Learning from the UN Preventive Deployment Mission in Macedonia: Nothing Fails Like Success?

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LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

LEARNING FROM THE UN PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT MISSION IN MACEDONIA: NOTHING FAILS LIKE SUCCESS?

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PROGRAM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY
MARY FRANCES ROSETT LEBAMOFF
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
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acknowledge all of them. Know that you, whether named or not, are part of my fondest memories of the Republic and its peoples.

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on the coast, so the Major General and I could discuss KFOR and UNPREDEP, was remarkably generous, and typical of this kind and thoughtful man. Thanks to Bent Sohnemann, I have had a General cook meals for me, an authentic UNPREDEP blue beret (one of his own with emblem), and an UNPREDEP mug.

Colonel Kalle Liesinen and his wife, Tuuli, challenged my thinking at their summer home near Kuovola, Finland during a long weekend’s stay there. Colonel Liesinen’s insights as a former Battalion Commander were of the highest quality. Juha Engstrom and his wife opened their doors to me at their summer home near Mäntsälä, Finland. BG Engstrom’s responses and statements regarding UNPREDEP helped shape this dissertation in many ways.

BG Ove Johnny Strömberg, UNPREDEP’s final BG, drove into Oslo, Norway – what was to be a ninety-minute or so interview turned into over four hours, during which he provided resources and information not accessible elsewhere. My appreciation of his efforts to meet with me and of the material he offered knows no bounds.

At the Swedish National Defense Academy in Stockholm, BG Bo Lennart Wranker took time out of a crowded schedule to meet two separate times. His well-organized thoughts and clear, concise answers to questions were invaluable. His referral to BG Jan-Gunnar Isberg, considered a national treasure and legend in Sweden because of his peacekeeping experience, was also rewarding. Both BG Wranker and BG Isberg had lengthy assignments, BG Isberg two years with UNPROFOR/M, and BG Wranker, fourteen months with UNPREDEP, along with extensive tours of duty and command in other UN Peacekeeping missions.
For nearly four years, BG Finn Særmark-Thomsen led UNPROFOR/M, and thereafter tracked UNPREDEP closely. Meeting with him for an entire half-day at the historic Svanemølle Barracks of the Danish Military Academy in Copenhagen was very fruitful. His incisive comments and responses gave additional depth to this research.

UNPREDEP’s longest-serving SRSG, the distinguished diplomat Henryk J. Sokalski, generously agreed to two interviews at his home in Warsaw, Poland in 2010. He and his wife, Maria, were generous hosts. Mr. Sokalski, shrewd and insightful, offered new depth and enhanced comprehension of UNPREDEP in the field, of UN HQ, and dealings between the field and HQ. I consider them my esteemed friends.

I am also deeply appreciative to the United Nations Archives for granting me access to some UNPREP files prior to their public availability.

Without friends and colleagues here in the U.S. urging me on and becoming nearly as fascinated with Macedonia as I am, this project would not have been completed: I especially thank my children, and my friends Edgar Jorge Marcolin, Ph.D., and Ryan Jay Burch, M.A.

Major Per Iko (Sweden) offered his recollections of the dismantling of UNPREDEP in 1999. “The highway north out of Thessaloniki was clogged with NATO heading into Macedonia; the [same] highway south was backed up with UNPREDEP heading out of Macedonia.” The image Major Iko evoked remains with me.
For my extraordinary father, the late Alexander Thomas Lebamoff, M.D.,
and my remarkable children, Joshua, Andrew, Lanora,
Damien and Mary-Claire
I opened almost every meeting with UNPREDEP military leaders quite *positively*, I thought:

“Gentlemen, we appear to have suffered another success.”

– Henryk J. Sokalski

14 July 2010
Warsaw, Poland
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<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARM</td>
<td>Army of the Republic of Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANCOY</td>
<td>Danish Company (UNPREDEP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESA</td>
<td>UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPET</td>
<td>Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union (formerly European Community, EC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOMM</td>
<td>European Command, U.S. Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINCOY</td>
<td>Finnish Company (UNPREDEP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (UN Name)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICFY</td>
<td>International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force (NATO), Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>International Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNA</td>
<td>Yugoslav National Army (prior to break-up of SR Yugoslavia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Forces (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANU</td>
<td>Macedonia Academy of Sciences and Arts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILO</td>
<td>Military Liaison Office/Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td>Macedonia (Postal Abbreviation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOC</td>
<td>Macedonian Orthodox Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLAOO</td>
<td>Northern Limitation of the Area of Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORBAT</td>
<td>Norway Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORDBAT</td>
<td>Nordic Battalion (UNPREDEP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OECD ......................................................... Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFA ................................................................. Ohrid Framework Agreement 2001
ONUC ............................................................. United Nations Mission in the Congo
OSCE ............................................................. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
P-5 ................................................................. Permanent Five, UN Security Council
PKO ................................................................. Peacekeeping Operation
POC ................................................................. Protection of Civilians
QRF ................................................................. Quick Reaction Force (in UNPREDEP)
R2P ................................................................. Responsibility to Protect
RoM ............................................................... Republic of Macedonia (Constitutional Name)
SEEU .................................................................. South Eastern European University, Macedonia
SFOR ................................................................. Stabilisation Forces (NATO)
SRSG ............................................................... Special Representative of the [UN] Secretary-General
SWECOY .......................................................... Swedish Company (UNPREDEP)
UN HQ .............................................................. United Nations Headquarters
UN ................................................................. United Nations
UNAMIR ............................................................ United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNARMS .......................................................... United Nations Archives and Records Management Services
UNCIVPOL ....................................................... United Nations Civilian Police
UNCRO ............................................................ United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia
UNCTAD ........................................................... UN Conference on Trade and Development
UNIFICYP .......................................................... United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNIFIL ............................................................. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIK ............................................................. United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMO .............................................................. United Nations Military Observer/s
UNOSOM I and II .................................................. United Nations Operations in Somalia I and II
UNPF-HQ .......................................................... United Nations Peace Force – Headquarters (Belgrade)
UNPL ............................................................... United Nations Patrol Line (for UNPREDEP)
UNPREDEP ......................................................... United Nations Preventive Deployment Mission (Macedonia)
UNPROFOR ....................................................... United Nations Protection Forces
UNPROFOR/M ....................................................... United Nations Protection Forces/Macedonia
UNSC ............................................................... United Nations Security Council
UNTAES .......................................................... United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia
USBAT ............................................................. United States Battalion (UNPREDEP)
VJ ................................................................. Transcription to Latin alphabet from Serbian for Army of the FRY
ABSTRACT

Preventive deployment as a conflict prevention tool has not recurred in the past decade-plus, despite the broadly acclaimed success of the United Nations Preventive Deployment in Macedonia (UNPREDEP 1995-1999; and its predecessor mission, UNPROFOR/Macedonia, UNPROFOR/M 1992-1995). The United Nations in particular has continued with mainly first- and second-generation peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding actions. What may best explain why has there has been no other engagement in preventive deployment missions, when there has been much emphasis placed formally and informally on early warning, detection, mitigation, and prevention of conflict? There have also been an increasing numbers of violent conflicts worldwide, so again, why no more preventive deployments?

Realism, organizational learning and constructivism in particular offer potential theoretical insights. Several research innovations were established: first, the main organizations involved (the UN Headquarters, UN HQ) and the field organization (UNPREDEP) were conceived of as two separate entities; second, the examination of the case was expanded temporally, and third, theoretical approaches infrequently utilized in international relations, particularly organization and organizational learning theory, were applied.
Learning in the field organization pre-, during and post-deployment, and learning situated at key UN Departments and sections were to have been critical but largely unexamined factors in this outcome relevant to the absence, post-UNPROFOR/M and UNPREDEP of preventive deployment as part of preventive diplomacy. Interviews with primary field and headquarters actors were crucial to addressing this question. Primary materials from the UN Archives were also made partially available for the first time, and were an important source for this case study.

It is found that learning and knowledge interactions between organizations (especially between the field and UN HQ) resulted in flawed processes and outcomes at headquarters, and thereby blurred opportunities for understanding, learning and change, instead allowing decisions, principles, practices, policies and norms that at the very least marginalized preventive deployment as an ongoing, viable tool of pre-conflict management.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Preventive deployment, a physical manifestation of preventive diplomacy, was first conceived roughly fifty years ago by Dag Hammarskjöld as Secretary-General of the UN. The United Nations Preventive Deployment in the Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP), the single case of a preventive deployment UN mission, was based on those principles of preventive deployment first given formal shape in Agenda for Peace in 1992, and restated in its Supplement in 1995.¹ In Agenda for Peace, intervention in a conflict at the behest of a state or states prior to bloody confrontation, was considered a key aspect of preventive diplomacy, a concerted and focused effort to avoid full-out inter- or intra-state war between entities at violence-prone odds with one another.

Section II.20 of the Agenda defines preventive diplomacy as, “... action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into violent conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.”² Preventive


deployment is described in Section III.28-29 of the same report; Section III.32 (under Preventive Deployment) was applied specifically to the eventual Macedonian mission:

In cases where one nation fears a cross-border attack, if the Security Council concludes that a United Nations presence on one side of the border, with the consent only of the requesting country, would serve to deter conflict, I recommend that preventive deployment take place. Here again, the specific nature of the situation would determine the mandate and the personnel required to fulfil it.³

In all instances, states’ sovereignty was to be respected in accordance with the original UN Charter.⁴ But importantly, the Agenda recognized formally and specifically that intervention pre-bloodshed or pre-tipping point was preferred to an outbreak of armed conflict.⁵ Yes, UN missions would continue to engage in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peacemaking. But early intervention would be preferred whenever and wherever possible, as the Secretary General and author of Agenda for Peace, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, made clear:

Our aims must be:

- To seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results;
- Where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues that have led to conflict;
- Through peace-keeping, to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the

---


peacemakers;
- To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war;
- And in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression. It is possible to discern an increasingly common moral perception that spans the world's nations and peoples, and which is finding expression in international laws, many owing their genesis to the work of this Organization.⁶

Peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding in international relations are usually examined from a limited group of theoretical and practical approaches: conflict prevention, management and resolution; human rights and legal studies; nation/state building; and security studies, military strategy and logistics. One finds analyses of troubled missions viewed through these lenses: Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Somalia are icons of failed United Nations peacekeeping efforts.⁷ It evidently has largely escaped scholarly notice that the other side of the failure coin is success. Surprisingly, there have been few examinations of how and why success has occurred.

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UNPREDEP, far less the subject of scholarly endeavors, engaged in pre-conflict prevention and protection, utilizing a relatively small force, and was considered a solid success case—yet more traditional peacekeeping missions have followed it for the past decade-plus. There has been no other specifically preventive deployment under UN auspices. Why has this positive outcome not engendered additional efforts at preventive deployments? Or is this a situation in which, counterintuitively, nothing failed like success?

**Central Question of this Dissertation**

This dissertation explores why preventive deployment has not been undertaken again by the UN, when the United Nations Preventive Deployment’s (UNPREDEP) preventive characteristics appear applicable to a broad range of early-warning and pre-conflict circumstances and their management. This is puzzling, particularly since more traditional peacekeeping missions continue, given high-profile failures such as Somalia (UNOSOM I and II), the Democratic Republic of Congo (ONUC and MONUC), and Rwanda (UNAMIR), to name a few besides UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina.8

Yet UNPREDEP (1995-1999) remains the sole case of a formal preventive deployment mission to date. This status is both puzzling and intriguing, particularly given its success. If the United Nations Charter’s Preamble is to be fulfilled, “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind,” then *ceteris paribus*, one would expect more preventive deployments, not fewer. Intra-state wars and conflicts have not vanished, and inter-state

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ones have not disappeared. Early-warning signs abound for which a preventive deployment would be applicable and preferable. The central question of this examination of UNPREDEP is, “Why no more?” since that mission?

Three potential explanations are explored for preventive deployment’s disuse after UNPREDEP. First, powerful states discarded it as a viable option. This is examined by testing the evidence against the approach of realism. The most powerful states, after all, form the Permanent Five (P-5) in the UN Security Council, hold veto power, and authorization over preventive deployment and/or the use of other types of preventive diplomacy.\(^9\) It is conceivable that preventive deployments are understood not to be in the national interests of these powerful states, in that they diminish economic and other resources vital to national interests and national security, or that they otherwise militate against the accretion of power by the P-5 countries.

Second, discrete yet interlinked organizations in the field and at headquarters may well have experienced learning in quite different ways, possibly leading to dysfunctions or “disconnects” between some (or all) learning sites. This potential explanation is explored through organizational learning approaches and the terms of social constructivism.\(^10\)

The third conceivable related set of prospects is that security organizations, as a group of actors, interacted post-UNPREDEP to promote a norm obviating use of

\(^9\) The P-5 of the United Nations Security Council is comprised of the United States, Russia, China (PRC), the United Kingdom, and France.

preventive deployment in conflict prevention and mitigation. This is suggested under constructivist terms. There is evidence of some inter-IGO communications during the course of UNPREDEP and afterward, particularly between the OSCE, NATO and the UN in Macedonia and at various field headquarters, available in mission records and described in interviews with mission leadership.

Another group, epistemic communities, not only IGOs, security organizations or NGOs, could also have disregarded preventive deployment as a viable option in peace operations, or have moved toward a different type of underlying peace keeping motivation. Peter M. Haas, in addressing epistemic communities, argues that systemic constraints and domestic political considerations are not the only determinants of states’ preferences and actions.11

Often epistemic communities [of experts] are influential in highly technical policy areas where the causal linkages between policy and outcomes are especially unclear. …Shocks to the systems – failures or unexpected outcomes – will prompt leaders to rethink policies and consider ideas generated by epistemic communities. There are three causal dynamics through which epistemic communities exert influence over preferences and outcomes: uncertainty, interpretation, and institutionalization. Decision-makers facing uncertainty will turn to epistemic communities to clarify substantive causal relationships and linkages with other issues, define the interests of states, and formulate policy. Ideas become institutionalized through the efforts of transnational networks, often bureaucrats within governments or employed by international organizations. These coalitions push for the adoption of policy measures corresponding to the consensus of the epistemic community. The shared normative commitment of epistemic communities distinguishes them from other professional groups.12


12 P.M. Haas, 1992; see also Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 40-46, 90, 129-130, 163, 188 and passim, especially regarding epistemic communities, learning and international organizations.
Howard Adelman analyzes this “missing link” regarding epistemic communities and conflicts, and takes it one step further:

…the major problem behind the resort to violence in complex emergencies and the inadequate international response to dealing with such conflicts is the absence of an epistemic community sharing a common body of knowledge and a set of minimal values [emphasis added]. In other words…we need better knowledge and analysis of conflict situations, their causes, and strategies for dealing with them not simply as instruments upon which to base better policies, but because the process of developing that knowledge and those analyses provides an opportunity to create a cosmopolitan epistemic community which is the essential missing substantive element in such policies and actions.\(^\text{13}\)

This is a puzzle: even though admittedly successful, what happened to engaging in more preventive deployment mission engagements after UNPREDEP’s achievements? Exploring success, and the learning that was part of it, would be logical approaches in helping ensure a future preventive deployment with positive outcomes. Could we learn from this previous accomplishment about how to engage in a similar mission? Learning results from and leads to change; policy arises from learning and change, and policy leads to praxis.

Only within the past decade or so has scholarly attention been paid to missions broadly considered successful by academics, scholars and the military. Even then, these entities have tended to examine predominantly traditional, multidimensional, post-conflict UN peacekeeping missions, particularly those operating in close relation to civil wars.\(^\text{14}\) There have been only occasional analytical and/or narrative works that have

\(^{13}\) Howard Adelman, “Epistemic Communities and Conflict Prevention: Reconceptualizing Multilateralism after the Rwanda Genocide” (draft manuscript), August 1, 1996, at http://yorkspace.library.yorku.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10315/2625/H%20A%20Epistemic%20Communities%20and%20Conflict%20Prevention%20-%20Reconcept.PDF.

\(^{14}\) Multidimensional UN missions encompass military, police and civilian components, usually with many development and capacity-building efforts by others in the host country. The majority of UN missions
attempted to explain, *inter alia*, the success of differing operations such as observer-only or preventive deployment. The majority of such examinations and explanations of success tend to be of logistical, strategic (including conflict management), and operational approaches.

**Why Preventive Deployment?**

Preventive deployment is of substantial and relevant interest because this method has been adjudged effective, and was considerably more economical than traditional, in-conflict or post-conflict peacekeeping missions. Furthermore, with growing numbers of intra- and inter-state conflicts worldwide (including those undertaken by non-state actors), and a plethora of early-warning systems and organizations, there would appear to be no shortage of solicitations and appropriate conflicts for such missions. The case examined herein is the United Nations Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) in

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Macedonia during 1995-1999. It was a highly effective field operation undertaken in the midst of a number of other regional conflict situations that involved UN mission failures. Those fiascos included the United Nations Protection Force mission in the rump Yugoslavia (Serbia), Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia.\textsuperscript{18} UNPREDEP’s mandate was aimed at preventing spillover into Macedonia from the former Yugoslavia’s conflicts. During its tenure, in this it succeeded.

UNPREDEP is therefore the ideal (and only) preventive deployment case available for exploration: it was invited into Macedonia by the state’s President at that time, Kiro Gligorov, and it was a pre-bloodshed, pre-tipping point situation. The mission was in a neighborhood fraught with tensions and violence, although the violence was then outside of the small, new state, mainly in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, with outbreaks in Croatia and Eastern Slavonia that were more quickly settled. Both internal and external tensions abounded, some due to Macedonia’s demography: about 25% ethnically Albanian Macedonians (mostly Muslims) and about 60% ethnic Macedonians (mostly Orthodox Christians), with other minorities making up the balance.

Some tensions were geo-politically based: Macedonia had not only been a Republic in the former Yugoslavia, it remains a central point of the Balkans geographically. Thus, it could well have been part of any “Greater Serbia” aspirations on the part of that warring state. At the very least, both similarities and differences among

\textsuperscript{18} UNPROFOR’s mandate included five former Yugoslav Republics with the addition of Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia (cf. UN Department of Public Information reports at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_b.htm).
the former constituent Yugoslav Republics and their neighbors were too great to ignore the distinct possibility of the surrounding conflicts overwhelming Macedonia.

Crucially, Macedonia was exceptionally vulnerable; it had no real military force at that time. While it was the sole former Yugoslav republic to declare independence bloodlessly, when the Yugoslav National Army withdrew from Macedonia into Serbia, they removed with them almost all assets of military value. In addition, the nascent Macedonian national police and military were ethnically unbalanced and less than well-trained, which led to major inter-ethnic mistrust and law enforcement issues. There was real fear in Macedonia that violence would engulf it; to make the situation worse, there were few states or security communities in the region upon whom it could absolutely rely for assistance and protection, particularly since it had little valuable to offer in return.19

Turning to the UN in this case made sense politically, domestically, and in other respects; Gligorov clearly understood this, and was willing to concede a degree of absolute state sovereignty for a time in order to ensure the newly democratic state of Macedonia survived.20 The international community was also openly supportive of his plea to the United Nations for a peace mission there. There was a meaningful level of

19 It may initially appear that the conflict situation in the former Yugoslav Republics was unique; however, break-ups of other states into at least two separate entities, have occurred (consider East Timor/Indonesia, and Sudan/South Sudan. The ongoing situation in South Morocco, the former Spanish Sahara, differs only because three countries assert claims against it.) Consider, too, the high-profile break-up of the former USSR even though a confederation was formed from some of the resulting countries.

international belief that the Balkans were heading toward powder keg status once again, and that Serbia had “Greater Serbia” aspirations. Europe and most of the Great Powers did not want a historically unstable area to reignite, or, in this case, to have the conflagration spread further.21

The United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia from February 1992 through December 1995), and then a semi-independent UNPROFOR/M (Macedonia 1993) preceded the fully autonomous UNPREDEP. They were established and implemented as traditional, first-generation peacekeeping missions. In fact, they had some characteristics of a second-generation mission in that they were multi-dimensional: they had limited capacities expansion responsibilities (state and economic reconstruction) and institutional transformation duties (reforming police, army and judicial system; fair elections’ oversight; and rebuilding civil society).22

Many aspects of the original UNPROFOR have been extensively analyzed through various theoretical lenses, including those related to military strategies and to conflict management and resolution. UNPROFOR’s operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in particular, its enforcement mission to deter, dissuade, and deny the Serb forces their goals, especially through establishing safe havens in Bosnia and

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Herzegovina, have been assessed as failures of varying extents (with the exception of the mission in Eastern Slavonia).

In addressing narrower, praxis-oriented analyses of peacekeeping and peace-related issues, Roland Paris stresses that, “Building a study of peace missions into a mature academic subfield will require a concerted effort to move beyond the current preoccupation with practical operational issues and, instead, to use these missions as windows into larger phenomena of international politics.” These “larger phenomena” that move toward broader insights into international politics, as developed in this research, include the illustrative powers of learning and constructivist approaches to international governmental organizations (IGOs), their related entities and endeavors in peacekeeping operations.

Organizational learning perspectives and constructivism seem most appropriate to complement the existing literature, as they emphasize the organizational and learning parts of the IGO and its missions, along with related but different issues such as conflict management, prevention or resolution; military strategy; logistics and the like, since these may be crucial traits of the organization. This research is predicated upon organizational

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and learning analytical lines, along with constructivist views, in examining the sole UN preventive deployment mission from 1995 through 1999 in the Republic of Macedonia, i.e., UNPREDEP.

Organization theories and organizational learning have long been applied to evaluating, analyzing and examining an extensive swath of business organizations. But they rarely have been applied to IGOs like the United Nations, the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE). This is a curious omission for a number of reasons. First, IGOs are unquestionably organizations, in that they share many characteristics with business firms, and therefore can conceivably be addressed and analyzed as such. Second, security-oriented IGOs and NGOs—those undertaking inter- and intra-national security work—are growing in number, size, and roles in peace and security efforts. Yet


there has not been a corresponding growth in the application of potentially useful explanatory theories to them, with the notable more recent exception of principal-agent theory focused largely on the UN, EU, central banking, and certain security questions.27 Third, IGOs such as the UN and others have or had “Lessons Learned” and “Best Practices” units. But it has not been evident that learning and the learning process itself (rather than operational, logistical and/or strategy-focused analyses) have informed those lessons, or been used to expand or explore such learning and lesson meanings and applicability.

There also has been a dearth of scholarly attention given to differentiated segments of IGOs: some IGOs include “special” organizations, such as field organizations that are affected by distance, language, culture, location, and other factors. In this work, organizations in the field mission versus the headquarters (HQ) organization are examined discretely and as interlinked entities, in order to explore learning endeavors regarding preventive peacekeeping more fully, examine empirical evidence of organizational learning at the United Nations and in the field, and more particularly, to open up the “black box” of field learning in Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs). Headquarters’ organizational learning especially may hold explanatory potential

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regarding why preventive deployment has not been institutionalized and reproduced under preventive diplomacy as an approach to conflict prevention/mitigation.

Why have such learning theories not been applied to the “boots on the ground” field organization responsible for the best possible peaceable outcomes in UN peace operations? Conceivably, as Paris notes, it is because in the face of rapidly rising demands on peacekeeping, that much of the analytical focus has shifted to the practical and utilitarian: for example, operational issues, logistics, conflict management/resolution, and strategy. This, however, ignores distinctive factors and differences that shape the discrete IGOs and their cultures, including language(s), culture(s), and distance(s) between organizations, and more specifically, between HQ and field operations. These variances also exist between states who supply peacekeepers, regarding physical placement and utilization of the blue helmets, *vis-à-vis* command and control variables in peace operations, and even the ways in which the field and HQ communicate with one another. The states and governments with peacekeeping missions on their territory add further elements to the processes in the field and at HQ.

The hybrid nature of peacekeeping and peacebuilding endeavors—their civil-military, domestic and international aspects—has been examined to some extent from practical and utilitarian perspectives. During the Cold War, peacekeeping was largely marginalized and exceptional, and, when undertaken, less militarily-oriented. This may

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explain why peacekeeping endeavors have eluded intensive examination under a broader range of theoretical lenses, including dominant international relations (IR) theories such as realism, and its variants, and constructivism, much less organization theory and organizational learning theory.\textsuperscript{29}

Put succinctly, it appears the most common questions about traditional peacekeeping were - and are, “Does it work? If so, how can we make it even better?” with the ancillary question, “If it doesn’t work, what do we do from here on, given the many conflicts in the world? Why \textit{not} turn to preventive peacekeeping?” These queries arguably should lead to an analysis of learning and learning processes, along with related inquiries under a social constructivist approach, such as that utilized by Barnett and Finnemore.\textsuperscript{30}

The assumptions maintained here are that UN peace-oriented field operations uniformly engage in learning in the field as organizations (military and political) in and of themselves. Further learning takes place at the headquarters (HQ) of the involved and/or interested international organizations (and in the various states that contribute troops and other support), even though outcomes and assessments regarding success or


failure may vary considerably among learning sites and organizations in part or in total.\textsuperscript{31}

Still, each entity – the field and headquarters – is an organization engaged in learning.

It is also possible that further learning takes place between organizations, in this case, specifically between field and HQ organizations with a security interest: NATO, the OSCE, and the EU, as examples. How are learning outcomes shaped, transmitted and applied inter- and intra-organizationally? Do they inform policy and practice outcomes, especially regarding preventive deployment missions? It is further hypothesized in this dissertation that policies and practices are developed, perhaps with and among several organizations, not solely in the organization in which such learning originated, and that such policies and practices are not only disseminated within the originating organization(s), but among them.\textsuperscript{32}

\textbf{Why This Research is Important for Theory and Practice}

The questions of learning from preventive deployment as a tool in the preventive diplomacy arsenal, how learning occurred, and what learning outcomes have been and why, are important for several reasons. First, in an era in which there is no shortage of intrastate and regional tensions and conflicts, it seems especially appropriate to examine UNPREDEP, not only as a case of successful pre-conflict intervention, but also as a


mission from which much could be learned about effective PKOs and about preventive diplomacy, including conflict prevention, in a broader sense. Analyzing what was learned from it, and how and why it was learned is a critical step in this process, as yet unexamined.

Second, given the outcome that there have been no further preventive deployment missions, it appears this means of early conflict prevention and conflict mitigation has been marginalized, if not outright adjudged “off the table,” as part of preventive diplomacy. This is in spite of its success. Lest one assume that this writer is the only one to adjudge it positively, note that Richard Solomon, President of the United States Institute of Peace, commented, “…perhaps the most telling sign of UNPREDEP’s success came two years after the mission left, when the “unfinished war” in Kosovo breached Macedonia’s largely unmonitored northern border and swept across much of the country’s overwhelmingly ethnic Albanian northern and western regions.”33 In other words, when UNPREDEP was present, “the dog didn’t bark”. Alice Ackermann wrote, “…the success of UNPREDEP is beyond doubt and was conducted much in the way envisioned by Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace. ...Boutros-Ghali emphasized that although it should never be a static concept, ‘preventive deployment can work where there is political will, a clear mandate and purpose, and the necessary commitment on the part of all parties concerned.’”34

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34 Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail, 128-129.
Ripiloski comments less directly but insightfully on UNPREDEP’s success, writing “Yet, as with any form of prevention, precisely because nothing happened—UNPREDEP’s ultimate yardstick—can the mission be deemed a success. … In effect, UNPREDEP’s presence was vindicated only upon the outbreak of violence” after the mission was terminated.\(^{35}\) Another analyst and expert on the area, Peter Siani-Davies, said, “…only in Macedonia can the UN deployment be seen as an almost unqualified success.” The late P.H. Liotta remarked that “UNPREDEP – an amazing situation, the first preventive deployment ever – and it was a success. The leadership in the field must take the fullest credit for this.”\(^{36}\)

Each of the military Field Commanders pronounced UNPREDEP itself a success; it fulfilled terms of its mandate, even if terminated prematurely. Henryk Sokalski, a highly respected Polish diplomat and Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who led the civilian and political side of UNPREDEP, also said openly it was a success, as did Abiodun Williams, one of Sokalski’s chief aides during the mission. Michael Lund, long considered a conflict management and resolution expert with a special interest in Eastern Europe, stated UNPREDEP was successful.\(^{37}\)

Representatives and delegates from various international organizations and countries also positively assessed UNPREDEP, including those from the EU, OSCE,

\(^{35}\) Saso Ripiloski, 2011, 82, 84.

\(^{36}\) P.H. Liotta, interview May 2011 with author.

OECD, NATO, Geert Ahrens of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Lord David Owen of the UK, Thorvald Stoltenberg of Norway, Macedonian Army General Mitre Arsovki, and Macedonian Air Force General Mile Manolev, Bulgarian leadership, Finland’s Minister of Defence Anneli Taina, and various U.S. diplomats and representatives. Kofi Annan as Secretary-General of the UN was unstinting in terming it “successful” when discussing UNPREDEP privately and publicly. All of these statements are available in a multitude of articles, news reports, UN files on UNPREDEP, books and recordings.

Yet, it seems evident that pronouncing a mission a success does not necessarily mean it will be replicated in any way in the future—this is the unusual situation regarding preventive deployment. Could it be that saying it was a success did not indicate real learning had taken place from it, or that some other factor(s) intervened to militate against a repeat effort at preventive deployment?

This dissertation questions what the learning outcomes may have been among various actors, explores both why and how these might have occurred, and examines the effects. Outcomes and effects could be due to distance, primary language differences, communications issues or incomplete feedback, as examples. Organizational learning theory has not been widely applied in the international relations (IR) field and has much to offer in understanding the complexities of such endeavors and interrelationships.

Third, this work modifies a social constructivist approach, which should test the explanatory power and generalizability of Barnett and Finnemore’s approach, expanding it first to the actors in the field and at UN headquarters. Then, this approach is used to test other IGOs as interrelated organizations regarding preventive deployment—including the
Council of Europe (CoE), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO and the European Union (EU. It is possible that interactions between these IGOs promoted norms or principles (perhaps due to flawed communications as well as for other reasons) as outcomes of learning so that preventive deployment would not be undertaken again. Furthermore, this work explores a peacekeeping success in testing the explanatory power of social constructivism, keeping constant the involvement of the UN and a mission, but changing the case study from a failure (the Rwandan genocide in Barnett and Finnemore 2004, and Barnett 2003) to one adjudged successful.

**Dissertation Structure**

The following chapters address the issues introduced above. Chapter II delves into such theoretical approaches as realism, organization/learning theory, and constructivism and their terms, as well as the expectations that arise from each, considered regarding preventive deployment’s non-recurrence. Chapter III describes the case study and methodological considerations for exploring this preventive deployment. Chapter IV examines case context relevant to the former Yugoslavia, the Balkans, and to UNPREDEP in Macedonia. Chapter V presents original and other evidence from experts on UNPREDEP, preventive deployment and peacekeeping. Chapter VI explains how

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38 Norms and principles are defined according to Stephen Krasner (ed.) in *International Regimes* (NY: Cornell University Press 1983: 1-3). Norms are “standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations.” Principles are “beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude.” “Principles and norms provide the basic defining characteristics of a regime,” defined as “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area.”

realism, social constructivism, and organizational/learning theories apply, fully or partially, to this case. It includes rationales and findings to examine which theoretical approach or approaches hold the greater explanatory power for the research question regarding why there have been no further preventive deployments. Suggestions are offered as to what those explanations could most likely be. Finally, Chapter VII offers a summary of findings and outcomes, along with potential directions for further exploration on pre-violence peacekeeping operations in particular.
CHAPTER II

CONSIDERING MAJOR THEORIES:

PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT'S NON-RECURRENCE

Realism

There is no question that powerful United Nations member states were (and continue to be) principal actors with meaningful influence regarding UN endeavors. According to the approach of realism articulated by Hans J. Morgenthau, states act in their self-interest (national interest), with those self-interests defined as power (particularly economic and military power).¹

The United States, China, France, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation (the P-5) hold permanent, veto-wielding positions of on the Security Council. These five powerful states may well have had significant degrees of influence on other member states, on the views of intergovernmental organizations (other than the UN) concerning preventive deployments, and on eventual positions and actions taken by the UN itself.² Research into the views of the White House, the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Congress, American think tanks, and press coverage of UNPREDEP may offer evidence regarding the position of the United States on the relevance of preventive deployment's non-recurrence.


deployment to its national interests. Thus, there should be some signs regarding a dominant U.S. position, negative or positive, regarding both UNPREDEP and potential future preventive deployments. While the United States contributed troops to UNPREDEP, there has been little examination of how the U.S. and other powerful states viewed the experience, and whether or not the “lessons learned” led to disinterest in—if not outright preclusion of—similar efforts in the future.

Russia did not contribute UNPREDEP troops, but has had centuries of interest and involvement, especially in the post-World War eras, in Eastern Europe. It openly expressed support for Serbia and the rump Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s and beyond, and abstained from voting in the Security Council on matters relating to the former Yugoslavia and its successor states. This placed Russia in a unique position: not directly vetoing UNPREDEP, but always capable of bringing a veto or veto threat to bear in the Security Council should its interests change.

Russia, in any case, did not have to use its veto power. China did so on continuation of UNPREDEP in February 1999, publicly asserting that UN military missions must have exit points, and that the situation in Macedonia and the region was

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much stabilized, so such an endeavor was no longer vital. However, that veto was widely seen as China’s response to Macedonia’s recognition of Taiwan (in return for promised direct aid to Macedonia from Taiwan estimated at between $1 and $2 billion); China has historically utilized its veto in matters related to Taiwan, because it is in its national interest to do so and it has the power to veto.\(^5\) That makes some sense under realism; certainly, little credence was given to China’s public explanation of its veto that “every mission must have an exit point.”\(^6\) No one knows exactly when any UN mission will end, and exit points cannot be pre-determined.\(^7\) China’s professed rationale was also far less credible because it was publicly and widely known that China threatened Macedonia that it would do everything it could to ensure the small country received no UN or other aid unless the small, poor state withdrew its recognition of Taiwan completely.\(^8\)

\(^5\) Macedonia recognized the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) in 1999. Taiwan severed diplomatic ties with Macedonia in June 2001, as Macedonia prepared to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) instead. Various reports attributed this “change of heart” on Macedonia’s part to China’s threat to veto UN aid to the struggling Republic unless Macedonia recognized the PRC. This was perceived domestically as a credible threat by the PRC against Macedonia, given its veto in February 1999 against UNPREDEP’s continuation. From interview with BG Juha Engstrom, 17 June 2009, in Mäntsälä, Finland. See also Sasho Ripiloski, *Conflict in Macedonia: Exploring a Paradox in the Former Yugoslavia*. CO: FirstForumPress (Div. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.), 2011; and Henryk J. Sokalski, *An Ounce of Prevention: Macedonia and the UN Experience in Preventive Diplomacy*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003.


\(^7\) Consider the UN missions of various types in Cyprus, the Golan Heights, Southern Morocco/Western Sahara, and Haiti, in Serbia, Guatemala, Lebanon, the military observer group in Kashmir, and others that remain ongoing, in certain cases for more than twenty years.

\(^8\) Anonymous informant, UNDPKO, NY, on 12 November 2010; P.H. Liotta, Interview and emails with author, May 2011.
Which theoretical lens would be most helpful to consider the question posed here, that is, why have the international and/or security communities mounted *no more* preventive deployment missions since UNPREDEP’s success in Macedonia?

**Do Realism, Neorealism or Offensive Realism Explain This?**

**Realism**

On first glance, realism, often referred to as today’s dominant theoretical and real-world paradigm, would not adequately explain preventive deployment’s non-reproduction. But this initial impression might not be fully accurate. Realism is, after all, centered on power measured through economic and military means; it is “interest defined as power,” as Morgenthau wrote. “For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason.” It assumes rational actors and rational alternatives in foreign policy. It further assumes “that statesmen think and act out of interest defined as power…It is the testing of this rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences that gives theoretical meaning to the facts of international politics.”

9 As Max Weber wrote, “Interests (material and ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of men.”

The “Melian Dialogue” by Thucydides is regarded as a core document reflecting early realism. The well-known quote from Chapter XVII in volume five is spoken by the militarily and economically strong Athenians, “…you know as well as we do that right,

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9 Morgenthau, 4-5.

as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”

The idealistic islanders of Melos, militarily and economically weaker than Athens, counter that statement with “…you enjoin us to let right alone and talk only of interest…you are as much interested in this as any, as your fall would be a signal for the heaviest vengeance and an example for the world to meditate upon.” Athens’ representatives are unimpressed. The discussion between the Athenians and the Melians continues, with Athens holding fast to its rational, realist approach against any idealist (or other) arguments or potential threats the Melians raise, including the latter’s belief that others will come to their aid and rescue them.

The Melians’ would-be “rescuers,” calculating what they would sacrifice to do so, do not come to Melos’s deliverance. Athens eventually conquers the island, killing all military-aged men, taking the women and children as slaves, and sending five hundred Athenians to settle there. Such is the world-view of classical realism and realpolitik: “…the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”

Attributing war and conflict less to human nature than to anarchy, a world condition where there is no sovereign body to control relations among states, Kenneth

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11 Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, 5.17.235-240, “The Sixteenth Year of the War—The Melian Conference—Fate of Melos”, (contains page numbers as digitized), quote at page 236. Translated by Richard Crawley. Out of copyright; accessed via Amazon Kindle, digital edition date of 2012. There are eight volumes in the complete *History of the Peloponnesian War*, covering the period of 433 B.C.E. to 410 B.C.E. The work ends in 410 B.C.E. (arguably due to Thucydides’ death), thereby omitting the final six years of the Peloponnesian War.

Waltz proposed a theory of structural realism (also termed neorealism), a system-level theory, in international politics. Because of ongoing international anarchy and the absence of a centralized system (structure), states are constrained by conditions regarding their choices to ensure their security, which is their main goal. They are continually contending with one another. They cannot, as the Melians found to their great disadvantage, rely on others to help them achieve this security, so states must always be ready to help themselves. The costs to a state in terms of security, political autonomy, and cultural integrity would be too great if they are not always thus prepared. States, furthermore, may be willing to form alliances; in fact, according to Waltz, for security, states will align with anyone (external balancing).

Even if flawed, states will never disappear entirely, because there is arguably no non-state actor or sovereign body holding the capabilities of the state. These outcomes are not the result of any kind of structural determinism. The two relevant characteristics of the international system under neorealism are, after all, anarchy and relative capacity, that is, again, power. “To explain outcomes, one may look at the capabilities, the actions, and the interactions of states, as well as the structure of their system. …Causes at both the national and international level make the world more or less peaceful and stable. I concentrate attention at the international level because the effects of structure are usually

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overlooked or misunderstood and because I am writing a theory of international politics, not foreign policy.”

While Waltz denies formulating a theory of foreign policy, he argues neorealism has value for explanatory capability alone. It may be applied in order to hypothesize or develop explanatory propositions about international politics.

Offensive Realism

John J. Mearsheimer, closely associated with neorealism and more particularly with offensive realism, held to offensive realism (a sub-set of neorealism) in his The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. He proposed that Great Powers seek first to survive. They then seek to increase their power at each other’s expense, in order to become the regional hegemon (the dominant state power in a given geographic area) in an anarchic world. A Great Power, in its quest for survival, will also seek to maximize its wealth, to be the greater land power militarily, and to attain nuclear superiority. Mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not a credible hindrance to Great Powers seeking nuclear superiority, he asserted.

What are a hindrance to world-wide hegemony are oceans. Mearsheimer claimed that oceans stop any state from reaching more than regional hegemony. Oceans, he contended, constrain the power projection capabilities of militaries; logically then, land

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16 Waltz, International Politics, 174-175.
18 Mearsheimer, Great Power Politics, 140-147.
19 Mearsheimer, Great Power Politics, 130-133, 145-146, 224-231.
forces are the prevailing military power. Furthermore, Great Powers will not tolerate their rivals gaining power at their expense.

Mearsheimer differentiated offensive realism from the neorealist lens by adding a system-centric focus to the study of state behavior in an interdependent world, based on the structure of the international system. The tragedy that he notes is that, when viewed through the lenses of neorealism and offensive realism, conflicts between Great Powers will not end.

Does realism or any of these variants help explain more fully why preventive deployments have not been attempted since UNPREDEP? The presence of the five Great Powers as a permanent part of the UN Security Council certainly matters when power, i.e., national interests, are considered under realism. The projection of power through U.S. involvement fulfills one of the key requirements of the theory, no matter if classical or neorealism. Economic benefit is much harder to argue in preventive deployments or peacekeeping ventures of any type; indeed, they cost the states involved, even the host state. So wealth accumulation was out of the question in this case, since the Balkans had little to offer a Great Power especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and even less after the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc as former member states declared independence over the ensuing few years.

Did any state have the largest land force at that time? Surely the U.S. was a contender for this, as well as for nuclear superiority, but taking part in a preventive

21 Ibid., 155.
deployment would not contribute to either of those requirements under Mearsheimer’s offensive realism interpretation of realism. And taking part in a mission in the Southeastern Balkans certainly did not enhance the U.S.’s “regional Great Power” status. Was there any risk that, because of conflicts overseas in Eastern Europe, the U.S. would not survive as a state? Of course not.

Furthermore, the U.S. was not directly stopping any other Great Power from gaining on it—although were one to consider Russia’s support for the FRY during the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict, and its historic involvement in Eastern Europe, it may have initially appeared so. Yet Russia did not veto the preventive deployment’s inception nor its mandate renewals throughout their multiple cycles.

China vetoed continuation of UNPREDEP in February 1999, publicly asserting that UN military missions must have exit points, and that the situation in Macedonia and the Balkans was much stabilized, so such an endeavor was no longer vital.\(^22\) The Chinese veto makes some sense under realism; certainly, little credence was given to China’s public explanation of its veto that “every mission must have an exit point.”\(^23\) It is simple:

\(^{22}\) Macedonia recognized the Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan) in 1999. Taiwan severed diplomatic ties with Macedonia in June 2001, as Macedonia prepared to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) instead. Various reports attributed this “change of heart” on Macedonia’s part to China’s threat to veto UN aid to the struggling Republic unless Macedonia recognized the PRC. This was perceived domestically as a credible threat by the PRC against Macedonia, given its veto in February 1999 against UNPREDEP’s continuation. From interview with BG Juha Engstrom, 17 June 2009, in Mäntsälä, Finland. See Ripiloski, *Conflict in Macedonia*, 2011; and Sokalski, *An Ounce of Prevention*, 2003.

\(^{23}\) Drawn from interviews by the author with various experts, in particular Stevo Pendarovski, National Security Advisor to the President at that time; Ljubko Kekenovski, PhD, and Gjorge Ivanov, PhD, in Skopje, Macedonia, June 2006. Stated by UNPREDEP Brigadier Generals Bent Sohnemann and Ove J. Stromberg in interviews during Summer 2010. See also Ripiloski, *Conflict in Macedonia*, 2011, and Sokalski, *An Ounce of Prevention*, 2003.
no one knows exactly when a UN mission will end, and exit points cannot be pre-
determined in most cases, even within months.\textsuperscript{24} China’s veto explanation was not
generally accepted because it was also publicly known that China threatened Macedonia
that it would do everything it could to ensure the small, fragile country received no UN or
other aid as long as the Balkan state recognized Taiwan.\textsuperscript{25}

When considering the explanatory power of realism, many of the same analytical
outcomes apply to the Nordics, Canada, and other states involved in UNPREDEP—those
who would be likeliest to become involved in another preventive deployment after
February of 1999, given their extensive peacekeeping focus, heritage and prior
involvement in UN missions.

In addition, realists favor stability: is stability in the Balkans important to Great
Powers like the U.S. in contemporary times? An examination of the facts suggests not
significantly in this instance for the U.S., although much more plausibly for closer states
in Europe and for Russia, even though the Balkans have long been viewed as the “powder
keg” of Eastern Europe. The First and Second Balkan Wars (1912 and 1913) had already
blown the keg apart twice prior to the June 1914 assassination in Sarajevo, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria. Austria had already occupied a
weak Bosnia in 1878 and then annexed it in 1908, much to the despair and rage of Serbia
and Russia. Serbia had openly indicated its desire to unify all Slavs under pan-Slavism

\textsuperscript{24} Consider the missions in Cyprus, the Golan Heights, Southern Morocco/Western Sahara, Haiti, in Serbia
Guatemala, Lebanon, the military observer group in Kashmir, and others that are still ongoing, in some
cases for more than twenty years.

\textsuperscript{25} Anonymous informant, UNDPKO, NY, on 12 November 2010.
with Serbia claiming leadership and control (as it did during the Bosnian conflict period), and Russia supported that goal. Did the assassination in Sarajevo lead to World War I, as some have argued? Was it more the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire? Those questions remain a matter of scholarly debate.

For World War II, some of the Eastern European states joined the Axis powers. The Italians invaded Greece (without notifying Germany in advance); Germany invaded Yugoslavia and Greece; Albania was used as a battleground between the Greeks and Italians; and all warring factions and forces transited the Balkans, particularly Macedonia, at one point or another in pursuit of their goals.

Tito had kept the area largely out of the limelight for decades, even during the USSR’s activities in the region, so attention to it across the Atlantic had been minimal. Tito’s death, the Berlin’s Wall fall, and the USSR’s break-up changed that to an extent. Then war broke out in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Eastern Slovenia as the former Yugoslavia broke apart into distinct, largely nationalistic states.

President William J. Clinton expressed no real interest in the Balkans or their stability, at least initially, although he had humanitarian concerns as the Bosnia-Serbia situation deteriorated. Yet he insisted he would not put American boots on the ground in Bosnia unless and until a solid peace accord had been signed by all parties. On 19 May,

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1992, the U.S. State Department implied that “there was no American security interest at stake in Bosnia”; this was interpreted by extension to include all of the former Yugoslav republics. A week later, then-U.S. Secretary of State James Baker insisted to European leaders at a NATO meeting in Lisbon that they, not the U.S., do more about the situation. General Colin Powell had made it clear since early Spring 1992 that Americans would not be involved in any military action without the UN’s authority behind it, and stuck to that position. Unfortunately, the U.S. media did not offer thorough coverage of UNPREDEP.

The other Great Powers, the UN, and EC member states were concerned that, if they took a broader, more militarily forceful role in Bosnia, the risk of reprisal attacks by Serbs against their peacekeeping soldiers in Bosnia would skyrocket. That objection was mooted when, in early May, Bosnia requested the removal of some 9,000 UN peacekeepers in order to suspend the arms embargo sanctions, and permit potential NATO air strikes. Still, there were huge concerns there would be spillover from the conflict into neighboring states, or that Kosovo, still troubled, would flare up. The eventual decision for establishment of safe haven areas in Bosnia proved completely disastrous, as has been well documented. There was no chance to return to the status quo ante and its relative stability.


Taken together, these facts indicate that realism, while offering meaningful insights, does not provide the sole explanatory theory by which to find an answer to “Why no more preventive deployments?” If neither realism nor its variations alone lend sufficient explanatory power regarding why no more preventive deployments have been undertaken in seeking to avoid conflict and to support peace, then perhaps an approach that includes constructivism and its variants would be more beneficial.

**Constructivism and Social Constructivism**

A constructivist approach may be utilized to help explain and understand the international management of crises. Constructivism does not deny the importance of material factors incorporated in the realist approach; additionally, this theoretical viewpoint permits reflection on how social forces, such as ideas, communications, culture, language, values and norms, can influence behaviors. Constructivism blurs what divisions there may be between the field, headquarters and even other organizations—*if all entities are communicating with one another*. It is thus conceivable that entities and actors are not as separate as one might initially envision. If a common inter-organizational learning framework results, it can be scrutinized. Greater comprehension of the relationships of learning activities under constructivism would be

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an important contribution to how inter-organizational affairs and connections are understood, especially in international relations.\textsuperscript{33}

Barnett and Finnemore applied social constructivism in their examination and explanation of international organizations’ behavioral dysfunctions and bureaucratic pathologies.\textsuperscript{34} As noted, they argue that IGOs’ dysfunctions can be traced to either internal or external (environment) \textit{material} forces, or to internal or external (environment) \textit{cultural} forces.\textsuperscript{35} These factors and their potential effects are considered in this research, particularly at UN headquarters, in the field, and among the IGO and security communities. This suggests that those aspects of social constructivism, especially those which overlap with organizational learning theory (discussed below), may be of particular value in explaining why preventive deployment appears to have been sidelined as a UN mission option.\textsuperscript{36}

The underlying assumptions of constructivism are that internal and external \textit{material} factors along with internal and external \textit{cultural} forces are shaped and created, and in return, shape and create. The role of socialization is crucial. As explained by Alexander Wendt in “Constructing International Politics”, what unites constructivism and

\begin{thebibliography}{10}
\end{thebibliography}
other theories is “a concern with how world politics is socially constructed, which involves two basic claims: that the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material (a claim that opposes materialism), and that these structures shape actors’ identities and interests, rather than just their behavior (a claim that opposes rationalism).”37 Furthermore, “to analyze the social construction of international politics is to analyze how processes of interaction produce and reproduce the social structures—cooperative or conflictual—that shape actors’ identities and interests and the significance of their material contexts.”38

These can be important in evaluating the factors that may have contributed to preventive deployment’s non-recurrence. It includes behaviors (or absence of behaviors) through the second assumption regarding the power of “cultural forces”: ideas, culture, traditions, language and norms, and the consideration of how such cultural forces shape behaviors. Norms and rules are mutually constitutive: they connect people and society in an interactive process, and impact how states conceive their identity and interests. These identities and interests arise from how people use language and behavior to construct their social environment. More than other shaping influences, complex cultures and cultural traits shape every state’s identification of its international security situation and military forces.

The constructivist approach thus points to the following: if (and this is a significant qualifier, given research and evidence from this case study) all entities are

38 Ibid., 81.
communicating with one another, it is conceivable that all units are not as separate as one might initially envision. If (again, a crucial “if”, given case study and research indications) a common inter-organizational learning (constructive and constructing) framework exists, that framework can be scrutinized. 39 Neither of the requisite explanatory features appear to be present in this case, because not all of the entities were communicating (at least, apparently less than-effectively), and no inter-organizational learning construct (even between the field and HQ) appeared extant.

Norms are another distinctive characteristic of the constructivist approach. Normative elements may matter as beliefs and values are internalized by an organization, which then gains stability from them. Norms are tied, therefore, to organizations and actors. 40 Shared understandings about identity and activities, combined with regulating elements, lead to behavior conforming to the organization’s rational interests. Internalized norms then lead to an institutional logic, comprised of sanctions and constraints, shared cognitive meanings, and other normative elements that then lead to expressed behaviors. 41

Björkdahl examined UNPREDEP as a “norms promotion” case of peacekeeping: as a successful effort at conflict prevention, it thereby promoted “growing acceptance of


the international norm of early intervention in conflict management.” If so, why has more than a decade passed without such a pre-bloodshed, early intervention effort being repeated? It is apparent that promoting a norm is not the same as institutionalizing it—or even ensuring that the most appropriate and effective learning has led to its development and transmission. The promotion and institutionalization of norms also may take a significant amount of time, with repeated tests of a norm, such as preventive deployments’ acceptability and efficacy. That, of course, did not occur post-UNPREDEP.

Further, it is possible that the norm or principle promoted (and which potentially could have been institutionalized) was not, “Let’s proactively engage in preventive deployment again,” but rather, “Let’s avoid such an endeavor in the future,” particularly in the IGO and security communities, although the reason the latter may have occurred is not immediately evident. Since there was no accessible, reliable evidence one way or the other in the Archives, the UNDPKO office, or in the media, it is a challenge to resolve this puzzle.

It is possible that organizational theory with its associated organizational learning and knowledge theory will enrich explanatory power with constructivism and social constructivism when included as a companion approach to the question of, “Why no further preventive deployments?”

**Organizational Learning Theory**

Organizational theory arose from several scholarly fields in their parallel attempts to understand more or less formalized collections of individuals, with special emphasis

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42 Björkdahl, “Promoting Norms,” 214-228.
on business firms. The open system of organizations and the perspectives related to their structures tended to dominate organization theory until the mid-1970s: organizations, especially business organizations, were considered to be open to, highly aware of, and reliant on their external environment in particular. To survive, they had to adapt effectively and efficiently to that environment and to the feedback they received from it.\(^{43}\) They were required to learn and change in order to continue to exist, to serve the interests of constituents, and to achieve goals. To serve and to achieve selected goals, organizations had a tendency to grow and expand, to accept (at least to some extent) equifinality, and to perform both maintenance and adaptive activities.\(^{44}\) Certainly, this seems applicable to international governmental organizations and to peacekeeping missions.

Organizational theory framework addressing knowledge as power evolved in the early 1990s, largely from the path-breaking work of Ernst B. Haas’s *When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations*. Organizational actions, systems, and structures are dependent upon contingent, ever-changing tactical interactions and alliances. These are negotiated and renegotiated as power mechanisms,

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\(^{44}\) *Equifinality*: Different initial states or stimuli can lead to similar or the same end states (in other words, it is recognition of non-linear causality). According to Thomas G. Cummings and Christopher G. Worley in *Organization Development & Change* (Cincinnati OH: South-Western College Publications: 2004), 87, equifinality encompasses the idea that “many beginnings can lead to the same outcome and the same beginning can lead to different outcomes.” See also Talcott Parsons, “A Revised Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification,” in *Class, States, and Power: A Reader in Stratification*, ed. Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1953), 92-128; Robbins, *Structure, Design*, 17.
which in turn result from knowledge acquisition, learning and adaptation. They enable organizations to carry forward knowledge and skills in multilateral relationships to achieve various goals.45

Ernest Haas addresses “turbulence” and “turbulent nongrowth”: in situations of social complexity, and sometimes in incidents of crisis, actors cannot agree on how they got into a particular condition nor see a clear a way out of it. This is so even if the actors know one another, and even if the organization is still technically growing, with increasing budgets, staffs, tasks, operations, and offices. Turbulence often arises when there are large amounts of knowledge that add certainty to parts of an issue’s manifestation, but that confuse or undermine sureness about the whole (emphasis added).46

Interestingly, Haas proposes that turbulence may arise “because previous patterns of adaptive, incremental behavior were so successful” (emphasis added).47 Because of those successes, specific responses have become entrenched in the organization and its culture. Turbulence that conflicts with previous specific responses based on earlier successes makes learning more difficult, especially regarding problem identification and change. Was Haas speaking directly to peace missions, particularly preventive ones?


47 Ibid., 111.
Organization and its related learning theory have not been much applied in international politics and relations; notable exceptions to this are the works of Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, examining pathologies and dysfunctions in organizational bureaucracies. Barnett and Finnemore combined organizational theory approaches with constructivism for greater explanatory power; the present research follows in that model.\(^{48}\)

Learning theory is utilized specifically here as part of this case study of UNPREDEP to seek an answer to the question as to why preventive deployment (a success) has not recurred in international efforts since then: what has led to such a seemingly surprising outcome? Aspects that explain an organization’s adaptation and learning (leading—or not—to change) are of particular importance.\(^{49}\) Organizations “rarely change in a way that fulfills the intentions of a particular group of actors,” and sometimes adapt in ways “not intended by their creators.”\(^{50}\) It may be fairly argued they do not necessarily learn in expected ways either, or alternatively, do not learn what they would be expected to learn. Nor do they necessarily change in anticipated ways.

Ernst Haas describes change in organizations as “the change in the definition of the problem to be solved.”\(^{51}\) The driving forces for change will be what the organizations


view as problems and how they define those problems. The definitions of those perceived problems then impel change—within constraints in the environment that affect power, capabilities and capacities. Some environmental factors influencing change can include perceptions of the organization’s legitimacy and authority, along with related material, cultural, and structural limitations. According to Barnett and Finnemore, change in organizations tends to be path dependent, and bureaucracies enlarge in both size and scope of responsibilities for various reasons, including the demands of members. This can lead to the previously described turbulence in international organizations impacting learning and adaptation capacities from knowledge, particularly if that knowledge appears to contain contradictory elements.

Furthermore, the most discernible changes are usually brought about by crisis—rapid global change—or by unsettled states. From one such unsettled state (some would say also a rapid global change), the Cold War’s end and subsequent rising nationalist tensions in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, the UN began to realize that its former interstate peacekeeping practices largely ignored the root causes for conflict, and were far too often too little, too late. Their more traditional former peacekeeping practices thus were not appropriate or effective in managing or resolving certain types of conflicts, including intrastate ones, with their underlying issues and driving forces.


53 Ibid., 42-43.

54 Ibid., 158-163.
Examples of missions the UN community and others saw as such failures included UNISOM I and II, UNPROFOR, ONUC and MONUC, and Rwanda’s UNAMIR.\(^5^5\) Two UN documents, 1992’s *Agenda for Peace* and the 1995 *Supplement* to it, arguably represented selected learning outcomes and recommendations for change as a result of this organizational awareness; the results included important reports from the Secretary-General and a proactive attempt to address conflict prior to bloodshed (as in UNPREDEP) rather than during or post-conflagration.

Stewart Clegg argues that knowledge-as-power theories tend to adopt a view of organizations as “the condensation of local cultures of values, power, rules, discretion and paradox”\(^5^6\). This marks the importance of the social constructivist factors in knowledge-as-power theories, which may be significant when examining and contrasting learning in the field organization and the UN headquarters’ organization to help explain the non-reproduction of preventive deployment.

Benner and Rotmann’s work explored organizations that are aimed at obtaining peace and security in the world. They examined the challenges in creating an effective *post-conflict* peacebuilding organization that must “learn to learn,” but they do not

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examine pre-conflict oriented organizations in the field. Their work on learning in the UN itself clearly supported that the HQ must “learn to learn” from peacekeeping.\(^{57}\)

Wolfgang Biermann and Martin Vadset edited a volume regarding learning from the UN mission failures in the former Yugoslavia, but the works included in it do not fully take a learning approach focused on organizations. They are instead post mortems on operations and events, mainly (and quite usefully) examining field organizations, but largely omitting the HQ as an organization, independent or otherwise, thus differentiating this research and analysis from that scholarship.\(^{58}\) There is little exploration of the learning process itself as experienced by various entities, nor of what may have shaped it.

Thus, in this present analysis, it may be first concluded that all of these theoretical approaches contribute to the nexus of explanation for the absence of a repeat by the UN of its UNPREDEP success, each approach providing an essential analytical tool: realism, constructivism, organizational learning, and organizational knowledge. What are closely examined, in particular, are the learning processes and outcomes before, during and following pre-conflict intervention and management, both in the field mission itself, at the HQ organization (the United Nations), by states, via highly-ranked international governmental organizations other than the UN, and in non-governmental organizations. Secondly, this enhanced theoretical approach, building on the major international relations theories, but adding a deeper look at organizational learning theory and the


interaction (and different learning methods and results) of headquarters with the field, could provide a fuller, perhaps more adequate, explanation of why preventive deployment has not been repeated since UNPREDEP’s success.

Table 1. Expectations of Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Preventive Deployment’s Non-Recurrence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Expectation</th>
<th>Initial Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Realism &amp; Variants</td>
<td>Facts given meaning through reason; Anarchy is the state of the world; Interest defined as power; States act in national interest; Power usually defined as military and/or economic; Projection of power important, as is stability.</td>
<td>Neither realism, neorealism nor offensive realism will explain why no further preventive deployments as fully as another theory or theories.</td>
<td>Great Powers had no real national interest in Eastern Europe, and economic and military power were not at stake; projection of power may have been somewhat of a concern (Russia vs. the U.S.). Stability was a concern, too, but it does not appear any of these explain why there have been no more preventive deployments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructivism</td>
<td>Material factors matter, but so do social forces; Ideas, communications, language and norms</td>
<td>Constructivism will assist in explaining why no more such deployments, but needs additional evidence and/or</td>
<td>Ideas, communications, language and norms can influence behaviors, identities and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory</td>
<td>Terms</td>
<td>Expectation</td>
<td>Initial Rationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization Theory and Learning</td>
<td>Organizations must learn, change and adapt to environment and feedback from it in order continue to exist; Serve and achieve selected goals, maintain self and engage in adaptive activities.</td>
<td>This will add explanatory value to understanding why no further preventive deployments due to HQ difficulties in adapting and changing, perhaps lack of clarity surrounding selected goals.</td>
<td>Organization theory, with its learning and knowledge sub-fields, appears to be of particular value in explaining dearth of preventive deployments when combined with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory</td>
<td>Terms</td>
<td>Expectation</td>
<td>Initial Rationale</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizational Knowledge</td>
<td>Addresses turbulence and turbulent non-growth; organizations depend on contingent tactical interactions or alliances renegotiated as power mechanisms; success may lead to entrenched organizational responses rather than adaptation or change.</td>
<td>Explanatory value: lack of appropriate response to success; theoretical claim that organizations rarely change in ways that a particular group of actors wants and sometimes, indeed, do the opposite. This leads to same concept regarding learning: unexpected outcomes. Crisis/unexpected change can be accommodated within these organizational theory terms.</td>
<td>Knowledge theories examine organizations as “local cultures of values, power, rules, discretion and paradox” (Clegg, 1994), important characteristics that may help explain change or lack thereof resulting unexpected learning or change. These have led to no further preventive deployments.</td>
</tr>
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CHAPTER III

RESEARCHING THE SINGULAR CASE OF
UNITED NATIONS PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT

This study addresses the unique preventive deployment mission, UNPREDEP, authorized and created by the United Nations at the request of the Macedonian President, with the approval of the UN Security Council, to prevent the fragile country from becoming pulled into the rapidly evolving Yugoslav pattern of violence.

The case study method was applied to examine the complexity of the UNPREDEP mission and its achievements more deeply.

The Case Study: Methodological Considerations

The scope of case studies is, according to Robert Yin, empirical inquiries that investigate a contemporary phenomenon or event within its real-life context, using multiple sources of evidence. This is because “the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”¹ Case study inquiry, because of its complexity

- copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result
- Relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result
- Benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection” and analyses.²


² Yin, Case Study Research, 2009, 18.
Case studies “get as close to the subject of interest as they possibly can, partly by means of direct observation in natural settings, and partly by their access to subjective factors...thoughts, feelings, and desires”.\textsuperscript{3} “Case study research is remarkably hard, even though case studies have traditionally been considered “soft” research...”\textsuperscript{4} Developing a workable and effective case study research model for this endeavor supported the accuracy of this statement.

There are conceivably exceptional circumstances when a single case is so unique or important (as in the UNPREDEP mission) that a case study investigator cannot necessarily generalize to any other cases. These are sometimes termed “intrinsic” case studies or “portraits.”\textsuperscript{5}

The central research phenomenon explored and examined in this case study is why a specific type of UN peace mission, preventive deployment, has not been attempted again after the UN Preventive Deployment in Macedonia, the sole such mission (1995 – 1999), even in the face of repeated failures of other mission types, and even though world circumstances have arisen in which preventive deployment could plausibly have had a major role. UNPREDEP was judged by others as generally very successful, less costly than other forms of peace operations, and overall, expectations were that more such missions would follow, given appropriate circumstances. These would be part of


\textsuperscript{4} Yin, \textit{Case Study Research}, 21.

\textsuperscript{5} Yin, 22. Note 2. See also Robert E. Stake, \textit{The Art of Case Study Research} (CA: SAGE Publications 1995), for “intrinsic” and particularistic cases.
preventive diplomacy efforts. Moreover, it aligned very well with positive conflict prevention, intervention, and conflict management and resolution principles and practices.

This study relies heavily upon data obtained from interviews with key military and political elites affiliated with UNPREDEP in the field and at the United Nations headquarters in NY, first-hand observations, and mission and other documents. This analysis seeks to provide insights into why it was not utilized again, and to affirm or disconfirm potential theoretical lenses through which the mission itself could be viewed to more deeply understand UNPREDEP itself and why it has not been reproduced. It offers the means to examine the case in context, and by getting as “close to the subject of interest” as is feasible.


Primary Sources: Subjects and Documents

This study encompasses two primary groups most relevant to this case: (1) the United Nations and its structures, notably the U.N. Security Council and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO); and (2) the peacekeeping category, which encompasses the United Nations Protective Forces, UNPROFOR/M and UNPREDEP’s specific participants, including military and political elites, and other public figures who were influential due to their positions and reputations, such as the Special Representative for the Secretary-General of the UN (the SRSG). In this case study, the positional approach was helpful in identifying the following individuals who, by the nature of their official position or office, were recognized as having influence. Subjects were also identified by means of the “reputational” technique: all participants were asked to name persons or groups/organizations they felt had influence or knowledge in the field. This led to several key actors with such attributes who might have been missed using “positional” techniques alone.

Additionally, important individuals and organizations (NGOs, in particular) were identified during fieldwork through referrals from initial interview subjects.

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9 Dahl and Stinebrickner, 2002.
Table 2. Sources and Subjects 2009-2010\(^{10}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Peacekeeping/Security Community</th>
<th>Elites/Public Figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations and DPKO</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>UNPROFOR/M, UNPREDEP, UNDPKO, DPET; Interviews with Brigadier Generals (4) and other military members; Special Representative of the Secretary General to UNPREDEP, SRSG Aide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNARMS (UN Archives and Record Management Services)</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>As documented in records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organizations (Non-UN)</td>
<td>ICFY, OECD, OSCE and NATO</td>
<td>As documented in UNARMS records and in literature; from BGs’ personal materials; Interview: Military leader from NATO/KFOR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Analysis of the Singular Case of Macedonia**

Following is a synthesis of the various phases of data collection and analysis. To achieve a deeper understanding of this case, several research methods were utilized. These included qualitative case study, data collection and analysis, methods composed of

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\(^{10}\) Note: It is recognized that some subjects could be included in more than one category.
literature reviews, assessments of primary documents in the UN Archives on UNPREDEP and on-line, documents provided by individuals, and face-to-face, semi-structured interviews. Those interviews included elite military and political leaders, as well as others closely involved in UNPREDEP, its precursor operation United Nations Protective Forces/Macedonia, and the successor Kosovo Forces (KFOR) operation under NATO’s aegis. Interviews were conducted in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Poland in 2009 and 2010. Data analysis occurred across all three data collection methods on a comprehensive and recurring basis.

Preliminary Fieldwork: Macedonia 2006

The purpose of the preliminary fieldwork was two-fold: to determine whether similar field research had been conducted within a fairly recent time period (2000-2006), and whether those in Macedonia favored or did not favor a more intense study of UNPREDEP and associated operations. Those interviewed ranged from the National Security Advisor to Macedonia’s then-president Branko Crvenkovski, to various media members and authors, and the two Generals charged with rebuilding the Army of the Republic of Macedonia (ARM) and its Air Force after the Yugoslav National Army’s withdrawal in February through March, 1992. Additionally, ethnically Albanian and Macedonian scholars and faculty members at various universities, including Saints Cyril and Methodius as the major state university, and South Eastern European University (SEEU) in Tetovo, a number of leaders of Macedonian NGOs, and several candidates for political office in the upcoming election were contacted for semi-structured discussions.
Every expert felt strongly that, for various reasons, this would be an important, meaningful study; almost all referred the researcher to other influential, reputable and positionally significant individuals. Many private meetings were held in 2006 with the future (now current) President of Macedonia, Gjorge Ivanov, who holds a PhD in political theory and philosophy from Saints Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, and was Law Faculty there. All felt the research question was well worth pursuing for diverse reasons, including that an extensive literature review indicated no scholarly studies had investigated questions similar to this analysis regarding UNPREDEP’s non-reproduction.

What this preliminary work in 2006 accomplished was to establish contacts and rapport with a sizeable number of subject-matter experts, academicians, political and media figures, and others who in turn, as mentioned, were instrumental in identification and referrals to other contacts and influential individuals.

Focused Fieldwork: May through July 2009 and June-July 2010

The bulk of fieldwork focused on military and political elite interviews. The purpose of these was to obtain the fullest possible set of experiences, knowledge, perceptions and insights into UNPROFOR/M and UNPREDEP, with the heaviest emphasis on UNPREDEP. The interviews featured some direct questions in order to focus the interviewee on the subject matter. Direct questions, “although they are not ‘leading’ in character, force subjects to focus their attention on items and issues to which
they might not have responded on their own initiative.”\textsuperscript{11} This also helped with flexibility during interviews, and in analyzing information and data thereafter, as it permitted the respondent to include relevant issues or raise questions the researcher might not have otherwise considered. Therefore, both focused and open-ended questions were used. Overall, as indicated, the interviews concentrated on guiding the researcher and the informants to illuminate relevant issues about UNPREDEP that might signal why it has not been reproduced.

In 2009, interviews were organized in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark with proposed interview subjects. These interviews, done in person, included observations of the interviewee, and some featured immediate document review when the opportunity was offered.

In 2010, the interview schedule featured two done in-person with UNPREDEP’s longest-serving former Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Henryk J. Sokalski, in Warsaw, Poland, and a return visit with Brigadier General Bent Sohnemann of Denmark, UNPREDEP’s longest-term Field Commander.

Ending Fieldwork: 2009 and 2010

There were several criteria involved in decisions to end the fieldwork effort at various points: that it appeared all information of value to the research question had been imparted to the interviewer; that the interview subject became markedly less cooperative or appeared to engage in misdirection, showed signs of promoting their own agenda, or

used other techniques so that speaking with them no longer benefitted the research efforts; that interviewee(s) showed signs of irritation, impatience, or physical exhaustion, or simply did not have the information being sought; or that available time with the interviewee was expended.\textsuperscript{12} No respondent requested that discussions be brought to a close that was in any sense premature.

**Archival and Other Document Examination**

Physical documents were broadly defined for the purpose of this research, and included public newspapers and the Internet, and non-public records. The latter included the United Nations’ Archives and Records Management Services (UNARMS) files on UNPROFOR/M and UNPREDEP, personal or private papers and records provided to the researcher, and highly personalized mission books such as those developed by SWECOY, the Swedish Company’s mission participants, as examples. As George and Bennett recommend, specific attention was paid to the reason such documents—especially archival and news/internet materials—may have been developed, and to consider them as possible “purposive communication.”\textsuperscript{13} Purposive communications have a *raison d’être*; they may not reveal that reason in flashing lights or clear prose, but the intention is there, and can often be discerned.

\textsuperscript{12} Mr. Sokalski, for example, was interviewed into two sessions about a week apart.

Public and Archival United Nations Documents

Primary UNPREDEP documents available to the general public from the UN number about fifty. These consist of UN Mandates for the mission, Secretary-General Reports, draft and final Security Council resolutions, and some financial statements, a very limited resource set for the purposes of these analytical efforts. These reports, however, offer at least some indication of what Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld label the “sensemaking process and its outcomes”, discussed below.14 These readily-available primary documents also reflect, to some extent, information processed at the Skopje offices and the UN from the field organization, the UNPREDEP mission itself, and by its leadership (the SRSG and the military in particular). But because they are intended for specific purposes, and are heavily edited (as such reports likely must be, given the requirements of the United Nations Security Council), they do not contain all of the information upon which they are based.

Since the balance of UNPREDEP documentation at the United Nations is less than twenty years old, they were not publicly available.15 This researcher therefore sought special access, which was granted on October 8, 2010. This was the first time some sixty linear feet of mission documents, minus access to an unknown percentage adjudged by UN staff to still be classified, were made available for research, and most were analyzed immediately at the time of review. This markedly enriched the stock of primary


15 UN Secretariat Administrative Instruction ST/AI/326 of 28 December 1984, especially Sec. 4.b and 4.c, plus others.
resources. The primary UNARMS collection was supplemented with printed mission books, news/media reports, and a limited set of communications with UNPREDEP civilian support staff.

There were tantalizing hints of interactions between various IGO and NGO entities and UNPREDEP within the sixty linear feet of files – but not fuller details or support materials for those references. There were few documents of import from the field commanders, nor were there any available regarding the military observers (UNMOs), police trainers, and others, civilians especially, who were associated with UNPREDEP. Chiefs of Staff (U.S. military leaders) records were not present. Unfortunately, there were a great many lengthy “date gaps”, particularly in the SRSG’s official papers, and no files from Sokalski’s main aides (e.g., Abiodun Williams or Dr. Vera Mehta). Moreover, there was little in the Archives on the actual withdrawal or its process details.

Note that gaining special permission to access UNPREDEP files prior to general availability was a privilege accepted with much gratitude. The researcher hopes to revisit UNARMS in 2019 or as soon as the UPREDEP files are made fully and publicly available to explore an even fuller understanding of UNPREDEP and UN HQ as discrete learning organizations during this mission.

In these and other documents, explicit and implicit information was sought that could be particularly important to understanding UNPREDEP as a preventive deployment, the involvement of various states, the influential individuals in this mission, key and major events with potential explanatory value regarding UNPREDEP and its
non-duplication, important economic information and indicators, and information regarding factors that may have affected the mission and understandings or perceptions about it, both during its active phase and afterward.

**Maintaining Documents, Recordings and Notes**

Recordings were maintained on a dedicated, portable computer drive under password protection and encryption. Other notes, such as during UNARMS research, were maintained in electronic files on a dedicated portable computer drive under password protection and encryption. More general documents were placed into files (if physical; otherwise, onto same dedicated computer drive. To encompass all these materials, indices were developed and kept in electronic files.

This body of research materials comprised the case record, which was then subject to analyses with the goal of data reduction in line with the research question: analyzing the raw, field notes so that “final” conclusions can be developed and verified; data display (organized assembly of information so as to draw conclusions and arrive at an action plan); and conclusion drawing and verification, wherein “meanings emerging from data [are] tested for…plausibility, sturdiness, confirmability—that is, their validity”. Weaving these three actions together during and after data collection generated “analysis”.

Observational notes relevant to the research question were initially categorized as uninterpreted statements and/or observations; theoretical notes were considered contextual interpretations of one or more observational notes. Methodological memoranda were recorded as operations directions pertaining to completed fieldwork
procedures. More analytically-oriented memos, written or tape-recorded, brought together theoretical notes, and in some specific instances, noted new thinking on the issues.\(^{16}\)

Additional post-fieldwork analyses of field notes and associated recordings (along with other information) were undertaken to identify recurrent patterns of “themes, accounts, explanations, perceptions, facts and the like, in order to generate…and to establish an evidentiary warrant for the assertions one wishes to make.”\(^ {17}\)

**Public Figure and Elite Interviews**

As indicated, significant explanatory value arose from elite interviews, because these offered internal information, insights and experiences about the UNPREDEP field organization and its precursor UNPROFOR/Macedonia (UNPROFOR/M), and about the UN headquarters organization. Interviews with the top field leadership highlight potentially unforeseen variables or processes that may not be clear in archival research, and could enable confirmation or disconfirmation of findings from the literature and archives. Semi-structured interviews also offered the opportunity to acquire information that might well be missing from written documentation but is essential to the processes of organization learning.

In most cases, written records and archives could not offer this internal organization focus and perspective. Instead, in this case, written materials and archives

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provided a body of work against which to compare interview results, making interviews even more crucial to the discrete “field organization and learning vs. headquarters organization and learning” approaches associated with this research thesis regarding preventive deployment's non-reproduction.

**Semi-structured Elite (Military and Political) Interviews: Selection**

In 2009, it was most feasible and practical to focus on military elites associated with the Nordic Battalions, specifically the Field Operations Commanders. These constituted the highest-ranking UNPROFOR/M and UNPREDEP officers, those in control of the field organization, all of whom were from Finland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The strongest reason for beginning with these interviews is that communication and contact with both active duty and retired military is not highly restricted in these countries, as it now is in the United States. Furthermore, the Nordic countries have a lengthy history of peace operations and conflict management involvement, giving rise to the great depth of experience each country and its leadership brought to Macedonian operations.

Military leaders from these four countries offered rich sources of information about the learning processes of the precursor UNPROFOR/M, and of UNPREDEP as field organizations, and about their commands (which included Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, Swedish, and U.S. troops, along with a lesser number of individuals from other troop-contributing states). For a variety of reasons, some adaptive behaviors and decisions during the course of UNPREDEP were taken by individuals who have asked to
remain unnamed. Two individuals who led UNPROFOR/M (the mission preceding UNPREDEP) were also interviewed, as was a NATO Kosovo Forces Danish general (KFOR based in Skopje, post-UNPREDEP), to complete the temporal expansion of this analysis. Interviews were focused, semi-structured, and confidentiality and/or anonymity was protected based on requests for such.

Table 3. Interview Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Dates of Service</th>
<th>Dates of Interviews</th>
<th>Place of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Juha Engstrom</td>
<td>Brigadier General (Ret.)</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>February 1995 to February 1996</td>
<td>June 17, 2009</td>
<td>Mäntsälä, Finland (residence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bo Lennart Wranker</td>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>March 1996 through May 1997</td>
<td>June 24, 2009</td>
<td>Swedish National Military Academy, Stockholm Barracks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bent Sohnemann</td>
<td>Brigadier General (Ret.)</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>June 1997 through September 1998</td>
<td>July 8-10, 2009 and July, 2010</td>
<td>Varde, Denmark (residence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ove Johnny Strömberg</td>
<td>Brigadier General (Ret.)</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>September 1998 to end of Mandate, February 28, 1999</td>
<td>July 4, 2009</td>
<td>Oslo, Norway (Grand Hotel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paavo Kalevi Kiljunen</td>
<td>Nordic Battalion Commander, now Major General</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1996 – 1997</td>
<td>June 16, 2009</td>
<td>Tampere, Finland (Ministry of Defense Offices)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


19 There were several informants who requested anonymity and confidentiality protections; these individuals do not appear in the table.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name19</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Dates of Service</th>
<th>Dates of Interviews</th>
<th>Place of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finn Særmark-Thomsen</td>
<td>Brigadier General (Ret.)</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>UNPROFOR/M (1993 – 1995)</td>
<td>July 6, 2009</td>
<td>Danish Military Academy, Svanemølle Barracks, Copenhagen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalle Liesinen</td>
<td>Colonel (Ret.) – Nordic Battalion Commander</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>April 1995 through June 1996</td>
<td>June 12-14, 2009</td>
<td>Kuovola (summer residence) and in Helsinki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunnar Lange</td>
<td>Major General, NATO/KFOR/IFOR (now ret.)</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>April 3, 2001 through March 15, 2002</td>
<td>July 10, 2009</td>
<td>Blåvand at residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Iko</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>September 1998 to end of Mandate, February 28, 1999</td>
<td>June 25, 2009</td>
<td>Swedish National Defense Academy, Stockholm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henryk J. Sokalski</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations to UNPREDEP</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td>July 9th and 14th, 2010</td>
<td>Warsaw, Poland at Sokalski residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abiodun Williams</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace; Aide to SRSG Henryk J. Sokalski in UNPREDEP, Macedonia</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
<td>October 6, 2010</td>
<td>Telephone to Washington, D.C./USIP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To address the political side of UNPREDEP and the United Nations headquarters’ representation in the field, as noted above, similar semi-structured interviews were conducted in person with the first Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to UNPREDEP, Henryk Sokalski, on the 9th and 14th of July, 2010, in Warsaw, Poland, and by telephone with Abiodun Williams, a key civilian aide in Sokalski’s offices in Macedonia during UNPREDEP, on 06 October 2010.

**Summary**

The research incorporated primary materials and methods not extensively utilized or available for previous work. First, it included information from interviews directly with Force Commanders, Chiefs of Staff, battalion commanders and others closely related to UNPREDEP; with the political leader and diplomat of UNPREDEP who served as the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General throughout most of its operations; and with UN officials at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Several of the military leaders of UNPREDEP confidentially provided select personal papers and records from the mission, along with various reports they transmitted during the course of UNPREDEP to the United Nations and other entities, mainly OSCE and NATO. These documents and interviews offered a unique opportunity to gain insights into field learning and, for comparative explanatory purposes, into HQ learning at the UN.

Second, as a result, UN documentation from UNPREDEP other than that previously utilized or presently publicly available, and therefore exclusive to this research
and analysis, offered rich potential for more significant analysis than any previously undertaken.

Finally, in order to ascertain more information about American military, political and public attitudes toward UNPREDEP, media coverage was examined, and interviews with selected individuals offering expert information, insights, and evidence were undertaken. Document-based methods were incorporated to explore the potential interconnection between IGOs relevant to UNPREDEP, including the UN, CoE, OSCE, EU and NATO.
CHAPTER IV

THE BALKANS, THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND

PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY/DEPLOYMENT IN MACEDONIA:

THE CASE OF UNPREDEP

UNPREDEP remains the UN’s only peacekeeping mission to date authorized and established in a state prior to the commencement of actual hostilities within or against it—a preventive deployment.¹ It offers the sole UN case permitting examination of the organizations and learning of key actors most closely associated with a preventive deployment mission and its mandate(s), implementation and assessment. In order to add context to this case, a review of the history of the region, subjective aspects, Macedonia’s geo-strategic location, and other factors are included.

Yugoslavia: 1918 - 1991

With the death of Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980), initially Prime Minister and later President of Yugoslavia, the state lost the leader with an “unassailable power base” who was able to unite six disparate nations for nearly three decades from 1953 until his death in 1980. These constituent republics were Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, and Serbia with its two semi-autonomous provinces of Kosovo

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and Vojvodina. For much of the world, “the very words Tito and Yugoslavia were indelibly linked.”

Yet there was a Yugoslavia prior to Tito. For over 700 years, Macedonia and the region had been part of the Ottoman Empire. The “First Yugoslavia” was formed post-World War I from the remains of the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires. Between 1918 and 1929, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was a monarchy that transitioned to dictatorship in 1929 under “hegemonic Serbian dynastic leadership.”

This interwar kingdom fell apart as Serbian leaders resisted political compromise; armed nationalistic, xenophobic militias rose up; various non-Serb national groups objected to Serb leadership, and institutional, political and economic corruption proliferated. Notwithstanding efforts to inculcate “democratic culture,” growing nationalistic feelings among the various ethnic groups stimulated constant crises.

Due at least in part to these factors, three embodiments of Yugoslavia existed during the interwar years. First was “Greater Serbia, with Serbian identity and leadership paramount, and with non-Serbs discriminated against to a significant extent. A second follow-on effort was made to establish and solidify an artificial Yugoslav identity on all of the nations and peoples in Yugoslavia. King Aleksandar, as royal dictator of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, imposed this from above. The King abolished

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Parliament and the 1921 Constitution. The third incarnation of Yugoslavia during the interwar period was one formed during attempts to cut deals with the Croats, the nascent Kingdom’s “most vociferous opponents.”

The first option alienated everyone but the Serbs, and the second essentially estranged all parties including Serbians. A highly centralized state, further, was quite possibly the least appropriate choice given the “various constituent peoples of Yugoslavia.” The research conducted for this study indicated, however, that this was precisely Tito’s solution, which he made work quite well.

Tito’s own background was extensively intertwined with the rise of Stalin and the Communist Party in the USSR, and was a survivor of Stalin’s multiple purges. His roles included serving in the Communist International (Comintern, 1919-1943) and its successor, the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform, 1947-1956). Yet he was the sole Eastern European leader not appointed by Moscow and not put into power by their occupying forces: “From Moscow’s point of view, he was dangerously independent, and too ambitious.” Yugoslavia was expelled from the Eastern Bloc in 1948.

Once again, Yugoslavia went through a governmental transformation to a socialist, communist, centrally controlled entity. Tito created what was essentially a one-

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5 John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a country* (NY and Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 160.


7 Ibid., 34.

8 Ibid., 57-58.

9 Silber and Little, *Death of a Nation*, 28.
man state, despite several constitutional revisions that appeared to indicate ostensible moves toward democracy. Under Tito’s leadership, Yugoslavia was able to maintain a tenuous balancing act addressing both Eastern and Western interests along with the country’s own. He was largely able to defuse or control ethnic nationalism through economic apportionment, repression, deportations, and other means such as manipulation of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and its draftees, and he strongly emphasized a unified “Yugoslav” identity (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{10} Further, he co-founded the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, which improved diplomatic and other relations with many countries. At one time, possession of a Yugoslav passport with its travel privileges was highly prized.\textsuperscript{11}

Tito most certainly is not forgotten: a bronze bust of him was erected in Bitola, Macedonia, on its main pedestrian concourse, within the past decade. Skopje, the Macedonian capital, has “Broz” coffee shops, akin to Starbucks.\textsuperscript{12} As recently as late November of 2013, a large, bronze statue of Tito mysteriously appeared in front of Tito High School in Skopje.\textsuperscript{13} These may well be signals of “Yugo-nostalgia” or Tito-nostalgia in the general populace.\textsuperscript{14}


\textsuperscript{12}Stevo Pendarovski, interview with author, Skopje, Macedonia, 16 May, 2006; Dr. Goce Georgievski, interview with author, Skopje, Macedonia, 22 May, 2006; personal observations, Summer 2006; Abiodun Williams, telephone interview with author, 06 Oct, 2010.


\textsuperscript{14}A. Williams, interview with author, 06 October 2010.
Prior to his death in May of 1980, Tito made a serious strategic error: he failed to name or appoint a specific successor. An eight-way presidency, ineffective and especially unpopular, was instituted after his demise. Unrest proliferated throughout the constituent republics, a good part of it based on formerly repressed ethnic identities and the resultant rising nationalism. The Yugoslav Communist Party also lost favor with the constituent peoples in the republics because of suspicions of favoritism, infighting, ineffectiveness, economic downturns, corruption and overall inefficiencies. By the late 1980s, Yugoslavia had become distinct republics, awaiting next steps in the tensions.15

The Run-Up to UNPROFOR/M and UNPREDEP

During the 1980s, the situation in Yugoslavia deteriorated even more in terms of economic distress; growing nationalist sentiments in the republics that had been mostly neutralized or controlled by Tito during his tenure; increasingly absent and/or ineffective leaders and in-fighting among them; blatant ethnic favoritism; rising corruption, and declining institutions. Few of the constituent republics anticipated the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would survive intact (except possibly Serbia): all had plans either for independence or a different version of confederation. For example, Serbia and Montenegro, two former republics, became the “rump Yugoslavia”. The ensuing independence declarations of several former Yugoslav republics contributed to actual and perceived tensions, and to conflicts among and within the former republics and their citizenries. Slovenian and Croatian voters approved independence in late June, 1991;

Macedonia ratified its independence on 08 September of 1991 following failed
confederation discussions; and Bosnia-Herzegovina declared freedom from the rump
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on 01 March 1992.\textsuperscript{16} A Third Balkan War seemed
nearly inevitable, most directly due to Serbia’s aggressive actions under then-President
Slobodan Milosevic (1989-1997), specifically his hostilities against Bosnia-Herzegovina.

On or about 05 January 1992, roughly six months prior to the definitive outbreak
of war involving Bosnia-Herzegovina (mere weeks before UN Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali’s \textit{Agenda for Peace} of 31 January 1992, which outlined preventive
diplomacy, including preventive peacekeeping efforts), Bosnia’s Muslim President Alija
Izetbegovic asked the UN, via Cyrus Vance who was in Bosnia at the time, for 2,000 to
3,000 preventive peacekeeping troops. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s
response was “equivocal” in his report to the Security Council S/23363 (05 January
1992).\textsuperscript{17} When the Bosnian Foreign Minister asked again in April of 1992 for preventive
troops from the UN, the Secretary-General responded more particularly, emphasizing,
“…the division of labour between the United Nations, whose peace-keeping mandate was
limited to the situation in Croatia…and the peace-making role of the European


\textsuperscript{17} His predecessor, Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, might have reacted differently based on his
experience when in that role, but this is conjecture, as he had just left office.
Community (EC) as a whole. Concerning his specific request, I observed it might be more appropriate for EC to expand its presence and activities in Bosnia-Hercegovina.”

In mid-April 1992, Vance again went to Bosnia, but even though Izetbegovic reiterated his request for preventive forces, Boutros-Ghali stood by his earlier position: “…the present conditions in Bosnia-Hercegovina make it impossible to define a workable concept for a United Nations peace-keeping operation.” Vance stressed UN resource limitations; it was finally agreed that forty-one UN military observers would serve four areas of Bosnia. Meanwhile, Izetbegovic had increased his request for UN forces to 10,000 to 15,000 with air support, “to restore order” as conditions in the area deteriorated swiftly and dramatically. No matter what Izetbegovic requested, less or more, including UN protection of aid convoys, he finally was forced to agree with Sir Marrack Goulding and Lieutenant-General Satish Nambiar, commander of UNPROFOR: that without some kind of agreement between the conflicting parties, his appeals could not be answered positively.

To make matters worse, the forty-one UN military observers in Bosnia, after a mere two weeks, were redeployed to Croatia when conditions in Bosnia grew too risky to ensure their safety. Roughly 60% of UNPROFOR’s Sarajevo headquarters personnel were also relocated to Belgrade, Serbia, a few days thereafter (mid-May, 1992, which many found ludicrous, given Serbia’s role in the conflict). Only about 100 remained in Sarajevo to support humanitarian activities.

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No matter how many “reminders” and resolutions the UN sent to Belgrade and the Yugoslav Federal Army (JNA) to cease interference in Bosnia, Serbia remained intransigent. Not even arms and others sanctions cut the link between Belgrade and Bosnian Serbs. Izetbegovic and Radovan Karadzic, political leader of Bosnian Serbs and military strategist there, along with Ratko Mladic, continued to act as blocks to any significant agreements, even those regarding humanitarian aid delivered via the Sarajevo airport and then to areas in need. Nothing the UN formally authorized would stop the war itself, in which the international rules of war were ignored and routinely violated.

Even the Security Council’s Resolution 776 in September of 1992, authorizing UN troops to follow rules of engagement and use force in self-defense (including when armed groups tried to stop them for carrying out their humanitarian assistance tasks), had little to no effect mostly because the number of UN troops was so small: approximately 7,700, authorized to grow to 21,000 in the former Yugoslavia as part of UNPROFOR II (a separate Bosnian command). No one was totally innocent in this “brutal war”, except civilians, but “few believed the Serbs were not the worst offenders.”

Sokalski observed, “[T]he UN ignored the [Izetbegovic] request[s], citing a procedure banning the dispatch of peacekeepers before an outbreak of hostilities.

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19 Radovan Karadzic, after 13 years in hiding, was brought before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 2008, accused of a multitude of war crimes including genocide, ethnic cleansing and forced relocations against Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and Croats. He was specifically charged with the genocide of Srebrenica. His military commander, Ratko Mladic, was also indicted on the same charges. It is anticipated the trials will end in 2016.

Sokalski, Williams and others understood this to refer to completely exhausting unnamed additional diplomatic efforts (likely including other types of preventive diplomacy) prior to the potential dispatch of peacekeepers, but this may not have been accurate, given other information as described above. Had it been argued that this conflict not reached all those touchstones by late summer of 1992, one would have been in utter denial, given failed agreements between the warring parties, futile threats from the Great Powers, cease-fires broken within hours of their inceptions, ineffective sanctions, and, at that time, still no full agreement on use of military force. Boutros-Ghali, just beginning his tenure as Secretary-General of the UN, may well have rightly refused to send UN forces to Bosnia during the first five months of 1992: without a valid truce, peacekeepers were little more than human targets, even if armed.

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was truly no peace to keep under such circumstances, although the siege of Sarajevo had to be broken. Yes, there were peace making duties and peace enforcement to be done, but those were yet outside the mandates.

Strained UN resources were a given, although no one quite anticipated a turf war at UN HQ between UN senior civilian and military officials, or the effects of the “chaotic [UN] bureaucracy.” Nor is there evidence that full consideration was given that the former Yugoslavia would fall so far, so fast.\textsuperscript{24}

Furthermore, none of the UN Resolutions had “teeth” regarding this conflict so close to Macedonia, making the situation even more menacing. The Serbs continued to ignore the UN statements with impunity, even UN threats of a war tribunal. There was no committed military force behind the resolutions through most of 1992, although the subject was raised at various times and conferences. The UN (and others) felt the EC had to step up to the plate on this conflict; the EC felt that the UN (and perhaps NATO) needed to become more directly involved in Bosnia and the Balkans.

By winter, there was rapidly escalating violence between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and significant signs of ever-increasing turbulence and clashes in Kosovo, then an autonomous Serb province with undefined boundaries between southern Kosovo and northern Macedonia, along with increasingly frequent Serb incursions into Macedonian territory. On 11 November 1992, Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov contacted UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to formally request that a UN contingent

be dispatched to Macedonia to protect the small, unarmed and mostly defenseless state from being drawn into the bloody battles raging on its northern and western borders.

Gligorov’s request met with more success than had the Bosnian President’s eleven months prior. Supported by strong recommendations from the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), especially those of former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and former British Foreign Secretary Lord David Owen, the Secretary-General first gained approval for a fact-finding mission to visit Macedonia for a brief period from late November 1992 to early December 1992. Shortly thereafter, based on those findings, the Secretary-General endorsed a 700-person military force, supported by other technical, monitoring and administrative personnel, both military and civilian. The Security Council approved that recommendation on 11 December 1992. Almost exactly six months later (18 June 1993), the U.S. committed to providing about 300 troops to UNPROFOR within Macedonia’s borders (UNPROFOR/M), despite its earlier refusal to put boots on the ground in the Bosnian conflict (UNPROFOR). The first U.S. contingent arrived in July of 1993 to augment a battalion from Norway along with Canadian and Danish units already there. That was the initial NORBAT, later without Canadians but expanded with troops from Finland and Sweden as the Nordic Battalion or NORDBAT. This became the UNPROFOR Macedonia Command (UNPROFOR/M) affiliated with UNPROFOR, and recognized as early as February 1993 as the “first preventive deployment operation in the history of United

25 From UNSC Resolution 795 (1992), at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,LEGAL,,MKD,3b00f16714,0.html (not available in Official Document System (ODS) of the UN).
Nations peace-keeping."

Because it was not completely independent of UNPROFOR and UN Peace Forces-HQ (UNPF-HQ then in Belgrade, Serbia) until February 1996, was not fully equipped to deal with its mandated duties, did not have a completely independent Field Commander, and moreover, did not stress preventive deployment in its UN-assigned mission title, this assessment seemed premature.

An earlier mentioned document must be re-emphasized at this point, without which this mission may not have occurred. The United Nations Preventive Deployment Mission in Macedonia (UNPREDEP) was the successor mission to the United Nations Protection Force/Macedonia operation (UNPROFOR/M), a preventive diplomacy effort based, at least in part, on Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992’s *An Agenda for Peace.* Preventive deployment is a form of peace-keeping; that is, protecting an extant peace, an early-intervention approach under the rubric of preventive diplomacy. In the *Agenda*, Boutros-Ghali devoted five full paragraphs to it in Section III, paragraphs 28-32. Publicly recognizing that UN crisis area operations are often “too little, too late”, the Secretary-General recommended earlier UN mission presence in carefully considered

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26 In the Secretary-General’s Report on UNPROFOR to the UNSC of 10 February 1993, in which he requested an extension of the one-year old UNPROFOR mandate. Multiple Security Council Resolutions (SCRs) extended UNPROFOR for various brief time spans and placed heavy reporting requirements on the Secretary-General regarding the situation “on the ground”, especially in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.


and circumscribed circumstances respectful of state sovereignty as specified in the 1945
UN Charter. UNPREDEP was authorized when UNPROFOR was formally divided into
separate, independent operations in February 1996, and was specifically based on Section
III of the Agenda, as the following describes:

In cases where one nation fears a cross-border attack, if the Security
Council concludes that a United Nations presence on one side of the
border, with the consent only of the requesting country, would serve to
deter conflict, I recommend that preventive deployment take place. Here
again, the specific nature of the situation would determine the mandate
and the personnel required to fulfil [sic] it (Agenda for Peace, Sec. III,
paragraph 32).  

Henryk J. Sokalski had more than twenty-five years’ of distinguished experience
in the Polish Foreign Service, and thirteen years at the United Nations, his last UN HQ
position as an Assistant Secretary-General. From July 1995, four months after
UNPROFOR/M was spun off as UNPREDEP, to September 1998, Sokalski led the
political and civilian side of the UN Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia as the
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG). The UN essentially was
engaged in a grand experiment, arising from preventive diplomacy principles initially
suggested by Dag Hammarskjöld, but more fully developed under UN Secretaries-
General Javier Peréz de Cuéllar and Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s tenures, and continued by
Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

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29 Agenda for Peace, 1992. This makes the earlier UN denial of the Bosnian President’s request in December
of 1991 for UN peacekeepers all the more puzzling.

30 Sokalski was later a senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington D.C., 2000-2001.

31 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 1-16, passim. Boutros-Ghali was an author of An Agenda for Peace
(1992), midway through a massive increase in UN peacekeeping missions (from five to seventeen between
1988 and 1994, involving 9,570 military members in 1988 but 73,393 in 1994, and a similarly enormous
The OSCE, the Council of Europe (CoE), the OECD, NATO and the EU actively participated in political and domestic aspects of the operation. There was significant international support for each of the former Yugoslav republics’ desire to achieve independence, and by contrast, particular condemnation of Serbia’s then-President Slobodan Milosevic’s openly nationalist-based fervor to form not a “new Yugoslavia” but rather a “Greater Serbia”. These five international organizations were genuinely convinced of Milosevic’s “Greater Serbia” aspirations, and publicly concerned that the newly independent states’ survival be assured. Furthermore, they were aware of other critical, entirely conceivable outside destabilizing factors in the region: for example, might Albanians act in support of their ethnic kin in Kosovo and Macedonia? Greece, publicly and vociferously opposed to the Macedonian state under that name, might plausibly become more actively involved if an opportunity presented itself. Greek intervention could, without a great stretch of imagination, bring Turkey, which was

budgetary increase from 1988’s $230 million to 1994’s nearly $4 billion. A Supplement to the Agenda for Peace of 1992 followed in January 1995, a few months prior to the Resolution authorizing UNPROFOR.


33 Greece objected to the state’s constitutional name, Republic of Macedonia, certain terms of its constitution, and to its flag with the “Star of Vergina”, among other protestations. The Hellenic Republic felt these indicated irredentist ambitions against Greece. The so-called “name row” remains unresolved to date—Macedonia was admitted to the UN under the provisional “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM), a name deeply resented by most Macedonians worldwide. Greece had also previously embargoed Macedonia unilaterally (February 1994 through October 1995), significantly harming the new state economically; ergo, fears regarding Greek willingness to act against Macedonia were not entirely unfounded. The US recognizes the state under its constitutional name, as do nearly 140 other countries, including Russia and China, both permanent members of the UN Security Council. The recognition issue is complicated by certain states that use Macedonia’s constitutional name in bilateral activities, but use FYROM in other circumstances.
engaged in friendly overtures toward Macedonia, into the mix as the Hellenic Republic’s historic rival.

Bulgaria to Macedonia’s east was the only nearby country not a significant threat to the institutionally weak, economically disadvantaged, ethnically fragmented and democratically fragile new state, even though it had public complaints regarding the linguistic roots of the Macedonian language and about the state’s Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC). Furthermore, the international community was keenly aware of growing tensions along Macedonia’s mostly undetermined north border with the then Serbian province of Kosovo, around 90% ethnically Albanian.34

**UNPREDEP Mandates and Mission Expanded:**

**Consolidating Peace**

UNPREDEP mandates, beginning in 1995 and taken on by up to 42 contributing states, were interpreted to include certain state-building efforts aimed at improved inter-ethnic relations and support for domestic institutions and for infrastructure projects, largely under UNSC Resolution 908 (1994), regarding utilization of “good offices” by the SRSG and UNPREDEP forces. That the UN claimed the capability to *state-build* as part of peace-building was evident (if frequently criticized by UN HQ) during UNPREDEP’s operations; this ability was initially considered when the endeavor was authorized and during its entire course.35

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34 Sokalski, interview with author, 09 July 2010.

35 See UN Security Council Resolutions relevant to UNPREDEP in Bibliography.
Sokalski particularly emphasized his role on the civilian and political sides of the mission as *consolidating* peace, a perceived existing domestic peace (as opposed to restoring peace). He described it as backing the “human dimension” to which he was especially dedicated, through his outreach efforts to the Republic’s citizens, social and economic activities, inter-ethnic relations attention, fundraising efforts, and other means. All of these were, in his view, crucial to UNPREDEP’s overall mission and to reinforcing civil society in Macedonia, even if, as indicated, he came under significant criticism from UN HQ.\textsuperscript{36}

Therefore, this mission provided an appropriate case, given its mandates and practices, through which to examine field organization learning and adaptation. It further offered clear connections to HQ organizational learning and decisions (UN HQ in NY as issuer of those mandates and as author of subsequent reports that reflect problem identification, understandings and responsive change; and to the field UN HQ in Belgrade). This linkage was especially evident in the Secretaries-General reports to the Security Council of 1993 through early 1999.\textsuperscript{37}

Understanding gained through the case study method can be crucial to the identification and understanding of explanatory variables in greater detail.\textsuperscript{38} One of the


greatest benefits of a case study is interpretation and clarification of potential factors leading to a particular outcome. Case studies are appropriate for research like this, wherein the goal is, through examination of various aspects, to gain a fuller understanding of how and why a specific outcome occurred (i.e., a widely acknowledged successful preventive deployment), and why this particular undertaking (preventive deployment) has not been repeated.\textsuperscript{39}

Taking UNPREDEP as a case study also allows an examination of a third relevant set of actors: epistemic communities and other international organizations involved, such as the EU, the OECD and the OSCE, along with NATO, separately and in the aggregate. Was their learning affected by field experiences and via what others at HQ organization(s) learned? If so, how and why? What were the positions of powerful states on preventive deployment? And how might this have affected the interpretations of others about this type of mission?

UNPREDEP, as noted above, has almost unanimously been found to be a success as a preventive deployment.\textsuperscript{40} Given that UN peacekeeping operations have been judged near-universally as deeply problematic or failures,\textsuperscript{41} and that ongoing and increasing


numbers of conflicts exist worldwide, particularly intra-state and inter-ethnic conflicts, an examination of why a successful UN approach to early conflict intervention when key elements of such pending conflict are present (i.e., preventive deployment, along with the means of addressing inter-ethnic/nationalist elements) has not been attempted again is of signal importance to peacekeeping and conflict prevention, management and resolution learning and application.

After the mission ended in 1999, Macedonia continued to search for stability and recognition in the Balkans and outside it. Learning from it has both contemporary and future value, particularly in the face of the ever-growing numbers and sites of conflict worldwide. As Michael Lund persuasively argues, “…peacekeeping missions may find themselves handling more complex and destructive conflicts.”

Therefore, it is well worth exploring learning from this lower cost, “less troubled alternative” to more traditional missions. This may assist in comprehending why preventive deployment for conflict prevention apparently was a one-off, even during a decade-plus of rising conflict types that conceivably were and/or are well-suited to early intervention through preventive deployment. It may also help explain why this

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43 Ibid.

successful approach to early conflict intervention and prevention has not been undertaken since Macedonia’s mission.

**UNPREDEP and Preventive Deployment in the Literature**

Although there have been relatively few dedicated studies of UNPREDEP as a preventive deployment mission, at least four scholarly books examine it to date. What do these books contribute to the problem of the non-replication of preventive deployment and to the theory of organizational learning as is advanced in this dissertation?

Alice Ackermann wrote one of them, *Making Peace Prevail* in 2000, as did Abiodun Williams in the same year (*Preventing War: The United Nations and Macedonia*); the latter was directly involved in UNPROFOR/M and UNPREDEP as political and humanitarian affairs officer in Macedonia from 1994 through 1998. A third publication, titled *An Ounce of Prevention: Macedonia and the UN Experience in Preventive Diplomacy*, authored by Henryk J. Sokalski, the SRSG for UNPREDEP (1995 through 1998), was written approximately four years after mission’s end, in 2003. A later volume (2011) examining the mission in part is Sasho Ripiloski’s *Conflict in Macedonia: Exploring a Paradox in the Former Yugoslavia*. Therefore, two of the four works were written by those who were part of UNPREDEP for all or most of its existence, offering valuable first-person insights into the mission’s implementation, course and development.45

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In his volume, Abiodun Williams raised the issue of implementation in the efforts at conflict prevention. He also questioned success’s metrics and measurement. Williams examined UNPREDEP as a test case for the efficacy of preventive deployment, following it across time from pre-inception to its close. He focused on “the crucial nexus between theory and practice of international peacekeeping” to attempt to determine “the limits and possibilities of preventive deployment in general and UNPREDEP in particular.” Williams found great promise in preventive deployment and UNPREDEP, and was convinced there would be more such missions.

Williams presented a detailed recounting of UNPREDEP and aspects of its implementation, thus offering important information for this research. He set out conclusions at the end of each chronologically-based chapter, yet offered no inclusive analysis of another critical interconnection: that between peacekeeping and learning, particularly in the field, and relevant outcomes of such learning, particularly in and to the HQ organization (the UN in NY). He also does not fully develop a preventive deployment model for possible future use.

Alice Ackermann’s 2000 book, *Making Peace Prevail*, was a study of “the art of conflict prevention.” She asked why the Yugoslav wars did not spread into Macedonia, given its multi-ethnic society, in an effort to better understand effective conflict prevention. Ackermann engaged in considerable analysis of the role of Macedonian political elites, in concert with international actors such as UNPREDEP, the OSCE and

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the EU, in making peace prevail. Ackermann’s work is of value as it took a forward-looking approach to consideration of how preventive diplomacy (including preventive deployment) might be utilized in the future. While some of Ackermann’s conclusions may be criticized because of the ensuing destabilization of Macedonia and the conflict(s) that occurred less than two years after UNPREDEP withdrew, this study featured a balanced approach to UNPREDEP and its efforts to maintain peace in a state surrounded by vicious conflict. She examined the mission period from ethno-political, cultural, sociological and psychological points of view, took the environment into specific consideration and adopted some explicitly and implicitly constructivist standpoints.

Henryk J. Sokalski, a career diplomat and SRSG of UNPREDEP from 05 July 1995 through 18 September 1998, wrote his book on the mission in 2003, two years after the 2001 internal conflict in Macedonia, and some four years post-UNPREDEP. There is selected discussion of in-the-field learning as expressed in implementation and at the mission’s political headquarters, but it is more a humanitarian and political operation description than a theoretical analysis of the mission.

He attempted to sum up what was learned, but not necessarily how it was learned either on the ground or at in-country headquarters, or from interactions between the two with the international peacekeeping and security communities. He also did not treat the outcomes of learning in any detail—as a model for future preventive deployments, for example.\footnote{Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 216-239.} Furthermore, he and his office transmitted much of the information about the
field/military mission to UN HQ. This suggests that those reports conceivably were not quite those originally written or presented by the military leadership; examination of documents at the UN Archives about this mission sustained this supposition, as did interviews with Mr. Sokalski in the summer of 2010. This flaw may also have permeated his book.

All of the above works were written so close to the termination of UNPREDEP that none attempted to explain why another such endeavor was not undertaken, which is understandable. Without exception, these three authors indicated they expected usage of preventive deployment missions in the future. These were also, with the exclusion of Sokalski’s volume, written prior to the 2001 conflict in Macedonia that led to the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) of that year. Thus, conflict did occur in Macedonia after all.

Still, the general opinion was that UNPREDEP, ending in 1999, some 20 months prior to 2001’s inter-ethnic conflict, was nonetheless a successful preventive deployment with a positive outcome. Given the specific and limited terms of the mission’s mandate, UNPREDEP did satisfy it positively: to prevent the spillover of area conflicts into Macedonia, especially from Serbia, Kosovo, Albania, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It also engaged in as much good offices outreach and institution building as it genuinely could. It thus fulfilled its mandates virtually completely, with few or no cavils possible.

Although there are scholarly articles specifically addressing UNPREDEP, including those by Alice Ackermann, Bilyana Vankovska-Cvetkovska, Annika Björkdahl, Clive Archer, Howard Kuenning and others, these articles neither investigate nor analyze UNPROFOR/M or UNPREDEP using theoretical lenses. Further, they do not address questions related to organizational learning from these missions at UN HQ or the regional UN HQs, nor do they examine why preventive deployment has not been attempted since.\(^5\) They offer valuable information, however, about the mission itself, how it was perceived and some events during it, along with matters of conflict management and resolution. Part of the analytical process in this research included culling relevant information from these scholarly articles.

**Summary**

The approach of this study differs markedly from any taken in the body of literature reviewed and from the small amount of prior research into organizations and

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learning. The next chapter further highlights how and what was learned in the missions and from them, and in what ways that learning (or lack thereof) may relate to the discontinuation of UN preventive efforts, given that UNPROFOR/M and UNPREDEP apparently were effective, i.e., successful in terms of the mandate. It incorporates a broad assortment of primary information gained through interviews with elites and others, and through examination of the UNPREDEP archives at the UN.

This work further examines the conduct, processes and outcome, i.e. no further preventive deployments post-UNPREDEP, in an attempt to explain its sole use, and to seek an explanatory theory that may assist in better understanding both preventive deployment and its non-recurrence.
CHAPTER V

EVIDENCE AND VOICES:

EXPERTS’ KEY POINTS IN UNPREDEP ANALYSES

Danish Brigadier General Finn Særmek-Thomsen of UNPROFOR/Macedonia neatly summed up a key issue specified by all military leaders of that mission and later of UNPREDEP, when he stated, “The United Nations will not regularly succeed in its peacekeeping and related missions if it persists in limited-to-no learning from prior efforts, and continues to act according to previous conflicts.”

This problematic situation, he posited, would lead within the near future to a growing lack of support for UN-sanctioned peace, monitoring, and/or conflict missions; diminished political will by member states to commit vital resources (troops and funding, along with armaments and other equipment), and critically reduced respect for the UN’s credibility, reputation, legitimacy, and overarching commitment to peace in a conflict-ridden world.¹

While his statements were both an assessment of present issues and of potential future risks to the United Nations and its peace missions, General Særmek-Thomsen brought to bear his decades of experience in peacekeeping to arrive at such conclusions. Furthermore, his evaluations aligned with the majority of the other former, deeply

¹ BG Finn Særmek-Thomsen of Norway, interview with author on 06 July 2009, Svanemøllen Barracks in Copenhagen, Denmark; from Notes taken at time of interview and from recordings.
experienced military Field Commanders and members of UNPREDEP and its precursor mission, UNPROFOR/M.

Certainly, his three points would be a fitting epitaph were one considering the central UNPROFOR operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina), along with other previously mentioned failed UN missions. But instead of failed UN operations, here we examine UNPREDEP, a success, a particular type of success at which a second attempt has never formally been made: a preventive deployment mandate and mission.

As data analysis was undertaken regarding interviews and documents, it became evident that several specific themes were consistent among the military elites, and often repeated multiple times, albeit in slightly different ways, by particular individuals. Those specifics were then examined by their prevalence among the military leadership group as a whole, with twin goals of data reduction and explanatory influence assessment for preventive deployment’s singularity. Thus, it became even clearer after this analysis that there are areas of both broad and specific agreement on certain key points concerning the UN HQ organization, and about the field organization (UNPREDEP military and political operations). There were also unique and significant observations, particularly regarding UNPREDEP’s mandate and its efficacy.

**Principles and Preconditions of a Successful Preventive Deployment**

General Juha Engstrom, the first UNPREDEP Field Commander, who had previously served for twenty years as Aide de Camp to President Urho Kaleva Kekkonen of Finland and possessed decades of peacekeeping experience, outlined the principles and
preconditions he believed were vital to the start of a preventive deployment and that would help ensure its success:

First, the three overarching *UN principles* of peacekeeping were required to be adopted and enforced by all mission members. These would lend any such mission the credibility, UN Charter legality, and *gravitas* necessary for successful implementation in carrying out any mandate:

1. Consent of the involved parties;
2. Impartiality and neutrality of peacekeepers toward involved parties and others;
3. No use of force “except in self-defence and the defence of the mission and mandate.”

Second, the *vital preconditions* BG Engstrom specified were:

1. The alleged threat to a state had to be validated by international organizations and the international security community;
2. Political will and commitment were required to be consistently resolute among countries about to become involved;
3. The UN Security Council had to be convinced that there would be nearly-assured (or at the very least, highly likely and meaningful) contributions of resources from member states;
4. A convincing draft budget, at minimum, needed to be developed and available so that those committing their troops and other material involvement knew that there would be equally assured, available and ongoing financial resources for a mission;

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5. There had to be manifest dedication and assurances that member states would act quickly to put adequate boots and materiel on the ground in the threatened state;
6. The Security Council then had to pass a resolution specifically addressing a preventive deployment mission and an appropriately developed mandate.³

The table below (4) indicates the levels of support and expectations that persist and are vital to preventive deployments’ success. This was developed as a summary of Engstrom’s conversations and points made regarding requirements and understandings in the international and security communities, along with states (often members of such communities or organizations), and their commitment to preventive deployment’s main functions.

Table 4. Variances in International and Security Communities’ Support and Expectation Levels for Preventive Deployments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support &amp; Expectation Levels in International and Security Communities</th>
<th>Traditional Peacekeeping Tasks</th>
<th>Humanitarian Tasks</th>
<th>Enforcement Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of Support</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Degree                                                         ✓                                ✓</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Moderate Degree</td>
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<td>Reduced Degree</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Levels of Expectations</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Degree                                                         ✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moderate Degree</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced Degree</td>
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<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³ Interview (notes and recording) with BG Juha Engstrom on 17 June 2009 at his residence near Mäntsälä, Finland.
Command and Control of U.S. Troops in UNPREDEP

Every UNPREDEP and UNPROFOR/M Brigadier General indicated “command and control” issues as key challenges to be handled within and outside of UNPREDEP. Howard Kuenning, a former U.S. military Chief of Staff for UNPROFOR/M, explained it in his research project on UNPREDEP: the U.S. Battalion’s limitations, under U.S. law, were many, and appeared focused on risk-avoidance rather than effective, balanced sharing of responsibilities with the Norwegian, Finnish, Danish and Swedish troops (collectively, the Nordic Battalion) and others, and field orderliness.4 While there was certainly a degree of field command and control over the U.S. troops, the soldiers were in reality and in all critical matters led from a distance by the U.S. European Command (EUCOMM), and via U.S. military members in the UN Peace Forces and Operations offices in Zagreb, Belgrade, and Sarajevo, and thus by those not in the field themselves.5

Every general and former Chief of Staff or other officer interviewed indicated that this led to circumstances that had to be overcome for mission success. Particular national military companies were assigned to each monitoring position along the borders, so these limitations on the troops and foreign commanders created unique challenges. Additional time had to be spent on training the U.S. troops; this affected both the American troops

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and the Nordics. Training materials sometimes had to be developed, another unanticipated burden. The generals and other military leaders stressed especially the following:

1. American troops were required to be assigned to the lowest-risk Observation Posts (OPs) and Temporary Observation Posts (OPTs). They could not be assigned OP Hilltop 1703 specifically (the Čupino Brdo peak), even though it was within their patrol area. While “low-risk assignments” had some positive aspects, they created other issues, since U.S. troops were led by a foreign commander for a specified time and particular mission. An operation’s needs in toto could not always accommodate lowered risk to certain troops; that UNPREDEP’s field organization and leadership did is actually quite remarkable.

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6 Kuenning, “Preventive Peacekeeping as a Model for the Prevention of War”, in *UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia: Peacekeepers’ Views on the Limits and Possibilities of the United Nations in a Civil War-like Conflict*, eds. Wolfgang Biermann, and Martin Vadset (Burlington VT: Ashgate Press, 1999), 238-252. Ripiloski, *Conflict in Macedonia*, 83-84. A near-violent Serbian military-Macedonian Special Forces confrontation occurred in 1994 at the Čupino Brdo mountaintop, considered strategically and culturally important to both Serbs and Macedonians. A Nordic company staffed this OP, although it was within the U.S. Battalion’s border observation area. BG F. Særmark-Thomsen was field commander, and successfully shuttle-negotiated the highly volatile situation directly between Belgrade and Skopje. Macedonia was about to send troops to Čupino Brdo, while Nordic peacekeepers were deployed there as a buffer between the two states’ military elements during negotiations. As a result of BG Særmark-Thomsen’s intensive efforts, the Serbs agreed to withdraw. BG F. Særmark-Thomsen, interview with author on 06 July 2009; Sokalski, interview with author on July 14, 2010.
The foreign commander’s authority over U.S. troops is limited to that necessary to organize, coordinate, and direct the mission-related tasks of those units provided to him, in order to accomplish the assigned mission. In addition a variety of safeguards are recognized as needed to protect the U.S. troops…In particular the United States participates actively in the policymaking bodies that oversee the military operations, seeks the clear delineation of operational missions in governmental agreements, and limits the authority of foreign commanders.  

2. As the generals and others explained, specific national military companies were assigned to each monitoring position along the borders, usually contiguously per company, so these limitations on the U.S. troops created unique challenges in the field for foreign Commanders. They stressed especially the following:

a. Unevenness of duties and responsibilities between the U.S. Battalion and the Nordic one, somewhat adversely affected organizational field learning.

b. The least-experienced UNPREDEP Battalion, the U.S. one, was less likely to gain significant peacekeeping experience in the field. Their one-month peacekeeping training for UNPREDEP, prior to service in the field itself was not supplemented with immediate and meaningful involvement in preventive deployment activities themselves.

c. Once U.S. troops were in the field, and were trained even more extensively by Nordic forces, they could not fully utilize this training in real-mission

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8 BG J. Engstrom (17 June 2009), BG B. Wranker (24 June 2009); BG B. Sohmann (08-10 July 2009); and Major P. Iko, 26 June, 2009 at Swedish National Defense Academy in Stockholm, Sweden, all interviews with author (notes and recordings).
operations, negatively impacting all troops’ morale to some extent, and the field organization’s cohesiveness and learning.  

3. The U.S. troops could not patrol within 300 meters (about 1,000 feet) of any border or patrol line, and could do no night patrols. These restrictions made it impossible for them to form relations with Albanian, Serbian and other border guards for mutual benefits. This further negatively affected the field organization operationally, structurally, and regarding organizational learning.

4. U.S. military leaders, including Chiefs of Staff, were not permitted to cross borders out of Macedonia, even for meetings with other states’ military leaders when Field Commanders and Nordic Chiefs of Staff visited or negotiated with them.

5. U.S. troops were often the target of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) Army complaints, and specifically mentioned whenever the FRY threatened, hinted at or otherwise addressed problems of which they themselves were a part.

6. U.S. troops did perform a specific support function: they maintained a thirty-person, non-patrolling unit as a “quick reaction force (QRF).” Were they to patrol, “this would result…in a decrease in the response time should there be a need for the QRF.”

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10 BG Wranker (24 June 2009), BG Sohnemann (5-7 July 2010 and 08-10 July 2009), BG Engstrom (17 June 2009), and Col. Kalle Liesinen (12-14 June 2009), all interviews with author.

Yet crucially, in contrast to the challenges of having U.S. troops in UNPREDEP, there were obviously marked benefits to having U.S. commitment with forces on the ground in the mission, even those with constrained functions. These troops represented a projection of American power in the post-Yugoslav conflict area, based on international and Washington D.C.’s political and diplomatic understanding of what was occurring there:

…the Yugoslav wars were provoked by an aggressive Serbia seeking to annex Serb-dominated lands in…territorial aggrandizement…the Clinton administration’s decision to contribute troops to the UN preventive peacekeeping operation in Macedonia were…borne of this interpretation. For Washington, Serbian military expansion into Kosovo and Macedonia was a distinct possibility, one that, by potentially setting off a larger regional war, would likely impact American security interests. Containment (emphasis added), therefore, was key. …this deployment validated—and represented a concrete American commitment toward—Macedonia’s existence and territorial integrity.  

Containment, for American policy at that time, meant that the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be stopped from spreading south into Macedonia. The deterrent and containment values of U.S. on-the-ground involvement in UNPREDEP were unusually high for three reasons: first, it was verifiably a complete turn-around from previous U.S. political attitudes toward UN peacekeeping and from the U.S.’s absolute refusals (to Europe) to contribute peacekeepers to UNPROFOR or to the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict in some other fashion. This leads to the second, the symbolic value, if nothing else, of having U.S. soldiers in Macedonia, as part of a UN mission (one which was the first of its kind besides, a preventive deployment): its significance, when there were no

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U.S. troops on the ground engaged militarily or in U.N. peace missions elsewhere in the Balkans, cannot be overstated.

Third, this gave UNPREDEP greater military credibility and legitimacy, and added an unwritten threat: if the Serbs engaged in aggression toward Macedonia, there would very likely be retaliatory American action. “Put simply, the American presence served as insurance against Serb incursions into Macedonian territory. …The American deployment signaled a stronger and more unequivocal statement to Milosevic than OSCE monitors, who pre-dated UNPREDEP, or…Nordic peacekeepers, could ever deliver.”13

Even though, under American law, U.S. Command in Europe (EUCOMM) held primacy over UN Command and as a result, the U.S. Battalion came under limited operational control of UNPREDEP field commanders, that did not deter those field commanders from incorporating the U.S. Battalion to its fullest strength and effect within the constraints as set forth. Consequently, as the field commanders agreed, despite the constraints and certain drawbacks of having U.S. troops as part of UNPREDEP, the benefits immeasurably outweighed the disadvantages. Furthermore, insightful and creative military leadership by experienced peacekeepers as Field Commanders, and by U.S. Chiefs of Staff in the field organization, some of which were described to the author, were crucial to overcoming such perceived issues.

All parties – and others in the international and security communities – fully understood the political significance of having the U.S. troops patrol the Macedonian

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13 Ripiloski, *Conflict in Macedonia*, 89. Ripiloski stresses that the potential of American retaliation against Serbia for aggression was a critical element that had been missing at the start in the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict arena.
border with Serbia, for example, rather than elsewhere.\textsuperscript{14} They were very aware that the inclusion of U.S. military members in UNPREDEP in Macedonia, was a unique response for the U.S. to the need for a first-time, multidimensional prevention effort prior to violence, rather than a strictly in-conflict or post-conflict military-type approach.\textsuperscript{15} After all, UN troops (field organizations) elsewhere in the Balkans were flailing because they were entangled in active, high-risk, extremely violent conflicts.

Importantly, it appeared the UN and others in the international security community were largely unresponsive to early warnings, and arrived too late to engage in meaningful, multifaceted preventive efforts in other parts of the Balkans. Those missions, it should be stressed, did \textit{not} have a meaningful U.S. military “boots on the ground” presence (they acted in air support and in medical contingents) with that boots on the ground concomitant projection of American power.

The map on the following page (Figure 1) shows the approximate placement of key Observation Posts (OPs) and Temporary Observation Posts (OPTs). Those numbers preceded with “U” were U.S.-manned; those with “F” by the Finnish companies, “N” indicates Norwegian troop-held posts, and “D” means the Danish Company peacekeepers handled those posts.

\textsuperscript{14} An action which the Macedonian Government had suggested and strongly approved (Ripiloski, \textit{Conflict in Macedonia}, 89-90); Stevo Pendarovski, National Security Advisor to the President, interview with author on 16 May 2006, Skopje, Macedonia.

\textsuperscript{15} BG O. J. Strömberg (04 July 2009), BG B. Sohnemann (08-10 July 2009), MG Paavo Kiljunen (16 June 2009), and BG J. Engstrom (17 June 2009), all interviews with author; Sokalski, \textit{An Ounce of Prevention}, 132.
Note that the US troops, at most times numbering roughly half of UNPREDEP’s soldiers, were posted on only about one-third of the border; the troops from Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway, the other half of UNPREDEP’s total, were responsible for a little more than two-thirds of it. This changed as drawdowns affected the mission and other factors were taken into consideration, but this map reflects the most prevalent configuration of OPs and OPTs. The OPTs (temporary Observation Posts) by their very nature were in various locations during the mission, too.

Figure 1. UNPREDEP Deployment Areas on Borders (June 1998)

UNPREDEP: An Economical Operation

It has already been noted that the cost of UNPREDEP was strikingly competitive when compared to other UN peacekeeping missions. Part of this was due to its smaller size, but also that it was pre-conflict, and thus did not include the far higher costs of a
conflict-laden mission (such as the major endeavor in the Balkans, UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina.) As a mission independent of UNPROFOR, UNPREDEP incurred average costs of about $60 million annually, with a closing transition budget of $21.1 million allocated for 01 July 1998 through 30 June 1999, once the mission ended 28 February 1999. To put this in perspective, the total cost at the end of 1996 of UNPREDEP was $204 million, and at the end of June 1997, $234 million (or $29 million per each six months). Note most numbers below are written with “,” instead of “.” for tenths.

On 29 April 1998 (A/51/508/Add.3), the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly the budget for the maintenance of UNPREDEP from 1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998, amounting to $49,4 million gross ($47,9 million net). Expenditures for UNPREDEP covering the period 1 July 1996 through 30 June 1997 amounted to $50,4 million gross ($49,5 million net) [A/52/768]. On 26 June 1998, the Assembly appropriated $21,1 million to maintain the Force from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999. … The Assembly, in resolution 53/20 of 2 November 1998, appropriated an amount of $29 million (gross) for the maintenance of UNPREDEP for the period from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999, in addition to the amount of $21 million (gross) already appropriated for this period under its resolution 52/245 of 26 June 1998. The assessment of $16,6 million (gross) for the period from 1 March to 30 June 1999 at a monthly rate of $4,1 million (gross) was subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Force. The Council, on 25 February 1999, however, did not extend UNPREDEP beyond 28 February 1999 under SC/6648. As at 31 January 1999, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNPREDEP special account amounted to $20.3 million.

Covering preceding budget requirements, $51,6 million gross ($50,1 million net) were appropriated by the General Assembly for UNPREDEP for the period 1 July 1996 to 39 June 1997 (report A/52/768 of 16 January 1998). By adopting resolution 51/154 B on 13 June 1997, the General Assembly decided to appropriate $46,506,700 gross ($44,969,500 net) for maintaining UNPREDEP during the period 1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998. By adopting resolution 51/154 B on 13 June 1997, the General Assembly decided to appropriate $46,506,700 gross ($44,969,500 net) for maintaining UNPREDEP during the period 1 July 1997 to 30 June 1998. The General Assembly, on 16 December 1996, appropriated a total of $25,373,400 gross ($24,615,600 net) for maintaining UNPREDEP during the period 1 July 1996 to 30 June 1997, inclusive of $632,400 for the support account for peacekeeping operations (resolution 51/154). In so doing, the Assembly took


Thayer projects that had the Macedonian situation deteriorated to the point of belligerence between Macedonia and a single country, for example, Albania or Bulgaria, and had there been a two-year duration (thus, a mid-size and mid-length conflict), total costs (military, humanitarian, direct and opportunity economic costs, plus those to individual states) would be reasonably forecast at about $15 billion.\footnote{Thayer, “Macedonia”, 1999.}

Had it become a one year, large-scale conflict involving multiple countries (perhaps Macedonia, Serbia, Albania, Greece, Turkey and the U.S.A.), forecasted costs reach about $143.94 billion. Thayer’s estimate metric is the cost of the first Gulf War. He makes certain adjustments, assuming the Balkans have no valuable resources (like oil) to make them attractive to other countries, relatively small national economies, and do little trade with the U.S., the more western part of Europe, or Japan. Too, some Gulf War
donor-states (such as Japan) would not likely support conflict-ending efforts on the same scale as the first Gulf War, if at all, because they have no direct interests in the southern Balkans. The human costs of a mid-sized or large scale conflict cannot be calculated “but would be great.”

Thayer makes no predictions regarding costs of a civil conflict in Macedonia.

To put these dollar amounts into more familiar terms, compare annual UNPREDEP costs to the cost to the U.S. Air Force of F-15E fighter jets in 1998 (the model used most in Balkan bombing and close support operations during UNPROFOR): $31.1 million apiece fly-away cost. Thus, UNPREDEP’s annual costs, 1995 through 1999, were equivalent to the cost of slightly less than two F-15 E fighter jets at fly-away cost (1998). The total cost of one U.S. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (“drone”), the MQ-9 Reaper, equals nearly $17 million (2013 dollars) with ground control but without initial development expenses. According to a U.S. Air Force fact sheet, costs were “$56.5 million (includes four air craft with sensors, ground control station and Predator Primary satellite link) (fiscal 2011 dollars).”

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20 Thayer, “Macedonia”, 138-142: see Tables 7.1 (at 139) and 7.2 (at 141) especially. Thayer is forecasting costs based on available mission economic data to mid-1997, as he explains.

21 F-15E fighter jet costs from https://archive.today/20121212030041/http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=102; accessed January 31, 2009; see also Steve Davies, *F-15E Strike Eagle Units in Combat 1990–2005*. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing Limited, 2005. 236 of these fighter jets were built between 1985 and 2001. These are the aircraft utilized in Balkan UNPROFOR operations on request from the UN and NATO to enforce no-fly zones and to undertake bombing missions during NATO-led Operations Deny Flight, Deliberate Force, and Allied Force between August 1993 and March of 1999. F-15E pilots and weapons officers conducted both patrol and combat missions during this period. They averaged in-flight times of 7.5 hours (including two in-air refuelings), and carried both air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons and munitions. They also engaged in close air support missions, a newer tactic in the ‘90s that has since gained immense popularity with the U.S. Air Force.

One must note that should peacekeepers enter into a mission where there is an active conflict (such as those in Africa, or UNPROFOR while it was in place, as examples), costs cannot be fully determined nor will they impact the type of mission chosen—nor can an end date for the mission necessarily be set. Consequently, cost factors and lack of firm, predictable ending date cannot fully explain why there have been no further preventive deployments by the UN. Also, as noted earlier, there are many UN operations that have been going on for more than twenty years, and are still active.

**Funding to the Field Organization: “Inadequate”**

UNPREDEP’s funding was considered inadequate by all parties interviewed, and by several authors on this subject, even while conceding praise for its low cost. There was never a budget line for the exercise of “good offices”, for outreach efforts to area communities and sometimes not for materials for such efforts, nor for required maintenance programs and infrastructure, professional conferences, certain travel and the like, even though “good offices” were specified as part of UNPREDEP’s mandate. Indeed, the UN HQ, rather than being supportive to the field organization, appears to have made such peace- and state-building endeavors more difficult for the SRSG and the Field Commanders. Often, they had to expend significant time and effort to obtain funds from other sources than United Nations headquarters.

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23 From UNARMS, Box 2, 1999/0116 Accession Date, Subject files of SRSG, SRSG Special Assistant and Public Information Officer; specific cables between multiple parties 13 March (Fax 151-3130/157-8053); 10 April 1996; 12 April 1996; 23 May 1996 (from Steinar Bjornsson to H. Sokalski) re “U.S. Contracted Construction Project” and reimbursement from UN HQ will not occur per Bjornsson; 03 July 1996 from Sokalski to K. Annan referencing funds for road repairs ($280,000 needed immediately; UN HQ told of
The UN was often not responsive to or, perhaps, frequently less than forthcoming regarding expenses and funds requests related to this mission. Timeliness of UN HQ responses was an ongoing difficulty. One typical example was a critical request for $280,000, primarily to repair, renovate and maintain access roads for the OPs and OPTs. UNPREDEP further was burdened by outmoded equipment vital to these road jobs: several pieces had been out of service for some time, and parts were not available, either locally or from elsewhere.24

The field organization had learned on the ground that in the mainly mountainous and rugged terrain, access and other critical roads did not hold up through winters and wet springs. Access maintenance and repairs could only be done seasonally because of weather and other factors, they knew; therefore, it was a highly time-sensitive request and crucial to both OP accessibility and troops’ safety and security. The military sent the cost breakdown to SRSG Sokalski and to the UN on March 13 and May 2, 1996, but there was no response from HQ in NY over the next nearly three months other than to demand further details in July (which, as noted, had been submitted three months earlier).25 Local gravel and other contractors demanded payment up-front, due to the weak Macedonian

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economy, so this was not a situation where a trustworthy letter of credit could have resolved the issue.

Eventually, UN HQ suggested that UNPREDEP arrange for equipment from the UN Transition Office in the former Yugoslavia (UNTOFY) in Zagreb and from Camp Polom (at United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation, UNCRO) in Croatia, and from Tuzla in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\(^{26}\) Additional engineering support had been requested in April 1996, too, and was anticipated from the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia on a rotational basis. The Indonesian engineering group of fifteen persons was operational, however, only through the end of May 1996.\(^{27}\)

As noted, UN HQ and UNPREDEP arranged for some machinery trade-offs between Balkan regional operations, but in fact, this replacement equipment mainly arrived too late and indeed, some key units never reached UNPREDEP at all.\(^{28}\)

The situation was further complicated because helicopters could not fill the road access voids to OPs and OPTs, primarily since they were irregularly available for this purpose. Besides, several of the U.S.-supplied UH-60 Blackhawks (painted white for

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\(^{26}\) From UNARMS, Box 2, 1999/0116 Accession Date, Subject files of SRSG, SRSG Special Assistant and Public Information Officer; specific cables between multiple parties 13 March (Fax 151-3130/157-8053); 10 April 1996; 12 April 1996; a seemingly angry message, all in capital letters, 23 May 1996 from Steinar Bjornsson to H. Sokalski re unauthorized “U.S. Contracted Construction Project” ($3.2 million contract with US Army Europe?) and reimbursement from UN HQ that will not occur per Bjornsson, who states actual budget 01 January through 30 June is $504,000; 03 July 1996 from Sokalski to K. Annan referencing funds for road repairs ($280,000 needed immediately; UN HQ told of this at HQ on May 2); 17 July fax from H. Sokalski to Mr. Medili, UN HQ with cc to K. Annan and Major General Franklin Van Kappen (UN HQ), no. UNPREDEP 051.

\(^{27}\) UNARMS 1996 Files, Box 2 (1999/0116 accession date), fax from Kofi Annan of 19 April 1996 to field commanders and Sokalski.

\(^{28}\) BG Bent Sohnemann (8-10 July 2009), interview with author (notes and recordings).
U.N. use, so known as Whitehawks) were withdrawn from UNPREDEP by the U.S. in 1997, to be green-hatted (redone in U.S. military colors and retained by the U.S. military) for use in NATO missions in the region. This exacerbated transport alternatives.29

In another instance, described by BG Sohnemann, he requested ten snow-mobiles in order to get to several crucial OPs via literal “goat and sheep paths”. They were not accessible on foot or by other means during later Autumn, Winter and early Spring, but were key to observations of critical security and passage points. HQ denied the request; they argued that UNPREDEP already had “snow-cats”, huge tracked trucks that never fit on many rural roads, and certainly not a goat path. This forced him to order the use of far more costly helicopters, when available, for access to these OPs and for troop safety.30

Was this mission truly under-funded since it was successful? The best answers to that question came from several of the Brigadier Generals and others: it was successful despite under-funding, mainly because of exceptional and creative efforts on the part of leadership, troops and the generosity of resources other than the UN. Troops and officers devised ingenious ways to address resource needs wherever and whenever they could. Further, one could ask if it could not have even more successful with appropriate funding, especially in outreach and “good offices”/human dimension efforts and results.

Indeed, another answer was directed at the “good offices” work of the SRSG: there was no budget line for his outreach efforts, and a great deal of time was expended by many parties to obtain the needed resources. Time has monetary value, too, as a Major

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29 UNARMS 1996 Files, Box 2 (1999/0116 accession date), memo to field commanders and Sokalski, April 1996 (not further dated; no identification of author).

30 BG Bent Sohnemann (8-10 July 2009), interviews with author (notes and recordings).
correctly noted. Military leaders were incredulous that no funding for outreach and state-
building efforts were included in the budget when those roles were clearly indicated in
the mandate for the SRSG.31

Overall, generalized “success” is not necessarily the correct measure when
assessing appropriate funding, one BG added, especially when success was achieved “in
spite of.” If one or two variables had changed (such as more limited creativity, less-
experienced leadership, or less generous donors), this may well have resulted in an
unsuccessful or less successful mission. Which direction a causal arrow points is a matter
of some debate.32 Since the mission raised about $8 million in funding and in-kind
donations, particularly for state-building and human dimension endeavors, that would
probably be a logical starting point when discussing how much more funding was needed
for UNPREDEP to more thoroughly address its mandate and for other purposes such as
additional training of U.S. troops, necessary travel, public relations, conferences and the
like.33

Do other UN missions find themselves short on funds? Yes, but not to this extent,
and not in areas that were vital parts of the mandate, such as maintenance and good
offices work, especially the human dimension, according to knowledgeable sources.

31 Major Per Iko, interview with author on 26 June 2009 at Swedish National Defense Academy (notes);
others who asked for anonymity on this topic.

32 BG Ove J. Strömberg, 04 July 2009, interview with author on 04 July 2009, Oslo, Norway (notes,
recordings and documents from BG Strömberg).

33 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 147-203.
Demarcation of Borders: UNPREDEP’s Never-Ending Challenge

The borders situation at the end of the mission was nearly the same as when it started, with a few small exceptions (about 20% total remained in doubt): not entirely demarcated between Macedonia and Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia or Macedonia and Albania. Despite UNPREDEP’s military leadership and others addressing border identification for patrol purposes near-constantly with leaders in Macedonia and in surrounding states, there were no lasting, firm conclusions. Establishing temporary agreements was sometimes more fruitful, but none were respected for very long if at all by the states, their militaries or national police forces. In April of 1997, Serbian military officials were still insisting they would patrol “cadastral” borders (meaning administrative borders previously mapped when Macedonia was a constituent Republic of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia). 34

Without agreed-upon borders, multiple challenges arose for UNPREDEP patrols that included unexpected confrontations with militaries and militias from surrounding states and ongoing arguments among various parties about where the lines could, would, or should be. Some off these incidents came perilously close to violent exchanges, such as the one on the Macedonian-Albanian border in late May of 1997, when UNPREDEP troops could not visit two villages, Susevo and Petrovici. Armed Macedonian soldiers maneuvered in and around OP-F12 (a Finnish OP), “placing the OP in the direct line of fire between Army of the Republic of Macedonia [ARM] soldiers and the Albanians who

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were shooting at the ARM soldiers, further highlighted the need for our engineers to accomplish force-protection activities.”

Most of the border issues were predicated on several factors: first, no state willingly abdicates territory; second, borders in nearly all the Balkans had business and cultural impacts (including, for example, traditional grazing lands, or access to towns near border but potentially on the opposite side of it) and historically had been somewhat fluid or blurred; third, unforgiving terrain dominated much of the area not demarcated, making surveying and related undertakings extremely difficult if not impossible; fourth, physical changes were always possible (rock-slides, severe erosion and the like) which would impact border identification; fifth, any border markers were considered labile by at least one party to discussions; sixth, Serbia was generally uncompromising in patrol-line setting attempts, and seventh, Kosovo was highly unstable during most of the border-setting efforts.

Furthermore, UNPREDEP sought an agreeable patrol line, not to set political borders permanently, which some parties did not appear to fully comprehend. Serbia, for example, demanded that the line be the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslav administrative border (cadastral border) for the then-constituent Macedonia. Serbia became more insistent on this and more aggressive on border issues as time passed.

Add to this some intense disagreements over what maps would be acceptable to all parties (Serbian ones? Macedonian? Albanian? Some other publishing source like the

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UN?), along with the overall lack of maps at the appropriate scale, despite multiple requests from the field to UN Liaison Offices in Zagreb and Sarajevo and to UN HQ in NY City—and UNPREDEP’s border delineation challenges multiplied. It was noted that at least 20,000 to 25,000 copies of whatever maps were used would be required: locating and purchasing so many copies, or having copies made and laminated in Zagreb, Croatia, would be cost-prohibitive and very slow.  

Because of the lack of consensus on the patrol lines and borders, incursions cross-borders became more marked in March of 1997 and thereafter, Sokalski and BG Bo Wranker informed the UN HQ that the FRY increased border-area patrols

…coinciding with the exchange of FRY’s and FYROM’s cartographic positions on the border line  

… It should not be excluded that the patrol pattern is politicalized [sic] and that FRY is using the patrols to put pressure on FYROM in connection with their border negotiations. …when FYROM’s internal situation threatens the stability of the country, any external pressure could prove dangerous. Today, for the first time in many months, we have seen a FYROM patrol cross the UNPL [UN Patrol Line] to the north…in the same area where several FRY patrols have crossed the line during recent weeks. …An increase in…FRY patrols crossing the UNPL is expected later in [S]pring; an increase has already been seen, and the high frequency is expected to go on.” UNPREDEP’s military and political leadership concluded that there was “a significant change in the FRY activity near the future border line”...


37 In this particular UN document, the Republic of Macedonia is referred to by its UN-developed name, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or FYROM. FRY is the acronym for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, established in 1992, and lasting until 2003 as a union, until Montenegro declared its independence in the latter year.

38 UNARMS UNPREDEP File No. 17, Box 4, outgoing code cable no. UNPREDEP 204/207 (parts 1 and 2), dated 12/13 March 1997 to Major General F. Van Kappen, UN HQ, from H. Sokalski and BG B. Wranker, accessed on 15 November 2010.
In early 1994, during UNPROFOR/M, the cadastral border already had proved problematic, since it might or might not have become the final “international” border, and it too suffered many of the drawbacks associated with setting a patrol line. To address this, a military administrative boundary (the Northern Limitation of the Area of Operation, or NLAOO) was negotiated and accepted by both FYROM and FRY military authorities. After several months, UNPROFOR/M (and later, UNPREDEP) found the NLAOO unmanageable due to difficulty consistently and accurately locating it on maps, the harsh terrain, and patrolling impediments.

A revision to that line was undertaken, using more permanent and more easily recognizable physical features of the area; it was then drawn on a 1:50,000 Serbian map. All parties (the UN, UNPREDEP, FRY and Macedonia) were provided copies, and on 08 December 1995, BG Juha Engstrom as Field Commander of UNPREDEP, formalized the revised UN line by signing a cover letter to the FRY Ministry of Defense and FYROM’s General Staff.

When BG Juha Engstrom handed a copy of the map and cover letter to Lieutenant General Blagoje Kovacevic (Deputy Chief of Staff for FRY General Staff), Engstrom stated, “A UN line is very important to answer practical questions — to ensure our patrols are on the right side and to avoid incidents. …let me emphasize this is not to delineate a new official border, but a UN-line for practical purposes.” Kovacevic responded, “Your mission is one of peace. … I hope…we can immediately meet again. I expect no problems.”

In late January of 1997, the two verbally agreed in person to the new line, Kovacevic on behalf of the FRY and Engstrom for the UN. Engstrom then presented the
UN-line, drawn on another map, to FYROM military authorities, with written descriptions attached; FYROM also verbally agreed to it. Engstrom then signed an order that the UN-line would be effective 15 March 1995. Two months after that, the UN-line was renamed the UN Patrol Line (UNPL).\textsuperscript{39}

All went relatively well, with a decreased number of incursions cross-line from the entities who had agreed to the UNPL, until late Winter and early Spring of 1997. The UNPREDEP Force Commander reported he informed FRY interlocutors “as to the impropriety of disregarding the UNPL - especially the past 2 months. The response was evasive… there was no unified position on the FRY side and the military represents a harder line than the civilian counterparts.”\textsuperscript{40}

In late March 1997, FRY Lieutenant Colonel Lukic informed UNPREDEP’s Eastern Sector Battalion Commander, U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Niedringhaus, that the UNPL was rescinded and there was to be no UN presence in the FRY. There were further incidents on 29 March 1997 that involved U.S. and FRY troops in a 30-minute stand-off at OP-U51B. Thereafter, the FRY accused UNPREDEP of eight more violations (five on land; three airspace), and then insisted the FRY had never recognized the UNPL. FRY representatives seemed especially disconcerted by UNPREDEP members entering a

\textsuperscript{39} UNARMS UNPREDEP File No. 17, Box 4, (SRSG’s Office File) 01/01/97 – 31 Dec 1997), outgoing code cable No. 207 (4 pages total); accessed on 15 November 2010, NY City.

\textsuperscript{40} UNARMS UNPREDEP File No. 17, Box 4 (SRSG’s Office File 01/01/97 – 31 Dec 1997), outgoing code cable No. 213 from H. Sokalski to Bernard Miyet (2 pages total with attachment of letter from the Office of the Force Commander, Bo Wranker, regarding unarmed UN Military Observers stopped and harassed by an armed FRY patrol); accessed on 15 November 2010, NY City.
number of villages. They insisted that the FRY and FYROM would decide the border (note the UN or UNPREDEP were omitted).

On 11 April 1997, Sokalski reported incursions south of the UNPL to UN HQ, stating incisively, “These are not sporadic incidents any more.” He requested a demarche at HQ through the Permanent Representative, adding that “the matter may soon be brought to…the Security Council.”*41* The demarche was then issued.

In examining official UN maps offered by BG Bent Sohnemann and those in Military Liaison Officers’ (MILO) tubes at UNARMS, it was immediately apparent how crucial and difficult border determinations were.*42* Much of the terrain was generally unfriendly to mechanized ground or on-foot patrolling, a vital element of UNPREDEP’s work, and key to the set-up of OPs and OPTs with clear lines of sight for observation and reporting. Utilizing natural markers seemed most practical: rocks, trees, creeks/streams and ridges, along with goat, sheep and horse tracks.*43* BG Sohnemann applied an eminently workable, creative “field” solution: painting boulders and other markers white.

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*41* UNARMS UNPREDEP File No. 17, Box 4 (SRSG’s Office File 01/01/97 – 31 Dec 1997), outgoing code cable No. 207 from H. Sokalski to Bernard Miyet at UN HQ (4 pages total); accessed on 15 November 2010, NY City.

*42* UNARMS UNPREDEP MILO (Military Liaison Office) Maps Tube, File 65 (undated, assessed as 1997); examined on 16 November 2010, NY City. BG B. Sohnemann (8-10 July 2009), interview with detailed maps (notes, photographs and recordings).

*43* BG J. Engstrom (17 June 2009), BG B. Wranker (24 June 2009), Col. Kalle Liesinen (12-14 June 2009), interviews with author (notes and recordings); UNARMS, 16 November 2009, Maps in Military Liaison Office tube, File 65 (1997), Maps at scale 1:50,000 from UN Series 1005/Sheet 683-1, Sheet 730-1 and 2, Sheets 682-1 through 4, Sheets 681-1 through 4, Sheet 680-4 with OPs marked (Finnish, U.S., Norwegian, Swedish); un laminated/undated map setting UN Patrol line and marking former administrative lines with comments on OPs, patrol lines, villages, etc.; un laminated 1948 map of area from General Manesieski of Macedonia to Field Commanders.
along the UNPL. Of course, boulders could be moved but they rarely were, although
nonetheless much too often ignored by other militaries, paramilitaries, and militias.44

Still, according to OSCE and other reports, internal and external, there were
“clear signs of the Federal Republic [FRY] seeking to assert its claims by proxy of the
UN, through the Yugoslav military pressurising UN patrols on or near the border, and
especially those of the battalion of the United States.”45 Another communication
indicated quite the opposite, from Julian Harston at the UN Liaison Office in Belgrade to
Sokalski, quoting Colonel Dragan Vuksic, Head of Department for Cooperation with
International Organizations and Foreign Ministry Representatives of the FRY Army
(abbreviated from the Serbian alphabet as the VJ) General Staff:

…relations with UNPREDEP are affected by wider decisions by the U.S. to
increase pressure on Yugoslavia…the dispatch of UN soldiers to Macedonia was
based on the assumption that the FRY was the potential aggressor. …relations
with UNPREDEP would never be on an equal footing. UNPREDEP was – as a
preventive deployment – not neutral in the way that UN forces are normally
neutral. It was in Macedonia to give support to Skopje and as a force multiplier to
the woefully inadequate Macedonian armed forces. (In this context, Vuksic noted
he could not recall a single recent “incident” involving the VJ and Macedonian
forces.)46

44 BG B. Sohnemann, interview with author on 5-7 July 2010 and 08-10 July 2009 (notes and recordings);
UNARMS UNPREDEP File No. 17, Box 4 (SRSG’s Office File 01/01/97 – 31 Dec 1997), Incoming
message from Julian Harston, UN Liaison Office, Belgrade, to H. Sokalski CBV-083, 14 April 1997
accessed at UNARMS on 16 Nov 2010.

45 OSCE Report March 14-April 17, 1997; accessed at UNARMS on 16 Nov 2010, Box 4, File No. 22. BG
B. Sohnemann (8-10 July 2009), BG J. Engstrom (17 June 2009), BG O.J. Strömberg (04 July 2009),
interviews with author, various locations; Major General Mitre Arsovski (Army of the Republic of
Macedonia) and General Mile Manolev (Macedonian Air Force), interviews with author (notes) in Skopje,

46 UNARMS UNPREDEP File No. 17, Box 4 (SRSG’s Office File 01/01/97 – 31 Dec 1997), Incoming
message from Julian Harston of UN Liaison Office, Belgrade, to H. Sokalski CBV-083, 14 April 1997
accessed at UNARMS on 16 Nov 2010.
Harston further commented, his point 9, on a deeply significant intercultural matter:

Precision in discussion and in interpreting the results of such discussion is not a natural phenomena [sic] here [in the Balkans]. It needs to be forced. We strongly recommend that at a meeting with the Yugoslav [sic] a written understanding is reached over the precise nature of the UN patrol line and its implication, if any, for the deployment of VJ forces in the border area.47

But a written understanding had been reached, it was believed, and for what? A short time later, on 04 June 1997, BG Bent Sohnemann sent a message to FRY Lieutenant General Dragoljub Ojdanic to inform him of multiple incidents between the FRY, UNPREDEP troops, and UN Military Observers (UNMOs), mainly at Orljak Hill. This was the seventh such site confrontation since 17 April 1997, and 04 June was only about three weeks past a 26 May 1997 meeting between military leaders at which it was reconfirmed “we had an agreement.” Ojdanic, unimpressed, indicated in his response that he “really does agree with the core principles of the “gentlemen’s agreement.””48

Harston’s response to Sokalski to the latter was sent in 26 June 1997.

The FRY military…believe that the understandings between them and UNPREDEP were reached by negotiation and discussion between the military – no formal “political agreement” was ever made and, of course, there is no Security Council mandate which allows UNPREDEP to operate inside the FRY…the FRY military [say] that any problems would be sorted out by the military at as low a level as possible…The repeated raising of this issue by the US ambassador here, and in very blunt terms by his military attaché and…references to it by Mrs. [Madeline] Albright to President [Slobodan] Milosevic…have left the military in a resentful and perplexed mood (emphases added).49

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Finally, it is true that UNPREDEP members had multiple unplanned and unanticipated encounters with other states’ military, paramilitary, and militia members. These were usually not fruitful because such incidents were often generated by those who, accidentally or otherwise, crossed the UNPL or threatened UNPREDEP’s OPs or OPTs and their personnel in some obvious manner (shots fired, aggressive behavior, refusal to respond to questions, irregular forces rather than regular military, as examples.)\(^{50}\)

Abduction and extortion attempts against UNPREDEP members, especially versus the U.S. component of the mission and the unarmed UN military observers, mainly by Serbian forces while on Macedonian soil, were well-known, and both U.S. President Clinton and the U.S. Congress were aware of such attempts (which were occasionally minimally successful, although rarely were individuals held any significant length of time).\(^{51}\)

\(^{50}\) BG B. Sohnemann (07 July 2010), BG Bo Wranker (24 June 2009), BG J. Engstrom (17 June 2009), Major Per Iko (25 June 2009), BG O. Strömberg (04 July 2009), and Col. Kalle Liesinen (12-14 June 2009), interviews with author, notes, photographs, and recordings; UNARMS UNPREDEP Files (accessed 15 Nov 2010) Box 4 (SRSG’s Office Files), File #17, outgoing code cable to MG Franklin Van Kappen and Bernard Miyet, UN HQ (UNPREDEP Cable No. 207, 4 pages total) from BG B. Wranker and U.S. Chief of Staff Colonel Charles Seland on Patrol Line, point 12, and Part 2, points 1 and 2. Cf. also UNPREDEP Cable 212 from Sokalski and BG B. Wranker to B. Miyet (UN HQ), 09 April 1997, Summary and point 10; UNPREDEP cable 213 from Sokalski again to B. Miyet at UN HQ, dated 11 April 1997, all points and attached “Protest” from BG B. Wranker regarding an incident involving unarmed UN Military Observers. A further cable on 04 June 1997 from BG Bent Sohnemann to LtGen Dragoljub Ojdanic, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, FRY, regarding continuing “incursions” beyond the UNPL includes that reports will be made should these “repetitive” allegations continue from FRY soldiers, particularly as on 26 May 1997, the UNPL agreement was “reconfirmed,” a brief nine days prior.

In an outbound cable on 30 June 1997, Sokalski and BG Bent Sohnemann describe many of these incidents as situations where “we do seem to be entangled in a Balkan syndrome of credibility and responsibility for the spoken word. Yet, we can also clearly see that there is a difference of interpretation and assessment not only between UNPREDEP and FRY, but also between you and us (emphasis added).” Sokalski and Sohnemann summarized the troop security situation as follows:

Our paramount consideration is the safety and security of our troops. We can ill-afford FRY snipers overseeing our patrols from hill tops, “orders” to UN patrolling teams to leave border areas, or undisciplined troops of dubious morality demanding money from our UN troops and searching their vehicle. Unfortunately, all of these actions have occurred in a number of incidents since end-March of this year... It is clear to us that FRY’s change of mind on UNPL has been directly linked to the process of negotiations on the demarcation of the border.52

Peacekeeping Force Experience Varied:

98% of Finns versus “0%” of U.S. Troops

According to statistics from BG Gunnar Isberg of Sweden, 40% of Swedes had previous UN mission experience, as did 60% of Norwegians and Danes, and 98% of Finns. But US troops had “next to none or none”.53 These differences created significant inequalities in knowledge: 98% of Finns with previous peacekeeping experience and 100% of U.S. military without it illustrates this gap. The peacekeeping experience


53 BG G. Isberg (23 June 2009), interview with author in Stockholm, Sweden (notes).
shortfall of the U.S. troops gave rise to additional training requirements and for revisions to planned company locations and duties.\textsuperscript{54}

The U.S. experience deficit placed greater encumbrances on the Nordics as they covered areas the U.S. could not (legally, or due to command or experience constraints). Therefore, the Nordic Battalion bore additional patrolling burdens, along with coverage of OPs not contiguous to others they manned. Morale of U.S. and Nordic troops was not strengthened by any of these circumstances, and military leadership had to exert extra efforts to improve it.\textsuperscript{55} The restrictions on the US troops were especially galling to those soldiers. One American soldier told his Chief of Staff and the BG, “I’m a proud member of one of the finest militaries in the world – and I can’t even do my job to its fullest.”\textsuperscript{56} This was an often-expressed frustration for the American military in UNPREDEP. The Brigadier Generals all discussed various approaches they took to this U.S. troop issue, including ensuring the U.S. troops had constant interactions with more-experienced peacekeepers, and with OP and OPT area peoples and communities.


\textsuperscript{56} BG O.J. Strömberg (04 July 2009) and Col. Kalle Liesinen (12-14 June 2009), interviews with author (notes, photographs, and recordings).
Communications and Feedback: An Ongoing Challenge

Between Field and HQ Organizations

Within Macedonia, there were fairly open channels of communication between the field and the Mission HQ in Skopje, and vice versa. Frequent meetings between military and political leadership and those in Skopje HQ helped support these. Communications with the Macedonian government were also as open as could reasonably be expected between all entities.57

There were also supposed to be conduits, as described, through which to communicate with UN HQ and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). However, based on available records, it seems few visitors to the field from the UN HQ or from DPKO spent any meaningful amount of time with the field organization to gain more comprehensive knowledge of UNPREDEP, its implementation, challenges it faced (including topography, encounters with other militaries and militias, smuggling, finances, and so on), what its ongoing needs were, and what day-to-day operations were like – in other words, to learn directly from the boots on the ground by putting their own there.

Kofi Annan, for example, visited UNPREDEP 10-11 January 1996 as Under-Secretary-General and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for a total of 1.5 days (arriving 10 a.m. on 10 January 1996 and departing 11 January 1996 at 3 p.m.), spending nearly all that time in press conferences and meetings with the Macedonian Government.58 He released a single press statement that included UNPREDEP: “As for

58 UNARMS UNPREDEP FILE S-1822/Box20/File 7 (1999/0116), accessed on 17 May 2011.
UNPREDEP, I am proud of those in the military and civilian ranks of the mission. UNPREDEP has been a success for the United Nations. Our mission here demonstrates that preventative diplomacy can flourish where there is a sound mandate, a clear purpose, and above all, goodwill."^59

Mr. Behrooz Sadry, UN HQ Assistant Secretary-General, visited for about two days in late March, 1996, in his role as Assistant Secretary-General for Management and Coordination in the United Nations Peace Forces in the former Yugoslavia, a position to which he was appointed in August 1995.^60

Bernard Miyet, newly appointed Under-Secretary-General of UN Peacekeeping Operations, was in Macedonia to visit UNPREDEP 06-07 May 1997; he met for lengthy periods with Macedonia’s President Kiro Gligorov (recovering from an assassination attempt) and Gligorov’s Minister of Defense, Blagoy Handziski. Miyet seems, judging from his written report, to have gained some understanding of the UNPREDEP mission and its importance (if not its realities), even if more from the Macedonian Government’s side than directly from the field organization and its members.^61

This is not to claim that UNPREDEP was ignored at UN HQ, by other military leaders (several U.S. Generals and Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Department of Defense checked out UNPREDEP personally), by kings, by American and other politicians, nor

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by those in the diplomatic corps, all of whom visited for varying lengths of time. Nor is it intended to suggest that that more visits from UN HQ, UN Field Offices, or DPKO were possible, plausible, or perhaps even desirable. Some visits distracted from the mission itself or claimed assets UNPREDEP could have used instead (helicopters chief among them). Others were not from organizations or persons who could or would support UNPREDEP in meaningful and significant ways.

The point here is, as Sokalski and BG B. Sohnemann said in a message to UN Field HQ, Belgrade, at the end of June, 1997, and noted earlier, “…we can also clearly see that there is a difference of interpretation and assessment … between you and us (emphasis added).” This message was directly referring to the UN Patrol Line, but as noted earlier, could easily have applied to many other areas of UNPREDEP in which the communications and feedback loop between HQ and the field broke down or was seriously frayed in one respect or another.

Specific examples of areas where these breakdowns occurred, according to files and interviews, included funding appeals, “good offices” efforts and events, requests for needed field equipment, discussion regarding necessary troop levels and requisite specialized support (such as engineers), frequent UN demands and UNPREDEP field responses regarding troop limits, cutbacks or planning for end of mission (these requests

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started barely a year after UNPREDEP’s formal inception, as a matter of fact, with messages from UN HQ’s Iset Kittani to Sokalski on 16 February 1996 and prior.\footnote{UNARMS UNPREDEP Accession 1999/0116, Box 2, “Reduction of the Military Component 01 January through 31 December 1996”, Cable Z-256 (Sokalski to Kittani) and various responses to it through 02 April 1996 (UNPREDEP at approximately 14 months of existence), accessed 08 November 2010. BG B. Wranker (24 June 2009), BG B. Sohnemann (08-10 July 2009), Maj. Per Iko (26 June 2009), MG Paavo Kiljunen (16 June 2009), and Col. Kalle Liesinen (12-14 June 2009), interviews with author (notes and recordings).}

It may fairly be said that communications between the field and HQ appeared to be too often needlessly difficult and negative. It seems the necessary complete feedback loop was frayed and sometimes broken (as in the case of access road repairs, described above, for example). At minimum, it too was in need of repair.

Communications Between Other International Organizations and UNPREDEP

The OSCE and UNPREDEP seem, from all apparent evidence and interview responses, to be the two organizations that communicated most strongly and consistently across the board, especially on-site.\footnote{UNARMS UNPREDEP Accession S-1822/Box 14/File 7 (1999/0116), “OSCE Reports 12/17/96 – 12/18/97 Spillover Mission to Skopje”, Monthly OSCE Reports (formerly File #22). Accessed on 16 May 2011.} Sokalski and UNPREDEP HQ and field staff met regularly, sometimes as often as weekly, with their counterparts in the OSCE. Further, written monthly OSCE reports were filled with information on critical topics, including:

a) border demarcation progress;
b) disputes at the various universities;
c) inter-ethnic relations, especially those addressed under the auspices of Maximilianus “Max” van der Stoel, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, such as “Building Harmonious Inter Ethnic Relations” in December of 1996;

d) important political and military visitors to Macedonia; regional military relations/visitors

e) announcements about UNPREDEP, especially potential troop reductions;

f) the Tetovo University crisis and ensuing events; the “TAT Affair” (a massive, collapsed pyramid scheme in Albania that also affected Macedonia profoundly, politically, socially and economically); the “flag” issue regarding the Albanian flag display in majority ethnic Albanian regions (July 1997); 65

g) the Greek unilateral embargo against Macedonia until its end on 15 October 1995; and name talks between Greece and Macedonia (most of which were “swiftly deferred”, although an Interim Accord was approved by the Macedonian Parliament, Sobranie, in October 1995 that ended the Greek embargo); extensive border delays when exiting Macedonia into Greece (reported to be 10-20 hours long at Gevgelia and Evzoni);

h) the Royaumont Initiative; 66


66 "The Royaumont Initiative emerged as an outcome of the Stability Pact of Europe (March 1995) and the Peace Process as embodied in the Dayton Agreement. The appointment of a Process Co-ordinator for the Royaumont Initiative by the Council of Ministers of the European Union is an expression of the European Union’s intention to reassert its presence in the region by giving a new momentum to the projects of stability, neighbourliness, conflict alleviation, and peace. It is also the EU’s recognition of the importance of citizen groups and civil associations to act in promoting democratisation and conflict resolution."
i) border patrol reports on smuggling and other incidents;

j) NATO exercises in the region;

k) Sobranie boycotts by ethnic Albanian political parties; changes to and mergers of Albanian parties in opposition or unification with the Macedonian government;
ejections from the Sobranie (Arben Xhaferi, who had boycotted it for over two years in political protest);

l) Bilateral relations reports on Macedonia and Albania in particular (“complicated and tense” in July 1997);

m) Macedonia’s membership in OSCE as of 13 October 1995; Macedonian government attitudes toward international organizations, especially those concerned about inter-ethnic relations;

n) Political party reports for Macedonian and Albanian ethnicities; Macedonian government reports; trade union issues, especially the police trade union;

o) When appropriate, refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) reports, especially for Kosovo, and for Montenegro as a refugee-recipient nation (Summer 1998 particularly).

In October of 1997, in a letter to the United Nations regarding involvement of various UN entities in Macedonia, Sokalski indicated that the following had been

The Royaumont Process constitutes an innovative, comprehensive approach to conflict alleviation in a twofold way. First, it encourages democratisation by promoting a dialogue amongst citizens and the modernisation of civic structures. Second, it fosters and extends new communication channels among different groups across national boundaries, creating co-operation networks among non-governmental organisations. It thus substantially supplements the existing instruments of preventive diplomacy and conflict alleviation.” Excerpted from “The Royaumont Process: An Initiative for Stability and Good Neighbourliness in South-Eastern Europe” by Dr. Panagiotis Roumeliotis, Co-Coordinator of the Royaumont Initiative, accessed on 16 September 2010 at http://www.hri.org/MFA/thesis/autumn98/royaumont.html. Recent information on it was not available.
engaged in “development-oriented interventions” for some time in concert with “the peace-building component of the operation as an important value-added factor of preventive deployment,” along with EU and other organizations’ activities there. Some had ended their efforts in the country; others were ongoing. These entities included the World Food Programme; the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN; Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (coordinated with EU-Phare and EUROCUSTOMS, and later with Interpol; the UN Economic Commission for Europe, especially its subsidiary mission, the South East European Initiative (SECI); the UN’s Industrial Development Organization and the International Labor Office (ILO) for Central and Eastern European Team (CEET) headquartered in Budapest, Hungary.

The World Health Organization began efforts in Macedonia, but “had to divert assets to northern war-torn republics”; in contrast, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) worked quite closely with UNPREDEP and was consistently active in Macedonia in education, with the Ministry of Arts and Sciences regarding national development strategies, in training on social services and in other projects “initiated by UNPREDEP with UNDP’s financial support.”

The World Bank (to 23 October 1997) loaned Macedonia $300 million in a variety of loans for different purposes, while the IMF engaged in macroeconomic stability efforts, and in an “extensive program of technical assistance,” aimed at “fiscal

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67 UNARMS UNPREDEP Files Accession S-1999/0116, Box 5/File 4, letter of 16 October 1997 from H. Sokalski to the UN HQ NY.
policy administration, tax and expenditure reform, banking supervision, monetary policy reform and compilation of macroeconomic statistics,” mostly through its resident mission in 1995.68

UN’s DESA (Department of Economic and Social Affairs) was involved in development strategy for Macedonia from 1995-1997, and addressed social change in a project entitled, “Action for Social Change: A New Facet for Preventive Peace-Keeping: the Case of UNPREDEP,” completed in Finland in 1996.69 Sokalski had responded to inquiries from UN DESA’s Nitin Desai regarding that study with a statement:

…it in the absence of a resident representative of the UNDP or a humanitarian coordinator in the host country, we at UNPREDEP have tried to advance the peace-building component of the operation as an important value-added factor of preventive peace-keeping. Consequently, based exclusively on extra-budgetary resources from several governments and international organizations [emphasis added], we have managed to pursue a number of developmental projects, which has resulted in an impressive flow of external experience to the host Republic, based on universally recognized practice and standards on social integration and national capacity- and institution-building. (Emphasis added).70

Even the Universal Postal Union’s International Bureau consulted on Macedonian postal law, and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) engaged in a customs modernization project that consumed two years (1996 and 1997) regarding

68 UNARMS UNPREDEP Files Accession S-1999/0116, Box 5/File 4, letter of 16 October 1997 from H. Sokalski to the UN HQ NY.


70 UNARMS UNPREDEP Files Accession S-1999/0116, Box 5/File 4, letter of 07 October 1997 from H. Sokalski to Nitin Desai of DESA at the UN, NY.
installation of an Automated System for Customs Data (known by its acronym ASYCUDA).\textsuperscript{71}

Without the involvement of and communications between these entities and at least the political office of UNPREDEP (Mr. Sokalski and his staff), there is no question the mandate would have been even more difficult and more expensive for UNPREDEP to successfully fulfill.

NGOs were similarly involved in Macedonia, as has been described earlier. Some were local, some international. The International Red Cross/Red Crescent, EuroBalkan, Soros/Open Society, Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières, Catholic Relief Services, and a multitude of smaller ethnically-focused socio-political organizations, including those for Roma, Albanian-Macedonians and others, maintained quite consistent service to their constituencies.\textsuperscript{72} Often, UNPREDEP was able to offer neutral and impartial services or support to these NGOs (such as soldiers and officers donating at blood drives).

What the above indicates is the critical importance of IGOs and NGOs to UNPREDEP’s success, and that communications between all entities were of similar value in achieving mutually agreed upon endeavors and goals.

\textsuperscript{71} UNARMS UNPREDEP Files Accession S-1999/0116, Box 5/File 4, letter of 16 October 1997 from H. Sokalski to the UN HQ NY.

\textsuperscript{72} Vladimir Milcin, Soros Foundation/Open Society (22 June 2006, Skopje, Macedonia), Zlatko Oncevski, former Military Charge d’Affaires, Macedonian Embassy, Washington D.C. (29 June 2006, Skopje, Macedonia), Dimitar Mircev, retired University Professor and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Macedonia (19 May 2006, Skopje, Macedonia), Stavre Dzikov, former National Public Prosecutor of Macedonia (30 May and 04 June 2006, Skopje and Krusevo, Macedonia), Jadranka Kostova (20 May 2006, Skopje, Macedonia), Dr. Zhidas Daskalovski (22 May 2006, Skopje, Macedonia), Drs. Abdylmenaf Bexheti and Veton Latifi (01 June 2006, Tetovo, Macedonia), Mr. Ivica Bocevski, Chief of Cabinet to the Deputy Prime Minister of Macedonia (06 June 2006), interviews with author (notes and recordings)
The Mandates (UNPROFOR/M and UNPREDEP):

Impediments or Encouragement?

The United Nations offers key information regarding the mandates of both UNPROFOR/M and UNPREDEP:

Established on 31 March 1995 by Security Council resolution 983 (1995) to replace UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, UNPREDEP’s mandate remained essentially the same:

- to monitor and report any developments in the border areas which could undermine confidence and stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and threaten its territory.

Within the general framework of its mandate, UNPREDEP has:

- served as an additional element of support for the international community's efforts to promote a peaceful resolution of the overall situation in the former Yugoslavia;
- been a valuable early-warning source for the Security Council;
- helped to strengthen mutual dialogue among political parties and assisted in monitoring human rights as well as inter-ethnic relations, both at the national level and in areas populated by ethnic minorities;
- successfully mediated several tense border encounters and negotiated a military administrative patrol line between the two parties that determined the northern limit of the area of operation for its troops;
- established mutually beneficial contacts with the military authorities of Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and at the highest political level of Albania;
- evolved into a fully-fledged preventive operation along the lines spelled out in the Secretary-General's Agenda for Peace and the Supplement thereto; and
- developed a strong three-pronged approach to the implementation of its mandate, covering political action and good offices, troop deployment, and the human dimension.

Effective 1 February 1996, following the termination of the mandates of UNCRO, UNPROFOR and UNPF-HQ, UNPREDEP became an independent mission, reporting directly to United Nations Headquarters in NY. Despite its new status, the operation has maintained basically the same mandate, strength and composition of troops. By adopting resolution 1082 (1996) on 26 November 1996, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNPREDEP for a six-month period through 31 May 1997 and decided on a reduction of its military component by 300 all ranks by 30 April 1997.
The mandate of UNPREDEP to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia requires it to concern itself with numerous aspects of the country's internal and external situation. Its tasks include preventive deployment, good offices, measures to build confidence, early warning, fact-finding, monitoring and reporting, as well as selected social and development projects.\footnote{From “UNPREDEP Mandate”, in “UNPREDEP Mission Background” (n.p.), last updated 16 March 1999, at “http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unpred_b.htm#MANDATE.”}

However, military leadership of both UNPROFOR/M and UNPREDEP felt unanimously that the two field organizations were rendered less effective than they plausibly would have been because of the restrictive mandates’ terms as noted above: essentially observe and report but no more (hands-off, in other words), and by personnel drawdowns during UNPREDEP (impacting mandated preventive observation and reporting). Nothing and no one could be intercepted, stopped, touched, examined, or otherwise confirmed or disconfirmed at the operation’s various Observation Posts (OPs) and Temporary Observation Posts (OPTs) along the borders between Macedonia/Serbia, Macedonia/Kosovo, and Macedonia/Albania.

The clear majority of leaders, both political and military, along with the troops, understood and admitted that there was, at the very least, small-arms, ammunition, and cigarette smuggling going on cross-borders. Yet some would state for the record only that they could “neither confirm nor deny” those incidents or others. Nevertheless, every general and other military leader interviewed directly stated or implied exactly those assessments, along with clear reasons they believed their concerns and beliefs were well-founded. This led some to question just how effective “prevention” was supposed to be enforced.
“Non-engagement/observe/report” proscriptions became even more detrimental as pressures on Macedonia’s northern border with Kosovo over that territory’s relationship with Serbia increased markedly over the final year of the mission (February 1998-February 1999). There were definite signs of growing instability between Kosovo and Macedonia, largely due to concerns about potential refugees of Kosovar-Albanian ethnicity entering Macedonia in case of an actual Kosovo-Serbia violent conflict. In the Macedonian government, there was simultaneously an obvious awareness that radicalized Albanians and/or Kosovars within Macedonia (perhaps even Serbs) might begin some kind of conflict with ethnic Macedonians over minority rights or related contentious, unresolved minority issues.

Furthermore, this mandate restriction (do not engage/only observe and report) was not well-aligned with the Macedonian government’s attitudes during UNPREDEP. That government clearly signaled that it wanted the UN troops to, “Stop trouble at the border, and close the border if necessary” (emphasis added). The government was focused on crisis management: do not let the crisis materialize or, if it somehow did, then respond forcefully and forcibly, as the Macedonian Government did regarding the Albanian-language “underground” Tetovo University situation in 1995 (it was not State-approved).

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74 Ripiloski, *Conflict in Macedonia*, 78; Ackermann, *Making Peace Prevail*.

75 360,000 Kosovar and other refugees eventually did flow into Macedonia beginning in 2001.

76 BG Ove Johnny Strömberg, Oslo, Norway on 04 July 2009, Col. Kalle Liesinen, former Nordic Battalion Chief of Staff UNPREDEP, at Kuovola, Finland on 12-14 June 2009, interviews with author (notes, recordings, photographs, photocopies).

77 Interview with BG Finn Særmark-Thomsen (UNPROFOR/M) of Denmark on 06 July 2009, Svanemøllen Barracks in Copenhagen, Denmark; statement from Notes taken at time of interview and from recordings.
to Albanian flag-flying incidents at municipal buildings in Tetovo and Gostivar in 1997, and other similar incidents.\textsuperscript{78}

Macedonian government officials were especially sensitive to any reporting done by UNPREDEP or UN associates in Macedonia (to the UN Security Council or others at HQ) that they felt was the least bit negative about internal domestic matters in the country, specifically inter-ethnic relations or human rights disputes, and other “growing pains” for the new democracy.\textsuperscript{79} They felt this unduly and inappropriately internationalized and unjustifiably publicized purely domestic issues. As mentioned earlier, UNPREDEP’s relations with nearly all government entities were good. Still, Macedonian government officials did not hesitate to let the UNPREDEP SRSG know of their demurrals, especially regarding UNPREDEP reports to the UN.\textsuperscript{80}

Troop reductions per mandates were also objectionable for the most part to the participating countries, to Macedonia, and, as mentioned, to the field organization as a whole. For example, Blagoy Handziski, Macedonian Minister of Defense, frequently argued for an expanded UNPREDEP mandate and a review of current one, given changes in circumstances in and around Macedonia. On 15 August 1995, when UNPREDEP had been in Macedonia for barely seven months, Hanziski said, in an interview with \textit{Vecer}, a Macedonian newspaper:

\begin{quote}
A. Williams, 118-130; and from Interview (telephone) with A. Williams on 06 Oct 2010; Ripiloski, 56-59 and \textit{passim}. Both Tetovo and Gostivar were and are majority Albanian ethnicity towns.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Interview with BG Ove Johnny Strömberg (04 July 2009); interview (telephone) with Abiodun Williams, 06 Oct 2010.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Sokalski, \textit{An Ounce of Prevention}, 112-116; Sokalski, interview with author on 09 July 2010, Warsaw, Poland.
\end{quote}
Viewing all these potential dangers that can cause the war to spill over into the southern part of the Balkans...: Is it not time that UNPREDEP's mandate, composition and number be reviewed? Even though UNPREDEP is successfully executing its preventive mission with the current number and composition, in cooperation of the Macedonian Army, still the question raised is: Shall we wait for the events to escalate on our northern border and then react by involving additional troops, or do we react now, at this very moment preventively and thereby psychologically influence any idea of destabilizing Macedonia?... However, considering the relations within the UN and the misunderstandings that exist between the superpowers, it should not be surprising if one of the powers decides to send a new contingent of troops to Macedonia under its own flag or under the command of NATO. This possibility cannot be ruled out, because the leader of the American Congress, Robert Dole, has said on several occasions that their soldiers should join UN missions under the US flag. On the other hand, depending on the agreement between the Western parties, there is a possibility that NATO forces will be present on our borders.81

BG Bo Lennart Wranker, Field Commander UNPREDEP, was particularly direct in his message to UN HQ of 02 April 1996. He was deeply dismayed by troop drawdowns in the face of ever-growing inter-ethnic tensions, a crumbling economy in Albania, unrest on the border with Kosovo, increased smuggling across all borders, and confrontations with the FRY military. He stated bluntly, “If we reduce our posture, we lose to a large extent the ability to flexibly execute a mandate widely recognized as a model for preventive diplomacy.”82 He also mentioned, in his interview, that he felt this sent an entirely inappropriate message to the Macedonian peoples and the government.

BG Wranker was strongly opposed to troop reductions because of negative impacts, highlighting them as “operationally damaging and politically harmful,


82 UNARMS UNPREDEP File Box 2 from Accession 1999/0116: Outgoing Code Cable (unnumbered) from BG Bo Wranker through Sokalski (who also signed it) to Kofi Annan, then Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at the UN in NY, dated 02 April 1996; accessed 08 November 2010; BG Bo Lennart Wranker on 24 June 2009, interview with author (notes and recording).
particularly in view of the host country’s desire for an undiminished troop presence.” One concern he specified was that the Quick Reaction Force size would be cut in half (from 107 to 56) and would then lack “flexibility and reinforcement capability necessary to meet the diversity of potential emergencies along a 250 KM long patrol line on extraordinarily inhospitable terrain…this degradation of QRF capability [is] most serious…this is militarily essential in crisis situations.”

BG Wranker predicted in this message of early April 1996 that there would be increased smuggling and ever-growing border tensions because of reductions in UNPREDEP patrolling. He further informed the UN HQ that the UNPREDEP compound’s guards would have to be replaced by contract guards under the drawdown as then planned. “The fact that the UN is unable to guard its own HQ must, in a tense situation, be looked upon from a force protection point of view” (troop security). He further stressed that relinquishment to the Macedonian Border Guard of the U.S.-staffed OP-U56, even if sensible due to ongoing access problems, “will send a false message to our hosts… [A] decision to withdraw this OP shall be seen as an act of not being impartial.” All of this describes the fallout BG Wranker anticipated from the drawdown in April of 1996, regardless of Security Council instructions to do so. His concerns were

83 UNARMS UNPREDEP File Box 2 from Accession 1999/0116: Outgoing Code Cable (unnumbered) from BG Bo Wranker through Sokalski (who also signed it) to Kofi Annan, then Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at the UN in NY, dated 02 April 1996; accessed 08 November 2010.

84 UNARMS UNPREDEP File Box 2 from Accession 1999/0116: Outgoing Code Cable (unnumbered) from BG Bo Wranker through Sokalski (who also signed it) to Kofi Annan, then Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at the UN in NY, dated 02 April 1996; accessed 08 November 2010.

85 UNARMS UNPREDEP File Box 2 from Accession 1999/0116: Outgoing Code Cable (unnumbered) from BG Bo Wranker through Sokalski (who also signed it) to Kofi Annan, then Under-Secretary-General
validated as the mission went on, and as later drawdowns compounded those negative effects.

BGs Sohnemann and O.J. Strömberg also held sharply critical views of the harmful impact of troop drawdowns, and noted that the constant planning for mandate non-renewal was deeply troubling and stressful to military leaders, their troops, civilian staff, and Macedonia. It essentially added up to nearly losing three months of every six-month mandate renewal in terms of planning time and effort while waiting to see if the mandate would be reissued for another six months, said Strömberg. During these six-month periods, troops rotated and other changes occurred, such as adding or closing OPs and OPTs, training had to recur, especially for U.S. troops, and had to be accounted for in any plans, adding even more complexity to the processes.86

**Mandated Good Offices Efforts of the SRSG and Troops**

The “good offices” directives in the mandate mitigated some of the more restrictive terms of it. The accomplished Polish diplomat Henryk Sokalski, as UNPREDEP Special Representative of the Secretary-General, was particularly adept at developing relations and projects of high value in a broad swath of communities under such auspices. These surely contributed to better relations between specific locales, communities, and UNPREDEP, but not always between ethnicities, and sometimes not with UN HQ.

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86 BG Bent Sohnemann, 08 July 2009 and 05-07 July 2010, Varde, Denmark, interviews with author (notes, photographs and recordings). BG O.J. Strömberg stressed the same issue (04 July 2009), as did H. Sokalski in interviews by the author with them.
SRSG Sokalski was deeply committed to utilizing his “good offices” functions for the benefit of Macedonia and its “human dimension”, particularly in cases of ethnic issues and more open relations between the two dominant ethnicities, Macedonians and Albanian-Macedonians. Based on 2002 census data, ethnic Macedonians comprise about 64% of the population, and Albanian-Macedonians are in the range of 23% to 28% (the latter remains difficult to state with precision, since a great many ethnic Albanian-Macedonians have refused to participate in Government censuses since 1992.) The remainder of the population is a variety of minorities, each less than 5%: Turks (3.9%), Roma (2.7%), Vlachs, Torbesi/Pomaks/Gorani (ethnically Macedonian Muslims), Greeks and others, as seen in the map below. The total population (July 2014 estimate) is 2.091 million.\textsuperscript{87}

As indicated in the map, specific regions of Macedonia (total area: 9,927.85 square miles, slightly larger than the U.S. state of Vermont) are mainly one ethnic group or another. Albanian-Macedonians predominantly follow Islam (non-denominational Muslims dominate, although some claim adherence to either the Sunni or Bektashi Shi’ite sects). Ethnic Macedonians are nearly all Christians, most affiliated with the State’s Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC). This has certain impacts on “good office” efforts, as cultural and religious distinctions are highly significant in the country.

Getting to know the communities within such ethnic areas was a critical facet of UNPREDEP’s field operations. The more the troops and leaders could learn about a

given village, town or region, the greater investment and engagement by both a given community and the troops in keeping Macedonia secure. Positive relationships between UNPREDEP and the public near the borders were essential to the success of spillover prevention responsibilities. Every Brigadier General (and military and political leaders in Macedonia with whom the author spoke in 2006) stressed that those good relations were invaluable, and some recounted experiences they had while trying to establish those good relations. Often troops would, when they had time off mandate and duty, would volunteer to repair sanitary services, a community center or school “on their own time” with the permission of their military leadership, for example.

Figure 2. Ethnic Population Distribution in Macedonia
American troops ostensibly had a more difficult time forming these community links since they were sometimes perceived by the Macedonian peoples (and, admittedly, frequently appeared to understand themselves) as “U.S. military soldiers first, peacekeepers second.” Some of this was undoubtedly due to their lack of experience in a role where “there was no enemy,” where neutrality and impartiality were the rules of engagement. Sokalski’s good offices and outreach, often with the support of the Field Commanders or other officers, were particularly important in these instances. More than one person, including anonymous informants, mentioned, “Albanian-Macedonians thought the U.S. military personnel favored the ethnic Macedonians; the ethnic Macedonians thought the reverse, mostly because there were many more Albanians in the United States than there were Macedonians.”

One event that successfully linked up diverse groups for three consecutive years was the Blossom Run, a 42 kilometer marathon (26.1 miles) between Tetovo (traditionally ethnically mostly Albanian) and Skopje, in which individuals of various ethnic identities, government and political party affiliations, and UNPREDEP members, including civilian staff and some troops, took part.

Most such outreach efforts, as noted above, were completely unfunded by the UN; therefore, Sokalski and others had to find the money to support professional conferences, socially-oriented events, many meetings, community support and repairs, and the like.

88 Col. Kalle Liesinen, 12-14 June 2009, interview with author (notes, recordings), near Kuovola and in Helsinki, Finland.

89 BGs Sohnemann (July 5-7 2010 and 08-10 July 2009), Engstrom (17 June 2009), and Col. Liesinen (12-14 June 2009); and H. Sokalski (09 July 2010) and A. Williams (06 Oct 2010), interviews with author.
That Sokalski was a highly respected diplomat unquestionably helped open doors for funding. Fortunately, the Scandinavian countries, Italy, Japan, Germany, and on occasion, the UN (via small grants), along with the Macedonian government and others, were supportive of fundraising efforts. UNPREDEP was able to raise about $8 million in cash and in-kind support for notable efforts such as the “Living Together” interethnic rapprochement program, and SOS Children’s Villages. The Macedonian Centre for Ethnic Relations sponsored “Our Future Leaders: Catalysts of Tolerance” and “Rainbow,” which focused on politically active youth. Both were partly funded by Japan.

The involvement and initiatives of various NGOs and IGOs such the International Red Cross and Red Crescent, Open Society Institute of Macedonia/Soros, Catholic Relief Services/Catholic Charities, Search for Common Ground, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the OECD and OSCE, SOS Children’s Villages, and multiple small domestic NGOs, among others, were exceptionally supportive of UNPREDEP’s outreach and “good offices” programs, and toward overall efforts to develop and enhance what Lipset termed cross-cutting cleavages between ethnic groups.

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together to achieve a variety of initiatives on the political and domestic fronts, some of
which were more efficacious than others.\textsuperscript{93}

Indeed, there is evidence that on more than one occasion, UN HQ actively
attempted to \textit{discourage} much of Sokalski’s work as “out of the mandate terms.” Sir
Marrack Goulding at UN HQ’s Department of Political Affairs, and Kofi Annan, then
with the DPKO, engaged in a series of near-confrontational code cables with Sokalski for
about three months beginning 31 May 1996 through the end of August 1996, in which
they invited Sokalski to answer several questions about his “good offices” actions. These
queries occurred during a period of growing tensions within Macedonia; UN HQ
appeared to be concerned that Macedonia’s government might interpret Sokalski’s efforts
under his good offices mandate as focused on unintended and unapproved political
purposes or actions.\textsuperscript{94}

Sokalski agreed to not actively pursue specific initiatives, as he too had noted a
growing trend in Macedonian political thinking that external mediators should have no
part in settling domestic affairs in the country, whether due to inter-ethnic tensions or
not.\textsuperscript{95} Still, as the first U.S. Ambassador to Macedonia, Christopher Hill accurately noted,
Macedonia is “on a very key location, truly a crossroads…UNPREDEP, I think, has

\textsuperscript{93} NATO Parliamentarians Seminar Report, item #21, post-18 through 21 June Seminar held at Ohrid,
Macedonia; UNPREDEP archives File #23, Box 4, accessed by special permission at UNARMS on 16
November 2010.

\textsuperscript{94} UNARMS UNPREDEP File No. 10 (SRSG’s Office File 1996), multiple cables between Annan,
Goulding and Sokalski 31 May 1996 through 12 August 1996 and \textit{passim} (accessed on 10 November
2010). See especially Code Cable to Sokalski from Goulding and Annan, No. 2183, dated 08 August 1996.

\textsuperscript{95} UNARMS UNPREDEP Files, UNPREDEP #056, copied separately to Annan and Goulding, 12 August
1996 and \textit{passim} (accessed on 10 November 2010).
made a historic contribution to the region. It has definitely created stability in the region.” Macedon
ia, he added, “is in a tough neighborhood.”

Sokalski did not, however, back away from efforts he perceived as vital, which he made clear in his correspondence with UN HQ, particularly with Mr. Yasushi Akashi in UN Peace Forces (UNPF) HQ in Zagreb, and with Sir Marrack Goulding and Kofi Annan at UN HQ, NY. In a cable from Mr. Akashi responding to good offices efforts by Mr. Sokalski, Mr. Akashi wrote,

Security Council resolution 908 (1994) request the SRSG to "use his good offices... to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability" in FYROM "in cooperation with the authorities" of the country. However, this mandate does not include issues such as Macedonian-Greek relations, FYROM's recognition by its neighbouring states, or assistance to FYROM's efforts under Article 50 of the Charter...development of good neighbourly relations among Balkan States...UNPREDEP may be able to play a certain indirect role in these issues by facilitating information flow or by transmitting messages when requested by Macedonian authorities. But it would be difficult to go further than that.

... [A]n international symposium in early 1996 in Skopje on "Preventive Diplomacy: Theory and Practice" is very interesting...it would serve not only to promote UNPREDEP's activities... but also to further preventive diplomacy by the United Nations in general...the symposium would be better hosted by an independent (and preferably foreign) organization with an established reputation... [and] for UNPREDEP to be a “facilitator” rather than an organizer. UNPF could provide its assistance..."
The missive was clearly intended to discourage the fullest possible utilization of good offices and “human dimension” efforts by Sokalski and other UNPREDEP personnel.98

**UNPREDEP, IGOs and NGOs: Valued Relationships**

The low-profile diplomatic work of the International Conference in the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) was likely the most meaningful regarding minority and human rights in Macedonia. UNPREDEP might well have had a somewhat more public profile, but the ICFY, co-chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as the SRSG of the UN Secretary-General and former British Foreign Secretary Lord David Owen, was instrumental in facilitating Macedonia’s democratization and enhanced inclusiveness. Geert Ahrens, a veteran German diplomat, chaired its Working Group, established to promote and protect minority rights in all of the former Yugoslavia, from 1991 through January of 1996.

Termination at that particular time was less than propitious for the future of Macedonian human rights, democratic institutional development, and particularly for interethnic relations.99 The absence of the ICFY rendered the “good offices” and relationship-building portion of the mission more challenging, even with close collaboration between UNPREDEP, the OSCE, various UN agencies and offices, and

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98 UNARMS UNPREDEP File #10, Cable from Sokalski to K. Annan, and M. Goulding, #UNPREP 056 and #UNPREDEP 060, dated 29 July 1996; #UNPREDEP 062 and 070; H. Sokalski 14 July 2010, interview with author in Warsaw, Poland.

other NGO and IGO entities. While not addressed directly in UNPREDEP archives at the UN, what much of this record points to is the complex and multifaceted character of this preventive deployment mission: UNPREDEP and its members and staff, UNPREDEP HQ in Skopje, the OSCE, a long list of UN and other agencies and offices, many political and diplomatic figures, the international security community, and other NGOs and IGOs.  

Sokalski held regular luncheons monthly with the representatives of domestic NGOs and ethnic group representatives to establish the types of linkages with them that ICFY formerly had. Some of these meetings were more fruitful than others. Among the most successful were those involving UNPREDEP’s forces’ well-publicized participation in blood drives, school support, and those leading to the “Living Together” event and the three annual Blossom Runs.

UNPREDEP troops in the field undertook engineering and maintenance efforts to assist communities in ways that were need-dependent (repairing water supplies, wells and

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101 H. Sokalski, 09 and 14 July 2010, Warsaw, Poland; and B. Sohnemann, 8-10 July, 2009, Varde, Denmark, interviews with author (notes, photographs, recordings).
pipes, schools, community centers, and roads, even homes, as examples). In the field, UNPREDEP troops also focused on objective and impartial discussions with local leadership, regardless of ethnic identity or political affiliation, to ascertain needs, doing what they could do themselves to provide help, given economic and other constraints, and making referrals to domestic and local assistance agencies, and to NGOs such as the Red Cross/Red Crescent and the like.

Additionally, the troops and supporters headed school supply collections, visited (and sometimes repaired) schools and community centers, and patronized local businesses in efforts to build trust bridges spanning cross-cutting cleavages, especially with minorities in Macedonia, but specifically not addressed toward any particular ethnicity. With these activities, UNPREDEP leadership and troops undeniably had some anticipation of gaining information and insights helpful to the mission, especially in communities near OPs and OPTs, but their influence and presence were larger and more constructive than merely “intelligence gathering”, important though that was.

The direct contacts of UNPREDEP members primarily with ethnic Macedonian and Albanian-Macedonian individuals and businesses, with organizations both governmental and non-governmental, largely through its broadly-conceived “good

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102 BG B. Sohnemann (08-10 July 2009) in Varde, Denmark, BG O.J. Strömberg (04 July 2009) in Oslo, Norway; and Col. Kalle Liesinen, former Nordic Battalion Chief of Staff in UNPREDEP, at Kuovola, Finland (12-14 June 2009), interviews with author (note, recordings).

103 BG B. Sohnemann (08-10 July 2009) in Varde, Denmark, BG O.J. Strömberg (04 July 2009) in Oslo, Norway; and Col. Kalle Liesinen, former Nordic Battalion Chief of Staff in UNPREDEP, at Kuovola, Finland (12-14 June 2009), interviews with author (note, recordings).

104 BG B. Sohnemann (08-10 July 2009), Michael Esper (PKSOI, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA) by telephone (23 September 2010), and BG Bo Wranker (24 June 2009), interviews with author (notes and recordings).
offices’ work proved to be of solid worth in the field. All military leaders interviewed were certain these efforts paid off, particularly in information from and about communities near borders and relationships with them, border crossings, smuggling, small arms trafficking, and conditions in Kosovo and Albania. These efforts also made for more positive relations in general for UNPREDEP within Macedonia.

On some occasions, concrete information was offered voluntarily regarding the Serbian military or conditions in south Kosovo. “We were able to meet with Serbian and Albanian military and some political leaders, for example, because there were those in Macedonia and elsewhere willing to identify or introduce them, to sometimes act as intermediaries, and to help us achieve our mandate terms on prevention of conflict spill-over into Macedonia. You can learn about such people from other people there - when you are “boots on the ground” in the field - but this takes constant investments of time and energy, and the building of real and balanced relationships.”

“UN headquarters in NY and other UN offices in Zagreb and Sarajevo were not especially helpful when it came to identifying those who could be—might be—best to interact with, and frankly, the UN sometimes seemed disapproving of our less than formal efforts on these fronts, even with very good and positive outcomes for the mission

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105 B. Sohnemann (08-10 July 2009 and 5-7 July 2010) in Varde, Denmark with written documents provided for review; J. Engstrom (17 June 2009); Olli Haarinen, Ph.D., in Helsinki, Finland (15 June 2009); written documents and reports from O.J. Strömberg 04 July 2009; Lieutenant General Gunnar Lange (retd.), 10 July 2009, in Blåvand, Denmark, interviews with author (notes, photographs, recordings). Written documents and reports from confidential sources and from UNARMS UNPREDEP mission files (UNARMS UNPREDEP file access by special permission 08-16 November 2010 and 16-20 May 2011 in NY City).

106 BG O. J. Strömberg (04 July 2009), Oslo, Norway, interview with author (recordings, notes and photographs, photocopies).
and mandate.” These impressions were echoed by others closely involved in the deployment, even civilians, as mission members worked hard to cultivate and enhance supportive, important, and even quasi-traditional resources for the benefit of UNPREDEP and the security of Macedonia within mandate constraints.¹⁰⁷

**Summary**

When data analysis was performed regarding interviews and documents, several specific themes were identified as consistently addressed by the military elites in toto, and often stressed multiple times, albeit in slight different ways, in writing and in interviews. These key points are based on those raised by the clear majority of those interviewed for this research, and those topics that appeared consistently in the redacted UNPREDEP file set at the United Nations Archives and Record Management Services (UNARMS).¹⁰⁸

The first major themes were largely focused on UN HQ and the Security Council, in that they addressed the principles and preconditions of a successful preventive deployment as articulated by BG Juha Engstrom. Given the vital preconditions, resulting from learning in the field, BG Engstrom correctly recognized that “the Security Council then had to pass a resolution specifically addressing a preventive deployment mission and

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¹⁰⁸ Certain UNPREDEP files, even with special access permission granted the author, were unavailable due to their confidential nature or other reasons determined by UNARMS staff. The author is informed that the complete set of files with no restrictions will become available in mid-2019 (twenty years post-mission termination).
an appropriately developed mandate (emphasis added).”109 He stressed the principles of impartiality and neutrality in the field as fundamental to a peace-related mission of any type, and certainly in a preventive deployment. Further, a table noting variations in support and expectation levels for preventive deployments was developed by the author from data collected from various parties.

Command and control in the field by Field Commanders, as a result of U.S. involvement with specific restrictions, were particularly knotty issues. The presence of U.S. troops as part of UNPREDEP, albeit without experience as UN peacekeepers, was agreed to be quite beneficial overall, especially as a projection of U.S. power, but it offered specific challenges to the Field Commanders operationally and structurally; some of those were described in the “Command and Control” section. Georgie Anne Geyer summed it up thusly, quoting U.S. Lieutenant Colonel John Baggott, then serving in UNPREDEP, “…The problem is, you have no enemy here -- you’re not here to kill the enemy, you’re peacekeepers. We spend a lot of time going over the rules of engagement.” Geyer added, “…once these American troops leave here, they are put through another “re-education” course -- to take them out of this new neutralist peacekeeping mind-set and put them back into “kill-the-enemy” mode.”110

BG Bent Sohnemann spoke, too, of being approached by U.S. soldiers in an incoming rotation: “One of them asked me, “Sir, where is the enemy, sir? Point us toward

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109 BG Juha Engstrom on 17 June 2009, interview with author (notes and recordings), near Mäntsälä, Finland.

them, and we’ll take care of them.” I of course declined his good-faith offer, and then a group of us [non-Americans] with the Americans, we had a very good talk about peacekeeping, neutrality, impartiality, balance, and the absence of enemies per se.”

U.S. military were, in reality, led from a distance by the U.S. EUCOMM (European Command) and others, as communicated through U.S. Chiefs of Staff, rather than directly by UN Field Commanders. Both the troops and the commanders, along with U.S. support staff, faced ground-patrolling, border access, and other risk-control constraints imposed both by American law and EUCOMM.

Budgetary shortfalls for UNPREDEP and for “good offices” efforts were identified as additional major concerns. Certainly, this violates vital preconditions outlined by BG Engstrom: adequate support from member states, and from the UN. UNPREDEP was a low-cost mission, without question, but it suffered not only from economic shortfalls, but also from communications issues from the field to UN HQ. Responsiveness (especially in a timely manner) from UN HQ was a consistently cited challenge. A variety of grave communications and feedback (responsiveness) concerns were described above. Breakdowns did occur between the field and UN entities; levels of actual knowledge of the field varied greatly at UN HQ. Field commanders went to UN HQ in NY at various times for reporting and other responsibilities.

Undemarcated borders were unfailingly emphasized as challenging by military and political leaders. The borders of Macedonia and Albania, Macedonia and Serbia, and Macedonia and Kosovo were never fully agreed on during UNPREDEP’s four years, as

\[^{111}\text{BG B. Sohnemann (08-10 July 2009), interview with author (notes, recordings and photographs).}\]
previously discussed, although ineffectual agreements were reached from time to time about an UNPREDEP Patrol Line.

That there were significant peacekeeping experience gaps between the various contributing nations is inarguable: 98% of the Finns had it while essentially 0% of the U.S. troops did. This placed a pronounced training and support burden on the Nordic mission members; it also place a greater “learning” burden on American soldiers and their leadership, to mention only two effects this gap had. In the field, adjustments had to be made because of relative experience levels; these often impacted the Nordics more than the Americans in taking up field responsibilities.

Communications between the field and UNPREDEP HQ in Skopje were generally not problematic, nor were those with Macedonian government officials, although the latter could be challenging.

UNPREDEP and the OSCE formed a particularly effective and positive association; there were steady meetings between the members of each mission. The OSCE’s monthly newsletters were very good at keeping both groups well-informed of various important matters. There was inadequate information in the archive files to accurately determine and analyze relations between UNPREDEP and other IOs and NGOs more generally.

The mandates’ terms were seen on the whole as somewhat inhibitory to preventive deployment (except for “good offices”), so that achieving success was more taxing than it needed to be. The “Look from Afar, Don’t Touch, Do Report” restraints were most often cited as obstructive to the mission of preventing regional violence from spilling into Macedonia, especially that originating from the Serbs and FRY. Better
identification of smugglers and what they were passing across borders would have been very beneficial, particularly as tensions within Kosovo on Macedonia’s northern border grew. Kosovo-Macedonia relations were also strained because of Macedonia’s concerns about a potentially destabilizing influx of refugees from Kosovo should matters deteriorate further there. Additionally, the loss of the ICTY was sharply felt; it terminated shortly after UNPREDEP began.

Drawdowns of troops were also viewed as poorly aligned and ill-timed against the “on-the-ground” field situation; the Brigadier Generals unanimously indicated this, even to UN HQ in writing. Macedonia did not favor those cutbacks, either, especially as security conditions deteriorated even more outside its borders, and to some extent, it became more fragile inter-ethnically and economically within its borders.

In contrast, the “good offices” efforts related to UNPREDEP and its SRSG received praise; the direct contacts of UNPREDEP and its broadly-conceived “outreach” and human dimension (human security) work proved to be of value in the field. UN HQ appeared less favorably inclined toward those, even though such endeavors were authorized and specified in the mandates, and HQ wrote fairly frequently to SRSG Sokalski about his work potentially being out of mandate terms. The fear in NY appeared to be that the Macedonian government or others might view Sokalski’s “good offices” projects as being for unintended and/or unapproved political purposes. Sokalski’s
concerns were, however, for the “human dimension” of the mission, and he held firmly to his convictions about that dimension.\(^\text{112}\)

A long list of UN entities worked in Macedonia and the Balkans at various times on development and other projects. Local NGOs were very small but active, as were a considerable number of international ones. UNPREDEP also generally had very positive relations with NGOs, within the constraints of impartiality and neutrality, and with other UN field offices.

The multifaceted nature of UNPREDEP was crucial to its success. UNPREDEP was able to capitalize on its own and others’ strengths. It was an intricate and complicated inter-relationship, but it worked particularly well when executed in the field by leaders who were professionals, highly motivated, bricoleurs at least to some extent, and manifestly experienced militarily and politically, and by those under their direction problem.

Some might question why one would even desire another preventive deployment, as full of challenges as this one was. It is possible that the UN asked itself that question, or UNPREDEP participants did, arriving at the conclusion of “no more”, rather than attempting to make changes that would obviate the major difficulties that existed between UN HQ and the field. Admittedly, engaging in such changes likely would have been disruptive and somewhat difficult, especially for a highly bureaucratized, routinized organization, one with existing and ongoing turbulence and turmoil within it. As noted,

organizations can and do change, but sometimes in ways not intended by their makers or constituents – and sometimes do not change at all. Awareness of certain factors does not necessarily equate to learning from those factors or experiences. There is also the possibility that the HQ focus, in particular, may have been on the negatives (the challenges and difficulties of UNPREDEP), so they arrived at a learning outcome that called for “something like but not preventive deployment” in the future.

Given these key aspects of UNPREDEP’s successes and challenges as presented by military and other involved leaders, important questions still remain. The first is what theoretical approach might best explain these findings: realism and its variants, constructivism, or organizational learning theory? Perhaps none of these offers an adequate explanation. Still, disconfirming certain theories as explanatory is valuable. The second is, what would valid theoretical approaches mean to address and analyze further the question posed herein: why has the international community and the security community mounted no more preventive deployment missions since UNPREDEP’s success in Macedonia?
CHAPTER VI

THE UNPREDEP STUDY AND IR THEORIES

Discrete Organizational Learning Conceptualized

For this dissertation, organizational learning is adapted by conceiving of the HQ and field organizations as separate entities in separate environments, with different constraints and capabilities. What is thought-provoking and important relative to learning and organizational theory in this case is that what is requisite for change to occur in the international organization headquarters (i.e., approval, permission or endorsement—or, at a minimum, not specifically forbidding or vetoing—as a result of consensual knowledge) may not be necessary in the field for local organizations actively engaged in operations. This is often the case with peacekeeping missions. L.M. Howard, as noted earlier, claims that successful field organization learning has four indicators: the abilities to “(1) gather and analyze information; (2) coordinate among the different divisions of the peacekeeping mission; (3) engage… with its… environment; and (4) exercise leadership in such a way that the organization commands authority from all actors, even during crises.”

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1 Lise Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (NY and London: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 16.
Additionally, Howard identifies four specific structural preconditions that affect learning capacity and capability at both sites (in the field and at headquarters).²

Table 5. L.M. Howard’s Criteria Sets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria for the Field Organization</th>
<th>Fulfilled by Field Org of UNPREDEP?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Field Organization Learning</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Gather/analyze info</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Coordinate different peacekeeping divisions</td>
<td>Yes, excepting Command and Control Constraints re US Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Engage with environment</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Exercise authoritative leadership</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Preconditions: Field and HQ</th>
<th>Field or HQ or Both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. Mechanisms to gather information</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Operation coordinating International Organizations</td>
<td>HQ perhaps more than Field (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Field Orgs largely controlling day-to-day decision-making</td>
<td>Field, with constraints from HQ, especially on “good offices” mandate and state-building support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Knowledgeable core leadership on-site early</td>
<td>Field - Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From HQ – No, except for assessment prior to UNPREDEP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

² Howard, *Peacekeeping*, 16-17.
Effective learning at headquarters would lead to central organization changes, as mentioned at the close of the prior chapter. When a central organization makes significant changes in response to new knowledge and enhanced understanding of problems and their causes, organizational learning has successfully occurred. Empirical evidence of headquarters’ learning dysfunctions may include poor problem definition, weak strategic implementation, marked difficulties in articulating and reaching goals, the ignoring of (or lack of awareness of) contextual differences when programs transfer from one mission to another, or the addition of new programs or bureaucracies without questioning “the ultimate purpose of the collective endeavor,” and other incremental maladaptations (“pathologies”, according to Barnett and Finnemore). Examples of these pathologies are examined in Barnett and Finnemore’s case studies of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (specific to Burmese Muslim Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh 1994-95, and still an ongoing crisis in Burma), and of UNAMIR Rwanda.

In any event, those organizations affiliated with HQ such as the field mission will be affected. Through the differentiated, discrete terms of this research introduced herein, one is able to compare learning and changes (or lack thereof) in the HQ of an international organization to the learning and changes associated with the field mission.

**Time Frames: Learning in and from UNPREDEP**

This study expanded HQ and field organizational learning temporally to include periods prior to, during and post-preventive mission. Post-mission debriefings and

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analyses, along with end of mission and end of tour reports, were incorporated where available, since it is assumed learning at headquarters was practically impacted by the outcomes of prior missions and by post-mission debriefings, along with learning during the operations themselves. Therefore, information from UNPROFOR/M’s military leaders were included, along with post-mission interviews with a variety of military leaders and with the mission’s longest-serving political leader, Henryk Sokalski. Some interview materials with high-profile Macedonians from 2006 are also cited for explanatory purposes and context in this temporal expansion.

States also engage with a mission, including but not necessarily limited to troop-contributing states and the mission’s neighboring states. The host state learns by having such a mission in its territory. Intergovernmental organizations and the security community have opportunities to learn before, during and after a particular mission, too; this learning may arise from interactions among those communities as well.

Table 6. Temporal Expansion of Research to Entities Involved in Preventive Deployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Learning Prior to Mission</th>
<th>Learning During Mission</th>
<th>Learning After Mission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Organization</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other IGOs and the Security Community</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These constitute questions of substantial importance, and are particularly significant regarding preventive deployment, since monitoring and early warning, in

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5 UNPROFOR/M immediately preceded UNPREDEP, as noted earlier.
addition to conflict prevention by early intervention, offer great promise as being highly effective tools for peacekeeping and conflict management. There is also the not-inconsiderable matter of favorable economics: Thayer’s 1999 analysis of UNPREDEP, described previously, shows how cost-effective the preventive mission was, further supporting future such deployments from an economic standpoint, which UNPREDEP’s own financial summary supports.

It should also be noted that a top-level officer in the DPKO at UN HQ in NY stated he was unaware of any records in that office or its subsidiary offices (which then included the new DPET) relating to UNPREDEP and/or “Lessons Learned” from it. He thought they had “gone to Archives.” He said he further suspected that any persons involved in that deployment would likely have gone on to other endeavors long ago, although he offered no factual information on the latter, merely his “suspicions,” and did not attempt to explore if any of those personnel remained. If this were indeed true, then

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8 Anonymous informant, interview with author at UNDPKO, NY City, on 12 November 2010.
where are the DPKO’s UNPREDEP records and those of the former Lessons Learned department at the UN? These would be valuable to future research regarding preventive deployment, in order to get an even fuller analytical set.

Thus, Which Theoretical Approaches Best Lead to Explanations of the Non-Use of Preventive Missions post-UNPREDEP?

In a reexamination of the theory of realism and its variants (neorealism and offensive realism), it was found it added some valuable understanding why there have been no more UN-supported preventive deployments since the end of UNPREDEP in February of 1999. Concerns for state preservation could feasibly contribute to understanding why there have been no more such missions invited in by states, since realism is a state-centric approach. This includes protection of state sovereignty and the state national interests, which countries pursue rationally. Realism does contribute to one area of explanation: any such missions deplete state resources, including the host state’s (resources meaning power, considered as economic and military power), and thus would not necessarily be favored by those most likely to contribute assets or resources. Realism also hints that, given the ultimate veto power of the P-5 on the Security Council, there would be no more preventive deployments until and if the Great Powers favored them. Such support has evidently not occurred.

Why no more preventive deployments? Consider the lack of action from the UN regarding Syria, Yemen, Georgia, Ukraine, and other crises since 1999, or the very mixed-outcome Libyan operation that did occur (2011). This could be partly because states do not have a formal communications structure for early warning or a formalized learning structure but this is questionable; today’s media covers the world near-
instantaneously, and most states have intelligence establishments. Under constructivism’s approach, it seems the requisite set of “mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments…accepted by a group of states” has been insufficient to call forth change within institutional constraints.\(^9\) It likely also indicates that norms supporting preventive deployment, even if promoted by some, have not been as deeply institutionalized so as to lead to further such deployments.

After reviewing the traditional IR theories—realism and constructivism, and adapting organization theory and learning theory along with the history and structure of UNPREDEP, it became evident that, in order to determine why preventive deployment has not been utilized since 1999 by the UN or others, a modification of organizational learning theory and the constructivist approach of Barnett and Finnemore is most fruitful and appropriate. It is suggested that by combining aspects of both constructivism and organizational learning theories, we may reach the best possible effect.\(^10\) The four field learning criteria and four structural preconditions stated by L.M. Howard (see Table 6-1) were also helpful in framing at least preliminary answers to the non-recurrence question.\(^11\)

Expanding the temporal framework to include pre- or post-mission learning was not particularly significant in attempting to find answers, excepting inclusion of military leadership in UNPROFOR/M, UNPREDEP’s precursor, and about the much later

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establishment of a UN department (DPET), along with a later approach to peacekeeping, initially developed in Canada in the early 2000s, called the “Responsibility to Protect” or R2P.\textsuperscript{12} It was also helpful for states’ post-mission perceptions (interviews in Macedonia, 2006). What was more productive for the purposes of this analysis of why there has not been another preventive deployment was separating the “organization” into discrete entities: UN HQ and the UNPREDEP field organization. Because of this, the research and analysis focused on theoretical elements of constructivism, and organizational and learning fundamentals.

**Organization and Knowledge Theories**

Organization and knowledge theories will be addressed first for their explanatory power in answering the question regarding why there have been no further preventive deployments beyond UNPREDEP. In considering the HQ organization, it is well-known the UN is a massive bureaucracy, employing some 44,000 individuals world-wide.\textsuperscript{13} It is assumed that Barnett and Finnemore’s statements about bureaucracies are accurate; they


are also supported by E. Haas’s models. To briefly restate those findings regarding bureaucracy, they found that it is “a distinct social form with its own internal logic that generates certain behavioral tendencies…and proclivities” which “generates different expectations”. They can be highly routinized, too. In other words, bureaucracy-based organizations can act as good servants, a commonly acceptable norm, “but can also produce undesirable and self-defeating outcomes.” They are, to put it bluntly, a “double-edged sword.”

Organizations routinely behave in ways unanticipated by their creators and not formally sanctioned by their members. [Those] that start with one mission routinely acquire others. Organizations adapt to changing circumstances in unanticipated ways and adopt new routines and functions without getting approval from their “stakeholders”. [They] are notoriously resistant to reform or redirection because change threatens entrenched organizational culture and interests. (Emphasis added)

…Bureaucracies, by their nature, try to rationalize the world by defining it into neat categories and mapping each task or category of problem onto a specified solution set or set of standard rules for action. ...However, this rationalizing effort is always fraught with tension because the world’s complexity and connections defy the bureaucratic boxes. …much of organization change comes reactively from the incremental alteration of the organizational rules in response to shortcomings and new environmental circumstances.

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17 Ibid., 161-162.
Characteristics of organizations are they show “sensemaking” and creativity in their efforts to alleviate, avoid or adapt to potential and actual contradictions and tensions, both internal and external. Sensemaking means they figure out (construct), accurately or inaccurately, the meanings of experiences, ideas, events, actions and inactions, and respond accordingly. They can do this because, at HQ especially, they have bureaucratic power, legitimacy on the world stage, and they are constructed as technocrats, morally upright, impartial and neutral by others. They also, importantly, have time at HQ, a commodity which may be in short supply in the field.

In the field, actors are also officially impartial and neutral, according to the UN principles set out earlier, but can be and often must be quite creative to resolve exceptions, contradictions, and/or tensions, particularly when consent of all parties is clear and evident (and sometimes, even if not), and if the mandate and funding are supportive of these efforts (also sometimes, even if they are not fully supportive). The field organization too engages actively in sensemaking, creativity and bricolage, and use complex processes to shape decisions. The field also has legitimacy, conferred to it by the HQ organization (the UN Security Council), by those states engaged in the field mission, and by other IGOs, NGOs and similar communities with which they interact.


Constructivism and Social Constructivism

Barnett and Finnemore applied social constructivism in their examination and explanation of international organizations’ behavioral dysfunctions and bureaucratic pathologies.\(^\text{21}\) As noted above, they argue that IGOs’ dysfunctions can be traced to either *material* forces in the internal or external environment, or *cultural* forces in the internal or external environment.\(^\text{22}\) Such a group of factors and their potential effects were considered in this research, particularly at UN headquarters, in the field, and among the IGO and security communities. This suggests that those aspects of organizational learning theory which fall closest to social constructivism may be of particular value in explaining why preventive deployment appears to have been sidelined as a UN peace mission option.\(^\text{23}\)

The Explanatory Importance of Norms

Normative elements may be significant as beliefs and values are internalized by an organization, which then gains stability from them. Norms are tied, therefore, to both actors and organizations.\(^\text{24}\) Shared cognitive meanings about identity and activities,


combined with regulative elements, lead to behavior that conforms to the organization’s rational interests. Internalized norms lead to an institutional logic, comprised of sanctions and constraints, shared cognitive meanings, and other normative elements that then are realized as expressed behaviors.  

Promoting a norm is not the same as institutionalizing it—or even assuring that the most appropriate and effective learning has been undertaken during its development and transmission. It is possible that the norm or principle promoted (and possibly institutionalized) was not, “Let’s proactively endeavor to engage in preventive deployment again,” but rather “Let’s not do this again,” particularly in the IGO community and in security organizations. It may also have guided the UN toward a norm supportive of some other form of conflict intervention.

If a common inter-organizational learning framework results, it can be scrutinized. Identification of such a shared structure would be an important contribution to how inter-organizational affairs and connections are understood, especially in international relations. Constructivism blurs what divisions there may be between the field, headquarters and even other organizations if all entities are effectively and clearly communicating with one another. Again, note the “if” in the preceding sentence; it is a crucial condition for such blurred lines between entities.


Table 7. Theories, Approaches and Substantiation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Approach</th>
<th>UN HQ Organization</th>
<th>UNPREDEP Field Organization</th>
<th>Substantiation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constructivism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Literature on UN; interviews at UN; SRSG interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internalized Norms</td>
<td>Mainly but inconsistent on some issues</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norms Transmission</td>
<td>Inconsistent or Absent</td>
<td>Within Field= yes; Field to others = yes</td>
<td>UNARMS files; BG interviews; clear interactions with environment, other organizations, domestic actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialization Processes</td>
<td>Internally: Yes</td>
<td>Yes, among Units</td>
<td>BG Interviews; UNARMS files; Military leaders’ personal files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Flawed to Field; no evidence of internal comms</td>
<td>Relatively Consistent with HQ and OSCE, NATO</td>
<td>BG Interviews; UNARMS files; Military leaders’ personal files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of Awareness of Ideas, Culture, Language</td>
<td>Not entirely between HQ and Field Orgs or Domestic actors; better with other IOs</td>
<td>Yes, with some “gaps” (limited by impartiality/neutrality) with domestic actors, other IOs</td>
<td>UNARMS Files; Interviews with BGs and SRSG, others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Approach</td>
<td>UN HQ Organization</td>
<td>UNPREDEP Field Organization</td>
<td>Substantiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Org Learning Framework</td>
<td>Not evident at HQ</td>
<td>Attempted in and by Field Organization</td>
<td>UNARMS Files; Interviews with BGs and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth/Expansion</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Size limited by Mandate or requests rejected by HQ</td>
<td>DPET; UNARMS files; interview at UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Org and Org Learning Theory</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of Change with “Definition of Problem” changes</td>
<td>Questionable</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>SRSG Interview and use of good offices; UN literature; UNARMS files; BG Interviews and with others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Awareness</td>
<td>Irregularly re UNPREDEP</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>SRSG Interview; BG Interviews and with others; use of good offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signs of Turbulence (per Haas)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>UNARMS files; BG Interviews and with SRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turbulent Non-growth (per Haas)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>HQ inability to adapt due to routinization and prior successes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility and Creativity</td>
<td>Rare</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Many examples from Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Approach</td>
<td>UN HQ Organization</td>
<td>UNPREDEP Field Organization</td>
<td>Substantiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Learning</td>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>HQ: DPET; Field: daily learning from various sources, resources (BG interviews; UNARMS files; SRSG interviews); UNPREDEP literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Change from Learning</td>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>See above; post-mission formation of DPET at UN HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change: External Perception of Legitimacy, Authority, Control</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, during course of mission</td>
<td>UNARMS files; OSCE reports; BG and SRSG interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in cultural, structural or material constraints</td>
<td>Not significantly</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Command/Control re U.S. troops; inter-ethnic conflict in Macedonia; Field funding rejections; budgetary constraints and limitations on UNPREDEP; Constant troop rotations/re-training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indications of Path-Dependent Change</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Within military structure, yes</td>
<td>HQ’s resistance to expanded definition/use of “good offices”; in field within military structural constraints</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indications are then that fundamental aspects of organization and learning theory, along with social constructivism (including L.M. Howard’s “Criteria Sets” against which to test evidence, Table 6-1), hold somewhat more explanatory power than other theoretical options to help understand why there have been no further preventive
deployments since UNPREDEP. That the new conceptual framing of discrete organizations (Field and HQ) was valuable for this research and its findings and conclusions is clear, and expanding the temporal facet of the research was also helpful in specified ways.

First, it is apparent that the UN and member states, along with international organizations, the international and security communities, and non-governmental organizations no longer include preventive deployment, no matter its success and economic viability, in the preventive diplomacy options to which they turn when conflict threatens. The question then becomes why? What may have changed or been learned?

Explanations include that, in retrospect, it was a highly complex mission and there is some specific doubt that those complexities could be addressed in another preventive deployment as efficiently and effectively as UNPREDEP did – especially by such a small mission. Another possible reason is that there was growing awareness that without intense attention to the “human aspect” (and state- and institution-building), often addressed, to the UN’s chagrin, through the good offices endeavors of the UNPREDEP SRSG, such a mission is likely to be less effective, especially longer-term.

This was the case in UNPREDEP: just under two years later, 22 January 2001, Macedonia was embroiled in an internal violent inter-ethnic conflict. Simultaneously, it was faced with Kosovo’s crisis, which quickly sent in excess of 360,000 Kosovar mostly ethnic Albanian) refugees into Macedonia (equivalent to an increase of about 18% of
Macedonia’s population). This could arguably indicate even more clearly that UNPREDEP was quite a success: this did not occur while the Blue Helmets were on Macedonian soil.

Some of the factors that concerned the UN regarding “state- and institution-building” and the “human dimension” were related to state sovereignty. Others were viewed equally as political risks or as signaling a UN unwillingness to be involved in the Balkans any longer than was necessary. This would be especially true given the high-profile failures of the United Nations Protective Forces (UNPROFOR and related missions) in the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict; memories of it remain fresh even now among peacekeeping states, member states, at the UN and the Hague – and, of course, in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Those in the Balkans almost compulsively remember history, even though they may promulgate differing versions of that history.


28 The concept of “conditional sovereignty” should be explored further. When a state fails to or cannot provide for and protect its citizens, there are grave questions about its sovereignty. “States that are unable or unwilling to protect their own citizens may no longer hide behind a wall of sovereignty.” From Council on Foreign Relations, “The UN Panel Report and Conditional Sovereignty”, at http://www.cfr.org/world/un-panel-report-conditional-sovereignty/p7954, reprint from American Society of International Law Newsletter (January-February 2005).

29 Interview: Lieutenant General Gunnar Lange (retd.) of NATO/KFOR, July 10, 2009, at his home, Blåvand, Denmark.
The field engaged in norms promotion and transmission via its “good offices” efforts, interactions with other international, security, and non-governmental organizations, and with the various involved states. The UN, on the other hand, was apparently inconsistent in doing the same; had they been, that might have led to further preventive deployments and further testing of the norm of prevention via Blue Berets.

It was assumed for this analysis that the UN is a bureaucracy-based organization, and therefore highly routinized and largely resistant to change; those types of organizations can be “good servants,” “but can also produce undesirable and self-defeating outcomes”, the double-edged sword of risk. Given the lack of preventive deployments since UNPREDEP, this appears to be one of the less desirable outcomes. There was indeed some sense-making and creativity in addressing inherent or potential tensions internally and externally, because HQ has bureaucratic power and legitimacy. The field could do the same because of a transference of legitimacy via their mandate, and in preventive deployments, because they have been invited into the state by the host nation.

Impartiality and neutrality principles in both the UN HQ and the field may have limited transmissions of some shared concepts regarding ideas, culture and language. Like the UN HQ, the field had to rely on language translators; the official language of the field was English, no matter that the troops were from Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark and the U.S., and that the field commanders (the Brigadier Generals) were from non-English speaking states. The SRSG was from Poland, and again, a non-native

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30 Barnett and Finnemore, Rules, viii-ix, 3.
English speaker. The command of English by the Brigadier Generals was superb, as was the SRSG’s, but informants said that some troops’ English was not consistently at the same level, which affected not only domestic communications, but also cultural understandings. See the earlier comment regarding Balkan communication styles from Julian Harston as an example. Furthermore, only the civilian personnel associated with UNPREDEP were native Macedonian, Albanian or Serbian speakers; translators carried the burden of linguistic and language differences, sometimes along with cultural and interpretive responsibilities.

The field evidenced remarkable adaptability and creativity, but only very temporary growth or expansion (limited by mandate terms and by balancing of troop numbers among the involved states; indeed, they suffered fairly extensive drawdowns). The field showed strong evidence of learning and change associated with the definition of problems encountered. This was less distinct at UN HQ; indeed, there appeared to be significant resistance to defining or re-defining problems to be addressed, and to responsive changes. An increase in growth/expansion at the UN HQ did occur, as the number of worldwide peace operations requiring administrative and other HQ services increased markedly during this period (the 1990s). Further, the field evidenced continual awareness of the environment in Macedonia and surrounding states, physically, militarily, politically, environmentally, socially and economically. UN HQ, by contrast, seemed mostly content to ignore, discount or take less than seriously the “neighborhood” (except for its failed UNPROFOR mission), and the various environments, behaviors, and changes therein.
Signs of E.B. Haas’ turbulent and non-turbulent growth were different at HQ than in the field. Certainly, the UN HQ had those who did not adapt well due to routinization and to prior successes and failures. Yet, the UN’s Security Council was evidently willing to take on “something different” in responding to the Macedonian crisis and its President’s request for assistance: the inception of the first and only preventive deployment, in which the field made changes and engaged in bricolage to more effectively respond to crises, too.

Some in the Macedonian government and private citizens showed concerns regarding the legitimacy, authority and control of UNPREDEP, and a marked degree of preference for a NATO-led mission instead. But generally these external perceptions, while changing, were not outright rejections of legitimacy, authority or control. The other states in the Balkan neighborhood, such as Serbia, Kosovo and Albania, by contrast, challenged control, authority and legitimacy of UN missions and their members regularly.

Perhaps had NATO been the mission organizer and sponsor, this would not have occurred or occurred to a lesser extent. A preference for NATO organization was openly stated by UNPREDEP’s host nation Macedonia as time went on. NATO was already heavily enmeshed in subduing FRY conflicts—and about to be drawn in to Kosovo operations. In other words, a different sponsoring and organizing international institution might have had a different strategy set or outcome, and this must be carefully considered. However, since there were no NATO undertakings in preventive deployment nor another UN-authorized preventive deployment, little to no comparison can be made between how either might undertake such a future deployment.
NATO, however, was engaged in a high-profile Balkan peacekeeping mission, SFOR (Stabilization Force) in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Bosnian war. The mandate was that

The Stabilisation Force (SFOR) will deter hostilities and stabilise the peace, contribute to a secure environment by providing a continued military presence in the Area Of Responsibility (AOR), target and coordinate SFOR support to key areas including primary civil implementation organisations, and progress towards a lasting consolidation of peace, without further need for NATO-led forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.³¹

NATO subsequently became immersed in another notable post-UNPREDEP mission, KFOR (Kosovo Forces) beginning in June 1999, headquartered in Skopje, Macedonia, as a peacekeeping force (some NATO personnel still remain in Skopje and Kosovo.) But two peace-related actions do not even begin to approach the UN experience set, although both of NATO’s were considered broadly satisfactory.³²

The UNPREDEP field organization faced constant changes in structural and material constraints via UN budgets, frequent field troop rotations, troop drawdowns, and ongoing UN HQ demands to have an “end of mission plan” in place, to name only a few. By comparison, there was not a measurable change in structural or material constraints at UN HQ. As far as changes in cultural aspects or constraints of the mission, the field faced

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³² Interview: Lieutenant General Gunnar Lange (retd.) of NATO/KFOR, July 10, 2009, at his home, Blåvand, Denmark.
repetitive UN HQ criticism of the mandates’ “good offices” use by the SRSG and the troops in particular, and were constrained by impartiality and neutrality standards of the mission. HQ did not seem responsive to cultural matters in and near Macedonia, and used impartiality/neutrality constraints as a justification for actions that had a negative impact in the field in some cases.33

**Findings: Why No Reproduction of Preventive Deployment?**

One of the important outcomes of this research is that the UN showed few signs of responsive change to the challenges faced in the field. Had it done so, it would be a sign (change) that learning was or had occurred, according to E.B. Haas.

The second most suggestive finding for non-reproduction is that of communications: the feedback loops, language, communications channels, and other processes between UN HQ and the field were conspicuously flawed, ambiguous, and likely inhibited HQ learning and change to a significant extent. Yet, again, HQ did not act to improve this situation in order to more effectively have a full opportunity to learn and change. This was especially evident when the author visited the UN and no one seemed to know how to find various records or individuals with whom to speak about UNPREDEP. Admittedly, the UN was turbulent; it had made some fairly major internal changes, with births of and reorganizations of departments between UNPREDEP’s termination in February of 1999 and 2010-2011 when the author was there.

The UN HQ also apparently, and crucially, does not pay timely heed to communications of early warning signs of conflict, especially intra-state conflicts.

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33 Again, with the exception of the UNPROFOR missions.
Instead, it remains far more dedicated to peacekeeping operations that follow the traditional model, those which have been “far too little, too late”, very costly in many ways, especially those which occur post-bloodshed.\(^{34}\) The UN seems to be tone-deaf to early warnings to assess those situations, their volatility, and UN opportunities or needs for intervention, particularly successful interventions for humanitarian reasons.

Third, this operation was generally assessed as under-funded. Given actual experience in a preventive deployment, it is clear a future such mission would require more financial support and a more generous budget.\(^{35}\) Arguments regarding its cost-effectiveness may not hold in the future, making the UN and member states wary of undertaking another preventive deployment.

The fourth finding is that states and other organizations have made little or no effort to recommend preventive deployment as part of preventive diplomacy. Further, except in the case of South Sudan and the Libya engagement under R2P terms, states and organizations have not openly rejected preventive deployments, but neither have they made it a principal part of their conflict resolution arsenal.

Fifth, the United States has not publicly pushed for troop involvement in any other UN mission, regardless of type, nor indicated its willingness to do so. As noted, the U.S. involvement was vital to perceptions of UNPREDEP’s legitimacy and associated power.

\(^{34}\) Note: the two most critical differences between UNPREDEP and other peacekeeping efforts are (1) it was a preventive deployment (pre-violence, pre-conflict, pre-bloodshed), and (2) the UN has never opted to have any more preventive deployments. The preventive aspects of this mission explains what is special and unique about it, and the research herein indicates potential reasons why it has not been repeated.

\(^{35}\) Particularly were one to include some of L.M. Howard’s characteristics, such as an independent communications/media asset.
It also sent a clear message to those opposed to it that the U.S. was paying attention to the Balkans, and that facing off with the U.S. on that field could well be inadvisable. Possibly, were another P-5 state (a Great Power) to become involved in the way the U.S. did in UNPREDEP, and push for its use with the Security Council, this could encourage preventive deployment’s use in another mission.

As a sixth point, no mandate model or framework was developed for an improved or expanded mandate for such missions that would allow fuller use of “good offices” and other efforts on the part of the SRSG and others. Given mandates’ semiannual reapproval, this could be accomplished. Without this, it is likely a very limited number of states would hurry to be involved in such an operation again.

Even though the both the General Assembly and the Security Council of the UN accepted the concept of “conditional sovereignty” in 2005 and 2006 as part of Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P), it has not had appreciable real-world effect on its actions, plans, missions or other interventions. Absolute sovereignty tenets appear to rule, largely because of language in the UN Charter, even though there are multiple ways to address this seeming roadblock. It has not been fully developed or implemented by the UN or its states (consider today’s Syrian, Lebanese, South Sudanese, and Yemeni situations, to name a few.) They did not call on R2P to motivate and legitimate intervention in Syria’s crisis, for example, nor in Yemen’s. But R2P has apparently incorporated some aspects of preventive deployment within its tenets.36

See Appendix C for a comparison of Preventive Deployment’s terms and those of R2P. The UN shows no signs of using preventive deployment in the interim until R2P’s fuller development and implementation. Admittedly, R2P holds the potential to represent a significant change in the UN’s attitudes toward peacekeeping and sovereignty, but this potential has not yet been fully or accurately realized. R2P is not, it must be stressed, *preventive* in its focus: something violent, such as genocide or verifiable threat of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity must already be occurring: blood has been spilled. Even though Gareth Evans argued in 2001 and later that there were 3 “pillars” of R2P through which every mission would pass (first being prevention, the second a reaction of military intervention, and the third, rebuilding the conflict area), no mission, not even the one in Libya in 2011, came close to successfully meeting all three R2P pillars (preventive, reactive, or restoration and rebuilding)\(^37\).

All of these being offered as potential explanations to consider regarding why there have been no further preventive deployment missions: *is it possible that alternatives exist for actualizing all of the terms of preventive diplomacy, including preventive deployment?*

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

United Nations Headquarters and the Field

What is thought-provoking and significant relative to learning and organizational theories in this case is that what is requisite for change to occur in the international organization headquarters (i.e., approval, permission or endorsement—or, at a minimum, not specifically forbidding or vetoing—as a result of consensual knowledge) may not be necessary in the field for local organizations actively engaged in operations. This is often the case with peacekeeping missions.

Learning at the UN HQ must be examined if we are to comprehend why another such preventive deployment mission has not been undertaken. Hannan and Freeman’s concepts regarding structural inertia in organizations and their bureaucracies are useful in examining learning and the propensity for change in an IGO: organizations have routines which produce both internal constraints and external constraints on organizational change.1 These generally result in performance reliability on the one hand, as routines are repeated and reproduced; on the other, inertia and resistance to change are generated.2 Organizations and processes are likely to go on as they have gone in the


past, because routine leads to an internal structure and to a culture strongly resistant to change. Furthermore, changes in routines linked to the external environment can negatively affect links between the organization and that environment, and can lead to erosion of an organization’s legitimacy or general perceptions of its successes, a risk organizations guard against.³

Interestingly, Rafael Biermann observes that it appears more lessons have been learned at HQ from failures than from successes (emphasis added). Could this be true regarding preventive deployment practices/success and potential for future successful application?⁴ If so, the questions asked herein become all the more urgent: learning from success realistically offers the opportunity to reduce the odds of future failures, especially critical when the lives of peacekeepers and others may be at stake in any type of mission, whether preventive deployment or more traditional yet multidimensional peacekeeping ones.

There has been no critical attempt post-UNPREDEP to develop a “preventive deployment model” or to perfect a preventive deployment mandate applicable to potential missions of this type. Furthermore, research indicates that there have been no proactive recommendations for preventive deployment in the past decade at the UN—this may provide further evidence of flawed learning at headquarters. It is almost as if the UN is moving quickly to another approach (perhaps R2P, although this too is questionable)

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without having first examined and learned more fully from UNPREDEP—“throwing the infant out with the bathwater,” as one anonymous interviewee said.

In any event, those organizations affiliated with the central one will also be impacted. Through the differentiated terms of this research, one is able to compare and assess learning and changes (or lack thereof) in the central international organization to the learning and changes in and from field organizations.

**Discrete Field Organization and Learning**

What further differentiates the research herein from previous analyses is that the field operation of UNPREDEP is framed as a learning and decision-making organization in and of itself. This field operation was clearly not engaged in the same system of organizational learning as headquarters’ because peace operations face a multitude of practical realities in their deployment and mandate that are very much apart from the HQ. The field is the organization responsible for implementing the mandate within acceptable parameters of peacekeeping. Implementation includes using past learning, new learning and/or adaptation on-site that results in the standards, rules and daily operations of the force in the field, parameters oftentimes constrained by structure, past learning, economics, communications and other relevant internal constraints and experiences.

The field operation engages in various processes: it defines problems (including changes in the perceived problem), gathers information and knowledge, and develops solutions. Choices are made in the field, from the field, for the field.5 If one can more

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fully understand the outcomes as field organizations learn and/or adapt in the field, and
the learning process they incorporate to arrive at decisions as an organization, the more
likely it becomes that future peacekeeping or preventive diplomacy operations will gain
the insights, implementation skills and resources necessary from such analyses to make
more durable progress toward success.

The mission in the field must adapt within a framework that has *external*
constraints, of course. These include headquarters’ politics and policies; the terms of the
mandate; previous peacekeeping mission design, implementation and experience; the
limits and status of international political will; availability of suitable troops, and of states
willing to contribute such troops and support personnel and equipment, along with
appropriate funding. In contrast to earlier work emphasizing such external factors, this
dissertation has looked at the complex field organization itself in the field, its internal
focus, along with relations with headquarters, local mission offices (political and
civilian), other intergovernmental bodies, and with NGOs, taking an approach that has
received little attention.

These two points constitute voids, particularly significant omissions regarding
preventive deployment, since monitoring and early warning, in addition to conflict
prevention by early intervention, offer great promise as being highly effective tools for
peacekeeping and conflict management.6 There is also the not-inconsiderable matter of

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6 Alice Ackermann, *Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia* (NY: Syracuse
University Press, 1999); Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict
Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena*, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly
Conflict Series (MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999); Kevin Cahill, *Preventive Diplomacy*:

**State Level Learning**

States engage with the mission politically and militarily, including troop-contributing states and neighboring states. The host state learns by having such a mission in its territory.\footnote{The host nation’s openly-stated preference by some for a NATO operation versus the UN one is a potential example of learning and resultant change.} Further, mission reports and interactions between states offer additional opportunities for learning. Moreover, as members of intergovernmental bodies, many states then bring that learning to a wider setting. States take into account their own interests, dominant norms, values, and principles, culture and other factors when examining outcomes for lessons learned—and the lessons themselves are shaped by these influences, and ought to be accounted for and examined.

**Temporal Expansion: Preventive Deployment Learning Processes**

The present study expands the concept of learning temporally to include immediate past and subsequent peacekeepers’ operations and leadership. Learning from such experiences may be influential in any organization’s succeeding learning results

during a mission such as UNPREDEP. It further broadens HQ and field organizational learning temporally to include periods prior to, during and after preventive efforts. Post-mission debriefings and analyses, along with available end of mission and end of tour reports, are incorporated, since it is assumed learning at headquarters will have been practically impacted by the outcomes of prior missions and by post-mission debriefings, along with learning during the operations themselves.

States also engage with any mission, including troop-contributing states and the mission’s neighboring states. The host state learns by having such a mission within its borders. Post-mission reports and interactions between states, especially regarding Macedonia’s “tough neighborhood,” and the fact that the country “is on a very key location, truly a crossroads,” offer further opportunities for learning.9 Intergovernmental organizations and the security community have opportunities to learn before, during and after a particular mission, too; this learning may arise from interactions among themselves as well.

**Summary**

Several schools of thought in international relations, including realism, but most particularly a blended approach of constructivism and organization and organization learning theories, generate insights on the failure of the world community to repeat an acknowledged success, preventive deployment. A potentially disastrous conflict was avoided, lives saved, and peace in Macedonia prevailed by preventing surrounding

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9 UNARMS UNPREDEP Accession S-1822 of 1999/0116, Box 5, File 3; from an interview with U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill on 27 December 1997, question #9 as listed.
violence from flooding into it. By marshalling a theoretical array and presenting this case study in more depth, we have seen how the various organizations involved—the United Nations headquarters; the field operations organizations in Macedonia; Macedonia itself; other states; non-governmental organizations, and intergovernmental organizations learned— not— as organizations, and perhaps why there have been no further preventive deployments.

Once we found if, how, and what they learned, we were able to draw conclusions from those findings in order to posit why preventive deployment has not been replicated, despite world circumstances which could have and perhaps should have called for more pre-conflict, preventive diplomacy operations like it.

**This Case Study’s Contributions to the Field**

Alterations to organizational theory structure, developed and adopted by the researcher, improved the ability to arrive at and assess the analytical outcomes: discrete organizations (UN HQ and the field). Expanding the temporal framework to before, during and after the preventive deployment was similarly productive. This researcher’s modifications to a social constructivism framework, informed by Barnett and Finnemore’s works, proved invaluable in exploring, understanding, and explaining potential reasons for the absence of preventive deployment missions post-UNPREDEP.

Conceptualizing the field and HQ as separate organizations contributed to assessment and exploration capacities, as did expanding the temporal framework of the research.

First, accepting that the case study findings arising from the applications of organizational learning theory and of social constructivism are most productive, the case
study process constituted a meaningful exploratory approach. It was well able to incorporate new primary materials, such as interviews and the UN Archives on this mission, in order to enhance examinations and explanations. Second, the proposed expected findings were mostly supported, that discrete yet interlinked organizations in the field and at headquarters experienced learning in quite different ways, leading to dysfunctions, pathologies, or “disconnects” between some (or all) learning sites (powerful states discarded it as a viable option). The third (that the security community and others promoted a norm of “no more such operations”) and fourth (that epistemic communities had some influence in discarding it) were not as strongly sustained but appeared plausible and could not be discounted.\textsuperscript{10}

Even with these findings and conclusions being offered in explanation of why no further preventive deployment missions, an important follow-on question still remains for future research, equally as critical: \textit{if not preventive deployment, then what?}

\textbf{Implications: Further Research and Analysis}

A salient question is whether or not the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, developed in 2001, has truly and completely adopted, and fully incorporated into UN culture, norms, and processes.\textsuperscript{11} The impetuses behind it were the 1994 massacre in Rwanda, genocide in Bosnia during 1992–1995, and large-scale human atrocities in Kosovo in 1998–1999. The General Assembly and the Security Council of the UN accepted the concept of “conditional sovereignty” in 2005 and 2006 as part of R2P, and

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\textsuperscript{10} See pages 2 through 4 of this document.

more generally, the R2P program itself. But “conditional sovereignty” has not had an appreciable real-world effect on the UN’s actions, plans, missions or other interventions. Absolute sovereignty tenets appear to rule instead, largely because of language in the UN Charter, even though there are multiple legitimate ways to circumvent this ostensible roadblock.

Research indicates R2P has not been completely assimilated or implemented to date (although an R2P-type offer was made to Darfur, which was rejected, and a UN-NATO mission in Libya under Security Council Resolution 1973 of March 17, 201112 was asserted to be R2P because Muammar Gaddafi was publicly advocating genocide, using the term “cockroaches”, far too evocative of the 1995 Rwandan genocide.) The Libyan mission has been highly criticized for exceeding R2P’s tenets and engaging in a “change of regime” effort against Muammar Gaddafi; this R2P attempt resulted in far more deaths than Gaddafi or his weaker military caused, some critics argue.

In a 2012 report on R2P in Libya, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon indicated that lesser or non-coercive efforts were not fully explored or attempted prior to military action. In other words, preventive efforts and diplomacy had not been fully exhausted.13 There were also concerns that the mandate had been markedly exceeded by NATO in its

12 It is very important to note that Russia and China abstained from voting on SC Resolution 1973 regarding a Libya mission, leaving the so-called P-3 to pass it (the U.S., U.K. and France).

Cf. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect; and The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary Volume to the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa, ON, Canada: International Research Development Centre, 2001).
air campaign. R2P definitely requires an active conflict underway to which to directly respond (more specifically, war crimes, genocide or credible threats of it, crimes against humanity, or ethnic cleansing) whereas preventive deployment does not, a crucial difference between the two affecting mandates, implementation, operations, and results. R2P also has three requisite “pillars”: first, preventive diplomacy/deployment; second, military reaction if level one is ineffective; and third, that the operations area be rebuilt and/or restored post-conflict. All three did not occur in the Libyan mission. One may also note that within the exigencies of R2P, some type of UN “standing force” appears to be assumed. This currently does not exist.

Kenya’s 2008 mission has also been mentioned as an R2P engagement, a humanitarian intervention, but this may well be even more arguable.14 If not R2P’s adoption and efficacy, its success, why no more preventive deployments instead? If R2P has been completely assimilated or implemented, why? Does it replace or eliminate, within its terms, the pillar of preventive deployment as part of preventive diplomacy? What are the ramifications for policy and praxis changes under R2P’s terms?15 On their faces, the Libyan mission and its outcomes does not bode well for R2P, at least not at this time.

14 Alex Stark, “Alex Stark interviews Professor the Hon. Gareth Evans AO QC”, 2 September 2011 in online e-International Relations at http://www.globahr2p.org/media/files/gareth_interview-the-rtop-balance-sheet-after-libya.pdf. Republished November 2011 as The Responsibility to Protect: Challenges & Opportunities in Light of the Libyan Intervention” (contributions by Alex Stark, Thomas G. Weiss, Ramesh Thakur, Mary Ellen O’Connell, Aidan Hehir, Alex J. Bellamy, David Chandler, Rodger Shanahan, Rachel Gerber, Abiodun Williams, and Gareth Evans). Note that Gareth Evans is one of the two co-chairs of the original commission that developed R2P (see prior footnote).

15 Cf. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect; and The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary Volume to the report
Strict sovereignty principles, as set forth in the UN Charter, would demand re-examination under this doctrine, since a crucial aspect of it is “conditional sovereignty”, as noted earlier, which the UN’s main bodies (Security Council and General Assembly) accepted in 2005 and 2006. Furthermore, R2P has not been fully developed or implemented by the UN or its states (evidenced by today’s Syrian, Lebanese, and Yemeni situations, along with certain conflicts in Africa, to name a few.) No one called on R2P or preventive deployment to motivate and legitimate intervention in Georgia’s, Ukraine’s, Syria’s or Yemen’s crises (Syria was not believed to be a suitable case for R2P, according to the UN and Gareth Evans of ICISS).

Still, R2P has apparently integrated some aspects of preventive deployment within its principles even if, again, like preventive deployment, it is subject to greater analysis and not currently being well-utilized. Refer to Appendix C for a comparison of preventive deployment and R2P.

How, in order to respond sooner rather than later, and avoid proceeding too slowly, with too little, too late, does the UN fulfill the first affirmation set out in the

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16 Alex Stark, “Alex Stark interviews Professor the Hon. Gareth Evans AO QC”, 2 September 2011 in online e-International Relations at http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/gareth-_interview-the-rtop-balance-sheet-after-libya.pdf. Republished November 2011 as “The Responsibility to Protect: Challenges & Opportunities in Light of the Libyan Intervention” (contributions by Alex Stark, Thomas G. Weiss, Ramesh Thakur, Mary Ellen O’Connell, Aidan Hehir, Alex J. Bellamy, David Chandler, Rodger Shanahan, Rachel Gerber, Abiodun Williams, and Gareth Evans). Note that Gareth Evans is one of the two co-chairs of the original commission that developed R2P (see prior footnote).

17 Cf. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect; and The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary Volume to the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Both published Ottawa, ON, Canada: International Research Development Centre, 2001).
Preamble of its Charter as adopted on the 26th of June, 1945: “We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind…”?18 Those untold sorrows of conflict and war continue despite this proclamation of seven decades ago. This makes it even more evident that crucial and effective elements of mitigation, limitation, and prevention concerning conflict and war are still absent.

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEWEE CONSENT, CONTACT LETTER,
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
A-1. Interviewee Consent

**Primary Researcher:** Mary Frances Rosett Lebamoff – Loyola University Chicago

**Project Title:** *Learning from the United Nations Preventive Deployment Mission in Macedonia*

**Researcher:** Mary Frances Rosett Lebamoff

**Faculty Sponsor:** Dr. Alexandru Grigorescu – Department of Political Science

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**Introduction**

You are being asked to take part in a research study being conducted by Mary Frances Rosett Lebamoff for a doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Professor Dr. Alexandru Grigorescu in the Department of Political Science at Loyola University of Chicago.

You are being asked to participate because you have had extensive experience in a significant capacity related to the United Nations Preventive Deployment Mission (UNPREDEP) and/or UNPROFOR/M.

*Please read this form carefully and ask any questions you may have before deciding whether to participate in the study.*

**Purpose**

The purpose of this study is to explore the question of why, as part of preventive diplomacy efforts, there have been no further preventive deployments since UNPREDEP’s success between 1993 and 1999. Issues addressed in particular relate to learning, communications and understanding/knowledge emanating from UNPREDEP and the associated organizations.

**Procedures**

If you agree to be in the study, you will be asked to:

- Take part in an interview with the primary researcher about your experiences with and direct knowledge of UNPREDEP, its mission, operations and communications with local offices and officials, the UN and other international organizations and their representatives. The questions focus on periods before, during and after UNPREDEP, related to preventive deployment as part of preventive diplomacy.

- It will be very helpful to the researcher and for the dissertation and its accuracy if you agree to the interview being audio-recorded, **but** the interview is **not** dependent on agreement to be recorded. Please indicate whether you agree for your interview to be audio-recorded by checking the appropriate box at the end of this form.
• Length of Interview: The interview is anticipated to last approximately one (1) hour.

Risks/Benefits
• There are no foreseeable risks involved in participating in this research beyond those experienced in everyday life.
• There are no direct benefits anticipated for you from participation, but given the ongoing and increasing global demands for conflict prevention, management and resolution, benefits are expected for the military, international and domestic organizations, and others who participate in and/or are called upon to be involved with preventive diplomacy efforts in all its manifestations. The primary outcome anticipated from this research will be potential explanations for non-utilization of pre-conflict interventions since UNPREDEP. Additional outcomes may be recommendations for policy and actions, especially pre-conflict efforts which may be similar to UNPREDEP.

Confidentiality
• You may choose whether you would like your identity and participation in this research to remain confidential. If you request that the researcher keep your identity confidential the field notes and audio-recordings will not be labeled with your name and your name will not appear in any published work resulting from this research. Given the goals of the research it is impossible to avoid indicating that you may be from the Nordic countries, for example, or from the United Nations even if you request that your identity remain confidential. Given your position, lengthy experience, and elite status, it may be possible for others to deduce your identity from your comments that may be published. Please indicate your preference regarding confidentiality by checking the appropriate box at the end of this form.
• If you agree for your identity to be associated with your comments and the researcher wishes to cite you in the resulting dissertation, the researcher will contact you and provide you with a copy of the proposed citation, and request your approval to use materials resulting from the relevant interview(s). If you do not respond to the researcher, citations from your interview will be used at the discretion of the researcher.
• Audio recordings and related transcripts, if created, will be retained on a separate computer drive (portable), password-protected, in an encrypted format, and will be kept in a locked cabinet on the researcher's premises. The researcher is the only individual with access and will be the only person who will transcribe such notes and/or recordings. It is anticipated such recordings and records, if any, will be retained for a period not exceeding three (3) to five (5) years for future scholarly research and for responsive purposes.
Voluntary Participation
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you do not want to be in this study, you do not have to participate. Even if you decide to participate, you are free not to answer any question(s) or to withdraw from participation at any time without penalty.

Contacts and Questions
If you have questions about this research study, please feel free to contact Mary Frances R. Lebamoff at mflebamoff@gmail.com. You may also contact Dr. Alexandru Grigorescu, faculty sponsor at Loyola University Chicago, at agrigor@luc.edu or by telephone at +1.773.508.3059.
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the Compliance Manager, Loyola University Chicago’s Office of Research Services at +1.773.508.2689.

Statement of Consent
Your signature below indicates that you have read and understood the information provided above, have had an opportunity to ask questions, and agree to participate in this research study. You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records.

☐ Yes ☐ No I agree for my name, position, and other relevant information to be associated with my comments and participation in this research.

☐ Yes ☐ No I agree to the audio-recording of this interview.

____________________________________________  ____________________, 2009
Participant’s Signature                          Date

Participant’s e-mail  ___________________________@ ____________________

____________________________________________  ____________________, 2009
Researcher’s Signature                          Date
Dear General/Mr./Ms. ____________,

I am writing to you because of your leadership role (close involvement) with the United Nations Preventive Deployment Mission (UNPREDEP), Republic of Macedonia between 1993 and 1999. As a doctoral candidate at Loyola University Chicago, I am engaged in research utilizing UNPREDEP as the case study. I attach the Dissertation Proposal Abstract for your review, and would be pleased to provide you with the entire proposal should you wish.

The primary question this research examines is why there have been no further preventive deployment missions since UNPREDEP, given that it was assessed as successful and cost-effective in meeting the terms of its mandate. Your knowledge and experiences are of critical importance to exploring this question; few understand UNPREDEP better than those who were on the ground/directly involved in its operations and missions.

I would appreciate the opportunity to speak with you, and to include your insights into UNPREDEP as part of these dissertation efforts. I will be in ____________ the week of ____________, 2009, and ask if it is possible to set up an appointment with you during that week. About one (1) hour of your time would be deeply appreciated. Prior to this appointment, I could send you the general questions we would likely discuss upon your request.

Because the dates I will be in ____________ are rapidly approaching, and my time is, unfortunately, limited to some extent, I would appreciate your reply at your earliest convenience. I will be as flexible as possible in setting up meeting times and places; please do not hesitate to indicate your preferences – there may be some possibility for alternate dates or arrangements.

It is best to respond to me via e-mail at mubleamoff@gmail.com. On or before Wednesday, 10 June 2000, I will have a Sonera-based cell phone number with SMS text capabilities. I will forward that information to you immediately upon service activation.

Thank you so much for your professional generosity in addressing UNPREDEP and its importance. Your involvement is vital to this research, and I am truly grateful.

Respectfully,

Mary Frances Lebamoff  
Ph.D. Candidate - Department of Political Science  
*Loyola University Chicago*

Land Line (Chicago) 773.728.3668  
Cell Phone (US-based) 313.247.9473
A-3. Interview Questions

Please note: It is not anticipated all questions will be asked of all individuals. These are provided as an indicator of possible interview questions/topic areas. It will be deeply appreciated if those who consent to these discussions take an active approach to bringing up key issues, examples and concerns.

**General View of UNPROFOR/M and/or UNPREDEP**
- When did you join the mission and in what capacity?
- How did the mission and your view of it develop during your involvement with it?

**Challenges of UNPROFOR/M and/or UNPREDEP**
- What were some of the particular challenges you faced?
- What were the approaches to resolving them? How and why these chosen, and what were the results?
- Can you speak to your perceptions of the domestic situation at the time? Inter-ethnic relations? Government actors and their roles/activities?

**Information and Intelligence**
- What kinds of information did you have access to from the UN?
- How did you share information?
- Was information/intel from you specifically sought by the UN?
- Were you able to request specific information from UN? (Whom?)
- Did others volunteer information? (Who?)

**Interactions with Other Entities and Individuals**
- Can you describe interactions with other organizations/entities, and what their significance was to this mission:
  - Macedonian authorities, CoE, OSCE, EU or NATO, etc.?

**UNPREDEP: Success, Failure or Something In Between?**

**The Future of Preventive Deployment**
- How would you evaluate the outcome of UNPREDEP?
- Thoughts on why another PreDep has not been attempted since UNPREDEP?
- Other situations where PreDep might have been applicable – and if there is/are any, why it was not have been utilized?
- Do you feel there is a future for preventive deployment in the preventive diplomacy/conflict management arsenal?
- Is what you learned as part of UNPREDEP transferrable in some respects to other PKOs or conflict management situations? Please explain.
B-1. The Republic of Macedonia
B-2. Macedonia relative to Kosovo
B-3. Balkan Region Map

Provided courtesy of Zoran Ilievski, Ph.D.
APPENDIX C

COMPARISON OF PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P)
Comparison of Preventive Deployment and Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Terms and Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Preventive Deployment</th>
<th>R2P</th>
<th>Protection of Civilians (POC)/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Conflict entry or Later – not early intervention</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host State must request</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State can deny</td>
<td>Can ask to leave</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive Deployment Included</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved Security Council Resolution Required</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection from and Preventing Incitement to Atrocities</td>
<td>Largely untried in a single field operation to date, but within concepts</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Must determine relevant human rights violations <em>before</em> invoking</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gravity/Seriousness of Human Rights Violations determined</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application of R2P principles</td>
<td>Yes (some)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (possible)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State obviously failing to meet its responsibility to protect? Determine.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covers all violations of Human Rights?</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>No: strong link to HR</td>
<td>Related to Armed Conflict only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Conflict only?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not pre-conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Root Cause Deterrence?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Any form of a military intervention under R2P must fulfill the following six criteria to be justified as an extraordinary measure of intervention:

1. Just cause (large-scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing)
2. Right intention (primary purpose: to halt or avert human suffering)
3. Last resort – every non-military option for prevention or peaceful resolution exhausted
4. Proportional means (minimum necessary means to achieve objective of human protection)
5. Reasonable Prospects (of halting or averting the suffering; consequences of inaction greater than those of action)
6. Right Authority (UN Security Council)

Sovereignty was re-conceptualized by ICISS commission as responsibility – for protecting lives and safety of citizens; that national political authorities are responsible to citizens internally and to the IC through the UN; third, that state agents are responsible (and accountable) for their actions (omission and commission).

The key standard under which R2P will be considered is if the examination of the situation establishes a real risk that exceptionally grave human rights violations, as described in genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing are occurring or could occur in the future.¹

THREE PILLARS or LEVELS of R2P: Responsibility to “protect”

1. Prevent atrocity and suffering;
2. Intervene in cases of human rights violations;
3. Rebuild post-intervention to prevent future rights abuses.

FOUR CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH MOST APPLICABLE:

1. War crimes
2. Ethnic cleansing
3. Crimes against humanity
4. Genocide

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Chesterman, Simon, ed. Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics. NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003.


United Nations Security Council Resolutions on UNPREDEP


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1999: S/RES/1259 (ICTY Prosecutor, Yugoslavia and Rwanda); S/RES/1239 and 1244 (Kosovo); S/201[S/PV.3982] (Mandate renewal vetoed by China 25 February 1999); see also Press Release SC/6648. UNPREDEP formally ended on 28 February 1999 as a result.
VITA

Mary Frances Rosett Lebamoff was born in Oceanside, California, then lived in the Midwest or abroad. Prior to attending Loyola University Chicago, she had an “irregular” college career (five universities) as she sought her Bachelor’s for 31 years, finally attaining it with High Distinction at University of Michigan, Dearborn, in April of 2003. Her Master’s in Political Science is from Loyola University Chicago.

She began graduate studies at Loyola University Chicago in May 2003 in Chicago Studies, but then focused on Political Science as of January 2004. During her Loyola studies, she was the first to receive the Tuma-Gravett Award, the first President of the Graduate Students Association, and received an Arthur J. Schmitt Dissertation Fellowship. Lebamoff also taught undergraduate International Relations, Ethnicity and Nationalism, and War and Conflict at Loyola. In 2006, she began her pre-dissertation research in Macedonia and Eastern Europe, continuing research in Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Poland in 2009 and 2010. She also served as Secretariat Director for the IUS (Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society) from 2005 – 2011.

In February 2011, Lebamoff joined University of Maryland University College (UMUC), where she is presently Academic Director/Program Chair for Political Science and Government, and an Associate Professor. She has also served UMUC as Acting History and African American Studies Chair, and Acting Legal Studies Chair. She lives in Bowie, Maryland adjoining Washington, D.C., and remains active in several professional organizations, most focusing on peace operations and conflict management.