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An Examination of the Relationships between Voting Patterns in School Elections and Selected Social Variables of Community Members in Elementary School Districts in Cook, Dupage, Lake, Mchenry, and Will Counties, Illinois

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AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VOTING PATTERNS IN SCHOOL ELECTIONS AND SELECTED SOCIAL VARIABLES OF COMMUNITY MEMBERS IN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN COOK, DUPAGE, LAKE, MCHENRY, AND WILL COUNTIES, ILLINOIS

by

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VITA

The author, Gail Duke, is the daughter of Arline and Robert Clemons. She was born March 24, 1943, in San Antonio, Texas.

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CHAPTER I

DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM

Rationale

Few institutions in the United States command the widespread attention received by the public schools. Several possible explanations for this zealous concern merit discussion. First, citizens have a financial stake in the school system. Traditionally, the schools have served local needs, and they have been locally administered and funded. Taxpayers simply want to be sure they are getting their money's worth. Second, the schools are interwoven into the fabric of the community. They are not just places to which children are sent to be educated. They provide adults with an opportunity to participate in school-related activities. Parents are eager to join PTA's, sponsor Cub Scout troops, and raise money for needed playground equipment. In many towns and neighborhoods, the schools are activity centers; their facilities are used for adult education and community recreation. Finally, the public school is the primary transmitter of community values. As such, it is regarded as the property of each and every member of the community. Schools perform the vital service of educating and training the most important possession of the community: its children.

Given the emotional and financial investment of the citizenry, it is little wonder that they are interested in school policies and

programs. And given the variety of opinions reflective of that interest, it is little wonder that the public school system is often the center of public controversy. The problem is that in the face of change--political, social, and economic--interests intensify, opinions harden, and controversy can turn into conflict. And because change, both within the schools and in their social environment, is constant and ongoing, controversy is inevitable and conflict is always possible.

Furthermore, the changes in the public schools in the last decade, mirroring the changes in society at large, have resulted in an increase in disagreement over educational policies and growing controversy within the schools. One source of potential conflict, for example, has been falling enrollments. Because of the decline in the birth rate, fewer children have been entering schools. Indeed, many school districts undertook ambitious building programs to accommodate the expansion of the school age population caused by the baby boom after World War II. School boards have had to face the task of closing some schools and reassigning children to others. Communities have therefore been forced to rethink the concept of the neighborhood school and deal with the choice between selling or renting school buildings and busing students, on the one hand, and imposing higher taxes, on the other. Some districts have been able to control the level of conflict generated by such changing social conditions. Others have not.

Confronted by continuous change, school boards need to devote their energies to developing forward-looking policies, maintaining

fiscal management, and establishing sound educational planning. In order to formulate policies and make plans, boards must be able to work together. They cannot afford to waste time on political infighting and community disputes. And they must feel free to speak openly and deliberate disinterestedly.

In moderation, public discussion and debate can be stimulating to the school system. However, if they are carried to an extreme, they can lead to widespread discontent and dissension. The resulting conflict is a problem because it can produce hostilities that divide communities and create wounds that may take years to mend. Nussel (1964) concluded that open conflict in school affairs should be avoided because it results in intergroup cleavage, animosity, and residual bitterness. In addition, the effect on the school leadership can be devastating. Schools and school administrators can lose credibility, and they may be compelled to spend an inordinate amount of time examining, redefining, and defending programs and policies.

For these reasons, school boards must be able to manage controversy before it turns into conflict. They must retain public support and preserve an atmosphere of decision making that is hospitable to new ideas and unharried discussion. In order to do so, they must find ways of channeling community discontent into useful activities and transforming potentially inflammable issues into subjects of rational argument and calm deliberation. If members of the school board are afraid of close scrutiny by impassioned partisan interests, they may be unable to discuss the issues. And if they themselves have become caught up in the heat of public controversy,

they may be unable to make any decisions at all.

Ever since the establishment of the American public school system in the nineteenth century, it has been subjected to widespread and frequent criticism. The most recent example is the National Commission on Excellence in Education report entitled A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform. The Commission's evaluation of the public school system is grim. The report says that the United States is economically and otherwise endangered because world competitors are overtaking U.S. positions in science, technology, and industry. And this is the case, the Commission says, because mediocrity had become the norm in American education. That is, the public school systems are simply not working as the public believes they should be.

Although the report is pessimistic in its assessment of American schools, it is not hopeless. And its recommendations for reform bear directly on the problem under discussion. Among the five major proposals offered by the Commission is the need for capable school leadership. Several recent studies (Madden, 1976; Edmonds, 1978; and Rutter, 1979) support this view. How can the academic achievement of students be improved? These studies argue that among the factors characterizing schools with high student achievement is an emphasis on improving the instructional effectiveness of teachers. And all three contend that this emphasis derives mainly from school administrators. That is, strong administrative leadership influences teacher performance, which in turn influences student achievement. The result is a reverse domino effect from the top down: under these

circumstances, children can learn to their maximum potential.

Is there a relationship between increasing conflict and increasing mediocrity? Common sense answers yes. Suffice it to say, however, that unless conflict is controlled, the perception of mediocrity will not be eliminated. For even if the diversion of administrative energies into the task of conflict management did not foment the problem identified by the Commission, the continued sapping of resources by public discontent, controversy, and conflict will deter, if not prevent, school leaders from solving the problem of instructional mediocrity in the future.

Statement of the Problem

In light of the conclusions reached by the National Commission on Excellence in Education (1983) and other national reports, it is obviously important to discover how school boards can be permitted to concentrate on the job of improving public education instead of having to deal with conflict. Or, stated differently, school boards need to discover how to control conflict so that they can devote themselves to the ongoing principal concern of citizens: academic achievement.

School district superintendents are in a unique position to deal with the problem. As the chief administrative officers in the school system, they carry the primary responsibility for initiating and administering programs designed to improve the quality of public education. Furthermore, superintendents bear a large part of the responsibility for making the system run smoothly and efficiently. They must deal day to day with a variety of constituencies--teachers, parents, and board members--all of whom are very likely to address the

problems of public education in different ways. And they must find ways to accommodate and/or resolve these differences. As the report of the National Commission (1983) concluded, school leadership cannot be effective without cooperation between administrations and boards. Nor can leadership be effective without the cooperation of all those who have an interest in the school system--the entire community.

How can superintendents fulfill these responsibilities, especially in relation to the problem of conflict? First, they can help create an atmosphere of cooperation by <u>understanding</u> their constituencies, particularly the school board whose policies guide them and the communities whose interests they serve. More specifically, they can achieve this objective by understanding how these groups deal with conflict. Then, with that understanding, they can respond quickly and effectively when potential conflict arises.

Thus, if a superintendent knows that the school board he/she is responsible to is about to receive a major complaint or encounter any potentially divisive issue, he/she can spend time helping the board develop constructive ways of handling differences of opinion, either by working directly with members or by bringing in outside consultants. If the dispute arises from the community, he/she can recommend the use of persuasive techniques or the establishment of procedures for hearing, examining, and ultimately settling the disagreement. Being aware of long term trends and changes, he/she may suggest alternatives in the board's decision-making process or in its committee structure that would enhance its ability to deal with these trends and changes. Or he/she may recommend the establishment of

citizen committees or the institution of a caucus system of board member selection in order to give community members a feeling of fuller participation and greater control.

If, for example, a school district needed to raise money, the superintendent could counsel the school board as to the best way to accomplish its goal. Knowing that members of the community had openly expressed opposition to a tax increase, the superintendent would try to dissuade the board from raising property taxes by means of a referendum. Similarly, if a school district decided to reduce the size of its special education programs and the superintendent knew that the parents of students in these programs would resist such a change, he/she would recommend ways of presenting the proposal to parents that would allay their fears and diminish their opposition.

Clearly, to create controversy and risk conflict are unproductive for effective administrative behavior. Fortunately, superintendents are in a position to prevent this from happening by virtue of their access to all their constituencies. If they take the time to understand the groups they are dealing with and pay attention to changing social conditions, they can assist school boards in timing their proposals carefully, selecting their options with a due sense of their impact on the community, and using effective methods for presenting new ideas. During personal interviews conducted for this study, superintendents stressed again and again the importance of understanding their boards, including their strengths and weaknesses, and being able to gauge their ability to make certain decisions and deal with certain issues. Obviously, the same point applies to

superintendents in relation to teachers, parents, political groups, and service organizations that make up the community.

Research Questions

The purpose of this research study was to determine how school administrators can work more effectively with their constituencies. The study assumes that the more superintendents know about their constituencies, the better able they will be to help and direct their energies. With this assumption in mind, the study was designed to answer four general areas of inquiry:

1. Was there a difference as measured by electoral conflict in school elections between school districts that were ranked high and those that were ranked low on the social characteristics of the members of their communities?

2. On which types of issues did boards of education experience internal conflict, as indicated by split votes during the regularly scheduled meetings and were there any differences on the types of split votes between those communities that ranked high and those that ranked low on the social characteristics of the community members?

3. Was the level of conflict evident in the district, as indicated by electoral participation and dissent, related to the issues that produced recorded conflict among board members?

4. Did the presence of a caucus system of selecting school board members have an effect on the level of conflict within the district?

Although every board of education is composed of members who differ in terms of their experience and philosophical orientation, board members are likely to have some common characteristics that are

reflective of the community they represent. And because communities differ, it is necessary to study them in order to understand their boards. For that reason, this study is also concerned with the manner in which communities handle change and manage the problems that inevitably arise from differences in values and attitudes and from the existence of competing demands for limited resources.

The Theoretical Framework

To answer these questions, this study examined school board decisions; community social characteristics; manifestations of dissatisfaction with schools in general; and electoral processes. In order to determine the relationships among these factors affecting the public school system, this study also examined the extent to which each factor influenced the others.

The relationships between these factors have been studied by several students of public education. Minar (1966) investigated "...the links between the school system and its social environment" (p. 824), especially the influence of the latter on the former. Specifically, he was interested in the social causes and effects "...of conflict in school district politics" (p. 823). Focusing on electoral conflict and basing his study on a combination of election and referenda dissent to indicate control or lack of control of conflict, he hypothesized that a community's success in conflict control was directly related to certain social characteristics: "The ability of a community to suppress conflict is dependent on its resources in certain kinds of outlooks and skills and ... these are related to aggregate levels of educational and occupational status"

(p. 825).

Using rank-order correlation coefficients between aggregate community political behavior and social characteristics of community members for his analysis, Minar found that there were significant associations between political variables and status variables. The higher status communities were more able to manage conflict for several reasons. First, communities that were accustomed to the division of responsibility that leadership entails were more amenable to leadership. Low-manifest-conflict systems were adept at dissipating controversy before it reached the threshhold at which the less attached groups (parents, teachers, and non-administrative school personnel) became involved. Also, "high-status, low-conflict districts are more likely to lean more heavily on technical authority, to hire experts, retain them for long periods of time, and grant them considerable decision latitude" (pp. 831-32). Second, "high-status communities have less conflict on school affairs because they are less differentiated internally by 'class' lines and because people of similar class either work better together or have similar aspirations" (p. 828). Third, Minar's results suggested that conflict was more easily handled in areas with high socioeconomic status because there were more human and financial resources available for solving problems.

Minar also studied the relationship between electoral processes and conflict management. Focusing on the use of the caucus system of nominating candidates for school board membership as a conflict management mechanism, Minar concluded that "...high-rank communities

are not only more likely to have caucuses but are more likely to have them work as conflict-management devices" (p. 831). Stated in other terms, he found that higher socioeconomic communities developed methods like the caucus system to reinforce the conflict-suppression capacity of a system and to keep conflict at a sub- or prepublic level.

Two decades have passed since Minar investigated some of the questions raised in this study. This study was undertaken to determine whether the conclusions Minar drew in the 1960s are still valid in the 1980s. Before proceeding with that determination, however, a few words about the generalizability of the findings in this study are in order.

First, the sample from which the school districts were selected was representative of many school districts in the United States. The districts ranged from small, with a kindergarten through eighth-grade enrollment of 190 students, to medium, with an enrollment of almost 5,000 students. Only elementary districts were selected because the elementary districts in Illinois tend to have the same or nearly the same boundaries as the politically defined communities they serve. Thus, the conclusions in this study are generalizable to the extent that they are drawn from a variety of school districts.

Second, the data collected from the sample were unobtrusively obtained. They were derived from official records of past events, including legal documents, board meeting minutes, and voting eligibility records obtained from the county clerks of the various counties in which the school districts are located. Voting data were

either exact statistical accounts or official estimates used for all government purposes. Voting participation data were taken directly from school board records for the first three years of the study and from the records of county clerks for the final two years of the study. This is because elections were conducted by school districts from 1978 to 1980 and by counties thereafter. In 1980, the Illinois General Assembly passed a law consolidating elections, which also resulted in the cancellation of school board elections in 1982. The terms of current members were extended until the 1983 election.

Third, the social characteristics of each community were not determined by subjective impressions of school administrators, but were based on information obtained from the United States Census. The data were aggregated to ascertain the social rank of each community on the basis of standard sociological determinants.

Limitations of the Study

The general applicability of this study has three limitations. First, because of the need to deal with a manageable sample of communities in which the school district more or less corresponds to community municipal boundaries, the sample does not represent all types of districts and communities in the United States. For example, no large urban districts were included because they are heterogeneous. They were beyond the scope of this study. For the same reason, high school districts, which usually serve more than one community, were not included in the sample.

Second, although every effort was made to define school district boundaries accurately in order to ensure uniformity of comparative

data, not all school districts had boundaries that were exactly coternimous with a city or town. Thus, the relationships between school boards and communities, at least in some cases, may be slightly distorted.

Third, the social characteristics of the communities were taken from the 1980 Census. Although it was assumed that the communities remained fundamentally unchanged from 1980 to 1983, this assumption will not be verifiable until the 1990 Census.

A final limitation on this internal validity of the pre-experimental design used in this study is that of experimental workability. The evidence of group differences in conflict management over the five year period could be due to the differential drop-out of persons in the school community.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Before we examine the data collected for this report it will be useful to review a number of research studies whose conclusions bear on the questions raised in this investigation. These studies deal with four relevant issues: (1) the role of school boards in the management of public schools; (2) the methods of selecting school board members; (3) the effects of community social status on voter behavior and attitudes toward school officials; and (4) the role of the superintendents in school management and conflict control.

The Role of School Boards

Because there was no provision for education in the constitution of the United States, the legal basis for public schools was constitutionally established by the individual states. Initially, the schools were run by town governments. After 1825, however, the towns began to establish separate governing committees--boards of education. The duties of these boards were to establish schools, to make rules for their management and governance, to operate them, to raise and expend money for their support, and eventually to employ superintendents to administer some of these functions. In this way, the control of public education fell into the hands of the townspeople whose primary function was to oversee the education of the children in their districts (Campbell et al., 1975).

Most students of public education agree that school boards both control the school system and express the will of the community. According to Lutz (1980), for example, local boards are grass-roots, democratic institutions. At the same time, however, school boards are sometimes perceived by their constituents to be insufficiently responsive to community demands and expectations and insufficiently open and democratic in their decision making. Lutz explored several theories that account for school board behavior in these areas. The first, the continuous competition theory, asserts that although school boards are under constant pressure from various interest groups, they usually act for the good of their school district. Second, the decision output theory states that school boards are undemocratic because they do not respond to the demands of the public. Third, the dissatisfaction theory assumes that school boards are ultimately democratic because they are subject to defeat as a result of community dissatisfaction. And fourth, in terms of the council behavior theory, which locates group behavior on a continuum from "elite" to "arena", school boards usually act in an elite fashion. Assuming the role of trustees, they reach their decisions by consensus in private meetings and enact their policies in public by unanimous vote. Although the majority of the school boards Lutz studied acted in this matter, some exhibited arena behavior, which displays open conflict and requires change that typically results in the electing of a new council, which also exhibits elite behavior.

Regardless of which theory one accepts, however, it is clear that school boards do not govern in a vacuum. Indeed, after a thorough

review of the literature, Boyd (1976b) concluded that school administrators tend to dominate local educational policy making, but within constraints imposed by the local community through the board of education. This is so partly because school boards are inclined to employ superintendents who hold beliefs similar to their own. And their own beliefs are reflective, in turn, of beliefs of the community. In other words, superintendents are influenced by school boards, and school boards are influenced by the community. Boyd says that the constraints imposed on the superintendent vary with the type of school district and the type of policy issue he/she is faced with. However, superintendents and boards of education usually attempt to act in harmony with what they perceive to be expectations of the community. In homogeneous districts, in particular, school boards and superintendents tend to anticipate community needs and reflect community values.

Yet, despite the attempts of many school boards and school administrators to work together and despite the fact that both groups usually attain their positions of authority because they reflect the values of the communities they serve, there is obviously no guarantee that they will be able to govern smoothly and effectively. As Lutz (1980) points out, even though they may try to act for the good of the entire community, school officials cannot satisfy the demands of every interest group. Consequently, they are often accused of being unresponsive. Furthermore, because they typically deliberate behind closed doors, they are always subject to the charge of elitism. If dissatisfaction deepens, it can turn into opposition. And if it

broadens, it can lead to open conflict, which can result in superintendent dismissal and school board defeat.

Before we consider the ways in which school administrators can aid school boards in minimizing opposition and managing conflict, we must examine two important conflict-related variables, both of which have been extensively studied by educational researchers. The first variable, the method of selecting school board members, can be influenced by school officials. That is, they can promote and support the methods they perceive to be conducive to conflict control. The second variable, the social status of the community, is not subject to influence because it is a socioeconomic given. However, if school officials understand the relationship between community social status and conflict, they can at least be aware of its potentially good or ill effect in their own school districts and thereby maximize the former and minimize the latter.

The Selection of School Board Members

Members of the board of education are entrusted with the important responsibility of running the schools. Therefore, well-qualified candidates are needed to serve on the board. How are they selected?

Throughout the states there are two primary methods of selecting school board members: election and appointment. According to Campbell et al., (1975) about 25% of the school boards in the United States are appointed, usually by the mayor with city council approval. In the remaining 75% of U.S. school districts, boards are elected at large in nonpartisan elections.

The specific qualifications for school board membership vary from state to state, but there are many commonalities. In Illinois, for example, there are certain qualifications and procedures for running for the position of school board member. Candidates must be 18 years of age or older, residents of the school district for one year, and registered voters in their district on the day of the election (Murphy, 1977). The candidate must file a nominating petition supporting his candidacy and an ethics statement. The petition must be signed by at least 50 voters or 10% of the registered voters of the district, whichever is less. Candidates cannot be employees of the school district or hold other public offices.

Which method is best for securing effective school board members? Hurwitz (1972) lists three advantages of the elective method. First, an elected board is more responsive to the public. Second, an elected board owes allegiance to no person or political party. Finally, an elected board protects the school system from local partisan politics. Furthermore, Burris (1969) indicates that the elective process usually results in the selection of well-qualified candidates. School board members receive no salary, spend countless hours per week on school board business, and leave themselves open to public criticism. Yet, the typical board member, according to the American School Board Journal (1983), has a high level of income, works in a professional/managerial job, and has completed four or more years of college. And the typical elected board member ranks even higher in these categories. As Burris (1969) says, "There is something to the man who is willing to run, something that sets him apart in his desire

to give his best capacities to the public welfare" (p.13). Thus, although Muns (1961) contends that there are no substantive differences between elected and appointed board members in terms of their actions, there is every reason to conclude that election is preferable to appointment.

Tuttle (1958) has proposed a set of desirable traits for school board members. The effective board member, he says, believes in public education, is devoted to the public interest, has sound judgement, possesses breadth of view, is cooperative, and has a faith in people. How do communities attract qualified candidates to the school board? In some communities, individuals seek the position of school board member. In other communities, interested groups select and support candidates, while in still other communities current board members encourage persons they know to seek board membership.

One method of board member selection, which is used in a variety of school districts throughout the United States (Hurwitz, 1972), is the community caucus. Tuttle defines it as "...a body of representatives of a school district voluntarily associated together for the purpose of canvassing, screening, and nominating the best available candidates for school board membership, whether the final selection is to be by popular election or appointment" (1958, p. 152).

The procedure followed by a citizen's nominating committee in Great Neck, New York, has been outlined by Tourstein (1963). Each potential candidate submitted a biographical sketch, appeared before the committee, stated his position on education in general, and answered questions from the committee.

Tuttle (1958) views the caucus as an effective device for securing highly qualified school board members because it allows for a fairly thorough examination of every candidate and an evaluation of all candidates in comparison to each other. Muns (1964) also found the caucus to be a systematic and controlled method of screening candidates for board membership.

Two other studies of the caucus method bear on the question of candidate selection. In an investigation of 110 Indiana school districts that elected members of their school boards, Lawrence (1965) obtained his data through a postal card survey. Nineteen of these districts used the caucus system for nominating members to the school board. Lawrence interviewed the superintendent, an officer of the caucus, and a school board member in each of the 19 districts. He found that 85% of the board members in those districts had been nominated by caucus, the caucuses had been started by school or civic groups, the median size of the caucuses was 32 members, the median number of candidates screened was 51, and 85% of the caucuses slated one candidate for each vacancy.

Lawrence concluded that the caucus was effective in securing well-qualified candidates if it: (1) represented all segments of the school district, (2) was well publicized, (3) established desirable criteria for the selection of nominees, and (4) permitted all members to participate in the final screening.

In an extensive 1960-1961 study of 71 elementary and high school districts in Lake, DuPage, and Cook counties in Illinois, Muns (1961) investigated 64 caucus committees. By analyzing the constitutions of

the caucus, he found that their size varied from 5 to 122 members, but 50% had fewer then 30 members. The average number of meetings held per year for the entire caucus was two. Having developed from a combination of representatives of groups interested in education, the caucuses appeared to be a major force in securing candidates for school boards.

Among superintendents, school presidents, and caucus officers, 95% felt that the system secured well-qualified members in communities in which it was used. Among elected members, 67% to 72% would not have sought school board positions if the caucus had not solicited them.

In an extensive study of elementary districts in suburban Chicago, Minar (1966) examined the caucus as a conflict-management device. One-half of the districts in his sample used nominating caucuses, which Minar defined as independent organizations working under by-laws and rules, whose purpose is to select qualified candidates for school board positions. In his study, Minar found that caucus members frequently consulted, either overtly or covertly, with school board members and school administrators. The major function of the caucus, in Minar's view, is to "handle conflict before it reaches the level of visibility" (p. 829).

The research into the issue of school board members selection may be summarized as follows. First, the elective, as opposed to the appointive, method of membership selection results in the acquisition of better-qualified members and the minimalization of political/partisan influence on school board members who are better

able to reduce conflict. Thus, to the extent that school officials are interested in conflict management and to the extent that they can influence their communities to use the caucus and elective methods of board member selection, the foregoing studies indicate that they should encourage their communities to adopt both methods.

The Social Status of Communities

Minar's (1966) study of 48 elementary school districts in suburban Cook County, Illinois, from 1958 to 1962 focused primarily on the relation between socioeconomic status and conflict control. Examining school districts as political systems, Minar concluded that the level of electoral conflict varied from district to district. In order to determine the cause of this variation, he hypothesized that community social status is directly related to the level of conflict within the school district. Using board and referenda elections as a basis for judgement, he concluded that school districts that were ranked high socioeconomically had a low level of participation in elections and also had a low level of dissent within the community.

Attempting to explain this difference, Minar offered three hypotheses. First, communities with high levels of better-educated people and people in professional/managerial occupations had low conflict because they had a large supply of conflict-management skills and attitudes. That is "the ability of a community to suppress conflict is dependent on its resource in certain kinds of outlooks and skills and ... these are related to aggregate levels of educational and occupational status" (p. 825). Second, these high-status communities placed more reliance on and granted more latitude to

superintendents in the decision-making process. And third, these communities had less conflict in school affairs because they were less differentiated internally by class lines and because people of similar class either work better together or have similar aspirations. In addition, Minar found that the caucus was used as "a tool of conflict management" in high-status/low conflict districts (p. 830).

Using Minar's study as a reference point, Boyd (1976a) examined eight elementary school districts in suburban Cook County, Illinois. He concluded, as did Minar, that high-status districts had low levels of conflict and low-status districts had high levels.

Boyd based his analysis of social status on income, education, and occupation data drawn from the 1960 census. He defined conflict in terms of electoral results and between election dissent as determined by interviews, board minutes, newspaper coverage, and other sources.

Boyd explained his results by citing the findings of Banfield and Wilson (1963) who divided communities into two types depending on the extent of their participation in the political structure. Boyd's high-status school districts are similar to Banfield and Wilson's white-collar communities, in which power is invested in established civic organizations dedicated to serving the entire community. And Boyd's low-status communities, in which power is invested in disparate interest groups, hotly contest elections are welcome, and political conflict is actually enjoyed. In this respect, variations in conflict are not a function of differences in competence, as Minar argues, but of differences in political style--a matter of choice, not of

unalterable socioeconomic determinants.

To what extent do community social status and political culture or style affect the behavior of school boards? Blanchard (1973) sought to answer the question in his study of 57 Kentucky school districts. Deriving his data from questionnaires completed by school board members on community social characteristics and school board election results, he concluded that the ability of the boards to control conflict was directly related to the social status of their communities: the higher the status, the higher the ability.

Foster (1983) examined the effects of two very different political cultures on the attitudes of school board members in homogeneous communities in Nebraska and Louisiana. Four hundred and four school board members participated in the research. The school board members in Nebraska were thought to be less politically ambitious, more public regarding, and more tolerant of superintendent independence than those from Lousiana. Analysis of the data confirmed the first two assumptions, as well as the participation/control ratio discussed by Boyd (1976b)--that is, the more politically participatory communities in Louisiana experienced higher levels of school-related conflict and lower ability to control it.

However, Foster's data indicated that school board members in both states were willing to allow the superintendent to "assume a leadership role on educational issues...A majority of board members in both states felt that the superintendent should advocate for educational policy in the community" (p. 37). This finding is important because it shows that the type of political climate within

the school district, or state, does not significantly affect school board attitudes toward superintendent autonomy and that boards generally give power to superintendents regardless of their own orientation. Foster concluded that "superintendents are no longer just administrators following the mandate of the board, but are themselves policymakers" (p. 37). Lutz (1980) also contends that boards run their schools "with considerable help from a trusted superintendent" (p. 458).

Nevertheless, the evidence suggest that public attitudes toward school officials are influenced by community social status. Minar (1966), for example, argues that "as far as school affairs are concerned, some communities are more susceptible to leadership than others probably because their people are more accustomed to the division of responsibility that leadership entails" (p. 833). That is, high-status community are more likely than low-status communities to repose more trust in school administrators and grant them more freedom.

This conclusion is supported by two studies. First, Banfield and Grodzins (1958) found that fashionable communities inhabited by well-to-do business and professional people want (and can afford) a high level of governmental services. Proud of their schools and school officials, members of such communities are likely to hire businesslike and impartial administrators and grant them the autonomy their skills appear to justify (pp. 18-19). Second, Schnore and Alford (1963) concluded that high-status school districts prefer to have their school boards and superintendents operate on the model of

council-manager form of municipal government, which in turn is based on a business model: "the board of directors hires a plant manager, and there is no illusion of democracy, except through the distant intervention of the stockholders..., who get a chance to select members of the board at the annual meeting" (p. 6.).

In light of the foregoing studies, it would be useful for school officials to know which kind of community they are serving--high status or low status, politically active or inactive--not because they can change community status or political activities (they cannot), but because they can take it into consideration when they are about to deal with potentially inflammable issues. It seems that when school officials are compelled to broach such an issue, low-status communities--regardless of the ultimate reason for their typically higher participation in school politics and their greater disposition toward volatility--require less direct methods of presentation and less confrontative techniques of persuasion than do high-status communities.

Indeed, the research suggests that the range of sociological variables impinging on conflict control is wide and varied and that school officials would do well to be aware of all of them. Three variables are worth discussing briefly.

First, voter participation may vary with community size. Milton (1983) studied the level of participation in school board elections in 67 Florida counties. She found that although previous research had determined that voter turnout in such elections is minimal, elections in Florida had surprisingly high levels of participation. More

important, she concluded that, in Florida at least, persons who lived in smaller districts tended to participate in elections more frequently than did inhabitants of larger districts. "It appears that bureaucratized school boards in big cities may be alienating to the general public. A greater proportion of rural citizens know that they are paying property taxes to support schools. And they also know that the educational system is the biggest single expenditure in their counties" (p. 653).

Second, citizen's involvement in school board elections seems to depend on the citizen's affiliation or nonaffiliation with the school system. Taebel (1977) grouped voters into two general categories based on their motivation for voting: constituency voters, those who were employed by the school system or directly benefited from it, and clientele voters, all other members of the community. His assumptions were: (1) that constituent voters participate in elections in disproportionate numbers compared to client voters and (2) constituency voters were more supportive of schools and of incumbent board members.

Based on a sample from one moderately sized city in the Southwest, Taebel's findings indicated that his proposals were accurate. He concluded that in order to win support for the schools, especially in tax rate increases and in the election of incumbent members to school boards, school officials should concentrate on constituency voters.

Third, community interest in school issues, particularly elections, varies with the level of community dissatisfaction.

Although Iannaccone and Lutz (1970) contended that most citizens prefer noncompetitive, or uncontested, elections, Wirt and Kirst (1972) have argued that citizen input is a feeble trickle with sudden and severe storms of local stress followed by flash floods of political turmoil. According to this view, when members of the community are dissatisfied they tend to participate more in the electoral process. This participation is exemplified by large voter turnouts, incumbent board member defeats, and involuntary superintendent turnovers.

Perhaps what these three examples reveal, as much as the need for vigilance on the part of school officials, is the fact that when the issues are important voters will act (1) if they feel they can influence outcomes (as they are more inclined to feel in smaller communities), (2) if their own interests are at stake (as they are for constituency, as opposed to client, voters), or if they are dissatisfied, for whatever reason. All of this suggests that school systems are political as well as social systems and that school-related issues are always susceptible to political--ideolgical--reduction. As Badarak and Mitchell (1977) concluded, after a study of school board elections and referenda: (1) Political ideology is operating in school districts. (2) Politically active citizens can identify the ideology of school board members. (3) Liberalism and conservatism can be measured effectively. (4) The policies of school board members reflect their ideology. (5) When incumbents are defeated, new board members usually have an ideology different from that of former members.

The Role of the Superintendent

The relationship between the superintendent of schools and the board of education is based on an array of influences including, but not limited to, historical and political factors, formal and informal organizational structures, and a complex matrix of interpersonal relationships.

Historically, American schools during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were private or church-run institutions. When the public school movement in the United States began in about 1800, the small, local district--usually a one-room school--became the standard unit. These local schools were governed by the selectmen of the towns.

Two movements helped create the need for a superintendent (Campbell, 1975). The first was the combining of districts into citywide units. As cities and school districts grew, full-time, professional management was needed to direct the day-to-day administrative operations. City councils appointed superintendents. Somewhat later, boards of education became separate entities from municipal governments. Next, school boards were given statutory power to appoint superintendents. The second movement was the combining of rural districts into larger units. The role of the superintendent did not come to rural areas until the 20th century. In 1975, "about two-thirds of the operating school districts of the nation had a superintendent of schools" (Campbell, p. 199). The pattern of consolidation resulted in a more specialized role and the need for a full-time professional to manage schools.

The responsibility for the running of the school system is divided between the superintendent and the school board. The board is responsible for the establishment of policy and employing a superintendent. The duties of the superintendent are stated in the Illinois School Code: "a superintendent...shall have charge of the administration of the schools under the direction of the board of education. In addition to the administrative duties, the superintendent shall make recommedations to the board concerning budget, building plans, the location of sites, the selection of teachers and other employees, the selection of textbooks, instructional material, and courses of study. The superintendent shall keep or cause to be kept the records and accounts as directed and required by the board, and perform such other duties as the board may delegate to him" (10-21.4).

Although all school districts divide administrative responsibilities between the school board and the superintendent, the lines of demarcation are not easily drawn. In fact, allocating power equitably and rationally--and thereby minimizing the possibility of intra-administrative conflict--is one of the most important ways in which school leaders can contribute to the smooth functioning of a school system. As Minar (1966) says, "the key point in school government would seem to be the relations and the distribution of power between the superintendent and the board" (p. 831). In most school districts, he says, there are two types of authority: the technical expertise of the school administrator and the formal rank of the board of education. And the goal is to find the proper arena for

each. Other researchers explain the relationship between the board and its superintendent as a kind of marriage. As one school official put it, "we have our good times and we have our bad" (Zakariya, 1983, p. 28). In Zakariya's view, the division of responsibility and power can be solved by allowing the board to spell out the what, why, and how much and letting the superintendent handle the who, where, when, and how.

As Minar implies, however, what makes it difficult to allocate power properly and effectively is the competing claims of board members and superintendents based on their respective prerogatives of rank and expertise. In other words, the board is in control and has the ultimate responsibility for running the schools. But the superintendent has the technical know-how and the administrative ability. In this respect, according to Wickert (1982), the "real issue" is whether the school board is willing to trust the superintendent and give him free reign, at least in his areas of strength. The problem is somewhat alleviated in high status-low conflict communities, Minar (1966) says, because they "are likely to lean more heavily on technical authority, to hire experts, retain them for long periods of time and grant them considerable autonomy" (p. 832).

However, agreement on this and other issues depends on many factors. One important influence is the way board members and superintendents relate to each other based on their personal characteristics, such as flexibility, willingness to delegate authority, and ability to compromise. Bartley (1977), for example,

has suggested that superintendents and school boards coax each other to agree, a tactic that cannot succeed among stubborn and unyielding participants.

Brodinsky (1983) states that the relationship between the board and the superintendent can thrive only within a total organization that is sound and healthy. In order to develop such an organization, he says, agreement should be reached at the beginning of the relationship between the board and the superintendent on what exactly board policies and prerogatives are and what is in the administrative domain. It is important that both school board and superintendent value the roles and contributions of each other. The healthy group, in Brodinsky's opinion, is continually searching for ways to resolve conflict.

As we have seen, however, the achievement of good working relationships between school boards and superintendents is not enough. The major problem is that school officials are sometimes faced with external conflicts that threaten to undermine cooperation and block effective decision making. Thus, school boards can help themselves to establish harmony among all school officials by allowing superintendents to play out their proper (administrative) role. But superintendents can help school boards govern effectively by directing and guiding their efforts at managing conflict. According to Zeigler (1976), based on his study of 11 school districts, school boards usually allow their superintendents to be the dominant factor in school district decision making. However, if the superintendent does not take advantage of his delegated power--specifically, by giving

advice when it is most needed, in actual or potential conflict-related situations--he is not adequately playing his role because he is not taking on all of his responsibiities.

How can superintendents help school boards in this regard? Nelson (1980) collected data from 77 superintendents in order to determine which strategies they used to control conflict. Two were reported as most often used because they were most effective. The first was presenting convincing evidence to support the superintendent's position on any given issue. The second was "timing the approach", or delaying action until the superintendent's success seemed more probable. The success of both strategies is enhanced by the fact, pointed out by Zeigler (1976), that superintendents control communications at school board meetings.

Two other studies indicate that school boards and superintendents maintain their community-influenced attitudes by socializing new board members. Kerr (1964) conducted a study in two suburban school systems to find out how socialization occurred. His study shed light on both the control of educational policy and the selection of members for boards of education. Kerr found that the chief school administrator plays a large part in socializing the novice board member. Because of this socialization by the superintendent, the new board member, over time, begins to assign more responsibility to the administrative position and to depend on the administrator for information. In effect, selection is superceded by socialization after election. Kerr also concluded that the board of education acted as an "agency of legitimation" for administrative decisions.

Cistone (1977) took data from structured interviews with 40 novice board members in Ontario, Canada. In contrast to Kerr, he found that over time new board members assumed a greater role in board deliberations. However, the new board members were very eager to learn the "rules of the game" and develop a code of conduct toward their fellow board members. In fact, Cistone concluded that new board members are "already well socialized into the role as a consequence of recruitment, preincumbent experience, and anticipatory socialization" (p. 31). His findings indicate that novice board members did not acquire new behaviors because they "shared the norms of the system even before they entered it" (p. 32).

Superintendents can also help boards control conflict by recommending ways of reducing the likelihood and its occurrence and of minimizing its impact when it occurs. Two examples will suffice.

Foskett (1962) conducted a study of community influence on school administration in two communities. In the first, Valley City II, a growing lumber town with a population of 15,000 and a low educational level, Foskett interviewed 65 top influentials, many of whom lived near Valley City III. The other community, Valley City III, in which Foskett interviewed 85 influentials, had a stable population of about 50,000 and a high educational level.

Foskett first identified the leaders in each community. Including only adult males, he used a modified nominating technique in which members of a panel representing a cross-section of the community submitted 10 names each. From those names, Foskett formed a second group called "knowledgeables", who were asked to list, in any order,

the 50 most influential persons in their respective communities. The persons named most frequently on these lists were called "influentials". In both cases, the knowledgeables turned out to be influentials as well.

The data collection procedure involved interviews with the leaders to gain general information. Foskett also established a matrix schedule to determine the degree, areas, and reason for the influence of leaders. These data indicated that the influentials were more alike than they were different. They had a higher than average educational, occupational, and income level. They were married, had from one to three children, and were 35 to 55 years of age. They owned their own homes and had lived in the community for at least six years. Foskett thus concluded that "individuals who have a high education, income, and occupation somehow occupy a position in the social system whereby the exercise of influence is relevant and possible, whereas those with low education, income, and occupation have little chance to be a leader even if they possess appropriate personality traits" (p. 120). In other words, one's influence depends on one's position in the social system. Foskett also found that "influence is highly related to position gained through official functions or to special skills" (p. 25). Most important, these conclusions were equally valid for Valley City II and Valley City III.

Foskett's study has two significant implications for school administrators. First, because schools are affected by influentials, school officials should know who they are and establish a working relationship with them. School officials should also have some

understanding of the overall social structure and how it operates. As Foskett says, "A recognition of the characteristics of a given influence structure should enable a school administrator to anticipate certain consequences and thus permit him to at least minimize his mistakes" (p. 130).

Second, Foskett found that the attitudes and actions of influentials, at least in regard to school-related matters, were strongly influenced by the information they received from superintendents. Thus, superintendents can also help school boards work more effectively with community leaders by using the strategies discussed by Nelson (1980) in his own communications with influentials, namely presenting compelling evidence and a differing action until the time is right. Superintendents can do this, however, only if they know and understand the influentials in their own communities as well as--or better than--the school boards do.

The second example of how school administrators can contribute to school district conflict management relates to situations in which conflict has already surfaced. The question is: How can school boards either eliminate it or reduce its impact? In a nationwide study of 492 board members and 81 superintendents, Stelzer (1974) offered three hypotheses: (1) "School boards employed a strategy of receptivity when faced with community conflict.... (2) Receptivity is the mechanism by which the board channels community conflict into opposition to the superintendent.... (3) Competitive elections are an institutional mechanism that support school board receptivity" (p. 383). Stelzer's findings supported the hypotheses listed above. He

concluded that receptivity on the part of school board members acted as a conflict-control device. Stelzer also found that receptivity can be instituted by establishing channels that are either formal, such as committees or time on the agenda at board meetings for public participation, or informal, such as talking with interested citizens either by seeking their input or by listening to their concerns.

These conclusions were confirmed by Adkinson (1982) in a study comparing the effects of electoral conflict on voter turnout and on school board decision-making style. She concluded that conflict did not result in a significantly larger participation of citizens in the electoral process. However, it did result in increased school board receptivity to public input and participation. The board gave community members more opportunity to speak at school board meetings and enlarged the physical space available to the public. Adkinson's findings also supported Stelzer's observation that as a direct consequence of increased receptivity dissent is projected away from the school as an institution and onto the superintendent as the person responsible for the operation of the institution. Two years later, this school district returned to "normal" in that the conflict had dissipated and the superintendent who had been hired from outside the system was replaced by an assistant superintendent from within the system.

Although both Stelzer and Adkinson found that this conflict-control strategy resulted in increased difficulty for the superintendent involved, such results do not seem to be inevitable, particularly if school administrators encourage school boards to make

themselves more accessible and the decision-making process more open before conflict occurs. This is especially true if the superintendent himself/herself is equally accessible and open.

To summarize: Studies of public school governance indicate that school board-superintendent harmony can be achieved through a division of administrative labor and an attempt by all parties to cooperate. On the school board side, cooperation requires the superintendent be allowed to assume certain managerial functions related to his training and experience. On the superintendent side, it is necessary to manage not only school programs and employees, but also, in some sense, the school board itself. Research shows that several strategies for dealing with the board and with the public are available to superintendents. The purpose of this study is to test the validity of these conclusions. And that is the subject of the remaining chapters in this report.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The first two chapters of this paper have presented the theoretical and research bases for this study. This chapter explains the research method used in the study, including the sample, data collection procedures, hypotheses, design, and statistical analysis.

Sample

Kerlinger (1973) stressed the importance of using as large and as representative a sample as possible in research studies to ensure the reliability of the conclusions. He stated that the sample should reflect as closely as possible the population being studied. The close reflection of the population by the sample is important in order to make sure that generalizations from the sample are accurate. For this study, the sample was taken from all of the public elementary school districts in the five county Chicago suburban area, including Cook, Will, Lake, DuPage, and McHenry counties. This large geographic area was used so that the study would include suburban communities representing a wide socioeconomic range. The sample also reflected a range in the size of the school districts. The public school districts chosen were obtained from the directory published by the Illinois State Board of Education entitled 1983-1984 Illinois Public School Districts and Schools (1983).

On the basis of state directory information, school districts in

which all schools were located within one community were identified. Every school within the district had to have a mailing address to the same municipality in order to be included in the initial request letter (see Appendix A). Elementary districts were selected because they were more likely than high school districts to include only one municipality. The superintendents of these selected districts were sent a letter requesting their participation in the study (see Appendix A) and a questionnaire (see Appendix B).

In order to compare the social characteristics of community members, it was necessary to use school districts whose boundaries were coterminous or nearly so with a municipality. This matching was required because the United States Census data, from which the social characteristic information was obtained, were presented by community. However, if school districts were not coternimous with a municipality, it was possible to combine census tracts and obtain an accurate picture of the social characteristics of the members of the school district. The combining of tracts required only simple addition. When it was necessary to use split tracts because of irregular school district boundaries, a percentage of the tract data was computed and then combined with the data from other tracts. This procedure rested on the assumption that population characteristics were evenly distributed over each tract.

Whether a school district was coterminous with a municipality or not, it was felt that the school district constituted a new community unto itself that was not only associated with a town or towns, but also drew its identity from the various people living in the district.

People are members of many groups simultaneously and their group identity--their mutual interests and sense of shared responsibilities--is as definable in terms of their school district as it is in terms of their municipalities.

Design

This study used an ex post facto design to answer four research questions.

1. Was there a difference as measured by electoral conflict in school elections between school districts that were ranked high and those that were ranked low on the basis of the social characteristics of the members of their communities?

2. On which types of issues did boards of education experience internal conflict, as indicated by split votes during the regularly scheduled meetings and were there any differences on the types of split votes between those communities that ranked high and those that ranked low on the social characteristics of the community members?

3. Was the level of political conflict in the district, related to the issues that produced recorded conflict among board members?

4. Did the presence of a caucus system of selecting school board members have an effect on the level of political conflict within the district?

The types of decisions made by the boards of education of each school district were taken from the official school board minutes. The decisions were categorized into four basic areas: (1) finance, (2) personnel, (3) curriculum, and (4) policies. A decision was categorized as finance if it involved payment of bills, salaries, or

special fees. Issues that were listed as personnel included any that dealt with staff members. The category of curriculum included applications for title money and testbook adoptions. Policies was a general category that included all board policies, votes on board organization, and any matters that could not be categorized as finance, personnel, or curriculum. The social characteristics of the community members were found by combining educational level, occupation, and income data secured from the 1980 United States Census.

To determine the types of issues on which the school boards experienced internal conflict, every split vote from 1978 to 1982 was recorded in terms of the specific issue and the number of members voting aye and no. When recording a split vote abstentions were not considered as a split vote.

To produce an index of political conflict for each school district, election results in both school board and referenda elections were recorded. The conflict indicators chosen, participation and dissent in elections, were believed to reflect the community's public expression of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their schools. It was further hypothesized that a low voter turnout represented satisfaction and that votes cast for losing candidates or losing referenda expressed voter dissatisfaction.

The presence or absence of the caucus system procedure for nominating school board candidates was ascertained through the questionnaire filled out by the superintendent of schools in each district. It was hypothesized that the caucus system served as one

type of conflict control mechanism. The degree to which the caucus system had been refined in the individual districts was not examined. Other methods of securing candidates for the board of education were recorded but not considered as a control device.

Those superintendents who responded positively to the letter requesting their participation in the study (see Appendix A) were asked by telephone for permission to examine the minutes of the school board for the years 1978 through 1982. A follow up request for participation was sent approximately three weeks later to those superintendents who did not respond to the initial letter (see Appendix C). There were no differences in the patterns of responses between the initial and the second request for participation letters.

The five year time frame was selected for two reasons: First, five years was a sufficiently long period to observe trends in school board decisions (see Table 3) and in community voter participation and dissent (see Table 5) to be observed. Second, since this study is a partial replication of Minar's study of a five year period from 1958 to 1962, a comparable period of time was used. Minar found no taxpayer's revolt in his study. However the years 1978 to 1982 might show a reflection of the national sentiment against taxes in general.

Data Collection Procedures

The letter to the superintendents introduced the researcher and explained the procedures necessary for participation. The purpose of the letter was to secure the cooperation of the superintendent in examining school board meeting minutes and election results for the years 1978 through 1982 (see Appendix A).

The questionnaire (see Appendix B) consisted of seven questions designed to obtain information about the school district and the municipality that it served, the numbers of school board members elected, referenda held in the district over the five years of the study, the nominating procedures used in the district for school board members, and the length of tenure of the superintendent in his present position. An additional purpose was to obtain the opinion of the superintendent concerning the kinds of issues about which the board of education chose to question administrative decisions.

Questionnaires were sent to the superintendents of the 72 elementary districts that had all schools within the district located in one town. Of the superintendents contacted, 56 percent, or 40, agreed to participate in the research. An additional 20 superintendents chose not to participate, making the total response rate to the questionnaire 83 percent (see Appendix J). The questionnaire responses by county are shown in Table 1. County-by-county data, showing the characteristics of the superintendents and the presence or absence of a caucus system for nominating members to the board of education, are provided in Table 2. The length of tenure of the superintendents in their present position ranged from a high of 30 years to a low of less than one year. All of the superintendents were male. There was only one female superintendent in the original 72 districts.

Data Collected in Each District

Three instruments were used to collect data directly from the minutes of the school board in each district. The voting patterns of

each board (see Appendix D) were recorded by year, month, issue, and frequency. Split votes were noted by specific issue and vote. They were recorded, as they were encountered, in the margin of the voting patterns sheet. The second instrument used recorded school board election data (see Appendix E). The participation totals and the votes for the losing candidates were found in the official district records. Finally, referenda data (see Appendix F), for both tax rate increases or bond issues, were recorded. In most cases, the election data were in the official minutes of the board of education. If all the data were not recorded in the minutes, then it was necessary to open election envelopes and record the judges' tallies. Only two districts out of forty were unable to produce these voting totals.

Data Collected Outside the School District

Two additional sources of information were used to collect community data. The social variables of the communities comprising the school districts were taken from the United States Census Tracts: Chicago, Illinois, Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (1983). They include educational level, occupational level, and income level for each census tract (see Appendix G). The census provided other information about the population, such as racial make-up and poverty statistics. These data were not used for the purposes of this study.

The second source of outside data was the records of eligible voters in each school district for each election between 1978 and 1982. This information was obtained from the records of the individual counties. Copies of these records were obtained from the office of voter registration in Chicago (Cook County), Waukegan (Lake

County), Joliet (Will County), Woodstock (McHenry County), and Wheaton (DuPage County). These eligible voters were recorded on both the election and referenda data sheets (see Appendices E and F).

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: There was a positive relationship between the social characteristics of a community and the ability of that community to control electoral conflict.

Hypothesis 2a: Boards of education in all districts split their votes on all types of issues.

Hypothesis 2b: There was no difference in the types of issues on which school boards split their votes between those communities that ranked high and those that ranked low on the social characteristics of community members.

Hypothesis 3: There was no difference between districts that were able to control electoral conflict and those that were not, based on the voting patterns of their boards of education.

Hypothesis 4: The caucus system of nominating members to the board of education acted as a conflict control device.

Independent Variables

Social Characteristics of Community Members

Three social variables were added together to form the aggregate variable known as Community Social Rank (see Appendix H). The formula for determining this rank is: educational level + income level + occupational level = social rank. The educational level of a community (school district) is the number of persons over 25 years of age with four or more years of college divided by the total population

over 25 years of age. Four or more years of college is the highest educational category recorded in the census. The income level of a community is computed by dividing the number of households with a yearly income over $50,000 by the total number of households. The income level of $50,000 or more is the highest level recorded in the census. The occupational level is the proportion of persons classified as professional/managerial per 1,000 employed persons. Managerial/professional is the highest category listed in the census for occupation. Because the status criteria were used consistently, the social rank score was considered comparable among the school districts. These three variables, educational level, occupational level, and income level, were added together to form the aggregate social rank score for each school district (see Appendix H). In his study, Minar used a similar formula for determining the social rank of communities.

Local Election Results

Aggregate Community Political Behavior was equal to voter participation plus voter dissent in both school board elections and referenda over the five years of the study. Participation indices were equal to the sums of votes cast divided by the number of eligible voters times the number of voting occasions. Election dissent indices were equal to the sums of votes cast for losing candidates divided by the sums of all votes cast in school board elections during the five year period. Referenda dissent indices were equal to the sums of "no" votes divided by the sums of all votes during the five years of the study (see Appendix I). The aggregates measured: (1) the interest of

the community in school elections; and (2) the extent to which consensus failed (and conflict was not averted) before the formal election was reached. Minar developed the formulas for aggregate community political behavior.

There were three sets of data from the local school districts. The first set of data was the school board elections for the years 1978 through 1982. Because of a consolidated election law passed in 1980, which resulted in the cancellation of school board elections in 1982, there were only four elections during the five year period under study (see Appendix E). Four categories of information were recorded: voter participation, the number of votes cast for losing candidates (listed as dissent), the total number of eligible voters (obtained from the county clerk's records), and the number of elections (only one in each year).

The records of community voting in school referenda, on both tax rate increases and bond issues, were recorded in the same manner as school board elections. In the case of referenda, it is possible to conduct two elections per year on either tax rate increases or bond issues. Therefore, theoretically, ten elections were possible. In fact, some districts had no referenda in the five year period. The greatest number of referenda in any one district during the period was four (see Table 7).

Decisions Made by the Board of Education

As the third and final factor under study, specific decisions were taken from the votes of the board of education as recorded in the official minutes of the participating districts. They were

categorized into four major areas: (1) finance, (2) personnel, (3) curriculum, and (4) minor policies. The number of votes in each category was noted and the split votes were identified. These facts were recorded to obtain an accurate picture of the issues on which the board of education made decisions over the five year period from 1978 through 1982.

Dependent Variable

Conflict

The social characteristics of the community members (see Appendix H) and the aggregate community political behavior were computed (see Appendix I). A Kendall-Tau test for correlation was performed to determine if there was an association between community social status and electoral conflicts (see Table 8).

The school districts were grouped into high, medium, and low according to their social rank scores (see Table 6). The high group scores were 400 and above. The middle group scores were 200 to 399 and the low group scores were 0 to 199. The high and low groups were compared on percentage of split votes divided by total votes taken by the board of education on each of the four issues: (1) finance, (2) personnel, (3) curriculum, and (4) policies. Z scores were computed using a two-tailed test with $Z = \pm 1.96$ as the level of significance (see Table 9).

Aggregate community political behavior (see Table 10) was compared to votes taken by the board of education (see Table 17). A Kendall-Tau test for correlation was used with an alpha level of .05. The results are listed in Table 18.

A Kruskal-Willis test was used to determine if the caucus method of nominating members to the board of education had an effect on the aggregate community political behavior of the district. The alpha level of .05 was established. The results are shown in Table 16.

CHAPTER IV

PRESENTATION OF THE DATA

Research Questions

This study was designed to test four major research hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: There was a positive relationship between the social characteristics of a community and the ability of that community to control electoral conflict.

Hypothesis 2a: The boards of education split their votes on all types of issues.

Hypothesis 2b: There was no difference in the types of issues on which school boards split their votes between communities that ranked high and those that ranked low on the social characteristics of community members.

Hypothesis 3: There was no difference between districts that were able to control electoral conflict and those that were not, based on the voting patterns of their boards of education.

Hypothesis 4: The caucus system of nominating members to the board of education acted as a conflict control device.

Each hypotheses was tested separately and the results are presented in the tables located in this chapter.

Profile of the Sample

Forty school districts in the five county suburban Chicago area participated in the study: Will county, two districts; McHenry

county, four districts; and Lake county, six districts; DuPage county, seven districts; and Cook county, 21 districts. All of the superintendents of these districts were male. Their length of tenure in their present job ranged from less than one year to 30 years. Nineteen of the districts employed a caucus for nominating members to the board of education and 21 did not (see Table 2).

Table 1 presents the responses of the superintendents to the initial request for participation in the study by county. A breakdown of the total questionnaire responses is shown in Appendix J.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: There was a positive relationship between the social characteristics of a community and the ability of that community to control electoral conflict.

The social characteristics of a community were found by computing a social rank score (see Appendix H) for each district using data from the 1980 Census (see Appendix G). The results of the computations are shown in Table 11. Next the communities were listed highest social rank to lowest social rank and divided into three groups: high, middle, and low (see Table 6). Electoral conflict was determined by finding the aggregate community political behavior (see Appendix I) for each district for the years 1978 through 1982. The electoral conflict of each district is shown in Table 10. Only 39 school districts were listed because one district had school board members who were appointed and over the five years of the study that district presented no referenda to the voters.

In order to determine if there was a positive relationship

between the social characteristics of a community and the ability of that community to control electoral conflict, a Kendall-Tau test for correlation was used (see Table 8). The data showed a correlation of -0.25526 between social rank and electoral conflict higher than the level of significance at which the hypothesis was to be accepted, .05. School districts that ranked in the high group for social status experienced lower levels of conflict as indicated by electoral dissent. The Kendall-Tau test was used because it is a nonparametric procedure designed to be used with ranked data. The correlation of -0.25526 was significant for a two-tailed test. Therefore, the hypothesis was accepted.

Hypothesis 2a: The boards of education split their votes on all types of issues.

The data collected from each school district confirmed the hypothesis that the boards of education split their votes on all types of issues. Table 4 lists each district and the numbers of split votes by issue for each district.

Hypothesis 2b: There was no difference in the types of issues on which school boards split their votes between those communities that ranked high and those that ranked low on the social characteristics of community members.

The school districts were listed by their social rank score, and the number of split votes that the board of education had taken was listed by category. The four categories were finance, personnel, curriculum, and policies (see Table 12). The number of split votes was recorded by district and was listed in Table 4.

The school districts were divided into three groups based on their social rank score (see Table 6). Scores below 199 were in the low group, scores between 200 and 399 were in the middle group, and scores 400 and above were in the high group (see Table 5).

The number of votes and split votes taken by the 12 districts that scored high in social rank and the 12 that ranked low are listed in Table 17. Table 13 lists the total votes taken by social rank for each district.

Z scores, computed with the formula in Appendix K, are listed in Table 9. A two-tailed test with $z = \pm 1.96$ was used to compute each issue separately. In finance ($z = 0.199$), curriculum ($z = 1.36$), and policies ($z = 1.50$), there were no significant differences between the districts that were ranked high ad those that were ranked low socially. However, in personnel ($z = 2.80$), there was a significant relationship between high social rank and less conflict (as indicated by split votes of the board of education). The total $z = 1.650$ was not significant. Therefore, the hypothesis was accepted. Z scores were used because they produce an accurate assessment of association between social rank and split votes.

Hypothesis 3: There was no difference between districts that were able to control electoral conflict and those that were not, based on the voting patterns of their boards of education.

The aggregate data for both school board elections and referenda are presented by district in Table 5. The data, covering the years 1978 through 1982, were obtained from the school board minutes in each district and from the office of the county clerk of the respective

counties. The data were recorded on sheets identical to Appendices E and F.

For each district, electoral conflict was computed by using the formula described in Appendix I: Local Election Results. Each district was given an ECONF or aggregate community political behavior score (see Table 10).

The districts were reranked according to aggregate community political behavior (ACPB), and the percentage of their split votes by total votes was computed (see Table 15).

The Kendall-Tau test for correlation was used to determine if there was a relationship between the ability to control conflict and voting patterns of the board of education by issue. There were only 37 cases in this analysis because data were missing from two districts and no elections were held in a third district.

An alpha of .05 was selected using a two-tailed test. Finance (α = -0.06399), curriculum (α = -0.03042), and policies (α = 0.16036), were not significant. Again, however, personnel was significant = 0.25345. There was a slight positive correlation between districts that were able to control conflict and votes on personnel issues. The total correlation was 0.10287 and was not significant. Therefore, the hypothesis was accepted.

The Kendall-Tau test was used because of its ability to detect correlations based on ranked data. The results of this test are shown in Table 16.

Hypothesis 4: The caucus system of nominating members to the board of education acted as a conflict control device.

The school districts were categorized as either caucus or non-caucus by using the responses of superintendents on the questionnaires (see Table 7 for responses by individual district or Table 2 for responses by county).

The Kruskal-Wallis test was used to see if the presence of a caucus in a school district produced lower electoral conflict. This nonparametric test for two groups was used because of its ability to detect differences between two groups. The Chi square approximation was 0.21 with one degree of freedom. The hypothesis was rejected with a probability of Chi square = 0.6485 (see Table 14). The presence of a caucus did not appear to affect conflict management (see Table 19). Therefore, the hypothesis was rejected.

Table 1

Questionnaire Responses by County

County	# Sent	# Returned	% Yes
Cook	39	33	85
Will	2	2	100
DuPage	13	9	54
Lake	9	6	67
McHenry	9	4	44

*Six additional questionnaires were returned as no participation, but no indication of school district was given therefore it was not possible to include those responses by county.

Table 2

School Districts Responding Positively to the Questionnaire

County	Positive Responses	Sex M	Sex F	Avg Length of Tenure	Nominating Procedure Caucus	Nominating Procedure Non-Caucus
Cook	21	21	0	7.1 Yrs.	10	11
Dupage	7	7	0	7.4 Yrs.	6	1
Lake	6	6	0	11.8 Yrs.	3	3
McHenry	4	4	0	5.8 Yrs.	0	4
Will	2	2	0	21.5 Yrs.	0	2
Totals	40	40	0	8.5 Yrs.	19	21

Table 3

Issues Upon Which the Boards of Education Voted Between 1978 and 1982: 40 District Totals

Issues	Total No. of Votes Taken	No. of Split Votes	%
Finance	1660	40	.024
Personnel	1294	43	.033
Curriculum	0396	24	.060
Minor Policies	1668	24	.032
Grand Total	5018	162	.032

*For each district in each year two months of votes were recorded. This sampling was considered representative of the entire year.

Year	Months Recorded
1978	Jan and Feb
1979	Mar and Apr
1980	May and Jun
1981	Jul and Sep
1982	Oct and Nov

Table 4

School Board Split Votes

Dist Code	Fin	Pers	Curr	Poli	Total
1	0	1	1	1	3
2	2	0	2	0	4
3	3	3	2	1	9
4	1	0	0	0	1
5	0	1	0	3	4
6	2	0	0	0	2
7	1	3	1	0	5
8	0	0	0	0	0
9	1	2	1	0	4
10	2	0	0	0	2
11	0	4	0	0	4
12	3	1	1	2	7
13	1	1	1	0	3
14	0	0	1	1	2
15	0	1	0	0	1
16	0	0	0	0	0
17	1	3	0	5	9
18	0	0	0	2	2
19	0	0	0	0	0
20	0	2	3	0	5
21	0	2	0	0	2
22	6	6	1	7	20
23	0	0	0	0	0
24	1	0	0	0	1
25	6	1	3	0	10
26	2	0	0	0	2
27	0	0	0	0	0
28	2	0	1	1	4
29	2	2	0	0	4
30	0	1	1	4	6
31	0	1	0	0	1
32	0	0	1	0	1
33	0	2	0	2	4
34	0	0	0	0	0
35	0	0	0	2	2
36	0	0	1	3	4
37	1	0	1	2	4
38	0	1	1	0	2
39	0	0	0	0	0
40	3	5	1	10	19

Table 5

Participation and Dissent by District 1978 thru 1982

Dist Code	School Board Elections Participation:	Dissent	Referenda Elections Participation:	Dissent
1	2016	423	2733	1785
2	10596	11670	0	0
3	2200	517	0	0
4	0	0	0	0
5	1196	589	784	375
6	3227	35	0	0
7	DATA N.A.	396	0	0
8	1727	221	1062	500
9	1988	1317	0	0
10	912	246	0	0
11	1524	1143	0	0
12	3603	212	0	0
13	10951	4933	0	0
14	693	364	5617	353
15	1843	1140	0	0
16	1099	697	0	0
17	1453	711	0	0
18	3069	3396	0	0
19	1439	12	0	0
20	2136	685	0	0
21	3335	2326	10849	8743
22	916	548	0	0
23	967	41	0	0
24	985	316	0	0
25	876	667	883	119
26	DATA N.A.	137	969	558
27	723	252	0	0
28	3607	1421	1804	1264
29	6517	2844	0	0
30	3486	2277	0	0
31	858	791	0	0
32	1927	449	0	0
33	1168	764	0	0
34	451	26	0	0
35	DATA NOT AVAILABLE		1204	805
36	668	409	0	0
37	6140	4748	0	0
38	811	28	0	0
39	2570	787	1670	453
40	1362	578	1120	556

Table 6

Social Rank Score of School Districts

School Code	Social Rank Score	Place in Sample	Group
19	657.639	1	
6	564.531	2	
39	548.406	3	
9	509.954	4	
4	502.868	5	High
38	491.031	6	
12	466.821	7	
1	462.714	8	
32	448.604	9	
30	437.037	10	
20	431.215	11	
2	407.265	12	
34	399.700	13	
37	398.946	14	
36	374.429	15	
29	342.154	16	
10	337.710	17	
33	325.593	18	
3	315.330	19	
14	309.198	20	Middle
18	301.507	21	
17	280.766	22	
24	240.767	23	
7	240.538	24	
21	239.603	25	
25	231.122	26	
26	207.011	27	
27	205.152	28	
35	194.508	29	
15	188.966	30	
40	187.019	31	
22	185.702	32	
31	184.499	33	
23	180.710	34	Low
8	162.898	35	
5	157.627	36	
13	144.498	37	
16	123.126	38	
11	89.326	39	
28	70.385	40	

Table 7

Profile of Participating Districts

Dist Code	Quantity of Referenda	Caucus	No. of Schools	Supt. Tenure
1	1	Yes	3	7
2	0	Yes	10	2
3	0	No	4	12
4	0	Yes	5	12
5	1	Yes	1	4
6	0	Yes	4	7
7	0	No	1	10
8	1	No	3	8
9	0	Yes	3	5
10	0	No	4	4
11	0	No	3	5
12	0	Yes	5	.5
13	0	No	10	2
14	3	No	3	4
15	0	No	2	2
16	0	No	2	18
17	0	Yes	3	7
18	0	Yes	8	5
19	0	Yes	1	7
20	0	Yes	8	15
21	2	Yes	7	5
22	0	No	2	6
23	0	No	2	13
24	0	No	3	5
25	1	No	4	8
26	3	No	1	8
27	0	No	1	2
28	1	No	3	25
29	0	No	5	18
30	0	Yes	5	10
31	0	Yes	1	4
32	0	Yes	7	30
33	0	No	2	5
34	0	No	3	10
35	4	No	1	3
36	0	Yes	11	16
37	0	Yes	12	5
38	0	Yes	2	.5
39	1	Yes	2	16
40	2	No	2	3

Table 8

Kendall-Tau Correlation Coefficients

Prob > :R: Under HO:RHO=0 / Number of Observations		
	SOC	ECONF
SOC	1.00000	-0.25526
	0.0000	0.0262
	39	37
ECONF	-0.25526	1.00000
	0.0262	0.0000
	37	37

Table 9

Z Scores

Issue	Number of Votes	Number of Splits	Z Score
Finance	905	19	Z = 0.199
Personnel	840	27	Z = 2.800
Curriculum	245	15	Z = 1.360
Policies	1055	30	Z = 1.500
Totals	3045	91	Z = 1.650
*Two-Tailed Test			Z = $\pm$ 1.960

Table 10

SOC and ECONF by Caucus Status

OBS	AGREF	AGSB	ECONF	CAUC
1	0.57983	0.26390	0.84372	1
2	0.00000	0.44404	0.44404	0
3	0.00000	0.28544	0.28544	0
4	0.39395	0.46014	0.85409	1
5	0.00000	0.35214	0.35214	1
6	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0
7	0.23656	0.31557	0.55213	0
8	0.00000	0.35735	0.35735	1
9	0.00000	0.17907	0.17907	0
10	0.00000	0.39132	0.39132	0
11	0.00000	0.19346	0.19346	1
12	0.00000	0.77180	0.77180	0
13	0.74804	0.08441	0.83245	0
14	0.00000	0.47349	0.47349	0
15	0.00000	0.20859	0.20859	0
16	0.00000	0.44305	0.44305	1
17	0.00000	0.21165	0.21165	1
18	0.00000	0.35484	0.35484	1
19	0.00000	0.14858	0.14858	1
20	1.38368	0.17983	1.56351	1
21	0.00000	0.42154	0.42154	0
22	0.00000	0.49912	0.49912	0
23	0.00000	0.18989	0.18989	0
24	0.26487	0.02759	0.29246	1
25	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0
26	0.00000	0.57070	0.57070	0
27	0.43425	0.56790	1.00216	0
28	0.00000	0.47633	0.47633	0
29	0.00000	0.33262	0.33262	1
30	0.00000	0.73751	0.73751	1
31	0.00000	0.19433	0.19433	1
32	0.00000	0.97682	0.97682	0
33	0.00000	0.07829	0.07829	0
34	0.59463	0.64234	1.23696	0
35	0.00000	0.31641	0.31641	1
36	0.00000	0.26623	0.26623	1
37	0.00000	0.21031	0.21031	1
38	0.27450	0.35984	0.63435	1
39	1.08372	1.16086	2.24458	0

AGREF = Aggregate Referenda Voting
AGSB = Aggregate School Board Voting
ECONF = Electoral Conflict
CAUC - Caucus (1 = caucus; 0 = no caucus)
ECONF = Aggregate Community Political Behavior

Table 11

Social Rank Scores

BS	COLL	P25	MP	EMP	IC	HH	SOC
1	3401	7464	2755	5963	979	4029	462.714
2	13867	35226	11597	28508	1656	22480	407.265
3	2660	10785	2695	8554	201	7651	315.330
4	4679	9038	3563	7099	2179	4790	502.868
5	387	3739	644	4089	56	2014	157.627
6	5247	8414	3185	5653	2076	4238	564.531
7	540	5168	905	3765	163	2649	240.538
8	218	3274	506	3108	59	2273	162.898
9	1719	2313	1309	2572	479	1788	509.954
10	209	856	199	590	80	450	337.710
11	32	960	63	706	33	570	89.326
12	14006	31568	10581	22702	4648	15747	466.821
13	696	10433	1046	7244	232	6520	144.498
14	13	756	23	327	7	221	70.385
15	696	5391	750	3973	178	2846	188.966
16	554	8142	795	6462	162	5146	123.126
17	681	3267	805	2871	292	1741	280.766
18	3681	14538	4018	13341	663	8586	301.507
19	1231	1589	731	1114	559	834	657.639
20	4157	9372	3050	7085	1486	5219	431.215
21	3965	19358	3475	14519	546	9715	239.603
22	146	1477	208	1121	50	911	185.702
23	61	513	76	421	20	292	180.710
24	370	2013	412	1714	212	1012	240.767
25	1248	7245	1348	5839	339	3850	231.122
26	66	547	91	440	23	317	207.011
27	299	1894	416	2030	99	1449	205.152
28	182	712	185	599	37	394	309.198
29	3905	13105	2799	8196	1268	3644	342.154
30	4666	10280	3634	8327	1019	5955	437.037
31	195	1668	292	1584	48	1249	184.499
32	3590	7115	2699	6025	492	3710	148.604
33	168	726	188	578	42	411	325.593
34	1744	4511	1644	4118	248	2750	399.700
35	78	591	95	489	34	334	194.508
36	6055	19340	5923	15838	1460	10318	374.429
37	7740	22262	7013	17599	1379	12548	398.946
38	982	1951	752	1534	315	1028	491.031
39	3259	5320	2217	4051	1437	2757	548.406
40	206	1602	241	1290	62	903	187.019

Table 12

Number of Split Votes Taken by School Board by Social Rank

OBS	SOC	FS	PERS	CURRS	POLS	TOTALS
1	657.639	0	0	0	0	0
2	564.531	2	0	0	0	2
3	548.406	0	0	0	0	0
4	509.954	1	2	1	0	4
5	502.874	1	0	0	0	1
6	491.031	0	1	1	0	2
7	466.821	3	1	1	2	7
8	462.714	0	1	1	1	3
9	448.604	0	0	1	0	1
10	437.037	0	1	1	4	6
11	431.215	0	2	3	0	5
12	407.265	2	0	2	0	4
13	399.700	0	0	0	0	0
14	398.946	1	0	1	2	4
15	374.429	0	0	1	3	4
16	342.154	2	2	0	0	4
17	337.710	2	0	0	0	2
18	325.593	0	2	0	2	4
19	315.330	3	3	2	1	9
20	309.198	2	0	1	10	13
21	301.507	0	0	0	2	2
22	280.766	1	3	0	5	9
23	240.767	1	0	0	0	1
24	240.538	1	3	1	0	5
25	239.603	0	2	0	0	2
26	231.122	6	1	3	0	10
27	207.011	2	0	0	0	2
28	205.152	0	0	0	0	0
29	194.508	0	0	0	2	2
30	188.966	0	1	0	0	1
31	187.019	3	5	1	10	19
32	185.702	6	6	1	7	20
33	184.499	0	1	0	0	1
34	180.710	0	0	0	0	0
35	162.898	0	0	0	0	0
36	157.627	0	1	0	3	4
37	144.498	1	1	1	0	3
38	123.126	0	0	0	0	0
39	89.326	0	4	0	0	4
40	70.385	0	0	1	1	2

Table 13

Votes Taken in School Board Meetings 1978-1982

OBS	SOC	FT	PERT	CURRT	POLT	TOTAL
1	657.639	33	24	6	28	91
2	564.531	41	43	5	25	114
3	548.406	42	36	11	41	130
4	509.954	31	29	8	30	98
5	502.874	46	44	6	25	121
6	491.031	34	37	6	36	113
7	466.821	43	51	8	47	149
8	462.714	38	50	19	31	138
9	448.604	17	31	6	32	86
10	437.037	28	35	23	43	129
11	431.215	38	48	18	34	138
12	407.265	41	56	14	30	141
13	399.700	54	23	5	46	128
14	398.946	39	30	9	43	121
15	374.429	57	14	17	40	128
16	342.154	23	37	10	35	105
17	337.710	39	37	4	34	114
18	325.593	53	25	4	27	109
19	315.330	56	48	26	43	173
20	309.198	26	21	1	35	83
21	301.507	54	22	33	46	155
22	280.766	31	51	14	40	136
23	240.767	67	19	4	47	137
24	240.538	86	29	3	27	145
25	239.603	46	26	5	38	115
26	231.122	64	36	5	45	150
27	207.011	34	12	3	36	85
28	205.152	26	24	8	31	89
29	194.508	50	17	5	75	147
30	188.966	35	27	4	47	113
31	187.019	43	35	11	54	143
32	185.702	39	29	6	55	129
33	184.499	35	14	5	38	92
34	180.710	56	41	34	40	171
35	162.898	30	22	2	40	94
36	157.627	27	31	8	44	110
37	144.498	53	31	14	105	203
38	123.126	33	44	6	78	161
39	89.326	33	35	10	46	124
40	70.385	39	30	10	31	110

Table 14

Analysis for Variable ACPB Classified by Variable Caucus

Analysis of Variance

Level	N	Mean	Among MS	Within MS
			0.0215743	0.0849123
1	18	0.53		
0	19	0.58	F Value	Prob > F
			0.25	0.6174

Kruskal-Wallis Test (Chi-Square Approximation)

CHISQ = 0.21 DF = 1 PROB > CHISQ = 0.6485

Median Scores (Number Points Above Median)

Level	N	Sum of Scores	Expected Under Ho	Std Dev Under Ho	Mean Score
1	18	7.00	8.76	1.54	0.39
0	19	11.00	9.24	1.54	0.58

Median 2-Sample Test (Normal Approximation)

S = 7.00 Z = -1.1399 Prob > :Z: = 0.2543

Median 1-Way Analysis (Chi-Square Approximation)

CHISQ = 1.300 DF = 1 PROB > CHISQ = 0.2541

ACPB = Aggregate Community Political Behavior

Table 15

School Board Voting Patterns

OBS	FS	FT	PERS	PERT	CURRS	CURRT	POLS	POLT	TOTALS	TOTALT	ACPB
1	0.048780	41	0.000000	56	0.14286	14	0.000000	30	0.028369	141	1.18840
2	0.000000	54	0.000000	22	0.00000	33	0.000000	46	0.000000	155	1.14800
3	0.000000	35	0.071429	14	0.00000	5	0.000000	38	0.010870	92	1.07175
4	0.000000	53	0.080000	25	0.00000	4	0.074074	27	0.036697	109	0.86399
5	0.000000	46	0.076923	26	0.00000	5	0.000000	38	0.017391	115	0.86138
6	0.000000	33	0.114286	35	0.00000	10	0.000000	46	0.032253	124	0.83238
7	0.025641	39	0.000000	30	0.11111	9	0.046512	43	0.033058	121	0.82907
8	0.032258	31	0.068966	29	0.12500	8	0.000000	30	0.040816	98	0.75396
9	0.000000	28	0.028571	35	0.04348	23	0.093023	43	0.046512	129	0.72467
10	0.000000	35	0.037037	27	0.00000	4	0.000000	47	0.008850	113	0.72108
11	0.153846	39	0.206897	29	0.16667	6	0.127273	55	0.155039	129	0.68993
12	0.000000	57	0.000000	14	0.05882	17	0.075000	40	0.031250	128	0.68117
13	0.000000	33	0.000000	44	0.00000	6	0.000000	78	0.000000	161	0.67922
14	0.000000	50	0.000000	17	0.00000	5	0.026667	75	0.013603	147	0.66266
15	0.000000	39	0.000000	30	0.10000	10	0.032258	31	0.018182	110	0.66030
16	0.018868	53	0.032258	31	0.07143	14	0.000000	105	0.014773	203	0.62388
17	0.069767	43	0.142857	35	0.09091	11	0.185185	54	0.132867	143	0.61691
18	0.076923	26	0.000000	21	1.00000	1	0.285714	35	0.156627	83	0.59255
19	0.032258	31	0.058824	51	0.00000	14	0.125000	40	0.066176	136	0.58802
20	0.000000	27	0.032258	31	0.00000	8	0.068182	44	0.036364	110	0.57132
21	0.086957	23	0.054054	37	0.00000	10	0.000000	35	0.038095	105	0.54377
22	0.000000	38	0.020000	50	0.05263	19	0.032258	31	0.021739	138	0.53993
23	0.000000	56	0.000000	41	0.00000	34	0.000000	40	0.000000	171	0.53681
24	0.000000	26	0.000000	24	0.00000	8	0.000000	31	0.000000	89	0.47979
25	0.093750	64	0.027778	36	0.60000	5	0.000000	45	0.066667	150	0.45742

Table 15 (continued)

OBS	FS	FT	PERS	PERT	CURRS	CURRT	POLS	POLT	TOTALS	TOTALT	ACPB
26	0.014925	67	0.000000	19	0.00000	4	0.000000	47	0.007299	137	0.36476
27	0.000000	42	0.000000	36	0.00000	11	0.000000	41	0.000000	130	0.36118
28	0.000000	38	0.041667	48	0.16667	18	0.000000	34	0.036232	138	0.35554
29	0.000000	30	0.000000	22	0.00000	2	0.000000	40	0.000000	94	0.31543
30	0.051282	39	0.000000	37	0.00000	4	0.000000	34	0.017544	114	0.31168
31	0.053571	56	0.062500	48	0.07692	26	0.023256	43	0.052023	173	0.30240
32	0.000000	17	0.000000	31	0.16667	6	0.000000	32	0.011628	86	0.27891
33	0.069767	43	0.019608	51	0.12500	8	0.042553	47	0.046980	149	0.10650
34	0.048780	41	0.000000	43	0.00000	5	0.000000	25	0.017544	114	0.09864
35	0.000000	33	0.000000	24	0.00000	6	0.000000	28	0.000000	91	0.09687
36	0.000000	34	0.027027	37	0.16667	6	0.000000	36	0.017699	113	0.08665
37	0.000000	54	0.000000	23	0.00000	5	0.000000	46	0.000000	128	0.07694

Table 16

Kendall-Tau B Correlation Coefficients

Variable	N	Mean	Std Dev	Median	Minimum	Maximum
ACPB	37	0.55875297	0.28836288	0.58801997	0.07694000	1.8840000
FS	37	0.2371285	0.03668273	0	0	0.1538461
PERS	37	0.03251184	0.04652403	0.01960784	0	0.2068965
CURRS	37	0.08823862	0.18888821	0	0	1.0000000
POLS	37	0.03343121	0.06194037	0	0	0.2857142
TOTALS	37	0.03278806	0.03950482	0.01818182	0	0.1566265

PROB > :R: UNDER HO:RHO=0 / N = 37

FS	-0.06339
	0.6156
PERS	0.25345
	0.0391
CURRS	-0.03042
	0.8079
POLS	0.16036
	0.2060
TOTALS	0.10287
	0.3782

Table 17

Total Votes and Split Votes

	HL=0	
FS	12	10.00000000
FT	12	473.00000000
PERS	12	19.00000000
PERT	12	356.00000000
CURRS	12	4.00000000
CURRT	12	115.00000000
POLS	12	23.00000000
POLT	12	653.00000000
TOTALS	12	56.00000000
TOTALT	12	1597.00000000
PERCENTAGE TOTAL		3.5 percent
	HL=1	
FS	16	21.00000000
FT	16	755.00000000
PERS	16	16.00000000
PERT	16	454.00000000
CURRS	16	9.00000000
CURRT	16	151.00000000
POLS	16	25.00000000
POLT	16	613.00000000
TOTALS	16	71.00000000
TOTALT	16	1973.00000000
PERCENTAGE TOTAL		3.6 percent
	HL=2	
FS	12	9.00000000
FT	12	432.00000000
PERS	12	8.00000000
PERT	12	484.00000000
CURRS	12	11.00000000
CURRT	12	130.00000000
POLS	12	7.00000000
POLT	12	402.00000000
TOTALS	12	35.00000000
TOTALT	12	1448.00000000
PERCENTAGE TOTAL		2.4 percent

HL=2 = High Social Rank
HL=1 = Middle Social Rank
HL=0 = Low Social Rank

Table 18

Percentage of Split Votes by Issue

Dist Code	FIN	PERS	CURR	POLI	Totals
1	0	2	5.8	3.2	2.2
2	4.8	0	14.2	0	2.8
3	5.3	6.2	7.6	2.3	5.2
4	2.1	0	0	0	0
5	0	3.2	0	6.8	3.6
6	4.8	0	0	0	1.7
7	1.1	10.3	33.3	0	3.4
8	0	0	0	0	0
9	3.2	6.8	12.5	0	4
10	5.1	0	0	0	1.7
11	0	11.4	0	0	3.2
12	6.9	1.9	12.5	4.2	4.6
13	1.8	3.2	7.1	0	1.4
14	0	0	10	3.2	1.8
15	0	3.7	0	0	.8
16	0	0	0	0	0
17	3.2	5.8	0	12.5	6.6
18	0	0	0	4.3	1.2
19	0	0	0	0	0
20	0	4.1	16.6	0	3.6
21	0	7.6	0	0	1.9
22	15.3	20.6	16.6	12.7	15.5
23	0	0	0	0	0
24	1.4	0	0	0	.7
25	9.3	2.8	60	0	6.7
26	5.8	0	0	0	2.3
27	0	0	0	0	0
28	7.6	0	100	2.8	4.8
29	8.6	5.4	0	0	3.8
30	0	2.8	4.3	9.3	4.6
31	0	7.1	0	0	1
32	0	0	16.6	0	1.1
33	0	8	0	7.4	3.6
34	0	0	0	0	0
35	0	0	0	2.6	1.3
36	0	0	14.2	7.5	3.3
37	2.7	0	11.1	4.6	3.3
38	0	2.7	16.6	0	1.7
39	0	0	0	0	0
40	6.9	14.2	9	18.5	13.2

Table 19

Dissent by Social Rank and Caucus Procedure

	Low Social Rank		High Social Rank		
	Low Dissent	High Dissent	Low Dissent	High Dissent	Total
Caucus (usually no opposition)	0	1	7	4	12
Caucus (usually opposition)	0	1	1	0	2
No Caucus	7	3	0	0	10
Totals	7	5	8	4	24
Total	12		12		24

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This study was designed primarily to provide information about the relationship among the social characteristics of community members, political conflict within the community on educational issues, and decisions made by the board of education. The conclusions were based on the results of the data analysis, and the implications were derived from the conclusions.

Conclusions

Hypothesis 1: There was a positive relationship between the social characteristics of a community and the ability of that community to control electoral conflict.

The nonparametric Kendall-Tau test showed a correlation of -0.25526 between social characteristics and the ability to control electoral conflict. The hypothesis was accepted at the .05 level.

The analysis of the data relating the social characteristics of the members of the community and the ability of that community to control electral conflict on school issues supported the expected conclusion that the group of communities that ranked high on socioeconomic variables had lower levels of electoral conflicts than those that ranked low. There was negative correlation of -0.25526 between social rank and conflict.

In the current study, social status included three measures:

occupational level, income level, and educational level. The occupational level was based on the proportion of persons in a community who had completed four or more years of college compared to the total adult population of that community. Income level was computed by dividing the number of households with an income of $50,000 or more by the total number of households. The final measure of social status, occupational level, was based on a comparison of persons in managerial/professional occupations to the total number of employed persons. The findings of this study agree with Minar's (1966) earlier results. According to Minar, high-status communities are more successful at conflict control because their members possess conflict-management skills. Members of these communities were thought to be more able to examine issues rationally, to compromise for the common good, and to have a willingness to devote time to public service.

Minar also suggested that high-status communities are better able to control conflict because their members have similar aspirations to one another and worked better together than those in the low social ranked group. Also, these communities seem to be more comfortable with a division of responsibility between the board of education and the superintendent. Because of their own employment experiences, members of the high-social-rank communities expect technical management ability on the part of the superintendent and grant him more discretionary authority.

Another factor that might contribute to a higher level of conflict in the districts with a lower socioeconomic rank is the lack

of opportunity for members of the community to acquire information about school-related matters. When community members must, out of economic necessity, devote their time to making a living, they are likely to have little discretionary time to keep abreast of school issues. Conflict often arises when citizens are misinformed or partially informed.

Another social factor that may be at work in the low-status communities is social conditioning. Persons raised by parents who did not experience success in school and did not place a high value on education in general might be less inclined to inform themselves on school issues when they became parents of school-age children. They might be less socially conditioned than members of high-status groups to take an active part in school affairs.

Hypothesis 2a: The boards of education split their votes on all types of issues.

The range of split votes by the members of the boards of education was small. The total split votes over the five years of the study ranged from zero to a high of 20. The data arranged in Table 4 confirms the hypothesis that split votes occur on all types of issues.

Hypothesis 2b: There was no difference in the types of issues on which school boards split their votes between those communities that ranked high and those that ranked low on the social characteristics of community members.

Using Z scores to compare the association between social rank and total split votes, a $z = 1.650$ was not significant. Therefore, the hypothesis was accepted.

In both the high and low social rank communities, boards of education split their votes on each of the issues. In other words, there was no consistent pattern in the distribution of split votes in terms of issues. Regardless of community social status, each board acted on issues considering their individual merit. A comparison of the communities ranked high socioeconomically to those ranked low yielded a total z score of 1.650. A further breakdown of the total split votes by types of issue showed only one potentially significant statistic. On the issue of personnel, there were more split votes in high social rank communities than in low-ranking communities. However, the actual significance of this relationship is small because there were so few split votes (91 out of 3,045) that any conclusions based on these figures would be difficult to determine and defend. One possible explanation for the low level of split votes and the absence of a voting pattern, suggested in interviews with several of the superintendents, is that disagreemets and arguments among board members often take place in committee meetings, before full board meetings are convened. By the time the board is ready to take a formal vote, disagreements have been resolved and compromises have been reached. This process is in the best interests of the district to the extent that presenting a united front provides stability and instills public confidence in the capabilities of the board to manage the schools.

Another reason for the strong tendency of boards of education to agree formally can be found in the way boards typically accomplish their work. In the case of the school boards in this study, members

met monthly or bimonthly to discharge their legal duty to direct the management of the schools. Meeting regularly and frequently, the members of the board had to develop mutual trust, respect, and an ability to work together and with the superintendent. Working together toward the common goal of providing the children of their community with the best possible educational services requires give and take on the part of board members. They must weigh their personal feelings, prejudices, and prerogatives against the greater good of the system. In short, board members need to work well together.

Thus even though they may disagree and argue, attempt to persuade and dissuade each other, eventually they must bite the bullet and vote. It is at this time that they demonstrate their ability to provide leadership by putting forward a united front. Indirectly, they say to the community that they have gathered information, looked at the issue from every angle, proposed a myriad of solutions, and chosen the course of action that they believe is in the best interests of the greatest numbers of children in the school district. That is, they have done their best to be rational decision makers. They will try this plan, evaluate it, and begin again. The core of the issue is not in the numbers of split votes, but in the efforts of the members of the board before the vote is taken and in their desire to appear unified.

Again, unlike community members, school board members engage in a comparatively low level of conflict, regardless of the social status of the community. The results in Table 18 show that the percentage of split votes was over 35 in only one instance. And in that case, the

number of total votes (five) was too small to yield a significant statistic.

Hypothesis 3: There was no difference between districts that were able to control electoral conflict and those that were not, based on the voting patterns of their boards of education.

Using a Kendall-Tau test for correlation there was no significant correlation between voting patterns and electoral conflict. Therefore, the hypothesis was accepted.

There was no significant relationship between the control of electoral conflict (ECONF, also identified in this study as ACPB, or aggregate community political behavior) and board voting patterns as measured by the number of split votes as a percentage of total votes. On further analysis of the data by issue, split votes on personnel issues were slightly correlated with electoral conflict. Here again, however, as in the case of the relationship between social rank and split votes, the percentages were so small that accurate conclusions could not be based on them. Thus, the relationship between electoral conflict and the final patterns of the boards of education was not really significant. One possible reason for this conclusion is that even though communities differ the functions of school boards are so similar and they work in such similar ways that the community conflict factor has no effect. The data gathered from the individual districts strongly support this hypothesis. Examination of the school board minutes of 40 districts showed that their patterns of voting were so similar that one could not possibly tell them apart. As Table 17 indicates, both the high and low social rank districts (and therefore

the low and high conflict districts) had low levels of split votes. The high-status group formally disagreed on 2.4% of their votes, while the low group disagreed on 3.5%. In conclusion, the school boards in this study of suburban, small-to-medium-sized districts were more alike than they were different, at least in terms of their voting habits.

Hypothesis 4: The caucus system of nominating members to the board of education acted as a conflict control device.

The final purpose of this study was to determine whether the caucus system of nominating members to the school board acts as a conflict-control mechanism. The Kruskall-Wallis test did not indicate a significant relationship between conflict control and the use of a caucus system. Therefore, the hypothesis was rejected.

Although Minar (1966) found that the caucus did control conflict in the districts that he investigated, this study found no significant relationship between the caucus/non-caucus variable and the electoral conflict variable. The presence or absence of a caucus did not alter the degree of electoral conflict in the districts examined. However the social rank of a school district is a significant indicator of caucus use because eleven of the twelve high-social-rank communities used a caucus. In the low-social-rank communities none of the school districts used a caucus system for nominating members to the school board (see Table 19).

This conclusion has two possible explanations. The first involves the degree of sophistication of the individual caucus

systems. Although limited data were collected for this study on the individual caucus systems, the caucuses did vary among the districts. Responses to the questionnaire (see Appendix B) by the superintendents divided caucus districts further into those in which the caucus candidates usually or always ran unopposed and those in which the caucus candidates usually or always had opposition. In districts in which the slate ran unopposed, there was apparently greater consensus and perhaps greater unity of philosophy among community members. In contrast, in districts in which caucus nominees were opposed community members evidently had differing opinions and therefore less consensus (see Table 19).

On the other hand, some school districts that had no caucus had other unofficial, informal methods of candidate selection that may have been as successful or more successful than caucuses in controlling conflict. One superintendent reported that the present school board served as a major selector of potential board members. Current members recruited their friends or other community members who they felt would make good board members. Superintendents questioned about their role in board member selection denied participating in even an informal process. This position of noninvolvement in the selection process by the superintendent appears to be prudent because it would weaken the superintendent's position if he/she were to support a losing candidate.

Implications

This study has implications for three groups. First, universities with programs for training prospective school

administrators can integrate some of the findings of this study into their curricula. Administrators who are familiar with the dynamics of interpersonal relations, especially among school board members, will be better able to deal with their boards and work more cooperatively with them. Administrators who understand the influence of the demographics of a community on the relationship between its superintendent and the members of its board of education will be encouraged to ascertain the socioeconomic status of their communities in order to be able to anticipate the level of conflict that might arise in these communities. Furthermore, based on the conclusions in this study, if a superintendent does not wish or is not able to deal with community conflict, he could seek a position in a district with a high social rank. If, on the other hand, the superintendent is skilled in confict management, he/she might be in a position to choose from a wider range of school districts in which to work.

Another important implication for persons involved in the training of school administrators concerns the way in which board members disagree as indicated by their split votes. From this study it is evident that board members will disagree at least part of the time. If a prospective administrator were aware that this disagreement was the norm, then his/her expectation would be one of acceptance rather than one of concern. This realization would also act as a signal to the administrator that if the level of disagreement between board members became intense, there would be some type of strong force at work that probably would require careful attention.

Second, for those responsible for the administration of schools,

this study provides information about some of the factors that are under the control of the superintendent and about some that are not. The superintendent can play an informal, unofficial role in candidate nomination. He/she can encourage or discourage the formation of a caucus in his/her school district. And he/she can influence the votes of the school board by carefully selecting and ordering items on the agenda. On the other hand, the superintendent cannot influence the socioeconomic characteristics of the community members. He can be aware of those characteristics, however, and he can take them into consideration in planning the extent to which and the method by which he provides information and guidance for the school board and the community in general. In his conclusions, Minar (1966, p. 835) linked low electoral conflict districts with an ability to manage conflict. He believed that the continued professionalization of American society would lead to a greater ability of communities to control conflict. The fact remains, however, that according to the data generated by this 1984 study, school districts still reflect different resources in conflict-management skills. This may be due to the fact that there was a variety of communities included in the study or perhaps to the fact that some communities were diverse internally and were trying to accomodate a wider spectrum of members.

Practicing school administrators can use the information generated by this study when dealing directly with their boards of education. It is apparent that members of school boards attempt to work cooperatively. This fact is a great asset to the administrator because he/she can depend for the most part on the board of education

to agree on most issues. The willingness of board members to agree offers the opportunity to concentrate on solving problems in a productive and meaningful way. An attitude of cooperation can go a long way in promoting realistic solutions to difficult problems.

Third, for school board members or prospective members this study provides an insight into the way in which boards tend to agree in public. Most boards have established a cooperative relationship with their superintendents that has produced effective school systems. They have learned to divide responsibility between themselves and school administrators. Boards of education did split their votes on all types of issues even though these splits were infrequent. This fact might be explained by honest differences of opinions between board members. Since there was no difference in the types of issues on which the boards split their votes, split votes occasionally would be expected in the normal functioning of a board of education. The task of running the schools would seem to be facilitated by this spirit of cooperation and board members could have confidence in one another and themselves as a group to work for the common good of the children in the school district.

The board would also appear to have enough confidence in their administrators to grant them latitude in decision-making. Confidence in the superintendent would be essential and seem to be indicated by the actions of the majority of the school boards included in this study. Taking into consideration the length of tenure of the superintendents of the districts (see Table 2), the board of education could expect a stable relationship with its administration.

Recommendations

Four questions were answered in this study and four recommendations will be presented. First, since there was a positive relationship between social characteristics of community members and control of electoral conflict it would be important to be aware of the demographics of a community. In the higher socioeconomic districts little or no outward community electoral conflict would be expected. However, in the lower socioeconomic districts more conflict would be the norm. Both board members and administrators would use this information when planning their strategies for presenting issues to the community. It might be helpful to provide what might seem to be an overabundance of information to the voters in the lower socioeconomic districts. The voters might then be in a better position to make decisions based on the facts available. Conflict in this type of district should be expected and strategies developed to deal with it constructively.

Second, since all boards of education split their votes over some issues one would consider the split vote not as a negative indication but as a matter of course in any type of district. The main point being that it is not necessary to have consensus on each and every issue that a board votes upon. Because people are different and have different perspectives there will naturally be some differences of opinion and these differences should be considered as a normal occurance.

Third, since there were no differences in the voting patterns of the boards of education between those districts who were able to

control electoral conflict and those who were not it may be assumed that the presence or absence of conflict does not carry over to actions taken during normal board meetings. It would appear to be a great advantage to the administration and board and ultimately to the children of a school district that business go on as usual even after a contested election or opposition to a referenda. Even though dealing with conflict can be difficult and time consuming, board members, administration, and public can all have confidence that no matter the outcome, the system is able to continue to perform its vital function of governing the schools. It is recommended therefore that persons in a district that is experiencing conflict can expect that in the end the conflict will be resolved and that their institutions, the schools, will survive and thrive.

Finally, the caucus system for nominating members to the school board was not related to the control of conflict in the districts studied. This finding would prompt two recommendations. First, a caucus may or may not be necessary in a specific district depending on the history of the district and the level of involvement of the community. Second, perhaps other methods of selecting candidates for school board membership should be encouraged.

Recommendations for Further Study

This study has prompted four recommendations for further study based on the data that were examined.

1. Since this present study included only small to medium sized districts, it would prove useful to examine what effect, if any, the size of the district has on the relationship among community social

characteristics, electoral conflict, and board of education decisions. A future study could include large city districts.

2. Because this current study was conducted in one geographic location and included suburban school districts, different results might be obtained in other areas of the United States. Therefore, it is recommended that future studies include either more rural districts or other sections of the United States.

3. The internal composition of a school district might have an influence on the actions of community members or on the board of education. A future study might examine a district or several districts to find out if a variety of socioeconomic groups make up a community or if the community is primarily composed of one social group. Then a future study might focus on only those districts who were internally alike or conversely it might focus on only those districts who were internally different.

4. Finally, another aspect that could be explored in future studies is that of the internal workings of the board of education. It would prove useful for future researchers to focus on the relationships among the members of one board of education in order to determine just what factors influence their ability to work together.

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APPENDIX A

7855 Greenfield
River Forest, Illinois 60305
January 18, 1984

----------, Superintendent
School District Name and Number
School District Street Number and Name
Town, Illinois Zip Code

Dear ----------:

This letter is a request for your participation in my doctoral research study.

I am a graduate student at Loyola University of Chicago working on my dissertation in educational administration and supervision. In order to analyze the decision making functions of boards of education, I am seeking information from superintendents in the five county suburban Chicago area. Included with this letter is a brief questionnaire.

If you are willing to participate in this research, please

(1) Complete the questionnaire
(2) Return it to me (postage paid envelope included) before January 27, 1984
(3) Be willing to allow me to inspect your election results for the years 1978 to 1982
(4) Be willing to allow me to examine the voting records of your board between 1978 and 1982.

All information will be strictly confidential.

Thank you in advance for your support and participation.

Gail Duke
Ph.D. Candidate
School of Education
Loyola University

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE

NO. 1
Does your school district have the same physical boundaries as a municipality? YES NO

If yes, which town?.....

If no, list the towns and the approximate proportions of each.....

NO. 2
During the years 1978 to 1982 how many school board elections were held?.....

	Number of people elected
1978	.....
1979	.....
1980	.....
1981	.....
1982	.....

NO. 3
During the years 1978 to 1982 did the school district present referenda to the community? YES NO

If yes, how many?.....
If yes, what type?.....

	referenda	pass	fail	bond issue	pass	fail
1978	.....	....	....	.....	....	....
1979	.....	....	....	.....	....	....
1980	.....	....	....	.....	....	....
1981	.....	....	....	.....	....	....
1982	.....	....	....	.....	....	....

If no, please continue questions.

NO. 4
How are the candidates nominated for the board of education in your district?
a. caucus and usually or always unopposed by independents
b. caucus and usually or always opposed by independents
c. no caucus in operation
d. other (please explain)

NO. 5
On what kinds of issues is the board most likely to question administrative decisions and actions?

		no questions	board wants input
a.	finance	.....	
b.	personnel, hiring	.....	
c.	minor policies	.....	
d.	curriculum	.....	
e.	nothing	.....	
f.	other (please be specific)	.....	

NO. 6
How long have you been superintendent of this school district?.....

NO. 7
Signature of the superintendent.....
Name and number of school district
.....

APPENDIX C

7855 Greenfield
River Forest, Illinois 60305
February 8, 1984

----------, Superintendent
School District Name and Number
School District Street Number and Name
Town, Illinois Zip Code

Dear ----------:

This letter is a follow-up request for your participation in my doctoral research study. I originally wrote to you on January 18, 1984 seeking your help. If you wish to participate I would appreciate your prompt reply, if you do not wish to participate I would appreciate the return of the questionnaire.

I am a graduate student at Loyola University of Chicago working on my dissertation in educational administration and supervision. In order to analyze the decision making functions of boards of education, I am seeking information from superintendents in the five county suburban Chicago area. Included with this letter is a brief questionnaire.

If you are willing to participate in this research, please

(1) Complete the questionnaire
(2) Return it to me (postage paid envelope included) before February 17, 1984
(3) Be willing to allow me to inspect your election results for the years 1978 to 1982
(4) Be willing to allow me to examine the voting records of your board between 1978 and 1982.

All information will be strictly confidential.

Thank you in advance for your support and participation.

Gail Duke
Ph.D. Candidate
School of Education
Loyola University

APPENDIX D

Voting Patterns of Board of Education

School District Code: Year:

Month	Issue	Yes	No
	Finance		
	Personnel		
	Curriculum		
	Minor Policies		

APPENDIX E

SAMPLE ELECTION DATA SHEET

SCHOOL BOARD ELECTIONS

	Participation	Dissent	# of Elig Voters	# of Elec
YEAR				
1978				
1979				
1980				
1981				
1982				

School District Code

APPENDIX F

SAMPLE REFERENDA DATA SHEET

	Participation	Dissent	# of Elig Voters	# of Elec
Year				
1978				
tax rate				
bond				
1979				
tax rate				
bond				
1980				
tax rate				
bond				
1981				
tax rate				
bond				
1982				
tax rate				
bond				

School District Code

APPENDIX G

CENSUS INFORMATION DATA RECORD SHEET

TOWN

DISTRICT #

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

Population over 25

Number of people over 25 4 or more years of college

OCCUPATION

Managerial/Professional

Number of employed persons

INCOME

Income (household) over 50,000

Number of households

APPENDIX H

Social Characteristics of Community Members
Formula for Community Social Rank

Social Rank = Educational Level (EL) + Occupational Level (OL) + Income Level (IL)

Educational Level (EL)

The number of persons over 25 years of age with four or more years of college (PC+4) divided by the total population of the school district (TP).

$$EL = \frac{PC+4}{TP}$$

Occupational Level (OL)

The number of persons classified as professional/managerial (PM) divided by the total number of employed persons (TE) per 1,000 persons.

$$\frac{PM}{TE} = \frac{x}{1,000}$$

Income Level (IL)

The number of households with a yearly income of $50,000 (H50,00+) or more divided by the total number of households (TH).

$$IL = \frac{H50,000}{TH}$$

APPENDIX I

Local Election Results
Aggregate Community Political Behavior

Aggregate Community Political Behavior (ACPB) = Participation + dissent indices in both school board elections and referenda over the five years of the study.

$$ACPB = PI + EDI + RDI$$

Participation Indices (PI) = sums of votes cast divided by the number of eligible voters times the number of voting occasions over the five years of the study.

$$PI = \frac{V_1 + V_2 + V_3 + V_4 \quad + \quad VR_1 + VR_2 + VR_3 + VR_4 + VR_5}{(E_1 + E_2 + E_3 + E_4) \cdot 4 \quad + \quad E_1 + E_2 + E_3 + E_4 + E_5}$$

Election Dissent Indices (EDI) = sums of votes cast for losing candidates divided by the sums of all votes cast over the five years of the study.

$$EDI = \frac{VL_1 + VL_2 + VL_3 + VL_4}{VA_1 + VA_2 + VA_3 + VA_4}$$

Referenda Dissent Indices (RDI) = sums of "no" votes cast divided by sums of all votes cast over the five years of the study.

$$RDI = \frac{NV_1 + NV_2 + NV_3 + NV_4 + NV_5}{VAR_1 + VAR_2 + VAR_3 + VAR_4 + VAR_5}$$

V_1 = Total votes cast in 1978 in either school or referenda or both.
V_2 = Total votes cast in 1979 in either school or referenda or both.
V_3 = Total votes cast in 1980 in either school or referenda or both.
V_4 = Total votes cast in 1981 in either school or referenda or both.
V_5 = Total votes cast in 1982 in either school or referenda or both.

$E_1 \ldots E_5$ = Total persons eligible to vote in years 1978-1982 respectively.
$VL_1 \ldots VL_4$ = Sums of votes cast for losing candidates in years 1978-1981.
$VA_1 \ldots VA_4$ = Sums of all votes cast in school board elections in years 1978-1981.
$NV_1 \ldots NV_5$ = Sums of "no" votes cast in referenda in years 1978-1982.
$VAR_1 \ldots VAR_5$ = Sums of all votes cast in referenda in years 1978-1982.

APPENDIX J

Total Questionnaire Responses

First Mailing

Total Sent	Responses		
	Yes	No	Total
72	30	5	35

Second Mailing

Total Sent	Responses		
	Yes	No	Total
37	8	13	21

Late Responses

	Yes	No	Total
	2	2	4

Grand Totals	Responses		
	Yes	No	Total
	40	20	60

Positive Responses: 40 of 72 = 56%

Total Responses: 60 of 72 = 83%

APPENDIX K

Z FORMULA

H = 1 L = 2

n_1 n_2 p_1 p_2 $n..$ $\overline{p}$ $\overline{q}$

$$Z = \frac{|P_2 - P_1| - \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{1}{n_1} + \frac{1}{n_2}\right)}{\sqrt{\overline{p}\,\overline{q}\left(\frac{1}{n_1} + \frac{1}{n_2}\right)}}$$

	# Split	P
H: n_1	S_1	P_1
L: n_2	S_2	P_2
Total $n_1 + n_2$	$S_1 = S_2$	$\overline{p} \rightarrow \overline{q} = 1 - \overline{p}$

$\alpha = .05 \rightarrow \frac{\alpha}{2} = .025$

$\therefore$ Reject H_o if $Z > 1.96$

or $Z < -1.96$

APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by Gail Duke has been read and approved by the following committee:

Dr. Karen Gallagher, Director
Assistant Professor, Administration and Supervision, Loyola

Dr. Max A. Bailey
Associate Professor, Administration and Supervision, Loyola

Dr. Todd Hoover
Assistant Professor, Curriculum and Instruction, Loyola

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

June 12, 1984
Date

Karen D Gallagher
Director's Signature