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Dr. Sun Yat-Sen and the Formation of the Republic of China

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DR. SUN YAT-SEN AND THE FORMATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

by

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A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

January 1954
Born in Shanghai, China, on February 21, 1918, Hans Kung came to this country five years ago as an exchange student.

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In October, 1948, the author had the opportunity of being admitted into the Loyola University in America to study in the graduate school. Since then he has been specialized in the field of modern history.

It is the author's earnest intention that studying in the United States would help him to acquire not only the higher learning but also the culture of this country.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter                                                                 Page

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ................................................................. 1

Condition prior to the Revolution--Foreign relations--Opium problem--The Treaty of Nanking--The Tai-ping Rebellion--
The partition of the Empire--Russo-Chinese Alliance--
The German Advance.

II. REVOLUTIONARY ERA ....................................................................... 38

Events leading to the Revolutions--The economic and cultural foundation of the Revolution--Preliminary phases of the
Revolution (1905-1909)--The struggle against the Manchu Dynasty--Wang Ching-wei's attempt on the Prince Regent--
The Insurrection of March 29--The Wuchang Revolt of October 10, 1911.

III. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC ..................................... 73

Yuan Shih-kai's Move--The United Republic.

IV. THE NATIONAL PROGRAMME OF DR. SUN YAT-SEN....................... 83

San Min Chu I--The Kuomintang--The principles of the five-
power constitution--Planning for a New China.

CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 113

APPENDICES ......................................................................................... 121

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................... 127
INTRODUCTION

The Chinese Revolution in 1911 was a revolution in the true sense of the word, for it was an actual and radical transformation from one form of government, dynastical monarchy, to an entirely new form of government, i.e., a republic; and the time was mature for such radical change.

The 1911 Revolution marks the termination of almost twenty centuries of a series of dynasties, and embarkation upon the new era of the Chinese National Revolution. It is by no means a simple process. On the contrary, it is a complex transformation of political, social, cultural and economic systems, integrated under brilliant leadership of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. What are the driving forces responsible for such change? One of the most significant factors was the important role played by the foreign influences. There was China's defeat in the opium war which led to a series of unilateral "unequal treaties". There was further the infringement of Great Britain, France, Russia and Japan on China's territorial administrative and economic integrity at the end of nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Thus, pre-revolutionary China was the victim of the exaggerated form of mercantilism and militaristic imperialism. The intellectual impetus was another important feature not to be overlooked. The influence of western political philosophy was reflected in the thinking of practically all the prominent Chinese
revolutionary leaders, especially in the case of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who received the major portion of his education abroad.

In addition to western imperialistic aggression and western political thinking as the major forces responsible for the precipitation of the revolution, the Chinese revolutionary nationalism has its real basis in native revolutionary concepts. Viewed in proper historical perspective the Chinese national revolution was a logical continuation of the struggle started by the adherents of the Ming Dynasty 1368-1644 (actually the last Chinese dynasty) against the Manchu conquerors of China, who were regarded as alien aggressors. Hence, the revolution began essentially as an anti-imperialistic movement.

It should be emphasized that the Chinese revolution was a radical change. For the first time in history of China, a feudalistic, monarchical government was forsaken in preference for a democratic constitutional government. It was the ripe time for China to realize the insufficient and regressive nature of the former type of government and increasing demand of the people for a stronger and progressive form of government so as to adapt herself to existence in the modern world of the twentieth century. Numerous examples in the past centuries were to guide her on the right road to a successful revolution, notably the French Revolutions and the American Revolution. The French Revolution in 1789 changed a country from absolute monarchy to a republic. American Revolution in 1776 signified the birth of a democratic country which defied tyranny and religious persecution. From the American Revolution China learned the importance of political independence from alien domination and democratic constitution. From the French Revolution she
followed the footstep of France in the actual shaping of the revolution.

Concomitant with the drastic political change were the changes in social and cultural and economic organizations. The feudalistic society was to be discarded entirely in favor of equality among all citizens of the republic. There was also a noted struggle taking place in the minds of the Chinese intelligentsia between the reformist ideology which favored the constitutional monarchy and revolutionary philosophy of Dr. Sun and his associates. The former was gradually losing ground under the impact of the ever growing modern teaching of Dr. Sun. This indicated a shift among the intellectual group from the advocacy of the constitutional monarchy to that of democracy.

Economically, the rise of capitalistic industrialism was brought about by the revolutionary movement. Although foreign capitalism caused devastation of the general economy of China, it also brought into being new and vital forces which, originally co-operating with and subordinate to foreign capital, were bound, sooner or later, to challenge the predominant role played by the foreigners in China.

In general, the time was ripe for China to pronounce herself in favor of the formation of the Chinese republic. The general picture can be best illustrated in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's manifesto, entitled The True Solution of the Chinese Questions:

A new government, enlightened and progressive, must substitute the old one. In this way China will not only be saved, but also relieve the other nations of their task of maintaining her independence and integrity. There are among the masses many people with high culture, capable of forming a new government, and carefully worked out plans for the transformation of the old monarchy into a Chinese Republic have long ago been prepared.
Seeing the corruption and the downfall of the Manchu Dynasty, Dr. Sun, creator of Modern China, started a revolution with the hope of building a New China. While preparing his countrymen for revolution, he stressed the necessity of a reorientation of their thought and intellectual life as a prelude to any basic political and economic change. He believed that the creative history of a nation was made by the power of the mind. China's unconquerable spirit is indeed the best proof of the validity of his faith in what he called "Psychological Reconstruction".

The emergence of the Chinese Republic is an inspiring event in the history of Asia. The spirit of nationalism in China is not aggressive. Its legitimate purpose is to fight aggression with a view to achieving the status of independent national sovereignty and to creating a democratic state.

In this struggle China is also defending the future of all Asiatic people and her ultimate victory must be the precursor to freedom and democracy in Asia.

For some years after the beginning of the period of political tutelage under the Kuomintang, the study of Dr. Sun's principles was a required

1 Sun Yat-sen, The True Solution of the Chinese Questions, Shanghai, China, 1919, 14

2 Ibid., 15

3 Kuomintang - is a powerful political party of National Government. It is the combination of three Chinese words meaning, country, people and party. The usual translation is the people's party.
subject in all Chinese schools and universities. The value of Dr. Sun's teachings comes from the fact that they represent a well conceived programme for readjusting China's political institutions. He saw clearly what there was in China's age-old tradition which could serve as a starting point in the building up of a progressive democratic structure capable of promoting the welfare of the Chinese nation and of meeting changing world conditions. Dr. Sun planned in 1918 to write a series of books under the general scheme of planning for national reconstruction; but his plan was interrupted by tragic political upheavals in the early years of the Republic. Only the following works were published during his lifetime: The Philosophy of Sun-ken (1919); The True Solution of the Chinese Questions (1919); The First Step in Democracy (1919); The International Development of China (1921); An Outline of National Reconstruction for the National Reconstruction for the National Government (1924); Kidnapped in London (1897); Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary (1919); and Sixteen Lectures on San Min Chu I (1924). These have been translated into English. Besides these there were a few articles published in American and British journals.

The purpose of this thesis is to bring out the main principles and the values of Dr. Sun's teachings, the spirit and form of Chinese revolution and the Chinese republic. It is my hope that it may be helpful to those who are interested in China's problems in understanding the deeper meaning of the Chinese struggle. The outcome of this struggle is no mere domestic problem of the Chinese, for it has considerable bearing upon the future of Asia and the peace of the world.
CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

For a clear grasp of the political aspects of the Chinese Revolutions in 1911, it is necessary to understand the background of the pre-revolutionary China. The end of a dynasty in the Celestial Empire has always been marked by an extended period of internal turmoil. The hand of the Imperial authority had relaxed its control over its officials, who had become corrupt and uninterested in the welfare of the people. The weakening of authority had permitted banditry to increase on land and piracy on the water. Usually the condition of unrest had been aggravated by flood or drought, or both, upsetting the economy of the country, and stimulating organized robbery as a means of livelihood. Secret societies with anti-dynastic aims had developed and multiplied. Also the external attack sometimes became too strong for a deteriorating rule to withstand. The dynasty collapsed because of the mandate of heaven had been withdrawn—the evidence of it being the inability of the Emperor to preserve the domestic stability and to protect the country from foreign invasions.

Several incidents of the reign indicated the condition of growing corruption, actual or suspected, of the mandarinate, and of the change of official life, the result of mutual mistrust, which had so much to do with the weakening of the Imperial authority in its dealings with the foreigners.
At the close of the reign of Chi'en Lung the secret societies were becoming very troublesome and the Emperor began to take measures for their suppression. But, in the words of a Chinese proverb, he "stirred the sandrakes and roused the snake". Consequently the entire reign of Chia was disturbed by the agitations fomented by these organisations. This was especially the case in the south. The whole valley of the West River was the center of intense political and religious unrest for many years. The societies which were most active against the government were the White Lotus, the Triads, and the Society of Heavenly Reasons. Against these the government proceeded with the greatest possible severity but without achieving much success. In 1801 the Throne decreed the summary execution of all members of the societies engaged in pillage.

Those were the days of national calamities. It is not easy to understand the unrest of the populace unless we have drawn our attention to the terrible devastation of the land by hurricane and flood, especially when we remember the intimate connections the Chinese have always perceived between nature's disasters and the bad government. The great drought of 1817 caused the Board of Punishments to consult together as to whether they had been properly

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1 Chi'en Lung, 1735-1795, the fifth Emperor of the Manchu (Ta-ch'ing) Dynasty, his reign marks a new advance in population and wealth, which supported imposition of imperial control throughout Central Asia. Cultural activity continued to enjoy imperial patronage and leadership. Corruption of the civil service led by the venal Ho Shen (1750-1799) during the last twenty years of the reign provoked revolts which continued until the end of the dynasty.

2 *Historical Manuscripts of Ching Dynasty*, National Committee on Chinese History, Peking, China, 1905, 52.
fulfilling their duties. They drew up a document in which the hope was expressed that nature would soon reestablish her proper order. The Emperor himself, in accordance with the old customs, was moved to self-examination and confession of sins for himself and for his people. The following quotations illustrates part of his confession pronouncement:

The remissness and sloth of the officers of government constitute an evil which has long been accumulating. It is not the evil of a day; for several years I have given the most pressing admonitions on the subject, and have punished many cases which have been discovered, so that recently there appears a little improvement and for several seasons the weather has been favorable. The drought this season is perhaps not entirely on this account, I have meditated upon it and am persuaded that the reason why the azure Heavens above manifested disapprobation by withholding rain for a few hundred miles only around the capital, is that the fifty and more rebels who escaped are secreted somewhere near Peking. Hence it is that fertile vapors are fastbound and the felicitous harmony of the seasons interrupted. 3

In addition to the sufferings followed by the rise of the secret societies and the convulsions of unquiet nature, were those brought upon the southern provinces by the pirates. The estuary of the West River has always enjoyed the sinister reputation of being the most pirate-infested water in the world. 4 During these years the coast of Kwantung (southern province of China) and the Pearl River were made so dangerous that the Governor of Canton himself transferred his residence to Macao. The undoing of the pirates was in part brought about by two Englishmen, Turner and Glaspooles, who having been captured used the opportunity to learn something of the organization of the sea-robbers,

4 Ibid., 466.
The story of those disturbed times, to this day affords a frequent subject for the tales of old people in that region, and the same waters are still infested by the foam of sea as the Chinese term these freebooters. 5

By the middle of the nineteenth century the foreigners had successfully broken down the first barriers of the Manchu Empire, and established their representatives in Peking, forced cessions of territory (Hongkong to England and the territory to the North to Russia), and penetrated the Empire beyond Canton for trade and missionary purposes under conditions removing their peoples from the effective control of the Imperial authorities. They had waged two successful wars against the Empire and had occupied the capital, driving the Emperor into temporary exile. However, they had no intention to take over the government of the country. From 1842 to 1860 the European Powers had been forced to deal with the local officials at each place where a foothold had been secured to obtain their rights and position under the treaties. 6 In applying this local pressure one state had taken the lead, but the advantages won by her had become common property, and no state had attempted to secure special privileges by pursuing an independent policy. With the exception of Russia, the Western Powers had a common aim that of ending the period of seclusion. From 1860 to about 1875 the representatives of the West at Peking continued to think and act largely in terms of the common interest, the basis of

5 Ibid., 466

their policy being the wider opening of the breach in the wall of seclusion, but not the destruction of China. Mr. Anson Burlingame, the American representative at Peking from 1861 to 1867, in expounding his cooperative policy, gave the following statement:

The policy upon which we are agreed is briefly this: that while we claim our treaty right to buy and sell, and hire, in the treaty ports, subject in respect to our rights of property and person, to the jurisdiction of our own governments, we will not ask for, nor take concessions of, territory in the treaty ports, or in any way interfere with the jurisdiction of the Chinese government over its own people, nor ever menace the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire. That we will not take part in the internal struggles in China, beyond what is necessary to maintain our treaty rights. That the latter we will unitedly sustain against all who may violate them. To this end we are now clear in the policy of defending the treaty ports against the Taipings, or rebels; but in such a way as not to make war upon that considerable body of the Chinese people by following them into the interior of their country. 7

This policy gradually gave way to one of separate action to secure redress of grievances, or new privileges, so that after 1875 there was not the unity of purpose among the Powers, founded upon a willingness to respect the integrity of China, that the earlier period had produced.

From 1638 until the middle of the nineteenth century the far eastern trade was primarily a Chinese trade. The peculiar circumstances in which this trade was conducted, the politico-economic policies of the trading nations, and the character of the international merchants themselves, these and other factors, created the confused and irritating state of affairs which in 1840 resulted in what is usually called the "Opium War" and the placing of China's

7 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1864, 859ff, quoted in full by Dennett, T., Americans in Eastern Asia, 375-6.
foreign commerce on a regular and a treaty basis (1842-1844). China's foreign maritime trade in the eighteenth and the early years of the nineteenth century was shared by many western states. With the beginnings of the Portuguese, the Spanish, the Dutch, the English and the Russian trade, the British assumed the primacy in the Chinese trade. The French too sent occasional ships to Canton after 1660, to be followed by the Americans more than a century later. Other nations were also represented at rare intervals: those of Sweden, Prussia, Hamburg, Bremen, Austria, and some of the Italian states. Peruvians, Mexicans, and Chilians, as well, appeared in Chinese waters; but the trade of all these lesser states was of minor consequence. By the beginning of nineteenth century the British predominated in the Chinese trade, while the Americans, whose trade had begun only as late as 1784 soon occupied second place.

By the close of the century, a sizable commerce having developed, the British government determined in 1792 to dispatch an embassy to the court of Peking in the hope of removing restraints and exactions on the Canton trade and of securing the liberty of trading at other ports. What were the "restraints and exactions" on the Canton trade of which the British and other foreign nationals at Canton complained?

In 1757 the Chinese government proclaimed Canton the sole port at which foreign trade might be conducted. On the actual course of trade this decree had, in itself, little effect since for a matter of some fifty years commerce had tended to desert the northern ports where the exactions of local officials were more than the traffic would bear. Its

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9 Ibid., 33.
real importance may be attributed to the fact that after 1757 Canton enjoyed a monopoly in which the Chinese arbitrarily dictated the terms on which the foreigner might have access to his markets for silk and tea. For the most part the advantage was all with the Chinese. In the first instance there was a natural advantage. The western trader wanted Chinese silk and Chinese tea and was ready to pay well for it, while China wanted few, if any, products which a western market could offer in return. 10

Lord Macarney, who headed the embassy was permitted to proceed in 1793 to the Chinese capital. The embassy resulted in not a single advantage to the existing trade of the East India Company at Canton. The Macarney embassy was soon followed by the mission of Lord Amherst. In 1814 a British ship of war made a number of American captures in Chinese waters near Canton. Chinese officials instructed the agents of the East India Company to order the naval vessel to leave Chinese waters and when the agents pleaded lack of jurisdiction over a public ship, the Chinese threatened to stop British trade. 11 The incident itself was soon amicably settled, but it led to the decision by the British government to dispatch a second, the Amherst embassy, the object of which was a removal of the grievances which had been experienced, and exemption from them and others of the like nature for the time to come, with the establishment of the company's trade upon a secure, solid, equitable footing, free from the capricious arbitrary aggressions of the local Chinese authorities, and under the protection of the Emperor, and the sanction of regulations to be appointed by himself. 12

12 Ibid., 56.
The second embassy headed by Lord Amherst was an even more failure than of Lord Macarney, who at least had received hospitable treatment. Amherst on the contrary, had been subjected to gross insult, while the Chinese enjoyed a full diplomatic victory. The implications of Lord Amherst's failure were not without their effect at Canton. Opinion among the foreign traders already was shaping. There were but three alternatives: (1) the Canton trade could be abandoned; (2) it could be continued under what the foreigners regarded as the unreasonable and arbitrary Chinese regulations or (3) force might be used to compel China to adopt a more liberal and regular commercial policy. 13

There was always the danger, however, that the Chinese government might prohibit foreign trade. China had not sought this trade; it had been imposed upon her by the western world. Regarding herself as the Middle Kingdom, completely satisfied with her supposed pre-eminent position, she had looked upon all other states as her vassals. Her neighbors, in the act of presenting tribute, conceded their inferior status; as reward they might be permitted to trade with China, but only upon such terms as the Emperor, the Son of Heaven, might prescribe. There was no place in the Chinese scheme of things for commercial or political treaties between equal and independent states. It was but natural that when the westerners reached the Far East, China should apply this same code to them. As long as the foreigners were willing to trade peaceably, as long as they accepted the regulations that China imposed, and as long as they did not attempt to destroy Chinese procedure by the imposition of western

13 Ibid., 58.
authority, the commerce would continue. For many years in fact for more than three centuries, the foreign trader bowed to the Chinese view. At Macao and Canton he traded when and how China, the suzerain, permitted. But as time passed, as regulation became more troublesome and more strict, as the value and the potentialities of the foreign trade grew, as the vitality of the Manchu regime declined, and as the foreigners became more conscious of an ability to impose their will upon China, the trader became less inclined to accept the Chinese law. If the traders became active, if they agitated for a commercial treaty to regulate duties and other impositions, the fact is not surprising. The Macartney and the Amherst embassies, which have already been mentioned, were evidence that the British government was moving in this direction. And yet, the trader was timid as well as active. Despite all the impositions the Canton trade was profitable, and the trader was inclined to bear heavy burdens rather than to risk by diplomatic pressure an entire stoppage of the trade. Both the commerce and the methods under which it was conducted might therefore have continued indefinitely, had it not been for three factors of the extreme importance. The first was the development of the opium traffic; the second the question of jurisdiction; the third the abolition by the British government of the monopoly in the Chinese trade so long enjoyed by the East India Company. 14

As early as 1729 the Chinese government prohibited the sale of opium.

without imposing any penalties upon the smoker. The importation of foreign
opium, which was started by the Portuguese, increased rapidly during the middle
years of the eighteenth century. By 1800 its effects upon the people had
become so apparent that the Emperor prohibited not only importation of the drug
but also cultivation of the opium plant in China. Although Chinese officials at
Peking may have desired sincerely to stop the opium traffic, the local official
at Canton and Macao had not the slightest intention of doing so. For twenty
years the edict was virtually unheeded. The Go-Hong \(^{16}\) ceased to deal in opium
at Canton, and the British East India Company prohibited its transportation in
company ships, but none the less the drug continued to enter China at Macao.
Occasionally some officials might seem to apply the law; but not until 1836 was
there any real attempt to stop, or even to check, the trade.

The emperor might prohibit the trade, and might renew the prohibition
by repeated edicts; the viceroy might issue his proclamation in strict
accordance with the Imperial orders; and both viceroy and Hoppo\(^ {17}\) might
enjoin on the Hong merchants to obey the law; but viceroy, Hoppo, Gover-
nor, admiral, magistrate, and down to the smallest person with the
smallest connection with a government office, all connived at the con-
tinuous breach of the law, provided only that they found therein their
personal profit. \(^ {18}\)


16 See Appendix. I

17 Hoppo-At Canton the most important of the Chinese officials who
controlled the foreign trade was known as the Hoppo.

18 Ibid., 185.
The foreign traders were only too anxious to see the traffic increase. The best quality opium came from the British provinces of Bengal and Behar in India where its manufacture was a monopoly of East India Company. Parsees were the first carriers of this product. Later the company participated directly in the carrying trade; but after 1800 its ships carried no opium, and this privilege was granted on license to individual British and Indian shippers. American vessels, too, carried opium both from India and from Turkey. The foreigner supplied the opium because the Chinese would buy it, and because, together with raw cotton it was almost sufficient to pay for the exports of silk and tea. Its sale was the one way by which the trade could be balanced. To destroy it would bring serious consequences to the legitimate trade. Forty years later the traffic had grown to such proportions, had become so involved with legitimate trade, that any attempt to stop it would lead inevitably to the most serious consequences.

The second problem contributing to the coming crises in relations between China and the western nations was the question of jurisdiction. It was inevitable that disputes should arise when rough and ready sailors from foreign ships came ashore at Chinese ports. It would appear that the Chinese had no desire to shield their own nationals from punishment, but they insisted that justice should take its course according to Chinese ideas and methods, which the foreigner looked upon as decidedly barbarous. When the Chinese insisted

that they must apply the same law and procedure in the case of crimes committed by foreigners, trouble was bound to result. The Chinese viewpoint is easily understood. Prior to the coming of the westerners, China had relations only with vassal states that always had acknowledged their inferiority. The advent of the westerner had served merely to reinforce China's conception of her own superiority.

The third factor contributing to the approaching crises in Anglo-Chinese affairs started in 1833 when by an act of Parliament the English East India Company lost the monopoly of British trade at Canton. Vital changes were to result. As long as the company was established at Canton, it had controlled all British subjects there, had enjoyed a limited privilege to trade, and had accepted the regulations, irregular and arbitrary, imposed by the Chinese. In other words the British had acquiesced, until 1833, unwillingly but in the interest of trade, in China's assumptions of superiority. After 1833 all this was changed. Instead of British interests at Canton being represented by an agent of company, they were now in the hands of a direct representative of the British Crown. Lord William Napier, with two associates, was selected as chief superintendent of trade and was instructed to seek by all practical means to develop a good and friendly understanding with the Chinese. However, It was obvious from the first that Lord Napier, as representative of the Crown, would not accept the inferior status which the Chinese had accorded agents of the company. He would demand recognition of equality; and this the Chinese with

20 Ibid., 78
equal stubbornness would refuse. This issue was soon drawn. Lord Napier pro-
ceeded to Canton from Macao without securing the consent of the Co-Hong. There
he attempted to deal directly by letter with the Chinese officials. Naturally
he failed, and for two reasons. From the Chinese view his communication should
have been labeled a "petition" (the form used by vassal states), and furthermore it should have been transmitted through the Hong merchants. Being or-
dered to return to Macao, he at first refused. The Chinese thereupon ordered
the English trade stopped. After an attempted show of force, which proved to
be inadequate, Napier had no alternative save to comply returning to Macao, he
died there on October 11, 1834. His mission had failed completely. The Chinese
had refused any concession toward equality and were more convinced than ever
that in stoppage of the trade they possessed a weapon before which the British
and other foreigners would always yield. It will be recalled that the Imperial
ban on the importation of opium had remained dead for nearly forty years, while
the merchants, both Chinese and foreign, profitted with the rich on the contra-
bond trade. There was some discussion of legalizing the traffic in order that
it might be controlled and made to yield a revenue; but instead the Peking
government decided on its suppression. Responsibility for this decision must
go almost exclusively to the Emperor Taokwang (the third emperor of the Manchu)
for in 1838:

Only a few individuals high in the official world honestly desired to
abolish the trade in opium; but among them was the emperor who in 1820

21 Osburn, S., _The Past & Future of British Relation in China_,
succeeded to licentious and rotten court, a disorganized and corrupt government, and an empire honey-combed by rebellion and disorder. 22

Having enjoyed some success in reforming the metropolitan administration, he now sought to rid China of the illicit opium traffic. To this end he appointed in December, 1838 Lin Tae-su, viceroy of Hupeh and Hunan, as Imperial High Commissioner, with orders to proceed to Canton and to wipe out the opium trade. 23 Lin reached his post in March, 1839, and within eight days had ordered the foreigners to surrender all opium in their possession, and to give bond, on penalty of death, that they would import no more. Chinese troops and war-junks surrounded the foreigners in their factories, and all trade was stopped. The foreign merchants were now faced with a situation having no precedent. They were at last confronted by a Chinese official who was determined to enforce the law regardless of consequences. Convinced that this was the case, Captain Elliot ordered the surrender of all British-owned opium, amounting to more than 20,000 chests. To the astonishment of all, the surrendered opium, valued at about $10,000,000 was now mixed with lime and salt and poured into the river. 24 The next question was the giving of bond that no further opium would be brought in the foreign ships. The American and other merchants agreed to this demand, but the British refused, and on Captain Elliot's orders (May 22, 1839) all British subjects left Canton for Macao. In July a Chinese was killed at Kowloon as the


24 Ibid., 118.
result of rioting between Chinese and British and American sailors. Fines and imprisonment were imposed on the sailors by Captain Elliot, but the Chinese were not satisfied, and Commissioner Lin demanded the surrender of the accused on the charge of murder. When this was refused, food supplies were cut off at Macao; the British were ordered to leave, and accordingly in August took refuge on the Chinese island of Hongkong and while others resorted to the anchorage in Tsingtao. The Chinese now attempted to seize the accused seamen, and in November a fleet of war junks approached the two British naval ships at Hongkong. The resulting engagement destroyed four of the Chinese vessels. Lin was more determined than ever. Since the British would neither give bond nor surrender the seamen, their entire trade would be stopped. A decree to this effect was issued by the commissioner on November 26, and two months later it was confirmed by Peking. These developments finally forced the British government to adopt a specific and positive policy. The policy of "submission," which had been followed by the East India Company during its period of monopoly control, had given place, in the absence of positive instructions from London, to a so-called "quiescent" policy, which was really an absence of any definite line of action. Such was the state of affairs from 1854 to 1859, when the Chinese made an issue on the opium traffic. This forced the British to take up the larger question of diplomatic equality in official relations with Peking. The new British policy

25 Ibid., 119.
26 Chinese Repository VIII, 459, Correspondence Relating to China 1840, 452.
27 Ibid., 223.
28 Chinese Repository XI, 469-470.
was formulated on February 20, 1840, in instructions from Lord Palmerston to Admiral George Elliot and Captain Charles Elliot, who were to act as British plenipotentiaries. A Letter from Lord Palmerston to the minister of the Emperor of China reviewed the difficulties which had arisen since 1833, and observed that "the Queen of Great Britain has sent a naval and military force to the Coast of China, to demand from the Emperor satisfaction and redress for injuries inflicted by Chinese authorities upon British subjects resident in China, and for insults offered by those same authorities to the British Crown." In brief, Lord Palmerston's argument was that Chinese action had been unjust and precipitate. She had permitted the law against the importation of opium for many years, so that both natives and foreigners should be taught to consider it as of no effect. Then suddenly, and without sufficient warning it was infonse with the utmost vigor and severity.

It is notorious (said Palmerston) that for many years past, that importation has been connived at and permitted by the Chinese authorities at Canton; that these authorities from the Governor downwards have made an annual and considerable profit by taking money from foreigners for the permission to import opium; and of late the Chinese authorities have gone so far in setting this law at defiance, that Mandarin boats were employed to bring opium to Canton from the foreign ships lying at Lintin. Had China, continued Palmerston, after giving due notice, seized the opium instead of seizing peaceable British merchants, the British government would not have complained. But the injuries inflicted on British subjects and the insults offered to the British Crown could no longer be ignored. They would be met by demands:


30 Ibid., 117.

31 Ibid., 117.
First, the British government regarded the surrendered opium as a ransom exacted by the Chinese as the price of the lives of the superintendent and the imprisoned British merchants at Canton. For this surrendered property China would be required to pay at full value.

Second, since successive British superintendents of trade at Canton had been subjected to indignities, China would be required to treat all British officials accredited to her in a manner consistent with the usages of civilized nations, and with the respect due to the dignity of the British Crown. In a word, China was to bow to equality with the foreign barbarian.

Third, to insure the future security of British trade, and to protect British merchants from the arbitrary caprice either of the government at Peking, or its local authorities at the seaports, China would be required to cede permanently an island off her coast, though this demand might be waived if an otherwise satisfactory treaty were granted. 32

Naturally, China that for so long had prescribed the terms on which western traders might visit her shores was in no sense prepared to accept Lord Palmerston's demands, war was now inevitable. Palmerston's letter was delivered to Chinese officials at the Pei-ho River in the north during August, 1840, but without result. A British squadron blockaded Canton, demanding payment for the opium; this not being forthcoming, it bombarded they city in January 1841. This brought concessions from the local officials, and a draft treaty was signed, only to be disavowed later by both governments. Toward the close of winter hostilities were renewed, while Canton, which lay at the mercy of the British fleet, was ransomed for $6,000,000. 33 At the same time Commissioner Lin, who alone among Chinese officialdom had attempted to enforce the Emperor's law, was rewarded with removal from office and exile to the distant lands of Ili. Meanwhile Sir Henry Pottinger had arrived in China as Britain's chief Plenipotentiary. With more adequate forces, he moved northward, meeting with no effective

32 Ibid., 118.

33 Chinese Repository X, 63.
resistance. By October, 1841, the Chinese cities of Amoy, Tinghai, Chinhai, and Ningpo had all surrendered to British arms. In the following spring, when operations were renewed, other cities were taken: Chapu, Woosung, Shanghai, and Chinkiang by western arms.

In 1842 China was humbled; she was reduced to helplessness. Accordingly three imperial commissioners, officers of the highest rank, signed on the deck of a British battleship the treaty which legally at least ended the days of China's diplomatic superiority among the nations of the world.

The Treaty of Nanking is one of the most important commitments ever signed by representatives of Chinese government. Although its terms were broad, and required more explicit definition in later arguments, it was this treaty which set forth in the main principles that were to govern China's relations with foreign states for the succeeding century. Most important of its provisions was that affirming the principle of diplomatic equality between China and Great Britain. The properly accredited officials of both states would henceforth conduct their business as equals, according to the standards


35 Ibid., 41.

36 See Appendix II

37 Mayer, W. F., Treaties Between the Empire of China and Foreign Powers, 1906, 96.


39 Treaties, Convention, Etc., Between China & Foreign States, Shanghai, 1917, 352.
of western diplomacy. The days when an envoy of the British Crown could be accorded the same treatment extended to a tribute-bearing vassal from Korea were gone. Likewise were gone the days when China might confine her foreign trade to Canton under the cramping monopoly of the Co-hong. Instead, five ports were opened to British merchants: Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai; and at these ports the British might trade in an open market with such Chinese as they chose. Furthermore these new ports would be open for residence to the foreign traders. Commerce would now be conducted under a fair and regular tariff of exports and import duties; a conventional tariff, fixed by treaty, and thus subject to revision only upon the consent of Great Britain. By this one provision China signed away a large measure of fiscal independence, a not unimportant limitation upon her sovereignty. In addition, Great Britain revived the Island of Hongkong, which her merchants were soon to use as a base for their rapidly expanding commerce along the entire China coast. Finally China paid for the war with an indemnity totaling $21,000,000. Of this sum $12,000,000 was for the cost of the military and naval expedition; $3,000,000 was to cover debts due British merchants by members of the Co-hong; while the remaining $6,000,000 was to pay for the surrendered opium, the ransom

40 Ibid., 352.
41 Ibid., 352.
42 Ibid., 352.
43 Ibid., 352.
44 Ibid., 352.
exacted by China for the lives of British traders who had been confined in the Canton factories in March, 1839. For centuries China had regarded her own as the only respectable civilization. But when her high commissioners affixed their seals to the Treaty of Nanking, this view was no longer tenable. A scrap of paper, symbolic of the might of British arms and in the larger sense of the vitality of the western world, had destroyed it. It is not too much to say that in 1842 are to be found the real origins of the Chinese revolution which in 1911 ushered in the Republic, a revolution pre-eminently the product of the penetration of the western ideas. Since the Treaty of Nanking dealt in principles rather than details, its provisions were supplemented by further Sino-British negotiations completed during the succeeding year (1843) and embodied in the Treaty of the Bogue. Among the matters dealt with were trade regulations. It was found that the Chinese text of Article VIII of the Treaty of the Bogue (1843) contained an explanation that the negotiators of the Treaty of Nanking had agreed that the five ports opened under that treaty should be free to the nationals of all of the trading Powers on equal terms. Thus the "Open Door" principle was accepted by China from the first. As to the British responsibility in the matter, a member of the British commission wrote:

The Chinese government promised, on the representation of the American Commandore Kearny, previous to the Treaty of Nanking that whatever concessions were made to the English should also be granted to the United States. The throwing open the ports of China to Europe and America was not, therefore, the result of our (the English) policy, but had its origin in the anxious forethought of the Americans, lest we might stipulate for some exclusive privileges. 46


46 Foster, J.W., American Diplomacy in the Orient, Boston, 1903, 76.
It is necessary to recall that for many years the foreign traders at Canton and Macao had been unanimous in condemning Chinese notions both of the theory and the practice of justice. At Macao the Portuguese had sought to retain exclusive jurisdiction over their nationals, and in 1835 an order in council legalized the establishment of a British court of criminal and admiralty jurisdiction at Canton under the control of the chief superintendent of British trade there. It was not surprising then that in 1843 the British demanded that British criminals be tried and punished according to British law administered by a British consular court. Here was a second major instance in which China signed away an essential element of sovereignty. Only in later years was she to know the dangers of harboring in her seaports a foreign population over which her courts had no powers. Lastly, the negotiations of 1843 resulted in a treaty provision for most favored nation treatment. If China granted to other foreign states additional privileges or immunities, they would be enjoyed likewise by British subjects. Since this clause was soon inserted in treaties subsequently negotiated by other powers, it will be seen that the rights of any one power consisted of all the privileges granted in all the treaties. Following the precedent of the British, other powers secured similar concessions in treaties negotiated between 1844 and 1847.

The United States acted first (July 3, 1844); the France (October 24, 1844); and finally Norway and Sweden (March 20, 1847); Belgium tried, but failed


Of these various treaties, the most important was that secured by Caleb Cushing, representing the United States. The signing of a treaty between China and the United States was of value to each country. The latter profited from the experience of the English, while the Chinese gained a friend who in equal degrees had no desire to seize Chinese territory and no desire to have others seize it.

The plight of China in 1857 was indeed a tragic one. Her relations with the hated foreigner were about to precipitate a second and more disastrous war. The Manchu Dynasty had ruled at Peking since 1644. Though an alien house imposing its will upon the Chinese by force, it had, by able leadership, consolidated its power in a system of government whereby it ruled with, rather than over the conquered Chinese. As long as this government was benevolent, and prosperity prevailed, the conquered race was content to believe that the mandate of heaven belonged to the Manchus.

During the heyday of the dynasty China attained a fresh level of material prosperity, probably higher than ever before. In the latter part of the seventeenth and through most of the eighteenth century, indeed, it was the most populous and possibly the most prosperous realm on the planet. From the standpoint of order and justice it was probably as far advanced as any state of the time, for that was before the humanitarian movement had ameliorated the laws, the courts, and the prisons of the West. In total wealth, too, it very possibly surpassed every other nation of the period.

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50 Ibid., 137.

In the two decades which preceded the first British war widespread revolts had occurred with alarming frequency in such areas as Kwangsi, Shansei, Kweichow, Kiangsi, Hainan, Hupeh, and Formosa, all indicative of growing political discontent. In most cases these revolts were of purely domestic origin; in part, however, their inspiration arose from foreign contacts, and in particular from the teachings of foreign missionaries. This was the case with the Tai-pings.

Among those internal difficulties in China the most significant was the Tai-ping rebellion. The movement, in its political aspects, grew out of small beginnings of a religious character. The original societies formed were "Associations for Worshipping God" (Shang Ti Hsei, Shang-Ti means God, and Hsei means associations.) Since the worship of Shang Ti (God) was a recognized and peculiar function of the Emperor, it was not long until this worship came to be forbidden, although at first the ultimate political aims of the leader of the movement were not set forth by him or appreciated either by the officials or by the majority of the members of the "Associations". The leader of the movement was a native of Kwangtung province (South China) named Hung Siu-Chuen, who was a scholar by profession and ambition. Hung appeared at Canton at least three times to compete in the provincial examinations and was always unsuccessful, although he had shown great promise in his studies. Later he fell seriously ill and while in this state he had visions which became intelligible to him only as he began to read in a pamphlet, "Good Words to Exhort the Age," which he had received from a Chinese preacher at Canton. After winning a few

converts he moved with them into Kwangsi Province, where he continued to teach, preach, and have visions. His following increased rapidly, especially after his societies were put under the Imperial ban. Finally, as a result of persecution, and in obedience to his visions, Hung proclaimed himself as the "Heavenly King" and declared his intention of founding a new rule, to be known as the Tai-ping Dynasty (means "Perfect Peace"). He then began to move north swelling his following continually. Finally the Tai-ping rebels (they were usually called by the Chinese the "long-haired rebels" because of their manner of wearing their hair) reached Nanking, where the "Heavenly King" stopped. A band of his followers moved on northwards and reached Tientsin, but they were soon forced back to Yangtze valley. This marked the high tide of the movement. Their failure was due to three things: Hung lacked genius; wealthy Chinese rallied to the support of the Manchus; and finally the foreign powers threw their support against the rebels.

While the Tai-pings were enjoying their first major success and were already well established in their new capital at Nanking, and the Manchus had demonstrated their total inability to cope either with them or other rebellious movement, the foreign traders and their consuls were already of the mind that the treaties should be revised, and this by force. In September, 1855, Shanghai itself was captured by revolting bands, who expelled the imperial officials. All these forces working together raised the question as to whether the foreign

54 Ibid., 120.
powers should not recognize the Taipings and thus hasten the downfall of the Manchus. In return for this aid the Taipings would be required to guarantee all the commercial and diplomatic privileges which the foreigners desired. At the time the United States was represented in China by a commissioner, Humphrey Marshall, who believed the eventual success of the Taipings to be assured. It was his belief that:

the highest interests of the United States are involved in sustaining China—maintaining order here, and gradually engrafting on the worn-out stock—the healthy principles which give life and health to government.

Because of the co-operative policy that had been followed by the powers, the Tientsin Treaty formed in reality a single settlement. England and France exacted indemnities to cover their military and naval expeditions. With this exception, the settlement was a common settlement. The Russians and Americans had not used force, and their treaties contained little of importance; but since they insisted on the most favored nation clause, they fell immediately to the enlarged concessions won by British and French arms. These concessions were to prove of the utmost importance in China's future foreign relations. As summarized from the British treaty, they included the followings:

1. China would receive a British ambassador or other diplomatic agent who might reside at Peking permanently or visit the capital occasionally at the option of the British government. This ambassador should not be called upon to perform any ceremony derogatory to him as representing the sovereign of an independent nation on a footing of equality with that of China. The ambassador was to be given the


full protection of the Chinese government and his letters and effects shall be held sacred and inviolable. China agreed to nominate one of the highest ranking officials with whom the ambassador should conduct his official business either personally or in writing on a footing of perfect equality. 57

2. Article VIII of the treaty provided that: the Christian religion, as professed by Protestant or Roman Catholics, inculcates the practice of virtue, and teaches men to do as he would be done by. Persons teaching it or professing it, therefore, shall alike be entitled to the protection of the Chinese authorities; nor shall any such, peaceably pursuing their calling and not offending against the laws, be persecuted or interfered with. 58

3. Article IX provided: British subjects are hereby authorized to travel for their pleasure or for purposes of trade, to all parts of the interior, under passports which will be issued by their consuls, and countersigned by the local authorities. If he (the British subject) be without a passport, or if he commits any offense against the law, he shall be handed over to the nearest consul for punishment. 59

4. Articles X and XI provided that British merchant ships might trade on the Yangtze River, and that additional treaty ports should be opened, including: Chefoo, in Shantung province; Chinkiang, in Kiangsu; Hankow, in Hupeh; Kikujiang, in Kiangsi; Kiungchow in Hainan; Newchwang, in Chekiang; and Nanking in Kiangsu. 60

5. Article XVI dealt with extraterritorial rights in criminal cases: Chinese subjects who may be guilty of any criminal act toward British subjects shall be arrested and punished by the Chinese authorities according to the laws of China. British subjects who may commit any crime in China shall be tried and punished by the consul, or other public functionary authorized thereto, according to the laws of Great Britain. Justice shall be equitably and impartially administered on both sides. 61

6. Finally, the treaty contained the most-favored-nation clause. Provision was also made for revision of the tariff. 62

57 Ibid., 157.


This was the importance of the Tientsin settlement and it must be emphasized that it represented the policies of all four powers: England, France, Russia, and the United States. \(^{63}\) To be sure, the United States and Russia had refused to employ force, but they were insistent that they enjoy all privileges which a policy of force had won for England and France. The most striking gain won by the foreigners in the Tientsin Treaties was the right of their governments to maintain ambassadors or ministers at Peking. On the assumption that China was now to be opened to full diplomatic intercourse with the West, this was a reasonable demand. The delay and evasion which China had constantly practiced in dealing with foreigners would now be more difficult.

The historical relations of Japan and China all center in Korea, and it was in Korea that they first came into serious conflict in the modern period of their history. \(^{64}\) From this conflict developed consequences of grave significance, not only for the parties immediately concerned, but for the entire world.

The cause of Sino-Japanese War in 1894 was due to the growth of rebellion in Korea and the inability of the Korean government to maintain its authority against the rebels. The Tong-Haks, a religious sect which had sprung up in Korea (Tong-Haks, a sect founded on a combination of the elements of the three Oriental religions: Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism,) petitioned for a reversal of the decree which had branded their leader as a heretic, and for

\(^{63}\) Ibid., 362

\(^{64}\) Rockhill, W.E., China's Intercourse with Korea from the XVth Century to 1895, London, 1905, 124.
tolerance of the sect. But China, at that time refused to join Japan in urging reform on the Korean government. The people were ready for war. Reasons for Japan's intervention over Korea is obvious: (1) Japan looks Korea as the gateway for her continental expansion, (2) national fear lest Korea should come under the control of some strong foreign Power, and (3) her interest in control of the resources of the peninsula and in Korea as a market. Japan was no longer content for China to act in Korea alone. Japanese troops were soon on their way. They entered Seoul two days after the Chinese had landed at Asan. Accordingly, Japan now proposed to China that the two powers send commissioners to Korea to investigate measures of reform. China replied immediately that she could not interfere in Korean domestic affair, and much less could Japan, who had recognized Korea's independence. 65

Japan now acted quickly. She demanded a statement as to whether Korea regarded herself as independent or as vassal of China. China, alarmed by these developments, sought vainly for assistance from Great Britain, Russia, and the United States, and though the ministers of these powers counseled peace at Tokyo, their efforts failed. Meanwhile, Japan informed China that her failure to co-operate in Korean reform could be interpreted only as a desire to complicate matters further. The Japanese retorted that it was the Chinese who must leave and that all agreements between Korea and China that infringed the former's sovereign rights must be abrogated. Finally a war broke out between Chinese and Japanese troops in Korea. China now broke off diplomatic relations,

65 Inouye, J., The Japan-China War, Yokohama, Japan, 1895, 211.
both countries declaring war. The issue was Korea: tributary or free. 66

On the day that diplomatic relations were broken, China addressed the American Minister at Peking, asserting that the peninsula had been a tributary of China for many years. Japan, on the contrary, could well assert that she was fighting for independence and reform for Korea. The war resulted in the defeat of the Chinese fleet and the Japanese control of the sea. Japanese armies advanced across the Korean border into Manchuria, while additional forces landed on the coasts of Liaotung. China was forced to talk peace and was ready to admit Korean independence and to pay a war indemnity. 67 China meanwhile appealed to the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia, previous to which the United States had offered its good offices to both China and Japan. To this offer Japan on November 17, 1894, replied significantly that she did not propose to push her victories beyond reasonable limits, those limits can not be said to have been reached until China finds herself in a position to approach Japan directly on the subject of peace. 68 On November 18, 1894, Li Hung-chang, Chinese foreign minister, sent a personal agent to Japan seeking peace. 69 On November 22, the Chinese Foreign Office was asking peace on the

66 Ibid., 215.
67 Ibid., 217.
69 Ibid., 34.
basis of Korean independence, and an indemnity. All these efforts failed, and Japan replied that peace would not be discussed until China had dispatched properly qualified representatives. Late in January, 1895, China sent a second mission. It consisted of two Chinese officials of secondary rank, with John W. Foster, former American Secretary of State, as adviser. Again Japan asserted that their agents were insufficient, by which she meant that China was not yet prepared to make peace. Not until all hope of direct foreign aid had vanished did China appoint Li Hung-chang with full powers to make peace, and by this time Japan had made known that her terms would include the cession of territory. At last, the peace negotiations were conducted at Shimonoseki. The peace terms were submitted on April 1. They were severe in the extreme, including recognition of Korean independence, cession of a considerable area in south Manchuria, tremendous war indemnity and commercial concessions. The treaty was finally signed on April 17, in which (1) China recognized the independence of Korea; (2) China ceded to Japan Formosa and the Pescadores, off the coast of Fukien, (southern coast of China) and Liaotung Peninsula with Port Arthur in south Manchuria; (3) China agreed to pay within seven years a war indemnity of 2,000,000,000 taels, with interest at five per cent; (4) four additional treaty ports would be opened to Japanese trade and residence, and under most-favored-nation

70 Ibid., 34.
71 Ibid., 35.
treatment to all the treaty powers; and (5) Japan would be accorded most-
favored-nation treatment in China until the conclusion of a new Sino-Japanese
commercial treaty. 72 For Japan the war had been truly a great victory.

When Japan included in her demands cession of Port Arthur and its
hinterland, the moment for European action had arrived. The Origins of the tri-
ple intervention by which Russia, France, and Germany were to deprive Japan of
Port Arthur were complex. 73 Russia was the power most intimately concerned with
any annexations Japan might make in Manchuria. At this time, too, Russia had
already considered a route for Trans-Siberian railroad across northern Manchu-
ria. In these interests Russia could count on the support of her ally, France.
It was also at this time that Germany had become ambitious for a place in the
Pacific. 74 For many years she had been represented in the Far East by M. von
Brandt, a distinguished German diplomat who favored to support China against
Japan, and it was probably he who moved the German government to intervene.
The Ministers of these three powers presented the views of their respective
governments at the Japanese Foreign Office on April 23, less than a week after
the Treaty of Shimonoseki had been signed. 75 They asserted that the possession
of the peninsula of Liaotung claimed by Japan, would be a constant menace to
the capital of China, would at the same time render the independence of Korea,

72 Ibid., 35-36.
73 Clyde, P. H., International Rivalries in Manchuria, 1689-1922,
Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1926, 25.
74 Ibid., 25-26.
75 Ibid., 26.
and would henceforth be a perpetual obstacle to the peace of the Far East. 76
Finally Japan agreed to surrender Port Arthur. She asked that the Treaty of
Shimonoseki be ratified and that additional indemnity be granted. 77 This was
agreed to with an additional 30,000,000 taels being added to China’s bill. 78
In spite of the intervention, the final effect of the war was to demonstrate
the weakness of China at that time and the strength of Japan. For Japan, it
was only the temporary set-back resulting from the Three-Powers' interventions.

Shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Russia moved
to strengthen her new position as the protector of China. Partly from consi-
derations of internal politics and partly because of its friendly relations
with Russia, the Manchu government sent Li Hung-chang to St. Petersburg to re-
present China at the ceremonies of May, 1896, attendant upon the coronation of
the Czar. 79 Count Witte, the eminent Russian statesman, urged upon the Chinese
plenipotentiary, during his stay in the Russian capital, the negotiation of a
treaty of alliance. 80 He pointed out that the danger to China had been averted
only for the time, that Russia was desirous of giving China effective aid in
case her territory were again menace, and that it was advisable for China to
give Russia the right and the means to aid her effectively in time of need.

76 Ibid., 26.
77 Ibid., 30.
78 Ibid., 30.
79 Ibid., 36.
80 Ibid., 37.
A secret treaty of alliance between China and Russia was finally signed. The alliance was directed specifically against Japan, providing both countries agreed to support each other reciprocally, making war and peace in common, in the event of Japanese aggression in eastern Asia, whether against Russian or Chinese territory. In time of war China agreed to allow Russia freely to use her harbors and other facilities. 81 This guarantee of protection for China against a possible Japanese attack was given by Russia in return for the right to project the Trans-Siberian Railroad across northern Manchuria directly to Vladivostok. 82

Germany too, had joined in the intervention, and presumably expected some reward. The so-called "battle of the concessions" however, was inaugurated by Germany rather than by Russia. She had determined to insist on adequate recognition by China of her aid in securing the retrocession of the Liaotung peninsula. In the spring of 1897 she intimated to the other Powers her desire to secure a coaling and naval station on the coast of China. 83 However, before acting, she was looking for a suitable excuse. It happened when two German priests in Shantung province were murdered. Within a period of two weeks after the murder, the German government had made demands on the Chinese government, including: 1) a ninety-nine years lease of Tsingtao and an area comprehending the entire bay of Kiaochow; 2) the sole right of railway construction and the exploitation of the coal mines of Shantung province; and 3) the payment of an

81 Ibid., 37.
82 Ibid., 40.
83 Ibid., 48.
indemnity and the expenses of the naval expedition which had occupied Tsingtao prior to the serving of the demands. These demands were substantially accepted by the Chinese government and embodied in the agreement of March 6, 1898.

The granting of these demands meant a serious disturbance of the balance of power in the Far East in favor of one state. Consequently all the others moved immediately to secure their separate interests. Russia occupied Port Arthur and demanded a lease of the tip of the Liaotung promontory, including Port Arthur and Talienwan, for a period of twenty-five years; an extension of the concessions of the Russo-Chinese Bank to include a projection southward to Port Arthur of the Chinese Eastern Railroad; and mining rights in southern Manchuria.

This led England to request the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei for the period of the Russian occupation of Port Arthur. She also demanded from China a declaration that she would not alienate to any Power the provinces bordering on the Yangtze River; a promise that an English subject should hold the post of Inspector-General of the maritime customs so long as British trade supremacy was maintained in China; and a lease of the territory of Kowloon on the mainland opposite Hongkong.

France had already, in 1895, secured a statement from China that she would not alienate to any other Power the island of Hainan. In 1897-1898 she

84 Ibid., 49.
85 Ibid., 50.
86 Ibid., 52.
87 Ibid., 55.
further advanced her interest by securing a non-alienation agreement covering the provinces bordering on Tongking; by demanding and receiving definite concessions for the building of railroads in Yunnan province; by the gaining of a lease for ninety-nine years of Kwangchou Bay; and in the meantime, Japan asked for an agreement from China not to alienate to any other Power Fukien province, which lies opposite Formosa. All of these demands were acceded to by the Chinese government, but when Italy requested a lease of Sahmen bay it was refused by the Chinese government. 88

But this was not all. The western powers began to develop what we call "sphere of influence" in the interior of China. 89 These were the parts of the country mapped out by various nations in which they were to have special rights and privileges. 90 Under this policy Russia considered Manchuria the sphere in which she had special rights, and China should give her the rights of building railroads, of opening mines. 91 In like manner, Germany claimed Shantung as her sphere; France, Yunnan province (a province in South China and north Burma); England, the Yangtze Valley. 92 So great was the rivalry for special sphere that it looked almost as if China were to be broken up among the European nations. 93 Only the jealousy of the nations among themselves

88 Ibid., 58.
90 Ibid., 137.
91 Ibid., 141.
92 Ibid., 143.
93 Ibid., 147.
prevented China from losing more of her sovereignty than she did. Besides losing temporary and partial sovereignty in the leased territories and the sphere of influence, China lost in another way, namely the control over railroads in the interior of the country. Ever since the war with Japan, China's foreign indebtedness had been increasing. In order to pay the indemnities she had been forced to borrow from European nations and because of political weakness of China the nations lending money to her demand as a guarantee a provision that the interest should be allocated from the revenue of the Maritime Customs. Likewise when China wished to enter upon any new enterprise, like railroad building, she found herself in the same difficult position, lacking both money and credit. Foreign nations in lending her money for projects demanded guarantees for the protection of their interests. So in railroad building China was forced to grant concessions which gave to the lender the right to finance and build railroads in Chinese territory with whole or part management in the running of the road when completed. Thus the Belgians built the Peking-Hankow line; the Germans, the Shantung lines and the northern part of the Tientsin-Pukow line which united Peking and Nanking; the English the southern part of the Peking-Pukow line and its extension to Shanghai, Peking and Tientsin were connected with the Russian railroads in Manchuria. 94

During this period of "land grabbing" and concession hunting the United States stood aside. After the American-Spanish War, in 1898-99, the American interest in the Pacific had very much widened and somewhat changed in

94 Ibid., 176.
character by the acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands as territory and the
Philippines, at least as a temporary possession. With these new interests the
American trade and commerce in the Orient developed tremendously and she came
to view with concern these European sphere of influence in China. The American
policy in the Far East had been fixed traditionally as non-exclusive. In the
sphere United States feared restriction of her trade as the nationals of the
country controlling the sphere were in a favorable position. Special privileges
made it impossible for the merchants of other nations to compete with them. At
this juncture, United States Secretary of State, John Hay, sent identical notes
to the Western Powers, Russia and Japan saying that he understood that in the
sphere of influence there was entailed no loss of sovereignty on the part of
China. Therefore by the treaties China was open on an equal basis to the
trade of all nations. In other words, he objected to special privileges being
given by China to any one nation in any part of the Chinese Empire. Whatever
rights of trade China gave to one nation she gave, by the "most favored nation
clause", to all the treaty powers. This declaration of the equality of trade
opportunity in China to all nations is known as the "Open Door Policy." It
did much not only toward doing away with special privileges in the foreign
trade but also in keeping for China her sovereign trade right.

95 Callahan, J.M., *American Relations in the Pacific and the Far
East, 1784-1900*, Baltimore, 1901, 34.
97 Clyde, P.N., *International Rivalries in Manchuria, 1689-1922*,
Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1926, 114.
98 Ibid., 115.
99 Bau, M.J., *The Open Door Doctrine in Relation to China*,
100 Ibid., 110.
CHAPTER II

REVOLUTIONARY ERA

The loss of territory through foreign aggression during the closing years of the nineteenth century immediately awakened China to her military weakness and her bankrupt condition. In the meantime, there were some few Chinese willing to fight for a new and a modern China. These reformers were men of striking courage. Among the wisest of the Chinese statesmen who advocated reform was Chang Chih-tung. Like Tseng Kuo-fan, who saved the country from the fai-pings, he was one of the few officials who did not use his office to become rich. It is said that all the wealth that flowed through his Yamen (office) was spent on public works and public charity. The defeat of China at the hands of Japan made him fear for the safety of his country. As a true patriot, he realized the cause of China's defeat. In his book, China's Only Hope, he says:

Of all countries China has alone for these fifty years proved herself almost irreclaimably stupid and not awake. Many of the officials and people are proud and indolent. They contentedly rest in the belief that the old order of things will suffice for these dangerous times, and in the end become the easy prey of outsiders. Among our officials there is not one man of discernment. We have no real scholars and no skillful artisans. We are not represented abroad and at home have no schools. So our incompetences are not supplied. With nothing to stimulate the mind, harden the nature, or supply the deficiencies, there seems nothing left for China, but to perish miserably in the slough of despondency and despair. 1

1 Chang Chih-tung, China's Only Hope, Fleming H. Revell Co., N. Y. 1900, 73.
Chang Chih-tung was not a radical reformer like many of the young students, and would not throw away that part of old China that he thought was good. In education he did not advocate the destruction of China's ancient teachings. Loyalty to Confucianism he preached. Students, he said, must be well grounded in a knowledge of their own language and Confucian literature. He wanted schools established throughout the country, money for which he would obtain by using Buddhist and Taoist temples and confiscating the property of these religions which he believed were degraded and dying out. After a grounding in China's best teachings, let the nation acquire western learning from translations into Chinese of the best of the West. The "Eight Leg Essay," that stereotyped form of writing brought in during the Ming Dynasty, he would abolish from the official examinations and introduce western science in its place. He advocated sending students not to Europe and America, but to Japan, where the language difficulty was less. Although he believed they could learn much from western methods of government, he would have none of republics and parliaments. He exhorted the Chinese to be loyal to the Throne. He favored a modern navy and army and deplored the fact that Tso Tsung-tang's suggestions and the beginning made by the Board of Admiralty had no longer been followed. He too, like Li Hung-chang, Admiralty of Chinese Naval Force, saw that the building of railroads was essential. He says:

2 Eight Leg Essay, an official writing, its contents and compositions must conform with the regulations, restrictions and censorship of the government.
Is there any one power that will open the door of learning for the scholar, the farmer, the workman, the merchant, and the soldier? To this question we reply emphatically there is, and it is the railway. The potentialities of the scholar lie in extensive observation; of the farmer in finding a ready sale for farm products; of the workman in the increase of machinery; of the merchant, in cheap and rapid transit; and of the soldier in the quick dispatch of the munitions of war. The railway is the source of wealth and power of western countries. The laws of China make no provision for the building of thoroughfare. Let us build railways. The whole country will become really ours and China will be one great united family with no fear of famine or war. 3

Some of the early reformers drew their inspiration from knowledge of the West acquired through Christian missionaries. Although these views were often distorted by Christian prejudice, this did not lessen their influence on the Chinese mind. After 1860, a little encouragement was given by Prince Kung to western learning, much to the annoyance of reactionaries, who ascribed a prolonged drought and famine to this cause. But as late as 1894, there was little evidence to indicate that either the Manchu government or the Chinese people desired or sensed the need of reform as the writer Cameron says:

It is true that in the years after the Taiping Rebellion a portion of the Chinese literati began to take an interest in western institutions, which formerly they had been inclined to view as the curious ways of a barbarian people, unworthy of imitation by the Middle Kingdom. But to all those who thought that the inauguration of a few railway lines, the formation of one modern army corps and a small navy, and a tentative interest on the part of the government in western learning constituted an adequate reformation of the Empire, the Sino-Japanese War was a rude awakening. 4

3 Ibid., 125-126.

The humiliating defeat by westernized Japan aroused intelligent Chinese to the imperative need for reform. Some of the southern radicals, including Sun Yat-sen at Canton, memorialized the Throne requesting constitutional government. Another reformer of great influence in this period was Kaung Yu-wei, also from Canton. Trained in the Confucian school, he had early acquired an interest in things western, and his reading, if not deep, had at least been wide. Kaung Yu-wei again opened the way for historical criticism of ancient literature. Besides his interest in literature he was at heart a political and social reformer. To find sanction for his ideas of reform he printed a book entitled *Confucius as a Reformer*. His interpretation of Confucius as a progressive and not a reactionary sage commanded wide attention, and he soon emerged as an advocate of constitutional monarchy, the leader of the right-wing progressive. It was he, acting on behalf of a larger group, who in December 1895, submitted a grand memorial advocating complete westernization of the Empire. Associated with Kaung was another Cantonese scholar, Liang Chi-chao, who was an exceptionally brilliant writer and editor of a newspaper, which was the organ of the reformers. They saw one hope in the dynasty. They hoped the young Emperor, Kuang Hsü, might be persuaded to back the reformers. At this period the relationships between the Empress Dowager and the Emperor were becoming strained; he was beginning to break away from her tutelage. Outwardly they were still friendly but actually they were in severe conflict with each


ather as the conservatives looked upon the Empress as their leader and the younger reformers were beginning to look to the Emperor as their leader. The Emperor had already been reading and studying foreign books, the Bible, maps, etc., and now suddenly to the horror of the conservatives of the court, the Emperor received the radical reformer, Kaung Yu-wei in frequent audiences and made him Secretary of the Bureau of Foreign Affairs. In three months the reformer, Kaung Yu-wei, managed to place around the Emperor the men of his ideas. Day and night they filled the Emperor's mind with the need for drastic reforms and suddenly the Emperor startled the empire by issuing in rapid succession a series of edicts. In the next one hundred days he issued twenty-seven such reform proclamations. It has ever been known since as "The One Hundred Days" reform. In the summer of 1898 a number of edicts were issued making changes in the educational and examination systems, establishing a translation bureau, abolishing numerous sinecures, promoting reorganizations of military forces, and undertaking numerous other reforms. Some of the most important of the edicts were:

Changes in the examination system so as to include questions on history, political economy and scientific knowledge. The establishment of public schools throughout the Empire and the conversion of the temples and the monasteries into school buildings. The abolition of many superfluous offices both in the capital and throughout the Empire. The complete reorganization of the military system.

8 Ibid., 137-8.
had he worked slowly, he might have succeeded in instituting the reforms regard-
ing education, reorganization of the navy and the army and even the changes in the examination system. But when he went so far as to issue edicts regarding reforms in government machinery, which included cutting down the number of officials, the Manchu and the Chinese officials throughout the country raised cry of disapproval. The reformers showed the greatest lack of foresight in dealing with the reactionary party centered around the Empress Dowager. 9

Seeing their reform program collapse, they now turned to Yuan Shih-kai for help. He was at that time a judicial commissioner of Chihli Province (now the Province Hopeh in North China.) To him the Emperor entrusted the program of army reform. Taken into the confidence of the reformers, Yuan was informed that the Empress Dowager and her most trusted adviser, Jung Lu, viceroy of Chihli, must be imprisoned, and to this scheme it appeared that the Emperor gave his approval. Yuan, however, refused to be a party to the plot. He warned Jung Lu and through him the Empress Dowager. This lady, in turn, summoned the chief officials of the government, who implored her to resume again the direction of the government and thereby end what they regarded as the radical reforms of the Emperor. Accordingly, the person of the Emperor was seized. He was forced to issue an Imperial decree declaring that the Empress Dowager would again direct the affairs of the state. The reform edicts were declared void, old offices were re-created, and many of the reformers were executed, though

9 National Committee on Chinese History, Historical Manuscripts of Ching Dynasty, Peking, China, 1905, 321.
Kaung and Liang escaped. Thus ended an impractical effort to revolutionize China in a day. Now it is obvious that the program of Kaung and his supporters in 1898 could not have succeeded. The change was too abrupt, and neither the Emperor nor his liberal supporters appeared to have possessed the talents necessary for its enforcement. Both Kaung and Liang were considered as outlaws and forced to live in foreign countries until the Revolution of 1911 in which they took a prominent part. The Empress now entered on a strong reactionary program. She saw all too clearly that the dynasty was threatened: from within the country by the spirit of criticism and reform, and from without, by the foreigners who were asking so many privileges. She saw one last hope of re-establishing the dynasty: she would turn the criticism from the dynasty to the outside nations who had made so many aggressions on Chinese territory. The Empress Dowager appealed to the people to help her inorder to raise a war against the foreigners. She issued edicts calling upon the norther provinces (including Chili, Manchuria, Shantung) to strengthen, if they had none, the local militia or train bands. They should drill and be ready to support the dynasty. As they organized, there were enrolled into these bands desperadoes and members of societies: the Big Sword Society, Plum Blossom Fists, and Righteous Harmony Fists, the latter giving the name, Boxers, by which the foreigners know the movement. The superstition that they were immune to death gave a fighting enthusiasm to these members of the secret societies.

10 Ibid., 332.
The movement began in Shantung and spread into Chili (now the province Hopeh) in northern China. There the soldiers displayed huge banners on which were written, "The God assists us to destroy all foreigners. We invite you to join the Patriotic Militia." Their venom was aimed against the Christian missionaries and their Christian converts. The missionaries had been criticized for aiding their Chinese converts politically. The non-Christian Chinese felt that the missionaries used influence to help their converts who got into difficulty with the law. Capitalizing this feeling abroad in the land, they launched a campaign against the missionaries. Railroads, steamboat and telegraph lines also came under the displeasure of the society. As the reports came to the court of Peking of the spread of the movement and of the massacre of foreigners in outlying districts, the Empress Dowager worked herself into a kind of frenzy against all foreigners. By June 1900 so obsessed had she become with the idea of the extermination of the foreigners, that she offered rewards for the heads of those foreigners residing in Peking and ordered the Governor of Shansi to kill every foreigner in his province. Obeying her command, the Governor saw to it that all the foreigners in Shansi, mostly missionaries, many of them women and children, were massacred. The legations at Peking were at first unwilling to believe that any such fantastic thing as the killing of all foreigners in China would be undertaken. So the foreigners still stayed on in Peking.

12 Ibid., 63.

they were a not inconsiderable group now. Every country of any size had her minister and corps of lesser officials housed in legations. Both Catholic and protestant missions had larger centers in Peking. There was, however, no business. These few hundred foreigners scattered about over the huge city of Peking now became alarmed as the reports kept coming in of the massacre of the missionaries in outlying districts. They wired Tientsin for help and four hundred and fifty men from the foreign warships were sent quickly to Peking for the purpose of getting the foreigners away. They reached Peking but neither they nor those that had been sent to protect were able to leave Peking. Both the railway and telegraph lines were cut. The group of the foreigners were now out of touch with the rest of the world. And then came a day when an ultimatum was received from the Chinese Department of the Foreign Affairs saying that as China could no longer protect the legations, the legations would have to protect themselves. In a last effort to prevail upon the Empress Dowager to stop this Boxers' movement, Baron von Kettler, the German minister, started bravely to call upon the Department of Foreign Affairs. Putnam Weale says:

There were only two Chinese outriders with him as Von Kettler had refused to take any of his guard. I remember Von Kettler was smoking and leaning his arms on the front bar of his sedan, for all the world as if he were going on a picnic. The little cortege soon turned a corner and was swallowed up.

Fifteen minutes later, Von Kettler was shot to dead by these two outriders.

14 Ibid., 190.
15 Ibid., 196.
16 Simpson, B.L., Indiscreet Letters from Peking, Dodd, Mead & Co., N.Y., 1907, 100.
The siege of the legations had begun. Imperial troops and Boxers were now combined to destroy the foreigners. For this untimely development, the policy of the Empress Dowager and her men was the immediate cause. As early as November, 1899 she had warned high officials to be prepared for war.

Let no one think of making peace (she had urged), but let each strive to preserve from destruction and spoliation his ancestral home and graves from the ruthless hands of the invaders. Let these our words be known to each and all within our domains. 17

In the northern provinces, the Boxer madness had spread, bringing death to 232 missionaries and their families, both Catholic and Protestant. In a few cases these outrages reached as far as the Yangtze, but they were confined largely to the northern provinces and Manchuria. In the south, Li Hung-chang at Canton, and the Viceroy Chang Chih-tung and Liu Kyn-yi, in the Yangtze, maintained order. At that time, the attitude of the foreign governments was different. They maintained that no war existed. On the contrary, the outbreak was to be regarded as a rebellion which Peking was unable to suppress, but for which it would be held responsible. Meanwhile, the foreign departments of the great powers debated what should be done to save the Peking legations. All agreed that something should be done, but as to what it should be and as to who should do it, opinions were different. Organization of an international army or relief expedition sufficiently powerful to reach Peking was desirable but difficult.

The British at that time were engaged in the Boer War. American troops in the
Far East were still fighting in the Philippines insurrection. Distance pre-
vented the rapid mobilization of German or French troops. The Russians were
guarding their railway in Manchuria. Among all the great powers, Japan alone
was in a position to act quickly and effectively. Although she was urged to do
so by Great Britain, her plan was blocked by Russia.

Russians hoped secretly to make Manchuria a Russian protectorate. They
Germans stung by the murder of their Minister, were intent on a policy of
revenge. The British, the Americans and the Japanese feared the breakup of
China, with resulting restrictions on trade. The United States had long since
abandoned the co-operative policy for one of the unpredictable independent
action. Secretary Hay had observed:

The position of the United States in relation to China makes it expedient
that, while circumstances may sometimes require that it acts on lines
similar to those other powers follow, it should do so singly and without
the co-operation of other powers.

Acting in accordance with this policy, Hay circularized the powers on July 3,
1900, informing them that, while the United States proposed to hold the Chinese
to the "uttermost accountability," it nevertheless sought "a solution which may
bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial
and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by

18 Clements, P.H., *Boxer Rebellion*, Part II, "The International

19 Clyde, P.H., *International Rivalries in Manchuria, 1689–1922*,
Columbus, Ohio, 1928, 19.

20 Ibid., 125.
treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of
equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." While these
diplomatic exchanges were taking place and the siege in Peking continued, the
foreign concessions in Tientsin had been subjected to intermittent attack. By
July 14, sufficient foreign troops having arrived, the city was taken. With
Tientsin as a base, plans could be made for an advance on Peking. On August
4, the relief expedition left Peking. It included 3,000 British, 4,500 Russians,
2,900 Americans, 800 French, and 8,000 Japanese. It was a truly remarkable
force. Ten days were consumed in reaching Peking. On August 14, the city was
attacked and the legations relieved. Fighting continued throughout the city,
while the Empress Dowager and her court fled from her capital for a second time
before the hated foreigners. And now, the immediate danger gone, the foreign
troops and civilians looted the city. With the relief of the legations effected,
the larger problem of effecting a diplomatic settlement with the Chinese re-
mained. Among the foreigners in China there was a very general demand for
vengeance. The Chinese court had fled; there was no government in Peking worthy
of the name; general confusion prevailed; and the foreign powers were as sus-
picious of each other as they were of the Chinese. Yet two things were impera-
tive: a common settlement, and the selection of the Chinese negotiators on
them some reliance could be placed. Li Hung-chang was the obvious choice.

21 Ibid., 126.
22 Ibid., 134.
23 Ibid., 134.
24 Ibid., 135.
25 Ibid., 135.
He was recalled from south China and appointed peace commissioner by the Empress Dowager on August 7, 1900. By January, 1901, China had accepted the united demands of the powers and on February 5, the first meeting of the foreign envoys and the Chinese took place. The powers insisted that many of their demands be carried out in advance of the signature of the formal settlement. Among innumerable problems the question of indemnity was largest. In this respect, all the powers made extravagant demands, those of Russia, Germany and France, beyond all reasons. It was not until September 7, 1901 that the Boxer settlement - Boxer Protocol - was set up a new relationship between China and the foreign powers. Although not a treaty, this agreement has been of tremendous consequence. Its major provisions were included in twelve items.

The awakening of the Chinese people and the easy spread of revolutionary ideas at the beginning of the present century were but the inevitable consequences of the profound changes which had been taking place in the structure of Chinese society as a result of the peculiar relationship between China and the western powers. In the latter part of the eighteenth century and the first twenty years of the nineteenth century the balance of trade was in favor of China. Europe and America need her silk and tea, but China needs very little from the West. Her domestic industries, her large mineral resources and extensive cultivation made her independent of the outside trade. The Manchus

26 Ibid., 145.
27 Ibid., 175.
28 See Appendix III
realized that they were hostile to British trade. Up to 1830, it was difficult to find articles that China needed to pay for the silk and tea that the West wanted in rapidly increasing quantities. In his Trade and Administration of China, H.B. Morse says:

All that is known is that China wanted very little that the West could supply. Cotton manufacturers in 1905 constituted 44% of the value (excluding opium) of all foreign imports; but in this industry the West could compete with cheap Asiatic labor only after the development springing from the inventions of Richard Arkwright and Eli Whitney, and in the 18th century and early 19th century the movement of cotton cloth was from China to the West. Woolens were wanted, but only in small quantities, silver and lead were wanted, but in no great quantities; and the goods introduced consisted to a great extent of those articles which were objects of curiosity to the Chinese. The trade was on a cash basis.

It was during the period that this situation was growing more acute that the opium troubles commenced. Until the end of the eighteenth century not more than 200 chests of opium were imported and very little opium was grown in China itself. At the beginning of the nineteenth century there was a tremendous increase in opium smoking, so that the Chinese government began to prohibit the opium imports. In 1838 the British Government endorsed the action of the Chinese in searching ships for opium after the issue of proclamations and edict, but in spite of the attitude opium trade was supported and financed by the British government, which put its own stamp on the drug. Through the attempt of the Chinese government to stamp out the illicit trade (which was often supported by its own customs officials), it came into conflict with the British trade.


31 Allen, W., The Opium Trade, Lowell, Mass., 1855, 192.
The British representative, Elliot, supported his own countrymen and war broke out. As a result of defeat, China was forced not only to cede some territory to foreign countries and to give to the foreigners in China extraterritorial status, but she also forfeited her sovereign right of regulating foreign trade as the national interest demanded. The control over the maritime customs fell into the hands of the foreigners, especially the British. So from 1850 onwards the internal economy of China was wrecked by the ruthless search for markets by the western powers; the Chinese people further deteriorated in physique by the smoking of opium.

The defeat in the war against Japan put China again in a very difficult situation. In the first place, China lost all the prestige she once enjoyed as a military power. The treaties which concluded the Sino-British and Sino-French wars were most unfavorable to China, but the Chinese armies had always put up a good fight, and the feeling was abroad that China's misfortunes were due less to military inefficiency than to diplomatic inexperience. But China's defeat by Japan, considered a third-rate power, was beyond expectation; the powers now realized how much they had over-rated China. With the loss of prestige came additional losses of territory. In order to pay off the Japanese war indemnity, which amounted to 230 million taels (over thirty million pounds), China was forced to have recourse to international loans.\(^{32}\) This meant the concession of the most important source of revenue to the Central Government, namely the maritime customs and the Peking Government was henceforth financially at the mercy of the British controlled Inspectorate-General of the

\(^{32}\) Ibid., 197.
More significant than the financial and territorial readjustments were, however, the social and economic consequences arising out of the Treaty of Simonoseki of April 17, 1895, which concluded the Sino-Japanese War. In Article 6 of the treaty it was stated, among other things, that:

Japanese subjects shall be free to engage in all kinds of manufacturing industries in all the open cities, towns and ports of China and shall be at liberty to import into China all kinds of machinery, paying only the stipulated duties thereon. All articles manufactured by Japanese subjects in China shall in respect of inland transit and internal taxes, duties, charges and exactions of all kinds and also in respect of warehousing and storage facilities in the interior of China, stand upon the same footing and enjoy the same privileges and exemptions as merchandise imported by Japanese subjects in China. 33

This provision, applicable, under the most favored nation clause, to all other powers in treaty relationship with China, became the foundation of a modern industrialized China. Although the first modern factory, namely, the cotton mill founded in 1890, was Chinese, it was not until British and Japanese spin-dles and looms were allowed to operate in the treaty ports that the factory method of production was, in fact, introduced into China. Gradually large scale production on western lines found among the Chinese treaty ports. The foreign capitalism disturbed the primitive native economy of China. The value of China's foreign trade increased from about three hundred fourteen million taels in 1895 to six hundred seventy four million taels in 1905. More marked even is the increase of the import figures, namely, from one hundred seventy one million

taels in 1895 to four hundred forty seven million taels in 1905. These figures do not merely indicate the tightening of the foreign grip over China, they are also a certain index of the growth of the Chinese capitalistic merchant class, the necessary intermediary between the Chinese masses and the big foreign import and export houses. The development of the industrial bourgeoisie did not, however, keep pace with the accumulation of the Chinese capital. At every point the natural development of the Chinese industry was, therefore, handicapped by the existence of the foreign privileges. About 1895, for instance, Chinese capitalists had eagerly taken to the building of silk filatures on modern lines, but already in 1902 about half the silk factories, which were Chinese owned, had to close down owing to the existence of privileged foreign competition. The Imperial government, corrupt and inefficient, took no interest in the development of the Chinese industry; nor did they wish to protect it against the international capitalism, which grew more and more insistent as the years went on. It was, therefore, not until the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty and the outbreak of the World War in 1914 which brought China a temporary relief from foreign pressure that the industrialization of China by Chinese capital could make real headway. But the very factors which retarded the growth of the Chinese industrial bourgeoisie were also responsible for the gradual awakening of the Chinese moneyed classes to the necessity of a fundamental change of the regime in China. This feeling was especially strong among


35 Ibid., 168.
the Chinese capitalists living abroad, who enjoyed a relative security of property. They were able to devote themselves to the accumulation of wealth. The failure of 1900 was due to the fact that Sun Yat-sen almost entirely relied on the assistance by the foreigners which was withdrawn at a critical moment. With the participation of the Chinese bourgeoisie abroad, the Chinese revolution acquired a solid material foundation.

The true solution of the Chinese question was the first exact definition of the revolutionary purpose. Its publication meant the formal recognition by the Chinese revolutionaries that the new social and political order in China could not be established by reorganizing the Manchu Dynasty, nor by the enthronement of a new dynasty of the native origin, but only by the foundation of a democratic Chinese republic and the reconstruction of the economic life of the people on a socialistic basis. In order to achieve the revolutionary ideal, the organization and consolidation of the revolutionary forces in both China and abroad was a first necessity. During his stay in Europe in 1905, Sun Yat-sen already founded a new political organization among the few scores of the revolutionary students in Brussels, Berlin and Paris. This new organization was the "Chung-kuo Kuo-ming Tung-meng Hui" or commonly known in English as the United Revolutionary Party of China. Its ideological basis was the San Min Chu I, or the Three Principles of the People which details will be discussed in my


"Chung-kuo means Chinese; Kuo-ming means People; Tung-meng means united; Hui means party or league."
These three principles were the principle of the racial struggle, the principle of the people's sovereignty, and the principle of the people's livelihood. To make this principle clear, Dr. Sun Yat-sen says:

The principle of the racial struggle must not be confused with the attitude of Xenophobia. It is based on the fundamental idea that a people must not permit a foreign race to rob them of their political independence. If the government of the country is in foreign hands it is as if we had no country; for although we Chinese have a country, it is no longer ours. Think, where is our independence? We constitute one quarter of the human races; we are the oldest and one of the most civilized people, and to-day we are slaves. Is that not extraordinary? We must overthrow the power of the Manchus as such. We hate no one save our oppressors and enemies. With these we cannot live in the same country. 37

Regarding the second principle, he continued:

It is not enough to be actuated by the spirit of narrow patriotism. The political revolution should aim at a constitutional democracy. Therefore, in the present position of the country, even if the Emperor were Chinese, we should not hesitate to make the revolution. In former times political changes resulted only in the substitution of one Emperor for another one. If we revolutionaries had only this aim before our eyes, China would be lost. Our country must not be considered as the property of any private individual. Moreover, at present foreigners are preying on China. More than ever is the establishment of a strong government necessary and this can only be the government of the whole people. 38

In explaining the third principle, that of livelihood, Dr. Sun adopts a frankly socialistic attitude. He began by destroying the common illusion that in America and Europe everyone was happy and rich. He says:

Commensurate with the growth of the economic power of the countries, is the growth of the misery of the people. In England, for instance, there are a few rich, but many poor people. This is because the human elements cannot resist the capitalistic forces. One cannot oppose the evolution

37 Sun Yat-sen, Sun Ming Chu I, Commercial Press, Shanghai, China, 1938, 72.

38 Ibid., 73.
of society. Industrial civilization had advantages and inconveniences, but the rich in Europe and America have monopolized the former, leaving to the poor the latter. Such a social condition is tending to develop in China, but if we know how to act preventively, the struggle against capitalism will be easier than in the West. 39

He went on to explain why the social question had arisen in Europe and found that it was because they had not paid attention to the agrarian problem.

One cannot allow society to develop like trees which grow in isolation. We want the national revolution of independence because we do not want a handful of Manchus to rule all China for their own advantage. We want the political revolution, because we do not want any one person to monopolize all political power. We want the social revolution because we do not want a handful of rich people to monopolize the whole wealth of the country. Failure in any one of these three aims means the failure of our mission. Only when all three aims are attained can the Chinese be proud of their country. 40

Sr. Sun's solution for China was the fixing of the values of land and the appropriation by the state of unearned increments, so as to effect an equitable distribution of land and income. Regarding the future government of the country, he warned his followers not to try to imitate blindly any existing constitution. He proposed the creation of two independent powers of government, control and examination, an addition to the executive, legislative and judiciary, so as to improve on all existing constitutional systems. He realized, however, that a constitutional democracy cannot be established without careful preparation, and thus proposed the three stages, of military government, of educative government and of constitutional government.

Most of the Dr Sun's followers agreed on the first principle, that of the restoration of Chinese sovereignty over China. The second and third

39 Ibid., 74.
40 Ibid., 76.
principles and the five-powers constitution were merely of academic interest which very few of them understood. In the first manifesto issued by the Tung meng Hui, it proclaimed the following six aims:

1. To overthrow the corrupt Manchu Dynasty.
2. To establish the Chinese Republic.
3. To maintain the peace of the world.
4. To effect the equitable re-distribution of land.
5. To establish an alliance between the peoples of China and Japan.
6. To ask all countries to support the work of reconstruction in China.

As the name implied, the League was a federation of different revolutionary organizations, namely, of the Hsing Chung Hui (the Association for the Regeneration of China, Dr. Sun's old party), the Hua Hsin Hui (the Association for the Modernization of China) and the Kuan Fu Hui (the Restoration Society). The first two had great influence among the secret societies; the Hsing Chung Hui in the two Kwang provinces in south China; the Hua Hsin Hui in Hunan province. They both aimed at the establishment of a democratic Chinese Republic. To distinguish a little bit, the Hua Hsin Hui had to do with the political problems; the Hsing Chung Hui, under Sun's influence, was concerned about the economic emancipation of the masses on a socialistic basis. The Kuan Fu Hui consisted purely of intellectuals. They had the same programme as the secret societies.

As a leader of this organization, Dr. Sun completely dominated the League. An oath, which must be taken by every candidate for membership, thus imposes a kind of discipline upon the members. It runs as follows:

I swear under Heaven that I will do my utmost to work for the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty, the restoration of Chinese sovereignty, the establishment of the Republic and the solution of the agrarian question.

on the basis of the equitable redistribution of the land. I solemnly undertake to be faithful to these principles. If ever I betray my trust, I am willing to submit to the severest penalties imaginable. 42

Secrecy is another feature of the league; the very formula of the oath must be kept secret. The headquarters of the league are at Tokyo. Branches are to be found every province of China. Periodically the head office receives from the branches reports, a prominent feature of which is the number and character of the members. The names of these members are known only to the branch organizers; they are withheld even from the head office, except of those on important missions. Members are only known by numbers, the membership cards containing only a number and the seal of the league. There is a distinction between the Chinese and overseas branches. The former are solely for action and insurrection, and hence candidates for membership are very carefully scrutinized. One person is held responsible for communications with other branches and with the head office. With the overseas branches secrecy is not so important; they are more in the nature of propaganda and money-collecting centers. The central organization of the league is held together and controlled by Sun Yat-sen, who occupies the office of president (Chung Li). Under him are three councils, the executive, legislative, and supervisory. The executive itself is divided into several departments, the most important of which are the secretariat and the treasury. The function of the legislative is to criticize executive action, initiate proposals and draft programmes. The supervisory council is to arbitrate in disputes between party members and give judgment. These councils meet

monthly, but emergency meetings are called whenever necessary.

The league's income may be divided into two categories. There were the regular monthly contributions, which, in the case of government students in Japan, amounted to three dollars per month, or about ten per cent of their income. Private students contributed less. The proletarian members in the foreign countries generally contributed ten silver cents a month. The bulk of the regular income was, however, derived from the rich merchant members overseas, who contributed anything from one hundred to five hundred dollars a month.\(^4\)

Speaking of its social composition, the most important elements in the league were the Chinese students in Japan, which country received them in ever increasing numbers after the Russo-Japanese War. On their return to China, these student members established party nuclei in several of the most important educational institutions. The league actually controlled an important section of China's younger generation. Those who graduated from military academies became officers in the Chinese army, which they gradually imbued with the revolutionary ideas. The second group in the league consisted of the overseas Chinese, consisting chiefly of the merchants, but also including many workers. They took little active part in the revolution, but contributed greatly to its finances.

The Min Pao (People's Journal), the most powerful propaganda machine of the League, was founded in January 1906 and edited by a board, consisting of the principal members namely Wang Ching-wei, Chang T'ai-yen, Chu Chih-hsin, and Hu Han-min. Wang Ching-wei, a Hsiau Te'ai (Prefectoral graduate or B.A.),

\(^4\) Ibid., 55.
was the chairman of the legislative council of the league, and the exponent of
the idea of the republican nationalism; Chang T'ai-yen was the famous Chinese
scholar who derived his revolutionary ideas exclusively from a study of the
Chinese classics; he had never had any contact with foreign thought nor had he
any knowledge of politics. He joined the league not because he believed in the
republican and democratic principles of Sun Yat-sen, but purely because of his
racial hatred against the Manchus who caused his imprisonment in 1903. The third
of the editors, Chu Chih-hsin, was responsible for the interpretation and ela-
boration of Sun Yat-sen's principle of the people's livelihood. Chu was the
first to introduce the Marxian method into Chinese social thought, and accor-
ding to him, the livelihood principle was akin to state socialism. Unfortunate-
ly, in 1906, he had to leave Tokyo for Canton in order to do active revolu-
tionary work. Another outstanding member of the league was Hu Han-min, a Chu-
jen (Provincial graduate or M.A.), of the old regime, who became the editor of
the Canton paper, Ling Hai Pao. In 1905 he was introduced to Sun Yat-sen and
became the head of the secretariat of the league. He subsequently joined the
board of the Min Pao for which he wrote a well-known series of articles on the
international law. The Min Pao became very popular among the students both in
Japan and in China. Among the other notable members of the league were Huang
Hsing, Liao Chung-kai, Wu Chih-hui, Ta'ai Yuan-pei, Li Shih-ts'eng and Chang
Chi. When Sun Yat-sen, in September 1905, arrived in Tokyo, Huang joined him
in the organization of the Tung Meng Hui, revolutionary party. Sun Yat-sen was
the oldest and most experienced of the revolutionaries, and became automatic-
ally the president of the league. Huang came next. He was elected the chief of
the executive council of the league. Huang's affiliation to the league meant the extension of the basis of the revolution from Kwangtung and Kwangsi to Hu-nan and Hupeh provinces where Huang occupied the same position as Sun in the first two provinces. Sun and Huang were the two most powerful men in the league who decided on every important affair, political and financial. Sun was the ideologist and organizer of the Revolution and the man of principles and vision. Huang was the practical man of action and a great soldier. The success of the Revolution of 1911 was due to their wholehearted co-operation.

Liao Chung-kai was the financial expert of the league. In 1903 he met Dr. Sun and on the foundation of the league, in 1905, he became the Chief of Miscellaneous Affairs under Huang Hsing, a department which dealt with the study of the political and military affairs.

Wu Chi-hui is of importance in that he later became the leader of the Chinese anarchists and the founder of the scientific school in China. His influence was especially noticeable after the success of the revolution. As a professor at the National University of Peking, he led the revolt of China's younger generation against the Manchu regime.

Between 1907 and 1909 some six insurrections were organized by the special committee in the provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Yunnan. All the members of the special committee took part personally in the insurrections. Dr. Sun took charge of the general direction at the headquarters in Hanoi, and Huang Hsing as the local director of operations. All these uprisings at Chao-Chou in Fukien province, Huishow in Kwangtung province, Hsin-lin-chou in Kwang- tung, Chen-nan-kuan in Kwangsi, Hokou in Yunnan, ended in defeat. From a
military point of view they were of little importance to the revolutionary cause. They were more in the nature of political demonstrations against the Manchu regime, and regarded as such, they were a great success. The number of active workers grew with every successive revolt, and the influence of the league increased steadily within the country in spite of all defeat. The effect of these military failures, however, was most unfavorable on the morale of the league members in Tokyo who gradually lost confidence in the ultimate victory of the revolutionary cause. The fact that with the departure of Dr. Sun, Huang Hsing, Wang Ching-wei and Hu-han-min from Tokyo, no one of sufficient standing was in charge of the headquarters, made it easy for the enemies of the revolution to utilize the prevailing depression and to create dissensions within the ranks of the revolutionaries. An intrigue developed in the autumn of 1907, under the leadership of Chang Tai-yen and Chang Chi, to oust Dr. Sun, who was then in Annan, from the presidency of the league. In a manifesto published in October 1907, Chang Tai-yen and Chang Chi repudiated Sun Yat-sen's leadership, charging him with unnecessarily and recklessly sacrificing valuable Chinese youths for an impossible aim. They also accused Dr. Sun of misappropriating for his personal use the funds subscribed by the overseas Chinese for the revolutionary purposes. Chang's activities had as a consequence a considerable curtailment of the activities of the league. Seeing dissensions within the league, the Manchu government redoubled its efforts against the revolutionaries and made negotiations with the Powers so as to restrict the revolutionary activities abroad. They induced, in the beginning of 1908, the Japanese government to

44 Ibid., 75.
suspend the publication of the Min Pao. This resulted in the closing down altogether of the head office of the league in Tokyo. The French government, who had so far adopted an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards the league (it recognized the revolutionaries as belligerents) was induced to expel the revolutionaries from the French possessions. Sun Yat-sen himself was the first to be asked to leave, after his defeat at Chen-nan-kuan. He left for the Straits, leaving the supreme command to Huang Hsing. But even in the Straits he could not move freely, and finding the revolutionary work in the countries bordering China impossible, Sun decided in 1910 once more to go on a world tour for the purpose of collecting funds for the Revolution.

After the defeat at Hokou in 1909, Wang Ching-wei had gone back to Japan to take charge of party affairs. He came to the conclusion that only some sensational action would restore the morale in the party. Some time before, he had written many letters to the comrades in the North complaining about their revolutionary inactive. The replies he usually received was that the revolutionary spirit had not yet caught on in the North. Wu Lu-chen, a member of the league, for instance, had risen to the rank of a division general, commanding six important towns in the North-West, but owing to the general situation he was condemned to inactivity. Later in 1905, at the railway station at Peking, Wu Yush threw a bomb at the members of a diplomatic mission which was headed by Duke Tsai Tao for the purpose of studying the foreign administrative systems. Four persons were killed and many wounded, including the Duke's sons. At Anking in Anhwei province, on July 6, 1907, Hsu Hsi-lin, the director of the police

45 Ibid., 75.
school, fired in cold blood three revolver shots at the Governor of Anhui province, who came to inspect the school, accompanied by his bodyguard. These events caused a certain emotion all over China, but they had no far-reaching effects. Their actors were not members of the league and their acts were also easily forgotten. But the case with Wang Ching-wei was different. He was a prominent party leader, the right hand of Sun Yat-sen, and on his head was a prize of fifty thousand dollars if dead, and hundred thousand dollars if alive. No one expected him to dare to enter China for the purpose of carrying out the terrorist act. At that time a small terrorist group was being organized by the members of the league in Japan, consisting of Fang Ch'un-ying, the chairman of the Department of Assassination; his wife Tseng Hsing; Miss Chen Pi-chun, the daughter of a rich Penang merchant; Li Chung-Hei; Huang Fu-sun; and Yu Yuen-chi, a student of pharmacy and the writer of a book on explosives. 46 This group had already departed for Canton, where they intended to make an attempt on the viceroy there, when Wang decided to join them. The attempted coup at Canton was not yet proceeded because of the advice of Chu Chih-hsin, the party director of Kwangtung, who told them that although the revolutionary units of Kwangtung had suffered defeat, they still had a sufficient reserve, and the assassination of the viceroy might upset his original plans. They decided to leave for Hankow but there came to the conclusion that a coup at Hankow would not create the same moral effect as it would at Peking, in the very stronghold of the Manchu Dynasty. Therefore, they again left Hankow leaving their explosive behind

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Returning to Japan, Wang Ching-wei started to resume the publication of the Min Pao. Only two issues had been published. In the first he wrote an article, "The Revolutionary Tide", in which he attacked the misrule of the Manchu government and the insincerity of their reform proposals, advising them to restore to the Chinese their national heritage if they wished to avoid a violent revolution. In the second he wrote on "The Case of the Revolution", pointing out the determination of the Chinese to solve the problem of national regeneration by the revolutionary methods.

It was not until the end of the year 1909 that the plan of assassination had been carefully carried out. The followings are the exact stories:

When everything was arranged, Miss Chen, Li Chung-Hai, Huang Fu-sun and Yu Yuen-chi left for Peking in December, 1909. Wang, having made sure of their arrival in Peking, left Tokyo in January 1910, taking with him the explosives and several copies of the Min Pao, all hidden inside the lining of his clothes. Tseng and Fang were left behind at Tokyo. Having safely arrived at Peking, he immediately went with Miss Chen in search of the Prince Regent, at whom he intended to throw the bombs which he carried with him. They had no chance, however, of coming anywhere near to him, as he always left his palace closely guarded, with the streets, through which he passed, closed. They decided to use an electro-bomb for the purpose, and intended to rent a house in Yentai Hu Tung, one of the thoroughfares utilized by the Prince Regent. From that house they could secretly place the bomb in the street, and blow up a considerable part of it. But this street was densely populated and would cause unnecessary bloodshed. Humanitarian considerations made them decide to choose Shih Cha Hai, a deserted street passing through a field with a bridge on a lake. They placed the bomb under the bridge, working for three nights to finish the work. On the third night, March 28, they waited for the Regent to pass. Unfortunately, at about three o'clock in the morning, one of the comrades touched a sleeping dog, which started barking.

47 Sun Yat-sen, Memoire of a Chinese Revolutionary, Shanghai, China, 1919, 86.
This incident caused other dogs who were sleeping in the neighborhood, to bark too. The police became alarmed, and inspected the whole neighborhood with the projecting lamps. The conspirators know that, owing to the barking of the dogs, the whole plan was frustrated for the moment, and there being no hiding place near by they ran away before it was too late.

The discovery of the plot took place in the early morning of the 28th of March, 1910. In the afternoon, Huang who was of a careless nature, went to Shih Cha Hai, to the bridge, to see what had happened with the dynamite, not realizing that by doing so he put himself under suspicion and gave the police, who of course put a watch on the place, some definite clues. Wang was immediately brought to the Central Police Station where at the preliminary examination he startled the inspector in charge by disclosing his real name at once. 48

Wang was to serve his life sentence. From April 16 to April 25 he was confined at the Central Police Station. Later he was removed to the Civil Prison. Being life prisoners, Wang and Huang were put in iron chains, with locks round their hands, feet and neck. They had no money to bribe the guards to remove these chains. Not until the outbreak of the Revolution in October 10, 1911 were these chains taken off from them. 49

In spite of its failure, Wang's attempted assassination of the Prince Regent was an event of extreme importance in Chinese revolutionary history. It had a great moral effect on the revolutionary comrades, reviving their revolutionary spirit. Huang Hsing went to Singapore to see Dr. Sun. He arrived there just in time, as Dr. Sun was about to leave for Europe, under order of deportation issued by the British government, in compliance with the request of the Manchu authorities. Huang Hsing was thus given full powers to lead the revolution in China, in Dr. Sun's absence and Hu Han-min was instructed to obey his

49 Ibid., 70.
orders. Together they then returned to Hongkong, where they established a Central Committee for Southern Affairs. Their plan was to capture Canton, proclaim a Revolutionary Government there and using Kwangtung as the revolutionary base, conquer the rest of China.  

The insurrection was to take place in the autumn of 1910, the sign for this was to be given by a regiment of the New Army stationed at Shaho. This regiment was under the command of Ni Ying-ting. Unfortunately, Ni was killed and thus the insurgent troops were left behind without a leader, and the attempt again ended in dismal failure. This was a great blow to the revolutionaries, who had staked everything on the success of this insurrection. The confusion arising out of this defeat was so great that Sun Yat-sen, who was then in America, decided to return immediately to China. In view of the constant defeat in Kwangtung, it was decided not to confine the revolutionary activity to the South, but also to intensify efforts in the Yangtze valley. Propagandists were sent to Hankow, Hanyang and Wuchang in Hupeh province for the purpose of causing dissatisfaction among the garrisons there, which consisted of newly recruited soldiers. Meanwhile, however, Huang Hsing and the other members of the committee were, after raising sixty thousand dollars from the Chinese in the Straits, to return to Hongkong to attempt once more the capture of Canton, while Sun Yat-sen was to tour around Malaya, Burma and Siam to collect the

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50 Records of Kwangtung Province, 1895-1911, Annual Reports Published by the Provincial Government of Kwangtung, China, 1911, 285.

51 Records of the City of Canton, 1908-1911, Published by the City Hall of Canton, 1911, 108.
additional funds. 52 But everywhere he was refused admittance, and so he had no way open but to leave again for America and Europe. On his arrival at Hongkong Huang Hsing at once mobilized the revolutionary forces. He and his some five hundred party members, the "dare-to-die" was determined to sacrifice their lives for the country. They were ready to attack on the viceroy's and admiral's Yamens, the Arsenal and the Police station. Besides them, there were outside the city the secret societies organized into the People's Army by Li Fu-lin and the regiments of the New Army in secret communication with Chao Po-hsien. These forces were to attack the different city gates of Canton, as soon as the signal was given; they were placed under the command of Yao Yu-pin, Chen Chiu-ming and Hu I-sheng, a brother of Hu Han-min. Meanwhile the munitions were smuggled into Canton from Japan, packed in medicine cases and transported to the different strategic points in Canton city in the form of parcel posts. After some delay it was decided to start the attack on March 28. On March 25, Huang Hsing arrived at Canton to take command of the operations. 53 Having discovered that all the arrangements had gone wrong, Huang Hsing on the night of the 26th sent a cable to Hu Han-min to inform Chao Po-hsien and all the comrades, some three hundred, who were going to leave Hongkong for Canton on the 27th, not to come over until further instructions. 54 In the 27th Hu I-sheng reported to Huang Hsing that the authorities had already sent out soldiers to guard the

52 Ibid., 112.
53 Ibid., 114.
54 Ibid., 114.
most important streets and proposed to postpone the plot altogether. Huang Hsing decided to keep to March 29th on the ground that if the plot was postponed, they would be betraying the trust placed in them by the overseas Chinese who had been financing the scheme. Nothing, however, could persuade Huang Hsing to change his mind, for he had already decided to sacrifice himself and had gathered around him some hundred party members who were equally determined to die for the country. Thus, they marched from their hiding place to the viceroy's yamen (office) and carried out one of the most remarkable and memorable events in Chinese revolutionary history. The March 29th Insurrection was the tenth defeat of the revolutionary party, yet it was a glorious failure. The heroic death of the seventy-two revolutionary martyrs in Wang Fah-kaing in Canton started a veritable revolutionary tide in China. 55

On October 9, 1911, a bomb in a revolutionary house in Wuchang exploded, forcing a band of the revolutionaries to stage a revolution in order to save their lives. Acting quickly, they captured the three cities, Hankow, Wuchang, Hanyang, in Hupsh province. 56 Li Yuan-hung was their chief military commander. Revolution had begun. The Manchus were not ready to meet the situation. There was little bloodshed and some fighting at Nanking, the burning of Hankow. It was not war between the contending sides. It was simply a series of unchecked local revolts. Each province in turn deserted the dynasty and aligned itself on the revolutionary side.

55 Ibid., 125.

The imperial authorities at Wuhan were utterly demoralized by the sudden outbreak of the revolution and on October 12, Hankow and Hanyang, with its important arsenal, fell to the revolutionary army of Li Yuan-hung. Huang Hsing who was then in Shanghai, at once instructed the party members all over China to take action and on October 20, arrived himself at Wuhan. From Wuhan the revolutionary fever spread all over China. Szechuan province declared its independence, followed by Hunan and Shensi province. In Shansi province, the troops assassinated their Governor and burnt the Manchu city of the capital Taiyuanfu and established a revolutionary provincial government under Yen Hsi-shan. (Shansi is one of the north-western provinces in China, rich in coal deposits.) In Canton the Manchu garrison commander was assassinated and an independent government was established under Hu Han-min. Tientsin in Chili (now called Hopeh province) and Tsianan in Shantung province also went revolutionary. Now the Empress Dowager realized that the great Manchu nobles would not be equal to the task of meeting the dynastic crisis and turned for the assistance to Yuan Shih-kai whom she had disgraced some three years ago. On October 14, Yuan was appointed viceroy of the Hupeh province, with the order to suppress the Wuhan revolt, but he refused to take up his post. On November 1, Yuan Shih-kai was charged with the formation of a cabinet himself. The Throne would abandon all actual authority of the government and delegate all power to the cabinet. The National Assembly, a phantom creation of Prince Ching since October, 1910, attempted to take the lead in popular opinion and demanded the

57 Ibid., 106.
Immediate establishment of a Constitutional Government. It drew up a constitution of nineteen articles which provided for all political power to be in the hands of the parliament, and even the succession and the Imperial household budget were to be under the cabinet and the parliamentary control.\textsuperscript{58} This constitution which left to the Throne only a nominal rule, was accepted by the Empress Dowager.

\textsuperscript{58} McCormick, F., \textit{The Flowery Republic}, London, 1913, 454.
CHAPTER III

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC

After the outbreak of the Wuhan insurrection the great majority of the provinces of China had declared themselves for the revolutionary cause. Only Honan and Chili were still faithful to the Manchu Dynasty. Yuan Shih-kai, although appointed Prime Minister was not yet to take his post. Not until on November 7, 1911, was there a sudden change. Yuan Shih-kai had accepted his command, and the army generals, such as Feng Kuo-chang and Tuan Chiu-n, who were reluctant to obey the Manchus were glad to receive orders from him. Yuan's first step was to get the absolute control of the Northern Army before dealing with the revolutionaries in the South. What Yuan actually wanted was a constitutional monarchy. While Sun and his fellows wanted a real republic. So to counteract Yuan's move in the North, Wang Ching-wei, just released from prison, organized the Peking and Tientsin branch of the league, of which he became the Chairman. It was decided to continue the propaganda in the Northern Army. Before Yuan Shih-kai took charge of the affairs, the military situation in the North was quite favorable to the revolutionaries, who could count on the support of two army divisions. With the assassination of Wu Lu-chen and the fresh promotion of Chang Chao-cheng, the revolutionaries were left with
practically no armed forces. Part of the troops who were formerly under Wu Lu-shen went westwards and took the province of Shanxi and Shensi on behalf of the revolutionary cause. The greater part of Chang Chao-cheng's forces decided to obey Yuan and only a small part went revolutionary and revolted; these were crushingly defeated. Under these circumstances, it was imperative to enlarge the revolutionary nuclei in the Northern Army by propaganda. With the view to impressing the public opinion in the North a terrorist group was organized for the purpose of doing away with the key supporters of the Manchu Dynasty. On the 16th of January, 1912, the revolutionaries made an attempt on Yuan Shih-kai, but they failed. As the result they were arrested and executed. Although the attempt was unsuccessful, it made a great impression on Yuan, who at last realized the strength of the league in the North, inducing him to make the compromise with the South. It was also decided to solicit the support of the constitutional monarchists who were being influenced by the league's slogan, "Don't Help the Manchus to Kill the Chinese." Wang Ching-wei discussed the matter with their leaders at Peking and proposed to them two points, the calling of an armistice and the convention of a popularly elected national assembly to decide on the form of the government. An alternative plan was found in entering into negotiations with Yuan Shih-kai with a view to inducing him to make a compromise with the revolutionary army in the South and to join the

2 Ibid., 195.
republican movement himself. It was realized that Yuan was essentially a tool of the Manchus. So the league also wanted to use him as their instrument. When the plan of arriving at a compromise with Yuan was decided upon, Yuan was still in Honan and it was not until November 15 that he came to Peking and took up his Premiership. On his assumption of the office, Yuan had only three provinces, Chihli, Honan and Shantung under his absolute control, but his military forces were far superior to those of the revolutionaries. He realized that to attempt to save the Dynasty by armed force would ultimately end in failure. In the meantime, he had also ambitions of his own, thus, he sent the representatives to Wuhan to negotiate for an armistice with the South Revolutionary Army for the terms of the settlement. The Wuhan committee under Li Yuan-hung, after consultation with Wang Ching-wei, insisted on the Republic and offered him the first Presidency if he would bring over the North to the Republican scheme. Yuan replied that he had only the authority to negotiate on the basis of a constitutional monarchy under the Ching Dynasty. Both sides were insistent and the negotiations broke down. Yuan at first was hesitant whether to support or to over-throw the Dynasty, but finally he decided on the former. He gave Feng Ku-chang the order to capture the other Wuhan cities, Hanyang and Wuchang, and proceeded himself to Peking to take up his new post. With Nanking under the control of the revolutionaries, Yuan was reluctant to carry on the campaign in the Wuhan area any longer. So on December 11, he again asked for an armistice and formally appointed Tang Shao-yi, the Foreign Minister in his Cabinet, as Chief of the Peace Delegation which was to conduct the negotiations at Shanghai.

3 Ibid., 203.
On his way to Shanghai, Tang called on Wang Ching-wei in Tientsin. Tang expressed his sympathy for the revolutionary cause. Tang also gave Wang an introduction to see Yuan Shih-kai in Peking. Yuan told Wang that he did not want to carry on the war any longer, but wanted a peaceful settlement. Wang Ching-wei eabled these conversations to Huang Heing at Nanking, who instructed him to go immediately to Shanghai, leaving party affairs in the North to others. He arrived at Shanghai on December 18, but proceeded at once to Nanking, where a national convention had already been formed, consisting of the delegates from the revolutionary provinces. Wang Ching-wei thereupon was added to the republican peace delegation which had already been formed under the chairmanship of Wu Ting-fang. This also included Wen Yung-yao, Wang Chung-hui, Niu Yung-chien, Wang Cheng-ting and Hu Ying. 

Tang Shao-yi's delegation arrived at Shanghai on December 17, and three days after the peace conference was formally opened. At the opening of the first session Wu Ting-fang stipulated that only abdication of the Emperor and the establishment of a Republic would satisfy the people and prevent any further bloodshed. Even the peace conference broke up at the beginning, but the war was actually at an end. For Yuan was concentrating his forces in the three provinces under his control and in Manchuria, in order to suppress any insurrections there. Being busy in the North he had no time to deal with the South. During all this time Sun Yat-sen was abroad. When the Wuchang Insurrection in October 1911 took place, Sun was in America. He decided, however, not to return to China for the time being, for he thought that the diplomatic

front was more important than the military action. What he wished was to bring all the western powers interested in China to the side of the Revolution. Sun not only wished to obtain the moral support from the Powers but also wished some financial aid as well. Among the nations, America and France were sympathetic with the Revolution. Germany and Russia were in favor of the Dynasty. Public opinion both in England and Japan, however, was favorable to the Revolution, but the attitude of the governments was dubious.

In the National Convention at Nanking, they attempted to form a Revolutionary Military Government. The Revolutionary delegates had decided to elect Huang Hsing as Generalissimo, and Li Yuan-hung as Vice-Generalissimo. In view of the disunity prevailing among the delegates, neither Huang nor Li took up their posts and for a long time it looked as if the whole attempt would end in failure. This would have been fatal to the Revolution.

Fortunately, the return of Sun Yat-sen saved the situation. On December 21, 1911, he arrived at Hongkong, where he was met by Hu Han-min who had meanwhile been elected Tung (Civil Governor) of Kwangtung by the Provincial Assembly. Accompanied by Hu Han-min, Sun at once went to Shanghai where he arrived on Christmas Day. Sun was welcomed by his party members, Huang Hsing, Wang Ching-wei, Chen Chi-mei, the conqueror of Shanghai. The National Convention had previously decided to settle the deadlock between Huang Hsing and Li Yuan-hung by the election of Sun Yat-sen to the Provincial Presidency of the

5 Ibid., 89.
sun was at last formally elected the Provisional President of the Republic of China on December 29, 1911. He assumed office at Nanking on the 13th day of the eleventh month, a date corresponding to January 1, 1912, which henceforth was declared to be the first day of the first month of the first year of the Republic. His Cabinet consisted of Huang Hsing, Minister of War; Wu Ting-fang, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Wang Chung-hui, Minister of Justice; Tsai Yuan-pei, Minister of Education; Chen Chin-tao as Minister of Finance; Chang Chien, former president of the Kiangsu Provincial Assembly, Minister of Commerce and Industries; Tang Shou-chien, Minister of the Interior; Hu Han-min resigned his tutuship of Kwangtung on the formation of the Provisional Government, and became Chief Secretary to the President. Wang Ching-wei was appointed President of the Tung Meng Hui, the revolutionary machine.

After taking his office at Nanking, Dr. Sun informed Yuan Shih-kai that he had assumed the Provisional Presidency of the Chinese Republic, but that he was ready to resign and propose Yuan as his successor, provided Yuan would agree to the Republic. The motives which led Sun to take this step were not for the reason that he felt himself powerless to oust Yuan from the North. Nanking at that time already controlled fifteen out of the eighteen provinces of China and it would not take the revolutionaries much longer to get the

6 Ibid., 91.

7 See the State Papers in McCormick’s The Flowery Republic, London, 1913, 460.
remaining three provinces. Yuan in the republican scheme would shorten the war, but he was not essential for the union between North and South. Furthermore, the revolutionary leaders decided that Yuan would be acceptable as the first President, previous to Sun's arrival in China. There was, however, a more fundamental reason why Sun wanted to give up the Presidency. The truth was that Sun, from the very beginning was not happy as President. In the first place, he felt that the majority of the party comrades, immediately victory was in sight, had forgotten the implications of their revolutionary oath, and were no longer willing to submit to his guidance. There was no central organization, no centralized command, no party discipline; the members also protested against the immediate application of the oath of allegiance. He felt that he was being made use of by careerists, and that it was impossible for him as President, to carry out his task of the revolutionary reconstruction. Already there was a serious dispute between him and the members of the deputation who were conveying the offer of the Presidency when he first arrived at Shanghai. Sun intended to maintain the system of a military government until such time as the whole of China was pacified and the reactionary elements rooted out. This was to be followed by a period of the educative government during which the Chinese people would first have local autonomy in the districts and subsequently in the provinces. After the majority of the provinces had attained the stage of constitutional government, a constitution for the whole republic would be promulgated. Sun's view was that China was not yet ripe to enter the Constitutional period of the Revolution. The Chinese people had been, from the very beginning, under the domination of an autocratic monarchy which had the effect of creating a
slave psychology and this could not be destroyed without first passing through a period of preparatory training. These ideas Sun derived from a study of the French Revolution in 1789, the failure of which he ascribed to the premature introduction of a democratic regime. He frequently discussed the principle of the three stages, but only Wang Ching-wei seemed to have understood its implications. But the rest of the members of the deputation, with the sole exception of Wang Ching-wei, wanted the constitutional stage to be proclaimed at once and the constitution providing for a Parliament promulgated as soon as possible.

The peace negotiations were still carried on after the formation of the provisional government at Nanking. It was directed between Wu Ting Fang and Yuan Shih-kai and also through Tang Shao-yi who was still at Shanghai as Yuan’s personal representative. Most of the southern peace delegates had accepted other posts; only Wang Ching-wei remained to assist Wu. Wang was pre-eminently the party representative who simultaneously with the conduct of the peace negotiations, prepared for insurrectionary action in the North upon which he intended to fall back should the negotiations break down again. Meanwhile there were disturbances developing inside the Yuan controlled provinces (the three northern provinces). An attempt was made on Yuan but it failed and Yuan took drastic action against the terrorists, but his morale was temporarily shaken. He was later presented with an ultimatum signed by forty-six Imperial commanders, headed by Tuan Chi-jui and Peng Kuo-chang, stating that they would no longer oppose the advance of the Republican troops. Thus he accepted, nominally at

least, Sun Yat-sen's offer of the Presidency of the Republic, including the stipulations that Yuan should assume the Presidency at Nanking which would henceforth become the capital of the Republic and that the abdication of the dynasty should be unconditional and without delegation of power.

After a long discussion between the Manchu representatives and Yuan, the abdication edicts were finally issued on February 12, 1912. To the surprise of Dr. Sun, the Manchu Dynasty this time, instead of maintaining her former insistence, decided in favor of the Republic in China and the Throne ordered Yuan to organize with full powers a provisional Republican Government and to confer with the Republican Army as to the methods of union, thus assuring peace to the people and tranquility to the Empire, and forming the one great Republic of China. Sun Yat-sen immediately cabled to Yuan to the effect that the Republican Government cannot be organized by any authority conferred by the Ching Emperor. Any such presumption will certainly lead to trouble. "You are urged to repudiate the Imperial authority."

Yuan realized that he had gone too far, and wired back: "The republican form of government is the best, as admitted by all the world. The goal at which you gentlemen have been aiming through years of thoughtful labor has now been reached. You should assuredly gain a position of the highest satisfaction and never permit a monarchical government to regain a foothold in China. As the formation of a union is of great consequence, I earnestly wish to come southward to listen to your advice and to plan with you."

With this telegram from Yuan, Dr. Sun sent his resignation to the National Convention, recommending Yuan as his successor. On February 15, Yuan was elected Provisional President with the stipulation that Sun Yat-sen and his Cabinet should continue in the office until Yuan's inauguration which was to take place at Nanking. Accompanied by Tang Shao-yi, a delegation under Tsai

Yuan-pai went to Peking to fetch Yuan Shih-kai. On March 7, the Nanking government formally agreed, and on March 10, Yuan took the oath of office as Provisional President of the Republic. On April 1, 1912, Sun Yat-sen surrendered the seal of the Republic to Tang Shao-yi, appointed as Prime Minister by Yuan Shih-kai. On March 10, the National Assembly promulgated the Provisional Constitution of the Republic and adjourned to meet again in Peking on April 29. Thus, after a long struggle between South and North, the Republic of China had finally become a reality.

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CHAPTER IV

THE NATIONAL PROGRAMME OF DR. SUN YAT-SEN

San Min Chu I

(The Three Principles of the People)

San Min Chu I, the Three Principles of the People as expounded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen are based on three fundamental principles: Min-chu, people's independence, that is, nationalism; Min-chuan, people's sovereignty, that is democracy; Min-sheng, people's livelihood, that is, socialism. Nationalism aims at the liberation of China from foreign domination; democracy places emphasis on the sovereignty of the people and livelihood provides economic security for all.

The principles of President Abraham Lincoln of United States completely coincide with Dr. Sun's teachings, in favoring a government of the people, by the people and for the people. These principles have served as the maximum of achievement for the Europeans as well as the Americans.

It is proper to discuss these principles in such an order that understanding of one is essential to the understanding of the subsequent principles. So we shall now discuss Nationalism first.

What meaning do we impart to the word "nationalism"? With the establishment of the Manchu Dynasty in China, the people remained under an incredible yoke for two hundred years. Now that dynasty has been overthrown and the
people, it would seem, ought to enjoy complete freedom. But the Chinese still did not enjoy all the blessings of liberty. The reason is found in the fact that only the negative aspect of the revolutions has been successfully carried out but not the positive aspect. After the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of the republican system in the territory populated by the five nationalities: Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Tartars, and Tibetans, a vast number the reactionary and the religious elements appeared. And here lies the root of the evil. Numerically, these nationalities stand as follows: there are several million Tibetans, less than a million Mongols, about ten million Tartars and the most insignificant number of Manchus. Politically their distributions are as follows: Manchuria is in the sphere of Japanese influence, Mongolia is under the influence of Russia and Tibet is the booty of Great Britain. These races have not sufficient strength for self-defence, but they might unite with the Chinese to form a single state. It is Dr. Sun's objective to establish a united Chinese Republic in which all the peoples—Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, Tartars and Chinese—should constitute a single powerful nation. As an example he referred to the people of the United States of America, constituting one great whole, but in reality consisting of many separate nationalities: Irish, Germans, Dutch, English, French, etc. The United States are an example of a united nation.

For specific examples of nationalism, Dr. Sun mentioned Switzerland in his speech, of March 6th, 1912, at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in Canton:

Or take another case of a nation of mingled races, Switzerland. It is situated in the heart of Europe, on one side it borders on France, on
Germany the other side, on a third, Italy. Not all the parts of this state have a common tongue, yet they constitute one nations. And only the wise cultural and the political life of Switzerland makes its people of many races united and strong. All this is the consequence of the citizens of this Republic enjoying equal and direct electoral rights. Regarding this country from the aspect of the international policy, we see that it was the first to establish equal and direct electoral rights for all the populations. This is an example of nationalism.

Even though the task of uniting all the tribes inhabiting China has been completed still the object of nationalism has not been achieved. There still many peoples suffering from unjust treatment. The Chinese people must assume the responsibility of liberating the people from their yoke, in the sense of direct aid for them or uniting them under the banner of a single Chinese nation. This would give them the opportunity to enjoy the feeling of equality between man and man and of a just international attitude, that is that which was expressed in the declaration of the American President Wilson by the words "self-determination of nations." Everyone who wishes to join China must be considered Chinese. This is the real meaning of nationalism.

Having understood the meaning of nationalism, we should now focus our attention to the principle of nationalism itself. Retrospecting the history of China's social life and customs, we may describe that the principle of Nationalism is equivalent to the "doctrine of the state." The Chinese people have shown the greatest loyalty to the family and the clan with the result that in China there have been family-ism and clan-ism but no real nationalism. The family and the clan have been powerful unifying forces; again and again Chinese

have sacrificed themselves, their families, their lives in defence of their clan. But for the nation there has never been an instance of the supreme spirit of sacrifice. The unity of the Chinese people has stopped short at the clan and has not extended to the nation.2

In bringing out the contrast between the Chinese and western concept of nationalism, Dr. Sun stated as follows:

My statement that the principle of nationality is equivalent to the doctrine of the state is applicable in China but not in the West. The foreigners make a distinction between the nation and the state. The English word for "Min-tsu" is "nation"; the word nation has two meanings, they are very distinct and must not be confused. Nation and state are, of course, very closely related, and no separation seems necessary; but there is a clear line between them and we must distinguish carefully between the state and the nation. But when I say that the nation is equivalent to the state, why is this true only of China? For the reason that China since the Chin and Han dynasties, has been developing a single state out of a single race, while the foreign countries have developed many states from one race and have included many nationalities within one state. For example, England now, the world's most powerful state, has, upon the foundation of the white race, added brown, black, and other races to form the British Empire; hence, to say that the race or nation is the state is not true of England. Or, look at India, now British territory; within this British state are three hundred fifty million Indian people. If we say that the British state of India means the British nation, we are off the track. We all know that the original stock of England was the Anglo-Saxon race, but it is not limited to England. The United States, too, has a large portion of such race. So in regard to other countries we cannot say that the race and the state are identical; there is a definite line between them. How shall we distinguish clearly between the two? The most suitable method is by a study of the forces which moulded each. In simple terms, the race or the nationality has developed through natural forces, while the state has developed through the force of arms. To use an illustration from China's political history: Chinese say that the Wang-tao, (Wang means King or kingly; Tao means way) royal way or way of right followed nature; in other words, natural force was the royal way.

The group moulded by the royal way is the race, the nationality. Armed force is the Pa-tao, (Pa means armed; tao means way) or the way of might; the group formed by the way of might is the state. 3

Considering the law of survival of ancient and modern races, if Chinese want save and to preserve their race, they must certainly promote nationalism. The Chinese race totals four hundred million people; of mingled races there are only a few million Mongolians, a million or so Manchus, a few million Tibetans, and over a million Mohammedan Turks. These alien races do not number altogether more than ten million, so that, for the most part the Chinese people are of the Han or Chinese race with common blood, common language, common religion, and common customs, a single, pure race.

What is the standing of China in the world? In comparison with other nations, China has the greatest population and the oldest culture, or four thousand years' duration. Yet she is the poorest and weakest state in the world occupying the lowest position in international affairs. Her position now is therefore extremely perilous. In seeing that, Dr. Sun especially warned the Chinese:

If we do not earnestly promote nationalism and weld together our four hundred million into a strong nation, we face a tragedy, the loss of our country and the destruction of our race. Toward off this danger, we must espouse nationalism and employ the national spirit to save the country. Nationalism is that precious possession which enables a state to aspire to progress and a nation to perpetuate its existence. 4

In explaining how the Chinese lost her nationalism, Dr. Sun illustrated us with an interesting story:

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3 Sun Yat-sen, Sun Min Chu I, Translated Ed. by F.W. Price, Chung-king, China, 1943, lecture I, 5-10.

4 Ibid., 55.
It is an incident which I personally witnessed in Hongkong. There was a coolie who worked daily at the steamer jetties carrying passengers' baggage with his bamboo pole and two ropes. Each day's load was his means of livelihood for that day, but he finally managed to save more than ten dollars. The Luzon lotteries were flourishing at that time and this coolie used his savings to buy a Luzon lottery ticket. He had no home and no place to keep his things or the lottery ticket which he had bought. All his tool of trade was his bamboo pole and two ropes which he carried about with him everywhere he went. So he hid the lottery ticket inside his bamboo pole, and since he could not always be pulling out the ticket to be looking at it, he fixed the number indelibly on his mind and thought about it all the time. When the day for the drawing came, he went to the lottery shop to match this number, and as soon as he saw the list of numbers he knew that he had won first prize, acquiring a wealth of 100,000 dollars. He was in ecstasy, almost insane with joy. Thinking that he would no longer have to be a coolie and use his bamboo pole and ropes, that he would be a rich man forever, he gleefully took the pole and ropes and threw them into the sea. The collie's bamboo pole may represent nationalism, a means of existence; the winning of the first prize may represent the time when China's flourishing imperialism was evolving into cosmopolitanism and when our forefathers, believing that China was the world's great state that "Heaven has but one sun, people but one king"; that "gentry of all nations bow before the crown and pearls"; that universal peace would henceforth prevail and that the only thing necessary was a world harmony in which the world would bring its tribute to China; threw away nationalism as the coolie threw his bamboo pole into the sea. Then, when China was overcome by the Manchus, she not only failed to become the master of the world, but even failed to keep her small family property intact. The national spirit of the people was destroyed, just as the bamboo pole was thrown into the sea.

Dr. Sun believed that the people of the world were divided into two classes, the twelve hundred fifty million and the two hundred fifty million; the twelve hundred fifty million are being oppressed by the two hundred fifty million, and the oppressors are moving not in harmony with but in defiance of nature. Only when we resist Might are we moving with Nature. To resist Might, Dr. Sun urged that China should unite her four hundred million and join the

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5 Ibid., 72-73.
other twelve hundred fifty million of the world. In the meantime we should consider others and help the weaker, smaller people to unite in a common struggle against the two hundred fifty million. Together we shall use Right to fight Might, and when Might is overthrown and the selfishly ambitious individuals have disappeared, then we may talk about cosmopolitanism.

Speaking of cosmopolitanism, Dr. Sun quite disagreed with that of the European concept. He said that the cosmopolitanism which Europeans are talking about today is really a principle supported by force without justice. The English expression "migh is right" means that fighting for acquisition is just. The Chinese mind has never regarded acquisition by war as right; it considers aggressive warfare barbarous. This pacifist morality is the true spirit of cosmopolitanism.

In order to revive the nationalism, there are two ways as proposed by Dr. Sun. The first is by awakening the four hundred million Chinese to see where we stand. We are at a crisis when we must escape misery and seek happiness, escape death and find life. China formerly did not know that she was in decline and so perished; if she had seen ahead, she might not have perished.

What are the disasters which threaten us Chinese and from what direction do they come? They come from the Great Powers, and they are: first political oppression; second, economic oppression; and third, the more rapid growth of population among the Powers. These three disasters from without are already upon our heads, and our people are in a most dangerous situation. The first


7 Ibid., 100.
disaster, the destruction of the nation by political force, may happen in a
day. China, now under the political yoke of the Powers, may go to smash at any
moment. There are two ways in which political force can destroy a nation:
through military power and through diplomacy.

In his fifth lecture delivered in Canton, 1924, Dr. Sun gave a clear
explanation for these three disasters:

The first disaster, the destruction of the nation by political force may
happen any time in our country. The strength of the various nations in
China has become a balance of power which makes it possible for China to
still exist. There are some people in China who cherish foolish and exag-
gerated notions that the Great Powers, since they are now mutually jealous
over their rights in China, will always be equally balanced in power and
not united, and that as long as this is true, China needs not exert her-
self to resist and will not come to ruin. Isn't this sort of dependence
on others rather than upon oneself just "gazing at heaven and casting
lots"? As divination is unreliable, so this silly optimism about China
will bring us nothing in the end. 9

The second disaster is the foreign economic domination. Every year we are
robbed by the foreigners of twelve hundred million dollars, and the loss
is increasing each day. The balance of trade ten years ago was two hundred
million dollars; now it is five hundred hundred million dollars; at this
rate of increase, 250 per cent every ten years, another decade will find
us losing three thousand million dollars a year; divided among our four
hundred million people, and annual amount of 7.50 dollars per head. This
means that every one of us Chinese will be paying 7.50 dollars a year to
the foreign countries; in other words, a head of 7.50 dollars.

Do you say this is a frightening prospect or not? And this head tax will
increase, not decrease. So as I see it, if we still do not awake but go
on in the way we have been going, even though the foreign diplomatists
should sleep on their job, our nation would be ruined in ten years. To-day
our people are poor and our resources are exhausted; what the poverty of
the people will be in ten years hence can only be imagined. When our load
of debt is two and a half times what it is to-day, do you think that our
China can survive? 10

8 Ibid., 103.


10 Ibid., 110.
Then there is a third disaster which threatens us. The population of China has not increased during the past hundred years, and it will hardly increase during the next hundred years unless we find some way to stimulate the growth. In the last century the United States has grown tenfold; Russia, fourfold; England and Japan, threefold; Germany, two and a half fold; and France, least of all, has, however, added one fourth to her population. While their populations are daily growing, ours is at a standstill, or, what is worse, is becoming smaller. 11

Foreigners are constantly saying that the Chinese are a "sheet of loose sand"; in the matter of national sentiment it is true. We have never had national unity. Have we had any other kind of unity? But China has had exceedingly compact family and clan groups and the family and clan sentiment of the Chinese is very deep-rooted. 12

So the fundamental way to save China from her imminent destruction is for us to attain unity. If three or four hundred clan groups will take thought for the state, there will be a way out for us and, no matter what nation we face, we will be able to resist. There are two ways of resisting a foreign power, suggested by Dr. Sun. The first is the positive way--arousing the national spirit, seeking solutions for the problems of democracy and livelihood, struggling against the power. The second way is the negative way--non-co-operation and passive resistance whereby foreign imperialistic activity is weakened, the national standing is defended, and national destruction is averted.

In his last lecture on the principle of nationalism, Dr. Sun said:

If we want to be able to reach this ideal in the future, we must now revive our national spirit, recover our national standing, unify the world upon the foundation of our ancient morality and love of peace, and bring about a universal rule of equality and fraternity. 13

11 Ibid., 111.
12 Ibid., 113.
13 Ibid., 148.
What is the people's sovereignty? In order to define this term let us first define what a "people" is. Any unified and organized body of men is called a "people". What is "sovereignty"? It is power and authority extended to the area of the state. The states with the greatest power today are called in Chinese, "strong states," in foreign languages the "powers." The power to execute orders and to regulate public conduct is called "sovereignty", and when "people" and "sovereignty" are linked together, we have the political power of the people.

Generally speaking, government is a thing of the people and by the people; it is control of the affairs of all the people. The power of control is political sovereignty, and where the people control the government we speak of the "people's sovereignty."

The struggle of the human race, Dr. Sun said, may be divided into several periods. This division into periods will help us in studying the origins of democracy. The first period was one of the struggle between man and the beast in which man employed physical strength rather than any kind of power; in the second period, man fought with nature and called divine power to his aid; in the third period, men came into conflict with men, states with states, races with races, and autocratic power was the chief weapon. 14 We are now in the fourth period, of war within states, when the peoples are battling against their monarchs and kings. The issue now is between good and evil, between right and might, and as the power of the people is steadily increasing we may call this the age of the people's sovereignty—the age of democracy. 15

14 Ibid., 154. 15 Ibid.
Is China today ripe for democracy? There are some who say that the standards of the Chinese people are too low and that they are not ready for popular government. Dr. Sun said that if we are going to advocate democracy for China, we should understand very clearly what it means. 16

Back a thousand years ago men like Confucius and Mencius already spoke for people's rights. Confucius said, "When the Great Doctrine prevails, all under heaven will work for the common good." He was pleading for a free and fraternal world in which the people would rule. Besides, he gave us a very famous proverb: "Within the four seas, we are all brother," which implies the democratic ideas. Mencius said, "Most precious are the people; next come the spirits of land and grain; and last, the princes." Again: "Heaven sees as the people see, Heaven hears as the people hear." 17

Thus China more than two thousand years ago had already conceived the idea of democracy, but at that time she could not put it into operation. Democracy was then what the foreigners call a Utopia, an ideal which could not be immediately realized. 18

As the revolutionary ferment of the West has lately spread to China, the new students and many earnest scholars have risen up to proclaim liberty. They think that because European revolutions, like the French Revolution, were struggles for liberty, we, too, should fight for liberty. This is nothing but "saying what others say". They have not applied their minds to the study of

17 Ibid., 69.
18 Ibid., 72.
To give the real meaning of our revolutions, Dr. Sun said as follows:

There is a deep significance in the proposal of our Revolutionary Party that the Three Principles of the People, rather than the struggle for liberty, should be the basis of our revolution. The watchword of the French Revolution was "Liberty"; the watchword of the American Revolution was "Independence"; the watchword of our Revolution is the "Three Principles of the People." We spent much time and effort before we decided upon our watchword; we are merely imitating others...

Min-chuan, the People's Sovereignty, is the second part of our revolutionary watchword and corresponds to equality in the French watchword. Our Revolutionary Party advocates a struggle, not for liberty and equality, but for the Three Principles of the People. If we can put these Three Principles into practice, we will have liberty and equality. True liberty and equality stand upon democracy and are dependent upon Democracy. Only where democracy flourishes can liberty and equality permanently survive; there is no way to preserve them if the sovereignty of the people is lost. So the Revolutionary Party of China, in its inception, took liberty and equality as aims in its struggle but made Democracy—the sovereignty of the people—its principle and watchword...

Only if we achieve democracy can our people have the reality and enjoy the blessings of freedom and liberty. They are embraced in our principle of people's sovereignty...

Dr. Sun warned us not to follow others blindly. When we launched our revolution, we advocated the practice of democracy; the method which he had thought of is a new discovery in political theory and is a fundamental solution of the whole problem.

As to the classes of the human society, Dr. Sun divided them by means of the individual's natural intelligence and ability. He classified mankind into three groups. The first group are those who see and perceive first; they are the people of superior wisdom who take one look at a thing and see numerous principles involved, who hear one word and immediately perform great deeds, whose insight into the future and whose many achievements make the world

19 Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I, Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1927, 201.
advance and give mankind its civilization. These men of vision and foresight are the creators, the discoverers of mankind. The second group includes those who see and perceive later; their intelligence and ability are below the standard of the first group. They cannot create or discover but can only follow and imitate, learning from what the first group have already done. The third group are those who do not see or perceive; they have a still lower grade of intelligence and ability and do not understand even though one tries to teach them; they simply act. In the language of political movements, the first group are the discoverers; the second group, the promoters; the third group, the operators.

Dr. Sun believed that the progress of the world depends on these three types, and not one type must be lacking. He said:

The nations of the world, as they begin to apply democracy and to reform the government, should give a part to every man—to the man who sees first, to the man who sees later, to the man who does not see. We must realize that political democracy is not given to us by nature; it is created by human effort. We must create democracy and then give it to the people, not wait to give it until the people fight for it.

He further suggested us the ways of applying democracy. First, there is the suffrage and it is the only method on operation throughout the so-called modern democracies. The second is the power of recall. With this power, the people can pull the machine back. These two rights, the right to elect and the right to recall, give the people control over their officials and enable them to put all government officials in their positions or to move them out of their

20 Ibid., 296.

21 Ibid., 298.
positions. If all the people think that a certain law would be of great advantage to them, they should have the power to decide upon this law and turn it over to the government for execution. This kind of power is called the initiative. If everybody thinks that an old law is not beneficial to the people, they should have the power to amend it and to ask the government to revise law and do away with the old law. This is called the referendum and is a fourth form of sovereignty. Only when the people have these four powers can we say that there is a full measure of democracy, as Dr. Sun says:

For direct control of the government it is necessary that the people practice these four forms of popular sovereignty. Only then can we speak of government by all the people. This means that our four hundred millions shall be king, exerting their kingly authority and controlling the great affairs of state by means of the four powers of the people. 22

Ming Sheng Chu I is the principle of the People's Livelihood. Ming-sheng denotes the livelihood of the people, the existence of the society, the welfare of the nation, the life of the masses. The principle of livelihood is socialism. The rapid progress of material civilization all over the world, the great development of the industry and the sudden increase in the productive power of the human race—all these are briefly the main factors that have given rise to the problem of livelihood.

In using the term "Principle of Livelihood" instead of "Socialism", Dr. Sun's main purpose is to strike at the root of the social problem and to reveal its real nature, also to make it possible for the people to understand the term as soon as they hear it.

22 Ibid., 301.
Is the principle of livelihood really different from socialism?

Dr. Sun said:

Socialism deals primarily with the economic problems of the society; that is, the common problem of living. Since the introduction of machinery, a large number of people have had their works taken away from them and workers generally have been unable to maintain their existence. Socialism arose as an effort to solve the problem of livelihood, and thus the social question is also the economic question, and so we come to the principle of livelihood which is the main theme of socialism. But now every country's socialism has different theories and different proposals for social reconstruction. 23

Dr. Sun proposed two methods by which the principle of livelihood is to be carried out. The first method is equalization of landownership and the second is regulation of capital. If we follow these two methods we can solve the problem of livelihood in China. The different countries of the world, because of varying conditions and varying degrees of capitalistic development, must necessarily follow the different methods in dealing with the livelihood problem.

Dr. Sun further made distinction between communism and the Min-sheng (livelihood) in this way; communism is an ideal of livelihood, while the Min-sheng principles are practical communism. Their difference lies in the method by which they are applied. The aim of Min-sheng principle is to equalize the financial resources in the society. Our first step is the solution of the land problem. If the land problem can be solved, one half of the problem of livelihood will be solved. The capitalists in China with the largest incomes are still landowners, not machine owners. So it should be very easy for us now to equalize landownership, to regulate capital, and to find a way out of the land problem.

23 Ibid., 372-373.
problem. China has been a farming nation. Agriculture has been the great industry for the production of food. Since the production of food in China depends upon the peasants, and since the peasants have to toil so bitterly, the government should have a certain kind of regulations by law for the protection of peasants in order to increase the production of food. Although China does not have great landowners, yet nine out of ten farmers do not own their own fields. Most of the farming land is in the possession of landlords who do not do the cultivating themselves. It seems only right that the farmer should till his farm for himself and claim its products, yet the farmers today are tilling for others and over half of the agricultural products from the farms are taken by the landlords. In facing this grave situation, Dr. Sun urged that we must immediately use government and law to remedy it.

In dealing with the agricultural production, Dr. Sun proposed not only the question of liberating the peasants but also the methods of increasing production. Briefly, these methods are: use of machinery, use of fertilizer, rotation of crops, eradication of pests, manufacturing, transportation, and prevention of natural disasters.

Next important of the questions of production is the question of distribution. Equitable methods of distribution are impossible under a system of private capital, for under such a system all production heads toward one goal, that is profit. If we want to carry out the Min-sheng principle we must give thought to methods of distribution—methods which will aim not at profit, but at supplying the people with food.

24 Ibid., 457.
As to the relationship between the people and state, Dr. Sun explained as follows:

The people have very definite obligations: the farmer must produce food, the industrial worker must manufacture tools, the businessman must hold the balance between supply and demand, the scholar must devote his intelligence and ability—every man must fulfill his duty. Then all will be supplied with the four necessities of life. Three principles of the people—government of the people, by the people, and for the people—that is a state belonging to all the people, a government controlled by all the people, and the rights and benefits for the enjoyment of all the people. If this is true, the people will not only have a share in state production, but they will have a share in everything. When the people share everything in the state, then shall we truly reach the goal of the Min-sheng principle, which is Confucius' hope of a "great commonwealth." 25

As we know that at the present the Western powers are all treating China as a colonial market and are holding China's sovereign rights and her finances in their hands. We cannot find a solution for the problem of livelihood in the economic field alone; Dr. Sun therefore urged us that we must first take hold on the political side, abolish all unequal treaties, and take back the customs out of foreign control. Then we can freely increase the tariff and put into effect a protective policy. Such a policy will prevent the foreign goods from pouring into China, and our home industries will naturally be able to develop. 26

26 Ibid., 481.
The principles of the Kuomintang are no other than the Three Principles of the People. Our platform is based on these principles, and Dr. Sun firmly believed that there is no other way of saving the country. Every step of national revolution should be guided by these fundamental principles.

There are two aspects to this principle—namely, self-emancipation of the Chinese nation and equality of all races within Chinese territory. The principle of nationalism seeks to make China a free and independent nation. Before 1911 this principle was directed against the dictatorship of the Manchus and the foreign power's policy of partitioning China. After the Manchus had been overthrown, the "divide and govern" policy of the Powers was supplanted by one of international control. The militarists conspired with the imperialists and the capitalists, and since the condition of China was going from bad to worse, the Kuomintang members could not but continue to struggle for the emancipation of the Chinese race. In his Manifesto of the First National Congress, on January 30th, 1924, Dr. Sun said as follows:

In order to demonstrate that nationalism is able to suppress imperialism, we ought to assist in the organization of the masses and development of their ability. When the Kuomintang and the people are united, real freedom and independence for the Chinese race may then be achieved. The government of China after 1911 being still in the hands of the militarists, the different races within the country began to entertain doubts regarding the sincerity of the Kuomintang policies. From now on we must try to

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27 Ibid., 508.
28 Ibid., 509.
* See Appendix IV.
secure the sympathy of these races, and explain their common interest in the success of the national revolutionary movement. The Kuomintang solemnly declares that it recognizes the right of self-determination of all races within the country; and that after the completion of the national revolution a free and united Republic of China, based on the voluntary union of all races, will be established. 29

We have known in our previous chapters that the principle of the people's livelihood contains two fundamental aspects—equalization of land and regulation of capital. Since China is an agricultural country, and the peasants are the class that has suffered most, Dr. Sun declared that the Kuomintang should stand for the policy that those peasants owning no land should be given land by the State for cultivation. The State shall also undertake to irrigate and develop the waste land so as to increase the capacity of productivity. Therefore the success of the national revolution depends upon the participation of the peasants and the laborers of the whole country.

In the First National Congress, held on January 30th, 1924, Dr. Sun had carefully worked out detailed programme of the Kuomintang, in which he classified its policy into two main categories, namely External and Internal. 30

The reconstruction programme will be divided into three periods: 1. the period of military dictatorship; 2. the period of political tutelage; and 3. the period of constitutional government.

During the period of military dictatorship, all political machinery will be placed under the direct control of the military government. The Government, in order to bring about national unification, will, on the one hand, overcome internal discord by military force; and on the other hand, endeavour

29 State Papers of Republic of China, Nanking, China, 1924.
30 See Appendix. V.
to wake up the people through effective propaganda. During the period of political tutelage, the government will send to different Hsien, or district qualified experts who have passed satisfactorily the required civil service examinations to assist the people of the different Hsien in organizing the local self-government. When all the Hsien in a province have evolved a working self-government, then the provinces are to pass into the period of the constitutional government. The representatives' assembly will elect a provincial governor to supervise the provincial self-government. In matters within the sphere of the national administration, the governor will receive orders from the central government. At the outset of the constitutional government, the central government will establish five separate departments to administer the five political functions: namely, the Executive Department, the Judicial Department, the Examining Department, and the Board of Control. The drafting of the constitution will be based on the national reconstruction programme and on the actual experience during the period of political tutelage and the period of constitutional government. The constitution will be drafted by the Legislative Department and will, from time to time, be made known to the people so as to prepare them for its final adoption.

When the majority of the provinces in the country have reached the period of constitutional government, a People's Conference will be held to consider promulgate, and adopt the constitution. The promulgation of the national

31 Hsien, a country; there are 1,469 hsien in the Republic of China.
33 Ibid.
constitution will end the third period, that is, the period of constitutional government. A national general election will be held in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. This will be the successful completion of the programme of national reconstruction.  

To summarize the rules adopted by the First National Congress, 1924, they are as follows:

1. All persons who are willing to subscribe to the principles of the Party to strive to carry out its decisions, to obey its rules and regulations upon application and with the consent of the Party, without distinction of sex, become members of the Party.

2. The party shall consist of two kinds of members, regular and preparatory. (a) Regular members: any person, who is over twenty years of age and has been a preparatory member of the Party for at least one year shall, after being recommended by the sub-precinct party organization, examined and would qualified by the precinct executive committee, verified by the district or city executive committee, and approved by the provincial executive committee, be admitted to regular membership.  
(b) Preparatory members: any persons over sixteen years of age, who has made application in due form, has been recommended by two regular members of the Party, and has been approved at a meeting of the sub-precinct party organization, shall, after examination by the precinct executive committee, and approved by the district or city executive committee, be admitted to preparatory membership.

3. Every member of the party shall strictly observe the following discipline:
   a. to obey the constitution and regulations of the Party and to accept its principles;
   b. to discuss Party problems freely; but, when a resolution shall have been adopted, to give it unconditional obedience;
   c. to keep Party secrets strictly;
   d. to make no attack upon a fellow member of the Party or upon a Party organization outside the organization;
   e. to abstain from joining any other political party.
   f. to abstain from forming any factional organization within the Party.

34 Ibid., 523.

35 State Papers of Republic of China, Nanking, China, 1924.
(Note: This Party has a historic mission to perform. The struggle for the territorial integrity, independence, and tranquility of our country depends entirely upon the outcome of the efforts of this Party, which in turn depends upon the maintenance of strict discipline. Since the success or failure of the Party depends upon this, all members should do their best.) 36

The supreme organ of the Party shall be the National Convention of Delegates, which shall ordinarily meet once every two years. Regulations concerning the organization of the convention, the election of the delegates and the apportionment of representation in the Convention, shall be made by the Central Executive Committee. The Central Executive Committee shall have the following duties:

a. to represent the Party in its external relations.
b. to carry out the resolutions of the National Convention.
c. to organize and direct the subordinate Party Organizations.
d. to organize the various departments of the Central Party Executive.
e. to supervise the finances of the Party and have custody of its funds.37

The Principles of the Five-Power Constitution

The national government's programme for the reconstruction of China is based on the revolutionary principles known as the San Min Chá I and the Five-Power Constitution. The Constitution of Five-Power consists of Legislative, Judicial, Executive, Examination, Censorial Control. At the head of the administration stands the President; at the head of the legislative machine is Parliament; at the head of the Judiciary is a judge.

36 Ibid.

37 State Papers of Republic of China, Nanking, China, 1924, (rules adopted in the First National Congress, 1924.)
In explaining the importance of the Five-Power Constitution, Dr. Sun gave the following speech:

This is the machinery for governing the country. Besides the Five-Power Constitution, a very important part is the direct right of citizens in local government. Direct right is the true right of man. It has four forms: electoral, the right of recall, the initiative and the referendum. If the Five-Power Constitution can be compared to a vast machine, the direct right of citizens is the key to the machine. If the citizens have the right of election, they should also have the right of dismissing the officials whom they elect. If the citizens know of the existence of useful laws, which for some reason cannot pass the legislature, they should be able as a community to adopt them. Such a right is called the right of referendum. In order that the government may have a complete organ through which to do its best work, there must be a quintuple-power constitution. A government is not complete and cannot do its best work for the people unless it is based upon such a constitution. 38

At the beginning of constitutional government, the central government should complete the establishment of five "Yuan" for the exercise of the five powers. (Yuan means department. The national government of China is divided functionally into five departments. The Executive Yuan is the Cabinet.) The five Yuans are: 1. Executive, 2. Legislative, 3. Judicial, 4. Examination, and 5. Control.


Before the promulgation of the constitution, the presidents of all the Yuans shall be appointed or dismissed by the President, who shall supervise

38 State Papers of Republic of China, Nanking, China, 1924, Speech delivered by Dr. Sun to the Publicity Dept. of the Central Executive Committee in 1921.
them. As soon as the constitution is promulgated, the administration of the central government should be vested in the National Congress. In other words the National Congress should have the power to elect and recall officials of the central government as well as to initiate laws and veto laws promulgated by the central government.

Planning For A New China

In the national reconstruction, Dr. Sun proposed that the industrial development of China should be carried out along two lines: (1) by private enterprise and (2) by national undertaking. All matters that can be and are better carried out by private enterprise should be left to the private hands which should be encouraged and fully protected by liberal laws. 39

In working out the details of this plan for a New China, Dr. Sun said that four principles have to be considered. They are as follows:

1. The most remunerative field must be selected in order to attract foreign capital.
2. The most urgent needs of the nation must be met.
3. The lines of least resistance must be followed.
4. The most suitable positions must be chosen. 40

The goal of material civilization is not private profit but public profit. In his international development scheme, he proposed that the profits of industrial enterprises should go first to pay the interest and principal of

40 Ibid., 14.
foreign capital invested in them; second, to give high wages to labour; and third, to improve or extend the machinery of production. Besides these provisions the rest of the profit should go to the public in the form of reduced prices in all commodities and public services.\(^\text{41}\) It is his idea to make capitalism create socialism in China so that these two economic forces of human evolution will work side by side in future civilization.

To develop a new market in China big enough both for her own products and for products from the foreign countries, Dr. Sun proposed a detailed scheme. In order to carry out this project successfully, Dr. Sun suggested that three necessary steps must be taken: first that the various governments of the capital-supplying Powers must agree to joint action and a unified policy to form an International Organization with their war work organizers, administrators and experts of various lines to formulate plans and to standardize materials in order to prevent waste and to facilitate work. Second, the confidence of the Chinese people must be secured in order to gain their co-operation and enthusiastic support. If the above two steps are accomplished, then the third step is to open formal negotiations for the final contract of the project with the Chinese government.\(^\text{43}\) And last, a warning must be given that mistakes such as the notorious Sheng Shun Hwa'i's nationalized railways scheme in 1911 must not be committed again. In those days the foreign bankers entirely disregarded the

\(^{41}\) Ibid., 15.

\(^{42}\) See Appendix.VI

will of the Chinese people, and thought that they could do everything with the Chinese government alone. But to their regret, they found that the contracts which they had concluded with the government, by heavy bribery, were only to be blocked by the people later on. Therefore, in this international project we must pay more attention to the people's will than ever before.

Other items included in Dr. Sun's planning for New China are under the headings of:

(1) A Scientific Survey of the Land.

China has never been scientifically surveyed and mapped out. The administration of land is in the most chaotic state and the taxation of land is in great confusion, thus causing great hardships on the poor peasants and farmers. So, under any circumstances, the survey of land is the first duty of the government to execute. But this could not be done without foreign help, owing to lack of funds and experts. In his national reconstruction programme, Dr. Sun suggested:

This work be taken up by an international organization. This organization should provide the expenses of the work by a loan, and should carry out the work with the required number of experts and equipment. How much will be the expenses for the survey and what is the amount of time required and how large an organization is sufficient to carry on the work, and whether aerial survey by aeroplanes be practical for this work are questions which I shall leave to experts to decide. When the survey work is done and the land of each province is minutely mapped out, we shall be able to readjust the taxation of the already cultivated and improved land. As regards the waste and uncultivated lands we shall be able to determine whether they are suitable for agriculture, for pasture, for forestry, or for mining. In this way, we can estimate their value and lease them out to the users for whatever production that is most suitable. Besides the

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44 Sun Yat-sen, Outline of National Reconstruction for the National Government, Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1924, 130.
eighteen provinces, we have a vast extent of agricultural and pastural lands in Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang, and a vast extent of pastural land in Tibet and Kokonor. They will have to be developed by extensive cultivation under a colonization scheme. 45

(2) China Tea.

Tea, the most healthy and delicious beverage of mankind, is produced in China. Its cultivation and preparation form one of the most important industries of the country. Once China was the only country that supplied the world with tea. Now, China’s tea trade had been threatened by Indian and Japanese competition. 46 The Indian tea contains too much tannic acid, and the Japanese tea lacks the flavour which the Chinese tea possesses. The best tea is only obtainable in China, the native land of tea.

In explaining why China lost her tea trade, Dr. Sun said:

It is due to the high cost of production. The high cost of production is caused by the inland tax as well as the export duty and by the old methods of cultivation and preparation. If the tax and duty are done away with and new methods introduced, China can easily recover her former position in this trade. 47

Dr. Sun suggested that a system of modern factories for the preparation of tea should be established in all the tea districts, so that the tea could be prepared by machinery instead of by hand. Thus the cost production can be greatly reduced and the quality improved. As the world’s demand for tea is daily increasing, a project to supply cheaper and better tea will surely be a profitable one.


46 Ibid., 145.

47 Ibid., 147.
Silk, Cotton and Woollen Industries.

Silk is a Chinese discovery and was used as a material for clothes for many thousands of years before the Christian Era. It is one of the important national industries of China. Up to recent times, China was the only country that supplied silk to the world. But now that this dominant trade has been taken away from China by Japan, Italy and France, because these countries have adopted scientific methods for silk culture and manufacture, while China still uses the same old methods of many thousands of years ago. Italy was the first to destroy the Chinese monopoly of the world silk trade by smuggling the silk out of China. As the world's demand for silk is increasing daily, the improvement of the culture and manufacture of silk will be a very profitable undertaking. Dr. Sun suggested:

First that scientific bureaux be established in every silk district to give directions to the farmers and to provide healthy silkworm eggs. These bureaux should be under central control. At the same time, they will act as collecting stations for cocoons so as to secure a fair price for the farmers. Secondly, silk filatures with up-to-date machinery should be established in suitable districts to reel the silk for home as well as for foreign consumption. And lastly, modern factories should be put up for manufacturing silk for both home and foreign markets. 48

In southern China there is produced a kind of very fine linen in the form of ramie, known as "China-grass". This fibre if treated by modern methods and machinery becomes almost as fine and glossy as silk. But unfortunately, there is not yet such new methods and machinery for the manufacturing of this linen. The famous Chinese grass-cloth is manufactured by the old method of hand-loom. Therefore Dr. Sun proposed that new methods and machinery be

48 Ibid., 151.
introduced into China to manufacture this linen. A system of the modern factories should be established all over the ramie-producing districts in South China where raw materials and labour are obtainable.

Cotton is a foreign product which was introduced into China centuries ago. It became a very important Chinese industry during the hand-loom age. But after the import of foreign cotton goods into China this native handicraft industry was gradually killed by the foreign trade. So, great quantities of raw cotton are exported and finished cotton goods are imported in large quantities into China. The demand for cotton goods in China is very great but the supply falls short. It is necessary to put up more mills in China for cotton manufacturing. Therefore, Dr. Sun suggested:

That large cotton mills all over the cotton-producing districts under one central national control should be established. Thus the best economic results will be obtained and cotton goods can then be supplied to the people at a lower cost. Although the whole of north-western China, about two thirds of the entire country, is a pastoral land yet the woolen industry has never been developed. I suggest that scientific methods be applied to the raising of sheep and to the treatment of wool so as to improve the quality and increase the quantity. Modern factories should be established all over north-western China for manufacturing all kinds of finished woolen goods. Here we have the raw materials, cheap labour and unlimited market.

(4) Building Roads.

China, in order to catch up with modern civilization, must move. However, China, at present, lacks the means of facility for individual movement, for all the old great highways were ruined and have disappeared.

49 Ibid., 162.
50 Ibid., 178.
Dr. Sun, therefore, proposed to construct one million miles of roads. This should be apportioned according to the ration of population in each district for construction. In the eighteen provinces of China Proper, there are nearly two thousand Hsiens (country district). If all parts of China are to adopt the Hsien administration, there will be nearly four thousand Hsiens in all. Thus the construction of roads for each Hsien will be on an average of two hundred fifty miles. But some of the Hsiens have more people and some have less.

In his road building projects, Dr. Sun said:

If we divide the million miles of roads by the four hundred million people, we shall have one mile to every four hundred. For four hundred people to build one mile of road is not a very difficult task to accomplish.

51 Ibid., 180.
52 Ibid., 182.
CONCLUSION

Though new and radical are the principles of Dr. Sun they are in essence in conformity with the traditional character of the State of China. The traditional character of the State of China is held to be an agricultural patriarchal co-operative society under benevolent rulers. The state was regarded as one great family in which the Emperor was the father and the people the child. Since a child is by nature good and even capable of being virtuous by proper instruction, the true function of government should not, unlike the systems of the western world, be based on statutory laws.

A Chinese scholar writes, "...to be governed by law is not a sign of of respectability; the ideal was government by rules of propriety, by benevolence, by virtue, by non-assertion." ¹ China, before the revolutions, had developed a series of autonomous organizations based upon the cohesion and power of the social structure. The family, the village and district, and the guilds were the three outstanding agencies which constituted the model for the government. While the family system provided its religious as well as its social-economic foundations, the unit of local self-government was the village. The guilds were primarily co-operative organizations serving to maintain and strengthen the economic structure. All these institutions developed with the

least interference from the governmental superstructure, and consequently they acquired both strength and stability.

The Emperor was the supreme authority in the government of pre-republican China and the government itself was concerned with (1) the defence of the realm against barbarians; (2) the maintenance of public works; and (3) the collection of revenue. For the fulfillment of these functions it was assisted by the ministers and officials selected by civil service examinations.

Government was one of China's notable achievements in the long era which preceded western contacts. There was, under the ablest rulers from the time of the Han Dynasty (about 206 B.C.), a prosperity and contentment rarely surpassed in the history of any great people. The essential feature was that:

The state was regarded as an enlarged family and the attitude of a patriarchal society permeated the whole. The people were to be reasoned with and educated quite as much as commanded. 2

With the modern political revolution resulting from the influence of the West, China attempted to introduce novel and foreign institutions and yet to preserve the essential qualities of the old.

Then came the revolution of 1911, under the leadership of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. It was a movement against the Manchu Dynasty, against foreign economic and political penetration, and in support of economic reform for the peasant masses. It may well be that the Chinese have only entered upon the beginnings of their political revolution. There can be no question that in recent decades

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the Chinese have acquired an appreciation of western political nationalism. Nevertheless, they are not inclined to carry it to an extreme that would sacrifice that local autonomy which for centuries was the basis of Chinese democracy.

In economics, as well as politics, the force of western civilization is reshaping the life of China. China's foreign commerce has developed from the minor groups of foreign factories crowded together near Canton into a trade that has made Shanghai one of the great seaports of the world. Historically, the economic life of the Chinese was subject to minute regulation at the hands of local agencies, families, partnerships and guilds. There was no theory of laissez-faire. At least eighty per cent of China's population derives its livelihood from agriculture and from occupations connected directly with it. Furthermore, in China, it is the labor of man, not of horses or oxen or machinery, that sows and reaps the nation's food. It is the farmers who cultivate their own lands. It is to this group that China has owed much of her social stability.

Religion, too, in China has changed under western influence. This is not to say that China has adopted Christianity or that she appears likely to do so. In the theological aspects of Christianity, the Chinese have displayed comparatively little interest. Their response to Christian philosophy has been far more pronounced in matters of education, philanthropy, public health, and medicine. In fact, it may be affirmed that the revolutionary movement in China has been directed away from rather than toward religion in any of its conventional forms.

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3 Ibid., 35.
So much for the transitional era from the traditional China to the
revolutional China. Then comes the reconstructional period. According to Dr.
Sun's project, during this period, a New China is to be built on the founda-
tions of nationalism, democracy, and livelihood. His principles may be classi-
fied into two groups, the one dealing with the problems of social and economic
reconstruction, and the other with those related to the constitutional theory
of government.

In the first place, China must be united in order to be able to
combat both imperialism of foreign powers and militarism of Chinese war lords.
As a race the Chinese may well be described as homogeneous, and yet the Manchu
dynasty set about to destroy the sense of racial unity and the process was
considerably accelerated by the political and economic pressure of foreign
nations. It is for this reason that the principle of racial unity, especially
in the circumstances of China, has a significance in strengthening the nation-
ality movement which strives to secure not only the understanding of all the
races within the country, but to safeguard China's existence as a nation.

Secondly, China must have a clear concept of what is implied by a
democratic system of government; for that system exercises a modernizing in-
fluence so necessary for progress. But the principle of popular sovereignty
has to be applied in a manner so that the system of government may not be a
monopoly of influential and propertied classes. The people should not only
have the power of election but also those of initiative, referendum and recall.
Sun Yat-sen believed that the political powers invested in the people through
these institutions were essential features of constitutional democracy and
that they would safeguard the people against possible abuse of power by the government. The increased power of the electorate should not, however, mean a break with China's tradition of leadership. That is, democracy should not be allowed to become mob rule.

Thirdly, the social and economic structures of China must be re-adjusted in order to provide those conditions without which political institutions cannot function in the interest of the masses. Therefore Sun Yat-sen gave much stress to what he called the principle of livelihood because it concerns the life of the nation. Neither nationalism nor democracy can survive unless the people are assured of reasonable material welfare. The principle involves two radical measures, namely, the equalization of land and the control of capital, which are necessary for the protection of the interests of the peasantry and the working class.

The principle of livelihood expounded by Dr. Sun is a combination of socialism, communism and utopianism. It is a moderate form of socialism between two extremes of socialistic thinking. The materialistic marxism on one hand and the idealistic utopianism on the other. The marxism would solve all social problems by a dictatorship of the proletariat and all political and economic problems by revolution; they are the radical group. The latter group of socialists advocated peaceful methods and the use of political action and negotiation. Realizing the weakness of both groups, Dr. Sun proposed the principle of livelihood, which is not a radical movement nor merely a high ideal. According to him, it is a driving force in society. It is the center of all historical movements. He also made a distinction between communism and Min-sheng
principle (livelihood); communism is an ideal of livelihood, while the Min-sheng principle is practical communism. He saw no essential difference between the two principles—communism and Min-sheng—the only difference lies in the methods by which they are applied.

It is extremely important to understand the social factors of China that motivated Dr. Sun to create his principle of livelihood. He noted the general poverty prevailing over China after the Revolution, the impracticality of capitalistic practices in China, the problem of land ownership and inadequacy of industries. Thus, it is the aim of Ming-sheng principle to equalize the financial resources in society. Such aim may be realized through (1) the solution of the land problem, (2) regulation of private capital and development of state capital and (3) promotion of major industries, communication, mining and manufacturing.

The ultimate goal of Dr. Sun's three principles of the people is a government of the people, by the people and for the people, that is, a state belonging to all people, a government controlled by all the people and the rights and benefits for the enjoyment of all the people. If this is true, the people will not only have a share in state production, but they will have a share in everything. When the people share everything in the state then will we truly reach the goal of the Min-sheng principle which is Confucius' hope of a "great commonwealth"—a form of world federation.

As to the religious problem, the laws of the Republic of China provide that every person has undisputed freedom of religious belief. Such are merely reassertion of what Chinese people have advocated since the dawn of the
Chinese civilization. Basically religion in China is combination of ethics and philosophy. Hence, the Chinese people never reject any kind of religion as such and are tolerant toward religions which they consider as "foreign".

In the pre-revolutionary era the predominant religion in China were ancestor-worship, confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, Lamiaism, and Mohammedanism. With the advent of revolution, people became less restricted in their attitude toward forms of religions which they had considered as "foreign". Hence, Christian religion was to be accepted quite freely. As Christianity is fundamentally concerned with the establishment of the Kingdom of God and the reform of society, locally, nationally and internationally, the spirit of international good will was fully reflected in the Christian movement in China, in harmony with other movements which were also taking place under the impact of the Revolution.

In order to fulfill his principles, Dr. Sun proposed that a party government, Kuomintang, should be set up. This government should be divided into three stages of constitutional development: the military, during which the Kuomintang would have to acquire power in dealing with the war-lords; the educative stage, during which the party would rule and train the people in participation of democratic government; and the third stage of constitutional democracy, in which real self-government would be attained. He never advocated one-party government as a permanent feature of the Republic. As soon as the Five-Power Constitution is established by the National Constituent Assembly, the Kuomintang will become one of the political parties within the Republic; and the welfare and safety of the nation will then become the concern of the
entire Chinese people. In other words, the Kuomintang was only a transitional one and the popular rule is the ultimate goal.

In summarizing the doctrines of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, I should like to emphasize again the major characteristics, which are embodied in his "The Three Principles of the People", a guidance for the people to their political, social, and economic policies; in his "Five-Power Constitution", the basis of reconciling the conflict between centralization and regional autonomy; and his "The International Development of China", a vast scheme of agricultural and industrial development for China.

It is beyond doubt that China by virtue of the Revolution in 1911 had undergone a complete change, socially, culturally, and politically. However, such change by no means has stopped, it still continues. Even today China may be considered as in revolutionary era. Dr. Sun had predicted this in his last words before he died: "...Our revolution has not yet been completed, we should continue to strive for peace. Only strife and peace can save China." We have firm convictions that his will be ultimately fulfilled in the near future.

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APPENDICES

I. Co-Hong.

It was established in 1720. The Hong merchant were a group of people who as cooperative body known as Co-Hong, had the monopoly of the foreign trade of China. In actual operation each Hong merchant conducted business on his own account under the name of his Hong or firm. In the case of Hong merchant, the Hoppo or Commissioner of Canton Customs who was a government official, made the Hong merchants responsible for conduct of entire foreign trade.

II. The Treaty of Nanking.

It was conducted and signed aboard the British ship, Cornwallis at Nanking, on August 29, 1842, by Kiyng, Ilipu, and Sir Henry Pottinger. (quoted from P.C. Kuo, A Critical Study of the First Anglo-Chinese War p. 64.)

III. The Boxer Settlement in September 7, 1901.

1. For the murder of Baron von Kettler, German Minister at Peking, China was required to erect a monument and to dispatch a mission of apology.
2. Provision was made for the punishment of guilty Chinese officials. This included not only executions and exile, but lesser punishments on many provincial and local officials where the foreigners had been attacked.
3. For the murder of the Chancellor of the Japanese Legation, reparation and an apology.
4. In desecrated cemeteries monuments were to be erected.
5. The importation of arms and ammunition was to be prohibited for two years, and for a longer time at the discretion of the powers.
6. An indemnity of $352,900,000 (450,000,000 taels), with the interest at four per cent, capital to be paid by December, 1940, was demanded. Payments were to be guaranteed by allocation of the unpledged balance of the Chinese maritime customs, the native customs, and the revenue of the salt monopoly. Among the powers the indemnity was divided as follows:
7. A Legation quarter was to be set apart in Peking, which might be protected by the adequate guards.

8. The Taku forts were to be destroyed, thus insuring an unfortified approach to Peking.

9. Permission for the foreign troops to occupy certain posts between Peking and the sea was granted.

10. The Chinese government was required to issue edicts threatening death to the members of anti-foreign societies, announcing the punishments which had already been inflicted, and requiring provincial officials to be responsible for the future acts against the foreigners.

11. The commercial treaties were to be revised.

12. The Wai-wu Pu, the Chinese Foreign Office (formerly the Tsungli Yamen), was to rank above other departments of the government.


IV. Kuomintang.

It is the combination of three Chinese words meaning country, people, and party. The usual translation is the People's Party. It has, however, assumed different names in varying phases of the Nationalist Movement: Hsing chung hui, the Society for the Regeneration of China, 1894–1905; Tung meng hui, the League of Common Alliance, 1905–1912; Kuomintang, The Nationalist Democratic Party, 1912–1914; Chung Hua Kuo-ming Tang, Chinese Revolutionary Party, 1914–1920; and since 1920, Kuomintang.
V. Programme of the Kuomintang.

A. External Policy:

(1) All unequal treaties such as those providing for leased territories, extra-territorial privileges, foreign control of the customs tariff, and exercise of political authority on Chinese territories which impair the sovereignty of the Chinese nation should be abolished, and new treaties concluded on the basis of absolute equality and mutual respect for the sovereign rights.

(2) All countries that are willing to abandon their special privileges in China and to abolish their treaties which impair Chinese sovereignty should be accorded most favoured nation treatment.

(3) All other treaties between China and the foreign powers which are in any way prejudicial to the interests of China should be revised according to the principle of non-infringement of each other's sovereignty.

(4) The payments due on the Boxer indemnity shall be entirely devoted to education purposes.

(5) As long as they do not impair China's political interests, the foreign loans made by China should be properly secured and repaid.

(6) Foreign loans contracted by irresponsible governments in China, such as the Peking regime, founded on bribery and usurpation, were used, not to promote the welfare of the people, but to maintain the existence of the militarists or to further their policy of bribing and stealing. The people of China should not hold themselves responsible for the repayment of such debts.

(7) A conference consisting of delegates from the social and commercial organizations, such as banks, Chambers of Commerce, and educational institutions, should be called to devise ways and means for the repayment of foreign loans, in order to free China from the semi-colonial status arising from the economic bondage.

B. Internal Policy:

(1) The principle of equilibrium should be observed in the division of powers between the central and the local governments. Matters that require a standard of uniformity for the whole nation should be allotted to the Central Government. Those that are peculiar to a locality and need particular attention should be allotted to the local government. The division should over-emphasize neither centralization nor decentralization.
(2) The people of each province may draw up their own constitutions and elect their own governors. The provincial constitutions should not conflict with national constitution. The provincial governors should supervise the workings of local autonomy within their jurisdiction and administer affairs of state under the direction of the Central Government.

(3) The Hsien, or district, should be the unit of the local self-government. The people of every self-governing Hsien should have the rights of electing and recalling their own officials, as well as the rights of initiative and referendum in making laws. In regard to the expanses of the State, each Hsien should remit to the national treasury a certain percentage of its income. Such percentage should not be less than ten per cent or more than fifty per cent of its total receipts.

(4) Universal suffrage should be carried out. Class suffrage based on property qualifications should be abolished.

(5) Competitive examinations should be established to supply the deficiency of the electoral systems.

(6) The people's rights to freedom of assembly, of forming associations, of speech, of publication, of choice of domicile and liberty of conscience, should be established by law.

(7) A system of conscription should be put in force to replace the present mercenary troops. At the same time, special attention should be given to the economic welfare of the soldiers and the lower officers as well as the advancement of their legal status. In the armies, industrial and agricultural education should be given. The qualifications for the officers should be strictly defined, and the methods of promotion and dismissal of the officers should be reformed.

(8) The legal rates for land tax should be strictly determined. All extra taxes, such as Likin, etc. (Likin is an internal tariff system. The Chinese government was obliged to resort to this schedule in order to make good the deficit consequent upon the imposition of the tariff rates by the foreign powers in China. It should be noted that most of the Chinese debts were secured by a mortgage on customs receipts.) should be abolished.

(9) A census of the population should be taken, cultivated lands should be redistributed, while the production as well as consumption of food supply should be investigated so that the people may not be in want.

(10) The organization of rural communities should be improved so as to ameliorate the living conditions of the agricultural population.

(11) Labour laws should be enacted, labour conditions should be improved, labour organizations should be protected and promoted.

(12) Legal, economic, educational and social equality between the sexes should be recognized, and the development of women's rights should be encouraged.
(15) Energetic efforts should be made for universal education, and every effort should be made to develop education based on the interests of the children. The educational system should be revised, and educational expenditure should be increased and its independence guaranteed.

(14) The State should determine the laws governing lands, the use thereof, the expropriation, and tax on land values. Lands owned by private individuals should be assessed and reported to the government by the landlord. The owners of private land should declare its value to the government; the government should levy tax according to the declared value, and in case of necessity, may purchase it at the price so declared.

(15) Enterprises which partake of the nature of monopolies, or which cannot be well undertaken by private individuals, like railways and steamship lines, should be owned and managed by the State.

(The above items are quoted from the Manifesto of the First National Congress, January, 1924, in State Papers, Nanking, China.)

VI. The Scheme of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

1. The development of a communications system:
   a. 100,000 miles of railways.
   b. 1,000,000 miles of Macadam Roads.
   c. Improvement of existing canals.
      1. Hangchow-Tientsin Canals.
      2. Sikiang-Yangtze Canals.
   d. Construction of New Canals.
      1. Liaoho-Sunghwakiang Canal.
      2. Others to be projected.
   e. River Conservancy.
      1. To regulate the embankments and channel of the Yangtze River from Hankow to the sea thus facilitating ocean-going ships to reach that port at all seasons.
      2. To regulate the Hwangho Embankments and Channel to prevent floods.
      3. To regulate the Sikiang.
      4. To regulate the Hwaiho.
      5. To regulate various other rivers.
   f. The construction of more telegraph lines and telephone and wireless systems all over the country.

2. The Development of Commercial Harbours:
   a. Three largest ocean ports with future capacity equalling New York Harbour to be constructed in North, Central and South China.
b. Various small commercial and fishing harbours to be constructed along the coast.

c. Commercial docks to be constructed along all navigable rivers.

3. Modern cities with public utilities to be constructed in all railway centres, termini and alongside harbours.

4. Water power development.

5. Iron and steel works and cement works on the largest scale in order to supply the above needs.


7. Agricultural development.

8. Irrigational work on the largest scale in Mongolia and Sinkiang.


10. Colonization in Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, Kokonor, and Tibet.

(Sun Yat-sen, The International Development of China, London, N. Y., 1928, 12.)
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I. PRIMARY SOURCES

A. Books in English:


A Plan for National Reconstruction is the correct title of the book often called The International Development of China. The second title is somewhat misleading, as the book deals with mostly the national problems of China rather than international ones. Hence, it is preferable that the first title is used in reference to this book.

This book consists of a detailed yet highly practical project for building up a New China. It is divided into three parts: (1) Psychological reconstruction: Dr. Sun proposed the theory that "it is easy to do and hard to know" so as to encourage the people. (2) Physical reconstruction: known as the "Industrial Reconstruction" which is to be carried out in six steps. (3) Social reconstruction: known as the first step in democracy discussing in details the principles and ways of meetings and conferences.

Sun Yat-sen, The First Step in Democracy, Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1919.

Elaboration on the topic of the methods of carrying out democracy, which was originally discussed in the "Outline of National Reconstruction for the National Government." It is a piece of specific political essay on the actual working of the democratic government.


Excellent and realistic recollection of Dr. Sun's own experience during the revolutionary period. Truly a historically significant biographical account of a brilliant revolutionist.


A concise and unified outline of Dr. Sun's political doctrines on the constitutional government. It was written in twenty-five paragraphs forming the basis for carrying out San Min Chu I and the constitution of five powers.

It embodies three principles of government for the benefit of the people—nationalism, democracy, and economic collectivism. The first principle involves cultivating state allegiance, opposing foreign economic exploitation, and growing toward democracy. Democracy, the second principle, must be rooted in the old democratic spirit of China and gradually attained nationally under the tutelage of a strong central government and single party. The third principle, economic collectivism, must be attained in a pragmatic way, neither wholly liberal nor communistic. Finally, a China thus modernized and strengthened, could lead Asia and the world to a true cosmopolitanism.

This book is usually considered as a "Bible" of Kuomintang.

B. Books in Chinese:


Annual report by Nationalist Government on general informations of political, economical, social and cultural matters. It is a rich source for the general references on the working of the nationalist government.

History of Chinese Revolution, published by the National Committee on Chinese History, Nanking, China, 1919.

An authorized work chiefly composed by the members of the National History Association, an official institute in charge of the national historical recordings. This book was published in twelve volumes, revised edition.


An inspiring speech of Dr. Sun in his inauguration. It is a critical analysis on the contemporary international and national problems and their solutions.

Records of Kwangtung Province, 1895-1911, Annual reports published by the provincial government of Kwangtung, China, 1895-1911.

An authorized official records of Kwangtung Province, the original place where the revolution started. The records were officially collected and approved by the Provincial Government and was compiled by the Provincial Bureau of Research and Recording.
Records of City of Canton, 1908-1911, published by the City Hall of Canton, China, 1911.

Town-records of Canton, capital of Kwangtung Province and one of the most important cities for Chinese revolution. Like the Records of Kwangtung Province, the town-records consisted of all facts of the revolution which occurred in the city. These records were published annually by the city hall of Canton. Records of 1908-1911 were used as references for this thesis. They are helpful sources for the research on the actual happenings in the revolutionary Canton.


Documentary account of the Peace Conference between North and South held in Shanghai, 1919, marking the success of the unification of North and South China. It provides excellent materials for the history of China during the revolutionary period.

II. SECONDARY SOURCES

Ah-Ying, The History of Foreign War in China, Kwe-Kee Publishing Co., Shanghai, 1940. Most complete and authoritative work dealing with the foreign affairs in China.


Brown, A. J., _The Chinese Revolution_, New York, 1912. A short sketch, the major problems are treated in such a manner as to enable the student to see the picture as a whole.


Clements, F.H., _The Boxer Rebellion; A Political and Diplomatic Review_, N. Y., 1928. Most comprehensive in its field.


Foster, J.W., _American Diplomacy in the Orient_, Boston, N. Y., 1903. An excellent specialized work.


Inouye, J., _The Japan-China War_, Yokohama, Japan, 1895. Definitive account of the early Sino-Japanese War with special emphasis on its causes and effects.


Linesbarger, P.M.W., *Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Republic*, New York, London, 1925. Excellent discussion on Dr. Sun Yat-sen as the founder of the Chinese Republic.


III. STATE PAPERS & TREATIES

*Chinese Repository*, 20 vols., May, 1832 to December, 1851, Canton, China.


*Treaties Convention, etc., Between China and Foreign States*, City Hall, Shanghai, 1917.
APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Hans Ivo-Heiung Kung has been read and approved by three members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

Dec 15, 1954

Signature of Adviser