerous grassroots actors recurrently referred to government institutions and international agencies (such as NCERT, NERDS, MHRD, FME, UNESCO, and so forth) as “empty voices” and “impotent” actors whose commitment to ELP formation is defined by personal interests. Indeed, there is a deep-seated ambivalence about the sincerity of institutionalized ELP actors and the commitments they avow largely because their personal choices do not often reflect the professional recommendations they make to grassroots actors with expert certitude. One major indictment to institutionalized ELP actors who advocate the use of indigenous languages in schools issues from the fact that they hardly use these indigenous languages themselves. Local actors are acutely aware that the same mother-language education advocates deeply invested in the ELP formation processes that encourage the use of indigenous languages in schools also
enroll all their children in English-medium private schools. The recommendation that mother-language medium public schools better prepares students cognitively and linguistically receives reinterpretation on the grassroots level as an indigenized neocolonial strategy to perpetuate elite (English-based) dominance.

The same Nigerian scholar who argued that grassroots actors are largely unaware also reports an encounter between a famous Yoruba professor and advocate of culturally-grounded and mother-language education with local communities with whom he was working on ELP formation activities. Unconvinced by the inconsistencies between the professor’s academic wisdom and personal choices, the villagers queried him on the basis of his own apparently contradictory positions. As the Nigerian scholar notes:

Having made his case to the people about the importance of culture and mother-tongue in education, and the need to understand cultural norms, values and language, the villagers asked him: “Where did your own children go to school?” “Even [the other famous professors you tell us supports the idea of children going to school in Yoruba], did any of his children get educated in Yoruba? Are all his children not studying in the US?” This has become favorite reaction of the grassroots people. Another professor was asked, “Are you not the owner of this big car” [referring to his big SUV clearly visible from the village meeting arena]? The Prof said, “Yes, I’m the owner”. And they continued, “This education you’re talking to us about; was that the kind you had?” Because “the type of education you had that enabled you to afford this car, that’s the one I want for my own child. Period!” And they insisted on English-medium schooling. So, the real problem is that grassroots people look at those who are the most celebrated advocates of mother-tongue education and see that their actions are inconsistent with what they recommend, and what they advice local people to demand from their governments (personal interview, June 8, 2009).
During one of my interview sessions with one of the grassroots actors, a locally-based language activist who has worked with a lot of stakeholders from UNESCO, language institutes and universities, observed that he is not swayed by UNESCO’s recommendations for mother-language education/multilingual education nor does he trust the persuasions of foreign scholars who advocate for local languages. As he argues, when you go to Paris or to their universities, they [UNESCO officials, foreign scholars and local academic experts] force you to learn and speak their language whether you like it or not; when they come here, they also expect you speak to them in their language. None of them have come here and spent some time learning our own languages (personal interview, June 3, 2009).

The obvious lack of trust among ideological blocs on ELP formation issues partly from grassroots awareness of decoupling practices by supposedly legitimate authorities on the one hand, and the persistence of power imbalances expressed in linguistic terms on the other.

A Nigerian academic expert criticizes this grassroots perspective. He deploys the argument that inequalities are necessary elements of human society:

I’m not particularly worried about the infinitesimal 10 percent of well-to-do parents who send their children to English-medium, fee-paying schools. I’m worried about the 90 percent who have no alternative but to send their children to the publicly funded schools, which are poorly resourced, poorly managed, and with poorly trained teachers. If it were possible for all of us to send our children to fee paying schools, then there will be no problem. But that’s not possible (personal interview, June 8, 2009).
In societies where the culture of parenting requires providing children with all possible opportunities for a better life than their parents’, this argument comes off as a challenge to financially capable parenting, not an informed support of mother-language education for its inherent cognitive, social, emotional and linguistic values. However, an additional argument by the scholar above reveals the deeper issues of power imbalance against which grassroots players actively or silently revolt. He indicates that during the Ife Six Year Primary Project, many elite parents who realized that the students receiving instruction in Yoruba were outperforming their English-medium counterparts, sought to transfer their wards from elite English-medium, fee paying schools into the Yoruba-medium cohort, an option that was denied in the experimentation. By implication, when public mother-language and multilingual education institutions begins to show positive outcomes, the incentive for mother-language and multilingual education will be irresistible to elite consumers whose transfer to public institutions will equalize educational conditions.

While tenable, this argument conceals the underlying issue of power differentials beneath the purported lack of awareness among the grassroots. It is reasonable to wonder why it must take the children of grassroots players most of whom are poor and under-resourced to experiment on new mother-language and multilingual education initiatives and demonstrate its effectiveness before such an initiative gains elite

98 For further reading on the Ife Six Year Primary Project, see (Fafunwa, Macauley, & Sokoya, 1989).
endorsement. The power imbalance here is obvious considering that most of these initiatives are designed and conducted by the same elites who are most reluctant to use them. In other words, why must the poor masses be the “guinea pigs” of elite educational experimentation especially when the same elites already possess the knowledge, political positions and material resources to install a society-wide mother-language and multilingual education?

Local actors appear to be acutely aware that given poor parents’ limited resources for educational remediation, embarking on such linguistic experimentation is a potentially expensive risk. Even if only from a critical theory perspective, it is difficult to neglect the hegemonic tenor of these arguments. It is also important to note that such experimentation is hardly necessary or an exclusive option since significant research studies have already documented the benefits of mother-language and multilingual education, and several policy actors have proposed a “common school system” as an alternative to class-differentiated education. As noted previously, these studies also reveal the need for mother-language and multilingual education to be accompanied by several other educational conditions, such as highly qualified mother-language and multilingual education teachers, good texts in local languages, and other educational resources. It is not certain that these conditions will be satisfied in Nigerian and Indian public schools in any foreseeable future.
It appears therefore that grassroots players are not unaware but deeply informed about the potential economic and political valuation of English. As already argued in previous sections, the argument that lack of proficiency in English seriously impairs an individual’s employability in India and Nigeria, especially in the public sector, is not a myth. The countries’ economies, political offices and important public positions continue to be controlled by a small percentage of individuals highly proficient in English language. Convincing grassroots actors, who are arguably the most significant force capable of effecting massive ELP formation, requires a lot more than intellectual discussions. If grassroots action is critical for any comprehensive ELP reform in India and Nigeria (as I have argued previously), language policy stakeholders must address these issues that impede their collective action toward mother-language/multilingual education and ELP reform. Language policy and ELP scholars must also rethink the ways their research products are reinterpreted by various language policy agents in designing their studies and disseminating their findings. Overall, we must interrogate how these reconsiderations are likely to impact on ELP formation, that is, what are the implications of the foregoing for ELP formation if its goal of improving social relations through ELPs will be achieved? By implication, what sorts of questions are likely to guide the future of ELP formation and ELP scholarship?
Interrogating the Future of Education Language Policy Formation

It is useful for my analysis here to preface this section with two related claims of most participants in this study: that current ELPs are rather simplistic compared to the linguistic social environments they address, and that India and Nigeria are in need of a comprehensive ELP formulation at the centralized levels. A grassroots actor attached to Pratham in India captures this sentiment when he notes the people he works with on the grassroots level try to stick to the Three Language Formula [TLF], but I’m afraid there is a need of more clear planning even with the TLF because the problem is not often with the three languages; the problem is more with the additional language interests not accounted for (personal interview, June 12, 2009).

I argue earlier that the TLF addresses the interests of Hindi (as a national language of unity), English (as a language of scientific discourse and international integration), and regional languages (for maintaining diversity). However, it fails to account for the linguistic variations within each language group or each interest protected in the TLF. In Nigeria, the mutual unintelligibility within majority as well as minority languages renders the idea of learning three Nigerian languages (Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba) nearly meaningless. By several estimations, and judging by the perspectives of institutional and non-institutional actors, current ELPs in India and Nigeria are not only simplistic but anachronistic even with their constitutional provisions for language
diversity and policy recommendations of early primary mother-language education (FME, 2004; MHRD, 1986).

What issues arise as significant considerations for a comprehensive ELP formulation to which scholarly attention can be drawn? How can we define the scope of such ELP formulation? If the modest findings of this research are to be taken seriously, how possible is it to embark on any comprehensive ELP formulation without first engaging on a thorough and widespread ELP formation that enlists the participation of all possible actors? Western-style formal education is based on the linguistic logic of one classroom/one language, an educational extrapolation of the modernist linguistic framework of one nation/one language (Ricento, 2000a). This is true even in school systems that permit the study of multiple languages as school subject but require the use of one for instructional practices and assessment of student outcomes. Current ELPs in India and Nigeria, as is the case in most post-colonial multilingual societies, accordingly model their education language provisions on this basis of monolingualism. In a richly diverse and highly multilingual society, this monolingual model is strained beyond its logical capacity. If valid, the argument I propose here requires that as educational researchers, we begin to explore the possibilities that current systems of Western formal education is anachronistic in multilingual societies.

Several participants in this study argue for the need to make education relevant to the real life experiences of the students. While the claim about limited resources may
not be completely founded in current system it is arguable that to embark on a complete reform of current system of formal schooling, resource issues features in novel ways; if school materials have to be provided to students in their everyday language and this everyday language undergoes frequent changes, educational materials will by necessity undergo frequent revisions in multiple languages and therefore call for serious fiscal considerations. The traditional response to the issue of resource impediments would be to embark on policy to the limits of available resources, a “cut your coat to your size” model. An alternative model would be to reconfigure the needs in ways that map onto the actual ways individuals and groups currently attempt to satisfy their linguistic needs in a multilingual setting.

To do this will require a complete reevaluation of current language pedagogic practices. Participants in this study bemoan the mechanical approach to language pedagogy as a central policy and educational practice issue. A consultant to the Government of India on language issues highlights this issue:

Although there are ongoing healthy debates and discussions about mother tongue, there are contradictions regarding language pedagogy because on one hand we promote mother tongue based education, at the same time we teach English language in a very mechanical and disjointed way. When people are exposed to language without a sense of the culture, they learn the words and sentences but not cultures and contexts. When you teach English in school in the form of rigid alphabets, charts and posters, it gives a really wrong impression about English as a language. And people feel disconnected from it. And I think this is great injustice to English language by promoting English pedagogy in this current fashion (personal interview, June 9, 2009).
English is not a lone victim of poor language pedagogic practices in India and Nigeria. As one scholar argues, with the exception of the highly expensive elite schools that can afford well trained language teachers, all public and private schools in India have a very poor approach to teaching language. This partly accounts for the massive failures in English language in both India and Nigeria, where English continues to be the most failed subject especially in the primary and secondary schools exit exams. Some scholars have noted that humans do not acquire languages by rote memorization; no child learns language first through the typical alphabet charts and picture diagrams that dot the walls of kindergarten and primary school classroom walls. As E. Annamalai (2001) points out, this misconception is reflected in the policy arena where institutionalized actors frequently assume that language planning precedes language development. However, language develops primarily through use, not technical corpus planning. Future academic considerations of ELP formation will need to interrogate the ways in which language policymaking addresses these pedagogic concerns. How can language pedagogy be transformed through ELP formation to fit the natural organic processes of language acquisition?

Another problematic aspect of current linguistic educational practice that continues to command great policy attention is the focus of ELP activities on early primary education. The rationale here is that language acquisition is time sensitive with important critical periods. Once past early elementary education, any unlearned or
improperly mastered linguistic skill becomes extremely challenging to remediate. While this makes sense from psycholinguistic and cognitive perspectives, it presents major problems from the sociolinguistic, political and economic standpoint. Parents and grassroots actors who make the most basic educational decisions about their children, including what kind of schooling to demand for, are acutely aware of their resources for educational investment. For a parent who knows that the possibilities of sending their child to post-primary schooling is economically unfeasible (considering funding and need for child’s contribution to family income) the rationale to send a child to an English-medium school is appears rational; it is assumed that a child can always learn the native language from home and in the community but will perpetually miss the opportunity of learning English if not exploited at the earliest primary levels. It is important to bear in mind that collectively, parents like these, through the kind of schools they demand, determine the nature of instructional practices in public and private schools even more than any government mandated English-only education.

Furthermore, the individuals that represent images of success in local communities are often highly educated people with graduate and postgraduate degrees. Since higher education in Nigeria and India are still provided almost exclusively in English, the linguistic repertoires of such individuals often emphasize English as a language of the learned. For parents and students aspiring to similar educational achievements, English-medium schooling becomes even more attractive. The focus of
ELP on early primary mother-language education and relative de-emphasis on upper secondary and tertiary education might be strategically counterproductive. While empirical research evidence is needed in this area, it is an important academic and policy question to explore the impacts of embarking on a system-wide ELP formation that does not emphasize one levels of schooling over others.

Finally, ELP scholarship is confronted with an issue of curricular relevance. Several participants and numerous scholarly works note that educational curriculum in most post-colonial multilingual societies continue to reflect a European worldview with little relevance to the respective local conditions (Bassey, 1999). It is therefore reasonable to ask whether merely changing the language of instruction – from English to local language – without a corresponding reform of the curriculum will be of any meaningful benefit educationally and socially. The same applies to current understanding of teaching as a profession accessible only through quality teacher education in countries where less than half of all qualified candidates do not get admitted in to tertiary institutions due to lack of space. What potentials do local resources (such as the elders, parents, social rituals, cultural practices, and popular customs, and the local physical environment) hold as pedagogical aids for students? How can an otherwise “illiterate” society member be reconstituted into a useful source of knowledge capable of remediating for the current numerical deficits of teacher education? While these arguments are not entirely new and constitute core concerns of
studies of alternative and indigenous education, their linkage to education language policymaking has not been sufficiently made. It is to this and many similar challenges that I trust this dissertation research has invited ELP and language policy and planning scholars to rise.
APPENDIX A:

SYNOPSIS OF RESEARCH SITES
Participants in this research were enlisted on an individual basis. However, since the sampling logic required purposefully identifying individuals with experience and/or interest in ELPs, language policy-oriented institutions serve as channels for locating and enlisting individuals with relevant backgrounds. As such, while participants do not necessarily represent their respective institution officially—a requirement that would have possibly conscripted their capacity as voluntary participants as well as the nature of information they provide—their insights are authoritative, informed as they are by direct institutional experiences. Indeed, one benefit of using purposeful sampling is that nearly all participants occupy the most privileged vantage position to represent their respective institutions. The following are synopses of the institutional channels through which I identified and enlisted individual participants, and through which their experiences and interests in ELP processes were gauged to ensure that they meet the sample selection criteria for this study.

MINISTRIES OF EDUCATION

Department of Higher Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD), New Delhi

The Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD) was established on September 26, 1985 (during the 174th Amendment of the Constitution of India, on “Allocation of Business”) as a central body of the Government of India to integrate all relevant instruments and agencies for the holistic development of Indians. MHRD has two departments: one for School Education and Literacy, the other for Higher
Education. The Department of School Education and Literacy oversees elementary education, secondary education, and adult education and literacy programs. The Department of Higher Education (DHE) is responsible for all tertiary education, book promotion and copyright, government scholarships, the education of minorities and language issues. The DHE is specifically responsible for all language policy decisions at the national level that affect Indian school systems. Of the eleven bureaus comprising DHE, two are most closely associated with India’s ELP processes: Bureau of Book Promotion and Copyright, Education Policy, and Indian National Commission for Co-operation with UNESCO, and the Bureau of Administration, Coordination and Languages.

Participants from MHRD’s DHE, who serve on one or more of these Bureaus, also have experience working in various parts of several ministries. Each Indian civil servant is commissioned to work on almost all levels of various sectors, ranging from forestry to education and mining. Employees in nearly every public office enter civil service through the Indian Civil Service held by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC), which provides a general training and examination in civil services and specialized fields, such as combined medical, forest, and engineering services, as well as police force. A UPSC civil service certification qualifies an individual to work in several fields, with no additional specialization requirements. All government-affiliated participants currently working on the language policy arena have prior professional experience in other areas ranging from forestry to engineering. As such, their approach to public service is at once
highly technical/bureaucratic and profoundly informed by a wide breadth of professional experiences. Not all MHRD-affiliated participants work in the ministries complex. MHRD participants suggested additional interviewees in other institutions whose work bears on the ELP process.

**Federal Ministry of Education (FME), Abuja**

The Federal Ministry of Education (FME), located in the Central Secretariat Abuja, receives its statutory obligation for education policymaking and management from the Education Decree of 1985 and the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The FME formulates national policy on education, with its most basic policy document in its 2005 edition. It also collects and collates data for educational planning and financing, maintains uniform standards of education throughout the nation, controls quality through the supervisory operations of its inspectorate division, harmonizes educational policies and procedures across all 36 states through a National Council on Education (NCE), develops national curricula frameworks in conjunction with other education institutional stakeholders, and fosters international cooperation, especially with UNESCO and other UN agencies.

An independent language division of the FME, called the Language Projects, oversees language development. Partially supported by the French Government, which often has a representative at the Abuja Office, Language Projects works in tandem with the policy division of the FME to promote language-related issues in education. FME
participants are long-term staff of the language division and policy sector. Unlike their Indian counterparts, these individuals are recruited on the basis of their professional training and previous experiences in their specific areas of engagement. Most of them were classroom teachers at the elementary and secondary levels and school administrators in Federal Government Colleges (built as models for state schools) prior to assuming administrative positions at FME. Such change requires professional training in public administration and management. Like their Indian counterparts, FME participants were channels for locating additional participants within and outside the government.

UNIVERSITIES

University of Delhi (DU)

One of the nearly forty (40) Union or Central Universities of India, University of Delhi is India’s premier university, and was established in 1922 through an Act of the then Central Legislative Assembly of the colonial Government. Unlike state or private universities, Union or Central Universities in India are established by an Act of Parliament and funded by the Government of India (GOI). With two major (northern and southern) campuses, DU is currently one of the largest academic institutions in the country, with 14 academic faculties, 86 academic departments, 79 colleges spread all

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99 As in Nigeria, a university is typically divided into academic units called “faculties”, comparable to “schools” in North American university systems, which contain specific departments. This difference is a legacy of British education system. For a comparison of the British and American higher education systems, see (Wasser & Fortier, 2007; Wit, 2002).
over the city, and about 220,000 students (Delhi, 2010). Participants from DU are fulltime teaching staff at DU’s Faculty of Education, situated in the North Campus.

University of Delhi (and the Faculty of Education particularly) is a major source of academic expertise for government expert committees, commissioned councils, and policy consultancy. The Delhi Metro—a world-class rail system—connects the North (main) Campus to the Central Secretariat and MHRD, located at Shastri Bhavan, a walk from the hub of Delhi city, Connaught Place. As the participants reveal, this proximity to and interpenetration of India’s Central Government brings policy activities to a sharper view of academic critics and policy analysts. In the next chapter, I explore the ways in which this shift between academe and government is a problematic but useful element of the policy process.

University of Lagos (UNILAG)

Nigeria’s University of Lagos was founded in 1962 by an Act of the Federal Parliament. As one of Nigeria’s 27 Federal Universities, UNILAG receives operational funding from the Federal Government, and is overseen and accredited by the National Universities Commission (NUC), the statutory regulatory and advisory body of the federal government (under the FME) charged with higher education matters. UNILAG has nine academic faculties and a College of Medicine, offering over 117 undergraduate, Master’s and Doctoral degree programs, to a student body that has grown from 131 in 1962 to over 40,000 in 2010.
Participants from UNILAG are fulltime teaching and administrative staff of the university who either serve on or are very familiar with different ELP-related government commissions and independent policy actors. Located approximately 387 travel miles from Abuja, UNILAG is not particularly close to Abuja, often requiring an eighty minutes flight to commute. However, most of the government parastatals with which participants work are located at, or frequently meet and work in Lagos, Nigeria’s former capital city. Participants from UNILAG serve on expert commissions of the federal and state governments and are principal members of the most prominent linguistic organization in West Africa, whose role shape both federal and state government actions on language.

University of Ibadan (UI):

University of Ibadan is Nigeria’s premier university, initially established in 1948 as a college of the University of London, and transformed into an independent university in 1962. Located in the ancient Oyo city of Ibadan, UI student enrollment has grown from 144 in 1948 to over 20,000 in 2010 with about 62% undergraduate and 38% graduate (or in Nigerian parlance, postgraduate) in one of four colleges, three institutes, ten research centers and nine faculties with over 100 degree programs. UI has a record of excellence with academic staff working on a broad range of ELP arenas, from UNESCO to national expert and consultative committees, and grassroots movements.
All participants from UI work on one or more of these levels: international, national, and local, while holding a full-time professorship at the university. Along with the works of other major scholars from other institutions, their writings on language policy issues in Nigeria shape public discourse especially among a crop of informed citizens. All three universities represented in this study have graduate and postgraduate degree programs in which students study and write theses in indigenous languages up to the doctorate level. This is critical to the ELP processes in each country, as point I attend to in the results and analysis sections.

GOVERNMENT COUNCILS ON EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT

National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT)

The National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) is an autonomous advisory organ of the Government of India, under the bureaucratic auspices of the MHRD, established in 1961 to assist and advise the Central and State governments on implementation of education policies, especially on school education and teacher preparation. NCERT undertakes and coordinates educational research, disseminates improved techniques and practices for schooling, conducts pro-service and in-service teacher training, prepares and publishes educational materials (such as textbooks), and collaborates with Central and State institutions on improving the quality of school education.
Arguably, NCERT’s most far-reaching influence is through its National Curriculum Framework (NCF), drafted by expert committees to guide state education systems in determining content and syllabi structures. The NCF is significant not only for the subject-contents it stipulates but also for the languages it uses. In addition, NCERT drafts a national framework for the teaching of both Indian and English languages. The content of these frameworks are variously received and interpreted at different quarters, and constitute the subject of passionate debate among “expert” circles. NCERT-affiliated participants in this study occupy the dual shifting positions discussed in previous sections and chapters: one as outstanding academic expert, the other as government policymaker with para-bureaucratic responsibilities. Unlike those who entered public offices through the Indian civil service or UPSC system, my NCERT participants are appointed for their academic expertise and consider their roles in government as transient.

**Nigerian Educational Research and Development Council (NERDC)**

The Nigerian Educational Research and Development Council (NERDC), a government parastatal comparable to India’s NCERT, was established through a 1988 government Act that merged four bodies: Nigerian Education Research Council, Comparative Education Study and Adaptation Centre, Nigeria Book Development Council and Nigerian Language Centre. It has headquarter located in the outskirts of the
Abuja capital city, a press in Lagos (with branches across the country), and zonal offices in Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones.

NERDC is statutorily mandated to fulfill a long list of responsibilities, a few of which include (a) formulating and implementing a national policy on educational book development, and encouraging the production of core books on Nigerian languages in concert with the Language Division, (b) formulating new techniques and approaches (and promoting) curricular development, (c) producing curriculum and instructional materials (and syllabi) for all levels of education and in various languages taught in school, (d) organizing teacher education and orientation programs on new pedagogic innovations and techniques in curricula development, (e) encouraging, coordinating, publishing and disseminating research in and of Nigerian education systems, (f) facilitating the development of all (foreign and indigenous) languages, advising and implementing language policies, providing translation resources for book development, and coordinating all language-related research and programs of the Nigerian education system, (g) providing library and informatics services, (h) offering special programming, such as teacher training and conferences, and (i) advancing research-based policy on educational development. In addition to providing the primary policy documents of the FME, NERDC participants occupy the same dual positions of academics and bureaucrats. Their academic expertise accounts for their appointment as NERDC staff or consultant.
The National Institute for Nigerian Languages (NINLAN) was established in response to implementation challenges of the language provisions of the 1985 National Policy on Education (NPE). Now undergoing its 2010 revision, the NPE provides for education in Nigerian languages in the first three years of formal schooling. However, shortages of indigenous language teacher undermined the effective implementation of this provision. Since universities language teacher turnout was relatively low, a language institute committed to the development of and training of teachers in Nigerian languages was imperative. Following series of events starting with FME’s 1988 National Survey on the preparation of teachers for Nigerian languages, and a 1992 seminar in Otta, Ogun State, on the implementation strategies for the language provisions of the NPE, NINLAN was established in Aba through a 1993 decree (now Act 117) of the Federal Parliament of Nigeria (Enyia, 2008).

NINLAN is one of Nigeria’s three specialized language institutes; others are the Nigerian French Language Village (NFLV) in Badagry, and the Nigerian Arabic Language Village (NALV) in Ngala. NINLAN’s mandate empowers it to conduct research on and develop Nigerian languages, offer teacher training in indigenous languages and award diplomas for approved academic programs. NINLAN participation in this study was constrained by new developments requiring its relocation to the University of Nigeria, Nsukka (UNN), due to inadequate funding and consequent operational deficiencies. The
decision to merge NINLAN with UNN resonates with controversial decisions about language on the national level that I address in the later chapters. Participants are generally members of academia with bureaucratic responsibilities.

**Central Institute for Indian Languages (CIIL)**

The Central Institute of Indian Languages (CIIL) was established on July 17, 1969, as a national institution of advanced research in linguistics and Indian languages. Located in Mysore, CIIL’s official mandate is to co-ordinates the development of Indian languages, to facilitate the essential unity of Indian languages through scientific studies, to promote inter-disciplinary research, to contribute towards emotional integration of the people of India (Kumari & Sharada, 2010). In over four decades, CIIL has, according to its website ([www.ciil.org](http://www.ciil.org)), left a major footprint on India’s language policymaking by producing and archiving studies on more than 118 Indian languages, including 80 tribal languages, with over 500 published books, monographs, language learning materials, and audio courses in nearly all major Indian languages.

CIIL has seven regional centers with language instruction programs in fifteen Indian languages. The main objective of CIIL regional centers is to promote national integration through multilingual education by providing facilities for the implementation of the Three Language Formula (see Chapters One and Two) in all Indian states and Union territories. As an organ of the Government of India, under the administrative aegis of MHRD’s Dept. of Higher Education, CIIL (a) advises and assists the Central and
State Governments in matters of language, (b) contributes to development of all Indian languages by creating content and corpus, (c) protects and documents minor, minority and tribal languages, and (d) promotes linguistic harmony by teaching 20 Indian languages to non-native learners (CIIL, 2005).

LINGUISTIC ASSOCIATIONS

Linguistic Association of Nigeria (LAN)

Developments in the field of linguistics, following the emergence of nation-states and the two Great Wars of the twentieth century, led to the appearance of linguistic associations around the world, which were devoted to scientific study of language in society. One of the earliest association, the Linguistic Society of America (LSA), which was founded in 1924, plays a critical role in supporting and disseminating linguistic research works, and facilitates practical applications of linguistic scholarship to scientific, educational, and social issues of language (Linguistic Society of America, 2010).

During the period of post-colonial nation building, the West African Linguistics Society (WALS) appeared in 1965 as a transnational body committed to the scientific study of language that was the hallmark of mid-century linguistics scholarship. WALS took over the role of the Survey of West African Languages, a research on West African languages funded by the Ford Foundation, and brought together distinguished African and Africanist linguists from around the world (including Joseph H Greenberg, Robert G.
Armstrong, and Ayo Bangbose). Following WALS, the Linguistic Association of Nigeria (LAN) emerged as the premier and most prestigious language association in Nigeria with similar commitments as WALS and LSA. LAN’s membership is mostly from linguistic scholars at major academic institutions.

Through a network of scholars interested in the advancement of linguistic scholarship, LAN members embarks on extensive studies of African languages, and advocates for the application of current research findings in education and other social sectors. Participants in this study affiliated to LAN play multilayered roles as academic experts and language advocates in Nigeria, the West African subcontinent, and internationally, depending on their professional networks. Some of these participants are founding members of WALS and LAN, and active players on international linguistic scholarship for several decades.

In addition to LAN, Nigeria has associations of teachers of indigenous languages, (such as the Association of Teachers of Yoruba Language of Nigeria, Igbo Language Teachers Association, and Hausa Language Teachers Association). Although annexed to LAN, these language teachers associations work independently to advocate for and influence the conditions of the specific languages and their speakers. Since members of these language teachers associations also maintain ties with LAN and other institutions, those participants recruited through one professional affiliation ultimately represent multiple perspectives. In the next section, I examine the implication of these intersections of positionalities.
Linguistic Society of India (LSI)

Similar to the West African case, the origin of the Linguistic Society of India, which was inaugurated in April 1, 1928, links to the works of Sir George Abraham Grierson, who coordinated the first Linguistic Survey of India (see Chapter Two). Grierson received the Order of Merit award, the highest honor bestowed by the British colonial government) during this inaugural meeting in Lahore, but it was the Punjab linguists and professor of comparative philology at Calcutta University, Dr. Taraporewala, that advanced the LSI as a prominent body expert invested in the study and development of Indian languages. Taraporewala encouraged the advancement of Grierson’s works, and worked to popularize linguistics and the study of Indian languages among university students by debunking prevalent misconceptions about the possibility of Indian linguistics (Linguistic Society of India, 2009).

LSI’s administrative center moved from Lahore to Kolkata (Calcutta) in 1937, and finally to the Deccan College, Pune, after the 1955 merger of LSI with the Indian Philological Association, another language association operational since 1945. LSI continues to support studies and development of Indian languages and the Linguistic Survey of India. As with Nigeria’s LAN, LSI membership pool is mostly from the academe. However, their works vary from pure scholarship to language rights advocacy.
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS

Babs Fafunwa Center for Yoruba Language Engineering (BAFCYLE)

The Babs Fafunwa Center for Yoruba Language Engineering (BAFCYLE), named after one of Nigeria’s prominent educationists, language researchers, and former Minister of Education of the Federal Government, is a non-governmental grassroots-oriented agency for the development of Yoruba language. BAFCYLE was formed around two major motives: first, to challenge the neglect of Nigeria’s indigenous languages in the public and private sectors as key to national development; and second, to systematically develop and promote the Yoruba language. As the BAFCYLE Handbook (2008) notes, the center’s objectives are twofold: first, it works towards the “modernization and application of Yoruba language in specialized domains such as technology, science, medicine, engineering, agriculture, law and politics, administration, etc., by expanding its vocabularies through the addition of technical or sub-technical terms and encouraging its use for practical purposes” (2008, p. 16).

Second, it works to translate resource materials for active citizen participation (such as policy documents, educational texts, and the Constitution) into the Yoruba language. Making such materials available in Yoruba language is intended to facilitate the teaching of basic scientific and technological skills required by ordinary citizens (who have limited proficiency in English) to be productive active participants in enhancing their living standard and their societies. In addition, BAFCYLE facilitates professional
practice (such as in hospitals, legislative houses, courts of law, educational and scientific
research institutions, etc) through the of Yoruba medium.

The founders of BAFCYLE are mostly academic experts from various fields with
spoken commitment to the advancement of local languages and lore from a grassroots
perspective. Although their avowed stance is pro-indigenous and grassroots oriented, as
I show in the next chapter, this does not necessarily represent a grassroots perspective.
At best, it is an activist-oriented critical theorist (or, from a Marxist interpretation, an
elite) perspective on the language needs and solutions to the ordinary citizen.
Participants in this study who are affiliated to BAFCYLE are founding members and
directors of the center, and hold active professoriate at the university – a dual
attachment they appear to be highly aware of and critical about. As such, their affiliation
to the academe must not be interpreted as necessarily divorced from the grassroots.

**PRATHAM**

Pratham is a non-governmental organization committed to providing quality
education to India’s underprivileged children. Established in 1994 with support from
UNICEF to provide education to children in the slums of Mumbai, Pratham has expanded
its activities and support sources to several countries including the United States. One of
Pratham’s outstanding projects, the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) – ASER
also means “impact” in Hindi – runs large-scale household survey of educational
achievements of students, based on official public school curriculum.
ASER is the largest household educational survey undertaken by people outside
the government, and depends on a strong network grassroots network of volunteers
who visit randomly selected homes in districts around the country. The surveys are
conducted by local organizations or institutions in each district, using common tools and
common sampling frame. Its reports publish students’ achievements in reading and
computational skills in the elementary levels. In 2009, ASER reached almost 700,000
children in 300,000 households living in over 16,000 villages of 575 districts (Pratham,
2009). Pratham participants in this study work on ASER and other projects. Although not
all are essentially academic scholars, all have had some graduate level education in a
specific area in the field of education.

Pratham’s use of local organizations and volunteers from around the country
mark it out as both administratively non-governmental and operationally grassroots.
However, given that these volunteers fall into scripted roles, their unique voice as active
participants in shaping educational realities especially regarding ELP is not certain. As
with BAFCYLE, Pratham therefore represents a highly effective activist-oriented critical
theorist perspective on the educational realities of the ordinary Indian citizens.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

UNESCO

It is important to make a distinction, for the purpose of this study, between
UNESCO Field Offices, National commissions, and headquarters in Paris. As an enormous
inter-national entity, UNESCO organizationally functions through multiple and
diversified institutional structures. Although parts of the same giant UNESCO body, various units have unique operational objectives and occupy markedly different social space that distinguish them from other units and redefine the status on language policymaking. Speaking of UNESCO as one entity in relation to education language policymaking requires some calibration; some participants associated with UNESCO participate in this study as national actors while others occupy a territorialized international space.

UNESCO HEADQUARTERS

UNESCO’s main decision-making body, the General Conference, comprised of representatives from all member states with equal voting rights, is housed in the Paris secretariat. The Executive Board, which is comprised of 58 Member States, also operates from the Paris Secretariat to execute the programs adopted by the General Conference. The UNESCO Secretariat consists of the Director-General, the administrative head of the organization, and over 2,000 staff working in the Paris and some 170 countries around world, with about 740 staff in 65 field offices around the world. Administratively, UNESCO’s headquarters has five program sectors, two support sectors, and 14 central service areas responsible for the bureaucratic operation of the organization. Education and Culture (two of the five program sectors) and Bureau of Strategic Planning (one of the Central Services) are directly involved with ELPs on the international and national levels.
As I have shown in previous chapters, language features prominently in major program areas of the Organization. First, “language and multilingualism” is one of the four major aspects of Cultural Diversity, which is among the nine programmatic themes of the Culture Sector. The Culture Sector records a growing awareness of the vital role languages play in development, in fostering cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue, in enhancing quality education for all and strengthening cooperation, in building inclusive knowledge societies and preserving cultural heritage, and in mobilizing political will for applying the tools of science and technology to sustainable development (UNESCO, 2007).

Language is also a central focus of the Cultural Sector’s commitment to preserving Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH), with the goal of safeguarding endangered languages. The Culture sector encourages an interdisciplinary approach to policy- and practice-oriented programs for advancing multilingualism and linguistic diversity, such as building capacity, research and analysis, raising awareness, supporting projects, developing networks, disseminating information.

The Education Sector also identifies language as one of its core themes linked to quality education and literacy. Following UNESCO’s overall framework, the Education Sector promotes mother tongue-based bilingual or multilingual approaches in education, which it considers vital for inclusion and quality in education. Building on research in multilingualism and education, it provides normative frameworks for
language policy and education, and advocates good practices in bilingual and multilingual education and mother tongue instruction (UNESCO, 2010).

The Education Sector plays an important role in educational policy and planning by supporting national policymakers in developing educational policies and strategies consistent with UNESCO’s normative standards, and in managing the effective implementation of those policies. Such support come in the form of technical assistance in education policy analysis, development plans, donor mobilization in support of national educational priorities, national institutional capacity-building in policy formulation, simulation and dialogue, resource projection, program monitoring and evaluation, and so forth. These supports are administered through UNESCO Field Offices and National Commissions in the respective countries, and through the Paris Secretariat.

The secretariat also rents office complexes for permanent delegations from Member States, who serve as members of the General Conference and Executive Board. The permanent delegations ensure liaison between Member States Government and UNESCO Secretariat, and serve as the direct link between the headquarters and the National Commission in the respective countries. As such, they are involved in brokering program decisions in which the respective member state is a signatory.

UNESCO FIELD OFFICES AND NATIONAL COMMISSIONS

UNESCO’s Field Offices are strategic administrative units intended to facilitate the organization’s decentralization strategy. Field Offices work in concert with other UN
agency, national institutions and local agencies to examine local and national conditions, develop programmatic responses to perceived needs and execute UNESCO’s programs. Unlike the Field Offices, UNESCO’s National Commissions are organs of the Member State Government, working as a vital link between the Organization and civil society in the respective country. As a unique network within the UN system, the National Commissions provide valuable insights for UNESCO’s programming, and ensure the implementation of the Organization’s initiatives, including training, studies, public awareness campaigns, media outreach, and so forth.

The Commissions also establish partnerships with the private sector, which provide useful technical expertise and financial resources for the effective running of UNESCO’s larger operations. Field Offices and National Commissions are organized in clusters (geographically nested around different regions of the world) with some Field Offices serving as Regional Bureaus dedicated to specific UNESCO program sectors. For instance, the Dakar Field Office doubles as cluster office for Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, and Senegal on the one hand, and as Regional Bureau for Education.

While Field Offices are under Cluster Offices, not all Cluster Offices are program sector Regional Bureau. The New Delhi Field Office is also cluster office for Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Nigeria is under the Accra, Ghana, Cluster Office, along with Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo. All Field Office, Cluster Office and Regional Bureaus are supervised and supported by the Bureau of Field Coordination (BFC), which is located and serves as “the voice of the field” at the
Paris Headquarters (UNESCO, 2008). Regional, Cluster, and Field Offices and National Commissions are part of UNESCO network with BFC as focal point for the implementation of the Organization’s decentralization strategy and tool for ensuring UNESCO’s effective presence in the field, where it develops strategies, programs and activities in concert with national institutions and other UN system agencies.

From the outside, UNESCO, as most other UN system agencies, appears as a complex organizational structure with winding administrative and programmatic labyrinths. Yet, understanding the complexity of this institution is necessary for tracing the Organization’s role in ELP on the international, national and local levels. Consistent with the integrative design of this research, all parts of the UNESCO network constitute major sources of data on ELP processes. The UNESCO participants in this study come from the Field Offices and National Commissions in New Delhi and Abuja, as well as the Secretariat and Permanent Delegation that make up the Paris Headquarters. Some of the participants at the Secretariat have professional expertise in, or worked in the ELP program areas of UNESCO, and therefore bring multiple perspectives to the study.

INDEPENDENT LANGUAGE ACTIVISTS

In addition to institutionalized actors whose influences on ELPs come through government, non-governmental or educational institutions, some participants in this study are independent individual language activists who either advocate specific causes of particular (or several) interest groups or engage in national language policy
development issues that affect all individuals and social groups. These independent actors are academic experts who previously held policy or advisory positions in the India or Nigerian governments. Most of them also provided consultancy services to UNESCO on language policy and planning, and typically conducted significant linguistic studies sponsored and used by UNESCO.

As I argue in Chapters Seven and Eight, the complication of ELP decisions in political, social and economic transactions, make the policy processes highly prone to frustrating some actors who ultimately leverage individual resources and networks to accomplish what ordinarily would remain trapped in bureaucratic tussles. A common characteristic of this group of participants are therefore a mixture of frustration with “the system” and optimism in their ability to bring personal interests and resources to effect desired change in the respective ELP processes. While some are actively engaged in activist projects, others whose efforts have either succeeded or failed to yield desired outcomes play their role from the margins by critiquing the ELP process and attempting to shape the public opinions from outside any institutional standpoint.
APPENDIX B:

IRB APPROVAL
January 21, 2009

Dear Mr. Desmond Odugu,

Thank you for submitting the research project entitled: International Networks in Education Language Policy Discourse: Case Studies of India, Nigeria, and UNESCO, for expedited review by the Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects. After careful examination of the materials you submitted, we have approved this project as described for a period of one year. The IRB has approved the final version of the consent form(s). Official stamped version(s) are attached to the email you received. Please make copies of the IRB approved consent form(s) for use in obtaining consent from participants.

Approximately eleven months from your initial review date, you will receive a renewal notice stating that approval of your project is about to expire. This notice will give you detailed instructions for submitting a renewal application. If you do not submit a renewal application prior to January 21, 2010, your approval will automatically lapse and your project will be suspended. When a project is suspended, no more research or writing regarding human subjects may be done until the project is reevaluated and re-approved. I recommend that you respond to these annual renewals in a complete and timely fashion.

This review procedure, administered by the IRB, in no way absolves you, the researcher, from the obligation to immediately inform the IRB in writing if you would like to change aspects of your approved project (please consult our website for specific instructions). You, the researcher, are respectfully reminded that the University’s ability to support its researchers in litigation is dependent upon conformity with continuing approval for their work. Should you have questions regarding this letter or general procedures, please contact the Compliance Manager at (773) 508-2689. Kindly quote File #74112 , if this project is specifically involved.

With best wishes for the success of your work,

Dr. Raymond H. Dye, Jr.
Chair, Institutional Review Board

CC: Dr. Erwin Epstein -CIEP

http://www.luc.edu/ors/irb_home.shtml
APPENDIX C:

LETTER OF INVITATION TO PARTICIPANTS
LETTER OF INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH

March 12, 2009

Project Title: International Networks in Education Language Policy Discourse: Case Studies of India, Nigeria, and UNESCO

Researcher(s): Desmond I. Odugu
Faculty Sponsor: Professor Erwin H. Epstein

Introduction:
You are being asked to take part in a research study being conducted by Desmond I. Odugu for a doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Professor Erwin H. Epstein in the School of Education at Loyola University of Chicago.

You are being asked to participate because you work in the Federal Ministry of Education Nigeria or Department of Higher Education India, may have experience working on education language policy and/or may have experience working with UNESCO or other international organizations. Other participants from the Federal Ministry of Education Nigeria and/or Department of Higher Education India, expert linguists and university professors, and social critics whose work are relevant to education language policy are also being recruited for this research.

Your responsibility in this study is only to participate in a three-phase personal interview conducted in-person by the investigator either in your office or over the telephone. The three interviews will be conducted on different dates within a designated two week period from March 2009 to May 2009, and each interview will last no more than ninety (90) minutes. Prior to the interview, you will receive a brief outline of the interviews’ specific issues and/or questions. During the interview, a semi-structured conversational format will be followed; the investigator will ask direct and indirect questions to which responses are invited. You are free to decline responding to any question as well as ask questions anytime during the interview. Interviews will be in English language. Participating in this study does not pose any risk to participants. However, participants will benefit from the study by having full access to the study’s findings which can be used to inform education language policymaking activities. Participation in this study is completely voluntary.

If you have questions about this research study, please feel free to contact Desmond I. Odugu at dodugu@luc.edu or the faculty sponsor, Professor Erwin H. Epstein at eepstei@luc.edu.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Desmond Ikenna Odugu
Loyola University Chicago
APPENDIX D:

DOCUMENTATION OF INFORMED CONSENT
DOCUMENTATION OF INFORMED CONSENT

Project Title: International Networks in Education Language Policy Discourse: Case Studies of India, Nigeria, and UNESCO

Researcher(s): Desmond I. Odugu
Faculty Sponsor: Professor Erwin H. Epstein

Introduction:
You are being asked to take part in a research study being conducted by Desmond I. Odugu for a doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Professor Erwin H. Epstein in the School of Education at Loyola University of Chicago.

You are being asked to participate because you work in the Federal Ministry of Education Nigeria or Department of Higher Education India, may have experience working on education language policy and/or may have experience working with UNESCO or other international organizations. Other participants from the Federal Ministry of Education Nigeria and/or Department of Higher Education India, expert linguists and university professors, and social critics whose work are relevant to education language policy are also being recruited for this research.

Please read this form carefully and ask any questions you may have before deciding whether to participate in the study.

Purpose:
The purpose of this study is to understand the network dynamics in international and national education language policy discourse through an analysis of the education language policy process.

Procedures:
If you agree to be in the study, you will be asked to participate in a three-phase interview conducted by the investigator either in your office or over the telephone. The interviews will focus on identifying and understanding the activities of all agents involved in the education language policy process. The first phase will focus on your personal history and background as it relates exclusively to the research topic. The second phase will focus on your experiences in the education language policy process. The third and final phase will explore issues arising from the first two interview phases as well as personal reflections on your personal background and experiences as it relates to the research topic. All interview questions will be open-ended. The three interviews will be conducted on different dates within a designated two week period from April 2009 to June 2009, and each interview will last no more than ninety (90) minutes. Prior to the interview, you will receive a brief outline of the interviews’ specific issues and/or questions. During the interview, a semi-structured conversational format will be followed; the investigator will ask direct and indirect questions to which responses are invited. You are free to decline responding to any question as well as ask questions anytime during the interview. Interviews will be in English language. All interviews will be audio-recorded to aid transcription and analysis, and stored in electronic format accessible only to the researcher. All interview raw data will be deleted and destroyed.
immediately after this study. Transcripts of interview will be shared with all interviewees to verify the accuracy of information.

Risks/Benefits:
There are no direct benefits to participants issuing from this study. However, the researcher understands the need among those involved in education language policymaking to better understand the relationships and networks that exist among different policy agent and institution from the local through the international. This research will therefore address critical questions and issues faced in the policy process. The results of this research will be made available to all participants in an electronic format as an executive summary. Full electronic copy of the completed dissertation research will also be available to participants. Participants will therefore benefit by having complete access to the findings from this study which can be used in their actual policymaking activities. Finally, participants will have access to information on the internal networks of policy practices in other national and international spaces that can inform the activities other than their own.

This research does not entail any risk, harm or discomfort to the participants beyond those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine activities.

Confidentiality:
- This research is conceptually designed to disregard information that can identify specific participants. To ensure this complete confidentiality, no participant will be required to provide names or information that can connect particular data to participants. Pseudonyms will be assigned to interviewees’ records including interviewee’s institution, position, and identifiable status or actions. Participants will have the option to permit their information to be accurately identified in the report. Only those participants who explicitly consent to direct use of their information will have their information (institution, position, status and actions) reported directly. Others will be assigned pseudo names that will completely disguise the identity of the participants.
- Participants will be informed before and during the data collection processes of the procedures for ensuring confidentiality. And participants are completely free, and without prejudice, to opt out of the research at any point they perceive their confidentiality being compromised.
- All audio-recorded materials will be stored in digital formats on the researcher’s personal computer, and will be deleted and destroyed at the completion of this research and other associated academic work like scholarly publications. No other party than the present researcher will have access to the raw data collected in this study.

I permit that any information collected from me by the researcher in the course of this study, including but not limited to the name of my institution, title, and position which can identify me may be used in reporting the data from this research.  □ Yes □ No

Voluntary Participation:
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you do not want to be in this study, you do not have to participate. Even if you decide to participate, you are free not to answer any question or to withdraw from participation at any time without penalty.

Contacts and Questions:
If you have questions about this research study, please feel free to contact Desmond Odugu at dodugu@luc.edu or the faculty sponsor, Prof. Erwin Epstein at cepstci@luc.edu.
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the Compliance Manager in Loyola’s Office of Research Services at +1-773-508-2689.

Statement of Consent:
Your signature below indicates that you have read and understood the information provided above, have had an opportunity to ask questions, and agree to participate in this research study. You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records.

Participant's Signature ___________________________ Date __________

Desmond Ikenna Odugu ___________________________ January 2, 2009
Researcher's Signature ___________________________ Date __________
APPENDIX E:

SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL (FULL VERSION)
Dissertation Research Interview Protocol

Dissertation Topic:  International Networks in Education Language Policy Discourse:  
Case Studies of India, Nigeria, and UNESCO

Researcher:  Desmond I. Odugu

Supervisor:  Professor Erwin H. Epstein

Phase I: Participant’s Background and Relevance to Research Topic

1. How old are you/what is your year of birth?
2. What is your highest level of education?
   a. What did you study?
   b. When did you graduate?
   c. Where did you study?
   d. Why did you choose to study in your area?
3. What language(s) do you speak?
   a. What language group do you belong to natively?
4. What institution do you work for?
   a. What is you position in this institution?
5. Do you have any direct or indirect professional affiliations?
   a. Are this/these affiliations international, national or local?
   b. Have you travelled/ do you travel overseas for purposes of this affiliation?
6. How do you network with this professional body?
7. How will you describe your status in relation to Education Language Policy Process? (For follow-up clarification: Official government employed policymaker, Elected government policymaker, Official Consultant/Advisory [Academic], Academic professional with interest in language policy, Language activist, Local/regional representative activist of particular language group, Mass Communications personnel, Other?)
8. How long have you been in this status?
9. In what other capacities have you worked in relation to education language policy?
10. How long were you in this position/status?
11. How long have you been involved with the education language policy process?

**Phase II: Participant’s Experience with Education Language Policy Process**

12. Which other individual or institutional actors are involved in the education language process that you work in? (For follow-up clarification: Official government policymakers, Elected government policymakers, Officially recruited indigenous Academic Consultants/Advisers, Academic Professionals without official recruitment, Language Activists, Local/regional representatives of particular language groups, Mass Communications Personnel, International Organizations like UNESCO, Indigenous employees of international organizations like UNESCO, Foreign language experts, Foreign Government agents (please specify), Politicians, Social Critics, Other?)

13. What language behaviors are targeted in the education language policy process you work in? (For follow-up clarification: Language of instruction in public (government sponsored) schools, Language of instruction in private schools, Language of administration and management in schools, Written languages in schools, Spoken languages in schools, Language spoken at home, Language used in social settings, Language used in bureaucratic settings [e.g., business and trade], Language used in official settings [e.g., law court, government offices, post office], Language of academic publications, Language of government sponsored textbooks, Language of non-government sponsored textbooks, Language used in state and local schools, Language used in government and private hospitals, Languages taught in schools [across the entire country], Languages taught in schools [in state and local schools], Others)

14. What languages feature in your education language policymaking?
   a. What languages have received official status?
   b. Do the languages identified match ethnic affiliations, socioeconomic class, religious groupings or other special group?

15. Which levels of education are targeted by the education language policy you work in? (For follow-up clarification: Preschool, Nursery/kindergarten, Elementary/primary education, Secondary/High education, Tertiary/Higher education, Advanced/professional education)
16. Under what conditions are decisions education language policies made? (For follow-up clarification: Bureaucratic settings, collaborative setting, top-down or bottom-up)

17. What is the periodization of education language policy?
   a. Is education language policymaking scheduled within fixed time frames or flexible?
   b. If flexible, what prompts particular education language policymaking process or activity?

18. What are the conditions for establishing education language policies? (For follow-up clarification: Official Government veto, Voting, Correspondence with international organizations’ [UNESCO’s] policies, Consensus with foreign government agents, Consistency with scholarly research findings, Negotiation with language advocates, Lobbying, Recommendations of Consultants/Advisers, Popular mass appeal [represented through the media], Consistency with findings from government sponsored research, Consistency with findings from research sponsored by UNESCO or other IOs, Others?)

19. How are decisions about education language policy made? (For follow-up clarification: Official government mandate, Voting, Parliamentary action, House of Representatives, House of Assembly, Others?)

20. What conditions motivate the establishment of education language policy? (For follow-up clarification: Proactive government initiative, Response to academic problems in schools, Response to organized class action from educators and students, Findings from academic research, Recommendation by international organizations [UNESCO], Politicians [particularly during political campaigns], Social activists’ demand, Social insurrection, Imitation of foreign countries, Advocacy by international organizations, Outcomes of legal actions, Others?)

21. What means are used in the education language policy you work in? (For follow-up clarification: Action of Executive arm of government, Judicial Actions, Legislative Action, Public discourse, Official government appointed policymakers, Officially appointed standing or portfolio committees, Others?)

22. What are the processes of making decisions on education language policy?

23. Who has the final say in education language policy?

24. Which institution has the strongest influence in the education language policymaking process? (For follow-up clarification: Political party, Academic experts, International organizations [UNESCO], Social [language] activists,
25. What is the goal of education language policy? (Alignment with international organizations, Requirement for international organization funding, National unification, Upholding single national education standard, Political stability, Economic advancement, Resolution of colonial legacies, Revitalization of traditional language and cultures, Scientific and technological advancement, Resolution of language conflicts, Integration and representation of multiple language, Other?)

26. What effects have education language policy had so far? (For follow-up clarification: Integration within international community of nations, Alignment with foreign governments, Alignment with international organizations [UNESCO], Mollification of political instability, Economic progress, Scholastic achievement of students, Higher academic achievements, Greater conflicts, Political tension, Poor academic achievement, Other?)

27. Are education language policy reviewed?
   a. If so, how frequently?
   b. Who reviews education language policy?

28. Is the education language policy process monitored or regulated?
   a. If so, how and by whom?
   b. What is the purpose of such monitoring or regulation?

29. Are there other issues or questions you think relevant to this topic that we haven’t talked about?

Phase III: Participant’s Reflection on Education Language Policy Issues Raised in Phases I and II

30. Looking back to all your years working in this area, how do you think the activities of those you identified as actors in the education language policy process have influenced or shaped yours?
   a. How do you interpret their actions in the policy process?
   b. What would you want to change if you could in the way this relationship plays out?
c. (Explore all the actors identified by participant)

31. Given what motivated you to study/work in this field (mention), how do you think your activities have contributed in shaping the policy process and its outcomes?
   a. How much more or less influence do you think (would you like) your office should have?

32. In your view of how smooth or difficult your interaction with other policy agents is, do you think there is need to include or exclude some other policy agents (individual or institutional?)
   a. If so, which or who would this be, and why?
   b. What do you think the policy process should achieve by making this adjustment?

33. Do you think the education language policy process you work in captures or focuses on the right target (that is, language behavior, issue, feature, population)?
   a. If not, what other target would you propose?
   b. Do you think other policy agents share this opinion?
   c. If so, why do you think education language policymaking has not moved in that direction, and how could you make it move in that direction if you had the power to do so?

34. In your opinion, are the conditions under which your education language policymaking precedes the right ones?
   a. Are these conditions necessary and sufficient to reach desired policy goals?
   b. If not, what other conditions would you propose?
   c. Do you think other policy agents share this opinion with you?
   d. If so, why do you think the policymaking process has not moved to incorporate or exclude those conditions?
   e. What do you think you would do, if you had the power, to make it move in the right direction? (Which other policy agent would you need to work with to get this done?)

35. You identified (mention) as the decision making procedure of the policy process. Do you think this makes the policy process easy or more difficult?
   a. Why do you think this process is being followed?
   b. If you would desire a change, what would that be and why?
36. You identified (mention) as the critical policy goals of your education language policy. Do you think your policymaking process achieve these goals?
   a. If not, why and how do you think this can be changed?
   b. Which other policy agent do you think will be vital in changing the goals or how the already set goals are pursued?

37. Whether the desired goals are achieved or not, what do you think is the overall effect of the policy process (on the targeted language, issues, populations, etc)?

38. What is your overall impression about how your work relate to and is affected by others whose work shape the education language policy you work in?

39. What other issue or question do you think we should focus on that we have not discusses?

Thank you.
APPENDIX F:

SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL (ABRIDGED VERSION)
Dissertation Research Interview Protocol

Dissertation Topic: International Networks in Education Language Policy Discourse: Case Studies of India, Nigeria, and UNESCO

Researcher: Desmond I. Odugu
Supervisor: Professor Erwin H. Epstein

Phase I: Participant’s Background and Relevance to Research Topic

1. Demographic information:
   a. Age
   b. Education
   c. Language
   d. Employment
2. Professional affiliations
   a. Professional affiliations and networks
   b. Status in relation to education language policy

Phase II: Participant’s Experience with Education Language Policy Process

3. Who else do you know that work or have experience in the education language policy?
4. What languages are targeted by education language policy?
5. What levels of education are targeted by education language policy?
6. Is there a current policy activity on language of education or is an existing policy still in use?
7. What are the conditions for education language policy making?
8. What are the procedures for policy decisions on language of education?
9. What means are used in the processes and what goals are intended to be achieved?
10. Are education language policy reviewed, and if so, how and why?
11. Other issues you consider relevant.

Phase III: Participant’s Reflection on Education Language Policy Issues Raised in I and II
12. How has the activities of other stakeholders shaped yours in the education language policy process?
13. Has your activities/work contributed to the education language policy process, and if so, how?
14. How easy or difficult is it for you to interact with or communicate with other policy agents in the policy process?
15. What are your opinions regarding the conditions under which education language policies are made?
16. How appropriate are the means and goals of the education language policy, and why?
17. What are the overall effects or impacts (if any) of the education language policy process?
18. Any other issues.

Thank you.
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