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Expertise, Democratic Values, and Tolerance

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ABSTRACT

Political tolerance (the willingness to extend civil liberties to disliked groups) has been disturbingly low among the American public since measurement of tolerance began in the 1950's. The few voters who do exhibit tolerant attitudes tend to be people who know a great deal about politics (i.e. people high in "political expertise"). Researchers have theorized many explanations for why political experts are more tolerant on average; for example, experts may place more value on the legal and normative 'rules' of democracy (i.e. "democratic norms"), which guarantee free speech, or they may consider democratic norms to be more important than non-experts do, or some other related mechanism may drive the effect. While many explanations for this link between expertise and tolerance have been suggested, none have been directly tested in empirical research.

The present dissertation represents the first set of studies examining how political expertise promotes political tolerance. Three studies will examine possible mechanisms: study one will examine the role of explicit support for democratic norms and perceived importance of such norms; study two will examine the accessibility of democratic values; and study three will examine implicit support for democratic values. Interactions between these predictors will also be tested a priori (for example, not only will explicit support and importance of democratic norms be examined individually,

the interaction of the two will also be analyzed as a mechanism). These studies will inform future theory and experimental research on the causes of (and contributors to) tolerance, and will inform policy recommendations on how to increase tolerance in a generally intolerant public.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Overview

The present studies will examine the relationship between political expertise and political tolerance, and will examine several possible underlying mechanisms for the oft-demonstrated effect of expertise on tolerance. First, this paper will briefly define political tolerance and provide a review of landmark political tolerance studies and findings, will outline the political psychological literature on key predictors of tolerance, including political expertise, and will discuss the role of democratic norms and values in the development and endorsement of tolerance. Further, this paper will suggest several possible underlying mechanisms or mediators of the effect of expertise on political tolerance: endorsement of democratic norms, accessibility of democratic norms, internalization of democratic norms, and democratic norms importance. After outlining a theoretical case for why these variables may undergird the relationship between expertise and tolerance, this paper will propose a series of three studies testing all four simple mediational pathways, as well as three moderated mediational models, each of which tests mediation by the interaction between two of the aforementioned mediators. Survey methods, proposed statistical treatments, and potential implications of this research will be discussed.

Political Tolerance: Background

"I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." This absolute-free-speech sentiment, first reportedly expressed by Voltaire (1770), has long been held as a democratic ideal of paramount importance (Jefferson, 1944; Prothro & Grigg, 1960; McClosky, 1964; Mill, 1869). In reality, most Americans are not willing to fight and die for unpopular speech; indeed they will not even tacitly allow controversial public displays and protests (Stouffer, 1955). This disparity between ideal and fact was first observed in a landmark political tolerance study by political scientist Samuel Stouffer, and has vexed political theorists and scientists ever since.

In survey and experimental studies, political tolerance is typically defined as "an individual's willingness to permit the expression of ideas or interests one opposes" (Crick, 1973; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1982). Across decades of inquiry and using a variety of dependent measures, political scientists and psychologists have replicated Stouffer's basic finding: the American public is massively intolerant (McClosky & Brill, 1983; Prothro& Grigg, 1960; Sullivan et al, 1982; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). The psychological underpinnings of tolerance (or rather, mass intolerance) thus demand scientific inquiry.

Definition

Political tolerance has historically been defined by political theorists and social scientists alike as individual democratic citizens' willingness to permit or allow civil liberties to be extended to objectionable groups or offensive (but innocuous) ideas

(Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1982; Crick, 1973). While the specific issue of which rights constitute "civil liberties" may vary by country, in the United States tolerance typically refers to civil liberties granted in the First Amendment of the US Constitution, particularly non-religious rights that pertain to freedom of speech and expression (Prothro & Grigg, 1960; McClosky, 1964). These rights include freedom of speech (both literal and symbolic, in the form of attire or behavior), freedom of assembly, freedom to protest the government, freedom of the press, and freedom to petition (U.S. Const. art. I).

In terms of political theory and psychology, political tolerance represents a respect for the procedural norms of the democratic process, as well as belief that the laws of a country should be applied equally to all members of society—including those who are deemed personally repellant. In addition, tolerance represents a willingness to overlook one's initial prejudices against a group or idea, and allow that group or idea to be expressed in the public sphere without suppression—in this way, the expression of tolerance attitudes may be psychologically similar to other forms of effortful bias or prejudice suppression (e.g. Devine, 1989; Lepore& Brown, 2002).

It should also be emphasized, however, that permitting a group to exercise its free speech rights does not imply a change in anti-group attitude on the part of the tolerant individual—in fact, tolerance is almost exclusively defined by the willingness to extend free speech rights in the presence of active distaste for the group or idea being expressed (Sullivan et al, 1982). Sullivan et al (1979) perhaps best expressed this

contingency of tolerance in their landmark book Political Tolerance and American Democracy: “Tolerance implies a willingness to ‘put up with’ those things one rejects or opposes. Politically, it implies a willingness to permit the expression of ideas or interests one opposes.” (p.2).

History of Research on Political Tolerance

The umbrella term “political tolerance” and the academic study of the construct gained intellectual currency in the 1950s, with the publication of Samuel Stouffer’s seminal work, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (1955; Hazama, 2010).In the spring of 1954, Stouffer and colleagues surveyed the tolerance attitudes of a stratified sample of 4,933 United State citizens from wide swathes of the country, including political elites and individuals at all education and SES levels. Respondents were assessed for their general, abstract support for free speech rights, and were then asked whether communists, socialists, and atheists should be permitted to engage in the following free speech acts: teaching in public schools, publishing books to be held in the local libraries, holding public speeches, and working freely at a job in the community.

Stouffer’s results were troubling: while the vast majority of respondents supported the notion of tolerance in the abstract (roughly 90% or more in most groups), a majority denied speech rights to all three target groups (with one-third or fewer providing tolerant responses; Stouffer, 1955). Stouffer noted several factors that appeared to promote tolerance, most of which have been frequently replicated in later studies, using a variety of methods: education, political activism, living in an urban area,

experience with diversity, and political elite status (being either an elected official or a community leader with experience and agency in politics). Of these predictors, Stouffer found the largest effect was that of education, and he considered the effect of education on tolerance to be paramount. Stouffer theorized that education made individuals more tolerant by not only exposing them to a wide variety of diverse ideas (some correct, some not), but also by providing a strong instruction in the norms and values of the democratic system. He theorized that political elites were more tolerant for the same reasons— they experienced high exposure to a variety of perspectives, and had a high incentive to accept and internalize democratic values. Notably, political ideology and party were not strong predictors of tolerance, a pattern that would continue to be replicated in further research.

Stouffer's revelation that the majority of the American public was massively intolerant inspired a flurry of research and concern. McClosky (1964) and Prothro and Grigg (1960) soon replicated Stouffer's general finding that people support equal free speech rights theoretically but blanch once a target group or example of a particular free speech act is provided. Later replications by some of the same researchers found this result again on a new cohort of respondents (McClosky & Brill, 1983). Research also replicated all of Stouffer's key predictors of greater tolerance, particularly the value of education and political involvement and expertise (Prothro & Grigg, 1960; Jackman, 1972; Nunn et al, 1978). Again, regardless of ideology or partisanship, people who were

engaged and knowledgeable about politics were vastly more likely to provide a tolerant response, as were the more educated.

Seeing the link between education and political knowledge and tolerance, Stouffer (1955) anticipated that, as educational opportunities increased for younger generations, so too would tolerance for objectionable groups. Seeking to test this hypothesis, Davis (1975) analyzed survey data collected by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) in 1972 and found significantly higher tolerance from Stouffer's original sample. Nunn et al (1978) reported similar increases in tolerance (while again replicating the effects of education and political elitehood) several years later, using another NORC survey. Several other political scientists reported similar apparent increases in tolerance across this period (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996).

However, despite increases in education for younger cohorts, both Nunn et al (1978) and Davis (1975) found increased tolerance across all cohort groups, including older adults and individuals with less education. Lawrence (1976) criticized this apparent maturational effect by noting a clear problem in all prior studies' use of a limited number of target groups: since Stouffer (1955), every tolerance researcher had examined tolerance for communists, socialists, and atheists, and attitudes towards those target groups had shifted in the past two decades. A new method of measuring tolerance was desperately needed.

Trends in Measurement of Tolerance

All large-scale studies of political tolerance from Stouffer's (1955) to Nunn et al (1978) used the same target groups for all participants (communists, socialists, and atheists). All three target groups were liberal in ideology, and were rapidly becoming more accepted by society during the period that tolerance was observed to "increase". Thus, Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1982) set out to formulate a new measure of political tolerance that would be ideology-neutral and responsive to the attitudes of the individual survey taker.

Sullivan et al (1982) argued that granting free speech rights to a group only qualified as political tolerance in cases where the target group was actually disliked. Thus, asking a far-left voter if he or she would allow a "socialist" to speak might frequently be meaningless as a measure of tolerance, since the voter might have no hatred for the socialist or socialist messages that needed to be suppressed in order to provide a tolerant response. At the very least, individuals are more likely to provide a tolerant response to a target group they only mildly dislike when compared to a group they like least of all (Gibson, 1985). Theoretically, a 'tolerant' response is typically considered to only be possible when the target group (or speech) in question is distasteful to the voter, otherwise speech isn't being *permitted* or *tolerated* so much as passively accepted (see Gibson, 1992). Thus, if public opinion on Stouffer's target groups changed over time (which it demonstrably did; Sullivan et al, 1982) to the point where socialists, communists, and atheists were no longer strongly reviled, the existing

tolerance measure could not be said to be truly capturing tolerance, particularly if there remained another, unexamined target group to which participants would provide a less tolerant response than they provided for Stouffer's groups (Gibson, 2005). Furthermore, all of Stouffer's (1955) target groups were left-leaning, inserting an ideological bias into the measure that could lead to more apparently intolerant responses in conservatives. One previous study (Herson & Hofstetter, 1975) had attempted to correct for this bias by asking participants about the free speech rights of one left-wing and one right-wing group, but Sullivan et al (1982) instead proposed that it was necessary to ensure that respondents actively disliked the target group they were being asked about before tolerance could be meaningfully assessed.

Hence, Sullivan et al (1982) created perhaps the most frequently-used measure of political tolerance, the content-controlled measure of tolerance, which remains in use today. In this measure, participants are able to select their own target group, using what the authors called the least-liked procedure: participants are provided with a list of groups in politics that are frequently disliked, and are instructed to select the one they like the least. The subsequent tolerance question stems are then filled in to the survey item stems, to make the survey items pertain to the group that the participant selected (e.g. "Members of the _____ should be banned from holding public office."). The possible least-liked groups range from the KKK to pro- and anti-abortionists, to fascists and communists, and participants are permitted to select an alternate group that is unlisted as well.

Using this measure, Sullivan et al (1979, 1982) found that tolerance had not, in fact, increased since the 1950s; when ensuring that the target group was one respondents strongly disliked, the majority of the American public remained intolerant. Research using this measure also replicated many of Stouffer and others' findings regarding the factors that predicted tolerance: expertise, acceptance of democratic norms, education, and political involvement all predicted tolerance, whereas ideology did not, for example. The validity of Sullivan et al's (1982) measure became widely apparent and was adopted by many others soon after. This measure of political tolerance has since been used in a wide variety of survey and experimental studies, and is frequently used in contemporary research.

Popular alternatives to Sullivan et al's (1982) content-controlled measure of political tolerance include Gibson and Bingham's (1982) measure, as well as the tolerance for diversity items in the World Values Survey (WVS) and the tolerance items in the annual General Social Survey (GSS). Since all three measures are also frequently used in the tolerance literature, they merit some discussion. Rather than controlling the content of questions to ensure that the target group is one the respondent dislikes (and using that target group throughout), Gibson and Bingham's (1982) questions present respondents with a variety of civil liberties scenarios, with target groups that differ item-by-item(e.g. "A radio station, which permits the reading of an anti-Semitic poem over the air should have its FCC license revoked."), with some items specifying no target group whatsoever (e.g. "In their fight against crime the police should be entitled to use

wiretaps and other devices for listening in on private conversations."). This measure, then, may be closer to Stouffer's original "abstract" measures, which probe for general, notional support for tolerance more so than actual tolerance in practice. However, tolerance research using this measure has frequently replicated the same pattern of results found using alternate measures, including those of Stouffer (1955) and Sullivan et al (1982): the key constructs that typically predict tolerance (education, political expertise, support for democratic norms, and so on) do so regardless of measure (see Gibson, 1992, for an extensive review; Bobo & Licari, 1989).

In addition to the Gibson and Bingham (1982) and Sullivan et al (1982) measures, tolerance is assessed slightly differently in the World Value Survey and the General Social Survey. First, it should be noted that while the WVS is a widely-distributed international survey administered to an immensely wide swathe of people living in a variety of cultures, social-economic strata, and governmental systems, its definition of tolerance is too lax to be useful for the typical researcher examining political tolerance in a developed or longstanding democracy. The WVS's tolerance questions ask respondents, for example, if homosexuality is ever "justified" (with options of "always justified", "sometimes justified", "rarely justified", and "never justified"; Corneo& Jeanne, 2009). Similar questions exist for racial minorities and people of religions that differ from the respondent. In this way, while the WVS may be a very fruitful measure for those studying general tolerance for diversity in developing nations, its utility is

limited for those who are interested in studying tolerance that goes beyond the mere right for a target group to exist.

The General Social Survey, however, operationalizes tolerance in a manner more similar to Stouffer's (1955) framework and is useful as a point of comparison with other measures used in the US and Western Europe. The GSS uses an eighteen-item measure of tolerance, which inquires about the rights of six target groups (communists, atheists, homosexuals, militarists, Muslims, and racists) and three free speech rights (the right to hold a public speech, the right to teach a college, and the right to place books in the library; Davis, 1975; Postic,2011). These tolerance items have been collected on a stratified sample of the American public annually since 1975, and while some of the target groups are rapidly becoming irrelevant (e.g., most people support free speech for LGBT people), the general pattern of results has consistently held, and confers with the findings reported using other methods: education, political elite status, political expertise, and support for democratic values all positively predict tolerance, regardless of target group (Gibson, 1992; Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Chandler & Tsai, 2001).

Key Determinants of Tolerance

It is clear that across a variety of measures, a number of common trends in political tolerance can be consistently found (Gibson, 1992). In developing and presenting a theoretical framework of tolerance and its most fundamental determinants, it is useful to review these landmark predictors, some of which will be included in the present set of studies. The key, frequently-replicated determinants of

tolerance can be grouped into two subcategories: predictors or determinants of tolerance that deal with the respondent's attitudes toward the target group (i.e. the group being either tolerated or not tolerated), and predictors that have to deal with the psychological or political traits of the survey respondent him or herself.

Target-group-based determinants of tolerance. As the work of Sullivan et al (1982) made clear, much of what determines whether a survey respondent will provide a tolerant or intolerant judgment depends on the respondent's feelings about the target group. Under most contemporary theoretical frameworks of political tolerance, a tolerant judgment can only be made when the target group is hated or disliked by the individual responding; however, in the presence of such target-group hatred the majority of individuals are demonstrably intolerant (see Kuklinski et al., 1992 & 1993, for related evidence). The respondents' relationship to the target group is thus a strong predictor of tolerance in and of itself. Since Sullivan et al's landmark book introducing the least-liked tolerance procedure, many tolerance researchers have examined various other aspects pertaining to how an individual feels about the target group whose civil liberties are being discussed, and have found several recurring strong predictors.

Magnitude of dislike or hatred of group. First, the intensity with which a person hates the target group is a strong predictor of their level of tolerance for the group. While Sullivan et al (1982) and all researchers using Sullivan et al's least-liked measure of tolerance could be certain that the target group whose civil liberties were being judged was, in fact, disliked by the respondent, there are still observable individual

differences in the degree to which the respondent hates the target group. Sullivan et al (1982) even found an effect of level of dislike on tolerance in their initial spate of studies, with more hate predicting higher intolerance. Gibson (1992; 1989b) asked participants about their tolerance for not only their least-liked group, but their second, third and fourth least-liked groups, and found that there was far greater intolerance for the more intensely disliked targets. In addition, the more a target group is seen as a violator of social mores and norms, the less tolerant respondents typically are of that group's free speech rights (Marcus et al, 1995; Gibson & Gouws, 2003).

Threatingness of group. Another strong determinant of individuals' political tolerance judgments is their perception of the target group as a social (rather than personal) threat. The more a political group is perceived to challenge society's values or pose a risk to the public or to the respondents' way of life, the more likely the respondent is to provide an intolerant response (Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Huddy et al, 2005; Shamir, 1991; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Davis & Silver, 2004; Sullivan et al, 1993). This may even explain, in part, why tolerance for Stouffer's original target groups has increased over time: people have become more comfortable with communists, socialists, and atheists in a post-Red Scare, post-Berlin wall era where these groups are not looming specters. Similarly, Davis and Silver (2004) demonstrated that respondents were less tolerant of target groups when the target groups were framed as societal threats; personal threat did not influence tolerance in this case. Outside of the United States, McIntosh et al (2005) reported that a key determinant of tolerance for

Bulgarians and Romanians was respondents' perception of the target groups (ethnic minority groups in the region) as threatening to the majority and to the homeland. Sullivan et al (1982) also noted that the target groups toward which respondents were the most intolerant were those that actively advocated violence and rebellion, or had a history of participating in violent and revolutionary acts, which could be presumed to contribute to how threatening a least-liked group is perceived to be.

Political power or influence of group. In addition to participants' dislike of the target group and their perceptions of the target group as dangerous to society, another crucial target-based determinant of tolerance is whether the target has the potential for political influence. In a dissertation examining differences in tolerance across multiple nations, Hutchinson (2007) noted that one international predictor of tolerance was the influence the target group had over the nation's existing political structures; in nations where strongly disliked groups had the actual potential of overtaking the government or being elected into office, respondents were far less tolerant of those groups' civil liberties. In addition, some research demonstrates that tolerance is lower for disliked groups that have actually been elected into office (or have access to channels of political influence) than for disliked groups that pose an external social threat and have little power (Shamir 1991; Gibson and Gouws 2003; but see Marcus et al, 1995).

Again, this makes sense in light of Sullivan et al's (1982) findings, as well as the illusory increases in tolerance for Stouffer's target groups. First, Sullivan et al (1979, 1982) found the highest tolerance levels among participants who selected the John

Birch Society and fascists. These groups had no actionable political influence at the time of the authors' studies; so much so that it was (and is) hard to fathom members of such groups being elected to office or swaying public opinion. Therefore, the actual sociotropic risks posed by such groups expressing their views in the public sphere are relatively small. Similarly, tolerance has increased for Stouffer's (1955) target groups (communists, socialists, and atheists) as fear of communism and the international political influence of communism has decreased. Thus, tolerance is not only influenced by how strongly a respondent hates the group being considered, or by how distasteful or threatening the group's views are, but also by whether the group has any true influence on society or politics.

Respondent-based determinants of tolerance. Survey and experimental research has also consistently revealed a number of predictors of tolerance that occur at the respondent level. These predictors have been replicated in numerous political tolerance studies using a variety of sampling methods and measures, including the least-liked measure of political tolerance as well as more general measures such as the GSS, Gibson and Bingham's (1982), and the world value survey. Respondent-based determinants of tolerance include psychological and personality trait variables that are relatively unchanging within participants (such as authoritarianism), as well as social and experiential trait variables that can alter with life experience or across development (such as education or political involvement).

Psychological trait variables. Survey and experimental research has outlined a bevy of personality factors that influence how readily a person tolerates groups they find abhorrent. Among personality factors, low self-esteem, high neuroticism and low openness to experience have all been linked to low political tolerance (Marcus et al, 1995, Sullivan et al, 1982). Other individual differences such as authoritarianism have also been linked to tolerance, with more authoritarian and right-wing authoritarian participants displaying far less tolerance than average (Gibson, 1987; Adorno et al, 1950; Stouffer, 1955; McCloskey and Brill, 1983; Peffley and Sigelman, 1990; Feldman 2003, 2005). A variety of situational threat manipulations have also demonstrably lowered individuals' political tolerance (Chanley, 1994; Theiss-Morse, 1993).

Political elite status. Political elites and individuals who hold political office are more tolerant than members of the mass public (McClosky, 1964; McClosky & Brill, 1983; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Nunn et al, 1978; Stouffer, 1955). Samuel Stouffer hypothesized that people who were involved in politics were better informed about society's core democratic values than average, and were more motivated to uphold them. As a result, such elites were capable of pausing and taking a "sober second thought" when faced with an objectionable group; he argued that this thoughtful pause afforded elites greater tolerance (Stouffer, 1955). With this argument Stouffer essentially suggested that tolerance judgments were psychologically similar to other forms of bias correction (Devine, 1989; Wegener &Petty, 2001; Lepore& Brown, 2002). In addition, Sullivan and colleagues (1993) have found evidence that political elite status

predicts increased tolerance in several multi-national samples (including the U.S., Great Britain, and New Zealand; this appears to be true in Israeli samples as well; Sullivan et al 1985, Gibson, 1998) and are less likely to exhibit "slippage" from abstract support for civil liberties to support for the rights of specific targets (Sullivan & Transue, 1999).

Patriotism. A large body of research on national pride demonstrates that extreme levels of national pride (in the form of nationalism) can lead to intolerance in the form of outgroup derogation, outgroup hostility, and prejudice (Van Evera, 1994;Feshbach, 1994; Blank & Schmidt, 1993, 1997; Kosterman Feshbach, 1989). Patriotism, however, is a level of more modest (but not low) national pride, and is associated with commitment to maintaining the group's standards, including increased commitment to democratic values and maintenance of group standards (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, &Wetherell, 1987; Brewer, 1999; 2009 Noelle-Neumann & Kocher, 1987; Topf, Mohler, Heath, &Trompeter, 1990).

Participation and activism. Another robust finding in the political tolerance literature is that activists and people who participate frequently in politics are more tolerant than members of the mass public (McClosky, 1964; McClosky & Brill, 1983; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Nunn et al, 1978; Stouffer, 1955). Samuel Stouffer hypothesized that people who were involved in politics were better informed about society's core democratic values than average, and were more motivated to uphold them. As a result, such elites were capable of pausing and taking a "sober second thought" when faced with an objectionable group; he argued that this thoughtful pause

afforded elites greater tolerance (Stouffer, 1955). With this argument Stouffer essentially suggested that tolerance judgments were psychologically similar to other forms of bias correction (Devine, 1989; Wegener & Petty, 2001; Lepore& Brown, 2002). Stouffer's sample did in fact find that higher levels of political involvement and engagement promoted tolerance (1955); more recent research by Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) provides even stronger support for the positive relationship between involvement and tolerance, particularly for unconventional forms of participation (such as protesting) that require the exercise of civil liberties to express dissent, in contrast to more conventional and uncontested forms of participation (such as voting).

Education. One possible reason that elites, experts, and activists are more tolerant is that they tend to be better-educated (Sullivan et al, 1982). Controlling for political involvement, more years of education typically spell greater tolerance (Prothro & Grigg, 1960; Sniderman, 1984). Noting this pattern in his data, Stouffer hypothesized the mediating role of diversity of experience: the educated have more exposure to a variety of individuals, he argued, and through this exposure learn how to peacefully coexist with different others. This explanation for elite tolerance has generally not held over time, however—political knowledge and experience have been found to be highly confounded with education, instead (Sullivan et al, 1982; Bobo & Licari, 1989). Relatedly, an international study by Duch and Gibson (1992) suggested that education does not always promote greater tolerance; Zaller (1992) explained these findings by

positing that education only furnishes tolerance when it provides students with contact to unfamiliar groups and views (and thus that mere gains in cognitive ability or general knowledge are not sufficient to boost tolerance). Several alternate hypothesis accounting for the relationship between education and tolerance remain in need of testing, particularly the hypothesis that both political elite status and education increase commitment to democratic norms, which may itself lead to a more absolute-free-speech, tolerant view (McClosky & Brill, 1983; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Nunn et al, 1978).In developing Eastern European countries, increases in education over the past twenty years has not brought with it related increases in tolerance (Hodson et al, 1994; Coenders & Scheepers, 2003), which researchers have interpreted as a sign that democratic values must first permeate through the cultural and educational system and be broadly accepted before education can prompt tolerance (see below for more on the influence of democratic values).

Expertise. One of the most robust and oft-replicated findings in the political tolerance literature is that individuals who are highly informed and sophisticated in the realm of politics are far more likely to express tolerance (Cacioppo et al, 1996; Zaller, 1990; Krosnick, 1990; Golebiowska, 1999; Price & Ottati, 2012). Relatedly, Duch and Gibson (1992) and others (Powell, 1986; Lijphart, 1968) also note that individuals high in political sophistication (a construct highly related to, and probably synonymous with, political expertise; Lawrence, 2003; Delli-Karpini& Keeter, 1993; Krosnick, 1990) are higher in tolerance as well. This tendency for political experts to be tolerant appears to

be ingrained: Marcus et al (1995) call political expertise a "predisposition" to tolerance, and expert tolerance may even be relatively automatic (see Price & Ottati, 2012; Hazama, 2010). In fact, one of the frequently-presented explanations for why political elite status (and political involvement) predicts tolerance is because the politically elite have a greater knowledge of politics and the "rules of the game" overall (Sullivan et al, 1993; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Jackman (1978), in a reanalysis of Stouffer's original data noted that most of the difference between elite and nonelite respondents on tolerance could be accounted for by differences in political knowledge (Sullivan et al, 1993).

Knowledge about politics seems to lead individuals to have greater respect for equal protection of civil liberties regardless of group. This may occur because political experts have greater support for democratic values; alternatively, this may occur because democratic values are more accessible to experts than novices when forming a tolerance judgment, because experts have internalized democratic values to a greater degree, or because they consider democratic values to be more important than novices do, and thereby assign it more weight when forming their decision (Krosnick, 1990; McClosky & Brill, 1983; see below for a more complete list). The exact nature of the mechanism by which experts are more tolerant than novices has been frequently theorized but hasn't been directly tested, though many theorize that political experts' higher support for democratic values is involved (Stouffer,1955; McClosky, 1964; McClosky & Brill, 1983; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Nunn et al, 1978; Price & Ottati, 2012).

Support for democratic norms and values. Research on political tolerance suggests that commitment to democratic norms (hereafter used interchangeably with "support for democratic values"), predicts tolerance for disliked groups (Bobo & Licari, 1989; Gibson, 1993).Support for democratic norms theoretically includes the following: support for democracy as the ideal governmental system, support for procedural fairness, equality under the law, and support for pluralistic representation (Hutchinson, 2007; Sullivan et al, 1982; Sniderman, 1996).Sniderman (1996) argues that support for democratic values is similar theoretically to the 'abstract' tolerance measured by Stouffer's (1955) group-free measures. However, he and others (e.g. Hutchinson, 2007; Peffley et al, 2001) also argue that support for democratic values and tolerance are themselves distinct constructs despite this overlap, as support for democratic values reflects general philosophical respect for the "rules of the [political] game", whereas political tolerance is the ability to actually uphold these rules in the most difficult (and specific) instances. To clarify, Sniderman (1996) refers to intolerance as a 'failure' to *apply* democratic norms to the question of whether a particular group has the right to engage in a particular form of speech. Thus, support for democratic norms can be seen as a necessary but insufficient condition for tolerance: it helps explain and predict tolerance, but is not synonymous with tolerance, as many individuals who support democratic values in the abstract do not uphold it consistently when provided specifics.

While they are related but distinct concepts, support for democratic values is among the strongest and most consistently-observed predictors of tolerance

(Hutchinson, 2007; Sullivan et al, 1982, Gibson, 1996; 1998; Gibson and Gouws, 2003; Marcus et al 1995; and Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003). This effect holds in international samples as well (Duch and Gibson, 1992). The relationship between support for democratic norms and political tolerance has also been found using a variety of measures of tolerance, both 'least-liked' and otherwise, indicating a robust effect (Gibson, 1992; Sullivan et al, 1985). Some evidence suggests that people who support democratic values are also more likely to maintain tolerance consistently (Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Lawrence, 1976; Sullivan et al, 1982; Gibson & Bingham, 1983; McClosky & Brill, 1983; Gibson 1987; 1992). Choosing to tolerate the views of a despised group inherently involves a tradeoff between values, and pits democratic norms against practical concerns such as cost, political correctness, and safety (Hutchinson, 2007; Sullivan et al, 1982). Since tolerance judgments involve such a plentitude of competing considerations, reminding participants of the possible negative consequences of free speech (e.g. riots, political influence, public offense) can frequently make them less tolerant (see, e.g. Kuklinski et al 1991; 1993). However, survey respondents who strongly support democratic norms are far less likely to make this tradeoff, and hence are the most likely to remain resolutely tolerant, even in the face of a truly hated or potentially dangerous group, or even a prime that makes riots and dangerous consequences more accessible (Nelson et al, 1997).

Not surprisingly, support for democratic values is associated with political expertise, and may even account for the oft-noted relationship between expertise and

tolerance (Radin, 2006; Jones, 1979). The exact nature of the relationship between democratic values, political expertise, and tolerance currently remain unknown and untested, however, and make up the fundamental question of the present set of studies. The impact of democratic values on tolerance may even help account for the relationship between political elite status and tolerance, as political elites are more likely to value the governmental processes of which they are a part, and are more likely to see themselves and democratic standard-bearers (Stouffer, 1955; Gibson & Bingham, 1983; Gibson, 1987; Lawrence, 1976; McClosky & Brill, 1983). Elites and activists generally have high commitment to democratic norms, and may therefore appear more tolerant than non-elites because their attitudes toward civil liberties are more accessible than their attitudes toward disliked groups or their fear of negative consequences of tolerance (Marcus et al, 1995; Sullivan et al, 1982). Further, political elite status and political expertise are often seen and analyzed as similar constructs in the political tolerance literature (as elites are more likely to be experts and vice-versa; Zaller, 1990; Krosnick, 1990; Golebiowska, 1999), and it stand to reason that both high political status and high political knowledge bring with them a strong commitment to the values of the political system.

Expertise, Democratic Values, and Tolerance

Political expertise and support for democratic values are among the two most significant and frequently-replicated predictors of political tolerance. In addition, these two constructs' respective influences on tolerance have often been hypothesized to be related in some way (typically using language suggestive of mediation), though this relationship has never been tested. Sullivan and Transue (1999) state the fundamentality of these two predictors well: "In general, political experts exhibit higher levels of applied tolerance than do political novices, and in all cases, strong beliefs in democratic values constrain citizens to be more tolerant in practical situations." (p.635). Political experts are hypothesized to have greater knowledge of (and support for) the political "rules of the game" than nonexperts, who are by definition less familiar with democratic laws and concepts such as procedural fairness; Thus, political experts may be more tolerant than novices because they have greater support for democratic values (Jones, 1979; Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan et al, 1979). In addition, however, political experts may be more likely to enter democratic values into consideration when forming a tolerance judgment, in part because of their greater knowledge and familiarity of political issues—in which case, the relationship between expertise and tolerance may be accounted for by the increased accessibility of democratic norms amongst experts (Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Price & Ottati, 2012). Further, experts may have more rehearsed, 'automatic' (or implicit) support for democratic norms than novices, again due to knowing and thinking a great deal more about politics than novices, and experts'

implicit attitude of democratic values support may explain their high tolerance (for a related argument see Price & Ottati, 2012). Finally, political experts may assign more importance to democratic values, relative to novices (who may assign greater importance to other factors, such as their attitude toward the target group), and thus are more tolerant as a result. The exact mechanism by which tolerance, political expertise, and support for democratic values are related is unclear at this point. Since expertise and democratic values are two of the central predictors of tolerance, and since their relationship has been hypothesized but not tested to date, these possible mediational pathways are overdue for study.

Possible Mechanisms for the Relationship Between Expertise and Tolerance

The relationship between expertise and tolerance has been frequently noted, but theoretical explanations for the relationship have been presented without being subject to any empirical testing. Many of the underlying proposed mechanisms for the link between expertise and political tolerance involves the influence of democratic values support, though these proposed relationships have also been left unexplored. The possibility that democratic norm support mediates the relationship between expertise and tolerance is especially in need of testing, as it has been proposed theoretically by numerous researchers but left unexplored (Marcus et al, 1995; Sniderman, 1975; Golebiowska, 1999) and since it is clear that democratic norm support and expertise are in fact correlated (Golebiowska, 1999).

However, support for a set of values could mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance by several methods: for example, explicit value support might not be as strong a predictor of tolerance (or as strong a mediator of the relationship between expertise and tolerance) as implicit support for democratic values. Alternatively, support for democratic values itself might not by the true key predictor of tolerance; it may be more important to examine whether or not a respondent actually considers democratic values *at all* when forming a tolerance judgment (in which case the accessibility of democratic values may be the mediator, not support). Finally, the relationship between expertise and tolerance might be mediated instead by the importance individuals place on democratic values. This paper will examine several possible mechanisms for the relationship between expertise and tolerance, all involving mediation by constructs related to democratic values.

Support for democratic values. First, the relationship between expertise and tolerance may be mediated by explicit support for democratic norms and values. In other words, experts simply support the procedural "rules of the game" at a greater rate than non-experts, and are more tolerant as a result. This relationship was intimated by many tolerance researchers (Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan et al, 1982), but was first explicitly stated as a mediational relationship by Sniderman (1975), who proposed that political experts were more supportive of the norms and values of the democratic system, by virtue of their greater knowledge and greater attachment to the realm of politics, and that this was responsible for their greater willingness to allot free speech rights to

groups they found despicable. Golebiowska (1999) found some preliminary support for this, though she did not test the mediation effect directly: female respondents were found to be less tolerant as a result of lower commitment to democratic norms and lower political expertise, and the possibility that the latter mediated the relationship of the former was presented but was not within the scope of her research. It is high time, then, for research to directly examine whether explicit endorsement of democratic values mediates the link between expertise and tolerance.

Accessibility of democratic values. A great deal of research suggests that forming a tolerance judgment is usually a relatively automatic process, similar perhaps to bias correction (e.g. Devine, 1989), that occurs without much conscious cognitive appraisal of competing tradeoffs and considerations (e.g. Kuklinski et al, 1991, 1993; Price & Ottati, 2012). While it may be normatively ideal for a voter to consider many factors when forming a tolerance judgment (such as the consequences of the speech, democratic norms, attitudes toward the target group, and the consequences of speech repression, to name a few), most people instead form swift, knee-jerk decisions that are limited in scope and are susceptible to framing and priming effects (Nelson et al, 1997; Shamir & Sullivan, 1983**).** Indeed, political tolerance research involving both framing (Nelson et al, 1997) and motivation (Kuklinski et al, 1991; 1993; Price & Ottati, 2012) indicates that tolerance judgments are quite malleable on the basis of which factors respondents are pressed to consider (and which to overlook). This suggests that the key mediator between expertise and tolerance may not be individuals' support for

democratic norms, but rather how readily accessible democratic norms are to individuals in general. Thus, mere support for democratic norms may not be the most useful variable to examine as a mediator of the link between expertise and tolerance; after all, there is a great deal of 'slippage' from abstract support for civil liberties and specific tolerance judgments. Instead, experts may be more tolerant than political novices because democratic norms are more *accessible* when they are forming their appraisals of tolerance. In such case, democratic value accessibility would be expected to mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance rather than mere endorsement of democratic values, as tacit support for democratic values is quite distinct from actually taking that support into consideration when forming a judgment

Implicit support for democratic norms. Some evidence suggests that while explicit support for democratic values may predict tolerance, implicit support of democratic values may explain variance in tolerance more effectively. Experts appear to be tolerant 'automatically', as their responses remain tolerant even when asked to respond to questions while distracted (Price & Ottati, 2012), suggesting that the influence democratic values has on expert tolerance may not be conscious or deliberative; Relatedly, high tolerance appears to occur as a relatively automatic 'knee-jerk', rather than as the result of slow, effortful conscious processing (Kuklinski et al, 1991, 1992). This all implies that while explicit support of democratic values may predict tolerance, implicit democratic values attitudes may explain variance in tolerance more effectively, and may better mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance.

Many individuals who explicitly support democratic values may throw their values out the window when responding to specific tolerance questions involving a reviled target group, or when reminded of competing considerations (such as safety or public outrage). This may dilute the ability of explicit democratic values support to predict tolerance. The very presence of 'slippage' from abstract tolerance to specific (in)tolerance is itself a reflection of the fact that explicit support for democratic values does not always lead to a tolerant response (Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Stouffer, 1955; Peffley & Rohrsnieder, 2003). Further, explicit-reported support for democratic values may be an imperfect reflection of democratic values support, especially considering that most participants are aware of the 'correct', socially desirable response to such questions (e.g. Ganster et al, 1993). The present set of studies will be the first to examine whether political experts have a greater internalized support for democratic values, and will test whether this implicit attitude mediates the expertise-tolerance link.

Greater importance of democratic norms. Finally, experts may be more tolerant than novices simply because they place greater importance on democratic values when assessing tolerance scenarios. Attitude importance is crucial in determining whether an attitude will influence actual behavior, and also helps predict whether an attitude will be susceptible to attempts at persuasion or will influence other attitudes toward related objects (Krosnick, 1988; Boninger et al, 1995). As has already been mentioned, tolerance often involves tradeoffs between numerous values and factors, not all of which are consciously considered by the typical respondent (Kuklinski et al, 1991; 1993). Hence,

general democratic values support may be less useful as a predictor of tolerance than an individuals' explicit rating of the importance of democratic values. If an individual considers democratic freedoms and norms to be paramount, they are likely to consider such values when forming a tolerance judgment, and if they feel democratic values are relatively unimportant they are likely to ignore them, regardless of their level of explicit endorsement. Political experts typically place a great deal of interest and importance on political issues, however, and are probably more likely to consider democratic values relevant (and important) when coming to a decision about tolerance scenarios (Krosnick, 1988). Therefore the present studies will also examine whether individuals' perceived importance of democratic values mediates the link between expertise and tolerance.

Possible interactions/ moderated mediational pathways. In addition, the relationship between expertise and tolerance may be mediated by an interaction between two of the constructs listed above (i.e., a mediational path outlined above may be moderated by another predictor). Three such possible relationships are explored below.

Explicit support and importance of democratic values. The effect of expertise on tolerance might be moderated by the interaction between explicit support for democratic norms and participants' perceived importance of democratic norms. That is, the positive link between expertise and tolerance may only be present among individuals who both support democratic values and consider such values important and

worthy of consideration and "weight" when forming tolerance judgments (e.g. Miller & Krosnick, 2000). Thus, the interaction between support and importance should be examined as a mediator of the expertise-tolerance relationship.

***Explicit support and accessibility of democratic values*.** Similarly, explicit support for democratic values might only influence tolerance when such support is readily accessible (see, for example, work by Iyengar et al, 1982; and Behr & Iyengar, 1985, suggesting that for an issue to influence public opinion, it must be made accessible through media "agenda setting' or some other form of priming that calls the issue to mind; and work by Srull & Wyer, 1979, suggesting that for information to influence a judgment, that information must be readily accessible or made accessible). In this case, the accessibility of democratic values determines whether or not support for democratic values is granted "weight" in tolerance judgments. This effect of accessibility may moderate any mediational path between expertise, support for democratic norms, and tolerance. Accordingly, the possible interaction between explicit support for democratic norms and democratic norms accessibility should be examined as a further mediator of the relationship between expertise and tolerance**.**

Accessibility and implicit support for democratic values. It is a further possibility that the interaction between accessibility of democratic values and implicit support for democratic values might better explain the relationship between expertise and tolerance. Implicit support for democratic values may be a more 'pure' measure of participants' attitudes toward democratic norms, as discussed above; In addition, the

influence of implicit support of democratic norms on tolerance may be moderated by how readily accessible democratic values are to participants. Accordingly, the interaction between accessibility and implicit support should be examined as a mediator of the expertise-tolerance relationship.

CHAPTER TWO

THE PRESENT STUDIES

Overview

While democratic values have long been theorized to be a mediator of the relationship between expertise and tolerance (Sniderman, 1975), this body of research presents the first direct empirical tests of this relationship. Three studies will examine the possible mediational pathways between expertise, democratic values, and tolerance specified above. In each of the three studies, political expertise and tolerance will be assessed; however in each study at least two distinct constructs related to democratic values will be measured and assessed as mediators of the expertise-tolerance relationship, as well as a possible interaction between the two proposed mediators (see below for details). The three studies will examine these potential mediational relationships rather than one large study containing all possible mediators, because with the inclusion of each additional measure it becomes increasingly difficult to order questions in such a manner that one measure does not influence another (particularly implicit measures which might inadvertently prime democratic values or be influenced by explicit measures; see Schwarz, Strack, & Mai 1991; and Schwarz & Hippler, 1995 for a discussion of contrast and assimilation effects resulting from question order).

Study One

Study one will measure political expertise, explicit support for democratic values, importance of democratic norms and political tolerance, to determine whether the relationship between expertise and tolerance is, in fact, mediated by democratic values, importance, or the interaction between the two (see Chapter Five for additional details). Several hypotheses pertaining to these variables will be examined in this study. Direct effects of expertise on political tolerance, democratic values importance, and explicit support for democratic values are anticipated in this study. Additionally, explicit support is expected to significantly predict political tolerance, and democratic values importance is expected to significantly predict political tolerance. In terms of simple (i.e. nonmoderated) mediational effects, it is expected that the effect of expertise on tolerance will be diminished when the effect of explicit democratic values on tolerance is taken into account. Similarly, mediation of the expertise-tolerance effect by democratic values importance will be examined (see Chapter Five for full list of hypotheses in study one).

In addition to these simple mediational models, several moderated mediational pathways will be tested in this study. One moderated mediational model will test whether the expertise-tolerance relationship is mediated by explicit democratic values support, and whether this mediational pathway is moderated by importance of democratic values. Note, here, that importance of democratic values could conceivably moderate two possible relationships in this model: it might moderate the path from

expertise (the IV) to explicit support (the mediator), it might moderate the path from explicit support (the mediator) to political tolerance, or it might moderate both (see Appendix A for a discussion of the statistical difference). All these possibilities will be examined in this study.

Another moderated mediational model will be examined in this study, testing whether importance of democratic values serves as a mediator of the expertise-tolerance relationship, and whether such mediational pathway is moderated by explicit democratic values support. Again, explicit democratic values support could moderate the mediational pathway in multiple ways: first, it might moderate the relationship between expertise (the IV) and importance (the mediator), it might moderate the path from importance (the mediator) to political tolerance (the DV), or it might moderate both. All three possibilities will be examined in this study as well.

Study Two

Study two will measure expertise, explicit democratic values support, and political tolerance using the same methods as study one, but will first examine participants' democratic value accessibility to determine whether the link between expertise and tolerance is mediated by how inclined participants are to consider democratic values without prompting (see Chapter Six for details). Because the novel construct of interest in this study is how readily participants think of democratic values without external prompting, the measurement of accessibility will be implicit. In

addition, the interaction between explicit support for democratic values and the accessibility of democratic values will also be examined as a mediator.

Direct effects of expertise on political tolerance, democratic value accessibility, and explicit support for democratic values are anticipated. In addition, explicit support is expected to significantly predict political tolerance and democratic value accessibility as well. Democratic value accessibility is expected to also significantly predict political tolerance. In terms of simple (i.e. nonmoderated) mediational effects, it is expected that the effect of expertise on tolerance will be diminished when the effect of explicit democratic values on tolerance is taken into account. Similarly, mediation of the expertise-tolerance effect by democratic value accessibility will be examined (see Chapter Six for full list of hypotheses in study two).

In addition to these simple mediational models, several moderated mediational pathways will be tested in this study. One moderated mediational model that will be examined will test whether the expertise-tolerance relationship is mediated by explicit democratic values support, and whether this mediational pathway is moderated by accessibility of democratic values. Note, here, that accessibility of democratic values could conceivably moderate two possible relationships in this model: it might moderate the path from expertise (the IV) to explicit support (the mediator), it might moderate the path from explicit support (the mediator) to political tolerance, or it might moderate both (see Appendix A for a discussion of the statistical difference). All these possibilities will be examined in this study.

Another moderated mediational model will examine whether accessibility of democratic values serves as a mediator of the expertise-tolerance relationship, and whether this mediational pathway is moderated by explicit democratic values support. Again, explicit democratic values support could moderate the mediational pathway in multiple ways: first, it might moderate the relationship between expertise (the IV) and accessibility (the mediator), it might moderate the path from accessibility (the mediator) to political tolerance (the DV), or it might moderate both. All three possibilities will be examined in this study as well.

Study Three

Study three will measure expertise and political tolerance in the same fashion as studies one and two, and will measure democratic value accessibility in the same fashion as study two, but will additionally examine participants' implicit support for democratic norms by measuring the degree to which they implicitly associate democratic values with positive targets.

In this study, direct effects of expertise on political tolerance, democratic value accessibility, and implicit support for democratic values are anticipated; additionally, implicit support is expected to significantly predict political tolerance and democratic value accessibility as well. Democratic value accessibility is expected to also significantly predict political tolerance. In terms of simple (i.e. nonmoderated) mediational effects, it is expected that the effect of expertise on tolerance will be diminished when the effect of implicit democratic values on tolerance is taken into account. Similarly, mediation of

the expertise-tolerance effect by democratic value accessibility will be examined (see Chapter Six for full list of hypotheses in study two).

In addition to these simple mediational models, several moderated mediational pathways will be tested. One moderated mediational model that will examine whether the expertise-tolerance relationship is mediated by implicit democratic values support, and whether this mediational pathway is moderated by the accessibility of democratic values. Note, here, that accessibility of democratic values could moderate the path from expertise (the IV) to implicit support (the mediator). Alternatively, it might moderate the path from implicit support (the mediator) to political tolerance, or both (see Appendix A for a discussion of the statistical difference). All these possibilities will be examined in this study.

Another moderated mediational model will be examined in this study, testing whether accessibility of democratic values serves as a mediator of the expertise-tolerance relationship, and whether such mediational pathway is moderated by implicit democratic values support. Again, implicit democratic values support could moderate the mediational pathway in multiple ways: first, it might moderate the path from expertise (the IV) and accessibility (the mediator), the path from accessibility (the mediator) to political tolerance (the DV), or both. All three possibilities will be examined in this study as well.

CHAPTER THREE

GENERAL METHODS

Overview

In each of the three present studies, political expertise, political tolerance, participant demographics (such as age, education, and gender) and control variables (such as political ideology and party) were measured using the same survey items. Each study also included the measurement of at least two of the four potential mediators of the expertise-tolerance relationship: explicit support for democratic values, accessibility of democratic values, implicit support for democratic values, and importance of democratic values, respectively. Below is a general overview of the participants utilized, the measured predictor variables, the measured control variables and demographics, and the measured dependent variables that are common across all studies. Deviations from this are noted below (under each individual study's heading).

Participants

Participants were drawn from a convenience sample of United States citizens of legal voting age recruited via Amazon's Mechanical Turk (mTurk). Participants were recruited to participate in a study on their "political attitudes" that was advertised as lasting less than thirty minutes in duration, and for which they received payment of USD

$0.50. Participation was limited to English-fluent US citizens with internet protocol addresses (IP addresses) that identify them as currently residing in the US; these restrictions will be imposed using Mechanical Turk's enrollment rules. Upon enrolling in the study via mTurk, participants' responses were collected using the web-based survey software SNAP (for general survey questions) and WINTERAMIAT (for IAT results in study three; Allon, 2013).

Materials: Predictor Variables

Political expertise. Participants' political expertise was measured using Delli-Carpini and Keeter's (1993) recommended short form measure of political expertise. Expertise was assessed after tolerance and the proposed mediator for each study, as it was unlikely that the measurement of either construct would influence how much a participant knows about politics, whereas answering a potentially challenging political knowledge questionnaire could influence participants' responses to questions pertaining to tolerance and democratic values (for example, by leading participants who perform poorly on the expertise measure to be less certain of their views).Participants were asked, in an open-ended format, to identify the political party currently controlling the House of Representatives at the time of data collection, to name the branch of government responsible for determining the constitutionality of a law, who the current Vice President is, which party is most conservative, and what congressional majority is needed to override a Presidential veto. In addition, participants were provided with ten

multiple-choice questions, each asking for the identification of a political figure in terms of their current role (e.g., participants would be provided with the name Nancy Pelosi and were asked to select her current political office held from five possible multiple-choice options). These ten items were scored as either correct or incorrect, and then totaled into a single political expertise score.

Materials: Dependent variables

In all three studies, participants' political tolerance was recorded using Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus' (1982) content-controlled measure of tolerance.

Sullivan, Pierson & Marcus (1982). For the Sullivan et al measure of tolerance, participants were asked to select their least-liked group in politics from a list provided by the experimenter. Possible groups included the Ku Klux Klan, Pro-Abortionists, Anti-Abortionists, Occupy Wall Street Protestors, Tea Party Members, Fascists, Communists, Islamic Fundamentalists, and Atheists (note: some of the groups listed are from Sullivan et al's original measure, whereas others are more current political groups added by the experimenter). Participants also had the option of naming a group not provided by the experimenter. After selecting a "least-liked" group, participants were provided with a series of statements pertaining to the civil liberties of their target group (e.g. "Members of the ____ should be banned from being president of the United States."; Members of the ____ should be allowed to teach in the public schools.") and were asked to provide their agreement or disagreement with each statement on a 1-7 scale (ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree"). Responses to each of the scale items were

normalized and averaged to calculate a participants' least-liked procedure tolerance score.

Materials: Control Measures

Participants were asked to report their political ideology on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (extremely conservative) to 7 (extremely liberal) with a midpoint of "moderate". Participants were also asked to report their party identification on an ordinal scale with the following options: Strong Democrat, Moderate Democrat, Independent, Moderate Republican, and Strong Democrat. Participants were asked about their attitude toward their selected least-liked group, using a seven-point scale ranging from "Strongly Dislike" to "Strongly Like". Participants were asked to report their age, gender, highest level of education, and region of the country, each being assessed by a single question with multiple-choice responses. Participants were asked to report their past political participation by selecting political activities they have performed in the past from a checklist, ("Have you engaged in any of the following political activities? Please check all that apply."); the checklist included donating to political campaigns, volunteering for past political campaigns, voting in Presidential elections, voting in non-Presidential elections, wearing political buttons, displaying political bumper stickers or yard signs, and donating to political candidates. All control measures will be collected at the end of each respective study.

Procedure

Participants were recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk (with the exception of study three; see below). On mTurk, the studies were advertised as surveys on "Americans' Political Opinions" and study had an advertised length of less than thirty minutes, with a pay of $0.50. Upon agreeing to participate and "accepting" the study advertisement on mTurk, participants were directed to a survey link on SNAP. The survey on SNAP informed participants of their rights and obtain anonymous consent. Following informed consent, participants were assessed for the democratic value accessibility (in studies 2 and 3), then directed to a page that asked for their least-liked group in politics; participants' least-liked group were fed into the stems of the Sullivan et al (1982) tolerance questions, which participants then answered. Following these questions, participants were asked about their explicit support for democratic values (in studies 1 and 2), their implicit support for democratic values (in study three), and their subjective importance of democratic values (in study one) (see below for greater detail on measures and question order for each specific study). Participants then reported their political expertise. Following these key variables, participants were asked to report their political ideology, political party, and their demographics. Upon completing the survey participants were debriefed and assigned payment via mTurk.

Proposed Statistical Treatment

Multiple regression was used to analyze the data from the present studies. Continuous predictor variables (e.g., political expertise, explicit democratic values

support, etc) were centered (by subtracting participant's scores on each scale from the sample mean). These predictors were then entered into a regression equation. For each study, hypothesized main effects of predictors on tolerance were interpreted by examining effects for that predictor. To test mediation, Baron and Kenney's (1986) four-step procedure was used (see the following Chapters for study-specific hypotheses and details). To test moderated mediation when at least one predictor is not correlated with expertise, Muller et al's (2005) procedure was used, employing Preacher et al's (2007) MODMED macro (see Appendix B for details). To test moderated mediation in cases where both predictor variables (mediator and moderator) were correlated with expertise, Preacher et al's (2007) was also used, employing a slightly distinct model in MODMED (see below for details).

CHAPTER FOUR

PRELIMINARY ANALYSES

Reliability Analyses

Composite scores were created for all multi-item measures, including political tolerance, political expertise, explicit support for democratic values, importance of democratic values, implicit support for democratic values, and accessibility of democratic values. Reliability analyses were performed to determine how best to create these composite scores. All twenty tolerance items were highly internally reliable upon initial analysis (α=.771 for study one, α=.945 for study two, α=.946 for study three), and so all twenty items were included in participants' composite political tolerance score across all three studies. Political expertise was highly internally reliable across all studies (α=.751 for Study one, α=.780 for study two, α=.768 for study three) and all items were therefore retained for participants' composite score. Democratic values importance was highly internally reliable across both studies in which it was recorded (α=.913 for study one, α=.751 for study two). Explicit support for democratic values was highly reliable across both studies in which it was recorded (α=.777 in study one, α=.743 for study two). Accessibility of democratic values was reliable across both studies in which it was recorded (α=.860 in study two, α=.659 in study three). Implicit support of democratic values was highly reliable in the study in which it was recorded (α=.707 in study three).

Due to this consistent high reliability, all composite scales were kept intact across all three studies and analyzed accordingly.

Bivariate Relations Between Variables

Due to the considerable overlap in variables analyzed in study one, two, and three, it was considered prudent to first examine the bivariate relations between variables in all three studies before selecting appropriate control variables to be used across studies. This allowed for the selection of control variables to be consistent across all three studies and all three sets of analyses. Accordingly, the bivariate relationships between variables in all three studies will be described below, and possible control variables will be discussed before the results of the individual studies are explored.

Study One

Preliminary analyses were performed to examine the relation between the various continuous predictor variables- political expertise, explicit support of democratic values, and importance of democratic values (as well as the potential control variables, such as political ideology, political party, education, and age; see Table 1). Political expertise was significantly positively correlated with explicit democratic values support (r=.270, r^2=.07, p<.001), positively correlated with political participation (r=.344, r^2=.118, p<.001), positively correlated with education (r=.401, r^2=.16, p<.001), and positively correlated with age (r=.358, r^2=.13, p<.001. Explicit support for democratic values was significantly positively correlated with political participation (r=.156, r^2=.02, p<.013), and education(r=.216, r^2=.05, p<.001). Importance of democratic values was significantly

positively correlated with age (r= .131, r^2=.02, p<.041). Education was significantly positively correlated with participation (r=.180, r^2=.03, p<.040). Not surprisingly, political ideology and political party were strongly positively correlated (r=.794, r^2=.63, p<.001), such that more conservative ideologies were associated with a more Republican party identification (and likewise for liberal ideology and Democratic party identification). Political ideology was also positively correlated with age (r=.133, r^2=.02, p<.035), with more conservative ideological placement being associated with greater age. Correlation results therefore confirm that explicit support, importance, and expertise are correlated but conceptually distinct constructs.

The bivariate relations between predictor variables and political tolerance were also examined (see Table 1). Political tolerance was significantly positively correlated with political expertise (r=.167, r^2=.03, p<.009). Tolerance was also strongly positively correlated with explicit democratic values support (r=.216, r^2=.05, p<.001), political participation (r=.344, r^2=.12, p<.001), and education (r=.401, r^2=.16, p<.001). Note that political ideology and political party, despite being variables of massive import in political psychology, were only correlated with one another (r=.794, r^2=.63 p<.001) and not with political tolerance. This is typical for the political tolerance literature, and is consistent with past research using the least-liked measurement procedure, demonstrating no direct link between political ideology and political tolerance (Sullivan et al, 1981). Note also that political tolerance was not correlated with importance of democratic values in this study(r=.046, r^2=.002, p=.484).

Study Two

Preliminary analyses were performed to examine the relation between the various continuous predictor variables- political expertise, explicit support of democratic values, and importance of democratic values (as well as the potential control variables, such as political ideology, political party, education, and age; see Table 2). Political expertise was significantly positively correlated with explicit democratic values support (r= .291, r^2= .08, p<.001), positively correlated with democratic value accessibility (r= .292, r^2= .09, p<.001) positively correlated with political participation (r=.383, r^2=.146, p<.001), positively correlated with education (r= .366, r^2=.134, p<.001), and positively correlated with age (r= .246, r^2=.06, p<.001. Explicit support for democratic values was significantly positively correlated with democratic value accessibility (r= .170, r^2=.03, p<.007), positively correlated with participation (r=.193, r^2=.04, p<.002), negatively correlated with political party (r=-.163, r^2=.04, p<.009), and negatively correlated with political ideology (r= -.204, r^2=.04, p<.001). Education was significantly positively correlated with participation (r= .325, r²=.11, p<.001) and age (r= .217, r^2=.05, p<.001). Not surprisingly, political ideology and political party were strongly positively correlated (r= .751, r^2=.56, p<.001), such that more conservative ideologies were associated with a more Republican party identification (and likewise for liberal ideology and Democratic party identification). Political ideology was also positively correlated with age (r= .148, r^2=.01, p<.018), with more conservative ideological placement being associated with greater age, and with participation (r= -.132, r^2=.02, p<.036), with less participation

being associated with a more conservative ideology. Correlation results thus have confirmed that explicit support, accessibility, and expertise are correlated but conceptually distinct constructs.

The bivariate relations between predictor variables and political tolerance were also examined (see Table 2). Political tolerance was significantly positively correlated with political expertise (r= .372, r^2=.14, p<.001). Tolerance was also strongly positively correlated with explicit democratic values support (r= .618, r^2=.38, p<.001), democratic value accessibility (r= .137, r^2= .02, p<.029), education (r= .249, r^2= .06, p<.001), and participation (r= .252, r^2= .06, p<.001). Note that political ideology and political party, despite being variables of massive import in political psychology, were only correlated with one another (r=.751, r^2=.56 p<.001) and not with political tolerance. This is consistent with past research demonstrating no direct link between political ideology and political tolerance (Sullivan et al, 1981), as well as with the results of study one.

Study Three

Preliminary analyses were performed to examine the relation between the various continuous predictor variables- political expertise, explicit support of democratic values, and importance of democratic values (as well as the potential control variables, such as political ideology, political party, education, and age; see Table 3). Political expertise was significantly positively correlated with implicit democratic values support (r= .305, r^2= .09, p<.001), positively correlated with political participation (r=.440, r^2=.194, p<.001), positively correlated with education (r= .268, r^2=.072, p<.001), and positively correlated with age (r= .365, r^2=.133, p<.001), and was negatively correlated

with attitude toward least liked group (r=-.247, r^2=.061, p<.001) . Implicit support for democratic values was significantly positively correlated with age (*r*= .244, r^2=.059, *p*<.001), positively correlated with participation (*r*=.250, r^2=.063, *p*<.001), negatively correlated with political ideology (*r*=-.144, r^2=.02, *p*<.022, indicating that conservatism was associated with lower implicit support), and negatively correlated with attitude toward least liked group (r=-.184, r^2=033, p<.01). Democratic value accessibility was significantly positively correlated with ideology (r= .151, r^2=.022, p<.017; conservatism was associated with greater democratic value accessibility). Education was positively correlated with participation (*r*= .323, r^2=.104, *p*<.001), age (*r*= .172, r^2=.029, *p*<.006) and negatively correlated with attitude toward least liked group (r=-.129, r^2=.016, p<.04) and political party (*r*= -.132, r^2=.017, *p*<.037; Republican identification was associated with lower education). Participation was also negatively correlated with attitude toward least liked group (r=-.249, r^2=.062, p<.001). Not surprisingly, political ideology and political party were strongly positively correlated (*r*= .774, r^2=.599, *p*<.001), such that more conservative ideologies were associated with a more Republican Party identification (and likewise for liberal ideology and Democratic Party identification). Political party was also negatively correlated with participation (*r*= -.132, r^2=.017, *p*<.037), with less participation being associated with a more conservative ideology. Correlation results therefore confirm that accessibility, implicit support, and expertise are correlated but conceptually distinct constructs.

The bivariate relations between predictor variables and political tolerance were also examined (see Table 3). Political tolerance was significantly positively correlated

with political expertise (r= .261, r^2=.068, p<.001). Tolerance was also positively correlated with implicit democratic values support (r= .138, r^2=.019, p<.029), democratic value accessibility (r= .135, r^2= .018, p<.032), education (r= .170, r^2= .028, p<.007), and participation (r= .287, r^2= .082, p<.001). Political ideology was significantly negatively correlated with tolerance in this study (r= -.182, r^2=.033, p<.004), in sharp contrast with the prior two studies and with most prior research on political tolerance.

Potential Control Variables

In light of these preliminary results, three variables emerged as potential controls, due to their significant correlations with political tolerance in at least one of three studies: Education, Political Participation, and Ideology. For various reasons, these variables are not always appropriate controls for inclusion in all analyses across all studies: ideology is only correlated with tolerance in one study (study three), and is therefore not appropriate as a control variable in studies one and two. As for education and participation, which are correlated with political tolerance, these constructs are also possible antecedents to political expertise, and therefore controlling for these variables might, in essence, control for the effect of one of the key variables in this study. However, it should be noted in advance that all analyses in these studies were, nonetheless, run both with and without controls, and inclusion of education, participation, age, and ideology made no difference in the results of any analysis (see appendix C for analyses with controls). The rationale for excluding these variables from the main analyses, however, follows.

Education

Education was found to be a significant correlate of tolerance in all three studies (see Tables 1, 2, and 3). Education was also, however, a strong positive correlate of political expertise. This is consistent with extant political tolerance research and theory, which holds that education, particularly civics education, is a large contributor to both political knowledge and political tolerance (Stouffer, 1955; Prothro & Grigg, 1960; Jackman, 1972; Nunn et al, 1978; Bobo & Licari, 1989; see Chapter One of this dissertation). It is therefore unwise, when political expertise is the key predictor of interest, to control for effects of an antecedent to political expertise. Future research should examine the relationship between education, civics education, political knowledge, and tolerance, but since such questions are outside the purview of the present dissertation, it will not be discussed at length in this text (see Discussion Chapter of this dissertation). Education was therefore not used as a control variable in main analyses. However, all analyses were replicated with education included as a control, and there was no significant difference in any of the results (see Appendix C).

Participation

Participation was found to be a significant correlate of tolerance in all three studies. However, the pitfalls of controlling for the effects of participation are similar to the pitfalls of controlling for education; namely, it has long been theorized that taking part in politics makes a person more informed about the political landscape, and more familiar with (and tolerant of) opposing views as a result (McClosky, 1964; McClosky &

Brill, 1983; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Nunn et al, 1978; Stouffer, 1955; see Chapter One of this dissertation). Participation, is of course, also strongly correlated with political expertise in these studies and in much of the political tolerance literature. Accordingly, it was decided that political participation should not be included as a control variable in the main analyses. Nonetheless, all analyses were replicated with participation included as a control, as was the case with education, and it had no impact on the pattern or significance of results (see Appendix C for analyses with controls).

Ideology

In study three, participants' political ideology was found to be correlated with political tolerance, such that more liberal attitudes were associated with greater tolerance. This was inconsistent with the other two studies, which indicated there was no relationship between political tolerance and ideology. This result is also in sharp contrast with the prevailing findings in the political tolerance literature, particularly ones employing the least-liked measurement method; political ideology and party are typically found to be unrelated to political tolerance when respondents are allowed to select their own target group (see, e.g. Prothro & Grigg, 1960; Jackman, 1972; Sullivan et al, 1982; Shamir & Sullivan, 1983; Price & Ottati, 2012). Due to the fact that ideology is not typically related to tolerance, and due to the fact that it was not correlated with tolerance in the majority of these three studies, ideology was generally not explored as a control variable in the main analyses. Ideology was, however, included as a control when replicating analyses in study three, and had no impact on the pattern or significance of results (see Appendix C).

CHAPTER FIVE

STUDY ONE

Overview

In this first study, political tolerance was measured as the chief dependent variable of interest, and political expertise, explicit democratic values support, and democratic values importance were assessed as predictors. In addition, potential control variables such as education, participation, political ideology, and political party were assessed (see Chapter Four for details). This study was primarily concerned with examining effects of expertise, explicit democratic values, and democratic values importance on tolerance, respectively, as well as examining effects of expertise on importance and explicit support (see Hypotheses below). Additionally, mediation of the expertise-tolerance relationship by explicit support and importance, respectively, were examined. Moderated forms of these two mediational pathways were also tested (see below for specific hypotheses).

Hypotheses

H1: In a direct replication of numerous previous studies, expertise will be a strong positive predictor of tolerance.

H2: In direct replication of numerous studies, support for democratic values will predict tolerance.

H3: Expertise will predict explicit support for democratic values.

H4: Expertise will predict importance of democratic values.

H5: Importance of democratic values will predict tolerance.

H6: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by support for democratic values.

H7: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by importance of democratic values.

H8: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by importance of democratic values, when controlling for explicit support.

H9: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by support for democratic values, when controlling for importance.

H10: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by explicit support for democratic values for high importance participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not mediated by democratic values for low importance participants. This hypothesis presumes that importance of democratic values and expertise are not correlated, as per Muller et al's (2005) procedure for testing moderated mediation (see Proposed Statistical Treatment, below for detail).

H11: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by importance for high support explicit support participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not mediated by importance for low explicit support participants. This hypothesis presumes that support for democratic values and expertise are not correlated, as per Muller et al's (2005) procedure for testing moderated mediation.

H12: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by importance for high explicit support participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not mediated by importance for low explicit support participants. This hypothesis presumes that support for democratic values and expertise are correlated, and importance and expertise are correlated, and requires a different statistical procedure to be tested (Preacher et al, 2007).

H13: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by explicit support for high importance participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not mediated by explicit support for low importance participants. This hypothesis presumes that support for democratic values and expertise are correlated, and importance and expertise are correlated, and requires a different statistical procedure to be tested that the related hypothesis, above (Preacher et al, 2007).

Methods

Proposed Mediators: Explicit Support for Democratic Values and Importance of Democratic Values

In study one, participants' explicit support for democratic norms was assessed (using multiple measures from both Sullivan et al, 1995 and the World Values Survey) as a predictor of political tolerance, as well as importance of democratic values. Explicit support for democratic norms and importance were measured after political tolerance, as inquiring about participants' support for democratic norms prior to the tolerance questionnaire might increase the salience of such values and could influence tolerance judgments as a result (note, however, that related research has used either question

order with no apparent effect; Stouffer, 1955; Sniderman, 1975; Peffley et al, 2001.) Out of necessity, and in accordance with most studies of attitude importance, the importance of democratic values was recorded after explicit support (Krosnick, 1988).

Support for democratic norms. Participants' explicit support for democratic norms was recorded using Sullivan et al's (1985) Support for the Norms of Democracy Scale. This scale has been used to study support for democratic values in both the United States and developing former member states of the Soviet Union (Gibson et al, 1992) and has been consistently validated as a measure of participants' attitudes toward democratic ideals. The scale consists of four statements regarding the normative value of equal protection under the law (e.g. "No matter what a person's political beliefs are, he is entitled to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else."), two of which are reverse-scored (e.g. "When the country is in great danger we may have to force people to testify against themselves even if this violates their civil rights. "). In the present study, participants were asked to indicate their agreement with these statements by selecting values on a 1-7 scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree" (note: some early versions of this survey only provided three response options: agree, disagree, and don't know, but for the sake of increasing variation in responses the present study will use a 1-7 scale).

Democratic values importance. Following each item in the democratic values support scales, participants were asked how important their attitude is to them ("For the above question, how important is this attitude to you?"), selecting an option from a 1 to 7 scale (ranging from "not at all important" to "very important"; (Krosnick, 1988).

Results

Participant Demographics

Participants ranged in age from 18 to 72 years (*M*=32.60, *SD*=11.535). Most participants reported a college degree as their highest level of education (*M*=4.24, *SD*=1.688). Fifty-eight percent of participants were male (*N*=146) and forty-one percent were female (*N*=105). All participants were American citizens (*N*=251) and ninety-four percent of participants reported English as their first language (*N*=237). Participants were moderate in their level of political participation (*M*=2.41, *SD*=1.455). The most least-liked groups most frequently chosen by participants were: the Ku Klux Klan (48.8%), Islamic Fundamentalists (14.2%), Tea Party Protesters (7.4%), Fascists (7.6%), Communists (4.8%), Anti-Abortionists (5.6%), and Pro-Abortionists (2.4%).

Study One Main Analyses

Three sets of analyses were performed. First, linear regression analyses were performed to test hypotheses 1-5, pertaining to simple (i.e. nonmediated) prediction by continuous variables. Second, hypotheses 6-9 were tested using mediation analyses in regression, following Baron and Kenney's (1986) four-step procedure. Lastly, hypotheses 10-13 were tested using moderated mediational analyses, employing the bootstrapping procedure and MODMED SPSS macro created by Preacher et al (2007). In all cases, effects reported are from analyses without controls, but have been replicated with controls (see Appendix C for these analyses).

Hypotheses 1-5: simple linear regression analyses. The effect of political expertise on tolerance (hypothesis 1) was tested using linear regression. Expertise was

centered and entered as a predictor of tolerance at Step 1. Regression analyses revealed, consistent with hypothesis one, that political expertise was indeed a significant predictor of political tolerance (*B*=.147, β=.167 *SE*=.056 *p*<.009; see Table 4).

The effect of explicit support for democratic values on tolerance (hypothesis 2) was tested using linear regression. Explicit democratic values support was centered an entered as a predictor of tolerance at Step 1. Regression analyses revealed that explicit democratic values support was indeed a significant predictor of tolerance (*B*=.191, β=.216 *SE*=.055 *p*<.001; see Table 5).

The effect of democratic values importance on tolerance was tested by centering importance and entering it as a predictor at step 1. Regression analyses indicated that democratic values importance was, in fact, a significant predictor of tolerance (*B* =.158, β=.181, *SE*=.055, p<.004, see Table 6).

In addition, expertise was examined as a predictor of explicit democratic values support (hypothesis 3). Regression analyses revealed that expertise did significantly predict explicit support for democratic values, (*B* =.272, β=.270, *SE*=.062, p<.001, see Table 7).

Expertise was also examined as a predictor of democratic values importance (hypothesis 4). Regression analyses revealed that political expertise was not a significant predictor of importance of democratic values (*B*=.087, β=.046 *SE*=.124 *p*<.484, see Table 8).

Hypotheses 6-9: non-moderated mediation. Mediation of the expertise-tolerance relationship by explicit democratic values support (hypothesis 6) was tested

using Baron and Kenney's (1986) four step procedure. First, an as discussed above, a significant effect of expertise on tolerance was documented (*B*= .147, β= .167 *SE*= .056 *p*<.009). Second, and also as described above, the effect of expertise on the mediator, explicit support of democratic values, was confirmed (*B* =.272, β=.270, *SE*=.062, p<.001). Third, the effect of the mediator (explicit democratic values support) on tolerance was tested and found to be significant (*B*= .165, β= .188 *SE*= .057 *p*<.004). Finally, the fourth condition for mediation was tested: controlling for explicit democratic values support (mediator) reduced the effect of expertise on tolerance (Sobel, 1982, using Preacher and Leonardelli's 2010 calculator; *Z*=-2.416; *SE*= .019; *p*< .01; see Figure 1). Thus, explicit democratic values support partially mediated the relationship between expertise and tolerance.

The above mediational analyses were also reproduced when controlling for importance of democratic values, as per hypothesis 8. As before, a significant effect of expertise on tolerance was demonstrated using regression (*B* =.137, β=.143, *SE*=.055, *p*<.010), meeting the first necessary criterion for establishing mediation. Second, the effect of expertise on the mediator, explicit democratic values support, was also demonstrated when controlling for importance (*B* =.242, β=.265, *SE*=.062, p<.001). Third, the effect of explicit democratic values support on tolerance was again tested and established (*B* =.225, β=.219, *SE*=.062, p<.001). Finally, the fourth condition for mediation was tested: controlling for explicit democratic values support (mediator) reduced the effect of expertise on tolerance (Sobel, 1982, using Preacher and Leonardelli's 2010 calculator; *Z*= -2.637; *SE* = .019; *p*< .008; see Figure 2). Thus, explicit

democratic values support partially mediated the relationship between expertise and tolerance, when controlling for democratic values importance.

Next, mediation of the expertise-tolerance relationship by importance of democratic values was tested (hypothesis 7). As before, a significant effect of expertise on tolerance was demonstrated using regression analyses, meeting the first criterion for establishing mediation (*B* =.137, β=.143, *SE*=.055, *p*<.010) Second, the effect of expertise on the mediator, importance of democratic values, was tested; however, expertise was not found to be a significant predictor of importance (*B* =.045, β=.046, *SE*=.064, *p*=.484). Thus, the second criterion for establishing mediation was not met, and as per Sobel's (1982; see also Preacher & Leonardelli, 2010) procedure, the test concluded with no evidence of mediation by importance.

Following this mediational test, mediation by importance while controlling for explicit support was tested (in accordance with hypothesis 9). This time, the first criterion for establishing mediation was not met, as there was no significant effect of expertise on tolerance while controlling for explicit democratic values support (*B* =.103, β=.116, *SE*=.057, *p*<.074). However, since this effect was marginally significant, analyses proceeded to criterion two of establishing mediation. However, as above, there was no significant effect of expertise on the proposed mediator, importance, when controlling for explicit support (*B* =-.026, β=-.026, *SE*=.067, *p*=.701). Thus, the criteria for establishing mediation by importance were not met and analyses concluded.

Hypotheses 10-13: moderated mediation. First, hypothesis 10 and 12 were tested, which posited that the effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by explicit

support, but that this mediational path is itself moderated by democratic values importance. Analyses of these models followed Preacher et al's (2007) procedure and utilized the authors' (2007) moderated mediation testing macro for SPSS, MODMED.

According to Preacher et al (2007), Muller et al (2005), and MacKinnon (2008), there is evidence of moderated mediation if a) the effect of the IV on the DV is significant; b) there is a significant effect of the mediator on the DV; and if either (or both) of the following are met: c) there is a significant interaction between the IV and the moderator in predicting the mediator ; or d) there is a significant interaction between the moderator and the mediator predicting the DV. Once these prerequisites are met, the mediational model is estimated by MODMED at high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) levels of the moderator, as well as when the moderator is at the mean, and the indirect effect of the IV, via the mediator, for each level of the moderator is examined (see below for a description of how to interpret the indirect effect).

MODMED analyses revealed, first, that there was in fact a significant effect of the IV (expertise) on the DV (tolerance), as already demonstrated above (*B* =.137, β=.143, *SE*=.055, *p*<.010). Second, there was a significant effect of the mediator (explicit democratic values support) on the DV (*B* =.2187, *SE*=.056, *p*<.001; see Table 10). There was not a significant interaction between the IV (expertise) and the moderator (importance) predicting the mediator (explicit support) (*B* =-.009, *SE*=.063, *p*=.882; see Table 9), though note that this interaction was not predicted by hypothesis 10 (see Figure 3). However, there was a significant interaction between the mediator (explicit

support) and the moderator (importance) predicting the DV (*B* =-.1914, *SE*=.061, *p*<.002).

Given that the criteria for establishing moderated mediation were successfully met, the mediational model was then estimated for both high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) levels of the moderator (importance), using Preacher et al's (2007) MODMED macro for SPSS (see Table 11 for these estimated indirect effects). It should be noted, however, that when testing moderated mediation and estimating the mediational model at high and low levels of the moderator, the key score of interest (provided using MODMED analyses) is the indirect effect of the IV, via the mediator, at both levels of the DV. To those more familiar with simple mediational testing via the Sobel's test, this should be clarified: the indirect effect reflects the extent of the reduction of the IV's ability to predict the DV when the mediator's effect on the DV is accounted for (for a given level of the moderator). In other words, a high, significant indirect effect score is a sign of a mediational model that is successful and accounts for a great deal of the IV's effect on the DV. This is a direct inversion of what is typically observed in a simple mediational test, and which is tested by a Sobel's test: whereas in simple mediation, it is typical to look at the IV's ability to predict the DV by itself, and then look to see if the IV's ability to predict the DV is diminished when the mediator is included in analyses (and thus a low coefficient in the final model is a sign of mediation), MODMED simply reports the indirect effect of the IV on the DV, via the mediator, and thus indicates the size of the reduction itself (and thus a high score is an indication of mediation).

Analyses revealed that explicit support for democratic values did not significantly mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance when importance was low (-1 standard deviation below the mean; *B* =-.008, *SE*=.022; *Z*=-.388; *p*>.69; see Table 11). However, explicit support for democratic values did significantly mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance when importance of democratic values was high (+1 standard deviation above the mean *B* =-.104, *SE*=.046; *Z*=-2.26, *p*<.02). Thus, the mediational pathway tested (and supported) in hypotheses 6 and 9 was found to be moderated by importance, in accordance with hypothesis 10, though not hypothesis 12 (see Tables 9, 10, and 11).

Next, hypotheses 11 and 13 were tested. These hypotheses proposed a moderated mediational model where the expertise-tolerance relationship is mediated by democratic values importance, but that this indirect effect is moderated by explicit democratic values support. MODMED analyses revealed, first, that in the full model predicting the DV, expertise no longer remained a significant predictor (B =.091, β=.062, SE=.054, p=.095; see Table 12). This criteria for establishing moderated mediation being unmet, testing of the full model was discontinued.

Study One Discussion

Study one examined thirteen main hypotheses. As anticipated, expertise was found to be a significant and strong predictor of political tolerance. Expertise was also revealed to be a significant predictor of explicit democratic values support, as anticipated, though it was not found to significantly predict democratic values importance. Explicit democratic values was found to significantly predict tolerance, and

importance of democratic values was found to significantly predict tolerance as well. All these effects are largely consistent with what was hypothesized (except for the lack of an effect of expertise on importance), and demonstrates that these predictors are related but distinct constructs, all of which contribute to an individual's level of political tolerance. Bivariate correlational analyses revealed that these predictors were all related, but distinct constructs.

In addition, it was found that explicit democratic values significantly mediated the relationship between expertise and tolerance. In other words, when accounting for the effect of explicit democratic values support on tolerance, the effect of expertise on tolerance was significantly diminished. This indicates that the effect of explicit support on tolerance partially accounts for the expertise-tolerance relationship, as hypothesized. Experts are, in part, more tolerant than political novices because they have higher explicit support for democratic norms such as freedom and equality under the law. This mediational path remained significant when democratic values importance was controlled for, as well.

Mediation by importance of democratic values, however, was not established. This was due to the fact that expertise did not have a significant effect on democratic values importance, precluding the possibility of mediation. This suggests that the expertise does not increase tolerance because it leads to greater subjective importance of democratic values, but simply by increasing explicit support for those values.

While one of the two main moderated mediational models was unsupported in this study, there was evidence for mediation by explicit support and mediation by

importance, as hypothesized. Specifically, it was found that when importance of democratic values was high, explicit democratic values support did mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance. However, when democratic values importance was low, mediation by explicit support was no longer evident. This suggests that among individuals high in their subjective weighing of democratic values as an important and critical value worthy of consideration, part of the link between expertise and tolerance is accounted for by their explicit support of that value. However, among individuals who do not see democratic values as a critical and important value, the link between expertise and tolerance is not well accounted for by explicit democratic values support. In other words, explicit support for democratic values positively influences tolerance only when those values are seen as important. This implies that among experts who do not rank democratic values as important, some other factor must be contributing to their higher-than-average tolerance.

CHAPTER SIX

STUDY TWO

Overview

Study one provided some evidence that the expertise-tolerance relationship is mediated by explicit democratic values support, and that this mediational pathway might only occur when democratic values are seen as important. Study one also replicated previous findings that tolerance is predicted by expertise and explicit democratic values support, and provided new evidence that tolerance is predicted also by democratic values importance. Study two expands upon these findings by examining a more implicit measure, democratic value accessibility, as a predictor.

While many of the same predictors and potential controls were assessed in study two as in study one, democratic values importance was replaced in this study by democratic value accessibility. This construct has never been previously examined as a predictor of tolerance in an empirical study, let alone as a possible mediator of the expertise-tolerance effect. Participants completed a word-completion measure assessing how inclined they were to think about democratic values (see Method section, below, for details on this measure). In addition, political expertise, explicit democratic values support, tolerance, and the same control variables as in study one were assessed. This study allowed, then, for the examination of several new hypotheses pertaining to democratic value accessibility, and also provided the opportunity to replicate study

one's results involving the effects of expertise and explicit democratic values support. It was expected that democratic value accessibility would mediate the expertise-tolerance relationship. Further, it was expected that democratic value accessibility might moderate the model in which explicit support served as a mediator of the expertise-tolerance relationship. Additionally, it was hypothesized that accessibility of democratic values might mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance, and that this mediational pathway might be moderated by explicit support.

Hypotheses

H14: In a direct replication of numerous previous studies, expertise will be a strong positive predictor of tolerance.

H15: Accessibility of democratic values will predict tolerance.

H16: Explicit support of democratic values will predict tolerance.

H17: Expertise will predict accessibility of democratic values.

H18: Expertise will predict explicit support of democratic values.

H19: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by accessibility of democratic values.

H20: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by explicit support for democratic values.

H21: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by accessibility of democratic values, when controlling for explicit support.

H22: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by support for democratic values, when controlling for accessibility.

H23: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by explicit support for democratic values for high accessibility participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not mediated by democratic values for low accessibility participants. This hypothesis presumes that accessibility of democratic values and expertise are not correlated, as per Muller et al's (2005) procedure for testing moderated mediation (see Proposed Statistical Treatment, below for detail).

H24: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by accessibility for high explicit support participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not mediated by accessibility for low explicit support participants. This hypothesis presumes that explicit support for democratic values and expertise are not correlated, as per Muller et al's (2005) procedure for testing moderated mediation.

H25: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by accessibility for high explicit support participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not mediated by accessibility for low explicit support participants. This hypothesis presumes that support for democratic values and expertise are correlated, and accessibility and expertise are correlated, and thus requires a different statistical procedure to be tested (Preacher et al, 2007).

H26: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by explicit support for high accessibility participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not mediated by explicit support for low accessibility participants. This hypothesis presumes that accessibility and expertise are correlated, and explicit support and expertise are

correlated, and requires a different statistical procedure to be tested (Preacher et al, 2007).

Methods

Proposed Mediators: Accessibility of Democratic Values and Explicit Support for Democratic Values

In study two, the accessibility of democratic norms was assessed (using an adapted version of Greenberg et al's 1994 death-thought accessibility measure), and analyzed as a predictor of political tolerance. In addition, explicit support for democratic values was measured in the same manner as study one. Accessibility of democratic values was measured prior to tolerance, explicit support, and expertise in this study, as consideration of tolerance judgments (or of political knowledge in general) might influence the salience of democratic values and increase accessibility if it were measured afterward, whereas the desired construct is how prone participants are to think of democratic values without such prompting. Explicit support for democratic values was measured after tolerance has been measured, as before.

Accessibility of democratic values. The accessibility of democratic values in participants' minds was assessed using an adapted version of Greenberg et al's (1994) fill-in-the-blank accessibility test. Participants were given 26 partially-completed word stems, which they were instructed to complete as quickly as possible. Seven of the words fragments had several possible "correct" answers, one of which pertained to democratic norms and values (e.g., __ R E E, which can be completed as either "free" or

"tree"; L __ W, which can be completed as either "law" or "low"), while the remaining 19 word fragments had neutral "correct" answers to mask the purpose of the measure.

Results

Participant Demographics

Participants ranged in age from 18 to 72 years (*M*=35.38, *SD*=13.761). Most participants reported a college degree as their highest level of education (*M*=4.13, *SD*=1.674). Fifty-five percent of participants were male (*N*=142) and forty-one percent were female (*N*=113). All participants were American citizens (*N*=255) and ninety-six percent of participants reported English as their first language (*N*=247). Participants were moderate in their rate of political participation (*M*=3.85, *SD*=2.263). The most popular least-liked groups chosen by participants were: the Ku Klux Klan (45.4%), Islamic Fundamentalists (16.2%), Tea Party Protesters (7.3%), Fascists (7.6%), Communists (4.4%), Anti-Abortionists (6.2%), and Pro-Abortionists (4%).

Study two main analyses. Three sets of analyses were performed. First, linear regression analyses were performed to test hypotheses 14-18, pertaining to simple (i.e. nonmediated) prediction by continuous variables. Second, hypotheses 19-22 were tested using mediation analyses in regression, following Baron and Kenney's (1986) four-step procedure. Lastly, hypotheses 23-26 were tested using moderated mediational analyses, employing the bootstrapping procedure and SPSS macro created by Preacher et al (2007). In all cases, effects reported are from analyses without controls, but have been replicated with controls (see Appendix C for these analyses).

Hypotheses 1-5: simple linear regression analyses. The effect of political expertise on tolerance (hypothesis 14) was tested using linear regression. Expertise was centered and entered as a predictor of tolerance at Step 1. Regression analyses revealed, consistent with hypothesis one, that political expertise was indeed a significant predictor of political tolerance (*B*= .561, β= .372 *SE*= .088 *p*<.001; see Table 14).

The effect of explicit support for democratic values on tolerance (hypothesis 16) was tested using linear regression. Explicit democratic values support was centered an entered as a predictor of tolerance at Step 1. Regression analyses revealed that explicit democratic values support was indeed a significant predictor of tolerance (*B*= .932, β= .618 *SE*= .075 *p*<.0001; see Table 15).

The effect of democratic value accessibility on tolerance (hypothesis 15) was tested by centering and entering it as a predictor at step 1. Regression analyses indicated that democratic value accessibility was, in fact, a significant predictor of tolerance (*B* =.207, β=.137, *SE*=.094, p<.029, see Table 16).

In addition, expertise was examined as a predictor of explicit democratic values support (hypothesis 18). Regression analyses revealed that expertise did significantly predict explicit support for democratic values, (*B* =.425, β=.323, *SE*=.078, p<.001, see Table 17).

Expertise was also examined as a predictor of democratic value accessibility (hypothesis 17). Regression analyses revealed that political expertise was a significant

predictor of democratic value accessibility (*B*= .264, β= .292 *SE*= .054 *p*<.001, see Table 18).

Hypotheses 19-22: non-moderated mediation. Mediation of the expertise-tolerance relationship by explicit democratic values support (hypothesis 20) was tested using Baron and Kenney's (1986) four step procedure. First, and as discussed above, a significant effect of expertise on tolerance was documented (*B*= .932*, β*= .618 *SE*=.075 *p*<.0001). Second, and also as described above, the effect of expertise on the mediator, explicit support of democratic values, was confirmed (*B* =.425, *β*=.323, *SE*=.078, *p*<.001). Third, the effect of the mediator (explicit democratic values support) on tolerance was tested and found to be significant (*B* =.838, β=.555, *SE*=.077, p<.001). Finally, the fourth condition for mediation was tested: controlling for explicit democratic values support (the mediator) reduced the effect of expertise on tolerance (Sobel, 1982, using Preacher and Leonardelli's 2010 calculator; *Z*=4.891; *SE*=.055; *p*<001; see Figure 5). Thus, explicit democratic values support partially mediated the relationship between expertise and tolerance.

The above mediational analyses were also reproduced when controlling for accessibility of democratic values, as per hypothesis 22. As before, a significant effect of expertise on tolerance was demonstrated using regression (*B* =.548, β=.363, *SE*=.092, *p*<.001), meeting the first necessary criterion for establishing mediation. Second, the effect of expertise on the mediator, explicit democratic values support, was also demonstrated when controlling for accessibility (*B* =.299, β=.299, *SE*=.062, p<.001). Third, the effect of explicit democratic values support on tolerance was again tested and

established (*B* =.839, β=.557, *SE*=.077, p<.001). Finally, the fourth condition for mediation was tested: controlling for explicit democratic values support (the mediator) reduced the effect of expertise on tolerance (Sobel, 1982, using Preacher and Leonardelli's 2010 calculator; *Z*=4.41; *SE* =.057; *p* <.001; see Figure 6). Thus, explicit democratic values support partially mediated the relationship between expertise and tolerance, when controlling for democratic value accessibility.

Next, mediation by accessibility of democratic values was tested (hypothesis 19). As before, a significant effect of expertise on tolerance was demonstrated using regression analyses, meeting the first criterion for establishing mediation (*B* =.548, β=.363, *SE*=.092, *p*<.001) Second, the effect of expertise on the mediator, accessibility of democratic values, was tested and confirmed (*B* =.264, β=.292, *SE*=.054, *p*<.001). Third, the effect of accessibility of democratic values on tolerance was again tested; however, this criterion for establishing mediation was not met (*B* =.047, β=.031, *SE*=.092, *p*=.611). Sobel's test results indicated that controlling for the effect of accessibility on tolerance did not significantly reduce the effect of expertise on tolerance, therefore failing to provide support for mediation by accessibility (*Z*=.508; *SE* =.024; *p*=.611).

Following this mediational test, mediation by accessibility while controlling for explicit support was tested (in accordance with hypothesis 21). Again, the first criterion testing the effect of expertise on tolerance while controlling for explicit democratic values support was met (*B* =.291, β=.193, *SE*=.077, *p*<.001). Second, the effect of expertise on the mediator (accessibility) while controlling for explicit support was tested and met (*B* =.239, β=.265, *SE*=.057, *p*<.001). Third, the effect of the mediator

(accessibility) on the DV (tolerance) was tested. This criterion was not met (*B* =-.022), β=-.015, *SE*=.076, *p*=.770). Sobel's test results further indicated that controlling for the effect of accessibility on tolerance did not significantly diminish the effect of expertise on tolerance, further disproving mediation (*Z*=-.288; *SE* =.018; *p*=.773).

Hypotheses 23-26: moderated mediation. Following the testing of the simple mediational models predicted in study two, hypothesized moderated mediational models were examined. First, hypotheses 23 and 25 were tested, as they both related to the same moderated mediational model. Theses hypotheses predicted that the relationship between expertise and tolerance would be mediated by explicit democratic values support, which would itself be moderated by democratic value accessibility (see Figure 7). Hypothesis 23 predicted that democratic value accessibility would not be related to expertise, whereas hypothesis 25 predicted the same moderated mediational model, but with a significant correlation between accessibility and expertise (again, see Figure 7 for the distinction).

According to Preacher et al (2007), Muller et al (2005), and MacKinnon (2008), there is evidence of moderated mediation if a) the effect of the IV on the DV is significant; b) there is a significant effect of the mediator on the DV; and if either (or both) of the following are met: c) there is a significant interaction between the IV and the moderator in predicting the mediator ; or d) there is a significant interaction between the moderator and the mediator predicting the DV. Once these prerequisites are met, the mediational model is estimated by MODMED at high (+1 SD) and low (-1

SD) levels of the moderator, as well as when the moderator is at the mean, and the indirect effect of the IV, via the mediator, for each level of the moderator is examined.

MODMED analyses revealed, first, that there was in fact a significant effect of the IV (expertise) on the DV (tolerance), as already demonstrated above (*B* =.305, β=.291, *SE*=.081, *p*<.001). Second, there was a significant effect of the mediator (explicit democratic values support) on the DV (*B* =.8318, *SE*=.079, *p*<.001). Third, there was a significant interaction between the IV (expertise) and the moderator (accessibility) predicting the mediator (explicit support) (*B* =-.198, *SE*=.062, *p*<.002), though note that this interaction was not predicted by hypothesis 23 (see Figure 7). However, there was no significant interaction between the mediator (explicit support) and the moderator (democratic value accessibility) predicting the DV (*B*=.076, *SE*=.073, *p*=.302; see Tables 19 and 20 for full model coefficients).

Accordingly, there was evidence for moderation of the path between expertise and the mediator (explicit support), providing some support for hypothesis 25. The mediational model was then estimated for both high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) levels of the moderator (accessibility), using Preacher et al's (2007) MODMED macro for SPSS (see Table 21). Analyses revealed that explicit support for democratic values did, in fact, significantly mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance when accessibility was low (-1 standard deviation below the mean; *B*=.353, *SE*=.079; *Z*=4.46; *p*<.001). However, explicit support for democratic values did *not* significantly mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance when accessibility of democratic values was high (+1 standard deviation above the mean; *B*=.065, *SE*=.086; *Z*=.752,

p=.452). This is the opposite of what was predicted in hypothesis 25, where explicit support was predicted to be a mediator when democratic value accessibility was high. Thus, the mediational pathway tested (and supported) in hypotheses 23 and 25 was found to be moderated by accessibility, though not in the pattern predicted a priori (see Tables 19, 20, and 21).

Next, the moderated mediational models predicted by hypotheses 24 and 26 were tested. This model predicted that the relationship between expertise and tolerance would be mediated by democratic value accessibility, and that this mediational pathway would itself be moderated by participants' level of explicit democratic values support (see Figure 8). Again, hypothesis 24 differed from hypothesis 26 in that the former did not presume a significant relation between expertise (the IV) and explicit democratic values support (the moderator), whereas hypothesis 26 did predict such a relationship (see Figure 8). MODMED analyses revealed, first, that there was in fact a significant effect of the IV (expertise) on the DV (tolerance), as already demonstrated previously (*B*=.340, *SE*=.082, *p*<.001). However, there was no significant effect of the mediator (democratic value accessibility) on the DV (*B*=-.001, *SE*=.077, *p*=.909). Third, there was not a significant interaction between the IV (expertise) and the moderator (explicit support) predicting the mediator (accessibility) (*B*=-.068, *SE*=.059, *p*=.252), though note that this interaction was predicted by hypothesis 26 but not 24 (see Figure 8). In addition, there was no significant interaction between the mediator (accessibility) and the moderator (explicit support) predicting the DV (*B*=-.013, *SE*=.079, *p*=.866; see Tables 22 and 23 for full model coefficients). Since the criteria for

establishing moderated mediation were not met, the model was not estimated at high and low levels of the moderator (explicit support), and hypotheses 24 and 26 were not supported.

Study Two Discussion

Thirteen hypotheses were examined in this study, some of which were replications of the hypotheses in study one, and some of which examined the impact of a new predictor, democratic value accessibility. As in study one, expertise was found to be a significant and strong predictor of political tolerance, even when other predictors were taken into account as control variables. Expertise was also found to significantly predict explicit democratic values support, as before. Expertise also significantly predicted democratic value accessibility in this study. In a direct replication of study one, explicit support for democratic values was found to predict political tolerance as well. In addition, accessibility of democratic values was found to significantly predict political tolerance. Bivariate correlational analyses revealed that these predictors were all related, but distinct constructs.

Several mediational models were also examined in this study. In a direct replication of study one, explicit support for democratic values was found, once again, to mediate the relationship between expertise and political tolerance. This provided further support to the theoretical notion that experts are, in part, more tolerant because they value democratic norms more than do political novices. This mediational model also held when accessibility of democratic values was controlled for. Accessibility of democratic values was examined as a mediator, but was not supported. Similar to

study one's results regarding mediation by importance of democratic values, the effect of accessibility of democratic values on tolerance did not significantly diminish the effect of expertise on tolerance.

Several moderated mediational models were also tested. Results indicated that the mediation of the expertise-tolerance relationship by explicit democratic values was moderated by accessibility of democratic values. Namely, explicit support did mediate the expertise-tolerance relationship when accessibility was low, but this mediational path was no longer significant when accessibility was high. This finding is a bit curious, and runs in the opposite direction as what was hypothesized for this model. These results suggest that the relationship between expertise and tolerance is only accounted for by explicit support for democratic values when those values are not accessible to the individual forming the tolerance judgments. This may indicate that a ceiling effect occurs when democratic values are accessible; namely, that when individuals are able to readily and easily think of democratic values, they are more prone to provide tolerant responses, even if they are not political experts or people otherwise inclined to be tolerant. These results also make it clear that accessibility of democratic values is a distinct construct from either explicit democratic values support or expertise, though it is not as strong a predictor as these other two constructs.

Finally, mediation by accessibility and moderation by explicit support was examined. There was, however, no support for the notion that mediation by accessibility was moderated by explicit democratic values support.

CHAPTER SEVEN

STUDY THREE

Overview

Study two again provided support for mediation by explicit democratic values and replicated existing evidence that tolerance is influenced by political expertise and explicit democratic values support. Study two also examined a novel predictor that has never been tested in the past, democratic value accessibility , and found some support for the utility of this construct as a predictor of tolerance, if not as a mediator of the expertise-tolerance relationship.

Study three examined many of the same predictors as in study two, with the exception of explicit democratic values support, which had already been examined successfully as a predictor, mediator, and moderator in both study one and two. Instead, explicit democratic values support was replaced with implicit democratic values support, using an altered form of the IAT (see Method section, below, for details). As before, political tolerance, political expertise, and democratic value accessibility were recorded, as well as the same control variables as in studies one and two. Effects of democratic value accessibility were therefore replicated in this study.

Implicit support for democratic values was examined as a predictor of tolerance, a mediator of the expertise-tolerance relationship, and a moderator of the hypothesized

mediation of the expertise-tolerance relationship by accessibility. While implicit attitudes have been examined in a variety of domains in the social psychological literature, this study marks the first measurement and examination of implicit democratic values as an implicit attitude and as a predictor of political tolerance. It was anticipated that implicit support would significantly predict political tolerance and would significantly mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance. It was hypothesized that implicit support for democratic values would moderate any mediation by accessibility of democratic values that was evident in this study (though it should be noted that accessibility was not a significant mediator in the previous study). Finally, it was hypothesized that accessibility of democratic values would moderate any mediation by implicit support.

Hypotheses

H27: In a direct replication of numerous previous studies, expertise will be a strong positive predictor of tolerance.

H28: Implicit support for democratic values will predict tolerance.

H29: Accessibility of democratic values will predict tolerance.

H30: Expertise will predict implicit support for democratic values.

H31: Expertise will predict accessibility of democratic values.

H32: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by implicit support for democratic values.

H33: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by accessibility of democratic values.

H34: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by accessibility of democratic values, when controlling for implicit support.

H35: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by implicit support for democratic values, when controlling for accessibility.

H36: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by implicit support for democratic values for high accessibility participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not mediated by implicit democratic values for low accessibility participants. This hypothesis presumes that accessibility of democratic values and expertise are not correlated, as per Muller et al's (2005) procedure for testing moderated mediation (see Proposed Statistical Treatment, below for detail).

H37: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by accessibility for high implicit support participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not mediated by accessibility for low implicit support participants. This hypothesis presumes that implicit support for democratic values and expertise are not correlated, as per Muller et al's (2005) procedure for testing moderated mediation.

H38: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by accessibility for high implicit support participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not mediated by accessibility for low implicit support participants. This hypothesis presumes

that implicit support for democratic values and expertise are correlated, and that accessibility and expertise are correlated, and requires a different statistical procedure to be tested (Preacher et al, 2007).

H39: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by implicit support for high accessibility participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not mediated by implicit support for low accessibility participants. This hypothesis presumes that implicit support for democratic values and expertise are correlated, and that accessibility and expertise are correlated, and requires a different statistical procedure to be tested (Preacher et al, 2007).

Methods

Proposed Mediators: Implicit Support for Democratic Values and Accessibility of Democratic Values

In study three, participants' implicit support for democratic values was assessed as a predictor of political tolerance, as well as accessibility of democratic values. As before, accessibility of democratic values was assessed first in this study, so it could not be influenced by the other questions. Implicit democratic values support was assessed after accessibility and tolerance, to prevent the implicit measure from having a priming effect or otherwise increasing the salience of democratic values in a manner that would influence either.

Implicit support for democratic values. The degree to which participants implicitly support democratic values was measured using an adapted form of the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald, McGee, & Schwarz, 1998), based on the usage guidelines published in Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji (2005), and implemented using the web-based, open-source software WINTERAMIAT by Allon (2013) . Participants were asked to group several sets of words that appeared on their computer screen into one of two appropriate categories using two keys on the keyboard; participants were asked to sort insects and flowers ("horsefly"; "tulip") into separate categories while also being asked to sort nouns and verbs into "noun" and "verb" categories (Bosson, Swann, &Pennebaker, 2000; Greenwald &Farnham, 2000; Nosek et al., 2002; Rudman et al., 2001). Some of the nouns sorted were related to democratic values (e.g. "liberty", "voter"), while most were unrelated to the political domain (e.g. pear, computer, sink) to prevent suspicion, and none of the verbs were related to democratic values (e.g. leap, sprint, climb).

The IAT typically features five blocks of trials, with steps 3 and 5 providing the data to be analyzed; this study was no exception. In step 1, participants learned the first concept dimension. Participants were asked to sort items from two different concepts into their superordinate categories (e.g., photographs of specific insects for "Insect" and photographs of flowers for "Flower"). Categorization was performed using two keys on a computer keyboard that were mapped for the two categories (for example, the "a"

key for “Insect”, and the “;” key for “Flower”) This was performed for 20 trials, though it served as a training session and was not analyzed. In step 2, participants performed the same task, but with new superordinate categories and items (in this case, they sorted nouns and verbs into the “Noun” and “Verb” categories). Again, this step was a training session lasting 20 trials, and was not analyzed. In step 3, these two sorting tasks were combined so that respondents were asked to identify a photograph as either a “Flower” or “Insect”, followed by a word as either a “Noun” or “Verb”. In this step, one key (“a”) was the correct response for two categories (e.g., “Insect” and “Verb”) and the other key (“;”) was the correct response for the remaining two categories (“Flower” and “Noun”). Participants performed a block of 20 trials with these sorting rules (which served as a practice block). After a brief pause, they repeated it for a second block of 40 trials (often referred to as the “critical” block, which were analyzed). In step 4, participants learned to switch the spatial location of the concepts, such that the stimulus items for the target concepts of interest (“Noun” and “Verb”) were sorted for 20 trials, but with a reversed key assignment (i.e., if “Verb” was originally associated with the “;” key, it would now be associated with the “a” key, and vice versa). Finally, in step 5, respondents sorted items from both the attribute and target concept categories once more, the only difference being that the response key assignments now required “Insect” and “Noun” and “Flower” and “Verb” items to be categorized with one another, the opposite association from step 3. Respondents sorted stimulus items with this

response assignment for 20 (unanalyzed) practice trials, and then again for 40 more "critical" trials.

Participants' implicit support for democratic values were determined by examining differences in the reaction time in pairing democratic value words with flowers, relative to the pairing of democratic value words with insects, using the conventional IAT scoring algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, &Banaji, 2003), which is calculated automatically by WINTERAMIAT. The IAT effect is calculated using latency data from Steps 3, using the software. Sorting the stimuli faster when democratic values terms ("Nouns") are paired with "Flower" (i.e., when "Verb" is paired with "Insect") than the reverse indicates a stronger association strength between democratic values and positively-valence things, compared to the reverse mapping, or in other words indicates an automatic preference for democratic values (Note: Greenwald et al., 2003, describe the scoring algorithm for calculating the IAT effect in detail).

Results

Participant Demographics

Participants ranged in age from 18 to 72 years (*M*=34.08, *SD*=12.692). Most participants reported a college degree as their highest level of education (*M*=4.20, *SD*=1.594). Fifty-two percent of participants were male (*N*=132) and forty-seven percent were female (*N*=118). All participants were American citizens (*N*=251) and ninety-six percent of participants reported English as their first language (*N*=242). Participants

were moderate in their political participation (*M*=3.57, *SD*=2.250). The most popular least-liked groups chosen by participants were: the Ku Klux Klan (43.6%), Islamic Fundamentalists (11.8%), Tea Party Protesters (11.6%), Fascists (8.4%), Communists (4.8%), Anti-Abortionists (6.4%), and Pro-Abortionists (3.6%).

Study Three Main Analyses

Three sets of analyses were performed. First, linear regression analyses were performed to test hypotheses 27-31, pertaining to simple (i.e. nonmediated) prediction by continuous variables. Second, hypotheses 32-35 were tested using mediation analyses in regression, following Baron and Kenney's (1986) four-step procedure. Lastly, hypotheses 36-39 were tested using moderated mediational analyses, employing the bootstrapping procedure and SPSS macro created by Preacher et al (2007). In all cases, effects reported are from analyses without controls, but have been replicated with controls (see Appendix C for these analyses).

Hypotheses 27-31: simple linear regression analyses. The effect of political expertise on tolerance (hypothesis 27) was tested using linear regression. Expertise was centered and entered as a predictor of tolerance at Step 1. Regression analyses revealed, consistent with hypothesis one, that political expertise was indeed a significant predictor of political tolerance (*B*= .392, β= .261 *SE*= .092 *p*<.001; see Table 24).

The effect of implicit support for democratic values on tolerance (hypothesis 28) was tested using linear regression. Implicit democratic values support was centered an entered as a predictor of tolerance at Step 1. Regression analyses revealed that implicit democratic values support was indeed a significant predictor of tolerance (*B*= .207, β= .138 *SE*= .094 *p*<.029; see Table 25).

The effect of democratic value accessibility on tolerance (hypothesis 29) was tested by centering the variable and entering it as a predictor at step 1. Regression analyses indicated that democratic value accessibility was, in fact, a significant predictor of tolerance (*B* =.203, β=.135, *SE*=.094, p<.032, see Table 26).

In addition, expertise was examined as a predictor of implicit democratic values support (hypothesis 30). Regression analyses revealed that expertise did significantly predict implicit support for democratic values, (*B* =.315, β=.305, *SE*=.062, p<.001, see Table 27).

Expertise was also examined as a predictor of democratic value accessibility (hypothesis 31). Regression analyses revealed that political expertise was not a significant predictor of democratic value accessibility (*B*= .013, β= .035 *SE*= .023 *p*=.580, see Table 28).

Hypotheses 32-35: non-moderated mediation. Mediation of the expertise-tolerance relationship by implicit democratic values support (hypothesis 32) was tested using Baron and Kenney's (1986) four step procedure. First, an as discussed above, a

significant effect of expertise on tolerance was documented (*B*= .392, β= .261 *SE*= .092 *p*<.001). Second, and also as described above, the effect of expertise on the mediator, implicit support of democratic values, was evident (*B* =.315, β=.305, *SE*=.062, p<.001). Third, the effect of the mediator (implicit democratic values support) on tolerance was tested, and found to be nonsignificant (*B* =.097, β=.064, *SE*=.096, p=.317; see Figure 9). Adequate support for mediation by implicit democratic values support was therefore not found.

The above mediational analyses were also reproduced when controlling for accessibility of democratic values, as per hypothesis 35. As before, a significant effect of expertise on tolerance (when controlling for democratic value accessibility) was demonstrated using regression (*B* =.399, β=.266, *SE*=.091, *p*<.001), meeting the first necessary criterion for establishing mediation. Second, the effect of expertise on the mediator, implicit democratic values support, was also demonstrated when controlling for accessibility (*B* =.316, β=.306, *SE*=.062, p<.001). Third, the effect of implicit democratic values support on tolerance was again tested and found to be nonsignificant (*B* =.091, β=.061, *SE*=.096, p=.341; see Figure 10). Mediation by implicit democratic values was therefore not supported.

Next, mediation by accessibility of democratic values was tested (hypothesis 33). As before, a significant effect of expertise on tolerance was demonstrated using regression analyses, meeting the first criterion for establishing mediation (*B*= .392, β=

.261 *SE*= .092 *p*<.001) Second, the effect of expertise on the mediator, accessibility of democratic values, was tested and found to be nonsignificant (*B* =.013, β=.035, *SE*=.023, *p*=.580; see Figure 11). This criterion of establishing not met, analyzes testing this hypothesis were concluded.

Following this mediational test, mediation by accessibility while controlling for implicit democratic values support was tested (in accordance with hypothesis 34). Again, the first criterion testing the effect of expertise on tolerance while controlling for implicit democratic values support was met (*B*= .362, β= .241 *SE*= .096 *p*<.001). Second, the effect of expertise on the mediator (accessibility) while controlling for implicit support was tested and was not significant (*B* =.015, β=.043, *SE*=.024, *p*=.521; see Figure 12). Again, adequate evidence for mediation by accessibility was not found and tests of hypothesis 34 were concluded.

Hypotheses 36-39: moderated mediation. Following the testing of the simple mediational models predicted in Study three, hypothesized moderated mediational models were examined. First, hypotheses 36 and 39 were tested, as they both related to the same moderated mediational model. Theses hypotheses predicted that the relationship between expertise and tolerance would mediated by implicit democratic values support, and would be moderated by democratic value accessibility (see Figure 13). Hypothesis 36 predicted that democratic value accessibility would not be related to expertise, whereas hypothesis 39 predicted the same moderated mediational model,

but with a significant correlation between accessibility and expertise (again, see Figure 13 for the distinction).

According to Preacher et al (2007), Muller et al (2005), and MacKinnon (2008), there is evidence of moderated mediation if a) the effect of the IV on the DV is significant; and if either (or both) of the following is evident: b) there is a significant effect of the mediator on the DV; *or*: c) there is a significant interaction between the IV and the moderator in predicting the mediator ; and d) there is a significant interaction between the moderator and the mediator predicting the DV (see Appendix B for a more in-depth explanation with relevant equations). Once these prerequisites are met, the mediational model is estimated by MODMED at high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) levels of the moderator, as well as when the moderator is at the mean, and the indirect effect of the IV, via the mediator, for each level of the moderator is examined (see below for a description of how to interpret the indirect effect).

MODMED analyses revealed, first, that there was in fact a significant effect of the IV (expertise) on the DV (tolerance), as already demonstrated above (*B* =.365, β=.354, *SE*=.096, *p*<.001). Second, there was not a significant effect of the mediator (implicit democratic values support) on the DV (*B* =.119, *SE*=.096, *p*=.217). Third, there was not a significant interaction between the IV (expertise) and the moderator (accessibility) predicting the mediator (implicit support) (*B* =-.002, *SE*=.064, *p*=.971; see Table 29), though note that this interaction was not predicted by hypothesis 36 (see

Figure 13). However, there was a marginally significant interaction between the mediator (implicit support) and the moderator (democratic value accessibility) predicting the DV (*B*=.187, *SE*=.097, *p*=.055; see Table 30).

Accordingly, there was borderline evidence in favor of mediation by implicit support and moderation by accessibility and so the mediational model was estimated for participants both at high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) levels of the moderator (accessibility) using Preacher et al's (2007) MODMED macro for SPSS (see Table 34 for indirect effect estimates). Analyses revealed that implicit democratic values did not significantly mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance when accessibility was high (+1 standard deviation above the mean; B=-.0208, SE=.041; Z=-.514; p=.6076). However, implicit democratic values did marginally mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance when accessibility was low (-1 standard deviation below the mean; B=.094, SE=.054; Z=1.761, p<.078), the opposite of what was predicted in hypotheses 36 and 39.

Next, the moderated mediational model predicted by hypotheses 37 and 38 were tested. This model predicted that the relationship between expertise and tolerance would be mediated by democratic value accessibility, and that this mediational pathway would itself be moderated by participants' level of implicit democratic values support (see Figure 14). Again, hypothesis 37 differed from hypothesis 38 in that the former did not presume a significant relation between

expertise (the IV) and implicit democratic values support (the moderator), whereas hypothesis 38 did predict such a relationship (see Figure 14). MODMED analyses revealed, first, that there was in fact a significant effect of the IV (expertise) on the DV (tolerance), as already demonstrated previously (*B*=.380, *SE*=.094, *p*<.001). There was also a significant effect of the mediator (democratic value accessibility) on the DV (*B*=-.197, *SE*=.089, *p*<.05). Third, there was not a significant interaction between the IV (expertise) and the moderator (implicit support) predicting the mediator (accessibility) (*B*=-.025, *SE*=.060, *p*=.682; see Table 31), though note that this interaction was predicted by hypothesis 37 but not 38 (see Figure 13). However, there was a significant interaction between the mediator (accessibility) and the moderator (implicit support) predicting the DV (*B*=-.182, *SE*=.093, *p*<.05; see Table 32).

The mediational model was then estimated for both high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) levels of the moderator (implicit support), using Preacher et al's (2007) MODMED macro for SPSS (see Table 33 for indirect effect estimates). Analyses revealed that democratic value accessibility did not significantly mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance when implicit support was low (-1 standard deviation below the mean; *B*=.001, *SE*=.014; *Z*=-.069; *p*=.954). However, democratic value accessibility did significantly mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance when implicit democratic values support was high (+1 standard deviation above the mean; *B*=-.086, *SE*=.037; *Z*=-.163, *p*<.05).

Study Three Discussion

Thirteen hypotheses were tested in study three, some of which were replications of hypotheses examined in study two. As in all three studies, expertise was a significant predictor of tolerance. Expertise was also found to predict implicit democratic values support, also as hypothesized. However, expertise did not predict accessibility in this study, inconsistent both with hypotheses and with the results of study two.

Accessibility of democratic values was a significant predictor of political tolerance, replicating the results of study two. Further, implicit democratic values support was also a significant predictor of tolerance, as hypothesized. Bivariate correlational analyses revealed that these predictors were all related, but distinct constructs.

Mediational analyses revealed that implicit democratic values support was not a significant mediator of the expertise-tolerance relationship, counter to hypotheses. Additionally, mediation by accessibility of democratic values was not supported in this study, in a direct replication of study two, which is consistent with that study's results but is inconsistent with hypotheses.

Next, moderated mediation was examined in this study. The first set of moderated mediational models, which involved mediation of the expertise-tolerance effect by implicit democratic values support and moderation by accessibility of democratic values, was marginally supported. Results indicated that, in accordance with

hypotheses 36 and 39, implicit democratic values support mediated the expertise-tolerance relationship, but only among participants for whom these values were accessible. This suggests that while implicit support for democratic values are (by definition) not consciously considered, they still have an influence on tolerance judgments when those values are more accessible to participants. The second set of moderated mediational analyses, involving mediation by democratic value accessibility and moderation by implicit democratic values support, was supported by analyses. Results indicated that the moderator, implicit democratic values support, did moderate the path from the mediator (accessibility) to the dependent variable (tolerance). Specifically, it was found that accessibility was not a significant mediator of the expertise-tolerance effect when implicit support for democratic values was low, but that it was a significant mediator when implicit democratic values support was high.

These findings are consistent with hypotheses. These results suggest that when an individual has a positive automatic evaluation of democratic values, accessibility of those values helps to account for the relationship between expertise and tolerance. However, if an individual has a negative, or relatively less positive automatic attitude toward democratic values, the accessibility of those values does not help account for the relationship between political expertise and tolerance. In other words, the effect of expertise on tolerance is only partially accounted for by the accessibility of democratic values when those democratic values are implicitly evaluated in a positive way. This

means that among individuals with a negative automatic evaluation of democratic values, some other mediator must account for the strong link between expertise and tolerance, which is evident across all three studies.

CHAPTER EIGHT

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Overview

The present set of three studies marks the first empirical examination of mechanism underlying the long-established relationship between political expertise and political tolerance. This research also serves as a useful replication of numerous existing effects in the political psychology literature, examining effects of democratic values support, ideology, and party on political tolerance, and effects of expertise and democratic values support on one another. In addition, this research introduces several constructs related to democratic values that have not been previously explored as predictors of tolerance (and mediators of the expertise-tolerance effect): implicit democratic values support, and democratic value accessibility. Due to the plethora of political psychological constructs examined in these studies, and due to the frequently close theoretical relationships between all these constructs, a number of correlations have been observed in this body of research, as well as several mediational relationships and moderated mediational relationships, some of which are consistent with the extant literature, and some of which are disparate or novel.

This research has the advantage of untangling many longstanding theoretical explanations as to why political expertise is associated with political tolerance through

the use of various related, but distinct constructs. In the past, it has been hypothesized that experts are more tolerant because they are more committed to tolerance than novices are, because they are more aware of the "rules of the game", or because they are more likely to consider democratic values a relevant factor when forming tolerance judgments. However, these numerous possible mechanisms have never been treated as fully distinct and tested empirically; instead, researchers have examined simply whether increases in expertise via, for example, increased civics education, leads to a concomitant increase in tolerance (e.g. Golebiowska, 1995; Bobo & Licari, 1989; Vogt, 1997; Knudsen, 1995). By devising specific measures that tap into some of these proposed mechanisms and analyzing them as potential mediators of the expertise-tolerance relationship, this dissertation lays the groundwork for more specific, precise experimental research on increasing tolerance in the population.

In addition, this research has the advantage of using several large, relatively diverse and well-educated samples of Americans of voting age. Not only do the three samples vary widely in age (especially relative to an undergraduate population), they also exhibit strong variability in education level, political ideology, and even in their least-liked political groups (especially relative to student samples, which overwhelmingly select the KKK; see Price & Ottati, 2010). These participants are also far more politically involved and engaged than the average convenience sample, reporting an average of 2.4 political activities in the first study (including voting, volunteering for

campaigns, and contacting political representatives), and an average of 3.5 political activities in the second and third studies. This is in sharp contrast to student samples in particular, who often are only recently eligible to vote and frequently have not engaged in political activities in any significant way. This research is therefore much richer than typical, university-based survey research in political psychology, and exhibits greater ecological validity and generalizability to the actually voting population. When considering matters of free speech rights and commitment to political values, a population that is actually involved in politics is invaluable.

Because these samples are such rich potential sources of information, and because so many of the same predictors were examined across the three studies as continuous predictors, it is useful first to compare and contrast the bivariate relationships between variables found in each of the three studies. These findings will also be compared and contrasted with the preexisting political psychology literature. Following this, the results of the simple mediational models examined in the present three studies will be examined and contrasted with one another (and with the extant literature). Finally, the results of the moderated mediational models tested in these three studies will be examined and discussed, and the overall results of the dissertation project, its limitations, and its implications for future research on political tolerance will be explored.

Bivariate Relations Between Variables

There is a notable internal consistency in the correlational and predictive relationships between variables found in these three studies. In all three studies, political expertise was a strong positive predictor of political tolerance, as was predicted and is consistent with the existing political psychological literature. Political tolerance was also consistently predicted by all the democratic values constructs examined in all three studies, including explicit and implicit support, accessibility, and importance, as was hypothesized. Also consistent with the existing political psychology literature, political expertise was strongly positively associated with education, age, and political participation in all three studies. This is consistent with findings going as far back as Sam Stouffer (1955) demonstrating that higher education tends to engender greater knowledge in the political domain (see, e.g. Bobo & Licari, 1989; Judd & Downing, 1990). Research also has demonstrated that participation and expertise tend to be correlated, though whether expertise engenders participation or vice versa is not entirely clear (Krosnick, 1990; McClurg, 2006). It makes sense, given the relationship between education and expertise and participation and expertise, that age is a positive predictor of expertise across all three studies, as people tend to become more educated and participate in politics more as they age (Zukin et al, 2006).

In studies two and three, political tolerance was also positively correlated with participation and education, which should come as no surprise given the strong

relationship between tolerance and political expertise, which is also strongly correlated with these constructs. Because of tolerance's strong association with expertise (which itself appears to be engendered in part by education and participation), it comes as something of a surprise that these variables are not related to tolerance in study one (see results section). However, this may just be a quirk of the sample in study one, which also exhibits a smaller (but still large and positive) correlation between expertise and tolerance than is evident in the other two studies. Another theoretical inconsistency that is noteworthy is the significant negative correlation between political tolerance and political ideology evident in study three (indicating liberalism is associated with greater tolerance). Most research in political psychology indicates a nonsignificant relationship between political ideology (and party) and political tolerance, especially when Sullivan et al's (1982) least-liked procedure is used, as it controls for effects of ideology on target group attitudes (Sullivan et al, 1981; Sullivan & Marcus, 1993; Price & Ottati, 2010). However, there is some research indicating that ideology is sometimes related to tolerance, including in other countries where free speech rights are not as vaulted as they are in the US (e.g., Israel; Shamir & Sullivan, 1983) and when ideology is related to tolerance, it is in the pattern observed in study three, with conservatives exhibiting less tolerance than liberals (Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Mueller, 1988; Goren, 2005). Therefore, the modest correlation between ideology and tolerance exhibited in one of the three studies is not necessarily cause for alarm or suspicion that the sample in that

study is inappropriate; however, it does indicate that there is some variability between these three mTurk sample populations, even though they were collected in a similar manner at roughly the same time.

In most cases, hypotheses involving expertise and the other political constructs were supported. Expertise is significantly positively correlated with implicit and explicit democratic values support in all instances, as hypothesized. Somewhat surprisingly, expertise is not associated with democratic values importance in study one (the only study in which importance was measured). Neither is importance associated with explicit democratic values support in study one (which was not hypothesized explicitly). Despite these two rather surprising null effects, importance of democratic values is, in fact, a significant positive predictor of political tolerance. This indicates that an individual's subjective weighting of democratic values as important accounts for some unique variance in the individual's level of political tolerance. This points to the necessity of untangling importance and explicit support as unique predictors and possible mechanisms of the expertise-tolerance effect, one of the major advantages of these three studies over existing theoretical work on this topic. Importance of democratic values, long hypothesized to be a possible mechanism underlying the expertise-tolerance relationship, is shown instead to be a predictor of tolerance wholly unrelated to expertise in this study. This effectively allows for one of the possible

mediators of the expertise-tolerance relationship to be ruled out (see the discussion of moderated mediational models, below, for greater detail).

Also worthy of note is the fact that expertise is positively correlated with democratic value accessibility in study two but not in study three. Future research should attempt to replicate the relationship between these constructs that was apparent in study two, to determine whether it is a true relationship or simply a type I error in that study. Theoretically, it makes sense that those who are knowledgeable about politics are more prone to call democratic values to mind in a neutral, nonpolitical task (such as a word completion test, as in these two studies); however, accessibility of an abstract construct such as democratic values can also be subtly influenced by a myriad cues and primes preceding the accessibility measure that are not related to participants' actual political attitudes and predilections. Relatedly, democratic value accessibility was found to be significantly positively correlated with explicit democratic values in study two, but not with implicit democratic values in study three. The relationship between democratic value accessibility and tolerance is also more modest than the other predictors of tolerance examined in these three studies (explicit and implicit democratic values support, expertise, and importance of democratic values). All of these results serve to bolster the notion that accessibility is not caused as consistently by participants' political attitudes and demographics as the other political constructs are. This makes sense theoretically; accessibility of an abstract construct is more fleeting

and more readily influenced by irrelevant external cues than any of the other constructs are.

The remaining significant bivariate relationships uncovered in these three studies are fairly typical of the political psychology literature. As is usually the case, political ideology and political party are strongly positively correlated in all studies. Party and ideology are also consistently negatively correlated with both implicit and explicit democratic values support (indicating that conservatives and Republicans express less support for democratic values). Age and ideology are positively correlated, indicating greater conservatism among older participants (see, e.g., Van Hiel et al 2000 for similar results). Other than the instances noted above, there is a great deal of consistency between the three studies, and with the extant literature in general, which speaks to the validity of the mTurk sample.

Simple Mediation Results

The results of these three studies also allow for some of the proposed mediational pathways explored in the introduction of this paper to be ruled out as possible mechanisms underlying the expertise-tolerance relationship, and for other possible mechanisms has provided some preliminary empirical support. Both study one and study two demonstrate strong evidence for mediation of the expertise-tolerance effect by explicit democratic values support. In both studies, controlling for the effect of explicit support on tolerance causes the effect of expertise on tolerance to drop into

nonsignificance; furthermore, this mediational path remains significant when controlling for importance of democratic values (in study one) and accessibility of democratic values (in study two). This provides a great deal of support to the existing, but until this point purely theoretical notion expressed in the political psychology literature that experts are more tolerant because they have more respect for the "rules of the democratic game" (Sullivan et al, 1993; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Furthermore, the consistency of this effect across studies further supports the finding, as does the extent to which explicit support eradicates the expertise-tolerance effect; by conventional metrics, explicit support can be said to fully mediate the effect of explicit support on tolerance (Rucker et al, 2011).

Other simple mediational models tested in these studies fared less well. In study one, democratic values importance was a significant predictor of tolerance, but expertise was not a predictor of importance, obviating the possibility of mediation. This suggests that importance of democratic values accounts, perhaps, for some unique variance in tolerance that is not accounted for by either expertise or explicit democratic values support. Future research should attempt to replicate this null mediational effect and attempt to discern which political variables do actually contribute to a voter's subjective rating of the importance of democratic values, if not expertise or explicit support of those same values. No other political constructs in these studies predicted democratic values importance; further research should examine whether, for example,

civics education or social capital influence democratic values importance, as has been theorized (Putnam, 2001; Sullivan & Transue, 1999).

Results were also tepid on mediation by accessibility of democratic values. In study two, accessibility was found to not be a mediator of the expertise-tolerance relationship, because accessibility did not remain a significant predictor of tolerance when expertise was included in analyses (and because the effect of expertise on tolerance did not significantly diminish when accessibility was included in analyses). In study three, expertise was not a significant predictor of accessibility of democratic values (see above discussion), so mediation by accessibility was also not supported in that study. This lack of support for mediation by accessibility was also apparent when controlling for explicit support (in study two) and implicit support (in study three). Thus, while further research may be warranted to determine whether expertise and accessibility are truly related (given the inconsistency between studies) there is little support for mediation of the expertise-tolerance effect by this construct.

Finally, implicit support for democratic values was explored as a mediator, and also failed to account for the expertise-tolerance relationship. Study three results demonstrated that while implicit democratic values support did predict tolerance, it did not remain a significant predictor of the DV when expertise was included in analyses, precluding the possibility of mediation. Further, the effect of expertise on tolerance did not diminish when the effect of implicit support was accounted for; rather, the effect of

expertise actually increased. Future research should attempt to replicate this effect to be certain, as there is a notable effect of implicit support on tolerance, though there is no support for this mediational pathway at this juncture. The results of the three studies are thus quite consistent: explicit support for democratic values seems, far and away, to best account for the relationship between expertise and tolerance that is so longstanding in the political psychology literature.

Moderated Mediation

Because several mediational pathways hypothesized in studies one, two, and three were not supported empirically, many of the related hypothesized moderated mediational models were also unsupported. Moderated mediation where importance served as a mediator in study one, for example, were entirely unsupported due to the fact that expertise was not a significant predictor of importance in the simple mediational model. However, a model where importance of democratic values moderated the mediation by explicit democratic values was still theoretically and empirically possible, and was tested in study one; results indicated that importance of democratic values did, in fact, moderate the mediational pathway. Specifically, explicit support for democratic values was found to not mediate the expertise-tolerance relationship when importance was low; whoever, when importance of democratic values was high, explicit democratic values support did significantly mediate the expertise-tolerance relationship.

This finding was predicted by hypothesis 10 (see introduction) and makes intuitive theoretical sense. Experts, who generally are more likely to support democratic values, only allow those values to influence their tolerance judgments when they deem the values to be important enough. When experts are supportive of democratic values but do not deem democratic values to be as importance (for example, if they value public order or public decency to a greater extent than equality under the law), they do not allow those values to influence their tolerance attitudes. Future research should examine which factors do mediate the expertise-tolerance relationship when importance is low, and should examine the effect of other value importance ratings (such as the aforementioned public safety or decency values) to determine what factors are considered relevant to tolerance judgments by participants who deem democratic values to not be the paramount value.

Study two presented moderated mediational results that are much more difficult to parse. Tests of hypotheses 23 and 25 established that accessibility did moderate the mediation by explicit democratic values support, as predicted; however, the pattern of results ran counter to what was hypothesized. Specifically, explicit democratic values support mediated the expertise-tolerance relationship when democratic value accessibility was low, but not when it was high. This runs counter to the hypothesized effect predicted by hypotheses 23 and 25. These results suggest that explicit democratic values support accounts for the effect of expertise on tolerance, but only when those

democratic values are not being readily considered/accessed by the participant. This implies that among experts, democratic values influence attitudes only when those value is inaccessible, which is inconsistent with the hypotheses and does not make much sense. One alternate explanation for this pattern of results is that when accessibility of democratic values is high, individuals are more likely to express tolerant positions, regardless of their actual degree of explicit support for those values. This jibes somewhat with the finding observed in previous research that tolerance is often an automatic "knee-jerk" for experts, rather than an effortful weighing of competing factors and values (e.g. Price & Ottati, 2010, Kuklinski et al, 1993). Future research should attempt to replicate this effect, especially in light of the fact that the relationship between accessibility and expertise is not consistent between studies two and three. Study two results failed to support the alternate moderated mediational models predicted in hypotheses 24 and 26, which posited mediation by accessibility and moderation by explicit support.

Finally, study three examined mediation by implicit democratic values support and moderation by accessibility. This moderated mediational model was ultimately not supported, however, due to a lack of an effect of the mediator (implicit support) on the DV, as well as the lack of an interaction between the IV (expertise) and the moderator (accessibility) predicting the mediator (implicit support). Thus, accessibility was not found to behave as a moderator when implicit democratic values served as a mediator,

despite the fact that it was a significant moderator of mediation by explicit support in study two. However, the failure of this moderated mediational model can be accounted for by the fact that in this study a) implicit support did not mediate the effect of expertise on tolerance, and b) expertise did not significantly predict accessibility of democratic values. Again, future research should examine this model further, or at least attempt to replicate the underlying findings, especially since the findings in study two ran counter to hypotheses.

Study three also examined mediation by accessibility and moderation by implicit democratic values support. There was sufficient empirical support for this model, specifically the model where implicit support moderated the pathway between accessibility and tolerance. Results indicated that accessibility did mediate the expertise-tolerance relationship when implicit democratic values support was high, but not when implicit democratic values support was low. This suggests that experts' automatic, implicit evaluations of democratic values only influenced their tolerance judgments when those automatic values were actually readily accessible to them, but not when such values were not readily accessed. This is essentially consistent with hypothesis 37 and makes intuitive theoretical sense. However, it is inconsistent somewhat with the results of study two, which found that explicit support only mediated the expertise-tolerance relationship when accessibility was low. However, since the mediators in question here are quite distinct (explicit versus implicit support) in both measurement

and in their relationship with the other variables in these studies, neither result necessarily invalidates or calls into question the other.

CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Overview

The present research proposed and tested several possible mechanisms underlying the relationship between expertise and tolerance, which were inspired by both political psychological and social psychological theoretical work that had not, to date, been empirically examined. The results of these studies help to rule out some of the proposed mechanism and have provided strong support for others. While tolerance is influenced to some degree by explicit support of democratic values, implicit support of democratic values, important of democratic values, and accessibility of democratic values, most of these constructs do not account for the relationship between expertise and tolerance to any significant degree. Across multiple studies, explicit democratic values support was found to be the only significant mediator of the expertise-tolerance effect, while the other three potential mediators were not supported. This suggests that experts are, as hypothesized by many, more tolerant by virtue of the greater endorsement of values such as freedom of speech and equality under the law.

These results should be used to inform future empirical research on the ways in which tolerance can be increased in the population. Past research has suggested that one of the methods by which tolerance can be increased is through increased education in general (e.g. Bobo & Licari, 1989), or increased civics education in particular (Sullivan

& Transue, 1999), because the resultant increases in political expertise seemed to drive an increase in political tolerance. While this remains a reasonable approach, increasing individuals' support for democratic norms and values may be a more direct tactic; at the very least, these results suggest that civics education programs should place emphasis on the centrality of democratic norms to the functioning of a healthy democratic system, rather than on other aspects of the democratic process or on procedural facts, if the goal is to increase tolerance.

The results of these studies also shed some light on more complex relationships between multiple political predictors. As stated above, mediation by explicit democratic values support was found quite clearly to be moderated by importance of democratic values. That is, explicit democratic values support only accounts for the relationship between expertise and tolerance when democratic values are upheld by the expert as important values worthy of consideration. This indicates that simple endorsement of democratic values is not enough; these values must be vaulted and seen as paramount in order for them to influence tolerance. This has been suggested previously by the Flexible Deliberation Model of Political Tolerance (Price & Ottati, 2010), which posits that tolerance judgments inherently involve numerous competing values, and the attitude at which a person arrives may depend a great deal on which values or factors they deem worthy of consideration. This result also should inform future research and possibly public policy: again, simple civics education may not be sufficient to bolster

tolerance, for democratic values must not only be taught and accepted, but seen as crucial values that are more important than other competing values.

Moderated mediational results in these studies also suggest that the mediation of the expertise-tolerance relationship by explicit support is moderated by accessibility of democratic values. Study two results, while unhypothesized, indicate that individuals' explicit democratic values support influences tolerance only when those values are not readily accessible. Future research should attempt to replicate this effect; importantly, future research must determine whether political expertise and accessibility are, in fact, related or not, as there was some inconsistency in the results of these studies. If the results of study two are supported by additional studies, some theoretical work will be necessary to make sense of how a value can be most influential when it is inaccessible; in particular, research might attempt to manipulate the accessibility of democratic values directly rather than measure it as an temporary individual difference, to see if this pattern holds.

Last, results of study three indicated that implicit support may only mediate the expertise-tolerance relationship when accessibility of democratic values is high (though the results of study two suggest the reverse). Again, this result seems inconsistent with the results of study two, and additional work is necessary to determine the exact relationship between expertise, accessibility, democratic values support (both explicit

and implicit), and tolerance. However, the results of study three do make the greatest theoretical sense of the two disparate findings.

Implications and Future Directions

These studies demonstrate that expertise, long vaunted as one of the premier predictors of tolerance, has a far more complex relationship with the construct that has previously been examined. In large part, the effect of expertise on tolerance is accounted for by explicit endorsement of democratic values. This is especially the case when democratic values are both supported and seen as important values worthy of consideration when forming judgments. Future research should determine the best method by which explicit support for democratic values can be increased, in order to find useful methods of increasing tolerance in the voting population. Some possibilities include improved education, improved civics education, persuasive materials about the value and importance of democratic values, increased social capital, and increased trust in the government or political system (see, e.g. Putnam, 2000; 2001).

In addition, future experimental research should examine ways of increasing subjective importance of democratic values, using some of the same methods, as well as simple persuasive messages regarding the value of democratic norms in society. Not only should this be examined as a permanent persuasive goal; experimental work should also work on developing methods of enticing participants to temporarily consider democratic values a relevant and important factor when forming tolerance

judgments in the short-term. Priming methods, explicit directions, group discussions about the importance of democratic values, and persuasive materials are among some of the options. In a similar vein, accessibility of democratic values should be experimentally manipulated as well, using priming methods or value rehearsal, to see if there are short-term increases in tolerance as a result. Research should also examine and confirm the relationship between expertise and accessibility of democratic values, both as an individual difference and manipulated variable.

Finally, additional research should examine in greater detail the relationship between education (both general and civics-based) and participation, expertise, democratic values support, and political tolerance. Existing research as well as the present sets of studies strongly suggests that there is a strong, significant positive relationship between all of these predictors and tolerance. The exact directionality of their relationships is, however unknown. It is likely, for example, that education promotes both political expertise and democratic values support, both of which lead to greater tolerance, but the exact path is, as of yet, untested. For example, general education might increase expertise in a variety of domains, including political expertise, which might in turn influence tolerance. However, civics education might influence both political expertise and democratic values support, which might in turn promote tolerance. Mediational pathways of this sort should be tested; in addition, experimental or quasi-experimental designs should be employed to determine whether increased

knowledge leads to greater tolerance, and whether this is accounted for by expertise or democratic values support.

Similar research should be conducted to clarify the role of political participation. In all three of the present studies, political participation was related to tolerance and expertise. This finding is not new (see Introduction). However, the directionality of the relationship is somewhat ambiguous and worthy of deeper exploration. For example, individuals who are already quite knowledgeable about politics might be more inclined to both participate in politics and provide tolerant responses; in such case, participation may have no causal role in tolerance whatsoever. However, the act of participating in politics could also conceivably influence a voter's understanding of the political landscape, inform their attitudes regarding democratic values, and boost or diminish their tolerance as a result. For example, working at the polls might expose a voter to other volunteers who are committed to the democratic process, but who differ from themselves in political attitudes. This experience of participation could increase political tolerance directly, or it might indirectly increase tolerance by increasing support for democratic values. Future research should employ both survey and experimental methodologies to examine the predictors of participation, as well as its effects.

Limitations

The results of these studies do come with a few caveats. First are the limitations of the sample: these participants were all mTurk users of eligible voting age in the

summer of 2013, with computer access, United-States-based IP addresses, and citizenship and English proficiency. Accordingly, this sample probably has greater education, income, and political interest than the average American voter. Research on mTurk user demographics suggest as much (Ross et al, 2010; Buhrmester et al, 2011) and also indicate that mTurk users are highly cognitively motivated and take part in online surveys in part for entertainment and educational purposes. Voting-age adults who do not have access to a computer, do not know about mTurk, or who are disinterested in such activities are thus excluded from the sample, which may influence the pattern of results. While the mTurk sample is far more diverse in age, region of the country, and education than are typical student samples, additional research should be conducted to replicate these results in different, more representative populations.

This research is also limited by the discrepancy between results in studies two and three, most notably regarding the effect of expertise on accessibility (or rather, the lack of one in study three). Study three is also anomalous in the sense that, in that sample, ideology is found to be related to political tolerance, which has not generally been found in related studies, including other studies using mTurk not included in this dissertation (e.g. Price & Ottati 2010; Price & Ottati 2012). Also surprising is the results of the moderated mediational model found to be significant in study two, which has already been discussed at length. Due to these limitations, replication is a must, including potentially replication using a different sample population.

A final limitation is the correlational nature of this data. Since these studies represented the first empirical examinations of the mechanisms underlying the expertise-tolerance relationship, and since the constructs theorized to be relevant were political individual differences, it made sense to first examine these predictors as continuous, measured variables rather than manipulating them experimentally. However, now that these results have been analyzed, experimental research into the same mediational effects is a prudent next step.

Conclusion

Mass public intolerance is a longstanding problem that has vexed political scientists and psychologists alike for many decades. Throughout years of survey and experimental study, several facts about tolerant individuals have reliably been demonstrated: tolerant people have greater political knowledge, and they express greater support for the democratic values that underlie tolerance itself. This research represents an initial test of what has long been suggested by the literature: expertise engenders tolerance because it also engenders a greater commitment to democratic norms. This research has tested a variety of possible mechanisms and has yielded several clear findings that should inform future research into political tolerance, as well as future attempts at bolstering tolerance in the lay populace. The research has also established several relationships that are in need of further experimental inquiry. These

results will inform a continuing program of research focused on the antecedents to tolerance.

APPENDIX A

TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1. Correlation Matrix For Continuous Variables Analyzed In Study One

	Tolerance	Explicit Support	Expertise	Democratic Values Importance	Education	Age	Participation	Ideology	Party	Attitude Least Liked
Tolerance	1.00									
Explicit Support	.216**	1.00								
Expertise	.167**	.270**	1.00							
Democratic Values Importance	.181*	.086	.046	1.00						
Education	.061	.216**	.401**	.027	1.00					
Age	.073	.066	.358**	.131*	.243**	1.00				
Participation	.029	.156*	.344**	-.094	.180*	.035	1.00			
Ideology	.058	-.022	.018	.056	.007	.133*	-.109	1.00		
Party	.047	-.020	-.047	.021	-.042	.042	-.110	.794**	1.00	
Attitude Least Liked	-.105	-.037	-.020	.025	.023	-.043	-.015	.056	.023	1.00

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level; * significant at the p<.05 level; ** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 2. Correlation Matrix For Continuous Variables Analyzed In Study Two

	Tolerance	Explicit Support	Expertise	Democratic Values Accessibility	Education	Age	Participation	Ideology	Party	Attitude Least Liked
Tolerance	1.00									
Explicit Support	.618**	1.00								
Expertise	.372**	.323**	1.00							
Democratic Values Accessibility	.137**	.170**	.292**	1.00						
Education	.249**	.076	.366**	.038	1.00					
Age	.017	.030	.246**	.066	.217**	1.00				
Participation	.252**	.193**	.366**	.118	.325**	.089	1.00			
Ideology	-.122	-.204**	.007	.015	.040	.148*	-.132	1.00		
Party	-.041	-.163**	.022	.042	.097	.113	.021	.751**	1.00	
Attitude Least Liked	-.900	-.025	-.080	-.113	.050	-.047	-.065	.079	.041	1.00

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level; * significant at the p<.05 level; ** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 3. Correlation Matrix For Continuous Variables Analyzed In Study Three

	Tolerance	Implicit Support	Expertise	Democratic Values Accessibility	Education	Age	Participation	Ideology	Party	Attitude Least Liked
Tolerance	1.00									
Implicit Support	.138*	1.00								
Expertise	.261**	.305**	1.00							
Democratic Values Accessibility	.135*	.012	.035	1.00						
Education	.170**	.056	.268**	-.047	1.00					
Age	.045	.244**	.365**	.093	.172*	1.00				
Participation	.287**	.250**	.440**	.043	.323**	.292**	1.00			
Ideology	-.182*	-.144**	-.050	.151	-.121	.087	-.233**	1.00		
Party	-.025	-.049**	.068	.099	-.132	.066	-.153*	.774**	1.00	
Attitude Least Liked	-.045	-.184**	-.247**	-.038	-.129*	-.058	-.249**	.125*	.058	1.00

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level; * significant at the p<.05 level; **significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 4. Expertise Predicting Tolerance In Study One

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	4.082**	.056	-
Expertise	.147*	.056	.167*
R^2		.130	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 5. Explicit Democratic Values Support Predicting Tolerance In Study One

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	4.081**	.055	-
Explicit Democratic Values Support	.191*	.055	.216*
R^2		.216	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 6. Importance Of Democratic Values Predicting Tolerance In Study One

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	4.089**	.055	-
Importance of Democratic Values	.158*	.055	.181*
R^2		.181	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 7. Expertise Predicting Explicit Democratic Values Support In Study One

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	-.015**	.062	-
Expertise	.272**	.062	.270*
R^2		.073	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 8. Expertise Predicting Importance Of Democratic Values In Study One

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.539**	.125	-
Expertise	.087	.124	.046
R^2		.046	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Figure 1. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise And Tolerance As Mediated By Explicit Democratic Values Support In Study One



The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while controlling for explicit democratic values support is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01.

Figure 2. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise And Tolerance As Mediated By Explicit Democratic Values Support (When Controlling For Importance)



The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while controlling for explicit democratic values support is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01.

Figure 3. The Moderated Mediation Model Specified In Hypotheses 10 And 12



Table 9. Regression Predicting The Mediator For The Moderated Mediation Model Specified In Hypotheses 10 And 12 (Study One)

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	-.001**	.062	-
Expertise	.263**	.063	.167**
Expertise x Importance	-.066	.063	.056

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 10. Regression Predicting The Dependent Variable For The Moderated Mediation Model Specified In Hypothesis 10 And 12 (Study One)

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	4.073**	.053	-
Expertise	.094*	.055	.082*
Importance	.183**	.057	.161**
Expertise x Importance	-.003	.056	.001
Explicit Support	-.219**	.056	.184**
Explicit Support x Importance	-.191**	.061	.185**

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 11. Indirect Effects As Specified By The Moderated Mediation Model In Hypothesis 10 And 12 (Study One)

Importance	Indirect Effect	SE	Z	P> Z
-1 SD (-.9824)	-.0084	.0216	-.3879	.6981
Mean (.0122)	-.0582**	.0206	-2.8211**	.0048
- 1 SD (1.0067)	-.1044**	.0463	-2.2578**	.0240

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Figure 4. The Moderated Mediation Model Specified By Hypotheses 11 And 13



Table 12. Regression Predicting The Mediator For The Model Specified In Hypotheses 11 And 13 (Study One)

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	.0323**	.068	-
Expertise	.023	.069	-.033
Expertise x Explicit Support	.074	.062	-.063

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 13. Regression Predicting The Dependent Variable For The Moderated Mediation Model Specified In Hypothesis 11 And 13 (Study One)

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	4.098**	.055	-
Expertise	.091	.054	.082
Importance	.174*	.057	.161*
Expertise x Explicit Support	.093	.050	.097
Explicit Support	-.239**	.057	-.220**
Explicit Support x Importance	-.1890*	.058	-.185*

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 14. Expertise Predicting Tolerance In Study Two

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	4.937**	.088	-
Expertise	.561**	.088	.372**
R^2		.139	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 15. Explicit Democratic Values Support Predicting Tolerance In Study Two

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.937**	.074	-
Explicit Democratic Values Support	.932*	.075	.618*
R^2		.382	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 16. Democratic Value Accessibility Predicting Tolerance In Study Two

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.937**	.094	-
Democratic value accessibility	.207*	.094	.137*
R^2		.019	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 17. Expertise Predicting Explicit Democratic Values Support In Study Two

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	5.465**	.078	-
Expertise	.425**	.078	.323**
R^2		.104	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 18. Expertise Predicting Accessibility Of Democratic Values In Study Two

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	1.165**	.054	-
Expertise	.264**	.054	.292**
R^2		.085	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Figure 5. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise And Tolerance As Mediated By Explicit Democratic Values Support In Study Two



The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while controlling for explicit democratic values support is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01.

Figure 6. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise And Tolerance As Mediated By Explicit Democratic Values Support (When Controlling For Accessibility) In Study Two



The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while controlling for explicit democratic values support is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01.

Figure 7. The Moderated Mediational Model Predicted By Hypotheses 23 And 25



Table 19. Regression Predicting The Mediator For The Moderated Mediation Model Specified In Hypotheses 23 And 25 (Study Two)

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	.058	.061	-
Expertise	.269**	.062	.188**
Accessibility	.126	.063	.132
Expertise x Accessibility	-.198**	.062	.195**

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 20. Regression Predicting The Dependent Variable For The Moderated Mediation Model Specified In Hypothesis 23 And 25 (Study Two)

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.945**	.077	-
Expertise	.305**	.081	.297**
Accessibility	-.014	.079	-.012
Expertise x Accessibility	-.068	.082	-.064
Explicit Support	.832**	.079	.823**
Explicit Support x Accessibility	.076	.073	.069

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 21. Indirect Effects As Specified By The Moderated Mediation Model In Hypotheses 23 And 25 (Study Two)

Accessibility	Indirect Effect	SE	Z	P> Z
-1 SD	.353**	.079	4.464**	.0000
Mean	.224**	.056	4.018**	.0001
- 1 SD	.065	.086	.752	.4519

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Figure 8. The Moderated Mediational Model Predicted By Hypotheses 24 And 26



Table 22. Regression Predicting The Mediator For The Moderated Mediation Model Specified In Hypotheses 24 And 26 (Study Two)

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	.022	.063	-
Expertise	.244**	.066	.221**
Explicit Support	.073	.064	.071
Expertise x Accessibility	-.068	.059	-.067

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 23. Regression Predicting The Dependent Variable For The Moderated Mediation Model Specified In Hypothesis 24 And 26 (Study Two)

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.888**	.076	-
Expertise	.340**	.082	.324**
Explicit Support	.863	.078	.835
Expertise x Explicit Support	.159	.081	.135
Accessibility	-.001	.077	-.001
Explicit Support x Accessibility	-.013	.080	-.012

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 24. Expertise Predicting Tolerance In Study Three

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.733**	.092	-
Expertise	.392**	.092	.261**
R^2		.068	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 25. Implicit Democratic Values Support Predicting Tolerance In Study Three

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.733**	.094	-
Implicit Democratic Values Support	.207*	.094	.138*
R^2		.019	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 26. Accessibility Predicting Tolerance In Study Three

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.733**	.094	-
Accessibility of Democratic Values Support	.203*	.094	.135*
R^2		.018	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 27. Expertise Predicting Implicit Support In Study Three

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	6.203**	.062	-
Expertise	.315**	.061	.305**
R^2		.093	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 28. Expertise Predicting Accessibility In Study Three

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	.414**	.023	-
Expertise	.013	.023	.035
R^2		.001	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Figure 9. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise And Tolerance As Mediated By Implicit Democratic Values Support In Study Three (Without Controls)



The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while controlling for implicit democratic values support is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01.

Figure 10. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise And Tolerance As Mediated By Implicit Democratic Values Support (When Controlling For Accessibility) In Study Three



The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while controlling for explicit democratic values support is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01.

Figure 11. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise And Tolerance As Mediated By Accessibility Of Democratic Values In Study Three



The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while controlling for accessibility is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01.

Figure 12. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise And Tolerance As Mediated By Accessibility Of Democratic Values In Study Three (While Controlling For Implicit Support)



The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while controlling for accessibility is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01.

Figure 13. The Moderated Mediational Model Predicted By Hypotheses 36 And 39 (In Study Three)



Table 29. Regression Predicting The Mediator For The Moderated Mediation Model Specified In Hypotheses 36 And 39 (Study Three)

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	.001	.060	-
Expertise	.306**	.061	.287**
Accessibility	.023	.061	.018
Expertise x Accessibility	.002	.064	.001

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 30. Regression Predicting The Dependent Variable For The Moderated Mediation Model Specified In Hypothesis 36 And 39 (Study Three)

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.727**	.091	-
Expertise	.365**	.096	.307**
Accessibility	-.215*	.913	-.187*
Expertise x Accessibility	.105	.099	.076
Implicit Support	.119	.096	.113
Implicit Support x Accessibility	-.187*	.097	-.142

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Figure 14. The Moderated Mediation Model Predicted By Hypotheses 37 And 38 (In Study Three)



Table 31. Regression Predicting The Mediator For The Moderated Mediation Model Specified In Hypotheses 37 And 38 (Study Three)

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	.008	.066	-
Expertise	.041	.067	.023
Expertise x Implicit Support	-.025	.060	-.017

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 32. Regression Predicting The Dependent Variable For The Moderated Mediation Model Specified In Hypotheses 37 And 38 (Study Three)

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.66**	.093	-
Expertise	.380**	.094	.342**
Implicit Support	.236*	.10	.219*
Expertise x Implicit Support	.243**	.085	.220**
Accessibility	-.197*	.089	.184*
Accessibility x Implicit Support	-.182*	.093	.163*

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 33. Indirect Effects As Specified By The Moderated Mediation Model In Hypotheses 37 And 38 (Study Three)

Implicit Support	Indirect Effect	SE	Z	P> Z
-1 SD	-.001	.014	-.068	.945
Mean	-.008	.015	-.094	.593
- 1 SD	-.086*	.037	-.163*	.024

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 34. Indirect Effects As Specified By The Moderated Mediation Model In Hypotheses 36 And 39 (Study Three)

Accessibility	Indirect Effect	SE	Z	P> Z
-1 SD	.0944+	.054	1.761	.078
Mean	.0364	.031	1.178	.239
- 1 SD	-.0208	.041	-.514	.608

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level

* significant at the p<.05 level.

** significant at the p<.01 level.

APPENDIX B

STATISTICAL TREATMENT DETAILS

Statistical Treatment Details

Simple Mediation

As per Baron and Kenny's (1986) procedure, simple mediation will be tested using the following three regression models, with expertise as X, tolerance as Y, and the mediator as M.

1. Y = B1 + B2X + e1
2. M= B3 + B4X + e2
3. Y= B5 + B6X + B7M +e3

To demonstrated mediation, the following four conditions must be met:

1. In equation 1, there must be an overall effect of expertise on tolerance. B2 must be significant.
2. In equation 2, there must be an effect of the expertise on the mediator; B4 must be significant.
3. In equation 3, there must be an effect of the mediator on the DV when controlling for the IV; B7 must be significant.
4. In equation 3, the effect of the IV on the DV must be reduced from the overall effect of the IV on the DV in equation 1.

Condition 4 is satisfied by computing Sobel's (1982) test. In the below equation a represents the raw coefficient for the effect of the IV on the mediator (s_a^2 is the

standard error of a), and b represents the raw coefficient for the effect of the mediator on the DV (s_b is the standard error of b; note that the critical value for a two-tailed Sobel's test at p<.05 is 1.96:

z-value = $a*b/\text{SQRT}\ (b^2*s_a^2 + a^2*s_b^2)$

If the Sobel's test is significant at the p<.05 level, there is evidence of mediation.

Simple Mediation with Controls

As per Baron and Kenny's (1986) procedure, simple mediation will be tested using the following three regression models, with expertise as X, tolerance as Y, the control as C and the mediator as M.

4. Y = B1 + B2X + B8C e1
5. M= B3 + B4X + B9C e2
6. Y= B5 + B6X + B7M + B10C +e3

To demonstrated mediation, the following four conditions must be met:

5. In equation 1, there must be an overall effect of expertise on tolerance. B2 must be significant.
6. In equation 2, there must be an effect of the expertise on the mediator; B4 must be significant.
7. In equation 3, there must be an effect of the mediator on the DV when controlling for the IV; B7 must be significant.

8. In equation 3, the effect of the IV on the DV must be reduced from the overall effect of the IV on the DV in equation 1.

Condition 4 is satisfied by computing Sobel's (1982) test. In the below equation a represents the raw coefficient for the effect of the IV on the mediator (s_a^2 is the standard error of a), and b represents the raw coefficient for the effect of the mediator on the DV (s_b is the standard error of b; note that the critical value for a two-tailed Sobel's test at p<.05 is 1.96:

z-value = $a*b$/SQRT ($b^2*s_a^2 + a^2*s_b^2$)

If the Sobel's test is significant at the p<.05 level, there is evidence of mediation.

Moderated Mediation: If Expertise and the Moderator are Uncorrelated (e.g., Hypothesis 10)

As per Muller et al's (2005) description of how to evaluate moderated mediation, predictors will be centered and entered into the three following regression equations, where X is the independent variable (expertise), Y is the dependent variable (tolerance), M is the mediator (explicit support for democratic norms), and W is the moderator (importance of democratic norms):

Equation 1: $Y = \beta1 + \beta2X + \beta3W + \beta4XW + \varepsilon1$

Equation 2: $M = \beta5 + \beta6X + \beta7W + \beta8XW + \varepsilon2$

Equation 3: $Y = \beta9 + \beta10X + \beta11W + \beta12XW + \beta13M + \beta14MW + \varepsilon3$

Following Muller et al's (2005) procedure, to have evidence of moderated mediation the following conditions must be met:

1. The interaction between the IV (expertise) and the moderator (importance) in its effect on the DV (tolerance) must be nonsignificant in equation 1 (β4).
2. At least one of the following must be evident:
    a. Either both the interaction between the IV (expertise) and the moderator (importance) must be significant predicting the mediator (explicit support; β8 in equation 2) *and* the effect of the mediator (explicit support) on the DV must be significant (β13 in equation 3).
    b. Both the effect of the IV (expertise) on the mediator (explicit support; β6 in equation 2) *and* the interaction term between the mediator (explicit support) and the moderator (importance) on the DV (tolerance) must be significant (β14 in equation 3).

    If there is evidence of moderated mediation, the following regression can be used (with coefficients taken from the above equations) to calculate simple overall effects at different levels of the mediator (+1 and -1 standard deviation):

    $\beta 2 + \beta 4W$

    The moderated indirect effect of the IV, via the mediator, is:

    $(\beta 6 + \beta 8W)(\beta 13 + \beta 14W)$

    The residual effect of the IV is:

$\beta 10 + \beta 12W$

These equations can be used to estimate simple effects at high and low levels of the moderator.

If the prerequisites for moderated mediation are apparent using this procedure, indirect effects of the IV, via the mediator at high (+1 SD) and low (-1SD) levels of the moderator, (as per Preacher et al, 2007, Ng et al, 2008 & Muller et al, 2005). The resulting indirect effects tests are reported in a separate table in Appendix A. Note: in moderated mediation, the indirect effect score represents the portion of the relation between the IV and the DV that is accounted for the mediator (at that particular level of the moderator). Thus, a high, significant indirect effect score and corresponding z-score indicates that the effect of the IV on the DV has actually dropped in significance when the effect of the mediator has been included, and therefore is the functional equivalent of a Sobel's test when testing moderated mediation (see Pearl, 2001, for a discussion of indirect and direct effects).

APPENDIX C

TABLES AND FIGURES FOR ANALYSES WITH CONTROLS

Table 35. Expertise Predicting Explicit Democratic Values Support With Controls

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	-.442	.206	-
Expertise	.197*	.071	.196*
Participation	.049	.045	.072
Education	.073+	.040	.123+
R^2		.091	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 36. Expertise Predicting Importance Of Democratic Values With Controls

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	-.515**	.207	-
Expertise	.112	.068	.113
Age	.016**	.006	.185**
R^2		.032	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 37. Regression Specified In Hypotheses 10 With Controls

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	-.001**	.062	-
Expertise	.263**	.063	.167**
Expertise x Importance	-.066	.063	.056
Education	.072	.040	.065
Participation	.044	.046	.039

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 38. Regression Specified In Hypothesis 12 With Controls

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	4.073**	.053	-
Expertise	.094*	.055	.082*
Importance	.183**	.057	.161**
Expertise x Importance	-.003	.056	.001
Explicit Support	-.219**	.056	.184**
Explicit Support x Importance	-.191**	.061	.185**
Education	.016	.034	.015
Participation	.021	.040	.019

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 39. Model Specified In Hypotheses 11 And 13 With Controls

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	.0323**	.068	-
Expertise	.023	.069	-.033
Expertise x Explicit Support	.074	.062	-.063
Education	.075	.046	.066
Participation	.039	.039	.034

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 40. Regression Specified In Hypothesis 11 And 13 With Controls

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	4.098**	.055	-
Expertise	.091	.054	.082
Importance	.174*	.057	.161*
Expertise x Explicit Support	.093	.050	.097
Explicit Support	-.239**	.057	-.220**
Explicit Support x Importance	-.1890*	.058	-.185*
Education	.016	.034	.012
Participation	.022	.040	.020

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 41. Expertise Predicting Tolerance With Controls In Study Two

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.264**	.223	-
Expertise	.181*	.087	.120*
Explicit Democratic Values Support	.843**	.076	.559**
Accessibility of Democratic Values	-.007	.075	-.004
Education	.132**	.047	.146**
Participation	.034	.035	.051
R^2		.438	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 42. Expertise Predicting Accessibility With Controls In Study Two

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	1.165**	.054	-
Expertise	.239**	.057	.265**
Explicit Democratic Values Support	.076	.057	.084
R^2		.092	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 43. Regression Specified In Hypotheses 24 With Controls

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	.022	.063	-
Expertise	.244**	.066	.221**
Explicit Support	.073	.064	.071
Expertise x Accessibility	-.068	.059	-.067
Education	-.046	.040	-.043
Participation	.009	.030	.008

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 44. Regression Specified In Hypothesis 26 With Controls

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.888**	.076	-
Expertise	.340**	.082	.324**
Explicit Support	.863	.078	.835
Expertise x Explicit Support	.159	.081	.135
Accessibility	-.001	.077	-.001
Explicit Support x Accessibility	-.013	.080	-.012
Education	.130	.047	.122
Participation	.031	.035	.029

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 45. Regression Specified In Hypotheses 23 With Controls

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	.058	.061	-
Expertise	.269**	.062	.188**
Accessibility	.126	.063	.132
Expertise x Accessibility	-.198**	.062	.195**
Education	-.036	.39	-.33
Participation	.039	.029	.037

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 46. Regression Specified In Hypothesis 25 With Controls

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.888**	.076	-
Expertise	.340**	.082	.324**
Explicit Support	.863	.078	.835
Expertise x Explicit Support	.159	.081	.135
Accessibility	-.001	.077	-.001
Explicit Support x Accessibility	-.013	.080	-.012
Education	.130	.047	.121
Participation	.035	.035	.026

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 47. Expertise Predicting Tolerance With Controls In Study Three

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.468**	.380	-
Expertise	.244*	.103	.162*
Implicit Democratic Values Support	.038	.095	.025
Accessibility of Democratic Values	.195*	.091*	-.130*
Education	.047	.060	.050
Participation	.117*	.047	.175*
Ideology	-.101	.061	-.103
R^2		.141	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 48. Expertise Predicting Accessibility With Controls In Study Three

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	.291**	.055	-
Expertise	.015	.023	.043
Ideology	.036**	.015	.153**
R^2		.025	

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 49. Regression Specified In Hypotheses 36 With Controls

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	.001	.060	-
Expertise	.306**	.061	.287**
Accessibility	.023	.061	.018
Expertise x Accessibility	.002	.064	.001
Ideology	-.069	.041	-.051
Participation	.059	.031	.057
Education	-.044	.040	-.039

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 50. Regression Specified In Hypothesis 39 With Controls

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.727**	.091	-
Expertise	.365**	.096	.307**
Accessibility	-.215*	.913	-.187*
Expertise x Accessibility	.105	.099	.076
Implicit Support	.119	.096	.113
Implicit Support x Accessibility	-.187*	.097	-.142
Ideology	-.096	.061	-.088
Participation	.122	.047	.109
Education	.045	.056	.452

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 51. Regression Specified In Hypotheses 37 With Controls.

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	.008	.066	-
Expertise	.041	.067	.023
Expertise x Implicit Support	-.025	.060	-.017
Ideology	.108	.060	.092
Education	-.040	.042	-.036
Participation	.044	.033	.042

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

Table 52. Regression Specified In Hypotheses 38 With Controls

Variable	Model 1		
	B	SE B	β
Constant	3.66**	.093	-
Expertise	.380**	.094	.342**
Implicit Support	.236*	.10	.219*
Expertise x Implicit Support	.243**	.085	.220**
Accessibility	-.197*	.089	.184*
Accessibility x Implicit Support	-.182*	.093	.163*
Ideology	-.110	.046	-.102
Participation	.109	.045	.089
Education	.042	.060	.044

+ marginally significant at p<.10 level
* significant at the p<.05 level.
** significant at the p<.01 level.

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