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Counseling Concepts Applied to the Process of Education

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COUNSELING CONCEPTS APPLIED TO THE PROCESS
OF EDUCATION

by

DANIEL D. TRANEL

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF LOYOLA UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Field of Education

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I. PURPOSE OF THE DISSERTATION

Since the arrival of John Dewey on the educational scene in the 1930's, there has been a great deal of discussion in educational literature about the need for teaching the "whole person", and of the necessity of the student to become totally involved in the learning process, not merely on an intellectual level, but somatically and emotionally as well, in order for genuine learning to take place. The impact of Rogerian client-centered counseling in the early 1940's highlighted the place of personal involvement and self-investment in the successful outcome of the counseling process. The purpose of this paper is to describe what might result when these generally accepted concepts and principles of counseling are applied to the educative process.

II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The following statement by Arbuckle will be helpful in delineating the problem:

If we are to think of man as a determined set of behaviors, then we would agree that ultimately every facet of man will be put under a microscope and examined, and prediction and control of the human race will become a part of an exact and empirical science. We might, on the other hand, hypothesize that one of the reasons why both psychology and medicine have never really got close to man, the total living being, is
that they have fallen into the trap of empiricism. To medicine, man is a disease; to psychologists, he is a problem; to psychiatrists, he is a disease-problem; and to counselors, too frequently, he appears to be a profile of the results of various tests and examinations. Science has generally accepted the words "cognitive" and "meaningful" as somewhat synonymous. At least I think that science would probably say that the less cognitive a picture of man is, the less meaningful it is. My own perception would be that man - not man's behavior, since you cannot cut one off from the other, but man, the total existential being, if you will - is not really subject to empirical examination, and that both a human experience and a human being could mean very little in a cognitive sense, and yet at the same time be overwhelmingly meaningful.

In the above quotation, Arbuckle is suggesting that those social scientists who have taken an empirical approach in their efforts to aid man have been ineffective in their efforts to the extent that they have dichotomized man. While not wishing to discredit the contributions of the scientific method to the betterment of mankind, the question remains whether it can, of and by itself, provide an answer to many of the problems currently being faced by educators. To put this another way, if educators, too, fall into what Arbuckle calls "the trap of empiricism", will they thereby become less effective in relating to the whole person and in ultimately fulfilling their task? Will they, in a dichotomized approach to man, bypass him altogether? If these questions are answered affirmatively, then what, if anything, can be done to avoid this "trap" on the part of the educator? These questions, and a suggested approach to them, will be considered. Specifically, this approach is the application of the concepts of counseling to the educative process.
III. EXPLANATION OF THE CONTENTS

While this dissertation is primarily descriptive, at least some of the concepts contained in it have been put into practice in an educational setting by the writer. The results of this will be explained in Chapter IV.

In the second chapter, a broad outline will be presented showing the Cartesian-Kantian basis of the prevalent concept of the nature of man and how much of modern education derives from this basis. Behavioristic learning theory, as an outgrowth of Cartesian-Kantian dualism, will be discussed. Limitations of a strictly Behavioristic approach to learning will be suggested.

In Chapter III, in discussing the relationship between teaching and counseling, it will be shown that while there is a distinct difference between these two processes, there are many concepts from the field of counseling that can be integrated into the teaching-learning process in such a way as to enable the educator to relate to the "whole person" of the student.

In the fourth chapter, the discussion will center around what actually happened when the concepts of counseling were applied in the classroom situation. The application of these concepts was made in two different situations: one of them, a High School Sophomore Latin class; the other, a High School Senior Religion class. The significance of the outcome of each will be commented upon.
The aim of Chapter V will be to point up the place that feelings have in the learning process. It will have been noted in Chapter IV, in describing the reaction of the students to what was happening in the classroom, that feelings played a prominent part in the process of learning. An attempt will be made to show that, since man is not only an intellectual being, but a psychosomatic entity, feelings would have to be regarded as an integral part of the educative process.

In Chapter VI, while focusing on the communication of values as the final aim of education, it will be seen how education is a process wherein, in the words of Curran, "meanings become values". Chapter IV will be cited as evidence of this. The position taken here is that the task of the educator involves more than the presentation of facts, or meanings. Rather than stopping short at the presentation of meanings, the educator must be concerned with the kind of self-investment that the student can make in these meanings.

Because it has been stated in Chapter VI that the ultimate aim of education is the acquisition of values on the part of the student, we are left to ask under what circumstances this might be accomplished. While not offering a final solution to this question, it is suggested in the final chapter that the community learning situation provides an opportunity for self-investment. In Chapter VII, therefore, community learning will be discussed as motivation for self-investment, in which the student is
motivated to learn because of his need to belong.

In Chapter VIII, the main ideas of this paper will be drawn together and suggestions of the implications that they have for education will be made.

CHAPTER II

PRESENT LEARNING THEORY BASED ON
A CARTESIAN-KANTIAN CONCEPT OF MAN

I. THE CARTESIAN-KANTIAN DICHOTOMY

The way in which the educator approaches his task of educating will depend not only on what he thinks education is and is supposed to achieve, but, more importantly, on his view of the nature of man. Since the time of Dewey, it has become a cliche' to say that education must be concerned with the "whole man". In order to understand more clearly the reason for the current emphasis on this notion, it is necessary first to consider the implications of its opposite, namely, the "divided man".

Of all the changes presently taking place in the field of education, there seems to be one that is common to all of them. This is the sharpening in awareness among many educators and psychologists of the unitary nature of man. Not that this is a totally new awareness; rather, it is a question of the rediscovery of an awareness that has been lost sight of through the emergence of a fragmented, dualistic view of man based on a mechanistic conception of his nature. The individual most influential in bringing about this dichotomized view of man was the seventeenth century philosopher, Descartes. Prior to his time, the nature of man was seen as a unitary entity and, in fact, the
thinking of Descartes in some ways represents a regression from what had preceded him. This is noted by Arnold

As we have seen, not only is Descartes' treatment no advance over that of older writers; his psychological analysis is actually inferior to that of Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas. The immediate consequence of this treatment of the soul-body relationship was to accustom his successors to the view of two independent entities, one res cogitans, the other res extensa, having but the most tenuous connection through the pineal gland. No wonder the soul was soon discarded as so much excess baggage when it was found that the pineal gland has none of the functions Descartes ascribed to it.

Influential as Descartes' thinking has been in the western world in the past three centuries, it is less and less able to bear scrutiny under man's growing awareness of himself as a unified being. The trend away from the fragmentary, mechanical model to the unified view of man's nature is described by Curran as follows:

This change is a movement away from the dichotomized view of man that has been the major influence since the time of Descartes and a return to a more ancient unified view of man; with it there is a commitment to sharing the human condition as well as the sense of uniqueness and mystery inherent in the human person.

If, then, the educator's view of the nature of man is a dualistic one, he cannot but fail in his avowed aim to educate the "whole man" since he would see himself, not as relating to the entire person in the human condition, but only to disconnected subjects. This assumption would have meaning only to one holding a compartmentalized view of man. In discussing much the same idea, some years prior to Cantor, Kelley remarks:
Perhaps this absolute parcelling of the absolute goods comes from the notion that the mind is something separate from the body, and further, that the mind itself is divided into compartments. We do certain things in school which are supposed to train our will power, others to train our reasoning power or our memory, as though these functions were separate and resided in particular parts of the brain.

The present change from the dichotomized view of man is, according to Curran, attributable to two sources:

...a growing resistance to the mechanized concept of man that industrialism and a popular scientism has produced; and an increasingly convincing amount of research in medicine, psychology and psychiatry re-emphasizing the unitary nature of man's reactions to himself and to his environment.

Similarly, the original dichotomized view of man is traceable to two sources, both philosophical: the writings of Descartes and Kant.

Insofar as his philosophy relates to education, it must be noted that Descartes was primarily concerned with the problem of intellectual certitude and he was determined to discover the basis for it in his own reason. Concerned with the notion of "the clear and distinct idea", he wanted to make all of knowledge a "universal mathematics". In his Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Descartes' aim is to provide a clean and orderly procedure for the operation of the mind. He sought to rebuild all of philosophy by recourse to rational powers directed according to his rules. In setting aside all truth that did not meet the test of absolute, mathematically conceived certitude, he presented us with a mechanistic view of man. But in applying this to human nature,
we have to ask to what extent this kind of certitude is possible or necessary, or even desirable.

In his dualistic view of man, Descartes left educators with this problem: If mind and extension are radically separate, how can they communicate? If man is made up of two really distinct substances, what kind of unity does he have? To carry this question a step further, how can man communicate with himself? This dualistic view gives rise to a further question of which Descartes himself was not unaware. If mind (extension) and matter (body) are distinct, how can the will control the "commotions" (passions) of the body? Descartes' answer (Treatise on the Passions, I, Art. XXXVI) was:

The most that the will can do while such a commotion is in its full strength is not to yield to its effect and to restrain many of the movements to which it disposes the body. For example, if anger causes us to lift our hand to strike, the will usually can hold it back.

In taking note of this view of Descartes, Curran explains it this way:

...man's body must be considered as a kind of machine, albeit a most complicated and subtle one. What, then, of man's spirit, his ultimate purpose and being, his real self? These could hardly be reduced to a machine however complicated and mysterious. Descartes' answer was that man, for all practical purposes, was really his psyche, not his soma.

Curran further suggests that, although a dualistic view of man may have filled a lacuna at one time, it is now bringing diminishing returns.

Although Descartes is identified by many people as a
philosopher, he is, nevertheless, primarily a mathematician. The mathematician is obsessed by the timeless self-identity of essences; hence, he is congenial to any philosophy that exalts essence over existence, e.g. Scholasticism. The philosophers of the 17th century, and those following it, were concerned with the expansion of mathematical physics. Because of its extraordinary conquests over nature, that discipline won recognition and acceptance over all others.

The way that this attitude creates difficulties when carried over to the social sciences is stated by Barrett:

In a human situation the waters are usually muddy and the air a little foggy: and whatever the intuitive person - whether he be politician, courtier, or lover - can perceive in that situation is not by virtue of well-defined logical ideas ... that man himself is a creature of contradictions and ambivalences such as pure logic can never grasp.

The influence of Cartesian dualism in the present time is exemplified most clearly in the use of the terms "objective" and "subjective", as Curran notes. The structure of Cartesian thought rests on a dualism between the ego and the external world of nature. The ego is the subject, a thinking substance; nature is the world of objects, extended substances. Following this, modern philosophy sees the subject as in constant opposition to the object. Hence the disunified view of man.

Looking at the influence of Kant on the modern concept of man, Curran says:

Kant's will, like Descartes' intellect, was
somehow unconnected with man's body in its basic directives. The Kantian concept of an impersonal "duty" as the universal imperative seems to have been a kind of moral equivalent of the Cartesian mathematical norm of knowledge.

As this relates to education, Kant would say that the most important function of education is to "discipline" man, i.e., to "civilize" him by inhibiting him and by combating his animal instincts. Kant makes a sharp distinction between play and work and insists that work need not be pleasant in itself. The importance of this point will be seen later on, in Chapter VI, when we discuss the notion of self-investment as related to values. Kant goes to the extent of saying that the failure to discriminate between work and play is a pedagogic error. Moral conduct must proceed from a sense of duty, but by this he means from the categorical imperative which applies to all men with no allowance for individual differences. It commands "an action as necessary of itself without reference to another end, that is, as objectively necessary."

All cognition, according to Kant, is expressed in the form of judgments, which are either objective or subjective. A subjective judgement would be, for example, "The room is cold". This is a subjective judgement because it is the product of experience and not necessarily true for everyone. To this extent it has little universal validity. An objective judgment, on the other hand, is one that is universally true, such as exists in geometry. The objective judgement is far superior to the
"merely" subjective kind of cognition. In Kant's view, actions which spring from emotions, from love, affection, etc., have no moral value because they lack universal validity. Our only relation to the moral law is had through duty and obligation.

Kant attempted to include all of reality, including human nature, in the mechanical model occurring in the scientific though of his time. This, however, presented a problem for him, for in applying the scientific method to human actions, the whole notion of freedom was threatened by absorption into a mechanical universe. This is a problem that we are still left with from Kant. He, himself, dealt with it by distinguishing between synthetic (can be validated by experience) judgements and analytic judgments, i.e., those which are universally true and, as noted above, only the latter are of any real value.

It can thus be seen how Kant could say that the moral judgment, "We ought to tell the truth" is, on principle, the same as the scientific judgment that "Every change must have a cause". Both of these judgments come from reason and not from the objects experienced. In commenting on this point, Stumpf says:

...morality for Kant is, therefore, an aspect of rationality and has to do with our consciousness of rules or "laws" of behavior, which we consider both universal and necessary ... Instead of searching for the quality of "goodness" in the effects of our actions, Kant focuses on the rational aspect of our behavior.

On the basis of this statement, Cantor can again justifiably number in his list of false assumptions of orthodox education:
"It is assumed that education is primarily an intellectual process." The Kantian basis of this assumption is evident, since the focus is on the rational aspect of human behavior to the exclusion of other aspects, for example, the emotional.

Because Kant emphasized so strongly the rational, non-somatic aspect of man, it seems like something close to treason that the nineteenth century Scientific Rationalism provided the first break from his thinking. Santillana and Zilsel, noting this point, explain how it came about:

Actually the Kantian armchair of stable forms and categories was getting more and more rickety, and non-Euclidean geometry had strongly contributed to its undermining. It was proved that mind had not one "form" of space only to superimpose on matter but a multiplicity of forms, flowing into one another, and that the Euclidean one was a choice and not a necessity.

In trying to give credit where credit is due, earlier remarks have indicated the positive aspect of the Cartesian-Kantian contribution. Generally, however, it must be stated that this thinking, whatever past value it may have had, and however much its influence still exists, it no longer seems to meet the needs of modern man. Barrett presents the following picture of modern man as he differs from the Cartesian man:

The man of today, technological man, is the final descendent of Cartesian man, but without Descartes' passion for clear and distinct ideas. As Descartes, locked up in his own luminous ego, confronted a world of material objects as thoroughly alien and perhaps unknowable, so technological man faces the objects in his world with no need or capacity for intimacy with them beyond the knowledge of what button has to be pressed in order to control their working.
In commenting on man's resistance to being mechanized as shown in the "organization man" and the "lonely crowd," Curran describes the effects of the Cartesian-Kantian thinking on modern man as follows:

One of the most striking effects of mechanism on society is to surround us all with dead things ... by this so-called "scientifically" objective language we are somehow removed from and uninvolved in the human condition. Others are thus "its".

In recent years there have been many attempts to explain the conflict and unrest on many college and university campuses. Curran seems to be the first one to relate this to the diminishing returns of an adherence to the Cartesian-Kantian view of the nature of man. He suggests that the present generation of students is the first one to be born into a non-Cartesian atmosphere. The resulting conflict between the Cartesian man and the non-Cartesian man is evident.

Because the Cartesian-Kantian conception of man is essentially a static one, and because the writer is attempting to show a trend mentioned earlier, away from the Cartesian-Kantian view of man, it will be helpful here to mention the notion of change as part of that trend. Educators have usually been in agreement that education involves some kind of change in the individual. However, they have not always been in agreement as to just what this change is and how it is to affect the person. The following two views, one by Dewey and one by Curran, will set the stage for the ensuing discussion of the place of behaviorism.
in education. In the following passage, Dewey is suggesting that the type of change that occurs in the education of his time is not really change at all, at least not a productive kind of change. He says:

Save as the effects of the educator connect with some activity which the child is carrying on of his own initiative independent of the educator, education becomes reduced to a pressure from without. It may, indeed, give certain external results, but cannot truly be called educative.

The key words in this statement of Dewey are "external results". The Behaviorists, for example, have never had any difficulty in producing external results, whether in animals or human beings. The question that we are about to raise in the second part of this Chapter is whether this constitutes learning.

Speaking in a different context than Dewey, but concerning the same idea, Curran says:

...that the personality is not changed by being forced from the outside like a machine. One does not change a person by some kind of aggressive attack, as one might hit a resistant object with a hammer. We know that such an attack most of the time only marshals the person's resistance and hostility to the prevention of change.

The reader will see later the possible aggressive aspect of a behavioristically based approach to education, and how it may be seen as an attack.
II. THE BEHAVIORISTS

In this part two points will be illustrated: first, that present learning theory is an outgrowth of the Cartesian-Kantian conception of the nature of man; second, the growing inadequacy of behavioristic learning theory in meeting man's emerging sense of self and his continuing search for autonomy and fulfillment. Before either of these points can be discussed, however, it is necessary to present an overview of Behaviorism.

In his discussion of learning theory, Garry tells us:

Two main streams of theory affecting research on learning have been association theory and field theory; in current usage, behavior theory and cognitive theory. In the former learning is thought of as the linking of stimuli with responses to form habits; in the latter, as acquiring understanding of the relationship in a field to form cognitive structures. Reinforcement plays a prominent role in association theory; insight, in cognitive theory.

The concern here is with the first, i.e., with reinforcement. The second, insight and its place in learning, will be taken up in Chapter V. Behavioristically oriented psychologists claim the study of learning as their own territory for two reasons. The first one is historical. Pioneers in the scientific study of learning, such as Ebbinghaus and Thorndike, who have provided the basic structure within which most of the research on the nature of learning has developed. According to Hilgard (1956), learning theory in America really amounts to agreement or disagreement with Thorndike's views.
The findings of Ebbinghaus and Thorndike have been eagerly snatched up by professional educators as a basis on which to build their practice. This basis is a dualistic, mechanistic view of man, with an almost obsessional need to quantify the results. Without this quantification there can be no validity to human behavior according to the limitations of scientific study. For scientific study, by definition, demands the ordering of facts into systems of laws and theories. This leaves educators with the question of what to do about those human behaviors that do not fit into the laws and theories of a mathematically based approach to the study of learning.

The second reason why psychologists have claimed the study of learning as their field of operation is that learning is central to the general systems of psychological theory. Hilgard states it this way:

Psychologists with a penchant for systems find a theory of learning essential because so much of man's diverse behavior is the result of learning. If the rich diversity of behavior is to be understood in accordance with a few principles, it is evident that some of these principles will have to do with the way in which learning comes about.

Although most behavioristic theorists include in their definitions of learning the notion of "process" and of "change" in some form or other, usually the kind of change that they have in mind refers exclusively to change in activity or behavior. This, according to Hill, is the origin of the term "behaviorism", which is usually associated with Watson. Hill explains:
The reason for the name "behaviorism" is clear enough. Watson was interested only in behavior, not in conscious experience. Human behavior was to be studied as objectively as was the behavior of machines. Consciousness was not objective ... And by "behavior" Watson meant nothing more abstruse than the movement of muscles.

Human behavior viewed in this kind of "objective" way would be the logical outcome of a mechanistic conception of man. By means of classical and instrumental conditioning, the basic principles of behaviorism, a person's activity may be changed. But is this all that is to be understood by learning? In giving prominence to the place of values, attitudes and principles in the learning process, people such as Maslow and Rogers would answer negatively. For those who base man's behavior on a mathematical, scientific model, learning is restricted to change in terms of what a person does with little concern for what he is.

This is quite different from the phenomenological view. Rogers, for example, would see learning, not as the acquisition of facts or of a skill, but as learning how to learn, or learning how to change. He states:

Teaching and the imparting of knowledge make sense in an unchanging environment. This is why it has been an unquestioned function for centuries. But if there is one truth about modern man, it is that he lives in an environment which is continually changing. ...The only man who has learned how to learn; the man who has learned how to adapt and change; the man who has realized that no knowledge is secure, that only the process of seeking knowledge gives a basis for security.

This statement presents quite a different picture from that of the Behaviorists, whose views about learning are largely derived
from animals and human beings in a controlled environment.

Is the problem, then, merely one of definition of what constitutes learning? It has been mentioned earlier that conditioning, whether classical, as expounded by Watson, Thorndike, Guthrie, and Hull, or instrumental, as advocated by Skinner and Tolman, is basic to Behaviorism. An important point about the nature of conditioning is made by Green in his distinction between indoctrination and conditioning. He states:

But the important thing is to observe that insofar as conditioning does not aim at an expression of intelligent doing, neither does indoctrination aim at an expression of intelligent believing. Conditioning is an activity which can be used to establish certain modes of behavior quite apart from their desirability. It aims simply to establish them. If a response to a certain stimulus is trained or conditioned, or has become a fixed habit, it will be displayed in the fact that the same stimulus will produce the same response even when the person admits it would be better if he responded otherwise.

Because the Behaviorists are particularly concerned with the quantification of learning, and because it is the business of mathematics to quantify, it is not surprising that much of behavioristic learning theory is based on mathematical models of one kind or another. This is an apparent effect of Cartesian influence, since Descartes himself was a mathematician primarily. Presently the place of mathematics in the study of learning will be reviewed, beginning with Ebbinghaus in 1885, and including some mathematical models in contemporary learning theory.

Ebbinghaus in 1885 was the first to attempt the application of scientific method to the study of learning. The procedure
that he used in showing that memory could be orderly later came to be known as "empirical curve-fitting", based on a logarithmic equation. Following Ebbinghaus' lead in the use of mathematical models, Hull developed what he called a "postulated method of theory construction". This is explained by Hill as follows:

Hull's concept of the ideal theory was a logical structure of postulates and theorems, similar to Euclid's geometry. The postulates would be statements about various aspects of behavior. They would not be laws taken directly from experiments, but more general statements about the basic processes involved.

Stating this in another way, once the theorist has determined by logic that theorems follow from postulates, he must determine by experiment whether they are true, and if they are, the whole theory is supported. This is the procedure used in Euclidean geometry, and applied by Hull to the study of learning.

In 1930, Thurstone developed a rational learning curve, basing his equations on a theory as to how learning takes place. This differs from Ebbinghaus' empirical learning curve in that with Ebbinghaus, instead of the equation being based on a theory, the theory was based on an equation formulated after observation of behavior. Thurstone's rational learning curves represent, according to Hilgard "an advance in the application of mathematical thinking to learning..."

The use of some kind of model to represent a theory, as Hilgard points out, is not new. He also says that the more formally a model is worked out, the more likely it is to be a
mathematical one, that is, one which "consists of a set of relationships and transformations that can be made consistently according to the rules and definitions of the particular kind of mathematics." There are various mathematical models in contemporary learning theory. Among these is that of Rashevsky, based upon differential calculus; the stochastic models (based on probability mathematics rather than differential calculus) of Estes and Burke; and the linear-operator model of Bush and Mosteller.

Not all behavioristic learning theories are based on a mathematical model. For example, even Guthrie's contiguous conditioning theory, objective and practical though it is, was derived without the benefit of mathematics, granting that it laid the groundwork for the later assumptions of Estes. The purpose in citing the use of mathematical models in behavioristic theory is to illustrate the influence of Cartesian thinking on present education. It helps to raise the issue about whether there can be any justification for fitting human behavior, and learning in particular, into the precision and predictability of mathematics, for in doing so, is it not possible that man's humanity is somehow diminished?

Among the traditional definitions of man, one of them is that he is a rational animal. Although this definition has weathered the assaults of time quite well, and still has much to be said for it, the Behaviorists have over-emphasized the "animal"
aspect, while the Rationalists have stressed the "rational" aspect. Although rationality is an intrinsic part of being human, it, nevertheless, does not tell the whole story, as Morris notes:

Man, therefore, is better defined not as a rational animal but as a choosing, and therefore valuing, animal who can think and does think if he chooses. Because it is grounded in man's existing, choosing precedes reasoning. Man must choose; there is no escaping choice. Man may reason if he chooses.

The Behaviorists' position is shown in the fact that most of their research is done with animals and applied to human beings. Even the Gestaltists, who represent a break with the behavioristic tradition, have experimented largely with animals. The Rationalists, on the other hand, with their emphasis on man's rationality, do nothing to heal the Cartesian-Kantian split. The Scientific Rationalism of the 18th century, carried over to the social sciences, explains how Ellis, for example, can say that the reason man acts contrary to societal norms is because he has not sufficiently reasoned things out. What he needs is a larger dose of rationality; unreason is to be cured with reason. What will be seen later is that rationality may, in fact, be used by the teacher to protect himself from an encounter with the student.

In discussing the decline of the mechanical conception of nature, Santillana says:

With the failure of mechanistic physics, the assumption of a second world behind experience had lost its scientific support. Now the subject-object metaphysics, the pride of all
philosophers, who looked down on the naive layman, was badly shaken; its problems began to appear as pseudo-problems.

The significance of this passage is that along with the decline of the mechanical conception of nature, there has been a corresponding decline in the mechanical conception of man as part of that nature, as upheld by the Behaviorists and Rationalists. Thus while the Behaviorists are closer to Descartes in their view of man, the Rationalists are closer to Kant. The principle reason for Maslow's attack on Behaviorism is not that it has nothing to offer, but that it fails to provide a unified view of man. He says:

It is simply a reflection or implication in science of an atomistic, mechanical world view that we now have reason to doubt.

If a behavioristic learning theory, or a rationalistic one, is taken from behavioristic or rationalistic psychologists and adapted by educators to the classroom situation, man's disunified view of himself is perpetuated.

A glance at behavioristic theories of learning shows that they have one thing in common, aside from stimulus-response as the central focus of their attention, and that is their conviction that a science of psychology must be based on a study of what is overtly observable, such as physical stimuli, muscular movements, and glandular secretions. It must be in some way measureable. They all exclude self-observation, or introspection, as a legitimate scientific method. Koch takes issue with this when
As we proceed through eras of "classical" behaviorism, neo-behaviorism, deflated neo-behaviorism, "subjective" neo-behaviorism, "liberalized" neo-behaviorism, we see successive efforts to salvage an epistemological judgment that condemns an entire "science" to evading, or, at best, misphrasing its subject matter in the interest of enforcing an apparent objectivity. Those who would argue that the behaviorisms have nevertheless been richly productive of research should be reminded that research is not knowledge.

It is now in place to look more closely at behavioristic learning theory in its application to education. Thorndike defined education as the "production and prevention of change". By this he meant that the aim of the teacher is to produce desirable and prevent undesirable activity in human beings by bringing about and inhibiting certain responses. Thorndike states his position in the following words:

The changes going on in any one object are of many sorts. Thus a man is a mass of matter subject to laws of gravitation, electrical conduction, and the like, so that some of the changes in him are for physics to study; he is also a concretion of atoms of nitrogen, oxygen, hydrogen, carbon and the like, so that some of the changes in him are for chemistry to study; other changes in men belong under anatomy; still others, under physiology; still sciences of intellect and character.

After thus describing the various areas of man open to the different disciplines, Thorndike gives his two famous laws by which "the many specialized sciences of intellect and character" are applied. These two laws are the Law of Exercise (formal-discipline theory) and the Law of Effect (identical elements theory). The Law of Exercise refers to the strengthening of
connections between stimulus and response with exercise, and the weakening of connections or forgetting when practice is discontinued. The Law of Effect refers to the strengthening or weakening of a connection as a result of the satisfying or unsatisfying condition that follows it. Although the Law of Exercise has been disproved, much teaching is still based on it, under the name of "intellectual discipline" or "mental discipline".

When the two laws of Thorndike are applied to man, he does in fact change, that is, he acts differently. But in saying this, the question comes up that was asked earlier, i.e., whether change in activity can properly be called learning. Most educators will probably agree that change in activity constitutes some kind of learning, but then, in Thorndike's view, animal and human learning are equated. This leaves unsaid anything about such learning as change in attitude, in values, in ultimate aims, which clearly do not enter into animal learning.

Thorndike's position, and that of the stimulus-response theorists generally, is seen in their opposition to the Phenomenologists. The Phenomenologists' attack on behaviorism stems from their view that the Behaviorists break up the person into parts for study. The Behaviorists maintain, on the other hand, that the Phenomenologists' ideas are not capable of empirical proof. The Behaviorists are deterministic, while the Phenomenologists are advocates of freedom in some degree or other. The tendency toward a resolution of the conflict seems to be on
the side of the Phenomenologists, although the issue is not a simple one. Garry observes:

More recently as research has accumulated, it has become clear that theoretical issues are not going to be resolved in favor of one position or the other, but that more sophisticated explanations are required.

Sigmund Koch speaks out more strongly against the inadequacy of Behaviorism to meet the changing educational needs:

Behaviorism has been given a hearing for fifty years. I think this is generous. I shall urge that it is essentially a role-playing position which has outlived whatever usefulness its role might once have had ... I suspect that there are a class of positions that are wrong but not refutable and that behaviorism may be in such a class.
III. LIMITATIONS OF BEHAVIORISTIC LEARNING THEORY

Granting the many valuable contributions that Behavioristic learning theory has made to the understanding of the learning process, it is coming under attack more and more by its opponents. Koch's criticism may be overly severe, but it is indicative of this trend. Man no longer wishes to be put into the narrow, mechanistic conception of Descartes, nor the rigid, moralistic view of Kant, which Behaviorism seems to perpetuate in its determinism. In holding out to a man a sense of freedom and the possibility of change, Mowrer says:

At best, it (behavioristic learning theory) gives us a picture of the basic biologically determined principles or laws of learning. It has little or nothing to say about what living organisms, and human beings in particular, ought to learn or what they in fact do learn; yet this is a question with which parents, teachers, ministers, jurists, and many others are deeply concerned. Learning theory may help such persons once they have decided upon their objectives, to attain them; but it never, or at least only rarely, dictates what these objectives should be.

In stating the position of the Behaviorists, Rogers says:
"For the Behaviorist, man is a machine, which we can learn to manipulate with greater and greater skill until he thinks the thoughts, moves in the directions, and behaves in the ways selected for him." It is not only man's quest for freedom and dignity that puts Behaviorism under suspicion, based as it is on the Cartesian-Kantian view of man; it is also man's refusal to be a machine. Rogers continues:
...man does not simply have the characteristics of a machine; he is not simply a being in the grip of unconscious motives; he is a person in the process of creating himself, a person who creates meaning in life, a person who embodies a dimension of subjective freedom. He is a figure who, though he may be alone in a vastly complex universe and though he may be part and parcel of that universe, and its destiny, is also able in his inner life to transcend the material universe; he is able to live dimensions of his life which are not fully or adequately contained in a description of his conditionings or of his unconscious.

Where Behaviorism specifically falls short is in its failure to provide for what Rogers calls man's "innerlife" and his ability "to transcend the material universe." Machines in themselves have no relation to life, and animals lack an inner life, thus making the question of transcending the material universe irrelevant to them. When the results of the study of animal learning are transferred to human beings, it is to be expected that much of what follows will have little relation to human life. One is thus forced to wonder if this may not be why much of education seems so unreal to many students. This point was raised by Prescott more than thirty years ago when he said:

So many children, and even adults, seem to feel that schools are all theory, abstraction, and unreality and that life outside is essentially different from life at school that we are led to wonder if there is some valid basis for this widespread feeling.

A final statement on the limitations of behavioristic learning theory will serve to illustrate the point. Staats says:

Thus, although the restriction of the psychology of learning to simple behaviors, simple situations, and simple organisms, was a part of the growth of the science, the separatism that has been described in the field, at
least as the field pertains to human behavior, can now be seen as an anachronistic obstacle to the creation of a general theory of human behavior. And, this obstacle has had serious disadvantages. For one thing, the separatistic approaches to learning have individually been inadequate to deal with complex human behavior.
FOOTNOTES


5. Curran, *op. cit.*, 95


8. Curran, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-97


12 Stumpf, *op. cit.*., p. 321


14 Barrett, *op. cit.*., p. 232

15 Curran, *op. cit.*., p. 99


17 Curran, *op. cit.*., p. 100


22

23
Hill, op. cit., p. 129

24
Hilgard, op. cit., p. 372

25
Hilgard, ibid., p. 375

26
Hill, op. cit., p. 169 ff.

27

28
Ellis, Albert, "Rationalism and Its Therapeutic Applications", in A. Ellis (Ed.), The Place of Value in the Practice of Psychotherapy, New York: American Academy of Psychotherapists, 1959, p. 59

29
Santillana, op. cit., 93

30

31
Koch, Sigmund, "Psychology Cannot Be a Coherent Science", in Psychology Today, Vol. 3, No. 4,

32

33
Thorndike, op. cit., p. 71
34  
Garry, *op. cit.*, p. 9

35  
Koch, *loc. cit.*, p. 6

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CHAPTER III

The Relationship Between Teaching and Counseling

As implied, the way in which one views the nature of the change in a person that is the result of learning will depend on his view of the nature of man. If his view of man is a Cartesian one, that is, static and mechanistic, then he is likely to see learning as a process of conditioning that does not involve any conscious awareness on the part of the learner, since conditioning does not necessarily involve the conscious association of a response with its new stimulus. On the contrary, conditioning is typically an unconscious process.

If, however, the theorist takes a dynamic, unified view of the nature of man, then the change which results from learning will be, for him, something quite different. It will be much more than a change in performance, such as is observable and measurable in laboratory animals undergoing a process of conditioning. In its deepest sense, it will be an inner change resulting in a new person, new in terms of the person's values, commitment, and self-investment in life. As a consequence of this change, not only would a "new" person be seen from the one known before; but a person who is in a continual process of renewing himself, who is always open to the newness within himself, would emerge.

Hilgard points out that learning theories presently fall
into two major families: stimulus-response theories, represented by such men as Thorndike, Guthrie, Skinner, and Hull; and cognitive theories, represented by the gestaltists, as well as Tolman and Lewin. Although the gestaltists are concerned with the place of conscious awareness in the learning process, none of these theorists has given any real place to the notions of values, commitment, and self-investment as an integral aspect of learning. These three terms, that is, values, commitment, and self-investment, are of course, very prominent in the counseling milieu. The concern in this chapter is to show how they are involved in the counseling process and are, in turn, carried over to the learning situation.

I. EDUCATION SEEN NOT AS AN INTELLECTUAL, 
BUT AS A PERSONALITY ENCOUNTER

In Chapter II, it was noted how behavioristic learning theorists have taken their information principally from animal studies, and from these have made inferences about human learning. It has also been indicated that the philosophical foundation for their experimentation is a dualistic conception of the nature of man, going back to the time of Descartes and Kant. If, as Descartes implied, learning is a process that goes on in a disembodied intellect, then educators would be justified in ignoring all the other components of man. They could rightly divide man into whatever parts suited their convenience and manipulate that
part to their own ends. In the sphere of education, the part most logically suited to manipulation would be the intellect.

However, the growing trend toward a more unified view of man has also been noted. Because the Cartesian-Kantian view of man leaves him with a disunified view of himself, it is at this point that counseling becomes a matter of interest and concern to the educator. His task becomes more than a matter of the intellectual presentation of information to the student; he must also, and perhaps primarily, as we shall see, be concerned with healing the rift between the psyche and the soma that exists within the student. Simply focusing on intellectual content will not bring this healing, however, since the student is not always in a mental state that is congenial to the acceptance of factual knowledge. This condition is, of course, what educators have been calling a lack of learning readiness and it is in this situation where counseling comes into play. In remarking on this condition of the student and the relatedness of counseling to it, Curran says:

As a result of the process initiated by counseling, he (the student) can slowly begin to digest and absorb what he knows as he reflects on himself and so lessens his narrow defensiveness and resistance. As he begins to see himself and his situation more clearly and less defensively, he can bring to bear on the devising of a more adequate solution whatever pertinent knowledge and advice he has previously received. Therefore he is now open to the more personal investment of himself in what he has learned, or at least has been told.

II. LEARNING AS A COGNIZING PROCESS

When the client comes to the counselor, it is because he
(the client) is in some way or other disturbed and is seeking help for himself in the area of his disturbance. In speaking of the relationship of teaching to counseling, is it to be assumed, then, that every time the teacher enters the classroom, he is faced with a group of people who are in need of some kind of therapy? Moreover, if this assumption is made, the additional question arises as to whether or not such an attitude on the part of the teacher is justifiable to the student. The answer to both of these questions would seem to be in the affirmative if it is further assumed that a person in a state of not-knowing (in this case, the student) is in some kind of conflict and anxiety because of this condition.

Because of the counselor's skillful response to the conflict, anxiety, and hostility of the client in the counseling relationship, the client is able to change and in some way to become more integrated. If these same feelings of conflict, anxiety, and hostility are present in the learning situation, but are ignored, or possibly even resisted, by the teacher, then it becomes questionable just how much real change can take place within the student, or to what extent he can move out of his state of ignorance. In order for him to do so, it appears that these feelings must be recognized and responded to in the same way as they would be in the counseling situation. In other words, just as the counselor relates to the client in a personal, unique way, the teacher in the classroom must relate in the same way. This point is made
by Curran in the following statement:

Each person hears what is said in unique ways. To be personally effective, the matter of education must reach a person at the point of his uniqueness. Such an educative process has to go beyond the intellectual logic to the unified man who operates through his whole person. The real sources for self-investment are as much his somatic-instinctive emotional structure as his intellectual awareness.

In addressing himself to much the same idea, Maslow states it this way:

Unlike the current model of teacher as lecturer, conditioner, reinforcer, and boss, the helper and teacher is receptive rather than intrusive ... It is my strong impression that this is the way in which much of the world of education could function. If we want to be helpers, teachers, guiders, or psychotherapists, what we must do is to accept the person and help him learn what kind of person he is already.

The learner's condition of not-knowing, is seen as threatening to him because of the distance that it creates between himself and the knower. He is thus in a handicapped state in relation to the knower. As the client who comes to the counselor for help is in a handicapped state, the condition holds for the student who comes to the teacher for knowledge. The same condition of distance exists. The aim of the teacher, then, as that of the counselor, is first of all to help the student in this handicapped state, to reach out to him at the point where he is, by reducing the distance between himself and the student. This, of course, will require as much skill on the part of the teacher as is required of the counselor, for the greater the student's (or client's) need for help, the greater is his resistance to
receiving it. This is what Curran, calls an "inverse ratio paradox".

The teacher then, as likewise the counselor, is faced with the task of aiding the person to accept himself in his handicapped state before any growth can take place, whether this be in the area of emotional maturity or intellectual awareness. It is the contention here, in fact, that these two cannot be separated. In speaking of the comparison between teaching and counseling, Farnsworth observes:

In this view (that counseling serves to raise academic standards) teaching and counseling are in many respects similar, emphasis in formal teaching being directed toward understanding the individual's interaction with the new ideas to which he has been exposed.

The implication here is not that the teacher performs two separate, unrelated functions, sometimes teaching, sometimes counseling; rather the two are inter-related in such a way that the needs of the whole person of the student are met. Farnsworth continues:

The extension of the teacher's attention to the emotional development of pupils, making the understanding of feelings as much a part of the teaching and learning process as the training of the intellect, should serve to simplify the task of teaching, rather than complicate it, once the basic assumptions of such a position have been accepted generally.

Education is thus seen not as a purely intellectual encounter, but rather as an encounter with the whole personality. Previously it was asked whether or not the teacher, on entering the classroom, might not be justified in assuming that the students there are in
need of some kind of therapy. More and more it is coming to be seen that counseling is not only for personal emotional problems, but can also be used in "normal" life circumstances for working out something where the self is in doubt.

In the counselor-client relationship, the client is dependent on the counselor to the extent that he needs the counselor as an agency through whom he can work out his conflicts. The greater the need of the client, the greater is his dependency on the counselor. Ordinarily, however, as the counseling process continues, the client would gradually be freed of his dependency on the counselor and become more and more independent and self-directed. Likewise, in the teaching-learning relationship, the student is dependent on the teacher for what he (the teacher) knows. However, in the educative process, the teacher would literally "lead the student out" of his ignorance, thereby freeing him of his dependency on the teacher.

But the dependency of the student on the teacher is generally not so great as that of the client on the counselor. In fact, it can even be that the student has little awareness at all of any need of the teacher. Consequently, when used in a non-therapeutic situation, which the classroom is usually regarded to be, counseling would require more skill than with the disturbed person because in the former situation the person does not have so great a need for the counselor and will be less willing to tolerate any counselor inadequacies. Seeing it this way, the person who comes
for therapy is easier to counsel than, say, the student in the classroom because the student has less need of help. The "normal" person is already sufficiently in control of himself so that his dependency on the counselor is minimal.

Thus counseling can be seen as a normal process, in the same sense that teaching is a normal process. When it is seen this way, counseling is not based on a medical model, which implies much that is impersonal, but on a communications model, that is, a communication with the self where conflict with the self is worked out in an atmosphere of openess and acceptance.

Counseling in this sense would begin, then, not with negative, or even positive feelings, but when the client begins to "cognize" his feelings; more accurately, perhaps, he "re-cognizes" them. In this way the counseling process helps the person to finalize various options that are open to him by giving cognition to his disorder. Similarly, the disorder within the student, which consists essentially of the threat and anxiety caused by his ignorance, is given cognition through the agency of the teacher. The student is thus not only given a wider selection of options from which to choose, but he is also in a more favorable position to make a choice.

Another way to describe the condition of the student before learning has taken place would be to say that he is in a state of discomfort due to his ignorance, much as the client is in a state of discomfort because of his inner emotional turmoil. As in
counseling this discomfort produces a state of counseling
readiness, likewise in the student, it produces a state of learn­
ing readiness. A comfort state, if it is too great, works against learning. The reason for this is that what is learned creates a
different situation than existed before the person learned. Since this situation is new, it is, therefore, threatening. Neverthe­
less, it is to be regarded, as we noted, as a positive force for
learning if rightly channeled by the teacher. If, however, this potential force for learning is not recognized and channeled by
the teacher, it can become a negative and destructive factor in
learning. In describing a group-learning situation where this latter condition clearly existed, Curran makes the following
observation:

We see here an example of the psychological conflict
that is often, if not always, initially involved be­
tween the person who is informed, who can and is eager
to give his knowledge, and the people who are blocked
from accepting that help by the hostility arising from
their anxiety and ignorance. This is clearly a coun­
seling therapeutic situation as well as a learning one.
Yet this kind of conflict seems intrinsic to at least
the first stages of learning.

What often goes on in a classroom, for example, is the end effect of the attempt to both groups - the teacher
and those who are to be taught - to resolve this kind
of complicated psychological involvement with on another. They seldom resolve it in a counseling way, but rather almost by chance, depending on the immediate circum­
stances. For some students this may have serious negative after-effects.

In considering the relationship of teaching to counseling, it might be mentioned that counseling is a reflective process in
which the counselee, through symbolization by the counselor, is
able to "re-look" at himself in relation to his experiences. This is closely related to the idea of the person giving cognition to the disorder within himself referred to earlier. It is as a result of this "re-looking" that the counselee is able to get a new perspective of himself. Learning can be said to involve the same reflective process wherein one "re-looks" at the learning experience, resulting in an integration or a re-ordering of what he has learned. It is the process described by Curran wherein "man calls experience by a name, he signifies its meaning to himself, he gives it a symbolic sign." This is further explained by Curran elsewhere:

A person cognizes himself and others especially as he reflects upon his experiences. Moments of experience themselves are usually so complicated that little is really understood here. Understanding comes more at the moment of reflection where conscious awareness symbolizes some part of what was experienced and so makes it a part of one's conscious memory. This then makes later reflection possible.

This also seems to be Gowin's interpretation of what Dewey means by "mediate" experience. Gowin states:

Dewey's assertion of the simple and unqualified "hadness" of immediate experience is relevant here. There is, for Dewey, experience which is immediate - had - and experience which is mediate - discourse about, pointing to, reference from immediate experience. Cognitive discourse is mediate, not immediate. One must posit a "hadness" of experience as a prior condition for the emergence of discourse about it.

What is being brought up here is the old question of how one can experience something and at the same time know that he is experiencing it. Dewey seems to be saying that this cannot be done,
for the moment that one reflects on an experience, the experience itself is lost. It is through later reflection on a prior experience that knowledge, or cognitive discourse, ensues. As Curran points out in his statement above, the experience itself is usually too complicated for any understanding of it while it is going on.

All this naturally requires that the student be allowed to have "had" the experience. Sometimes, however, in a classroom situation this may not be allowed, especially if the experience is too threatening to either the teacher or students. Nevertheless, when it is allowed, the experience is brought about by what Curran calls a "learning confrontation" in the relationship between the teacher and the student. In speaking of a therapy of limits that is inherent in the learning process, he says:

In a direct learning experience, e.g., learning a foreign language, the limits, with their confronting and disciplining effect on the learner, are evident. He must adapt his ear, tongue, eye and comprehension to words and grammar that are not only strange but very uncomfortable. Here the nature of the learning process itself makes this confrontation and invokes its own necessary limits, restrictions, and demands.

The agency of confrontation, therefore, or of limits, is different in the learning process from that of the counseling process. In the counseling relationship, the agency of confrontation is the person of the counselor, Curran continues:

In many personal relationships, however, the other person often becomes the agent who imposes limits. In so doing, whether as teacher, supervisor, superior, etc., he often attracts to himself the hostility, resentment and negation the other person has towards the
invoked limits ... A counselor's awareness, as we have seen, can help by understanding the painful state of the person, thus assisting him to begin to look at himself more constructively.

III. THE GREATER THE NEED, THE GREATER THE RESISTANCE TO EXPERT HELP

One of the prerequisites of successful counseling is that the client be in some degree or other committed to the resolution of the conflict within himself. In other words, he must make some kind of investment of himself in the counseling process. This kind of self-investment can often be painful if it involves a confrontation with a particularly unacceptable aspect of the self. The same is true of the learning relationship, in which the student is confronted with, or limited by, his own ignorance. In order to be able to be helped in this condition, the person must recognize and accept himself in his limitation. In the words of Curran, "To be teachable, the learner must at least 'know that he does not know'". To learn that one "does not know" requires, as in counseling, an experience of one's own ignorance, or a confrontation with it. This would be the beginning of true learning. Speaking in the context of an incarnate-redemptive educative process, Curran states both the condition of the student as learner and that of the teacher as knower:

Starting in the ignorant dependency of not-knowing, he (the learner) is free to develop into the independence of knowing. But to be needed can be self-aggrandizing for the "teacher", and to show off knowledge has an
exhibitionist reward that can be very satisfying. For these reasons such a commitment is in fact most difficult.

Later in this Chapter in discussing the teaching contract, the difficulty of the commitment that Curran speaks of here will become clearer.

What enables the counselee to honestly confront himself is the trust that he has in the counselor, through which he can feel safe in dropping his defenses, thereby overcoming his feeling of threat and alienation. The same thing applies in teaching, as Curran indicates:

But often before the person faces himself and what he does not know, and so becomes teachable, others must somehow show this to him. And when a person is the object of such a confrontation, his defenses are apt to be aroused. He may feel indignant. His basic self-esteem may be threatened. In this defensive state he can close himself off and so resist the knowledge and self-awareness that he needs.

From this statement it follows that in order to avoid defensiveness, the student must be able to trust the teacher, in the same manner as we have said the client must be able to trust the counselor. The relationship between the student and teacher, therefore, must be, above all, one of trust if the student is to receive what the teacher has to give. All the qualities that we speak of as necessary in a good client-counselor relationship are necessary also in the student-teacher relationship. Where they are lacking, the student becomes alienated and unteachable. In this sense the terms "client" and "student" are interchangeable, as are the terms "counselor" and "teacher". 
IV. LEARNING AS COMMUNICATION

Because the notion of communication is basic to the counseling relationship, it must be considered in connection with the learning situation. When, in the counseling relationship, the client feels that he is no longer in communication with the counselor, at least on some level of his feelings; when he feels that he is not being understood, he will not then feel free to continue the process of self-confrontation through the agency of the counselor. If the lack of communication continues, he will become more and more alienated, although he may only indirectly reveal this to the counselor. Instead of openness, there is suppression of hostility. In this type of situation no real change in self-perception can take place. This kind of alienation, resulting from lack of communication, often occurs when the counselor maintains a role of omnipotence and omniscience. The parallel holds in the teaching-learning situation. In his research on foreign language learning, Curran found the following situation to have occurred as a consequence of the omniscient attitude of the experts:

The group, as we have seen, tended to be hostile to anyone who knew too much. This produced various reactions. One common reaction, as in controlled hostility, was to alienate the expert. One of the ways to accomplish this seemed to be to make him appear a kind of god, and so remove him from anyhuman conditions, to put him in what we have called a "non-incarnate" state. Creatures can be seen as totally
dependent on this "non-incarnate God." There is almost no communication except that of helpless, dependent people toward a god-figure, who determines what is right, how things are to be done. Here we can go a step beyond the infant-parent figure dependency.

In the teaching-learning situation, therefore, the same kind of alienation resulting from a lack of communication that occurs in the counseling relationship is seen. At best, the student becomes totally dependent on the teacher; but he thereby also becomes helpless because he can never go beyond the teacher. The simple presentation of facts by the teacher does not mean that communication is taking place, and it could be an exhibition of power by the teacher to control the student.

V. DISTINCTION BETWEEN TEACHING AND COUNSELING

Up to now what in effect has been discussed, indirectly at least, is the internalization of knowledge as an integral aspect of learning. Although the necessity of internalization of knowledge in order for it to be acted upon effectively seems clear, stimulus-response theorists generally have failed to give it adequate consideration. Maslow points up rather forcefully the results of this when he speaks of the outcomes of conditioning as "extrinsic learning". He says:

... In this sense (of extrinsic learning) the learning is extrinsic to the learner, extrinsic to the personality, and is extrinsic also in the sense of collecting associations, conditionings, habits, or modes of action. It is as if these were possessions which the learner accumulates in the same way that he accumulates keys or
coins and puts them in his pocket. They have little or nothing to do with the actualization or growth of the peculiar, idiosyncratic kind of person he is.

The process of internalization of knowledge will be given fuller consideration in the following Chapter. At this point it is necessary to show where the parallel between teaching and counseling does not hold.

Because the contract between the teacher and student is different from that between the counselor and client, the two relationships will be different in some respects. Dewey seems to be speaking of the teaching-learning contract in his use of the analogy of teaching and learning to buying and selling. He says:

A merchant's report that he sold a great quantity of goods, although no one bought anything, would be ridiculous. So, too, would a teacher's statement that he taught all day but no one learned anything.

Here, of course, Dewey is simply affirming that the learning process does involve a contract between the teacher and student. For him, teaching is to learning as selling is to buying. A mutual agreement is required in either case to make it valid. However, to accept this delineation of Dewey would require a new description to cover what the teacher does when learning does not result. Bandman and Buttchen say that it would be simple "to call this unsuccessful teaching."

The nature of the teaching-learning contract, and how it differs from the counseling therapy contract, is explained by Curran in the concept of mimesis:
In the mimesic quality necessary to any learning situation, however, we have a clear distinction from counseling therapy. In this mimesic sense, the learning relationship would be determined by what the knower stands for or re-presents. It is the learner's awareness of this which brought him in the first place. In turn, it is the teacher's knowledge in a particular area which validates his position and determines the nature of his mimesis. In this the learning relationship of counseling or therapy. There the client is studying himself. He projects this study of himself in and through the counselor-therapist. In the mimesic relationship, the student is studying what the teacher knows, stands for, and re-presents. Consequently, his study and learning through the teacher extend to a field or block of knowledge beyond both himself and the teacher.

In this view, it would be the task of the student to study the teacher, rather than the reverse which is common to much of the present educational system. This is evidenced in the heavy reliance upon, and use of, tests that are given to students. It is as if the teacher were studying the student. It is not to be implied that testing has no place in an educational system; however, testing can often be used to obscure the real nature of the teaching-learning contract, as well as to almost completely eliminate any personal relationship between teacher and student.

The concept of mimesis to delineate the teaching-learning contract is helpful. The student goes to the teacher because he wants what the teacher has; he values it sufficiently to make the effort to obtain it. In a sense, then, the student is not at all studying "dead" subject matter that it contained in a textbook. Rather, he is studying the teacher who is the living personification of what he is teaching. Something of this notion of the teaching-learning contract is expressed by Calisch; in the
context of discussing some of the qualities of a good teacher, he says:

I guess what I am saying here is that I wholeheartedly endorse the client concept of education, in which the teacher has the obligation to know his subject and much more besides; in which the student comes to the teacher as a client to absorb what he can, to learn what the teacher has to teach.

Another distinction between counseling and teaching that must be noted is one that centers around the philosophical principle that "whatever is received is received according to the manner of the one receiving". The teacher is concerned with presenting general information intended for a wide audience. The counselor, however, is concerned with the unique individual, even in group counseling, and his integration and assimilation of what he knows. On this point, Curran states:

No matter how effective our presentation in education or guidance may be, it is only ultimately effective if it filters through and is really received by, integrated in and assimilated by the unique one who is receiving it. You can never become a mass in this or any other group, therefore ... Consequently, counseling is chiefly concerned not with "what is received" but with "the one receiving". It focuses on the psychosomatic unity and state of the one receiving. In this sense it is clearly distinct from education and guidance, both of which are much more directly focused on the information to be given.

Previously in this Chapter it was suggested that the terms "counselor" and "teacher" might be used interchangeably. To demand the exercise of both of these roles from the same person simultaneously may seem to be putting a very difficult burden on that person. Yet, if the inter-relationship between counseling and teaching is to be effectively realized, this would seem to be
required. In any case it might be well to keep in mind the idea emphasized throughout this Chapter, that counseling and teaching enhance one another, rather than being two opposing forces. It will, of course, require a certain flexibility on the part of the teacher. In discussing this point, Rogers states:

If the leader is able to let himself be utilized by the group in a variety of ways as their needs change, he will be more successful in facilitating learning with a minimum of resistance.

A little further on, in presenting his concept of the role of the leader in an educational setting when the aim is to center the process on the developing aims of the students, he says:

In responding to expressions from the group, he (the leader) accepts both the intellectual content and the emotionalized attitudes, endeavoring to give each aspect the approximate degree of emphasis which it has for the individual and the group.

In pointing up the relationship between teaching and counseling in this chapter, the approach taken has been to discuss the similarities and differences between the two processes. The similarities were seen from the following aspects: first, education was discussed from the point of view of being not simply an intellectual encounter between teacher and student, but an encounter of the whole personality; secondly, teaching was presented as involving much of the process of cognizing that is seen in counseling; thirdly, it was pointed out that just as in counseling, there is often found resistance on the part of the client to the help that the counselor can give, so in
expert help of the teacher; and fourthly, communication as a key
factor in the student-teacher relationship was discussed in com-
parison to the client-counselor relationship.

The distinction between the teaching and the counseling
process was seen to consist mainly in the fact that there is a
different kind of contract between teacher and student than be-
tween client and counselor. This was presented under the notion
of mimesis. A second distinction was discussed in relation to
the philosophical principle that "whatever is received is received
according to the manner of the one receiving".

This chapter is intended to serve as essential background
for what follows in the next chapter. Rather than present the
teaching-learning experiences first, it seems better to give the
theoretical position of the teacher and to provide a rationale
for what will be seen in what follows. Chapters V, VI, and VII
will be presented in retrospect to the experience.
FOOTNOTES


11  Curran, C. A., _op. cit._, 1968, p. 214
12  Curran, C. A., _ibid._, 1968, p. 214
13  Curran, C. A., _ibid._, 1968, p. 214
14  Curran, C. A., _op. cit._, 1969, p. 222
15  Curran, C. A., _op. cit._, 1968, p. 214
16  Curran, C. A., _ibid._, 1968, p. 309
17  Maslow, A. H., _loc. cit._, 1968, p. 691
19  Bandman, B., and Guttchen, R. S., _Philosophical Essays on Teaching_, New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1969, p. 82
20  Curran, C. A., _op. cit._, 1969, p. 225
21  Calisch, R. W., "So You Want to Be a Real Teacher", in _Today's Education_, Vol. 58, No. 8, November, 1969, pp. 49-51
22  Curran, C. A., "Notes on Counseling and Guidance", at Notre Dame and Loyola University, 1960-61 (Revised 1964)
24  Rogers, C. R., _ibid._, p. 402
CHAPTER IV

THE APPLICATION OF COUNSELING CONCEPTS TO LEARNING

In the beginning of the previous chapter, the place of such concepts as values, commitment, and self-investment as an integral part of counseling was noted. The aim was to show how these concepts from counseling might be related to learning, and how they might be adapted to the educative process. This presentation was generally of a theoretical nature.

In this chapter, the aim is to describe what actually happened when these concepts were applied to a learning situation. This will be done by discussing two such situations: one with a Latin class; the other with a Religion class.

The first one, the Latin class, involves the use of the Chromacord, a teaching apparatus. What this is will be explained presently. In Chapter 15 of his book, Counseling and Psychotherapy: the Pursuit of Values, Curran gives an account of the place of teaching machines and apparatus in learning. He comments:

In various forms, these machines and apparatus were not designed to be simply teaching machines, as, for instance, Skinner proposed. We did not disregard such Skinnerian-type apparatus but placed emphasis on the special purpose we had in mind in our designs: to facilitate an educative process modelled after the counseling relationship, and thus free the teacher to function increasingly as a learning counselor.

These machines and apparatus were used with the Latin group.

In the Religion group, no machines or apparatus were used.
Although there is reason to believe that the use of these apparatus, even in the teaching of Religion, would make a significant contribution to the acquisition of values, it was thought that since these would most likely not be available to most teachers of Religion, it would be better to proceed without them; the results would thus be more useful.

I. THE LATIN GROUP

A Latin class seemed to be a particularly challenging situation in which to see what might result if a counseling-learning situation could be created. The reason for this is that Latin is commonly regarded as a "dead" language and, as such, it is often considered by the student to have little practical value. Consequently, a common motivating force for learning is frequently lacking at the outset.

This group consisted of twenty high-school sophomores, chosen at random from among those who indicated an intention of taking second-year Latin. No special classroom as, for example, a language laboratory, was used or needed. The students were seated in the normal classroom arrangement.

Since the Chromacord played an important part in the learning situation, it is necessary to explain what it is. The following statement will be helpful:

The machine itself may consist of any number of units, depending upon the class enrollment. Each unit, or learning lantern, consists of a wooden box one foot
square and six inches deep, with a Plexiglass facing. Eight light bulbs of different colors are mounted inside, each color having a definite significance. For example, red represents either masculine gender or perfect tense; blue represents either feminine gender or future tense, etc. From each lantern there extends to the student an electrical cord, with a set of switches at the end by which he can control the lights. Ideally each student has his individual learning lantern and switches, so that if there are twenty students in the class, there will be twenty learning lanterns placed one on top of the other, forming a panel at the front of the room. It is not, however, necessary that each student have an individual lantern, since any number of switches can be connected to the same lantern.

In addition to the above arrangement of learning lanterns, there was, in the classroom, an overhead projector from which a Latin word or sentence could be projected onto a screen at the left of the lanterns. With this arrangement of the apparatus, the following procedure took place:

As one of the students read aloud a Latin word from the screen, all the students flashed on their lanterns the colors necessary to parse the word in detail. For example, if *aquam* appeared on the screen, blue, indicating feminine, and amber, indicating accusative, should appear on the lantern. At the same time another student would call out the translation, and another would give a cognate, or "security" word, as an aid of memory. If all students flashed correct lights, a bell sounded, indicating that the group was ready to move to the next word. If one or more students flashed the wrong colors, a buzzer sounded, and progress was delayed until an explanation, sometimes by the teacher, was made and all lights were correct.

The above procedure, with variations, was used throughout the course. One of these variations involved the use of a circulating round table. This is described as follows:

Five or six small reading stands were placed around the edge of the table and, as it rotated, one of the students
would place an 8" x 11" sheet of paper on a stand. On each sheet was a Latin word, with genitive, gender, and English meaning written toward the bottom. One student read the word aloud as it circled past him, another read a genitive case, a third the gender, and a fourth gave a cognate. For example, if the word equus were to appear on the rotating table, then red signifying masculine, white signifying nominative, and amber signifying genitive would appear on the lanterns as nominative, genitive, gender, and cognate were called out by various students.

After several months of studying Latin in this manner, the following developments became evident:

1. In order to get a sense of belonging, each student had to become completely involved in what was happening in the class. Since each student had a particular task to perform that related to the success of the entire group, there was no chance for any individual student to become isolated from the class. This can be stated as follows:

   After a time he (the student) seemed to realize that he was learning not in alienated isolation, but as a part of a community endeavor in which he was expected to contribute something to the community and would receive something from it in return.

2. The authority image of the teacher was minimized. This seemed to bring about a lessening of anxiety and a great learning readiness:

   The group itself became the authority. If any individual failed he reflected the failure of the group. This became evident when, for example, a particularly difficult passage or construction was under study and the majority got it wrong: the reaction might have been summed up in a statement such as "We did badly on that one", a remark most probably made by someone who actually had got it correct.

3. A factor contributing to the total involvement of the students was their complete absorption in the learning process:
In the kind of learning atmosphere which prevailed, it seemed almost impossible not to be personally and intensely involved, since the student was simultaneously occupied with sight, sound, touch and motion.

4. The role of the teacher took on a different meaning from that of the traditional classroom teacher:

It (the role of the teacher) became more like that of an expert consulted in unusual situations but otherwise remaining in the background. As a result, I felt freed from the burden of teaching, which was carried by the Chromacord, and I could truly interact with the students.

The significance of this final statement is that the teacher, instead of merely presenting facts in a theoretical and intellectual manner, was free to relate to the students in a human and personal way. This was possible because he could depend on the students, through their interaction with one another and with the apparatus, to acquire the necessary conceptual knowledge. This does not mean, however, that the teacher, as one who has greater knowledge than the students, is not necessary. He would still have the task and the obligation to insure that correct learning was taking place. He does this, however, under a different image, namely, that of a person who is humanly relating with the learners.

It is necessary now to consider how much Latin the students actually learned in the above situation. They were compared to a control group in the learning of vocabulary, with the following results:

Each group was allowed to study for fifteen minutes a Latin vocabulary list on which they were told they would be tested immediately. The control group studied by the traditional method of memorizing words, with no
interaction within their group. The experimental group studied the same list, using the color system and the rotating table. Both groups were tested; then two days later the same test was again administered to each group without advance announcement and with no opportunity for review. There were forty-six possible errors. The control group averaged 7.2 errors when first tested, 8.4 errors when retested; the experimental group 11.9 and 9.3 errors respectively. The experimental group actually seemed to know more in the retesting than it had originally learned.

The significance of these results is that they appear to illustrate that the students who learned in an atmosphere of involvement, of belonging, and of minimal anxiety retained more of the original learning and, paradoxically, their retention seemed to increase over a period of time. While it is true that the control group made fewer overall errors in both the original testing and in the retesting, there was a drop in retention between the two tests.

While it is difficult to make a conclusive statement about the above results, a tentative explanation is possible. Curran states that in a situation of belonging the person can absorb and actively assimilate all the aspects of perception rather than focus on the superimposed image. It is suggested that the group who studied Latin in the manner herein described, because they were learning in a relatively non-threatening atmosphere, were able to focus more openly on a broader perceptual field. "Thus they would absorb details without being aware of doing so, though the details would be available for later re-call."

Aside from the fact that the group which studied Latin by
using the Chromacord showed better retention, the fact still remains that the control group made fewer overall errors. A suggested explanation for this might be that, since they were more accustomed to studying Latin vocabulary in the traditional method, they had a greater skill in learning it this way. Another explanation might be that with continued refinement in programming for the Chromacord, improved learning could result.

II. A STUDENT EXPERIENCE APPROACH TO TEACHING RELIGION

For a number of years the writer had been teaching Religion to seniors in high school more or less according to the generally recognized approach of presenting information, attempting to clarify various difficulties of a doctrinal nature, and helping the students in a more personal way to solve religious problems that might enter into their lives. There was something about this approach, however, that left the students and the teacher both dissatisfied at the end of each school term. In discussing with the students this vague sense of dissatisfaction it came to be identified somehow as a feeling of emptiness, or as one student put it, a feeling of "so-what-else-is-new". Whatever was missing, although not too easily definable, was felt as very real.

The more this was thought about, the clearer it seemed that if Christianity were to become an integrated aspect of the lives of these students, the leaven in the dough, then it must be presented to them not merely as an external doctrinal and moral code,
but rather as something to which they could commit themselves, and with which they could become existentially engaged. This is not to imply that the presenting of facts, of information, and of meaning in general is out of place in a Religion class. It is saying, however, that to teach for meaning alone is not sufficient to engage a person; in order to do that, the meanings, the facts must become values. In commenting on this point, Curran makes the following remarks:

To make a personal commitment is a more profound, anxious and even angry experience than simply to absorb meaning. The nature of the classroom experience would change in proportion as we think of values, rather than meanings, as the end purpose of education. Once we free ourselves from Cartesian and Kantian concepts which separate intellectual and voluntary experience from somatic involvements, we can accept the fact that all aspects of the person are inextricably interwoven in any moment of learning. A main aim of the educative process then would be not just to impart meaning, but to enable the person to comprehend values. The educative process would in this way be much more concerned with methods, skills and relationships that promote value investment than with simply having the student learn the meanings in the course he has taken.

Although Curran is speaking here of the educative process as a whole, rather than of specifically the teaching of Religion, it seems obvious that the same principle would apply to the teaching of Religion, perhaps even more so since, if Religion is to be the cornerstone of all that a person is, it must become a value in which he can make his own unique investment. "A person is what he invests himself in."
A. Need for Integration

Religion, by definition, is something that comes from God. It is, therefore, something that comes to the person from outside of himself. In teaching Religion, the question would be one of how to enable the student to ingest and to integrate what is originally outside of himself. For unless he can bring religion into himself, in some manner he remains alienated from it. The learning of religion would seem to involve the integration by the students of that which is represented to them by the teacher. If, however, the teacher does not represent a personal and living integration of religious values to his students, but merely presents them with a catalogue of facts about religion, then religion will continue to remain outside of the students, a closed system that can be viewed in a detached way from a distance, but not something in which they can invest. The result of this is that at best students become passive listeners because there is no room for them into which they can expand. Somehow an opening must be created in which they can move around freely.

It was these considerations, as well as the reaction of the students, that prompted the writer to re-evaluate his own approach to the teaching of religion. The fact that the students were questioning the validity of a belief, and a way of life, that was taken for granted by a previous generation could not in honesty be ignored. However it seemed that this was a questioning, not of
Christianity itself as a value worthwhile investing in, but of the purely intellectualized presentation of it which left no room for somatic involvement, and thereby excluded self-investment.

It was the writer's conclusion, then, that so long as the focus was on presenting only the meanings of religion and failing to represent it as a value, there could be no progress toward solving the dilemma of futility that had previously been discussed with the students. The necessity of giving them a relationship through which eventually the person of Christ Himself could become a value investment seemed paramount. To put this in another way, if their religion was to become an integrated aspect of their lives, then these students must be given an experience of it, not just facts about it. This is the point that will be illustrated in Chapter VI, quoting Gurran to the effect that "more than knowledge is necessary for commitment and fulfillment." Further on, in discussing the process of maturity, Curran states:

The more mature person, because he is secure in being loved, can plunge into life, whereas the less mature, feeling himself to have little value or meaning, feels threatened, defensive, and so withdraws, or approaches life negatively. One might be said to feel himself 'redeemed', the other 'unredeemed'. Applied to a Theology of human belonging this would mean that somebody must redeem us in a purely human way by loving us and so giving us a feeling of self-meaning and worth, before we can feel loved enough to participate fully in a belief in divine Redemption.

B. Communication Through Commitment and Engagement

The application of these concepts to the integrating of
Christianity as a value system is obvious and basic, and it is perhaps for this reason that it is so challenging. The challenge seems to be this: how does one go about imparting a value system to another in such a way that it can become uniquely his own, and through which he can become a constructive participant in life? An attempt will be made to answer this question by giving an account of what actually developed as a result of trying to put into practice the notion of Christianity as a communicable value system through commitment and engagement. This approach is not suggested as the sole means of achieving this goal, or that it is to be exclusively adhered to by anyone who might attempt it. The manner of approach will necessarily be as varied as the number of those who implement it.

This account covers one scholastic year. Four different groups of students met five times a week. The average number of students in each group was about thirty-five, boys and girls. What is said here about any one of the four groups will be more or less representative of all of them. Upon entering the classroom on the first day of class the teacher spoke briefly to the group, outlining what he thought might be a useful and constructive procedure for the class to follow. This consisted mainly in suggesting that the procedure be in the fashion of a group discussion situation, and that the teacher would act as group leader, at least until other modifications developed. It was also pointed out by the teacher that he did not feel it necessary to limit the
discussions to strictly religious topics. It was then suggested that the class be open to discussion.

C. Negative Reaction

The immediate reaction to this was one of confusion and disbelief, since they had expected that the teacher would present them with a topic to be discussed. When this did not happen, there followed a great deal of uneasiness and complete silence for about fifteen minutes. Finally someone broke the silence by asking a question as to just how they were to get started. To this the teacher responded, not by answering the question, but by attempting to understand the student himself. This caused greater confusion and anxiety which was expressed through a whole barrage of further questions, each of which the teacher honestly tried to reflect and to understand, but did not answer in the usual way of creating closure, and thereby blocking further reflection on the part of the student.

It seemed that the main difficulty that this procedure brought out for the students was that they were so accustomed to having someone take the responsibility for their learning that they were at a loss as to what to do when they themselves were entrusted with this responsibility.

The class went along in this rather painful manner until about ten minutes remained of the period. At this point the teacher suggested that an evaluation be had of the first meeting
together. This proposal was met with an almost stunned surprise since there seemed to be little, if anything, to evaluate. The feelings expressed were quite negative, manifesting such sentiments as uselessness, boredom, hostility, frustration, confusion. It will be readily recognized that this type of negative expression is not too different from that which often arises in the initial interview of a counseling session. As Curran, says:

In the opening interviews, as we have seen, expressions of 'feeling confused' often occur. In this state the person does not clearly know what is wrong and sees no way out. Statements of fear and insecurity generally accompany this state. Hostility, attitudes are common. A person may be angry with himself, other people, or situations which in some way are concerned with his conflict state. There will also be expressions of unhappiness. These may be associated with urges to escape. People may also feel that others, upon whom they depend for love and acceptance, are not responding. They may express feeling rejected.

But if these negative feelings are openly and precisely reflected by the leader, positive tones will gradually emerge. Curran states elsewhere:

Somewhere in the interview process, however as the counselor's responses penetrate and unfold these feelings of confusion, hostility, rejection, and the like, some positive statement of needs, such as love, acceptance, achievement, security, peace and happiness, will begin to appear. A person may express unfulfilled goals. After dwelling on his difficulties, he may see a brighter side and give himself credit for this more positive picture. He may recite certain achievements he has already reached, some relationships where he is loved or accepted, and some things in which he does find real security.

The second class meeting was perhaps more tense than the first one. Again upon entering the classroom the teacher mentioned that someone might like to bring up a topic for discussion.
After a period of silence, as on the previous day, one student very tentatively asked a question. Again the teacher reflected back to the student what he had said in such a way that he could see it from a different perspective. Although this aroused considerable resistance from the entire group, it seemed nevertheless that the group was engaged in a painful but hopefully constructive struggle; that any direct attempt to alleviate it would ultimately be no more than superficially helpful, if not actually unfair. It further seemed that to do so would imply a betrayal of the trust already placed in the group. It would imply that having been entrusted with a common struggle, they could no longer be counted on to see it through.

D. Beginning of Change

Externally this second meeting, as well as those of the next two weeks or so, was not too different from the first one. Yet there seemed to be a subtle and undefinable difference, of which the students themselves were only vaguely aware; perhaps it was not more than an awareness that there was some difference. There were the expected attempts to escape from the situation, or to ignore it, by reading outside material, sleeping, etc. However, it seemed important that these reactions, too, should be accepted, and any attempt on the part of the teacher to manipulate the group would result in destroying whatever had been achieved up to this point.
Sometime during the third week of class, one member of the group voiced the opinion that if they were to gain anything at all from being in class they would have to take matters into their own hands. They proceeded to do so by asking the teacher to relinquish his position as leader of the group. This was agreed to, and the teacher sat down in one of the chairs among the group.

However this did not immediately solve anything and, in fact, from that point on things seemed to become worse. For now there was no leader at all, and this created the additional difficulty of not having anyone on whom to place the blame. This impasse lasted for several days and, to an outside observer, it might have appeared as totally without purpose. In fact, however, something deeply significant was going on within the students. For many, this was the first time in their lives they had found themselves in a situation of unconditional trust with no attempt to manipulate them. It seemed that it was this situation which was so difficult for them to comprehend and which accounted for so much of their internal turmoil. It was hard for them to believe that no one would interfere, that the responsibility was theirs. Up until this point there had always been the vague hope, or fear, that someone would come to the rescue.

When the realization came home to them that they were truly responsible for creating a learning situation, that whatever value they derived from the class would be their own and would not be imposed from outside, they took another step forward. A
suggestion was made by someone that they appoint a committee of four and five members whose task it would be to insure that a topic for discussion be prepared for each meeting. This was carried into action and it appeared to be effective to the extent that it provided a timely release from many pent up feelings. For the next several classes the committee members were to conduct a kind of panel discussion in which they would try to involve the rest of the class. At first it went rather smoothly, but it became progressively more difficult to sustain at a level that would hold everyone's interest. In searching for an explanation of this phenomenon, beyond the superficial reason that those conducting the panel discussions were inexperienced, it might be said that by this time something so profound had taken place within these students that they were beyond anything so prosaic as a panel discussion providing merely information or meanings. No one could label this change; the most anyone could say was that he felt differently about things. Perhaps it was the agonizing struggle of the first several weeks that had brought them into a real relationship with one another. Although there was still a great deal of anxiety and discouragement present, there was also a growing sense of hope.

This point of balance between discouragement and hope seemed to be the most crucial one of the entire experience. From a practical point of view, all four groups appeared in their own eyes to be a failure. They no longer had a leader, the committee idea had
failed, and the original problem was still facing them. There
was a deep questioning of where to go from here, but no one
suggested going back to where they were at the beginning of the
term.

E. Moving into a Vacuum

What appears to have happened here is that a vacuum was
created which urgently needed to be filled. But without this
vacuum there could have been no further growth. Perhaps this
was the "opening" mentioned earlier and now that it was here,
the question was how to move into it. It appeared that there
were two ways of doing this; either the students themselves
could be trusted to move in and fill the vacuum, even after their
previous sense of failure, or perhaps because of it; or else the
teacher could move in and take over. In viewing this second al-
ternative, however, it seemed that it would be impossible for the
students to increase if the teacher did not continue to decrease.

Sometime shortly before the end of the first quarter, two of
the four groups asked the teacher to resume the position of group
leader. The other two groups soon heard of this and they also
asked him to resume this position. He was also asked to give one
lecture a week. The teacher accepted both of these requests and
this seems to have been the turning point. There was considerable
learning readiness among the groups; they were able to listen, to
absorb, to integrate what was presented in the lecture (on Monday
of each week) which then usually became the topic of discussion for the remainder of the week.

This did not mean, however, that everything went smoothly from then on. Many negative feelings remained, and were usually expressed in one form or other. But there was a very definite, though less tangible, growth toward a mature independence and toward an inner freedom to be what they were. Along with this freedom came the responsibility to use it properly. For example, they became more respectful of one another and more sensitive to one another's feelings. They were able to enter into a true relationship of understanding with each other and to see the other person's world through his own eyes.

Eventually it occurred to someone that they divide the group into smaller units of five or six members each. It was hoped that in this way they would be able to speak more freely and openly, and on a more personal basis. This suggestion was put into effect and generally remained the procedure for the rest of the year. Usually about fifteen minutes before the end of the class period, the smaller units would come together again into a large group and share their exchange in the small group. The nature of the discussions in the small groups often became quite personal and was empathetically shared and accepted by the other members. With no formal counseling skills, these students were able to enter into and share the problems and anxieties of one of their peer group in an amazingly identifying way. As one of them pointed out, this
was not just talking Christianity, this was practicing it.

F. Value-Investment

In other words, what this student seemed to be saying was that Christianity had become for him a value-investment; that whereas previously he may have known a great deal about it, he could now commit himself to it in a personalized way; it had become something uniquely his own. This is something beyond education for meaning which, as will be noted in Chapter VI, is not sufficient for personal commitment. It involves, rather, the communication of values.

Seeing a class arrangement and procedure such as this, one might wonder what actual knowledge was gained. In answer to this question the following evaluations of one of the students, made at three different intervals throughout the year are presented. It appears to adequately illustrate a moral, intellectual, and emotional growth. This is not an isolated example; but this particular evaluation is chosen because it is fairly representative of the total number of students (about one hundred fifty) who had this experience.

**Evaluation after approximately two months**

I feel that by now we should have adjusted to this class but we haven't. There have been a few, but very few, times when this class has not been a total waste. If we could get the group to realize its responsibility, I think it would help a lot toward ironing out the feelings and problems that come with growing up. I believe we are too busy fighting the new way this class is
presented to see how much we can get from it. I am frustrated that we haven't started yet but hopeful that we may soon get started. Mistrust of the group is the main reason why I don't participate much in class.

Evaluation after the midterm

Knowledge, appreciation, understanding, and acceptance are I guess the big part of this year so far. Knowledge of who people are and a willingness to trust them. Appreciation of their trust in me. In life I will probably never be able to trust anyone to the fullest, but I find now I can accept people a lot better for what they are. This may sound trite but I've realized that there are many different people in the world besides me, and if I don't like these people, at least I will not condemn them for being what they are. The understanding is of others and of myself; although I can't seem to find myself as I want to now, I guess it will come with trying. This is the way I think I've learned most about me, and the happiness that comes in just being. My realization of what maturity is has been found in this class and I hope to find more throughout the year - to learn about the different phases of Religion and Christ in my life. I feel enthusiastic for life in whatever I do. If anything, this class has brought me enthusiasm for life.

Much of what Curran says, in discussing maturity as the ability to invoke limits on oneself, appears to be borne out by this student in his evaluation. Curran states:

One necessary aspect of the developmental process as a person grows from infancy to adulthood, is, then, a corresponding growth in this sense of, and ability to relate to, limits. As we have seen, any loving act of giving oneself to another is only possible when one has arrived at a sufficient degree of knowledge of oneself and of the area of oneself and of the other. This must be combined with the capacity to limit oneself, and thus give independent meaning and value to the other.

In the student's final evaluation at the end of the school term, he had this to say:
This year has been the best one in my education. I know that most seniors usually say this, but this year I have found something very precious: I have found myself. I have taken a good look at myself inside and have seen my good and bad points. I have come to realize that if I truly love my neighbor then I must accept him as he is, not as I would like him to be. My not always being able to do this is one of my biggest weaknesses; I must let others be themselves through me. Although I haven't opened a book this year in Religion class, I have a broader outlook on religion. I want to live it. I also have a deeper insight into sin, confession, marriage, and love. I am grateful for the opportunity to pen myself up a little bit to others. This has done me more good than any advice a teen-ager could receive.

What this student has said again bears out what Curran\textsuperscript{18} says in further discussing the maturity of limits:

There is, then, an ascending scale of self-commitment from the self-centered child who refuses to participate to the point in self-understanding where one finally desires to give himself to a task or game and to others in a maturity of limits. This involves a complex self-operation that is finally a disciplined and artistic gift of self.

G. Role of the Teacher

In presenting religion in the manner just described, it seems that the greatest challenge to the teacher's personal integrity is his ability to accept unconditionally the existential condition of the student, without allowing his own needs to get in the way of growth. It may be asked whether this does not lead to a breakdown in classroom discipline. On the contrary, it builds up a respect of the students for one another and for the teacher. Their respect was in direct proportion to the respect given them. They were quick to resent any attitude of superiority or condescension
Although they could be momentarily impressed by such attitudes, as soon as they saw them for what they were, they were left with the feeling of once more having been deceived.

In speaking of the necessity of the teacher to identify himself with the students, this of course does not mean that he is to become their buddy. The teacher, as an adult, and the student as an adolescent, each has his own separate interests, often quite apart from one another; and among the students themselves there is a wide range of differences. However, in the group learning situation it is precisely these differences that make for meaningful inter-communication, and through which the meaning of individuality comes to fulfillment. In this sense, then, it would be the uniqueness, rather than the conformity, of the group that creates genuine community.

H. Follow-up

One might ask what happened to these students once they left and no longer continued the kind of group sharing that they experienced. Were they able to live according to the change that took place within them? Or was this something that soon wore off? The practical difficulty of making any concentrated follow-up is obvious since, after graduation from high school, these students all went on the various colleges or into different occupations. The teacher's contact with them in large numbers, therefore, has been limited. In the contacts that have been possible, however, all of them felt that they would like to go
further in this type of Christian living, as they expressed it. Some spoke of the difficulty they had in encountering others with whom they could share such living and through whom they could stay "alive". In spite of this, however, they felt that their lives had been greatly enriched by this experience, and that they had come to a deeper meaning of their own existence.

A final question that might be asked is why a student should have to wait until his Senior year for an experience of this sort. Also whether this approach can be used only in the area of religious instruction, or would it apply to all areas of learning? It seems to the writer that if students could have such an experience of trust and responsibility earlier in their education career, in fact to the greatest possible extent throughout it, the aforementioned difficulty of "staying alive" would be obviated. Then it would not be merely an isolated experience, but an integral part of their lives, and the possibility of losing it would be more remote and less threatening.

As to whether this kind of experience would be feasible in the other areas of learning, it would appear to enhance the student's sense of personal unity and integrity. Instead of seeing their education in an atomized way, with little relationship between one academic discipline and another, they would be able to see the interrelationship of all that they are learning, with Christianity as the thread running throughout the entire process.
I. Conclusions

Since religion concerns the relationship of man to God, it is thereby personal and subjective, as any relationship must be. It is for this reason that the term "experience", rather than "experiment", was used in the title of the preceding discussion. From an experimental viewpoint, then, no conclusions, strictly speaking, can be drawn.

However, some generalizations can be made about what emerged. In the situation of personal interaction that developed, there was considerable involvement on the part of the students, negative though it was in the beginning. Out of this involvement there seemed to grow a commitment which more and more became internalized. As the commitment became internalized, and thereby personalized, religious meanings became values for the students. Religion was no longer something that was relegated to a text book, but was now an integral part of the lives of the students, something to be lived and acted upon. And finally there appeared to be genuine community learning, to which reference will be made later in Chapter VII in further developing this point.
FOOTNOTES


3 Tranel, ibid., p. 158

4 Tranel, ibid., p. 158

5 Tranel, ibid., p. 159

6 Tranel, ibid., p. 159

7 Tranel, ibid., p. 159

8 Tranel, ibid., p. 159-160

9 Tranel, ibid., p. 159


11 Tranel, loc. cit., p. 159

12 Curran, C.A., op. cit., 1968, p. 93

13 Curran, ibid., p. 76

14 Curran, ibid., p. 99


17 Curran, ibid., p. 212

18 Curran, ibid., p. 213
CHAPTER V

THE PLACE OF FEELINGS IN LEARNING

In Chapter IV, particularly in the section entitled "A Student Experience Approach to Teaching Religion", it was seen that the expression of feelings on the part of the students was quite prominent. A consideration of the place that such feelings have in the educative process will now be taken up. In discussing the significance of an acceptant attitude on the part of the teacher toward feelings of fear, anticipation, and discouragement in the student, Rogers says:

It will perhaps disturb some that when the teacher holds such attitudes, when he is willing to be acceptant of feelings, it is not only attitudes toward school work itself which are expressed, but feelings about parents, feelings of hatred for brother or sister, feelings of concern about self - the whole gamut of attitudes. Do such feelings have a right to exist openly in a school setting? It is my thesis that they do. They are related to the person's becoming, to his effective learning and effective functioning, and to deal understandingly and acceptantly with such feelings has a definite relationship to the learning of long division or the geography of Pakistan.

I. NEED TO ACCEPT THE FEELINGS OF THE STUDENT

The thing that makes a person most unique is his feelings. If, therefore, education is to reach the student on the level of his own uniqueness, as was discussed in Chapter III, then it must take his feelings into consideration. The significance of this
from the point of view of this paper is that in a Cartesian-Kantian conception of man, the uniqueness of the student on the level of his feelings is largely ignored.

In Chapter II, however, the trend away from the mechanistic view of man toward a greater awareness of the individual was noted. In introducing this Chapter, it is important to emphasize once again the emergence of this awareness. The following statement by Mulvey points this up:

It is imperative that everyone take time to recognize that education deals with individuals and education is not going to mass produce genius simply by grinding everyone through the same brain factory, and stamping them out with the same old pattern. Nor by discarding those who can't keep up, or those with differing opinions and values.

In Chapter III, it was proposed that the student, entering the classroom in what was called a state of ignorance or "sickness", was in some kind of conflict or anxiety because of this condition. Furthermore, it was suggested that if the teacher did not recognize and respond to these feelings, it would be difficult for the student to hear, much less to integrate, the intellectual content that was presented to him. On the contrary, he would resist it and attempt to protect himself against it. This is because his security state is threatened by someone (in this case, the teacher) who knows more than he does. In his ignorance he appears worthless in his own eyes. It is this feeling of worthlessness against which he must protect himself so that he is not totally destroyed. But where he is seen and accepted as a
unique individual, the acceptance can provide the security he needs to let down his defenses and be open to learning. Outside of an interpersonal relationship, however, this is difficult to do. That is the reason for previously stating that there is no learning outside of a relationship. The defensive attitude of a person in an anxiety situation is described by Curran as follows:

Anxiety and the feeling of worthlessness seem to be interrelated. Perhaps they are two sides of the same coin. One might say that because man is born out of nothing, he is always on the edge of nothing. He is pushed toward feelings of worthlessness and anxiety because he has nothing that is finally his own.

It is seen again, then, that the encounter between the student and teacher is much more than an intellectual one only; it is also an emotional encounter which, if ignored by the teacher, can become destructive of learning. If recognized, however, the feelings can become positive factors. The place that feelings play in learning, and their constructive-destructive value, is illustrated by Curran in an experiment in the learning of foreign languages. It will be useful to quote at some length his findings in this area:

The complicated and subtle part conflict, hostility, anger and anxiety play in learning recurred repeatedly in almost all aspects of this foreign language learning research. To a certain point, we can call these positive factors, for they engage one in the learning experience; they are forms of commitment and involvement. Beyond that point, however, they seem to become destructive forces; they block the student, make him want to escape the whole experience, or arouse him to a defensive kind of learning. Such a defensive learner often tends to disregard what he has learned as soon as it has served its defensive purpose, apparently because the whole
experience has been so painful. Many students, for example, spoke of the deep hostility they had toward foreign languages as a result of previous classroom experiences. In their negative anxiety and conflict, most had defended themselves against this threatening situation by getting a passing grade - some even a high one. But afterwards it was difficult and painful for them to try to speak this particular language in our research group.

II. INTELLECTUALIZED EDUCATION

In a purely intellectual encounter between student and teacher, where there is no channeling of emotions in a constructive direction, or where they are ignored, there is a great deal of safety and protection provided against the pain that might result in an interpersonal encounter since both the teacher and the student can take refuge behind intellectual content. The result of this is what Curran calls "an overintellectualized or 'angelic' idea of education," where in the long run real learning seems to be suppressed. To regard education as a totally and exclusively intellectual endeavor, therefore, is to strip it of the quality of wholeness and richness that is essential to any human encounter. In speaking of the emotional aspect of education, Bernard brings this out:

It seems highly probably that the teacher's and pupil's ability to understand, control, and direct emotions would be the single most productive factor in vastly improving learning efficiency. The anonymous individual who said "the intellect is a mere speck afloat upon a sea of feeling" was a wise psychologist. As teachers, we should realize that much, perhaps most, human behavior is instigated and sustained by emotion.
In the safety that is present in an intellectualized classroom atmosphere there is also a great deal of artificiality wherein the realities of the persons involved, the teacher and students, are not openly faced and constructively channeled. In this kind of situation, the feelings are destructive of learning in that they ultimately lead to vengeance and depression, about which we will have more to say later in this chapter. In the "safe" classroom it may appear that everyone is "getting along"; however, no one would seriously claim that this is the aim of education. This kind of "rationalized intellectualism", as Curran calls it, results where only the intellectual output of the students is recognized and accepted.

III. NEED FOR THE STUDENT TO EXPRESS FEELINGS

No one would suggest, of course, that disruptive atmosphere in the classroom, which might tend to be associated with uncontrolled expression of emotion, is something to be sought after by the educator. What is being discussed here, as stated above, is the constructive channeling of emotions as an integral aspect of education. Discussing the relationship between anxiety and hostility as they arise in the learning situation, Lindgren comments on the restrictive attitude in education toward expression of feeling:

Our middle-class culture does not approve, generally, of the free and open expression of hostility regardless of whether this expression be through physical or
verbal attack ... On the other hand, the feeling of hostility is a perfectly normal emotion ... It is a natural consequence of being thwarted or frustrated or threatened.

Lindgren is here speaking of the classroom situation in which the student is forced to inhibit his feelings. He goes on to say that it is the job of the teacher to help the student to work out these feelings, rather than force him to suppress them. Instead of doing this, however, what often happens on the part of the teacher is described by Lindgren in this way:

But the difficulty is that we ourselves are so anxious about our own hostilities (or hostility in general) that we stigmatize as wicked and unpardonable any feeling or expressions of hostility. As a result, there is a general tendency to make children feel guilty even about having hostile feelings, let alone expressing such feelings through hostile words or deeds.

To carry this point further, it might be said that when the feelings are not recognized there exists a certain kind of deception between the teacher and student in the sense that both are, in a way, denying the existence of something that is in fact most crucial, not only to learning, but to being human. In this denial what is seen is that the "safe" and intellectualized classroom is not necessarily the one in which learning is taking place. Referring to the above quote from Lindgren, the teacher can easily deceive himself about this because of his own anxiety. Speaking in a different context but in a way that is applicable to this situation, Curran puts it this way:

A person can also "rationalize" basic fears by seeming to withdraw above and beyond the human condition and
to look down upon it as a purely intellectualized being might be thought to look upon mere men. This distance is then masked as "objectivity" to cover and displace an anxiety and fear of involvement one cannot consciously handle.

This emphasizes that the problem being discussed here is that of Cartesian dualism and the mechanistic conception of man that we referred to in the first chapter. It results in education without emotion, and the issue that we are concerned with is whether this can be a valid approach to education. From an existentialist point of view, Morris states it this way:

To the Existentialist, therefore, Experimentalist and Progressive theory in education can be put down as essentially bloodless and emotion-free. It is a kind of detached, "cool cat" way of dealing with human experience. "Low-conflict" rapport with others - in neighborhood or classroom - is the unarguable first principle.

Where Morris uses the term "detached", Curran used the expression "fear of involvement" to depict the educational situation of a Cartesian based concept of man. But if we are to accept the teaching-learning contract idea as presented in the third chapter, the teacher would be obligated to accept the student in his entirety, not merely that part of him that is revealed as emotion-free. A genuine learning process could be quite bloody, to paraphrase Morris, and much that is uncouth and unsightly might be brought to the surface through the expression of emotion. Yet where this is anxiously avoided, the student is removed from the human condition, referred to by Curran, or perhaps he was not allowed to enter into it in the first place.
IV. THE CONSTRUCTIVE EXPRESSION OF FEELING

Given constructive expression, on the other hand, there occurs what Curran calls an "incarnate-redemptive" relationship between the teacher and the student. On this point, he says:

Consideration of an incarnate-redemptive learning experience patterned after the counseling relationship, and of the place of counseling itself in the educative process, must then start with the effects on learning of conflict, hostility, anxiety, defense, and other basic emotional and instinctive psychosomatic reactions.

When this is done in the educative process, there results an openness which is the beginning of learning and which eliminates deception and manipulation between the teacher and the student.

The fact of manipulation in education, and its result, is strongly stated by Shostrom:

The classroom is a frightening fertile field for manipulation. One major reason is the insistence by school administrators that above all else teachers maintain control over children. As we have seen, control of others, no matter how well-intentioned, reduces human beings to the status of things.

Being reduced to the status of a thing, the student is manipulable for there is no other way to relate to a thing. This occurs in an atmosphere where the totality of the student, and of the teacher, is excluded. Along these lines, Shostrom continues:

Teaching which would help students actualize would be teaching which centers on the interests of student and teacher; encourages full expression of feelings and ideas of students, handles student questions and asks questions skillfully; allows full expression of the teachers' ideas and feelings as well.
This final phrase of Shostrom is one which is often overlooked; it is not only the student who must be allowed to express his feelings; the teacher, as well as the counselor, must have this same freedom if there is to be open communication. The teacher must communicate not only his ideas but his whole self. In presenting a number of guidelines for the facilitation of learning, Rogers mentions the following one as applicable to this point:

He (the teacher) takes the initiative in sharing himself with the group - his feelings as well as his thoughts - in ways which do not demand nor impose but represent simply a personal sharing which students may take or leave. Thus he is free to express his own feeling in giving feedback to the students, in his reaction to them as individuals, and in sharing his own satisfactions or disappointments. In such expressions it is his "owned" attitudes which are shared, not judgments or evaluations of others.

The constructive force of anger and anxiety in learning, according to Curran, is that they represent a struggle for independent and responsible maturity. Consequently, without their constructive expression, maturity and responsibility as outcomes of the educative process cannot be achieved. The notion of responsibility as an integral outcome of education is stated quite explicitly by Morris:

Let education be the discovery of responsibility! Let learning be the sharp and vivid awakening of the learner to the sense of being personally answerable for his own life.

Where feelings are not given their proper recognition in the educative process, they will often appear as a threat to the
teacher, rather than as a positive force for education. But where the student is allowed to be himself, to be his feelings, as Rogers would put it, then the student no longer has to fear himself; he is free to allow an increase in his own being through accepting what the teacher has to give. The teacher would also be free to be his feelings, and in this kind of open situation, the teacher and students could truly communicate with each other. This would result in a deep conviction on the part of the student that he is accepted at the deepest level of his humanity, and it would bring about in him the desire to be open at this level.

V. DEFENSIVE LEARNING

Rather than being forced to suppress any anxiety that he might have concerning his human condition, the student would be allowed to face up to it directly. This is affirmed by May when he says:

When we try to understand the constructive use of normal anxiety from the **objective** side, we note that it is characterized by the individual's confronting the anxiety-creating situation directly, admitting his apprehensions but moving ahead despite the anxiety. In other words, it consists of moving **through** anxiety-creating experiences rather than moving **around** them or **retrenching** in the face of them.

May's term, "retrenching", seems to refer to the student's increased resistance when his feelings are not recognized. He is forced into a position of having to protect himself against the teacher. However, the underlying anxiety remains. The ways of dealing with it, and the protection against the teacher, and
ultimately against learning, may take various forms. This is referred to by Bernard:

It has long been accepted that fear of the birch rod, the anxiety produced by low grades, and the threat of failing to pass to the next grade do not produce good learning situations. Pupils tend to avoid the tension producing situations by truancy and dropping out of school, and they have frequently done so.

The examples mentioned by Bernard, such as truancy and dropping out of school, may be seen as extreme forms of protection against learning. There are more subtle means that the student uses to protect himself against the "birch rod". Memorizing might be one of them. While there is no implication that memorization is to be excluded from the total learning process, since it obviously has an important place, it may be used as a protective measure either against the teacher or against failure in an examination or against group humiliation; it ceases to be an integrated learning and takes on the aspect of defensive learning. Then, as soon as the need for defense is gone, for example, after an examination, the protective facade also disappears. In other words, the student immediately forgets what he has memorized because there is no longer any need to remember it. In addition to forgetting it, he may actually become quite hostile to it, and to the teacher as well.

The idea to be emphasized is that feelings are not merely a matter of secondary or incidental importance in the educative process, something which the teacher may or may not take into consideration; they are, on the contrary, a very integral part of
In speaking of this issue, Jeffreys says:

It would be a great mistake to think of the education of feeling as a distinct area or department of education which can be promoted or neglected independently of the rest of the educational process. A human being is, or ought to be, a whole organism; and what affects one part affects the rest also. It is the business of education to foster the growth of balanced, whole persons. If education is deficient on the side of feelings, it is bound to be defective on the intellectual side; the resulting intellectual life will tend to be arid - it will, so to speak, lack body.

The reference here to the integration of feeling and intellect reminds us of Curran's expression that often it is not that people lack sufficient knowledge that makes them ineffective; it is that they need greater integration of the knowledge that they already have with their "disordered appetites". He goes on to say:

This is applicable not simply to "disturbed" people with "problems", but rather to us all. While we may not be pathologically disturbed, we cannot claim any smooth coordination of our instincts and emotions as they relate to thought and action.

This statement of Curran, as well as Jeffrey's term "arid" (cf. quote, above), used to describe the intellectual life divorced from feeling, is close to Whitehead's phrase "inert ideas". Commenting on this, Dunkel says:

The whole essay, The Aims of Education, and indeed the whole book (as Whitehead makes clear in the preface) are devoted to an attempt to free education from the weight of inert ideas, "ideas that are merely received into the mind without being utilized, or tested, or thrown into fresh combinations."

As stated previously, there is no intent to deny a place in
learning to memorization. It can be stated, however, that memory in learning must go hand in hand with an experiential process, not separated from the rest of the person. Curran puts it this way:

However, it is not enough simply to have memory traces. There must be a living experience that is not only hypothalamic but cortical.

A little further on, speaking in the same context, he explains more fully:

It is obvious, therefore, that if such neural retrieval memory and cortical replay is a fundamental basis of learning - as of a foreign language - more precise psychosomatic involvement must be provided the student than simply sitting in his seat and passively listening. He must be somatically or physiologically, as well as intellectually engaged.

VI. VENGEANCE AND DEPRESSION

Another result of the suppression of feelings and the failure to constructively channel them will now be considered. Earlier in this chapter a reference to vengeance and depression as a result of suppressed hostility was made, and this will now be given further consideration. In a section dealing with depression, Buss says that the depressed person tends to attack himself instead of others:

Any tendency to attack others is rigidly suppressed; nor can feelings of hostility toward others be admitted because they would arouse intense feelings of guilt ... The depressive suffers from a sense of worthlessness and inferiority; he believes that he should not be allowed to live.

This last statement of Buss may be too extreme to apply to the
average student. Nevertheless, an idea can be gotten from it what might happen. Far from making the student a whole person, it tends to diminish him. A teacher who has a very "quiet" classroom externally may have a very disturbed one internally. In other words, this teacher would have little awareness of what Mouly calls the "emotional climate" of the classroom. Mouly goes on to imply that teachers, although neither called upon nor qualified for the most part to treat severe adjustment problems, can, by deeper awareness, at least prevent problems of mental health.

A clearer picture of the interrelationship of anxiety and depression is gotten from Arnold where she makes the distinction between anxiety and worry. Arnold states:

> Since worry contains both striving and apprehension, the psychological symptoms will not be those observed in simple fear. In fact it would seem that worry is an attempt to incite one's self to courage so that the thing feared can be attacked instead of avoided ... When danger increases and the threat cannot be avoided or overcome, worry ceases and stark fear takes its place, ending in despair or depression.

This explanation helps tie together two ideas discussed previously. In the beginning of this chapter the effort was to make clear that overt aggression in the classroom is not acceptable. However, in the third chapter there was also an attempt to make clear that the teacher does, in fact, represent at least an initial threat to the student because of the distance between them. In this sense the teacher represents a "danger" to the student which, if it can neither be attacked or avoided, causes depression in the student.

In this chapter, the place of feelings in learning and how
they are an integral part of it was seen. The position taken is that the constructive expression and channeling of feelings is essential to the acquisition of values in the educative process. In Chapter III, this was seen in operation.
FOOTNOTES


4  Curran, *ibid.*, p. 298


8  Lindgren, *ibid.*, p. 70


13 Shostrom, *ibid.*, p. 118


15 Morris, *op. cit.*, p. 117


17 Bernard, *op. cit.*, 1965, p. 408


22 Curran, *ibid.*, p. 344


CHAPTER VI

THE RELATIONSHIP OF MEANINGS TO VALUES IN THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS

It was noted in Chapter II that the insight, and the subsequent freedom to change, which results from the counseling process is, above all else, highly personal because of the investment of the self that the client has made in the process. The change is possible because the person is able to internalize relationships and situations that had previously been threatening to him. Once internalized and personalized, the person can freely choose to make these relationships or situations a value for himself if he so desires. These things are now seen from the inside out rather than from the outside in and, as such, no longer represent a threat because the person is not estranged from them and need not defend himself against them. Something of this seems to have been realized by the students in the experiences presented in the fourth chapter. In the preceding chapter, the relevancy of feelings to learning was delineated, and this, also, was related to the experiences of the students described in Chapter IV. It is necessary now to show the difference between meanings and values as part of the educative process.
I. THE NATURE OF VALUES

The acquisition of values among learning theorists generally does not hold a prominent place. Whatever place it does have, however, is related in some way to reinforcement. This is stated by Hill as follows:

The concept of reinforcement is basic to learning theory. While theorists are by no means unanimously agreed on the value of reinforcement terminology, there is little question that an empirical law of effect holds, that the consequences of an act influence its subsequent occurrence. A classification of kinds of reinforcers will be used here as the basis for analyzing the learning of values.

After classifying these reinforcers into primary, secondary, and vicarious, Hill then suggests that reinforcement applied to the acquisition of values results largely in negative values of the "Thou shalt not" variety. The values thus acquired are imposed on the person from outside of himself; as such, they are not values in which he can make a personal investment because they are essentially the values of someone else.

In discussing the acquisition of values through insight, something quite different than this is meant. The personal nature of values is something that cannot be measured or, in the words of Fromm, "cannot be experienced as a commodity with a certain exchange value." To state this another way, a value cannot remain purely the intellectual abstraction of another if it is to have a changing effect on the person which is essential to learning.
Referring to this issue, Winthrop says:

Values cannot be solely intellectual matters. Feeling is a very necessary accompaniment to them. Feeling seems to be an accompaniment of proximity and shared experience, imitation followed by the genuine appearance of the emotion simulated, understanding coupled with good will, and similar social accidents. However the problem of generating the feeling tone which is appropriate to an abstract value, is still pretty much unsolved. Unless such appropriate feeling accompanies the verbal expression of our values and education supplies a rough notion of the contexts which call for the enactment of these values, they will continue to remain abstractions.

From this the idea seems to be that the task of education is not only the presentation of intellectual ideas, but also the integration of these ideas into the person where they may become values. This is not a new discovery, as Curran points out; he also suggests, however, the place of counseling skills in aiding this process.

Since the main concern in this chapter is the place of meanings and values in the educative process, it is necessary to point out the distinction between them. To start, it might be stated that while values are personal, meanings are impersonal. In order for a meaning to become personal, and ultimately a value, insight into that meaning is necessary. Simple reinforcement does not necessarily involve insight which is essential to the acquisition of a personal value. The notion of insight, as used here, is taken from counseling as described by Curran:

But insight as we mean it and as we see it operating in counseling therapy, would be more than this intellectual awareness, more than perceptual gestalten, it would be evaluative in the most exact sense of that term, in that
such insight would consist of tracing emotional reactions to their sources in the self-invested values of the person himself. The unfolding and clarification of this value system and the ability to resort and reinvest the self as a result of this clarification would constitute genuine psychological insight.

It is seen from this that insight is more than an intellectual process. Rather it results from the total integration of the person. In speaking of the relationship of intelligence to values, Johann makes a statement that may help to clarify this notion of integration. He says:

In the human enterprise, therefore, head and heart are natural allies, and neither can go it alone; the heart supplies energy and push for the undertaking, but its happy outcome depends on using the head.

Unless the person can invest himself in the meaning, therefore, it remains outside of him and the intellect alone will not serve to make the meaning a value. As in counseling there is a continual evaluative process as insight is gained into the self, likewise in learning there is the same evaluative process whereby the student invests himself in what he sees intellectually. Without insight there is no investment and learning does not go beyond meanings.

This relationship of self-investment, or commitment, to intellect and knowledge is expressed by Curran as follows:

But, as we have seen, more than knowledge is necessary for commitment and fulfillment. The whole person must be engaged. Not only his intellectual understanding is involved, but in some significant areas at least, he must also engage and invest his
entire self. Such value awareness would characterize a responsible person who is genuinely committed - an inner-directed person - not one who waits for the impulse from outside, swaying often between changing moods and fashions of thought and feeling.

Earlier in this chapter it was stated that as a result of insight a person is able to see relationships and situations as they affect him from the inside out rather than from the outside in. It is this person who is inner-directed, who does not wait for the impulse from outside, but who acts responsibly from his own initiative. It is also this person who has truly learned because he has integrated and invested in the meanings that he has acquired. This was not an impersonal, abstracted, intellectual process; the "whole person" had to be involved.

II. THE UNIQUENESS OF VALUES

It is now necessary to look more closely at the distinction between meanings and values. Of this distinction, Curran says:

...we can distinguish between the quest for meaning and the pursuit of values by saying that "meaning" here stands for the intellectual search to understand the significance of reality and experience. Values would imply a further step whereby, having acquired some measure of significant meanings, a person may then search out special areas in which to invest himself. In this way values become personal norms, goals, and purposes in proportion as we have committed ourselves to them. So we may quest for meanings but we genuinely pursue values. The personal significance of any educational process, then, becomes finally oriented and integrated in values.

Here it is seen that the final outcome of learning is the acquisition of values, which is a step beyond the acquisition of
meanings. While the acquisition of meanings is obviously an essential and integral part of education, the process of education itself falls short if it stops at this.

The more meanings that a student has acquired, the broader the field of options open to him in which he can invest himself. Meanings are the same for everyone, while values are unique. Thus, for example, meanings can be presented by anyone who has an adequate intellectual understanding of the significance of reality but a value can be communicated only by one who has made a unique investment in a meaning because the meaning has now become a value for him. In connection with this point, Curran states that "without values, in this sense, the most adequate education could still lead to frustration and confusion." To have a large number of meanings available to oneself is one thing; to be able to invest in any one of them is a different matter. But it is in connection with self-investment in a meaning that change takes place.

In discussing the place of values, as distinct from meanings, in the educative process, Watson's famous statement comes to mind:

> Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to bring them up in and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select - doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief and, yes, even beggar-man and thief, regardless of his talents, inclinations, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors.

Even if Watson's "specified world" could be realized, this would
still not be so much a matter of education in the sense of education for values, as it would be a matter of imposing an alien value system on the person. The meanings then, that a person ultimately invests in, or the values that he pursues, are uniquely his own. This does not mean, however, that because one may invest in different meanings from those of others, his values are continually in conflict with theirs. Curran makes this point quite clearly:

Values uniquely fulfilling for each person, however, need not contradict values equally unique and fulfilling for others. Rather a common atmosphere and climate emerges so that aspects of what is unique in each can also in some measure be common to all. In their common and symbolic quality, they can be educative without being compulsive or abusive of unique self-fulfillment.

The pursuit of each individual of his own value system, then, does not mean that anarchy will result, either in the classroom situation itself or in society in general. A further explanation of this is offered by Rich:

Making intelligent value decisions, both within formal education and in one's larger expanse of life's activities, involves a process of finding renewed strength by seeking the locus of evaluation within ourselves. This does not mean that one ignores authority and tradition or habitually violates laws. Rather, our culture provides through its customs and institutional life a host of value perspectives that may be tested in everyday experience. This does not make for conformity and obeisance to the crowd. One is not a conformist merely by accepting values.

III. THE ACQUISITION OF VALUES

The educative process, then, is more than a matter of
communicating concepts or meanings about reality. If one were to adopt the value system of another, or of others, while he might seem to function adequately, his personal identity would be difficult of realization since his actions are not rooted in a personal and unique value system. For behavioral theorists, adequate functioning is a worthwhile and sufficient goal of education. But it is being suggested here that something more than this is needed to sustain the individual in a purposeful existence. This "something" is, as indicated, a unique value system. Simple conditioning does not provide this.

The result of conditioning is a trained subject, be it animal or human. The question that we wish to raise here, in connection with the acquisition of values as the final outcome of learning, is whether the trained person has acquired suitable values, or can acquire them through training alone. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to establish the distinction between insightful learning, and learning that results from drill or repetition which is the basis of training. This distinction is stated by Bayles as follows:

How does the learning as development of insight differ from the notion of learning as establishment or alteration of neural pathways? To wear a path requires continuous traversal of an area by way of a given line, without deviation. That is the precise meaning, neurologically speaking, of the so-called Law of Use. Through use, resistance across a given synapse is lowered and impulses cross it more easily afterwards. This point is vital to the path-wearing idea of conditioning, regardless of whether a commitment is hazarded as to the nature of the resistance.
It was neural paths of this kind which Lashley sought and failed to find. Repeating a line of action always the same way until it is "stamped-in" is what the concept has to mean if it means anything. Repetitive drill is another word for it.

Training is here described as the establishment of neural pathways, where insight on the part of the subject does not enter in. If, then, a person is trained to do or to say a number of different things, how does this broaden the field of options open to him if there is no insight and no integration involved in what he is doing or saying? Since it is being maintained here that the goal of education is the acquisition and integration of values derived from meanings, then education which stops at training does not achieve its goal.

In discussing the relationship between counseling and learning in Chapter III, we noted that the change in a person as a result of counseling was due to a new self-concept and new insight. Likewise in education, the acquisition by the student of additional facts by training without insight and integration of these facts does not result in change, Curran says:

The possession of knowledge does not of itself imply the ability to act on that knowledge. There must also be the practical integration of knowledge within; the here and now of each one's life. It is this latter aspect to which the term insight is especially applied.

Curran is speaking here in a specifically counseling context. Yet what he says is applicable to the educative context also. The task of education would not be complete if it provided knowledge only, without the ability to act on that knowledge. What
results is what is being called training which, as implied, is closely related to conditioning. Green points out this similarity:

It is natural to speak of teaching a dog to fetch, to heel, to walk in time to music. It is more of a distortion to speak of teaching a dog to salivate at the sound of a bell. It is precisely in this latter context that we speak of conditioning. Conditioning does not aim at an intelligent performance of some act. Insofar as training does not aim at the display of intelligence, it resembles conditioning more and teaching less.

IV. VALUES PRESENT OPTIONS

The individual is unable to act on impersonal knowledge, necessary though this is, because it remains outside of him and is, therefore, threatening to him, as indicated earlier in this chapter. Through insight, however, the person no longer finds the need to be defensive toward impersonal knowledge. The service that insight performs in the integration of knowledge is explained by Curran:

Insight, then, includes both impersonal knowledge and the singular, concrete event which is highly personal. Insight brings these two together and enables a man to act on a personal issue with the same objective judgment and integration he would have were he judging the conduct of someone else.

Much the same idea is stated in another way by Jeffreys which might be quoted here for further clarification:

Pasternak makes a character in Dr. Zhivago say: "Facts do not exist until man has put into them something of his own." To that proposition must be added the important rider that what man puts in of his own is not
optional, arbitrary, or capricious, if he wants to arrive
at the truth; but rather is the recognition of something
that is already "there" in external reality. Knowledge
is the response of the truth within to the truth without.
This response is primarily and ultimately intuitional,
though the explicit formulation of rational systems
greatly helps us to extend our grasp of experience, and
provides points d'appui from which successive intuitional
flights can take off.

Insight, then, initiates a movement away from threat, defense
and anxiety toward an investment of the self in what one sees.
What the person sees then provides him with an option for self-
investment. Is it to be said, then, that much of teaching has
been largely a matter of training, explained here, with little
thought given to the acquisition of values? A study by
A. Harrison, Jr. and E. G. Scriven entitled "Is There a Relevancy
Gap in Education" may be enlightening on this point:

The findings indicate overwhelmingly that the
things which students consider of major importance are
not academic, intellectual or cognitive. And yet these
are precisely the things that are emphasized in educa-
tion. Year after year students are drilled, tested,
quantified, measured, objectified and labeled with an
increasingly mechanical precision. Based on the find-
ings of this survey, there does seem to be a wide gap
between the major concerns of students which are affective
and the educational priorities which are cognitive.
Thus we must conclude that to a great extent education
must lack relevance for the vast majority of students.

It would be inaccurate to say that impersonal cognition, or
even training, has no place in education. The concern here,
however, is with the integration of the affective and cognitive
aspects of education, emphasizing that the former has been
neglected. Another way of stating this point would be to say
that the integrated individual is the end result of insightful
learning, while the trained individual is the product of drill. Curran speaks of drill as a kind of "conditioning isolation" where all the responsibility is with the trainer:

It implies manipulation on the part of the one doing the training rather than any free investment on the part of the learner. Consequently in this type of learning, if the human person does grow to find it pleasant, it is apparently only after the experience has evoked some kind of self-investment and commitment on his part.

V. TASK OF THE EDUCATOR IN VALUE LEARNING

What is implied in what has been said thus far is that the educative process is to be concerned with relationships that promote value investment. In training, as contrasted to value learning, it was seen how interpersonal relationships have no place; it becomes a matter of manipulation rather than of personal interaction. Drill is patterned for its effectiveness. It is something that takes place in isolation. More and more, the literature indicates an increasing alarm over the shortcomings of training which fails to follow through with insight, and ultimately to provide the student with a choice of values. The immediate concern is primarily to point up the problem. However, it is not enough simply to be aware of the problem, in this case the limited nature of drill and training in education. The problem for the teacher is compounded, for if he does see the limitation, and decides to change his present mode of operation in the classroom, he must have something to put in its place.
This dilemma is seen very clearly by Alford, although he offers no solution. Nevertheless, his view of the problem is as follows:

It is here (in compartmentalization and isolation of facts) that man has erred profoundly. In this manner he continues vainly to seek total fulfillment in periodic doses. He prefers to dip first into one compartment of knowledge, then another, and still another, like a gourmet sampling his vintage, experiencing life and seeking complete and total fulfillment through a perpetual series of spasmodic sprees which offer at most only temporary appeasement. In a word, man seeks total fulfillment through immediate, incomplete, inconstant, and short-range component experiences, rather than through the whole life in which all knowledge and experiences are in reality inseparably enmeshed and through which the full and genuine meaning of his existence is communicable to mankind.

It is this last phrase which is of particular significance for it suggests that the task of the teacher is to provide a value system in a relationship through which he communicates the meaning of his own existence. This, of course, is a much more difficult and threatening thing to do than simply to present facts, which may easily be used by the teacher as a protection against communicating the meaning of his own existence. The educative process, therefore, is more than a matter of the passing on of tradition. Frankl, in asking about the possibility of giving meaning to one's life, and of the realization of values, sums up his answer as follows:

Men can give meaning to their lives by realizing what I call creative values, by achieving tasks. But they can also give meaning to their lives by realizing experiential values, by experiencing the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, or by knowing one single human being in all his uniqueness.

Related to the educative process, it is the writer's understanding
of this statement that in order for the educator to give a sustaining value to the subject matter that he presents, in order to give values to meanings, he must be experienced by his students as the personification and the embodiment of all that he teaches: the Good, the True, and the Beautiful.

This notion of Frankl is germane to that of Curran to which reference was made in the last chapter in discussing mimesis. What the teacher says must literally "sound through" him, rather than be something extrinsic to him. Learning theorists have stressed the place or stimulus in learning; they understand this as something applied to the subject from the outside. What is to be said of stimulus here? The position taken is that the stimulus for education is what educators have traditionally said it was and should be, namely, man's natural thirst for knowledge. This thirst is expressed in the student's sense of dissatisfaction with himself as seen in relation to another who represents in himself what the student wants. In his attempt to acquire this, the student himself becomes a part of the intellectual struggle of the teacher. It is in this identity where values are communicated.

In retrospect, the fact of the acquisition of values, especially by the Religion group described in Chapter IV, was quite evident from the various statements of the students. In this chapter, it has been pointed out that values are personal and unique. Therefore, it is difficult to prescribe a method in which they might be acquired. Apart from this, however, it can
be helpful to verbalize the experience in which values seem to have been acquired. This was the purpose of this chapter.

In this chapter, the personal nature of values were delineated. This was done by contrasting meanings with values, stating that while meanings are the same for everyone, values become integrated in a personal way. From this followed the notion of the uniqueness of values. The way in which values are acquired was then presented by showing the relationship between training and insight. It was pointed out that while training may have a valid place in the educative process, it could, of and by itself, leave the person without valid options from which to choose, thus defeating the ultimate aim of education. The place and the task of the educator in the learning of values was then suggested. It was proposed that the educator, representing in himself what the student desires, provides the stimulus for learning. This stimulus was described as the natural thirst of man for knowledge. Reference was made to the Latin and Religion experiences of Chapter IV to illustrate this point.
FOOTNOTES


5  Curran, ibid., p. 368

6  Johann, R. O., Building the Human, New York: Herder and Herder, 1968, p. 31

7  Curran, op. cit., 1968, p. 77

8  Curran, ibid., p. 74

9  Curran, ibid., p. 75

10  Watson, J. B., Behaviorism, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Fifth Impression, 1963, p. 104

11  Curran, op. cit., 1968, p. 366


16 Curran, *op. cit.*, 1957, p. 139


19 Curran, *op. cit.*, 1968, p. 347


CHAPTER VII

COMMUNITY AS MOTIVATION

In both the Latin group and the Religion group, described in Chapter IV, an illustration of learning in community was seen. It was stated there that the students were motivated to learn because of their need to belong to the group. This was contrasted to learning in isolation. The aim of what follows in this chapter is to substantiate the place of community learning in education.

I. COMMUNITY AND AFFILIATION

The meaning of affiliation is given by Curran as follows:

"By "affiliation" we mean a relationship which engages us in real concern for the other and a conscious effort to convalidate his worth and dignity. Such a relationship, by definition, involves adequate communication."

The concept of affiliation is expanded if the adjective "creative" is placed before it, Curran continues:

"Creative" would suggest that such affiliations should be mutually encouraging, stimulating, and achieving. They should bring out from each, in home, family, school, work, and play, what is in the direction of one's better and more fulfilling self. They should, in a word, invoke and encourage the pursuit of each one's own excellence.

From the two preceding statements of Curran, it can be seen that affiliation, communication, and community are interrelated, and that they represent, in a sense, man's quest to belong. Where the possibility of belonging exists in the learning situation, the
student will be motivated to learn in order to be a part of the community or, in other words, to arrive at a state of creative affiliation.

II. THE REDEMPTIVE CLASSROOM

A student may be isolated from his fellow students, and even from his teachers, for any number of reasons. Specifically, however, in a given classroom the reason for isolation is that in the competitive atmosphere which often exists, he is unable to compete successfully with his peers. The result of this is further alienation. If he finds any sense of belonging at all, it is likely to be with others who are equally alienated. In this kind of situation there can be no creative affiliation since there is no one there who can convalidate the worth and dignity of the others; all feel equally worthless. In a group of students that is segmented on the basis of ability, or inability, to compete, learning is likely to be restricted to the best competitors. Instead of encouraging the pursuit of each one's own excellence, this excellence may actually be destroyed.

In contrast to this, a "redemptive" classroom might be considered. In Chapter III, it was suggested that the student, when he enters the classroom, is in some condition of alienation due to his possible ignorance and the distance that this creates between himself and the teacher; consequently, he is in need of "redemption" from his alienated state. This kind of situation
seems to have occurred in a rather obvious manner, in the Latin group particularly, which was described in Chapter IV. There, the students appeared to be concerned for one another's achievement; also the distance between the students and teacher was reduced because of the lessening of the teacher's authoritarian image.

It is being suggested, then, that in an educative setting, the classroom with an atmosphere of community learning serves as a redemptive agency. This atmosphere would be in sharp contrast to that which exists in the competitive classroom situation. In discussing the counseling model in research on foreign languages, where the notion of community learning was a primary factor, Curran observes:

> What we see here is a delicate sense of "will to community" taking the place of "will to power". The focus on teaching gave way to the joy of sharing in a person's independent learning growth. Where the will to power is given up in favor of will to community, either on the part of the teacher or on the part of the students, a feeling of creative affiliation and a sense of mutual verification results, wherein each person experiences his own worth to the group. It is in this way that he is redeemed. Moreover, the intellectual content of the classroom becomes more personalized. In further discussing his research on foreign language learning, Curran remarks:

> Another result was an increasing awareness that language is really persons. That is, the focus shifted
from grammar and sentence formation, to a deepening sense of personal communication. The concept of communion was restored to communication.

The last two statements of Curran are taken directly from his research on foreign language learning. Therefore, the question may be raised as to whether or not his findings would be applicable to other academic areas. Concerning this issue, Murray says:

There would, it might appear, be no special reason why we should choose the learning of a language rather than, let us say, the learning of Mathematics or History, to establish the importance of the part the emotions play in the process. As a matter of fact, Curran does project that the principles he has drawn from his language research might be applied universally to the learning process.

III. MUTUAL CONVALIDATION IN THE LEARNING COMMUNITY

It was stated previously (Chapter III) that because the teacher may be presenting a large number of facts to the students, this does not necessarily mean that communication is taking place; in other words, the concept of "communion" may be lacking from the communication that is there.

In speaking of a community learning situation, obviously a kind of static, dead conformity is not meant. This seems to be clear from the understanding of creative affiliation, described earlier in this chapter. In a community of mutual convalidation and creative affiliation that we have in mind, rather than conformity, the individuality of each member is brought out and enhanced. But it is because of the community that this is
possible; instead of the individual having to protect his uniqueness, as may be the case in a competitive situation, he is able to give expression to it. Frankl states it this way:

The meaning of individuality comes to fulfillment in the community. To this extent, then, the value of the individual is dependent upon the community. But if the community itself is to have meaning, it cannot dispense with the individuality of the individuals that make it up. In the mass, on the other hand, the single, unique existence is submerged, must be submerged because uniqueness would be a disrupting factor in any mass.

When the individual's worth is convalidated in and by the community, he sees that he has something worthwhile to contribute to it, and he is motivated to learn in order to make that contribution. As an isolated individual, however, any contribution, however small, would be difficult. As Beier says, "The motivation to belong to a group is apparently related to an individual's sense of isolation."

IV. THE RISK OF BELONGING

Assuming that a student is seeking a sense of belongingness that comes from the community, the question may arise as to how he gains admittance to the community. As indicated above, it involves a relinquishing of the will to power, since this carries with it the implication of manipulation of the group. In relinquishing the will to power, however, there is a risk involved. The risk is that the individual may become vulnerable to the group because he has given up his defenses. But it is because of the community that he is enabled to take the risk of giving up his
defenses. Without this, there can be no communication.

The reward for taking the risk of belonging is the acceptance of the community. By failing to take this risk, the student remains outside of the group in continued isolation.

In Chapter V, reference was made to conflict, anxiety, and hostility as intrinsic to learning. It was suggested that to sacrifice these to the purely intellectualized end of education would be ultimately defeating in terms of what the student learns. In the community learning situation to which reference is now being made, the feelings of the group become an integral part of the learning situation, in that these are shared by the group, as well as the intellectual content, Curran says:

In this kind of community learning where the conflict, hostility, anger, and anxiety intrinsic to learning are shared, intellectual development would be an important and central but not an exclusive aim. Counseling and procedures patterned from it would then have a basic and effective function. This would especially open the way for making values as well as meaning a main aim of the educative process.

In this statement of Curran, there is a tying together of the notion of meaning and values, of emotions, of the place of counseling, of intellectual development, and of community, in the educative process. These concepts are all interwoven.

V. HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL RELATIONSHIP

There remains to ask the place of the teacher in the classroom community situation being discussed. A clear picture of this can be gotten by considering the application of the
concepts "horizontal" and "vertical" relationship. In a competitive classroom atmosphere, the relationship between teacher and students would be solely a vertical one, that is, one in which the locus of power is found at the top of the hierarchical arrangement. It has already been stated that in the community learning atmosphere, the will to power must at some point be relinquished. When this takes place, there is a change from a vertical to a horizontal relationship, resulting in redemptive learning. This does not mean that the authority of the teacher is in any sense diminished or threatened, for in any learning situation verticality will be present by virtue of the mimetic relationship between the teacher and students. On the contrary, the real authority that is invested in the teacher is sharpened and crystallized: On this point Curran says:

Verticality is needed too in any kind of educational learning. There must be a knower or teacher who is equipped through knowledge, training and experience. An authentic teacher understands a certain area of knowledge in far greater depth and extension than do his students. In fact, the vertical word "authority" and the word "author" are related here, since the author's assumed greater knowledge of his work gives him authority. He, therefore, is vertically related to the students, who are themselves horizontal.

Verticality is not related, then, to power, or perhaps will to power, in the classroom. This would carry with it connotations of domination and manipulation. Rather verticality is related to authority which is necessary if one person is to learn from another. But to the extent that the learning process carries with it the aspect of redemption, it is also horizontal, Curran
continues:

But even here, as we will try to develop, real learning seems to involve the incarnate-redemptive process through which the knower strives to become like the learners. They can gain through this redemptive experience a sense of their own capacity to know and so to become like the knower. In this sense the norm of teaching might readily be that "he (the student) must increase and I must decrease". 

... Insofar as a learning process encourages and depends on the personal dignity and worth of the learner, it may be said to be horizontal as well as vertical.

In this chapter an attempt was made to conceptualize the motivation for learning that we saw happening in the fourth chapter. Specifically, these conceptualizations center around the redemptive versus the competitive classroom; mutual convalidation within the community learning situation; the risk of belonging which comes from relinquishing the will to power; and the nature of the horizontal and vertical relationships within the community.
FOOTNOTES


2 Curran, *ibid.*, p. 374

3 Curran, *ibid.*, p. 368


8 Curran, *op. cit.*, 1968, p. 320

9 Curran, *ibid.*, p. 40


11 Curran, *ibid.*, p. 19
CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. SUMMARY

The concern of this paper was to illustrate one way in which the whole person of the student might be reached in the educational setting. This was done by showing how some of the concepts from the field of counseling might be applied in the classroom. The position taken was that when this is done, learning would ultimately be therapeutic to the extent that it reaches the student on the level of his uniqueness.

The manner of presenting this position has been to give the broad background out of which much of the current educational system has emerged. This was done by proposing that in many ways modern man is still under the influence of a Cartesian-Kantian Philosophy that has lost much of its relevance for modern man. Out of this Philosophy grew Behaviorism which, while making vast contributions to man's advancement, may need to be revised in relation to a more humanistic philosophy.

In Chapter III, the relationship of teaching to counseling was discussed and, in context, it was suggested how the terms "teacher" and "counselor" could be used interchangeably. The approach taken was to show that education is more than a purely intellectual encounter with the student, but rather a personality
encounter. It was pointed out that the greater a person's need for help, very often the greater is his resistance to receiving it. Learning was then shown as a cognizing process, as is counseling.

Chapter IV constituted the central focus of the paper. The preceding two chapters were designed as theoretical orientation for what occurred in actuality. Two teaching-learning experiences were presented; one with a group of sophomore Latin students, the other with a group of senior Religion students. The meaning and results of the two experiences were described.

The final three chapters constituted a rationale, in retrospect, for what was described in Chapter IV. The main points of Chapter V were that the feelings that are concomitant with learning are to be constructively channeled; that learning can often be a function of self-protection against the threatening situation that may exist in the classroom; that suppressed feelings in the learning situation may lead to vengeance and depression.

Chapter VI was concerned with delineating what might be regarded as the final goal of education. This would be where meanings become values. This results from insight, which is a process of movement away from threat, anxiety, and defense to a new understanding and a participation. The distinction between meanings and values was explained.

In Chapter VII, a suggested setting was described in
which a counseling-teaching approach to education might be effective. This setting was explained under the concept of community learning. In this kind of situation, motivation for learning seemed to center around the need of the students to belong to the group or community. The classroom was thus seen as redemptive. The risk required to belong to the group was noted, and the pursuit of the student's own excellence as a result of taking the risk was commented on.

II. CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions center around the description of the learning experiences of Chapter IV. What resulted from these experiences for the students seemed to be related less to the intellectual content that was presented than to the person of the teacher. It did not seem, however, that the intellectual gain of the students suffered because of this. In the Latin group, while the results showed that the control group got a higher score in testing than the experimental group, it was pointed out in Chapter IV that this did not seem to be conclusive. The reasons suggested for this was possible need for refinement in the programming for the Chromacord, and the fact that possibly the experimental group had not yet sufficiently adjusted themselves to a different approach to learning.

While it appears that nothing conclusive can be stated, the gain in retention in the experimental group in Latin was
sufficiently encouraging that further application of this approach would be warranted.

As stated in the Introduction, the results of the Religion group were almost entirely subjective. This was explained as due to the nature of the subject, namely, Religion, which is by nature subjective. There is, therefore, only the subjective reaction of the students. Again, however, this reaction seemed sufficiently positive to justify some variation, at least of this approach to teaching Religion.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

The approach to teaching Latin and Religion as herein presented is quite flexible and consequently is open to many adaptations, depending, to a great extent, on the person of the teacher. Since this can seem overly subjective, it should be pointed out that the position of the teacher as the knower should not be lost sight of and his obligation to increase the knowledge of the students remains.

Concerning the use of the Chromacord in teaching Latin, it seems that further development in the programming of the material would be beneficial. The use of the Chromacord in teaching academic disciplines other than Latin may prove to be of assistance in this development.

In the teaching of Religion, the presentation of a greater amount of topical material by the teacher may help the students
to advance more rapidly in personal growth and value awareness. The purpose of this would be to make the class more task-oriented, thus opening up a broader selection of meanings out of which values could develop.

Concerning the use of the Chromacord in teaching academic subjects other than Latin, it seems that it would have considerable potential as an aid in the acquisition of values. The reason for stating this is not only that it is useful in creating a situation of total personal involvement, but also that it can make a significant contribution toward generating a community learning atmosphere. In Chapter IV it was seen how the focus of attention on the part of the students centered around the apparatus; it was all-engaging and provided a common task around which learning could take place. Moreover, the Chromacord itself is subject to a great variety of adaptations and this can readily lend variety to the learning process. However, if the Chromacord were to be employed in the learning of other subjects besides Latin, the programming would have to be adjusted to that particular subject. But this would seem to be not too difficult to do so long as the involvement of the students was given first consideration.

Since this paper is concerned with the application of the concepts of counseling to the process of education, the teacher who attempts to make this application would necessarily have to have an awareness of at least some of the basic concepts of counseling. In a sense, then, this relates to the notion brought
out in the third chapter, namely, that the terms "teacher" and "counselor" would be understood as interchangeable.
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The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Date

Signature of Adviser