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## The Relationship of Levels of Moral Development with Personality Variables of Autonomy, Socialization, and Empathy at Two Critical Age Periods

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THE RELATIONSHIP OF LEVELS OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT WITH  
PERSONALITY VARIABLES OF AUTONOMY, SOCIALIZATION,  
AND EMPATHY AT TWO CRITICAL AGE PERIODS

by

Peter C. Zavadowsky

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School  
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment  
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## VITA

The author, Peter C. Zavadowsky, son of Peter A. Zavadowsky and Josephine (Skach) Zavadowsky, was born July 29, 1935 in Chicago, Illinois.

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## CHAPTER I

### STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND RATIONALE

Long a restricted domain of theology and philosophy the study of moral development has recently become a scientifically respectable area for research in psychology. Since the publication of his work, The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932), Piaget has been recognized as a pioneer in the developmental study of moral development. However, Piaget's major concern is cognitive development to which he has devoted his career. The relatively recent upsurge of interest in moral development can be attributed to Lawrence Kohlberg (1958), whose research has been of significant heuristic value. The scientific study of moral development is in its early developmental stages and is clearly resistant to easy solutions. However, it is a field for which society implicitly, if not explicitly, is asking. As Jessor (1975) states, "The importance of the work on moral development and its implications for society warrant the imagination and effort involved," (p. 179).

Kohlberg (1975) equates moral development with moral judgment, and argues that the values underlying moral judgments can be evaluated within a framework of levels and stages of moral development. Although he states that other factors influence moral behavior, he views moral reasoning as the only distinctive moral factor in "moral" behavior. For Kohlberg, the distinctive evaluative criterion for "moral" action is the level of moral judgment.

Since Kohlberg's initial contribution (1958), an increasing amount of literature has developed concerning moral development. Reviewing a sample of recent research in moral development, DePalma (1975) and Jessor (1975) state that, for the most part, such research has neglected to address itself to individual differences, specifically, personality variables that may influence the levels of moral development. By and large, the reported research has not been anchored in a theoretical framework. A great deal of research has been conducted with children addressing itself to particular aspects of behavior, (e.g. donation of a small amount of money or candy in the investigation of helping and sharing behavior), that have little relation to higher levels of moral reasoning especially at the mature-principled level. Hogan (1975) cautions that if researchers continue to deal only with specific problems, exclusive of a general theoretical framework, their studies may be reduced to academic triviality. Hogan (1973) proposes the rooting of moral development research in personality theory. Based in personality theory, Hogan concentrates on character structure, (viewed as a function of a person's largely unconscious typical way of selecting, using, justifying, and enforcing rules), and proposes five variables that significantly effect character structure and subsequently moral development, namely: moral knowledge, ethics of conscience-ethics of responsibility continuum, socialization, empathy, and autonomy. Socialization, empathy, and autonomy are reported to be developmental in nature.

Although Hogan does not subscribe to a stage model of moral development, the present study addresses itself to the problem of incorporating Kohlberg's stage model within the theoretical framework

suggested by Hogan. Kohlberg's stage model gives a logical basis for coordinating concepts. Hogan's model gives a theoretical framework for research in moral development.

Two critical age periods have been hypothesized by Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) for the attainment of principled level of moral reasoning, the first being the period of preadolescence, ages ten to thirteen; the second, the period of late adolescence, ages fifteen to nineteen. Kohlberg and Kramer suggest that if during the preadolescent period a solid conventional level of moral reasoning is not attained, then principled moral reasoning is unlikely to be attained in adulthood. They further contend that during the late adolescent period at least twenty percent of principled moral reasoning is required for the person to develop principled moral reasoning in adulthood.

Since much research in moral development has been conducted without being incorporated into a theoretical framework and without consideration of individual differences, the present study addresses itself specifically to this problem by investigating three developmental personality variables as they are related to Kohlberg's developmental stages of moral development, at the two age periods of preadolescence and late adolescence. The study investigates the relationship between the personality variables of socialization (assessed by the social standards subscale of the California Test of Personality, Thorpe et al, 1953), autonomy (assessed by the self reliance subscale of the California Test of Personality), and empathy (assessed by a modified scale of empathy based on Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972), and the stages of moral reasoning for the two age



periods of preadolescence (assessed by Carroll's Test, 1974), and late adolescence (assessed by the Defining Issues Test, Rest, 1972). One hundred seventh grade students from a suburban Chicago public school were randomly assigned to the preadolescent group; one hundred and nine college students from a suburban Chicago junior college were assigned to the late adolescent group, each group being equally balanced for sex.

The study was designed to provide information concerning the following questions:

- (1) Is there a statistically significant relationship between the developmental variables of autonomy, socialization, empathy and the stages of moral reasoning for the seventh grade and college samples?
- (2) What is the relationship between autonomy and dominant stage of moral reasoning, between socialization and dominant stage of moral reasoning, between empathy and dominant stage of moral reasoning for the two samples?
- (3) What is the magnitude of any significant relationships?
- (4) Is there a statistically significant difference between the relationship of autonomy, socialization, and empathy, taken as separate variables, with the dominant stage of moral reasoning for the different age groups?
- (5) Are there significant sex differences in autonomy, socialization, and empathy, taken separately, and in relation to the dominant stage of moral reasoning for either age group?

Information concerning these questions may very well have far reaching educational implications for schools, teachers, teacher

training institutions, and parents in relation to the moral growth of the child. The atmosphere of school and classroom (as well as the home) facilitates or inhibits a child's growth in many areas. Even though the socialization of the child may be basically completed by the time the child enters school (as Hogan claims), parents and teachers serve as primary models in stimulating the depth and breadth of the socialization process for the child. An atmosphere of openness to experience where the child receives empathic treatment from parents, administrators, and teachers and is exposed to a variety of role taking experiences stimulates growth in empathy. Parents and teachers who are strong, individualistic, independent, demanding, and yet fair, and who clearly label certain actions as right or wrong, explain rules, and make praise contingent on the attainment of specified standards, provide children with clear models for autonomous behavior (Baumrind, 1971).

In order to become a facilitator and stimulator of moral growth in the child many skills are required of the teacher, namely: knowledge of the stage of moral reasoning for each child; the ability to communicate at a level of one stage above the child's moral reasoning stage; the ability to produce moral conflict, the resolution of which leads the child to a greater awareness of a higher stage or moral reasoning; (in discussions or moral dilemmas) the ability of utilizing real life situations relevant to the students' lives. It is safe to say that most teachers do not possess these necessary skills. School districts must be willing to provide long term in-service training for all those who are involved in the education of the child in order for these persons to facilitate and stimulate an atmosphere

that will be conducive to moral growth. School personnel must be willing to obtain such training. Teacher training institutions must be willing to revise their curricula so that future teachers will have the necessary skills and attitudes. If schools are to make progress in the area of moral development, boards of education and administrators must take the lead in their commitment to moral education and all that this implies.

A major implication, constituting a most delicate problem faced by school systems, is the reaction of parents to moral education. This problem could possibly be alleviated by keeping the parents informed, by including parents on planning committees for moral education, and by holding public meetings open to all members of the community where the goals and objectives of moral education are presented and questions are answered. By fostering the concept that the schools and parents are partners in the total education of the child, and by operationalizing this concept, school systems lay a foundation whereby delicate issues such as moral education are addressed with openness and integrity, and provide a setting in which constructive solutions for delicate problems can be determined.

## CHAPTER II

### REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The review of the literature will begin with a historical overview of the psychoanalytically oriented interpretation of moral development, and a review of the Character Education Inquiry of Hartshorne, May, and their colleagues. The major part of this chapter will be devoted to reviewing the literature concerning three major contemporary interpretations of moral development: (1) The Social Learning Interpretation (Bandura and Mischel); (2) The Cognitive Developmental Interpretation (Piaget and Kohlberg); (3) The Characterological Interpretation (Hogan). The major conceptual framework and research supporting each interpretation will be systematically presented.

#### Historical Perspective

Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Moral Development: Freud has greatly influenced psychology's view concerning moral development. Although researchers may disagree with some of Freud's conclusions, most accept his basic premise: that sometime in early childhood, the child begins to introject the behavior of the parent, and through the process of identification with the same sex parent, codes of conduct, such as moral standards and values, which originally were externally enforced, become internalized as part of the child's own standards.

Freud viewed personality as composed of three systems- id, ego,

and super-ego, the latter being the last system to be developed. Freudian theory conceives of the super-ego as the internal representation of the values and ideals of society as interpreted to the child by his parents and enforced by sanctions that reduce or increase tension. The super-ego is considered as the moral arm of personality, representing the ideal rather than the real, striving for perfection rather than pleasure. The child wishing to reduce tension learns to develop his behavior as demanded by his parents. The super-ego consists of two subsystems, the conscience and the ego-ideal. Whatever the parent dictates as wrong and punishes the child for, tends to be incorporated into the child's conscience. Whatever is approved and rewarded by the parent, tends to be incorporated into the child's ego-ideal. The conscience is the punishing subsystem of the super-ego making the person feel guilty; the ego-ideal is the subsystem that rewards the person by making him feel proud of himself. Freudian theory views the role of the parent as paramount in the moral development of the child.

Hoffman (1962) reviewing research on the role of the parent in the child's moral growth draws three conclusions from psychoanalytically oriented studies (Allinsmith, 1960; Aronfreed, 1959; Greening, 1955; Heinicke, 1953; Hoffman and Saltzstein, 1960; MacKinnon, 1938; Mussen, 1956; Sears, 1953; Sears, Maccoby, and Levin, 1957). First, identification of the child with the parent is promoted through the frequent expression of warmth and affection; although there is some evidence that a threatening and punitive approach might, in some cases, also contribute to identification. Second, the development of an internal

moral orientation, especially in the context of an affectionate parent-child relationship is facilitated by the use of psychological discipline (i.e. measures which seek to have the child feel that he has fallen short of some ideal or that he has hurt the parent and consequently is less loved by the parent because of what he has done), especially with respect to one's reactions following the violation of a moral standard. Physical discipline or techniques that directly assert the parent's power over the child facilitate an external moral orientation dependent upon fear of detection and punishment. Third, the type of internalized morality that develops, (e.g. whether it is oriented predominantly toward human need or conventional authority) may be influenced by the particular kind of psychological techniques used, i.e. to what particular aspect of the child's need system does the psychological discipline generally appeal, such as needs for affection, self esteem, and concern for others.

A word of caution is in order concerning the generalization of these conclusions. Since research on which the conclusions are based used mainly male subjects, generalization of these conclusions applies mainly to males. Psychoanalytic theory has always been better articulated and understood with respect to males. However, research suggests that the psychological forces induced in the discipline situation which facilitate internal moral orientation are different for boys and girls. In boys it seems to be guilt over the effects of the child's behavior on the parent; in girls it seems to be anxiety over losing parental love.

The psychoanalytic interpretation of moral development does not

subscribe to moral education in the school since the processes of identification and internalization are said to be accomplished by the age of five and the developmental study of morality is not necessary after that age. The Freudian interpretation of moral development emphasizes feelings as the basis for moral conduct (conscience and guilt). Moral development consists of the identification and the internalization of the parent's standards and values in the child's super-ego, which is formed by the age of five. Morality is culturally relative within a framework of universal psycho-sexual stages, with the parent being the central influence in the moral development of the child.

Character Education Inquiry: The pioneering research of Hartshorne, May, and their colleagues (Hartshorne and May, 1928; Hartshorne, May, and Maller, 1929; Hartshorne, May, and Shuttleworth, 1930) set the precedent for studying moral character in that they not only utilized verbal responses but also observed the concrete behaviors of children, such as cheating, sharing, and the like. The subjects included eight thousand public school and three thousand private school children between the ages of eleven and fourteen. An attempt was made to measure each child's moral knowledge and actual conduct concerning honesty and service. The results reported that almost all children cheat so that they cannot be described as honest or dishonest. Cheating is situation specific so that it is not a character trait that makes a person cheat. Verbalizations concerning the value of honesty have little influence on actual behavior, the decision to cheat being based on the expediency of the situation and on the degree of risk and effort required. Honesty is also situation specific depending

on group approval and example rather than on internal moral values. The conclusions showed that there was no such thing as generality in moral behavior, the results showing little evidence for unified character traits but showing much evidence that moral conduct is situation specific. Accordingly, it was concluded that there was no such thing as individual character structured of virtues and vices; the child could learn only specific habits, in specific situations, and therefore there was no need for studying moral development, and moral education in the school would be ineffective. However, the subjects in the Character Education Inquiry were in early adolescence and preadolescence and it can be argued that they were at earlier stages of moral development in terms of Kohlberg's stages. Kohlberg (1969) found that thirteen year old boys most often gave responses associated with stage three of moral reasoning, followed by stage four and stage two next in order of frequency. Kohlberg argues that in this age range moral judgment is developing and incorporating values unfavorable to aggression and to theft, but not yet to cheating. Whereas theft and aggression have obvious harmful consequences for others, cheating does not and requires a more advanced stage of moral reasoning to appreciate it as a moral imperative, probably stage four or above. Thus, among the age group studied by Hartshorne and May, resistance to cheating is determined by situational and expediency factors. At later developmental stages, Kohlberg (1969) finds cheating decreasing, producing a correlation between amount of cheating and stage of moral reasoning. MacKinnon (1938) used college students as his subjects utilizing the methodology of the Character Education Inquiry in order to attempt a repudiation of the theory of specificity. After



interviewing the subjects concerning moral verbalizations he observed their behavior in a situation that offered the opportunity of apparently unseen cheating. Consistency was found in both honest and dishonest subjects and a general trait of honesty was said to be evidenced. In light of his data, MacKinnon concluded that the results rejected the specificity theory of Hartshorne and May. However, two different samples were used, preadolescents and adolescents by Hartshorne and May, college students by MacKinnon. The results of both investigations are consistent with Kohlberg's assumption that cheating requires a higher stage of moral reasoning than do theft and aggression, a stage four or perhaps higher. Theoretically, the college students in MacKinnon's investigation could have been at stage four or higher of moral reasoning so that the results of the Hartshorne-May studies and the MacKinnon study may well not be contradictory to each other but complementary depending on the stage of moral reasoning of the subjects.

#### Bandura's and Mischel's Social Learning Interpretation of Moral Development

Since the late nineteenth century, observation followed by imitation has been recognized by psychologists as a principal mode of learning. However, during the behavioristic revolution, observational or social learning theory fell into disrepute. Bandura is credited for calling attention to this long neglected mode of learning and for sharpening the distinctive features that differentiate social learning from instrumental learning. In addition, Bandura has been responsible

for a series of detailed studies that have investigated the variables influencing social learning, such as the stimulus properties of the model, types of behavior shown by the model, the consequences of the model's behavior, and the motivational set given to the subject. Bandura (1971) states that Behaviorism is validly criticized for neglecting determinants of human behavior arising from man's cognitive functioning so that traditional behavioral theories provide an incomplete account of human behavior. Cognitive processes (coding, imagery, symbolic representations, problem solving) are said to be involved in controlling the influence of reinforcement contingencies, in controlling or reinforcing one's own actions, in thinking out and evaluating alternate actions, and in supporting or altering one's self concept. Central to the social learning position is the concept of imitative or observational learning. A critical component of observational learning is the nature of vicarious consequences, that is, the consequences, positive or negative, that come to a model for his or her behavior. A person will tend to perform or inhibit a response learned vicariously to the extent that he believes he will be rewarded or punished in such a way. Reinforcement may also alter the level of observational learning by affecting what or who the observer will attend to and how actively he codes and rehearses the model behavior.

Social learning emphasizes that the child's percepts are the basis for his behavior. The child observes the behavior of others and uses it as a model for imitation. If the child is to learn from the model, the model stimulus must be attended to. If the behavior of the model is to exert influence upon the child's future behavior, then the

behavior of the model has to be coded symbolically, represented, and retained until the future arrives. The motivational factor determining the expression of cognitions and behaviors learned earlier is said to be the anticipation of reinforcement. New forms of behavior do not come suddenly. They are the result of long periods of conditioning which reinforce the person's approximations toward the desired behavior. In order for the approximations to begin, the person must first observe and then imitate a model. Whether or not the observation of a model is followed by continuing imitation will depend upon whether the attempted imitation of the model's behavior is rewarded. Miller and Dollard (1941) have suggested that the child's tendency to imitate is an acquired secondary drive. The child may spontaneously or coincidentally imitate the behavior of another. When this is done the social environment rewards the child and reinforces his tendency to imitate. Bandura and Walters (1959) view reinforcement of imitative behavior as the basis of most acceptable behavior. They contend that when a child is told to behave in a certain fashion, whether verbally by instruction from the model or non-verbally by observation of the model if the schedule of reinforcement is appropriate, the child will behave in that fashion. Contrary to Freudian theory, Bandura (1968) does not assume that the parents serve as the exclusive source of the child's moral judgments and behavior. Bandura calls particular attention to the important roles played by extra familial adults, and by the child's peers.

Mischel (1973) contends that when we are looking at behavior or attempting to predict behavior, the cognitive act, social experiences, and the specific situation all must be examined. The person is not an

empty organism so that the cognitive social learning view looks at how persons mediate the impact of outside stimuli and generate distinctive complex behavioral patterns. Mischel and Mischel (1976) state that a comprehensive psychological analysis of morality must consider both moral judgments and moral behavior. They distinguish between the competency or capacity (potency) that a person possesses to generate moral behaviors and the incentives or motivation for moral performance in particular situations. Even though a person has the competency to generate moral behavior, the actual performance depends on motivational variables. Intelligence is viewed as having a major role in the development of moral competencies. Mischel and Mischel (1975) view intellectual competencies, age, and certain demographic variables, such as socioeconomic status and education, to be among the best predictors of the adequacy of social functioning. Moral competency is said to include the ability to reason about moral dilemmas and encompass role-taking skills and empathy "of the sort required to take account of the long term consequences of different courses of action" (p. 4).

Since considerable differences of moral reasoning and moral behavior may be displayed by the same person across different situations, such individual differences and differences between people are accounted for in terms of each individual's unique social history. A person who possesses the needed moral competency is capable of moral behavior; but whether he translates the capacity (potency) into performance (act) depends on specific motivational performance considerations in the particular situation, the person variables of most importance being the individual's expectancies and subjective

values. A person has a great number of behaviors from which he is capable of constructing within any situation. What guides the person is his own expectancies about the consequences of the behavioral possibilities. These expectancies depend on the outcomes a person has received for similar behavior in similar situations and also on the outcomes the person has observed occurring to other people. All moral behavior, even that of the highest level, depends on expected consequences, which may range from immediate, concrete consequences for self, to autonomy from external rewards, including distant and abstract considerations and self reactions on the part of the person. Such autonomy does not mean that moral behavior no longer depends on expected consequences, but that the outcomes are more and more contingent upon the person achieving or violating his own standards, and on consequences that go beyond immediate concrete externally administered consequences.

Different individuals may share similar expectancies about consequences and yet may choose different moral behavior patterns due to the differences in the subjective values each places on the expected consequences. Even if the subjective values for a specific behavior are shared, individuals may differ in their tolerance of behavioral deviations from the norms both in their own behavior or in the behavior of others.

In every day life moral behavior depends on moral choices which often require high levels of self control and attention to distant consequences of action. Such prolonged self control sequences hinge on the person's ability to regulate personal behavior amid strong temptations and pressures for long periods, without any obvious or

immediate external rewards. To go from moral thought to moral conduct requires self regulation.

Moral behavior is said to be controlled by expected consequences, many of these being externally administered. However, each individual also regulates his own behavior by self imposed goals and standards and self produced consequences. In attempting to attain the standards that a person sets for himself, the road may be long and arduous. Mischel and Mischel (1976) hold that progress can be mediated by covert symbolic activities, (i.e. as the person reaches sub goals he uses self praise and self instruction to maintain goal directed behavior). Positive self appraisal and selfreinforcement tend to occur when a person reaches self imposed standards; psychological self condemnation may result if the person fails to reach important self imposed goals. This self regulatory system requires "priority rules" for determining the sequence of behavior and "stop rules" for terminating a particular sequence of behavior. Moral behavior as any other complex human action depends on the execution of long, interlocking sequences of thought and behavior. Mischel feels that the concept of "plans" defined as the hierarchical processes "which control the order in which an organism performs a sequence of operations" is applicable here and merits much more attention than it has received. Mischel alerts us to the fact that a person may possess high moral principles and engage in harmful, aggressive, immoral behavior.

Accordingly, the social learning interpretation of moral development views moral behavior as a function of the person's conditioning and modeling history. In contrast to the Freudian viewpoint, moral

learning continues throughout life, the environment being the primary determinant of moral behavior. Morality is culturally relative and the role of adults and peers is critical, since they dispense rewards and punishment and serve as models. The function of the teacher is to serve as a good model and to reward appropriate behavior. The social learning interpretation is not dependent on sequentially hierarchical stages of moral development. Advancement in moral behavior occurs mainly in imitation of the behavior of others; the child is stimulated to change toward more appropriate behavior through modeling and rewards obtained for acceptable moral behavior. As learning continues, the achievement of a particular standard may take on reinforcing qualities of its own because past achievement has been paired with external reinforcement. The child gradually internalizes the standards of performance. The goal is to have the person eventually develop standard setting and reinforcement for moral behavior independent of externally controlled consequences.

#### Research Supporting the Social Learning Interpretation of Moral Development

Adkins et al (1974) in reviewing research on moral development cite a number of studies employing the social learning interpretation of moral behavior. Much recent social learning research has addressed itself to the relationship between observation of a model and prosocial behavior. A few studies have concentrated on the relationship between observation of a model and resistance to temptation.

Several researchers studied college and adult subjects in their

naturalistic settings exposing the subjects to a model condition where the model engaged in specific prosocial behavior. In contrast to subjects who were not exposed to the model condition, results revealed increased rates of: volunteering (Rosenbaum, 1956), donating (Bryan and Test, 1967), signing a petition (Hain, Graham, Mouton, and Blake, 1956), and helping to change a tire or complete a task (Test and Bryan, 1969). Laboratory studies employing model conditions in contrast to no model conditions showed that children exposed to the model condition increased anonymous donation activity (Rosenhan and White, 1967), sharing behavior (Harris, 1971) and rescue attempts (Staub, 1971). Witnessing a model engaged in non prosocial behavior or refusing to engage in prosocial behavior, decreased acts of volunteering (Schachter and Hall, 1952), and donation (Wheeler and Wagner, 1968). Schachter and Hall (1952) demonstrated that exposure of subjects to a volunteering model increased the rate of offering to volunteer; however, these subjects were found not to differ from controls who had not been exposed to modeling in the actual performance of the task that they had volunteered to perform.

A few studies have explored the relationship of model nurturance to prosocial behavior. Midlarsky and Bryan (1967) found that the increased model nurturance in the form of hugging did not increase altruistic behavior in children. In an investigation of donation behavior, with fourth and fifth grade students as subjects, Rosenhan and White (1967) had the subjects interact with either a warm, neutral, or hostile adult model during a pre-experimental session. Later the subjects were exposed to a test for donation behavior. Results revealed no difference among subjects exposed to the three different



model conditions. Grusec and Skubiski (1970) using third and fifth grade subjects exposed to either a high or a low nurturance model found no significant differences as a function of model nurturance.

Hornstein, Fisch, and Holmes (1968) contrived an interesting situation in which a model "found" a wallet, wrote a letter to the owner, and then accompanied by the model's letter, the wallet was "relost." Adult subjects then came upon the wallet and the letter. Results showed that those subjects who believed that they were similar to the model returned the wallet more frequently when the letter indicated the model felt good or neutral rather than bad, about returning the wallet. When the letter revealed that the model was dissimilar, the model's feelings had no effect. Midlarsky and Bryan (1972) used fourth and fifth grade subjects who were exposed to a model who expressed positive affect either contingently or non contingently following acts of greed or charity. Results showed that expression of contingent positive affect significantly influenced anonymous donation behavior. The researchers further investigated the generalization of the donation behavior. Results showed that the effect did not hold up on a generalization task a week and a half later.

White (1967) instructed fourth grade children to donate half of their winnings to charity. The experimental group who had received the instruction donated significantly more than the control group, but the effect did not generalize to a second test several days later. Several studies have exposed children to models who reminded them to practice charity or greed or were neutral in their admonitions, in contrast to physical demonstration of donating behavior by the model, (Bryan, 1971; Bryan and Schwartz, 1971; Bryan and Walbek 1970a; Walbek

1969). Results showed that such exhortations do not affect young children's donation behavior. However, observation of the model who donated, usually affected donation behavior significantly. Although exhortations merely reminding children of prosocial behavior do not seem to affect donation behavior, there is some evidence from a study by Midlarsky and Bryan (1972) that exhortations that are rational and justify what is being preached do have significant influence on the donating behavior of fourth and fifth grade children. Gelfand et al (1975) using kindergarten and first grade subjects who displayed a low baseline rate of donating pennies to help a needy peer, exposed the subjects to instructional prompts to donate, and the subjects were praised for each donation. The results showed that both instructional prompts and praise appeared to increase the children's donation behavior. It appears that these studies show that merely exhorting a child to do something does not have a significant influence on the child. However, when the exhortation justifies why the child should show charitable behavior, when the child sees a model demonstrate charitable behavior, and when the child receives social reinforcement for charitable acts, under these conditions a significant effect upon the child's charitable behavior has been shown.

What is the effect of inconsistency in what the model says and what he does? A few studies (Bryan and Walbek, 1970b; Midlarsky and Bryan, 1972) have investigated the effects on donation behavior by exposing second to fifth grade subjects to a model who either preached generosity but practiced greed, or preached greed but practiced generosity. Results showed that such inconsistency of the model has not been found to significantly affect later donation behavior. Payne

(1974) addressing himself to the lack of effect on these children by inconsistent models states that this result "would appear to indicate that exposure of young children to models does not trigger articulate cognitions regarding social obligations." However, Mischel and Liebert (1966) found that the inconsistency of a model did not affect the children's behavior in the presence of an adult; but when the children were left alone (secretly observed) many of those who observed the inconsistent model lowered their own standards, while none of those in the consistent model condition did so.

A few studies utilizing young children as subjects have explored the relationship between observation of a model and resistance to temptation. Bryan and Stein (1967) had kindergarten children observe a model stealing M & M candy, thus yielding to temptation, and a model who did not yield to the temptation; in one instance the model was an adult, in another instance the model was a peer. When the children were left alone, the two groups did not differ in their resistance to temptation. Stein (1967) using four year old boys had his subjects assigned to three groups; group 1 was assigned to a model yielding to temptation condition; group 2 was assigned to a resisting model; group 3 was assigned to a no model condition. Results showed that the subjects exposed to the yielding model condition, yielded to temptation significantly more than those exposed to a resisting model or no model condition. Those exposed to a resisting model did not differ significantly from subjects who were not exposed to a model condition. Actually, the control group (exposed to no model condition) demonstrated slightly greater resistance than the group exposed to a resisting model

condition. An explanation given for the last result was that the deviant response was less available to subjects who had not witnessed a model (control group) than to those who had. Walters and Parke (1964) had five year old subjects observe a film in which a boy of similar age played with a forbidden toy and later received a reward or a punishment or neither reward nor punishment. The control group did not view the film. On a subsequent task involving prohibitions against playing with certain toys, children who had viewed the model being rewarded or receiving no consequences, deviated more quickly, more often, and for a longer period than control subjects. There was no significant difference between the group who viewed the model being punished and the control group.

Bandura and McDonald (1963) attempted to modify children's moral judgments which were obtained on a pre-test using Piaget's story pairs. The age range of the children was from five to ten years. Three procedures were used in the experimental phase. The first involved only reinforcement in the form of praise when a child gave an advanced judgment as compared to the pretest. The second condition involved the children evaluating story pairs but alternating with an adult model who expressed moral judgments in opposition to the child's original orientation. The third condition was the same as the second with the addition of praise when the child made a judgment of the kind made by the model. Having completed the experimental phase, the children were taken into another room by an adult different than the model and were asked to evaluate twenty more story pairs. During this phase no praise or criticism was given and the model was not present. Results showed

that although praise alone was relatively ineffective in modifying the children's moral judgment orientation, modeling exerted a powerful influence in modifying the children's moral judgments. Cowan et al (1969) performed a study designed to replicate and extend the study of Bandura and McDonald. The time between modeling and posttest was lengthened and a wider sampling of moral judgment items was used. The results constituted an impressive replication of the earlier study by Bandura and McDonald. Cowan et al argued that modeling studies provide data on limited aspects of moral judgment, overlooking several dimensions of moral reasoning as well as intention consequences which would be assessed by Piaget. In reply to the paper by Cowan et al, Bandura (1969) reasserts the social learning position on moral development and suggests that modeling influences are more important in moral development than stage theories would lead us to believe.

In most natural situations, children as well as adults are not exposed to a single model, but to a succession of models. Hill and Liebert (1968), McMains and Liebert (1968), and Liebert and Fernandez (1969) conducted a series of experiments within a social learning framework. As a result of their work they have enumerated general statements governing the effect of multiple modeling in relation to specific rules: (1) A stated rule is more likely to be broken as the number of others whom one observes breaking the rule increases; (2) A rule is more likely to be followed as the number of others whom one observes upholding the rule increases.

Summary of Research Supporting the Social Learning View of

Moral Development: Social Learning studies have concentrated on the relationship between modeling and prosocial behavior. A few studies have addressed themselves to the relationship between modeling and resistance to temptation. The review of the research addressed itself to four general areas of social learning as related to moral development: (1) Relationship of modeling to prosocial behavior; (2) Relationship of modeling to resistance to temptation; (3) Relationship of modeling to moral reasoning; (4) Relationship of multiple modeling to rule observance.

Observance of a model engaged in specific prosocial behavior has increased rates of volunteering, donating, signing of a petition, helping to change a tire, anonymous donating, sharing, and rescue attempts, (Bryan and Test, 1967; Hain et al, 1956; Rosenbaum, 1956; Rosenhan and White, 1967; Staub, 1971; Test and Bryan, 1969; White, 1967).

Exposure to a nurturant model (model warmth) had no significant influence on altruistic and donating behavior, (Grusec and Skubiski, 1970; Midlarsky and Bryan, 1967; Rosenhan and White, 1967).

Positive affect consequences as expressed by the model and similarity to the model significantly influenced returning of a lost object and anonymous donation behavior, (Hornstein, Fisch, and Holmes, 1968; Midlarsky and Bryan, 1972). There is less evidence that praise given to a model significantly affects donation and sharing behavior, (Harris, 1970; Presbie and Coiteux, 1971).

Verbal instruction, exhortations that are justified, and physical demonstration by models significantly affected donation behavior while

mere verbalization, telling children to donate, did not affect their donation behavior, (Bryan, 1971; Bryan and Schwartz, 1971; Bryan and Walbek, 1970; Midlarsky and Bryan, 1972; Walbek, 1969; White, 1967). Instructional prompts and praise increased donating behavior in young children (Gelfand, et al, 1975).

Two studies, (Bryan and Walbek, 1970; Midlarsky and Bryan, 1972), showed that inconsistency in the verbal and physical behavior of the model (e.g. preaching charity but practicing greed) did not significantly affect later donation behavior. In another study, (Mischel and Liebert, 1966), inconsistent model behavior did not affect the subjects' behavior while the adult was present. However, when the adult was not present and the children were secretly observed, inconsistent model condition subjects significantly lowered their standards.

Observing a model yielding or resisting temptation did not affect children's resistance to temptation, (Bryan and Stein, 1967), while another study (Stein, 1967) found that exposure to a model yielding to temptation significantly increased children's yielding to temptation. Walters and Parke (1964) found that children viewing a model yielding to temptation and later rewarded, or neither rewarded nor punished, yielded more quickly, more often, and for a longer period of time than control subjects. There was no significant difference between the control group and the subjects viewing the model being punished.

Although praise alone was ineffective, modeling exerted significant influence in modifying children's moral reasoning. (Bandura and McDonald, 1963). Cowan et al (1969) attempted to replicate

the Bandura-McDonald study. Their results constituted an impressive replication of the earlier study.

In a series of multiple modeling studies, results showed that verbally stated rules are more likely to be followed or broken as the child observes increasing numbers of other people conforming to or breaking the rule, (Hill and Liebert, 1968; Liebert and Fernandez, 1969; McMains and Liebert, 1968).

The evidence for short term specific influence of modeling is well established. However there has been a paucity of studies attempting to verify that observation of a model produces enduring dispositions, (Midlarsky and Bryan, 1972; White, 1967), and these studies attempted generalization studies a few days to a week and a half later, with the result that the effect did not generalize. As D. L. Krebs (1970) has pointed out, before conclusions of acquired behavioral dispositions can be made, the effects must be shown to be generalizable to situations dissimilar to the testing situation. Even though social learning researchers have attempted to make laboratory situations as real as possible, the question of unrepresentativeness, due to the possible artificiality of laboratory measures, remains a problem.

Much of the social learning research has dealt with trivial forms of donating, sharing, and helping behavior, such as donating pennies to a needy peer, (Gelfand, 1975). Few investigations have included higher levels of sharing and helping behavior such as giving up a substantial amount of one's own time or money, or helping where danger or risk exists. Adkins et al (1974) state:



...trivial or low cost, as opposed to high cost prosocial behavior may follow different laws or be affected by different variables. Until it has been demonstrated that the same laws govern behavior in two different situations, it is unwarranted to assume that the situations measure the same thing (p. 122).

This may well account for the conflicting results concerning observation of an inconsistent model, (Bryan and Walbek, 1970; Midlarsky and Bryan, 1972; Mischel and Liebert, 1966), and the effect of a yielding to temptation model on subjects exposed to that condition, (Bryan and Stein, 1967; Stein, 1967).

Since age ranges and sex differences were limited, these social learning studies appear to give little information concerning developmental trends and sex differences. In future social learning investigations, attempts should be made to conduct studies addressed to developmental trends, sex differences, the generalization of modeling effects in naturalistic settings employing both low cost and high cost prosocial behavior. Arbutnot (1975) addressing himself to the issue of modeling and reinforcement producing specific modification of responses to moral judgments in children, states that these studies may have succeeded only in training subjects to recognize moral responses different from their own and to respond in the desired manner to obtain reward or approval whether or not the children understood the responses. Lickona (1976) explains the results of these studies in terms of the distinction between structure and content. Structure of thought is conceived as a filter that determines the meaning and impact of content. A person's susceptibility to influence of content varies with the stage of moral development, with the greatest susceptibility being at the conventional level since the person depends on the group for moral definition of the situation. The

results obtained by Bandura and McDonald (1963) and Cowan et al (1969) are seen as content overwhelming structure so that the adult social influence caused the children to abandon, at least temporarily, a more advanced stage of moral development in favor of a lower stage that focused on material reinforcement. And yet as Bandura (1969) claims, modeling may well play a greater role in moral development than stage theorists are willing to recognize.

### Piaget's and Kohlberg's Cognitive Developmental Interpretation of Moral Development

Piaget and his associates have been publishing their findings on the development of cognitive processes in children since 1927. The extensive formulation of children's cognitive development was extended to moral development in Piaget's work, The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932). The subjects studied by Piaget ranged in age from four to thirteen years and were reported to be from the lower socioeconomic sections of Geneva, Switzerland. In order to measure the children's level of moral judgment, Piaget presented pairs of stories to his subjects. The stories differed from each other on two dimensions: (1) the actual amount of damage done; (2) the intentions of the transgressor. The story pairs presented these dimensions in opposition to each other and level of moral judgment was determined on how the children responded to these dimensions. An example of Piaget's story pairs follows:

John was in his room when his mother called him to dinner. John goes down and opens the door to the dining room. But behind the door was a chair, and on the chair was a tray with fifteen cups on it. John did not know the cups were behind the door. He opens the door, the door hits the tray, bang go the fifteen cups, and they all get broken.

One day when Henry's mother was out, Henry tried to get some cookies out of the cupboard. He climbed up on a chair, but the cookie jar was still too high, and he couldn't reach it. But when he was trying to get the cookie jar, he knocked over a cup. The cup fell down and broke. (Piaget 1932)

The child was required to judge the naughtier of the two characters.

Piaget views moral development as following a sequence of three stages. Stage one is the blind obedience stage involving objective morality or moral realism. This stage lasts up to ages seven or eight and corresponds to the sensori-motor and preoperational stages of cognitive development. The child's conception of morality is based on what the parents forbid or permit. Transgressions are evaluated solely in terms of the amount of damage done without any consideration of the transgressor's intent.

Stage two is the progressive equalitarian stage involving subjective morality or moral relativism. This stage spans the ages of eight to eleven and corresponds to the concrete operational stage of cognitive development. Moral judgments take into account the spirit of the law and are made in terms of the apparent intent of the transgressor, thereby being less absolute and authoritarian.

Stage three is the moral autonomy stage, involving the tempering of purely equalitarian justice by considerations of equity, i.e. considering the individual's particular situation. This stage sets in towards ages eleven to twelve and corresponds to the formal operational stage of cognitive development. Rules are perceived as products of social interactions with peers and adults. Reciprocity and mutual agreement are paramount. Authority for rules stem from social consent and rules may be changed by consensus. This stage is accompanied by a degree of moral autonomy, and the child develops a

sense of ethical and moral responsibility for behavior. Piaget laid the foundation for the refined extension of the cognitive developmental interpretation of moral development by Lawrence Kohlberg (1958).

The main contemporary proponent of the stage dependent, cognitive developmental approach to moral development is Kohlberg. He has incorporated into his own elaborate model the Piagetian concepts of developmental stage sequence, conflict, and imbalance as a necessary precondition for advanced moral development.

Kohlberg (1968), Kohlberg and Turiel (1971) consider the child to be a moral philosopher since when children's moral judgments are examined, they have many standards that do not come in any obvious way from parents, peers, or teachers but rather from a morality of their own. The main goals of Kohlberg and his associates are the developmental stages a person must pass through to arrive at the principled stage of moral reasoning. The role of moral educators and moral developmental psychologists is seen as focused on the prevention of a child remaining at a lower level of moral reasoning when the child begins to lag behind (Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971).

Although not as interested in moral behavior per se as in the types of moral judgments a person makes, Kohlberg's levels and stages of moral reasoning are structures of moral judgment. What is important and significant is not the content of the judgment, i.e. the choice endorsed by the person, but the form, i.e. the process of reasoning about the content or choices that involve a conflict of obligation. The mere verbalization of a moral judgment does not define the

structure or stage of moral development; what defines the stage is the form, the why and how, of the verbalization.

Kohlberg acknowledges that one can reason in terms of principles and not live up to them. Although additional factors are necessary to translate principled moral reasoning into moral performance, he stresses that moral judgment is the only distinctive moral factor in moral behavior. Moral judgment change is long range and irreversible so that a higher stage is never lost. Moral behavior as such is largely situational and reversible in new situations (Kohlberg, 1975).

Moral principles are defined as principles of choice for resolving conflicts of obligation (Kohlberg, 1971). A moral principle is a way of choosing that which is universal. Accordingly, Kohlberg's position is an absolutist view of morality and his universal absolute is rooted in the Kantian conception of justice. Kohlberg (1970) defines justice as treating every man impartially regardless of the man. A fundamental distinction is made between moral principles and rules. Moral principles are universal and allow for no exception; rules allow for and are subject to exceptions. Specific moral beliefs are also distinguished from moral principles since beliefs are conceived of as being individually or culturally determined and therefore relative in content (Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971).

Ten universal moral values are enumerated, namely: punishment, property, roles and concerns of affection, roles and concerns of property, law, life, distributive justice, liberty, truth, and sex. The stage of a person's moral reasoning defines what that individual finds valuable in these issues, i.e. how the person defines the value and the reasons he gives for valuing it. Moral choice is said to

involve choosing between two or more of these values when they conflict in concrete situations of choice (Kohlberg, 1975).

Kohlberg (1958) originally defined three levels of moral development with two stages within each level. More recently a premoral stage (stage 0) has been added resulting "in the formulation of the seven culturally universal stages of moral development" (Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971). Table 1 presents the moral stages in terms of what is right, the reason for doing good, and the social perspective behind each stage. It should be noted that Rest (1972, 1974, 1976) distinguished stage five into substages five A and five B, five A being the morality of social contract, five B being the morality of intuitive humanism. Although the literature does not usually associate this substage distinction with Kohlberg, he does make the distinction in his 1972 paper. Most recently Kohlberg (1976) conceptualizes stage three and above as having substages A and B. He states,

We group the normative order and utilitarian orientation as interpenetrating to form Type A at each stage. Type B focuses on the interpenetration of the justice orientation with an ideal self orientation. Type A makes judgments...in terms of the given "out there." Type B makes judgments...in terms of what ought to be, of what is internally accepted by the self (p. 40).

Kohlberg reportedly is thinking of adding a higher stage that would account for the moral maturity of prophets like Jesus and Buddha (Woodward and Lord, 1976).

The stages are said to be sequentially invariant and hierarchical (Kohlberg, 1970; Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972). Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg (1969) define an invariant sequence as one:

TABLE 1

## THE MORAL STAGES

Level and Stage	What is Right	Reason for Doing Right	Social Perspective of Stage
Stage 0 - Premoral	Good is what is pleasant or exciting; bad is what is fearful or painful.	Child is guided only by can do, and want to do.	Presocial. Child has no idea of obligation, should, have to, even in terms of extreme authority.
LEVEL I - PRECONVENTIONAL Stage 1 - Heteronomous Morality	To avoid breaking rules backed by punishment, obedience for its own sake, and avoiding physical damage to persons and property.	Avoidance of punishment, and the superior power of authorities.	Egocentric point of view. Doesn't consider the interests of others or recognize that they differ from the actor's; doesn't relate two points of view. Actions are considered physically rather than in terms of psychological interests of others. Confusion of authority's perspective with one's own.

TABLE 1 (Cont'd.)

Level and Stage	What is Right	Reason for Doing Right	Social Perspective of Stage
Stage 2 - Individualism Instrumental Purpose and Exchange	Following rules only when it is to someone's immediate interest; acting to meet one's own interests and needs and letting others do the same. Right is also what's fair, what's an equal exchange, a deal, an agreement.	To serve one's own needs or interests in a world where you have to recognize that other people have their interests too.	Concrete individualistic perspective. Aware that everybody has his own interest to pursue and these conflict, so that right is relative (in the concrete individualistic sense).
LEVEL II - CONVENTIONAL Stage 3 - Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, and Interpersonal Conformity	Living up to what is expected by people close to you or what people generally expect of people in your role as son, brother, friend, etc. "Being good" is important and means having good motives, showing concern about others. It also means keeping mutual relationships, such as trust, loyalty, respect and gratitude.	The need to be a good person in your own eyes and those of others. Your caring for others. Belief in the Golden Rule. Desire to maintain rules and authority which support stereotypical good behavior.	Perspective of the individual in relationships with other individuals. Aware of shared feelings, agreements, and expectations which take primacy over individual interests. Relates points of view through the concrete Golden Rule, putting yourself in the other guy's shoes Does not yet consider generalized



TABLE 1 (Cont'd.)

Level and Stage	What is Right	Reason for Doing Right	Social Perspective of Stage
Stage 4 - Social System and Conscience	Fulfilling the actual duties to which you have agreed. Laws are to be upheld except in extreme cases where they conflict with other fixed social duties. Right is also contributing to society, the group, or institution.	To keep the institution going as a whole, to avoid the breakdown in the system "if everyone did it," or the imperative of conscience to meet one's defined obligations. (Easily confused with Stage three belief in rules and authority.)	system perspective  Differentiates societal point of view from inter-personal agreement of motives. Takes the point of view of the system that defines roles and rules. Considers individual relations in terms of place in the system.
LEVEL III - POST-CONVENTIONAL, or PRINCIPLES Stage 5-Social Contract or Utility and Individual Rights	Being aware that people hold a variety of values and opinions, that most values and rules are relative to your group. These relative rules should usually be upheld, in the interest of impartiality and because they are the social contract. Some non-	A sense of obligation to law because of one's social contract to make and abide by laws for the welfare of all and for the protection of all people's rights. A feeling of contractual commitment, freely entered upon, to family, friendship, trust, and work obligations. Concern that laws and duties be based on rational calculation of overall utility, "the greatest good for	Prior-to-society perspective. Perspective of a rational individual aware of values and rights prior to social attachments and contracts. Integrates perspectives by formal mechanisms of agreement, contract, object impartiality and due process.

TABLE 1 (Cont'd.)

Level and Stage	What is Right	Reason for Doing Right	Social Perspective of Stage
	relative values and rights like life and liberty, however, must be upheld in any society and regardless of majority opinion	the greatest number."	Considers moral and legal points of view; recognizes that they sometimes conflict and finds it difficult to integrate them.
Stage 6-Universal Ethical Principles	Following self-chosen ethical principles. Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid because they rest on such principles. When laws violate these principles, one acts in accordance with the principle. Principles are universal principles of justice; the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.	The belief as a rational person in the validity of universal moral principles, and a sense of personal commitment to them.	Perspective of a moral point of view from which social arrangements derive. Perspective is that of any rational individual recognizing the nature of morality or the fact that persons are ends in themselves and must be treated as such.

(Sources: Kohlberg and Turiel 1971;  
Kohlberg 1976).

in which attainment of an advanced stage is dependent on the attainment of each of the preceding stages. It is further assumed that a more advanced stage is not simply an addition to a less advanced stage, but represents a reorganization of less advanced stages (p. 226).

Kohlberg (1971), consistent with stage theory, states that the stages are universal and culture free. He writes:

A stage concept implies universality of sequence under varying cultural conditions. It implies that moral development is not merely a matter of learning the verbal values or rules of the child's culture, but reflects something more universal in development, something which would occur in any culture (p. 171).

The sequence of stages does not appear to be dependent on religious beliefs or lack of them. Kohlberg and Turiel (1971) state:

No significant differences appear in the development of moral thinking among Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Buddhists, Moslems, and Atheists. Children's moral values in the religious area seem to go through the same stages as their general moral values (p. 438).

Stages generalize over a field of responses (Kohlberg, 1970; Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972), i.e. behavior at a specific stage is truly learned and not forgotten in contrast to responses artificially taught, which are soon forgotten or unlearned.

The attainment of a given Piagetian cognitive stage is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the parallel moral reasoning stage. Kohlberg (1975) enunciates the necessary cognitive developmental stages in relation to his stages of moral development. Piaget's concrete operational stage is a prerequisite for the pre-conventional level, stages one and two. The cognitive stage of concrete operations plus a partial formal operational stage is required for the conventional level of moral reasoning, stages three and four. Full formal operational cognitive reasoning is prerequisite for the principled

level of moral development, stages five and six. Most persons appear to be higher in cognitive development than in moral development.

Kohlberg (1975) gives the following example:

Over fifty percent of late adolescents and adults are capable of full formal reasoning, but only ten percent of these adults (all formal operational) display principled (stages 5 and 6) moral reasoning (p. 671).

Loevinger (1975) states that Kohlberg views cognitive development as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the corresponding stage of Loevinger's ego development, which, in turn, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the corresponding stage of moral development (Kohlberg, 1976). Loevinger's formula is that moral development, interpersonal development, development of self concept, and inner life proceed together as a single integrated structure. Loevinger (1975) states, "I believe that in measuring ego development, I am measuring moral development" (p. 63). Loevinger has sketched out the course of healthy ego development into a sequence of seven stages that are not age specific, namely: (1) Presocial and symbiotic; (2) Impulse ridden; (3) Opportunistic; (4) Conformist; (5) Conscientious; (6) Autonomous; and (7) Integrated. It would seem that Loevinger's stages of ego development and Kohlberg's stages of moral development are not mutually exclusive. Table 2 shows a possible correspondence of Loevinger's and Kohlberg's stages (after Loevinger, 1976). Kohlberg (1976) granting that a high correlation is suggested between measures of ego development and measures of moral development states:

...such a correlation does not imply that moral development can be defined simply as a division or area of ego development...A broad psychological cognitive-developmental theory of moralization is an ego developmental theory...To see moral stages as simply reflections of ego level, however, is to lose the

TABLE 2

## CORRESPONDENCE OF LOEVINGER'S AND KOHLBERG'S STAGES

Loevinger's Ego Stages		Kohlberg's Moral Stages
Stage 1	Presocial - - - - -	Stage 0 Premoral Stage
Stage 2	Impulsive - - - - -	Stage 1 Punishment and Obedience
Transition Stage	Self Protective	Stage 2 Naive Instrumental Hedonism
Stage 3	Conformist - - - - -	Stage 3 Interpersonal Conformity
Transition Stage	3/4 Conscientious Conformist -	Stage 4 Law and Order
Stage 4	Conscientious - - - - -	Stage 5 Social Contract
Transitional Stage	4/5 Individualistic	
Stage 5	Autonomous - - - - -	Stage 6 Universal Ethical Principles
Stage 6	Integrated - - - - -	(Proposed Stage 7)

ability to theoretically define and empirically find order in the specifically moral domain of the human personality (p. 53).

For Kohlberg, advancement in moral reasoning occurs through the stimulation of moral conflict at a level of one stage above the existing stage (Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971; Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972).

Kohlberg and Turiel (1971) state that to stimulate change to a higher stage, three assumptions must be taken into consideration: (1)

Children do not comprehend reasoning more than one stage above their own; (2) Children should be helped to advance one stage higher by inducing moral conflicts; in doing this the children should be helped to understand the higher stage of reasoning; (3) Spontaneous use of the higher form of reasoning should be provided for children so that they can be helped to accept the higher form in new situations.

Kohlberg (1970) states:

Our Platonic view holds that if we inspire cognitive conflict in the student and point the way to the next step up the divided line, he will tend to see things previously invisible to him (p. 82).

A series of applications based on Kohlberg's model have been used in correctional settings (Kohlberg, Scharf, and Hickey, 1972; Kohlberg, Kauffman, Scharf, and Hickey, 1973). These have led to the concept of the "just community" in which rules are made and conflicts resolved through the discussion of fairness and a democratic vote. Such a program has been in operation since 1971 and has stimulated moral reasoning advances in inmates. The "just community" program which aims at a stage five level of moral reasoning is also being used in several high schools in the United States. Reasonable rules are used as vehicles for moral discussion with the hope that a sense of

community will lead to behavior changes of a positive nature. Kohlberg (1975) is quick to point out that the societal moral atmosphere of the home, school, and society in general, must be considered when one considers the conditions that stimulate moral growth.

Verbal I.Q. scores and mental age reflect a certain level of intellectual maturity and are a prerequisite for moral development since moral issues must be first understood before moral judgments can be made. However, Kohlberg (1969) states that I.Q. scores are poor predictors of maturity of moral judgment, the correlation between verbal I.Q. and maturity of moral judgment being in the 30s.

#### Research Supporting Kohlberg's Cognitive Developmental Interpretation of Moral Development

Research concerning Piaget's model of moral development will not be reviewed since the major emphasis of this section has focused on Kohlberg and his theory of moral development. Bronfenbrenner (1969) and Lickona (1976) give succinct surveys of research concerning Piaget's model of moral development to which the reader is referred.

Turiel (1975) reports tentative results of a continuing longitudinal study relating to the development of social concepts. A social conventional interview and a moral judgment interview were obtained from approximately 175 males and females between the ages of nine and thirty years of age. Subjects were reinterviewed at two or three year intervals. The research focused on the distinction between social conventional thinking and moral judgment. Turiel notes that previous explanations of social development either have treated social and moral concepts alike or have subordinated all social concepts to moral

reasoning. The results, so far obtained, have reported that moral judgments and social conventional thinking are not reducible to each other; morals and mores were found not to be the same.

Keasey (1975) investigated the relationship between Piaget's cognitive developmental stages and Kohlberg's moral developmental stages. Using twelve and nineteen year old girls as subjects, Keasey investigated the relationship between principled moral reasoning and the formal operational stage of cognitive development. The results showed that some of the subjects had formal operational thinking but not principled moral reasoning. However, there was no case of a person reasoning at the principled level of moral judgment that did not show evidence of a substantial amount of formal operational thinking. One of Keasey's conclusions was that formal operational thinking is a necessary but not sufficient condition for principled moral reasoning. In a second study, Keasey (1975) examined the relationship between concrete operational thinking and stage two of moral reasoning, utilizing seven and nine year old boys and girls as subjects. Results indicated that concrete operational thinking was a necessary but not sufficient condition for stage two moral reasoning.

Kohlberg (1968) reported data concerning cross cultural studies of moral reasoning in children from America, Taiwan, Mexico, Turkey, and Yucatan. These data suggest that the stages of moral reasoning are universal and not purely an American construct, even though initial evidence shows that the principled level is not often attained in primitive or preliterate societies.

Turiel (1966) utilizing forty-four middle class boys, ages twelve



and thirteen, tested the hypotheses that Kohlberg's stages form an invariant sequence and that each stage represents a reorganization and displacement of the preceding stage. In terms of the invariance of the sequence of stages, Turiel felt that the hypothesis was confirmed even though the results only reached a borderline level of significance. In terms of the second hypothesis the results were said to be only suggestive, since significant findings were minimal.

Holstein (1976) in a longitudinal study investigated Kohlberg's assumptions regarding the sequential invariance and the irreversibility of the stages. Middle class adolescents and adults were observed over a three year period as to their individual developmental sequences. Results supported sequential invariance but only in the movement from level to level rather than from stage to stage; and the sequential invariance was noted only for the first two levels of Kohlberg's three level model. As to irreversibility, regression was found for the higher stages. Kuhn (1976) reported results of sequentiality of the lower stages. Five to eight year old subjects showed significant progressive change, most of which consisted of slight advancement toward the next stage, after one year. White, Bushnell, and Regnemer (1978) reported that their three year longitudinal and cross sectional investigation of moral development in Bahamian school children, ages 8 to 17, showed a general upward stage movement within and between groups. However, not one of the subjects reasoned beyond stage three.

Several studies have investigated the relationship between a specific stage and various overt behaviors. R. L. Krebs (1971) found

that seventy-five percent of his adolescent subjects at stage four and below cheated on at least one of four experimental cheating tests while only twenty percent of the stage five youngsters cheated. The results of Brown et al (1969) were similar using college students as subjects. Almost fifty percent of the conventional level students cheated as compared to eleven percent of the principled level students. Milgram (1963) utilized college subjects who were told to inflict punishment to a student by increasing the severity of electric shock. The "victim" (an associate of the experimenter) had voluntarily agreed to participate in the learning experiment, and the subjects had made a contractual commitment to perform the experiment. Results showed that the majority of the students obeyed and continued to shock the "victim" to the danger point. Stage five students obeyed and conformed to the demands of the experimenter since they had entered into a contract agreement and the "victim" had freely consented. Only stage six students clearly defined the situation as one in which the experimenter did not have the moral right to ask the subjects to inflict pain on another person. Seventy-five percent of the stage six subjects refused or quit shocking the "victim", while only thirteen percent of all the subjects at lower levels did so. Haan (1971) used the real life situation of the 1964 Berkeley civil disobedience by students who staged a sit-in at the administration building of the University of California to preserve the rights of political free speech on the campus. The administrators held a stage five position, namely, a student came to the university voluntarily, knowing the rules, and could go elsewhere if he did not wish to comply since he had entered into a social contract. The issue for the

students was the willingness to violate authority for the sake of civil rights. It was found that only the stage six moral reasoning students clearly defined civil disobedience as just. Stage five reasoning did not lead to a clear decision. Stage three and four students viewed such an action as a violation of authority. Stage two students were concerned with their own rights in a conflict of power. Eighty percent of the stage six, fifty percent of the stage five, ten percent of the stage three and four students participated in the act of civil disobedience. However, over fifty percent of the stage two students participated. This unexpected result was accounted for by the model of moral reasoning that differentiated the stage six students from the stage two students. Stage six students reasoned in terms of justice; stage two students reasoned in terms of self rights in a conflict of power.

Freundlich and Kohlberg (1971) found that eighty-three percent of their sample of fifteen to seventeen year old delinquents from working class homes were at the preconventional level of moral reasoning while only twenty percent of non-delinquent subjects were pre-conventional.

Kohlberg, LaCross, and Ricks (1970) investigating the recidivist adolescent delinquent, state that such a youngster is not only at the pre-conventional level, but is likely to come from a delinquency prone neighborhood and from a family with severe problems. The authors state that in order to understand delinquency, sociological and psychological factors beyond immature moral judgments need to be considered.

Blatt (1971) conducted a series of studies investigating advancement in moral reasoning using Kohlberg's concepts. Subjects were eleven and twelve year old Sunday School children. Discussion of moral dilemmas was held once a week for a three month period. Results showed that a significant number of children advanced almost one full stage and that this advancement in moral reasoning remained advanced one year later. A replication of the procedure was made in a public school setting with a class of black and a class of white children, ages eleven and fifteen years. Control groups were children who had no discussion sessions, and children who discussed moral dilemmas on their own without having a trained discussion leader. Although advancement in moral reasoning was not as great as in the first study, the increase on the experimental group ranged from one quarter to one half stage.

Summary of Research Supporting Kohlberg's Cognitive Developmental View of Moral Development: The review of research addressed itself to five areas of Kohlberg's cognitive developmental interpretation of moral development: (1) Comparison of social conventional thinking and moral judgment; (2) The relationship of a given stage of Piaget's cognitive development to a given stage of moral development; (3) Characteristic properties of the stages; (4) The relationship of the stages of moral reasoning to specific overt behaviors; (5) Advancement in moral development.

One researcher investigated the distinction between morals and mores. Results showed that moral judgments are not reducible to social conventional thinking (Turiel, 1975).

The relationship of a given stage of cognitive development to a

given stage of moral reasoning was investigated by Keasey (1975). His findings showed that a formal operational stage of thinking is a necessary but not sufficient condition for principled moral reasoning; and a concrete operational stage of thinking is a necessary but not sufficient condition for stage two moral reasoning.

Several studies focused on the characteristic properties of the stages of moral reasoning. Only borderline results were obtained for sequential invariance of the stages (Turiel, 1966), but there was some evidence of sequential invariance in movement from level to level for Kohlberg's first two levels (Holstein, 1976, Kuhn, 1976). Minimal findings were obtained for the assumption that a higher stage represents a reorganization and displacement of the preceding stage (Turiel, 1966). As for the assumption of the irreversibility of the stages, this assumption was upheld for the lower stages (Holstein, 1976; White et al, 1978) but regression was found for the higher stages (Holstein, 1976).

A few studies investigated the relationship of a particular stage to specific overt behaviors. Students who were at the principled stage of moral reasoning cheated very rarely while persons below the principled stage generally cheated (Brown, 1969; Krebs, 1971). In an investigation where the subjects entered into a contract to inflict pain (electric shock) on a volunteering "victim", only stage six subjects concluded that the experimenter had no moral right to inflict pain on another person regardless of the conditions (Milgram, 1963). Civil disobedience in terms of sitting-in at a university's administration center to preserve the rights of political

free speech was engaged in basically by stage six and stage two persons. What differentiated the two groups was their mode of moral reasoning (Haan, 1971). Two studies investigated the stage of moral reasoning of adolescent delinquents. Even though the authors state that other factors in addition to moral reasoning must be considered in studying delinquency, the majority of adolescent delinquents were found to be at the preconventional level of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, LaCross, and Ricks, 1970; Freundlich and Kohlberg, 1971).

Weekly discussion of moral dilemmas in a Sunday school class under a trained leader showed that a significant number of children advanced almost one full stage and the advanced moral reasoning was present a year later. However, a replication using public school children did not show as much moral reasoning advancement (Blatt, 1971).

The distinction between morals and mores in the Turiel (1975) study gives initial support to Kohlberg's distinction between moral principles and societal rules. Kohlberg's conventional level of moral development can be reduced to social conventional thinking, which according to Kohlberg's description is just that. However, it is a level through which a person must pass in order to advance to the principled level of moral reasoning.

The work of Keasey (1975) partially confirms Kohlberg's contentions regarding the relationship between Piaget's stages of cognitive development and the stages of moral development. However, Kohlberg requires full formal operational thinking for principled moral reasoning. Some of Keasey's subjects who reasoned at the principled level were not fully formal operational in cognitive thinking.

Kurtines and Grief (1974) criticize Kohlberg's cross cultural data

in that the studies have never been published for fellow scientists to scrutinize. Quantative information concerning sample size, actual scores, range and standard deviation of scores are not reported, and no description is given of the method used to determine stages of moral development. Simpson (1974) faults Kohlberg's cross cultural data in respect to the limited scope of the data, difficulty in using moral dilemma and verbal interview techniques demanding mode of thought and language not valued or developed in many cultures, and limitations of the use of value categories that may not reflect the categories of the culture being studied.

Only minimal support is had for the invariant sequentiality of the stages with the inferred assumption that a higher stage is a re-organization of the preceding stage, and for the assumption that the stages are irreversible. Sequential invariance has been found for the lower stages (Kuhn, 1976) and lower levels (Holstein, 1976); reversibility was found in the higher stages (Holstein, 1976). Keasey (1975) states that the issue of sequential invariance has been fairly resolved. However, many would argue that such a resolution of the issue has not been attained. It would appear that a resolution of the issue would require longitudinal studies following children from the initial stage of moral reasoning through adulthood.

Kohlberg's contention that the only thing moral about moral behavior is the moral judgment, receives support from the Haan (1971) study, whereby the factor that differentiated stage six and stage two students, engaged in the same overt action, was their stage of moral reasoning.

Another assumption of Kohlberg is that behavior at a specific stage is truly learned and not forgotten. This may well be true, but what is learned is not necessarily performed. The issue of moral reasoning leading to moral action has not been sufficiently addressed by Kohlberg and his associates. As Mischel and Mischel (1976) have stated, a comprehensive model of moral development must take into account both moral reasoning and moral behavior. Kurtines and Grief (1974) raise questions concerning the arbitrary nature of the stages, the difficulty of comparing studies since different dilemmas have been used, the changes Kohlberg has made in his measuring instrument, and the reliability of the moral dilemma test. These questions should not be ignored but should be answered by Kohlberg and his colleagues.

Kohlberg (1975) responded to criticisms at the biannual convention of the Society for Research in Child Development. However, his remarks are unpublished and a personal communication from The Center for Moral Education, Harvard University, reported that his talk was unavailable.

Recent research by Napier (1976) has shown that teachers are unable to stage score moral reasoning statements with an adequate degree of correctness by using Kohlberg's global rating manual and self training. Kohlberg and Fenton (1977) have prepared an audio visual workshop for the training of teachers. This workshop prescinds from the teachers' ability to classify student responses one stage above their present level. (Rest, 1974, has questioned the ability of teachers to respond to students' responses at a +1 stage). This is disturbing



since the Kohlbergian literature concerning advancement in moral reasoning stresses that advancement is dependent on the stimulation of moral conflict at a level of one stage above the existing stage (Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971; Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972; Kohlberg, 1972; Kohlberg, 1975; Fenton, 1976). An explanation would seem in order concerning these omissions in the training program for teachers.

A special focus for research would appear to be the characteristic attributes of the stages (universality, sequential invariance irreversibility); most studies have been cross cultural with the exception of Turiel's (1975), Holstein's (1976), Kuhn's (1976), White's et al (1978) and Kohlberg's work. Longitudinal studies are needed and such studies may well answer many of the questions that have been raised in this section. Finally, Kohlberg's cognitive developmental view of moral development must address itself to the transition from moral reasoning to moral performance.

#### Hogan's Characterological Interpretation of Moral Development

Hogan (1973, 1975) espouses a developmental interpretation of moral development in that he subscribes to definable end points to development which are preceded by qualitative changes over time. Human development is viewed as an interaction between the human organism and the environment. However, Hogan's characterological developmental approach is a major departure from Kohlberg's interpretation in that he does not accept sequentially invariant and hierarchically arranged stages.

Brown (1965) proposes that social psychologists be characterized by the set of problems on which they concentrate. Hogan (1975)

conceives of Brown's viewpoint as perhaps the most critical problem facing psychologists studying moral development, in that, research and theory in moral development must be grounded in a broader conceptualization of social action. Hogan conceives of the study of moral development as integrated within the larger theoretical context of personality theory. Such theory addresses itself to questions of in what way are people alike, in what way are they different, and what is the meaning of specific anomalous behavior? Hogan conceives of the commonality among persons as anchored in motivation and development. In terms of motivation, Hogan (1975) sees human beings as simultaneously "attention seeking and rule following animals " (p. 154). Development is discussed in the context of two semantic aspects of personality, namely, role structure and character structure. Role structure is seen as the mode of action in social situations. Character structure consists of the inner, unconscious, deep, stable, and enduring dispositions that define a person as he truly is. Role structure is said to be a function of cultural-social determinants. Character structure is seen as resulting from the organism accommodating to familial, cultural-social, ethnic, and religious environment. Role structure and character structure taken together comprise the individual's personality. Character structure is inferred from overt attitude statements. The most important attitudes are those that a person develops in regard to the conventional rules and percepts of his culture.

Moral conduct is said to be essentially social conduct. Manners and morals are indistinguishable so that moral action is not distinct from ordinary social conduct. Hogan (1973) defines moral conduct as:

...actions carried out with regard to the rules that apply in a given social context...In the final analysis, moral behavior typically comes down to either following or disregarding a social rule of some sort; consequently a major problem for the psychology of moral conduct is to account for social compliance or noncompliance (p. 219).

For Hogan, moral action is understood primarily within the context of character structure, i.e. in not what a person does, but in his reasons for doing it, characterized by the recurring motives and dispositions giving stability and coherence to social conduct. He undertakes to describe the dimensions along which character structure seems to vary among persons in terms of five personality variables, which are conceptually independent and seem to characterize how people differ in their use of rules. He writes:

...these concepts are abstract dimensions of individual differences in nomotic (rule-governed) behavior, and as such, they should help explain moral conduct in any socio-cultural context (1973, p. 220).

The five dimensions of character structure are: (1) moral knowledge; (2) ethics of conscience-ethics of social responsibility continuum; (3) socialization; (4) empathy; and (5) autonomy. These dimensions are said to explain a considerable range of moral behavior and define important parameters of character development.

Moral knowledge is the base from which a person is able to make moral judgments. It involves the knowledge of social rules and has been associated with intelligence. Referring to Maller (1944) Hogan states that tests of moral knowledge and intelligence tests are functionally equivalent.

The second dimension of character structure is the ethics of conscience-ethics of social responsibility continuum, called by Hogan

(1975) the moral intuitionism - moral positivism continuum. Ethics of conscience is based on the assumption that there are higher laws unrelated to human legislation, i.e. natural laws, which may be discovered by reason and intuition. Human laws are just, only if they correspond to natural law. The underlying attitudes of the ethics of personal conscience resemble the natural law morality of Thomas Aquinas. Ethics of social responsibility is based on the denial of natural law. Human laws are justified in terms of their instrumental value in promoting the general welfare of society and are based in utilitarianism and positivism. Hogan (1973) does not view these two dimensions of character structure (i.e. moral knowledge, and the ethics of conscience - ethics of responsibility continuum) as developmental in the sense of having definable transition points which are preceded by qualitative changes over time. However, the three dimensions of socialization, empathy, and autonomy are viewed as developmental in nature and are said to be critical for mature moral development in the "normal" person. Hogan (1973) views these variables as major transition points in moral development occurring at progressively later points in time. He writes:

...once attained, these capacities bring about qualitative changes in the underlying structure of moral conduct...In this model, however, attainment of the later "stages" is not dependent on successful transition through the earlier levels. Rather, all three stages are distinct developmental challenges whose outcome defines each person's unique character structure (pp. 230-231).

In contrast to Freud, Hogan (1973) believes that the child is social by nature. He states:

Thus rather than ask what must be done to the child to fit him into society, it may be more important to ask what must be done in order to drive him out (p. 221).

Hogan views the socialization process as being basically completed by the time the child enters school. The internalization of social rules brings about a qualitative transformation in character structure. Without further developmental changes, socialization produces what Hogan calls a characterological syndrome exemplified by the tendency to act as if rules are sacred and unchangeable and valuable for their own sake, the moral realism stage of Piaget (1932).

Empathy, the fourth dimension of character structure, is viewed as an innate capacity which is facilitated by parental practices, but elicited by interaction with the social environment. Hogan views the development of empathy as a product of peer group experience and the child's attempt to accommodate himself to an expanded set of social norms. Hogan believes that the development of empathy is probably completed by late adolescence. The development of empathy brings about a transformation in character structure. In persons low in socialization, empathy is said to serve as a compensatory incentive for prosocial behavior; in persons high in socialization, empathy serves to temper and humanize their moral realism.

Socialization and empathy are committed to the status quo, while autonomy gives the capacity for prosocial non-compliance and is the source of constructive social change. The development of an autonomous sense of obligation produces a final transformation in character structure, and is said not to fully develop until a person leaves his peer group. Hogan (1975) writes:

In conjunction with high socialization and high empathy, autonomy produces moral maturity, a statistical rare character type. In conjunction with high socialization and low empathy, autonomy tends to produce a stern, patriarchal, old testament moralist... In conjunction with low empathy and low socialization, autonomy tends to produce strong, effective, resolute, unyielding scoundrels (p. 163).

Research Supporting Hogan's Characterological Interpretation of Moral Development

Hogan has specified the instruments for measuring the five dimensions of character structure. However, these measuring instruments require fairly sophisticated levels of development, and consequently should be used only with adolescents and adults, and are not recommended for use with younger subjects.

Moral knowledge being functionally equivalent to intelligence is measured by tests of general intelligence. Hogan (1970) has developed the Survey of Ethical Attitudes to measure the moral intuitionism - moral positivism dimension of character structure. This measure of ethical attitudes is reported to be uncorrelated with intelligence and Hogan (1970) reports that in two separate samples, the instrument discriminated strongly between persons whose occupational choices reflected a belief in law and established procedures such as policemen, and people who believed in civil disobedience as a means for promoting social change. Socialization and autonomy are measured by the socialization (Gough, 1969), and autonomy scales (Kurtines, 1973) of the California Personality Inventory. An empathy scale has been developed by Hogan (1969) which correlates between .30 and .50 with several measures of intellectual performance, suggesting that there seems to be some association between intelligence and empathy. This measure of empathy seemingly assesses empathy viewed as social

cognition in contrast to empathy viewed as the vicarious sharing of the affective state of another.

Hogan (1973, 1975) administered a fifteen sentence completion type instrument to measure maturity of moral judgment using college subjects who were required to respond quickly and briefly to such items as: "The police should be encouraged in their efforts to apprehend and prosecute homosexuals. Homosexuality threatens the foundations of society." Consistent with Hogan's departure from Kohlberg's approach, the moral maturity test developed by Hogan and Dickstein (1972) does not use stage prototypic statements. The results of the 1973 study showed positive correlations between mature moral judgment and the personality variables of socialization ( $r=.40$ ), empathy ( $r=.58$ ), and autonomy ( $r=.56$ ). In his 1975 paper Hogan reports the same correlations for socialization and empathy in relationship to mature moral judgment; however, a negative correlation ( $r=-.04$ ) is reported between autonomy and mature moral judgment. No mention is made in the 1975 paper regarding the positive correlation between autonomy and mature moral judgment in the earlier paper. The explanation appears to lie in the instruments used for measuring autonomy. In the 1973 paper, autonomy was measured by an instrument of independence developed by Barron (1953); however, in the 1975 paper, Hogan advocates the use of the autonomy scale (Kurtines, 1973) of the California Personality Inventory. The use of two different measures of autonomy seems to account for positive (Barron measure) and negative (Kurtines measure) correlations between autonomy and mature moral judgment.

In a recent study De Palma (1975) used the Defining Issues Test

of Rest (1972) and Hogan's measure of empathy to investigate the relation between principled moral reasoning and cognitive empathy. Results showed that high principled subjects (P scores  $\geq 48$ ) were likely to be high in empathy, while college subjects with lower principled reasoning (P scores  $< 48$ ) did not show any trends but were equally dispersed.

Summary of Research Supporting Hogan's Characterological View of

Moral Development: The research supporting Hogan's view concerning moral development is sparse due to the recency of his theory. De Palma (1975) found that subjects who were high in principled moral judgment on the Defining Issues Test, (Rest, 1972) were also high in cognitive empathy.

Hogan (1973) reported positive correlations between mature moral judgment and the variables of socialization, empathy, and autonomy. Hogan's 1975 paper relates the same correlations for socialization and empathy, but reports a negative correlation for the relationship between autonomy and mature moral judgment. The difference appears to be due to the different measures used to assess autonomy.

The Moral Maturity Test, (Hogan and Dickstein, 1972) a fifteen item sentence completion type instrument, must be questioned concerning its reliability. The test requires subjects to respond quickly and very briefly to controversial statements. It is questionable whether a valid response can be obtained due to space and time limitations. Another issue that must be considered is the query, does the test measure moral reasoning? The Moral Maturity Test as well as Hogan's



Survey of Ethical Attitudes require further research in order to more firmly establish initial reliability and validity.

Hogan (1969) states, "Empathy refers only to the act of constructing for oneself another person's mental state " (p. 308). His empathy scale is said to correlate .30 to .50 with various measures of intellectual performance. Hogan views empathy as a purely cognitive construct in contrast to Feshbach (1975), Feshbach and Roe (1968), Hoffman (1977), and Stotland (1969) who view empathy not only as a recognition of another's affect, but also as a person's vicarious affective response to another person's feelings. In measuring empathy, Hogan appears to be measuring social intelligence.

Candee (1977) found that principled stage physician's were distinguished from their lower stage colleagues by three dimensions, one of which was their ability of placing themselves in the place of their patients. A typical statement made by the principled stage physicians was, "I put myself emotionally in the patient's position and try to understand what he is coping with." Although Candee calls this ability role taking, it is this emotional placing of oneself in another's position that is called affective empathy in the present investigation.

Kohlberg (1976) views role taking as a more comprehensive term than empathy. He states "when the emotional side of role taking is stressed, it is typically termed empathy " (p. 49). Hoffman (1977) distinguishes between the cognitive awareness of another's emotional state and the vicarious affective response to another person's feelings. The former is designated as affective perspective taking, "or more simply, recognition of affect, since it pertains to the

observer's cognitive interpretation of the other's emotional state. The second concept pertains to... what is commonly thought of as empathy." (p. 712).

Feshbach (1975) stresses that empathy not only involves "the capacity to understand, but also the capacity to feel." (p. 28). Empathy is distinguished from social cognition in that the two are not merely different aspects of the same cognitive process, but are functionally distinct, even though, related variables. While empathy presupposes some degree of social cognition, the converse is not true. "Understanding the feelings of another person does not necessarily lead to an empathic response" (p. 26). The cognitive component of empathy is important, but it is the affective component that gives empathy its unique property.

#### Recapitulation

The work of Hartshorne, May and their colleagues, psychoanalytic theory, and the resurgence of behaviorism, inhibited research concerning moral development especially among American psychologists during the first half of the twentieth century. The Hartshorne and May studies (1928-1930) regarding cheating and honesty, (subjects being children ages eleven to fourteen years) reported that honesty and cheating are situation specific and their findings showed little evidence for unified character traits. They concluded that generality in moral behavior is non-existent. Psychoanalytic theory claimed that moral development was essentially completed by the age of five through the process of the child's identification with the same sex parent. Accordingly, study of moral development was not needed after that age.

Finally, the behavioristic revolution, with its emphasis on overt, measurable behavior, had no place for such mentalistic constructs as conscience and moral reasoning.

It was Piaget, the Swiss psychologist, who laid the foundation for renewed interest in the study of moral development. He hypothesized three periods or stages in the moral development of the child, based on a sense of justice. Piaget suggests that as a child becomes a member of a larger and more varied peer group, rules and moral reasoning may become less absolute and authoritarian, and more dependent on the desires and needs of the group. Piaget laid the groundwork for Kohlberg's contemporary interpretation of moral development.

The major focus of the preceding discussion of the literature was on three contemporary interpretations of moral development: (1) Bandura's and Mischel's social learning interpretation of moral development; (2) Kohlberg's cognitive developmental interpretation of moral development; (3) Hogan's characterological interpretation of moral development.

#### Bandura's and Mischel's Social Learning Interpretation of Moral

Development: Moral behavior is learned through modeling and reinforcement and continues throughout life with wide individual differences, the primary determinant of moral behavior being the person's environment. There are no universal values and morality is culturally relative. Mischel and Mischel (1976) distinguish between a person's competency to generate moral behavior and the actual performance of moral action. The translation of moral competency into moral

action in a specific situation depends on the person's expectation of the consequences of the action and the subjective value that he places on these expectancies. \* All moral action is said to depend on the expected consequences, be they immediate and concrete or distant and abstract and contingent upon the person achieving or violating self standards. Prolonged moral behavior requires self control and covert symbolic acts such as self praise or self instruction can mediate progress toward arduous goals.

Several studies have supported the relationship between pro-social behavior and imitation of the model (Bryan and Test, 1967; Hain et al, 1956; Rosenbaum, 1956; Rosenhan and White, 1967; Staub, 1971; Test and Bryan, 1969; White, 1967). The model's warmth (nurturance) had no effect on subject's behavior (Grusec, and Skubiski, 1970; Midlarsky and Bryan, 1967; Rosenhan and White, 1967). Positive affective consequences experienced by the model and the subjects' perceived similarity to the model were factors that influenced the subjects' behavior (Hornstein, Fisch, and Holmes, 1968; Midlarsky and Bryan, 1972); verbal instruction coupled with praise, justified exhortations, and actual demonstration by the model also were shown to affect behavior (Bryan, 1971; Bryan and Schwartz, 1971; Bryan and Walbek, 1970; Midlarsky and Bryan, 1972; Walbek, 1969; White, 1967). Conflicting results appeared to be obtained in studies concerning the model's inconsistency in verbal and physical behavior and the influence of the modeling on subjects (Bryan and Walbek, 1970; Midlarsky and Bryan, 1972; Mischel and Liebert, 1966). Seemingly conflicting results were also obtained in studies investigating the influence on children of a model yielding to temptation (Walters and

Parke, 1964; Bryan and Stein, 1967; Stein, 1967). Modeling exerted significant influence in modifying children's moral judgments (Bandura and McDonald, 1963; Cowan et al 1969). Social learning research has focused on overt behavior and individual differences. Generally, such research has not investigated behaviors at the principled level, although Mischel's position seems to be promising.

#### Kohlberg's Cognitive Developmental Interpretation of Moral

Development: While social learning researchers focus their investigations on overt behavior, Kohlberg focuses his energies on moral judgment which he contends is the only moral factor in "moral" behavior. Kohlberg incorporates his model within a framework of three levels and seven stages of moral development. The stages are said to be universal, sequentially invariant, hierarchical, and irreversible. Accordingly, morals are universal while rules are relative. Moral development occurs as a result of maturation and the person's interaction with his environment. Moral judgment is related to cognitive and ego development in that they are necessary but not sufficient conditions for moral reasoning. Persons one stage higher exert the greatest influence for moral reasoning advancement due to the moral conflict that is induced. Although Kohlberg views Loevinger's stages of ego development as necessary but not sufficient conditions for moral judgment, Loevinger equates the seven stages of ego development with stages of moral development.

Results of Turiel's study (1975) support Kohlberg's assumption that morals are not reducible to mores. Staub (1975) found that formal operational thinking is prerequisite for principled moral reasoning, and

concrete operational thinking is prerequisite for stage two moral reasoning, thus partially supporting Kohlberg's contention. The sequential invariance and irreversibility of the stages have received only minimal research support. There appeared to be a trend toward invariance in the first two levels (not stages) and regression was found in the higher stages (Turiel, 1966; Holstein, 1976). Research concerning the relationship of the stages to overt behavior has shown that principled level students rarely cheated (Brown, 1969; Krebs, 1971) that stage six students were the only ones to conclude that no one has the right to impose pain on another person (Milgram, 1963); that the majority of the students that participated in the same action of civil disobedience were either stage two or stage six in moral reasoning; what differentiated the two groups were their level of moral judgment (Haan, 1971). Adolescent delinquents were found to be at a pre-conventional level of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, LaCross and Ricks, 1970; Freundlich and Kohlberg, 1971). Children discussing moral dilemmas with a trained leader who challenged them one stage higher than the stage they possessed, showed stage advancement, while children discussing the dilemmas without the leader showed no advancement (Blatt, 1971). In his focusing on moral judgment, Kohlberg addresses himself to the commonality among people in that heredity determines the sequential, invariant order of the stages, while the environment affects the rate of development at each stage.

#### Hogan's Characterological Interpretation of Moral Development:

By rooting moral development research in personality theory, Hogan addresses himself both to individual differences and likeness among persons. Hogan contends that all people share a common set of motives

in that they are rule following, group living, and "attention seeking animals." Hogan suggests that people are also alike in the parameters of personality development, i.e. in the development of character structure and role structure which taken together comprise individual personality. Hogan accounts for individual differences in terms of genetics and social experiences. Rejecting sequential invariant, hierarchical stages of moral development, Hogan views moral development as being essentially the development of character structure. Hogan has concentrated on investigating the five dimensions that he considers to be a part of character structure: moral knowledge, ethics of conscience - ethics of responsibility continuum, socialization, empathy, and autonomy, the latter three being considered as developmental in nature in that they represent transition points followed by qualitative changes. Due to the recency of Hogan's theory, only minimal research has been reported in the literature supporting it. De Palma (1975) found that subjects who were high on principled moral reasoning were also high on the empathy variable. Hogan (1973) reports positive correlations between mature moral judgment and the variables of socialization, empathy, and autonomy; however, in a 1975 paper, a negative correlation was reported between autonomy and mature moral judgment. This discrepancy appeared to be due to the different instruments Hogan used for measuring autonomy.

These three interpretations convey the tone of the current views regarding moral development, with social learning focusing on individual differences, Kohlberg focusing on the likeness among persons, and Hogan (rooting his interpretation in personality theory) focusing on both

likeness and individual differences among persons.

Mischel (representative of social learning) puts major emphasis on behavior, contending that moral development, being acquired as a result of modeling and conditioning, is continuous throughout life with wide individual differences; the environment is considered as the primary determinant of moral development. Kohlberg puts major emphasis on moral reasoning, contending that morality proceeds as an ongoing process into adulthood in sequentially invariant, hierarchical, and universal stages (related to cognitive and ego development). He states that only a minority of adults arrive at the principled level which is usually reached only after the age of twenty. Heredity determines the fixed order of stages while the environment affects the rate of development at each stage. Hogan views character structure with its five dimensions as his point of major emphasis. Morality proceeds in "stages"(neither sequentially invariant nor hierarchical) of socialization, empathy, and autonomy; the attainment of the later "stages" being independent of successful transition through the earlier levels, all three "stages" being distinct developmental challenges. Morality is an ongoing process into adulthood, with mature morality being a rare statistic; environment is the primary determinant of moral development, while heredity gives universal human motives and the construct of character structure. Mischel and Hogan view morality as culturally relative so that morals are equal to mores; in contrast, Kohlberg contends that moral values and the stages of moral development are universal so that morals are not reducible to mores. Mischel, Kohlberg, and Hogan all agree on the importance of moral reasoning in



the psychological analysis of moral development.

Catania (1973) analyzing structural and functional psychology states that various areas in psychology complement rather than conflict with each other; he opts that controversy "may give way to more productive interactions" (p. 440). The present study attempted to conceptually integrate Kohlberg's and Hogan's interpretations of moral development, by investigating the relationship of stages of moral reasoning with the personality variables of socialization, empathy, and autonomy with one major departure; empathy as defined by Hogan (1969) refers to cognitive empathy (akin to social intelligence); empathy as defined in the present study refers to affective empathy, the vicarious sharing of another's feelings at least at the gross level.

## CHAPTER III

### METHOD

#### Hypotheses

The present investigation tested the following null hypotheses:

(1) The assessed personality variables of socialization, (assessed by the social standards subscale of the California Test of Personality, Thorpe et al, 1953), autonomy, (assessed by the self reliance subscale of the California Test of Personality), and empathy, (assessed by a modified scale of empathy based on Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972) will not be significantly related to levels of assessed moral reasoning for the seventh grade sample (assessed by Carroll's Test, 1974), and the college sample (assessed by the Defining Issues Test, Rest, 1972).

(2) The relationship of each of the personality variables of socialization, autonomy, and empathy with the assessed dominant stage of moral reasoning will not be significantly different at different ages, namely, the seventh grade and college ages.

(3) There will not be significant sex differences in socialization, autonomy, empathy, and the dominant stage of moral reasoning for either the seventh grade or the college samples.

#### Subjects

One hundred seventh grade students were randomly selected from a total population of 189 seventh grade students in a blue collar middle class public school located in suburban Chicago. Two special education

classes were excluded from the sample. Since two subjects were eliminated due to incomplete responses, and six students were absent when testing occurred, the final seventh grade sample included 92 Caucasian students, 43 males and 49 females. All testing was conducted during a two week period in May, 1977. Science Research Associates (S.R.A.) educational ability (I.Q.) and achievement scores were available for all subjects. The mean population I.Q. was 102.40, standard deviation being 13.11, with a range from 68 to 140. The mean sample I.Q. was 102.37, standard deviation being 12.86 with a range from 68 to 137. The population was somewhat below national norms in achievement, mean achievement scores being at the 44th percentile.

In addition, one hundred and nine Caucasian junior college freshmen and sophomore students, attending a middle class junior college located in suburban Chicago, were tested during a three week period in June, 1977. Since four test protocols were incomplete and nine were of questionable reliability, the final college sample included 96 Caucasian students, 43 males and 53 females, enrolled in an Introductory Psychology or a Child Psychology course. The students were informed by their instructor when the research testing would take place and they were given the option of not attending the testing session. All the students in the classes selected for testing chose to participate.

#### Procedure

Seventh Grade Sample: For testing purposes, the seventh grade sample was divided into four groups, each group containing 23 students.

Two class periods of forty minutes each were allocated for each group; during the first period, the Carroll Test (1974) measuring level of moral reasoning was administered; during the second period, the instruments measuring socialization, autonomy, and empathy were administered.

In order to control for reading ability, the instruments were administered both visually and auditorily, the examiner reading aloud the items while the subjects followed a written copy. The students were required to record their responses on two answer sheets, one used for responses measuring levels of moral reasoning, and the other used for responses measuring socialization, autonomy, and empathy (refer to appendix A).

The following directions suggested by Carroll (1977) were used:

I am going to ask you to think about four situations where individuals have to make difficult decisions. You are to read along as I read the situation to you. You may agree or disagree with the advice given, but that is not your main task... Rather, you are asked to decide whether the reasons that are given are good enough reasons for making such an important decision... Remember, the most important task is to decide whether the reasons are good enough reasons for making such an important decision.

The following directions were added by the examiner:

After a situation is read, you are to use the answer sheet and circle "yes" or "no". For instance, the first situation is about Heinz who has to make a decision about stealing a drug that might help his dying wife, since the druggist wanted ten times the amount it cost him and Heinz did not have the money. If you think Heinz should steal the drug, circle "yes"; if you think that Heinz should not steal the drug, circle "no". After each situation, there will be ten advice statements, forty in all, as you can see on your answer sheet. For each advice statement you are to mark it 1,2,3, or 4. If you accept the reason because it is good enough for making this important decision, you put down number 1; if you do not fully accept the reason but tend to accept it because it seems to be a good enough reason for making this important decision, put down number 2; if you tend to reject

the reason because it does not seem to be a good enough reason for making this important decision, put down number 3; if you reject the reason because it is not a good enough reason for making this important decision, put down number 4. Remember, if you fully accept the reason, write a number 1; if you tend to accept the reason, write a number 2; if you tend to reject the reason, write a number 3; if you fully reject the reason, write a number 4. (after Carroll, 1977).

The following was written on the blackboard: 1 = fully accept; 2 = tend to accept; 3 = tend to reject; 4 = fully reject.

Empathy was assessed utilizing a four point scale similar to the Carroll Test. If the subject strongly agreed with a statement he was instructed to answer with a 1; if he tended to agree, he was to answer with a 2; if he tended to disagree, he was to answer with a 3; if he strongly disagreed, he was to answer with a 4. The measures of socialization and autonomy required a "yes - no" response that was to be written on the answer sheet. Addresses of the students were available for possible follow up studies.

College Sample: Ninety minutes were allocated for each college group during which a battery of tests was administered to assess level of moral reasoning, socialization, autonomy, and empathy. Unlike the seventh grade sample, the college sample did not have the items read to them. The subjects received printed copies of the battery and were required to mark their answers on the protocols.

The directions, as given by Rest (1972) for the Defining Issues Test which measured level of moral reasoning, were printed on the protocol. An example was presented to the college students after which the examiner discussed the example with the subjects. Directions for the empathy instrument were the same as for the seventh grade sample (a four point scale, where 1 = strongly agree and 4 = strongly disagree). The measures of socialization and autonomy required a "yes -

no" response that was to be circled after each printed statement. No time limit was placed for the completion of the battery; however, subjects were informed that they could leave the room when they finished. Subjects were asked, on a voluntary basis, to include their home address on the first page for possible followup studies.

### Instrumentation

The California Test of Personality: The self reliance and social standards subscales of the California Test of Personality (C.T.P.) were utilized in the present investigation to measure autonomy and socialization, (intermediate level, form A for the seventh grade sample; secondary level, form A for the college sample). Kuder Richardson reliability coefficients for the self reliance subscales, intermediate and secondary levels, form A, are .70 with the standard error of measurement being 1.64; for the social standards subscale, intermediate level, form A,  $r = .94$ , with the standard error of measurement being .67; for the secondary level, form A,  $r = .84$  with the standard error of measurement being .60.

The C.T.P. is a self report type instrument, comprised of five levels with two forms at each level, spanning the age range from kindergarten to adulthood, in which the subjects answer "yes" or "no" to stimulus questions. There are two parts to the test, personal adjustment and social adjustment, with six subscales for each part. Scores are obtained for each part, for the entire test, and for each subscale.

The intermediate level was normed on 2,812 students, in grades seven to ten inclusive, from schools in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,

Washington, Wisconsin, and California. The secondary level was normed on 3,331 students in grades nine to fourteen, from schools in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and California. About eighty five percent of the total normative population were Caucasians, and the remainder were Blacks, Mexicans, and other minority groups.

The C.T.P. permits an objective, standardized testing situation with reliability coefficients for the two subscales of self reliance ( $r = .70$  for intermediate and secondary levels) and social standards ( $r = .94$  for intermediate level;  $r = .84$  for the secondary level) being acceptable for use in the present investigation. The C.T.P. does not require the excessive time that is needed for individual assessment either by interview or the use of projective techniques, nor does it require inter-rater reliability. With its five levels, it allows for longitudinal studies.

The Modified Empathy Scale: The seventh grade and college samples were administered the empathy scale developed by Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) which is a questionnaire type instrument containing thirty three items. The instructions given by Mehrabian and Epstein were such that the response to each item was to be on a scale of +4 (very strongly agree) to -4 (very strongly disagree). However, the present investigation utilized a four point scale of 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree), since it was deemed beneficial to use the same scoring method for both samples in view of modifying the scale, and the seventh grade sample could not be expected to differentiate responses on an eight point scale.

The items of the Mehrabian and Epstein Empathy Scale were piloted with seventy nine seventh grade students (different from the sample) in order to determine whether these students would be able to comprehend items, since the original instrument utilized college students. Whenever any of the pilot group did not clearly understand an item, they were to raise their hands for clarification. The thirty three items basically remained the same except for a few minor changes. Item number three reads: "I often find public displays of affection annoying." It was rewritten as follows: "I often find people kissing in public annoying." In item nine, "of myself" was added so that the item read, "I tend to lose control of myself when I am bringing bad news to people." In item nineteen, the words "ill treated" were changed to "mistreated." Item twenty three reads: "Sometimes at the movies I am amused at the amount of crying and sniffing around me." The words "and sniffing" were omitted. Item thirty reads: "I become more irritated than sympathetic when I see someone's tears." The words "someone's tears" were eliminated and the item read "...when I see someone crying." The changes were made only for the seventh grade sample; the college sample was given the empathy instrument as it was originally written.

The original empathy scale is reported to have a correlation of .06 with the Crowne and Marlowe (1960) social desirability scale. The split half reliability for the scale is .84. Content validity was inferred in part from factor analyses. Initial studies by Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) have shown validity of the empathy scale in distinct



settings, (aggressive and helping behavior).

Since college subjects were used in the construction of the empathy scale, alpha coefficients of reliability (Cronbach, 1951) were computed for both samples. For college subjects the alpha coefficient was .76; however, for seventh grade subjects, the alpha coefficient was .52. In an attempt to improve the reliability, especially at the seventh grade level, a principal components factor analysis was performed. The first unrotated component for each of the two analyses was examined. Items were selected for the revised empathy scale if they met the following conditions: (1) the directionality (+ or -) of the item was the same in both analyses as well as in the original study; (2) the magnitude of the loading of the item in the first component in both analyses was .15 or larger.

Twelve items met these conditions so that the revised empathy scale included items: +1, +7, +8, +9, +12, +14, -15, +17, +18, +19, -21, +31 (+ and - equal direction of scoring) from the original instrument of Mehrabian and Epstein. In the present investigation, the revised empathy scale was used to measure empathy for the seventh grade and college sample, alpha reliability coefficient for the seventh grade sample being .63, for the college sample .78. The revised empathy scale for seventh grade subjects had a correlation of .11 with the social standards subscale of the C.T.P. and a correlation of .66 with the original scale ( $p = .001$ ). For college subjects, the revised scale had a negative correlation of  $-.36$  with the social standards subscale of the C.T.P., with the correlation between the two empathy scales being .87 ( $p = .001$ ). (refer to Appendix B).

The Defining Issues Moral Reasoning Test - College Sample:

The Defining Test (D.I.T.) developed by Rest (1972) was utilized to investigate the level of moral reasoning for the college sample. The D.I.T. consists of six moral dilemma stories which are read by the subject. The subject is required to make a choice among three options (yes, can't decide, no) in an attempt to resolve the dilemma. The subject is then presented with twelve issues bearing upon each dilemma. For example, for the moral dilemma of whether Heinz should steal an excessively priced drug for his dying wife, the subject is asked to consider such issues as "whether Heinz is stealing for himself or doing this solely to help someone else," "whether a community's laws are going to be upheld," "what values are going to be the basis for governing how people act towards each other," and so forth. Each issue is rated on a five point Likert type scale of importance - most, much, some, little, or no importance. The subject then is required to rank his first four choices of the most important issues. It is from these rankings that the score is obtained.

The D.I.T. manual (1974) gives detailed instructions for scoring. The basic score is the principled score (P score), interpreted as the relative importance attributed to principled moral considerations in making moral decisions, obtained by adding the subtotals from the post conventional stages (stages 5A + 5B +6). In addition to the P score, it is possible to assign subjects to lower stages by converting each stage score to a standardized score using the formulas in the manual.

The construction of the D.I.T. was preceded by many hours of interviewing subjects concerning moral dilemmas and on ascertaining recurrent types of responses given in the free response mode, typical

of Kohlberg's stage characteristics. Having identified recurrent response types, the items for the D.I.T. were formulated. These stage prototypic statements were designed to exemplify the thought structure of a particular Kohlbergian stage of moral reasoning. Rest clearly states that the D.I.T. is an experimental measure and is an attempt to operationalize the psychological construct of moral development. The D.I.T. has been used in several studies and has shown definite age trends.

A correlation of .68 was found between the D.I.T. and Kohlberg's method which has the subject talk or write about his moral thinking in a free response mode. The scorers use a standardized system to score and classify the responses. Inter-scorer reliability is computed. In contrast to Kohlberg's method, the D.I.T. presents the subject with a set of standardized alternatives representing the scoring categories and the subject is to choose among them.

The reading level of the dilemmas are reported to be at least at the eleven year level and the level of the issue statements to be at the twelve to thirteen year level (McGeorge, 1973). Rest has found that ninth graders, even though not having difficulties with the words of the D.I.T., did not sufficiently understand the task of rating and ranking the issue statements. For younger subjects Rest recommends the format devised by Carroll (1974).

The D.I.T. was chosen for the present investigation since there is evidence for acceptable test - retest reliability ( $r=.65$  to  $.81$ : McGeorge, 1973; Rest et al, 1974; Rest, 1976; Martin et al, 1977). The D.I.T. produces comparable information with each testing,

minimizes variance due to differences in verbal or written expressivity, is scored objectively thus minimizing scorer bias, does not require inter-scorer reliability, and since it can be administered to groups, saves a great deal of time.

The Carroll Moral Reasoning Test - Seventh Grade Sample: The Carroll Test (Carroll, 1974) based on Kohlberg's stages of moral development and following Rest's lead in the development of an objective instrument for measuring stages of moral reasoning at the lower age levels, was the measure utilized to investigate the level of moral reasoning for the seventh grade sample. The test requires the subject to resolve a dilemma and to give a separate rating for ten stage prototypic statements for each of four dilemmas. Stages five and six are combined into the principled stage (P stage) so that the stages for which statements are presented are one through four and the P stage. Cooper (1972) has shown that stages five and six cluster as a P stage on the D.I.T. In Carroll's pilot study, subjects being eleven to fifteen years of age, there was inadequate principled responding to reveal the distinctions of the principled level that Kohlberg hypothesized.

The language of the stage prototypic statements was written for average or above average fifth grade readers. Carroll states:

Combining oral presentation of each item with the written form may make the measure useful with a somewhat younger or less able sample. At present the measure has been used with subjects between 11 and 16 years of age (1977, p. 1).

Each stage prototypic statement is evaluated by the subject on a four

point scale: I accept... I tend to accept... I tend to reject... I reject. For scoring purposes Carroll (1977) recommends summing the raw scores where reject equals four, tend to reject equals three, tend to accept equals two, and accept equals one.

Reported internal consistency reliability coefficients are in the 70's for stage one and two, in the 60's for stage three, in the high 40's for stage four, and in the high 50's for the principled stage. Carroll states:

In theory and method the measure is intended to complement the Defining Issues Test (D.I.T.) developed by James R. Rest. The measure is appropriate for less able readers or younger subjects than is the D.I.T. In addition, it focuses on subject's evaluation of lower stage reasoning rather than identification of principled issue statements. This measure, unlike the D.I.T., has had neither extensive replication nor longitudinal examination... (1977), p. 1).

In terms of useability, Carroll's test has the same advantages as Rest's D.I.T. It is an objective measure scored objectively, does not require interscorer reliability, does not depend on verbal or written expressivity, and saves a great deal of time, in contrast to Kohlberg's interview free response mode.

### Statistical Analyses

Hypothesis 1: In order to test the first hypothesis the following statistical analyses were computed for both samples: (1) Canonical analyses between socialization, autonomy, empathy (constituting set one variables) and the dominant stages of moral development (constituting set two variables); (2) analysis of variance for each of the personality variables of socialization, empathy, autonomy and assessed dominant stages of moral development; (3) Neuman-Keuls procedure;

(4) trend analyses; (5) Pearson product moment correlation coefficients between measured socialization, autonomy, and empathy and dominant stage of moral development.

Hypothesis 2: The following analyses were performed to test the second hypothesis: (1) Comparative analyses of selected data obtained in testing hypothesis one; (2) Testing the significance of the difference between the correlations obtained for socialization, autonomy, and empathy with dominant stage for the two independent samples (seventh grade and college subjects) utilizing the Zr transformation for r.

Hypothesis 3: The third hypothesis was tested by the following statistical analyses computed for both samples: (1) T statistic with sex as the independent variable; the personality variables, and moral development stage scales as the dependent variables; (2) Pearson product moment correlation coefficients for each sex separately, relating socialization, autonomy, and empathy to the dominant stage of moral development; (3) Testing the statistical significance of the difference between the correlations obtained in number two above (males and females being independent subsamples) utilizing the Zr transformation for r.

### Definitions

For the sake of clarity and uniformity of understanding, the following major terms used in the present investigation are defined:

(1) Socialization is the score a subject obtained on the social standards subscale of the California Test of Personality. A socialized person is one who has come to appreciate the necessity of sub-

ordinating certain personal desires and inclinations to the needs and rules of the group.

(2) Autonomy is the score a subject obtained on the self reliance subscale of the California Test of Personality. An autonomous person is one who can do things independently of others, depends on himself in various situations and directs his own actions, having attained the capacity to make decisions without being influenced by group or authority pressures.

(3) Empathy is the score a subject obtained on the modified empathy scale. An empathic person is one who vicariously responds to the feelings of another, including sharing those feelings at least at the gross affect level. The present investigation focused on affective empathy (vicarious affective responses to another's feelings), in contrast to mere cognitive empathy (social cognition) which focuses on the recognition of another's affect and prediction.

(4) Level of moral reasoning is the stage or level attained by the subject on the Defining Issues Test or Carroll Test, corresponding to Kohlberg's levels and stages of moral development.

## CHAPTER IV

### RESULTS

Prior to the detailed statistical analyses of the data, the derivation of the assessed dominant stage of moral development for the seventh grade and college samples will be discussed. The statistical analyses related to the testing of hypothesis one will then be examined, followed by the statistical analyses for hypotheses two and three, with each null hypothesis being rejected or not rejected at the .05 level of significance. Following the major statistical analyses for each hypothesis, any further ancillary results will be presented. The computerized programs contained in the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (Nie et al, 1975) were utilized for all statistical analyses with the exception of the  $Z_r$  transformations for  $r$  which were computed by hand.

#### Derivation of the Index of Dominant Stages of Moral Development

The index utilized for the assessed dominant stage of moral development was that of "exceptional usage." "Exceptional usage" refers to the stage a person uses significantly more than any other stage. The criteria for its derivation will be presented in detail later in this section.

Rationale for Subject Exclusion: Since all subjects did not exhibit a clearcut dominant stage of moral development, the sample was



reduced when investigating dominant stage (college n = 73; seventh grade n = 64). In addition, the seventh grade sample was further reduced to sixty three, since one person was at dominant stage one. This subject was eliminated from subsequent analyses in order to utilize the same comparative sample for the analysis of variance, Student Neuman-Keuls procedure, trend analysis, and the Pearson product moment correlation coefficients.

Dominant Stage Scoring Criteria: As previously mentioned in Chapter three, the scoring of the Carroll Test of Moral Development was on a four point scale (1 = fully accept; 4 = fully reject) so that a high score for any stage would reflect a low degree of stage acceptance, while a low stage score would be indicative of a high degree of acceptance of that stage. Accordingly, the assessed dominant stage, for the seventh grade sample, was obtained utilizing the following criteria: (A) the lowest score was chosen among the stages for each subject; (B) the lowest score was required to be adjacent to the next lowest score; (C) if two scores were equally low, adjacency was required and the extreme stage was chosen (e.g. stage one and two adjacent, stage one chosen; stage three and four adjacent, stage four chosen, etc.).<sup>1</sup>

In similar fashion, the assessed dominant stage was obtained for the college subjects utilizing the following criteria: (a) the Z score

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<sup>1</sup>The statistics presented in the tables of this chapter concerning the seventh grade data and the data for empathy for both samples will reverse the original scoring system so that 1 = lowest and 4 = highest.

for a stage was  $\geq 1.00$ ; (B) if two or more  $\underline{Z}$  stage scores were  $\geq 1.00$ , they were required to be adjacent, with the highest  $\underline{Z}$  score chosen as the dominant stage; (C) if no stage was predominant and the  $\underline{Z}$  score for  $\underline{M}$  (abstract, meaningless statements) was  $\geq 1.50$ , the person was typed as  $\underline{M}$ ; (D) if no stage nor  $\underline{M}$  predominated and the  $\underline{Z}$  score for  $\underline{A}$  (anti establishment orientation) was  $\geq 1.00$  the person was typed as  $\underline{A}$ . Subjects were typed  $\underline{M}$  or  $\underline{A}$  only if the analysis of the scores showed a clearcut pattern for such typing. For a clearcut type  $\underline{M}$  a  $\underline{Z}$  score  $\geq 1.50$  was required since a  $\underline{Z}$  score  $< 1.50$  would have been misleading in some cases not identifying a clearcut  $\underline{M}$  type.<sup>2</sup>

Findings: Table 3 presents a summary of the number of subjects at the different dominant stages of moral reasoning for both samples. Forty-eight percent of the total seventh grade sample was solidly in the conventional level of moral development (stage three or stage four); twelve percent was at the principled stage, eight percent was at stage two, and thirty percent did not exhibit a solid dominant stage.

Of the total college sample, forty-five percent was within the conventional level of moral development; twenty-five percent was at the principled level, and twenty-four percent did not exhibit a solid dominant stage. However, when the  $\underline{M}$  typed cases ( $n = 2$ ) were excluded, since the subjects were responding to meaningless statements, and the  $\underline{A}$  typed cases were viewed as stage four-and-one-half as Rest (1974) suggests, then the percentage of college students not exhibiting a

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<sup>2</sup>It should be understood that dominant principled stage for the college sample = stage 5A + 5B + 6.

TABLE 3

Number of Subjects at Different  
Stages of Moral Reasoning

Stage	Seventh Grade n = 92	Stage	College n = 96
1	1	2	7
2	7	3	22
3	16	4	20
4	29	5A	9
P	11	5B	7
		6	8
	n = 64	P(5A+5B+6)	24
			n = 73
		M*	2
		A**	7
		no category	14
		non stage typed ***	23

\* not a stage

\*\* possible stage 4 1/2  
(Rest, 1974) not considered  
a stage in the analyses.

\*\*\* non stage typed = M+A+  
no category

dominant stage, was only fifteen percent. In the present study the A typed cases were treated as non stage typed cases.

### Hypothesis 1

The assessed personality variables of socialization, autonomy, and empathy will not be significantly related to levels of assessed moral reasoning for the seventh grade and college samples.

Canonical Analyses - Seventh Grade Sample: Table 4 presents a summary of the canonical analyses for the seventh grade sample. It should be noted that the two sets of variables, namely, socialization, autonomy, empathy (constituting group one variables) and stages of moral development (constituting group two variables) are significantly related to one another. Canonical analysis yielded a first canonical correlation of .48 that was significant at the .001 level. Canonical variates one reflect that low empathy and low socialization subjects reject stage three thinking, while tending to accept stage one thinking. Subjects scoring high in socialization, high in empathy, and low in autonomy accepted stage three thinking and rejected stage one thinking.

The canonical analyses yielded a second canonical correlation of .38, significant at the .026 level, indicating that seventh grade subjects scoring high in socialization, high in autonomy, and low in empathy rejected the lower stages of moral development and accepted the principled stage of moral development, (with the largest loading being for socialization, +.72, followed by autonomy, +.26, and empathy, -.43).

From the canonical analyses for the seventh grade sample we have

TABLE 4

Summary of Canonical Correlation Analysis  
for Seventh Grade Sample (n = 92)

No.	Canonical Correlation	Wilks Lambda	Chi-Square	D.F.	Sig.
1	.48	.63	40.40	15	.000
2	.38	.82	17.43	8	.026
3	.21	.96	3.76	3	.288

Canonical Coefficients

	Group 1 Canvar 1	Canvar 2	Group 2 Canvar 1	Canvar 2
Socialization	-.621	+.721	Stage 1 +.326	-.233
Empathy	-.854	-.430	Stage 2 -.096	-.598
Autonomy	+.114	+.265	Stage 3 -1.075	-.179
			Stage 4 +.027	+.004
			Stage P +.026	+1.019

the following general schema:

Canoni- cal 1	Low empathy + low socialization + high autonomy = acceptance of stage one and rejection of stage three.
	High empathy + high socialization + low autonomy = acceptance of stage three and rejection of stage one.
	High socialization + high autonomy + low empathy = acceptance of principled stage and rejection of lower stages.
Canoni- cal 2	High empathy + low socialization + low autonomy = acceptance of lower stages and rejection of the principled stage.

Canonical Analyses - College Sample: Table 5 presents a summary of the canonical analyses for the college sample. Canonical analysis yielded a first canonical correlation of .56 that was significant at the .001 level. Canonical variates one reflect that subjects scoring low in autonomy, low in empathy, and low in socialization accepted stage two of moral development and tended to reject the higher stages.

The canonical analyses yielded a second canonical correlation of .48 that was significant at the .003 level. Canonical variates two indicate that subjects scoring high in autonomy, high in socialization, and low in empathy tended to accept stages two and six thinking and rejected stages three and five B thinking, (the largest loading being for socialization, +.67, followed by autonomy, +.43, and empathy, -.70).

The following general schema summarizes the results of the canonical analyses for the college sample:

TABLE 5

Summary of Canonical Correlation Analysis  
for College Sample (n = 96)

No.	Canonical Correlation	Wilks Lambda	Chi-Square	D.F.	Sig.
1	.56	.51	60.79	18	.000
2	.48	.74	27.08	10	.003
3	.20	.96	3.50	4	.478

Canonical Coefficients

	Group 1 Canvar 1	Canvar 2	Group 2 Canvar 1	Canvar 2
Socialization	-.48	+.67	Stage 2 +.23	+.57
Empathy	-.70	-.70	Stage 3 -.12	-.74
Autonomy	-.08	+.43	Stage 4 -.54	+.08
			Stage 5A -.84	+.05
			Stage 5B -.50	-.26
			Stage 6 -.19	+.28

Low autonomy + low socialization + low empathy =  
 acceptance of stage two and rejection of higher stages.

Canoni-  
 cal 1

High autonomy + high socialization + high empathy =  
 rejection of stage two and acceptance of higher stages.

High autonomy + high socialization + low empathy =  
 acceptance of stages two and six and rejection of  
 stages three and five B.

Canoni-  
 cal 2

Low autonomy + low socialization + high empathy =  
 acceptance of stages three and five B and rejection  
 of stages two and six.

Further Results Related to Hypothesis 1: The canonical analyses investigated the relationship of the two sets of variables, namely, the personality variables of autonomy, socialization, empathy (set 1) and the assessed dominant stages of moral reasoning (set 2). The following analyses investigated autonomy, socialization, and empathy, taking each of these personality variables separately, in relationship to the assessed dominant stage of moral reasoning, for both the seventh grade and college subjects. The following analyses addressed themselves to two questions: (1) What is the relationship between level of autonomy and dominant stage of moral reasoning, between level of socialization and dominant stage of moral reasoning, between level of empathy and dominant stage of moral reasoning, for both samples? (2) What is the magnitude of any significant relationships?

Seventh Grade Sample: Autonomy and Dominant

Stage of Moral Development

Table 6 presents a summary of the analysis of variance relating the dominant stage of moral development to the personality variable



TABLE 6

Analysis of Variance:  
 Dominant Stage with Autonomy for  
 Seventh Grade Sample (n = 63)

Source	Sum of Squares	D.F.	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	76.19	3	25.40	3.33	.026
Within Groups	450.70	59	7.64		

Group Statistics

Dominant Stage	Mean	S.D.	N
2	5.43	3.36	7
3	7.13	2.68	16
4	8.10	2.76	29
P	9.36	2.50	11
Total	7.78	2.92	63

Pearson  $r = .38$  ( $P = .002$ )

of autonomy for the seventh grade sample, with the Pearson correlation given between autonomy and dominant stage. It should be noted that the analysis of variance yielded results significant at the .026 level, indicating significant differences in the dominant stages as a function of autonomy. The Neuman-Keuls procedure indicated that stage two subjects were significantly lower than the principled stage subjects in autonomy. Trend analysis revealed a significant linear trend with nonsignificant quadratic trends. The Pearson correlation coefficient being .38 ( $P = .002$ ) lends substantiation to a linear relationship between dominant stage and autonomy. An investigation of the means of the dominant stages reveal a steady increase from stage two to the principled stage. Accordingly, it can be stated that as autonomy increases, dominant stage of moral development increases, that is to say, the higher the autonomy, the higher the stage of moral development for the seventh grade sample.

Seventh Grade Sample: Socialization and  
Dominant Stage of Moral Development

A summary of the analysis of variance relating dominant stage of moral development to the personality variable of socialization for the seventh grade sample, with the Pearson correlation coefficient between socialization and dominant stage, is presented in Table 7. No significance is found in the analysis of variance nor in the correlation coefficient, indicating that socialization does not seem to be significantly related to the dominant stages of moral development for the seventh grade sample.

TABLE 7

Analysis of Variance:  
 Dominant Stage with Socialization  
 for Seventh Grade Sample ( n = 63)

Source	Sum of Squares	D.F.	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	27.88	3	9.30	1.85	.149
Within Groups	296.97	59	5.03		

Group Statistics

Dominant Stage	Mean	S.D.	N
2	9.14	2.41	7
3	9.25	2.49	16
4	10.69	2.24	29
P	10.09	1.70	11
Total	10.05	2.29	63

Pearson  $r = .20$  (N.S.)

Seventh Grade Sample: Empathy and Dominant

Stage of Moral Development

Table 8 presents a summary of the analysis of variance relating dominant stage and empathy, with the Pearson correlation coefficient between empathy and dominant stage. Analysis of variance reveals significance at the .034 level, with the Neuman-Keuls procedure revealing that stage three subjects scored significantly higher in empathy than those subjects at the principled stage. Trend analysis did not indicate linear nor quadratic trends, nor did the Pearson negative correlation coefficient indicate a linear relationship between empathy and dominant stage of moral development. It should be noted that the means of the dominant stages show that empathy seemed to be associated more with stage three than with any other stage.

Seventh Grade Sample: Summary of Ancillary Statistical

Results for Hypothesis 1

The ancillary statistical analyses for hypothesis one, investigating autonomy, socialization, and empathy taken as separate variables, for the seventh grade sample, seem to indicate that as autonomy increases, so does the dominant stage of moral development. Although there was a significant F ratio for empathy as related to the dominant stages, with stage three subjects being significantly higher in empathy than the principled stage subjects, neither trend analysis nor Pearson correlation (negative correlation) revealed linearity. Socialization and the dominant stages of moral development were not significantly related.

TABLE 8

Analysis of Variance:  
 Dominant Stage with Empathy for  
 Seventh Grade Sample (n = 63)

Source	Sum of Squares	D.F.	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	236.10	3	78.70	3.09	.034
Within Groups	1502.12	59	25.46		

Group Statistics

Dominant Stage	Mean	S.D	N
2	26.57	5.03	7
3	30.19	5.81	16
4	26.52	4.82	29
P	24.55	4.39	11
Total	27.11	5.29	63

Pearson  $r = -.24$  (P = .059, N.S.)

College Sample: Autonomy and DominantStage of Moral Development

The analysis of variance relating dominant stage to autonomy (refer to Table 9) did not produce a significant F ratio. However, the Pearson correlation was significant ( $r = .24$ ;  $P = .037$ ) so that there appeared to be a linear relationship. Trend analysis was computed and the results confirmed a significant linear term with quadratic terms being non-significant. Accordingly, it would appear that as autonomy increases, the dominant stage of moral development increases. Studying the means of the dominant stages one finds an inversion between stages two and three with stage two being higher in autonomy than stage three. Keeping this inversion in mind, it can therefore be stated that seemingly the higher the level of autonomy, the higher the level of moral development.

College Sample: Socialization and DominantStage of Moral Development

Table 10 reveals that socialization is significantly related ( $F=3.68$ ;  $P=.016$ ) to the dominant stages of moral development for the college sample. The Neuman-Keuls procedure reveals that stage three subjects are significantly lower in socialization than the principled stage subjects. Trend analysis indicates a significant linear term and non significant quadratic term. Furthermore, significant linearity is substantiated by the Pearson correlation ( $r = .34$ ;  $P = .003$ ) indicating that as socialization increases, dominant stage of moral development increases. It should be noted that there is an inversion for stages two and three, in that stage two appears to be

TABLE 9

Analysis of Variance:  
 Dominant Stage with Autonomy  
 for College Sample (n = 73)

Source	Sum of Squares	D.F.	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	32.50	3	10.83	2.13	.104
Within Groups	350.46	69	5.08		

Group Statistics

Dominant Stage	Mean	S.D.	N
2	9.57	1.72	7
3	8.86	1.96	22
4	9.70	2.47	20
P	10.54	2.43	24
Total	9.71	2.31	73

Pearson  $r = .24$  ( $P = .037$ )

TABLE 10

Analysis of Variance:  
 Dominant Stage with Socialization  
 for College Sample (n = 73)

Source	Sum of Squares	D.F.	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	58.35	3	19.45	3.68	.016
Within Groups	364.66	69	5.29		

Group Statistics

Dominant Stage	Mean	S.D.	N
2	11.57	3.46	7
3	11.23	2.45	22
4	12.75	2.27	20
P	13.33	1.74	24
Total	12.37	2.42	73

Pearson  $r = .34$  ( $P = .003$ )



higher in socialization. Accordingly, it would appear that the higher the level of socialization, the higher the dominant stage of moral development, with the second and third stages being inverted.

College Sample: Empathy and Dominant

Stage of Moral Development

Table 11 indicates a significant relationship ( $F = 2.89$ ;  $P = .042$ ) between empathy and the dominant stages of moral development. Neuman-Keuls procedure reveals a significant difference between stage two subjects and principled stage subjects with the principled stage subjects being significantly higher in empathy. Trend analysis indicates a significant linear trend with quadratic term being non significant. The Pearson correlation being  $.29$  ( $P = .014$ ) substantiates a linear trend. Accordingly, the results seemingly indicate that the higher the empathy, the higher the dominant stage of moral development (with stages three and four being inverted so that subjects at stage three were more empathic than stage four subjects).

College Sample: Summary of Ancillary

Statistical Results for Hypothesis 1

The ancillary statistical analyses for hypothesis one, investigating autonomy, socialization, and empathy as separate variables, seem to indicate that as autonomy, socialization, and empathy increase for the college sample, so does the dominant stage of moral development (with stages two and three being inverted for both autonomy and socialization and stages three and four being inverted for empathy). The results can be characterized by the following general organizing

TABLE 11

Analysis of Variance:  
 Dominant Stage with Empathy  
 for College Sample (n = 73)

Source	Sum of Squares	D.F.	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	265.04	3	88.35	2.89	.042
Within Groups	2111.59	69	30.60		

Group Statistics

Dominant State	Mean	S.D.	N
2	22.57	7.57	7
3	26.64	5.78	22
4	25.95	5.26	20
P	29.08	4.86	24
Total	26.86	5.75	73

Pearson  $r = .29$  ( $P = .014$ )

schema: high autonomy + high socialization + high empathy = principled stage of moral development.

### Hypothesis 2

The relationship of each of the personality variables, socialization, autonomy, and empathy, with the assessed dominant stage of moral development will not be significantly different at different ages, namely, the seventh grade and college ages. Hypothesis two is addressed to the following question: Is there a statistically significant difference between the relationship of each of the following pairs of variables: socialization and dominant stage, autonomy and dominant stage, empathy and dominant stage for the two different age levels?

Comparative Data from Hypothesis 1: Table 12 presents data comparing Pearson product moment correlation coefficients and their significance between assessed dominant stage of moral development and each of the personality variables of socialization, autonomy, and empathy for the seventh grade and college age levels. From the comparative analysis of this data obtained in testing hypothesis one, high autonomy appears to be a prerequisite condition for principled stage of moral development for the seventh grade age level; while for the college age level, high autonomy, high socialization, and high empathy appear to be prerequisite conditions for principled moral development. Accordingly, it would seem that the relationship between socialization, empathy and assessed dominant stage of moral development differ at the seventh grade and college age levels, (i.e. in addition

TABLE 12

Comparison of Pearson Correlations between  
the Personality Variables and Dominant Stages  
for Seventh Grade and College Samples

Personality Variables	Seventh Grade Sample (n = 63)	College Sample (n = 73)
Autonomy	Pearson $r = .38$ $P = .002$	$r = .24$ $P = .037$
Socialization	Pearson $r = .20$ $P = N.S.$	$r = .34$ $P = .003$
Empathy	Pearson $r = -.24$ $P = .059 (N.S.)$	$r = .29$ $P = .014$

TABLE 13

Zr Transformations for r for the Two Independent  
Samples, Between Dominant Stage and Autonomy,  
Socialization, and Empathy

Variables	Seventh Grade Sample (n = 63)	College Sample (n = 73)	Z
Autonomy and Dom. Stage	$r = .38 (P = .002)$	$r = .24 (P = .037)$	$Z = .88$ $P = N.S.$
Socialization and Dom. Stage	$r = .20 (P = N.S.)$	$r = .34 (P = .003)$	$Z = .86$ $P = N.S.$
Empathy and Dom. Stage	$r = -.24 (P = N.S.)$	$r = .29 (P = .014)$	$Z = 3.09$ $P < .01$

to autonomy, principled moral development for the college age sample requires high empathy and high socialization).

Zr Transformation for r Between the Two Independent Age Levels:

Table 13 presents the Zr transformations, for the independent seventh grade and college age samples, between the Pearson correlations relating dominant stage to the three personality variables of socialization, autonomy, and empathy. It should be noted that the only significant difference between the two independent age groups, seemingly as a function of age, was between the dominant stage of moral development and empathy, Z equaling 3.09 ( $P < .01$ ).

Accordingly, even though comparative analysis of the data obtained in testing hypothesis one seemed to indicate a difference between the relationship of socialization and empathy with dominant stage of moral development at both age levels, the statistical analysis indicates that only the relationship of empathy with dominant stage is significantly different as a function of age.

Hypothesis 3

There will not be significant sex differences in socialization, autonomy, empathy as related individually to the dominant stage of moral development for either the seventh grade or college samples. This hypothesis addressed itself to the following questions: (1) Are there significant differences between males and females for the three personality variables and for the stages of moral development at the seventh grade and college levels? (2) Are there significant sex differences between the relationship of each of the personality variables and the dominant stage of moral development at each age level? (3) Is there a statistically significant difference between

the relationship of autonomy, socialization, and empathy and the dominant stage of moral development for the independent male and female groups at each age level?

T Statistic with Sex as the Independent Variable Seventh Grade

Sample: An analysis of table 14 reveals that what differentiates seventh grade males from seventh grade females in regard to each of the three personality variables and dominant stages of moral development are: (A) empathy (seventh grade females being significantly more empathic ( $T=2.91$ ;  $P=.005$ ) than seventh grade males) and (B) assessed dominant stage three ( $T = 3.00$ ;  $P = .003$ ), (with females being significantly at stage three while the seventh grade males were scattered through out the stages).

Pearson Correlations Between Personality Variables and Dominant Stage for Each Sex Taken Separately - Seventh Grade Sample:

An examination of table 15 indicates that both males ( $P = .001$ ) and females ( $P = .035$ ) show a significant relationship between autonomy and assessed dominant stage of moral development, and a non significant relationship between empathy and assessed dominant stage. The relationship between socialization and assessed dominant stage is significant for females ( $P = .006$ ) but not for males.

T Statistic with Sex as the Independent Variable - College

Sample: The data presented in table 16 reveals that what differentiates college males from college females in regard to each of the three personality variables and assessed dominant stages of moral development are: (A) empathy (with females being significantly more empathic ( $T=6.42$ ;  $P=.001$ ) than males); (B) socialization (with females being significantly more socialized ( $T=4.25$ ;  $P=.001$ ) than males);

TABLE 14

T. Statistic with Sex as the Independent Variable: Seventh Grade Sample

Variable	Mean		T	Sig.
	Males (n = 43)	Females (n = 49)		
Autonomy	7.488	8.082	.98	.329
Socialization	9.674	10.388	1.28	.203
Empathy	25.395	28.429	2.91	.005
		<u>Dominant Stage</u>	**	
Stage 1	17.698	17.016	.83	.408
2	16.349	16.592	.32	.752
3	15.163	13.082	3.00	.003
4	14.093	13.286	1.07	.300
P	14.628	15.020	.53	.598

\* The raw statistics are given for the dominant stages; so that, low = high and high = low, since 1 = fully accept, 4 = fully reject. Unlike the previous tables, the data has not been converted.

\*\* Males n = 25  
Females n = 38

TABLE 15

Pearson Correlations Relating the Personality  
Variables and Dominant Stage for Each Sex  
Taken Separately: Seventh Grade Sample

Personality Variable	Pearson r Sex Taken Separately	
	Males	Females
Autonomy	r = .603 P = .001	r = .297 P = .035
Socializa- tion	r = .129 P = N.S.	r = .390 P = .006
Empathy	r = -.162 P = N.S.	r = -.126 P = N.S.



TABLE 16

T Statistic with Sex as the Independent  
Variable: College Sample

Variable	Mean		T	Sig.
	Males (n = 43)	Females (n = 53)		
Autonomy	9.605	9.774	.34	.736
Socializa- tion	11.605	13.415	4.25	.000
Empathy	23.953	30.094	6.42	.000
	<u>Dominant Stage</u>			
Stage 2	6.233	3.472	3.97	.000
3	13.907	10.698	2.62	.010
4	18.093	16.057	1.36	.176
P	3.417	4.243	3.85	.000

\* Males n = 36  
Females n = 37

(C) dominant stage two, three, and principled stage of moral development (with males significantly predominating at dominant stage two ( $T=3.97$ ;  $P=.001$ ) and three ( $T=2.62$ ;  $P=.01$ ) and females significantly predominating at the principled stage ( $T=3.25$ ;  $P=.001$ ).

Pearson Correlations Between Personality Variables and Dominant Stage for Each Sex Taken Separately - College Sample: The

relationship between autonomy, socialization, and empathy and assessed dominant stage, investigating the male and female sample separately, is given in table 17. It should be noted that the relationship between autonomy, empathy, and assessed dominant stage of moral development is not significant for either sex. However, the relationship between socialization and dominant stage is significant for the college males ( $P = .024$ ) but not for the college females.

Zr Transformation for r for Male and Female Subsamples at the

Seventh Grade and College Levels: Zr transformations (for males and females at both age levels) for the Pearson correlation coefficients (sex taken separately) relating the three personality variables to the dominant stage of moral development are given in table 18. The differences between the correlations for males and females were not significant in any of the analyses for either the seventh grade or the college sample, that is to say, the Zr transformations for r between the Pearson correlations (for the personality variables of autonomy, socialization, and empathy related to the dominant stage) did not differ significantly either for seventh grade males and females, or for college males and females.

TABLE 17

Pearson Correlations Relating the Personality  
Variables and Dominant Stage for Each Sex  
Taken Separately: College Sample

Personality Variable	Pearson r Sex Taken Separately	
	Males (n = 36 )	Females (n = 37)
Autonomy	r = .288 P = N.S.	r = .161 P = N.S.
Socializa- tion	r = .375 P = .024	r = .009 P = N.S.
Empathy	r = .115 P = N.S.	r = .089 P = N.S.

TABLE 18

Zr Transformations for r for Males and Females  
at the Seventh Grade and College Levels

	Seventh Grade		Z	College		Z
	Males (n = 25)	Females (n = 38)		Males (n = 36)	Females (n = 37)	
Autonomy: and Dom. St.	r = .603 P = .001	r = .297 P = .035	Z = 1.49 P = N.S.	r = .288 P = N.S.	r = .161 P = N.S.	Z = .61 P = N.S.
Socializa- tion and Dom. St.	r = .129 P = N.S.	r = .390 P = .006	Z = 1.44 P = N.S.	r = .375 P = .024	r = .009 P = N.S.	Z = .37 P = N.S.
Empathy: and Dom. St.	r = .162 P = N.S.	r = .126 P = N.S.	Z = 1.09 P = N.S.	r = .115 P = N.S.	r = .089 P = N.S.	Z = .12 P = N.S.

## CHAPTER V

### DISCUSSION

In this chapter a hypothesis by hypothesis discussion of the results will be presented, followed by a more general discussion of the data including a consideration of the study's internal and external validity. The central portion of this chapter will focus on the societal and educational implications of the investigation, with the final section addressing itself to possible future research.

#### Hypothesis 1

Canonical analyses of the data lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis, thereby indicating that the personality variables of assessed autonomy, socialization, and empathy (taken as a unit) are significantly related to assessed dominant stage of moral development for both the seventh grade and college samples.

The importance of empathy in stage three moral thinking for both samples is indicated by the canonical analyses. This result is in accordance with cognitive developmental theory in that, by definition, stage three moral reasoning views as right that which pleases others and is approved by them. Empathy, defined as a person's vicarious response to another's feelings, connotes that one is able to "stand in another person's shoes", not only cognitively but also affectively. In such a reciprocal stance, one possesses the capacity to please others and by doing so receives their approval. In addition, the

canonical analyses indicate that for the college sample, empathy is also significantly related to stage 5B (stage 5B being the morality of intuitive humanism, in contrast to stage 5A, the legalistic morality of social contract). By definition, empathy is humanistically oriented, so that one would expect the obtained result of high empathy being significantly related not only to stage three but also to stage 5B.

The second canonical correlation revealed that seventh grade subjects scoring high on the autonomy and socialization scales, and low on the empathy scale appear to be at the principled stage of moral reasoning, while college subjects scoring high in autonomy and socialization, and low in empathy appear to be at either stage two or stage six of moral development. This result for the college sample parallels the Haan study (1971) in which the majority of college students who took part in the civil disobedience of "sitting in" at the Berkeley campus were those motivated by stage two or stage six of moral reasoning. In a certain sense both stage two and stage six are independent of society's norms. The hedonist (stage two) strives for pleasure regardless of society's dicta; the absolute principled person (stage six) transcends the dicta of society. Viewed from a different perspective, it would seem that both stage two and stage six persons are doing "their own thing", independent of societal norms: stage two subjects motivated by satisfaction of their personal needs, stage six subjects motivated by principles of justice and human rights.

It should be noted that stage two college students were found to be high in the personality variable of socialization; this appears to be idiosyncratic. As discussed above, one would not expect stage two

subjects to be high on the socialization scale due to the hedonistic orientation of stage two. Such an idiosyncratic result begs for an explanation. A possible resolution may be had in Kohlberg's (1976) recent explanation of a transitional stage between stages four and five (a stage four-and-one-half). The college students labeled as stage two moral thinkers, both in the present study and in the Haan study, may well have been at this transitional stage. In terms of the present investigation, the transitional stage would better account for the college subjects being high in socialization.

Ancillary analyses (analyses of variance and Pearson correlations) of the three personality variables taken separately, as related to the dominant stages of moral development, yield for the seventh grade sample, the result of autonomy being the only significantly linear personality variable (i.e. as autonomy increases, the dominant stage of moral development increases). In addition, even though empathy did not exhibit a significant linear relationship with assessed dominant stage, the Pearson correlation between empathy and dominant stage ( $r = -.24$ ) approached significance ( $P = .059$ ) so that stage three was significantly higher in empathy than the principled stage for the seventh grade sample.

As previously stated the present investigation sought to conceptually integrate Kohlberg's interpretation of moral development with Hogan's developmental personality variables. However, one important exception must be noted: when Hogan speaks about empathy he is clearly describing cognitive empathy; on the other hand, the present study views empathy as affective empathy. Hogan claims that mature moral

reasoning is characterized by high autonomy, high socialization, and high empathy. The results of the ancillary analyses for the college sample in the present investigation reveal a similar pattern, in that as autonomy, socialization, and empathy increase in intensity, the dominant stage of moral development increases (i.e. when the three personality variables are investigated separately in relationship to dominant stage, principled stage of moral reasoning requires high autonomy, high socialization, and high empathy). Accordingly, Hogan's thesis receives partial support from the results of the present investigation. The support is only partial since Hogan's definition and the present investigation's definition of empathy differ. However, as Feshbach (1975) and Hoffman (1977) have reported, cognitive empathy in the usual case, appears to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for affective empathy, the former being the cognitive recognition of affect in others, the latter being vicarious, affective arousal.

In summary, the statistical analyses of the data relevant to hypothesis one reject the null hypothesis and reveal: (1) the unique role of empathy in relation to stage three moral reasoning (for both seventh grade and college samples) and stages two, 5B, and six (for the college sample); (2) autonomy as the major variable related to dominant stage for the seventh grade sample; and (3) partial support for Hogan's thesis that high autonomy, high socialization, and high empathy lead to mature moral judgment.



### Hypothesis 2

The results of the analyses related to hypothesis two are such that the null hypothesis is rejected. The two different age levels (seventh grade and college) are significantly differentiated from one another by the personality variable of empathy as related to dominant stage. Age differences between correlations for autonomy as related to dominant stage and socialization as related to dominant stage did not significantly differentiate the seventh grade sample from the college sample. An investigation of the means for the autonomy and socialization scores seemingly indicated age trends. Seventh grade males exhibited the lowest mean scores for autonomy and socialization, followed by seventh grade females, then college males, and finally college females who exhibited the highest mean scores for both measures of autonomy and socialization. However, although such trends may be suspected, the present investigation cannot definitively establish such trends due to the fact that two different levels of the California Test of Personality were used (intermediate level for seventh grade sample; secondary level for the college sample) and these levels are not strictly comparable.

All in all, the analyzed data for hypothesis two reject the null hypothesis and show that empathy as related to dominant stage is significantly different for the seventh grade and college samples as a result of age.

### Hypothesis 3

Results related to hypothesis three show significant sex differences so that the null hypothesis is rejected. Both seventh grade females ( $T = 2.91$ ;  $P = .005$ ) and college females ( $T = 6.42$ ;

$P = .001$ ) were significantly more empathic than their male counterparts. This result supports Hoffman (1977) who reviewed sixteen studies dealing with affective empathy and reported that regardless of age or measure utilized, females obtained higher scores in all sixteen studies. Hoffman points out that the probability of females having higher scores in sixteen out of sixteen studies is one in sixty-four thousand. Investigating sixteen other studies concerning the recognition of affect (cognitive empathy), males and females were reported to be approximately equal in this cognitive skill. Hoffman concludes that in emotional situations both males and females are equally adept at assessing how a person feels (recognition of affect) but females are more likely to experience the vicarious affect of the other person (affective empathy).

Seventh grade females clustered at stage three ( $T = 3.00$ ;  $P = .003$ ) while seventh grade males were scattered throughout the stages. Such a pattern of scatter during late adolescence may suggest a transition period between stage four and stage five involving a phase of conflict and disequilibrium (Turiel, 1975); however, such is not the case for the seventh grade males who are in the period of late preadolescence or early adolescence.

College females, in addition to being significantly more empathic than their male counterparts, were also significantly more socialized ( $T = 4.25$ ;  $P = .001$ ) and significantly predominated at the principled stage ( $T = 3.85$ ;  $P = .001$ ). College males significantly predominated at stage two ( $T = 3.97$ ;  $P = .001$ ) and stage three ( $T = 2.62$ ;  $P = .01$ ) of moral development. These results seemingly

stand in opposition to the findings reported by Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) who found that adult women stabilize at stage three of moral development, while adult males stabilize at stage four.

Pearson correlations were computed for each sex separately indicating that at the seventh grade level there is a significant relationship between autonomy and dominant stage of moral development for both sexes; the relationship of socialization with dominant stage being significant for females ( $r = .39$ ;  $P = .006$ ) but not for seventh grade males. At the college level the relationship between socialization and dominant stage proves to be significant for males ( $r = .38$ ;  $P = .024$ ) but not for college females.

Post factum partial correlational analyses controlling for sex (i.e. variability due to sex being partialled out) show that for seventh grade sample, autonomy related to dominant stage is significantly associated ( $r = .43$ ;  $P = .001$ ); empathy is not ( $r = -.15$ ;  $P = .124$ ). However when variability due to sex is taken into account we have seen that empathy approaches significance ( $r = -.24$ ;  $P = .059$ ). Socialization is significantly related to dominant stage when variability due to sex is partialled out ( $r = .28$ ;  $P = .013$ ) but becomes non significant when sex variability is taken into account ( $r = .20$ ;  $P = .107$ ).

For the college sample, partialling out variability due to sex, reveals that autonomy and socialization are significantly related to dominant stage ( $r = .22$ ;  $P = .033$ ;  $r = .22$ ;  $P = .033$  respectively), with empathy related to dominant stage being non significant ( $r = .04$ ;  $P = .379$ ), but becoming significant when variability due to sex is

taken into account ( $r = .29$ ;  $P = .014$ ).

Accordingly, when variability due to sex is taken into account, empathy as related to dominant stage becomes significant (college sample) or approaches significance (seventh grade sample), and socialization as related to dominant stage becomes non significant for the seventh grade sample. Autonomy for both samples and socialization for the college sample are significantly related to the dominant stage of moral development independently of sex variability (i.e. when variability due to sex is partialled out or when it is taken into account).

An investigation of the analyzed data for hypothesis three indicates that the means for affective empathy do not reveal age trends but show the following pattern: college males being lowest in empathic scores, followed by seventh grade males, then seventh grade females, with college females being highest in empathic scores. Focusing on dominant stage of moral development the following statistically significant pattern of results is obtained: seventh grade males being scattered through out the stages, college males predominating at stage two and three, seventh grade females clustering at stage three, and college females being mostly at the principled stage. From these analyses, college males appear low in both level of affective empathy and dominant stage of moral development. An explanation of this seemingly idiosyncratic phenomenon is found in the construct of adolescent egocentrism in that a substantial number of

the college male subjects appeared to be going through the period of adolescent egocentrism, while the female college sample apparently had overcome this developmental challenge. This phenomenon appears to be partially a function of the college sample used in the present investigation. The male college subjects as a group appeared to be in the lower half of their high school graduating class and had not made a definite choice for future career plans. In contrast, the female group was in the upper half of their graduating class and as a group had definite career plans.

Adolescent egocentrism, according to Inhelder and Piaget (1958), occurs at the time that formal operational thought is developing. The adolescent is primarily concerned with himself assuming that others are as concerned with his appearance and behavior as he is. This assumption constitutes the egocentrism of adolescence. Accordingly, the young person is continually reacting to an imaginary audience (Elkind, 1974), in that he believes that he will be the center of attention (audience) which usually is not the case (imaginary). While the young person fails to differentiate the concerns of his thought and the thoughts of others, he simultaneously over differentiates his own feelings, regarding his feelings as specifically unique and special.

Progressing through the period of adolescent egocentrism, the young person focuses on his needs and feelings, distorting what is pleasing to others. Having such an orientation, it would seem that the person would be low in affective empathy and would be at stage two of moral development. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude in the present investigation that the college males who were going through the period of adolescent egocentrism were those who were significantly

low in affective empathy and at dominant stage two of moral development.

Kohlberg's longitudinal data revealed an idiosyncratic result in that some college students shifted from stage four to stage two rather than making direct progression to stage five (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969; Kramer, 1968). This would seemingly contradict the sequential invariance of the stages. However, Kohlberg explains this shift by viewing it as a transition between stage four and stage five, a stage four-and-one-half, since these subjects eventually progressed to stage five. Kohlberg (1976) states that the social perspective of stage four-and-one-half is clearly different from stage two in that subjects in the transitional stage questioned society and viewed themselves from an outside of society perspective. This view was in contrast to stage two subjects who view things as concrete individuals "relating to other individuals through concrete reciprocity, exchange, and utilities?" (P. 43).

The college males at stage two, in the present investigation, may well be in this transitional stage four-and-one-half. From the present analyses the data is suggestive of such a possibility in that the Pearson correlations relating socialization to dominant stage of moral development for each sex separately reveals that the college males show a significant relationship ( $r = .38$ ;  $P = .024$ ) while the college females do not. It may be argued that the college males' social perspective may well be different from the individualistic perspective of the stage two hedonistic orientation (i.e. one would not expect a significant relationship between socialization and stage two). However, without further longitudinal data for the college male sub-

jects, no definite conclusion is possible at this time.

To recapitulate, the analyses of the data for hypothesis three reject the null hypothesis and show: (1) significant sex differences in affective empathy with seventh grade and college females being more empathic than their male counterparts; (2) significantly higher socialization scores for college females than for college males; (3) predominance of seventh grade females at stage three, with seventh grade males being scattered through out the stages; (4) significant clustering of college females at the principled stage, with college males predominating at stages two and three; (5) the importance of variability due to sex (for each sex separately and with variability due to sex partialled out); and (6) the seemingly idiosyncratic phenomenon of college males being low in empathy and in dominant stage of moral development.

### Theoretical Discussion of Four Dimensions of Character Structure

#### Related to Moral Development

Having completed a hypothesis by hypothesis discussion of the results obtained in the present investigation, we will now turn our attention to a more general discussion of: (1) how cultural socialization patterns may account for sex differences in the development of affective empathy; (2) the importance of autonomy in mature moral development; and (3) the relationship of intelligence to moral development. In other words, four dimensions of character structure (socialization, empathy, autonomy, I.Q.) having a reported relationship to moral development (Hogan 1973, 1975) will be theoretically discussed.

Socialization Patterns and Affective Empathy: Although

socialization and empathy are separate and independent constructs, the traditional socialization patterns for males and females seem to play an important part in the development of affective empathy. Parsons and Bales (1955) and Johnson (1963) distinguish between two roles in any social unit, the expressive and the instrumental. In American society females have been traditionally socialized to perform the expressive role in the family unit, a role in which the female is responsive to the needs and feelings of others in order to maintain the family as an intact, harmonious unit. In contrast, males are socialized to perform the instrumental role, acting as liaisons between the family unit and other social institutions, especially occupational institutions. Initially males are socialized expressively but with age are encouraged to acquire instrumental traits such as mastery and problem solving. It is possible that male socialization practices produce males who are action oriented toward instrumental, ameliorative action in affective situations. That is to say, having recognized the affect of another, the male may be considering action alternatives rather than empathizing in these situations. Hoffman (1975a) and Hogan (1973, 1975) discuss the possibility that humans may have an innate empathic predisposition. On the other hand, infant girls appear to be more likely to cry than infant boys in response to another child's cry (Simmer, 1971; Sagi and Hoffman, 1976). Such crying may suggest the possibility of a constitutional predisposition in females that together with differences in socialization patterns account for later sex differences in empathy. In either case (innate general predisposition or female predisposition), the capacity for affective empathy seems to be actualized through the different



socialization patterns for males and females.<sup>1</sup>

Hogan (1973) reports that interviews with subjects who received very high scores on his cognitive empathy scale suggest that they often suffer from an excess of role taking in that they are "too concerned with the expectations of others, they excessively inhibit hostility and aggression, and suffer from identity diffusion" (p. 224). If Hogan's caveat is correct in regard to cognitive empathy, how does it relate to affective empathy? The present study has shown that high empathy in combination with high levels of socialization and autonomy is significantly related with principled moral development. Thereby, the personality variable of empathy, like those of socialization and autonomy, can not be viewed in isolation when moral development is considered. An excess in any one of the personality variables without a corresponding regulation by the other two personality variables may well lead to anomalies of the personality.

The Import of Autonomy in Mature Moral Development: Socialization and empathy as related to moral developmental stages reflect a utilitarian bias in that compliance is given to social norms based on the larger welfare of society or on self interest. Kant (1933 Trans.) argues that such compliance is in no way moral and that the truly moral person has an autonomous will and is governed by a personal sense of duty. An adequate description of moral development requires the

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<sup>1</sup>Traditional socialization patterns are more and more being discarded in the United States. Male and female roles in some quarters are being reversed. Time and research will tell us the effect of these non traditional socialization patterns.

personality variable of autonomy. A well socialized and empathic person might be the model citizen in his conformity to societal norms but may act immorally. The example often given is that the person who complied with the collective societal norms of Hitler's Germany would be complying to and justifying the execution of innocent Jews. Autonomy serves to insulate one from the potential immorality of collective compliance and to facilitate non conformist prosocial behavior. However, an autonomous person who is unsocialized and non-empathic is likely to be autocratic and non conformist for non-conformity's sake. Accordingly, as mentioned previously, the personality variables of socialization, empathy, and autonomy cannot be viewed in isolation. Results of hypothesis one revealed that at the seventh grade level, autonomy was the significant variable in relation to dominant stage of moral development (i.e. as autonomy increased, dominant stage of moral development increased). However, in no way does this result suggest that the seventh grade subjects were unsocialized and nonempathic. In fact, additional analyses revealed that female seventh grade subjects were more empathic and predominately at a higher stage of moral development than seventh grade and college males.

Relationship of Intelligence to Moral Development: For a person to understand basic issues in moral situations a certain degree of moral knowledge is needed. Hogan (1973, 1975) operationalizes the construct of moral knowledge by equating its measurement with tests of general intelligence. Correlation coefficients between intelligence and moral development have generally been reported to be in the 30s

(Hogan, 1973). In the present study I.Q. scores were available for only the seventh grade subjects.<sup>1</sup> Pearson correlational coefficients: (1) between dominant stage of moral development and I.Q. were  $r = .33$ ,  $P = .009$ ; (2) between autonomy and I.Q.  $r = .16$ ,  $P = .125$ ; (3) between socialization and I.Q.  $r = .14$ ,  $P = .173$ ; and (4) between empathy and I.Q.  $r = -.34$ ,  $P = .001$ . Hogan (1973) reports a correlation coefficient of .30 between I.Q. and autonomy and reports that cognitive empathy correlates between .30 and .50 with several measures of intellectual performance. However, the present study shows a much lower correlation between I.Q. and autonomy and a significant negative correlation between affective empathy and I.Q. for the seventh grade sample. The results of the present study are consistent in that there is a negative correlation between affective empathy and dominant stage of moral development but a positive significant correlation between I.Q. and dominant stage. Accordingly, the correlation between I.Q. and empathy is negative for the seventh grade sample. In addition, the present investigation is consistent with previous reports in that the correlation between I.Q. and dominant stage of moral development is in the 30s.

#### Statements Supporting Internal and External Validity

The present inquiry sought to support internal validity by utilizing the following criteria: valid and reliable instrumentation;

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<sup>1</sup>The measure of general intelligence available for the seventh grade sample was the Short Test of Educational Ability (S.T.E.A.) obtained from Science Research Associates.

objective scoring; selection of subjects; careful examination of all protocols; control of reading ability and verbal expressivity.

Autonomy and socialization were measured by the self reliance and social standards subtests of the California Test of Personality, appropriate levels being used for the seventh grade and college subjects. The stringent criteria, in terms of logical analyses, experience, judgments of clinical and educational psychologists as well as teachers, and statistical analyses, in the construction of the test (with validity studies) point to well established validity. Reliability coefficients at the intermediate and secondary levels for the measurement of autonomy and socialization are in the 70s or above.

Since the computed reliability coefficient for the seventh grade subjects was in the 50s on the Mehrabian-Epstein affective empathy scale (1972), a revised scale was utilized producing a Cronbach (1951) alpha reliability coefficient of .63 for the seventh grade subjects and .78 for the college subjects. Due to its recency, the original scale has not been extensively used. However, content validity has been inferred in part from factor analysis and initial studies have supported the validity of the scale.

Until recently, the only available technique for measuring levels of moral development was the free response method of Kohlberg. Several attempts have been made at the objective measurement of moral stages, the one with the most extensive replication and longitudinal analysis being the Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1972). As previously reported, the correlation between the Defining Issues Test (D.I.T.) and Kohlberg's free response method is .68 (Rest, 1974). The D.I.T. has been used with over fifteen hundred subjects with reliability reported

as ranging between .65 to .81 depending on the age and educational status of the subjects. The Carroll Test of Moral Development (1974) has been developed as a downward extension of the D.I.T. The Carroll Test is acceptable for use with fifth grade subjects and above while Rest (1974) cautions that the D.I.T. is not appropriate for subjects below the eleventh grade. Although Carroll's measure has neither extensive replication nor longitudinal examination, the theoretical base of the Carroll Test and initial pilot studies (Carroll, 1974) appear sufficiently respectable in terms of reliability and validity considering the present immature state of moral development assessment.

The use of objective instruments rather than of a free response interview gave significant control of subjects' verbal and expressive abilities while the use of strict objective scoring criteria controlled investigator bias and eliminated the need for inter-rater reliability. Incomplete and unreliable protocols were eliminated according to the reliability criteria given by Rest (1974). Reading ability for the seventh grade sample was controlled by reading aloud the items while the subjects followed a written copy. Sample selection was based on theoretical considerations presented in the literature (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969) stating that the selected age levels were critical periods for the attainment of principled moral development in adulthood.

In considering external validity or generalizability, the extensive standardization and norming of the California Test of Personality must be taken into account. Seventh grade subjects were chosen randomly from a greater number of seventh grade students in the same school. College subjects were a sample of convenience, necessitated by the inability of the investigator to obtain a large college population from which to

choose a randomized sample of one hundred subjects matched for sex.

A logical analysis of the alternate hypotheses for the present inquiry leads to "strong inferences" (Platt, 1964) of a general nature. The review of research reported by Hoffman (1977) has shown that females are more affectively empathic than males. The results of the present investigation support Hoffman's findings. Accordingly, a strong inference can be made from the present results that generally, junior high and college females will be more empathic than their male counterparts.

From a logical analysis of the characteristics of the stages of moral development and the definitions of the developmental personality variables, the assumptions relating the stages and the personality variables might be as follows: (1) persons at stage two would appear to be highly autonomous, poorly socialized, and non empathic; (2) those at stage three would be highly empathic, poorly socialized and lacking in autonomy; (3) those predominating at stage four would seem to be highly socialized, non autonomous and empathic; (4) those at the principled stage seemingly would be well socialized, empathic, and autonomous. Results of the present investigation provide support for the logical assumptions concerning stage three and the principled stage.

It can be logically assumed that a person in the period of adolescent egocentrism would be less empathic and at a lower stage of moral development than an adolescent who has passed through this period. Empirical support is given to this logical assumption by the inferred results of the present study. However, it can not be generalized that

college males will be lower in moral development than females because in a sample of college students from a different population, the males might not be undergoing the period of egocentrism which was a peculiar characteristic of the college sample used in the present study.

When one is concerned with the generalizability of results the issue of ecological representativeness must be taken into account. The theoretical foundation on which the present investigation is built assumes that all people go through the same sequential, invariant stages of moral development, i.e. heredity provides the general capacity. In terms of universal general capacity, it can be logically inferred that the present study theoretically would seem to be representative of all human beings. However, this capacity will not become actualized without proper interaction with the environment. The question of ecological representativeness seems to be the question of "will the interaction with the environment produce the necessary moral conflict so that the person may advance from the capacity to the actualization of higher stages of moral development?" In terms of actualization of capacity, the present study is limited by the environmental forces that have interacted with the subjects utilized in the sample.

#### Societal - Educational Implications of the Present Inquiry

The results of the present investigation have implications for many societal units such as the family, the school, and the church. These societal units will be discussed in the following section.

The Family: A growing body of research has been directed toward the developmental antecedents of personality variables and parenting practices in the development of personality variables. Since it is strongly inferred from the present study that the personality variables of empathy, socialization, and autonomy are significant variables in the developmental growth of moral thinking, a brief summary of the relationship of the developmental antecedents for each personality variable and parenting practices will be presented.

### Empathy

As has been stated previously, the socialization practices for boys and girls take different paths in that girls are socialized to perform an expressive role (being responsive to the needs and feelings of others) while boys are socialized to perform an instrumental role (mastery, problem solving, liaison between the family and occupational society). The development of affective empathy seems to be related to these different roles of socialization, so that females, as a rule, are more empathic than males (see Hoffman, 1977). However, there is a strong movement in America today advocating that both boys and girls be socialized expressively as well as instrumentally. Such familial and extra familial expectations would have far reaching consequences especially for the development of empathic persons, since there is a growing amount of literature supporting the notion that empathic tendencies or predispositions may be innate (see Hogan, 1973).

Role taking is an indispensable precursor of empathy in that the person is required to adopt another's perspective in the awareness and recognition of the other's feelings. Hoffman (1976) states, "the



rudiments of role taking competency may be present before the child is two years old." (p. 138). Since role taking is a learned skill, parents can facilitate its acquisition by using daily real life situations of conflict and asking their child to reflect on how does he think the other person feels. Using such a parenting technique will also afford the child practice in developing this skill.

A state of well being and need fulfillment may well be necessary conditions for the development of the empathic response in that pressures of egoistic concerns are reduced, permitting the person to be more open and responsive to the feelings of others. Warm, nurturant, democratic and empathic parents appear to serve as significant models for their child in the development of empathy.

### Socialization

The relationship of the socialization processes to empathy for boys and girls in terms of instrumental and expressive roles has been discussed above. Research directed toward the developmental antecedents of socialization has shown that warm, nurturant, accepting and consistently restrictive parents tend to produce the most socialized children. Successful socialization involves an exchange in which the child gives up his desire to do as he pleases and begins to internalize familial and societal norms. However, for the child to become socialized, he must have some confidence in his ability to deal effectively with his environment.

### Autonomy

Early development of cognitive and verbal skills and interest in school achievement enhance a child's self esteem and self confidence, while self esteem and self confidence appear as necessary precursors of autonomy. Although a high degree of self reliance is not developed until later in life, the early period of life appears to be most important in the child's development of autonomy. Parents must respect the child's right to choose so that the young child can make choices. The young child has a need to explore and investigate his environment. An overprotective parent may be warm and nurturant when the child is an infant but when the child shows signs of independence, the parent becomes restrictive and overly cautious. Parenting practices of acceptance, warmth, nurturance, reasonable permissiveness in respect to the child's exploring, manipulating, and investigating, democratic exercise of parental power, explanation of reasons for parental rules and expectations, encouragement of discussion and verbal give and take, and avoidance of arbitrary decisions in that certain behaviors are clearly labeled as permitted and other behaviors as forbidden, foster autonomy. The child is provided by such parenting practices with opportunities for self reliant behavior and can receive parental guidance and control. In addition, such practices promote the child's identification with the parents based on love and respect and the parents themselves become primary models for responsible autonomy (see Baumrind, 1971). It should be noted that warm, nurturant, accepting and consistently restrictive parents produce the most

socialized children while less restrictive parents foster autonomy. The maxim "in medio virtus stat" applies here as in many other situations. Too much empathy may lead to identity diffusion, too much socialization may lead to blind conformity to societal demands, too much autonomy may lead to non conformity for non conformity's sake. Accordingly, a mixture of these variables tends to lead to balance and mature moral development.

#### Cognitive - Moral Development

Since cognitive and moral development are apparently stimulated by cognitive conflict, a democratic milieu whereby verbal discussion is encouraged in the home will facilitate cognitive and moral growth. At close inspection, many of the parental practices associated with the developmental antecedents of autonomy appear to be necessary but not sufficient conditions for moral discussion and facilitation of moral conflict. These antecedents are necessary but not sufficient conditions since parents need to be familiar with the developmental aspects of cognitive and moral growth. "Do what I say and not what I do" can only confuse the child since the child is looking to the parents to provide models for his behavior.

All that has been said concerning the family, points to the task of educating parents to new modes of parenting. Many high schools offer courses concerning parenting where the young person receives his first exposure to necessary parenting skills. Many parents-to-be attend prenatal classes and it is suggested that these classes could extend their scope and include parenting skills as part of the educational process at a time when the future parents would seem most open

to such education. The local schools and community colleges could offer workshops or classes for parents to help them develop necessary parenting skills for the facilitation of empathy, socialization, and autonomy and moral growth in their children.

The School: The traditional adage that the schools stand "in loco parentis" still holds true today. What has been said concerning parenting practices applies to effective teacher practices in the schools. In addition, teachers can serve as important models for their learners.

It is during the "critical years" of elementary and high school that the young person will advance in moral development toward principled moral reasoning or stabilize at a lower stage. It is the avoidance of this stabilization at a lower level of moral development that teachers with the help of moral developmental psychologists must address themselves. Since cognitive development is a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral development, a young person that does not reach full formal operational thinking will not reach the principled level of moral development. If such is the case, the young person still has the right of receiving such experiences that will actualize whatever limited capacity that he possesses. Crucial to developmental growth is the updating of teacher training through inservice sessions, additional course work, or a program of guided reading and discussion.

Schools might do well to investigate Kohlberg's concept of a "just community school" which involves making moral discussion an integral part of the curriculum. The theory behind such a concept is postulated on a participatory democracy which stresses that solution of

school problems are had in a community meeting using the moral discussion process. The assumption is that higher moral reasoning will prevail in these discussions. Real life moral situations and actions are treated as issues of fairness and as matters for democratic discussion. A school where the students participate in democratic solutions to problems offers extensive opportunities for role taking. Since moral discussion is written into the curriculum (and necessary teacher training is given) small group moral discussion precedes the democratic decision making meetings. A rotating student body serves as a discipline committee. Such a democratic school presents a social system of fairness and reasonableness but this is not its primary purpose. Rather Kohlberg sees the democratic process as a vehicle for moral discussion and the cause of an emerging sense of community (see Kohlberg, 1972, 1975; Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971). Such schools can thus become vital democratic forces in the community and through workshops and discussion groups addressed to parents, can function as change agents in offering these parents an opportunity to acquire necessary skills for fostering cognitive and moral growth.

The lyrics of popular music often appeal to all ages so that they can be a most relevant and poignant vehicle for moral discussion. A present day popular hit has the songstress singing "...it can't be wrong when it feels so right"<sup>1</sup> clearly an espousal of stage two hedonistic morality. In sharp contrast to this hedonistic orientation

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<sup>1</sup>From the song "You Light Up My Life" sung by Debby Boone and chosen as the best single record for the year 1977.

are the lyrics from the song "Alfie":

What's it all about Alfie? Is it just for the moment we live? What's it all about when you sort it out?... Are we meant to take more than we give, or are we meant to be kind? And if only fools are kind, Alfie, then I guess it is wise to be cruel. And if life only belongs to the strong... what will you lend on an old golden rule? As sure as I believe there's a heaven above, Alfie, I know there's something much more... (David, 1966)

The lyrical rendition of Harry Chapin's "Cats in the Cradle," certainly will create cognitive if not moral conflict concerning the responsibility of the parent as a primary model for their children.

Using popular music, movies, television programs, selected literature etc. in the classroom as vehicles for moral discussion will bring the world of the young person in direct confrontation with moral issues that are relevant to the person's everyday life.

The Church: In a world of scientific and technological "miracles," a world preoccupied with materialistic concerns and with the emergence of the so called "new morality," a stage two morality of self gratification and hedonistic pursuits, the churches stand in a unique position of not only proclaiming the "good news" but of being vital agents of moral conflict motivating their membership to higher stages of moral development. The scriptural readings in themselves are potent forces for creation of moral conflict; take for instance the incident of Abraham willing to sacrifice his son, Isaac (Genesis 22, 1-14); or the words of Jesus at his impending death, "Greater love than this no one has, that one lay down his life for his friends. This is my commandment that you love one another as I have loved you" (John 15, 13 & 12); or the beatitudes (Matthew 5, 3-11).

In addition to having responsibility of creating moral conflict

in their members and proclaiming the "good news," the churches have the responsibility of aiding their members in the formation of an "informed conscience." For in the final analysis it is not the rules and/or religious practices that determine the goodness of an action, but the person's individual "informed conscience."

When the congregation is small, moral dilemmas can be presented with congregational discussion. Sermons would have to be geared to different ages of the congregation; theoretically, it would be a safe assumption that most adult parishioners would be at the conventional level of moral development.

#### Research Implications

The present inquiry being an ex post facto study and utilizing multivariate correlational analyses strongly inferred that the personality variables of autonomy, socialization, and empathy were significantly related to levels of moral development with significant age and sex differences being found at the two different age levels. Systematic replicative investigations utilizing stratified age-grade samples selected from varied populations would be desirable in terms of confirming or questioning generalizability of the present study. An inquiry utilizing other instrumentation for measurement of autonomy, socialization, and empathy while retaining the instrumentation used for the measurement of moral development could provide important confirming or disconfirming results. In such a study the definitions of the personality variables must remain the same as given in the present investigation. The need for longitudinal studies in the investigation of moral development is apparant from the foregoing

discussion. The author intends to annually assess autonomy, socialization, empathy, and moral development of the seventh grade subjects included in the present study as part of a continued longitudinal investigation. The primary aim of this additional study will be to investigate the invariant sequentiality and irreversibility of the stages and to investigate the function of the personality variables as age and moral development increase.

The magnitude of empathic arousal seems to be affected by the similarity or dissimilarity between the observer and the observed (Feshbach and Roe, 1968; Krebs, 1975; Hoffman, 1977). The Kohlberg, Rest, and Carroll dilemmas clearly specify gender and infer age. Retaining the basic issues of the dilemmas with all cues of gender and age being removed (as far as possible) theoretically should refine the dilemmas. A comparative investigation utilizing the original (gender-age cued) and modified (non gender-age cued) dilemmas could produce interesting results.

Hogan (1973) has found that subjects that were highly empathic appeared to be suffering from identity diffusion and showed excessive inhibition of aggression and hostility. Additional research seems to be warranted especially with stage three subjects in order to investigate possible identity diffusion and excessive inhibition of aggressive and hostile tendencies. Since the stage at which a person operates renders the reason, the motive for his "moral" action, an investigation of motivational theories as related to the various stages of moral development and the personality variables of interest could produce perspicacious results. For instance, a purely hedonistic theory of human motivation would seem to espouse a stage two



morality and possibly a highly autonomous orientation with low socialization and low empathic orientation.

The relationship of autonomy, empathy, and socialization to ego development as well as the relationship between ego and moral development would seem to be fertile fields for continuing research. Even though Kohlberg views ego development as a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral development, additional research seems necessary to provide further theory articulation.

Another area of potential research would be an investigation of Maslow's hierarchy of needs and levels of socialization, autonomy, empathy and moral development, since the satisfaction of a given need stage may be prerequisite for attainment of a corresponding moral stage.

The present investigation indexed moral development by the exceptional usage of a particular stage. Other means of indexing moral development are: indexing by highest stage of substantial use in which the highest stage at which a subject produces at least twenty percent of his responses is chosen as the stage of substantial usage (Rest, 1976); indexing by the stage of predominant usage at which fifty percent or more of the responses occur. Further research appears to be needed regarding the comparative usefulness of the various indices of moral development.

Continued research investigating age and sex trends in the development of autonomy, socialization, empathy, and moral reasoning seems to be warranted. Interesting research could be done in the consideration of levels of autonomy, socialization, empathy and moral development in relation to diverse occupations and professions such as

Candee's pilot study (1977) which reported that one of the dimensions differentiating principled stage physicians from their lower stage colleagues was the personality variable of affective empathy.

Additional research is called for in order to clarify Kohlberg's transitional stage four-and-one-half. This research would require longitudinal data and must address itself to the social perspective of each stage of moral development.

Another research area suggested by the present inquiry would be the relationship of teachers' levels of autonomy, socialization, empathy, and moral development and classroom climate as perhaps assessed by Flanders' interaction analysis method (Amidon and Flanders, 1971). One could also investigate the effect of teacher training (regarding conditions that facilitate autonomy, socialization, empathy, and moral development in their students) on student growth in these areas. An additional research question could be: does such training act as a change agent for the teachers themselves? Various methods of training could be utilized (such as discussion, lecture etc.) and the efficacy of training methods in producing change could be compared.

Finally, assessing levels of autonomy, socialization, empathy, and stage of moral development in active church goers (defined as those who attend Sunday services at least three times a month) who are differentiated by intrinsic religious motivation in contrast to extrinsic religious motivation would appear to be an interesting area for research. Intrinsic religious motivation has been operationalized by the scale developed by Hoge (1972).

To recapitulate, the research implications of the present

investigations are many, namely: (1) systematic replication studies, (2) utilization of different instrumentation for autonomy, socialization, and empathy, (3) continued longitudinal studies, (4) reduction of gender and age cues in the moral dilemmas, (5) investigation of possible identity diffusion in stage three subjects, (6) investigation of motivational theories as related to moral development and personality variables, (7) relating personality variables to ego development, (8) continued research concerning the relationship between ego and moral development, (9) investigation of Maslow's hierarchy of needs and levels of autonomy, socialization, empathy, and moral development, (10) indexing moral development by highest stage of substantial usage and/or predominant stage of usage, (11) continued research regarding age and sex trends in the development of the personality variables and moral development, (12) utilizing diverse occupations and professions in investigating levels of autonomy, socialization, empathy, and moral development, (13) continued research concerning Kohlberg's transitional stage four-and-one-half, (14) relating teachers' level of autonomy, socialization, empathy, and moral development to classroom climate, (15) effect of teacher training in moral development on student moral growth, (16) investigation of training in moral development discussion as a change agent for the trainee, (17) investigation of levels of the personality variables and stage of moral development in church goers differentiated by intrinsic as opposed to extrinsic religious motivation.

These research possibilities have arisen from the investigator's frame of reference, a different frame of reference could produce many other implications for research. All in all, the present investigation can be of significant heuristic value.

## CHAPTER VI

### SUMMARY

The investigation sought to study the relationship between Kohlberg's stages of moral development and the developmental personality variables of autonomy, socialization, and empathy proposed by Hogan as necessary for mature moral development with one major difference. Empathy as defined by Hogan refers to cognitive empathy (the cognitive awareness and recognition of another's feelings); empathy as defined in the present study refers to affective empathy (the vicarious sharing of another's feelings).

Two critical age periods (preadolescence and late adolescence) suggested in the Kohlbergian literature were selected for investigation. Ninety two Caucasian seventh grade students from a suburban Chicago public school were randomly assigned to the preadolescent group. Ninety six Caucasian students from a suburban Chicago junior college were assigned to the late adolescent group. Each group was balanced for sex differences. Subtests of the "California Test of Personality" were utilized to assess socialization and autonomy; affective autonomy was assessed by a modified scale of the "Mehrabian-Epstein Empathy Scale." Moral development was measured by the "Carroll Test of Moral Reasoning" for the seventh grade subjects and by the "Defining Issues Test of Moral Reasoning" for the college subjects.

The results indicated that the three personality variables of

autonomy, socialization and empathy (taken as a unit) were significantly related to dominant stage of moral development. However, when the personality variables were investigated separately, autonomy was the only variable showing a statistically significant linear relationship for the seventh grade sample. In contrast, for the college sample, as autonomy, socialization, and empathy scores increased, the dominant stage of moral development also increased. This result of mature-principled moral development requiring high autonomy, high socialization, and high empathy, partially confirmed Hogan's hypothesis.

Empathy significantly differentiated the two age groups, and significant sex differences were obtained. Seventh grade males were differentiated from seventh grade females by, (1) empathy (females being significantly more empathic than males) and (2) dominant stage (with females significantly clustering at stage three, while males were scattered throughout the stages). College males were differentiated from college females in that, (1) females were significantly more empathic, (2) females were significantly more socialized, and (3) males significantly predominated at stages two and three, while females significantly clustered at the principled stage. Females in both age groups were more empathic than their male counterparts. This finding was discussed in terms of socialization patterns and Hoffman's distinction between cognitive and affective empathy. The present study seemingly stands in opposition to findings reported by Kohlberg and Kramer who found that adult females stabilize at stage three while adult males stabilize at stage four.

The seemingly idiosyncratic result of college males being low in

affective empathy and in dominant stage of moral development was discussed in terms of the peculiarity of the chosen sample, Piaget's concept of adolescent egocentrism, and Kohlberg's transitional stage four-and-one-half.

Societal and educational implications were applied to the family, the school, and the church. Implications for future research were presented.

## EPILOGUE

Maslow (1970) states that he believes that "the ultimate disease of our time is valuelessness" (p. 82). Kristol (1974) has pointed out that Western Civilization in general, and the United States, in particular, are at present experiencing a crisis in values. Frankl (1972) has referred to the state of man characterized by feelings of emptiness, boredom, valuelessness, and meaninglessness, as "the existential vacuum" and believes that this vacuum has become ubiquitous with the youth all over the world being engulfed by the existential vacuum.

In light of man's precarious existential predicament, Salk (1975) poses the following questions:

Is man programmed for relatively short term survival in which his end may come of his own doing? Or is he programmed for a life in which only those who have lost the power to discriminate, or who are otherwise degenerate, will continue to inhabit the planet as long as reproductive activity continues to supply "victims" of life? And what other alternatives exist? (p. 667)

Salk quests for the end of the Darwinian epoch, replaced by an epoch requiring a complete inversion of values, an epoch ruled by the wisdom of cooperation in which the welfare of the individual and the welfare of the species are tightly bound.

It has been widely assumed that cooperation and affective empathy are significantly related. Johnson (1975) tested this assumption and found that the predisposition for cooperative behavior is significantly related to affective empathy in elementary aged children and a predisposition for competition "is related to a lack of affective

perspective taking ability or egocentrism." (p. 870)

The present investigation strongly infers the importance not only of affective empathy but also of socialization and autonomy for principled moral development. A world based on principled morality would be a world based on justice, and justice is the foundation on which a world of love (agape) can be built. It is hoped that this study may contribute, however infinitesimally, to an epoch of cooperation, an epoch of justice, an epoch of agape.



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APPENDIX A



ANSWER SHEET FOR SEVENTH GRADE SAMPLE: CARROLL  
MORAL REASONING TEST

<u>NAME</u>	<u>BIRTHDATE</u>	<u>AGE</u>	<u>GRADE</u>
A) YES-NO		C) YES-NO	
1.		21.	
2.		22.	
3.		23.	
4.		24.	
5.		25.	
6.		26.	
7.		27.	
8.		28.	
9.		29.	
10.		30.	
 B) YES-NO		 D) YES-NO	
11.		31.	
12.		32.	
13.		33.	
14.		34.	
15.		35.	
16.		36.	
17.		37.	
18.		38.	
19.		39.	
20.		40.	

ANSWER SHEET FOR SEVENTH GRADE SAMPLE: EMPATHY  
AUTONOMY, AND SOCIALIZATION MEASURES

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

(EMPATHY)		(AUTONOMY)	(SOCIALIZATION)
1.	21.	1.	16.
2.	22.	2.	17.
3.	23.	3.	18.
4.	24.	4.	19.
5.	25.	5.	20.
6.	26.	6.	21.
7.	27.	7.	22.
8.	28.	8.	23.
9.	29.	9.	24.
10.	30.	10.	25.
11.	31.	11.	26.
12.	32.	12.	27.
13.	33.	13.	28.
14.		14.	29.
15.		15.	30.
16.			
17.			
18.			
19.			
20.			

APPENDIX B

SIXTEEN ITEMS OF THE MODIFIED MEHRABIAN - EPSTEIN  
AFFECTIVE EMPATHY SCALE

\* \*\*

- (+) 1. It makes me sad to see a lonely stranger in a group.
- (+) 7. I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend's problem.
- (+) 8. Sometimes the words of a love song can move me deeply.
- (+) 9. I tend to lose control of myself when I am bringing bad news to people.
- (+) 12. I would rather be a social worker than work in a job training center.
- (+) 14. I like to watch people open presents.
- (-) 15. Lonely people are probably unfriendly.
- (+) 17. Some songs make me happy.
- (+) 18. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel.
- (+) 19. I get very angry when I see someone being mistreated.
- (-) 21. When a friend starts to talk about his problems, I try to steer the conversation to something else.
- (+) 31. I become very involved when I watch a movie.

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\* The (+) and (-) signs indicate the direction of scoring.

\*\* The numeration of the items is that of the original scale.

APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by Peter C. Zavadowsky has been read and approved by the following committee:

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The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Date

4/19/78

Director's Signature

