



1964

Major Philosophical Implications of Carl Rogers' Theory of Personality

Daniel Artley
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses



Part of the [Philosophy Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Artley, Daniel, "Major Philosophical Implications of Carl Rogers' Theory of Personality" (1964). *Master's Theses*. 1869.

https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/1869

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.

Copyright © 1964 Daniel Artley

MAJOR PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF CARL ROGERS' THEORY
OF PERSONALITY

by

Daniel W. Artley, S.J.

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of
the Requirements of the Degree
of Master of Arts
in Philosophy

September

1964

CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	1
A. Justification for and Purpose of This Thesis	1
1. Justification	1
a) Rogers has formulated a theory of per- sonality that is the subject of much attention today.	1
b) He recognizes the need for a psycholo- gist to have a proper philosophy.	1
(1) He has explicitly tried to formu- late the basic philosophical foun- dation of his theory of personality.	1
(2) He believes philosophy is important for all psychologists.	2
2. Purpose is to present the major philosoph- ical implications that underlie Rogers' theory of personality and the major criti- cism to which this philosophy has been subjected.	3
B. An Aid in Understanding These Philosophical Positions Is Some Knowledge of Rogers' Back- ground.	4
1. Life of Rogers	4
2. Theoretic Influences on Rogers	7
a) Psychiatry and psychotherapy	7
b) Existential psychology	9
II. THE PERSONALITY THEORY OF CARL ROGERS	11
A. Introduction	11
1. Theory the result of experience, reflec- tion, and research.	11
2. Theory constantly modified	11
B. Structural Constructs of Personality	12
1. <u>Organism</u>	12
2. <u>Experience</u> or <u>phenomenal field</u>	12
a) Defined	12
b) Organism responds to experience by	13
(1) <u>Awareness, symbolization, conscious-</u> <u>ness</u>	13

	(2) <u>Perception</u>	13
	(3) <u>Subception</u>	13
3.	<u>Self</u>	14
	a) <u>Defined</u>	14
	b) <u>Ideal self</u>	15
	c) <u>Formation out of total perceptual field</u>	15
C.	<u>Dynamics of Personality</u>	15
	1. Behavior is basically explained by the tendency of every organism toward <u>actualization.</u>	15
	a) <u>Actualization a holistic concept</u>	17
	b) Behavior is goal-directed	18
	(1) Satisfies needs	18
	(2) Follows perception	18
	(3) Importance of the present	19
	2. Actualization is modified and complicated in the human organism.	20
	a) Need-reduction not adequate explanation of behavior	20
	b) Actualization basically in terms of <u>self-actualization</u>	21
	(1) <u>Behavior tends to maintain the self-structure.</u>	21
	(2) But conflict may arise between the self-structure and actual experience	21
	(a) <u>Self-structure defended when threatened</u>	21
	i) Need for consistency of self-structure determines perception	21
	ii) Deviant behavior not accepted as one's own	21
	(b) Cause of conflict seen in terms of:	22
	i) <u>Positive regard</u>	22
	ii) <u>Unconditional positive regard</u>	22
	iii) <u>Self-regard</u>	23
	iv) <u>Unconditional self-regard</u>	23
	v) <u>Condition of worth</u>	23
	(3) <u>Reintegration process</u>	24
	(a) Achieved in interpersonal relationship	25
	(b) <u>Internal locus of evaluation</u>	25
	(c) <u>Universal application</u>	25

III. THE NATURE OF MAN	27
A. Man Has a Nature	27
B. Characteristics	28
1. Fundamentally positive direction	28
a) The primary truth about man	29
b) Whether this is over-stressed	31
(1) Criticism that it is	31
(2) Further explanation of Rogers' position	33
(a) Man does not necessarily actualize fully.	33
i) Factors which may hinder actualization	33
ii) Actualization invariant only under certain conditions	34
iii) Man capable of evil	35
(b) Question of emphasis	35
c) Summary	36
2. Social	37
a) True actualization manifested in social behavior	37
b) Criticism	38
3. Freedom	39
a) Clearly maintained by Rogers	39
(1) Result of research and experience	39
(2) Criticism	41
(a) Accepted as evidence that Rogers has advanced beyond purely organismic theories of man	41
(b) One reason Rogers labelled an idealist	42
b) Traditional psychology inadequate for explaining freedom	42
(1) Scientific psychology	43
(a) Paradox of experience	43
(b) Rogers-Skinner	43
i) Skinner believes that the scientific method necessitates denial of freedom.	44
ii) Rogers insists that scientists choose goals.	45
(c) But Rogers not rejecting scientific study of man	47
(2) Classical psychoanalysis	47

c)	Freedom in light of existential psychology	48
(1)	Freedom basically an inner attitude	49
(2)	Tentative solution to freedom-determinism problem	49
d)	Freedom does not differentiate man from other organisms.	50
(1)	Implication that all experience biologically based	50
(2)	Freedom depends on consciousness	51
(a)	This unique to man	51
(b)	But does not make man different in kind	51
(3)	Thus theoretically possible to understand man by laws of natural science	51
(4)	Criticism	52
(a)	That this is reductionism	52
(b)	That behavior never invariant regardless of what motivating factors are present	53
e)	Summary	53
4.	Unique	53

IV.	THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF OBJECTIVE REALITY	55
A.	Relevance of the Problem	55
1.	From psychological standpoint, perception equals reality	55
2.	But the question of objective reality is important for a philosophy of personality.	55
B.	Implications in Early Writing That There Is No Reality beyond Perception	56
1.	In 1947 article Rogers implicitly denied such reality	56
a)	Behavior perhaps only influenced by perception	56
b)	Self-satisfaction the index of adjustment	56
c)	Criticism	56
2.	But he came to imply reality beyond perception	57
C.	Whether the Reality beyond Perception Is an Objective Reality, and Whether It Can Be Known As Such	58
1.	Implication that reality limited to the sensible	58

2. Objective truth not reached by scientific method	58
a) Supposition that scientific method most likely to reach truth	58
(1) Description of science	58
(a) Must incorporate all ways of knowing	58
(b) Objective aspect of science	60
(2) Implications that it reaches truth	62
b) Strictly speaking it does not.	63
c) But the possible existence of an objective reality not denied	66
3. Experiential knowledge gives only practical truth.	66
4. Two-world theory implied	67
5. Criticism of Rogers' epistemology	67
a) Criticism that Rogers limits reality to subjective perception	68
b) Dettering's criticism that in Rogers' theory the subject knows only subjective perception divorced from reality	68
(1) Rogers-Dewey	69
(2) Comments on Dettering	71
 D. Summary	 72
 V. THEORY OF VALUES AND THE GOOD LIFE	 74
A. Theory of Values	74
1. Presupposes Rogers' theory of the nature of man and his epistemology	74
2. Three types of value	74
3. Process of evaluation	75
a) Values must be found "within."	75
(1) Criterion is sensory and visceral experience	75
(2) The total organism must be the base of evaluation	76
(a) Scientific description of this	76
(b) Thus man wiser than his intellect	77
(3) Therefore values never fixed or rigid	78
(a) Observed in infant	78
(b) Observed in mature adult	79
b) Whether this is philosophical relativism	80
(1) Criticized as such	80

(2) Values dependent solely upon experience	81
(a) But internal locus of evaluation enhances the individual	81
(b) And internal locus of evaluation also enhances society	82
(3) But Rogers does acknowledge a universality of values	82
(a) Believes he has a new demonstration of the fact	83
(b) Suggested similarity between Rogers and natural-law moralists	83
B. Theory of the Good Life	84
1. Importance of the question	85
2. Rogers' theory	85
a) Depends on the theory of values	85
b) Process conception of the good life	85
(1) "To be that self which one truly is"	85
(a) Individual moves away from incongruence	86
(b) Individual moves toward being the fully-functioning person	87
(2) Impossibility of static description	89
c) Social Implications of the theory of life	91
VI. CONCLUSION	92

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Dr. Carl R. Rogers is a psychologist, not a philosopher by profession. But there is much justification for a thesis which examines in detail the major philosophical implications of his theory of personality; for as the originator of a well-known therapeutic method--non-directive or client-centered therapy--Rogers has become a center of much controversy both for the theory of personality he has formulated to account for his psychotherapeutic experience and for the philosophical positions that underlie this theory. It is therefore important to realize what these positions are and also what is the major criticism to which they have been subjected.

Rogers has clearly recognized the importance of having a proper philosophy of man in order to construct an adequate theory of personality, and he has explicitly attempted to formulate his philosophy. He mentions that today most psychologists would feel insulted if accused of thinking philosophical thoughts but that he himself does not share this reaction, for he cannot help puzzling over the meaning of what he has seen.¹ He points out

¹Carl R. Rogers, On Becoming a Person: A Therapist's View of Psychotherapy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1961), p. 163.

that it is impossible to engage in psychotherapeutic work without at least acting according to an underlying set of values and a basic view of what man is, even though the therapist may not explicitly formulate the philosophy which he practices.² Rogers emphasizes that the philosophy determines the therapist.³ If the therapist sees man as an object to be dissected, diagnosed, and manipulated, his approach to counseling will reflect this attitude; and the therapist will consider it not only preferable but a strict duty to take the responsibility for directing the life of the person who has come to him for help. If on the other hand his philosophy stresses man's ability for self-direction and self-responsibility, counseling will reflect this attitude.

However, in Rogers' eyes philosophy is important not only for the psychologist who is a therapist. Rogers asks his fellow psychologists to realize that what they do as scientists will have implications far beyond the purely scientific meaning of their findings, just as the work of atomic physicists necessarily has important social meanings for humanity.⁴ This problem is becoming increasingly obvious in contemporary society, where the

²Carl R. Rogers, "A Note on the Nature of Man," Journal of Counseling Psychology, IV (1957), 199.

³Carl R. Rogers, "The Attitude and Orientation of the Counselor in Client-Centered Therapy," Journal of Consulting Psychology, XIII (1949), 82-85, 94; Carl R. Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy: Its Current Practice, Implications, and Theory (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951), pp. 20-22.

⁴Carl R. Rogers, "A Personal View of Some Issues Facing Psychologists," American Psychologist, X (1955), 248-49.

state is assuming more and more responsibility for directing the various socio-economic activities of man. Are the "planners" of the modern complex state to use the discoveries of the social scientists in a way that will further or diminish the dignity of the individual man? The answer to this question will depend to a very large extent on the philosophy not only of the "planners" but also of the social scientists themselves, who necessarily orientate their investigations according to their personal philosophy of man. Rogers calls attention to the utopia of manipulation envisioned by B. F. Skinner in Walden Two⁵ as an example of what some psychologists are apparently seriously proposing as the end point of the evolution of the modern state. Huxley's satiric Brave New World⁶ also vividly portrays the loss of personhood associated with increasing psychological and biological knowledge.⁷ One's philosophical outlook on the individual, then, will determine one's philosophical outlook on society as a whole. If the philosophical supposition is that men are free and capable of self-direction, then a responsible democratic order will be achieved; if this is denied, the society will be at best a Walden Two wherein individuals submit to a subtle manipulation by experts rather than actively directing the course of their own

⁵B. F. Skinner, Walden Two (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948).

⁶Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (New York: Harper and Bros., 1946).

⁷Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., p. 214.

unique lives.⁸

More and more in recent years, then, Rogers has turned his attention to the basic philosophical foundation of his approach, seeking to determine the nature of man and the implications of the answer to this question. It is these questions and the answers to them that Rogers gives that will be examined in this thesis. The primary intention is to present what Rogers and his critics have said concerning these points, and is not to offer an evaluation either of Rogers' own positions or of the criticism of them, except in places where it is relevant to offer some internal criticism of the positions.

An aid in understanding Rogers' philosophical positions is some knowledge of his background.⁹

Rogers was born in Oak Park, Illinois, on January 8, 1902. He mentions that the family religion was a highly conservative Protestantism; and when he was twelve, the growing family moved to a farm, leaving behind what were considered to be the temptations of suburban life. Here Rogers became deeply interested in

⁸Carl R. Rogers, "Divergent Trends in Methods of Improving Adjustment," Harvard Educational Review, XIIX (1948), 212, 218-19. Quoted in Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., pp. 224-25.

⁹The following synopsis of Rogers' life is taken from: Carl R. Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy, Personality, and Interpersonal Relationships As Developed in the Client-Centered Framework," Psychology: A Study of a Science, Vol. III: Formulations of the Person and the Social Context, ed. S. Koch (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), pp. 185-88; Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., pp. 3-15; Arthur W. Melton, "The APA Distinguished Scientific Contribution Awards for 1956," American Psychologist, XII (1957), 128-29.

scientific farming and acquired a knowledge of and a respect for the methods of practical science. This led him to enter the University of Wisconsin as an agricultural student. However after his second year in college, as a result of some emotionally charged student religious conferences he transferred into history, believing that studies in this area would better prepare him for the ministry. A trip to China during his junior year for an international World Student Christian Federation Conference at which he came to realize that sincere and honest people could hold very divergent religious beliefs resulted in the final rejection of his family's dogmatic views on religion; and he entered the liberal Union Theological Seminary in New York City after graduation from Wisconsin in 1924. Rogers comments that the seminary at this time was deeply committed to freedom of philosophical thought and respected the sincere attempts of students to think their way through the problems that they themselves raised. Rogers took the opportunity to think himself right out of religious work, saying that he could not intellectually justify committing himself to a field of work in which he would have to believe in some specific doctrine. His views had changed so much during his college years that he could not be sure they would not continue to change.

Rogers next entered Teacher's College, Columbia University, where he was introduced to clinical psychology. The following year he was granted an internship at the new Institute for

Child Guidance in New York City. Here he realized the conflict between the two different worlds of psychology he was living in: the highly Freudian approach to personality at the Institute, and the rigorously scientific and coldly objective statistical and Thorndikean views at Teacher's College.

The next twelve years (1928-1940) were spent in a community child guidance center at Rochester, New York. The staff at this center was eclectic and Rogers was exposed to a wide variety of methods. He published his first major work, The Clinical Treatment of the Problem Child,¹⁰ in 1939. He had meanwhile received his M.A. in 1928 and his Ph.D. in 1931 from Columbia.

In 1940 Rogers accepted a professorship in psychology at Ohio State University. He admits that the shift to university teaching on a full-time schedule was a sharp one, but one which proved profitable in that his ideas were subjected to the intellectual curiosity of graduate students who were eager to learn and to contribute through theory and research to the development of this field of knowledge. His first book on non-directive therapy, Counseling and Psychotherapy,¹¹ was published in 1942.

In 1945 Rogers moved to the Counseling Center of the University of Chicago where his approach to psychotherapy continually developed as he gained more and more experience and

¹⁰Carl R. Rogers, The Clinical Treatment of the Problem Child (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1939).

¹¹Carl R. Rogers, Counseling and Psychotherapy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1942).

subjected his findings to further empirical research. During this period he wrote Client-Centered Therapy: Its Current Practice, Implications, and Theory¹² and "A Theory of Therapy, Personality, and Interpersonal Relationships As Developed in the Client-Centered Framework."¹³

Since 1957 Rogers has been at the University of Wisconsin where he is investigating the possibilities of using his psychotherapeutic method for helping psychotic patients. His last major work, On Becoming a Person: A Therapist's View of the Good Life,¹⁴ was published in 1961.

Rogers was president of the American Association for Applied Psychology in 1944-45, of the American Psychological Association in 1946-47, of the Division of Clinical and Abnormal Psychology in 1949-50, and of the American Academy of Psychotherapists in 1956. He received an American Psychological Association Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award in 1956.

Rogers, of course, has not developed his theories in a vacuum but has been influenced both by the men and by the ideas with which he has come into contact. In an article on the development of client-centered therapy, Raskin traces some of the non-directive concepts that were antecedent to Rogers and which

¹²Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy. . . .

¹³Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.).

¹⁴Rogers, On Becoming a Person. . . .

became assimilated into his thought.¹⁵ Raskin mentions Freud, Otto Rank, Jessie Taft, and Frederick H. Allen. Freud had some non-directive inclinations in his work inasmuch as he came to place more and more emphasis on the attitudes of the patient rather than upon the will and direction of the analyst. Otto Rank, the primary early influence on Rogers,¹⁶ differed from Freud in centering his attention upon the creative powers of the individual's will rather than considering the patient a battleground of such impersonal forces as id and superego, in looking upon the aim of therapy as acceptance of oneself as unique and self-reliant and capable of positive self-direction, in making the patient the central figure in the therapeutic relationship, and in believing that the goals of therapy are achieved not through exploration of the past but through experience of the present. Jessie Taft, Rank's translator and associate, further developed Rank's ideas; and Frederick Allen carried on the Rankian emphases and explicitly developed the notion of man's innate potency and urge toward growth and individual responsibility.

Rogers has also frequently acknowledged his debt to many

¹⁵Nathaniel J. Raskin, "The Development of Non-Directive Therapy," Journal of Consulting Psychology, XII (1948), 92-109.

¹⁶Rogers, Counseling and Psychotherapy, p. 440. Rogers mentions that the concepts underlying this first book on non-directive counseling are much influenced by the Rankian group; he refers the reader to Otto Rank, Will Therapy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1936). Milton L. Blum and Benjamin Balinsky discuss the influence of Rank on Rogers in Counseling and Psychology (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), p. 103.

contemporary psychologists whose ideas have influenced his theories.¹⁷

Rogers' own experience has gradually led him away from viewing the human person solely from the standpoint of logical positivism. He now prefers to view man from the standpoint of an approach which has today been labelled "existential psychology":

I see a great need for creative thinking and theorizing in regard to the methods of social science. There is a rather widespread feeling in our group that the logical positivism in which we were professionally reared is not necessarily the final philosophical word in an area in which the phenomenon of subjectivity plays such a vital and central part. Have we evolved the optimal method for approximating the truth in this area? Is there some view, possibly developing out of an existentialist orientation, which might preserve the values of logical positivism and the scientific advances which it has helped to foster and yet find more room for the existing subjective person who is at the heart and base even of our system of science?¹⁸

He contrasts the traditional American objective trend in psychology, which is nonhumanistic, impersonal, and based on knowledge of animal learning, with the existential, more humanistic trend of European psychology. The latter trend is characterized by adjectives such as phenomenological, existential, person-centered; by concepts such as self-actualization, becoming, growth; by individuals (in this country) such as Gordon Allport, Abraham Maslow, and Rollo May. It is with this group of men that Rogers

¹⁷Cf., e.g., Carl R. Rogers, "Some Observations on the Organization of Personality," American Psychologist, II (1947), 366-68; Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), p. 194; Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., pp. 128, 215.

¹⁸Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), p. 251.

would like to place himself, believing that the existential approach more adequately accounts for the whole range of human behavior.¹⁹

¹⁹Carl R. Rogers, "Two Divergent Trends," Existential Psychology, ed. Rollo May (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 88. For a general discussion of the inadequacy of the positivistic, behavioristic viewpoint, consult Carl R. Rogers, "Toward a Science of the Person" (unpublished paper prepared for a symposium on "Behaviorism and Phenomenology: Contrasting Bases for Modern Psychology" at Rice University, Houston, Texas, March 20-22, 1963), pp. 15-37.

CHAPTER II

THE PERSONALITY THEORY OF CARL ROGERS

Rogers' personality theory has gradually developed through the continual interplay of therapeutic experience, abstract conceptualizing, and research using operationally defined terminology.¹ The most important of these is Rogers' own personal clinical experience;² he believes that a theory constructed from one's own experience can avoid the charge of being merely armchair speculation.

A point to note in approaching the following synopsis of Rogers' personality theory is that the theory is constantly being modified in the light of further experience and research.³ The major directions of the theory have not markedly changed; but there have been changes in the constructs and organization of the theory, and Rogers expects this ongoing process of revision to continue.

¹Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), p. 194. Cf. Rogers, "Some Observations on the Organization of Personality," 358.

²Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., p. 32.

³Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), p. 244; Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., p. 17.

The following, then, is a summary of Rogers' personality theory as it has been developed up to this time.⁴ The structural constructs of personality will be examined first.

The total individual considered as an organized whole is referred to as the organism. The phenomenal field is the experiential field of which the organism is the center. In his 1951 book Rogers describes the phenomenal field as the totality of experience, that is, all of the "sensory and visceral experiences" going on within the organism at any given moment regardless of whether or not the individual is conscious of them.⁵ By 1953, when Rogers formulated his theories in detail at the request of the American Psychological Association, he preferred to use the term experience rather than phenomenal field;⁶ and he made more explicit the notion that the term includes only that experience

⁴This summary is taken mainly from: Carl R. Rogers, "Significant Aspects of Client-Centered Therapy," American Psychologist, I (1946), 415-22; Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., pp. 489-533; Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), pp. 184-233. Summaries of Rogers' personality theory as it is explained in Client-Centered Therapy . . . are found in Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of Personality (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957), pp. 478-89; Nicholas Hobbs, "Client-Centered Psychotherapy," Six Approaches to Psychotherapy, ed. James L. McCary (New York: Dryden Press, 1955), pp. 51-58.

⁵Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., p. 483.

⁶Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), p. 197. The term phenomenal field has been used in various ways and has more connotations than the relatively neutral term experience. Cf., M. B. Smith's objection to the use of phenomenal field in "The Phenomenological Approach in Personality Theory: Some Critical Remarks," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XVI (1950), 516-22.

which is potentially available to consciousness. The psychological aspects of hunger, for example, would be included in experience since a person can turn his attention to the fact of hunger even though he now happens to be so engrossed in work that he is not aware of this need; but a change in the sugar count of the blood would not be included. The verb experience means to receive in the organism the impact of the sensory or physiological events which are happening at the moment.

The terms awareness, symbolization, and consciousness are used synonymously by Rogers. Consciousness or awareness is the symbolic representation (although not necessarily in verbal symbols) of some part of experience. This representation can have varying degrees of vividness.

Perception is a hypothesis for action which comes into being in awareness when stimuli impinge on the organism. Thus it is a more narrow term than awareness since perception emphasizes the importance of an external stimulus whereas awareness can refer to purely internal stimuli. By defining perception as a hypothesis for action, Rogers means that when we perceive an object (for example, "this person is my mother") we are making a prediction that the object from which the stimuli are received would, if checked in other ways, exhibit properties which we have come to regard, because of past experience, as being characteristic of that object.

Subception signifies discrimination without awareness.

This is the capacity of the organism to discriminate on a pre-conscious level an experience as threatening without the individual being aware of the threat.

The self, which is the central structural concept in Rogers' theory of personality,⁷ is a differentiated portion of the total perceptual field of the organism. It is the conscious sense of autonomy, the awareness of being and functioning. It is a gestalt composed of the perceptions and concepts of the characteristics and abilities and goals of the "I" or "me" and the relationships of the "I" or "me" to various aspects of life, together with the values attached to these perceptions and concepts. Although at any given moment it could in theory be completely known, Rogers points out that in practice this would probably be impossible since as a gestalt it is a continually changing even though usually consistent process. He admits that as a construct the self could be defined in various ways but prefers to include in his definition only experience which is available to awareness although not necessarily now in awareness. He feels that a definition of the self which includes unconscious material that cannot be brought into awareness would be impossible to handle operationally.⁸

The ideal self denotes the self-concept which the

⁷Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., pp. 12, 136-37.

⁸Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), pp. 202-203.

individual would most like to possess. In all other respects it is the same as the self-concept.

The question arises as to how the self-structure is formed out of the total field. Rogers believes that it develops as a result of interaction with the environment and especially as a result of evaluational interaction with other people.⁹ An infant gradually comes to realize the difference between himself and the other and perceives that some things belong to him and other things to the environment. At the same time he is forming a concept of himself in relation to the things he comes in contact with, and he evaluates these relationships as good or bad. Rogers considers it very important that values are not only the result of direct experience but are also taken over (introjected) from other people and perceived in a distorted manner, as if they had been experienced directly. For example, a child may like to slap his baby brother but, upon being told by mother that it is "good" to like baby brother, he may come to believe that he does not really want to hurt him in spite of a very real desire to do so. Out of these two sources--the direct experience of the individual and the distorted symbolization of sensory reactions resulting in the introjection of values as if they were directly experienced--the structure of the self develops.

Turning now to the dynamics of personality we find that

⁹Ibid., p. 223; Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., pp. 498-501.

behavior is explained primarily in terms of actualization. In his earliest book on his method of therapy (1942) Rogers recognizes the natural drive within every organism to actualize, maintain, and enhance itself when he refers to "the impulses toward growth and normality which appear in every individual";¹⁰ in every person there are "positive impulses which make for growth."¹¹ Belief in the individual drive toward growth, health, and adjustment is reiterated and elaborated in Rogers' later writings. In his second book on client-centered therapy, he speaks of a single unifying teleological drive: ". . . one of the most basic characteristics of organic life is its tendency toward total, organized, goal-directed responses."¹² His conviction about the universality of this drive constantly developed as he saw client after client achieve a more integrated life; and in his latest book (1961) he repeats his belief, stated in an earlier article, that all psychotherapy--and, indeed, all constructive activity¹³--ultimately depends upon man's tendency to actualize himself, to become his potentialities, to expand, extend, develop, mature:

Gradually my experience has forced me to conclude that the individual has within himself the capacity and the tendency,

¹⁰Rogers, Counseling and Psychotherapy, p. 201.

¹¹Ibid., p. 35.

¹²Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., pp. 486-87.

¹³Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., pp. 350-51.

latent if not evident, to move forward toward maturity. . . . Whether one calls it a growth tendency, a drive toward self-actualization, or a forward-moving directional tendency, it is the mainspring of life, and is, in the last analysis, the tendency upon which all psychotherapy depends. It is the urge which is evident in all organic and human life--to expand, extend, become autonomous, develop, mature--the tendency to express and activate all the capacities of the organism, to the extent that such activation enhances the organism or the self.¹⁴

It is essential to realize that this process of actualization is a unifying and holistic concept in Rogers' theory. The organism reacts as an organized whole to its experience, and all psychological and physiological needs are considered partial aspects of this one fundamental need for actualization. Rogers insists that man's activity cannot be understood by analysing out segments of the total man and studying these independently of the rest, for each individual segment is closely interdependent with all of the others:

The outstanding fact which must be taken into account is that the organism is at all times a total organized system, in which attraction of any part may produce changes in any other part. Our study of such part phenomena must start from this central fact of consistent, goal-directed organization.¹⁵

By insisting on this view Rogers is careful to avoid a homunculus theory by which behavior would be organized and directed by some little genie pulling levers at a control panel within the individual. It is only the organism as a whole which acts. The

¹⁴Ibid., p. 35; cf. p. 285.

¹⁵Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., pp. 486-87.

self, for example, although an important construct in the theory of man, does not "do" anything but is merely one expression of the general tendency of the organism to behave in ways that maintain and enhance itself.¹⁶

Behavior, then, is basically the goal-directed attempt of the organism to satisfy its needs as experienced in the field as perceived. The goal toward which it strives is the actualization, maintenance, and enhancement of the organism so that all needs will be balanced.¹⁷ In 1942 Rogers remarked that a person "chooses the course which gives him the greater satisfaction."¹⁸ In 1951 he stated: "These needs occur as physiological tensions which, when experienced, form the basis of behavior which appears functionally (though not consciously) designed to reduce the tension and to maintain and enhance the organism."¹⁹ In 1961 he compared the organism to a giant electronic computer which quickly computes the behavior "which would be the most economical vector of need satisfaction in this existential situation."²⁰

The goals toward which the organism strives are the goals as they are perceived by the organism--behavior follows the

¹⁶Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), p. 196.

¹⁷Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., p. 491.

¹⁸Rogers, Counseling and Psychotherapy, p. 210.

¹⁹Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., p. 491.

²⁰Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., p. 190.

organism's perception of experience. From a psychological standpoint it is the perception of reality, and not necessarily reality itself, that is crucial in determining behavior. As far as the psychologist qua psychologist is concerned an organism's perception of reality is reality: "it is the perception of the environment which constitutes the environment, regardless as to how this relates to some 'real' reality which we may philosophically postulate."²¹ Each individual lives in his own subjective world in which reality is constituted by his unique perceptual field, and behavior is appropriate to these perceptions.²² For example, two men driving at night on a western road may see an object suddenly loom up in the road before them. The first man sees a large rock and swerves his car in fright; the second, a native of the area, sees a tumbleweed and reacts with nonchalance. Or a son and a daughter may have very different perceptions of a parent and consequently behave quite differently when faced with the same situation.

Because behavior follows perception, Rogers is careful to stress that the present is of primary importance in regard to needs and their fulfillment--goals affect the organism at the moment of its action. The past and the future cannot be divorced from the present; although the organism comes out of the past and

²¹Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), p. 222.

²²Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., pp. 484-86.

is directed toward the future, it is living in the present. This is not to deny that past experience can influence present behavior, but motivation of a given action is caused by a present need:

It should also be mentioned that in this concept of motivation all the effective elements exist in the present. Behavior is not "caused" by something which occurred in the past. Present tensions and present needs are the only ones which the organism endeavors to reduce or satisfy. While it is true that past experience has certainly served to modify the meaning which will be perceived in present experiences, yet there is no behavior except to meet a present need.²³

Such is Rogers' general explanation of the actualization of the organism. However, it is important to realize that this theory of actualization is modified and complicated in Rogers' explanation of the human organism in particular.

First of all it should be pointed out that although Rogers discusses actualization, even on the human level, basically in terms of tension-reduction, he does qualify his description by stating that the human actualizing tendency includes concepts of motivation which go beyond need-reduction:

It might also be mentioned that such concepts of motivation as are termed need-reduction, tension-reduction, drive-reduction, are included in this concept [the actualizing tendency]. It also includes, however, the growth motivations which appear to go beyond these terms: the seeking of pleasurable tensions, the tendency to be creative, the tendency to learn painfully to walk when crawling would meet the same needs more comfortably.²⁴

²³ Ibid., p. 492.

²⁴ Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), p. 196.

Secondly, in the human organism, the factor of the development of the self is added to the general actualizing tendency. Following the development of the self-structure, the tendency of the organism toward actualization expresses itself in self-actualization, in maintaining and enhancing the self-structure. If the structure of the self is basically congruent with the total experience of the organism, the actualizing tendency will remain relatively unified. However, if this is not the case, the organism will try to behave in ways which are consistent with the self so that the self-structure will not be threatened.²⁵

Defenses against threats to the self-structure are built up by refusing to admit these threats into consciousness. Perception therefore is selective, and the primary criterion for selection is whether the experience appears consistent with one's self-structure at the moment. It is this that determines whether the organism will symbolize its experience so that it becomes conscious, ignore the experience as having no pertinent relationship to the self, or deny or distort symbolization as inconsistent with the self.²⁶

Behavior may, however, be brought about by organic experiences and needs which are in conflict with the self-structure. But such behavior which deviates from the self-concept is often

²⁵Ibid., pp. 196-97, 203.

²⁶Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., pp. 503-507; Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), p. 227.

not accepted as really belonging to the individual--"I wasn't myself when I did that." Such inconsistency between the actual experience of the organism and the distortion or denial of it in order to maintain the self-structure is the basis for psychological maladjustment.

Why, though, does the conflict between experience and self-structure occur? Why is the individual not open to his experience at all times, as the infant is?

The fundamental reason hinges on the fact that there is a universal need for positive regard.²⁷ This term signifies such attitudes as warmth, liking, respect, sympathy. Rogers uses the term positive regard in the 1953 description of his theory rather than the term acceptance because of the misleading connotations he has found the latter term to have. The need for positive regard from others develops as the awareness of self develops and is so compelling that it may take precedence over the individual's personal organismic valuing process. The key concept of unconditional positive regard means that I perceive another's self-experiences (or another person perceives mine) in such a way that no self-experience is considered more or less worthy of positive regard than any other. It means considering the other deeply worthy of respect, valuing his inherent worth as a person even though I cannot equally value all of his actions, as a

²⁷Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), pp. 208, 223.

father would love his son while recognizing that some of the son's acts are more deserving of praise than others. (Note that there is a distinction here between "experience" and "overt action.") Accepting the other in this sense means "prizing" the other--to use Dewey's term²⁸--or "confirming the other"--to use Martin Buber's phrase²⁹--as he is and in his potentialities.

The need for self-regard is related to the need for positive regard from others.³⁰ The term denotes the satisfaction which has become associated with personal self-experiences independently of the positive regard received from others in interpersonal situations. This positive attitude toward self is thus no longer directly dependent on the attitudes of others. Unconditional self-regard is had when the individual perceives all of his self-experiences as equally worthy of positive regard.

Opposed to unconditional positive regard is a condition of worth.³¹ The self-structure is characterized by a condition of worth when self-experiences are avoided or sought solely because the individual considers them as less or more worthy of

²⁸Quoted in Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), p. 208.

²⁹Carl R. Rogers and Martin Buber, "Dialogue between Martin Buber and Carl Rogers" (unpublished dialogue which took place at Ann Arbor, Michigan, April 18, 1957), p. 21. Referred to by Rogers in On Becoming a Person . . ., p. 55.

³⁰Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), pp. 209, 224.

³¹Ibid., pp. 209-10, 224-26.

self-regard. Rogers considers this term more exact than the notion of "introjected value." A condition of worth arises when the positive regard of another person whose acceptance I value is conditional, that is, when I feel that I am accepted in some respects and not accepted in others. If the significant other has this conditional attitude toward me, I will gradually assimilate this into my self-regard complex and come to accept his value as if it were my own experience rather than because it enhances or fails to enhance my organism. Thus a condition of worth disturbs the valuing process and prevents full self-actualization.

Rogers states that ten years ago he believed that this conflict between self-structure and experience by which the conscious man becomes estranged from his directional organismic processes is a necessary although unfortunate part of human living. He now believes, however, that it is due only to certain types of social learning (especially predominant in Western culture) and that therefore this element of life could be changed.³²

Rogers does not believe that this conflict is necessarily interminable; for although the process of actualization may become deeply buried beneath layers of psychological defenses, it is Rogers' conviction that it exists in every individual and that

³²Carl R. Rogers, "The Actualizing Tendency in Relation to 'Motives' and to Consciousness" (unpublished paper given at the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, February 21-22, 1963), pp. 27-29.

given the proper conditions it will be released and manifest itself.³³ If the person who is incongruent--that is, who does not revise his self-concept to make it consistent with the actual experience of the organism, accurately symbolized--finds himself in a nonthreatening interpersonal relationship in which the other person is congruent in the relationship, and experiences unconditional positive regard toward and empathic understanding of the threatened individual, and if the threatened individual perceives at least to a minimal degree this unconditional positive regard and empathic understanding which the other has for him, then the individual is able to explore the unconscious experiences that he has before been unwilling to face and bring these experiences into awareness.³⁴ If he knows that another can accept him, then he is capable of accepting himself. He then gradually acquires an internal locus of evaluation³⁵ whereby the criterion of the valuing process is his own actualizing process rather than external values which are not personally meaningful to him. Rogers suggests that such acceptance may be the strongest factor of change in a person.³⁶

³³Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., p. 35.

³⁴Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), pp. 213, 230-31.

³⁵Ibid., p. 210; Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., pp. 119-22.

³⁶Rogers and Buber, "Dialogue between Martin Buber and Carl Rogers," p. 22.

Although in his discussion of this Rogers is primarily speaking of people who are incongruent enough to need psychotherapeutic help, he believes that because there is no man who is always completely congruent the theory could be extended beyond the psychotherapeutic situation to all interpersonal relationships.³⁷

³⁷Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), pp. 235-44; Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., pp. 40, 178.

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF MAN

There are three basic models according to which a theory of personality can be constructed. First, man can be looked upon as a physical machine, lacking any teleological principle and consequently wholly explainable in mechanistic terms according to the laws governing the physical sciences. Second, the theorist can look upon the human person as a biological organism, thereby admitting a teleological principle in man but seeing man as adequately explainable according to the laws of biology. The third possibility is to go further and construct a theory of personality in the belief that man is essentially different from other biological organisms. Such a theory allows for a unique modification of the general teleological drive which motivates every organism in that at the human level this drive is controlled by the human organism's free volitional choices as to just what his particular actualization will consist in.

What is the model of man, the conception of man's nature, according to which Rogers has constructed his theory of personality?

First of all, it is clear that Rogers believes that man does have a nature. The term does not seem to be a particularly

welcome one in psychological circles because of its philosophical implications; and Rogers himself suggests that the term nature may not be a happy choice for the concept it represents,¹ perhaps not because it is philosophical but because of its medieval flavor. But Rogers does explicitly state his belief that man has a nature which is common to his species. He approaches the question from the point of view of the animal kingdom in general, pointing out that each animal has a basic substratum of attributes characteristic of its species, and that therefore each animal has a basic nature. No amount of training will make a lion out of a mouse, or vice-versa: "I do not discover man to be, in his basic nature, completely without a nature, a tabula rasa on which anything may be written, nor malleable putty which can be shaped into any form."²

Four main characteristics of man may be found in Rogers' writings: man's dynamic nature is essentially positive, tends toward social behavior, is free, and is unique. These will be examined in turn.

First, Rogers finds that man is essentially good. Man has "a compelling necessity . . . to search for and become himself,"³ and the directional tendency of the organism toward

¹Rogers and Buber, "Dialogue between Martin Buber and Carl Rogers," p. 18.

²Rogers, "A Note on the Nature of Man," 200.

³Carl R. Rogers, Becoming a Person (Oberlin College Nellie Heldt Lecture Series; reprinted by the Hogg Foundation for Mental

wholesome, constructive growth is the most profound truth⁴ and the most impressive fact⁵ that one discovers about man. Rogers has built his psychotherapeutic method upon basic confidence in this essentially constructive nature of the human organism⁶ and he constantly reiterates his belief throughout his various writings.

In his first book on the non-directive method of psychotherapy, Rogers states that positive impulses toward growth are among the most certain and predictable aspects of the whole psychotherapeutic process.⁷ He remarks in his next book that the forward-moving forces of life underlie the entire process of functioning and change.⁸ In 1961 he stresses that:

It has been my experience that persons have a basically positive direction. . . . The words which I believe are most truly descriptive are words such as positive, constructive, moving toward self-actualization, growing toward maturity,

Hygiene; Austin: University of Texas, 1956), p. 12.

⁴Carl R. Rogers, "The Potential of the Human Individual: The Capacity for Becoming Fully Functioning" (unpublished paper dated November 15, 1961, prepared as one chapter of a proposed volume on The Conception of Man, ed. Arthur Burton), p. 6.

⁵Rogers, "The Actualizing Tendency in Relation to 'Motives' and to Consciousness," p. 5.

⁶Carl R. Rogers and Rosalind F. Dymond (eds.), Psychotherapy and Personality Change (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 5.

⁷Rogers, Counseling and Psychotherapy, pp. 39, 209.

⁸Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., p. 195.

growing toward socialization.⁹

And in a 1963 article, Rogers reviews his belief in this tendency and illustrates it with examples from the biological and psychological sciences.¹⁰

This positive-directedness of man is discussed at length in Rogers' article, "A Note on the Nature of Man." Here Rogers raises the question of evil. If the forces at the core of man are released, a Freudian would ask, who is to control man? Rogers' answer is that there need be no control except by the individual himself. He makes his point by comparing man with the lion. The lion has a reputation of being a ravening beast; but, upon examination, we find that the lion does not kill for the sake of killing but only when he is hungry or threatened. We find that in his puppyhood the lion is completely selfish and self-centered but that as he matures he shows a cooperativeness in the hunt. We discover that lions satisfy their sexual needs but that they do not participate in lustful orgies, and that they protect and seem to enjoy their young. In sum, we find that the lion is basically a constructive and trustworthy member of the species Felis leo and that his behavior enhances both himself and the species; it would be foolish to say that releasing the "lionness" of the lion would be to release an animal impelled by

⁹Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., pp. 26-27.

¹⁰Rogers, "The Actualizing Tendency in Relation to 'Motives' and to Consciousness," pp. 1-8.

insatiable lusts, uncontrollable aggressions and innate tendencies of destructiveness.¹¹

In turning to the nature of man Rogers states that man too is a basically trustworthy member of the species. He says that

I find that man, like the lion, has a nature. My experience is that he is a basically trustworthy member of the human species, whose deepest characteristics tend toward development, differentiation, cooperative relationships; whose life tends fundamentally to move from dependence to independence; whose impulses tend naturally to harmonize into a complex and changing pattern of self-regulation; whose total character is such as to tend to preserve and enhance himself and his species, and perhaps to move it toward its further evolution. In my experience, to discover that an individual is truly and deeply a unique member of the human species is not a discovery to excite horror. Rather I am inclined to believe that fully to be a human being is to enter into the complex process of being one of the most widely sensitive, responsive, creative, and adaptive creatures on this planet.¹²

Many critics have objected, however, that Rogers over-stresses this notion of man's basic inherent goodness. Walker compares him to Rousseau, after first comparing Freud with Augustine:

. . . Carl Rogers, in the same sense, is the successor to Rousseau. Recall that Rousseau began his classic presentations in Emile with the observation that every man comes from the hand of his Maker a perfect being. This pristine splendor is corrupted, said Rousseau, by an imperfect society.

In his counseling theory Carl Rogers seems to have subtly refurbished the conception of man as basically good. Rogers comes close to the assumption of a "great golden beast" which slumbers beneath the surface of neurotic man with his façade

¹¹Rogers, "A Note on the Nature of Man," 200-201.

¹²Ibid., 201.

of tensions, symptoms, and antagonism.¹³

Menne makes the same comparison,¹⁴ as do Perry and Estes, who feel that Rogers' stress on innate growth tendencies place him in a line beginning with Comenius and extending up through Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Herbart, Fichte, Froebel, and John Dewey.¹⁵ Nosal, commenting on Walker's article, agrees that Rogers overemphasizes goodness in not stressing that man's behavior goes in different directions.¹⁶ Vanderveldt and Odenwald, criticizing Rogers from a theological standpoint, believe that he neglects the evil toward which man tends because of original sin.¹⁷ Ellis, writing in 1948, counters Rogers' statement that psychotherapeutic experience leads to "a high degree of respect for the ego-integrative forces residing within each individual"¹⁸ by saying that "the nondirective school of therapy does not seem, anywhere, to recognize the power of or have any respect for the ego-disintegrative

¹³Donald E. Walker, "Carl Rogers and the Nature of Man," Journal of Counseling Psychology, III (1956), 89.

¹⁴Raymond Menne, The Theory of Personality of Carl Rogers (Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum "Angelicum," 1961), p. 26.

¹⁵William H. Perry and Stanley G. Estes, "The Collaboration of Client and Counselor," Psychotherapy, Theory and Research, ed. O. H. Mowrer (New York: Ronald Press, 1953), p. 96.

¹⁶W. S. Nosal, "Letter to the Editor," Journal of Counseling Psychology, III (1956), 301.

¹⁷J. H. Vanderveldt and Robert P. Odenwald, Psychiatry and Catholicism (2d ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957), p. 101.

¹⁸Rogers, "Some Observations on the Organization of Personality," American Psychologist, II (1947), 361.

forces which either reside within certain individuals or are forced on them from without."¹⁹ Nuttin, although looking with favor on Rogers' stress upon the sound constructive forces of growth which exist in man, believes that Rogers' self-actualization theory follows a simple one-track direction and fails to recognize the conflict within man.²⁰


However, prescinding from the theological criticism, which is hardly his concern, Rogers certainly does not believe that man necessarily achieves the self-actualization of which he is capable. His entire life as a psychotherapist has been spent in helping people who have not developed properly according to their potentialities. He recognizes that both external and internal factors can affect an individual's strength and capacity to alter his life:

Such elements as the constitutional stability, the hereditary background, the physical and mental equipment of the individual, enter into such an evaluation [of the strength or capacity of the individual to take action altering his life course]. The type of social experience, too, has had its molding effect, and the emotional components of the family situation are especially important in judging the basic assets of the younger person. The economic, cultural, and educational factors, both positive or negative, which have entered into the experience of this person are also important.²¹

¹⁹Albert Ellis, "A Critique of the Theoretical Contributions of Non-Directive Therapy," Journal of Clinical Psychology, IV (1948), 251.

²⁰Joseph Nuttin, Psychoanalysis and Personality: A Dynamic Theory of Normal Personality, trans. George Lamb (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1953), pp. 100-101.

²¹Rogers, Counseling and Psychotherapy, p. 63. Cf., Rogers, "The Potential of the Human Individual" p. 8.



It is true, however, that Rogers does lay heavy emphasis on the inherent drive toward self-actualization--so heavy, in fact, that he actually refers to this drive as invariant.²² But he is careful to qualify this by saying, only under certain conditions. These conditions, exemplified in the optimum counseling situation, basically constitute an interpersonal relationship of unconditional positive regard and empathic understanding wherein the person realizes this regard and understanding. If a threatened person finds that another can accept him, then he is able to accept himself and move in the direction of growth. Menne suggests that Rogers' realization of the importance of this relationship, in which the person comes to appreciate his own value and consequently is incited to love others and to effect his own self-actualization, "could well be the basic and positive aspect of Rogers' non-directive therapy."²³

The process of human actualization, therefore, is by no means automatic; on the contrary it is a slow and painful process.²⁴ But given the choice between forward-moving or regressive behavior, the tendency toward growth will operate. Writing in 1948, Rogers remarks that he has yet to find the individual who, when he examines his situation deeply and feels that he

²²Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., pp. 34-35; Rogers and Buber, "Dialogue between Martin Buber and Carl Rogers," p. 22.

²³Menne, p. 54.

²⁴Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., p. 490.

perceives it clearly, deliberately chooses dependence. When the elements are clearly perceived, the balance seems invariably in the direction of growth.²⁵

But Rogers is not blind to the outright evil of which man is capable. He denies that he has a Pollyanna view of human nature and says that he is well aware that out of defensiveness and fear man can be "incredibly cruel, horribly destructive, immature, regressive, anti-social, hurtful."²⁶ And in replying to Walker, Rogers disavows any direct influence from Rousseau and points out that he, unlike Rousseau, does not view man as an essentially perfect being warped and corrupted by involvement with society.²⁷

The primary question, then, in Rogers' eyes is, which of the two directions in which man can and does move--positive and negative--is predominant or more basic? Rogers clearly opts for the former. He admits the obvious fact that man does have the power and capacity for tremendous destruction, but he finds that at core man has an overpowering thrust for growth if the

²⁵Rogers, "Divergent Trends in Methods of Improving Adjustment," 218. Cf. Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., pp. 90-91.

²⁶Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., p. 27. Cf., Carl R. Rogers, "Concluding Comment to Bernard M. Loomer, Walter M. Horton, and Hans Hofmann, 'Reinhold Niebuhr and Carl R. Rogers: A Discussion,'" Pastoral Psychology, IX (1958), 27-28.

²⁷Rogers, "A Note on the Nature of Man," 199-200.

opportunity is provided.²⁸ To say that man is capable of evil, therefore, is not to say that man is evil.²⁹ In a discussion with Martin Buber, Rogers refers to the fact that his psychotherapeutic experience has taught him that the clinician need not supply the motivation toward positive, constructive actualization, for that already exists in the individual and indeed is what is most basic to the individual. Rogers observes that he is probably willing to place a greater trust in the process of actualization than is Buber, who does not seem to believe that the positive direction in man is more fundamental; rather Buber believes that there is a basic positive-negative polarity in man and that man is equally capable of moving in either direction since both the positive and negative poles are equally fundamental.³⁰

In summary, then we see that Rogers considers man a fundamentally positive-directed organism whose deepest tendencies are toward growth. Man is capable of great evil, yes, but at the core man is constructive, is positive-orientated; the roots of man are directed toward his self-actualization.

²⁸Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., p. xi. This point is strongly emphasized throughout Rogers' writings: cf., e.g., "The Potential of the Human Individual . . .," p. 22; On Becoming a Person . . ., pp. 26-27, 91-92, 194-95.

²⁹Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., pp. 177-78, 325.

³⁰Rogers and Buber, "Dialogue between Martin Buber and Carl R. Rogers," pp. 18-24.

A second characteristic of man's nature found in Rogers' writings is that man is basically a social being and that his most characteristic behavior is social. As has been pointed out, Rogers finds that man's basic nature tends toward cooperative relationships with others. The process of actualization does not lead to egoistic behavior; rather self actualization involves not only enhancement of self but also the enhancement of others.³¹

Rogers gives the abbreviated case history of a Mrs. O., a woman who gradually discovered that the further she looked within herself, the less she had to fear about herself and others; and she gradually realized the possession of a self which was deeply socialized. Rogers asks whether we dare to generalize from this type of experience and state that if we cut deeply enough to our organismic nature we will find that man is a social animal. He answers in the affirmative.³² It is only when man is false to himself and acts as less than man that he is to be feared; when he is fully man his behavior, although not always conforming to others, will always be socialized:

To put it another way, when man is less than fully man--when he denies to awareness various aspects of his experience--then indeed we have all too often reason to fear him and his behavior, as the present world situation testifies. But when

³¹Cf., Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., pp. 150, 488; Rogers and Dymond (eds.), Psychotherapy and Personality Change, p. 4; Carl R. Rogers, Review of The Self and the Dramas of History, by Reinhold Niebuhr, Pastoral Psychology, IX (1958), 17; Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., pp. 91-92, 192.

³²Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., p. 103.

he is most fully man, when he is his complete organism, when awareness of experience, that peculiarly human attribute, is most fully operating, then he is to be trusted, then his behavior is constructive. It is not always conventional. It will not always be conforming. It will be individualized. But it will also be socialized.³³

Dettering compares Rogers to John Dewey in seeing the individual as tending toward social cohesiveness.³⁴ However, he believes that Rogers differs from Dewey in being extremely anti-authoritarian and that consequently, since neither counselor nor teacher nor society is permitted to motivate this socialization, Rogers must count on some tendency within the individual to bring it to fruition. And this, in Dettering's eyes, would necessarily be an uncaused socializing tendency, the psychological laissez-faire counterpart to the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith's economics.³⁵

Because of Rogers' stress on the need of a proper interpersonal relationship as the condition for constructive change to take place in a person, it is doubtful whether the flat statement that "neither counselor nor teacher nor society is permitted to motivate this socialization" is justified. However, there is no question that Rogers does rely on a tendency within the individual toward self-actualization; this is the basic element of his

³³Ibid., pp. 105-106. Cf. Rogers, "The Potential of the Human Individual . . .," p. 4.

³⁴Richard W. Dettering, "Philosophical Idealism in Rogerian Psychology," Educational Theory, V (1955), 207.

³⁵Ibid., 212.

entire personality theory. But whether he would agree that this is necessarily an uncaused tendency is another question. Because Rogers considers the organism as dynamic rather than static, he would probably answer that the tendency itself is a causal factor.

We have noted that in Rogers' personality theory behavior is explained basically in terms of actualization as the goal-directed attempt of the organism to satisfy its experienced needs, although every behavior of the human organism does not appear to be reducible to need-reduction in a strict sense.³⁶ The question arises as to whether Rogers goes beyond a purely organismic model of man and recognizes at the human level a unique modification of this natural drive of the organism in that it is supplemented and dominated by an individual's free, rational choices: does Rogers believe that man is free to determine his own life?

The answer is clearly, yes. Man is free.

Frankl quotes Rogers as saying that he believed again in human volition as a result of a student dissertation he directed which made it clear that the determining factor in behavior is the degree of self-understanding.³⁷ Behavior depends primarily

³⁶ Supra, pp. 18, 20.

³⁷ Viktor Frankl, "Psychotherapy and Philosophy," Philosophy Today, V (1961), 59-64. Frankl refers to: Carl R. Rogers, "Discussion," Existential Inquiries, I, No. 2 (1960), 9. The results of the dissertation referred to here and a later one

not upon external conditions to which the individual is or has been exposed but rather upon the individual's own awareness of the reality of his situation, in the face of which he chooses his course of action.

In his 1942 book Rogers recognizes the necessity of admitting man's ability to choose more satisfying goals for himself; the term creative will is employed to signify the kind of choice which occurs when an individual is faced with two or more ways of satisfying his needs.³⁸ Howie's objection that Rogers means two different things by creative will--that the organism has an inherent drive for growth, and that action is done for the sake of rewards--does not seem necessarily valid;³⁹ it is possible to answer that the will act is being considered from two different points of view--on the one hand, from the point of view of the agent, and on the other, from that of the value or reward.

In a 1946 article Rogers explicitly points out that although behavior may be determined by the influences to which the individual has been exposed, it may also be determined by the creative and integrative insight of the organism itself;

which confirmed the first are published as: Carl R. Rogers, B. L. Kell, and Helen McNeil, "The Role of Self-Understanding in the Prediction of Behavior," Journal of Consulting Psychology, XII (1948), 174-86.

³⁸Rogers, Counseling and Psychotherapy, pp. 208-210.

³⁹D. Howie, "Some Theoretical Implications of Rogers' Non-Directive Therapy," Journal of General Psychology, XIII (1950), 239-40.

spontaneous forces of volitional control exist within the individual. This is a very important statement in reference to Rogers' philosophy and deserves quoting in full:

The clinical experience could be summarized by saying that the behavior of the human organism may be determined by the influences to which it has been exposed, but it may also be determined by the creative and integrative insight of the organism itself. This ability of the person to discover new meaning in the forces which impinge upon him and in the past experiences which have been controlling him, and the ability to alter consciously his behavior in the light of this new meaning, has a profound significance for our thinking which has not been fully realized. We need to revise the philosophical basis of our work to a point where it can admit that forces exist within the individual which can exercise a spontaneous and significant influence upon behavior which is not predictable through knowledge of prior influences and conditionings. The forces released through a catalytic process of therapy are not adequately accounted for by a knowledge of the individual's previous conditionings, but only if we grant the presence of a spontaneous force within the organism which has the capacity of integration and redirection. This capacity for volitional control is a force which we must take into account in any psychological equation.⁴⁰

Nuttin and Menne both refer to this passage as evidence that Rogers' theory of personality is an advance over biological theories.⁴¹

This stress on freedom is probably one reason why Snyder says that Rogers' non-directive type of psychotherapy is

⁴⁰Rogers, "Significant Aspects of Client-Centered Therapy," 422.

⁴¹Nuttin, pp. 102-103; Menne, p. 16. Menne also refers to later writings of Rogers as evidence of the same point: "Some Directions and End points in Therapy," Psychotherapy, Theory and Research, ed. O. H. Mowrer (New York: Ronald Press, 1953), pp. 56, 57; "The Concept of the Fully-Functioning Person" (unpublished paper; Chicago: University of Chicago Counseling Center, 1953), esp. pp. 20-22; "Persons or Science? A Philosophical Question," American Psychologist, X (1955), 268.

philosophically rooted in idealism (following Kant) rather than in logical positivism (following Locke), which Snyder considers the philosophical foundation of directive psychotherapy.⁴² This would be the same distinction Allport makes when he writes that a psychology which considers man as passive is rooted in Locke, whereas one which considers man as active looks to Leibnitz and, subsequently, to Kant.⁴³ Rogers belief in the spontaneity of the will is also one reason why Dettering considers Rogers an idealism.⁴⁴

The fact that Rogers recognizes free will, the *bête noire* of American psychology, clearly puts him at variance with the mainstream of traditional psychology; but he cannot help concluding that the traditional philosophical background of mechanistic determinism is inadequate for handling the phenomena of experiential freedom--the capacity of the individual to reorganize his attitudes and behavior in the direction determined by his own insight.⁴⁵

⁴²W. U. Snyder, Comment to "Carl Rogers and the Nature of Man," by Donald E. Walker, Journal of Counseling Psychology, III (1956), 92.

⁴³Gordon W. Allport, Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1955), pp. 7-17.

⁴⁴Dettering, 211-12.

⁴⁵Carl R. Rogers, "Dealing with Interpersonal Conflict," Pastoral Psychology, III (1952), 18-20, 37-44. Cf., Carl R. Rogers, "Learning to Be Free" (unpublished paper given to a session on "Conformity and Diversity" in the conference on "Man and Civilization" sponsored by the University of California School of Medicine, San Francisco, January 28, 1962), pp. 6-7.

In an article written in the early 1950's and included in a revised form in his latest book, Rogers openly discusses the seeming paradox that modern scientific psychology is faced with regarding man's freedom. On the one hand psychology, like any other empirical science, is committed to a rigorous determinism in which every event is necessarily determined by what precedes it. Yet, Rogers observes that it would be impossible for him to deny that in the psychotherapeutic relationship he is faced with a man who feels within himself the power of naked choice; such a man is free--"to become himself or to hide behind a façade; to move forward or to retrogress; to behave in ways which are destructive of self and others, or in ways which are enhancing; quite literally free to live or die, in both the physiological and psychological meaning of those terms."⁴⁶

Because Rogers, a prominent psychologist, is so insistent on the fact of man's freedom, he is a likely target for deterministically orientated psychologists to aim at. His most notable and consistent adversary in this matter is Dr. B. F. Skinner, with whom Rogers has debated or discussed the question on various occasions.

In a study treating of the relationship between science and human behavior from a behavioristic standpoint, Skinner upholds environmental determinism. All activity is ultimately

⁴⁶Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., p. 192.

reducible to external behavior, and all causality is external.⁴⁷
 Skinner believes that such a deterministic approach explains all
 behavior which "common sense" would call free:

Man's vaunted creative powers . . . his capacity to choose and our right to hold him responsible for his choice--none of these is conspicuous in this new self-portrait [provided by behavioral science]. Man, we once believed, was free to express himself in art, music, and literature, to inquire into nature, to seek salvation in his own way. He could initiate action and make spontaneous and capricious changes of course. Under the most extreme duress some sort of choice remained to him. He could resist any effort to control him, though it might cost him his life. But science insists that action is initiated by forces impinging upon the individual and that caprice is only another name for behavior for which we have not yet found a cause.⁴⁸

His basic contention is that science depends upon the strict causality of behavior and that therefore to admit free will is, in effect, to destroy the efficacy of science since a free event is looked upon as an uncaused event.

The depth of Skinner's conviction that freedom must be denied may be seen by the following. A paper by Skinner led Rogers to address these remarks to him, implying that Skinner had neither choice nor purpose in giving the paper at the meeting:

From what I understood Dr. Skinner to say, it is his understanding that though he might have thought he chose to come to this meeting, might have thought he had a purpose in

⁴⁷ B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1953), pp. 35, 62-69, 149, 237, 317. Quoted in Roberto Zavalloni, Self-Determination: The Psychology of Personal Freedom, trans. Virgilio Biasiol and Carroll Tageson (Chicago: Forum Books, 1962), pp. 17-18.

⁴⁸ B. F. Skinner, "Freedom and the Control of Men," American Scholar, XXV (Winter, 1955-56), 52-53. Quoted in Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . . , p. 390.

giving this speech, such thoughts are really illusory. He actually made certain marks on paper and emitted certain sounds here simply because his genetic makeup and his past environment had operantly conditioned his behavior in such a way that it was rewarding to make these sounds, and that he as a person doesn't enter into this. In fact if I get his thinking correctly, from his strictly scientific point of view, he, as a person, doesn't exist.⁴⁹

True to his philosophy, Skinner accepted this characterization of his presence at the meeting!

Rogers himself does not deny that there is a real problem in explaining freedom, for he agrees with Skinner that it is necessary that science look upon all behavior as caused. But he accepts as a starting point the incontrovertible fact of man's subjective experience of free choice:

If we choose to utilize our scientific knowledge to free men, then it will demand that we live openly and frankly with the great paradox of the behavioral sciences. We will recognize that behavior, when examined scientifically, is surely best understood as determined by prior causation. This is the great fact of science. But responsible personal choice, which is the most essential element in being a person, which is the core experience in psychotherapy, which exists prior to any scientific endeavor, is an equally prominent fact.⁵⁰

And he disagrees with Skinner's explanation of what the causality of science entails. Science, says Rogers, is not to be reified and spelled with a capital S as though it were a subsistent being; rather science is knowledge which exists only in the mind of the scientist and which is employed only for a purpose chosen by the scientist. In any scientific endeavor there is a prior

⁴⁹Rogers, "Learning to Be Free," p. 5.

⁵⁰Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., p. 400.

value choice on the part of the scientist concerning the object of that endeavor, and this choice necessarily lies outside of the scientific endeavor itself. This applies to Skinner as well as to any other scientist; he must decide what the goal of his behavioral experiments is to be. A frequent answer to this might be that a continuing scientific endeavor will evolve its own goals inasmuch as initial findings will alter the direction and subsequent findings will alter them still further. But even here, Rogers points out, subjective personal choice enters in at every point at which the direction changes. Science, in sum, is not an inexorable juggernaut crushing the scientist but rather is knowledge employed according to subjectively chosen goals.⁵¹

Skinner refers to Rogers' explanation of how choice enters into scientific work and answers that "choice" can be explained by a behavioristic reinforcement theory; values are merely reinforcers which make any behavior which produces them more likely to recur. And such reinforcers are external to the organism; or, at least, no evidence can be given to satisfy Skinner that there is a truly inner choice of values.⁵²

Rogers' disagreement with Skinner concerning the problem of freedom does not mean, however, that Rogers is criticizing attempts to study man's behavior scientifically but only that he

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 215-24, 384-402.

⁵² Carl R. Rogers and B. F. Skinner, "Some Issues Concerning the Control of Human Behavior," Science, CXXIV, No. 3231 (1956), 1065.

is criticizing the philosophical presuppositions of scientists like Skinner. Rogers himself defends scientific procedure against Reinhold Niebuhr's contention that free acts of man are not a valid area of scientific investigation. Niebuhr believes that science is over-stepping its legitimate bounds when it attempts to predict future behavior on the basis of investigation of past behavior. Rogers believes that this is equivalent to telling scientists that they should not search for order in the nature of man or in man's outer behavior, and he does not believe that scientists will be very receptive to the admonition.⁵³

The framework of classical psychoanalysis is also inadequate for seeing the totality of man, for it too reaches only the objective aspect of man. Rogers approves of Rollo May's statement that psychoanalysis was most helpful and most effective in understanding the Umwelt--man in his biological relationship to the environment, his "world-around" but that it has not been successful in providing an understanding of the Mitwelt--the "with-world" of man's relationship to his fellow men--and that its greatest lack has been on the level of the Eigenwelt--the "own-world" of relationship to one's self.⁵⁴ The more subjective and personal the relationship, the greater the failure of a

⁵³Rogers, Review of The Self and the Dramas of History, by Reinhold Niebuhr, 15-16. Cf., Rogers and Skinner, "Some Issues Concerning the Control of Human Behavior," 1060.

⁵⁴Carl R. Rogers, "The Way to Do Is to Be": Review of Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology, by Rollo May, et al., Contemporary Psychology, IV (1959), 196-97.

purely external approach to explain it.

Rogers believes, then, that to obtain an adequate view of man it is necessary to go beyond a mechanistic philosophy, beyond an external approach to man, and to find a philosophy which will bridge the gap between the determinism upon which science is built and the self-determination or freedom which is the only foundation upon which experience is explicable.

This search for a framework which will enable the entire man to be grasped has led Rogers to existential psychology, an approach to man which refuses to accept the prevalent modern view that man is unfree, a mere product and pawn of his heredity, culture, and circumstances. Here the central focus is always man as a human person, man seen from a subjective viewpoint, from the "inside" rather than from an external frame of reference in which he is objectified. Here again we have the clear statement of one of Rogers' fundamental convictions:

From the existential perspective, from within the phenomenological internal frame of reference, man does not simply have the characteristics of a machine, he is not simply a being in the grip of unconscious motives, he is a person in the process of creating himself, a person who creates meaning in life, a person who embodies a dimension of subjective freedom. He is a figure who, though he may be alone in a vastly complex universe, and though he may be part and parcel of that universe and its destiny, is also able in his inner life to transcend the material universe, who is able to live dimensions of his life which are not fully or adequately contained in a description of his conditionings, or of his unconscious.

.....
 Man has long felt himself to be but a puppet in life--molded by economic forces, by unconscious forces, by environmental forces. He has been enslaved by persons, by institutions, by the theories of psychological science. But he is firmly

setting forth a new declaration of independence. He is discarding the alibis of unfreedom. He is choosing himself, endeavoring, in a most difficult and often tragic world, to become himself,--not a puppet, not a slave, not a machine, but his own unique individual self. The view I have been describing in psychology has room for this philosophy of man.⁵⁵

In this framework, freedom is essentially an inner thing, quite aside from the outward choice of alternatives which is often thought to constitute freedom. It is fundamentally an attitude, the choice of one's attitude toward life and the discovery of meaning and responsibility from within oneself. This remains when everything else has been taken from a man, as is illustrated by Frankl's description of his years in a Nazi concentration camp.⁵⁶ Regardless of whether a person has hundreds of objective outer alternatives from which to choose or whether he has none, this freedom remains.⁵⁷

In the light of such thinking, Rogers proposes a tentative solution to the problem of freedom versus determinism: the freely-functioning person--that is, the person in whom there is fundamental congruence between the self-concept and experience--voluntarily chooses and wills that which is also absolutely determined by the factors of the existential situation; the individual chooses and assumes responsibility for bringing about the

⁵⁵Rogers, "Toward a Science of the Person," pp. 34-35.

⁵⁶Viktor E. Frankl, From Death Camp to Existentialism, trans. I. Lasch (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), p. 65. Quoted in Rogers, "Learning to Be Free," p. 7.

⁵⁷Rogers, "Learning to Be Free," pp. 7-8.

destined events of his world. This would mean that considered from an external scientific viewpoint there are specific determining causes for everything that man does, a view which necessitates the denial of freedom; but looked at subjectively, man is free to determine much of his life.⁵⁸ Freedom is thus saved, at least from the standpoint of the subjective, and this is most important in Rogers' eyes since he believes that the subjective precedes the objective framework in considering man. The scientific view is an abstraction from the totality of man whereas the subjective is more encompassing than scientific knowledge.⁵⁹ This solution, it may be repeated, seems to be a manifest paradox even to Rogers; and he is not offering it as definitive.

Rogers therefore clearly maintains that man is free. However, it should be noted that for Rogers this characteristic of freedom does not distinguish man essentially from other organisms, as traditional philosophy maintains. He has implied that all needs are ultimately physiologically rooted,⁶⁰ and he has used the terms "sensory and visceral experiences" and "organic experiences" to refer to the totality of experience.⁶¹

Strictly speaking, what makes man different for Rogers

⁵⁸Ibid. Cf., Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., p. 193.

⁵⁹Rogers, "The Potential of the Human Individual . . .," p. 21.

⁶⁰Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., pp. 491-92.

⁶¹Cf., Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), p. 197.

from other organisms is that man has the potentiality of awareness; it is upon this that rationality and freedom are founded. But Rogers does not regard this as sufficient evidence that man is different in kind from other organisms. In a recent article he states that awareness is, indeed, a unique characteristic of man and one which, coupled with man's vocal equipment, makes him far superior to any other organism; however, he adds that this makes man almost, but not quite, different in kind and not merely in degree:

To a greater degree than any other living organism, man has the capacity to be aware of his functioning, to symbolize--whether in words, in images, or in other ways--that which is going on within his experience, and that which has gone on in the past. This has given him enormous power--to think, to plan, to take a pathway symbolically and foresee [sic] its consequences without taking the pathway in fact. It, plus his vocal equipment, has also given him an enormous range of personal expression, so much superior to that of any other organism that it is almost a difference in kind, rather than simply of degree.⁶²

It is a logical step from this to say, as Rogers does, that viewed from the objective perspective it will probably be increasingly possible to understand human behavior in terms of laws similar to the laws of the natural sciences, in which view man would be but "a complex sequence of events no different in kind from the complex chain of equations by which various chemical substances interact to form new substances or to release energy."⁶³ Rogers believes, then, that behavior would be

⁶²Rogers, "The Potential of the Human Individual . . .," p. 11.

⁶³Ibid., p. 20.

unpredictable only in fact, not in theory. If instruments were available to measure all of the stimuli affecting the organism and if a giant mechanical computer were available to interpret this data and to calculate the most economical vector of response for the organism, then behavior could be predicted. But in a concrete situation--and every concrete situation is different from every other--there are so many stimuli exerting a causal influence on the organism that all of the relevant data could not be collected and interpreted before the organism itself makes its own appraisal and performs the action. Behavior of the adjusted person, therefore, will be dependable but not predictable. The more congruent a person is, the less predictable is his behavior. It is the maladjusted person who tends to be predictable, for his behavior falls into rigid patterns.⁶⁴

Rombauts believes that Rogers' theory is open to a charge of reductionism because of Rogers' implication that the totality of human experience can be reduced to basic sensory and visceral experience.⁶⁵

Menne takes issue with Rogers' application of this theory of freedom to his general theory of interpersonal relations; Menne comments that if man is truly free, behavior is never

⁶⁴ Rogers, "The Concept of the Fully-Functioning Person," pp. 17-19.

⁶⁵ A. J. Rombauts, "De Opvatting van de Persoonlijkheid in het Counseling-Systeem van Carl Rogers," Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, XXI (1959), 79-81, 95.

invariant regardless of what conditions are present to motivate change.⁶⁶

In summary, then, we may say that Rogers insists on the fact of man's freedom; the basic experience of man cannot be denied in this matter. Rogers recognizes that such an admission is not consistent with the presuppositions of modern science and he offers a tentative solution to the problem by considering freedom from two different points of view, the objective in which freedom is denied, and the subjective in which freedom is admitted. Rogers believes that consciousness, upon which freedom depends, is unique to man; but he does not believe that this characteristic essentially differentiates man from other organisms.

The fourth characteristic concerning man's nature that is evident in Rogers' personality theory is an emphasis on the uniqueness of each individual man.⁶⁷ Just as the natural consequent of Rogers' stress on the goodness of man is his emphasis on the social nature of man, so this characteristic of uniqueness is dependent upon his stress on man's freedom. Theorists who deny the freedom of man are prone to regard individuals as so many examples of the species; if man is not free to direct his self-fulfillment, all one need look for to explain an

⁶⁶ Menne, p. 56.

⁶⁷ Cf., e.g., Rogers, Becoming a Person, pp. 7, 21; Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., pp. 175, 178, 349-50.

individual's behavior are the rigid patterns of behavior common to the species. As we have seen, Rogers encounters difficulty in this matter because of his desire not to contradict the scientific viewpoint; but his primary insistence is on the freedom and consequent uniqueness of each individual.

This characteristic is significant enough to deserve particular mention because it too differentiates Rogers' theory from the majority of other prevalent psychological theories of personality that leading psychologists have proposed. The importance of this characteristic will become evident in Chapter V, where it will be seen that Rogers discusses values and the good life in terms of the unique valuing process of each individual person.

CHAPTER IV

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF OBJECTIVE REALITY

As a psychologist Rogers is interested in the question "what is reality?" primarily from the standpoint of psychology, specifically clinical psychology. His conclusion, as we have mentioned in discussing his theory of personality, is that as far as the psychotherapist is concerned an individual's perception of reality is reality; the entire perceptual field of the individual constitutes reality for him, and his behavior is appropriate to his perceptions.¹

Whether or not there is such a thing as "objective reality" to which subjective perceptions may correspond is, to Rogers' mind, irrelevant as far as psychological purposes are concerned. However, it may be argued that it is invalid to separate psychology from philosophy in this matter. Certainly the question of whether an individual is in contact with what might be called objective reality is important for a theory of personality, particularly in regard to the formulation of a theory of values and an explanation of the good life. And since Rogers explicitly formulates a theory of personality to account for his

¹Supra, pp. 18-19.

psychotherapeutic experiences and spends considerable time discussing values and the good life, it is necessary to determine his underlying epistemology.

Rogers makes statements in an early article published in 1947 that could be interpreted to mean that he is denying any reality beyond subjective perception. He suggests that behavior is perhaps influenced only by an individual's perception of reality and not by any "real" reality behind this perception: he hypothesizes that "behavior is not directly influenced or determined by organic or cultural factors, but primarily (and perhaps only) by the perception of these elements."² (It should be noted that this statement seems to be more "contra-psychoanalysis" than strictly philosophical. Rogers' point is that behavior is not a "given" resulting automatically from certain organic and cultural conditions but that it is primarily the result of the values that subjective behavior places upon them.) Secondly, Rogers speaks of self-satisfaction as the index of adjustment and well-being, thereby defining adjustment as an internal affair, dependent upon an individual's perception of himself rather than upon an external reality.³

In a cudgel-swinging attack on this article, Ellis comments that if the concept of adjustment is entirely dependent upon internal satisfaction, no type of person may a priori be

²Rogers, "Some Observations on the Organization of Personality," 362.

³Ibid., 364.

considered maladjusted; for most religious zealots, hatchet murderers, rapists, psychopaths, and schizophrenics usually seem quite content with their internal affairs. This definition of adjustment is seen as but the logical result of Rogers' first statement about behavior perhaps being influenced only by perception. Ellis claims the support of Northrop and other modern philosophers in saying that an individual's perception of reality is not divorced from that reality but is intrinsically linked ("epistemically correlated") with it. He therefore believes that Rogers' position is both philosophically untenable and contradictory--"if a client's adjustment were only influenced by his perception of external events, rather than also by the external reality of such events, he might just as well have a directive as a non-directive therapist--or, indeed no therapist at all."⁴

Block and Thomas also objected to Rogers' saying that an individual's judgment of himself is the index of his adjustment.⁵ However the editor of the magazine in which the Block and Thomas article appeared pointed out that after this article was written, but before its publication, Rogers published Psychotherapy and Personality Change⁶ which includes the reporting by Rogers,

⁴Ellis, 252. Ellis cites F. S. C. Northrop, The Meeting of East and West (New York: Macmillan, 1946).

⁵J. Block and H. Thomas, "Is Satisfaction with Self a Measure of Adjustment?" Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LI (1955), 254-59.

⁶Rogers and Dymond (eds.), Psychotherapy and Personality Change.

Butler, and Haigh of the finding of a high relationship between self and ideal self descriptions in individuals recognized by other means as defensive and repressive;⁷ so Rogers himself had come to admit that a maladjusted person may be very satisfied with himself, thus implying that there is a reality to which such a person is not adjusted.

But is this reality that lies beyond perception what can be called objective reality in a philosophical sense, and can it be known as such? Two suppositions of Rogers' epistemology are relevant to a consideration of these questions.

First of all, Rogers implies that reality does not extend beyond the sensible--"anything that exists can be measured."⁸ It is perhaps unfair to conclude from this somewhat offhand remark that Rogers definitely limits reality to the sensible, but at least it might be said that he believes that man cannot have knowledge transcending the sensible.

Second, Rogers believes that if truth is to be known, if reality is to be perceived, then science is the best road to follow in achieving it, even in such a delicately intricate area as that of human relationships.⁹

What therefore is Rogers' conception of science?

First, Rogers believes that true science does not limit

⁷Block and Thomas, 254.

⁸Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . . , p. 206.

⁹Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . . , p. xi.

itself, as is commonly thought, to one type of knowledge--objective knowledge--but rather makes use of all three of the ways of knowing that Rogers discovers in man.

In an article written in 1963, Rogers states that the essence of all knowing is the construction of hypotheses and that these hypotheses are checked in three different ways, constituting three different types of human knowing. Subjective knowing is knowledge from within a person's own internal frame of reference, and the hypotheses are checked by using the ongoing flow of preconceptual experiencing as a referent. For example, I wonder "do I love her?" and realize that it is only by reference to the flow of feelings in me that I can begin to conceptualize an answer. Rogers admits that this type of knowledge does not lead to publicly validated knowledge; but he believes that it is fundamental to everyday living and is our most basic way of knowing, "a deeply rooted organismic sensing, from which we form and differentiate our conscious symbolizations and conceptions."¹⁰ The second type of knowing is objective knowing. Here the hypotheses are based upon an external frame of reference and are checked both by externally observable operations on the part of the individual and by dependence upon a trusted reference group. Rogers points out that this type of knowing can be concerned only with objects or with the objective aspects of whatever is being studied. The third type is interpersonal or phenomenological

¹⁰Rogers, "Toward a Science of the Person," p. 5.

knowing, which is concerned primarily with the knowledge of human beings and of higher organisms. Here I "know" that you feel hurt, that you have a strong desire to reach the top of your profession, that you are concerned with thermo-nuclear war. These hypotheses are checked by placing myself, as much as possible, within your personal world of meanings, your phenomenological field. The criteria for this type of knowing are twofold: either you yourself confirm my hypothesis about your internal frame of reference by directly telling me, or else I check my hypothesis by a kind of consensual validation, inferring from your actions that my hypothesis about you is correct or having other people mention to me the same fact that I have sensed about you.¹¹

It is only as each of these three ways of knowing is used in appropriate relationship to the other two that a satisfactory science will develop. As was mentioned in discussing Rogers' explanation of freedom, he believes that all science begins with subjective knowledge, with a highly valued creative inner hypothesis that is checked against the relevant aspects of one's experience and which may then lead to a formal scientific hypothesis to be objectively studied. Further, the interpersonal type of knowledge must be used to arrive at richer and deeper insights about nature and human nature than any purely external approach

¹¹Ibid., pp. 2-13.

could do.¹²

Second, to consider the objective aspect of science in detail, we find that science proceeds by the construction of theories and that the core of a theory is a set of hypothetical formulations which may be put to the test: "Scientific advance can be made only as we have hypotheses which may be experimentally tried, tested, and improved."¹³ The stress on objective testing is essential, for only by this means can it be determined whether or not a theory is useful:

It has been felt that a theory, or any segment of a theory, is useful only if it can be put to test. There has been a sense of commitment to the objective testing of each significant aspect of our hypotheses, believing that the only way in which knowledge can be separated from individual prejudice and wishful thinking is through objective investigation. To be objective such investigation must be of the sort that another investigator collecting the data in the same way and performing the same operations upon it, will discover the same or similar findings, and come to the same conclusions.¹⁴

These hypotheses will lead to operational definitions which may be the basis of increasing predictability: ". . . research workers can make specific predictions in terms of operationally definable constructs. . . ."¹⁵ And besides this possibility of increasing the ability to predict events, the theory may also

¹²Ibid., pp. 13-15.

¹³Rogers, Counseling and Psychotherapy, p. 16.

¹⁴Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., pp. 244-45.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 246.

lead to control over the events.¹⁶ Further, the theory aims at consistency and its propositions should adequately account for all the phenomena;¹⁷ and it seeks to establish orderly relationships between the phenomena.¹⁸ Finally, the constructs should have generality.¹⁹ We may piece these characteristics together, then, and say that Rogers would define a scientific theory as a set of hypothetical formulations characterized by verifiability and generality, leading to operational definitions which are integrated in a consistent framework that will adequately account for and order the phenomena and may also lead to increased predictability and control.

The word hypothetical in this definition does not mean that the theory is an a priori mental construct created out of thin air apart from observed data but is rather built up by induction from the perceived data. Rogers insists that there "is no need for theory until and unless there are phenomena to explain."²⁰ He will therefore say that those who, for example, criticize client-centered therapy for not proceeding from a coherent theory of personality have actually distorted the

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 206.

¹⁷ Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., p. 482.

¹⁸ Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., pp. 24-25; Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), p. 188.

¹⁹ Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., p. 246.

²⁰ Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., p. 15.
Cf. Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), p. 189.

purpose of a theory; for the theory implicit in client-centered therapy, as with any other theory, is one which has been built up by induction.

Because a theory begins with induction and is primarily intended to furnish an adequate framework for all of the observed phenomena, one is at first led to believe that Rogers assumes a realistic epistemology. This impression is further heightened by the fact that Rogers explicitly states that the aim of science is to objectively understand the data:

In approaching the complex phenomena of therapy with the logic and methods of science, the aim is to work toward an understanding of the phenomena. In science this means an objective knowledge of events and of functional relationships between events.²¹

He also discusses the problem of checking objective scientific findings with reality and states that by using different lines of evidence the scientist can be sure that his finding has some real relationship to fact.²²

However, this assumption is not true in the case of Rogers. He goes on to assert that no matter how profound the scientific investigation, no absolute truth can be discovered by it nor any underlying reality in regard to persons, relationships, or the universe. Science can only describe relationships which have an increasingly high probability of occurrence but which can never be known as completely certain since the factor

²¹Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., pp. 205-206.

²²Ibid., pp. 217-18.

of error necessarily enters into the picture to a greater or lesser extent.²³ Although there may be objective truth, it can never be known:

To put it more briefly, it appears to me that though there may be such a thing as objective truth, I can never know it. All I can know is that some statements appear to me subjectively to have the qualifications of objective truth. There is no such thing as Scientific Knowledge; there are only individual perceptions of what appears to each person to be such knowledge.²⁴

Further, Rogers states that there is no such thing as a scientific methodology which gives infallible knowledge. If a science does not limit itself to one mode of knowledge but rather interweaves all three, it will approximate the truth; but such approximations are not absolute certitude.²⁵

In the light of these beliefs, then, it is logical that Rogers should preface his latest article on the nature of man with the statement that although everyone has some describable conception of the nature of man, no one can know this nature with assurance.²⁶

Rogers believes that this view of science is as valid for psychology as it is for the physical sciences. The physicist, says Rogers, has become accustomed to the fact that he cannot

²³ Ibid., p. 206; Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), pp. 190-91.

²⁴ Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), p. 192.

²⁵ Rogers, "Toward a Science of the Person," p. 14.

²⁶ Rogers, "The Potential of the Human Individual . . .," p. 1.

know "reality," as evidenced by the fact that space and motion have no absolute meaning but are relative to the vantage point of the observer;²⁷ in like manner may it not be possible that the quest for "reality" may be equally unsound in dealing with problems of personality? Perhaps a recognition that there are various perceptual vantage points from which to view the person, one of these being from within the consciousness of the person himself, will have to be substituted for a hypothetical single reality. Rogers believes that the evidence of lawfulness and internal order within each of these perceptual viewpoints points to the correctness of his suggestion. It is true that there is also evidence of significant and perhaps predictable relationships between these different perceptual systems; but this remains far from conclusive evidence that there is a reality with which the science of personality deals,²⁸ particularly in view of the fact that the perceptual "map" according to which each of us lives is never reality itself.²⁹ In the light of this assumption, it is easily understandable why Rogers states: "I have endeavored to check my clinical experience with reality, but not without some philosophical puzzlement as to which 'reality' is most valid."³⁰

²⁷Rogers refers the reader to Lincoln Barnett, The Universe and Dr. Einstein (New York: Wm. Sloane Ass., Inc., 1948).

²⁸Rogers and Dymond (eds.), Psychotherapy and Personality Change, pp. 432-33.

²⁹Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., p. 485.

³⁰Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., p. 197.

It is evident, therefore, that Rogers does not believe that man can reach objective truth in the traditional sense of the term, that is, that the actual intelligibility of an object is grasped and spoken by the knowing subject. For science, the approach most likely to discover an objective truth, does not achieve this end. But it should be pointed out at the same time that although Rogers denies that man is able to know objective truth, he does not deny that an objective truth may exist. Whatever is known is not and cannot be known as objective reality from my subjective standpoint, but the possibility of such a reality cannot be categorically denied.

In spite of Rogers' scientific theories, however, he does not deny that for purposes of practical living men do reach a common practical truth.³¹ This is explained by the fact that we are constantly checking our perceptions (which, it will be recalled, constitute reality from a psychological standpoint) against one another, or combining them, and checking them against those of other men so that they become more reliable guides to "reality." So although Rogers' main stress is upon the reality of personal perceptions, he will say that considered in a social context reality consists of perceptions which have a high degree of commonality among various individuals. This is still not an objective truth, however. Rather than saying that most people have a similar perception of this desk because it is real, Rogers

³¹Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., pp. 485-86.

states the proposition the other way around: "This desk is 'real' because most people in our culture would have a perception of it which is very similar to my own."³²

Thus Rogers clearly implies a dichotomy between two different worlds--the experiential world in which a practical truth is reached, based upon the commonality of experience; and the intelligible, yet unknowable, world of the "really real" that may lie beyond perception: "Strictly speaking I do not know that the rock is hard, even though I may be very sure that I experience it as hard if I fall down on it."³³ Rogers recognizes that as a man living in the world, surrounded by and interdependent on the obvious reality of the world, he is living as though he were in contact with reality. But following the positivistic training he has received he feels forced to admit that the scientific investigator does not really pierce through the layer of subjective perception to the hard core of what may be considered the really real; as a coldly logical scientist who accepts the principles of science as he has learned them and as he has applied them, Rogers must believe that there is something not quite legitimate about the common sense world in which he lives, the world of illusion which entices man into believing that the real may be known.

Having examined Rogers' own position, we are now able to

³² Ibid., p. 485.

³³ Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., p. 341.

consider the major criticism to which his position has been subjected.

Menne ascribes to Rogers the belief that reality is limited to what is present in a person's mind and therefore to the purely subjective:

Rogers . . . has clearly defined just what he does mean by reality. For him, reality is limited not only to that portion of existing things which have a relation to, or effect on, a person, but these things only insofar as they are "potentially available to awareness." This very definitely limits reality to the subjective. That is, things are real insofar as they are present in a person's mind.³⁴

However, the statements of Rogers that Menne refers to in support of his contention are taken from psychological contexts in which Rogers is developing his theory that all the psychologist need be concerned with is the individual's perception of reality.³⁵ But we have seen that Rogers does not deny the existence of objective reality from a philosophical standpoint, so Menne's criticism is unjustified.

The strongest objection to Rogers' epistemology has come from Dettering.³⁶ He interprets Rogers' personality theory, particularly its stress on self-actualization, to mean that Rogers rejects any form of realism, that is, any body of hard,

³⁴ Menne, P. 18.

³⁵ Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), pp. 197, 222-23.

³⁶ Richard W. Dettering, "Philosophical Idealism in Rogerian Psychology," Educational Theory, V (1955), 206-214.

inflexible facts, or any standard higher than the subjective.³⁷

Dettering compares Rogers to John Dewey in rejecting static absolutes and in finding truth only in the realm of experience; specifically, both Dewey and Rogers stress the continuity and unity of experience and nature, the dynamism of human experience, the progressive freedom of the individual and the emergence of a self-directed purpose, and the goal of this personal emancipation as some type of social cohesiveness.³⁸ But Dettering believes that there is also a big difference between the two. Dewey's pragmatism, according to Dettering, represents a convergence of Hegel and Darwin, of dialectical idealism and empirical science, of individualism and socialism (in the sense of social, objective, scientific knowledge). Dettering finds that Rogers has the Hegelian but not the Darwinian side of Dewey, that is, he lacks the three major elements of Darwin's philosophy that are found in Dewey.³⁹

The first of these is the concept of interaction. Dewey says that interaction means giving equal weight to both factors of experience, the internal and external factors. Dettering finds it ambiguous whether Dewey means by this what Darwin would have meant--an objective, scientifically-reported phenomenon--or whether it is to be considered as itself a private experience

³⁷Ibid., 206.

³⁸Ibid., 207.

³⁹Ibid., 207-210.

involving only two interacting aspects of the experiential field of a given subject; but he has no doubt that Rogers, with his emphasis on the individual reacting to his personal perceptions, accepts the latter interpretation.

Second is the notion of experiment and consequences. The experimental method depends upon regularities of nature, for only on this basis can conclusions be predicted; the whole method would fall in a completely unpredictable universe. But, Dettering believes, since Rogers rejects socially-acknowledged results and any external imposition of norms, the intersubjective, social verification of Dewey is replaced by a total intrasubjective verdict.

The third element is conflict and problem solving. For Dewey problems could be found introspectively, in the private world of experience, but neither understood nor solved except in social and scientific terms. Dettering finds that Rogers keeps the notion of self-directed solution to problems but that unlike Dewey he would keep the problem totally within the subject's personal perceptual field for both its comprehension and its solution.

The general opposition which Dettering finds running through all three of these differences is the contrast between an intersubjective and an introspective concept of knowledge: while Dewey relied ultimately on the consensus of the scientific community, Rogers rests on the process of self-disclosure. Dettering

applies to Rogers the same criticism which Dewey himself used against introspectionism in general, rejecting the belief that "consciousness or experience is the organ of its own immediate disclosure of all its own secrets," a view, Dewey says, which arose with Descartes and Locke.⁴⁰

The fact that Rogers lacks the social aspect of Dewey is bad enough in Dettering's eyes; but it is particularly objectionable in that Rogers seems to stretch the subjective and individualistic side of pragmatism far over into the idealist camp--so far, in fact, that Rogers' epistemology is compared to a mysticism which eventually ends with the subject in speechless identification with the cosmos.

Finally, Dettering believes that the denial of intersubjective relationships leads to the insoluble problem of solipsism.

Four comments will be made on these remarks of Dettering.

First, it must be pointed out that Rogers does not deny all realism. But it is true that according to his theory man can never know reality and therefore can never regulate his life in terms of objective values.

Second, regarding the criticism that Rogers lacks the Darwinian elements of Dewey, it must be said that, as we have seen, Rogers does admit that there is a reality apart from the individual subject, that a part of scientific knowledge is its

⁴⁰ John Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization (New York: Minton, Black and Co., 1931), p. 265. Quoted in Dettering, 210.

verification by the scientific community, and that there is a social reality based on the commonality of experience. It is true, however, that the major stress in Rogers' thinking, as with that of phenomenalist psychology in general, lies on the subjective perceptions of the individual.

Third, the most obvious part of Rogers' entire theory of personality is his stress on the inherent drive within each individual toward self-actualization, which drive manifests itself in socialized behavior. He does not deny, however, that this drive may be checked by various factors, some of which are external and environmental.

Finally, when speaking in psychological terms, Rogers does make statements that seem to imply an ultimate denial of the subject-object dichotomy. But he would never admit to a solipsism. A solipsist does not talk about interpersonal relationships nor about the commonality of knowledge and the validation of scientific findings within a scientific community.

In summary, then, we have seen that although the implication could be drawn from early writings that Rogers denied a reality beyond subjective perception, he adjusted his theory to admit that such a reality may exist. As to whether this is objective reality, Rogers says that it may be but that an individual can never know it as such because it cannot be reached by the scientific procedure, the approach most likely to reach truth. Rogers seems to have a Kantian view of reality in placing a dichotomy between the experiential world which is known and

lived in by men and the intelligible world which may lie beyond or behind this experiential world but which in any case can never be known by man. For this reason the theory is attacked by those who hold a realist epistemology.

CHAPTER V

THEORY OF VALUES AND THE GOOD LIFE

Rogers' theory of values and his conception of the good life, which rests upon the theory of values, presuppose his theory of the nature of man and his epistemological principles.

Regarding the nature of man, it will be recalled that each unique man naturally manifests a continual process of actualization in a fundamentally positive, social direction, and that man is free to determine his own particular fulfillment.

Regarding Rogers' epistemology, we have seen that he has rejected the idea that objective truth could ever be reached. Reality for the individual is his own subjective perception, his own experience, which may or may not correspond to what is "really real."

Rogers' theory of values will be presented first, followed by the theory of the good life.

In a paper written in 1962, Rogers accepts the distinctions between three types of value.¹ The preferential behavior of any living being for one kind of object or objective rather

¹Carl R. Rogers, "Toward a Modern Approach to Values: The Valuing Process in the Mature Person" (unpublished paper dated September, 1962), p. 3.

than another is directed by the operative values of that organism. However a conceived value is proper only to man. This refers to the individual's preference for a symbolized object, and the individual usually foresees the results of his action. The third type of value is an objective value; this signifies what is objectively preferable whether it is conceived as such or not. But because Rogers does not know if objective truth exists and, at any rate, is quite sure that it could not be known if it did exist, he refrains from discussing what the significance of an objective value might be.

Because an objective value cannot be known as such, goodness or badness, at least as far as an individual is concerned, is not found "out there," is not found intrinsic to an object or experience.² The necessary alternative, therefore, is for an individual to discover his values "within," to have an internal locus of evaluation. The "within" of an individual is, of course, his sensory and visceral experience. The only real criterion of the worth of an object or activity is personal experience; values cannot be meaninglessly imposed upon an individual by any type of external authority:

Experience is, for me, the highest authority. The touchstone of validity is my own experience. No other person's ideas, and none of my own ideas, are as authoritative as my experience. It is to experience that I must return again and again, to discover a closer approximation to truth as it is

²Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., p. 139.

in the process of becoming in me.

Neither the Bible nor the prophets--neither Freud nor research--neither the revelations of God nor man--can take precedence over my own direct experience.³

This criterion will be effective, however, only if the individual accepts all of his experience. Man must not value only certain parts of his experience and thus guide his life according to partial evidence, rejecting the rest of his experience as evil or unworthy or uncharacteristic of him. Rather man must trust his entire organism, the totality of his life-experiences.⁴

It is possible to view this organismic base of valuing, which the human individual shares with the rest of the animal world, from an external scientific standpoint. From this perspective, man functions like a giant electronic computer.⁵ Life is regulated by thermostatic controls in terms of various needs;⁶ and the organism is capable of receiving feedback information which permits adjustment of non-satisfying behavior. The organism would not be infallible; but because it would be open to all of its experience, the organismic computing machine would be able

³Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., pp. 23-24. Cf., Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., pp. 149-50, 522-24.

⁴Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., pp. 118-19, 189-91.

⁵Ibid., pp. 190-91. Cf., Rogers, "The Potential of the Human Individual . . .," p. 18.

⁶Rogers, "The Potential of the Human Individual . . .," p. 24.

to quickly discover and correct an error in the light of further data.⁷

Rogers' statement that "man is wiser than his intellect"⁸ is to be interpreted in the light of his insistence that the entire organism must be the base of valuing. The intellectual experience dependent upon awareness is, indeed, unique to man. But, as has been noted, it has a physiological base like any other type of experience; and, as only one part of the totality of experience, it cannot be the sole judge of goodness or badness. Rogers' writings stress the importance of feelings and intuition more than intellectual knowledge in determining values for a person. In fact, intellectual knowledge can actually be a hindrance to a person if this knowledge is of supposedly objective norms which are not experienced as relevant. Therefore there is no need to "know" the correct values; through the data supplied by his own organism an individual can experience what is satisfying and enhancing.⁹ When an activity feels as though it is valuable or worth doing, it is worth doing:

One of the basic things which I was a long time in realizing, and which I am still learning, is that when an activity feels as though it is valuable or worth doing, it is worth doing. Put another way, I have learned that my total

⁷Rogers, "Toward a Modern Approach to Values . . .," p. 15; Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., pp. 190-91.

⁸Rogers, "The Potential of the Human Individual . . .," pp. 10, 14.

⁹Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy . . ., p. 523.

organismic sensing of a situation is more trustworthy than my intellect.

All of my professional life I have been going in directions which others thought were foolish, and about which I have had many doubts myself. But I have never regretted moving in directions which "felt right," even though I have often felt lonely or foolish at the time.

I have found that when I have trusted some inner non-intellectual sensing, I have discovered wisdom in the move.¹⁰

To give an outstanding example of such organismic valuing, Rogers quotes Einstein, who writes that for years he kept moving along in the direction which he felt to be right even though he could not at the time give a rational explanation as to why this was the direction he sought.¹¹

Values given by experience, therefore, can never be fixed or rigid; for as the reality which an individual perceives changes as the gestalt of his self-structure changes, the values an individual places on this reality will change accordingly. There will be a continual process of evaluation just as there is a continual process of actualization. Rather than twist experience to fit a preconceived structure, it is the fluid experience of what is satisfying that will determine the good.¹²

Clear evidence of such a process of evaluation is found in the infant, whom we see naturally preferring experiences which maintain, enhance, or actualize the organism in terms of

¹⁰ Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., p. 22.

¹¹ Rogers, "The Potential of the Human Individual . . .," pp. 10-11.

¹² Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., pp. 188-89.

operative values. At one moment the infant values food and, when satiated, is disgusted with it; at one moment he values stimulation, and soon after values only rest. The single important criterion is actual sense experience. This actualization process is evident until the time comes when, because of his need for love, the infant begins to establish conditions of worth based on the introjected values of others and consequently to distrust his own experience.¹³

This same valuing process, with important differences, is also evident in the mature adult. Like the infant, the mature adult does not hold values rigidly but finds them continually changing. He finds that general principles are not as useful as sensitively discriminating reactions. His valuing process is fluid and flexible, based on internal experience. As opposed to the infant, however, the adult's evaluation is much more complex and is in terms of conceived values by which past experience and the realization of the future are taken into account.¹⁴ It is clear therefore that there can be no closed system of beliefs nor any unchanging set of principles by which a man can guide his life, for experiences are too varied and too complex ever to fit into general formulae.¹⁵

¹³Rogers, "Toward a Modern Approach to Values . . .," pp. 3-7.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 12-15.

¹⁵Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., p. 27.

From this denial that there is one philosophy or belief or set of principles for everyone and from Rogers' contrary emphasis on the necessity of having a constantly changing, internal locus of evaluation, it might appear that Rogers' theory is an example of pure philosophical relativism that can only lead to chaos and anarchy.

Rombauts believes that Rogers' valuing theory, based upon the finding of values solely within an individual's sensory and visceral experience, is an unjustifiable philosophical relativism. He says that Rogers

accounts it one of the ends of therapy to bring the client to the point where his own sense experience and physiological experience support, not to say constitute, value. He comes then to experience as valuable all that is for the good of his own organism.

Apart from the question of how this sense experience is able eventually to discern higher values, one can only conclude that this conception includes a philosophical relativism for which no single justifying word is offered.¹⁶

Menne also criticizes Rogers on this point. He analyzes the nature of man from the standpoint of traditional ethical philosophy and states that man tends toward an absolute end (God)

¹⁶ Rombauts, 82:

". . . zal het één van de doeleinden zijn van de therapie de client ertoe te brengen op zijn eigen zintuigelijke en fysiologische ervaring te steunen om uit te maken wat waardevol is. Hij gaat dan als waarde ervaren al wat het eigen organisme ten goede komt.

"Afgezien van de vraag hoe deze sensorische ervaring eventueel hogere waarden weet te erkennen, kan men niet anders dan vaststellen dat deze opvatting een filosofisch relativisme insluit, waarvoor geen enkele rechtvaardiging wordt geboden."

Translated for this thesis by Peter J. Harvey, S.J.

and that actions which are in accord with this natural tendency are objectively and absolutely good.¹⁷

Further, although Menne agrees with Rogers that values must be meaningful to a person, he believes that Rogers goes too far in the direction of rejecting values received from others which are not here and now found personally meaningful. Menne believes that it is essential to point out that a part of man's social nature is that man learns from others, and that this includes accepting their values on occasion (for example, children from parents) even though these values have not yet been personally appropriated and integrated into one's life.¹⁸

There is no doubt that Rogers is positing philosophical relativism in the sense of making the value of an object or experience completely dependent upon the subject. His insistence on this point is clear. However he does not believe that this is destructive either of the individual or of society.

First of all it must be remembered that at the core of Rogers' philosophy is a confident trust in the on-going drive of the individual toward actualization. The deepest roots of man are good and positive-directed, and Rogers believes that if the individual is congruent his conduct will lead to his true enhancement as a human being. What feels right is right for the

¹⁷Menne, pp. 37-40.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 40-42.

congruent individual; as open to all of his experience his judgment is made in the light of all the relevant data, and his judgment will lead to self-actualizing behavior.

Second, Rogers believes that the enhancement of individuals will not conflict with that of society as a whole; for there is an organismic commonality of value directions in the persons of every culture who are moving toward greater and greater congruence.¹⁹ Rogers finds the explanation of this in the fact that men are all members of the same human species. All individuals have the same basic needs, and one of these is the need for socialized behavior: "To achieve a close, intimate, real, fully communicative relationship with another person seems to meet a deep need in every individual, and is very highly valued."²⁰ Again, it is only the incongruent individual--the man who is less than fully man--who values behavior that conflicts with the needs of others.

The behavior, therefore, of the individual who is true to his organismic valuing process will enhance himself and yet will not conflict with others either in his own community or in another culture. Even though a particular individual would not have a consistent nor even a stable system of conceived values, the directions of the valuing process would be constant across

¹⁹Rogers, "Toward a Modern Approach to Values . . .," pp. 16-20; Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., p. 187.

²⁰Rogers, "Toward a Modern Approach to Values . . .," p. 18.

culture and across time. Rogers therefore admits the fact of universal values but feels that he is reaching the demonstration of this fact by a route different from that along which his readers might be accustomed to travel:

Finally, it appears that we have returned to the issue of universality of values, but by a different route. Instead of universal values "out there," or a universal value system imposed by some group--philosophers, rulers, or priests--we have the possibility of universal human value directions emerging from the experiencing of the human organism. Evidence from therapy indicates that both personal and social values emerge as natural, and experienced, when the individual is close to his own organismic valuing process. The suggestion is that though modern man no longer trusts religion or science or philosophy nor any system of beliefs to give him his values, he may find an organismic valuing base within himself which, if he can learn again to be in touch with it, will prove to be an organized, adaptive and social approach to the perplexing value issues which face all of us.²¹

Rogers is, then, clearly opposing his valuing theory to what he conceives to be more traditional theories which men have accepted. It might be pointed out, however, that the attempt to explain values in terms of an analysis of man's nature is as old as the Greeks. Bertocci and Millard ask whether it is not clear that psychologists like Rogers who attempt to discover motivational needs based upon the intrinsic nature of man "are in fact carrying on the intention of the natural-law moralist as they ferret out permanent, universal needs?"²² The traditional

²¹Ibid., p. 20.

²²Peter A. Bertocci and Richard W. Millard, Personality and the Good: Psychological and Ethical Perspectives (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1963), p. 114.

natural-law moralist would not admit with Rogers that all experience is rooted in sensory and visceral experience and would stress the role of the intellect in judging values more than does Rogers, but he too would look upon the only valid explanation of the valuing process to be one based upon man's concrete human nature. Inasmuch, then, as Rogers admits a universality of values based upon human nature, he is not differing from the traditional explanation of values as much as he believes. The adversary against which he sets himself--an adversary who believes that the universality of values comes only from an authoritarian imposition from "without" rather than arising from the needs and desires of man's concrete nature--is hardly in the truly "traditional" philosophic stream.

In his 1961 book, as a prefatory remark to the section concerned with what Rogers calls "a philosophy of persons," he remarks that "I have formed some philosophical impressions of the life and goal toward which the individual moves when he is free."²³ One of the questions which has most concerned Rogers, as it must any therapist, is the question of the good life. What is the goal or goals of life toward which clients, and all men, tend? Given the universality of human nature and the consequent universality of the value directions which men who are inwardly free manifest, what description of the life which is good to live will be most adequate to the experience of seeing oneself and

²³Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., p. 161.

others move in these directions?

That this is not a pseudo-problem is clearly recognized by Rogers. The question of the purpose of life has been asked by men of all ages, and each man has formulated an answer either explicitly or implicitly and lives his life accordingly. One evident fact, however, is that neither the men of the past nor the men of the present have agreed on the answer:

When men in the past have asked themselves the purpose of life, some have answered, in the words of the catechism, that "the chief end of man is to glorify God." Others have thought of life's purpose as being the preparation of oneself for immortality. Others have settled on a much more earthy goal--to enjoy and release and satisfy every sensual desire. Still others--and this applies to many today--regard the purpose of life as being to achieve--to gain material possessions, status, knowledge, power. Some have made it their goal to give themselves completely and devotedly to a cause outside of themselves such as Christianity, or Communism. A Hitler has seen his goal as that of becoming the leader of a master race which would exercise power over all. In sharp contrast, many an Oriental has striven to eliminate all personal desires, to exercise the utmost of control over himself.²⁴

Rogers however does not choose to describe the good life in terms of any of these or similar possible answers. His conception of the good life is basically an outgrowth of his theory of values. Just as he has a process theory of values--there are no immutable values which invariably hold for all people at all times--so he has a process theory of the good life.

Rogers is within the existential stream of psychology when he views the question from the standpoint of process; and,

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 164-65.

in fact, he turns to the existentialist philosopher Kierkegaard for a concise formulation of the answer, believing that the aim of life which best reflects the psychotherapeutic experience of man's dynamic process of development is expressed in Kierkegaard's words--"to be that self which one truly is."²⁵ Kierkegaard states that the most common form of despair is the despair of not willing to be oneself but that the deepest despair is the despair of willing to be another than oneself; the opposite of despair, on the other hand, is to actually will to be that self which one truly is, and this choice is the deepest responsibility of man.²⁶

What does it mean to become the self which one truly is? First of all this becoming may be stated negatively, in terms of what the person does not do. As an individual comes closer to the ideal of the hypothetical fully-functioning person, he will move further and further away from hiding behind façades, away from being a self which he is not, that is, away from having a self-concept which is not true to all of the significant experience of the organism. No longer will he deny or distort aspects of his experience because of a threat to a self-structure which is not true to the whole. Such an individual will move away from

²⁵ Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, trans. with an introduction by Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1941), p. 29. Quoted in Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . . , p. 166.

²⁶ Cited in Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . . , p. 110.

guiding his life according to "oughts" which are meaningless to him as a person, and thereby away from trying to please others by conforming to their expectations of what he should or should not do.²⁷

On the contrary, the good life will be a fluid and changing process of becoming, a life in which a person is not disturbed to realize that he is constantly changing in terms of new experience, a life in which a person is content to be a process, not a product. Rogers accepts Kierkegaard's characterization of the truly existing person:

An existing individual is constantly in process of becoming, . . . and translates all his thinking into terms of process. It is with [him] . . . as it is with a writer and his style; for he only has a style who never has anything finished, but "moves the waters of the language" every time he begins, so that the most common expression comes into being for him with the freshness of a new birth.²⁸

For Rogers, then, as for Kierkegaard, existence is a process of becoming. This is reflected in the title of Rogers' most recent book: On Becoming a Person.

The good life will be characterized by increasing self-acceptance and therefore by increasing congruence between the self-concept and the organismic valuing process, based upon an openness to the totality and complexity of his experience. The

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 167-70.

²⁸ Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. Swensen, completed after his death and provided with an introduction and notes by Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1944), p. 79. Quoted in Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . . , p. 172.

fully-functioning person will move toward greater self-direction, accepting responsibility for himself and choosing the goals toward which he wants to move.²⁹

Further, it will be a life in which the individual becomes more acceptant of other persons and experiences an ever greater need for true interpersonal relationships in which he can manifest himself as he actually is. Rogers discusses this basic universal need in terms of Martin Buber's "I-Thou" relationship:

There is an obvious hunger to be one's feelings, to be known and accepted for what one is, to communicate one's self in genuine terms, not as a façade. . . . The human being wants, clearly, to be fully known and fully accepted in a relationship.

When such an experience occurs, as it does with some frequency in therapy, but also in other life situations, it partakes of the characteristics which Martin Buber has so well described as the "I-Thou" relationship. It has no concern with time, with practicalities, with differences of status or role, not even a concern with consequences. It is simply the deep mutual experience of speaking truly to one another as persons, as we are, as we feel, without holding back, without putting on. As Buber well points out, this deep "I-Thou" experience is not one which can be maintained, but unless it occurs from time to time the individual is cheated of his full potential development. It is one of the experiences which makes a man truly human.³⁰

The only control of behavior will be the natural and internal balancing of needs and the discovery of behavior which follows the vector most closely approximating the satisfaction of

²⁹ Cf., Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., pp. 107-124, 170-76; Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.), pp. 234-35; Rogers, "Toward a Modern Approach to Values . . .," pp. 16-18.

³⁰ Rogers, "The Potential of the Human Individual . . .," p. 15. Cf., Rogers and Buber, "Dialogue between Martin Buber and Carl Rogers," pp. 10-15.

all needs. The experience of extreme satisfaction of one need (for example, sex) in a way to do violence to other needs (for example, tender relationships)--a common experience in defensively organized persons--will be decreased.³¹ Such a person will participate in the vastly complex self-regulatory activities of his organism in such a fashion as to live in increasing harmony with himself and others. The fully-functioning person will find that such a life will not be without problems, but it will be satisfying for he will be true to himself in meeting life and the obstacles which it presents. Becoming oneself is not an easy task, nor one that is ever completed. It is a continuing, courageous way of life.³²

The actions of the fully-functioning person, therefore, will be meaningful manifestations of his basic drive toward self-actualization, made in terms of true values--values that have personal significance. The good will be that which actually brings organismically experienced satisfaction that maintains and enhances the entire organism both in the immediate present and considered from a long-range standpoint.

Since the good life is a process or a direction, not a state of being or a destination, Rogers emphasizes that it does not imply fixity or rigidity. He therefore rejects the idea that the goal of life is a state of happiness that is achieved once

³¹Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., p. 195.

³²Ibid., pp. 181, 196.

and for all:

It seems to me that the good life is not any fixed state. It is not, in my estimation, a state of virtue, or contentment, or nirvana, or happiness. It is not a condition in which the individual is adjusted, or fulfilled, or actualized. To use psychological terms, it is not a state of drive-reduction, or tension-reduction, or homeostasis.

I believe that all of these terms have been used in ways which imply that if one or several of these states is achieved, then the goal of life has been achieved.³³

Here again Rogers is echoing Kierkegaard, who states that the continual process of striving to become oneself does not mean that the person has a static goal which he achieves once and for all.³⁴ (And here again it might be pointed out that such a static and rigid value-theory as Rogers is refuting cannot be identified as the truly traditional value-theory. No contemporary philosopher who is working within the framework of the Western philosophic tradition would think of need-reduction and happiness as the same or of virtue and homeostasis as equivalent.)

Menne criticizes Rogers for rejecting happiness, but as he himself admits he does not mean by it the same thing as Rogers. Menne is looking at happiness as the goal of man's actions and, ultimately, as the state of perfect fulfillment in God,³⁵ whereas Rogers is denying, as Kierkegaard does, that man

³³ Ibid., pp. 185-86. Cf., Ibid., p. 176; Rogers and Skinner, "Some Issues Concerning the Control of Human Behavior," 1062.

³⁴ Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 84-85.

³⁵ Menne, pp. 38-39.

could ever reach a static goal of complete actualization in this life.

Finally, Rogers believes that his theory of the good life is not limited to individual application but can also be extended on a social level to groups, organizations, and even nations. Social groups will find, as do individuals, that it is a deeply rewarding experience to face and accept the reality of life-experiences, to become what each one truly is.³⁶

³⁶Rogers, On Becoming a Person . . ., pp. 178-80.
Cf., Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," in Koch (ed.),
pp. 192-94, 235-44.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In accord with the purpose of this thesis, we have considered the major philosophical implications of Carl Rogers' theory of personality, presenting both Rogers' positions and the major criticism to which these various positions have been subjected. In conclusion, let us draw together in a few remarks some of the main themes that run through Rogers' writings.

Clearly, the fundamental concern of Rogers is a modern concern quite in touch with the contemporary world: the personhood of man. He asks the questions, what is personhood and how does man achieve it? At the root of Rogers' answer we find a confident, optimistic trust in the basic goodness of man. Rogers is aware of the evil in the world that is caused by man and to which man is subjected; but he centers his attention beneath these layers of cruelty and degradation and finds at the core of the human personality a positive, on-going drive toward true fulfillment of the individual person. When man is free to become himself, he realizes his value and dignity as a human person and acts in such a way that he personally and society as a whole will be enhanced. Man is good, his actions are socially constructive, and he consciously tends toward a self-ideal that embodies his

full potentiality. Rogers therefore stands out as a spokesman for the responsible dignity of human nature in a deterministically-minded age which has cast serious doubts on both man's responsibility and man's fundamental goodness.

Rogers approaches man from an existential rather than what might be called an essential viewpoint. His concern is with a concrete man immersed in a world of hopes and loves and dreams and hates. He watches the stream of man's development, the process of man's becoming. Life, he finds, is deeper than logic; the breadth of man-in-the-world cannot be captured in intellectual formulae. Man must open himself to the fullness of his experience and guide the currents of his development according to values that are personally felt, personally meaningful. Life is not static but an existential stream of creative growth. Man commits himself to accept responsibly the direction of his own self-fulfilment.

The emphasis, therefore, is on the subjective, that is, on personally appropriated knowledge in a Kierkegaardian sense. I do not uncritically accept the values of others and behave according to their expectations unless I myself have found personal meaning in these values. In a sense, then, man is the measure of all things; objects and values that stand outside the ambit of what I find personally meaningful can hardly take precedence over those that I experience as truly fulfilling.

Man, therefore, is seen in an existential context; for the

depth of his reality cannot be objectified from an external scientific standpoint. The inner wealth of his being can only be grasped from within, from the core of subjectivity in which the individual person lives and struggles to achieve the manhood that he is capable of becoming.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. PRIMARY SOURCES

A. BOOKS

- Rogers, Carl R. Becoming a Person. (Oberlin College Nellie Heldt Lecture Series; reprinted by the Hogg Foundation for Mental Hygiene) Austin: University of Texas, 1961.
- Client-Centered Therapy: Its Current Practice, Implications, and Theory. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951.
 - The Clinical Treatment of the Problem Child. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1939.
 - Counseling and Psychotherapy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942.
 - On Becoming a Person; A Therapist's View of Psychotherapy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961.
 - and Dymond, Rosalind F. (eds.). Psychotherapy and Personality Change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.

B. ARTICLES

- Rogers, Carl R. "The Actualizing Tendency in Relation to 'Motives' and to Consciousness." Unpublished paper given at the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, February 21 and 22, 1963.
- "The Attitude and Orientation of the Counselor in Client-Centered Therapy," Journal of Consulting Psychology, XIII (1949), 82-94.
 - "The Characteristics of a Helping Relationship," Personnel and Guidance Journal, XXXVII (1958), 6-16.

- _____ . "Classroom Approaches to Human Behavior." Address given at Harvard Conference, April 4, 1952.
- _____ . "The Concept of the Fully Functioning Person." Unpublished paper. Chicago: University of Chicago Counseling Center, 1953.
- _____ . "Concluding Comment to Bernard M. Loomer, Walter M. Horton, and Hans Hofmann, 'Reinhold Niebuhr and Carl R. Rogers: A Discussion,'" Pastoral Psychology, IX, No. 85 (1958), 25-28.
- _____ . "Dealing with Interpersonal Conflict," Pastoral Psychology, III, No. 28 (1952), 18-20; III, No. 29 (1952), 37-44.
- _____ . "Discussion," Existential Inquiries, I, No. 2 (1960).
- _____ . "Divergent Trends in Methods of Improving Adjustment," Harvard Educational Review, XIIX (1948), 209-219.
- _____ . "The Interpersonal Relationship: The Core of Guidance," Harvard Educational Review, XXXII, (1962), 416-29.
- _____ . "Learning to Be Free." Unpublished paper given to a session on "Conformity and Diversity" in the conference on "Man and Civilization" sponsored by the University of California School of Medicine, San Francisco, January 28, 1962.
- _____ . "A Note on the Nature of Man," Journal of Counseling Psychology, IV (1957), 199-203.
- _____ . "A Personal View of Some Issues Facing Psychologists," American Psychologist, X (1955), 247-49.
- _____ . "Persons or Science? A Philosophical Question," American Psychologist, X (1955), 267-78.
- _____ . "The Potential of the Human Individual: The Capacity for Becoming Fully Functioning." Unpublished paper dated November 15, 1961, and prepared as one chapter of a proposed volume on The Conception of Man, edited by Arthur Burton.
- _____ . Review of The Self and the Dramas of History by Reinhold Niebuhr, Pastoral Psychology, IX (1958), 15-17.
- _____ . "Significant Aspects of Client-Centered Therapy," American Psychologist, I (1946), 415-22.

- . "Some Directions and End Points in Therapy." In O. H. Mowrer (ed.), Psychotherapy, Theory and Research. New York: Ronald Press, 1953, 44-68.
- . "Some Observations on the Organization of Personality," American Psychologist, II (1947), 358-68.
- . "A Theory of Therapy, Personality, and Interpersonal Relationships as Developed in the Client-Centered Framework." In S. Koch (ed.), Psychology: A Study of a Science, Vol. III; Formulations of the Person and the Social Context. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959, 184-256.
- . "Toward a Modern Approach to Values: The Valuing Process in the Mature Person." Unpublished paper dated September, 1962.
- . "Toward a Science of the Person." Unpublished paper prepared for a symposium on "Behaviorism and Phenomenology: Contrasting Bases for Modern Psychology" at Rice University, Houston, Texas, March 20-22, 1963.
- . "Two Divergent Trends." In Rollo May (ed.), Existential Psychology. New York: Random House, 1961, 85-93.
- . "The Way to Do Is to Be": Review of Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology, by Rollo May, et al., Contemporary Psychology, IV (1959), 196-98.
- , and Buber, Martin. "Dialogue between Martin Buber and Carl Rogers." Unpublished dialogue which took place on April 18, 1957, at Ann Arbor, Michigan.
- , Kell, B. L., and McNeil, Helen. "The Role of Self-Understanding in the Prediction of Behavior," Journal of Consulting Psychology, XII (1948), 174-86.
- , and Skinner, B. F. "Some Issues concerning the Control of Human Behavior," Science, CXXIV (1956), 1057-66.

II. SECONDARY SOURCES

A. BOOKS

Allport, Gordon W. Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955.

- Arnold, Magda B. and Gasson, John A. The Human Person. New York: Ronald Press, 1954.
- Barnett, Lincoln. The Universe and Dr. Einstein. New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948.
- Bertecci, Peter A., and Millard, Richard M. Personality and the Good: Psychological and Ethical Perspectives. New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1963.
- Blum, Milton L., and Balinsky, Benjamin. Counseling and Psychology. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951.
- Buber, Martin. I and Thou. Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith. 2d ed. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958.
- Curran, Charles A. Personality Factors in Counseling. New York: Grune and Stratton, 1945.
- Dewey, John. Philosophy and Civilization. New York: Minton, Black and Co., 1931.
- Frankl, Viktor E. From Death Camp to Existentialism. Translated by I. Lasch. Boston: Beacon Press, 1959.
- Hall, Calvin S., and Lindzey, Gardner. Theories of Personality. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957.
- Huxley, Aldous. Brave New World. New York: Harper and Bros., 1946.
- Kierkegaard, Søren. Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Translated by David F. Swenson. Completed after his death and provided with an introduction and notes by Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944.
- . The Sickness Unto Death. Translated with an introduction by Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941.
- Koch, Sigmund (ed.). Psychology: A Study of a Science. Vol. III: Formulations of the Person and the Social Context. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959.
- Menne, Raymond. The Theory of Personality of Carl Rogers. Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum "Angelicum," 1961.
- Northrop, F. S. C. The Meeting of East and West. New York: Macmillan, 1946.

- Nuttin, Joseph. Psychoanalysis and Personality: A Dynamic Theory of Normal Personality. Translated by George Lamb. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1953.
- Rank, Otto. Will Therapy. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1936.
- Skinner, B. F. Science and Human Behavior. New York: Macmillan, 1953.
- _____. Walden Two. New York: Macmillan, 1948.
- Snygg, Donald, and Combs, Arthur W. Individual Behavior: A New Frame of Reference for Psychology. New York: Harper, 1949.
- Vanderveldt, J. H., and Odenwald, Robert P. Psychiatry and Catholicism. 2d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957.
- Zavalloni, Roberto. Self-Determination: The Psychology of Personal Freedom. Translated by Virgilio Biasoli and Carroll Tageson. Chicago: Forum Books, 1962.

B. ARTICLES

- Block, J., and Thomas, H. "Is Satisfaction with Self a Measure of Adjustment?" Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LI (1955), 254-59.
- Cartwright, Desmond S. "Annotated Bibliography of Research and Theory Construction in Client-Centered Therapy," Journal of Counseling Psychology, IV (1957), 82-100.
- Dettering, Richard W. "Philosophical Idealism in Rogerian Psychology," Educational Theory, V (1955), 206-14.
- Ellis, Albert. "A Critique of the Theoretical Contributions of Non-Directive Therapy," Journal of Clinical Psychology, IV (1948), 248-55.
- Frankl, Viktor. "Psychotherapy and Philosophy," Philosophy Today, V (1961), 59-64.
- Hobbs, Nicholas. "Client-Centered Psychotherapy." In James L. McCary (ed.), Six Approaches to Psychotherapy. New York: Dryden Press, 1953, 51-58.
- Howie, D. "Some Theoretical Implications of Rogers' Non-Directive Therapy," Journal of General Psychology, XIII (1950), 225-41.

- Hunt, William A. "Diagnosis and Non-Directive Therapy," Journal of Clinical Psychology, IV (1948), 232-36.
- Labo, Dell. "The Development of Client-Centered Therapy in the Writings of Carl Rogers," American Journal of Psychiatry, CX (1953), 104-109.
- Leeper, R. W. Review of On Becoming a Person: A Therapist's View of Psychotherapy, Contemporary Psychology, VIII (1963), 229-30.
- Loomer, Bernard M., Horton, Walter M., and Hofmann, Hans. "Reinhold Niebuhr and Carl R. Rogers: A Discussion," Pastoral Psychology, IX, No. 85 (1958), 17-25.
- Melton, Arthur W. "The APA Distinguished Scientific Contribution Awards for 1956," American Psychologist, XII (1957), 125-33.
- Nosal, W. S. Letter to the Editor, Journal of Counseling Psychology, III (1956), 299-301.
- "Person to Person," Time, LXX (July 1, 1957), 34-35.
- Perry, William H., and Estes, Stanley G. "The Collaboration of Client and Counselor." In O. H. Mowrer (ed.), Psychotherapy, Theory and Research. New York: Ronald Press, 1953, 95-119.
- Raskin, N. "The Development of Non-Directive Therapy," Journal of Consulting Psychology, XII (1948), 92-109.
- Rombauts, A. J. "De Opvatting van de Persoonlijkheid in het Counseling-System van Carl Rogers," Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, XXI (1959), 20-95.
- Skinner, B. F. "Freedom and the Control of Men," American Scholar, XXV (1955-56), 47-65.
- Smith, M. B. "The Phenomenological Approach in Personality Theory: Some Critical Remarks," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XVI (1950), 516-22.
- Snygg, Donald, and Combs, Arthur W. "The Phenomenological Approach and the Problem of 'Unconscious' Behavior: A Reply to Dr. Smith," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XVI (1950), 523-28.

- Thorne, Frederick C. "Further Critique of Nondirective Methods of Psychotherapy," Journal of Clinical Psychology, IV (1948), 256-63.
- Walker, Donald E., with comment by Snyder, W. U. "Carl Rogers and the Nature of Man," Journal of Counseling Psychology, III (1956), 89-93.
- . Letter to the Editor, Journal of Counseling Psychology, III (1956), 229-30.

APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Daniel W. Artley, S.J.

has been read and approved by three members of the Department of Philosophy.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Sept. 30, 1964
Date

Walter Kamell, S.J.
Signature of Adviser