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The Rise of Political Islam

Can The Turkish Model Be Applied Successfully in Egypt?

By Dr Taha Kassem

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Abstract

Although the parliamentary elections run in Egypt in December 2011-January 2012 indicated that Egypt is witnessing an era of political or democratic transformation, they signified the rise of political Islam to authority; the rise which created a lot of debates and posed a lot of questions about the political and economic future of Egypt. The core of these debates circles around these questions: Would Egypt adopt, literally, a rigid pro-Islamic type of rule based on the Islamic Sharia (Islamic Code) or would it adopt a moderate model, like that in Turkey, in its political and economic transformation? Pessimists think that Egypt will become another model of Iraq where national strife causes a lot of bloodshed or another model of Iran which gained a global antagonism. Optimists, on the other hand, aspire that Egypt will adopt a moderate pro-Islamic model as Islam itself is called the religion of moderateness (Din al Aetdal wa al Wasatiya) and they suggest and appreciate that Egypt follows the steps taken by the Turkish party AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi), The Justice and Development Party in Turkey. They base their argument on the political and economic development witnessed by Turkey under the rule of the AKP. Moreover, they consider Turkey to be a Muslim but pro-Western and secular state, a “model” or “inspiration” for other Muslim countries. Though the author supports the optimists’ view, he thinks that Egypt faces a lot of barriers that

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could hinder the achievement of these objectives or at least preclude their realization on the short run.

**Keywords:** Political Islam, Demonstrative effects, The Development and Justice party in Turkey (AKP), The Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt (FJP), Muslim Brotherhood, Civilization conflicts, State culture theory, Crisis theory, Resurgence theory, Textual theory, Political transformation, Economic transformation, Islamic Sharia, Religious party

**JEL Classification:** F55, O10, O20
Introduction

On Saturday the 21st of January 2012, The Elections supreme commission in Egypt declared the final results of the Parliamentary elections which revealed to the public that political Islamic parties won the majority of seats in the revolutionary parliament. Even though the Islamic parties belong to different Islamic movements and adopt different contextual thinking, they are all classified under the notion of political Islam. If we have a look at the statistical results, we will find that the Freedom and Justice Party (the political wing of the Muslim Brother hood) won about 242 out of 498 seats, El Nour party (the political wing of the Salafi Movements) won about 128, El Wafd party 38, the coalition (ELKUTLA) 34, independents 20, EL Wast party 10, the Reparation and Development party 9, the Freedom party 5, National Egypt party 5, Egyptian Citizen party 5 and the Union party 2 of the total seats. This means that the Islamic parties won about 79.48.1% out of the total seats in the parliament (Freedom and Justice 48.5%, el Nour 26% and el Wast 4.98%) which implies that in a case of forming a coalition among these parties the Egyptian parliament will become a religious based parliament, which stimulates a lot of fear and suspicion among the Egyptian citizens who aspired to replace tyranny and autocracy with democracy, not with theocracy. Fears and suspicions arose that Egypt would become another Iran, which is highly secluded from the international community and exposed to economic sanctions and political boycott from most of the countries, or that Egypt would suffer and bleed from burning strife among the different sects in Egypt, particularly the Muslims and the Copts. Although these fears and doubts are justified and accepted to some extent, the majority of the Egyptians, including the author of this article, hope that Egypt is witnessing a step forward towards democratic transition. Before exaggerating in talks about hopes, we have to ask ourselves
certain questions which would clarify to a great extent the Egyptian situation, the current and the prospective. These questions first start with; do we need a model to adopt? Is Turkey considered an appropriate model for the Arab spring countries, especially Egypt? Do the Egyptian Islamic parties, especially the Freedom and Justice Party, has a mindset or ideology similar or close to that of the Turkish AKP party (Development and Justice Party) that could enable the Egyptian Islamic parties to lead Egypt to political stability and economic boom as is the case in Turkey? What are the major barriers or obstacles that hinder Egypt from achieving these objectives?

**A Model for Change**

Different terms have been used to describe what the Arab World had witnessed since the beginning of the year 2011, revolution, uprising, popular revolt, protests and demonstrations, etc. (1) Gilbert Achkar commented on the Tunisian and Egyptian cases by saying that although what happened in both countries and the success of their revolutions to overthrow their regimes, we cannot describe this act which gave the impression that the regime was overthrown in accordance with the people's wishes, when in reality it was not, as it would be in a revolution. This is because the revolution has not yet achieved all of its objectives, only the head and the most despotic and corrupt figures of the regime were removed but the back bone of the regime still survives. (2)

In my opinion, Achkar argument is correct, however, to succeed in their revolutionary process, revolutionists should listen to the voice of wisdom which requires that they stop revolting and demonstrating and calm down to rebuild their country. Egypt now is in a transitional state moving from a state of tyranny and despotism to a state of democracy and freedom. Nevertheless, due to the long time of tyranny, and corruption, Egypt has lost its cohesiveness and even
its identity. Through the different regimes which ruled Egypt, Jamal Abdel Nasser with its anti western and pan- Arabism ideology, Sadat with his Arab boycott and pro-western ideology, and finally Mubarak with his total subjugation to the west, particularly, to the United States of America for the preservation of his authority and power, pushed Egypt to a state of internal disequilibrium. Generations differ in their ideologies through the three different reigns which ended with a confused and hesitating society. What escalates the problem is the rise of Islamic movements to authority through the last parliamentary elections which means that a new generation with a different religious ideology will appear on the scene. All of these different generations or different ideologies exist within Egyptian society, which is why conflicts are salient in Egypt. This pushes us to a fact that Egypt, necessarily, must adopt a model which melts all these differences together and allows them to coexist and creates a stable society.

Opinions differ about whether it would be better to adopt a model or not, and which country could stand as an appropriate model for Egypt. On one hand, some people argue that, apart from that fact that it is impossible for any country to clone the experience of another in governance, economy, or in value system, each country has its own unique characteristics which bear no resemblance whatsoever to the situation in other countries. For those who claim that Turkey is an excellent model for Egypt, the Turkish model has many characteristics that distinguish it totally and preclude its application in Egypt for the following reasons.(3) Considering the overwhelming majority of the Islamic parties in the Egyptian parliament, the most crucial factor in the Turkish experience over the past eight years has been the AKP, which has never cast itself as a religious party that has sought to transform the state into a form of theocracy; it has never opposed the secular values and never had as its principle objective the literal
application of Sharia law as understood by the Salafi movement. (4) In addition, to a large extent, the AKP adheres to the Western values. For example, the AKP adheres to democracy, the value which enabled it to come to authority in 2003 in the context of a democratic system of government which was established in 1946. The AKP operated in the context of a general aspiration to obtain European Union membership, a process that requires commitments to a range of political, economic and social reforms (Copenhagen Criteria). (5) On the whole, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) offers a model of secularism reconciled with religion. From this perspective, secularism is a system that guarantees every citizen the right to practice his or her religion freely without fear of punishment or exclusion from public life. (6)

Although the previous opinion may seem plausible to some extent, on the other hand some argue that states in transition must adopt a certain model from countries that witnessed economic boom and political stability and which have similar circumstances. Larry Diamond, a leading scholar of democracy and democratization in the United States, underlines the importance of a model in inspiring reform and transformation among Arab countries. (7) He cites that the absence of such a model in the Middle East is one of the set of factors that complicate prospects of democratization in the region. (8) Moreover, prominent personalities ranging from the Tunisian opposition leader, Rashid El Ganoushi (the leader of Al Nahda Islamic party) to the grandson of Hassan El Banna, the Founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Tariq Ramadan, had highlighted the importance of the model, the Turkish model, for the transformation of the Arab World. (9) Turkey was not only an appropriate model for the Arab countries but for the soviet republics which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union as well. (10) The Economist announced Turkey to be the “star of Islam” and a model for the Central Asian republics especially. (11) Roughly a
decade later the idea of Turkey as a model was raised once again, this time by the American president George Bush when he launched the BMENA initiative. (12) In both cases Turkey’s model credentials were based on Turkey being a secular Muslim country and a democracy with liberal market. (13)

Samuel Huntington in his seminal work on the “Third Wave” of democratization highlights the importance of the model and its demonstrative effect as a means of showing that democratic change can happen and how it can happen. (14) By demonstrative effect, Samuel means the successes achieved by a certain country that makes this country a model of interest for other countries. (15) Therefore, if we apply the notion of the demonstrative effect on the case of the Turkish model, we will find that Turkey achieved a lot of economic and political successes, these successes are a function of three developments, the rise of the trading state, making Turkey visible through commerce, investment and trade, in the diffusion of Turkey’s democratization experience as a work in progress and the positive image of Turkey's new foreign policy, including the introduction at policies encouraging free movement of people between Turkey and the Middle East.

Concerning the three developments, if we shed light on Turkey as a successful trading state, we will find Turkish democracy has extended hand in hand with the growth of its economy and per capita income. (16) Economic development transforms societies in different ways, most importantly it enlarges the middle class, making it difficult to sustain the concentration of political power in the hands of narrow elite and encourage social capital to emerge thereby enriching civil society. (17) The Turkish economy which was closed and imports substitution oriented economy was transformed to an export oriented economy. Turkey's per capita income increased from about 1,300 USD in 1985 to 2,773 USD in 1995 and finally almost 11,000 USD in 2008 and in
comparison with the agricultural sector which declined to a large extent, the manufacturing sector grew significantly together with the service sector. These changes coincided with a period when Turkey became a trading state; Turkey's foreign trade grew from less than 20 billion USD in 1985 to more than 330 billion USD in 2008. Much more significantly in terms of the demonstrative effect, the Turkish trade with its immediate neighbors increased from about 4 billion USD in 1991 to 82 billion USD in 2008.

These developments are significant for Turkey's neighborhood for different reasons, first they set an example of how economic success in the sense of how a transition from a primarily agriculture dominated import substitution economy to a globally competitive one and democratization has gone hand in hand, Turkish exports and investments make this relationship visible. Secondly, especially as the Turkish economy is increasingly engaged in its neighborhood, there is a greater interaction between Turkish the business elite and the business people of the region, inevitably, issues of rule of law, accountability and transparency come up during conversation between the two sides.

Concerning the Turkish democratization process, it is clear that the Turkish democracy is itself a work in progress which, in turn, closes the otherwise large gap and also hierarchical relationship that inevitably forms between well established democracies and countries that are receiving democratic assistance. The fact that Turkey is still struggling with consolidating and deepening its democracy enables the Turkish side to relate to their neighbors much more easily. Turkey acting as a venue for gathering activists from the region becomes critical as they can get both firsthand experiences from their Turkish counterparts and see the work in progress for themselves.

Turkey's demonstrative effect is highly explicit in Turkey's new foreign policy. With the arrival of the Justice and Development party (AKP) to power
and the zero problems policy, Turkish relations with its neighbors improved and expanded, and was accompanied by a growing interest to seek solutions to the problems of Turkey's neighborhood from Balkans to the Middle East. The zero problems policy has engendered considerable Turkish involvement in regional issues ranging from efforts to mediate between Arab / Palestinian and Israelis, between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq, between Afghanistan and Pakistan, between Bosnia and Serbia and in resolving bilateral conflicts such as Cyprus and relations with Armenia. Even if these mediation efforts have not always been very successful, it has nevertheless helped to change Turkey's image in the eyes of the Arab World; Turkey has come to be known as a country that speaks much more softly, multilaterally and cooperatively than others, and hence has been much more positively received. Another important aspect of Turkey's new foreign policy has been the close relationship that the government has developed with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, plus the bitter criticism it has directed towards Israel; these developments have made Erdogan particularly popular among the so called “Arab street” strengthening Turkey's demonstrative effect. Finally, energetic efforts to primate a stable and prosperous neighborhood through encouraging greater economic integration between Turkey and the Arab world highlighted this demonstrative effect.

Due to the successes of the AKP in the political and economic domains, most of the Egyptians wished to repeat the Turkish experience. Moderate Islamists, a booming economy, democracy, political stability, and a balanced foreign policy with the preservation of the Turkish identity are factors that attracted the Egyptian people to aspire to adopt the Turkish model. Turkey or the Turkish model changed from a source of aspiration for the Egyptians to a source of inspiration. What escalates the ambition of the Egyptian is the rise of the Islamic parties to power in the last election. Egyptian thought that the
Freedom and Justice party is the other face of the coin and that the first face is the Development and Justice party (AKP) but the former is in Egypt, while the latter is in Turkey. Egyptians who voted for the Egyptian Islamic party thought that this party has an ideology and a vision similar to the ideology and vision of the AKP, as they are both stemming from the same source of “Islam,” and therefore thought Egypt would witness the economic and political transformation witnessed by Turkey at the hands of the AKP.

Although most of the Egyptians, with the ascendance of the Islamic parties, particularly Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) aspired for a moderate and modern Egypt, the evidence may let them down.

\[\textbf{Evolution and ideology of the AKP and FJP} \]

\[\textbf{A Comparative Perspective} \]

Different theories tried to explain the causes of the evolution and resurgence of political Islam in different countries. To trace the reasons of this phenomenon implies to a large extent the mindsets and the ideologies that lie behind it. In other words, what stimulates and motivates Islamic movements to appear on the scene clarifies to a large extent the ideological context of these movements. In many of the studies concerned with the revival of political Islam, there is an implicit assumption that the revival is a result of relative depression in particular oppressive state policies and social injustice.\(^{(29)}\) A general problem with this assumption is that it may explain the revival in some countries but not in others and at the moment there is no single theory that can account for the many faces of political Islam in such divers settings as for example, Turkey (democratic Islamism), Iran (Islamic revolution) and Egypt (Islamist opposition).\(^{(30)}\) Nevertheless, a range of theories, presented under three broad headings of Civilization, social, and textual, tried to explain the phenomenon. The first theory aims at explaining the dynamics of Islamic civilizations internally and
externally vis-à-vis an external power, the second theory focuses on social process, it locates the Islamic revival not in religion but in the social context in which it embedded and the third theory locates the Islamic revival in Islam's founding texts and doctrines as well as religious worship. (31)

If we try to use the previously mentioned theoretical contexts and apply them to the Islamic revival in Turkey and Egypt we will find that the civilization context explains to a large extent the Islamic revival in Turkey, while a mixture of the social and textual context explains the revival in Egypt, and this could be clarified in the following.

The idea of the clash of civilization has long been a powerful metaphor by which we can interpret the Islamic revival, the revival which stems from the clash between the Islamic civilization with its creeds and the western civilization with its secular values and practices, which put the Islamic values and practices at stake. In Turkey, Islamism has come to be associated with oppositions to the indigenous pro–western state ideology and values of kemalism, named after Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938) who founded the modern republic out of the ruins of the Ottoman empire in 1923. (32) Ataturk regarded the form of Islam as practiced under the Ottoman empire an obscurantist obstacle to development; once Ataturk had consolidated his grip on power, he pushed through a series of reforms which gradually expunged Islam from public life. (33) These reforms included:

1- The abolition of the Caliphate system, religious school and Islamic Sharia law courts and the subsequent introduction of new laws based on the Swiss civil, German criminal, and Italian economic codes.

2- The closure of Islamic shrines, the banning of the religious brotherhood, known as Tarikat, the adoption of the western Gregorian calendar, and the granting of political rights to women.

3- The removal of Islam as the state religion and the redesignation of Turkey as a secular state.
4- The adoption of European numerals and replacement of Arabic with a Latin script.
5- The replacement of Arabic with Turkish for the call to prayer.
6- The change of the weekly holiday from Friday to Sunday.

As a result, secularism in Turkey has come to mean not the removal of religion from the public sphere, but the replacement of one creed with another to the extent that women wearing head scarfs represents a political statement, an assault on the ideological foundations of the state. (34)

Ataturk's reforms triggered a series of rebellions which combined elements of Islamism. While the reforms had a major impact on Turkey's urban elite, they were less successful in penetrating rural areas, which still accounted for the vast majority of the population and where the practice of folk Islam continued with a little change. (35) But with the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1946, these rural areas were involved, as the nominees courted the rural conservative vote. The first to do so was the Democrat Party of Adnan Menderes, prime minister in 1950 – 1960, who restored the call to prayer in Arabic, reintroduced religious lessons in schools, allowed Koranic recitations on radio, and built about 15000 mosques. (36) Not only did Menderes tolerate the re-emergence of the Tarikats but he actively sought the electoral endorsement of Said Nursi, the founder of the Nuxcu Tarikat, which grew to become the second largest religious movement in the country after the Naqshabandi. (37) However in 1960 Menders was toppled by a military coup and the Democrat Party was banned. Subsequence Islamic parties were established, the most explicit party was established by Necmettin Erbakan, a member of the Naqshabandi Tarikat; this party was called the National Order Party, however it was closed down following the 1971 military coup. Other Islamic parties were established subsequently, for example, the National Salvation Party and the Welfare Party which adopted a pro-Islamic policies, however the Welfare party faced the Kemalists pro-western military Junta measures of which the most prominent
measures were the 28th February 18 measures in 1997 to curb Islamist activity, ranging from restrictions on the Islamist media to the closure of private Koranic schools and courses, and the Welfare Party was closed down by the constitutional court and Erbakan was banned from politics for five years in 1998. (38) Following the closure of the Welfare Party, most of its members joined the Virtue party under the chairmanship of Recai Kutan, a long time confidante of Erbakan, The Virtue Party was immediately faced with a dilemma as the other subsequent parties, particularly the Justice and Development party, ((the AKP) Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), if it appeared to be a continuation of the Welfare Party, it risked closure by the constitutional court, but if it distanced itself from the Welfare Party, it might lose its grass roots and alienate the party's former supporters. In the end, the Virtue Party, as its successor the AKP, opted for a more moderate image by repeatedly stressing its commitment to secularism and appointing a number of secular women to its national executive. (39) Although the AKP seemed similar to the Virtue Party, the case of AKP in Turkey is a unique experience and should be considered a new chapter in the history of Islamism. Even though the AKP has the support of religious people, it was able to change its understanding of religion and politics. It presents itself not as a representative of Islam but as a representative of conservative democrats, which means that secular tones determine the AKP political framework, not religious ones. AKP, as a conservative democratic party, defends change, reform, and transformation in favor of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. (40)

From what is mentioned above, it became obvious that political Islam in Turkey was not the progeny of Islamic fundamentalism or the desire to establish the Islamic state, however it was a sort of movement which opted to retrieve the Islamic rules in a society which was masked by a pro-western and secular values; or in other words, these movements tried to create a sort of coexistence between the pro-western secular creed and the Islamic creed which is inherent
in the Turkish society. Islamic parties in Turkey used the Islamic empathy to rally the support of the rural Muslim areas in their political struggles against the Kemalists, pro-western and secular military junta. Moreover AKP’S self-definition as conservative democrat represents a great transformation regarding the role and function of religion in politics. AKP is no longer the representation of political Islamic, in other wards, AKP is not a religionist party, but religiosity is the aspect of its many members. AKP says yes to religiosity but says no religionism. (41) Although religiosity is an important aspect of individual and social life in Turkey, the majority of Turkish society does not support an Islamist regime. In other words, Turkish society demands a social Islam, not political Islam. (42) Therefore the conflict between Islam and secularism represents a difference of ideas and values, anti-Westernization is not a part of AKP’S political ideology and in AKP’S conservative democracy there is no room for political Islam. Since the issue of coexistence was preferred to the issue of replacement, there is a sort of harmony between allowing freedom of religiosity in society and adopting western principles in politics and economy.

The picture depicted above provides the most important pillars of the Turkish model: a bottom-up connection with Islam as opposed to a top-down and revolutionary version of Islamism. (43) The Turkish model emphasizes a more civil and tolerant connection with Islam as the Turkish Islamism promotes and motivates individuals to Islamize their environments through grass roots activism and solidarity by forming social networks, emphasizing education (both religious and secular) entrepreneurship, and the use of the media. (44) This bottom up connection also includes operating within the boundaries of democratic rules. Since the establishment of the National Order Party, Turkish Islamists have operated within the boundaries of a relatively well functioning democracy and internalized the democratic civic culture to a great extent. (45) The second pillar of the Turkish model lies at the Turkish Islamists connection with the idea of secularism. The AKP document states that the party considers...
religion to be one of the most important institutions and secularism as a prerequisite for democracy, and it rejects the interpretation and distortion of secularism as enmity against religion. (46) Basically, secularism is a principle which allows people of all religions and beliefs to comfortably practice their religions, but which also allows people without beliefs to organize their lives along these lines. (47) From this point of view secularism is a principle of freedom and social peace. The AKP document refuses to take advantage of sacred religious values and ethnicity and to use them for political purposes; it considers the attitudes and practices which disturb pious people and which discriminate them due to their religious lives and preferences as anti-democratic and in contradiction to human rights and freedoms. (48) The third pillar of the Turkish model is the connection to the economy. The economic policy of the AKP supports some principles, the most prominent of which are: to favor a market mechanism that works with all its rules and institutions, that the state should not be involved in any kind of economic activity as the economic function of the state is regulatory and supervisory, that privatization is an important vehicle for the formation of a more rational economic structure, and that, finally, foreign capital plays an important role in the transfer of international know-how and experience, which contributes to the development of the Turkish economy. (49)

From this information, we can deduce that the AKP enjoys a sort of flexibility based on a comprehensive ideology, which contains all differences and melts them to serve and develop Turkish society. The AKP adopts a flexible vision of political Islam, a vision which coexists with ideas that are beneficial for the community as a whole, regardless of the sour of these ideas.

Since Islamic rituals are practiced freely in Turkish society and the Islamic creed retrieves its status and coexists with the western creed in the social context, and does not exceed the boundaries of this zone to the political and economic zones, the AKP as a party feels that it has fulfilled its obligation towards the sacred identity of Islam. It is not in the AKP’S agenda to establish
the theocratic state based on the application of Islamic Sharia. While the conflict was civilizational, a conflict between the western civilization and Islamic civilization, the outcome of this conflict was a compromise or a peaceful coexistence between the two civilizations. This coexistence stems from the fact that the AKP or the Turkish society as a whole does not consider the West to be an enemy, nor do they consider western values as values of the ignorant and the infidel society.

Although the Freedom and Justice party (FJP), the political hand of the Muslim Brotherhood, represents the strongest religious party in Egypt, it differs from its counterpart in Turkey, the AKP. The Muslim Brotherhood as a movement, initiated by Hassan El- Banna in 1928, saw the Islamic community at a critical crossroads and insisted that Muslims would find strength in the total self-sufficiency of Islam. The leaders of the Brotherhood believed that Islam was no longer exclusively a religion, but an ideology that provides a total framework for all aspects of political, social, economic and cultural life in the Muslim world. “Our duty as Muslim Brothers is to work for the reform of selves, of hearts and souls by joining them to God the all- high, then to organize our society to be fit for the virtuous community which commands the good and forbids evil- doing, then from the community will arise the good state. The Muslim Brotherhood initially began as a twofold movement for the reform of both the individual and social morality; the movement stresses that Islam is comprehensive ideology for personal and public life and subsequently the foundation for Muslim state and society. Using the revivalist logic, the leaders of the movement called for a return to the Quran and the Sunna and the practice of the early community to establish an Islamic state and a system of government through means of preaching the unity of religion and the state (din wa dawla). According to the principles of the Brotherhood, no distinction is to be drawn between religious and secular law or the citizen and the believer, thus establishing a single state and society governed by Islam. Therefore, the
Muslim Brotherhood wanted first to purify the individual through adopting the rules of Islamic Sharia embodied in the Quran and the Sunna, to purify the Muslim society from the sins and ignorance that prevailed due to the adherence of the Muslim rulers to the infidel Western values and ideologies and finally to establish the Islamic state or the state of the Islamic Caliphate.

The retrieval of the Caliphate and the establishment of the Islamic state through eliminating the ignorant society (Al Jahili) as an objective and a dream of the Muslim brotherhood confronted a lot of barriers through harsh and violent interactions with the subsequent governments from the late 1920s until they captured authority in 2012. During this long period, different causes enhanced the rise of this political religious movement. These causes clarify the social and textual context within which the movement grew, the textual context, represented in the texts of the Quran and the Sunna to which, if the individual and the society as a whole committed, they would become purified and the social context in which the members of the movement will confront the ignorant and infidel society with its evils and replace it by the utopian and Muslim society through the holy fighting (Jihad). The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan El Banna, established an organization that provides people with the means of political expression as well as a positive direction towards social advancement through Islam. (56) The movement called attention to the notion that the society devoted to salvation produces virtuous citizens willing to relinquish individual gains to the collective group. (57) This allowed the finest people to emerge as social rulers, justifying the individual's attainment of power through the belief that one is merely serving the greater good of Islam and its people. (58)

If the revival of political Islam in Turkey was manifested by the civilization conflict between the Western and Islamic creeds, or in other words, re-Islamizing the westernized Turkish society, the resurgence of political religious movements led by the prominent religious group, the Muslim Brotherhood
mobilization was initiated and consolidated by different factors. First, Hassan Al Banna was not only critical of the West and the debilitating ideas it deposited upon the Arab Muslim world, but also of the state of the third world and its inability to create its own success; Banna called upon the message of the Muslim Brotherhood to relieve the East from this tumultuous relationship. The disease affecting these Eastern nations assumes a variety of aspects and has many symptoms either politically, economically, or socially and culturally. (59) Second, the authoritarian regimes, starting with Nasser's regime, which prohibited all independent political groups including the Muslim Brotherhood as a religious political group, became one of the 1952 revolution's main victims after being officially outlawed as an opposition group when a member of the Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Nasser in 1954. Under the reign of Sadat, the Muslim Brotherhood was given a little scope of liberty, as Sadat wanted to use the movement as a weapon against the leftists, but soon he changed his position and began to arrest and detain the leaders and members of the movement. Under Mubarak's reign the situation was worse than it was under Sadat, as the movement was prohibited from being involved in politics, and was considered a prohibited group (Al Gamaa Al Mahzoura). Third, the most significant aspect of revivalism since the late 1970 is that it had become a part of a moderate, mainstream life within society, the cry for Islam was met by the educated and the uneducated, the young and the old, the peasants and the professionals and women and men, as Islam serves as a catalyst for change. (60) Islam provided a sense of identity as well as a common set of religious cultural values and legitimacy that effectively mobilized the population to revolt. Fourth, Egyptian society is formally depicted as a culture of alienation, and the absence of public opinion data may be the hardest form of evidence proving the political estrangement present. This setting of extreme alienation is an outcome of continual low voter turnout in parliamentary elections as well as a general lack of popular affiliation with the established and approved parties. This trend
of laxity adds to the discernment that the Egyptian political ethos has increasingly been characterized by isolation, defeatism, and influence; however, with the increase in the Brotherhood's popularity emerged an increasingly heightened and receptive populace. The people responded positively to the nature of the Islamic message within the political sphere. This massive increase in participation is indicative of the Egyptian society's perception of morality as the savior of a population in a state of decline. Fifth, against the backdrop of a seemingly out of touch military bureaucratic state, the Islamic trend portrayed itself as the successor to a more human and responsive political tradition. This tradition could be traced back to the exemplary rule of the rightly guided caliphs of the first Islamic state. The Islamic trend was a servant of public interest, a state within a state. The movement created new models of political leadership and community involvement, creating islands of democracy in a sea of dictatorship. The viewpoint sought to slowly build a parallel society based on Islamic ideals by the power of example, through infiltration of the various systems and networks that reached out to the majority. The group became closer to the political center within the state from the bottom up; Islamic mobilization on the periphery was not subject to centralized coordination and control within the government. The Brothers’ move from the periphery to the center of governmental politics enhanced the movement's political influence; however, it also exposed the organization and its leaders to new risks. Sixth, the state's continued unresponsive nature in dealing with economic problems, such as chronic under-employment, offered an opening to the Muslim Brotherhood to capitalize on the misfortune of the people of Egypt who were suffering both at the hands of the economy and the government's unwillingness to mend the matter. From the abovementioned causes, the Muslim Brotherhood conceives itself to perform the activities of the Islamic call including involvement in politics and economics as well as social and cultural issues. The Brotherhood's goal is to
implement religious functions within the state of morality to prevail. Using the values concerning zeal and protection of religion, the group strives to protect the future of the Islamic state and secure the practice of religious rights; the movement has threatened to remove any factors that interfere with their goals.  

This self-concept reflects to a large extent the type of mindset and the ideology which characterizes the Muslim Brotherhood, the mindset and ideology which impact their political and economic vision which was clearly observed in their documents which were publicized from 2004 to 2007. These documents identified the political framework of Egypt and the characteristics of its economic system. A close reading of the documents, statements and interviews by the Brotherhood’s leading figures reveals that there is a great deal of overlap between its religious and political functions, so that the political reform is viewed as part of religious reform.  

Hassan Al. Banna, the founder of the Brotherhood, based its concept of political reform on two different points; the rejection of externally imposed reform or measures taken under foreign pressure and setting up God's law through developing the Muslim individual, household, government and state to lead the other Islamic states.  

Regarding the first point, the Brotherhood is deeply suspicious of the real goals behind foreign imposed reform programs and does not believe them to be in the interest of the peoples of region. They perceive these programs’ aims as being to continue hegemony and control over the region's wealth and destiny, the supremacy of the Zionist entity which is usurping the land of Palestine and planting governments that are more cooperative with it in its overall strategy.  

The political project of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers seems to have three aims regarding setting up God’s law and the Islamic state: creating the faithful man, establishing theocratic polity, and enhancing the interventionist state.  

First, Hassan al-Banna viewed that purification of the society as a whole starts first with the purification of its individuals. The purified individual is the faithful man. The cornerstone of the Muslim Brother's strategy in Egypt, and in
the Islamic world at large, is the creation of a new man who will be devoid of sinful intentions, will have a good consciousness, and be ready to fulfill and serve the word of God. (70) To achieve this objective, the Brother's project clearly calls for the establishment of a near monopoly over the country's means of socialization, including the mosques, the media, and the school. (71) After cleansing public institutions from all means of corruption, they will become the places of free opinion, the good word, the sublime art, to respect the constants of the nation, or the principles of the religion of Islam as the Muslim Brothers interpret them. (72) Second, as stated before, the Muslim Brotherhood initially began as a twofold movement stressing Islam as a comprehensive ideology for personal and public life and the foundation of a Muslim state and society. Returning to Islamic principles stated in the Quranic verses, the Sunna and the practices of the early community will enable Muslims to establish the Islamic state. Although Muslim Brothers have repeatedly rejected the allegation that they aim to establish a theocratic and a religious state, they have sought to advance the prospects of an Islamic, religious, and theocratic state in a variety of ways. First, they rely heavily on the second article of the Egyptian constitution which states that Islam is the religion of the state and the principles of the Sharia are the main source of jurisprudence. (73) Second, the Muslim Brothers insist on slogans and political symbols that are religious and theocratic. For example, they use slogans like “Islam is the solution.” (74) Third, the Brother's draft party platform stipulates that the state has essential religious functions and that these religious functions are implemented by the head of the state. (75) Fourth, non-Muslims, e.g. Copts are excluded from official positions because these position entail religious functions which can not be performed by non-Muslims. (76)

Regarding the interventionist state, the Muslim Brothers are concerned mainly about the economic reform. They believe that to enhance economic growth and foster economic development, the state must assume an
The Brotherhood's financial system can be outlined based on the following points: First, restructuring the financial system through two principal mechanisms, abolishing the usury system "interest rate" and converting banks and financial institutions into investment institutions so their function is to invest deposits and other financial instruments, rather than trading in money through interest rate bearing loans. The Brotherhood platform reaffirms the Islamic investment models, particularly, “Musharka,” venture capital, “al Buyu” sales, and “al Ajar” leasing contracts. The Brotherhood's stance is based on the belief that profit is the product of relationship between capital and labor i.e., the product of investing capital in economic work, and thus it rejects the idea of profiting by trading in money and currency. The second point is in preserving the state's socio-economic role. The state is the guide, the planner, and responsible for handling crises and combating exploitation through breaking up monopolies and scams, and controlling prices to safeguard the poor and manage Islamic endowments. Third, belief in the idea of class distinction within society and protecting both the wealthy and poor classes alike. The state
ensures that the wealthy fulfill their obligations to the poor through zakat, charity and taxes, as key financial tools. The goal of these institutions is not achieving class equality in society, but rather to ensure a dignified lifestyle for the poor. (84)

**Conclusion**

Some analysts have maintained that past revolutionary Egypt could clone the Turkish model for political and economic transformation, especially with a parliament composed of religious-based members similar to the Freedom and Justice Party. Unfortunately this was not the case. First, the Egyptian revolution was not a complete revolution as it has not yet fully achieved its objectives; therefore, Egypt is not ripe enough to adopt any model. Although the FJP in Egypt and the AKP in Turkey came from religious vacuum, the AKP never cast itself as a religious party, while the FJP never denied its identity as a religious party. The religious party is the party whose ideology is derived from and shaped by religious ideas, and which mobilizes the grass roots on the basis of a shared religious identity. This sort of party seeks regime change by implementing their religious views, the Islamization of the state and society, and overcoming class and ethnic divisions on the basis of a shared religious affiliation. (85) The AKP never sought to transform the state into a form of theocracy. It has never opposed secular values and never has as its principal aim the application of Sharia law. In regards to the economy, the AKP adopted the noninterventionist role of the state and favored an economy controlled by market mechanism, with the state taking on only a regulatory rule. On the other hand, the FJP strives to establish the religious state, the Islamic state, and retrieve the state of Islamic Caliphate, the literal application of the Islamic Sharia. Any society which does not apply the Sharia is an ignorant society and to overcome this infidel society holy fighting (Al Jihad) must be adopted. The FJP uses the religious bases and sentiments to mobilize the grass roots.
Moreover, this Islamic state must adopt an interventionist role in all issues, especially the economy of the state, to safeguard social justice. The differences between the Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt and the AKP, the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, clarify that the application of the Turkish model in post-revolutionary Egypt could never be successful, due to the different ideologies adopted by the two Islamic parties in each country.
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