1966

The Occupation of Gotland by the Teutonic Knights, 1398-1408

Karl-Ferdinand Schmidt

Loyola University Chicago

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THE OCCUPATION OF GOTLAND BY THE
TEUTONIC KNIGHTS, 1398 - 1408

by

Rev. Karl-Ferdinand Schmidt, S.J.

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

January

1966
Karl-Ferdinand Schmidt was born in Koblenz on Rhine, Germany, May 16, 1929. He graduated from Goerresgymnasium Koblenz, June, 1949. From summer 1949 until Spring 1950, he attended the University of Mainz, Germany. In April 1950, he entered the Society of Jesus, and after two years of noviceship, he studied at Berchmanskolleg in Pullach, near Munich from September 1952 until May 1956. After two years as prefect and teacher at Mauritius-gymnasium in Bueren in Westfalia, he studied theology at Hochschule St. Georgen in Frankfurt am Main from September 1958 until May 1962. On July 31, 1961, he was ordained priest in Frankfurt. After tertianship in St. Beunos, Wales, England, he began graduate studies at Loyola University in September 1963.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS v

INTRODUCTION 1

Chapter

I. GOTLAND AND THE BALTIC SEA TRADE 4

A. The Baltic Sea Trade before 850 A.D.

B. The Trade from 850 till the Time of the Hanseatic League

1. The Trade Places
2. The Trade Routes through the Continent

C. The Trade at the Time of the Hanseatic League

1. The Changing of the Trade Market
2. Germans and Goths, Lubeck and Visby
3. The Sea Law of Visby
4. The Danish Intruders and Mischief-makers

II. THE DYNASTIC RIVALRIES OF THE BALTIC STATES, 28
1375-1398

A. The Situation after Waldemar IV's death, 1375

B. Albert of Mecklenburg imprisoned by Margaret, 1389-95

1. Mecklenburg fights for Albert
2. Intervention of other Baltic powers
C. The Vitualian Brothers in Gotland, 1395-1398

1. The continuation of insecurity in the Baltic Sea
2. The concern of the Prussian cities
3. The affair of Calmar, 1396
4. The piracy at its peak

III. THE OCCUPATION OF GOTLAND, 1398-1408

A. THE ACQUISITION OF GOTLAND BY THE TEUTONIC ORDER

1. The Expedition to Gotland
2. The Pre-negotiations
3. The Negotiations to acquire the Island
   a) Queen Margaret's reaction
   b) Albert of Sweden's reaction

B. THE DEFENSE OF GOTLAND

1. The War of Diplomacy
   a) Margaret's demands for Gotland
   b) The Time of Vivid Messages
   c) The three Congresses about Gotland

2. The War of Forces, 1403-1404
   a) The Invasion of Gotland by Margaret
   b) The reaction of the Grandmaster
   c) The Armistices of 1404

C. THE SALE OF GOTLAND

1. The Intervention of the Hanseatic League
2. The Negotiation of Falsterbo, 1405
3. The Final Negotiations
   a) The Diet of Helsingborg, 1407
   b) The Diet of Calmar, 1408
IV. MOTIVES FOR THE OCCUPATION OF GOTLAND

A. The General Situation of the Ordensland in 1398

B. The Trade of the Order
   1. In Western Europe
   2. Dependent on the Free Sound-passage

C. The Foreign Relations of the Order
   1. Lithuania and Samogitia
   2. Poland
   3. The Bishoprics of Riga and Dorpat
   4. Pomerania and Mecklenburg

D. The Order and Its Towns

V. MOTIVES FOR THE ABANDONMENT OF GOTLAND

A. The Situation inside the Ordensland

B. The Foreign Relations of the Order
   1. Riots in Samogitia and Lithuania
   2. New Tensions with Poland
   3. Unreliable Dukes of Pomerania

C. The Trade of the North in 1408
   1. New Trade Routes
   2. Gotland and Visby lost their Importance

BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BSC - Baltic and Scandinavian Countries (Periodical)
Ch.St. - Chroniken der deutschen Staedte, ed. by Karl Koppmann
Cod. dipl. Pr. - Codex diplomaticus Prussicus, ed. by J. Voigt
GDH XIV/J. - Geschichte der deutschen Hanse im 14. Jahrhundert, by E. Daenell
HGBL - Hanische Geschichtsblaetter (Periodical)
HR - Hanserecesse, ed. by K. Koppmann
HUB - Hansisches Urkundenbuch
HZ - Historische Zeitschrift (Periodical)
Koeln. Konf. - Die Koelner Konfederation vom Jahre 1367, by E. Daenell (Dissertation)
LEKUB - Liv-,Est- und Kurländische Urkundenbuch, ed. by Bunge
LUB - Codex diplomaticus Lubicensis. Luebekisches Urkundenbuch
MGH SS - Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores
Mon. Po. - Monumenta vetera medii aevi Poloniae
MUB - Mecklenburgisches Urkundenbuch
PS - Parteiatschrift, Conrad of Jungingen's Defense of his Actions, ed. in HR IV 438
PUK - Preussisches Urkundenbuch
SSRRGerm - Scriptores rerum Germanicarum
SSRRPr - Scriptores rerum Prussicarum
SSRRSuec. - Scriptores rerum Suecicarum medii aevi
STA. - Akten der Staendetage Preussens, ed. by M. Toeppen
INTRODUCTION

With hundredweight they weighed their gold,
They played with precious stones,
Their women used golden distaffs,
And pigs ate out of silver troughs. ¹

With these words an old Swedish folksong describes the wealth of Visby, the capital of the island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea. It is certainly overdone, since its purpose is to expose the great crime committed by Waldemar Atterdag when he occupied and destroyed Visby in 1361. Yet it does indicate the importance of Visby and Gotland for northern European trade during the Middle Ages. Today's tourists and visitors to the city are still impressed by its imposing view and grandeur. The city wall is about two miles long, with forty-five towers. Of the twenty-two churches of the medieval city only one is preserved, but seventeen impressive ruins are still to be seen.²

¹guld vage de gutar pa hispundrag,
de spela med adleste stenar,
avinen ata ur sulfer trag,
och hustrurna spinne pa juld tener.
Quoted according to Ernst Hering, Die deutsche Hanse (Leipzig, 1942), p. 105.
Translation by the author.

In 1398, the Teutonic Order occupied the island of Gotland and its city, Visby. The Knights held the island for ten years. The aim of this paper is to investigate this event at the turn of the 14th and 15th centuries. Previously, only one historian has investigated this incident closely: Otto Kehlert, who wrote a dissertation on this subject in 1887. Yet since that time many further studies have been made touching the problems arising out of this event. Recently another German scholar, Friedrich Benninghoven, published an article about the occupation of Gotland by the Teutonic Knights, but his interests were in the military, technical aspects of the expedition.

The intention of this paper is not to discover new facts but to put the events of 1398-1408 in a larger framework than Kehlert or Benninghoven did, in order to be able then to answer the two basic questions of this paper: Why did the Order occupy the island of Gotland in 1398? Why did the Order abandon the island so quickly again having gone to such expense and such tremendous efforts to occupy and to hold it for only ten years?

It will be shown that the occupation of the island of Gotland by the Teutonic Order was not in the least sense an

3 Otto Kehlert, *Die Insel Gotland im Besitz des Deutschen Ordens* (Dissertation, Königsberg, 1887); also in: *Altpreußische Monatsblätter* 24 (1887), 185-442.

attempt to enlarge its territorial power in the Baltic Sea area, and that the expedition was a mistake for various reasons, especially because of the declining position of the island in the Baltic trade of the 14th century.

To prove this we have to investigate the condition of trade in the Baltic Sea and the role of Gotland in this trade before 1398. After considering Gotland and its economic importance we look at the immediate prehistory of the occupation by the Order, namely, the dynastic rivalries of the Baltic states. This will be followed by the history of the expedition and occupation of Gotland by the Teutonic Knights, the problems of administration and defense, and the sale of the island. Finally we will attempt to interpret the events of 1398-1408 by investigating the reasons for and significance of the acquisition and the abandonment of Gotland.
CHAPTER 1

GOTLAND AND THE BALTIC SEA TRADE
CHAPTER I
GOTLAND AND THE BALTIC SEA TRADE

The island of Gotland commands the center of the Baltic or East Sea. As soon as trade began to develop in the Baltic area, Gotland and later its capital, Visby, served as its center. It replaced the trading cities of Birka in the Maeler Sea in Sweden and Haithabu or Hedeby in Schleswig, and was in turn followed later by Novgorod and Lubeck. In this chapter we shall trace these trends by dealing first with the history of the Baltic Sea trade until the German incursions (around the beginning of the 9th century A.D.); then by indicating the lines of trade from the Viking raids until the time of the Hanseatic League; and finally by treating the commerce of the Baltic Sea area until the death of King Waldemar Atterdag of Denmark in 1375.

A glance at the map will show why this island of Gotland assumed such importance. The unique geographical situation of Gotland was the reason why it finally outranked Birka and Hedeby and why it became a big, rich, and wealthy trading place destined to play an important role in the Baltic Sea for a very long time. Before the 13th and 14th centuries ships were small and were

\[5\text{Cf. Appendix A-C.}\]
bound to follow the coastline. Mariners, restricted to short passages, could not for long lose sight of the shore, for they had neither compass nor charts as guides. They avoided the open sea. Gotland was naturally a most favorable anchorage on the way to the different countries around the Baltic Sea. Because of its good harbors the island was a secure place to await better weather as well as better trade conditions.

Gotland is about fifty-five miles from Sweden and one hundred and ten miles from Kurland. The distance from the Vistula river is the same as that from the mouth of the Duna, the Maeler Sea in Sweden with Birka, and the Gulf of Finland. The island is about 1850 square miles in size, and has today about 70,000 inhabitants, of whom about 15,000 live in the city of Visby.

Favored by its geographical situation Gotland has always been an important trading center. Archaeological finds show that in the Bronze and Iron ages as well as the time of the Roman Empire it must have had a well established commerce. No

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other area in the Scandinavian countries is as rich in finds of coins as the island of Gotland. In all about 7,000 are known, of which 5,000 came from the island of Gotland alone. 8

How did this happen? The many Roman coins found in the North came there via the routes by which amber, a commodity known to most of the ancient people, was brought south. Spekke indicates three amber routes: the "amber river" Rhone to Marseilles; the rivers Vistula-Dniester into the Black Sea, and thence to the near East; and the main route through Samland to the Vistula to Aquileia in northern Italy, or to Carnuntum in Pannonia. 9 Besides amber, Swedish horses seemed to have been in demand in the south. Also there are indications from this period of the manufacturing and use of iron in Gotland, which itself did not have ore. This must have been obtained by trade. 10

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9Arnolds Spekke, The Ancient Amber Routes and Geographical Discovery of the Eastern Baltic (Stockholm, 1957), speaks of a "flourishing amber trade between eastern Baltic and the Adriatic" in the first two or three centuries after Christ (p. 3ff).

Little is known about trade and commerce during the 6th - 8th centuries except that the Scandinavians were the lords of the Baltic Sea. With the German incursions and the Viking raids, we have more evidence and are able to trace the commercial centers and trade routes in the Baltic Sea area quite well.\textsuperscript{11}

A result of the raids of the Vikings was the establishment of a connection between trading areas which until this time were separated units, namely the Baltic or East Sea, the North Sea (at this time called the West Sea), and the Atlantic Ocean. By now Scandinavian ships sailed in the Gulf of Finland as well as in the Skager Rak and in the Bay of Biscay. The connection point between East and West Seas was the Port of Haithabu or Hedeby near today's Schleswig, which was founded by the Northmen. Later the Frisians became the mediators between the Scandinavian and West European countries.\textsuperscript{12}


\textsuperscript{12}Many coins found in Gotland originated from Western Europe especially Anglo-Saxon and German territories, Cf. Mews, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 69.
From Hedeby ships sailed into the various routes of the Baltic Sea. We know about these routes quite well, since the northern chroniclers such as Canon Adam of Bremen describe them. On their way from Hedeby to the East many merchants liked to stop in Julin, also called Jumne or Jummeta, near today's Wollin on the island of the same name, near the mouth of the Oder River. Julin ranked third in size, following Hedeby and Gotland, among the northern ports; even the Arabs knew of it.13

Looking at the map we see another port, Truso, near today's Elbing. Of Truso we have the first written report by a certain Wulfstan who told about his journey to the English King Alfred the Great. Alfred inserted the reports of Wulfstan and of the Norwegian Ottar in his translation of the Latin history of the world by the Spanish presbyter Orosius.14

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From the three named ports, Hedeby, Julin and Truso, ships sailed to Gotland and on to Birka or to Sigtuna, since Birka disappeared during the tenth century. From there the merchants bought furs. Other articles for export were ore and copper, butter, meat and hides, corn, wood, naval supplies, wool, hemp, wax and honey.\(^{15}\) Canon Adam describes trade between Samland and Sweden via Gotland; Saxo Grammaticus mentions a Danish foundation in Samland.\(^ {16}\)

Because of its tremendous importance a few words must be said about Novgorod, the last of the big trade centers in the Baltic area. For the Baltic trade it was of great consequence that the Northmen emigrated out of Sweden and Gotland to the east, entering the Gulf of Finland and on to the east shore of the Baltic Sea. Then they gradually invaded the territory that is now Russia, penetrating deep inland to the south along the river valleys. Finally they reached Byzantium and made contact with the Greeks and Arabs.\(^ {17}\) The year 839 A.D. is the earliest known


\(^{17}\)Gutasaga c.l: "so fierri foru pair, at pair quamu til Griclanz," quoted here according to Mews, op. cit., p. 19.
date for this contact, but it probably had begun earlier. 18
Canon Adam of Bremen described the contact between Gotland and
the Black Sea trade as follows: "Those who have a knowledge of
geography also assert that some men have passed by an overland
route from Sweden into Greece. But the barbarous people who live
between make this way difficult; consequently the risk is taken
by ship...the next island is called Holm (Gotland), the most
celebrated port of Denmark and a safe anchorage for the ships
that are usually dispatched to the barbarians and to Greece..." 19
Arabic sources give evidence of the commercial contact between
the North and the East, as do the finds of numerous Arabic coins
in Scandinavia, especially on the island of Gotland. 20 Byzantine
gold coins have also been excavated in Gotland. 21 Hence it is

18 Cf. Annales Bertiniiani, in SSRR Germ. in usum schol. ex MGH by
G. Waitz (Hanover, 1933), p. 19. Marten Steinberger, Die
Schatzfunde Gotlands der Wikingerzeit, vol. 1 (Stockholm, 1958),
p. 353; George Vernadasky, The Origins of Russia (Oxford, 1959),
p. 186.

19 Adam of Bremen, Engl. transl., p. 196f.

20 Ibn Chordabeh (around 847); Al Masudi (10th Cent.) Cf. Masudi
ed. by Aloys Sprenger, Meadows of Gold and Mines of Gems
(London, 1841), vol. 1, p. 417; Ibrahim ben-Jaqubs; Arnold
Spekke, "Arabians Geographers and the Early Baltic People," in: Baltic and Scandinavian Countries, hereafter cited as
BSC. IX (1938), 155-159. Steinberger, op. cit., p. 352;
Noack, op. cit., p. 59ff. In 1885, the number of Arabic coins
found in Scandinavia and Baltic was estimated to be around
100,000, of which 13,000 are found in Gotland. Georg Jacob,
Der nordschbaltische Handfol der Araber im Mittelalter
(Dissertation, Leipzig, 1887), p. 53 estimated that 1 million
coins are brought to the North.

21 Noack, op. cit., p. 66 gives the number of such coins as 137.
evident that Gotland had an intensive trade during the pre-Hanseatic period.

There were different trade-routes through the continent. From Sweden via Gotland into the Gulf of Finland, then up the Neva River to Lake Ladoga, via Volkchov into Lake Ilmen to Novgorod was the first part of one of the routes. From Novgorod there were two main routes. The first one followed the Volga down to the trading places of Bulgar, near Kazan, and of Itil, near Astrachhan at the coast of the Caspian Sea. There the merchants met the Arabs who came over the Caspian Sea from Bagdad or Cadiz, and the Northmen exchanged their furs and other goods for the treasures of the Far East, silver coins and other oriental goods like spices, silk, linen, garments, tapestries, gold, pearls, jewelry and precious leather.22

A second route from Novgorod led through Lake Ilmen into the Lowest River, then overland crossing the continental divide between the Baltic and the Black Sea to the Dnieper River.

following this down as far as Kiev, which had contact with Byzantium. A third route reported by Saxo Grammaticus and Henry of Livonia was nearly identical with the second one; into the Gulf of Riga and then up the Duna River, a natural road for entering the vast country of today's Russia, to Vetebst and the old route to Kiev.

While the Volga route was mostly used to contact the Arabs, the Duna and Dnieper Rivers were preferred for trade with Byzantine merchants. The Northmen contacted the south also via the Vistula River, which they followed from Danzig to Cracow, about 500 miles away and only 550 feet above sea level. Then they used the San or Narav and Bug to Dnieper, on which they travelled down into the Black Sea. In Cracow the northern merchants contacted traders from Czechoslovakia or Hungary who sold horses and silver to the Scandinavians.

In the second half of the 10th century the Baltic Sea

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23. Nestor gives an exact account of this, yet from the other direction, since he wrote in Kiev. Cf. Engl. transl. of Nestor's Chronicle, p. 53f.


trade suffered a serious blow. Scandinavian, Arabic and Byzantine trade nearly came to an end because of the expansion of the Kievan state, which began with the reign of Prince Sviatoslav (964-972), and the struggles and wars of his sons and successors. After the death of Yaroslav I (1054) the process of disintegration of the Kiev state became evident. 

Russia became a loose federation of feudal principalities each trying to control a part of the network of river routes. Trade from the Baltic into Russia declined rapidly. Also the decline of the Abbasid Caliphate early in the tenth century contributed to the breaking down of the Baltic-Black Sea trade. 26

Of great importance for the development of the trade in Northeastern Europe was the missionary work and colonization by the Germans in the East and on the shores of the Baltic Sea, which led to the foundation of numerous cities. One of these was Lübeck. From this port the Germans started to take part in Baltic commerce. Yet the Gotlanders still controlled the trade in the Baltic and were seen everywhere and were well accepted. Emperor Lothar therefore conceded them special privileges about 1125, which were later reaffirmed by the Duke of Saxony, Henry the Lion, on the occasion of a dispute between the Germans and

the Goths in Visby, which soon came to have a German colony.27 In 1188, Emperor Frederick Barbarossa gave Lubeck a charter and conceded to the "Russi," Goths and "Normansi" freedom of tax, toll and tribute. Foreign traders could now come more easily and Lubeck and the countries of Saxony enjoyed many advantages. 28

Here may be the place to say a few words about Lubeck and its position and role in the Hanseatic League. It is difficult to determine when the League was founded. No special date can be given. Hansa means community. It was not a political association or an agreement of trade in the technical meaning. The Hansa was a league, an alliance of German towns whose citizens were merchants travelling into foreign countries, where they often lived together in small communities, which is the original meaning of the word Hansa. Later Hansa indicated the alliance of German cities which tried to defend the right of German merchants outside that country. The

27 By using the word "Goths" we avoid a decision about the native population of Gotland. What people the Gotlanders were at this period is not evident. We will use this term "Goths" following the sources which speak nearly constantly of the "Gothi." There is much discussion about the foundation of Visby and when it took control of the trade of the island. Cf. Adolf Bjoerkander, Till Visby steds aeldsta historia (Upsala, 1898) and its review by Wolfgang Schlüeter, "Zur Geschichte der Deutschen auf Gotland," in HGBI 36 (1909, 455-473).

mutual mercantile interests of the trading cities sometimes led them to form confederations, occasionally even to fight with weapons for their rights, for example the Confederation of Cologne against Waldemar IV Atterdag. Some historians consider this event of 1367 as the beginning of the Hansa. It would be wrong to think that the cities were always in complete agreement. They often had local interests and thus among the Hanseatic cities there were soon sub-groups like the "Westerlinge" and "Osterlinge," the Wendish cities and the Prussian cities. Local interests often hindered the cities from taking common action even when badly needed. The Hanseatic cities were sometimes under the dominion of a sovereign, sometimes they were free, independent communes. Since the principal function of the Hanseatic League consisted in the protection of commerce between the east and west coast of northern Europe, i.e., between the North Sea and the Baltic, it was this fact that gave Lubeck its position of leadership in the League. The same condition somehow gave the League itself the complexion of a political as well as a mercantile body. 29

One of the goals of the German merchants was Novgorod, which became more and more the center of the Russian trade;

since the character of the Russian trade changed, Novgorod was no longer a mere transit station for the Baltic-Arabic trade. Now goods from all directions came together here. Rivalries quickly developed and numerous incidents are recorded. In 1130, for example, the people of Novgorod sent many ships of the Goths to the bottom of the sea. Four years later the Danes robbed Novgorodians, and in 1142, Swedes attacked merchants on their way to the city. Russians and Swedes fought many battles, in one of which Sittunga was despoiled; in a battle of 1187, the "Varangians, the Germans with the Goths" were defeated by the people of Novgorod at Coruzk and Novotozok. These events finally led in 1189 to a treaty between the Germans and Gotlanders on the one hand and Yoroslav Vladimirovic, Prince of Novgorod on the other. By 1254, as attested in a treaty of that year, Russians were even living in Gotland. 30

Gotland was for a long time the intermediate station of the German-Russian trade in the Baltic Sea; merchants on their way from Germany to Russia as well as on their journey from Novgorod to Germany always travelled via Gotland. This practice

continued all through the 13th and into the 14th century. The cities of Lubeck and Visby together with Novgorod thus controlled the medieval trade of North Europe. Visby was the leader, as is clearly seen in the fact that in doubtful law suits the Petershof of Novgorod, the German trading-post and center there, had to have recourse to the council of the Germans of Gotland in Visby. From Novgorod the Germans bought furs, wax, fish, fish-oil, tallow, soap, corn, vegetables, silver, silk, drugs. They exchanged those for their own commodities: clothes, salt, herring, honey and metal.\(^\text{31}\)

Another depot of German eastern trade was Riga, founded by Bishop Albert with the help of the Gotlanders in 1201 on the route running up the Duna River to Smolensk. Henry of Livonia and the Novgorod Chronicle describe the route and indicate that Gotland was a station of this trade also. This trade was only a branch of the main German-Russia trade and submitted to the basic regulations of the latter. Riga climbed more and more to its peak during the second half of the 14th century after it had passed under the rule of the Teutonic Knights, in 1338, and it finally replaced Novgorod at the beginning of the 15th

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A few words should be said about the Teutonic Knights at this point. The Teutonic Order was first founded as a hospital order and defender of the faith during the third crusade at Acre in Palestine around 1190. In 1231, its fourth Grandmaster Hermann von Salza followed the call for help from Duke Conrad of Masovia in order to subdue the Prussians on the south shore of the Baltic Sea. Within a century Prussia had been conquered and repopulated, and most of the district brought into submission. This was accomplished partly by the hard fighting of the Knights, partly by the building of towns and fortresses, but most of all by the steady stream of German immigrants into the newly established towns and into the districts whose native population had been slaughtered or driven eastward. Thorn, Kulm, Elbing, Danzig, Koenigsberg and other cities were founded or seized. Most of the cities were members of the Hanseatic League. The Order itself soon became a trader on a great scale.

32 Henry of Livonia, Engl. trans. p. 28f, 34ff, 68, 84. Chronicle of Novgorod, Engl. transl. p. 12, 164. HUB I, 88 (1211), HUB I, 194 (1225); Visby law given to Riga, which show also the connection of Riga with Visby. Cf. Konstantin Hoehlbaum, "Die Grundung der deutschen Kolonie an der Duna," in HGBI 21 (1872) 21-65. HUB I, 678 (1270, April 21); HUB I, 816 (1278, Spring); HUB II, 628 (1338, November 1).
and a powerful political factor in Eastern Europe.  

During the 13th century Frisians and Flemings travelled to Gotland. The Flemings were occasionally expelled from England and its commerce because of disputes with Englishmen. Therefore they looked for compensation for the lost English wool trade and they were especially attracted by Gotland, where they could find contact with Russia and its goods. Yet the Germans did not want competition and therefore they tried to forbid them the route to Gotland by the same act by which they tried to forbid the non-German merchants of Gotland to sail westwards. The Hanseatic cities of Zwolle and Kampen in Netherland wanted and asked Lubeck to extend this prohibition against Englishmen, too.

All this shows us that there was a remarkable trade between Gotland, Flanders, and England, otherwise it is not quite understandable why Zwolle, Kampen and Lubeck were so


deeply concerned about it. For a long time, there had been contact between Gotland and the British Islands. We can trace back the trade with the English Island in earlier days and even, as we already saw, back as far as the beginning of the Baltic Sea trade, because of the many Anglo-Saxon coins found in Gotland. As a further proof of this contact, either direct or indirect, we may consider the similarity, which is often remarked, among the figured stones in Gotland, Scotland, Orkney and Shetland Islands. By the way, the widespread location of art or artifacts indicates also the connection of Gotland with various countries; the relationship in architecture is certainly evident.


Gotland and its city Visby were really the center of the Northern trade during the Middle Ages, or at least a very important trading place; the fact that through many centuries all the peoples of the North observed the so called Sea Laws of Visby proves the influence of this city.38 The date of these laws and their relationship to the Roll of Olerson have been a subject of much discussion among the best authorities. Probably they date from the 13th century and were not promulgated prior to 1266, but were first printed in 1505.39 Whatever may be the date and the origin of the Sea Laws of Visby, the fact is that there were regulations and laws respected by all the nations of the North. The Sea Laws of Visby are a collection of customs that had obtained the sanction of general use because of their equity, good sense, and convenience. The sphere of the laws and ordinances of Visby have been defined by Grotius: "The naval law of Rhodes, as the law of nations in

38"dat hoegste unde oeldeste water recht, dat de gemen kopman und schippers geordubert unde gemaket hebten to Wissby, dat sick eynen yder (de thor sewert vorkerst) hyr na rich- ten mach. Facsimile of the Sea Law of Visby, published by the Commerzbibliothek in Hamburg (Leipzig, 1935).

the Mediterranean Sea, was in force, as in Gaul the laws of Oleron, as also among all Scandinavians the laws of Visby." Authors of the laws of sea such as McFee say that the parallel of the Rhodian Law and the Role of Oleron with the Sea Laws of Visby is not carried too far. The law of the Baltic was known for centuries as the "waterrecht" of Visby, even after Gotland and Visby had already lost their importance in the Baltic. In 1447, Danzig asked the city of Visby to send it a copy of the Sea Laws. Even a century later, a law book of Scotland still referred to the Sea Laws of Visby. It should be remarked that the Sea Law of Visby is not identical with the city law of Visby which was also the law of many other Baltic trading cities among them Riga and Reval.41

In order to show further the importance of Gotland, or rather of the city of Visby on Gotland, we have to return to the relationship between Gotland and Novgorod and to mention the struggle between Lubeck and Visby. Lubeck advanced during the 13th century to be the leader of the German trading cities. Lubeck struggled with Gotland and Visby for the hegemony of

40 Here quoted according to Macarthur, op. cit., p. 108.
the trading cities in the Baltic. In 1275, it forbade the non-German merchants of Visby and Gotland to sail into the North Sea. To protect themselves against the outraged Goths, an alliance with the Germans in Visby was necessary, in which Riga joined two years later. Lubeck and the German merchants in Visby needed one another. Together they felt strong enough to watch and protect the Baltic Sea from the Sound and the Trave river to Novgorod. Yet soon the alliance broke up and Lubeck sought to be the appellate court of Novgorod instead of Visby. Lubeck and the other cities under the law of the city of Lubeck felt affronted that their cities should be controlled by the Law of Visby. Soon a fight arose concerning this question whether the German merchants should have recourse to Visby or to Lubeck, and finally, in 1293, the messengers of the Hanseatic cities decided at Rostock that the merchants be governed in future by Lubeck. Visby was also not permitted to use as its seal the seal of the common merchant.

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42 HUB I, 1154s: "nec...mare occidentale, de cetero licet frequentare." HUB I, 863; 906. LUK I, 402 (1280, September 7); 435 (1282).

43 Hanserecesse, 4 series, Series I: 1256-1430, 8 vols. (Lubeck, 1870-1897), hereafter cited as HR, I p. XXVIIIff; I 23, 36, 60-71, 80. HUB I 1129 (1293, October); 1299; 1131f.
With this decision of 1293 Lubeck took over more and more the important role of Visby till finally Gotland and its city Visby became a preferred place for pirates instead of merchants. 44

Responsible for this development were to a great extent the Danes. The Danish kings tried to establish a great kingdom. Waldemar I (1157-1182) wanted to make Denmark a new great power. Together with Henry the Lion he defeated the Wendes. His son Knut VI conquered the island of Ruegen and subjugated the princes of Pomerania and Mecklenburg. His brother Waldemar II overcame Holstein. Therefore Denmark ruled over the western part of the Baltic Sea, because the south part of Sweden and Scania also belonged to the Danish crown. Waldemar II tried to extend his territory to the east. In 1219 he founded the city of Reval on the eastern Baltic coast, and subjugated the Ests. Soon afterwards Waldemar was captured by a rioting vassal, count Henry of Schleswig. When he was freed in 1225, he tried to regain his old power, yet he was defeated in the battle of Bornhoevo.

in Holstein (1225) and the Danish hegemony was destroyed. Waldemar died in 1241.45

Not until a century later were the Danes again a considerable power in the Baltic. Waldemar IV ascended the throne in 1340, and tried to reestablish Danish hegemony in the Baltic Sea area. Although he sold Estonia to the Teutonic Order he acted more in the western part of the Baltic Sea. He regained Scania and conceded to the Hanseatic League privileges there which were important for the herring trade, one of the main sources of trade. Yet then Waldemar attacked the Hansa: first he sailed with a strong fleet to Oeland, conquered Bornholm, and then sailed to Gotland where he occupied Visby.46 Visby was a very rich city. All the profits of the Petershof in Novgorod were deposited for many years according

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to an old custom in the so-called St. Peterskasten, which was placed in St. Mary's church in Visby. Attracted by this and other treasures of the city Waldemar landed in Gotland, overpowered the people there, and appeared before the city of Visby. The citizens did the wrong thing, namely, they left the city walls to face the enemies in the open field. They were defeated; about 1800 were reported killed. On July 27, 1361, Waldemar entered the city and he and his soldiers plundered the town. Waldemar assumed the title of the "King of Slavs and Goths".47

The occupation of Gotland and Visby by Waldemar Atterdag was a hard blow for the Hanseatic League. It endangered its trading hegemony. The League took immediate actions. The result was a blockade against the Danes and finally an alliance of the trading cities, the so-called Confederation of Cologne, in 1367. The Hanseatic League, or the Koelner Confederation, was quite successful in its fight with Denmark and finally forced Waldemar to make peace at Stralsund (1370).

How much power the League had at this time may be seen by the fact that henceforth Danish kings needed the confirmation and

approbation of the Hanseatic League for their elections. 48

Waldemar himself eventually realized that his hopes that Visby and its trade would bring him many advantages had been false. A city which was a subject of a coup de main of a conquerer, was no longer an attractive trading post and entrepot. The whole affair finally worked to the advantage of the other cities situated on the continent, especially Lubeck, which now advanced to be the undisputed leader of the Hanseatic League. Lubeck, originally only the doorway to and from Germany and one end of the direct trade line and connection with Gotland, the doorway to the East, now surpassed this former center of the Baltic Sea trade. 49 But the island of Gotland and its city Visby had not finished their role in the Baltic Sea, although it had played out its first role in trade and commerce. It would remain for a while a focus for political interest because of its unique geographical situation.

48 HUB I, 258 (1361, August 1), HUB IV, 30 (1361, November 14); cf. also the alliance with King Magnus of Sweden and King Hakon of Norway: HUB IV, II (1361, September 8) and HUB IV, 26ff (1361, September 9); HUB IV 227 (1367, November 19); Die Koelner Konfoederation vom Jahre 1364 und die Schonischen Pfandschaften (Dissertation, Leipzig, 1894).

CHAPTER II

THE DYNASTIC RIVALRIES OF THE BALTIC STATES

1375 - 1398
CHAPTER II

DYNASTIC AND COMMERCIAL RIVALRIES OF THE BALTIC STATES, 1375-1398.

Having seen the importance of the island of Gotland and its city Visby no one will be surprised that this spot in the middle of the Baltic was always a subject of dynastic rivalries. In order to be able to give a final answer to our question: Why did the Teutonic Order occupy Gotland in 1398? we have to investigate the prehistory of the occupation. This chapter will show the connection between the different points and parties involved in the rivalries for the hegemony in the Baltic Sea. We may have to indicate some more details still later but all that is said here in this second chapter will be useful and even necessary for the understanding of the final solution.

When Waldemar IV Atterdag of Denmark died in 1375 without being survived by a son, a struggle for the succession in the Scandinavian countries started and lasted for some decades. Both of Waldemar's daughters claimed the succession to the Danish throne for their sons: Margaret for her son Olaf, and Ingeborg for her son Albrecht IV of Mecklenburg.
Ingeborg was the elder daughter of Waldemar and had married Henry of Mecklenburg. According to the German law of succession Albrecht had the right to succeed his grandfather. But in Denmark the German rights were not valid, since Denmark elected its sovereigns. Therefore Olaf, the son of the younger daughter Margaret and of King Hakon VI of Norway had the same chances to become king of Denmark. The decision lay with the noblemen of Denmark.¹

There were two factions in Denmark which fought for different candidates. The difficulty stemmed from a treaty made years ago between Albert II of Mecklenburg² (known as the Elder to distinguish him from his grandson Albrecht IV the Younger) and Waldemar IV, the father-in-law of Albert, son of Henry of Mecklenburg. The treaty provided that the Danish throne should pass to Albrecht.³

¹Appendix I, genealogy of the Scandinavian sovereigns.


The Duke of Mecklenburg simultaneously made an agreement with and received promises of help from Emperor Charles IV, his son Wenzel and the Dukes of Brandenburg. The Emperor even fulfilled his promise when he admonished the Danes to pay homage to Albrecht IV, the Younger, and when Charles IV asked Lubeck to help and assist the Duke of Mecklenburg. But the Danes refused to do homage, because they preferred Olaf. Emperor and Empire were far away and the Hanseatic cities hesitated to do anything in this case, in spite of their rights according to the peace treaty of Stralsund, in 1370. Hence Margaret succeeded in her attempt to win the crown for her son Olaf. On May 3, 1376, the Danish noblemen elected him King of Denmark.

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4. Mecklenburgisches Urkundenbuch, hereafter cited as MUB, 24 vols. ed. by Verein fuer mecklenburgische Geschichte und Altertumskunde (Schwerin, 1873-1913) XVIII, 10449ff (1373, June 6); 10454 (1374, April 28); 10792 (1375, November 6); HR II 108-112 (1376, February 16).

Yet Albert the Elder, Duke of Mecklenburg, did not give up. He sailed with a fleet to Copenhagen, but a storm forced him to make an armistice. Since he could not end the affair alone he had to look for help. During the years 1375 and 1376 there were many complaints at the general diets of the Hanseatic League (Hansetage) about sea-robbery. The cities had already decided to do something about the matter, when Albert the Elder hired the pirates for his fight against Denmark. It was the first time during the Scandinavian struggles that a sovereign used the robbers for his aims. It is difficult to determine the exact time of the agreement between the pirates and the Mecklenburgers. It probably occurred during the fall of 1376 or spring of 1377.

Soon the complaints about robberies on the sea increased. In Fall of 1377, the pirates were so numerous that Lubeck and other cities were really concerned and tried to control the situation. But dissension among them did not permit them to do

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6 Die Lubeckische Chronik des Franziskaner-Lesemeisters Detmar und seine Kontinuatoren) ed. by Karl Koppmann, in: Chroniken der deutschen Staedte, Niedersachsen, Lubeck, XVIII, XIX, XXVI (Leipsig, 1884) hereafter cited as Detmar Ch. St. XIX, p. 556. A full account of these events is given by E. Daenoll, Koeln, Koff.

much. The particular interests of the different Hanseatic cities often hindered effective common actions of the league. This time an unexpected event brought temporary relief. 8

The chief adversary of the newly elected Danish King Olaf and his mother Margaret—she ruled as regent for her son who was not yet of age—was Albert II, the Elder, Duke of Mecklenburg. He died suddenly on February 18, 1379. His son and successor Henry III (1379-83), who was the husband of Ingeborg, the elder daughter of Waldemar Atterdag, changed his policies and opened negotiations. As a result Albrecht IV, his son, abandoned the title of king and called himself only "heir of Denmark." Meanwhile Margaret rose more and more to the peak of her power. When her husband Hakon VI of Norway died, in 1380, she became regent of this country, too. 10

In 1383, Henry of Mecklenburg died and his brother, Albert III, King of Sweden, wanted to defend the "rights" of his nephew Albrecht. Albert of Sweden followed again the

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8 HR II, 148; III 99 (1377); II 174 para. 8; cf. Daemell, Koeln, Konf. p. 102ff.


10 MUB XIX 11117; 11247; 11285 (1380); 11344 (1381). Reg. Dan. Ser. p. 139.
line of his father Albert the Elder, and in 1384 he even invaded Scania, with little success. Albert had become King of Sweden as he deposed his uncle Magnus Smek in 1364 but since he was a foreigner and did not even speak the language and moreover favored the Germans living in Sweden, especially in Stockholm, many of the nobility revolted against him and he fled to Mecklenburg to wait for better days. When the leader of the opposition in Sweden, high bailiff (Drost) Bo Johnson died in August 1386, Albert thought he could now return to Sweden. But he was wrong. Margaret had been active meanwhile and had worked among the nobles and clergymen of Sweden.

Queen Margaret claimed the crown of Sweden, since her son Olaf was the last offspring of the Folkunger dynasty, for he was the grandson of Magnus II Smek whom Albert III had deposed. But when Olaf died in 1387, his mother, already ruling over Denmark and Norway, asserted her own claim to the Swedish throne.

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12 A long account of these events is to be found in: *Girgensohn, op.cit.*, p. 12-88; *Oekgarte, op.cit.*
The next year Albrecht IV the Younger, the original pretender to the Danish throne, died. His uncle Albert of Sweden now tried to win the throne of Denmark for himself and for his son Erich, at the same time that he was struggling to defend his own crown of Sweden. But the noblemen of Sweden finally gave in to the blandishments of Margaret and in 1388 deposed Albert in absentia.  

Soon war broke out and Albert led an army of Mecklenburgers against Margaret, but he was defeated in the battle of Falkoeping in Vester Goetland on February 24, 1398. Albert of Sweden and his son Erich were captured and imprisoned in Uintholm in Scania, south Sweden. Margaret in turn invested Stockholm, which was defended successfully by the Germans who lived there. At this time Stockholm was virtually a German city, since so many Germans lived there, and they favored Albert and stood on his side. Although Margaret could not win the city the town itself was surrounded and in  


14 Detmar, Ch. St. XXVI p. 25f, Annales Scanici, p.191; Reg. Dan. Ser., p. 141; HR IV 438 para. 1. This document is a report of the Grandmaster to defend his opposition during the Gotland affair. This Parteischrift will be indicated in future by PS.
serious difficulty. The Mecklenburgers tried to relieve the city in the fall of 1390, but a storm destroyed most of the ships. Nevertheless the Mecklenburgers made some raids inland into Sweden. By their failure they learned that they were not strong enough alone to obtain their goal. Therefore they did the same thing that they had done years before: they began to employ pirates. They were not particular about the means they employed. They opened their ports to all who on their own risk wanted to sail into the Baltic in order to harm and to attack the Danes.

All kinds of people responded to this call: burgesses of many cities, craftsmen, farmers, adventurers, criminals


16 Albert III of Sweden had ordered that in case something happened to him, his nephew John IV should be the heir of the Swedish throne. Since John was not yet of age, the Mecklenburgers asked Duke John I of Stargard, an uncle of Albert of Sweden, to defend their interests, a duty which was taken over after the death of John in 1393 by his son John II of Mecklenburg-Stargard, a cousin of King Albert. The delay of one year was probably due to the feud of the Mecklenburgers with Brandenburg, which was finished by 1390. Det-mar CH.St. XXVI, p. 33,38.

of various kinds, even noblemen who liked to live on their own. All these formed private groups under the leadership of certain outspoken men, quite often noblemen, and these sea-robbers came to be called Vitualian Brothers. There is much discussion regarding the name. They were not pirates in the usual sense of the word. Although the sources speak constantly of pirates ("Raubare") we have to think more in terms of mercenaries and privateers. They served political interests, on behalf of a sovereign. They were people looking out for their advantage and when someone took them into his service they were happy to have a legal excuse for their attacks of merchant ships.

18Detmar, Ch.st. XXVI, p. 50. The problem of the Vitualian Brothers is only sporadically threatened; Cf. v.g. Johannes Voigt, "Die Vitualienbrüder" in Historisches Taschenbuch ed. by Friedrich von Raumer, new series, II (1841) I-160; Cordsen, op. cit., Teichmann, op. cit. This is deplored by Wladyslaw Dziewulski, "Problem Bractwa Witalijskiego" in: Przegląd Zachodni VIII (1952) p. 415ff.

Dziewulski by the way is quite interesting because of his interpretation as a communist historian. According to his theory, the great number of outlaws and pirates represents a primitive form of already strong protest against feudalism. (Cf. p. 415). When the Germans repressed the Swedes in Stockholm, Dziewulski considers it an act against the "poorer brother citizens," a class war (p. 417). The Vitualian Brothers were also called "like deeler," i.e. "equal shares," as in indication of their egalitarian customs. (p. 417f).

19Detmar, Ch.st. XXVI, p. 50; Reimer Kock, in: Luebecker Chroniken, ed. by Grautoff, 2 vols. (Hamburg, 1829), I 494; Cf. the summary of the discussion in Cordsen, op. cit., p. 17ff and Karl Koppmann, Introduction to HR IV p. lff.
The Mecklenburgers were the first to use these dissolute fellows, yet soon they lost control of the pirates who were not particular about the means they employed; also they indiscriminately seized the ships of Danes as well as of others, especially of the Teutonic Order and their cities and of Livonia. The Mecklenburgers received many complaints about the pirates; some of them established their headquarters on Gotland in 139220 from where they had a very effective base of operation.

The pirates were quite numerous and became a plague for the whole Baltic Sea; on one occasion 1500 men showed up before the coast of Livonia. No ship was safe, whether it was a merchant vessel or simply a fishing boat.21 Only in groups of about 10 ships could the mariners try to pass the Sound.22 Therefore the Hanseatic League--at this time at the peak of its power--decided to take arms against them. The League

20 Kehlert, op. cit., 387; HR III 475 (1390, June 24); IV 28f (1391, October 18); IV 438 para. 3 (PS).

21 Chronologia ab anno 266-1430, in: SSRSuec. I, 1 p. 30; Reimar Kock I, 494; HR IV 142 (1392, September); IV 144-149 (1392, October).

22 HR IV 124 (1392); IV 648 (1394, June 9): mentions 300 pirate ships.
decided to put a number of ships, called peace-ships (Friedekoggen), specially heavy and armed and furnished them with soldiers, out to sea to destroy the Vitualian Brothers and restore peace and security in the Baltic. However, the attempt of the Hansa to control the sea with their "Friedekoggen" failed, and so the League finally decided to stop the herring trade with Scania completely. Yet all the efforts of the League were not as successful as expected, since its cities were not acting unanimously. The Prussian cities did not totally support the League's efforts because of local interests.

During all these years the Teutonic Order, and under its leadership the Prussian cities, had preserved neutrality and had thus not become involved in the struggle with Waldemar IV. This attitude of neutrality was maintained by all Grandmasters.

23 HR IV (1394, February 2): "36 Koggen und 4 Rheinschiffe." In 1395, Lubeck sent 20 big ships with many small boats to sea: Detmar, Ch. St. XXVI, p. 66.

24 HR IV 156 para. 3 (1393, July 23); Teichmann, op. cit., p. 47 considers this step as a capitulation of the League. We cannot accept this especially when he himself says a page later: "der Verlust der Schönschen Zolleinnahmen... bewogen Margaret das Begehren der Staedte anzunehmen" (p. 48), namely to negotiate. Why should this be only an accidental and not an intended effect of the trade blockade? Cf. E. Daenell, Geschichte der deutschen Hanse in der 2. Hälfte des 14. Jahrhunderts. Hereafter cited as Daenell, GDR XIV J. (Leipzig, 1897) p. 96.
until Conrad von Jungingen (1393-1407). The order did not want to lose the friendship of the Mecklenburgers, since the connection of their land trade and the route of the "war guests" of the Order from the German territory passed through Mecklenburg. The Order needed and received help from the Empire for the fight with the heathen in Livonia, Samogitia, and Lithuania. Knights errant following the call and assisting the Order were called war-guests, since they served only temporarily as honored guest warriors. Many, if not most of them took the road through the provinces of the northern Dukes. The struggle with Livonia-Samogitia was another reason for the Order's neutral policy in the Baltic, since the Order needed to have a free hand. Thus the Knights as well as

25 There is much discussion about the reason of the neutrality. Carl Sattler "Das Ordensland Preussen und die Hanse bis zum Jahre 1370," in *Preussische Jahrbuecher* 41 (1878) 341, says Prussia was afraid of the favor and partiality of the Pope as well as Emperor for the King of Denmark. He also says, as many others, that it was not possible for the Teutonic Knights to oppose Waldemar as a Christian King (p. 348). cf. v. g. Teichmann, *op.cit.*, p. 16 and Krollman, *op.cit.*, p. 16 and Krollmann, *op.cit.*, p. 56. But there can be some doubt about this since the Knights did not have difficulty fighting against the Poles who were Christians, too. cf. Leon Koczy, *The Baltic Policy of the Teutonic Order* (Torun 1936) p. 27.

the cities in Prussia were careful to avoid offending the Mecklenburgers, when Margaret in 1393 strove to draw the Order to her side and to induce the Grandmaster to take actions against Mecklenburg. In 1395, we even hear of gifts sent by Margaret to Jungingen and of a new Danish embassy in Marienburg, but it did not bring the Knights to her side. On the other hand the Order and its cities did not want to offend Margaret. When the Mecklenburgers asked the Grandmaster to support King Albert, the answer was similarly a negative one. Only in 1394/95 after the alderman Conrad Roemer of Rostock was sent to Grandmaster Conrad von Jungingen, the attitude of neutrality changed, and because of the same reason just mentioned the Prussians were still reluctant during the negotiations of 1394 and 1395.

The Hanseatic League became convinced that as long as the struggle between Margaret and the supporters of Albert of Sweden lasted, there was no hope at all of ending the insecurity.

27 HR IV 168 (1393, November 8); HR IV 138 (1393, December 18); Cf. Leon Koczy, op. cit., p. 38f.

28 (1391), June 30.

of the Baltic Sea trade. But as long as Albert and his son Erich were imprisoned by Margaret, the Mecklenburgers would not stop fighting. Therefore Lubeck and the other cities, hoping to settle the question, tried to persuade the Mecklenburgers and Margaret to negotiate. Margaret acquiesced for a number of reasons: The loss of the toll income of the herring trade in Scania, rising prices, and the realization that it was difficult for the time being to resist the attacks of her enemies. The Teutonic Knights also intervened, at the request of Conrad Roemer, the envoy of Mecklenburg. The Grandmaster finally sent two envoys, Albert von Schwarzenberg, commander from Schwetz, and Johann Tiergarten, commander from Marienburg, to Scania in 1394/95. By this time the negotiations had been going on for sometime; they had started September 1393 in Falsterbo, and had been

30 Detmar, Ch.St. XXVI, p. 51.

continued at many diets of the Hanseatic League. Finally all efforts of the League as well as of the Order as mediators between Margaret and the Mecklenburgers culminated in the treaty of Falsterbo in 1395, sometimes called the treaty of Lintholm or Lintholm-Falsterbo.

Since this treaty of 1395 will be important later for a deeper understanding of the Gotland affair, it is necessary to examine it in detail. Margaret agreed to free Albert of

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32 HR IV 159, 167-171; LUB IV 592 (1393, September 29). Here a new day was determined for February 2, 1394, which was then held March 3 at Lubeck, cf. HR IV 182 and 192. But Margaret was not present and therefore a new day was set for June 24, cr. HR IV 191 (1394, January 24) and HR IV 192, 7 (1384, March 3), HR IV 195 (1394, March 27).

On July 7, 1394, the negotiations started at Rostock, the further conventions were 1394, July 22, at Helsingborg; 1394, September 8 at Rostock. About these cf. the report of the Prussian messengers (HR IV 236) who were captured and held back on their way to the diet by Duke Wratislaw of Pomerania favoring Margaret. cf. Girgensohn, op.cit., p. 168; Oelgarte, op.cit., p. 63. Then a day at Alholm, 1394, November 1, was held, on which practically they decided to delay the last negotiations to April 23, 1395. cf. HR IV 243f (1395, February 17).

33 Detmar, Ch.St., p. 68ff; Chronik des Johannes von Posise, in: SSRRPr II, p. 197f; Reg. Ser. Dan., p. 142. About May 20, 1395, the negotiations came to an end at Skanger and Falsterbo, which then were signed by Margaret and Albert at Lintholm, cf. HR IV 258-260; HR IV 261 recess-text; HR IV 262ff the documents; HR IV 265-274 the documents signed at Lintholm on September 8, 1395. For details see v.g. Teichmann, op.cit., p. 49-63.
Sweden and his son Erich for three years, with the condition that the seven cities of the Hanseatic League which took part in this treaty - Lubeck, Thorn, Elbing, Stralsund, Greifswald, Danzig, and Reval - give security for the financial part of the treaty. After three years Albert and his son would return to prison if they could not pay a ransom of 60,000 marks silver, or if they do not either return or pay the ransom Stockholm had to be delivered to Margaret. During these three years the seven sea-cities had the right to occupy Stockholm, as a pawn for their given security.34

This treaty of Falsterbo also ordered the pirates to clear the sea by the 25th of July, or they would have to face hard punishment. But the Hanseatic League, knowing that it would have to take decisive action if it really wanted peace on the sea, made provision for such a contingency.35

The Vitualian Brothers did not disappear. For the moment without an employer, during the two year negotiations which finally ended in the treaty of Falsterbo, some of the pirates directed their activities eastward and northward.

34 HR IV 438 para. 4 (FS); LUB IV 626f (1395, August 1); Lubeck had already sent Jordan Pleskow to Stockholm on September 29, 1393, cf. LUB IV 592; 629 (1395, September 13).

35 HR IV 275.
Greta Dume, the widow of Bo Johnson, who was the soul of the resistance of the nobility in Sweden against Albert, gave them protection along the Finnish coast. The cities of Livonia especially suffered as a result. In 1393, Dorpat could not even send its peace ships to join the fleet of the Hanseatic League because of the privateering. In April 1395, another group of the pirates under the leadership of the nobleman Albrecht von Peckatel, in the pay of Mecklenburg, attacked Gotland and occupied a part of the island. Although there is no positive evidence in the documents, the new invasion of Gotland might have influenced Margaret's willingness to negotiate, which finally led to Falsterbo. Margaret had asked during the negotiations that the island be handed over to her. But the treaty provided that Albert and his son Erich and Duke John of Mecklenburg, the cousin of King Albert,


37. Chronol. Sueciae Wisb., in: SSRR Suec. I, 1 p. 46; Diarium fratrum minorum Wysblensium, in: SSRR Suec. I, 1 p. 35; HR IV 438 para. 2 (PS); 262 para. 4; 262.
should have Visby and whatever other parts of Gotland which they possessed before April 24, 1395, namely, before the attack of Albert of Peckatel. This shows that the Mecklenburgers were still in possession of a part of Gotland and its city Visby. The pirates obeyed the order of the treaty of Falsterbo to leave the sea by July 25, but only in part, since they moved either north to the shores of Finland or westward into the North Sea where, under the leadership of the famous Klaus Stoertebeker and Godeke Michels, they attacked the Frisian and Dutch traders.

For the future of the Vitualian Brothers the important question was whether any of the various factions or sovereigns who would like to use their services any longer. They finally found protectors in the Swedish nobles as well as in the Mecklenburgers. Thus the complaints about insecurity on the sea did not stop. The remonstrance of the Hanseatic League


39 Detmar, Ch.St, XXVI p. 79, 90, 102; cf. von Wanke, Die Vitualienbrueder in Oldenburg, (Dissertation, Greifswald, 1910). K. Koppmann, "Der Seeraeuber Klaus Stoertebeker in Geschichte und Sage," in: HGB1 7 (1877) 35-58; also his introduction to HR IV, p. VI-XXIII.
to King Albert was fruitless. After his release from prison he stayed in his own country. Appeals to Duke Erich, who went to Gotland after the release from Margaret's prison, also produced no results. The League decided to put its "peace-ships" to sea again. Again discord among the cities did not permit successful efforts against privateers. Therefore the Prussian cities now took the initiative into their own hands. In April 1396, they decided to put a convoy of ships to sea in the next month. At the island of Mela the Prussian fleet waited for ships from Lubeck, which had promised to join the action against the Vitualian Brothers. From there the united fleet sailed for Gotland, the main base of the privateers.

A part of Gotland, as has already been said, had fallen into the hands of the Vitualian Brothers under the leadership of Albert of Pekkatel, in the service of Mecklenburg, before the treaty of Falsterbo. Thus a section of the island was in the hand of Erich, son of Albert of Sweden. The other part of Gotland was given by the treaty of Falsterbo to Margaret, who had installed Sven Sture as her governor. Sven was the

40 HUB V 202; HR IV 278f; 290 para. 15; 308 (1395, September 29); MUB 12832 (1395, September 22).
41 HR IV 309 para. 4; 328; 336f; 344 (1396, April 21); 365; 375.
leader of another group of pirates. Margaret as well as Erich now hired privateers. In 1396, Erich began to fight against Sven Sture, overcame him and occupied the whole island of Gotland. When Margaret arrived to rescue Sture she found that her governor had deserted to her enemies. Thus this good strategic point opposite the coast of Sweden was in the hands of the Mecklenburgers, or rather of Erich, who invited still more pirates. The privateers now swarmed on the island in great numbers.\textsuperscript{42}

Meanwhile Margaret was not idle either. In Spring 1396, her cities armed some ships, sailed to Gotland and were somehow successful in expelling a goodly number of their foes.\textsuperscript{43} Pleased by this success the Danish fleet showed up before Visby and it looked as if the Danish had something in mind. But, having taken no action, they finally set sail for home. At Horborch near Kalmar they met the "peace-ships" of the Prussian and Wendish cities, which had united before Hela as we already saw. Unsuspecting, the Danish ships were captured and burned by the Prussian contingent, while the sailors were brought to Visby and executed on the suspicion

\textsuperscript{42}HR IV 264 para. 4; 370; 438 para. 4 cf. Daenell, G.D.H. XIV J p. 139 where a detailed account of these events is given.

\textsuperscript{43}Cf. Daenell, G.D.H. XIV J. p. 131.
that they intended to occupy Visby for Queen Margaret. It was the irony of fate that the Hanseatic cities, sailing against the Vihtualian Brothers, fell afoul of other foes of the robbers. This all shows how confused the situation in the Baltic Sea was at this time. 44

The accident of Horboch—also called the affair of Kalmar—had various effects. First, it alienated Lubeck and the Wendish cities from the Prussian cities still more, since the crews of the non-Prussian ships refused to take part at the execution of the Danes. Therefore the Prussians accused them of being protectors of the Danes. 45 In fact it became evident that in general Lubeck and the Hanseatic League under its leadership favored the Danish party since they wanted to have free access to Scania and the herring fishing and trade there, which was the base of Lubeck's trade and wealth. In addition they feared a strong German sovereign more than a strong Scandinavian country because of the danger to their independence and freedom, while the Prussians, on the other hand, favored the Mecklenburgers. The reasons for the

44 HR IV 372f (1396, July 9); 551f.
45 HR IV 374: Margaret's complaint to Danzig. HR IV 375: the report of this event by the Prussians. HR IV 552: the report by Lubeck.
Prussians' attitude were mentioned earlier namely to have an undisturbed passage through Mecklenburg, which was in a certain sense of vital necessity, and to have a free hand to fight the foes in Livonia-Samositia. Furthermore this accident of Horboch embittered Margaret. She was already offended by the Prussians' refusal to cooperate in fighting the Vitualian Brothers as long as she refused to pay back some claims of damages to Prussian merchants. This tension would increase in the future.

Finally, the affair of Kalmar discouraged the League from action about the pirates during 1397. The Prussian cities together with the Knights jointly considered this problem at their meetings in this year but they could come to no definite decision. They did not want to do anything without the other Hanseatic cities, because the Teutonic Knights had not yet quite settled their problem with Livonia and therefore were hardly able to put enough ships and men to sea to fight the Vitualian Brothers. Lubeck too had its own troubles; its perennial struggle with the Dukes of Brunswick-Luneburg,

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46 HR IV 309 para. 4; 344.

47 HR IV 384 para 2, 3; 386 para. 9, 10; 388. Napiersky 522 (1397, July 15). Cod. dipl. Pr. VI 22 (1397, April); VI 44 (1397, July 13); cf. Teichmann, op. cit., p. 425ff; Th. Lindner, Geschichte des deutschen Reiches unter-Wenzel, 2 vols. (1880) II p. 274ff.
and unrest among its citizens.  

The result of this indecision was a catastrophic situation for seafaring on the Baltic. During the summer of 1397 trade in the Baltic Sea was nearly impossible. The trade of Prussia and Livonia was almost totally ruined. The Vitualian Brothers became stronger. Margaret asked Lubeck what the cities intended to do about the peril. The Prussian cities asked their lord, the Grandmaster of the Teutonic Knights, to end this intolerable situation. Then Duke Erich changed his policy. In June 1397, instead of the expected guerilla action against Margaret he attacked Stockholm directly, which was held by the seven sea-cities according to


49HR IV 405; 409 para. 3; 438 para. 6 (F5); Cf. Teichmann, op. cit., p. 74; Kehlert, op. cit., p. 389.
the treaty of Falsterbo. Stockholm's governor, Herman von der Halle, attacked by Erich's large force of 42 ships and 1,200 men, begged the Prussians for help. But intervention soon became unnecessary; Duke Erich died July 26, 1397. His companion Sven Sture returned to Gotland, where Erich's widow, Sofia of Pomerania-Wolgast, appointed him high commander of these irregular forces. Sture took the pirates into his service, not for political reasons but for a predatory war against the merchants. Moreover, he opened Gotland to all other pirates as a base for their operations and predatory war.

More and more privateers now gathered on Gotland in response to the invitation from Sven Sture and Sofia of Pomerania-Wolgast. Since they found no resistance they could do as they pleased. The situation was unbearable. Prussia asked Albert to stop Sofia, his daughter-in-law. Thus he sent his cousin Duke John II of Stargard to Gotland to win control over the mercenaries, but John was defeated by the privateers in the fall of 1397. The Mecklenburgers were quite helpless and totally lost control over the pirates. The House of Mecklenburg had to bear the wrath and blame of the Baltic cities

50HR IV 408; 410 (1397, July 3).
51Detmar, Ch.St. XXVI p. 93. HR 438 para. 5 (PS).
MUB XXIII 13158.
and sovereigns since they were judged responsible for having called and employed the Vitualian Brothers in the beginning.\textsuperscript{52}

Since the situation was so bad something had to be done. Mecklenburg and Margaret would not take any decisive action. The Hanseatic League assembled in Lubeck but could come to no satisfactory decision. If the Prussian cities and the Teutonic Knights wanted to overcome the serious crisis in their trade and commerce on which the wealth of the cities and the Order depended they had to take independent action at once.\textsuperscript{53} It was of no importance who was \textit{de jure} in possession of Gotland; \textit{de facto} the Vitualian Brothers occupied the island. They were the enemies who had to be eliminated. Margaret had, during the summer of 1397, accomplished her greatest triumph: the union of Calmar, by which the three Scandinavian countries were united under her personal reign.\textsuperscript{54} If Margaret could win this island and add this strategically important place to her dominion, she could control the whole Baltic area. She had

\textsuperscript{52}HR IV 438 para. 6-8 (FS); HR IV 425f.

\textsuperscript{53}HR IV 413-17 (1397, September 8); 438 para. 9 (FS). cf Benninghoven, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 429.

\textsuperscript{54}(1397, 13 July) \textit{Reg. Dan. Ser.}, p. 142.
serious ambition about the island. In December, 1397, for instance, she contacted Sofia, the widow of Erich, asking her to submit Gotland to her. This became known to the Grandmaster and induced him to take action. Furthermore, during the winter of 1397/98 most of the pirates of the Baltic Sea gathered on Gotland, making it possible to attack them all at once. Thus it is not surprising that Grandmaster Conrad von Jungingen decided to work with his cities against the pirates by means of an expedition to the island.  

55 HR IV 424 (1397, December).  
56 HR 438 para. 9 (PS); Kehlert, op.cit., 389f.
CHAPTER III

THE OCCUPATION OF GOTLAND

1398 - 1408
CHAPTER III

THE GOTLAND AFFAIR OF 1398-1408

A. THE ACQUISITION OF GOTLAND BY THE TEUTONIC ORDER

As early as the winter of 1397 Grandmaster Conrad of Jungingen had decided to act. When in December 1397 Conrad von Gortzen as an envoy of Duke John II of Mecklenburg-Stargast journeyed to East Prussia to appease the Grandmaster, Conrad rebuffed him coldly.¹ John II wanted to assure the head of the Order that all his captains had promised to fight the robbers and that he had invited the Vitualian Brothers to oppose the Danes on land, not at sea. But Conrad of Jungingen would not even listen to the Duke's message.

¹HR IV 425 (1397, December).
On January 23, 1398, the messengers of the Prussian cities and the Grandmaster with his principal officials (Grossgebietiger) conferred at Marienburg, after the cities had at different times insisted on action by the Order against the robbers. An immediate attack on Gotland was resolved.

It was decided to arm a fleet of ten large and 30 small ships and to raise 2,000 men, of which the five cities, Thorn, Elbing, Danzig, Koenigsberg and Braunsberg, had to provide 400. All should be fitted out by February 22. Actually the fleet set sail shortly after March 17, secretly and well prepared.

2 There were 5 principal officials besides the Grandmaster: Grand Commander (Grosskomtur), Chief Marshall (Marschall), Head Almoner (Spitler), Sumptuary or Drapier (Trapier), and Treasurer (Tresler). More details about them and other authorities of the Teutonic Order Cf. Frank Milthaler, Die Grossgebietiger des Deutsch-Ritterordens bis 1440, Ihre Stellung und Befugnisse (Koenigsberg, 1940). There are extant two copies of the acts of this diet of Marienburg, one dated January 23 from Thorn, the other dated February 2 from Danzig. HR II 424, also in: Akten der Staendetage Preussens unter der Herrschaft des Deutschen Ordens, ed. by Max Toeppen, 5 vols., hereafter cited as STA (Leipzig, 1874-1886), I, p. 55

3 Detmar says "midvastene" (SSRRPr III 217), that is March 17, therefore not, as Toeppen (STA I 55) pointed out, at the end of February. For some interesting details Cf. H. Grotefend, "Zur Eroberung Gotlands durch den deutschen Orden," in: HGBI XV (1886) 161-163.

4 The Prussians kept their plan secret to surprise Margaret. When the fleet left Danzig, a ship with the news was sent to Lubeck at the same time: HR IV 434 para. 14. When Grandmaster Conrad as well as the Prussian cities wrote to Margaret in January, both did not mention their plans at all and said that the problem of the Vitualian Brothers will be threatened at the next diet of the Hanseatic League: HR IV 427f (1398, January 23), HR IV 430f (1398, January 28).
and very much larger than first planned, which was perhaps the reason for the delay. The forces consisted of eighty-four ships with 4,000 men and 400 horses under the leadership of fifty knights of the Order.\footnote{Posilge, in SSRRPr III 217f is the only one who mentioned the knights. Cod. Dipl. Pr. V 103, p. 135. HR IV 438 para. 9, (PS).}

On March 21 they landed at Garn, 3 miles from Visby, without difficulties or resistance. The Vitualian Brothers, somehow warned in advance, went to Visby and joined forces with Johann. Since it was still winter time and there was much snow the Prussians could not move the siege machines.\footnote{HR IV 438 para 10, (PS). Chronol. Sueciae, in SSRRPr III 458. Diar. Wisb. in SSRRPr III 459.} Probably impressed by the splendid forces of the Prussians, Johann of Mecklenburg and Sven Sture offered negotiation, but without results.\footnote{About the number and strength of the Prussian army and fleet Cf. Benninghoven, op. cit., p. 430ff. HR 438 para. 11f, (PS); IV 471 (1398, May 29).} Even while they were still in progress the Prussian army went into the interior of the island and destroyed three castles held by the robbers. Then they turned back to Visby and with the help of the fleet, conquered the city without
any serious opposition. 8

On April 5, 1398, an armistice was made at Visby and the city was officially handed over to Johann of Mecklenberg, with the agreement of the mayor and the aldermen of the town, together with the whole island of Gotland. In detail it was determined to permit access to the merchants of the Hanseatic League, to clear the town and the island of the enemies of the Order, to destroy the castles, to make restitution for stolen goods, to surrender the city, harbor and island, and to preserve the privileges of Visby. The pirates who did not leave the island during the next three days were to be captured and killed. The contract was made on the condition that it would be ratified by King Albert of Sweden, now living at Mecklenburg, and the Grandmaster "of Prussia." 9

A garrison of 200 men, 100 of them paid by the Grandmaster, the other 100 paid by the Prussian cities, together with 100 horses, remained on the island under the command of Johann von

8HR 438 para 13, (PS). Continuation of Detmar, in: SSRRPr III

Thetvytz as Prussian Governor (Vogt) of Visby and Gotland. Also three knights of the Order remained. During the summer of 1398 the Grandmaster placed the fleet under the command of Arnold Hecht from Danzig to protect the sea and island.

The Knights treated the population of Gotland well, and they conceded them the old privileges. However, they had to contribute to the cost of the expedition, and the Grandmaster justified this demand for money by pointing out that the Order's intervention had been in the best interest of the inhabitants themselves. But the island had already suffered so greatly that it was not able to help much. Therefore the Order had to proceed more or less alone. Because the security of the Baltic Sea shipping was now important for the Knights, the Grandmaster agreed with the cities to pay half of the expenses in order to sustain the "peace ships."

10HR IV 511 (1398, November 20); IV 438 para. 15, (PS). These are not the three commanders (Gebietiger) who signed the treaty of armistice as Voigt, Gesch. Pr. VI 111 pointed out. The text says only: "und lyssen do drey bruder des ordens." That does not necessarily mean the commander.

11HR IV 467 (1398, May 1). The recess of Marienburg decided to leave some ships at sea at least until May 16. Posilge also mentions the ships in SSRPR III 217f.

12HR IV 560 (1399, September 5); IV 471 (1398, May 29).

13HR IV 467, (1398, May 1).
These were still necessary, because a good number of the pirates had escaped and continued to harass the merchants. However, they were expelled soon from the Baltic Sea, especially after Stettin, which first gave them shelter, also agreed not to protect the pirates any more.¹⁴ Now the robbers moved further west and soon trouble started in the North Sea.¹⁵

Soon after the occupation of Gotland a lively diplomatic campaign began. Through the treaty of Lintholm a part of Gotland lawfully belonged to Queen Margaret. The action of the Teutonic Knights was against her interest, and thus the Knights could surely not have been surprised if she sought to persuade them to withdraw. Yet, for the first time, she did not reveal any resentment at all, at least not during the negotiations at Copenhagen in August, 1398. She had at the moment some other interests. The purpose of the meeting at Copenhagen was to ransom the promises given by Albert at Lintholm in 1395. The question was whether Albert would pay the stipulated sum

¹⁴Detmar, in Ch. St. XIX, p. 101; HR IV 419; 435; 468 (1398, May 10), cf. Loos, op.cit., p. 40.

¹⁵Detmar, in: Ch. St. XIX, p. 102. HR IV 453 (1398, May 24); IV 465 (1398, June 23); IV 466 (1398, July 4).
of money or would instead return to Margaret's prison. Otherwise the seven sea-cities would have to surrender Stockholm, which by now they had been holding for three years as the guarantors of the correct fulfillment of the treaty of Lintholm.

Albert did not appear at the assembly of Copenhagen on August 1. Margaret wanted to know what Albert planned to do in respect to the terms of Lintholm due on September 29. She should have been informed by June 2. She was not willing to wait longer than until the 24th of August. Therefore, the Hanseatic cities were much concerned and sent Wulf Wulflam, mayor of Stralsund, to Albert. The cities threatened to surrender Stockholm if he would not give answer. Albert wrote a letter which was as usual very procrastinating and undecisive. Now the cities decided to surrender Stockholm to Margaret.

Since this was all worked out through the intervention

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16 HR IV 482, the recess of the meeting of Copenhagen on August 1, 1398.

of the Hanseatic League, Margaret wanted to express her gratitude. So King Erich of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway—united under one ruler by the union of Calmar on July 1, 1397—confirmed, with Margaret's consent, the old trade privileges of the League in August 1398.18

During this period Margaret pretended to be on quite friendly terms with the Teutonic Order. She asked the Knights to send to the meeting in Copenhagen the same messengers who had helped shape the treaty of Linstholm, which was accomplished by the intervention of the Hanseatic League as well as the Teutonic Order.19 To appease the Knights Margaret apologized for the harm done to the Prussian tradesmen and ordered that the Archbishop of Lund should pay 5,000 nobles, while earlier all admonitions about claims of restitution for damages against the Archbishop and his subjects because of abusing the ius naufragium and because of piracy had been useless.20

Grandmaster Conrad von Jungingen and the Teutonic Order even signed an agreement of friendship with King Erich of Denmark

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18 Hub V 332-335; 338 (1398, August 28/29). Cf. HR IV 484-487; 489.

19 HR IV 478 (1398, July 19): the answer of the Grandmaster.

20 HR IV 430 (1398, January 28). Cf. Hub V 299; HR IV 483, 3 and 6 (1398, August 1); IV 494 (1398, August 1).
and Queen Margaret on September 1, 1398. This agreement provided that no one should do anything against the other or start a war against the other; they should not help the enemies of the other; each of them conceded the old privileges for the merchants in their respective countries. 21

The treaty of Cohenhagen did not create any new situation between Denmark and the Order of the Hanseatic League, which guaranteed each other freedom of trade and peace "in perpetuity." Although the Danes were constrained to make economic concessions to the Hansa, they were successful in maintaining the status quo in Scandinavia. For by its recognition of Erich of Pomerania as a ruler of the three Scandinavian countries, the Hansa made a settlement unfavorable to the legitimate claims of Albrecht III who had been expelled. The Order did the same, with curious inconsistency since it recognized Albert's right to Gotland, as we will see. The treaty of Copenhagen put an end to the state of war in the Baltic and established favorable conditions for trade. At the same time it confirmed the Union

21 Weise, op. cit., I 8. The document signed by the Grandmaster is dated June 24, 1399: HUB V 475, HR IV 492f. How did this happen? The recess of the diet at Marienburg on May 2, 1399, gives some explanation. Only then the agreement was proposed. But the cities wanted first to consult their aldermen: HR IV 528, 1.
of Calmar, which became the foundation-stone of Danish power in the Baltic Sea area.22

We saw that the first reaction of Margaret after the occupation of Gotland was to be on friendly and good terms with the Order, since she wanted first to get hold of Stockholm. At Lintholm in 1395, she knew when establishing the terms that Albert would not be able to pay off the required sum as ransom. Now being so close to reaching her old goal she did not want to lose this easy way of winning Stockholm for her realm. Gotland would be her next step, but first she wanted to be sure of Stockholm, on the mainland opposite the island. In the future she will show her true face.

How did Albert react to the occupation of Gotland? Soon after the treaty of Copenhagen he went to Prussia together with Johann of Mecklenburg and the mayors of Rostock and Wismar to negotiate with the Teutonic Order in October, 1398.23

He demanded the island and was willing to give money for the expenses which the Order had incurred. But his offer was

22Koczy, op.cit., p. 40f.

23HR IV 501, 1, the recess at Leskau on October 6, 1398. Cf. also HR IV 502 (1398, October 6), a letter to the Grandmaster, who was at the time of the arrival of Albrecht at the boundaries of Livonia in order to make a treaty of peace with Witowd at Sallinwerder, October 12, 1398. Cf. Weise, op.cit., I 2.
firmly refused. His promises were unacceptable, because he was unable to protect Gotland from the pirates, as the Grandmaster pointed out later in his Parteischrift. 24

Soon afterward Conrad von Jungingen sent Hermann von Halle, governor of Stockholm from 1395 to 1398, to Albert asking him to give him Gotland as pawn. In this way Conrad may have hoped to obtain a legal title to the island. Albert agreed. Conrad seemed to show haste, as Albert realized, and therefore this opportunist wanted to get as much money as possible. 25 Since it was not easy for him to obtain the desired sum, Albert attempted to delay the negotiations. Already on January 7, 1399, the Grandmaster sent a first draft and said that it was not customary in the Order to send an authorized negotiator on an important subject. A second draft was sent by Conrad von Jungingen on March 16. 26 Finally they agreed on the treaty of Schwaan, south of Rostock, on May 25, 1399. This treaty was signed on the part of the Order by Friedrich

24HR IV 438, para. 16, (FS); Detmar, in: SSREPr III 217.

25HR IV 509 (1398, November 4); IV 510 (1398, November 20). 1 nobel has the value of nearly 1 Prussian mark, cf. C. Sattler, Handelsabrechnungen des Deutschen Ordens, (1887).

26HR IV 512 (1399, January 7); IV 521 (1399, March 16).
von Wenden, Commander of Thorn. Duke Johann of Mecklenburg, the cities of Rostock and Wismar and ten noblemen of Mecklenburg signed the document as guarantors.

In detail—and we have to go into details, since this treaty later became important—the treaty stipulates that Gotland and Visby would be given to the Teutonic Order and the Grandmaster as pledge for 30,000 nobels, of which 20,000 were to be considered as already paid in view of the expenses the Order had incurred in expelling the Vitualian Brothers from Gotland. The people of Gotland and Visby were freed by Albert from all allegiance; herafter all income, use, and profit of the island would advert to the Grandmaster. Albert would have the first right to buy back the island for the same amount. If the Grandmaster should be accused by some third persons of illegal actions concerning the island, King Albert and Duke Johann

27HR IV 438 para. 17, (PS); IV 539 (1399, June 23); IV 553 (1399, September 29); IV 657; Cod. dipl. Pr. V 113. Weise, op. cit., I 7 (p. 16f). W. Hubatsch, Quellen zur Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens (Goettingen, 1954), no. 27, where it is mentioned that this document has 60 (!) well conserved seals. Tumler, op. cit., p. 615ff: List of the officials.

28Albrecht tried to bring the 20,000 nobels to account for the harm and loss which he and the pirates did to the tradesmen, especially of Prussia. But the Grandmaster refused it. Instead of this Conrad wanted to bring the money in account for the expenses which the Order had incurred in fighting against the robbers. Thus he could not give him a receipt for this. Cf., HR IV 512 (1399, January 7); IV 521 (1399, March 16).
promised to intercede in his favor. If the Grandmaster should be attacked, they would send him military assistance. After one year, the Grandmaster would be permitted to pledge the island to a third person, but whatever the Order would build or buy on the island while it was possessed by the Order as pawn, would have to be paid for by whoever will ransom the pawn. If the island were captured by force by anyone else, Albert would have no right to claim and ask restitution or compensation of the Grandmaster or the Order.

Thus by the terms of the Treaty of Schwaan the Grandmaster not only possessed Gotland de facto, but also de iure, at least so he believed. Soon he realized that this was a great self-deception.

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29This part of the document very important for the future reads:
(Hubatsch, Quellen, no. 27): "Und of ymant anders, he sy geatlik edder werlik, edder in wat stat he sy, de vor recht komen will und recht geven und nemen wolle, den heren homsister sine nakomelinge edder den orden hinderde edder bewore yengerleiewys umme dat land Gotland und de stat Wisbu, so scal de her homeister edder sine nakomelinge edder de orde ums edder umse erven und nakomelingen dat enbeden mit synen enkeden breven edder boden an eyn unser steded to Wismar edder to Rostock. So scole wy koning Albrecht und hertoge Johan vorscreven und ik alle unse erven und nakomelinge dem heren homeister, sinen nakomelin en und dem orde vorscreven plichtich syn, dat gantze land Gotland und de stat Wisbu mit alle aeren tobehoringen to vriende in allem gericht, ze sint festlik edder werlik, dar ynne der orde wert angeclaget."

B. THE DEFENSE OF GOTLAND BY THE TEUTONIC ORDER

When Conrad von Jungingen bought Gotland from Albert he must have known that, at least partially, Queen Margaret held legal title to the island. What was his reason for ignoring this factor and consumating the bargain with Albert? Was it that he trusted in the friendship with Margaret, signed by the treaty of September 1, 1398? Did he put all his confidence in the promises given by Albert in the treaty of Schwaan? Albert probably would have promised still more because he realized Gotland was lost to him anyway and so he wanted to gain whatever he could.

Meanwhile Margaret had used the time to reinforce her position in the three Scandinavian countries. She now offered her assistance to the German cities against the Vitualian Brothers and she did not stop doing so even after refusal of cooperation with her by the Prussian cities as long as she and her subjects did not pay damages done to Prussian merchants. Nevertheless she was always very friendly to the Grandmaster and his subjects. And, as we already know, she was especially friendly during the negotiations at Copenhagen.

31 HR IV 505 (1398, October 31) letter of the Prussian cities to Lubeck about this question. HR IV 507 (1398, November 27) the answer of Lubeck. cf. HR IV 503 (recess of October 31, 1398) and HR IV 516 (recess of January 6, 1399). cf. also HR IV 517a (1399, January 6).
in August 1398.\textsuperscript{32} But suddenly her behavior changed, and she showed her true sentiments. During a meeting at Nykoeping in September 1399, she adopted a quite different attitude, unfriendly and adamant, towards the Prussians. Why? How can we explain this? At the time of the treaty of Copenhagen she was still weak and not in a strong position in her three domains; she still had to subjugate North Sweden and Finland. She also had to gain possession of Stockholm. But now in the fall of 1399, she had secured her position in Scandinavia and felt strong enough. She did not feel it necessary to inquire into complaints of the Germans and Prussians against her subjects, but refused these with vain excuses. Instead she sent her chancellor to Conrad and asked for Gotland, of which she claimed legal title and rights. Conrad sent this demand to Albert, the real owner and legal claimant since the island was still his, since he had only given it to the Order as a pawn.\textsuperscript{33}

Albert had to defend the legal claim of the Grandmaster according to the treaty of Schwaan. But Albert did not fulfill

\textsuperscript{32}HR IV 513 (1398, December 4); IV 517 (1399, January 6).

\textsuperscript{33}HR IV 438, para. 18, (PS); IV 550, 1 (recess of Nykoeping on September 8, 1399); IV 563f (1399, October 25).
his promises and did not defend the Grandmaster. Yet he wanted to appear correct and hence he procrastinated. His first answer, which is not extant, was given in general and unsatisfying phrases, as we know from a letter which Conrad wrote to Margaret at this time. Albert simply declared in general terms that the Order had some reasonable legal right to Gotland. But Margaret was not satisfied by this answer and so Conrad promised to ask the King of Sweden to specify his answer and to explain "reasonable right."

Whether Conrad asked or not, we do not know. But in February 1400, Margaret again demanded Gotland from the Grandmaster. Conrad could not consult his commanders (Gebietiger), who were at the front in Samogitia. Weeks could pass till Albert would answer. Therefore the Grandmaster asked for postponement until Easter.

34HR IV 565 (1399, November 22).

35Kehlert, op. cit., p. 410 writes: "Dieses Versprechen hat er (der Hochmeister) nicht gehalten. Er hat vielleicht gedacht, Margaret wurde es damit bewendet sein lassen." I cannot agree with this conclusion, since we have no positive sign that Conrad wanted to deceive Margaret. About the characteristics of Conrad von Jungingen cf. Chapter IV. Kehlert is able to prove his statement only by argumento ex silentio and that has to be used very carefully as historical method.

36HR IV 582 (1400, February 11), the answer of Conrad to Margaret.
Helfenstein did the same, since Margaret had also written to him. At the same time the Grandmaster wrote to Albert demanding that he fulfill his promises and defend the Order "earnestly." In February 1400, Albert expressed his willingness to go to law and to dispute with Queen Margaret. He proposed Lubeck, Stralsund and Kiel as places for the legal dispute with the Queen of Denmark. The Grandmaster hoped that this proposal of Albert's would please Margaret, as he wrote this to her on March 28, 1400, and asked her to meet Albert in one of the three cities. He even asked her to look after his interests; it seems that he believed Margaret was demanding the island because she did not know exactly the legal situation and the agreement between Albert and the Order.

But Margaret refused to meet Albert and instead again demanded the island. Conrad answered her in June, explaining how he had come into possession of Gotland and adding that he would be willing to surrender the island to any person who could claim it legally if such person would repay the Order for

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38 HR IV 438 para. 20 (PS); IV 587 (1400, March 28).
the expenses it had incurred in expelling the robbers. The
day before, he wrote to Albert again asking him to defend the
rights of the Order. 39 On the first of August Conrad sent the
answer he received from Albert to Margaret by his Treasurer
Johann Tyrgarten. As in his previous letter he explained again
how he had come into possession of Gotland and that he was
willing to surrender it, if this could be done with honor and
without any harm or loss to the Order. 40

That seems to have been too much for Margaret. She knew
about Albert and his unreliability and self-seeking attitude
as well. Since the Grandmaster was always very careful and
cautious, she became bold. She sent a messenger to Prussia
in the fall of 1400 and declared concisely that Gotland belonged
to the crown of Denmark and therefore had to be surrendered to
her. 41

That was also too much for Conrad. He answered firmly
and assuredly to the messenger that he was not able to fulfill
her demands. At the same time, on October 15, he sent her a
letter with some excuses. 42 On November 11, Margaret's

39 HR IV 613 (1400, June 18); IV 612 (1400, June 17).
40 HR IV 617 (1400, August 1).
41 HR 438 para. 21 (PS).
42 HR IV 623 (1400, October 15).
Chancellor Jakob arrived at Marienburg with the same demand as before. The Grandmaster again wrote to Albert and the guarantors of the treaty of Schwann, Duke Johann of Mecklenburg, the cities of Rostock, and Wismar, and ten noblemen of Mecklenburg as he had done already before in October. At least now he would have realized how much he could trust Albert and his men.

After consulting his cities, Conrad von Jungingen asked Lubeck and the Hanseatic League in January 1401 to intervene between him and Margaret. We do not know if Lubeck in the name of the League accepted this request or not, since the sources are silent. But it is very probable that it did because from about this time on the Hansa played a certain role in the negotiations and Margaret changed her policy.

At the time Queen Margaret was just concluding negotiations with the League about a trade-treaty in the interest and in favor of her countries, which was finally signed on September 8, 1401, at Lund. Thus it was not surprising that Margaret suddenly gave in to the wishes of the League and

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{43}}HR V 10 (1401, March 22): letter of Conrad to Margaret reporting that he wrote to Albert after receiving her message through Chancellor Jacob. HR IV 625-27 (1400, October 24).

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{44}}HR V 1,7 (1401, January 25). cf. Kehlert, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 412/13. The \textit{Parteischrift} has to be dated in this time.
agreed on a meeting with Albert. This sudden willingness of Margaret is hard to explain as a result of the answer of Albert, which had been sent to her by Conrad on March 22. The Grandmaster wrote her that he had written on March 6 to the guarantors again to force Albert to explain the situation in full details since Albert's answer was as usual unsatisfactory. It seems that Conrad also feared the worst, since he wrote on the next day, March 23, to Gotland and Visby to be prepared and not to dismiss their soldiers. 46

During the summer of 1401 Grandmaster Conrad von Jungingen received an invitation from Margaret to a meeting in Hoelvike in South Sweden on August 15. Albert also received such a challenge. Conrad accepted on the condition that Albert be there, too. 47 But Albert refused the invitation and did not appear nor did any of his subjects. When the meeting opened Margaret was present along with Erich, Treasurer Johann Tyrgarten as deputy of the Grandmaster, Duke Gerhard of Schleswig and Duke Bogeslaw of Stolpe, an uncle of Erich, as well as representatives of Rostock and Wismar as guarantors of the treaty of Schwaan. The fact that Albert did not come in person was interpreted by Margaret as a trick of the Grandmaster. 48

46 HR V 10 (1401, March 22); V 11 (1401, March 23).
47 HR V 30 (1401, June 28).
48 HR V 39 (1401, November 2): a letter of Conrad to Albert accusing him of being the reason for the tense situation.
Thus Tyrgarten had a difficult position. Margaret threatened war against Gotland, that is against the Order, but was willing to wait for a satisfactory answer until the 1st of November. 48

Conrad asked for delay of this ultimate date, since the 1st of November was too soon to settle the question, and proposed the 1st of May 1402. 49 He was in a worse position than ever, since there was no hope that the situation would change. Furthermore the Dukes of Stolp and Schleswig also demanded that he surrender Gotland to Margaret. He explained his rights to them. 50

Indignant about Albert and the noblemen of Mecklenburg as the guarantors of Schwaan, he wrote again to them. If they would not react soon he would no longer feel obliged to adhere to the Treaty of Schwaan nor was he willing to incur the danger of war because of them. 51 This again was unsuccessful. However, Albert declared some months later that he was willing to go to law and to dispute with Margaret. But what did this mean?

Meanwhile, Margaret agreed to wait until May 1, 1402. 52

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48HR V 37 (1401, October 20).
49HR V 38 (1401, October 20).
50HR V 39-41 (1401, November 2).
51HR V 42 (1401, November 18).
But even by this date the Teutonic Knights could not solve the problem; so they asked Wulf Wulflam, Mayor of Stralsund, who as a messenger of the Wendish cities attended the diet of the Prussian cities in Marienburg on March 8, 1402, to intervene in order to postpone the term again. Wulf was successful. Now the Hanseatic cities proposed to Margaret to submit the Gotland question to a court of arbitration. 53

Finally, another meeting was held at Calmar on July 25, 1402. Albert again was not present although he had agreed to come. Present were the representatives of the cities of Lubeck, Hamburg, Stralsund, Elbing and Danzig. Margaret agreed to accept Hamburg and Lubeck as a court of arbitration about Visby, but Gotland, she insisted, belonged to her according to the treaty of Lintholm and therefore she demanded that it be given back. Since the messengers of the Grandmaster were not authorized for the case that Albert was not present they went home for instructions. 54 The representatives of Lubeck remained with the Queen at Calmar to await the answer which

53 HR V 71, 4 (1402, March 8). HR V 101, 5 (1402, July 21). Here is mentioned the decision of the Hanseatic League to propose to Margaret the way of a court of arbitration. This decision of the League was done on May 14, yet the recess-documents of May 14 say nothing about the decision.

54 No recess-documents of this diet are extant, but HR V 95 (1402, June 1) and V 103 (1402, July 21) refer to it. HR V 76 (1402, April 26): Albert promised to be present at Calmar.
was expected at the latest by September 29.55

Now the Grandmaster was in a delicate position. If he would agree to the proposition of Margaret, he would risk losing all compensation. If he would oppose this proposition, a war seemed inevitable and in the eyes of the Hansa which finally established the meeting of Calmar he seemed to be the man who was responsible for the war because of his inflexibility. Due to a new intervention of the Hanseatic League, both sides finally agreed to prorogue the meeting till June 24, 1403.56

With this new concession Margaret's patience was nearing its end. Therefore, if Albert failed again, the Grandmaster feared the worst, as he indicated in his letter to Albert on August 30, 1402, and to Visby on April 8, 1403.57

Albert now played an unfortunate role. He did not want to clarify the problem but to profit from it as much as possible. He also wanted to restore his reputation. Since the Hansa took the Gotland affair into its hands, he went to its diet of April 22, 1403, in Lubeck, where he declared that he

55 We know all these facts from a letter of the Grandmaster to Albert written August 30, 1402: HR V 104.

56 LUB V 51 (1402, September 1); HR V 105ff (1402, September 1) V 129, 3 (1403, May 20).

57 HR V 104 (1402, August 30), cf. note 55 above, HR V 120 (1403, April 8).
not only was willing to buy back Gotland if the Order would agree, but also insinuated that the Grandmaster did not come into possession of the island quite legitimately. Whether or not the Prussian cities present there immediately protested, the documents do not indicate. In any case Conrad von Jungingen demanded a correction of this statement before the Hanseatic League.

Also, the third congress about Gotland was delayed, this time by bad winds for the Prussian messengers. As usual, Albert did not appear, and thus this meeting of August 24, 1403, was again without any remarkable success. The ambassadors of the Grandmaster were only instructed in case Albert was present. They were instructed to ask Albert to redeem Gotland and if necessary to try to force him by withdrawing from him in public.59

Three times Margaret had been willing to negotiate, and and three times she had been unsuccessful. But even now, in

58 God gebe das ez nicht not sy czu sagen, wy der here homeister by das land Gotland sy gekommen..." (HR IV 129, (1403, May 20) the recess of this May diet in Marienburg informs us about the meeting of April 22 and the reaction of the Grandmaster.

59 LUB V 76 (1403, June 16); HS V 136 (1403, July 2); V 138, 2-5 (1403, July 16); V 137 (1403, July 4); the recess HR V 139 of August 24, 1403 does not mention the Gotland affair. About this we have knowledge and can conclude from letters: HR V 144-48 (1403, September 27).
the interest of a peaceful solution she made another concession. She even asked the Hanseatic League to protest and to present the case to Conrad personally. But again Mecklenburg did not react, and thus Conrad was alone. At the end of September he informed Margaret that he was unable to give an answer by the fixed date, November 11. He warned Visby and the Governor of Gotland of a possible attack by Margaret. But even now he did not take the situation too seriously, as he equipped only one ship, which was sent out to Visby on December 13. But by this time war had already started on Gotland.

Conrad's statement in September that he could not give an answer was not diplomatic at all and only confirmed Margaret in her decision to solve the problem by force. On November 12, 1403, a great Swedish-Danish army led by her trusted friends and advisers, Abraham Brodersson and Algo Magnusson, landed on Gotland, occupied the whole island and sacked it. The Prussian commander on the island, Johann von Thetvytz, could only hold Visby. On December 24 the Danish Army tried to obtain Visby by treason, but without success.

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60HR V 145f (1403, September 27).
61HR V 147f (1403, September 27); V 144 (1403, September 29).
62HR V 150, 9 (1403, November 20); V 166, 5 (1403, December 13).
On the next day they began the siege of the town. 63

What was the reaction of Grandmaster Conrad von Jungingen? In the midst of December he probably heard about the attack on Gotland. On December 13 the Prussian cities were still discussing how to send help to Gotland "without war." But shortly afterward Conrad must have written to Albert and demanded help and intervention, and must have received a negative answer of Albert. Since on December 29, 1403, Conrad wrote to the cities of Wismar and Rostock, the guarantors, complaining about Albert who had promised at Monotholm to help in case of war and now refused. Yet this complaint did not achieve anything. In February 1404 Albert excused himself to Conrad by saying that he was already occupied by his war with Brandenburg. Conrad reacted angrily and wrote a harsh letter to Albert. 64

The Grandmaster and his commanders decided to fit out 1,500 men. In order to have a free hand in Gotland, Conrad entered negotiations for a treaty of peace with Poland and

63 Diar. Wisb. in: SSRRPr III 459, cf. M. Hill, Margaret of Denmark (London, 1898) p. 115; Pospelov, in: SSRRPr III 269 mentions that seven ships full of sacked goods were captured and brought to Danzig. HR V 194 (1404, July 1).

64 HR V 167f (1403, December 29); V 179 (1404, February 6).
Livonia. On January 31 he informed the Prussian cities of the decision to relieve Visby and demanded that they contribute 300 men. March 2, 1404, was the date fixed for departure of the army and fleet to Gotland. Conrad also informed the Hanseatic cities and warned them to stay away from Gotland; he asked them not to intervene because the defense of Gotland would be an affair of honor for the Order. Only because he was forced by Margaret, he asserted, had he taken arms. He had not interrupted the negotiations, yet he had not been able to answer until November 11.

On March 2 the fleet left Danzig and arrived off Gotland a week later. Visby was relieved at once. At the end of the month of March the Prussians tried to occupy one of the castles, probably Slite, but unsuccessfully and they lost a great number of men. The situation looked dangerous especially because

65 Cf. Voigt, Gesch. Fr. VI 265; Regesta I 737 (1404, January 21); I 747 (1404, May 22); Weise, op. cit., I 24, the peace of Racianz; also Weise, op. cit., I 29.

66 HR V 175ff (1404, January 31); Regesta I 781.

67 HR V 180 (1404, February 21); Cf. V 181, 8 (1404, March 2).

Margaret was equipping reinforcements at Calmar. Thus Conrad decided to send a reinforcement army of about 700 men, 440 horses, and 50 wagons. The army and fleet left Prussia on April 27 and arrived at Gotland on May 7. Now success followed quickly; on May 16 the castle of Slite in the north-east of the island was captured and destroyed.\(^{69}\)

A three-week armistice between the Prussian and Danish armies followed to allow the Danish forces to ask Margaret for instructions.\(^{70}\) The armistice was convenient for Algot Magnusson, the commander of Slite, since he knew that Margaret was preparing a new army to help him. He and Trut Hass, together with two messengers of the Knights, went from Gotland to Wadstena on the east shore of the Wetter Sea where Margaret was attending a meeting with the Hanseatic League discussing the situation in the Baltic since the trade there was quite

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\(^{69}\)Benninghoven, op. cit., p. 461 Benninghoven's figure sounds more reasonable than H. Von Treischke, Origins of Prussianism (London, 1942) p. 91: stating 15,000 men! Franc, Thor, Ann. in: SSRKPr III 273: "in vigilia ascensionis" (May 7). Who the commander of this army was is difficult to say. Kehlert assumed Ulrich von Jungingen, Commander of Balga, because he is the first who signed later the document of peace. Cf. Kehlert, p. 426. But I think that is a vague speculation. Why was Ulrich not yet sent with the first army? Why was he not sent especially for the negotiations of peace? Kehlert is, I think, not able to exclude these possibilities. HR V 196 (1404, May 16).

\(^{70}\)Weise, op. cit., I 20; HR V 196 (1404, May 16).
dangerous because of the war. Margaret declared that she was willing to defend her rights before a court of arbitration. This was refused by the Knights, who demanded that Margaret first clear Gotland. They charged that Margaret had started the war by invading Gotland, although the Order had been willing to negotiate further, and as long as the enemy was on the island, this new proposition of Margaret was unacceptable.

Meanwhile the three weeks armistice expired. But Margaret had used this time well and had gathered a great fleet to attack the Prussians. However, this was revealed in advance to the Prussian commander and he decisively defeated the Danish fleet and army at Calmar which were destroyed almost entirely. This battle decided the war. Soon the Prussian army stood before the last two castles held by the Danes: Gultborg, which surrendered on June 27, and another unnamed stronghold. Margaret was defeated and she sent Volmar Jakobsson and Thomas von Vitzgen to Visby to ask for peace.

On July 1, 1404, the Order, Erich and Margaret signed an armistice for one year. During this year a meeting should be

71 HR V 190, recess of the day of Wadstena, May 1404.
72 Posilga, in: SSRRPr III 274.
73 HR V 197 (1404, June 27).
74 For details of the war of 1403/04 cf. Benninghoven, op.cit., p. 454-473.
held at Skanoer or Calmar in order to negotiate about Gotland and Visby. Until this day prisoners had to be freed. By the terms of the armistice the rights of the Teutonic Order on Gotland were accepted by all, regardless of previous opinions. Although Margaret had considered the island as her property, she was now willing to obtain it by paying compensation. But at the same time as the Grandmaster was the winner, Conrad was already on the way to losing Gotland.

Weapons were silent, but the struggle over Gotland was not yet finished. It took some years until all was finally settled.

75 Weise, op. cit., I 21.
C. The Sale of Gotland

Margaret had come to realize that she could not win the dispute over the island of Gotland by force since she had no soldiers to match the valorous Teutonic Knights. Thus the diplomacy of negotiations started anew, this time by the Grandmaster. Conrad asked the Hanseatic League to intervene and to protest to Margaret that the prisoners should be freed according to the armistice of July 1404. Again the Hanseatic League was the intercessor between the two parties, Margaret and Conrad. Margaret answered the Hanseatic cities on this point. Soon the Hansa set a diet in order to continue negotiations, namely in Falsterbo in Scania on June 7, 1405. Margaret agreed, although, as she wrote to Lubeck, it was inconvenient for her. The Grandmaster was also willing and sent his messengers on May 17. Because of bad winds the envvoys of the Knights did not arrive by the date set, so the conference began late on June 24. At this meeting of Falsterbo Margaret showed a conspic-

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76 HR V 209, 13-14 (1404, October 16); LUB V 112; HR V 218 (1404, November 11).

77 HR V 225, 1 (1405, March 12); V 230f (1405, March 14).

78 HR V 233 (1405, March 30); V 234 (1405, April 7); V 247 (1405, May 17); cf. also HR V 244 (1405, May 6).

79 HR V 248 (1405, May 24); V 255, 1 (recess of June 24, 1405).
uous interest in the messengers of the Grandmaster and was very friendly to them. She even offered to intervene between the Grandmaster and Henry of England, Flanders and Netherlands. She also tried to delay the negotiations with the Order. No progress was made in the Gotland affair. The only positive result was a decision to meet again at Calmar on August 15, 1406, a full year later. How did this happen, since all seemed to have good will?

Margaret had a new motive. It seems that she had changed her mind again as a result of secret negotiation between herself and Albert of Mecklenburg. Albert could not expect that his interests would be considered in the imminent negotiations at Falsterbo because he had failed to fulfill the obligation of Schwaan. He knew for sure that Gotland was lost. But if he would abdicate his rights to Gotland to Margaret, he could probably at least secure financial compensation. Such an action would strengthen Margaret's position in relation to the Grandmaster. It seems that Albert had already made such an offer to Margaret before Falsterbo, which would explain Margaret's behavior there and some other facts which are otherwise hard to

80 HR V 258 (1405, July 23) answer of Conrad to Margaret concerning the diet of Falsterbo.

81 HR V 259 (1405, July 23), letter of the Grandmaster to Thorn.
A meeting between Albert and Margaret was arranged by direct intervention of Albert's sister Anna, Duchess of Holstein. Conrad was only informed of it and wrote therefore to Margaret that he was unable to be there but he hoped and expected, nevertheless, they would take into consideration the interests and rights of the Order during their negotiations. How did it happen that Albert was now so willing to appear and to meet Margaret since till then he had always avoided personal confrontation? How did it come about that Margaret negotiated with Albert whom she had overlooked all the time before? It seems that Margaret had asked Conrad to admonish Albert again of his duty and promises under the treaty of Schwann, for Conrad wrote to her in January 1406 that he had done so and that Albert had informed him of the meeting with her. How can we explain Margaret's having to ask Conrad to admonish Albert, since till then Conrad had insisted on this point?

In any case, whether Margaret wanted to deceive Conrad

82 Cf. Kehlert, op. cit., p. 431.
83 HR V 278 (1405, October 19).
84 HR V 285 (1406, January 8).
or whether she may have used underhand methods, on October 24, 1405, Margaret met Albert at Flensburg and the negotiations continued till November 25, when a final treaty was signed. Albert abdicated to Margaret all his rights to Gotland. He attested that whatever Margaret and the Grandmaster would decide in the future about Gotland would be agreeable to him. In compensation Albert received 5,000 pounds Lubeck. Nothing specific was mentioned in the treaty about the title and rights of the Order.

Albert now drops out of the picture. He had played to the end his unfortunate role in the Gotland affair. Now his cousin Duke Johann II of Mecklenburg-Stargard claimed his rights on Visby and Gotland. According to the treaty of Falsterbo in 1395 Visby and a part of the island were conceded to Albert and John II. The Duke of Stargard declared now that, although Albert had abandoned his rights over Gotland to Margaret, he did not give up his legal title yet and would still have some claim to compensations. Yet he was refuted strongly and decisively by the Grandmaster, who said he had to clear this...
question with his cousin Albert. 87

By this treaty of Flensburg Conrad had lost an important battle since Margaret hereafter based all her legal claims and rights to Gotland on this treaty. 88 The relation between Margaret and Conrad again became strained. The rights of the Teutonic Knights to Gotland by virtue of their treaty of Schwaan with Albert had been passed over in silence during the negotiations of Flensburg. The Grandmaster protested violently and insisted that he could not submit to the new agreement without compromising the honors of the Order. 89 Therefore he refused to send authorized messengers to conclude the negotiations of Falsterbo in 1405 which were supposed to be continued on August 15, 1406, and he decided to leave the affair to the future. 90

Now again the Hanseatic cities intervened. In February 1406, the Prussian cities had complained to the Wendish cities and to Margaret about violations of old trade privileges of August 1398, and treatment of the shipping-trade. They were

87 HR V 286 (1406, January 18); HR V 287 (1406, January 20).
88 Kehlert, op. cit., p. 433: "Conrad hatte sich wider einmal grundlich uberrumpeln lassen".
89 HR V 285 (1406, January 8).
90 HR V 326 (1406, March 29); V 327 (1406, May 25).
not willing to intercede with the Grandmaster before compensations were given for some stolen goods. Since Margaret on the other hand did not want to alienate the Hansa, negotiations between her and the Order started soon again. In June 1406, Margaret, hoping to finish quickly the controversial issue, wrote cordially to Conrad, and invited him to meet her personally or at least to send authorized messengers. Conrad accepted the invitation. They quickly agreed on a time and place, namely on August 15 at Calmar, but Margaret did not come at that time. She was hindered because she had to welcome the bride of Erich, Philippa, daughter of Henry IV of England. Yet Erich did not want to decide anything alone and since the Prussians did not want to wait till Margaret would appear, the meeting produced no results. Margaret regretted the failure of this conference very much and proposed to Conrad a new meeting. Conrad finally accepted the proposition of Margaret

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91 HR V 290 (1406, February 2); V 309 (1406, March 22).

92 HR V 331f (1406, June 12); V 333 (1406, June 21); V 335 (1406, July 4).

93 HR V 358f (1406, November 6). Her letter shows that she wanted to finish the struggle. The Prussian messengers refused to go to her, since they did not have letters of safe conduct and did not want to wait for an indefinite period. Kehlert supposed here that Voigt came to his conclusion, that Conrad feared war, because he did not know HR V 358. Conrad gave as condition of further negotiations the delivering of the Prussian stolen goods. But Margaret said these goods were already given back in the summer, Cf. HR V 338 (1406, December 4). It is right that Conrad wanted to have this
and asked to settle the controversial issue and to end the problem. But he did not see the end of this affair, since he died March 30, 1407.

Werner von Tettingen, Head Almoner and Commander of Elbing, now in charge of the office of the Grandmaster until the new one was elected, continued the policy of Conrad von Jungingen and wanted to conclude the Gotland affair. He wrote to Margaret as well as to the Hanseatic sea-cities asking if a meeting at Pentecost in Helsingborg would be convenient for them. The cities could not promise to be there, since they had already arranged a diet at Hamburg. In June 1407, the Prussian negotiators met Erich and his advisers at Helsingborn. Wulf Wulfian, Mayor of Stralsund, represented the Hanseatic League. They provided that King Erich should pay 9,000 nobels to the Order, since he wanted to have preserved the fortifications built by the Order on the island during the occupation.

point of issue cleared up before the Gotland affair could be settled, Cf. HR V 363 (1407, February 19), but nevertheless he asked at the beginning of this letter to set a new meeting. Cf. Kehlert p. 436 note 1.

94 [HR V 360 (1407, January 24); V 362 (1407, February 19).]


96 [HR V 375f (1407, April 11).]

97 [HR V 378 (1407, May 2); V 379 (1407, May 6).]
Safe-conduct was guaranteed to all Prussians, as also impunity to the people of Gotland and the guarantee of their previous rights and privileges. Then the Order would surrender Visby and Gotland. To fix these points by a treaty a new meeting was set for June 3, 1408, at Calmar.  

Meanwhile on June 26, 1407, Ulrich von Jungingen had been elected to succeed his brother as Grandmaster. Ulrich possessed a different character than his brother Conrad, and changed the sea-oriented policy of his brother to a more inland-oriented policy. His brother on his deathbed had warned the Knights not to elect Ulrich as his successor, since Conrad knew him well and visualized the nearly inevitable conflict between the Order and Poland. In fact, Ulrich's policy led to war with the neighbor in the East and he was killed in the tragic and decisive battle of Tannenberg, in 1410.

The final conference regarding the Gotland affair was held on September 22, 1408. Erich now paid 9,000 nobels, after promising to observe the other points of the agreement signed in Helsingborg. Now Gotland and Visby were surrendered by the Prussians to the three Scandinavian countries; the transfer

98 Weise, op. cit., I 50; HR V 422-25.
99 Die ältere Hochmeisterchronik, in: SSRRPr III 627f.
100 Weise, op. cit., I 52f; HR V 504f (1408, September 22).
was acknowledged by King Erich of Denmark, Norway and Sweden on September 27. On November 1, 1408, Grandmaster Ulrich von Jungingen also signed and acknowledged that the conditions of the treaty of Helsingborg were fulfilled and therefore the dispute between Denmark and the Teutonic Order about Visby and Gotland was finished. 101

We can summarize the whole affair of Gotland as follows: The Teutonic Order occupied the island by surprise, and in the very short time of only 15 days it was able to break the power and might of the Vitualian Brothers. To prevent the island from again becoming a hiding place for the sea-rovers and to have some security for the expenses, 102 the Knights retained the island in their possession, despite the claim of the other Baltic powers. Queen Margaret of Denmark, anxious to gain control of Gotland, first tried diplomacy. Since she failed, or better, since she became impatient at the protracted nature of the negotiations, she attempted to use force. But this proved to be a total failure. Finally, after the Order had kept Gotland for just ten years, the Knights agreed to surrender it. Was it really the high diplomatic ability of Margaret

101 Weise, op. cit., I 59; HR V 506; Regesta I 1035 (1408, September 27); Weise, op. cit., I 55, HR V 507 (1408, November 1). Posilge, in SSRPR III 292; Diarium Wisbyns, in: SSRPR III 459; Chronol ab anno 266, in: SSRPR III 459; Chronol. anonymi, in: SSRPR III 458.

102 20,000 English nobels or about 20,000 Prussian marks. Cf. Weise, op. cit., I p. 16f; Benninghoven, op. cit., p. 473 ff.
which produced this result, or were there other factors and circumstances which helped Margaret to obtain her long-wished goal? Questions like these lead us to the crucial problem of interpretation of the Gotland affair of 1398-1408.
CHAPTER IV

MOTIVES FOR THE OCCUPATION OF GOTLAND
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MOTIVES FOR THE OCCUPATION OF GOTLAND

The purpose of this chapter is to try to explore the reasons for the intervention of the Teutonic Knights. We face two main questions, already indicated in the beginning of this paper: 1. Why did the Order invade Gotland in 1398? 2. Why did the Order withdraw from the island ten years later?

To specify the first question it might be asked, did the Grandmaster aim chiefly to extend the political power of the Knights and the territory of Ordensland or were his motives primarily economic, that is, the protection of the commercial interests of the Order and of the trading cities of Prussia? Many modern scholars like Daenell, Hering, Vogel, and Zajaczkowski accept the former interpretation. Yet evidence exists to support the latter also.¹ To arrive at a sound resolution to the question we must connect the events of 1398 with the general background of that year, and also examine a document emanating from the Grandmaster himself, Conrad of Jungingen, the so-called Parteischrift of 1401.² This we shall do in the

²HR IV 438 (FS).
To answer our question we have to connect the events of 1398 with the background of that year. What was the position of the Order at this time? The Knights were at the peak of their power. As a result of its numerous political successes the Order had reached the apex of its brilliance. The Baltic States of the Order comprised at that time the compact territory of Prussia, Pomerelia and the district of Kulm, its homogeneity remaining undisturbed by the petty states of the Prussian bishops who were for that matter under the powerful influence of the Order. Other possessions held by the Knights were Curland, Livonia and Esthonia, from the northern frontiers of Samogitia to the Bay of Finland, the territories known today as Latvia and Estonia.³ The Ordensland was in a real sense a Baltic Sea state.

The principal basis of the power of the Order was the combined territory of Prussia-Pomerelia-Kulm which, during the 14th century developed both economically and culturally, this being in great measure due to German colonization. As a result of this colonization, a number of new and active economic centres arose. Towns multiplied during the 14th century and

³Cf. E. Chudzinski, Die Eroberung Kurland durch den Deutschorden im 13. Jahrhundert. (Dissertation, Erlangen, 1917). Livonia given to the Order by Emperor Ludwig IV, in 1337: Napiersky I, 341 (1337, December 13). In 1346, Estonia was bought from Waldemar IV of Denmark, when his brother Otto entered the Order: PUK IV 55f (1346, August 15); see also Zajaczkowski, op. cit., p. 49.
these as did those in Livonia, entered into animated commercial relations not only with the neighbouring countries but also with more distant lands such as the Netherlands, Flanders and England. As we already indicated, those provinces were crossed by highways for the transit of goods to and from Poland, Ruthenia, Hungary. The towns of the Teutonic state, Danzig, Thorn, Elbing, Koenigsberg, Meml, Riga, Dorpat, and Revel were also engaged in the Baltic trade and manifested a lively interest in all the affairs of the Baltic provinces. They also joined the Hanseatic League, and formed a miniature league within the League, cooperating in matters of special significance to the Prussian area and in safeguarding their common interests vis à vis the Grandmaster.

The Order itself, in the second half of the 14th century, embarked on the role of trader on a great scale. The possessor of large areas producing great quantities of grain and, moreover, holding the exclusive right to exploit amber, the Order created a monopoly in these commodities and derived therefrom a very considerable income. It is true that such a competitor would

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4 Around 1400, the import of amber from Lubeck was worth 2300-6700 marks Lubeck. The total turnover of the amber trade at this time is estimated around 10,000 marks Lubeck. Cf. W. Stieda, "Luebische Bernsteindreher oder Paternostermacher," in *Mitteilungen des Vereins fuer Luebeckische Geschichte und Altertumskunde*, II, 7 (1886), p. 103.
would not be particularly welcomed by the towns. Yet for a long time good relations prevailed between the cities and the Order, since the Knights respected the political problems of their territories and fully supported the towns.\textsuperscript{5}

The trade of the Order was directed by two officials called Schaeffer, one in Marienberg and the other at Koenigsberg. Trade was the source of the Order's wealth, which became very famous. Since this trade involved the Baltic Sea and its littoral, the Order became more and more interested in this entire area. It became a sea power in a certain sense. The other important Baltic power of the 14th century was the Hansa. It is astonishing how well the Order and the Hanseatic League got along since the League could not bear any competition and always fought hard against it. The Prussian members of the Hansa bore the competition of the Order with patience as the Order was their protector and overlord. The Order did not hinder its cities from affiliating with the Hansa and left them a free hand in their trade policy, at least within certain limits.\textsuperscript{6}

The main focus of Prussian trade, both of the Order and of the cities, was England and Flanders. The Prussian Hanseatic towns maintained active commercial relations with England, regulated by a royal license of 1303. It has been calculated that

\textsuperscript{5}Cf. Zajackowski, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 51.

\textsuperscript{6}Cf. Krollmann, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 55.
the turnover of the English merchants at Danzig alone from 1300 to 1437 averaged 400,000 English pounds yearly, a very considerable sum for those days. The Hanseatic privileges in England were for a long time recognized by the English authorities. It was only at the end of the reign of Edward III (1327-1377) that difficulties began when England raised the duty on imports. Further, about 1375 the English merchants claimed to possess the same rights and privileges in the Hansa towns as the latter enjoyed in London; they especially wanted to open a factory at Danzig like the trading stations the Germans had at Bruges and Novgorod.

In the quarrel over trading rights the English merchants were supported by the royal court. Therefore the League could not dispense with the support of the Teutonic Order. The help of the Grandmaster was especially needed in 1384, when the English began to seize Prussian ships saying that all goods in an enemy country were to be considered enemy property, no matter who was the actual owner. Now the Prussians confiscated English property in Prussia equal to the value of the ships which had been seized. Since negotiations led to nothing Grandmaster

7Theodor Hirsch, op. cit., p. 121; Cf. Koczy, op. cit., p. 45.
8HR II 99f.
9HR III 317ff.
10HR III 204, 3.
Conrad Zoellner von Rotenstein took decisive steps: in August 1385, he forbade the import of English cloth into Prussia, and the export of timber and forest products to England. Now negotiations were opened by England and the Knights enjoyed the respect and esteem of the English court and endeavored to profit by it in their negotiations, which culminated in the treaty of Marienburg in August 1388.11

Soon the Prussians realized that the new treaty was more to the advantage of the English merchants than to themselves. When the Englishmen imposed fresh duties on Prussian products new tensions started.12 Yet the problem of the Vitulian Brothers absorbed all interest of the Prussians. Furthermore, since Henry IV started to negotiate with Margaret of Denmark about a marriage between his daughter Philippa and Erich of Pomerania 13 it seemed better for the Prussians not to break completely with England, otherwise it could affect the relations with Denmark. Trade continued and the Order's merchants still visited England. They finally reached an agreement, when

12HUB IV 998, 1054; V 21.
Henry IV of Lancaster undertook an expedition against Lithuania in common with the Order, in 1399. In these protracted commercial negotiations with England Teutonic diplomacy was quite successful, representing at the English court either the whole of the Hanseatic League or at least the Prussian part of it.  

The other Western European trade center Prussia dealt with was Flanders and its capital Bruges, where the Order had an official commercial representative, called Lüezer. Contacts here were governed by an agreement of 1360 between Flanders and the Hanseatic League. There followed a period of comparative peace, permitting the League and Order to enjoy their privileges undisturbed until 1430. The factor of Koenigsberg purchased Maline cloth and exported amber to Flanders. The turnover of the factory in Bruges was a sixth of the total turnover of all the factories established by Koenigsberg in different cities. 

The Order even maintained relations with the French court, where it protected the interests of the Prussian merchants. The main product brought from France was the salt of Baye. Baye is a place near Bourgneuf and Beavoir in West France. There had

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15 HR III 18; III 251. HUB III 495, 502.

already been trade connections of this kind.17 It had flourished in the second half of the 14th century; Danzig and Reval notably were salt traders. From Danzig the salt was brought into Poland or sold over the sea to Scandinavia. From Reval it went to Lithuania, where Kowne was an important trading-place.18 This trade was always molested by Norman and English pirates, yet Charles V of France as well as his successor Charles VI promised protection and freedom of trade for subjects of the Order.19

All Prussian trade with the West of Europe had to pass through the Sound, the narrow passage between Scania and the main Danish island of Zealand, as it moved from the North Sea into the Baltic. The Prussians consequently took much care to have free access and passage through this strait. During the 1390's the piracy of the Vitualian Brothers endangered this traffic through the Sound and seriously affected the trade and consequently the wealth and income of the Order as well as of its subjects, the Prussian cities. Because of the great danger involved, the Order had to forbid its subjects the passage of

17 HUB I 198, 201 (1226); I 220 (1227); III 653 (1342). Cf. A. Agats, Der Bausische Baisenhandel (Heidelberg, 1904).
19 HR II 168 (1378); III 144; 358; III 198 para. 6 (1385, May 12); III 202 para. 15; HUB I 513 (1375); HR III 163ff (1383, March 23).
the Sound and it seems that trade was nearly ruined. Also affected was Prussia's transit trade carrying goods from Silesia and Hungary to the Wendish cities, but the trade with England, the real foundation stone of the Prussian trade, nearly collapsed.

It is quite difficult to give exact figures indicating the extent of the Prussian trade in 1398. But some statistics are available to demonstrate the extent of Prussian commerce around 1398. Even if they do not cover the exact year of 1398, they help nevertheless to give an idea how immense that trade was in 1398. In 1368/69 the Prussian cities collected 3,080 marks import tax; since the toll was 1/288 of the value, the total turnover was around 8,999,200 marks Lubeck. For the same period the turnover in Danzig was valued around 6,000,000 marks. In 1392, more than 300 English grain ships called at Danzig. The working-capital of the Schaeffer in Koenigsberg was, in 1396, 30,000 marks; in 1404, 64,000. Marienberg's

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20 Cf. HR IV 453.


working capital was 53,000 marks in 1404.²³ This flourishing trade was vitally affected by the Vitualian Brothers: for instance the herring fishing went down from 33,000 tons to 5,000 tons; the price went up from 16 marks Lubeck to 72 in Lubeck, inland up to 162. No furs, grain or timber were shipped to Flanders or England in 1397 and 1398. No cloth and salt from Lueneburg or Baye could be imported in the same years. The effect on commerce and trade was nearly catastrophic.²⁴ Other factors may have been involved in this fluctuation in prices but the sources do not give any indication of any cause besides the immediate Baltic situation.

For around six years endless discussions and innumerable meetings and negotiations were undertaken, yet no person was able or willing to repel the pirates. Margaret as well as the Mecklenburgers even took the Vitualian Brothers in their services. The Hanseatic League, or better said, Lubeck, was not able, since it was occupied with trouble of its own, as we

²⁴HR IV 438 para.5f (PS): "und toten dem Kowfmanne unvorwintlichen schaden...alczu grossen Schwaden entfingen von den scheroubern, dy czu Gotland lagen...und zulde ys lenger haben gestanden, das ys unvorwintlich wer gewest."
already mentioned. The sea ports of Mecklenburg and Pomerania protected the pirates too. Admonitions to them were in vain. 25 Who was interested in bringing peace to the sea again and willing to do something about it? The situation was intolerable for merchants as well as fishermen. The extensive trade of Prussia, the source of its wealth, was nearly broken.

The Order had to take actions alone against the piracy, as Conrad of Jungingen pointed out in his Parteischrift, for the interests of the common merchants and its own. 26 The so-called Parteischrift is a report of justification written by Grandmaster Conrad von Jungingen in order to justify the occupation of Gotland by the Order. Unfortunately the only extant manuscript copy is not dated. But since it tells the story till the beginning of 1401 it can hardly have been written before that date. There is on the other hand no special reason to date it later. As Kehlert pointed out, it suits quite well the month of February 1401, when Conrad asked Lubeck and the Haneistic League to intervene between him and Margaret. 27

25 Cod. dipl. Fr. V 97, p. 123.

26 HR IV 438 para. 9 (PS): "das her beschirmen mochte den gemeynen Kowfman und syn landt Prussen und Lyefflandt."

27 Kehlert, op. cit., p. 412f.
We also do not know before whom Conrad wanted to justify himself and to defend his rights. Since it is a justification and Conrad spoke therefore pro domo we have to take his words with some reservation. The document, which is largely a statement of fact emphasizing the legal position of the Order in view of the treaty of Schwan and other agreements, gives a hint in only one clause about the Grandmaster's motive. At this place Conrad affirms that he occupied Gotland because it was a nest of robbers and they had totally ruined Baltic trade. For the sake of his cities and the good of all merchants he took the action since no one else was willing to do so. Afterwards, (namely after the pirates took hold of Gotland) the common merchants suffered very serious losses especially those of the land of Prussia and Livonia; if they had gone on any longer it would have been unbearable. No one was willing to do anything to help oppose this affliction. 28 But was this the real reason? Or were there other reasons, too? Since most historians as already indicated see the foreign political situation of 1398 and the aim of the Order to extend the

28 HR IV 438 para. 9 (PS): "Dornoch zo nam der gemeyne Kowffman alzo gar grosen schaden, benemeligh das landt czu Prussen und Lyefflandt; und zulde ys lenger haben gestanden, das ys unvorwintlich wer gewest. Und hyczu wolde nymandt ichtes thun, der dese ungenode hulffe widdir keren."
political power of the Knights as the motives, we have to look now to the political developments. Doing this we may also find an answer to the question: why did the Order not interfere earlier than 1398, since the piracy had been going on for years?

In 1397, Margaret achieved her greatest triumph in the union of Calmar by which all three Scandinavian dominions were united under the rule of the same sovereign. It was only a question of time until Margaret would possess and subdue the entire old Swedish domain. It was quite obvious that Margaret intended to win Gotland, which, except for the few places on the island still held by Mecklenburg was little more than a pirate lair at this time. Declining Mecklenburg had played out its role as an important power in the Baltic Sea. By the treaty of Lintholm in 1395 its end was practically decided. On the other hand, Queen Margaret already had some rights on the island, first by the occupation of Visby by her father, King Waldemar IV Atterdag, in 1361, and the subsequent homage done to him and to her son, Olaf, too, in 1376; secondly and particularly by the treaty of Lintholm in 1395, as we saw above; and finally because of the traditional connection of this island with Sweden.
Yet an occupation of Gotland would not only be an action against the robbers—it was even doubtful that it would put an end to their activity; at least Conrad von Jungingen doubted it.  

But it would also strengthen Denmark, which was, as many historians like Koczy, Vogel, Daenell and others say, in a certain sense opposed to the interests of the Teutonic Order, which was a considerable power and state on the Baltic. They argue that the Order's interests were affected by a conquest of Gotland by Margaret and therefore must be hindered by a quick action of the order. We do not find the political argument fully convincing.

The year 1398 seemed to be a favorable one for the Teutonic Order since at this time the Knights were on good terms with their neighbors to the east and northeast, Poland and Lithuania. While from the middle of the 14th century relations with Poland were generally amicable, it was quite different in the northeast. Esthonia, whose knights of the Order of Sword Bearers had long ago entered into an alliance with the German Brotherhood, was in 1347 completely won for the Order when the Order bought its land for 19,000 silver marks

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29HR IV 438 para. 15 (PS): "und dykonigynne von Denemarkt hetts ys gerne widdir; und das landt lyt mitten in der sehe, so das man veyl argis dovon thun mechte, wen ys in bosir luthe handt qweme." Who are these evil men, Queen Margaret or the Vitualian Brothers?
from Waldemar IV of Denmark. Thus it came to pass that all the
coast between Lake Peipus and the Lebe in Pomerelia was placed
at the disposal of the Teutonic Knights. By the acquisition
of Esthonia the Order had now a double border with its most
dangerous remaining adversary in the northeast, namely Lithuania,
Between the province of the Swina and that of the Vistula
lay Samogitia, a belt of about 100 miles of wilderness, stretch-
ing from Memel as far as Libau. Samogitia was part of the
Dukedom of Lithuania, which lay farther to the east. The
fundamental aim of the Knights was the conquest of Samogitia
which would line up their northern and southern possessions.
Despite constant warfare they had made little progress to this
end. In spite of larger or smaller expeditions or raids nearly
every year against the Samogitians and Lithuanians, it was not
until 1370 that the Knights finally succeeded in demolishing
the Samogitian strongholds on the Niemen. Finally in the
battle of Rudau in 1370 the Knights won a decisive victory. They erected their own castles from which they could carry their

30 The knights of Esthonia and Livonia were founded by Bishop
Albert of Riga in 1202 and united with the Teutonic Knights
in 1237, Cf. Liv-, Est- und Kurländisches Urkundenbuch,
5 vols., ed. by F. G. Bunge, (Reval, 1857/ff), hereafter
cited as LEKUR, I 168 (1237, May 12). See also Bericht
Hartmann's von Heldrungen, in: SSRRPr V 168ff. Napiersky,
367 (1346, August). LEKUR II 407-409. Cf. W. Mollerup,
Daenmark's Beziehungen zu Livland, (Berlin, 1884); Kroilman,
op. cit., p. 213.

31 Cf. K. Hecht, Die Schlacht bei Rudau 1370 (Dissertation,
Koenigsberg, 1914).
raids ever deeper into Samogitia and Lithuania. Simultaneously they attained an important diplomatic victory; taking advantage of internecine strife of the Lithuanian princes, in 1382 the Knights persuaded them to cede to the Order part of the province of Samogitia, namely the land between the territory of the Order and the Dubitza river. Later events, however, soon nullified this success of the Knights.

It is not possible or necessary to go into the details of the fight between the Order and the Lithuanian princes Jagiello and Withold. Both princes, fickle and untrustworthy, did not keep their promises or observe their agreements. Endless recriminations and disputes resulted. A severe blow to the Order was the union between Poland and Lithuania in February 1386. This resulted from the marriage of Jagiello with Queen Jadwiga of Poland. Thus Jagiello became King Wladislaus II of Poland, and the two countries were knit together in a personal union. Moreover the marriage led to the official conversion of Lithuania as promised by Jagiello, who himself was baptised three days before his wedding. The "conversion" of the dukedom of Lithuania again brought to the fore the question of the need for the further existence of the Teutonic Order on the Baltic, since it had been sent there to christianize the pagans, and now there remained, officially, no more pagans to convert.

32 Napiersky, 436 (1380); 437 (1382, November 1); 439 (1382, October 31). Cf. Zajaczkowski, op. cit., p. 52f.
Could the Order count any longer upon foreign knights from the Empire as war-guests? What had previously been crusades would now become nothing more than ordinary secular campaigns. 33

The dominion of Jagiello in Lithuania was not undisputed, His cousin, Witold, claimed some rights and they fought for many years. In 1392, Jagiello appointed his cousin Witold (or Witowd) Grand Duke of Lithuania. This appointment changed the situation somewhat since Witold's politics now became oriented towards the east, toward Russian lands that seemed to invite conquest. Consequently, he desired peace with the Knights in order to safeguard his western borders. In 1396 he concluded peace with them and then signed armistices during the next two years until a final settlement was reached at Sallinwerder in October 1398. By this treaty Witold gave the rest of Samogitia to the Order. 34 Now the whole land between Kurland and Prussia belonged to the Knights. These events in Lithuania appeared to give the Grandmaster a somewhat free hand in the northeast as

33 Details in: K. Heini, Fuerst Witold von Litauen in seinem Verhaeltnis zum Deutschen Order in Preussen wahren end der Zeit seines Kampfes um sein litauisches Erb, 1382 bis 1401. (Berlin, 1925).

34 Cod. dipl. Pr. VI 22 (1397, April); VI 44 (1397, July 13); VI 107 (1398, April 2). Napierisky, 517 (1396, July 30) 525 (1398, April); 528 (1398, October 12). Whether or not the Order asked too much in the negotiations of 1396 so that Witold was forced to refuse, thus justifying the Order for its campaign against Lithuania, ia an open question and will always be a conjecture. Cf. Heii, op. cit., p. 125ff.
as well as in the east because the relations with Poland were peacable and as long as Queen Jadwiga lived the Knights felt themselves safe. Yet it must be said here in order to prevent a wrong impression that the tensions in the northeast and east never disappeared totally. The Grandmaster had always to keep a close eye on these areas, especially because he could trust neither the unpredictable Witold nor Jagiello, now king of Poland. Nonetheless, the east-northeast frontier was more secure and calm than it had been for generations, and the Order's energies could in turn be safely channeled elsewhere--toward Gotland, for instance.

A few other points remain to be considered since we believe they also influenced the Grandmaster's decision to strike toward Gotland. While the Christian knights and brotherhoods attempted to christianize the Samogitians and Lithuanians, the Archbishop of Riga and the Bishop of Dorpat made trouble in the rear. The sovereignty of the bishoprics in Livonia was not touched by the union of this country with the Ordensland. Ever since Livonia had become part of the land of the Order the Knights had to struggle with the Bishops of Riga and Dorpat, because the Knights wanted to have the same influence in these small principalities as they exercised in the Prussian bishoprics. They especially desired control of episcopal elections. At the end of the 14th century the struggle was particularly acute.
Archbishop Johann von Sinten of Riga fled to Lubeck in 1391 and tried to continue his opposition to the Order from there. In 1393, he appealed for help even from Queen Margaret, but in vain. He agitated with the Emperor as well as with the Pope. While Pope Boniface IX was finally won by the Order—it had more money than the bishop—Emperor Wenzel protected Archbishop Johann. The Pope removed Johann von Sinten from Riga and named him Archbishop of Alexandria, an empty, honorary title. Then Boniface IV gave the bishopric of Riga to Johann von Wallenrodt, a member of the Order, in 1393.

But Johann von Sinten did not give up. With the approval of Emperor Wenzel he named the young Duke Otto of Stettin, a 14 year old son of Duke Swentibor I of Stettin, as his successor. Emperor Wenzel disliked the Order because it had refused at different times to purchase the Neumark from him; always impecunious, Wenzel wanted to lay his hands on some of the

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35 HR IV 153 (1393).


37 Lekub III 1344 (1393, September 24); Cf. Napiersky, 513 (1395, April 8); SSRRPR III p. 183 note.

38 Lekub II 1366.
reported wealth of the Knights. Disappointed, he put himself on the side of the Archbishop of Riga. In November 1393, Johann von Wallenrodt arrived in Marienburg with the papal nomination as bishop of Riga, while messengers from Wenzel asked Conrad to invest Otto of Stettin. The Grandmaster refused the Emperor's request, saying he had to obey the papal decision. He gave the same answer to messengers of Swantibor of Stettin. 39

The only way to end all this was by force. Duke Otto of Stettin and Duke Albrecht of Mecklenburg, son of Johann II of Mecklenburg-Stargard whom bishop Dietrich Damerow of Dorpat, the other revolting bishop in Livonia, the heart of the resistance against the Knights, had named as his successor, went to Livonia in April and July, 1395. 40 They called in Vitsualian Brothers from Finland for help. The next year they fortified their position by a treaty and alliance with perfidious Witold of Lithuania. 41 Yet this was a mistake. The danger of an invasion of the Lithuanians, their arch-enemies, brought many Livonians to the side of the Order. 42 Meanwhile the Grandmaster had not been idle. First he tried to separate Witold from the allies and in June 1396 he concluded with him the armistice

39 LKUB IV 1369; Cod. dipl. Pr. V 78; Cf. Vetter, op. cit., p. 28.
40 LKUB IV 1378f, IV 1399f.
41 LKUB IV 1413, 1415 Cf. Schiemann, op. cit., p. 306.
42 LKUB IV 1417f.
and finally the peace-treaty mentioned above. The Order now had a free hand to act and in a short time it reasserted its mastery in Livonia; only Dorpat still resisted for a while, assisted by the Vitualian Brothers. Finally in July 1397 the Order was able to end this affair and Johann von Wallenrod took possession of his bishopric of Riga. Two months earlier Pope Boniface had ordered that for the future only a member of the Teutonic Order should be elected as Archbishop of Riga. 43

It was clear that after the interference of the Mecklenburgers in the Riga-Dorpat affair the Teutonic Order could not trust these sovereigns at all. Already years before, the Mecklenburgers had given much trouble about passage through their territories, especially for the war-guests of the Order. The Order complained to Emperor Wenzel, since the attacks were made on imperial roads. 44 The Mecklenburgers finally declared official war on the Knights at the beginning of 1397 and were soon joined by the Duke of Stettin. In order to confuse the situation still more, the Dukes of Stralsund-Barth joined in and gave assistance to the widow of Erich, since they hoped to win Gotland by this because Sofia was from the house of Stralsund-Barth and Wolgast. They were so blinded by their purpose

43 Regesta I 547 (1397, July 15); LEKUB IV 1423; for details Cf. v. g. Loos, op. cit., p. 33ff: Fr. K. Gadebusch, Livländische Jahrbuecher, 8 vols. 1030-1761 (Riga, 1780-1783), I 516ff.
that they even tried to win Queen Margaret for their plans, but she only passed the information on to the Order. 45

A notable feature of the Teutonic Order's policy under Conrad von Jungingen and his predecessors was its close cooperation with the Prussian towns, and even, whenever possible with the German Hansa. It is said by Woltmann in his dissertation that the policy of the Order and the cities was a joint one. It is another question whether the towns acted only under pressure according to the will of the Grandmaster. We have to make the distinction between independent inner-policy and dependent foreign relations of the Prussian cities. If they asked permission of the Grandmaster it was only as insurance for their own decisions. From 1360 on they acted in political freedom, and gradually became politically self-conscious. 46 Danzig became more and more their leader, especially after 1371 when the Vistula River found a new way into the sea and Danzig became a harbor on this river. 47 Since the six great towns

45 Cod. dipl. Pr. V 94: declaration of war by Mecklenburg, HR IV 427.


47 M. Toeppen, Beitrage zur Geschichte des Weichseldeltas (Koenigsberg, 1894), Cf. Werner, op. cit., p. 42ff.
of the Ordensland joined the Hanseatic League early, they "were under two masters." The cooperation of the cities and the Order was so natural that the growth of the two powers was simultaneous. At the diets held at Marienburg or Danzig the Prussian Hansa towns would decide issues jointly with the Grandmaster or his representatives. When the piracy finally became intolerable and greatly affected trade and wealth the cities in July 1397 they petitioned their lord to take actions against the robbers since the situation was quite serious.48

Let us summarize what we have tried to explain up to this point and by so doing we hope to give an answer to the question: Why did the Order occupy Gotland in 1398? The Order had been exhorted and admonished by its cities, who suffered as much as the Order itself from the depredations of the Vitualian Brothers from their main bases in Gotland and in Mecklenburg-Pomerania. At the moment the Order had almost a free hand, that is, it had no actual struggle in the east and northeast, since the affair in Riga was settled, Witold was interested in Russia at the moment, the peace-loving Queen Jadwiga reigned in Poland. Angry about the Mecklenburgers, especially the house of Stettin

48 HR IV 409 (1397, July): Item umme dy zee czu befreden, ez der stete syn, das mans unsirm heren homeister vorleghe, ab her dorzu tun welle." Cf. Voigt, Gesch. Fr., VI p. 106; Barthold, op. cit., p. 430.
because of its interference in Riga-Dorpat and its untrustworthy behavior in Pomerania as well as in the Baltic Sea by protecting the pirates; facing the possibility of defeating the robbers all at once since they all were temporarily concentrated on Gotland; the Grandmaster Conrad von Jungingen decided in the winter 1397/93 to take action in conjunction with the Prussian cities.49

There is no special reason to assume that Conrad was impelled by power politics, that is a desire to incorporate the island of Gotland into the Ordensland. There are three documents in existence from which we can glean the Grandmaster's intentions: his Parteischrift of 1401, his instructions to his envoy John Ryman in 1398, and a letter to Paul Quentyn, a burgess of Frankfort on Oder in the same year. There is no reason to reject the words of Conrad in his Parteischrift. He affirmed that, after all, no one was willing to repel the robbers (which can certainly be confirmed from other documents), and that he spent all this money and effort only to protect the "common merchants" as well as his country of Prussia and Livonia.50

He declared in this document that he would surrender the island

49Barthold, op. cit., p. 431; Treischeke, op. cit., p. 87; Teichmann, op. cit., p. 77; Sattler, Hanse und Order in: HGBi 11, p. 80; HR IV 438 para. 9 (PS): "Des zo wart der homeister gesu rathe mit synen gebitigern und mit synen steten."

50HR IV 438 para. 9.
of Gotland to anyone who could prove it belongs to him and who was willing and able to compensate the Order for its expenses.\textsuperscript{51} We have to consider who is writing this. All sources speak of Conrad as a pious, honest, true-hearted man, without anger or passion. He wanted to please all and always. It is said that Conrad of Jungingen was fearful and peaceable. Ridiculed by his brothers for being a weakling, it seems not to fit quite well into this picture of the Grandmaster, that he should have prevaricated in his statements in his report of justification in 1401.\textsuperscript{52} Furthermore, his words are not entirely new, since he had earlier said the same thing in two additional sources to which we now refer.

On February 26, 1398, on the eve of the Order's Gotland campaign, Conrad sent an envoy to the German princes to reassure

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\item[50] HR IV 438 para. 9.
\item[51] HR IV 438 para. 22.
\item[52] v.g. Die Chronik des Conrad Bitschin, in: SSRRPr III 483: "Pacis cupidus." Heinrich Casper, Deutschordenschronik, in: Deutsche Chroniken, ed. by H. Maschke, p. 150: "Her was gützig mit seiner getreueten wesen, demütig und keusch, mitte-sasm and vredesam...Darum muste her vele achterrede leiden und auch horen, wie das besser were czu einer Kloster nomen wen czu einen hochmeister.: Cf. Voigt, Gesch. Pr. VI 389-399; Rutenberg, op. cit., II 21; Krollman, op. cit., 68.
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them of his peaceful attitude. According to this envoy's instructions, it seems that the action in Gotland was intended more against Mecklenburg and Stettin than Margaret of Denmark. Conrad accused the Dukes of Stettin of protecting the pirates who harmed not only the Order but also the common merchants. How angry the Grandmaster was about the Dukes of Stettin is evident when he accused them of desiring to harm the Order with the help of Lithuania, the pagans and Poland. Conrad's arguments in this document stress the defensive nature of the expedition. If the action was really intended to be one of conquest, it is hard to understand why the Grandmaster from the beginning so openly expressed his willingness to turn the island over to its rightful owners, who would be able to keep the sea clear from pirates and keep the island from becoming again a nest for robbers. The second extant letter is one that Conrad wrote in the summer of 1398 to Paul Qentyn, a burgess of Frankfort on Oder, who had informed him that Queen Margaret was looking around for support. The Grandmaster stated positively that he did not intend to withhold the island from anyone who could prove himself the rightful owner. Both these interesting

53 HR IV 436 (1398, February 26) This instruction was given to John Ryman during the preparation of the expedition.

54 HR IV 436: "ab her mochte und ouch mit hulfe der Littowen beschadigen des Ordens lande, Liffland unde Frussen..." Cf. also HR IV 439.

55 HR IV 472 (1398, June 21)
notes were written before the treaty of Copenhagen, in August 1398, when Margaret was still friendly with the Prussians and had not yet laid claim to the island. Nor had the Order yet concluded its treaty with Albert of Sweden with terms looking toward the ultimate purchase of the island.

That the Grandmaster feared an intervention by Margaret sooner or later is clear from his statement in the Parteischrift: "The Queen of Denmark wanted Gotland. And the island is in the middle of the sea so that much evil can be done, if it comes into the hands of evil men." We think this showed his mistrust in her. It does not say that Conrad considered Margaret an "evil man" but only that he did not trust her, that she might not keep the robbers from the island, since she had already used them before. It is true that the Order built castles on the island immediately after the conquest but this does not prove that plans were being formulated for a permanent occupation. Rather, the purpose could well have been mere defense. But the question arises, defense against whom? Why not against the pirates who are not completely driven out from the Baltic Sea immediately after the occupation of Gotland? Following Benninghoven again, we think that the tremendous forces

56 *HR* IV 433 para. 15; Cf. note 29 above.
57 Koczy, *op. cit.*, p. 58.
of the Order had the duty of finishing the business in Gotland as soon as possible so that they could return quickly to the continent since the Order could not afford to keep 2,000 men tied up for a long time on Gotland, leaving its boundaries unprotected. As we saw above, the tensions with Lithuania and Poland were not over. Why did Grandmaster Conrad nevertheless risk weakening his boundaries by occupying Gotland and concentrating all his manpower at this spot? What was the reason? He was following mainly the mercantile oriented Baltic policy of the Order started by Grandmaster Winrich von Kniprode, and he did it basically in the interest of the trade of the cities as well as the Order.

It might be called an act of power politics or imperialist expansion but it was influenced and essentially determined by mercantile aspects, motives and considerations. If we recall the statistics of the extent of Prussian trade at this time and if we consider that this was cut off more or less totally, then the economic factor becomes quite understandable. Conrad knew, too, as did the Swedes, Danes, Mecklenburgers, Vitualian Brothers, and the Hansa, that the master of Gotland and its

fortresses controlled the waters of the Baltic. We tend to
say with Bemminghoven: a proof that the Order wanted to keep
the island at any price does not exist. Therefore we believe
that the occupation of Gotland was not merely a political act
of conquest, but rather essentially an act of mercantile policy
and self-defense. Are not economic motives usually or at least
quite often the reason for political actions?

60 HR IV para. 6 (ES): "von ys mitten in der sehe leyet." Cf.
HR IV para. 15, note 27 above.

61 Bemminghoven, op. cit., p. 447.
CHAPTER V

MOTIVES FOR THE ABANDONMENT OF GOTLAND
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MOTIVES FOR THE ABANDONMENT OF GOTLAND

Gotland was occupied by the Teutonic Order in 1398 and we try in vain to find a completely satisfying explanation for this one appearance of a Teutonic fleet on the waters of the Baltic. It is likewise difficult to attempt to answer a second question: why did the Order give up the island ten years later? After expending so much effort, manpower and money and after such a long debate on this subject, the Knights finally yielded and ceded the island to Queen Margaret of Denmark. What was behind this decision? Did they realize that their claims were not justified? Did they fear Margaret and her power? Were there other factors and events forcing the Knights to withdraw from the sea? What were these factors? Finally, was the occupation of 1398, in the light of the retreat in 1408, a mistake and a failure?

As soon as Gotland was occupied, Grandmaster Conrad von Jungingen concluded a treaty with Margaret in Copenhagen, with a view to an eventual alliance of eternal friendship.1 Both of them wanted to gain time at the moment; both were busy in other regions: Margaret wanted first to subdue North Sweden and Fin-

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1 HR IV 492 (1398, September 1): "eine Fruntschaft, mine, eintrach und einen ganzen frede tzu ewigen tzieten." Cf. HUB V 343; Weise, op. cit., I 8: 9.
land and then to win Stockholm. According to the treaty of
Linholm in 1395, it was to be handed over to her by the
German cities holding it as security, if Albert of Mecklenburg
should fail to ransom it.

The Order, for its part, had business in its own territory: its relationship with the cities in Prussia was becoming tense.
The problem of the Prussian cities is quite complex. The cities were, as we saw, in a certain way dependent on their landlord, but on the other hand the Order gave them much freedom. Their populations embraced several distinct groups: There were the
Prussian noblemen who moved into the cities and formed a proud patriciate, together with the upper middle class citizens, the traders and merchants on a great scale, the real men of the Hansa. Below them came the craftsmen and lesser citizens who made up the guilds. In some cities as in Danzig the Germans were no less insistent than the Order itself upon the supremacy of German descent and German civilization, and only those of pure Teutonic blood were granted entry into the guilds or into the knightly brotherhood of the patriciate: the brotherhood of Saint George. Ethnically most of the townsmen were German, but in Danzig there was a considerable Polish quarter of Vistula shipmen.\(^2\)

Juridical and administrative matters were kept severely separate. The former were in the hands of the justiciar and his sheriffs, the latter in those of the burgomaster and his council. The constitution was aristocratic and developed a strong oligarchy of the upper class. But on certain matters the assent of the guildsmen was required. More than once the guildsmen had made violent demonstrations in front of the patriciate's "Court of King Artus." Danzig was a particularly troubled spot. Here the council of the patriciate itself had recently been discussing an audacious plan for wresting the city from the strict tutelage of the Order.  

The cities, as we have said, had joined the Hanseatic League. This brought them into contact with the cities of Western Germany which enjoyed much more freedom and self-government. Understandably the Prussian towns became jealous and desired similar liberties. This idea appeared first in Danzig and spread soon to the other towns, especially Thorn and Elbing. The cities had good opportunities to exchange ideas in their numerous diets and meetings which met to discuss and decide on a common foreign policy in cooperation with the Order. Yet those meetings were also good occasions to bring forward complaints and requests to the Knights. When the Knights demanded toll upon imported goods the cities debated this

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3 Treischke, op. cit., p. 88f.
question fiercely, because they thought it interfered with their interests and rights. The Order claimed a preferential right of purchase where the goods imported by its town were concerned. The Order was not restricted in regard to its own activity by the vetos on export which it sometimes decreed. But the cities tried to restrict the rights of the Order more and more. In a certain sense they completely reversed this position in regard to the Knights: from 1401 on, the Treasurers (Schaeffer) of the Order had to pay toll to the cities on imported goods. By this the cities won the supervision of imports and compensation of damages, too. On the other hand, the prosperous conditions of the country at the time of Conrad of Jungingen prevented the gap between the Order and its cities from coming to light. But the later fierce struggle and open clash in 1410/11 indicates a long period of tension and preparation for these ideas of freedom and independence.

The problem of the revolt of the Wendish Hanseatic cities is better developed by historians than the one of the Prussian cities. In spite of the publication of the source material by M. Toeppen there are few historians who try to trace the rising of 1410/11 into the time of Conrad of Jungingen. Except a short publication by A. Werminghoff, Der Deutsch Orden und die Staende in Preussen bis 1466, (Muenchen, 1921) the dissertation of Paul Werner, op. cit., was helpful here.
Surely the Grandmaster was aware of these currents of thought in his cities. His mistrust of the inhabitants is indicated by the character of his edicts around 1405. For example, he decreed that no one should carry weapons while travelling if he is not a Knight; craftsmen were forbidden to meet more often than once a year, and then only in the presence of an official. Distrust of the cities and their inhabitants was so strong that the Knights even risked the security of their territory: they refused to fortify and to renew the fortifications of the great towns in spite of the imminent danger of a Polish war. Elbing for instance complained at the beginning of the 15th century that it would like to improve its fortifications but this was not agreeable to the "masters" and these never would permit an improvement.

How far the increasing tension with their towns and the news of the actual rebellion in Lubeck in 1407/08 influenced the Order in its behavior and its decision to abandon Gotland we do not know. Unfortunately, we could not find any historian who directly connected these two points. Yet we think they must be related, especially if we consider certain statements of the historians Voigt and Rundstedt who affirm that the situation in Prussia and the relationship with the cities

7 Gadebusch, op. cit., I, 2 p. 4.
8 SSRP, IV 400: "Das aber war den Herren zuwider."
forced Conrad von Jungingen to make a treaty with Margaret in 1398. If this is true for 1398, why not even more for 1408, when the shadows of the great rebellion of 1410/11 already darkened the horizon?\(^9\)

Two other points seem to need consideration: the secret Society of the Lizard and religious dissent. In 1397, the gentry of Prussia, which was separated from the nobility and middle class of the cities, formed a secret society in order to be able to resist the increasing power of the cities and also to oppose the authority of the Order. The gentry formed the society following the pattern of similar leagues elsewhere in Germany and called it Society of the Lizard (Eidechsen-gesellschaft). The Society was originated by two brothers named Ramys and two brothers of the Kyntheau family, all of them very much in debt. This Society of the Lizard was outwardly loyal in form and mouthed pious phrases, yet its main intention was to take the law into its own hands, to rebel and to plunder. Even worse, it often had contact with the Poles, especially with Cracow.\(^{10}\) Later around 1440, the Society of the Lizard merged into the League of the Prussian cities.

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\(^9\)Voigt, Gesch. Pr. VI 198; H. G. v. Rundstedt Die Hanse und der deutsche Order in Preussen bis zur Schlacht bei Tannenberg (1410), (Weimar, 1937) p. 35.

\(^{10}\)Voigt, Gesch. Pr. VI 150.
There is some indication of heresy in Prussia. We may recall that it is the time of the spread of Lollardy in England and of the religious awakening of Bohemia. Through merchants from England as well as from Bohemia such ideas also found entry in Prussia. In 1402, for example, a heretic woman who is said to have done harm, was burned in Danzig. Since we know that Conrad of Jungingen was a pious, religious, zealous man, as all sources agree, then we can very easily imagine that he was much concerned about a case like this. When in 1425 the bishop of Ermland wrote to the archbishop of Gnesen complaining about heretical movements and increasing disrespect of Church and priesthood among the population, then we should have in mind that intellectual movements like this do not appear suddenly but need time for development. Again, no historian has connected these developments in Prussia with the Gotland affair, although Treischke mentions reports of contact of the "Knights of the Lizard" with the city of Cracow. But to criticize fairly a man like Conrad von Jungingen we have to elucidate as far as possible the entire situation in which he acted. We do not affirm here that these events—the tension with the cities, the heretical movement, the secret Society of the Lizard—were decisive factors in Conrad's decision to abandon Gotland but we think we should at least keep them in mind in trying to

11 *Posilge*, in: *SSRRPr* III 84: "die vil luthe in irthum des glaubin gebracht hatte."


13 *Cod. dipl. Pr.* V 724.

14 Treischke, *op. cit.*., p. 113.
discern his thinking at this time. It is not possible that Conrad did not feel concern for them.

To make a just judgment we should also consider the question of the morals of the Knights which seem to have deteriorated under Conrad of Jungingen. He had to legislate a number of new rules and regulations for the Knights, especially concerning their dealing with women. Who were these women? We can only think of the wives and daughters of the inhabitants of the cities and villages. Thus the subjects of the Order had grave reason for complaints and resentment. Another source of dispute between the Order and the cities was the feudal custom known as *ius naufragium* which Conrad exercised on behalf of the Order at the insistence of the Knights. The injured members of the Hanseatic League on at least one occasion took revenge and burned the storehouses of the Castles of the Order as well as churches and villages in Prussia.15

The point of all this is that the internal condition of the Teutonic Order at this time showed symptoms of many illnesses which must be taken into consideration in weighing the policies adopted by the Knights in the field of international

relations. In the latter area itself, the foremost problems in 1408 stemmed from the Order's relations with Lithuania and Poland. Most modern scholars of Teutonic history have emphasized these factors heavily. 16 Hence we have to investigate them briefly to discover any possible connection with the Gotland affair.

The Order won Samogitia in 1398 from Duke Witold. Yet legal possession does not necessarily mean submission. Thus the Knights had to struggle with the population for a long time. By raids into this area they tried to subdue and convert the Samaites. Every year the Knights together with their war-guests undertook such expeditions; in 1399 Henry of England was one of the noble guests. 17 In 1399, Witold, who had ambitions eastwards, was defeated by the Russians and now realized how unrealistic it was to reach in that direction, so he turned his interests westward again. On January 18, 1401, he made peace and an alliance with Wladislaus-Jagiello of Poland, and by this won from Jagiello a guarantee of his position as Grand Duke of Lithuania. But, and this was more important and completely against the policy of the Order, by this

16 Cf. Treischke, op. cit., 111ff; Koczy, op. cit., 60ff; Daenell, Bluete, I 148ff; Rutenberg, op. cit., II 18ff.
17 Posilge, in SSRPr III 226; Cod. dipl. Pr. VI 96.
treaty of Wilna the link between Poland and Lithuania was also secured by the provision that after the death of Witold, who was childless, Lithuania would be annexed to Poland. 18 Meanwhile Witold knew how to influence the Samaites toward his ideas, even though he had detached them from the dukedom of Lithuania three years ago for since then the Samogitians were severely oppressed by the Knights. 19 The Samaites soon rose in rebellion, behaving "like young wolves which, when well fed, are all the readier to attack those who tend them." 20 In 1402, the fortifications of the Order in Samogitia-Lithuania, including Memel, were stormed by the barbarians as a full-scale war erupted.

In 1404, through the intervention of Pope Boniface IX, the Order made peace with Lithuania. 21 Poland took part in this treaty although it was not at war against the Order. The Teutonic Order ceded to Jagiello the country of Dobrin which

18 This union of Poland and Lithuania was the reason why Conrad of Jungingen asked Lubeck for intervention with Margaret. Cf. HR V para. 7. Kelhert p. 142 points out that the Grandmaster took this step under the advice of the Prussian cities. Daenell says correctly: "Schon Anfang 1401 befragte der Hochmeister seine Staedte, ob man nicht Lubecks Vermittlung anrufen solle..." GDH XIV. J. p. 143.

19 Kotzebue, op. cit., III 292f.

20 Posilge, in SSRRPr III 226.

21 Weise, op. cit., I 24, (1404, November 22).
it had received as a pawn from Wladyslaw of Oppeln, a vassal of Poland and the godfather of Jagiello and the Knights in turn received from Lithuania a renewal of their earlier cession of Samogitia. The Order really won nothing. What was given to the Order in 1398 was now only reaffirmed. With the help of Witold the Knights again subdued the Samaites and baptized them in 1406; in spite of their repeated rebellions and complaints to the sovereigns and princes of the Empire in the following years they remained under the hard rule of the Order. But Samogitia remained an insecure dominion. Thus Witold in 1407 had to give guarantees to the Grandmaster that the Knights could pass through the country without harm. Obviously the situation in Samogitia was not at all favorable for the Knights if they as lords of the country needed guarantees from Witold to travel unharmed.

Witold also tried to mediate between the Order and Poland at the negotiations at Kowno on January 6, 1408, since new ten-

22 The hesitation of Conrad von Jungingen in his decision to interfere in Gotland in 1403/04 when Margaret started war there, has its explanation in this war of the Order in Lithuania: HR V 166; Posilge, in: SSRRPr III 269.

23 Monumenta vetera medii aevi Poloniae, 18 vols. (Cracow, 1874-1908) hereafter cited as Mon. Pol. VI 1021, 1038.

24 Mon. Pol. VI 1046 (1407, December 13).
sions between Poland and Prussia had developed. How did this happen? Queen Jadwiga died on July 17, 1399 and her death marked a turning point in the relationship between Poland and the Teutonic Order, although at first all seemed to go well. In December 1400, Conrad permitted Jagiello to hunt within the territory of the Order. Jagiello paid his respects and sent the Grandmaster precious trophies, for which the Grandmaster thanked him. Conrad and Jagiello seemed glad to be at peace. But this did not last and soon Jagiello showed his true face. When he had been elected king of Poland in 1386, he had promised the Polish junkers that he would restore to Polish rule the provinces, especially Pomerelia, that had been detached from Poland by the Knights.

Thus far Jagiello had achieved no success along this line. Then in 1402 Polish aspirations suffered another setback at the hands of the Knights when the latter, albeit reluctantly, purchased the Neumark from Sigismund of Luxemburg, the margrave of Brandenburg. The Knights had agreed to the purchase to

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25 Mon. Pol. V p. 9 (1399, December 8); Cod. Dipl. Pr. VI 92 (1400, January 10); 93 (1400, January 25).
prevent Poland's acquisition of this territory and a consequent threat to the Order's line of communications with the Empire and the West.  

This purchase was a mistake and turned out to be fatal. It depleted the treasure of the Order, and led to an conflict with Poland. Poland was by now totally cut off from the Baltic shore, because the Order now controlled not only the Vistula but also the Warthe and Netze rivers and by these the Polish trade of the Oder river. Moreover, from the beginning the atmosphere in the Neumark was not at all friendly toward the Order. Jagiello used this indignation to encourage riots of the untamed nobility and gentry of Neumark, who were already quite used to independence and unhappy at the prospect of coming under a closer administration by the Order. Polish noblemen also made uninterrupted raids into the borderland of the Neumark.

But it was not only Poland which was angry about the Order's acquisition of the Neumark but also some of the Wendish princes of Pomerania. When the Order bought the Neumark, the Dukes of Pomerania-Stettin as well as of Pomerania-Stolp became its neighbor. Shortly before the purchase the Order had made a treaty with Swantibor I of Pomerania-Stettin by which the old struggle about Riga was finally settled. As we recall,

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26 Regesta I 684 (1402, September 29).
27 For details Cf. J. Voight, Die Erwerbung der Neumark (Berlin,
Swantibor's son Otto II was named as anti-bishop of Riga, and Swantibor promised free passage for all war-guests. Swantibor of Pomerania-Stettin, according to the treaty just signed, could no longer continue his customary raids into the Neumark now that this territory belonged to the Order. Thus he too was displeased. Yet, although the gentry of the Neumark tried to win him and to pull him to the side of Poland, they could not do so. Since the Order had not interfered in some business he had with Margaret Jost of Moravia, Swantibor wanted to show his gratitude and helped the Knights to defend their new province and maintain order.

A quite different reaction was manifested by another Pomeranian duke, Bogislaw VIII of Pomerania-Stolp, who offered to buy the Neumark from the Order. The Grandmaster, however, refused. Chagrined, Bogislaw then offered to help the Grandmaster to conquer Colpin, a hiding place of robbers, and was

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1863) and K. Heidenreich, Der Deutsche Order in der Neumark (1402-1455) (Berlin, 1932).

28 LEKUB IV 1621 (1402, April 2).

29 Regesta I 721 (1403, October 21); 722 (1403, October 31); 801 (1405, May 5).

30 Cod. dipl. Pr. VI 133.
again rebuffed by the Order. At that he turned angrily during 1403 to an alliance with Poland. Bogislaw apparently feared a possible invasion by the Knights into his country. His mistrust grew when the governor of Neumark, Baldwin Stal in 1403 established suspicious contact with the bishop of Kammin, an independent sovereign with considerable territory within Pomerania-Stolp.31

Bishop Nickolaus Buck of Kammin was a member of the Teutonic Order, yet disobedient and not subservient to it. While he was serving as Procurator in Rome, he was named Bishop of Kulm by Pope Boniface IX but since the Order protested having a disobedient member bishop in its own territory, he was installed in Kammin.32 Buck had to fight against the Dukes of Pomerania who for years had been trying to dominate the bishopric of Kammin. Buck now looked for help from the Order, since the Neumark belonged to his jurisdiction; he intended in 1403 to incorporate the bishopric into the states of the Order, because he realized that his fight for independence was hopeless. Governor Stal

31 Recesta I 702 (1403, April 23; 703 (1403, April 24); Cod. dipl. Pr. I 4 p. 571.
was pleased by this prospect and was in such a hurry that he immediately started to negotiate without asking for approval of the Grandmaster. Conrad, however, refused an incorporation but thought of a protectorate.\textsuperscript{33} But already this idea was enough to embitter Bogislaw of Stolp anew, and to throw him back into negotiations with Poland during 1406-1407; however, nothing came of this, although Jagiello used Bogislaw for a time during 1406 as a contact with Erich, Bogislaw's nephew.\textsuperscript{34}

Meanwhile another of the Pomeranian dukes, the Duke of Pomerania-Barth-Stralsund, opened diplomatic contacts with Queen Margaret and even joined her in her attack on Gotland in 1403-1404. All these maneuvers, diplomatic feints and endless negotiations demonstrate clearly how unstable the Dukes of Pomerania were and how much of a nuisance they represented for the Teutonic Order.\textsuperscript{35}

A much greater danger to the Order, however, was Poland-Lithuania. Most historians of the Teutonic Knights emphasize the increasing tension of the Order with Poland and Lithuania

\textsuperscript{33}Stal's justification dated: 1405, October 25.

\textsuperscript{34}Regesta I 903 (about 1406); 904 (about 1406), 926 (1407, May 25); 931 (1407, June 2).

\textsuperscript{35}For more details Cf. Loos, \textit{op. cit.}
as the main reason for the abandoning of Gotland in 1408.\textsuperscript{36}

This was, indeed, a crucial matter. The power of King Wladislaus-Jagiello was growing formidable. He was striving to build up alliances against the Knights. He found friends among the clergy of Livonia, who asked for the support of the Poles against their Teutonic overlords.\textsuperscript{37} In Prussia it was currently reported that secret messengers often came from Cracow to confer with the Lizard Knights. The princes of Pomerania were ready to acclaim the new greatness of the Slav king, who even entered into an alliance with the heathen Tatars and Wallachians. By the first decade of the fifteenth century the Order found itself faced by a hostile coalition consisting of Jagiello of Poland, Witold of Lithuania, the allied Pomeranian dukes, and miscellaneous lesser figures.

Nevertheless, there are other points which should be considered, since they surely influenced the decision of the Knights to abandon Gotland, namely, the changing commercial picture in the lands of the Order. The acquisition of the Neumark in 1402 had seemingly secured the Order's tie with Germany, which had


\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Regesta} I 777 (1403/04); 794 (1405, February 4); Cf. Treischke, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 113.
long remained uncertain as long as the Wendish princes of Pomerania were in a position to cut it whenever the fancy took them. Now at length the danger was averted by securing a trustworthy route of communication entirely under the Order's control. Even if the nobles of the Neumark felt unhappy at the new situation, the new road into the Empire was of the utmost importance for the economic life of the Order no less than for its political designs. It could now exploit to the fullest its German possessions including the two commanderies of inexhaustible wealth - Autria and Coblenz.

Secondly, the Order now had new trading routes that promised to be quite lucrative to Prussia.\textsuperscript{38} Not only the overland connection with the Empire was now open for the Knights, but also a land route was established with Lithuania and beyond to Russia. At the negotiations for the peace treaty of Sallinwerder in October, 1398, Duke Witold worked to promote the trade of Lithuania. He therefore opened his country to the subjects of the Order and ceded them important privileges. The most important was the right to establish a settlement in Kovno on the Nieman River, which was the focus of the Lithuanian trade.

\textsuperscript{38} Cf. Treischke, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 92f.
The factory of the Prussian merchants soon flourished under the leadership of traders from Danzig. Danzig brought its wood and forest products via Kovno in Lithuania, which were then brought down the Gitze, into the Kurisches Haff, along the Deime, Pregel, Frisches Haff and Eastern Vistula to Danzig. The salt ships of Danzig used the same route eastward to Kovno. Evidence of the Order's zeal in developing this route is seen in the fact that Conrad of Jungingen deepened the Deim river, the link between the two water systems. 39

A further increase of the Lithuanian trade was achieved by the treaty of Kopussa between the Germans in Riga and the Russians in Polotsk in 1406. The connection between Riga and Polotsk, a trade center in Lithuania, had been interrupted by wars and quarrels. Under the auspices of the Grand Duke Witold of Lithuania a treaty between the city of Polotsk and the city of Riga was concluded which formulated new regulations and toll exemptions, and in effect introduced a flourishing period for Polotsk. Witold gave the German merchants property in Polotsk. The trading place of Polotsk established the contact between Riga and the Upper Duna and as far as Vitebsk, Smolensk, Novgorod and Moskow. The most interesting fact is that the treaty

39Daenell, Blute, p. 96f; Vogel, Geschichte, p. 274f.
of Kopussa does not even mention Gotland, which had been till then the one great Baltic trading place or transit place of the Russian merchants. At the same time a direct land connection was established from Riga through Samogitia with Memel, which now became more and more the second important trading place of Prussia after Danzig. Riga and the other cities of Livonia took over the place of Novgorod and of the factory there and won the leadership in the East Baltic.

Now goods from the Black Sea, Hungary and Ruthenia did not necessarily have to be transported on the Baltic past Gotland and Visby. These goods were brought via Lemberg or Cracow down the Vistula river. This route had been established earlier. The Poles even had tried for a while to be the only middlemen in the trade between the Baltic and the Black Sea. In 1352, the King of Poland had forbidden foreigners to use the trade routes passing through his realm to Hungary and the

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40 HUB IV 726 (1406, July 2); Cf. HUB IV 1090. Cf. Daenell, Bluete, p. 98.

41 Goetz, Handelsgeschichte p. 32, speaks of the period from 1392-1494 as of the decline of Novgorod.
Black Sea. Yet soon he had to abandon this plan, the more willingly since the Prussian merchants had secured the aid of the Teutonic Order in pushing through Lithuanian territory to the Black Sea. When the Polish merchants tried later in 1390-94 to avoid the Prussian trading places, especially Thorn where staple laws were enforced in restraint of trade, they concluded an agreement with Bogislaw VI of Pomerania-Wolgast in regard to transit rights for a new trade route to the Baltic. This connection was called the "Flanders road." But since it was in practice too long and inconvenient, the Polish merchants turned to the old way of passing Thorn, especially after the acquisition of the Neumark which cut them off from their connection with Pomerania.42

If we take a glance at the map again, we see that Gotland and its city Visby no longer lay athwart the route passed by the Prussian cities for their westward-oriented trade. We could perhaps imagine that the Order realized the island was no longer as important for trade as it had been centuries before. Visby was losing its significance. A place which was so often a target of plunder and a hiding place for pirates was no longer attractive

42 EUB IV 726 (1406, July 2); Cf. EUB IV 1090. Cf. Daenell, Bluete, p. 98.
for merchants and shippers. They preferred rather to go via other routes, even if these were less convenient. Further, larger ships permitted them to sail all the way down from the east without stopping on the island of Gotland and in the harbor of Visby. 

In answer to the question, why did the Order dispose of Gotland in 1403? we state: the gathering of the thunderstorm in Poland-Lithuania was surely one decisive factor. Grandmaster Conrad of Jungingen had to choose between facing Margaret or Jagiello-Witold, between Gotland or Danzig-Pomerelia. He had to realize more and more that it was not feasible to defend both conquests and that he had to jettison one in order not to lose both. His choice fell on Gotland since he must have recognized that, all things considered, the island was now of far less importance now than was Danzig-Pomerelia. Gotland and its city Visby were in a certain sense even useless. The island was a dangerous spot only in the hands of "evil men," the pirates, but these pirates had finally been driven out of the Baltic Sea; their power was broken and soon they would disappear completely. From an economic point of view, there was no special need to possess the island, because the development of new trade

43 Daenell, Bluete I p. 147. Comparing the five maps (Cf. Appendix D-F) which A. Lewis in his book published, we can see quite fairly the general trend.
routes had opened up alternative sources of business and wealth to the Prussian towns and to the Order itself.

Only one motive of an economic nature seemed to weigh significantly by 1406-1408; the need for the Order to recover some of the money it had spent in the operation. The Order's treasury was not inexhaustible. Since the Knights had recently purchased many territories and since the costs of the expeditions were so high, while income was reduced by the disturbed trading conditions, the coffers of the Order were quite emptied.44

At the same time, Grandmaster Conrad also had to save the Order's face, what he called the "honor of the Order." That was surely not pride or some ethereal chivalric idea. Supposing, as do more or less all historians, that he recognized the gathering of the thunderstorm in the south and east, it was then natural that he would want to demonstrate his strength; otherwise he would have invited his foes to begin the war earlier. The Order had to try to win the respect of its enemies and simultaneously it had to prepare for the imminent struggle with its foes. Hence Conrad, now clearly convinced of the uselessness of Gotland and desirous of disposing of it, could not really do so until he could do it honorably and in such a way that the Order might recover a part of its investment.

44Koczy, op. cit., p. 50; Benninghoven, op. cit.
Hence the sale of Gotland was compelled by circumstances: the menacing danger of the Polish-Lithuanian alliance which used every contact in the land of the Knights and the increasing unimportance of Gotland in 1408.

In the light of this answer we may pose a last question: was the Gotland affair a success or a mistake and failure? What was the result of this situation? If we follow most historians and consider this question from their point of view of power politics we would have to say: It was a failure. But, as we pointed out earlier, we think that such was not the intention of Grandmaster Conrad von Jungingen. Therefore we have to state: Its loss was not a political disaster. If we consider the occupation and abandonment of Gotland from the economic point of view we have to distinguish: at first it looks like a failure insofar as the Order put far more money in this affair than it received from it. 45 But if we look at the longer term results we see that the expedition was a total success, since it expelled the Vitualian Brothers from the Baltic and restored peace on this sea. The real winners were

45 Cf. Benninghoven, op. cit., p. 475: the Order spent more than 70,000 Prussian marks in 1398-1408 while it received back from this action only about 30,000 marks.
the merchants, the traders and the Hanseatic League, and even the Order insofar as it was a trader on a great scale. All in all we must point out that the Order was the victim of circumstances and time, of its mercantile-oriented Baltic Sea policy. Were the Knights perhaps victims of the great dilemma they had to face ever since Hermann von Salza brought them to the East: namely, the contradiction and choice between missionary labor or political power? But here we are already out of the realm of history.
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Appendix A

Map of the Pre-Hanseatic and Hanseatic trade system, from Hans Friedrich Blunck, Die nordische Welt (Berlin, 1937) p. 171
Appendix E

Appendix H

Appendix J

Genealogical Table Illustrative of the Baltic Rivalries in the 14th century.
Genealogical Table Illustrative the Baltic Rivalries in the 14th century

Drawn from: H.B. George, Genealogical Tables Illustrative of Modern History (Oxford, 1916), tables XLIII;

S. Buchholtzer, Versuch in der Geschichte des Herzogtums Mecklenburg, (Rostock, 1753), tables 5. 6.


Otto I of Pomerania-Schlesien
1278 - 1344

Barnim II of Pomerania-Schlesien
1298 - 1368

Swantibor I of Pomerania-Schlesien

Mangold II of Wizza (1447-1487)

Władysław II Jagiełło (1392-1434), (B. of Dorpat)

Otto II
1380-1427

Jan II of Mecklenburg-Strelitz (1393-1466)

Agnieszka of Mecklenburg-Strelitz (1395-1467)

Joan I of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern

Amalie of Pomerania-Mecklenburg
APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Reverend Karl-Ferdinand Schmidt, S.J. has been read and approved by three members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

Feb. 26, 1966
Date

Raymond W. Schmidt
Signature of Adviser