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The Equivalence of the Religious and the Existential in Kierkegaard

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THE EQUIVALENCE OF THE RELIGIOUS AND THE EXISTENTIAL IN KIERKEGAARD

By

David Goicoechea

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter I</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter II</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter III</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter IV</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter V</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter VI</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter VII</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter VIII</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter IX</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter X</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conclusion</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appendix A</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appendix B</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appendix C</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Footnotes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bibliography</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

There are some philosophers who claim that they appreciate the existential thought of Soren Kierkegaard but that they reject his religious thought. They justify such a claim by saying that for Kierkegaard the existential refers to the ethical and that the religious is something other. The purpose of this thesis is to show that such a claim is a contradiction in terms. I will argue that the religious and the existential are equivalent for Kierkegaard and that the ethical is, therefore, not existential except in so far as it is religious.

In order to defend my thesis that the religious and the existential are equivalent, I shall focus my attention upon Kierkegaard's concept of the leap. For, upon consideration, it is obvious that the leap plays a key role in Kierkegaard's philosophy. It is the leap which relates the ethical and the religious for Kierkegaard. If one wanted to see the differences between the ethical and the religious, he would do well to consider the leap. If he interpreted the existential in relation to the leap, he would then be able to locate the existential in its relation to the ethical and the religious. Thus, I will examine these notions and argue that the religious is equivalent to the existential by showing that they are both equivalent to the leap.
From the beginning a distinction will be made between two moments of the leap. For, the leap according to Kierkegaard is a double movement leap. Grounded in this double movement leap are two moments of the religious and two moments of the existential. Upon clarifying this distinction, the confusion by which one might come to see the existential as the mere ethical will be wiped away. For sometimes Kierkegaard refers to the first movement of the religious or religiousness A as the ethico-religious and sometimes merely as the ethical. But, upon seeing that this "ethical" is really one form of the religious, we shall see that if one wants to retain the existential of Kierkegaard he cannot reject the religious.

The argument for my thesis will proceed by an analysis of ten different structures of the leap. First, the basic pattern of the double movement leap will be explicated in terms of the stages on life's way. Then such religious themes as love and sin will be interpreted in terms of the leap. Reason and Faith will be related to the leap. The existential and the leap will be related. The leap will be analyzed even in relation to the incarnation, temporality and Kierkegaard's style. By such a procedure the chief nuances of the religious and the existential will be brought into focus.

In the conclusion I shall shift my attention from the evidence for my thesis to the kind of evidence which
Kierkegaard uses for supporting his position. I shall make clear just what sort of justification he appeals to.

Finally, in Appendix A I shall clarify my interpretation of Kierkegaard even more by considering some other prominent interpretations of Kierkegaard. In Appendix B, I shall answer an objection to my thesis which might be raised from what Kierkegaard writes concerning marriage in his later writings. In Appendix C I will voice a critical question which I have concerning Kierkegaard's notion of the double movement leap.
It is in *Fear and Trembling* that Soren Kierkegaard describes the double movement leap.\(^1\) He does this under the image of the two Knights. The Knight of Infinite Resignation represents what he will come to call religiousness A or natural religion. The Knight of Faith represents religiousness B or Christianity.\(^2\) However, in spite of the detail with which Kierkegaard describes these two Knights, we only see them in their leap. We do not see the paths from which they made the leap. It is in *The Concept of Dread* that Kierkegaard gives us an important clue concerning the interpretation of *Fear and Trembling* and so also the image of the two Knights. He writes of *Fear and Trembling*:

"There the author several times allows the wishful ideality of the aesthetical to founder upon the exacting ideality of the ethical, in order by these collisions to let the religious ideality come to evidence which is precisely the ideality of reality, and therefore is just as desirable as that of aesthetics and not impossible like that of ethics, yet to let it come to evidence in such a way that it breaks out in the dialectical leap..."
and with the positive feeling "Behold, all things have become new!" and in the negative feeling which is the passion of the absurd to which the concept of "repetition" corresponds."

What is this collision of the aesthetic and the ethical out of which arises the Knight of Infinite Resignation? How does the aesthetic founder upon the ethical so as to result in the first movement of the leap? What is this way of the aesthetic and this way of the ethical?

The aesthetic represents for Kierkegaard a way of life or a stage on life's way, depending on whether or not it has been renewed by the leap. It is a way or a stage that has to do with the immediate, the beautiful, and the artistic. But it is very complex and contains within it several essentially distinct ways or stages. Thus, in The Banquet dialogue of Stages on Life's Way, Kierkegaard allows five aesthetic characters to speak their philosophy of life. In the first volume of Either/Or Kierkegaard distinguishes three stages of the erotic, which, in effect, means at least three stages within the aesthetic stage. In the introduction to The Concept of Dread Kierkegaard argues that for the Greeks even the ethical was within the aesthetic perspective. And, of course, religiousness A is aesthetic religion.

But, Kierkegaard's concept of the ethical stage is no less complex. First, we should notice that the ethical
as such is never a way, it is only a stage. Because it refers to action and never mere conceptualization it never, as ethical, claims to be a way and thus it is not a way. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard distinguishes three very important types of the ethical. First, he clarifies what he means by improper ethics. This is ethics on the background of the aesthetic. Its criterion is never merely the exacting but for it there is always a predominant longing for the beautiful. Next, Kierkegaard distinguishes two types of proper ethics. The first of these claims to rest upon metaphysics. That is, it claims that reason is self-sufficient to produce and accomplish the exacting ideal. The second type of proper ethics claims to rest upon dogmatics. It thinks that reason can never by itself arrive at a notion of sin and that only faith can ground a true ethics where sin is a possibility.

The vast complexity of the aesthetic and the ethical will clarify itself only as we slowly follow Kierkegaard on his reflective path. The perfect symmetry, the prodigious applicability, the fertile simplicity of Soren Kierkegaard's fundamental philosophic insight will reveal itself only as we patiently examine it layer by layer, chapter by chapter. In this opening picture of the two Knights we see only the most general and yet most basic structures of this way of the leap. In the Way of Abraham, the Knight of Faith, we see five essential moments: (1) He receives the promise,
(2) He endures the threats against that promise, (3) He receives Isaac, (4) He endures the threat against Isaac, and (5) He receives Isaac a second time. The Knight of Infinite Resignation is like Abraham in the first four moments but he is lacking in the fifth. If we examine these five moments in terms of the interpretative clue which we received from The Concept of Dread, we shall be on the way with Kierkegaard at least in reflection.

Kierkegaard speaks of the aesthetic as the wishful ideality that is desirable. He exemplifies the first moment of this wishful ideality in Abraham as Abraham received the Promise in Ur of the Chaldees. Kierkegaard will often refer to this first moment of the aesthetic as the first immediacy. Abraham hears that the promised land will be his. He hears that he will be the father of many nations. He hears that through him all the world will be blessed. He longs that this might be. It is for him as a dream. In the first blush of his childlike enthusiasm he feels as if it already were. This is the wish of the aesthete in its first and simplest form. It is a beautiful wish for the beautiful. It is desirable that all men should at one time be such aesthetes. The immediacy of the first dream entices one on his way. Abraham sets out alone leaving his family behind that the beautiful promise might be fulfilled.

But what did he experience as he separated himself from the protective immediacy of his family? He slowly and
painfully discovered that he was also separated from the
object of his desire. Threat after threat seemed to tell
him that the promise would not be fulfilled. Now Abraham
began to experience the ethical, that exacting ideality.
With effort he was faithful to the promise even though it
was threatened. He began to reflect. Will I really be
the father of many nations? I am not even the father of
one child. Will I really receive the Promised Land? Lot
got the best part of the land. How will the world be
blessed through me? I will die and be forgotten. But he
did not give up his longing. In spite of the collision
between his longing and the brute facts of temporal reality
he persevered. Many men would give in to the threat. Many
would not even have left the first immediacy. But Abraham
was seeking and he endured the threats. It began to seem
impossible that the exacting ideal of his dream could be
achieved and yet he continued faithfully on the way. Even
though it seemed that the path of his longing and the path
which he was treading could never be the same, even though
it seemed that the aesthetic and the ethical could never be
one, he lived as if they were.

And then, when the trial of collision seemed hope­
less he received Isaaq. Just out of the blue he was
released from the threats and taken up into the second
immediacy. His long endurance was a preparation that
renewed for him the wishful ideality of the aesthetic.
Once again through the small voice which said to him, "Sara shall bear you a child" the vision of old was renewed for him. And now he saw the direction of the way even more clearly than he had before the trial. The exacting ideality of the ethical had strengthened his eyes and now the vision was so bright that it seemed it would last forever. This was for him the beginning of the first movement of the leap. In his exaltation he rose above the separated paths of aesthetic longing and ethical demands. He saw them as necessary to one another that this new and greater longing might be.

But then, as Abraham trod this path of bliss, a new threat appeared on the horizon. God demanded Isaac in sacrifice. At this point the Knight of Infinite Resignation and the Knight of Faith begin to be distinguished. As this threat appears they are both in the bliss of the second immediacy. They are one with the promise through Isaac. Now we must look carefully, for what happens as they approach the horizon distinguishes the two Knights. This distinction is the main focus of attention which Kierkegaard portrays in his painting of the two Knights.

Again neither Knight succumbs to the trial. Both see this as a new threat to the promise. Both of them are willing to teleologically suspend the ethical. That is, both are willing to sacrifice Isaac. Notice, this is another and even greater level of the collision between the aesthetic
and the ethical. And because of this collision both Knights leap higher into the air even to the point of infinity. Once again it seems that the longing after the promise will be frustrated by the exacting demands of the ethical situation. But that does not hinder our Knights. They are still in the ascent of the second immediacy and it carries them to the point of infinite resignation. But if we watch them as the paths of the aesthetic and the ethical are united by the leap, we see that their leaps are very different. The Knight of Infinite Resignation ceases to believe that the promise will be fulfilled in time. He thinks that the ethical demands are really impossible and so he feels that he will receive Isaac again only in eternity. He does not perform the second movement of the leap. Abraham, the Knight of Faith, leaps up infinitely resigned, but always, by virtue of the absurd, he believes that the promise will be fulfilled even on earth and in time. He does not lose the ethical as does the other Knight. Once again he preserves both the way of the aesthetic and the way of the ethical.

Kierkegaard distinguishes these two leaps as the leap of love and the leap of faith. He has his pseudonym, Johannes de Silentio, who represents the Knight of Infinite Resignation write:

"I am convinced that God is love, this thought has for me a primitive lyrical validity. When it is present to me, I am unspeakably blissful; when it
is absent I long for it more vehemently than does the lover for his object; but I do not believe, this courage I lack. For me the love of God is, both in a direct and in an inverse sense, incommensurable with the whole of reality. I am not cowardly enough to whimper and complain, but neither am I deceitful enough to deny that faith is something much higher. I can well endure living in my way, I am joyful and content, but my joy is not that of faith, and in comparison with that I am unhappy.\textsuperscript{9}

In this beautiful passage Kierkegaard distinguishes the religion of the mystic from the religion of the believer. He distinguishes religiousness A from religiousness B. He distinguishes the single movement leap of the Knight of Infinite Resignation from the double movement leap of the Knight of Faith.

Notice what happens in the second movement of the leap. Abraham receives Isaac a second time and he is happy. The Knight of Infinite Resignation would have been unhappy at the second reception of Isaac. In his mystical flight he was totally content with the infinite and wanted no more to be bothered with the finite. But it was not just the reception of Isaac a second time that distinguished the two Knights. Abraham had faith, by virtue of the absurd, that the promise would be fulfilled in time. It is this
faith which renews for him the ethical. Just as the first movement of the leap gave the Knights the aesthetic a second time, so the second movement gives Abraham the ethical a second time. Just as he received the aesthetic in double measure in the first leap, so he now receives the ethical in double measure by the second leap. Before the leap the way of longing was always incomplete as was the way of the exacting. They both were in collision. By the double movement leap they become complete. They move from being just partial paths to being a whole way. They are no longer just half sufficient. They are whole. They are double.10

Such then are the stage structures of the leap.
The aesthetic refers to a longing which is immediate and is related to the perfect or infinite or eternal. It is a longing for the beautiful ideal. The ethical refers to the exacting demands of the finite and temporal situation. These collide. It seems that the factual situation makes it impossible for the ideal to be attained. But through perseverance in one's longing the collision is overcome and a new immediacy arises which renews one's enthusiasm for his ideals. However, the temporal or ethical situation once again makes its challenge and threatens the ideal. One can, in infinite resignation, freeze himself in a blissful disregard for this new threat and consider only the eternal. Or he can, by virtue of the absurd, that is through faith, continue to believe that his ideals can be reached in time.
If he so believes then he has received his ideal in time.

In this way Soren Kierkegaard seeks to show that the either/or of the aesthetic can be overcome by the both-and of faith. By this double movement leap he seeks to allow all ways to open into one another. Thus he seeks to love away the scandal of love. Now we must turn to his concentration upon that love as such.
CHAPTER II

THE LOVE STRUCTURES OF THE LEAP

As a genius of reflective love, Soren Kierkegaard ranks with Plato, Augustine, Pascal and Scheler. As with them his world view was forged in the fires of love. He stood alone and longing in that criss-cross of unnamed paths. And then that lightning flash of first love lit his way so that he could never forget the direction. As he trod on through the darkness, which was even blacker after that flash, the light of love within him, clearer even than the noon day sun, revealed to him even other mysteries of love. His very double movement leap is simply the leap of love.

It is no wonder then that immediately following that painting of the two Knights we see in Fear and Trembling the painting of the young swain and his princess. It is with this picture that we are introduced to the love structures of the leap. By means of the stage structures of the leap Kierkegaard might make his appeal to philosophers, but by means of the love structures he makes his appeal to all men. He reaches out with his stories of eros even to seducers and psychoanalysts. With his beautiful descriptions of marriage he might touch any man or wife. With his autobiographical descriptions of erotic inspiration he can
loosen the deepest well springs of youthful idealism even after the manner of a Dante or a Petrach. His insight into Christian love is as earth embracing as that of St. Francis and as profound as that of Scheler. How shall we begin to understand then this beautiful but haunting and mysterious picture of the young swain and his princess?

The elements which Kierkegaard presents to us are only five: (1) The young swain meets the princess and loves her with all of his concentration. (2) Through his love for her he comes to love the infinite and the eternal, that is, God. (3) But he cannot marry her. (4) Yet he continues to love her with all of his concentration but with a great suffering. (5) Until finally through faith he sees that he can marry her. But the questions are as many as the elements: (1) What was that concentration with which he loved her? (2) How did he come to love God by loving her? (3) Why could he not marry her? (4) Why did he continue to love her and to suffer so even when he knew he could not marry? (5) How did he finally become able to marry her?

This love which the young swain has for his princess is no ordinary love. We are told how he lets it permeate every fibre of his body and of his mind. He has the power "to concentrate the whole content of life and the whole significance of reality in one single wish."² But how did he get such an aesthetic power, such a power of longing? To be such an extraordinary young man the young swain must
have had an extraordinary upbringing. What could this have been like?

In the first volume of *Either/Or* the young man interprets the three operas of Mozart in such a way as to suggest how a person goes through three stages of the immediate erotic. For the pre-puberty child, the aesthetic longing is as a dream. The masculine and the feminine are still united within him. Hence, the boy longs for the feminine but not as an external object. However, at puberty and through his teens the feminine is separated from him and his longing for the beautiful ideal becomes a seeking. But he does not seek the feminine in a particular person, he just seeks the feminine as such. Finally, his longing becomes concentrated in a definite desire. He desires the feminine in a particular woman.

These first three stages of the aesthetic are erotic expressions of the same three stages through which Abraham passed. When the ideal of the promise first presented itself to him it was with the immediacy of a dream. Then through many years he went through that period of seeking the vague ideal which was distant from him. Finally, that ideal became particularized for him as he desired it through the person of Isaac.

In asking ourselves what the concentration of the young swain means we are asking about the quality of his particularization process. Kierkegaard shows us several
ways in which a person can enter this third stage of the erotic. He might enter it as a Judge William who would marry the girl. He might enter it as a Johannes who would seduce the girl. He might enter it as a Victor Eremita who through gallantry would not marry the girl but would preserve her as his muse. Our question is - how might a young man, who is in the second stage of erotic seeking, enter into the third stage of erotic desire with the concentration of the young swain? Kierkegaard takes great pains to describe all the possible nuances of this transition.

First, Kierkegaard describes for us the young man in that second stage of erotic longing as seeking. We find him in that condition as he gives his speech at The Banquet. He is one who has never been in love but he is highly interested in it. It appears to him contradictory and comic. He cannot understand how a man and a woman could express their love for each other in time and space. For that would be to reduce the loftiest ideals to the mundane. It is in this very mixture of the ideal and the mundane that he sees the ground of the contradiction and the comedy. He does not yet concentrate his desire on a particular person. Therefore, he is open to the ways of the other pseudonyms.

Judge William represents the ethical way in which the young man might put an end to his erotic seeking and become mature in the desire of one woman. Marriage is the universally accepted way for a young man to settle down and attain
his goals in the finite and temporal. Through a decision of positive resolution, the young man will eventually be able to end his seeking and become happy. Thus, the second part of *Stages on Life's Way* and the second volume of *Either/Or* are appeals to the young man from the Judge, so that when he finally meets the right girl he might become an ethically solid citizen of the earth.

However, there are other appeals. Johannes the Seducer, in his speech at the end of *The Banquet* and in his diary at the end of the first volume of *Either/Or*, presents the beauties of his way of desiring the beautiful. His way is an exception to the universal order but it is interesting. He will not allow the gods to catch him on the fish hook of marriage whereby they sap him of his creative energy. No, he will just suck the delicious bait, which is the sweet and tender virgin, off of each hook and then in glee leave the hook dangling there bare.

So, the young man is faced, as he goes seeking on his way, with the two conflicting paths of the ethical and the aesthetic. They seem again to be locked in the utter contradiction of the *Either/Or*. But like Abraham he pursues his goal with perseverance. When we meet him once again he has finally fallen in love. And, oh, what a love it is! It is the very love of the young swain for his princess. It is in *Repetition* that Kierkegaard tells us of the detail of this story of his love.
In Repetition we see that the young man is not following the way of Judge William or the way of the seducer. Rather he is following the way of Victor Eremita, the victorious hermit. Victor appears explicitly as the editor of Either/Or and as the third orator at The Banquet. However, the way of life which he symbolizes is that of the young swain or Knight of Infinite Resignation in Fear and Trembling and that of Quidam in Stages on Life's Way. Even Johannes de Silentio and Johannes Climacus keep quiet his secret and have climbed up by his leap. It is into the position of Victor Eremita that the young man is taken up in Repetition. Thus, this one aesthetic position appears in all the early works of Kierkegaard's aesthetic authorship and it is the central position which he there seeks to clarify. For, it is precisely the position of the religious aesthete.

We might assume that Victor, as editor of Either/Or, has some sympathy for both the way of the aesthete and the way of the ethical man. If we look carefully at his philosophy of life as it is manifest in his Banquet oration, we see that this is so. He is one of the aesthetes. He is fully accepted as an aesthete by the other four. And yet he is very different from the others. In his gallantry he always stays at a distance from the one whom he loves that she might be his muse. In short, he has made a resolution not to marry. This is a very ethical undertaking. As Judge
William explains in the ethical section of *Stages on Life's Way*, it is precisely resolution which characterizes the ethical.⁵ That resolution can be of two types, either the positive or the negative. Victor Eremita is the personification of negative resolution. So it is with our young swain. He loves with such a concentration that he cannot even marry. And how did that concentration arise? As we look at what is common to Victor Eremita and the young man we can finally answer that question.

In short, we can account for the intensity or the concentration of the young swain by two factors: immersion in the tradition of eros and immersion in himself through chastity. As we listen to the young man in his *Banquet* oration and in *Repetition* and in the first volume of *Either/Or*, we see that he has read and thought through the whole of the literature on Eros. And just as Victor was very careful to protect his ideal through celibacy, so the young man sought his ideal by striving for purest chastity. He even says such things of himself as the following:

"I have never, because it was smart, challenged a woman by a glance, but I have cast my eyes down, unwilling to abandon myself to an impression before I have clearly made out what is the significance of that power under the dominion of which I am about to let myself fall."⁶

During this period of longing as seeking he sought to feel
and express the ideal love. He sought to be chaste until the right moment came that it might be the greatest of all moments. He sought to be a poet that he might express it in the most beautiful of words. In this way our young man prepared himself to become a Victor Eremita. Without such immersion in tradition and without such chastity such a love would not be possible. And what was this love? It was a love of prodigious concentration. Through his reading and his thought and his striving for purity, the young man had opened within himself the capabilities for all that intensity of feeling which we see in the young swain. But what did that intensity imply? It implied that through his love for the princess the young swain would even come to love God. What does that mean?

In Repetition we see that the young man did not suck the bait off the hook as did the seducer, but rather the girl was for him the fishing fly by which God caught the young man for himself. In The Banquet Victor tells us that by loving with gallantry a man could become a genius, or a poet, or a knight or a saint. This gallantry is another word for concentration. It was made possible for Victor by the tradition of chivalry and by his chastity. And we know that our young swain comes to love God as he loves his princess. Why and how does erotic inspiration open a man to God so that with Johannes de Silentio he can say those beautiful words:
"I am convinced that God is love, this thought has for me a primitive lyrical validity." 8

It is the young swain's love for the princess that gives him this conviction. What is the structural force of that primitive lyrical validity?

This phenomenon of discovering God in erotic love is the phenomenon of platonic love, which Socrates describes in his second speech of the Phaedrus. It is the same phenomenon which Dante experienced when he fell in love with Beatrice and which Petrarch experienced when he fell in love with Laura. It is the phenomenon which Soren Kierkegaard describes again and again showing now these nuances now those. It is the central phenomenon of his aesthetic literature and especially of Repetition. In short, this falling in love with a girl so as to fall in love with God, even to the point of becoming a poet and a saint, is the first movement of the leap.

The young swain loved the princess with such concentration that he discovered within his relationship to her the infinite and the eternal. During this period of trial he sought to be in the company of the holy ones who lived as chastely, of the poets who sang as purely. He tried to immerse himself in the tradition and in the chastity to which it admonished him. But while he knew these so as to seek them, he could not bend himself to them so as to live them. He was not concentrated. His energies were dispersed
in distraction. The goal which he sought with so much longing seemed that it could never be his. He must have prayed, as did the holy ones whom he read about, but without their total abandon. That abandon was his one and only wish. He must have struggled in his idealistic moments for purest chastity just as did his heroes, but he was without their constancy. That constancy was his one and only wish. He must have tried to express himself with "the rhyme, the rhythm, the carol, the creation" of his idols but he was without their poetry. That poetry was his one and only wish. And then, when it seemed that he could never attain his goal, when it seemed that the ethical demands of time and space would always make impossible his aesthetic ideals, there appeared the princess. Just as Isaac came to Abraham, so the princess came to the young swain and he entered into that new immediacy. Before it had always seemed to him that a particular woman would be a temptation. He had always cast down his eyes. But now he looked into her eyes and he found that she was his saving angel. She was not an occasion of sin. She was his sacramental. She was his way to the divine. From her streamed out the eternal and the infinite.

All of a sudden chastity was no longer difficult. He never even felt it as a problem. He was so concentrated upon her beauty that there could not enter his mind the slightest temptation to impurity. All of a sudden he loved
God with total fervor. He felt her in all that he experienced. How he praised that God of Beauty who shone forth in splendour out of all beings. How he thanked that gracious God who had fulfilled his farthest longings. Through the princess there came to the young swain a new mood of euphoric glory and power. She was to him infinitely perfect. Through her he saw the whole world as perfect. In everything in the world he experienced the infinite perfection of God. He knew that his love for her was eternal. There could never be an end to this absolute bliss as long as he loved her. He felt this with that primitive lyrical validity. Now he experienced first hand the eternal itself. Thus, in praise and thanksgiving, in glory and in power, the young swain, with his every breath, lived and moved and had his being in the infinite and the eternal. No wonder then that pure poetry came rushing forth from within him. Now through her he was all that he ever wanted to be. God had revealed himself through his goddess.

So, our young man has reached the threshold. He has fallen in love and upon leaving that aesthetic stage of longing as seeking he has now passed into the path of desire. But, before he knows it, new problems arise. There is not only one way here. There is the path of the judge or marriage. There is the path of Johannes or seduction. There is the path of Victor or gallant celibacy. We know that the young swain chooses the path of Victor. Johannes
de Silentio writes of him:

"Love for that princess became for him the expression for an eternal love, assumed a religious character, was transfigured into a love for the Eternal Being, which did, to be sure, deny him the fulfillment of his love yet reconciled him again by the eternal consciousness of its validity in the form of eternity, which no reality can take from him." 13

We know that Victor thinks that marriage is fudge, that seduction is fudge, and that even the way of the ladies' tailor is fudge. 14 To him only one way is heroic and that is the way of celibacy. What is Soren Kierkegaard's argument for celibacy? Even to the end of his life he saw celibacy as of great value and as a vital need of his times. In the satirical writings of his last years he even condemned marriage in order to show the necessity of celibacy. 15

Why was he so concerned about this matter?

Soren Kierkegaard's answer to this great question is quite simple and it must not be blurred over with excessive words. He thought that celibacy and chastity are so important because it is through them that the majesty of God reveals itself. 16 Of course, he does admit that there might be other ways that are just as effective. 17 But for Kierkegaard the majesty of God became real for a man most often in chastity and celibacy. That is not to say that this happens often.
This majesty of God refers to His infinity and
eternity, to His power and glory, which one experiences in
erotic inspiration. Through the ideality which the beloved
brings the lover, he is convinced of immortality\textsuperscript{18} and
exalted to infinity.\textsuperscript{19} He experiences the divine power in
poetic creativity and the divine glory in all that exists.
Victor knew that chastity made this erotic inspiration
possible and he knew that celibacy would preserve it. He
wanted this ideality as his highest value and, therefore,
celibacy became for him a necessity, even an easy necessity.

The peculiarity of Kierkegaard's notion of chastity
is that it is not only compatible with erotic love but fully
possible only through it. Of course, this notion would not
have been peculiar to Plato or Dante or Petrarch but it is
to most other people. The detail of the dialectic is as
follows: the young man through the tradition in which he
was steeped sought to be a pure and poetic lover of infinite
perfection. This was his greatest longing. But he could
not attain it. Then he fell in love with a girl. She
became a princess and he the young swain. Through his
chaste love for her he had all he wanted. She brought him
love of God and ascetic victory. Through her he became the
victorious hermit. He knew that if he wanted he could live
forever in this state of erotic God intoxication. All he
would have to do would be to preserve his erotic love for
the princess. That he would do through celibacy. His very
love for her gave him the energy and concentration which made this celibacy easy. Thus he became a Knight of Infinite Resignation.

The young swain is now at that point of the new immediacy in its fullest bloom as was Abraham when he possessed Isaac without threat. But then as he is leaping blissfully along his way it again begins at times to appear like the path toward marriage. This impression becomes stronger and stronger. And before long a new threat has arisen. Just as Abraham was challenged, so is the young swain. It seemed that the sacrifice would take Isaac from Abraham. Now it seems that marriage must take away the princess and make of her a housewife. Victor knows the necessity of celibacy and it is even easy. Why does the temptation of marriage with all of its suffering even arise?

Again, Kierkegaard is very clear in his answer to this question. Something arises in his love relationship for which the young swain had not bargained. The girl falls in love with him and even though it is possible that she too might enter the order of knighthood it seems to the young swain that she will want to marry. He comes to think that she suffers because of unfulfilled love and his sympathy for her suffering becomes, for him a momentous torture. It is primarily because of sympathy that the erotic love is first led in the direction of marriage.

There seems to be a natural tendency within the
aesthetic which again and again brings it into collision with the ethical. His new suffering aggravates the young swain to even greater and greater poetic expression. It is as if the only way he can express his love to his lady is through poetry. But, of course, this only causes her to love him the more and, hence, him to suffer the more. In his sympathetic imaginings he even begins to consider the joys of married life. The beautiful descriptions of marriage in the second volume of *Either/Or* and the second part of *Stages on Life's Way* are such poetic overflows. The judge, as he claimed, was really showing the aesthetic beauties of marriage. A fully ethical man could not separate himself from marriage in poetic rhapsody, he would just fully live in the temporal and the finite.

And so it is that the young swain again comes to suffer. Even the most noble of aesthetic paths becomes trapped in the circle of the unhappy search for beauty. Two ways split the heart of the young swain. Shall he sacrifice his muse and marry, or shall he sacrifice his wife and remain a Knight of Infinite Resignation? It seems that he will be guilty in either decision. To marry would be to follow the ethical way of universal order but it would be to betray the higher law within him. Not to marry would be unfair to the princess and would deprive him of his natural happiness in the finite and temporal world. This new suffering of his conscience only aggravates him the more.
Kierkegaard's thought is that when this decision presents itself to a man he should choose the aesthetic way and teleologically suspend the ethical. That is, a man should become a Knight of Infinite Resignation. He must fully make the first movement of the leap by saying no to the universal. Kierkegaard argues for this with great skill. In Stages on Life's Way he shows the values of negative resolution and even has the judge argue for a higher way than that of marriage. This way is the way of the justified exception. And not just any exception to the ethical order is justified. The way of the ladies' tailor and the way of the seducer are not justified. Kierkegaard works out a set of very rigid and exact criteria whereby he will allow one to follow the higher way and rebel against the universal order. The last half of Fear and Trembling shows the nature of such a rebellion. But it is at the end of Repetition that Kierkegaard gives us the most succinct and picturesque summary of his criteria for the justified exception. In this beautiful image of the wrestling match Kierkegaard shows us how the individual arises in his struggle with the universal order and how even the universal profits thereby.

So then, Kierkegaard demands that one suspend the ethical in terms of his criteria. But there are two ways in which this can be done. The young swain can choose not to marry just as a Knight of Infinite Resignation or also as a
Knight of Faith. In either case he must choose not to marry. For even if he is to be a Knight of Faith, he must first be a Knight of Infinite Resignation. Kierkegaard always insists that religiousness A is necessary for religiousness B and he insists with special emphasis in the story of the young swain. This means, if one is making the leap through love of a woman, that if one is to enter into Christian marriage, he must first have decided to be a celibate. In short, Kierkegaard sees it as necessary for the Knight of Faith that he must first experience the divine majesty.

But now a new problem arises. The young swain decides to be a celibate and yet he gets married. How does that happen? What is this leap of faith by which he first renounces earthly marriage and then at the same time has it? Does Kierkegaard think that one can be in a state of erotic inspiration and be married at the same time even to the same woman? From what he tells us in Fear and Trembling his answer seems to be in the affirmative. But it is only in The Works of Love that he begins to explain the inner structures of this Christian love which can retain both the aesthetic and ethical at once.

In Fear and Trembling we see that the second movement of the leap is made by virtue of the absurd. It seems that one will decide for celibacy knowing all the while, through faith, that he will be able to marry his love.
This is a contradiction introduced and overcome only by faith. No human calculation can see how the marriage will come about but one trusts that it will through a power greater than human calculation. That power, therefore, is a gift of God. The Knight can make the first movement of the leap completely by his own power. But all of his energy is concentrated on giving the girl up. It is through a gift of grace that he believes he will receive her.\textsuperscript{27}. As long as he believes he will receive her he still lives in time and finitude. He is not just a Knight of Infinite Resignation.

When examining the stage structures of the dialectical leap with the example of Abraham, we saw how the aesthetic and the ethical became new. We saw how something of each was preserved even to the extent that it became doubled. But that is only part of the dialectic for there is also a cancellation. When one makes the second movement of faith, it is not as if he has erotic inspiration and married love joined together without any change at all taking place within them. No, certain elements of each are cancelled and certain elements are preserved. This cancellation and elevation takes place in the leap of Christian love which is a new and higher love. It both cancels and preserves elements of the lower loves. How does this dialectic of love take place?

In\textit{ Works of Love} Kierkegaard writes:
What is it that really binds the temporal and the eternal? What is it other than love, which therefore is before everything else and remains when all else is past? We have seen that the temporal is connected with the ethical and the eternal with the aesthetic. What is this love that is before them and which binds them and which remains when they are past? Once we have seen its nature and have seen how it differs from erotic and married love, then we can see how it cancels and preserves them.

Soren Kierkegaard's meditation upon Christian love centers on the commandment - "you shall love your neighbour." The essence of Christian love is shown in its contrast with erotic love, friendship, and married love. All of these loves are preferential. That is, my erotic feelings are directed only to one or a few as are my feelings of friendship. Likewise I only marry one or a few. But neighbourly love is to be directed to all humans. No preference on the basis of neighbourly love is possible. One admires the beloved or the friend. But no admiration is necessary for neighbourly love. One has self love in his love for his beloved and his friend. They are truly the alter ego. But neighbourly love casts out this egoism.

Love of neighbour also differs from these other loves in that it is God mediated. As Kierkegaard writes:
"Worldly wisdom thinks that love is a relationship between man and man. Christianity teaches that love is a relationship between: man - God - man, that is that God is the middle term."31

Christian love is not merely love of all men but it is love of all men because God has commanded it. In order to be love of neighbour, Christian love must first be love of God. Mere humanitarianism again is a preferential love, it is a group selfishness. In it one may prefer to love all men but when the motive is not rooted in the God command it can never be a true I-thou love.32 Altruism that is not God mediated will always be egoism even if it is the alter ego whom I love.

It is the command that distinguishes Christian love from all other loves. Those words - "you shall" - indicate that Christian love is not preferential but is instead God mediated. When one loves his neighbour because he is motivated by this command, he is taken beyond egoism. When one is motivated by this command of God, God is always present in his action. But, how strange are those words - "you shall love!" To eros and friendship this command would be an affront. No poet who sings the beauty of these loves would ever consider them as rooted in duty. They are beautiful precisely in their very spontaneity. It is this command to love that makes Christian love different from all other loves.
But just because it is different does not mean that it is not related to the other loves. As we have seen, Kierkegaard thinks that eros can prepare the way for Christian love. We are now seeking to understand how Christian love cancels and yet preserves erotic and married love. But before we do that, let us first recall how eros can prepare the way for this Christian love.

Kierkegaard's theory was that one must first make the leap of the Knight of Infinite Resignation before he can make the leap of the Knight of Faith. Or, putting it more exactly, the leap of faith includes that of resignation. In terms of love, this means that Christian love first of all depends upon chastity even to the point that it results in erotic inspiration and its accompanying celibacy. This celibacy is a necessary condition, therefore, of Christian love but it is never a sufficient condition. It is merely human and could never bring one to an awareness of Christian love. That can only arise with faith which is a gift of God. Only if one believes will he know of that command - "you shall love your neighbour." It is the collision of erotic inspiration, wherein one wants to marry but wants to be celibate, that opens a person to receive the gift of Christian love. And what does this gift do for him in his condition of collision? It enables him to receive both loves anew just as faith enabled Abraham to receive Isaac a second time. We are now ready to understand how this
Christian love precedes the aesthetic and ethical love and how it binds them and how it remains even when they are past.

For one living within the Christian tradition, there are two meanings in the idea that neighbourly love is before everything else. First, if one grows up in that tradition and learns of its ideals, then he will in some vague way seek after this ideal of neighbourly love. He may confuse it at first with the other loves but eventually his confusion will bring him to contradictions. The implicit goal will be first in his intention even though it is last for him in explicit execution. Secondly, this idea means that if one comes to understand the command, then his neighbourly love will be the foundation for his other loves. It will be first in order of importance. As Kierkegaard writes:

"Everyone as an individual, before he relates himself in love to a beloved, to a friend, to lovers, to contemporaries, must first relate himself to God and to God-demand." 33

If he does this, then the eternal and the temporal will become something new for him even in such a way that they can be compatible. Erotic inspiration made the eternal meaningful to our young swain as he discovered the majesty of God in his chaste love. But then through sympathy he needed to marry and possess her temporally.
But that would take from him his constant awareness of eternity. However, if he loves out of duty he will also love eternally. For,

"only when it is a duty to love, only then is love eternally secured against every change, eternally made free in blessed independence, eternally and happily secured against despair."34

Neighbourly love reveals the eternal even in a new and fuller way. The eternity of erotic love can easily pass. But if one loves out of duty, he will love forever. But love of neighbour is also very temporal. It is accomplished only in the works of love whereby I love my brother right here and now. Thus neighbourly love is both eternal and temporal. The aesthetic and ethical are united within it.

When neighbourly love is seen as the most important love, that is as the first love, then it will offer the chief values of the other loves, that is, an awareness of eternity and the ability to love in time. Once a man's most fundamental needs are satisfied by this love, then he is free to love erotically and in marriage without fear that one will destroy the others. The point is - if neighbourly love is placed first, then it can unite the most important elements of the other two loves and preserve them.

Neighbourly love, thus, cancels out the selfishness of erotic and married love. But it preserves the awareness of the eternal, that is God's majesty, and the ability to
appreciate the temporal and the finite.

Thus, while Kierkegaard demands celibacy for all Christians, he does not at all condemn erotic love or marriage. He even writes of the Middle Ages as having created a "cleft between body and spirit" and as having "despised love as sensuality." But he saw this as "a misunderstanding, an extravagance of spirituality." Because of the double movement leap, Kierkegaard can write:

"'You shall love your neighbour'. Just as this command will teach every man how he ought to love himself, likewise will it also teach erotic love and friendship what genuine love is: in love towards yourself preserve love to your neighbour, in erotic love and friendship preserve love to your neighbour."36

In loving away the scandal of love he does not have to say that there are many contrary ways. He can, through his synthesis, bind them all together. His philosophy allows him that beautiful harmony whereby he can write:

"Love your beloved faithfully and tenderly, but let love to your neighbour be the sanctifier in your covenant of union with God; love your friend honestly and devotedly, but let love to your neighbour be what you learn from each other in the intimacy of friendship with God!"37
I will not even comment upon those words of Kierkegaard lest I take something from them. I say only - amen.
CHAPTER III

THE EXPERIENTIAL STRUCTURES OF THE LEAP

In the great gallery of Fear and Trembling there is the painting of the two Knights making the leap. This painting reveals the stage structures of the leap. Immediately after it, there is the painting of the young swain and his princess which reveals the love structures of the leap. But preceding both of these and at the very beginning of the gallery we see the fourfold painting of Abraham and Isaac at the sacrifice.¹ This painting rightfully comes first for it reveals the experiential structures of the leap. Soren Kierkegaard did not arrive at his central insight only through philosophical speculation and historical analysis. First and before all else, he acquired his vision through a reflection upon his own life. By interpreting the double movement leap in terms of his life and his life in terms of the leap, perhaps some further light can be cast upon each.

In the fourfold painting of Abraham and Isaac, we see four possible ways in which the sacrifice could have been made. The first and the fourth possibilities show two possible results for Isaac. The second and the third possibilities treat of two possible results for Abraham. In the first of the four pictures, we see what we might call
"the noble lie." At first the father tries to explain to the child why the child must be sacrificed. But the child cannot understand. So then the father pretends to be an idolater and the child, while not understanding his father, at least has faith in the God of Abraham. In the fourth picture Isaac loses his faith because he sees that his father hesitates just for a moment in doubt. In the second picture, the father becomes disillusioned because God has demanded this sacrifice of him and he can no longer live with joy. In the third picture, the father thinks that he is guilty of a great sin in being willing to sacrifice his son. Thus, in the painting we see how reason presents contradictory sets of possibilities. Isaac's faith might be lost if the father does not carry out the sacrifice with absolute obedience. But, on the other hand, the whole sacrifice might only be a temptation which would plunge Abraham into greatest sin. Such is the collision. And it might be so great that it will ruin Abraham no matter what the outcome.

This witch's cauldron of writhing snakes is not just a product of Kierkegaard's imagination for it was his way of life day after day and hour after hour. Here in these four pictures he paints the great collision of the aesthetic and the ethical as he does in the picture of the two Knights and in the picture of the young swain and his princess. But, in this fourfold painting of Abraham and Isaac one can feel the
suffering and magnificence of Kierkegaard's own life even more than in those other two paintings. For in this painting of Abraham and Isaac we have a double symbolism which brings to mind not only his relationship with Regina but also his relationship with his father. His relationship with Regina and with his father were the main events of his life. All of his other relationships were greatly influenced by them. His very notion of the double movement leap grew out of these two relationships.

Kierkegaard had five kinds of human love relationships which were all interconnected. There was parental love, erotic love, married love, friendship, and neighbourly love. Throughout all of these loves developed his love for God and his love for God influenced all of these loves. Why were his love for his father and his love for Regina so important for all of these love relations? Can one describe in detail the interconnections of his loves? Perhaps with the aid of his concept of the double movement leap this can be done. Perhaps the central insight of his philosophy will clarify some of the enigmas of his life. And, of course, while this clarification is being made, the very notion of the double movement leap might become more meaningful. Our task is not that of the biographer. Lowrie has written two wonderful biographies of Kierkegaard. Our task is to better understand Kierkegaard's basic philosophical insight; and in so doing to perhaps clarify some of the mysteries which a biographer of
It is the fourth picture of the painting that most brings to mind Soren's relationship with his father. Here we see the great influence which the father has upon the faith of the son. Abraham was very calm and serene in preparing the sacrifice but as he raised the knife he clenched his left hand in despair and a tremor passed through his body. Isaac saw it and that was enough. In spite of all the rest of his father's shining example, Isaac lost his faith.

The only parental love which Kierkegaard discusses is that of his father for himself. He does not seem to take up his relationship with his mother at all. One can find a good summary of the chief elements of Kierkegaard's relation with his father in Lowrie's Short Life. There are three phases of this relationship: unity, separation and reconciliation. The pertinent elements in the early phase of the relation seem to be the following: (1) Kierkegaard was a very serious and religious man who, because of success in business, could retire early and devote himself to philosophy and theology. (2) The father instilled an ethical punctuality and discipline in Soren so that the young boy would study as if it were his sacred duty. (3) The father was a source of shame for the boy so that he never invited anyone to his strange home. (4) The father contributed toward the development of a prodigious dialectical imagination in the
boy. (5) The father inculcated within the boy a great religious idealism. (6) The father was concerned about sexual purity. How do these details further clarify the stage and the love structures of the leap? What do they indicate concerning Kierkegaard's further development?

Within the context of this paternal love, Soren was, from the beginning, introduced to the religious and the ethical. Of course, he was a child and could relate to it only with aesthetic immediacy. But for a clear understanding of the relation between the stages, it is important to note that the religious and the ethical were there in an implicit way from the beginning. In fact, they even precede an out and out aesthetic life which would come along in his late youth. Thus, his father introduced him to a certain severe interpretation of the Christian tradition and was the source of a great discipline and idealism within the boy. From his earliest years, the boy immediately followed ethical demands and admired religious heroism. He greatly admired his father's piety and his father's thoughts. He wanted to please his father and to imitate him. And yet still there was an ambivalent mixture of shame in this child's pious admiration. The father was not like other fathers and he dressed and treated the boy unlike other boys. Already in the child some collision was starting to brew, a collision that was handed down from the father.
When treating the love structures of the leap, we saw how one could make the transition from immediate erotic love to full erotic inspiration only if he were introduced to the ideals of a tradition and only if, because of these ideals, he strove for chastity. How this concretely takes place one can see in the details of Kierkegaard's own life. Through the example and constant teaching of his father, Kierkegaard was early introduced to a religious and ethical tradition and to some desire for purity. His imagination was quickened and all of this prepared him for that great concentration which the young swain must have if he is to love as Kierkegaard loved.

Thus, the father gave the boy a clear direction in life. He set the little one going on that path which was religious. He gave the boy a great strength of concentration and imagination. The boy was interested in the ideal and the heroic. He could not see the end of the path. It was far beyond him. The father even gave the boy a great energy by which he sought that God which his imagination set so high. And yet, at the same time the boy was different and ashamed. So it was that he entered the world outside of his home and began to make his friends. His friendships and all of his loves would be forever, marked by his relationship with his father.

The father had carried the boy in his strong arms of piety and imagination and idealism but the boy felt some
slight trembling of weakness. But gradually the boy started to walk on his own, to stand side by side with other boys and with other teachers and to appreciate the world with them. As he joined arms with others the more firmly, the more certainly did he feel the weakness of his father's arms. Finally, when he was seventeen, Soren entered the university and for the first time pursued the study of liberal arts and he was truly liberated toward the aesthetic. With his new friends he now came to appreciate music and poetry and mathematics and science. But this only separated him from his father's way the more. Two paths were growing out of the one and the collision was becoming more and more explicit. Friendship and erotic love were beginning to make their appeal. He was awakening from the dream of the child to the seeking of youth.

Finally, the split with his father became complete. Kierkegaard came to a crossroads and he abandoned the path of the religious and followed the path of the aesthetic. He calls this occasion the great earthquake and writes about it in Quidam's Diary in Stages on Life's Way. There he points out how horrible it is to have to be ashamed of one's father whom one loves so deeply. Under the image of David, the father, and Solomon, his son, Kierkegaard paints another of those magnificent pictures and this time he shows how a son can lose his faith because of the sin of his father.

Here we see the very same sentiment that we saw expressed in
the fourth of the Abraham Isaac pictures. Isaac lost his faith because of the tremor in Abraham's body. Solomon lost his faith because of the sobbing in David's repentant body. Kierkegaard at the age of 22 explicitly and clearly faced the guilt of his father and, in disillusionment, he left his former hero and followed the aesthetic path with Solomon.

Thus, for three years, from his twenty-second birthday in May of 1835 until he was twenty-five did he follow the path of longing as desire. He abandoned not only his father but also his father's religion. He immersed himself in the aesthetic tradition of Don Juan and Faust and the Wandering Jew. He asserted that philosophy and Christianity were not compatible and he chose philosophy. However, as much as he tried to abandon himself to the aesthetic, he could not forget his father and religion. Christianity kept tempting him back. In leaving his father, Kierkegaard did not escape the collision. It only became greater and greater.

As could be expected with Kierkegaard, the collision centered around the problem of sexuality. Lowrie points out how Kierkegaard considered himself to be uncommonly erotic. Then Lowrie writes that this must be taken with a grain of salt for those who knew him best thought of him as an uncommonly pure man. But, there is no reason to speak of a grain of salt here. As in the case of Plato and Augustine, a great eroticism and a great purity are by no means contra-
dictory but rather it is possible that they can even foster each other. Lowrie keeps buzzing around Kierkegaard's sexuality like a bee around a flower but he never does quite draw out the honey. 7 Lowrie even mentions that Kierkegaard saw himself as "an extraordinary combination of purity and impurity." 8 But then, Lowrie dilutes this by saying that Kierkegaard has a rare sense of shame. Undoubtedly that is true. But that need not imply, as Lowrie seems to imply, that he was not very erotic.

So Kierkegaard went further than did Abraham and further than did the young man. Abraham left his father and went seeking. But he did it for a new faith that he never abandoned. The young man left the dreaming immediacy that he displayed at The Banquet and sought the feminine by falling in love. But he never lost his purity. Kierkegaard, however, as his biographers agree, not only suffered the guilt of his father but the dread which arose from his father's guilt precipitated his own fall into sin. 9

As a result of his momentous tension between purity and impurity, Kierkegaard went through a nightmare of struggling and falling. Time after time he made resolutions to sin no more but as Lowrie so nicely puts it "so many resolutions would not have been needed if he had not been continually relapsing." 10 This does not mean, of course, that Kierkegaard was a frequent fornicator or adulterer. No, his falling must have been of a more secret and shameful
type. A Don Juan might boast of his escapades and Faust would not mind if others knew that he seduced Margaret. But Kierkegaard could only hide his sin in lonely shame. Kierkegaard himself even writes about:

"visiting one of those places where, strangely enough, one gives money for a woman's despicableness."\(^{11}\)

But he could never write about the cause of his many renewed resolutions. That is, unless he hid it under the symbol of "thorn in the flesh."

In any case, the problem was no light one. Kierkegaard even thought of suicide. But precisely at this moment he experienced a new and partially saving love. In June of 1836, his friend, Paul Møller, must have given Kierkegaard some boost. For, as Lowrie points out, Kierkegaard refers to Møller as "the mighty trumpet of my awakening."\(^{12}\) In September of 1836 Kierkegaard discovered George Hamann who, although he lived before Kierkegaard, became one of Kierkegaard's great dead friends. As Lowrie puts it - these friends planted seed thoughts in Kierkegaard's mind.\(^{13}\) Through them Kierkegaard began to become intellectually convinced that Christianity was the right way of life. Once again as a result of these friends, Kierkegaard began turning toward the religion of his father. But the path back was not easy. Though he was intellectually free, he could still not morally free himself. His despair
even became the greater. Before the trumpet blast of his friends, he was at least wholly on the aesthetic path even though he was ashamed of it. But with the sound of the trumpet, his mind and his heart were now split asunder. Now he did not even believe in the aesthetic way but helplessly he could not abandon it.

In the summer of 1837 when he was twenty-four and in the midst of his despair, he fell in love at first sight with Regina Olson, a girl of fourteen years. Less than one year later he became reconciled to his father and to his religion. The great question is - was there a relationship between his erotic love and the renewal of his love for his father and for God? Lowrie is aware that some great religious experience took place on May 19, 1838, at 10:30. He is aware that on July 6 Kierkegaard went to confession. Lowrie wonders about what happened in this experience of indescribable joy and he thinks that Kierkegaard never revealed what happened. But is that true? Is it not very probable that it was Kierkegaard’s love for Regina that occasioned his reconciliation with his father and with God? As we pointed out in the last chapter, Kierkegaard frequently writes of the poetic and religious inspiration that can come from eros. The first movement of the leap can be made through erotic inspiration. This was the case with Victor Eremita, the young man in Repetition, the young swain in Fear and Trembling and Quidam in Stages on Life's Way.
Would it not be very strange indeed if it were not Kierkegaard's love for Regina that occasioned this great religious experience?

What must have happened is this. He fell in love with Regina in 1837. Slowly this began to have its effect upon him. His love for her and her love for him must have given him a new euphoria. He must have begun to recognize with that primitive lyrical certitude as he says in Fear and Trembling that God is love. He must have warmed not only towards God but also toward his father. Finally, it must have all become explicit in that double forgiveness of father and son on May 19 of 1838. This was the first movement of the leap. Kierkegaard now experienced the joy and the power of the eternal. He even had strength to go to confession. In all likelihood, he was now so snatched out of boredom and dread that impurity was not even a problem for him. Regina was truly his Regina. She was his princess who saved him from that which he hated most, his impurity. She was the occasion of his reconciliation with his father and with God. Friendship had occasioned his intellectual conviction of the rightness of the path of religion. But only eros could convince him emotionally, as it did. An aesthetic love had made possible religious love. They were not conflicting paths after all.

Of course, like his pseudonyms, Kierkegaard did not only become a religious man as a result of his love for
Regina. He also became a poet. He wrote his dissertation with as much ease as he loved God and with as much ease as he was morally pure. Regina enabled him to be the perfect aesthete, the perfect ethical man and the perfect religious man. Or so it seemed for a while - for, just as Abraham received his Isaac and was then called upon to sacrifice him, so was Soren called upon to sacrifice his Regina.

Now we cast our eyes upon the first of the four pictures. There we see Abraham gazing down upon his son with wildness and horror in his face and in his body. He grabs the boy by the throat and flings him to the ground screaming to his son that he himself is an idolater. In a few brief months, Soren will find it necessary to do this to his tender and loving darling, to his princess and his wife to be. What happened to bring about this new and even more dreadful collision of the aesthetic and the ethical? Why could Kierkegaard not marry Regina? Why did he break his engagement?

Kierkegaard thought his way into the love of marriage as one who did not marry. Just why he did not marry can be seen through a careful analysis of Quidam's Diary. Here we can see how the second great collision between the aesthetic and the ethical arose. Basically there are five interconnected reasons which Quidam gives for not marrying. They have to do with: melancholy, the meaning of life, the divine counter order, the apex of desire, and the inspiration
of his erotic love.

Melancholy is a tremendously complex and technical term for Kierkegaard. He sees it as arising out of his relationship with his father. It is a faithful mistress to whom he must be faithful. It can bring a man to resolve not to marry because he must always battle with his melancholy and therefore could not be properly attentive to his wife. It gave him a heaviness which did not fit with Regina's lightness. In some way he feared that he would lose his melancholy if he married. He was his melancholy and he wanted to be faithful to it and to himself and to his father. Marriage would make him unfaithful.

He connected this melancholy with the meaning of his life. He thought that if he did not suffer in this melancholy way, the meaning of his existence would disappear. He could not stand to have his life become empty and have no meaning at all. His love for Regina had filled his life with meaning. But he was afraid that in marrying her, he would become too content and the meaning would flee. The meaning that came from eros seemed to depend upon the mystery and distance of celibate love. It seemed to come from sublimation. He seemed to believe that sexual fulfillment would mean a loss of the fulfillment of his life's meaning.

But this not marrying was not just a plan of his own device. He connected it with what he called a divine counter
order. This divine counter order did not come in a dream or in a vision. It had to do with a collision between repentance and existence. While he was in this collision, he was in a suspended state and could not marry. But as soon as the divine counter order would be lifted, he would be able to marry. Thus, he felt that he would possibly be able to marry some day.

This divine counter order was clear and specific in his mind by means of what he called "the apex of desire." The meaning of his life came through a melancholy longing for the infinite. As long as he needed Regina at a celibate distance in order to bring this about, the divine counter order was dear. He could not marry. She was the source of what he called the elasticity of passion. She stretched out his mind so that he longed for the eternal. He knew that another way of keeping himself at the apex of desire might come and when it did, he could marry her. But, until then he must preserve her as his muse.

So the whole reason that he could not marry her at the time was that he could not afford to lose her as his source of inspiration. She was the source of all that he held dear - his aesthetic and ethical and religious excellence - and he wanted this even more than he wanted her as a wife. For years he had struggled for this in near despair and now through her it was his. He did not want to lose it by entering the contented state of mere ethical
happiness. However, he knew that in some way both could be his. He knew that the divine counter order could be lifted and that he could still be in contact with the magnificence of God. But now was not the time for that and so - he had to break his engagement. The terrible scene of Abraham pretending to be an idolater shows us what that break meant to Kierkegaard.

As he began to consider the break, his sympathetic feelings opened out to Regina and he could scarcely bear her suffering. He thought he could spare her by this noble lie. He tried to appear to her as a sadistic and fickle rogue. But still she believed in him. Now we can cast our eyes upon the second and third pictures. Would he be able to bear this new and unexpected collision of the aesthetic and ethical? Would he not be guilty even before God by not marrying her? Guilty or not guilty? He could not know through reason where he stood. On the one hand there was the divine counter order which bade him preserve his infinite resignation. On the other hand, there was the feeling of his dearly beloved, her family, and the universal ethical order. He was torn between them in a way he had never been torn even in his previous days of impure isolation and weakness. Now in his strength he suffered more than he had in his impotence. Would he collapse under the burden of this collision and come again to disillusionment? Was he now even a more terrible sinner? He did not know. Such were
the possibilities of his new found aesthetic religion.

In such a state Kierkegaard contemplated the meaning of marriage. He knew full well that some day perhaps he could marry. He knew the way of the Knight of Faith and he at least knew that the divine counter order could be lifted even if one would not want to say that he believed that it would be lifted. In *Repetition* we see him grasping after that belief as he waited for the lifting of the ban in the thunderstorm. But then Regina became engaged to someone else. At this moment we can feel the full significance of the four Abraham-Isaac sacrifice pictures. Kierkegaard not only lived through the horrors of sacrificing Regina and being sacrificed by his own father, he even felt himself as a sacrifice which God offered up for mankind. As he puts it in *Point of View*:

"The thought goes very far back in my recollection that in every generation there are two or three who are sacrificed for the others, are led by frightful sufferings to discover what redounds to the good of others. So it was that in my melancholy I understood myself as singled out for such a fate." 25

Such is the meaning of the four pictures of the sacrifice.

Perhaps Kierkegaard was just approaching the moment when he could marry and he discovered that Regina would marry another. In any event, the meaning of the rest of his life in its key events is clear when we see it in the
light of the double movement leap. In a general way, Kierkegaard knew that the divine counter order could be lifted as early as *Fear and Trembling* in 1843. This is the whole point of the double movement leap and as a result he wrote in his diary of this time - If I only had faith I could marry her."²⁶ It is certain that by 1847 he knew concretely that it was neighbourly love that could permit one to marry. As we have seen, neighbourly love is the synthesis of the eternal and the temporal.²⁷ One can stay in contact with the eternal as long as he has neighbourly love. And yet, at the same time he can marry, he can live in the temporal.

But did Kierkegaard make the double movement leap? Of course, his answer to this would have been - no. It is not something one can make, it is something one, with the grace of God, must always be making. This he and God did. In *Point of View* he writes about the role that divine governance played in his life and there he discusses his authorship and the Corsair Affair. There are two events, together with his belief that he could marry, that are evidence of his making the second movement of the leap. But the whole movement became explicit in his second great religious experience of 1848. Just as the first movement of the leap was focused in the experience of May 19, 1838, so the second movement was focused in the experience of Holy Week of 1848. Finally, there was his attack upon
Christendom which was a further development of this second movement of the leap. So our question is - what do his authorship, the Corsair Affair, the experience of 1848 and the attack have to do with the second movement of the leap?

As we have said, the second movement of the leap is a return to the earth which is made possible by neighbourly love. This is a God given gift that is possible only if one has made the first movement of the leap. Soren Kierkegaard did that through his erotic love for Regina which brought him to the point of infinite resignation. The second movement is a reclaiming of the ethical after it has been suspended even so that it is doubled. He began to do this by his eventual belief that he could marry. But he continued the burial of himself in the earth through his authorship. This was a work of neighbourly love that bound him to men in time and space. As his authorship progressed through the aesthetic to the religious, it became more and more temporal. He moved from an aesthetic indirect communication to a more ethical and Christian form of direct communication.

In the Affair of the Corsair he became even more bound in the temporal and the earthly. He learned the meaning of witness and martyr and saw how this was demanded by neighbourly love. By the time he finished the Postscript he thought that he could fully enter the earth by becoming a country pastor. But this was not for him as he was snatched
up by the Corsair Affair.

Then there was that enigmatic "thorn in the flesh" which kept Kierkegaard bound to the earth. The great experience of Easter Week 1848, wherein he felt that God not only forgave his sin but forgot it, had to do with this thorn in the flesh and with poverty. Just as the experience of '38 had to do with "the thorn in the flesh" and poverty. He lost his money and he came to be able to live with himself, even his thorn in the flesh. This "thorn in the flesh" has something to do with his melancholy and probably his shame. In any event, 1848 marks the full return of Kierkegaard to the earth. He even started using direct communication.

Finally, in his attack he continued to make the second movement of the leap even more magnificently. That is, just as one could not tell the Knight of Faith from the ordinary man of the street, so it was hard to distinguish Kierkegaard from an enemy of the church. Through his satire he was more fully a witness. In the last years of his life, Kierkegaard became a witness to the necessity of the first movement of the leap and thereby made the second movement of the leap.

In such a way did Soren Kierkegaard develop through five stages of love. As a child with his father, he longed for the infinite as in a dream. But then he left his father and went seeking the infinite with friends. At first these
friends led him along paths contrary to that of his father and his father's God. But then other friends came and with a trumpet blast intellectually recalled him to his former way. But morally he could not abandon the new found aesthetic way of seeking. However, on this very way he discovered erotic inspiration and as he came to desire one girl infinitely, he even became reconciled with his father and his father's God. But, then in not being able at once to marry he faced a new collision wherein he had to teleologically suspend the ethical and he did not know whether he was guilty or not guilty. Finally, he discovered neighbourly love by which he was able to reconcile the aesthetic love of eros and the ethical love of marriage. In dethroning both of these loves, neighbourly love could even preserve them both together.

Thus, in Kierkegaard's own life we see an example of the double movement leap. Through the collision of his aesthetic and ethical loves, he discovered that love which transcended and cancelled both and yet at the same time preserved them even to the extent that it doubled them. But, we have only begun to see into the intricacies and the all embracing potentiality of this central insight of Soren Kierkegaard. So far we have emphasized his treatment of the leap as it appears in his early aesthetic literature, now we are ready to move on and see how he analyzes this leap in his predominantly philosophical literature. Here we shall
analyze the leap with Kierkegaard in its sin, reason, and existential structures.
CHAPTER IV

THE SIN STRUCTURES OF THE LEAP

As one studies the life and thought of Kierkegaard it becomes evident that for him there are different levels or gradations of guilt. When he was in the mere aesthetic stage he felt guilty about his impurity. After he fell in love with Regina he felt guilty about his teleological suspension of the ethical when he broke his engagement with her. Even as he made the second movement of the leap, he always felt guilty and needed not only that God forgive him his sin but that God forget it. What is guilt and what are its various gradations? How does one make the transition from one gradation to the other?

As one begins to peer into this very complex and interesting problem in the life and thought of Kierkegaard, he immediately sees that it has to do with the leap. Kierkegaard first begins discussing guilt in a thematic way in The Concept of Dread, and there he constantly affirms that sin comes into the world only through the qualitative leap. We must not avoid the obvious question. We must ask and try to answer that puzzling and awkward question - is the fall into sin the same as the leap of faith? Surely there are not two different leaps are there? Can the leap whereby one sins be different from the leap whereby he
believes?

As one tries to answer the above questions he will find that it is necessary to raise another - how does Kierkegaard define and distinguish original sin and personal sin? His whole discussion of the gradations of sin and the transition between them involves a treatment of original sin. When he examines the leap whereby one makes the transition, he again is involved in the problem of original sin as well as that of personal sin. These three questions concerning the gradations of guilt, the transition from one grade to the other through the leap, and the distinction between original sin and personal sin are so intimately bound together that Kierkegaard does not unravel them one by one but rather all together. We, too, while trying to be ever clear, shall take this approach.

Once again as we wander through the gallery of Fear and Trembling we find another painting that will suitably launch us on our way into a meditation upon sin. In the sketch of Agnes and the Merman, Kierkegaard begins to suggest to us the sin structures of the leap which he will discuss in The Concept of Dread and in the second part of Sickness Unto Death. As we begin to look at this picture we shall pay attention only to the footnote version. Merman is a seducer but an unhappy one. He feels guilty and wants to be saved. He thinks that only a beautiful maiden can save him. He spies on Agnes, then arises up
out of the swamp to take her in his arms only to be saved. But, she looks down into the violent sea and longs for him to seduce her and take her to the bottom. Now a variety of paths lie open to him. Many new levels of guilt beckon to him. Now we must carefully examine his first guilt that brought him to Agnes. We must question each nuance of these new possible guilts. We must even ask about the guilt of Agnes as she wished to be seduced.

We have seen how in the first volume of *Either/Or* Kierkegaard distinguished three stages of the immediate erotic: longing as dream, longing as seeking, and longing as desire. This basic distinction appears constantly in Kierkegaard's writing. Abraham was in the immediacy of a dream when he first heard the promise in Ur of the Chaldees. Then, his longing became that of an indefinite seeking as the promise was constantly threatened in his wanderings through Palestine and Egypt. Finally, with the coming of Isaac his longing for the fulfillment of the promise became concentrated in desire only for his son. So it was with the young swain. In his childhood the masculine and feminine were united within him in the immediate longing of a dream. Then as the young man he began to seek the meaning of love. Finally, his longing became concentrated in the desire for his princess. In Kierkegaard's own experience it was the same. In his childhood with his father, the aesthetic and ethical were united for him the
immediacy of a dream. But then he separated himself slowly from his father and religion and ethics and his aesthetic longing became that of seeking. Through this period he was constantly tempted and was miserable in his guilt. Finally, he fell in love with Regina and he gained the second immediacy of love. He desired only her and was beyond his old guilt. And, so it is in this picture of Agnes and the Merman. Agnes represents the innocence of childhood's dream just as it makes its transition to the guilt of seeking. In the Merman's arms she looks down into the depths and longs to be seduced. That is the beginning of her loss of innocence. But Merman has fallen prey to the temptations of seeking relief through a new and innocent love for Agnes. We first see him on the verge of his second immediacy. What is this first collision of the aesthetic and ethical that leaves a man guilty? What is the nature of the guilt in the stages of first immediacy? How does one succumb to it?

Agnes gazes down into the depths and longs to be taken there and seduced. This is Kierkegaard's image of Dread. In the Concept of Dread he writes:

"One may liken dread to dizziness. He whose eye chances to look down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy. But the reason for it is just as much his eye as it is the precipice. For suppose he had not looked down."
"Thus dread is the dizziness of freedom which occurs when the spirit would posit the synthesis, and freedom then gazes down into its own possibility, grasping at finiteness to sustain itself. In this dizziness freedom succumbs. Further than this psychology cannot go and will not. That very instant everything is changed, and when freedom rises again it sees that it is guilty. Between these two instants lies the leap, which no science has explained or can explain. He who becomes guilty in dread becomes as ambiguously guilty as it is possible to be." 4

Kierkegaard explains the transition from innocence to guilt in terms of dread and he thinks that it is only through dread that one becomes guilty. So the first collision of the aesthetic and ethical is an experience of sinking into one's dread. And what happens in this succumbing is that one gains a certain knowledge of the distinction between good and evil. Innocence is ignorance. 5

In perfect innocence there is that dreamlike blending of good and evil. The movement into dread separates them and brings one to the state of seeking. But what is this dread which entices one to that guilt ridden knowledge of the distinction between good and evil?

This dread arises because of the commandment. It arises because of tradition. Kierkegaard thought that if
from childhood one were commanded not to do something, then he would be in dread of it and this dread would entice him to do it. Adam was told not to eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. But this commandment, through the presence of Eve, preyed on his mind and he succumbed. Kierkegaard's Christian tradition commanded him to be pure and thus it was possible that sensuality could be for him sinful. The Greek tradition too had its commands and thus one could succumb even there into a kind of guilt.

Thus, a distinction emerges between two kinds of guilt which are possible within the spheres of the immediate erotic. Within the natural tradition which Kierkegaard calls the Greek, there is a different kind of dread and guilt than there is in the Christian tradition. Agnes and Merman could not have existed within the Greek context just as a Don Juan or Faust could not have appeared in a non-Christian tradition. The two different traditions give rise to two different kinds of guilt. But before we clarify this distinction we should first pay attention to the next level of guilt which we see in the sketch of Agnes and the Merman. For the same distinction applies at this second level of guilt.

So Agnes loses her childhood innocence by succumbing to dread. She does this within the commands of her tradition and thus her guilt would differ from that of the Greek at the
same level. Such is the first level of guilt. But then we see the Merman at even another level of aesthetic guilt. As a seducer he had been guilty. This guilt was the same as that into which we see Agnes stepping. But then he comes to be cleansed. He is cleansed. He enters into the new immediacy of love. However, a new level of dread comes. He has a new guilt to bear. He makes Agnes unhappy. He cannot take her to the bottom of the ocean, to that place for which his temptation had occasioned her to seek. Here we see the teleological suspension of the ethical. Just as Kierkegaard felt guilty in breaking his engagement, so the Merman experiences the horror of a new and greater guilt. Here we see the second collision of the aesthetic and the ethical.

Both of these collisions take place within a predominantly aesthetic context. Both of them take place before the second movement of the leap begins. The first level of guilt is there before the first movement of the leap. It arose out of the collision which called forth the need for the first movement of the leap. The second level of guilt arose as a result of the first movement of the leap. Within the Christian tradition it calls forth the second movement of the leap. But it is the second movement of the leap which is of vital importance here. Only through it does guilt become true sin. The second movement of the leap is the transition from mere aesthetic guilt to true
Christian sin. It is the transition between the two different traditions. We must now take great care to clarify this leap which is the fall into sin.

So far we have pointed out that there are two different kinds of dread which are rooted in the Greek and the Christian tradition. Kierkegaard refers to these as objective and subjective dread. In the Greek context one is in dread but he is not aware of it as an individual. Thus he can be guilty but never a sinner. For this reason Kierkegaard refers to Greek ethics as improper ethics. The Greek can be either a sophist or a Socrates. He can be totally unaware of ethics or he can be a profoundly ethical man. He can live before or after the first movement of the leap. But in either case he is primarily an aesthete. Even his religion is an aesthetic religion. Of course, the aesthetic exists within the Christian tradition too. But it has different possibilities. One can become aware of his dread as an individual and thus sin can become a possibility. The subjective dread of Christianity is a possibility for Agnes and the Merman. Thus, their earliest moments of aesthetic or objective dread are already touched by a glimmer of subjective dread. Hence, there are two levels of guilt possible in the Greek context and three levels possible in the Christian context. Because of the level of sin within Christianity, even the first two levels differ between the two contexts. So what is the meaning of
the great distinction between objective and subjective dread?

Between the levels of mere guilt there is only a quantitative difference, but between mere guilt and sin there is a qualitative difference. Thus, real sin has two important elements, namely, both a quantitative and a qualitative increase over mere guilt. Real sin involves both a temptation, the quantity, and a free giving into it, the new quality. In order to understand the difference between mere guilt and sin, we must now explicate both the quantitative and the qualitative increase.

Kierkegaard's meditation upon original sin reveals to us three important aspects of the quantitative increase. First, he points out that sin can come into the world only through sin. That is, there cannot first be innocence and then some gradual development of a flaw within innocence until it reaches the point that it is sin. That would be a mere quantitative increase. No, original sin could come into the world only if Adam really sinned. That is, he had to make a real qualitative leap beyond innocence. Sin can enter the world only through a qualitative leap. The quantitative element is a necessary condition of sin but it is not a sufficient condition.

But, the second point is, men inherit the effects of original sin and this can contribute to their sinfulness. From their fathers and from their tradition men receive
those commands which bring them to the edge of the precipice wherefrom they gaze into dread. Hence, original sin can be inherited in greater quantity by one man than it is by another. The quantity of sin refers to the tempting power of inherited dread. Some men inherit far more tradition and far more dread than others. Some men even inherit the Christian tradition which can give even a different kind of dread. The Christian tradition can make possible not only an objective dread but also a subjective dread. Thus, men inherit the quantitative determinants of sin either with the Christian or a non-Christian context and within those contexts in greater or lesser amounts.\textsuperscript{14}

And, the third point is, that in some strange way original sin had the effect that it rendered man incapable of true sin unless he was given some special new grace that would make him capable of sin. This idea follows from the fact that those in the Greek tradition cannot sin while those in the Christian tradition can sin. Because of the command of God, Adam could sin. But then the effects of his sin brought a loss of this ability to sin to his offspring. They were no longer before God to the extent that they could sin. Thus the Greek could not sin. But the Christian through his tradition becomes again like Adam. He can stand once more before God and thus be capable of sin. So the quantitative effects of original sin are different for the Greek and for the Christian. The Greek stands in
a tradition of innocence. The Christian, through the atonement of Christ, once again stands in a tradition where he can leap beyond innocence into sin. For this reason, Don Juan and Merman can exist in the Christian tradition but not in the Greek. The Greek context is too innocent to produce the idea of a Don Juan or a Merman.

So this brings us to the clear insight that the qualitative leap is the only sufficient condition to account for sin. The quantitative condition of tempting dread is necessary but it cannot alone account for sin. It is certain that one needs the special grace of Christ in order to sin. One must make the second movement of the leap in order to sin. Or, shall we say in sinning one makes the second movement of the leap? In answering this question we must be very careful for as Kierkegaard points out in the Merman sketch - "it was not by sin that Abraham became an individual."15 What is the difference between the leap of faith and the qualitative leap that is necessary that one might sin? Our answer which we shall now go on to explicate is - there is no difference in the beginning of the leap, but there is a difference between what Abraham and the sinner do after they start to leap. It is that difference that needs clarification.

After Merman is saved by the innocent Agnes, he begins sympathetically to feel the unhappiness he has brought her. Kierkegaard describes three paths that now
open out before him. He can try to save her by his deceit as did the Abraham of the first picture. But to do this would be to fall into the sin of the demoniacal. He can cease to worry about her and let God save her. He can stay in his state of infinite resignation. But by this he would sin in such a way that he would be lost for the world. Or he could believe that God will save both himself and Agnes. In this way he would not sin. Toward the end of *Sickness Unto Death* Kierkegaard labels these two sins as the sin of despairing over one's sin and the sin of despairing of the forgiveness of sin. Thus, as we think our way into Kierkegaard's concept of sin, we must from the beginning realize that there is more than one kind of sin.

So, sin is despair before God. Despair is Kierkegaard's technical term for guilt. Any guilt that is before God is sin. And what is despair or guilt? It is a break in the relationship which is man. Kierkegaard defines man as a relationship which is related to himself and to God. That is, in his fullest capability he is aesthetic - he is a relation, he is related to the other. But he is also ethical - he is related to himself. And he is religious - he is related to God. If he should be so aesthetic that he is not ethical then he is guilty. He is in despair. If he should be so ethical that he is not aesthetic, then he is in despair. If he should be so religious that he is not both aesthetic and ethical, then he is in despair. So guilt
is a failure to live up to one's full potentialities. Guilt is an emphasis of one of man's relations to the extinguishing of another relation.

But in order for guilt or despair to become sin, it must be possessed in the presence of God. Despair is possible for all men but sin is possible only if one is before God. Thus, being in the presence of God is the decisive determinant by which one leaps into the consciousness of his sin. Thus, the man who has only made the first movement of the leap cannot really sin. This man of religiousness A is not before God, he is God. The mystic qua mystic is so united with the divine that he cannot even sin. It is as a man of faith and not merely as a mystic that one stands apart from God but still before God and thus becomes capable of sin.

But when one is in the presence of God, how can he despair? Kierkegaard's answer to this question is to be found in his notion of dread. We have seen how Adam was issued a command and how he looked down into his freedom and succumbed. In such a way did the fascinated Agnes look down from the arms of Merman into the depths of the ocean. But what is it that happens when one passes from objective dread to subjective dread? For it is this movement which constitutes sin. The aspect of dread which makes this possible is scandal or the offence. This is the great concept which Kierkegaard has worked out in such detail and by
which he shows how the leap of sin can take place. Jesus Christ and his tradition can be offensive either in a lofty or in a lowly way. Just as the Pharisees were scandalized by Jesus because he looked like a mere man but claimed to be God, so can any man be offended by Christ's promise. One can be afraid to take the risk and believe that Christ will really give him the Kingdom of Heaven. This promise is too lofty for his understanding. He can be offended by it and turn away. But, on the other hand, of one believes in the loftiness of Christ, he can be offended by his lowliness. Just as Peter denied Christ thrice before the cock crew, so one who believes in Christ's divinity can be offended by his humanity. He can refuse to accept the earthly. The two kinds of sin—despair over one's sin and despair over the forgiveness of one's sin—are rooted in the two types of offence. If God is too lofty then the sinner sees himself as too lowly. He despairs over his lowliness. But if God appears as lowly and one is offended by the lowly so that one will not admit it, then no forgiveness of his own lowliness is possible.

It is at this point that we can begin to see the difference between the leap of sin and the leap of faith. Notice, grace is necessary both for sin and for faith. One could not be in the presence of God without grace; at most he could be one with God. But grace makes it possible for one to stand before God in such a way that God can be
offensive. Sin is possible only before the offence and faith is possible only before the possibility of the offence. So by the qualitative leap one stands before the offensive Christ. If he succumbs to the offence he sins. If he believes in spite of the offence and thereby is not offended, he is a man of faith. Both men start making the second movement of the leap but then all of a sudden the sinner plunges into the abyss of subjective dread. But how does this happen?

Kierkegaard clarifies this plunge into sin through his notion of procrastination. One receives the revelation that he is in sin. That is, through grace he begins to make the leap. In short, he hears the call of conscience and becomes convinced that he should change his life's way, that he should not sin. He knows that he can change through God's grace. The man of faith acts on the revelation immediately. But the sinner? Well, he procrastinates. He does not act immediately. He puts off the action and thinks and slowly his will begins to cloud his intellect. At first he sees clearly what he should and should not do. But he does not want to do what is right. Then he willfully clouds his intellect. This is sin.

At this point we can begin to understand what Kierkegaard means when he writes that "sin grows every instant one does not get rid of it." Because sin is essentially a mind clouding procrastination whereby one
despairs in the presence of God who offends him, he
continues to sin with every moment of procrastination. One
just keeps destroying the relationship which he is. But,
of course, not all of this sinning need be subjective
sinning. One can lapse off again into objective guilt and
not be in subjective sin. But he is responsible for this
lapse. He may so deaden himself to revelation that he will
forget about sin until he receives another special grace in
that call of conscience.

But what happens when one receives this revelation?
Insofar as sin is concerned, he sees himself as a sinner.
Yes, every man, even Abraham, has objective guilt, and when
he sees himself as he is through revelation then he sees
that he is a sinner. Thus, Kierkegaard speaks of sin as a
despair over one's sin or as a despair over being forgiven.
The man of faith sees himself as a sinner but does not
despair over it. Rather he is always repentant because he
sees himself as never completely being the full relationship
that he could be. So he is conscious of his guilt as sin
through the leap but he posits no new sin. He does not sin
by succumbing to his sinfulness. But the sinner sins by
succumbing to his sin.

So, the leap of faith is always a fall into sin.
By the leap one becomes conscious of himself as a sinner
before God. But the leap need not be a fall into sin in
the sense that it itself becomes a new sin. This happens
only if one leaps in such a way as to despair over his sin or over the forgiveness of his sin. As one makes the leap his dread becomes different. He moves from objective to subjective dread. With this leap new possibilities of sin open out that were not previously there. Kierkegaard begins to clarify these new possibilities of sin by his consideration of Socrates' concept of sin. Because Socrates did not live within the tradition of revelation he could not, even in an implicit way, know of genuine sin.

"Socrates defined sin as ignorance." But if sin is ignorance, then it does not properly exist. With these two notions Kierkegaard indicates his position concerning the possibility of sin for a Socratic. If guilt arises because of ignorance, then one is not responsible for it. If one is truly ignorant, then he cannot choose one alternative instead of another. Ignorance removes the factor of will. But Christianity makes sin possible by affirming individual will and thus the possibility of defiance. Christianity places the blame directly upon the individual man and thus does away with the all determining role of fate. But what are the implications of this great distinction? What are the characteristics of the man who lives within the tradition of the leap, and how do they differ from the characteristics of man who lives within the tradition of fate? Kierkegaard singles out for consideration three of these characteristics: individuality,
history and sexuality.

Only within the context of the leap is it possible for a man to exist as an individual. When fate rules, the intellect and the will of the individual do not have the ability to be responsible for sin. Individuals are extensions of fate and thus not true individuals. They have no power of defiance. But within the context of the leap, one can, even if it is through a gift, go beyond ignorance and see alternatives. He can choose. And above all, he can choose to make himself ignorant or not. The great difference between the Socratic and the Christian context is that in the Christian context the individual can be free to be ignorant or not. In the Socratic context he cannot be free to be ignorant or not. He is always ruled by and is an extension of fate. There are not many free individuals. There are only extensions of one great individual.28

As a result, history has a very different meaning within the two contexts. Within the context of fate the individual temporal moment has no importance of its own. The temporal is just an extension of the eternal. Here we see the temporal implications of the aesthetic context. The true ethical, that is, the temporal and the historical, is an impossibility. Because there can be no free individual resolution and because there can be no decisive temporal moment, there can be no true ethics. There is no such thing
as a creative event in time for individuals. Thus, history is only an explication of the fated flow of the eternal succession. But within the Christian context there is the possibility of many free individuals and the possibility of decisive temporal moments. An individual can create or destroy within time. Thus, history is the explication of individual creative activity. 29

And furthermore, sexuality differs in the two contexts. 30 In the mere aesthetic context sensuality is only psychically determined. But in Christianity it is spiritually determined. Spirit for Kierkegaard means individual freedom. It refers to the creative power of each individual person. This brings us back to the difference between eros within the Greek and Christian contexts. Greek sensuality was in harmony and accord. Christian sensuality is in opposition and exclusion. Only when the spiritual is posited in language, that is, in tradition, does it gain its power. 31 For the Greek there is no individual rebellion against sensuality. For the Christian there is. Spirit is the synthesizing medium of body and of psyche. 32 Thus, it seeks to keep both in balance and it is opposed to an over-emphasis of either. It is from this that the new and heavy burden of Christian dread arises.

And so, if one considers man only in his natural state, that is, after the fall into original sin, he will
see that no concept of sin is possible and that man cannot sin. Thus, as Kierkegaard shows in his sketch of Agnes and the Merman:

"An ethics which disregards sin is a perfectly idle ethics; but if it asserts sin, it is so ipso well beyond itself."³³

Ethics is dependent on either an aesthetic or a revealed tradition. No true ethics is possible in the aesthetic or Greek tradition. But once one makes the second movement of the leap he, through grace, can become an individual. At that moment he sees himself as a sinner and he can succumb to this sinfulness by despairing over his sin or the forgiveness of his sin. So, the Christian is a sinner but at the same time he is a free individual with sensuality and history. Thus, the very concept of man has two vastly different meanings within these two contexts. This is so because reason in the Christian context belongs to free individuals. But in the Greek context there is at root only one great reason and not several individual reasoning beings. But what are the reason structures of the leap? How does philosophy itself, an activity of reason, differ in the two contexts?
As we enter the great gallery of Fear and Trembling there stands at the threshold, in the preface, the painting of Descartes. We see him with his distinction between the natural light of reason and faith. His reason comes to collision and he must doubt. But out of his doubt grows a new and stronger reason. However, he never doubts his faith. Faith is higher than reason. Descartes is a hero who stands alone and does not try to lead others into his doubt. Together with Descartes there appear in the painting two other sets of figures. There are the Greek skeptics who also were heroes. They spent their life with the difficulties of reason. They doubted and remained in that doubt and never went beyond it. They did not have faith to aid them but nevertheless they were not disloyal to reason. Also within the painting there are the Hegelians of Kierkegaard's own day. They have doubted all, both reason and faith, and they have quickly gone beyond them to the system. Kierkegaard ridicules them in their hasty and careless arrogance. Are they real thinkers who feel the paradox of reason? Do they understand doubt or faith? These who claim to know all, appear as superficial in
comparison with the Greek skeptics and Descartes. What is the meaning of the painting? What is the relation between reason and doubt and faith in the philosophy of Kierkegaard?

It is in the Philosophical Fragments that we find a full explication of this painting of Descartes with all of its philosophical overtones. Here Kierkegaard clarifies three different levels of the collision between reason and the paradox. Even the Hegelians can get a glimpse of the first collision. This epistemological collision has to do with the Socratic knowledge paradox. It becomes manifest before one makes the first movement of the leap and calls forth that leap. The second collision is that which the Greek skeptics were able to experience. It is the metaphysical collision whereby reason becomes embroiled in its great proofs, especially the proofs for the existence of God. This collision is possible only after one makes the first movement of the leap and it is such that it is incomplete without the second movement. Finally, there is the paradox with which Descartes is capable of colliding. This collision is possible only after one makes the second movement of the leap and it has to do with the theological paradox concerning our knowledge of the God-man. Hence, the pattern of the double movement leap can once again be seen as the foundation of this Descartes painting and the philosophical text which explicates it. Just as the three levels of collision formed the foundation for the three
levels of guilt, so now they can be seen as the foundation for the three levels of the paradox.

Kierkegaard begins to reason about reason with a consideration of the Socratic knowledge paradox. This paradox has to do with seeking after knowledge. How can one seek the truth? He cannot seek something that he does not know. If he already knows it, how can he seek it? If one sought to understand a triangle, he would have to already know to some degree what a triangle was or he could not even begin to consider it. But if he did really know it, then seeking to know it would not be possible. How could the teacher impart knowledge if there were not already some foundation for that knowledge within the learner? Learning to Socrates seemed to be a quantitative development of that foundation of knowledge. Thus it was natural for Socrates to solve the knowledge paradox with his theory of recollection. He thought that each person already had the foundation of knowledge within him and that learning was just a development of this foundation. Thus he saw the role of the teacher as that of the midwife. The teacher could never impart new knowledge, he could only bring to birth that which was already within the learner. To seek knowledge is possible because one already possesses in a fundamental sense that which he seemingly seeks. Yes, only seemingly seeks, for in reality he already has it.

But what are the implications of this answer to the
paradox? What does it mean to hold this recollection theory? First, it is evident that the recollection theory does solve the paradox. It does away with the paradox by doing away with the seeking. The truth is something that one already possesses. It is within him and, therefore, he need not seek it without. But it is no great thing just to get beyond the paradox. For, "the thinker without a paradox is like a lover without feeling: a paltry mediocrity." However, that is exactly what the Hegelians in our painting do. They doubt everything - reason and faith. But they quickly go beyond this doubt to the system. Once they reach the system they have swallowed up doubt forever. They have explained all paradox by explaining contradiction. Hence, they become thinkers without passion. In the hands of Socrates the recollection theory overcame the knowledge paradox but at the same time discovered even a greater paradox. That was the paradox of all Greek skepticism. But the Hegelians are such great reconcilers that they come to no higher and lasting paradox.

But, the overcoming of the paradox is not the only result of the recollection theory. If one says that man has always known the truth even from eternity, then he destroys the significance of the temporal moment. The temporal moment becomes only an occasion wherein the truth is recalled. It is not a decisive moment wherein new truth is really acquired. The recollection theory is a kind of
eternalism which robs the temporal of any ultimate significance. It even makes it impossible that there be any personal freedom. For truth is within one from eternity and it thereby determines him. He cannot acquire any new truth by himself and thus the foundation for any creative act is denied the individual. The moment is swallowed up in the eternal and the many are swallowed up in the one.

These two implications of the recollection theory indicate the necessity for the two movements of the leap. The first movement of the leap enables one to regain the paradox. Even within the context of the recollection theory, Socrates was able to recover the paradox. But the mediation theory of the Hegelians does not permit a recovery of the paradox. They cannot be left in perpetual doubt. But Socrates and the Greek skeptics were. The first movement of the leap enabled them to recover the passion of thought. However, only the philosophy which Descartes represents is able to respond to the second implication of the recollection theory. Because there is room for faith in Descartes's philosophy there can be a significant temporal moment. The second movement of the leap can give the temporal moment an eternal significance.

But, just how is the second movement of the leap an adequate answer to the Socratic knowledge paradox?

Together with Socrates, Kierkegaard approaches the paradox by agreeing that man does not really seek the truth. But,
while Socrates thinks that man has the truth in a hidden way, Kierkegaard thinks that man is fleeing the truth. Kierkegaard is intent upon preserving the freedom of the individual and thus he does not maintain that man lost full awareness of the truth through an accident or that God cast him from the truth. He holds that man freely forfeited the truth. Thus, through his own will, man is beyond the pale of truth. He does not seek truth. He flees truth.

This means that if man is ever to receive the truth, the relation between teacher and learner must be very different in the Kierkegaardian context from what it was in the Socratic context. And so it is. In the context of recollection, the teacher could give neither the truth nor the condition for receiving the truth. The teacher could be only a midwife. The learner had the truth within him and the only sufficient condition for his finding the truth was his own turning inward. But in the context of the leap, the teacher must give both the truth and the condition for receiving the truth. If one is really beyond the pale of truth and fleeing truth, the only way he will really get truth is to receive it as a gift. He will not be able to acquire truth through his own efforts. But, as strange as it may seem, it is only in the latter context that one can freely and as an individual arrive at the truth. We have seen that if the truth is in one from eternity, then the
temporal moment will not be significant. Also, the individual will not be free for as he moves inward and discovers the truth, he will see that he is not one individual distinct from others. He will see that he is but an extension of the eternal knower. He will see that he is not free as an individual who can create something new. Rather, he will see that when time is but the eternal and souls are but Soul, then creation is but illusion. But, if one is really apart from the truth, then the temporal moment can be significant. One can acquire the truth in time and that moment of acquisition will be as important as truth is important. And how can that acquisition be an act of freedom? It is free because man can reject the truth and the condition for receiving the truth at the moment that they are offered to him. He is not forced to receive the truth even though it is given to him as a gift. He is free to accept or reject in the moment. Thus, by allowing man to freely accept or reject truth in the moment Kierkegaard's theory preserves the significance of the temporal moment and the freedom of the individual. The theory of Socrates permits neither.

So, just how does this free acquisition of truth take place? What is the condition which the learner must receive that he might receive the truth? That condition is precisely the consciousness of oneself as a sinner. As soon as one becomes aware that he is guilty before God
of having fled the truth, then he becomes capable again of receiving the truth. One becomes aware of his individual freedom at the moment that he becomes aware of his sinfulness. The fall into sin is the leap of faith which reveals the truth of the distinction between good and evil and the human freedom to choose between these alternatives.

But, who must the teacher be who can give both the truth and the condition for receiving it? Clearly, it can be none other than the God. No man could be such a teacher. In this Socrates was right. But this brings us to a new paradox. How can we know that there is such a God? If the God is truly other, how can man know Him? Is not the wholly other, by definition, beyond the knowledge of man? In such a way, the theory of the leap preserves the passion of the paradox. But how does this paradox arise to the metaphysical level for the Greek skeptic and for the Christian such as Descartes? Why does it fail to arise for the Hegelian?

Socrates lives within the context of the recollection theory and therein he finds a solution to the knowledge paradox. He does not seek truth without but he comes to know himself and therein finds truth. But as he finds this truth within a new paradox arises. He discovers within himself the Divine as such. His soul is Soul. As a man he is Man. With his new discovery, he is like Abraham with the young
Isaac. He is satisfied with his new acquisition. The old struggle is gone. But then the new paradox arises. Reason seeks and finds a new collision. As Socrates looks within he begins to wonder whether he is "a stranger monster than Typhon or a creature of a gentler and simpler sort, partaking of something Divine." Kierkegaard even compares this dialectic of reason to the dialectic of love, after one enters the bliss of the first movement of the leap, his reason too experiences that new collision:

"But now the Reason stands still, just as Socrates did; for the paradoxical passion of the Reason is aroused and seeks a collision; without rightly understanding itself, it is bent upon its own downfall. This is like what happens in connection with the paradox of love. Man lives undisturbed a self-centered life, until there awakens within him the paradox of self-love, in the form of love for another, the object of his longing. Self-love lies as the ground of all love or is the ground in which all love perishes."

Thus, reason goes through the same dialectical pattern as did self-love. Like erotic love, reason too is a manifestation of the aesthetic. It collides with the ethical both before the first movement of the leap and after the first movement of the leap. Of course, the ethical at these first
two levels is the fruit of its own production. And what is this ethical pre-figuration which the reason produces and with which it collides? It is the paradox. Before the first movement of the leap, it was the knowledge paradox. After the second movement of the leap, it is the paradox of the unknown. Socrates becomes baffled by that which he discovers within himself. There not only seems to be something within him which is less than man, there seems to be something that is more than man. This more than man which he has discovered is the unknown.

Like the Greek skeptics, Socrates stands paralyzed before the paradox, unable to move. He finds himself and he seems like the Divine, and yet unlike the Divine. His reason surmises the existence of the unlike. But his reason is confounded by the different, by the other. It must posit it and yet it cannot conceive it. Socrates and the skeptics can only waver here before the other in silence.

But within the Christian context reason's collision with the second paradox differs from the second collision within the Greek context. Just as the epistemological collision differed, so does the metaphysical. Within the context of recollection it seems that reason produces the idea of the unknown. But, within the context of the double movement leap, Kierkegaard argues that this idea of the unknown will have to be given to reason by the unknown.9
This is the whole point of the second chapter wherein he paints the picture of the king who marries the humble girl. The ways of the king are unknown to the girl. She will be unhappy if she is married but cannot share his life with him. The king knows this and wonders how they might come to an understanding. He knows if she is raised to his level she will be changed. He will not be able to love her as he now does for he loves her in her simplicity. How can she know him and yet be herself? That is, how can her individuality and freedom be preserved when she knows the king? The king thinks that in order to bring this about, he will have to descend to her level. But then she would no longer be able to love him as king. So he has to remain the king and yet communicate. He can do this if he becomes her servant. As her servant, he can preserve her individuality. And yet, if she believes him, she will still know him as king. He will be to her servant and king. So it is with God and man in the Christian context. Man does not get the idea of the unknown through recollection and reason. But his reason receives the idea through a gift. 10

At this point a serious question arises. When treating the previous structures of the leap, we saw that man could make the first movement of the leap by his own power. The young swain and Kierkegaard could reach the teleological suspension of the ethical through their own
willing. Abraham and the Knight of Infinite Resignation could reach infinite resignation through the strength of their own will. Is Kierkegaard now contradicting his own dialectic by saying that one can reach the second paradox only through a gift of the unknown? No, he is not. Only through the gift he argues, can the freedom of the individual be preserved. Within the Greek context there can be no individual will which reaches infinite resignation. The first movement of the leap is made when one abandons individuality and becomes resigned to fate. So Kierkegaard now reveals a new subtlety within his dialectic. If one is really to freely do something, grace is necessary.

And, just how is this grace given? At this metaphysical level one also sees through the paradox by the gift wherein he recognizes himself as a sinner. How does the Christian come to realize that God is absolutely unlike him? He sees this when he sees that he is a sinner. For the sinner is absolutely unlike the God. But, even more than this, he comes to realize that it was his sin that brought about this complete unlikeness between God and himself. We saw when treating reason's first paradox that it was by man's sin that he fled the truth. So now we see that it is by man's sin that he separates himself from God. Both of these separations he brought about freely and thereby laid the foundation for the two paradoxes. If he freely
accepts himself as a sinner, he sees through the paradoxes. He sees the truth even though he did not seek it and he comes to know the unknown just as he freely created the unknown aspect of the God. He becomes united with them rather than separated from them.

In such ways then do Socrates and the Christian come to know of the existence of the unknown. When Socrates thinks that reason produces the paradox, he forfeits individual freedom and again the significance of the temporal moment. For the difference has been there from eternity and the individual has nothing to do with it. But Kierkegaard preserves individual freedom and the temporal moment. He thinks that the individual man brings about the difference by sin in time and he thinks that man freely comes to realize this in time when he accepts the insight that he is responsible for the difference. But both Socrates and Kierkegaard while knowing the unknown do not claim to know it by a proof of reason. In this they differ from the Hegelians.

Thus, in his detailed analysis of the proofs for the existence of God, Kierkegaard continues to distinguish between these three positions which we find in the Descartes painting. It is true that for Socrates the paradox of knowing the unknown is produced by reason. But, Kierkegaard is very clear in stating that reason does not produce the
unknown for Socrates through proof. Even though Socrates is credited with the physico-teleological proof Kierkegaard thinks that Socrates

"always presupposes the God's existence, and under this presupposition seeks to interpenetrate nature with the idea of purpose."13

Thus, reason has a role in bringing Socrates to the notion of the unknown but he did not understand how. He was truly hung up in the metaphysical dimension of the paradox. Like the skeptics in our picture and especially like the Corneades, "he could not get it into his head when the new quality actually emerged."14 Socrates did not know how he came to know of the unknown.

But, the Hegelians in our painting do not reason to the limit of reason as do the Greek skeptics. They think that they can prove the existence of God. However, they express themselves unfortunately for they blur the important distinction between the ideal and the factual. The ontological aspect of their proof fails:

"For the difficulty is to lay hold of God's factual being and to introduce God's ideal essence dialectically into the sphere of factual being."15

And so the causal aspect of their argument too must fail for one always reasons from existence, not toward existence. I do not first discover the existence of Napoleon by observing
his deeds. No, as an historian I must first assume his existence and then I can say that such and such deeds belong to him.

Thus, Kierkegaard thinks that the Hegelians are wrong in their exaggerated use of reason and he thinks that Socrates respects the limits of reason but is baffled before it. But, what does Kierkegaard think about the role of reason in knowing God? How does he approach the proofs for the existence of God? He is not just a mere fideist. Just as the double movement leap always includes the aesthetic but dethrones it, so too does his faith always use reason. Reason uses the proofs but of themselves they must fail. Reason cannot by itself know the unknown. So when I use the proofs and then drop them because of their inadequacy, I demonstrate that I know of the unknown. Thus, the proofs have an important demonstrative power. Kierkegaard writes:

"When I let the proof go, the existence is there. But this act of letting go is surely also something; it is indeed a contribution of mine. Must not this also be taken into the account, this little moment, brief as it may be - it need not be long, for it is a leap." 16

Thus, the leap enables Kierkegaard to go beyond Socrates. Kierkegaard sees the importance of the moment and of his own contribution in overcoming the metaphysical
paradox. He can abandon the proof because of the gift whereby he clearly sees himself and the unknown. Socrates never gets this clarity. But does this mean that Kierkegaard loses the passion of thought after all? Does he become like the Hegelians who are beyond the paradox?

No, for once Kierkegaard sees through the metaphysical dimensions of the paradox there arises for him the theological dimension. Faith has come to the aid of reason for Kierkegaard but now faith presents its own paradox. What is this new paradox? How does it arise? How does reason relate to it?

In abandoning the recollection theory, Kierkegaard argued that the learner had to receive both the truth and the condition for the truth from the teacher. In this way he sought to preserve the eternal importance of the moment and the freedom of the individual. But the truth which the learner receives is a new paradox. The condition for receiving the truth which the learner likewise receives is also a new paradox. That is this new paradoxical truth and what is this new paradoxical condition?

Within the context of the eternally important moment the dialectic of the paradox proceeds as follows. First, the epistemological paradox of learning what one does not know presents itself. It is assumed that one freely comes to know a new truth. That is, it is a new
truth of the moment which was not his from eternity. But, this assumption implies that both the truth and the condition for learning the truth have to be presented to the learner by the teacher. A learner without the truth could not find it simply by himself. But, this gift gives rise to a second paradox. For the one who gives the truth and the condition for the truth must be other than man. This other must have the truth and the condition for the truth. But, how can this being who is wholly other communicate this gift to man? How can man know this wholly other even enough to receive from Him a gift? But, one does know of Him and he shows this by letting go of the proofs for the existence of the other. But, if one does know the wholly other and has not always known Him a new paradox arises. The wholly other cannot be wholly other. He must in some way be like man if he is understood by man. The new paradox is the likeness of the unlike. It is that the eternal God is also temporal.

But, now we see that the paradox is the teacher himself. As one looks at the Socratic knowledge paradox, he discovers the paradox of knowing the wholly other. Socrates saw both of these paradoxes. But, if one is to solve them so as to permit individual freedom, then the wholly other must at the same time be the same as man. The teacher who truly teaches must be eternal and yet also
temporal in order that the learner might truly learn. The new paradox is the eternal God who is also a temporal man. The teacher is at the same time the teaching. The paradox gives the condition by which the paradox can be understood. Only with such a theory can the eternal importance of the temporal moment be preserved.

So, to be free the individual learner must receive not only the truth but also the condition for receiving the truth. The condition which enables the learner to know the truth must be a knowledge which is not a knowledge. If the condition for receiving the truth were simply knowledge, then it would not be a condition, it would be truth itself. Again, man would not be free to bring about truth in the moment he would simply receive it. But, if the condition were not at the same time a knowing, then it would not aid man in knowing. This condition is faith. Faith is the paradoxical knowing-not knowing that conditions man’s knowing the known-unknowable. When man freely accepts the condition and the truth, he stands in a paradoxical relationship to the paradoxical.

But, just how does the God-man give this double gift? Just how does man receive it? The God-man gives the gift of faith by becoming the God-man. When God walks as a man among men, he makes it possible for them to believe. But, God walked among men only once. In becoming temporal God became truly temporal. That is, he lived and died in a
certain time as do all men. So there are two problems. How did the contemporaries of the God-man come to believe in Him and how do disciples at second hand come to believe in Him?

Of course, the contemporary of the God-man could not simply know the God-man. He too had to believe in the God-man. The contemporary might see the historical man and he might reason to the eternal God. But, he could not simply know the absurdity that the eternal God was the historical man. Many who saw the God-man did not believe Him to be the God-man. How did those who did believe in Him come to believe in Him? In The Fragments Kierkegaard gives two aspects of his answer to this question. In order that the contemporary might believe, it was necessary that he see a sign and that he look inward even to the extent that he might discover himself as a sinner.

As the God-man went among men, the very loftiness of his mission would attract the crowds. But, the masses cannot believe. Even if one became extremely interested in him and watched him day and night, that would not mean that he believed. In order that one believe, it is necessary that he pay attention but the mere attention which the sign might call forth is not yet belief. If one is to believe, he must also look inward. As he looks both at the God-man and himself, he must come to see that he is a sinner. If
he comes to see that the God-man is also his judge even to the extent that he can be scandalized by the God-man, then he is on the threshold of belief. If he then accepts himself as a sinner and accepts the God-man as his saviour, then he is a believer. To believe is to repent.

The way in which the disciple at second hand receives the gift of faith is exactly the same. For in reality, there is no such person as a disciple at second hand. The God-man is not merely eternal and He is not merely historical. He is an absolute fact and thus can be contemporary to every generation.\textsuperscript{17} He has the power to force a decision for anyone who will believe in Him in any age. The God-man must always supply the condition for truth to each individual directly. Only if one pays attention to the sign and then steps out of the crowd as an individual sinner is he a believer. One can look at the sign and be aroused to repentance equally well in any generation. There is only a quantitative difference between the strict historical contemporary of the God-man and the believer of a later generation. What a man of one generation can do for a man of another generation is to pass on the testimony of his belief.\textsuperscript{18} In this way, the testimony of one believer can arouse the attention of another potential believer. But, this arousal of the attention through the tradition of believers is not a sufficient condition for
faith. It is only a quantitative occasion that cannot in itself bring about the new quality of belief.

So it is that one receives the gift of faith whereby he stands in a paradoxical relationship to the paradoxical. In the God-man he sees the judge and by looking inward he sees himself as a sinner. If he accepts himself as a sinner, he believes. But this is possible only through the gift of the witness who arouses his attention. In order to believe, a man has to receive the gift of the absolute witness. But then only some believe. That is, only some will exercise their freedom as an individual. The accepting of oneself as a sinner is the free act of the individual. But, what is the role of reason in this act of accepting the gift of faith? What happens to reason as one places himself within the paradoxical relation to the paradoxical?

First of all, as we have seen when treating the proofs for the existence of God, the paradox bestows itself when reason sets itself aside. But, the act of setting itself aside is an act of reason. So reason must first reason to its limit and in so doing realize that the limit exists. Faith is thus occasioned by reason. But, faith is the third entity which permits reason and the paradox to encounter one another happily in the moment. Thus, reason not only has the role of setting itself aside but it can be preserved within the context of faith. Just
as religiousness B dethroned the aesthetic but still preserved it and just as love of neighbour dethroned the erotic love but still permitted it, so does faith dethrone reason but still preserve it.

If one is to be a philosopher within the context of faith, then his reason is necessary for his faith. Just as religiousness A was absolutely necessary for religiousness B, so is reason absolutely necessary for the philosopher if he is to have faith. And reason can still exist even within faith, just as the aesthetic could exist even though dethroned. Reason is dethroned when it recognizes that it cannot produce the awareness of sin and when it admits nevertheless that sin exists.

Thus, we have seen the new paradox of faith, its genesis and reason’s relation to it. But before leaving this painting of Descartes with his firm distinction between reason and faith, we should clearly summarize the relation of the dialectics of reason to the double movement leap. Kierkegaard presents three paradoxes that stand in a temporal relation to one another. First, one encounters the paradox of knowledge. As he works his way through this there arises the paradox of the unlimited God being known. Then he sees that if he is to know the God, the God must also be human. The humanity of God is thus the third paradox. The first collision of reason and the paradox has
therefore to do with knowing something external. This is the problem of the mere aesthete before he makes the first movement of the leap. He solves this paradox by moving inward and discovering his unity with the Divine. This solution to the second paradox is the first movement of the leap. But then he discovers that he is not only God. He discovers that he is also a sinner. This discovery is revealed to him when the God-man reveals himself. This takes place in the second movement of the leap.

Thus, if a man is a Christian philosopher he will proceed according to the same basic pattern as the Christian lover. He will move from the first collision to the first movement of the leap and from there to the second collision. From the second collision of the aesthetic and ethical he will then move on to the second movement of the leap. In such a way does Descartes differ both from the Greek philosophers and from the philosophers of Christendom. But, this distinction can be even further clarified if we now consider the existential structures of the leap. For the Christian philosopher lives his philosophy in a way that both the Greeks and the Hegelians do not. The existential structures of the leap will further clarify both the love and reason structures of the leap. They will also prepare us to examine the faith structures of the leap which will in turn further clarify the sin structures.
CHAPTER VI

THE EXISTENTIAL STRUCTURES OF THE LEAP

At the very end of Fear and Trembling, we find the painting wherein Kierkegaard contrasts Socrates and Abraham as they break their silence at the moment of death. This issue of death and of silence plunges us at once into what Kierkegaard means by the existential. How do these two men approach death in such a way that they are both existential? How do they maintain silence and yet speak that last word as existentialists? What does Kierkegaard mean by the existential? But then again, Socrates and Abraham are contrasted. They are existentialists in very different ways. How is the existential distinguished in its two basic kinds?

It is in The Postscript that Kierkegaard clarifies the existential structures of the leap. Here he shows how the leap is always a leaping, that is, a becoming subjective. This becoming subjective or, as he calls it, this subjective truth, is what he means by the existential. But, The Postscript does not only clarify the leap by explicating its existential structures. The Postscript is also a kind of commentary upon all of Kierkegaard's previous aesthetic literature. Thus, in this book he not only introduces us
to the existential structures of the leap but he then
relates these structures of the leap to the previous
structures which we have examined. Hence, The Postscript
marks the great turning point in Kierkegaard's authorship.
Here he firmly distinguishes between aesthetic religion and
Christian religion even in its existential dimensions. He
completes and summarizes all he has to say about the leap
from the aesthetic viewpoint. He paves the way for his
purely Christian development of the leap.

In its fundamental meaning, existence refers to the
kind of being which a particular, thinking, human entity
possesses. Thus, Kierkegaard considers the being of an
idea to be non-existential. It is abstract and not particu-
lar. Also, he contrasts the being of a human with the being
of a potato. The human can possess an idea in a way that the
potato cannot. By the existential, Kierkegaard refers to
that particular entity which can have ideas. Thus, neither
an idea nor a potato is existential in the strictest sense.
But, Kierkegaard goes even further in defining the existential.
He declares that "God does not think, he creates; God does
not exist, He is eternal." Thus, according to Kierkegaard
there are at least four levels of being: God, idea, human,
and particular entities without ideas. Existence in its
strictest sense Kierkegaard predicates only of the human.

But, then Kierkegaard clarifies the existential in
man even further. For man can have both existential and non-existential aspects. He refers to thought within existence as a foreign medium. Because of abstract thought one can live outside the realm of existence. He can live in the realm of possibility instead of reality. This poetic or intellectual standpoint which sees only possibility and is disinterested in the particular is the foundation for a non-existential way of life and for degrees of the existential within ways of life. Because of his thought, it is possible for man to escape the existential. But again, it is because of his finite thought that man can be existential. The potato which lacks thought cannot be existential. So man is existential insofar as he is a mixture of the ideal and the particular, of the finite and the infinite. But through thought he can escape the existential predicament and live only in the ideal, that is, in the non-existential.

Hence, there is only a certain kind of issue which is truly existential. If one can attain objective certainty about some issue, then it is not existential. It can become purely ideal. Thus, one can wonder about whether or not a scientist can bring life out of non-life. But this is not an existential issue, for all the scientist has to do is produce life and the problem is solved. However, ethico-religious issues like the existence of God, my life after death, my prayer life, and the issue of whether I should marry this woman or not are existential issues. They
cannot be solved by means of objective evidence. They can only be entered into by a subjective decision. Thus, that question of death and how to approach it, which we encounter in our Socrates-Abraham painting, is an existential question. For these two men do not convert it into an objective matter. They preserve its subjectivity in silence and in their ironic last word.

So, the existential has to do with human existence. But the human can escape his existential dimension. He can flee into the objective. But why would he want to do that and how would he do it? The answer to this question begins to emerge as we further clarify the meaning of the existential especially in its relationship to the leap.

In The Fragments we saw that the leap was the moment, the instant. But, in The Postscript, Kierkegaard develops another aspect of the leap. Here he writes:

"The martyrdom of faith (crucifixion of the understanding) is not a martyrdom of the instant but precisely the martyrdom of endurance."?

So the leap begins with the suddenness of the instant but it endures through a lifetime. Death for Socrates was not something he faced only as he departed life. He was always dying that philosopher's death. So also the sacrifice of Isaac did not just end for Abraham as he lay down the knife. That event endured through his life. But, what is the nature
of this leaping? Kierkegaard refers to it as becoming subjective and as subjective truth.

In the theses attributable to Lessing Kierkegaard points out how the subjective thinker "is constantly in the process of becoming, i.e., he is always striving." He agrees with Lessing that "if God held all truth in His right hand, and in His left the lifelong pursuit of it, he would choose the left hand." Man must constantly be striving for truth and can never completely attain it because of his finite and temporal nature. He can be in contact with truth because of his infinite and eternal nature but this is limited by his other side. Because man is existential, because he is that mixture, he can only continue to strive after truth and if he does not continue to strive he destroys himself as existential. A logical system wherein one is concerned only with the abstract and ideal is possible for man. But an existential system for man is impossible. God can know of all reality in a final and perfect way but man cannot.

Hence, Kierkegaard defines truth for man as: "an objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation process of the most passionate inwardness." Man can never have objective certitude about the existence of God, about his own immortality, about whether he should now marry this woman. In ethico-religious matters, objective evidence can
never completely convince him. And yet, these are the most important matters of his life. Therefore, he can be concerned about them with the greatest possible inwardness.

To be so concerned and yet always to realize that objective evidence will never occur is to be in subjective truth. It is to be constantly striving. It is to be leaping. So it was with Socrates. He always concerned himself with all of his energy about ethico-religious matters. He never forgot of immortality. As a philosopher, he was always concerned with death even so that he could say, philosophy is a dying. So also with Abraham. The sacrifice would not cease to haunt him. Its paradox could never leave him as long as he was man. Both of these men were making the existential leap. But what are the characteristics of this leap even more specifically?

The characteristic of the existential leap which Kierkegaard refers to most often is that it is the most difficult of all tasks. He writes:

"To strive to become what one already is--is a very difficult task, the most difficult of all tasks, in fact, precisely because every human being has a strong natural bent and passion to become something more and different."13

One is constantly tempted to get rid of his passionate inwardness and either cease caring about ethico-religious
matters or to convert them into matters of objective certitude. Not to give in to the temptation is the most difficult of all tasks. Hegelianism gave in to the temptation. The people of Kierkegaard's day were constantly in danger of giving in to it especially because of the increased knowledge of the day. They could easily forget that Christianity was not a matter of mere knowledge. Kierkegaard saw it as his vocation to make things difficult for people. To stem the tide of ease was his quest.

The existential leap is very deceitful in its difficulty. It can even appear to the observer as an easy task. But, as Kierkegaard puts it:

"It is as if one were to recommend being put to death by the guillotine, saying: it is a very easy matter, forsooth; you simply lay your head down on a block, somebody pulls a string, the axe falls - and the thing is done. But suppose that being executed was precisely what one did not wish; and so also the leap. When one is indisposed to make the leap, so indisposed that this passion makes the chasm infinitely wide, then the most ingenious contrivance for the purpose will not help at all."¹⁴

The leap is difficult because it is a lifelong task. One is constantly tempted to be finished with life before it is
finished with him. Thus, it is precisely illusion and deceit that lay at the bottom of the difficulty. One thinks he is finished once he has made the decision. But the leap is a leaping throughout all of one's life. One must constantly renew the decision.

"It is easier to become a Christian when I am not a Christian than to become a Christian when I am one."16

Becoming subjective is the most difficult of all tasks because it is so easy to think that I have become subjective. But that is precisely to become objective.

An immediate implication of this difficulty is the second characteristic of the existential leap, namely, that the leap is a suffering of inwardness.

"While aesthetic existence is essentially enjoyment, and ethical existence is essentially struggle and victory, religious existence is essentially suffering, and that not as a transitional moment, but as a persisting. The suffering is, to recall the Frater's words, the seventy thousand fathoms deep on which the religious man constantly lies. But suffering is precisely inwardness, and it is an inwardness which marks itself off from the aesthetic and the ethical types of existential inwardness."17

The suffering of the leap is a suffering that arises from
from within because of the paradox. As long as the paradox is there one is over the seventy thousand fathoms. This suffering grows out of the collision which is manifest in subjective truth. There is always the tension of objective uncertainty and passionate inwardness. One wants certainty more than anything else but he knows he cannot attain it. However, he still persists in his concern. This is the suffering of inwardness.

A third characteristic of the existential leap which runs through Kierkegaard's authorship is that of scandal or the offence. We have already had occasion to treat this characteristic when we were clarifying the sin and the reason structures of the leap. It will arise again when we treat the incarnational structures of the leap. At present we need merely to point out that two of Kierkegaard's most frequent adjectives by which he describes the religious are suffering and offence. Both Socrates and Abraham are offensive. Socrates was so offensive that they put him to death. Abraham looks like the murderer of his own child. Both of these men appeared as offensive and both suffered the offence of the paradox. The paradox which founds subjective truth is offensive.

Then there is the fourth characteristic of individuality. The individual is one of Kierkegaard's most fundamental concepts. It refers to the man who is making
the existential leap. Socrates could only go inward alone. No teacher could really help him. Even he could only be a midwife. And Abraham had an absolute relation to the absolute. His relationship to God was not mediated by any relative means. He alone could face the full meaning of Isaac's death. Both Socrates and Abraham stood alone as individuals before death. No man could share their secret with them. Both stood as lonely rebels against the established order. They were offensive because they were so different. They suffered the most difficult of all sufferings because they were alone over the seventy thousand fathoms.

But what did all this mean? It meant that they were locked in utter silence. No one could understand them even if they were to speak. They were beyond the limits of language in their existential leap. Kierkegaard puts it nicely when he writes that Jacobi:

"is not dialectically clear about the leap, so as to understand that it cannot be taught or communicated directly, precisely because it is an act of isolation, which leaves it to the individual to decide."\(^{18}\)

By the existential leap one enters the realm of the paradox beyond understanding and beyond language. Thus, Socrates and Abraham are silent about their death except for that
last ironical word whereby they both point to the necessity of silence. The leap can only be communicated indirectly.

Such are the characteristics of the existential leap. Socrates and Abraham both made that leap. They were both existentialists. But Kierkegaard's main point is one of contrast. They participated in the characteristics of the existential leap in very different ways. What is the distinction between the two levels of the existential which Kierkegaard is so intent upon showing?

The difference between the existential leap of Socrates and that of Abraham is precisely the difference between religiousness A and religiousness B. Socrates only makes the first movement of the leap which takes him as far as natural or aesthetic religion. Abraham makes both movements of the leap which take him to the religion of faith. Kierkegaard contrasts the two as follows:

"If the individual is inwardly defined by self-annihilation before God, then we have religiousness A. If the individual is paradoxically dialectic, every vestige of original immanence being annihilated and all connection cut off, the individual being brought to the utmost verge of existence, then we have the paradoxical religiousness. This paradoxical inwardness is the greatest possible...."
Only Abraham lives at the utmost verge of existence. He has a paradoxical relation to the paradoxical. Socrates relates only straightforwardly to the paradoxical.

Both men experience becoming subjective. Both live in subjective truth. Both of them avoid the flight into objectivity. Thus, Kierkegaard contrasts the Greek or existential dialectic with the Hegelian dialectic:

"The Greek philosopher was an existing individual and did not permit himself to forget that fact. In order that he might devote himself wholly to thought, he therefore sought refuse in suicide, or in a pythagorean dying from the world, or in a Socratic form of philosopher's death.... Existence involved him in a process of becoming. In order to think in very truth he took his own life. Modern philosophy from its lofty heights smiles at such childishness."^21

Socrates just as well as Abraham is involved in an existential dialectic. But there is a difference in kind between the two forms of the dialectic. As we have seen when treating the reason structures of the leap, Socrates does not abandon the paradox. He finds within himself something of Typhon and something of the Divine. However, through the infinite resignation of his recollection theory, he does not have what Kierkegaard calls a paradoxical relationship to
the paradoxical. His existential dialectic lacks this dimension which is possible only by virtue of the absurd.

Within his context of resignation, the last word of Socrates about death is a jest. His point is to show that through his philosopher's life he has already passed into the eternal and as a result he can approach physical death without fear and trembling. He relates to the paradox with reason. Abraham, on the other hand, approaches death very differently. He too has reached resignation and, therefore, shares in the paradox of Socrates. But, by virtue of the absurd, he continues to believe in the temporal fulfillment of the promise and thus he relates paradoxically to the paradox. For Socrates life would come after death. That is not absurd.

Because of this basic difference between the two leaps, there is also a difference in kind in the characteristics of the existential leap for the two men. Socrates can approach death in jest but Abraham only in fear and trembling. To make both leaps is difficult but, strictly speaking, only the double movement leap is the most difficult of all tasks. The first movement is only analogously difficult. The leap of Socrates whereby he abandoned physical science and sought knowledge within was an existential task which took great effort. But, once he made the leap he was beyond real difficulty. His immanent relation
to the divine, that is, his non-paradoxical relationship to the paradoxical grounded his jest. But, the absurdity of Abraham's position could ground only fear and trembling. Abraham believed in the fulfillment of the promise with an aesthetic immediacy not unlike that of Socrates. But the promise was to be fulfilled in time, not in eternity. And the means whereby it was to be fulfilled was temporal. Abraham's difficulty was to destroy the means and yet still be convinced of the end.

So also Socrates had a great inwardness. But when he went inward he discovered that he was divine. Even if there were strong traces of Typhon within him, he still knew the bliss of the one and with reason held to that as the only reality. Abraham lived only for the fulfillment of the promise in time. With the conviction of Socrates he knew it would be fulfilled. That conviction he had with the first movement of the leap. But then in his inward dread he saw himself destroying the only means to the fulfillment of the promise. The means was infinitely important to Abraham whereas it was not to Socrates. The moment was lost for Socrates. But because it was there for Abraham, his inward suffering was even of a different kind from that of Socrates.

This difference of kind is clear in the characteristic of scandal. Kierkegaard writes:
"Christianity is the only power which is able truly to arouse offense; for hysterical and sentimental fits of offense at this or that can be simply dismissed and explained as lack of ethical seriousness which is coquettishly busy about complaining of the whole world instead of itself." 22

Socrates was only capable of experiencing accidental scandal but Abraham was capable of facing the essential scandal. 23

So also as individuals, Socrates and Abraham were essentially different. Socrates relates to himself only within an improper ethical context. He never leaves the realm of the aesthetic even though he is a most ethical and religious man. Thus, he cannot sin. He cannot freely make himself guilty. But Abraham is capable of individual creativity. He is capable of creating or destroying something of supreme importance within time. He discovers the infinitely important as did Socrates with absolute mystical conviction. But through constant faith he is not swallowed up in the infinite. Through faith he is so able to emphasize the Typhon aspect within himself that it always remains.

Finally, as we have noticed, Socrates in his last word can jest about death. When he hears his death sentence he can reveal his infinite resignation by "expressing surprise that he has been condemned by a majority of three
votes." But, the communication of Abraham's paradoxical relationship to the paradoxical calls for even more than Socratic irony. He cannot just utter a word that shows that Isaac is immortal. The promise cannot be fulfilled through a dead but immortal Isaac. It can be fulfilled only through an Isaac who lives in time. And now that Isaac is to die, what can Abraham say. There is his word: "God will provide Himself the lamb for the burnt offering, my son." In this communication, the double movement leap is manifest. He does not say: "you are to be sacrificed, Isaac." He does not say: "I know nothing." He does know that Isaac must be sacrificed. But, to say that would be an untruth for by faith he knows that it is not to be Isaac. So through his enigmatic last word, he manifests the double movement leap.

Hence, Socrates and Abraham both qualify as existentialists. Both retain passionate inwardness by refusing to abandon the paradox. But, between their existential leaps there is an essential difference. Socrates relates immediately to the paradox and does not contradict reason. Abraham relates paradoxically to the paradox through the absurd. So it is with the existential structures of the leap. At this point we can further clarify the structures of the leap we have so far studied by interpreting them in terms of subjective truth. Just as Kierkegaard finds it
fitting to make a summary of his aesthetic literature in The Postscript, so it would be helpful if we would do likewise before moving on to the faith structures of the leap.

So far we have seen that within Kierkegaard's dialectic there are three collisions of the aesthetic and ethical. The first takes place before the first movement of the leap; the second after the first movement of the leap; and the third after the second movement of the leap. Kierkegaard refers to the three contexts within which these collisions take place as the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious, even though all three spheres penetrate each other at each moment. In our next chapter, it will be necessary to study this interpretation of the spheres. But for the moment we need to show that it is by the criterion of existence that Kierkegaard establishes his dialectical hierarchy of values. The aesthetic is most devoid of existence. The ethical has more. But the peak of the existential is the religious. In fact, it is even accurate to say that the existential and the religious are equivalent.

The hierarchy of the stages is determined by the criterion of existence, which refers to the synthesis of the aesthetic and the ethical. The immediate aesthetic has three moments: yearning as dream, yearning as seeking and yearning as desire. When Abraham first received the promise
his existence was at the level of a plant. In the enthusiasm of his first immediacy, he saw no difficulties. The question of truth or certainty had not arisen for him. He did not reflect. But then he had to endure the threats to the promise. In his experience of the first collision he began to reflect. The ethical and the question of truth began to emerge for him. He experienced the imperfections of temporality and he became uncertain. But at least he attained the existential status of the butterfly. As he experienced the either/or of this first collision, he did not go the way of mere objective truth. He chose the existential level of a Socrates rather than that of a Hegel. He made the first movement of the leap and received Isaac. In his second immediacy he was at rest, but only for a moment, for a new collision announced itself. Now he had to endure the threat to Isaac. Through his faith he made the second movement of the leap and thus attained the highest level of existential truth. In this dialectic of Abraham we see the existential hierarchy of the plant, the butterfly, a Hegel, a Socrates and finally that of the mature Abraham. Each of these levels is characterized by a higher synthesis of the aesthetic and ethical.

The hierarchy of love also reveals the existential criterion. The erotic dreaming of the page is a perfect blend of the masculine and the feminine. There is no
reflection by which the page distinguishes himself from the object of his longing. But then with Papageno the distinction between himself and the other is made. His longing is a seeking even if it is for the feminine in general. Again this first collision presents its various possibilities. But the young man does not go the way of Constantine or the ladies' tailor or the seducer. He does not choose the definite even to the forgetfulness of the mysterious. No, he follows the way of Victor Eremita and makes the leap of erotic inspiration into the new immediacy. He makes a synthesis of the aesthetic and ethical in such a way that they are held together reflectively. However, the ethical is subordinated to the aesthetic. But then a new collision arises. Sympathy rebels against the negative resolution and calls for equal status for the ethical in a positive resolution. Through this new collision, there is revealed the higher existential possibility of neighbourly love. This permits a balanced synthesis of aesthetic and ethical love. With its eternal demand for temporal love, it permits both erotic and married love. Thus, in the dialectic of love there is the existential hierarchy of the page, Papageno, the seducer, Victor Eremita, and neighbourly love.

Even in Kierkegaard's own life there is evidence of this existential development. As a child, he experienced the first immediacy of parental love. The aesthetic and
ethical were not distinguished for him. He performed his duties with the total energy of immediacy. But then with his friends, he began to seek other values than those he had found with his father. He experienced the new existential level of the distinction between the aesthetic and the ethical. He flirted with Hegelianism. He flirted with seduction. The first great collision became more and more violent. The trumpet blast of Paul Møller called to him and he even thought of suicide. He abandoned intellectually his search for the aesthetic particular. But morally abandon it he could not. Then he was caught by the fishing fly of Regina, and in 1838 he made the first movement of the leap. He returned to his father and to God with a new immediacy. The values of the aesthetic and ethical were now explicit in their new found harmony. But the ethical was subordinate to the aesthetic in this harmony. However, a new collision arose. Should he marry Regina? He knew that he could if he only had faith. He waited for the lifting of the divine counter order. He waited to return to the earth. He saw in the instant that he could marry. He began to make the second movement of the leap but it was always only a beginning. His martyrdom was not that of the moment but that of endurance. He endured through the Corsair Affair and the great experience of 1848 and even the years of the attack. He lived on in the absurdity of faith always
becoming subjective. Kierkegaard lived through those levels wherein the aesthetic and ethical at first were not distinguished, then collided in friction, then were harmonized in the second immediacy, then were torn apart by sympathy and were finally separated but united in the absurdity of faith.

The sin structures of the leap also reveal the existential gradations. The aesthetic and ethical are so united for the child that there is no question of sin. He is just learning the meaning of the terms. He is in the process of sorting out the aesthetic and the ethical. Once the distinction is made the Hegelian possibility can arise. Kierkegaard labels this as proper ethics of the first order. The Hegelians know of sin but in accounting for it by reason they rationalize it away. They have no existential possibility of sin because they have abandoned all existential possibility. However, at this point there is the possibility of improper ethics. Socrates roots sin in ignorance. But that is to put ethics on the background of aesthetics. It is to destroy the significance of the temporal moment wherein one can sin. Socrates preserves subjective evil in his improper ethics, whereas Hegel and Christendom fail to do so. But for Socrates there are no individual subjects, hence no personal sin. Finally, there is the possibility of sin within the context of proper ethics of the second order. Here, individual guilt is
possible because there are free individuals. At this level the ethical is not swallowed up in the aesthetic as it was for Socrates. The ethical is not subsumed under the category of ideal rationality as it was for Hegel.

Finally, we can see how the existential is the criterion which distinguishes the reason structures of the leap. Reason arises with the paradox of knowledge which is its first collision. Reason can emerge out of the first collision in either the Hegelian or the Socratic way. If it becomes Hegelian, then it will reduce all matters to objective certainty and thereby move into metaphysical disinterestedness and lack of passion. If reason makes the first movement of the leap by moving inward in ethical passion, then it will discover a new dimension of the paradoxical. Reason will collide with the other. It will meet its limit. It can Socratically remain here or it can move on to even a higher existential possibility. By reason of faith, it can move from immanence to transcendence. It can even collide with the limit-become-limited. This is the new paradox of the absurd wherein the ethical is no longer lost in the aesthetic. At this existential level, the aesthetic and ethical are related with equal importance. The ethical moment is given an eternal importance.

So, Socrates and Abraham are both existentialists. Hegel abandons the existential. Kierkegaard primarily
affirms the existential of the two movements of the leap
and any dialectical stage besides that is non-existential.
But, by the first movement of the leap one enters religious-
ness A and by the second movement of the leap he enters
religiousness B. Therefore, the existential and the
religious are equivalent. Any other stage is non-existential.
The immediate aesthetic is non-existential. The collision
of the aesthetic and the ethical before the first movement
of the leap is non-existent. The flight into objectivity
out of the first collision is more existential. If one wants
to say that the ethical is existential, then he has to mean
the ethico-religious. He has to mean the ethical as it is
subordinated to the aesthetic immediacy of natural religion,
or he has to mean the ethical as it has equal rights with
the aesthetic within Christianity. There is no such state
as an existential ethical state without religion.

But, this brings us to a new problem. If the
existential is a synthesis of the aesthetic and ethical,
then was it not there even in the pre-leap moments? There
is some kind of synthesis even in the child and in the first
collision. Does not one have to say that even the child and
even the Hegelian can be religious? Is not faith present
in some way even in the aesthete just as the aesthetic is
present in the man of faith? Here we have the problem of
the interpenetration of the spheres. This question brings us
to the faith structures of the leap.
CHAPTER VII

THE FAITH STRUCTURES OF THE LEAP

In Fear and Trembling it is perhaps Kierkegaard's beautiful little portrait of "that blessed woman, the mother of God, the Virgin Mary," which whispers to us most fruitfully of the faith structures of the leap.¹ She was highly favored and yet what distress, what dread, what paradox were hers! She was God's mother and yet it was still her privilege and her agony to believe in Him. How did Mary make the double movement leap? What were the elements of her faith? How were these elements related so as to be dynamic? What were the negative and positive aspects of her faith?

All along, we have been saying that the double movement leap is a synthesis of the aesthetic and the ethical. We have seen that existence is a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal. But what sort of synthesis is this? Did not Kierkegaard above all else teach the doctrine of the Either/Or? Did he not argue that one had to be either aesthetic or ethical and that one could not be both? In Works of Love, for example, he writes that erotic love always claims an Either/Or.² If Christian love should strive a compromise then:
"Both poetic and Christian love have become confused, and the replacement is neither the poetic nor the Christian."³

One must pay great attention to the either/or for in attempting a both-and it is easy to come up with a neither-nor.

But, on the other hand, there must be a valid form of the both-and. For at the very heart of Kierkegaard's philosophy lies the idea that:

"The subjective thinker is not a man of science, but an artist. Existing is an art. The subjective thinker is aesthetic enough to give his life aesthetic content, ethical enough to regulate it and dialectical enough to interpenetrate it with thought."⁴

The highest form of the existential is precisely a combination of the temporal and the eternal or the ethical and the aesthetic. Thus, we have to make a distinction between two kinds of both-and, one which is illegitimate and one which is absolutely necessary for the Kierkegaardian philosophy.

Mary, in her faith, lived out precisely such a synthesis of aesthetic and ethical love. For her the eternal and the temporal were united in her child but like any other human she could only see the temporal. However, through faith, she knew of His eternal divinity. How were these elements of the eternal and temporal balanced in her
faith? How did she accomplish the both-and of faith and avoid the both-and of Christendom? By a close analysis of the forms of despair in *Sickness unto Death*, we shall be able to understand the elements of her faith and of all faith. Despair is the opposite of faith. Thus, in describing despair, Kierkegaard gives us a negative description of faith. By showing us what faith is not he at the same time shows us what it is. By an analysis of faith's balance in *Sickness unto Death* we shall see both the proper and the improper senses of the both-and.

As we have seen, Kierkegaard defines man in *Sickness unto Death* as a relationship, related to himself and to God. This means that man is aesthetic (he is related to the other) and ethical (he is related to himself) and religious (he is related to God). Any break in the balance of this threefold relation constitutes despair. If a man should relate only to the other he would be in aesthetic despair. If he should relate only to himself he would be in ethical despair. If he should relate only to God he would be in the despair of infinite resignation. Thus, there are three basic kinds of despair or three ways in which a man can remain outside the both-and of faith.

By aesthetic despair, we refer to a plunge into infinity, eternity, and possibility. One becomes an aesthete by projecting an eternal value upon a temporal
object. This is a kind of worldliness whereby one attributes "infinite value to the indifferent." Aesthetic despair is always a swallowing up of the self in the object. It ignores the limits of finitude and actuality.

"Possibility then appears to the self even greater and greater, more and more things become possible, because nothing becomes actual. At last it is as if everything were possible - but this is precisely when the abyss has swallowed up the self."7

Thus, it is evident that in aesthetic despair, we have an illegitimate kind of the both-and. Both elements are found here. There is aesthetic infinity, eternity and possibility. There is ethical finitude, temporality and actuality. But, the both-and is accomplished by a pre-reflective transformation of the finite into the infinite, the temporal into the eternal and the actual into the possible. The aesthete is in despair because he does not recognize the ethical aspect of reality. Through yearning or melancholy, he makes a dishonest projection of what he wants upon what is.

Kierkegaard describes two types of this aesthetic despair. There is that of the young girl who eternalizes the present moment. This is pure non-reflective despair. Then there is the despair of the old man who dreams dreams and the young man who sees visions. The old man eternalizes
the past and the young man the future. Neither has a full relationship to himself as he is in the present. In the young girl, the young man and the old man, we see the three stages of the immediate aesthetic. The young girl is like the page who has the longing of the dream. The young man is like Papageno whose longing is an indefinite seeking. The old man is like Don Giovanni whose longing is a definite desire.

Just as aesthetic despair converts all into the eternal, infinite, and possible so ethical despair converts all into the temporal, finite, and actual. This despair too takes two forms: that of weakness and that of defiance. In the despair of weakness:

"A man finds it too venturesome a thing to be himself, far easier and far safer to be like the others, to become an imitation, a number, a cipher in the crowd.... The despair which not only occasions no embarrassment but makes one's life easy and comfortable is naturally not regarded as despair." 8

It is precisely this despair of weakness which seems to compromise the both-and and receives instead a neither-nor. This is the despair of Christendom which abandons both the passion of poetic love and the passion of Christian love. It seeks to be purely ethical, that is, to
be at home in the temporal without any passion for the eternal. But the ethical can never stand by itself. It must be rooted either in the background of the aesthetic or the background of Christianity. This despair of weakness is made possible by Christianity which emphasizes the importance of the temporal. But, this form of despair will not admit the passion of the aesthetic which Christianity also demands and thus it falls into the weakness of comfort and security. It wants both the aesthetic lack of dread and the Christian earthly emphasis. But it receives neither aesthetic nor Christian passion. The philosophical expression for this form of despair is Hegelianism.

The second form of ethical despair is that of defiance wherein one chooses to remain in infinite resignation. This can be referred to as ethical despair even though it is still improperly ethical, that is, it is set in the context of the aesthetic. For it is an attitude of self reflection and even decision. But it is a decision wherein one wills not to be himself. He wills not to be free to make decisions. However, in this ethical despair one does not flee into the protective crowd as did the weak one. He does not seek relief by becoming anonymous. Rather, in his introversion he stands alone in proud defiance against all others and against God. As Kierkegaard puts it:
"The dialectic of resignation is commonly this: to will to be one's eternal self, and then with respect to something positive wherein the self suffers, not to will to be oneself, contenting oneself with the thought that after all this will disappear in eternity, thinking itself therefore justified in not accepting it in time, so that, although suffering under it, the self will not make to it the concession that it properly belongs to the self, that is, it will not humble itself under it in faith." \(^9\)

So, this despair of defiance is also made possible by the Christian context. One sees his weakness; but then flees from it in resignation. The Greek and especially the Stoic could flee resignation; but he did not see the weakness to be his own personal possession so clearly as does this defiant man. He has caught a glimpse of the possibility of the second movement of the leap. His individual sin has suggested itself to him but he chooses to be ignorant of it. In this way, he cancels out the finite and concentrates only on the infinite. Thus, here too is an unbalanced both-and.

In so describing aesthetic and ethical despair, Kierkegaard shows five instants where the both-and is not a satisfactory synthesis. The young girl has her nose
pressed so closely against the window of the world that she cannot even see her own reflection. She longs within a dream world. She feels that she can have, and do, and be, all that she wants. All these things are within her. Both the finite and the infinite are united for her because she does not see the difference. This synthesis of naivete has not made the distinction between past, present and future; between possibility and actuality; between the finite and the infinite. The synthesis of the young man is a little more advanced in despair. He feels some kind of distinction between himself and the other and therefore he can seek his vision. The future singles itself out for him as distinct from the present, but it is not yet a future with definite finite objects. He still lives in the pre-reflective ignorance wherein he does not yet distinguish the particular finite thing from his vision of the infinite. The old man dreams dreams about definite events of his past life. He not only has made the distinction between the dimensions of time but he has made the distinction between many finite things. But, still he chases after each separate, finite individual as if it were the infinite. His synthesis of the finite and the infinite is still one wherein he fails to distinguish the two. The man of weakness finally reaches the level of reflection wherein he can distinguish himself from the other finite thing and himself from the
infinite. He sees himself as a finite being needing the infinite. But in his weakness he despairs of ever attaining this infinite; so he forgets it and becomes lost in the comfortable world of finite individuals. His synthesis is not one of the both-and but rather one of the neither-nor. Finally, we have the man who has made the first movement of the leap. The man of weakness represents Don Giovanni or the ladies' tailor at the every day level and Hegel at the philosophical level. The man of defiance represents a man who has gone as far as Victor Eremita or Socrates, but then when given the gift of faith refuses to accept it. He is one who has gone as far as the movement of faith but is so scandalized by evil that he refuses to face it. His synthesis is so existential that he faces the paradox of the infinite as finite but he will not face it paradoxically. He faces it immanently and then succumbs to it in objective dread. He chooses to forget the finite.

Such then, are the contradictory and the inadequate synthesis of the both-and. At the aesthetic level the either/or must reign. But, at the Christian level the either/or of the aesthetic is overcome in a both-and which permits both the aesthetic and the ethical to dwell side by side as distinct and yet as harmonized. Just how does this second movement of the leap take place wherein one fully recovers the ethical while retaining the eternal? What is
the dynamic force by which one moves back to the finite?

In his painting of Mary, Kierkegaard tells us that she became great by saying, "behold, the handmaid of the Lord." Through her acceptance of God's gift she made the leap of faith. By this faith she entered the realm of distress, dread, and paradox. "What woman was so mortified as Mary?" So it is with all men who believe. In accepting the gift of faith they become mortified even to the point of distress, dread, and paradox. It is in his book *Purity of Heart is to Will one Thing* that Kierkegaard clarifies the relation between this mortification and the movement of faith. One reaches that perfect synthesis of the both-and wherein he wills only one thing through the mortification of repentance. By this act he accepts himself as an individual who has sinned.

The voice of conscience which calls a man from double mindedness to purity of heart is a two-fold voice. It is a voice which calls to him both from behind and from in front. Out of the past it reminds him of his guilt, that is, of the divided ways upon which he has dissipated his energy. From the future it puts before him the ideal of the one way wherein he wills only the good. If one is silent and listens to this voice of eternity which speaks through the past and the future, he will repent and become collected in the present with purity of heart.
The voice of conscience reveals all those barriers to willing one thing which were described in *Sickness unto Death* as the forms of despair. These forms of double mindedness, wherein the false both-and of the aesthetic ways reign, are revealed in their falsity. The young girl might dream of variety and great moments. But this is not to will one thing. Her mind mirrors its objects and it becomes split and is at odds with itself when it seeks many objects. Only when one wills one thing, which is the good, does he have purity of heart.

The young man too, who seeks his vision which beckons to him for the future, is also double minded. For even if he wills only the good and the reward that might come from willing it, he has not purity of heart. If he but listens to conscience he will see that the reward is also something and that in willing it he is double minded. Repentance should not be motivated by the desire for reward for that, too, is but another form of despair. True faith does not seek the reward of heaven which lies off in the future like the young man's vision. No, the true synthesis of both heaven and earth, of both the eternal and the temporal, does not see heaven as a future reward. It sees heaven and earth as one.

The old man might not dream of variety and he might not seek after future reward, but he can still be double
minded. If he looks into the past at his sins and then desires the good out of fear of punishment, he is still dissipated in the manifold of the false both-and. 15 Man should not fear punishment; he should fear to do the wrong. If one concentrates both upon punishment and upon the good, then he does not only will the good. Even if one preserves a certain slavish blamelessness out of fear of punishment, he would still be double minded.

Even if one becomes ethical and in his self reflection does not dream of the manifold or seek reward or fear punishment, he can still be double minded. It is possible that he might live in an egocentric service of the good. 16 He might not seek only the good but the victory of the good. Thus, Victor Eremita, in his impatience for the victory of the good, might be scandalized by the slowness of time which clothes the good. This man of defiant despair might, like Judas, treacherously wish to hasten the victory of the good. He does not perfectly harmonize time and eternity, for in his quest for victory he is impatient with time. Thus, even though he appears as ethical, he shows in reality that he is improperly ethical. He really misuses the temporal in his eternal quest.

Finally, there is the double mindedness of weakness. This other ethical attitude is a barrier to willing one thing because it will only become committed to a certain
This man does not forsake the temporal but he dwells in the temporal with busyness. In his busyness, he lets time cut him off from contemplation and the eternal of contemplation—this man misuses the eternal in his temporal quest. With his ability and indefatigable industry, he might become well-to-do and respected, but he is busy with trivialities. He does not chart out a straight and clear course. He might even be busy only for the good but his very busyness is another goal. He does not live for the victory of the good but he lives for busyness in service of the good. This too is not purity of heart. It is a way of life that is without the passion of the eternal. It is neither Christian nor aesthetic.

Despair then is double mindedness and faith is the purity of heart which wills one thing. This double mindedness is always an unbalanced joining of both the aesthetic and the ethical. It is such a perfect balance that they become one thing, not one thing through a pre-reflective indistinctness, but one thing even in their clear distinctness. How is it that one moves along the stages of life's way wherein he despairs to that stage of willing one thing? What is the dynamic force by which one moves from the collision of both the aesthetic and the ethical to their harmony in the double movement leap?

It was in The Concept of Dread that Kierkegaard
began to spell out the dynamics of the double movement leap. There he showed how dread is that psychological phenomenon whereby one can plunge down into himself and rise up a new man. Dread had very much to do with the attractive yet repelling powers of eros. We have seen how sympathy is one of the aspects of that dynamic force whereby one moves toward the second movement of the leap.\textsuperscript{18} In \textit{Purity of Heart}, Kierkegaard again briefly refers to the dynamic power of eros and speaks of how it can educate one toward the good.\textsuperscript{19} But, then he goes on to write that shame will help one "better than all human sympathy which easily leads to double mindedness."\textsuperscript{20} What is Kierkegaard's concept of shame? We have seen that shame played a great role in Kierkegaard's development.\textsuperscript{21} How is shame related to repentance and to dread? How does it bring a man from double mindedness and despair to purity of heart and faith?

Kierkegaard points out that one might be more serious in his task when another is watching him than when he is alone. This shame before another which motivates one to efficiency is, however, the shame of the child. There is a higher sense of shame wherein one is most of all ashamed even before himself. This is the shame which strengthens one to will one thing. This self-shame can be developed by the sense of shame which one has before a revered person and before a transfigured person who is dead. A man
cannot get around the transfigured one. This transfigured one exists only in the sacredly still silence of shame. In this silence one is beyond the double mindedness of despair. Finally, there is the shame of the elder before the child even as there is shame of the child before the elder. This shame of the elder as he admonishes the child toward good also admonishes the elder toward good. 22

Thus, Kierkegaard touches upon five levels of shame that might motivate one through the stages on life's way. The child can begin to will one thing as he has shame before his elders. The youth can discover his double mindedness even more as he has shame before his revered hero. The older man can have even a deeper shame before, perhaps, his father who has died and thereby become transfigured. Then he can will the good even more purely as he is ashamed in admonishing his child toward the good. Through all of these stages of shame, there develops the shame before oneself. As one becomes more and more an individual, he becomes more capable of being ashamed before the all seeing eye of the eternal which is within him. As he becomes more balanced and harmonized, his sense of shame becomes deeper. He can even make the qualitative leap to the shame of faith when he becomes so individualized that he repentantly sees himself as a sinner.

In The Concept of Dread, Kierkegaard points out how
shame is a manifestation of dread.\textsuperscript{23} And, thus, just as
dread moves one along toward the first and toward the
second movements of the leap, so shame is an aspect of this
motivating force. Shame can even bring one to the point of
repentance. Through shame, one comes to feel himself as a
sinner. It is this shame of repentance that moves one from
double mindedness to purity of heart. When one feels shame
deeply enough to repent, then he is a man of faith. It is
in repentance that one sees the detail of the perfectly
balanced synthesis of both the aesthetic and the ethical.
In repentance, these two stages are distinguished yet one.
In repentance, man can will only one thing. But, that one
thing is both aesthetic and ethical.

It is in \textit{The Gospel of our Sufferings}\textsuperscript{24} that
Kierkegaard spells out the detail of this synthesis of
repentance. When treating the problem of suffering,
Kierkegaard shows how the greatest suffering can be for the
man of faith at the same time the greatest joy. He describes
several bonds which bring about this paradoxical unity of
suffering and joy. But, the bond which is most pertinent
to repentance appears in chapter two.\textsuperscript{25} Here he shows how
the burden of suffering, even though it is very heavy, can
at the same time be light.

Through an eternal perspective which faith provides,
a thought can arise which transforms suffering into joy.
If one believes his suffering to be a good, then he can bear it joyfully. He will not see how it is good through human understanding, but he can believe through faith that it is good. Thus, faith takes one beyond the temporal insights of reason. It takes one beyond the ethical. It has an aesthetic aspect. And yet, at the same time, it gives one joy in his suffering right now. The true believer does not think that his joy will come in a future and distant heaven. No, upon earth and in the ethical moment he can be joyful because of the thought that suffering is a good. When one suffers, he might suffer with courage, with generosity, with patience. But, none of these indicate that he suffers as a Christian. At most they show that he has made the first movement of the leap. They show infinite resignation. But, the true Christian suffers with meekness and in such a way that he inherits the earth. Meekness alone bears lightly the heavy burdens of time because it firmly and humbly believes that they are good. This meekness, as seen by Kierkegaard, is not at all what Nietzsche thinks Christian meekness to be. When one is meek he inherits the earth. He does not live for the world beyond.

"Therefore is the faith that heavy suffering is for our good more perfect far than the expectation of a happy ending. For the happy ending may not
come about, but a believer believes the suffering is for the good, hence good cannot fail to come about since it already is!"^{26} When one turns the other cheek in meekness, he need not shame the other; but rather meekness alone can make the wrong less.\(^{27}\) For meekness can see it as a good.

But, what is the heaviest burden of all? It is the burden of guilt. As Nietzsche further pointed out, this is the basic burden which the Christian alone bears. But, the Christian bears it with joy; not with resentment as Nietzsche thought. The true Christian does not brood in his sin and wallow in his impotence. He does not become a man of revenge and create false values. No, with the idea that faith provides, he can just as easily see that sin is forgiven as he can see that he is a sinner. When one is meek, he can bear lightly even the burden of sin. Jesus took upon Himself all the sins of the world and yet he was meek and humble of heart. And so also Mary, in showing her faith through those words: "Behold the handmaid of the Lord," took upon her shoulders the heavy burden. She suffered the paradox and distress and dread. And yet because of her meekness, she was blessed among women.

So it is that faith is a perfect synthesis of the eternal and the temporal. Because one has an insight that is not arrived at in time and that cannot be fully under-
stood in time, he can live in time joyfully. The man of faith believes his temporal life to be a good even in its suffering. In such a way is he different from the man of religiousness A. Hence, he need not live in fear of punishment. He need not live for some future reward. These are escapes into the past and the future. If he wills only the one thing, which is the good, then he inherits the earth in the present. He has all the values of the ethical and temporal earth in full. If one merely has that idea, which cannot be arrived at through time, that suffering is good, then the temporal can be accepted with joy. So it is that one leaps back to the earth.

And yet, this leap can be made only through the gift of faith. If Jesus would not have revealed the way, then no man would have found it. So now it is time that we turn to the incarnational structures of the leap and see how it was that God Himself made the leap that man might make it.
CHAPTER VIII

THE INCARNATIONAL STRUCTURES OF THE LEAP

It is in the painting of the Duke of Gloucester that we are best introduced to what we might call the incarnational structures of the leap. Here Kierkegaard puts before us Shakespeare's portrait of the wretched noble, Richard III. Feel the pathos of that man:

"I, that am rudely stamped, and want love's majesty To strut before a wanton ambling nymph; I, that am curtailed of this fair proportion, Cheated of feature by dissembling nature, Deformed, unfinished, sent before my time Into this breathing world, scarce half made up, And that so lamely and unfashionable That dogs bark at me as I halt by them."

And what is the ground of all this suffering? It is the human body. Richard III becomes a demon because he cannot bear the pity he had been subjected to since childhood. For many the body is a source of offence. But, Jesus Christ had just such a body. However, He did not bear the sufferings of His body so as to become a demon. No, instead, through His body, He made the second movement of the leap. How did Jesus make the leap? How does His leap make possible the leap of all who believe? It was through His incarnation that God gave man the gift of faith. How does the double movement leap have its very source in the
incarnation of Jesus?

Kierkegaard's primary meditation upon the incarnational structures of the leap is in his book *Training in Christianity.*³ Here he spells out the meaning of the incarnation in such a way that we can see it as the primary instance of the double movement leap. Here he shows in precisely what way the incarnation was a suffering that nevertheless was borne with joy. Here Kierkegaard enables us to see how the incarnation is the efficacious example that makes the leap of faith possible for all Christians.

Of course, Jesus did not make the double movement leap in just the way that mere humans do. He did not begin in the collision of the aesthetic and the ethical and move from there to infinite resignation through the first movement of the leap. No, as God He began in the infinite. He did not have to leap into that. But, He did make the second movement of the leap while at the same time preserving His infinity and eternity. He did come to the temporal earth even though it was not by way of return. Thus, through His incarnation, He became a perfect synthesis of the eternal and the temporal; of the infinite and the finite. Hence, in Him we see the perfect model of that balanced both-and which men strive for in faith. The incarnation is the first and most perfect instance of the double movement leap.
Kierkegaard begins to show how the paradoxical nature of Jesus is manifest by an examination of His words: "Come hither, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, I will give you rest." It seems that such a consoling invitation would attract many. But that is not the case. Instead, most people look at the one offering the invitation and flee. He offers such a lofty gift but He appears to be such a lowly man. That is the paradox. He speaks as if He were God and yet He is a man. Even His miracles and His resurrection and His ascension do not take the beholder beyond the paradox. His miracles are not a proof that He is divine. Rather they are signs by which He attracts attention to Himself just as He does by His words. It is easy to explain away the miracles. Many did it and do it. As the paradox He can only be known by faith. His body and His words and His actions are temporal. And yet, He is also divine. But He is divine only for those who believe.

So, Jesus Christ is the God-man and one can know Him only through faith. And what is faith? It is the double movement leap. Thus, Jesus, as the paradox, can only be known through the paradox. As we have seen, Christianity is a paradoxical relationship to the paradoxical. So what kind of God must this Jesus be to whom one relates in the double movement leap? What are the implications of Kierkegaard's theory concerning the nature of God?
It is evident that the God of Christianity, for Kierkegaard, is not merely the Divine of the Greeks or the God of the Hebrews. Kierkegaard would agree that Jesus Christ was a folly to the Greeks and a scandal to the Jews. The Greeks did not conceive of a monotheistic God separate from men and nature. The Hebrews did not conceive of God as a human person. The Greeks came to know of the divine in a natural way through their mystic experience. The Hebrews came to know of their God as He revealed Himself in their history. The God of the Greeks was an aesthetic God whom one experienced immediately. If there were ethical manifestations of the divine for the Greeks, it was always in an improper sense. The God of the Hebrews was an ethical God whom one knew in the reflection of covenant faith. But, what is the God of the Christians? He is a synthesis of the God of the Greeks and of the God of the Hebrews. Therefore, one must know Him in the double movement leap. Through the first movement of the leap one comes to know the aesthetic and Greek aspect of God. Through the second movement of the leap one comes to know the ethical and Hebrew aspect of God. Jesus Christ as God could be understood neither by the Greeks nor by the Jews. He was different from both of their Gods. He was different because He was a synthesis of both the pantheistic and the monotheistic God. That is the fundamental paradox of the Christian God.
Such must be the implications of Kierkegaard's thought even though he never spells it out so clearly. The first movement of the leap is always absolutely necessary if one is to be a Christian. This means that one must first discover the divine majesty even as the saints of natural religion found it. Religiousness A is necessary before religiousness B becomes possible. If one is not first a pantheistic mystic according to Kierkegaard, he can never become a Christian. But, of course, that is not sufficient for Christianity. He must then go on and make the second movement of the leap and discover the divine as the personal God of history.

Because this God of Christianity is the paradox, one can know Him only through the paradox of faith. But, that very faith is a gift that the paradoxical God gave to man in His incarnation. By making the leap to the earth, Jesus makes it possible for man to leap after Him and in their leaping to believe in Him. How is it that Jesus gives the gift of faith through His incarnation?

Just as the Duke of Gloucester suffered because of his body, so Jesus suffered because of His. In His body He bore the burden of all mankind's sin. In taking upon Himself this guilt and dying because of it, He suffered. He was mocked and scourged and spat upon. He too was an outcast among men. But, the greatest suffering of Jesus came from the paradox of Divine Body. Just as the Duke of Gloucester
suffered because of friction between his desires and the limitations of his body, so Jesus suffered because He was a scandal to men. He wanted all, literally all, to come to Him and be refreshed but when they saw Him in His human body they were offended by His divine invitation. It was through his incarnation and the suffering implied by it that Jesus gave to man the gift of faith. We are enabled to make the leap of faith because of his example. But, how do we come into contact with His example in such a way that it can be efficacious for us in making the double movement leap?

Kierkegaard's answer to this question is hinted at in his words:

"The relationship to Christ is not: either to doubt or to believe; but either to be offended or to believe."

Being offended or scandalized is the opposite of faith and yet faith is not possible for a person unless he overcomes the possibility of being offended. In order to see how Jesus gives the gift of faith through that incarnation according to Kierkegaard it is necessary to examine his concept of scandal.

According to Kierkegaard, Jesus is capable of scandalizing others in three ways. The first of these ways is the accidental scandal that arises from his collision with the established order. He refers to the other two ways as the essential scandal of loftiness and lowliness
which arise from the collision of His incarnation.

Accidental scandal is possible when the subjective individual collides with the objective universal order.

Kierkegaard shows how others besides Jesus, Socrates for example, are capable of offending in this way. Socrates offended the Athenian establishment and Jesus offended the Pharisees. In each case it was the simply human kind of offense that any rebel can provoke. However, the essential scandal of Jesus was not possible for Socrates. Because He claimed to be the God-man Jesus could offend people in two unique ways. He could offend people by the loftiness of His claim that He was God. People would look at Him and think: "an individual like us pretends to be God." However, if they did believe in Him as God and then saw Him acting as a mere man they could be offended by His lowliness. Thus it is that when Kierkegaard thinks of the incarnation he is first struck by the scandal of Jesus.

"He would save all, but literally all—and all were offended in Him, literally all."

However, it is possible to look at Jesus and not even notice that He could be offensive. But, Kierkegaard thinks that this is to construe Him in a fantastic sense. If one would see Jesus as He is, the God-man would always appear as a possible stumbling stone. In opposition to seeing Christ in a fantastic sense Kierkegaard describes what he means by having a contemporary sense of Christ.
The one who is contemporary with Christ is always capable of being scandalized in the strict essential sense. The meaning of this contemporaneity will be examined in the next chapter on the temporal structures of that leap. The way in which the Christian witness can bring another to a sense of contemporaneity will be referred to in the last chapter on the style structures of the leap.

When one beholds Jesus contemporaneously he sees Him as offensive. This is the decisive moment. The man will either be offended by Jesus or he will believe in Jesus. If he believes he will imitate Jesus in the suffering of His incarnation. As Kierkegaard writes:

"Christ's life here upon earth is the paradigm; it is in likeness to it that I along with every Christian must strive to construct my life."  

It is by imitating Jesus in His suffering that a man makes the double movement leap. The suffering of Jesus is the source of the gift of faith whereby a man makes the leap. This can be understood when we see that the primary suffering of Jesus is rooted in His incarnation. Christ suffered because by His incarnation He was a sign of contradiction. He was to be the saviour of the world and yet, men were scandalized and therefore condemned Him. Kierkegaard writes of Christian suffering that:

"It is a whole musical tone deeper than common human suffering."  

Christian suffering is as different from common suffering
as the essential scandal is from the accidental. This 
suffering is rooted in the paradox whereby the eternal and 
the temporal are one. When a man beholds Jesus, the 
temporal embodiment of the eternal, and believes, it means 
that he too suffers the christian paradox, he sacrifices 
his understanding for madness. The madness of Jesus first 
reveals to man the possibility of such a madness. And 
then that madness is so efficacious that it even makes it 
possible for the willing man to imitate it.

We know that according to Kierkegaard the leap of 
faith is a gift and yet man makes it freely. Man receives 
the gift through the incarnation. There Jesus shows him 
the possibility of the double movement leap. But there 
must be more to the gift than the showing of the possibility. 
What that other characteristic of the gift is, and how it is 
rooted in the incarnation, is part of our problem. The other 
part is to reconcile such a gift with man's effort and free-
dom. So far we know that man makes the first movement of 
the leap by his own efforts. Here we see his freedom at 
work. But, how is this first free movement of the leap 
related to the incarnation?

Kierkegaard explains this by saying that:

"The decisive mark of christian suffering is the 
fact that it is voluntary and that it is the 
possibility of offence for the sufferer. We 
read of the apostles that they forsook all to 
follow Christ. So it was voluntary."
This forsaking all refers to the asceticism which makes the first movement of the leap possible. With his own efforts one enters the stage of infinite resignation. By doing this he freely imitates Jesus. In this movement of the leap he imitates Jesus in His infinity and eternity. By asceticism he unites himself with the God of the incarnate Jesus. But, now he is not united with the man of the incarnate God. For this movement back to the earth grace is necessary.

So far we have seen one aspect of man's freedom. He freely makes the first movement of the leap by imitating Jesus and any other Holy man who has made that movement. But, now we must see another aspect of his freedom. For, in this state of infinite resignation he can receive the grace to return to the earth and reject it. He is free to make the second movement of the leap or not. He can see Jesus becoming incarnate and be offended or he can see it and believe. In this moment of belief, in this second movement of the leap, there is a special grace and there is a special freedom. What are they and how are they related to the incarnation?

That special grace is not only the example of Jesus in the incarnation whereby he shows us the possibility of making the second movement of the leap. That grace must also include some power that helps us to actualize that possibility. That power is derived from the incarnation. What is it?
Kierkegaard clarifies the efficacious power of that grace by relating it to humility and indirect communication. The incarnation is an act of humility. Jesus actualized the possibility of the double movement leap.

"That reality is even more terrible than possibility... It is a strange sort of dialectic: That He who almightily...binds Himself, and does it so almightily that He actually feels Himself bound."\(^{13}\)

Jesus even had to die. Such was His humility. But at the same time this mystery of the bound God indirectly communicates something to man. It communicates to man whatever man freely chooses to see in it. Because God presented Himself as a riddle man is free to believe. The incarnation is an invitation to man beckoning him to make the double movement leap. The invitational power of its riddle is the efficacious aspect of the grace that comes from the incarnation.

Because this grace is invitational, it not only allows the individual to be free in his second movement of the leap, it even calls forth that freedom. Man becomes free as an individual the moment he responds to the invitation.

Thus it is that the incarnation is the first instance of the double movement leap and it is the source of grace that makes that leap possible for all individuals. Jesus felt the limitations of His body as did the Duke of Gloucester. So does every christian who follows Him. But
these limitations are accepted in faith for that is the very meaning of the return to earth in the second movement of the leap. One even finds joy in the earth and in his body. He feels the contradiction as did the Duke. But instead of being scandalized by it he experiences the resurrection of the body. He dies to his body in the first movement but then recovers it as glorified but still temporal in the second movement.
CHAPTER IX

THE TEMPORAL STRUCTURES OF THE LEAP

The painting which might most adequately plunge us into a fruitful meditation upon the temporal structures of the leap is that of the four fathers who are killing their children.¹ In this painting, Kierkegaard seeks to clarify the special nature of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac. In order to do this, he contrasts the Abraham-Isaac case with the cases of Agamemnon and Iphigenia, Jephtha and his daughter, and Brutus and his son. Kierkegaard wants to show that by his act Abraham suspended the ethical, but by their acts the other fathers acted in accordance with ethical demands. Thus, the other three would be understood and praised by others, whereas Abraham could not be understood and, hence, could only be blamed. The other three are tragic heroes. But Abraham is something else.

The special value of this painting for our consideration of time lies in its complexity. Here we see in contrast a Greek, a Hebrew, a Roman and then Kierkegaard's peculiar Hebrew model whom he uses as a paradigm case of Christian faith, Abraham. It is valuable to take the most complex of Kierkegaard's paintings when considering time for it is primarily in terms of time that Kierkegaard makes all
of his key distinctions. Kant and Hegel had prolonged meditations upon time. In our day, Heidegger, Husserl, Bergson, and Sartre, not to mention almost all other serious philosophers, have continued to grapple with time just as did Aristotle and Augustine. In short, time is one of the central philosophical issues and I would not be surprised if, of all philosophers, Kierkegaard has not dealt with this issue most constantly, most comprehensively, and most deeply. What is his notion of time insofar as it has a bearing upon the structures of the leap?

In order to answer this question we shall consider four of Kierkegaard's ideas: the relation of the temporal dimensions to the eternal, repetition, the moment, and contemporaneity. This will give us an opportunity, first of all, to see how Kierkegaard distinguishes all of the various stages in terms of time. Then, once these distinctions are clarified, we shall be able to consider the temporal flow or dynamics of the leap. In other words, we shall examine the elements of the leap and the dynamics of the leap in terms of time. We shall consider Kierkegaard's notion of time in its dimensions, duration, and succession and thereby discover the ground in terms of which he makes his basic distinctions.

The primary distinction which Kierkegaard makes throughout all of his authorship is that between the Greek world view, the world view of Christendom, and the world
view of Christianity. Thus, he is continually contrasting the recollection theory of Socrates, the mediation theory of Hegel, and his own theory of repetition. But, in this painting of the four fathers and their children, Kierkegaard even hints at two other world views, namely, the Roman and the Jewish. Let us begin to unravel the complexities of his theory of time by considering how he makes these distinctions.

It is in *The Concept of Dread* that Kierkegaard concerns himself the most with the distinction and relation between these world views. Here he firmly distinguishes four world views: paganism, Judaism, Christianity, and paganism within Christianity. The Greeks, the Romans, and, as he mentions, the Oriental theories of fate all belong to paganism. Perhaps we can best get into the temporal distinctions between these world views by considering a statement Kierkegaard makes about paganism within Christianity. He writes:

"The life of Christian paganism is neither guilty nor not guilty. Strictly speaking, it makes no distinction between present, past, future, eternal. Its life and history go on like the writing in those old days when people used no marks of punctuation but crabbedly traced on the paper one word, one sentence, after another."
In this synthesis of the both-and which turns out to be a neither-nor, one loses both the significance of the temporal dimensions and the eternal duration. All he has is a meaningless succession which Kierkegaard calls spiritlessness. From this it is evident that the nature of a people is related to their view of time.

Paganism proper, that is, all the world views which are not influenced by the Semitic world view, as Kierkegaard so often and in so many ways shows, is an eternalism. The dimensions of time have no ultimate importance of their own. They are only manifestations of the eternal. From this it follows that there are, in reality, no individuals. They, too, are only instances of the world soul. History in such a context does not emphasize the creative genius of individuals but demonstrates rather the great pattern of the rise and fall of the eternal circle. Ethics, as Kierkegaard argues, is, in such a context, an improper ethics. Strictly speaking, there is no sin or individual guilt because there is no individual freedom. There is only an aesthetic criterion by which one can judge human action. Hence, between Agamemnon and Brutus there is no essential difference. They both kill their children within the context of eternalism. Both of them are aesthetes and are beyond the pale of guilt. Kierkegaard says that they are both ethical by which he means that their actions are
reasonable and do not conflict with the universal order. Their actions have a telos that fits in with the aesthetic criteria of their world view. They are ethical but in an improper sense as Kierkegaard would argue in The Concept of Dread. If one wants to make a distinction between Agamemnon and Brutus, he might do it in terms of the past and the future. Agamemnon killed Iphigenia because of a future hope. If he would kill her, then favourable winds would come and he could sail against the enemy. Brutus killed his son because his son had broken the law and Brutus was an executor of the law. Thus, with the vision of youth, Agamemnon looked to the future and with the apollonian dream of old age, Brutus looked to the past. Even though these men both operated within the context of aesthetic eternalism, they were still improperly ethical and thus had some relation to the dimensions of time.

Judaism is the complete opposite of pagan eternalism. It is a pure temporalism. Hence, while Hellenism uses the lighter expressions of: fate, luck, misfortune; Judaism always refers to guilt. Judaism has the monotheistic God of Providence but not the pantheistic gods of fate. For Judaism, God, man, and nature are distinct. Nature and man are completely temporal. Classical Judaism has no thought of an after life. It lives only for the earth. Immortality has no individual reference in the context of Judaism.
It means, rather, that the race will last forever and even that the promise will be fulfilled. Eschatology has a racial reference but not an individual reference in Judaism. As long as Israel, as the race, through her king, is loyal to the covenant, God is pleased. But, if the race should forsake the covenant, and the covenant was always a racial phenomenon, then God would be angry. If the people remembered what God had done for them in the past and if they remembered what He would do for them in the future, that is, fulfill the promise, then they would please God in the present. The present was meaningful in their context when weighted with the temporal past and future. For the Jews, the present could have meaning without the eternal of the pagans. The present would lose meaning only when separated from its historical context of the covenant. Thus, Jephtha would kill his daughter within an ethical context. He would kill her in the context of the covenant because God demanded her in sacrifice that the race might live. Through her death, the fulfillment of the promise could be promoted.

Christianity is a synthesis of both paganism and Judaism. It paradoxically combines both an eternalism and a temporalism. The present moment has meaning for the Christian because of both an eternal and an historical context. He does not make one subservient to the other.
Unlike the Greek he protects the absolute significance of the temporal moment. He does not sacrifice it to fate and necessity. Unlike the Jew, he thinks that the promise has to do with eternal salvation or damnation for the individual person. Thus, the emphasis is placed upon individual freedom and guilt for the Christian. As we have seen, his very God concept is the ground of this eternal-temporal paradox. Jesus Christ is for him the Son of the monotheistic God. But, He is also the mystical vine in whom each individual branch is united. He is the head of the mystical Body wherein all members are united even with the Father. In Christianity, there is a paradoxical balance of both community and individuality. This equal respect for both the aesthetic and the ethical never became explicit in Greek fatalism or in Jewish racism.

Thus, there are four major world views distinguished by their temporal structures. Hellenism is an eternalism. Eternal duration is so emphasized that the temporal dimensions are seen as but aspects of it and, hence, history and temporal succession are not so important because they are but fleeting moments. Judaism is a temporalism. There is no eternal duration but, rather, the present dimension receives meaning when it is weighted with mindfulness of the dimensions of the past and future. Thus, historical succession is the very key of meaning. The race must always
in its covenant ceremonies and religious ritual recall its unique past and future, that it might prosper in time. Christianity seeks to give the present meaning both by a remembrance of the temporal dimensions and by a truly eternal quest. Thus, in ideal it is conscious of temporal succession and eternal duration in such a way that it does not reduce one to the other. In the double movement leap, it seeks to combine both in the dimension of the present.

Christendom, on the other hand, lives in a meaningless present. It does not weight its present with the fated meaning of eternity as did the Greek. It does not have the racial solidarity of the old covenant that constantly recalls the past and seeks the promise. It is unwilling to risk weighting its present with an individual eternity that is won in the temporal moment. Thus:

"If now one will compare this view (call it Christian or what you will) with the Greek view, I believe that more has been won than has been lost. True, there has indeed been lost something of that melancholy erotic Heiterkeit, but there has also been gained a spiritual quality unknown to Hellenism. The only men who truly lose are the many who go on living continually as if it were 6,000 years ago sin came into the world, as if it were a curiosity which did not concern them. For they do not win the Greek
Heiterkeit, which is precisely a thing which cannot be won, but only lose it, nor do they win the eternal meed of spirit."?

Of course, these same temporal distinctions apply not only to the great cultural phenomenons of Greece, Rome, Israel, modern Europe and the individual Christian. They apply also to all the stages on life's way and to the pseudonyms who represent them. Thus, longing as dream, seeking, and desire are all moments of aesthetic eternalism. They are distinct only in an improper ethical and temporal sense, insofar as the young girl might represent the barbarian fascination with the present. The seeking youth or Greek longs for his vision in the future. The Roman has the attitude of the conservative law maker always looking to the lesson of the past. Kierkegaard does not develop with any sustained effort or pseudonym the position of Judaism. But, he does portray the position of ethical weakness or Christendom in the persons of the ladies' tailor and the seducers. Finally, there is the pagan saint, Victor Eremita, who has gone beyond the contradictions of the immediate aesthetic to the pure eternalism of infinite resignation. Thus, we see that Kierkegaard makes his important distinctions by means of the temporal dimensions, succession and duration. But what does he mean by past, present, future, history, and eternity?
Kierkegaard is continually making observations about time throughout all of his writing. But perhaps some of his most sustained meditation upon the dimensions of time and their relation to duration appears in the *Edifying Discourses*, of his aesthetic period. In his discourse entitled *The Expectation of Faith*, he writes about the man of expectation. This man is preoccupied with the future. But perhaps it is not good to be preoccupied with the future. Perhaps by so doing, one does not fully live in the present. But, if one were only occupied with the present and had no concern for the past or future, he would live like the animals. So in what sense should one be concerned for the future and in what sense should he not be concerned? Kierkegaard's answer is that one must first conquer the future and then he can become sound and strong in the present.

But, what does he mean by the future and by fighting with the future? By the future he means oneself and all the possibilities that one can see. For this reason the future is the one enemy that a man cannot conquer by himself. For the future is himself in his imagination and one is always stronger than himself. He can always see difficulties that leave him defenseless. But, it is through this fight with the future that one comes to know himself. Without this struggle one is left ignorant of his own
possibilities and creative energies and weaknesses. But, the future is not so entirely dangerous for it is not so entirely new. We have had some experience of it. It is made up out of the past. But, how do we go to battle with the infinite possibilities of the future even though they are formed only from the elements of the past?¹⁰

Kierkegaard writes that the sailor in a storm does not struggle by looking at the countless crashing waves. Instead, he looks up at a fixed star and so charters his course through changing multiplicity. Thus, does a man fight with the future. He lets the eternal be his guide. For the eternal is the ground of the future. Then he conquers the future through faith. For faith is the eternal power in man.¹¹ Kierkegaard makes this idea concrete only in his later discourses where he treats faith in detail. Thus, in The Gospel of Our Sufferings¹² we see how the battle is won. One can look to the future and see countless possible sufferings. He can become swallowed up in dread and fall into despair. But, if he has faith he can see that every suffering is a good and, thus, he can live in the present with joy. So does he conquer the future and return strong to the present.

Thus, we see that the temporal dimensions are structures of the self. The future is the self in one's possibilities and the past is the self in one's experience.
One's possibilities depend upon experience but become infinite through the imagination. This infinity indicates the eternal which is the ground of the future. The eternal is, thus, the ground of the self and yet it is at the same time the fixed star that is beyond the self. When relying on it, one can overcome the future self and be strong in the present. Such are the temporal structures of the leap. One collects himself or the temporal dimensions by concentrating upon the eternal which he finds in his struggle with possibility. This is the first movement of the leap. But then he returns strong to the present. This is the second movement.

In his edifying discourse entitled *Man's Need of God Constitutes His Highest Perfection*,\(^\textsuperscript{13}\) Kierkegaard clarifies these relations between the dimensions of time and the eternal duration even more. Here is described the struggle and the reconciliation of what he calls the first self and the deeper self. The first self has its eye on the changing manifold of earth and it desires one changing thing after another. The deeper self has its eye on eternal stability and it points out to the first self the unsatisfactory precariousness of earth. And so they go to battle. The first self can win only by forgetting the deeper self and plunging into the din of change. For the deeper self is surely right and no sophism can overcome it.\(^\textsuperscript{14}\) The deeper self is surely
right for it can even point to new possibilities. It will not forget experience, as the first self must, if it is to live securely in the earth. As soon as the first self is about to choose a finite and temporal reality in order to satisfy itself, the deeper self points out that chances are this will never wholly satisfy. Thus, the first self, if it is honest, is brought to a standstill. If the first self will not abandon its passion for satisfaction nor become forgetful of past experience as it lusts after some future temporality, then it must submit.¹⁵

If the first self submits, then the two selves can become reconciled. The deeper self will say that now the first self can have what it wants. But, before this happens, the first self must reach the point wherein it no longer infinitely wants the finite. Thus, the leap of infinite resignation is made. This is the first condition necessary for self knowledge.¹⁶ But, in order that a man might fully know himself "greater dangers must be met and new conflicts must be won."¹⁷ It is in this new collision after the first movement of the leap that one comes to see his helplessness and need of God. So it is that he comes to the second movement of the leap. But, here Kierkegaard goes no further for it is only in the purely religious writings that he develops this movement of the leap.

In the book Sickness Unto Death, we saw that man was
a relationship, related to himself and to God. That is, in his ideal form he is aesthetic, ethical and religious all at once. Faith or the double movement leap is this perfectly balanced synthesis. Now we have seen this balance even more concretely in terms of time. The relations which a man is are temporal relations. The ideal man lives in the present after he has conquered the future. The future is constructed out of the past and is grounded in the eternal. Thus, man can be a synthesis of the temporal dimensions and eternal duration. It is in terms of these possible temporal combinations that Kierkegaard makes his distinctions between the various aesthetic stages and the ethical and the religious. But now we must ask how succession fits into this. We have clarified Kierkegaard's thoughts on the meaning of the dimensions and their relation to duration but we have not paid attention to the flow of time. This brings us to Kierkegaard's thought on repetition, the moment, and contemporaneity.

Repetition is the term by which Kierkegaard expresses movement in the realm of spirit. At its highest level and at the only level where it is fully possible, repetition is individual freedom. As a result "repetition is the interest of metaphysics, and at the same time the interest upon which metaphysics founders." The metaphysics which does not assume freedom founders upon freedom for it cannot
deduce the existence of freedom. Freedom is a movement of passion and, thus, if metaphysics seeks to be disinterested and objective, it must be deprived of the very matter which it seeks to analyze. Kierkegaard thinks that repetition will become the key concept of modern philosophy. He thinks that up to his time, Leibnitz was the only philosopher who had glimpsed its meaning. This insight he manifests in his idea that in the monad "the present is pregnant with the future." Kierkegaard thinks that repetition is for his philosophy what recollection was for Plato and mediation was for Hegel. Repetition refers to the temporal structures of freedom and since the metaphysics of his day could not approach such passionate matters, Kierkegaard sought to clarify them psychologically.

Repetition is not possible at the mere aesthetic level. Kierkegaard shows this by Constantine's trip to Berlin. The aesthete went there to see if he could repeat some of the earlier experiences of his previous trip. But he found that he could not. The full repetition of external affairs is impossible. One is not free to have all that he will of temporal things. He does not have complete control over them. So Constantine retired to his home with its "monotonous and uniform order." He found that with firmness of purpose one could anesthetize oneself and attain uniformity. But, this ethical attempt at repetition also
fails, for monotonous uniformity is not freedom. This repetition of shrewdness is a mere forgetfulness of one's passion. By such observations Constantine became convinced that there is no repetition. But then, through the experiences of the young man, he is brought to a change of mind.

The young man falls in love and he experiences the first movement of the leap. Through erotic inspiration, he becomes a poet. The power of the muse gives him a new creative freedom. The first movement of the leap gives him the freedom that the Greek attained in recollection. And yet, this is not an individual freedom. It is a power that takes hold of the poet and looses his lips. The poet becomes one with being and with the divine and in his unity receives the creative energy of the world source. There is the freedom of pantheism and the young man first attained this.

But, in his infinite resignation, the young man became melancholy and sympathetic. Because he would not marry the girl, existence mocked him and he began to feel guilty. Thus, he approaches the second movement of the leap and repetition.

"The problem which baffles him is neither more nor less than repetition. He is quite justified in not seeking light upon this problem either from
modern philosophy or from the Greek; for the Greeks perform the opposite movement, and in this case a Greek would prefer to recollect, unless his conscience were to frighten him, and modern philosophy makes no movement generally it only makes a fuss, and what movement it makes is always within immanence, whereas repetition is always a transcendence."22

The young man makes this move from immanence to transcendence with the help of Job. With Job he discovers the transcendent God and his own individuality. He discovers the transcendent freedom that is possible within this context which enables him alone to bring something new into existence.

The young man discovers three moments in Job's transition to self knowledge. At the beginning of his trial, Job rested in the bliss of infinite resignation. He could utter these patient words: "The Lord gave, the Lord hath taken away, blessed be the name of the Lord."23 But then, as the trial proceeded, guilt was pressed upon Job. However, he rebelled against this notion and against God's seemingly unjust ways. He cried out: "O, that a man might go to law with God, like a son of man with his fellow."24 Finally, the third great moment, that of the thunderstorm, arrived. Job repented and:
"The Lord and Job understand one another, they are reconciled...Job is blessed and has received everything double. This is what is called a repetition."²⁵

So it is with the young man. He makes the first movement and attains the bliss of erotic inspiration. In his love he overflows with poetic rhapsody. But then comes his period of lament. Finally, when he repents, he receives a new and individual freedom. He discovers the God who is transcendent. He has rebelled against this transcendent God and he repents this rebellion. Thus, within the context of monotheism a new source of creative freedom is found. It comes not from the muse which is a sign of one's union with the divine. This new freedom comes from within one's self as an individual. Of course, the insight that one has this freedom must be received as a gift in the thunderstorm. But it is this very gift whereby one comes to repent that enables one to be free. Thus, in the double movement leap one has two creative sources of freedom. The aesthetic freedom has its roots in the context of pantheism and the immanent God. The ethical freedom is rooted in monotheism and the transcendent God. Repetition is the paradoxical double movement whereby one, through the absurd, has these contradictory freedoms together. Thus, through repetition all things are renewed or doubled. The aesthetic and the ethical are not only in collision and thus only half
satisfying. They are reconciled and thus wholly satisfying or doubled.

But notice, Kierkegaard calls this moment of the thunderstorm a repetition. That is, it has the nature of a dynamic continuation. It keeps repeating. It is not merely a moment that takes place and then lasts with an eternal duration. No, repetition signifies not only eternal duration but also temporal succession. It is both aesthetic and ethical. In repetition the present is pregnant with the future. One knows through faith that he can continue to have the freedom of inspiration's muse if he only wills it. Yes, the child of the future is a child of the will. One does not simply see in the moment of the thunderstorm that suffering is a good and thereby rejoice without effort forever in this suffering. No, one must will at every moment to remain in this insight. One must continually exercise his new found individual freedom or he will lose it at once. Sin is precisely the forfeiting of this freedom and one is always free to sin, yes, even tempted by dread's heavy burden to sin. So, repetition or freedom in both its aspects at once is possible because of the double movement leap. But the leap is always a leaping. Faith comes in the moment or the instant of the thunderstorm but:

"The martyrdom of faith (crucifixion of the understanding) is not martyrdom of the instant but precisely the martyrdom of endurance."26
So, in order to more fully understand this temporal succession of the enduring instant, wherein the temporal dimensions and eternal duration interplay with one another, we must now take another look at Kierkegaard's concept of the moment.

Kierkegaard analyzes the structures of the historical moment in the *Interlude* of his *Philosophical Fragments.* There he asks himself about the nature of coming into existence. How must an event be if it is truly to come to exist out of nothing? That is, how can the new leap on to the scene as a result of creative freedom? Only such an event is the historical event. If succession is to be truly different from duration, then there must be something new, not just an alteration of the old. What makes this possible?

If there were only the eternal there would be no true coming into existence. For the eternal is the necessary and the necessary must remain as it is. The necessary has no true possibility. If there is to be possibility, there must arise something other than the necessary or the eternal. Any coming into existence must take place freely and not necessarily.

But, anything that comes into existence is historical for it has come into existence. The historical refers to a past event. It means that something has become actual.
Something that has come into existence may reduplicate or come into existence a second time. This points to the free dialectic of history. In order for something to become historical, it must at present have this possibility in the future. Thus, in order that there be something that has a past, there must have been a present that was pregnant with the future. Succession always implies an interwovenness of the three dimensions. Thus, any historical event has the characteristic of possibility and it retains that characteristic always. Hence, it is just as impossible to know with certainty the historical event as it is to know a future event. The historical can never be known with logical necessity. Also, it cannot be known with any immediate experience because of its quality of possibility and pastness. Thus, if one is to know the historical he has to make a leap of belief in it. He can look at the evidence but this alone will never give him any absolute certitude. The certitude about historical events comes not from evidence but from belief.

But, concerning the historical event whereby the eternal God became an historical man, there is even the greater problem of the paradox. Only the faith that is given by the gift of the incarnation and accepted in the consciousness of oneself as a sinner is sufficient to allow recognition of this event. Thus, there are two kinds of
historical event which necessitate two kinds of belief if they are to be recognized. But, both kinds of event must continue to be believed in if they are to continue to be recognized. For even when they are believed in they still remain only possible for that is always the nature of an historical event. However, if one is to continue to believe in the God-man, he will have to continue to resolve to believe. If he resolves once and then does not continue to resolve, he falls into Christendom and loses the passion of his faith. In order to remain in the repetition of the double movement leap, the incarnation must continually re-duplicate itself in the believer. He must continue to experience the simultaneity of eternal duration and temporal succession. One freely comes to believe in this paradox at the moment he begins to repent. But, he must continue to repent or his faith vanishes and the freedom which he gains the instant he sees himself as a sinner also vanishes. So if he is no longer conscious of his sinfulness, he is no longer free.

But this brings us to Kierkegaard's concept of contemporaneity. In this notion he shows how a person continues to keep himself in the presence of the incarnate God, that is, in the presence of the eternal duration which is at the same time a temporal succession.

As we have seen faith can arise only in people
who are as contemporary with Christ as were the people of his own day. These people could be scandalized by Him because of the lofty-lowly paradox. But, rather than be scandalized by the empirical evidence, they leaped beyond the evidence and believed that he was the God-man. They were able to be scandalized by the evidence and yet to leap beyond the evidence because of this contemporaneity with Christ in His incarnation. What is this contemporaneity?

Kierkegaard begins to explain contemporaneity by contrasting it with poetry and with history. When one is related to something only poetically, it is not actual or real for him. It is only imaginary and possible. The historical, however, really occurred. It went beyond the mere possibility of poetry and became actual. But, as past the historical is not now actual. It lacks the determinant of reality - the for thee. It was for somebody else in another age. Only when one is with something in the present is it actual or real for him. Kierkegaard calls this real presence contemporaneity. Poetry is the relation one has to possibility. History is the relation one has to the actuality of the past. Contemporaneity is the relation one has to the actuality for himself in the present.

But, there are two kinds of contemporaneity - For:
...every man can be contemporary only with the age in which he lives - and then with one thing more: with Christ's life on earth; for Christ's life on earth, sacred history, stands for itself alone outside history."^{33}

Because there are two kinds of history, it turns out that there are two kinds of contemporaneity. For sacred history, which one knows through faith, has the kind of reality which the present has, that is, reality for thee. Christ was the eternal duration become succession. And this mystery can be present in every age. One can experience the eternal duration in the first movement of the leap. But one cannot experience the eternal duration as temporal succession except through faith. So, now our more refined question is - what is the contemporaneity of faith? How does the incarnation of Christ become more than a poetic or historical event for one? How does the contemporaneity of the absolute event differ even from the contemporaneity of the ordinary event?

So far we have seen that the grace of the incarnation makes it possible for one to believe in the incarnation. This happens in the moment when one becomes conscious of himself as a sinner and this faith endures as long as one's repentance endures. Repentance is brought about by the double voice of conscience coming both out of the past and
out of the future. When one is still and listens to this voice, he imitates Christ in His obedience to the Father. He wills only one thing, the good. By imitating Christ in His incarnation, the believer becomes contemporaneous with Christ. It is in this willing of the good, which one learns to do as he sees how he has failed to will the good, that one believes. This is the paradox of the believer whereby he becomes contemporaneous with the God-man. This is contemporaneity. This is the moment. This is repetition. This is the double movement leap.

When one achieves that eternal insight that all is good for him, even suffering, and when he wills only this good, then he is contemporaneous with the Incarnate God. He takes joy from each moment of time. He wills the good in each moment of time. He suffers in each moment of time. And this is possible because of the eternal insight that he has in each moment of time. The aesthetic is willed. One knows that it cannot totally satisfy. One suffers thereby. But one can take joy in the aesthetic anyway. The aesthetic is renewed through faith. Faith encourages one to take joy even in the painful possibilities of poetry. The ethical is willed. One fully lives in time. One can even submit to the suffering of boredom. But he can do this with genuine joy. For he can see it as a good. Faith turns the humdrum succession of time into an eternal good. Faith renews and
doubles both the aesthetic and the ethical. It transforms the non-reality of poetry and history into a contemporary reality for the believer. Even what is lacking in both the aesthetic and the ethical is now, through faith, seen as a good. Thus, the eternal duration and temporal succession so flow together in faith that the past and the future are joined in fullness to the present. The present so extends out in faith that it encompasses all of the past and all of the future and gives them its own present reality. Such are the temporal structures of the leap.
CHAPTER X

THE STYLE STRUCTURES OF THE LEAP

It is the painting of Faust which best suggests to us what we choose to call the style structures of the leap. Here we see the great aesthetic doubter who in his doubt is silent. And yet the ethical commands him to speak his secret. Through sympathy he reflects into himself and then becomes a poet, through sympathy he speaks but he speaks not of his doubt nor of his love. What is the meaning of this strange poetic speaking which still keeps secrets? Why does Kierkegaard write of the poet:

"For the poet purchases the power of words, the power of uttering all the dread secrets of others, at the price of a little secret he is unable to utter...and a poet is not an apostle, he casts out devils only by the power of the devil."

Yes, what are these strange thoughts which Kierkegaard has about the doubting poet? And, even more strange, why did Kierkegaard himself speak like this poet throughout all of his life? In telling us about Faust, Kierkegaard is telling us very much about himself. What is the great secret of his style? Why did he have such a secret? How did he tell it even so hiddenly?
In answering these questions we shall first clarify the great pattern of Kierkegaard's style. Then we shall seek to further understand the meaning and purpose of his indirect communication. Finally, we shall treat specifically the meaning and purpose of the pseudonyms. In this way we shall come to see that even in his style this great artist constantly manifested the structures of the double movement leap. Then in terms of this pattern of the leap we shall ferret out the secret of the poet, who was more than a poet, and therefore told us his secret.

As one becomes accustomed to seeing the pattern of the collision and the double movement leap, he can see how the authorship is a manifestation of this pattern in its very style. First, the entire authorship shows forth the pattern. Secondly, each book individually puts the pattern into our grasp. Let us first notice the entire authorship.

The authorship is divided into three parts. There is in the beginning the purely aesthetic part. Then there is the middle part which we might look upon as that which primarily represents religiousness A or the first movement of the leap. Finally, there is the last part which explicates in detail religiousness B or the second movement of the leap.

The purely aesthetic part of the authorship includes (1) Either/Or, (2) Fear and Trembling, (3) Repeti-
tion, and (4) Stages on Life's Way. The predominant idea running through these books is that of the collision. All of these books are written under the sign of the Either/Or. That sign of the two opposing pillars, which never meet and that appear to always be contrary one to another, already appears before us in the first volume of Either/Or. The young man sees himself as a pure aesthete and is completely opposed to the ethical. But already in the second volume some hint of a reconciliation is given. Judge William sees the ethical as fulfilling the aesthetic. As Kierkegaard writes in the introduction to The Concept of Dread, Fear and Trembling is a portrayal of a series of collisions. But already in Fear and Trembling the collision is shown as culminating in the religious. Repetition is the companion volume to Fear and Trembling and shows one collision in detail. Still the main point is the same. Repetition is impossible in either the aesthetic or ethical but becomes possible in the religious. The very mood of the first three volumes is one of collision and confusion. One is strongly convinced of the either/or as he begins Either/Or. But the second volume dissipates his conviction. At first he may not even focus on the collision as the main theme of Fear and Trembling and Repetition but with help from the note in The Concept of Dread he does this. Once again he feels the tension of the either/or but it is a
tension that pushes him to the religious. And strangely enough even that religious bristles with collision and tension. These three early books seem to promise some secret to be unlocked in the future, but of themselves they leave one in the end only with many unanswerable questions.

Stages on Life's Way at first seems that it will clearly separate the stages and set up a clear collision. But again we are carried into the same whirlpool of confusion. The ethical seems to include the aesthetic but at the same time the ethical seems to be the religious. At first there seem to be two opposing pillars. But as one looks more carefully it seems that they merge. And then it seems that the original pillars A and B turn out to be pillar C or the religious.

The style of the middle works of the authorship primarily mirrors religiousness A or the first movement of the leap. Here Kierkegaard writes in a technical philosophical way about the paradox which overcomes the collision. This philosophical technique is a purified form of aesthetic expression. It is a style perfectly suitable to an expression of the paradox. It can lay bare the paradox of dread out of which arises the leap. It can analyze the three fold paradox in relation to Socrates and the leap. It can clarify the difference between the paradox of Abraham and that of Socrates. The clear philosophical style
goes beyond the confusion of the style of the merely aesthetic. But it does not yet reach the straightforwardness that arises in the purely religious writings.

In the last phase of his authorship, Kierkegaard uses a style of direct communication in order to say what the religion of Jesus means. He no longer hides anything but he tries to spell out in detail the full both-and of the double movement leap. He directly shows the meaning of sin and faith and the scandal and suffering.

So there is a mirrored image of the collision and the double movement leap in the ground plan of Kierkegaard's authorship. But, one also sees this image in each work individually. There is a progressive expression of the collision and the synthesis by way of the leap in each work as one moves through the authorship. Each book is a progressively clearer presentation of the whole authorship. The communication becomes more direct as one advances from book to book. But what is the significance of this movement from indirect to direct communication in Kierkegaard's style? Why does he begin by deceiving his reader with the hiding of a great secret? Why in his expression is Kierkegaard as mysterious as Faust?

The meaning and purpose of Kierkegaard's move from indirect toward direct communication is to be found in his theory of education. He wanted to understand himself. He
wanted to understand Jesus Christ. He wanted to understand the movement of history. He wanted others to do the same. This was his fundamental drive. He searched for a style that would best fit this purpose. After coming to some degree of self-understanding in the Regina experience, he was inspired to write for others. He describes his theory of education primarily as one of deceiving people into the truth. He thought that men were separated from the truth by a veil of illusion and his technique of indirect communication was the only way of helping them out of this illusion. For the truth's sake he wanted to deceive men into the truth.

From the vantage point of his Regina experience Kierkegaard saw the mere aesthetic as illusory. He saw the mere ethical as illusory. He saw the collision between the aesthetic and the ethical as illusory. It was the first movement of the leap that revealed the illusion of the previous stages and even began to reveal its own illusion. He saw that his age was especially afflicted with such an illusion. He pointed out how the demoralization of the modern state, especially through the press and the spirit of anonymity, contributed to this illusion. He knew how he got beyond the illusion. He knew that he moved along by experiencing the contradictions of the various stages. Hence, he wrote and lived so as to involve men more deeply in the aesthetic that they might see the deception of the
aesthetic. He wrote as the most aesthetic of aesthetes so that he might bring men beyond the aesthetic. As he puts it, he began by accepting the other man's illusion as good money.⁵

Kierkegaard's theory of education and hence his use of indirect communication is rooted in his psychological and theological understanding. Primarily he wants men to see Jesus Christ as making the double movement leap and he wants men to imitate Jesus in that leap. But, as he thinks of himself as trying to help men see a complex difficulty arises before his mind's eye. The leap of Jesus is shrouded in the mystery of scandal. The attention of men is clouded. Kierkegaard knows that he is trying to reach a supernatural goal by a natural means. He is trying to bring men to faith but he knows that they can come to faith only by their own efforts and by the grace of God. Their own asceticism is necessary for the first movement and God's grace is necessary for the second movement. What does he have to do with the whole process?

As he ponders his task as an educator, and to him that only means educating a man to become individual,⁶ he sees his role as that of the witness. He comes to see the crowd as the untruth.⁷ He thinks that only the individual who becomes a witness to the truth can deliver another individual from the crowd. To be a witness is to be a
martyr. In his psychological and theological insight he became convinced that all an educator can do is compel another to take notice.

"Compelling people to take notice and to judge is the characteristic of genuine martyrdom. A genuine martyr never used his might but strove by the aid of impotence."\(^8\)

His style of indirect communication was a method of impotence. It was based in his insight that his own might or direct communication was powerless.

Thus, Kierkegaard's very style is rooted in his concept of himself as a witness. He knew that he could only teach by learning. He wrote in great sincerity: "I am not a teacher, only a fellow student."\(^9\) Even his style indicates the constant "becoming" structure of the leaping. His indirect communication is a product of his belief in the existential. As one comes to understand his style he feels the passionate inwardness of Kierkegaard's expression. What pathos there is in those words we have seen before:

"The thought goes very far back in my recollection that in every generation there are two or three who are sacrificed for the others, are led by frightful sufferings to discover what redounds to the good of others. So it was that in my melancholy I understood myself as singled out for such a fate."\(^10\)
Just as Faust broke his silence out of sympathy, so did Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard too had his doubts even about his ability to communicate. But he, too, became a poet even that he might deceive men beyond poetry. When he became a poet he also experienced his religious awakening and, thus, he did not desist from using poetry to bring others to poetry even that they might become religious. The religious subsumes the aesthetic and thus the aesthetic is not absolutely contradictory to the religious. Thus, Kierkegaard can use the aesthetic in bringing men to the religious. The double movement leap which unites the ethical and the aesthetic can even unite the poetic and the crowd. When that happens the individual arises. So it is that indirect communication is grounded in the leap and constantly mirrors forth the leap. But can we understand all this more concretely?

It is through Kierkegaard's use of the pseudonyms that he stylistically attempts to deceive the crowd into the truth. An understanding of the role of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms would help us see just how he was able to communicate indirectly. Very simply, the point is, he was always a religious author even when he was writing as a mere aesthete or as a philosopher. His first task was to go to the crowd and meet them in their own position. Thus, he would express the values of the aesthetic in the most
beautiful way he knew how. He would express the poetic and philosophic ways as if they were sufficient in themselves. But, all the while he knew they were not. That is why he never signed his own name to those writings. They were part of his world view and each pseudonym represented a strand of his own consciousness. But, they were all partial and inadequate views. By using the name of the pseudonyms he pointed to their insufficiency. Because he was deceiving the crowd out of an illusion he had to use falsities. But he did not want to claim these falsities as the truth and therefore he expressed them under the sign of the pseudonym. He always believed in the both-and of the double movement leap. But in order to convince others of this he thought he had to begin with the either/or of the collision. Thus, his early literature was written under the double sign of the either/or and the pseudonym. The pseudonym was a smile to the side by which Kierkegaard said, some day you will see that I deceived you but then you will remember this smile and realize that I was only seeking to deceive you into the truth. By the pseudonyms Kierkegaard disowned his own deceit even while he deceived.

Before looking at this technique of the pseudonyms more closely, we should mention two other aspects of his revealing concealing style. Just as he deceived with the either/or but took it back with the pseudonyms, so he also
deceived with the image of himself which he presented to the crowd and took it back with the Edifying Discourses. During his merely aesthetic period he showed himself to the people of Copenhagen as a mere aesthete. He convinced them that he lacked any seriousness. Even in his personal existence he deceived others that he stood with the crowd. And his technique worked. Especially The Diary of a Seducer became popular. And yet, at the same time he published an Edifying Discourse with each aesthetic work in order to show the religious which the aesthetic work needed. Nobody appreciated his religious works. He also deceived with his personal life but revealed his real intent with his discourses.

In keeping with the three parts of his authorship Kierkegaard uses three sets of pseudonyms. The pseudonyms of the collision period include Judge William and the aesthetic characters. Judge William is the author of the purely ethical writings. But they are purely ethical only in appearance. For he attempts to include the aesthetic within his ethical perspective and he is always religious. The two main aesthetic characters are the young and Victor Eremita. Victor represents the aesthetic religious or the first movement of the leap. As has been earlier pointed out the young man is revealed at three stages of his development. We see the young man as he views the aesthetic possibilities
and eventually follows that of Victor. It is in Repetition that the young man becomes Victor.

As one considers these pseudonyms of the collision period, one can see them as masks whereby Kierkegaard can deceive and yet go beyond the deceit. But, one is also aware of another dimension which they possess. They allow Kierkegaard to speak of his personal life without being so obvious so as to offend his reader or Regina. Through the pseudonyms he can explore all of his feelings with detachment. Perhaps it is precisely the spirit of detachment which the mask of Constantine Constantus is capable of evoking. It is right here, in the depths of the relation between the pseudonym as a device of religious education and the pseudonym as a mask of the intimately personal, that Kierkegaard reveals his secret. It was necessary for Kierkegaard to communicate the collision indirectly, for the collision was so dialectical that in reality it was far more than the collision. In Kierkegaard's great experience of 1838, he became at once a poet and a religious man. That was for him the moment of repetition which united the dimensions of time with one another and with eternity. Thus, in his one experience there was the collision and the first movement of the leap and even a premonition of the second movement of the leap. Kierkegaard experienced all the moments at once and he wanted to bring others to this experience even by writing about it. But, in order to
write about this he had to spatialize, as it were, that which was one moment. Thus, in bringing his insight to language he had to break it into parts, whereas in reality it was not broken into parts. In order to whisper of the unity of the collision and the leap, he used indirect communication and the pseudonyms. In order to speak of them he had to break them asunder. But, he still needed a stylistic technique to point to their unity. Thus, his peculiar style.

In the middle period of his authorship Kierkegaard spoke through Vigilius Haufniensis and Johannes Climacus. This writing which mirrors forth the first movement of the leap has less of incompleteness in it than the period of the collision. Thus, the pseudonyms are not separated so far from Kierkegaard. Johannes the Seducer in his Diary is three steps removed from Kierkegaard himself. Between Kierkegaard and that Diary there stands Johannes the writer, and the young man and Victor the editor. But, Kierkegaard is only removed from the contents of The Concept of Dread by its philosophical abstractness. Thus, Vigilius, the watchman of Copenhagen, is only a thinly diaphonous mask over Kierkegaard himself. Johannes Climacus is the leaper who knows of the first movement of the leap and its difference from the second movement even in their philosophical distinction. He has spelled out
the differences between religiousness A and religiousness B. He is removed from the real Kierkegaard to the degree that speculation is not yet full praxis.

Finally, in the third stage of his authorship Kierkegaard abandons indirect communication but still uses the pseudonym of anti-climacus. Anti-climacus is against the mere leap beyond the earth and shows the necessity of coming back to the earth. Kierkegaard uses a pseudonym here for a reason exactly opposite to the reason he used pseudonyms in the earlier stages. In the first and second parts of the authorship he understood more than he wrote and hence used a pseudonym. In the third part he does not understand all that he writes but believes it. So again he feels the need to use a pseudonym.

Through his pseudonyms Kierkegaard speaks indirectly and thus, like Faust, reveals even by concealing. He does this in conscious imitation who indirectly communicated to men the lesson of the double movement leap through His Incarnation. He does it as the teacher that he might be effective and that he too might continue to learn. His style exhibits the unity and development of his primary thought. It constantly portrays the collision and the leap. For that reason all of his thought can even be seen in the ten pictures we have selected from Fear and Trembling.
CONCLUSION

My method of argumentation has been quite straightforward. I have sought to show the equivalence of the existential and the religious in Kierkegaard. In order to accomplish this I have argued that they are both equivalent to the leap and therefore to each other. My whole effort has been to clarify the meaning of the leap so that in terms of it the religious and the existential can be correctly interpreted. But, while doing this I have suggested even more. I have been in effect saying that the leap is the central issue in Kierkegaard's thought. From this suggestion a problem arises, the answer to which will form a suitable conclusion to this thesis. The problem is this: what is the relation between Kierkegaard's goal and method and my goal and method?

Kierkegaard's goal is primarily to make the leap and to persuade others to make it. Clarification of the leap is only a means toward his goal, whereas for me it is the primary goal. Because of his goal his method will include much more within it than philosophical analysis. As we have seen he will make his appeal through such techniques as the pseudonyms, his *Edifying Discourses*, and even his way of life. His techniques of indirect communication include much more than critical reflection and a
dialectical analysis. With this complexity of his method in mind we might pick out just his dialectical analysis and make explicit how that proceeds. Then we can relate our method of argumentation to this aspect of his method.

As one looks at the authorship he sees that Kierkegaard's argument has three moments. There is the aesthetic moment, the philosophic moment and the religious moment. All three of these are part of the same dialectical argument so there is still a philosophic issue in the aesthetic and religious moments. Kierkegaard’s way of philosophizing is to reduce several different philosophies to form basic possibilities and then to relate those basic philosophies within an hierarchy. In these ways he shows how one philosophy is more consistent and adequate than the others. He repeats the pattern of this basic argument through the three moments of his authorship.

In the aesthetic moment of his argument he treats what we might call the stage and love structures of the leap. Here he clarifies the basic terminology of his philosophy and shows how it is pertinent to the human situation. He shows the collision between the aesthetic and ethical and then shows how one gets beyond this collision by the synthesis of the double movement leap. At the same time he shows how this collision is one between aesthetic love or eros and ethical love or marriage. This collision is gone beyond by erotic inspiration and neighbourly love.
In the philosophical moment of his authorship he clarifies the dialectical structures of the leap. In this section he shows the superiority of his own dialectic by contrasting it with the dialectics of Socrates and Hegel. His basic argument is that his existential dialectic which assumes sin as a reality is a more consistent and adequate dialectic than the other two. The criterion by which he establishes his hierarchy of dialectics is the existential. His dialectic is existential in the fullest sense.

In the religious moment there is a further treatment of the temporal structures of the leap. The aesthetic and the ethical are related to the eternal and the temporal. Kierkegaard shows how faith recognizes the values of both the eternal and the temporal and unites them in a perfect synthesis. Faith or religiousness is shown as the highest existential possibility because it alone has respect for both the eternal and the temporal.

In my argument I have made more specific the four basic structures of the leap. Thus, in the aesthetic moment I treat the stage, love and experiential structures. I divide Kierkegaard's analysis of the dialectical structure into an analysis of the sin, reason and existential structure. I further divide his considerations of time into a treatment of faith, the incarnation and his style. My argument makes explicit the repeated pattern of his thought so as to show the equivalence of the leap, the
religious, and the existential. In this way I clarify his philosophical argument which shows the superiority of religiousness B by showing that it is the way of life that is the most completely existential.
APPENDIX A

In order to show how my thesis compares and contrasts with some of the interpretations of Kierkegaard, I shall now comment on five other authors. I will approach each author with the four issues which I have treated in the Conclusion. I do not think that such a detailed consideration is necessary for every writer in my bibliography. The five men I have chosen know and represent the standard interpretation of Kierkegaard. I consider it valuable to comment upon at least their ideas in order to pinpoint what is new and what is old in my interpretation.
Stage Structures of the Leap

Collins understands the stage structures of Kierkegaard's thought as the fundamental skeleton of his entire authorship. However, one of the chief problems which Collins has throughout his book is to harmonize his interpretation of the stages with his interpretation of Kierkegaard's entire thought development. For the sake of getting into this problem, which Collins has, of making Kierkegaard consistent, we might consider the issue which Collins labels "Christian Humanism."  

Collins thinks that Kierkegaard was ambivalent concerning retention of aesthetic or human values once the leap to religiousness B had been made. He thinks that Kierkegaard wavered sometimes thinking that such values could be retained and sometimes thinking that they must be abandoned. But Collins goes even a bit further and seems to think that Kierkegaard cannot be a "humanist". He writes:

"Yet when the aesthetic life is no longer admitted to be absolute, there still remains the task for Christians of renewing the face of the entire earth and hence of reckoning in a positive way with humanistic values."  

Collins thinks that Kierkegaard:

"...lacked full confidence in the power of the supernatural order to transform natural abilities and perfections, without compromising its own transcendental character."
The basic reason why Collins thinks that Kierkegaard has this problem of being a humanist arises from the interpretation which Collins has of the stages and their relationships. Even though Collins is careful to point out that one does not pass only from the aesthetic to the ethical to religiousness A and to religiousness B in just that rigid order, and even though Collins thinks that religiousness A can contain the ethical and the aesthetic and that the ethical can contain the aesthetic, Collins still doubts that the leap to religiousness B permits the survival of the previous stage.

At this point we must ask Collins how he would conceive of the leap. He does speak of a leap from the aesthetic to the ethical. He indicates that the transition from one stage to the other is the leap. But he does not make any analysis of the leap. If he did, would not he have to say that the full existential leap is that double movement leap which we have described?

If Collins would agree to this, would not he have to say that Kierkegaard's notion of dialectics is closer to Hegel's than he admits? Collins' point concerning Hegel's dialectic and Kierkegaard's humanism is that Kierkegaard finds it hard to be a humanist because he cannot admit a synthesis in his dialectic as does Hegel. However, Kierkegaard is still different enough from Hegel in that
his dialectic is existential whereas Hegel's is ideal. If our thesis is correct, then Kierkegaard does have his own kind of existential synthesis. It is this synthesis of the double movement leap which enables Kierkegaard to found his "Christian Humanism." Kierkegaard does not lack a foundation for explaining how the Christian can renew the face of the earth.

Collins supports one of the key tenets of our thesis, that the ethical alone is an existential impossibility. At the same time he points out the fundamental opposition between the aesthetic and the religious.

"His own experience, rather than any theoretical requirements, convinced Kierkegaard that man's real predicament is to be placed between a thoroughly esthetic way of living and a thoroughly religious one. No permanent footing can be maintained on a purely ethical basis, and in this respect Kierkegaard stands opposed to all efforts to make morality self-sufficient. Ethical principles are intrinsically ordained to the religious outlook, and a secular morality is either unaware of its religious significance or only an esthetic discourse about being moral."7

I agree entirely with this very important and well expressed interpretation of Collins. It goes to show the existential impossibility of the merely ethical. But does Collins have to stress the fundamental opposition of the aesthetic and religious to such a point that they cannot be reconciled? Does not Kierkegaard's notion of the double movement leap as he develops it from Fear and Trembling show how he can reconcile the two extremes?
In his book on Kierkegaard, Collins takes very little interest in love. His treatment of Regina is quite unique. Collins does not indicate that Regina had anything to do with Kierkegaard's religious development. Collins does think that Kierkegaard's relation to his father was very influential in his religious development. But in keeping with his interpretation of the fundamental opposition between the aesthetic and the religious, Collins does not relate Kierkegaard's erotic love to his religious love.

If Collins would consider Kierkegaard's experience of, and thought about, the erotic, I wonder if he would not have to reconsider his treatment of the leap and its stage structures. Would Collins agree with the following explanation of the dialectical relation between the aesthetic and the religious? There are different kinds of aesthetes, i.e., Johannes the Seducer and Victor Eremita. Between Johannes and Victor there are both likenesses and differences. Together they both live in immediacy; they live for the eternalized moment. But they are as different as Lysias and Socrates in Plato's Phaedrus. By loving a woman, Johannes just steals bait from the gods. But Victor becomes a poet or a genius or, yes, even a saint. That is it! One can leap from one level of the aesthetic, that of
Johannes, to another level, that of Victor. This is the leap of infinite resignation that brings a man to religiousness A. Is not this the experience that Kierkegaard had through his love for Regina? Was she not the occasion by which he became a religious aesthete? Through her he experienced the magnificence of the immanent God. But that was not yet faith in the transcendent aspect of God. However, Kierkegaard made the second part of the leap by returning to the earth, which would be the ethical part of the leap, by becoming ready to marry. Johannes de Silentio could not have such faith and even if Kierkegaard could not, though I think he did, he saw the idea as being this double movement. The erotic was the occasion for the grace and once the grace came it could preserve the inspiration of the erotic; it could continue to make the eternal existentially real. If Collins would agree with such an interpretation then could he not overcome the difficulty of determining whether Kierkegaard can be a humanist or not?

**Dialectic Structures of the Leap**

If Collins is really serious about the fundamental importance of the stage structures throughout the whole of Kierkegaard's thought, then I do not see how he can maintain his interpretation of the stage and the leap. Collins writes:
"Around this three-fold division, Kierkegaard organizes the entire argument which runs through the esthetic works. His later philosophical and religious studies suppose that this original analysis of central human motives is a sound one, which can be applied even outside the aesthetic context."

This I see as another true and admirable statement. But then Collins makes his interpretation of the stage, so that Kierkegaard has difficulty being a humanist. Finally, throughout much of his book, especially that dealing with the religious phase of Kierkegaard, Collins shows the humanism of Kierkegaard. Now there is an inconsistency here. Why should Kierkegaard, when he becomes most religious in his writing, become most humanistic if there is to be some conflict between his Christianity and his humanism? One explanation would be that Kierkegaard had two contradictory phases: the first wherein the stage structures did not permit a humanism and the second wherein they did. Another explanation would be that Kierkegaard just dropped his stage structure format. Collins would not want to accept either of these explanations. Therefore, if he admits the humanism of Kierkegaard's religious phase, I do not see how he can maintain his interpretation of the stage structures of the leap. But he does admit the humanism of the religious writing of Kierkegaard as I will now show.

In his treatment of the existential Collins has long
passages that are in perfect agreement with our thesis. He shows how religiousness B contains much within it of religiousness A. In other words, one does not leap beyond the third stage when going to the fourth. Collins points out how:

"...in the Christian economy, all things are made new, above all, man himself, who becomes nova creatura. The individual no longer seeks to exchange his finitude for a merger with the absolute, but gains a new sense of the worth and human value of creatureliness. Time is not to be fled, and neither is it merely to be endured strongly but without hope of fulfillment. The eternal is now found to be immanent in the temporal order, in such a way as to give time significance in itself and for eternal happiness."[11]

This is what I would call a perfect statement of the dialectical structures of the leap as I see it. But notice this very statement of Collins contradicts what he wrote earlier when discussing the stages as such.

How could Collins doubt the humanism of Kierkegaard if he would agree that such an idea as this is dominant throughout the whole of the Kierkegaardian authorship? How could he doubt that such an idea is dominant if he saw the meaning and central place of the leap? For the leap is just as significant as are the stages. Without a correct notion of the leap one does not understand the stages.

Collins even relates this synthesis to the instant but apparently does not see the equivalence of the instant
and the leap. He writes:

"This act occurs in the Instant, as kind of synthesis of time and eternity, in which the believer is rendered contemporaneous with Christ."\(^ {12}\)

If Collins would relate the eternal to the aesthetic and the ethical to the temporal as Kierkegaard does in Stages and the Postscript, then would not he have a very hard time maintaining that there can be no synthesis of the aesthete within the religious?

In his chapter on The Nature of the Human Individual, Collins again shows much evidence in Kierkegaard's thought that he would find hard to reconcile with the idea that Kierkegaard was lacking in "humanism." Collins points out Kierkegaard's great concern for political and social criticism. He shows Kierkegaard was as much caught up in "humanism" as were Nietzsche, Marx and Feuerbach. When he discusses "Humanism" and Christianity at the end of that section he writes:

"Thus the age in which we live poses an inescapable either/or. Either one must be loyal to man and the earth, as Nietzsche counseled, in such a way that one is a traitor to God, or one must learn to love God above all things earthly and human and thus to love men and the earth the better in Him. Kierkegaard's hope was that the inhumane consequences of following the first alternative will dispose us to choose the other path, so as to build up a Christian humanity, a fellowship of individuals united by faith and charity in Christ."\(^ {13}\)

Notice the meaning of the either/or and of the synthesis in this passage. Here Collins unites what he
earlier called the aesthetic within the religious and yet
still has a meaningful either/or which is based on the
absoluteness of the aesthetic.

Temporal Structures of the Leap

In the above, we see that it is in love of Christ
that we come to love our brothers and the earth. We know
that it is in love and faith that the eternal and temporal
are united. But for some strange reason Collins will not
take up this theme of love seriously just as previously he
would not take up erotic and married love even though they
were of paramount importance for Kierkegaard. If he would
consider the leap of love, would not the central place of
the leap in Kierkegaard’s thought clarify itself for him
and overcome his problem of humanism?

At the beginning of his chapter Becoming a Christian
in Christendom Collins writes:

"The desired synthesis of moral and esthetic
interests is not to be made, however, on any
basis furnished by one or the other outlook."14

He writes this as if he is now convinced that
there can be such a synthesis even though at the beginning
of his book he would have denied such a possibility. He
would have said it was Hegelian and not Kierkegaardian.
He emphasizes the importance of becoming contemporaneous
with Christ. For this is the way the synthesis is to be
made. He has mentioned Kierkegaard’s treatment of the
I-Thou relationship. And finally Collins comes to that all important notion of the Love of God. But what does he do? In one and one-half pages he passes it by. He does not show how the eternal and the temporal are linked in the leap of love. He does not discuss the difference and the possible relations between poetic and Christian love. If he would I wonder what he would say about our thesis.
Walter Lowrie

Stage Structures of the Leap

Lowrie refers to himself as a biographer and not as a philosopher. He is an excellent historian and I greatly appreciate not only his translations but also his way of interpreting Kierkegaard's life. He knows the facts and he assembles them meaningfully. In the following consideration of his interpretation of the leap I shall be concerned with two points - how would my interpretation of the leap serve him in clarifying his biographical data and how well is my interpretation supported by his data? Putting this in another way I will ask - how does Kierkegaard's fundamental philosophical insight aid us in interpreting his life and works and is this insight confirmed by the biographer-historian? In short, I am suggesting that Lowrie is and must be a philosopher in his biographical and historical interpretation and I will now inquire into what happens to that interpretation when one emphasizes the philosophical over the historical and the biographical. I will compare and contrast his interpretation with mine and mine with his.

Lowrie cites texts wherein Kierkegaard refers to the leap. But Lowrie does not think it is his task to analyze philosophically such concepts as the leap. However, if Lowrie did make a careful study of the stage structures of the leap, I wonder if he could lay out his biography of
Kierkegaard in the way that he did. For example, Lowrie refers to the time from June 4, 1836 to 10:30 a.m. on May 19, 1838 as the ethical stage of Kierkegaard's life. Lowrie writes:

"It is out of deference for S.K.'s own nomenclature, his sharp distinction of the three stages, that I have adopted this title (The Ethical Stage) to describe the present chapter.... Where else could we look for the ethical stage? S.K. instructs us that it lies between the aesthetic and the religious - therefore this must be the peace. And what have we a right to expect of S.K. in his ethical stage? Surely no more than that he was trying to be good. It must be confessed that this conclusion has more truth than evidence on its side, so far as the testimony of the Journal is concerned." 15

At this point we see Lowrie letting his theory of the stages guide him as to how to interpret Kierkegaard's life. But is his theory of the stages right? Perhaps the difficulty which Lowrie feels arises from a wrong notion of the stages. Lowrie indicates that it is hard to find such a stage. He sees there is not much evidence for it. Maybe there is as little truth in his conclusion as there is evidence for it.

Our thesis has been that the collision of the aesthetic and ethical is dialectically related to the double movement leap. We have never thought that one is first in an aesthetic stage and then an ethical stage and finally a religious stage. We have never thought that the leap is a transition first from the aesthetic to the ethical stage and then from the ethical to the religious stage.
Lowrie would seem to support this ordinary view.

We have begun our argument with what Kierkegaard says about the leap in *The Concept of Dread*. There we have seen the leap as a transition from pagan innocence to Christian guilt. We have maintained that this is the same leap that Kierkegaard describes in *Fear and Trembling* and his other works. We have argued that this is a description of his own religious experience. In light of this we would argue that the ethical is not an existential possibility. The aesthetic stage and the religious stage are livable but the ethical is not. One is either an ethical aesthete or an ethical religious man and there is no middle ground. This we have shown is the point of Kierkegaard's threefold distinction of the ethical in *The Concept of Dread* whereby he shows the first kind of proper ethics to be impossible.

Lowrie suggests in his statement that the ethical is that stage wherein a man tries to be good. But I do not think this is at all an adequate notion of what Kierkegaard would mean by the ethical. First of all, Kierkegaard connects the ethical with marriage, and, of course, Kierkegaard never married. He was always an ethical exception. Always, also in the *Postscript* Kierkegaard describes ethics as a successful striving. But what Lowrie describes as Kierkegaard's ethical period is not a successful striving. Kierkegaard strives to be good but is not
good. Mere striving is not the ethical. The ethical man is good.

In non-Christian religion there is no proper ethics. But within the Christian world there can be two kinds of ethics. That ethics which is sublated within Christianity. Proper ethics of the second kind which is founded on dogmatics or faith is true ethics. But then there is the ethics of Christendom. Theoretically this thinks it can rest on metaphysics and practically it is the mere following of the universal order. It is not an existential possibility. That is, the many who are in this ethical order are lacking in existence. Now Kierkegaard was living in the Christian world. Therefore, Lowrie is seeking to find within his life a period when he wholeheartedly followed the ethical patterns of Christendom. No wonder that such a period is hard to find.

In Kierkegaard's very literature there is not first an aesthetic period and then an ethical period and then the philosophical and finally the religious. No there is first an aesthetic/ethical period. The young man and Judge William right from the start meet in collision. So it was in Kierkegaard's life and so it is in his theory.

**Love Structures of the Leap**

I greatly admire Lowrie's fine treatment of Kierkegaard's relation with Regina. With great patience
Lowrie shows himself to be a careful detective in ferreting out the nuances of Kierkegaard’s religious experience. I agree with Lowrie completely that his real conversion resulted from his experience with Regina. Lowrie is careful to distinguish the unspeakable joy aspect of his conversion from "the fact" of that conversion as such.\(^{16}\)

However, if we approach Kierkegaard’s broken engagement from the notion of the double movement leap, I wonder if we will not get a slightly different interpretation than Lowrie’s. He suggests that Kierkegaard did not marry for religious reasons. The main aspect of that reason was that Kierkegaard saw himself as a penitent because of his past sins.\(^{17}\) I agree that Kierkegaard did see himself as a penitent and did not want to infect Regina with his and his family’s guilt. But wasn’t the central reason for the rupture the divine counter order? And did not this have to do with the erotic inspiration whereby Kierkegaard became a religious poet? Lowrie goes all around this idea and gives many pertinent quotations. But he does not zero in on it. He does not come right out and see this as the first movement of the leap - that movement of infinite resignation. He quotes the long passage with delight concerning the Knight of Infinite Resignation and the Knight of Faith.\(^{18}\) But he does not interpret the Regina experience in terms of this. He points out how Abraham is
to Isaac and S.K. is to Regina. If Lowrie would settle his mind on this central notion, would he not see even that here we have a distinction of the ethical phase? The man of the earth from whom the Knight of Faith cannot be distinguished is that ethical man for whom there are no existential possibilities.

At his moment of erotic inspiration I think Kierkegaard became fully an aesthete – he was an inspired poet. He became religious at least in the sense of religiousness A. And he now became ethical. Previously as a lower level aesthete he wanted to be good. But now he could be. He is now beyond the collision so as to be both aesthetic and ethical. But that is so only because he has leaped into the infinite. Now he must make the movement whereby he becomes back to the earth.

Dialectic Structures of the Leap

Lowrie is also good even to the point of being inspirational in his handling of Kierkegaard’s distinction between religiousness A and religiousness B. By means of this distinction he clearly shows the difference between Christian faith and all other religions. He shows how one must first have religiousness A before he can have religiousness B. Lowrie puts the paradox nicely:

"...it (Christianity) is the only religion which the hope of an eternal blessedness upon something historical, which moreover by its very nature cannot be historical, and so must become so by virtue of the absurd."
Lowrie does an excellent job of commentary on Kierkegaard's idea:

"to comport oneself at the same time absolutely with regard to the absolute Telos and relatively with regard to the relative." 21

He shows in his commentary how Kierkegaard hereby repudiates the protestant ethics which stresses the secular calling.

All that Lowrie has written about the differences and relation between religiousness A and B I see as a confirmation of my thesis. The first movement of the leap is religiousness A and the second movement is religiousness B. When these movements are made together religiousness A is the sublated aesthetic and religiousness B is the sublated ethical. Here we see the both-and or the fullness of the existential.

Again, I wonder what would have happened to Lowrie's interpretation if he would have stressed the centrality of the leap. In stressing the absoluteness of the Divine which the man of religiousness A discovers, Lowrie shows how Kierkegaard repudiates protestant ethics. For, protestant ethics does not stress the necessity of asceticism. It does not make such a firm distinction between the good and the holy. But if Lowrie would have remembered throughout the role of religiousness A, I wonder if he might have interpreted Kierkegaard's relation to mysticism in a slightly different way. 22 Kierkegaard
definitely says he is not a mystic. Kierkegaard, as Lowrie points out, often does criticize mysticism. But could not everything that Lowrie here writes about mysticism be clarified by seeing mysticism as religiousness A? Kierkegaard would not want to say that the Christian ideal was just to become a Knight of Infinite Resignation. He would not want to say that he was just a mystic even though Johannes de Silentio might. But he could say that mysticism was the first part of the leap. I think that Kierkegaard was a sublated mystic and that he would have to defend the rights of the mystic. Religiousness A means mysticism. That is, it is union of God and man. But that is not to say that Kierkegaard ever thought he was just a mystic. He was definitely no mystic in the popular sense of mysticism. But he did experience the absolute as immanent. Lowrie could admit that and be true to Kierkegaard. He does not have to go so far as to write:

"If it is allowable to bestow the name mystic upon a man who did not stress the immanence of God but rather the transcendence, etc...then I raise no objection if any one prefers to call S.K. a mystic." \(^{23}\)

I think Kierkegaard did experience God as immanent. In fact I think Kierkegaard says a man has to, if he wants to become a Christian. That is, religiousness A is necessary. Lowrie is too good a historian not to know that there is something wrong with his interpretation. He writes:

"But on the other hand he approached mysticism almost as closely as one could without becoming a mystic." \(^{24}\)
Why doesn't Lowrie just get it over with? Why doesn't he just admit Kierkegaard was a mystic even if Kierkegaard says he wasn't and then agree with Kierkegaard by saying that he was not just a mystic, just as he would say Kierkegaard was not just a man of religiousness A?

Temporal Structures of the Leap

Lowrie points out how important the theme of time is in Kierkegaard's thought. In fact, Lowrie thinks that Kierkegaard more than anyone else has brought the attention of contemporary man to the theme of time. Lowrie takes up the theme of the instant and relates it to the leap. But he does not feel that it is his task to make a detailed analysis of the temporal structures of the leap. In fact he does not consider The Works of Love carefully at all. He mentions that Kierkegaard emphasizes works and not faith alone. But he does not show how Kierkegaard conceives of Christian love as the synthesis of time and eternity. Lowrie even refers to Buber's I-Thou as if he isn't aware of Kierkegaard's usage of this in Works of Love.

If one is aware of faith as a double movement leap whereby through love one lives both in the eternal and the temporal, I wonder if he would not have to interpret Kierkegaard's religious experience of 1848 with more dialectical finesse than does Lowrie. It seems to me that what Lowrie refers to as the 1838 experience is the first
movement of the leap and the 1848 experience is the second movement of the leap.

Lowrie shows very clearly how the second religious experience has to do with faith in God who helps us in the temporal situation. That experience had to do with God forgetting as well as forgiving Kierkegaard's sins. Lowrie's summary of some excellent quotations which he cites from Kierkegaard on this relation between God helping us in time and his forgetting our sin is:

"Not only had he failed as yet to appropriate the thought that God can forget as well as forgive, but (in close connection with this) he was incredulous of the power of God to help him temporally when he saved him eternally."26

Lowrie shows how the experience of 1848 was a movement beyond this incredulity.

But when one thinks of this experience in relation to the leap, a very strange sort of problem arises. Kierkegaard knew of this aspect of the religious experience way before 1848. Already in Fear and Trembling he describes the double movement leap and he knows that if he would have had faith he would have married Regina. In fact, as Lowrie is keen to see, Kierkegaard did consider the double movement at that time for himself. Kierkegaard refers to his sin and his melancholy over it as a leak in his boat in which he floated over the 70,000 fathoms and as a thorn in his flesh. Thus Lowrie writes:
"The earlier occasion when he thought of 'repairing the leak' and drawing out the thorn was when he was engaged to Regina - and at that time he concluded that it was hopeless."27

Now I am not at all sure that Kierkegaard concluded that it was hopeless. The question is - what is the relation between his experiencing the second movement of the leap and his knowing about it? Did he first experience it and then realize its possibility in thought? Or did he first see its possibility in thought and then experience? Lowrie is aware of the dialectical problem here to a degree. He shows how the "metamorphosis of 1848" as he calls it was led up to by certain presentiments of 1847 and how it was fully experienced on in 1849. He points out how it has to do with the whole problem of direct and indirect communication. But isn't it more complicated than Lowrie admits? Wouldn't Kierkegaard have found it possible to marry Regina if she would not have become engaged to Schlegel? Or at least was he not ready to accept the earth as early as 1844? Surely he knew of the double movement leap all along. I would think he came to know of it through experience. In the Works of Love he shows in great detail how divine love breaks into time. All I suggest is that in seeking to understand the metamorphosis Lowrie has to push the dialectics back at least three years beyond 1847. Kierkegaard's notion of the double movement leap demands this.
Stage Structures of the Leap

I agree almost entirely with Dupre's superb handling of Kierkegaard's dialectic. He is extremely exact in pointing out how the aesthetic\(^{28}\) and the ethical\(^{29}\) are "sublated in that term's twofold meaning of being suspended and of being preserved, on a higher level."\(^{30}\)

He makes explicit the relation between the existential and the religious and shows that they have to do with the synthesis of the ethical and aesthetic.

"The spirit first becomes real on the religious level. Previously, the synthesis of the finite and the infinite (in which, as we saw, the essence of the spirit consists) was not yet accomplished, since the choice of myself on the ethical level was limited to the finite (though on the background of the infinite). Therefore, only the religious man exists in the full sense of the word, that is, as synthesis of the temporal and eternity."\(^{31}\)

He argues that the religious must contain the aesthetic.\(^{32}\) But when I look carefully at Dupre's interpretation of the leap a discrepancy arises. I can best bring this out by focusing on Dupre's interpretation of the relation between religiousness A and religiousness B. He writes:

"As was pointed out in the second chapter, Kierkegaard regards the instant not as an element peculiar to Christianity, but as a central element in every type of religion. The religious life on a sheerly natural basis, the so-called religiousness A, culminates in the consciousness of guilt before God. In this affirmation of oneself before God, natural religion arrives at an instant in which eternity touches existence in time, but without penetrating it. By a
free admission of his guilt man affirms his intrinsic relation with God and thus brings something absolute into his existence. For this leap into the absolute no direct intervention of God is required. The instant of religiousness A has nothing to do with Grace: time and eternity remain irreconcilably opposed.33

I do not think Dupre can rightly say that Kierkegaard thinks that the man of natural religion has a consciousness of guilt before God. In fact, Kierkegaard in the Concept of Dread, as Dupre well knows, argues that by making the qualitative leap one becomes a sinner. Dupre knows of:

"the existence of despair on the aesthetic stage, where there is no actual sin."34

Of course, Dupre connects religiousness A and the aesthetic. But as he works his way through this he gets into some difficulties. That he is not in harmony with Kierkegaard further manifests itself when he writes:

"the transition from innocence to guilt occurs in the fall into sin itself, and at that moment man is no longer free."35

Kierkegaard thinks that freedom comes only to the man who is conscious of his sin and therefore is a sinner.

All this suggests that there is a level of the Kierkegaardian dialectic which Dupre has not yet penetrated. Even though Dupre affirms the dialectical balance of sinfulness and faith in general, I do not think he follows the concrete thought of Kierkegaard on this matter exactly. I do agree with Dupre that religiousness A is attained without
grace properly speaking. But is Dupre justified in predicating the instant of religiousness A? I think not. He is more right in his statement above when he writes: "eternity touches existence in time, but without penetrating it." For paganism there is, strictly speaking, as Dupre will affirm, no true temporal succession. So eternity cannot touch time. There is no time as there is no freedom. All this comes in the instant when one leaps into faith and fades into sin.

Because of his difficulties with this issue Dupre follows others in setting up a false problem which he does not adequately solve. Completely contrary to his notion that there is sin in natural religion he writes:

"We have already mentioned the existence of despair on the aesthetic stage, where there is no actual sin. But there is more. On the one hand, Kierkegaard asserts that despair is a sickness which, outside Christendom, is universal...on the other hand, Kierkegaard has defined sin as despair before God. But since only a Christian has a correct concept of God, it seems that sin, in the true sense of the word, can exist only in Christianity. And this conclusion has been affirmed by Kierkegaard himself. Then how can sin and despair ever coincide, if the one exists only within, and the other only outside of, Christianity?"

One of the strange confusions that Dupre makes throughout his book and further examines is this taking of Christendom and Christianity as equal. If he wants to say there is no despair in Christianity all right. But definitely he cannot say there is no despair in Christendom.
The difference between Christendom and Christianity is despair. So it is precisely in Christendom that one can see how despair and sin can coincide. But that is not all. Man is always becoming. Even the man of faith is on the way; he is leaping. Consequently, even he recognizes himself as sinful even though faith and sin are opposites. And insofar as he recognizes himself as sinful he sees that he is moving out of despair. The point is: the man of faith or the man of Christianity is being saved from sin and despair. But for the Christian they coincide exactly. He is moving beyond both.

So Dupre is ambiguous on the place of sin in religiousness A. He says it is other but then shows that it cannot be. Finally he does not clearly distinguish Christendom and Christianity or one aspect of religiousness A and religiousness B and thereby generates a false problem that "potentiality" language does not adequately deal with for there is no such problem.

Love Structures of the Leap

The implications of this confusion can be seen when we examine his theory concerning Kierkegaard's own religious experience. Dupre does not make explicit that Kierkegaard's theory of the leap explains his own experience, but Dupre does speculate on Kierkegaard's experience.

Dupre's approach is first of all to point out the
psychological deformities of Kierkegaard's personality and then he shows how:

"these psychological weaknesses acquired a new meaning from religion."38

This continues to be a very interesting attempt at dialectical explanation on Dupre's part, but again I continue to think it just misses. I will now continue to show in terms of Kierkegaard's experience why I think Dupre misunderstands religiousness A and therefore the relation between religiousness A and religiousness B. Dupre writes:

"The rupture with Regina had been inspired not by purely religious motives, but by psychic impotence. However, it led him to a deeper religious consciousness and thus earned a functional role in the whole of his vocation."39

Dupre is just wrong when he thinks that the rupture was not inspired by purely religious motives. Of course, as we have shown, there were several kinds of motives. Some were connected with psychic quirks but some of them were purely religious. The whole issue of the "divine counter order" in the Stages, I would say, is purely religious. The suggestion by the young man in Repetition about being inspired to religion by his muse is, I think, autobiographical. Victor Eremita's speech in the Stages points out the purely religious motives leading up to a rupture. The reason I am so sure of this is because I interpret Kierkegaard's experience in light of his theory of the double movement leap. It is this rupture that leads
to the first movement of infinite resignation. Kierkegaard always praised celibacy because it had this power of revealing the God of love to man. True it only brings a man to religiousness A but that is a necessary aspect of religion if the synthesis means anything.

Since Dupre does not see how celibacy is connected with this religiousness A we might wonder how he conceives of this rupture as having a salutory effect in Kierkegaard’s life. Dupre is thinking of what he writes concerning the rupture and authentic religion.

"Kierkegaard, too, had abandoned all earthly desires, in the person of Regina, and had thereby reached a religious threshold. But, as he put it, he never became a Knight of Faith like Abraham, because he merely arrives at the point of renouncing the mundane, without ever fully achieving the new reality of faith. 'Had I had faith; he wrote in his diary, I should have remained with Regina'".40

"I believe that this insight in Fear and Trembling opened the way for Kierkegaard to true religion. All that precedes it was so greatly deformed by his abnormal upbringing and warped psychology that it appears to be a disguised projection of subconscious drives rather than authentic religion."41

Dupre thinks that religiousness B, that is, its faith aspect as distinct from the religiousness A that is contained within it is authentic religion. He reduces the resignation of religiousness A to the results of a warped psychology. I think Dupre is excellent in pointing out how Kierkegaard came to religiousness B. I, too, see Fear and Trembling together with Repetition as the first state-
ment of authentic religion in Kierkegaard. But I am sure Kierkegaard would be highly displeased with Dupre's reduction of natural religion and its relation to celibacy to warped psychology. In fact this is not even good dialectics. Religiousness B will transform religiousness A but religiousness B would not have been without religiousness A. It is not justified to reduce infinite resignation to mere lunacy.

Dialectic Structures of the Leap

His confusion concerning the role of religiousness A enables Dupre to make some highly suspicious statements when he analyzes Kierkegaard's psychic feelings for Christianity. Dupre wonders how Kierkegaard kept his faith and writes:

"Kierkegaard's attitude toward Christianity oscillated constantly between attraction and aversion. This aversion was at the basis of the ferocious attack of his last years against the Danish Church."42

Such a remark as this fails to take account of Kierkegaard's distinction between Christendom and Christianity which, of course, Dupre is so well aware of. Kierkegaard did not oscillate constantly between attraction and aversion toward Christianity. He had an aversion for Christendom and he attacked the Danish Church because of that.

Kierkegaard saw the necessity of celibacy which is
an aspect of religiousness A. And he has an aversion for Christendom. These two notions are related. Christendom is a complacent ethical watering down of Christianity. It has precisely left out the natural experience of God which can come through such means as celibacy. It has not made the first movement of the leap. Dupre understands how the second movement is a faith in God such that one can accept the temporal. However, he consistently misunderstands the role of religiousness A. As a result he does not fully understand religiousness B because, of course, that is not possible without religiousness A. Religiousness B without religiousness A easily becomes mere Christendom. This is why Dupre so often sees Christianity and Christendom as equal.

I have mentioned that I do not think Dupre has penetrated into Kierkegaard's dialectic as far as he might. Dupre has a chapter on the Dialectic of Sin and one on the Dialectic of Faith. He knows that they are related. Consciousness of sin is necessary for faith. But he does not tie them together as tightly as would Kierkegaard. Dupre speaks of the leap into sin. He speaks of the leap of faith. But he never analyzes these two leaps to find out if they are the same or different. If he did I think he would be forced to see the double movement nature of the leap. Then I think he would have to clarify his notion of
religiousness A. This would help him to understand more accurately the role of celibacy in Kierkegaard’s thought and experience and that in turn would force upon him a clearer distinction between Christendom and Christianity.

Temporal Structures of the Leap

Dupre very nicely points out that for Kierkegaard the incarnation is the supreme revelation of God’s love. When the eternal freely becomes temporal, love manifests itself. In his chapter on the Imitation of Christ, Dupre clarifies how man must realize this synthesis within himself to be existentially full. A breakdown in this synthesis is despair. Dupre even follows Kierkegaard in his analysis of true love insofar as it differs from earthly love. In his section on the Works of Faith Dupre shows the kind of ethics that Christianity demands in order not to be hypocritical. Dupre points out how Kierkegaard hereby went beyond “Luther’s incapacity to grasp two notions dialectically.” I think Dupre’s theory concerning the development of Kierkegaard’s ethics is interesting. But what I think would be most helpful would be a relating of Kierkegaard’s notion of Christian love and his notion of Christian faith. This, of course, could be done in terms of the temporal structure of the leap.

Love manifests itself as the synthesis of the eternal and the temporal. This synthesis is the very
synthesis of the leap of faith. Kierkegaard from his beginning had this basic notion and hence I mistrust any speculation about some radical development concerning his ethical theory. I see him as only making explicit what his notion of the double movement leap permitted all along. With this in mind I would even add that Christian love not only makes an active Christian ethic possible but it allows the aesthetic and erotic love to be sublated too. Kierkegaard deals with this at great length in *Works of Love*. Again, I think Dupre may have missed it because of not seeing the full implication of that great synthesis of the leap.
Eduard Geismar

Stage Structures of the Leap

Geismar sees the theory of the stages as arising out of Kierkegaard's reflection upon his own experience. One of the interesting ideas that Geismar has, concerning these stages, is that concepts have different meanings within each of the stage contexts. In his analysis of Repetition, Geismar concentrates on showing what repetition means first in the aesthetic context. He shows how it is longed for but cannot be attained. In the ethical context Geismar sees repetition as related to monotony. In the religious context repetition is seen as possible. Geismar sees this repetition as a restoration of the moral integrity which the young poet lost when his beloved became a muse and he had to become an ethical exception by not marrying her. Geismar sees this problem of religious rebirth or repetition as the most important problem in any man's life and he thinks that:

"Each individual book in the Kierkegaardian literature is devoted to some single phase of a life problem. Taken together all these many books point to the central question for which Christianity offers a solution. This solution consists in nothing less than the restoration of each man's pristine moral integrity through the forgiveness of sins." 48

I, too, think with Geismar that this is the central problem for it is nothing less than the problem of the leap. Of course, Kierkegaard not only has the problem of showing
what forgiveness means and how one attains it in the religious context, he even has the problem of showing that aesthetic and religious contexts are so different that the aesthete will not even know of sin. The interesting aspect of Geismar's insight is that the leap is a transition from one context to another. What is longed for such as repetition in the aesthetic context is allowed in the religious context and is not the mere monotony of the existentially sterile ethical context. Geismar does not at this point make explicit the notion that the religious contains the best of the aesthetic but he does imply it.

When he discusses the relation between religiousness A and religiousness B he becomes quite excited in arguing against the Barthian school and others. The latter form contains the prior. The point at issue has to do with resignation, suffering, and guilt which Geismar thinks are the chief characteristics of the religious. Many German commentators try to say that the man of religiousness B leaves these behind when he makes the leap. At this point Geismar calls upon the oft quoted statement of Professor Hirsch who wrote:

"The manner in which the Postscript is usually understood in Germany is roughly as follows: Here we have a description of the ethical and religious life devoted solely to the purpose of keeping it entirely distinct from the Christian religious life, and from faith in the paradox. This view could properly be awarded first prize in a competition to see who could say the most stupid thing about Kierkegaard." 49
This is an extremely important point in my thesis. It has to do with the possibility of the existential at the merely ethical level. The men whom Geismar and Hirsch are criticizing come at the issue from the other side and say that Christianity gets beyond the existential by leaping beyond resignation, suffering, and guilt. This interpretation of Kierkegaard is totally perverse. Kierkegaard's point is that religiousness B contains this aspect of religiousness A. And notice it is religiousness A. It is not the mere ethical, as Kierkegaard always maintained the mere ethical is not even an existential possibility.

Geismar is very strong in his emphasis on the importance of the ethical decision if one is to make the leap. He stresses Kierkegaard's notion:

"In the moment of decision, the eternal is the future."\(^{50}\)

In this moment of decision the eternal enters the temporal. Geismar clearly sees this moment as the leap which contains the elements of resignation, suffering, and guilt.

"The moment of decision faces the future with its uncertainty; once made, the decision alters the personality. After the decision he is not the same man as he was before the decision."\(^{51}\)

"By a leap we reach the absolute maximum of subjectivity in the Christian consciousness of sin, with its imperative need for a new point of departure."\(^{52}\)

"The way to Christianity goes through a decision, a crucial decision in the temporal moment; faith is an existential leap."\(^{53}\)
The chief point to be noted in this interpretation of Geismar's is that man's effort has much to do with the leap. Geismar does stress grace also, but here he is showing what man must do for that grace to become effective. He must become resigned. That is, religiousness A is the ordinary pathway toward religiousness B. Religiousness B not only contains religiousness A, but religiousness A prepares the way for religiousness B.

With Geismar's general treatment of the stage structures of the leap I have no quarrel. But as he expresses his understanding of Kierkegaard's own life, I do not feel so much at ease with him.

**Love Structures of the Leap**

Geismar is uneasy with Kierkegaard's attitude toward celibacy, and yet he praises Keirkegaard's notion of resignation, suffering, and guilt. It seems to me that Geismar does not like resignation, suffering, and guilt in the concrete but only at an aesthetic distance. Of course, what Kierkegaard says about marriage toward the end of his life is a special problem and I will take it up as such.

But Geismar writes:

"His diaries from the last three years are full of comments on sexual matters which to my mind are revolting."\(^{54}\)

"We cannot fail to see a lack of respect for work and for marriage, as this respect interpenetrates the Lutheran doctrine. And I for my part cannot
help believing that this disrespect has some relation to the attitude he assumes toward woman in the earlier writings: erotic emotion without sexuality, sexuality as something mean.55

Geismar in his pious Lutheran way does not seem to see any value in celibacy. It does not connect in his mind with the resignation, guilt, and suffering that are necessary for the leap. He tries very hard to figure Kierkegaard out and comes up with three kinds of answer.

The first has to do with psychic diagnosis.56 He thinks that Kierkegaard was a special kind of manic-depressive who in writing could express either side of his person no matter what state he was then in. Also Kierkegaard remained like a youth all his life and separated eros from sex, praising the one and belittling the other. Because of this double problem he entered a manic state when he saw the beauty of eros and then had to break the engagement when he went into the depressive state and emphasized the ugliness of the sexual. This sort of stuff makes Kierkegaard look like a mere robot. I do not deny that there is something to it, but what is necessary to make it interesting is a phenomenology of the family whereby we could see this tendency growing up in Kierkegaard's relation to his parents and in the relation between them and their parents. Kierkegaard tried this a bit.

Next, Geismar points out how Kierkegaard was inspired by his love for Regina in both a poetic and
religious way. Geismar writes:

"The tragic love affair set free in him simultaneously the poetic afflatus and the religious determination."

Now if Geismar considered what he quoted from Repetition about the young man who could not marry his muse, might he not have to change his thought a bit? Perhaps it was not the tragedy of the love that was his muse, but rather, because Regina was his muse his love became tragic.

In his third observation Geismar even hits on this idea:

"Luther sets up marriage and the rearing of children as religion of the highest kind. Kierkegaard's objection is drawn from the effect of woman upon man's idealism. Every man begins his life with a certain amount of idealism but then he gets married, and his Juliet deprives him of the lost child of idealism, on the pretext that he has no right to risk the welfare of his wife and children. Here we have the root of Kierkegaard's zeal for discrediting the family interest in connection with religion."

The reality that Geismar misses is that Regina heightens his idealism even to the point that he becomes a poet and saint as Victor Eremita put it, and the young man in Repetition experienced it.

Kierkegaard valued celibacy because he saw it as connected with the resignation, suffering, and guilt that brings a man to religiousness A. But as Johannes de Silentio put it, the real Christian ideal is to make the double leap and after discovering the God of love to come
back to the earth through faith in marriage. Kierkegaard was not really opposed to marriage as such. He was just opposed to ideas like those of Luther and Geismar that marriage is religion of the highest kind. Erotic love and married love can be made compatible with and through Christian love, but they are not Christian love.

Dialectic Structures of the Leap

Now that we have focused on this discrepancy between Geismar and Kierkegaard, let us watch carefully what happens as Geismar approaches the dialectical structures of the leap. True to his good general direction he zeros right in on the essentials:

"Man is a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal. From this it follows that the central problem of a human life is to express this synthesis adequately and truly. Man lives in time. But everything temporal has its ultimate ground in the eternal, and on the other hand has in the eternal its ultimate goal. To exist means to express the eternal in time, to translate the eternal content of the human self into a living reality in time. What do we see when we thus confront our task? When an existing individual is oriented in this manner, the eternal is for him not the eternal pure and simple, but wears the aspect of futurity and reveals itself as something that comes to be. In the moment of decision, the eternal is the future."

This description of the dialectical synthesis is accurate as far as it goes. But notice carefully how far it goes! It only goes so far as to emphasize how the eternal comes into time in the dimension of the future. Kierkegaard made this emphasis in the Edifying Discourses.
But that is only the synthesis of natural religion. And it is not even a true synthesis. The future reveals the eternal. It is not joined with the eternal. Always when he is concerned with the Christian synthesis Kierkegaard emphasizes how the eternal is connected with the dimension of the present. If a man has faith he is reborn. He does not merely discover the eternal in the future. Abraham would not hope in the future that another son would come to him as he thought he would kill Isaac. No, he so believed in the face of the absurd that even if a son never came somehow God's promise would be fulfilled. This was real for him right now.

I wonder if Geismar is not missing the part that infinite resignation has to play in Kierkegaard's leap? Two discrepancies are now evident: he does not appreciate Kierkegaard's view of celibacy and he does not put the emphasis on the present dimension when the temporal and eternal are synthesized. But by infinite resignation one does face the ultimate scandal of the problem of evil. No temporal dimension contains the eternal, not even the future. He is opened to the eternal as such.

Kierkegaard is not trying to say that the synthesis takes place between the future and the eternal but as one fights himself in the indefinite future he discovers himself as eternal. Geismar is right when he says "the eternal is the future." But that is not the synthesis he
thinks he is talking about. It is not Kierkegaard's synthesis of the temporal and the eternal. Geismar seems to make two errors concerning infinite resignation. On the one hand he does not appreciate its severity - he does not appreciate celibacy. On the other hand he over extends it and thinks one is a Christian by it. He does not see how one gets beyond it by something quite different, namely, faith.

In order to check this discrepancy further we shall now examine how Geismar treats Christian love. For as we have revealed that is the activity wherein synthesis really takes place. That is where we can see most clearly the temporal dimension of the leap.

Temporal Structures of the Leap

Geismar gives a beautiful tribute to Kierkegaard for his expression of ideas in Works of Love. Geismar tells us how he first came to understand from these works what is meant by the words "God is love." Geismar stresses the eternal nature of love and talks about how it abides. But he does not show how the works of love are the meeting place of time and eternity in that special Christian synthesis. He does not stress the works or the temporal side. He does talk about the sola fide problem of Lutheranism and says that Kierkegaard is making a new stress on works. But Geismar does not show how these works are related to Grace.
He seems to think that Kierkegaard does not stress Grace as much as did Luther because of his historical situation. But Kierkegaard's entire thought is about Grace even though he does not always explicitly say it. He shows how certain acts can be the occasion for Grace, and he shows how other acts flow from Grace. That is, he shows how some temporal acts prepare the way for more discovery of the eternal and then how man can continue to act because of that eternal vision and with that vision in time.

Geismar sees man's decision as the event wherein the eternal and the temporal merge. But that is the event wherein the eternal is discovered. And besides, that kind of a merger is not a synthesis. He does not see the acts of love as the event where time and eternity meet in the present. A decision is necessary for this synthesis, but so is God's Grace - the Grace which enables man to receive a second time the temporal.
Stage Structures of the Leap

In Thomte's book there are two levels of interpretation: that of selection and that of interrelational explication. I think that Thomte does an admirable job of selection. He goes through Kierkegaard's works and summarizes key aspects so that he can show what Kierkegaard means by the religious. Most of Thomte's work consists in this kind of selection and summary. However, at times he does begin to interrelate certain notions of Kierkegaard's so as to explain them in terms of each other. In this activity he reveals his understanding of Kierkegaard and makes more clear why he chooses to select the passage he does for summarization. I feel that his understanding is highly accurate. I say this because I agree very much with the kind of interrelational explication that he does. I only wish that he would do more of it. And I think if he did more of it some of the minor contradictions which now reveal themselves in his interpretation would be eradicated.

To my mind the two best examples of interrelational explication in his book have to do with his interpretation of three of the Edifying Discourses and with the notion of "the second immediacy." Concerning the first Thomte writes:

"Three of the discourses deal with what Kierkegaard in his philosophical writings terms the infinite double movement, i.e., the renunciation of the world (resignation), and the regaining of it (the movement of faith)."
Thomte goes on to interpret each of these discourses in terms of the double movement leap, and in so doing throws light on the leap as well as the discourse. When Thomte explicates faith as immediacy after reflection he writes:

"By the term immediacy after reflection he means exactly what he formerly had called "repetition," namely the restoration of the personality to its pristine integrity." Following this suggestion one can relate what Thomte writes in his summary of *Repetition* to what he is saying about faith.

If Thomte would have extended this method of explanation he could have interrelated all of Kierkegaard's thought on the religious as it is centered in the notion of the leap. If he would really grapple with the problems that present themselves such as what is the relation between the leap as the double movement, as the fall into sin, as the solution to the Socratic knowledge paradox, as the synthesis of time and eternity in the work of love, then he would force himself to come up with an idea of the stages and their relations which would weed out the contradictions in his present interpretation. His book gives an excellent summary of Kierkegaard's books that deal with the stages. He does a good job in trying to find a criterion around which the hierarchy of the stages is structured, namely, that of existence.
fullness of the existential and thereby the highest stage. But he has problems concerning the stage structures of the leap that his lack of interpretation does not enable him to solve. For example, there is the notion of the ethical stage. At times Thomte sees the ethical as a real existential stage prior to religion A. Thus he writes:

"...for there are actually two transitions; first, from the ethical to religion A, then from religion A to the paradoxical religiosity."66

Then at times Thomte does not treat the ethical as a stage separate from religion A. Thus,

"How does Kierkegaard's theory of communication relate itself to the philosophy of the stages?  
1. When life is viewed aesthetically the relationship between teacher and pupil is entirely relative.  
2. When life is viewed ethico-religiously (within the category of religion A) each person is regarded according to his nature as equally adapted for eternity and essentially related to the eternal. The teacher steps aside and is merely "on occasion."  
3. When life is viewed from the standpoint of paradoxical religion or the specifically Christian religion, man is not by nature essentially related to eternity for sin has intervened."67

From this it can be seen that insofar as Thomte merely uses the method of selection and summary, he is at the mercy of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms and his developing authorship. He cannot get inside of Kierkegaard's thoughts. Unless Thomte does not get an interpretative base by building up Kierkegaard's central thought, he will not have an explicit criterion for interpreting the meaning of the stages, etc. As a result he cannot show what something within the ethical means and how the apparent contradictions
are to be understood.

**Love Structures of the Leap**

Thomte concerns himself little with Kierkegaard's life or with relating Kierkegaard's thought to his biography. Thomte does consider Kierkegaard's religious experience twice, and each time it has to do with the experience of 1848. Not once does Thomte consider the religious significance of Regina. However, that in itself is not so bad because Thomte does not at all take up the biographical aspect of Kierkegaard's thought. I doubt the wisdom of such an approach as I would in the case of Socrates or Augustine. But when I consider Thomte's approach to the love structures of the leap even apart from the biographical issue, I find them wanting. It seems that Thomte must relate the love structure to the leap in order to explicate satisfactorily the religious. But he does not.

He does select passages which treat of eros and marriage. How could he help it when dealing with Kierkegaard's aesthetic writings? But he does not seem to see the significance of what he is quoting insofar as it is related to the religious. For example, he will summarize the thought of Victor Eremita in *Stages* but when he gets all done he will write:

"The erotic relationship per se is of minor importance. Essentially it is used for orientation in the religious sphere."
But Thomte does not really say what he means by orientation and he does not show why that is of minor importance. If one looks at Thomte's thought on eros carefully some peculiarities are to be found. When he is treating *Works of Love* he will write about Kierkegaard, contrasting Christian love with friendship. But he does not say a word about the contrast with eros even though that is obviously at least as important as friendship in Kierkegaard's contrast. Also he will talk about marriage as being possible within Christian love, but he does not at all consider how eros is compatible with neighbourly love though I think Kierkegaard's writings are more concerned about that.

Thomte does not seem to see the significance of eros for religion. He does not reveal the religious significance of the Regina affair. In his preface he does express a debt of gratitude to Geismar. Perhaps he follows Geismar in his interpretation of eros without even going so far as to see the idealizing power of eros as did Geismar.

In short, Thomte only makes selections concerning the love structures of the leap but does not reveal his understanding of them.

**Dialectic Structures of the Leap**

Thomte shows a fine appreciation of Kierkegaard's dialectical balance. He stresses the double movement leap
and sees the significance of the distinction between religion A and B. In fact he thinks that one of Kierkegaard's most important contributions is to distinguish Christianity from natural religion. He sees the role of sin in the transition and treats the leap in Kierkegaard's Concept of Dread. All of this is, I think, excellent. But my basic criticism is that he does not carry this approach far enough and thereby falls into some contradictions.

He seems hazy on the ways the stages are synthesized. He writes:

"In Kierkegaard's presentation there is a definite and sharp breach in the continuity of the three stages. No man can live in two spheres at the same time. If a person's life is transported from the aesthetic sphere to the ethical sphere the aesthetic part of his nature is not destroyed but dethroned, i.e., it is under ethical domination.")

How meaningfully can one relate the notion of a definite and sharp breach with the notion of dethronement? This is a key distinction on relationship and one needs to look carefully at the double movement leap in all of its application such as repetition, the eros marriage relationship, and the sin faith relation in order to explicate it. Thomte is on the way toward this but halts too soon.

For this reason even his distinction concerning something as vital as the existential becomes blurred. He distinguishes four kinds of pathos: aesthetic, existential, ethical and religious. What is existential pathos
apart from either aesthetic or religious pathos? It is bad enough to speak of ethical pathos as if that were distinct from either the aesthetic or the religious. But to distinguish the existential from them is really meaningless. A good understanding of the existential in terms of the double movement leap would keep Thomte out of this kind of problem.

Thomte follows Geismar in his treatment of the religious as resignation, guilt, and suffering. He does this in terms of the conflict between earth and eternity. But as with Geismar one might agree with his general statements but disagree in concrete application. One oddity that does appear even in his general treatment is seen in this statement.

"Only when the individual is related to an eternal happiness by the most decisive existential pathos, can there be a question of becoming a Christian."74

From what precedes I do think that Thomte links the most decisive existential pathos with religion A that then enables one to move to religion B. But the greatest pathos comes from the paradox of both A and B at the same time.

**Temporal Structures of the Leap**

Thomte is well aware of the temporal structures of the leap and thus will write:

"The relationship of the stages may also be described in terms of their relationship to time."75
But when he gets into the detail of interpreting these structures he seems to say little that is very clarifying. Thus he writes:

"Religion A emphasizes time still more by presenting the task of a decisive transformation of the personality to occur in time."76

What is important temporally in religion A is the breakthrough into the eternal. One needs to relate this to the aesthetic time structures for religion. A is within the aesthetic context. Thomte's analysis never penetrates this far because he will not relate the different aspect of Kierkegaard's religious thought to that extent.

When making a temporal contrast between Greek and Christian religiosity, Thomte does point out the tendency of recollection toward the past. But he stresses that Christianity stresses the future.77 This is a false emphasis. For the particular dimension of Christianity is the present as can be seen in Repetition where Kierkegaard also contrasts Repetition with mediation which has a future orientation.

Of course, Thomte does follow Kierkegaard's texts so well that contrary to this false interpretation he does stress faith as contemporaneity.78 In his analysis of Works of Love Thomte uses a diagram from Geismar79 and shows how love has to do with the absolute relation to the absolute and the relative relation to the relative. This is fine. But Thomte doesn't bring out all their implica-
tions. He does not fully link the Works of Love with the imitation of Christ and the leap.\textsuperscript{80}

As I have mentioned Thomte attempts to retain marriage within Christianity\textsuperscript{81} but he does not always have this good dialectical sense. Thus he will stress that:

"The human religiosity is the religiosity of immanence."\textsuperscript{82}

Which is true? But then he goes on to write:

"The Christian religiosity or the paradoxical religiosity is altogether transcendental."\textsuperscript{83}

That is patently false. Why is it paradoxical if it is not that it is a combination of the immanent and the transcendental or the eternal and the temporal? Why does Kierkegaard always stress the absolute necessity of religion A if it is not to be included dialectically within religion B?

In the final analysis, I do not think Thomte fully sees the meaning of religion A. This is indicated in his lack of insight into eros and mysticism. I think he is quite good in his selection and summary and is on the track of a comprehensive and penetrating interpretation of the leap as central to Kierkegaard's notion of religion. But he does not fully follow this out and as a result gets caught in some contradiction.
APPENDIX B

Upon completing his authorship Kierkegaard spent the last years of his life preparing for and writing his Attack Upon Christendom. During this last period of his life his expression is completely lacking in dialectical balance. In fact, there are very many passages in the Journal of his last years and in the Attack that completely contradict the authorship as we have interpreted it in our thesis. These passages center around the topic of marriage and the main idea can be seen in the following samples:

(1) "The sexual is the culmination of human egoism. Hence from a merely human standpoint, both the woman and the man regard their life as lost and a failure if they do not marry. Only the married man is a proper citizen in this world; the celibate is a stranger (and this is just what Christianity wants the Christian to be)."¹

(2) "In Protestantism there is no beating about the bush in this regard; here it is simply taught that marriage is what is well-pleasing to God, and I see the day coming when it will be discovered by learned theology that the God of the Christians is not called Jehovah or Adonai, and is not even neuter gender, but is a woman called Maggie Matchmaker!"²

(3) "0 infinite majesty, even if you were not love, even if you were cold in your infinite majesty I could not cease to love you, I need something majestic to love.... There was and there is a need of majesty in my soul, of a majesty I can never tire of worshipping. In the world I found nothing, no, I found no more majesty than there is beard on a young girl's cheek - even less than that, for I found it ridiculous."³
"As for myself, I cannot boast that I at once understood everything as I did later; if I had not once for all been wrecked on something special, I too should have been married."

"Something quite special held me back, and now after a long time I see that what was special to me is what Christianity calls the general, the normal: I see that Christianity holds by a man's single state and rather makes marriage the special case."

"So here again a Providence has been with me. And in truth. For how should a man, born and brought up in this Danish-Protestant eudaimonism, have any eye for what is Christian, unless a Providence helped him by first letting him experience constantly, in special conflicts, what Christianity is in a formal sense?"

(4) "In God's Word the single state is recommended. 'But', says man, 'that sort of worship doesn't suit me, and I am certainly not an ungodly man either. Such an important step as marriage (which, be it noted, God advises against, and thinks that not taking this "important step: is the important thing" I surely ought not to take without assuring myself of God's blessing,' (Bravo!) That is what this man of God, the Priest is for; he blesses this important step 'the importance of which consists in not doing it', and so it is well pleasing to God - and I have my will, and my will becomes worship, and the Priest has his will, he has ten dollars, not earned in the humble way of brushing people's clothes or serving beer or brandy at the bar; no, he was employed in God's service, and to earn ten dollars in that way is... divine worship." (Bravissimo!)"

These passages are typical throughout the last phase of Kierkegaard's writing. They are also very important. For if they were taken in themselves they could easily give one a distorted view of Kierkegaard's basic philosophy. In fact, they often are read outside of the basic context and radically misinterpreted. Thus, Dupre, for example, sees Kierkegaard in his later years as becoming bitter against
sex and contradicting the balanced theology of his earlier writings. So in interpreting them we must first ask: what is their basic philosophic meaning? Then we can ask how they fit with Kierkegaard's thought as a whole.

Very briefly Kierkegaard argues that Christianity like any of the deeper views of life demands chastity and celibacy. This is so because sexual expression promotes egoism while abstinence reveals the majesty of God. Christendom actually promotes egoism and hides the majesty of God in its blessing of marriage.

In our thesis we have argued that Christianity for Kierkegaard is a perfectly balanced synthesis of the aesthetic and the ethical. This means that he appreciates the aesthetic values of first love and marriage and finds room for them within Christianity. We have seen his great tribute to marriage in the second part of Either/Or and in the second part of Stages on Life's Way. In Works of Love, Training in Christianity, and Purity of Heart he praises marriage and sanctions it within Christianity. We have argued that even erotic love can be important as the occasion whereby one reaches religiousness A as was the case with the young man in Repetition and Victor Eremita in Stages on Life's Way. So if Kierkegaard were to be understood in the last phase of his life as being opposed to erotic and married love, then he would be contradicting
the central philosophy of his authorship or I would have gravely misinterpreted that philosophy of the authorship. But the matter is not that serious for if one understands what he is doing in the last phase of his life, one sees that it is perfectly consistent with his authorship.

Kierkegaard has always argued that religiousness A is an absolute prerequisite of religiousness B. That is, one must make the first movement of the leap before he can ever make the second movement. This means that before one can ever become a Christian he must first pass through the rigid asceticism which leads to infinite resignation. Chastity and celibacy are very important means toward this end. In the characters of Victor Eremita and the young man of Repetition, Kierkegaard has shown the importance of chastity. His own experience with Regina, insofar as that experience was one of distance from her, revealed to him the majesty of God. He has always argued for the necessity of celibacy and at least chastity for a period of time for any Christian.

But here in the last phase of his career he seems to stop at religiousness A and to disregard religiousness B. If that were the case he would be stopping at natural religion and disregarding that which is specifically Christian. In terms of his basic philosophy as we have spelled it out in our thesis, Kierkegaard would be abandon-
ing Christianity or the second movement of the leap if he were really serious about the contradiction between marriage and Christianity. So what is he doing? Surely he is not saying that Christianity equals something like Tibetan Buddhism, is he?

The point of Kierkegaard's last phase is that he is attacking Christendom. And what is Christendom? It is precisely a false image of Christianity that is false because it has not made the first movement of the leap. So in his attack he puts his whole emphasis upon showing the necessity of the first movement of the leap which is very intimately bound up with chastity and celibacy. In his attack he uses the style of satire...he exaggerates and pays no attention to dialectical balance because of his purpose. He wants to attack Christendom only. He has already shown how true Christianity is a balance of the aesthetic and ethical. Now he puts that question of balance aside for the moment and with singleness of mind shows one essential characteristic of Christianity that his age has forgotten, namely, religiousness A. Actually Christianity or religiousness B is impossible in his age. But that Christianity is a combination of religiousness A and the ethical. In his age Christianity was reduced to Christendom or the mere ethical. Therefore, in this connection, we need to reclaim religiousness A that
Christianity might be correct. That is why he stresses celibacy. It is an aspect of religiousness.

As Lowrie has so well pointed out, Kierkegaard was well aware that he was setting aside balance for the sake of the attack. Lowrie writes:

"It is certain, however, that this 'thoroughly polemicalized' young man had a natural bent for satire. He knew also that satire necessarily involves exaggeration. For this reason he held completely in check his rare dialectical ability to see both sides. In the Instant this very dialectical man was no longer dialectical."

In a fine passage from the Journal which Lowrie quotes, Kierkegaard explains his tactics.

"If the absolute is to be introduced - and this age excels to the most dreadful degree in taking up everything characteristically 'to a certain degree' - prudence requires one not to do what commonly one would preferably desire to do, both for one's own sake and for the sake of others, before making the decisive attack, that is, to go to the rulers and say it to them, in order to see if possibly they might not yield a little. No, one cannot do this because - well, the misfortune is precisely this, that one cannot be sure, however strongly one might express oneself, that they would not take it up 'to a certain degree', and so one would have bungled one's task of introducing the absolute. No, like the spring of the wild beast, or like the swift blow of the bird of prey, so it is the absolute must be introduced especially in the face of this characterless 'to a certain degree'."

Kierkegaard attacks Christendom as a mighty eagle dropping out of the sky on its prey. But he attacks that he might heal. As he realized in the Thunderstorm of Repetition and in Fear and Trembling when he discovered the distinction between the Knight of Infinite Resignation and
the Knight of Faith, marriage is possible through faith once one makes the first movement of the leap through chastity and discovers the majesty of God. Then he can marry and still preserve that sense of majesty. Kierkegaard would not deny that in his last years. He just shows that marriage alone is not at all religious. If one has not been chaste to the point that it religiously pays off in the first movement of the leap, then one is not yet ready for marriage. Christendom is not yet ready for marriage. Once it discovers the ascetic, then it can consider marriage with that.
Chapter I - The Stage Structures of the Leap


Chapter II - The Love Structures of the Leap

1. *Fear and Trembling*, pp. 52-56.

2. *Fear and Trembling*, p. 53.


Gerard Manly Hopkins, his last completed poem, *To R. B.*, describes the poetry of inspiration as such.

This new immediacy which Kierkegaard analyzes in *Stages*, pp. 159 ff., is the result of the mystical erotic experience. Gibson's book, *The Choir of The Muses* is an analysis of this phenomenon. He begins with Plato's *Phaedrus* and considers such lovers as Dante, Petrarch, and Wagner. Thomas Mann's novella, *Tod in Venedig*, is a further consideration of erotic inspiration.

Of course, Kierkegaard does not use this technical Roman Catholic terminology, but his idea is the same. His great discovery was that by love for a woman he could become chaste. Sublimation gave the necessary energy whereas sheer effort of will was futile.

Again, I quote that beautiful mystic passage from *Fear and Trembling*, p. 44. Pascal had already singled out for analysis this knowledge of the heart. Later on, Max Scheler will show how ethics and religion are based upon this material a priori knowledge of emotion.


See *Journals 1853-55*, p. 93 and *Attack*, p. 221.

*Stages*, p. 71.

*Stages*, p. 73.

*Fear and Trembling*, p. 75.

*Fear and Trembling*, footnote p. 52.

*Stages*, p. 55.


23 Stages, pp. 113-120.

24 Stages, pp. 166-175.

25 Repetition, pp. 132-134.

26 Fear and Trembling, p. 57.

27 Fear and Trembling, p. 60.


29 This relation will be considered in detail in the ninth chapter when we take up the temporal structures of the leap.

30 Works of Love, pp. 66 ff.

31 Works of Love, p. 112.

32 Works of Love, p. 69 and p. 98.

33 Works of Love, p. 117.

34 Works of Love, p. 44.

35 Works of Love, p. 65.

36 Works of Love, pp. 73-74.

37 Works of Love, p. 74.

Chapter III - The Experiential Structures of the Leap

1 Fear and Trembling, pp. 26-29.


3 See page 20 of this writing.

4 Stages, pp. 236-237.

5 A Short Life, p. 97.
Lowrie is the most sensitive commentator I know of on the relation between Kierkegaard's eroticism and his poetic, philosophic, and religious inspiration. But, Lowrie does not seem to see the possibility of a relation between Kierkegaard's love for Regina and the experience of May 19, 1838. He never sees the full implications of erotic inspiration for the first movement of the leap. Also, Lowrie has no clue as to the meaning of the thorn in the flesh. But, this also might be explained by Kierkegaard's eroticism.

Boesen was the confidant of S. K. but was he such a friend as Hamann and Møller? With these men Kierkegaard truly stood side by side.

Just as the young man in The Banquet, p. 47, could say that "having no love-experience was also a love-experience in a way" so S. K. by not marrying had a marriage experience in a way. His particular way probably brought to him more thoughts about marriage than most married men ever have.
23 Stages, p. 245.
24 Stages, pp. 233, 238, 239.
26 Repetition, p. 16.
27 See p.30-34 of this writing.

Chapter IV - The Sin Structures of the Leap

1 Fear and Trembling, pp. 103-111.
2 Fear and Trembling, p. 104.
3 See page 7, pp. 16-18 of this writing.
4 Dread, p. 55.
5 Dread, p. 34.
6 A Short Life, p. 98.
9 Fear and Trembling, p. 106.
10 Dread, pp. 49 ff.
11 Dread, p. 15.
12 Dread, pp. 27-29, 39.
13 Dread, p. 29.
14 Dread, p. 31.
15 Fear and Trembling, p. 108.
16 Fear and Trembling, pp. 103-109.
18  Sickness Unto Death, pp. 146, 162.
19  Sickness Unto Death, pp. 210-213.
20  Fear and Trembling, p. 45.
21  See Kierkegaard's beautiful picture of the emperor and the day laborer. Sickness Unto Death, pp. 214-215.
23  Sickness Unto Death, pp. 224-227.
24  Sickness Unto Death, p. 237.
25  Sickness Unto Death, pp. 218-227.
26  Sickness Unto Death, p. 218.
27  Sickness Unto Death, p. 219.
28  Dread, pp. 14, 26, etc. The individual is a key concept for S. K. and we shall meet it further in the chapters on the Existential and the Faith Structures of the Leap.
29  Dread, pp. 66-72.
30  Dread, pp. 56-66.
32  Dread, p. 39.
33  Fear and Trembling, p. 108.

Chapter V - The Reason Structures of The Leap
2  Fragments, p. 11.
3  Fragments, p. 16.
4  Fragments, p. 46.
5  Fragments, p. 18.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Pages</th>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Fragments</td>
<td>p. 19</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Fragments</td>
<td>pp. 46, 49</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Fragments</td>
<td>p. 48</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Fragments</td>
<td>p. 57</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Fragments</td>
<td>pp. 28-45</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Fragments</td>
<td>p. 58</td>
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<td>Fragments</td>
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<td>Fragments</td>
<td>p. 125</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Fragments</td>
<td>p. 131</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Fragments</td>
<td>p. 53</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Fragments</td>
<td>pp. 67, 73</td>
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Chapter VI - The Existential Structures of The Leap

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<td>pp. 147-167</td>
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It would seem that Kierkegaard uses Abraham as a model of Christian faith. But, of course, Abraham was not a Christian, he was a Jew. Within Kierkegaard's philosophy, it would seem that Judaism represents the purely ethical. The Jew lives only for the earthly and the temporal, for the historical. He has no context of the eternal. The promise is to be fulfilled in time. The Greek, on the other hand, represents the aesthetic. He lives for the eternal and the infinite even to the extent that the temporal and the finite are swallowed up by them. Christianity would be the synthesis of these two in the double movement leap. The Christian must, according to the thought of Kierkegaard, be first a Greek and then at the same time become a Jew. Just how well Abraham does this, I am not sure. I know of no place wherein Kierkegaard faces this problem and explains why Abraham can serve as a model of Christianity. S. K. does briefly spell out the place of Judaism within his philosophy in The Concept of Dread, pp. 92-93, but this still does not totally solve the problem of Abraham. The great difference between Judaism and Christianity seems to be between the race and the individual. But at the time of Abraham there was no race. There was just the individual. Thus, perhaps the father of faith was really like the Christian. Perhaps he fully made the first movement of the leap within the context of his Chaldean religion. And then, perhaps, having attained that natural sanctity, he fully discovered the earth and continued to believe in the promise even though it seemed impossible.
Chapter VII - The Faith Structures of The Leap

1. *Fear and Trembling*, pp. 75-76.
5. See page 71 of this writing.
10. *Fear and Trembling*, p. 76.
18. See page 27 of this writing.
19  Purity of Heart, pp. 66, 67.
20  Purity of Heart, p. 89.
21  See page 47 of this writing and Stages, p. 236.
22  Purity of Heart, pp. 89-98.
23  Dread, pp. 61-64.
26  Gospel of Our Sufferings, p. 36.
27  Gospel of Our Sufferings, p. 43.

Chapter VIII - The Incarnational Structures of the Leap

2  Fear and Trembling, p. 115.
4  Training, p. 83.
5  Training, pp. 86-95.
6  Training, pp. 96-104.
7  Training, pp. 104-108.
8  Training, p. 107.
9  Training, p. 105.
10  Training, p. 109.
11  Training, p. 111.
12  Training, p. 111.
Chapter IX - The Temporal Structures of the Leap


3. *Dread*, p. 84.


6. See Chapter VIII on the **Incarnational Structures of the Leap**.


Chapter X - The Style Structures of the Leap


2 Fear and Trembling, p. 72.


4 Point of View, pp. 44-45.

5 Point of View, p. 48.
Appendix A


5. *The Mind of Kierkegaard*, p. 44.


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<tr>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Kierkegaard, p. 263.</td>
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<td>Kierkegaard, p. 139.</td>
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<td>Kierkegaard, pp. 267-270.</td>
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<td>Kierkegaard as Theologian, pp. 48-49.</td>
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Appendix B

2 The Last Years' Journals, p. 267.
3 The Last Years' Journals, p. 268.
4 The Last Years' Journals, pp. 93-94.


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(2) Secondary Kierkegaard Sources


The dissertation submitted by David Goicoechea has been read and approved by members of the Department of Philosophy.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

[Signature of Advisor]

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