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Philo’s Εὐσέβεια and Paul’s Πνεῦμα: The Appropriation and Alteration of Hellenistic and Greek Philosophical Traditions in Their Ethical Discourses

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Loyola University Chicago

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PHILO’S ΕΥΣΕΒΕΙΑ AND PAUL'S ΠΝΕΥΜΑ: THE APPROPRIATION AND ALTERATION OF HELLENISTIC JEWISH AND GREEK PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS IN THEIR ETHICAL DISCOURSES

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY PROGRAM IN THEOLOGY

BY SR. NELIDA NAVEROS CORDOVA, CDP DIRECTOR: FR. THOMAS H. TOBIN, S.J., PH.D.

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS AUGUST 2016
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to help me proofread the chapters of this dissertation, along with Diane E. D. Wilkens. Finally, my deepest gratitude to my family, for their unconditional love, especially many thanks to my father, to whom this dissertation is dedicated.
For my father, Abraham Naveros Galindo
The Spirit of the Community is the Spirit of Jesus Christ Himself…. It is our great work to be like Jesus in everything; in our thoughts, in our hearts, in the intention of our actions, in our outward appearance, in all of our relationships, in His goodness, in His humility and His meekness. This is our whole life’s duty.

—Bishop Ketteler
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABR  Australian Biblical Review
AGJU  Arbeiten zur Geschichte des antiken Judentums und des Urchristentums
AIPHOS  Annuaire de l’Institut de philologie et d’histoire orientales et slaves
AJT  American Journal of Theology
ALGHJ  Arbeiten zur Literatur und Geschichte des hellenistischen Judentums
AnBib  Analecta Biblica
ASBF  Analecta Studium Biblicum Franciscanum
ASE  Annali di Storia dell’Esegesi
ATR  Australasian Theological Review
AB  Anchor Bible
BASP  Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists
BBR  Bulletin for Biblical Research
BECNT  Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament
BETL  Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium
BFCT  Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie
BHT  Beiträge zur historischen Theologie
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<td>Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester</td>
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<td>Black’s New Testament Commentaries</td>
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<td>BTH</td>
<td>Bibliothèque de théologie historique</td>
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<td>BZ</td>
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<td>BZAW</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBQ</td>
<td>Catholic Biblical Quarterly</td>
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<td>CCT</td>
<td>Cuneiform Texts from Cappadocian Tablets in the British Museum</td>
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<td>CRINT</td>
<td>Compendia Rerum Judaicarum ad Novum Testamentum</td>
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<td>CSCP</td>
<td>Cornell Studies in Classical Philology</td>
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<td>CurBR</td>
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<tr>
<td>EKKNT</td>
<td>Evangelisch-katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament</td>
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<td>Estudios biblicos</td>
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<td>FRLANT</td>
<td>Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments</td>
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<td>HTR</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Modern scholarship on Philo (ca. 20 C.E.–50 C.E.) and Paul (ca. 8 B.C.E.–68 C.E.) has shown a strong interest in their ethical teachings, and this study continues that interest. The main focus of this study is to investigate and compare Philo and Paul’s ethical discourses through the lens of two key concepts: εὐσέβεια (piety) and πνεῦμα (spirit), and situate Philo and Paul within the larger context of Hellenistic Judaism and the Greco-Roman world. The purpose of the comparison is to illumine how the common Greek virtue expressed as εὐσέβεια in Philo’s writings and the concept of πνεῦμα in Paul’s seven undisputed letters are mutually revelatory for understanding both the ways of negotiating their Hellenistic Jewish and Greek philosophical traditions, and the worlds of Judaism and early Christianity of the first century C.E.

Status Quaestionis

Scholars have made valuable contributions in the studies on ethics in Philo and Paul that have opened the horizons to new approaches and methods in ways that have enriched Jewish and New Testament studies. In Philo, for example, particular importance has been given to the intrinsic relation between the Decalogue and ethical life. In Paul’s case, the role of πνεῦμα in his ethics has received significant attention. To date, however, none of the studies has offered an examination of the preeminent role that εὐσέβεια plays in Philo’s ethical discourse. Similarly, although previous studies on πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethics have
offered valuable insights, a more comprehensive analysis needs to be done on the Greek concept of πνεῦμα viewed as the primary concept in the configuration of Paul’s ethical discourse. This study aims to examine in depth their ethical discourses in light of two traditions: the Hellenistic Jewish and Greek philosophical. Chapter one, then, presents chronologically the important contributions of previous studies that have examined Philo’s use of the concept of εὐσέβεια and Paul’s use of the concept of πνεῦμα in their ethics.

Philo’s Εὐσέβεια

Historical scholarship on Philo’s ethics is relatively large.1 Surprisingly, however, works devoted to Philo’s use of the concept of εὐσέβεια appears small, and actually, none of these treatments of εὐσέβεια in Philo shows the important connection of this concept with his ethical discourse.

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Harry Austryn Wolfson and Dieter Kaufmann-Bühler: The Background of Philo’s Concept of Εὐσέβεια in Greek Philosophical Tradition and Jewish Scripture (LXX)

Harry Austryn Wolfson² is the first scholar who dedicates a small section of a chapter on “Ethical Theory” to a study of the concept of εὐσέβεια in Philo. Wolfson’s aim is primarily to present the significant similarities between Philo’s definition of εὐσέβεια with the Greek philosophical understanding of the concept.³ He argues that it is in accordance with Greek philosophical usage that Philo uses εὐσέβεια as a virtue equivalent to “wisdom [σοφία] in the service of God” or “the knowledge [ἐπιστήμη] of how to serve God.”⁴ It is also in accordance with Greek philosophical usage that Philo considers εὐσέβεια as a special kind of justice towards the gods (Virt. 19–20).⁵ In fact, when Philo lists several virtues, he tends to place either εὐσέβεια, ὁσιότης (holiness), or θεοσέβεια (godliness) immediately after δικαιοσύνη (justice).⁶ An important contribution of Wolfson is his claim that among the Stoics, the virtue εὐσέβεια is placed first on the list of subordinate virtues under the


⁵. Cf. Plato, Def. 412E; Diogenes Laertius 3. 83; Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Physicos 1.123–24; Aristotle, Eth. eud. 7.15, 1249b20; Plato Euthyphr. 12E; Protagoras 329C, 349D.

⁶. Εὐσέβεια after δικαιοσύνη: Cher. 96; Det. 73; ὁσιότης after εὐσέβεια: Det. 21; θεοσέβεια after δικαιοσύνη: Spec. 4.134, 170; ὁσιότης after δικαιοσύνη: Spec. 1.304; 2.12; Virt. 47; Praem. 66.
generic virtue δικαιοσύνη. Also, making a connection with Platonic thought, he asserts that in the *Euthyphro*, Plato has Socrates suggest that εὐσέβεια, a virtue concerned with worshipping the gods, is a part of δικαιοσύνη (12E 9–10).

Wolfson observes that it is Philo who first describes εὐσέβεια as the queen (βασιλίς) or leader (ἡγεμονίς) of all the other virtues (βασιλίς, *Spec.* 4.147; ἡγεμονίς, *Decal.* 119; *Spec.* 4.135; *Virt.* 95; QG 2.38). Indeed, neither Plato nor the Stoics makes such claim. Wolfson shows that in Aristotle there are statements where δικαιοσύνη is often thought to be the greatest or mightiest (κρατίστης) of virtues (*Eth.* *Nic.* 5.1.1129b27–28) and that εὐσέβεια is either a part of δικαιοσύνη or an accompaniment to it (*Virt.* vit 5.1250b22–23). Although Wolfson convincingly explains the close association of Philo’s εὐσέβεια with common Greek philosophical use of the term, he does not explore the Greek philosophical influenced on Philo’s motivation for giving εὐσέβεια a prominent position in his lists of virtues.

Wolfson also proposes the view that the reason why Philo calls the virtue of εὐσέβεια queen of virtues (ἡγεμονίς τῶν ἀρετῶν) is actually because he was primarily inspired by the Jewish Scripture (supposedly the LXX). Wolfson argues that the key to


8. Wolfson (*Philo*, 2:214–15) explains that the Greek term εὐσέβεια is composed of the two Greek words εὖ (well) and σέβας (fear or awe). The expression “fear of the Lord” in the Old Testament is translated as εὐσέβεια in the LXX. Ferfrugge (*The NIV Theological Dictionary of New Testament Words*, 1152) confirmed Wolfson’s view stating that the common feature of “fear of God” is essentially an Old Testament idea of εὐσέβεια; in fact, in the few cases where εὐσέβεια and its cognates are used, it generally renders words from the Hebrew root יָרֵא (to fear). On the use of the concept of εὐσέβεια in the LXX, see T. Muraska, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the Septuagint* (Louvain: Peeters, 2009); George Morrich, *A Handy Concordance of the Septuagint, Giving Various Readings from Codices Vaticanus, Alexandrinus, Sinaicus, and Ephraemi with an
scriptural passage responsible for Philo’s special treatment of εὐσέβεια is Prov 1:7 (“The fear of the Lord [φόβος θεοῦ] is the beginning [ἀρχὴ] of wisdom… and piety towards God [εὐσέβεια δὲ εἰς θεὸν] is the beginning [ἀρχὴ] of discernment”). Wolfson connects the word ἀρχὴ in Prov 1:7 with Philo’s description of εὐσέβεια as the beginning (ἀρχὴ) of all the virtues in Decal. 12, 52 (here the term ἀρχὴ is to be supplied from the context), assuming that Prov 1:7 inspired him to refer to εὐσέβεια as the queen (ἡγεμονίς) of the virtues. Wolfson also uses two passages from a Hellenistic Jewish work, the Letter of Aristeas (2nd century B.C.E.), to support his claim: Let. Arist. 131 (“Our Lawgiver first of all [πρῶτον] laid down the principles of piety [εὐσέβεια] and justice”), and Let. Arist. 189 (“If you take the fear of God as your starting point [καταρχήν], you will never miss the goal”). However, he does not explain how these two passages are linked to Philo’s thought about εὐσέβεια. Although Wolfson’s short treatment became the foundation for later studies on Philo’s εὐσέβεια, as seen in the following decades, he does not offer any contribution to the relationship between Philo’s εὐσέβεια and ethics, or the Mosaic Law.

The German scholar Dieter Kaufmann-Bühler in his section on εὐσέβεια dealing with Philo made two significant contributions beyond Wolfson. First, Kaufmann-Bühler

Appendix from Origen’s Hexapla etc., not Found in the Above Manuscripts (London: Samuel Bagster & Sons Limited, 1970).


11. Like his predecessor, Kaufmann-Bühler also relates Philo’s usage of εὐσέβεια with Plato’s Euthyphro (12E 9–10) and the Stoic definition of εὐσέβεια as a kind of δικαιοσύνη towards God (Chrysippus, SVF 3:264). But, it is only with Philo, Kaufmann-Bühler notes, that both δικαιοσύνη and εὐσέβεια came to have the same meaning (e.g., Abr. 208; Virt. 51, 95). For
connects the concept of εὐσέβεια with Philo’s ethics as Philo reveals the unique character of his ethics when he positions εὐσέβεια as ἡγεμονίς τῶν ἀρετῶν. While it is true that εὐσέβεια has a place in ancient Greek philosophical catalogue of virtues, εὐσέβεια is never either the prerequisite or the main principle of ancient ethics. It is only designated a virtue subordinated to the generic virtue of δικαιοσύνη. Kaufmann-Bühler argues that εὐσέβεια’s special position in relation to other virtues reflects the theonomic character of Philo’s ethics (Decal. 52; Spec. 1.303; Virt. 181; Mos. 1.189; Abr. 129). That is, Philo’s unique position of εὐσέβεια in his ethics is only the natural result of his being thoroughly theonomic. Although his claim is important, he does not give examples of how this is so.

Second, Kaufmann-Bühler points to the close association of εὐσέβεια with the Decalogue. He argues that although Philo’s language is in accord with the popular Greek usage, his use of εὐσέβεια is closely related to the Jewish religious observances laid out in the Decalogue. Kaufmann-Bühler, however, does not attempt to trace or establish how this is shown in Philo’s treatises. In his analysis of Philo’s ethics and εὐσέβεια, Kaufmann-Bühler emphasizes the connection between the virtues δικαιοσύνη and φιλανθρωπία, (love of humanity), and especially the relationship between εὐσέβεια and φιλανθρωπία, when Philo refers to both as queen of virtues (Virt. 95). Although Kaufmann-Bühler recognizes εὐσέβεια, δικαιοσύνη, and φιλανθρωπία as central virtues

example, Chrysippus writes, “δικαιοσύνη is the first virtue and εὐσέβεια, χρηστότης (goodness), εὐκοινωνησία (good fellowship), and εὐσυναλλαξία (fair dealing) are subordinated to it.” See Kaufmann-Bühler, “Eusebeia,” 992.

12. Kaufmann-Bühler (“Eusebeia,” 991) argues that εὐσέβεια is listed in the Stoic-Platonic canon of virtues under the generic virtue δικαιοσύνη, and as such it its moral character is generally connected with acts of justice only in the sozialen Seite (the social sphere).

in Philo’s *Decalogue*, he does not go further to explain the fact that Philo subsumes the ten headings or “summaries” under these three virtues, together with ὁσιότης: the first set of five commandments under the virtues of εὐσέβεια/ὁσιότης and the second set of five commandments under the virtues of δικαιοσύνη/φιλανθρωπία.

Despite Kaufmann-Bühler’s treatment of εὐσέβεια is limited, his study offers a substantial contribution to the understanding of Philo’s use of εὐσέβεια and its relationship to other virtues, especially φιλανθρωπία and δικαιοσύνη. Most importantly, he introduces the significant association between εὐσέβεια as the queen of the virtues and the *Decalogue* in Philo’s ethics, which is valuable for the present study.

*David Winston and Ronald Williamson: The Decalogue and the Intellectual Virtues: Piety, Holiness, Godliness, and Faith*

David Winston,14 in his article “Philo’s Ethical Theory,” devotes a brief discussion to Philo’s view of εὐσέβεια and its intrinsic relation to the *Decalogue*. This expands on Kaufmann-Bühler’s study. When discussing Philo’s ethics and its relation to the *Decalogue*, Winston explains that Philo equally divides the *Decalogue* into two sets of five commandments (see *Decal.* 50–51): the first set comprising the duties to God (εὐσέβεια), and the second set the duties to human beings (δικαιοσύνη) (*Her.* 168; *Spec.* 2.63). For Philo, neither the service to God nor to human beings must be neglected for the other, because the practice of both sets of commandments are necessary to “win honor” in virtue (*Decal.* 108–110).15 Unfortunately, Winston does not connect Philo’s ethical theory with the

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15. When Philo explains how one is to serve both God and human beings, he claims that it is through εὐπάθεια (rational emotions) rather than πάθη (passions) that one is capable of serving both of them. That is, one who acts out of εὐπάθεια would clearly be a lover of both God
concept of εὐσέβεια, despite the fact that the virtue εὐσέβεια is so intrinsically linked to the Decalogue, as chapter three will show. Winston briefly associates εὐσέβεια along with δικαιοσύνη with the Decalogue only when he illustrates Philo’s depiction of the lives of the Patriarchs (Abraham, Jacob, Isaac, and also Moses) as examples of both virtues (εὐσέβεια and δικαιοσύνη).16 Winston’s view of εὐσέβεια is generally in relation to other Greek virtues. For example, discussing the virtue of φιλανθρωπία, like Kaufmann-Bühler, Winston sees the special relationship between εὐσέβεια and φιλανθρωπία when he points out that Philo describes φιλανθρωπία as εὐσέβεια’s sister and twin, “for the love of God involves the love of man, inasmuch as man, ‘the best of living creatures’, through that higher part of his being, namely, the soul, is most nearly akin to heaven, the purest thing in all that exists…” (Decal. 134).17

Ronald Williamson18 also dedicates a chapter to Philo’s ethics. Taking the Jewish Scripture as the basic text for Philo’s ethics, Williamson argues that for Philo, Jewish ethics, which is enshrined in the Decalogue, is superior to all other ancient Greek ethics. Like his predecessors (e.g., Wolfson), Williamson points out that εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης are great virtues, and together with πίστις (faith) and δικαιοσύνη, are equally designated and human beings, and the one who serves only one side (either God or human beings) would act as a result of πάθη. Cf. Winston, “Philo’s Ethical Theory,” 2:396.

16. Winston (“Philo’s Ethical Theory,” 2:395) however, recognizes the chief place of εὐσέβεια or ὁσιότης, because the love of God is the highest good, and everything else derives from it (e.g., Spec. 4.97, 135, 147; Decal. 119; Virt. 95; Praem. 53). Cf. Plato Euthyphr. 12Cff.; Prot. 330B; Lach. 199D; Aristotle, Eth. nic. 5.1.1129b27–28; Eth. eud. 7.5.1249b20; Virt. vit. 1250b23–24; Plato Def. 412–15; Diogenes Laertius 3.83; SVF 2.1017; 3.660.


queens of virtues. Although, he views Philo’s ethics as primarily influenced by the Pentateuch, with some borrowings from Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, he believes, like Winston, that the Decalogue is the “heart” of Philo’s ethical thinking.

According to Williamson, Philo views the Decalogue as “the supreme catalogue of virtues,” which are necessary “to imitate God” (Spec. 4.41–77 [Exod 23:3]). For example, the first four commandments of the Decalogue teach intellectual virtues (piety [εὐσέβεια], holiness [ἁγιότης], godliness [θεοσέβεια], and faith [πίστις]) because they have God as their object. They are related with right opinions, beliefs about God, his nature, and his activity as Creator. So, to possess the intellectual virtues is, in Philo’s view, to possess wisdom (σοφία), which is knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of all the teachings contained in the Law. From the four intellectual virtues, εὐσέβεια is the queen or source of all the other virtues as God is the source of being (Dec. 52). But, when Philo writes about the virtue of πίστις, he also calls it queen of the virtues like εὐσέβεια. The intellectual virtue πίστις


20. Williamson, (“The Ethical Teaching of Philo,” 208) points out that in terms of categories of virtues, Philo makes a distinction between intellectual, moral, and bodily virtues. He also makes an important distinction, following Aristotle, between virtue and action, stressing the importance of the virtuous act, of right actions. For a description of Philo’s division of virtues, see Wolfson, Philo, 2:202–205.


22. In the Aristotelian and Stoic catalogues of virtues, there are two types of virtues, the intellectual virtues and the character or moral virtues (see Aristotle, Ethic. nic. Book 2–5; Book 6; Diogenes Laertius 7.90–91; Stobaeus 2.59.4–62.6).
not only involves belief in revealed truths (Leg. 3.228), but it also inculcates trust in God’s promises (Her. 100–101; cf. Gen 15:6), as he frequently speaks of “faith as trusting ‘in God alone.’” Like Kaufmann-Bühler, Williamson emphasizes the special place Philo gives to the virtues of δικαιοσύνη and φιλανθρωπία (Decal. 164; Mos. 2.9), which are virtues nearest in nature to εὐσέβεια (Virt. 51).\(^{23}\) It is clear that for Philo εὐσέβεια requires φιλανθρωπία, for the pious person is also one who loves humanity.\(^{24}\) This is observed for example in his description of Moses, the Lawgiver. He is considered εὐσεβής (a pious man) because he possesses φιλανθρωπία through a “happy gift of natural goodness” (Virt. 80). Following in the footsteps of Wolfson, Williamson argues that Philo’s treatment of εὐσέβεια, and thus wisdom, was probably influenced by Prov 1:7 (Decal. 52) rather than Greek philosophers.\(^{25}\)

Williamson’s most valuable contribution for this study, however, is the idea that “becoming like to God” (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ)\(^{26}\) is essential in Philo’s ethical theory. In Migr. 132, Philo views εὐσέβεια and πίστις as virtues that “adjust and unite the intent of the heart to the incorruptible Being: as Abraham when he believed is said to ‘come near to God’ (Gen 18:23).”\(^{27}\) It is worth noting that Hans-Joachim Schoeps is the first scholar to recognize that in Philo, the Patriarchs (Abraham, Jacob, and Isaac, as well as Moses) are figures

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24. Because of the tie connection between εὐσέβεια and φιλανθρωπία (Virt. 95), Philo calls both piety and love of humanity the “chief virtues” (e.g., Spec. 4.147; Praem. 53).


26. Williamson, “The Ethical Teaching of Philo,” 214. Previously, Kaufmann-Bühler (“Eusebeia,” 1021) stresses the idea that Philo’s combination of philosophical knowledge of God consisting of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ and εὐσέβεια is for Philo the basis of all virtues. This idea is later developed by Sterling, whose work will be treated in this dissertation.

who symbolize human souls on their way towards God.\textsuperscript{28} They are examples of mystical perfection because of their εὐσέβεια. In fact, Philo explains in \textit{Post}. 28 that when God commands Moses on Sinai: “Come here to me,” it is an indication that God is imparting to him a share in His own divine nature.

Like his predecessors, there is a vital contribution in Williamson’s connection between Philo’s ethics and the Decalogue as well as the association of εὐσέβεια with the other contemplative virtues. But, with the exception of his treatment of “becoming like to God,” he does not move beyond what his predecessors have already supplied and offer a more substantive understanding of the role of εὐσέβεια in Philo’s ethical teaching. Consequently, this important Greek concept, as a key concept in Philo’s ethical discourse, still remains obscure.

\textit{Gregory E. Sterling and Angela Maria Mazzanti: The Imitatio of God as the Ultimate Goal of Εὐσέβεια and Philo’s (Mono)theism}

More recently, Gregory E. Sterling has supplied the first extensive study of Philo’s εὐσέβεια as the queen of the virtues.\textsuperscript{29} Discussing Philo’s source for his definition of εὐσέβεια, Sterling reaffirms what his predecessors (Wolfson and Kaufmann-Bühler) have already claimed: that Philo’s εὐσέβεια reflects both Plato’s definition of it in \textit{Euthyphro} (12E)\textsuperscript{30} and the Stoics’ understanding of the term (“the knowledge of the service of the gods” \textit{[SVF} 2.304.18–19; 3.67.11; 3.157.11–12; 3.157.25–26\textit{]}). Drawing on John Dillon, John Glucker, [Hans-Joachim Schoeps, \textit{Paul: The Theology of the Apostle in the Light of Jewish Religious History} (trans. Harold Knight [German was published in 1959]; London: Lutterworth Press, 1961), 32–33.]


\textsuperscript{30} Sterling, “‘The Queen of the Virtues,’” 112.
and Naomi G. Cohen, Sterling observes a close affinity between Plato’s definition of ἑυσέβεια in *Euthyphro* 13A and Philo’s understanding of the term in *Det.* 55; cf. *Abr.* 129.31 According to Sterling, like most philosophers, Philo often links ἑυσέβεια with related terms, especially with ὁσιότης, and uses “the term [ἑυσέβεια to suggest the human understanding of God, thus giving it an intellectual quality.”32 Sterling’s view clearly aligns with the arguments offered by Williamson and Wolfson (Philo’s division of virtues), in which the virtue of ἑυσέβεια is an intellectual type under Wisdom. They explain that

31. John Dillon (*The Middle Platonists 80 B.C.to A.D. 220* [Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1977], 150) is the first who notes the close similarities between Philo’s *Det.* 55–60 and Plato’s *Euthyphro* 13A. According to Dillon, Philo had *Euthyphro* in mind because *Det.* 55–60 echoes *Euthyphr.* 13A. When discussing the “canon of two virtues” (ἑυσέβεια and ὁσιότης), Philo replaces wisdom and makes both ἑυσέβεια and ὁσιότης the “queen” of the virtues (*Spec.* 4.135). The association of ἑυσέβεια and ὁσιότης is typical in the philosophical tradition that goes back at least to Plato (*Euthyphr.* 13B and 5C-D, for the adjective ἑυσεβής, 12E). Likewise, when speaking of φιλανθρωπία, he ranks it as the twin of ἑυσέβεια (Virt. 95)—love of humanity concerning service towards human beings, and thus towards all creation, which is the counterpart to the honoring of God defined by the Stoics as “the science of the service of the Gods” (*SVF* 2.1017). Later, John Glucker (“Piety, Dogs, and a Platonic Reminiscence: Philo, ‘Quod Deterius’ 54–56 and Plato, ‘Euthyphro’ 12e–15a.” *ICS* 18 [1993]: 131–38) expands this similarity between *Det.* 55–56 and *Euthyphr.* 12E–15A. Glucker argues that although in Philo’s definition of ἑυσέβεια and ὁσιότης, the latter and its cognates are entirely absent, he takes it for granted that ἑυσέβεια is θεοῦ θεραπεία in the sense that it is the service “slaves render to their masters when they are set on doing promptly what they are told to do.” His idea that those who serve God properly do so only for their own benefit, is something that would be incomprehensible to the *Euthyphro* of Plato’s dialogue. However, from *Euthyphr.* 14A to the end of the dialogue, Socrates’ and Euthyphro’s discussion turns from acts of justice to acts of “pure worship, that is, from ὅσιον to ἑυσεβές.” They would imply that, since the gods give us all the good things we have, they deserve honor and respect from us even though they need, and get, nothing out of them. This idea would be close enough to Philo’s position, although his idea of worshipping God is a step in a person’s progress towards knowledge of God. But, unlike those, who sees a distinction between ἑυσέβεια and ὁσιότης, for Philo, according to Glucker, the two virtues are one and the same virtue. Glucker’s argument is supported by Naomi G. Cohen (“The Greek Virtues and the Mosaic Laws in Philo,” 10) who points out that “ἐυσέβεια and ὁσιότης’ as used by Philo is actually a *hendiadys*—the expression of a concept by two words connected by “and” (cf. *inter alia* Philo *Decal.* 119; see also *Mos.* 2.216; Plato *Euthyphr.* 12E).

32. Sterling, “‘The Queen of the Virtues,’” 113.
εὐσέβεια together with ὀσιότης, θεοσέβεια, and πίστις have God as their goal (service of God).

Like Williamson, Sterling also sees the Greek philosophical influence (Platonic, Stoic, and Neo-Phythagorean) on Philo’s understanding of εὐσέβεια in relation to ὀμοίωσις θεῶ. But, Sterling is the first to make a direct association of the formulation ὀμοίωσις θεῶ to εὐσέβεια alone. He takes Plato’s Theaetetus 176B (“flight is likeness of God”), the Cynic-Stoic formulation (“according to nature”), and the Pythagorean formulation (“to follow God”) to show correctly that Philo shares with these philosophical ways of understanding the necessity of “becoming like to God” by being zealous for εὐσέβεια (Abr. 60). While Sterling seems to place particular attention to Philo’s understanding of “becoming like to God” (ὁμοίωσις θεῶ) within Greek philosophical thought, his observation does not go further to associate the central role of εὐσέβεια with Philo’s ethics.

In the footsteps of Winston, Sterling also connects Philo’s εὐσέβεια to the Decalogue. Sterling, however, is the first to supply concrete examples from Greek writers, who paired “εὐσέβεια and δίκαιος·νη as a shorthand way to summarize human

33. Sterling, “‘The Queen of the Virtues,’” 118–19.

34. See also Spec. 1.30; Virt. 175; Ebr. 84; Somn. 2.106; Spec. 1.186; or a lover of piety in Spec. 1.316; Virt. 218.

35. This is observed when Sterling notes that Philo generally presents the virtue of εὐσέβεια as acting for God where the intimate connection between God and the soul allows human beings (through the divine “likeness” [εἰκόν], that is, the “mind” [νοῦς]) to seek and “become like to God.” See Sterling, “‘The Queen of the Virtues,’” 119. See Philo, Leg. 3.209; Sacr. 37; Somn. 1.194; Spec. 1.299; Virt. 42, 45; Hypoth. 7.13.
obligations to the gods and to other human beings. However, unlike the Greek authors, Philo uses the Greek-twofold division as a means of setting out the requirements of the Law: εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης towards God, φιλανθρωπία and δικαιοσύνη towards human beings (Decal. 50–51, 121).

For Sterling, the Law or Decalogue—whether natural or Mosaic—set the standard for what is pious and what is impious. For this reason, Philo encourages εὐσέβεια towards human beings: for example, to parents (Ios. 240; Decal. 117, 120; Spec. 2.237; QG 4.202), to benefactors (Flacc. 48, 103), and to rulers (Flacc. 98; Legat. 280, 335 [also the negative in Flacc. 128; Legat. 355]); but, he also recognizes the difficulty in practicing εὐσέβεια (Agr. 177–78; cf. Abr. 171; Mos. 2.260; Spec. 2.28). To promote εὐσέβεια, he holds out figures of Israel’s history as models: for example, Noah (Virt. 201), Abraham (Abr. 60, 61, 98, 198, 199, 208), Moses (Mos. 1.187; 2.66, 284; Praem. 53), the twelve tribes (Mos. 1.159, 189), the Levites (Spec. 1.79), and Nadab and Abihu (Somn. 2.67). Like many philosophers, Philo also presents the rewards for εὐσέβεια and the penalties for ἀσέβεια.

36. E.g., Isocrates, Nic. 2; De pace 34; Posidonius frg. 59 [FGrH 87]; Cicero, Nat. d. 2.153; Diodorus Siculus 1.92.5; Marcus Aurelius 7.54; 11.20; cf. also Xenophon, Mem. 4.8.11. Sterling, “The Queen of the Virtues,” 119. This ancient twofold division, human obligations towards gods and to other human beings, Sterling suggests, might have come from the fact that the gods were traditionally identified with the polis, and that religious and civic duties were intimately bound together.

37. Sterling, “The Queen of the Virtues,” 120.

38. Sterling, “The Queen of the Virtues,” 122. For ἀσέβεια as a violation of the Law, see Ebr. 18; Conf. 117; Spec. 1.120; 3.90; Virt. 144; Praem. 129, 142. On ἀσέβημα, see QG 1.66. On ἀσεβέω, see Somn. 1.95; Spec. 2.27; QG 1.66.

39. Philo also provides a few examples of Jews (Contempl. 3, 88; Legat. 297) and non-Jews (Aet. 10; Legat. 319).

40. For the rewards, see Post. 39; Ios.122; Virt. 218; Praem. 93. For punishment, see Cher. 2,
Sterling summarizes in one statement Philo's view of the requirements of εὐσέβεια: “Let there be one bond to serve God and that everything that we say or do is on behalf of piety” ([Spec. 1.317; cf. Post. 181]).

Philo, according to Sterling, is aware of Greek philosophers’ discussions about εὐσέβεια’s relationship to δικαιοσύνη. Indeed, Sterling notes, like Wolfson and Kaufmann-Bühler, that in Greek catalogue of virtues, εὐσέβεια is listed as a subordinate virtue under the heading of δικαιοσύνη, and as such εὐσέβεια concerns obligations or duties to God. Also, Sterling recognizes that unlike Greek philosophers, Philo subsumes all of the virtues under the virtue of εὐσέβεια. He calls εὐσέβεια the queen of virtues ([QG 2.38; Spec. 4.135, 147; Virt. 95, Decal. 119]), the queen of dance ([Praemn. 53]), the greatest ([Spec. 4.97, the leading and greatest virtue ([Abr. 60]), the finest and most profitable ([Mos. 1.146]), and the source of the virtues ([Decal. 52]).

Sterling deals with the crucial question: what led Philo to give εὐσέβεια such prominence? According to Sterling, Philo’s understanding of εὐσέβεια does not derive from the concept of fear of the Lord (Prov 1:7), or from the Middle Platonic formulation

12, 39; [Ebr. 223; Conf. 121, 182, 188; Congr. 57; Mut. 61–62, 169, 265; Somn. 1.22; 2.133; Mos. 1.96; 2.47, 56, 57, 221, 282, 285; Spec. 1.55; Praem. 69; Legat. 293; Prov. 2.33.


42. Sterling notes that for Aristotle the cardinal virtue δικαιοσύνη took precedence over εὐσέβεια; in fact, he calls δικαιοσύνη “perfect virtue,” “the chief of virtues,” and “the whole of virtue” ([Eth. nic. 5.1.1129b26–1130a10]).

43. This is the view of Wolfson ([Philo, 2:215] and Williamson (“The Ethical Teaching of Philo,” 209).
of τέλος ὁμοίωσις θεῷ. Rather, Sterling states that it is basically his theism that led Philo to give εὐσέβεια such prominence; in fact, for Sterling, theism holds the central place in Philo’s thought. To support his argument, Sterling explains that the prominence of εὐσέβεια in Philo is principally a question of the “ultimate source.” That is, as God is the source of all that exists, so is εὐσέβεια the supreme source of the virtues (Decal. 52; cf. Abr. 114). Sterling’s view reflects the position of both Wolfson and Williamson in the sense that they also use Decal. 52 to support their own arguments. However, whereas Sterling focuses on Philo’s theism, Wolfson and Williamson focus on Prov 1:7.

Sterling emphasizes an essential point in Philo’s understanding of εὐσέβεια, a topic that will be discussed in chapter 5. He states that “Philo has advanced well beyond Plato’s Euthyphro … εὐσέβεια became a cardinal virtue. Unlike the thinkers in the Hellenistic philosophical traditions who subordinated εὐσέβεια to δικαιοσύνη or another virtue, Philo thought that it served as a source of all other virtues.” Thus, the main motive that led him to give εὐσέβεια such prominence lies, according to Sterling, in the theocentric nature of his thought, his theism. Sterling states, “it is not that we imitate God to experience God, but that our understanding and experience of God shape our virtue or impiety.”

The rationale for the analogy between “God as source” and “piety as source” is more than the fact that they share a common function; according to Sterling, they are

44. This is the view of Kaufmann-Bührer (“Eusebeia,” 6:994).
45. Sterling, “‘The Queen of the Virtues’,” 121.
46. Sterling, “‘The Queen of the Virtues’,” 123.
47. Sterling, “‘The Queen of the Virtues’,” 123.
intrinsically related in Philo’s thought. Sterling describes both the physical and the moral worlds as the creation of God. With this schema, εὐσέβεια towards God governs both our concept of creation and the ordering of our lives; everything, including ethics, begins with a proper belief in the existence of God and the divine governance of the cosmos. For Philo, these beliefs are held in the νοῦς, which is the “image of God.” Since all human actions are actions for God, they must be pious as well. According to Sterling, Philo portrays Abraham as an example of εὐσέβεια towards God: e.g., his willingness to offer his son Isaac for the sake of God (Gen 22:16). This is a sign of Abraham’s εὐσέβεια, for “it is pious to do everything on behalf of God alone” (Leg. 3.209). From this pious attitude virtues develop, and it is for this reason that Philo regularly includes εὐσέβεια in lists of virtues. While he knows the standard Stoic list (Leg.1.63–65), he often modifies it to include εὐσέβεια, and in some occasions he pairs it with another virtue. Just as he includes εὐσέβεια in virtue lists, he also includes ἀσέβεια in vice lists, and often connects it with ἀδικία. These two lists with their respective association (εὐσέβεια/virtues and ἀσέβεια/vices) are laid out thoroughly in chapter three.


49. For details, see Roberto Radice, Platonismo e creazionismo in Filone di Alessandria. Introduzione di Giovanni Reale, (Metafisica del Platonismo nel suo sviluppo storico e nella filosofia patristica 7; Milano: Vita e pensiero, 1989), esp. 383ff.


51. Cher. 96; Sacr. 27; Det. 72, 73, 114, 143; Deus. 164; Sobr. 40; Abr. 24; los. 143, 246; Mos. 2.216; Spec. 2.63; 4.97, 170, 135; Praem. 160; Prob. 83. On the verb, see Congr. 6.

52. With ἀρετή (Sonn. 1.251); ἐγκράτεια (Spec. 1.193; Sonn. 2.106); θεοσέβεια (Mos. 1.303; καλοκάγαθια (Abr. 98); σωφροσύνη (Sonn. 2.182; and φιλανθρωπία (Virt. 51, 95).

53. Philo incorporates ἀσέβεια or one of its cognates in vice lists in Sacr. 22, 32; Det. 72;
Undoubtedly, Sterling’s study of εὐσέβεια as the queen of the virtues offers an important contribution for the present study. He not only acknowledges previous studies, but his argument is also presented in a more expanded and comprehensive form. Although his focus is on the virtue of εὐσέβεια as the queen of the virtues, he does not deal with the special prominence given to εὐσέβεια particularly in Philo’s ethical discourse.

Following Sterling, Angela Maria Mazzanti analyzes Philo’s concept of εὐσέβεια and its intrinsic relationship to the expression “to do everything for the sake of God only” (Leg. 3.209). According to Mazzanti, the phrase “to do everything for the sake of God only” represents for Philo the true meaning of εὐσέβεια. Like Sterling, she claims that Philo’s identification of εὐσέβεια as a virtue (Spec. 2.62–63) as the fundamental or dominant virtue (Decal. 52; Virt. 95; Spec. 4.147; QG 2.38) is understood in Philo’s monotheistic context where God is not only older than the cosmos, but He is also its Creator (Leg. 3.209). This notion emphasizes the intrinsic relationship that human beings have established with the only God (Plant. 77). Using the example of Gen 22:16 (used also by Sterling), Mazzanti points out that Abraham’s obedience to God’s command represents the true meaning of “to do everything for the sake of God only.”

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Like her predecessors (Kaufmann-Bühler, Winston, Williamson, and Sterling), for Mazzanti, Philo's εὐσέβεια constitutes the principal basis of the Mosaic Law (Decalogue). In fact, the association between εὐσέβεια and the Decalogue in Philo is well-identified in the phrase “to do everything for the sake of God only.” For him, human action is determined by its end, which is ultimately the Law. A key point in Mazzanti’s argument is the realization of the special place of εὐσέβεια in Philo’s monotheism found especially in the concluding passage of On the Creation (Opif. 172; see also Spec. 2.258–59). Like previous scholars, she claims that the supreme virtue εὐσέβεια assumes an intellectual significance (Opif. 172; see also To have εὐσέβεια or to be εὐσεβής, therefore, is considered to have the most important of the benefits, which is knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of the service of God. Mazzanti rightly associates εὐσέβεια with the term λόγος (reason) in the acquisition of virtues when she points out the importance of λόγος in the ascetic exercise of man’s self-offering, as it is observed in Philo’s description of the road of the spiritual athlete (Somn. 1.251). But other than showing that the highest expression of εὐσέβεια is the consecration of the individual’s own self (Spec. 1.248), Mazzanti does not further explore this important connection between εὐσέβεια and λόγος in Philo’s ethics.

Although Mazzanti’s study deals with Philo’s concept of εὐσέβεια, she too does not link the concept with Philo’s ethics. She succeeds in providing an answer to the question of what, according to Philo, the phrase “to do everything for the sake of God only” means, and its close relation to the virtue of εὐσέβεια. She admits, like Sterling, Philo’s

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58. This association will be treated in chapters three and nine.
monotheism as the basis for his view of εὐσέβεια, but he does not offer a substantive support to her view passages besides her interpretation of one particular text in Philo’s writings (Leg. 3.209). She fails to engage other Philonic passages in order to describe with sufficient depth the important association of εὐσέβεια with λόγος, especially in relation to Philo’s ethical discourse.

**Conclusion**

Scholars have contributed significantly to the studies of Philo’s use and understanding of the concept of εὐσέβεια. The works of Wolfson and Kaufmann-Bühler have illustrated Philo’s background of his use of the concept of εὐσέβεια, especially its association with Prov. 1:7 and the Greek philosophical understanding of the term (Plato’s *Euthyphro*, Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*). Significantly important to this study is Kaufmann-Bühler’s emphasis of Philo’s recognition of εὐσέβεια as ἡγεμονίς τῶν ἀρετῶν, and the connection between εὐσέβεια and the Mosaic Law or Decalogue. They have correctly argued that both Greek philosophical tradition and Jewish scripture have helped, in part, to shape his understanding of εὐσέβεια as the queen of the virtues. Their successor, Winston, has expanded the notion of Philo’s εὐσέβεια and associates the concept with the intellectual virtues, and especially with the virtues δικαιοσύνη and φιλανθρωπία. It is Williamson, however, who claims the *Decalogue* as both the supreme catalogue of virtues and the “heart” of Philo’s ethical thought. Also his introduction of the philosophical formulation of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ as an essential element in Philo’s ethical thought is valuable for the present study.

Sterling has been the first to offer a more comprehensive illustration of the concept of εὐσέβεια as the “queen of the virtues” in Philo’s writings upon which this
study shall be built. Although he does not explore in depth all Philonic passages, his argument highlights the special place Philo gives to εὐσέβεια, and shows correctly that Philo moves beyond Greek philosophical understanding of εὐσέβεια. Despite his definition carries on Greek thought, Philo’s εὐσέβεια has a preeminent place in his virtue lists. Unlike his predecessors, Sterling suggests that Philo’s theism has helped shape his unique understanding of εὐσέβεια as the “queen of the virtues,” a view that is followed by Mazzanti in her study of εὐσέβεια and its intrinsic association with the phrase “to do everything for the sake of God only.”

Despite their significant contributions, these studies have not really adequately treated Philo’s association of εὐσέβεια to his ethical discourse. They have indirectly suggested but not established the intrinsic relationship of εὐσέβεια, the source of all other virtues, to Philo’s ethical thought. In addition, they have overlooked how the Hellenistic Jewish and Greek ethical traditions have helped him to configure his own ethical discourse around the concept of εὐσέβεια, and to move beyond both traditions.

Paul’s Πνεῦμα

There is a large amount of secondary literature on πνεῦμα in Paul’s letters.59 Especially since the mid-nineteenth century, Pauline scholars have given particular attention to Paul’s ethics in relation to his theology.60 These studies have emphasized in one way or


60. For a robust bibliography on Paul’s ethics and his theology, see Victor Paul Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1968), esp. 242–94; Wendell L. Willis,
another, the role that πνεῦμα plays in Paul’s ethical teaching. In the present dissertation, however, only those studies that make direct association of πνεῦμα to Paul’s ethics will be presented due to limited space.\[^{61}\] I will rely, to an extent, on the impressive overview of 140 years of research on Paul’s ethics and πνεῦμα in the work of Volker Rabens, *The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul: Transformation and Empowering for Religious-Ethical Life.*\[^{62}\]

**Heinrich Friedrich Th. L. Ernesti and Otto Pfleiderer: Πνεῦμα as the Principle or Law to Ethical Life**

In 1868, the German scholar Heinrich Friedrich Th. L. Ernesti\[^{63}\] published the first study in contemporary scholarship on Paul’s ethics. In his argument, he claims that for Paul the ethical life of a believer is fundamentally based on living κατὰ πνεῦμα (according to the

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\[^{61}\] A number of these authors in this chapter have different views about the Pauline corpus, and for the sake of consistency, I will report only texts that refer to the seven undisputed Pauline letters.


\[^{63}\] Heinrich Friedrich Th. L. Ernesti, *Die Ethik des Apostels Paulus in ihren Grundzügen dargestellt* (Braunschweig: Leibrod, 1880\(^3\); 1868).
Spirit).\(^{64}\) He notes that the divine \(\pi\nu\varepsilon\u03b1\ma\) is the principle of the Christian ethical life by which the believer lives truly ethically. Living “according to the \(\pi\nu\varepsilon\u03b1\ma\)” brings freedom from the power of sin, in a way that the believer can with spontaneity (Selbstthätigkeit) live in accord with the law of God, which according to Ernesti, is the law of \(\pi\nu\varepsilon\u03b1\ma\).\(^{65}\) For Paul, this life in \(\pi\nu\varepsilon\u03b1\ma\) begins at baptism, when a new rebirth in God transforms and sanctifies the believer (e.g., 2 Cor 7:1; Phil 1:9), and creates an ongoing transformation in all aspects of the believer’s Christian life (2 Cor 4:16). The believer’s new life of holiness is only the work and creative expression of God’s power upon the believer (2 Cor 5:18; 1 Cor 6:11), in which the divine \(\pi\nu\varepsilon\u03b1\ma\) becomes imprinted within the human soul.\(^{66}\)

Ferdinand Christian Baur\(^{67}\) helped shape Ernesti’s thought. His concept of Selbstthätigkeit (spontaneity) echoes Baur’s emphasis on Selbstbewuβtsein (self-confidence). Ernesti’s discussion of the Spirit of God as “objective principle” of Christian awareness that becomes subjective possession and “immanent” to the human spirit is also similar to

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64. Ernesti, *Ethik*, 13, 43, 70.

65. Ernesti, *Ethik*, 64–65. He argues that those who have the Spirit are freed from the authority of the law and are able to know inwardly the truth about life’s ultimate goal, as well as the specific requirements of God’s will. Furnish (Theology and Ethics in Paul, 244) raises a question regarding Ernesti’s view about the “spontaneous” character to the believer’s new life. It is difficult to imagine why, if the Spirit creates such spontaneous positive behavior, Paul spends so much time addressing admonitions, prohibitions, and exhortations to his various communities. Ernesti (Ethik, 73–79), however, recognizes this difficulty and addresses the issue by stating that the believer’s new life only begins with conversion and that the fulfilment of holiness happens only through an inner progressive process (my italics). To this process, Paul applies the term “sanctification;” therefore, his commands, exhortations, and warnings do not contradict his teachings about the power of the Spirit.


Baur, who argues that “the Spirit himself testifies with our spirit that we are children of God (Rom 8:12) because that the Spirit which one receives…. is the same Spirit of God, the Spirit as the objective principle of Christian awareness.”68 Later, a similar view is offered by Hermann von Soden.69 He describes the fusion of the divine ethical power with the human personality, and this fusion allows moral life to come forth freely because this power is in God himself. Many of Ernesti’s ideas are also present in Soden’s book. Soden, however, emphasizes human responsibility when he points out that the step from living in the Spirit to “walk by the Spirit” (Gal 5:25) is taken by a Spirit-empowered free decision (e.g., 2 Cor 3:17). Although Ernesti does not explain how the believer’s possession of πνεῦμα can lead to a spontaneous ethical behavior and a virtuous life without the individual effort, his study is a valuable contribution primarily because it set the grounds for future studies on the role of πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethics.

Otto Pfleiderer,70 another German scholar, expands Ernesti’s view of πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethics. According to Pfleiderer, it is Paul’s faith in Jesus Christ that led him to develop the doctrine of πνεῦμα as the principle of his ethical teaching.71 The concept of πνεῦμα is a supernatural “wonder-working power” dwelling and acting in Paul’s new life in Christ. It is the active principle, or ‘law’, that is manifested, not in the extraordinary

68. Baur, Paulus der Apostel Jesu Christi, 137.


71. Pfleiderer, Paulinism, 22.
impulses and miraculous powers, but in the creative energy of a ‘new creature’, in the renewing of the heart, in the sanctification of one’s life, in the generation of every Christian virtue, and in a growing likeness to the image of Christ. Pfleiderer claims that Paul is the first to make a connection between πνεῦμα with ethics. Being influenced primarily by his Christology and his own religious experience (the time when Paul felt completely transformed by the divine power of πνεῦμα), Pfleiderer argues that Paul, by his teaching, laid the theological foundation of “a new ethical system.” Pfleiderer also notes that Pauline pneumatology could be described as both “Christianized Pharisaism” and “Christianized Hellenism.” For the former, he bases his claim on Old Testament promises of the outpouring of the Spirit at the time of salvation (e.g., Joel 2:28–29; Ezek 36:27), and for the latter, he simply suggests that Wisdom of Solomon might have been one of Paul’s sources for his understanding of πνεῦμα.

H. Wendt challenges Pfleiderer’s view. In his argument, Wendt argues that Paul

72. Pfleiderer, *Lectures on the Influence of the Apostle Paul on the Development of Christianity*, 81. Rabens (The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul, 260) notes that Pfleiderer, like Ernesti, has been influenced by Baur (Baur was in fact Pfleiderer’s teacher).


75. Cf. Pfleiderer, *Primitive Christianity*, 3:34. According to him, Paul was able to think Judaically with one-half of his mind and Hellenistically with the other. Later, Eduard Schweizer (“Spirit of Power: The Uniformity and Diversity of the Concept of the Holy Spirit in the New Testament.” *Int*. 6 [1952]: 259–78) claims, like Pfleiderer, that Paul’s understanding of the Spirit was influenced by both Jewish and Hellenistic stands; he interprets Paul’s pneumatology as being largely the result of the Hellenistic context in which Paul found himself.

76. H. Wendt, *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist im biblischen Sprachgebrauch* (Gotha: Berthes,
was not the first to associate the concept of πνεῦμα with ethics, and that the traditional understanding of Paul of πνεῦμα in his Christian view had a much richer and deeper meaning than Pfleiderer assumes. In fact, the Spirit of God, which finds a broader application in the expected end-time in Paul, is part of the content of the Old Testament idea of πνεῦμα. Wendt, however, does not mention Old Testament passages cited above (Ezek 36:26; 37:1–14; Isa 32:9–20), in support of his claim.77

_Hermann Gunkel, Rudolf Bultmann, and Albert Schweitzer: The Gifts of Πνεῦμα and its Association to the Christ-Event_

Hermann Gunkel78 in his well-known book, _The Influence of the Holy Spirit: The Popular View of the Apostolic Age and the Teaching of the Apostle Paul_, claims that πνεῦμα is a divine, supernatural power of God that works in the believer and through the believer.79 This suprahuman power is a force mightier than the natural man, and it is received by

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77. For a similar view, see J. Gloël, _Der Heilige Geist in der Heilsverkündigung des Paulus_ (Halle: Numeyer, 1888), 238–41; cf. 354, 397; Friedrich Büchsel, _Der Geist Gottes im Neuen Testament_ (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1926); Albert Schweitzer, _Paul and His Interpreters: A Critical History_ (London: Black, 1912).


79. Gunkel, The Influence of the Holy Spirit, 34, 25, 93. Later, however, Paul Wernle (_Der Christ und die Sünde bei Paulus_ [Freiburg i. B. und Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr, 1897], 89) argues that there is a contradiction within Paul's thinking. Sometimes, Paul refers to πνεῦμα as a supernatural power which grasps men and transfers them into a higher order (the indicative), whereas at other times Paul refers to πνεῦμα as a high, divine potentiality in a person which a believer himself can help to victory (the imperative). In 1933, Ernst Käsemann (_Leib und Leib Christi: Eine Untersuchung zur paulinischen Begrifflichkeit_ [BHT 9; Tübingen: J. C. B. [Paul Siebeck], 1933) argues that the Holy Spirit is the real divine power that transforms the historical person, and that it is the Holy Spirit who enacts ethical life within the believer. This ethical work, according to Käsemann, is founded upon the sacraments.
the believers (1 Cor 2:12; Gal 3:2, 14; 2 Cor 11:4; Rom 8:15), given to the believers (2 Cor 1:22; 5:5; Rom 5:5; 1 Thess 4:8), supplied (Gal 3:5) and sent (Gal 4:6), so that πνεῦμα finds a place for its ethical activity (gifts of grace) in the believer’s heart (1 Cor 2:6).\textsuperscript{80} According to Gunkel, Paul was the first to emphasize the ethical dimension of the gifts of the divine πνεῦμα as he introduced an ethical judgment and valuation of spiritual gifts, new to the early Christian community (1 Cor 12). This new understanding led Paul to view πνεῦμα as the source of his personal instructions about moral behavior (1 Cor 7:40; see 1 Clement 47:3).\textsuperscript{81} In fact, Paul believed that his apostleship was a moral duty, “a feeling of responsibility” (1 Cor 9:16).\textsuperscript{82}

With respect to Paul’s background for his understanding of πνεῦμα, Gunkel argues that Paul’s thought about πνεῦμα in his ethics is grounded not only in his own personal experience (Pfleiderer), but also in his education and everyday communication.\textsuperscript{83} Although Paul’s writings contain similar ideas found in the Old Testament, (e.g., the view of the Spirit as a wonder-working power), it does not mean that the Old Testament is the ground for his view (and teaching) on πνεῦμα.\textsuperscript{84} Gunkel also argues against Pfleiderer

\textsuperscript{80} Gunkel, \textit{The Influence of the Holy Spirit}, 93.

\textsuperscript{81} Gunkel, \textit{The Influence of the Holy Spirit}, 76–90, esp. 78–79.

\textsuperscript{82} Gunkel, \textit{The Influence of the Holy Spirit}, 89.

\textsuperscript{83} Gunkel clearly rejects the idea that Paul’s reading of the Old Testament (Wendt) or that his Christology (Pfleiderer) influenced his view of πνεῦμα.

\textsuperscript{84} Gunkel, \textit{The Influence of the Holy Spirit}, 99–100, 115. Gunkel admits that Paul borrowed Old Testament terms for his notion of πνεῦμα. Gunkel also recognizes that Paul’s understanding of πνεῦμα emerged from the popular view that was prevalent in the Old Testament, Judaism and primitive Christianity, however, Gunkel separates Paul’s pneumatology from that of Judaism and the early Christians.
that Paul's understanding of πνεῦμα is not influenced by Wisdom of Solomon. Gunkel, however, does not include substantial evidence in support of his claim. While Gunkel disagrees with Pfleiderer to some extent, both of them acknowledge that Paul's experience and his origins in Judaism allowed him to appropriate ideas and terms about πνεῦμα that were prevalent in the early churches, and not in the Hellenistic environment. Gunkel's work offers a significant contribution for the present study, especially when he relates the gifts of πνεῦμα with Paul's ethics. However, his argument in terms of the background of Paul's understanding of πνεῦμα in his ethics fails to provide a fresh view and different from his predecessors.

Rudolf Bultmann provides the first detailed analysis of the mechanism of the full


86. Gunkel simply notes that although both show similarities, their statements have actually different meanings.

87. Gunkel, *The Influence of the Holy Spirit*, 76. Morton Scott Enslin (*The Ethics of Paul* [New York: Harper & Brothers, 1930], 58), who emphasizes the sociological context for Paul's ethical teaching, minimizes Hellenistic aspects of his thought and claims that it was Paul's heritage as a moral Jew, his pre-Christian experience, which enabled him to see the importance of morality.

88. Rudolf Bultmann, “The Problem of Ethics in Paul,” trans. Christoph W. Stenschke, in Rosner, ed., *Understanding Paul's Ethics*, 195–216. In his article, Bultmann's major focus is with the theological aspect of Paul's ethics, in particular the problem of indicative and imperative statements. He opposes the view that there is a logical contradiction between Paul's indicative and imperative statements and argues that for Paul the imperative statement is grounded in the fact of justification which is derived from the indicative one: “Because the believer is freed from sin through justification, he ought to wage war against sin.” Bultmann, in his *Theology of the New*
phrase κατὰ πνεῦμα (according to the Spirit). Discussing the indicative statement about “being in the Spirit” and the imperative one about “walking by the Spirit” in the various Pauline passages, Bultmann states that “for Paul imperative and indicative necessarily belong together (Rom 6),” in the sense that “Paul bases the imperative on the very fact of justification and derives the imperative from the indicative. Because the Christian is free from sin through justification, he is now to fight against sin: ‘if we live by the Spirit, let us keep in step with the Spirit’ (Gal 5:25).” Bultmann presents an innovative and coherent view of the indicative and imperative statements in the ethical life of the believers by carefully emphasizing the work of πνεῦμα on the believer’s willingness. According to Bultmann, the disposition of πνεῦμα as power for the believer shows an extraordinary trust in the indicative statement (being in the Spirit), so that, πνεῦμα’s work upon the believer’s will is the primary work assigned to πνεῦμα. For Bultmann, every other ethical action of “walking by the Spirit” (imperative) is the believer’s laying hold of God’s gift of “being in the Spirit” (indicative).

Taking up some ideas of previous scholars, especially Gunkel, Bultmann stresses the view that the believer is really justified because πνεῦμα abides in the believer as the principle force working in him, and as such the believer is placed in a special relationship with God. According to Bultmann, πνεῦμα, which for Paul is bestowed upon believers

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Testament (trans. Kendrick Grobel; vols. 2; New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951–1955; German, 1948), argues that the understanding that the indicative “calls forth” the imperative is the key (my italics) to the Pauline ethics. Some questions regarding Bultmann’s study of the indicative and imperative statements are raised by Hans Windish in his article “Das Problem des paulinischen Imperativs.” ZNW 23 (1924): 265–81; Kurt Niederwimmer, “Das Problem der Ethik bei Paulus.” TZ 24/2 (1968): 81–92.

through baptism, is conceived as a supernatural power dwelling and acting in the believers (cf. Rom 5:5; 8:11, 16; 1 Cor 2:10–16) for a new mode of ethical life (Rom 8:4–14; Gal 5:16–25).⁹⁰ This is for Paul the norm of the believer περιπατεῖν (to walk); in fact, Bultmann argues that while the first occurrence of πνεῦμα in Galatians refers to it as power (Gal 5:25), the second occurrence refers to the norm because it stands in place of what Paul expresses in Gal 5:16 as living κατὰ πνεῦμα.⁹¹ Although Bultmann has offered a new view of the indicative and imperative statements in the believer’s life, he has failed to describe how the believer’s transformation of the will by πνεῦμα occurs, and whether this transformation of the will by the Spirit is a process, or it happens spontaneously (Ernesti) upon the believer’s entrance into faith.⁹² Also, because he limits the scope of Paul’s ethics to only the indicative-imperative actions, his study does not explore how the role of Paul’s dualistic heritage for his understanding of πνεῦμα has influenced his ethical thought.

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⁹². Rabens (The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul, 277) rightly stresses the point that Bultmann does not indicate how the indicative-imperative statements become a reality after the decision to follow πνεῦμα’s guidance has been made, and whether such experience is a supernatural act of πνεῦμα. Rabens’ main concern regarding Bultmann’s view is that he does not clarify whether the supernatural power of πνεῦμα established the outworking of the imperative in a particular situation or not. It appears that for Bultmann the decision to “walk according to πνεῦμα” is taken by the believer in a way where the victory over sin already had been won. If this is the case, Bultmann does not know the believer’s struggle with the power of sin after a first decision against sinning had been made. Niederwimmer (“Das Problem der Ethik bei Paulus,” 81–92) who studied the problem of Paul’s ethics in his enigmatic antinomie of the indicative-imperative relationship disagrees with Bultmann when he stresses that Paul presents a new existence, a “trans-empirical absolute.” The statements of the indicative look back on the past; that is the old man is dead, he has perished in baptism, sin is destroyed, and πνεῦμα is given. The new beginning has been set through baptism and the bestowal of πνεῦμα. It is not something that happens every morning, but it happens once and is done once and for all.
Albert Schweitzer\textsuperscript{93} in his \textit{Mysticism of Paul the Apostle} takes up Pfleiderer’s idea of “faith in Christ” and develops his argument on the possession of πνεῦμα connecting closely with Jesus’ death and resurrection, the Christ-event. Schweitzer argues that, according to Paul, the believer, who has been raised from the dead with Jesus, receives the πνεῦμα of the glorified Christ and enters into the \textit{new life-principle} of a supernatural state of existence.\textsuperscript{94} This new life of existence endowed with πνεῦμα allows the believers to free themselves from the world and to experience a “new creation” (καινὴ κτίσις; e.g., Gal 5:13–6:10; Rom 5:1–8:17).\textsuperscript{95} Despite the fact that Schweitzer does not focus on the role of πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethics, he emphasizes the notion that Pauline ethics is grounded in the πνεῦμα’s working in the believer who is in Christ.

Schweitzer, like Wendt, links Paul’s notion of πνεῦμα with Old Testament ideas, particularly with those found in Joel and in the earlier Prophets, “according to which the Spirit bestows upon man a new mind and a new heart” (e.g., Joel 2:28–31).\textsuperscript{96} But, like his predecessors, he also overlooks the Hellenistic Jewish and Greek philosophical traditions as background for Paul’s understanding of the concept of πνεῦμα in his ethical teaching.

\textsuperscript{93} Albert Schweitzer, The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle (New York: The Seabury Press, 1968\textsuperscript{2}; German, 1930), 293–333.

\textsuperscript{94} Schweitzer, \textit{The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle}, 294.

\textsuperscript{95} According to Rabens (\textit{The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul}, 271), Schweitzer overemphasizes the believer’s activity in their ethical life, when he argues—contrary to Ernesti’s \textit{spontaneous} character of the believer’s life—that for Paul the believers must take an \textit{active} responsibility for their ethical actions.

To this point, most scholars have only considered Paul’s Old Testament ideas, his personal experience, and Hellenistic Jewish literature (Wisdom of Solomon) as the only possible sources for his take of πνεῦμα as the principle of his ethics. Both Schweitzer and Wendt clearly fail to see that both the Hellenistic Jewish heritage (especially the LXX) and Greek philosophical thought (to some extent) have influenced Paul in the composition of his ethical discourse around the concept of πνεῦμα.

Kurt Stalder: Πνεῦμα as the Believer’s Sanctification and its Association with Paul’s Eschatological Views

Kurt Stalder,97 whose main emphasis is on the nature of πνεῦμα, stresses the role of πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethics. Stalder describes particularly the role of πνεῦμα as continually working within the believers for their “sanctification” (ἁγιασμός).98 Using the Pauline passage Rom 8, he discusses first the role of πνεῦμα in the believer’s sanctification and argues that Paul views the concept of πνεῦμα as a Wesen (a being), that is, Gott selbst (God himself).99 Stalder establishes his definition on the basis of Gal 4:6; Rom 8:15–16, 26–27; and 1 Cor 2:10–11, where the believer faces God in a specific action, such as


98. In his argument, Stalder criticizes the inadequacy of the methodology of Hermann Bertrams (Hermann Bertrams, Das Wesen des Geistes nach der Anschauung des Apostels Paulus: Eine biblisch-theologische Untersuchung [NTA 4.4; Münster: Aschendorff, 1913], 159). According to Stalder, Bertrams’ methodology is not helpful because it is not possible to investigate the work of πνεῦμα without first asking about the nature of πνεῦμα. Any description of πνεῦμα’s activity presupposes a certain view of the being of πνεῦμα (Stalder, Das Werk des Geistes, 5–8).

99. Stalder, Das Werk des Geistes, 47. He rejects the idea of talking about πνεῦμα as a Personalität (personality) for it would suggest that the Holy Spirit is a divine being next to and apart from God (my italics). Rabens (The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul, 282–83) notes that according to Stalder, for Paul πνεῦμα was neither a personification nor hypostasis of a divine attribute (like of power [δύναμις]), nor was πνεῦμα identified with power, for Paul refers with power to one of God’s characteristics.
praying to God. So, the indwelling of πνεῦμα as a divine Wesen represented for Paul a pure miracle of God’s presence within the believer, and for this reason the believer’s sanctification is God’s work through the Holy Spirit (1 Cor 6:11). Although Stalder’s main argument does not focus on the “spiritual” nature of πνεῦμα, he argues however that ἁγιασμός as God’s work does not mean that the Holy Spirit becomes a human reality, or a kind of Geistsubstanz (spirit-substance). Rather, πνεῦμα remains God, and as a result, God’s gracious work of sanctification in the believers is expressed in their acting ethically. Thus, the work of πνεῦμα in both justification and sanctification constitute the believers’ recognition of the significance of the Christ-event. That is, although sanctification is God’s work (1 Cor 6:11), it requires also the believers’ continuous personal work (like Schweitzer) to live a new life in Christ no matter how sinful or weak they may conceive themselves. Therefore, the believer’s sanctification is said to be the work in co-operation between God’s πνεῦμα and the believer.

Stalder’s significant contribution to Paul’s pneumatology and its relation to ethics is when he argues that the ethical work of πνεῦμα lies in the fact that Sein nach dem Geist (living κατὰ πνεῦμα) identifies πνεῦμα as possessing full authority over believers to surrender themselves gradually to the authority and commands of πνεῦμα. Stalder states, “It is the luminous mystery … it is a miracle of the Holy Spirit itself to bring the people to act in freedom and to surrender to the authority of πνεῦμα and to live according to


πνεῦμα” (e.g., Rom 8:5; 8:14). The Einwohnung (indwelling) of πνεῦμα in their hearts will establish the believers’ disposition (e.g., Rom 8:9), and consequently only by faith, they will recognize the πνεῦμα’s presence within them. For Paul, according to Stalder, πνεῦμα is only experienced when the believer is acting in faith (e.g., Gal 5:5).

Similarly, Stalder explains Gal 5:25 when he states that believers live in the πνεῦμα. It is πνεῦμα, according to Paul, that allows them to recognize their sanctification (ἁγιασμός) and believe in it as their concrete reality in the freedom for God, so that believers confidently will dare to live with God in obedience. As Rabens notes, even the love of God, poured out by πνεῦμα into the believers’ heart (Rom 5:5), is mainly the work of πνεῦμα, so that the believers realize the reality of their justification and sanctification. For Stalder, it is πνεῦμα, therefore, not the believer himself or herself, who establishes the believer’s ethical stand as the believer decides to obey the guidance of πνεῦμα in a specific situation of an ethical practice.

Victor Furnish, Heinz-Dietrich Wendland, and James D. G. Dunn: Paul’s Hellenistic Background (Hellenistic Forms and Concepts) and the Πνεῦμα-Love Ethics

Victor Paul Furnish in his influential work on Pauline ethics, Theology and Ethics in

103. Stalder, Das Werk des Geistes, 425.

104. Stalder, Das Werk des Geistes, 434–35.

105. Stalder, Das Werk des Geistes, 471.

106. Stalder (Das Werk des Geistes, 485) is the first to argue that the work of πνεῦμα in both justification and sanctification constitutes the “valid action of a testimony” and does not involve any kind of “increase of ethical power” on the believer. Significantly, Stalder provides scholars with an illustrious analysis of an area in Pauline studies that had not been treated comprehensively before; so, scholars who write about the ethical work of the Spirit in Paul are greatly in debt to Stalder’s effort. Cf. Rabens, The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul, 285.

107. Victor Paul Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul.
Paul, deals with Paul’s background. Furnish argues that Paul makes use of Old Testament materials in his ethical teaching only in the sense that they provide him a perspective from which he interprets the whole event of God’s act in Christ (e.g., Rom 12–15; Gal 5–6; 1 Thess 4–5; 1 Cor 6:16). Although Furnish acknowledges some Old Testament influence on Paul’s ethics, he stresses that Paul never quotes the Old Testament in extenso for the purpose of developing a pattern of conduct. In other words, the Old Testament does not provide Paul rules, aphorisms, maxims, and proverbs for his ethical teaching.

In his argument, Furnish acknowledges the fact that many scholars have accepted Paul’s acquaintance with the Hellenistic Jewish text of Wisdom of Solomon (e.g., Rom 1:20ff. and Wis 13:1ff.; Rom 9:19ff. and Wis 10–11). However, for Furnish, the similarities between Paul and Wisdom of Solomon are more formal than material (my italics). For this claim, however, he fails to further provide explication. He explains that Paul’s ethical teaching

108. Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul, 42–43.

109. Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul, 28–34. Furnish makes clear that the Old Testament is not a “source” for Paul’s ethical teaching in a narrow sense, it is only a source for his ethics in a more basic way; that is, Paul draws upon the Old Testament not only to support his admonitions, but also to gain an understanding of the Christian’s concrete ethical responsibility. Rosner (Paul, Scripture and Ethics: A Study of 1 Corinthians 5–7 [AGAJU 22; Leiden: Brill, 1994]) argues that Paul stands firmly within pre-Christian Judaism in his ethics, in his exegesis of biblical texts, and in his understanding of the covenant community. Rosner is particularly concerned to show that Paul does not quote from the Old Testament carelessly; rather, Jewish scriptures are a crucial and formative source of Paul’s ethics, as is their mediation to Paul through Jewish moral teachings of his own day.

110. Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul, 35–36. Unfortunately, Furnish does not explain what he meant by “formal” and “material.” Furnish also rejects the view of Robert H. Charles (Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament [vol. 2; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963], 180–81, 292) who claims that Paul used 1 Enoch and the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs (T12P) (e.g., 1 Enoch 61:10 and Rom 8:38; 1 Enoch 77:1 and Rom 9:5; 1 Enoch 62:4 and 1 Thess 5:3; T. Benjamin 4:3 and Rom 12:21). Furnish’s argument concerning Paul’s use of language similar to that of 1 Enoch lies in the assumption that the concepts and phrases were simply current in his day. Regarding Paul’s use of T12P, Furnish points out that, despite the striking verbal similarities between Paul
is indebted to Hellenistic “sources” only in general terms. Paul applies metaphors, phrases, and ideas which are frequently used in Hellenistic circles (e.g., Stoicism),\(^\text{111}\) as it is reflected in his concept of conscience (1 Cor 8:7ff.; 10:25ff.) and natural law (Rom 2:14–15). Paul’s ethical teaching then is mainly dependent upon Hellenistic forms and concepts rather than Old Testament forms and concepts.\(^\text{112}\) However, unlike Greek philosophers (e.g., Stoics), Paul’s ethical exhortation is not grounded in living κατὰ φύσιν (according to nature [e.g., Epictetus, Disc. 4.5.6]); rather, he exhorts the believers to live κατὰ πνεῦμα (according to the Spirit [Rom 8:4ff.]).

Furnish also argues that Paul has his own ideas that reflect his own personal background in Judaism and his experience as a Jew. For example, when Paul exhorts, instructs, or admonishes, he generally does so in an ad hoc fashion in specific situations and cases.\(^\text{113}\) Although Paul’s surrounding environment and early Christian communities helped him to determine the direction of and give some shape to his concrete

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\(^{112}\) Furnish, *Theology and Ethics in Paul*, 48–50.

\(^{113}\) Furnish, *Theology and Ethics in Paul*, 210. His argument is based in the fact that Paul never follows a single practical ethical pattern or a “Christian code of conduct.” Furnish writes, “he sponsors no particular ethical program, and his various specific ethical injunctions taken together are not intended to provide a comprehensive portrait of ‘the Christian man’.”
ethical teaching, the decisive factor behind Paul's ethical teaching is grounded in his understanding of what it means to be “in Christ” and to “belong to him.”

Although Furnish's study does not focus on πνεῦμα as the principle of Paul's ethics, he briefly refers to πνεῦμα as a representative power of the coming age, already operative in the present. God's promise, for Paul, is “the promise of the Spirit” (Gal 3:14) and those who receive the promise as “sons” are the recipients of “the Spirit of God's son” (Gal 4:6; cf. Rom 8:15). He also reaffirms Wendt's interpretation regarding the intrinsic association of πνεῦμα and δύναμις by arguing that, in Paul’s thought, πνεῦμα works with divine power (e.g., 1 Thess 1:5; 1 Cor 2:4; Rom 15:13, 19; Gal 3:5). While πνεῦμα represents the actual entry of the eschaton into the present age—and thus the operative presence of God's love (Rom 5:5)—it is also the harbinger of that which is to come, the ground of hope (Rom 8:11). So, for Furnish, Paul views πνεῦμα as the divine power which is present and effective within the believer “in this age” and “in the age to come.”

Heinz-Dietrich Wendland, who devotes a brief section to Paul's ethics in his book, Éthique du Nouveau Testament: Introduction aux Problèmes, argues that Paul's ethics is grounded in Heilsgeschichte (salvation history) and is focused upon the eschatological existence manifested in πνεῦμα, Christology, and baptism. Like previous scholars,

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115. Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul, 129.


118. Karl Benz (Die Ethik des Apostels Paulus [BS 17, 3–4; Freiburg im Breisgau:
Wendland notes that πνεῦμα is the theological motivation for Paul’s ethics (Rom 8:1ff. and Gal 5:5:13ff.), because πνεῦμα is present in the believers’ life to enable them to “walk according to the Spirit” (Gal 5:25; Rom 8:4). He appeals to Romans 6 and 8 to claim that Paul’s ethics is essentially an ethic of love in the Spirit (my italics). The close connection between πνεῦμα and love in Paul’s ethics is Wendland’s most important contribution. Indeed, he stresses that for Paul, πνεῦμα without love (ἀγάπη) is impossible, because πνεῦμα is love and love is πνεῦμα. Therefore, as πνεῦμα is the supreme norm of Paul’s ethics, so is love (1 Cor 8, 10, and 13; in Gal 5:22, love is ‘fruit’ of the Spirit).

James D. G. Dunn like Gunkel, claims that for Paul, πνεῦμα is a vital ethical power operating in the “heart” of the believer (Rom 5:5; 6:1ff.; 8:9, 14; 1 Cor 1:4–9; 6:9–11; 12:13; 2 Cor 1:21f.; Gal 3:1–5; 4:6f.; 1 Thess 1:5f), and that in Paul’s thought πνεῦμα is grounded in his personal experience. The believers’ ethical conduct is determined

Herdersche Verlagshandlung, 1912], 31–8) previously noted that Paul’s concept of the πνεῦμα’s presence and working within the believer is a gift received in faith; at baptism the believer becomes mystically united with Christ and an heir of the life God bestows in the Son’s death and resurrection. Also Johannes Weiss (The History of Primitive Christianity [trans. F. C. Grant, et al.; 2 vols.; New York: Wilson-Erickson, 1937; German, 1917], 2:564) believes that for Paul the bestowal of the Spirit at baptism meant an inner connection with God and πνεῦμα. Later, Wolfgang Schrage (Ethik des Neuen Testaments [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982]), taking up some of Wendland’s themes, argues that Paul’s eschatology, Christology, pneumatology, and ecclesiology are all so integrated that his ethics is grounded in their unity, not in any one of them alone.


120. On the footsteps of Wendland, Reginald E. O. White (Biblical Ethics [Atlanta: John Knox, 1979]) argues that Paul’s ethics is based upon the supremacy of love. This “agape-ethic” is described as a “new life” for the believer.


by πνεῦμα, and they are identified as those who walk by πνεῦμα (Rom 8:4; Gal 5:16), who are led by πνεῦμα (Rom 5:14; Gal 5:18), and who order their lives by πνεῦμα (Gal 5:25). Influenced by Wendland’s interpretation, Dunn develops further a πνεῦμα-love ethics, where he interprets πνεῦμα as an inner compulsion expressed in ἀγάπη (cf. Rom 5:5). According to Dunn, Paul’s πνεῦμα-love ethics is set as an antithesis to and as a replacement for Israel’s Torah ethics. He argues that for Paul the primary driving force in ethics is no longer obedience to the Mosaic law (coming from the outside), but obedience to an inner conviction drawn by πνεῦμα (the law written on the heart, the law of the Spirit), thus shaping both motive and action (cf. “the mind of Christ,” 1 Cor 2:16; Phil 2:5). The believers’ ethical conduct conceived by Paul is, therefore, not only as “walking in accordance with the Spirit” (e.g., Rom 8:4; 2 Cor 12:18; Gal 5:16), but also as “being led by the Spirit” (e.g., Rom 8:14; Gal 5:18).

Dunn argues that the experience of πνεῦμα in the process of awareness of God’s will in ethical decision making cannot be degraded to some rationally construed claim of God, nor can love be reduced to a generalized ethical principle. Instead, Paul and his believers experience a transformation through the reality and vitality of πνεῦμα’s real


124. For the same idea of love as a manifestation of πνεῦμα, see also Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1998), 668–69, 736.

125. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle, 643.

126. In Rom 12:2, this fundamental reshaping and transformation of inner motivations and moral consciousness (νοῦς) is a process and leads to a spontaneous awareness of God’s will in ethical decision making. Cf. Rabens, The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul, 289.

127. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle, 435.
ethical power in their own lives. According to Dunn, it is on this ground that Paul is able to promote the charismatic recognition of God’s will and the inward compulsion of love as the distinctive elements of his ethics.\footnote{Dunn, \emph{Jesus and the Spirit}, 223–25, 311; Dunn, \emph{The Theology of Paul the Apostle}, 430. Cf. Rabens, \emph{The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul}, 289.} This πνεῦμα-love ethic, for Paul, draws attention to the view that a fierce warfare between πνεῦμα and σάρξ is introduced in the believers’ life. Although the believers are ἐν πνεύματι (Rom 8:9), they are still prone to live κατὰ σάρκα (according to the flesh).\footnote{Dunn, \emph{Jesus and the Spirit}, 312–18; Dunn, “Rom 7:14–25 in the Theology of Paul.” \emph{TLZ} 31 (1975): 257–73, esp. 269.} But for Paul, the surpassing power of πνεῦμα given to the believers is stronger than human desire and enables them to put to death the attitude and desires of the flesh (Rom 8:13; Gal 5:24) even while living “in the flesh.”\footnote{Dunn, \emph{Jesus and the Spirit}, 337–38. Later, Fee (\emph{God’s Empowering Presence}, 816–21) describing the nature of Paul’s Spirit-flesh antithesis emphasizes the supreme power of πνεῦμα over against that of σάρξ, which stands in contrast to the views of Dunn. According to Fee, Paul does not perceive Christian life as a struggle between πνεῦμα and σάρξ within the human heart. This is not because the believers are in the Spirit but simply because Paul does not address this problem at all. For a detailed discussion concerning Fee’s view about Spirit-flesh antithesis, see Rabens, \emph{The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul}, 299–304.} Although Dunn’s basic πνεῦμα-love ethic is persuasive, he leaves little room for the believers’ own will and effort in their ethical transformation ἐν πνεύματι.

\textit{John M. G. Barclay, Friedrich Wilhelm Horn, and Gordon D. Fee: The Power of πνεῦμα for Ethical Living}

John M. G. Barclay\footnote{John M. G. Barclay, \emph{Obeying the Truth: A Study of Paul’s Ethics in Galatians} (SNTW; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988).} demonstrates that for Paul πνεῦμα really empowers the shaping of the believer’s character. Barclay is interested in showing how Paul particularly in his letter to the Galatians intended to demonstrate the sufficiency and practical value of living
κατὰ πνεῦμα.132 Barclay tries to elucidate Dunn’s view of the surpassing power of πνεῦμα and its warfare with σάρξ by arguing that for Paul “walking in the Spirit” excluded the “desires of the flesh” (Gal 5:16).133 In his interpretation of Gal 5:17, Barclay claims that the mutual opposition of πνεῦμα and σάρξ in the conflict implies mutual exclusion and therefore ensures that the Galatian believers will not misuse their freedom, because the πνεῦμα will set them against the σάρξ. For Paul, it is πνεῦμα that provides the believers all the necessary guidance in the fight against σάρξ, and defines the moral choices they must make.134 Barclay stresses that the mutual exclusion between πνεῦμα and σάρξ does not indicate that the two sides are evenly balanced. Rather, it is to show the Galatian believers that they are already committed to some forms of activity in the Spirit against others (the flesh).135 Similar to some of his predecessors, Barclay notes that Paul uses some ethical traditions (e.g., Jewish, Hellenistic, and Christian) for his ethical teachings, but unfortunately he does not explore these traditions further. He simply notes, using Gal 5–6 as an example, that Paul in some situations is an innovator; and in others, he adopts and applies previous Jewish and Hellenistic moral traditions.136

In relatively recent scholarship, Friedrich Wilhelm Horn,137 like Wendland and

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137. Friedrich Wilhelm Horn, *Das Angeldes Geistes: Studien zur paulinischen Pneumatologie* (FRLANT 154; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992). Horn marks a significant milestone in the discussion of Paul’s pneumatology. He argues that in Palestinian
Dunn, connects πνεῦμα and ἀγάπη. According to Horn, Paul associates the divine πνεῦμα solely with love of one’s neighbor, but not with other virtues.\(^{138}\) So, when the believer acts ethically, πνεῦμα is active exclusively in the love of one’s neighbors and in the love of one’s brothers and sisters (1 Thess 4:8–9; 1 Cor 13; Gal 5:22).\(^{139}\) Horn bases his argument on three sets of Pauline passages where the relationship between πνεῦμα and ethics is specifically defined by Paul: (a) 1 Thess 4:8; 1 Cor 3:16; 6:19; (b) Gal 5:13–6:10; and (c) Rom 8:1–17.\(^{140}\) In 1 Thess 4:8, for example, the believers are exhorted to love their brothers without concern about the practice of the Mosaic Law. It is in Gal 5 where Paul shows that the love of one’s neighbor fulfills the Law. This love, according to Horn, is the fruit of the Spirit (Gal 5:22). Horn clearly stresses the importance of the virtue of love in the believer’s ethical life (Gal 5:13–6:10) when he views love as naturally flowing from πνεῦμα when

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\(^{138}\) Horn, “Wandel im Geist: Zur pneumatologischen Begründung der Ethik bei Paulus.” *Kerygma und Dogma* 38/2 (1992): 149–70, esp. 168–70. In this article, Horn tries to correct Gunkel’s view of the uniqueness of Paul’s ethical pneumatology. Contrary to Gunkel, Horn argues that there is evidence of a significant correspondence between the pneumatological ethics of the Jewish writings and Paul; therefore, a close connection between the πνεῦμα and ethics in pre-Pauline Judaism and Christianity is observed in the phrases such as “God has given us the Spirit” (e.g., Rom 5:5; 11:8; 2 Cor 1:22; 5:5; 1 Thess 4:8) and “you have received the Spirit” (e.g., Rom 8:15). Horn challenges Gunkel’s 1888 study, and the majority opinion of scholarship, when he argues that description of the ethical work of πνεῦμα is shown only in a few places in the Jewish Scripture and early Judaism (e.g., Ezek 36:27; *Sib. Or.* 3.582).


\(^{140}\) Horn, *Das Angeldes Geistes*, 163. See also “Wandel im Geist,” 163–68.
the believer is led by πνεῦμα (Gal 5:18). In fact, he argues that love is the only connection between Paul's ethics and πνεῦμα in Galatians.¹⁴¹

Likewise in Rom 8, love is the work of πνεῦμα; that is, “to walk according to πνεῦμα” (8:4), or “to live by πνεῦμα” (8:12–13), or “to think according to πνεῦμα” (8:5) aims to love one's neighbors, brothers and sisters. Thus, the believer's transformation into glorification at baptism is effectively accomplished in the πνεῦμα of love (1 Thess 4:8; 1 Cor 3:16; 6:19).¹⁴² Horn traces the development of Paul's thought about πνεῦμα back to his pre-Christian days, and against Pfleiderer, he argues like Wendt that Paul was not the first to relate πνεῦμα with ethics. Pre-Christian Judaism taught him that virtues (e.g., love) are the result of πνεῦμα (e.g., Wisdom of Solomon, Philo, and 1QH), but these Jewish texts, unlike Paul, are restricted to Law observance.¹⁴³ Even though Paul did not have a fully developed pneumatology when he began his mission,¹⁴⁴ Horn sees 1 Thessalonians as the grounds for Paul's understanding of πνεῦμα. First, because it reflects strong Old Testament and Jewish influence, and second, because here πνεῦμα is viewed as the eschatological gift, promised and bestowed upon the believers to enable them for eschatological conduct.¹⁴⁵ Despite Horn limits his study only to a few Pauline passages and in regard to Paul's background only to three Jewish texts, his detailed study on the relationship of πνεῦμα to love in Paul's ethics is still very important.


¹⁴² Horn, Das Angeld des Geistes, 422–28; “Wandel im Geist,” 164.


¹⁴⁴ Horn, Das Angeld des Geistes, 115.

¹⁴⁵ Horn, “Wandel im Geist,” 168–69, 70; Das Angeld des Geistes, 119.
In the footsteps of Gunkel, Gordon D. Fee\textsuperscript{146} emphasizes the supreme power of πνεῦμα and its ethical work. In Fee's view, for Paul πνεῦμα has an essential role in the believer's life, for it is πνεῦμα that empowers ethical living in all of its dimensions. The believers in Christ are “Spirit people” who are living by πνεῦμα, are walking in πνεῦμα, and are being led by πνεῦμα, bearing the fruit of πνεῦμα and sowing by πνεῦμα.\textsuperscript{147} The question of the praxis of “walking by the Spirit” is Paul’s basic imperative (Gal 5:16),\textsuperscript{148} indicating (against Ernesti) that the believer’s life in πνεῦμα is not a passive submission to a supernatural power (Gal 5:18). It requires a conscious effort (like Schweitzer) in order to make ethical choices (Gal 6:8).\textsuperscript{149} But, according to Fee, Paul is not clear how one is to live according to πνεῦμα’s desire. He suggests that in the light of the renewed mind the believer’s action must be focused and intentional (Rom 12:2).\textsuperscript{150} With the experience of πνεῦμα, believers become aware of its supreme power over against σάρξ to live in accordance with πνεῦμα’s desire. This is the reason for Fee why Paul does not go into further details when he exhorted them to “walk by the Spirit.”\textsuperscript{151} Fee presents a substantive

\textsuperscript{146} Gordon D. Fee, \textit{God’s Empowering Presence}.

\textsuperscript{147} Fee, \textit{God’s Empowering Presence}, 876–81.

\textsuperscript{148} Fee, \textit{God’s Empowering Presence}, 358.

\textsuperscript{149} Fee, \textit{God’s Empowering Presence}, 433, 467, 547, 559, 563, 566.

\textsuperscript{150} Fee, \textit{God’s Empowering Presence}, 559. According to Rabens (\textit{The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul}, 302), Fee’s positive perspective on πνεῦμα’s enabling of ethical life swings the pendulum of scholarship into almost the opposite direction to that of Dunn. While both Fee and Dunn emphasize the experience of the eschatological πνεῦμα as central both to Paul and his hearers, Fee understands this new dimension in the believers’ lives as the end of internal struggles.

\textsuperscript{151} However, according to Fee, Paul does not provide an answer to his later believers who might be interested in \textit{how} πνεῦμα enables ethical living. While Horn presents πνεῦμα as producing ontological change in the believers’ behavior, Fee understands the πνεῦμα-σάρξ
contribution of Paul's pneumatology; however, a comprehensive analysis about the central role of πνεῦμα in Paul's ethics still remains unexplored.

**Finny Philip and Volker Rabens: Paul's Own Experience of Πνεῦμα before and after Damascus and Πνεῦμα as Moral Agent for Religious-Ethical Life**

Recently, Finny Philip has explored the background of Paul's understanding of πνεῦμα focusing on the Old Testament and other Jewish literature. Like some of his predecessors, he claims that Paul's own experience of πνεῦμα, prior to and after his call on the Damascus road, and his interactions with the early Christian communities (especially the church at Antioch) are key factors for his understanding of πνεῦμα. One of Philip's major concerns is to show how Paul's pre-Christian convictions (as a Pharisee and persecutor) about πνεῦμα and Paul's own experience (his call and initial years with the church in Antioch) influenced his thought about πνεῦμα. Focusing on Paul's biographical statements (e.g., Gal 1:13–14; Phil 3:5–6; cf. Acts 22:3; 26:1ff.), Philip argues that Paul is familiar with the various strands of Jewish thought on the nature and effects of πνεῦμα

language as divorced from anthropology; for him, it is purely eschatological. Despite this discrepancy, both have similarities in that they believe that the work of πνεῦμα has a strong bearing on the believers in that ethical living develops almost spontaneously (in the case of Horn), or at least without internal struggle (in the case of Fee). No consensus on the details of the connection between πνεῦμα and ethics in Paul has been reached in the more recent history of scholarship. Cf. Rabens, *The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul*, 304.


153. Philip, *The Origins of Pauline Pneumatology*, 28. In part one (32–120), Philip deals with the question whether the bestowal of πνεῦμα also includes Gentiles. He argues that in the Hebrew Scripture (Isa 44:1–5; Joel 3:1–5; and Ezek 36:26–27) and post-biblical Judaism (LXX, Jubilees, Qumran, Philo, Wisdom of Solomon), the bestowal of πνεῦμα upon the Gentiles is almost non-existent, and that the promise of πνεῦμα is on the people, only when they become members of the community of God.
prevalent in the first century C.E.; for example, (a) the notion that divine enlightenment by πνεῦμα was necessary for the study and interpretation of Torah; (b) the belief that resurrection and purity concerns were associated with πνεῦμα\textsuperscript{154} and (c) that πνεῦμα was linked to the early Christian persecution, for example in the Stephen circles\textsuperscript{155}.

Philip also illustrates how Paul’s call as an apostle to the Gentiles (1Cor 15:8–10; Gal 1:13–17; Phil 3:4–11)—a crucial point in Paul’s life (Gal 3:1–5; 1 Thess 1:4–6; cf. 1 Cor 2:4–5)—relates to the understanding of his experience of πνεῦμα\textsuperscript{156}. According to Philip, this decisive event in Paul’s life provides information about his thought on the role of πνεῦμα (2 Cor 1:21; 3:1–4:6). In fact, the significant aspect of his experience on the road of Damascus, according to Philip, is an experience through πνεῦμα (“the glory of the Lord through the Spirit,” 2 Cor 3:14–18).\textsuperscript{157} But, it is also an experience that changed his view of the Mosaic Law and help shape the connection between πνεῦμα and his ethical teaching. Philip concludes his argument stating that Paul’s conviction about πνεῦμα is influenced by the “Hellenists,” but again this idea is not further pursued.

\textsuperscript{154} Philip, The Origins of Pauline Pneumatology, 139.

\textsuperscript{155} Philip, The Origins of Pauline Pneumatology, 160. According to Philip, Stephen’s activities (wonders and signs, charismatic wisdom, teaching, and pneumatic activities) might have incited Paul to become involved in the persecution of the church.

\textsuperscript{156} Philip, The Origins of Pauline Pneumatology, 164–65.

\textsuperscript{157} Philip, The Origins of Pauline Pneumatology, 202–203. This is the moment, according to Philip, in which Paul indicates a new understanding of πνεῦμα. Now, his pre-Christian convictions concerning the need of πνεῦμα for the study of the Torah became insignificant in light of his new understanding of πνεῦμα. His experience at Damascus became the entrance into the new life of πνεῦμα, a life which opened an understanding that πνεῦμα was coming also upon Gentiles apart from the Law (Gal 3:3). For further details on the outpouring of πνεῦμα upon the Gentiles, see chapter seven (204–24).
The most recent study on pneumatology and Paul’s ethics is Volker Rabens.\textsuperscript{158} In his extensive study, Rabens focuses on how \textit{πνεῦμα} enables believers to practice ethical conduct. First, he challenges the so-called “infusion-transformation approach”—the view that the concept of substance-ontological transformation through a material \textit{πνεῦμα} could be traced to Paul\textsuperscript{159}—and argues that neither Hellenistic nor Jewish traditions provides us elements to support the claim that \textit{πνεῦμα} for Paul is a material substance. Then, Rabens proposes a new approach which states that it is “through a deeper knowledge of, and an intimate relationship with God, Jesus and the community of faith that people are transformed and empowered by \textit{πνεῦμα} for religious-ethical life.”\textsuperscript{160} For Paul, ethical transformation is the result of \textit{πνεῦμα}’s \textit{relational} work (2 Cor 3:18), when the believer’s intimate relation with God, Christ, and fellow believers is strengthened and empowered by \textit{πνεῦμα} for religious-ethical life.\textsuperscript{161} Rabens uses a few early Jewish and Hellenistic

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{158} Volker Rabens, \textit{The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul}.
\item \textsuperscript{159} For example, Horn (\textit{Das Angeld des Geistes}, 248), who proposes a material \textit{πνεῦμα} based on the philosophy of the Stoics, views \textit{πνεῦμα} as a physical substance because it is compared to wind in the Old Testament (Rabens, \textit{The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul}, 36); Otto Betz (\textit{Offenbarung und Schriftforschung in der Qumransekte} [WUNT 6; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr Paul Siebeck, 1960], 130) argues that the Spirit of God fuses with \textit{πνεῦμα} of the believer and becomes one with it (1QHa 8.22); Peter Stuhlmacher (“Erwägungen zum ontologischen Charakter der καινη κτισις bei Paulus,” \textit{EvT} 27 [1967]: 1–35, esp.13) dealing with \textit{Joseph and Aseeth} argues that \textit{πνεῦμα} is a physical substance; Charles Harold Dodd (\textit{The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel} [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953], 219) provides evidence for a materialistic \textit{πνεῦμα} in Philo (e.g., \textit{Ebr.} 106), similarly Troels Engberg-Pedersen (“The Material Spirit: Cosmology and Ethics in Paul,” \textit{NTS} 55 [2009]: 179–97, esp.186) points out that Philo displays a material \textit{πνεῦμα} when he attributes Stoic language (e.g., \textit{Leg.} 1.42), although in his \textit{Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 24–25), he argues that Philo’s pneumatology is Platonic.
\item \textsuperscript{160} Rabens, \textit{The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul}, 124.
\item \textsuperscript{161} Rabens, \textit{The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul}, 126. He bases his argument upon Paul’s context (see chapter five, 146–170) and Paul’s writings (see chapter six, 171–242).
\end{itemize}
sources (Philo, Qumran, traditions based on Ezek 36:25–28; [Jubilees 1:23–25; Testament of Judah 24:2–3]) and only one Greco-Roman work (Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus) to show that intimate relationships are understood as ethically empowering in Paul’s context. In the same manner, using Paul’s own writings (especially 2 Cor 3:18; Rom 5:5; Gal 4:1–7), Rabens provides evidence that believers are not only transformed and empowered for religious-ethical life by πνεῦμα, but this transformation creates both a deeper knowledge of God and Christ, and an intimate relationship with Him (e.g., in the ‘Abba’-cry).

Rabens expands further his new relational approach or dynamic model by claiming that for Paul it is the πνεῦμα’s role to shape the community of believers for ethical behavior through both spiritual gifts and common participation in πνεῦμα (Rom 1:11–12; 1 Cor 12–14; Phil 2:1–3). In fact, the power of πνεῦμα enables believers to participate in the community where they are moved closer to one another (2 Cor 3:18; Rom 12:17). Like many of his predecessors, Rabens believes that for Paul πνεῦμα is a moral agent that enables believers to have an ethical life. But, Rabens stresses the point that the ethical work of πνεῦμα in Paul is focused only on the Spirit, and not on the work of the believer (Ernesti). In a continual process, πνεῦμα draws the believer toward God and toward the community of believers, so that they are empowered and transformed by πνεῦμα to live ethically. Although Rabens has answered the question of how πνεῦμα empowers the believer to experience a reciprocal relationship with God, Christ, and the

community of believers, he grounds his thesis only on a very limited body of Hellenistic Jewish and Old Testament texts. He clearly acknowledges the various scholarly positions regarding Paul’s background on his view of πνεῦμα and his ethics. However, he never offers his own stand on the influence of both Hellenistic Jewish and Greek philosophical traditions on the relationship between πνεῦμα and Paul’s ethical thought.

**Conclusion**

Since Ernesti, the scholarly production on Pauline pneumatology has put great emphasis on πνεῦμα and Paul’s ethics. Pauline scholars have recognized in diverse forms that the divine πνεῦμα is the ethical principle for a new life in Christ, where πνεῦμα is said to guide believers to act ethically. While Ernesti argued that the possession of πνεῦμα leads believers to live an ethical life *spontaneously* (similarly also Horn, Fee, and Rabens), others like Schweitzer stressed the believers’ *active* ethical responsibility. Stalder, who focused on the nature of πνεῦμα, in the footsteps of Bultmann, took the middle position when he argued that the believer’s sanctification is the *continuous* work of both πνεῦμα and the believer (also Fee). As Barclay’s study showed, to live ethically required the believers’ disposition to actively choose what is good (πνεῦμα vs. σάρξ).

Gunkel’s study sought to show πνεῦμα not simply as a power, but as a “suprahuman power” that over-empowers believers for an ethical behavior. Whether πνεῦμα is viewed as a principle of ethical life, or simply a power, or a divine superhuman power, for Paul its possession transformed the believers to walk/live κατὰ πνεῦμα. The view of πνεῦμα as the ethical power acting in the believer was elucidated by Rabens as πνεῦμα, the moral agent, transforming the community of believers for religious-ethical life.
Other major contributions over the years of research have been offered. First, it is the connection of πνεῦμα and Paul’s ethics to eschatology by Wendland. Although he did not provide an examination with sufficient depth, he introduced the fundamental notion of πνεῦμα and eschatology in Paul’s ethical teaching. Second, it is the relationship of πνεῦμα to ἀγάπη that Wendland, Dunn, and consequently Horn emphasized. The intrinsic connection between πνεῦμα and ἀγάπη seen by Wendland allowed Dunn to develop his theory of πνεῦμα-love ethics in Paul, which later, Horn exclusively narrowed to the love of one’s neighbor, brothers, and sisters.

Valuable contributions have been made regarding the background of Paul’s understanding of the relation of πνεῦμα and his ethics. While not all the previous studies focused on this important question, those studies that did, mostly emphasized Paul’s own personal experience; though its explanation varies among scholars. While Pfleiderer placed more emphasis on Paul’s experience of Christ for his view of πνεῦμα, for Gunkel, Paul’s experience included his experience in Judaism, his education as well as his daily communication. Furnish expanded Gunkel’s view by including Paul’s personal ideas, his own life as a Jew, his environment, and his interaction with the early Christian communities. Philip regarded Paul’s experience as his experience before (also Horn) and after the event at Damascus. Furthermore, Old Testament ideas have been considered as Paul’s background, particularly by Schweitzer, and most prominently Furnish mentioned Hellenistic Jewish forms as being the source for Paul’s ethics, but not for his view of πνεῦμα.

Beyond these scholarly interpretations, there is not a comprehensive study on the important concept of πνεῦμα as the principal “enabler” of a virtuous life in Paul’s
ethical discourse. These works have failed to provide a substantive examination about the question of the background of Paul’s understanding of πνεῦμα as a central element for the understanding of his ethics. Furthermore, none of the previous studies has examined the level of influence of the Hellenistic Jewish and Greek philosophical traditions in his view of πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethical discourse. Consequently, this fundamental aspect has not been treated adequately, and thus, it will be the work of this study.

**The Thesis**

The purpose of this study is to explore how these two Hellenistic Jews, Philo and Paul, appropriated, altered, and re-interpreted the Hellenistic Jewish and Greek philosophical traditions in order to configure their own ethical discourses around two key concepts: εὐσέβεια (Philo) and πνεῦμα (Paul). Chapter two will cover briefly their religious and cultural backgrounds, depending on what can be drawn not only from the evidence provided by their writings, but also from current research concerning the Greco-Roman world of the first century C.E. Aspects such as their Judaism in the Diaspora, their education, and their basic attitudes especially with regard to five central elements of Judaism (monotheism, Temple, circumcision, ethical commandments, and food laws) will be analyzed in order to place them within their own context, and provide the background for the chapters to follow.

Chapter three will investigate the complexity of Philo’s use of the concept of εὐσέβεια in his extant writings (The Allegories of the Law, the Exposition of the Law, Questions and Answers, and other Miscellaneous Works), particularly paying attention to five aspects in which Philo privileges the place of εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse: (a) εὐσέβεια for the service of God, (b) εὐσέβεια as the foundational virtue, (c) εὐσέβεια as
the opposite to ἀσέβεια, (d) the practice (ἀσκησις) of εὐσέβεια, and (e) the relationship between εὐσέβεια and φιλανθρωπία. Chapters four and five will explore the way Philo’s special treatment of εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse is influenced by the Hellenistic Jewish tradition (chapter four), and the Greek philosophical ethical discourse (chapter five). The examination of these chapters will allow us to identify more precisely the factor(s) that led Philo to give εὐσέβεια a preeminent place in his ethical discourse, a place that moves beyond Hellenistic Jewish and Greek philosophical use of εὐσέβεια.

Chapter six will apply the same methodology to Paul’s complex use of the concept of πνεῦμα in the collection of his seven undisputed letters. This chapter will address three aspects in which Paul shows the primacy of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse: (a) πνεῦμα and its relation to the gospel, and not the Mosaic Law, (b), πνεῦμα as the opposite of the flesh, and (c) the relationship of πνεῦμα to the practice of virtues, especially the love commandment. Chapters seven and eight will show the way πνεῦμα’s primary place in Paul’s ethical configuration is influenced, analogous to chapters four and five, by the Hellenistic Jewish tradition (chapter seven) and the Greek philosophical tradition (chapter eight). These chapters will help us to highlight the factor(s) that led Paul to give πνεῦμα a central place in his ethical discourse.

The similarities and differences between Philo and Paul in their ethical discourses will be elucidated in chapter nine. This chapter will be divided into three parts: part one will consider the similarities between the roles of Philo’s εὐσέβεια and Paul’s πνεῦμα; part two will show the differences between Philo and Paul in the configurations of their ethical discourses around the two concepts, respectively; and part three will suggest the philosophical stance of Philo and Paul based on the use of εὐσέβεια (Philo) and πνεῦμα
(Paul) in their own ethical discourse. The presentation of these three parts will derive from the analyses of the previous chapters (3 to 8). Finally, chapter ten will summarize the findings, draw some conclusions, and suggest some directions for further study.
CHAPTER TWO

PHILO AND PAUL: CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND

This chapter is devoted to a brief introduction to the cultural and religious background of Philo and Paul. The aim of this chapter is to place them in their own context before we move on to the following chapters. Using primarily their own writings and important secondary literature, this chapter shows how their way of life was influenced—yet in different ways and to different degrees—by both the Hellenistic Jewish heritage and Greco-Roman culture.

Cultural Background: Philo of Alexandria and Paul of Tarsus

This section of the chapter presents two aspects regarding the lives of both Philo and Paul in the Jewish Greek-speaking Diaspora: their family and Jewish and Greek education, and their Hellenistic environment. The presentation of these two aspects of their lives are important in order to highlight their dual heritage and set each of them within the larger Greco-Roman world of the first century C.E. This general presentation represents the basic consensus among scholars as well as my own contribution.

Philo of Alexandria

Family and Education

Most scholars place Philo’s birth in ca. 20 B.C.E. and his death in ca. 50’s C.E. ¹ His life

¹. The only thing we can date with certainty is his trip to Rome in 39–40 C.E., heading a delegation that defended the Jews of Alexandria to the emperor Caligula (Legat. 182). There Philo wrote of himself as an “old man” (γέρων). According to Opif. 105, a man is judged a γέρων from
overlapped with that of figures such as Herod the Great, Jesus, Paul, and some of the Jewish rabbis, Hillel, Shammai, and Gamaliel. Information about Philo’s private life, for example whether he was married or had children, is unfortunately obscure. However, from his own treatises and the “testimonia of later Christians,” we can probably state five facts about his life. First, he was a pious and faithful Hellenistic Jew in the Greek Diaspora (*Legat.* 210), who deeply valued the Jewish Scriptures (LXX), the Jewish way of life, and above all, the ethical value of the Mosaic Law. Second, he lived all his life in one of the most Hellenized metropoleis in the ancient world, Alexandria. Ancient historical records show that during Philo’s time Alexandria was a city of intellectual culture, which


had surpassed that of Athens.\textsuperscript{6} Third, he belonged to one of the most distinguished and wealthiest Jewish families of Alexandria;\textsuperscript{7} there is no doubt that such a privileged life allowed him to enjoy participation in banquets (\textit{Leg.} 3.156), theater and concerts (\textit{Ebr.} 177; \textit{Prob.} 141), as well as to watch boxing, wrestling, and horse-racing (\textit{Prob.} 26; \textit{Hypoth.} in Eusebius, \textit{Praep. ev.} 7:14, 58). Fourth, he may have held triple-citizenship (πολίτευμα).\textsuperscript{8} Jewish citizenship of Alexandria, Alexandrian citizenship, and Roman citizenship.\textsuperscript{9} Fifth,


\textsuperscript{7} Bentwich, \textit{Philo-Judaicus of Alexandria}, 46. According to Schenck (\textit{A Brief Guide to Philo}, 12), there are clear indications that Philo's family belonged to a prestigious family in Alexandria; for example the name Julius appears prominently in his family (e.g., the name of his nephew Tiberius Julius Alexander, who apostatized from Judaism and went on to become procurator of Judea under Claudius [46–48 C.E.] and prefect in Egypt [66–70 C.E.]). We also know from Josephus (\textit{A. J.} 18.159–60; 20.100) that Philo's family had an immense sum of fortune. His brother, Gaius Julius Alexander Lysimachus, a very wealthy customs official in Alexandria (Josephus calls him an “alabarch,” perhaps an official who supervised the collection of certain revenues), lent 200,000 dracmas (about a million dollars) at one point to the grandson of Herod the Great (Herod Agrippa I) and plated the gates of the Temple of Jerusalem in gold and silver. See also Victor A. Tcherikover and Alexander Fuks, \textit{Corpus Papyrorum Judaicorum} (vols. 3; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957–64), 1:49, 67; Borgen, “Philo of Alexandria,” in Stone, \textit{Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period}, 252.

\textsuperscript{8} At least his brother, Gaius Julius Alexander, and nephew, Tiberius Julius Alexander, must have held these triple-citizenships.

\textsuperscript{9} It is certain that Philo possessed Roman citizenship and probably whatever kind of citizenship given to the Jews in Alexandria. However, the whole question about Jews and citizenship is very complex and is still debated; first, because the term πολίτευμα (or πολιτεία) in antiquity meant various things, from citizenship, constitution, civic rights to simply way of life; and second, because the evidences are unclear. For example, Tcherikover and Fuks provide evidence of papyri (\textit{Corpus Papyrorum Judaicorum} 2, no. 150, 151, 152, 153, 154–59) that put into question the issue of the Jewish citizenship at Alexandria. There is a contradiction, especially, between the letter from the Emperor Claudius to the Alexandrians preserved in the papyrus no. 153 and Josephus’ account in \textit{A. J.} 12.119–126; 14.188; 19.280. In the letter, Claudius treats the Alexandrians and the Jews as two different groups. He tells the Alexandrians “to behave gently and kindly towards the Jews who have inhabited the same city for many years, and not to dishonor any of their customs in their worship of their god, but to allow them to keep their own ways, as they did in the time of the god Augustus and as I too, having heard both sides, have confirmed.” Then, Claudius tells the Jews “not to aim at more than they have previously had and not in future to send
he was a respected and influential leader of the Jewish community of Alexandria.\textsuperscript{10} He describes in his treatise, \textit{On the Embassy to Gaius}, that he was chosen in his old age to lead a delegation of five members sent by the Jewish community of Alexandria to the Emperor Gaius Caligula in 39–40 C.E.\textsuperscript{11}

Information about Philo's education comes primarily from his treatises. Undeniably, he received a thorough Jewish education in \textit{Greek} as was true for other elite Jews in the Greek Diaspora.\textsuperscript{12} He studied the LXX and perhaps attended the synagogues two embassies as if \textit{they} lived in two cities, a thing which has never been done before, and not to intrude \textit{themselves} into the games presided over the \textit{gymnasiarchoi} and the \textit{kosmetai}, since \textit{they} enjoy what is \textit{their} own, and in a city which is not \textit{their} own \textit{they} possess an abundance of all good things.” Claudius’ letter shows that the Jews in Alexandria might have not possessed citizenship equal to those of the Greek inhabitants. If this is the case, Josephus’ account, that Caesar granted citizenship to all Jews at Alexandria (\textit{A. J.} 14.188; cf. 12.119–126) and were called “Alexandrians” (\textit{A. J.} 19.280), is probably incorrect. The Jews at Alexandria might have well enjoyed certain political privileges, but full political rights is doubted (see also 3 Macc 2:28–33). For a good discussion about the question of Jewish citizenship in Alexandria, see Tcherikover and Fuks, \textit{Corpus Papyrorum Judaicorum}, 2:36–55; Aryeh Kasher, \textit{The Jewish in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt} (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1985); John J. Collins, \textit{Between Athens and Jerusalem: Jewish Identity in the Hellenistic Diaspora} (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006\textsuperscript{3} [1983]), 113–22; \textit{Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age} (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 140–49. Concerning Philo’s Roman citizenship, Maren R. Niehoff (“Jewish Identity and Jewish Mothers: Who was a Jew According to Philo?.” \textit{SPhA} 11 [1999]: 31–54, esp. 39) has noted that it is clearly reflected in his participation in public affairs, his intellectual works, and in special way in one event of his life: His participation in the embassy to Gaius Caligula following the pogrom in Alexandria that broke out during Agrippa I’s visit in 38 C.E. According to Schenck (\textit{A Brief Guide to Philo}, 12), Philo’s family might have received Roman citizenship during Julius Caesar’s involvement with Alexandria on behalf of Cleopatra (ca. 47 B.C.E.).


of Alexandria. Indeed, his writings give strong evidence of the high quality of his Jewish education as well as his deep commitment to the beliefs and practices of Judaism.

As a son of a prominent Jewish family in Alexandria, Philo also received a rich Greek education (Legat. 182), which probably surpassed that of all but a few of his contemporary Alexandrian Jews. As part of a larger tradition, the young Hellenistic boy probably attended a Greek gymnasium for the ephebate, a school where he learned basic grammar, mathematics, and music (Congr. 74–76). Philo went further to receive


13. While the scholarly tradition is clear, the question regarding Jewish schools in Alexandria is not that clear. See Sterling, “Philo,” in Collins and Harlow, The Eerdmans Dictionary of Early Judaism, 1064; Morris, “The Jewish Philosopher Philo,” 3:873–76.

14. E.g., Migr. 89–93; Spec. 1.1–12, 186; 3.29; 4.100; Somn. 2.123; Prov. 2.64; Virt. 65; Legat. 278–80. Cf., Sterling, “Philo,” in Collins and Harlow, The Eerdmans Dictionary of Early Judaism, 1064.


16. Greek gymnasium was education for the élite in the Hellenistic age. Here male youths about to enter manhood received physical and intellectual training. Education in the gymnasium allowed them to acquire citizenship and to participate in the city’s overall cultural life, which in return they were exempt from the Roman poll tax (λαογραφία). However, participation in the gymnasium had a significant religious component such as sacrificing to the gods/goddesses and participation in religious processions. For Jews like Philo it was probably difficult to full participate in gymnasium life without compromising their Jewish heritage. Cf. Schenck, A Brief Guide to
an advanced level of Greek general education called ἐγκύκλια παιδεία (encyclical training at school). This encyclical training involved a large range of subjects, such as grammar, rhetoric, arithmetic, dialectic, geometry, music, and astronomy, subjects that Philo’s writings show he had studied very well. Philo expresses the importance of the gymnasium and the encyclical training when he writes about parents as the benefactors of their children. He says that the former is the training of the body, and the latter is the training of the soul, and that parents not only have the duty to nurture their children, but also to educate them in “body and soul…They [children] have benefited the body by means of the gymnasium…They [children] have done the same for the soul by means of letters and arithmetic, and geometry and music, and philosophy as a whole…” (Spec. 2.229–30; cf. Congr. 148). It is also plausible that Philo studied Greek philosophy as a discipline beyond his encyclical training (see Congr. 79). In fact, in his treatises he clearly shows a detailed knowledge of Greek Philosophy, including emerging Middle Platonic


17. See Spec. 2.230; Prov. 2.44–46; Cong. 74–76; Spec. 1.314. This type of Greek education was especially given to children of wealthy families and of Jewish upper class families. Cf. Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 160. For a good description of the encyclical training, see Alan Mendelson, Secular Education in Philo of Alexandria (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1982), 1–24, 26–27.

18. For Philo’s references in these subjects, see Congr. 11, 15–18, 74–77, 148; Cher. 105; Agr. 18; Somn. 1.205; QE 2.103; QG 3.21; Mos. 1.23.


20. Only the most privileged individuals went beyond the encyclical training to study a subject such as medicine, law, philosophy, or rhetoric (Schenck, A Brief Guide to Philo, 11).
ideas. For instance, as we shall see in chapter five, he certainly studied philosophers such as Plato, the Stoics, and Pythagoreans, and received knowledge of Greek literature such as Homer, the tragedians, the poets, and the historians. What is unclear, however, is how Philo obtained that knowledge; perhaps he attended an institution or simply received this education from private tutors.

**Hellenistic Environment**

Greek culture was an integral part of Jewish identity in Alexandria. While some Alexandrian Jews found it difficult to reconcile their Jewish identity and Hellenistic

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21. Philo read Plato’s *Timaeus* (since there is a parallelism with Philo’s *On the Creation* and the *Phaedrus*. He probably knew other works of Plato such as the *Laws*, the *Phaedo*, the *Republic*, the *Symposium*, and the *Theaetetus*. He also knew the philosopher Aenesidemus. For example, Philo’s definition of philosophy (“the practice or study of wisdom, which is the knowledge of things divine and human and their causes” in *Congr.* 79) is Stoic, as is also his division of philosophy into logic, ethics, and physics (see, *Leg.* 1.57; *Spec.* 1.336; *Agr.* 14f.). Cf. Sterling, “Philo,” in Collins and Harlow, *The Eerdmans Dictionary of Early Judaism*, 1064. For a discussion on Philo’s philosophical background, see David T. Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato* (Leiden: Brill, 1986); Goodenough, *An Introduction to Philo Judaeus*, 75–80; Borgen, “Philo of Alexandria,” in Stone, *Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period*, 256; Morris, “The Jewish Philosopher Philo,” 871–72.


culture. Philo, rather than rejecting Hellenism, embraced it, but not uncritically. The consensus among scholars is that Philo was able to appropriate and incorporate Greek thinking, its images, and methods into his intellectual interpretation of Judaism and Scriptures. This is especially true of his interpretation of Genesis. In fact, the categories of his thought are most often the categories of Greek culture and its philosophies. Certainly, one could say in Birnbaum's words that "Philo represents Judaism to a great extent as a kind of philosophy." The two titles ascribed to him reflect this dual identity:

24. Fairweather, Jesus and the Greeks or early Christianity in the Tideway of Hellenism, 174. At least, we know that a Hellenistic Jew, Philo's nephew, Tiberius Julius Alexander, left Judaism because he could not reconcile these two worlds (Judaism and Hellenism). Barclay (Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 161–62) suggests that in Philo's thought there was no hint of a tension between Greek and Jewish values, no fundamental struggle to reconcile the Jew and the Greek. There was only one kind of conflict pervading his whole life and thought: politics (Spec. 3.3). For an analysis on how Philo tries to accommodate the tensions between his loyalty to his native religious tradition to his philosophical conviction see David Winston, “Judaism and Hellenism: Hidden Tensions in Philo's Thought.” SPhA 2 (1990): 1–19.


26. See Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria, 4. He argues that Philo was unique in the sense that he was able to blend Judaism and Hellenism; especially in his exposition of Jewish Scripture, Philo's works stand in a long tradition of allegorical exegesis (a Stoic method) at Alexandria, interpretation that looked for hidden meaning in the biblical text and its stories. Following the footsteps of his "predecessor," Aristobulus (2nd century B.C.E), who applied allegorical methods to the Torah, Philo used this particular Stoic method, which allowed him to interpret Scripture in terms of Platonism and Stoicism. See also Schenck, A Brief Guide to Philo, 11; Morris, “The Jewish Philosopher Philo,” 876–78.

27. Cf. Schenck, A Brief Guide to Philo, 43. For example, Philo's allegorical method at times appropriates elements from Greek mythology (Opif. 133). And he could compare understanding the Pentateuch to entrance into a pagan mystery cult (Cher. 48–49). According to Sandmel (Philo of Alexandria, 15), Philo quotes about fifty-four classical authors. For Philo's relationship to Greeks and Greek culture and how he uses words related to Greek see Birnbaum, “Philo on the Greeks: A Jewish Perspective on Culture and Society in First-Century Alexandria.” SPhA 13 (2001): 37–58. For a detailed discussion on Philo's view of Egyptians, Alexandrians and Greeks see Alan Mendelson, Philo's Jewish Identity (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 115–28.

sometimes he is called Philo *Judaeus* and at other times Philo *Alexandrinus*. Philo’s dual character has led scholars to question Philo’s true identity; that is, whether he is more Platonist than Jewish or *vice versa*. What is undeniable, however, is that Philo regularly tends to subordinate Greek culture and its philosophies to Judaism. He presents Judaism, the Existent One (τὸ ὄν), the Mosaic Law, and the Lawgiver Moses as superior to any other religion, gods, laws and lawgivers (e.g., *Spec.* 1. 345; cf. *Her.* 81; *Legat.* 194). This is observed, for example, when he emphasizes Moses not only as a philosopher, but as “The Father” of philosophy, from whom all Greek thinkers received their ideas (*Leg.* 1.108; *QG* 4.152; *Her* 214). The Existent One (τὸ ὄν) is “better than the Good, purer than the One,


and more primordial than the Monad” (Comtempl. 2; cf. Praem. 40, QE 2.68). Moreover, the Mosaic Law is superior to other laws for it is eternal, equal with the Law of Nature and Unwritten Law (Prob. 62; Abr. 5–6, 276; Mos 2.13).

Paul of Tarsus

Family and Education

What little evidence we have about Paul’s life comes from his own letters and the Acts of the Apostles. From the letter to Philemon 9, we can deduce that Paul was born in ca. 8 C.E. He died sometimes in the mid to late 60’s, perhaps in ca. 68 C.E. Paul himself does not provide information about his birthplace, but the author of Acts designates Paul’s hometown as Tarsus (Ταρσός), the capital city of Cilicia in Asia Minor (Acts 21:39; 22:3), a designation that there is no valid reason to doubt. During Paul’s time, Tarsus was

32. Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 156.

33. In the letter to Philemon 9 (ca. 61–63 C.E.), Paul describes himself as πρεσβύτης (an old man).

34. Jerome Murphy O’Connor (Paul: A Critical Life [New York: Oxford University Press, 1996], 8) places his birth in 6 C.E. and his death in the 60’s C.E. James D. G. Dunn (Beginning from Jerusalem: Christianity in the Making [vol. 2; Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2009], 2512) places Paul’s birth around ca. 2 B.C.E.–1 B.C.E., and his death early in the 60’s C.E. See also Udo Schnelle, Apostle Paul: His Life and Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Academy, 2003), 47. For the reconstruction of the chronology of Paul’s life and work, see pages 48–56; also Klaus Haacker, “Paul’s Life,” in Dunn ed., The Cambridge Companion to St Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 19–33.

an “important city” (Acts 21:39) with a high level of Greek culture, and as such it was considered both a *metropolis* of Hellenistic culture and a city of athletes, rhetoricians, and philosophers. Ancient evidence shows that Tarsus was well known as the center of Stoic philosophy, which was the most prominent school of philosophy in Tarsus.

Paul’s family was Jewish. From Paul’s own testimony, we learn that he was an Israelite (Rom 11:1; Phil 3:5; cf. 2 Cor 11:22), circumcised on the eighth day (Phil 3:5), a descendant of Abraham (Rom 11:1; cf. 2 Cor 11:22), and a Hebrew born of Hebrews (Phil 3:5; cf. 2 Cor 11:22). Also, we learn that his family was descended from the tribe of Benjamin (Rom 11:1; Phil 3:5), and he himself was a Pharisee (Phil 3:5). Although he was a Pharisee, it was probably not the case for his parents because there is no evidence of Pharisees outside of Palestine. Therefore, the account of Acts (23:6; cf. 26:5), where


38. For example, Aratos of Soli (315–240 B.C.E.) was a renowned Stoic as well as a poet dealing with astronomy. He made an influential contribution in astronomy to the Stoic school in Tarsus. He collaborated with Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism. Chrysippus (280–207 B.C.E.) was also from Soli and a great influence on the Stoic schools of philosophy in Tarsus. Upon his death, Zeno of Tarsus took over. Diogenes of Babylon and Antipater of Tarsus (200–129 B.C.E.) followed Zeno as leaders of the Stoic school at Tarsus. Likewise, Athenodoros (74 B.C.E.–7 C.E.) was the most prominent Stoic of his time and the teacher of Augustus for a while.

the author associates Paul’s family with the sect of the Pharisees when he describes him as an observant “son of Pharisees,” may be very well the author of Acts’ own incorrect conclusion. In the most famous passages about Paul’s life before his experience of the risen Christ, Paul gives the account of how he advanced in Judaism beyond many of his peers among his people, and was extremely zealous for his ancestral traditions (Gal 1:13–15; Phil 3:4–6). As a Pharisee, he was blameless before the Law (Phil 3:5; Acts 22:3), and inspired by his zeal (Gal 1:13–17), he became a persecutor of the early followers of Jesus.41

There is no clear information, however, concerning the social status of Paul’s family, whether he had brothers/sisters, or was married.42 Hengel and Deines argue that if Paul received Greek and Jewish education, he probably belonged to a prosperous or fairly well-to-do Jewish family, especially if his parents had to pay the γραμματιστής, the Greek


41. See also the zeal of Phinehas (Num 25); Elijah (1 Kgs 18–19); Simeon and Levi (Gen 34); during the Maccabean period (1 Macc 2:24–27, 50; 2 Macc 4:2); cf. Josephus, A.J.13.297. According to Haacker (“Paul’s Life,” 23), Paul’s pre-Christian zeal shows his own convictions and initiative in defense of his religious traditions (Acts 8:1–3; 9:1–2), which included imprisonment (Acts 8:3; 22:4; 26:10) and beating (Acts 22:19) of Jesus’ followers (The Way), even torture in order to force them to blaspheme (1 Cor 12:3; Acts 26:11). Paul even confesses to having voted for death sentences against Jesus’ followers (Acts 26:10). Schnelle (Apostle Paul, 64–69) notes that according to Acts 5:34–39, Paul’s rigorous attitude towards Jesus’ followers did not come from Gamaliel’s teaching, since, he appeared to be a tolerant Rabbi. So Paul’s zeal for his Jewish religion, according to Schnelle, cannot be based on his being trained as a Pharisee by Gamaliel. See also Goodenough, “Paul and the Hellenization of Christianity,” in Neusner ed., Religions in Antiquity, 28.

42. About his personal life, we can only conjecture. For example, according to Schnelle (Apostle Paul, 58), Paul did not marry; he lived his life alone by fundamental convictions (cf. 1 Cor 7:1, 8; 9:5). Schnelle also notes that Paul might have suffered from sickness for extended periods (2 Cor 12:7; Gal 4:14; 2 Cor 10:10). Also, Murphy O’Connor (Paul, 35, 45) suggests that Perhaps Paul had a nephew in Jerusalem (Rom 16:13; Acts 23:16).
elementary teacher. Based on Acts 18:3, Schnelle suggests that Paul, who had the same trade, tentmaker (σκηνοποιός), as Aquila and Priscilla, and worked day and night with his own hands, would have belonged to the lower middle class. But, Schnelle also notes that Paul's work as a missionary and founder of churches would have also placed him on a high social standing. The fact that his mission to the Gentiles extended beyond national boundaries, that his letters have a noticeable literary quality, his use of secretaries in his work (cf. Gal 6:11; Rom 16:22), his ability to coordinate and work with numerous workers are proofs not only of his outstanding theological career, but also his relatively high social status.

According to the author of Acts, Paul held a double-citizenship: a citizenship of Tarsus (Acts 21:39; cf. 22:3) and of Rome (Acts 16:37–38; 22:28). However, it still not clear whether Paul had full citizenship in the city of Tarsus, since in antiquity πολίτης (citizen, Acts 21:39) could have referred to either official citizenship or only to one's place of origin. According to ancient sources, in the imperial period, the rights of a citizen could be obtained in Tarsus for five hundred drachmas (Dio Chrysostom, 2 Tars. 21–23). Paul's ancestors could, for example, have purchased citizenship and he could have inherited it


45. See also Acts 22:25–29; 23:27. Given Paul's level of Greek education and that he had been shipped to Rome, according to the author of Acts, it is not implausible that Paul held double-citizenship. However, it is true that plausibility does not mean probability. But, it is important to note that there is no evidence from Paul's writings and from Acts that contradicts the statements in Acts 21:39; 16:37–38; 22:28, even if one considers that these accounts as the author's imagination, as Pervo claims (Acts, 555). For a good discussion and support of Paul's claims to double-citizenship, see Hengel and Deines, The Pre-Christian Paul, 4–15.
Likewise, it is also not completely clear whether Paul obtained his Roman citizenship. Most scholars believed that he did; in fact, if Paul was not a Roman citizen, there could have been no “appeal to Caesar” (Acts 22:9–12). According to Schnelle, Paul could have obtained Roman citizenship by various ways: e.g., by birth, release or purchase from slavery, release from being a prisoner of war, discharge after long military service, adoption, or acceptance into a citizens’ association (adlectio). He also argues that Paul most likely had inherited Roman citizenship from a prior generation in his family (cf. Phil 2:28). This account (that Paul held a double-citizenship), if true, shows his privileged dual identity: Greek-Diaspora Jewish and Greco-Roman. The two names given to Paul—one Hebrew, Saul, and the other Latin, Paul—support his dual identity. Besides, the account that he “appealed to Caesar” in Acts 22:9–12 shows not only that he was a Roman citizen (Acts 22:28), but it also provides a hint about his relatively high social status.

Paul probably received his basic Jewish education in Tarsus, and a more advanced education later in Jerusalem. As a young boy of the Greek Diaspora Tarsus, he probably received his first education in the Jewish Scripture in Greek (LXX). Later in Jerusalem,

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49. Cf. E. P. Sanders, “Paul between Judaism and Hellenism,” in John D. Caputo and
he was educated within the sect of the Pharisees (Phil 3:5) perhaps at the feet of the great Gamaliel (Acts 22:3; 26:4–5) in Hebrew and Aramaic. However, the age at which Paul moved to Jerusalem is unclear.50 While Paul was well-educated in Judaism, the question regarding his level of Greek education is still disputed (cf. 2 Cor 10:10).51 Given the level


50. There is a debate among scholars about the age at which Paul moved to Jerusalem and whether he received his Jewish education in the Greek Diaspora Tarsus or in Jerusalem. Van Unnik ("Tarsus or Jerusalem," 1:259–320) claims on the basis of Acts 22:3 and 26:4–5 that the child Paul moved with his parents from Tarsus to Jerusalem, and that he was reared and educated entirely in Jerusalem. According to Haacker ("Paul's Life," in Dunn ed., *The Cambridge Companion to St Paul*, 21–22), who agrees with van Unnik, Paul moved to Jerusalem as a child, since the term ἀνατεθραμμένος ("brought up") in Acts 22:3 refers to early childhood and not to later education or formal training for a profession. However, Schnelle (Apostle Paul, 68–69) disagrees with van Unnik and Haacker and argues that an early move from Tarsus to Jerusalem seems unlikely. If Paul studied a program on Torah under Gamaliel, he probably came to Jerusalem at about the age of fifteen, not earlier (cf. Josephus, *Vita* 10). A similar position is held by Murphy O'Connor (Paul, 46) when he argues that it is plausible that Paul left Tarsus when he was already grown (after 20), when he had finished his basic education in Tarsus (e.g., Strabo, *Geography* 14.5.13). See also Dunn, *Beginning from Jerusalem*, 498; Goodenough, "Paul and the Hellenization of Christianity," 28–29; Hengel and Deines, *The Pre-Christian Paul*, 29–34, 38–39; Sanders, “Paul between Judaism and Hellenism,” 77; *Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977), 8; Maritain, *The Living Thought of Saint Paul*, 2.

51. Schnelle, *Apostle Paul*, 63. Glover (*Paul of Tarsus*, 23) claimed that Paul was not trained in Greek culture at all; that he was not a product of the Greek schools, nor was he a philosopher. Similarly, Hengel and Deines (*The Pre-Christian Paul*, 3) object the idea that Paul received a Greek elementary education; they also doubt whether Paul was trained in one of the usual schools of rhetoric, since they make a clear distinction between the Greek elementary school and instruction in rhetoric. They also note that the question regarding the place (Tarsus or Jerusalem) where he received his Greek elementary education must remain an open question. For a detailed description of education in the Greek world and a bibliography, see Ronald F. Hock,
of his Greek education, it is plausible that Paul might have spent part of his adolescence in Tarsus where he attended a Greek school, and later as a young man (late adolescence) moved to Jerusalem probably from Tarsus (Acts 21:39; cf. 22:3), where he joined the sect of the Pharisees (Phil 3:5) and perhaps met Gamaliel (Acts 23:16). However, it is important to note that Paul probably continued maintaining contact with his native place after his time in Jerusalem (cf. Acts 9:30; 11:25). It is hard to deny that Paul's letters evince some Greek literary education and even some Greek philosophical education (e.g., Rom 7; 1 Cor 15:33; 2 Cor 4:18; Phil 4:11–12), including Middle Platonic and Stoic philosophical ideas as we shall see in chapters eight and nine. However, this does not presume a solid or high level of education in Greek philosophy as is the case of Philo, considering the


53. Sanders, “Paul between Judaism and Hellenism,” 82. For possibilities for higher Jewish-Greek education in Jerusalem, see Hengel and Deines, *the Pre-Christian Paul*, 57–61.

54. Paul's knowledge of classical Greek literature is also questionable. Collins and Harlow (*The Eerdmans Dictionary of Early Judaism*, 1034) argue that Paul was trained in Greek rhetoric; in fact, they note that the city of Tarsus had various types of rhetorical schools and preserved the fame of being a *metropolis* in the region with its enlightened and knowledgeable public. Paul's style of argument, for example the diatribe, has a Hellenistic background (e.g., 1 Cor 4:6–15; 9:1–18; 5:29–49; Rom 1:18–2:11; 8:31–39; 11:1–24; cf., 1 Cor 6:12–20; 12:12–13:13; 2 Cor 11:16–33; Rom 2:17–24; 7:7–15). For a discussion, see Sanders, “Paul between Judaism and Hellenism,” 79; Troels Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul in His Hellenistic Context* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995). According to Glover (*Paul of Tarsus*, 18–19), however, Paul was not trained in rhetoric, either in the narrower sense of the art of speaking or in the larger sense of Greek literary and philosophical culture. To support his claim, Glover takes the passage of 1 Cor 2:1, 4, where Paul tells the Corinthians that he did not come to them “with excellency of speech or of wisdom,” that he brought no “enticing words of man's wisdom.” For a basic bibliography, see Rudolf Bultmann, *Der Stil der Paulinischen Predigt und die Kynisch-Stoische Diatribe* (FRLANT 13; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910); Stanley K. Stowers, *The Diatribe and Paul’s Letter to the Romans* (SBLDS 57; Chico: Scholars Press, 1981), and
fact that Paul specifically cites Greek literature only once (1 Cor 15:33). While it is clear that he had some knowledge of Greek philosophy, how he obtained that knowledge is also obscure.

**Hellenistic Environment**

In the early twentieth century, the question of Paul’s relationship with Hellenism and Greek philosophical schools was hotly debated. What is evident from his letters is that his complex thought had been influenced, both directly and indirectly, by three great streams of tradition: the Jewish Scripture, Hellenistic Judaism, and some philosophical traditions of Greco-Roman Hellenism, especially Stoicism and some emerging trends of Middle Platonism (1 Cor 15:35–49; 2 Cor 5:1–10). Abraham J. Malherbe notes that Paul’s affinity with popular Greek philosophy of his day (e.g., Stoics and Cynics) is shown also “Does Pauline Christianity Resemble a Hellenistic Philosophy?, in Troels Engberg-Pedersen ed., *Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 81–102; Thomas Schmeller, *Paulus und die “Diatribe”: Eine Vergleichende Stilinterpretation* (NTAbh NF 19; Münster: Aschendorff, 1987).

55. This happens when Paul refers to a popular proverb of Euripides found in Menander’s comedy *Thais*: “bad company ruins good morals.”

56. While some scholars have argued that there is nothing that shows that Paul was familiar with Greek culture, others, like Pfleiderer, argues that he was at least indirectly acquainted with Greek thought. What is clear for others, like Fairweather (*Jesus and the Greeks or early Christianity in the Tideway of Hellenism, 387–88*), is that the Hellenistic influence in his thinking could not be ignored. His Greek environment at Tarsus and on his missionary journeys at a later period had familiarized him with his intercourse with educated men and through the natural tendency on the part of the dominant scientific and philosophic ideas. For example, passages like Phil 4:2; Rom 7:23; and 2 Cor 5:1 evince Stoic thought; although Glover (Paul of Tarsus, 20–21) claims that in these three passages Paul does not use them in any strict Stoic sense, but he lack to provide a substantial argument to support his claim.

in his method of moral teaching and pastoral exhortation, and his paraenetic style of argumentation (e.g., 1 Thess 2:2; 2:6–7; 2:11–12; 3:3–4; 3:7; 4:9–12; 5:11; 2 Cor 11:18). Yet, as Malherbe states, “when Paul is viewed as a theologian, the Hellenistic elements do not lie at the center of his [Paul’s] thinking but provide the means by which he conducts his arguments. But when he and others discuss his ministry, it is extraordinary to what degree the categories and language are derived from the Greeks.”

58. Abraham J. Malherbe, “Paul: Hellenistic Philosopher or Christian Pastor?” ATR 68 (1986): 86–98. For example, Paul’s call to imitate him (1 Thess 1:5–6) followed a procedure recommended by Seneca (Epistle 11.8–10); his pastoral care he adopts as he reminds the believers when he was with them (1 Thess 2:1–12) find its parallel in the description of Dio Chrysostom (Discourse 32.11–12); his demonstration of his own work as hard labor and his hardships, sufferings, and pains of labor with his own body (cf. 1 Thess 4:9–12; 1 Cor 4:12) parallels the account of his contemporary Musonius Rufus (Fragment 11; see also Seneca, Epistle 24.15); and Paul’s various communal concerns, such as marriage, brotherly love, and the Parousia (1 Thess 4:6, 9–12, 13–18; 5:11–15) find their parallel in the Epicureans. While there are some similarities between Paul and philosophers, Malherbe argues that there are also differences between them. While the philosophers looked at the practice of manual labor as an ideal, Paul not only followed it, but his self-support was an integral part of his understanding of his apostleship. Indeed, he views his manual labor as a demonstration of his self-giving and love for his converts (2 Cor 11:7–11; cf. 1 Thess 2:9). Likewise, while the philosophers would give emphasis on their own words and deeds, Paul draws attention to the Gospel and God’s role in the believers’ conversion. Unlike Dio, Paul was not concerned with virtue and practical wisdom, nor did he engage in abuse and reproach, and unlike the Epicureans, Paul’s view of the Thessalonians community concerning its pastoral care centers in God (1:1); that is, it was established by God, who calls them into his own kingdom and glory (2:12). The Thessalonian community is an eschatological one which Paul hopes he will boast of when Christ returns (2:19). And it will not be destroyed by death (3:11–13; 14:14–15, 17).

from the Greco-Roman philosophy, but adapts them to express his own understanding of his mission while forming communities of believers.

Paul's writings reveal that he not only belonged to the Jewish world in Palestine, but also to the Greek-speaking Diaspora. In fact, his missionary work outside Palestine allowed him not only to be in contact with, but to make use of and be influenced by Greek philosophical thought, such as Stoicism and Cynicism (e.g., Rom 1:18–32; 1 Cor 9:24–27; 1 Thess 2:1–12), and at times, his encounter with the Hellenistic world also permitted him to present himself as a philosopher (e.g., 2 Cor 11:16–12:10). In a way similar to his contemporaries Philo and Josephus, he was able to reconcile and blend in his thought the cultures of Hellenistic Judaism and the Greco-Roman world.

Religious Background:

Philo and Paul's Attitude towards Judaism

Scholars have come to the realization that defining Judaism at the time of Philo and Paul is not easy. It is even more difficult to define what constituted a proper Jewish behavior


61. Cf. Epictetus, Diatr. 3.22.23; 3.22.69; Dio Chrysostom, Discourse 32.11–12 (Dio’s description of the Cynics). See also Schnelle, Apostle Paul, 70, 75–76; Malherbe, Paul and the Popular Philosophers, 35–48. Tomson (Paul and the Jewish Law, 52) makes the emphasis that Paul was a Hellenized Jew only (my italics) to the extent that he lived among Greek-speaking communities of Jews and Gentiles, wrote letters in Greek, and in doing so employed both Hellenistic literary conventions and motifs from popular Stoic and Cynic wisdom.


63. See for example Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism; and Paul, the Law, and
in the Hellenistic Diaspora. From their writings, however, we can identify a general view (not a detailed account) of some basic Jewish beliefs and practices that were part of the Greek Diaspora. Five areas of Jewish beliefs and practices are considered key for the purpose of this study. They include monotheism, Temple, circumcision, the ethical commandments of the Law, and food laws or dietary code.

Philo

In this section we shall see that Philo was a committed Jew and remained one his entire life. The manner in which he viewed and lived Judaism in the Greek-speaking Diaspora of Alexandria, however, was greatly affected by his larger Hellenistic environment. As a result, his beliefs regarding some of the central elements of Judaism were re-interpreted within the parameters of Greek philosophical thought and Hellenistic Judaism. As we shall see next, his description of the five central elements of Judaism, his religion, is done in a way that reflects Greek philosophical language.

Monotheism

Philo presents his doctrine of monotheism especially in his treatises On the Decalogue 52–65 and The Special Laws 1.13–65, when he deals with the first commandment: “the

the Jewish People (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983); Alan F. Segal, The Other Judaisms of Late Antiquity (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987); Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 273.

64. As Schenck says correctly, “the more we move away from Palestine into the Diaspora, the more we find Jews doing things that are far from ‘kosher’ in terms of the Jewish Palestinian religious practices.” For example, Onias IV establishing a Jewish temple at Leontopolis in Egypt; Artapanus’s attitude towards Monotheism and his description of Moses as the founder of Egyptian animal worship; Letter of Aristeas’ view of the Jewish God in association to Zeus; and Pseudo-Phocylides’ attitude towards the Jewish God and Scripture.

65. For the reasons just mentioned, Sabbath, calendar, festivals, and sacrifice among other important Jewish practices are not discussed in this study.
monarchical principle by which the world is governed” (Decal. 51, 155; Spec. 1.12).66 As it was for all Jews, for Philo the Supreme Jewish God is One (Opif. 100; Leg. 3.105; Cher. 27),67 the true and only God (Post. 115, 183; Leg. 1.47; Gig. 2.45).68 Borrowing Platonic language, Philo describes the Jewish God as the Existent One (τὸ ὄν),69 and his unique description of the Existent One reflects his own conversation with the larger Greco-Roman world. First, he uses Greek philosophical language in order to describe the Existent One as Creator, Maker of heaven and earth, Husband and Father of the universe, Author of all things, Master and Sovereign of the universe, Architect, Artificer of the universe, Archetype, Cause of all things, Begetter of the universe, Source of all good things, Primal Cause, and most ancient Cause of all.70 Second, he emphasizes the superiority of Judaism


67. Also Leg. 1.44; 2.1, 2, 3; Cher. 97; Det. 124; Post. 63; Plant. 39; Ebr. 126; Conf. 136, 181; Her. 93, 94, 143; Congr. 152; Mut. 31, 138, 213; Somn. 1.229; ABR. 104, 206; Mos. 2.100, 168; Spec. 1.67, 30, 311; 2.53, 54, 3.125, 127; 4.199; Virt. 34, 35; Praem. 44, 45; Prob. 20; QG 3.8.

68. Also Cher. 28, 29; Fug. 40; Spec. 1.36, 53, 65, 209, 313, 344; Spec. 3.125, 127; Mos. 2.168; Virt. 40, 102; Prov. 2.10. Scholars have recognized that the climatic moment of Philo’s monotheistic view is found at the end of his treatise On the Creation, 170–72. There, he presents a summary of his belief about the One true God in five points: (1) that the divine exists (against atheism); (2) that God is one (against polytheism); (3) that the world is created; (4) that the world is one and; (5) that God cares for the world (belief in providence). Some scholars, like Tobin, suggest that Philo is responding to some pagan authors who deride Jewish monotheism and Jewish practices (e.g., Legat. 361; Tacitus, Histories 5.5). Cf. Schenck, A Brief Guide to Philo, 31, 46.

69. Philo uses τὸ ὄν and identifies the ὁ ὄν (he who is [Exod 3:14]) with the τὸ ὄν of Platonism; e.g., Leg. 1.99; Det. 160 [cf. Exod 3:14]; Post. 21, 175; Deus. 11, 52, 55, 69, 108, 109; Plant. 21, 22; Ebr. 107, 108; Conf. 95; Migr. 169; Her. 95, 229; Mut. 11, 27; Mos. 2.161; Spec. 1.270, 313, 344, 345; Virt. 34, 215; Praem. 27, 56; Prob. 43; QG 1.100; QE 2.47.

70. E.g., Opif. 26, 72, 129 [Gen 2:4, 5], 139, 140; Leg. 7, 15, 21; 2.2, 14; 3.6, 73, 73; 102; Det. 83, 86, 126, 147, 148; Post. 175; Deus. 21, 31, 80, 108; Agr. 129, 173; Plant. 15, 86, 35, 61; Ebr. 30, 42, 105, 107, 108; Conf. 136, 161, 196; Migr. 41; Her. 230, 231, 232, 236, 246; Fug. 70, 97, 141; Mut. 18, 29; Somn. 1.67, 73, 123, cf. 2.136; Abr. 69, 75; Mos. 2.88, 100, 205, 210; Decal. 32, 41, 51, 64; Spec. 1.20, 39, 31, 34,
by describing the Existent One as Universal Ruler, Superior to all things, Superior to virtue, King of kings and God of gods, All-sovereign, Sovereign of the universe, Great King, Prince of Peace, Commander and Ruler, Ruler of the universe, and Savior. Third, he also appropriates Middle Platonic language to describe the Existent One as Unchanged, Uncreated, Incorruptible, Transcendent, Immaterial, Invisible, Eternal, Possessor of knowledge, Fountain of Reason, Self-Existing, Self-Sufficient, Existent God, and Existing Being. Fourth, he ascribes the Existent One's further characteristics, such as Goodness, True Good, Benefactor, Prince of Peace, Peace-Keeper, and Peace-Maker.

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71. E.g., Opif. 8, 75; Leg. 2.3; Cher. 28, 29, 99; Det. 55; Deus. 110; Agr. 50, 54; Plant. 91; Conf. 59; Fug. 103; Somn. 1.73; cf. Mos. 1.111, 284; 2.88, 168; Decal. 41, 65; Spec. 1.11, 20, 22, 30, 34, 294; 4.180; Praem. 41, cf. 162; Aet. 1. In two occasions, Philo identifies the Existent One as Savior (Legat. 196 and QE 2.2).

72. E.g., Leg. 1.51; 2.1–3; Opif. 23; Leg. 2.2; Cher. 44, 52; Sacr. 60, 66; Det. 124; Post. 7, 63, 69, cf. 78; Deus. 22, 60; Plant. 22, 31, 64, 66, 89; Ebr. 152; Migr. 40; Congr. 107; Mut. 22; Mos. 2.161; 2.171; Decal. 8, 41, 52, 60, 64; Spec. 1.20, 30, 34, 294; Virt. 65; 213, 214, 218; Praem. 46; Legat. 318; QG 2.10, 12, 16; QE 2.37. In two instances, Philo describes God as pervading everything (Gig. 46 and Conf. 136). The Stoic conception of God as the all-pervading force is supplemented by the Platonic conception of him as goodness and grace. See Fairweather, *Jesus and the Greeks or early Christianity in the Tideway of Hellenism*, 187–88. Philo stands firmly with the Greek philosophers (e.g., Platonists) to say that the anthropomorphic elements are not to be taken literally (e.g., Conf. 98 [Exod 24:10]; 134–140 [Gen 11:5]; Somn. 2.222). Aristobulus, whose allegorical interpretation is confined to the biblical anthropomorphisms, also exemplified, in lesser degree, the broader trend of Judaism to modify and remove anthropomorphism ascribed to God (see Fragment 2, taken from the writings of Eusebius, *Prae. ev.* 8.9.38–8.10.17). Cf. Borgen, *Philo, John, and Paul: New Perspectives on Judaism and Early Christianity* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987), 13; Goodenough, *An Introduction to Philo Judaeus*, 87. For a treatment of Philo’s anthropomorphic views, see Williamson, *Jewish in the Hellenistic World*, 74–84.

73. E.g., Leg. 1.47; 3.73, 102; Gig. 2.45; Deus. 108, 110; Sobr. 55; Decal. 41, 178; Spec. 1.209; 2.192; prov. 2.10.
For Philo, the greatest expression of worship is to be given only to the Existent One (τὸ ὄν), that is true εὐσέβεια (piety). Although in some sources Philo recognizes the celestial beings, the sun, the stars, the planets, and the heaven itself as “gods” (Opif. 27; Decal. 53–57; Spec. 1.19; Aet. 10, 20; Mos. 1.158), he gives them the rank of “subordinate rulers” (Spec. 1.19). According to Philo, they have been brought into existence by the Existent One through an act of creation (Leg. 3.82 [Deut 4:39]; 2.1). Therefore, it is the greatest act of ἀσέβεια (impiety) to give lesser and created beings the worship which is due only to the Existent One (Spec. 2.164–67; Decal. 62, 63). In his writings, Philo harshly criticizes those who believe in many gods (polytheism) and worship them by way of idols of wood, stone, and images (e.g., Decal. 7, 52–65, 66–81; Spec. 1.13–15, 21–31, 331–332; 2.225; Conf. 144; Migr. 69; Legat. 139; Contempl. 3–9). Most of all, he strongly condemns the use of cult images and the “great absurdity” of Egyptian animal worship (e.g., Decal. 52–65,

74. See also Wis 13:1–9, where the author recognizes the celestial beings as gods, yet in less elaborated form than Philo.

75. Goodenough, An Introduction to Philo Judaeus, 83, 44. He points out that, for Philo, it is the Existent One who has a power of his own right and nature, and is the originator of the power of all created beings including of the universe (e.g., Mos. 2. 238–41; Spec. 1.308; 2.176–82). Philo has no objection to use the Greek language referring to the stars as visible gods, and the heaven as the great visible god, and to say of God that “He is God not only of men but also of gods” (Spec. 1.307; 2. 165). Cf. Wolfson, Philo, 1:173, 1:201.


66–81; Spec. 1.13–20; Praem. 162; cf. Mos. 2.205),78 because they are acts of ἀσέβεια (Decal. 62, 63).79

For Philo, the ethical character of monotheism is at stake. He associates the Existent One with virtue (ἀρετή) when he writes that God “is conceived by virtue” (Post. 63; QG 4.42), God’s nature is “all goodness and virtue” (Det. 54, 55; Post. 4; Deus. 7; Virt. 9), and “God is the lover of virtue” (Opif. 81; Mos. 1.148; QG 2.13a), and as such He loves those who live “in accordance with virtue” (QG 1.100). Ἥσεβεια towards the Supreme God is thus the greatest of human expressions of worship, for the Existent One (τὸ ὄν) is the beginning or origin (ἀρχή) of all things, and the virtue Ἥσεβεια is the beginning or origin (ἀρχή) of all the virtues (Decal. 52; cf. Spec. 1.345). The ethical character of monotheism as reflected in Philo’s treatises is expressed in a way that the worship of God becomes accessible to everyone, and through the practice of Ἥσεβεια, the “most splendid

78. It is true that while Philo appropriates imagery of Greek mythology (Decal. 54), he rejects any literal belief in the Greek gods/goddesses or any sacrifices to images of wood and stone (Spec. 1.56). Rejection of idolatry, especially against Egyptian animal worship was commonplace in Hellenistic Judaism. However, Philo’s description of the absurdity of Egyptian animal worship is done in a more sophisticated way than Wis 13:10–15:17, esp. 15:1–19, Let. Arist. 134–138, Josephus, C. Ap. 1.225, 239, 244, 249, 254; 2.66, 81, 86, 128–129, 139; and even much more sophisticated than the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarch and the Sibylline Oracles. The topic of idolatry and its particular association with ἀσέβεια in these Hellenistic texts is treated in chapter three, part two. For the examination of idolatry in Wisdom of Solomon and Paul (esp. Romans 1:18–2:11), see Alec J. Lucas, Evocations of the Calf? Romans 1:18–2:11 and the Substructure of Psalm 106 (105) (Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft 201; eds. James D. G. Dunn, et al.; Boston: De Gruyter, 2015), esp. 114–49, 169–73, 183–89, 208–210; for a current study on idolatry in Paul (1 Corinthians) and other Hellenistic Jewish texts (Philo, Wisdom, and Josephus), see Trent A. Rodgers, “God and the Idols: Representation of God in 1 Corinthians 8–10” (Ph.D. diss., Loyola University Chicago, 2015), esp. 81–136, 220–99, and 312–26.

79. Section C of chapter three examines in depth Ἥσεβεια as the opposite of ἀσέβεια in Philo.
possessions” (Mut. 76), one reaches the perfect knowledge of God (Opif. 32), an ideal that will be discussed in chapter three.

**Temple**

In Philo’s writings, the Temple stands at the heart of Judaism (Flacc. 46), but in a very complex way. Ethically, he closely links the Temple with monotheism (Mos. 2.88, 141):

> “Since there is only One God, there should be also only one Temple on earth” (Spec. 1.67).

It is to this Temple that Diaspora Alexandrian Jews are invited to come in pilgrimage for the religious observances and feasts (Spec. 1.69–70, 316; 2.216; 4.98; Legat. 157). He

80. Here, we notice the absence of legalistic monotheism or any Jewish particularity: e.g., Philo never describes God as YHWH, he is the Existent One, and he intentionally omits Jewish elements (e.g., the God of Israel, I am your God and you are my people, etc.). He does that in order to make Jewish monotheism accessible to all people as well as superior to any other Greek notion of a deity.


82. In Philo, the observance of the High Holy Days is crucial. In Spec. 2.41–214 (see also 1.168–242), he describes in greater detail the ten feasts recorded in the Law: 1) the feast of every day (2.42–49); 2) the Sabbath (2.56–64; 1.168–176); 3) the feast of the new moon (2.140–144; 1.77–179); 4) the feast of Passover (2.145–149); 5) the feast of the unleavened bread (2.150–162; 1.181); 6) the offering of the “Sheaf” (2.168–175; 1.183); 7) the feast of Weeks or Pentecost (2.179–187); 8) the feast of Trumpets (2.188–192; 1.186); 9) the feast or Day of Atonement (2.193–203); and 10) the feast of Tabernacles (2.204–214; 1.189). Philo offers two reasons why these Jewish observances must be performed: first of all God is in view and secondly the ethical conduct of human beings. The most important reason for these feasts is God (the Existent One), the Creator of all; also to thank God for the creation of the universe (1.209–210, 242; 1.194–197; 2.204, 209,156); and to gain some benefits from God, like forgiveness of sins (1.190–193, 196), and the purification of the body and soul (2.163). Ethically, these observances lead human beings to have a life pleasing to God (cf. 1.201, 215); for example, the feast of the Day of Atonement, Philo writes, “teaches the mind perfect piety” (2.197); and the celebration of the Sabbath, the birthday festival of the world (2.70), helps to gain perfection of virtue (2.68). Concerning the feast of the new moon, Philo writes, it “inculcates
mentions in one occasion that he himself made a pilgrimage to the temple in the holy
city “to offer prayers and sacrifices” (Prov. 2.64; see also Eusebius, Praep. ev. 8.14.389b).

Philo also speaks of two Temples (Spec. 1.66–67; Somn. 1.215).83 the earthly Temple and
the spiritual Temple. Both Temples, according to Philo, have ethical value. Concerning
the earthly Temple, the various Jewish practices for and at the Jerusalem Temple are
expressions of pious acts that inculcate the virtue εὐσέβεια (Spec. 1.77–78; Legat. 312–313).84
It is the place to “pay their [Jews] tribute to εὐσέβεια, perform sacrifices, give thanks to
God and ask for forgiveness for sins” (Spec. 1.67; cf. 1.237).85 Philo rejects the validity of
other temples and their practices (Spec. 1.67–68), and catalogues them as acts of ἀσέβεια
(impiety) for there should be only one Temple for the Existent One.86

Metaphorically, the spiritual Temple, for Philo, is “the highest, and in the truest

83. Here in Somn. 1.215, there are two temples of God: the universe, where the high priest
is the divine reason or Word (λόγος), and the rational soul, where the priest is the real man, who
offers prayers and sacrifices and wears the priestly vestment, a replica of heaven. This is different
from what Philo writes in Spec. 1.66 (see page 21).

84. Jewish practices like sacrifice, collection of money for the Temple and Jerusalem,
revenues, first fruits and festivals. See also Spec. 1.76, 152; Ebr. 66; Legat. 216.

85. For Philo, it is important that those who are going to take part in sacrifice must need
to have “their bodies made clean and bright, and before their bodies their souls” (Spec. 1.269). The
physical Temple according to Philo also provided a “safe refuge,” where many people seek it to find
peace (e.g, Spec. 1.69, 158; 3.88, 130; Prob. 148).

86. According to Niehoff (“Jewish Identity and Jewish Mothers,” 35), Philo remains
reticent about fellow Jews who identified with the Jewish temple in Leontopolis. For a discussion,
see Daniel R. Schwartz, “Egyptian Jews Between the Temple of Onias, the Temple in Jerusalem and
sense the holy, temple of God, as we must believe, the whole universe” (*Spec. 1.66*), in which the altar is replaced by the “most sacred of all existence,” the holy vestments by the “stars,” and the priest by the “angels,” all belonging to the intelligible world (κόσμος νοητός). The Existent One (τὸ ὄν) could not dwell literally in any earthly building (*Cher. 99*), for the Supreme and Eternal God could only dwell in a worthy mind (*Cher. 99–101*).⁸⁷ Philo believes that people whose minds (souls) are holy, virtuous, and pious (εὐσεβῆς) are in a holy place with their minds even if their bodies are not present (*Leg. 1.62*). In other words, the true Temple is within the human’s soul. The virtuous life allows the human soul to become a house of God, a holy Temple (see also *Somn. 1.149*; cf. *Plant. 108*), thus a virtue-loving soul.⁸⁸

From his writings, we notice that Philo’s attitude towards the Temple is complex. At times, he describes the Temple metaphorically. It is important to point out that of the 64 times that Philo makes explicit reference to the Temple in the holy city (either ναός or ἱερόν) only 3 instances he speaks metaphorically of the spiritual Temple (*Somn. 1.149, 215; Spec. 1.66*). He internalizes (or spiritualizes) the Jerusalem Temple, but in a way that the physical reality of the Temple still remains very important (*Spec. 1.67, 74, 76; Prov. 2.64*).⁸⁹ In other words, although the temple language becomes in a few instances spiritualized, for Philo, the religious observances at and for the Jerusalem Temple are maintained as a

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⁸⁷. Karl-Gustav Sandelin (“Philo’s Ambivalence Towards Statues.” *SPhA 13* [2001]:122–138, esp. 131–32) argues that in *Opif. 55* and 82, Philo may speak of a spiritual temple dwelling within the human body.

⁸⁸. This idea is developed in chapter three, section D.

⁸⁹. See also *Legat. 157, 198, 203; 232, 290, 310, 346.*
central element of Judaism (Spec. 1.76; Migr. 92) in order to preserve Jewish ethical values as well as community unity.

**Circumcision**

In terms of the observance of circumcision, Philo emphasizes both the literal and ethical meaning of it. For him, the physical observance of circumcision is an initiation ritual, when a young Jew becomes Jewish. In Migr. 86–93 [Gen 12:2], he speaks of the necessity to keep and observe the Mosaic Law, including the literal practice of circumcision: “the observance of bodily circumcision should be observed and it should not be abolished” (Migr. 92). Likewise, in QG 3.47–48, he provides four positive reasons for maintaining

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91. Cf. Spec. 1.1–2; Migr. 224. In Migr. 86–93, Philo gives an exposition of the word to Abraham in Gen 12:2 (“I will make thy name great”). According to Tolbert (“Philo and Paul: The Circumcision Debates in Early Judaism,” 401), here Philo is dealing with two groups of Jews who are disputing about circumcision, and challenges those who oppose the literal practice of circumcision. Like Tolbert’s view, Mendelson (*Philo’s Jewish Identity*, 55), argues that in Migr. 89–93, Philo is dealing with two distinct audiences or groups of Jews: those who emphasized the symbolic meaning of circumcision at the expense of its literal sense, and those who do not. The former group suggests that the higher, more crucial symbolic meaning of circumcision can be appropriated without the literal rite itself. See also Francis Watson, *Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles: A Sociological Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 37–38; Borgen, “Observations on the Theme ‘Paul and Philo,’” 86.

92. Although bodily circumcision was not required for entering the Jewish community (QE 2.2), it was one of the commandments which all Jews had to obey “because it [the body] is the abode of the soul” (Migr. 92–93).
the physical circumcision: to prevent “disease,” “increase fertility,” maintain “purity in the sacred offerings,” and because “circumcision assimilates the circumcised to the heart,” which, according to Philo, is the seat of the mind (cf. *Spec.* 1.6)\(^93\)

However, the ethical meaning of circumcision is also important for Philo.\(^94\) In *Spec.* 1.8–11, he gives two reasons for circumcision: the first is “the excision of excessive pleasure” and all passions of the soul,\(^95\) and the second “to correct men’s delusion” of power and pride (cf. *QG* 3.48).\(^96\) His position enhances the control of pleasure (ἡδονή) and desire (ἐπιθυμία) as well as corrects men’s erroneous attitude about the power of their sexual organ to procreate. This view is reinforced when he discusses the position of proselytes (*QE* 2.2 [Exod 22:21]). To Philo, circumcision is not necessary for becoming a proselyte or for entering the Jewish way of life.\(^97\) He explains that προσήλυτος (proselyte) is not the one who has circumcised his uncircumcision, but the one who has circumcised

\(^{93}\) Other passages with similar meaning are *QG* 3.48; *Spec.* 1.4–7.

\(^{94}\) Williamson (*Jews in the Hellenistic World*, 3) notes that Circumcision for Philo had only a significant value in its symbolic meaning. Cf. Schenk (*A Brief Guide to Philo*, 36).

\(^{95}\) Philo explains that “excessive pleasure” befuddles and confuses the human mind (soul), especially during intercourse, which according to Philo, it is the “greatest pleasure.” So, by the excision of a piece of the male organ, which ministers the intercourse, appeases the excessive and superfluous pleasure. For a discussion on *Spec.* 1.1–11, see Hecht, “The Exegetical Contexts of Philo’s Interpretation of Circumcision,” 62–68; Schenck, *A Brief Guide to Philo*, 34. According to Mendelson (*Philo’s Jewish Identity*, 88–89), Philo views circumcision of male children (*QG* 3.61 [Gen 17:21–24]) as an expression of ascetic practice in order to restrain also sexual impulses.

\(^{96}\) Philo describes that some men feel proud and powerful because their ability to procreate makes to view themselves as gods. So, he sees the need to excise from their mind (souls) this “evil belief” and recognize that it is only God the Cause of all who creates.

his desires and sensual pleasures, and the other passions of the soul. True circumcision, therefore, is that of the “heart,” where the soul is capable to moderate or control the appetites of the passions and vices (Spec. 1.305; cf. 1.6).

Worth noting is that Philo does not want to deny the physical observance of circumcision (Migr. 92; cf. QG 2.52). He is not ready to reject physical circumcision in favor of only the ethical or spiritual character of it because he still sees both as valuable, as he writes: “we should look on all these outward observances as resembling the body, and their inner meanings as resembling the soul” (Migr. 93). Philo keeps both meanings not only because the observance of the Mosaic Law and the caring for the body, but also because the body is the dwelling place of the soul (Migr. 93),99 and because it is important to maintain community identity (Migr. 88).100 Interestingly, when Philo spiritualizes circumcision, it becomes more individualistic. For him, the deeper ethical meaning of circumcision represents the liberation of the individual’s mind (soul) from sense-pleasures and bodily passions (QG 2.52), for the soul who is not symbolically circumcised, purified, and sanctified of the passions and desires cannot be loyal to God (Spec. 1.11).

98. See also Agr. 39; Migr. 92; Spec. 1.9–11 [Gen 17:10], 305 [Lev 24:41]; QG 3.46–48, 52 [Gen 14:14], 61 [Gen 17:24–25]. See a discussion on QE 2.2 in Wolfson, Philo, 2:362–73. He argued that here in QE 2.2, Philo speaks of a spiritual proselyte, as distinguished from the full proselyte who was bodily circumcised, and from the resident alien who was still a practicing idolator (e.g., Spec. 1.52, 308–309; Virt. 103, 104). Borgen sees a parallel between QE 2.2 and Rom 2:28–29 and explains that for both, Philo and Paul, circumcision of the heart is essential, and that this spiritual circumcision is the decisive criterion for deciding who is a Jew and also who is a proselyte (Philo, John, and Paul, 221). See also Neil J. McEleney, “Conversion, Circumcision, and the Law.” NTS 20 (1974): 328–329; J. Nolland, “Uncircumcised Proselytes?” JSJ 12 (1981): 173–94.


100. In Philo, we could also find a strong Jewish “philosophical” apology against Greek perception of circumcision as an obscene act.
The Ethical Commandments

As scholars have already recognized, for Philo, the Decalogue or Ten Commandments, is the “heart” of his ethics.\(^{101}\) While other ancient laws were given by intermediaries, the Mosaic Law was given directly by God himself to Moses.\(^{102}\) The Jewish Law is the perfect law in harmony with the whole universe (Opif. 3).\(^{103}\) It is the ideal, superior and divinely inspired Law (Congr. 120; Spec. 2.163; Prob. 80; cf. Mos. 2.17, 43). Philo also describes the Jewish Law as the written expression of the eternal Unwritten Law, which was dearly sought and esteemed by ancient philosophers.\(^{104}\) The ethical commandments of the Decalogue gain a universal significance when Philo makes the written Law equal to or the very same Law as the Law of Nature, which, according to him, is also the Unwritten

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101. The Ten Commandments are the Ten Headings (On the Decalogue) under which the special or particular laws are grouped (Spec. 1, 2, 3, 4).

102. For Philo, unlike the Mosaic Law which was given directly by God himself, the special laws or the particular laws were given through Moses. Cf. Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria, 66.

103. For the Stoics, for example, the ideal life was to live in harmony with the universal law (νόμος κοινός); in fact, Plutarch thought that this was the goal of Zenos’s Republic (Plutarch, Alex. fort. 329A-B [SVF 1.262; HP 67A]). Cf. Sterling, “Universalizing the Particular: Natural Law in Second Temple Jewish Ethics.” SPhA 15 (2003): 64–80, esp. 74.

In fact, for him, the Patriarchs are living expressions of the Unwritten Law or Law of Nature before the written Law (e.g., Decal. 1; Prob. 62; Abr. 4–6, 276; Mos. 2.13). He shows that the Mosaic Law offers a superior ethics, not only in teaching but also in practice in ways that other religions and philosophies did not.

Moreover, Philo associates the Decalogue with virtue itself (ἀρετή, Leg. 3.245; Post. 89). He describes the Law as “perfect virtue” (Agr. 157; Decal. 132; Spec. 4.131), “natural virtue” (Cher. 101), “beauty,” and “loving wisdom” (QG 2.12). In order to attain virtue, one is to live ethically because it is from ethics that virtues spring (Virt. 8). So, the Decalogue as virtue itself promotes the enhancement of “human character” (Ebr. 91).

Philo views the “laws of their fathers” (the Mosaic Law) as the “trainers” (Prob. 80) under which the human soul must be trained to live virtuously (Virt. 18; Praem. 5; Prob. 80), and


106. The virtuous lives of the Patriarchs will be analyzed in depth especially in section D of chapter three.

107. See also Josephus, C. Ap. 2.154–296.

108. See also Virt. 194; Mut. 150; cf. Praem. 5, 119; Contempl. 2.

109. Philo at one point associates the Law to philosophy when he describes the Law as a “true and genuine philosophy” in Post. 102.

110. Philo defines ethics as “the improvement of human character” in Ebr. 91. For him, the Decalogue and the particular laws are not only meant to benefit those who follow them (Congr. 120), but also they are meant to foster the well-being of all (Decal. 132).
according to nature (Mos. 2.48). A life guided by the ethical commandments promotes virtues, noble actions (Cher. 101; Det. 18), and happiness (Cher. 106; Agr. 157). For Philo, the practice of the Law is to be shown in the conduct of life (Praem. 79; 82); so that the whole of one’s life is to be an exhibition of virtue (Prob. 74; cf. Praem. 119).

Therefore, the practice of the ethical commandments enshrined in the Decalogue and its particular laws seek perfect virtue (Agr. 157). One who lives according to nature—that is virtuously—has the Law “cemented in the soul” (Spec. 4.160) through “reason” (Somn. 2). One who lives governed by reason, according to Philo, is called a “virtue-loving soul” (Cher. 106; Abr. 68); and one who is a virtue-loving soul “obeys the injunctions of the divine laws” (Spec. 2.163; Praem. 119). Certainly, in conversation with Greek culture, Philo describes the Decalogue not only as the principle of ethical conduct, but also as the supreme catalogue of virtue (ἀρετή). The Decalogue and its particular laws are the best course to attain Greek virtues, so much desired and sought by Greek

111. The Stoic expression “to live according to nature” will be dealt in chapters three and four.

112. See also Spec. 3.163; Abr. 5.

113. See also Leg. 3.107; cf. Leg. 1.59.

114. Cf. Virt. 8. Those who are governed by reason opt for freedom (ethical commandments) rather than slavery (passions and desires) (Prob. 45; Spec. 4.10). Therefore, allegorically speaking “virtue-loving souls,” who follow virtue (the Laws), are Unwritten Laws (Virt. 194) like the Patriarchs (Decal. 1).


116. E.g., Spec. 1.314; Virt. 182; Mos. 1.154; Spec. 1.324; 4.96; Flacc. 121. For a discussion, see Terence L. Donaldson, Judaism and the Gentiles: Jewish Patterns of Universalism (to 135 CE) (Waco, Tx: Baylor University Press, 2007), 218–19; Wolfson, Philo, 2:200–205; Bentwich, Philo-Judaeus of Alexandria, 113.
philosophers (e.g., *Spec.* 4.134–35; *Mos.* 2.9–11), even by “ordinary citizens and rulers alike” (*Mos.* 2.43). They inculcate both Greek intellectual virtues—piety, godliness, holiness, and faith—and Greek cardinal virtues or moral virtues—prudence (or practical wisdom), temperance (or self-control), courage, and justice. What is characteristic in Philo, as we shall see in chapter three, is that he tends to add or append piety and holiness to the four cardinal virtues (e.g., *Mos.* 2.216; *Praem.* 160; *Spec.* 4.134–135). Significantly distinctive it is also the fact that he subsumes the ethical goal of the Law under two virtues, piety and love of humanity, “queens” of the virtues (*Virt.* 95). The ethical commandments as viewed by Philo improve human character and control desires, passions, and vices (*Spec.* 1.257; *Contempl.* 2; *Post.* 52; *Spec.* 2.163) “in a higher degree than those who are governed by other laws” (*Spec.* 4.55; see also 314).

**Food Laws**

For Philo, the Jewish dietary laws have an important place in his ethics (cf. Lev 11:1–4, 7–8). But, the traditional explanation that certain animals are unclean (e.g., camels, *Agr.* 131 [Lev 11:4]; pigs [*Spec.* 4.101]) no longer provides satisfactory reasons in the larger context.

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119. In chapter three, these two virtues, piety and love of humanity, will be treated.

120. In Philo’s list of Jewish practices (*Migr.* 91–92), he mentions only the Seventh Day or Sabbath, circumcision, and the Temple.
Hellenistic environment.\textsuperscript{121} So, drawing from “an already existing pattern of interpretation in Hellenistic Judaism” (e.g., \textit{Let. Arist.} 128–171; 4 Macc),\textsuperscript{122} he provides a different interpretation of food laws, where heaccentuates the \textit{ethical character} more than the legalistic character of the dietary laws.

Philo deals extensively with the food laws in his treatment of the tenth commandment (\textit{Spec.} 4.78–131): “thou shall not covet.”\textsuperscript{123} When Philo offers an ethical explanation of the food laws, he expresses the importance of the literal meaning of it.\textsuperscript{124} He takes \textit{ἐπιθυμία} (desire), one of the four Stoic passions, and defines it as the worst of “all the passions of the soul” (\textit{Decal.} 142).\textsuperscript{125} Influenced by Middle Platonism, he \textit{re}-interprets the tenth commandment as “you shall not desire” in order to highlight the ethical character of the commandment. However, the food laws are not for the extirpation of \textit{ἐπιθυμία} (the goal of the Stoics), but to control (\textit{ἐγκράτεια}) or moderate it, the goal

\textsuperscript{121} Cf. Mendelson, \textit{Philo's Jewish Identity}, 68–71. See also Goodenough, \textit{An Introduction to Philo Judaeus}, 43.


\textsuperscript{123} Cf. \textit{Decal.} 142, 174, 51. For a full analysis on Philo's tenth commandment, see Hans Svebakken, \textit{Philo of Alexandria's Exposition of the Tenth Commandment} (SPhM 6; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012).

\textsuperscript{124} According to Goodenough (\textit{An Introduction to Philo Judaeus}, 42), “each law of the Mosaic Law is justified on the basis of its general \textit{symbolic} value in representing to the faithful the type of virtue Philo and his pagan reader together have throughout assumed to be the norm.” See also Schenck, \textit{A Brief Guide to Philo}, 36.

\textsuperscript{125} Philo mentions the Stoic-four passions: fear, anger, pain, and desire in \textit{Decal.} 142. In Platonic psychology, the soul is divided into reason, temper, and desire. Cf. Bentwich, \textit{Philo-Judaeus of Alexandria}, 123.
of Middle Platonics. In Philo's view, the process of controlling daily diet (food and drink) is a training that enhances a discipline of ἐγκράτεια (self-control) or σωφροσύνη (temperance). Since certain animals (e.g., pigs) “provide a very appetizing and delectable repast” (Spec. 4.103), they can arouse a person's desires and produce gluttony.

126. In the Letter of Aristeas (ca. 2nd century B.C.E.), Eleazar, the Jewish High Priest, instructs Ptolemy's ambassadors (Greek audience) in the deeper symbolic moral value of the dietary laws (128–171). However, Philo's interpretation of the food laws is different from the interpretation found in the Letter of Aristeas. Eleazar interprets the symbolic value of dietary regulations; that is, Jews do not eat carnivours because they symbolically indicate that Jews are not to act in brutal fashion (e.g., Jews do not eat kill other human beings). Therefore, they eat only herbivores. There is a symbolic reason why they eat certain things and do not other things. It has to do with its symbolic way in pointing out what is ethical and unethical. Also in 4 Maccabees, there is an eloquent defense of these same laws as the precepts of reason which fortify the mind. The author of 4 Maccabees suggests that the complete mastery is only available for anyone who obeys the Law. Cf. Bentwich, Philo-Judaeus of Alexandria, 123; Mendelson, Philo's Jewish Identity, 70.

127. See Spec. 4.100; Somn. 1.93–94; QG 4.167. In Leg. 1.69, self-control is the third virtue and takes the stand against pleasure/desire within Philo's "tripartite soul" (reasoning part: prudence; assertive part: courage; and desirous part: self-control). Philo follows the Middle Platonic view of dietary regulations, which is the moderation of desires, as such as they are under the control of reason. At one occasion, Philo railed against what he saw at the excesses of the Hellenistic banquet (Contempl. 48–63). For a discussion see also Mendelson, Philo's Jewish Identity, 69–70; Svebakken, Philo of Alexandria’s Exposition of the Tenth Commandment, 20–31. Svebakken argues against Wolfson, who claimed that Philo's tenth commandment deals only with desire for what belongs to another person (see Philo, 2:228–29). Also Svebakken's argument opposes that of Kathy L. Gaca (The Making of Fornication: Eros, Ethics, and Political Reform in Greek Philosophy and Early Christianity [Hellenistic Culture and Society 40; Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003], 196), who asserts that Philo understands the tenth commandment exclusively as a prohibition of sexual desire; that is, when Philo hears the word “you shall not desire,” he has in mind physical appetite, especially sexual appetite.
So, the food laws as part of the whole of the ethical commandments have the moral purpose of “improving the character of man” (Spec. 4.100–118).

Philo also explains allegorically the process of controlling ἐπιθυμία (desire), the source of all evils (Virt. 100; Decal. 173–174, 151–153), giving emphasis on how the human soul is to become a “virtue-loving soul,” rather than a “lover of pleasure” (Leg. 1.90–106).

When Philo describes the meaning of true “eating” (food and drink), he says that true “eating” is to eat “for food”—not just “simply eat” (Leg. 1.99)—so that the soul finds true nourishment by reason, which is necessary for the acquisition of virtues (Leg. 1.101).

The eating “for food” is when the soul eats like “an athlete does”: “masticates slowly” (Leg.

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128. See also Spec. 1.50. He argues that Moses was acting in the best interests of the Jews when he forbade them to eat pig, “the most delicious of the meats” (Spec. 4.101). However, when the emperor Caligula asked Philo why the Jews did not eat pork, he did not offer some practical benefit of the practice. He just noted that every race has its own customs (see Legat. 361–62). Cf. Schenck, A brief Guide to Philo, 36). At one occasion, Philo railed against what he saw at the excesses of the Hellenistic banquet (Contempl. 48–63). Mendelson (Philo's Jewish Identity, 70) suggests that here Philo is arguing against a group of Jews, “modern Alexandrian Jews,” who seem not to realize that the list of unclean animals (e.g., Lev 11:1–23; Deut 14:3–20) was not drawn up arbitrarily, but rather through a process of reasoning.

129. Cf. Mendelson, Philo's Jewish Identity, 68. While Philo sees the discipline of keeping the food laws as the moderation of desire, for him too, like in the Let. Arist. 128–171, such dietary regulations demonstrate Jewish superiority.

130. According to Tobin, Philo's allegorical interpretation of Gen 2–3 (Leg. 1, 2, 3) contains an inherent moral component at the very heart of “the allegory of the soul.” Tobin writes, “it has to do with the way in which the human soul should function as it was intended by God, what it must do to live according to nature and to become more like God, to function in a way that leads to virtue and how it can avoid temptations to act otherwise.” See Tobin, “The Beginning of Philo's Legum Allegoriae." SPhA 12 (2000): 29–43, esp. 19.

131. Food and drink are the two most essential necessities of the body (Ios. 154; Mos. 1.184; Opif. 38).

132. Here, Philo's thought about reason as necessary for the acquisition of virtue is very Stoic and will be treated in chapter three.
Allegorically, then, “eat” is a symbol for the nourishment of the soul, and the eating “for food” is the way “virtue-loving souls” control desires, passions, and vices by reason (Leg. 1.59). When the soul “washes out the entire belly,” that is, overcomes the body through the practice of ἐγκράτεια, the perfect soul lives a life of virtue and is alive only to this life, and not to that of vice (Leg. 1.106).

Paul

In this section, we will see that Paul also sees himself as a Jew. However, his personal experience of call changed his “Pharisaic” way of understanding and living Judaism. To a greater or lesser degree, his view towards certain beliefs (especially Temple, circumcision, the observance of the Mosaic Law as a whole, and food laws) placed him, unlike most of his contemporary Jews, outside the “boundaries” of what constituted Palestinian and Hellenistic Judaism in the first century C.E. Although he always saw himself as a religious Jew (e.g., 1 Cor 9:20–21), his relationship to some of the central elements of Judaism changed drastically to the point that he later became a key figure in the formation of a new religion; this is Christianity.

Monotheism

For Paul, God is One (Gal 3:20; 1 Cor 8:4; Rom 3:30). Although Paul also acknowledges

133. This act of “masticate slowly” is viewed by Philo as the “training” of the human soul to become virtuous. In fact, for him this is the real meaning of God’s command: “You shall eat ‘for food’” in Gen 2.16.

134. Likewise, for Philo when the soul is overcome by the body, the soul dies to the life of virtue and is alive only to that of vice.

the celestial beings as “gods” (1 Cor 8:5), for him there is only One true God (1 Cor 8:6
[Deut 5:7; 6:4]; cf. 1 Cor 12:4–6). He describes God as Father, and perhaps influenced
by Stoic language, calls God the Creator of “all things” (tà πάντα, 1 Cor 8:6).136 Like his
contemporary Philo, his description of God’s invisible qualities reflects (Middle) Platonic
language: God is Eternal, Powerful, Invisible, Incorrupt, and Immortal (Rom 1:20–23; cf.
Rom 11:33–36).137 On this Nils A. Dahl is correct when he suggests that Paul is not only
in agreement with Jews, but he is also with many educated Hellenized Jews, Greeks, and
Romans.138 In the Greek philosophical tradition of Paul’s time, as in Philo, “One God
expressed a conceptual monotheism. This tradition goes back to Xenophanes (ca. 500
B.C.E.), who said: “one God, greatest among gods and humans, is in no way similar to
mortals in either body or mind” (See also Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 5.109).

Paul’s main ethical concern regarding monotheism is idolatry (1 Thess 1:9–10; 1
Cor 8:5–6; 2 Cor 6:19; Gal 5:20; Rom 1:23), which according to him, is the direct path to
moral depravity and every kind of vices (Rom 1:18–32). In Paul, the sin of idolatry, or the
failure to worship the true God, is depicted as the “source” or “root” (cf. Rom 1:23, 25) of
all kinds of vices/sins (Rom 1:24–32).139 In Paul’s thought, idolatry is closely associated

136. See also 1 Cor 11:12; Rom 11:36; cf. Philo, Spec. 1.208–209; Josephus, Ag. Ap. 2.167;
A. J. 4.201. For a discussion about Stoic influence on 1 Cor 8:6, see Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J., First
Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 32; New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2008), 336; Larry W. Hurtado, One God, One Lord: Early Christian Devotion and

137. Cf. Fairweather, Jesus and the Greeks or early Christianity in the Tideway of Hellenism,
388.


139. Douglas J. Moo, Epistle of the Romans (NICNT; Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans,
with “lusts of the heart” (ἐπιθυμίαις τῶν καρδιῶν, Rom 1:24), “passions of dishonor” (πάθη ἀτιμίας, Rom 1:26–27), and a “depraved mind” (ἀδόκιμος νοῦς, Rom 1:28–32), which are very much related to improper actions, particularly unnatural intercourse among both women and men. These vices/sins, Paul emphasizes, are “acts” of impiety (ἀσέβεια) and “unrighteousness” (ἀδικία) (Rom 1:18), and find their source in the sin of idolatry. To avoid such evil practices, believers are exhorted to turn away from idols to worship the One God only (1 Thess 1:9–10; cf. Rom 14:11; 1 Cor 14:25; 2 Cor 9:13).

In the footsteps of his Hellenistic Jewish fellows who despised especially Egyptian idolatry, Paul appropriates as his own the creed of monotheism (the one true God

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over against the Gentile gods) of Hellenistic Judaism, and claims that God’s Temple has no common ground with idols (2 Cor 6:16). As a matter of fact, in 1 Cor 10:7, 14–22, Paul argues strongly against eating εἰδωλόθυτα (food sacrificed and eaten in the temple precincts), an actual “act” of idolatry, and urges believers to “flee from idolatry” (1 Cor 10:14). In his attempt to emphasize the ethical character of monotheism, Paul universalizes his view of monotheism. As salvation is for both Jews and Gentiles, apart from the observance of the Mosaic Law (Rom 3:4:25), the One God is also the God of all Jews and Gentiles (Rom 15:9), because all those who have faith in Christ receive God’s promises that were made to the Patriarchs of Israel (Rom 9–11).

Temple

Unlike his contemporary Philo, in his seven undisputed letters, Paul does not speak of or mention the “physical” reality of the Jerusalem Temple or the religious practices and feasts for and in the Temple (e.g., sending money to the Temple, offering first fruits, sacrifices, and the observances of the Holy Days). For Paul, the believers in Christ are “the Temple of God.” Therefore, there is no clear evidence about what Paul’s personal attitude towards

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142. Cf. Aristobulus 124–169; Jos. Asen. 11:10–11; Philo, Spec. 1.208; Leg. 2.1–2; Legat. 115; Josephus, A. J. 8.91; 4.201; 5.112; 8.335, 337.


145. Unlike Philo, there is no evidence of Paul observing these Jewish feasts. Gal 4:9–11 and Rom 14:5 show Paul’s negative attitude towards the Sabbath. However, he adopts language from early Christianity that is indirectly connected with Jewish feasts, but these are used metaphorically to explain Christology (e.g., Gal 2:21; 3:1; Phil 2:6–11; 1 Cor 6:20; 7:23; Rom 3:24; 8:18–26, 37).
the physical Temple after his experience was. However, that Paul is silent cannot be taken as an indication that he did not have an esteem for the Temple and its practices.

In his letters to the believers in Corinth, he does speak of the Temple metaphorically in such a way that he moves away from the existing Temple in Jerusalem and from the religious observances related to the Temple.146 The concept of the earthly Temple is transformed by the new Law of Christ, in a way that Paul gives more value to the metaphorical spiritual Temple, which is in his thought the believer’s body.147 Dealing with the issues of dissensions in the Corinthian community (1 Cor 3:16–17; 6:19), for example, Paul claims that “the body [σῶμα] is a temple [ναός],”148 and he reminds the believers that their physical body is central in their faith in Christ. For Paul, according to Murphy O’Connor, “the body is the sphere in which the following of Christ became real.”149

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147. Bruce J. Malina and John J. Pilch, Social Science Commentary on the Letters of Paul (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 2006), 75.

148. Christina Fetherolf (The Body for a Temple, a Temple for a Body: An Examination of Bodily Metaphors in 1 Corinthians. ” Proceedings & MWSBL 30 (2010): 88–106, esp. 91, 94) argues that Paul uses σῶμα and ναός because his audience, mainly Gentiles, would have been familiar with the language, which in the mid-first century C.E. was identified as the language of body politics. Paul would have drawn on concepts from the Greco-Roman world as well as Jewish background (e.g., 1QS 8.5–7a). Here in 1 Cor 3:16–17, Paul opts for ναός instead of ἱερόν, where the noun ναός refers strictly to the dwelling of the “abode of God,” the sanctuary, the inner temple. See A. Robertson and A. Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1963), 66; Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 315.

149. Murphy O’Connor, “1 and 2 Corinthians,” 77; cf. Fetherolf, “The Body for a Temple, a
That is, the believers’ ethical conduct in relation to other believers is essential in the early Christian community.

Paul’s metaphorical outlook on the Temple is quite similar to that of Philo’s in the sense that both of them—Paul more than Philo—tend to view the Temple spiritually. Paul, however, treats the metaphorical spiritual Temple differently from Philo’s way in two aspects: first, whereas in Philo the human soul (mind) is a Temple, in Paul, it is the believer’s body, which is the Temple for God’s Spirit to dwell (1 Cor 3:16). Second, whereas in Philo the spiritual Temple is focused on the individual, in Paul, it is community oriented (1 Cor 3:17; cf. 2 Cor 6:16). In 1 Cor 6:19, for instance, Paul uses the temple imagery when he discusses the issue of sexual immorality. Again, he declares that the community of believers is the Temple of the Holy Spirit,150 and emphasizes that their conduct or ethical life should reflect that of their new status under the Law of Christ or love commandment. The believers’ lives are to be consistent with the presence of God

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150. For a discussion, see Lim, “Paul’s Use of temple Imagery in the Corinthians Correspondence,” 194.
indwelling within them. 151 Paul’s use of the temple imagery is to “promote the values aligned to the gospel of Christ,” 152 which is ultimately the Law of Christ.

**Circumcision**

Paul addresses circumcision especially in Romans and Galatians. 153 Only once, however, does he refer to circumcision of the flesh as having a value, that is, only if one obeys the Law (Rom 2:25a). The believer who is circumcised and does not observe the Law, his circumcision is of no value; his physical circumcision “has become uncircumcision” (Rom 2:25b). In this argument, Paul stresses the importance of being consistent between the observance or obedience of the Law and the practice of the physical circumcision. In fact, he argues that those who are not circumcised in the flesh but observe the Law are actually

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151. Lim, “Paul’s Use of temple Imagery in the Corinthians Correspondence,” 194. See also Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 264; Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AB 32; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 269–70. Also, in 2 Cor 6:16, Paul again uses the temple imagery to exhort the Corinthian believers to live up their status as the temple of the living God by drawing clear social boundaries for their relationship with those outside the community. However, this passage is one of the most debated controversial pericopes in the Corinthian correspondence, and its authenticity and integrity have been questioned. For a discussion, see M. E. Thrall, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (vol. 1; ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 3–49; J. Ayodeji Adewuya, *Holiness and Community in 2 Cor 6:14–7:1: Paul’s View of Communal Holiness in the Corinthian Correspondence* (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), 13–43. For Bibliography, see Lim, “The Sufferings of Christ are Abundant in Us” (2 Corinthians 1:5): A Narrative-Dynamic Investigation of Paul’s Sufferings in 2 Corinthians (New York: T&T Clark, 2009), 28–29.

152. Lim, “Paul’s Use of temple Imagery in the Corinthians Correspondence: The Creation of Christian Identity,” 200.

153. When Paul mentions circumcision, generally he expresses the irrelevance of its physical practice. See Rom 2:28–29; 3:1, 30; 4:9–12; 15:8; 1 Cor 7:19; Gal 2:7–9, 12; 5:6, 11; 6:15; Phil 3:2–5.
accounted as circumcised (Rom 2:26). Therefore, what is important for Paul here is not the evident (physical circumcision), but the genuine intention to keep the Law.¹⁵⁴

There is a lack of symmetry between Philo and Paul that needs to be pointed out. Unlike Philo who shows the importance of both physical and spiritual circumcision, Paul considers the physical circumcision prescribed by the Law as no longer necessary, and gives priority to the metaphorical spiritual circumcision, which is an inner circumcision. He turns circumcision into a metaphorical language, as a way of describing the importance of a circumcision of the “heart.” In Rom 2:28–29, Paul emphasizes the ethical value of circumcision and symbolically stresses that true circumcision is of the “heart” and in the Spirit and faith, not in the letter (cf. 3:1, 30).¹⁵⁵ A circumcised heart is a transformed person, turned towards obedience (cf. Rom 6:17) and faith (Rom 10:8–10) to live a virtuous and holy life. He argues that the practice of bodily circumcision itself is unnecessary (1 Cor 7:19), and that a real Jew is not one who bears a physical mark, but the one who lives by the Law of Christ or love commandment (Gal 5:6; cf. Phil 3:2–3). What is more important for Paul is that the believers participate in Christ’s life by living the Law of Christ or ethics of love.


¹⁵⁵ For Paul, “real circumcision” is not something external but internal. In two occasions, he mocks sarcastically those who practice bodily circumcision by comparing circumcision to mutilation (Phil 3:2) and castration (Gal 5:12). Tolbert (“Philo and Paul: The Circumcision Debates in Early Judaism,” 404–405) points out that Paul in his own self-assessment seems unlikely to have ever adopted such a high symbolic view of (or reject) circumcision (e.g., Phil 3:5–6; Gal 1:14). See also Barclay, “Paul and Philo on Circumcision: Romans 2:25–9 in Social and Cultural Context,” 545–53.
In Gal 5:11–6:10,156 Paul transfers the role of the physical circumcision to the believer’s crucifixion with Christ (Gal 5:11, 24; cf. 6:13–14). In fact, with baptism in Christ, circumcision for Paul comes to an end (Gal 5:2–6; 1 Cor 7:17–20).157 For Paul, the initiation ritual now becomes baptism; that is, the ritual of baptism has taken the place of the ritual of circumcision (cf. Gal. 3:2–3; 27–29; Rom 6:3; 13:14). In Gal 5:11, he formulates an “either-or” between circumcision and the stumbling block of the cross, which he elaborates in Gal 5:24: “they who belong to Christ have crucified the flesh together with its passions and desires.” Paul claims that crucifixion with Christ and not bodily circumcision has removed the passions and desires (Gal 5:19–24; 6:13–14),158 freeing the believers to live a virtuous life in accordance with the Law of Christ or love Commandment (Gal 5:14; 6:2) and not in the observance of the Mosaic Law.159

Paul’s view of circumcision is metaphorically internalized and as a result eliminates the boundary between Jews and Gentiles (Gal 3:27–29; Rom 10:12; 1 Cor 12:13).160 Since


159. For a good discussion on Christ and the Mosaic Law see Tobin, “Romans 10:4: Christ the Goal of the Law.” *SPhA* 3 (1991): 272–80. Tobin argues that Christ is not the end of the Law, but *its goal* for the justification of every one who has faith, but it is a justification *not* through observance of the Mosaic Law but through faith (1 Cor 9:14; Phil 3:12–16).

160. According to Tolbert (“Philo and Paul: The Circumcision Debates in Early Judaism,” 403–404), Paul not only eliminates the insider/outsider boundary, but he also eliminates the gender (female and male) boundary that Philo tried to preserve. So, unlike Philo, for Paul women
“real” circumcision is an internal circumcision of the heart, he re-defines his inherited tradition and gives to it an ethical value through the baptismal ritual. Unlike Philo, what is in view is that Paul makes no attempt to keep together the metaphorical spiritual and the literal meaning of circumcision, Instead, he sees the two at war with each other (2 Cor 3:6); it is “either-or” rather than “both-and” situation. His basic argument favors the true meaning of circumcision, which is the spiritual life in Christ (Phil 3:3) lived by Christ's Law (ethics of love).161

Ethical Commandments

Paul's view of the ethical commandments, and also food laws, sets him apart from other Hellenistic Jews, including his fellow contemporary Philo. It is evident from Paul's letters that the Mosaic Law has a significant value only as long as it serves in the *interim* between Moses and Christ (Rom 7:1–4; 9:4; 10:4; 2 Cor 3:11).162 Although, for Paul, the Law is “holy, good, and just” (Rom 7:12–14), is “not against the promise” (Gal 3:21–22), and “does not annul the promise given to Abraham” (Gal 3:15–18), the Law was introduced at best only for a period of time, in order to restrain sin until the coming of Christ (Gal 3:23–24; 4:1–5).163 The Christ-event, that is Jesus' death and resurrection (Rom 7:25–8:4), could participate in that “real” circumcision of the heart as fully as did any man. Consequently, the spiritual circumcision that Paul proclaimed not only did away with the distinction between “Jew and Greek” but also with the distinction between “male and female” (Gal 3:28).


163. Matera has pointed out correctly that in Gal 6:2, it is the only time Paul speaks of the “Law of Christ.” In Rom 7:7, for example, Paul writes that the Law was introduced to make sin known (see also 3:20; 5:13; 7:5, 8; 9:31). According to Fitzmyer (*Romans*, 466), Paul does not
has brought about the fulfillment of the Mosaic Law (Rom 13:8–10; Gal 5:14), that is the Law of Christ (Gal 6:2; cf. 5:14; 1 Cor 9:21).\textsuperscript{164} Thus, by incorporating the Law of Christ, Paul grounds the ethical commandments in “love” (ἀγάπη, 1 Cor 13:13), the greatest of the virtues, as he writes in Gal 5:14, “the whole of the law” is summarized in a single command, “love your neighbor as yourself,” and in Rom 8:10, “love is the fulfilling of the Law.”\textsuperscript{165} For Paul, this is the “ethics of love,” which brings about the new creation (καινὴ κτίσις, Gal 6:15). In the Law of Christ or love commandment, the sexual practices are not private matters anymore. They involve the life in the community of believers, that Paul identifies metaphorically as the Temple of God (1 Cor 6:19).\textsuperscript{166} Likewise, when Paul claims “circumcision is nothing and uncircumcision is nothing but keeping the commandments of God is everything” (1 Cor 7:19), Paul challenges the believers to live out the implications of that identity in light of the “ethics of love.”

What is required is that the believers must be led by the Spirit (Gal 5:18) through faith in Jesus Christ (Gal 2:16; Rom 2:28). Only then, the Law perfected in the Law of Christ (ethics of love) will have its true value (Rom 3:31). It will be engraved in the

\begin{itemize}
  \item mean that the law allows a person to know what is right and wrong; instead, he means that the law brings sin in human life. Contrary to Fitzmyer, Matera argues that with the coming of the Mosaic Law, human beings became aware that they were violating God’s will. See Matera, \textit{Romans}, 172.
  \item See also Gal 6:2; Rom 13:9; cf. Lev 19:18.
  \item Tomson, \textit{Paul and the Jewish Law}, 52.
\end{itemize}
believers’ hearts (Rom 2:15), and it will gain a universal significance (Gal 3:28; Rom 9:31; 10:12; 1 Cor 12:13). For Paul, the Law of Christ or love commandment, grounded in the “ethics of love,” is a superior and universal Law (Rom 4:16). It promotes virtues (Gal 5:22–23; cf. Rom 2:20; 13:10) and avoids passions, desires, and vices (Rom 7:5, 8; 8:13–14; Gal 5:19–21).

This crucial distinction between Philo and Paul regarding the Mosaic Law and ethics cannot be avoided. For Philo the ethical commandments of the Mosaic Law are central; for Paul, however, they are not. Later in chapter six, we will discuss in a detailed manner how Paul deals with ethics. What can be said for now is certainly that for him the virtuous life of the believer does not involve the observance of the Mosaic Law. Rather, the Law of Christ or love commandment becomes the heart of his ethics.

**Food Laws**

Rather than re-interpreting the Jewish dietary laws, as is the case in Philo (Spec. 4.78–131) and in the author of the *Letter of Aristeas* (parags.128–171) in order to accommodate to their Hellenistic audiences, Paul rejects entirely food laws. His radical view of the Jewish food laws is evident in his rebuke to Peter at Antioch (Gal 2:11–14). Paul aligns himself with a group of believers (Gentiles) who believe that no food is unclean (Rom 14:14–23), when he claims “I know and am persuaded in the Lord Jesus that nothing is unclean in


168. According to Krister Stendahl (*Paul Among Jews and Gentiles and other Essays* [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1964], 2), Paul rebukes Peter not because Peter is keeping the food code, but it is because Peter’s changing his attitudes under pressure from Jerusalem (Gal 2:11–15).

itself” (Rom 14:14). Food laws came to an end (Rom 14:1–4, 14, 20); thus, “everything is clean” in the Law of Christ (Rom 14:13–20), which indeed is the love commandment (the ethics of love). Paul strongly supports the abandonment of the food and purity regulations of the Mosaic Law. When people dispute the validity of food laws, he declares that the food laws, unlike the Law of Christ or love commandment, have no ethical consequences (cf. Rom 14:14–15).

Paul’s attitude towards food laws is also observed in his argument concerning the actual eating of “food sacrificed to idols” (1 Cor 8:1–11:1). According to Rogers’ recent study, Paul’s moral arguments in 1 Cor 8–10 against eating εἰδωλόθυτα (food sacrificed to idols and eaten in the temple precincts) “are made on the basis of love, over against the Corinthians’ self-seeking, pride, claims of personal rights, and jealousy.” Rogers asserts that “the Strong at Corinth should abstain from eating εἰδωλόθυτα on account of love for those for whom Christ died and on account of exclusive faithfulness to and fellowship with Christ.” Therefore, on the basis of love, Paul gives three essential ethical

170. A negative attitude concerning food sacrificed to idols is also found in other Hellenistic Jewish texts. For example, Philo considers that participation in the meals of religious associations entails a violation of the food laws and eating forbidden and idolatrous food (Somn. 2.123; Ios. 154; Mos. 1.31, 241, 278, 298; 2.167, 270; Spec. 3.126; Praem. 98; Flacc. 14, 50. See Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians (Sacra Pagina Series 7; Daniel J. Harrington, S.J. ed.; Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1999), 305. Syb. Or. 2.96 exhorts abstinence “from what is sacrificed to idols,” and a sentence in Pseudo-Phocylides instructs, “do not eat blood; abstain from what is sacrificed to idols” (31). This sentence, however, is missing in important mss. Paul W. van der Horst suggests that sentence 31 was probably a Christian interpolation on the basis of Acts 15:29. Pieter W. van der Horst, “Pseudo-Phocylides: A New Translation and Introduction,” in James H. Charlesworth, ed., The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, 2:527.


172. Rogers, “God and the Idols,” 300. For detailed analyses about Paul’s arguments in 1 Cor 8–10, see pages 235–298; Collins, First Corinthians, 304–404; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 330–404; Eckhard J. Schnabel, “How Paul Developed His Ethics: Motivations, Norms, and Criteria of
exhortations about eating εἰδωλόθυτα: (1) he teaches that eating εἰδωλόθυτα should be avoided, because to eat food that has been offered to idols is not only participation in idol worship, but also an offense against a believer (1 Cor. 8:9–13).\textsuperscript{173} (2) Paul also exhorts believers to “eat everything sold at a meat market not questioning for the sake of consciousness, for the earth is the Lord’s and all that is in it” (1 Cor 10:25–26). Here, he suggests that when believers buy meat in a marketplace to eat at home, they need not to worry if the meat was offered to idols.\textsuperscript{174} (3) However, if an unbeliever invites a believer to eat at his or her house, and someone tells the believer that the food was sacrificed to idols, the believer should not eat for the sake of consciousness (1 Cor 10:27–29). “Paul urges those with knowledge to have concern for other believers, and not exercise their ‘rights’ apart from their obligations to love other believers.”\textsuperscript{175}

What is at stake for Paul is the ethical life of the believers, and not the “observance” of the commandments of the Mosaic Law (1 Cor 9:21).\textsuperscript{176} For example, regarding the issue of eating εἰδωλόθυτα, his emphasis is not on the observance of the food laws of the Mosaic Law, but on the ethical concern for other believers. As Collins points out, “the eating food offered to idols is to be avoided to the extent that it proves offensive to

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\textsuperscript{173} Collins, First Corinthians, 323.

\textsuperscript{174} Here in 1 Cor 10:25–26, Paul shows concern for the poorer members of the Corinthian community. They had relatively little opportunity to eat meat, and probably the only meat that was available to them had been sacrificed to idols. Cf. Collins, First Corinthians, 305.

\textsuperscript{175} Rogers, “God and the Idols,” 281.

\textsuperscript{176} Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 370.
a member of the Corinthian community who has delicate conscience.” Paul's main concern, therefore, is the ethical life of the believers; that they live guided, not by the Mosaic Law, but by the Law of Christ or love commandment (ethics of love) because only this Law is the supreme Law that can lead them to a virtuous and holy life.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has located both Philo and Paul in their own context and has provided a brief sketch where each Hellenistic Jew stands in terms of his Hellenistic Jewish heritage and Greek philosophical background. Although some aspects in their personal lives are still obscure—due to lack of evidence—we can draw some tentative conclusions. (1) Their upbringing in Judaism of the Greek Diaspora was affected by the wider world of Hellenism. Either directly or indirectly, such interaction with that wider world allowed their Jewish heritage and Hellenism to culturally converge with their own religious identity and convictions. (2) Their attitudes toward certain Jewish beliefs and practices have been strongly shaped by their own experiences living in the Greek Diaspora. As Hellenistic Jews, their interpretations of both Jewish Scripture and religious observances have been often done in ways that reflect a continuous conversation and interaction with the larger Greco-Roman world. To some extent, their personal convictions have been genuinely shaped by that world. (3) Their cultural convergence or assimilation (in Barclay’s words), however, never devalued the Jewish heritage. In fact, Philo’s Judaism always remained primary, and Paul’s commitment to preach Christ’s Gospel to the Gentiles remained grounded in his Jewish heritage as he re-defined and fulfilled it in the light of Christ’s death and resurrection.

In terms of the five areas of beliefs and practices briefly presented in this study, what comes to light is the fact that in Philo and Paul there is a strong symmetry in their treatment of monotheism. In terms of the Temple, the parallels are weak, and there are few parallels in regard to circumcision, the ethical commandments, and food laws. Their view of monotheism is grounded in the belief that there is One God and only the true God deserves worship. Idolatry, which leads to all kinds of immoral behavior and vices, is strongly criticized by both of them. Both of them spiritualize the Temple. But, while Philo maintains both the physical and the spiritual Temple(s) as important, Paul moves away from the physical Temple to focus more on both the individual believer and the community of believers as the Temple of the Spirit. Also, they re-interpret the meaning of circumcision. However, whereas Philo upholds both the physical and spiritual circumcision as valuable, Paul internalizes and advocates only the metaphorical spiritual circumcision. Only at one point he speaks positively of the physical practice of circumcision (Rom 2:25–28), but he does that when referring to the importance of obeying the Law. For both Hellenistic Jews, true circumcision is of the heart and has ethical value for it frees a person from passions and desires. Philo maintains the validity of the Law and re-interprets the food laws; but, Paul simply does not follow the tradition of Hellenistic Judaism. For him, the Law is fulfilled in the Law of Christ (ethics of love) and the food laws have no value at all. In Paul’s case, he is an outlier and stands away from other Hellenistic Jews.
Table 1. Degree of Parallelism between Philo and Paul

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Beliefs and Practices</th>
<th>Degree of Parallelism between Philo and Paul</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monotheism</td>
<td>Strong parallels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temple</td>
<td>Weak parallels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circumcision</td>
<td>Few parallels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethical commandments</td>
<td>Few parallels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food laws</td>
<td>Few parallels</td>
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</tbody>
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In all, what is significant about these Hellenistic Jews is that the innovation and re-definition of both Jewish heritage and Hellenistic culture, as viewed in their life and in the treatment of the five central religious beliefs and practices, not only transformed the view of Hellenistic Judaism—and in case of Paul also early Christianity—but also allow us to better understand—or gives us a clearer lens of—what Judaism and early Christianity was in the Greco-Roman world of the first century C.E. Now, with this in mind, we will proceed to chapter three.
CHAPTER THREE

PHILO’S ΕΥΣΕΒΕΙΑ

Introduction

Before engaging in the discussion of this chapter, there is an important preliminary issue that needs to be situated. One of the difficulties that the analysis of Philo’s ethics involves is that in his treatises he is not doing direct philosophical treatments, as one finds reading Aristotle, the Stoics, or even Plato. Rather, he deals with biblical interpretation (esp. Genesis). As a result, it can be a challenge attempting to provide a clear distinction between Philo’s view of εὐσεβεία and the views of other Hellenistic Jewish writers as well as of writers of philosophies. This challenge is principally for two reasons. (1) As we shall see in chapters four and five, there is a fairly good amount of overlap between Hellenistic Jewish writers and Greco-Roman philosophers. (2) At the same time, Hellenistic Jewish writers differ, yet in different degrees, from the broader Greco-Roman philosophers. What can surely be said is that the philosophical elements in Philo’s writings emerge as part of his doing biblical interpretation. Therefore, in this chapter, I will try to demonstrate that Philo’s understanding of εὐσεβεία is provided by his biblical interpretations. It is from this that we can bring to light his characteristic take on the concept of εὐσεβεία in his ethical discourse.

Scholars have noted that the call to live a virtuous life is a central element in Philo’s writings. However, the key element that governs his thought on ethics is quite
complex. In this complexity lays the difficulty for properly understanding Philo's ethical discourse. Scholars have attempted to pinpoint the complexity, and therefore, elucidate the foundation of his ethics. A recent work of Carlos Lévy¹ tried to provide an understanding of Philo's ethical teaching by emphasizing the kinship between human beings and God. Lévy’s approach led him to see the τέλος formula of “becoming like to God” (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ) as the main element in Philo’s ethics. He argues that a person in his or her desire “to become like to God” is capable of getting “closer to God,” because of his participation in the λόγος (reason).² For Philo, through the perfect λόγος, human beings receive the νοῦς (mind/soul), so that they become intimately connected with God. Lévy concludes his study by pointing out two dynamic movements in Philo’s ethical teaching. He writes:

It is necessary to flee the world in order to come face to face with God, but also to deepen one’s insertion into the world in order to experience a relationship with God through meeting others. In this sense, the ethics of Philo are inseparably both transcendent and immanentist.³

Clearly, Lévy is dependent upon Winston’s argument and paraphrases Winston’s conclusion.⁴ Lévy’s approach, “becoming like to God” as the grounding of Philo’s ethical

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4. According to Winston, Philo’s ethical theory is grounded in his conception of God as being at once “transcendent” and “immanent” in reality. This duality, he noted, is present in Philo’s conception of the human soul, which is viewed as two opposites: “a divine fragment” and “a reality opposed to God.” With this perspective in view, Winston examined important themes in Philo’s ethics, such as freedom and determinism, the Law of Nature, the conscience, the concepts of love of humanity, and asceticism. See Winston, “Philo’s Ethical Theory,” 372–416.
teaching, is certainly one way of understanding Philo’s ethics. This study, however, espouses another way of understanding Philo’s thought on ethics. By examining the Greek concept of εὐσέβεια in his biblical interpretations, this chapter shows how Philo consistently and intentionally privileges the place of εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse. His treatises will show that the key element that governs his thought on ethics is εὐσέβεια, and it is through εὐσέβεια that Philo’s ethical discourse will be illumined in a special way.

The Greek concept of εὐσέβεια—a term composed of two words (εὖ, “well” and σέβομαι, “venerate,” or “pay homage”)—is supreme for Philo. In his writings, he mentions the term εὐσέβεια 162 times, and its cognates, εὐσεβέω 16 times, and εὐσεβής 18 times.5 There is also evidence from Philo’s treatises that he dedicated a section or a treatise to εὐσέβεια when he wrote, “concerning the queen [ἡγεμονίδος] of the virtues, piety or holiness, … we have spoken earlier” (Spec. 4.135).6 According to Philo’s Virt. 51, the original place of the lost Περὶ εὐσεβείας might have been between Fortitude (Virt. 1–50) and Love of humanity (Virt. 51–174).7 This section, Περὶ εὐσεβείας, was probably lost by the middle or end of the second century C.E. since, according to Sterling, Clement of

5. I have used the concordance of Peder Borgen et al., The Philo Index: A Complete Greek Word Index to the Writings of Philo of Alexandria (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 156.


Alexandria did not know about it (Strom. 2.78–100). While there is a consensus among scholars of the early existence of Περὶ εὐσεβείας, there is, however, a disagreement in terms of its position in the Philonic corpus.

In terms of ethics, Philo is part of the larger Greco-Roman philosophical discussions about virtues, in which εὐσέβεια plays a role. However, it is recognizable that εὐσέβεια’s role in Hellenistic Judaism is more prominent than in Greco-Roman philosophies. Significantly in Philo, εὐσέβεια is highly privileged in many different ways, and this chapter shows that privilege in his ethical discourse.

**Five Uses of Εὐσέβεια in Philo’s Treatises**

Before we move into the discussion of the concept of εὐσέβεια in Philo’s writings, a brief note about Philo’s writings needs to be highlighted. Philo wrote more than 70 treatises, of which about 37 survive thanks to early Christians, like Origen, Eusebius, and Clement of Alexandria, who used Philo’s works and kept them in their library. At least one

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8. However, according to Royse, that Clement did not cite Philo’s Περὶ εὐσεβείας is not an indication that by Clement’s time this work was already lost. Royse argued that “whatever Περὶ εὐσεβείας might have existed in the Philonic corpus as known to Clement, it did not exist where conjectured it to be, namely between Virt. 50 and Virt. 51. Thus, if Περὶ εὐσεβείας existed at all in that corpus as known to Clement, it existed at some other place.” Royse, “The Text of Philo’s De Virtutibus,” 92–93. Cf. Colson, PLCL 8.xiii-xiv n. b.

9. This is a topic that is hotly debated. For instance, those who argue against an independent treatment of Περὶ εὐσεβείας are Schürer, *Die Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi* (4th ed.; Leipzig: Hinrich, 1909), 3:671; Runia, “Underneath Cohn and Colson: The Text of Philo’s De virtutibus,” 133; Morris, “The Jewish Philosopher Philo,” 3:851. Those who are in favor of an independent section of Περὶ εὐσεβείας are Royse, “The Oxyrhynchus Papyrus of Philo,” 132–33, who claimed that the Philonic codex found at Oxyrhynchus contained the lost text of Philo’s Περὶ εὐσεβείας; he had even the confidence to note that the length was about 14 pages. Later, Royse (“The Text of Philo’s De virtutibus,” 73–102) argued that the lost section was part of the final section of On Virtues, that is, after On Nobility.

10. The Philonic corpus known to us is generally divided into four series or groups: Allegories of the Law, Exposition of the Law, the Questions and Answers, and Miscellaneous
third were lost, and that includes the section or treatise, Περὶ εὐσέβειας. While Philo
devoted his life writing copious treatises, he not only was dependent on the influential
and growing tradition of Greek philosophy (especially emerging Middle Platonism), but
also on the Hellenistic Judaism of Alexandria (see chapter two). His thorough Jewish
and Greek educational backgrounds and his privileged life in Alexandria allowed him
not only the leisure to compose works, but it also gave him the confidence to interpret
the Jewish scripture (LXX), and on many occasions allegorically, especially Genesis. The
question whether Philo’s writings were meant for Hellenistic Jewish students of different
levels, proselytes, or a larger Greek audience interested in Judaism is still disputed, and
it goes beyond the scope of this study.11 What is important in this study is that Philo’s
overall conception of Judaism as presented in his treatises reflects a fusion of the Greek
philosophical and Hellenistic Jewish traditions.

Philo’s writings offer a full range of Greek themes and concepts, which are valuable
for the understanding of Hellenistic Judaism of the first century C.E. The concept of
εὐσέβεια is one of these. The root εὐσέβ in Philo occurs 196 times, used either in the
religious or non-religious context.12 According to Foerster, εὐσέβ expresses a proper

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11. For the question of audience of Philo’s treatises, see Hilgert, “A Review of Previous
Research on Philo’s De Virtutibus,” 111–12.

12. Borgen, The Philo Index, 156; see also Foerster, “εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” TDNT,
“respect” for orders of domestic, national, and international life.\textsuperscript{13} It is understandable, therefore, that in the Greek world, the terms εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω, and εὐσεβής came to refer to the human relationship with the gods.\textsuperscript{14} Philo appropriates this Greek term εὐσέβεια and applies it to situations concerning ethical conduct towards God and towards human beings, only in exceptional cases. To understand εὐσέβεια’s preeminent place in Philo’s ethical discourse, it is useful to examine first the complexity of his presentation of εὐσέβεια in his writings. Although it is unfortunate that the crucial treatise or section devoted to εὐσέβεια has been lost, which, undoubtedly, would have been valuable for this study—what [treatises] have survived will still be of great value for the construction of Philo’s ethical discourse and his complex ways of describing εὐσέβεια’s preeminence. To present a comprehensive investigation of the complexity of Philo’s εὐσέβεια, this part of the chapter is divided into five major sections: (A) εὐσέβεια for the service of God and human beings, (B) εὐσέβεια as the foundational virtue, (C) εὐσέβεια as the opposite of impiety (ἀσέβεια), (D) the practice (ἄσκησις) of εὐσέβεια, and (D) the relationship between εὐσέβεια and φιλανθρωπία. This fivefold structure will show the different ways Philo privileges εὐσέβεια, and at the same time, it will offer us a window into the configuration of Philo’s ethical discourse. It will also give light to the way he uses εὐσέβεια

\textsuperscript{13} In the domestic level: piety towards a dying parent (e.g., Pseudo-Plato, \textit{Ax. 364C}), towards children (e.g., Sophocles, \textit{El. 464: 589–590}), and parents (e.g., Sophocles, \textit{Oed. tyr. 1431}; Plato, \textit{Resp. 615C}). In the national level: piety towards rulers (e.g., Sophocles, \textit{Ai. 1350}; Antiphon, \textit{Or. 5.96}), and in the international level: piety towards aliens and refugees (e.g., Euripides, \textit{Alc. 1148}; Aeschylus, \textit{Suppl. 336}; Sophocles, \textit{Ant. 731}).

\textsuperscript{14} Foerster, “εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” \textit{TDNT}, 7:175–76.
in comparison with and in contrast to both the Hellenistic Jewish heritage and Greek ethical discourse, topics that will be treated in chapters four and five.

Εὐσέβεια for the Service of God and Human Beings

The well-known Greek virtue εὐσέβεια in Hellenistic ethics serves as a preeminent virtue for Philo’s description of the two important ethical principles of the Decalogue: the proper worship towards God, the truly Existent One (τὸ ὄν) and the proper conduct towards human beings. At first glance, the understanding of this twofold division looks simple; however, when looking at them in depth, one can become almost overwhelmed by the complexity of Philo’s ethical use of εὐσέβεια in relation to God and other human beings. For the sake of clarity, this section is divided into three subsections: (1) εὐσέβεια in reference to the Decalogue; (2) εὐσέβεια in reference to the Existent One (τὸ ὄν); and (3) εὐσέβεια in reference to human beings.

Εὐσέβεια in Reference to the Decalogue

When Philo speaks of εὐσέβεια in reference to the Decalogue, he consistently connects εὐσέβεια to his two-part structure of the ten headings or “summaries:” the service to God under the heading of εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης, and the service toward human beings under the heading of δικαιοσύνη and φιλανθρωπία (e.g., Abr. 208; Spec. 2.63; Virt. 76; Her. 172). However, on three occasions, he departs from this structure and treats εὐσέβεια without making a strong distinction with δικαιοσύνη/φιλανθρωπία (Virt. 51, 95, and Abr. 208). Coincidentally, they all occur in the Exposition of the Law series. In Virt. 51, Philo writes, “the next subject to be examined is φιλανθρωπία, the virtue closest to εὐσέβεια, its sister

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15. This structure, for Philo, constitutes the supreme ideal Law for the acquisition of the virtues upon which the ideal philosophical law was to be based. Cf. Wolfson, Philo, 2:200.
and its twin [ἀδελφήν καὶ δίδυμον].” He views the virtue εὐσέβεια very close to the virtues of δικαιοσύνη and φιλανθρωπία. In fact in Virt. 95, he describes the virtues, εὐσέβεια and φιλανθρωπία, as “queens of the virtues” (ἀρετῶν ἡγεμονίσιν). Philo identifies the law on the first fruits as “a lesson” not only of piety, but also of love of humanity (cf. Mos. 1.254; Spec. 1.78, 248; Legat. 316). Walter T. Wilson is right when he points out that for Philo the “nature that is pious is also humane, and the same person will exhibit both qualities, holiness [piety] towards God and justice towards others.” As the virtues of δικαιοσύνη and φιλανθρωπία are somehow the same in nature, Philo treats them almost in the same way, as it will be shown in the respective section below.

According to Philo’s structure of the Decalogue, the virtues of δικαιοσύνη and φιλανθρωπία form together one of the two main headings, the one concerning duties towards human beings. However, in the same way as he treats the virtues of δικαιοσύνη and φιλανθρωπία, he does so the virtues of εὐσέβεια and δικαιοσύνη: the one who is pious is also just. In the important work, On Abraham, Philo shows the close connection between εὐσέβεια and δικαιοσύνη:

These examples must suffice for our treatment of Abraham’s piety [εὐσεβείας] … for the nature [φύσεώς] which is pious [εὐσεβῆ] is also kindly [φιλάνθρωπον], and

16. According to Liddell and Scott (Greek-English Lexicon, 762–63), the noun ἡγεμονίς also means “imperial,” “chief,” “leading,” and “primacy.” This study follows Colson’s translation (“queen”).


18. In the work On Abraham, Philo organizes his treatise in two sections, in the same way he does in the Decalogue. (1) In paragraphs 60–207, he deals with Abraham’s piety, that is, his relationship to God, and (2) in paragraphs 208–276, he describes Abraham’s possession of the four cardinal virtues (prudence or practical wisdom, courage, justice, and temperance), that is, his relationship to human beings. Cf. Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria, 59, 65.
the same person will exhibit both qualities, holiness [ὁσιότης] to God and justice [δικαιοσύνη] to human beings (Abr. 208).

This passage, very Stoic in nature, describes the Patriarch’s pious behavior. It is his piety (εὐσέβεια) that makes him exhibit his φιλανθρωπία in the form of “kindness,” and both his holiness to God and his justice to other human beings. At first glance, it may appear that Philo is differentiating εὐσέβεια from δικαιοσύνη. But, looking more closely at the passage one sees that he views εὐσέβεια closely connected with ὁσιότης, δικαιοσύνη, and φιλανθρωπία. The virtue of εὐσέβεια in its nature is a form of holiness, justice, and love of humanity; for Philo, the one who is pious and holy is also just and loves others.

Furthermore, indirectly, the virtue εὐσέβεια is pictured as the “source” of ὁσιότης, δικαιοσύνη, and φιλανθρωπία. Philo does not write “piety (εὐσέβεια) to God,” but “holiness (ὁσιότης) to God.” Why? One reason, and an important one, is that he wants to single out εὐσέβεια as the primary virtue in his ethical discourse, and he does that by making an indirect distinction between εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης. This argument may surprise readers since the structure of the two sets of the ethical commandments of the Decalogue (the ten headings), has both virtues (εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης) as a heading for the ethical commandments dealing with the service of God. In fact, they are called the “queen” (ἡγεμονίς) among all the virtues (Spec. 4.135). Philo’s thought on εὐσέβεια is not

19. Philo’s description in Abr. 208 has a strong parallel in the extant work of the Stoic philosopher Musonius Rufus (1st century C.E.), who describes God as possessing “the four cardinal virtues, and it is, therefore, God who is truly magnanimous, beneficient, and loves human beings” (see also Epictetus Diss. 2.1.4.11–13).


21. Note the singular noun (ἡγεμονίς). It is worth noting now that this is the only time that Philo treats εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης as being one by labeling them “queen” in a singular form. Philo places both virtues, εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης, together in Opif. 172; Cher. 94; Plant. 35; Ebr.
an indication that his twofold structure of the *Decalogue* has not been defined yet when
he was writing *On Abraham* and *On the Virtues*. Rather, he may have been influenced by
some early traditions of the Greek philosophical thought, a topic that will be discussed in
chapter five.

There are two passages, however, in which Philo makes a sharp distinction
between the virtues of εὐσέβεια and δικαιοσύνη, the first in the Allegory of the Law (*Her.*
172) and the second in the Exposition of the Law (*Spec.* 2.63). In *Who is the Heir*, he writes
regarding the meaning of the fifth commandment:22

This commandment was graven on the borderline between the set of five which
makes for piety (εὐσέβεια) to God and the set which comprises the prohibitions
against unjust acts (ἀδικημάτων) to our fellows (*Her.* 172).

In this passage, Philo does not include either ὁσιότης or φιλανθρωπία. Also, the virtue
justice (δικαιοσύνη) is not mentioned, but it is taken from the context because of the word
“unjust acts” (ἀδικημάτων), which is the opposite of the virtue justice. This text provides
the fundamental distinction that Philo makes between the ethical character of the virtues
of εὐσέβεια and δικαιοσύνη.

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22. Cf. *Decal.* 51, 106–111; *Spec.* 2.223–241. For Philo, the fifth commandment has a special
status in the *Decalogue* because this commandment stands on “the borderline between the two sets
of five; it is the last of the first set in which the most sacred injunctions are given and it adjoins the
second set which contains the duties of man to man” (*Decal.* 106).
Scholars have already pointed out Philo’s constitution of the ten headings. Sandmel, for instance, argues that Philo balances the two sets of five commandments between εὐσέβεια and the four cardinal virtues (prudence or practical wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice). That is, the first set of five commandments under the virtue εὐσέβεια (duties concerning God) and the second set of five under the four cardinal virtues (duties concerning the relationship between human beings). Goodenough simply notes that the two tablets deal with relations of man with God and with society. However, Philo sharply distinguishes the two sets of commandments of the Decalogue. The commandments related to God fall under the virtue of εὐσέβεια, and likewise, the commandments related to human beings under the virtue of δικαιοσύνη. These two important virtues in both Hellenistic Jewish ethics and in the Greek catalogue of virtues are chosen by Philo to frame the structure of his presentation of the Decalogue. It does not mean, however, that one is more important ethically than the other as Williamson has

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23. It was already noted in chapter one that Philo divides the Decalogue into two tablets. See Wolfson, Philo, 2:200; Goodenough, An Introduction to Philo Judaeus, 123; Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria, 65–67.

24. Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria, 65, 69, 114. So, Sandmel subsumes the second set of five commandments under the four cardinal virtues rather than just one virtue, justice (δικαιοσύνη).

25. Goodenough, An Introduction to Philo Judaeus, 123.
thought. Rather, both are equally and ethically significant to “win virtuous life” (Decal. 108–110). Human beings are exhorted to be both pious toward God and just toward human beings.

The distinction between the virtues of εὐσέβεια and δικαιοσύνη, including ὁσιότης and φιλανθρωπία, is also found in Philo’s treatise, On the Special Laws 2. Describing the importance of the Sabbath for exercising the soul in virtue and philosophy, Philo writes:

One duty to God as shown by piety [εὐσεβείας] and holiness [ὀσιότητος], one duty to men as shown by love of humanity [φιλανθρωπίας] and justice [δικαιοσύνης], each of them splitting up into multiform branches, all highly laudable (Spec. 2.63).

In this passage, Philo presents the skeletal framework in which the whole constitution of the ethical commandments of the Mosaic Law would be structured. Sterling points out a few examples from Greek philosophical catalogues of virtues that display similar twofold division where the two virtues, εὐσέβεια and δικαιοσύνη, are paired together (see chapter one, pages 13-14). However, Philo was probably the first Hellenistic Jew to set up the ethical commandments of the Law under the ten headings or “summaries” (e.g., Spec. 2.63; Virt. 76; Her. 168). The four virtues (εὐσέβεια, ὁσιότης, εὐσέβεια, and φιλανθρωπία) are not the four Greek cardinal virtues (prudence or practical wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice). Instead, Philo takes two intellectual Greek virtues (εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης),

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26. Williamson, Jews in the Hellenistic World, 256. According to Williamson, the second set of five commandments is more concerned with ethics.


28. Interestingly, in his interpretation of Gen 2:10–14 in Leg. 1.63, Philo praises the four cardinal virtues, and allegorically, he treats them as the four rivers of Eden. Each of them takes the role of generic virtue from which all the virtues flow. Cf. Hilgert, “A Review of Previous Research on Philo’s De Virtutibus,” 103.
one cardinal or practical virtue (δικαιοσύνη), and love of humanity (φιλανθρωπία)\textsuperscript{29} and places them as the two main “heads” of the Decalogue: the virtues of εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης as the head of the “duties towards God,” the Existent One, and the virtues of φιλανθρωπία and δικαιοσύνη as the head of the “duties towards human beings.” Each set of two virtues is distinguished from the other set of two, which will be discussed next. Also, in Spec.

2.63, Philo speaks of “multiform branches” of the ten headings, which are the specific or particular ethical commandments of the Mosaic Law (Special Laws 1, 2, 3, and 4). According to him, they were not given directly by God himself, but through Moses, the Lawgiver.\textsuperscript{30}

In his biblical interpretation, Philo’s thought about εὐσέβεια in reference to the Decalogue shows two different ways of understanding the virtue: (1) Philo highlights the prominence of the virtue of εὐσέβεια by placing it equal to the cardinal virtue δικαιοσύνη, and (2) he privileges εὐσέβεια by singling it out from δικαιοσύνη.

**Εὐσέβεια in Reference to God**

Our second subsection deals with Philo’s understanding of εὐσέβεια for the service of God. Philo was a (Hellenistic) Jew at heart, and as a result, his monotheistic attitude is defined as being theocentric.\textsuperscript{31} The reading from the LXX, “You shall fear the Lord your God, and him you shall serve, and to him you shall hold fast, and by his name you shall

\textsuperscript{29} It is worth noting now that φιλανθρωπία is an important virtue for Philo. In ancient Greek ethics, however, φιλανθρωπία was not listed as a virtue; at least, there is no evidence that it was considered a virtue. Philo’s φιλανθρωπία shall be discussed briefly in section E.

\textsuperscript{30} Sandmel, *Philo of Alexandria*, 66.

\textsuperscript{31} See Philo’s monotheism in chapter two.
swear” (Deut 10:20), must have resounded continually in his heart/mind (Migr. 132).32 There are several passages especially in both series, the Allegories of the Law, and the Exposition of the Law in which Philo shows his notion of εὐσέβεια for the service of God.33

For Philo, serving the Existent One (τὸ ὄν) is an important way to show one’s εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης (Sacr. 37; Spec. 3.127). The service of God is about giving the proper worship to the true God (Legat. 347). In terms of his ethics, it is primarily understood as a virtue, an intellectual type closely connected with wisdom (σοφία).34 Philo in his biblical interpretation, like Aristotle, connects wisdom (σοφία) with “the service of God,” and similar to the Stoics, Philo views wisdom (σοφία) as the “knowledge of things divine.”35

But, as we will see in chapter five, Philo differs from the Stoics and the other philosophers in the way he links εὐσέβεια with σοφία in actions corresponding to only the Existent One, and not to other deities (Decal. 62, 63; Spec. 2.164–167).

At the end of his work, On the Creation, Philo describes key beliefs about the Jewish God (see Opif. 172).36 Here, the virtues of εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης are inherently linked to the One Eternal God, the one world, His creation, and His care for it (προνοια).

32. The translations from the LXX are based on Albert Pietersma and Benjamin G. Wright, eds., A New English Translation of the Septuagint (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), sometimes slightly modified.

33. In the Allegories of the Law: Leg. 3.10; 3.209; Det. 55, 56; Deus 17, 68; Migr. 132; Mut. 39, 155; Agr. 128; Plant. 77; in the Exposition of the Law: Opif. 172; Abr. 268; Decal. 108; Spec. 3.127; 4.147. There is only one reference in Questions and Answers (QG 1.100) and one in other Miscellaneous Works (Legat. 347).


35. Wolfson, Philo, 2:212.

36. Scholars call it Philo’s creedal formulation.
It is a just act of εὐσέβεια to pay honor to God (Leg. 3.10; Agr. 128) for God alone is the cause of all things good (Mut. 155; Abr. 268; QG 1.100), and He alone is the beginning (ἀρχήν) and final (πέρας) goal of all things (Plant. 77). This is, for Philo, a monotheistic teaching, as the Existent One is the cause or source of all things good, so is εὐσέβεια the source of the “greatest blessings since this virtue gives the knowledge [ἐπιστήμην] of the service of God” (Spec. 4.147). In Glucker’s words regarding Philo’s view, the “worshipping God is a step in a man’s progress towards his aim in life, knowledge of God.”

The virtue of εὐσέβεια unites the intent of the heart to the Incorruptible and Eternal Existent One (Migr. 132) as God says to Abraham “‘Be well pleasing before Me’ [Gen 17:1], that is, ‘be well pleasing not only to Me but also to My works’” (Mut. 39). Mazzanti says that it is in the phrase “to do all things for the sake of God only” that the true meaning of εὐσέβεια lies (Leg. 3.209). But the exhortations of εὐσέβεια for “the service of God only” refer also to “loving and fearing the Existent One” (Deus 68), a crucial point that Mazzanti has overlooked. True εὐσέβεια for the service of God means caring for God in a way that will benefit only the Existent One (Det. 55). It means wholly devoting one’s personal life to the service of God (Decal. 108; Legat. 347), as slaves devote their lives to the service of their masters and do promptly what they are told to do (Det. 56; cf. Gen 17:1). The true meaning of the virtue εὐσέβεια in relation to the service of God

37. Glucker, “Piety, Dogs, and a Platonic Reminiscence,” 135; for a recent discussion about Philo’s view of the knowledge of God, see Jang Ryu, Knowledge of God in Philo of Alexandria (WUNT 2; Reihe 405; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015).

38. Here in Migr. 132, Philo includes faith (πίστις) as he does also in Abr. 268.

39. See chapter one, pages 18–19.
is, therefore, the complete surrender of the human soul to the Existent One’s will and words.

**Εὐσέβεια in Reference to Human Beings**

Although this subsection is the shortest one, it is important to give its own category to highlight the way Philo depicts the prominent role of εὐσέβεια explicitly in reference to human beings. Only in nine instances does he allude to the virtue of εὐσέβεια as a service to human beings, and they are in the series of the Exposition of the Law (5 times), Questions and Answers (once), and in other Miscellaneous Works (3 times). Interestingly, there is none in the Allegories of the Law.

As Sterling has already pointed out (see chapter one), in Philo’s writings the virtue of εὐσέβεια has certain uses which illustrate the ideal of pious (εὐσεβής) acts towards parents. The command “give proper honor to parents” is especially shown in his treatment of the fifth commandment in Decal. 106–120 and Spec. 2.223–241. In order to emphasize the privileged position of the virtue εὐσεβεία in relation to honoring one’s parents, Philo provides a new example from the animal world, birds. He writes “the younger birds making light of the hardships sustained in their quest for food, moved by piety and the expectation that the same treatment will be meted to them by their offspring, repay the

40. In the Exposition of the Law: Mos. 1.187, 198; Ios. 240; Spec. 2.237; Decal. 117; in Question and Answers: QE 1.21; and in other Miscellaneous Works: Flacc. 48, 103; Legat. 279.

debt…” (Decal. 117). If εὐσέβεια is expected from lesser creatures, like birds, children are expected to repay their parents’ εὐσέβεια to their own parents with the same treatment (and even much more than birds). For Philo, εὐσέβεια for the service to human beings—in the case of one’s parents—carries on the same ethical value as εὐσέβεια for the service of God. For Philo, parents are a kind of mirror of God; their roles both as originators of human life and parents are analogous to that of the characteristic quality of God as Creator and Father. Philo’s view of the role of parents, as creators, seniors, rulers, and masters, led him to view parents as worthy of receiving proper devotion and honor. In Spec. 2.237, he writes “pious respect is due to parents, not only in the ways above mentioned, but also from the manner in which persons behave to those who are of the same age with their parents.” His statement allows us to interpret that filial piety moves beyond blood relations as is shown in Spec. 2.226–227 (cf. Spec. 2.237–238). That is, juniors are expected to express piety towards seniors, pupils towards teachers, beneficiaries towards benefactors, subjects towards rulers, and servants towards masters.

Furthermore, when Philo places special emphasis on εὐσέβεια for the service to human beings, he encourages εὐσέβεια towards the benefactors of the imperial house, especially in On the Embassy to Gaius and Flaccus. When Philo reports the account about Flaccus, he speaks of the Jewish custom of paying honor towards the emperor. Philo writes, “when King Agrippa visited us [Alexandria] … with apologies for the delay, showing that we were not slow at all in understanding the duty of piety towards our


43. These two treatises are mainly apologetic and the context of both writings is political; therefore, Philo encourages εὐσέβεια towards rulers only for apologetic reasons.
benefactor and his family [εὐεργέτην οἶκον] …” (Flacc. 103; see also Flacc. 48). Philo mentions explicitly the practice of εὐσέβεια towards the Emperor Gaius (Flacc. 98); and when Philo relates what Agrippa wrote to Gaius appealing for the Jewish Nation, Philo promotes piety towards Caesar and the imperial dynasty. He writes, “for the Nation, that it may not get a reputation the reverse of the truth, when from the very first it has been so piously [εὐσεβέστατα] and religiously [ὁσιωτάτα] disposed to all your house” (Legat. 279). These examples show emphasis on the ethical duty to express a special honor to emperors, who are “benefactors” of the Jewish people. Philo also describes allegorically the meaning of εὐσέβεια for the people of Israel. In QE 1.21, he says that εὐσέβεια is the “force of the Nation,” and the “force of the soul.” According to him, as long as cities and villages have that “force,” which is the virtue of εὐσέβεια, they act properly. Jews look for the good of the community, become “the pillars of the whole communities, and also support cities and city-governments as if they were great houses.”

Εὐσέβεια as the Foundational or Source Virtue

When Philo teaches about virtues, an important way in which he emphasizes εὐσέβεια’s position is when he intentionally treats εὐσέβεια as the foundational or source virtue. In order to provide a better understanding about how Philo emphasizes this aspect of εὐσέβεια, the section is divided into three subsections: (1) εὐσέβεια the virtue par excellence; (2) εὐσέβεια and the cardinal virtues, and (3) εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης.

44. The translation is from Pieter W. van der Horst, Philo of Alexandria: Philo’s Flaccus, the First Pogrom (Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series 2; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 72.

**Εὐσέβεια the Virtue par Excellence**

Throughout his biblical interpretation, Philo makes an effort to highlight the primacy of εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse. Indeed, there are about 19 explicit references in Philo’s writings in which the virtue of εὐσέβεια is singled out from the other virtues. They are found in the series of the Allegories of the Law (3 times), the Exposition of the Law (13 times), and in Questions and Answers (3 times).46 Philo catalogues εὐσέβεια among other virtues in ways that εὐσέβεια’s privileged place is consistently highlighted. For example, he calls εὐσέβεια:

- the “beginning,” “origin,” or the “source” of virtues (Decal. 52)
- the “most important” of all the virtues (Decal. 100)
- the “greatest” virtue, the “power” of every virtue (Det. 72)
- the “most splendid of possessions” (Mut. 76)
- the “chief” or “greatest” of all the virtues (Spec. 4.97)
- the “highest” and “most profitable” of lessons (Mos. 1.146)
- the “queen” of the virtues (QE 2.38a; Spec. 4.147 [βασιλικά]; Decal. 119; Spec. 4.135; Virt. 95)47
- the “highest” and “greatest” of virtues (Abr. 60)
- the “queen of the dance,” and the “fairest” among them all (Praem. 53)
- the “best” of the virtues (QG 1.10)
- the “most godlike of qualities” (Somn. 2.186)48
- “pure” and “undefiled” (Abr. 129; Spec. 1.30), and
- “divine” (QE 2.15b)

These special qualities given to εὐσέβεια follow the Platonic, Socratic, Aristotelian, and

46. In the Allegories of the Law: Mut. 76; Det. 72; and Somn. 2.186; in the Exposition of the Law: Decal. 52, 100, 119; Spec. 1.30; 4.97, 135, 147; Virt. 95; Mos. 1.146; 2.108; Praem. 53; Abr. 60, 129; in Questions and Answers: QG 1.10 and QE 2.15b; 2.38a.

47. Philo expresses a special fondness for the word ἡγεμονίς, as he uses the term in different contexts when he defines, especially, εὐσέβεια and holiness (ὁσιότης) as “queens” in Decal. 119; εὐσέβεια and love of humanity (φιλανθρωπία) as “queens” in Virt. 95; εὐσέβεια and holiness (ὁσιότης) as the “queen” (singular) in Spec. 4.135.

48. This expression will be treated in section D in reference to the Middle Platonic formulation “becoming like to God.”
Stoic idea that “virtue is one” or “virtues are one,” a point that is discussed in chapter five. However, unlike both Plato who extols wisdom, and Aristotle who praises justice, Philo’s unique choice of εὐσέβεια allows him to configure his own catalogue of ethical virtues under the generic virtue of εὐσέβεια. By ascribing εὐσέβεια a special status, the virtue εὐσέβεια becomes a type of virtue. As Sterling notes, for Philo, εὐσέβεια takes the primary position in his list of virtues when he names it “the queen,” “the highest,” “the origin,” and “the greatest” of virtues. Moreover, with the title “queen” among the virtues, εὐσέβεια becomes the greatest defining ethical core in which the whole of a virtuous life is encapsulated. In addition, referring to εὐσέβεια as the “beginning” or “origin” (ἀρχή) of the virtues, it receives the quality of a super-virtue, paralleling the Existent One (τὸ ὄν), Who is the ἀρχή of all existing things and beings. So, to Philo, the nature of the virtue εὐσέβεια shares in a way the divine nature of the Existent One (Decal. 52; QE 2.15b).

It is important to note that εὐσέβεια is not the only virtue to which Philo gives such a unique prominence. He also calls faith (πίστις) the “most perfect virtue” (Her. 91), the “most sure and certain” of the virtues (Virt. 216), and, like εὐσέβεια, “queen” (βασιλίς) of the virtues in Abr. 270. Likewise, Philo identifies θεοσέβεια (godliness) as the “greatest

49. Goodenough, An Introduction to Philo Judaeus, 120.

50. This idea will be developed more in section D.

51. Philo calls faith the queen of the virtues in a context when he speaks of Abraham’s trust in God. As Philo says, Abraham did not put his trust in material wealth, fame, or noble birth, but faith in the Existent One, the Cause of all things. Cf. Wilson, On Virtues, 407. In terms of faith however, Moses takes precedence over Abraham (Leg. 3.228). Whereas Philo says that Abraham trusted in God, and He reckoned it to him as righteousness (Gen 15:6), Moses refused to place his trust in his own reasoning (cf. Mos. 2.66). Cf. Feldman, Philo’s Portrayal of Moses in the Context of Ancient Judaism, 256.
of the virtue” (Opif. 154), and names the Platonic main virtue, prudence or rational wisdom (φρόνησις), the “most approved” virtue (Leg. 1.66). Despite the praises of these virtues, for Philo εὐσέβεια prevails as the virtue par excellence. It is the only Greek virtue holding the highest position in Philo’s list of ethical virtues that goes beyond those of the Greek catalogue of virtues, including that of the four generic virtues (prudence or rational wisdom, justice, temperance, and courage). Although, he is not altogether consistent in his attribution of εὐσέβεια as the “greatest” of all the virtues—in the sense that he also ascribes similar qualities to two “other” intellectual virtues (faith and godliness) and a cardinal virtue (prudence or practical wisdom)—undeniably, his special preference and also admiration for the virtue εὐσέβεια cannot be ignored. For him, the virtue of εὐσέβεια is characteristically the supreme virtue, and in his ethical discourse it stands above all the other virtues, including the cardinal virtues.

Εὐσέβεια and the Cardinal Virtues

The preeminence of the virtue of εὐσέβεια is developed within the frame of the Greek cardinal or generic virtues—prudence or practical wisdom (φρόνησις), temperance (σωφροσύνη), courage (ἀνδρεία), and justice (δικαιοσύνη). Before we move to the discussion of Philo’s εὐσέβεια and the cardinal virtues, it seems appropriate to give a brief note about the four cardinal virtues in the Greek philosophical tradition. In the classical world, they represented the four cardinal virtues for both the Platonic and Stoic

52. The term θεοσέβεια is a synonym of εὐσέβεια; therefore, it conveys the same idea of service of God as εὐσέβεια. Philo associates θεοσέβεια (godliness) with εὐσέβεια (piety) in Opif. 155 and Abr. 114. Cf. Sterling, “‘The Queen of the Virtues’,” 120. Plato also places together both virtues in Euphphr. 5C.

53. This happens when Philo describes allegorically the four rivers of Eden, which are composed by the four cardinal virtues. He identifies the virtue φρόνησις as the River Pheison.
traditions. The Aristotelian catalogue of virtues lists the four cardinal virtues among the mean (μέσος) virtues (Eth. nic.2.7). But what is unique about Aristotle is that in his catalogue of ethical virtues he places first the virtues of courage (ἀνδρεία) and temperance

54. See Plato, Resp. 426–435; Prot. 361B; Chrysippus’s ethical virtues from Stobaeus 2.59.4–62.6; Pseudo-Andronicus of Rhodes 2.61.4–5. Cf. Christoph Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (New York: Continuum, 2009), 75–76, 163. In Greek philosophy, the term wisdom (σοφία) underwent several changes. In Plato, σοφία is used as synonymous with the term φρόνησις. He uses this word interchangeably; for example, in Resp. 428B, Plato replaces prudence or practical wisdom (φρόνησις) with wisdom (σοφία). Sometimes he uses σοφία to mean practical wisdom about deciding what to do and sometimes to mean theoretical wisdom giving us knowledge of the eternal Forms. Sometimes he uses φρόνησις to mean knowledge of the Forms, although he uses it more often to mean wisdom about deciding what to do in a given situation. Plato has Socrates discuss about σοφία as wisdom par excellence, when Socrates expresses that the city described is a “well-counselled” (εὐβουλολος), and this (“good counsel”) is a form of wisdom” (Prot. 318E). According to Jedan (Stoic Virtues, 83), Socrates’ listeners would have understood the word “well-counselled” as “an integral part of, or subsumed under, wisdom” (σοφία). In Aristotle, there is a distinction between σοφία and φρόνησις; the former deals with things divine (theoretical wisdom) and the latter with things human (practical wisdom). However, both terms are classified as intellectual virtues, distinct from moral virtues (Eth. nic. 1.13.1103a5–10; 6.5.1140a25–30). This Aristotelian distinction is also found in Prov 30:2–3; 1:2; 313, 19; 7:4; 8:1; 10:23; 16:16. Cf. Michael Brennan Dick, “The Ethics of the Old Greek Book of Proverbs.” SPhA 2 (1990): 20–50, esp. 45. The Stoics followed Plato’s four cardinal virtues (Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1034C–E; Virt. mor. 440E–441B). However, unlike Plato, the Stoics distinguished σοφία from φρόνησις as the former was contrasted with the term philosophy and knowledge, and the latter was part of the four cardinal virtues. Different from Plato, Aristotle, and Stoics, Philo uses the term σοφία as a designation of the teachings of the revealed Law; but, similar to the Stoics, he defines σοφία as “the knowledge of things divine and human (Congr. 79). Like Aristotle and the Stoics, Philo uses the term φρόνησις as a cardinal virtue (Leg. 1.63). Sometimes, like Aristotle, Philo differentiates σοφία, which is “the service of God” and φρόνησις, which is “the regulation of human life” (Post. 128). As Wolfson has noted, wisdom (σοφία) becomes with Philo “a designation of the intellectual or divine virtues together with the actions corresponding to them.” Wolfson, Philo, 2:211–12. For a detailed treatment of the development of σοφία and φρόνησις in Aristotle ethics, see Anthony Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics: A Study of the Relationship between the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 160–89.

55. For the Aristotelian list of virtues, see Jedan, Stoic Virtues, 162.
(σωφροσύνη), and last the virtues of justice (δικαιοσύνη) and prudence or practical wisdom (φρόνησις).

In Philo’s case, the association of εὐσέβεια with the four cardinal virtues is multifaceted. In Cher. 96, he lists εὐσέβεια as one of the fourth cardinal virtues: prudence or practical wisdom (φρόνησις), endurance (καρτερία), justice (δικαιοσύνη), and piety (εὐσέβεια). However, in Spec. 4.135, he lists three cardinal virtues: prudence or practical wisdom (φρόνησις), temperance (σωφροσύνη), justice (δικαιοσύνη), and he adds piety (εὐσέβεια) and holiness (ὀσιότης) as the “fourth virtue.” We recall that this is the only instance where Philo treats εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης as one virtue; in fact, he calls both in a singular form the “queen” (ἡγεμονίς) of the virtues. Twice, he lists εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης next to the four cardinal virtues:

Praem. 160: “prudence or practical wisdom, courage, temperance, justice, holiness, piety and the other virtues and good emotions...”

Mos. 2.216: “prudence or practical wisdom and courage and temperance and justice and also of piety, holiness and every virtue...”

While in Praem. 160, the virtue holiness (ὀσιότης) is placed before piety (εὐσέβεια), in Mos. 2.216, εὐσέβεια is listed before ὁσιότης. But, both Praem. 160 and Mos. 2.216 maintain the four cardinal virtues in the same positions. This is an indication that Philo tends to privilege the place of both εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης, classifying them as part of the cardinal virtues.

56. Corage: Eth. nic. 2.7.1.1107b30–5; temperance: Eth. nic. 2.7.5.1107b5–9.

57. Justice: Eth. nic. 2.7.1108b5–9; prudence or practical wisdom Eth. nic. 2.7.10.1107b9–10. Aristotle notes that justice “has not one simple meaning,” but it has “two kinds” of meanings, and that each kind is a mean (Eth. nic. 2.7.1108b8–9). He promises to discuss them later (book five).

58. Here in Spec. 1.135, Cohen (“The Greek Virtues and the Mosaic Laws in Philo,” 10) is right calling piety and holiness a hendiadys, “an expression of a concept by two words connected by and.”
virtues, and he does that by listing them as separate virtues, not as one virtue as in Spec. 4.135.

Furthermore, Philo also positions εὐσέβεια with some of the four cardinal virtues. In Congr. 6, he places εὐσέβεια with two cardinal virtues: prudence or practical wisdom (φρόνησις), justice (δικαιοσύνη), and piety (εὐσέβεια).59 In Ios. 143, however, εὐσέβεια and ὠσιότης are listed with two other cardinal virtues: prudence or practical wisdom (φρόνησις), courage (ἀνδρεία), piety (εὐσέβεια), and holiness (ὁσιότης). In Ios. 246, he lists εὐσέβεια with a cardinal virtue: prudence or practical wisdom (φρόνησις), piety (εὐσέβεια), and in Legat. 213, he also places εὐσέβεια with another cardinal virtue: justice (δικαιοσύνη) and piety (εὐσέβεια). Likewise, Philo catalogs εὐσέβεια together with δικαίωσύνη in Virt. 175. Here, he shows the primacy of his virtue εὐσέβεια by placing it first before δικαίωσύνη (cf. Abr. 208). However, Philo also puts both εὐσέβεια and ὀσιότης with δικαίωσύνη in Hypoth. 6.8: holiness (ὁσιότης), justice (δικαιοσύνη), and piety (εὐσέβεια). In Prob. 83, interestingly, he lists the same three virtues, but he gives εὐσέβεια the first place, ὀσιότης the second, and δικαίωσύνη the third. But in QE 1.12, δικαίωσύνη stands first, εὐσέβεια second, and then ὀσιότης. The way how Philo classifies the virtue of εὐσέβεια among the cardinal virtues shows his flexibility and his attempt to depict εὐσέβεια’s primacy, as one of—or among—the four generic virtues. It also provides the evidence that Philo does not generally view εὐσέβεια and ὠσιότης as one virtue (a

hendiadys) as Cohen has argued. Philo gives each virtue (piety and holiness) its own place; it is also shown in his longest list of virtues (Sacr. 27), where εὐσέβεια stands first and ὁσιότης second among the 34 virtues, which include the four cardinal virtues.

There are two other important points to mention regarding the relationship between Philo’s εὐσέβεια and the cardinal virtues. First, following Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, as we will see in chapter five, Philo views εὐσέβεια as a mean (or middle path [μέση]) like courage (ἀνδρεία) and prudence or practical wisdom (φρόνησις) (Deus 164; see also Spec. 4.147). Second, Philo views the deficiency ἀσέβεια as the opposite of the mean εὐσέβεια and lists εὐσέβεια among other mean virtues, prudence or practical wisdom (φρόνησις), courage (ἀνδρεία), and self-control (ἐγκράτεια), with their respective deficiencies (Abr. 24). Philo raises εὐσέβεια from its subordinate place (in Greek catalogue of virtues) to a privileged position in which εὐσέβεια receives the same weight as the cardinal virtues as a whole. He identifies εὐσέβεια as a perfect virtue (mean) between two extremes (deficiency and excess), or two opposites.

Εὐσέβεια and Ὅσιότης

There are a good number of Philonic passages in which the virtue of εὐσέβεια stands


61. Cf. Wolfson, Philo, 2:272. Other examples where Philo adopts the Aristotelian doctrine of the virtue as a mean are in Migr.146–147; Deus 162–163; Gig. 64. In Migr. 146, Philo writes: “Let the mind be bent not only on following God with alert and unfailing steps, but also on keeping the straight course. Let it [the mind] not incline to either side, either to what is on the right hand or to what is on the left, where Edom, of the earth earthy, has his lurking holes, and thus be the victim now of excesses and extravagances, now of shortcomings and deficiencies. For better is it to walk on the central road, the road that is truly ‘the kings’ (Num 20:17), seeing that God, the great and only king, laid it out a broad and goodly way for virtue-loving souls to keep.”

62. Piety and its opposites (impiety and superstition) will be discussed in detail in section C.
together also with ὀσιότης, either by themselves or among other virtues or the cardinal virtues. Philo uses both virtues frequently in parallel constructions, and sometimes, they seem to be used interchangeably. However, more than listing these two virtues together among other virtues (e.g., Sacr. 27), or simply singling them out (e.g., Decal. 110), for Philo, they are special virtues. For instance, he calls them “great virtues” (Plant. 35), “powers” (Ebr. 92), and “queens” among the virtues (Decal. 119). Also, Philo labels the virtue ὀσιότης alone as “worthy holiness” (QE. 1.7; 2.83; QE 1.12). The special designation of both virtues εὐσέβεια and ὀσιότης shows not only Philo’s knowledge of the common Greek understanding of the terms as we will see later in chapter five, but most importantly, he allows them to stand above all the other virtues as privileged virtues. Even in his longest list of ethical virtues (Sacr. 27), he has εὐσέβεια and ὀσιότης leading the other virtues, including the cardinal virtues. We have seen that once he identifies them as one virtue (Spec. 4.135) and in another instance, he interchanges their positions: ὀσιότης before εὐσέβεια (Praem. 160).

Overall, this section on εὐσέβεια as the foundational or source virtue, has shown that in Philo’s treatises of biblical interpretation there are sufficient clues to argue that

63. Philo uses the virtue ὀσιότης 72 times. The virtue εὐσέβεια with ὀσιότης 35 times: Plant. 35; Aet. 10; Ebr. 91, 92; QE 1.7; 2.83; Decal. 110; Spec. 1.54; 186; 2.224; 3.127; Opif. 155; 172; Sacr. 37; Somn. 2.186; Migr. 194; Mos. 1.198; 307; 2.142; 270; Congr. 98; Legat. 279; Virt. 201; Somn. 2.186; QE 2.47; Spec. 1.30; 52; Abr. 198; Cher. 94; Det. 21; Her. 123. Praem. 160; Legat. 242; QE 1.7; Decal. 110. The virtue εὐσέβεια and ὀσιότης with the cardinal virtues 8 times: Mos. 2.216; Spec. 4.135; Praem. 160; Prob. 83; Abr. 208; Hypoth. 6.8; and QE 1.12; Sacr. 37. The virtue εὐσέβεια and ὀσιότης with other virtues twice: Sacr. 27; Spec. 2.63. The virtue εὐσέβεια alone with other virtues in Det. 114; with faith (πίστις) in Migr. 132; Abr. 268; with love of humanity in Virt. 51, 95; with self-control in Somn. 2.182.

64. Wilson, On Virtues, 137.

65. In QE 1.12, besides piety, Philo includes justice.
εὐσέβεια is regarded as a privileged virtue in his ethical discourse. Despite the fact that Philo lacks consistency—since he labels other virtues “queen” (faith, love of humanity, and holiness)—the greatest virtue εὐσέβεια is the queen among virtues, and holds preeminence above all the other virtues in Philo’s ethical catalogue of virtues. More importantly, εὐσέβεια is classified among the four primary Greek virtues. Rather than listing εὐσέβεια simply as a part of the cardinal virtue of justice (δικαιοσύνη), Philo puts εὐσέβεια with the cardinal virtues, and in his list of ethical virtues (Sacr. 27), εὐσέβεια is the leader, followed by ὁσιότης. The unique and superior nature of the virtue εὐσέβεια constitutes the fundamental key that led Philo to configure his ethical discourse in a new way that moves beyond that of his Hellenistic Jewish and Greek philosophical traditions as it will be shown in chapters four and five.

Εὐσέβεια as the opposite of Impiety (Ἀσέβεια)

Another way Philo privileges εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse is when he contrasts it with ἀσέβεια. Philo uses εὐσέβεια and its cognates 196 times and ἀσέβεια and its cognates 110 times. Only 20 references, however, explicitly mentions εὐσέβεια and ἀσέβεια as two opposites (piety vs. impiety): in the series of the Allegories of the Law (11 times), the Exposition of the Law (5 times), and Questions and Answers (4 times). He also uses δεισιδαιμονία (superstition) instead of ἀσέβεια (piety vs. superstition) in 6 instances: in

66. E.g., Plato’s Euthyphro 12E 9–10. For details, see chapter five.

67. Borgen, The Philo Index, 156 and 51.

68. In the Allegories of the Law: Det. 72, 73, 143; Sacr. 15; Ebr. 18, 41, 78, 109; Conf. 132; Deus 164; Post. 39; in the Exposition of the Law: Abr. 24; Decal. 120; Spec. 1.312; 2.27–28; 4.147; in Questions and Answers: QG 1.66, 76; QE 1.10; 2.26.

69. The Greek word δεισιδαιμονία means “fear of the gods” and “religious feeling;” but in
the series of the Allegories of the Law (5 times) and once in the Exposition of the Law. In order to get a better understanding of how Philo shows the preeminent place of εὐσέβεια in the contrast with ἀσέβεια, this section is divided into three subsections: (1) εὐσέβεια versus ἀσέβεια; (2) ἀσέβεια the road of pathless wilds; and (3) ἀσέβεια the greatest of the evils.

Εὐσέβεια versus Ἀσέβεια

Of the 110 times that Philo uses the term of ἀσέβεια and its cognates, he makes an explicit reference to the virtue εὐσέβεια as the opposite of the vice ἀσέβεια about 20 times. In Det. 72–73, the contrast between εὐσέβεια and ἀσέβεια is reflected in that εὐσέβεια is a virtue that confers “great benefits” (“the power of every kind of virtue to bring health and safety”) and ἀσέβεια is a vice associated with “great length on the unsociability of injustice, the loss of health,” which involves a licentious life and all forms of wickedness (Det. 143; see also Conf. 132; Spec. 4.147; QG 3.28). Philo’s queen virtue εὐσέβεια is closely connected to the Mosaic Law, and he views the obedience to the ethical commandments of Law as a life in virtue, εὐσέβεια, and the disobedience of the Law as a life in vice, ἀσέβεια (Ebr. 18; Sacr. 15; QG 1.76). In fact, for Philo, impiety and injustice are two vices that represent the antithesis of the Mosaic ideal. When he discusses, for example, perjury and its penalties in Spec. 2.26–28, (third commandment: “taking the name of God in vain”), he speaks of εὐσέβεια as the opposite of ἀσέβεια (See also Praem. 12; Mos. 3.303). Unlike Philo, it is generally interpreted in a bad sense, “superstition.” Cf. See Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 199610; 1843), 375.

70. In the Allegories of the Law: Det. 18; 24; Deus 163, 164; Sacr. 15; in the Exposition of the Law: Praem. 40.

71. Wilson, on Virtues, 235.
those who obey the Law, and thus, are known by their piety (εὐσέβεια), those who are
guilty of perjury are to receive the greatest penalty for their impiety (ἀσέβεια). For Philo,
a pious soul is the one who obeys the Law, and the one who does not follow its ethical
commandments is an impious soul (Post. 39; cf. QG 1.66).

Idolatry is another example of the prohibitions of the ethical commandments in
which Philo emphasizes εὐσέβεια’s preeminent position in the contrast with ἀσέβεια.
When he expresses his view about polytheism in Ebr. 109, he speaks against idolatry and
explains that “idols made of stone and wood, and figures shaped in various materials”
are acts of ἀσέβεια (See also Mos. 2.165).72 He goes on to say that the “great prizes and
magnificent honors given to painters and sculptors of idols, public and private” are acts of
ἀσέβεια (See also Decal. 63). Polytheism and idolatry, according to Philo, create “atheism
in the soul of the foolish” (Ebr. 109) and makes atheism “the source of all iniquities”
(Decal. 91). In Spec. 1.20, he stresses the need to give proper honor to the Immaterial,
Invisible God of gods and Maker of all, and “if anyone renders the worship due to the
Eternal, the Creator to a created being… must be guilty of impiety in the highest degree.”73
The impious soul is “the enemy and foe who stands against God” (QG 2.82). To Philo,
εὐσέβεια is rendered only towards the Jewish God, the Existent One (τὸ ὄν), and the cult
or worship of other gods is considered ἀσέβεια (Decal. 120; Spec. 1. 312; 4.40),74 a view that

72. For a good discussion of Philo’s attitude towards worship of idols and his defense
of monotheism, see Karl-Gustav Sandelin, “Philo’s Ambivalence Towards Statues.” SPhA 13

73. Cf. Spec. 1.330; Ebr. 41; QE 2.45a.

74. For the same idea, see also Mos. 2.161; cf. QE 2.47; Virt. 34.
distinguishes from that of Plato’s and the common understanding of the Greek world that
will be discussed in chapter five.

Moreover, disobedience towards the two sets of five commandments—regarding
the Existent One (τὸ ὄν) and human beings—is intrinsically linked to ἀσέβεια. Philo
explains that the impious deeds human beings commit are “not only against each other,
but also against the Deity” (Conf. 15; cf. Spec. 1.312). This is shown when Philo deals with
the fifth commandment. He writes: “If you despise your father and mother, you must
also show impiety towards God” (Mut. 226). The idea of δικαιοσύνη and ἀδικία, and
therefore, εὐσέβεια and ἀσέβεια, is reflected in QE 1.10. Speaking about the Hebrews and
the Egyptians, he locates both nations opposite from each another; on one pole, the Jewish
people—its priests and people, who perform sacrifices—who “give evidence of their
εὐσέβεια,” and on the other pole, the Egyptians, who give evidence of their ἀσέβεια, for
they are “impious, unworthy and unclean,” and because of that they deserve punishment
(QE 1.10).

Philo treats also εὐσέβεια as μέση ὁδός or “middle path” between ἀσέβεια and
δεισιδαιμονία in three passages: Deus 163–164, Spec. 4.146–147; and Abr. 24. We have seen
that Philo views virtue as a mean (μεσότης, Migr. 147–148) between two extremes, and he
considers the mean, like Aristotle, to be a characteristic of perfection or virtue, and the
extremes (excess [ὑπερβολή] and deficiency [ἐλλειψις]) characteristics of vices of the soul
(cf. Deus 162–165; Sacr. 15).

Deus 163–164: “… courage is the mean between rashness and cowardice, economy
between careless extravagance and illiberal parsimony, prudence between knavery
and folly, and finally, piety between superstition and impiety.”

75. See also Decal. 111; 120; QG 4.202a; cf. Mos. 1.90.
Spec. 4.146–147: “to add or to take from courage he changes its likeness and stamps upon it a form in which ugliness preplaces beauty... by adding he will make rashness and by taking away, he will make cowardice... addition will beget superstition and substraction will beget impiety, and so piety too is lost to sight.”

Abr. 24: “He [Abraham] passes across ignorance to instruction, from folly to sound sense, from cowardice to courage, from impiety to piety, and again from voluptuousness to self-control from vaingloriousness to freedom from arrogance” (cf. QE 2.26).

Table 2. Philo’s View of the Mean in Deus 163–164

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Excess</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Deficiency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rashness</td>
<td>Courage</td>
<td>Cowardice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Careless extravagance</td>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Illiberal parsimony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knavery</td>
<td>Prudence/practical wisdom</td>
<td>Folly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superstition</td>
<td>Piety</td>
<td>Impiety</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Philo’s View of the Mean in Spec. 4.146–147

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Excess</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Deficiency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addition (+)</td>
<td>Substraction (-)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashness</td>
<td>Courage</td>
<td>Cowardice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superstition</td>
<td>Piety</td>
<td>Impiety</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Philo’s View of the Mean in Abr. 24

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From....</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deficiency</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignorance</td>
<td>Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folly</td>
<td>Sound sense/prudence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cowardice</td>
<td>Courage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impiety</td>
<td>Piety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excess.... to</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluptuousness</td>
<td>Self-control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaingloriousness</td>
<td>Freedom from arrogance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Only twice, Philo replaces ἀσέβεια with δεισιδαιμονία (superstition), and speaks of εὐσέβεια as the opposite of δεισιδαιμονία. In the first example (Praem. 40), his description is very explicit when he writes: “Others whose notions about the subsistence of God are derived through habit rather than thinking from those who brought them up, believe themselves to have successfully attained to piety yet have left on it the imprint of superstition.” In the second example (Sacr. 15), he names δεισιδαιμονία the “sister” of ἀσέβεια when he writes: “by the fact that the rules and customs which impress and exercise their authority upon him expel piety and set up in its stead that superstition which is the sister of impiety” (cf. Det. 24). The fact that there are only two examples in which he describes the vice δεισιδαιμονία (excess) as the opposite (or extreme) of εὐσέβεια (μέση ὁδός) reflects the Greek philosophical influence upon his thought, especially the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean (Eth. nic. 2.7). Generally, however, Philo ascribes his privileged ethical virtue, εὐσέβεια as a mean, and both ἀσέβεια and δεισιδαιμονία as vices (deficiency [ἐλλειψις] and excess [ὑπερβολή]).

ἀσέβεια the Road of Pathless Wilds (Ἀνοδία)

Philo speaks of ἀσέβεια as the road of “pathless wilds” (Ἀνοδία) in connection with εὐσέβεια 8 times: in the series of the Allegories of the Law (4 times), in the Exposition of the Law (3 times), and once in the Questions and Answers. The reason why this subsection is treated separately is because in many of Philo’s references about the mean εὐσέβεια and its opposite the vice ἀσέβεια (and δεισιδαιμονία), he places emphasis on the

76. For the definition of the Aristotelian mean and a detailed discussion, see chapter five (“The Influence of Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean on Philo’s Ἐὐσέβεια in his Ethical Discourse”).

word ὁδός (road, path, way). This subsection is closely related to vices and passions that will be examined in the next subsection. Here, however, the focus is on how he uses the metaphor road (ὁ ὁδός) to describe the soul’s journey to either a virtuous or a vicious life.

There are two roads: (1) one road that leads the soul to εὐσέβεια, μέση ὁδός; 78 (2) another road that leads the soul to vice, either δεισιδαιμονία, an excess (ὑπερβολή) or ἀσέβεια, a deficiency (ἔλλειψις). 79

The soul, according to Philo, seeks perfect virtue. There is a path (ὁδός) that leads the soul to εὐσέβεια (Spec. 3.29; QE 2.26). On the journey, the soul must “wish and pray to walk straightly along the middle path” (μέση ὁδός), which is εὐσέβεια (Deus 164; Det. 24). 80 But, once the soul surrenders and strays from the path to (or of) εὐσέβεια, it turns aside to either the right (excess) or the left (deficiency) into a “pathless wild” (ἀνοδία), which is actually the road of vice (Spec. 3.29; Det. 21; cf. Somn. 2.182).

Philo explains that this “pathless wild” (ἀνοδία) is not the way to εὐσέβεια, but the path to δεισιδαιμονία and ἀσέβεια (Det. 18, 24; QE 2.26; Spec. 1.62). This road leads the soul away from “virtue and noble conduct” (cf. Spec. 1.215; QG 3.28), as he writes, “for deviations in either direction whether of excess or of deficiency, whether they tend to strain or to laxity, are in fault, for in this matter the right is not less blameworthy than the left” (Deus 162; cf. Spec. 1.54, 60; Gig. 64). Going astray from the road that accords with εὐσέβεια (μέση ὁδός) is the way of δεισιδαιμονία, an excess (Det. 18, 24), or the way of

78. This topic is treated in detailed in section D.

79. See Det. 18, 21, 24; Deus 162–164; Spec. 1.62, 215, 312; 3.29; QE 2.26; cf. Abr. 24; Somn. 2.182.

80. In Isa 26:7, there is the same emphasis: “the way [ὁδός] of the pious has become straight, the way [ὁδός] of the pious has also been prepared.”
ἀσέβεια, a deficiency (Deus 163). The soul does not practice εὐσέβεια in a superstitious way, because this is “a pathless road” leading to vices, like knavery or cunning, stinginess, meanness, and rashness (cf. Det. 18). Likewise, the soul does not practice εὐσέβεια in an impious way (Spec. 1.312), for ἀσέβεια is a pathless place, where “the mind lamed and falls short of the φύσιν ὁδοῦ (natural road), [which is εὐσέβεια], the road that ends in the Father” (QE 2.26; cf. Deus 162–163). There is nothing between vice and mean; therefore, the soul must remain on the middle road (εὐσέβεια) by crossing, like Abraham, from the pathless of vice to the path of virtue (Abr. 24).81

Ἀσέβεια the Greatest Evil

Of the 56 direct associations of ἀσέβεια with all kinds of vices and passions, in 13 instances the virtue of εὐσέβεια is mentioned.82 For Philo, the greatest of evils is ἀσέβεια (QG 1.76; cf. Mos. 1.237), an evil that according to him has no end (Fug. 61). When the soul is led by the pathless wilds of ἀσέβεια, the soul is filled with ribaldry (Deus 102) and wickedness, which invade and overturn everything that is holy and virtuous. As a result, εὐσέβεια becomes a “bastard growth” and ὁσιότης becomes “debased” (Cher. 94; cf. Decal. 110). The soul abandons the most vital virtue, εὐσέβεια, and is “blindfolded” into the pathless wilds of “darkness” (Spec. 1.54). As the greatest evil, ἀσέβεια produces all kinds of vices against the ethical commandments of the Mosaic Law.83 So, the soul, who is inflicted by

81. For the Stoics, there was nothing between virtue and vice, unlike the Peripatetics, who believed that there is the state of improvements (Diogenes Laertius 7.127). Cf. Wolfson, Philo, 2:268.

82. See Opif. 155; Cher. 94; Decal. 110; Spec. 1.54 (in these four passages Philo also mentions ὁσιότης); Det. 143; Det. 73; Deus 102; Plant. 107; Mos. 1.187; 2.165; Spec. 4.40; Praem. 12; Contempl. 2–3.

83. Cf. Flacc. 128; QG 2.17b.
the greatest evil of ἀσέβεια, has been transformed into the “nature of wild beast” (Decal. 110), upon whom falls the “worse misfortunes” (Mos. 1.183), which are the “greatest of ills” (Congr. 160), “unholy deeds” (Spec. 3.19), and “evil practices” (Praem. 142; Prob. 90; Prov. 2.39; Flacc. 128).

Therefore, by giving εὐσέβεια its preeminence, Philo also highlights ἀσέβεια’s close association with vices. The following list shows all the vices that are related to ἀσέβεια. This list contains primarily vices that are listed together with ἀσέβεια and with its opposite εὐσέβεια, that is, when impiety is mentioned together with a series of vices or the expression “pathless wilds” with other vices, or when piety is mentioned along with a number of vices, and with “superstition” instead of “impiety”:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vices (ἀσέβεια)</th>
<th>Philo’s Treatises</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ἀβουλία (evil counsel)</td>
<td>Ios. 173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἄγνοια (ignorance)</td>
<td>Post. 52; Abr. 24; Spec. 4.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀδικία (injustice)</td>
<td>Det. 72, 73, 143; Somn. 2.182; Sacr. 15, 22; Post. 52; Deus 112; Conf. 117; Conf. 152; Spec. 1.215; Praem. 105; Prov. 2.24, 39; Contempl. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>αθεία (godlessness, atheism)</td>
<td>Post. 52; Deus 21; Ebr. 18, 78, 110; Conf. 114, 196; Conf. 196; Congr. 159; Mos. 2.196; Legat. 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>αἰσχρός (ugliness)</td>
<td>Spec. 4.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀκολασία (licentiousness, profligacy)</td>
<td>Sacr. 15, 22; Deus 112; Mos. 1.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ακράτεια (intemperance)</td>
<td>QG 4.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>αλλοτρίωση (alienation)</td>
<td>Sacr. 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἄμετρος ἐπιθυμία (passionate desire)</td>
<td>Post. 52; Conf. 117; Mos. 1.305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀνελευθερία (meanness)</td>
<td>Det. 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀναγνον (impurity, uncleanness, defilement)</td>
<td>Cher. 94; Spec. 2.27; QE 1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vices (ἀσέβεια)</td>
<td>Philo’s Treatises</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>αναισχυντία (shamelessness)</td>
<td>Conf. 117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀνδροφονία (murder)</td>
<td>Conf. 117; Prov. 2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀνομία (lawlessness)</td>
<td>Post. 52; Conf. 117; Mos. 1.301; 2.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀνοσότης (unholiness)</td>
<td>Cher. 94–95; Mos. 1.301; Spec. 3.19; Spec. 4.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀνισότης (unfairness)</td>
<td>Post. 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀπανθρωπία (inhumanity)</td>
<td>Mos. 1.95; Decal. 111; Virt. 94; Prob. 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀπάτη (deceit)</td>
<td>Sacr. 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀπιστία (faithlessness)</td>
<td>Sacr. 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀπληστία (gluttony)</td>
<td>Spec. 2.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀπόνοια (senselessness)</td>
<td>Post. 52; Conf. 117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀποστροφή (aversion)</td>
<td>Sacr. 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>αὐθάδεια (self-will)</td>
<td>Post. 52; Ios. 174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀχάριστα (ingratitude)</td>
<td>QG 2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀφροσύνη (foolishness)</td>
<td>Det. 73; Ebr. 110; Abr. 24; Contempl. 2; QE 2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>βαρυδαιμονία (misery)</td>
<td>Prov. 2.24; QG 3.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>βαρύμηνις (rancorous disposition)</td>
<td>Prob. 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>βία (violence)</td>
<td>Conf. 117; Prov. 2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>βωμολόχος (sacrilege)</td>
<td>Cher. 94</td>
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<tr>
<td>δειλία (cowardice)</td>
<td>Sacr. 15; Deus 163, 164, 112; Abr. 24; Spec. 4.146</td>
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<tr>
<td>δεισιδαιμονία (superstition)</td>
<td>Det. 18, 24; Sacr. 15; Deus 163, 164; Spec. 4.147; Praem. 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>διοικήση (parsimony)</td>
<td>Deus 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐκκεχυμένος (extravagance)</td>
<td>Deus 163, 164</td>
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<tr>
<td>ἐπιθυμία (desire)</td>
<td>QG 4.42</td>
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<tr>
<td>έχθρα (hostility, hostility)</td>
<td>Sacr. 96; QG 4.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἡδονή ἀμετρία (unmeasured pleasure)</td>
<td>Conf. 117; Somn. 2.106; Mos. 1.295, 301; Post. 52; Contempl. 2; Mut. 226; QG 4.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἡλιθιότης (silliness)</td>
<td>Legat. 163</td>
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<tr>
<td>θράσος (rashness, audacity)</td>
<td>Det. 18, 24; Post. 52; Deus 163, 164; Conf. 117; Spec. 4.146</td>
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<tr>
<td>κακία (wickedness, evil)</td>
<td>Conf. 196; Ebr. 78; Conf. 196; Fug. 61; Det. 72; Mos. 2.196; Spec. 1.330; 3.125–126; Praem. 12; Prob. 90; Prov. 2.39; Legat. 193</td>
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<tr>
<td>κλοπή (stealing,)</td>
<td>Plat. 107; Conf. 117</td>
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<tr>
<td>κολακεία (flattery)</td>
<td>Sacr. 22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vices (ἀσέβεια)</td>
<td>Philo’s Treatises</td>
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<tr>
<td>λαγνεία (wantonness)</td>
<td>Mos. 1.295, 305</td>
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<tr>
<td>λαίμαργος (greedy)</td>
<td>Somn. 2.182</td>
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<td>λεηλασία (seizing property)</td>
<td>Plant. 107</td>
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<td>λύπη (grief)</td>
<td>Contempl. 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>μεγαλαυχία (arrogance)</td>
<td>Post. 52; Spec. 4.146</td>
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<td>μοιχεία (adultery)</td>
<td>Conf. 117</td>
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<td>μωρία (folly)</td>
<td>Deus 164</td>
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<td>οργή (anger)</td>
<td>Sacr. 96; QG 4.42; QE 2.115</td>
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<td>πάθος (passion)</td>
<td>Sacr. 15, 95; QE 2.115</td>
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<tr>
<td>πανουργία (cunning/knavery)</td>
<td>Det. 18, 24; Deus 163, 164; Conf. 117; Decal. 91; QG 1.76</td>
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<tr>
<td>πανουργία (villainy)</td>
<td>Sacr. 22</td>
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<tr>
<td>πάνουργος (simpleton)</td>
<td>Deus 163</td>
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<tr>
<td>παραφροσύνη (madness)</td>
<td>QE 2.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>παρανομία (disobedience)</td>
<td>Mos. 1.295; Praem. 142</td>
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<td>πικρία (bitterness)</td>
<td>Prob. 90</td>
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<tr>
<td>πλεονάζουσα ἐπιθυμία (unrestrained desire)</td>
<td>QE 2.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>πολύθεος (polytheism, idolatry)</td>
<td>Ebr. 110; Mos. 2.165</td>
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<tr>
<td>προπέτεια (recklessness)</td>
<td>Sacr. 22; Deus 163; Conf. 117</td>
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<td>ράθυμα (laziness)</td>
<td>Praem. 12</td>
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<td>ύβρις (insolence)</td>
<td>Conf. 117</td>
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<tr>
<td>φειδωλία (stinginess)</td>
<td>Det. 18, 24; Deus 164</td>
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<td>φενακισμός (imposture)</td>
<td>Sacr. 22</td>
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<td>φιλαργυρία (covetousness)</td>
<td>Mut. 226; Contempl. 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>φιλαυτία (self-love; selfishness)</td>
<td>Post. 52; Legat. 193</td>
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<tr>
<td>φιληδονία (voluptuousness)</td>
<td>Abr. 24</td>
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<tr>
<td>φιλωδοξία (vaingloriousness)</td>
<td>Abr. 24</td>
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<tr>
<td>φόβος (fear)</td>
<td>Sacr. 15; Contempl. 2;</td>
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<tr>
<td>χρεωκοπίδης (defrauding creditors)</td>
<td>Plant. 107</td>
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<tr>
<td>ψευδολογία (false opinion, falsehood)</td>
<td>Sacr. 22; Conf. 117; Cher. 94; Mos. 1.90, 95; Post. 52; Decal. 91; Praem. 12</td>
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<tr>
<td>ψευδορκία (perjury)</td>
<td>Sacr. 22; Conf. 117; Spec. 2.224; 4.40</td>
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The long list of vices are offenses or transgressions that go directly against the ethical commandments of the Mosaic Law. The soul involved in such evil deeds and words deserves punishment. Philo writes in *Hypoth.* 7.2:

If you commit an outrage on the person of a slave or a free man, if you confine him in bonds or kidnap and sell him. So too with larceny of things profane and sacred, so too impiety not only of act but even of a casual word and not only against God Himself… but also against a father or mother or benefactor of your own the penalty is the same, death and not the common ordinary death: the offender in words only must be stoned to death. His guilt is as great as if he were the perpetrator of impious actions.84

For Philo, offenses against εὐσέβεια towards others deserve the punishment of death. But especially those who offend God and parents are subject not to an ordinary death, but they must be stoned to death. In Philo’s ethical discourse, the greatest vice ἀσέβεια not

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84. See also *Spec.* 3.90; *Post.* 39; *Praem.* 12; *QG* 2.17b; *Conf.* 117, 152; *Sacr.* 15, 22, 95; *Mos.* 1.295, 301, 305, 311; *Spec.* 3.90, 125, 126; *Praem.* 105; *Prob.* 90; *Prov.* 2.24; *Legat.* 163; *Post.* 95; *Deus* 112, 163, 164.
only stands above all the other vices, but it is also the cause of the greatest punishment and eternal death (see also *Post.* 39 and *QE* 1.10).85

Philo also calls desire (ἐπιθυμία) the source of all evils (*Decal.* 173–174, 151–153; *Spec.* 4.84; *Virt.* 100). In his treatment of the tenth commandment: “you shall not desire” (*Spec.* 4.78–131), he writes, “desire constitutes the most devious and intractable of the passions since, of all of them ‘it alone originates within ourselves’” (*Decal.* 142–153).86 Similarly, when Philo interprets allegorically Gen 2:18–3:14 (Adam as the Mind, Eve as sense-perception, and the serpent as pleasure), he assigns pleasure (ἡδονή) as the source of all sin and evil (e.g., *Leg.* 107).87 However, Philo does not show the privileged place of ἐὐσέβεια by contrasting it with either ἐπιθυμία or ἡδονή. Indeed, he never places either ἐπιθυμία or ἡδονή as the opposite of ἐὐσέβεια; he treats ἐπιθυμία as the source of all evils when he deals only with the tenth commandment, and ἡδονή as the source of all sin and evil, when he treats allegorically the “Fall” in Genesis. Therefore, as the virtue of ἐὐσέβεια is the origin or source (ἄρχη) of all the other virtues, the greatest of evils, the vice ἀσέβεια, is also the source of all the other vices, passions, and desires.

The Practice (Ἄσκησις) of Ἐὐσέβεια

We have seen that the virtue of ἐὐσέβεια is not only viewed as a μέση ὁδός or perfect virtue, but most importantly, it is the queen of all the other virtues and the foundational or source virtue. This section shows Philo’s understanding of the practice (ἄσκησις) of

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85. According to Wolfson (*Philo*, 2:279), in Philosophy, a life of vice will be “punished by happiness,” for wicked deeds determines the opposite of happiness.


87. See also *Leg.* 2.71–72, 77–78; 3.68, 107, 112, 113. Sometimes, both ἐπιθυμία and ἡδονή are used by Philo interchangeably (e.g., *QG* 1.31). Cf. Wolfson, *Philo*, 2:231, 268.
the primary virtue εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse. The urgency to practice εὐσέβεια in order to acquire a virtuous life is present in all of Philo’s series: the Allegories of the Law (20 times), the Exposition of the Law (65 times!),88 Questions and Answers (17 times), and the other Miscellaneous Works (16 times).89 As in the other previous sections, this section is divided into three subsections: (1) the practice of εὐσέβεια and the Mosaic Law; (2) the practice of εὐσέβεια and the soul’s effort; and (3) the practice of εὐσέβεια and perfection.

The Practice of Εὐσέβεια and the Mosaic Law

For Philo, the practice (ἄσκησις) of the virtue εὐσέβεια is intrinsically connected to the Mosaic Law; for him, the Ten Commandments or summaries are the “supreme catalogue of virtues.”90 The respect for, obedience and loyalty to, and the practice of, the commandments of the Mosaic Law in order to acquire a virtuous life are continuously stressed in Philo,91 and it is shown in all four series of Philo’s writings.92 Although scholars

88. This number should not surprise the reader, since the series of the Exposition of the Law deal mostly with the ethical commandments of the Decalogue and Mosaic Law.

89. In Allegories of the Law: Det. 20; Cher. 42; Agr. 177; Ebr. 18, 37, 84; Sacr. 37, 130; Sobr. 40; Migr. 97, 194; Her.123, 186; Congr. 98; Mut. 76; Somn. 1.251, 194; 2.67; 106, 182; in the Exposition of the Law: Opif. 9; Abr. 60, 61, 98, 129, 171, 177, 179, 190, 198, 199, 208; Jos. 122; Mos. 1.146, 187, 189, 254, 303, 307, 316, 317; 2.66, 108, 136, 142, 159, 170, 197, 270; Decal. 58; 63; Spec. 1.30, 51, 52, 64, 67, 68, 78, 79, 132, 186, 193, 248, 250, 299; 316, 317; 2.183, 197, 209, 224, 250, 309, 313; 4.50, 55; Virt. 42, 45, 95, 129, 175; 201, 218, 221; Praem. 93; in Questions and answers: QG 1.10, 55, 66; 4.12, 19, 53, 67, 84, 202a; QE 1.1, 21; 2.15b, 26, 27, 31, 99, 115; and in other Miscellaneous Works: Prob. 83; Contempl. 25, 88; Flacc. 48; 98, 103; Hypoth. 6.6, 8; 7.13; Legat. 216, 242, 245, 280, 297, 316, 319.


91. Only twice, Philo calls for obedience to the Jewish Scripture, when he stresses not only the practices prescribed by it “describe εὐσέβεια” (QG 4.53), but also the Jewish Scripture contains the “proofs” of one’s εὐσέβεια (Abr. 61).

92. E.g., in the Allegories of the Law: Ebr. 18, 37, 84; Det. 20; Congr. 98; cf. Sobr. 40; in the Exposition of the Law: Abr. 60, 61, 177; Mos. 1.254, 303, 317; 2.66, 159, 270; Decal. 58; Spec. 1.67, 78, 132, 186, 193, 248, 317; 2.209, 224, 299; Virt. 95; cf. Abr. 171, 179; Mos. 1.189; 2.260; in Questions and
have argued that for Philo, the Decalogue is the heart of Philo’s ethics, they did not go further to make the observation that for him the virtue of εὐσέβεια is actually at the heart or source of the Decalogue’s ethics, since it is upon this fundamental virtue that all the ethical commandments of the Mosaic Law are built. The 65 references of εὐσέβεια in the Exposition of the Law show that for Philo the virtue of εὐσέβεια is the foundation upon which the whole of the Jewish way of life rests. While obedience to the commandments is urged, so are the prohibitions stressed (Spec. 2.299). They all are meant to promote εὐσέβεια (Spec. 2.224) and to refrain vices and unrestrained desires (QE 2.31; see also QG 4.42). We have seen in chapter two that the Law of Moses, for Philo, is the ideal Law, for those who practice its commandments are exempt from passion and vice “in a higher degree than those who are governed by other laws” (Spec. 4.55).93

Practices of εὐσέβεια regarding devotion to God are highly called for by Philo.94 This is especially expected from the priests, who according to Philo, should stand out in their εὐσέβεια, like Moses, the high priest (Mos. 2.66, 142; cf. Sobr. 40). Expressions such as prayers, hymns, words of praise (Spec. 1.193; 2.209; Contempl. 88; Legat. 280), daily or perpetual holy rites (Legat. 280; Ebr. 18; Sobr. 40; Congr. 98), sacrifices (Abr. 171, cf. 179; Mos. 2.159, 270; Spec. 1.67, 193; Legat. 280; QE 2.99; Somn. 1.194),95 first-fruits (Mos. 1.254; Answers: QG 4.53, 84; QG 4.202a; QE 2.99, 115; in other Miscellaneous Works: Contempl. 25, 88; Hypoth. 6.6, 8; 7.13; Flacc. 48; Legat. 216, 280, 316, 319.


94. For a detailed explanation concerning εὐσέβεια towards God, see above. This section only emphasizes references in regard to the practice of εὐσέβεια.

95. In the Greek world, εὐσέβεια was also expressed in cultic acts; for the gods valued each individual’s sacrifice according to his means (e.g., Hesiod, Erga 336, quoted by Xenophon,
Spec. 1.78, 248; Virt. 95; Legat. 316),96 offerings or votive offerings (Abr. 177; Legat. 280, 319), donations (Mos. 1.317; cf. Flacc. 48), and sacred services (Mos. 2.159)97 promote true εὐσέβεια (Spec. 2.224; Mos. 2.270), or the cause of εὐσέβεια (Spec. 1.317; Spec. 2.224 [here Philo also includes holiness]). The religious observances offered to God by the heart of the pious soul give proof of εὐσέβεια (Somn. 1.194; Mos. 1.303), which according to Philo, is “perfect” and “divine” (Spec. 2.197; QE 2.15b).

Also, Philo makes a special emphasis on the practice of εὐσέβεια towards the Temple in Jerusalem.98 In three of his four series, he speaks of the Temple in close


96. For Philo, the law of first fruits is also for the practice or cultivation of self-control. Cf. Svebakken, Philo of Alexandria’s Exposition of the Tenth Commandment, 16. Epictetus, in The Manual of Epictetus Being An Abridgment of his Philosophy (trans. George Stanhope; Philadelphia: Thomas Lang, 1660–1728), writing about the proper conduct towards gods, stresses the idea of making libation, sacrifices, and offering first fruits according to “the custom of our fathers, with purity and not in slovenly or careless fashion, without meanness and without extravagance” (31). See also William W. Fortenbaugh, et al., eds. and trans., Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought, and Influence (Leiden: E. J Brill, 1992), n. 5.1–32.3 (584A), 405–429; Porphyry, On Abstinence from Eating Animals 2.5.1–9.2, 11.3–15.3, 19.4–31.1, 31.7–32.3 (CB vol. 2 p.74.17–79.9, 80.19–83.24, 87.9–98.3 Bouffartigue) and 2.59.1–61.2 (CB vol. 2 p.121.10–123.2 Bouffartigue).

97. See also, Xenophon, Mem. 4.6.4; Plato, Leg. 716C–717B; Diogenes Laertius 7.119. Cf. Foerster, “εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” TDNT, 7:177.

connection with the practice of ἐὐσέβεια: the Exposition of the Law (Mos. 1.317; 2.159; Spec. 1.67, 68, 193), Questions and Answers (QE 2.115), and other Miscellaneous Works (Flacc. 48; Hypoth. 6.6; Legat. 216, 319). When he speaks of the “temple made by hands” in Spec. 1.67, he refers explicitly to the earthly Temple. It is in this physical structure that Jews offer sacrifices primarily in order to “pay tribute to ἐὐσέβεια, give thanks for the blessings received, and ask for pardon and forgiveness.” The same emphasis is found in Mos. 2.159 when Philo expresses the value of the practice of sacrifices brought to the Jerusalem Temple at assemblies and feasts. They are virtuous and holy acts that lead the soul to true ἐὐσέβεια. Likewise, pilgrimage to the Jerusalem Temple is a religious practice deeply esteemed by Philo. We know from his writings that he participated once in a pilgrimage to the Holy City (Prov. 2.64). Although this evidence may be taken as his first and only visit to the Jerusalem Temple, his deep appreciation for the pilgrimage to the main Temple is expressed in Spec. 1.68. In this passage, he praises Jews, who join together in pilgrimage and leave their country and friends, because their enduring separation from their family and dearest friends represent not only their “act of sacrifice,” but also their “stronger attraction of ἐὐσέβεια.”

The practice of ἐὐσέβεια and its close relationship to the main Sanctuary in Jerusalem is also expressed in the material possessions given to the Temple. For example, the purpose of the annual offerings of gold and silver—brought to the Temple by envoys—was to gain the virtue ἐὐσέβεια. In fact, the envoys believed that “the endless road led them to ἐὐσέβεια” (Legat. 216). Moreover, the expensive donations of gold and silver and ornaments for the sacred Sanctuary expressed the donors’ ἐὐσέβεια, whether Jews or non-Jews. For instance, the gifts of Gaius’ great-grandmother Julia Augusta, such as golden
vials and libation bowls to adorn the Temple, and also the multitude of other sumptuous offerings, show her desire for εὐσέβεια (Legat. 319; see also Mos. 1.317; Det. 20).

Philo goes further to claim that the Holy Sanctuary is the “place” of the virtue εὐσέβεια. In Flacc. 48, when Philo describes the destruction and desecration of synagogues in Alexandria, he writes:

The Jews though naturally well-disposed for peace could not be expected to remain quiet whatever happened, ... because they are the only people under the sun who by losing their meeting-houses were losing also what they would have valued as worth dying many thousand deaths, namely their means of showing piety to their benefactors [εὐεργέτας εὐσέβειαν], since they no longer had the sacred buildings where they could set forth their thankfulness...

Philo’s statement expresses the notion that the Jews were unique in that they believed that the virtue of εὐσέβεια could only be adequately shown in a place of worship (e.g., synagogue or the Temple).99 The same idea is also found in Hypoth. 6.6 when Philo says that the “Jews under the leadership of Moses at their journey from Egypt built a temple and established everything else needed for εὐσέβεια and worship” (see also Spec. 1.193).

Moreover, Philo writes in QE 2.115:

Sanctuary is the place of εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης and every virtue (πάσης ἀρέτης), and when the mind (ὁ νοῦς) reaches this all together acquires perfect reason (τέλειον λόγον), which controls and directs and seizes the reins so as to restrain the passions (τὰ πάθη), especially anger (θυμός), which is wont to be refractory toward it.

For Philo, the physical Temple is the incentive for a desire for the virtue of εὐσέβεια and all the other virtues. Once the soul (or mind) reaches εὐσέβεια and the other virtues, it acquires a state of perfection.100 Using Stoic language, he describes that attaining εὐσέβεια,

99. Cf. Colson, PLCL 9.328–29 n. a. In chapter two, we saw that Philo also tends to spiritualize the Temple (see somn. 1.149, 215; and Spec. 1.66).

100. For Philo, as Goodenough pointed out (An Introduction to Philo Judaeus, 119), virtue
through practice, allows the soul to control and restrain the passions, and in particular anger—interestingly not desire (ἐπιθυμία). The virtue of εὐσέβεια is described again as the supreme virtue; indeed, its possession leads the soul to “a perfect reason and knowledge” (see also Contempl. 25).

Another important aspect regarding the practice of εὐσέβεια and the Mosaic Law is the ideal of zeal (ζήλος). For Philo, zeal is an accompaniment to εὐσέβεια in the practice of the ethical commandments. In Abr. 60, he mentions that the Patriarch Abraham filled with zeal for εὐσέβεια, the highest and greatest of virtues, was eager to follow God and keep His commands. Also, the soul in desire for human fellowship observes the customs, and in zeal and passion for εὐσέβεια observes the ordinances of God (Ebr. 84). The ideal of zeal to obey the Law spurs the soul to serve God appropriately, to reject bodily pleasures, and to fight against idolatry and perversion, and against those guilty of apostasy (Mos. 2.170–172). Zeal for the Law leads the soul to defend the cause is primarily an inner state, in which the soul lives guided by and in harmony with God and reason (λόγος).

101. Seneca, who wrote On Anger, argued that “anger is the most intense and dangerous of all the passions.” According to him, “it is anger that creates catastrophe;” for example, Medea, enraged at Jason’s betrayal is driven by her rage to kill her children; Atreus, furious at the thought that his brother may have slept with his wife, plots to make Thystes eat his own children; Juno, mad with rage at Jupiter’s adulteries and Hercules’ growing renown, fills him with madness and makes him kill his children (see also Seneca’s Phaedra).

102. The word “zeal” is mentioned in connection to εὐσέβεια in three of Philo’s work series: the Allegories of the Law (Ebr. 84; Her. 123; Somn. 2.67, 106; cf. Sacr. 130); the Exposition of the Law (Abr. 60; Mos. 1.303, 307; 2.136, 170; Spec. 1.186; Virt. 45; cf. Abr. 179); and other Miscellaneous Works (Legat. 245).

of εὐσέβεια to the point to bravely give up one’s life (Somn. 2.106). A passage that is worth pointing out is Virt. 45. Here, Philo interprets zeal as the source for εὐσέβεια when he writes that in the combat “the source was the zeal which led them [the Hebrew soldiers] to champion the cause of εὐσέβεια.” He adds, “God was with them in the fight inspiring their minds with wise counsels and enduring their bodies with irresistible doughtiness.” As Wilson notes, for Philo, “victory is attributed to the exceptional virtue [εὐσέβεια] of the combatants themselves. Hebrew soldiers exhibit proper courage by acting as defenders of piety, displaying faithfulness to both God and their leader” (cf. Mos. 1.307–308, 317–318).

Therefore, as the virtue εὐσέβεια is the source or beginning of all the other virtues, the ideal of zeal is also the source for acquiring true εὐσέβεια. This zeal may be alien to creation, Philo says, but it is akin to God (Somn. 2.67), for zeal is an ideal so much loved by God and so much desired to or for εὐσέβεια (cf. QG 4.12; Legat. 245).

The Practice of Εὐσέβεια and the Individual’s Effort

Certainly, the practice (ἀσκησις) of εὐσέβεια for Philo requires effort because εὐσέβεια can only be acquired through hard work. In one way or another, this is emphasized in the

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105. For a good commentary about Virt. 45, see Wilson, On Virtues, 144–47.

106. Wilson, On Virtues, 147. He argues that in the Greco-Roman world, it was a common belief that the battlefield success proved “superior piety” because their motives for battle were “most holy;” therefore, the gods granted them many victories (e.g., Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. Rom. 2.72.3–4; 8.2.2–3; cf. 8.8.1; 10.23.1).
four series. Philo says that it is an “earnest toil” (Sacr. 37). It requires instruction, learning, training, and above all, it needs persistence and endurance in practice in order to strengthen the soul’s will. Philo says that it is a process to learn εὐσέβεια, and the lessons of εὐσέβεια (Mos. 1.146; Cher. 42; cf. Legat. 245) are for him the ethical commandments of the Mosaic Law (Ebr. 37). So, the soul is trained to εὐσέβεια (Somn. 1.251; Prob. 83; Her. 123; cf. Her. 12), so that, he or she becomes a learner and a trainer in search of “εὐσέβεια, the most splendid of possessions” (Mut. 76). The soul must unceasingly practice noble actions (Mos. 1.189), endure sacrifice (e.g., Spec. 1.68; 2.183), and keep the body pure and undefiled (Spec. 1.250), all for the cause of εὐσέβεια.

In order to describe the hard toil to attain εὐσέβεια, Philo uses athletic language. The practice for the acquisition of the virtue is a competition (cf. Mos. 2.136) where the souls are runners and trainers in the search for εὐσέβεια (Agr. 177; cf. Mos. 2.170; cf. Prob. 83). Thus, to train the human character (Mos. 2.142; QG 4.19), the soul must make every effort to win εὐσέβεια like a true athlete does. Philo notes that on the way to εὐσέβεια, the soul meets many obstacles (Agr. 177). Therefore, the practice of εὐσέβεια is to be maintained with endurance and persistence (Congr. 98; Abr. 129; Spec. 1.68; 2.183; Virt. 45)

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107. In the Allegories of the Law: Cher. 42; Ebr. 37; Agr. 174, 177; Her. 123; Sacr. 37; Mut. 76; Somn. 1.251; cf. Migr. 97; Congr. 24; in the Exposition of the Law: Opif. 9; Abr. 129; Mos. 1.146, 189; 2.66, 136, 142, 170; Spec. 1.30, 68, 79, 132, 250; 2.183, 197, 313; Virt. 42, 45, 95, 129, 175; cf. Ios. 230; Spec. 4.124; Praem. 119; in Questions and Answers: QG 4.19, 84; QE 2.27, 47, 50b; and in other Miscellaneous Works: Prob. 83; Hypoth. 7.13; Legat. 216, 245, 319.

108. According to Wolfson (Philo, 2:201), the Mosaic Law, which is the ideal Law sought by philosophers, guides the soul to live in accord to virtue; in fact, he noted, “the Ten Heads and the special laws foster all the virtues of universal value.” But, in his discussion, Wolfson omits piety.
until the soul masters the virtue of εὐσέβεια (Somn. 1.251). The goal of the soul is—as it is for the athlete—to win the contest (Mos. 2.136; Spec. 2.183), gain the victory of εὐσέβεια (Spec. 1.30, 79; 2.313; Virt. 45, 175; cf. Mos. 1.307) and receive the “prize” of high virtue (Mos. 2.136; QE 1.1).109 God, who is the friend of virtue, rewards the lovers of εὐσέβεια with “imperial powers to benefit those around them” (Virt. 218).110 According to Philo, “when the thought of God reaches the soul, He brings the whole mind into a state of holiness” (QE 2.47), in which the soul is able to abstain and restrain from passions (Spec. 1.250; cf. Virt. 95, 129). Through reason (λόγος), the soul reaches the goal of εὐσέβεια, which is perfection (Mos. 2.66) and knowledge (Hypoth. 7.13; QE 2.115; Contempl. 25).111 Knowledge of God, for Philo, was the secret to human happiness and to the good life (Det. 86).112 For this reason, the virtue of εὐσέβεια is “majestic” (Praem. 93), and as such, it deserves “true admiration” (Decal. 58; Flacc. 98; Legat. 297; Abr. 199).113

109. In 2 Maccabees, there is “a great favor laid up for those who died piously.” The tragedian Sophocles also refers to the idea of winning praise for piety (Electra, 968). Also, in Plato’s Republic, Plato mentions that the guardian of the ideal state are said to “live a life more blessedly happy than that of the victors in the Olympian games” (Resp. 5465D).


111. In Prov 1:7, a similar idea is expressed: “piety [fear of the Lord] toward God is the beginning of wisdom.”

112. Philo sees two kinds of good life: the theoretical and the practical (Decal. 101; Spec. 2.64; Praem. 11; Contempl. 1), and unlike other ancient laws, the Jewish Law teaches both. Philo writes, “no knowledge is profitable to the possessors through the mere theory if it is not combined with practice” (Congr. 45–46). Cf. Williamson, “The Ethical teaching of Philo,” 201.

113. For Philo, εὐσέβεια is the final “prize,” but the virtue-loving soul must also “practice” the virtue of εὐσέβεια, implying that one must try to be “pious.” Sometimes, Philo is not clear describing whether the virtue-loving soul must have already εὐσέβεια in order to practice it. We find an analogous example in Wisdom, when the author describes the ethical role of σοφία/πνεύμα (Wis 1:4–5 and 7:27). For details, see the discussion in chapter seven.
The Practice of Εὐσέβεια and Perfection

According to Philo, the three Patriarchs were living examples of perfection, not only because their lives embodied the Unwritten Laws before the written Laws were given by God to Moses,114 but also because of their εὐσέβεια (Abr. 2–6; Decal. 1). Philo speaks of three elements required for the acquisition of virtue, and thus, perfection: they are nature (φύσις), instruction (διδασκαλία), and practice (ἄσκησις) (see Abr. 52–54; los. 1; Mos. 1.76; Praem. 65).115 He portrays each Patriarch—Abraham, Jacob, and Isaac—as a symbol of each of these three forms in which virtue is exhibited (Congr. 35–36; Mut. 12–13; Abr. 52–53; Mos. 1.76); although they [the Patriarchs], Philo says, could also possess all three elements together to some degree (Abr. 53).116 Philo describes Abraham as the paradigm for the acquisition of virtue (Gig. 60–63)117 because he showed perfect εὐσέβεια when he was willing to sacrifice his only and beloved son, Isaac (Abr. 177, 198; 208; Somn. 1.194).

However, Abraham attained perfection (virtue) through instruction or teaching; therefore, Philo associates Abraham with “instruction” (διδασκαλία).118 Philo also connects Jacob

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115. Wilson, On Virtues, 301.


118. Also, on The Embassy to Gaius, Philo regards the emperor Augustus not only as a philosopher, but also as an instructor in εὐσέβεια, and even as an “adherent of Judaism” (Legat. 317–318). But it was just for polemical reasons, because Philo knew very well that Augustus was not an “adherent of Judaism.” Cf. Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria, 59; see also Sandmel, “Virtue and Reward in Philo.” Essays in Old Testament Ethics (1974): 215–23.
with “practice” (ἀσκησίς); that is, Jacob attained virtue by way of practice and training. That Jacob symbolized progress toward virtues is depicted in Philo’s description of Jacob as “a simple man living at home,” who practiced the “related virtues of household-management and statecraft” (QG 4.65; Ebr. 80ff). These two ways of acquiring virtue certainly require individual effort. As Sandmel says, “the virtuous things that Jacob did brought him to the spiritual goal.”

Philo associates Isaac with “nature” (φύσις). Unlike Abraham and Jacob, Isaac was a soul which was naturally virtuous, without any human effort, instruction, or practice. By nature he possessed virtue, and thus, perfection. He had no need of laws, he likewise needed neither “practice” nor “instruction,” for his soul was naturally perfect, and his nature was in a state of the virtue. Philo, therefore, depicts Isaac as the model of virtue par excellence (Abr. 3–4). For Philo, the three Patriarchs also possessed “right reason” (ὀρθός λόγος), and showed their εὐσέβεια through words and deeds (Spec. 1.317). Likewise, the worthiest men such as Moses (Mos. 2.192; cf. 284), Joseph (Ios. 122),


120. Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria, 86.

121. According to Mendelson (Secular Education in Philo of Alexandria, 64), there is a certain supernatural quality about Philo’s depiction of Isaac. This unique quality comes from the suggestion of Isaac’s divine paternity and that he was “not a man, but a most pure thought” (Fug. 167). For a detailed study about Isaac in Judaism, see Devorah Schoenfeld, Isaac on Jewish and Christian Altars: Polemic and Exegesis in Rashi and the Glossa Ordinaria (FSMS; New York: Fordham University Press, 2013).


123. Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria, 87. In Praem. 28–56, Philo speaks of the Patriarchs’
and Noah (Virt. 201) showed their willing disposition and zeal for the virtue of εὐσέβεια (Mut. 76; Abr. 60; Virt. 175; QG 4.84; QE 2.27). However, Moses, who is also depicted as model of human perfection (Post. 174; Virt. 51; Leg. 3.134, 140; Ebr. 94), possessed the virtue of εὐσέβεια in a higher degree, and as a result of his piety, he represented mind in its perfection. Philo writes about Moses, “a beautiful and godlike [πάγκαλον καὶ θεοειδές], a model [παράδειγμα] for those who are willing to imitate [μιμεῖσθαι] it [his life]” (Mos. 1.158). As Reydmas-Schils points out, Moses “is the only human beings who already in the final phase of his human life, on the threshold of immortality, became pure mind (Mos. 2.288).” These Jewish men are considered virtue-loving souls, for they pursued both perfect εὐσέβεια and perfect knowledge (cf. Contempl. 25; Hypoth. 7.13). According to Philo, the names of these holiest men are “worthy to be recorded in the sacred books” rewards for their holy lives: Abraham’s reward was his faith (28–30); Isaac’s was spiritual joy (31–35); and Jacob’s was the vision of God (36–46). Philo speaks of Moses, who possessed the virtue of piety in a special degree, and through it Moses gained four special rewards: the office of king, legislator, prophet, and high priest (Praem. 52–56). Cf. Sandmel, “Virtue and Reward in Philo,” 221; Louis H. Feldman, Philo’s Portrayal of Moses in the Context of Ancient Judaism (ed. Gregory E. Sterling; CJAS 15; Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 258. In chapter four, we will see that Josephus also praises Moses’ piety in similar way as Philo does.

124. Philo also speaks of Noah as a perfect man who acquired all the virtues (e.g., Deus 122; 117, 140; Abr. 34). Cf. Williamson, “The Ethical teaching of Philo,” 202.


126. See also Mos. 1.154–159; Somn. 2.189; QE 2.27; 29; cf. Sirach 45:1. Philo describes Moses’ divinity in Sacr. 8–10; Mut. 125–129; cf. Prob. 41ff, and allegorically in Det. 159–162.

Therefore, the practice of the virtue εὐσέβεια leads the soul to perfection and holiness (QE 2.47). In this state, the mind arrives at the Father (Migr. 194) to delight the "greatness of God" (QG 4.19), to enjoy the holiest secret, "the true and genuine" εὐσέβεια (Cher. 42), and also the good and joyful life (Spec. 2.209; Virt. 221; Mos. 1.187; cf. Sacr. 37; QG 4.67). The soul is also worthy to receive the admirable truths (Mos. 2.66) that uphold εὐσέβεια (Virt. 42), and the knowledge of the future (Spec. 1.64). Through the practice of εὐσέβεια, God receives what is His right: supplication and service (Spec. 2.309), honor and praise (Spec. 2.209). The service to God and virtue, according to Philo, are in an "intense and severe harmony" (Sacr. 37) in which the "fruits of virtue," shown in deeds and words, are brought to perfection (Mos. 2.66; Her. 186).

For Philo, a perfect and joyful soul is pure like Isaac (Fug. 167), because of εὐσέβεια (cf. QG 1.55; Decal. 58). The soul possesses "worthiness, excellent judgment in all aspects of life in thoughts, deeds, and words" (QG 4.84; cf. 2.27). Also, in an inner perfect state, the virtue-loving souls have "knowledge of what is truly good or evil or indifferent and how to choose what they should and avoid the opposite" (Prob. 83). Following Abraham’s example of εὐσέβεια, the soul exhibits "both qualities, holiness to God and justice to men" (Abr. 208), the two ethical principles of the Decalogue so much exhorted by Moses, who

128. According to Williamson ("The Ethical teaching of Philo," 213), "one reward that a virtuous man receives here and now is the great reward of joy" (Praem. 31).

129. Philo agrees with the Stoics and Aristotle (Eth. nic. 2.5–6), that virtue is an inner state corresponding to the nature of God; the pursuit of virtue is the way to resist the passions (Gig. 44; see also 4 Macc 7:22). Cf. Peggy A. Vining, Galatians and First-Century Ethical Theory (Ph.D. Dissertation [Catholic University of America, 2008], 54).
dearly loved virtue and goodness (Virt. 175). From the teachings of the most excellent philosophy, the Mosaic Law, the soul gains knowledge of the Existent One (τὸ ὄν), rejects the deception of created gods (cf. Virt. 65), and restrains the passions (QE 2.115). God, the Friend of virtue, is pure love (Det. 54, 55), and as such, He loves the pious souls, who are also “lovers of piety” (Virt. 218; Spec. 1.316; cf. Mos. 2.108). As Plato writes in Philebus 39: “A just, pious [εὐσέβης], and good man is surely a friend of the gods.” Therefore, for Philo, one who is a “lover of εὐσέβεια” cannot be a “lover of evil” or ἄσεβης (Abr. 199). In fact, the virtue-loving souls live by three ethical “standards”: love of God, love of virtue [εὐσέβεια], and love of men” (Prob. 83).

Furthermore, virtue-loving souls possess the “fruits of the virtue of εὐσέβεια” (Mos. 2.66), and in a perfect soul εὐσέβεια fosters excellent virtues (see the list below). For Philo, the virtue of εὐσέβεια is not only the “best of the virtues” that a perfect soul possesses; it is also through εὐσέβεια that the soul becomes immortal. In QG 1.10, Philo writes, “the tree of life is the best of the virtues in man, namely piety, through which pre-eminently the mind becomes immortal” (see also QE 2.38a; Opif. 155). Philo describes the virtue of εὐσέβεια allegorically as the tree of life from which fruits (virtues) derive, and through which the human soul becomes immortal. Similarly, in Opif. 154, he connects the


131. Wilson, On Virtues, 176. Sometimes, Philo relates the virtue εὐσέβεια to philosophy; for example, in Mos. 2.66; Decal. 58; Legat. 245. For him, Moses was the first and the best philosopher, and all the other philosophers “received their virtue-loving opinions directly from Moses as from a source” (QG 4.167; cf. 2.6; 3.5; 4.152).

132. See also Post. 4, 63; Deus 7; Virt. 9; QG 4.42.

133. See also Isa 32:8.
tree of life to θεοσέβεια, a virtue closest to εὐσέβεια, “by means of which the soul attains to immortality.” We will see that in the Let. Arist. 261, the author also expresses a similar idea that εὐσέβεια is the “fruit of wisdom” which “leads one’s life in sincerity” and “the highest joy and tranquility of soul.” For Philo, however, the virtue εὐσέβεια as the tree of life is also the “source of health and life” (Spec. 2.197), and “a good soil” for philosophy (Mos. 2.66; cf. Legat. 245) which brings about the fruits of the virtue εὐσέβεια.134

While Philo sees the virtue of εὐσέβεια as the “source of life,” he also describes εὐσέβεια as having the quality of immortality. In Middle Platonism, what is incorrupt and immortal belongs to the intelligible world (κόσμος νοητός). Philo’s εὐσέβεια is in, or belongs to, this intelligible world, a quality given to εὐσέβεια that is distinct from the four cardinal virtues (prudence or practical wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice).135 Philo speaks of the virtue εὐσέβεια not only as possessing the quality of immortality, but also as being “true and incorruptible” (Spec. 1.30). With such a statement it is no wonder why Philo calls εὐσέβεια “divine εὐσέβεια” (QE 2.15b; see also Somn. 2.186). The passage in QE 2.15b provides a description of Philo’s thought about the connection of the virtue εὐσέβεια with the immaterial, intelligible world (κόσμος νοητός): “every soul

134. Feldman in his discussion on Moses notes (Philo’s Portrayal of Moses in the Context of Ancient Judaism, 257) that “for Philo (Mos. 2.66), Moses made use of his great natural gifts. In these, we may remark, far from finding a conflict between philosophy and piety, Philo states that philosophy found a good soil, which she improved still further by the admirable truths that she brought before his eyes; nor did she cease until she brought the fruits of virtue to perfection in word and deed.” Similarly, in 4 Macc 8:1 there is the idea that “philosophy of reason is rooted in piety.”

135. Sandmel (Philo of Alexandria, 114) makes an implicit connection between εὐσέβεια and the intelligible world (κόσμος νοητός) when he briefly mentions that a virtue-loving soul crosses from “this sensible world (κόσμος αἰσθητός) into the intelligible world where piety and wisdom abide.” But, unfortunately, he does not develop this important connection. I develop this topic in chapter nine.
which piety fattens with its own mystical and divine piety is sleepless and watchful for
the vision of things worthy to be seen.” He associates the virtue of εὐσέβεια with things
that are “invisible,” and he qualifies εὐσέβεια with the word “divine.” So, when he speaks
of a “pious character” who is able to see the “greatness of God,” God’s divine and invisible
qualities are in view (QG 4.19). Therefore, the tree of life in Eden is for Philo the
“generic” virtue of εὐσέβεια. Sandmel is correct when he argues that in Philo’s thought
generic virtue means the idea of virtue in the intelligible world, but Sandmel does not
identify the “generic virtue” or “the idea of virtue” with εὐσέβεια. For Philo, that “idea
of virtue” or “generic virtue” is no other virtue than εὐσέβεια. It is, therefore, through the
practice of the virtue εὐσέβεια that the virtue-loving soul ascends up to the heavenly realm
and shares the Existent One’s supernatural or divine qualities. It is also in this inner divine
state that the virtue-loving soul lives in harmony with God through reason (λόγος).

Furthermore, in Philo’s thought, the practice of the virtue εὐσέβεια leads to one

136. Philo speaks of Moses, as an example of experiencing God’s greatness. Moses’ piety
led him to the heavenly realm; for example, in Her. 17, the relationship between God and Moses
was such that they were in a continuous conversation, mouth to mouth with each other without
interruption (see also Leg. 3.103; Her. 262; cf. Deus 142f; Migr. 39). Cf. Feldman, Philo’s Portrayal of
Moses in the Context of Ancient Judaism, 257.

137. Allegorically, Philo speaks of Sarah also as the generic virtue, the archetypal
virtue (e.g., Cher. 3–6; Mut. 77–79). She is also wisdom (e.g., Congr. 79) and true philosophy. Cf.
Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria, 113–14. For a detailed discussion of Philo’s concept of generic virtue,


140. The Platonic ideal of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ in relation to Philo’s “to become like to God” will
be discussed in chapter five.
genuine practice of εὐσέβεια in words and deeds leads the virtue-loving soul “to become like to God” (Fug. 63). True morality, as Plato teaches, is for Philo to become like to God (Migr. 131, 175; Opif. 144; Decal. 73; Virt. 168). As Williamson pointed out, an important element in Philo’s ethical teaching is the ideal of “becoming like to God,” which is closely also connected with the Stoic ideal of “living according to nature.” Abraham is described, for example, as “living in accordance to nature” (cf. Abr. 4–6, 60–61), for the virtue of εὐσέβεια together with πίστις “adjust and unite the intent of the heart to the incorruptible Being: as he [Abraham], when he believed, is said to ‘come near to God’ (Migr. 131–132 [Gen 18:23]).” Also Moses’ exhortation in Migr. 131 is to follow God (τὸ ἐπεσθαι θεῷ, a Pythagorean formulation), walking on the path (ὁδός) of virtue and right reason (ὁρθὸς λόγος), which, according to the Stoics, means “living in accordance with nature.” In Leg. 1.63–73, Philo describes how the source of all the virtues is in God’s wisdom (σοφία) and reason (λόγος). Again, his statement connects to what he writes in Decal. 52: “God is the source of all things, and εὐσέβεια the source of all the other virtues.” What is important for Philo is to show that all the virtues come from God, who is virtue Himself. Through the three ethical standards—love of God, love of virtue (εὐσέβεια), and love of human beings—the virtue-loving souls experience the perfect harmony between 

141. Other passages where Philo emphasizes the ideal of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ are for example QG 4.25, 188; Spec. 2.225 (imitation [μίμησις] of His powers); 4.73, 188; Virt. 165–170 (imitation [μίμησις] of God); Mut. 129; cf. Opif. 25 (Gen 1:26–27); Leg. 1.48.


the virtue of εὐσέβεια and God, for God loves εὐσέβεια, the queen of all the other virtues. This greatest virtue becomes the source of all the other virtues, in the sense that it is from εὐσέβεια that all the other virtues derive; for God Himself, who is also virtue, is the source of all things created.

As Philo highlights εὐσέβεια’s prominence as a source virtue, a number of virtues are also emphasized. The following list shows all the virtues that are closely related to εὐσέβεια. Similar to the list of vices, only the virtues emphasized in relation to εὐσέβεια are listed here:

Table 6. List of Virtues in Philo

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<td>ἀνδρεία (courage)</td>
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<td>Leg. 3.10; Det. 143; Cher. 96; Sacr. 27, 37; Agr. 128; Congr. 6; Abr. 208; Mos. 2.216; Spec. 2.26, 63; 4.135; VIRT. 175; Praem. 160; Prob. 83; Hypoth. 6.8; Legat. 213; QG 2.23; QE 1.12</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>οἰκονομία (domestic conduct)</td>
<td>Prob. 83; cf. Deus 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>όλιγόδεια (frugality)</td>
<td>Sacr. 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>όσιότης (holiness)</td>
<td>Det. 21; Sacr. 27, 37; Cher. 94; Ebr. 91, 92; Migr. 194; Her. 123, 186; Plant. 35; Congr. 98; Somn. 2.186; Opif. 155, 172; Abr. 198, 208; Ios. 143; Mos. 1.198, 307; 2.136, 142, 216, 270; Decal. 110, 119; Spec. 1.30, 52, 54, 186; 2.63, 224, 248; 3.127; 4.135; Virt. 201; Praem. 160; QE 1.7, 12; 2.83; Prob. 83; Hypoth. 6.8; Legat. 242, 279; QE 2.47; cf. Mos. 2.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>παιδεία (instruction)</td>
<td>Abr. 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πίστις (faith)</td>
<td>Migr. 132;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πολιτεία (civic conduct)</td>
<td>Prob. 83; cf. Deus 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πραότης (meekness, gentleness)</td>
<td>Sacr. 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>προμήθεια (foresight)</td>
<td>Sacr. 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σεμνός (reverence)</td>
<td>Decal. 120; Contempl. 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σωφροσύνη (temperance)</td>
<td>Det. 18, 72, 114, 143; Sacr. 27; Somn. 2.182; Abr. 24; Mos. 2.216; Spec. 4.97, 135; Praem. 160</td>
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<tr>
<td>τελειότης (perfection)</td>
<td>Mos. 2.66</td>
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<tr>
<td>τέλειος λόγος (perfect reason)</td>
<td>QE 2.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τιμή (honor)</td>
<td>Legat. 347; QE 1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ύγιεινότατος (wholesome, healthy)</td>
<td>Det. 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φιλαδελφία (love of humanity)</td>
<td>Sacr. 27; Ios. 240; Spec. 2.63; 4.97; Virt. 51, 95; QG 4.2, 29, 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φιλανθρωπία (kind affection, kindness)</td>
<td>Sacr. 27; Abr. 208; Ios. 246; Spec. 1.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φιλία (friendship)</td>
<td>Spec. 2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φιλόθεος (devotion)</td>
<td>Abr. 198; Decal. 108; Spec. 1.248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φιλοκίνδυνος (bravely)</td>
<td>Virt. 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φιλοξενία (hospitality)</td>
<td>QG 4.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtues (εὐσέβεια)</td>
<td>Philo’s Treatises</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>φρόνησις (prudence, practical wisdom)</td>
<td>Cher. 96; Sacr. 27, 37; Det. 18, 114; Ebr. 37; Deus 164; Mut. 39; Congr. 6; Abr. 24; Spec. 4.135; Ios. 143, 246; Mos. 2.216; Praem. 160; QG 2.23; 4.53; QE 2.38; cf. QG 4.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φρονεῖν (sensible conduct)</td>
<td>Det. 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χρηστότης (honesty, uprightness)</td>
<td>Sacr. 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς τε καὶ εὐπαθείας (other (fine) virtues/good emotions)</td>
<td>Leg. 3.209; Cher. 96; Det. 18, 72, 114; Somn. 1.251; 2.182; Congr. 6; Mos.1.189; 2.66, 216; Decal. 52, 100; Virt. 218; Praem. 53, 93, 160; QG 1.10, 12; 2.23; QG 1.100; QE 2.38, 155</td>
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This long list shows that for Philo a virtuous life is obtained especially through the practice of the virtue εὐσέβεια. The possession of the virtue εὐσέβεια allows the virtue-loving souls to enjoy the delights of all the virtues, which ultimately are the fruits of εὐσέβεια. As in the list of vices, ἀσέβεια the opposite of εὐσέβεια, is the source of all the vices, passions, pleasures, and evil deeds, Philo privileges the role of εὐσέβεια in his ethics by intentionally identifying “his” supreme virtue as the source of all the virtues, and of a virtuous life in words and deeds.145 Most significantly, he shows εὐσέβεια’s primacy when he stresses the notion that the virtue of εὐσέβεια leads the virtue-loving soul to perfection, which is “becoming like to God.”

The Relationship between Εὐσέβεια and Φιλανθρωπία

Although this is the shortest section among the five sections of this chapter, it is worth noting that φιλανθρωπία (love of humanity) in Philo’s writings is the topic that has received more attention in recent scholarship.146 In Philo’s treatises, there are only 8

145. Cf. Decal. 52; see also Josephus, C. Ap. 2.170.

146. Among the most important works are Franz Geiger, Philon von Alexandreia als
instances when he speaks of both εὐσέβεια and φιλανθρωπία together: in the Exposition of the Law (Ios. 240; Spec. 2.63; 4.97; Virt. 51, 95), and in Questions and Answers (QG 4.2, 29, 200). As shown above (εὐσέβεια for the service of God and other human beings), Philo views the virtue of εὐσέβεια akin to the virtue of φιλανθρωπία and vice versa; both main virtues are used by him as the headings for his two sets of the commandments of the Decalogue: the first set of five ethical commandments, duties concerning the service of God (εὐσέβεια/ὑσιότης), and the second set of five ethical commandments, duties concerning the relationship between human beings (φιλανθρωπία /δικαιοσύνη). Philo's view of the Decalogue and his treatment of the commandments are also discussed in Wolfson, who notes that the concept of φιλανθρωπία was not considered a virtue in the Greek catalogue of virtues. However, the closest equivalent to φιλανθρωπία listed as a sozialer Denker (Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft 14; Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1932), 7–9; Goodenough, An Introduction to Philo Judaeus, 123–130; Williamson, Jews in the Hellenistic World, 210–223; Wolfson, Philo, 2:219–20; Hilgert, "A Review of Previous on Philo’s De Virtutibus," 112; Borgen, "Philanthropia in Philo’s Writings: Some Observations," in John F. Priest, Linda B. Elder, et al., Biblical and Human: a Festschrift for John F. Priest (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1996), 173–188; Milo Dean van Veldhuizen, Philanthropia in Philo of Alexandria: A Scriptural Perspective (Diss., University of Notre Dame, 1982); “Moses: A Model of Hellenistic Philanthropia.” Reformed Review 38 (1985): 215–24.


147. In Demosthenes φιλανθρωπία is associated with δικαιοσύνη (Philip. 2.12; 7.31; 20.109; 36.55; 44.8), as well as with gentleness or kindness (see also 8.31; 24.51; 24.196; 41.2; Erot. 13; 21.49); see also Arian Didymus, Epitome of Stoic Ethics, 51.30; 11627–35 (ed. Arthur J. Pomeroy, 35, 65). Also, Josephus in Against Apion relates δικαιοσύνη with φιλανθρωπία in his defense against Apollonius Molon and Lysimachus, who accused the Jews with hatred of human beings. Josephus in his defense claims that love of humanity is one of the qualities fostered by the Jewish Law (C. Ap. 2.145–146; see also A. J. 2.101; 7.391). Cf. Louis H. Feldman, Studies in Hellenistic Judaism (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 213–14.

148. Wolfson (Philo, 2:219–20) noted that the term φιλανθρωπία is not part of the Greek catalogue of virtues (e.g., Diogenes Laertius 3.98). Cf. Colson 8. xi n. b. In Hellenistic Jewish tradition, the virtue of φιλανθρωπία appears in the Letter of Aristeas 208 and Wis 1:6; 7:23, but it is not associated with εὐσέβεια. However, in the Latin philosophical tradition, the term humanitas occurs as a virtue under the virtue justice (cf. Macrobius, Commentarius ex Cicerone in Somnium Scipionis 1.8. [M. Nisard, Collections des Auteurs Latins, p. 33. Col. 1]). The question regarding the reason why Philo might have given the term φιλανθρωπία a status of a special virtue has been
virtue in the list of the Aristotelian ethical virtues is “friendship” or “friendliness” (φιλία), which is a μέσος (Eth. nic. 2.7.1108a27–28). Philo is the first to include both virtues εὐσέβεια and φιλανθρωπία as the headings of the ethical commandments of the Mosaic Law. It is also true that he is the first to view φιλανθρωπία as akin to the virtue εὐσέβεια (e.g., Virt. 51, 95). However, it is also true that from the 162 times that Philo uses

addressed by some scholars. For example, Wolfson (Philo, 2:220–21) argued that the reason for “Philo’s elevation of love of humanity to the leadership of the virtues comes from the influence of Jewish tradition.” In the LXX tradition, he noted, “the Greek word for justice translates the Hebrew word sedakah (Gen 18:19), and the same term sedakah is also translated there by the Greek term for ‘mercy’ or ‘alms’, which is treated by Philo as a virtue akin to the virtue love of humanity (Vit. 80–174). Therefore, the term sedakah means both justice and love of humanity.” Wolfson also pointed out that in the Let. Arist. 131, justice is said to be one of the two principles which “our Lawgiver first of all laid down, the other being piety.” Williamson (“The Ethical teaching of Philo,” 211) follows Wolfson and based on Deut 6:25; 24:13; Dan 4:27 (LXX 24) argues that “Philo takes dikaiosunē and eleemosunē and treats them as variant descriptions of philanthropia.” Against Wolfson and Williamson, van Veldhuizen (Philanthropia in Philo of Alexandria, 53) argues that “Philo’s notion of love of humanity derives from Stoic thought and from Hellenistic ideas of kingship.” Van Veldhuizen explains that in the human level the wise man is a king because he rules his passions, and in teaching such mastery to others, he expresses love of humanity. Philo departs from the Greek understanding of the term φιλανθρωπία in that for him it is God who is the source of love of humanity. That is, human expressions of love of humanity are only because of God. Van Veldhuizen also argues that φιλανθρωπία does not find extensive usage in the LXX; it is found only in the book of Wisdom (Wis 1:6; 7:22–23; 12:19) and in the books of Maccabees (2 Macc 6:22; 14:9; Macc 3:15–20; 4 Macc 5:4–32). In his article (“Moses: A Model of Hellenistic Philanthropia,” 115–17), van Veldhuizen notes that Philo, who uses the term love of humanity (a word that was familiar to philosophers and connected to Hellenistic kingship), combines the philosophy of Hellenistic kingship with a very Stoic understanding of the ideal king, God, whom Moses imitated as he ruled Israel through the Law. Philo embraces Stoic thought and departs from it. For a good discussion about the cultural context of the concept φιλανθρωπία, see van Veldhuizen, “Moses: A Model of Hellenistic Philanthropia,” 215–16.

149. Aristotle treats the virtue of friendship in Eth. nic. book 7. According to David Konstan, Aristotle uses the term φιλανθρωπία in the literal sense of “liking human beings,” applying it also, for example, to friendly animals (Hist. an. 617b26, 630a9). However, it was already employed this way by Aeschylus in the tragedy Prometheus Bound. Aristotle also connects φιλανθρωπία with gentleness and a disposition to forgive (Ath. pol.16.2; Rhet. 1390a18–20). See David Konstan, “Philo’s De Virtutibus in the Perspective of Classical Greek Philosophy.” SPhA 18 (2006): 59–72, esp. 66.

150. In the Greco-Roman world, the term φιλία (friendship), from which the term
εὐσέβεια, only 8 times, he mentions both virtues εὐσέβεια and φιλανθρωπία together.\textsuperscript{151}

This section does not attempt to provide the reason(s) why Philo gives φιλανθρωπία the status of a special virtue, or what tradition (Hellenistic or Jewish) influenced Philo. What it can be said is that in terms of Philo’s ethical discourse, his notion of these two virtues (εὐσέβεια and φιλανθρωπία) as “sisters” or “queens” is neither a reflection of his Hellenistic Jewish heritage nor of his Greek philosophical tradition. As he is distinctive in giving εὐσέβεια a privileged place by cataloguing this virtue as the primary virtue in his ethical discourse, he is also unique when he, sometimes, complements εὐσέβεια with φιλανθρωπία.

However, there are a good number of passages in which Philo praises the virtue of φιλανθρωπία, but the prominence of φιλανθρωπία is dictated by the two tablets (or headings) of the Decalogue (εὐσέβεια/ὁσιότης and φιλανθρωπία/δικαιοσύνη). For example, Philo exhorts people to practice kindness—which is a virtue akin to φιλανθρωπία—to human beings, including slaves (\textit{Virt.} 121–124), to animals (\textit{Virt.} 125–147), and to vegetable world (\textit{Virt.} 148–160).\textsuperscript{152} His fondness for love of humanity φιλανθρωπία derives, called for observance of “friendship” between citizens. This idea is viewed in Plato’s \textit{Laws} (742C) as well as in the Stoic conception of friendship. The term φιλανθρωπία had a significance as a cultural value; for example, when Plutarch mentions the term φιλανθρωπία, he refers to it as “being humane” and “being Greek” (\textit{Phil.} 8.1), the two being synonyms. Friendship and love is also treated by Middle Platonist Alcinous, who discusses the natural affection of parents for their children and of kinsfolk for one another, as well as for political and club friendships (John M. Dillon, trans., \textit{The Handbook of Platonism} [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993], 32.2). See Wilson, \textit{Philo of Alexandria}, \textit{On Virtues}, 35, 24. For a discussion of the history of φιλανθρωπία in Greco-Roman and Hellenistic Jewish texts, see van Veldhuizen, \textit{Philanthropia in Philo of Alexandria}, 40–73.

\textsuperscript{151} Ios. 240; \textit{Spec.} 2.63; 4.97; \textit{Virt.} 51, 95; QG 4.2, 29, 200.

\textsuperscript{152} Cf. \textit{Virt.} 80–81; \textit{Mos.} 2.9. In the \textit{Testament of the 12 Patriarchs}, compassion and kindness is also extended to dumb animals (\textit{T.Zebuon} 5.1). In Philo’s writings, the virtue...
is expressed in that he devotes a section to φιλανθρωπία in his treatise, On the Virtues (51–174). In Philo’s thought, exhibiting both εὐσέβεια and φιλανθρωπία constitutes the foundation for the observance of the Mosaic Law. Indeed, one cannot be εὐσεβής without being φιλάνθρωπος (cf. Abr. 208; Virt. 51); that is, the soul which is εὐσεβής towards God is also φιλάνθρωπος/δίκαιος towards other human beings and vice versa (cf. Virt. 97).

Moses, who possessed both qualities, is not only the model of εὐσέβεια, but he is also the model of φιλανθρωπία. As David Konstan says, Moses as a paradigm of φιλανθρωπία, “transcended the boundaries of kindness.” Likewise, van Veldhuizen asserts that “Moses as a good Hellenistic king was the archetype of φιλανθρωπία.” Therefore, two ethical virtues that the soul expresses (εὐσέβεια and φιλανθρωπία) maintain the harmony of humanity to the virtues of politeness, courtesy, kindness, generosity (Mut. 225; Mos. 2.9; Decal. 164); fellowship, concord, equity (e.g., Spec. 1.295), grace (Mos. 2.242), and mercy (Somm. 1.147). Cf. Wolfson, Philo, 2:219; Williamson, “The Ethical teaching of Philo,” 210–211, 224; Goodenough, An Introduction to Philo Judaeus, 123. In Demosthenes, the term φιλανθρωπία is also associated with εὐσέβεια (Mid. 21.12) and “good will” (18.5) kindness (36.59). The term φιλανθρωπία also occurs in connection with pity (25.76; 25.81; cf. 21.185; 24.196). The Stoic Epictetus speaks of the duties of humanity as duties of the citizen, which turns into human-confraternity and love of humanity. For a discussion about the Stoics doctrine of universal love of humanity, see Bonhoeffer, The Ethics of the Stoic Epictetus. 140–58.

153. This is the longest section on Philo’s On the Virtues: courage 1–50 (50 paragraphs), love of humanity 51–174 (123 paragraphs!), repentance 175–186 (11 paragraphs), and nobility 187–227 (40 paragraphs). He deals with justice in Spec.4.136–238 (102 paragraphs). For a good commentary on the section of Love of Humanity (φιλανθρωπία), see Wilson, On Virtues, 149–349.

154. Wilson, On Virtues, 161–62. The same idea that one who is φιλάνθρωπος is also δίκαιος is found in Demosthenes, Syntax 21.12; Polybius, Hist. 4.20.1; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. Hist. 3.56.2; 21.17.4; Pausanias, Descr. 1.17.1.


between the two sets of five commandments (Decal. 108–110). In Spec. 4.78–131, Philo identifies the law of the “first fruits” as a lesson in piety and love of humanity, including self-control (4.97–99), and those who do not offer first fruits to God, as van Veldhuizen said, engage in the sin of pride (Sacr. 2–3).

Wilson has argued in his commentary, On Virtues, that the “pairing of piety and humanity” represents how both the Lawmaker (Virt. 76) and the Law he established (Virt. 95) embodied in themselves these two virtues. For instance, Philo describes Moses’ hymns to God as a blend of piety and love of humanity, a blend of both reverence for God and care for his fellow Jews (Virt. 76). Also, in his portrayal of Abraham, Philo shows that Abraham’s εὐσέβεια allowed him to show both qualities, holiness and love of humanity (QG 4.53). Speaking of Joseph, Philo states that it was not only εὐσέβεια towards God what explained Joseph’ pious act of forgiveness. It was also his εὐσέβεια to his ancestral “fathers” and φιλανθρωπία to all men, particularly to those of his “blood” (Ios. 240). These two virtues were his two counselors to forgive his brothers’ evil action against him (cf. Virt. 95; Spec. 4.97–99). According to Philo, Moses, the Lawgiver, exhorted everyone and everywhere to seek εὐσέβεια and δικαιοσύνη, a virtue akin to φιλανθρωπία (Virt. 175).


159. Wilson, On Virtues, 162. Cf. Goodenough, An Introduction to Philo Judaeus, 130. But, for Philo, it is not only the Law which is summed up in both εὐσέβεια and φιλανθρωπία, it is also the whole Jewish Scripture (e.g., QG 4.2b), although he uses holiness instead of piety.


161. Philo’s application of the combination of εὐσέβεια and φιλανθρωπία to the great
In viewing the two headings of the *Decalogue* (εὐσέβεια and φιλανθρωπία) and their related virtues (.ordinal number and δικαιοσύνη), in a variety of ways the virtue of εὐσέβεια for Philo holds a privileged place in his ethical discourse. But, he also takes along with it the concept of φιλανθρωπία and elevates it to a virtue, and to a virtue closely akin to εὐσέβεια. In Philo’s ethical discourse, both εὐσέβεια and φιλανθρωπία are related virtues (QG 4.29). As a matter of fact, Philo places the virtue φιλανθρωπία at the same level of his privileged virtue εὐσέβεια when he calls them “queens of the virtues” (Virt. 95). He also names love of humanity “the virtue closest akin to piety, its sister and its twin” (Virt. 51; cf. Abr. 208). While scholars have argued the question regarding why Philo gives φιλανθρωπία the status of a special virtue, a crucial question that needs to be posed in regard to the studies of Philo’s ethical discourse is why he calls the virtue of φιλανθρωπία the “sister” and “twin” of εὐσέβεια. One important reason is that Philo attributes to φιλανθρωπία the same quality he gives to the virtue εὐσέβεια. For example, he views the practice of φιλανθρωπία, like εὐσέβεια, as a way to attain the goal of “becoming like to God” (Spec. 4.73; cf. Spec. 1.294; Congr. 171). In his description of Moses, he emphasizes that Moses’ exceptional φιλανθρωπία made him worthy to “become like to God.”

Jewish heroes (Moses, Abraham, and Joseph) brings to mind the research by Jacquiline de Romilly, *La Douceur dans la Pensée Grecque* (Collection D’Études Anciennes; Les Belles Lettres: Paris, 1979), where she has done a study of the virtues most praised in heroes from the earliest time (beginning with Homer), to the Christian era (Plutarch). She argues that, in Greek thought, φιλανθρωπία (together with πράος and ἐπιεικές) was frequently used to show the good character of the heroes (see pages 37–63). That Philo represented his main heroes with φιλανθρωπία (rather than δικαιοσύνη) as an expression of εὐσέβεια was meant to win a view of these heroes as admirable and loveable to a first century audience.


shows the high status of both virtues (piety and love of humanity) when he describes
allegorically the meaning of the words from Genesis 27:8–10: “now, my son, listen to me
and go to the flock, and fetch me from there two kids of the flock, tender and good…”
(QG 4.200). Explaining the deeper meaning of it, Philo says that the “go to the flock”
means to “go to the virtues,” and the “fetch me from there two kids of the flock” means
allegorically “fetch me from there two utterances.” Philo calls these two utterances “kids,”
which are allegorically the virtues of εὐσέβεια and φιλανθρωπία. So, allegorically, he
views the two virtues as preeminent virtues among all the virtues, as they are chosen from
among all the virtues. Most importantly, the practice of these two virtues leads the virtue-
loving souls to the goal of human life: becoming like to God.

What is important in Philo’s ethical discourse is to show that the soul’s ethical
life pertains to two ethical dimensions: the “vertical” and the “horizontal.” The former
subsumes all the ethical commandments related to the religious observances toward
the Existent One (τὸ ὄν), including parents, since their primary duty (beget children)
assimilates them to God; and the latter subsumes all the ethical commandments related
to human beings: the social obligations toward friends, neighbors, fellow Jews, non-Jews,
including animals and the vegetable world.

Although Philo ascribes to φιλανθρωπία the same attributions of εὐσέβεια (Virt.
51, 95), the latter still remains the primary virtue in his ethical discourse. In fact, he shows
his special preference of εὐσέβεια as the supreme virtue when he mentions the virtue

that Moses’s generous gifts to his fellow Jews portrayed his φιλανθρωπία. His natural disposition to
gentleness and love of humanity extended even to the various species of animals and the different
kind of cultivated trees. See also Sandmel, *Philo of Alexandria*, 70.
φιλανθρωπία, and immediately after, he identifies the virtue εὐσέβεια as the chief of all the virtues (Spec. 4.97). However, the one main quality that places these two virtues together, or in parallel, is their association with the goal of “becoming like to God” (ὁμοίωσις θεῶ). From all the texts that speak of εὐσέβεια, and also in relation to φιλανθρωπία, there is the emphasis that those who live by these two virtues are in the process to become like to God. So the two dimensions of the ethical life of the soul (horizontal and vertical) find a common point in the ideal of ὁμοίωσις θεῶ, which is the ethical goal of the soul.164

**Conclusion**

Chapter three has shown in detail Philo’s complex use of the virtue of εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse. Most importantly, the five different aspects of understanding εὐσέβεια studied have shown the extent to which he tends consistently to privilege the place of εὐσέβεια in his ethics. What comes to light is especially the close connection between the virtue of εὐσέβεια and the Mosaic Law. In Philo’s thought, εὐσέβεια is the foundation or root of the ethical commandments of the Mosaic Law through which the human soul attains perfection. Philo has shown that observances and practices of the ethical commandments of the Jewish Law require primarily the acquisition of εὐσέβεια. They are meant to promote the virtue of εὐσέβεια, because it is in this virtue that the soul gains the experience of a virtuous and holy life that is pleasing to God.

Also significant is that Philo not only makes εὐσέβεια equal to the generic cardinal virtues. In his ethical discourse, the qualities given to the virtue εὐσέβεια supersede those qualities of the four cardinal virtues. It is only εὐσέβεια that holds preeminence, and only

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164. These two ethical dimensions (vertical and horizontal) will be discussed in chapter five.
to this virtue qualities that belong only in the intelligible realm are attributed. What is distinctive, and therefore significant, is also the fact that Philo intentionally associates εὐσέβεια and the other virtues with the immaterial world, the mind (νοῦς), and reason (λόγος). He uses philosophical language, particularly the emerging Middle Platonic, to qualify uniquely his virtue of εὐσέβεια as divine and immortal and to give εὐσέβεια exclusive powers that only belong to God. To possess εὐσέβεια means, for Philo, to possess εὐσέβεια’s extraordinary qualities. As such, εὐσέβεια as the source of the ethical commandments makes the human soul virtuous; εὐσέβεια as the tree of life provides the soul with the other virtues; εὐσέβεια as the opposite of impiety leads the soul away from vices; εὐσέβεια as the supreme virtue leads the soul on the path of virtue and right reason; εὐσέβεια as divine leads the soul to knowledge and perfection; εὐσέβεια gives immortality, and most unique of all, εὐσέβεια makes the human soul to become like to God.

This brings us back to what Philo refers in Decal. 52: as God is the origin or source of all that exists (and virtue itself), Philo’s εὐσέβεια is also the origin or source of the soul’s virtuous life. As having the quality of source, εὐσέβεια ranks first in the Jewish way of life, and in the practice of the ethical commandments of the Mosaic Law. In Philo’s ethical discourse, it is through the practice of the virtue of εὐσέβεια and through the λόγος that the human soul regains divine status, a status that God intended from the beginning. Thus in Philo’s writings, the virtue of εὐσέβεια is intentionally moved to the immaterial and rational level, for it is a virtue of the rational (νοῦς), but still part of the earthly realm, that of human beings. The special and high prominence is particularly shown in the Allegories of the Law and Questions and Answers series. However, this is not always the rule, since the Exposition of the Law and other Miscellaneous Works series also depict εὐσέβεια’s
prominence in the intellectual level. What can be said is that when one tries to separate Philo’s understanding of εὐσέβεια by series, one comes to the realization that there is no consistent pattern that can distinguish Philo’s treatment of εὐσέβεια in each series.

What comes to light is that Philo explains the role of the virtue εὐσέβεια in this whole process of “becoming like to God,” the goal of life in Philo’s ethical discourse, within the parameters of both Hellenistic Judaism and Greek philosophical ethical discourse. But, surprisingly, Philo’s consistent effort to privilege εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse sets him apart from his two traditions. In the next two chapters, the roots from which his characteristic view of εὐσέβεια derives will be explored in texts from Hellenistic Jewish (chapter four) and Greco-Roman philosophies (chapter five). I will show how his level of philosophical knowledge sets him apart from both traditions, and how he goes beyond the Greek philosophical ethical systems of Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, and emerging Middle Platonism.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE HELLENISTIC JEWISH TRADITION IN PHILO’S UNDERSTANDING OF ΕΥΣΕΒΕΙΑ IN HIS ETHICAL DISCOURSE

Introduction

In the preceding chapter, I have elucidated the privileged position of εὐσέβεια in Philo’s ethical discourse. The view of εὐσέβεια as an important virtue, however, was not uncommon in the Hellenistic Jewish tradition. This chapter focuses on how Philo’s understanding of the virtue εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse is influenced by his Hellenistic Jewish heritage. We will see that the prominence attributed to the virtue εὐσέβεια in his ethics is a reflection of the prominence given to it by Greek speaking Jewish writers. They give a prominent place to εὐσέβεια, but that prominence is not developed as one finds in Philo. This chapter attempts to freshly illumine the level of influence of Hellenistic Jewish tradition on Philo’s privileged place of εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse. The analysis will reveal two important points: (1) that the prominence given to εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse has its roots in the Hellenistic Jewish tradition of the Greek-speaking Diaspora; and (2) that Philo’s configuration of his ethical discourse around the virtue of εὐσέβεια moves beyond the Hellenistic Jewish tradition. The value of this chapter is that this is the first study that attempts to illumine the level of influence of the Hellenistic Jewish tradition on Philo’s use of the virtue of εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse.
In order to present a concise, but enlightening study, we will focus only on Jewish writings in Greek that emphasize in one way or another the prominence of the virtue of εὐσέβεια in their ethical exhortations. The texts selected are the LXX, Aristobulus, the Letter of Aristeas, the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, Wisdom of Solomon, 4 Maccabees, Josephus, and the Sibylline Oracles. These Hellenistic Jewish texts are treated in a roughly chronological way. That is, the chronology of the texts is not going to be arranged neatly, since some dates are very much debated, especially in the case of the Sibylline Oracles which were written over a long period of time (roughly from 2nd century B.C.E to 7th century C.E.).

The Virtue of Εὐσέβεια in the Septuagint (LXX)
The Hebrew phrase יְרָאָה הָיֹתֶה (fear of the Lord) is translated as εὐσέβεια in the LXX. Sterling and other scholars already pointed out that the concept of εὐσέβεια in the LXX is not common. In the parts of the LXX that are translated from Hebrew, εὐσέβεια and its cognates appear 12 times, and in texts composed in Greek, εὐσέβεια and its cognates occur 75 times (about 63 times appear in 4 Maccabees). For obvious reasons 4 Maccabees will

1. For our purpose only texts dated approximately between 2nd century B.C.E. and 2nd century C.E. will be treated in this study.

2. Sterling, “The Queen of Virtues,” 104. He notes that εὐσέβεια occurs only 3 times in parts of the LXX that are translated from Hebrew יְרָאָה הָיֹתֶה (Prov 13:11, where it has no equivalent in the Masoretic Text (MT); Isa 11:2 and 33:6, where it translates “fear of the Lord.” The term εὐσέβεια occurs a number of times in texts composed in Greek: twice in 2 Maccabees (3:1; 12:43 [sic. 12:45]); twice in 3 Maccabees (1:9 [as a variant in A]; 2:31; and 45 times in 4 Maccabees. See also Barclay, New Testament Words, 109; Foerster, “εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβέω,” 7:179; Edwin Hatch and Henry A. Redpath, A Concordance to the Septuagint and the Other Greek Versions of the Old Testament (Including the Apocryphal Books) in Three Volumes (Vol. 1; Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1983), 580.

3. In parts translated from Hebrew: Isa 11:2; 33:6; Prov 1:7; 13:11 (noun); Sirach 12:4; 37:12;
receive its own treatment (see below), where 2 Maccabees (3:1; 12:45) and 3 Maccabees (1:9 [variant A]; 2:31) will be included. In passages that are translated from Hebrew היראת יהוה (fear of the Lord), including Prov 13:11, εὐσέβεια refers to the right attitude to God and to things divine, which consist of attitude of awe, reverence, worship of God, and obedience to the observance of the Law. The concept of εὐσέβεια in the LXX is not explicitly a virtue, but a moral attitude or disposition of the human soul to do the right things in relation to both God and the Mosaic Law (see Philo, Spec. 2.224; QE 2.26).

Although εὐσέβεια in the LXX is not strictly understood as a virtue, its use entails an ethical dimension that echoes three important aspects of Philo’s use of εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse. First, there is an emphasis on the ethical behavior of the human soul (εὐσεβής vs. ἀσεβής), which mirrors Philo’s understanding of εὐσέβεια as the opposite of ἀσεβεία (e.g, Post. 39; Ebr. 18; Sacr. 15). In the LXX, the pious person (εὐσεβής), who receives the benefits of εὐσέβεια lives according to the ordinances of the Law, and the impious one (ἀσεβής), who is far from God’s commandments (Isa 26:7–10; Prov 1:7, 12:12; 13:19; Sirach 12:4; cf. Sirach 24:16), is also far from knowledge (Prov 11:12; 13:19).

As in Philo, in the LXX both εὐσέβεια and the Mosaic Law are intrinsically connected, especially in terms of the obedience to the commandments (Isa 26:9; 24:16; Sirach 36:12). The observance and practice of the Law also generates good deeds in benefit towards the pious soul (Sirach 12:4). It is a fountain of life (Prov 13:14) that leads the soul to God.

Second, Philo mirrors the LXX’s emphasis on εὐσέβεια as the way or road (ὁδός) that leads the soul to God. The Prophet Isaiah writes, “The way [ὁδός] of the pious has

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Isa 24:16; 26:7, 7; 32:8; Prov 12:12; 13:19 (adjective). In texts composed in Greek: 2 Macc 3:1; 3 Macc 1:9 [A]; 2:31; (noun); 2 Macc 12:45 (adjective).
become straight; the way of the pious has also been prepared... and the impious has come to an end” (Isa 26:7–10).  As in Philo (e.g., Spec. 3.29; QE 2.26), there is one way, the straight path on which the pious walks towards God (Isa 26:7–9). Third, the LXX like Philo (see e.g., Spec. 1.147) also associates εὐσέβεια with knowledge (ἔπιστήμη). In Isa 11:2, for example, εὐσέβεια is a gift of “the Spirit of the Lord” and, together with knowledge (ἔπιστήμη) and wisdom (σοφία), “treasures of righteousness” (Isa 33:6; in Prov 13:19 with γνῶσις). Similar to Philo (e.g., Cher. 42; QG 4.19; cf. Decal. 52; Leg. 1.63–73), the LXX also associates εὐσέβεια with “things intelligent” (συνεταί, Isa 32:8) and with wisdom (σοφία, Isa 33:6; Prov 1:29). Significantly, these special “attributes” of εὐσέβεια evoke Philo’s connection of the virtue εὐσέβεια with knowledge of God (e.g., Hypoth. 7.13), with κόσμος νοητός (e.g., QE 2.15b) and indirectly with reason (λόγος). Although the author of Proverbs relates εὐσέβεια with “knowledge,” “wisdom,” and “things intelligent,” in Prov 1:7 he links εὐσέβεια directly with sense perception (αἴσθησις), the earthly or sensible realm. This not only contradicts Isa 32:8, but it is something that Philo never does.

In the LXX, εὐσέβεια is treated as an “inner attitude” or disposition to obey the commandments of the Mosaic Law. As in Philo’s ethical discourse, εὐσέβεια is closely associated with the Mosaic Law; the one who obeys is identified as pious and the one who disobeys is identified as impious. Likewise, εὐσέβεια has the role to lead the soul to God, and most significant is εὐσέβεια’s association with knowledge, wisdom, and


5. See also Prov 13:19, which reads, “The desires of the pious sweeten his soul, but the works of the impious are far from knowledge.”
the immaterial world. But these ideas are not further developed as Philo does in the presentation of his ethical discourse.

The Virtue of Εὐσέβεια in Aristobulus

Five fragments of the works of Aristobulus (2nd century B.C.E.) are preserved by Clement of Alexandria (ca. 215 C.E.) and Eusebius of Caesarea (ca. 339 C.E.). The fragments show Aristobulus’ attempt to “reconcile Jewish tradition and Hellenistic philosophy.” However, only fragments 3 and 4 pertain to our discussion. Both fragments emphasize the Mosaic Law, and only in fragment 4, εὐσέβεια is mentioned once in connection with the Jewish Law (4.8); this is the topic that is presented next.

Εὐσέβεια and the Mosaic Law

Similar to most Hellenistic Jewish writers (e.g., Philo, the authors of 4 Maccabees and the Letter of Aristeas, and later Josephus), Aristobulus presents the superiority of Judaism and the supremacy of the Jewish Law. In fragment 3, for example, Aristobulus shows the superiority of the Jewish Law when he claims that Greek philosophers such as Plato and Pythagoras followed the tradition of the Law and borrowed many of the ideas from the

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Jewish tradition (3.1; 4.4; 2.4). He also claims in fragment 4 that Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato, followed Moses, the Lawgiver; and even Orpheus imitated him (4.4; 2.4). As other Hellenistic Jews, Aristobulus considers the Jewish Law sacred and holy (2.9.38; cf. 10.1; 5.7).

However, while Philo stresses more the ethical value of the commandments of the Mosaic Law, Aristobulus focuses on the Jewish Law as the source for Greek philosophers and their ideas. He not only subordinates Greek culture to Mosaic authority, he also makes the Greek philosophical ideas and systems as dependent on Jewish tradition, its Law, and Moses’ teaching. Although the ethical component of the Mosaic Law is absent in the fragments, Aristobulus, in the footsteps of his Hellenistic fellow Jews, connects the Jewish Law with εὐσέβεια. In fragment 4.8 according to Eusebius (Praep. ev.13.13.8), Aristobulus attests that the “whole structure of our law has been drawn up with concern for piety, justice, self-control, and other qualities [καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν] that are truly good.” There are two important points that can be drawn from this text. First, as Philo and the LXX, Aristobulus links the Mosaic Law with εὐσέβεια. The practice of the commandments

9. All the translations of Aristobulus’ fragments are from Holladay, Fragments from Hellenistic Jewish Authors. Volume III: Aristobulus, sometimes slightly altered. See Eusebius, Praep. ev. 13.12.1; 8.10; 13.13.21; Clement, Strom. 1.22.150; 4.14.3. Cf. Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 189. Aristobulus claims that parts of the Jewish Law were translated by others before Demetrius of Phalerum, before the dominion of Alexander and the Persians. That means before the Septuagint version accounted by the author of the Letter of Aristeas.

10. Eusebius, Praep. ev. 13.13.4; 13.12; Clement, Strom. 5.14.99.3. Artapanus claims that Moses not only taught philosophers philosophy, but he also taught Orpheus. See Artapanus fragment 3.27.4, preserved by Eusebius, Praep ev. 9.27.4).


of the Mosaic Law concerns the virtues of εὐσέβεια, δικαιοσύνη, and ἐγκράτεια, as well as of other qualities (virtues).

Second, like Philo in his ethical discourse, Aristobulus associates εὐσέβεια with two important virtues in the Greek catalogue of ethical virtues. Aristobulus views εὐσέβεια as one of the cardinal virtues, since he lists εὐσέβεια together with δικαιοσύνη and ἐγκράτεια. We will see that the virtue of δικαιοσύνη is frequently mentioned by the author of the Letter of Aristeas, and the virtue of ἐγκράτεια by Philo especially in his treatise on the Special Laws (Spec. 4.78–131). Although the author of 4 Maccabees takes self-control or temperance (σωφροσύνη) as an important virtue that helps to overcome emotions and passions (see below), he does not list ἐγκράτεια (or σωφροσύνη) together with εὐσέβεια, except when he lists the four cardinal virtues (4 Macc 5:23–24). In the case of Philo, εὐσέβεια is listed together with δικαιοσύνη (e.g., Legat. 213 and Virt. 175; cf. Abr. 208), and these two virtues with holiness (ὁσιότης) in Hypoth. 6.8; Prob. 83; and QE 1.12.

Similarly, we shall see that the author of the Letter of Aristeas lists εὐσέβεια together with δικαιοσύνη twice (24; 131; cf. 215), and ἐγκράτεια together with δικαιοσύνη only once (278).

What is significant in Aristobulus is that the virtues of εὐσέβεια, δικαιοσύνη, ἐγκράτεια, and other qualities (virtues) are described as “truly good” (ἀγαθῶν τῶν κατὰ ἀλήθειαν). The practice of the commandments of the Jewish Law is meant to promote

13. The author of Titus in the New Testament also mentions the same three virtues, and interestingly he keeps the same order, piety first, justice second, and self-control or temperance third (Titus 2:12).

14. For the author of the sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides, self-control or moderation is the best of all, and the excesses are grievous (36, 69b, 98); therefore, the author exhorts the practice of self-control (76).
virtues, for in Greek ethics, “truly good” refers to a virtuous life as opposed to a bad life (a life of vices). Therefore, for Aristobulus the Jewish Law fosters first of all the virtue of εὐσέβεια, and then the Greek cardinal virtues. The fact that he gives εὐσέβεια the first place indicates its primacy among the virtues of justice, self-control, and other virtues, and also its close connection with the Jewish Law. His reference to εὐσέβεια and δικαιοσύνη (second in place) in association with the Mosaic Law is also familiar, since it is found in Philo’s constitution of the ten headings and, as we shall see next, also in the Letter of Aristeas (131).

The Virtue of Εὐσέβεια in the Ethical Exhortation of the Letter of Aristeas

The Letter of Aristeas (2nd century B.C.E.) is a representation of Hellenistic Judaism in that the superiority of the Jewish Law is presented to the Greek world in the best possible ways. This is especially shown in the speech of the high priest Eleazar (λόγος προτερπτικός, 128–171) regarding the defense of the food and purity laws of the Mosaic Law. He explains that these laws are principally for the sake of the ethical value of the Jewish Law. For example, the food laws prohibit eating mice and weasels (Lev. 11:29) to promote contemplation and the perfection of character (144). He explains that Moses forbade Jews to eat mice and weasels not because the inherent character of these animals (whether a creature is good or bad), but because of the value of ethical conduct. Mice are

destructive, and weasels—thought to conceive in the ear and bring to birth through the mouth—represent those who eagerly hear and spread evil rumors (163–166).\(^{16}\) By avoiding eating these creatures, Jews avoid the vices that these creatures symbolize by their actions. According to the author of the *Letter of Aristeas*, the observance of the food and purity laws is meant to promote the practice of virtue, particularly self-control (ἐγκράτεια, e.g., 122, 222–223, 237, 256), and the avoidance of vices.\(^{17}\)

In Eleazar’s defense of the food laws, similar to Philo (*Spec. 4.78–131*) and the author of 4 Maccabees as we shall see, the Jewish Law is re-interpreted in a way that the emphasis is on the ethical character of the food laws. Eleazar’s speech describes an ethical life that entails the acquisition of virtues and the pursuit of the “good life” (127). In the *Letter of Aristeas*, the cardinal virtue of justice (δικαιοσύνη) is highly praised.\(^{18}\) In fact, the food and purity regulations are “toward justice and for the sake of human relations” (168–169),\(^{19}\) which ultimately are for the sake of a higher way of life. Along with justice the author emphasizes the cardinal virtues of temperance (σωφροσύνη, 3 times), or self-control (ἐγκράτεια, once), courage (ἀνδρεία, twice), φρόνησις (once), and wisdom (σοφία, 3 times). Similar to justice, the virtue of εὐσέβεια is also regarded as a special virtue. While

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justice and its cognates are mentioned more than 40 times, εὐσέβεια and its cognates appear 11 times.20 The author’s special view of the virtue εὐσέβεια, therefore, mirrors two aspects of Philo’s understanding of the privileged place of εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse: (1) εὐσέβεια and the Mosaic Law, and (2) εὐσέβεια and δικαιοσύνη.

**Εὐσέβεια and the Mosaic Law**

As in Philo, so too in the *Letter of Aristeas*, the Jewish Law is depicted as the Supreme legislation of Judaism. The practice of the ethical commandments of the Law leads the soul to virtues. This is observed for example in the author’s description of the first commandment, “You shall honor God.” Eleazar shows the primacy of the Jewish God over all the other gods by naming God the “true God” (140) and the “Ruler and Preserver” (157).21 He also expresses the supremacy of God in his criticism of polytheism and Egyptian animal worship (134–139).22 As in Philo, the ethical emphasis on the first commandment is *theocentric*.23 The author of the *Letter of Aristeas* connects the obedience to this commandment with the virtue of εὐσέβεια. He writes, “Our resolve in this matter

20. Paragraphs 2, 24, 42, 131, 210, 215, 229, 255 (noun); 37 and 261 (adverb); 233 (verb). The author mentions godliness (θεοσέβεια) once (179), and holiness (ὁσιότης) also once (18). He also refers to impiety (ἀσέβεια) twice (166 and 297), as οὐχ ὅσιον (not holy).

21. However, the author of the *Letter of Aristeas* shows a tension when he links the Jewish God with Zeus or Dis (15–18). According to Barclay (*Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora*, 143), in 15–18, the author suggests the recognition that Jews and Greek worship the same God under the guise of different names. This is the closest the author comes to imply the equivalence of Jewish and non-Jewish religion.

22. We saw similar criticism against idolatry in Philo, *Decal*. 66–81; *Spec*. 21–31. Also, we will see in other Hellenistic Jewish texts: *Wisdom of Solomon*, the *Sibylline Oracles*, and Josephus. In a Jewish Hellenistic novel *Joseph and Aseneth* (1st century B.C.E.–2nd century C.E.), a text not treated in this study, the author also deals with idolatry, especially in chapters 1–21. For a good overview on this topic, see Rogers, “God and the Idols,” 44–50.

was to do a pious deed and dedicate a thank offering to God the most high” (37).\(^{24}\) The expression of εὐσέβεια towards God is not only meant to honor the true God (42), it is also a way to attain virtue (e.g., 122, 200, 215). The 72 Jewish elders (philosophers), who were chosen to translate the Jewish Scripture into Greek (LXX) showed their virtues, especially their piety, in ways that impressed the king Ptolemy (200; cf. 124). Their piety is shown by their daily ritual, such as washing their hands to pray to God before engaging in the translation (305).\(^ {25}\) Also, Eleazar praised the king Ptolemy because the king’s desire to translate the Jewish Scripture into Greek was an expression of his εὐσέβεια for the Jewish God (42).\(^ {26}\)

According to Eleazar, through the Law, Moses, the Lawgiver, displayed the “power of God” (133), and for this reason the Law is holy (313; 171). With the prescription of the food laws, Moses “fenced” the Jews from impurity and pollution, so that they remain pure in body and in spirit (139). God guides towards holiness to “live according with the holy law” (10), and “to live in accordance with justice” (147). The food laws for the sake of justice are meant to promote contemplation and perfection of character (144). Therefore, the highest rule of the Law, according to Eleazar, is the avoidance of all passions, pleasures, and vices (221–224). A virtuous Jew practices every restraint and expresses the Law in actions and in return receives “honor through noble virtue” (285). For example, the exemplary life of the philosophers (the Jewish elders) and their zeal for the Law led them

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\(^{24}\) All the translations are based on Hadas, *Ariosteas to Philocrates*, sometimes modified.


\(^{26}\) As Barclay notes, Eleazar recognizes the validity of the king’s sending gifts to the Jerusalem Temple on the basis that they are an act of piety to “our God.” Eleazar’s praise in a sense is similar to Philo, who speaks of εὐσέβεια towards Caesar (e.g., *Legat*. 280; *Flacc*. 48).
to acquire an extraordinary virtue (cf. 39; 122). Such virtuous men, Eleazar states, “are beloved of God, since they have cultivated their minds” (287). This cultivation of the mind through the practice of the Law meant, similar to Philo, “a cultivation of the mean,” which according to the author, and also Philo, “is the best course” (122; see Deus 164; Det. 24).27

There is one passage that depicts εὐσέβεια’s prominence. On the second day of the banquet one of the translators answers to the king Ptolemy saying:

> In every way, your majesty, you must make piety the objective of whatever you say or do, so that you may be certain in your own mind that, adhering to virtue, you do not choose to grant favors contrary to reason nor, abusing your power, set justice aside (215).28

First, Eleazar’s speech associates εὐσέβεια and the virtuous life (attained through the practice of the Law) with reason (λόγος). Interestingly, the same three elements in Philo and also in 4 Maccabees, as we shall see later, are also found here: the Mosaic Law, εὐσέβεια and λόγος. Second, Eleazar indirectly relates the goal of “a good life” with εὐσέβεια. This example as in Philo shows the primary role of εὐσέβεια in the practice of the Law in “words” and “deeds” and in finding “virtue,” which is the “best course,” the perfect virtuous state. However, Aristeas stresses the idea that “men do not embrace virtue” on their own; “it is God who guides and who grants right judgment” to act virtuously (267; 277–278; 287; cf. 161). For the author, virtue allows the soul to be conscious of doing no wrong and to lead one’s life in sincerity. Indeed he states, “from these things there will accrue to you the highest joy and tranquility of soul…while you

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27. Williamson, “The Ethical teaching of Philo,” 203. Here, the author of the letter of Aristeas is like Philo influenced by Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean.

28. Cf. 229; 272.
wield power over the real of piety” (261). This according to the translator on the fifth day is the “fruit of wisdom” (σοφίας καρπός).

Furthermore, similar to Philo who connects the goal of the virtue-loving soul with εὐσέβεια (e.g., Her 186; Fug. 63), the author of the Letter of Aristeas links the goal of the human soul (good life) with εὐσέβεια. In Eleazar’s ethical teaching, according to Aristeas, “good life” or “highest joy” consists in “becoming like to God.” This is found in Let. Arist. 210, where the author describes the dialogue between Eleazar and the king Ptolemy.

On the third day, the king asks, “Wherein does piety consist?” Eleazar’s response points forward to the Philonic goal when he replies, “In the realization of God’s work in creation and his knowledge, and that one must avoid injustice and evil deeds, so you [referring to the king] imitating God be void of offense.” For the translator, loyalty to the ethical commandments of the Law, even in time of tribulation requires a firm εὐσέβεια (233). This is likewise similar to what the author of 4 Maccabees describes about the Jews’ genuine piety for the Jewish Law. So, for Eleazar, εὐσέβεια through the practice of the Mosaic Law is the virtue that leads the virtue-loving souls to the goal of human life, imitation of God, which is synonymous to Philo’s “becoming like to God” (Fug. 63). Therefore, the practice of the virtue εὐσέβεια is crucial to the Jewish way of life (255) because it leads the soul to attain “imitation of God.”

Εὐσέβεια and Δικαιοσύνη

In the Letter of Aristeas, the virtue of εὐσέβεια is linked with the cardinal virtue of δικαιοσύνη. Of the 11 references to εὐσέβεια in three instances it appears together

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29. This has been noted already by Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 145.
with δικαιοσύνη (24; 131; 215).30 The author speaks of the cardinal virtue δικαιοσύνη as a fundamental virtue for the ethical value of the observance of the food and purity laws. Aristeas explains that the Jews observe these laws in holiness (ὁσιότης) “for the sake of justice” (18). Eleazar further explains that “all the norms have been regulated with a view to justice… so that we may practice justice towards all men, being mindful of the sovereignty of God” (168). While Eleazar configures the ethical character of the food and purity laws around the cardinal virtue of δικαιοσύνη, he makes the symbolic meaning of these laws symbols of justice and truth (306). The deeper ethical reality of these laws concerns above all justice, and justice in terms of “just intercourse among human beings” (169). The one who procures justice is one who hates evil and loves good, that is, virtues (291). Therefore, to honor justice is the most essential quality, for God is a lover of justice (209; 280). In similar way, Philo also calls God the lover of εὐσέβεια (see Virt. 218; Spec. 1.316). As seen, the cardinal virtue of δικαιοσύνη takes the central place in the author’s ethics concerning food and purity laws.

But Aristeas also sees εὐσέβεια as an important virtue in conjunction with the cardinal virtue of δικαιοσύνη. Describing the ethical value of the food and purity laws of the Mosaic Law, he associates justice with piety when he writes, “we strive in every respect

30. In 210, the author mentions εὐσέβεια with injustice. Interestingly, when the author of the Letter of Aristeas speaks about moderation and passions, he does not mention εὐσέβεια (e.g., 222; 256; 277–278). In 277–278, he talks about virtue (ἄρετή) and places moderation (μετριότης) together with justice, while Philo relates self-control (ἐγκράτεια) and εὐσέβεια (e.g., Spec. 4.97) together with love of humanity. We saw that Aristobulus speaks of εὐσέβεια together with two important Greek virtues, justice (frequently mentioned by the author of the Letter of Aristeas) and self-control. In the Letter of Aristeas, we find the author using the virtue justice with εὐσέβεια in 131, 24, and 215, and justice with self-control (ἐγκράτεια) in 278. In Josephus also we will see that piety, justice, and harmony are listed together (C. Ap. 2.293). Harmony seems to be a peculiarity of Josephus.
to deal fairly with all men in accordance with justice and piety” (24). In a similar way to Philo, who sets up the two sets of five commandments under the virtues of εὐσέβεια and δικαιοσύνη, Aristeas takes these two important virtues as the two “principles” or commands (piety and justice) that Moses, the Lawgiver, laid down and expounded point by point (131). Aristeas, however, does not go further to explain whether the principle of εὐσέβεια concerns commandments related to God and the principle of δικαιοσύνη concerns commandments related to human beings. What is clear is that the food and purity regulations of the Mosaic Law are for the sake of the principles of piety, justice, and belief in one God.

That an important place is given to the virtue of εὐσέβεια in the ethics of the Letter of Aristeas cannot be denied. The food and purity laws are for the sake of justice and to promote perfection of character, or virtuous life; but, they also educate the Jews in both justice and piety as well. These laws are about showing “Jewish piety” in a way that surpass other ethical laws and religions. In the ethics of the Letter of Aristeas, the virtue of εὐσέβεια takes an important place as does δικαιοσύνη (see also 210; 215; 229; 272), and indeed, in one instance the author calls the virtue εὐσέβεια “the greatest good of all” (2).

As in Philo, in the Letter of Aristeas, virtues are rooted in the Mosaic Law. Also in the ethical teaching, the virtue of εὐσέβεια plays an important role in leading the soul to “imitation of God” (becoming like to God). Philo’s definition of εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse moves beyond that of the Letter of Aristeas. Philo’s understanding of εὐσέβεια is more complex than the author of the Letter of Aristeas. Philo in his ethical

31. The same placement is found in Philo’s Virt. 175; cf. Ios. 246; Legat. 213. See also Plato, Gorg. 507B-C.
discourse names εὐσέβεια the “queen,” “beginning” or “source” of all the other virtues, and ascribes to it divine qualities and powers. In the Letter of Aristeas what is at stake is the supremacy of the Jewish Law and the ethical value of the food and purity laws. The virtues of δικαιοσύνη and εὐσέβεια take the major roles as the two principles given by Moses. Aristeas’ depiction of both primary virtues shows a primitive view of what we find later in Philo’s constitution of the two sets of five commandments under the headings of δικαιοσύνη and εὐσέβεια. It is possible that Philo’s structure of the ten headings was in some way influenced by the Letter of Aristeas (e.g., 24; 131; cf. 215). At least, it cannot be denied that the Letter of Aristeas points towards that configuration.

The Virtue of Εὐσέβεια in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs (T12P)

The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs (2nd century B.C.E.–2nd century C.E.) contain the supposedly final ethical exhortation of the twelve patriarchs to their family to act virtuously and avoid sins. Each patriarch delivers his testament with stories from his life.

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(T. Asher is the exception) that illustrate a virtue or a vice. It also contains a set of ethical instructions or exhortations, a prediction of the future of the tribe, and a conclusion with the description of the death and burial of the patriarch. What is valuable in light of Philo’s ethical discourse is that the ethical instructions of the Testaments employ ethical language and concepts of Greek philosophical ethical discourse, especially Stoic. One aspect of the ethical exhortation of the Testaments is the emphasis on the Mosaic Law and its association with εὐσέβεια.

Εὐσέβεια and the Mosaic Law

Kee notes that in the T12P, the patriarchs highly stress obedience to the Mosaic Law; in fact, the Law appears more than 60 times! Like Philo, obedience to the Law does not refer to the ceremonial character of a specific commandment; rather, the obedience

33. Particular important are: the story of Reuben describes the evil of fornication; that of Simeon the vice of envy; Judah the vices of inebriation and fornication. Issachar’s story shows the virtue of single-mindedness; that of Zebulon the virtue of compassion; Joseph the virtues of chastity and forgiveness. Cf. Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 179.


37. Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 183.

38. Similar to Wisdom, and unlike Philo, the Sabbath observance is not mentioned in the T12P. The law of circumcision is mentioned in connection with the destruction of Schechem, and not in connection with a positive instruction (T. Levi 6.1–11). The food laws are mentioned only
to the Law involves the ethical dimension of the Law. Virtues common in Greek philosophical discourse on virtues are frequently mentioned throughout the Testaments, and most of them are important virtues of Stoicism. The virtue εὐσέβεια and its cognates figure in the Testaments 4 times (T. Reuben 6.4; T. Judah 18.5; T. Issachar 7.5; T. Levi 16.2), and its opposite ἀσέβεια and its cognates appear 19 times (T. Reuben 3.14, 15; 6.3; T. Levi 10.2 [twice]; 13.7; 14.1, 2, 4, 6; T. Joseph 5.2; 6.7; 9; T. Naphtali 4.4; T. T. Asher 7.5 twice; T. Judah 25.5; T. Zebulon 10.3; T. Benjamin 3.8). In the ethical exhortations of the patriarchs, as in Philo, the practice of the commandments of the Law is intrinsically connected with the virtue of εὐσέβεια and the disobedience to the prescription of the Law with the vice ἀσέβεια. The Testaments refer to the virtuous ones as “pious men” or “pious ones,” and their words as “pious words.” Whereas the life of virtue is connected with εὐσέβεια, the life in vices is associated with ἀσέβεια; the Testaments refer to those who are far from virtue as “impious ones,” and their actions “impious deeds” and “impious acts.” Unlike the pious ones who will receive the gift of eternal life, the impious ones who

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40. Also the term holiness (ὁσιότης) occurs 4 times: T. Benjamin 3.1; 5.4 [twice]; and T. Gad 5.4; godliness (θεοσέβεια) appears twice: T. Joseph 6.7 and T. Naphtali 1.10. Since there are fragments of the testaments in Hebrew and Aramaic, in two instances there is the reference to “fear of the Lord” (φόβῳ κυρίου, T. Simeon 3.4 and T. Joseph 10.5).


42. All translations are by Kee, “Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs,” 1:775–828.
disobey the Mosaic Law will be punished (T. Naphtali 8.6; T. Judah 23.3–5), for they are led by lawlessness (vices).

One point that is worth noting is that the Testaments also link the Law with σοφία (T. Levi 13.1–9). According to Kee, the Law is treated as a synonym for σοφία. Similar to Philo (e.g., Prob. 62; see chapter two) and the book of Wisdom as we shall see, the Mosaic Law (σοφία) is also connected with the Law of Nature (T. Naphtali 3.3–4). The link between σοφία (the Law) and the Law of Nature, however, goes beyond the viewpoint expressed by the author of Wisdom (ch. 7), for the Testaments appeal to a universal Law (of Nature), which like Philo breaks the boundaries of covenantal identity. What is also significant in the Testaments is that the virtue of εὐσέβεια is directly related to Philo’s two main headings of the Mosaic Law. The Testament of Issachar reads, “I acted in piety and truth all my days. The Lord [God] I loved with all my strength; likewise, I loved every human being as I love my children” (T. Issachar 7.6). Collins notes that the emphasis on the duties towards God and human beings in the Testaments is a typical reflection of

43. Also, Hellenistic Jewish writers present the Jewish Law as a Law in accordance with the Law of Nature. For a further discussion, see Dieter Georgi, The Opponents of Paul in Second Corinthians (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986), 148–51.

44. The appeal to universalism is also found in the Let. Arist. 128–171; 225–30, especially in Eleazar’s speech about the food and purity laws. Kee (“The Ethical Dimensions of the Testaments of the XII as a Clue to Provenance,” 262) argues that the Law in the testaments is universal in its revelatory power as in Stoicism rather than as the ground of a special covenant relationship with Israel. The Law is not regarded as a way of commitment to a covenant. For example, idolatry and homosexuality are reprehensible not because of their prescriptions in the Law, but because they are not in accord with the Law of Nature. The Law is linked with the movement of the celestial bodies, and together they are seen as parallel expressions of the divine Law. See also, Kee, “Testaments of the twelve Patriarchs,” 1:780; Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 179; De Jonge, “The Main Issues in the Study of the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs,” 519; “The Two Great Commandments in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs.” NovT 44/4 (2002): 371–92; Dixon Slingerland, “The Nature of Nomos (Law) within the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs.” JBL 105/1 (1986): 39–48.
Hellenistic Judaism. But this passage particularly mirrors Philo’s view of εὐσέβεια before its transition. The virtue of εὐσέβεια is associated with both reverence towards God and duties towards human beings; they are rooted in εὐσέβεια. Later, Philo tends to classify them under the two virtues of εὐσέβεια and δικαιοσύνη.

Furthermore, an important characteristic of the T12P is that the Testaments illustrate both the patriarchs’ virtuous (righteousness) and non-virtuous lives (unrighteousness) in Greek philosophical terms. The patriarchs’ ethical instructions to keep God’s Law are meant to promote virtues (T. Simeon 5.2; T. Naphtali 8.5) for the “enlightenment of every human being” (T. Levi 14.4). However, the Testaments do not regard εὐσέβεια as the primary virtue as in Philo’s ethical discourse; instead, the virtue of φιλαδελφία (brotherly love) is viewed as the highest virtue (T. Simeon 4.5–7; T. Issachar 5.2; T. Dan 5.3; T. Joseph 17.2–8). In terms of reward in the Testaments it is eschatological, which involves “the restoration” of the people of Israel. If they live virtuously in holiness keeping the Law, they will be enlightened with a new knowledge (T. Benjamin 11.2; T. Levi 18.1–14; T. Asher 6.2–3) and will receive “eternal life” (T. Asher 5.2; 6.5; T. Judah 25.1; T. Issachar 7.9; T. Dan 7.1; T. Benjamin 10.3–4). Also through their good works, which display righteousness (virtuous life), they will “imitate the Lord” (T. Asher 4.3). Therefore, in one way or another, the goal of the ethical exhortations in the

45. Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 184.

46. On this topic, see chapter five.

47. Cf. T. Gad 3.1–5.11; T. Simeon 2.6–7. As Thompson notes (Moral Formation According to Paul, 160), in some of Hellenistic Jewish texts, φιλαδελφία is an important virtue; for example, the virtue is also emphasized in Wis 13:23–16 and in the Let. Arist. 225 (φίλια) and 229 (ἀγάπη).

Testaments is “imitation of God” (T. Benjamin 4.1), as in the Letter of Aristeas, and similar to Philo (becoming like to God). Like in Philo, the three Patriarchs (Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob) are mentioned in the Testaments. But in here, they represent the eschatological judges whose virtuous life led them to receive the gift of resurrection (T. Levi 15.4; cf. T. Judah 25.1; T. Dan 7.2; T. Benjamin 10.6). As examples of virtue, they are chosen to give mercy to the pious ones (T. Levi 15.4) and will rejoice while the pious ones are clothed in righteousness (T. Levi 18.14).

The ethical exhortations of the Testaments inculcate virtues and the avoidance of vices in a similar way as is found in Philo, and in the Letter of Aristeas. The Testaments, however, present most of the virtues and vices, borrowing Collins words, in a “dualistic framework.”49 The following chart shows the major virtues and vices mentioned throughout the testaments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virtues</th>
<th>Vices</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ἀγαλλίασις (joy)</td>
<td>λύπη (grief)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Judah 25.5; Benjamin 10.6</td>
<td>T. Levi 17.4; T. Judah 23.1; 25.4; T. Dan 4.6; T. Joseph 8.5; T. Benjamin 6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀγάπη (love)</td>
<td>μίασι (hated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Reuben 6.9; T. Simeon 4.7; T. Levi 17.3; 18.13; T. Judah 23.5; T. Gad 4.1–7; 5.2; 6.1–3; 7.6–7; T. Asher 2.4; T. Joseph 17.3; T. Benjamin 3.5; 8.1, 2; 11.2</td>
<td>T. Dan 2.5; T. Gad 1.9; 2.2; 3.1, 3; 4.1, 5–7; 5.1–4; 6.1–3; 7.7; T. Asher 4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φθόνος (envy)</td>
<td>T. Simeon 2.13; 3.1–4, 6; 4.5, 7; 6.2; T. Dan 2.5; T. Gad 4.5; T. Joseph 1.3, 7; 10.3; T. Benjamin 4.4; 7.2; 8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ζῆλος (jealousy)</td>
<td>T. Reuben 3.5; 6.4; T. Simeon 2.7; 4.5, 9; T. Judah 13.3; T. Dan 1.6; T. Asher 4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

49. Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 182.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virtues</th>
<th>Vices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ἁγίασμα (sanctification, holiness)</td>
<td>ἄνοια (lawlessness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>T. Levi</em> 18.6–7; <em>T. Dan</em> 5.9; <em>T. Benjamin</em> 10.11</td>
<td><em>T. Reuben</em> 3.2; <em>T. Levi</em> 2.3; 17.11; <em>T. Zebulon</em> 1.7; <em>T. Dan</em> 3.2; 6.6; <em>T. Naphtali</em> 4.1; <em>T. Gad</em> 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀληθεία (truthfulness)</td>
<td>γοητεία (witchcraft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>T. Reuben</em> 3.8, 9; 6.9; <em>T. Levi</em> 8.2; 18.2, 8; <em>T. Judah</em> 14.1; 20.1, 3, 5; 24.3; <em>T. Issachar</em> 7.5; <em>T. Dan</em> 1.3; 2.1–2; 5.2, 13; 6.8; <em>T. Gad</em> 3.1, 3; 5.1; <em>T. Asher</em> 5.3–4; 6.1; <em>T. Joseph</em> 1.3; <em>T. Benjamin</em> 6.5; 10.3</td>
<td><em>T. Judah</em> 23.1; <em>T. Joseph</em> 6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀνδρεῖα (courage)</td>
<td>κακία (wickedness, evil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>T. Simeon</em> 2.5</td>
<td><em>T. Zebulon</em> 8.5; 9.7; <em>T. Dan</em> 1.3; 5.5; <em>T. Gad</em> 7.7; <em>T. Asher</em> 2.1, 8; 3.1–2; 7.5; <em>T. Joseph</em> 5.3; 6.6–7; <em>T. Benjamin</em> 7.1; 8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>γνώσις (knowledge)</td>
<td>πλάνη (deceit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>T. Reuben</em> 2.6; <em>T. Levi</em> 4.3; 18.3, 5, 9; <em>T. Gad</em> 5.7; <em>T. Benjamin</em> 11.2</td>
<td><em>T. Reuben</em> 2.1; 3.2, 7; <em>T. Simeon</em> 2.7; 3.1; 6.6; <em>T. Levi</em> 3.3; <em>T. Judah</em> 14.1, 8; 19.1, 4; 20.1, 3; 23.1; 25.3; <em>T. Issachar</em> 4.4, 6; <em>T. Zebulon</em> 9.7, 8; <em>T. Dan</em> 2.4; 5.5; <em>T. Naphtali</em> 3.3; <em>T. Asher</em> 6.2; <em>T. Joseph</em> 3.9; <em>T. Benjamin</em> 6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>δικαιοσύνη (Justice/righteousness)</td>
<td>πλεονέκτης (cheating)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>T. Levi</em> 8.2; 13.5; <em>T. Judah</em> 22.2; 24.1, 6; <em>T. Zebulon</em> 9.8; <em>T. Dan</em> 6.10; <em>T. Naphtali</em> 4.5; <em>T. Gad</em> 3.1; 5.3; <em>T. Asher</em> 1.6; 6.4; <em>T. Benjamin</em> 10.3</td>
<td><em>T. Reuben</em> 3.5; <em>T. Issachar</em> 7.4; <em>T. Dan</em> 1.3; 2.1, 4; 3.6; 4.6–7; 5.1; 6.8; <em>T. Gad</em> 5.1; <em>T. Asher</em> 5.3; <em>T. Benjamin</em> 6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀδικία (injustice/unrighteousness)</td>
<td>ψεῦδος (falsehood)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>T. Reuben</em> 3.6; <em>T. Levi</em> 2.3; 3.1; 4.1–2; 17.5; <em>T. Dan</em> 6.10; <em>T. Benjamin</em> 10.8</td>
<td><em>T. Reuben</em> 3.5; <em>T. Issachar</em> 7.4; <em>T. Dan</em> 1.3; 2.1, 4; 3.6; 4.6–7; 5.1; 6.8; <em>T. Gad</em> 5.1; <em>T. Asher</em> 5.3; <em>T. Benjamin</em> 6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtues</td>
<td>Vices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| ἐγκράτεια (continence, self-control)  
*T. Issachar 2.1; T. Naphtali 8.8* | ἐπιθυμία (desire)  
*T. Reuben 5.6; 6.4; T. Judah 14.1; 16.1;  
*T. Issachar 6.1; T. Dan 4.5; T. Asher 3.2;  
6.5; T. Joseph 4.7; 7.7–8; 9.1, 3* |
| ἔρημη (peace)  
*T. Levi 18.4; T. Judah 7.7; 9.1, 7; 22.2;  
24.1; T. Dan 5.2, 9, 11; 6.2, 5; T. Naphtali  
6.9; T. Gad 6.3; 8.4; T. Asher 6.6; T.  
Benjamin 6.1* | βία (violence)  
*T. Joseph 8.2* |
| ἐλεός (compassion, mercy)  
*T. Judah 23.5; T. Zebulon 5.1, 3–4; 7.3;  
8.1–2, 6; T. Naphtali 4.3, 5; T. Gad 2.1* | ἀνηλεής (merciless)  
*T. Gad 5.11* |
| ἡδονή (pleasure)  
*T. Judah 13.6; 14.2; T. Issachar 3.5; T.  
Dan 6.1; T. Issachar 6.9; T. Gad 6.9;  
4.3; T. Asher 5.2; T. Benjamin 6.2–3* | πάθος (passion)  
*T. Levi 4.1; T. Judah 18.6; T. Joseph 7.8;  
T. Benjamin 5.1* |
| πυρωσις (heated passion)  
*T. Judah 16.1* | πυρωσις (heated passion)  
*T. Judah 16.1* |
| ἕβρις (wantonness)  
*T. Judah 16.3; T. Gad 5.1; T. Benjamin  
6.5* | ἕβρις (wantonness)  
*T. Judah 16.3; T. Gad 5.1; T. Benjamin  
6.5* |
| ἡδονή (pleasure)  
*T. Judah 13.6; 14.2; T. Issachar 3.5; T.  
Dan 6.1; T. Issachar 6.9; T. Gad 6.9;  
4.3; T. Asher 5.2; T. Benjamin 6.2–3* | πάθος (passion)  
*T. Levi 4.1; T. Judah 18.6; T. Joseph 7.8;  
T. Benjamin 5.1* |
| πυρωσις (heated passion)  
*T. Judah 16.1* | πυρωσις (heated passion)  
*T. Judah 16.1* |
| ἕβρις (wantonness)  
*T. Judah 16.3; T. Gad 5.1; T. Benjamin  
6.5* | ἕβρις (wantonness)  
*T. Judah 16.3; T. Gad 5.1; T. Benjamin  
6.5* |
| εἰρήνη (peace)  
*T. Levi 18.4; T. Judah 7.7; 9.1, 7; 22.2;  
24.1; T. Dan 5.2, 9, 11; 6.2, 5; T. Naphtali  
6.9; T. Gad 6.3; 8.4; T. Asher 6.6; T.  
Benjamin 6.1* | βία (violence)  
*T. Joseph 8.2* |
| καθαρότης (purity, cleanness)  
*T. Naphtali 3.1; T. Levi 8.5; 9.13; 14.2–3;  
16.5; T. Asher 2.9; m4.5; Benjamin 6.5;  
8.2–3* | ακαθαρσία (uncleanness)  
*T. Levi 15.1; T. Judah 14.5; T. Asher 2.9;  
4.5; T. Joseph 4.6; T. Benjamin 5.2* |
| μακροθυμία (endurance, patience)  
*T. Dan 2.1; 6.8; T. Gad 4.7; T. Joseph 2.7;  
17.2; 18.3* | θυμός (anger)  
*T. Judah 7.7; T. Dan 3.1, 8; 2.1–2, 4; 3.1,  
4–5; 4.1–3, 6–7; 5.1; 6.8; T. Naphtali 2.8* |
| μετάνοια (repentance)  
*T. Reuben 2.1; T. Judah 19.2; T. Gad  
5.7–8* | ἐκδίκησις (vengeance)  
*T. Reuben 6.6; T. Levi 2.2; 3.2–3; 5.3;  
18.1; T. Dan 5.10; T. Gad 6.7; T. Joseph  
15.5; 20.1* |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virtues</th>
<th>Vices</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>πίστις (faith)</td>
<td>εἰδωλολατρεία (idolatry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>T. Levi</em> 8.2; 16.5; <em>T. Asher</em> 7.7</td>
<td><em>T. Reuben</em> 4.6; <em>T. Levi</em> 17.11; <em>T. Judah</em> 19.1; 23.1; <em>T. Joseph</em> 4.5; 6.5; <em>T. Benjamin</em> 10.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>πραότης (gentleness)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>T. Judah</em> 24.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πτωχεία (poverty)</td>
<td>ánagnosia (ignorance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>T. Judah</em> 15.6; 25.4; <em>T. Dan</em> 5.13</td>
<td><em>T. Levi</em> 18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σοφία (wisdom)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>T. Levi</em> 13.7; <em>T. Zebulon</em> 6.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φρόνησις (prudence, practical wisdom)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>T. Naphtali</em> 2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σωφροσύνη (temperance, chastity)</td>
<td>ánagynosis (licentiousness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>T. Joseph</em> 4.1–2; 6.7; 9.2, 3; 10.2, 3</td>
<td><em>T. Judah</em> 23.1; <em>T. Levi</em> 17.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>κτηνοφθόρος (practice bestiality)</td>
<td><em>T. Levi</em> 17.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μοιχός (adulterer)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>T. Asher</em> 4.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>παιδοφθόρος (pederast)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>T. Levi</em> 17.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πορνεία (prostitution, sexual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>promiscuity, fornication)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| *T. Reuben* 1.6; 3.3; 4.6–8, 11; 5.3, 5; 6.1, 4; *T. Simeon* 5.3–4; *T. Levi* 9.9; *T. Judah* 12.2; 13.3; 14.2–3; 15.2; 18.2; *T. Dan* 5.6; *T. Joseph* 3.8; *T. Benjamin* 8.2; 9.1; 10.10


Overall, the ethical exhortations in the *TI2P* exhibit three major parallels with Philo’s ethical discourse around the virtue of εὐσέβεια. (1) Philo and the Testaments link the observance of the Mosaic Law with virtues, and among these virtues εὐσέβεια is an important one, but not as prominent as the virtue of φιλαδελφία. The view of εὐσέβεια as connected with both duties towards God and duties towards human beings is quite significant in the testaments, since it reflects Philo’s understanding of εὐσέβεια before its transition. (2) As in Philo and other Hellenistic Jewish texts (see below), the catalogue of ethical virtues and vices which appears in the Testaments is typical in the lists of classical Greek ethical virtues and vices. (3) The Testaments clearly exhibit familiarity with the philosophical tradition, especially Stoicism, as is shown in the associations of the Law with σοφία and the universal Law of Nature. However, these parallels are less sophisticated than Philo’s similarities with the *Letter of Aristeas*, Wisdom, and 4 Maccabees. In fact, the Testaments are far less developed than the Hellenistic Jewish texts discussed in this chapter.50

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50. Collins (*Between Athens and Jerusalem*, 160) catalogues the *TI2P*, together with the *Sibylline Oracles* and the sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides, as “less philosophical literature of Hellenistic Judaism.” Although Collins (*Between Athens and Jerusalem*, 173) claims that “most of the sentences in Pseudo-Phocylides (1st century B.C.E.–1st century C.E.) are quite commonplace in both Jewish and Hellenistic ethics,” in terms of the relationship between the ethical exhortation of Pseudo-Phocylides and Philo’s ethical discourse, the sayings of Pseudo-Phocylides stand far apart from both philosophical and Hellenistic Jewish traditions. The word virtue occurs only twice: “love of virtue is worthy” (67), and “labor gives great increase to virtue” (163). Although two of the four cardinal virtues (justice, self-control or moderation) appear in the ethical exhortations,
The Virtue of Εὐσέβεια in the Ethical Exhortation of Wisdom of Solomon

The book of Wisdom (1st century B.C.E.–1st century C.E.)\(^5\) contains some linguistic parallels with Philo.\(^5\) Because of these similarities, Winston argues that the author as well as the rejection of passion, a Stoic vice, and other Greek vices (e.g., envy, love of money, immoderate desires, and injustice), the sentences overall lack familiarity with the philosophical ethical discourse. Pseudo-Phocylides, surprisingly, does not mention the Mosaic Law or its various observances; for example, circumcision and Sabbath observance. What is more surprising is that idolatry is totally absent (a commonplace in Hellenistic Judaism), despite the fact that reference to Jewish monotheism is implied (e.g., 8, 17, 29, 54, 106, 111). But, there is a couple of references to polytheism (e.g., 75 “blessed ones” and 104 “gods”). Here, we encounter a parallel with Philo (e.g., Opif. 27, “visible gods,” for more example see chapter two). If we are to find similarities with other Jewish ethical teachings, the ethical rules of Pseudo-Phocylides reflect the ethical teaching of Philo’s and Josephus’ summary of the Jewish Laws (Philo, Hypoth. 9.1–9 and Josephus, C. Ap. 2.190–219), and perhaps also with the ethical instruction of Tobit in the book that bears his name, and Ben Sirach. Also, in Pseudo-Phocylides neither εὐσέβεια nor ἀσέβεια and their cognates appears at all. Therefore, Pseudo-Phocylides stands apart from the ethics of Hellenistic Jewish texts studied and especially from Philo’s ethical discourse around the virtue of εὐσέβεια. For this reason, Pseudo-Phocylides is not treated in this study. For good studies and bibliography about Pseudo-Phocylides, see Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 168–74; Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age, 158–77; Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 336–46; Flavius Josephus: Against Apion: Translation and Commentary (vol. 10; ed. Steve Mason; Leiden: Brill, 2007), 355–58.


52. Winston (Wisdom of Solomon, 59–62) points the following similarities: their view
of Wisdom was “deeply influenced by Philo rather than the other way around.” The relationship between Philo and Wisdom is debated, and the purpose of this study is not to take a position on influence of one on the other, but provide a comparison about their use of εὐσέβεια in ethics. What is distinct from Philo’s ethical discourse is that the author of Wisdom does not mention the virtue of εὐσέβεια, except one instance (10:12). It is in this key point that Philo differs from the author of Wisdom. We have seen that Philo’s primary virtue in his ethical discourse is εὐσέβεια, which is also the source of all the other virtues. The author of Wisdom, however, takes the Stoic term wisdom (σοφία) instead of the Hellenistic Jewish virtue εὐσέβεια as necessary for the acquisition of virtues. Despite this major difference, the ethical teaching of the author of Wisdom around σοφία reflects two important aspects of Philo’s ethical discourse around the virtue of εὐσέβεια: (1) the relation of the Jewish Law with virtue, and (2) the parallels between σοφία and εὐσέβεια.

of σοφία (wisdom); their creation theories; their doctrine of immortality; their ethical theory; their linguistic parallels. However, the book of Wisdom omits a number of characteristics of Philonic conceptions: the Platonic theory of Ideas; God’s Powers; connection between the Mosaic commandments with the philosophical virtues; formulation of the Law of Nature; use of Philonic allegory; the experience of mystical union; Philo’s doctrine of daemons or angels. For a general discussion about ethics of Wisdom of Solomon, see Thompson, The Moral Formation According to Paul, 30–34.


54. The author refers to σοφία 119 times: Wis 1:4; 3:11; 6:9, 12, 13 [she, her], 14 [her twice], 15 [her twice], 16 [she, her], 17 [her], 18 [her twice], 20, 21, 22 [she, her twice], 23; 7:7 [a spirit of wisdom], 8 [her], 9 [her twice], 10 [her 3x], 11 [her twice], 12 [she], 13 [her], 15, 22 [also she, her], 24 [also she, her], 25 [she], 26 [she, 27 [she 3x, herself], 28, 29 [she twice]; 8:1 [she], 2 [her 3x], 3 [she, her twice], 4 [she], 5, 6 [she], 7 [her, she], 8 [she 3x], 9 [her, she], 13 [her], 16 [her 3x], 17, 18 [her 4x], 21 [her twice]; 9:1, 4, 6, 9, 10 [her twice, she], 11 [she, her], 17, 18; 10:1 [she], 2 [she], 3 [her], 4, 5 [she], 6 [she], 8, 9 [also her], 10 [she 3x], 11 [she], 12 [she 3x], 13 [she], 14 [she 4x], 15 [she], 16 [she], 17 [she twice], 18 [she], 19 [she], 21; 11:1 [she]; 14:2, 5. After chapter 14:5, σοφία is not mentioned again.
The Jewish Law and Virtue (Ἀρετή)

For the author of Wisdom, the practice of the ethical commandments of the Law is meant to promote righteousness or virtuous life (1:1, 12; 4:1; 6:4, 18; 9:5; 14:16; 16:6). The author speaks about “the righteous” versus “the unrighteous” as equivalent to Philo’s “pious” versus “the impious” in his ethical discourse (e.g., Post. 39; QE 1.10; Ebr. 18; Sacr. 15). Those who follow and practice the Law, are the righteous Jews and those who sin against the Law are the unrighteous ones (pagans). In Wisdom, the “the righteous ones” are identified as “the children of God,” the “holy ones” who stand in contrast to “the unrighteous,” “the foolish,” “the impious,” and the “wicked ones” (1:16; 2:12; 4:16; 5:14; 10:6; 11:9; 12:9; 14:16; 16:18). They are “idolaters” who worship gods (12:27) and make representations of them by their hands (13:10–15:17). In an analogous way to Philo (e.g., Ebr. 109; Decal. 52–65) and the author of the Letter of Aristeas (134–137), the author of Wisdom criticizes especially the Egyptian worship of animals and the making of idols from “clay” (15:7–17) and “wood” (13:11–14:7). According to the author, “the impious ones” failed to know the Existent One (τὸ ὄν, 13:1), and as a result, they will receive “punishment in accordance with the way they reasoned” (3:10). They “reasoned, but they were led astray [ἐπλανήθησαν], for their wickedness blinded them; therefore, they did not

55. However, as Collins notes (Between Athens and Jerusalem, 200), the author of Wisdom does not make reference to some basic observances of the Law: circumcision, the Sabbath observance, and food laws. There is only one reference to sacrifice (18:9).

56. While the author of Wisdom mentions εὐσέβεια only once, he mentions ἀσέβεια and its cognates 13 times.


know the divine mysteries” (2:21; see also 13:6; cf. 1:16; 5:13). Therefore, for the author of Wisdom, the sin of “idolatry” or the “worship of idols” is the “beginning, cause, and end of every evil” (14:27), especially sexual sins. Indeed, the author writes, “the thought of idols was the beginning of illicit sexual behavior and the invention of them the corruption of life” (14:12).

The children of God, however, “walk according to the counsel of God” (6:4), and their obedience to the Law leads them to “virtue” (4:1; 5:13), “to have knowledge of God and receive “righteous blessings” (2:13, 16). However, the knowledge that the author speaks about is related with the cosmos (a cosmic knowledge), a full knowledge of the constitution of the world. As Collins notes, “the righteous” becomes knowledgeable about the universe, of its structure, its existing being, and the operation of the elements, the beginning and end and middle of times” (7:17–18). Like in Philo’s ethical discourse, the practice of the Mosaic Law leads the virtuous ones to receive the gift of immortality (1:15; 3:4; 4:1; 8:13, 17; 15:3), incorruptibility (12:1; 6:18–19; 18:4; cf. 5:15), and brings them near God (6:18–19). Indeed, the notion of getting “near to God” is similar to the goal of life

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60. As Philo mentions pious Jewish men as examples of virtues, the author of Wisdom also refers to Israel’s righteous men (without explicitly mentioning their names), such as Abraham, Noah, Jacob, Enoch, etc. (11–19).

61. Collins, *Between Athens and Jerusalem*, 198. Other Hellenistic Jewish writers also refer to “the beginning, the middle, and the end,” see Aristobulus, 4.5; Josephus, *C. Ap.* 2.190.

62. According to Reese (*Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and Its Consequences*, 38), in Wisdom, the portrayal of man’s search for God to attain “union with God” derives from the
in Philo, becoming like to God. Through the practice of the Mosaic Law, the righteous ones not only get “closer to God,” but also regain the quality of immortality, because God created human beings for incorruption by making them in the image of His own nature (2:23). Therefore, obedience to the Law as interpreted by the author of Wisdom entails how people are to live virtuously in order to return to the divine, the state of immortality and incorruption, something that God had intended at the beginning.

Σοφία and Εὐσέβεια

Surprisingly, the author of Wisdom mentions the virtue of εὐσέβεια only once. He writes, “She [wisdom (σοφία)] carefully guarded him [the righteous one] from his enemies, and from those who lay in wait for him she kept him safe; and in his arduous contest she decided in his favor, that he might learn that piety [εὐσέβεια] is more powerful than everything” (10:12). Similar to the author of the Letter of Aristeas, the author of Wisdom opts for the Greek virtue of justice (δικαιοσύνη) to describe a virtuous life as a life of “righteousness;” in fact, he mentions it almost 40 times. But, when referring to the opposite of δικαιοσύνη, which is ἀδικία (injustice or unrighteousness), the author prefers to use impiety (ἀσέβεια), which is the opposite of the virtue εὐσέβεια. The vice of ἀσέβεια and its cognates occur about 13 times, and ἀδικία 8 times (see list of vices below).

In Philo and the other Hellenistic Jewish texts (LXX, Aristobulus, Letter of Aristeas, and 4 Maccabees), the ethical teaching combines the practice of the Law with εὐσέβεια. The ethics in the book of Wisdom is also Law-oriented, but the author does

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literature of the Isis cult (e.g., Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca 1.27.4–5). See also Collins, Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age, 203–209.

63. Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 199.
not attempt to connect the observance of the Law and righteousness with the virtue of εὐσέβεια. Instead, the author uses σοφία as the source of a “righteous life”; it is σοφία that leads to virtues (6:20; 7:12; 8:7). In Wisdom, the Law and σοφία are intrinsically connected in the same way Philo connects the Law with the virtue εὐσέβεια. The portrayal of σοφία, however, is complex. The author praises the nature and the power of σοφία (Wis 6:22–10:21) using philosophical language (Stoic and Platonic). For instance, the 21 attributes or epithets that describes σοφία in Wis 7:22b–24 are largely borrowed from Stoic philosophy, especially the claim that σοφία “pervades and penetrates in everything [πάντα]” in creation (SVF 2.416, 1021, 1033). But, in Wis 7:25–26, the author moves away

64. The association between the Law and σοφία is found also in Sirach 24:23–25. For a further discussion about Wisdom and the Law in Sirach, see Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age (The Old Testament Library; Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 42–61.

65. See Winston, “Wisdom in the Wisdom of Solomon,” in Leo G. Perdue et al., eds., In Search of Wisdom: Essays in Memory of John G. Gammie (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), 149–64; Grabbe, Wisdom of Solomon, 68–80. The description of σοφία in Wisdom is far more developed philosophically than Prov 8 and Sirach 24. For example, in Prov 8, the language is less cosmological, and the author describes σοφία as being made by God prior to creation (8:23ff.). She was not only with God in creation (8:27–29), but she was also the one in whom God took delight (8:30). Unlike Wisdom, in Prov 8, σοφία does not take an active participation in creation and she is not identified with the Jewish Law. In Sirach 24, however, σοφία is related with God, creation, and human beings (24:3–7). The author describes σοφία as existing from eternity, from the beginning (24:8–10). She is also identified with the Torah (24:23–25), and σοφία pervades the cosmos, a quality that Philo, like the Stoics, attributes to reason (λόγος). As the λόγος in the Gospel of John, σοφία in Sirach comes to dwell among the people, in Zion (24:11–20). Similar to Prov 8, in Sirach 24, the cosmological role of σοφία found in Wis 7:15–22 is absent.

66. See SVF 2.780; 2.937; 2.1115. Similarly, the series of 21 epithets that describes Wisdom find their parallel in the ancient world; e.g., in the Mithras Liturgy, Aion is similarly invoked with 21 epithets; the most ancient of the Zoroastrian formula, the Ahuna Vairya, contained 21 words. See Winston, “Wisdom in the Wisdom of Solomon,” 152; Clarke, the Wisdom of Solomon, 54.

67. The author’s presentation of σοφία resembles the Stoic λόγος (or πνεῦμα) as it is a principle of rationality pervading the universe. Cf. Winston, “Wisdom in the Wisdom of Solomon,” 153; see also Collins, Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age, 202; Grabbe, Wisdom of Solomon, 76–77.
from his Stoic background and describes σοφία’s essence and her unique efficacy using Middle Platonic language. The fivefold metaphor—breath or exhalation (ἀτμίς), effluence (ἀπόρροια), effulgence (ἀπαύγασμα), mirror (ἔσοπτρον), and image (εἴκων)—emphasizes the notion that σοφία is an “emanation” from God’s power and glory.68 She is not only the “fashioner of all things” in creation (7:22), but she is one with God, because she is the “image” of God and “emanates from God” (7:25–26).69

What is characteristic in Wisdom is that in terms of ethics, σοφία plays the principal role, in the same way εὐσέβεια does in Philo’s ethical discourse. For the author of Wisdom, σοφία is not only involved actively in creation, and is the emanation from and image of God. Like εὐσέβεια is the source of virtues (Decal. 52), σοφία in Wisdom is also the source of virtues (ἀρεταί), for “the fruits of her [σοφία] are virtues,” and especially the cardinal virtues are the gifts of the divine σοφία (8:7).70 Also, like Philo’s εὐσέβεια, σοφία guides on the straight paths to receive understanding or “knowledge of God” (10:10; cf. 6:12) immortality (4:1; 15:3) incorruption (6:18–19; 8:13, 17; 12:1), and leads the soul “near to God” (6:18–19). These qualities and powers ascribed to σοφία, typical patterns in Middle Platonism, reflect the same qualities and powers given to εὐσέβεια in Philo’s


70. This is the only time the author makes a reference to the four cardinal virtues (self-control or temperance, prudence or practical wisdom, justice, and courage [see Plato’s *Phaed.* 69C]).
ethical discourse (see also below 4 Maccabees). A passage that clearly assimilates σοφία to εὐσέβεια is Wis 6:17–20:

Her [αὐτῆς] true beginning is the desire for instruction, and concern for instruction is love [αὐτῆς], and love [of her] is keeping her laws [νόμων αὐτῆς], and paying attention to [her] laws is confirmation of incorruption (or immortality [ἀφθαρσίας]), and incorruption brings one near to God [ἐγγύς … θεοῦ]; so the desire for wisdom [σοφίας] leads to a kingdom.

Here, the author closely associates σοφία with the Law and its instruction; indeed, the Jewish Law is σοφία’s Law. Therefore, σοφία’s role in Wisdom’s ethics is to lead to righteousness or virtuous life (6:12),71 and grant to the righteous or virtuous soul the reward of immortality or incorruptibility (ἀφθαρσία). What is revealing is that the language applied in the ethical teaching of Wisdom is similar to Philo’s ethical discourse. In Wisdom’s ethics, σοφία has a position, one that, in a sense, reflects the privileged place of εὐσέβεια in Philo. Both Hellenistic authors differ in the election of the concept to define the driving force from which virtues derive; that is, εὐσέβεια for Philo, and σοφία for the author of Wisdom.

Therefore, there are several parallels that need to be pointed out between the position of Wisdom’s σοφία and Philo’s εὐσέβεια in their own ethics. (1) Both σοφία and εὐσέβεια are the source of virtues and righteousness (Wis 2:13, 16; Decal. 52); (2) both σοφία and εὐσέβεια are intrinsically connected with the Law (Wis 1:1; Spec. 2.224); (3) both σοφία and εὐσέβεια are viewed as possessing the “fruits” for a virtuous life (Mos.

71. Collins points out that there is a contradiction between 7:27 and 1:4. While in 7:27, σοφία makes people friends of God, that is righteous, in 1:4, σοφία does not enter a soul that plots evil; that is the soul must already be righteous for σοφία’s entrance into the soul. Although the contradiction is obvious, the point here is that σοφία is “the identifier of righteousness;” that is, the presence absence of σοφία determines the eschatological fate of the individual. Cf. Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 197. This notion of σοφία as the identifier of the virtuous soul corresponds Paul’s view of the Spirit that will be discussed amply in chapter six.
1.66; Wis 8:7); (4) both σοφία and εὐσέβεια are associated with knowledge of God (Wis 10:10; Hypoth. 7:13; Contempl. 25); (5) both σοφία and εὐσέβεια have the power to lead the soul near to God (Wis 6:18–19; Her. 186; QE 4:19; Fug. 63); (6) both authors attribute to their own source of virtues (εὐσέβεια and σοφία) Middle Platonic qualities, such as the following qualities: immortality (Wis 4:1; 15:3), incorruption (Wis 6:18–19; 8:13, 17; 12:1), and the idea of becoming like to God or coming near to God. Interestingly, the same parallels between σοφία and πνεῦμα will be reflected in Paul’s ethical discourse, which will be highlighted in chapter seven.

Despite these strong parallels, however, unlike Philo’s εὐσέβεια, Wisdom’s σοφία is personified as a feminine figure; she is not a virtue like εὐσέβεια. Also, Wisdom’s σοφία is directly referred as divine, since she emanates from God and is an image of God (7:25; 26). However, Philo does not apply the terms of “emanation” and “image” to εὐσέβεια, but the fact that Philo calls εὐσέβεια “divine εὐσέβεια” (QE 2.15b), he attributes to his primary virtue the quality of divinity, certainly in less sophisticated way than σοφία, which clearly is the central figure in Wisdom. These lead to the conclusion that although there are important parallels between σοφία and εὐσέβεια, the author of Wisdom gives less importance to εὐσέβεια than both Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees do, as we will see in the next subsection. The only description of εὐσέβεια by the author of Wisdom finds its parallel in the Letter of Aristeas: the author of Wisdom describes εὐσέβεια as the

72. As we shall see in chapter nine, Philo attributes this idea of image (εἰκών) of God to the λόγος of God, who plays the role of an intermediate reality between the transcendent God and the universe. See Tobin, “Logos,” 4:350–51; Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age, 201; Wolfson, Philo, 1:226–82.
“more powerful than everything” (Wis 10:12), and Aristeas describes εὐσέβεια as “the greatest good of all” (2).

The following list shows the virtues that supposedly derive from σοφία and vices (sins), which according to the author of Wisdom, find their root in idolatry:

Table 8. List of Virtues and Vices in Wisdom of Solomon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virtues</th>
<th>Vices</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ἀγαθότης (goodness) 12:22 ;7:26 ;1:1</td>
<td>ἀγνωσία (ignorance) 14:22 ;13:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀγάπη (love) 8:18 ;6:18 ;3:9</td>
<td>ἀδικία (injustice) ;10:3 ;14:16 ;3:19 ;1:8</td>
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<tr>
<td>ἀνδρεία (courage) 15 ,8:7 ;</td>
<td>ἀκαθαρσία (uncleanness) 2:16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>γνώσις (knowledge) 14:22 ;7:17 ;2:13</td>
<td>ἀλαζονεία (false pretention) 5:8 ;17:7</td>
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<tr>
<td>δικαιοσύνη (justice/righteousness) ,1:1</td>
<td>κακία (wickedness, evil) 4:11 ;2:22 ;5:13 ;7:30 ;12:2 ;10 ;20 ;16:14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐλπίς (hope) ;14:6 ;13:10 ;5:14 ;18 ,11 ,3:4</td>
<td>ἀμνηστία (forgetfulness) 19:4 ;14:26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>εὐσέβεια (piety) 10:12</td>
<td>ἀνομία (lawlessness) 23 ,5:7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μακάριος (happiness, blessedness) ;2:16 ;3:13</td>
<td>ἀνόσιος (unholy) 12:4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ὀσιότης (holiness) ;9:3 ;6:10 ;5:19 ;2:22</td>
<td>ἀπιστία (unfaithfulness) 14:25</td>
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<tr>
<td>πίστις (faith) 3:14</td>
<td>ἀσέλγεια (licentiousness) 14:26</td>
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<tr>
<td>ψιλια (friendship) 8:18 ;7:14</td>
<td>ἀταξία (indiscipline) 14:26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φρόνησις (prudence, practical wisdom) 8 ;16 ,7:1 ;6:15 ;4:9 ;3:15:6–7 ,18 ,20 ;17:7</td>
<td>ἀρρήθος (ungratefulness) 16:29</td>
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<tr>
<td>σωφροσύνη (temperance) 9:11 ;8:7</td>
<td>χαρά (joy) 8:16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>εἴδωλον (idolatry) 14:12 ,27 ,29 ,30 ;15:15</td>
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</table>
Philo and the author of Wisdom were influenced by their Greek philosophical tradition, yet in different degrees and modes.73 The author of Wisdom, unlike Philo, takes the Stoic λόγος and substitutes it with σοφία and applies to her the attributes of the λόγος. Likewise, the ethical role of σοφία in Wisdom can be equated to εὐσέβεια’s role in Philo’s ethical discourse. Philo, however, uses the λόγος instead of Wisdom’s σοφία; in other words, for Philo, the λόγος of God corresponds to Wisdom’s σοφία.74 Especially, similar to the author of 4 Maccabees, Philo associates the practice of the ethical commandments

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<tr>
<th>Virtues</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ἔλεγχος (dishonor) 1:9; 2:14; 11:6; 17:7; 18:5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ἐπιορκία (perjury) 14:25, 28</td>
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<td></td>
<td>κενοδοξία (vainglory) 14:14</td>
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<td></td>
<td>κλοπή (theft) 14:25</td>
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<td></td>
<td>μιασμός (scandal, crime) 14:26</td>
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<td></td>
<td>μίσητος (hateful) 14:9</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>μοιχεία (adultery) 3:16; 14:26; 17:4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>πορνεία (prostitution, sexual promiscuity, fornication) 14:12</td>
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<td></td>
<td>προδοσία (betrayal) 17:12, 15</td>
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<td></td>
<td>φθόνος (envy, ill-will) 2:24; 6:23</td>
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<td></td>
<td>φθορά (corruption, seduction) 14:12, 25</td>
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</table>

73. Although the author of Wisdom was not a philosopher, Wisdom shows that the author was influenced by Middle Platonism, since he combines Platonic ad Stoic ideas (something that is typical of Middle Platonism of the author’s and Philo’s day). Especially, his portrayal of σοφία conforms to the pattern of Middle Platonism. Collins argues that the author’s tendency to combine Platonic and Stoic ideas is not the result of his “superficial” knowledge of philosophy; rather, it reflects of the tendency of his day. Collins, *Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age*, 200–202; Winston, *The Wisdom of Solomon*, 61–63; cf. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, xiv.

of the Law and his virtue ἑυσέβεια with reason (λόγος) in his ethical discourse. Winston may be right when he claimed that the author of Wisdom is dependent on Philo; however, in terms of ethics, this may not be the case. If Wisdom is dependent on Philo, ἑυσέβεια would have played a major role in the ethics of Wisdom, particularly in relation to the Law and virtues (righteousness). Therefore, rather than arguing for dependency on either Hellenistic author, in their ethical approach they are influenced by two traditions: their philosophical (σοφία/ἑυσέβεια) and Hellenistic Jewish (Jewish Law), each in their own times and circumstances.

In the configuration of his ethics, why does Philo choose the virtue of ἑυσέβεια and not the figure of σοφία? Philo structures his ethics in two ways: (1) influenced by the philosophical idea that “virtue is one” or “virtues are one,” he wants to choose a Greek virtue that is also cherished in Hellenistic Judaism and expresses in the best way the Jewish way of life, that is, “Jewish piety.” He takes ἑυσέβεια, and he highly develops a new understanding of it. (2) Like the author of 4 Maccabees (as we shall see next) and influenced by his Stoic tradition, Philo structures his ethical discourse in a way that reason (λόγος) plays also an important role. This key aspect in Philo’s ethics becomes crucial, for the λόγος of God becomes the intermediate divine reality between human beings (the universe) and the transcendent God. It is through the λόγος that the soul reaches the transcendent God (e.g., Opif. 69, 146; Spec. 4.4.123).75 This same notion of the λόγος will be reflected in Paul’s view of Christ in the configuration of his ethical discourse around the Spirit (πνεῦμα), which will be discussed in chapter nine.

75. See also, Somn. 1.68–69, 86; Leg. 3.169–178. Cf. Collins, Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age, 202.
The Virtue of Εὐσέβεια in the Ethical Exhortation of 4 Maccabees

The author of 4 Maccabees (1st century C.E.) provides a vivid account of the terrible time that the Jewish people faced under the control of the Seleucid kingdom, especially under Antiochus IV Epiphanes (175 B.C.E.–164 B.C.E.). The author shows how through philosophical reason (λόγος) and the faithfulness to the commandments of the Mosaic Law, Eleazar, the seven brothers and their mother were able to conquer torture and martyrdom (see also 2 Macc 6–7). Using philosophical language, the author describes the faithfulness and loyalty to the observance of the food laws. Although the persecutors tried to force Eleazar, the brothers and their mother to eat pork and food sacrificed to idols by terrible physical torture and suffering, they remained faithful to the Law until death. According to the author, reason (λόγος) is the absolute ruler over the passions

76. For a detailed commentary of 4 Maccabees and bibliography, see David A. DeSilva, 4 Maccabees: Introduction and Commentary on the Greek Text in Codex Sinaiticus (eds. Stanley E. Porter, et al.; Septuagint Commentary Series; Leiden: Brill, 2006); Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem; Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 369–80. On a general overview on ethics in 4 Maccabees, see Thompson, Moral Formation According to Paul, 23–30.

77. Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 369.

78. The defense of the food laws in 4 Maccabees is similar to the Letter of Aristeas (128–171), but the author of 4 Maccabees does not attempt to allegorize the food laws in the same way as the author of the Letter of Aristeas does. See Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 206. Unlike Philo, who views the food laws as a moderation (ἐγκράτεια) of passion (πάθος), for the author of 4 Maccabees, the Jewish food laws has a symbolic meaning which assimilates to the Stoics’ view, the eradication of all pleasures and desires. The food laws teach the Jews self-control so that with the guidance of and obedience to the divine Law, they [Jews] overcome all pleasures and desires. The author uses the example of Eleazar, the seven brothers and their mother to explain two things: that reason (λόγος) dominates the emotions and all vices; and that reason guides the virtues of courage and endurance, which led to the downfall of the Seleucid king Antiochus IV. Reason, according to the author, prevails over all emotions, even over love for parents and children (2:9–14). Also, the author makes emphasis on the role of the Law and its compatibility with reason (7:7–10).
It helped Eleazar, the brothers and their mother to overcome suffering and death, and ultimately champion eternal life.

The questions at stake are, what is the role of εὐσέβεια, or how does the author of 4 Maccabees view εὐσέβεια? How similar to Philo is his notion of εὐσέβεια? In 4 Maccabees, the author does not give a detailed account of his ethics; however, εὐσέβεια takes a central place in the author’s account of the story of Eleazar, the seven brothers and their mother. Its main role is especially in the acquisition of virtues. There are three important elements in which the author of 4 Maccabees shares in common with Philo’s understanding of εὐσέβεια: (1) εὐσέβεια and the Jewish Law; (2) εὐσέβεια and reason (λόγος); and (3) λόγος, εὐσέβεια, and the cardinal virtues.

**Εὐσέβεια and the Jewish Law**

For the author of 4 Maccabees, εὐσέβεια and the Mosaic Law are intrinsically linked. As a matter of fact, the concept of εὐσέβεια and its cognates occur 63 times and the Law is mentioned 56 times. As in Philo, the Law was given by God to the human soul or “human mind” (2:23), and it was considered a divine Law (θεία νόμος, 11:27; 13:22; 17:16) or divine philosophy (θεία φιλοσοφία, 7:9). It was meant to teach virtues, especially the cardinal virtues (5:23–24; 18:10), and for that reason the author calls the Jewish Law, a


80. The concept of εὐσέβεια: 5:8, 24, 31, 58; 6:2, 22; 7:1, 3, 4, 16, 18; 7:22 [as a variant in A]; 8:1; 9:6, 7, 24, 29, 30; 11:20; 12:11, 14; 13:7, 8, 10, 12, 26, 27; 14:3, 6, 6, 7; 15:1, 2, 3, 12, 17, 29, 32; 16:4, 13, 14, 17, 23; 17:5, 7, 7; 18:3 (noun); 1:1, 7 [as a variant in A]; 6:3; 7:16; 10:15; 11:23; 13:1; 16:1; 17:22 (adjective); 11:5, 8 [as a variant]; 15:23; 18:2 (verb); 7:21 [as a variant]; 9:6; 18:1 (adverb). The concept of θεοσέβεια (godliness) appears 3 times (7:6, 22; 17:15). The Law: 2:6, 8, 9, 10, 14, 23; 3:20; 4:19, 23, 24; 5:11, 16, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 25, 25, 27, 29, 33, 34, 35, 36; 6:18, 19, 27, 30; 7:7, 8, 9, 15, 21; 8:7, 14; 9:1, 2, 4, 15; 11:5, 27; 13:9, 13, 15, 22, 24; 15:9, 10; 16:16; 17:16; 18:1, 4, 10.
virtuous Law (ἐνάρετος νόμος, 11:5). Therefore, loyalty and faithfulness to the Jewish Law was highly inculcated in the Hellenistic Jews living in the Greek Diaspora.81 Living a way of life in accordance with the ancestral Law, even in the most terrible circumstances, was required to show fidelity to God and to His divine Law (2:20, 23; 4:23, 24; 5:16, 29).82 As in Philo, keeping Jewish identity (the Jewish way of life) was crucial in times of persecution (4:19; 5:36; 18:5). The loyalty to the Law was not only expressed in certain observances, such as circumcision (4:25) and sacrifices in the Temple (4:20), but also in the observance of the food laws: abstaining from eating pork and food sacrificed to idols (5:2).83 What is important for the author, like Philo, is that the faithfulness to the prescriptions of the Law was a “demonstration of εὐσέβεια” (13:10). Indeed, in 4 Maccabees, a person lives piously by the rule of philosophy, which is the Law, “to endure every pain for the sake of virtue” (7:21–22). The same idea is also expressed in 3 Maccabees, when the author, speaking about the importance of the practice of sacrifices to the Supreme God (3 Macc 1:9), claims that it is not easy to maintain Jewish piety in times of persecution (3 Macc 2:31; cf. 2:31). Also in 2 Maccabees, the author explains that the commandments of the Law were observed because of the high priest Onias’ example of piety (2 Macc 3:1). He writes, “While the holy city was inhabited in unbroken peace and the laws were strictly observed because of the piety of the high priest Onias and his hatred of wickedness.”84

82. See also 5:33; 7:8, 9, 15; 9:2; 15:9; 18:1, 4.
83. The author of the sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides also exhorts not to eat blood and abstain from food sacrificed to idols (31). Cf. Thompson, The Moral Formation According to Paul, 162.
84. According to Robert Doran, the author of 2 Maccabees balances εὐσέβεια and the
The author of 4 Maccabees defines the Jewish Law as the Supreme Law “in accordance with nature” (5:25) or “in accordance with truth” (6:18; 5:18). The author’s familiarity with Stoic ideal of “living according with nature” comes to light.85 He portrays Eleazar, who lived according to the Law, as a true philosopher who trusted in God (7:21). Similar to Philo, who connects the Mosaic Law with reason (λόγος), the author’s emphasis on the Law as “philosophy” (5:11, 22; 7:21) and particularly as “philosophical reasoning” (5:35; 8:1) denotes the notion that, “living in accordance with truth (nature),” Eleazar was able to “live in accordance with the law.” As Collins notes, “reasoning is virtually equated with keeping the law.”86 Unlike Philo, however, who opts for the Platonic τέλος formula “becoming like to God,” for the author of 4 Maccabees, observance of the Law was equivalent to the Stoic τέλος “living according with nature,” “living in accordance with reason,” or “living in accordance with virtue.” His position is not surprising, since he strongly stresses the supremacy of reason and its compatibility with the Law (1:1–3:18).87 He also calls reason (λόγος), “divine reason” (θείου λογισμοῦ, 13:16), and as Philo (e.g., phrase “hatred of evil;” εὐσεβεία is the beginning of all the virtues (Philo, Decal. 52), while “hatred of evil” is a virtue expected in officeholders from kings down. See Robert Doran, 2 Maccabees: A Critical Commentary (ed. Harold W. Attridge; Hermeneia: A Critical and Historical Commentary on the Bible; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2012), 78; see also Daniel R. Schwartz, 2 Maccabees (ed. Loren T. Stuckenbruck et al.; CEJL; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 186.

85. According to Collins (Between Athens and Jerusalem, 205), while it is true that one finds Stoic and Platonic features in 4 Maccabees, the author was not a philosopher but a rhetorician who used philosophical ideas eclectically to embellish his account. Therefore, 4 Maccabees cannot be assigned to any philosophical schools.

86. Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 205.

87. The author mentions the word reason (λόγος) 71 times: 1:1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 13, 15, 19, 29, 30 [twice], 32, 33, 34, 35; 2:3, 4, 7, 9 [twice], 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 24; 3:1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 15, 16, 18, 19; 5:31, 35, 38; 6:7, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35; 7:1, 4, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20; 8:1; 9:2, 17; 10:19; 11:25, 27; 13:1, 3, 16; 14:2, 11; 15:1, 11, 23; 16:1, 4; 18:2.
Mos. 2.66), the author of 4 Maccabees connects reason (λόγος) with εὐσέβεια, a topic that will be discussed in the next subsection.

As in Philo, the author of 4 Maccabees understands the Law as ethical commandments, in which the human soul needs to be trained. The Law is not only called “virtuous Law” (11:5), but it also trains the soul to practice virtues (13:24; 5:23–24), to the point that one is willing to die for the food laws. Through the practice of the ethical commandments, the soul acquires “virtuous habits” (ἀρετῆς ἠθῶν, 13:27),88 as Eleazar, the brothers and their mother show. The author sees education (παιδεία) and discipline in the divine Law (13:22) as the key for the education or training (παιδεία) of the soul in virtues (1:17; 5:34; 13:24).89 The soul is also trained in εὐσέβεια (12:11), in the Law to “learn divine matters reverently and human matters advantageously” (1:17).90 For example, because the Jews were trained in the Law (13:24), they were able to obey and keep the ordinances (dietary laws), even unto death (15:10). By their deeds and words, they showed their fidelity to the divine philosophy (7:9), and most importantly their “greater love for εὐσέβεια” (15:3; 13:10; Virt. 218). The Jewish Law teaches εὐσέβεια towards God, the author

88. His emphasis on “habit” (ἔθος) echoes Aristotle's description of the training in virtue as an acquisition of “habituation” (ἔθος, *Eth. nic.* 2.1.1103a17).


90. As Philo (e.g., Congr. 79), the author defines σοφία (wisdom) as “the knowledge of things divine and human and of the causes of these” (1:16). It includes training (παιδεία) “in the Law, training by which we learn divine matters reverently and human matters advantageously” (1:17). The author's definition of σοφία is similar to that of Philo, the Stoics, and Platonists. It is similar to Philo because the author associates σοφία with the teachings of the Law and with the knowledge of things divine and human; and it is similar to the Stoics and Platonists because the author associates σοφία with both the knowledge of things divine and human. Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 89.5; Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.26.57.
writes, “so that we worship the only living God in a way that befits his greatness” (5:24) and show “devotion to the Creator of all” (11:5).91

Using athletic language, like Philo, the author of 4 Maccabees explains that the training in the Law is not easy. The soul has to go through endurance (ὑπομονή) and pain (λύπη), like “a noble athletic” does to gain virtue (6:10; 17:16; Sacr. 37; Congr. 98; Spec. 1.68). Eleazar, in his old age, was admired by his torturers for his courage (6:11) and defense of εὐσέβεια (5:31), which brought about his glory (7:9). Through his suffering and endurance, he was able to “gain the prizes of virtue,” which ultimately was “to be with God” (9:8). Eleazar, the brothers and their mother were courageous to endure willingly all the pain and be champions of εὐσέβεια, and become the prizewinners in the contest that took place in their heart (15:29). For the author, the tyrant Antiochus did not champion the divine Law even unto death (6:21). The Jews by championing εὐσέβεια, they championed also the divine Law (9:15); and ultimately they became champions of virtues (12:14). By dying nobly, they as true athletes fulfilled their duty of piety towards God (12:14). Godliness (θεοσέβεια), a virtue akin to εὐσέβεια, won also the victory and crowned its athletes (17:15), because “virtue testing them for their perseverance offered rewards. Victory means incorruptibility, a long-lasting life” (17:12; 10:15). Likewise, using nautical metaphor of the pilot and ship, common in Hellenistic philosophy, the author writes:

A most skillful pilot, [Eleazar], steered the ship of piety on the sea of the passions, and though buffetted by the stormings of the tyrant and overwhelmed by the mighty waves of the tortures, in no way did it turn the rudders of piety until it sailed unto the haven of immortal victory. (7:1–3).

91. The author’s reference to “Creator of all [πάντα]” is a reflection of Stoic influence (e.g., SVF 2.416, 1021, 1033).
The author compares Eleazar’s reasoning faculty to a pilot steering the “ship of piety” over the raging sea of the passions. As Philo, the author of 4 Maccabees makes emphasis on ἐυσέβεια as having the quality of immortality, and the role of giving the virtuous soul the prize of incorruptibility, a life with God (9:8; 17:12). So, when the author writes, “the path to immortality” (14:5; 17:5), one finds a similarity with Philo’s phrase, “the path to εὐσέβεια” (Spec. 3.29; QE 2.26).

Philo’s ideal of zeal (ζῆλος) and its connection with both the Jewish Law and εὐσέβεια (Abr. 60; Ebr. 84) is also present in 4 Maccabees. For the author, the zeal of Eleazar, the brothers and their mother is deeply rooted in the obedience to the Law. The author explains that they were ready to “die for the sake of the law” (6:27; 13:9, 13), and all their suffering and death were for “the sake of God” (16:19, 25). Their common ideal of zeal for the Law was associated with virtue, for “to die for the Law” was to “die for the sake of virtues or for the “sake of nobility of character” (1:10; 11:22; 13:25; 15:9). Also, the ideal of zeal extended to the virtue of εὐσέβεια when the author writes that the mother “urged each boy and all together on to death for the sake of piety” (15:12; see also 9:7). The author of 2 Maccabees likewise speaks of the ideal of zeal for the Law and εὐσέβεια. Their zeal led the pious ones to die for righteousness and to be free from sin, and receive the reward for their εὐσέβεια. For those who “sleep in piety,” there is a “splendid reward” awaiting for them (2 Macc 12:45). Similar to Philo, for the author of 4 Maccabees, the Jews by fighting

92. DeSilva, 4 Maccabees, 150. Philo also uses the same imagery in Leg. 3.118; 223–224; Migr. 6.

93. DeSilva, 4 Maccabees, 150.
zealously in defense of their ancestral Law (16:16; 6:30) also expressed their noble fight for their true εὐσέβεια (9:24). As the Patriarch Isaac, they were willing “to be slaughtered for the sake of piety” (13:12), rather than to transgress their Law in any way (5:17, 20, 27, 35; 8:14; 9:1, 4; 13:15). The author shows that the Jews acted piously for the sake of piety (9:6) and in “defense of piety” (5:31; 14:3; 16:14), and not for impiety (9:15). As children of Abraham (18:1), their truly pious lives (11:23; 17:22; 18:1) were in harmony with the Law, and thus, for the author, they were considered true philosophers of the divine Law (7:7). It is worth noting that like Philo, the author of 4 Maccabees presents the Patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, as models of true zeal for the defense of both the Law and εὐσέβεια (7:14, 19; 13:17; 16:20, 25).

Εὐσέβεια and Λόγος

As in Philo, in 4 Maccabees the Stoic concept of λόγος is also closely associated with εὐσέβεια. The story of Eleazar, the seven brothers and their mother is a story of their reason overcoming the passions and vices (1:3–6; 2:17; 3; 6:7; 7:14; 11:27) and most importantly “the story of their piety” (17:7). For the author of 4 Maccabees, εὐσέβεια is the “root” of the λόγος (7:4; 16:4), and the philosophy (Law) of reason is also “rooted in εὐσέβεια” (8:1). Reason as the absolute ruler of the passions (2:15) has to do with the mind, sound judgement, and the life of wisdom (1:15), and all these qualities of reason find their source in εὐσέβεια. There is no wonder why the author, when describing the terrible torments and sufferings of the Jews who showed their εὐσέβεια and their loyalty to the Law, labels reason (λόγος) a “pious reason” (ὁ εὐσεβὴς λογισμός, e.g., 1:1; 6:31; 7:16; 13:1; 94. There are a few references where the author describes piety as the opposite to impiety (e.g., 5:38; 6:19; 9:15, 32; 10:11; 12:11).
When the author narrates the maternal affection of the mother for her boys, and how she was able to overcome that affection by λόγος for the sake of εὐσέβεια, the author poetically praises both λόγος and εὐσέβεια: "O reason of the children, tyrant over the emotions! O piety, more desirable to the mother than her children!" (15:1).

While Philo makes εὐσέβεια the source of all the virtues in his ethical discourse, the author of 4 Maccabees treats εὐσέβεια as the "root" or source of λόγος, the ruler over all emotions and passions. As reason (λόγος) is perfect and divine (13:16) so indirectly is εὐσέβεια, because it is the source of reason (7:4; 16:4; 8:1; cf. 15:17). The author writes about the seven brothers, “Just as the hands and feet are moved in harmony at the promptings of the soul, so those holy youths, as though moved by an immortal soul of piety” (14:6). The author, like Philo, uses Middle Platonic language and indirectly ascribes εὐσέβεια the same attributes of reason (λόγος): that of incorruptibility, and immortality, and divinity (cf. 9:22; 18:23). While Philo qualifies the word “divine” with the virtue εὐσέβεια (QE 2.15b; Somn. 2.186; cf. QG 4.19), the author of 4 Maccabees qualifies the word “divine” with reason (divine reason) and so also the Law (divine Law). Therefore, in 4 Maccabees, εὐσέβεια receives indirectly the attribution of “divinity” through the λόγος, for εὐσέβεια is the source of reason (ὁ εὐσεβὴς λογισμός). It is worth noting that for the author of 4 Maccabees εὐσέβεια, like the divine λόγος, possesses some qualities that belong to the heavenly realm. The author of 4 Maccabees further develops the idea found in the LXX (Isa 32:8; 33:6; Prov 1.29; 13:19).

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95. In one instance, the author relates reason with prudence or practical wisdom (7:18). According to Barclay (Jews in the Mediterranean, 373), the phrase ὁ εὐσεβῆς λογισμός occurs in Greek literature only in 4 Maccabees. See also Attridge, The Interpretation of Biblical History in the Antiquitates Judaicae of Flavius Josephus (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1976), 167.
The Λόγος, Εὐσέβεια, and the Cardinal Virtues

The author of 4 Maccabees mentions the word virtue (ἀρετή) 19 times, but does not actually say that εὐσέβεια is a virtue. However, virtue is associated with the Jewish Law and reason (λόγος). We have seen that he calls the Law “virtuous Law” (11:5), and its practice “virtuous habits” (13:27). He also says that “reason is the guide of the virtues” (1:30), and the holy man Eleazar, who died nobly in his tortures, stood firm by virtue of reason, in defense of the Law (6:30; 1:30). The Jews championed the divine Law (6:21) for the sake of God, for the sake of nobility, for the sake of the Law, and for the sake of εὐσέβεια. The author also affirms that the Jews’ loyalty to the Law (dietary laws) is “for the sake of virtue… with the help of godliness” (θεοσέβεια, 7:22; see also 1:8; 11:2). When the author speaks about loyalty to God’s Law, he urges not to “betray virtue” (2:10) and stresses that the ability to endure torture and suffering is “because of training and divine virtue” (10:10). The courage of their virtue and endurance (17:23) in “defense of virtue” (9:18) enabled the Jews to become “champions of virtue” (12:14). Their championship led them to gain “the prizes of virtue” (9:8; see Agr. 177) and receive the “joys that come from virtue” (9:31; see Cher. 42).

For the author reason (λόγος) and the Law (or philosophy) are associated with virtues; he also links the divine Law and the divine reason with εὐσέβεια. Therefore, in one way or another, for the author εὐσέβεια is a virtue. There is one passage where the author depicts εὐσέβεια as a virtue, and as one of the four cardinal virtues. In 5:22–24, the author writes:

You scoff at our philosophy [Law] as though our living by it were not sensible. But

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96. 1:2, 8, 10, 30, 30; 2:10; 6:30; 7:22; 9:8, 18, 31; 10:10; 11:2, 5; 12:14; 13:24, 27; 17:12, 23.
it [Law] teaches us self-control [σωφροσύνην] so that we overcome all pleasures and desires, and it also exercises us in courage [ἀνδρείαν] so that we endure all pain willingly; it trains us in justice [δικαιοσύνην] so that in all our dealings we act impartially, and it teaches us piety [εὐσέβειαν] so that we worship the only living God in all way that befits his greatness.

As Philo, the author of 4 Maccabees is familiar with the Platonic and Stoic four cardinal virtues (φρόνησις, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, and ἀνδρεία, see 1:2–4 and 1:18). In 5:22–24, the author lists three cardinal virtues (δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία), and he adds εὐσέβεια as the fourth virtue rather than φρόνησις. He also mentions the same three cardinal virtues in 15:10 (δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, and ἀνδρεία), but in 5:22–24, the author replaces φρόνησις with the virtue εὐσέβεια. The “substitution” of εὐσέβεια for one of the cardinal virtues is also found in Philo (Cher. 96), but Philo replaces σωφροσύνη with his primary virtue εὐσέβεια. Similar to the Stoics, who treat the four cardinal virtues as “parts” of knowledge” (see Stobaeus 2.59.4–11; Arius Didymus, Epitome of Stoic Ethics 5.b15–16), the author of 4 Maccabees considers them “kinds of wisdom [σοφία]” (1:18). Unlike Philo, who gives prominence to εὐσέβεια by defining it the greatest and highest virtue, and as the source of all the other virtues, the author following the Greek philosophical tradition labels the virtue of φρόνησις “the supreme over all the other cardinal virtues” (1:18–19), and “the greatest virtue” (μεγίστης ἀρετῆς, 1:2).

Despite the fact that the author of 4 Maccabees considers the virtue of φρόνησις as the primary virtue among the cardinal virtues, in the story of Eleazar, the seven brothers and their mother, the virtue of εὐσέβεια holds the central place in comparison to other virtues. The author asserts that his account of these holy and virtuous Jews is “the story of

97. See also Xenophon, Mem. 4.6; Josephus, C. Ap. 2.170. According to DeSilva (4 Maccabees, 135), 4 Macc 5:23–24 list the same four virtues as are found in Xenophon, mem. 4.6. For a good discussion, see pages 134–36.
piety” (17:7). Their defense of the food laws is rooted in εὐσέβεια through reason (λόγος), because it was “for the sake of piety,” and the author reiterates it several times throughout the story.98 Most importantly, in the whole story, what is “at stake is εὐσέβεια!” (5:38), not the Mosaic Law, or φρόνησις, or reason (λόγος).

Therefore, in the ethical exhortation of 4 Maccabees, the Mosaic Law, εὐσέβεια, and λόγος are so intrinsically united that one cannot be without the other two. The same three elements are also found in Philo’s ethical discourse. Therefore, the ethical teaching in 4 Maccabees can be configured around these three key elements. The author begins the story of Eleazar, the brothers and their mother by stating that “pious reason is the absolute master of the passions” (1:1). In the author’s ethics, the ability to overcome passions and all emotions means to champion the divine Law by reason, through endurance and suffering. It also means to walk on the “path of knowledge” (1:2) and on “the path of piety” (17:5; 15:29; see Spec. 1.147, where Philo connects piety with knowledge of God). It is also the path of perfection of virtue that leads to the goal or τέλος: a pure and an immortal life with God (9:8; 18:23).

Throughout the story of the holy Jews, the author emphasizes certain virtues and vices, most of them are common in Philo’s ethical discourse and in Greek philosophical ethical catalogue of virtues and vices:

### Table 9. List of Virtues and Vices in 4 Maccabees

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In his ethical teaching, the author of 4 Maccabees aligns himself with his philosophical tradition in his view of the cardinal virtues (in particular the virtue φρόνησις) and λόγος, especially Stoicism and Platonism. Like Philo, his tendency towards Middle Platonism is also reflected in his notion of λόγος, incorruptibility and immortality as he connects them with the divine Law, divine reason and εὐσέβεια (14:6; see also 14:4; 9:22; 18:23). The author, however, like Philo departs from his philosophical tradition in his position regarding εὐσέβεια and in his reference to the Mosaic Law as the path to perfection of virtue. He shares with Philo the same Hellenistic Jewish tradition of connecting the Mosaic Law with εὐσέβεια. Both lead the human soul to live a virtuous and holy life, and ultimately, attain an immortal life with God, a share with God's divinity. Although εὐσέβεια in 4 Maccabees is not depicted as the source of all the other virtues, the primary place of εὐσέβεια is reflected in that it is associated with virtues and the avoidance of passions and vices. Also, for the author of 4 Maccabees, εὐσέβεια is closely linked with reason (λόγος) and the faithful observance of the Law, even in times of suffering. In 4 Maccabees, εὐσέβεια is a virtue and is given a particular prominence in comparison to other virtues.
Flavius Josephus (37-ca. 100 C.E), the Jewish historian, was born to a priestly aristocrat family in Judea (Vita 1).99 Josephus tells that he was the son of Matthias, a man of “noble birth” and “esteemed for his upright character” in Jerusalem (Vita 7) and a mother of “royal ancestry” (Vita 2).100 In terms of his education, Josephus received a thorough Jewish education. Indeed, he claims to have received, perhaps from his parents, a “great education” (μεγάλη παιδεία),101 which according to Josephus, consisted particularly in the Jewish laws (Vita 8), through both instruction and ethical practice (C. Ap. 2.171–183).102 It is, however, not clear whether he received a Greek education; elsewhere, he implicitly indicates that he did not receive “the kind of Greek-language education enjoyed by others of his acquaintance” (Vita 359; A. J. 20.263–266).103 This is one of the reasons that leads us to suggest that Josephus was not a Hellenistic Jew. That he was not a Hellenistic Jew from the Greek Diaspora comes from his own biographical account in the Life, where he


100. The translations from Josephus are based on Henry St. J. Thackeray, JLCL, sometimes modified.

101. According to Mason (Life of Josephus, 13), information about Judean education at this period is scarce, since most of the relevant scholarly literature depends mainly on later rabbinic portraits. However, according to Mason, Judean education appears to have been rather informal and familial.

102. Josephus’ boasting about his Jewish education is well expressed when he accounts: “I made a great progress in my education, gaining a reputation for an excellent memory and understanding. While still a mere boy, about fourteen years old, I won universal applause for my love of letters; insomuch that the chief priests and the leading men of the city used constantly to come to me for precise information on some particular in our ordinances” (Vita 9).

103. Mason, Life of Josephus, 12.
tells that grew up in Jerusalem, and at twenty-six he went to Rome (Vita 7–14). Although he is not considered a true representative of Hellenistic Judaism, his works (The Jewish War, Jewish Antiquity, The Life, and Against Apion), as Mason states, “have become the indispensable source for all scholarly study of Judea from about 200 BCE to 75 CE.”

They are both a mirror of the various aspects of Judaism in Judea, and a window of the larger world of Judaism in the first century C.E. Also, Josephus’ life, as described in his works is, in a sense, a representation of how a “faithful Jew” tried to reconcile the challenges of living under Roman rule.

In his encomium of the Jewish Law (C. Ap. 2.145–219) Josephus emphasizes the divinity of the Jewish Law or Constitution, and regards Moses, the Lawgiver, as the “most ancient legislators,” even prior to the Greek lawgivers (C. Ap. 2.154–156). Most importantly, unlike Greek lawgivers, who emphasized either practice (ἀσκησις) or precept (λόγος), Moses’ ethical education (παιδεία) combined both practice and precept (C. Ap. 2.171–174), centered on the virtue of εὐσέβεια (C. Ap. 2.168–173). Josephus’ encomium of the Jewish Law in Against Apion is a reflection of Philo’s characteristic view of εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse, and like Philo, he speaks about the obedience to the ethical commandments of

104. Mason, Life of Josephus, ix.


the Jewish Law in terms of two important points: (1) the Jewish Law and εὐσέβεια; and (2) εὐσέβεια and the cardinal virtues.

**The Jewish Law and the Virtue of Εὐσέβεια**

Josephus shares with Philo the notion that the practice of the Jewish Law promotes virtues (C. Ap. 2.159), especially the virtue of εὐσέβεια (C. Ap. 2.291; Spec. 2.224). Josephus writes, “He [Moses] considered it incumbent on him to live piously and to provide for his people an abundance of good laws, in the belief that this was the best means of displaying his own virtue” (C. Ap. 2.159). As Barclay points out, for Josephus the virtue of εὐσέβεια is central to his description of the Jewish Constitution in that its practice inculcates the virtue of εὐσέβεια, which ultimately is the goal of Jewish life (C. Ap. 2.146; cf. 1.60). Similar to Philo’s ethical discourse, Josephus associates εὐσέβεια with the duties towards God (A. J. 2.196; cf. 2.192) and δικαιοσύνη with duties towards human beings (C. Ap. 2.206–214), and this includes reverence to one’s parents. In similar way to Philo (see Decal. 117), Josephus views parents as benefactor, whose gifts to their children should be returned in honor and reciprocal care (A. J. 1.131; 2.206–207). However, unlike Philo who exhorts εὐσέβεια toward one’s parents, Josephus distinguishes εὐσέβεια from δικαιοσύνη in his presentation of the law concerning “honoring parents” (C. Ap. 2.206). He views εὐσέβεια only as the duty towards God, and excludes the application of εὐσέβεια as the duty or reverence

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109. Whereas Philo places the commandment of “honoring parents” in the fifth place as in the LXX, Josephus places this commandment on the sixth place in his summary of the laws.

towards parents.\textsuperscript{111} This is expressed when Josephus writes, “the mere intention of doing wrong to one’s parents or of impiety against God is followed by instant death” (\textit{C. Ap.} 2.217). For Josephus, the Jewish Law regarding “honoring parents,” as in Stoicism, ranks second only to honor God (see also \textit{Let. Arist.} 228).\textsuperscript{112}

As in Philo’s ethical discourse, the practice (ἄσκησις) of the commandments of the Jewish Law puts emphasis on the acquisition of virtues and the avoidance of vices.\textsuperscript{113} While the religious observances of the commandments of the Law are acts of εὐσέβεια (\textit{C. Ap.} 2.215), deeds and words that go against the teachings of the Jewish Constitution, Josephus considers acts of ἀσέβεια (\textit{C. Ap.} 2.184; 2.276; \textit{Vita} 74–75).\textsuperscript{114} Josephus states, “the original institution of the Law was in accordance with the will of God, it would be rank impiety not to observe it” (\textit{C. Ap.} 2.184), and later, he adds, “they [commandments of the Jewish Law] teach no impiety” (\textit{C. Ap.} 2.291).\textsuperscript{115} Similar to Philo, Josephus presents important Jewish figures from Jewish history as examples of εὐσέβεια. For example,

\begin{quote}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{111} Philo and the author of the \textit{Letter of Aristeas} are more in line with the common view of εὐσέβεια in the Greek world: piety towards God and towards one’s parents.

\textsuperscript{112} Cf. Thackeray, LCL, 376 n. b.


\textsuperscript{114} Attridge argues that in the \textit{Jewish Antiquities}, true worship of God is “not simply an affair of cultic externals (that is, virtue, which is epitomized in piety, is more universal or inclusive), but involves a complete devotion to God and a willingness to obey His law, including His moral law. Εὐσέβεια in the \textit{Jewish Antiquities} is the proper human response to the fact of God’s providence.” Therefore, for Josephus, in the \textit{Jewish Antiquities}, ἀσέβεια consists primarily of the improper attitude towards God’s providence. See, \textit{The Interpretation of Biblical History in the Antiquitates Judaicae of Flavius Josephus}, 143, 151.

\textsuperscript{115} Attridge, \textit{The Interpretation of Biblical History in the Antiquitates Judaicae of Flavius Josephus}, 42.
\end{quote}
Abraham, whose depth of his piety led him to do God’s will by taking his son Isaac to the mountain for his sacrifice (A. J. 1.222–235); likewise, Isaac, who practiced every virtue, showed devoted filial obedience and a zeal for the worship of God (A. J. 1.222); and Jacob, who excelled in his piety (A. J. 2.196).  

In his summary of the laws, Josephus presents particular commands and prohibitions. Like Philo, and the Sibylline Oracles, as we shall see, his presentation of monotheism (God is One) is done in ways where the nature of God reflects strongly the philosophical notions of God (e.g., Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Plato, and the Stoics). The use of Middle Platonic language cannot be ignored. When Josephus treats the first commandment, for him, God is “the theme, the beginning, the middle, and the end of all things [τῶν πάντων]” (C. Ap. 2.190). He describes God as “Uncreated”, “Immutable” (C. Ap. 2.164–167), “Creator,” and “Ruler of all” (C. Ap. 2.190–192). In a similar way to Philo, Josephus also speaks of the primacy of the Jerusalem Temple and the cult when he writes, “there is one Temple for the one God” (C. Ap. 2.193–198). Curiously, at the time when Josephus writes Against Apion (ca. 95–98 C.E.), the Temple is already destroyed. What was ethically important for Josephus is that the worship of the true God in the Jerusalem Temple was a practice of virtue (C. Ap. 2.192–197; cf. Vita 14), and especially the practice of true εὐσέβεια. Surprisingly, Josephus does not deal with idolatry in his summary of the


laws; however, the rejection of polytheism and Egyptian animal worship is emphasized throughout his argument in *Against Apion* (e.g., *C. Ap. 1.225, 239, 244, 249, 254; 2.66, 81, 86, 128–129, 139, 145–286*). Likewise, the practices concerning the laws about marriage (*C. Ap. 2.199–203; 2.273, 275*), education of children (*C. Ap. 2.204*), funeral ceremonies (*C. Ap. 2.205*), honoring parents and other regulations (*C. Ap. 2.206–208*), attitude towards aliens (*C. Ap. 2.209–120*), and humanity or kindness towards outsiders, enemies, even to animals (*C. Ap. 2.211–214*) are meant to foster virtues, so that, the soul lives in harmony with virtue and the universe (cf. *C. Ap. 2.293*). Therefore, the faithfulness to and practice of the commandments of the Law leads Jews to virtuous life, a fact that according to Josephus, is the “will of God” (*C. Ap. 2.184*).

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119. We have seen in chapter three that Philo’s love of humanity also expands to animals. Also, in the *Jewish Antiquities*, the exercise of God’s providential care is determined by their [Jewish people] virtues and vices. For instance, Saul is praised for his virtue of justice, courage, and wisdom (6.346); Abraham for his intelligence (1.154), and persuasion (1.154); Jacob for his piety (2.190); Nathan for his understanding (7.147); Samson for his strength (5.317); Solomon for his piety (8.13; 9.22); Joshua for his courage, endurance, and piety (3.49; 491; 6.160); Saul for his piety (6.124); David for his piety (6.160; 7.130; 8.196; 8.315); Saul and David together for their temperance and self-control (6.63, 346 and 7.391). Samuel for his piety, justice, bravery, and obedience (6.160); Jonathan for his piety (6.127); Hezekiah for his piety (9.260, 276); Josiah for his piety (10.50, 51, 56). Moses, especially, is praised for his natural intelligence and wisdom (2.224, 229, 230; 3.317), his piety, justice, fortitude and obedience (4.329–31), courage (3.65), temperance (3.13–21; 4.42), and control of his passions (4.329, 331). Also, the actions of Joseph's brothers are described as imprudence (2.163); of Pharaoh’s as foolishness (2.307); of Rehoboam’s as boastfulness and foolishness (8.264). In the story of Joseph, Josephus emphasizes the vices of envy, anger, hatred, greed for money or power, and lust for sensual pleasure. These vices, according to Josephus, are the driving forces in human nature that can lead ultimately to the abandonment of the Law and the Jewish way of life. Virtue, in the story of Joseph consists primarily in the ability to resist and overcome these vices. For a good discussion about morality and virtues in the *Jewish Antiquities*, see Attridge, *The Interpretation of Biblical History in the Antiquitates Judaicae of Flavius Josephus*, 109–144.
Εὐσέβεια the Primary Virtue in the Jewish Law

The primacy of the virtue εὐσέβεια is clearly presented in the summary of the Jewish Law (C. Ap. 2.146, 170, 291, 293). Josephus shows that in the Jewish way of life εὐσέβεια is the best of the virtues. Indeed, in several instances, he makes explicit emphasis on εὐσέβεια’s preeminence. When he praises the Jewish Laws, he labels εὐσέβεια the “most genuine” virtue (C. Ap. 2.291), the “greater beauty” and “inviolable” (C. Ap. 2.93); this echoes the praise of εὐσέβεια in Let. Arist. 229: “Piety, piety is the first degree of beauty.” When Josephus writes about Pythagoras (C. Ap. 1.162), Josephus treats εὐσέβεια as synonym of the cardinal virtue σοφία (cf. SVF 3.256, 202). He writes, “The only wisdom, the only virtue, consists in refraining absolutely from every action, from every thought that is contrary to the laws” (C. Ap. 2.183). The phrases “the only wisdom” and “the only virtue” are references to εὐσέβεια, which is the central virtue in his summary of the laws. He writes about the intrinsic relationship between the virtue of εὐσέβεια and the obedience to the ethical commandments of the Jewish Law: “the laws govern our daily life” (C. Ap. 2.147), and “piety governs all our actions and occupations and speech” (C. Ap. 2.171).

Similar to Philo, for Josephus “piety must be the motive of all our occupations in life” (C. Ap. 2.181).

According to Louis H. Feldman, Josephus in his refutation against the various charges claims that the Jews espoused the four cardinal virtues: wisdom (cf. C. Ap. 2.148, 160; 1.235), courage (C. Ap. 2.148), temperance (C. Ap. 2.137, 141), justice (C. AP. 2.51–52–53.120 Following in the footsteps of Philo, Josephus includes εὐσέβεια as the fifth

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120. Feldman, Studies in Hellenistic Judaism, 206–214. For instance, Josephus in the Jewish Antiquities stresses the virtues of wisdom and courage as he praises, for example, the wisdom and understanding of important figures of Israel’s history: Abraham (A. J. 1.154), Isaac (A. J. 1.261),
cardinal virtue (C. Ap. 2.73), like Plato (Prot. 349B), the Stoics (SVF 3.64.40), and Diogenes Laertius 7.119. This also happens in the Jewish Antiquities in his encomium of Moses (A. J. 4.329–331). Among the cardinal virtues, however, Josephus embraces the virtue of εὐσέβεια above all throughout his encomium of the Jewish Law, and in his presentation of Moses, the Lawgiver (C. Ap. 2.145–219). That the virtue of εὐσέβεια stands above all the other virtues is also observed in Josephus’ statements in the Jewish Antiquities. He explains that Moses trained the Jews primarily in εὐσέβεια and in the exercise of the other virtues as well (A. J. 1.6). Josephus also attests εὐσέβεια’s prominence when he declares that “once Moses won the obedience of the Jews to the dictates of εὐσέβεια, he had no further difficulty in persuading them to honor all the other virtues” (A. J. 1.6).122

Most significant is the fact that, according to Josephus, Moses, the Lawgiver, did not make εὐσέβεια a department of virtue, but the various virtues, such as justice, temperance (self-control), endurance (fortitude), and mutual harmony, are departments of εὐσέβεια (C. Ap. 2.170; see also 4 Macc 1:18 where the cardinal virtues are viewed as kinds of σοφία).123 Josephus expresses the notion that the virtue of εὐσέβεια as the source

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122. Likewise, Josephus, in his description of Abraham and Isaac, claims that “it was because their εὐσέβεια that they were willing to do God’s will” (A. J. 1.222–236). Josephus also emphasizes the piety of other Jewish figures: Jacob (A. J. 2.190); Joshua (A. J. 3.491); Samuel (A. J. 6.160); Saul (A. J. 6.124); Jonathan (A. J. 6.127); David (6.160; 7.130; 8.196; 8.315); Solomon (8.13; 9.22); Hezekiah (9.260, 276); and Josiah (10.50, 51, 56). Cf. Feldman, Studies in Hellenistic Judaism, 214–15.

123. Here, Josephus lists the four cardinal virtues of the Platonic school, except that
from which the cardinal virtues (and other virtues) derive. By making the cardinal virtues parts of ἑυσέβεια, Josephus, like Philo, places the virtue of ἑυσέβεια as the primary virtue and the cardinal virtues as subordinated virtues under ἑυσέβεια. Josephus believes that there is nothing greater than ἑυσέβεια, as well as nothing greater than obedience to the Jewish Law. The virtue of ἑυσέβεια is even higher than the virtue of justice, because obedience to the Law brings about the benefit of a virtuous (pious) life to be in harmony with one another (C. Ap. 2.293). For Josephus, the virtue of ἑυσέβεια is “the end and aim of the training of the entire community” (C. Ap. 2.188). Therefore, following in the footsteps of Philo, Josephus attributes ἑυσέβεια not only the quality of a foundational virtue or source of the other virtues, but also the “goal” of a holy and virtuous life of the Jewish community.

The Virtue of Ἑυσέβεια in the Sibylline Oracles

The Sibylline Oracles (2nd century B.C.E.–7th century C.E.) are composed of a Prologue, 12 books, and 8 fragments that contain oracular pronouncements in the style of epic verse. Only Oracles composed between 2nd century B.C.E. and 2nd century C.E. are included in the discussion; they are Sib. Or. 1–2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and the fragments 1–3

συμφωνία (mutual harmony) replaces the “super Platonic” virtue φρόνησις (prudence or practical wisdom). Cf. Thackeray, LCL, 361. But in C. Ap. 2.183, Josephus refers to φρόνησις as the “only virtue” (μίαν… φρόνησιν ἀρετήν). In the Jewish Antiquities, Josephus lists ἑυσέβεια among the two of the cardinal virtues: ἑυσέβεια, δικαιοσύνη, and ἀνδρεία (he also adds obedience or persuasion [πείθω]).

124. Sib. Or. Prologue; Sib. Or. 1–2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14; Sib. Or. fragments 1–8. For studies on the Sibylline Oracles and bibliography, see Collins, “Sibylline Oracles: A New Translation and Introduction,” in Charlesworth, The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, 1:317–472; Between Athens and Jerusalem, 160–67; Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 216–28. According to Jewish tradition, the author of the Sibylline Oracles was the daughter-in-law of Noah (Sib. Or. 3.809–829). However, their provenance, composition, and date are still debated.
(which are probably part of *Sib. Or.* 3.1–45). The most important feature of the *Sibylline Oracles* are the “prediction of woes and disasters to come upon mankind.” Like the prophetic books, the *Sibylline Oracles* describe the destruction of specific people (the impious ones) and cities, and the restoration of the people of Israel (the pious Jews).

In terms of ethics, the *Sibylline Oracles* contain moral exhortations, and similar to the ethical exhortations in *Tl2P*, they are eschatologically oriented. As Collins points out, destruction is a punishment for sins (vices) and can be avoided with righteous deeds (virtues). However, the ethical exhortations in the *Sibylline Oracles* show one important element from Philo’s ethical discourse around the virtue of εὐσέβεια: the connection of the observance of the Mosaic Law with εὐσέβεια.

**The Observance of the Mosaic Law and Εὐσέβεια**

The Mosaic Law is central in the ethical exhortations of the *Sibylline Oracles*. In reference to this Collins notes, the Sibyls remain “devoted to the Law of Moses.” Similar to Philo, the *Tl2P*, and Wisdom, the Sibyl views the Jewish Law as the Law of Nature (*Sib. Or.* 3). According to Thompson (*Moral Formation According to Paul*, 132–33), in order to maintain a convergence between the Law of Nature and the Mosaic Law, Hellenistic Jewish authors applied the Stoic conception of living in “accordance with nature.” This is explicit for example in the distinction between natural and unnatural sexual acts (Philo, *Mut.* 111–112; *Spec.* 3; *Abr.* 135; *T. Naphtali* 3.4; Josephus, *C. Ap.* 2.199; *Let. Arist.* 152; *Wis* 14:22–31).

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126. Collins, *Between Athens and Jerusalem*, 164, 162. The Jewish Law appears more than 15 times; but circumcision, Sabbath observance, and food laws are not mentioned in the *Sibylline Oracles*.

εὐσέβεια and its cognates close to 30 times, and ἀσέβεια and its cognates more than 20 times. The pious one (εὐσεβής) is one who practices the Law, and the impious (ἀσεβής) is one who transgresses the Law. As in Wisdom, in the Sibylline Oracles εὐσέβεια is directly associated with the Jewish people and ἀσέβεια with non-Jews (pagans), their cities and tribes. Babylon, Rome, Greece, Egypt, Phoenicia, Galatia, and all Asia, for example, are viewed as impious cities and tribes (e.g., Sib. Or. 3.597–599). Therefore, the Sibyls identify Jews and pagans in terms of pious vs. impious (εὐσεβής vs. ἀσεβής); the former are called “pious ones,” the “righteous ones,” the “faithful ones,” and the “people of God,” and the latter are called “impious ones,” “lawless ones,” and “faithless ones” (see the similarity with QE 1.10, where Philo designates the Jews as pious and the Egyptians as impious).

Throughout the Oracles, obedience to the Mosaic Law is emphasized; like Philo (e.g., Spec. 2.224), the Sibyls repeatedly exhort monotheism and Temple observances. Regarding monotheism, in the Sibylline Oracles, God is one (Sib. Or. 4.28; fragment 1.7, 33; 2.3), the true and only God (Sib. Or. 5.490; 3.625; 5.490, 495; 8.377), and only the Jewish God is to be worshipped. His uniqueness is expressed following Greek philosophical and Middle Platonic notions in ways that echo Philo’s description of the Existent One (τὸ ὄν).128 Using philosophical language, for example, the Jewish God is described as the Begetter of all (Sib. Or. 5.285; 360, 405, 495, 500; 8.500), and Creator (Sib. Or. 8.395; fragment 1.5). The Sibyls also show the superiority of Judaism by describing the Jewish God as the Holy One (Sib. Or. 3.709), Great King (Sib. Or. 3.805; 5.405, 495), Great God (Sib. Or. 3.90, 270, 580, 630, 655, 665, 670, 700, 735, 740; 4.25; 5.405; fragment 1.5), Supreme of all (fragment 3.3), universal Ruler of all (Sib. Or. 5.495; fragment 1.8, 17), Master of heaven (Sib. Or. 8.430),

128. See chapter two (Philo’s monotheism).
and Unique God (fragment 3.3). Middle Platonic language is also reflected when the Sibyls depict the Jewish God as unbegotten (fragment 1.7, 17; 7.1), Eternal (Sib. Or. 3.717; 8.429), Immortal (Sib. Or. 1.50, 55, 330; 3.275, 625, 670, 675, 705, 710, 740, 755; 4.65; 5.65, 279, 495, 500; 8.90, 210; fragment 1.11; 3.46), Invisible (fragment 1.8), Imperishable God (Sib. Or. 5.110, 295, 490, 495, 500), Self-generated (Sib. Or. 8.429; fragment 1.17), Incorruptible Creator (fragment 3.17; Sib. Or. 8.429), and Everlasting (Sib. Or. 8.429).  

As in Philo, the Letter of Aristeas, Wisdom, and Josephus, polytheism is severely criticized in the Oracles; especially the Egyptian animal worship. The Sibyl writes:

They [the Egyptians] worship stones and brute beasts instead of God,… the particular types of idols, brought into being by the hands of mortals. From their own labor and wicked notions, men have accepted gods of wood and stone. They have made them of bronze and gold and silver, vain, lifeless, dumb, and smelted in fire, vainly putting their trust in such as these (Sib. Or. 5.77–84).  

While the worship of the Jewish God is an act of εὐσέβεια, to worship idols made by hands, whether from wood or clay, it is an act of ἀσέβεια. According to the Sibyl, the Jewish God was not fashioned by “hands of men in the likeness of speechless idols of polished stone” (Sib. Or. 4.6–7). The Sibyl also exhorts to “worship the Living One” (Sib.

129. The Providence of God is also emphasized (Sib. Or. 5.225, 320).


131. The Sibyls show their rejection to idolatry making emphasis on the following expressions: “reverence to idols” (Sib. Or. 2.59), “reverence to things made by hand, idols and statues of dead men” (Sib. Or. 3.723–724), “worshipping snakes and sacrificing to cats” (Sib. Or. 3.30), “sacrifice to idols” (Sib. Or. 3.548), “many idols of dead gods” (Sib. Or. 3.554), “honor the idols of mortals” (Sib. Or. 3.279), “honor idols” (Sib. Or. 3.605), “unlawful worship” (Sib. Or. 3.763), “stone statues and handmade images” (Sib. Or. 4.28), “no longer honor mortal things, neither dogs nor vultures, which Egypt taught men to revere with vain mouths and foolish lips” (Sib. Or. 5.278–279), “processions and rites to gods of stone and earthenware” (Sib. Or. 5.495–496), “speechless idols, which will destroy you” (Sib. Or. 7.14), “useless idols” (Sib. Or. 8.389; fragment 3.45).
Or. 3.763), and to “make sacrifices only to the Great King” (Sib. Or. 3.808). In the Oracles, idolatry is considered the greatest sin or the greatest expression of ἀσέβεια (e.g., Sib. Or. 3.545–55).132 In a similar way, in Philo and Wisdom, idolatry is considered the “source” of sins, especially sexual sins: homosexuality (Sib. Or. 3.185–195, 595–600, 762–766; 5.166), adultery (Sib. Or. 1.178; 3.38, 204, 762–766, 595–600; 5.166, 430), covetousness (Sib. Or. 3.189), prostitution (Sib. Or. 5.388), sexual relations of son with mother (Sib. Or. 7.44; 5.390) and daughter with father (Sib. Or. 5.391; 7.44), pederasty (Sib. Or. 3.185, 596; 5.166–167, 387, 430), and bestiality (Sib. Or. 5.393).133

Furthermore, throughout the Oracles the primacy and sanctity of the Jerusalem Temple is stressed (Sib. Or. 3.266–267).134 Similar to Philo’s view, the Temple is the “greatest Temple” (Sib. Or. 5.433) of the Great God (Sib. Or. 3.90). Unlike the pagans (ἀσεβής), who honor idols with prayer and unholy worship (Sib. Or. 8.380), and abandon the Immortal God (Sib. Or. 2.260), the Jewish people (εὐσεβής) observe faithfully the Temple observances, such as honoring God with sacrifices and prayers (Sib. Or. 3.715–718; 5.268–269, 575–579; compare with QE 1.10). However, in the Sib. Or. 4, the Sibyl seems to reject the physical Temple when he writes, “He [God] does not have a house, a stone set up as a temple, dumb and toothless, a bane which brings many woes to men” (4.8). The

132. Cf. Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 162.

133. The author of the sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides also lists a series of similar sexual misconduct (e.g., 175–206, 214). As we will see, in Paul’s letter to the Romans, idolatry is also viewed in a similar way (1:19–23, 26–27; 6:12–20; 12:1–15:13; cf. Lev 17–26; see also chapter two).

134. Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 164; Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 221. See also Sib. Or. 3.290, 565, 657, 665, 703; 5.150, 422, 434. In the Sib. Or. 5.493–511, the Sibyl speaks of a temple to the true God in the land of Egypt, but that temple will be destroyed later by the Ethiopians.
Sibyl’s statement not only parallels the speech of Stephen in Acts 7 as Collins notes,135 but also Philo’s description of the spiritual Temple in *Cher. 99* (see chapter two). For the Sibyl, true righteousness and εὐσέβεια consist in rejecting all temples, their sacrificial cults, and altars too (*Sib. Or. 4.27–30*; compare with Philo, *Spec. 1.66*). But as Collins argues, it is not clear whether the Jerusalem Temple is included in the Sibyl’s statement.136 The Sibyl’s oracle in *Sib. Or. 4.116*, “an evil storm of war will also come upon Jerusalem from Italy, and it will sack the great Temple of God… and commit repulsive murders in front of the Temple” reflects—more than a negative attitude towards the Temple or rejection to the Jerusalem Temple137—the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple in 70 C.E. It is important to point out that the oracles in *Sib. Or. 4.8* are in the context when the Sibyl utters criticism against idolatry (*Sib. Or. 4.5–12*). Therefore, the phrase “all the temples” in *Sib. Or. 4.27–30* may refer only to the temples of idols, since the Sibyl in the oracles generally praises the faithfulness of the Jews for worshipping [in the Temple] only the Great God.

As in the *Tl2P*, the reward for their [Jews] εὐσέβεια and punishment for their [pagans] ἀσέβεια has an eschatological dimension. The impious people who do not obey the Mosaic Law receive punishment directly from God, that is death (*Sib. Or. 3.654*) and the destruction of their cities (*Sib. Or. 3.90, 660–701; 4.175–178; 5.107–110, 154*). The righteous or pious Jews receive the restoration of the earth and resurrection (*Sib. Or. 4.180–190*), the exaltation of their Temple (*Sib. Or. 3.701–706, 767–795*), and the expansion of their holy city, Jerusalem (*Sib. Or. 5.250–254, 281–285*). In the *Sibylline Oracle 4*, God


will also grant repentance (conversion to Baptism) and will not destroy the cities of those who repent.\textsuperscript{138} God will stop His wrath if they “practice honorable piety” in their “heart” (\textit{Sib. Or. 4.168–169}).\textsuperscript{139} Here, εὐσέβεια is depicted as a genuine and inner quality of the heart that characterizes true repentance.

The ethical exhortations in the \textit{Sibyline Oracles} stress the practice of the Mosaic Law, but the term “virtue” is mentioned only twice. In \textit{Sib. Or. 3.233–234}, the Sibyl praises the Jews for their righteous deeds and their care for virtue, and in \textit{Sib. Or. 2.139} (a section borrowed from Pseudo-Phocylides), virtue is revered. While the Sibyls do not view εὐσέβεια as a virtue \textit{per se}, they associate it with Jewish piety, which defines the Jewish way of life. The Sibyls do not show a catalogue of ethical virtues and vices, but throughout the \textit{Oracles} they stress certain virtues and vices, the former are characteristics of the Jewish people and the latter characteristics of the pagans:

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Virtues} & \textbf{Vices} \\
\hline
ἀγάπη (love) 8.481 & ἀθεία (godlessness) 5.309 \\
ἀγιος (holiness) & ἀδικία (injustice) 309 , 5.167 ; 3.362 ; 2.265 \\
βουλή ἄγαθη (good counsel) 3.220 & ἀκαθαρσία (uncleanness) 264 , 5.168 \\
δικαιοσύνη (Justice/righteousness) & ἄναγνος (unclean, unholy) , 399 , 5.387 \\
3.23 314 , 2.262 ; 3.41 , 1.1253–234, 580, 630, 720, 782; 4.153; 5.154, 226, 357, 426; 7.92 & 7.107 ; 479 , 408 \\
ἐλπίς (hope) 7.73 ; 5.284 & ἀνομία (lawlessness) ; 5.509 ; 3.69 ; 2.259 \\
3.374 & 8.287 \\
εὐδικίη (righteous dealing) 3.374 & ἀπείθεια (disobedience) 8.301 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{List of Virtues and Vices in the \textit{Sibyline Oracles}}
\end{table}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{138} The reference to baptism shows that this is a later Christian insertion.
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{139} Here, the Sibyl connects piety with Baptism. In chapter six, we shall see that Paul will connect baptism with πνεῦμα.
\end{flushleft}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virtues</th>
<th>Vices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>εὐσέβεια (piety)</td>
<td>ἀπιστία (unfaithfulness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>εὐφροσύνη (joy)</td>
<td>ἀσέλγεια (licentiousness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>θάρσος (courage)</td>
<td>θυμός (anger)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>καλὰ ἔργα (noble deeds)</td>
<td>κλέπται (theft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ψεῦδος (falsehood)</td>
<td>Ψεύστης (lying)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vices</td>
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<tr>
<td>ἀπιστία (unfaithfulness)</td>
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<td>ἀσέλγεια (licentiousness)</td>
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<td>θυμός (anger)</td>
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<td>κλέπται (theft)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ψεῦδος (falsehood)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
With the exception of the relationship between the Mosaic Law and ἐυσέβεια, especially in terms of monotheism and the Temple, the ethical exhortations of the Sibylline Oracles find their parallel more in the ethical exhortations of the \textit{T12P} than in Philo’s ethical discourse. Piety, righteousness, and faithfulness to the Law are primarily exhorted. But although the Sibyls do not refer to ἐυσέβεια as a special virtue, it is mentioned more than any of the other virtues. The Sibyls are familiar with the four cardinal virtues, since they appear spread throughout the \textit{Oracles}, but they are never listed together. Only once ἐυσέβεια and ὁσιότης appear together (\textit{Sib. Or}. 7.73). These reveal that the Sibyls’ knowledge of Greek philosophy was modest, perhaps similar to what is found in the \textit{T12P}. Also, the ethical exhortations in the \textit{Sibylline Oracles} do not reflect a great knowledge of philosophical ethical discourse as Philo’s ethical discourse does.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{PHILO} & \textbf{LXX} & \textbf{Aristo.} & \textbf{Let.} & \textbf{Arist.} & \textbf{T12P} & \textbf{WS} & \textbf{4 Mac.} & \textbf{Joseph.} & \textbf{Sib. Or.} \\
\hline
ἐὐσέβης vs ἀσεβής & & & & & & & & & \\
ἐὐσέβεια and ὁδός & & & & & & & & & \\
ἐὐσέβεια and κόσμος νοητός & & & & & & & & & \\
ἐὐσέβεια and ἑπιστήμη/σοφία & & & & & & & & & \\
ἐὐσέβεια and the Mosaic Law & & & & & & & & & \\
ἐὐσέβεια and λόγος & & & & & & & & & \\
ἐὐσέβεια and champion virtue & & & & & & & & & \\
ἐὐσέβεια and immortality & & & & & & & & & \\
ἐὐσέβεια and incorruptibility & & & & & & & & & \\
ἐὐσέβεια and zeal for the Law & & & & & & & & & \\
ἐὐσέβεια and training & & & & & & & & & \\
ἐὐσέβεια is a virtue & & & & & & & & & \\
ἐὐσέβεια and justice & & & & & & & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Major Trends of Philo’s Ethical Discourse in Hellenistic Jewish Tradition}
\end{table}
Conclusion

This chapter has shown that in Hellenistic Jewish tradition there is a prominence given to the virtue of εὐσέβεια, and that prominence had an influence on Philo’s understanding of εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse. His configuration of his ethics around the Greek virtue εὐσέβεια, therefore, is shared with Hellenistic Jewish ethics. Like Hellenistic Jewish writers, Philo espouses ethical philosophical conceptions, but principally embraces the virtue of εὐσέβεια as central in the teaching and practice of the ethical commandments of the Mosaic Law, which is identified with the universal Law of Nature.

Philo’s ethical discourse is rooted in the Hellenistic Jewish tradition. Although among the Hellenistic texts discussed, the level of Greek philosophical influence differs from each other, there are various ethical conceptions which Philo shares with the Hellenistic Jewish tradition. He adopts from this heritage primarily his emphasis on the Mosaic Law as ethical commandments to promote virtues. The emphasis on the acquisition of virtues and avoidance of vices through the practice of the ethical
commandments of the Mosaic Law and specially the importance of the cardinal virtues are commonplace in the Hellenistic Jewish tradition. Characteristic of his Hellenistic Jewish heritage as shown in the Hellenistic Jewish texts discussed is the close connection between εὐσέβεια and the Mosaic Law. Also, Philo shares with the Hellenistic Jewish tradition the view that εὐσέβεια is a great virtue among the other virtues.

Philo, however, moves away from the Hellenistic Jewish tradition in the configuration of his ethical discourse around the virtue of εὐσέβεια. For example, as shown in chapter three, his treatment of φιλανθρωπία as a special virtue, and sometimes as equivalent to εὐσέβεια is Philo's own creation. Indeed, he is probably the first Hellenistic Jew who makes this connection between εὐσέβεια and φιλανθρωπία in his ethical discourse. At least, in the ethics of the texts discussed in this chapter, this connection is absent.

Likewise, the harmony between εὐσέβεια and the Existent One—as he presents the former as the beginning or source of all the virtues and the latter as the beginning or source of everything—finds no parallel in his Hellenistic Jewish tradition. The quality of “tree of life” ascribed to εὐσέβεια is unique to Philo as well. The superior qualities and powers given to εὐσέβεια in Platonic categories (e.g., divinity, incorruptibility, and immortality) are present only in 4 Maccabees, but the quality of divinity is only through reason (λόγος). As we shall see in chapter five, these attributions given to εὐσέβεια are not found in his philosophical tradition. In Wisdom, σοφία has these qualities and powers. Philo's association of εὐσέβεια with λόγος in his ethical discourse is probably a heritage of the Hellenistic Jewish tradition. However, only 4 Maccabees and the Letter of Aristeas make this association.¹⁴⁰ Likewise,

¹⁴⁰ The three main elements of Philo's ethics, the Mosaic Law, εὐσέβεια, and λόγος, appear in both Hellenistic Texts.
the connection of the goal of the virtue-loving soul (becoming like to God) and the virtue of εὐσέβεια is shown in the Letter of Aristeas and the T12P. But in Philo’s ethical discourse, the presentation of this association is far more developed as he links his formula “becoming like to God” particularly with λόγος. Interestingly, the Letter of Aristeas links εὐσέβεια with λόγος, but does not connect the λόγος with the Philo’s formulation of the goal of life “becoming like to God.” Therefore, most of the qualities and powers attributed to εὐσέβεια are unique to Philo. We can say that he shares with the Hellenistic Jewish tradition some of these qualities and powers, but he is the only Hellenistic Jew who takes further these ideas and develops them within the categories and notions of his philosophical tradition, particularly the Greek philosophical ethical discourse. As he is influenced by the emerging Middle Platonism, what becomes significant as well as revealing is that Philo’s treatment of εὐσέβεια shows more familiarity with philosophical ethical systems than other Hellenistic Jewish writers. In other words, Philo takes that prominence given to εὐσέβεια in the Hellenistic Jewish tradition and moves beyond it. In the next chapter, we will see the ways that the prominence given to εὐσέβεια in Philo’s ethics is reflected in the Greek philosophical tradition, and how his philosophical sophistication also sets him apart from his Greek philosophical tradition. It is to this topic that we move now.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE GREEK PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION IN PHILO’S UNDERSTANDING OF EΥΣΕΒΕΙΑ IN HIS ETHICAL DISCOURSE

Introduction

The topic of ancient Greek philosophical ethics is quite complex.¹ This chapter focuses primarily on how the privileged place given to the virtue εὐσέβεια in Philo’s ethical discourse is influenced by the Greek philosophical tradition. Sterling has already claimed that Philo’s understanding of “Judaism was profoundly influenced by Hellenistic philosophy” and that “a good example of this is his presentation of εὐσέβεια.” Sterling also has pointed out that “Philo assigned an importance to εὐσέβεια that it did not have in Hellenistic philosophy,” this referring to εὐσέβεια’s designation as “source” and “queen” of all the other virtues.² The analysis of this study will reveal two important points: (1) that the various uses of the virtue εὐσέβεια in Philo’s ethical discourse strongly reflect


the ancient Greek philosophical understanding of the concept, especially in the great philosophical schools: Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and emerging Middle Platonism; (2) that while Philo’s philosophical sophistication in his description of the prominence of εὐσέβεια shares with the Greek philosophical schools, he significantly re-configures this tradition. At this point, I will locate his cultural and religious heritage (the trailing edge), as well as the direction he is going with this heritage (the leading edge). As chapter four, the value of this chapter is that this is the first study that attempts to illumine the level of influence of the Greek philosophical tradition on Philo’s use of the virtue of εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse, and how his characteristic view of the virtue moves beyond this tradition.

The Transition of the Virtue of Εὐσέβεια in the Greco-Roman Philosophical Tradition

In chapter three, we have seen that Philo treats the virtue of εὐσέβεια in two ways. He distinguishes εὐσέβεια from the virtue δικαιοσύνη (Her. 172 and Spec. 2.63), and at the same time, he treats them almost without distinction (Abr. 208; Virt. 51, 95). Philo was probably influenced by some early Greek tradition. Indeed, the virtue of εὐσέβεια in the Greek philosophical tradition went through a development, from being understood almost indistinguishably from δικαιοσύνη to being sharply distinguished from δικαιοσύνη. That is, in the first position, εὐσέβεια and δικαιοσύνη were somehow “intertwined,” in which the object was both God and human beings; and in the second position, εὐσέβεια was clearly differentiated from δικαιοσύνη, in which the object of εὐσέβεια was only God.
The First Position: Εὐσέβεια Before Its Transition in the Greek Philosophical Tradition

The first position (before εὐσέβεια’s transition) shows that εὐσέβεια and the virtue of δικαιοσύνη were “intertwined.” Franz Geiger, who addressed the relationship between love of humanity (φιλανθρωπία) and justice (δικαιοσύνη), noted that εὐσέβεια in the Greek tradition included proper conduct both towards gods and towards human beings. While Geiger implicitly acknowledged the first position, unlike Wilson, he did not see this connection in Philo’s writings.3

This position is present in Plato’s Republic and Euthyphro, when εὐσέβεια not only puts a person into right relationship with “God,” but, it also situates the individual in right relationship with other “human beings.”4 In the Republic, Plato speaks of εὐσέβεια in connection to both God and parents (Resp. 615C; though, this is a special case).5 Also, discussing the true definition of ὁσιότης and εὐσέβεια in Euthyphro (12E), Plato has Socrates define ὁσιότης (εὐσέβεια’s synonym in Plato) as δικαιοσύνη. In Euthyphr. 12A, Plato’s Socrates defines holiness (or piety) as justice, when he asserts that “all holiness is just.”6 In the dialogue with Euthyphro, Plato’s Socrates seems to understand the virtues of

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4. The earliest appearance in Greek literature piety was defined with reference not only to the gods but also to justice, the virtue in which “the whole of virtues is brought together.” Examples are: Theognis 145–148; Euripides, frg. 852 [N], 853; Alc. 1147–1148; Phoem. 524–525; Hipp. 1080–1081; Heraclid. 901–908; Sophocles, El. 968–969; Phil. 79–85, 1049–1051; Demosthenes, Or. 21.12; Aeschylus, Suppl. 395–396, 404; Th. 597–598.


6. In Euthyphro, Socrates and Euthyphro are concerned with the relationship of justice to piety (e.g., 5D-E; 11E–12A). The relationship between justice and piety in Plato’s writings is highly debated. In this study, however, the view of the majority of scholars is taken. For a detailed analysis on the relationship between piety and justice in Plato’s Euthyphro, see P. T. Geach, “Plato’s
εὐσέβεια (in the form of ὁσιότης) and δικαιοσύνη almost without distinction. Socrates states, “if wherever justice is, there is holiness as well, and wherever there is holiness, there is justice too” (Euthyphr. 12D; cf. Apol. 28B–29B, 35C-D). Socrates not only establishes an intrinsic relation between piety and justice, but when he stresses the notion that “all piety must be just” (Euthyphr. 11E), he goes further to establish the “unitarian view” that piety and justice are “indistinct” virtues, or simply cannot be separated. In other words, Plato’s Socrates reinforces the traditional Greek association of piety and justice, since these two virtues are understood as inseparables. Likewise, in Protagoras, a discussion about how virtues are related (330A–334E, 349A-end), Plato has Socrates claim that “justice is pious and piety is just,” implying that the two virtues are “the same,” or are “as similar as possible,” that is, not strongly distinguished (see Prot. 329D; 331A-C). This fact conveys the notion that one could possess both virtues by having just one or the other


8. The inability to separate the two virtues is defined as the “unity of virtues of Socrates” or the “Socratic Unitarian view of virtues.”


10. Cormack, Plato’s Stepping Stones, 59.
virtue. Both moral (δικαιοσύνη) and intellectual (εὐσέβεια) virtues are understood almost indistinguishable in the early Greek philosophical tradition.\textsuperscript{11}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{eusbeia_transition.png}
\caption{Εὐσέβεια before Its Transition}
\end{figure}

\textbf{The Second Position: Εὐσέβεια After Its Transition in Greek Philosophical Tradition}

The second position shows that at some point during the fifth century B.C.E., εὐσέβεια came to be understood differently from δικαιοσύνη. While Wilson noted the first position in Philo, Wilson, like Geiger, overlooked the second position, when εὐσέβεια was viewed as “distinct” virtue from δικαιοσύνη. Thompson, however, who briefly studied Philo’s εὐσέβεια, observed only the second position, εὐσέβεια strictly in reference to the worship of God, and δικαιοσύνη strictly in reference to duties concerning the relationship between human beings.\textsuperscript{12} Thompson, like Wilson and Geiger, overlooked the fact that Philo’s use of εὐσέβεια exhibits two positions.

In Plato’s dialogues we encounter the second position.\textsuperscript{13} In \textit{Euthyphro}, Plato has Socrates tentatively define “holiness as a part of justice” (μέρος τὸ ὅσιον τοῦ δικαίου,


\textsuperscript{12} Thompson, \textit{Moral Formation according to Paul}, 39.

\textsuperscript{13} The second tradition is also found in non-philosophical literature: e.g., Isocrates, \textit{Speeches} 1.3; 3.2; 12.124; \textit{De Pace} 34; Xenophon, \textit{Mem.} 4.8.11; \textit{Anab.} 2.5.20; Polybius, \textit{Hist.} 4.20.1; Diodorus Siculus 1.92.5; 2.2.2; 3.56.2; 21.17.4; Pausanias, \textit{Descr.} 1.17.1.
Euthyphr. 12D), and Euthyphro comments in reply that “the part of justice which is religious and is holy is ‘the part’ that has to do with the service of the gods. The remainder is ‘the part’ of justice that has to do with the service of human beings” (Euthyphr. 12E). Although, εὐσέβεια is viewed as “a part of” the virtue δικαιοσύνη, a difference between both virtues is also established. Euthyphro views piety and justice as distinct virtues, and therefore, they are to be distinguished from one another. While Socrates depicts εὐσέβεια prior to its transition, when εὐσέβεια was used almost indistinctly from δικαιοσύνη, Euthyphro defines εὐσέβεια after its transition, when εὐσέβεια was distinguished from δικαιοσύνη. Also, Protagoras admits that, even if justice and piety are “somehow” similar, there is a difference—at least some—between piety and justice (Prot. 331C-E). This distinction between εὐσέβεια and δικαιοσύνη is also reflected in the Stoics, who define εὐσέβεια as “justice towards the gods” (εὐσέβεια δικαιοσύνη περὶ θεούς, SVF 2.304.22; 3.165.41), or “the knowledge of the service of the gods” (SVF 2.304.18–19), in the Roman philosopher Cicero (106 B.C.E.–43 B.C.E.), and later in the Stoic Marcus Aurelius (121–

14. See also Euthyphr. 13B; 14D; Epin. 989B; Def. 412E. The notion of justice (δικαιοσύνη) was expanded by Aristotle, whose definition of justice (mean) included not only the right service of gods and human beings, but also deified spirits, one’s country, parents, and those departed (Virt. vit. 5.125ob22–23). Similarly, Diogenes Laertius writes, “there are three species of justice: one is concerned with gods, another with men, and the third with the departed” (3.83). The rhetorician Menander of Laodicea also expands the parts of justice to piety towards the gods, fair dealing toward men, and reverence towards the departed.


16. Note that both definitions do not include human beings. See also SVF 3.67.11; 3.157.11–12; 3.157.25–26.

17. See Nat. d. 1.2.3; 2.253; 61.153; De fin. 3.22.73; 5.23.65.
These examples show the understanding of εὐσέβεια after its transition, where both virtues (εὐσέβεια and δικαιοσύνη) were distinguished in a way that it implied that one could possess one of the two virtues without the other.\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{The Influence of Two Positions on Philo’s View of Εὐσέβεια in his Ethical Discourse}

Philo’s understanding of the virtue εὐσέβεια suggests that he is not only aware of the two positions (before and after εὐσέβεια’s transition), but he is being also influenced by them. These two ways of understanding εὐσέβεια are represented especially in Philo’s treatment of εὐσέβεια as the service of God and human beings. The examples (e.g., \textit{Virt.} 51, 95, and \textit{Abr.} 208) demonstrate that Philo knows the early Greek use of εὐσέβεια as Plato’s Socrates does (see Plato’s \textit{Euthyphr.} 12D-E; \textit{Prot.} 331B-E). Philo views the virtue of εὐσέβεια as a manifestation of both ethical behaviors towards God and towards human beings. Likewise, Philo shows the development of εὐσέβεια as distinct from δικαιοσύνη in his presentation of the twofold division of the ten headings of the \textit{Decalogue} (e.g., \textit{Her.} 172 and \textit{Spec.} 2.63). But why does Philo keep both positions? Plato’s \textit{Euthyphro} provides a clue. In the discussion concerning the true definition of εὐσέβεια, Socrates and Euthyphro

\textsuperscript{18} See 7.54; 11.20.

manifest the existence of both positions. That Socrates and Euthyphro in the dialogue
failed to give a “satisfactory” definition (at least for Plato’s Socrates) reveals that either
the understanding of εὐσέβεια before its transition continued to be prevalent, or after
its transition a tension regarding the “true” meaning of εὐσέβεια was created between
both positions. Plato’s Euthyphro and also Protagoras show that tension. Philo’s writings
about εὐσέβεια may also reflect that tension, since he was very much influenced by
Plato’s writings. Writing in the first century C.E., it would make more sense if Philo’s use
of εὐσέβεια would reflect after its transition, as it is shown in Her. 172 and Spec. 2.63. In
fact, he is generally consistent, when treating the ethical commandments of the Mosaic
Law according to the twofold division of the Decalogue, under the two main virtues of
εὐσέβεια and δικαιοσύνη. But, as it is shown, this is not the case.

One important reason why Philo keeps the early use of εὐσέβεια before its
transition may rest in his view of the preeminent place of εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse.
As explained in chapter three, he is interested in the first tradition that implicitly depicts
εὐσέβεια as a central virtue. He adopts this tradition, but moves beyond it when he closely
associates the virtues of holiness, justice, and love of humanity with the virtue εὐσέβεια
(e.g., Abr. 208). Therefore, while Plato views εὐσέβεια, the reverence towards the gods, as
the greater and most important part of virtue for human beings (Epin. 989B), Philo treats
εὐσέβεια as the source virtue (see also Decal. 52).

The Greek Understanding of the Virtue Εὐσέβεια in
Philo’s Presentation of Εὐσέβεια for both the Service
of God (the Existent One) and Human Beings

Chapter three has shown the complexity of Philo’s presentation of the prominence given
to εὐσέβεια in his ethics, and one area of that complexity is in terms of the use of εὐσέβεια in reference to both the Existent One (τὸ ὄν) and human beings. This section shows that these two ways of viewing εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse are a reflection of the Greek philosophical understanding of εὐσέβεια.

Εὐσέβεια for the Service of God (τὸ ὄν)

In the Greek philosophical tradition, εὐσέβεια is a virtue. Wolfson was first to find a connection between Philo’s own definition of the virtue and Pseudo-Plato’s Definitions 412E.20 According to the author, Plato defined εὐσέβεια as “justice concerning the gods,” which includes “the ability to serve the gods voluntarily, the correct conception of the honor due to gods, and knowledge of the honor due to gods” (Def. 412E).21 Sterling also emphasizes that Philo’s view of the virtue εὐσέβεια exhibits Plato’s description of εὐσέβεια in Euthyphro,22 which describes the virtue of εὐσέβεια as “the service to the gods,” and “a part of the cardinal virtue of justice” (Euthyphr. 12E; 13B; 14D; cf. Epin. 989B). Likewise, Aristotle views the virtue of εὐσέβεια as either “a part of justice or an accompaniment of it” (Virt. vit. 5.1250b23).23 In the Stoic tradition, εὐσέβεια is also “a virtue subordinated to

20. Definitions is a dictionary of about 185 philosophically significant terms attributed to Plato. The individual definitions were probably coined by members of the Academy in the fourth century B.C.E. We do not know who wrote them; however, most scholars attribute the work to the “School of Plato.” Cf. John M. Cooper, Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 1677–78.

21. Translation is by Cooper, Plato: Complete Works, 1680. The same definition is found in Plato’s Leg. 717; Prot. 329C, 349D; Epin.989B; in the Stoic Diogenes Laertius 4.119; and in Aristotle, Eth. eud. 7.15.1249b20.

22. Sterling, “‘The Queen of the Virtues,’” 112. He suggests that “Plato’s Euthyphro is probably Philo’s source.”

23. The translations of Aristotle’s work are based on Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Complete
the cardinal virtue justice” (δικαιοσύνη). It is defined, similar to Plato’s Definitions (412E), as the service to the gods, and justice towards the gods.24

Philo takes this tradition, that εὐσέβεια is a virtue for the service of God. However, as Sterling points out, when Philo treats εὐσέβεια in reference to the service of God, he never views the virtue of εὐσέβεια as a part of Justice.25 Rather, as God is the source of all things good, the virtue of εὐσέβεια is also the source of all the other virtues (Decal. 52). But, εὐσέβεια is likewise the source of “living in accordance with virtue” (QG 1.100), a parallel to the Stoic formulation “living in accordance to nature,” or “living in accordance with virtue.” When Philo speaks of the duties regarding the service of God, Philo sometimes places εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης together, like Plato (e.g., Sacr. 37; Spec. 3.127; Euthyphr. 12E; 13B). Furthermore, when Philo treats the virtue εὐσέβεια as the “proper worship of God,” his notion of the virtue as fostering friendly relations with the Existent One (Virt. 218; Spec. 1.316) carries on the philosophical thought of Plato and the Stoics. For example, there is a connection with Plato’s notion of “friendly relationship” with the gods. Plato urges people to εὐσέβεια so that they may become the friends of God (Symp. 193D). Likewise, in Plato’s Philebus we read that εὐσέβεια allows a person to be “a friend of the gods” (Phileb. 39E). Also, for the Stoics, “the pious person is particularly happy, 

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24. E.g., SVF 2.304.18–19; 3.67.11; 3.157.11–12, 25–26; Chrysippus [Stobaeus 2.59.4–60.2; 60.9–24; SVF 3.262, 264] and Arius Dydimus, Epitome of Stoic Ethics 5b15–20; SVF 2.304.22; 3.165.41.

25. See Opif. 172; Leg. 3.10, 209; Agr. 128; Sacr. 37; Det. 55, 56; Deus 17, 68; Migr. 132; Mut. 39, 155; Decal. 108; Spec. 3.127; 4.147; Legat. 347; cf. Plant. 77; Abr. 268.
prosperous, blessed, fortunate, and dear to the gods” (Arius Dydimus, Epitome of Stoic Ethics 11g35–37).

In terms of Philo’s ethical discourse, εὐσέβεια as the service of God refers to honoring God properly (Legat. 347). Philo’s view resembles the Stoic understanding of εὐσέβεια because, in the Stoic tradition, εὐσέβεια is viewed as the “science [ἐπιστήμη] of the worship to the gods” or the “knowledge [ἐπιστήμη] of the service of the gods.”

Philo would have taken this Stoic tradition as the knowledge of how God, the Existent One (τὸ ὄν), should be worshipped properly (Spec. 1.147). For Philo, the principle of “proper worshipping” the One true God only is not primarily understood as a duty in terms of mere civic obligations. It is an ethical duty, a virtue, concerned primarily with the core belief of Jewish monotheism.

The text in Opif. 172, which summarizes Philo’s central beliefs about God, the Existent One (τὸ ὄν), shows several ideas from the Stoic tradition found in Epictetus (55–135 C.E.). In The Manual of Epictetus, he writes:

For piety towards the gods know that the most important thing is this: to have right opinions about them [gods]—that they exist, and that they govern the universe well and justly—and to have set yourself to obey them, and to give way to all that happens, following events with a free will, in the belief that they are fulfilled by the highest mind…For men’s piety is bound up with their interest. Therefore he who makes it his concern rightly to direct his will to get and his will to avoid, is thereby making piety his concern (31).


27. The translations for the Greco-Roman literature are from Loeb Classical Library (LCL) sometimes slightly modified.
providence (πρόνοια). Interestingly, while Epictetus reflects polytheistic beliefs (they [gods] exist, and they govern the universe), Philo affirms his monotheism (One God and He [only] cares for the universe). Whether he is responding to ideas such as those found in Epictetus, we do not know; however, what is revealing here is that for Philo εὐσέβεια is only given to the Existent One (τὸ ὄν). It is in this important aspect that Philo's understanding of εὐσέβεια differs from those of Plato, Socrates, and Stoics. When Philo presents his exposition about εὐσέβεια for the service of God in his ethical discourse, he follows the traditional understanding of εὐσέβεια in Greek philosophical discourse, but only in part. Whereas in the Greek philosophical tradition, εὐσέβεια is understood in polytheistic terms, that is, the service of the gods/goddesses, in Philo's ethical discourse, obviously εὐσέβεια is understood in monotheistic terms, that is, the proper worship of the Existent One only. As seen in chapter three, Philo views the honoring or worshipping of other deities as acts of impiety (ἀσέβεια).

Εὐσέβεια for the Service of Human Beings

Philo's understanding of εὐσέβεια for the service of human beings is different from his view of δικαιοσύνη (e.g., justice toward human beings). The way Philo takes εὐσέβεια in reference to human beings is similar to the common Greco-Roman philosophical understanding of εὐσέβεια. The virtue of εὐσέβεια is not used only for the attitude towards God, but Philo also employs it towards parents (Spec. 2.234–237), rulers (Flacc. 48; Legat. 279), and even for the attitude of slaves towards masters (cf. Det. 56). The importance he gives to εὐσέβεια, especially in relation to respect and reverence towards one's parents, parallels the Greek thought that εὐσέβεια in the form of reverence is above all to one's parents. It is found in Plato's Republic (Resp. 615C), the Stoic Epictetus (Dis.
The Greek Philosophical Understanding of Εὐσέβεια as the Virtue

The notion of the four cardinal virtues (prudence or practical wisdom [φρόνησις],

28. Epictetus made emphasis on the love of parents to their children. He notes that the natural love of parents for their children is something grounded in human nature and is indeed strong. See also Musonius, \textit{Ben. 3.38.2; Depository of Wisdom Literature}, chapter on Theophrastus, saying n. 20 (Fortenbaugh, \textit{Theophrastus of Eresus}, n. 456, 285).

29. Interestingly, Cicero, in \textit{De Inventione} (46 B.C.E.), distinguishes \textit{pietas} and \textit{religio}; he uses the former for one’s responsibility towards other, and the later for duties towards the gods. For example, he writes that the virtue \textit{pietas} admonishes to do the duty to “our country or parents or other blood relations” (\textit{Inv.} 2.22.66; see also 2.53.161; \textit{Planc.} 33.80; \textit{Part. or.} 22.78; \textit{Resp.} 6.16; \textit{Brut.} 33.126). One observation: the three elements associated only with \textit{pietas} (country, parents, and blood relations), in Philo are—like duties towards God—also linked with \textit{εὐσέβεια} (see \textit{Decal.} 106–120; \textit{Spec.} 2.223–224; \textit{Flacc.} 103; \textit{Jos.} 240; \textit{QE} 1.21; \textit{Legat.} 279; \textit{Mos.} 1.187). According to Hendrik Wagenvoort (\textit{Pietas: Selected Studies in Roman Religion} [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980], 7–10), Cicero’s view about \textit{pietas} changed after he wrote \textit{De Invenzione}. In 45 B.C.E., “Cicero wrote his \textit{De Finibus}, in which he says among other things: ‘without an explanation of nature we cannot understand \textit{pietas adversum deos} (piety towards the gods) and what great gratitude we owe to them’” (3.22.73). The following year, he wrote \textit{De Natura deorum}; in it, he expresses once again his view of \textit{pietas}, when he writes, “it seems probable to me that, if piety towards the gods disappears, also loyalty and the community of the human race, in other words humanity! And that particular excellent virtue, justice will disappear” (\textit{Nat. d.} 1.2.3). The reason why Cicero alters his view, Wagenvoort argues, is that in 45 B.C.E., Cicero turned to the study of philosophy—as is found in the quote from the philosopher Posidonius, who writes, “for piety is justice towards the gods” (\textit{Adv. phys.} 1.124)—and once Cicero began to go deep into Greek philosophy, it influenced his view of the significance of \textit{pietas}. Wagenvoort writes, “since the year 45, \textit{pietas} has changed its content for Cicero, or at least that the emphasis has shifted, and that instead of being applied to one’s country, parents and relatives, it is applied, in the first place, to the gods.”
temperance [σωφροσύνη], courage [ἀνδρεία], and justice [δικαιοσύνη]), most famously articulated in Plato’s Republic (Resp. 427E–435C, 441C–443C), was embraced by the Stoics, and subsequently by other Greek and Roman philosophy. Philosophers in ethical discourses argued about the unity of the virtues. To have a better grasp of the background of Philo’s understanding of the virtue of ἐνσέβεια as “the virtue” in his ethical discourse, I will present the view that “virtue is one” (or virtues are one) in Philo’s Socratic, Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic traditions.

**Philo’s Socratic and Platonic Tradition that Virtues is One**

In Plato, there is the notion that “the virtues [ἀρεταί] are one,” or “virtue [ἀρήτη] is one,” and that virtue is sufficient for having all the other virtues. In Plato’s Protagoras, for example, Protagoras claims that “virtue is a single entity” (Prot. 329C-D); having one virtue means having all the virtues. For Plato’s Socrates this one virtue is prudence or practical wisdom (φρόνησις). Socrates calls φρόνησις “the greatest of the parts” (Prot. 330A), and speaks of “wisdom and knowledge as the most powerful elements in human life” (Prot. 352D; 357C). Socrates also names φρόνησις “truth,” “the best state of the soul,”


31. See for example Arius Dydimus, epitome of Stoic Ethics, 5b1–4; Stobaeus 2.58.5–15 (SVF 3.95); 2.60.9–15; 2.63.6–24 (SVF 3.280); Diogenes Laertius 7.92; Chrysippus, from Stobaeus 2.59.4–60.2; 60.9–24 (SVF 3.262, 264); Chrysippus, from Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1042E-F (SVF 3.85); Zeno, from Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1034C-E; Virt. mor. 440E–441B; Seneca, Ep. 113.24; 120.11. The Peripatetic philosopher, Andronicus of Rhodes also lists the four cardinal virtues (2.61.4–5); Cicero, Off. 1.15–17; and the founder of Epicureanism, Epicurus (De Finibus 1.42–54).

32. Devettere, Introduction to Virtue Ethics, 78.

33. See also Symp. 209A; Prot. 352D, 361B; Euth. 281D-E; cf. Resp. 428B; Theaet. 176C. According to Devettere (Introduction to Virtue Ethics, 79), for Socrates, knowledge is nothing else than wisdom (Prot. 360D–361B). In the discussion between Socrates and Meno, virtue is
and “the virtue” (Apol. 38A).³⁴ Devettere states that for Socrates, “virtue is knowledge” and “knowledge is prudence or practical wisdom.”³⁵ Socrates maintains that σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, and δικαιοσύνη are all branches of φρόνησις (Prot. 356D–357B);³⁶ in other words, according to the Socratic unity of the virtues, “the virtues are one” (Prot. 331A-B; Lach. 198A–199E; Meno 87E–88C).

Later, Cicero, giving an account of Socrates, writes: “often Aristotle and Theophrastus admirably praised for its own sake the very knowledge [scientia] of things. Captivated by this alone, Erillus maintained that knowledge [scientiam] is the highest good [sumnum bonum] and that no other thing is to be sought for itself.”³⁷ Cormack argues that “the implication that knowledge is sufficient for virtue further indicates that the virtues are unified in knowledge.”³⁸ For Socrates, since “virtue is one” the human soul needs only one virtue, and that virtue is φρόνησις, which is also knowledge. For him, knowledge belongs to “the rational part of the soul,”³⁹ because it guides the soul’s choices knowledge and can be teachable (however, this is questioned later in the argument); virtue embraces everything that is good (Meno 87C-E; Resp. 493A). Virtue, either in whole or in part, is wisdom (Meno 88C–89A).


³⁷. Cicero, On Ends 5.72–3 (BT p.192.2–8 Schiche); cf. Fortenbaugh, Theophrastus of Eresus, n. 480A (73), 305.


³⁹. Irwin, Plato’s Ethics, 349; cf. Devettere, Introduction to Virtue Ethics, 94
of what is good and bad. As Irwin points out, according to Socrates, all virtues are to be identified with knowledge of the good.40

Plato, unlike Socrates, believes that the soul has three realities: an appetitive part, a spirited part, and a rational part.41 In the Republic (429–441), he assigns σωφροσύνη to the appetitive part (e.g., desires of hunger and thirst), ἀνδρεία to the spirited part (e.g., desires such as anger and fear), and φρόνησις to the rational part (e.g., desire to achieve happiness in life as a whole).42 Uniting all these three parts of the soul is, however, the virtue of δικαιοσύνη (Resp. 441E), and not φρόνησις.43 Philo adopts the same tripartite soul: the reasoning part, which is ruled by prudence or practical wisdom, the assertive part ruled by courage, and the desirous part ruled by self-control. As with Plato, for Philo, δικαιοσύνη is the virtue uniting all three parts of the soul by “distributing according to merit” (Philo, Leg. 1.69–87). But, for Plato, as for Socrates, the virtue of φρόνησις (sometimes σοφία) remains the primary virtue; it is the virtue that creates and unites all the other virtues. In the Laws, Plato refers that there are four cardinal virtues (e.g., Leg. 631C-D; 688A-B; 963A–965E), and at the same time, he makes φρόνησις the first virtue among them. He labels φρόνησις “the leader of the entire of virtue” (Leg. 688B), “the greatest wisdom” (Leg. 689D), “the leader of all the virtues” (Leg. 688B), “the first and


41. For a recent study on Plato's tripartite soul, see Rachel Barney et al., Plato and the Divided Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

42. Sánchez, La Ética de los Griegos, 77.

43. Here, as Engberg-Pedersen points out, Plato ascribes a special place to the virtue of justice. See “Paul, Virtues, and Vices,” in Sampley, Paul in the Greco-Roman World, 610.
chiefest wisdom” (Leg. 631C) and temperance “the virtue following wisdom” (Leg. 631C).⁴⁴ Although Plato sees φρόνησις or σοφία as the primary virtue, it is important to clarify that unlike Socrates who sees virtue as a single reality (φρόνησις), Plato treats prudence or practical wisdom as the virtue of the rational part only, as he explains in his discussion of the tripartition of the soul in the Republic. He believes that the three virtues (courage, temperance, and justice) are inseparable, and each of them requires φρόνησις.⁴⁵

**Philo’s Aristotelian Tradition that Virtue is One**

Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics favors also the virtue of φρόνησις, as the central virtue. However, he does not list the four cardinal virtues as the four primary virtues in his catalogue of ethical virtues as Plato, Socrates, and the Stoics do. Instead, he classifies fourteen virtues as means or perfect virtues (Eth. nic. 2.7.1107b–1108b1–10) and among them the four cardinal virtues.⁴⁶ In the Rhetoric, however, he lists nine

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⁴⁶ The fourteen virtues are: courage, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, an unnamed virtue that denotes proper ambition, patience, truthfulness, Wittiness, an unnamed kind of friendliness which is close to friendship, shame, righteous indignation, justice, and prudence or practical wisdom (Eth. nic. 2.7). Cf. Reinhard Weber, *Das Gesetz im hellenistischen Judentum: Studien zum Verständnis und zur Funktion der Thora von Demetrios bis Pseudo-Phokylides* (Arbeiten zur Religion und Geschichte des Urchristentums 10; Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2000), 349; Jedan, *Stoic Virtues*, 162. Unlike Jedan, who includes justice and prudence and practical wisdom, William J. Prior (*Virtue and knowledge: An Introduction to Ancient Greek Ethics* [New York: Routledge, 1991], 163, 165) does not. Prior lists courage, self-control, generosity, magnificence, high-mindness, gentleness, truthfulness, wit, friendliness, modesty, righteousness, indignation, and an unnamed virtue. He argues that Plato’s virtue of justice is missing, but Aristotle promises to discuss it later (book 5); prudence or practical wisdom is also missing, because for Aristotle it is an intellectual virtue, not a moral one; he discusses it in book 7. See also Irwin, *Plato’s Ethics*, 34.
virtues (Rhet. 1.1366b1–3), and in Ethics Eudemian fourteen moral virtues (Eth. eud. 2.3.1220b–3.1221a12). Although the lists do not include the virtue of εὐσέβεια, with no explanation for its absence offered, Aristotle in his On Virtues and Vices, like Plato’s Socrates, mentions εὐσέβεια as a “part of justice or an accompaniment of it” (Virt. vit. 5.1250b20–24). In his ethical discourse, Aristotle embraces the unity of virtues in the form of reciprocity: that means, to have one virtue entails having all ethical virtues. He also makes the virtue of φρόνησις the unifying virtue from which all the other virtues derive, as he writes, “with the presence of the one quality, practical wisdom, will be given all the virtues” (Eth. nic. 6.13.1145a1–2; Eth. eud. 2.12.1144b31–32). He also writes, “the man of practical wisdom is one who will act and who has the other virtues” (Eth. nic. 7.2.1146a7–8). In the same way as Plato and the Stoics, Aristotle believes that virtues are inseparable, but unlike Plato, who takes the virtue of justice as the unifying virtue (Resp. 441E), Aristotle makes φρόνησις the unifying virtue.

47. Justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, generosity, gentleness, prudence or practical wisdom (φρόνησις), and wisdom (σοφία). However, others list only seven moral virtues and do not include prudence or practical wisdom: justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, pride, generosity, and gentleness (the virtue of love he discusses in book 2).

48. Gentleness, bravery, modesty, temperance, righteous indignation, the just, liberality, sincerity, friendliness, dignity, [endurance], greatness of spirit, magnificence, [wisdom]. Aristotle also devoted two of the ten books of his Nicomachean Ethics to love and friendship, he also made pride the capstone of the moral virtues. Cf. Devettere, Virtue Ethics, 74.

49. The Greek rhetorician, Menander of Laodicea also identifies εὐσέβεια as “a part of justice” (1.17–20).

50. Price, Virtue and Reason in Plato and Aristotle, 137.

51. Cf. Devettere, Introduction to Virtue Ethics, 81–82. Aristotle, however, in Eudemian Ethics, writes of “cleverness” (δεινότης) as “being both necessary for φρόνησις… and to hit it” (Eth. eud. 1.12.1144a23–29). This statement led scholars to question whether the virtue of φρόνησις was actually the unifying virtue in Aristotle’s ethical system. Price supports Aristotle’s unity of
Unlike Plato and Socrates, however, Aristotle divides the soul into two parts, the rational part (reason) with its own virtues: intellectual virtues (e.g., prudence or practical wisdom); and the non-rational part (the appetitive) with its own virtues: the moral or character virtues (e.g., courage, temperance and justice). For Aristotle, both types of virtues (the intellectual and moral) are necessary to acquire a good and happy life (Eth. eud. 2.4.28.1222a1–14). But, for him, φρόνησις, which is intellectual, is the virtue that originates all the moral virtues in the non-rational part of the soul (Eth. nic. 2.7.1108b10). Aristotle asserts that “the appetitive part shares in [reason],” that is the rational part (φρόνησις), “insofar as it listens to and obeys it” (Eth. nic. 1.13.1102b30–33). The non-rational part is in some sense persuaded by reason, so that, a virtuous soul can be developed (Eth. nic. 1.13.1102b33–1103a1). However, unlike the Stoics, but similar to Plato, Aristotle names the virtue of δικαιοσύνη the “perfect virtue” (Eth. Nic. 5.1.1129b26–1130a10), “complete virtue,” the highest of all virtues, and a virtue and argues that Aristotle’s espousal of the unity of virtues is closely linked with his doctrine of the mean. For a helpful overview of this topic, see Price, Virtue and Reason in Plato and Aristotle, 134–43. For a further discussion about practical wisdom of Aristotle, see W. F. R. Hardie, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory (Oxford: Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1968), 212–39.


53. For Aristotle, “virtue is a faculty of providing and preserving good things; or a faculty of conferring many great benefits, and benefits of all kinds on all occasions” (Rhet. 1.1366a35–37).

54. Devettere, Introduction to Virtue Ethics, 82.

55. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 63.

56. Sterling, “‘The Queen of the Virtues,’” 119.
“without qualification.” Aristotle’s special definitions of δικαιοσύνη (especially his view of it as “complete”) parallels Plato’s thought about the role of the virtue δικαιοσύνη in his tripartition of the human soul, in which δικαιοσύνη unifies the other three cardinal virtues (Plato’s Republic, book 4). What is interesting about Aristotle is that, unlike Socrates, Plato, and Chrysippus, he does not only identify virtue or knowledge with φρόνησις, but also with intelligence (νοῦς). Aristotle also believes that other virtues besides φρόνησις are necessary to live virtuously, and thus achieve a life of happiness (Eth. nic. 2–10).

Philosophic Stoic Tradition that Virtue is One

For Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism, the virtue of φρόνησις is also the chief virtue among all the virtues. Later Middle Platonist Plutarch (ca. 50–120 C.E.) provides an account of Zeno’s position in a well-known passage: “Zeno of Citium… defines prudence

57. See Anonymous, On Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 5.3 1129b29–30 (n. L89, QETHs p.52–3 Fortenbaugh); cf. Fortenbaugh, Theophrastus of Eresus, (529A), 349. According to Prior (Prior, Virtue and knowledge, 169), the reason why δικαιοσύνη is a complete virtue is because justice “enjoys all the acts of the various virtues: it requires people to be brave, temperate, gentle and so on as well as just in the narrow sense.”

58. But, Aristotle seems to contradict himself when he defines “justice a part of virtue” (Eth. nic. 5.21130a14). To solve this tension, Konstan (“ Philo’s De Virtutibus in the Perspective of Classical Greek Philosophy,” 65) interprets the virtue of justice in “a general sense as equivalent to perfect virtue, understood not in itself but in respect to others” (Eth. nic. 5.1. 1129b25–27).


or practical wisdom in matters of distribution as justice, prudence or practical wisdom in matters of desire as temperance, and prudence or practical wisdom in matters of standing firm as courage” (*Virt. mor.* 441A; see also *Fort.* 97E). In some sense, the Stoics hold the view that “virtues are one,” and this one virtue is φρόνησις.\(^6^1\) However, Devettere argues that some scholars question whether Zeno actually embraced the Socratic position and advocated a single virtue, φρόνησις.\(^6^2\) The reason for their question is based on another passage from Plutarch, in which, Zeno, like Plato (*Resp.* 427E–435B; 441C–444A) takes the cardinal virtues to be inseparable, that is “virtue is one” (φρόνησις), but yet “in its operations,” as Plutarch writes, “appears to vary with its relations to its objects” (*Stoic. rep.* 1034C). This has led some scholars to claim that Zeno, according to Plutarch, contradicts himself.\(^6^3\) Long supports the position, like Devettere, that Zeno made φρόνησις the foundation for the cardinal virtues, since both Cleanthes and Chrysippus seem to have followed and interpreted Zeno.\(^6^4\) Although we may never know Zeno’s real position about the unity of the virtues, what we can say is that the Stoics describe the virtuous person not as the just person, nor as the courageous person, but as the wise person, the σοφός.\(^6^5\)

For Chrysippus (ca. 279 B.C.E.–ca. 206 B.C.E.), the third leader of Stoicism after Zeno and Cleanthes, “φρόνησις is a scientific knowledge [ἐπιστήμη] of what should

\(^{61}\) E.g., Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 440E–441D; Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 2.7.5a–5b7; 2.31.123; 2.59.4–60.24; 2.63.6–24; Arius Didymus 5a–5b7; Seneca, *Ep.* 85.2; 90.46; 120.11.


\(^{63}\) Devettere, *Introduction to Virtue Ethics*, 80.

\(^{64}\) Long, *Plato and the Stoics*, 16, 19.

\(^{65}\) Devettere, *Introduction to Virtue Ethics*, 80.
or should not be done,” and each of the other three cardinal virtues is also “a scientific knowledge” (Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.59.4–11). However, according to Plutarch, Chrysippus claims that “virtue is one, φρόνησις” (Plutarch, Mor. 441B). Therefore, in the Stoic ethics, prudence or practical wisdom is also viewed as the virtue par excellence, and all the other virtues are types of knowledge or φρόνησις (see Arius Dydimus, Epitome of Stoic Ethics 5b15–16). According to the classification of Stoic ethical virtues, the virtue of εὐσέβεια is simply a part of justice or a secondary virtue.

Philop’s Re-Interpretation of the Greek Philosophical Idea that Virtue is One in his Ethical Discourse

In the major Greek philosophical ethical systems (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics), the virtue of φρόνησις is espoused as the virtue, the one single reality, and εὐσέβεια holds

66. In Chrysippus, virtue is a kind of knowledge or art; it is a unitary disposition of the soul, which is divided into four primary virtues. Each of these virtues is defined in terms of knowledge and have also their subdivisions (SVF 3.264). According to Algra (The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, 720), the Socratic influence on Stoic ethical theory is reflected in that in the Stoa virtue is considered as a summation of forms of knowledge, and that virtues are also defined as forms of knowledge (Stobaeus 2.67.1). The Stoics also divided the four cardinal virtue into subcategories (e.g., Diogenes Laertius 7.92.126; SVF 3.262, 264–266). For the list of the Stoics’ four cardinal virtues with their subdivisions, see Jedan, Stoic Virtues, 158–159, 163–164. Cf. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974), 260; Algra, The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, 719; S. Wibbing, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge im Neuen Testament und ihre Traditions-geschichte unter Berücksichtigung der Qumran-Texte (Berlin: Töpelmann, 1959), 16.


68. E.g., SVF 3.64.14–25; Chrysippus, from Stobaeus 2.59.4–60.2; 60.9–24 (SVF 3.262, 264; here, piety is listed among the cardinal virtues); Theophrastus, from Diogenes Laertius, The Vita Theophrasti 5.50 (Stobaeus, Anthology 3.3.42). Also in the Peripatetic tradition (e.g., Aristotle, Virt. vit. 1250b20–24. Cf. Fortenbaugh, Theophrastus of Eresus, 343. Sterling notes that sometimes the Stoics also listed εὐσέβεια in the catalogue of virtues randomly, giving εὐσέβεια no special preference (e.g., SVF 2.304 16–31). Sterling, “The Queen of the Virtues,” 120, footnote 101.
generally the place of a subordinate virtue, a part of, or an accompaniment of δικαιοσύνη.

Philo embraces the idea that there are four cardinal virtues, and also follows the ethical notion in the philosophical ethical discourse that “virtue is one” or “virtues are one.” But, he takes ευσέβεια as that virtue and makes it the central virtue in his ethical discourse.

In Philo’s thought, if you have ευσέβεια, you have all the other virtues and that includes the four cardinal virtues. Although Schenck is right in claiming that Philo takes on the Platonic and Socratic idea that virtue is one, he omits Philo’s Aristotelian and Stoic traditions. Schenck also fails to acknowledge that Philo clearly moves beyond these philosophical traditions by choosing ευσέβεια, a well-known virtue in the philosophical ethical systems, to configure his own ethical discourse. The virtue of ευσέβεια serves him as the epitome for defining appropriately how a human soul is to live virtuously in the best possible ways to acquire the goal (τέλος) of human life. Philo praises a single virtue, ευσέβεια, as for example “greatest,” “highest,” “beginning,” and “queen,” and he intentionally makes it become the source and preeminent virtue in his ethical discourse, as is φρόνησις in the ethical systems of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, as well as other philosophers. However, influenced perhaps by Plato and the Stoics (Prot. 352D; 69. In Leg. 1.63, 65, 67, and 87, Philo gives important places to the four cardinal virtues and treats them as generic virtues. Interestingly, in Leg. 1.65, he writes about them, “each of the virtues is in very deed sovereign and a queen.”

70. Schenck, A Brief guide to Philo, 120.

71. For instance, in Epicurean philosophy, the founder Epicurus also makes φρόνησις the most precious thing even more precious than philosophy (Ep. men. 132). In the Peripatetic philosophical school, φρόνησις was viewed as the unifying and primary virtue. Alexander of Aphrodisias writes, “it is impossible to act in accordance with any of the moral virtues apart from practical wisdom, and (if) practical wisdom is concerned with all things practical and so brings with itself all the moral virtues—if at least it is a disposition to act reasonably in regard to all things good for man qua man, not in regard to some things and not others, but all things—then
Theaet, 176C; Diogenes Laertius 7.101–103; Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1034C-E), Philo tends to maintain the virtue of φρόνησις in the first position when he lists the four cardinal virtues (e.g., Leg. 1.63, 65; 2.18; Mos. 2.216; Spec. 4.134; cf. Spec. 2.18; Spec. 1.277).

We have seen in chapter three that Philo classifies the virtue εὐσέβεια as a cardinal virtue. Occasionally, Philo places εὐσέβεια (together with ὁσιότης) next to the fourth cardinal virtues (Praem. 160 and Mos. 2.216), and at other times, as one of the four cardinal virtues (Cher. 96; Congr. 6; Ios. 143, 246).72 This identification of εὐσέβεια as a cardinal virtue is found in Plato’s Protagoras and Meno. In Prot. 329C–330B and 349A-C, for example, εὐσέβεια is included with the four cardinal virtues. Influenced also by Plato’s Socrates, the Stoic Cleanthes sometimes treats εὐσέβεια as the fifth cardinal virtue (cf. Cleanthes, from Clement, Protr. 6.72.2 [SVF 1.557]; see also SVF 2.60.9). In Plato’s Prot. 333B, three cardinal virtues are listed (prudence or practical wisdom, temperance, and justice) with εὐσέβεια (compare with Philo’s Spec. 4.135). Likewise, in Meno 73E–74A and 78E, two cardinal virtues (justice and temperance) appear with εὐσέβεια. What is revealing as well as significant is that Philo is not an isolated philosophical thinker in his classification of εὐσέβεια with and among the four cardinal virtues. The various ways Philo classifies the virtue εὐσέβεια as a cardinal virtue attest to the strong influence of his philosophical background on his ethical discourse, especially by Plato’s two dialogues (Protagoras and Meno) and the Stoics. Philo’s idea of appending εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης to the four cardinal virtues may have been very well influenced by Socrates and the Stoics,

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72. See also Abr. 208; Virt. 175; Hypoth. 6.8; Prob. 83; Legat. 213; QE 1.12.
who considered five important virtues in addition to the four cardinal virtues (see Plato, *Gorg.* 507B-C; *Prot.* 330B, 349B; *SVF* 1.557 and 2.60.9).

It has been said that Philo was aware of the philosophical notion that “virtue is one.” But for him, ἕρμηνης was not the appropriate virtue to be used in the configuration of his ethical discourse. Likewise, for him, it was not sufficient to classify his virtue of εὐσέβεια as the fifth cardinal virtue or as one of the four cardinal virtues. In the virtue of εὐσέβεια he saw the perfection of virtue, and as such, in his ethical discourse, he regularly and intentionally privileges εὐσέβεια. The virtue of εὐσέβεια becomes the supreme, highest virtue, and allegorically, “the tree of life” from Eden (e.g., *QG* 1.10; see *Leg.* 1.63). Therefore, for the human soul, to possess εὐσέβεια means to possess all virtues.

The Praise of the Virtue *Εὐσέβεια* in Greek Thought:

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Xenophon, and Sophocles

Scholars have claimed that Philo was the first to give the virtue of εὐσέβεια the most important place in his catalogue of ethical virtues (see chapter one). To a certain degree, they are right; in fact, none of the most prominent philosophers (e.g., Socrates, Plato, Platonists, Aristotle, and Stoics) in their ethical systems takes εὐσέβεια as a primary virtue. However, it is worth mentioning that there are three Greek texts, from non-philosophical authors, in which the virtue of εὐσέβεια receives a special treatment. The first evidence comes from the Greek historian and rhetorician, Dionysius of Halicarnassus (ca. 60 B.C.E.–7 B.C.E.). In his account, he praises Xenophon “for displaying first of all the virtue of εὐσέβεια” (*Ant. rom.* 4.778). Like Philo, the Greek historian sees εὐσέβεια as the most important virtue. The second example is from the Greek dramatist Sophocles (ca. 496 B.C.E.–406 B.C.E.). In *Philoctetes*, he describes Zeus’ preference for the virtue εὐσέβεια:
It is fated that Troy will be taken once again with the aid of that bow. Take care, though, that when you’re destroying the city you pay due reverence to the gods because that, above anything else, is what Zeus, my father, considers important. To him, all else takes second place to the reverence of gods. Reverence for the gods does not die when the mortals die but it goes on eternally, whether man is alive or dead (Phil. 1440–1444).

In this passage, Heracles’ advice to Philoctetes reveals two important beliefs about εὐσέβεια. First, according to Heracles, the god Zeus considers εὐσέβεια above everything else. Second, as gods are eternal, so is εὐσέβεια, for it goes beyond death and can live eternally.73 Heracles’ account about εὐσέβεια echoes Philo’s own description of his source virtue as immortal (e. g., QG 1.10; Opif. 154; Spec. 1.30). Heracles implicitly refers to εὐσέβεια as a virtue belonging to the intelligible world (κόσμος νοητός), the incorruptible, and the immaterial, and not to the sensible world (κόσμος αἰσθητός), which is material, mortal, and corruptible. These characteristic qualities given to εὐσέβεια, as in Philo, echo the Middle Platonic notions of νοητός. Third, Heracles parallels the god Zeus’ immortality with εὐσέβεια’s immortality in a way that reflects Philo’s parallelism between God and εὐσέβεια (e.g., QG 1.10; QE 2.38; Opif. 155). Fourth, the special connection of εὐσέβεια with Zeus in Sophocles is reflected in Philo’s Decal. 52: God is the origin (ἀρχή) of everything, and εὐσέβεια is the origin (ἀρχή) of all the other virtues.

The third text that shows the special place of εὐσέβεια comes again from Sophocles. He writes in Electra:

May I yet see you live exalted in might and wealth above your enemies by as much as you now dwell beneath their hand! For I have found you enjoying no prosperous estate, yet for observance of nature’s highest laws you win the noblest prize by your reverence toward Zeus (El. 1090–1097).

This text resembles two important points in Philo’s exposition of the practice of the virtue

εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse. First, in a similar way to Philo, Sophocles associates εὐσέβεια with the Law of Nature. We have seen in chapter two that Philo associates the Jewish Law with the Law of Nature or Unwritten Law (e.g., Abr. 4–6, 276). Second, like Philo, the practice of εὐσέβεια leads the individual to receive the highest prize which is, according to Sophocles, the noblest prize (see e.g., Philo’s Mos. 2.136; QE 1.1). These Greek sources, which are not part of the literature of the philosophical tradition, help us understand that Philo’s characteristic qualities and powers attributed to εὐσέβεια were not in complete isolation from the Greek literature. His advanced education (ἐγκύκλια παιδεία) probably had introduced him to both Sophocles and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (see chapter two). Therefore, these special attributes given to εὐσέβεια, and the different ways of understanding it in Philo’s Greek tradition possibly played a role in the construction of his ethical discourse around the virtue of εὐσέβεια. But, it was not only this Greek tradition that influenced Philo. His Hellenistic Jewish tradition also played an important part in contributing the configuration of his ethical discourse using the virtue of εὐσέβεια as his primary virtue.

The Influence of Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean on Philo’s Εὐσέβεια in his Ethical Discourse

Philo treats the virtue of εὐσέβεια as a mean, as he does also with the four the cardinal virtues (e.g., Deus 162–164; Spec. 4.146–147; Abr. 24; Migr. 146–147; cf. Gig. 64). In chapter three, it has been said that Philo probably follows Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, particularly Eth. nic. 2.6–7 (see also Eth. eud. 2.3–3.7.1234b12).74 Prior notes that Aristotle’s

74. See Colson and Whitaker, PLCL 3; p. 489. Aristotle’s three categories (deficiency, mean, excess) were known in other Greek ethical systems. For example, according to the Peripatetic philosopher Xenarchus (first century B.C.E.), every virtue has two opposites. He
doctrine of the *mean* is one of the best known, but it is also the most criticized, and the least well understood of his ethical system (see *Eth. nic.* 2.6.1107a6–8).\(^7^5\) Aristotle writes: “virtue is a kind of mean; it aims at what is intermediate” (*Eth. nic.* 2.5.6.1106a–1107a1–25).

He defines virtue a *mean* because he believes that it is where the acme of virtue is.\(^7^6\)

According to Aristotle’s doctrine of the *mean*, “in everything continues and visible” there is an excess, a *mean*, and a deficiency (*Eth. eud.* 2.3.1220b21–24; *Eth. nic.* 2.6). While both the excess and the deficiency are characteristic of vice, the *mean* is a characteristic of virtue (*Eth. nic.* 2.6.1106b33–34). In Philo’s ethical discourse, εὐσέβεια (like the cardinal virtues and other virtues) is treated as a *mean* or “middle path,” which embraces a perfect state halfway between two extremes: excess and deficiency.

**Figure 4. Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean in Philo**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Excess (ὑπερβολή)</th>
<th>Mean (μέσος)</th>
<th>Deficiency (ἐλλειψις)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>εὐσέβεια</td>
<td>cardinal virtues</td>
<td>other virtues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observing the three passages from Philo pointed in chapter three (*Deus* 163–164; *writes*: “we say that to each of the virtues there are two contraries: for instance wisdom has the two contraries cunning and stupidity, courage has the two contraries rashness and cowardice, and so in other cases.” See Simplicius commentary on Aristotelé’s *De Caelo* (CAG 7.55.25–31), in Kenny, *The Aristotelian Ethics*, 19.

\(^7^5\) Prior, *Virtue and Knowledge*, 162.

\(^7^6\) In Aristotle’s list of ethical virtues or *means* (*Eth. nic.* 2.6–7), he mentions prudence or practical wisdom, but he does not provide the two extremes (excess and deficiency); he does the same with the *mean* justice (*2.7.1108b8–10*). Aristotle discusses the *mean* φρόνησις is *Eth. nic.* book 6; also, in *Eudemian Ethics* 2.3 1120b35–21a10, Aristotle presents a list of triads (excess-*mean*-deficiency), where φρόνησις with its two extremes are included (cunning and simplicity). With the exception of φρόνησις, the triads in the list are names of moral virtues and vices. The *mean* δικαιοσύνη is treated in *Eth. nic.* book 5. Cf. Kenny, *The Aristotelian Ethics*, 213–214.
Spec. 4.146–147; and Abr. 24), the parallelism between Philo’s passages and Aristotle’s Eth. nic. 2.7 is certainly obvious:27

**Philo, Deus 163–164:** Courage is the mean between rashness and cowardice, economy between careless extravagance and illiberal parsimony, prudence between knavery and folly, and finally, piety between superstition and impiety.

**Philo, Spec. 4.146–147:** To add or to take from courage he changes its likeness and stamps upon it a form in which ugliness preplaces beauty... by adding he will make rashness and by taking away, he will make cowardice... addition will beget superstition and substraction will beget impiety, and so piety too is lost to sight."

**Philo, Abr. 24:** He [Abraham] passes across ignorance to instruction, from folly to sound sense, from cowardice to courage, from impiety to piety, and again from voluptuousness to self-control from vaingloriousness to freedom from arrogance (cf. QE 2.26).

**Aristotle, Eth. nic. 2.7.1107b:** With regard to feelings of fear and confidence courage is the mean; of the people who exceed, he who exceeds in fearlessness has no name (many of the states have no name), while the man who exceeds in confidence is rash, and he who exceeds in fear and falls short in confidence is a coward. With regard to pleasures and pains—not all of them, and not so much with regard to the pains—the mean is temperance, the excess self-indulgence.... With regard to giving and taking of money the mean is liberality, the excess and the defect prodigality and meanness....With regard to honour and dishonour the mean is proper pride, the excess is known as a sort of ‘empty vanity’, and the deficiency is undue humility.

Table 12. Parallels between Philo, Deus 163–164 and Aristotle, Eth. nic. 2.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philo</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Deficiency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Excess</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td><strong>Deficiency</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashness</td>
<td>Courage</td>
<td>Cowardice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Careless extravagance</td>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Illiberal parsimony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knavery</td>
<td>Prudence/practical wisdom</td>
<td>Folly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superstition</td>
<td>Piety</td>
<td>Impiety</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27. For an informative table of Aristotelian triads, see Jedan, Stoci Virtues, 162.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philo</th>
<th>Excess</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Deficiency</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Excess</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addition (+)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Subtraction (−)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashness</td>
<td></td>
<td>Courage</td>
<td>Cowardice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Superstition</td>
<td></td>
<td>Piety</td>
<td>Impiety</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philo</th>
<th>From…</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deficiency</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignorance</td>
<td></td>
<td>Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folly</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sound sense/prudence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cowardice</td>
<td></td>
<td>Courage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impiety</td>
<td></td>
<td>Piety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excess…. to</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluptuoussness</td>
<td></td>
<td>Self-control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaingloriousness</td>
<td></td>
<td>Freedom from arrogance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ethic. eud. 2.3.1120b35–21a10.*
Aristotle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From...</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deficiency</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simplicity/silliness</td>
<td>Prudence/practical wisdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cowardice</td>
<td>Courage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excess... to Mean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-indulgence/licentiousness</td>
<td>Temperance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undue humility</td>
<td>Proper pride/magnanimity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Konstan, Philo employs Aristotle’s terminology (ὑπερβολή and ἔλλειψις) for the extremes, but Philo suggests a more harmonious relationship between the vices and the mean. Konstan says that “the mean occupies the ruling position in a triad, harmonizing in unity by an indissoluble bond the elements on either side, by which it is guarded in the manner of a king (Spec. 4.168).”78 Philo considers the mean, especially εὐσέβεια, a characteristic of perfection, and the excess and deficiency characteristics of vices of the soul (cf. Deus 162–165; Sacr. 15). This idea is found in Det. 18 and 24, where Philo speaks of the mean, excess and deficiency:

**Det. 18:** Neither is it our business to practice good sense/prudence with cunning/knavery, or self-mastery with stinginess and meanness, or courage with rashness, or in a superstitious way, or any other virtue-governed knowledge in a spirit of ignorance.

**Det. 24:** ‘What seekest thou?’ (Gen 37:15). ‘Is it sound sense/prudence thou art seeking? Why then dost thou walk upon the path of cunning/knavery? Is it self-mastery? But this road leads to stinginess. Is it courage? Rashness meets thee by these ways. Is it piety thou art in quest of? This road is that of superstition.

Although Aristotle does not include εὐσέβεια or ὁσιότης in his catalogue of virtues,79

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78. Konstan, “Philo’s De Virtutibus in the Perspective of Classical Greek Philosophy,” 64.

there are two strong similarities between Aristotle’s φρόνησις and Philo’s εὐσέβεια. First, Philo in his ethical discourse associates εὐσέβεια with the λόγος (Mos. 2.66; Leg. 1.63–73) and perfect or right reason (ὅρθος λόγος; e.g., QE 2.115; Migr. 131). For Philo, the virtue of εὐσέβεια as a mean is both perfect knowledge and “perfect reason” (τελεία λόγος; e.g., Contempl. 25). Therefore, through the λόγος the virtue-loving soul reaches the goal of the virtue εὐσέβεια: “becoming like to God.” Also in Aristotle’s ethical system, he links the mean φρόνησις with λόγος. To him, it is “reason that reveals the mean” (Eth. nic. 6.1.1138b18–21), which is the way to attain the goal (τέλος): good and happiness (Eth. nic. 6.13.1145a6). Second, in Philo’s ethical discourse the virtue of εὐσέβεια as a mean helps the virtue-loving souls to walk on the “middle path,” “the path of virtue” (e.g., Deus 164; Det. 24; Migr. 131), and avoid the pathless wilds. It also leads the virtue-loving souls to the goal of “becoming like to God,” which is the “the most Godlike of qualities” (Fug. 63; Her. 185–187). Likewise, for Aristotle, the mean φρόνησις guides the soul to the right path, goal, and it helps to avoid the extremes of excess and deficiency (Eth. nic. 2.6.1106b16–24). For Philo, however, the practice of the ethical commandments of the Mosaic Law is primordial to promote virtues, and thus, to remain on the right path or “the middle path,” which is εὐσέβεια. The connection of the law with the mean is expressed in both Aristotle and Plato. The former states that “the law is the mean” (Pol. 3.16.1287b4–5), and the latter describes the “laws as the best course for displaying virtues;” they are prescribed to promote virtue. Plato also has an elderly Athenian say, “Our preamble may properly be followed by a sentence which will express the sense of our laws, a general injunction to


81. See Plato’s Laws, 643D; 673A; 722B; 745D; 765E; 886B, 903B; 963C, 961D.
the impious men to turn from their ways to those of piety” (Leg. 907D).\(^{82}\) The idea of the mean is also found in other philosophers as we shall see next.

**The Understanding of the Mean in Other Greek Philosophical Traditions**

The doctrine of the mean was espoused also by other philosophers. For example, Plato not only associates the mean with the law, he praises also the mean or “the moderate” as the idea of good, especially in the Laws and the Republic.\(^ {83}\) For Plato, like Philo, in order to have a meaningful life, one must seek the middle path (Resp. 349D-E; Leg. 691C, 701E, 728D-E; Gorg. 485B). Plato also speaks of the mean in relation to possessions, noble birth, personal beauty and strength, in all natural and acquired gifts of the soul. They represent the ideal of a good and happy life (Resp. 619A-B; Leg. 679A-B, 792D-E).\(^ {84}\) As in Philo, in Euthyphro, Plato has Socrates distinguish two qualities (mean and deficiency), when Socrates sees ἀσέβεια as the opposite (ἐναντίος) of εὐσέβεια (Euthyphr. 5C-D; Resp. 615C; Ep. 2.311; cf. Ep.12E). This dichotomy between εὐσέβεια and ἀσέβεια is likewise reflected in the Stoic doctrine that “nothing is in between virtue and vice, although the Peripatetics say, according to Diogenes Laertius, that “progress is in between these” (7.127). Similarly, Plutarch speaks of εὐσέβεια as a mean, but the mean between atheism (ἀθεότης) and

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82. Ferfrugge (*The NIV Theological Dictionary of New Testament words*, 1152) points out that there was a close association between the laws of the Greek-city state and the worship of the gods; that is, the impious (ἀσεβής) man was generally named side by side with the wicked (ἀδικος)—the one who engaged in immoral behavior, that is did not obey the laws of the Greek community, was labeled ἀδικος; and ἀσεβής the one who did not follow the ordinances regarding the gods.


superstition (δεισιδαιμονία). For the Stoics, the mean is also reason (λόγος); Stobaeus’ Anthology reads: “This is the mean relative to us, for it is determined by us by means of reason. Wherefore virtue is ‘a disposition to choose, being in the mean which is relative to us, determined by reason and such as the practically wise man would determine it.’ The natural disposition of progress towards virtue (mean) is also attested in Middle Platonism. Alcinous speaks of the “intermediate” disposition as well as the vices (excess and deficiency) when he discusses the soul’s journey towards virtue. He believes that moderation in passions requires living in accordance with reason. Similar to Philo, who speaks of the acquisition of εὐσέβεια as being a hard toil (Sacr. 37), Alcinous stresses that the practice of moderation is not easy. The individual must transfer all at once from vice to virtue, since there is a great distance and mutual opposition between these two.

The significance of Philo’s notion of mean (εὐσέβεια) and both the deficiency ἀσέβεια and the excess δεισιδαιμονία is that they have ethical implications. In his ethical discourse, εὐσέβεια and the vices (δεισιδαιμονία and ἀσέβεια) are strictly in direct association with the Existent One (τὸ ὄν, Praem. 40). While the virtue of εὐσέβεια (mean) consists in the proper attitude towards God, the deficiency ἀσέβεια (vice) is turning away (to the left side) from the “middle path,” and the excess δεισιδαιμονία (vice) is turning away (to the right) also from the “middle path.”


Following Alcinous’ view that the practice of moderation is not easy, according to Philo, the soul must be alert on keeping the straight course (“middle path”), and not incline to either side, “either to what is on the right or to what is on the left” (*Migr*. 146). This notion of two conflicting opposites (εὐσέβεια versus ἀσέβεια and εὐσέβεια versus δεισιδαιμονία) highlights two qualities of the soul’s character in relation to God in Philo’s ethical discourse: (1) one quality that shows God’s gracious benefits towards the soul (εὐσέβεια), and (2) the other shows the negative qualities expressed in vices of the soul (ἀσέβεια and δεισιδαιμονία). For Philo, the two extremes are “sisters” (*Sacr*. 15; cf. *Spec*. 4.147) because both lead the soul on the road of pathless野s, the road of vices. What is established in Philo’s ethical discourse is the notion that εὐσέβεια as a mean fosters virtues, and its deficiency (ἀσέβεια) and excess (δεισιδαιμονία) foster all kinds of vices.

Philo labels the deficiency ἀσέβεια as the “greatest evil” (*QG* 1.76; *Congr*. 160); but, he does not identify the excess δεισιδαιμονία as such. Instead, he simply calls it “evil” (*Plat*. 107; *Mut*. 138) and “the source of much harm” (*Deus* 103). He also recognizes ἀσέβεια as the opposite of εὐσέβεια in 21 instances, and only twice δεισιδαιμονία as the opposite of εὐσέβεια (*Praem*. 40 and *Sacr*. 15). This may suggest that, for Philo, the greatest evils derive not from both extremes (*vices*), but from one vice, in this case, deficiency.88

88. Philo’s depiction of δεισιδαιμονία as the “source of much harm” is in a way similar to his identification of the passion ἐπιθυμία as “the source of all evils” in his treatment of the tenth commandment (see *Decal*. 173–174, 151–153; *Spec*. 4.84; *Virt*. 100). It is worth pointing out that Philo’s depiction of ἐπιθυμία as the source of evils reflects the Greek philosophical tradition,
Nature, Instruction, and Practice in Greek Ethical Tradition

In the Greek philosophical tradition, acquisition of virtue is sometimes described as taking place in three ways: nature (φύσις), instruction (διδασκαλία), and practice (ἀσκησις). For example, Aristotle speaks of nature, instruction, and practice as ways of acquiring virtues (Eth. nic. 10.9.1179b20–24). Likewise, Diogenes Laertius, who speaks of the importance of education, stresses three things as essential: “natural [φύσεως] endowment, study [μαθήσεως], and constant practice [ἀσκήσεως]” (5.18).89 These three elements in the Greek philosophical tradition are also associated with the discussions about laws, the acquisition of the virtue φρόνησις, and the Sage of virtue, or the wise man.

The Association of Nature, Instruction, and Practice with Laws in the Greek Philosophical Tradition

Philo’s thought about the three elements for acquiring virtue and their association with the Mosaic Law is very much influenced by this Greek philosophical tradition. The Greek philosopher Archytas of Tarentum (428–347 B.C.E.), in his discussion about the law and virtues, emphasizes nature, practice, and instruction (2.20–25 [Stobaeus 4.1.136]). Likewise, in Plato’s Protagoras, both practice and instruction of good laws—in terms of the well-being of the state and its citizens—are possible ways of acquiring virtue (Prot.

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89. These three ways of acquiring virtue are also found in Plutarch, Lib. ed. 2A-B.
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326C–328E; See also Plato, Resp. 492A; Meno 71A). Good laws of a good state, according to Plato, foster human happiness (εὐδαιμονία), the goal of human life (Leg. 770D–771A). 90

In Philo, not only the practice of the ethical commandments of the Mosaic Law leads the virtue-loving soul to εὐσέβεια, but also through the practice (ἀσκησις) of εὐσέβεια and through reason (λόγος) to perfection and knowledge of God (e.g., Mos. 2.66; Hypoth. 7.13; QE 2.155). Unlike nature (Isaac), both the instruction (Abraham) and practice (Jacob) are essential components in the quest of a virtuous life and the soul’s perfection. For Philo the ethical commandments are the principal “lessons” (Ebr. 37) of instruction (Abraham) for the virtue of εὐσέβεια (Mos. 1.146; Cher. 42), and the practice (Jacob) of their observance promotes the acquisition of εὐσέβεια. For example, both instruction (the ethical commandments of the Mosaic Law) and practice (the observance of the ethical commandments of the Mosaic Law) define the perfection of the virtue-loving soul through the virtue of εὐσέβεια.

*The Association of Nature, Instruction, and Practice with the Acquisition of the Virtue Φρόνησις in the Greek Philosophical Tradition*

As in Philo’s ethical discourse, nature, instruction, and practice are closely related to εὐσέβεια, in Plato these elements are necessary for gaining the virtue of φρόνησις (Prot. 323D–325B; Resp. 492A), which is the only thing good the soul needs for achieving good life. 91 For Plato’s Socrates, the road to virtue, φρόνησις (knowledge), is through practice (ἀσκησις) and instruction (διδασκαλία); both help the soul “to acquire a good and noble character” (Prot. 328B). For Aristotle, the training or practice of virtues, especially the

90. For a good discussion about Plato’s Laws and happiness, see Devettere, *Virtue Ethics*, 104–106.

moral virtues, is also important for the acquisition of “habit” (ἔθος). Aristotle speaks of the importance of the threefold division (instruction, practice, and nature) as the manifestation of virtues (Eth. nic. 10.9.1179b20–24) for the acquisition of habituation. He writes, “moral virtue… grows with habit” (Eth. eud. 2.2.1220b1–3), “habit that tends to choose the mean” (Eth. eud. 2.11.1227b5–9). When the soul is habituated in the practice of virtues, the soul is on the way to φρόνησις, the virtue that makes the soul do the things that bring about the goal of life (happiness). The virtue of φρόνησις, for Aristotle, is the “greatest good” (Eth. Eud. 1.1.1214a30–31), a quality of mind concerned with knowledge (Ethic. nic. 7.8.1142a23–28).

In Philo's ethical discourse likewise “knowledge of God is the secret to happiness and the good life” (Det. 86; Spec. 2.209; Virt. 221). For the Middle Platonist Alcinous, the soul acquires the virtue of φρόνησις through “habituation and practice” (ἔθος καὶ μελέτη).

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92. See Eth. nic. 2.1.1103a17.

93. Prior, Virtue and Knowledge, 156.

94. See also Eth. eud. 1.1.1214a10–25; 2.1.1220a39; Eth. nic. 2.1.1103a17, 24–34. For Aristotle, none of the moral virtues come about in human beings by nature. However, human beings are fitted to acquire them, but through habituation (Eth. nic. 2.1.1103a18–26). Also Arius Didymus believes like Aristotle that human “character derives from habituation;” nature gives human beings only “the starting points and seeds” for right development which must be completed by habituation and eventually by reason (116.21–117.7; 118.5–6).

95. According to Sánchez (La Ética de los Griegos, 92), for Aristotle, virtue is understood as a state of habituation of each individual according to his/her own perfection, in which there is a consistent equilibrium between passion and right reason. Applying this criterion, the individual is able to remain between the two extremes respectively.


97. Cf. Prior, Virtue and Knowledge, 156.

Similar to Philo (Spec. 1.250; Prob. 83), for both Aristotle and Alcinous, the practice (ἀσκησις) and exercise of virtue is an inner disposition of progress towards virtue to form the soul’s character in a way that the soul is capable of abstaining from pleasures and vices (Eth. nic. 2.21104a27–1104b3; Alcinous, The Handbook of Platonism 30.184.28–35).99

In the discussion between Socrates and Protagoras about whether φρόνησις is teachable, Socrates claims that φρόνησις is teachable (e.g., Prot. 328C and 361B). However, if the virtue of φρόνησις is to be taught, the person should be “sent to a trainer, so that a good mind may have a good body to serve it” (Prot. 326B). At the end of the dialogue, however, the question whether the virtue of φρόνησις can be taught remains unanswered. If φρόνησις is something other than knowledge (Prot. 361A-C), clearly for Socrates, it cannot be taught. In Plato’s dialogue Meno, the three elements are mentioned again, when the question whether virtue can be taught is again raised (Meno 71A) and argued (Meno 87B–100A-C).100 Although Meno and Socrates agree that φρόνησις is knowledge (also Plato, see Resp. 493A), and therefore, teachable (Meno 89B-C; see also Euthyd. 273D), at the end of the dialogue, Socrates claims that φρόνησις cannot be taught, therefore it cannot be knowledge (Meno 99B).101 Socrates concludes the dialogue by asserting that φρόνησις is “acquired neither by nature nor by teaching, but it is imparted to us


100. However, Plato in the Republic 7 echoes Aristotle’s idea of habituation. Plato says that virtue is acquired through “habit” guided by knowledge as a result of their further education. Also in Leg. 792E, Plato says that character grows from “habit.” Cf. Cormack, Plato’s Stepping Stones, 89.

101. According to Cormack (Plato’s Stepping Stones, 55), the distinction between the nature of virtue and the teaching of virtue is not always clear in Plato’s dialogue, especially in the Protagoras, the Meno, and the Euthydemus. Cormack argues that “this is largely due to Plato’s use of the craft analogy.” For details, see Cormack, Plato’s Stepping Stones, 65–76.
by divine dispensation [θείᾳ μοίρᾳ]” (Meno 99E–100A-B). In a way similar to Philo, Socrates and Aristotle in their discussion about virtue put great emphasis on the threefold manifestation of virtue (nature, instruction, and practice), and by doing so they also strongly connect their primary virtue φρόνησις with knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) as Philo does with εὐσέβεια and knowledge (ἐπιστήμη, e.g., Contempl. 25; Hypoth. 7.13; cf. Abr. 3–4). Philo, however, not only chooses εὐσέβεια instead of φρόνησις, but he also makes the three Patriarchs representatives or symbols of the three elements required to acquire virtue. Philo, who relates εὐσέβεια with knowledge, particularly with knowledge of God, does not go further to question whether the virtue of εὐσέβεια can be taught. For him, the virtue of εὐσέβεια is teachable and practiceable, and the ethical commandments of the Mosaic Law are the lessons of εὐσέβεια.

The Association of Nature, Instruction and Practice with the Sage of Virtue, and the Wise Man in the Greek Philosophical Tradition

In Philo, the depiction of the three Patriarch as exemplars of virtues—through nature, instruction, and practice—resembles particularly the Greek models of education. What is interesting about Plato’s dialogues is that the virtue of φρόνησις and its acquisition through “teaching” especially in the Protagoras and the Euthydemus requires good teachers of virtue. While in the Protagoras, Protagoras asserts that to become a good teacher is to make one a better person (Prot. 318A-B), in the Euthydemus, Dionysidorus and Euthydemus claim that “their instruction about virtue is better than anyone else” (Euthyd. 273D; see also 274E–275A). In the Stoic ethics, the person who practices
right actions is no longer a learner but an expert, for he has mastered the skill of living. The expert is the Sage (σοφός), who does everything in accordance with reason (λόγος). Therefore, the Sage does not follow laws; instead, he evaluates the situation, and determines what is reasonable (Diogenes Laertius 7.121). According to the Roman Stoic Seneca (4 B.C.E.–65 C.E.), the Stoic Sage is “born to be of help to all and to serve the common good” (Clem. 2.6.23). Aristotle’s φρόνιμος (one who has a right mind or is a prudent person) is similar to the Stoic Sage because both have acquired expertise to figure out for themselves what actions are right in life situations. But, the φρόνιμος, unlike the Stoic Sage, was not free from error. In Philo’s ethical discourse, however, it is the pious (εὐσεβής) who through the practice of the virtue εὐσέβεια becomes virtuous. Only Abraham and Moses, the Lawgiver, are the true instructors of virtue (εὐσέβεια); Abraham represents the model of instruction, for his own life is an example of perfection (Abr. 77, 198, 208; Somn. 1.194). In reference to Moses, Philo claims that Moses was not only the instructor of the ethical commandments; he also walked on the path of virtue (Migr. 131). Therefore, Philo’s Abraham and Moses, like the Stoic Sage, were never wrong; they were able to lead virtue-loving souls to a life of perfection.

Furthermore, Philo’s view of Isaac (nature) and Moses is also reflected in the Greek philosophical tradition. It was common among philosophers to discuss the appropriate definition of the “wise man.” Philo’s description of Isaac parallels the philosophers’

The Westminster Press, 1986), 62. For a brief, but helpful discussion on Plato’s Protagoras and the acquisition of virtue, see Cormack, Plato’s Stepping Stones, 54–58.


104. Devettere, Virtue Ethics, 131–33.
description of the wise man. Plato, for example, defines the wise man as someone who naturally needs no laws (Leg. 875A-D; Meno 70A-E) and who is like the first man (Leg. 679E–680A).\footnote{105} In Plutarch’s view, the wise man becomes wise and virtuous in an instant (Virt. prof. 75D; Stoic. rep. 1057E). According to Cicero (Leg. 2.11), the Law of Nature exists in full accord “in the perfected reason of the wise man.” Similarly, Philo’s description of Moses (e.g., Praem. 52–56) reflects Cicero’s depiction of the wise man as someone who never hurts anyone (Fin. 3.71), a true king (Fin. 3.75), happy (Fin. 2.104) and one who attains goodness (Off. 3.15). Philo’s portrayal of both Isaac and Moses has a parallel in Aristotle, who defines the wise man a god between men, perfect, and above the law (Pol. 1.1.1252a9; 3.8.1279b1–2; Eth. nic. 4.8.1128a10; Eth. eud. 7.2.34).\footnote{106} Likewise, the Peripatetic Theophrastus, in the book of Commentaries, writes: “It is characteristic of the wise man that no passion can enter into his soul. For bodily passion is opposed to all judgment and wisdom.”\footnote{107} Among the Stoics, Diogenes Laertius describes the wise man as someone who is free from passions (7.116), does all things well (7.125), is infallible (7.122), and like Philo’s Moses is godlike (7.119; see Mos. 1.159; Sacr. 8–10; Mut. 125–129; Det. 159–162). The Stoic Chrysippus states also that “the wise man is like Zeus himself,” but if he should slip the slightest degree below perfection, then he is altogether evil.”\footnote{108}


\footnote{106} Cf. Martens, One God, One Law, 23.

\footnote{107} From the Light of the Soul B, chapter 63, On Wisdom, E (ed. 1477\textsuperscript{2} Farinatar), in Fortenbaugh, Theophrastus of Eresus, n. 448, 277.

\footnote{108} Dick, “The Ethics of the Old Greek Book of Proverbs,” 44. In the Stoic ethical system, there is nothing in between virtue and vice (see Diogenes Laertius, 7.127); Arius Dydimus, Epitome of Stoic Ethics 5b8.
Many of Philo’s conceptions in his ethical discourse around the virtue of εὐσέβεια, his understanding of virtue itself, and the three elements required for the acquisition of virtue have probably derived from the Greek philosophical tradition. The complex characterization of his ethical discourse is noteworthy. Philo recycles categories and concepts of philosophical ethical systems, and re-applies them in the configuration of his own ethical discourse around the virtue of εὐσέβεια. The virtue that guides the virtue-loving souls to a good and happy life, is εὐσέβεια, and not φρόνησις. Philo applies to εὐσέβεια all the qualities that philosophers give to φρόνησις. Philo goes even further when he takes from philosophical ethical discourse the three elements for the acquisition of virtue and reinterprets them in light of the three Jewish Patriarchs. The qualities given to the wise man by philosophers, Philo attributes primarily to both Isaac (nature) and Moses, the Lawgiver. These important aspects in Philo’s ethical discourse show that he is not in isolation from his philosophical background.

The Virtue of Εὐσέβεια and Reason (Λόγος)

We have seen in chapter three that in Philo’s ethical discourse the virtue of εὐσέβεια is connected with λόγος. In the philosophical ethical discourses, the acquisition of the highest goal of human life requires also the primary virtue of φρόνησις with the guidance of reason (λόγος). As Plato claims (Prot. 361B), the virtue of φρόνησις is closely linked with knowledge (ἐπιστήμη); in other words, “becoming like to God” requires the “guidance of knowledge or wisdom.” Plato, Socrates, Eudorus, Alcinous, and later

109. See Konstan, “Philo’s De Virtutibus in the Perspective of Classical Greek Philosophy,” 59; Cormack, Plato’s Stepping Stones, 88–89.
Plutarch, and virtually everyone else after Eudorus\textsuperscript{110} make this claim when discussing the τέλος formula of “becoming like to God.”

In Stoicism, virtue is the perfection of reason (λόγος), thus, the goal (τέλος) of human nature.\textsuperscript{111} Because human beings are rational by nature, the universal λόγος directs them to act “according to reason.”\textsuperscript{112} Plutarch writes about the Stoics, “All [the Stoics] agree that the virtue φρόνησις is a disposition of the ruling part of the soul and a power engendered by reason, or rather is itself reason that is consistent, firm, and unshakable” (Mor. 441B-C). For the Stoics, “living in accordance with nature” also means “living in accordance with virtue” (Stobaeus 2.77.16–27 [SVF 3.16]),\textsuperscript{113} which is a life of reason or right reason (ὁρθός λόγος).\textsuperscript{114} The Stoics understood that the wise life, which leads to happiness (εὐδαιμονία), comes in conformity to nature and reason.\textsuperscript{115} For the Stoics, it was nature as reason (λόγος), God, even law, that was their guide to the virtuous


\textsuperscript{111.} Long & Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1:400.

\textsuperscript{112.} Devettere, Virtue Ethics, 127.

\textsuperscript{113.} Long & Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 63A, 1:394.


It is just the same in Aristotle’s ethics, where living rationally (Eth. nic. 1.6) is the complete life in accordance with virtue (φρόνησις), which requires also reason (λόγος). The intellectual virtues belong to the rational part of the soul, unlike the moral virtues, which belong to the irrational part and by nature are obedient to the part possessing reason (Eth. eud. 2.1.1220a5–13).

This Greek philosophical principle is reflected in Philo’s view of εὐσέβεια and its association with reason (QE 2.115; Mos. 2.66; Migr. 131; Spec. 1.63–73), and with “living in accordance with virtue” (QG 1.100). For Philo, the practice of εὐσέβεια allows the virtue-loving soul to possess “right reason” (ὀρθός λόγος), and indeed, it is through reason (λόγος) that the virtue-loving soul reaches a virtuous life and the goal of perfection (becoming like to God). Philo speaks of the Patriarchs as well as of Moses as virtuous men who possessed not only perfection, but also “perfect reason” (τέλειος λόγος). Their disposition and zeal for εὐσέβεια led them to acquire perfect knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), which allowed them to enjoy the greatness of God (e.g., QE 4.19). To Philo, the state of perfection and knowledge (becoming like to God) is only attained when the virtue εὐσέβεια and reason (λόγος) are dynamically interrelated. As said above, Philo speaks of the virtues as the “fruits of the virtue εὐσέβεια” (Mos. 2.66), and he attributes to his virtue the qualities and powers of immortality, incorruptibility (e.g., Spec. 1.30), and divinity (QE 2.15b; Somn. 2.186), qualities and powers that belong only to the intelligible realm (κόσμος νοητός). He also views the virtue of εὐσέβεια as the source of all the other virtues in ways that assimilate to his view of the Existent One (τὸ ὄν) as the Source of all that exist (Decal. 52; cf. Abr. 268). When Philo claims that the source of all the virtues is

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116. Cf. Diogenes Laertius, 7.87–89; Cicero, Resp. 33; Leg. 18–19.
in God’s wisdom and reason (Leg. 1.63–73; see also Leg. 1.65), he directly links εὐσέβεια with God’s wisdom and reason, as it is shown in QE 2.115. In his ethical discourse, Philo connects intrinsically both the virtue εὐσέβεια and the λόγος of God with the τέλος of the virtue-loving soul (becoming like to God). While in philosophical ethical systems the connection is between φρόνησις and λόγος (and ἐπιστήμη), in Philo’s ethical discourse, the connection is between εὐσέβεια and λόγος.

The Virtue Εὐσέβεια and the Greek Philosophical Ideal of “Becoming Like to God”

We have seen in chapter three that, for Philo, the practice of the virtue εὐσέβεια leads the soul to the goal of “becoming like to God” (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, Her. 186; Fug. 63). The ideal of “becoming like to God” is a state of perfection and holiness (QE 2.47), and perfect knowledge (Contempl. 25). At this state the virtue-loving soul possesses the “fruits” of the virtue εὐσέβεια and is able to enjoy the divine delights (Cher. 42; Mos. 2.66) of immortality (QG 1.10; Spec. 1.30). This whole notion of the prominent role of εὐσέβεια in Philo’s ethical discourse reflects his philosophical heritage.

117. Philo also connects the virtue of εὐσέβεια with wisdom (σοφία) in Mut. 39; QG 4.53; with knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) in Spec. 1.64; 4.147; Det. 18; Mut. 76; Contempl. 25; Hypoth. 7.13.

118. We shall see in chapter nine that Paul will connect the source of his ethical discourse, the Spirit (πνεῦμα), with Χριστός (Christ), not the λόγος.

Happiness and “Becoming Like to God” in Greek Philosophical Ethical Discourse

In philosophical ethical systems, the goal of life (τέλος; finis in Latin) is happiness (εὐδαιμονία); in fact, all philosophers are considered eudaimonists. In Stoicism, for example, happiness is the goal, and it consists of attaining φρόνησις. As Annas stresses, for the Stoics virtue is sufficient for happiness (Arius Didymus 69.11–16; Diogenes Laertius 7.103). Therefore, the “good” is a state of perfection, and is the key for achieving the goal, that is, happiness. Stoic philosophers maintain that happiness, which is also the “good,” is about “living harmoniously in accordance with nature” (Stoabeus 2.35.11ff.; SVF 1.179; Arius Didymus 77.16–78.6), which means living consistently in accordance with reason or virtue.

In Plato’s ethical system, the goal of life (the τέλος) is also happiness (εὐδαιμονία),


121. Long, Stoic Studies, 112, 145, 182–83. He argues that the Stoics stand alone in their claim that happiness consists solely and entirely in ethical virtue. That is, the goal of human life (happiness) is generated only by virtue.

122. Annas, The Morality of Happiness, 163, 166.


124. Long, Stoic Studies, 202, 150. Arius Dydimus writes concerning the Stoics: “They say that happiness is the goal. Everything is produced for its sake, while it is not produced for the sake of anything else. It consists in living according to virtue, in living in agreement, and in addition, this being the same thing, living in accordance with nature. Zeno defined happiness in this way: Happiness is a smooth flow of life. Cleanthes also used this definition in his treatises, as did Chrysippus and all their followers, saying that happiness was nothing other than the happy life, but saying that happiness was set up as the target, while the goal was to achieve happiness, which is the same as being happy. So it is clear from this that ‘living in accord with nature,’ ‘living the good life,’ ‘living well’ are equivalent, as are also ‘the fine and good’ and ‘virtue and what participates in virtue’” (Epitome of Stoic Ethics 6e.10–28). See also Diogenes Laertius 7.87–88; Cicero, Off. 3.13. Cf. Martens, One God, One Law, 18; Algra, The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, 684–85.
but unlike the Stoics, it consists in the ideal of “becoming like to God” (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ).\textsuperscript{125} Plato's Socrates, in the \textit{Euthydemus}, asserts that virtue and virtuous actions are needed for the sake of happiness.\textsuperscript{126} He lists the goods that are necessary for the acquisition of a happy life (\textit{Euthyd}. 279A-C), and claims that the key for happiness is the virtue of φρόνησις (\textit{Euthyd}. 279D).\textsuperscript{127} Plato agrees with Socrates in that the guide for virtuous acts is neither justice, nor courage, nor temperance nor any other moral virtue; only φρόνησις (which is knowledge, ἐπιστήμη) is necessary for happiness (εὐδαιμονία). It is the “very foundation virtue” to guide the soul to right action (\textit{Meno} 97C) and human goal (\textit{Meno} 88C).\textsuperscript{128}

Happiness, which means “becoming like to God,” is the final result of a virtuous life (\textit{Theaet}. 176A–177A; \textit{Resp}. 465D).\textsuperscript{129} Therefore, the only two things that matter in human life are virtue (φρόνησις) and happiness (\textit{Gorg}. 492C, 494E). For Plato, human souls become divine through the virtue of φρόνησις. He also emphasizes the need to practice virtue to achieve the goal (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ). He writes, “man will never be neglected who is willing and eager to be righteous, and by the practice of virtue to be likened unto God so

\textsuperscript{125} For a good discussion about Plato's understanding of happiness in his dialogues, see Annas, \textit{Platonic Ethics, Old and New}, 31–51; Devettere, \textit{Virtue Ethics}, 40–59. Plato's Socrates in the \textit{Euthydemus}, like the Stoics, accepts that the only thing that matters for happiness is virtue. However, as Annas argues, the idea that virtue is sufficient for happiness is not found in Plato's \textit{Laws}. Here, Plato stresses on the importance of material and social aspects of the life of the citizens. Antiochus combines both Stoic and Aristotelian ethics by claiming that virtue was sufficient for happiness, but not for the completely happy life, which contains virtue and also external goods (from Cicero, \textit{Fin}. 5). See Annas, \textit{Platonic Ethics, Old and New}, 44–50.

\textsuperscript{126} Irwin, \textit{Plato's Ethics}, 32–33, 67.

\textsuperscript{127} See also Plato's \textit{Phaed}. 58E, 115D; \textit{Char}. 172A; \textit{Symp}. 204E–205A; \textit{Resp}. 621D. Cf. Devettere, \textit{Virtue Ethics}, 88.

\textsuperscript{128} Devettere, \textit{Virtue Ethics}, 95.

\textsuperscript{129} Cormack, \textit{Plato's Stepping Stones}, 104.
far as that is possible for man” (Resp. 613B). Also, Plato connects two virtues (δικαιοσύνη and ὁσιότης) with the ideal of “becoming like to God:” the soul becomes like to God when he or she becomes “just” and “holy” through wisdom (cf. Crito 54B; Resp. 615B).130

In Aristotle’s ethical system, the highest good is likewise happiness (εὐδαιμονία). For him, the good of man, as Douglas S. Hutchinson points out, is an activity of the soul in a perfect life in accordance with perfect virtue.”131 Aristotle identifies the virtue of φρόνησις as “the instrument for happiness” (ἡ ἀρετὴ τοῦ νοῦ ὄργανον, Eth. nic. 1.8.1098b22–26),132 and sees both happiness and the virtue of φρόνησις as the best of human goods in the soul.133 According to Aristotle, the definition of happiness is the “activity of complete life in accordance with complete virtue” (Eth. eud. 2.1.1219a35–39).134 To act in accordance with virtue was to act according to reason (λόγος), for “virtue is

130. See also Resp. 501B; 585C; Phileb. 33B; Epin. 992C-D; Euthyphr. 12E; Tim. 90B-D. Cf. Wilson, On Virtues, 149.


132. Hutchinson, The Virtues of Aristotle, 71. Like the Stoics, who claim that, only φρόνησις is necessary for the acquisition of the goal of human life (happiness), Aristotle also asserts that φρόνησις is sufficient for happiness. But twice he rejects this (Stoic idea) and claims that the life of virtuous activity has also external goods, like health, beauty, money, power, etc… (see Eth. nic. 1.5.1095b32–1095a2 and 7.13.1153b14–25). For discussion on this, see Annas, “Aristotle on Virtue and Happiness,” in Nancy Sherman, ed., Aristotle’s Ethics: Critical Essays (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), 35–56, esp. 35–37.

133. Kenny (The Aristotelian Ethics, 195, 198) claims that according to Aristotle, pleasure, like happiness and φρόνησις, is also the greatest good in the soul, but only because pleasure is identified with the exercise of all the virtues (e.g., Eth. eud. 1.4.1215a34–35). However, for Plato’s Socrates, pleasure itself is not always a good thing; in fact, he acknowledges that some pleasures are bad (Plato, Prot. 351C-E).

134. See also Eth. nic. 1.4.1095a14–15, 1.5.1095b15, 1.12.1102a1–5; Eth. eud. 1.7.1217a20–24; 2.1.1220a5–8; cf. Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics, 191.
an instrument of the intellect” (*Eth. eud. 7.14.1248a28–29*). For Aristotle, happiness is also to “act according to right reason” (*Eth. nic. 2.2.1103b30–33*), which means “in accordance with φρόνησις” (*Eth. nic. 6.13.1144b20–25*).

While in Greek philosophical ethical systems, the virtue of φρόνησις becomes the key for achieving happiness (εὐδαιμονία), in Philo’s ethical discourse, it is the virtue of εὐσέβεια necessary for acquiring a virtuous and holy life, and ultimately the soul’s perfection. But, as in the philosophical ethical systems, happiness requires reason (λόγος), in Philo’s ethical discourse, the goal of the virtue εὐσέβεια also requires right reason (ὀρθός λόγος). What is unique in Philo is that he moves beyond the philosophical ethical tradition by rejecting the virtue φρόνησις, so much praised in Greek philosophical ethics. Unlike the philosophical thinkers, who never ascribe the primary virtue of φρόνησις the qualities of incorruptibility and immortality, Philo gives εὐσέβεια not only these superior qualities but he also equates εὐσέβεια with the Supreme

135. For a detailed discussion of Aristotle’s view of happiness, the good, and virtue in both the *Nichomachean Ethics* and *Eudemian Ethics*, see Kenny, *The Aristotelian Ethics*, 161–70, 190–214.

136. See also *Eth. nic. 6.1.1138b27–28, 6.1.1139a5; Eth. eud. 2.1.1220a7–10; 7.14.1248a3–4*.

137. See also *Eth. nic. 10.7.1177a11–13*.


139. E.g., *QE* 2.115; *Mos*. 2.66; *Migr*. 131.


141. Plato, *Meno* 88C; Aristotle, *Virt. vit. 2.1250a4–5; Eth. eud. 1.5.1216b1–9; 1.7.1217a1–24; 2.1.1218b34–35; 1.4.1215b33–35. For a good discussion about Plato’s goal of life, see Cormack, *Plato’s Stepping Stones*, 104–109.
God (τὸ ὄν), when he calls εὐσέβεια “divine εὐσέβεια” (QE 2.15b; see also Decal. 52; Leg. 1.63–73). Therefore, Philo not only replaces the one virtue φρόνησις with εὐσέβεια; he also attributes to it a “godlike” quality (Somn. 2.186).

The significant and unique title of “divine εὐσέβεια” given to his source virtue in Philo’s ethical discourse connects directly with the Platonic ideal of “becoming like to God” (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ). Although scholars have claimed that Philo is dependent on Plato’s ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, the τέλος of human beings, they did not relate this connection to Philo’s εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse. In Philo’s ethics, through reason the virtue-loving soul attains the goal of εὐσέβεια (Mos. 2.66). Therefore, it is the virtue εὐσέβεια, the queen and source virtue, that leads the virtue-loving soul to become like to God (Her. 186; Fug. 63).

For Philo, the cultivation of the virtue εὐσέβεια played a significant role in the process of becoming like to the divine.143 While Helleman rightly claims that the goal of a human being is “to become assimilated to God” through the practice of virtue, so the practice of virtue is an imitation of the “powers” of God.144 However, Helleman fails to connect “the practice of virtue” with the practice of the virtue εὐσέβεια.

The Association of “Becoming like to God” and the Pythagorean Ideal of “to Follow God”

Philo connects his source virtue εὐσέβεια with the emerging Middle Platonic understanding of the intelligible world (κόσμος νοητός), in which εὐσέβεια’s qualities and powers of divinity, immortality, and incorruptibility are depicted (QG 1.10, 4.19; QE

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142. E.g., Williamson and Sterling, see chapter one.

143. Fug. 62–64, 82; Spec. 4.188; Virt. 163ff; Opif. 144; Migr. 127–131; QG 2.62; 4.188. See Helleman, “Philo of Alexandria on Deification and Assimilation to God,” 54–62.

144. Helleman, “Philo of Alexandria on Deification and Assimilation to God,” 62.
2.15b, 38; Opif. 155; Decal. 52; Spec. 1.30; cf. Migr. 131–132). Plato also describes the heavenly realities, in which all things are “eternal” and “unchanging,” and in “perfect order, “and they [all] dwell in “harmony” with the divine. In Philo’s ethical discourse, it is in this immaterial, intelligible reality that the virtue-loving souls attain the ideal of becoming like to God. Plato writes, in the intelligible world “he fashions himself in their [gods] likeness and assimilate himself to them” (Resp. 500C).

As Sterling points out (see chapter one), Plato also uses the Pythagorean formulation “to follow God” in some of the dialogues, especially in the Laws and Phaedrus. In the Laws, Plato expresses the importance of the practice of sacrifices, prayers, and offerings to God, as the law directs, in order for the soul to acquire ethical conduct as well as to attain communion with heaven. Plato writes, “What line of conduct, then, is dear to God and a following of him?... to do sacrifices and be ever in communion with heaven through prayer and offerings and all manner of worship…. , as the law directs” (Leg. 716B–717B). Socrates, arguing about the followers of Zeus, also speaks of the manner in which they [the followers] express their love of Zeus through sacrifice and honor to him. To attain the τέλος, “the followers of Zeus seek a beloved who is Zeuslike in soul; wherefore they look for one who is by nature disposed to the love of wisdom [φρόνησις]” (Phaed. 252D-E). Socrates connects the Pythagorean ideal “to follow God” (ἔπεσθαι θεῷ) with the virtue of φρόνησις. Like Plato, Socrates wants to divinize the followers of Zeus through φρόνησις.

A similar connection is shown in Philo’s ethical discourse, but the connection is
between the ideal “to follow God” (ἕπεσθαι θεῷ) with the virtue of εὐσέβεια (Abr. 60).\textsuperscript{145}

The passage in Migr. 131–132 is very similar to what Plato’s Socrates says in Phaed. 252E:

\textit{Migr. 131–132:} To follow God is, then, according to Moses, that most holy man, our aim and object…. Piety, surely, and faith: for these virtues adjust and unite the intent of the heart to the incorruptible Being.

\textit{Phaed. 252E:} The followers of Zeus seek a beloved who is Zeuslike in soul; wherefore they look for one who is by nature disposed to the love of prudence of practical wisdom.

The parallel between Plato and Philo is shown: Plato’s Socrates expresses the notion that the followers of Zeus become “Zeuslike” by “following Zeus” with the succor of practical wisdom (φρόνησις). Philo also shows the same notion; that is, to follow God leads the virtue-loving souls to union with the “incorruptible God” with the help of εὐσέβεια and πίστις.

\textbf{Aristotle and the Stoics: The Platonic Goal of “Becoming like to God”}

In Aristotelian ethics, the relationship between human beings and the divine plays an important role.\textsuperscript{146} Like Plato, Socrates, Pythagoras, the Stoics, and Middle Platonists, Aristotle embraces the same process of making oneself as divine as possible, when he asserts that “we are to take thought of what is noble and divine, whether it be itself also divine or the most divine element in us” (καλῶν καὶ θείων, … ἔτεθε θείων ὃν καὶ αὐτὸ ἔτεθε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, Eth. níc. 10.1177a7). He speaks of the need of becoming more

\textsuperscript{145.} There are some Philonic passages where Philo speaks of the Pythagorean formulation “to follow God,” or “imitate God,” or “imitation of the powers of God” without the presence of the virtue εὐσέβεια (e.g., Migr. 131; Spec. 4.187, 188; Opif. 144; Virt. 168). According to Helleman (“Philo of Alexandria on Deification and Assimilation to God,” 61, 64), the mean virtues like justice and courage, are referred to as powers or gifts to be shared so that others may be benefited (cf. Spec. 4.188; Virt. 168).

like to the divine by learning, practice, and habituation. Happiness (εὐδαιμονία), the goal of human life, comes as a result of virtue (φρόνησις) and a process of learning, training, that is habituation. This state of happiness for Aristotle is “something complete,” a complete “life in accordance with complete virtue” (Eth. eud. 2.1.1219a35–39). It happens when the soul attains “to be among the most godlike things; for happiness is the prize and end of virtue, which is the best thing and something godlike and blessed” (καὶ θείόν τι καὶ μακάριον, Eth. nic. 1.9.1099b15–17). In Aristotelian ethics, happiness allows the soul to enjoy the greatest benefit (to share with the divine in contemplation), and this state is only acquired by virtue (φρόνησις). In a state of happiness, the human soul by virtue shares in contemplation with the divine insofar as is possible; to contemplate with the divine as far as happiness extends and as far as contemplation allows. As Aristotle writes, “happiness must be some form of contemplation [with the divine]” (Eth. nic. 10.8.1178b25–32).

The Platonic goal ὁμοίωσις θεῷ is in a sense equated with the Stoic τέλος “life according to nature.” Zeno described the goal of human life as “living in agreement,”

147. Aristotle compares the acquisition of virtue with learning a skill (τέχνη) like house-building or learning to play an instrument (see Eth. nic. 2.1). Cf. Annas, The Morality of Happiness, 67.

148. See also Eth. nic. 4.3.1123b35; 10.7.1177b1–4.

and his successor Cleanthes added to it the phrase “with nature,” and represented it as “living in agreement with nature” (Stobaeus 2.75.11–76.8; cf. Diogenes Laertius 7.89). However, some Stoics also view the expression “becoming like to God” as the formulation of the goal of life. For example, Cleanthes in the *Hymn to Zeus* speaks of human beings walking by the law of Zeus to “bear a likeness to God” (θεοῦ μίμημα λαχόντες, SVF 1.537). Diogenes Laertius as well declares that good men are “godlike, for they have within them something divine” (7.119). The Stoic Epictetus (55–135 C.E.) borrowing the Pythagorean formulation “to follow God” (ἕπεσθαι θεῷ) likewise speaks of it as the end or purpose of human life (*Diss*.1.30.4). According to Helleman, Philo’s writings give evidence of the influence of Stoicism, especially when he refers to the Stoic goal of “living in accordance with nature” as a legitimate goal alongside to that of the Pythagorean goal “following

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150. Long & Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 63B, 1:394. Koester (“ΝΟΜΟΣ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ, 527) writes: “the oldest form of the Stoic Telos formula in Zeno does not contain the term φύσις, but was simply τέλος... τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν, and is to be translated ‘to live in agreement with the Logos’ To Zeno’s formula, the term φύσις was added to eliminate the awkwardness of his impossible etymology of ὁμολογουμένως and to create what was to become the classical form of the Telos formula: τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν w(Cleanthes fragments 552). Antiochus of Ascalon also makes nature very important in his ethical theory. Cicero writes about Antiochus’s stand: “the first part [of philosophy]...they sought from nature and said that we must obey it, and that nowhere else but in nature was to be sought that the final good to which everything is referred. And they established that to have achieved everything from nature in mind, in body, and in life; nature is the ultimate choice worthy and the final good” (Varro 19). Cf. Annas, *The Morality of Happiness*, 181.


152. See also Epictetus, *Diss*. 1.12.5, 8; 1.20.15; *Ench*. 52.31; Seneca, *Ira*. 2.16; Cicero, *Leg*. 1.25.
God.”  

But, also in his interpretation of Gen 1:26–27 on the creation of the intelligible man “after the image of God,” Philo affirms the Platonic goal “becoming like to God” as a legitimate and proper goal of life. That goal, as it has been shown, involves a choice based on knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and reason (λόγος), a choice to pursue goodness, and to cultivate virtues, which are in turn imitations of divine virtues. Although Helleman overlooks Philo’s association of the virtue εὐσέβεια with the formulation of the goal of life “becoming like to God,” her connection of it with reason is definitely valuable in Philo’s ethical discourse.

The Platonic Goal of “Becoming like to God” and Middle Platonism

Plato’s Theaetetus, as scholars argued, is the closest to Philo’s ideal of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, the τέλος of the human life (see chapter one). In Theaet. 176B, Plato has Socrates say, “we should make all speed to take flight from this world to the other, and that means becoming like to the divine so far as we can, and that again is to become righteous and holy with the help of wisdom [φρόνησις].” For Plato’s Socrates, one becomes like to

153. Helleman, “Philo of Alexandria on Deification and Assimilation to God,” 66.


155. Helleman, “Philo of Alexandria on Deification and Assimilation to God,” 70.

156. See also Plato’s Phaed. 253A; Crito 54; Tim. 69A; Leg. 716C; Resp. 500D; 613B, 631B; Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, 28; Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.49.8–9. According to Schenck (A Brief Guide to Philo, 66), in terms of ethics, Philo “preferred the Platonic goal of life as “likeness to God” (Fug. 63). Such likeness entailed becoming just and holy with wisdom. For Philo, knowledge of God was the secret to human happiness and the good life (Det. 86).” Although Schenck is in part right, he overlooks the place of the virtue εὐσέβεια in Philo’s ethical discourse, and the fact that Philo is also influenced by his Stoic, Aristotelian, and Phytagorean traditions. For a detailed analysis on Plato’s Theaetetus and the ideal “becoming like to God,” see Lloyd P. Gerson, “Platonism in Aristotle’s
God by becoming virtuous; that is, the notion of becoming like to God is what becoming virtuous is. Socrates believes that “in human life good and evil will always be mixed up, and it is useless thinking that evil will ever be eliminated;” God however is never evil, but always just and virtuous. This is the reason why a soul should escape from earth to heaven, and escape means becoming as like to God as possible. A soul becomes like to God when he or she becomes just and pure, with understanding.

This leads to two important points, which are reflected in Philo’s treatment of his virtue εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse. (1) The need to move away from the earthly or sensible (αἰσθητός) to the intelligible or heavenly (νοητός). Philo’s εὐσέβεια as the source which has the power to lead the virtue-loving souls to God belongs to this heavenly realm.

(2) The state of perfection, which the soul attains by “becoming like to God,” is acquired once the soul moves away from the earthly world (κόσμος αἰσθητός) and reaches the intelligible world (κόσμος νοητός). Philo’s εὐσέβεια is the virtue that shares God’s divine qualities to lead the virtue-loving soul to the heavenly world, which ultimately is the goal of life: “becoming like to God.”

Here, patterns of Middle Platonism are evident. For Middle Platonists, like Alcinous, the highest happiness is the natural goal of the acquisition of virtue by reason


158. Annas, Platonic Ethics, Old and New, 54, 59–60. For Plato, human nature is very complex and tripartite, and in order to liken to God, the soul must escape (flight from) the conditions of human life, from the mix of good and evil in our world. See Plato’s Phaed. 64E. Here Plato emphasizes the need for the soul to withdraw from the things of the body. Cf. Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 9.
(λόγος). Similar to Plato’s Laws (716A), Alcinous claims, “the only elements in us… which can attain likeness with it are intellect [νοῦν] and reason [λόγον]… and happiness [τὴν δὲ εὐδαιμονίαν] is not to be found in human good, but in the divine and blessed souls.”\(^{159}\) As such, he understood the goal of human life as a movement away from the material towards the immaterial and intelligible, the realm of the divine.\(^{160}\) Therefore, for Philo, like Plato, Socrates (Thea. 176A-C), and Alcinous, the τέλος of “becoming like to God” (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ) in his ethical discourse is a process of transition (Fug. 62–64; cf. Mos. 1.146),\(^{161}\) which consists moving away from the earthly/sensible world (which is characterized as a world of vices, corruption, material, and mortal) to the heavenly/intelligent world (which is characterized as a world of virtues, of incorruption, of immateriality, and of immortality). Philo’s ethical discourse stands in close association with these characteristics of emerging Middle Platonism. In fact, he particularly shows the trends of Middle Platonism in the first century C.E. Nevertheless, in Philo’s ethical discourse, “becoming like to God” is a process that is guided by the one virtue, εὐσέβεια, and not by φρόνησις.

A similar expression about the ideal of “becoming like to God” is found also in another Middle Platonist, Eudorus of Alexandria (ca. 25 B.C.E.), a contemporary of Philo.


\(^{161}\) Cf. Helleman, “Philo of Alexandria on Deification and Assimilation to God,” 62.
According to Dillon, Eudorus was directly influenced by Plato’s *Theaetetus* (176A-B).\(^{162}\)

Eudorus says:

Socrates and Plato agree with Pythagoras that the τέλος is becoming like to God (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ). Plato defines this more clearly by adding: ‘(according) as far as we can [κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν], and it is only possible by practical wisdom [φρόνησις], that is to say, as a result of Virtue.’\(^{163}\)

Eudorus affirms that “becoming like to God” is the goal not only for Plato, but also for Socrates and Pythagoras; Plato, however, made the formula more precise.\(^{164}\) Winston argues that Philo, who adopts the Platonic ideal of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, follows in the footsteps of Eudorus of Alexandria (e.g., *Fug.* 63 where Philo quotes Plato’s *Theaet.* 176A-B).\(^{165}\)

Plato’s *Theaet.* 176B includes the virtue φρόνησις as an important virtue in the process of “becoming like to God,” and Eudorus follows that.\(^{166}\) Philo in his ethical discourse,

\(^{162}\) According to Dillon (*Alcinous*, xxxviii), Eudorus of Alexandria abandoned the Stoic definition of “life in accordance with nature” that Antiochus of Ascalon adopted, and he took a more spiritual, Platonic ideal of “becoming like to God.” See also Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 9, 44, 114, 122–24. Cf. Helleman, “Philo of Alexandria on Deification and Assimilation to God,” 54.


\(^{164}\) This refers to the idea that Plato defined the formula “becoming like to God” according to the parts of philosophy: in the way appropriate to physics in the *Timaeus*, ethics in the *Republic*, and logic in the *Theaetetus*. Becoming like to God means contemplating and following the cosmic order (*Timaeus*), escaping from the world of the senses (*Republic*), and using the mind (*Theaetetus*). See Bonazzi, “Eudorus of Alexandria and Early Imperial Platonism,” 366.

\(^{165}\) See also Opif. 144, 146; *Virt.* 8–9, 168–169, 204–205; Spec. 4,73, 188; *Decal.* 72–75; Leg. 2.4; Plato, *Tim.* 90A–E; *Laws* 716B. See Winston, “Philo’s Ethical Theory,” 398; *The Wisdom of Solomon*, 44–45.

\(^{166}\) Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 123.
however, does not connect the τέλος formula with φρόνησις, as Eudorus, Alcinus, Socrates, Plato, and Pythagoras do. Although, both Philo and Eudorus are directly dependent on Plato, Philo departs from Eudorus in that he takes the virtue of εὐσέβεια as essential in his ethical discourse by way in which the soul “becomes like to God.”

Sterling rightly argues that Philo shares with these philosophical ways of defining the ideal or goal of human life (see chapter one). In one way or another, Philo expresses the philosophical notions that the end of human life entails a sort of being with the divine, or sharing with the divine in his likeness. But, also Philo’s ethical discourse departs from his Platonic, Socratic, Aristotelian, and Pythagorean traditions, including that of Eudorus and Alcinous. The τέλος of the virtue-loving soul in Philo’s ethical discourse lies on the intrinsic connection between the virtue εὐσέβεια and the Platonic goal of life “becoming like to God.” As was said, it is εὐσέβεια, and not φρόνησις, that Philo associates with either the Platonic formula “becoming like to God” (e.g., Her. 186; Fug. 63), which Antiochus of Ascalon adopted,167 or the Pythagorean formulation “to follow God” (Migr. 131–132; Abr. 60–61), or the Aristotelian principle of “becoming like to the divine” (e.g., QE 2.15b; QG 4.19), or the Stoic ideal of “living in accordance with nature [virtue or reason]” (QG 1.100). Therefore, in Philo’s ethical discourse, the practice of the virtue εὐσέβεια through reason (λόγος) allows the virtue-loving soul to enjoy a virtuous life (the fruits of εὐσέβεια), which is a life of perfection, holiness, and knowledge of God. It is a life that leads the virtue-loving soul to attain the goal: becoming like to God.

Table 15. The Basic Doctrine in Philosophical Ethical Systems and Philo’s Ethical Discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosophical tradition</th>
<th>Goal of human life</th>
<th>Primary Virtue</th>
<th>Intermediate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plato/Socrates</td>
<td>Happiness: Becoming like to God</td>
<td>φρόνησις</td>
<td>λόγος</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoics</td>
<td>Happiness: Living in accordance with nature (=reason or virtue)</td>
<td>φρόνησις</td>
<td>λόγος</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>Happiness: Becoming like to the divine</td>
<td>φρόνησις</td>
<td>λόγος</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pythagoras</td>
<td>To follow God</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philo</td>
<td>Virtuous life: Becoming like to God</td>
<td>εὐσέβεια</td>
<td>λόγος</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusion**

There is a kind of life for human beings to live. According to Philo’s ethical discourse, that life is founded especially in one virtue, εὐσέβεια, and in the obedience to the ethical commandments of the Mosaic Law, which for Philo, is the Supreme Law equivalent to the Law of Nature or Unwritten Law. The practice of the ethical commandments of the Mosaic Law leads the human soul to the virtue of εὐσέβεια, and through reason (λόγος) virtue-loving souls reach the goal of becoming like to God. Philo’s treatment of εὐσέβεια is similar to the way philosophical schools talk about this virtue. However, he adopts philosophical ethical conceptions and categories in ways that his ethical discourse becomes the best representation of philosophical ethical discourse *Judaized*. His ethical discourse presents all the philosophical components necessary to lead the virtue-loving
souls to the highest good and happiness of human life. It exhorts how to attain virtues and avoid vices; how to acquire perfection and knowledge of God; and how to become like to God.

Philo in his ethical discourse takes and adopts not only one or two categories and notions of the philosophical tradition, but a combination of Platonic, Socratic, Aristotelian, Pythagorean, and Stoic ethical systems. Philo describes his ethical discourse in ways that parallel the constitution of philosophical ethical systems. In fact, he is influenced by the various trends of thought of philosophical ethical tradition. For example, the idea that virtue is one (or virtues are one), the principle of the highest good, happiness, or goal of human life, the idea of the *mean*, reason and knowledge, and the Middle Platonic categories that describe εὐσέβεια (divine, immortal, and incorrupt) find their root in the philosophical ethical discourses. Furthermore, his presentation of the three elements for the acquisition of virtue (nature, instruction, and practice) in connection with the virtue εὐσέβεια was a basic Middle Platonic doctrine in the first century C.E. Philo applies all of these elements to configure his ethical discourse around the virtue of εὐσέβεια. As a good representative of emerging Middle Platonism, he combines and interconnects the various philosophical strands, a fact that became a major characteristic during the Middle Platonic period (ca. 25 B.C.E.–40 C.E.). It was a time of coalescing philosophies and notions about moral life. As Dillon notes, in Greek philosophical ethics, no strict canon of ethics prevailed. Philo finds himself in this


complex world, and the different uses of εὐσέβεια in the configuration of his ethical
discourse show that.

**Conclusion to Chapters Three, Four, and Five**

These chapters have shown in detail Philo's understanding of εὐσέβεια in his ethical
discourse, and how both Hellenistic Jewish and Greek philosophical traditions influenced
the configuration of his ethical discourse around εὐσέβεια, yet in different modes and
degrees. In Philo's Hellenistic Jewish tradition, there is a prominence given to εὐσέβεια
and that prominence is clearly reflected in his ethics. However, the philosophical
sophistication in the configuration of his ethical discourse around εὐσέβεια owes more to
his philosophical tradition. The presentation of the prominence of the place of εὐσέβεια
in light of his traditions helps us to identify where Philo stands in terms to his ethics.
Philo is not unique in his view of the Mosaic Law and its intrinsic relation with εὐσέβεια
in the acquisition of virtues. As such, his view of the connection of the Mosaic Law
with εὐσέβεια is part of the Hellenistic tradition he inherited. He remains rooted in it.
Therefore, it can be argued that the *trailing* edge in his ethical discourse is his association
of the Jewish Law with εὐσέβεια in the acquisition of virtues.

However, the sophistication of how he, as a Hellenistic Jew, integrates the
categories and conceptions from the Greek philosophical tradition into his ethical
discourse allowed him to move beyond both traditions. *First*, he takes ideas from his
Hellenistic Jewish tradition (e.g., the view of the intrinsic connection between the
Mosaic Law and εὐσέβεια, the association of εὐσέβεια with virtues, and the link between
εὐσέβεια and imitation of God or likeness to God). *Then*, influenced by the philosophical
ethical systems (e.g., Plato, Socrates, Aristotle, Stoics, Pythagoras, and Middle Platonists)
he combines these (Hellenistic Jewish) ideas with the philosophical categories and conceptions of ethics to configure his own ethical discourse around εὐσέβεια. He does it in a way that he remains rooted in both traditions, but at the same time, moves beyond both that prominence given to εὐσέβεια in his Hellenistic Jewish tradition (even beyond 4 Maccabees) and that philosophical sophistication in the Greek philosophical ethical systems. Therefore, the leading edge in terms of his ethical discourse is his appropriation of ideas, categories, and notions in order to apply them to his own understanding of εὐσέβεια. His εὐσέβεια not only becomes the central virtue in his ethical discourse, but also by attributing to it qualities and powers, εὐσέβεια attains harmony with the Existent One (τὸ ὄν), something seen nowhere in the two traditions. As we shall see in chapter nine, the way Philo structures his ethical discourse around the virtue εὐσέβεια reveals that he is a good representative of emerging Middle Platonism. But also, it reveals that in his ethical discourse, he is first a Jew, second a philosopher.

In Philo’s ethical discourse, there are three essential elements required to attain the goal of human life (becoming like to God). They are the virtue of εὐσέβεια, the λόγος, and the Mosaic Law. Three important elements are also reflected in Paul’s presentation of his ethical discourse: the concept of πνεῦμα, the figure of Christ, the Law of Christ. They will play the same roles in the acquisition of virtues and ultimately perfection as in Philo’s ethical discourse. It is therefore to Paul, a contemporary of Philo, that we move next.
CHAPTER SIX

PAUL’S ΠΝΕΥΜΑ

Introduction

Before we engage in the discussion of this chapter, two important points need to be addressed. Like Philo, Paul did not develop a full exposition of “an ethical system” in his letters, which could provide a basic picture of his ethical thought about various ethical questions. Likewise, in none of his genuine letters does Paul use the concept of πνεῦμα exclusively about ethical teaching. Although it is difficult to speak of “the ethical system

1. In terms of Paul’s complexity of his use of the concept of πνεῦμα, for instance, Gary T. Cage (The Holy Spirit: A Sourcebook with Commentary [Reno, Nevada: Charlotte House Publishers, 1995], 494) has rightly argued that “Paul is the most ambiguous of all of our writers on the subject of the Holy Spirit. Because of his ambiguousness, his interpreters have been able to spin a wide variety of doctrines from his statements.” Félix Puzo (“Significado de la palabra ‘Pneuma’ en San Pablo.” Estudios Bíblicos 1 [1942]: 437–60, spec. 437) points out that trying to examine the rich doctrine of πνεῦμα in the Pauline corpus is difficult, and even more difficult is to try to pinpoint which ones are the texts that speak precisely of God’s Spirit or the holy Spirit. Some have based their argument on the basis of the presence and absence of the definite article with πνεῦμα (the Spirit or a spirit); they take the former (the Spirit) as reference to “the Spirit,” and the latter (a spirit) as reference to the human spirit. Fee (God’s Empowering Presence, 15–28) suggests that when Paul refers to the Spirit of God or the Spirit of Christ, or the divine/holy Spirit, πνεῦμα is understood as Spirit. When Paul speaks of the human spirit or “the spirit of [a person],” πνεῦμα is understood as spirit. In this study, Fee’s position will be taken. For the various positions and discussions on this issue, see also Nigel Turner, Grammatical Insights into the New Testament (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1965), 17–22; John R. Levison in his work, Filled with the Spirit (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2009), 238; Marie E. Isaacs, The Concept of Spirit: A Study of Pneuma in Hellenistic Judaism and its Bearing on the New Testament (London: Heythrop College, 1970), 70–81; Werner G. Kümmel, Man in the New Testament (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963), 43–47; Ernest DeWitt Burton, Spirit, Soul, and Flesh (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1918). Others, like Rabens (The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul, 17–18, 248–52) has questioned whether Paul follows the Stoic view of πνεῦμα as a material substance (Stofflich) or as immaterial substance (Unstofflich). For “material spirit” in Greco-
of Paul," his letters reflect the kind of behavior that Paul expects from the believers who live in Christ. Indeed, his letters reveal Paul's desire to teach them *how* one ought to walk and please God. Also, what is particular about Paul is that he uses the concept of πνεῦμα to develop a (complex) connection between this concept and ethics, more than any other Hellenistic Jewish writer of his time, as we shall see in chapter seven. In fact,


2. Unlike Pfleiderer (*Primitive Christianity*, 1:409) who claims that Paul establishes “an ethical system,” modern scholars argue that Paul does not establish a set of moral codes, nor does he offer a coherent ethical organization. See Schnabel, “How Paul Developed His Ethics,” 267; Furnish, *Theology and Ethics in Paul*, 208–212; Thompson, *Moral Formation According to Paul*, 6, 9–10; Martin Dibelius, *From Tradition to Gospels* (New York: Scribner, 1965), 239. According to Bultmann (“Das problem der Ethik bei Paulus,” 138), Paul does not offer a new ethical set of principles; instead, he simply recognizes what was good in the judgment of the Gentiles. Similarly Betz (*Galatians: A Commentary on Paul’s Letter to the Churches in Galatia* [ed. Helmut Koester; Hermeneia,: A Critical and Historical Commentary on the Bible; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1988]) claims that in Gal 5:19–25, Paul simply summarizes conventional morality of the time, and also accepts the view that Paul might have been influenced by his Hellenistic Jewish tradition. Malherbe (“Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament,” in Wolfgang Haase and H. Temporini, eds., *Principat II: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der Neueren Forschung* [ANRW; 26.1; Berlin: De Gruyter, 1992], 269), however, argues that early Christians, including Paul, are indebted to “whatever schools happened to meet their immediate needs” (see also his “Paul: Hellenistic Philosopher or Christian Pastor?” *ATR* 68 [1986]: 86–98). Following Malherbe’s position, Engberg-Pedersen (*Paul and the Stoics*) provides crucial comparisons between Paul’s ethics and the Stoics’ and argues that Paul’s structure of his ethics is clearly influenced by the Stoics, particularly in the emphasis on the individual progress from self-centered to a concern for others. See also his “Paul, Virtues, and Vices,” in J. Paul Sampley, ed., *Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook* (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003), 608–629; and his response to Philip F. Esler (“Paul and Stoicism: Romans 12 as a Test Case.” *NTS* 50/1 [2004]: 106–124) in “The Relationship with Others: Similarities and Differences between Paul and Stoicism.” *ZNW* 96 (2005): 35–60. On the footsteps of Malherbe and especially Engberg-Pedersen, I will show that Paul does present, to some degree, an organized ethical discourse rooted in the Greek concept of πνεῦμα.


4. We will see that the concept of πνεῦμα in Paul’s letters is used to refer to different
modern scholars have recognized that πνεῦμα (Spirit) is a sine qua non factor in Paul’s ethical teaching. According to Furnish, the Spirit functions as “a guide for the believer in practical matters of conduct.”5 Fee, in his God’s Empowering Presence, refers to the πνεῦμα as “essential to Paul’s ethics, for truly Christian ethics can only be by the Spirit’s empowering.”6 Dunn in his Theology of Paul the Apostle argues that the believers’ conduct is for Paul “an outworking of the Spirit,” in which they are urged to “walk… in accordance with the Spirit.”7 Rabens in his The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul holds that for Paul “the Spirit transforms and empowers believers for religious-ethical living.”8 Recently, Thompson in his Moral Formation According to Paul has argued that in Paul the “Spirit is the divine power that equips believers to keep the commands rather than a guide to consult in making decisions.”9 These scholars in one way or another all maintain the view that for Paul πνεῦμα gives believers guidance for ethical decisions.10

things: God’s holy πνεῦμα (the Spirit of God) and Christ’s πνεῦμα (the Spirit of Christ), the holy πνεῦμα (the holy Spirit), God’s power, miraculous powers, like prophecies, free gifts (χαρίσματα), manifestations, and human spirit/body. Important to mention is also that πνεῦμα is associated with concepts like virtues, holiness, fellowship, justice/righteousness, eternal life and salvation, just to mention some. While it is true that Paul “mixes his usage” of the concept of πνεῦμα, as a result, many passages have led to multiple interpretations (see Cage, The Holy Spirit, 605–607), his association of πνεῦμα with moral exhortation in the believers’ life is clearly reflected in his letters (πνεῦμα motivates ethical behavior).

5. Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul, 231.


7. Dunn, Theology of Paul the Apostle, 642; Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 53.


While the concept of πνεῦμα has been highly stressed as the guidance and agent for moral conduct in the study of Paul’s ethics, the central role of πνεῦμα in Paul's ethical discourse still needs further analysis. More recently, the studies of Rabens and Thompson have shed new light on the understanding of Paul’s ethics. Rabens’ new approach of “religious-ethical empowerment by the relational work of the Spirit in Paul” offers a new dimension in the understanding of Paul’s πνεῦμα in his ethics, although with some limitations (see chapter one). Thompson’s study has, likewise, explored the Greek (philosophical) and Jewish traditions as Paul’s backgrounds of his ethical teaching, and how his ethics can be understood within the existing models of Greco-Roman morality and Jewish tradition.11 However, πνεῦμα as the key element of empowerment for a virtuous and holy life in Paul’s thought has not yet been satisfactorily explored. This chapter attempts to throw new light on Paul’s ethical discourse by seeing the concept of πνεῦμα as central for the acquisition of virtues and the avoidance of vices. This new and

11. Unlike Rabens, Thompson’s study does not focus on πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethics. However, Thompson provides a comprehensive examination of Paul’s moral guidance within the larger context of his role as a pastor and theologian in the Hellenistic world. Although Paul does not provide a code of ethics, he asserts, Paul offers an important model for ethical conduct as he re-interprets the Old Testament in light of the story of Christ. At the same time, Paul’s participation in the larger Greco-Roman world allowed him, like other Hellenistic Jewish authors (e.g., Philo, Wisdom of Solomon, and 4 Maccabees) to borrow some moral values corresponding to Greek philosophical tradition to reinterpret the teachings of the Law.
fresh approach analyzes the different ways that Paul shows πνεῦμα’s privileged place in his ethical discourse. The following chapters, seven and eight, will examine how the Hellenistic Jewish and Greek philosophical traditions influenced Paul in the configuration of his ethical discourse rooted on the concept of πνεῦμα. This will be done in light of, and in comparison to, Philo of Alexandria, Paul’s contemporary.¹²

The Greek word πνεῦμα is a verbal noun from the root πνέω (πνείω in Homer) meaning “to blow,” or “to breathe.”¹³ Matthew Edwards notes that in the Greek world the meaning of πνεῦμα varied from author to author, especially when it was used within different philosophical systems. In the Jewish Scripture (LXX), πνεῦμα is a concept often

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¹². While doing my research, I found very interesting Nijay K. Gupta’s comment (“The Theo-Logic of Paul’s Ethics in Recent Research: Crosscurrents and Future Directions in Scholarship in the Last Forty Years,” 354). He writes, “An interesting area for further research is a comparative approach that puts Paul’s letters side-by-side with another (probably contemporaneous) writer. Morlang attempted this in comparison of the ethical constructs of Matthew and Paul (1984), but this, I think, could be done for Paul in comparison to, for example, Philo or the Qumran writers. An exercise in comparison may shed light on interesting levels of agreement and disagreement, as well as hermeneutical and philosophical paradigms.” His observation is similar to that of Rabens’. He writes, “A number of major issues have been left unresolved in the course of previous research. Apart from the puzzle of the two broad lines of interpretation of the Spirit’s work mentioned above [referring the literature engaged in his study], a first set of questions concerns the religious background of Paul’s understanding of the relation of Spirit and ethics. Was Paul influenced by Hellenism in this regard (Pfleiderer, Horn, Engberg-Pedersen et al.)? Or was his thinking on this matter based on the Old Testament (Wendt et al.)? Or early Judaism (Gunkel et al.)?” (The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul, 305). Hopefully, my study will cover some of Gupta’s observations and give answers to some of Rabens’ questions.

used as a translation for the Hebrew word רווח (breath and wind). But, as we shall see in the following chapters, the concept of πνεῦμα was primarily understood in terms of the movement of air, whether within the human soul as breath or outside of the human soul as wind. The notion of the term πνεῦμα is expanded by Paul, whose understanding of πνεῦμα includes not only the reference to the human spirit (e.g., 1 Cor 2:11) or the interior part of human being (e.g., Rom 1:9), but principally, his use of πνεῦμα as related to the divine (the Spirit of God) includes an ethical dimension; πνεῦμα is used as a central element to teach the believers about the acquisition of virtues and the avoidance of vices.

Πνεῦμα in Paul's Seven Undisputed Letters

During his missionary career (ca. 33–68 C.E.), Paul as the founder and leader of various early Christian communities, interacted frequently via letter with the believers. This back-and-forth letter-interaction was primarily due to three reasons: (1) to maintain close ties with the believers of the communities, especially with those he founded; (2) to continue exhorting and teaching (and sometimes re-teaching) the believers about what

14. Edwards, *Pneuma and Realized Eschatology in the Book of Wisdom*, 107. Because the term πνεῦμα is employed in different contexts and with diverse meanings, some have questioned whether πνεῦμα is to be understood as “one single” concept or as separate and distinct categories representing “a number” of concepts. This study follows the view of Isaacs, who argues that in Hellenistic Judaism πνεῦμα, apart from its usage as “wind,” is regarded as “one” concept. For a detailed discussion on this issue, see Isaacs, *The Concept of Spirit*, 59–64.

their new life in Christ entails and how they ought to live virtuously pleasing to God; and (3), because of the challenges that brought about the preaching of his gospel within the broader spectrum of early Christian communities, Paul in certain circumstances was forced to defend the authority of both his gospel and apostleship. Therefore, unlike his contemporary Philo who wrote treatises, mainly about interpretation of the Jewish Scripture—the reasons for writing them are still obscure (see chapter two)—Paul wrote letters, which addressed directly specific issues and concerns of the communities. So, when reading his letters, one senses the particularities of each community, its problems and needs, its weaknesses and strengths within their own contexts, as well as Paul’s personal character in relation to the different communities.

There are 13 letters attributed to Paul in the New Testament; however, the majority of scholars agree that only seven are authentic letters written by Paul—First Thessalonians, Galatians, First and Second Corinthians, Philippians, Philemon, and Romans. The study

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17. Paul’s letters, however, present a mixed type of genres similar to those found in Greek and Roman handbooks. In his letters, he combines, manipulates, and conforms to the familiar genres dexterously. On this topic, see Patrick Gray, *Opening Paul’s letters: A Reader’s Guide to Genre and Interpretation* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2012), 39–65, esp. 52–61.

18. The 6 disputed letters, sometimes referred to as deuterological or pseudo-Pauline letters are: 2 Thessalonians, Ephesians, Colossians, and the pastoral letters (1 and 2 Timothy, and Titus). Because of the difference in vocabulary and style, and themes of these letters, most scholars today agree that these letters come from the Pauline school tradition. See Eduard Lohse, “Changes of Thought in Pauline Theology? Some Reflections on Paul’s Ethical Teaching in the Context of His Theology,” in Eugene H. Lovering, Jr. and Jerry L. Sumney, eds., *Theology and Ethics in Paul and His Interpreters: Essays in Honor of Victor Paul Furnish* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), 148–49; François Bassin, *Les Épîtres de Paul aux Thessaloniens* (CEB 13; Vaux-sur-Seine, France: Edifac, 1991), 46–50. The first to question the authenticity of several of Paul’s letter was Ferdinand C. Baur, the founder of the Tübingen School in Germany. In his *Paul, the Apostle of Jesus Christ, his Life*
of the different ways he privileges the place of πνεῦμα as the central element in his ethical discourse derive from these seven undisputed letters; the other letters will be referred in the footnotes only insofar as the study requires it. Paul’s use of the concept of πνεῦμα is complex; this complexity and characteristic understanding of πνεῦμα’s central place in his ethical discourse are mainly depicted in three major sections: (A) πνεῦμα and its relation to the gospel (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον), and to the Mosaic Law (ὁ νόμος), (B) πνεῦμα as the opposite of the “flesh” (σάρξ), and (C) the relationship of πνεῦμα to the practice of virtues, especially the love commandment. Since each of Paul’s letter embodies the believers’ situation in their own communities, these three major sections are treated individually in each of his genuine letters. The logic for this is simple: as Paul deals with specific issues in each community, and the believers express their particular needs, πνεῦμα as the key concept of his ethical discourse also has a special emphasis on each letter. This organization will illuminate how in each letter Paul shows πνεῦμα’s preeminent role in the believers’ virtuous life. As in Philo, this threefold structure will offer us a window into the configuration of Paul’s ethical discourse. But, before we move on to the discussion of the chapter, two

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features are briefly described; they will serve as the ground for the presentation of the three main sections of Paul’s understanding of ρνεῦμα in his ethical discourse.

Πνεῦμα as Power and the Spirit of God

In Paul’s seven undisputed letters, πνεῦμα and its cognates (πνευματικός [adj.] and πνευματικῶς [adv.]) appear 122 times.\(^{19}\) Paul often connects πνεῦμα with “power” (δύναμις),\(^{20}\) the connection between these terms is an important feature in Paul’s letters and serves as foundational for the composition of his ethics.\(^{21}\) Of the 53 occurrences of δύναμις and its cognates in Paul’s letters, 18 times the term is explicitly linked with πνεῦμα,\(^{22}\) and as we shall see, this often occurs in connection with both “the gospel” (1 Thess 1:5; 1

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\(^{19}\) The noun πνεῦμα: 1 Thess 1:5, 6; 4:8; 5:19, 23; Gal 3:2, 3, 5, 14; 4:6, 29; 5:5, 16, 17, 18, 22, 25 [twice]; 29; 6:1, 8, 18; 1 Cor 2:4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14; 3:16; 4:21; 5:3, 4, 5; 6:11, 17, 19; 7:34, 40; 12:3, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13; 14:2, 14, 15 [twice]; 16, 32; 15:45; 16:18; 2 Cor 1:22; 2:13; 3:3, 6, 8, 17 [twice]; 4:13; 5:5; 6:6; 7:1, 13; 11:4; 12:18; 13:13; Phil 1:19, 27; 2:1; 3:3; 4:23; Phlm 25; Rom 1:4, 9; 2:29; 5:5; 7:6; 8:2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15 [twice]; 16, 23, 26, 27; 9:1; 11:8; 14:17; 15:13, 16, 19, 30; the adjective πνευματικός: Gal 6:1; 1 Cor 2:13, 15; 3:1; 9:11; 10:3; 4, 4; 12:1; 14:1, 37; 15:44 [twice], 46 [twice]; Rom 1:11; 7:14; 15:27; and the adverb πνευματικῶς: 1 Cor 2:14. For an excellent illustration of Paul’s usage of πνεῦμα and its cognates, see Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 14–36.

\(^{20}\) See 1 Thess 1:5; 3:9 [δυνάμεθα], Gal 3:5; 1 Cor 1:18, 24, 26; 2:4, 5, 14 [οὐ δύναται]; 3:1 [οὐκ ἠδυνήθην], 2 [ἐδύνασθε], 2 [δύνασθε]; 3:11 [δύναται]; 4:19, 20; 5:4; 6:14; 10:13 [δύνασθε], 13 [δύνασθαι]; 12:10, 28, 29; 15:24, 43, 50 [οὗ δύναται]; 15:56; 2 Cor 1:8; 3:7 [δύνασθαι]; 4:7; 6:6–7; 8:3, 3; 9:8 [δυνατεῖ]; 10:4; 12:9, 10, 12; 13:3 [δυνατεῖ], 4, 4, 8 [δυνάμεθα], 9; Phil 3:10 [δύναμιν], 3:21 [δύνασθαι]; 4:13 [ἐνδυναμώνητι]; Rom 1:4, 16, 20; 4:20 [ἐνδυναμώθη], 21; 8:7 [δύναται], 8 [δύναται], 38, 39 [δυνήσεται]; 9:17, 22; 14:4 [δυνατεί]; 15:13, 19 [twice]; 16:25 [δυναμένω]. In the letter to Philemon, there is no reference to the word δύναμις.

\(^{21}\) According to Liddell and Scott (A Greek-English Lexicon, 452), the term δύναμις means “power,” “force,” “faculty,” “capacity,” and “potentiality”; definitions that are closely related to the domains of the human intellect.

\(^{22}\) See 1 Thess 1:5; Gal 3:5; 1 Cor 2:4; 5:4–5, 14; 3:1; 5:4; 12:9–11; 2 Cor 6:6–7; Rom 1:4; 15:13, 19. In the letters to the Philippians and Philemon, there is not an association between πνεῦμα and δύναμις.
Cor 2:4–5; 2 Cor 6:6–7; Rom 15:19), and “Christ” (1 Cor 5:4; Phil 3:10, 20–21; 4:13; Rom 1:4). Another major characteristic reflected in Paul’s ethics is that πνεῦμα is defined as “the Spirit of God” (πνεῦμα θεοῦ) and sometimes as “the Spirit of Christ” (πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ). In fact, the emphasis on πνεῦμα as “the Spirit of God” is attested in six of his undisputed letters (except Philemon). Paul’s Christocentric views led him to describe πνεῦμα as “the Spirit of Christ” (except in first Thessalonians and Philemon). This new application, as it shall be shown below, is first expressed in the letter to the Galatians, when Paul formulates for the first time the framework of the ethical role of πνεῦμα (5:13–6:10), and comes fully expressed in Romans. When he describes the believers’ life in πνεῦμα (Rom 8:1–39), he identifies “the Spirit of God” as “the Spirit of Christ” (Rom 8:9).

The Relationship of Πνεῦμα to Virtues and Vices

In Paul’s ethical discourse, God’s divine and holy πνεῦμα is the principal power through which the believer in Christ has the capacity to practice virtues and to avoid vices. What is at stake is the practice of virtues and the avoidance of vices by the “power” of God’s holy πνεῦμα. The crucial role of πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethics is articulated in detail for the first time in the letter to the Galatians (5:13–6:10), in the midsts of his argument in response to the...
controversy regarding the issue of the observance of the Mosaic Law. It is, however, in the letter to the Romans where the configuration of the role of πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethical discourse is re-described in a way that what he had radically claimed in Galatians is shifted to a more moderate understanding of the dynamic work of πνεῦμα in the believer’s virtuous life.

Therefore, the presentation of the argument in this chapter takes Galatians as the most important letter, in the sense that this letter sets out for the first time the structure (or skeleton) of Paul’s ethical discourse. The essential elements highlighted in first Thessalonians, the earliest of Paul’s letters, serve as “a base” for the connection that Paul later elaborates between his ethics and πνεῦμα. Indeed, this connection becomes crystallized in Galatians. For this reason, the analysis of Galatians emphasizes the central argument, especially in 5:13–6:10, with respect to Paul’s view of the Mosaic Law and the role of πνεῦμα.

We will see that in first and second Corinthians, Philippians, and Philemon, Paul carries out in different ways essential elements from the “core” of his ethics he structured in Galatians: the role of πνεῦμα in the life of the believers, who have faith in Christ, is to enable them the practice of virtues and the avoidance of vices. In Romans, we will see how Paul again draws on, and moves away from, the ethical template of Galatians in a way that he re-directs his understanding of the Mosaic Law and the role of πνεῦμα in a different direction.

Paul’s First Letter to the Thessalonians

First Thessalonians was probably Paul’s first letter written early in his apostolic career, perhaps sometime between the years 49 and 51 C.E.26 The letter is a brief correspondence

26. The dating of the letter is somewhat disputed. For recent good commentaries, see John Byron, 1 and 2 Thessalonians (The Story of God Bible Commentary; Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 2014); Jeffrey A. D. Weima, 1–2 Thessalonians (BECNT; Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2014); Gary S. Shogren, 1 & 2 Thessalonians (ZECSNT; ed. Clinton E. Arnold; Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 2012); Ben Witherington III, 1 and 2 Thessalonians: A Socio-
which reflects Paul’s (also Timothy’s and Silvanus’) special fondness towards his Thessalonian community after its founding. The urgency for writing this letter was to clarify some important issues, about which the believers in Thessalonica asked Paul for advice, as well as to deal with (some?) problems Timothy might have perceived while staying with them. While most scholars have recognized only chapters 4 and 5 as exhortatory, the letter as a whole is pervaded with an ethical tone from beginning to end, in which essential elements in Paul’s ethics—the gospel and the virtue of brotherly love—ought to be the focus of their actions.


29. Commentators note that only 1 Thess 4–5 contain ethical exhortation. Shogren (1 & 2 Thessalonians, 150–51) claims that only 4:1 turns to the ethical exhortation: do this, don’t do that; in fact, with the phrase “beyond that” (λοιπὸν οὖν) Paul for the first time gives his readers a word of exhortation.” Likewise, Green (The Letters to the Thessalonians, 181) identifies chapters 4 and 5 as ethically-oriented toward giving moral instruction to the believers in Christ at Thessalonica. For Witherington III (1 and 2 Thessalonians, 107), in chapters 4 and 5 Paul’s exhortation follows both the convention and regular topos of epideictic rhetoric as he praises key virtues and condemns vices. See also Weima, 1–2 Thessalonians, 246; Dunn, Beginning from Jerusalem, 2:709. Unlike these scholars, Malherbe (The Letters to the Thessalonians, 80) suggests that throughout first Thessalonians “paraenesis features (ethical exhortation/instruction) are present, and that they perform a pastoral function;” that is, Paul puts the “paraenetic” style to a pastoral use (pastoral paraenesis). See also Paul and the Popular Philosophers, 49; “Exhortation in First Thessalonians.” NovT 25 (1983): 238–56.
love—are connected with πνεῦμα. Paul encourages, admonishes, and exhorts the believers in the community of Thessalonica to “abstain from evil [vices]” and live a life “pleasing to God.” Therefore, Paul’s statement in 1:5 (“because our gospel did not come to you in word only but also in power [ἐν δυνάμει] and in holy Spirit [ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ] and [in] much conviction, just as you know what kind of men we were [in] you because of you”) encapsulates the whole of the letter’s ethical exhortation (paraenesis).30

Πνεῦμα and Its Relation to the Gospel and to the Mosaic Law in First Thessalonians

It is important to mention that in first Thessalonians, in none of the 5 references to πνεῦμα (1:5, 6; 4:8; 5:19; 5:23 [the human spirit]) Paul connects it with ὁ νόμος; in fact, he never mentions the word ὁ νόμος.31 In the letter, it is the figure of Christ that is central as he calls himself and his co-workers, Silvanus and Timothy, “apostles of Christ” (2:7). For Paul, τὸ εὐαγγέλιον (the gospel or the good news) is the essential factor in the life of the Thessalonian believers, especially Jesus’ death and resurrection, which become the key in the development of his ethical discourse.32 The believers are to guide their ethical conduct


31. From Paul’s correspondence with the Thessalonian believers and Timothy’s report (3:1–2, 6), it appears that the community in Thessalonica was far from experiencing either internal or external threats regarding the correct understanding about salvation through faith in Christ, and not through the observance of the Mosaic Law. It also seems that the authority of Paul’s apostleship and his gospel were not questioned by the Thessalonian believers.

32. Byron (1 and 2 Thessalonians, 25) claims correctly that “the death and resurrection of Jesus underpins everything Paul argues in this letter.” Furnish (Theology and Ethics in Paul, 66) also argues that Paul’s ethics must be appreciated in terms of his revelation of Christ and the new reality following the death and resurrection of the Messiah. Paul’s source is the teaching of Jesus (gospel of God and of Christ). As Tobin (The Spirituality of Paul [Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock,
by hearing and living the gospel imparted to them by Paul and his co-workers. In first Thessalonians, therefore, the gospel is associated with: (1) πνεῦμα, and (2) a virtuous life.

**Πνεῦμα and the Gospel (Τὸ Ἑὐαγγέλιον)**

In First Thessalonians, Paul establishes the crucial relationship of his ethics and πνεῦμα by depicting the whole of his ethical discourse as founded in the “unity” of the gospel, God/Christ, and the holy πνεῦμα. In the letter, Paul explicitly mentions τὸ Ἑὐαγγέλιον 7 times (1:5; 2:2, 4, 8, 9; 3:2, 6). For Paul, τὸ Ἑὐαγγέλιον is both “the gospel of God” (2:2, 8–9) and “the gospel of Christ” (3:2). When he implicitly emphasizes the gospel of God or of Christ, he refers to it as both the “word of God” (2:13; cf. 1:6) and the “word of the Lord” (1:8; 4:15). Paul links the gospel—Jesus’ teachings during his ministry—with God, to suggest that Paul's proclamation of the gospel (3:6) is also the “word of God” (2:13). As Weima notes, for

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33. 1:5; 2:2, 4, 8, 9; 3:2, 6. For a good discussion about Paul's understanding of the gospel, see Graham N. Staton, “Paul's Gospel,” in Dunn, St Paul, 173–84.

34. Cf. Byron, 1 & 2 Thessalonians, 25. “The Lord” in 1:8 and 4:15 refers to Christ because in 4:15, Paul speaks of the coming of “the Lord” at his “coming” (παρουσία), and in 5:23, Paul clarifies that the Lord is Christ when he writes, “in the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.” However, Shogren (1 & 2 Thessalonians, 110) strongly argues that “word of God” in 4:15 (his translation is “an oracle from the Lord”), which finds its parallel in the LXX (specifically in 3 Kgs [Kgdms] 13:18), might not be a reference to Jesus' earthly ministry and teaching but to a word given to a Christian prophet such as Silas (Acts 15:32) or even Paul himself. It is something like a revelation found in John 14:26, where the Evangelist writes that the Spirit would “teach [them] all things.” But Shogren fails to acknowledge that the central focus on first Thessalonians is the gospel, which is closely linked to the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Therefore, in 4:15 “word of God” does refer also to Jesus' earthly ministry. This idea follows the view of Green, see The Letters to the Thessalonians, 221, and Weima, 1–2 Thessalonians, 321–22.

35. In 1 Thess, Paul does not explicitly explain or define the meaning of the gospel.
Paul and his co-workers the “source” of their gospel is God himself.\textsuperscript{36} Through Paul and his co-workers, the gospel came to them not only in “word,” but also in power and in the holy Spirit (ἐν δυνάμει καὶ ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ, 1:5).

Paul relates πνεῦμα with the holiness of God. Paul calls πνεῦμα “holy” (ἀγιος) in 3 instances (1:5 [πνεύματι ἁγίῳ], 6 [πνεύματος ἁγίου]; and 4:8 [τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ τὸ ἁγιον]).\textsuperscript{37} This identification serves as a foundation for the strong association he will make between the role of πνεῦμα and the acquisition of virtues in Galatians and in his later genuine letters. By ascribing πνεῦμα the quality of holiness, Paul reminds the Thessalonian believers what they already know (οἴδατε): that the source of their “sanctification” (ἁγιασμός), which comes through the holy πνεῦμα, has its roots in God’s divine and holy nature.\textsuperscript{38} Therefore, it should not surprise the Thessalonian believers that the gospel (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον) came to them in power (ἐν δυνάμει) and in “holy Spirit” (ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ), so that they are able to act virtuously and avoid vices (2:1–3:13; 4:1–5:18).\textsuperscript{39} Branick’s statement reflects the unity of the gospel and God’s holy πνεῦμα in the believers’ search for

\textsuperscript{36} Weima, 1–2 Thessalonians, 160, 162–64.

\textsuperscript{37} In 4:8, like in 2 Cor 1:22; 5:5; and Rom 11:8, Paul applies the Jewish formula “God gave the spirit in us” as found in Ezekiel 36:26–27; 37:6, 10, 14.

\textsuperscript{38} A distinct argument is offered by Fee (God’s Empowering Presence, 51–52), who argues that in 4:8, the source of the Thessalonian believers to live in holiness is actually only the holy Spirit, taking completely away God’s own participation in πνεῦμα’s holiness.

\textsuperscript{39} Fee (God’s Empowering Presence, 44–45) argues that for Paul the Spirit is the source of power in both Paul’s preaching the gospel and in the believers’ conversion. Since Fee does not deal exclusively with Paul’s πνεῦμα in his ethics, he clearly does not acknowledge πνεῦμα’s primary role in Paul’s exhortation to the Thessalonian believers. However, Fee believes that πνεῦμα plays a crucial role in Pauline ethics, first because “for Paul there is no such thing as ‘salvation in Christ’ that does not also includes righteousness on the part of God’s people;” and second, because “truly Christian ethics can only be by the Spirit’s empowering.” See Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 878–79.
their sanctification; he writes, “Paul is somewhat distinctive with his hint at an individual or personal relationship to the Spirit on the basis of some personal decision, namely, accepting the gospel.”

Accepting the gospel becomes crucial in the believers’ virtuous lives. As we shall see in the next subsection, for Paul, the Mosaic Law (νόμος) no longer plays a role in his ethics, and the believers understood that only the gospel, lived as taught by Paul (and those exercising leadership), confers a holy life that is “pleasing to God.”

**The Gospel (Τὸ Ἑὐαγγέλιον) and A Virtuous Life**

In first Thessalonians, God’s holy πνεῦμα enables the believers to live their virtuous life in light of the new teachings provided by the gospel, and not by the Mosaic Law. Dunn notes that “all that Paul had in view was the actual illuminating, convincing power of the gospel itself.”

According to Paul, his “visit” to Thessalonica was not in vain (2:1; 3:6; cf. 2:7–12; 2:20), because the believers there have learned and lived the gospel of God (of Christ) well. His emphasis on the connection between the gospel and virtues is shown in a context in which he is dealing with the community’s—and his own—issues and concerns. At the beginning of the letter, he directly points to the “goal” (τέλος) of

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40. Branick, *Understanding Paul and His Letters*, 129.

41. While commentators have made emphasis on the importance of faith for salvation in first Thessalonians, none has acknowledged the view that the gospel replaces the Mosaic Law. See Weima, *1–2 Thessalonians*, 86.

42. Dunn, *The Theology of Paul the Apostle*, 456.

43. Although Green recognizes the believers’ faith in 3:7, his interpretation of 3:10 takes another turn when he claims that the faith of the Thessalonian believers had “deficiencies” (ὑστερήματα) and supports his claim with Paul’s statement in 3:2 (pages 174–75). Green ignores, however, Paul’s other statements, especially in 1:7, where he sees them as “examples” of faith; even in times of hardship “their faith prevailed” (3:6). See Green, *The Letters to the Thessalonians*, 170.

44. Malherbe, *The Letters to the Thessalonians*, 76.
living the gospel of Christ when he exhorts, “become imitators [μιμηταὶ] of us and of the Lord” (1:6; see also 2:14) and praises them because they are “an example [τύπον] to all the ones believing in Macedonia and in Achaia” (1:7). Then, he develops his ethical thought around this notion in conjunction with his and his co-workers’ own experience and the community’s matters of concerns. Therefore in light of the gospel’s power, Paul’s ethical exhortation is expressed in a twofold way: (1) that Paul, Silvanus and Timothy encourage the believers (1:2–5:10; 19–25) and (2) that the believers also encourage one another (4:18; 5:11–18). Indeed, this mutual encouragement extends even to times of affliction and hardship. As we shall see, this is later crystallized in the love commandment in Galatians.

In his ethical exhortation, Paul shows a special fondness for the expression “you know” (οἴδατε) or “having known” (εἰδότες), referring to the believers’ knowledge of what it means and entails to please God as expounded and taught in the gospel of Christ (of God). The first and most important thing that the believers in Thessalonica know is that to “please God” (2:4; 4:1; cf. 2:15) is God’s will (4:3; 5:18) and necessary because it leads to their “sanctification” (4:3; 5:23) and “salvation” (5:8, 9). This means that to be an example

45. The word “encourage” in first Thessalonians is mentioned 9 times (2:2, 12; 3:2, 7; 4:1, 10, 18; 5:11, 14); the word “admonish” twice (5:12, 14); and the word “exhortation” twice (2:3, 12).

46. See 1:4, 5; 2:1, 2, 5, 11; 3:3, 4, 5; 4:2; 5:2, 12. Paul once replaces “you know” with the imperative “remember” (μνημονεύετε, 2:9; cf. 1:3)

47. For the interpretations of the phrase “you know” in Paul, see Shogren, 1 & 2 Thessalonians, 90, 137, 156, 201–203; Weima, 1–2 Thessalonians, 96, 140–41, 213–14, 259–60, 345. Both Shogren and Weima emphasize the knowledge of the Thessalonian believers concerning Paul’s whereabouts and their personal knowledge about various issues. However, Shogren interprets the expression “you know” in 4:2 as the believers’ knowledge of the teaching of Jesus, and only Weima’s viewpoint connects “you know” with Paul’s ethical exhortation, when he argues that Paul reminds the believers of Jesus’ command so that they conduct themselves in “a God-pleasing manner.”
and a witness (of God) the believer is “to walk worthily [περιπατεῖν... ἀξίως]” to acquire virtue (2:12; 4:1, 12) and abstain from sins/vices (4:1–8, 9–12, 13–14; 2:12; 3:6–9, 12–13; 5:4–10, 12–25; cf. 2:16). Paul then moves on to explain specific ethical issues, and he starts with monotheism, the central belief in Judaism. Commending the Thessalonian believers’ faith (1:7–10), he reminds the believers when they “turned to God from the idols to serve [the] living and true God” (1:9; cf. 3:8).48 As Weima points out, in a place like Thessalonica where many gods/goddesses, heroes, or personifications of virtues were being worshiped, it was not easy for the believers “to turn to God from idols.”49

They not only know (οἴδατε) about the gospel as their ethical guidance for a virtuous life;50 they also take the virtue of “faith” (πίστις) to show their trust “in God” (1:3, 7–8; cf. 2:10; 5:8), and “in His word,” which is the gospel (2:13). Paul compliments them

48. Commentators describe the ancient city of Thessalonica as a pluralistic and polytheistic city. Both written and archaeological evidence have shown that Thessalonica was one of the leading cities in the Roman Empire, and as such had a significant number of pagan cults and temples to many deities. Among the most important deities are Dionysus, the god of ecstasy and wine; Sarapis, originally an Egyptian god; Cabirus, the female deity Roma, Isis, Osiris, Harpocrates, and Anubis. To these includes the imperial cult in which divine honors were shown to Roman emperors. Archaeology reveals that the worship to gods especially Dionysus, Sarapis, and Cabirus was complemented by mystery cults. For reference on this topic, see Wanamaker, The Epistles to the Thessalonians, 4–5; Byron, 1 & 2 Thessalonians, 12–13; Weima, 1–2 Thessalonians, 9–10; Margaret M. Mitchell, “1 and 2 Thessalonians,” in James D. G. Dunn, ed., The Cambridge Companion to St Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 51–63, esp. 51–52.

49. Weima, 1–2 Thessalonians, 22, 282. He finds a parallel with Ezek 36:25, which reads, “you shall be cleansed from all your unclean acts and from all your idols, and I will cleanse you.” Likewise, God has cleansed the Thessalonian believers from their idolatry, with the result that they have “turned to God from idols to serve the living and true God” (1:9).

50. The Thessalonian believers will know (and will remember) that the power of God’s πνεῦμα active in Paul’s preaching of the gospel brought about their conversion (e.g., their turning to God from idols, 1:9). Cf. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 43; Edwin D. Freed, The Morality of Paul’s Coverts (London: Equinox, 2005), 56.
for they have worked in their faith (1:3; 3:5–10) even in times of afflictions (3:3–4).\textsuperscript{51} Paul
not only praises their living the gospel and their example of faith even outside Macedonia
and Achaia (1:8). He also reaffirms their true response to his preaching the gospel of
God.\textsuperscript{52} By leaving behind their pagan way of life, the believers in Thessalonica “took the
radical step of abandoning those gods that were part of the worship of their family and
their community,”\textsuperscript{53} and “came to the One and true God.”\textsuperscript{54} Paul encourages them in the
midst of pagan cults and deities to “stand firm in the Lord” (3:8); for “He is our Father and
our Lord” (3:11; cf. 3:9, 13). What is at stake for Paul is that the One and true God is the
source of the gospel as His holy πνεῦμα as power will become the source of Paul’s ethical
discourse in Galatians.

An important ethical behavior which the Thessalonian believers asked Paul for

51. Although the believers in Thessalonica have faith, in times of much affliction and
persecution, Paul sees the need to supply what is lacking in the believers’ faith (3:10). However,
Paul does not explain what exactly the believers are lacking in their faith. According to Byron (1 &
2 Thessalonians, 111), “hope is what they are lacking (see 1:3 and compare it with 3:6). In Timothy’s
report (3:6) “hope” is not mentioned. Whether it is hope or not, what is clear is that they had faith
and showed the eagerness to progress in this important virtue. The Thessalonian believers, as
Weima (1–2 Thessalonians, 215, 228) notes, have probably experienced some kind of persecution
that threatened their faith. For this reason, Paul sent Timothy to them “to strengthen you and
comfort you concerning your faith” (3:2), but also “to learn about your faith” (3:5).

52. Dunn (Beginning from Jerusalem, 710) points out that the Thessalonian believers were
not an introverted group, rather they actively spread the Gospel outside their community.

53. Green, The Letters to the Thessalonians, 106–107. According to Green, the verb “to
turn” (ἐπιστρέφω) refers not only to a change in attitude but most importantly to action, which
implies that the believers at Thessalonica lived out truly the gospel of God/Christ as Paul taught
them. Freed (The Morality of Paul’s Coverts, 57) questions whether the believers in Thessalonica
received first πνεῦμα before the gospel. He points out that according to 1:5, 9–10, the believers
turned to faithfulness toward God and received πνεῦμα from God before they even learned about
Christ. The gospel came later; they first learned to serve God and then to wait for His Son Jesus
from heaven.

advice is sexual conduct (4:2–8).55 Again, it is a topic that they were already instructed; Paul says, “you know.” What do they know? Each of them knows that they have God’s holy Spirit within them, which enables them to walk pleasing to God. They know that they are able to conduct their life virtuously, to control/possess their own vessel56 in sanctification and honor, and avoid passion of desire and uncleanness/impurity, and of course fornication (see 4:4–8). Although Paul never mentions the word ἀρετή (virtue) in first Thessalonians, his exhortations are all about the practice of virtues and the avoidance of vices. The human body for Paul matters for “sanctification” as well as “the human soul and spirit” (5:23).57 The whole being of the Thessalonian believers must be blameless, that is, be in a state of perfection/holiness (5:23–24). These various aspects of a virtuous conduct

55. Cf. Branick, Understanding Paul and his Letters, 120.

56. There is a debate about the interpretation of the Greek word σκεῦος. Its meaning in English ranges from “vessel,” “implement of any kind,” “inanimate object,” “thing” to “body.” See Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, 1607. Some commentators take the word σκεῦος as a euphemism for the male genitals (Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 51–52 [although he also accepts the word “body”]; J. Witton, “A Neglected Meaning for Skeuos in 1 Thessalonians 4.4.” NTS 28 [1982]: 142–43; Wanamaker, The Epistles to the Thessalonians, 152–53), and others like Witherington and Murphy-O’Connor argue that Paul use of σκεῦος refers to one’s wife or husband (e.g., 1 Pet 3:7); see Witherington III, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, 113–14; Murphy-O’Connor, Paul, 125. For a good discussion on this issue and the various interpretations, see Green, The Letters to the Thessalonians, 191–94. I agree with Shogren’s interpretation of σκεῦος. For him Paul speaks about the Thessalonian believers’ control of their own bodies in a way that pleases God in sexual holiness. Shogren, 1 & 2 Thessalonians, 161). As Paul speaks of the human body as temple of the holy Spirit in 1 Cor 6:19, here Paul speaks of the human body as vessel of the soul. This idea is supported in 5:23, “may your whole spirit, soul, and body be preserved blameless.” Paul’s ethical point is that the believers maintain their body pure and in holiness.

57. According to Paul, human nature is tripartite: the spirit (τὸ πνεῦμα), the soul (ἡ ψυχή), and the body (τὸ σῶμα). As Malherbe (The Letters to the Thessalonians, 338) points out, this is the only place in Paul’s letters where the tripartite division of human nature appears. In 1 Cor 7:34, Paul mentions body and spirit, when he writes, “be holy in body and spirit.” For a discussion on the issue of a tripartite of human nature in Paul, see Malherbe, The Letters to the Thessalonians, 338–39; Shogren, 1 & 2 Thessalonians, 233–34; Green, The Letters to the Thessalonians, 268–69; Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 64–66.
guided by the teachings of the gospel in power of God's holy πνεῦμα would lead the believers to “imitation” of the Lord and Paul (and his co-workers, Silvanus and Timothy).

Living and practicing the gospel as a way of attaining sanctification and salvation is also reflected in Paul's pastoral exhortation about the Coming of the Lord (Παρουσία). By responding to the Thessalonian believers’ question concerning the dead and those still living at the Parousia (4:13–18) as well as the timing of the end (5:1–10), Paul’s exhortation touches the goal of living the gospel of Christ. As Paul describes what they already “know” (5:1, 12) about the coming of the Lord—as Jesus died and rose (4:14), so both those who are already dead and those who are still living will also raise like Christ (4:14–17)—the goal of his ethical exhortation is revealed: “to meet with the Lord and be always with Him” eternally in God’s kingdom and glory (2:12), and this will happen at “his coming” (1:10; 2:19; 3:13; 4:15–17; 5:23–24). It is in this eschatological context (4:15–18; 5:1–25) that Paul exhorts, encourages, and testifies to the power of God's holy πνεῦμα and His gospel in the attainment of the believers' final goal. He concludes his ethical exhortation re-stating everything he has written with four imperatives, putting first emphasis on the power of God's holy πνεῦμα: “do not quench the Spirit,” “do not reject prophecies,” “hold fast the good,” “abstain from every form of evil” (5:19–22).

58. Commentators see 4:13–5:11 as Paul's eschatological exhortation. The believers in Thessalonica were concerned whether those who had recently died would take part in the final salvation. Paul responds by affirming that “Jesus died and rose again,” so “God will bring with [Christ] those who have died” (4:14). At the Coming of the Lord, the dead in Christ would rise and then “we” (the believers at Thessalonica and also Paul and his co-workers) “the ones living together with them will be caught up in clouds and meet the Lord in the air and we will always be with Him” (4:15–17).

59. Although there is not a direct reference to “union with Christ,” in Paul's ethical discourse there is the idea that the Thessalonian believers’ future salvation will be a life with Jesus Christ forever (4:17; 5:10; cf. 4:14).
Πνεῦμα as the opposite of the Flesh (Σάρξ) in First Thessalonians

In first Thessalonians Paul does not make a contrast between πνεῦμα and σάρξ. Commentators have not tried to explain the reason(s) why Paul ignores such an important element in his ethical exhortation. The atmosphere in which Paul writes first Thessalonians is distinct compared to some of his later letters; as Malherbe notes, “the letter is not polemical or apologetic, rather friendly and paraletic in style.” Indeed, in this letter Paul expresses openly his deep affection and genuine admiration for “his believers” even at times of distress and afflictions. Apparently, there are no such “intruders” visiting his community in Thessalonica—at least it is not hinted in this letter. It is true, however, that the believers experienced some kind of affliction and opposition (2:14) that threatened their faith (3:2–3), yet Paul does not describe the exact nature of this (3:3–4). We can say that even in times of affliction, the letter reflects that they have excelled in virtues (e.g., faith and love).

Paul does not present the πνεῦμα-σάρξ antithesis as a way of describing the opposition of “living according to πνεῦμα” (virtues) versus “living according to σάρξ” (vices), a contrast first established in Galatians (5:13–6:10). In fact, the early contrast in the letter is not between πνεῦμα and σάρξ; rather, it is a contrast that expresses a dualistic reality as shown in the following table.

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61. Some scholars, however, have detected “opponents” in the community at Thessalonica, and they argue that Paul might have them in view when he was writing first Thessalonians. On this issue, see the discussion in Malherbe, *The Letters to the Thessalonians*, 79–80; Murphy-O’Connor, *Paul*, 121.
Table 16. Dualistic Expressions in First Thessalonians

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>πνεῦμα</th>
<th>σάρξ</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pleasing God 2:4; cf. 2:15</td>
<td>Pleasing men 2:4, 15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sons of light 5:5</td>
<td>Sons of darkness 5:4, 5*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Being of the day 5:5, 8</td>
<td>Being of the night 5:5, 7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Being awake 5:6</td>
<td>Being asleep 5:6–7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Good 5:15, 21</td>
<td>Evil 5:15, 22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salvation 5:8, 9; cf. 2:16</td>
<td>Wrath to the end 1:10; 2:16; 5:9</td>
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* Paul’s language reflects the terminology of Qumran and its description of the dualistic reality of the “sons of light” and the “sons of darkness” (e.g., 1QS). As Malherbe (The Letters to the Thessalonians, 294) notes, Paul like other early Christians may have been influenced by the dualism of the Qumran community. Similar dualism is also found in Rom 13:12 and 2 Cor 6:14–7:1.

The letter reflects both the eschatological and moral dimensions of the Thessalonian believers’ existence in the contrast of their behavior that is “proper” (pleasing God) or “appropriate” to the day (light), to behavior that is “improper” (pleasing men) or “belongs” to the night (darkness).62 First Thessalonians emphasizes a number of virtues and vices; however, they are not put in terms of the contrast between πνεῦμα and σάρξ.

Table 17. List of Virtues and Vices in First Thessalonians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virtues</th>
<th>Vices</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ἀγάπη (love) 1:3; 3:6, 12; 4:9; 5:8, 13</td>
<td>ἀκαθαρσία (impurity) 2:3; 4:7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀγιασμός (sanctification) 4:3–4, 7</td>
<td>ἁμαρτία (sinful deed) 2:16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀμεμπτος (blameless) 3:13</td>
<td>ἀτακτος (idleness, disorderly) 5:14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀσφάλεια (security) 5:3</td>
<td>δόλος (guile, deceit) 2:3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>εἰρήνη (peace) 1:1; 5:3, 23</td>
<td>κακός (evil) 5:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἑλπίς (hope) 1:3; 2:19; 4:13; 5:8</td>
<td>κολακεία (flattery) 2:5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The list of virtues shows that the virtues of faith and love, followed by hope, are the most important virtues in first Thessalonians. Throughout his ethical exhortation, Paul encourages the Thessalonian believers to stand firm in their faith to attain sanctification/holiness. He also admonishes them to encourage one another and love one another, a topic that will be discussed next. All these virtues are manifested by living and practicing the gospel, which came to the Thessalonian believers not only in word but also in power and in holy πνεῦμα.

The Relationship of Πνεῦμα to the Practice of Virtues,

Especially the Love Commandment in First Thessalonians

Although Paul neither associates directly πνεῦμα with love (ἀγάπη) nor mentions the love commandment in first Thessalonians, the virtue of love (ἀγάπη) is highly encouraged by Paul. He mentions ἀγάπη 6 times (1:3; 3:6, 12; 4:9; 5:8, 13), and in the adjectival form (ἀγαπητοὶ) once (2:8). In the letter, the virtue of love is closely associated with the virtues of faith (πίστις, 3:6; 5:8) and hope (ἐλπίς, 1:3; 5:8. Although these 3 virtues are key for Paul in order to be virtuously “sober” and attain “salvation” (5:8), the letter highlights love as an essential virtue for Paul, and also for the Thessalonian believers, who sought Paul for advice concerning brotherly love (φιλαδελφία), a virtue akin to ἀγάπη.63

63. It was common in the Greek world and in the LXX that the virtue φιλαδελφία was
The virtue of φιλαδελφία in particular is held as an important virtue because it was taught to them by God Himself (ὑμεῖς θεοδίδακτοί ἐστε εἰς τὸ ἀγαπᾶν ἀλλήλους, 4:9). In his response, Paul praises his “beloved” brothers and sisters saying that there is no need to write to “you” about this virtue for “you” are already exceedingly showing love for one another, not only among themselves but also in the whole of Macedonia (3:12; 4:10, 12). Nevertheless, Paul encourages them again to “love one another” and virtuously “to excel more” in mutual love in all Macedonia (3:12–13), and to have esteem toward those who exercise leadership in the community (5:12–13; cf. 1:7). Indeed, Paul exhorts them to live “a quiet life,” to do “their own work,” and to walk “properly toward outsiders” (4:11–12). He urges them to admonish the “idle ones,” “to console the faint-hearted,” “to uphold the ones who are weak,” and “to be patient towards all” (5:14), and to always “pursue the good to one another and for all” (5:15).

As Wolfgang Schrage asserts, “human love, like God’s love, is not an attitude or generally confined to the love between blood relatives (e.g., 4 Macc 13:27–14:1; 2 Macc 15:14; Rev 1:11; 3:7). Paul however extends the meaning of φιλαδελφία beyond biological family to include members of the community and outsiders (non-believers) not only in Thessalonica but also in other locations throughout Macedonia. Cf. Rom 12:10. Cf. Shogren, 1 & 2 Thessalonians, 167–68; Green, The Letters to the Thessalonians, 202–203; Malherbe, The Letters to the Thessalonians, 243.

64. According to Schnabel (“How Paul Developed His Ethics,” 278), the letter shows that for Paul the gospel was also “taught by God” and was made effective in the believers by the holy πνεῦμα. However, some scholars relate the phrase “taught by God” with Jer 31:33–34 (see also Isa 54:13 [LXX]), where πνεῦμα acts efficaciously in the believers’ heart; they will know everything that will need no teachers to teach them. On this topic, see Weima, 1–2 Thessalonians, 288; Malherbe, The Letters to the Thessalonians, 244–45.


66. A recent commentator who offers a detailed discussion about vv. 10–12 is Weima, 1–2 Thessalonians, 289–300.
an emotion but an act (1:3), freedom from self and openness to others.67 The practice of a genuine love and the other virtues is only possible in the power of God’s holy πνεῦμα, which enables them to acquire a virtuous and blameless heart, so that, when the Lord comes, the believers will meet the Lord and gain eternal salvation (5:8, 23). Paul as an example of brotherly love ends his letter sending them a genuine “holy kiss” (5:26). The importance given to the virtue of love in first Thessalonians and Paul’s exhortation to “love one another” (φιλαδελφία) are framed in Galatians as the “love commandment,” and for the first time its intrinsic connection with πνεῦμα becomes distinguished, when Paul describes the virtue of love as a “fruit” of πνεῦμα.

Paul’s Letter to the Galatians

The letter to the Galatians,68 one of the most polemical and difficult of Paul’s seven undisputed letters,69 was written some time in the early 50’s C.E., from either Ephesus or

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69. While authorship has been the least uncontroverted issue, the addressees, date, opponents, and situation of the Galatian communities, however, are difficult issues not yet resolved. Also, the complexity of Paul’s structure of his argumentation, its relation to the narrative accounts in Acts, and the application of various features make the attempt to understand the
Corinth. The letter presents a polemical tone which shows a Paul deeply committed to defend both the truth of the gospel and the authority of his apostleship. The letter itself is unique in the sense that, in it, Paul is forced to deal with a specific external problem which is threatening the faith of the Galatians believers. Apparently there were “some troubling” the believers in Galatia, wishing to “pervert the Gospel of Christ” (1:7); they were persuading the believers to receive circumcision in order to become “righteous”

letter’s content quite challenging. For a summary of these controversial issues in Galatians, see Longenecker, *Galatians*, lvii-cxix; Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 5–19.

70. Lührmann, *Galatians*, 3; Matera, *Galatians*, 26. There are several issues that make difficult dating Galatians. One major issue, which determines the date of the letter, is concerning the recipients of the letter; that is, whether the letter was written to south or north Galatia. Although the destination of the letter does not change the letter’s interpretation, what makes the difference however is in terms of history. For example, the question how the letter to the Galatians is related to Acts (e.g., Gal 2:11–14 and Acts 15). For a discussion on the north and south theories, see Betz, *Galatians*, 9–12; Schreiner, *Galatians*, 22–31; Longenecker, *Galatians*, lxiii-lxxii; Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 5–10.

71. Cf. Lührmann, *Galatians*, 100; Tobin, *Paul’s Rhetoric in Its Contexts*, 63. Betz (*Galatians*, 24, 30) suggests that the letter to the Galatians represent an example of an “apologetic letter,” where Paul defends the truth of the gospel rationally using a rhetorical device common of the Greco-Roman rhetoric, “the art of persuasion” used in court rooms (*Judicial rhetoric*). That is, the addressees are the jury, the opponents (agitators) are the accusers, and the defendant is Paul. Tactically, he persuades the Galatian believers not to accept the agitators’ gospel of circumcision (1:6; 2:7). However, other scholars have challenged Betz’s proposal and have suggested that Galatians should be classified as *deliberative rhetoric*, since in the letter Paul exhorts the Galatian believers to consider their life in Christ, seeking to persuade (not to accept circumcision) or dissuade them (from accepting circumcision). See Schreiner, *Galatians*, 53–55. Longenecker (*Galatians*, cxxi-cxxix) strongly criticizes Betz’s judicial rhetorical approach by arguing that Betz has pushed “too hard” and “too far,” especially trying to make all of Galatians fit the model of judicial rhetoric or to “conform to the genre of ‘apologetic letter.’” Longenecker suggests that Galatians should not be judged as a “replica of some classical mode;” rather, Paul in Galatians combined different features, such as “Hellenistic epistolary structures, Greco-Roman rhetorical forms, Jewish exegetical procedures, and Christian soteriological confessions.”
before God. Using rhetorical strategies (deliberative rhetoric), Paul intensely responds to this crisis by dissuading the believers from accepting circumcision.

In this context of dissuasion (Paul) and persuasion (false teachers)—in which Paul tries to defend the validity and the divine origin of his gospel to the Gentiles, and disprove the false teachers’ gospel of circumcision—Paul introduces for the first time the central role of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse. The passage in 5:13–6:10 is especially crucial for the understanding of how Paul configures his ethics around πνεῦμα. He presents two major interpretations: (1) he develops a negative view of the observance of the Mosaic Law, one of the central elements in Judaism, and as a result, he re-defines the whole understanding of the Mosaic Law when it is fulfilled in one single commandment; (2) he sets a contrast between πνεῦμα and σάρξ to speak about the contrast between virtues and vices; this

72. The letter itself reveals the tensions between Paul and “some agitators.” Betz (Galatians, 5) points out that Paul is not clear identifying to whom the “agitators” refers. In one occasion, Paul calls them “false brothers” (2:3) and in another “certain ones from James” and “the ones of the circumcision” (2:12). According to Fee (God’s Empowering Presence, 369, footnote 5) these agitators probably refer to outsiders, who were compelling the believers at Galatia to accept circumcision. However, it is not clear whether in these three instances Paul is referring to the same group or he is speaking of three different groups. Most scholars identify them as Jewish Christians from Judea who advocated circumcision and Law observance, but their relationship with the Jerusalem community, their view of Paul, and the precise motives for their mission are still obscure. Cf. Matera, Galatians, 5, 7–11. On the question of the identity of the opponents in Galatians, see John C. Hurd, “Reflections Concerning Paul’s ‘Opponents’ in Galatians,” in Stanley E. Porter, Paul and his opponents (Pauline Studies 2; Leiden: Brill, 2005), 129–48; Schreiner, Galatians, 39–52; Bruce, The Epistle to the Galatians, 25–27.

73. Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric in Its Contexts, 64, 268. With the intention to gain the believers back Paul, according to Betz (Galatians, 30–32) develops skillfully six arguments: the argument of experience (3:1–5); the argument from Jewish Scripture (3:6–14); the argument from common human practice (3:15–18); the argument from Christian tradition (3:26–4:11); the argument of friendship (4:12–20); and the allegorical argument from Jewish Scripture (4:21–31). For a good summary of Paul’s arguments, see Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric in Its Contexts, 63–70; G. Walter Hansen, “Paul’s Conversion and His Ethics of Freedom in Galatians,” in Richard N. Longenecker, The Road from Damascus: The Impact of Paul’s Conversion on His Life, Thought, and Ministry (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997), 213–37.
contrast leads him to give a “new” meaning to the terms πνεῦμα and σάρξ by associating
the former with virtues and the latter with vices/sins. These “core” components, which are
illustrated in the three major sections below, highlight the important elements already
mentioned in first Thessalonians, and are worked out in the later letters. In Galatians, we
will see essential elements, such as the sending of the Spirit of God’s Son, the gospel, and
the love commandment or/and the Law of Christ, conforming part of the configuration of
his ethical discourse.

Πνεῦμα and Its Relation to the Gospel and to the

Mosaic Law in Paul’s Letter to the Galatians

In Galatians, the word πνεῦμα and its cognate (πνευματικός) appear explicitly 19 times.74
However, Paul’s understanding of “righteousness through faith in Christ,” and not through
the observance of the Mosaic Law, leads him to disassociate ὁ νόμος from πνεῦμα. For
Paul, the role of the Mosaic Law as ethical guidance has come to its end with the coming
of the Christ’s event, his death, resurrection, and the reception of πνεῦμα. So, in his
argument of dissuasion Paul speaks of πνεῦμα as (1) the Spirit of God’s Son and associates
it with faith (πίστις), and (2) he relates the πνεῦμα of God’s Son with the gospel (τὸ
εὐαγγέλιον).

The Relation of the Πνεῦμα of God’s Son with Faith

As a way of emphasizing the role of the gospel and its connection with πνεῦμα, Paul
focuses on the role of Christ and refers to πνεῦμα as “the Spirit of God’s Son.” He writes,
“because you are sons, God sent the Spirit of His Son [τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ νικών αὐτοῦ] into

74. Πνεῦμα: 3:2, 3, 5, 14; 4:6, 29; 5:5, 16, 17 [twice] 18, 22, 25 [twice], 6:1, 8 [twice], 18;
our hearts crying out ‘Abba, Father’” (4:6). When God sent forth His Son (4:4; cf. 1:6), He also sent forth the Spirit of His Son; both πνεῦμα and Christ are “sent” by the Father, God,76 so that, through the redemptive work of Christ and his gospel, God’s Son (4:5; cf. 3:13), the believers experience God’s divine and holy πνεῦμα in their ethical conduct (3:1–5). If they do not have the Spirit of God’s Son, they do not belong to Christ (cf. 2:16–17; 3:6–14).77 In Paul’s view, the role of God’s Son is central for the believers’ understanding that πνεῦμα’s power enables them to cry out “Abba, Father,” a loving expression towards God of those who believe in Christ and his gospel.78 The believers receive πνεῦμα at their baptism (3:27) as fulfillment of the promise to Abraham; and like Abraham and his

75. The Greek words τοῦ Υἱοῦ is omitted in the oldest mss P46 (to give “God sent his Spirit”). See Dunn, The Epistle to the Galatians, 209. The expression “the Spirit of His Son” is a hapax theologomenon in the New Testament and unique in Paul. Commentators argue whether “sonship” comes first and the “gift of the Spirit” second or the other way around. The point here is that Paul is reminding the Galatian believers that God sent πνεῦμα to the believers in order to ratify their sonship, that they are truly God’s sons. So Paul’s emphasis is not on what came first or second, but on the believers’ relationship with God, their Father. See Schreiner, Galatians, 271–72; Betz, Galatians, 209–210; Longenecker, Galatians, 174.

76. Boer (Galatians, 266) argues that “God’s having sent forth the Spirit parallels his having sent forth the Son in 4:4b. The sending forth of the Spirit is thereby closely tied to the sending forth of the Son.” In his discussion, Fee (God’s Empowering Presence, 405) holds that Paul is interested in making sure that the believers in Galatia understand who πνεῦμα is. That is, πνεῦμα is both God’s πνεῦμα and Christ’s πνεῦμα.

77. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 374.

78. It is significant that the only place in Galatians where Paul names πνεῦμα as “the Spirit of God’s Son” is in reference to the Abba-cry. See David Jon Lull, The Spirit in Galatians (SBL Dissertation Series 49; Chico, California: Scholars Press, 1980), 157; cf. Schreiner, Galatians, 272. The expression “Abba, Father” is only found in Rom 8:15 and Mark 14:36; cf. Matt 9:27; Acts 14:14; Rom 9:27. According to Betz (Galatians, 211), “Abba” was taken over from the Aramaic-speaking Palestinian community of believers by Greek-speaking believers. Betz asserts that Paul had in mind the “Lord’s Prayer,” which believers used as reflection of their self-understanding as “sons” of God, the Father. See also Dunn, The Epistle to the Galatians, 221.
descendants, they, through God's Son and his πνεῦμα, receive a new relationship with God, that of sonship.  

The close relationship of God with both Christ and πνεῦμα in Galatians is expressed in a way that God is “our Father” (1:1, 3, 4; 4:2), Christ is “God’s Son” (1:6; 2:20; 4:4), and πνεῦμα is the “Spirit of God’s Son” (4:6). The sending of God’s Son, mainly according to Paul, aims two important goals: (1) to redeem God’s people from the “curse of the Law” (3:13; 4:5; cf. Deut 27:26; 21:23) through his death on a cross (3:1; 5:24; 6:13, 14), and (2) to set the believers free from a “yoke of slavery” (5:1) that is, the Mosaic Law (5:1; cf. 2:4). As Paul treats the Mosaic Law as a “yoke of slavery,” his negativity towards the Law sets Christ in a radical opposition to the Mosaic Law. Paul argues that the observance of the Mosaic Law has no ethical value. In this regard, Fee notes, “for Paul the gift of the Spirit, along with the resurrection of Christ, meant the end of the time of Torah.” Paul assures the Galatian believers that πνεῦμα comes into their hearts only from (ἐκ) or through (διά) faith (3:2, 5, 14; 5:5) in Jesus Christ (2:16, 20; 3:22, 26).

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79. Fee, *God’s Empowering Presence*, 408–409. Fee argues that in Galatians 4:6 “Paul is not concerned with the ethical implications of the Spirit’s indwelling in the believers’ heart, especially in the expression “Abba, Father.” However, Fee overlooks the fact that Paul connects the believers’ experience of πνεῦμα at their baptism, and the fact that it is πνεῦμα, the source of virtues in Galatians, that enables the believers to cry out Abba, Father. For a good study on the theme of “sonship” and its Jewish background, see James M. Scott, *Adoption as Sons of God* (WUNT 2; Reihe 48; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1992.

80. This is Paul’s most intricate and important argument. According to Paul, Christ’s death on a cross freed the believers from the curse of the Law, and for him to continue observing circumcision, a commandment of the Mosaic Law as way of gaining righteousness, represents a reality in which the believers remained in a state of a “curse” (3:10; cf. 1:8–9), or “slavery” (4:21–31). Cf. Bruce, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, 163–67.


82. The phrase πίστεως Χριστοῦ in Gal 2:16b (see also Phil 3:9) or πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ
words, it is “in the Spirit from faith [πνεῦματι ἐκ πίστεως]” outside the observance of the Mosaic Law that true righteousness comes (2:16). In fact, Paul assures the believers that “if righteousness comes through the Law, then Christ died on the cross for nothing” (2:21; cf. 3:10–18; 5:4). In this powerful statement, Paul touches the most fundamental “core” of his ethical discourse: the ethical significance of the role of πνεῦμα as “the Spirit of God’s Son” acting dynamically in the ethical life of the believers who have “faith” in Christ. In God the Father, His work of powers through πνεῦμα, and in His Son Jesus (3:5)83 the believers’ life of virtues and holiness rests.84

(Gal 2:16a; 3:22; Rom 3:22) or πίστεως Ἰησοῦ (Rom 3:26) or ἐν πίστει ζῶ τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ (Gal 2:20) is hotly debated, since it can be rendered either as an objective genitive (through faith in Jesus Christ) or as a subjective genitive (through faith of Jesus Christ). In the analysis of Paul’s seven genuine letters, this study takes the position of the majority of scholars (an objective genitive). The reason for rendering the phrase as an objective genitive is because Paul in Galatians is persuading the Galatians believers that righteousness is not through the observance of the Mosaic Law, but through faith in Jesus Christ. The main issue that Paul is dealing in Galatia is not the faithfulness of Christ, his obedience to God, but the believers’ response to that faithfulness. That is, the theme of interest is the faith of the believers. For a good discussion on this topic, see Arland J. Hultgren, “The Pistis Christou Formulation in Paul.” NovT 22 (1980): 248-63.

83. This is the only instance where Paul connects πνεῦμα with the term δύναμις, and this occurs at the beginning of his main argument of dissuasion (3:1–4:31). In Galatians, πνεῦμα as “works of powers” (δυνάμεις) is presented in a way that both are from God and both complement each other to act dynamically as an ethical instrument in the believers’ life of righteousness. There is one reference to the verb δύναμαι, where Paul speaks of the Law as not “being able” (δυνάμενος) to give or provide life (3:21).

84. Schreiner (Galatians, 174) argues that with the word δικαιοσύνη Paul “does not refer to ethical renewal but the pronouncement of the judge based on whether the standards of the Law were observed. Paul argues here that righteousness cannot come via the Law, If it did, then Christ’s death on the cross is superfluous.” However, Paul’s focus on justice/righteousness (δικαιοσύνη) highlights the idea that virtuous life does not come from “observance of the Law” but from “faith in Christ.” As Boer (Galatians, 165) states, “this is the truth of the Gospel that Paul has now disclosed” to his opponents and the Galatian believers. Now the gospel of Christ serves as the lessons for acquiring virtues and avoiding vices.
The Relationship of the Πνεῦμα of God’s Son with the Gospel

As Paul connects πνεῦμα with faith, he also connects faith with the gospel, when he writes, “the one persecuting us then is now preaching the gospel [εὐαγγελίζεται], the faith once he destroyed” (1:23). In Galatians, the gospel (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον) is explicitly mentioned 11 times. For Paul, the gospel is “of Christ” (1:7), and contains the lessons to righteousness. By conjoining τὸ εὐαγγέλιον with Christ, Paul directly associates πνεῦμα, which is “the Spirit of God’s Son” (the Spirit of Christ), with the gospel. Defending “his” gospel, at the beginning of the letter, Paul speaks of the “truth of the gospel” (2:5, 14), claiming that his opponents (the agitators) are preaching “a false gospel,” or “a different gospel,” though according to him, there is not “another gospel” (1:6–8). For Paul, “his” gospel came to him “through a revelation of Jesus Christ” (δι' ἀποκάλυψις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ) and not “according to a human being” (κατὰ ἄνθρωπον, 1:11–12). Thus, the “true” gospel is “of Christ” and came directly from “him,” so that he may preach “him” among the Gentiles (1:16; 2:2, 7; 4:13).

85. See 1:6, 7, 8, 9, 11; 2:2, 5, 7, 14; 3:8; 4:13. Indirect references are in 1:16 and 1:23.

86. In Galatians, Paul does not describe what the “gospel” means. What is clear for Paul is that the gospel is Christ’s message. Paul needs to make a hard distinction about the meaning of “gospel.” The fact that he needs to emphasize the “truth of the gospel,” implying the existence of opposite of that truth, something that he as the preacher of the gospel, has been believing, teaching, and living. See Frank W. Hugues, “The Gospel and Its Rhetoric in Galatians,” in Ann Jervis and Peter Richardson, eds., Gospel in Paul: Studies on Corinthians, Galatians, and Romans for Richard N. Longenecker (JSNTSup 108; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994), 210–21, esp. 220.

87. For Paul, what his opponents (agitators) are preaching is not a gospel, although in 2:7 he distinguishes the gospel of Christ from the gospel of the circumcision. Betz (Galatians, 49) notes that at the time of the Jerusalem conference, Paul probably did not deny that there were two gospels with the same quality of grace. But, between the Jerusalem conference and the incident at Antioch (2:11–14), things have changed, and the attitudes of both groups (Paul and the agitators) have also changed, each group denying each other’s gospel.

88. In order to convince the Galatian believers, Paul proofs that he received the Gospel through a revelation of Jesus Christ (the gospel of Christ) and not through a human being by
It is at this point that “the gospel of Christ” is presented as one of the essential elements in Paul’s ethical discourse. The “practice” of living the gospel of Christ replaces the “observance” of the Mosaic Law,\(^89\) in a sense that the whole of the Mosaic Law becomes fulfilled in the “love commandment” (5:14).\(^90\) This is one of the two major interpretation in Paul’s ethics highlighted in chapter 5 (e.g., 5:1, 18). Tobin states that in light of the believers’ experience of Christ and his πνεῦμα through faith, they are no longer bound by the observance of the Mosaic Law as such.\(^91\) By “hearing the gospel with faith” (cf. 3:2, 5) πνεῦμα acts in the believers’ ethical conduct, and transforms their relationship with God into a new intimate Father-son relationship (3:2–5; cf. 5:18). For

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89. In Galatians Paul mentions the word ὁ νόμος (the Mosaic Law) 27 times. This is not surprise since in the letter he is trying to dissuade the Galatian believers from accepting circumcision, an observance of the Mosaic Law. What is particular about Paul is that he proudly confesses his previous life in Judaism as blameless and beyond excellence (1:13–14, 23; also see Phil 2:3–5). As a Jew, he never felt shame about his Judaism; in fact, he never viewed himself outside Judaism. In Galatians, the Mosaic Law has come to an end; for him, the Law “was added for the sake of transgression until the coming of God’s Son (τὸ σπέρμα), Christ Jesus (3:19; see also 3:16); the Mosaic Law was like a custodian of children (扆) until Christ. As Tobin (The Spirituality of Paul, 63, 89–90, 95) asserts, for Paul, “it [the Mosaic Law] reached its goal in the coming of Christ,” and that, “it was the Jewish Scriptures themselves which point to a time when it would no longer be necessary to observe the Mosaic Law.”

90. This topic is discussed in section C.

Paul, πνεῦμα leads in the “practice” of the Law of Christ (6:1–2); therefore, as the Mosaic Law is fulfilled in the love commandment, Paul re-interprets it in a way that his interpretation moves to the spiritual dimension, a new re-definition of acquiring virtues and avoiding vices, in which πνεῦμα and faith are intrinsically interconnected with Christ and his gospel rather than with the observance of the Mosaic Law.

Πνεῦμα as the opposite of the Flesh (Σάρξ)
in Paul’s Letter to the Galatians

In Galatians, one of the principal components of Paul’s ethical discourse is the contrast between πνεῦμα and σάρξ which he uses to speak about the virtues and vices (5:13–6:10). For the first time, he applies the term πνεῦμα as a “divine enabler” in the practice of virtues and the avoidance of vices. He also, for the first time, expands the meaning of the term σάρξ by associating it with vices/sins in his ethics. That is, Paul attributes to the term σάρξ a negative connotation, connected with “the human and sinful reality” controlled by passions and desires (e.g., 2:17; 3:3, 22; 4:23, 29; 5:13, 16, 17, 24; 6:8). Of the 19 times that the word πνεῦμα is mentioned in Galatians, 7 times πνεῦμα is sharply contrasted with σάρξ (3:3; 4:29; 5:16, 17 [twice]; 6:8 [twice]). Paul employs a rhetorical question in which the believers themselves recall their own moment of transformation by God’s πνεῦμα: “Having begun in [the] Spirit (πνεύματι), now are you being perfected in

92. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 438.

93. We have seen in first Thessalonians that Paul uses the word σάρξ when he refers to the human spirit (5:23). In Galatians, and in his later genuine letters (e.g., 1 Cor 2:11; 5:3–5; 7:35; 14:14; 16:18; 2 Cor 2:13; 7:1, 13; Phil 1:27; 4:23; Phlm 1:25; and Rom 1:9; 8:16), the term σάρξ also refers to both the human body and human nature on its material side (the earthly existence; e.g., 1:16; 2:16, 20; 4:13, 14; 6:12, 13, 18). For a good illustration of the use of σάρξ in Paul, see Boer, Galatians, 335–39; R. E. O. White, Biblical Ethics (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1979), 135–38; Bruce, Paul: Apostle of the Free Spirit (Exeter: The Paternoster Press, 1977), 203–211.
[the] flesh (σαρκὶ)?” (3:3). Paul defines both πνεῦμα and σάρξ as two contrasting realities belonging to two different periods in the believers’ ethical living: “before” and “after” the coming of God’s Son and his πνεῦμα (3:6–14; 4:1–7).

Paul shows πνεῦμα as the opposite of σάρξ especially in the context in which he distinguishes living “in πνεῦμα” (righteousness) and living by “the observance of the Mosaic Law” (unrighteousness). Fee points out that the burning question is how the believers at Galatians are called to live virtuously without the observance of the νόμος. The epoch of the νόμος has come to its end;94 and it is now in πνεῦμα (and faith in Christ, 2:16) that the believers become righteous. For Paul, “it is clear that no one is justified [δικαιοῦται] before God from the law [νόμῳ]” (3:11); it is from πνεῦμα that virtues come and makes the Galatian believers virtuous (righteous), not the observance of the Mosaic Law.95 He writes a rhetorical question, “Did you receive πνεῦμα from observance of the law or from hearing of faith?” (3:2, 5).96 Dissuading the believers from accepting circumcision, Paul consistently highlights the contrast between πνεῦμα and σάρξ in terms of contrasting the virtue of faith (πίστις) and ὁ νόμος.97 In Paul’s thinking, ὁ νόμος is not of faith (3:12) because the former has no part with

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95. For Paul, those who practice circumcision become debtors and are obliged to “do” the whole Law (5:3); therefore, Paul refutes the agitators as those who do not practice and observe the whole Law, and circumcision alone is not enough to become virtuous or righteous (6:13).

96. The phrase ἐξ ἔργων νόμου is translated as “from observance of the Law” and the phrase ἐξ ἀκοῆς πίστεως as “from hearing of faith” or “hearing with faith.”

97. One of the most significant arguments from Jewish Scripture in which Paul makes a sharp distinction between πνεῦμα and σάρξ is 4:21–31 (the Sarah-Hagar allegory). Paul shows the role of πνεῦμα as the principal agent of righteousness by identifying the free son of the free woman (Sarah) with the Galatian believers who have faith in Christ (“born according to the Spirit”) over against Ishmael the son of the slave girl (Hagar), who was “born according to the flesh” (those who accept the practice of circumcision). For a discussion, see Tilburg Gijs Bouwman, “Die Hagar-
Christ or πνεῦμα. So, it is in this contrast (πνεῦμα and σάρξ) that Paul expresses the most severe criticism of ὁ νόμος (the Mosaic Law) in the framework of his ethics.

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<tr>
<th>Πνεῦμα</th>
<th>Σάρξ</th>
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<td>The gospel of Christ 1:7; the true Gospel 1:12; 2:14;</td>
<td>Another gospel? 1:6; there is not another gospel 1:7; the gospel of the circumcised 2:7</td>
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<td>Faith in Jesus Christ/ hearing of faith 3:2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spirit 3:5</td>
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<td>According to the Spirit 4:29</td>
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<td>The “fruit” of the Spirit 5:22</td>
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<td>Sowing/reaping to the Spirit 6:8</td>
<td>Sowing/reaping to the flesh 6:8</td>
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These two contrasting realities neither can overlap with each other nor can be reconciled; instead, they “oppose” each other. As Paul says, “for the flesh desires against the Spirit [γὰρ σὰρξ ἐπιθυμεῖ κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος] and the Spirit desires against the flesh [τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα κατὰ τῆς σαρκός]” (5:17). Contrary to σάρξ, to live a life according to πνεῦμα (cf. 4:29) is to live according to the ethical values brought about by Christ through his death on a cross (cf. 6:14, 17). For Paul, only when the believers live the gospel of Christ hearing with faith (cf. 1:23), πνεῦμα as a divine reality enables them to “crucify the flesh with its passions and desires” (5:24).98

98. For Paul, ὁ νόμος (the Mosaic Law) is powerless against the desires and passions of the flesh; only the Spirit of Christ has the power, as Boer points out (Galatians, 331), to counter the flesh's attacks on human life. Cf. Rosner, Paul and the Law, 72.
The explicit ethical contrast between πνεῦμα and σάρξ is clearly explained in terms of virtues and vices. Paul urges the believers to “walk in the Spirit” (πνεύματι περιπατεῖτε, 5:16),99 to be “led by the Spirit” (εἰ … πνεύματι ἄγεσθε, 5:18), and to “live in the Spirit” (εἰ ζῶμεν πνεύματι, 5:25), so that they practice virtues and avoid vices. It is true that he does not explicitly mention the word virtue (ἀρετή) in Galatians, but the virtue of δικαιοσύνη (justice/righteousness) is often mentioned (2:21; 3:6, 21; 5:5; cf. 2:16, 17; 3:8, 11, 24; 5:4) in a way that often it expresses the notion that one who is “righteous” is also “virtuous.” For him, the righteous person is one who lives blameless (cf. Gal 1:14; see also Phil 2:15; 3:6) before God and a life pleasing to God. In Galatians, Paul is clear when he describes “ὁ καρπός [the ‘fruit’] of the Spirit” (5:22) and “τὰ ἔργα [the ‘works’] of the flesh” (5:19), and directly relates πνεῦμα with virtues and σάρξ with vices (5:16–26).100 Thus, the following list shows the virtues and vices that Paul mentions explicitly in 5:19–23:101

99. Paul uses the verb “to walk” (περιπατέω)—a word that in Judaism has a moral connotation (Ps 103:7; Deut 8:6; cf. 10:12–13)—and invites the believers choose between two ways of life: walking according to πνεῦμα vs. walking according to σάρξ. Cf. John W. Drane, “Tradition, Law and Ethics in Pauline Theology.” NovT 16 (1974): 167–78, esp. 173.

100. According to Tobin (The Spirituality of Paul, 103), the majority of the vices are not vices associated with the body; rather, they are vices of the human soul (spiritual vices). Lührmann (Galatians, 101) suggests that the lists of virtues and vices in 5:19–23 (positive and negative ways of behaving) and the ethical exhortation in 6:1–10 (individual and communal ethical instructions) were adopted from the Jewish Scripture. Betz (Galatians, 33) argues that “the fruit of the Spirit” do not represent “virtues” in the traditional sense, but they are “manifestations” of divine redemption, manifested in the community of believers by means of the Spirit. It is the believers’ task to allow the virtues (fruit of the Spirit) to manifest in themselves.

101. Other virtues mentioned throughout Galatians are: hope (ἐλπίς) 5:5; justice/righteousness (δικαιοσύνη) 2:21; 3:6, 21; 5:5; truth (ἀληθεία) 2:5, 14; 5:7; fellowship (κοινωνία) 2:9; grace (χάρις) 1:3, 6, 15; 2:9, 21; 6:18. Other vices mentioned are: desire (ἐπιθυμία) 5:16, 24; depraved passion (πάθος) 5:24; ill-will (φθόνος) cf. 5:26.
Certainly, it is by/in πνεῦμα that the believers “walk” on the road toward virtues (the “fruit” of πνεῦμα, 5:22), and those who do “the works of the flesh” are “under” the Mosaic Law (5:18). For Paul, to be “under” ὁ νόμος means also to be in enslavement under “the elements of the world” (τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου, 4:3, 9), which conveys the notion of being a “curse” (3:10–13).\(^{102}\) Therefore, in the radical contrast between πνεῦμα (virtues) and σάρξ (vices), Paul formulates the central role of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse:

\(^{102}\) The word “curse” occurs only here in Paul. Betz (Galatians, 1149) notes that “the curse of the Law is the curse which the Law brings and which, in this sense, the Law itself is.” The meaning of the phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου has been debated since antiquity. Its meaning ranges from “the fundamental principles of the world,” “the four elements: earth, air, fire, and water,” “elemental spirits,” to “heavenly bodies: the twelve signs of the zodiac.” For a discussion of the different views of the phrase, see Boer, Galatians, 252–56; Dunn, The Epistle to the Galatians, 212–13.
πνεῦμα, the source of virtues, is that from which ὁ καρπός (‘the fruit’) of the Spirit derives, so that the believers in the power of πνεῦμα are able to practice virtues and avoid passions, vices, and desire (5:24–26).

In 6:1–10, Paul explains what entails living according to σάρξ versus living in the power of πνεῦμα, again highlighting “the love commandment,” here expressed in terms of “the Law of Christ” (6:2). Paul exhorts the believers that if they sow in the flesh (εἰς τὴν σάρκα), they will also “reap” from the flesh corruption, but if they “sow” in the Spirit (εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα), they will also “reap” from the Spirit (ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος) eternal life (ζωὴν αἰώνιον, 6:8). He speaks of eternal life as “the inheritance of the kingdom of God” (5:21), the life of the eschatological coming age promised to the Galatian believers who “sow” in the power of πνεῦμα. Paul’s statement in 2:20 (“I no longer live [in me, it is] Christ who lives in me”) shows that to attain the goal (eternal life/God’s kingdom) the Galatian believers are to become “one” with Christ. Therefore, through the practice of virtues, the “fruit” of πνεῦμα (5:22), they are able to attain a state of holiness (righteousness), and thus gain eternal life/God’s kingdom.

103. Cf. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 419. Betz (Galatians, 308) points out that Paul uses the metaphors of “sowing” and “reaping” and interprets them dualistically (πνεῦμα-σάρξ). This dualism, which is stated in 5:17, not only underlies the whole theology of Galatians, but also Paul’s ethical discourse configured around the concept of πνεῦμα. See Longenecker, Galatians, 281; Bruce, The Epistle to the Galatians, 265.


105. Betz (Galatians, 123) rightly notes that Paul declares that “I” as belonging to the sinful “flesh with its passions” and desires (5:24). Therefore, “it is Christ who lives in me” means dying to the world of vices and sins, as Paul asserts, “to me to boast, certainly not, except in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ through whom the world has been crucified to me, and I to the world” (6:14).
The Relationship of Πνεῦμα to the Practice of Virtues, Especially
the Love Commandment in Paul’s Letter to the Galatians

Paul’s letter to the Galatian believers is the most polemical of his letters and the least
friendly. The tone of the letter is very much distinct from that of first and second
Corinthians, Philippians and Philemon. However, it is in this context of dispute against
his opponents (the agitators) that Paul expresses the importance of the virtue of love
(ἀγάπη) by urging the Galatian believers to love each other by serving “one another as
slaves through love” (5:13–14), and bearing “one another’s burden” (6:2) in the power of
πνεῦμα. He mentions the virtue ἀγάπη and its verbal form 5 times in the letter (2:20; 5:6,
13, 14, 22), and he closely relates πνεῦμα with ἀγάπη especially in his catalogue of ethical
virtues. He places the virtue of love first in the list of virtues when he writes, “the ‘fruit’
of the Spirit is love,…” (5:22–23). In his ethical discourse, Paul chooses the virtue of love
first among all the other virtues; faith (πίστις), which is the virtue most mentioned (with
its cognates 24 times!), is actually positioned seventh on the list.

Despite the tension between Paul and the Galatian believers, he still calls them

106. The rhetorical device used in combination with the strong polemical character shows
Galatians as a kind of “an unfriendly letter.” Galatians has neither thanksgiving at the beginning
of the letter nor a personal greeting to anyone in Galatia or a greeting from any of those who had
been with him in those days in Galatia. Lührmann, Galatians, 1.

107. As Betz (Galatians, 33) points out, the virtue of love is the only exception from
his list (5:22–23) that does not belong to the conventional Greek catalogue of ethical virtues. As
Longenercker (Galatians, 260) notes, the virtue of love (ἀγάπη) is not found in Greek literature,
but the verb ἀγαπάω appears a number of times. Also in the LXX, both ἀγάπη and ἔρως are used
interchangeably, and generally in contexts that have to do with God’s love, ἀγάπη is often used. In
Josephus there are about 74 instances of ἀγαπάω but none of the virtue of love. In Greek literature
3 words for love appear: φιλία, ἔρως, and στοργή. Love, therefore, is more likely a virtue common
See Lührmann, Galatians, 104; Schnabel, “How Paul Developed His Ethics,” 271.
ἀδελφοί (brothers), which is a way of expressing his affection for them and that they
have received πνεῦμα. Paul emphasizes what he wrote earlier in first Thessalonians by
exhorting them to practice the virtue of love by caring for one another in the community,
and by “restoring those who fell into sin (vice) in a Spirit of meekness” (6:1). The
example of Christ’s love is the epitome for the ethical conduct of the Galatian believers
and for Paul himself. Paul expresses Christ’s love for him, as well as his love for Christ
when he writes, “It is no longer I who lives in me, but it is Christ who lives in me, and
what I now live in the flesh, I live in faith, that (faith) in the Son of God, who have
loved me and have given himself over on my behalf” (2:20). This is a true expression of
love. Indeed, the believer who has “put on Christ” at baptism (3:27) now lives the life of
freedom in the power of πνεῦμα. This is the kind of “freedom to which they have been
called (5:13)”—freedom attained not by the “observance” of the Mosaic Law (the yoke of


109. Paul makes a general recommendation on how to act lovingly in a case of
wrongdoing by members in the Galatian communities. Likewise, using maxims, sententia, and
warnings Paul presents his final ethical exhortation about how the virtue of love in the power
of πνεῦμα will work out in the everyday relationships within the community and the mutual
responsibilities (6:2–10). Cf. Dunn, The Epistle to the Galatians, 316.

Conversion and His Ethic of Freedom in Galatians,” in Longenecker, The Road from Damascus,
224) calls it Paul’s ethics of freedom by πνεῦμα (5:16–25), which is essential to see that the
affirmation “Christ lives in me” (2:20) means the same thing as the affirmation “we live by πνεῦμα”
(5:25).

111. Fee (God’s Empowering Presence, 426) argues that in 5:13, Paul deliberately sets out
to bring together two crucial elements from 5:1–6. They are freedom from the Mosaic Law, and
love as the way faith works. In fact as Schnabel (“How Paul Developed His Ethics,” 271–72) notes,
love is the result of faith (5:6) and is part of the “fruit” of πνεῦμα. Regarding love, Longenecker
(Galatians, 236) points out that the major theme of love informs all of Paul’s ethical exhortations
vis-à-vis the believers’ libertine tendencies: serving one another must be done in love (5:13b); the
entire Law is fulfilled in the love commandment, “love your neighbor as yourself” (5:14); the works
slavery), but guided by πνεῦμα. Therefore, for Paul, “in Christ neither circumcision nor uncircumcision is of any force, but faith [in Christ] working through love” (5:6). Love is a fruit of πνεῦμα, an ethical dynamic and inherent relationship of being “in Christ Jesus.”

Therefore, as a central element of his ethics framed in Galatians (5:13–6:10), Paul establishes a new relationship between πνεῦμα and the virtue of love. He writes, “the entire law has been fulfilled [πεπλήρωται] in one word, in the word ‘love your neighbor as yourself’” (5:14; cf. Lev 19:18). This new law, “the love commandment” that Paul also labels “the Law of Christ” (6:2), is the “fulfillment” of the Mosaic Law, and is related to the new creation (καινὴ κτίσις, 6:15). The love commandment is an alternate to the Mosaic Law, because it is established in God’s πνεῦμα and includes Gentiles in the full participation of God’s grace (salvation). Longenecker states, “life now ‘in Christ’ is to be lived not in the context of laws but in the context of ‘the Spirit’. It is not just a ‘re-creation’ that God effects ‘in Christ’ and by ‘the Spirit,’ thereby taking the believers back to some primordial state. Rather, what God has done ‘in Christ’ and ‘by the Spirit’ is to effect a

of the flesh are the antithesis of love (5:19–21); the fruit of the Spirit is the epitome of love (5:22–23); love restores the erring brother (6:1); love bears the burdens of others (6:2); love is humble (6:3); and love never fails to work for the good of all people (6:9–10).

112. Longenecker, Galatians, 229.

113. Lüührmann (Galatians, 101–103) argues that Paul adopted the love commandment (5:14) from the Jewish Scripture; but the commandment of love in the Jewish Scripture is one commandment among others, and it receives no recognizable systematic meaning. However, in Judaism it is generally linked with the commandment to love God (e.g., Mark 12:28–34; Deut 6:5).

114. Bruce, The Epistle to the Galatians, 261.

According to Paul’s ethical discourse, in God’s πνεῦμα the practice of the love commandment or the Law of Christ promotes the acquisition of virtues and the avoidance of vices, so that “Christ is formed [μορφωθῇ Χριστὸς]” in them (4:19). The expression “Christ is formed” ethically speaking means that “Christ lives in the believers” (cf. 2:20). It is the power of God’s πνεῦμα which causes the spiritual transformation “into Christ” (becoming like to Christ), which ultimately will lead the believers to reach the goal, eternal life and the kingdom of God.

Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians

The first letter to the Corinthians was written by Paul probably from Ephesus before Pentecost (1 Cor 16:8) sometimes in the early or mid-50’s C.E.117 Questions remain regarding the unity of the letter;118 however, for our purpose, this study presupposes first

116. Longenecker, Galatians, 296.


118. It is assumed by scholars that Paul wrote multiple letters to the believers at Corinth, two of which are held in the New Testament (1 and 2 Corinthians). As a result, critical questions regarding the unity of the letter have been posed by modern scholars. From the letter itself we learn that Paul wrote at least once previously (5:9), but this missive is lost to us. Some scholars argue that a fragment of it is preserved in 2 Cor 6:14–7:1. Most scholars argue that Paul sent at least four letters to the Corinthian believers, and that first Corinthians is actually Paul’s second
Corinthians is a unified letter in which Paul deals with a wide variety of issues in the community in Corinth. In this letter, Paul addresses the whole community of believers, a community that he founded at Corinth (1 Cor 3:6, 10; 4:15; Acts 18:1–11). What is unique about first Corinthians is that the letter's content shows how the external and internal situations and circumstances have affected the relationships among the members of the Corinthian community. The letter shows the various problems within the community: wisdom and divisions (1:10–4:17), sexual immorality (5:1–13), sacred assemblies, and abuses at the celebration of the Lord's Supper (11:2–34). But it also reveals

letter. Murphy-O'Connor (*Paul*, 255) identifies five Corinthian correspondences: the lost previous letter (5:9), 1 Corinthians, the lost painful letter (2 Cor 2:4), 2 Corinthians 1–9, and 2 Corinthians 10–13. In terms of first Corinthians, Fitzmyer (*First Corinthians*, 48–53) points out that because of its various topics, some commentators have argued that Paul wrote several letters to deal with these different topics that were eventually gathered together into one single letter, today called first Corinthians. Commentators (Conzelmann, Fee, Murphy-O'Connor, Garland, Collins), however, have argued that first Corinthians is a unified letter, in the sense that Paul wrote it in stages, first chapters 1–4 as a response to the report of Cloe's people, and then added chapters 5–16 after the arrival of Stephanas and the others (16:17). They claim that first Corinthians may be a composite of Paul's own making. However, a minority of commentators view the letters as a unified writing and that a few passages (14:33–36 and chapter 13) have been interpolated later (Hays, *First Corinthians*, 9). What is problematic with these claims is that 14:33–36 are found in all the Greek manuscripts of first Corinthians. For a discussion, see Collins, *First Corinthians*, 10–14; Schrage, *Der Erste Brief an die Korinther*, 1:63–70; Betz, *2 Corinthians 8 and 9: A Commentary on Two Administrative Letters of the Apostle Paul* (Hermeneia;, A Critical and Historical Commentary on the Bible; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 3–36.

119. Hays, *First Corinthians*, 5; Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 6. The city of Corinth during its two periods (as a Greek-city state and as a Roman city) was a prosperous city, and well-known for its pagan cults. From Pausanias (*Description of Greece* 2.2) we learn that ancient Corinth was a major center for the various cults of deities such as Dionysus, Isis, Demeter and Persephone, Asclepius and Poseidon, Apollo and Hermes. The city was adorned by magnificent temples and statues, which were built in public places to honor these gods and goddesses. Also, Strabo (*Geography* 8.6.20), who visited Roman Corinth in 29 B.C.E., provides information about Corinth's prosperous commercial life during the time of Paul. For a good description of ancient Corinth and archaeological investigation of Corinth, see Murphy-O'Connor, *St. Paul's Corinth: Texts and Archaeology* (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 20023 [1983]).

a number of issues that led the Corinthian believers to write Paul asking for his ethical advice (7:1a): marriage and celibacy (7:1b–40), eating meat that had been offered to idols (8:1–11:1), spiritual gifts in the community’s worship (12:1–14:40), resurrection of the dead (15:1–58), and the collection for the saints (16:1–4). The reasons, then why, Paul writes first Corinthians can be summarized in three points: (1) to exhort unity among the believers at Corinth; (2) to respond to the Corinthians’ various questions; and (3) to reassure his authority as an apostle and restore respect for the gospel. In one sentence, first Corinthians is a letter that urges the believers in the Corinthian community to be one in heart and mind (1:10). It is in “dealing with behavioral problems” and “advising good living” that Paul illustrates in a more concrete level the framework of the role of πνεῦμα in his ethics that he formulated in Galatians. He exhorts the Corinthian believers to practice virtues and avoid vices on the basis of the power of God’s πνεῦμα, the εὐαγγέλιον, and the commandment of the Lord (Christ).

In first Corinthians the term πνεῦμα and its cognates (πνευματικός, πνευματικῶς) appear 56 time, more than in any other of Paul’s undisputed letters! As such, Paul shows the privileged place of πνεῦμα as the most essential power in the ethical life of the Corinthian believers, and the fellowship (κοινωνία) of the community. In this

121. Hays, First Corinthians, 5.

122. Cf. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 52.

123. Noun: 2:4, 10, 11, 11 [twice], 12 [twice], 13, 14, 14; 3:16; 4:21; 5:3, 4, 5; 6:11, 17, 19, 7:34, 40; 12:3 [twice], 4, 7, 8, 8, 9 [twice], 10, 11, 13 [twice]; 14:2, 14, 15 [twice], 16, 32; 15:45; 16:18; adjective: 2:13 [twice], 15; 3:3; 9:11; 10:3, 4 [twice]; 12:1; 14:1, 12, 37; 15:44 [twice], 46, 46 and adverb: 2:14.

regard, Fee holds that πνεῦμα is “the key to everything.” The letter itself reflects very much the dynamic activity of πνεῦμα in fostering unity in κοινωνία and diversity of the community’s gifts (χαρίσματα; see chs. 12–14). For Paul, the believers in Christ are spiritual people; for it is πνεῦμα that takes the role in inspiring and empowering them to live a virtuous and holy life in one κοινωνία. We shall see next how Paul carries out his view of the fundamental role of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse.

Πνεῦμα and Its Relation to the Gospel and to the Mosaic Law in Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians

It is important to note that in first Corinthians, Paul mentions ὁ νόμος 14 times, but in none of these instances does he associate πνεῦμα with νόμος. Only once, however, he links the term πνευματικός with ἐντολή (14:37), when he writes, “if anyone thinks to be a prophet or a spiritual person [πνευματικός] let him fully know what [ὁ] I write to you is a commandment [ἐντολή] of the Lord [κυρίου].” This connection between πνευματικός and ἐντολή occurs in Paul’s exhortation about prophets and spiritual people (14:37–40). But, why does Paul use ἐντολή κυρίου in first Corinthians, and not νόμος κυρίου, as he uses it elsewhere in his other letters (e.g., Romans)? To understand Paul’s thought about πνεῦμα

125. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 83.

126. First Corinthians characterizes itself for being in content a “charismatic letter” because πνεῦμα is the primary focus. Concerning this, Fizmyer (First Corinthians, 80) claims: “the main role of the Spirit in 1 Corinthians is described in its external ‘manifestation’ or in the bestowal of pneumatika, ‘spiritual gifts’ (12:1) for the good of the Christian church. Although Paul distinguishes the pneumatika into different sorts, charismata, ‘gifts’, diakoniai, ‘services’, and energēmata, ‘works’, and ascribes the source of them respectively as the ‘same Spirit’, ‘same Lord’, and ‘same God’ (12:4–6), eventually they are also said to be ‘the manifestation of the Spirit for some good’ (12:7), i.e., for the good of the community as a whole.”

127. The term νόμος appears in 9:8, 9, 20 [4x], 21 [5x]; 14:21, 34; 15:56.
and its relation to the gospel and to ὁ νόμος in first Corinthians, this section is divided into two subsections: (1) ὁ νόμος and its relation to ἐντολή κυρίου, and (2) ὁ νόμος and its relation to τὸ εὐαγγέλιον.

Νόμος and Its Relation to the Commandment of the Lord (Εντολή Κυρίου)

In first Corinthians, Paul uses the terms ἐντολή and ἐπιταγή, two words having almost the same meaning. Both references, ἐντολή (7:19; 14:37) and ἐπιταγή (7:25), are followed by a genitive, either God (ἐντολῶν θεοῦ 7:19) or Lord (ἐπιταγήν κυρίου, 7:25; κυρίου ἐστίν ἐντολή, 14:37). In the context in which Paul writes 7:25, when he is giving his opinion about the advantage of virginity (7:25–35), the phrase ἐπιταγήν κυρίου may allude to “the Law of Christ” (Gal 6:2). This is in the sense that he is appealing to Christ in order to give his “opinion” (γνώμη). The expression κυρίου ἐστίν ἐντολή in 14:37 may likewise refer to “the Law of Christ,” established in Gal 6:2. Paul, who considers himself a spiritual man

128. According to the meanings in Liddell and Scott (A Greek-English Lexicon, 577 and 663), the difference between the terms ἐντολή and ἐπιταγή is minimal; the latter means “injunction,” “order,” “command,” and “imperial ordinance,” and the former refers to “little commission,” “command,” “injunction,” and “required condition.” Both are associated with legal laws; however, the word ἐντολή seems to have a stronger emphasis.

129. The passage in 7:19 reads, “circumcision is nothing and uncircumcision is nothing, but keeping the commandments [ἐντολῶν] of God;” and 7:25 reads, “now concerning the virgins, I do not have a command [ἐπιταγήν] of the Lord, but I give an opinion.” The singular ἐντολή in 14:37 is read by P46, Ncs, A, B. Other mss change it to the plural ἐντολαί (D¹, K, L, Ψ); others omit it (D⁴, F, G). Cf. Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament, 566; Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 257.

130. Commentators do not offer a discussion about the meaning of the phrase ἐπιταγήν κυρίου and to what extent it is, or it is not, connected to the Mosaic Law or the Law of Christ. See Schrage, Der Erste Brief an die Korinther, 2:131, 154–55; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 314–15; Garland, 1 Corinthians, 319–22; and Ciampa and Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, 330–34.
(that is, he has πνεῦμα), appeals to “Christ’s commandment” to advise the Corinthian believers concerning the gift of being a prophet or a spiritual person.131

However, when he speaks of “the commandments [ἐντολῶν] of God” (7:19), in the context when he is discussing the issue of circumcision (Jews) and uncircumcision (Greeks) in 7:17–20, he might be well referring, as Fitzmyer holds, to “other ‘commandments’ than that of circumcision” (see Gen 17:9–13), or as Charles K. Barrett suggests, to the “obedience to the will of God.”132 What is of interest in 7:19 is that Paul reiterates in different words what he claimed previously in Gal 5:6 and 6:15.133 In Christ and his Law (the love commandment), and not in the observance of the Mosaic Law, believers experience a “new creation.” Therefore, when solving the various issues in first Corinthians, Paul does not appeal to the Mosaic Law, but to Christ and his commandment, which in Galatians is expressed as the Law of Christ (Gal 6:2) or love commandment (Gal 5:14).

Paul re-affirms again the notion that the Mosaic Law is no longer the guiding ethical principle according to which the Corinthian believers are to guide their lives virtuously. In first Corinthians, however, he does not show a negative attitude towards the Mosaic Law as he does earlier in Galatians.134 Only once, his negativity about ὁ νόμος is

131. Unfortunately, however, no one has been able to define exactly what Paul would have meant with the word “commandment,” or what early believers would have understood by it. Cf. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 537; Ciampa and Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, 733.


133. Schrage, Der Erste Brief an die Korinther, 2:131.

134. In reference to Paul’s view of the Mosaic Law, Tatum (New Chapters in the Life of Paul, 37) argues that in first Corinthians the observance of the Mosaic Law is not a problem; what
expressed. In 15:56, he writes, “now the sting of death is sin, and the power of sin is the law.” Paul does not explain further the meaning of his statement, so one assumes that the Corinthian believers understand what he means. He is speaking about the nature of sin, and how sin uses ὁ νόμος as its instrument,135 so that, sin gains power over the non-spiritual people, those who do not possess πνεῦμα. As Paul associates the Mosaic Law with sin, his emphasis on the notion that the “observance” of the Mosaic Law is no longer necessary becomes more explicit. In his argument, he opts to speak about “the commandment of the Lord” instead of the “observance” of the Mosaic Law not only to deal with the issues of concern in the letter, but also to teach the Corinthian believers about a virtuous and a holy life.

But, a crucial question arises: to what extent is the Mosaic Law related to the Law of Christ in first Corinthians? Paul writes in 9:21, “to the ones without [the] law [I became one] as without [the] law, not being without the law of God, but within the law of Christ, so that, I may gain the ones without [the] law.” While in 9:20, Paul speaks to the Jews,136 now in 9:21, he speaks to the Greeks.137 Unlike Romans, as we shall see, the phrase, “the is a problem is the non-observance of the Law in terms of the prohibitions of idolatry and sexual misconduct.

135. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 607.

136. Paul writes, “I became to the Jews as a Jew so that I may gain Jews. To those under [the] law [I became as one] under [the] law being myself not under [the] law, so that, I may gain the ones under [the] law.” The four words “law” (νόμος) refer to the Mosaic Law or the commandments of God (7:19), and the clause “under [the] law” is missing from some mss, e.g., D2, (l), K, Ψ, 1881, but found in Θ, A, B, C, D*. Cf. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 370.

137. According to the Jews, Greeks or Gentiles are ἄνομοι, in that the Law was not given to them, only to the Jews. Cf. Collins, First Corinthians, 355. Paul speaks similarly in 9:22, “to the weak ones I became weak, so that, I may gain them; to all people I became all things so that I
Law of God” refers to the Mosaic Law or “the commandments of God” (7:19), and “the Law of Christ” is a reference to “the commandment of the Lord” (cf. 7:25; 14:37). In 9:21, however, Paul is not contrasting the Law of God (the Mosaic Law) with the Law of Christ, as Collins claims. Instead, Paul reassures the believers not only that he is in the Law of God, but also he is within the Law of Christ, assuming that for him, the Mosaic Law is related to the Law of Christ or commandment of the Lord (see 9:8; cf. 15:58). They are both related, but only in the sense that both laws come from God. What makes the Law of Christ superior to the Mosaic Law is that the former is empowered by πνεῦμα, which is God’s πνεῦμα, and the latter is no longer necessary in the ethical life of the believer. Although Paul does not relate directly πνεῦμα with ὁ νόμος or the Law of Christ (only indirectly πνεῦμα is related to the commandment of the Lord), the power that enables the Corinthian believers to live out the Law of Christ is only God’s πνεῦμα.

Νόμος and Its Relation to the Gospel of Christ (Τὸ Ἑὐαγγέλιον Χριστοῦ)

In first Corinthians, the word τὸ εὐαγγέλιον appears 12 times, and indirectly 3 times (9:23, and 1:17, 18). Paul indentifies himself as a “preacher,” a “proclaimer,” who was sent by Christ to preach the gospel (εὐαγγελίζεσθαι), not in wisdom of speech (1:17), but in “wisdom of God” (2:6–7). For Paul, “Christ became for us the wisdom from God” may save some of them.” In the first statement, the phrase “weak ones” means the Jews, and in the second statement, the expression “to all people” is a reference to Greeks, who are without the Law.


(1:30); therefore, the gospel is not only “the gospel of Christ” (9:12; 15:12),\textsuperscript{140} but also “the wisdom of God” (1:24, 30; 2:6–7).\textsuperscript{141} It is this gospel that he is called and committed to proclaim/preach,\textsuperscript{142} as he emphatically expresses it several times (1:17; 4:15; 9:16, 18, 23; 15:1, 3). In first Corinthians, it is in the contrast (πνευματικοὶ vs. σαρκικοὶ/σάρκινοι) that Paul shows that his proclamation [of the gospel] is rooted in Christ. Paul calls the (new?) Corinthian believers “infants in Christ” to express the idea that what he proclaims is \textit{in Christ}. In this context, Paul’s figurative language of “the feeding of milk and solid food” (3:2) refers to his teaching and preaching the gospel in Christ. Indeed, Paul expresses that only in Christ can be laid the foundation of his preaching (3:11), and that, it is in the name and power of Christ that Paul is able to bring together the Corinthian believers in one κοινωνία. While he proclaims the gospel of Christ, that power of Christ is πνεῦμα, as he says “my spirit with the power of our Lord” (5:4; see also 7:40; 14:14–15; 16:18).

For Paul, the gospel proclamation is a “demonstration” of God’s πνεῦμα as δύναμις. In 2:4–5, which follows Paul’s argument concerning false and correct ideas about σοφία (1:18–31), Paul assures the Corinthian believers that his proclamation of the gospel is in God’s wisdom and in God’s power, and in God’s πνεῦμα (σοφία-δύναμις-πνεῦμα). The πνεῦμα is, according to Paul, the power that reveals the preaching of the gospel

\textsuperscript{140} These two texts are the only instances in which Paul refers to the gospel as “the gospel of Christ.”

\textsuperscript{141} Here may lie the reason why Paul does not speak of “the gospel of God” as elsewhere in his letters.

\textsuperscript{142} To describe his call to preach the gospel of Christ, Paul either uses the verbal forms of εὐαγγελίζομαι (to preach the gospel), καταγγέλλω (to proclaim), or κηρύσσω (to proclaim the gospel).
(λόγος) as “God’s σοφία” (2:7). That is for Paul, the gospel is no other than God’s own wisdom (σοφία). Thus, Paul reminds the Corinthian believers that the real δύναμις in proclaiming the gospel lies in both the λόγος and σοφία through the dynamic work of πνεῦμα. When Paul stresses the gospel’s connection with God’s wisdom and πνεῦμα’s power, he contrasts two “wisdoms” (σοφίαι): the wisdom “of God” vs. the wisdom “of human beings” (2:5). The “δύναμις of God,” then, not only parallels “the power of πνεῦμα,” but also the “power of God,” which is the “σοφία of God,” the gospel that Paul preaches (wisdom of God, 1:24).

For Paul, the notion of “possessing πνεῦμα” and “not possessing πνεῦμα” is crucial for the reception of the σοφία of God (the gospel of Christ). He tells the Corinthian brothers that he “was not able to speak to you as spiritual people [πνευματικοῖς], but as fleshy people [σαρκίνοις], as infants in Christ” (3:1). Here, the term σαρκίνοις refers either to those who still live according to σάρξ (3:3)—that is, those who have not yet received πνεῦμα (or perhaps are about to receive it)—or to those believers who still think like mere

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143. The “word of the cross” that Cage (The Holy Spirit, 536–37) speaks about (2:6–10) is “the gospel,” and not “salvation through a crucified Messiah,” as he claims. The gospel (God’s wisdom) “was secret and hidden wisdom which God finally revealed to them through the Spirit” since only God’s πνεῦμα has access to God’s thoughts.

144. Fitzmyer (First Corinthians, 169) correctly argues that Paul expresses that his preaching among the Corinthian believers has been done not in the eloquent wisdom, but in the inspiration of God’s πνεῦμα, an idea that he explains more in the following verses (2:6–3:3). It is in God’s πνεῦμα that Paul speaks of his coming to the Corinthian believers to proclaim the mystery (μυστήριον) of God (2:1; see also 2:7; 4:1).

145. The expression “wisdom of human beings” (see also 2:13) means the wisdom of those who live according to σάρξ (1:26), that is, the “fleshy people [σάρκινοι/σαρκικοί]” in whom πνεῦμα does not dwell. They are those who are puffed up in the word (λόγος) of σάρξ (4:19), which is the false λόγος or false wisdom. This false λόγος, which is of σάρξ, is not in πνεῦμα’s power; therefore, it does not lead believers to the kingdom of God (15:50; cf. 4:20; 15:24).
human beings—that is, they have already received πνεῦμα, but they act like if they did not have πνεῦμα. The latter argument is supported by the word brothers (ἀδελφοί), which is an expression that Paul often uses for the believers who believe in Christ. They have received πνεῦμα, but they have not fully allowed πνεῦμα to transform their hearts, as he said, they “are infants in Christ;” they are still not ready to be fed “with solid food” (3:2). The former argument is supported by what Paul says in 3:3, “for you still are fleshly people [σαρκικοί], since there is jealousy and strife among you. Are you not fleshy and are [still] walking according to a human [inclinations]?” The word σαρκικοί refers to those who are devoid of πνεῦμα; therefore, they are not πνευματικοί (spiritual people) who walk according to πνεῦμα (cf. 14:37).

In First Corinthians “the gospel of Christ” is also the gospel “of the cross” (1:18); that “Christ died for our sins according to the Scripture and that he was buried and that he was raised on the third day according to the Scripture” (15:3–4; see also 1:17, 23; 15:12; cf. 4:17). It is on this gospel “of the cross” that the Corinthian believers have received, have


147. This is Fee’s argument (God’s Empowering Presence, 111), who argues that the believers have πνεῦμα, but are acting just like those who do lack πνεῦμα. Like Fee, Cage (The Holy Spirit, 539) also claims that they had the holy Spirit in them but they were not spiritual; they have not grown out of the fleshly state to the spiritual state. Fee and Cage clearly overlook what Paul writes in 3:3.

148. In 3:3, Paul changes the word σάρκινοι (3:1) with σαρκικοί. However, both words have the same meaning for Paul and he uses them interchangeably, and both can either refer to the fleshly parts of the human body, the human body, the material/physical aspect of the human body belonging to this world or the unspiritual, who do not possess πνεῦμα.

149. This is Collins’ position (First Corinthians, 142), who argues that σαρκίνοις refers to those who have not yet received πνεῦμα. However, since both arguments can be supported, Paul could be referring to either one of them, or both.
stood, and are ultimately saved (15:2; see also 1:13; 2:2, 8) in the power of God (1:18). It is also this gospel that Paul and his co-workers (3:9) have proclaimed and were taught in words, not by human wisdom, but by the power of God’s πνεῦμα (2:12–13). There are two important points in 2:12–13: (1) for Paul, πνεῦμα teaches God’s wisdom; thus, the gospel of Christ is the wisdom of God. (2) This is the only time in which Paul associates the gospel with πνεῦμα, and at the same time, he shows that his gospel “of the cross” is rooted in the Jewish Scriptures (see also 5:3–4; 15:12). However, because Paul’s gospel—gospel of the cross, gospel of Christ, the wisdom of God—was taught by πνεῦμα (unlike the Mosaic Law), the gospel teaches only “spiritual things” and only to those who have πνεῦμα, the spiritual people (2:13) who have faith in Christ (15:2).

What is at stake for Paul is that it is now the gospel of Christ, and not the Mosaic Law, that contains the lessons that guide the Corinthian believers on how to conduct their lives virtuously (9:14), and thus gain their salvation (1:18; 15:1–2).150 He urges the believers to be “steadfast, immovable, always excelling in the work of the Lord;” the believers know that in their living (practice of) the gospel of Christ their labor is not in vain (15:58; cf. 9:27). Paul assures them only in the gospel of Christ they are able to “endure all things” (9:12), and to live lives “pleasing to God” (1:21; 7:32; 10:5, 33). This way of life grounded on the gospel of Christ leads the believers to receive their reward: “to be saved in the power of God” (1:18), the power of πνεῦμα (2:13–14).

What then can be said concerning ὁ νόμος and its relation to the gospel of Christ in first Corinthians? Two essential remarks: In first Corinthians, unlike the Jewish

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150. The lessons of the gospel of Christ is about, using Tobin’s words, “how” the believers are ought to behave in a way that is pleasing to God, and not about “what” the believers are to observe. Tobin, *The Spirituality of Paul*, 102.
Scriptures (9:9; 14:21, 34), ὁ νόμος (the Mosaic Law) does not play a role in his ethical discourse; in fact, Paul does not use the language of fulfillment or summation (πλήρωμα or πληρόω) anywhere in the letter. Second, what leads Paul to replace the Mosaic Law with the gospel of Christ is the empowerment of God’s πνεῦμα as the guiding principle in the believers’ ethical life. It is now the dynamic work of πνεῦμα—which will be defined in Romans as “the Law of πνεῦμα” (ὁ νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος)—grounded in the gospel that leads believers to virtues and thus their salvation.

Πνεῦμα as the opposite of the Flesh (Σάρξ) in

Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians

In first Corinthians, Paul uses the term σάρξ 14 times, and in 2 instances (3:1 and 9:11), he shows the contrast between πνεῦμα and σάρξ, but in a different way than Galatians. In 3:1 Paul writes, “I brothers was not able to speak to you as spiritual people [πνευματικοῖς], but as fleshly people [σαρκίνοις] as to infants in Christ,” And in 9:11, “if we sowed among you the spiritual things (πνευματικά) is it a great thing if we will reap fleshly things (σαρκικά) from you?” These two passages show that Paul makes an intentional contrast of πνευματικά with its opposite, σαρκικά, yet not as sharp as we find especially in Galatians (πνεῦμα vs. σάρξ) and later in Romans. In a way similar to first Thessalonians, the contrast


152. 1:26, 29; 3:1, 3 [twice]; 5:5; 7:28; 10:18; 15:39 [4x], 50. From these references to σάρξ, in 8 instances Paul uses σάρξ in referene to the human body, the earthly existence (5:5; 6:16; 7:28; 15:39, 50).
in first Corinthians distinguishes dualistically two realities that are opposed, but unlike first Thessalonians, the dualism emphasizes the distinction between believers who possess πνεῦμα and those who do not, as is shown in the table below:

Table 20. Dualistic Framework of Opposed Realities in First Corinthians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Πνεῦμα</th>
<th>Σάρξ</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life 3:22</td>
<td>Death 3:22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future 3:22</td>
<td>Present 3:22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light 4:5</td>
<td>Darkness 4:5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angels 4:9*</td>
<td>Human beings 4:9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong 4:10</td>
<td>Weak 4:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritual things 9:11**</td>
<td>Fleshy things 9:11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom 9:19</td>
<td>Slavery 9:19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resurrection 15:21</td>
<td>Death 15:21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavenly bodies 15:40</td>
<td>Earthly bodies 15:40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritual body 15:44, 46</td>
<td>Natural body 15:44, 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christ (the ‘last’ Adam), a life-giving πνεῦμα 15:45, 47</td>
<td>Adam (the ‘first’ man), a living being 15:45, 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heaven 15:47</td>
<td>Earth 15:47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heavenly man 15:48</td>
<td>Man of dust 15:48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image of the heavenly man 15:49</td>
<td>Image of the man of dust 15:49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immortal 15:53, 54</td>
<td>Mortal 15:53, 54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For Paul’s reference to “angels” see also 6:3; 11:10; 13:1.
** Rom 15:27.

This dualistic view, a further elaboration of the contrast (πνεῦμα vs. σάρξ) in Galatians, is what governs Paul’s thought in his description of the consequences of “living in πνεῦμα” and “living in σάρξ.” This type of contrast is similar to what he will illustrate in Romans (ch. 8). To have a better understanding of how Paul works out the ethical duality
between πνεῦμα and σάρξ, this section is divided in two subsections: (1) living in πνεῦμα’s power and (2) living in σάρξ’s power.

**Living in Πνεῦμα’s Power**

In first Corinthians, πνεῦμα is for Paul “the Spirit of God” (2:11, 12, 14; 3:16; 6:11, 19; 7:40; 12:3),153 a divine power infused in the Corinthian believers at their baptism in Christ (1:13–17; 6:11; 10:2; 12:13; 15:29). Paul describes that at their baptism believers “were washed, sanctified, and justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of God” (6:11; see also 1:2, 30; 15:34).154 Although Paul does not use the word περιπατέω (to walk) or ἀρετή (virtue) in connection with πνεῦμα,155 for him, God’s πνεῦμα empowers the believers to guide their conduct virtuously according to the gospel of Christ (9:14). In the power of πνεῦμα, they have the possibility to be holy, righteous (virtuous), and avoid vices (15:34). To this life in πνεῦμα they all were called into the fellowship (κοινωνία) of God’s Son Jesus Christ the Lord (1:9).156

In first Corinthians, as Paul works out the framework of his ethics that he introduced in Galatians, he also closely connects God’s πνεῦμα with Christ (3:23; 6:17; 8:6; 10:3–4; 12:6, 13), especially when he identifies Christ as “the spiritual rock.” In 10:3–4, Paul reinterprets the Israelites’ journey through the wilderness in their exodus, in light

153. In first Corinthians, ὁ θεός (God) plays the most important role in Paul’s argument; in fact, the letter refers to God 108 times!

154. Interestingly, unlike his other letters (esp. Galatians and Romans) in first Corinthians, Paul mentions the word δικαιοσύνη only 3 times (1:30; 15:34; and 6:11 [verbal form δικαίω]).

155. Only twice Paul uses the verb περιπατέω (3:3 and 7:17).

156. As in Romans, in first Corinthians, God’s call is universal, includes both Jews and Greeks (1:24, 26; 7:15–24).
of the Corinthian believers’ experience of the new age. He speaks of how they “all ate the same spiritual food [τὸ αὐτὸ πνευματικὸν βρῶμα ἔφαγον] and drank the same spiritual drink [τὸ αὐτὸ πνευματικὸν ἔπιον πόμα], for they were drinking from a spiritual rock [πνευματικῆς ... πέτρας] following [them], and the rock was Christ [ἡ πέτρα δὲ ἦν ὁ Χριστός]” (cf. 10:16–17).\(^{157}\) Paul’s emphatic statement that “the rock was Christ” reveals not only the association of both the spiritual food and spiritual drink with Christ, but most importantly, the intrinsic connection of “the Spirit of God” with Christ. In first Corinthians Paul never refers to πνεῦμα as “the Spirit of Christ.” It is in this passage (10:3–4) that Paul reveals (implicitly) that God’s πνεῦμα is the same as Christ’s πνεῦμα.

This is better observed in 12:13, when Paul says, “in one Spirit [ἐνὶ πνεύματι], we were all baptized into one body [ἕν σῶμα], whether Jews or Greeks, whether slaves or free, and we all were given to drink one Spirit [ἐν πνεῦμα ἐποτίσθημεν].” Paul explains that the Corinthian believers were baptized in Christ (1:13–17; 6:11; cf. 15:29); therefore, ἐνὶ πνεύματι in 12:13 refers to Christ. The phrase ἐν σῶμα refers to the body of Christ (12:12, 27; see also 6:15; 10:16; 11:24, 27; 12:20), which ultimately the statement of “your body is the temple of the holy Spirit” is no other than a reference to Christ’s body.\(^{158}\) Also, the expression “all were given to drink one Spirit” is a direct reference to Christ.\(^{159}\) As for Paul

\(^{157}\) Reflecting on Israel’s example, some scholars argue that in this passage Paul presents a midrashic exposition using the Exodus account. See Collins, *First Corinthians*, 364–67.


\(^{159}\) Other than this interpretation, the “drinking” of the Spirit has been diversely
God is “one” (εἷς; 8:4, 6; see also 1:3; 15:24), and “the same God” (ὁ αὐτὸς θεός, 12:3), God’s πνεῦμα is also “one” (ἐνὶ πνεύματι, 12:9, 13; see also 6:17), and “the same πνεῦμα” (12:4, 8–11), which is also “the Spirit of Christ.” Thus, Christ is the spiritual food and spiritual drink; so he as the “last” Adam became a “life-giving πνεῦμα” (15:45). With their new life in πνεῦμα, a life in holiness and in virtues, Paul asserts the Corinthian believers that they have life in Christ (15:19, 22); they are “the body of Christ” (6:13, 15, 20; 12:22–27; cf.10:16; 11:24, 27), “one body with Christ” (12:2, 13–20); and they are the “Temple of God’s holy πνεῦμα” (3:16–17; 6:19; cf. 7:34). They have received free gifts (χαρίσματα, 1:7; 7:7; 11:21–31; 12:4–31; 14:2–25), so they are urged to come to their own senses, to live righteously, avoid sinning (15:34) and to become “imitators” of Paul, as he is of Christ (4:16; 11:1; cf. 7:8).

explained. Fitzmyer (First Corinthians, 478–79) notes that it has been understood figuratively as a reference to baptism, or as a drinking of the Eucharistic cup. Both positions can be argued safely.

160. There are other few references in which Paul associates God’s πνεῦμα with Christ; for instance, Paul writes, “you are of Christ and Christ is of God” (3:23); “the one joining himself to the Lord is one πνεῦμα” (6:17); and “there is one God, the Father, and one Lord Jesus Christ through whom all things (τὰ πάντα) are and through him we are” (8:6; cf. 12:6). Cf. Collins, First Corinthians, 320.

161. Tatum (New Chapters in the Life of Paul, 47) holds that the body of Christ motif, which addresses primarily the issues of idolatry, sexual misconduct, and speaking in tongues (glossolalia, see 6:6:15; 10:17; 12:12–27; cf. 11:24, 29), is related to the πνεῦμα-σάρξ antithesis. Paul argues against those who think that the deeds of the body, especially, eating and sexual activity (6:12–13; 8:8), are ethically indifferent (Corinthian slogans) by claiming that their body (σῶμα) has ethical and eschatological value. Although the present body is corruptible, mortal, weak, and dishonored (15:43, 53–54), it is not evil; bodies are, for Paul, members of Christ (6:15). See also Gerhard Sellin, “Hauptprobleme des Ersten Korintherbriefes,” in Haase, Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der Neueren Forschung, 2940–3044, esp. 3001–3003, 3008–3010.

162. For Paul, each spiritual believer has his/her own gift (χάρισμα) that comes from God’s πνεῦμα (e.g., 7:7; 12:8, 24, 28). For a discussion about χαρίσματα in first Corinthians, see D. A. Carson, Showing the Spirit: A Theological Exposition of 1 Corinthians 12–14 (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1987).
As Paul understands “the Spirit of God” as “the Spirit of Christ” in his ethical discourse, he develops the themes of “receiving” and “knowing.” The theme of receiving directly appears in 2:12, 14, and indirectly as the result of receiving πνεῦμα in 6:11; 7:40; 12:3. Paul asserts the Corinthian believers that they have received πνεῦμα, but as he emphatically states, this πνεῦμα is “not the spirit of the world but the Spirit of God” (2:12). This πνεῦμα who is from God, thus divine, grants the believers “the things” (τὰ) of πνεῦμα, which are “the things” of God (2:14; see also 2:11). Paul asserts that the unspiritual person (ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος), that is, the one who does not possess God’s πνεῦμα, does not receive “the things” of God’s πνεῦμα (2:14). Paul himself is spiritual (πνευματικός), because he claims to have God’s πνεῦμα (5:3; 16:18), thus he possesses “the things” of πνεῦμα (7:40).

What are “the things” (τὰ) of God’s πνεῦμα that the spiritual believers have received? According to Paul, God’s holy πνεῦμα empowers the spiritual believers (πνευματικοί) to be able to say, “Lord Jesus” (12:3). Also, it is God’s holy πνεῦμα which sanctifies and justifies the spiritual believers, in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ (6:11). Paul likewise explains about the diversity of gifts in the κοινωνία of believers by emphasizing πνεῦμα’s role in the “receiving of gifts.”163 God through πνεῦμα (12:8) gives the manifestation of πνεῦμα (12:6–7), a gift of “the workings of powers” (ἐνεργήματα δυνάμεων, 12:10), which are for the good of κοινωνία, a κοινωνία in “the same God” (ὁ

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164. The mss P46 tries to solve the difficult plural that seem tautologous by reading ἐνέργεια δυνάμεως, a genitive understood as descriptive (working of power). Collins suggests (*First Corinthians*, 455) that the phrase ἐνεργήματα δυνάμεων is a term used in Hellenistic literature to denote miraculous powers. See also Fee, *God’s Empowering Presence*, 158; Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 467.
αὐτὸς θεός, 12:6), in “the same Lord” (ὁ αὐτὸς κύριος, 12:5), and in “the same πνεῦμα” (τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα, 12:9). Thus, τὰ (the things) are the gifts of God’s πνεῦμα (χαρίσματα) that are related to Christ and his gospel (3:4–15; 15:10–11). But the manifestations of πνεῦμα are given only to the believers in whom πνεῦμα dwells. Paul reminds the Corinthian believers in 2:14 that one who does not possess πνεῦμα, “[the] ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος (the unspiritual person) does not receive [οὐ δέχεται] the things [τὰ] of God’s πνεῦμα, for they are foolishness to the individual, who is not able to know [them] because they are spiritually [πνευματικῶς] discerned.” For Paul, having πνεῦμα is essentially necessary (sine qua non) in order to understand πνεῦμα’s ways of discernment, a discernment of the νοῦς (mind) that will lead the Corinthian believers to foster virtues, and endure both temptation (10:13) and the power of sin (15:56). He exhorts them: “strive for the spiritual things” (πνευματικά, 14:1), and “do not be ignorant” (ἀγνοεῖν, 12:1).

Furthermore, τὰ (the things) also includes “knowing.” The theme of knowing in relation to living in the power of πνεῦμα explicitly appears in 2:11, 12; 3:16; 6:19; 12:3, and implicitly in 2:10. According to Paul, all things (τὰ πάντα) belong to God (11:12; cf. 10:32; 11:16; 15:9), but no one knows “the things of God,” except God’s πνεῦμα (2:11). Paul claims that God revealed “the things” (τὰ) to the spiritual believers through πνεῦμα, and

165. Cf. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 184.

166. The language of “knowing” without the presence of πνεῦμα and in its verbal form appear throughout the letter (see 6:16, 19; 7:17; 8:1, 4; 9:24; 11:3; 13:9; 15:58; 16:15).

167. In 3:20, Paul speaks of Christ, the Lord, as knowing the reasoning of the wise. Fee (God’s Empowering Presence, 102, 104) points out that πνεῦμα is what enables the Corinthian believers and Paul to understand God’s wisdom. It is πνεῦμα that becomes the believers’ instructor of God’s mysteries. Thus, πνεῦμα is the key to everything.
it is only πνεῦμα that searches all (πάντα) even the deep things of God (2:10–12). The “things” that involve this knowing in God’s πνεῦμα are: that the believers know what to speak (12:3; cf. 2:4–5; 16:22), and that they know that they are God’s Temple (3:16; 6:19). In both examples, it is God’s πνεῦμα that gives them the knowledge about “speaking” rightly about Christ (12:3; see also 2:10–13), and about the knowledge concerning the Spirit of God’s “dwelling” in them (3:16; cf. 14:25). The true spiritual believers (πνευματικοί) know that their body is the Temple of the holy πνεῦμα, and that their body is not their own, for they have received it from God (6:19; 3:17; cf. 7:34). These “things” (τὰ) are the knowledge of God that the un-spiritual people are devoid to knowledge (15:34).

Living in the power of πνεῦμα requires believers to follow Christ’s way, as Paul writes, “because of this I sent to you Timothy, who is my beloved child and trustworthy in the Lord, who will remind you of my ways [ὁδούς] in Christ Jesus” (4:17). For Paul, his ὁδός in Christ, which is the way of virtues, is worthy to be imitated because he may share Christ’s blessings (9:22–23). In 9:24–27, Paul describes what their imitation of Paul’s virtues entails combining both athletic and Middle Platonic language. He tells the believers that they all are competing, as in the games; they are runners, running in a race to pursue the prize (the τέλος). He encourages them to run so that they may obtain the prize. With the

168. Paul designates πνεῦμα not only as an instructor of “the things of God,” but also as the source of revelation (ἀποκάλυψις, see 1:7; 2:10; 3:13; 14:6, 26), in the sense that by “having πνεῦμα” the believers are able to know “the things” that have been given freely to them by God. Cf. Fee, *God’s Empowering Presence*, 140.

169. To speak rightly about Christ for Paul means that the believer confesses that Jesus was crucified and was raised by God and because of that he is Lord of all. Cf. Fee, *God’s Empowering Presence*, 157.

170. In 12:8, Paul describes the free gifts (χαρίσματα) of “wisdom” and “knowledge” as manifestations of “the same” πνεῦμα (see also 13:2; cf. 13:8; 14:6).
practice of self-control (ἐγκράτεια), like the athletes, he assures them that they will be able to attain a prize that is imperishable, and not a perishable wreath.\textsuperscript{171} The Corinthian believers as spiritual people in Christ are called to practice and live the gospel's teachings zealously (14:12, 39). God's hidden mysteries have been manifested to them, so that they will worship only God (14:25). They will not only please God (1:21; cf. 7:32; 10:5, 33), but also they will glorify God in their body (σῶμα, 6:20; cf. 2:7; 7:35; 15:41), which is of Christ. Only then they will be able to attain “the reward” (3:8, 14; 4:5; 9:17, 18; cf. 3:15): salvation (1:18, 21; 3:15; 5:5; 7:16; 9:22; 10:33). This is the goal (τέλος) of the believers' life (1:8; 15:24), in which they will take part in the kingdom of God (4:20; 6:9–10; 15:24, 50), and the revelation (ἀποκάλυψις) of the Lord Jesus Christ on the last day (1:7–8; 5:5; cf. 7:29, 31). In Christ, they will be made alive (15:22) for he is the life-giving πνεῦμα (15:45); so at the resurrection, their body (σῶμα) will be transformed into spiritual, immortal, immaterial, and imperishable bodies (9:25; 15:40–42, 50–54),\textsuperscript{172} characteristics very much associated with the intelligible world (κόσμος νοητός).\textsuperscript{173} This is the believers' final victory through the Lord Jesus Christ (15:54–57), where in the power of God's πνεῦμα, their bodies become spiritual and ascend to the heavenly realm.

\textsuperscript{171} Here, Paul shows his familiarity with the Isthmian games, which were so popular in Corinth. Probably, his staying in Corinth (at least 2 years) must have coincided with the Isthmian games at least once, and perhaps he attended them. Cf. David J. Williams \textit{Paul’s Metaphors: Their Context and Character} (Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 1999), 267, 273.

\textsuperscript{172} Paul makes reference to resurrection in several passages, especially in chapter 15 (e.g., 6:14; 15:4, 12–17, 20–21, 29, 32, 35, 42–44, 52). Paul explains that at the believers' resurrection, their body will be transformed into "spiritual body", which is a body non-physical that belongs to πνεῦμα in its final glorified, imperishable expression. This “Spiritual body” belongs to the world of πνεῦμα, the world of God (the intelligible world).

\textsuperscript{173} See the discussion in chaper nine.
Living in Σάρξ’s Power

In first Corinthians, Paul directly associates vices and sins with σάρξ, particularly when he writes, “for you still fleshly, since there is jealousy and strife among you. Are you not fleshly and are walking according to [the] flesh [lit. human standard]?” (3:3). He also intrinsically connects σάρξ with idolatry, eating food sacrificed to idols, and polytheism (10:14–22). For Paul, those who practice vices and sins of the σάρξ do not “boast before God” (1:29). Rather, these are arrogant people (5:2), who are puffed up in human knowledge (8:1; cf. 1:26). As Paul disassociates πνεῦμα from vices/sins, he directly links σάρξ with Satan (7:5; 5:5). It is this fleshly life in σάρξ (vices/sins) that leads Corinthians to judgment,176 destruction (5:5; 6:13; 10:9–10) and punishment (3:15; 5:5; 16:22), which is condemnation to death (4:9; 11:32; 15:21–22, 26, 54–56). Paul explains to the Corinthian believers that “the unrighteous ones will not inherit God’s kingdom” (6:9); and sinners, such as fornicators, idolaters, thieves, and so on, “will not inherit the kingdom of God” (6:10).177 It is true that in first Corinthians, he does not lists virtues as manifestation of living a life in the power of God’s πνεῦμα, and vices as manifestation of walking according to the power of σάρξ. But, πνεῦμα is associated with the capacity to practice virtues and

174. See also 8:4–5, 7, 10; 9:13; 10:19–20; 12:2. For Paul, participation in pagan meals have disastrous ethical consequences for the believers at Corinth; such behavior threatens their life in holiness and ultimately salvation. Cf. Ciampa and Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, 469.

175. For Paul, true boasting is only in the Lord Jesus and in God’s πνεῦμα (see also 1:31; 3:21; 4:7; 5:6; 9:15–16; 13:3; 15:31).


177. The vices listed in 6:9–10 contains 6 items which are repeated from 5:11, and 4 from 5:9. For a detailed explanation of these vices, see Ciampa and Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, 2410–45.
avoid vices/sins. The following table shows the list of virtues and vices highlighted in first Corinthians:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virtues</th>
<th>Vices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ἀγάπη (love) 4:21; 8:1; 13:1–4, 8, 13, 14:1; 16:14, 24</td>
<td>ἀγνωσία (ignorance) 15:34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀγιασμός (sanctification) 1:30</td>
<td>ἀδικία, ἀδίκος (injustice, unrighteousness) 13:6 ; 9 ,6:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀγίος (holy) 1:2; 3:17; 6:1–2; 7:14, 34; 12:3; 14:33; 16:1, 15, 20</td>
<td>ἀκαθαρσία (impurity) 7:14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀλήθεια (truth) 13:6 ;5:8</td>
<td>ἀκρασία (lack of self-control) 7:5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>γνώση (judgment) 1:10</td>
<td>ἀμαρτία (sinful deed) 56 ,15:17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>γνώσης (knowledge) 12:8 ;11 ,7 ,8:1 ;1:5 14:6 ;8 ,13:2</td>
<td>ἀπιστος (unbelieving) 7:1 ;6:62–15; 10:27; 14:23–24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>δικαιοσύνη (justice, righteousness) 1:30</td>
<td>ἀρσενοκοίτης (male homosexual) 6:9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>έλεος (mercy) 7:25</td>
<td>ἐπιθυμητής (one who desire a thing) 10:6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἔνδοξος (honorable) 4:10</td>
<td>ἔρις (strife) 3:3 ;11:11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>καλός (good) 5:6; 7:8, 26; 9:15</td>
<td>ζήλος (jealous) 3:3; 13:4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>κοινωνία (fellowship) 1:9; 10:16</td>
<td>κακία, κακός (evil) 5:8; 10:6; 13:5; 14:20; 15:33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μακροθυμία (patience) 13:4</td>
<td>κλέπτης (thief) 6:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>οἰκοδομή (edification) 26 ,12 ,5 ,4 ,14:3</td>
<td>λοιδορος (reviler) 6:10 ;5:11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>παρακλήσις (encouragement) 31 ,14:3</td>
<td>μαλακός (effeminate) 6:9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>παραμυθία (consolation) 14:3</td>
<td>μέθυσος (drunkard) 6:10 ;5:11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πραΰτης (meekness, gentleness) 4:21</td>
<td>μωρία (foolishness, folly) 2 ,1:180–21, 23, 25, 27; 3:18–19; 4:10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The list shows that in first Corinthians the virtues most frequently mentioned are love, faith, wisdom, and holiness. Especially love and faith are the most important virtues to Paul, two virtues very much emphasized when he set up the structure for his ethics in Galatians.

The Relationship of Πνεῦμα to the Practice of Virtues, Especially the Love Commandment in Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians

In this letter, Paul does not directly associates πνεῦμα with the love commandment. However, the virtue of love (ἀγάπη) and its cognates (ἀγαπῶσιν, ἀγαπατά, ἀγαπᾷ, and ἀγαπητοί) appear 19 times, and love appears twice together with πνεῦμα (4:21 and 14:1). In 4:21, Paul writes, “what do you want? Should I come to you with a rod, or in love and in πνεῦμα of meekness?” He refers to his own personal ethical performance, in which the virtues of love and meekness are expressions of πνεῦμα dwelling in his heart. In 14:1, he begins his exhortation on love exhorting the believers to “pursue love and zealously desire the spiritual things;” in other words, “follow the way of love” (ch. 13). Paul links the virtue of love with πνευματικά (spiritual things/gifts) or χαρίσματα (free gifts). What

178. See 2:9; 4:14, 17, 21; 8:13; 10:14; 13:1, 2, 3, 4 [twice], 8, 13 [twice]; 14:11; 15:58; 16:14, 24. In 16:22, Paul uses the verb φιλέω (to love) in a negative form, οὐ φιλεῖ (does not love).

is significant is that in both texts, Paul shows πνεῦμα's intrinsic association with both the virtue of ἀγάπη and χαρίσματα.

**The Relationship of Πνεῦμα with Love and Free Gifts**

For Paul, free gifts (χαρίσματα) that the Corinthian believers receive are manifestations of God's πνεῦμα in their life to bring unity among them (3:13; 12:1–11; 14:2, 25; 13–40; cf. 4:5; 11:19).\(^{180}\) Paul's proclamation of the gospel, for example, is also a manifestation of God's πνεῦμα and power (2:4); in fact, the words he teaches (spiritual things) are interrelated with the "spiritual ones" (πνευματικοί) because they are taught by πνεῦμα (2:13).\(^{181}\) But, the manifestations of God's πνεῦμα are not only χαρίσματα, they are also manifestations of virtues. For Paul, virtues are also “gifts” associated with God's πνεῦμα (7:34; 14:3–6; cf. 6:17); and the main virtue that he privileges in his ethical exhortation is ἀγάπη. He starts his letter reminding the Corinthian believers: “eye did not see and ear did not hear, and human heart did not conceive the things that God prepared for the ones loving [ἀγαπῶσιν] him” (2:9).\(^{182}\) And he concludes his letter by exhorting them: “to

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180. Although sometimes, it is difficult to distinguish the free gifts on Paul’s list from one another (see 12:4–31; 14:1–40), there are two gifts of speech (wisdom and knowledge); three suggest miraculous powers (faith, healing, working miracles), there are three gifts of inspired utterance (prophesy and speaking in tongues, and interpretation of tongues), and one gift of the intellect (discernment of spirits). Here, the word “spirits” (12:10) has received different interpretations. It could mean “angels” and “demons” (see 5:5; 7:5; 10:20–21; 13:1) or disembodied, supernatural beings (see 2 Macc 3:24). The word “spirits” could also mean spiritual entities (1 Enoch 15.1ff), or “spirits of the firmament” (4 Ezra 6:4). For a detailed discussion, see Munzinger, *Discerning the Spirits*, esp. 45–70.


182. As Fitzmyer (*First Corinthians*, 81) points out, “all the good things that God has prepared for those who love him are ‘revealed to us through God’s πνεῦμα’ (2:10).” Although Paul
do everything \[πάντα\] in love \[ἐν ἀγάπῃ\]” (16:14). What is at stake for Paul is that the believers’ virtuous life is grounded in the virtue of love, especially “love of God” and “love of Christ.” Concerning the love of God, Paul writes: “if someone loves God, this one has been known by God” (8:3), and therefore, he urges his Corinthian brothers to “flee from idolatry” (10:14)—because this sin is the root of vices, especially of all kinds of immoral behavior (e.g., 6:9; see above list of vices)—and “whether you eat or you drink or whatever you do, do all things \[πάντα\] for the glory of God” (10:31). Concerning the love of Christ, Paul writes: “if anyone does not love the Lord, let him be a curse. ‘Come our lord!’” (16:22; see also 12:3).

As Paul depicts the virtue of ἀγάπη as the most important virtue among all other virtues, he describes love as a virtue superior to knowledge (γνῶσις), when he writes,

introduces this biblical quotation (it has been written), no one has been able to identify the exact source of the words. The first clause echoes Isa 64:3 and 52:15 in the LXX. The second clause may echo either LXX Isa 65:16 or LXX Jer 3:16 or Jer 39:35; 51:21. The last clause may echo Sir 1:10 in the LXX. See Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 177.

183. The mss P⁴⁶ does not contain the words τὸν θεόν (God) and ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ (by him). The absence of the first phrase (τὸν θεόν) is to be regarded as the result of formal assimilation to 8:2. The latter (ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ) is also omitted in mss N* and 33; its omission is regarded by the committee as accidental. See Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament, 556–57; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 340.

184. As Scott (Implicit Epistemology in the Letters of Paul, 19) states, “the worship of idols is a vice for which human beings are held morally responsible. Hence this idolatry brings on God’s punishment (1:26–27).” We have seen in 14:25 that Paul urges the Corinthian believers to worship only God (see also 8:6). Paul once more (see 10:7) exhorts the Corinthian believers to flee from the worship of false gods and serve only the one God, the Father. Paul admonishes the Corinthian believers that worshipping idols in pagan temples, or the practice of polytheism, and eating food sacrifice to idols have no value, for they are demons, and not the true God (10:19–21). Cf. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 388; Freed, The Morality of Paul’s Converts, 98.

185. The word Μαρανθα θα (come our Lord!) is an Aramaic expression written in Greek letters. For discussion, see Collins, First Corinthians, 616–17; Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 629–31.
“love edifies” the Corinthian community (8:1; 14:26). For him, the virtue of love never fails (13:8), even when all things will pass away, love will remain, as he writes, “… now remains these three [virtues] faith, hope, and love; and the greatest [μείζων] of these is love [ἀγάπη]” (13:13). The virtue of love is the “greatest” manifestation of God’s πνεῦμα in the ethical life of the believers in Corinth. In fact, Paul as a spiritual man asserts to them that if he has no love, he is nothing (13:2), suggesting to them that if they have love they have “everything.” This is observed when he describes the nature of the virtue of love (13:1–13) and he claims that “if I do not have love, I am a sounding brass or clanging cymbal…, I have gained nothing.” He then describes the virtue of love as the “source” of other virtues:

Love is patient, love is kind, love is not jealousy, love does not brag, [love] is not puffed up, [love] does not behave dishonorably, [love] does not seek for itself, [love] is not hot tempered, [love] does not put down to one’s account of evil [love] does not rejoice over unrighteousness/injustice, but rejoices in the truth. [Love] covers all things [πάντα], believes all things [πάντα], hopes all things [πάντα], and endures all things [πάντα] (13:4–7).

First, Paul mentions the special relation of ἀγάπη with other virtues, and its disassociation from vices. The phrase “[love] believes all things, [love] hopes all things, and [love] endures all things” embodies three essential virtues (faith, hope, and endurance) in the ethical life of the believer. To have God’s πνεῦμα, according to Paul, requires faith, to attain the goal of life requires hope, and to do all things in the love of God and of Christ according to the gospel requires endurance.

The passage in 13:1–11 illustrates three ways in which the virtue of love is expressed:

186. Fitzmyer (First Corinthians, 502) notes that love is superior to the virtues of faith and hope not only because love plays an important role in the ethical life of the Corinthian believers, but “especially because it perdures even into ‘the age to come’… it is eschatological, has eternal value, and is the reason why the Christian will ‘know’ fully and be ‘fully known’, i.e., by God.” See also Ciampa and Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, 665.
love to God, love to Christ and love to believers, including love to unrighteous people (13:5–6). This threefold dynamic of love stands as the most essential component for the edification of the community in Corinth (cf. 5:6, especially that of κοινωνία), and the ground for living out the “love commandment” or “the Law of Christ” that Paul set up in Galatians. What is significant about Paul’s view of the virtue of love is that more than simply viewing love as the greatest of virtues, it is the virtue that embodies all the other virtues, particularly the virtues that are necessary to receive God’s πνεῦμα, to live according to the teachings of the gospel of Christ, to attain salvation, immortality, and to inherit the kingdom of God. In this way the virtue of love is presented as a powerful manifestation of God’s πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethical discourse. If Paul does not explicitly mention the love commandment/Law of Christ in first Corinthians is because the ultimate expression of the virtuous life of the believers who are sanctified and justified with Christ Jesus and God’s πνεῦμα is determined, as Fee says, by the exhortation “to ‘walk in love.’”

This is the true Law of Christ or commandment of the Lord.

**Paul’s Second Letter to the Corinthians**

Paul’s second letter to the Corinthians is perhaps the fourth letter that he wrote to the believers in Corinth, and was written from Ephesus sometimes between 52 and 55 C.E. 

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Most scholars take the letter as a composite letter, even those who argue for the integrity of the letter acknowledge that chapters 1–9 and 10–13 constitute two separate letters. The reason relies on the sudden and sharp contrast between the language and tone from chapters 1–9 to 10–13. While the former chapters contain expressions of jubilation, confidence, and relief, and can be very much defined as a passionate private letter, the latter contains defensive and harsh language, as if Paul would be defending himself and his gospel from fierce accusations. Although second Corinthians is probably a patchwork of several fragments put together, for our purpose, the letter is viewed as a unity.

Paul's inner feelings toward the members of the community come to light, especially at the beginning of the letter (chs. 1–2). The language of suffering affliction, forgiveness, and consolation show a Paul who genuinely loved his Corinthian brothers and sisters. The presence of contrasts between two opposites reflect a Paul who is very

Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003); Jan Lambrecht, S.J., Second Corinthians (Sacra Pagina Series 8; ed. Daniel J. Harrington, S.J.; Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1999). For the place and date of composition, see Dunn, Beginning from Jerusalem, 2:512; Furnish, II Corinthians, 28–29; Murphy-O’Connor, Paul, 184; Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 22; Stegman, Second Corinthians, 23.

189. Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 28; Lambrecht, Second Corinthians, 3, 9; Murphy-O’Connor, Paul, 254. Currently, the majority of commentators agree that second Corinthians consists of several “fragmentary” letters. Some radical interpreters view 6 or even more fragments: (1) 1:1–2:13 and 7:5–16, the letter of reconciliation; (2) 2:14–7:4, the letter of apology; (3) ch. 8, the letter of the collection; (4) ch. 9, another letter of the collection; (5) chs. 10–13, the letter of second apology; and (6) 6:14–7:1, the letter of fragment. Some have argued that this last fragment is a later interpolation and does not come from Paul because it does not fit logically into the flow of the argument for the whole letter, and that it does not match Paul's other writings. See Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 26; Matera, II Corinthians, 24–32; John T. Fitzgerald, “Philippians in the Light of Some Ancient Discussions of Friendships,” in Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies of Friendship in the New Testament World (SNT 82; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 141–60, esp.143; for a detailed discussion on the Corinthian correspondences, see Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, 3–51; Furnish, II Corinthians, 30–48; Branick, Understanding Paul and His Letters, 184–96.

190. See Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 29; Lambrecht, Second Corinthians, 8.
much emphasizing the presence of God, Christ, and πνεῦμα in the believers’ life (chs. 3–7). It is to this life—which he himself is part of (chs. 10–13)—they are enticed to belong, a way of life grounded in love (chs. 8–9). It can be said that Paul wrote second Corinthians for several reasons: he is (1) appealing for sensitivity to his suffering (1:8–11); (2) explaining his decisions (1:12–2:4); (3) commending to the Corinthians his mission’s authentic embodiment of ministry (2:14–7:4); (4) promoting the collection (8–9); (5) and confronting the Corinthians about his opponents (10–13).

In the letter, the word πνεῦμα appears 17 times, and 7 of them are in 3:1–18, Paul’s discussion about the sharp contrasts between two letters (ministry of righteousness vs. ministry of death) and between two covenants (Old Covenant/Moses vs. New Covenant/Lord). One of the essential characteristics of second Corinthians is that in the letter πνεῦμα is often identified as both “the Spirit of the living God” (πνεῦμα θεοῦ ζῶντος) and “the Spirit of the Lord” (τὸ πνεῦμα κυρίου). As Paul associates πνεῦμα with God and Christ, he develops a special relationship between πνεῦμα and the theme of “the image of God.” Paul writes,

Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord [is there is] freedom.

191. What is surprising regarding second Corinthians is that the letter’s content has no connection with what Paul writes in first Corinthians. Regarding the letter, Fee (God’s Empowering Presence, 282–83) notes that is like entering into a new world in which none of the issues raised in first Corinthians seem to appear in second Corinthians. The reference to the collection (16:1–4/ chs. 8–9), the Paul’s defense of his authority and gospel (9:1–27/2:12–17; 4:1–6; 10:1–11:11), and the allusion to some Platonic ideas are (15:42–54/4:16–5:10), including the emphasis on virtues and vices throughout the letter, themes that connect both letters.

192. Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 39. For other divisions of the letter, see Lambrecht, Second Corinthians, 7; Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, 67–87.

And all of us with the face unveiled—seeing [κατοπτριζόμενοι] the glory of the Lord as in a mirror, have been transformed [μεταμορφοφόμεθα] into the same image [τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα] from glory to glory, just as from [the] Lord, [the] Spirit [πνεύματος] (3:17–18; cf. Gen 1:26–27; Wis 7:26).¹⁹⁴

This passage contains the only direct reference in which Paul states that πνεῦμα is Christ; Paul often refers to it as “the πνεῦμα of the Lord.” For Paul, it is the Lord, Christ, who unveiled the faces of the Corinthian believers (3:16), unlike Moses who put a veil over his face (Exod 34:33), so that the Israelites were not able to see the end of what [glory] was fading away (3:13). Paul claims that it is “the living πνεῦμα” of the Lord that brought the believers freedom (by unveiling their faces),¹⁹⁵ and it is through the Lord’s action (of unveiling) that they are able to see his [Christ] glory, as in a mirror. Therefore, it is in the Lord, who is πνεῦμα, that they are transformed into the same εἰκών (of Christ) from glory to glory, just as from the Lord, the πνεῦμα (3:18; cf. 4:4). The “glory” that Paul speaks about is “the πνεῦμα of the Lord” (cf. 3:8); as Fee asserts, the glory turns out to be that of the Lord himself.¹⁹⁶ Such is the power of the Lord that through their seeing him “as in a mirror” their spiritual transformation in a new life occurs. The expression “glory to glory” could be understood as “from the glory of the Lord (Christ) to the glory of

¹⁹⁴. According to Lambrecht (Second Corinthians, 55), Paul wants to suggest that Christ’s glory is seen as in a mirror; but Furnish (II Corinthians, 214–15) based on 8:19 (the glory of the Lord) claims that in Paul’s mind is God’s glory in 3:17–18 (cf. Num 12:8; Exod 34:33–34), not Christ’s glory. But, the glory of the Lord in 8:19 means the glory of Christ; according to the content, Paul is describing the generosity of the Corinthian believers during severe affliction. Following Christ’s example, he advises them to show their goodwill; they live the gospel by their sharing with others (see also 8:23–24; 9:13).

¹⁹⁵. Cf. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 309. Cage (The Holy Spirit, 559) interprets “the Lord” not as Christ, but as God’s Spirit when he states that in 3:17–18 Paul identifies “the Lord” of Exod 34:34 with the holy Spirit. That is, the holy Spirit freed the believers’ mind from the veiling of the Mosaic Law through Christ (3:14).

¹⁹⁶. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 309.
God,” expressing the idea that Christ is the εἰκών of God (4:3–4; cf. 2:16), and through him (Christ), and not through Moses, the Corinthian believers become the εἰκών of God, and thus be able to experience the “glory of God,” which also includes the “knowledge of God” (see 2:14; 4:6; 10:5). This is for Paul a greater glory, a new life which is superior to that of Moses’ glory (3:10–11). It is in this contrast and the relationship of πνεῦμα with the living God and Christ, the image of God, that Paul carries out important aspects of his understanding of the central role of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse that he previously formulated in Galatians (5:13–6:10)—aspects such as the Mosaic Law, the gospel, the consequences of walking according to πνεῦμα and walking according to σάρξ, and the virtue of love. With this notion in mind, we will explore next the three major sections of his understanding of the role of πνεῦμα in second Corinthians.

Πνεῦμα and Its Relation to the Gospel and to the Mosaic Law in Paul’s Second Letter to the Corinthians

What is striking in second Corinthians is that Paul does not mention ὁ νόμος at all. However, speaking about the Corinthians’ generosity towards the poor (8:1–24), he

However, speaking about the Corinthians’ generosity towards the poor (8:1–24), he

197. The word δόξα (glory) is a favorite for Paul who uses it 22 times (1:20; 3:7 [twice], 8, 9 [twice], 10 [3x], 11 [twice], 18 [3x]; 4:4, 6, 15, 17; 8:19, 23; 9:13). In 3 instances, he refers to “the glory of God” (1:20; 4:6, 15), and in other 3 instances to “the glory of Christ” (4:4; 8:19 [Lord]; 23). For a discussion on 3:16–18 (LXX Exod 34:34), see Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 312–20.

198. Fee argues (God’s Empowering Presence, 365) that for Paul to receive πνεῦμα means to experience God’s very presence, and to do so in freedom; πνεῦμα leads one to see God’s glory so that one is actually transformed into the likeness of Christ, the ultimate image of God. See also, J. M. F. Heath, Paul’s Visual Piety: The Metamorphosis of the Beholder (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 221.

199. Only once (6:14), Paul speaks of ἄνομία (lawlessness), the opposite of νόμος, but here he contrasts it with δικαιοσύνη; thus for him lawlessness is used as a synonym of unrighteousness/injustice. As he opposes δικαιοσύνη to lawlessness, he also contrasts light with darkness; Christ and Beliar (6:15–16). For a discussion, see Stegman, Second Corinthians, 164–65.
mentions once the word “commandment” (ἐπιταγή, 8:8). Although Paul does not associate ἐπιταγή with νόμος, he emphasizes two relationships that bring to light his understanding of the Mosaic Law and the gospel in connection to the Spirit of the living God: (1) the “letter” (γράμμα) with ὁ νόμος of the Old Covenant and (2) the Spirit of the living God with the gospel of the New Covenant.

The Relationship of the “Letter” and the Mosaic Law

In Paul’s discussion about the contrast between two covenants (3:1–18)—in which the Spirit of the living God (πνεύματι θεοῦ ζῶντος) plays the most important role in the letter—he alludes to the Mosaic Law (See 3:6 [twice] and 3:7), however, using the word “letter” (γράμμα) rather than ὁ νόμος. He writes:

God who also made us competent as ministers of a new covenant not of letter [γράμματος] but of the Spirit, because the letter [γράμμα] kills and the Spirit gives life. And now, if the ministry of death, which has been engraved in letters [γράμμασιν], in stones, came in glory so that the sons of Israel were not able to gaze into the face of Moses because of the glory of his face, which is fading (3:6–7).

Paul distinguishes two covenants: the Old Covenant and the New Covenant. The former involves Moses, the “letter,” and the people of Israel (see also 3:17). The “letter” (γράμμα) refers to the Mosaic Law—the letter written in “ink” and on “tablets of stones” (3:7; see also 3:3; Exod 34:1–4, 27–28)—that Moses received at Sinai for the Jewish people. Paul assures that when reading or knowing (ἀνάγνωσις) this “letter” of the Old Covenant, the veil (κάλυμμα) remains “even to this day,” and “it [the veil] lies on their minds/hearts” (3:14–15).200 This

200. In second Corinthians, Paul makes reference to Moses only in this section, where he contrasts the two covenants (see 3:7, 13 [twice], 15). Guthrie (2 Corinthians, 199) claims that Paul is not contrasting two covenants; in fact, he argues that “letter” does not refer to the Mosaic Law or Torah. Instead, Paul is contrasting approaches to ministry and the outcomes of those ministries. Therefore, for Guthrie, the “letter” means “an attempt to minister or engage the Scriptures apart from the new-covenant work of the Spirit.” However, his argument misses Paul’s statement in 3:14–15. For a discussion on this passage, see Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 222–24.
“letter” is what leads to destruction, and finally to death,\(^{201}\) for it does not have πνεῦμα of the living God.

**The Relationship of Πνεῦμα of the Living God with the Gospel of the New Covenant**

The gospel (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον) in second Corinthians is mentioned 9 times, and it is referred as “the gospel” (4:3; 8:18; 10:16; 11:4), “the gospel of Christ” (2:12; 4:4 [the gospel of the glory of Christ]; 9:13; 10:14), or “the gospel of God” (11:7; see also 2:17; 4:2 [the word of God]).\(^{202}\) Paul links πνεῦμα with τὸ εὐαγγέλιον twice (3:3 and 11:4).\(^{203}\) He explains that he and his co-workers (Titus, Silvanus, and Timothy) preach (κηρύσσομεν) “one gospel,” the gospel about Jesus Christ the Lord (4:5), who is πνεῦμα (3:17–18) and the Son of God (1:19; 11:4). This is the gospel of the New Covenant that now comes to the

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201. The word “death” (θάνατος) is particularly a favorite of Paul, and generally contrasts it with life or salvation (see 1:9–10; 2:16; 3:7; 4:11–12; 5:4, 14–15; 6:9; 7:10). He also speaks of destruction and death in association to punishment in 2:15; 4:3; 6:9; 7:3; 13:10.

202. Also, Paul speaks of “the word of reconciliation” (5:19), referring to God’s message of the gospel.

203. In 11:4 Paul writes, “if indeed the one coming preaches another Jesus whom we did not preach or you receive a different spirit which you did not receive or a different gospel which you did not receive you put up well enough.” For Paul, all the Corinthian believers received at their baptism the “same” πνεῦμα, which is God’s living πνεῦμα. From Paul’s point of view, it seems that the “false teachers” are preaching a different [Jesus] as though they would have received a different πνεῦμα. Although Paul does not provide enough information to deduce what he exactly means with the phrase “a different gospel,” what we can say is that he means a gospel other than the gospel of Christ or the gospel of God, a gospel that does not contain “the word of truth” (6:7), which is the word of God (2:17; 4:2). The phrase, which is most debated, “a different ‘whom’ [Jesus]” refers to a gospel that preaches not the crucified Jesus (see 4:10), through whom the believers share in God’s image (4:4; 3:18). Also it means a gospel that is not based on the virtue of faith (πίστις) (4:4). As the gospel of Christ is very much related to God’s πνεῦμα, faith is also as he calls πνεῦμα, “the Spirit of faith.” Therefore, in the new covenant, the Corinthian believers’ virtuous life is founded in God’s πνεῦμα, the gospel of Christ and also the virtue of πίστις. For other views and comments concerning 11:4, see Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 509–12; Furnish, II Corinthians, 488–89, 499–502; Lambrecht, Second Corinthians, 174–75; Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 342–45.
faithful believers through their reception of πνεῦμα of the living God (3:6; 11:4). This is also the gospel that is grounded in the virtue of faith (πίστις)—that is why Paul calls πνεῦμα of the living God both “the Spirit of the Lord” and “the Spirit of faith” (4:13). Therefore, Paul’s preaching of the gospel of Christ is actually a “ministry of πνεῦμα” (3:8–10).

According to Paul, the ministry (διακονία) of the gospel of Christ in the New Covenant is what leads believers to “life” because it is of πνεῦμα of the living God (3:6; 5:4; 13:4). This new life is a life in justice/righteousness; in fact, in 11:15 Paul calls himself and his co-workers “ministers of justice/righteousness” (διάκονοι δικαιοσύνης), thus associating “the ministry of πνεῦμα” with “virtues” (cf. 5:21). The practice of the gospel for Paul means carrying in one’s body the death of Jesus, so that the life of Jesus becomes manifested in the believers’ conduct (4:10–11; cf. 5:15; 6:9; 7:3), as Paul writes metaphorically, “we are an aroma of Christ to God, .... a fragrance of life to life” (2:15–16). Furthermore, the practice of the gospel of Christ leads to the ultimate goal (τέλος), salvation (1:6; 2:15; 4:1–2; 5:15; 6:2; 7:10). Paul writes, “it is necessary for all of us


205. This is what Paul also calls “manifestation of the truth” (4:2; cf. 11:6).

206. In Phil 4:8, Paul also uses the words “aroma” and “fragrance” (a fragrance of aroma). According to Scott J. Hafemann, this expression is a Jewish sacrificial imagery established by post-exilic period. While the term “aroma” was used to designate the odor of the acceptable sacrifice the term “fragrance” used alone retained its usual meaning of “scent.” Paul uses this Old Testament sacrificial imagery to describe himself as a conquered slave of Christ who is led to his death in the triumphal procession, in where Paul sees God always leading him to death. For a good overview of the background of these two terms, see Scott J. Hafemann, Suffering & Ministry in the Spirit, 35–83.
to be manifested before the judgment of Christ, that each may receive the recompense for the things [done] through the body according to the things practiced whether good or bad” (5:10). Paul speaks of “the reward and punishment that awaits before the tribunal of Christ;”207 those who practice vices (see 12:20–21; 6:16) will be put to death (6:9; 7:10), and those who live by the gospel of Christ practicing virtues in the power of πνεῦμα hope in the day of the Lord Jesus (1:14), the resurrection of the dead by God (1:9; 4:14; 5:15).208

Paul speaks about the ministry of the “letter” in the Old Covenant (the Mosaic Law) as the instrument that leads to death (the letter kills), and the ministry of πνεῦμα in the New Covenant (the gospel of Christ) as the instrument that leads to life (3:1–18). In different ways Paul expresses the contrast between these two ministries in second Corinthians:

Table 22. The Contrast between the Ministry of the “Letter” and the Ministry of Πνεῦμα

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Old Covenant</th>
<th>The New Covenant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Written with ink</td>
<td>Written with πνεῦμα of the living God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers of the letter</td>
<td>Ministers of the new covenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The letter kills</td>
<td>Πνεῦμα gives life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of death in letters</td>
<td>Ministry of πνεῦμα in glory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moses</td>
<td>Lord/Christ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A veil over Moses’ face</td>
<td>Christ set aside the veil (veil removed)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

207. Lambrecht, Second Corinthians, 86.

208. According to Paul, the Corinthian believers know that the goal (τέλος) is the hope of full knowledge in the day of the Lord Jesus (1:13); that they will be raised by God like He raised Christ (4:15); that they will have an eternal house in heaven (5:1; cf. 5:6). For Paul, salvation is through Christ’s death and weakness, as he says in 13:3, that Christ’s power arises from the weakness of his death on the cross and this power is for you (see also 13:4). Cf. Branick, Understanding Paul and His Letters, 208.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Old Covenant</th>
<th>The New Covenant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of condemnation</td>
<td>Ministry of justification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost its glory</td>
<td>Greater glory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freedom*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seeing the glory of the Lord as in a mirror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transformed into the same image of Christ, the image of God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>These all come from the Lord (Christ), who is πνεῦμα</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*3:17 is the only reference to freedom in second Corinthians.

While Paul associates the ministry of πνεῦμα (the gospel of Christ) with virtues, he does not link the ministry of the “letter,” that is the Mosaic Law, with vices. The emphasis on the ministry of the letter, in fact, is not transgression or sin (vices); rather, Paul’s thought focuses on the centrality of Christ (and his life) who is πνεῦμα, and through it the Corinthian believers are able to become Christ’s image and experience God’s glory, and thus, the full knowledge of the glory of God (1:3; 2:14; 4:6; 10:5’ cf. 8:7; 11:6). As Paul says, “if anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation; the old things passed away; behold, the new has come” (5:17). The “letter,” therefore, is only used then as an “instrumental device” to show two covenants: the Old (ministry of the letter) and the New (ministry of πνεῦμα). The former did not give life (the letter kills; ministry of death; lost its glory) because it lacked πνεῦμα, and the latter, which is also the ministry of reconciliation (5:18–21), gives [eternal] life (greater glory) because it has πνεῦμα (3:8).\(^{209}\) This πνεῦμα is Christ, and the practice of

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the gospel of Christ is what now leads to the goal: salvation, full knowledge of God (1:13), and eternal life in heaven.

Πνεῦμα as the opposite of the Flesh (Σάρξ) in
Paul’s Second Letter to the Corinthians

In second Corinthians, the word σάρξ appears 14 times, and in 4 instances it refers to the human body, the earthly, mortal existence (3:3; 4:11; 7:5; 12:7). Only once Paul puts together πνεῦμα and σάρξ, when he writes at the beginning of his personal appeal (7:1–16), “therefore, having these promises, beloved, let us cleanse [καθαρίσωμεν] ourselves from every defilement [μολυσμοῦ] of [the] flesh and spirit [σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος] perfecting holiness [ἁγιωσύνην] in fear of God” (7:1). In this passage, both πνεῦμα and σάρξ are not seen as opposites, but, as Furnish argues, “here spirit is used anthropologically, and the combination flesh and spirit refers either to the totality of human existence or to its outward and inward aspects.”

Although the contrast between πνεῦμα and σάρξ is not highlighted in second Corinthians in the same way it is done in Galatians, Paul shows

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211. This is the second and last time that the phrase “fear of God” (φόβῳ θεοῦ) appears in the letter (see 5:11); also, the word “holiness” (ἁγιωσύνη). Apart from this text, the term “holiness” only appears in Rom 1:4. The word “defilement” (μολυσμός) occurs only here in the New Testament (1 Cor 8:7 in its verbal form), it is the only place in which Paul refers to the defilement of either flesh or spirit (only to the subjection of the flesh to sin, e.g., Rom 7:25; 8:3; 13:14), and to the works of the flesh in Gal 5:19–21. The verb “to cleanse” (καθαρίζω) occurs nowhere in Paul’s genuine letters, and nowhere else in the New Testament it refers to believers’ cleansing themselves. See Furnish, II Corinthians, 365.

212. Furnish, II Corinthians, 365. In anthropological references, Paul links spirit with body and with soul and body. Similarly, Paul speaks of the “outer” and “inner” person (4:16); the outer person is the human being as “body” (οῶμα), and the “inner” person is the human person as soul/spirit (7:1, human πνεῦμα; 12:15, ψυχή). For other interpretations, see Matera, II Corinthians, 115.
πνεῦμα’s association with virtues in terms of (1) “walking by the same Spirit,” and σάρξ’s association with vices in terms of (2) “walking according to the flesh.”

Walking by the Same Πνεῦμα

In a passage where Paul is defending himself and his apostolic ministry, he writes, “I urged Titus [to go] and I sent the brother with him. Surely, Titus did not take advantage of you? Did he? Did we not walk by the same Spirit [τῷ αὐτῷ πνεύματι περιεπατήσαμεν]? Did we not [walk] in the same steps?” (12:18). Already Paul has used the word περιπατοῦμεν to express the believers’ living according to a certain way of life (5:7; 6:16), which involves the practice of virtues and the avoidance of vices (4:2; 10:2–3). For Paul, practicing virtues means living according to the justice/righteousness (τῆς δικαιοσύνης) of God (3:9; 5:21; 6:7, 14; 9:9–10; 11:15). In second Corinthians, πνεῦμα is “given” [δοὺς] to the believers in Christ (1:22 and 5:5; cf. 2:13); in these two passages (1:22 and 5:5), it is God who “has given” [δοὺς] πνεῦμα to the Corinthian believers’ hearts, and πνεῦμα becomes the guarantee that they now have life. God “anointed” them and “established” them in Christ (1:21), and “sealed” them,213 as Paul writes, by “having given us the earnest of the Spirit in our hearts.” Paul identifies “the Spirit of the living God” (πνεῦμα θεοῦ ζῶντος, 3:3)—“infused” in the believers’ heart—as the key principle for their new life in Christ and also for his own ministry among them. At their baptism, God conquered/destroyed death swallowing the

213. Paul uses the words “anointed” and “sealing,” two metaphorical terms, to describe what happened at the Corinthian believers’ baptism. See Lambrecht, Second Corinthians, 29. Fee (God’s Empowering Presence, 291–92), notes that unlike the word “sealed,” which appears in Rom 4:11; 15:28; 1 Cor 9:2, the word “anointed” is the only occurrence in the Pauline corpus, and is used in a play on words to explain the idea of “putting us into Christ;” that is “God christed the believers.” For a description of the meaning of both metaphors, see Levison, Filled with the Spirit, 255–63.
mortal (5:4; see also 2:7; 1 Cor 15:54 [Isa 25:8]),\textsuperscript{214} and the living πνεῦμα “infused” in their hearts (1:22; 5:5) became the guarantee that their new life is a life in holiness (7:1), for the living πνεῦμα that God gives is a “holy πνεῦμα” (6:6–7; 13:13).

A virtuous and holy life is both defined and guided by the power of “the same πνεῦμα,” which is the Spirit of the Lord (3:16–17), the Spirit of the living God (3:3; cf. 3:6). Only “in God’s power” (δυνάμει θεοῦ)\textsuperscript{215} and “in holy πνεῦμα” (πνεύματι ἁγίῳ), believers are capable to practice virtues and avoid vices, and to present themselves as God’s servants in much endurance, affliction, hardship, and distress… and in virtues such as purity, knowledge, patience, kindness, genuineness, love, truth…. These are “the weapons of justice/righteousness” (6:4–7; see also 4:2).\textsuperscript{216} Most importantly, the believers please God sharing in one fellowship (κοινωνία) as a Temple of the living God, and worshipping only the true God (6:14–18). Paul assures them that πνεῦμα is the key to their being God’s

\textsuperscript{214} The verb καταπίνω (to drink down or to swallow) is also a figurative meaning to “to destroy completely” by devouring (e.g., Tob 6:2; Polybius, Hist. 2.41.7; Philo, Virt. 201). See Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 283.

\textsuperscript{215} Of the 17 occurrences of δύναμις and its cognates in second Corinthians, 5 times Paul speaks of the “power of God” (4:7; 6:7; 9:8; 13:4, 4). When he speaks of “the power of God,” he means “πνεῦμα of God.” For example, God’s extraordinary power that he mentions in 4:7 is no other power than God’s πνεῦμα. It is this power (of God/of πνεῦμα) that effects transformation in the believers and gives them life and freedom under the new covenant (cf. 9:8). See Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 254; Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 322.

\textsuperscript{216} In “the power of God” (δυνάμει θεοῦ) Paul and his co-workers, Titus, Timothy, and Silvanus (1:19, 24; 8:23) receive God’s grace (χάρις, 6:1)—which are virtues of purity, knowledge, patience, kindness, holiness, love, truthful speech, righteousness—all of these are received through the weapons of righteousness. For Paul, God’s grace (χάρις) also constitutes the power of Christ (see 12:9–12; 13:9, 13; 1 Cor 4:10), which comes to perfection in Paul’s weakness (12:9), and also brings to a fullness the believers’ ethical conduct, thus their perfection (13:9; 7:1). Cf. Furnish, II Corinthians, 579.
Temple (6:16), thus calling them to holiness (6:16–7:1), and not to vices. It is in all of these and in the ministry of the gospel of Christ that the true “boasting” lies for Paul.

Paul likewise speaks of “the same Spirit of faith” (τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα τῆς πίστεως), when he writes, “having the same Spirit of faith according to what has been written: ‘I believed therefore I spoke, both we believe and therefore we speak’” (4:13; cf. Ps 115 in the LXX). First, his reference to τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα (the same Spirit) connects back to τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα (the same image) in 3:17–18. Here is an observation that the “same Spirit” that Paul mentions is the “image of Christ;” that is, “πνεῦμα is the Spirit of the Lord,” only the Spirit that God gives (living πνεῦμα), and no other spirit. Second, that Paul also connects πνεῦμα with πίστις is in fact his way of associating the virtue of faith with both his preaching of the gospel and the believers’ living the gospel (4:13–15), as he emphatically claims using a text from Jewish Scripture, “I believe, therefore I spoke; we believe and therefore we speak.” Paul’s reference to τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα in connection with “the gospel” finds its parallel in 12:18, where “the same Spirit” refers to the same Spirit of the Lord; the same Spirit in which Paul and Titus walk, or guide their conduct based on an ethical pattern, which is the gospel (see 4:2; 5:7; 10:2–3).

What can be said is that through

219. As Guthrie (*2 Corinthians*, 616) notes, presumably Paul believes that the “false teachers” are imparting a “different” spirit than the one the Corinthian believers received at their baptism.
220. Cf. Ps 115:1 in LXX.
221. Cf. Guthrie, *2 Corinthians*, 615; Fee, *God’s Empowering Presence*, 358–59. Cage (*The Holy Spirit*, 563) argues that the phrase “the same Spirit” in 12:18 could also have several meanings;
Christ God gives “us” His living πνεῦμα, which is also for Paul Chirst (πνεῦμα is the Lord).

**Walking According to the Flesh (Κατὰ Σάρκα)**

When Paul speaks of the phrase κατὰ σάρκα (1:17; 5:16 [2x]; 10:2–3; 11:18) in second Corinthians, he means that aspect of human nature by which the believer acts in a worldly, inappropriate way;\(^{222}\) that is, unvirtuously, rather than virtuously (τῷ αὐτῷ πνεύματι περιεπατήσαμεν). In other words, his emphasis on σάρξ as shown in 1:12, 17; 5:15; 7:1; 10:2–4; 11:18 has negative connotations and is connected with vices and “bad” practices (5:10), which oppose to the will of God. Paul describes the expression of “walking according to the flesh” (10:2–3), for example, as conducting one’s life in a “fleshly wisdom” and not in the grace of God (1:12; 8:1; cf. 12:9; 8:9 [the grace of the Lord]). Paul not only contrasts the “fleshly wisdom” with the “grace of God,” but he also shows that it is in the fleshly wisdom that σάρξ manifests its vices, and every defilement/uncleanness of the body (12:21; cf. 6:16; 7:1-2).\(^{223}\) In second Corinthians, πνεῦμα is the force by which virtues are practiced and vices avoided, and σάρξ the force associated with vices, which are also the work of “Satan” (2:11; 6:15 [Beliar]; cf. 11:14; 12:7).

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\(^{223}\) In 12:21, Paul is connecting defilement/uncleanness of the body (fornication, debauchery) with the pollution of pagan idolatries and the worship of deities in pagan temples. Cf. Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 365.
Table 23. List of Virtues and Vices in Second Corinthians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virtues</th>
<th>Vices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ἀγάπη (love) 2:4, 8; 5:14; 6:6; 8:8, 24; 13:11, 13</td>
<td>ἄδικα (injustice, unrighteousness) 12:13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀγαθός (good) 9:8</td>
<td>αἰσχύνη (shamefacedness, shameful deeds) 4:2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀγιωσύνη (holiness) 7:1</td>
<td>ἀκαθαρσία (impurity, uncleanness) 12:21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀγνότης (purity) 11:3; 6:6</td>
<td>ἀμαρτία (sinful deed) 13:2; 11:7; 5:21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀλήθεια (truth) 6; 4:2; 7–8; 7:14; 11:10; 13:8</td>
<td>ἀνομία (lawlessness) 6:14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀνυπόκριτος (sincere, genuine) 6:6</td>
<td>ἀπιστος (unbeliever) 4:4; 6:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀπλότης (generosity, graciousness) 1:12, 9:11; 8:2</td>
<td>ἀτμία (dishonor) 6:8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>διακονία (service, ministry) 3:6, 7–9; 4:1; 5:18; 6:3–4; 8:4; 9:1, 12–13; 11:8</td>
<td>ἀφροσύνη (foolishness) 1, 11:16–18; 12:6, 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>γνώσις (knowledge) 8:7; 6:6; 4:6; 2:14 11:6; 10:5</td>
<td>δόλος (deceit, guile) 12:16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>δικαιοσύνη (justice, righteousness) 3:9 9:14, 6:7; 5:21:9–10; 11:15</td>
<td>δυσφημία (defamation) 6:8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>εἰλικρίνεια (sincerity) 2:17; 1:12</td>
<td>εἰδωλολατρεία (idolatry) cf. 6:16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>εἰρήνη (peace) 1:2; 13:11</td>
<td>ἐκδίκησις (vengeance) 7:11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐλπίς (hope) 1:7</td>
<td>ἔρις (contention, strife) 12:20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐπιείκεια (gentleness, fairness) 10:1</td>
<td>ἔριθεία (rivalry, self-seeking) 12:20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ζῆλος (zeal) 9:2; 11; 7:7</td>
<td>ζῆλος (jealousy) 12:20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ισότης (equality) 8:13–14</td>
<td>θυμός (anger) 12:20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>καλός (good, noble) 13:7; 8:21</td>
<td>κακός (evil) 13:7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>καταλλαγή (reconciliation) 5:18–19</td>
<td>καταλαλία (slander, evil speaking) 12:20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>κοινωνία (fellowship) 9:13; 8:4; 6:14 13:13</td>
<td>πλάνος (deceiving) 6:8</td>
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<tr>
<td>μακροθυμία (patience) 6:6</td>
<td>πανουργία (cunning) 11:3; 4:2</td>
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<tr>
<td>μετάνοια (repentance) 7:10</td>
<td>παρακοή (disobedience) 10:6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>οἰκτιρμός (compassion) 1:3</td>
<td>παράπτωμα (traspas) 5:19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>παράκλησις (encouragement) 1:3, 5–7; 7:4, 6–7; 8:17; 9:5</td>
<td>πορνεία (fornication, sexual immorality) 12:21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the list, we see that in second Corinthians the virtues mentioned the most are service/ministry, love, encouragement, and justice/righteousness.

The Relationship of Πνεῦμα to the Practice of Virtues, Especially the Love Commandment in Paul’s Second Letter to the Corinthians

In second Corinthians the word ἀγάπη and its cognates appear 13 times. Twice πνεῦμα and the virtue of love are mentioned together in the letter (6:6 and 13:13). The first (6:6) appears in his apostolic appeal (6:1–18), and the second (13:13), in his last appeal to the Corinthian believers, at the end of the letter. What is true, however, is that when Paul speaks of the virtue of love, he tends to associate the virtue not only with πνεῦμα, but also with God (the living πνεῦμα) and Christ (πνεῦμα is Christ). Indeed, when Paul connects

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the πνεῦμα of the living God and the virtue of love, he links it with the δύναμις of God (6:6–7). The virtue of love is a primary, genuine virtue, associated with the divine God, πνεῦμα, and Christ (13:13). There are three ways in which Paul shows that relationship: (1) the reciprocal love between Paul and the Corinthian believers, (2) love, δικαιοσύνη, and other virtues, and (3) the love of God.

The Reciprocal Love between Paul and the Corinthian Believers

In second Corinthians, there is an emphasis on Paul’s abundant love for the Corinthian believers. He, himself, expresses his love for them in several places; for example in 2:4, he writes, “out of much affliction and distress of heart I wrote to you with many tears not that you be grieved, but that you may know that I have love beyond measure [τὴν ἀγάπην ἵνα γνῶτε ἣν ἔχω περισσοτέρως εἰς ὑμᾶς].”225 That his love for his Corinthian believers is “beyond measure” is attested not only by his affliction, distress of heart, and tears,226 but also by his giving himself to them in a ministry out of love. He writes, “I will most gladly spend and I will be utterly spent for your souls. If I love you beyond measure [εἰ περισσοτέρως ὑμᾶς ἀγαπῶ (ν)], am I to be loved less?” (12:15).227 As Guthrie holds, Paul is expressing his love by showing willingly his readiness not only to spend his own resources

225. This passage provides a clue that Paul wrote a previous letter to the Corinthians, letter that it is known today as the tearful letter.

226. Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 126.

227. The reading of the word ἀγαπῶν is strongly supported by P46, N7, B, D, F, G, Ψ, etc; whereas the reading of ἀγαπῶ is supported by N*, A, 33, 104*, 330, etc. The most difficult reading (ἀγαπῶν) is preferred by the committee, but in view of internal considerations it was thought advisable to enclose “ν” within square brackets. See Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament, 586–87.
in ministering to the Corinthian believers, but also to be poured out himself. Paul is aware that “God knows” (ὁ θεὸς οἶδεν) his great love for them (11:11); despite the great affliction and distress of heart that they caused him (2:1–13), they are his ἀδελφοί, and his “beloved ones” in Christ (7:1; 12:19).

Paul also knows that they love him; he shows this in a rhetorical question, “If I love you beyond measure, I am to be loved less?” (12:15; see also 8:7). Paul is not expressing the idea that “as his love for them increases, the less they love him,” the way Guthrie has interpreted. Rather, as he loves them “beyond measure,” they are expected to love him more, and their love is also expected to expand to others, even to those who caused them (Paul and the believers) pain. He exhorts the believers to “confirm your love to him” (2:8), anyone who has caused grief to them (2:5–6). What is ethically important for Paul is that the Corinthian believers “out of love” forgive and encourage the wrongdoer (2:5–11), for God has given them His living πνεῦμα (1:21–24). Also “out of love,” Paul appeals to them to share their gifts with the poor (8–9) as a demonstration of their love (8:24), for one who cheerfully loves God, and God loves him (9:7–8). God who is Father will abound all graces to them for every good work they do (9:8–9; see also 9:6, 10; cf. Ps 111:9, LXX).

The virtue of love, according to Paul, is the measure of the believers’ virtuous life. Paul’s most tender and affectionate way of expressing his love for his Corinthian brothers and

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228. Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 611–12.

229. In second Corinthians, Paul refers to the Corinthian believers as brothers (ἀδελφοί) in 1:1, 8; 2:13; 8:1, 18, 22–23; 9:3, 5; 11:9; 12:18; 13:11.

230. Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 612.

231. Stegman, Second Corinthians, 279.
their love for one another is certainly when he closes his letter exhorting them, “greet one another with holy kiss” (13:12). 232

Love, Δικαιοσύνη, and other Virtues

Although Paul does not mention the word virtue (ἀρετή), he treats love as an important virtue, even superior to the virtues of service/ministry, joy/rejoice, encouragement, confidence, and justice/righteousness. In 6:6–7, Paul writes: “in purity, in knowledge, in patience, in kindness, in [the] holy Spirit, in genuine love, in a word of truth, in power of God through the weapons of justice/righteousness for the right hand and for the left.” What is significant about this passage is that “genuine love” is placed between “in holy Spirit” (πνεύματι ἁγίῳ) and “in a word of truth” (ἐν λόγῳ ἀληθείας), which is the word of God/the gospel of Christ. Also noteworthy is the fact that Paul singles out the virtue of δικαιοσύνη; all of these virtues are “in the power of God” and “through the weapons of justice/righteousness.” 233 Using military imagery, Paul describes virtues as “weapons” of δικαιοσύνη in the power of God, weapons of the right hand (for attack, e.g., a sword)

232. This is another occurrence that Paul uses “holy kiss” concluding his letter (see also 1 Thess 5:26; Rom 16:16; 1 Cor 16:20).

233. The interpretation of the phrase “of righteousness” has been debated. There are three other ways of interpreting it: as a descriptive genitive (righteous weapons); as an epexegetic genitive (weapons that consist of righteousness); as an objective genitive (weapons that promote righteousness); and as a subjective genitive, the way it is interpreted here (weapons that flow out of righteousness). The crucial meaning points to the idea that weapons (a metaphorical way for expressing virtues) are in one way or another closely linked with the virtue of δικαιοσύνη. Similarly, Stegman (Second Corinthians, 157) argues that the expression “weapons of righteousness” refers to the believers’ ability to show forth their goodness and fidelity of God through their actions (See also Rom 6:13). He also argues that “to become the righteousness of God” (5:21) is due to the empowerment of the Spirit (see 1:21–22; 3:17–18; 4:13). Thus, it is not accident that that Paul calls the new covenant ministry “the ministry of the Spirit” (3:8) and “the ministry of righteousness” (3:9). For a discussion about the various meanings, see Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 332–33.
and weapons of the leaft (for defense, e.g., a shield). Elsewhere, as in Gal 6:1–10, Paul has expressed figuratively, using agricultural language (sowing and reaping), the idea that “the one who gives generously to the poor will increase the fruits of his/her justice/righteousness” (9:10; cf. Isa 55:1–11; Hos 10:12). There are two important points: first, one’s generous deed comes out of the virtue of love; and second, the virtue of love and generosity are viewed as “fruits” that come out from the virtue of δικαιοσύνη. As Paul quotes from Jewish Scripture (LXX Ps 111:9): “he scattered, he gave to the poor, his righteousness remains for ever” (9:8). The virtues of love and generosity for Paul are expressions of the virtue of δικαιοσύνη, as well as an expression of the virtue of κοινωνία (9:13). When Paul speaks of “his/her justice/righteousness,” he means that the believer has God’s holy πνεῦμα; for only in this πνεῦμα, the Corinthian believers become δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ in Christ (5:21). Also, only in God’s holy πνεῦμα, they are ministers of δικαιοσύνη (11:25), for the gospel of Christ is a ministry of δικαιοσύνη in glory (3:9).

The Love of God

In second Corinthians, Paul calls God “the God of love” (13:11), closely associating the virtue of love with “the love of God” (ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ, 13:13). For Paul, the God of love is the source of virtues, because it is in “the love of God” that the Corinthian brothers are urged to rejoice, be restored, be encouraged, and be at peace (13:11). But, the virtue of love is also “the love of Christ” (ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Χριστοῦ) who holds them together (5:14) in κοινωνία. That Paul speaks of the love of Christ is not surprising for Christ’s death on a cross was an act of true love for “us” (see 5:14–21; 13:4). This is the “Christ of love” that is preached (the love commandment/the Law of Christ), in which the Corinthian believers

234. Lambrecht, Second Corinthians, 110.
are to guide their conduct in holiness and in virtues, to reaffirm their love to him (2:8–11), and to “do good things” to other human beings (8:21; 13:7).

Furthermore, Paul describes virtues—e.g., faith, knowledge, and diligence—as God’s grace (χάρις, 8:5–7; 13:11). God, the Father, provides the Corinthian believers “with every blessing in abundance” for their good works, or virtuous acts (9:8–9). But, Paul also refers to “the grace of Christ,” when he writes at the concluding blessing of the letter: “the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the fellowship of the holy Spirit be with you all” (13:13). This passage holds two important ethical points, crucial for the understanding of Paul’s view of the virtue of love and its association with the holy πνεῦμα, Christ, and God. (1) There are two-threefold parallels: grace—love—fellowship, and Christ—God—holy πνεῦμα. Grace can be paired with Christ; love with God; and fellowship with holy πνεῦμα. Since God’s grace is also related to virtue, the phrase “the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ” expresses “the love of the Lord Jesus Christ” (see also 8:7; cf. 4:15; 8:9; 12:9). Therefore, Paul chooses two virtues (love and fellowship) to pair love with Christ and God, and fellowship with the holy πνεῦμα. Therefore, the grace (love) of the Lord Jesus Christ parallels the love of God. Paul also speaks of “the grace of God” several times in the letter (6:1; 8:1, 6; 9:14), showing that the virtue of “love” is intrinsically connected with Christ and God, so close that Paul can use both the love (grace) of God and the love (grace) of Christ interchangeably. (2) The virtue of “fellowship” is also connected with the virtue of love; fellowship, according to Paul, is an expression of love for others in the community, especially the poor. It is a virtue that Paul mentions 4 times (see the list above). Therefore, the virtues of love, fellowship, and the other virtues find their connection with Christ, God, and the holy πνεῦμα, and especially the virtue of love,
although not explicitly established as a law or commandment, is intrinsically associated with the divine: God, Christ and the holy πνεῦμα.

**Paul's Letter to the Philippians**

Paul's letter to the Philippians was written sometime, somewhere while Paul was being imprisoned (1:7, 13, 14, 17; cf. 4:14). Despite the fact that the letter itself does not provide enough information, the modern consensus is moving towards the theory that Philippians was written at Ephesus sometimes in the mid–50’s C.E. A distinctiveness

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236. Thurston, *Philippians and Philemon*, 30; Murphy O’Connor, *Paul*, 184. For a good overview regarding the date and place of composition, see Marcus Bockmuehl, *A Commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians* (BNTC; London: A & C Black, 1997), 25–33. Likewise, because the letter’s overall argument and its rough transitions (e.g., 3:1) have led scholars to question whether Philippians is one letter or a composite of several has been highly debated among modern scholars. Fee (*Paul’s Letter to the Philippians*, 1); Freed (*The Morality of Paul’s Converts*, 250), and Richard R. Melick, Jr., *Philippians, Colossians, Philemon* [NAC 32; ed. David S. Dockery; Nashville, Tennessee: Broadman Press, 1991], 34) see Philippians as “one letter.” However, there are others who argue that Philippians is a compilation from two or three original letters, or a composite of several fragments (letter A, 4:10–20; letter B, 1:1–3:1; 4:4–9, 20–23; letter C, 3:2–4:3). Branick (*Understanding Paul and His Letters*, 291) divides the letter by topics: a) a note of thanks
about Philippians is that the letter reflects characteristics of ancient letters of friendship, especially 4:10–20 (letter A). This has led the majority of scholars to identify Paul’s letter as a “letter of friendship,” or “a hortatory letter of friendship.” The letter as a whole reflects two main issues going on in the community in Philippi (1:27–28; cf. 1 Thess 2:2). First, there is some kind of disunity among the Philippian believers (internal problems); and second, the presence of “intruders” who are causing opposition and suffering in the community (external problem). The purpose of the letter, therefore, is not only to thank the Philippians for a gift received (4:10–20), but most importantly to exhort them, 


238. This is the view of Fee, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians, 2–14. Others like Coursar (Philippians and Philemon, 12) and Reumann (Philippians, 73) argue that Paul in the letter to the Philippians does not follow the literary and category of a letter of friendship. Although they recognize that he uses language that is conventional in letters of friendship, Coursar claims that the primary language of friendship (φίλος and φίλημα) is completely absent in the letter. Witherington III (Paul’s Letter to the Philippians, 21), however, views Philippians as “a family letter” written by Paul to some of his closest Christian family, the brothers and sisters at Philippi (see his argument, pages 17–21).

239. Migliore, Philippians and Philemon, 9.
as Bruce states, to maintain “a spirit of unity among them,” and to “stand firm in one Spirit” in their affliction (1:27–2:18).

As in first Thessalonians, the word πνεῦμα in Philippians appears 5 times (1:19, 27; 2:1; 3:3; and 4:23 [human spirit]). Only once, Paul speaks of πνεῦμα as “the Spirit of God” (3:3), and as “the Spirit of Christ” (1:19) in relation to the gospel. Paul shows the unity between God and Christ in terms of πνεῦμα, and views πνεῦμα as the powerful presence of the resurrected Christ in his life and as the source of his future “deliverance” from bondage, acting dynamically and in harmony with the believers’ genuine prayers. The letter to the Philippians carries out πνεῦμα’s privileged role in Paul’s ethical discourse in a way that his strong Christocentric attitude is reflected. Indeed, it is worth mentioning that in Philippians, Paul never mentions πνεῦμα as power (δύναμις), but he does directly connect the language of power with Christ (3:10; 3:20–21; see also 4:13). Therefore, for Paul, having

240. Bruce, Philippians, 19.


242. In his exhortation against false teachers, Paul writes, “we are ‘the circumcision,’ the ones worshipping [λατρεύοντε] by the Spirit of God” (3:3). This is an instance of “circumcision” as a collective noun, which is of the “heart,” an inner circumcision or purification. For Paul, “the circumcision” represents all those who have faith in Christ and his gospel (e.g., 1:27, 29; 3:9), and those who render to God true worship by the πνεῦμα of God.

243. Fee (God’s Empowering Presence, 738) interprets “deliverance” not that Paul will be delivered from imprisonment, but that God will both “save” Paul and vindicate Christ and the gospel.

244. Paul mentions Christ or refers to him (either as Lord, Jesus, he, or him) 59 times: Christ: 11, 1, 2, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 26, 27, 29; 2:1, 5, 11, 16, 19, 21, 24, 29, 30; 3:3, 7, 8 [twice], 9, 12, 14, 18, 20; 4:7, 19, 21, 23. Lord: 1:14; 3:1; 4:1, 2, 4, 5, 10. Jesus: 2:10. He: 2:7, 8. Him: 2:9; 3:10 [4x]; 4:19.
Christ is to have everything, as he claims, “for me to live is Christ and to die is gain” (1:21).

With this Christocentric view in mind, we will see next the privileged role of πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethical discourse, and the different ways he expounds the framework of his ethics structured in Galatians—especially the relationship of πνεῦμα with both the gospel and virtues.

Πνεῦμα and Its Relation to the Gospel and to the Mosaic Law in Paul’s Letter to the Philippians

Significantly, in this letter, Paul refers to ὁ νόμος (the Mosaic Law) in three occasions, when he writes briefly about his autobiography (3:5, 6, 9).245 Paul describes two epochs of his religious life parallel to Galatians (see 1:13–14 and 1:15–16): as a faithful Jewish observant and as a faithful believer in Christ and his gospel. In the first two passages (3:5, 6), Paul accounts his life as a Jew before his call; that he was “a Pharisee according to the law” (3:5), and that “have become blameless in the law according to justice/righteousness” (3:6). As a Jew before his call, as it was expressed in Galatians, Paul excelled not only in zeal and as a Pharisee, but also in strictly obeying the law, the guiding principle for ethical life in Judaism.246 However, in 3:9 Paul writes, “I may be found in him [Christ] not having my own justice/righteousness, the one from a law, but the [justice/righteousness] through faith in Christ, the justice/righteousness from God, based on faith.” After his call, Paul came to the realization that righteous (virtuous) life, which is from God, comes only through faith in Christ and his gospel through πνεῦμα, and not through the observance of the

245. Scholars who support Philippians as a composite letter argue that this passage belongs to a fragment, a third letter (C) of Paul (3:2–4:1). Letter A (4:10–20; letter B (1:1 or 1:3–2:30 or 3:1 plus perhaps parts of 4:1–9 and 21–23; letter C 3:2–21.

Mosaic Law (cf. Gal 2:21). In two ways Paul explains the primacy of the gospel in his ethical discourse: (1) πνεῦμα and the gospel of Christ, and (2) the gospel of Christ and virtues.

**The Relation of Πνεῦμα with the Gospel of Christ**

In Philippians, Paul never associates νόμος and πνεῦμα; instead, he explicitly connects πνεῦμα with the gospel (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον). In 1:27, Paul exhorts unity among the believers in Philippi:

> Only conduct your citizenship worthy of the gospel of Christ [τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τοῦ Χριστοῦ], so that having come and having seen you or being absent I may hear the things about you, that you stand firm in one Spirit [ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι] with one soul striving together for the faith of the gospel [τῇ πίστει τοῦ εὐαγγελίου].

That the believers are ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι means that they have the Spirit of God, which is also the Spirit of Christ present among them.²⁴⁷ Paul’s association of πνεῦμα with the unity among believers (ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι) emphasizes, as Fee asserts, the believers’ common experience of the “one Spirit,” the basis for unity.²⁴⁸

In Philippians, Paul then develops the special relationship between πνεῦμα and the gospel that he set up in Galatians by stressing the fact that the gospel of Christ (τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τοῦ Χριστοῦ) lived in πνεῦμα, not the Mosaic Law, contains the lessons to acquire virtues. In the letter, the word εὐαγγέλιον is explicitly mentioned 9 times and implicitly 5 times (total 14 times!).²⁴⁹ Through the practice of the gospel’s teaching

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²⁴⁹. The term “gospel” appears in 1:5, 7, 12, 16, 27; 2:22; 4:3, 15; the “gospel of Christ” in 1:27; the “word” (λόγος) in 1:14; 2:16; the phrases “proclaim Christ” in 1:15, and “preach Christ” in 17, 18. Interestingly, in Philippians Paul does not speak of “the gospel of God;” indeed, the word “God” appears only 16 times in Philippians (Christ 59 times!).
the believers acquire appropriate conduct “in a manner that is worthy of the gospel”
(1:27–2:18; 3:1–4:1). So, the ethical exhortation to “conduct your citizenship worthy to
the gospel of Christ” means in terms of Paul’ ethical discourse to live the gospel ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι, which means to live one's life according to the teachings of the gospel of Christ, and not the observance of the Mosaic Law.

The Gospel of Christ and Virtues

Paul's letter to the Philippians is centered in the figure of Christ, his gospel, and his
death and resurrection. As a result, Paul's ethical exhortation is also centered in Christ's example; Christ is the supreme model of virtues. Paul encourages the believers to work on Christ's behalf, and to live the gospel of Christ to become righteous (virtuous), even in times of affliction (4:14), fear and trembling (2:12). For Paul, the goal of the believers' life is their “salvation” (σωτηρία, 2:12–13), which involves the “resurrection from the dead” (3:11). The goal of life is, therefore, eschatological; Paul writes, “that you may be pure and blameless in [the] day of Christ, having been filled with a ‘fruit’ of justice/righteousness through Jesus Christ to a glory and praise of God” (1:10–11). Paul believes that “the Lord is near” (4:5), and exhorts the believers to be virtuous when the Lord comes. In the day of Christ (1:10; 2:16; 3:20), if virtuous, the believer's body will be “transformed” to a glorious


251. Thurston (Philippians and Philemon, 17) notes that the language of “citizenship” (πολιτεύεσθε) reflects the political realities in Philippi. The citizens were proud of their status as a Roman colony; so Paul reminds the believers that their true citizenship is in heaven (3:20; cf. Acts 23:1)

252. Paul does not use the word τέλος, instead he uses the term σκοπός (hapax legomenon in the New Testament), which has several meanings: an observer, a watchman, the distant mark looked at, the goal or end one has in view. All are in relation to the language of Hellenistic games.
body in the power of Christ (3:21).\(^{253}\) Using a language typical of a competitive runner, Paul describes this as their prize: their true citizenship in heaven (3:20). In fact, for Paul, the pursuing of “the prize” is God’s call (3:14).\(^{254}\) Therefore, to attain their own salvation (σωτηρία), Paul calls them to seek perfection by exhorting them, “become imitators of me [συμμιμηταί μου], brothers, … walking as you have us as example [τύπον]” (3:17; see also 1 Thess 1:6; 2:14). To follow Paul as example of virtues (and Timothy’s) is, according to Paul, the way to perfection (3:12, 15).\(^{255}\) He says that there are “many who walk,” but they do not follow Paul as an example of virtues; they are “enemies of the cross of Christ” (3:18).

Paul sees himself an example of how to live the gospel of Christ. His own life, rooted in Christ, is an example of virtues. In fact, it is in this context that Paul mentions the word “virtue” (ἀρετή), when he writes:

As to the rest, brothers whatever things are true, whatever honorable, whatever just/righteous, whatever pure, whatever lovely, whatever well-sounding, if any virtue [εἴ τις ἀρετή] and if any praise, take account of these things, that you learned, received, heard and you saw in me. Practice these things [ταῦτα πράσσετε] and the God of peace will be with you (4:8–9).

There are two important points here. First, Paul shows that it is in the “practice” of the gospel of Christ, which they have learned, received, and heard from Paul, that the

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\(^{253}\) For the first time in 3:20, Paul calls Jesus “Savior,” who will come from heaven to transform bodies by his power.


\(^{255}\) In this respect, Freed (*The Morality of Paul’s Converts*, 263) argues that “we should not stress the theology of Paul here [3:17] to neglect of his ethics, as does Furnish. True, Paul has shared in Christ’s suffering and been conformed to his death. But to say, ‘this is the Paul whom the Philippians are to imitate’ (Furnish, *Theology and Ethics*, 221) is only half correct. The verb στοιχέω (3:16) and περιπατέω make the moral/ethical element clear. It is not just ‘his faith’ the Philippians are to imitate but his behavior as well.”
believers in Philippi acquire virtues. Second, Paul sees himself as an “example” of virtues (righteous conduct); he has practiced “these things” (virtues), and they have learned, received, and heard “these things” from Paul. In 4:13, Paul explains that he can do “all things” (πάντα) “in the one [Christ] empowering me [ἐνδυναμοῦντί με].” Although Paul does not mention πνεῦμα, from the context of the letter where πνεῦμα and power (δύναμις) appear (e.g., 1:19, 27; 2:1; 3:3, 10, 21; 4:13, 23), Paul’s virtues, as in Galatians (4:6), derive in the power of the πνεῦμα of God’s Son.

Πνεῦμα as the opposite of the Flesh (Σάρξ)

in Paul’s Letter to the Philippians

In Philippians, the word πνεῦμα appears 5 times (1:19, 27; 2:1; 3:3; and 4:23), and the word σάρξ 3 times (1:22, 24; and 3:3). Only in 3:3, however, πνεῦμα appears alongside σάρξ. Paul writes, “for we are ‘the circumcision’, the ones worshipping by the Spirit of God [πνεῦμα θεοῦ] and boasting in Christ Jesus and not having confidence in [the] flesh [ἐν σαρκί].” Although ἐν σαρκί is contrasted with πνεῦμα, the word σαρκί is not

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256. As commentators note, the virtues in 4:8–9 were common in Greek catalogue of ethical virtues of Paul’s time. Cf. Migliore, Philippians, 162.

257. The phrase “take account of these things” or “think about these things” is a way of exhorting the believers to discern, to reason what is truly excellent (virtues) and ethically worthy of praise in their lives. Cf. Fowl, Philippians, 185; Freed, The Morality of Paul’s Coverts, 264. Similarly, in 1:10 Paul describes the function of discernment with the verb δοκιμάζειν, which refers to the ability to examine and discriminate options of conduct. See Schnabel, “How Paul Developed His Ethics,” 290.

258. In 1:22 and 24, the term σάρξ refers to Paul’s human body, the “body of humility” (see 1:20; 3:21; 2:7–8), and σάρξ does not have a negative connotation; Paul uses it as a synonym of body (σῶμα). In fact, he views “his” “remaining in the flesh” as advantageous for the gospel and beneficial for the believers in Philippi.

259. Most scholars consider this passage as part of a third fragment (letter C, “the letter of warning”), and is considered one of the most difficult sections in Philippians, in terms of its
used in the sense of its evil or sinful connotation. Rather, it is used as a reference to the practice of circumcision. Paul is, therefore, contrasting πνεῦμα and the circumcision of the flesh: those who are the “true circumcision” vs. those who are the “physical circumcision” (false teachers) and remain in the pure human level of σάρξ.

Despite the fact that in Philippians only once Paul contrasts πνεῦμα and σάρξ in reference to the physical circumcision, he uses language characteristic of two eschatological realities that contrast the divine level (God’s πνεῦμα) and the human level (σάρξ).

Table 24: The Contrast between Two Eschatological Realities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divine level (πνεῦμα)</th>
<th>Human level (σάρξ)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Us”</td>
<td>“Others”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“We”</td>
<td>“They”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boasting in Christ 3:3</td>
<td>Boasting in the flesh 3:3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The [true] circumcision” 3:3</td>
<td>Confidence in the flesh (physical circumcision) 3:3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals: salvation 2:12</td>
<td>Their end: destruction 1:28; 3:18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemies of the cross of Christ 3:18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ones thinking earthly things 3:19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

coherence and its relationship to what precedes and follows. See Murphy O’Connor, Paul, 228; cf. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 751.


261. Paul does not identify who the opponents are, and it is not important for the thesis of this study. It is sufficient to label them as “false teachers.” For a discussion about the identity of the “opponents,” see Hansen, The Letter to the Philippians, 98–101; Fee, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians, 7–9; Reumann, Philippians, 469–78. Thurston, Philippians and Philemon, 115; Bruce, Philippians, 9; Charles B. Cousar, Philippians and Philemon: A Commentary (NTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), 8; Murphy-O’Connor, Paul, 228–29.
In Philippians, the practice of virtues and the avoidance of vices are also related with πνεῦμα, which Paul associates with the eschatological reality of the divine level. The following table shows the virtues and vices that appear in the letter:

Table 25. List of Virtues and Vices in Philippians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virtues</th>
<th>Vices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ἀγαθός (good) 1:6</td>
<td>αἰσχύνη (shameful deeds) 1:20; 3:19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀγάπη (love) 1:9, 16; 2:1; 4:1</td>
<td>ἐριθεία (rivalry, self-seeking) 1:17; 2:3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>δικαιοσύνη (justice/righteousness) 1:7, 11; 3:6, 9</td>
<td>ἔρις (strife) 1:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀλήθεια (truth) 1:18; 4:8</td>
<td>κενοδοξία (vainglory, empty pride) 2:3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἅμεμπτος (blameless) 2:15; 3:6</td>
<td>φθόνος (envy) 1:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>εἰρήνη (peace) 1:2; 4:7, 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐλπίς (hope) 1:20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐπίγνωσις (knowledge) 1:9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>εὐδοκία (good will) 1:15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>κοινωνία (fellowship) 2:1; 3:10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>λειτουργία (service) 2:21, 30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>παράκλησις (encouragement) 2:1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πίστις (faith) 1:25, 27; 2:17; 3:9, 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ταπεινοφροσύνη (humility) 2:3; 4:12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χαρά (joy) 1:4, 25; 2:2, 29; 4:1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χάρις (grace) 1:2, 7; 4:23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Relationship of Πνεῦμα to the Practice of Virtues, Especially the Love Commandment in Paul’s Letter to the Philippians

In Philippians, Paul does not make an explicit reference to the relationship of πνεῦμα with the love commandment or the Law of Christ. However, Philippians is a “letter of friendship;” as such, the letter itself—whether it is a composite or a single letter—fully expresses the love commandment, rooted in the gospel of Christ. By reading the letter, the
language of love, affection, and the genuine sharing of joy and suffering cannot be missed.\textsuperscript{262} In fact, the virtue of \(\alpha\gamma\alpha\pi\eta\) is mentioned 4 times (1:9, 16; 2:1; 4:1), and it is explicitly highlighted in 2:1–2 in three forms: the encouragement in Christ, the consolation of love, along with the fellowship of the Spirit.\textsuperscript{263} The heart of the letter is Christ's example of true love (2:6–11); both his "becoming flesh" and his "death on a cross" are acts of true love, and his glorification is the reward of his true love.

Paul and the Philippian believers know that their manner of life must be guided by Christ's example and his gospel. It is on this ground that Paul expresses his affectionate love toward the believers as he calls them "brothers" (\(\alpha\delta\epsilon\lambda\rho\omega\iota,\ 1:12, 14; 2:25; 3:1, 13, 17; 4:1, 8, 21\)) and "my beloved ones" (\(\alpha\gamma\alpha\pi\pi\tau\omega\iota\ \mu\omicron\upsilon,\ 2:12; 4:1, 11\)). He sincerely expresses his "confidence" (1:6, 14; 2:24; 3:3, 4, 4), at times of affliction and opposition, that their love will increase in deeper knowledge and practical understanding (1:9),\textsuperscript{264} and that their joy of faith will progress (cf. 1:25–26) in the gospel (cf. 1:12). Paul also shows his

\textsuperscript{262} In reference to this Bockmuehl (\textit{The Epistle to the Philippians}, 66) notes that love is the general theme in Philippians (1:27–2:18). God is also described as a loving Father. Regarding God's affection, Branick (\textit{Understanding Paul and His Letters}, 299) points out that "the outstanding qualities of God are mercy and kindness. God has mercy on Epaphroditus and Paul (2:27). God listens to prayers (4:6). As a result, Paul has an intense sense of offering thanksgiving to 'my God' (1:3)."

\textsuperscript{263} Bockmuehl, \textit{The Epistle to the Philippians}, 66.

\textsuperscript{264} In 3:8, Paul also speaks of "the knowledge of Jesus Christ my Lord" as the "important thing" in his life (cf. 1:23; 3:10–11). Cf. Bockmuehl, \textit{The Epistle to the Philippians}, 67. Thurston (\textit{Philippians and Philemon}, 53) points out that the fruit of love is seen in knowledge and insight, a knowledge from personal experience. The term "deeper knowledge" is generally associated with the true knowledge of God and his revelation of Christ. Scott (\textit{Implicit Epistemology in the Letters of Paul}, 129) also notes that Paul exhorts the believers to grow into a deeper ethical knowledge to develop the skill of ethical discernment, so that they will be pure when the eschatological "day of Christ" dawns (1:9–11). Here however, Paul associates "deeper knowledge" with the virtue of love, the mutual love among the Philippian believers, a love that is to reflect Christ's love (2:5–11). See also Schnabel, "How Paul Developed His Ethics," 289.
genuine “affection” for them (1:8) and theirs to him: “you hold me in your heart” (1:7).

Furthermore, the unity between the members of the Philippians community and Paul is clearly emphasized; they are in “one Spirit, with one soul” (ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι, μιᾷ ψυχῇ, 1:27). Paul praises their “obedience” during both his presence and his absence (2:12), and rejoices for them and invites them to rejoice with him (2:17–18). This is for Paul a true and loving “fellowship of the Spirit” (εἴ τις κοινωνία πνεύματος, 2:1). In this κοινωνία, Paul has been filled receiving the Philippians’ “gifts,” which he considers to be “a fragrant odor, an acceptable sacrifice well pleased to God” (4:18–19).

In the virtue of love Paul also shares his suffering with his beloved brothers and asks them to do the same. He views all his sufferings and struggles in his flesh (1:30; 4:12) for the sake of Christ (3:8). He writes, “that Christ will be magnified in my body is life or death, and to me, to live is Christ and to die a gain” (1:20). According to him, their affliction was also given to them in order to suffer for Christ out of love, like him (1:28–30). He also encourages them to “do all things without grumbling and argument… not in vain, I ran nor labor in vain” (2:14, 16). As an example of true love, Paul mentions the


266. Migliore (*Philippians*, 70–71) expands the interpretation of 1:29–30. He writes, “earlier Paul has assured the Philippians that his suffering and imprisonment should not unsettle or frighten them. ... On the contrary, his imprisonment and suffering have served to spread the gospel (1:12). Now he calls the Philippians to view their present situation in a similar manner. Far from being a burden, or a mark of God's displeasure, God has graciously granted them 'the privilege... not only of believing in Christ, but of suffering for him as well' (1:29).”

267. Some scholars parallel the “grumbling” and “argument” with the Israelites’ at the wilderness (Deut 32:5 LXX). But the question is against whom is the grumbling and argument? One interpretation may be that Paul has in mind the false teachers. Another is that Paul is referring to Euodia and Syntyche (4:2–3). See Witherington III, *Paul's Letter to the Philippians*, 161–62.
beloved brother Epaphroditus, who risked his life on account of the work of Christ (2:30).

Thus, the relationship of πνεῦμα with the love commandment/Law of Christ is vividly reflected in the Philippian community, as the believers are united in the virtue of love, and in “one Spirit” (1:27). To this Law the Philippian believers are committed to live virtuously and in holiness by the power of πνεῦμα.

Paul’s Letter to Philemon

The letter to Philemon,\(^\text{268}\) which contains only 25 verses, is Paul’s shortest letter.\(^\text{269}\) Like Philippians, Paul wrote the letter from prison (1:1, 9, 23, 24); however, the exact place

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\(^{268}\) Philemon was a well-to-do believer who lived at Colossae. He probably became a believer through Paul in their encounter at Ephesus (1:19). Cf. Lohse, *Colossians and Philemon*, 186. John Knox (*Philemon Among the Letters of Paul: A New View of its Place and Importance* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935], 62–70) proposed that the recipient of Paul’s letter was Archippus, Onesimus’ master (1:2; cf. Col 4:17). According to Knox, Paul asked Philemon, a leader in the community at Laodicea, to support his request that Archippus take Onesimus back. According to Knox, “the [letter] from Laodicea” (Col 4:16) is actually the letter to Philemon. Paul sent Onesimus back home by way of Laodicea, where Philemon lived, with the instructions to read the letter of Colossians as well as the letter to Laodicea (Col 4:15–16). Knox makes this claim based on the view that the letters to the Colossians and Philemon were written at the same time, and that Ignatius mentions a bishop at Ephesus (2nd century C.E.) by named Onesimus. However, Knox’s argumentation has failed to convince. The fact that Philemon is named first and the singular “you” indicate the addressee was Philemon. Cf. Lohse, *Colossians and Philemon*, 186–87; Fitzmyer, *The letter to Philemon*, 12–13; Cousar, *Philippians and Philemon*, 96.

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and date is uncertain. Unlike other Pauline letters, the letter to Philemon is a personal letter in which Paul intercedes for a slave Onesimus, whose identity is not clear. The circumstances under which and where he encountered Paul is also obscure.

270. Most commentators agree that Ephesus, where Paul was imprisoned for a time, is probably the place of composition in the mid–50’s (1 Cor 15:32; 16:9; 2 Cor 1:8–9; 6:5; 11:23–24; Rom 16:7; see also Phil 1:7, 12–13, 20–26 [Ephesus?]). Traditionally, it was held that the letter to Philemon was written from Rome (mid–50’s) where Paul was also imprisoned at the end of his life (Acts 28:16, 30). Others suggested Caesarea Maritima (58–60 C.E.), a place where Paul likewise was imprisoned for two years on his way from Jerusalem to Rome (Acts 23:35; 24:26–27). But especially because of geographical distance from either Rome or Caesarea to Asia Minor both options are rejected. For discussion on this issue, see Migliore, *Philippians and Philemon*, 190–92; Fitzmyer, *The letter to Philemon*, 9–10; Ryan, *Philippian and Philemon*, 179–80; Lohse, *Colossians and Philemon*, 188.

271. Paul does not explain what caused Onesimus to flee from Philemon. In the ancient Greco-Roman world, the situation of runaway slaves was precarious. Peter Stuhlmacher (*Der Brief an Philemon* [Zurich: Benziger/Neukirchner Verlag, 1975], 22–23) points out that a runaway slave had five alternatives: (1) join a band of out laws, (2) disappear in a large city, (3) flee to the hinterlands, (4) be hired by a farmer or craftsman, or (5) seek asylum in a temple and hope to be taken as a slave by a more humane master. Cf. Migliore, *Philippians and Philemon*, 191–92. Currently, scholars reject the traditional view that Onesimus who lived at Colossae was a runaway slave (Paul never uses the word φυγας [one who flees] or δραπέτης [runaway]). Most support the view that Onesimus was a slave who for an unknown reason had gotten in some kind of trouble with his master Philemon and sought Paul's help and his intercession so that he might be restored in his master's household. Cf. Peter Lampe, "Keine 'Sklavenflucht' des Onesimus." ZNW 76 (1985): 135–137, esp. 137; Migliore, *Philippians and Philemon*, 192; Fitzmyer, *The letter to Philemon*, 17–18 (also Knox and Lampe); Wall, *Colossians & Philemon*, 185. On the fact that Paul writes, “beloved brother” and “in the flesh and in the Lord” (1:16), Allen D. Callahan (Embassy of Onesimus: *The Letter of Paul to Philemon* [Valley Forge, Pa.: Trinity, 1997], 50–54, 371) suggests that Onesimus was actually Philemon's blood brother who had some issues with each other. Cf. Cousar, *Philippians and Philemon*, 97. Sarah B. C. Winter ("Paul's Letter to Philemon." *NTS* 33 [1987]: 203–212, esp. 204) argues that Onesimus was not a runaway slave but was sent by the community at Colossae to be with Paul ("on loan") to help him in prison, like the Philippians sent Epaphroditus. Therefore, Paul writes the letter to request for Onesimus to stay in Ephesus a longer time. Cousar (*Philippians and Philemon*, 98) rightly challenges Winter's claim by questioning the reason why a non-believer would have been sent to aid Paul.

272. Some argue that Onesimus sought help from Paul, presumably having heard of him in his master's house. For this view see Migliore, *Philippians and Philemon*, 191–92; Fitzmyer (17–18); others argue that Onesimus took refuge with Paul while prisoner; see Lohse, *Colossians and Philemon*, 186. Others even claim that Onesimus was sent to Paul by his master with a gift or a message; see Knox, *Philemon Among the Letters of Paul*, 62–70.
the type of relationship Onesimus had with Philemon, his master, is not exactly certain. What is reflected in the letter is that Paul recognizes Philemon’s legal rights and decides to send Onesimus back to his master (1:14, 16),273 so that both (master/slave) might be “reconciled” (1:15).274 This study will highlight the ethical aspect of the letter in light of the central role of πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethical discourse that he framed in Galatians.

In Philemon, the word πνεῦμα appears only at the concluding blessing, and it refers to the human spirit. Paul writes, “the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ be with the spirit of you” (τοῦ πνεύματος ὑμῶν, 1:25).275 While it is true that Paul does not refer to God’s πνεῦμα, its work is present in the letter. In Paul’s thought, the three divisions of human nature (spirit, soul, and body) are dynamically united in Christ’s grace (1:25). And this is caused by the power of God’s πνεῦμα acting in each of them. Important for this study, however, two essential elements also stressed in the framework of Paul’s ethics in Galatians are illustrated in this letter: the gospel and the virtue of love.

Πνεῦμα and Its Relation to the Gospel and to the
Mosaic Law in Paul’s Letter to Philemon

As in his other letters, the gospel (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον) takes the place of the Mosaic Law in this letter. In 1:13 Paul writes, “whom [Onesimus] I was wishing to keep myself, so that on your behalf he would serve [διακονῇ] to me in the bonds/chains of the gospel [τοῦ


274. This is Wall’s view. See Colossians & Philemon, 184.

275. The phrase τοῦ πνεύματος with μετὰ is distributive sing., so “your spirits.” Cf. Harris, Colossians & Philemon, 281; Fee, God’s Empowereing Presence, 635.
εὐαγγελίου]. The reason why Paul desires to keep Onesimus is because Onesimus will continue to serve Paul in teaching and spreading the gospel. Onesimus can, like Philemon, act as a good representative in the service of the gospel (1:13). Paul does not see Onesimus, therefore, as a slave but as a brother, a fellow worker for the sake of the gospel (1:11).277

In terms of ethics, Paul considers Onesimus a “virtuous man,” who was baptized (1:11), and is faithful and obedient to preach the gospel while Paul is in bondage (1:11, 13–14). What is at stake for Paul is “the gospel” (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον), the source of ethical teaching to the believers. Indeed, the central figure in this letter is Christ, since he mentions him 8 times (1:1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 20, 23, 25). Paul’s appeal to Philemon, therefore, has an ethical character in itself. It is in the name of the gospel (of Christ) that Paul seeks for Onesimus’ freedom. Paul’s priority is the gospel (of Christ); so the purpose of sending Onesimous back to his master Philemon is to get Onesimus’ freedom. Paul knows that only Philemon has the legal right to dissolve Onesimus’ state as slave (to perform the manumission of Onesimus).

Πνεῦμα as the opposite of the Flesh (Σάρξ)
in Paul’s Letter to Philemon

The reference to the word σάρξ in 1:16 (“both in flesh [ἐν σαρκὶ] and in the Lord”) refers

276. Fitzmyer (The Letter to Philemon, 111) notes the complexity of the meaning of 1:13. In reference to the word “τοῦ εὐαγγελίου,” he questions whether Paul uses it in the content sense, that is, the gospel he preaches (e.g., 1 Thess 3:2), or in the active sense, that is, “evangelization.” Ryan (Philippians and Philemon, 237) notes that Paul refers to τὸ εὐαγγέλιον as either the authority of the gospel (the gospel of God) or what the Gospel proclaims (the gospel of Christ). Although Paul does not specify whether the gospel is “of Christ” or “of God,” as in first Thessalonians, the gospel in Philemon refers to both the gospel of God and the gospel of Christ.

to the human nature (spirit, body, and soul). There is, however, one crucial element to point out. The statement in Paul’s thanksgiving (1:4–5) leads to two “results” (1:6–7) that are reflected in the letter’s body (1:8–20). Paul states:

I give thanks to my God always making mention about you [Philemon] in my prayers, hearing about your love and faith, which you have for the Lord Jesus and for all the saints (1:4–5).

Then he writes (results):

That the sharing of your [Philemon] faith which you have for the Lord Jesus and for all the saints, so that, the sharing of your [Philemon] faith may become effective in the knowledge of all the good in us for Christ. For I had much joy and encouragement with respect to your [Philemon] love, because the hearts of the saints have been refreshed through you, brother (1:6–7).

Paul’s thanksgiving certainly shows Philemon as an example of living the gospel through the power of God’s πνεῦμα. His ethical life is based not only on the gospel teaching, but also it is the product of God’s πνεῦμα, and not of σὰρξ. Indeed, a vice or sin is never mentioned in the letter. Therefore, the “knowledge of all the good” which Paul refers to is nonetheless “the gospel,” from which “good things” (virtues) come, working through the power of πνεῦμα. Ryan states, “Knowledge of the good is essentially connected with the experiential knowledge of God as the source and future guarantor of that goodness.”

Her argument is in part right since it is in the practice of the gospel that the believer acquires knowledge of God, but it is also completed through πνεῦμα’s dynamic work

278. This is the only Pauline text that combines both phrases, “in the Lord” and “in the flesh.” See Fitzmyer, The Letter to Philemon, 116; Migliore, Philippians and Philemon, 232; Lohse, Colossians and Philemon, 203; Ryan, Philippians and Philemon, 247.

279. Commentators have recognized 1:6 as the most difficult texts in Philemon. For the diverse of opinions on this text, see Moo, The letters to the Colossians and to Philemon, 389–94.

expressed in virtues. Paul points to several important virtues that come from Philemon's living the gospel in πνεῦμα's guidance:

Table 26. List of Virtues in Philemon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virtues</th>
<th>References</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ἀγαθὸν (good)</td>
<td>1:14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀγάπη (love)</td>
<td>1:5, 7, 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>εἰρήνη (peace)</td>
<td>1:3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐλπίς (hope)</td>
<td>1:22</td>
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<tr>
<td>παράκλησις (encouragement)</td>
<td>1:7</td>
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<tr>
<td>πίστις (faith)</td>
<td>1:5–6</td>
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<tr>
<td>ὑπακοή (obedience)</td>
<td>1:21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χαρά (joy)</td>
<td>1:7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χάρις (grace)</td>
<td>1:25</td>
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The two most important virtues that Paul emphasizes in this letter are ἀγάπη (3 times) and πίστις (twice). Philemon has excelled in the practice of both virtues as Paul addresses to him as “beloved” (τῷ ἀγαπητῷ, 1:1),\(^{281}\) so much that even Paul himself and all the saints “have been refreshed” through his virtues.\(^{282}\) To set up the ground for his appeal, Paul stresses both Philemon’s virtue of “love” for all people, and his virtue of “faith” toward Christ. What is striking is the complete absence of vices/sins, which provides a hint that Paul is pleased with the way of living the gospel virtuously by Philemon and his entire household, and that the power of God’s πνεῦμα is actively present among them (1:25).

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The Relationship of Πνεῦμα to the Practice of Virtues, Especially
the Love Commandment in Paul’s Letter to Philemon

The principal lesson of the gospel in Paul’s letter to Philemon is the virtue of ἀγάπη. There is not a direct reference to the love commandment or the Law of Christ, but the practice of the virtue of love is the practice of the love commandment. In the letter, Philemon is known for his love, and Paul makes his appeal to him “out of love.”²⁸³ Paul calls him “beloved” (1:1) and compliments his love for all the saints and his faith in Christ (1:5, 6, 7, 9). Out of love Paul does not give a command to Philemon, but an “appeal” to receive him forever not as slave but as a more than a slave (ὑπὲρ δοῦλον), “a beloved brother” (ἀδελφὸν ἀγαπητόν, 1:16), that is, “a free man” (1:21; cf. Col 4:9).²⁸⁴ Paul assures that what he does concerning Onesimus is not on his own conviction, but he wants to consult Philemon (1:14–15).²⁸⁵ Paul also shows his love for Onesimus by expressing his willingness to “pay back” all Onesimus’ debt or wrong doings (1:18–19). The central ethical exhortation in Paul’s letter to Philemon is to love others as taught in the gospel. But, this becomes effective only in the power of God’s πνεῦμα.


²⁸⁵. Pao, *Colossians & Philemon*, 392; Barclay, *Colossians and Philemon*, 114. It is very difficult to know what Paul meant in 1:15 when he writes, “perhaps, because of this he [Onesimus] was separated for an hour [a short period of time], so that you may have him eternally/forever.” Paul speaks of the separation of Onesimus and Philemon for a short time, and the reason for it is that they will stay together eternally. That is, the separation was crucial for both Onesimus and Philemon. To Onesimus because it allowed him to meet Paul, to be baptized by Paul and receive God’s πνεῦμα, and the most important, to get his manumission, his freedom to continue preaching the gospel. To Philemon, the separation served him to show his virtue of love towards his slave.
Paul's Letter to the Romans

Written from Corinth by Paul sometime in the mid or late 50’s C.E., Romans brings to light the most important, yet intricate theological thoughts of Paul. In fact, its content reveals essential theological elements that became the base for later Christian theology. The unique aspect of this letter is that Paul writes to the Roman communities, which he had neither established nor yet visited. These have led scholars to wonder why Paul writes to the Roman believers, and what the situation and circumstances were at the time he writes the letter. Scholars have offered various reasons that lead Paul to compose

286. Most commentators suggest that Paul wrote Romans in Gaius’ home (16:23) between the years 54–59 C.E. See Matera, Romans, 5; Byrne, Romans, 8–9; Fitzmyer, Romans, 87.


288. Another debate concerns the recipients’ identity, whether they were Jewish believers (the weak ones? 11:1; 14:1–15:8–13; 16:4, 26) or Gentile believers (the strong ones? 1:5–6, 13–15; 11:13, 17–24, 30–31; 15:7–9, 20–22); or whether they were composed by both groups (this option is more plausible). Also questions are regarding whether they sympathized with Paul’s Gospel or not, and whether they accepted Paul’s authority or not. Cf. Byrne, Romans, 2–4. For a good discussion, see Matera, Romans, 6–8.

289. From the content, we can deduced the circumstances: Paul has finished his work in the East, and he intends to take the gospel to Spain, and on his journey to the farthest West, he wants to visit the believers at Rome. But before his visit, he plans to take the collection from Achaia and Macedonia to the poor in Jerusalem. Matera summarizes as follows the situation of the believers at Rome: they belonged to different household churches, in which there might have been some tensions between Jewish believers and Law-observant Gentile believers, on one side, and Gentile believers who did not observe the Mosaic Law, on the other. See Matera, Romans, 6–8. See also Hultgren, Paul’s Letter to the Romans, 11–13; Fitzyer, Romans, 68–84; Schreiner, Romans, 10–23.
Romans. Matera summarizes them: Paul writes Romans (a) to present his gospel; (b) to prepare his defense at Jerusalem; (c) to solicit the support of the Romans for his mission to Spain; and (d) to resolve the problem of the “weak” and “strong.” While many questions are still unresolved in Romans, it is suggested the Paul wrote the letter to the entire Roman community of believers, composed of both Jewish and Gentile backgrounds. From the content itself, he intends to describe several important theological beliefs apropos of God and His righteousness in the salvation of both Roman Jews and Roman Gentiles believers. He also wants to lay out “his” gospel in connection with his view of Christ and his role in God’s plan of salvation. Paul ties these important aspects to the Mosaic Law and the role of πνεῦμα, but in a way that their roles he outlined earlier in Galatians—the former negative and the latter positive and essential—are significantly re-interpreted (esp. in chs. 6–8) in a new direction. The discussion of the three major sections highlights particularly how Paul presents a “new” and positive understanding of the Mosaic Law, how the role of πνεῦμα is not in opposition with the Mosaic Law, and how the term σάρξ is no longer connected with the observance of the Mosaic Law. In terms of ethics, the letter to the Romans may be labeled as Paul’s mature description of his understanding of the central role of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse.

In Romans, the concept of πνεῦμα and its adjectival cognate (πνευματικός) appear

290. Commentators have argued about the integrity and unity of the letter. Some commentators do not ascribe chapters 15–16 to Paul, especially the question whether 16:1–23 has originally existed as part of Romans or Paul simply wrote 1:1–15:33. On the integrity and unity of Romans, see Fitzmyer, Romans, 49–51, 55–65.

291. Matera, Roman, 8, 10. For other views, see Byrne, Romans, 17–18; Fitzmyer, Romans, 71, 76, 78–79, 85; Hultgren, Paul’s Letter to the Romans, 13.
38 times. Fee states rightly that “except for 1 Corinthians, Paul’s letter to the church in Rome contains the largest amount of Spirit material in the corpus.” Of the 38 references of πνεῦμα in Romans, 22 times (twice indirectly) it appears just in chapter 8 alone! Paul re-affirms what he has stated in his previous letters—that πνεῦμα is the “Spirit of God” (πνεῦμα θεοῦ, 8:9, 11, 14; 15:19), and the “Spirit of holiness” (πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης, 1:3–4; see also 5:5; 9:1; 14:17; 15:16). Likewise, he links πνεῦμα with the term δύναμις (ἐν δύναμει πνεύματος ἁγίου), especially in relation to Christ (1:1–7).

292. The noun πνεῦμα appears in 1:4, 9; 2:29; 5:5; 7:6; 8:1 [N2, D2, K, L, P, ...], 2, 4, 5, 6, 9 [lx], 10, 11 [twice], 13, 14, 15 [twice], 16 [twice], 23, 26 [twice], 27; 9:1; 11:8 [quotation from Deut 29:3; Isa 29:10; 6:9], 12:11; 14:17; 15:13, 16, 19, 30. The adjective πνευματικός in 1:11; 7:14; 15:27. Only twice Paul refers to the human spirit (1:9; 8:16). Fitzmyer (Romans, 124) argues that “when Paul speaks of the Spirit, he does not understand pneuma as in the Hellenistic world of his time, as the power of thaumaturgy and ecstasy, but rather as an apocalyptic manifestation of the end time, as in the Old Testament. Whereas in the Old Testament it was often an eschatological manifestation, early Christianity understood it as related to the resurrection of Christ. Paul especially used the idea to express the presence and activity of the risen Lord in his community. Consequently, when Paul uses pneuma, he takes over much of the Old Testament idea of ‘the Spirit of God.'”

293. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 472.

294. The first 4 instances (8:9, 11 [2x], 14) occur in 8:1–39. The last instance (15:19) appears at the end of Paul’s letter in 15:14–29, thus he creates an inclusio.

295. Matera (Romans, 30) notes that the expression “[the] Spirit of holiness” is not mentioned anywhere else in Paul’s letters. This has led scholars to argue that 1:4 might have derived from an early creedal formula. There are some parallels in other Jewish texts (e.g., Isa 63:10–11; Ps 51:11 [MT 51:13]; 1QS 4.21; 8.16; 9.3; CD 2.12; 1QH 7.6–7; 9.32; T. Lev 18:11).

296. The crucial event for Paul is Jesus’ resurrection; at this event, God designated Jesus by the power of “the Spirit of holiness” as His Son. For Paul, πνεῦμα as power, therefore, plays a primary role in the appointment of Jesus as the “Son of God,” and empowered Jesus Christ the Lord to call believers to faith just as Abraham through the promise of God was empowered by faith to give glory to God (4:20–21; cf. 14:4). Also, God at the last judgment is also able to demonstrate His wrath (ὀργή θεοῦ) for destruction in πνεῦμα’s power against those who are not virtuous or do not practice “the good” (1:18; 2:5). Paul links God’s righteousness with salvation and God’s wrath with punishment, and as such, Paul highlights the virtue of holiness with God’s πνεῦμα and His power (δύναμις). For Paul the image of “the wrath of God” (ὀργή θεοῦ) is generally related to both God’s power to against the unrighteous ones (not virtuous) and to the
Πνεῦμα and Its Relation to the Gospel and to the Mosaic Law in Paul's Letter to the Romans

When comparing the number of times that Paul uses the word πνεῦμα and its cognates (38 times) and the term ὁ νόμος in Romans, it is striking to find that ὁ νόμος appears 67 times. What is interesting is that Paul uses the noun νόμος in various ways, and not always in reference to the Mosaic Law. What is even more striking is that only the letter to the Romans relates ὁ νόμος with πνεῦμα in two occasions (7:14 and 8:2). In one instance, he associates πνεῦμα with the gospel of Christ (1:9), assuring the believers that it is the gospel of Christ now, not the Mosaic Law, that sets up the guidelines (lessons) for a virtuous and holy life. As Fitzmyer argues, “the gospel thus becomes a norm for Christian conduct and life, summoning human beings to 'hear' it (10:16–17) and 'obey' it with 'a commitment of faith' (1:5).”

Important for the argument is that in Romans (chapters 2:8; 3:5; 4:15; 9:22; 12:19 [Deut 32:35; Prov 25:21–22]; 13:4; cf. 9:17). As Fitzmyer (Romans, 107) points out, ὀργή θεοῦ “denotes the expected divine reaction to human sin and evil. It is linked with monotheism and to the covenantal relationship of God with Israel, expressing the justifiable reaction of a loving and faithful God toward his disobedient people and their proneness to idolatry, to evil, and to sinful conduct. It denotes God's steadfast attitude as a judge of Israel's breach of the covenant.”

297. See 2:12, 14 [4x], 15, 17, 18, 20, 23, 25, 26, 27 [twice], 29; 3:19 [twice], 21 [twice], 27 [twice], 28, 31 [twice]; 4:13, 14, 15 [twice], 16; 5:13 [twice], 20; 6:14, 15; 7:1 [twice], 2 [twice], 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 [3x], 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 21, 22, 23 [3x], 25 [twice]; 8:2 [twice], 3, 4; 9:31 [twice]; 10:4, 5; 13:8.

298. Fitzmyer (Romans, 131–32) notes that Paul sometimes uses νόμος in generic terms (a law, 4:5b; 7:1a); sometimes is used in a figurative or analogous sense (a principle, 3:27a; 7:21, 23a; as a way of referring to sin, 7:23c, 25b; or to sin and death, 8:2b; or to human nature, 2:14d; or even as a way of referring to faith, 3:27b; and to the Spirit, 8:2a; other times νόμος is used to mean the Jewish Scripture or some part of it (the Psalms, 3:19a; the Torah, 3:31b). In the majority of cases, however, νόμος, with or without the article, refers to the Mosaic Law (2:12–14a, 15, 17–18, 20, 23, 25–27; 3:19–21, 27b, 28; 4:13–15a, 16; 5:13, 20; 6:14–15; 7:2–9, 12, 14, 16, 22, 23b, 25; 8:3–4, 7; 9:31; 10:4; 13:8, 9).

299. Fitzmyer, Romans, 110.
6–7), Paul re-interprets his argument that he laid out earlier in Galatians, especially in chapter 5. His re-interpretation moves from a negative view of the Mosaic Law (Galatians) toward a more positive one (Rom 6–7). This new take on the Law and πνεῦμα’s relation to both the gospel and the Mosaic Law come to light in terms of the connection of πνεῦμα with (1) the spiritual law (the Mosaic Law), (2) the Law of πνεῦμα, and (3) the gospel of Christ.

Πνεῦμα and the Law as Spiritual (7:14)

In Romans, Paul calls the Law “spiritual” when he writes, “we know that the law is spiritual [ὁ νόμος πνευματικός ἐστιν], but I am carnal, having been sold under a sin” (7:14). This statement occurs in the concluding presentation of “the nature of the law” (7:14). This statement occurs in the concluding presentation of “the nature of the law” (7:14).

300. John A. Drane, Paul Libertine or Legalist? A Study of the Theology of the Major Pauline Epistles (London: SPCK, 1975), 142–43. Because in Romans Paul’s attitude towards the Law is positive comparing it with that of Galatians and also first Corinthians, Hans Hübner (Law in Paul’s Thought [ed. John Riches. Trans. James C. G. Greig; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1984], 91–91) argues that Paul progresses from fighting on principle (the Antioch incident, Galatians) to tolerance in Romans (see ch. 14). Also, Dunn (The New Perspective on Paul: Revised Edition [Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005], 280) argues that although in Galatians Paul views the role of ὁ νόμος positively as the custodian for a period of time (until Christ); the more negative thrust predominates. In Romans, however, the emphasis is the reverse; due to different circumstances, Paul claims that the role of ὁ νόμος in the period of Adam has been perverted by sin and the weakness of the flesh, preventing the full outworking of the gospel to all who believe. The key here is that Paul’s negative thrust against the Law in Romans was not directed against the Mosaic Law as such but against the Law manipulated by sin. For Paul, sin came through Adam’s transgression, and the Mosaic Law was an opportunity for sin to be activated (7:18).” See also Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric in Its Contexts, 219–50; Byrne, Romans, 223; Lohse, “Changes of Thought in Pauline Theology?,” 154–55; Bruce, Paul, 188–202.

301. The identity of the speaker of Rom 7 (ἐγώ) is a major issue in the study of Romans and a matter of debate among scholars. In this discussion, however, it should not be a matter of concern; whether it is taken as a reference to Paul himself, to a person under the Law, who is unable to fulfill the commandments of God, to a fictive “I,” or it is simply a rhetorical stylistic form it does not affect the argument. For a discussion on this topic and bibliography, see Hultgren, Paul’s Letter to the Romans, 676–91; Bultmann, The Old and New Man in the Letters of Paul (trans. Keith R. Crim; Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1964), 33–48.
(7:1–25), where he is re-thinking his view about the Mosaic Law (νόμος), and defines it and its commandments “good,” “just,” and “holy” (7:12). In this crucial passage, Paul introduces, three main qualities of the Law, its “goodness,” its “righteousness,” and its “holiness,” as a way of affirming to the Roman believers his “true” conviction regarding the Law. Speaking of the goodness of the Law, in 7:7–25, he expresses that “through the Law, one comes to know what is good and wrong, and through the Law what is sinful is manifested as utterly sinful.”

Nevertheless, is Paul insinuating that ὁ νόμος has πνεῦμα (the Law is spiritual), and thus, produces virtues (e.g., goodness, holiness, and righteousness/justice)? For him ethically speaking, ὁ νόμος πνευματικός ἐστιν not because it is from or has πνεῦμα, but because its origins is in God (cf. 7:12), and as such, it was originally meant to produce virtues (righteousness). Although ὁ νόμος was meant to lead to the “good,” in the end, it did not prove capable of overcoming sin (vices), and thus lead the believers to righteousness and eternal life, as is shown in 5:1–21. What is crucial in his presentation of ὁ νόμος’s true nature is that he shifts his older, and now abandoned, understanding of the Law (Galatians) and tries to convince the Roman believers that they were not “freed from the Mosaic Law,” but they were “freed from sin.” With this notion, he abandons the connection he made in Galatians between the Mosaic Law and “a yoke of slavery” (5:1) and “the elements of the world” (4:3, 9). That is, unlike Galatians, in Romans, it is about “freedom” from sin, and not from the observance of the Mosaic Law; it is about


303. As Tobin (The Spirituality of Paul, 95) rightly argues, the Mosaic Law was part of God’s revelation. See also Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 143.
being obedient, a “slave” of God and of righteousness, and not about being a “slave” of
the Mosaic Law (Rom 7:1–25). This explains further what he expressed previously in
5:12–14 that sin and death really entered the world, not through ὁ νόμος (the Mosaic Law),
but “through a man” (Adam), who is a type of Christ. Therefore unlike his radical view
of the Law in Galatians, in Romans, ὁ νόμος is not wrong, and cannot be equated with
sin and death. To expand his more positive view of ὁ νόμος, Paul implicitly contrasts the
“Law” with the first person pronoun “I” and “spiritual” with “carnal.” His contrast aims
to emphasize two important ethical realities of human nature: (1) that the fleshly aspect
of human nature as expressed in the “I” (7:14–17, 20, 24, 25)—which is carnal (sinful)—is
what is tied with sin; (2) that ὁ νόμος’s nature is spiritual; an important fact that points
forward to the Law of Christ (love commandment), which is the “fulfillment” of the
Mosaic Law (10:1–4).

According to Paul, the Mosaic Law does not provide believers with the capacity to
overcome sin. Rather, they receive such capacity by “dying” to sin through their baptism
into the body of Christ. For Paul, at baptism, the believers receive πνεῦμα, and thus,
the capacity to live righteously, so as to experience the “newness” of the Spirit, a “new
creation” (Gal 6:15) rather than the “oldness” of the Mosaic Law. Therefore, although
Paul speaks of the “goodness” and “holiness” of the Law in his ethical discourse, he does
not appeal to its “observance” to attain righteousness.

The Law of Πνεῦμα (8:2)

Strikingly, unlike Rom 7, in chapter 6, Paul neither emphasizes the Mosaic Law nor the


305. Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric in Its Contexts, 246.
ethical role of πνεῦμα. Instead, the emphasis is on obedience and slavery to God and to righteousness in order to attain eternal life.306 More striking is the fact that in chapters 5–7, the section that deals with ethics (unlike Gal 5:13–6:10), πνεῦμα play only a minor role (5:5; 7:6). What is of interest in Romans is that Paul significantly re-interprets the place of πνεῦμα, and its connection with ὁ νόμος. In 8:1–17, the role of πνεῦμα is no longer in opposition to the observance of the Mosaic Law; rather, πνεῦμα is in opposition to the “law of sin and death.” He asserts, “for the law [ὁ γὰρ νόμος] of the Spirit of life [τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς] in Christ Jesus freed you from the law [τοῦ νόμου] of sin and death” (8:2). Paul views πνεῦμα as “the Law of the Spirit of life,” and places it in a direct contrast with ὁ νόμος (cf. 7:6), referring not to the Mosaic Law, but to “the law of sin and death.” While the first ὁ νόμος (8:2a) is a reference to the Mosaic Law but “fulfilled” in the Law of Christ (cf. 7:14; 10:1–4)—as such we can say that the Mosaic Law remains the “material norm”307—the second ὁ νόμος (8:2b) refers to “the law of sin and death,” and leads to death (see 5:13, 20; 7:7, 23, 25). We shall see in the next section that this law is associated with σάρξ, that law which Paul also refers to as “another law” (ἕτερον νόμον, 7:23).308


308. Not everyone holds this position. For example Fitzmyer (Romans, 131; also Hultgren, Romans, 297) claims that Paul employs ὁ νόμος in a metaphorical sense, as a principle; in the first instance of ὁ νόμος refers to “the Spirit” (God’s own life-giving Spirit) and the second ὁ νόμος to sin and death (not the Mosaic Law). Matera (Romans, 190–91) follows Fitzmyer. However, Dunn (Romans 1–8 [WBC 38; Dallas, Tex.: Word Books, 1988], 1:416–17) argues that both instances of ὁ νόμος refers to the Mosaic Law. Against Dunn, Byrne (Romans, 242) asserts that in view of 7:4 (“you, my brothers, were put to death to the Law through the body of Christ”) and 7:6 (“but we were released from the Law, having died to that in which we were held”), it is difficult to see how Paul could have conceived the Law as the agent of the liberation. For Byrne, Paul has already expanded the sense of ὁ νόμος in 7:21–23. For a good discussion on this issue, see Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 519–27.
“Law of the Spirit of life” is the Mosaic Law “fulfilled” in the Law of Christ (Gal 6:2), in Romans referred as “the Law of πνεῦμα” (8:2), “the Law of God” (7:25; 8:7), and “the Law of πνεῦμα” (8:2), a topic discussed below.

Πνεῦμα and the Gospel of Christ

As in his other genuine letters, the figure of Christ and his gospel (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον) are central elements in Romans, and Paul inherently links it with πνεῦμα. The connection of πνεῦμα with the gospel of Christ is shown (1) in the letter’s thanksgiving, when Paul presents to the Roman believers his plans to visit Rome and expresses his eagerness to preach the gospel there (1:8–15), and (2) in his last remarks concerning the description of his mission as an apostle to the Gentiles (15:16–19). Significantly, he tries to emphasize the close association between the Spirit of God with Christ’s gospel, in a similar way he understands that the Spirit of God (πνεῦμα θεοῦ) is the Spirit of Christ (πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ, 8:8–9; cf Ezek 36:27). Indeed for Paul, “the gospel of God” (1:1, 9; 15:16) is also “the gospel of Christ” (15:19), or “the gospel of the Son of God” (1:9).

The gospel of Christ is crucial to live virtuously; Paul writes, quoting the prophet Isaiah (53:1): “how beautiful the feet of the ones proclaiming the gospel, [which are] good things” (10:15). He shows the gospel and God’s πνεῦμα as two fundamental principles in order to have lives pleasing to God, and that is what Paul preaches (15:1–13; cf. 8:8). For instance, that Paul is able to worship God (1:9)—a true expression of both his monotheism


310. Matera, Romans, 195.
and his virtues (1:8–32)—derives only from God’s πνεῦμα and the gospel of His Son. It is no wonder then why Paul feels so eager to preach with his own mouth the gospel [of Christ] also to the believers in Rome (1:15; cf. 15:15).\textsuperscript{311} The gospel in the power of πνεῦμα leads not only to virtues, but brings salvation (σωτήρια) to all those—Jews first and Greeks also—who have faith (1:16; 10:8).\textsuperscript{312} What is key for Paul in terms of his ethical discourse is that the teachings of the gospel of Christ in πνεῦμα’s power is expanded to everybody, so that all believers in Christ receive salvation, the final goal of the believer’s life.

For Paul, obeying the gospel requires the virtue of faith (cf. 10:16), faith in the Lord Jesus who was raised by God, who will also save them (10:8). Therefore, faith in Christ goes hand in hand with both the gospel and πνεῦμα. In fact for Paul, “the gospel of the Son of God” or “the gospel of Christ” (1:9; 15:19) is “the word of faith” (10:8), “the word of Christ” (10:17). Paul makes the gospel of Christ “his own” when he states, “according to my gospel through Jesus Christ” (2:16), and “according to my gospel and the proclamation of Jesus Christ” (16:25). Paul identifies “my gospel” with Christ in order to emphasize that the gospel he preaches is no other than the gospel of Christ. Significantly, Paul also parallels “my gospel” (2:16; 16:25) with “my πνεῦμα” (1:9), thus linking πνεῦμα with τὸ εὐαγγέλιον (of Christ).\textsuperscript{313} Even more significant is the fact that Paul calls the gospel of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
  \item In Romans, Paul's gospel, which is the proclamation of Jesus Christ, is according to the revelation (ἀποκάλυψις) of a mystery kept in secret for long times (16:25). This mystery (the gospel) has been manifested to the Gentiles according to God through Jesus Christ.
  \item Cf. Hultgren, \textit{Paul's Letter to the Romans}, 72. The expression “Jews first and Greek also” is puzzling (see also 2:9–10). Hultgren interprets as a reference to “all people,” and the word πρῶτον (first) means a priority of preaching the gospel to the Jews. What is at stake for Paul is that although salvation is universal, the place of the Jews in God’s plan of salvation history is still crucial, for God does not break His promise (9–11). Cf. Schreiner, \textit{Romans}, 62.
  \item Rom 1:9 is a complex use of πνεῦμα. Fee (\textit{God’s Empowering Presence}, 485) states
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Christ “the gospel of God,” and he does that at the beginning and end of the letter, thus forming an *inclusio* (1:1; 15:16). In both passages, Paul identifies himself as a slave (δοῦλος) and a servant (λειτουργός) of Christ, and shows Christ Jesus as the “content” of the gospel of God. Paul’s identification of the gospel of Christ as “the gospel of God” connects the special relationship of the gospel with “the Law of God” (7:25; 8:7), the Mosaic Law “fulfilled” in the love commandment, a topic that will be treated below.

Πνεῦμα as the opposite of the Flesh (Σάρξ)

in Paul’s Letter to the Romans

In Romans, Paul deals with the contrast of πνεῦμα and σάρξ in chapter 8 (8:1–17; see also 2:29), the section that contains the largest amount of Spirit material in Romans. However, while in Galatians the sharp contrast is between πνεῦμα and σάρξ (5:13–6:10), and also with the observance of the Mosaic Law,314 in Romans, the contrast takes a different direction, one in which the role of πνεῦμα changes significantly (8:4–13, 17). Paul’s re-definition of the contrast is illustrated in three ways: (1) the contrast between πνεῦμα and σάρξ; (2) the contrast between “the mind of σάρξ” and “the Law of God;” and (3) the contrast between “letter” and πνεῦμα.

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that “chief reference is anthropological and that Paul is referring to his own spirit as the location or means of his divine service.” But, we can assume from the content of the letter, especially his view of his call to preach the gospel of Christ/God that it also refers to God’s πνεῦμα dwelling and dynamically acting in his own heart/spirit (also 8:16).

314. Those who are empowered by πνεῦμα and those who are circumcised and observe the Law (Gal 3:1–5; 3:13–14; 4:8–10); those who are freed from the Law and those who are under the Law and are slaves to the elements of the world (5:2–6, 18). Cf. Tobin, *Paul’s Rhetoric in Its Contexts*, 278.
The Contrast between Πνεῦμα and Flesh (Σάρξ)

The term σάρξ appears in Romans 25 times,315 and Paul treats πνεῦμα as the opposite of σάρξ in 5 instances (8:4, 5, 6, 9, 13).316 The notions of “walking according to πνεῦμα” (8:4; Gal 5:16), “living according to πνεῦμα” (8:5, 13; Gal 5:25), being “in πνεῦμα” (8:9), and being “led by πνεῦμα” (8:14; Gal 5:18) are contrasted with “living according to σάρξ” (8:5, 12–13). But, unlike Galatians, Paul develops these contrasts in a context where he is not dealing specifically with ethical conduct (see chs. 5–7); in chapter 8, he re-interprets the role of πνεῦμα (8:1–17). Therefore, whereas in Galatians, the main role of πνεῦμα is clearly “ethical” (5:13–6:10), here in Romans, the role of πνεῦμα is oriented toward the “eschatological hope.”317 Paul presents two possible ethical attitudes of life by distinguishing the eschatological consequences of walking “according to σάρξ” and “according to πνεῦμα.” Paul asserts that “the righteous requirements of the law” are only fulfilled in the believers who “walk not according to σάρξ, but according to πνεῦμα” (8:4; cf. 8:9).318 This is followed by two statements (8:5, 6) in which the contrast between πνεῦμα and σάρξ is re-stated. In the first statement, he explains, “for the ones who [live]

315. 1:3; 2:28; 3:20; 4:11; 6:19; 7:5, 18, 25; 8:1 [e.g., mss A, D1, Ψ], 3 [3x], 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12 [twice], 13; 9:3, 5, 8; 11:14; 13:14. In Romans, Paul uses the term σάρξ to refer to physical body or human existence (1:3; 2:28; 9:3–8; 11:14), to sinful or evil inclination linked with sin/vices (6:19; 7:5, 14–25; 13:14).

316. Byrne, Romans, 244; Branick, Understanding Paul and His Letters, 260.


318. In Romans, Paul uses the verb περιπατέω (to walk) 4 times to speak of the way of life expected of the believers (6:4; 8:4; 13:13; 14:15). See Schreiner’s discussion (Romans, 405), where he argues that with the use of the participle περιπατοῦσιν (walking) the activity and obedience of the believers is intended (chs. 7–8). However, obedience not to the Mosaic Law, but to the Law of πνεῦμα, so that the believers conduct their life in the “newness of life” (6:4), “by πνεῦμα” (8:4), and “in love” (14:15).
according to σάρξ think about the things of σάρξ, but the ones [who live] according to πνεῦμα think about the things of πνεῦμα” (8:5). For Paul, “the things of σάρξ” (τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς) refers to vices and “the things of πνεῦμα” (τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος) refers to virtues.319 A good example about the “things of σάρξ” (vices) is shown at the beginning of the letter when Paul describes his view of monotheism (1:18–32).320 Here, he associates σάρξ with “impiousness and unrighteousness” (1:18), with sins like idolatry, polytheism (1:22–23, 25), sexual immorality (1:24), and homosexual practices (1:26–28). All of these practices (τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς) and other vices and sins (1:29), are contrasted with monotheism: the worship to the true God in πνεῦμα, in the gospel of Christ (1:9), and the true knowledge of God or proper worship of God (1:21, 28). As idolatry is associated with vices and death, monotheism is related with virtues and knowledge of God. In the second statement, Paul unfolds the fundamental nature of both σάρξ and πνεῦμα when he writes, “The mind of σάρξ is death, but the mind of πνεῦμα is life and peace” (8:6).321 Unlike πνεῦμα’s nature, which produces virtues that give “life” and peace, σάρξ’s nature leads directly to “death.” Indeed, he tells the Roman believers that “if you live according to σάρξ, you are destined to die; but if by πνεῦμα you put to death the practices of the body, you will live” (8:13; cf. 8:12). The ethical consequences of those “who are in σάρξ” and thus “not capable of

319. Cf. Hultgren, *Paul’s Letter to the Romans*, 301. Matera (Romans, 194) overlooks the ethical aspect of the contrast between σάρξ and πνεῦμα when he argues that Paul is making a distinction of two “realms” to which believers are oriented: the realm of σάρξ, which belongs to the material and perishable (earthly world), and the realm of πνεῦμα (God’s πνεῦμα), which belongs to the imperishable and immortal Spirit (heavenly world).

320. See the discussion in chapter two.

321. Although Matera’s argument is correct when he notes that in 8:6, “Paul means the flesh’s fundamental orientation” and God’s life-giving Spirit’s orientation, he overlooks the ethical emphasis of 8:6. See Romans, 194.
pleasing God” (8:8) is ultimately death (condemnation). As in his other letters where Paul contrasts πνεῦμα (virtues) and σάρξ (vices), he does this in a way that πνεῦμα and virtues are often related to the mind (νοῦς). That is, both πνεῦμα and virtues hold in their nature qualities that belong to the νοῦς.322

For Paul, God’s πνεῦμα, which has been “poured out” in the believers hearts (5:5), “dwells” in the believers, who are justified through faith at baptism (6:3; 13:14),323 as such they are no longer in σάρξ, but in πνεῦμα.324 So, the believers who have God’s divine πνεῦμα abiding in them (8:9, 11) and are guided by it and not by σάρξ (8:9, 11) not only obtain “sonship” through their baptism and in the power of God’s divine πνεῦμα (11:8; cf. 8:16; Deut 29:3; Isa 29:10; 6:9), but also are capable to live ethical lives (8:14) by doing τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος and avoiding τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς. In Romans, Paul reaffirms two important ethical realities in the believers’ life: (1) that they presently live in πνεῦμα, and (2) that they have received Christ’s πνεῦμα, that is God’s πνεῦμα, at their baptism. Now, the Roman believers know not only that they have a life in freedom to “walk according to πνεῦμα,325 but also that they are “not in σάρξ” (vices), the way of “ruin and misery” (3:16). Therefore, with the expression to “walk in the newness of life” (6:4)—a language that not only echoes 7:6; 8:2, and 8:4, but also Gal 6:15, “new creation”—Paul encourages them to act virtuously

322. This idea is expanded in chapter nine.


324. Schreiner, Romans, 395.

in the power of πνεῦμα (cf. 8:26). The following table shows the contrast between two opposites, which are connected with πνεῦμα and σάρξ.

Table 27. Contrasts in Romans Related to Πνεῦμα and Σάρξ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Πνεῦμα</th>
<th>Σάρξ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Circumcision of the heart 2:29</td>
<td>Circumcision of the letter 2:29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good things (virtues) 3:8</td>
<td>Bad things (vices) 3:8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Observance of the Law (circumcision) 3:20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walking according to πνεῦμα 8:4–5</td>
<td>Walking according to σάρξ 4:1; 8:4–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Righteousness 6:16</td>
<td>Death 6:16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Law of God 7:22; 8:7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Law of the mind 7:23</td>
<td>The law of sin 7:23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The mind of πνεῦμα 8:6, 27</td>
<td>The mind of σάρξ 8:6–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvation 8:13; 10:10</td>
<td>Death 8:13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One crucial point to emphasize is the fact that Paul does not classify the Mosaic Law under σάρξ. Unlike his radical view of the Law in Galatians, in Romans, he intentionally disassociates the Mosaic Law from σάρξ (vices) and the law of sin and death. It also demonstrates his positive view of the Mosaic Law as a whole, when he uses the language of “law” in connection with πνεῦμα.

*The Contrast between “the Mind of Σάρξ” and “the Law of God” (8:7)*

The contrast between “the mind of the flesh” and the “the Law of God” is another way in Romans Paul works out the contrast between πνεῦμα and σάρξ set up in Galatians. According to Paul, σάρξ cannot be associated with the Law of God because σάρξ in its own nature is “enmity to God” (8:7–8). Indeed, whereas πνεῦμα is connected with God and Christ, and with righteousness (virtue), σάρξ is connected with “the law of sin and
death” (8:2; 7:25), but with “the slavery of corruption” (8:21), but not with the Mosaic Law (3:31; 7:12). As in his other letters, Paul sometimes speaks of σάρξ as referring to the physical human body (σῶμα), but more often, he speaks of σάρξ as the sinful condition of human nature in which sinful inclinations reside (e.g., 6:19; 7:5, 18, 24; 8:3a; 9:8). Then, σάρξ’s nature, described as “the mind of σάρξ,” becomes intrinsically associated with wickedness and vices that derive from sin.

But when Paul speaks about “the Law of God” (see also 7:25), he directly associates it with πνεῦμα (the Spirit of God and of Christ). For Paul, πνεῦμα’s nature is holy (1:4; 5:5; 9:1; 15:16), as Fee argues, in most cases, his emphasis on πνεῦμα as holy carries with it ethical implications for the believers, who live indwelt by it and live empowered by the holy πνεῦμα. In this sense, God’s πνεῦμα is the source of holiness, righteousness, and virtues. Because of the holy nature of πνεῦμα, Paul identifies “the Law of God” with “the Law of πνεῦμα” (8:2). However, “the Law of God” is not the Mosaic Law, but it is a kind of “law” identical with “the Law of πνεῦμα,” also referred as “the Law of faith” (3:31). As Tobin notes, in Romans the role of πνεῦμα becomes “lawlike,” a Law of πνεῦμα; although πνεῦμα is not an “aid” in observing the Mosaic Law, it is an “aid” in observing “the Law of God.” Therefore, this Law is the key to freedom from the observance of the Mosaic Law (cf. 2:25–29; 4:9–12), the Law that overpowers the “things of the flesh” (τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς),

326. As Fitzmyer (Romans, 489) points out, the mind of σάρξ (the earth-minded human beings) refuses to observe God’s Law (to please God); thus hostility to God becomes open transgression of the Law (cf. 8:8), which ultimately is transgression of the Law of πνεῦμα.


328. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 593.

and leads believers to virtues, righteousness and sanctification (6:19; cf. 8:10), and to the avoidance of vices. Paul is emphatic in his re-interpretation of the role of πνεῦμα when he assures the Roman believers that their reception of πνεῦμα at their baptism and their receiving “Sonship” (8:15, 23) or their becoming “children of God” (8:21; 9:8) enable them to experience the “first fruit(s) of πνεῦμα” (ἀπαρχή, 8:15–23). But since Paul connects πνεῦμα with “law,” a “Law of πνεῦμα,” the “fruit(s)” of πνεῦμα mean nothing other than the practices of virtues in the power of “the Law of πνεῦμα.” The following list shows the virtues and vices that appear in the letter:

Table 28. List of Virtues and Vices in Romans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virtues</th>
<th>Vices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ἀγαθόν (good)</td>
<td>ἀδικία (injustice, unrighteousness) 1:18, 29, 2:8, 3:5, 6:13, 9:14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀγάπη (love)</td>
<td>ἀκαθαρσία (impurity) 6:19 :1:24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἰδιόν (holiness)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀλήθεια (truth)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀνοχή (forbearance, patience)</td>
<td>ἀμετανόητος (unrepentance) 2:5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀπλότης (generosity)</td>
<td>ἀνελεήμων (merciless) 1:31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>γνώσις (knowledge)</td>
<td>ἀνομία (lawless deeds) 6:19 :4:7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>δικαιοκρισία (just judgment)</td>
<td>ἀπειθής (disobedient) 15:31 :1:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>δικαιοσύνη (justice, righteousness)</td>
<td>ἀνομία (lawless deeds) 6:19 :4:7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀρσενοκοίτης (male homosexual)</td>
<td>ἀρσενοκοίτης (male homosexual) 1:26, 27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

330. Paul makes several references to ἀπαρχή (e.g., 1:13; 6:21, 22; 7:4, 5; 15:28).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virtues</th>
<th>Vices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>εἰρήνη (peace) 1:7; 2:10; 3:17; 5:1; 8:6; 14:17, 19; 15:13, 33; 16:20</td>
<td>ἀσέβεια (impiety) 11:26 ;5:6 ;4:5 ;1:18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐλεος (mercy) 15:9 ;12:8 ;11:31</td>
<td>ἀσέλγεια (wantonness, debauchery) 13:13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐλπίς (hope) 4:18; 5:2, 4–5; 8:24; 12:12; 15:4, 13</td>
<td>ἀδυνατος (unloving) 1:31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἐπίγνωσις (knowledge) 10:2 ;1:28</td>
<td>ἀσύνετος (unwise, foolish) 1:31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ζῆλος (zeal) 10:2</td>
<td>ἀσυνθετος (treacherous) 1:31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἰλαρότης (cheerfulness) 12:8</td>
<td>δόλος (deceit) 1:29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>καλός (good, noble) 12:17 ;14:21 ;7:16</td>
<td>εἰδωλολατρεία (idolatry) 2:22 ;25 ,3:23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χαρά (joy) 32 ,15:13 ;14:17</td>
<td>ἐκδίκησις (vengeance) 12:19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μακαρισμός (blessedness) 4:6–9; 14:22</td>
<td>ἐπιθυμία (desire, lust) 13:14 ;7:7 ;1:24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μακροθυμία (patience) 2:4</td>
<td>ἔρις (strife, contention) 13:13 ;1:29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>μετάνοια (repentance) 2:4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>οἰκτιρμός (compassion) 12:1</td>
<td>ζῆλος (jealousy) 13:13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>παράκλησις (encouragement) ;12:8 15:4–5</td>
<td>θεοστυγής (hateful to God) 1:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σοφία (wisdom) 11:33</td>
<td>κακία (evil, malice) 1:29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σπουδὴ (diligence, earnestness) 12:8</td>
<td>κακοθεσία (maliciousness) 1:29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ύπομονή (endurance) 5 ;2:7:3–4; 15:5</td>
<td>κατάλαλος (slanderous) 1:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φιλαδελφία (brotherly love) 12:10</td>
<td>κλέπτης (thief) 2:21; 13:9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φιλοξενία (hospitality) 12:13</td>
<td>κοίτη (sexual immorality) 13:13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φρόνιμος (prudent, sensible, wise) 11:25</td>
<td>κόμος (carousing) 13:13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χρηστότης (kindness) 2:4; 11:22</td>
<td>μοιχός (adulterer) 13:9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>όργη (anger, wrath, vengeance) 2:5, 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ὀρεξίς (desire, lust) 1:27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>παράβασις (transgression) 2:23; 4:15; 11:11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are three important points worth noting in Romans: (1) the list shows that most of the virtues find their opposite in the list of vices; (2) similar to Galatians, there are more vices listed than virtues; and (3) the most important virtues mentioned are justice/righteousness and faith, and goodness.

**The Contrast between “Letter” and Πνεῦμα**

On one occasion Paul speaks of πνεῦμα as the opposite to the “letter” (γράμμα) when he writes, “one is a Jew who is one inwardly, and real circumcision is of [the] heart in πνεῦμα not [in the] letter [γράμματι], whose praise is not from human beings but from God” (2:29).\(^{331}\) In “the newness of πνεῦμα” and according to the gospel, the physical practice of

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\(^{331}\) Paul’s statement echoes what Jeremiah writes, “I shall put my Law within them; I shall write it in their hearts” (31:33), and Ezekiel, “I shall place my spirit within you and cause you to walk by my statutes” (36:27). According to Stephen Westerholm (“‘Letter’ and ‘Spirit’.” NTS 30 [1984]: 229–48, esp. 236, 239), the word “letter” in 7:27 refers to the possession of God’s commandment in written form, and in 7:29 refers to circumcision in a physical, external form. Thus, the term γράμματα refers concretely to the demands of the Mosaic Law, which Jews were bound to obey, but in fact resulted in a “bondage” to the law of sin and death. Πνεῦμα, however, refers to God’s πνεῦμα which has replaced the obligation to the laws of the Mosaic Law: the result is righteousness and life. Cf. Fitzmyer, Romans, 323; Matera, Romans, 76–77.
circumcision—the “oldness” of the letter—is no longer necessary; so, “real” circumcision is of the “heart” in the Law of πνεῦμα. This Law has renewed the believers’ hearts, so that they now are capable to do God’s will, something that the “letter” itself could not provide (cf. 8:3).

Similar to his argument in Galatians (chs. 3–4), Paul relates the “letter” (the observance of the Mosaic Law) with “a spirit of slavery” (πνεῦμα δουλείας, 8:15) and not with “a spirit of sonship” (πνεῦμα υἱοθεσίας, 8:15), for πνεῦμα dwelling in the believers testifies that they are truly “children of God” (8:16; see also 8:21, 23; cf. 8:14). The phrase “a spirit of slavery,” however, refers not to the Mosaic Law as in Galatians, but to a state in which believers are dominated by σάρξ in “the slavery of corruption” (τῆς δουλείας τῆς φθορᾶς, 8:21). They, according to Paul, are those who “live according to σάρξ” and are destined to die (8:13; cf. 7:5). Therefore, Paul’s statement that the believers “are released from the law” through baptism in Christ, expresses the notion that now they may live (and walk) in the “newness of πνεῦμα” and not in the “oldness of the letter” (7:6; 6:4). This new

332. For a brief discussion about this topic, see chapter two.

333. Matera, Romans, 77.

experience in πνεῦμα is a “free gift” (χάρισμα; δώρημα) in which the believers receive sonship to cry “Abba, Father” (8:14–15; cf. 8:21) in God’s grace through Jesus Christ.

In a similar way to Galatians, Paul writes, “the righteousness of God337 is revealed in it from faith to faith as it has been written, ‘the righteous will live by faith’” (1:17; Gal 3:11; Hab 2:4; Gen 3:11). Concerning Paul’s view of δικαιοσύνη,338 four important points are worth noting: (1) righteousness is the “righteousness of God” (1:17; 3:21, 25–26; 10:3); (2) to become righteous, faith (in Christ) is the key virtue (1:17; 3:22, 25–26, 28, 30; 4:3, 5–6, 24; 5:1–2; 9:30, 33; 10:4; cf. 4:23; 16:26); in fact he calls faith “the righteousness of faith” (10:6); 336

335. As in the letter to the Corinthians, the language of “free gift” (χάρισμα; δώρημα) in Romans is generally associated with πνεῦμα. It appears in the letter 6 times (1:11 [spiritual gifts]; 5:15, 16; 6:23; 11:29; 12:6). Fee (God’s Empowering Presence, 32–35) argues that χάρισμα is an almost exclusively Pauline word in the New Testament. Although in its own the word has little to do with πνεῦμα, it often relates to special manifestation and activities of πνεῦμα; for such reason, χάρισμα is generally translated as “gracious gifts of the Spirit” or “spiritual gifts.” A difficult passage, however, is 12:6, where Paul speaks of “having χαρίσματα differing according to the grace that has been given to us.” Here, χαρίσματα is linked with the word χάρις (grace), which is the root word for χαρίσματα. The problem with this passage, according to Fee (God’s Empowering Presence, 34), is that in the narrow context Paul does not allude to πνεῦμα (12–14); therefore, χαρίσματα as “spiritual gifts” is not a proper interpretation. Yet, some still argue on the basis of the broader context of the letter (e.g., ch.8) that πνεῦμα is assumed to lie behind 12–14; thus, χαρίσματα in 12:6 can be understood as “spiritual gifts.” In this argument, however, χάρισμα is understood as a “free gift” that is closely related to the dynamic work of πνεῦμα within the believer’s heart; it is a gift that derives from God’s πνεῦμα.

336. This is the second instance in which Paul addresses to God as Abba, Father (see Gal 4:6), in which he re-states that it is God’s πνεῦμα who testifies the believers’ status as God’s children (8:16).


(3) righteousness is not through the observance of the Mosaic Law (3:20–21, 28; 4:5; 9:31; 10:4–5) but through Jesus Christ (3:24–25; 5:1–2, 9, 17–19; 6:5, 7; 9:33; 11:36); and finally, (4) righteousness leads believers to salvation and includes both Jews and Gentiles, who have faith in Christ.339

The virtue of δικαιοσύνη is associated with the goal of life (τέλος):340 salvation/eternal life/kingdom of God.341 Paul claims, “the goal [τέλος] of the law is Christ [resulting in] righteousness [δικαιοσύνην] to everyone who believes” (10:4; see also 6:22; 6:19).342 As Christ has been raised, the expectation is that the believers will also (6:5; 10:9; 14:8–9); indeed, they are eagerly waiting in hope (8:24–25; 12:11), for their salvation


340. Paul often associates the language of τέλος—which refers to salvation—with glory (2:7, 10; 3:7; 4:20; 5:2; 6:4; 8:18, 21, 30; 9:4, 23; 11:36; 15:6, 9; 16:26) and grace (1:5, 7; 3:24; 4:4, 16, 20; 5:2, 15, 17, 20; 6:1, 14, 15; 11:5; 12:3; 15:15; 16:20). Once Paul rhetorically shows grace as the contrast of the Law (6:15). Also, for him, the gift of salvation is very much linked to “the calling of God” a theme that is emphasized throughout the letter (e.g., 1:6; 8:28, 30; 9:12, 24–26; 10:12, 14; 11:5, 29). See also the theme of election (11:7, 28).


342. Tobin ("Romans 10:4 Christ the Goal of the Law," 272–80) points out that the meaning of the term τέλος in this 10:4 is ambiguous. The major question is whether τέλος refers to the end of the Mosaic Law. In other words, is Christ the “end” of the Law? Or does it mean that Christ is the “goal” of the Law, so that the Law does not lose its validity? Or does τέλος mean that Christ is the “completion” or “consummation” of the Law? In his argument, Tobin concludes that if Christ were the “end” of the Mosaic Law, then, the testimony of the Law to Christ would have no weight. Thus, τέλος in this context means “goal” rather than “end;” Christ is the goal of the Law for the righteousness of the believers who have faith, a righteousness that is continued not through the observance of the Law but through faith in Christ.
is nearer than what they believe (13:11). What is at stake for Paul is that with Christ's death humanity has been crucified with him, and as a result, σάρξ (the body of sin) is no longer effective to serve sin (6:6). They have died to σάρξ in order to live for God like Christ lives to God (6:10). In the power of πνεῦμα, they now “walk in the newness of life” (6:4), a conduct that is pleasing to God (8:9; 12:1–2; 14:18; 15:16, 27, 32). In Romans, the role of πνεῦμα becomes also closely connected with the τέλος (the eschatological hope). Paul writes, “the kingdom of God is not eating and drinking but [it is] righteousness, peace, and joy in the holy πνεῦμα [ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ]” (14:17). Paul emphasizes the notion that true righteousness, thus salvation, does not come from dietary regulations, but from faith in Jesus Christ in the holy πνεῦμα. For Paul, It is ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ that the believers will be guided to the eschatological resurrection of the body and eternal salvation (5:9; 8:11, 23–24), and they will be “conformed to the image or likeness of God's Son, Christ” (συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ νόον αὐτοῦ, 8:29).

343. Although salvation for Paul is nearer, it is still a thing of the future. However, what is important to Paul is that the Roman believers understand that their salvation has been guaranteed by the indwelling of πνεῦμα in them. Cf. Fitzmyer, Romans, 682.

344. Cf. Fitzmyer, Romans, 697.

345. In Romans, Paul speaks of both present (or realized) and future eschatology. In terms of the former he expresses, for example, “we are now crucified with Christ” (6:6), “present yourself to God as raised from the dead to life” (6:13), “we are no longer in the flesh but in the Spirit” (8:8), the “mystery held in secret in past ages is now being revealed” (16:25–26), “the kingdom of God is... a matter of justice, peace, and the holy Spirit” (14:17). But he also speaks of the future eschatology; for example, he urges “our salvation is nearer... the night is advanced, the day is at hand” (13:11), “as in the day” (2:16). Cf. Branick, Understanding Paul and His Letters, 282–83.
The Relationship of Πνεῦμα to the Practice of Virtues, Especially the Love Commandment in Paul’s Letter to the Romans

We have seen that in Romans, Paul emphasizes the “Law of πνεῦμα” (ὁ νόμος τοῦ πνεῦματος, 8:2; cf. 7:14), sometimes referred as the “Law of faith” (3:27), the “Law of God” (7:22, 25; 8:7), the “Law of the mind” (7:23), and perhaps the “Law of righteousness” (9:31?). It is this Law—ὁ νόμος τοῦ πνεῦματος—that Paul connects with both (1) the virtue of love and (2) the love commandment, as we shall see next.

The Law of Πνεῦμα and Love

In Romans, the love commandment, or the Law of Christ (Gal 5:14; 6:2), is described in terms of a threefold expression of love: the love of πνεῦμα, the love of God, and the love of Christ. The practice of the ὁ νόμος τοῦ πνεῦματος is what gives life of righteousness to the believers (8:10). So Paul urges the Roman believers “not to be lazy in zeal, but be ardent in the Spirit, serving the Lord, rejoicing in hope, enduring in tribulation, and persevering in prayer” (12:11). This new way of life by the “Law of πνεῦμα” is what truly allows them to

346. The phrase νόμον δικαιοσύνης is an unusual expression in Paul, since he does not use it elsewhere. The most convincing argument is offered by Hultgren (Paul’s Letter to the Romans, 378; see also Fitzmyer, Romans, 578), who argues that the “Law of righteousness” is to be taken in a way of life in which a believer pursues the “Law of righteousness,” or the “Law that teaches justice/righteousness.” That is, the believer’s way of life conforms all of life to the Law, a Law that demands justice/righteousness and by observing it is the means to achieve it. Similarly, in 8:4, Paul speaks of “the righteous requirement of the Law.” Some scholars (See Schreiner, Romans, 407), however, have argued on the bases of Gal 5:14 and Rom 13:8–10 that 8:4 is an indirect reference to the “Law of love,” a Law that fulfills the whole of the Mosaic Law. See also Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 537.

347. It is difficult to know what Paul exactly means with the phrase τῷ πνεύματι ζέοντες. It can be translated “be ardent in πνεῦμα,” “be aglow with πνεῦμα,” or “be ardent in [one’s own] spirit.” While some take πνεῦμα as the human spirit, it is probable that is refers to God’s πνεῦμα. As Fee (God’s Empowering Presence, 612) argues, Paul often refers to πνεῦμα’s activity (e.g. ch.8), and there is a parallel between τῷ πνεύματι ζέοντες and τῷ κυρίῳ δουλεύοντες (serving the Lord). Cf. Hultgre, Paul’s Letter to the Romans, 455–56.
live in the “newness of πνεῦμα” (7:6). Paul’s emphasis on the “Law of πνεῦμα” is such that he directly associates it with the virtue of love (ἀγάπη) when he exhorts the believers at the end of the letter, “Now I urge you brothers through our Lord Jesus Christ and through the love of the Spirit [διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης τοῦ πνεῦματος] to strive together with me on the prayers on my behalf before God” (15:30). As Paul speaks of “the love of πνεῦμα,” he also speaks of “the love of God,” when Paul writes, “the love of God [ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ] has been ‘poured out’ [ἐκκέχυται] in our hearts through the holy Spirit [πνεύματος ἁγίου] having been given to us” (5:5). According to Paul, God himself has shown his love to a sinful humanity (5:8) by sending His Son (8:3), and also by “pouring” his love in the believers’ hearts through πνεῦμα (5:5). In return, believers are called to love God (8:28). Likewise, Paul speaks of “the love of Christ;” a love that has been truly manifested in his “dying on a cross” (8:37). To this love (his self-giving) Paul refers when he writes, “who will separate us from the love of Christ” (8:35). What comes to light in Romans is that Paul not only treats πνεῦμα as a “Law,” but he also links the Law of πνεῦμα with the virtue of love (the love of πνεῦμα). In Paul’s thought, the “Law of πνεῦμα” is like a “law” very much related to the love commandment (13:8–10, 15:14; 15:2), and not to the Mosaic Law. As in Gal 6:1–10, he exhorts the Romans believers to “work the good to everybody [παντὶ τῷ ἐργαζόμενῳ τῷ ἀγαθόν], Jews and Greeks” (2:10), but while in Galatians Paul emphasizes love to one another in the community, in Romans, it is expanded also to the

348. This is the final mention of πνεῦμα in Romans, and only here Paul speaks of the “love of πνεῦμα.”

349. See also 5:8; 8:35, 37, 39; 9:13, 25; 11:28. Paul, according to Branick (Understanding Paul and His Letters, 262), consistently incorporates the theme of the love of God into his understanding of universal salvation (5–8), especially into his understanding of the role and place of Israel (11:28).
God and Christ are the examples of the indiscriminate and true love, and on this “universal” commandment of love and πνεῦμα stands “the Law of God,” which is also the Law of πνεῦμα. It is in this Law that Paul is convinced that nothing will be able to separate all those who believe “from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord” (8:39).

The Law of Πνεῦμα and the Love Commandment

In Romans, the love commandment is the “fulfillment” of the Mosaic Law (13:8–10). He writes, “owe nothing to anyone, except love one another; for the one who loves another has fulfilled [πεπλήρωκεν] [the] law” (13:8). All the commandments are fulfilled in this word, “you shall love your neighbor as yourself” (13:9; cf. Lev 19:8). Paul’s statement re-affirms his statement in Galatians (Gal 5:14), but the negative view of the Mosaic Law is gone. The Mosaic Law is fulfilled, but Paul still recognizes that the Law has a place in God’s revelation. His exhortations, “walk according to πνεῦμα” (8:4) and “walk according to ἀγάπη” (cf. 14:15), show that “the Law of πνεῦμα” is “the love commandment,” and also identical with “the Law of God” (8:7). It is in this Law that Paul urges the believers to conduct their lives virtuously (12:9; 13:8–10; 14:15; 14:21; 15:2); indeed, those who practice love, the supreme virtue for Paul, are “full of goodness” (15:14; cf. 9:11). It is also this “Law of love” that is closely tied to the gospel of Christ, as Paul speaks of “proclaiming the gospel of good things” (10:15). He shows that there is no other law that leads believers to virtues and the avoidance of vices. In view of the love commandment, Paul also exhorts the Roman believers: “let love be genuine, abhorring the evil, clinging to the good” (12:9; cf. 12:17), “do not be conquered by evil but conquer the evil in the good” (12:21), and “do

350. Paul makes various ethical exhortations in regard to love: for example, he urges humility and love within the community (12:3–8), love to all, even to enemies (12:9–21), submission to civil authority (13:1–7), and love toward the weak (14:1–15:6).
the good and you will have praise from it” (13:3). In these practices, they will experience the ethical transformation by the renewing of their mind through the power of πνεῦμα, so that, they will prove what the will of God is (12:2).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has shown the complexity of Paul’s use of the concept of πνεῦμα in his seven undisputed letters, and the different ways the central role of πνεῦμα is emphasized in his ethical discourse. In first Thessalonians, πνεῦμα is holy and is of God (God’s holy πνεῦμα), an essential definition in the inherent relationship of πνεῦμα with ethics that Paul later frames in Galatians (5:13–6:10). Since the figure of Christ is so central, living the gospel of Christ in God’s holy πνεῦμα leads believers to imitation of Christ, a key ethical element that Paul later expounds in his other letters. Love is the main virtue, and is reciprocal; it was given (taught) by God, and in response the believers at Thessalonica are to love Him and love one another. This love is primarily expressed in the virtue of brotherly love, which is not only practiced among the members of the community of believers, but also it expands to all living in Macedonia. In first Thessalonians, pleasing to God requires believers to have His holy πνεῦμα, and to live according to, and in power of, the teaching of the gospel, which is of Christ and of God.

It is in Galatians, however, that Paul really formulates for the first time the framework of the central role of πνεῦμα in his ethics (5:13–6:10), especially the principal function of πνεῦμα in the acquisition of virtues and the avoidance of vices. Paul re-interprets two major components in his ethics—the Mosaic Law and the role of πνεῦμα—that are carried out in his other letters, and finally revised in Romans. Paul shows that it is through the Spirit of God’s Son that the Galatian believers attain righteousness
and not from the observance of the Mosaic Law. With Christ’s πνεῦμα and his gospel, the understanding of the ethical life of the Galatian believers is re-described in a new dimension in which the whole of the Mosaic Law is “fulfilled,” rather than “observed,” in the love commandment or the Law of Christ.

Describing the new ethical life of the believers, Paul sets the Mosaic Law in direct opposition to πνεῦμα and to righteousness. The Mosaic Law is contrasted with πνεῦμα in a way that he associates the former with a “yoke of slavery,” “slavery to sin,” and with “the elements of the world,” and the latter with “freedom,” and “slavery to God and to righteousness.” Paul also establishes a sharp contrast between πνεῦμα and σάρξ. In this contrast, Paul expands the meanings of both terms: πνεῦμα now plays an ethical role by being connected with virtues; and σάρξ is not simply associated with the human spirit and the human body, but also with vices, sinful deeds, and passions. Walking in πνεῦμα or being led by πνεῦμα characterizes virtues, and walking according to σάρξ defines the life in vices. What is pleasing to God is not the observance of the Mosaic Law, but the virtuous and holy life derived from “the fruit” of πνεῦμα, a new ethical life that leads believers to righteousness, and thus, eternal life/kingdom of God. As Paul attempts to focus on the believers’ virtuous and holy life, he establishes a new dimension in terms of πνεῦμα and the virtue of love. This is what Paul calls “a new creation” lived in and through the love commandment or the Law of Christ based on his gospel.

In first Corinthians, the role of πνεῦμα structured in Galatians is highlighted in various forms. In the letter, πνεῦμα is described as “holy” and “of God,” and “one” and the “same” πνεῦμα. This πνεῦμα (God’s holy πνεῦμα) is Christ (the rock), who as the “last Adam” becomes “a life-giving πνεῦμα.” The virtuous life of the Corinthian believers, as
in first Thessalonians, depends on both God’s holy πνεῦμα and the gospel of Christ (the
wisdom of God) manifested in power and πνεῦμα (πνεῦμα’s power). The gospel of Christ
(and of the cross) comes to be expressed in “the commandment of the Lord.” The different
spiritual things or/and the free gifts—essentials in the communal life of the Corinthian
believers—are manifestations of the community’s κοινωνία as one body of/in Christ,
rooted in the “same” and “one” πνεῦμα and in the gospel of Christ.

Furthermore, Paul in first Corinthians uses the word πνεῦμα to show the
virtuous qualities of the spiritual believers who have πνεῦμα, contrasting that with σάρξ;
although the contrast of living in πνεῦμα and walking in σάρξ is not strong as we find
in Galatians. One virtue, which Paul qualifies as the greatest, eternal virtue, is love. In
his ethical discourse, the virtue of love embodies in itself all the other virtues and gifts,
and encompasses all things (πάντα), in terms of doing everything in love and in terms of
enduring, hoping, and bearing/covering everything (πάντα).

In second Corinthians, πνεῦμα is God’s power, is holy and also the Spirit of the
living God and of faith. These attributions given to πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethical discourse is
important because through and in the Spirit of the living God, which is also the πνεῦμα
of Christ, the Corinthian believers are able to see as in a mirror the glory of God through
Christ, the image of God. This supernatural and powerful act of Christ enables the
believers in the New Covenant to experience spiritual transformation into the same image
of Christ, which allows them to also experience, through the νοῦς (mind), knowledge
of God. In this “same” πνεῦμα, they also guide their ethical conduct living the gospel of
Christ, which is only received and ministered by God’s holy and living πνεῦμα.

Although in second Corinthians Paul does not make an explicit contrast between
πνεῦμα and σάρξ, πνεῦμα is often associated with the capacity of enabling believers to practice virtues and avoid vices. In Paul’s ethical discourse, virtues are described as fruits of justice/righteousness, and these fruits (virtues) are acquired through the practice of the gospel of Christ. The emphasis is especially on the virtue of love in a way that the love of God, love of Christ, and the reciprocate love among members of the Corinthian community are tied to God’s holy πνεῦμα. This threefold expression of love highlights the love commandment and the Law of Christ in Galatians.

In Paul’s letter to the Philippians, πνεῦμα is presented as the Spirit of God and the Spirit of Christ. The role of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse is shown especially in its association with the role of Christ and his gospel. As in his other letters, the gospel of Christ contains the lessons that lead to a virtuous and holy life. Paul sees himself as an example of seeking virtues living the gospel of Christ, as he exhorts the Philippian believers to be imitators of him. In his ethical discourse, Paul associates πνεῦμα with virtues, and σάρξ only indirectly with vices. Also, the virtue of love is closely linked with the gospel of Christ; significantly, the letter’s ethical teaching is founded on Christ’s example of love, his becoming flesh, his dying on a cross, and in his πνεῦμα.

In Paul’s letter to Philemon the word πνεῦμα, which appears only once, refers to the human spirit. The content of the letter, however, reflects the active role of πνεῦμα in Paul, Onesimus, Philemon and his household. It is in God’s πνεῦμα dwelling and acting in Paul that he is driven to appeal for Onesimus’ freedom. It is also in God’s πνεῦμα that Philemon preaches the gospel, and he and his household are examples of living the gospel. Likewise, it is in God’s πνεῦμα that Onesimus works as an instrument for preaching the gospel. In the letter there is not a contrast between πνεῦμα and σάρξ; in fact, only several
The virtue of love is highly emphasized; they preach and live the gospel out of love. Paul’s appeal is made out of love, as well as his love for Onesimus is greatly expressed in the letter. What Philemon would do for Onesimus—take him as “more than a slave, as a brother”—would be also for the sake of the gospel and out of love.

In the letter to the Romans the role of πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethical discourse is revised, so that his view of πνεῦμα in relation to the Mosaic Law is significantly shifted. Paul shows πνεῦμα as the Spirit of God and the Spirit of Christ, and Paul identifies this πνεῦμα as holy. However, the role of πνεῦμα is not exclusively ethical as in Galatians; rather, its role is directed toward the eschatological hope. In this context, he presents his preaching of the gospel, which is both the gospel of Christ and the gospel of God, as coming in God’s power and in His holy πνεῦμα. As he presents his gospel to the Roman believers, the ethical role of the gospel is emphasized; the gospel, which is also the gospel of God’s Son, works dynamically in unison with God’s holy πνεῦμα to produce a virtuous and holy life. This dynamic work is explained by Paul in terms of “the Law of πνεῦμα,” which is “the Law of God.” Although the Mosaic Law is incapable to provide believers an ethical life, in the letter, he emphasizes the nature of the Mosaic Law, its goodness and its holiness. He corrects the negative statements he made previously in Galatians by showing that πνεῦμα is not in opposition to the Law. That is, it is no longer about freedom from the Law, but freedom from the law of sin and death; it is no longer slavery to the Law, but slavery to God and to righteousness in order to attain eternal life.

Likewise, continuing the contrast of πνεῦμα and σάρξ, in Romans, shows two eschatological consequences in terms of “walking according to πνεῦμα” and “walking according to σάρξ.” The former the things of πνεῦμα (virtues) and the latter reflects the
things of σάρξ (vices). Life in πνεῦμα leads to salvation, and life in σάρξ leads to death; thus, πνεῦμα represents the newness of life in the Law of πνεῦμα (the Law of faith/Law of God/Law of the mind), and σάρξ represents the law of sin and death. These two opposites, using πνεῦμα/virtues and σάρξ/vices, are also illustrated in terms of “the law of God” and “the mind of σάρξ,” the former associated with πνεῦμα, righteousness and sanctification, and the latter with slavery and corruption. The Law of πνεῦμα associated with the virtue of love is described by Paul as “the love of πνεῦμα” rooted in both the love of God and the love of Christ. This Law of love is the fulfillment of the Mosaic Law (love commandment) on which the believers walk according to πνεῦμα, and are conformed to the image or likeness of God’s Son.

In all the seven genuine letters, πνεῦμα’s role is associated with the practice of virtues and the avoidance of vices. Although the presentation of his ethical discourse derives from his dealing with each of the community’s situation, problems, and needs, the three aspects of Paul’s understanding of the concept of πνεῦμα show that each letter reflects πνεῦμα’s central role in his ethics in different ways: (1) πνεῦμα is tied with the virtue of love; living in love towards God/Christ and towards others is effective only in πνεῦμα; (2) πνεῦμα is intrinsically associated with Christ and his gospel, and not the observance of the Mosaic Law; (3) having πνεῦμα is crucial for becoming righteous and holy; indeed, πνεῦμα confers virtues and helps avoid vices; (4) πνεῦμα is linked with faith in Christ; (5) πνεῦμα is related to the newness of life or/the new creation; (6) living in πνεῦμα is living in the love commandment or the Law of Christ; (7) πνεῦμα effects spiritual transformation, so that the believer becomes one with Christ, or transformed
into Christ—this is the goal of Paul’s ethical discourse; and (8) πνεῦμα leads to salvation/eternal life/kingdom of God.

All these (ethical) qualities attributed to πνεῦμα originate in God Himself; Paul qualifies the concept of πνεῦμα as holy and divine (God’s πνεῦμα). But the most significant factor in Paul’s ethical discourse, as we shall see in chapter nine, is that by defining πνεῦμα as the Spirit of Christ, and thus, connecting closely the gospel of Christ together with the virtue of love, the nature of this concept changes. The principal role of πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethics is centered in the figure of Christ (God’s Son). The Greek concept of πνεῦμα through Christ enters into a new sphere, a spiritual one, which empowered by God’s power embodies the whole and perfect divine dimension. God’s πνεῦμα has the power of transforming the believers’ human reality into a spiritual, holy, virtuous, and perfect and eternal (and transformed) being, qualities that belong to the realm of the divine. We will see in chapter seven and eight that the essential goal effected by God’s holy πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethical discourse is configured—yet in some way and to some degree—within the parameters of both Hellenistic Judaism and Greek philosophical tradition. Like Philo, Paul will depart from these two traditions in his attempt to highlight the role of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse.
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE HELLENISTIC JEWISH TRADITION IN
PAUL’S UNDERSTANDING OF ΠΝΕΥΜΑ

Introduction

Chapter six has shown the various ways Paul treats πνεῦμα as a central concept in his ethical discourse. This chapter now explores the use of πνεῦμα in Paul’s Hellenistic Jewish heritage, and fleshes out how Paul’s understanding of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse has been influenced, directly or indirectly, by some of this Hellenistic Jewish tradition. As with Philo, the analyses of this chapter will highlight two important points: (1) on the one hand, Paul’s understanding of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse is rooted in the Hellenistic Jewish tradition of the Greek-speaking Diaspora; (2) and on the other, Paul’s intentional and consistent connection of πνεῦμα with his own conviction about Christ and his gospel set him apart from the Hellenistic Jewish tradition. This chapter, therefore, illumines the level of influence of the Hellenistic Jewish tradition on Paul’s use of πνεῦμα, particularly, in his ethical discourse, and how his characteristic view πνεῦμα moves beyond this tradition. It is worth noting that not all the Hellenistic Jewish authors studied in Philo (chapter four) use the concept of πνεῦμα, and those who employ it, do not give πνεῦμα an ethical meaning. As a result, the literature selected in this study are the LXX, Aristobulus, the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs, Wisdom of Solomon, 4 Maccabees, and the Sibylline
Oracles. Also, important to mention is that the language found in these texts (except the LXX) about πνεῦμα is not reflected in a major way in Paul; nevertheless, the points reflected cannot be neglected, and rightfully find a place in this study.

Πνεῦμα in the Ethical teaching of the Septuagint (LXX)

In the LXX, the word πνεῦμα is often used as the translation for the Hebrew word רוח (wind). Isaacs points out that “of 378 occurrences of רוח in the Hebrew Old Testament, 277 appear in the LXX as πνεῦμα. These include all the various uses of the word to be found in Hebrew: breath, wind, life principle; human disposition, mood, thought or determination, and the Spirit of God.” As in Paul, the word πνεῦμα in the LXX is also

1. In the Letter to Aristeas and Pseudo-Phocylides, the concept of πνεῦμα does not appear; though in the latter the verbal form appears in reference to θεόπνευστος or the divinely inspired speech (sentence 129). In Josephus’s writings, the concept of πνεῦμα appears, but he never correlates πνεῦμα with ethical conduct as Paul does. In Josephus, πνεῦμα is employed in various forms, similar to the uses in the Jewish Scripture. The concept of πνεῦμα is used to speak of “the divine Spirit” (e.g., A. J. 4.107–118; 6.166, 401–410; 10.239) and “the Spirit of God.” (e.g., A. J. 4.119; 6.22–23; 8.114). Josephus also attributes God’s Spirit the qualities of “might” and “power” (see also B. J. 2.138 [Slavic addition]), and shows πνεῦμα as a source of understanding or wisdom (A. J. 10.239). Cf. age, The Holy Spirit, 286–89. As in the LXX, Josephus speaks of πνεῦμα as “wind” (A. J. 2.343, 349; 8.346; 9.36, 210; 10.279; 12.75; 14.28; 15.17, 20, 62), “air” (B. J. 4.477) and “breath” (A. J. 1.127; 3.291; 17.169), and he associates πνεῦμα with creation (A. J. 1.127). Πνεῦμα likewise is linked with the “principle of life” (A. J. 11.240), and “the spirit of man” (A. J. 1.34; 3.260; 11.240), and in some instance πνεῦμα denotes human emotion (B. J. 3.92). See Isaacs, The Concept of Spirit, 150–52. What is characteristic about Josephus is the tendency that he generally associates the possession of “the Spirit of God” or “the divine Spirit” with prophecy (see especially A. J. 4.108, 118, 119–20; 6.166, 222–23; 8.408), that is, there is a strong correlation between God’s Spirit and prophecy, but as Bieder (“Josephus,” in Friedrich, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, 6:375) notes, Josephus never uses πνεῦμα of God for the Spirit of inspiration. In Paul, we have seen that prophecy is a gift of the πνεῦμα of God.

2. Isaacs, The Concept of Spirit, 10–11. She notes that of the 117 instances of רוח meaning “wind” in the Hebrew, 65 are rendered πνεῦμα by the Greek translators, and in other 52 cases the alternative word άνεμος is employed. The LXX employs common Greek usage regarding πνεῦμα as a synonymous term for άνεμος (e.g., Job 13:25). When רוח means “breath,” it is also translated πνεῦμα (e.g., Isa 25:4). However, sometimes it is rendered άνεμος (e.g., Jer 5:13), and in other occasions, πνοή (e.g., Isa 38:16; Ezek 13:13; Prov 1:23) or θυμός (e.g., Job 15:13; 6:4; Zech 6:8; Ezek 39:29) is employed. The fact that the alternative Hebrew word for breath (רוח) is also translated
employed for the human spirit (e.g., Isa 19:3; 26:9; 27:8; Sir 38:23; Ezek 3:14; 21:7; 1 Macc 13:7; Wis 15:16; Susanna 44–46), and also for evil spirits (e.g., Isa 19:14), a use not found in Paul’s seven undisputed letters. But, the uses of πνεῦμα in the LXX expand beyond these; similar to the Stoic view, as we shall see in chapter eight, πνεῦμα is associated with creation (κόσμος), that is, πνεῦμα as a “cosmic spirit” constructs and fills the world and holds it together (e.g., Judith 16:13–14; see also Sir 24:3). According to Cage, the expression πνεῦμα θεοῦ (the Spirit of God) in the LXX is borrowed from the Jewish Scripture. Thus, πνεῦμα is used for almost all “the Spirit of God” passages in the Jewish Scripture. Indeed, with the phrase “the Spirit of God” or “the divine Spirit” (θεῖον πνεῦμα, e.g., Ezek 11:24), Isaacs claims, the LXX introduced a new dimension, a religious one, into the usual Greek understanding of πνεῦμα.

In terms of the use of πνεῦμα as an ethical concept in the LXX several passages

πνεῦμα (e.g., 3 Kgdms 17:17; Dan 5:23) indicates that the LXX applies πνεῦμα to mean breath, as is viewed in the translation of Isa 38:12, where the association of breath with life is evident. See also Cage, The Holy Spirit, 160–61; Friedrich Baumgärtel, “πνεῦμα, πνευματικός,” in Friedrich, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, 6:367–68; Burton, Spirit, Soul, and Flesh, 141–46, 153–54.

3. As Isaacs (The Concept of Spirit, 12, 17) points out concerning “the human spirit,” it is important to note that the tendency of the LXX is not to apply πνεῦμα to the human spirit. Indeed, it is Paul who develops the use of πνεῦμα with reference to the “spirit of man,” and largely to the “Spirit of God.” Cf. Burton, Spirit, Soul, and Flesh, 188.

4. The use of the concept of πνεῦμα in reference to evil or demons is only found in Eph 2:2; 6:12; 1 Tim 4:1.

5. E.g., Isa 34:16; 42:1; 44:3; 48:16; 57:16; 59:21; 63:10 [his holy Spirit], 11 [his holy Spirit], 14; Ezek 36:27; 37:14.

have been pointed out by scholars.7 In this study, these passages, together with some others, are analyzed in light of Paul’s understanding of πνεῦμα as the primary concept in his ethical discourse. The book of Wisdom of Solomon and 4 Maccabees will receive their own separate treatment as in Philo.

In the LXX, especially in the books translated from Hebrew, the word πνεῦμα is mainly associated with the eschatological renewal of God’s people and the land of Israel.8 There are four ways in which the eschatological πνεῦμα reflects somewhat Paul’s view of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse. (1) In Paul, at the Coming of the Lord (the Parousia), God’s holy πνεῦμα gives the righteous believers eternal life; in the LXX, however, it is πνεῦμα that will cause the resurrection of the people of Israel at the eschatological time. God through πνεῦμα—in Paul, it is God through Christ in πνεῦμα—will bring them back to life again at the last time (Ezek 3:14; see also 2 Macc 7:23; 14:46). As in Paul, πνεῦμα in the LXX is life, and in God’s power, is able to confer [eternal] life (Ezek 1:20–21; 10:17; 37:5, 14). Therefore, in the LXX, God’s πνεῦμα is directly related with salvation (Isa 34:16).

(2) In Paul’s ethical discourse, God’s holy πνεῦμα enables the believers an ethical conduct that is pleasing to God (e.g., Rom 8:2, 8:8–9, 11). In the LXX, God’s πνεῦμα is an

7. Associating the relational and the ethical work with the Spirit, Rabens (The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul, 163–66) examines Ezek 36:25–28. He claims that it is “one of the most central passages of the S/spirit in the Hebrew Bible.” This passage, according to Rabens, speaks about God’s cleansing of Israel and her (anthropological) renewal, and the promising of the giving of God’s Spirit. Philip (The Origins of Pauline Pneumatology, 53–98) examines passages from the LXX (Ezek 36:26; 37:1–14; Isa 32:9–20; 44:1–5; Joel 3:1–2; Wis 1:6–7; 7:7, 22–25; 9:17; and 4 Macc 7:13–14), and argues that in the Jewish Scripture the Spirit is the power of Israel’s eschatological transformation; the Spirit is a sign and an agent that enables people to live according to the commandments. In Wisdom, we will see that the author replaces the Spirit with σοφία, but the Spirit is still viewed as an internal principle of the human and moral life.

eschatological gift, and its primary role is “to wash away the filth of the sons and daughters of Sion” and “cleanse the blood from their midst by a spirit of judgment and a spirit of burning” (Isa 4:4; cf. 11:14; 30:28). The role of πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethics—acting dynamically in the believers’ ethical life to promote virtues and avoid vices—alludes to the language of “washing away” and “cleansing” from impurity. However, in Isaiah, it is not explicitly ethical, rather eschatological; since it refers to Sion being purified—that is, Israel’s people being cleansed from sins—by a spirit of judgment and of burning at the eschatological time (see also 1:25–28). But, the significance in relation to Paul is that God’s πνεῦμα has the role of “purifying” and “cleansing” from impurity (sins).

Similar to Paul, in the LXX, it is also God’s holy πνεῦμα (Sir 38:23; Isa 42:1; 44:3; 63:11) which fills the individual’s inner being (Sir 39:1–11; Isa 11:3; cf. Isa 32:15; Prov 15:4), dwells in the people (Ezek 36:27), and guides God’s people “to make their name glorious” (Isa 63:14). Unlike Paul, the ethical character in the LXX lies rather on the association of God’s holy πνεῦμα with the ordinances or the Law. God’s holy πνεῦμα enables Israel and its descendants to live according to God’s commandments; indeed, according to Ezek 36:27, God’s πνεῦμα causes to obey God’s ordinances. Ezekiel writes:

> I will give them another heart, and I will impart a new Spirit in them, and I will draw forth the heart of stone from their flesh, and I will give them a heart of flesh so that they might walk by my ordinances and keep my statutes and perform them, and they shall be for me as a people, and I will be a God for them (11:19:20).

Similarly, later in the passage Ezekiel writes, “throw away from yourselves all your impieties that you committed against me and make for yourselves a new heart and a new Spirit” (18:31). Obedience to God’s ordinances are the way to righteousness on the land;
God’s commandments, in God’s πνεῦμα dwelling in “mortals,” teach discernment and wisdom (Job 32:7–8; Sir 39:6–10; cf Isa 11:4). They are the path of the pious (righteous), “the light upon the earth” (Isa 26:9). In the LXX, the role of God’s πνεῦμα is also to bring judgment, condemnation (e.g., Isa 28:6; see also 11:3–4), and blessing (Sir 39:6). Those who follow God’s ordinances (the pious ones) learn righteousness, which is defined as “truth” (ἀλήθεια), and receive God’s blessings. Contrary to the pious, those who do not learn righteousness on earth (the impious ones), have come to an end, because they do not perform truth (Isa 26:10).

(3) Another important aspect reflected in Paul’s use of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse is that in the LXX God’s holy πνεῦμα is sometimes linked with virtues. A good example is found in Isa 11:2: “the Spirit of God shall rest on him, the Spirit of wisdom and understanding, the Spirit of counsel and might, the Spirit of knowledge and godliness.” In the LXX, God’s holy πνεῦμα has the “power” to produce ethical transformation (see also Isa 32:17–18),10 which is a new life (Ezek 37:2–24) experienced by those upon whom God “pours out” (ἐκχεῶ) His holy πνεῦμα (Joel 2:28–29; Isa 44:3; Rom 5:5).11 As in Paul, this

10. It is important to note that in the LXX, the term “power” does not appear in direct association to the role of God’s πνεῦμα in ethics. However, only in God’s power, the holy πνεῦμα of God enables transformation, and also give life.

11. cf. Ezek 39:29; Sir 39:6. The verb “to pour out” (ἐκχεῶ) is often used in the LXX referring to the indwelling of πνεῦμα; however, the language of God sending His πνεῦμα is also present in Judith 16:13–14. The question is whether the outpouring of the Spirit is only upon the Jewish people or it also includes Gentiles; that is, whether the meaning of “I will pour my Spirit upon all flesh” (Joel 2:28–29; see also Ezek 39:29) has, for example, a universal meaning or it is limited to Israel. While in certain passages the outpouring of God’s πνεῦμα is exclusively upon Israel, for example in Sir 39:1–11—to be filled with the Spirit of understanding is clearly a reward for the few—only some receive the Spirit of understanding (see also Ezek 36:26–27; 37:1–14). Other passages such as Isaiah (32:9–10; 44:1–5) can be interpreted as universal outpouring of πνεῦμα (cf. Joel 3:1–5). Like in Paul, the reception of πνεῦμα ends divisions between Jew and Gentile (Rom 5:5), male and female, slave and free, in Joel πνεῦμα also ends social inequalities.
virtuous life is “a sign of the new age” brought about by God’s holy πνεῦμα;¹² however, unlike Paul who emphasizes the virtue of “faith” and baptism for the reception of God’s holy πνεῦμα, in Joel, “repentance” (μετάνοια) is what brings about ethical transformation at the eschatological time (2:12–14). Therefore, obeying the instructions of God’s Law (Sir 39:1–8), that is, living according to its teaching is the key to repentance, because being filled with God’s holy πνεῦμα empowers one to perform wondrous deeds (Sir 48:12–14).

(4) Furthermore, in the LXX, a divine quality is given to πνεῦμα, that is, the quality of “knowing the hidden mysteries” (Sir 39:1–11; 48:22–25; Dan 4:6), an expression emphasized by Paul in his ethical discourse (e.g., 1 Corinthians). In a way, both the LXX and Paul attribute the ability to know God’s mysterious knowledge to the holy πνεῦμα (e.g., 1 Cor 14:25). For instance, in the LXX, πνεῦμα is associated with the “Spirit of understanding” (πνεῦμα συνέσεως, Isa 11:2; Exod 31:3), the “Spirit of wisdom” (πνεῦμα σοφίας, Exod 31:3), and the “Spirit of knowledge” (πνεῦμα ἐπιστήμης, Susanna 63; Exod 31:3), and in Paul with the “knowledge of God” (e.g., 2 Cor 2:14; 4:6; 10:5) and the “wisdom of God” (1 Cor 2:6–7). The significance of this association lies in the fact that in both (Paul and the LXX) one of the primary effects of God’s πνεῦμα is to give or reveal God’s knowledge. The LXX associates this “hidden knowledge,” like Paul, with prophecy and visions (Dan 4:6; Joel 2:28–29; Sir 48:12–14, 22–25; Ezek 37:9),¹³ but Paul also links this knowledge with the gospel of Christ, and the power of God. The LXX speaks of the “Spirit

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¹³. According to Cage (The Holy Spirit, 162), also Isaacs (The Concept of Spirit, 13), in the post-exilic Judaism, the phrase “the holy Spirit” began to be used as a technical term for God’s Spirit inspiring prophecy and other extraordinary actions.
of wisdom” (Exod 31:3) and the “Spirit of might” (Sir 48:24) as references to prophetic abilities. In Paul, however, the work of πνεῦμα in the prophetic and visionary levels is described as free gifts (χαρίσματα) and manifestations of God's holy πνεῦμα in the community of believers (see 1 Cor 11:21–31; 12:4–11; 14:2–25). Therefore, it can be said that Paul's use of πνεῦμα parallels in part the LXX's use of πνεῦμα in that in both prophecy and visions derive from God's holy πνεῦμα.

In the LXX we find notions concerning πνεῦμα that significantly parallel Paul's understanding of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse. The Jewish Scripture shares with Paul some notions of the important role played by πνεῦμα in ethics. Πνεῦμα, when referred to God's πνεῦμα, is divine and holy (God's holy πνεῦμα). This πνεῦμα is closely associated with God's power, the eschatological promise of God's πνεῦμα, the giving of [eternal] life, the knowledge of the hidden meanings or mysteries, as well as prophecy and visions. Also, πνεῦμα (God's holy πνεῦμα) in the LXX, is linked with cleansing, repentance, and ethical guidance, and also leads to the eschatological transformation into a new life. This new life entails a life of virtues, but intellectual types of virtues: wisdom, piety, knowledge, and counsel (e.g., Isa 11:2). However, in the LXX, unlike Paul, these virtues and everything that God's holy πνεῦμα generates is tied to the observance of God's ordinances (the Mosaic Law); in fact, the commandments contain the teachings and instructions for acquiring a

14. According to Cage, the “Spirit of wisdom” and the “Spirit of might” may not involve necessarily God's holy πνεῦμα, at least as far as explicit the statements go. See Cage, The Holy Spirit, 172, 161, 164. He explains that the phrase “spirit of God” simply may be “a stylistic variant of ‘the Spirit of God,’” and may refer to “a gift from God, but not God's Spirit itself.” However, his argument has no further clarification. Concerning the phrase “spirit of might” in Sir 48:24, he points out that it “could very well be simply might, or an aspect of power. It cannot be determined here whether it refers to a spirit being or an aspect.”

clean and pure heart and avoid impiety and sins. What is important to note is that while it is true that the LXX shares with Paul some important notions about πνεῦμα, in his ethical discourse, he gives πνεῦμα a central place that moves beyond the use of the Jewish Scripture, as chapter six has shown.

Πνεῦμα in Aristobulus

The word πνεῦμα in Aristobulus appears only twice, in fragments 2 and 4. However, only one of these (fragment 2) corresponds to Paul’s use of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse. According to Eusebius, Aristobulus writes, “consequently, those who have keen intellectual abilities [νοεῖν] are amazed at his [Moses] wisdom [σοφίαν] and the divine Spirit [τὸ θεῖον πνεῦμα], in virtue of which he has been proclaimed as a prophet [προφήτης] also” (fragment 2, 8.10.4). This text does not speak particularly about ethical exhortation; rather, it is a reference about Moses’ extraordinary words and his superior knowledge. It is the work of the divine πνεῦμα to make Moses a prophet, and through πνεῦμα’s inspiration he is able to have the intellectual abilities that amaze his people.

What we take from fragment 2 is Aristobulus’ association of the divine πνεῦμα (θεῖον πνεῦμα) with the intellect, wisdom, and also prophecy. The first two, νοεῖν (a quality), and σοφία (an intellectual type of virtue), are related to the νοῦς, similar to what we will find also in 4 Maccabees. Paul, similarly, links the divine πνεῦμα with σοφία and δύναμις (e.g., 1 Corinthians) and also with νοῦς, as well as with the immaterial, incorruption, eternality, and immortality. The linking of πνεῦμα with prophecy in Paul is

16. See Aristobulus, fragment 2 (Eusebius, Praep. ev. 8.10.4) and fragment 4 (Eusebius, Praep. ev. 13.13.5).

17. In fragment 4, 13.13.5, Aristobulus speaks of the ruler of all, Zeus, who “holds the reigns of the winds [πνεῦματα] in their flight over the sky and watery stream.”
shown especially in first Corinthians. He speaks of prophecy as a “gift” (χάρις), when he associates πνεῦμα with the spiritual believers (πνευματικοί). For Paul, it is also through God’s holy πνεῦμα that the believer receives the gift of prophecy (1 Cor 12:10–11, 28–29; 14:37). Likewise, his ability to advise the Corinthian believers is only possible through the inspiration of God’s holy πνεῦμα (1 Cor 7:25, 40). Although fragment 2 does not contain ethical exhortation, without a doubt, Aristobulus and Paul, both Hellenistic Jews, converge at one point: the view that God’s πνεῦμα is divine (πνεῦμα θεῖον), and the association of πνεῦμα with prophecy and things divine (e.g., νοῦς).

Πνεῦμα in the Ethical Exhortation of the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs (T12P)

The term πνεῦμα appears in all the Testaments, and it is generally used in two ways: first, to speak of “the Spirit of God,” as is often employed in the Jewish Scripture, and second, to describe two attitudes of conduct (two πνεύματα). In 3 instances, πνεῦμα is referred as the “πνεῦμα of God,” and is directly associated with virtues and holiness (T. Simeon 4.4; T. Benjamin 8.3; 9.3). Πνεῦμα is also linked with knowledge, when it is identified as “a Spirit of understanding [πνεῦμα συνέσεως] from the Lord” (T. Levi 2.3; see also 18.7, cf. 8.2). When the testaments use the plural πνεύματα (spirits), it is not to describe the primary role of πνεῦμα in the ethical exhortation of the Patriarchs. Instead, πνεύματα is used to show two ways of life or two different attitudes or impulses of the human will: good (virtues) and evil/bad (vices). These two opposite ways are explained by two different sets

18. E.g., T. Reuben 2.1–3.9; 5.3; T. Simeon 3.1, 4; 4.4, 9; 5.1–2; 6.6; T. Levi 2.3; 3.2–3; 4.1; 9.9; 18.7, 12; T. Judah 13.3; 14.2, 8; 16.1; 20.1–5; 24.2–3; 25.3; T. Issachar 4.4; 7.7; T. Zebulon 9.7–8; T. Dan 1.6–8; 2.1, 4; 4.5; 5.5–6; T. Naphtali 2.2; 3.3; T. Gad 3.1; 4.7; 5.9; 6.2; T. Asher 1.9; 6.2; T. Joseph 7.2; T. Benjamin 3.1–8; 4.5; 6.1; 8.1–3; 9.3.
of spirits within a person, and they appear in several forms in the Testaments, as shown in table 29.

Table 29. Two “Kinds” of Spirits in the *T12P*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Spirit Associated with Good</th>
<th>The Spirit Associated with Evil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The spirit of truth <em>T. Judah</em> 20.1, 5</td>
<td>The spirit of error <em>T. Judah</em> 20.1; <em>T. Simeon</em> 6.6; <em>T. Judah</em> 14.8; <em>T. Issachar</em> 4.4; <em>T. Zebulon</em> 9.8; <em>T. Asher</em> 6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven other spirits <em>T. Reuben</em> 2.1–3.9</td>
<td>Seven spirits of deceit <em>T. Reuben</em> 2.1–3.9; <em>T. Simeon</em> 3.1;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Spirit of understanding and sanctification <em>T. Levi</em> 18.7</td>
<td>The spirit of jealousy and pretentiousness <em>T. Dan</em> 1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Spirit of love <em>T. Gad</em> 4.7</td>
<td>The spirit of anger <em>T. Dan</em> 1.8; 2.1, 4; 4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Spirit <em>T. Benjamin</em> 4.5</td>
<td>The spirit of falsehood <em>T. Dan</em> 2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spirit of grace <em>T. Judah</em> 24.3</td>
<td>The spirits of sexual promiscuity and of arrogance <em>T. Levi</em> 9.9; <em>T. Judah</em> 14.2; <em>T. Dan</em> 5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The spirit of hatred <em>T. Gad</em> 3.1; 6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Four evil spirits: desire, heated passion, debauchery, and sordid greed <em>T. Judah</em> 16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The spirit of envy and promiscuity <em>T. Judah</em> 13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The wicked spirits <em>T. Levi</em> 18.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The spirit of deceit <em>T. Judah</em> 25.3; <em>T. Zebulon</em> 9.7; <em>T. Dan</em> 5.5; <em>T. Benjamin</em> 6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The evil spirit(s) <em>T. Simeon</em> 3.5; 4.9; 6.6; <em>T. Asher</em> 1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The spirit(s) of Beliar <em>T. Levi</em> 3.3; <em>T. Issachar</em> 7.7; <em>T. Zebulon</em> 9.8; <em>T. Dan</em> 1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The invisible spirits <em>T. Levi</em> 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wondering spirits <em>T. Naphtali</em> 3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As the list shows, unlike in Paul, the word πνεῦμα is often used in connection with evil spirits. In the Testaments, “spirit(s)” have no special relevance to the Spirit of God. They simply represent two contrasting ethical attitudes: good vs. evil, similar to what one finds in the doctrine of the Two Ways in Zoroastrian literature and the Dead Sea Scrolls (e.g., 1QS 3.13–4.26), where God is the creator of all “spirits,” “man’s spirit,” “good spirits,” “evil spirits,” and “spirits” as forces in the cosmos. These “spirits” can act in various contexts as well as within the individual. Although important topics, it is not part of this present study to examine the doctrine of the Two Ways in either Zoroastrian literature or 1QS 3.13–4.26.

In the Patriarchs’ ethical exhortation, virtues and vices are described in terms of “spirits” (πνεῦματα): two spirits working within a person, each spirit trying to persuade to either virtues (the spirit of truth: good spirits) or vices (the spirit of error: evil spirits). While the evil spirits (πνεῦμα πονηρά) are in connection with Beliar or Satan (τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ βελιάρ, e.g., T. Dan 1.7; T. Joseph 7.4; T. Benjamin 3.4), the good spirits are related to “the Spirit of God” (e.g., T. Joseph 4.4). In the Testaments, having the Spirit of God leads to a virtuous and a holy life (T. Benjamin 8.1–3). In other words, the outpouring

21. For the list of virtues and vices in the *T12P*, see chapter four. Josephus also speaks of “evil spirits” (see A. J. 6.211, 214; B. J. 3.92; 7.185); he also speaks of disembodied “spirits of the wicked” (see B. J. 7.185), but he uses them not in contrast with good spirits. Josephus also uses the Greek word δαιμόνια to describe “evil spirits” (e.g., B.J. 7.185; A. J. 6.211). Isaacs (*The Concept of Spirit*, 33) argues that Josephus seems to understand δαιμόνια as the spirits of the evil departed, who can possess the living (Vita 402; B. J. 1.556), but Josephus also does not associates the πνεῦμα of God with evil spirit (see A. J. 6.166; cf. Kgdms 19.4).
of God’s \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \u03b1 \mu \alpha \) upon a person, as it is expressed 5 times in the Testaments (\( T. \) Simeon 4.4; \( T. \) Levi 2.3; \( T. \) Judah 24.2, 3; \( T. \) Benjamin 8.2), motivates or arouses “the good spirits, to practice virtues and avoid vices. So that, the person who has God’s Spirit (\( T. \) Simeon 4.4) walks in accordance to God’s decrees (\( T. \) Judah 24.3–4; see also \( T. \) Issachar 5.1).\(^{22}\)

Paul’s use of \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \u03b1 \mu \alpha \) in his ethical discourse reflects only in part one of the “two ways” of the Testaments. When Paul speaks of \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \u03b1 \mu \alpha \), it is generally in connection with either God’s holy \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \u03b1 \mu \alpha \), the \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \u03b1 \mu \alpha \) of Christ, or sometimes the human spirit, but this last is often in reference to the believer who has \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \u03b1 \mu \alpha \) (e.g., Philm 1:25).\(^{23}\) For Paul, it is God who sends His \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \u03b1 \mu \alpha \), which is holy and powerful, and as such it is associated only with goodness, righteousness, and holiness (virtues), not with evil or vices as in the Testaments (evil spirits). Therefore, in his seven genuine letters, Paul never links the Greek concept of \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \u03b1 \mu \alpha \) with evil (vices) or Satan (Beliar); even when he distinguishes two ethical attitudes or human realities (good vs. evil)—those who have \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \u03b1 \mu \alpha \) and those who do not—\( \pi \nu \varepsilon \u03b1 \mu \alpha \) is always referred to the believer who is righteous and holy (virtuous). The principle of ethical conduct of a virtuous reality of the believer is always described in terms of \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \u03b1 \mu \alpha \). Paul makes use of the term “flesh” (\( \sigma \alpha \rho \xi \)) not only to speak about the human body or human existence, but also to describe, from an ethical viewpoint, what is evil and sinful (vices), and also to speak about those who do not possess \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \u03b1 \mu \alpha \) (\( \pi \nu \varepsilon \u03b1 \mu \alpha \ vs. \sigma \alpha \rho \xi \)). In Paul’s ethical discourse, the application of \( \pi \nu \varepsilon \u03b1 \mu \alpha \) involves often virtues,

\[^{22}\text{In chapter four, we have seen that the Patriarchs exhort obedience to the commandments of God's Law.}\]
\[^{23}\text{For more examples, see chapter six.}\]
pleasing to God and doing His will, expressed emphatically in the phrase, “walk according to, in, or by πνεῦμα.”

Despite this major difference between Paul and the T12P, in both Paul and the Testaments there is an inherent relationship between “the πνεῦμα of God” and the acquisition of virtues and holiness. Indeed, in the Testaments, “the Spirit of God” is “the Spirit of sanctification [ἁγιασμοῦ],” and in Paul, God’s Spirit is “the holy [ἁγιος] Spirit.” Also, as the seven letters of Paul evince, the Testaments exhibit a strong emphasis on the relationship between God’s πνεῦμα and the virtue of love (ἀγάπη). In the Testaments, πνεῦμα is called “the Spirit of love” (T. Gad 4.7); but the exhortation to love is mainly expressed in the virtue of “brotherly love” (φιλαδελφία), which is, together with sexual morality, the major focus in the exhortations (e.g., T. Reuben 4.6–9; 8.5; T. Gad 6.2; 6.3; T. Benjamin 3.3; 4.3). Particularly in Paul’s first letter to the Thessalonians, the virtue of brotherly love is held in high esteem by Paul and the believers (see 1 Thess 1:7; 3:12–13; 4:9–12; 5:12–14). In the Testaments, however, πνεῦμα and love work by the Law of God; in fact, the virtue of love is the essence of the Law. In Paul, πνεῦμα and the virtue of love work according to the love commandment (Law of Christ). While it is true their avenues

24. Like Paul, who emphasizes the virtue of love, in the Testaments, the call to love one another is common; indeed, Joseph is a model of love, especially brotherly love (T. Joseph 17.2; T. Zebulon; T. Simeon 4.4; see also list of virtues in chapter four). Cf. Thompson, Moral Formation According to Paul, 80.

25. Thompson, Moral Formation According to Paul, 35.

26. As shown in chapter four, the exhortation to observe the “whole Law” or “all the commandments” is pervaded in the Testaments. Cf. Thompson, Moral Formation According to Paul, 35. Important to note is that, similar to Paul, in the Testaments, the observances of circumcision, Sabbath, and food laws are not emphasized. Although circumcision and food laws are mentioned only once, their observances are not encouraged.
on how to acquire virtues and holiness, and ultimately salvation, are distinct—in Paul through the love commandment/Law of Christ, and in the Testaments through the Law of God—in both Paul and the Testaments, “the Spirit of God” is the force that leads one to virtues. Whereas in the Testaments, God’s πνεῦμα is expressed in terms of “the Spirit of truth,” “the Spirit of understanding,” “the Spirit of sanctification,” “the Spirit of love,” and “the Spirit of grace,” in Paul it is in terms of “God’s holy Spirit,” “the Spirit of Christ” and “the Spirit of the Lord,” “the Spirit of faith,” and “the same and one Spirit.”

Πνεῦμα in the Ethical Exhortation of *Wisdom of Solomon*

In Wisdom,27 the word πνεῦμα appears 18 times, but only in 10 instances, does it probably refer to God’s πνεῦμα.28 There are two ways in which the use of πνεῦμα in Wisdom reflects the view of πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethical discourse:29 (1) the idea that πνεῦμα is given by God, and (2) the inherent correlation between πνεῦμα and σοφία (wisdom).

**Πνεῦμα is Given by God**

The notion that πνεῦμα is given by God is found particularly in 1:5; 2:3; 11:20; and 15:11.

For the author of Wisdom, God’s holy πνεῦμα (1:5; 7; 9:17), which is incorruptible (12:1)  

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27. It is traditionally believed that the author of Wisdom might had taken over the term πνεῦμα from either the Alexandrian teacher Erasistratos or from the idea in Gen 2:7 (πνοήν ζωῆς). See Werner Bieder, “Πνεῦμα in Wisdom,” in Friedrich, *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, 6:370.


29. There are some other parallels (non-ethical) between Paul and the book of Wisdom, which led some scholars to argue that Paul was acquainted with the book of Wisdom. For a detailed study of the parallels between Paul and the book of Wisdom, see Eduard Grafe, “Das Verhältnis der paulinischen Schriften zur Sapientia Salomonis.” *Theologische Abhandlungen* (1892): 251–86; see also Fee, *God’s Empowering Presence*, 911–13.
and powerful (11:20–21), is given by God to the individual. As in Paul, God’s holy πνεῦμα in Wisdom is “a life-giving πνεῦμα” (...ἐμφυσῆσαντα πνεῦμα ζωτικόν, 15:11; Rom 5:5),30 infused in the person’s soul. By qualifying this πνεῦμα as “uncorrupted” (ἀφθαρτος, 12:1), the πνεῦμα in Wisdom takes on an attribute belonging to the realm of the divine; indeed, πνεῦμα does not perish and lives eternally (2:3; 16:14). Whereas in Paul faith in Christ and baptism are required for the reception of God’s πνεῦμα, in Wisdom, it is through “prayer” (7:7; 9:17) that God gives Himself (His πνεῦμα) to the person. The author writes, “I [Solomon] prayed and understanding [φρόνησις] was given to me, I called on God and a Spirit of wisdom [σοφίας] came to me” (7:7). This text not only shows the association of God’s πνεῦμα with “understanding” or “practical wisdom” (cf. 1:7), and therefore, with the “intellect” (νοῦς) but also, similar to Paul (Aristobulus and 4 Maccabees), God’s πνεῦμα is closely related to “wisdom” (σοφία), as we will see next. The understanding of πνεῦμα as the “Spirit of wisdom” reflects in part Paul’s view of πνεῦμα, when he describes it as “a teacher” of God’s wisdom, and goes further to associate directly “the gospel of Christ” with “the wisdom from God” (e.g., 1 Cor 1:30).

Furthermore, in Wisdom, God’s holy πνεῦμα abides only in a righteous person, as the author writes, “a holy and disciplined Spirit will flee from deceit and depart from senseless thoughts and be ashamed when unrighteousness approaches” (1:5).31 According


31. An interesting point about the passage in Wis 1:5–8 is what John R. Levison (Filled
to the author of Wisdom, “a holy and disciplined Spirit” can lead all people in the way of wisdom (σοφία), which is the path to virtues (8:7). Interestingly, the author in 1:5 refers to God’s holy πνεῦμα as not dwelling in an unrighteous person, implying that the recipient of πνεῦμα must be already and be continuously virtuous. Previously in 1:4, the author makes an analogous statement, but this time in direct reference to σοφία, not πνεῦμα, but we will see below that for the author, πνεῦμα is wisdom (1:4–5). The author states that “wisdom will not enter a soul that plots evil, or reside in a body involved in sin.” What is significant about these passages is that the author of Wisdom, like Paul, connects πνεῦμα with virtues and disassociates it (πνεῦμα) from vices: that is, πνεῦμα leads to virtues and away from vices (7:30; 14:22; Gal 5:13–6:10). Indeed, the author’s statement in 7:27–28, “she renews all things, and in every generation, she passes into holy souls and makes [them] friends of God and prophets,” implies that it is σοφία (=πνεῦμα), which makes people righteous or virtuous. In a similar way to Paul in his ethical discourse, the author of Wisdom speaks about “walking by God’s πνεῦμα” as the “right way” to attain a life that is pleasing to God (9:18). In this regard, Philip rightly identifies God’s holy πνεῦμα in Wisdom as “an internal principle of the human and moral life.” Similar to Paul’s sharp disassociation of πνεῦμα from vices and sin, in Wisdom, πνεῦμα flees away from deceit and foolish thoughts (see with the Spirit [Grand Rapids, Michigan: W. B. Eerdmans, 2009], 144) argues. He writes, “the author has drawn an implicit association, along Stoic lines, between the spirit within a human and the spirit which fills the world. The spirit within, ‘a disciplined holy spirit’, avoids deceit, foolishness, and injustice. It corresponds to the spirit of the Lord, which is described in quintessential Stoic terms as that which ‘has filled the world’ and which ‘holds all things together’. The cosmic spirit, like a disciplined holy spirit, cannot tolerate injustice. The effect of these three references to the spirit in such rapid succession in relation to humanity, wisdom, and the cosmos is to give the distinct impression that all belong together, that all share in the same substance as pneuma, that all evince the same commitment to virtue and an abhorrence of vice.”

32. Philip, The origins of Pauline Pneumatology, 92; see also Cage, The Holy Spirit, 170.
also 1:3–5; 1:9–11), for God’s πνεῦμα cannot not find a dwelling place in these (vices/sin). While the emphasis is placed on the relationship between God’s holy πνεῦμα and a virtuous life, both Hellenistic Jewish authors disassociate evil and unrighteousness (vices/sin) from God’s holy πνεῦμα. In this respect, Tanielian states,

Those who are sincere in their faith in God and who meditate on practical virtues, are reproached by the Holy Spirit and rebuked by their conscience if they turn away from [doing] good works, because He instructs their minds to rejoice in God’s law. When the law of the flesh contradicts it and enslaves him to the law of sin, the poor man is rebuked and reproached.33

While Tanielian points to a parallel between Wisdom and Paul, both authors view the ways of righteousness (virtue) as the ways of God’s holy πνεῦμα. Only Paul, however, views the ways of unrighteousness (vices/sin) as the ways of σάρξ (πνεῦμα vs. σάρξ), and he links σάρξ with “the law of sin and death” (e.g., Rom 8:2). Interestingly, the author of Wisdom associates the ways of unrighteousness (vices/sin) with “enslavement to sin” (1:4). Whereas for the author of Wisdom, the ways of righteousness involve God’s Law (the Mosaic Law), for Paul, it is the love commandment/the Law of Christ rooted in the gospel of Christ.

Πνεῦμα and Σοφία (Wisdom)

Chapter four has shown that in Wisdom σοφία is not only involved actively in creation (7:22–24), and that she is the emanation from God and the image of God (7:24–26), but also σοφία plays the principal role in ethics. What is significant, and perhaps characteristic, in Wisdom’s ethics is the inherent association between σοφία and πνεῦμα;34

33. Tanielian, Commentary on Wisdom of Solomon, 125.

34. Scholars have already made emphasis on this important association in Wisdom. See Philip, The Origins of Pauline Pneumatology, 92; Isaacs, The Concept of Spirit, 20–22; Bieder,
this is shown especially in 1:6–7; 7:22–23; 9:17–18. For the author, σοφία is “God’s holy πνεῦμα,” “a kindly or humane Spirit” (φιλάνθρωπον γὰρ πνεῦμα σοφία, 1:6; see also 7:22), “a Spirit of wisdom” (7:7). Σοφία not only gives understanding and intellectual knowledge (7:18–19), but also has in her nature moral qualities (7:15) for ethical guidance (7:21). She by her own nature, like God’s πνεῦμα in Paul, inspires virtues, teaches moderation, prudence, righteousness, and valor; as Rabens notes, living by σοφία means living a virtuous life (see 6:18–19; 7:14; 8:7; 9:10–12, 18; 15:2). Like πνεῦμα in Paul, σοφία is depicted as the source of virtues (ἀρεταί, 8:7), including the cardinal virtues. For the author of Wisdom, the beginning of σοφία is the sincere desire for ethical instruction (7:15), based on the observance of the commandments of the Law. She is the guiding principle of ethical life as she guides people on the right path (9:18) and brings them “near” to God. She leads to the immortal life, a life of the soul in the presence of God (7:12–30). In Wisdom, σοφία is, therefore, the assurance of incorruptibility and immortality for all those who love her, and the ultimate goal of the way to salvation.

Thus, the role of σοφία in Wisdom’s ethics is somewhat similar to that of the central role of πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethical discourse. For Paul, it is πνεῦμα that confers


39. The similarities between Wisdom’s σοφία and πνεῦμα here are very much similar to the ones between Wisdom’s σοφία and Philo’s εὐσέβεια described in chapter four (see page 33).
virtues and leads to salvation, which is an eternal, immortal and incorrupt life. However, it is not through the observance of the Mosaic Law, but through the instructions and practices of the teaching of the gospel of Christ, which is also the gospel of God, established for the first time in the love commandment (Gal 5:14) or the Law of Christ (Gal 6:2), and later in Romans, re-defined as the Law of πνεῦμα and the Law of God. Also, both σοφία in Wisdom and πνεῦμα in Paul are associated with prophecy and friendship (Wis 7:27; e.g., 1 Corinthians). Whereas in Paul, God loves the one who has πνεῦμα, in Wisdom, “God loves nothing so much as the one who lives with σοφία” (7:28; 11:24). In addition, similar to the contrast between πνεῦμα and σάρξ in Paul’s ethical discourse, in Wisdom’s ethics, the contrast is between σοφία and “evil” (κακόν), as the author writes, “against σοφία evil [κακία] does not prevail” (7:30). However, once the author conceives ignorance (ἄγνοια) as the source of vices (14:22). Furthermore, the contrast in 9:13–18 in reference to σοφία is a reflection of Paul’s dualistic reference in relation to πνεῦμα (1 Cor 15:40–48, 52–54; Rom 2:7; 8:21). Both authors employ the language of material, perishable, mortal vs. heavenly, immortal, immaterial, imperishable, and incorruptible. As we shall see in chapter nine, this language is typical in emerging Middle Platonism current in the first century C.E.

Another distinguishing factor in Wisdom is that for the author πνεῦμα is σοφία, in

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40. As Cage (The Holy Spirit, 171) points out, the reason why God loves all things/all human beings is because they have God’s immortal πνεῦμα and because God’s πνεῦμα is in all living things.

41. The author of Wisdom also shows the explicit immortality of God’s πνεῦμα in 12:1 (“for thy immortal Spirit is in all things”). See also, “immortality” (ἀθανασία) in 4:1; 8:13, 17; 12:1; 15:3; 16:14; and “incorruptibility” (ἀφθαρσία) in 6:18–19; 12:1.
the sense that she has in her own nature God’s holy πνεῦμα. In Wisdom, πνεῦμα as the source of life, like σοφία, plays a cosmological role; God’s incorruptible πνεῦμα pervades or fills the world and holds all things (πάντα) together (1:7; 12:1). While the author of Wisdom attributes to both σοφία and πνεῦμα the knowledge of the world (κόσμος), the various natural sciences are only given to σοφία (7:16–22). What is interesting in Wisdom is that the same 21 attributes given to σοφία in Stoic categories (SVF 2.416) are also ascribed to πνεῦμα (7:22–24). Wisdom’s πνεῦμα receives the qualities of the Stoic λόγος/πνεῦμα; that is, πνεῦμα is intelligent, holy, unique, unpolluted, pure, … and as such, this powerful πνεῦμα, like σοφία, is oriented towards the good (virtues) and is free from vices. However, only some of the 21 epithets (7:22–24) are associated with the πνεῦμα in Paul (intelligent, holy, unpolluted, loving the good, and all powerful), and these are often connected with πνεῦμα’s primary role in his ethical discourse. Nevertheless, σοφία’s 21 attributes described in Stoic terms are more philosophically developed than Paul’s description of πνεῦμα. In addition, like σοφία, πνεῦμα in Wisdom has knowledge

42. Horn, “Wandel im Geist,” 155. Isaacs (The Concept of Spirit, 53) argues that Wis 7:22 could be interpreted as evidence of the author understanding σοφία as a being separate from God, for it implies that σοφία has a spirit. This interpretation would give a different impression from passages that speak of σοφία being a πνεῦμα (e.g., Wis 1:7; 12:1). However, 7:22 could also imply a distinction between σοφία and πνεῦμα, enhancing the idea that σοφία, like any other created being, requires πνεῦμα for its existence.

43. Cf. Bieder, “Πνεῦμα in Wisdom,” TDNT, 6:371–72. He notes that πνεῦμα shares both God’s transcendence over the world and also its participation in the events of this world. Isaac (The Concept of Spirit, 22) holds that in 1:7 and 12:1 there is an influence of Stoic thought and could be interpreted in the light of Stoic beliefs about the all-pervading nature of πνεῦμα (or λόγος), and the reference to the Spirit which “fills the whole world” and which “holds all things together” could be seen as “echoing Platonic/Stoic beliefs in the permeating, cohesive anima mundi.” Cf. Wolfson, Philo, 1:95.

and understanding (1:7; 7:7), two qualities very much emphasized in the role of πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethical discourse.

What is distinctive in Paul, however, is that πνεῦμα is not personified or “molded into flesh” as is σοφία in Wisdom (7:1, 22; cf. 1:6). In Paul, it is Christ who becomes flesh (e.g., Gal 4:4; Rom 1:3; 8:3; 9:5). Even more distinctive is the fact that Paul never describes πνεῦμα in terms of the fivefold Platonic metaphors (exhalation/breath, effluence/emanation, effulgence/reflection, mirror, image) employed for Wisdom’s πνεῦμα (7:25–26).45 However, it is true that both Hellenistic Jewish authors tie their key concepts with power; Wisdom’s σοφία is “the breath (ἀτμίς) of the power of God” and Paul’s πνεῦμα is also “the power of God.” For Paul, it is Christ who is the “image [εἰκὼν] of God” (e.g., 2 Cor 4:4) and the “wisdom [σοφία] of God” (1 Cor 1:30). It is through Christ, who is also πνεῦμα, that the believers are able to see, as in a mirror, the glory of Christ and of God; thus being transformed into the same image of Christ (see 2 Cor 3:18). So while Wisdom’s ethics show the threefold structure: God-σοφία/πνεῦμα-salvation, in Paul’s ethical discourse that threefold structure is God-Christ/πνεῦμα-salvation. The role of σοφία in Wisdom’s ethics is replaced by Christ in Paul’s ethical discourse. For both Hellenistic Jewish writers, however, the central figure—σοφία for Wisdom and Christ for Paul—has πνεῦμα (Wis 7:22; in Paul, the πνεῦμα of Christ) and is πνεῦμα (Wis 1:6; in Paul, Christ is πνεῦμα).

Πνεῦμα in the Ethical Exhortation of 4 Maccabees

Interestingly, in 4 Maccabees, the word πνεῦμα appears only twice (7:14 and 11:11). In 11:11, πνεῦμα appears twice (7:14 and 11:11). In 11:11,

45. Winston (The Wisdom of Solomon, 184–85) notes that even Philo, who is even more philosophical than the author of Wisdom, backs off from explicit terms such as effluence and effulgence, for his description of the origin of the divine λόγος.
the author writes, “in this condition, gasping for spirit/breath and suffocating in body;” and speaking about Eleazar’s old age, the author writes, “he [Eleazar] became young again in spirit [πνεῦματι] through reason [διὰ λογισμοῦ] and by reason like that of Isaac, he rendered the many-headed rack ineffective” (7:14). In these two passages, πνεῦμα itself is not related to God’s holy πνεῦμα, nor has it any ethical connotation. In fact, whereas in 11:11 πνεῦμα refers probably to the human spirit, in 7:14, πνεῦμα is associated with reason (λόγος). Whether πνεῦματι in 7:14 refers to God’s πνεῦμα (probably indirectly) or the human spirit is not quite clear; what is significant, however, is that by linking πνεῦμα (spirit) with λογισμός (reason), the author of 4 Maccabees, like Aristobulus and Wisdom, connects πνεῦμα directly with the intellectual sphere, which is the realm of νοῦς. This association is what mirrors somehow Paul’s understanding of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse: the relationship of πνεῦμα to the spiritual, supernatural, and intellectual sphere (νοητός).

Paul’s construal of his ethical discourse in chapter six has shown the intrinsic connection of God’s holy πνεῦμα with the “knowledge of God” (e.g., 2 Cor 1:13; 2:14; 4:6; 10:5; Rom 1:1, 28; 11:33). Like in 4 Maccabees (7:14), the mind (νοῦς) in Paul is intrinsically connected with God’s knowledge and wisdom (especially in 1 and 2 Corinthians), and even more when God’s holy πνεῦμα plays the central role in his ethical discourse. When Paul speaks about the Law of Christ as the way to accomplish God’s will in order to acquire the τέλος of life (salvation), he mentions for instance the “law of mind” (… τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νοός, Rom 7:23–24), which is also referred as the “mind of πνεῦμα” (τὸ φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος, Rom 8:7–17, 27). As the terms νοῦς (Paul) and λόγος (4 Macc
belong to the intellectual realm, one also finds an association of God’s holy πνεῦμα with that realm.

While it is true that the connection between 4 Maccabees and Paul is minimal in their use of πνεῦμα in ethics, both Hellenistic Jewish writers converge on one important point. They understand πνεῦμα as a spiritual, intellectual, divine reality, related to the intelligible realm (κόσμος νοητός). While it is also true that the author of 4 Maccabees employs this association—πνεῦμα/λόγος [νοῦς]—to describe Eleazar’s heroic virtue of piety and his faithfulness to God’s commandments, Paul also connects πνεῦμα with νοῦς, but to show a new alternative of an ethical life, apart from the observance of the Mosaic Law. As shown in chapter six, for Paul, it is not the loyalty to the Mosaic Law that leads to righteousness (virtue) and salvation, but the faithfulness to the love commandment/Law of Christ, defined also as “the Law of the mind” or “the Law of πνεῦμα” rooted in the gospel of Christ.

Πνεῦμα in the Ethical Exhortation of the Sibylline Oracles

It has been shown that in Hellenistic Judaism, at least in the texts discussed in this study, the ethical teaching is presented in terms of the virtue of piety (see chapter four). In the

46. There is, nevertheless, a strong connection between 4 Maccabees and Paul concerning the virtue of φιλαδέλφια (brotherly love). It is emphasized in Paul (see 1 Thessalonians) and among the Hellenistic Jewish literature, this virtue appears in the Maccabean literature (see 4 Macc 13:23, 26; 14:1; φιλάδελφος in 2 Macc 15:14; 4 Macc 13:21; 15:10), and the T12P (see above). For a discussion about the virtue of brotherly love in 4 Maccabees and in Greek literature, see Hans-Josef Klauck, “Brotherly Love in Plutarch and in 4 Maccabees,” in David L. Balch et al., eds., Greek, Romans, and Christians: Essays in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), 144–64.

47. See chapter four for a detailed discussion.
Sibylline Oracles (1–5, 7–8, and fragments, 1–3), as in most of the Hellenistic Jewish texts, the concept of πνεῦμα in reference to ethical exhortation is used a number of times. There are three ways in which the Oracles employ πνεῦμα: (1) πνεῦμα is “the Spirit of God,” (2) πνεῦμα describes an inner ethical attitude, and (2) πνεῦμα is associated with reward.

Πνεῦμα as the Spirit of God

Like Paul and other Hellenistic Jewish authors discussed, the Oracles identify πνεῦμα as “the Spirit of God” (Sib. Or. 3.701; 7.69). This πνεῦμα, as in Paul, knows no evil, as the Sibyl writes, “the Spirit of God knows no falsehood” (Sib. Or. 3.701). The Sibyl clearly disassociates God’s πνεῦμα from falsehood, which is a type of vice and impiety (see also Sib. Or. 8.185–87, 287). That the Spirit of God is only associated with goodness (virtues) is also reflected in Sib. Or. 7.69, where the Sibyl, like Paul, describes the Spirit of God as holy. Thus, the exhortation to virtues, that is, righteousness, faithfulness to the Law, and the way to victory and immortality, is conducted by “the holy Spirit of God.” But, the association between the holy Spirit of God and virtues is, unlike Paul, associated with obedience to the Law of God (e.g., Sib. Or. 5.357; 7.126).

48. As in chapter four, only Oracles composed between 2nd century B.C.E and 2nd century C.E. are included in the discussion of this section.


51. Sib. Or. 7.69 is in the context of a Christian interpolation (7.64–75) of the baptism of Jesus. In it the Sibyl speaks of Christ as Word, the Father, and the Holy Spirit, the three being united.
Πνεῦμα’s Relation to Virtues and Vices

As in the *T12P*, the *Oracles* employ the term πνεῦμα, not only to refer to God’s Spirit, but also to speak about the inner attitude, that is, whether the human disposition is ethically prompted to act virtuously or not. The interior disposition of human beings to act either virtuously or not is described in terms of “a πνεῦμα.” The Sibyls make use of πνεῦμα to identify a moral quality in a person: “good spirit” and “evil/bad spirit;” however, the use of dualistic “spirits” (good and evil) is not strongly emphasized as in the *T12P*. The former indicates the positive moral attitude (virtues/righteousness) and the latter the opposite (vices/impiety). For example, inner negative attitudes are identified as “a shameless spirit” (*Sib. Or. 3.40; 5.192), often related to lawless deeds, as “a mindless spirit” (*Sib. Or. 3.687) particularly associated with “not knowing the law” and “idolatry” (*Sib. Or. 3.722–23), and as “an impious spirit” (*Sib. Or. 5.171). All these negative “spirits” (πνεῦματα) are associated with all kinds of sexual immorality, idolatry, and other sins against the Law. As the Testaments, the *Oracles* also associate these sins, evil deeds, with Beliar (e.g., *Sib. Or. 3.73*).

Only once does the Sibyl describe a positive or good ethical quality using the term πνεῦμα. In *Sib. Or. 5.67*, the Sibyl writes, “where is your sturdy spirit among people? Because you raged against my children who were anointed by God and you incited evil against good people.” In a context in which the Sibyl speaks against Egypt and about its destruction, he seems to apply the term “spirit” dualistically (good spirit vs. evil spirit), as in the Testaments. Egypt and its people lack the “sturdy spirit” to do the good (good spirit), that is virtue, and avoid the evil (evil spirit). Therefore, like in Paul, the *Oracles* emphasize πνεῦμα as the Spirit of God, but unlike Paul, and similar to the *T12P*,


the Oracles use πνεῦμα to speak about two different inner attitudes or behaviors, and frequently to speak about the evil spirits.

**Πνεῦμα and Reward**

A significant way of employing πνεῦμα in the ethical exhortation of the Oracles is in terms of reward. Like Paul, the Oracles describe God as giving the pious and righteous “a Spirit, life and grace at once” (Sib. Or. 4.46; see also 4.189). It is clear that the Oracles associate πνεῦμα with reward; but, there are also two important points that mirror Paul’s use of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse: (1) the relationship of πνεῦμα with [eternal] life, and (2) the relationship of πνεῦμα with “the Spirit of God,” which is discussed above. The Sibyl promises that at judgment day, as in the LXX, God will give the pious one His own πνεῦμα, which is and has life. As Paul views God’s πνεῦμα as the “life-giving πνεῦμα,” we can interpret the Oracle in a similar way: the goal at the resurrection of the pious (those who live according to God’s Law) is that God will give them [eternal] life through His πνεῦμα. Although in Paul’s ethical discourse, God’s holy πνεῦμα is received not as a reward at judgment day, but in baptism, πνεῦμα plays the main role leading believers to attain the reward (eternal life/salvation). The association of πνεῦμα with [eternal] life (the Spirit of life) is a point of convergence between Paul and the Sibyl. The word “grace” (χάρις) also refers to “a free gift” (χάρισμα), a word very much cherished by Paul in his ethical discourse, especially when he links God’s πνεῦμα with “God’s grace” (e.g., 2 Cor 6:1; 8:7; 13:11).
### Table 30. Major Trends of Hellenistic Jewish Tradition in Paul’s Ethical Discourse

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<th>PAUL</th>
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### Conclusion

This chapter has shown that Paul’s view of the concept of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse reflects partially the use of πνεῦμα in Hellenistic Jewish tradition. Paul embraces, and moves beyond, some key Hellenistic Jewish notions about πνεῦμα in Hellenistic Judaism to explain the new ethical life of the believers. Especially, the references to πνεῦμα as “the πνεῦμα of God” (πνεῦμα θεοῦ), the “divine πνεῦμα” (πνεῦμα θείου), and “God’s holy πνεῦμα” reflected in the Hellenistic Jewish texts (except in 4 Maccabees) are broadly expanded by Paul (e.g., πνεῦμα of Christ, πνεῦμα of the Lord, πνεῦμα of faith, πνεῦμα of
love). Particularly significant is that the LXX is to be considered a *key* source in leading Paul's (and other Hellenistic Jewish authors') understanding of πνεῦμα as πνεῦμα θείον or πνεῦμα θεοῦ. The close association between πνεῦμα of God and prophecy in Paul is found primarily in the LXX, and then, in Aristobulus, and *Wisdom of Solomon*. Likewise, Paul's understanding of πνεῦμα of God as “a life-giving πνεῦμα” in his ethical discourse in some ways reflects both *Wisdom of Solomon* and the *Sibylline Oracles*. Paul's characteristic view of God's πνεῦμα as holding the qualities that belong to the realm of the divine (e.g., immortal, incorruptible, eternal, and immaterial) is found in Hellenistic Jewish authors (Aristobulus, *Wisdom of Solomon*, and 4 Maccabees), who have been most likely influenced by the Greek philosophical tradition. What is also significant is that Hellenistic Jewish authors who are far less philosophically oriented (e.g., LXX, *T12P*, and the *Sibylline Oracles*) do not make this association.

Furthermore, Paul's association of the *central* role played by God's holy πνεῦμα in conferring righteousness and virtues is also found in the Hellenistic Jewish tradition: mainly in the LXX, and also in *Wisdom of Solomon*, the *T12P*, and the *Sibylline Oracles*. In the book of Wisdom, however, πνεῦμα’s role is shared with σοφία; indeed, it is σοφία which makes one virtuous, for she is the source of virtues. Paul's depiction of πνεῦμα as having the power of transforming the believers into a new life comes rather from the LXX, as well as his association of God's πνεῦμα with both the knowledge of God and the hidden/mysterious knowledge. However, the connection between God's πνεῦμα and understanding is found not only in the LXX, but also in the *T12P*, and *Wisdom of Solomon*. In addition, Paul's association of πνεῦμα with the virtue of love is found only in

the T12P and in Wisdom of Solomon, but here through σοφία (=πνεῦμα). Interestingly, the direct association of πνεῦμα with God’s power in Paul’s ethical discourse is only found in Wisdom of Solomon, and indirectly in the LXX, and perhaps in the Sibylline Oracles, too.53 Finally, Paul’s link between God’s πνεῦμα and salvation/eternal life is found especially in the LXX, the T12P, Wisdom of Solomon, and the Sibylline Oracles; in the book of Wisdom, however, this link is again through σοφία (=πνεῦμα).

A crucial difference between Paul and the Hellenistic Jewish tradition is the means to attain virtues (righteousness) and salvation. While Paul takes from the Hellenistic Jewish heritage the idea that God’s πνεῦμα is inherently involved in the acquisition of virtues and holiness, he does not take the Jewish Law—whether it is expressed as the Mosaic Law, or the Law/commandments of God—as the guiding principle for the acquisition of virtues, sanctification, and ultimately the goal: salvation. It is at this specific point that Paul departs from his heritage, and moves beyond the Hellenistic Jewish notions about πνεῦμα. Paul re-configures the Hellenistic Jewish understanding of πνεῦμα as the “prime mover” in his ethics in a new way that requires not the observance of the Mosaic Law, but a new ethical principle, a “new Law,” the love commandment/Law of Christ expressed in various ways. This “new Law” finds its basis on both God’s holy πνεῦμα and a central figure, Christ (πνεῦμα/Χριστός). So, in chapter nine, we will see how these two “core foundations” (God’s holy πνεῦμα and Christ) define the primary role that πνεῦμα plays in Paul’s ethical discourse. But, before we move on to chapter nine, we will

53. In Sib. Or. 3.701, the Oracle expresses the notion that the Spirit of God knows “no falsehood and it is throughout the world.” There is not only an allusion to the power of God’s πνεῦμα, but also to the presence of God’s πνεῦμα in all things (πάντα), like the Stoic πνεῦμα/λόγος.
need to explore the use of πνεῦμα in the Greek philosophical ethical discourse and how this tradition also influenced the privileged place of πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethical discourse.
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE GREEK PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION IN PAUL’S
UNDERSTANDING OF ΠΝΕΥΜΑ IN HIS ETHICAL DISCOURSE

Introduction

The use of the concept of πνεῦμα in the Greco-Roman world is broad and has a variety of meanings. Isaacs points out that, like רוח, the most common meaning of πνεῦμα in the ancient Greek world was “wind.” From the metaphor “breath of life” (πνεῦμα βίου) developed the use of πνεῦμα to imply “life” itself, or an agent of “life,” which was closely tied to “breathing” (e.g., Aeschylus, Pers. 507). In the field of medicine, especially from the time of the Greek physician Hippocrates (460 B.C.E.–370 B.C.E), the concept of πνεῦμα was used to mean “breath” (πνοή) which defined the essential element for bodily health. Often times, πνεῦμα also meant “soul” (ψυχή) because of its relationship


2. Isaacs, The Concept of Spirit, 15. The Greek view of πνεῦμα meaning “wind” was also used metaphorically (e.g., Sophocles, Oed. col. 610–13; Euripides. Iph. taur. 1317). Isaacs explains that from the time of the Greek tragedian Aeschylus (525 B.C.E.–456 B.C.E., πνεῦμα occurs often, in both poetry and prose, as a synonym of πνοή or ἄνεμος (e.g., Aeschylus, Prom. 1086). Cf. Cage, The Holy Spirit, 316–17.

3. Sometimes, πνεῦμα was used to speak not only of human beings, but also of animals (e.g, Euripides, Orest. 277; Plato, Tim. 66E; 91C). Cf. Kleinknecht, “πνεῦμα in the Greek World,” TDNT, 6:335.
with “breath,” the principle of life.

Thus, with this thought, πνεῦμα became the basis of all human existence. Metaphorically, particularly in poetry, the concept of πνεῦμα also carried on the transferred meaning of “spiritual reality,” which expressed mental experiences, generally associated with interpersonal relationships or with the invisible world of the divine πνεῦμα (θεῖον πνεῦμα). One of the distinguishing characteristics in Greek literature and philosophy is that sometimes the word ἐπίπνοια (breathing upon, inspiration) was used instead of πνεῦμα to speak about divine inspiration and prophecy. This use will be made clear in the passages below, particularly in Plato, who generally employs the term ἐπίπνοια instead of πνεῦμα.

It is recognized by scholars that ancient Greco-Roman philosophers did not use the concept of πνεῦμα as the core of their ethics; it was rather an essential concept in physics, particularly in Stoicism. As pointed out in chapter five, in Greek philosophical literature

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4. E.g., Zeno, fragment 136 (SVF 1.38.6–9); fragment 140 (SVF 1.38.30–33); Epictetus, Diss. 3.3.22. Cf. Isaacs, The Concept of Spirit, 15; Kleinknecht, “πνεῦμα in the Greek World,” TDNT, 6:336. However, the Greek view of the soul developed in terms of ψυχή rather than πνεῦμα.


6. E.g., Euripides, Her. fur. 216. See Kleinknecht, “πνεῦμα in the Greek World,” TDNT, 6:336. This idea is further developed below.

7. Plato prefers to use the term ἐπίπνοια, and often uses πνεῦμα for an element in natural science (e.g., Phileb. 29A; Phaedr. 229B–C; Pol. 295D; Theaet. 152B). Cf. Isaacs, The Concept of Spirit, 15.

ethical systems of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, φρόνησις is used as the “core” virtue of their ethics. In fact, while scholars have already referred to Hellenistic Jewish influence on Paul’s understanding of πνεῦμα in his ethics, barely any scholars—except for Engberg-Pedersen⁹—have attempted to show the Greek philosophical influence on Paul’s special use of the concept of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse.¹⁰ In the Greek philosophical tradition, πνεῦμα is a physical concept, signifying wind, air, breath, breath of life, and generally not associated with either the human spirit, immortality,¹¹ virtues, or ethics.

Indeed, the term πνοή (breath), not πνεῦμα, was used to describe the gods’ endowment of powers in the soul (e.g., Plato, Crat. 419C-D; Diogenes Laertius 3.1.67). While it is true that

9. Engberg-Pedersen’s study has mainly focused on the comparison between Paul and the Stoics. The work in which he deals briefly with πνεῦμα and ethics in Paul is his “The Material Spirit,” 179–97, which treats the so called material Spirit passages in Paul’s letters (1 Thess 5:23; 1 Cor 2:14–15; 15:44; 15:35–50; 2 Cor 3–5; Rom 7:7–25; 8:1–13). His approach is done from the Stoic viewpoint of πνεῦμα’s role in cosmology. He explores the cosmology of πνεῦμα in connection with the future resurrection of believers in 1 Cor 15:35–50, the indwelling of πνεῦμα in the bodies and souls of believers here and now (2 Cor 3–5), and the relation between Rom 8:1–3 and 7:7–25 based on Paul’s concrete cosmology. However, only his analyses of the anthropology of 1 Thess 5:23 and 1 Cor 2:14–15 are directly treated in connection with Paul’s ethics. As we shall see in chapter nine, in his Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul, 175–81, Engberg-Pedersen re-describes his Stoic “model” (I- >X- >S) that he presented in a previous work (Paul and the Stoics, 34–60), now emphasizing the role of πνεῦμα in his model.


11. Cage, The Holy Spirit, 311. He notes that even Plato and Xenophon, who believed in immortality never made use of the concept of πνεῦμα to describe the belief of immortality.
the concept of πνεῦμα holds a place in Hellenistic Jewish thought (see chapter seven), it is not the case in Greek philosophical thinking. Isaacs notes that outside Stoicism “πνεῦμα had only secondary significance in Greek philosophical and religious writings.”

Despite the fact that πνεῦμα plays basically no role in the presentation of philosophical ethical systems, throughout its development, the meanings of πνεῦμα began to be also associated with some form of ethics. In a recent study about πνεῦμα in Greco-Roman literature, Cage concludes that only few passages of Greco-Roman literature associate πνεῦμα with ethics. These are, however, valuable texts that will be analyzed in relation to Paul’s characteristic view of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse. Paul, who was part of the Greek Diaspora, was not immune of the influences that brought about the development of πνεῦμα


13. It is significant that the meanings of the concept of πνεῦμα went through a process of development from the pre-Socratic period of Greek literature (8th century B.C.E–400 B.C.E.) to the Greek Magical Papyri and Corpus Hermeticum material (200–400 C.E.). The process of development in relation to our purpose is summarized as follows: throughout the classical period, πνεῦμα is a physical term meaning wind, air, breath, and breath of life. In the sixth century B.C.E., Anaximenes related πνεῦμα with ἀήρ, and Xenophanes defined πνεῦμα breath. In the fifth century, Empedocles made πνεῦμα (air), together with water, fire, and earth, the source of all things. In Aristotle’s day, πνεῦμα was defined as a vital generative substance of all living things, plants and animals. For Zeno and his followers, the soul was πνεῦμα, and for Chrysippus, like Diogenes Laertius, the ultimate basis of things was self-moving πνεῦμα, and like Zeno, made πνεῦμα a vital fluid or vapor. In the fourth century, Menander used the phrase θείον πνεῦμα, and Posidonius (150 B.C.E.) made the assertion that God is πνεῦμα. Only in the LXX under the influence of Jewish thought we find the expression πνεῦμα θεοῦ (Spirit of God), or πνεῦμα ἅγιον (holy Spirit). See Burton, Spirit, Soul, and Flesh, 169–70. Although important, it is outside the scope of this study to present all the features and different meanings of the concept of πνεῦμα throughout its development, except insofar as they relate to the association of the “divine πνεῦμα” with both ethics and features reflected in Paul’s use of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse.

14. See Zeno, fragment 127; Cleanthes, fragment 533; Chrysippus, fragment 1009; Seneca, Ep. 41.1–9; Plutarch, Is. Os. 2.365d; Cicero, Nat. d. 1.10.26; 2.7.19; Posidonius (Stobaeus, Ecl. 1.1.29). See also Theocritus, Id. 12.10–19; Valerius Maximus 1.8.10; Diodorus of Sicily 1.11.6–1.12.2. Cage, The Holy Spirit, 366.
in the Greek world. In fact, some viewpoints of πνεῦμα's development are shown in Paul's use of πνεῦμα as the central concept in his ethics. Nevertheless, the notion that πνεῦμα leads people in a moral direction is minimal in Greek literature and philosophy. Therefore, the analyses of this chapter will highlight two important points: (1) that Paul's characteristic view of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse is explained in ways that reflects the use of πνεῦμα in Greek literature and philosophy; and (2) that Paul's intentional and consistent connection of πνεῦμα with his own conviction about Christ and his gospel set him apart from both traditions: the Hellenistic Jewish and the Greek philosophical. That is, the way πνεῦμα's primary place in Paul's ethical discourse is not only further developed from the Greco-Roman literature and philosophy, but the central role of πνεῦμα in ethics becomes firmly established in Paul. As with Philo (chapter five), I will offer the possible reason(s) why Paul gives πνεῦμα a primary place in his ethical discourse, as well as, I will locate the cultural and religious heritage (the trailing edge) and the direction to where he goes with this heritage (the leading edge). Although the parallels between Paul and the Greek literature and philosophy are fairly minor here, there are several important features that are worth mentioning. This chapter, therefore, illustrates them in light of Paul's own understanding of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse illustrated in chapter six.

The Power of “Inbreathing” the Divine Πνεῦμα

in the Greco-Roman Tradition

Often Greco-Roman authors hold the common view that the “god” or “goddess” breathes

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some kind of quality or inspiration into the person, and as a result, the person is able to do something spectacular, something that would not be possible to do without the “inbreathing” (ἐμπνέω). For example, in Homer, it is said that “some god breathed the thought [ἐνέπνευσεν φρεσὶ δαίμων]” into Penelope’s heart, so that she was able to keep her suitors at bay (Od. 19.138–140).

In his *Theogony*, Hesiod receives poetic inspiration, “a divine voice” (…ἐνέπνευσαν δὲ μοι αὐὴν θέσπιν), which enables him to compose songs about persons of both the past and the future as well as to compose songs in praise of the gods (*Theog.* 29–34). In some other instances, the divine inbreathing consists in the reception of a revelation, as is in the case of Euripides (480 B.C.E.–406 B.C.E.), when Hippolytus receives a timely revelation of the θεῖον πνεῦμα (1391–1392), and in philosophical texts, like the Roman philosopher Cicero, the “divine inspiration” (*adflatu divino*) is equated with “divination” (*divinationis, Nat. d. 2.66.166–167*).


17. Hesiod, *Theogony, Works and Days, Testimonia* (ed. and trans. Glenn W. Most; LCL 57; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). For similar examples of poetic inspiration, see Euripides, fragment 195; Democritus, fragment 17. According to Cage (*The Holy Spirit*, 319), both Euripides and Democritus are the earliest Greek writers to use the noun πνεῦμα with the gods’ inspiration of poetry and music. The “inbreathing” inspires also the knowledge of technique in battles (fighting qualities), so that the one who is inspired and possessed by the gods becomes irresistible and invincible (Plutarch, *Virt. mor. 12*). Similar idea is also found in Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.4.32), where a god by his inspiration inbreaths the Eleans valor, courage, and strength more than what ordinary humans are capable to show in military battles. In the later Greek Magical Papyri (PGM), the god is called a “fire-bright πνεῦμα” and has power to “put silence, subordinate, enslave someone” (7.962–967; see also PGM 10.10–14). Translated by E. N. O’Neil and edited by Hans Dieter Betz, *The Greek Magical Papyri in Translation, Including the Demotic Spells* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986).


By the Roman era, the association of *spiritus* with the gift of poetic inspiration becomes established. Horace (65 B.C.E.-8 B.C.E.) writes, “It was Phoebus (Apollo) who gave me inspiration, Phoebus who gave me the lyric art and the name of poet [*spiritum Phoebus, mihi Phoebus artem carminis nomenque dedit poetae*]” (Horace, *Carm.* 4.29–30). What is significant in Horace is that he expresses the notion that the only way to receive the gift of the art of singing is directly through *spiritus*, and it is the god Phoebus who imparts it. According to Horace, one receives divine gifts through the reception of the *spiritus*, and these gifts especially consist of the art of song, poetry, and noble utterance.

These gifts in a way reflect the “free gifts” (χαρίσματα) of God’s πνεῦμα that Paul mentions in 1 Cor 14:1–36, especially that of “speaking in tongues” (λαλῶν γλώσσαις). The divinely inspired gift of poetry (or prose-talk) also alludes to one of Pseudo-Phocylides’ sentences. In his moral exhortation, he writes, “speech of the divinely inspired [θεόπνευστος] wisdom is the best” (sentence 129). These authors directly associates the gift of higher speech with the θεῖον πνεῦμα, rather than to the human and ordinary ability to speak.

Philosophers, like Plato (*Phaedr.* 262D) and later Middle Platonist Plutarch (*Def. orac.* 41–50; 432E-F) also associate the gods’ inbreathing (ἐμπνέω) with the gift

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20. The Latin term for πνεῦμα is usually *spiritus* or *afflatus*. Particularly during the Greco-Roman period, the mysterious figure of the Delphic Pythia was frequently associated with “becoming filled with an inspiring *spiritus*,” in which the divine spirit took hold of the prophet and produced not only prophetic ecstasy, but also prophetic inspiration (e.g., see Strabo 9.3.5; Aeschylus, *Ag.* 1207–1212; Pliny the Elder, *Nat.* 2.95.208; Pseudo-Longinus 13.2; Iamblichus, *On Mysteries*, 3.11; Dio Chrysostom 72.12; Cicero, *Div.* 1.89). Cf. Levison, *Filled with the Spirit*, 155–57, 172–73.


of prophecy, a topic discussed below. Prophecy as a divine inspiration or inbreathing, according to Plutarch, comes from the πνεῦμα of Apollo, by which its possession allows the receiver participation in the divine power of enthusiastic inspiration.23 Plutarch likewise associates the possession of πνεῦμα with the word ἀγάπη, but in a romantic way, when he writes, “he had a friend, Xenares, who had been his lover [ἔραστον] (or inspirer [ἐμπνεῖσθαι], as the Spartans say)...” (Cleom. 3.805).24 The significance in relation to Paul is that the romantic love, which the Spartans considered a result of the inbreathing of the gods of love, derives directly from the θεῖον πνεῦμα.25

The various uses of the language of “inbreathing” by the θεῖον πνεῦμα in Greek literature and philosophy show that Paul’s view of the primary place of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse is not completely isolated from these ancient ideas. In Paul, we see a minor reflection—yet not negligible—of the divine powers (e.g., prophecy, revelation, noble speech) as free gifts (χαρίσματα) of God’s divine πνεῦμα. In the Greco-Roman tradition, however, the possession of these qualities had no real ethical significance as in

23. This kind of inspiration is sometimes related to “ecstatic phenomena” such as the dreams and oracular utterances at Delphi (e.g., Plato, Tim. 71E–72B). Munzinger (Discerning the Spirits, 56–59) suggests that scholars should be careful identifying the role of the prophet at the Delphic Oracle with tongues (and their interpretation) or prophecy in Paul, since they are semantic and conceptual differences. See also C. Forbes, Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and its Hellenistic Environment (WUNT 2.75; Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1995), 103–105.


25. Although Plato does not relate πνεῦμα with love, it is important to mention that in the Laws he speaks of what is called the Golden Rule: “may I do to others as I would that they should do to me” (Leg. 913A; see also Crit. 50A–54D; Phaed. 62B–C). See Jeffrey Wattles, “Plato’s Brush with the Golden Rule.” JRE 21 (1993): 69–85. Cf. Hamilton and Cairns, The Collected Dialogues of Plato, 1225.
Paul, who somehow re-interprets and transforms the meanings of the word πνεῦμα in the Greco-Roman tradition. In his ethical discourse, God’s πνεῦμα has the power not only to make believers sharers and participants in God’s divine gifts, but also the exclusive power to enable ethical conduct that is pleasing to God.

The Life-Giving Πνεῦμα in the Greek Thought:

Aeschylus and Diodorus of Sicily

In Paul’s ethical discourse, πνεῦμα is the Spirit of the living God, and it is in fact this living πνεῦμα the key principle for the believers’ new virtuous life in Christ. While it is true that in both Hellenistic Jewish and Greek philosophical traditions, πνεῦμα is related to “life,” the reference to the divine πνεῦμα as “life-giving πνεῦμα” in the Greek tradition does not generally have an ethical connotation. In fact, there are two texts that support the argument.

In the pre-Socratic period, the tragedian Aeschylus (525 B.C.E.–456 B.C.E.) writes:

By the force of his [Zeus] painless strength and by his divine breath [θείαις ἐπιπνοίαις] she [the maiden] was stopped, and in tears she wept away the grief of her shame. And, receiving what can truly be called a Zeus-given burden, she bore a perfect child … and so the whole land cried, ‘this is the offspring of Zeus [Ζηνός ἔστιν ἀληθῶς], the begetter of life!’” (Suppl. 574–89).26

Aeschylus speaks of the divine ἐπίπνοια, a word akin to πνεῦμα, as the “seed of life-giving Zeus.” Although the reference is in relation to the miraculous power of Zeus to “give human life,” Zeus’ ἐπίπνοια is viewed as a divine living inspiration.

Also, in a work from the Roman period, the Greek historian Diodorus of Sicily (90 B.E.–30 B.C.E.) writes, “Now the spirit they called Zeus [πνεῦμα Δία προσαγορεύονται], as we translate their expression, and since he was the source of the spirit of life in living

things [τοῦ ψυχικοῦ τοῖς ζῷοις] they considered him to be in a sense the father of all things [πάντων οίονεὶ τινα πατέρα]” (Biblioteca historica, 1.12.2).27 This text holds three reflections in regard to Paul’s use of God’s πνεῦμα as the life-giving πνεῦμα. (1) In terms of the creation of the world, it is Zeus, the father, who is associated with all things (πάντα); like God the Father in Paul, Zeus is the giver of life to all existing things. (2) It is about the πνεῦμα of Zeus, the most high god of the Olympian gods, who is the source of the spirit of life, as in Paul, the true and One God is the source of “the Spirit of life.” In both Aeschylus and Diodorus, the power of giving life is only associated with Zeus’ ἐπίπνοια or his πνεῦμα.28 But, in Paul, the life-giving πνεῦμα is not only linked with God, but also with Christ, who is also the life-giving πνεῦμα (e.g., 1 Cor 10:3–4), and with “the Law of the Spirit of life” (ὁ νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς) which is the new Law of Christ/love commandment. What is valuable in light of Paul’s view of πνεῦμα is that in both examples the divine ἐπίπνοια/πνεῦμα is associated with the notion of “giving life.” In Paul’s ethical discourse, this notion of the divine πνεῦμα is re-configured by being applied as a primary ethical character of God’s πνεῦμα.

The Divine Πνεῦμα and the Gift of Prophecy in the Greek Tradition

Chapter seven has shown that Hellenistic Jewish authors often associate God’s divine πνεῦμα with the gift of prophecy. This section also shows that association in the Greco-


28. Plutarch also associates Zeus with πνεῦμα, when he writes, “the Egyptians apply the name ‘Zeus’ to the πνεῦμα, and whatever is dry or fiery is antagonistic to this” (Is. Os. 2.365). Plutarch, Moralia. Translated by Frank Cole Babbitt. LCL, 5 (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1936).
Roman literature and philosophy. Plato, who uses the term ἐπίπνοια instead of πνεῦμα, speaks of prophecy—one of the four types of madness—as deriving directly from the divine (Apollo’s) ἐπίπνοια (*Phaedr*. 265A-B). Plato has Socrates claim that “prophets and tellers of oracles [οἱ χρησῳδοί τε καὶ οἱ θεομάντεις] under divine inspiration [ἐνθουσιῶντες] utter many truths;” although “they have no knowledge of what they say, they are to be considered as acting no less under divine inspiration [ἐπίπνους ὄντας], inspired and possessed by the divinity [θείους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν]” (*Meno* 99C-D). Cicero, likewise, describes prophecies as coming directly from the god Apollo, and that the prophecies given by the Pythian prophetesses in the oracles at Delphi is said to have been affected by Apollo’s divinus afflatus (*Div. I*. 1.19.37–38).

When these authors correlate θεῖον πνεῦμα or divinus spiritus/afflatus with prophecy, some of the philosophers highlight the divine power. Cicero writes, “what is divine [divinum] as a subterranean exhalation that inspires the soul with power [afflatus e terra mentem ita movens] to foresee the future—a power such that it not only sees things a long time before they happen, but actually foretells them in rhythmic verse?” (*Div. II*. 2.57.117). The same connection between power and πνεῦμα is later found in Plutarch’s *Oracles at Delphi* (402B), *On Moral Virtue* (452C), and the *Dialogue on Love* (758E, here ἐπίπνοια). This divine power of πνεῦμα, as in Paul, is also expressed in terms


of knowledge; the divinus spiritus gives prophets knowledge of what is hidden about
the future, as is found in the Delphi oracle in the selection of the Roman poet Lucan
(The Civil War 5.81–101, 128–40, 161–197). As chapter six has shown, in Paul, God’s
πνεῦμα is a key factor in the attainment of knowledge of God (e.g., Rom 2:6–16; 12:1,
3–4, 7–9, 11; 14:20, 30, 37). Plutarch also speaks of prophetic inspiration as “most divine
and holy [πνεῦμα θειότατον ἐστι καὶ ὁσιώτατον]…; for when it is instilled into the body
[καταμειγνύμενον γὰρ εἰς τὸ σῶμα], it creates in souls an unaccustomed and unusual
temperament, the peculiarity of which is hard to describe with exactness, but analogy
offers many comparisons.” (Def. orac. 432D-E). In this passage, Plutarch identifies the
divine inspiration as “holy” (ὁσιότης), a quality that is already found in the pre-Socratic
philosopher Democritus, who writes, “what a poet writes with enthusiasm and holy spirit
[ιερόν πνεῦμα] is most beautiful” (fragment 18).

These texts show how Greco-Roman authors relate the gift of prophecy with the
divine πνεῦμα (or ἐπίπνοια). Paul’s understanding of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse
reflects in part some of these features that are worth mentioning. (1) As in Paul, the
language of “power” and “hidden knowledge” in the Greek tradition are mainly linked
with divine prophetic inspiration. These divine qualities in Paul’s ethical discourse,

32. Later in the Corpus Hermeticum (C.H. 1.30), interestingly the language of “becoming
god-inspired” (θεόπνευστος; lit. inspired of god) appears in reference to a knowledge coming
directly from Hermes (see also C.H. 12.19). Translation of the C.H. is taken from Walter Scott,

33. Plutarch, Moralia, Volume V: Isis and Osiris, The E at Delphi, The Oracles at Delphi
No Longer Given in Verse, The Obsolescence of Oracles (trans. Frank Cole Babbitt; LCL 306;
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936). See also Plutarch, Exil. 604F–605A.

34. Translated by C. C. W. Taylor, The Atomists, Leucippus and Democritus: Fragments: A
Text and Translation with A Commentary (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
however, are not only associated with the gifts of prophecy, interpretation of tongues, or glossolalia. They are used also as manifestations of God’s πνεῦμα in the community of believers, who live in faith and by Christ’s Law. In Paul, these divine qualities become characteristic features of Paul’s ethics. (2) Even more significant is the early association of divine prophetic inspiration with moral status and holiness. In Paul, God’s πνεῦμα is not only the source of prophecy, and of other gifts, but God’s πνεῦμα leads to a virtuous behavior that is “good” and “holy.” Thus, Paul’s view of God’s holy πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse as the source principle of ethical conduct finds its resonances not only in the Hellenistic Jewish tradition, but also to a certain extent in the Greco-Roman tradition. Paul’s presentation of the ethical role of πνεῦμα as God’s holy πνεῦμα is, however, significantly more developed than these two traditions.  

The Relationship of the Divine Πνεῦμα with the 

Intellect in the Greco-Roman Tradition

In Paul’s ethical discourse, God’s πνεῦμα is associated not only with knowledge (e.g., γνῶσις/ἐπίγνωσις), but also with the intellect (νοῦς). There are a few, but important parallels between Paul and the Greek tradition in their association of πνεῦμα with νοῦς. For example, the Greek dramatist Menander (342 B.C.E.–291 B.C.E.) has one of the earliest references in which the divine spirit is associated with the intellect. He writes, “have done with talking of intellect [νοῦς]; for the human intellect amounts to nothing, while Fortune’s [intellect]—whether we call it divine spirit or intellect [εἴτε τοῦτο πνεῦμα θείον εἴτε νοῦς]—this is what steers all and veers and saves, whereas mortal thought is smoke

35. This idea will be developed in chapter nine.
and nonsense” (fragment 482). For Menander, the “intellect” (νοῦς) is a quality closely connected with the θεῖον πνεῦμα, as he directly links the πνεῦμα of the goddess Fortune with the “mind.” The Roman poet of the Augustan period Virgil in his Aeneid, speaking about the power of prophecy, also describes Apollo’s breathing as “a mighty mind and soul [magnam cui mentem animun], revealing the future” (Aen. 6.9–12.42.51). The same relation of the θεῖον πνεῦμα with the intellect is also attested in Stoicism (e.g., Chrysippus and Posidonius), as we shall see below. Later in the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue Axiochus (370 B.C.E or 1st century B.C.E), and Plutarch make the same correlation. While for the latter the association is between reason (λόγος) and the spirit of prophecy (Def. orac. 41), for the former, the θεῖον πνεῦμα possesses both intelligence and knowledge. Pseudo-Plato identifies these qualities as “good things,” and attributes it to “a divine spirit in the soul,” as he contrasts the heavenly realm (κόσμος νοητός) from the “material or mortal nature” or κόσμος αἰσθητός (Axiochus 370B-C).

The association between the θεῖον πνεῦμα and νοῦς is also found in the Roman Stoic philosopher Seneca, who connects divinus spiritus with “right reason” (ratio recta) in his Moral Epistles. He writes,

Nothing is more divine than the divine, or more heavenly than the heavenly.


39. See also Plutarch, Amat. 16 (2.758E).

40. Translated by Cooper, Plato, 1740.
Mortal things decay, fall, are worn out, grow up, are exhausted, and replenished. Reason \([ratio]\), however, is nothing else than a portion of the divine spirit \([divini spiritus]\) set in a human body. If reason is divine \([ratio divina est]\) and the good in no case lacks reason, then the good in every case is divine \([bonum omne divinum est]\) (Ep. 66.12).41

Seneca makes two important points in relation to Paul’s view of \(\pi\nu\varepsilon\u0391\alpha\mu\alpha\) and its association with \(\nu\omicron\upsilon\zeta\) in his ethics: (1) that reason \(\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\omicron\varsigma\) derives from the divine \(\pi\nu\varepsilon\u0391\alpha\mu\alpha\), and thus, belongs to the heavenly world \(\kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\omicron\nu\nu\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma\), and (2) that both the divine \(\pi\nu\varepsilon\u0391\alpha\mu\alpha\) and \(\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\omicron\varsigma\) are associated only with what is “good” (goodness), that is, virtue. Therefore, virtues, like reason \(\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\omicron\varsigma\), are linked not only with the divine \(\pi\nu\varepsilon\u0391\alpha\mu\alpha\), but also, implicitly, with the intelligible world. In a way similar to Paul who associates God’s \(\pi\nu\varepsilon\u0391\alpha\mu\alpha\) and virtues with the \(\nu\omicron\upsilon\zeta\), the immaterial, and only “indirectly” with \(\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\omicron\varsigma\) (e.g., 1 Cor 2:1–5),42 in Greek literature and philosophy, the divine \(\pi\nu\varepsilon\u0391\alpha\mu\alpha\) possesses “higher powers” which belong to the realm of the rational.

The Stoic Material \(\Pi\nu\varepsilon\u0391\alpha\mu\alpha\) In Paul’s Understanding of God’s \(\Pi\nu\varepsilon\u0391\alpha\mu\alpha\) in his Ethical Discourse

For over two centuries the so called “sacramental passages” (1 Cor 10:3–4; 6:11; 12:13) and the passage in 15:44 (\(\sigma\omega\mu\aupsilon\pi\nu\varepsilon\u0391\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\nu\)) in Paul have been the point of continuous debates about a key question: whether Paul conceives the concept of \(\pi\nu\varepsilon\u0391\alpha\mu\alpha\) as a “material

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42. As it will be shown in chapter nine, Paul does not link \(\pi\nu\varepsilon\u0391\alpha\mu\alpha\) with the Stoic \(\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\omicron\varsigma\) the way we find in 4 Maccabees and Seneca. Paul uses the term \(\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\omicron\varsigma\) in connection to the gospel of Christ.
substance” (οὐσία).

Chapter two has shown the fact that Paul is influenced—yet in different ways and to different degrees—by the philosophical schools of his time, especially Stoicism and Middle Platonism. In this section, I will argue that the influence of the Stoic theory of πνεῦμα is fairly minimal on Paul’s view of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse.

From Cicero, we learn that Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, characterizes “God’s nature as aether” (aethera deum [Greek. αἰθήρ]), the highest form of substance in which the heavenly bodies exist (Nat. d. 1.14.36). For Zeno, aether (sometimes expressed as “heated air”) and πνεῦμα are the same; indeed, according to Rufus Ephesius, Zeno says, “heat and πνεῦμα are the same” (Zeno, fragment 127), “indirectly” identifying πνεῦμα with God. Cleanthes maintains that πνεῦμα “permeates the universe” (Cleanthes, 43. See chapter one, and for an overview of the history of the debate, see Rabens, The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul, 69–74, 86–120.

44. See also Plato, Crat. 410B.


46. Similarly, in Aristotle, πνεῦμα carries on the idea of a vital heat (Gen. an. 2.3.736b35–737a1), which is necessary for life, and it is especially associated with the faculties of the soul such as sensation and movement (Eth. nic. 3.1110a1–4; Metaph. 8.1.1042b1–35). However, unlike the Stoic theory of πνεῦμα, Aristotle does not give a precise and detailed description πνεῦμα’s meaning and, even he does not explain its relation to the four material elements (e.g., Pol. 4.1290a1–29). As David J. Furley states, in Aristotle, “πνεῦμα’s definition is ill defined.” See From Aristotle to Augustine (New York: Routledge, 1999), 29.

47. See Rufus Ephesius, De Part. hom. p. 44C (θερμασίαν δὲ καὶ πνεῦμα Ζήνων τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι φησίν). SVF 2:117. This idea was also expressed earlier by the pre-Socratic philosopher Anaximenes (585 B.C.E.–528 B.C.E.), who made ἄηδ̄ God by employing ἄηδ̄ and πνεῦμα synonymously (see Cicero, Nat. d. 1.10.26).

48. It is important to note that the early Stoics identified πνεῦμα with τὸ ὄν; that is, it is πνεῦμα that constituted the τὸ ὄν. Cf. Burton, Spirit, Soul, and Flesh, 113.
indeed, for him, πνεῦμα is a “fine corporeality” (Cleanthes, fragment 484). Chrysippus describes the essence of God as πνεῦμα and its form(less) state permeating the universe, when he writes “God is intelligent and fiery πνεῦμα [πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες], not having indeed form, but changing into what it will and assimilating itself to all things” (Chrysippus, fragment 1009, SVF 2:299). The later Stoic philosopher Posidonius (135–51 B.C.E.) mirrors in Chrysippus’ statement. Posidonius writes, “[God is] πνεῦμα intelligent and fiery [πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες], not having indeed form but what it will and assimilating itself to all things” (Stobaeus, Ecl.1.1.29). Paul’s contemporary, Seneca, also views God’s nature as spíritus, but as a “celestial spirit” (caelesti spíritu) (Dial. 12.6.7). What is characteristic about these Stoic philosophers is that they, like Paul, relate the divine πνεῦμα with both the intellect (νοῦς) and the immaterial realm. More significant is, however, that both Chrysippus and Posidonius declare that “God is πνεῦμα.” While the former directly identifies πνεῦμα with God, the later expressly states that God is πνεῦμα. Especially in Posidonius, we find the notion that πνεῦμα has become less material and acquired a more distinctly non-material sense.

In Stoicism, God is made up of intelligence (νοῦς) and πνεῦμα, and all things

49. SVF 1:121, from Tertullian, Apology 21; see also Cicero (Nat. d. 2.7.19), who describes God as a divine πνεῦμα (divinus spíritus) ordering and maintaining the universe.

50. Other texts that show πνεῦμα as material are: Chrysippus, fragment 715; 1027; SVF 1:108, 28; Plotinus, Enn. 4.7.4; Alexander of Aphrodisias, Míxt. 225.1–10; Chrysippus, Fragment 897 (SVF 2:246.15). Cf. For a good bibliography on πνεῦμα in Stoicism, see Rabens, The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul, 27, footnote 7.

51. The same emphasis is also found later in Cicero, Acad. 1.39; Alexander of Aphrodisias, Míxt. 225.1–2. Cf. Rabens, The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul, 31; Cage, The Holy Spirit, 349.

52. To Burton (Spirit, Soul, and Flesh, 119–121), Posidonius is the first thinker whom we definitely know to have used the word πνεῦμα as a predicate of God.
created are ascribed to this πνεῦμα (God’s own nature).⁵³ Therefore, God was inherently associated with πνεῦμα, the basic material substance—yet intelligent—pervading the universe.⁵⁴ Levison states that “by the first century C.E., one of the fundamental conceptions of Stoicism was that pneuma pervades a living and rational cosmos,” as Diogenes Laertius writes, “the world is a living being [ζώον], rational [λογικὸν], animate [ἐμψυχον] and intelligent [νοερὸν]… It is a living thing in the sense of an animate substance endowed with sensation [οὐσίαν ἔμψυχον αἰσθητικήν]” (Lives 7.142).⁵⁵ Within these terms, the Stoics understand the Greek concept of πνεῦμα in its primitive sense of wind, and as such it is material, air endowed with the power of self-motion (see Chrysippus, fragment 471).⁵⁶ At the same time, God’s divine essence is also πνεῦμα, a material substance, and a formless πνεῦμα pervading the universe (κόσμος).⁵⁷

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53. For a good overview of πνεῦμα and the Stoa, see Levison, Filled with the Spirit, 137–40.

54. According to Cage (The Holy Spirit, 325), it is thought that Cleanthes is probably the first to explicitly make this association. But, this association between the divine πνεῦμα and the universe was made in some way during the pre-Socratic period. An earlier fragment of Anaximenes reads, “as our soul, being air, holds us together, so do πνεῦμα (breath) and air surround the whole universe” (fragments 2–3; Diogenes Laertius 11.3). Kleinknecht (“πνεῦμα in the Greek World,” TDNT, 6:352) points out that this text may be the first instance of the concept of the cosmos, which understood in Stoic fashion after the analogy of the human organism, has ψύχη, ἀήρ, and πνεῦμα.


57. The characteristic view of the κόσμος as “pervaded by πνεῦμα” comes from Stoic anthropology, which viewed human beings as living, unified organisms. For instance, Cleanthes believed that the human soul consisted of “heat,” with the heart as its ruling part. Chrysippus slightly modified this view by describing the human soul as “πνεῦμα,” with its ruling part, aether, at its farthest and purest periphery (Diogenes Laertius lives, 7.139). In this sense, the Stoic πνεῦμα comes to be closely related with the notion of “the unifying element that permeates both the
Therefore, three essential characteristics are given to the θεῖον πνεῦμα in Stoicism: πνεῦμα is God, πνεῦμα is a material substance, and πνεῦμα pervades all things (πάντα). In Stoicism God and πνεῦμα share the same nature and God’s πνεῦμα is the source of the principle of life in the universe. In terms of Paul, πνεῦμα is substantially used in reference to “the Spirit of God,” even more than other New Testament writers. However, while he speaks of πνεῦμα as “the Spirit of God,” he does not employ the concept of πνεῦμα to speak about the principle of life in the universe. The idea that πνεῦμα is the source or “principle of life” is somehow applied to his ethical discourse; this in the sense that the central role played by πνεῦμα is distinguished as the “enabler,” the “power” in the virtuous and holy life of believers. The strong and consistent emphasis on the ethical work of “the πνεῦμα of God” in Paul’s ethics is probably original with Paul, since this emphasis is found nowhere before his time, and only in a lesser degree in the Hellenistic Jewish writers.

Whereas the Stoics do not hesitate combining material with immaterial, Paul—κόσμος and soul (ψύχη);” the human soul for the Stoics is viewed as a fragment of the cosmic soul (Diogenes Laertius Lives, 7.143). See Levison, Filled with the Spirit, 140.

58. Engberg-Pedersen (“The Material Spirit: Cosmology and Ethics in Paul,” 186) provides a good definition of the Stoic material πνεῦμα: “the Stoic pneuma is a material element or energy made up from a mixture of the two finest elements of the four: fire and air. It extends throughout the world but has its principal place in the uppermost regions of the world. But also the Stoic pneuma is also a cognitive entity (reason). It is what gives human beings a share in rationality and reason (logos and nous). The Stoics therefore said (and I am quoting from Paul’s contemporary, Seneca) that ‘reason is nothing other than a part of the divine spirit descended (or sunk) into a human body” (Ep. 66.12).


60. Not only Stoicism, according to Martin, but also within Hellenism in general. He argues that in the Greco-Roman world, there was no distinction at all between the material and the immaterial, and that all ancients were “monistic” (e.g., Plato, Tim. 39E–40A). He also asserts that the notion of “dualism,” which many think of it as Platonic, was actually developed only by Descartes. See, The Corinthian Body, 21–25. However, as Rabens states, “the fact that the Platonic
influenced primarily by the Jewish Scripture (the LXX, θείον πνεῦμα and πνεῦμα θεοῦ)—views the nature of God’s πνεῦμα not precisely as material. For him, and also for other Hellenistic Jewish writers, God’s πνεῦμα is immaterial and divine. But, only Paul and some Hellenistic Jewish authors (Aristobulus, *Wisdom of Solomon*, and 4 Maccabees) ascribe God’s πνεῦμα qualities that belong to the realm of the νοῦς, and the intelligible world. This is by virtue of the fact that it is in God’s divine πνεῦμα that believers are able to acquire virtues, and thus attain eternal life, which is a heavenly life in and with God. Chapter seven has shown that in Paul’s ethical discourse, the qualities ascribed to, or are associated with, God’s πνεῦμα (e.g., intelligence, wisdom, knowledge, immortality, incorruptibility, and immateriality) are qualities equivalent to characteristics of the Platonic νοῦς. In his ethical discourse, Paul equates the Stoic (material) πνεῦμα with these Platonic qualities, and in doing so, Paul spiritualizes the Stoic concept of πνεῦμα.\(^\text{61}\)

The Stoic πνεῦμα, which is an invisible fine substance carries in its own nature the powerful essence to permeate, integrate, vivify, and give the soul all reality and in all its forms.\(^\text{62}\) The πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethical discourse reflects fairly the powerful Stoic πνεῦμα; although his complex use of the powerful πνεῦμα is quite different from Stoic philosophy.\(^\text{63}\) For Paul, the powerful role played by πνεῦμα is not in relation to the life principle of the Academy as such no longer existed after 88 BCE does not necessarily imply that Platonism had entirely lost its influence on the philosophy at the turn of the ages.” See *The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul*, 28.

\(^{61}\) This idea is further developed in chapter nine.


\(^{63}\) Along this thought, DeSilva (“Paul and the Stoa,” 551) argues that between Paul and the Stoics, there is no discernible connection in their usage of πνεῦμα; though he does not associate this distinct use of πνεῦμα with ethics.
universe and human organisms (Diogenes Laertius 7.1.68–86). Paul does not describe, for example, God’s πνεῦμα permeating the whole universe (πάντα). Paul attributes to God’s divine πνεῦμα one fundamental quality that distinguishes it from the Stoic πνεῦμα, that is, the quality of “holiness.” God’s divine πνεῦμα is “holy” (πνεῦμα ἅγιον). This way of describing God’s πνεῦμα is not new, since in the Hellenistic Jewish tradition God’s πνεῦμα is “holy” (ἡγίος). Thus, some of the powerful qualities of the Stoic πνεῦμα in Paul are re-defined in the direction of ethics. Paul expands, and thus, transforms the notion of πνεῦμα in a new way that now it is not God’s πνεῦμα permeating and giving life to the universe (πάντα), but it is God’s holy πνεῦμα “dwelling” in the community of believers, who share χαρίσματα in one κοινωνία and one πνεῦμα. This is how God’s holy πνεῦμα gives “true life,” one that leads to eternal life and salvation. As we shall see in chapter nine, the key figure for Paul is Christ, not the Stoic λόγος. Therefore, at this point, it will suffice to say that it should not be surprising (against Rabens) that Paul, sometimes, treats πνεῦμα

64. It is important to note is that philosophers like Seneca (see below) and Plutarch identify the θείον πνεῦμα as holy, but the latter uses the word ὁσιότης instead of ἅγιος. The phrases πνεῦμα ἅγιον and θείον πνεῦμα appear considerably in the magical payri. Cf. Burton, Spirit, Soul, and Flesh, 174–75.

65. E.g., Wis 1:5; 7:22; 9:17; Sib. Or. 7.69; cf. 3.701. Isaacs (The Concept of Spirit, 19) rightly argues that the Stoics did not ascribe the quality of “holiness” to God’s πνεῦμα because it would have contradict their immanentist theology. They endowed matter with the characteristics of spirit; or in other words, they endowed spirit with the characteristic of matter. Stoicism would allow no dualism between spirit and matter; both were of the same essence and that essence was reason (λόγος).

66. See Rabens, The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul, 86, 108, 119–20. Rabens strongly argues (against Engberg-Pedersen) that Paul never views πνεῦμα as Stoff, or material, not even in the so called “sacramental passages.” His argument based on Hellenistic Jewish sources—the idea that a material πνεῦμα is not found in (Hellenistic) Judaism—is not convincing to support such claim. Interestingly, while he strongly argues in favor for non-material πνεῦμα in Pauline writings, at the end he asserts that “Paul does not attribute such an importance to these factors (referring to the material/immaterial πνεῦμα); rather he leaves these matters open.”
within the categories of the Stoic πνεῦμα (e.g., 1 Thess 5:23; Gal 3:27–28; 1 Cor 2:14–15; 10:3–4; 6:11; 12:13; 2 Cor 1:21–22; 3:8; Phil 3:21; Rom 5:5). It is also true that Paul’s view of God’s πνεῦμα does not reflect in its entirety the material Stoic view of πνεῦμα—this is probably due to the influence of the non-material aspect given to πνεῦμα in the LXX, Paul’s primary source. Other times, he places πνεῦμα within the realm of the Platonic intelligible world (e.g., 1 Cor 15:44; 2 Cor 4:16–5:10). This dualistic view occurs for two main reasons: (1) because of his Christocentric view, and (2) because Paul is influenced by emerging Middle Platonism. I will show in chapter nine that Paul’s view of the primary role of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse is a good example to see the degree of influence of Middle Platonism in Paul’s ethical thought.

The Relationship of the Concept of Πνεῦμα and Virtue in the Greco-Roman Tradition

In the Greek philosophical tradition the concept of πνεῦμα does not play a prominent role in ethics. However, there are some important texts in which the concept of πνεῦμα is somehow associated with moral performance, directly and sometimes indirectly. For the purpose of this study, we will analyze these texts and see the way Greek authors employ πνεῦμα in their ethics. The Greek tragedian Aeschylus attributes to Zeus’ πνεῦμα the quality of “compassion,” when he writes, “Zeus the Savior protector of the houses of holy men [ὁσίων ἀνδρῶν]—receive as suppliants this female band, and may the country

67. Other passages that depict πνεῦμα in Stoic categories are: 1 Cor 15:35–49; 2 Cor 4:7; 5:10; Rom 1:19–23; 6:2–6; and 8:10, 14–30.

68. This idea is developed in chapter nine.
show them a spirit of compassion [αἰδοίῳ πνεύματι χώρας].” (Suppl. 25–29). Although
this text may refer to either the wind or the physiological breath of the people of the
land (see lines 1–48), Zeus’ spirit infused within the people creates a positive attitude
in men and women of the land. Previously in the text, Aeschylus speaks of the “breath
of Zeus” (ἐπιπνοίας Διὸς), using the term ἐπίπνοια instead of πνεῦμα to speak about the
inbreathing of Zeus’ love (Suppl. 19–20).

A similar connection is found in the Greek philosophical tradition. For instance,
in Plato’s Republic, the notion of truth, perfection, incorruption, and the genuine passion
for true philosophy is tied with a θείας ἐπιπνοίας (Resp. 499B-C). As mentioned above,
Plato uses the term ἐπίπνοια instead of πνεῦμα to speak of divine inspiration. The key
point is that for Plato, truth (ἀληθεία), true love or genuine passion (ἀληθινὸς ἔρως),
and human perfection (τέλεος) are directly associated with ἐπίπνοια. These features
reflect somewhat Paul’s understanding that divine inspiration through ἐπίπνοια (or
πνεῦμα) brings about positive qualities associated with the “good” and the τέλος of life.

There are, however, two essential differences worth making, this in relation to πνεῦμα in
Paul’s ethical discourse: (1) while for Plato, these positive qualities flow from some divine

69. Aeschylus, Persians, Seven against Thebes, Suppliants, Prometheus Bound (ed. and

70. See Kleinknecht, “πνεῦμα in the Greek World,” TDNT, 6:337. Cf. Cage, The Holy Spirit,

71. Resp. 499B-C reads, “for this cause and foreseeing this, we then despite our fears
declared under compulsion of the truth that neither city not polity nor man either will ever be
perfected until some chance compels this uncorrupted remnant of philosophers, who now bear
the stigma of uselessness, to take charge of the state whether they wish it or not, and constrains the
citizens to obey them, or else until by some divine inspiration [ἐκ τινος θείας ἐπιπνοιας] a genuine
passion for true philosophy takes possession either of the sons of the men now in power and
sovereignty or of themselves.”
inspiration (ἐκ τινος θείας ἐπιπνοίας), in Paul’s ethics, these prominent characteristics are not only associated with God’s holy πνεῦμα, but they are qualities given to the believers (truth and genuine passion) and attained by the believers (perfection and incorruption) only through God’s holy πνεῦμα. (2) While Plato links these qualities directly with “philosophers” and with a passion for “philosophy,” Paul’s connection is with “the believers” in Christ and with “ethics.”

Another passage that also reflects in some way Paul’s description of the role of πνεῦμα in promoting virtues is found in On Virtue, a Socratic dialogue attributed to Plato (ca. 350–300 B.C.E.). In a discussion between Socrates and “a friend” about whether virtue can be taught, Socrates speaks of prophecy as a divine “inspiration” (ἐπιπνοία) and associates it with a personal moral status. Pseudo-Plato writes:

How then do you suppose, Socrates, that they become virtuous, if it’s neither by nature or teaching? How else could they become good?... [Socrates replies] the possession of virtue is very much a divine gift and that men become good just as the divine prophets and oracle-mongers do. For they become what they are neither by nature not skill: it is through the inspiration of the gods that they become what they are (Virt. 379C-D).72

The divine infusion (ἐπιπνοία) has direct influence on a person’s behavior, for in fact, virtue is a gift that exists only by a divine inspiration to those who possess it. Seneca also associates more explicit the holy πνεῦμα with ethics. In Moral Epistles, he writes,

God is near you, he is with you, he is within you. This is what I mean, Lucilius: a holy spirit indwells within us [sacer intra nos spiritus sedet], one who marks our good and bad deeds, and is our guardian. As we treat this spirit, so are we treated by it. Indeed, no man can be good without the help of God. Can one rise superior

72. Translated by Cooper, Plato, 1698. This is one the few passages where the divine πνεῦμα/ἐπιπνοία is connected with virtue. Cf. Cage, The Holy Spirit, 327.
to fortune unless God helps him to rise? He it is that gives noble and upright counsel (Ep. 41.1–2).\textsuperscript{73}

This way of understanding the role of God's πνεῦμα in ethics is quite close to Paul's own view of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse. Like Paul, (1) for Seneca, the “holy” spiritus is God; (2) Seneca refers to spiritus as “a holy Spirit” (spiritus sacer), thus attributing to it the power to effect holiness, which is a virtuous life;\textsuperscript{74} (3) Seneca claims that God (a holy πνεῦμα) dwells in “good” men; (4) In Seneca’s letter, it is the holy πνεῦμα that gives noble and upright counsel; that is, God's holy πνεῦμα leads only to what is “good” and “virtuous,” and that good people can ask God (or his holy πνεῦμα) for ethical guidance.

These examples convey the notion that the concept of πνεῦμα in the Greek tradition is sometimes used as inspiring good behavior. God's πνεῦμα (or ἐπίπνοια) is referred to divine inspiration, and its possession sparks not only miraculous power such as prophecy, mystical experience, skill in battle, artistic talents (e.g., music and poetry), but also ethical conduct. In the Greek literature and philosophy, God's πνεῦμα sometimes function as a divine force to lead people towards virtues, especially virtues of compassion and goodness. In a way similar to Paul's ethical discourse, the association of the θεῖον πνεῦμα or God's πνεῦμα with ethical performance in the Greek tradition is in part understood in association with perfection. However, the analyses of these texts of Greek


\textsuperscript{74} As Levison points out (Filled with the Spirit, 144–45), Seneca's description of “a holy spirit,” which “indwells within us, one who marks our good and bad deeds, and is our guardian,” resembles somehow Wisdom's description of “a holy and disciplined Spirit will flee from deceit and depart from senseless thoughts and be ashamed when unrighteousness approaches …” (Wis 1:5–8).
literature and philosophy have demonstrated that the preeminent role played by πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethical discourse shows a marked advance on the Greco-Roman tradition.

Table 31. The Basic Doctrine in Philosophical Ethical Systems and Paul’s Ethical Discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosophical tradition</th>
<th>Goal of human life</th>
<th>Primary virtue</th>
<th>Intermediate figure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plato/Socrates</td>
<td>Happiness: Becoming like to God</td>
<td>φρόνησις</td>
<td>λόγος</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoics</td>
<td>Happiness: Living in accordance with nature [=reason or virtue]</td>
<td>φρόνησις</td>
<td>λόγος</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>Happiness: Becoming like to the divine</td>
<td>φρόνησις</td>
<td>λόγος</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pythagoras</td>
<td>To follow God</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul</td>
<td>Virtuous life: becoming transformed into the image or likeness of Christ; Salvation/eternal life with God</td>
<td>πνεῦμα</td>
<td>Christ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 32. Greek Philosophical Features in Paul’s Ethical Discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paul</th>
<th>Greco-Roman Literature</th>
<th>Greco-Roman Philosophy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>πνεῦμα as divine πνεῦμα</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πνεῦμα and “pouring out” or infusion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πνεῦμα and inspiration/χαρίσματα</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>πνεῦμα and prophecy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πνεῦμα and holy πνεῦμα</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πνεῦμα and life-giving πνεῦμα</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πνεῦμα and λόγος</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Malherbe asserts that Paul’s letters have many affinities, even on a superficial level, with the popular philosophy of his day, especially Stoicism.\(^75\) This chapter has shown important, and relevant for our purpose, texts from Greco-Roman literature and the Greek philosophical tradition. It is true that in Paul’s ethical discourse there are some parallels with the use of πνεῦμα in the Greek (philosophical) tradition, but compared to the parallels found with Philo (see chapter five), they are fairly minor. The use of πνεῦμα and its association with the deity is common in Greek literature and philosophy, especially in terms of divine inbreathing, infusion, or inspiration, and significantly in prophetic inspiration. In the Greek philosophical tradition, the θεῖον πνεῦμα has power, and is identified with God’s own nature or material essence, especially in Stoicism. Although in Posidonius, we find the notion that πνεῦμα has become somehow less material. In Platonism, however, God’s essence is immaterial (cf. Claudius Galen, \textit{Phil. hist.} 16).\(^76\) Also, the θεῖον πνεῦμα is associated with the rational (λόγος), the mind or intellect (νοῦς),

\(^75\). Malherbe, “Paul: Hellenistic Philosopher or Christian pastor?,” 86.

and with the noetic world, thus having the quality to move above the earthly and material world.

The concept of πνεῦμα in the Greek (philosophical) tradition had a development, and this development can be observed—yet in a lesser degree—in Paul’s use of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse. We can say that he adopts and sometimes adapts the Greco-Roman (philosophical) tradition, current in his day, by using the same language describing πνεῦμα. However, the fact that there is not much correlation between Paul and writers of Greek philosophical discourses (e.g., Platonists, Aristotle, Stoics, Middle Platonists), particularly in the association of πνεῦμα with ethics, shows that Paul is certainly not a philosopher like Philo. As a matter of fact, Paul never discusses the nature of πνεῦμα, for example, whether it is material or immaterial. His description of πνεῦμα is less philosophically developed than the way the author of Wisdom does with πνεῦμα (=σοφία). In this regard, two comments can be made about Paul: (1) the fact that Paul reflects a relatively minor influence about πνεῦμα in the Greek (philosophical) tradition demonstrates that his familiarity with the rich Greek tradition of the understanding of πνεῦμα and its development is fairly modest. He skillfully and originally re-shapes some of these to his own distinctive understanding of πνεῦμα. This re-definition is essentially done in combination with his central thought on ethics, his view of Christ, and his gospel. (2) As a Hellenistic Jew, Paul uses some of the Greek (philosophical) ideas and notions about πνεῦμα into his own ethics. Indeed, he not only applies to God πνεῦμα (the Spirit

77. One point that needs to be noted is that Paul never relates πνεῦμα with wind. When he uses πνεῦμα is frequently used in reference to the Spirit of God.

78. See discussion in chapter seven.
of God) in a unique way, but he also gives God’s πνεῦμα a strong ethical meaning in a way that is not found elsewhere. The role played by πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse, therefore, becomes firmly established. Thus, Paul is at once, a Hellenistic Jew and a believer in Christ.

**Conclusion to Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight**

These chapters have examined the way Paul gives prominence to the concept of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse (chapter six), and how both the Hellenistic Jewish (chapter seven) and the Greek (philosophical) tradition (chapter eight) influenced him to re-configure his ethics around this Greek concept. The analyses of these chapters have shown that the more significant influence in Paul’s notion of πνεῦμα in his ethics is primarily found in the Jewish Scripture (LXX), and secondarily in the Hellenistic Jewish heritage. What comes to light is that the influence from Greek (philosophical) tradition is rather minimal. Paul shares his view of πνεῦμα with Hellenistic Jewish writers, especially with texts that are more philosophically oriented (Aristobulus, *Wisdom of Solomon*, and 4 Maccabees), yet in these texts, with the exception of Wisdom, the prominence given to πνεῦμα is not primarily in the domain of ethics. Rather, this prominence is in the relation of πνεῦμα with the noetic, immaterial/intelligible world. An interesting feature is that the Hellenistic Jewish authors discussed in this study share more than Paul does with the Greek philosophical tradition. In other words, in both traditions, πνεῦμα does not play a prominent role in ethics (in Wisdom it is only through σοφία), and in both traditions it is rather the virtue of εὐσέβεια that holds an ethical preeminence.79 In both traditions,

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79. Wisdom is an exception; the virtue of εὐσέβεια appears only once (10:12), and it is σοφία who plays the primary role in ethics (see chapter four).
πνεῦμα plays sometimes a minor role in ethics, but as we have illustrated it is not strongly and consistently emphasized as in Paul. The fact is that the ethical prominence given to πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse is highly developed than in either the Hellenistic Jewish tradition or the Greek (philosophical) tradition.

The analyses of Paul’s seven undisputed letters have shown that he has transformed views of πνεῦμα in such a way that πνεῦμα’s nature, powers or qualities become intrinsically associated with virtues and the believers’ ethical conduct. Thus, Paul’s ideas that God’s πνεῦμα is divine (immaterial), is holy, and is a life-giving πνεῦμα do come from the Hellenistic Jewish tradition he inherited. The notions that God’s holy πνεῦμα confers virtues, has power and knowledge, inspires especially prophecy, and possesses qualities related to the Platonic νοῦς and the intelligible world are also part of this tradition. However, as chapter eight has shown, some of these elements (ethical behavior, prophecy, and life-giving πνεῦμα) are also part of Greek literature and philosophy. In particular, the qualities of πνεῦμα related to the νοῦς and the intelligible world evince a Greek philosophical influence on Paul, and on other Hellenistic Jewish writers (e.g., Aristobulus, Wisdom of Solomon, and 4 Maccabees). It is in these ideas and notions of the divine πνεῦμα that he remains grounded in the Hellenistic Jewish and Greek literature and philosophy. Therefore, the trailing edge in terms of Paul’s ethical discourse is the common view of these ideas and notions about πνεῦμα and their application in his ethics.

As it will be shown briefly in chapter nine, philosophically, Paul is “eclectic.”

80. This statement contradicts Gunkel’s argument that Paul drew on the popular view of πνεῦμα in early Christianity, and not on Jewish Scripture or Hellenistic Judaism. See Gunkel, Die Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes nach der populären Anschauung der apostolischen Zeit und der Lehre des Apostels Paulus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1888), 76–82.
Paul is part of the Hellenistic Jewish world, more than part of the various philosophical schools of thought. It is perhaps, as Free states, because of his “Jewishness,” that Paul uses “holy” and “holiness” instead of “virtuous” and “virtue.” However, this does not make Paul immune from Greek philosophical influence on his view of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse. Indeed, the evidence of the material substance of πνεῦμα in Paul comes probably from his Stoic background. His association of πνεῦμα with the νοῦς and divine qualities like that of immortality, spiritual, incorruptibility, eternal life, and perfection leads to the association of πνεῦμα with the immaterial or intelligible realm. In fact, Paul tends to disassociate πνεῦμα from the material, mortal, and corrupt world. Although he treats God’s πνεῦμα in terms of both the Stoic and Platonic categories (of πνεῦμα), Paul develops his own view of πνεῦμα in a less philosophical fashion than Philo does. What is also significant in Paul is that he never directly associates πνεῦμα with the Stoic λόγος. Interestingly, only 4 Maccabees makes this association. Paul’s connection with λόγος is more or less “indirect;” that is, while in the Stoic philosophical tradition there is a direct association of πνεῦμα with λόγος (especially in reference to the κόσμος), in Paul, there

81. Free, The Morality of Paul’s Converts, 70.

82. Paul’s virtues and vices, for example, contains a form of popular Greek discourse on virtues (e.g., Epictetus, Diss. 3.22.44.), as attested especially in Gal 5:22–23; Phil 4:8–9 (virtues) and in Rom 1:29–31; 13:13; 1 Cor 5:10–11; 6:9–10; 2 Cor 6:6; 12:20–21; Gal 5:19–21 (vices). For a discussion about Greek values and ideals reflected in Paul’s ethics, see Lategan, “Is Paul Developing a Specifically Christian Ethics in Galatians?” in Balch, Greeks, Romans, and Christians, 323; DeSilva, “Paul and the Stoa,” 561–63; Engberg-Pedersen, “Paul, Virtues, and Vices,” in Sampley, Paul in the Greco-Roman World, 608; Betz, Galatians, 282; Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, 138–40. For the background of the expression “fruit of the Spirit,” see G. K. Beale, “The Old Testament Background of Paul’s Reference to ‘the Fruit of the Spirit’ in Galatians 5:22.” BBR 15/1 (2005): 1–38.

83. For details about the material and immaterial πνεῦμα in Paul, see chapter nine.
is rather an association between πνεῦμα and Christ.\textsuperscript{84} At this point we can say also that
the antithesis of πνεῦμα and σάρξ established first in Galatians is in large part of a new
development, where Paul not only expands the ethical meaning of πνεῦμα, but also the
term σάρξ acquires a new negative connotation.

It is true that, like Philo, Paul departs from both traditions (Hellenistic Jewish
and Greek philosophical). But unlike Philo, whose view of εὐσέβεια stays rooted in the
Hellenistic Jewish tradition, Paul departs from this tradition in a way that the prominence
given to πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse radically moves beyond the main Jewish principle
of ethical life, the Mosaic Law. Therefore, the \textit{leading} edge in terms of Paul's ethical
discourse is his appropriation of ideas and notions concerning God's holy πνεῦμα from
the Hellenistic Jewish and Greek traditions into his ethical configuration, and their
\textit{re}-definition in light of his own convictions about Christ and the new Law (the love
commandment), apart from the observance of the Mosaic Law. With this appropriation,
the concept of πνεῦμα in Paul not only becomes \textit{central} in his ethical discourse, but the
prominence given to it in the acquisition of virtues and the avoidance of vices is radically
centered in the figure of Christ and his gospel. This radical configuration makes Paul an
“outlier” from other Hellenistic Jewish writers, although he never saw himself as other
than an authentically Jewish (see chapter two).

As in Philo, three important elements are reflected in Paul's presentation of his
ethical discourse: (1) the concept of πνεῦμα, (2) the figure of Christ, and (3) the love
commandment/Law of Christ, which is rooted in the gospel. In chapter nine, these three
essential elements are presented in comparison to and in contrast with Philo's three

\textsuperscript{84} This idea is further developed in chapter nine.
elements; they are (1) the virtue of εὐσέβεια, (2) the λόγος, and (3) the Mosaic Law. It is to this that we turn now.
CHAPTER NINE

PHILO’S ΕΥΣΕΒΕΙΑ AND PAUL’S ΠΝΕΥΜΑ: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Introduction

The analyses of chapters three (Philo) and six (Paul) are the main basis for arguing that both Philo and Paul share affinities in the way they configure their ethical discourses around their own concepts—Philo/εὐσέβεια and Paul/πνεῦμα. The form in which each of them treats his central concept demonstrates that they have been influenced—though with varying degrees of influence—by ideas and notions which were prevalent in both Hellenistic Jewish and Greek philosophical traditions.1 In a way similar to other Hellenistic Jewish authors (those discussed in this study), Philo and Paul drew from what must have been a set of notions, language, and ideas common in these two traditions concerning εὐσέβεια, in the case of Philo, and πνεῦμα, in the case of Paul. As chapters

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1. This statement goes against Barclay’s claim (Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora, 386–95) that Paul owes very little to anything in the Greco-Roman context. According to Barclay, Paul’s “ethical foundations are quite different from those of the Stoics.” For example, “he has neither aimed at nor achieved anything like that cultural convergence we have found in Aristobulus and Philo... Paul’s ethics are not significantly by the cardinal virtues (the terms ἀρετή appears only in Phil 4.8). He makes no attempt to relate his moral values to that common ethic to which Aristeas, Pseudo-Phocylides, and others made appeal.” Barclay also argues against Malherbe and Engberg-Pedersen stating that “some similarities between Paul’s patterns of though and those of Stoicism rarely touch the fundamentals of Paul’s thought.” While it is true that the authors of Wisdom of Solomon, the Letter of Aristeas, 4 Maccabees (Hellenistic Jewish texts discussed in this study) are far more Hellenized than Paul, his ethical discourse around the concept of πνεῦμα shows the contrary to what Barclay states. I would also disagree with Barclay’s statement about Paul’s refusal of “cultural convergence;” on the contrary, Paul, similar to Philo, spent part of his life trying to accommodate his teaching within the larger thought in the Hellenistic environment in order to communicate his message more meaningfully and efficiently.
three through eight have shown, Philo and Paul were part of the same larger world of
discussion about virtues, a discussion that was commonplace for Hellenistic Jews of the
Greek Diaspora in their encounter with the larger Greco-Roman world.

While Philo’s configuration of his ethical discourse around the primary virtue of
εὐσέβεια moves beyond both Hellenistic Jewish and Greek philosophical traditions, Paul
departs radically from both traditions. In fact, in Philo’s ethics, the central virtue εὐσέβεια
is intrinsically linked with both the λόγος and the Mosaic Law (e.g., Letter of Aristeas and
4 Maccabees), and in Paul, πνεῦμα, which is not a virtue, is closely associated with Christ
and the Law of Christ, and not the Mosaic Law. The three elements central to each of
them, therefore, are different; yet, the ethical role that each element plays is very similar
in both ethical discourses. For an easier understanding, this chapter is divided into three
parts. Part one shows the similarities between the roles of εὐσέβεια and πνεῦμα, part two
shows their differences, and part three suggests the philosophical stance of Philo and Paul
based on the discussion of εὐσέβεια and πνεῦμα in their ethical discourses, and not in
broader terms.²

Part One: Similarities between Philo’s
Role of Εὐσέβεια and Paul’s Role of Πνεῦμα

Previous studies have highlighted important similarities between Philo and Paul,³ but

² To avoid repetition, only key passages of Philo and Paul will be quoted in this chapter. For more examples, see the respective discussions in previous chapters, especially chapters three (Philo) and six (Paul).

³ E.g., Gundrun Holtz, “Von Alexandrien nach Jerusalem. Überlegungen zur
Vermittlung philonisch-alexandrinischer Tradition an Paulus.” ZNW 105/2 (2014): 228–63; Runia,
they have overlooked the similarities concerning the roles of εὐσέβεια and πνεῦμα. This part of the chapter shows the particular similarities in their ethical discourses centered in the special prominence given to εὐσέβεια in Philo and πνεῦμα in Paul. Especially from the presentation of chapters three and six, it is evident that both Hellenistic Jews, Philo and Paul, privilege consistently and intentionally the place of εὐσέβεια and πνεῦμα in their respective ethics. As a result, the role played by each concept, εὐσέβεια and πνεῦμα, becomes strongly emphasized, especially in the acquisition of virtues and the avoidance of vices. In his ethical discourse, Philo treats εὐσέβεια in ways that are very similar to πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethical discourse. These similarities are viewed especially under three main aspects: (1) both εὐσέβεια and πνεῦμα are closely connected with the virtue of love; (2) both εὐσέβεια and πνεῦμα are portrayed as “source” of the virtues; and (3) both εὐσέβεια and πνεῦμα are linked with the immaterial.

**Love**

We have seen in chapter three that Philo connects εὐσέβεια with the virtue of love of humanity (φιλανθρωπία).⁴ For him, love of humanity is a virtue akin to the virtue of justice (δικαιοσύνη), two main virtues which are placed as one of the two main headings of the Decalogue, containing the principles of Philo’s ethics. In the description of the practice of the commandments of the Decalogue or Mosaic Law, Philo emphasizes three ethical standards based on the virtue of love: they are love of God (τὸ ὄν), love of virtue (ἄρετή), and love of human beings (φιλανθρωπία).⁵ For Philo, the two dimensions of love—the vertical and the horizontal—are grounded in “virtue,” that is, εὐσέβεια. The

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⁴. See chapter three.

⁵. E.g., *Prob.* 83.
vertical dimension concerns the relationship between human beings and God, the Existent One, who is pure love (Det. 54, 55) and also a “lover of piety” (εὐσεβείας ἐραστής, Virt. 218). In Philo, the expression of love toward God is linked with love of εὐσεβεία in a way that one who has one virtue (piety) must have the other one (love), and vice versa. That is, if a person is pious (εὐσεβής), that one also is a lover (ἐραστής) of God.

In an analogous way, Paul connects the concept of πνεῦμα with the virtue of love (ἀγάπη). In fact, in his seven undisputed letters, the virtue of love is highlighted as the virtue par excellence. In first Thessalonians, love is expressed in the virtue of brotherly love (φιλαδελφία). In Galatians—the letter where the framework of Paul’s ethics is set up for the first time—love is presented as the first “fruit” of πνεῦμα (5:22). In first Corinthians (13:4–7), love is described as being everything, holding everything, and enduring everything (πάντα). In second Corinthians, love is associated directly with God when Paul calls Him “the God of love” (13:11–13). In Philemon, love is linked with the gospel as Paul, Onesimus, Philemon and his household live out the gospel teaching “out of love.” In Romans—the letter which contains Paul’s mature presentation of the relationship of his ethics and πνεῦμα—love is presented as the Law of πνεῦμα (8:2). As Paul expounds his ethical discourse grounded in the virtue of love, he also emphasizes three aspects that are reminiscent of Philo’s three ethical standards; they are love of God, love of Christ, and love among believers.⁶ As εὐσεβεία is the foundation of the two dimensions of love in Philo, so in Paul does πνεῦμα act as the linking power between the two dimensions of love: the relationship between the believers and God (vertical), and the relationship among believers.

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⁶ The emphasis on Christ is discussed in part two below (the differences between Philo and Paul).
believers (horizontal). It is true that, unlike Philo, Paul does not speak of “love of virtue.” But, Paul speaks of the “the love of πνεῦμα” (Rom 15:30), and also his emphasis is on “the love of Christ” (2 Cor 5:13). To Paul, Christ’s love (his self-giving to the point of death on a cross or κένωσις) is the true model of love (2 Cor 5:14–21; 13:4; Gal 1:3–4; 2:20; Phil 2:6–11). Therefore, the love of πνεῦμα, which is also the “Spirit of Christ,” unifies the love of God and the love among believers in “one love” and “one πνεῦμα.”

One of the great similarities between εὐσέβεια and πνεῦμα in their relationships with the virtue of love is especially observed in Philo and Paul’s view of monotheism, the vertical dimension of love. It is in this aspect of monotheism that both Hellenistic Jews share a strong affinity, since they remain very much under the influence of the monotheism of the Jewish Scripture. According to Philo, εὐσέβεια is to be expressed only towards the Existent One (τὸ ὄν) and not to other deities (Ebr. 109). For Paul, too, πνεῦμα is associated with the worship of the One God (Rom 1:18–32). Interestingly, both Philo and Paul connect the proper worship of God with “knowledge of God” (Spec. 1.147; Mos. 2.66; Rom 1:21, 28). Also, both of them identify what is impious (ἀσεβής) with idolatry (polytheism), which is for both the “source” of vices/sins, especially sexual immorality. In a way similar to Wisdom (14:27), idolatry can be defined as the “source,” “cause,” and “end” of every evil. In Philo, however, this is described in such a way that the practice of εὐσέβεια towards the Existent One (monotheism) represents an expression of what is

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8. For details, see the discussions in chapters two, three, and six, respectively.
truly virtuous, and in Paul, proper worship of God (monotheism) in πνεῦμα is likewise expressed in virtues.

Furthermore, both Philo and Paul give a special prominence to the virtue of love towards others (horizontal dimension of love) by linking the virtue of love to their own privileged concepts. Both of them describe God's friendship and love towards virtue-loving souls (Philo) and believers (Paul) within what constitutes their own ethical principles: for Philo, the ten headings of the Decalogue, and for Paul, the love commandment, sometimes referred as the Law of Christ (Galatians), the Law of πνεῦμα and the Law of God (Romans). Although Philo and Paul vary in the terminology they use, both of them designate the virtue of love as the core of the ethical principle concerning the relationship between human beings—particularly in Philo, it is expressed in the virtue of φιλανθρωπία, together with δικαιοσύνη. Indeed, both of them speak of a reciprocate love between a loving God and the one who is loved by God (see Det. 54, 55; Virt. 218; Spec. 1.316; 1 Cor 2:9; 8:3; 2 Cor 13:13; Rom 8:39). Yet in Philo, this loving expression cannot be performed without εὐσέβεια and the practice of the Mosaic Law, and in Paul, the believers must have πνεῦμα and practice the love commandment or the Law of Christ to live in κοινωνία and share in χαρίσματα. In their ethical discourses, while Philo remains true to the Mosaic Law, one of the five central elements of Judaism discussed in chapter two, he and Paul have much in common, in that their key concepts remain essential to love God and human beings likewise.

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The Source of Virtues

In diverse ways, Philo and Paul depict their key concepts as “a source” of virtues. In Greek philosophical ethical systems (e.g., Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic), εὐσέβεια holds a place, but that place is of a subordinate virtue, and most of the Hellenistic Jewish authors give εὐσέβεια a special prominence in their ethical exhortations. In the case of Philo, however, that prominence is strongly emphasized; εὐσέβεια is not only the primary virtue in his ethical discourse, but it is also the virtue under which all the other virtues, including the cardinal virtues, are subsumed. Influenced by the Socratic notion that “virtue is one,” or “virtues are one,” Philo acknowledges that εὐσέβεια in its nature embodies all the other virtues. For him, if a virtue-loving soul has εὐσέβεια, he or she has all the other virtues.

Paul shares the same idea concerning the privileged place of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse. When he structures the relationship of his ethics with πνεῦμα in Galatians (5:13–6:10), he depicts πνεῦμα as the source of virtues. To Paul, possessing πνεῦμα means having all the virtues, and later, especially in 1 Corinthians, he also adds χαρίσματα. Everything that involves the believers’ virtuous and holy life finds its source only in God’s holy πνεῦμα. For him, the possession of πνεῦμα qualifies the believer to behave virtuously and avoid vices. Paul is not per se unique relating πνεῦμα with ethics, for some of the Hellenistic Jewish and Greek (philosophical) traditions—as seen in chapter seven and eight—had also connected the role of the divine πνεῦμα with ethical performance. But in

10. See chapter five.

11. E.g., Plato, Prot. 329C-D, 331A-B; Lach. 198A–199E; Min. 87E–88C.
Paul, that prominent connection is not superficial, rather it is much more developed and sophisticated.

For Philo as for Paul, virtues are seen as “fruit(s).” For the former, virtues are the “fruits” of εὐσέβεια (see Mos. 2.66), and for the latter, virtues are the “fruit” of πνεῦμα (see Gal 5:22; cf. Rom 8:23). What is significant in both Philo and Paul’s ethical discourses is that their “monotheism” is what establishes the ground for their claim. Philo and Paul tie their own key concepts directly to God: εὐσέβεια/God and πνεῦμα/God. In Philo, this is observed, for example, in Decal. 52 and Leg. 1.63–73. Εὐσέβεια, as the source of all the other virtues, has its origin in God Himself and His wisdom (σοφία), and reason (λόγος). Therefore, its possession represents the recognition that it is the Existent One who actually possesses εὐσέβεια in His divine nature. Likewise, in Paul, God is the source of πνεῦμα (Rom 15:19), and everything that is spiritual and virtuous has its root in God Himself (1 Thess 2:14; 2:11). Indeed, it is God Himself who sends forth the πνεῦμα of His Son Jesus Christ (Gal 4:6). Despite the central ethical idea that God is the source of εὐσέβεια (Philo) and πνεῦμα (Paul) is the same, a crucial difference, however, is evident. Philo connects εὐσέβεια with λόγος, and Paul connects πνεῦμα with Christ. Although each key concept is inherently tied with a different figure (λόγος for Philo and Χριστός for Paul), at the same time, both Hellenistic Jews treat each of them (λόγος and Χριστός) as the “intermediate” figure between God and human beings, as we shall see below, in part two.

According to Philo’s ethical discourse, the possession of the virtue of εὐσέβεια leads the virtue-loving soul to virtues and knowledge of God (Spec. 1.147; Mos. 2.66; cf. Contempl. 25; QE 2.115). In Paul’s ethical discourse, likewise, the possession of πνεῦμα leads the believer to virtues and knowledge of God (2 Cor 1:13; Rom 1:21). What Philo and
Paul have in common is the notion that possessing εὐσέβεια (Philo) and πνεῦμα (Paul) is crucial because it makes the virtue-loving soul naturally virtuous, or, in the case of Paul, naturally disposed to act virtuously. For example, Philo uses the figure of the Patriarch Isaac to explain the soul's state of perfection naturally. Without any human effort and laws, Isaac, by virtue of his own being, is able to show his εὐσέβεια (e.g., Spec. 1.317; Abr. 3–4) and live in a state of virtue, that is, perfection. Paul, similarly, speaks of the powerful and divine experience of receiving πνεῦμα at baptism and possessing it (Gal 3:1–5; 4:4; 2 Cor 1:22; 5:5). Paul explains to the believers that they have the “fruit” of πνεῦμα (virtues), so that, they are able to act in ways pleasing to God. Believers do not need to observe the commandments of the Mosaic Law, because their faith in Christ, the reception of πνεῦμα, and the disposition of their mind (νοῦς) prompt them to be virtuous. Although the essential context is different, both Hellenistic Jews express the same idea of what it means to be virtuous. In Philo God’s εὐσέβεια is as vital to possess the “source” of virtues to act virtuously as is God’s πνεῦμα in Paul.

In their ethical discourses, the means to acquire virtues for Philo is εὐσέβεια, and for Paul it is πνεῦμα. Both Philo and Paul see each of their key concepts as the way (ὁδός) to perfection and the acquisition of God’s knowledge. For Philo, εὐσέβεια is the “path” (ὁδός) that leads the soul to perfection and knowledge of God. When Philo depicts the journey of the soul towards God, εὐσέβεια is described as the right path, or middle path (μέση ὁδός), a perfect virtue which ultimately leads the soul to a perfect state with the divine. For Paul, it is πνεῦμα that leads on the “way” (ὁδός) of virtues and finally eternal life, a life of perfection with God. Walking according to πνεῦμα is the way of virtues and
peace, not of ruin and misery, which is the way of σάρξ (Rom 3:16–17). But for Paul, the path to virtues is also the way of Jesus Christ (1 Cor 4:17), who through the lessons of his gospel leads believers to virtues and ultimately, to a life eternal with God. Regarding the lessons of Christ’s gospel, Paul views πνεῦμα as the source of the gospel, because the gospel that Paul preaches was taught by πνεῦμα. This notion finds its parallel in the special relationship between εὐσέβεια and the Mosaic Law in Philo. According to him, the ethical commandments of the Mosaic Law contains the lessons to attain virtues (Ebr. 37), thus perfection (Mos. 2.66). So, both Philo and Paul attribute to their key concepts the role of leading towards the path of virtues, perfection, and knowledge of God.

The Platonic Κόσμος Νοητός

The construal of the ethical discourses of Philo and Paul is in a way similar to most Middle Platonists. The goal of living virtuously is to move as far as possible away from the realm of the material world and toward the immaterial realm of the divine. Chapters three and six have demonstrated that to a certain degree both Philo and Paul connect their key concepts (εὐσέβεια and πνεῦμα) with the Middle Platonic understanding of the intelligible world (κόσμος νοητός). As a matter of fact, various characteristics particularly related to the “noetic world”—such as divine, immortal, incorrupt, eternal, immaterial, and invisible—are qualities that εὐσέβεια and πνεῦμα possess. In Philo, these powerful attributions given to εὐσέβεια are not unique, since they are also found in both the LXX

12. For Paul, there is nothing between πνεῦμα (virtues) and σάρξ (vices). This is something similar to the Stoic notion that there is nothing between virtue and vices (e.g., Diogenes Laertius 7.127), referring to the notion that one is either virtuous or non-virtuous.

13. E.g., Timaios of Lokri 82–84; Alcinus, Didaskalikos 1.152.2–3; 15.172.6–10.
and 4 Maccabees. Yet in Philo, the connection of εὐσέβεια with νοητός is emphasized in a particular way. Through the practice of εὐσέβεια, the virtue-loving soul not only becomes immortal and incorrupt (Opif. 155; QG 1.10; QE 2.38a), but also has the power to share with the divine qualities of the Existent One (τὸ ὄν). As Philo describes, one who has “a pious character is able to see the invisible things of God’s greatness” (QG 4.19). In Philo, εὐσέβεια receives one of the highest attributions given to a virtue, that of divinity, something not found in the Greek philosophical tradition. It is true, in 4 Maccabees, the author makes a similar connection between εὐσέβεια and the quality of divinity, but this is done only indirectly through reason (λόγος). In Philo, there is no intermediate λόγος as in 4 Maccabees through which εὐσέβεια becomes divine. The virtue is explicitly called “divine piety” (QE 2.15b; see also Somn. 2.186). The virtue of εὐσέβεια also has the characteristic of “origin” or “source” (ἀρχή) that directly associates it with the Existent One (Decal. 52), in a way that the nature of εὐσέβεια shares with the divine nature of God. Philo, following a Middle Platonic view, identifies his privileged virtue εὐσέβεια, as he does with the λόγος, with the immaterial world, which is the realm of God. Another important aspect is that by viewing εὐσέβεια as the source of all the other virtues, he associates virtues with the mind and thus the intelligible world.

The concept of πνεῦμα and virtues in Paul’s ethical discourse operate within Middle Platonic oriented categories, however, in a more peripheral way than Philo’s ethics. For Paul, it is πνεῦμα which leads the believers to eternal life (salvation), a life which Paul, too, identifies as divine, spiritual, immortal, and incorrupt (Gal 6:8; 1 Cor 15). In

14. See chapter four.

15. Sandmel (Philo of Alexandria, 150) argues that “in both [Philo and Paul], man is
fact, Paul warns the Corinthian believers, “I say this, brothers, that flesh and blood are not able to inherit the kingdom of God, neither the perishable inherits the imperishable” (15:30), “the unrighteous ones will not inherit God’s kingdom” (6:9), and sinners, such as fornicators, idolaters, thieves, and so on, “will not inherit the kingdom of God” (6:10). Paul not only relates πνεῦμα and virtues with the immaterial world, but he also associates σάρξ (vices/sins) with the sensible or material world (see also 1:26; 3:1, 3; 5:5; 10:18; 15:33, 39).

The dualistic understanding of πνεῦμα vs. σάρξ expressed in 1 Corinthians (see table 20 in chapter six) reflects also Platonic language. Paul describes being possessed by πνεῦμα or being possessed by σάρξ using categories belonging to emerging Middle Platonism. In Paul’s thinking, like Philo, πνεῦμα and virtues are part of the immaterial world, the realm of the mind (νοῦς), and σάρξ and vices part of the material world. But, what is distinctive in comparison with εὐσέβεια in Philo is that πνεῦμα for Paul, and for all Jews, is divine (πνεῦμα θείον or πνεῦμα θεοῦ).

The relationship between Middle Platonic categories with the primary role played by Philo’s εὐσέβεια and Paul’s πνεῦμα in the acquisition of virtues and avoidance of vices is particularly obvious in that both concepts are linked with the goal of life (τέλος). Each Hellenistic Jew, however, expresses it differently: for Philo, εὐσέβεια’s main role is to lead the soul, through reason (λόγος), to the goal of “becoming like to God” (Spec. 4.73). challenged to rise above body and to live in the intelligible world, as Philo phrases it, or in the ‘spirit’ as Paul does.” While Sandmel’s claim is correct, he overlooks the fact that the role played by πνεῦμα in Paul, is played by εὐσέβεια in Philo.

16. The vices listed in 6:9–10 contains 6 items of which are repeated from 5:11, and 4 from 5:9. For a detailed explanation of these vices, see Ciampa and Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, 2410–45.
For Paul, πνεῦμα’s main role is to lead the believer to become “the image or likeness of God’s Son,” Christ (Rom 8:29), who is also the “image of God” (2 Cor 4:4; Phil 2:6; Rom 8:29–30). Paul urges the believers to “imitate him” (Phil 3:17), for imitating him, they are also imitating Christ.17 Neil Richardson asserts that “if Christ is the image of God and is to be imitated,” implicitly, they are “being enjoined to imitate God.”18 Both Philo and Paul, Livesey argues, “share the common final goal of immortality and communion with the divine.”19 There is, however, a distinction between Philo and Paul in the conceptuality they use (πνεῦμα and Χριστός) as the foundation upon which each of them defines the acquisition of the goal of life in their ethical discourses.

Part Two: Differences between Philo’s Εὐσέβεια and Paul’s Πνεῦμα

Both Philo and Paul were part of the “same conversation” about virtues in the larger Greek philosophical tradition. Previous chapters have shown that they use language, ideas, and notions that were current and understandable in both Hellenistic Judaism and Greek philosophical traditions—though in a greater degree in Philo, and a lesser degree in Paul. However, there is nothing analogous in Paul to Philo’s terminology used in the presentation of his ethical discourse. Just to begin, Philo uses a concept (εὐσέβεια) that is a virtue in both Hellenistic Jewish and Greek philosophical catalogues of virtues. Paul, however, chooses a concept (πνεῦμα) that has a limited use in the ethical exhortations of

17. Livesey, “Paul, the Philonic Jew,” 43.


19. Livesey, “Paul, the Philonic Jew,” 44.
both Hellenistic Jewish and Greek philosophical traditions. With this basic difference in mind, I will describe three major points of divergence between Philo’s εὐσέβεια and Paul’s πνεῦμα in their ethical discourses: (1) the acquisition of virtues; (2) the practice to attain virtues; and (3) the essential transformation of εὐσέβεια and πνεῦμα.

**The Acquisition of Virtues**

In Philo and Paul’s ethical discourses, the principal role of εὐσέβεια or πνεῦμα is to lead the soul (Philo) or the believer (Paul) to virtues. Nevertheless, Philo emphasizes three important elements for the acquisition of virtues—training (τέχνη ἀλειπτική), instruction (διδασκαλία), and practice (ἀσκησις)—and relates them with εὐσέβεια. In the soul’s journey towards God (becoming like to God), “training” is necessary to become virtuous. It is in this way that the soul masters the greatest virtue, εὐσέβεια, and with it, all the other virtues or “noble practices” (Somn. 1.250–251). The “training” to attain εὐσέβεια goes in hand with both “instruction” and “practice,” because the acquisition of εὐσέβεια, and other virtues, requires effort by means of instruction and practice. These two elements are represented by two Patriarchs: Abraham, who represents instruction, and Jacob, who represents practice. Unlike Isaac, who is by “nature” virtuous, both Abraham and Jacob exemplify the arduous effort in the journey toward virtues, toward knowledge of God, and finally toward the goal of “becoming like to God.” In Philo’s ethical discourse, the inherent association of εὐσέβεια with these three elements (training, instruction, and practice) is essential for the acquisition of perfect virtue.

In Paul’s ethical discourse, however, the direct connection of πνεῦμα and the three elements (training, instruction, and practice) is not found. For Paul, the possession, or the reception of πνεῦμα at baptism does not require human effort; there is no need of
training, instruction or practice to have πνεῦμα. To possess πνεῦμα requires the virtue of πίστις (“faith in Christ”), and a genuine disposition of the mind (νοῦς). God’s πνεῦμα has the power to generate “understanding,” at least, in the same way as it is depicted in the Stoic notion of πνεῦμα (e.g., 1 Thess 2:13; 1 Cor 2:16). When the believer receives God’s πνεῦμα in “faith,” intellectually the believer’s “mind” possesses the power to be virtuous and holy (cf. Phil 2:1–4). The believer is ready to walk according to, or led by, πνεῦμα, and that happens without training, instruction, or practice. Paul’s construal of the possession of πνεῦμα in the believers’ heart is analogous, in some way, to Philo’s representation of Isaac, who possesses virtues “naturally.”

In Paul’s ethical discourse, it is the love commandment, or the Law of Christ, which is analogous to the three essential elements of training, instruction, and practice. Christ’s love becomes the model for the believers to follow and imitate (Phil 2:5–11; Rom 14:14–18) through training and practice of love, the virtue *par excellence*. In fact, if the believer practices love, he or she practices all the other virtues (Gal 5:14; 1 Cor 13). Paul consistently exhorts the believers to be trained in, and practice love towards one another, according to the love commandment or the Law of Christ. Therefore, the training and practice to live the love commandment require an individual effort, and Paul once describes it using athletic imagery, like Philo, when he speaks of the importance


21. Paul’s treatment of the virtue of love assimilates to Philo’s treatment of the virtue of piety, in the sense that both virtues embody in their nature all the other virtues, and that both are closely related to God.

to practice εὐσέβεια and virtues (see 1 Cor 9:24–27; Philo, Agr. 177; Congr. 98; Abr. 129). God’s πνεῦμα gives the believers the assurance that they possess the power to practice virtues and to reach eternal salvation, but they have to practice love in order to practice the other virtues and avoid vices (2 Cor 7:1–9; Rom 3:2–20; 7:4–5). What is significant in Paul’s ethics is that these three elements are also intrinsically connected with the gospel of Christ, which contains the instructions or lessons of the love commandment.

**Practice to Attain Virtues**

When Philo and Paul speak about the acquisition of virtues and the avoidance of vices, each associates his key concept (εὐσέβεια and πνεῦμα) with what constitutes the basic principle of virtues. In Philo’s ethical discourse, εὐσέβεια is closely linked with the Mosaic Law, and in Paul, πνεῦμα with the love commandment or the Law of Christ, which is also called the Law of God, the Law of πνεῦμα, and the Law of the Lord. They similarly speak of the importance of living virtuously in order to attain the goal of life, but the means to attain it is expressed differently. To Philo, the principle that contains the instruction to virtues is the commandments of the Mosaic Law. It is in this essential aspect that Philo, as other Hellenistic Jewish writers discussed, remains rooted in his Jewish tradition. The Mosaic Law contains the ethical lessons to lead the virtue-loving soul to εὐσέβεια (cf. Mos. 1.146), the other virtues, and thus to a state of perfection. Indeed, it is the “faithfulness” and “loyalty” to the various observances of the Mosaic Law that show one’s true εὐσέβεια toward God and human beings. In Philo’s ethical discourse, faithfulness to the various

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23. This statement follows Sandmel’s viewpoint, when he writes, “The goal of righteous living is achieved when man, observing the Laws of Moses, thereby progresses from this earthly or sensible world (κόσμος αἰσθητός) into the intelligible world (κόσμος νοητός) where virtue, piety, and wisdom abide.” See Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria, 114.
observances of the Mosaic Law goes in hand with both the commandments of the Mosaic Law and εὐσέβεια.

Paul, however, departs from the Hellenistic Jewish tradition in his intentional replacement of the Mosaic Law with the Law of Christ (Gal 1:7), which is rooted in the gospel of Christ. In his ethical discourse, Paul does not exhort faithfulness or loyalty to the observance of the commandments of the Mosaic Law, but “faith in Christ,” because it is in faith that the believers would experience the dynamic work of God’s πνεῦμα (Gal 3:1–5), so that, they can act virtuously in accordance with the Law of Christ, and conduct their lives in a way that is pleasing to God (Rom 15:1–15). For Paul, the value of the Mosaic Law remains as a material norm, only in the sense that it points toward the Law of Christ or love commandment (cf. Gal 6:2; Rom 13:8–10). In Paul, the Law of Christ is the goal of the Mosaic Law.24 As such, it is in this aspect that Paul remains in part connected with his Hellenistic Jewish heritage. Because of the Christ-event, the Mosaic Law is transformed in, through, and by the gospel of Christ in God’s πνεῦμα (1 Cor 2:12–13). The believers who “walk according to πνεῦμα” conduct their lives in accordance with the gospel of Christ, which contains the instructions of the Law of Christ. According to Paul, the example of Jesus’ life (death and resurrection) is the central content of the gospel Paul preaches. The believers who practice the teaching of the gospel of Christ (Rom 8:8) are “practicing” the love commandment or the Law of Christ. As Hays points out, the Law of Christ is nothing other than “Christ's self-giving.”25 In Paul's ethical discourse, then, faith in Christ goes


hand in hand with the gospel of Christ, the Law of Christ, and πνεῦμα (or the Law of πνεῦμα).

Whereas in Philo’s ethical discourse, both εὐσέβεια and the Mosaic Law have the essential role to lead the soul to achieve the goal of “becoming like God,” in Paul’s ethical discourse, that role is played by πνεῦμα and the Law of Christ, as laid out in the gospel of Christ. As a result, in Paul, the goal of life is not “becoming like to God,” but being “transformed into the likeness or image of Christ,” who is the image of God. The way of expressing the final goal of human beings, who live virtuously and in holiness, brings us to another important difference between Philo and Paul.

**The Essential Transformation of Εὐσέβεια and Πνεῦμα**

At the end of chapters five and eight, I mention three fundamental elements in Philo and Paul’s ethical discourses. In Philo, they are εὐσέβεια, λόγος, and the Mosaic Law, and in Paul, πνεῦμα, Christ (Χριστός), and the Law of Christ. In Philo, we have seen the importance of the practice of the commandments of the Mosaic Law and its close connection with εὐσέβεια. In an analogous way, though using different terminology, in Paul, the Law of Christ and πνεῦμα are also two fundamental elements in the virtuous life of the believers. What needs to be stressed now is the relationship between εὐσέβεια and λόγος in Philo, and πνεῦμα and Christ (Χριστός) in Paul.

For Philo, the key figure is the λόγος, and for Paul, it is Χριστός. Both λόγος and Χριστός are intrinsically tied with a respective privileged concept: in Philo, λόγος with

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26. In Hellenistic Judaism, only the author of 4 Maccabees makes this association, where εὐσέβεια is connected with both the λόγος and the Mosaic Law (see the discussion in chapter four).
εὐσέβεια, and in Paul, Χριστός and πνεῦμα. Although the terms central to their ethical discourses are clearly different (λόγος and Χριστός), the roles they play are similar. Both the λόγος and Χριστός are the “intermediary,” linking figures between God and human beings. As Sterling notes concerning Philo’s λόγος, “it was his larger system of thought that accentuated the transcendence of God and required him to posit an intermediary between the unknowable God and the sense-perceptible world that led him to accentuate the role of the Logos as the representative of God.” The same emphasis can also be expressed about the role of Χριστός in Paul. A crucial difference, however, is that for Philo, despite his language of personification, the λόγος remains impersonal, and thus does not become human. As Sandmel points out, Philo’s λόγος “is timeless and unconnected with time or space.” Whereas for Paul, Χριστός was born from a woman (Gal 4:4), that is, he became personal, the historical person of Jesus.

27. Whereas Philo’s association of εὐσέβεια with λόγος comes from his Hellenistic Jewish heritage (e.g., 4 Maccabees and Letter of Aristeas), Paul’s association of πνεῦμα with Christ is probably Paul’s contribution. The same connection is later found in the Johannine writings, where one of the main roles of Jesus is to bring the Spirit to the believers.


29. Philo’s concept of λόγος derived from Stoicism, and he re-interprets it using Platonic categories. According to Tobin (“Was Philo Piddle Platonist?” 48), Philo depicts the λόγος in a variety of ways; for example, the λόγος is “the image of God,” the closest to God (Fug. 101; Opif. 25–26), the λόγος is the “model” or paradigm for the ordering of the rest of the universe (Somn. 2.45); the λόγος is the “archetypal idea” on which all of the other ideas are contained (Opif. 24–25); and the λόγος is also the “instrument” through which the universe was ordered (Cher. 127; Spec. 1.81). For a treatment of the λόγος in Philo, see Sterling, “‘The Image of God,’” 160–65; Tobin, “Logos,” in David Noel Freedman (ABD 4; Doubleday: 1970: 348–56, esp. 354–55; Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 144–47, 149–50, 154–56.


In Philo’s ethical discourse, it is through the λόγος that the virtue-loving soul reaches the goal of εὐσέβεια (Mos. 2.66). Indeed, it is perhaps for this reason that Philo calls εὐσέβεια, “the most Godlike of qualities” (Somn. 2.186). Also, εὐσέβεια, the source of all the other virtues, is in both God’s σοφία and God’s λόγος (Leg. 1.63–73). Therefore, both εὐσέβεια and the λόγος are in the “mind of God.” Following the lessons of εὐσέβεια (Mos. 1.146) and through the λόγος, the virtue-loving soul reaches the goal of εὐσέβεια: becoming like to God. Connecting the λόγος with the goal of “becoming like to God” should not surprise us, since Philo also understands the “image of God” as God’s λόγος.32

As such, it is through the λόγος that the virtue-loving soul becomes an “image of God,” the Platonic τέλος. In a sense, the λόγος in Philo’s ethical discourse is closely related to both God, in that, the λόγος is the image of God, and the virtue-loving souls, in that, they through the λόγος become like to God. In other words, the virtue-loving soul, once reaching the goal of εὐσέβεια, becomes image of the λόγος, who is the image of God.

In Paul’s ethical discourse, however, it is through the figure of Χριστός that the believers attain the goal of becoming transformed into the image or likeness of Christ. That is, it is in God’s holy πνεῦμα and living the gospel of Christ in faith that the believer

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32. E.g., Opif. 25–26; Leg. 3.96; Her. 231; Spec. 1.81; 3.83, 207; QG 2.62. Sterling (“‘The Image of God,’” 161) argues that Philo probably knew the tradition of Gen 1:26–27, which describes the creation of the “heavenly man” as distinct from the earthly man in Gen 2:7. The “heavenly man” is closely linked with the image of God, who is the λόγος through whom human beings are created in the image of God; therefore, they can become like to God. Philo deals with the creation of man in God’s image, especially, in his treatise On the Creation (see Opif. 24–25, 69–71 [Gen 1:26–27], 134–135 [Gen 2.7]; see also Leg. 1.36–40. For a good discussion, see Tobin, The Creation of Man, 56–176; Richard A. Baer, Philo’s Use of the Categories Male and Female (ALGHJ 3; Leiden: Brill, 1970), 20–35; Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the “Timaeus” of Plato, 334–40; Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul, 25–31, 219–20.
is “transformed into the likeness of Christ, who is the image of God” (2 Cor 4:4; Phil 2:6 [in the form of God]; Rom 8:29–30 [conformed to the image of His Son]). Paul identifies Christ with the image of God, as Sterling shows in his statement, “Paul’s point is that Christians share in the form of God’s Image who is Christ.” In a way similar to Philo, who conceives the λόγος, the image of God, as a “heavenly man,” Paul describes the figure of Christ as the image of the “heavenly man,” not the man of dust (1 Cor 15:48–49), but the “last Adam who became a life-giving πνεῦμα” (1 Cor 15:45). Unlike Philo, however, Paul does not allude to Gen 1:26–27, but Paul has in mind that Christ is “the image of God” (2 Cor 3:18; 4:4), through whom the believers can become “images” of God’s image (Christ), and thus have a share in the glory of God. While Philo gives emphasis to the ideal of “becoming like to God,” Paul emphasizes the ideal of “becoming like to Christ” (Rom 8:29). Therefore, in Philo the virtue-loving soul is able to contemplate God through the λόγος, who is the image of God, in Paul, the believers are able to contemplate God eternally through Χριστός, who is the image of God. In Philo’s ethical discourse, Sterling (""The Image of God,"" 171) notes that Paul understands the “image” (εἰκών) and “form” (μορφή) to be directly related (in the form of the image of His Son). Sterling also points out that in Philippians, Paul uses the language of imitation in 2:5 (“let this thinking be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus”), although this passage does not explicitly use the concept of “becoming the image of the Image of God.” Free (The Morality of Paul’s Converts, 86) argues that Paul’s use of the language of “imitation” (1 Thess 1:6; 1 Cor 4:16; 11:1; Phil 3:17) derives from Stoic philosophers, some of whom urged students to choose a nobleman to imitate (Seneca, Mor. ep. 11.8–10). However, according to Malherbe (Paul and the popular Philosophers, 70), Paul is more confident than the philosophers when he calls believers to imitate him (1 Thess 1:6; 2:14; 1 Cor 4:16; 11:1), and the nature of that confidence is what distinguishes him from philosophers (Seneca, Ep. 6.5; 11.8–9; Pseudo-Diogenes 14, 31; Dio Chrysostom 6.31). Sterling, ""The Image of God,"" 170. According to Sterling (""The Image of God,"" 172), “it seems likely that Paul may have learned of the identification of Christ as the Image of God in Christian worship.” While early Christian hymns do not allude to Gen 1:27, Sterling suggests, this passage “played a prominent
the role of εὐσέβεια is fundamental for the final encounter of the soul with the divine, as is depicted in his theocentric goal. Similarly, in Paul, it is πνεῦμα which plays the essential role, as is shown in his christocentric goal. What we know about Philo is that he intentionally “divinizes” the virtue of εὐσέβεια, and he does that generally in Platonic terms. In his ethical discourse, the highest prominence given to εὐσέβεια is its association with the Existent One (τὸ ὄν).

Paul, on the contrary, does not have to divinize his privileged concept, πνεῦμα, because he shares with the Hellenistic Jewish view, and with some Greek philosophical authors, that in some sense πνεῦμα is already divine and holy. But, Paul takes the concept of πνεῦμα in another direction, not found in either the Hellenistic Jewish or Greek traditions. What is singular in Paul is that the divine πνεῦμα becomes “christicized,” in that his understanding of πνεῦμα becomes centered in the figure of Christ. This special relationship between πνεῦμα and Christ is central to, and governs all of Paul’s ethical discourse. The discussion of chapter six has shown, for example, that the πνεῦμα of God becomes the πνεῦμα of Christ (Rom 8:9), and that Christ is πνεῦμα (2 Cor 3:17; Rom 8:10), and that Christ is the one who brings πνεῦμα to the believers who have faith in

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36. For details, see the discussion in chapters seven and eight.
37. Paul’s experience of the revelation of Jesus Christ (Gal 1:12) is seen as the key to his Christocentric understanding of πνεῦμα in his ethical teaching. For a further treatment on this topic, see Fee, “Paul’s Conversion as Key to His Understanding of the Spirit,” in Longenecker, The Road from Damascus, 166–83.
Christ (Gal 4:6). For Paul, the Law of Christ is also the Law of πνεῦμα, and the gospel of Christ is the wisdom of God, which is the πνεῦμα of God (1 Thess 4:8).

The essential difference between Philo’s εὐσέβεια (“divinization”) and Paul’s πνεῦμα (“Christification”) is observed in two main aspects, which involves both the divine and human spheres. In Philo’s ethical discourse, the virtue of εὐσέβεια is given a twofold relationship: εὐσέβεια relates directly to both God and the virtue-loving souls. In relationship with God, εὐσέβεια becomes associated with God; that is, the virtue is “divinized.” In relationship to the virtue-loving souls, εὐσέβεια is part of the practice of their virtuous life; that is, the virtue in the human sphere is practiced according to the commandments of the Mosaic Law. The twofold relationship of Philo’s εὐσέβεια has an affinity in the role played by πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethical discourse. In relationship to God, πνεῦμα is God’s divine πνεῦμα; that is, it is already divinized. The divine πνεῦμα is intrinsically associated with Christ (πνεῦμα is Christ); that is, it is “christicized.” In relationship to the believers, therefore, the divine πνεῦμα through Christ becomes part of the human realm, when the believers, who have faith in Christ, receive πνεῦμα in their hearts in baptism. The divine πνεῦμα, by either being “poured out” (ἐκκέχυται) in the believer’s heart (Rom 5:5), or “dwelling” (οἰκεῖ) in the believer’s human body (Rom 8:9, 11; 1 Cor 3:16), becomes part of or one with the material body (Gal 3:27–28; 4:4; 1 Cor 2:14; 3:16; 2 Cor 1:22; 5:5; Rom 8:11). It is, therefore, through Christ and in Christ, and dwelling in the believer’s body, that God’s divine πνεῦμα comes in contact with the material realm.

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38. See also 1 Cor 7:40; Gal 5:25; 2 Cor 6:16.

39. Rabens (“The Development of Pauline Pneumatology: A Response to F. H. Horn.” Biblische Zeitschrift 43 [1999]: 161–79), who consistently argues against Horn’s argument (a material concept of πνεῦμα), overlooks the fact that Paul’s understanding of πνεῦμα is affected by his
and in a sense, πνεῦμα becomes materialized (1 Cor 15:45; 2 Cor 3:6, 17–18; Rom 8:9; cf. 1 Cor 6:17). In Paul’s ethics, the material and immaterial πνεῦμα is not a real issue, since he treats πνεῦμα as either material (stofflich) or immaterial (unstofflich). Paul’s understanding of Christ. For Paul, the role of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse cannot be effective without Christ, who is also πνεῦμα.

40. This assessment follows in part Engberg-Pedersen’s argument (Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul, 57). He states that “the resurrected Christ is a pneumatic being and a shining one. He is also a bodily beings a pneumatic body and a ‘body of glory (shining)’. What accounts for the bodilines is both the fact that he is made up of pneuma, which is itself a bodily thing, and also the fact that he is shining” (2 Cor 4:4). While Engberg-Pedersen’s statement is correct, he fails to recognize two essential elements, that both Christ (Rom 8:3; Gal 4:4) and πνεῦμα (Rom 8:9, 11) share the divine nature of God, and that God’s πνεῦμα dwelling in the believers maintains its divinity.

41. Gunkel, Die Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes nach der populären Anschauung der apostolischen Zeit und der Lehre des Apostels Paulus, 43–49, 75. He strongly supports the position that Paul and the early believers conceived πνεῦμα as a “material phenomenon.” Gunkel also argues that in Paul πνεῦμα is understood to direct the whole life of the believers. Similarly, Engberg-Pedersen (“The Material Spirit: Cosmology and Ethics in Paul,” 181, 187–90; see also his Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul, 16–17, 39–41) claims that πνεῦμα in Paul is a material and a cognitive phenomenon. In his discussion about 2 Cor 3:18, he correctly argues that πνεῦμα seems to be operative in believers both materially (the transformation) and cognitively (the vision). Also in 3:17, Paul suggests that the Lord, that is, the risen Christ, is the πνεῦμα, appoint that he seems to presuppose in 3:18. Likewise, regarding 1 Thess 5:23; 1 Cor 2:14–15, and 15:44, Engberg-Pedersen points out that Paul understands believers have a body and a soul and that they, different from everybody else, have also πνεῦμα infused in their bodies. That is, in their body and soul, they have received into their bodies πνεῦμα as a material entity, and such, they are on their way towards being completely transformed into bodies and souls that are spiritual (πνευματικός). Therefore, in this process, πνεῦμα has both a cognitive (reason) role to play and a material one (the material stuff which permeates the cosmos), just as in Stoicism. For Engberg-Pedersen, Paul’s ethics is grounded in his cosmology (the cosmological composition of the physical body of flesh and blood), as spelled out in Stoicism. For a similar view, see also Horn, Das Angeldes Geistes, 43–48, 57–59, 430; Martin, The Corinthian Body, 132. These prominent scholars, who argue in favor of a materialistic, concrete, and tangible understanding of πνεῦμα, are right only in part, because they fail to recognize that Paul treats πνεῦμα also as an immaterial reality. They not only exclude a Platonist readings of πνεῦμα, but they, too, do not link the “materialization” of πνεῦμα with Christ. For a brief summary of the works of Gunkel and Horn, see Rabens, The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul, 8–10, 12–15.

42. Gérard Verbeke supports the understanding of πνεῦμα as something “immaterial,” arguing that Pauline pneumatology should be understood along the lines of Platonic thought.
is not alone in portraying πνεῦμα in both ways (stofflich and unstofflich) in his ethical discourse. This may be due to his attempt to try to reconcile his own understanding of πνεῦμα as reflecting its relationship with Christ, the believer’s ethical life, and “the Jewish” understanding of the divine πνεῦμα. In Paul, we find the close connection of the divine πνεῦμα with the material realm, expressed in ways that reflect Stoic categories rather than Platonic.

Whereas in Philo, his “divinization” of εὐσέβεια makes him more “Platonically oriented,” in Paul’s case, however, it is less clear. His “Christification” of πνεῦμα makes him a “Stoically oriented,” and yet at the same time, his association of πνεῦμα with the immaterial and divine realm is beyond Stoicism. In this sense, it follows the notion that for Paul the issue of a material or immaterial πνεῦμα is not a matter of particular concern in his ethics. Nevertheless, it is Paul’s Christification of πνεῦμα that places him apart from the common Hellenistic understanding of πνεῦμα as divine and immaterial, in the same way as Philo’s divinization of εὐσέβεια places him beyond the Hellenistic Jewish tradition.

One final thought. Εὐσέβεια is a virtue, and in Philo’s ethical discourse, a

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43. The text in 2 Cor 5:4–5 is a good example where Paul combines Stoic and Platonic language to describe πνεῦμα’s activity in the believers. His way of viewing (material [Stoic] and immaterial [Platonic]) is not unique in Hellenistic Jewish tradition. For example, πνεῦμα is viewed as both material and immaterial in Wisdom of Solomon and in the Sibylline Oracles (see the discussion in chapter seven). It is worth mentioning that in Wisdom, the author mixes Stoicism and Platonism in a striking way in his description of wisdom (σοφία) in 7:22–8:1. The author speaks of wisdom in Stoic terms (7:22–24 [here σοφία has in her a πνεῦμα; in 15–6, the author describes "σοφία as a humane spirit"], 27, 8:1; cf. 13:1–9) to describe wisdom’s active role in the world; then in 7:25–26, 29, the author describes wisdom in Platonic terms to depict wisdom’s beauty and divine status as reflecting her special relationship with God.
privileged one. What kind of a concept is πνεῦμα for Paul in his ethical discourse? Paul never defines πνεῦμα; he does not explicitly say, for example, whether πνεῦμα is material or immaterial, despite his treatment of God’s πνεῦμα in both ways. Chapters seven and eight have highlighted that Paul’s understanding of πνεῦμα reflects some notions of πνεῦμα as divine and holy in the Hellenistic Jewish tradition (especially in the Septuagintal text), and less so in the Greek tradition. Paul shares likewise with both traditions the notion that πνεῦμα is closely related to the intellect (νοῦς). Paul builds upon these notions his own view of πνεῦμα, which can be defined as a “spiritual and intellectual reality” that has the power to transform dynamically the ethical activity of the believers’ virtuous life. Then, πνεῦμα as a “spiritual and intellectual reality” is transformative. Paul uses this notion to express ethical experiences associated with the believers’ interrelationships in the human level (among believers in the community), and the divine level (between believers and God). The notion of πνεῦμα as a “spiritual and intellectual reality” in Paul’s ethical discourse is, however, complex, since the divine and holy πνεῦμα takes on an “existential form” dwelling in the believer. As a “spiritual and intellectual reality,” πνεῦμα is in the heavenly realm divinized and sanctified, but through Christ, it becomes part of the believers’ ethical experiences, having the power to transform dynamically their lives into a virtuous and holy life. In Paul, there is a new dimension of πνεῦμα as a “spiritual and intellectual reality,” that is, its “Christification.”

44. Especially in the Hellenistic Jewish tradition, Paul shares with Aristobulus, Wisdom, and 4 Maccabees.
A question that scholars have raised regarding Philo is whether he is a Middle Platonist.\(^{45}\)

The same question I would raise not only about Philo, but also about Paul on the basis of the use of εὐσέβεια, in the case of Philo, and πνεῦμα, in the case of Paul, in their own ethical discourses. The analyses of chapters three through eight provide with the basic elements tentatively to locate the philosophical stance of each Hellenistic Jew. The crucial question is, on the level of shared language, ideas, and notions with the Greek philosophical traditions, where can we place Philo and Paul philosophically? To bring to light the final aim of this study, each Hellenistic Jew will be treated individually.\(^ {46}\)

**Philo: A de facto Middle Platonist**

In his treatment of the virtue εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse, Philo is first a Jew (Ἰουδαίος), and second a philosopher (φιλόσοφος). What kind of philosopher? I would suggest that he is a good representative of emerging Middle Platonism. The way he describes the special prominence of εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse reveals characteristics which are current in emerging Middle Platonism. The most obvious is that Philo retains the same Platonic formulation of the goal of life (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ), like Middle Platonists Eudorus, Alcinous, and later Plutarch. But sometimes Philo, too, appropriates the Pythagorean (to follow God) and Stoic (living according to nature)

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45. For bibliography, see chapter two (footnote 30).

46. To evaluate both Philo and Paul’s philosophical stances, I will follow Runia’s useful schema of the six possible positions of Philo’s philosophical stand: (1) a de iure Middle Platonist, (2) a de facto Middle Platonist, (3) a Platonizing expositor of scripture, (4) an eclectic philosophical expositor of scripture, (5) an independent philosopher, and (6) a Jewish religious thinker. See Runia, “Was Philo a Middle Platonist?,” 125.
He also adopts the Aristotelian Doctrine of the Mean and applies it to εὐσέβεια. Furthermore, Philo uses language common to both Platonism and Stoicism to describe εὐσέβεια’s superior qualities and powers. Certainly, Philo shows an awareness of the trends of thought that “virtues are one” or that “virtue is one” and its discussion in Greek philosophical ethical systems. In a sense, his definition of εὐσέβεια embodies not one, but various ideas and notions that represented the ethical systems of the Platonic, Aristotelian, Pythagorean, and Stoics. In addition, although Philo’s use of the concept of λόγος derives from Stoicism, his re-definition of the Stoic λόγος as an intermediate reality between God and the human world (e.g., Her. 205), as Tobin asserts, was common in Middle Platonism.

Therefore, I would suggest that according to Philo’s connection of εὐσέβεια with Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic ethical doctrines in his ethics, he is by no means a de iure Platonist, nor is he affiliated with a particular philosophical school (αἵρεσις). Rather, Philo’s special treatment of εὐσέβεια as a privileged virtue in his ethical discourse demonstrates that he is a de facto Middle Platonist.

It is important, however, to stress the fact that defining what constituted Middle Platonism in the first century C.E. is quite challenging. Indeed, Tobin has rightly noted

47. For details, see chapter five.

48. Tobin, “Was Philo a Middle Platonist?,” 48–49. Tobin notes that Philo’s reinterpretation of “the Stoic λόγος as an intermediate reality in the intelligible realm seems to have taken place primarily in Alexandria and at an early stage in Middle Platonism.” Cf. Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 46. In his argument, Tobin points out that Philo’s use of the term λόγος as an intermediate reality (between the transcendent God and human beings) is distinguished from later Middle Platonists. Sterling (“The Image of God,” 165) explains Tobin’s statement by further comparing Philo’s use of the λόγος with that of Plutarch. While Philo used the λόγος for both the immanent and the transcendent aspects of God’s relationship to the world, Plutarch used λόγος not for the transcendent, but for the immanent aspect of God’s relationship to the world and human beings (Plutarch, Mor. 369).
that the interpretation of Middle Platonism is difficult to understand for two main factors. The first is that “what we have of Middle Platonic writings is very fragmentary, and that we have very few complete Middle Platonic treatises for a philosophical movement that lasted over two hundred years.” Here, Tobin points out treatises of Plutarch, Alcinus, Albinus, “Timaios of Lokri,” On the Nature of the World and the Soul, and Philo of Alexandria. Tobin continues, “The rest of our knowledge of Middle Platonic writers and of their interpretations of the Timaeus are fragmentary and are often culled from later commentaries.” The second factor, according to Tobin, is that “the origins of Middle Platonism are obscure. Various figures (Posidonius of Apamea, Antiochus of Ascalon, Eudorus of Alexandria) have been suggested at its founder(s). While scholars now tend to exclude Posidonius from the list, the origins of Middle Platonism still remain somewhat of a mystery. Yet evidence does suggest that first century B.C.E. Alexandria played an important role in its development.”

Although the characteristics of what represented Middle Platonic thought in the first century C.E. is not clear, the suggestion that Philo is a de facto Middle Platonist is on the basis of one important reason. In the configuration of his ethical discourse around the primary virtue εὐσέβεια, Philo’s tendency of using Platonic characteristics (e.g., κόσμος νοητός) to describe εὐσέβεια’s privileged place in his ethical discourse makes him a Platonic in orientation. His special understanding of εὐσέβεια is predominantly Platonic, at least in the way he expresses it. Both his combination of Greek philosophical ethical notions about virtue-ethics, and the consistent use of Platonic categories place Philo at the beginning of emerging Middle Platonism. Applying Runia’s schema of the six possible

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49. See Tobin, “The Fate of Plato’s Timaeus in Middle Platonism,” 2–3.
positions, it is position two. Interestingly, my suggestion coincides with Sterling’s proposed position. He, who evaluates Philo’s philosophical stance in broader terms, also identifies Philo as “a de facto Middle Platonist,” that is, “a representative of Middle Platonism.”

Paul: An Eclectic Middle Platonist

A number of scholars have intended to understand Paul’s ethics in comparison with Greek philosophy, especially Stoicism. The most influential study in modern scholarship, in my opinion, is Engberg-Pedersen, whose works have been focused primarily on the comparison between Paul and Stoicism. Engberg-Pedersen, following on the footsteps of Mahlerbe, writes,

Paul’s ‘ethics’, I would say, are a radicalized version, not of Aristotelian ethics, but of Stoic ethics, too. Paul did not change what he found in his Jewish and

50. Runia defines position two as follows: one who “does not belong to the school, but has a philosophical stance which is fundamentally Platonist and might well make him welcome in such circles.”

51. See Sterling, “Platonizing Moses,” 111. For Runia (“Was Philo a Middle Platonist?,” 130), Philo is a “Platonizing devotee of Mosaic scripture” (position three). For Wolfson (cf. Svebakken, Philo of Alexandria’s Exposition of the Tenth Commandment, 118), Philo is an “eclectic” who adopts any number of different philosophical positions ad hoc. Both Dillon (The Middle Platonists, xiv) and Runia (“Was Philo a Middle Platonist?,” 131), however, argue that we should be careful and avoid calling Philo “eclectic.” Indeed, in the use of εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse, Philo is not eclectic. It is true that he combines ideas, language, and notions from Greek philosophical ethical systems, but his description of εὐσέβεια’s privileged place in his ethics distinguishably expresses his Platonic preference, as other Middle Platonists do (e.g., Alcinus and Eudorus; see chapter five).

Hellenistic context. But he did radicalize what he found by extending it to what may well be called its logical end: now was the time, not only when what should be done could be done, but also when it could be done in such a way that any relic of the individual, bodily person would be wiped out completely by an exclusive directedness toward Christ.\footnote{Engberg-Pedersen, “Paul, Virtues, and Vices,” 628.}

Engberg-Pedersen finds a close affinity between Paul and the Stoic ethics. Although his argument centers on Paul’s ethics in comparison with Stoicism, the concept of πνεῦμα is not central. Indeed, Engberg-Pedersen’s “Stoic model” (I- > X- > S)—first described in his book, \textit{Paul and the Stoics}\footnote{When Engberg-Pedersen (\textit{Paul and the Stoics}, 34–60) assesses the similarities between Paul and Stoic ethics, he argues that Paul’s ideas are coherent, and similar to the Stoics’ visual model (I- >X- >S). In Stoicism, according to Engberg-Pedersen, this model is intended to capture a movement of thought from individual concern for oneself (I) via the experience of belonging to something (X: reason/God) outside the immediate “I” and, thereby, as a member of a new social entity (S). Using this Stoic model, Engberg-Pedersen represents a coherence in Paul, and argues that, in Paul’s ethics, the individual (I) comes to see himself/herself as belonging to God and Christ (X) outside the immediate “I” and to a shared social concern for others (S). Engberg-Pedersen asserts that this model shows the way to salvation, the way in which a believer moves from an unsatisfactory to a satisfactory condition. For an analysis and critique of Engberg-Pedersen’s model, see Munzinger, \textit{Discerning the Spirits}, 123–40.}—does not include πνεῦμα, an essential factor in Paul’s ethics. Later in his book, \textit{Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul},\footnote{See Engberg-Pedersen, \textit{Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul}, 175–81.} Engberg-Pedersen himself acknowledges that omission, and \textit{re}-defines his “Stoic model” (I- > X- > S) considering three elements: πνεῦμα, Christ, and the believers. Engberg-Pedersen includes the reception of the Spirit, who is Christ himself, and its presence in the community of believers. Πνεῦμα, however, is not depicted as a central concept in the \textit{re}-definition of his “Stoic model.” As was said in chapter eight, Engberg-Pedersen is probably the only scholar,
in modern scholarship, who briefly focuses on the role played by πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethics in comparison with Stoic ethics.56

The aim of this section is to locate Paul’s philosophical stance, and this will be done on the basis of the analyses in chapters six, seven, and eight. Unlike Philo, Paul is not a philosopher (φιλόσοφος); in fact, Paul neither belonged to, nor recognized, a Greek philosophical school (αἵρεσις). His letters evince a Paul who is more likely a “preacher,” a “pastor,” or a “proclaimer” of the gospel of Christ. Paul is a Jew, and, according to his own view of himself, remained one throughout his life. However, his use of πνεῦμα as the privileged concept in his ethical discourse shows that he shares language, ideas, and notions that were current in the Greek understanding of πνεῦμα. Paul’s construal of πνεῦμα shows that he knows some interpretations of πνεῦμα in the Greco-Roman literature and philosophy. Like other Hellenistic Jewish authors discussed in this study,57 Paul would have been aware—at least—of some of the various Greek notions of πνεῦμα. Therefore, I would suggest that Paul is an “eclectic” Middle Platonist, one who did not belong to a αἵρεσις, or recognized a philosophical school, but selected, appropriated, and even altered significantly some of the Greco-Roman philosophical ideas and language as he wished to suit his purpose. Primarily, Paul’s description of the reception of πνεῦμα at baptism reflects Paul’s notion of Platonic language, as he writes, God conquered/destroyed death swallowing the mortal (2 Cor 5:4; see also 2:7; 1 Cor 15:54 [Isa 25:8]).58 The way Paul


57. See the discussion on chapter seven.

58. The verb καταπίνω (to drink down or to swallow) is also a figurative meaning to “to destroy completely” by devouring (e.g., Tob 6:2; Polybius, Hist. 2.41.7; Philo, Virt. 201). See Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 283.
defines the role played by πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse using Middle Platonic language related to the heavenly, intelligible world conveys a basic knowledge of Platonic thought in the first century C.E. The believers’ righteous and holy life leads them to the goal of life, salvation (2 Cor 1:6; 2:15; 4:1–2; 5:15; 6:2; 7:10), and eternal glory (2 Cor 4:17–18). Paul describes it in Platonic terms: πνεῦμα leads to the divine, to what is perfect, incorrupt, immortal, immaterial, and eternal.59 Also, through πνεῦμα the believers are conformed to the “image” or “likeness” of Christ, and ultimately to the likeness of God (2 Cor 3:18; 4:4). All these notions about πνεῦμα can be related with Platonic categories, which were probably current in his day.

At the same time, similar to the author of Wisdom, Paul would have been familiar with the Stoic understanding of πνεῦμα, especially the relationship of πνεῦμα with a material entity.60 The Stoic formulation that the material πνεῦμα permeates everything (πάντα) and gives life to everything is somehow appropriated and altered by Paul to speak about the “indwelling” of God’s holy πνεῦμα in both the believer and the community as a whole (1 Thess 4:8; 1 Cor 3:16; 6:19). Indeed, the living πνεῦμα “infused” in the believer’s heart (2 Cor 1:22; 5:5) is the guarantee that the new life is a life in holiness (7:1), for the living πνεῦμα that God gives is a “holy πνεῦμα” (2 Cor 6:6–7; 13:13). The Stoic notion of what (πνεῦμα) permeates the κόσμος resides within every human being is altered by Paul in terms of the πνεῦμα’s indwelling, not only in the individual believer, but also in the

59. Pauline passages that reflect Platonic language are specially 1 Cor 2:12; 9:25; 15:40–49, 52–54; 2 Cor 3:18; 4:4; 5:1, 4; 7:10; Gal 6:8; Phil 3:3, 19, 21; Rom 7:4, 25.

60. Chapter two has shown that Tarsus, a city where Paul spent his childhood and probably his adolescence, had a strong Stoic tradition. Then, he would have had some familiarity with the Stoic doctrine of a “material” πνεῦμα.
community of believers. Moreover, as the Stoic πνεῦμα gives life, generates understanding, and is connected with the mind (νοῦς), so the πνεῦμα of God in Paul is what gives the believers true life—through the disposition of the mind—a life that leads to eternal life (salvation), and leads to understanding and knowledge of God.

Furthermore, Paul employs the Stoic term πάντα to describe the supremacy of the virtue of ἀγάπη (1 Cor 13:7), which is closely connected with πνεῦμα (love of πνεῦμα, Rom 15:30). He ascribes to the virtue special qualities that are generally given to God in Stoic language (πάντα)—love covers [στέγει] all things [πάντα], believes all things [πάντα], hopes all things [πάντα], and endures all things [πάντα]” (1 Cor 13:7). Especially the expression “love covers all things” is a reference analogous to the Stoic notion of the role of λόγος/πνεῦμα in creation. While in Stoicism, πάντα is related directly with the

61. The Stoic word πάντα is shown in 1 Corinthians more than any of his other genuine letters (e.g., 2:15; 3:21, 22; 4:6, 13; 8:6; 9:12, 22, 23, 24, 25; 10:2, 17, 23, 31, 33; 11:2, 12; 12:6, 11, 13, 30; 14:18, 23, 24, 26, 40; 15:10, 25–28.

62. E.g., “to cover closely,” “to keep out,” “to bear up,” “to sustain,” “to support,” “to hold,” to contain” among others. See Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, 1636. The variety of meanings have led scholars to interpret “love” in different ways. Collins (First Corinthians, 481–82), for example, argues that Paul would have intended to affirm that love protects all, or that love hides everything in the sense of covering evil with silence. Also, Paul would have meant that love bears everything (9:12). Fitzmyer (First Corinthians, 496) claims that Paul would have preferred “to keep confidential” (e.g., be silent about what is displeasing in another person; cf. 9:12; Sir 8:17). Ciampa and Rosnes (the First Letter to the Corinthians, 649) opt for the meaning “to protect,” based on the ideas of “not giving in” and “not giving up.” Love “protects” is then understood in a sense of giving resistance to things or forces. In the context and by what follows (πάντα), στέγει must mean either “covers,” “bears,” “sustains,” or “holds.”

63. Also, “love covers all things” infers the notion of God’s caring for all things (πρόνοια). Whatever Paul might have meant with the verb στέγει, the main idea is that the virtue of love plays an important role in his ethics.
material universe (κόσμος),\textsuperscript{64} in Paul it is related to ethics, particularly with the virtue of love.\textsuperscript{65}

The central role of πνεῦμα in Paul’s ethics is primarily shown in terms of Platonic and Stoic ideas and notions. The combination of both philosophical schools of thought represented a main characteristic of what was Middle Platonism in the first century C.E.\textsuperscript{66} Paul is an “eclectic” appropriating and re-defining various Platonic and Stoic notions into a consistent ethical view in order to configure his ethical discourse around πνεῦμα. Paul is, therefore, a representative of an “eclectic” Middle Platonism of the first century C.E. This does not directly put Paul in the same category as other “Middle Platonists” in the strict sense of the word, or that his understanding of πνεῦμα was purely Platonic (immaterial). Nevertheless, unlike Philo, whose philosophical inclination is more Platonic, since he is deeply influenced by the various philosophical schools, Paul’s configuration of his ethical discourse around πνεῦμα demonstrates that his philosophical orientation was more Stoic. As such, Paul shares in the category of an “eclectic” Middle Platonist, heavily influenced by Stoic doctrines. Using Runia’s six possible positions, Paul fits well in position four,

\textsuperscript{64} As Fitzmyer (\textit{First Corinthians}, 336–37) notes, πάντα is used in Greek Stoic cosmological formulas. It means “all things” or “the All” (the κόσμος). However, it is important to note that although there are parallels between Paul’s use of πάντα and the Stoics’ πάντα, he does not present cosmological formulations. Cf. Fitzmyer, \textit{First Corinthians}, 336–37.

\textsuperscript{65} Also, the Stoic goal of life, to live “according with nature” (κατὰ φύσιν, e.g., Epictetus, \textit{Disc.} 4.5.6, or κατὰ λόγον, e.g., Stobaeus 2.96.18–97.5)—one’s nature consisting in part of a holy πνεῦμα (Seneca, \textit{Mor. ep.} 41.8–9)—is also linked to the κόσμος. In this sense, it is through “reasoning,” which in Stoicism is a synonym of one’s own “nature,” that a transformation occurs in Stoic ethics. In Paul, however, the phrase κατὰ φύσιν/λόγον becomes re-defined in a way that “nature”/”reason” is replaced by the ethical role of πνεῦμα: to live “according with the Spirit” (κατὰ πνεῦμα).

an “eclectic,” who uses philosophical language, ideas, and notions for the purpose of teaching and exhorting virtues.

**Conclusion**

Chapter nine has shed light on the similarities and differences between the roles of Philo’s εὐσέβεια and Paul’s πνεῦμα in their own ethical discourse. This chapter has also offered a general characterization of the philosophical stances of Philo and Paul, on the basis of each one’s level of appropriation, alteration, and influence from the Greek philosophical tradition in their ethical discourses. Both Philo and Paul, two Hellenistic Jews from the Greek Diaspora, have much in common in the way they configure their ethics. They were not only part of the larger Hellenistic world, but they, like other Hellenistic Jewish authors, construed their ethics within that same larger context. Each of them drew on what can be characterized as non-Jewish categories and doctrines according to his own experience and purpose in order to present his ethical teaching about the acquisition of virtues and the avoidance of vices. Each of them also appropriated a Greek concept, and developed a discourse on ethics that suited his intended purpose more effectively. Though their concepts were different (εὐσέβεια and πνεῦμα), the role each one played in ethics was similar.

The Hellenistic Jewish and Greek philosophical traditions allowed Philo and Paul to be part of the same larger Hellenistic Jewish world, but also to move beyond both. In terms of the Hellenistic Jewish heritage, their strong monotheistic view, the importance about the acquisition of virtues and the avoidance of vices, the supremacy of the virtue

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67. Runia, “Was Philo a Middle Platonist?,” 125. He defines position four as follows: “one who appropriates various school doctrines as it suits his exegetical purposes.”
of love, and the horizontal and vertical relationships are aspects in which both Philo and Paul converge harmoniously. However, Philo’s understanding of εὐσέβεια is very much rooted in the Hellenistic Jewish tradition. In his ethics, εὐσέβεια, the λόγος, and the Mosaic Law are essential elements that cannot be separated in the virtuous life of the soul. Paul’s leading influence in his ethics is largely the LXX, and then, the Hellenistic Jewish tradition. Nonetheless, what is distinctive about Paul is that his ethical discourse breaks with the Hellenistic Jewish tradition in very significant ways. For him, his understanding of God’s πνεῦμα cannot be detached from his understanding of Christ. Paul’s personal conviction about Christ set him apart from what constituted a “Jewish” understanding of πνεῦμα. This is an essential aspect that led him to focus not on the Mosaic Law but on a new law, the Law of Christ or love commandment, in which its true meaning (or content) is found embodied in the gospel of Christ. In Paul’s ethics, πνεῦμα, Christ, and the Law of Christ are three elements that cannot be separated in the virtuous life of the believer.

In terms of the Greek philosophical tradition, the characterization of Philo and Paul’s concepts in Platonic categories shows their acquaintance with this tradition. Philo more than Paul, however, is deeply affected by it, especially in terms of the development of Middle Platonism. His “divinization” of εὐσέβεια and its privileged place in his ethics is mainly expressed in Platonic categories, a fact that makes him a de facto Middle Platonist. Paul shows some acquaintance with the Greek tradition; however, his view of πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse shows that he is not greatly influenced by it. His take on terminology is minor, and some are embedded in the Hellenistic Jewish tradition. When it comes to philosophy, however, he reflects some of the effects of the development of emerging Middle Platonism in the first century C.E. Paul’s “Christification” of πνεῦμα
and his description of the qualities and powers given to his primary concept using both Platonic and Stoic language make him an “eclectic” Middle Platonist. Yet the similarities with reference to these Greek philosophical traditions in Paul’s ethics exist only at the terminological level, and not in content.
CHAPTER TEN

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Conclusion

This study has taken two Greek concepts, εὐσέβεια and πνεῦμα, to illumine how Philo and Paul configured their own ethical discourse around a concept: Philo around εὐσέβεια and Paul around πνεῦμα. Before engaging in the main thesis of the study, I briefly described Philo and Paul’s Hellenistic Jewish and Greek philosophical backgrounds for the purpose of placing them in their own context of the first century C.E. Both Hellenistic Jews were very much immersed in the challenges of living “Judaism” within the parameters of the Greek Diaspora. The five central aspects of Judaism discussed (monotheism, Temple, circumcision, ethical commandments, and food laws) have provided the level of parallelism between Philo and Paul. In terms of monotheism, there is a strong parallelism; in relation to their view of the Temple, the parallels are weak; and in regard to their attitude toward circumcision, ethical commandments, and food laws, parallels are few.

I have shown the complexity of Philo’s use of εὐσέβεια in his treatises, and have elucidated the primary role played by εὐσέβεια in his ethical discourse. Philo viewed εὐσέβεια not simply as a virtue, but as a “privileged” one intrinsically associated with the Existent One. The characteristic treatment of εὐσέβεια has unfolded the notion that the virtue of εὐσέβεια lays at the “heart” of Philo’s teaching about the ethical commandments of the Mosaic Law or Decalogue. His configuration of his ethical
discourse around εὐσέβεια was not, however, in isolation from the Hellenistic Jewish and Greek philosophical traditions. Both were essential in shaping Philo's thought of εὐσέβεια as he structured his ethics along the lines of the Hellenistic Jewish heritage, and Greek philosophical ethical systems. Philo shared with other Hellenistic Jewish writers the prominence given to εὐσέβεια. However, his particular characterization of the virtue εὐσέβεια showed that he was more indebted to the Greek philosophical tradition, a tradition that led him to move beyond the common definition of the virtue in Greek philosophical systems. Philo declared εὐσέβεια the “source” or “beginning” of all the other virtues and ascribed to it the quality of “divinity” (divine εὐσέβεια).

In an analogous way, I have described how Paul viewed the Greek concept of πνεῦμα in each of his seven undisputed letters. The investigation of his complex use of πνεῦμα has shown a special emphasis on the primary role played by πνεῦμα in his ethical discourse. As Paul's ethical exhortation urged a virtuous and holy life, he established what can be defined as a vis-à-vis relationship between God's holy πνεῦμα and Christ. This relationship—which at first glance looked simple—was understood by the believers and became effective in the believers not through the Mosaic Law, but through the lenses of faith in Christ, his gospel and his Law. This tripartite connection with πνεῦμα determined the core foundation of Paul's ethical discourse. Like Philo, Paul was not alone in construing his ethics in such way. But, primarily the LXX, and secondarily the Hellenistic Jewish tradition, and in a lesser degree, the Greek philosophical tradition served as the foundation to ascribe πνεῦμα a privileged place in his ethical discourse. Paul followed the LXX of viewing the concept of πνεῦμα as God’s divine and holy πνεῦμα, which had the power to transform dynamically the ethical life of the believers. In the Greek literature
and philosophy, sometimes, the concept of πνεῦμα was also viewed as the divine and holy (Greek philosophy) πνεῦμα which had the power to help individuals in their ethical performance. But, it is with Paul that the understanding of πνεῦμα took a radical turn in two essential aspects: (1) πνεῦμα acquired a strong ethical connotation; that is, the acquisition of virtues and the avoidance of vices are operative only in πνεῦμα, and (2) πνεῦμα’s ethical role was determined by the role of Christ (the Christ-event). These two essential aspects led Paul to re-direct his own view of himself in relation to Christ, which also resulted in a re-definition of his own conception of πνεῦμα in the ethical life of the believers.

I have said that the topic of virtue-ethics was part of the larger discussion in the Greco-Roman world, and that both Philo and Paul were part of that discussion, each in his own context. Taking into consideration their participation in this larger conversation, I have shown that both Philo and Paul shared the influence of ideas, language, and notions with both the Hellenistic Jewish and Greek philosophical traditions. However, that influence was in different degrees and modes. The comparison between Philo’s use of εὐσέβεια and Paul’s use of πνεῦμα were strongly reflected in the association of both concepts with the three fundamental elements in their ethical discourses: in Philo, εὐσέβεια was intrinsically linked with the role of the λόγος and the Mosaic Law, and in Paul, πνεῦμα was closely associated with the role of Christ and the Law of Christ. Furthermore, this study has highlighted that both εὐσέβεια and πνεῦμα were linked particularly with the virtue of love, as was expressed in the vertical and horizontal relationships. They, likewise, were sometimes depicted as the “source” of virtues, in the sense that its possession promotes virtues and avoids vices. What is also characteristic
between Philo and Paul was that both of them tended to describe the ethical goal of the possession of either εὐσέβεια (Philo) or πνεῦμα (Paul) by using Platonic qualities, thereby associating both concepts, and thus virtues, with the νοῦς and the noetic world of the divine.

I have also presented the differences between the connection of the two concepts with the practice or acquisition of virtues, the lessons or means to acquire virtues, and the radical transformation of εὐσέβεια—its “divinization”—as well as of πνεῦμα—its “Christification.” These differences in their ethical discourses, however, did not set Philo and Paul completely apart from their Hellenistic Jewish environment. Rather, the dissimilarities represented the flexibility of Philo and Paul’s navigation within the larger thought of the Greco-Roman world. Paul and Philo were able to live their “Judaism” in the Greek Diaspora according to their own convictions in the midst of the challenges brought about by their current Hellenized environment of the first century C.E. As a result, the configuration of their own ethical discourse around a Greek concept served as an example not only to sustain the view that both Philo and Paul were part of a common background in Greek-speaking Judaism, but also to demonstrate that they were able to explain confidently their concern for a virtuous and holy life within the categories of the Greco-Roman understanding of virtues.

Both Hellenistic Jews transformed their own ethical concept in philosophical terms. In regard to εὐσέβεια’s transformation, Philo’s strong Platonic acquaintance and tendency allowed him to define εὐσέβεια and to construe its qualities and powers in Platonic terms. In the case of πνεῦμα’s transformation, Paul’s Stoic tendency permitted him to depict God’s divine and holy πνεῦμα in some Stoic terms, without creating
a conflict between the Platonic (immaterial) and Stoic (material) understanding of πνεῦμα in the thought of the believers in first century C.E. Therefore, while the Platonic tradition provided Philo the tools to “divinize” his primary virtue εὐσέβεια, both the Platonic and Stoic traditions provided Paul the tools to “christicize” his primary concept of πνεῦμα. Moreover, Philo’s privileged virtue εὐσέβεια was raised to the intelligent, immaterial world, but without disengaging it from the earthly world. In other words, whereas εὐσέβεια in Philo became part of the noetic world, εὐσέβεια’s ethical role in the virtuous life of the virtue-loving soul was still connected to the practice of the ethical commandment of the Mosaic Law or Decalogue. In a similar way, whereas Paul’s primary concept of πνεῦμα became part of the earthly, material world through the believer in Christ, πνεῦμα’s nature remained rooted in the heavenly world, that is, in the divinity and holiness of God. It seems that this dichotomy found in Philo and Paul was not in conflict; instead, the direct, and sometimes indirect, association of both key concepts (εὖσέβεια and πνεῦμα) with the material and immaterial worlds were harmoniously conjoined as both Philo and Paul configured their own ethical discourse within the context of the larger Greek world. In fact, the special prominence given to both key concepts allowed the suggestion that the philosophical stand of each Hellenistic Jew was within the parameters of current emerging Middle Platonism, where elements particularly characteristic of Platonism and Stoicism coalesced.

Suggestions for Further Research

I believe that this study is not the final conclusion of the comparison between Philo and Paul’s ethics around the two concepts (εὖσέβεια and πνεῦμα) in light of the influence of the Hellenistic Jewish and Greek philosophical traditions. Hopefully, this study opens
the horizons for further research. The special treatment of εὐσέβεια (Philo) and πνεῦμα (Paul) has revealed that in the configurations of their ethical discourses, Philo and Paul were indebted—Philo more than Paul—to the Hellenistic Jewish and Greek philosophical discourse. In other words, Philo shared with other Hellenistic Jewish authors discussed in chapter four the notion that εὐσέβεια holds a prominent place in the ethical exhortation for the acquisition of a virtuous and holy life. Likewise, chapter five has demonstrated that Philo shared with the Greek philosophical ethical tradition (Platonic, Aristotelian, Pythagorean, Stoic, and some Middle Platonists) the idea that the “virtues are one” or “virtue is one.” In fact, Philo’s high level of philosophical knowledge and influence allowed him to apply to the virtue of εὐσέβεια the qualities given to the virtue of practical wisdom or prudence (φρόνησις), a virtue highly praised in the Greek philosophical ethical systems and catalogues of virtues. More significant is that unlike philosophers, Philo’s εὐσέβεια was consistently distinguished from other virtues, including the cardinal virtues when he intentionally associated εὐσέβεια with qualities of the intelligible world, the λόγος, and the Existent One. Although Philo was not unique in his association of εὐσέβεια with the noetic world and the λόγος—the authors of the Letter of Aristeas and 4 Maccabees associated εὐσέβεια with λόγος, and LXX and 4 Maccabees linked εὐσέβεια with the noetic world, but indirectly—εὐσέβεια’s direct relationship with the Existent One in Philo is undoubtedly unique (in 4 Maccabees this association was only indirect, through the λόγος). This allowed Philo’s εὐσέβεια to hold the highest divine attribution and power that is given to a virtue in an ethical discourse. This study has not dealt with the issue of “dependency;” therefore, the investigation of the different levels of similarities between the
λόγος and εὐσέβεια in 4 Maccabees and λόγος and εὐσέβεια in Philo focused particularly on the authors’ ethical exhortation would provide a helpful basis for further research.

Also, in terms of the role of πνεῦμα in his ethics, Paul was influenced by other Hellenistic Jewish authors (the Wisdom of Solomon, 4 Maccabees, and Sibylline Oracles) discussed in chapter seven, but significantly by the LXX. Paul is minimally affected by Greek literature and philosophy. Paul was not unique in associating πνεῦμα with the immaterial world, the λόγος, the language of “pouring out,” prophecy and inspiration, and more strikingly, with both material and immaterial. All these connections were somehow found in both the Hellenistic Jewish and Greek literature and philosophy. But generally speaking, in the Greco-Roman literature and philosophy—with few exceptions—these connections were not linked with ethics. What is characteristic to Paul is that his understanding of the primary role played by πνεῦμα in ethics was connected to God directly through Christ. That is, God’s holy πνεῦμα as a “spiritual and intellectual reality” in the believer’s ethical life came to be effective through the figure of Christ, who is the “image” or “likeness” of God. As Paul emphasized the role of Christ, his gospel, and his Law, Paul’s view of the divine and immaterial πνεῦμα—the view in Hellenistic Judaism—became seemingly materialized through the reception of God’s πνεῦμα in the believer’s body and through Christ, defined in this study as the “Christification of πνεῦμα.”

The notion of viewing a concept in both ways (material and immaterial) was particularly found in Wisdom of Solomon, when the author, who was not a philosopher like Paul, depicted the figure of wisdom (σοφία), which is also πνεῦμα, as both material (Stoic) and immaterial (Platonic). The comparison of the dualistic take of σοφία in Wisdom and πνεῦμα in Paul is a potential subject for further research, so that, it will further exemplify
that the notion of viewing πνεῦμα or a similar concept as both material and immaterial was a common place in the first century C.E.

Furthermore, the comparison between Philo and Paul's philosophical stances on the basis of the two concepts (εὐσέβεια and πνεῦμα) has brought to light the characteristic description of what constituted emerging Middle Platonism in the first century C.E.

As good representatives of Hellenistic Judaism, both Philo and Paul were aware of the various notions of the different philosophical strands of virtue-ethics—Philo more deeply than Paul. Philo, a de facto Middle Platonist, and Paul, an “eclectic” Middle Platonist, moved beyond the Greek philosophical tradition, as their philosophical tendencies were crystalized at the point of divergence from their two traditions: Philo, Platonic tendency (divinization of εὐσέβεια), and Paul, Stoic tendency (“Christification” of πνεῦμα). What is striking is Philo and Paul's tendency to link virtues with the νοῦς (mind) and the immaterial world, the realm of the divine. This is another avenue for further possible research that will shed light on Philo’s view of virtues in relation to these Platonic categories, as well as Paul's own view.
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VITA

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