Justice Across Group Boundaries: Extending Empathy-Motivated Helping to Out-Groups

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―Pastor Martin Niemöller
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ABSTRACT

This research integrates the theoretical perspectives of three separate but related areas of social-psychological research to hypothesize about relationships between the emotion of empathy and an individual’s effort to extend helping behaviors to out-groups. The literatures on social justice, prosocial behavior, and group stereotypes are reviewed. An experimental study manipulated empathic concern for an out-group by varying the perspective through which participants interpret an experience that is had by a fictional immigrant group to America. In addition, the study manipulated the stereotypes that characterized the immigrant group. The effects of these independent variable manipulations on psychometric measures of empathic concern, helping behaviors, identity considerations, and personal distress were assessed. Findings suggest that instructions to take the perspective of an out-group described as socially cold and incompetent results in significantly less helping compared to a control group. Results are discussed in reference to the theory and practice of intergroup relations.
CHAPTER ONE
SOCIAL JUSTICE

In a world with increasingly global undertones, efforts to understand the social-psychological dynamics that are involved in intergroup helping behaviors are more needed than ever. The various world media are replete with examples of efforts to marshal and to increase helping behaviors for various out-groups (e.g., hurricane Katrina victims, the victims of the earthquakes and tsunamis in Japan, Sudanese refugees). Yet social psychology, a discipline uniquely suited to provide scientific guidance toward this end, has yet to develop a theoretical perspective with which to pose questions about when and why individuals and groups may extend, or withhold, helping behaviors to out-groups. The research reported here attempts to address this void in the literature by integrating the insights offered by social-psychological approaches to justice, prosocial behavior, and group stereotypes in order to provide initial understanding of which types of out-groups are more or less likely to receive help from others.

As societies have evolved, the universality of social justice concerns has emerged from numerous philosophical discussions, lay people’s reactions to justice and injustice, as well as empirical research. Social justice standards are of particular interest to social psychologists because they are both created and maintained by individuals, groups, societies, and cultures (Tyler & Smith, 1998). Given the consensus across disciplines such as philosophy, law, political science, and psychology that justice is indeed
important, it is necessary to attempt to understand justice phenomena and their implications for behavior. The social-psychological study of justice has grown over the last six decades in response to this need. Contemporary justice studies are attempting to isolate specific processes responsible for justice effects and have thus become extremely focused in their approach. The initial investigations into the psychology of justice, however, formed both the intellectual foundation as well as the theoretical framework upon which current research is based.

The first two decades of the social psychology of justice evolved according to two sequential lines of thought. Beginning with social exchange theory and continuing into the 1960s, distributive justice theories attempted to answer questions regarding how people evaluate the fairness of the outcomes that they receive from social interactions (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Adams, 1965). Although distributive justice theories vary in their specific focus and implications, they converge in their shared assumption that the primary motivation underlying social relationships is to maximize self-interest.

What mattered to people according to distributive theories was having control over the outcomes of social interactions (i.e., outcome control). Importantly, the distributive justice theories reflected the reality that people did not evaluate justice according to the outcomes received from a single social interaction. Rather, this literature suggested that, to the extent that an individual’s exchange relationships were favorable over time, individuals evaluated them as “fair” and were likely to maintain them.
The second major line of thought in justice literature took place in the 1970s, when researchers began to ask subjects to describe experiences of injustice (Tyler & Smith, 1998). These individuals did not describe these experiences in terms of unfair outcomes. Instead, the events subjects described reflected concerns about violations of interpersonal considerations—elements that were directly tied to group procedures. Procedural justice theories thus evolved to answer questions regarding how people evaluate specific procedures that lead to the outcomes of social interactions. A core postulate of the procedural justice models is that individuals are sensitive to the process by which decisions are made. In their pioneering work on procedural justice, Thibaut and Walker (1975) suggested that procedural considerations included process control elements such as the opportunity to present one’s views (i.e., having “voice”), having those views considered by a decision-maker, and having some control over the presentation of evidence relevant to decision-making.

As value-expressive theories of justice, procedural justice models suggest that the elements of process control are valuable in their own right and often are more important than outcome control. To understand the roots of the relevance of process control, justice researchers looked to the theoretical framework of social identity theory, which addresses the general motivation behind individual involvement with groups (Tajfel, 1982). Social identity theory postulates that an individual’s personal identity and social identity are components of that individual’s self-concept. Consequently, an individual’s social identities have direct bearing upon the way that individual evaluates himself or herself.
Because the core motivation underlying social identity theory is that individuals seek to have a positive self-concept, the theory postulates that individuals strive to achieve and maintain a positive social identity. Therefore, people will be more attracted to groups that achieve this end.

Reflecting the motivational aspects of social identity theory, the group-value model of justice builds upon the premise that people rely upon the degree of process control afforded to them in order to glean information about the quality of their social relationships within groups. Specifically, group procedures for treating individual group members are postulated to communicate information regarding one’s relative position within the group, as well as the position of the group as a whole (Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996; Tyler & Blader, 2002). This information is presumably conveyed by the relational implications of the extent to which authority figures display neutrality, trustworthiness, and status recognition towards their subordinates (Tyler, et al., 1996). According to this perspective, group authorities are considered to be prototypical representatives of groups; as such, the behaviors of authority figures in groups are considered salient indicators of group opinions and values. Fair treatment by the group (i.e., fair procedures), within the framework of the group-value model, transmits to individuals that they are valued and respected group members. This information, in turn, has direct implications for self-evaluation, reflecting the core premise of social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982; Tyler, et al., 1996).
Despite the focus of distributive justice theories on outcome control and the focus of procedural justice theories on process control, both types of theories share in common the fact that they are highly individualistic. That is, whether the motivation is to maximize outputs or to feel like a valued and respected group member, the level of analysis that is relevant for these theories is the individual. Reflecting this reality, a vast body of social justice research now exists that investigates the determinants of justice evaluations for individuals (Rasinski, 1987; Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler, 1987; Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985).

The next development of the social justice literature reflected an interest in the implications of group-level variables on the justice evaluations of individuals. Some of this work reflected the fact that different countries around the world had much different ideas about what was “fair” in terms of democratic representation in government bodies (Lijphart, 1984), and that to some extent, different ideas about fairness were due to individual differences in value orientations such as economic individualism (Deutsch, 1975; Rasinski, 1987; Stouten, De Cremer, & van Dijk, 2005; but see Van den Bergh, Dewitte, & De Cremer, 2006, for interesting qualifications). Other research built upon this general line of reasoning by investigating how different-sized factions within the same group evaluated the fairness of superordinate group decision-making procedures (Azzi, 1992, 1993; Azzi & Jost, 1997; Jost & Azzi, 1996).

Reflecting the next logical step, researchers began investigating the relational implications of the group-value model in organizational contexts and discovered that
identification with a superordinate group (e.g., a work organization) was associated with an increased emphasis on relational concerns (i.e., process control) over outcome control in the context of conflicts among members of different subgroups (Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996; Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz, & Lind, 1998). The overarching concern among these researchers was whether or not this promotion of relational concerns came at the expense of an individual’s subgroup identity (defined in this research as ethnicity). Among those highly identified with the superordinate group, relational concerns were found to weigh more heavily than outcome concerns in terms of predicting acceptance of the decisions of a superordinate authority figure, irrespective of whether or not the decision-maker was a member of the perceiver’s ethnic subgroup. That is, although members of ethnic subgroups were sometimes faced with an unfavorable decision by an authority figure representing a different subgroup than their own, if they strongly identified with the organization, they accepted the decision to the extent that they were afforded acceptable levels of process control. Unfavorable outcomes in this case did not come at the expense of subgroup identity. In contrast, it was found that outcome concerns predicted decision acceptance for those who had weaker levels of superordinate identification with the organization. Although the research by Huo and her colleagues (Huo, et al., 1996) was correlational, it was important to the development of social justice theory because it indicated that the benefits of superordinate identification need not necessarily come at the expense of loyalty to one’s subgroup. Studies that have
experimentally manipulated superordinate identification have replicated the dominance of procedural justice effects among the highly identified (De Cremer, 2006).

Importantly, however, research findings such as these should not be interpreted as suggesting that outcomes do not matter as long as authority figures give process control to their subordinates. This is especially important to realize in real-world organizational contexts in which the potential for authority figures to abuse the non-instrumental effects of process control is both very high as well as extremely plausible (Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990). Lind and his colleagues explicitly stated in the discussion section of their 1990 paper that individuals faced with repeated denials of outcomes would not be forever satisfied by just having their voices heard. A recent meta-analysis reinforces this conclusion by indicating that while procedural justice considerations like process control do lessen the negative impact of unfavorable outcomes, they cannot totally eliminate these effects (Cohen-Carash & Spector, 2001). In fact, in some situations, group identification may actually *exacerbate* the impact of negative outcomes, irrespective of process control. In a revealing demonstration of this possibility, recent research suggests that, in group contexts in which social identity is relevant, collective outcomes are more important than voice considerations, and increasing levels of social identification intensify this effect (Leung, Tong, & Lind, 2007).

Another area of justice research focused on reactions to experiences of *injustice* within a group. One such study was conducted in which three-person groups experienced the same overall level of unfair treatment under one of two conditions: Either the
injustice was concentrated upon one group member, or the injustice was distributed across all group members. Participants evaluated the fairness of their experiences both before and after group discussion (Lind, Kray, & Thompson, 1998). The authors argued that the discussion would provide a larger pool of instances of fair/unfair actions than would individual experience. Therefore, these authors argued, it was logical to expect that individuals would use the discussion information when they generated an overall impression of their experiences. Results generally supported this argument, but with interesting qualifications. As predicted, the supervisor was rated less favorably in concentrated versus distributed injustice conditions, but the relative weight given to the injustices experienced by another in participants’ fairness evaluations was much less than that given to personal experiences of injustice. In fact, analyses revealed that it took roughly three times as much injustice to another to produce the same weight as a small amount of personally experienced injustice (Lind, et al., 1998).

Of the social justice literature that recognizes the importance of group-level variables, a vast majority is decidedly intra-group in nature (but see Azzi, 1992; 1993; Jost & Azzi, 1997; Azzi & Jost, 1996). For example, the group-value model of justice (Tyler, et al., 1996) has elicited many investigations of how group-level procedures affect the experiences of individuals within groups. Research that has been conducted from the group-value model perspective has investigated the efficacy of procedural justice variables such as process control to ameliorate conflicts among subgroups, but has done so by implicating the role of an overarching group membership that subsumes the
different subgroups (Huo, et al., 1996). Thus, although the conflicts of interest in these studies may be intergroup in nature (i.e., conflicts among different subgroups within an organization), the processes which are assumed to lead to successful resolution arise from an intra-group phenomenon that either dissolves or makes secondary the intergroup distinction (e.g., superordinate identification with the organization as a whole). The existing group-level social justice literature, therefore, is mostly silent about truly intergroup justice phenomena.

This limitation in the justice literature may be inherent to the very definition of justice as we currently understand it. Philosophers throughout history have discussed justice as a benefit that is (or should be) provided by the state or nation to its citizenry. Aristotle, in his earliest writings on the subject, suggested that justice referred to one’s fellow citizens (Balot 2001, 1-44). Although he did not explicitly state that justice did not apply to individuals outside of that category, he did imply this point by stating that the law (and thus justice) applied only to citizens of a particular state, and not to those outside of it. Although he was not a social psychologist in the academic sense, when Aristotle spoke about justice in these terms, his became the first recorded mention of the idea that justice was only relevant inside of some shared category membership. To the extent that this perspective has been historically enduring, it is not at all surprising that there is very little social justice research from a truly intergroup perspective. Indeed, the very concept of justice may have meaning (psychologically and sociologically, if not logically) only for the in-group and thus may be categorically deactivated for outsiders.
Within social psychology, Morton Deutsch (1979) was the first to suggest that there was a “scope,” or a limited range to the social relationships in which justice principles are applied. The essence of this idea was made formal in the construct of moral exclusion, whereby certain individuals or groups are perceived to be outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply (Opotow, 1990). One way that the limits of one’s scope of justice have been explained is from a moral or symbolic perspective, which suggests that issues of social identification motivate exclusion (Tyler & Smith, 1998). Specifically, people react more strongly to injustice that is done to others if they identify with them in some way. It is much more difficult (if not impossible) to motivate people to extend justice considerations to members of a group with which they do not identify (Huo, 1994; Wenzel, 2001; 2002; Lowenstein & Small, 2007). Whether and by what process individuals can be motivated to extend justice considerations to out-groups without an induction of a common identity is an important area of both theoretical and practical concern.

How can individuals be motivated to care about out-groups with whom they do not identify? As indicated previously, the prevailing wisdom of the social psychology of justice appears to suggest that motivating people to care about the injustices of out-groups without appealing to a superordinate identification is either extremely difficult or impossible (Huo, 1994; Wenzel, 2001; Wenzel, 2002). Fortunately, however, social psychology literature outside of the justice tradition suggests that individuals can be motivated to help other individuals with whom they share no common identity via the
motivation induced by empathy, defined as an other-oriented emotional response corresponding to the perceived welfare of a person in need (Batson, Klein, Highberger, & Shaw, 1995), or more generally as “emotional sensitivity to others” (De Waal, 2008). The notion of need discussed in the empathy literature is a direct connection to the justice literature, as previous theorizing has already established that need is a general principle underlying justice evaluations regarding the well-being of others (Deutsch, 1979). Furthermore, to the extent that helping behavior can be equated with justice behavior (i.e., supporting social policies that protect the rights of out-groups), the conceptual connections between the justice and empathy literatures are clear. If individuals can also be motivated via empathy to help entire groups (and not just specific individuals that represent those groups) with whom they do not share a common identity, then there is the possibility that social justice theory could be extended, via a theoretical integration with the empathy literature, to a truly intergroup level of analysis.

Empathy’s potential as a theoretical framework for intergroup justice depends, however, on the precise nature of the motivational underpinnings of helping behaviors elicited by empathy.

There is significant debate within the field about this issue. These disagreements will be more explicitly outlined in following sections, but the gist of the divergence is that researchers disagree about whether empathy is motivated by altruism (a selfless desire to help another) or egoism (helping the other to somehow benefit the self). To the extent that empathy elicits helping behavior that is altruistically motivated, an
individual’s justice concerns could be extended to out-groups independently of the process of superordinate identification. To the extent that empathy results in helping behavior that is in any way egoistically motivated, however, superordinate identification could not be ruled out as an explanation for extending justice concerns to out-groups. An egoistic account of the effects of empathy on helping behaviors towards out-groups could still be beneficial to justice theorizing, however, by suggesting a way to extend justice concerns to out-groups that is independent of a direct appeal to superordinate identification.

Ultimately, which account (altruism versus egoism) of empathy’s effects on helping behavior is correct could be philosophically (and empirically) irresolvable. The precise motivational mechanisms underlying such effects, however, are of secondary importance to the more general theoretical question of whether or not people can be motivated by empathy to extend helping to out-groups. Before this possibility can be fully appreciated, a more complete discussion of the literature suggesting that people can be motivated by empathy to help other individuals is necessary.
CHAPTER TWO

EMPATHY AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR

Prosocial behavior is defined in the literature as behavior that is intended to benefit “one or more people other than oneself” (Batson, 1998, p. 282). The importance of the self-other distinction is hardly a novel one in the discussion of behavior towards people in need. The intellectual history of the study of human morality has long acknowledged the primacy of self-interest in motivating behavior. For example, the philosopher Immanuel Kant (1785/1965) contended that acts of human kindness were “inherently selfish,” and that only acts that were motivated out of a sense of duty were worthy of praise. Most accounts of prosocial behavior in the social-psychological literature concede that the default response in most situations is to act selfishly, but argue that additional mental effort can override the selfish response when one perceives the needs of others (Lowenstein & Small, 2007; Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 2009). The mental energy required to maintain such effort once it is elicited is likely to be substantial. The exhaustive nature of caring for the well-being of others is well documented by evidence suggesting that proportionately, people donate more money in response to rare disasters such as hurricane Katrina (which took 1,093 lives) than they donate in response to social problems that are perniciously enduring (e.g., approximately 180,000 deaths per month (mostly children under five years of age) due to infectious diarrhea associated with unsanitary water) (Epstein, 2006).
That more intense human suffering elicits less of a reaction is a phenomenon that has been explained by the process of psychological numbing, which suggests that as the raw number of lives at risk increases, people are less sensitive to the value of lifesaving interventions (Lowenstein & Small, 2007; Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, & Friedrich, 1997). Paradoxically then, it seems as though the larger and more severe the social problem, the less likely people are to help others in need. Because of this, organizations that provide financial relief for long-term human crises advertise for donations by using a single individual victim to represent the crisis as a whole. Putting one face to a larger catastrophe leads to what is known as the “identifiable victim” effect, which results in both more and larger donations to the cause than if the advertisement were to present the true magnitude of the potential for loss of life (Epstein, 2006). Psychologically, the identifiable victim effect offers an individual two benefits relevant to prosocial behavior in contexts of ongoing humanitarian crises. First, a single victim is a sufficient stimulus to provide the motivation to overcome the selfish default response and donate money to a cause. Second, and more importantly, donating money in response to a single victim offers the individual the relatively easy opportunity to bypass the obligation to invest emotional energy in the plight of all the others in need—aside from the one “poster child.”

**Empathy as an Individual Difference Variable**

To some extent, the degree to which people are sensitive to the needs of others (i.e., dispositional empathy) may be rooted in relatively stable personality traits such as agreeableness (Graziano, Habashi, Sheese, & Tobin, 2007). Although many social-
psychological investigations of the empathy-helping behavior relationship have focused on experimentally manipulating empathy, Graziano and colleagues suggest that for those low on agreeableness, such manipulations are less effective in eliciting helping behavior when the costs of helping are high. When the costs of helping are low, however, empathy manipulations operate as a contextual reminder to those low on agreeableness that they should be sensitive to the needs of others. In contrast, people high on the agreeableness dimension do not seem to be affected by empathy manipulations (Graziano, et al., 2007).

Importantly, exposure to the needs of another does not automatically elicit empathic concern, even for those who are high on agreeableness. Attributional explanations of how motivations arise from emotions suggest that exposure to the needs of another evokes a search on the part of the perceiver for the causes of the target’s distress. Presumably, of crucial concern for perceivers in these search scenarios are indications that the responsibility for the target’s need is internal or external to the target (Weiner, 1980; 1986). These explanations contend that to the extent that a person is perceived to be responsible for his or her own need, the perceiver is much less likely to experience emotional responses such as empathy (but see Batson, Polycarpou, Marmon-Jones, Imhoff, Mitchener, Bednar, Klein, & Highberger, 1997a for exceptions). Thus, to the degree that a tendency to attribute internal causation to the situations of others is an individual difference variable, those high on this construct will be less likely to experience empathy for a person in need unless explicit information is provided regarding an external cause of that person’s suffering. Similarly, perceivers that believe in a just
world (i.e., that people get what they deserve), are less likely to empathize with individuals in need (Lerner, 1980).

**Empathy as an Experimental Manipulation**

As an experimental manipulation, empathy is presumed to be elicited by perspective taking, defined as either actively imagining the experiences and/or feelings of another, or as imagining how one would feel in another’s shoes. Developmental psychologists have long acknowledged the importance of putting oneself in the position of another for social development (Davis, 1983) as well as moral development (Kohlberg, 1976). For social psychologists studying prosocial behavior, the value of perspective-taking manipulations that induce empathic concern for people in need is self-evident. As mentioned previously, however, there is significant debate regarding the precise nature of the motivation (altruistic vs. egoistic) that empathy elicits (c.f. Batson, et al. 1995; Cialdini, 1991). Whereas this literature defines egoism as a motivational state with the goal of increasing one’s own welfare, altruism is defined as “a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare” (Batson & Shaw, 1991, italics added). To the extent that taking the perspective of another leaves the self-other distinction intact, the empathic motivation induced by perspective taking can be considered to be altruistic. However, to the extent that taking the perspective of another results in a cognitive overlapping of the self and other, the motivation induced by perspective taking would be, at least in part, egoistic.

Not surprisingly, researchers arguing from the position of the existence of altruism produce research that supports an altruistic account of helping behavior, but
researchers arguing from the position of the non-existence of altruism produce research that supports a more egoistically driven account of helping behavior. Importantly, both the altruism and the egoism approaches agree that a perceiver is emotionally affected when he or she observes the suffering of another. What differs between the two approaches is the understanding of the nature of the pain that is experienced by the perceiver.
CHAPTER THREE
THE ALTRUISM VS. EGOISM DEBATE

Led by Daniel Batson, researchers from the altruism perspective suggest the empathy-altruism hypothesis to explain helping behavior. The hypothesis states that empathic emotions such as sympathy, compassion, and tenderness elicit motivation to help others, and that the goal of this help is to benefit the person for whom empathy is felt—hence indicative of selfless or altruistic motivation (Batson, 1991, 1998; Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981; Batson, Bolen, Cross, & Neuringer-Benefiel, 1986; Batson, Dyck, Brandt, Batson, Powell, McMaster, & Griffitt, 1988). In contrast, researchers from the egoistic perspective suggest that, although empathic emotions do elicit motivation to help others, the act of perspective taking creates negative consequences for the perceiver, and thus the goal of helping is either to eliminate or to reduce the intensity of this negativity (Cialdini, Schaller, Houlihan, Arps, Fultz, & Beaman, 1987; Cialdini, 1991; Maner, Luce, Neuberg, Cialdini, Brown, & Sagarin, 2002). The benefit to the other that results, while prosocial in the definitional sense, is selfish in the motivational sense.

Affective Alternatives

Researchers disagree with Batson and his colleagues about the variables that mediate the link between perspective taking and helping behavior. According to Batson’s critics, apart from altruism, two other explanations for this relationship are equally
plausible. First, it has been suggested that observing the suffering of others leads to negative affect (e.g., personal distress, fear of negative social sanction for not helping) on the part of the perceiver, and that it is the need to alleviate this negative affect that motivates individuals to help others (Cialdini, et al., 1987; Cialdini, 1991; Maner, et al., 2002). If this is the case, then helping behavior elicited by perspective taking can be explained by egoism rather than altruism. On a more general level, the ideas put forth in such negative-state relief models of helping behavior are at least as old as the thirteenth century, when philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas suggested that the suffering of others matters most because when we see that others are suffering, we know that their plight will soon become our own. This knowledge is presumed to produce a variety of negative emotions, all of which are capable of motivating helping behavior independently of a pure concern for the well-being of another. Helping others, according to negative-state relief models, eliminates the stimulus responsible for negative emotions within the perceiver.

In response to the negative-state relief explanations of the empathy-helping behavior relationship, altruism researchers have asserted that the empathy-altruism hypothesis does not deny that benefits to the self exist—e.g., a reduction of personal distress, or avoiding social censure for not helping. Rather, so say these researchers, the hypothesis claims that such self-benefits are unintended consequences of actions that benefit another, and that self-benefits are secondary to the primary motive of improving the situation of the person in need (Batson, et al., 1986; Batson, 1998). Recent research along these lines experimentally manipulated the extent to which participants were
induced to value the welfare of a person in need, finding that valuing the welfare of another explains variance in helping behavior that is independent of the extent to which participants empathized with the target. These findings suggest that even if empathy manipulations do lead to motivational conflicts that involve the self, *at least some* helping behavior is unique to purely other-related concerns (Batson, Håkansson-Eklund, Chermok, Hoyt, & Ortiz, 2007). Note, however, that Batson’s own previous research has suggested that perceived similarity manipulations, in and of themselves, affect the extent to which individuals value the welfare of a person in need (Batson, Turk, Shaw, & Klein, 1995).

**Cognitive-Affective Alternatives**

The second major line along which there is disagreement regarding the effects of perspective taking is grounded in the social identity and social cognition literatures. Specifically, some researchers draw upon well established social-psychological theories such as social identity theory and self categorization theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) to hypothesize about the results of perspective-taking manipulations meant to induce empathy for others in need. These researchers suggest that a result of perspective taking is an increase in perceptions of the extent to which the self and other are similar. This perceived similarity then leads to a cognitive overlapping of the self with the other (Aron & Aron, 1986; Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996; Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997). That there is cognitive overlapping between the self and the other suggests that identity concerns are at least partially responsible for motivating helping
behavior. Thus, in contrast to the altruism approach to the effects of empathy which suggests that helping is due to a selfless concern for others, the social identity approach is grounded in the idea that the emotion of empathy may be associated with a fundamental cognitive confusion between the self and the other (Wegner, 1980) which results in perceptions of shared category membership. Presumably, a consequence of this confusion is that the suffering of others becomes, in essence, the suffering of the perceiver.

That helping behavior may be inextricably intertwined with perceptions of shared category membership is a possibility that is reinforced by research suggesting that ostracism, social exclusion, and rejection are causally linked to a reduction of prosocial behaviors (Williams, 2007). Experimental manipulations of social rejection and exclusion (i.e., the removal of social bonds) have been shown to significantly decrease prosocial behavior across a variety of domains, an effect which is mediated by decreases in empathy towards those in need (Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007). Moreover, other researchers point to the fact that humans are sometimes motivated by more biological or evolutionary mechanisms to help those who are the most closely related to themselves (Burnstein, Crandall, & Kitayama, 1994). In particular, the decision of who to help is sensitive to the larger social context. In life-or-death circumstances, for example, the decision of who to help is dominated by heuristic processes that include inclusive-fitness considerations: People are more likely to help those who are related or close to them. In more everyday contexts, however, other elements that require more cognitive elaboration (e.g., what is moral) come into play in deciding to help (Burnstein, et al., 1994).
In response to explanations of the empathy-helping relationship that are based on social identity, Batson and his colleagues argue that empathy, by definition, requires awareness of another’s distinctiveness from the self, and that the effects of empathy manipulations on helping behavior are not bounded by the group membership of the perceiver (Batson, Sager, Garst, Kang, Rubchinsky, & Dawson, 1997). More fundamentally, it has been suggested that the studies supporting the group identification/perceived similarity/self-overlap explanations contain a number of methodological confounds (Batson, Lishner, Cook, & Sawyer, 2005). Specifically, variables in these studies that were not statistically controlled (the degree of personal contact between perceiver and target, the degree of personal relevance of the target’s need to the perceiver, the extent to which the goals of the perceiver and target were interdependent, and the extent to which the perceiver anticipated future interaction with the target) could all lead to perceived similarity independently of the empathy manipulation. Instead of perceived similarity, Batson and colleagues suggest that “nurturance,” as an altruistic impulse, is a more tenable explanation for the effects of empathy manipulations on helping behavior (Batson, et al., 2005).

The nurturant tendencies hypothesis rests upon three assumptions. First, empathy is assumed to be an integral part of the human impulse to care for and protect one’s young. Second, humans are capable of generalizing this impulse to non-genetically-related others. Finally, the extent to which the impulse generalizes to non-genetically-related others varies. It was hypothesized that the effects of empathy would be stronger for targets who were more childlike, more vulnerable, and/or who needed protection.
Thus, to the extent that individuals feel empathy based out of a sense of altruistic nurturance, they should report the most empathy for targets that are relatively helpless. To the extent that individuals feel empathy based on a sense of similarity, however, they should report the most empathy for the target with which they are the most similar. In a particularly ingenious test of these ideas, Batson and his colleagues manipulated perceived similarity by having four levels of the target of empathy. Specifically, “Kayla” was described as a student, as a dog, as a puppy, or as a child. Results indicated that participants were more likely to report stronger empathic concern for dissimilar targets (the dog, puppy, and child) than they reported for the similar student target (Batson, et al., 2005). That the empathy-helping relationship was the weakest for the similar target contradicts perceived similarity explanations which suggest that empathic concern should be the strongest for the targets that are perceived to be the most similar to the perceiver.

**Hybrid Alternatives**

Some researchers have suggested that the altruism-egoism dichotomy is false (or misleading), and that altruism is best defined as a continuum that is defined by how much an individual intends to help another relative to what that individual expects to gain for his or her self (Krebs, 1991). Others contend that describing the effects of perspective taking as purely affective (i.e., only empathy arousing) is too narrow, and that there are also cognitive processes at play, some of which are likely to involve considerations of self-other similarity (Eisenberg, 1991; Davis, et al., 1996). According to approaches such as these, perspective taking involves cognitively understanding another’s experience, and empathy is the emotional response that results. Indeed, as mentioned previously, which
approach (i.e., affective/altruistic vs. affective and cognitive/egoistic) is a more accurate account of the empathy-helping relationship may be irresolvable. In any case, the ability to entertain the psychological perspective of another person has been shown to result in some outcome (altruism or less egoism) which has been shown to elevate the interest in another person, relative to one’s own self-interest.
CHAPTER FOUR

GROUP-LEVEL EMPATHY

Whereas previous research has indicated that group-level emotions exist, and that specific group emotions such as anger and contempt are useful in explaining group-level offensive action tendencies against out-groups (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007), less is known about positively valenced group-level emotions that may explain prosocial actions towards out-groups (Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, Manzi, Jorge, & Lewis, 2008). Whether empathy exists at the group level in the altruistic (i.e., selfless) sense is of particular concern to the prosocial behavior literature generally, and the intergroup justice literature in particular. There is reason to doubt the existence of intergroup empathy, however. Previous research of this question has suggested that dispositional empathy predicts in-group helping behavior, but interpersonal attraction predicts out-group helping behavior (Stürmer, Snyder, & Omoto, 2005).

Moreover, researchers have demonstrated that even in a minimal group paradigm, empathy is actually deactivated for out-groups (Stürmer, Snyder, Kropp, & Seim, 2006). These researchers suggest that it is not the case that people only help in-group members and never help out-group members; rather, they suggest that the motivation for helping in each context is different.

Specifically, whereas the motivation to help in-group members is due to socio-cognitive phenomena that result in self-other overlap (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, et
al., 1987), helping out-groups is likely to be motivated by more systematic cost-benefit analyses, and is therefore less likely in a general sense.

Some positive effects of empathy inductions on overall attitudes towards out-groups has been documented in previous literature, however (Batson, et al., 1997a; Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003). In the evaluative domain, participants that are instructed to take the perspective of an out-group member indicate an increased valuing of that person’s welfare. If group membership is salient, this valuing of the out-group member’s welfare translates to more favorable evaluations of the group to which the target belongs. Importantly, this is the case irrespective of the extent to which stereotypes about the relevant out-groups are privately endorsed by perceivers (Vescio, et al., 2003). In the domain of justice behaviors, taking the perspective of a single out-group member has been shown to predict monetary allocations to out-groups as a whole (Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002). Thus, there is evidence that individuals can be influenced via empathy manipulations to have more positive evaluations of out-groups, and that such positive evaluations can generalize to increased financial support of out-group causes. It remains to be seen, however, whether or not these effects can be interpreted as the result of truly group-level empathy or whether such positive evaluations and allocations are artifacts of the individual-level empathy felt for the target out-group member.

Despite these potential benefits, sometimes perspective taking can backfire in intergroup contexts. Specifically, efforts to appreciate an out-group’s point of view can lead individuals to think about how the relevant out-group perceives the individual’s own in-group, a phenomenon known as meta-stereotyping (Vorauer, Martens, & Sasaki,
In this particular study, participants low in prejudice evidenced less favorable behavior towards ethnic out-groups if they were instructed to first take the perspective of an out-group member—a result that stands in stark contrast to those of previous studies (c.f. Batson, et al., 1997a; Vescio, et al., 2003). Presumably, taking the perspective of an out-group member led participants low in prejudice to consider the possibility that the out-group may have perceived the in-group as highly prejudiced (i.e., a meta-stereotype of one’s own in-group). The researchers argued that such meta-stereotyping elicited a sense of in-group threat in low prejudiced participants, which then resulted in lower ratings of out-groups than was the case for participants high in prejudice who also took the perspective of an out-group member. The study by Vorauer and colleagues is important to the present investigation because it suggests that the potential benefits to out-groups as a result of perspective taking do not hold in all circumstances. Although the moderator of the effect of perspective taking in the Vorauer study was an individual difference variable (i.e., prejudice), there are likely to be many moderators of such effects. One class of variables likely to affect the strength of perspective-taking manipulations are those that refer to the out-group itself. Are there characteristics of out-groups that may lead to stronger (versus weaker) empathy effects on helping behavior? Fortuitously, a theoretical framework for investigating questions such as these already exists in the form of the group stereotypes literature. This literature both describes the different dimensions along which individuals evaluate out-groups, as well as explains the functions such evaluations fulfill.
Group Stereotypes

The potential relationships between justice, empathy, and group stereotypes are well demonstrated by a recent study suggesting that priming participants with specific group stereotypes (e.g., black criminals, promiscuous black females) reduces policy support for black evacuees of hurricane Katrina and black pregnant women in need, but does not influence responses towards white targets in the same circumstances (Johnson, Olivo, Gibson, Reed, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2009). Importantly, the interactive effect found by these researchers was mediated by perceived empathy towards the targets in need: Primed participants did not report significant levels of empathic concern for black targets. Johnson and colleagues (2009) measured empathy as an outcome variable, but did not include a perspective-taking manipulation. The omission of a perspective-taking manipulation in the Johnson study is important because previous literature has shown that taking the perspective of another negates the impact of privately held negative stereotypes on the evaluations of out-groups (Vescio, et al., 2003). Although both of these studies are provocative, they focus only on racial stereotypes. Thus, the extent to which their implications can be generalized across different kinds of groups is limited. However, substantial work has been done in the area of stereotypes about out-groups, and this work is singularly suited to shed light on the complex relationships between empathy and out-group helping behaviors.

Stereotypes about out-groups are presumed to be important because they are functional: They allow for a sense of in-group prediction and control over potential external threats, and such group threats are presumed to be the motivational
underpinnings of discrimination and prejudice (Fiske, 2004). Some out-groups are likely to be perceived as threatening, whereas others are likely to be perceived as relatively harmless. All else being equal, individuals may be more likely to help a non-threatening out-group than they are to help an out-group that in some way threatens their own in-group (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). A separate but related line of research has already suggested a similar set of relationships. Specifically, participants that believe they are powerful (as the result of an experimental manipulation) are more likely to frame social decision-making in terms of social responsibility, leading them to allocate more money to those who are described as powerless (Handgraaf, Van Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke, & De Dreu, 2008). Importantly, this finding was explained in terms of empathic concern of the powerful towards the powerless. To the extent that powerless groups can be even partially equated with non-threatening groups, the research by Handgraaf and colleagues (2008) seems particularly relevant to the present research.

The stereotype content model of group stereotypes has been used to hypothesize about similar effects of the concept of threat as it applies to out-groups. This model grew out of a need to expand research on stereotype content from a single evaluative dimension (good vs. bad) to include the reality that out-group stereotype content can be (and often is) ambivalent (Fiske, 2004; Claussel & Fiske, 2005). The theoretical underpinnings of the model suggest that when encountering out-groups, perceivers have two primary needs to fulfill. First, perceivers want to know what the intentions of out-groups are towards the in-group (perceived warmth); second, after intentions are known, perceivers are interested in whether or not the out-group has the power to effect their
intentions (perceived competence) (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). The model further postulates that the content of group stereotypes depends upon the status ascribed to out-groups (which predicts competence) and the extent to which out-groups are perceived to be competitive (which predicts lack of warmth or coldness). Crossing perceived warmth with perceived competence results in four quadrants within which groups can be categorized: warm-competent, warm-incompetent, cold-competent, and cold-incompetent (Fiske, et al., 2002). According to this framework, out-groups perceived to be warm and incompetent are the least threatening, whereas out-groups perceived to be cold and competent are the most threatening (Fiske, et al., 2002).

The warmth and competence dimensions that are outlined by the stereotype content model have been found to predict specific behavioral tendencies towards out-groups (Lin, Kwan, Cheung, & Fiske, 2005; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). Specifically, this research suggests that behavioral tendencies towards out-groups are determined along two major dimensions. The first dimension represents intensity of effort: Behaviors are either active (i.e., effortful behaviors that directly affect the target group) or they are passive (i.e., less effortful behaviors that still have consequences for the target group). The second dimension represents valence: Behaviors either facilitate (by actively helping or passively associating with) the target group, or they harm (by actively harassing or passively neglecting) the target group. A conceptual crossing of these two dimensions results in four specific types of out-groups that elicit more specific behavioral tendencies. Admired groups are perceived as warm and competent and elicit association and help; hated groups are perceived as cold and incompetent and elicit harassment and neglect;
envied groups are perceived as cold and competent and elicit association but also harassment; finally, pitied groups are perceived to be warm and incompetent and elicit help but also neglect (Cuddy, et al., 2007). The research just outlined does not include empathy as a consideration. In fact, no research to date has investigated the empathy-helping behavior relationship in the context of the stereotype content model. The existing research does suggest, however, that the empathy-helping behavior relationship is likely to be stronger for certain kinds of out-groups than it is for others.

Consideration of the preceding section suggests the potential to address a current weakness of the empathy-helping behavior literature. Specifically, helping behavior has been measured as a binary outcome in most investigations (i.e., help versus no help choices). Rather than a threatening out-group eliciting zero helping behavior from a perceiver, it is possible that such groups will receive less help than non-threatening groups will receive. Helping behaviors that require substantial effort and/or a high level of trust from helpers (i.e., hosting an out-group member in one’s home), for example, are probably extremely unlikely if the stereotype of the out-group indicates threat. In contrast, helping behaviors that are less effortful and/or require less trust (i.e., a one-time only donation of funds to an out-group cause) may be more likely in threatening situations. It is important to demonstrate, from an empathy-helping behavior perspective, whether such variations in types of helping behaviors exist. If so, it is important to document whether such variations are functions of specific characteristics of out-groups (e.g., those that are indicative of threat).
More fundamentally, another weakness of the empathy-helping behavior literature is that studies which have suggested that empathy does not apply to out-groups have not manipulated empathic concern, via variations in perspective-taking instructions, at a truly group level. Rather, the limited research that has investigated group-level effects of empathy manipulations has relied exclusively upon perspective-taking instructions that lead participants to consider the perspective of a single target person, and have then measured evaluations of the target’s group and/or monetary allocations to the target group’s cause. No research to date, however, has instructed participants to consider the perspective of the out-group as a whole. If it is to be argued that the benefits of empathy do or do not extend to the group level, it must first be demonstrated that experimental manipulations that result in variations in empathic concern (i.e., perspective taking) can be effectively operationalized at the group level.

Summary

The overarching goal of the current research is to investigate whether or not empathic concern can motivate justice behaviors that benefit out-groups. The preceding sections have thus reviewed the major insights offered into this question by three separate (but related) social-psychological literatures: social justice, prosocial behavior motivated by empathy, and group stereotypes. With very few exceptions, a review of the social justice literature suggests that justice concerns simply do not apply to out-groups. Rather, this literature suggests that the very definition of justice appears to be bounded by notions of shared category membership. Thus, if the goal is to concern perceivers with the plight of out-groups, the prevailing wisdom of the justice literature is that it may be necessary to
make direct (or indirect) appeals to a sense of superordinate identity. To the extent that these appeals are successful, the effect of superordinate identification should be to dissolve the intergroup distinction and transform thoughts of “Us vs. Them” to thoughts of a more inclusive “Us.”

A review of the prosocial literature, however, may suggest a slightly different picture. Although there seems to be agreement within this literature that empathy, as an affective construct, is deactivated for out-groups as a whole, there is evidence suggesting that taking the perspective of an out-group member can result in empathic concern for that individual, which then results in increased monetary allocations to the target individual’s group (i.e., an out-group) (Batson, et al., 2002). Since allocations to groups are distributive justice behaviors, and since the existence of an “out-group cause” implies that the intergroup distinction remains more or less intact, the prosocial literature suggests that at least some justice behavior can in fact be extended to out-groups, and that it is at least possible that such behavior may be inter- rather than intra-group in nature. However, because the perspective-taking instructions in all of the existing studies instruct individuals to consider the situation of a single individual rather than the situation of a group as a whole, it is impossible to argue that benefits to the target’s group reflect intergroup phenomena.

Finally, a review of the out-group stereotyping literature suggests that even if empathic concern does exist for out-groups, the relative magnitude of such concern is likely to vary according to the specific characteristics (i.e., stereotypes) that are associated with a particular group. For example, the stereotype content model suggests
that when individuals encounter an out-group, they are primarily interested in divining
the answers to two questions (Cuddy, et al., 2007). First, individuals want to know the
out-group’s intention toward their own in-group: *Is this group warm or cold?* Second,
individuals want to know if the out-group can effect its intention towards their in-group:
*Is this group competent or incompetent?* To the extent that an out-group is considered to
be cold and competent, that group is considered to be threatening to one’s in-group
position. That empathic concern for these types of groups would motivate helping
behavior is indeed unlikely. A warm and incompetent group, however, is not threatening
to the in-group, so empathic concern towards such groups (if it exists), may be more
likely to motivate helping behavior. Indeed, previous work has shown that whether or not
individuals extend helping behaviors to out-groups depends on the different stereotypes
associated with those groups (Cuddy, et al., 2007). It remains to be seen what motivates
this behavior, because the group stereotypes literature is, for the moment, absent any
mention of the possible role of empathy. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether these
effects of group stereotypes would persist in the context of actively taking the perspective
of an out-group. This question is important because previous research indicates that one
effect of perspective taking is to negate or mitigate the impact of privately held
stereotypes on the evaluations of out-groups (Vescio, et al., 2003). If perspective taking
negates or mitigates the impact of negative stereotypes, then it is possible that people can
be motivated to help out-groups—even if they are threatening to the in-group.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE PRESENT RESEARCH

The purpose of the present research is to examine what variables may lead individuals to extend helping behaviors, both justice-related and non-justice-related, to out-groups. Despite the fact that the review of the justice literature indicates that such considerations and behaviors do not apply to out-groups, the empathy-helping behavior literature suggests that actively taking the perspective of a target individual can lead to evaluations and allocation behaviors that benefit that target individual’s group.

Perspective taking as an experimental manipulation has additional value in that it is able to be operationalized at various levels. The research that has used perspective taking to induce empathic concern for others has compared two levels of perspective-taking instructions: instructions to remain objective to the plight of the target person (i.e., objective conditions), and instructions to consider the plight of the target person carefully (i.e., individual empathy conditions). Across multiple studies and multiple contexts, individuals in empathy conditions have been found to extend more helping behavior to individuals in need than to individuals in objective conditions—and some of these benefits have been successfully applied to the groups to which the targets belonged.

The first major aim of the current study will be to add two more levels to perspective-taking instructions with an eye to further theory and understanding about out-group justice behaviors. Previous research that has suggested that empathy-motivated
helping is deactivated for out-groups has not manipulated empathy at the group level (Stürmer, et al., 2006). The present research will attempt to address this weakness of the literature by explicitly making the target of the perspective taking a group rather than an individual. Group-level perspective taking will be operationalized in two different ways that are relevant for a group-level analysis. First, “out-group empathy” conditions will use a set of perspective-taking instructions that ask participants to consider the plight of the target group as a whole, leaving the explicit intergroup distinction intact. Second, “superordinate empathy” conditions will use a set of perspective-taking instructions that ask participants to consider the plight of the target group as a whole, but will include a direct appeal to a superordinate level of identification with the perceiver. Differences in levels of empathic concern that are indicated between these two new conditions should be able to be interpreted as inter- versus intra-group experiences of empathy.

As indicated previously, the review of the group stereotypes literature suggests that even if group perspective taking elicits empathy for the out-group, the level of empathic concern may vary depending on specific stereotypes about the out-group. The second major aim of the current study is to investigate this possibility directly by integrating the group stereotype literature with the empathy-helping behavior literature. Specifically, the current investigation will manipulate the two dimensions of the stereotype content model, warmth and competence, to create four separate types of out-groups: warm and competent groups, cold and competent groups, warm and incompetent groups, and cold and incompetent groups. To the extent that the four levels of
perspective-taking instructions (i.e., individual objective, individual empathy, group empathy, and superordinate empathy) interact with the dimensions of the stereotype content model, the levels of perspective taking should have different implications for out-group helping behavior depending on the type of out-group that is relevant.

Whereas research that has investigated helping behavior as the result of empathy manipulations is vast, all of this research has operationalized helping in terms of either help versus no help choices or in terms of differences in the extent to which individuals report intentions to engage in a single helping behavior. That is, the existing literature seems to treat helping behavior as a unitary construct (but see Cuddy, et al, 2007).

Helping behavior, however, should correspond to at least two dimensions. First, helping behaviors should vary according to the extent to which they require effort on the part of the helper. Second, helping behaviors should vary according to the extent to which they require helpers to trust the individuals (or groups) they wish to help. A third aim of the present research, therefore, is to create and utilize dependent measures of helping behaviors that correspond to the dimensions of effort and trust. In addition, helping behavior items reflecting a concern for procedural justice will be created and included as a separate dependent measure for the main study.

A final goal of the present study will be to investigate the mediational process through which perspective taking influences willingness to engage in helping behaviors. It is likely that potential mediators of this relationship will vary among the different empathy conditions. On one end of the levels of empathy, the results for individual
empathy conditions should replicate those of previous research. That is, participants in individual empathy conditions should experience empathic concern for the target out-group member, and this concern should mediate the relationship between perspective taking and helping behavior. The literature suggests that it is also possible that the extent to which participants in individual empathy conditions experience a cognitive overlapping of themselves with the target individual will also occur as a result of the empathy manipulation. Thus, the potential for self-other overlap to mediate the relationship between perspective taking and helping behavior will also be investigated.

On the other end of the levels of empathy, the nature of superordinate identification is such that it emphasizes a common identity. Thus, individuals in superordinate conditions should indicate that they are more likely to engage in helping behaviors toward the out-group relative to those participants in the control conditions (i.e., individual objective conditions), because the superordinate manipulation should influence perceivers to view the targets as new members of their own in-group. If this is indeed the case, then the relationship between perspective taking and helping behavior for participants in superordinate conditions should be mediated by the extent to which participants feel that they share a common identity with the relevant group. In contrast, participants in out-group empathy conditions should not indicate particularly high levels of a shared identity with the out-group, because the subgroup distinction should remain intact. Instead, if perspective taking leads to increases in willingness to help in out-group empathy conditions, this relationship might be mediated either by the extent to which
participants experience empathic concern or the extent to which they experience a degree of cognitive overlap with the target, or some combination of both processes.

The hypotheses for the superordinate and the out-group empathy conditions are both speculative. Previous research from within the empathy-helping behavior literature suggests that empathy is deactivated for out-groups (Stürmer, et al., 2006), and that helping towards out-groups is predicted by interpersonal attraction rather than intergroup empathy (Stürmer, et al., 2005). Thus, instructions to empathize with the out-group may not lead to increased willingness to help the out-group. Moreover, even if such instructions do lead to increases in out-group helping, such increases may not be motivated by empathy. These potentials for null effects should be considered in light of the fact that the research of Stürmer and his colleagues (2005, 2006) did not include perspective-taking instructions as an experimental manipulation of empathic concern.

Thus, the present study will investigate the effects of four levels of perspective taking and four different out-group stereotypes on empathic concern for the targets of the perspective taking. In addition, the effects of empathic concern on participants’ willingness to engage in helping behaviors that vary according to effort and trust, as well as their willingness to engage in specific justice-related helping behaviors will also be investigated. Finally, if the above effects are found to be statistically significant, the present study will attempt to identify process mechanisms for the observed empathy-helping relationships.
CHAPTER SIX

HYPOTHESES

Empathic Concern

The empathy literature indicates that careful consideration of the perspective of another individual leads to empathic concern for that individual, which, in turn, motivates helping behavior. In a first test of a group-level empathy hypothesis, it is hypothesized that instructions to take the perspective of a group as a whole (defined either as an explicit out-group or in terms of a superordinate level of identification) will lead to empathic concern which, in turn, should motivate helping behavior.

Group Stereotypes

Assuming that the above hypothesis is supported by the data, it is further hypothesized that the level of empathic concern experienced will depend on the specific stereotypes that are associated with the out-group. Because this study represents the first attempt to integrate the group stereotypes literature with the empathy-helping literature, it is in some sense exploratory. However, there are expectations for some general patterns of results. For example, groups associated with cold and incompetent stereotypes should elicit less empathic concern from perceivers than groups associated with warm and incompetent stereotypes.
Perspective Taking

The main effect of group stereotypes is hypothesized to interact with the effect of the perspective-taking manipulation. That is, the effects of group stereotypes on levels of empathic concern may be different depending on the specific level of the perspective-taking variable. Taking the perspective of a cold and incompetent out-group as a whole may lead to less empathic concern and therefore less helping than would taking the perspective of a single member of that out-group. Similarly, taking the perspective of a cold and incompetent out-group as a whole may lead to less empathic concern than would taking the perspective of such a group that is defined in terms of superordinate identification with the perceiver’s own in-group. Yet another possibility of the perspective-taking manipulation is that the empathy instructions (for individuals and groups) may effectively wipe out any influence that group stereotypes have on empathic concern. This possibility is suggested by previous research indicating that taking the perspective of a target individual wiped out the effects of negative racial stereotypes on evaluations of the target’s racial group (Vescio, et al., 2003).

Willingness to Help

Effort and Trust

It is hypothesized that increases in empathic concern, as a result of the empathy perspective-taking conditions, will be associated with increased willingness to engage in helping behaviors. However, the likelihood of helping out-groups is expected to be moderated by the nature of the helping behavior itself. Helping behaviors that require
minimal effort and/or trust, for example, may be more likely in general than are behaviors that require maximum effort and/or trust on the part of the helper. The effect of effort and trust may be further qualified by the effect of the stereotypes associated with the out-group and the level of perspective-taking instructions. One manifestation of this three-way interaction would be if helping behaviors that require substantial effort and trust are likely only for groups associated with warm and incompetent stereotypes that are also defined in terms of superordinate identification with the perceiver’s in-group.

Justice

If individuals can be motivated via empathy to extend justice behaviors to out-groups, then empathy perspective-taking instructions should lead to increased willingness to engage in justice-related helping behaviors compared with instructions to remain objective. This is especially likely in the superordinate empathy conditions, as the justice literature specifies that justice concerns are extended only to those who share a common identity with the perceiver. The results of the analyses of the justice behaviors for the group empathy conditions are of particular interest to the current investigation. If, as the justice literature suggests, individuals do not consider out-groups in terms of justice, then there should be no effect of the group empathy manipulation on willingness to engage in justice-related helping behaviors. However, the empathy literature has already shown that individuals can be influenced by empathy manipulations to allocate financial resources (i.e., a distributive justice behavior) to out-groups. Because this research instructed participants to consider the feelings of a single out-group member, however, it remains
unclear whether the increase in allocation is a result of group-level empathy or an artifact of the empathy felt for the single target member. If benefits for the out-group are due to the empathy felt for the single target member, then such benefits should not be observed in conditions which instruct participants to consider the feelings of the out-group as a whole. However, if benefits for the out-group are at least partially related to group-level empathy, then such benefits to out-groups in these conditions should remain intact.

It should be mentioned that the degree to which the empathy manipulations will lead to helping and/or justice behavior will likely vary depending on the out-group stereotype manipulation. Those groups that are seen as particularly vulnerable, for example, may receive the greatest degree of benefit whereas those seen as cold and competent may receive the least benefit, regardless of the empathy manipulation. These possibilities have not been directly investigated in previous research, so they are speculative until such time as the data can provide more solid conclusions.

**Mediation**

If perspective taking and group stereotypes interact to predict increases in empathic concern, and if increases in empathic concern predict helping behavior, then the mediational mechanism underlying such effects is likely to be different depending on both the level of perspective-taking instructions (individual vs. out-group vs. superordinate), as well as the stereotypes associated with the particular out-group (warm-competent vs. warm-incompetent vs. cold-competent vs. cold-incompetent). Thus, several tests of mediation will be conducted. The direct effect of perspective taking on
helping for participants in superordinate empathy conditions is expected to be mediated by group identification. For participants in individual and out-group empathy conditions, the direct effect of perspective taking on helping is expected to be mediated by either empathic concern, self-other overlap, or some combination of both. Assuming these relationships are supported by the data, additional analyses will be conducted within each of the perspective-taking conditions to see if the mediator of the relationship holds across the four categories of out-group stereotypes.

Group Identification

The justice literature suggests that the likelihood that an individual will extend justice-related helping behaviors (i.e., allocations, collective action against injustice) is high only when the individual shares some level of category membership with a target. Thus, the effects of group stereotypes and perspective taking on helping behaviors for individuals in empathy conditions could be mediated by perceptions of group identification as measured by group/self similarity and group attraction variables (Prislin, Limbert, & Bauer, 2000). This is especially likely to be the case in superordinate empathy perspective-taking conditions.

Self-Other Overlap

Whereas group identity refers to identification with a group as a whole, self-other overlap refers to identification with a single individual. Thus, the effects of group stereotypes and perspective taking on helping behaviors for participants in individual
empathy conditions could be mediated by self-other overlap (Aron & Aron, 1986) as well as empathic concern (see below).

**Empathic Concern**

The empathy-altruism literature suggests that extending helping behavior is likely to the extent that an individual experiences empathic concern for the target. If so, then the effects of group stereotypes and perspective taking could be mediated by empathic concern instead of, or in addition to, self-other overlap. This pattern of results is expected for out-group empathy conditions, even though previous literature suggests that empathy is deactivated for out-groups. This pattern is also expected for individual empathy conditions.
CHAPTER SEVEN

STUDY ONE

It is hypothesized that helping behaviors would correspond to at least two dimensions: the extent to which they required effort on the part of the helper, and the extent to which they required trust. Thus, the aim of study one was to generate two Guttman scales of helping behavior: one for effortful helping behaviors and one for helping behaviors that required trust. Twenty-two items were generated, six items represented behaviors requiring low effort, five items represented behaviors requiring high effort, five items represented behaviors requiring low levels of trust, and six items represented behaviors requiring high levels of trust (Questionnaire A).

Method

Thirty undergraduate students (mean age = 22.43 years, SD = 6.78 years, 6 males) were asked to fill out a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. Of the participants, 17 (56.7%) identified themselves as Caucasian, 3 (10%) identified themselves as African American or Black, 4 (13.3%) identified themselves as Asian, 5 (16.7%) identified themselves as Latino, and one participant (3.3%) indicated that he/she was from an ethnic background that was not listed as an option.

Procedure

Participants read that the study was investigating people’s perceptions of the degree to which various helpful behaviors towards out-group members required effort
and trust. They were asked to read a scenario that described a particular group, and then asked to evaluate various behaviors according to how much effort and trust they would each require on a scale from 1 (none) to 9 (a great deal). Regarding effort, participants read that “effortful behaviors are those that require conscious and focused trying in pursuit of a goal. In the current context, effortful behaviors are those that require time and/or energy on the behalf of others.” Regarding trust, participants read that “trusting behaviors are those that rely on the character, ability, and truth of another. In the current context, trust means that you would need to put faith in the character, ability, and truth of members of this group before you would engage in the behaviors.”

Participants then read a paragraph describing the “Wallonians,” a description adapted from Cuddy and colleagues (2007). The scenario read as follows:

Due to political and economic circumstances, United States demographers are predicting waves of immigration in the next few years from an ethnic group outside of our borders that call themselves the Wallonians. Imagine that you are being asked to provide assistance to the Wallonians. Please read each of the behaviors listed below, and indicate how much effort and trust you think each behavior would require.

Following completion of the questionnaire, participants indicated their age, gender, and ethnicity. They were then thanked for their participation, debriefed as to the purpose of the study, and released.

**Results**

Ratings of effort required were indexed into a single measure of effort (α = .88), and ratings of trust required were indexed into a single measure of trust (α = .91). A correlational analysis indicated that effort and trust were separate, but related, constructs
(r = .35, p = .06). Five items were selected for the effort scale based on the means and standard deviations of the effort ratings (Questionnaire B, part I). The five items for the effort scale were selected based on the relative magnitude of the mean effort required for each behavior, such that the first item represented the lowest effort and was given a weight of one and the last item represented the highest effort and was given a weight of five. Likewise, five separate items were selected for the trust scale based on the means and standard deviations of the trust ratings (Questionnaire B, part II). The five items for the trust scale were selected based on the relative magnitude of the mean level of trust required for each behavior such that the first item represented the least amount of trust required and the last item required the most trust (Table 1).

**Discussion**

The purpose of the initial study was to demonstrate the utility of investigating helping behaviors that correspond to differential levels of effort and required trust. As was expected, results suggest that people are sensitive to different levels of effort and trust that are required when deciding to help. Thus, behaviors that require less effort and trust are likely to be observed more often than are behaviors that require maximum effort and trust.

**Main Study**

Since the preliminary study suggested that people are sensitive to the extent to which helping behaviors require effort and trust, the next logical question (and the main question of this research) became clear: would individuals be willing to extend various
levels of effort and trust to help different types of out-groups? Specifically, it was hypothesized that out-groups that were described as socially cold and incompetent may benefit from helping behaviors on the low ends of the effort and trust scales, but would be less likely to benefit from behaviors that required maximum effort or trust. In contrast, it was expected that out-groups that were described as socially warm and incompetent would be more likely to benefit from helping behaviors that required a greater amount of effort and trust on the part of the helper.

**Method**

Participants and Design

Three hundred and thirty-two undergraduates (123 men, $M_{age} = 19.0$ years, age range: 18-30 years) were recruited for the study and randomly assigned to conditions among a 4(perspective taking: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. out-group empathy vs. superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence: competent vs. incompetent) between subjects design. Of the participants, 218 (65.7%) identified as Caucasian, nine (2.7%) identified as African American, 55 (16.6%) identified as Asian, 27 (8.1%) identified as Latino, eight (2.4%) identified as Middle Eastern, and 15 participants (4.5%) indicated that they identified with an ethnicity that was not included among the options. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they perceived their family to be immigrants to America on a 7-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much), $M = 4.15$, $SD = 2.32$. 
Procedure

Participants arrived in the laboratory, and were asked to read and sign a consent to participate in research. Participants were then told that the research was part of a larger effort to get student input regarding American society’s reactions to groups of incoming immigrants. Next, participants were told that United States demographers were predicting waves of immigration in the next few years for an ethnic group that call themselves the Wallonians. A brief description of the Wallonians followed which contained the manipulation of out-group stereotypes (Cuddy et al., 2007). Specifically, participants in warm-competent conditions read that Wallonians are viewed by their native country as “competent, intelligent, socially warm, and good-natured.” Similarly, participants in warm-incompetent, cold-competent, and cold-incompetent conditions read that Wallonians are viewed by their native country as incompetent, unintelligent, socially warm, and good-natured; competent, intelligent, socially cold, and ill-natured; or incompetent, unintelligent, socially cold and ill-natured, respectively. After reading the description, participants read that several hundred Wallonians had already arrived in the United States, and that the purpose of the study was to assess student reactions to the experiences that Wallonians have had so far.

Next, the perspective-taking manipulation took place. Specifically, participants were instructed either to consider the experience of an individual Wallonian in the described scenario objectively (i.e., individual objective conditions), to consider the experience of an individual Wallonian carefully in terms of the impact that experience
had on his or her feelings and how it affected his or her life (i.e., individual empathy conditions), to consider the experience of a group of Wallonians as a whole carefully in terms of the impact it had on their feelings and how it affected their lives (i.e., out-group empathy conditions), or to consider the experience of a group of Wallonians as representatives of new Americans carefully in terms of the impact it had on their feelings and how it affected their lives (i.e., superordinate empathy conditions). Following this manipulation, participants read the following scenario (which they were told had been translated from the Wallonian’s native language) describing the experience of a group of Wallonians:

My friends and I were traveling to see the sights downtown. We were not familiar with Chicago’s bus and train system, and we ended up getting off the train a few stops early. We decided to walk the remaining blocks to reach our destination, but we became extremely lost. We could not make sense of the city maps we had, because we were not familiar enough with English to understand many of the terms. We were quickly overwhelmed by the noise and activity level of the city, and we quickly became disoriented and confused. It was a very scary experience for us. How will we ever adjust to life in this city?

Immediately following this procedure, participants were given five minutes to describe the group they had read about and to write down any thoughts that they had in response to reading about the scenario. This procedure was meant to encourage the strengthening of the perspective-taking manipulation and the group-stereotype manipulation. Following the thought listings, participants were asked to respond to a series of questionnaires (see Questionnaires C-H in the Appendices) that measured the dependent variables of interest as well as several demographic variables.
Measures

Manipulation Checks

Participants’ open-ended responses to the two thought listings were analyzed for content. Specifically, the responses were coded for the extent to which they reflected objectivity or empathy towards the Wallonians, and the extent to which they mention the stereotypes associated with the Wallonians.

Empathic Concern

Empathic concern was measured with the scale used by Batson and colleagues in previous research (Batson, 1991, 1998; Batson, et al., 1986; Batson, et al., 2002; Batson, et al., 2007). Participants indicated on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all and 7 = extremely) the extent to which they felt sympathetic, soft-hearted, compassionate, tender, and warm after reading about the experience of the Wallonians. Reliability of the empathy scale was assessed with the average inter-item correlation ($r = .64$), the average item total correlation ($r = .83$), and Cohen’s alpha ($\alpha = .91$). Responses to these items were averaged into an index of empathic concern.

Personal Distress

Because some researchers in the prosocial literature suggest that personal distress, rather than empathic concern, mediates the perspective-taking helping-behavior relationship, this construct was also measured (Maner, et al., 2002). Participants indicated on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all and 7 = extremely) the extent to which they felt alarmed, troubled, distressed, upset, and disturbed after reading about the experience of the
Wallonians. Reliability of the distress scale was assessed with the average inter-item correlation \((r = .66)\), the average item total correlation \((r = .86)\), and Cohen’s alpha \((\alpha = .91)\). Responses to these items were averaged into an index of distress.

Helping Behavior

Helping behavior was measured with the scales developed in study one. Participants were asked to check the blanks that corresponded to behaviors that they would be willing to engage in. The first five items were arranged in ascending order of the degree of effort required to engage in the behavior. Specifically, participants indicated if they would be willing to hold a door open for Wallonians carrying heavy loads, give directions to Wallonians who were lost, invite Wallonians to a weekend barbeque at their home, organize a benefit picnic in their community for Wallonians, and speak up if they witnessed Wallonians being cheated by a shop keeper. For purposes of analysis, a total effort score was computed by adding the number of behaviors participants indicated they would engage in. The second five items were arranged in ascending order of the degree of trust required to engage in the behavior. Specifically, participants indicated if they were willing to read an informational flier describing the situation of Wallonians in America, donate $5.00 to help Wallonians orient to the city, participate in a parade or march to advocate tolerance for Wallonians, introduce Wallonians to their personal friends, and offer to host Wallonians in their homes for a month. For purposes of analysis, a total trust score was computed by adding the number of behaviors participants indicated they would engage in.
Procedural Justice-Helping Behaviors

For the justice-related behaviors, participants indicated on a 10-point scale (0 = not at all and 9 = extremely) how willing they were to sign a petition in support of social policies that protect the rights of Wallonians, campaign for legislation designed to protect the rights of Wallonians, vote in support of policies designed to protect the rights of Wallonians, volunteer their time to raise money for a town hall meeting where Wallonians can express their concerns, support policies that take the perspective of Wallonians into account, support community decisions that haven’t considered the voices of the Wallonians (reverse scored), and support equal representation for Wallonians in community decision-making. Reliability of the procedural justice scale was assessed with the average inter-item correlation ($r = .45$), the average item total correlation ($r = .73$), and Cohen’s alpha ($\alpha = .85$). Responses to these items were averaged into an index of procedural justice.

Group Identification

Two measures of group identification, group/self similarity and group attraction, that have been used in several previous studies (Prislin, Limbert, & Bauer, 2000; Prislin, Brewer, & Wilson, 2002; Prislin & Christensen, 2005; Jacobs, Christensen, & Prislin, 2009) were adapted for use in the current investigation. Group/self similarity was measured by items that assessed on a 10-point scale (0 = not at all and 9 = extremely) the extent to which participants reported that the Wallonians were similar to them and to people who were important to them. The reliability of the scale was assessed with
Cohen’s alpha ($\alpha = .84$); responses were averaged into an index of group/self similarity. Group attraction was measured by items that assessed on a 10-point scale ($0 = \text{not at all}$ and $9 = \text{extremely}$) the extent to which participants reported that they liked the Wallonians, would like to socialize with the Wallonians, would like to take a class with members of the Wallonians, would like to discuss other issues with the Wallonians, and would like to work on a long-term project with the Wallonians. Reliability of the group attraction was assessed with the average inter-item correlation ($r = .66$), the average item total correlation ($r = .86$), and Cohen’s alpha ($\alpha = .88$). Responses to these items were averaged into an index of group attraction. Because group/self similarity and group attraction proved to be significantly correlated, $r = .58$, $p < .001$, only group attraction was chosen to be included in the main analyses as a measure of group identification.

Cognitive Overlap

Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they perceived an overlapping between their personal identity and the Wallonians, their personal identity and Americans, and Americans and the Wallonians. Participants indicated each by choosing among various figures that were adapted from previous research (Aron & Aron, 1986; Aron, et al., 1991). The figures display two circles; one circle represents the self whereas the other circle represents the other (Questionnaire I). There are seven versions of these figures within the measure, and the degree to which these circles overlap varies between versions. Responses to the self-other overlap were scored such that the figure representing zero self-other overlap was assigned a value of one and the figure
representing almost total overlap was assigned a value of seven. This measure has been used heavily in the past as an indication of the extent to which individuals experience cognitive overlap between themselves and another (Aron & Aron, 1986; Aron, et al., 1991).
CHAPTER EIGHT

RESULTS

Manipulation Checks

To test the efficacy of the perspective-taking manipulation, the three empathy conditions (i.e., individual, group, and superordinate) were aggregated into a single category for purposes of analysis. Immediately following the description of the event experienced by the Wallonians, participants were given an open-response question that asked them to list thoughts that came to mind while they were reading the scenario. The thought-listing task was meant to serve the dual purpose of reinforcing the perspective-taking and group-stereotype manipulations as well as to assess whether empathy and the group stereotypes were mentioned. Participants’ responses were coded according to whether or not empathy was mentioned. Specifically, two independent coders analyzed the thought-listing task for whether stereotypes about social warmth and competence were mentioned, as well as whether responses indicated that participants felt empathy for the out-group. For all three variables (warmth, competence, and empathy), Cohen’s Kappa coefficients indicated acceptable inter-rater reliability (Kappa = .74, .69, and .90, respectively). A chi-square goodness of fit test indicated that whereas seven (8.5%) participants in objective conditions mentioned empathy, 79 (31.6%) participants in perspective-taking conditions mentioned empathy, a difference that is beyond chance levels, $\chi^2 (1) = 17.11, p < .001$. In addition, mean empathy levels reported for participants
in objective conditions ($M = 4.16, SD = 1.36$) were significantly lower than those of participants in the perspective-taking conditions ($M = 4.52, SD = 1.20$) $t(329) = -2.31, p = .02$. Taken together, these two analyses indicate that the empathy manipulation was successful overall. Comparisons within the perspective-taking conditions, however, did not indicate that there were different levels of empathy according to the level (i.e., individual, out-group, and superordinate) of perspective taking (all $ps > .13$).

To investigate the efficacy of group stereotypes about warmth, participant responses to the open-response item were coded according to whether or not statements about social warmth and coldness were mentioned. Inspection of these frequencies indicated that 37 (11.1%) of participants mentioned social warmth or coldness in their descriptions, indicating that the manipulation of group stereotypes about warmth was weaker than expected. The main analyses that will be discussed below, however, indicate some statistically significant effects of warmth stereotypes that suggest that these variables were manipulated successfully. Similarly, to investigate the efficacy of group stereotypes about competence, participant responses to the open-response item were coded according to whether or not competence, incompetence, intelligence, and ignorance were mentioned. Inspection of these frequencies indicated that 24 (7.2%) participants mentioned competence or incompetence in their descriptions, indicating a weaker manipulation than expected. As was the case for warmth stereotypes, however, the main analyses reported below indicate significant effects for stereotypes about competence that suggest that these variables were successfully manipulated.
Correlations

Correlations among variables are listed in Table 2. Results indicate that perceived overlap between participants and Wallonians significantly correlated with many of the study variables. First, as participants perceived greater overlap between themselves and Wallonians, they perceived greater overlap between Americans and Wallonians $r = .48, p < .001$. However, whereas self-Wallonian overlap was associated with increases in empathy for Wallonians ($r = .29, p < .001$), American-Wallonian overlap and self-American overlap were not ($rs = -.04$ and -.10, $ns$, respectively). In addition, as participants perceived greater degrees of overlap between themselves and Wallonians, they indicated that they were more distressed ($r = .14, p < .001$), that they would exert more effort ($r = .28, p < .001$) and trust ($r = .32, p < .001$) to help Wallonians, that they were more willing to extend procedural justice considerations toward the Wallonians ($r = .37, p < .001$), and identified more with the Wallonians as a group ($r = .44, p < .001$).

Perceptions of self-American overlap were negatively correlated with the extent to which participants perceived themselves and their families to be immigrants, $r = -.14, p < .001$. Inspection of a scatter plot of this relationship suggests that as perceptions of self-American overlap increase, the perception of status as an immigrant decreases.

Finally, American-Wallonian overlap was significantly correlated with self-American overlap ($r = .28, p < .001$), the effort and trust (both $rs = .11, p < .05$) participants would put in helping Wallonians, and the level of identification with the Wallonians ($r = .15, p < .05$).
As participants’ perceptions of themselves and their families as immigrants to America increased, so did empathy for the Wallonians \( (r = .29, p < .001) \), trust in the Wallonians \( (r = .15, p < .001) \), willingness to extend procedural justice considerations toward the Wallonians \( (r = .25, p < .001) \), and identification with the Wallonians as a group \( (r = .21, p < .001) \).

Empathy was found to be significantly related to many of the study variables in addition to the overlap measure mentioned above. Specifically, as participants’ level of empathy for the Wallonians increased, so did their levels of distress \( (r = .25, p < .001) \), the effort \( (r = .35, p < .001) \) and trust \( (r = .43, p < .001) \) they would put into helping Wallonians, their willingness to extend procedural justice considerations to the Wallonians \( (r = .52, p < .001) \), and their level of identification with the Wallonians as a group \( (r = .50, p < .001) \). In addition, as participants indicated more distress, they were more likely to extend procedural justice considerations to the Wallonians, \( r = .15, p < .001 \).

The amount of effort participants were willing to expend in order to help Wallonians was also positively correlated to the amount of trust they were willing to place in the Wallonians \( (r = .59, p < .001) \), their reported willingness to extend procedural justice considerations to Wallonians \( (r = .46, p < .001) \), as well as with the level of identification with the Wallonians \( (r = .43, p < .001) \). The amount of trust participants were willing to place in the Wallonians was also positively correlated with willingness to extend procedural justice considerations \( (r = .60, p < .001) \) as well as
identification with the Wallonians \( (r = .50, p < .001) \). Finally, willingness to extend procedural justice considerations to Wallonians was positively associated with the extent to which participants identified with Wallonians as a group, \( r = .67, p < .001 \).

**Personal Distress**

Responses to the personal distress index were subjected to a 4(perspective-taking instructions: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. out-group empathy vs. superordinate empathy) \( \times \) 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) \( \times \) 2(competence: competence vs. incompetence) analysis of variance (ANOVA). Means and standard deviations of the distress score as a function of experimental condition are listed in Table 3. Results indicated a significant perspective-taking \( \times \) competence interaction effect on responses to the distress index \( F(3, 316) = 2.77, p = .042 \). Subsequent simple effects tests within competence conditions revealed a main effect of perspective taking \( F(3, 166) = 4.59, p = .004 \). Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) procedure indicated that when out-groups were described as competent, those in out-group perspective-taking conditions \( (M = 3.05) \) and superordinate perspective-taking conditions \( (M = 3.0) \) experienced significantly more distress than participants in objective conditions \( (M = 2.10) \), \( t(83) = 3.28, p = .007 \) and \( t(83) = 3.10, p = .012 \), respectively. In addition, when out-groups were described as competent, there was a trend for those in individual empathy conditions to experience more distress than participants in objective conditions, \( t(82) = -2.50, p = .063 \) (see Figure 1). Participants that read about incompetent
groups experienced similar levels of distress across levels of perspective taking $F(3, 158) = .95, ns.$

Because research has suggested that personal distress, rather than empathic concern, mediates the perspective-taking / helping-behavior relationship, the effect of personal distress on willingness to engage in helping behaviors was assessed with regression analyses. Results indicated that distress did not predict willingness to engage in effortful helping behaviors ($B = .05, SE = .04, p = .144$). In contrast, distress did significantly predict willingness to engage in helping behaviors that required trust ($B = .13, SE = .05, p = .007$). This latter result indicates that increases in personal distress are associated with increases in the willingness to trust an out-group. Thus, subsequent analyses that will investigate the effect of the empathy manipulation on intentions to engage in helping that requires trust will be statistically controlled for the influence of personal distress.

**Empathic Concern**

Responses to the empathy index were subjected to a 4(perspective-taking instructions: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. out-group empathy vs. superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence: competence vs. incompetence) analysis of variance (ANOVA). Means and standard deviations of the empathy as a function of experimental condition are listed in Table 4. Results indicated a marginally significant effect of perspective-taking conditions $F(3, 315) = 2.56, p = .055$. Because there was a specific interest in the effect of the different levels of the
perspective-taking manipulation, Dunnett’s test was used as a post-hoc procedure that compared responses of participants in each of the three empathy perspective-taking conditions with responses of participants in objective conditions. The results of the Dunnett’s test indicated that participants in superordinate empathy conditions ($M = 4.70$, $SD = 1.12$) reported significantly higher levels of empathy than participants in objective conditions ($M = 4.16$, $SD = 1.36$), $t(163) = 2.76$, $p = .017$. No other effects were significant in this analysis.

Helping Behavior

The effects of the independent variables on three separate types of helping behaviors (those requiring effort, those requiring trust, and those that were justice related) were investigated.

Behaviors Requiring Effort

Responses to the effortful helping scale were subjected to a 4(perspective-taking instructions: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. out-group empathy vs. superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence: competence vs. incompetence) analysis of variance (ANOVA). Means and standard deviations of the effortful helping score as a function of experimental condition are listed in Table 5. A main effect of competence indicated that participants were more likely to expend effort to help competent groups ($M = 3.52$, $SD = .92$) than they were to help incompetent groups ($M = 3.31$, $SD = .93$), $F(1, 316) = 4.22$, $p = .041$. 
This effect of competence was qualified by a significant perspective taking X warmth X competence interaction, \( F(3, 316) = 2.65, p = .049 \). Simple effects tests within warmth conditions revealed a competence X perspective-taking interaction effect only within cold conditions, \( F(1, 316) = 3.12, p = .03 \). Subsequent decomposition of this effect revealed that there was no effect of perspective-taking instructions on the level of effort participants were willing to expend for cold and competent groups \( F(3, 316) = 1.24, p = .31 \). For cold and incompetent groups, however, the results of a Dunnett’s test indicated that participants in objective conditions (\( M = 3.65, SD = .99 \)) showed significantly more willingness to put effort into helping than did individuals in out-group empathy conditions (\( M = 2.95, SD = 1.0 \)), \( t(316) = -2.38, p = .052 \) (see Figure 2).

**Behaviors Requiring Trust**

Responses to the trustful helping scale were subjected to a 4(perspective-taking instructions: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. out-group empathy vs. superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence: competence vs. incompetence) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with personal distress added as a covariate. Means and standard deviations of the trustful helping score as a function of experimental condition are listed in Table 6. Inspection of the results revealed only one marginally significant finding. Specifically, there was a trend for participants to be more likely to engage in behaviors requiring trust for groups described as competent (\( M = 2.78, SD = 1.19 \)) than as incompetent (\( M = 2.56, SD = 1.26 \)), \( F(1, 316) = 2.71, p = .10 \).
Justice-Related Behaviors

Responses to the procedural justice-helping behaviors were subjected to a 4(perspective-taking instructions: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. out-group empathy vs. superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence: competence vs. incompetence) analysis of variance (ANOVA). Means and standard deviations of the procedural justice score as a function of experimental condition are listed in Table 7. Results indicated no effect of either of the independent variables on the procedural justice index.

Group Identification

Responses to the measure of group identification were subjected to a 4(perspective-taking instructions: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. out-group empathy vs. superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence: competence vs. incompetence) analysis of variance (ANOVA). Means and standard deviations of the procedural justice score as a function of experimental condition are listed in Table 8. Results indicated a main effect of warmth such that participants identified significantly more with groups that were described as warm ($M = 6.14, SD = 1.35$) than with those described as cold ($M = 5.82, SD = 1.58$), $F(1, 316) = 4.06, p = .045$. No other effect was significant in this analysis.

Cognitive Overlap

Responses to all three measures of self-other overlap were subjected to 4(perspective-taking instructions: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. out-
group empathy vs. superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence: competence vs. incompetence) analyses of variance (ANOVA).

Self-Wallonian Overlap

Means and standard deviations of perceptions of cognitive overlap between the participants and the Wallonians are listed in Table 9. Results indicated a main effect of warmth such that participants perceived significantly more cognitive overlap between themselves and warm groups ($M = 3.38, SD = 1.42$) than they did between themselves and cold groups ($M = 3.09, SD = 1.42$), $F(1, 316) = 3.78, p = .053$. In addition, there was a main effect of competence such that participants perceived significantly more cognitive overlap between themselves and competent groups ($M = 3.44, SD = 1.43$) than they did between themselves and incompetent groups ($M = 3.01, SD = 1.42$), $F(1, 316) = 7.80, p = .006$. No other effects were statistically significant in these analyses.

Self-American Overlap

Means and standard deviations of perceptions of cognitive overlap between the participants and Americans are listed in Table 10. Results indicated no effect of the independent variables on perceptions of cognitive overlap between participants and Americans.

American-Wallonian Overlap

Means and standard deviations of participants’ perceptions of cognitive overlap between Americans and Wallonians are listed in Table 11. Results indicated a marginal effect of perspective taking such that participants who were instructed to empathize with
the Wallonians as a group indicated slightly weaker perceptions of American-Wallonian overlap ($M = 2.64, SD = 1.27$) than did participants who were instructed to be objective ($M = 3.10, SD = 1.45$), $t(316) = -2.05, p = .10$. Results also indicated a main effect of competence such that participants who believed that the Wallonians were competent indicated significantly higher perceptions of American-Wallonian overlap ($M = 3.14, SD = 1.45$) than did participants who believed that the Wallonians were incompetent ($M = 2.83, SD = 1.42$), $F(1, 316) = 3.84, p = .051$. No other effects were statistically significant in these analyses.

**Empathic Concern and Helping Behavior Relationship**

Two separate regression equations investigated the direct effect of empathic concern on willingness to engage in helping behaviors that required effort and trust, respectively. With regard to effort, analysis indicated that increases in empathic concern were significantly related to increases in willingness to extend helping behaviors that required effort, ($B = .245, SE = .038) t(329) = 6.66, p < .001$. Analysis also indicated that, controlling for personal distress, increases in empathic concern were significantly related to increases in willingness to extend helping behaviors that required trust, ($B = .419, SE = .049) t(329) = 8.55, p < .001$. To investigate the nature of these effects, mediation analyses were conducted (Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998; MacKinnon, 1994).

**Mediation**

The previous analysis of the effects of the independent variables on willingness to engage in helping behaviors that required effort revealed a perspective taking X warmth
X competence interaction effect. The decomposition of this effect by subsequent analyses indicated that it was the cold and incompetent out-groups in which there was a main effect of the perspective-taking manipulation. More specifically, for out-groups that were described as cold and incompetent, instructions to take the perspective of the out-group as a whole resulted in significantly less willingness to help than instructions to remain objective. Thus, for only those participants who read about socially cold and incompetent groups, three potential mediators of this effect (empathic concern, self-other overlap, and group identification) were investigated with the use of multiple regression analyses.

Three dummy variables were created to represent the comparisons between the objective conditions and the three empathy conditions that were then entered into a regression equation predicting willingness to engage in helping behaviors that required trust. This analysis indicated that compared with instructions to remain objective, instructions to take the perspective of the out-group as a whole resulted in significant decreases in willingness to help ($B = -.70, SE = .294$) $t(76) = -2.38, p = .02$. To investigate whether empathic concern mediated the effect of perspective taking on helping, a second regression equation was created. These results revealed that taking the perspective of a cold and incompetent out-group as a whole resulted in a non-significant decrease in empathic concern ($B = -.576, SE = .39$), $t(75) = -1.48, p = .14$. Thus, the second criterion for establishing mediation via empathic concern was not satisfied in these analyses. Analysis proceeded by investigating whether the direct effect of perspective taking on effortful helpful behaviors (for participants in cold and incompetent
conditions) was mediated by perceptions of self-other overlap or by perceptions of group identification. In both cases, the second criterion for mediation (i.e., that perspective taking influenced the mediator) was not established ($B = -.50, SE = .47$) $t(76) = -1.06, p = .30$ and ($B = -.46, SE = .55$) $t(76) = -0.84, p = .40$, respectively.

The previous analyses of the effects of the independent variables on willingness to engage in helping behaviors that required trust revealed no statistically significant effects. Thus, potential mediators of the perspective-taking / helping-behavior relationship were not investigated further.
CHAPTER NINE
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Knowledge of what types of groups are likely to receive help from other individuals, and under what conditions such help is motivated by empathic concern versus group identification versus self-other overlap is important for both the theoretical and applied social-psychological arenas. Most basically, the value of the research described here is that it represents a first step at integrating three separate areas of inquiry: social justice, prosocial behavior, and group stereotypes.

A main purpose of the study was to see whether or not empathy could be elicited toward out-groups via a perspective-taking manipulation that instructed participants to take the perspective of an out-group as a whole. Results for these analyses revealed two noteworthy findings. First and foremost, this study failed to replicate the well-established finding that taking the perspective of an individual in need leads to increases in empathic concern compared with instructions to remain objective.

That is, there was not a significant difference in levels of empathic concern between objective conditions and conditions which instructed participants to empathize with the individual describing the stressful event. It is a well-established finding in the empathy literature that empathy is deactivated for out-groups, but the individual empathy perspective-taking instructions asked participants to “consider how the author of the description felt and how it affected his or her life.” These words were taken, verbatim, from previous research that has consistently found higher levels of empathy in
perspective-taking conditions relative to objective conditions (Batson, 1991, 1998; Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981; Batson, Bolen, Cross, & Neuringer-Benefiel, 1986; Batson, Dyck, Brandt, Batson, Powell, McMaster, & Griffitt, 1988). What was it about the current study’s procedures that may have led to a non-significant difference between individual empathy and objective conditions?

One element of this study that has differed from research on the empathy-helping behavior relationship is that even though the instructions to participants in individual empathy conditions were to focus on the individual, the target person was described, explicitly, as a member of an out-group. There has been at least one previous study, however, that has demonstrated that taking the perspective of a stigmatized out-group member results in empathic concern for that individual (Batson, et al., 2002). Batson’s study, however, focused on an out-group (convicted heroin dealers) that was stigmatized according to the norms and values of the participant’s own society. Because convicted heroin dealers are stigmatized sub-groups within a larger group (i.e., citizens of the United States), they are not the same kind of out-groups as are the out-groups in the current investigation (recent immigrants from another country). Thus, in the context of the empathy-helping behavior relationship, it could be the case that there are varying levels of distance from one’s own in-group by which out-groups can be conceptualized. If so, then it is a strong possibility that the value of perspective taking in eliciting empathy for representatives of out-groups will be sensitive to this level of distance between the perceiver and the out-group. Whereas the convicted heroin dealers in Batson’s research (Batson, et al., 2002) may have been conceptualized as a proximal out-group, the out-
groups in the current investigation (recent immigrants from another country) may have been conceptualized as *distal* out-groups. Thus, the fact that the present study failed to replicate the well-documented finding that taking the perspective of an individual leads to increases in empathy for that individual may be because the individual in the current context was a member of a distal out-group. Future research will investigate this possibility further.

Another possibility is the description of the actual event in the scenario. The current study differed from previous investigations of these phenomena because the description was of an event experienced by a group rather than by an individual. Thus, although the description was recounted by an individual, and although participants were instructed to consider the perspective of that individual while reading the description, the description itself referred to a group-level experience and not an individual one.

The second noteworthy conclusion with regard to the empathy findings is interesting especially because of the immediately previous discussion about the deactivation of empathy for out-groups. Specifically, results indicated that the only perspective-taking condition that resulted in significantly higher levels of empathic concern than the objective condition was the one that explicitly instructed participants to think of the experience of the out-group from a perspective that stressed a superordinate level of identification. Once participants were interpreting the description of the group-level event from a perspective that stressed an overarching identification with the out-group, significantly higher levels of empathy were reported compared with those found in objective conditions. The lack of effects for the out-group perspective-taking condition
may be because considering how an out-group feels is very difficult for people to do
cognitively. That is, participants may not have the cognitive capacity to empathize with
anything other than an individual. Thus, empathizing with a group may simply not
register as a conceivable option for participants. Overall, the results of the first test of the
group-level empathy hypothesis suggest two possibilities. First, empathizing with an out-
group may require cognitive mechanisms that are different from those required to
empathize with an individual, and therefore may require different instructions. The
second possibility is that the mere suggestion of an out-group may deactivate empathic
concern unless a specific appeal to an overarching identification with the out-group is
made. Put differently, only when “they” become “us”—or come closer to becoming
“us”—is empathy activated.

A second major goal of the current study was to assess if the magnitude of
empathy toward out-groups depended on specific stereotypes associated with those out-
groups. The stereotype content model (Fiske, et al., 2002; Fiske, 2004; Cuddy, et al.,
2007) has been used in the past to predict willingness to engage in helping behaviors
towards groups, but had not been used in conjunction with empathy manipulations until
the current investigation. The model, standing on its own, suggests that two variables
influence willingness to engage in helping behavior: the extent to which groups are
perceived as warm and the extent to which they are perceived as competent. The value of
an integration of this literature with the empathy literature is in the fact that competence
and warmth, as out-group stereotypes, are likely to affect the magnitude of empathic
concern felt for groups. Specifically, it was hypothesized that participants would feel
more empathy for out-groups that were described as socially warm and competent than they would for out-groups that were described as socially cold and incompetent.

In terms of theoretical contribution to the research of the empathy-helping behavior relationship, the major implications of this research are to suggest, first, that empathy manipulations do not result in differences in helping behavior toward out-groups* per se. *Rather, the results of this study suggest that the empathy manipulations affect willingness to engage in helping behaviors that require effort but not those that require trust. The second theoretical implication of this research is the finding that, indeed, the effects of perspective taking on willingness to engage in helping behaviors that require effort depend on the specific stereotypes that are associated with the out-group. The nature of this finding, however, is much different than was expected.

At a general level, it was hypothesized that without an empathy manipulation (i.e., in objective conditions), participants would be less likely to help groups that had undesirable characteristics (i.e., social coldness and incompetence). Further, it was hypothesized that instructions to empathize with groups described as socially cold and incompetent would lead to increases in helping behavior. Results indicated exactly the opposite. Specifically, participants who were instructed to empathize with socially cold and incompetent groups as a whole indicated significantly *less willingness* to engage in effortful helping behaviors compared with participants who were instructed to be objective. Although unexpected and counterintuitive, these findings suggest the possibility that thoughtful consideration of the perspective of a group that is socially cold and incompetent may lead to negative feelings that result in less helping. Even if
participants in objective conditions had these same negative feelings in response to reading about such groups, the instructions to be objective may have helped them to ignore the influence of those feelings when making decisions about helping.

Another explanation converges with recent research suggesting situations in which perspective taking is likely to backfire. For example, a field experiment that was conducted in the Democratic Republic of Congo (an area replete with intergroup conflict) investigated the effects of perspective taking on attitudes toward naturally occurring out-groups. Results indicated that people who were exposed to the perspectives of out-groups indicated less tolerance of the out-group and were less likely to help them than if they had not been exposed to their perspectives (Paluck, 2010).

Integrating the justice literature into this discussion is of value because resource allocation to out-groups (a distributive justice behavior) is, in fact, a helping behavior directed toward out-groups. As such, it was hypothesized that justice-related helping behaviors may also be sensitive to empathy and group-stereotype manipulations. Standing on its own, the justice literature suggests that in order for people to extend justice considerations to out-groups, there is a need to establish some sort of overarching common identity. Researchers studying prosocial behavior, however, have demonstrated that individuals can be motivated by empathic concern for an individual out-group member to allocate money (a distributive justice behavior) to that individual’s group. The research presented here attempted to extend those findings to the realm of procedural justice. On a purely descriptive level, it is interesting to note, first, that the correlation between empathy and willingness to extend procedural justice considerations to out-
groups was significant and positive, indicating that increases in empathy are associated with an increase in the inclusion of out-groups into procedural justice reasoning (see Table 2). Second, the prevailing wisdom from within the social justice literature is that justice considerations apply only to individuals who share a common identity with the perceiver. If this were indeed the case, then one would expect participants in superordinate empathy conditions (who experienced a deliberate appeal to a common identification with the out-group) to be the only group to indicate strong willingness to include extend procedural justice reasoning to out-groups. Inspection of Table 7, however, indicates mean values above the scale’s mid-point across experimental conditions, suggesting that participants in this study were relatively willing to extend procedural justice considerations to groups as a whole, even without an appeal to superordinate identification.

Perhaps because of the relatively high mean values of the procedural justice variable across experimental conditions, results of the inferential analyses suggest that neither perspective taking nor group-stereotype manipulations affected the degree to which participants were willing to extend procedural justice considerations to out-groups. The pattern of means offers suggestive evidence, however, of the benefits of superordinate identification in some circumstances. Specifically, the rank order of the magnitude of the means across warmth conditions indicates that the value of superordinate identification may be the most pronounced when groups are described as socially cold. That is, only when groups are described as cold are the means for the superordinate perspective-taking conditions the highest of the four perspective-taking
levels. That said, these differences were not statistically significant. Because evidence suggests that the group-stereotype manipulations for the warmth and competence dimensions were weaker than expected, a conclusion that these variables don’t affect procedural justice concerns may be too hasty. It remains an interesting question for future research to investigate if a stronger (and conceptually cleaner) manipulation of group stereotypes will impact willingness to extend justice considerations to out-groups.

The competence dimension, in particular, should be of interest in future studies for a variety of reasons. First, although participants indicated significantly more personal distress after reading about groups that were described as incompetent, only participants who read about competent groups were significantly more willing to engage in helping behaviors requiring effort (and also those requiring trust, though this effect was only marginally significant). Second, two of the three measures of cognitive overlap (self-Wallonian overlap and Wallonian-American overlap) had main effects for competence such that ratings of these measures were significantly higher for participants who read about competent groups compared to incompetent groups. These findings suggest that whereas participants are more distressed when reading about a stressful experience that was had by an incompetent out-group, they are only more likely to extend effortful helping behaviors toward out-groups that they believe to be competent. Thus, the results of this study suggest that helping of out-groups is not associated with increased levels of personal distress.

Interestingly, there was no main effect of competence for the group identification measure. To the extent that participants experienced increases in perceptions of cognitive
overlap between themselves and Wallonians and between Americans and Wallonians as the result of the competence manipulation, it seems reasonable to expect similar effects of competence on the group identification variable, as group identification and self-other overlap are related constructs. Instead, however, there was a main effect of the warmth dimension on mean levels of group identification such that participants who read about socially warm groups reported significantly higher levels of identification with the out-group than did those who read about socially cold groups. Importantly, the questions that made up the group identification measure were those such as “How much do you like this group?”, and “How much would you like to spend time with this group in the future?” It may be the case, therefore, that whereas the competence stereotype influences cognitive dimensions of affiliation with others (i.e., self-other overlap), stereotypes about warmth influence the affective dimension of affiliation with others.

In terms of applied significance, the results reported here suggest that groups associated with certain characteristics (i.e., competence and intelligence) are more likely to receive help from others than groups associated with other characteristics (i.e., incompetence and ignorance). Thus, focused efforts should be made to highlight the competence and intelligence of out-groups that are in need of help. The results reported here also suggest that efforts to help out-groups that are perceived as socially cold should not attempt to elicit empathy to motivate helping behavior. Indeed, the results of the present study suggest that appeals to empathy for such groups actually decrease willingness to help. Efforts in these situations may be better spent trying to focus on the extent to which out-groups who are socially cold are intelligent and competent. Finally, if
it is simply not possible to mitigate the impact of stereotypes about the social coldness of out-groups, the research presented here suggests that instilling an overarching identification with socially cold out-groups may be necessary in order to elicit empathic concern toward them. In sum, these results suggest that if the goal is to increase helping behavior toward out-groups, then specific strategies should be employed that either eliminate or reduce the impact of stereotypes about incompetence, ignorance, and social coldness on individuals’ willingness to help others.

**Limitations**

The biggest limitation of the study is that since the Wallonians are a fictional group unknown to most people, participants did not have access to any information about them other than what was given in the description. Obviously, real-world out-groups are nested within a shared social context that this study did not represent, so future research should attempt to investigate the relationships suggested here using real-life out-groups.

That said, one of the main purposes of the current study was to assess the effects of group stereotypes on willingness to help out-groups; thus, the benefit of the current study is that the content of those stereotypes was experimentally controlled. Control over the content of stereotypes about real out-groups would either be impossible or extremely difficult, and this could lead to multiple confounds about the inferences drawn about the effects of stereotypes on helping.

Another limitation to the study is suggested by the inspection of the responses to the thought-listing task that followed the manipulation of group stereotypes. Specifically, very few participants mentioned anything about social warmth or coldness or competence
or incompetence. Of those that did mention these things, the majority of responses indicated that the description of the event experienced by the Wallonians who were lost in the city seemed to contradict the description of the group that was provided. For example, participants seemed confused that a group that was supposed to be competent and intelligent would not think to ask for directions if they were lost in the city.

More problematic is the fact that 44% of the sample mentioned the language barrier in their thought listings, even though a language barrier was not included in the theorizing about this project. As part of the scenario, a statement was included that the description participants were going to read about a recent immigrant group had been “translated from the group’s native language.” This statement was meant to strengthen the perception of the Wallonians as an out-group; however, this statement introduced a significant amount of “noise” to the validity of assumptions regarding the effects of competence and warmth. The majority of participants who mentioned the language barrier in their thought listings argued one of two things. First, participants indicated that an inability to understand a foreign language is not and should not be perceived as ignorance or incompetence. Second, many participants expressed anger and frustration at the Wallonians that they would come to the country without knowledge of the English language. Moreover, many participants expressed particular surprise that groups described as intelligent and competent would be in a situation that would require language competence if they did not know the language.

The thought listings, therefore, suggest at least two intractable confounds to the current research. First, some participants seemed to be disregarding information about
incompetence by focusing on the fact that a language barrier can sometimes masquerade as ignorance or incompetence. Second, some participants were using information about the language barrier to disconfirm stereotypes about competence. In retrospect, the sentence about the translation was a mistake, and future research will either not mention the language barrier or will explicitly state that the out-groups in question are familiar with the English language.

Regarding the procedural justice findings, one limitation is the ad-hoc nature of the measure of procedural justice-related helping behaviors. The scale was developed and piloted in the current study, and although initial psychometric evidence suggests that the scale is reliable, there is no validity evidence for the scale as of yet. The items of the scale were developed from within the framework of procedural justice theory: all items reflected questions revolving around the extent to which participants believed that the voices of the Wallonians should be heard in American decision-making processes. In this regard, the scale has a high degree of face validity. It remains a task of future research, however, to establish the validity of this scale further.

As a final point, the effort to integrate the social-psychological literatures of social justice, the empathy-helping behavior relationship, and group stereotypes is going to require multiple studies across multiple contexts. As a first investigation, the current study, rather than establishing when perspective taking is useful across different types of groups, has instead established when such perspective taking backfires. Thus, interventions to promote empathy with ingroup members may not be appropriate, and may even be detrimental, when used in conjunction with outgroup members.
Table 1. Means and standard deviations of effort and trust ratings of helping behaviors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effort</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hold doors open for Wallonians carrying heavy loads.</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer to give directions to lost Wallonians.</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>2.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invite Wallonians to a weekend barbeque at your home.</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speak up if you see a merchant cheat a Wallonian.</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organize a benefit picnic for Wallonians in your community</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trust</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read an informational flier describing the situation of Wallonians in America.</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>3.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donate $5.00 to help Wallonians adapt to the city.</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in a march to advocate tolerance for Wallonians.</td>
<td>5.59</td>
<td>2.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduce Wallonians to your personal friends.</td>
<td>6.76</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host Wallonians in your home for a month.</td>
<td>8.31</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
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Table 2. Correlations among variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Self-Wallonian overlap</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.48**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.44**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Self-American overlap</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>-.12*</td>
<td>-.14**</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. American-Wallonian overlap</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Age</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.08</td>
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<td>5. Immigration status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
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<td>6. Empathy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td>.50**</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Distress</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Total effort</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.59**</td>
<td>.46**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Total trust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.60**</td>
<td>.50**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>10. Procedural justice</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.67**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Group identification</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .001$
Table 3. Means and standard deviations of distress as a function of experimental condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective-taking condition</th>
<th>Warm Competence</th>
<th>Cold Competence</th>
<th>Warm Incompetent</th>
<th>Cold Incompetent</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>2.08 (1.13)</td>
<td>2.56 (1.38)</td>
<td>2.13 (1.03)</td>
<td>3.09 (1.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual empathy</td>
<td>2.95 (1.58)</td>
<td>2.62 (1.39)</td>
<td>2.72 (1.16)</td>
<td>2.69 (1.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group empathy</td>
<td>2.95 (1.51)</td>
<td>3.11 (1.37)</td>
<td>3.14 (1.65)</td>
<td>2.93 (1.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superordinate empathy</td>
<td>2.79 (1.67)</td>
<td>2.40 (1.15)</td>
<td>3.19 (1.31)</td>
<td>2.65 (1.46)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses
Table 4. Means and standard deviations of empathy as a function of experimental condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective-taking condition</th>
<th>Warm</th>
<th>Cold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>4.17 (1.74)</td>
<td>4.03 (1.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual empathy</td>
<td>4.49 (1.33)</td>
<td>4.50 (0.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group empathy</td>
<td>4.71 (1.25)</td>
<td>4.43 (1.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superordinate empathy</td>
<td>4.58 (1.26)</td>
<td>4.67 (0.90)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses
Table 5. Means and standard deviations of effortful helping as a function of experimental condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective-taking condition</th>
<th>Warm</th>
<th>Cold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>Competence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competent</td>
<td>3.52 (0.87)</td>
<td>3.10 (0.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompetent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual empathy</td>
<td>3.50 (0.76)</td>
<td>3.57 (1.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group empathy</td>
<td>3.62 (0.92)</td>
<td>3.33 (1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superordinate empathy</td>
<td>3.48 (1.08)</td>
<td>3.50 (0.76)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
Table 6. Means and standard deviations of trustful helping as a function of experimental condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective-taking condition</th>
<th>Warm</th>
<th>Cold</th>
<th>Competence</th>
<th>Competence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>2.62 (1.24)</td>
<td>2.50 (1.40)</td>
<td>2.29 (1.31)</td>
<td>2.70 (1.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual empathy</td>
<td>2.95 (1.19)</td>
<td>2.76 (0.94)</td>
<td>3.09 (1.15)</td>
<td>2.45 (1.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group empathy</td>
<td>3.05 (1.12)</td>
<td>2.71 (1.19)</td>
<td>2.64 (0.95)</td>
<td>2.15 (1.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superordinate empathy</td>
<td>2.67 (1.11)</td>
<td>2.65 (1.27)</td>
<td>2.95 (1.36)</td>
<td>2.55 (1.36)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
Table 7. Means and standard deviations of procedural justice behaviors as a function of experimental condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective-taking condition</th>
<th>Warm Competence</th>
<th>Warm Incompetent</th>
<th>Cold Competence</th>
<th>Cold Incompetent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>5.99 (1.39)</td>
<td>5.38 (1.51)</td>
<td>5.36 (1.35)</td>
<td>5.74 (1.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual empathy</td>
<td>5.33 (1.92)</td>
<td>5.68 (1.08)</td>
<td>5.80 (1.43)</td>
<td>5.51 (1.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group empathy</td>
<td>5.84 (0.95)</td>
<td>5.90 (1.54)</td>
<td>5.64 (1.60)</td>
<td>4.89 (1.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superordinate empathy</td>
<td>5.82 (1.55)</td>
<td>5.84 (0.98)</td>
<td>6.16 (1.47)</td>
<td>5.93 (1.42)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
Table 8. Means and standard deviations of group identification as a function of experimental condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective-taking condition</th>
<th>Warm</th>
<th>Cold</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competent</td>
<td>6.26 (1.43)</td>
<td>5.98 (1.31)</td>
<td>5.60 (1.30)</td>
<td>5.84 (1.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompetent</td>
<td>6.00 (1.63)</td>
<td>1.67 (1.02)</td>
<td>5.83 (1.76)</td>
<td>5.43 (1.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>6.26 (1.23)</td>
<td>5.79 (1.63)</td>
<td>6.03 (1.39)</td>
<td>5.38 (2.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompetent</td>
<td>6.76 (1.23)</td>
<td>5.90 (1.16)</td>
<td>6.05 (1.23)</td>
<td>6.36 (1.57)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
Table 9. Means and standard deviations of self-Wallonian overlap as a function of experimental condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective-taking condition</th>
<th>Warm</th>
<th>Cold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>Competence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competent</td>
<td>3.76 (1.48)</td>
<td>2.71 (1.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompetent</td>
<td>3.00 (1.21)</td>
<td>3.05 (1.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual empathy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competent</td>
<td>3.90 (1.71)</td>
<td>3.00 (1.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompetent</td>
<td>3.19 (1.47)</td>
<td>2.85 (1.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group empathy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competent</td>
<td>3.33 (1.23)</td>
<td>3.27 (1.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompetent</td>
<td>3.33 (1.23)</td>
<td>2.55 (1.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superordinate empathy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competent</td>
<td>3.67 (1.56)</td>
<td>3.91 (1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompetent</td>
<td>2.85 (1.27)</td>
<td>3.30 (1.59)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
Table 10. Means and standard deviations of self-American overlap as a function of experimental condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective-taking condition</th>
<th>Warm Competence</th>
<th>Warm Incompetent</th>
<th>Cold Competence</th>
<th>Cold Incompetent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>4.71 (1.42)</td>
<td>4.85 (1.63)</td>
<td>4.71 (1.87)</td>
<td>5.00 (1.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual empathy</td>
<td>4.90 (1.25)</td>
<td>4.71 (1.45)</td>
<td>5.05 (1.17)</td>
<td>5.35 (0.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group empathy</td>
<td>4.90 (1.55)</td>
<td>5.14 (1.28)</td>
<td>4.36 (1.59)</td>
<td>5.50 (1.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superordinate empathy</td>
<td>5.14 (1.56)</td>
<td>4.71 (1.45)</td>
<td>5.27 (1.55)</td>
<td>5.00 (1.66)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
Table 11. Means and standard deviations of American-Wallonian overlap as a function of experimental condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective-taking condition</th>
<th>Warm</th>
<th>Competence</th>
<th>Cold</th>
<th>Competence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>3.57 (1.50)</td>
<td>2.75 (1.33)</td>
<td>2.86 (1.46)</td>
<td>3.20 (1.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual empathy</td>
<td>3.40 (1.64)</td>
<td>2.43 (0.98)</td>
<td>3.05 (1.53)</td>
<td>3.05 (1.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group empathy</td>
<td>2.43 (0.81)</td>
<td>2.86 (1.31)</td>
<td>2.77 (1.48)</td>
<td>2.50 (1.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superordinate empathy</td>
<td>3.38 (1.40)</td>
<td>2.80 (1.40)</td>
<td>3.64 (1.43)</td>
<td>3.05 (1.85)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
APPENDIX B:

FIGURES
Figure 1. Mean levels of distress as a function of perspective-taking instructions and competence stereotypes.
Figure 2. Mean levels of effort as a function of perspective taking, warmth, and competence stereotypes.
APPENDIX C:

QUESTIONNAIRES
Questionnaire A: Helping Behavior Scale

**Instructions:** This study is investigating peoples’ perceptions of the degree to which various helpful behaviors towards out-group members require effort and trust. Please read the scenario below that describes a particular group. Listed below the scenario are several helping behaviors that we’d like you to evaluate according to how much effort and trust they would each require.

**Effortful Behaviors** are those that require conscious and focused trying in pursuit of a goal. To require effort in this context means that you will need to dedicate time and/or energy on behalf of others. Please rate the extent to which you perceive each behavior to require effort on a scale of 0 (not at all effortful) to 9 (extremely effortful).

**Trusting Behaviors** are those that rely on the character, ability, and truth of another. Trust in this context means that you would need to put faith in the character, ability, and truth of members of this group before you could engage in the behaviors. Please rate the extent to which you perceive each behavior to require trusting in the members of this group on a scale of 0 (requires no trust) to 9 (requires a great deal of trust).

**Scenario:**

Due to political and economic circumstances, United States demographers are predicting waves of immigration in the next few years from an ethnic group outside of our borders that call themselves the Wallonians. Imagine that you are being asked to provide assistance to the Wallonians. Please read each of the behaviors listed below, and indicate how much effort and trust you think each behavior would require.

1. Read an informational flier describing the situation facing Wallonians in America.
   ___ Effort (0 – 9) ___ Trust (0 – 9)

2. Volunteer to give a brief speech at an orientation meeting for Wallonians.
   ___ Effort (0 – 9) ___ Trust (0 – 9)

3. Speak up if you see a shopkeeper or street vendor cheating Wallonians out of correct change for purchases.
   ___ Effort (0 – 9) ___ Trust (0 – 9)

4. Donate $5.00 to the cause of orienting Wallonians into United States society.
   ___ Effort (0 – 9) ___ Trust (0 – 9)
5. Offer to write an article advocating Wallonians in your local newspaper.
   ____ Effort (0 – 9)  ____ Trust (0 – 9)

6. Offer to give directions to Wallonians who are obviously lost in your city.
   ____ Effort (0 – 9)  ____ Trust (0 – 9)

7. Help organize a benefit picnic in your community for Wallonians.
   ____ Effort (0 – 9)  ____ Trust (0 – 9)

8. Smile at Wallonians when you see them.
   ____ Effort (0 – 9)  ____ Trust (0 – 9)

9. Volunteer as an English language tutor to Wallonians on weekends.
   ____ Effort (0 – 9)  ____ Trust (0 – 9)

10. Sign a petition to bring the cause of the Wallonians to the attention of your local city council.
    ____ Effort (0 – 9)  ____ Trust (0 – 9)

11. Invite Wallonian children to your home to play with your children (or your younger brothers and sisters).
    ____ Effort (0 – 9)  ____ Trust (0 – 9)

12. Invite a family (or families) of Wallonians to your home for a weekend barbeque.
    ____ Effort (0 – 9)  ____ Trust (0 – 9)

13. Participate in a parade or march to advocate tolerance for Wallonians.
    ____ Effort (0 – 9)  ____ Trust (0 – 9)

14. Offer to host Wallonians in your home for a month while they become accustomed to life in the United States.
    ____ Effort (0 – 9)  ____ Trust (0 – 9)
15. Campaign for legislation designed to benefit Wallonians.
   ____Effort (0 – 9)  ____Trust (0 – 9)

16. Introduce Wallonians to your personal friends.
   ____Effort (0 – 9)  ____Trust (0 – 9)

17. Offer to give rides to Wallonians in your personal car.
   ____Effort (0 – 9)  ____Trust (0 – 9)

18. Vote in support of social policies designed to benefit Wallonians.
   ____Effort (0 – 9)  ____Trust (0 – 9)

19. Volunteer to act as a city services tour guide for Wallonians.
   ____Effort (0 – 9)  ____Trust (0 – 9)

20. Hold doors open for Wallonians who are carrying heavy loads.
    ____Effort (0 – 9)  ____Trust (0 – 9)

21. Offer to jump a car for Wallonians who are stranded on the side of the road.
    ____Effort (0 – 9)  ____Trust (0 – 9)

22. Offer to help Wallonians dig out cars from underneath snow drifts in the winter.
    ____Effort (0 – 9)  ____Trust (0 – 9)
Questionnaire B: Guttman Scales of Helping Behavior

Please check in the space next to the items below if you’d be willing to engage in the following behaviors.

I.  Effort

_____ Hold doors open for Wallonians carrying heavy loads.

_____ Offer to give directions to lost Wallonians.

_____ Invite Wallonians to a weekend barbeque at your home.

_____ Speak up if you see a Wallonian being cheated by a shopkeeper.

_____ Help organize a benefit picnic in the community for Wallonians.

Please check in the space next to the items below if you’d be willing to engage in the following behaviors.

II. Trust

_____ Read an informational flier describing the situation of Wallonians in America.

_____ Donate $5.00 to helping Wallonians orient to Chicago.

_____ Participate in a parade or march to advocate tolerance for Wallonians.

_____ Introduce Wallonians to your personal friends.

_____ Offer to host Wallonians in home for a month.
Questionnaire C: Demographic Questions

Please respond to the following demographic questions below.

1. What is your age? ________

2. What is your gender?
   a. Male
   b. Female

3. What is your ethnicity?
   a. Caucasian
   b. African-American / Black
   c. Asian
   d. Latino/a
   e. Middle Eastern
   f. Other (please indicate): _____________

4. To what extent do you perceive your family to be immigrants to America?

   1  2  3  4  5  6  7
   Not at all  Very Much

   1  2  3  4  5  6  7
   Not at all  Very Much
Questionnaire D: Perspective-Taking Instructions

Instructions:

This research is part of an effort to get student input regarding American society’s reactions to groups of incoming immigrants. Due to political and economic circumstances, United States demographers are predicting waves of immigration in the next few years from an ethnic group outside of our borders that call themselves the Wallonians. Several hundred Wallonians have already arrived in the United States, and the government is interested in the experiences that they’ve had so far.

(Participants who will take the perspectives of groups as a whole will read one of the two following paragraphs, depending on experimental condition):

Condition 1: Group Empathy Condition:

We would like for you to read about a recent experience that a group of Wallonians had in Chicago. While you are reading the description, try to imagine how the Wallonians feel about what has happened to them as a group, and how it affects their lives. Try to feel the full impact of what the Wallonians have been through and how they feel as a result. The description that follows has been translated from the Wallonian’s native language.

Condition 2: Superordinate Empathy Condition:

We would like for you to read about a recent experience that a group of Wallonians had in Chicago. Since America is a nation of immigrants, all citizens have in common that our ancestors were immigrants into a new country. Because of this commonality, we should all be able to understand the experience of getting used to life in a new country. When reading the description that follows, consider the fact that all Americans (including your ancestors) were immigrants at one time. Think about the experience described below as an example of the difficulties associated with becoming new Americans in general. That is, as you read the statement below, please consider how the Wallonians’ experience is similar to the experiences that face all groups of new Americans. Think about how your own ancestors as well as other past immigrant groups felt as you think about the Wallonians’ experience. While you are reading the description, try to imagine how the Wallonians feel about what has happened to them, and how it affects their lives. Try to feel the full impact of what the Wallonians have been through and how they feel as a result. The description that follows has been translated from the Wallonian’s native language.

(Participants who will take the perspective of individuals will read one of the two following paragraphs, depending on experimental condition):
Condition 3: Individual Empathy Condition:

We would like for you to read about a recent experience that a group of Wallonians had in Chicago. While you are reading the description, try to imagine how the author of the description feels about what has happened to him or her, and how it may have affected his or her life. Try to feel the full impact of what the individual has been through and how he or she feels as a result. The description that follows has been translated from the Wallonian’s native language:

Condition 4: Individual Objective Condition:

We would like for you to read about a recent experience that a group of Wallonians had in Chicago. While you are reading the description, try to be as objective as possible about what has happened to the author. To remain objective, do not let yourself get caught up in imagining what he or she has been through and how he or she feels as a result. Just try to remain detached as you read the description. The description that follows has been translated from the Wallonian’s native language:

(All participants will then read the following scenario):

My friends and I were traveling to see the sights downtown. We were not familiar with Chicago’s bus and train system, and we ended up getting off the train a few stops early. We decided to walk the remaining blocks to reach our destination, but we became extremely lost. We could not make sense of the city maps we had, because we were not familiar enough with English to understand many of the terms. We were quickly overwhelmed by the noise and activity level of the city, and we quickly became disoriented and confused. It was a very scary experience for us. How will we ever adjust to life in this city?
Questionnaire E: Empathic Concern

Participants will indicate the extent to which they experienced the following emotions on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I felt sympathetic.</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I felt softhearted.</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I felt warm.</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I felt compassionate.</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. I felt tender.</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. I felt moved.</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
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<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Questionnaire F: Personal Distress Scale

Participants will indicate the extent to which they experienced the following emotions on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely):

1. Alarmed
2. Troubled
3. Distressed
4. Upset
5. Disturbed

Questionnaire G: Procedural Justice-Helping Behaviors

All items will be measured on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 9 (extremely).

1. How likely are you to vote in support of social policies designed to protect the rights of Wallonians?

2. How likely are you to sign a petition to bring the cause of the Wallonians to the attention of your local city council?

3. How likely are you to campaign for legislation designed to protect the rights of Wallonians?

4. How likely are you to volunteer your time to raise money for a town hall meeting where Wallonians can express their concerns?

5. How likely are you to support policies that take the perspective of the Wallonians into account?

6. How likely are you to support community decisions that haven’t considered the voices of the Wallonians?

7. How likely are you to support equal representation for Wallonians in community decision-making?
Questionnaire H: Group Identification

All items will be measured on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 9 (extremely).

Group Attraction

1. How much do you like the Wallonians?
2. How much would you like to socialize with the Wallonians?
3. How much would you like to take a class with members of the Wallonians?
4. How much would you like to discuss issues with the Wallonians?

Group/Self Similarity

1. How similar are members of the Wallonians to people who are important to you?
2. How similar are members of the Wallonians to you?
Questionnaire I: Inclusion of Other in Self Scales

1. **Self / Wallonians overlap.**

Instructions: Please circle the figure that best describes how you see the Wallonians in relation to yourself.

2. **Self / American overlap**

Instructions: Please circle the figure that best describes how you see Americans in relation to yourself.

3. **American / Wallonian overlap**

Instructions: Please circle the figure that best describes how you see the Wallonians in relation to Americans.
REFERENCE LIST


versus no power in social decision making. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 95, 1136-1149.


VITA

Elizabeth Jacobs was born and raised in Greeley, Colorado. Before attending Loyola University Chicago, she attended San Diego State University, where she earned a Master of Arts degree in psychology in 2005 under the supervision of Dr. Radmila Prislin. Her graduate work in San Diego earned her the Rebecca Bryson-Kissinger memorial award for outstanding master’s thesis. Prior to that, Elizabeth earned her Bachelor of Arts in psychology in 2002 from the University of Northern Colorado, where she was named a department scholar in 2001.

At Loyola University Chicago, Elizabeth works directly with Dr. R. Scott Tindale on various projects involving small group performance and decision-making. Since the spring of 2009, she has been teaching research methods and statistics for Loyola. Outside of the university, she has worked as a freelance statistical and methodological consultant for the Erikson Institute, as well as for several other independent clients in the Chicago area.

Currently, Elizabeth is still teaching statistics and research methods for Loyola and working with Dr. R. Scott Tindale on multiple manuscripts and research projects.