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Edward Sayre  
*University of Southern Mississippi*

Nada Abdelqader Benmansour  
*Fikra Research & Policy*

Samantha Constant  
*Fikra Research & Policy*

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The Determinants of Youth Unemployment in Qatar

Edward Sayre\textsuperscript{2}, Nada Abdelqader Benmansour\textsuperscript{3}, and Samantha Constant\textsuperscript{4}

\textbf{Jel Codes}: J11, J16, O17

\textbf{Abstract}: While Qatari unemployment is low compared to regional standards, unemployment is even more concentrated among first time job-seeking youth than in other countries in the Arab world. This paper examines the factors that influence unemployment by young Qataris when they are first entering the labor market. This paper first introduces the set of labor market policies that govern the employment of Qatari nationals. Next, the paper examines the labor market outcomes of Qatari youth from 1995 to 2014 to evaluate the effect of these policies. Finally, the paper uses a unique data set of 2,000 primarily young Qataris to model unemployment duration. These data were collected in September and October of 2014 and explore typical labor market indicators as well as questions concerning the school to work transition. Using non-parametric models of unemployment duration, this paper describes the different characteristics that are correlated with longer spells of unemployment duration by first time job seekers. The paper finds that own education and gender are the two most important factors determining the length of unemployment spells for young Qataris.

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\textsuperscript{2} University of Southern Mississippi and Fikra Research \& Policy, contact author edward.sayre@usm.edu

\textsuperscript{3} Fikra Research \& Policy

\textsuperscript{4} Fikra Research \& Policy
1. Introduction

The transition from schooling to work is one of the most difficult periods in the transition from youth to adulthood. In the Middle East, this transition has been particularly fraught as labor market structure and the recent youth bulge has caused a large number of young people, often with advanced degrees to be seeking a relatively small number of jobs. This phenomenon is manifested in youth unemployment rates that are the highest in the work. Furthermore because of the relatively strong employment protection offered to workers with jobs, youth unemployment is often 3 to 4 times that of adult unemployment rates. While the Gulf region, and especially Qatar has lower unemployment rates, unemployment is primarily a youth phenomenon. This paper examines the factors that influence unemployment by young Qataris when they are first entering the labor market.

In order to fully understand this phenomenon, one must place the Qatari experience in its appropriate policy context. As a labor receiving country, the policy challenge has involved encouraging young people to get the right types of skills and encouraging private sector employers to hire them. The policy challenge remains substantial because while governments can easily prohibit forms of economic activity, it is much more difficult to encourage economic activity in a given area. Encouraging Qatarization requires that Qataris be willing to work in the private sector and that private sector managers be willing to hire Qataris under current labor market conditions. There are both economic and institutional factors that create hurdles in encouraging private sector employment. Qatarization policies have yet to be able to overcome these institutional hurdles while some recent policies have actually made Qatarization of the private sector more difficult.
One hurdle arises due to Qatar’s rapid economic growth in the past 15-20 years. With the economic boom has come a demand for low skilled (expatriate) labor while at the same time, many Qataris have been able to afford not to work. This is particularly true in the case of Qatari men over the age of 40 who can begin to retire from public sector jobs and often have alternate sources of income to supplement their pensions. The second hurdle is that policies to support Qatari workers in the public sector have actually worked to impede Qatarization in the private sector. This has been largely due to the more attractive work conditions and prestige associated with the public sector compared to the private sector. After the fall 2011 Emiri decree of increasing public sector salaries by 60 percent (120 percent for the military), private sector businesses will find it even more difficult to attract and retain Qataris. Thus, while the Qatari government is attempting to localize its workforce, other policy objectives may impede the success of Qatarization.

The foundation for understanding the current policy environment in Qatar is the Qatar National Vision 2030 (QNV). This vision influences all aspects of policy currently being considered in Qatar. The QNV seeks to transform a rapidly growing hydrocarbon-based economy that is dependent upon less skilled expatriate labor into an economy that seeks most of its growth through knowledge intensive sectors. This concept of a K-economy for Qatar is based upon a vision of sustainable growth beyond hydrocarbons. The QNV sets forth three interrelated goals for the Qatari economy (1) a high standard of living; (2) expanded innovation and entrepreneurship; and (3) economic outcomes being aligned with economic and financial security. As part of this effort, the overriding emphasis is to create a diversified K-economy such that it is not completely beholden to the whims of the international hydrocarbon market. In order to implement the QNV, the National Development Strategy 2011-2016 sets out more specific
action items in order to build towards the QNV goals. The NDS attempts to align expatriate labor
demand with the QNV by attempting to match the size and quality of the expatriate labor force
with the path to development. Specifically, the NDS hopes to move away from low skilled labor
and towards high skilled labor while skill upgrading continues for the Qatari labor force, with a
target Qatarization rate of 15 percent in the private sector. However, with only 16% of Qatar’s
entire labor force being comprised of Qatari nationals, the challenge of meeting this target will
be daunting.

The recent growth of the expatriate population within Qatar has been phenomenal. The
total population of Qatar grew from 490,000 in 1990 (Willoughby, 2004) to 1.7 million in 2010
(QSA, 2010). This population growth primarily happened since 1997 and was largely due to the
growth in the expatriate workforce. The expatriate population more than doubled from 2004 to
2010. This growth in the expatriate population was necessary to fuel the economic growth that
took place, especially due to the booming liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector.

This paper will use a unique data set collected in September and October of 2014 and
explore typical labor market indicators as well as questions concerning the school to work
transition. Using parametric and non-parametric models of unemployment duration, this paper
describes the different characteristics that are correlated with longer spells of unemployment
duration by first time job seekers. The paper finds that own education and parental education are
the two most important factors influencing the school to work transition for young Qataris.

2. Qatari Labor Market conditions

Qatar’s population increased dramatically in the past twenty years. The number of Qatari
nationals increased from 1990 to 2010 from 116 thousand to over 230 thousand, roughly
doubling. The overall population increased even more dramatically as the population of
expatriates increased from 305 thousand in 1990 to over 1.4 million in 2010. This was largely as a response to the aggressive development strategies pursued since 1995 and the need for non-Qatari labor, especially in the construction sector. As of 2013 the population stood at nearly 2.2 million with less than one seventh of that population native Qatar (Snoj, 2013).

Given these relative numbers it is clearly not possible to exclusively use a domestic labor force to fill all of these jobs. When individuals discuss Qatarization, even of the private labor force, they generally do not tend to imply that they expect all of the basic occupations in construction, domestic service and services to have a certain proportion Qatari. Instead, the implication is Qatarization of only a certain section of jobs. However, even given this narrower definition of Qatarization, an examination of other labor market characteristics will shows that there are weaknesses of the Qatari labor force and areas that could be improved regarding staffing of private sector and government sector jobs with more Qatari nationals.

By examining the policy settings of Qatar, it will now be possible to interpret the current labor market conditions and finally analyze the impact that Qatarization policies have on employment of youth. The first basic labor market statistic to understand is the labor force participation rate. This rate is defined as the proportion or percentage of the total working age population which is either currently employed or not employed, but looking for work (unemployment). Those not in the labor force include retirees, the disabled, students and those who are fully dedicated to household duties.

The primary observations of the labor force participation rate can be summed up as follows. Labor force participation rate among Qatari men is low compared to both developed and developing countries. The labor force participation rate for women is low compared to most developed countries, but it is increasing especially compared to fellow GCC countries. In the
second quarter of 2014, the labor force participation rate for Qatari men over the age of 15 was 68%; while the rate for women was 36%. In general, there has been an upward trend in labor force participation for men, as fewer are continuing on with their studies, while women’s labor force participation has remained roughly the same, around 35% (see Figure 1).

The labor force participation rate for women shows a substantial increase in the past 20 years. This is particularly apparent among women aged 20 to 24 in recent years (see Figure 2). Figure 3 shows labor force participation of Qatari men, by year and age group. As seen in this figure, the recent rise in labor force participation has come from several age groups, but the most dramatic increase was for the group aged 20-24. If these young men were not in the labor force, then they would like be schooling so the increase in the labor force participation of young men is actually a negative sign of the movement away from continued schooling (this will be discussed further below). For women, older, post-schooling age groups have been increasing their participation in the last couple of years while school aged women have had their labor force participation or dropping somewhat from 2012 to 2013 (see Figure 4).

Unemployment is fairly low, as one would expect in such a rapidly developing economy, but it differs significantly by age, gender and educational level. For men, the highest unemployment rates are for those young men with only secondary schooling or below. For women, the highest unemployment rate is for those women with university level schooling. Unemployment is a market failure in that the available positions in the economy are not well matched with the workers who are willing to take on work, or there is lack of information about the availability of workers or jobs. However, it is clear that when it comes to matching workers with jobs, the primary consideration is one of social norms, benefits and expectations.
The overall female unemployment rate (3.3 percent) is over four times the male unemployment rate (0.7 percent). These figures can seem even more dramatic depending on the age group and year (see Table 1). In the most recent years, unemployment for young women has been as high as 10 times higher than unemployment for male youth. In 2013, the 20-24 year old age group, women have a 12.7 percent unemployment rate compared to only a 1.2 percent for men. By the time these young people reach the 25-29 year old age group, the men’s unemployment rate drops to a negligible 1.2 percent, and for women the unemployment rate stays drops to 2.5 percent. However, in recent years, when the labor market wasn’t quite so strong, women’s unemployment rate would stay above 10 percent until women were in their 30s.

The effect of education on unemployment also differs between men and women. For men, with the exception of illiterate Qatari’s, the higher level of education, the lower the unemployment rate. For women, there unemployment is highest for those with the lowest level of schooling (for the purpose of 2013 data, this would be primary level), and then decreases with education level. Women with only primary schooling have a 23 percent unemployment rate, those with a preparatory have a 14 percent unemployment rate, but those with university or more schooling have an unemployment rate under 1 percent. For men, unemployment follows a similar pattern with those at the secondary level having a slightly higher unemployment rate than those at the preparatory level (.8 percent compared to .7 percent), but the highest unemployment is with primary level (2.5 percent) and the lowest is with university or above .3 percent.

One of the telling aspects of the issue of unemployment involves the fact that many of the unemployed are waiting for jobs in the public sector. In the 2008 labor force survey one half of all unemployed Qatari’s responded that they were not willing to work in the private sector. For women the proportion not willing to work in the private sector is 64 percent with only 36 percent
willing to work. For men the proportion is reversed with 65 percent of the unemployed men willing to work in the private sector while only 35% are not willing to work in the private sector. (QSA, 2009)

By 2013 these figures had changed, with women and men showing less of an inclination to work in the private sector. Among unemployed women in the 2013 survey, 75 percent said they are unwilling to work in the private sector and 25 percent were willing to work in the private sector. An even bigger decrease occurred for unemployed men. While 65 percent had said they were willing to take a private sector job in 2008, this had fallen to 39 percent by 2013. Thus, men and women were generally unwilling to work in the private sector by 2013. While there are many possible reasons for this change, one of them could have been the 2011 pay increase for public sector workers. In fact, the number one reason why men said they would not work in the private sector was because of the lower wages in the private sector. For women, it was also the low pay the discouraged them from seeking private sector work, but the hours of work also was highly ranked.

Due to the requirement that non-Qatars be sponsored by employers to be able to reside in the country, it is not surprising that non Qatars have much lower unemployment rates than Qatars. Non Qatari men have unemployment rates less than .1% compared to .7% for Qatari men and non-Qatari women have and unemployment rate of 1.2% percent compared to 3.4% for Qatari women, in 2013.

Unemployment for Qatars is primarily a problem for first time job seekers. In 2013, only 9.8 percent of unemployed Qatari men and none (literally 0 individuals in the sample) of unemployed women have been employed previously. Thus, Qatari unemployment is primarily a concern of young female job seekers with less than a college education, though other
demographic groups still exhibit significant numbers of unemployed. Finally, it should be noted that although the overall unemployment rates are much higher for women, the total number of unemployed are not as dramatically different, due to differences in participation rates. For the 2013 survey, the estimate is only 1,029 Qatari women were unemployed and 400 Qatari men were unemployed.

3. Has Qatarization been successful?

While there are no clear guidelines as to what will ultimately define successful Qatarization efforts, an analysis of the extant data will allow us to get a better understanding as to how much progress has been made. In order to understand where these Qatarization efforts stand, this paper will examine the distribution of employment by industry and nationality, the changes over time in the distribution by sector and the degree to which Qatars are engaging in both employment and schooling.

The distribution of employment by industry, gender and nationality is seen in Table 2. While the public administration workforce is comprised of more than 50 percent Qatari nationals, most other major industries have less than 10 percent of their total workforce made up of Qatari nationals. For example, construction, which employs more than half a million workers, has less than one fourth of one percent of its workforce made up of native Qatars. Education is another field that employs a large share of Qatari nationals. Thirty percent of total education employment are Qatari nationals and 84 percent of these Qatars are women.

Table 2 shows that the percentage of those employed who are Qatari definitely differs based upon gender. For men, 48 percent of the 80,000 men who work in public administration
and defense are Qatari. For women the number is even more striking as 71 percent of the women who work in this sector are Qatari. Another sector where there is a strong difference between men and women is education. While only 13 percent of the 13,000 men who work in education are Qatari, Qatari women comprise a total of 36 percent of the 26,000 women in this sector. Other fields that are predominantly Qatari include mining and quarrying where 9 percent of the men are Qatari and 32 percent of the women are Qatari. Both health and information technology sectors are ones that should be expected to grow given the QNV 2030 and given the proportion of Qatari employment, this is a promising development. In the health sector 11 percent of the 13,000 men who work in this sector are Qatari and 24 percent of the 14,000 women who work in this sector are Qatari. Of the women engaged in professional and scientific activities, 11 are Qatari, while of the men only one percent are Qatari, which may reflect the relative increase in the greater numbers of Qatari women pursuing advanced degrees compared to men.

There are two things that must take place for the proportion of Qatari in private and mixed sectors to increase. First, more Qatari must enter the work force and stay in it longer to meet the market demand for these workers. Second, incentives must be such that the private and mixed sectors will hire more Qatari and more Qatari must be willing to their supply of labor to these sectors.

One statistic that will help assess the degree to which Qatari are more engaged in the labor force is the labor force participation rate. However, it is also useful to note that in addition to encouraging more Qatari to work, there has also been educational reform which has encouraged them to stay in school for longer and to obtain tertiary education. One of the effects of encouraging students to stay in school is that there will be lower labor force participation rates for especially those aged 20-24 as they are not leaving school after the secondary level to pursue
work. Thus, there are two statistics that I will refer to below. The first is labor force participation rate of those aged 25 to 39, who are less likely to be affected by efforts to increase the level of schooling. The second is the proportion of the population that is engaged in either schooling or work. This is the work+schooling rate is 84.5% for men and 58.1% for women in 2009. In 2007, the work+school rate was 85.0% for men and 55.5% for women. Women increased the proportion that they were both in the workforce and in schooling during these two years.

Looking back a bit earlier, they work+schooling rate in 2001 for men was 81% while the work+schooling rate for Qatari women was 50%. Thus, there has been an eight percentage point increase in this more broadly defined version of economic activity for women. Since 2009, the rate has remained flat. In second quarter of 2014, the work+schooling rate for women was up to 58% and for men it stood at 86%.

The source for the change for women has been entirely due to the increase in the employment to population rate for women. In 2001, employment rate for women was only 21.4 percent. This figure grew to 32.6 percent in 2005 and 34.7 percent in 2009 and stayed nearly steady at 33.9 in 2014. From 2005 to 2009, the proportion of women going to school decreased during this time, but the overall growth in employment made up for this. Thus, the decline in schooling is not because women are not achieving the same level of education as education rates are increasing. Instead, there are relatively smaller cohorts of women in school at any time (compared to those who have finished schooling), while the absolute numbers continue to grow.

Based upon the 20 percent goal in all sectors (government, government company, mixed and private) Qatarization targets were met early on in the public sector. In 1997, the quantitative target was to reach 20 percent in 4 years. Most, if not all, public sector authorities met this target. In 1999, for example, figures and statistics show that Qatarization in the public administration
was 60 percent, in government corporations it was 27 percent, and in the mixed sector it was 18 percent. Thus, Qatarization in most organizations was actually above the stated target. However, more recent data show that since the economic boom during the 2000s, there has such rapid expansion of the Qatari economy and the labor force that the percentage Qatari in each sector has dropped since 1999. Figure 5 shows the relative distribution of Labor Force between Qatari and Non-Qatari by sector in 2013 (QSA, 2014). As seen in this figure, Qataris now make up less than 50 percent of the government sector workers. In government companies the percentage is less than 20 percent and in the private sector, the Qatari share of employment is less than only .1 percent. Finally, Oil and Gas Sector (OGS) also promoted a separate Qatarization policy that has been met with some success. While the overall goal has had to be revised downward, this sector has increased the overall Qatari share since the 1980s from 30 percent to 50 percent today.

While the overall percentage of Qataris in any sector is going to be negatively affected by the dramatic expansion of the economic in the past 10 years, there can be some indication of the success of Qatarization based upon the sector of employment. If Qataris are becoming less dependent upon the public sector, either public administration or public companies, then some of the goals of Qatarization can be seen as being met. Figures 6 and 7 show the percentage of Qataris in employment by sector for men (Figure 6) and women (Figure 7) from 2006 to 2013. As seen in Figure 6, there has been a decline in the share of Qatari employment for men in government companies and a rise in the share in the private sector. In government companies while 16 percent of Qatari men worked in this sector in 2006, the figure has fallen to 13 percent in the more recent data. In the private sector, while only 6 percent of Qatari men worked in this sector in 2006, this figure has now increased to nearly double at 11 percent. While the change in
distribution is important, it is also worthwhile to note that this represents nearly a trebling of the total number of Qatari men in the private sector from 2400 to 6500.

Table 5 shows the economic status by age from the 2010 Qatari Census for all employed Qatari (men and women). It is clear from looking at these figures that the proportion of the workforce that are either on their own account or are employers is very low in the Qatari economy. This is not a surprise given the relatively few individuals that are employed in the private sector, where most of the employers will be located. In 2010 fewer than 2 percent of employed youth were either on their own or employed others. The highest rate of entrepreneurship was actually among 15-19 year olds of whom 2.3 percent were employers or on their own account. These rates stay very low until Qatari men reach their 40s. It is likely when they retire from public sector jobs in their 40s, many Qatari men then decide to begin a second career as an employer.

4. Qatarization efforts, youth and families

The efforts to increase the proportion Qatari working in the Qatari economy can only come about through a combination of some or all of the following factors. First, the overall demand for labor, especially unskilled labor, will need to decrease. Given the relative size of the Qatari population, an increase in unskilled labor demand will continue to create strong demand for expatriate labor.

Second, there will need to be an increase in labor force participation for Qatari men in their 40s and 50s. As there is an increase in health outcomes and educational levels, the movement to a K-economy should promote the ability of Qatari men to stay in the workforce later, instead of labor force participation decreasing around the age of 40.
Third, there will need to be an increase in labor force participation of Qatari women. Right now, the labor force participation rate of Qatari women at 36 percent reflects important growth in this aspect of Qatarization. However, compared to the most highly developed countries, this participation rate still lags behind the natural peers that Qatar should aspire to compare itself with. Furthermore, since employment of Qatari women is largely found in the education and public administration sectors and there is a relatively large unemployment rate for women who cannot find jobs in these sectors, there appears to be an imbalance in the matching job seekers and job opportunities. The essence of this problem lies in the social norms that attract women primarily to government sector jobs and the relatively unattractive nature of private sector jobs. Of unemployed women surveyed less than half said that they would be interested in a private sector job.

Fourth, there needs to be an overall increase in Qatari population. The Qatari government has explicitly begun a pro-natalist policy in order to effect this increase in Qatari population, thus leading to needing fewer expatriate workers in the future due to a relatively largely domestic population. However, this effort to increase population growth rates will negatively impact Qatari women’s ability to participate in the labor force and thus works against another factor to increase Qatarization.

5. Unemployment Duration during the school to work transition

Data

Data for the following section comes from the 2014 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) data for Qatar. The GEM was started as a joint venture with the London Business School and Babson College in 1999 and now covers countries entailing 75% of the world’s population and 90% of the world’s GDP. Silatech is the local partner for 2014 GEM Qatar. The current data
come from a module within GEM Qatar that was created to study the school to work transition for young Qatari’s through a partnership between Silatech and FIKRA Research & Policy. The survey was conducted August-October 2014 and released to partner organizations in December 2014.

This data set contains 2,025 Qataris and 2,235 non-Qataris. This analysis will focus on the Qatari sample which is relatively well educated: 17% have less than secondary schooling; 40% have secondary and 34% have tertiary schooling. The bulk of the survey is between 18 and 34 years old. 23% are 18-24 years old; 30% are 25-34 while 40% are between 35 and 54. The sample is slightly more female than male, representing the greater likelihood for Qatari males to be abroad: 52% are female and 48% are male.

Figure 8 shows unemployment duration through a Kaplan Meier survival function. The y axis shows the proportion of the population that has “survived” in the base state, which in this case is to be unemployed (seeking work). The x axis is the months that the individual has been seeking work without finding a job. Figure 8 shows that non-Qataris are more likely to exit unemployment after finishing schooling than are Qataris. It takes approximately 4 months longer for three quarters of Qataris to find a job compared to non-Qataris. The rest of the figures will only examine the Qatari portion of sample and will look at various subgroups.

Figure 9 shows unemployment duration by sex. Male exit unemployment more rapidly than women, but this mostly shows up in the amount of time it takes the very slowest job finders take. For example, approximately 50 percent of both men and women find work within 4-5 months. However for men 75% percent of them have found a job within 6 months, but it takes 6 months longer for 75 percent of women to find work (a full 12 months).
By age (Figure 10) and education (Figure 11), a few clear patterns emerge. First, note that while Figure 10 shows the findings by age group, since this is retrospective data about their transition from schooling to work, the transition for older workers took place many years before the transition for younger workers. The very youngest workers in the sample (18-24) and workers over 45 have the shortest unemployment durations. This may reflect the relatively small size of the employment cohort for older workers by which the public sector easily absorbed workers going back 20 years or more and that fewer women participated in the labor force in previous years. The youngest workers having short duration might be a selection issue by which only those who do not going on to tertiary schooling (because they have access to a job already) are in this pool.

Figure 11 shows the impact of education independently on unemployment duration. The four education groups shown in this figure are less than secondary; secondary; diploma (or 13-15 years) and university. In the figure that includes both men and women (Figure 11), we see that less than secondary and secondary have longer spells of unemployment after finishing schooling than do those Qataris that earn either a diploma or a university degree. Getting a university degree only tends to cut unemployment duration slightly when looking at this pooled data. Even more of an issue, those that complete a secondary degree have longer durations on the right hand tail (last 25% to find a job) than those who have less than secondary degree. Since most young people nowadays have at least a secondary degree, this may represent some pooling over generations.

Figures 12 and 13 attempt to examine the independent impact of education separately for men and women. Figure 12 shows that for men each level of education decreases the duration of unemployment, though often the differences are minor. For men with both tertiary forms of
schooling (diploma and university) about 75% of young people find jobs within 6 months. It takes an additional 3 months for 75% of those with secondary degrees to find a job and another month longer for 75% of those with less than a secondary to find work. For women, the story is more diverse. While 75% of women with a university degree find work within 6 months, it takes nearly a year for 75% of those with only a diploma to find work. For those with only a secondary degree, it takes nearly two years for them to find a job after finishing schooling. Thus, for women there is a real return to going to university since tertiary education leads to significantly shorter unemployment duration.

6. Conclusions

The policy problem created by the large expatriate population in Qatar today is multifaceted. It is impossible to continue to develop at the rate that they have been without continued reliance on workers from abroad. However, with a redirection of the economy away from such a heavy dependence on the hydrocarbon sector and towards a knowledge-based economy, there is the possibility of effective Qatariization.

Unfortunately, most of the success of Qatariization has taken place within the government sector. This is largely due to the increase in employment of Qatari women and the increased educational levels of all Qataris leading to the greater use of high skilled domestic labor instead of foreign labor. However, the stigma against working in the private sector remains and the only serious attempts increase the demand for Qatari labor in the private sector and increase the supply of labor to that sector will take the place of making both Qatari and non-Qatari labor
more expensive. Non-Qatari labor needs to become more expensive (it is argued) because the low wages that can be offered leads to expansion in sectors that are low skilled intensive.

On the other hand, it is argued that private sector jobs should become more expensive to employers is justified due the need to make these jobs more attractive to Qataris by offering benefits and wages that are equivalent to those found in the public sector.

However, what is keeping Qataris out of the private sector is as much a matter of social norms and cultural values as it is about riyals and benefits. For example the low labor force participation rate of Qatari women is one factor that increases the need for expatriate labor. If women worked as much as men, there would be 20,000 fewer expatriates needed in the workforce. However, it is seen as by some in Qatar to be prestigious to have women not work outside the home (GSDP Labor, 2010). Without the need for a second income due to the relatively high wages for Qatari men, the only thing that will push women into the workforce is social norms and cultural values that view working outside the home as something prestigious or aspirational. With role models such as Her Highness SHEikha Mozah Bint Nasser Al-Misnad, and countless women holding high level positions throughout the workforce, there is likely to be increased acceptance and willingness to work outside the home (Felder and Vuollo, 2008). However, employer attitudes towards women still need to be improved because certain positions are seen as not appropriate because women ask for too much time off for family reasons (Stasz, Eide, and Martorell, 2007).

Likewise, Qatari men also show a strong preference to working in the public sector, even though it is not as strong of a preference as that shown by Qatari women. There is relatively little labor force attachment for non-pecuniary reasons and as soon as Qatari men can afford to retire due to generous pension plans, end of service payments and non-labor income, they choose
to do so. Keeping these men in the workforce after they can afford to retire will take a change in
social norms and culture as much as any economic incentives that may be offered.

In terms of unemployment determination, men and women have very different
experiences. While 50 percent of men find employment within 3 months, it takes 50% of women
4 months to find a job. Also, while younger cohorts have slightly shorter spells than older
cohorts, the pattern is not clear and could be tied to generational issues related to education and
gender as much as other patterns. Finally, education has a different impact for men and women.
While a university degree or diploma for men leads to 50% finding jobs in 3-4 months, it takes
less than secondary 5 months for 50% to find a job. For university and diploma educated men
75% find jobs within 6 months; it takes 9 months of secondary educated to reach this milestone.
For women, there is a bigger return for the university degree. While 75% of women with a
university degree have found a job within 6 months (same as men), for women with only a
secondary degree it takes 24 months for 75% of them to end their unemployment spells.
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Figure 1. Labor Force participation rates, 2013

Male  
Female
Figure 2. Female Labor Force Participation by year
Figure 3. Male Labor Force Participation, by year
Figure 4. Female Labor Force Participation by Year and Age Group
Figure 5. Male Employment by Sector and Nationality, 2013

[Bar chart showing employment distribution by sector and nationality for Qatari and Non-Qatari individuals in 2013.]
Figure 6. Employment Share of Qatari Men, by sector and year
Figure 7. Employment share of Qatari women, by sector and year
Figure 8. Unemployment duration by nationality
Figure 9. Unemployment duration by sex
Figure 10. Unemployment duration by age
Figure 11. Unemployment duration by education
Figure 12. Unemployment Duration Male by Education

Kaplan-Meier survival estimates

- less than secondary
- secondary
- diploma
- university
Figure 13. Unemployment Duration: Female by Education

Kaplan-Meier survival estimates

- less than secondary
- secondary
- diploma
- university

Analysis time
Table 1. Unemployment rates by nationality, gender and year, 2007-2013 (percent)

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<td>Qatari male youth (15-24)</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
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