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Anti-Judaism, Anti-Semitism, Anti-Zionism: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Anti-Jewish Phenomenon throughout Its History to the Present

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ANTI-JUDAISM, ANTI-SEMITISM, ANTI-ZIONISM: A THEORETICAL
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ANTI-JEWISH PHENOMENON
THROUGHOUT ITS HISTORY TO THE PRESENT

by

Bradley (Benzion) Allswang

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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1985

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VITA

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1. The effects of punishment, positive reinforcement, and extinction in problematic junior high school classrooms. The Israeli School Psychology Periodical, 1982, 9, 3.
2. The propagation of a myth. Jewish Chicago, 1984, 3, 6-12.

Rabbi Allswang is currently married with three children.

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CHAPTER I

THE HYPOTHESIZED PRIMARY CAUSES OF ANTI-JEWISH HOSTILITY

Remember the days of old, consider the years of many generations, ask thy Father and he will recount it to thee, thy elders, and they will tell thee.
--Deuteronomy, 32:7

Father Edward Flannery (1965) commented in his introduction to The Anguish of the Jews that

Christians, even highly educated ones, are all but totally ignorant of it--except for contemporary developments. They are ignorant of it for the simple reason that anti-Semitism does not appear in their history books. Histories of the Middle Ages--and even of the Crusades--can be found in which the word "Jew" does not appear, and there are Catholic dictionaries and encyclopedias in which the term "anti-Semitism" is not listed. (Introduction, p. xi).

The present author, some twenty years later would add that Jews as well (specifically the present young adult generation) know little of the unfortunate circumstances which have befallen their ancestors throughout recorded history. Accordingly, a fixation, common among Jewish people today is to focus almost exclusively on the Nazi-German holocaust while bypassing millennia of savage persecution. In the opinion of the author, this semi-obsessive perspective perpetuated repeatedly by Jewish organizations and institutions

has inadvertently created an atmosphere of self-pity, helplessness and emotionally-directed behavior. Its repetitive nature may, in fact, become somewhat repulsive to the younger generation of Jew and Gentile alike, whose perception of the Jewish people is at variance with the depiction of the Jew as a totally helpless and hopeless individual. It is the author's opinion that such shortsightedness is unable to deal with the problem adequately, and needless to say, any constructive plan of action following therefrom is doomed to failure. This is not to imply in the least that the beastiality of the German people during World War II deserves a respite from condemnation, but only that the attempted genocide carried out by one of the most "civilized" nations in the twentieth century was no more (albeit in an extreme form) than the progression of an ongoing millennia old social cancer. Accordingly, it is the opinion of the author that only through a broad historical analysis can anti-Jewish hostility be properly understood.

The above is not to imply that there exists a dearth of literature on the subject, but only that the information is not widely known either in America or in Israel. A further and probably more serious problem concerns the type of historical analysis heretofore presented. Since World War II there have been several serious English works (e.g., Flannery, 1965; Grosser & Halperin, 1978; and Ruether, 1979) which have presented histories of anti-Jewish hostility with all

its bloody consequences, but have done little more than to delineate historical facts while concomitantly inciting horror and indignation toward those responsible for carrying out such atrocities. Their intent in exposing such activity was apparently in order to prevent further occurrences. However, it is the author's opinion that their writings (as conclusive works) are substantively inadequate for the following two reasons: (1) anti-Jewish hostility has taken various forms and has been perpetrated by considerably different ideological entities throughout history, and therefore without a cohesive theory delineating a common underlying cause, Jews may be too preoccupied searching out Nazis and condemning Christianity today to effectively deal with the contemporary threats facing Jewry, and (2) criticism and moral exhortations cannot be expected to change peoples' attitudes and actions (regardless of the emotional sincerity exhibited by the respective writer) but ironically may produce further frustration in the potentially hostile non-Jewish population which paradoxically could bring more Jewish suffering in its wake (the "blaming the victim" effect).

Correspondingly, the only seemingly constructive way to deal with the problem is through logical and unambiguously directed activity based on solid theory and experience. Unfortunately, the above writers have failed on both counts. An exception to the rule is Prager and Telushkin (1983) who unlike the others have developed a theory which is histori-

cally consistent, but in the opinion of the present author is philosophically and psychologically shallow, and their strategies to combat the malady appear unrealistic and possibly harmful. For example, their historical-universal reason for Jew-hatred is specifically Jewish (unlike other theorists who postulate economic, social, psychological or political explanations for the problem and whose theories may be superimposed on any distinctive ethnic or racial minority). In a word, their explanation is Judaism itself, but their exposition of Judaism's "threat" appears incomplete. In fact their primary social-psychological emphases may be interpreted as bordering on the authors' own ethnocentric biases. For example, their claim that anti-Jewish hostility is in great part because Jews have been better educated, less habitually intoxicated, more charitable with one another, less prone to crime, and have had a more stable family unit than their non-Jewish neighbors is dubious, for these factors may be more a result of anti-Jewish hostility than a direct cause thereof. In addition, their primary solution is that Jews accept the challenge of spreading ethical monotheism to the world (not necessarily to convert but to teach). Ironically, the authors themselves express the contradiction that it is "the ultimate cause of antisemitism (i.e., the perception that Judaism stands for something more ethically lofty) which must be fulfilled in order to end antisemitism" (p. 191)?!

It must also be mentioned that several social scien-

tists have developed overall theories of anti-Jewish hostility (as will be seen in Chapter III) but these theories are mostly ahistorical in nature and cannot deal, on their unilevel of analysis, with historical anti-Jewish hostility (i.e., their theories are at best dubious when superimposed on various cultures and times). In contrast to these above types of analyses and theories, the present author has attempted to develop a theory, firmly rooted in history, which lends itself to empirical analysis and concrete strategies (for combating this social malady) following therefrom.

In the present paper, the term anti-Jewish hostility is used in lieu of the more commonly applied "anti-Semitism" to denote antipathy toward the Jewish people. This is because the term anti-Semitism is a misnomer (Flannery, 1965). The word Semitism comes from the name Shem, who was Biblically one of Noah's three sons. Therefore, according to the Bible (and assuming that all three sons were equally prolific), approximately one-third of the world's population today should be inhabited by Shemites (or Semites). In practice, anti-Semitism has been used exclusively to denote anti-Jewish hostility, and directed against a people who account for less than 1 percent of the total world population. The term anti-Semitism was originally coined in Germany in the 1870s to purposely signify a "racial" enmity toward Jews in lieu of the "dated" religious prejudice engendered in the past. Accordingly, if the term anti-Semitism was to be employed

in the present study, the author would be implicitly furthering a myth rooted in anti-Jewish hostility.

In order not to lose the reader at this point (and throughout the lengthy historical analysis which ensues) it is important that the author spell out in the beginning the direction and unorthodox approach taken in the forthcoming analysis. Prior analyses of historical anti-Jewish hostility are in general theoretically monolithic, varying only in their emphasis on detail and the particular era(s) of analysis. The factual horror-stories told by these various writers have aptly depicted the lowly state of humanity throughout the ages, but have failed in describing the uniqueness of anti-Jewish hostility. Their main topic is ostensibly Jewish suffering, yet their emphasis focuses primarily on the non-Jewish antagonists (i.e., their savagery). These writers do not appear interested in portraying anti-Jewish hatred per se but rather the universal message of man's inhumane treatment of his fellow man. Jews are seen as qualitatively replaceable by other persecuted minority groups such as Blacks, Women, the American Indian, etc., and only by virtue of the intensity and extensiveness of their suffering do they embody the most complete paradigm from which to portray humanity's sadistic nature. In other words, anti-Jewish hostility is not considered different in kind from other forms of group-hostility, and lessons to be derived

are not and never intended to be specifically Jewish but rather universal in content and application.

It is the opinion of the present author that it was specifically this a priori intention of admonishing the world (arbitrarily via the Jewish experience) which precluded the analysis of anything exclusively Jewish. In contrast, the present author declares at the outset his disinterest in detailing man's universal active enmity towards his fellow man (a cursory reading of most contemporary newspapers would illustrate the same), but rather to inquire into the unique and specific nature of anti-Jewish hostility. As predicted (as will be seen in the following pages) by asking the question "What is fundamentally different about anti-Jewish hostility?" as opposed to the implicit question asked by most writers which is "What has been the general state of prejudice throughout the ages?" the answers also turn out to be distinctly different. Where other writers present a sad commentary on humanity, in which Jews are little more than arbitrary stimuli on whom frustration and contempt is heaped, the present analysis will attempt to interpret the anti-Jewish process as something distinctively Jewish. Where most other writers attempt to derive universal lessons from history (which are hoped will benefit all persecuted minority groups) the present study attempts to derive Jewish specific lessons which may serve universal ends (i.e., for both majority and minority populations).

Aspect No. 1

Following from the above, it is little wonder why writers fail to see the following unique aspects of anti-Jewish hostility. The first aspect deals with Jewish longevity and resilience. Better put, the question is not why Jews have been attacked so savagely throughout four millennia, but rather how they continued to remain a distinct people under the most unbearable and ironic of circumstances (and most of the time in a foreign land). All other peoples throughout history have relinquished their national and/or religious identity (when given the opportunity to do so) to become one with the powerful majority population (small seclusive sects which have little to no interaction with the majority culture may be exceptions to this rule). Only the Jewish people amidst untold discrimination and persecution have retained their own language, religion, national consciousness, and civil laws for over three thousand years, while simultaneously becoming an integral part of the larger society. The question "why the Jews suffer?" is less than profound for many minority groups throughout history have been targeted scapegoats. The present study, in contrast, asks how and why the Jews have remained a separate people in spite of the brutal consequences of being distinct?

Aspect No. 2

A second aspect which differentiates the persecution

and discrimination of Jews from that of most other minority groups (e.g., Blacks, Women, etc.), and is likewise overlooked by historians and social scientists, is the differential origins of discrimination when it comes to Jews as opposed to other minority groups. Historically, most other minority groups who have suffered never had a choice to do otherwise. They were never given the choice to be assimilated as equals into the majority culture. (For example, Blacks when taken from Africa were not given the option to be like their white Christian or Arab Moslem captors or else accept slavery. For them slavery was the only viable "option.")

In contrast, the Jews always had a chance to become one with the majority. In certain lands this opportunity was abrogated (e.g., Nazi Germany) but even in these lands the possibility of total assimilation had at one time existed. Not only had Jews the opportunity to totally assimilate, but they were quite often the primary focus of the ruling power (whether national or international) who went to great lengths in their attempt to totally assimilate them. It was always after-the-fact when Jews refused to totally relinquish their identity did discrimination and persecution follow in its wake.

Hence, by failing to distinguish between the anti-Jewish process and other anti-minority group processes we are, indeed, learning about the barbarous history of mankind, but little concerning specific anti-Jewish activity. In

fact, by lumping the anti-Jewish process with others we are, in effect, leading the serious student astray, and blocking any understanding that the anti-Jewish phenomenon may be a process quite different in kind from others. In essence, by failing to discriminate between the process of anti-Jewish hostility and others, the historians and social scientists are, at best, describing the symptoms (which may be portrayed as universal in kind) while blatantly ignoring the differences in origin (which may smack of particularism or even racism to some "enlightened" Western thinkers).

Aspect No. 3

A third interesting and unique aspect which follows from the first (and therefore writers who do not speak of the first aspect will inevitably fail to emphasize the third aspect) concerns the particular form of Judaism which has maintained itself throughout millennia. Although through history there have been several different forms of Judaism (e.g., Sadducees, Nazarenes, Karaites, etc.), and in each of their respective eras these groups have suffered as intensely as the one form of Judaism that has consistently survived (i.e., Oral Law Judaism which has been called during different eras Pharisaical Judaism and Orthodox Judaism) only one group has consistently throughout the ages, in different lands and cultures, kept the spark of Judaism alive. Whereas other Jewish groups throughout history have claimed to be

the most modern, or truthful form of Judaism in whose destiny it was to replace the "antiquated" or "corrupt" Oral-Law tradition, their claims were never actualized. When a particular epoch in history ended so did the various "adaptable" forms of Judaism. The only group to survive through every age and culture was the group which claimed that its detailed interpretation of the Bible (i.e., the Oral Law) was, in addition to the Bible (i.e., the Five Books of Moses), handed down to Moses from G-d. The other transient forms of Judaism never claimed that their interpretation of Scripture was transmitted uninterruptedly from Moses to their respective era, but claimed (in the negative) that the Oral Law tradition (as embodied in the Talmud today) was man made. The corollary of their claim was obvious, if the scholars could make up their own interpretations, why should other Jewish groups be prevented from doing the same. Irrespective of their claims, these so-called man-made interpretations (i.e., the Oral Law) continued to lead the Jewish people in every era and culture whereas the other movements' interpretations never survived past a culture or two (as viable legislation for the Jewish people to live by).

This point becomes all the more important when Jewish continuity becomes an integral factor in interpreting the anti-Jewish phenomenon. It dispels the myth that there is something inherently super-tenacious or super-obstinate about the Jewish people per se. It shows that only the Jewish

people following the Oral Law, which unlike all other minority groups under the same circumstances, have astoundingly preserved their distinct identity. This fact should not be taken lightly for if one of the unique aspects of anti-Jewish hostility is specifically the longevity of the Jewish people, and if this longevity is exclusively a function of Oral Law tradition, then the serious student is obligated to investigate the sustaining force of the Oral Law (as embodied today in the Talmud). Needless to say most other writers who have seriously investigated the anti-Jewish phenomenon never seem to discern the above relationship between anti-Jewish activity and the Oral Law tradition.

Because the Oral Law tradition will be talked about throughout the dissertation a short summary describing its origins and legislation will be presented here. The rationale behind this short presentation is that although many people are familiar with the Bible, the Oral Law interpretation of it is little known among modern American Jewry, and even less so in the non-Jewish world.

The Talmud (Gittin 60B) which is today the embodiment of the Oral Law expresses the above thusly: "the Holy One, Blessed be He, did not establish His covenant with Israel except by virtue of the Oral Law." (Translation mine.)

Support for the claim that there was detailed legislation given together with the Written Law (i.e., the Bible), and more specifically the Five Books of Moses) is that it

is difficult, if not impossible, to make tangible-pragmatic sense of the Written Law without an accompanying interpretation. For example, there are many terms in the Bible which are undefined, the term "work" in Sabbatical law (Exodus, 31:14) or the term "slaughtering" in the dietary laws of Kosher (Deuteronomy, 12:21) are undefined and only via the Oral Law are these concepts elucidated in order that they may be practically applied. In addition, there are basic legal concepts and institutions, the existence of which is assumed by the Bible, but which are not further explained. For example, without previously specifying the formal institution of marriage and divorce, the Bible (Deuteronomy, 24:1-4) states that a husband cannot re-marry the wife he has divorced, if in the meantime she has been married to another man. Only via the Oral Law are Biblically assumed concepts thoroughly defined.

A story is related in the Talmud (Shabbos, 31A) about a non-Jew who approached the two leading Sages of the time individually (Hillel and Shamai who were the heads of the Jewish Supreme Court some 2,100 years ago) and inquired of one "How many Divine bodies of legislation are there?" He (the Sage) replied, "two, the Written Law and the Oral Law." The non-Jew retorted, "the Written Law I believe in but the Oral Law I don't believe in, convert me on the condition that I accept only the Written Law," the non-Jew was immediately escorted out. He then approached the other Sage and

made the same request, the Sage immediately started teaching him the Hebrew alphabet. When the new convert returned the next day he (the Sage) started teaching him the alphabet in reverse order. The convert exclaimed, "but yesterday you taught me the opposite!" The Sage replied, "you see that you must rely on me even on this, then rely upon me also with respect to the Oral Law." (I.e., there must be a certain reliance upon authority before anything may be learned.)

The Oral Law (as its name designates) was passed down orally from generation to generation by the leading Sages and their Sanhedrin (i.e., the Jewish Supreme Court comprising 71 of the greatest scholars of the generation), and uninterruptedly disseminated to the Jewish people in the Land of Israel and the Diaspora (Maimonides, 1972). When the Roman empire prohibited the Sanhedrin from convening, the task of teaching and clarifying the Oral Law was placed upon the various Sages and their educational institutions (i.e., in their Yeshiva). In light of the fact that there was no longer any real central legislative authority in Israel together with the ongoing persecution and dissemination of the Jewish people throughout the Roman and Persian empires, various versions of Oral Law legislation began to proliferate (this proliferation of opinions concerned only the minute details of the Law, but in Jewish Law any deviation, however small, was considered a deviation from the will of G-d), and there was great fear that the true Law would soon

be forgotten. Although the law (Talmud, Gittin 60B) prohibiting the public writing of the Oral Law had been in effect for 1,400 years the need to put it down in writing became irreversibly evident in the times of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (approximately 200 C.E.), so the Sages of the time decided that in order to preserve Oral Law legislation one of its laws (i.e., the prohibition of publicly writing it down) had to be uprooted.

The public redaction of the Oral Law which became better known as the Talmud (i.e., comprising both the Mishna and Gemara) began in the days of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (218 C.E.) in the Land of Israel and was sealed in the form of the Talmud Bavli in Babylonia (500 C.E.). The Sages and their students collected, sorted, and redacted the ocean of literature known as the Oral Law tradition. In light of the fact that there were differences of opinion on many of the laws, which was a direct outgrowth of the persecution and dispersion during the Roman conquest, the Sages refused to accept the responsibility of throwing out any authoritative legislative opinion. They therefore entered all the various opinions into the Talmud. These multiple opinions are usually followed by heated dialectics, aimed at discerning the most valid of the various opinions. In addition to legislation of Sinatic origins (i.e., Laws considered given to Moses by G-d) the Talmud is also replete with Rabbinic legislation which are in most cases protectives, which guard against

the transgression of Sinatic legislation. People well versed in the Talmud today are usually able to differentiate between Sinatic legislation and the many Rabbinic enactments.

The emphasis placed upon the spiritual quality of Oral Law teachers, and not merely on the quality of their teaching is a distinctive feature of traditional Judaism (Talmud Sukkah 28A). It is also given as a reason for why it was prohibited to write down the Oral Law (Sefer Ha'Ikarim, 1960). The writing down of the law enables any scholar, whatever his bias to present himself as an interpreter and teacher of the Oral Law. On the other hand, when the Law is handed down orally it is unlikely that teaching would be accepted from anyone whose character is not such as to make his tradition reliable (Schimmel, 1971). The Talmud itself (Hagigah, 15B) states "If the teacher is similar to an angel of G-d they should seek the Law from him and if not, they should not seek the Law from him." (Translation mine.)

It is the opinion of the present author that the many Jewish groups which deviated from the Oral Law tradition did not do so out of intellectual honesty, but rather out of an emotional desire to be "free" (like the non-Jews who are not obligated or expected to follow the demanding Jewish Law), and only afterwards rationalized their deviation into something seemingly positive. Accordingly, it becomes comprehensible why most of these Jewish groups accepted the Divinity of the Written Law while negating that of the Oral Law.

The Written Law is general and ambiguous (i.e., when it comes to the specification and application of the Laws) and can be easily manipulated to fit the lifestyle of the manipulator. The Oral Law in contrast, although dynamic in the sense that it can and has been adaptable in every society throughout history has concretely defined limits, and is detailed enough to make it virtually impossible to accept its Divine origins and still act according to one's impulses and desires.

The present author believes that a true understanding of anti-Jewish hostility is only possible when viewed historically. Only by delineating common anti-Jewish themes and objectives throughout history (in addition to those mentioned above) does the anti-Jewish phenomenon appear to take on a unique identity of its own. Therefore, in the following pages a rather lengthy historical analysis will be presented in an attempt to locate common themes and components of the phenomenon. In brief, the historical analysis is undertaken with the intent of locating the primary cause of anti-Jewish hostility.

Chapter II in the present manuscript deals with the hypothesized secondary causes of anti-Jewish hostility which, as will be seen, represent a phenomenological-historical interpretation of the phenomenon. Chapter III presents the hypothesized tertiary causes of anti-Jewish hostility which are posited as psychological in nature. At the conclusion

of each of the three chapters a general plan will be presented for investigating empirically the hypotheses following from each of the respective chapters. Chapters IV, V, and VI present the methodology, results, and discussion, respectively of the dissertation's empirical investigation, and at the conclusion of Chapter VI a theological perspective on the origins of the problem will be discussed.

The Development of a Nation and Egyptian
Anti-Jewish Hostility

The advent of the Jewish nation began with one man Abraham the Ivri (the Hebrew) in the seventeenth century B.C.E. (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1973). The Midrash (Bereshet rabbah) states that the word Ivri means "on the other side" where the idol worshipping population at that time was figuratively on one side, and Abraham through his philosophical genius and unflinching ethical behavior stood on the other. Abraham suffered both persecution (Midrash: Bereshet rabbah) and exile (Genesis 12:1) because of his spiritual convictions. He bequeathed his revolutionary philosophy and lifestyle (with its concomitant responsibilities) to his son Isaac and sent Ishmael away at the urgings of his wife Sara which was afterwards justified by G-d Himself (Genesis 21:12). Isaac then passed the tradition along to the younger of his two sons Jacob (whose name was later changed to Israel) who then passed it down to his twelve sons who later became the Twelve Tribes of Israel. Because of sibling jealousy

the sons of Jacob sold their brother Joseph into slavery in which state he was brought down to Egypt (Genesis 37:28). Joseph miraculously became great in Egypt and eventually attained the status of second in command (Genesis 41:43-44). He also singlehandedly saved the people of Egypt and other peoples from starvation and simultaneously procured for Pharaoh enormous wealth (Genesis 47:14-26). Because of the famine, which had also swept the Land of Canaan at that time, Jacob and his whole family came to Egypt where they were reunited with Joseph. Pharaoh, quite graciously, granted to Jacob and his sons the best of Egypt, the fertile land of Goshen (Genesis 47:6) to dwell in as free men.

In Egypt, Jacob's family grew by leaps and bounds (Exodus 1:7) and within a relatively short period of time developed into the Hebrew nation. Within eighty years after the Hebrews had entered Egypt with the passing of Joseph and his brothers (Miller, 1968), they began to adopt for themselves several Egyptian customs (i.e., to assimilate) (Ezekiel 20:5-7). The Midrash (Tanchuma) states that they became ardent cosmopolitans, and that their presence was felt at all great cultural events of the time. Although the Hebrews were rapidly assimilating into Egyptian society (the most sophisticated society in the world at the time) the Midrash (Mekilta; Pische) relates two distinctive behaviors of the Hebrews which helped to prevent their total assimilation, (1) they retained their Hebrew names, and (2)

they retained their Hebrew language.

Suddenly, the new ruler of Egypt seemed struck by a sense of paranoia (a common theme running throughout Jewish history), "Lest they multiply and endanger the land" (Exodus 1:10). (Translation mine.) In light of the fact that Egypt was considered a progressive land of culture and orderly rule a flagrant decree to subjugate the people of Joseph (who had saved them from starvation) would have been a black mark against the progressive nature of its leaders (Miller, 1968). Therefore, Pharaoh and his advisors attempted an alternative plan of action. Pharaoh said: "Let us deal wisely with them" (Exodus 1:10). The Talmud (Sotah, 11A) relates that he began his scheme by appealing to the Hebrew's patriotism by requesting their help in building his storehouse-cities. The children of Israel fell into the trap, and worked diligently (Midrash rabbah) for the system which Joseph had originally instituted (Genesis 41:35). Gradually, the Hebrew volunteers were pressed into service until they found themselves unable to break loose.

To the dismay of Egypt, Israel began to increase in proportion to the oppression (Exodus 1:12). The Egyptian plan to uproot the Hebrew's stubborn national identity via slavery proved unsuccessful. The Hebrew tradition initiated by Abraham and predicated on ethical monotheism with its ultimate fulfillment realized only in the Land of Canaan (i.e., the land of Israel before the Jews arrived there as a

nation) as promised to Abraham (Genesis 17:8), was too strong a bond for even Egyptian bondage to sever. Egypt then implemented its second stage of attack, physical back-breaking labor (Exodus 1:13). If national identity could not be totally obliterated through forced labor, then bone-crushing demands were to be implemented in order to crush the spirit, creating in effect, national misfits. Apparently this second stage of action was also unsuccessful for Pharaoh then commanded the murder of all male infants at the time of delivery (Exodus 1:16). When the Hebrew midwives shrewdly refused to carry out Pharaoh's command he openly decreed that every newborn Hebrew boy was to be cast into the river (Exodus 1:22). Pharaoh's three-level strategy of oppression (1) discrimination and subjugation, (2) spirit crushing physical persecution, and (3) extermination was to be the prototype for all subsequent anti-Jewish activity throughout history.

There are also other strong similarities between Egyptian anti-Jewish hostility and those that followed. Jews in Egypt were extraordinarily successful before their oppression. One of their founding fathers (Joseph) was second only to Pharaoh (Genesis 41:43-44) and was revered by the Egyptian populace (47:25). For instance, when Joseph's father Jacob died, all of Egypt was in a state of mourning for seventy days (50:3). Pharaoh himself, gave the Hebrews the finest land in Egypt, and offered them positions of prestige (Genesis 47:6). For the first eighty years of their sojourn

in Egypt the Hebrews were successful and prosperous and only afterwards were they bitterly oppressed. In other lands too, Jews would always succeed (when given the opportunity) only to be oppressed in the end.

If the Hebrews would have completely assimilated into Egyptian society (as small groups, who are given the opportunity, consistently do in every great culture or society), or had they not been so successful, the Egyptian oppression would probably have been greatly attenuated or may never have occurred. The threat of a distinctly successful and dynamic non-Egyptian population burgeoning in the midst of Egypt (the cultural center of the world) was ostensibly the cause of Pharaoh paranoia, for there is no intimation from any historical source that the Hebrews were any less loyal to the ruling Egyptian government than their indigenous Egyptian counterparts. As will be seen, this common theme characterized by a successful entry into mainstream society without a concomitant complete disassociation from anything distinctively Jewish has proved overwhelmingly threatening to many of the Jews' non-Jewish hosts throughout history.

It is also important to repeat the distinction between Jewish oppression and most other types of minority group oppression as mentioned above. As discussed above other targeted minority groups throughout history were commonly thought of as inferior and were therefore discriminated against. The Jews, in contrast, were always prime targets

for assimilation and only after they remained "stiff-necked" and refused to totally comply did discrimination and persecution follow. What began as a self-imposed desire to be separate but equal turned into a universally accepted antipathy toward Jews. Following therefrom, it is not difficult to understand why the persecution of Jewish populations throughout history has transcended in scope and intensity the persecution of other minority groups.

Another common theme which pervades Jewish history is that the people of Israel's chief antagonists (e.g., Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, Greece, Rome, etc.), after having vented their wrath, were eventually always conquered by yet another up and coming national power. Most of these oppressive powers retained their identity only through the annals of history, and others retained some semblance of identity while becoming virtually impotent internationally, but none ever reclaimed its former political status in world affairs. Ironically the only nation (i.e., the Jewish nation) which has ever risen to become a key player on the international scene repeatedly throughout millennia (usually without even living in its own land) is the very nation the great powers of the world have so assiduously attempted to destroy.

Again, ancient Egypt can be seen as the prototype for the above theme. After the Egyptians had wreaked considerable suffering on the Hebrews, the ten plagues befell Egypt where all water turned to blood (Exodus 7:20), a plague

of frogs invaded their homes (Exodus 8:2), lice overran the land (Exodus 8:13), and a mixture of fierce beasts ravaged the country (Exodus 8:20). After that, pestilence destroyed the livestock (Exodus 9:6), sores broke out pervasively on men and animals alike (Exodus 9:10), a hail of terrible violence descended upon the land (Exodus 9:23), clouds of locusts came in as never before witnessed (Exodus 10:14), an intense tangible darkness covered the land for three days (Exodus 10:22), and finally every first-born Egyptian man and animal in the land perished in one night (Exodus 12:29). Three days after the Hebrew exodus, the Egyptians pursued them and in consequence were drowned in the Red Sea (Exodus 14:27). Egypt was ruined, for five hundred years until the days of Solomon Egypt was not heard from (Miller, 1965), and it played no critical part in the history of nations thereafter.

Before moving chronologically onward the historicity of the above event demands intellectual affirmation for many scholars in both the physical and social sciences alike, tend to ignore religious sources, as if science and religion (in any form) are mutually exclusive. This rule is usually accepted as gospel (or perhaps more appropriately termed the dogma of scientism, as not to be confused with the scientific method) in academia and perforce precludes any viable integration of the two. The above phenomenon is a poignant case-in-point of how this seemingly provincial perspective

of scientism may create an impasse in understanding the "world's greatest hatred." According to the above analysis, to omit the episode in Egypt because it is based on Biblical and Talmudic sources would be to omit the prototype for all subsequent discrimination and persecution directed against the Jewish people. This type of thinking is so prevalent, that despite the fact that the historicity of Egyptian persecution has never been disproven by nonbiblical sources (Prager et al., 1983), the present author has not found one secular source on anti-Jewish hostility which gives more than a paragraph (in passing) to the happening in Egypt.

The lack of direct Egyptian documentation does not disprove the persecution and subsequent miraculous emancipation from Egypt, for both democratic and particularly totalitarian governments have been known to historically emphasize (or invent) their "glorious" past and to minimize (or negate) embarrassing or incriminating events. For instance, after World War II despite the vast pictorial and eyewitness evidence, the testimony of tens of thousands of survivors, and the confessions of thousands of perpetrators, dozens of books and articles have and continue to be published which deny the Holocaust (Prager et al., 1983; Cawley, 1985).

This lack of perspective when dealing with anti-Jewish phenomena becomes all the more salient when one remembers that both traditional Christianity and Islam have never contested the above events in Egypt (with its subsequent culmina-

tion at the mountain of Sinai). On the contrary, both traditional Christianity and Islam are wholly dependent on the historical veracity of the above phenomenon, and invoke it as one of the most convincing proofs of the existence of G-d and His relationship to the social world of men and women. These religions taken together embrace over a billion people representing the majority of what we call today the "civilized world" (Cohen, 1984). Without this historical foundation all three religions turn into human fabrications, or as Karl Marx, the "great emancipator" put it "the opiate of the masses."

The episode in Egypt when viewed objectively appears to satisfy most (if not all) of the criteria needed to validate an authentic historical event. An event claimed attested to by some six hundred thousand adult men (Numbers 2:32), in addition to women, children, and the aged which changed the way of life of a nation and eventually of the whole world would seem impossible to smuggle into the annals of history for all time. Similarly, we accept as fact that there was a king called Alexander the Great or a Roman legislator called Cicero because it is almost impossible to introduce fictitious public figures or mass events into recorded history. This logic is corroborated by the fact that the people who witnessed the miraculous events were not members of a primitive servile-type tribe, but rather a stiff-necked individualized type people. In fact there are many accounts in the Bible

(e.g., Exodus 16:3; 17:1; Numbers 14:22) of the Hebrews' contentious attitudes and rebellious actions. However, among all the Israelites' varied criticism and skepticism there is never a question concerning the authenticity of the events in Egypt, which is frequently referred to in the Pentateuch (e.g., Exodus 6:6, 20:2; Deuteronomy 5:6).

Further corroboration for the above event is its highly unflattering description of how the Jewish nation developed. A nationally proclaimed history claiming to have evolved via slavery is not to be easily dismissed. Based on the psychology of political entities which tend to exaggerate their past in the opposite positive direction, the history of the Jewish people based on the Bible is to be seriously considered. A further support (as mentioned above) is that immediately after the recorded Exodus from Egypt, the great Egyptian culture and society came to an abrupt halt, and was not to be heard from until some several hundred years later (Miller, 1968).

A major reason why historians are reluctant to deal with Biblical history in any depth may be a consequence of the pseudo-science known as Biblical criticism, which was introduced in Germany in the early nineteenth century. In brief, this criticism denies the historical accuracy of the Bible and claims multiple authorship at various stages in history. Their criticism, in most part was based on the Hegelian thesis that civilization had advanced from the prim-

itive stage, and as it moved westward advanced to a higher stage until it reached its apex in Hegel's Germanic Culture. Accordingly, Israel's Bible and her history were reconstructed to fit this chauvinistic mold. Everything was neatly arranged in logical progression, and the religion of Israel was depicted having developed gradually from a primitive idolatry to the advanced monotheism of the prophetic period (Feldman, 1965).

Unfortunately for these scholars, their elaborate intellectual edifice was crumbling as quickly as it was being built. The first telltale sign came in 1887 when the Tel El Amarna letters were discovered. The letters revealed a well-developed culture in the ancient Middle East as early as the fourteenth century B.C.E. It portrayed a world quite advanced in intellect, commerce, trade and diplomacy, and demonstrated that Israel's history (originating with the Jewish Patriarchs) began long before the times of Moses (Feldman, 1965). Since then, the maturing science of Biblical archaeology with its base in Israel has made literally hundreds of discoveries which corroborate the times and happenings cited in the Bible (e.g., Keller, 1956; Negev, 1972).

In addition to these atheoretical archeological discoveries which substantively upset the philosophical basis of Biblical criticism, Universities in Israel have attempted over the last several years to examine the literary foundation of Biblical criticism. The entire book of Genesis (in its

original Hebrew form) was put into a computer, and based on grammatic, textual, and overall literary form the computer concluded (contrary to Biblical criticism) that the book was most probably put together by a single author (Spiegler, 1982).

In spite of the evidence suggesting the contrary, the "established conclusions" of Biblical Criticism have become part of the intellectual baggage acquired by the average college graduate (Kapustin, 1978). Paradoxically, as one modern scholar (G. Mendenhall) has pointed out concerning the liberal adherents of Biblical criticism that "it is at least a justified suspicion that a scholarly piety toward the past, rather than historical evidence, is the main foundation for their position" (Kapustin, 1978, p. 438).

A final reason why many social scientists may shy away from Biblical support is that secular academia, predicated on the ideals and objectives of the Enlightenment, represents in its original form a severance from the dogmatism of organized religion. Although a severance seemed to be in order in light of the many barbarous activities legitimized in the name of G-d, an academia (based on the scientific method) ostensibly seeking truth which blatantly avoids the psychological, social, political, and historical ramifications of a religious perspective is itself dogmatically ignoring the most powerful social phenomenon known to man. Accordingly, the historian's avoidance of the Biblical account in

ancient Egypt, in its relationship to subsequent anti-Jewish activity seems to poignantly reflect this bias. Ironically, despite historians' passing gesture to it, very few historical facts have as much logical and empirical support as does the Jewish experience in ancient Egypt. The event in Egypt is seen as representing the prototype for all successive anti-Jewish oppression which implies a common theme throughout history (something that other historians or social scientists have seemingly never been able or willing to locate).

Most historians and social scientists when evaluating anti-Jewish prejudice skip over the following 750 years (from approximately 1290-540 B.C.E.) of history following the Israelite exodus from Egypt to the Jewish sojourn in Persia. The most probable explanation is that during this time period the Hebrew nation was an independent nation with its own government, religion, and land. It therefore, not unlike other political entities fought numerous wars, conquered and was conquered, and was eventually expelled from the land. At a superficial level this course of events has nothing to do with anti-Jewish hostility, which in its classic form portrays a virtually helpless but distinctive minority group residing among (or adjacent to) the non-Jewish majority population. This superficial description appears inadequate for reasons to be discussed later (see Discussion, Chapter VI), but suffice it to say that according to this paradigm the present Communist and Arab-world gang-up on the state of

Israel would not be considered a variant form of anti-Jewish hostility.

Before proceeding to the more classical forms of anti-Jewish hostility it is important to mention two historical facts whose relevance to the understanding of this phenomenon will hopefully become clearer further on. One, the many nations or tribes which warred against Israel during this 750 year period (e.g., Amalelites, Cannanites, Philistines, Assyrians, Babylonians, etc.) have all been lost to oblivion. There is no group of people today (or for that matter over the last 1,400 years) who can definitively claim descent from these tribes and nations, and needless to say their religious, governmental, and political institutions are, at best, kept alive in the historical annals of antiquity. Two, at approximately 928 B.C.E. (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1973) the Jewish Kingdom was severed. The northern Kingdom was called Israel (and comprised ten of the twelve tribes of Israel), and the southern Kingdom was called Judah. Between 722-720 B.C.E. (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1973) the northern Kingdom (Israel) was conquered by the powerful Assyrian nation, and its people were deported en masse to various regions of the Assyrian empire. These Israelites of the northern Kingdom descended from the same ancestors, and had the same historical tradition as their brothers in Judah, and yet after their expulsion were lost to antiquity (via assimilation like their ancient international counterparts

as discussed above). This point becomes all the more important when discussing Judah's (i.e., the two remaining tribes together with the priestly tribe of Levi) staying power throughout millennia amidst tremendously adverse conditions.

Persian Anti-Jewish Hostility

The land of Judah was eventually captured by the great Babylonian empire, and with the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem in 586 B.C.E. (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1973) the remaining Israelites were deported en masse to Babylonia. This group of Jewish people (unlike their northern counterparts) did not totally assimilate into Babylonian society. Even after the mighty empire of Babylon fell to the Media-Persia empire, the conquered Jews living in the conquered land remained voluntarily distinct. This self-imposed distinctiveness almost brought upon them a genocide more heinous than the one originally attempted in Egypt.

This voluntary distinctiveness was used against them by the infamous Persian prime minister Haman. In short, Haman claimed that the Jews refused to adopt the ways of the empire, and were undermining the king's authority, and therefore needed to be utterly destroyed (Ester 3:8-9). The Talmud (Megillah 11A) relates the King's favorable predisposition to Haman's plan, and consequently an official edict was declared concerning its implementation (Ester 3:12-13). The Bible (Ester 3:5) also reveals the reason

for Haman's unbridled hostility. Mordecai, the leader of the Jews at the time, refused to bow down to Haman who wore an idol around his neck. Mordecai's obstinacy tore Haman apart internally (Ester 3:5, 5:13), and attempted genocide was the logical consequence. Fortunately for the Jews, Haman's plan backfired (see Biblical Book of Esther) and following his demise Mordecai the Jew succeeded him as prime minister of the Persian empire (Ester 10:3).

As in Egypt the Jews' refusal to be totally subjugated like the other subjects of the empire infuriated the ruling power. When attempts to break the Jewish spirit by estranging them from their traditions (Midrash; Yalkut Shemoni) proved unsuccessful, the only recourse left for these tyrants (or more appropriately, these self-proclaimed deities) was to annihilate the Jewish collective body. Consequently, the Jewish people continued to persevere in their already "anti-quoted" traditions, and in their relationship to the Land promised them forever by G-d (Genesis, 17:8; Exodus, 6:8; Jeremiah, 7:7; Ezekiel, 28:25). In contrast, the Persian empire was totally dissolved along with its indigenous type of religion(s), form of government, and societal mores.

Greek Anti-Jewish Hostility

After the seventy year Babylonian-Persian exile the Jews were permitted to return to their land and build their Temple once again. In 332 B.C.E. (Encyclopaedia Judaica,



1973), Alexander (the Great) of Macedonia with his 40,000 soldiers attacked and defeated the larger Persian army, and conquered much of the land previously governed by Persia including the land of Israel. Alexander showed favor to the Jews allowing them to continue their autonomous rule in the land, and even extended their borders, adding to it three zones that had previously belonged to the Samaritans under Persian rule (Scherman & Zlotowitz, 1982).

Alexander's ambitions were cultural as well as military. He expected that the various segments of his newly founded Macedonian empire would mingle and evolve a common civilization and way of life, modeled after the highly progressive Hellenic culture. The dissemination and influence of the Hellenic spirit brought in its wake libraries, scientific research, and technological advancement (Mason, 1968). Unfortunately, as time went by this progressive spirit degenerated into an intensification of idol worship with its usual concomitant corruption of morals (Scherman et al., 1982).

For 150 years Greek civilization and Jewish culture (based on the Oral Law) were able to coexist, but with the advent of Antiochus IV (175 B.C.E.) the relationship became badly strained. Antiochus IV believed himself to be divine, and ordered all people under his rule to erect statues of him in their temples, and to prostrate themselves before his image. He physically imposed Hellenic culture, and would

not tolerate the Jewish unwillingness to become Hellenized. Consequently, he gave orders that Judaism must be destroyed (Grayzel, 1968). He called for the cessation of sacrificial service in the Temple, and in its place temples were to be set up everywhere where hogs and other non-suitable animals were to be sacrificed. He also commanded that the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem be converted into a pagan temple (Miller, 1968). The observance of the Sabbath and Festivals, the dietary laws, circumcision, the laws of family purity, and others were singled out for prohibition. All copies of the Torah were to be burned and anyone found possessing these books would be executed. Even to profess one's Jewishness was punishable by death (Scherman et al., 1982).

This form of anti-Jewish oppression was distinctly different from the attempted Persian genocide. In Persia the Jewish body was to be annihilated, while under Greek rule the Jewish spirit was to be dismembered. Nevertheless, according to the Egyptian archetype both Persian and Greek forms of anti-Jewish hostility follow a common pattern. The pattern begins with an innocuous attempt to foster total Jewish assimilation into the majority culture. When Jewish separatism obstinately continues (in some manner or form) the Jewish lifestyle and/or presence is seen as a competitive threat and relentlessly attacked. Accordingly, both the Persian and Greek empires (like their predecessor in Egypt) enacted unbearably harsh legislation in their attempt to

deal with this Jewish "backward" type of philosophy and lifestyle which was said to be "contaminating" the "progressively minded" majority population. And both forms of oppression (i.e., of body and of spirit) were used in Egypt some one thousand years prior.

Antiochus (like his predecessor) did not succeed in uprooting the Jewish spirit or collective body. Mattisyahu the Hasmonean, with his five sons led a relatively small group of militarily undisciplined zealots against the vastly superior Syrian-Greek army and miraculously prevailed (Josephus, 1970). (This victory in behalf of the Jewish spirit is celebrated today and better known as Chanukah.)

Roman Anti-Jewish Hostility

During the next hundred years the Land of Israel (better known as Judea) was ruled by an independent Jewish government (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1973), but the Roman Eagle was concurrently conquering the already severed Grecian empire (Josephus, 1970). In 63 B.C.E. the Roman general Pompey was invited, by the Jews of Judea, to intervene in a civil war that was taking place among the Jews themselves. Unfortunately for the Jews, Pompey did not leave after helping to quell the internal strife, but ended up conquering the land in a battle which exacted tens of thousands of Jewish lives (Scherman et al., 1982). Once again the sovereign state of Judea was reduced to an autonomous vassal state,

but this time under the auspices of the mighty Roman empire (Josephus, 1970). Theoretically, the Jewish people should have been able to live peaceably under Roman rule, despite economic hardships and loss of national self respect, as they did for a time under both Persian and Greek rule (Scherman et al., 1982). Although possible, it did not work out that way for the spirit of unity and independence was a constant irritation to the Roman proconsuls governing Judea (Scherman et al., 1982). Rome made many attempts to fully integrate Judea into its vast empire, but each attempt to erase Jewish national identity was countered by a stronger Jewish resistance.

When Rome realized that Jewish separatism (i.e., national identity) was not to be easily uprooted via peaceful methods other more forceful tactics were implemented. Following therefrom, the Roman proconsul Gabinius decided to abolish the spiritual core of the land which was the Sanhedrin (i.e., the Jewish Supreme Court). He reasoned that by stripping the Court of all its powers the people would be lost, and would consequently become as docile and submissive as other conquered nations under Roman jurisdiction (Scherman et al., 1982). This strategy was unsuccessful for the driving force of Judaism (i.e., the Oral Law tradition) which propelled and directed the High Court was continually being propagated by the scholars (i.e., the Pharisees), and was still the lifeblood for most of the people.

The years between 60 B.C.E, to 70 C.E. proved a perilous period for the Jewish nation. The Romans were unrelenting in their efforts to subjugate the minds and bodies of the people under their dominion, and the Jewish nation proved equally as obstinate in their refusal to be completely taken over. This set the stage for many brutal battles between the two nations in which literally hundreds of thousands of Jews were slaughtered (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1973), and reached its climax in the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem (70 C.E.). In addition to the slain, many more were taken captive before the Jerusalem siege. Tens of thousands were sold into slavery, sent to toil in ships and mines, or presented as gifts to non-Jewish cities adjacent to Judea to fight against wild animals in their amphitheatres. Cities and villages were burnt and destroyed either in the course of the war or afterwards as acts of revenge and intimidation (Encyclopedica Judaica, 1972). The tortures inflicted on the Jews in order to compel them to transgress their Oral Law tradition reached an apex of barbarity (Josephus, 1970). Not contented with the above destruction the Romans searched out the Jewish families said to be descended from the house of David in order to eradicate the last remnant of hope for the restoration of the Davidic Kingdom (Scherman et al., 1982).

As uncanny as it may seem, the Jews already protacted appearance in the annals of history was far from over. Al-

though several Jewish sects which had broken from the Oral Law tradition had been abandoned, the scholars were busily rebuilding the Jewish nation. Their revived communal life was reconstructed outside of Jerusalem in Yavneh. Unfortunately again for the Romans, the scholars reawakened the people's national spirit as well. During the ensuing sixty years (70 C.E. to 130 C.E.) Jews started buying up and cultivating the land of Judea once again. They flocked once again to Jerusalem in the hope of rebuilding the Temple under the jurisdiction of Hadrian the Roman emperor. However, within a relatively short period of time Hadrian abandoned his plan of rebuilding Jerusalem as a Jewish city, and instead decided to continue its construction as a pagan Roman city (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1973).

Within that sixty year interval the Jewish people had consolidated their resources and under Simeon bar Kosiba succeeded in liberating the whole of Judea, which for a very short three year period came under independent Jewish rule (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1973). But, once again the Roman empire prevailed destroying 985 of Judea's most important settlements. Hundreds of thousands of Jews were once again killed and according to the Talmud on the ninth of Av (the summer of 135 C.E.), the anniversary of the destruction of both the First and Second Temples in Jerusalem, the last stronghold (Bethar) was captured (Ta'anith 26B). The Romans, determined not to make the same mistake, massacred large popu-

lations, laid the land waste, sent great numbers of Jews off to slave markets, and under Hadrian launched an all-out war against the study and observance of Jewish law. Jews were forbidden to live in Jerusalem, and in order to blot out all reference of the Jews' relationship to the Land of Israel (Judea), changed its name to Syria Palaestina.

The Roman empire eventually faded from history and its indigenous and conquered populations adopted (or were forced to adopt) new political leadership fostering foreign ideologies, novel individual and group mores, and untried innovative religions. Ironically, its fierce little opponent, the people of Israel, continued as before (and even flourished in an intellectual, spiritual, and communal sense) as a distinct civilization based exclusively on the Oral Law. Another, almost miraculous, phenomenon is that the Land of Israel (Syria Palaestina) after being laid waste by Rome was to remain neglected for the next 1,750 years (despite Arab propaganda to the contrary), was never to become a sovereign or even autonomous separate political entity (until the creation of the modern State of Israel in 1948), and continued to be the lifeblood (together with the Bible and Talmud) of the Jewish people throughout its 1,800 year sojourn in the Diaspora.

A descriptive example to support the above point comes from Mark Twain in his The Innocents Abroad, who after visiting Palestine in 1867 described it as:

. . . [a] desolate country whose soil is rich enough, but is given over wholly to weeds--a silent mournful expanse. . . . A desolation is here that not even imagination can grace with the pomp of life and action. . . . We never saw a human being on the whole route. . . . There was hardly a tree or a shrub anywhere. Even the olive and the cactus, those fast friends of a worthless soil, had almost deserted the country. (Davis, 1984, p. 10)

Another example comes from a Report of the Palestine Royal Commission which quotes an account of the Palestine Maritime Plain of 1913:

The road leading from Gaza to the north was only a summer track suitable for transport by camels and carts . . . no orange groves, orchards, or vineyards were to be seen until one reached Yabna village. . . . Houses were all of mud. . . . The sanitary conditions in the village were horrible. Schools did not exist. . . . The western part, towards the sea, was almost a desert. . . . Many ruins of villages were scattered over the area, as owing to the prevalence of malaria, many villages were deserted by their inhabitants. (Davis, 1984, p. 10)

The British Government's Director of Development, Louis French, wrote in 1931 concerning the Arab inhabitants of Palestine:

We found it inhabited by Fellahin who lived in mud hovels and suffered severely from the prevalent malaria. . . . Large areas . . . were uncultivated. . . . The Fellahin, if not themselves cattle thieves, were always ready to harbor these and other criminals. The individual plots . . . changed hands annually. There was little public security, and the Fellahins lot was an alternation of pillage and blackmail by their neighbors, the Bedouin. (Davis, 1984, p. 10)

In short, in almost supernatural terms, the flowering and populating of the land took place before the Jews were expelled en masse, and its regeneration occurred only with the massive return of the Jews to the region in the twentieth century.

Although Jewish suffering at the hands of Rome was much more intense than the oppression meted out by the other previous empires, Roman persecution does not deviate in kind from the Egyptian anti-Jewish paradigm discussed above. The irrepressible desire to mold the Jewish people to be and act like the ruling power became the catalyst for oppression aimed at destroying the Jewish national identity and the unique Jewish spirit. Despite the fact that hundreds of thousands of Jews were slain in battle or savagely massacred, Rome's objective never seemed to be the eradication of the Jewish collective body. Rather, these methods were used exclusively as a means to break the distinctive Jewish national identity and spirit.

For the next 1,800 years (i.e., from 135 C.E. to the establishment of the modern Jewish state in 1948) Jews, together with their Oral Law traditions wandered, literally, around the world. Jewish wandering was usually precipitated by fierce spiritual and physical persecution or by forced expulsion. A partial understanding of the Jewish 1,800 year exile is reflected in the many lands from which they were expelled in light of their refusal to totally assimilate.

In the third century (C.E.) they were expelled from Carthage (North Africa), in the fifth century from Alexandria (Egypt), in the sixth from provinces in France, and in the seventh from the Visigothic empire. In the ninth century they were expelled from Italy, in the eleventh from Mayence

(Germany), in the twelfth from France, the thirteenth from England, the fourteenth from France, Switzerland, Hungary, Germany, and in the fifteenth from Austria, Spain, Lithuania, Portugal, and Germany. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Jewish populations were expelled from Bohemia, Austria, Papal States, the Netherlands, the Ukraine, Lithuania, and Oran (North Africa). In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries they were expelled from Russia, Warsaw (Poland), and Galatz (Romania). In the twentieth century all Jews living in Nazi-controlled areas were relocated as a step to Hitler's Final Solution, and in 1948, in order to escape severe anti-Jewish persecution, hundreds of thousands of Jews escaped with their lives (while leaving their possessions behind) from the lands of Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq (Grosser et al., 1978).

Christian Anti-Jewish Hostility

The next epoch of anti-Jewish hostility which lasted for approximately 1,500 years (from approximately 400 C.E. to 1900) was probably the most unfortunate and unforgettable oppression the Jews had experienced heretofore. Unfortunate, because the non-Jewish world never had a chance to objectively study and learn from the psychological, sociological, and philosophical systems embodied in the Oral Law tradition (the Talmud). Unforgettable, because the group perpetrating this oppression was a direct outgrowth of Judaism itself,

and when all the auxillary manifestations (which came about only after the foundations were set) are removed, may be justifiably called a form of Judaism not too distinct from other historical Jewish groups who had broken with the Oral Law tradition (the main difference was that the other groups died out whereas Christianity became a non-Jewish religion).

This new form of religion (i.e., Christianity) centers in the person of Jesus Christ. Jesus, however, was not a Christian but a Jew. It appears historically that Jesus had no intention of breaking with Judaism and that he would have been profoundly shocked to know that his works and teachings would become the basis for rejecting Judaism (Lamprecht, 1955). Being that Christianity in its Pauline form is based on the spirit of the Jewish Law while rejecting the letter of the Law, the remarks in Mathew 5:17-18 would not have spuriously been attributed to Jesus if they were not true:

Think not that I am come to destroy the Law, or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill. For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the Law, till all be fulfilled.

Any orthodox Jew of today following the precepts of Oral Law Judaism would feel right at home with the above statements. There is no doubt that Jesus did break with the Sages in his interpretation of the fundamental significance of the Law, but he was at best a revolutionary force within, not against, Judaism. This is seen, clearly, in Matthew 15:24: "I am not sent but unto the lost sheep of the

house of Israel [i.e., as their Messiah]." Similarly the Apostles, the group of disciples chosen by Christ to preach his Gospel were Jewish and their message (in the beginning at least) was directed exclusively at the Jewish people. Only after the great majority of Jews, led by the scholars, refused to accept their brand of Judaism did they then preach to the non-Jewish Roman population. Other movements in Judaism had sprung up over the centuries (particularly during the great Roman persecutions which were right before and after the destruction of the Temple), but none had succeeded in swaying Jewish popular opinion (for any lengths of time) from the Oral Law tradition as communicated and passed down by the scholars in each generation.

The Jewish Christian movement, unlike the others, when confronted with Jewish mainstream resistance turned to the non-Jews, but their relationship to Judaism was still far from severed. The Founding Fathers of Christianity (i.e., the Apostles) were split on the desired relationship to Oral Law Judaism, and two schools of thought (i.e., the Petrine and Pauline doctrines) hotly competed to become the official dogma of the up and coming Catholic Church (Ruether, 1979; Gager, 1983). The accepted argument is that the Petrine (as advanced by Peter) school of thought rigorously advocated a Judaized Christianity where both Jew and Gentile would be obligated to observe the Law, whereas the Pauline doctrine,

which eventually prevailed, called for a complete abrogation of the Law.

Although this has been the accepted argument for millennia it has recently been called into question by John G. Gager (1983) who brings strong support to justify his claim that the Pauline doctrine of Christianity had been considerably doctored by later Church Fathers, who desirous to wean the people from any Judaizing influence recreated a Paul totally antagonistic to Pharisaical (Oral Law) Judaism. Gager concludes that Paul's real intent was to propagate the message of Torah (based on the Oral Law) for Jews and Christ for Gentiles, but that the consequence of any positive Judaizing effect on the new burgeoning religion was too threatening for the later church fathers to handle, and demanded to be wiped out in-toto.

The importance of the above cannot be over-estimated for it expresses the inextricable relationship of Christianity in its pure form via both the Petrine and Pauline schools of thought to mainstream (Oral Law) Judaism. The difference being that this new sect of Jews (and only later Gentiles) believed that Jesus was the Messiah, and although they did make inroads among Jews, the great majority refused to accept Jesus as the Messiah. According to Gager both Petrine and Pauline doctrines, which lay at the foundation of true Christianity as propagated by Jesus and his Apostles are not inherently anti-Jewish, but ironically philo-Jewish in their

relationship to Jewish Law (Peter) and benevolently tolerant of the Pharasaic Oral Law system (Paul). It was only after the Apostles, when Christianity in the second and third centuries began to sever itself completely from Judaism did total intolerance of Judaism and the Jewish people begin (Flannery, 1965; Gager, 1983). The early Church Fathers (as distinct from the Petrine and Pauline doctrines) while trying to consolidate Christianity and formulate one official church dogma, viewed the Judaizing influence in Christianity (as fostered by Christians not Jews) as an intolerable competitive threat. This was especially true all the while a viable Jewish people following their own traditions existed (Flannery, 1965). To uproot the Jewish tradition from Christianity meant to uproot Christianity, but to accept it as legitimate meant to shed doubt on the Church's role as the new Israel. The only alternative was to claim that the Church had replaced the old Israel because of the latter's "grievous sins," and particularly the abomination of Deicide (Flannery, 1965). Only through conversion could Jews redeem themselves in this world and the next. It appears that it was this total severance of Christianity from Judaism which eventually supplied the justification for the ensuing discrimination, persecution, and massacre of Jews in the name of Christianity.

Before proceeding further, it is important to briefly note Judaism's view of Christianity for the point is not often made in discussing Christian anti-Jewish hostility,

and when discussed is oftentimes misleading. The Church's guilt for the oppression of Jews from the fourth century onward (after it had become the state religion of Rome) is sometimes mitigated by relating individual and local Jewish hostility towards Christians during the first and second centuries. This approach is misleading for the Jewish persecution of "Christians" (which is infinitesimally insignificant to the latter's persecution of Jews) was not aimed, by any stretch of the imagination, at the Church. This was rather the result of infighting among Jews themselves as to which movement in Judaism was to prevail. This was not an unusual occurrence in Judaism (especially at that critical period in time) where historically other Jewish movements (e.g., Hellenists, Sadducees), who claimed parity or even the right to succeed the "antiquated" Oral Law tradition, went to battle (both figuratively and literally) against the scholars and their adherents, and which at times had bloody consequences.

However, Oral Law Judaism's view of Christianity as a legitimate religious creed for non-Jews is completely different. Not only is the Oral tradition tolerant of other monotheistic religions, but states explicitly that all non-Jews, obeying the seven general commandments (e.g., prohibition against killing, stealing, etc.) handed down to the sons of Noah have a portion in the world to come (Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin). In addition, several of the greatest Talmudic scholars throughout history (e.g., Moses Nachmonides)

have explicitly stated that Christianity (the very religion in whose name the Jewish people have endured untold oppression) is a permissible religion for non-Jews, and may be conceived as a positive phenomenon "in fulfillment of G-d's ultimate purpose" (Kaplan, 1979). Paradoxically, as is the case with most of Jewish history, the above Pauline doctrine (as reevaluated by Gager [1983]) seems to be a near perfect fit (i.e., Oral Law Judaism for Jews alongside a Gentile population imbued with the Christian spirit). Unfortunately for the Jewish body and Gentile soul this perfect fit never actualized, and only their total differentiation based on the "despicable" Jewish character in concert with the Jewish "heinous" type of lifestyle regulated the relationship between the two.

The pattern of Christian anti-Jewish hostilities reflects the pattern of oppression mentioned above in relation to Egypt, Persia, Greece, and Rome and only in its intensity and extensiveness may qualify as a different form of oppression. The general themes of anti-Jewish hostility discussed above are all present here:

1. The Jews refuse to assimilate (i.e., convert) into the ever-growing Christian empire.
2. The Church feels threatened and reacts accordingly.
3. This reaction takes two of the three forms mentioned above:

- A. the attempt to uproot any positive national identity via ghettoization or expulsion,
 - B. the attempt to break the distinctive Jewish spirit via bookburning (specifically the Talmud), forced conversions, and monetary and physical persecutions,
4. The continuity and flowering (in the intellectual and spiritual sense) of Oral Law Judaism.

According to Grosser and Halperin (1978), during the early Christian period (325-500) after Christianity had been adopted as the official state religion of Rome:

- A. Christians were forbidden to interact with Jews.
- B. State policy restricted the political and civil rights of Jews.
- C. Jews were forbidden to live in Jerusalem.
- D. Marriage between a Jew and Gentile was punishable by death.
- E. Forced conversions were carried out, and
- F. Sporadic Christian mobs attacked Jewish quarters and synagogues.

The Dark Ages (500-1000) ushered in a new era of Christian anti-Jewish hostility. In light of political instability at the time of what was the Eastern and Western halves of the Roman empire the Church proved to be the major unifying and stabilizing force. Jewish settlements, at the time, existed throughout the Empire in virtually every province and city.

Although Jews were declared enemies of the state for refusing to convert to Christianity the hostility at this time seems to be an elitist phenomenon with an absence of popular anti-Jewish feelings. Support comes from the almost constant and repetitive royal and Church decrees commanding the faithful and lower clergy to refrain from interacting and from maintaining friendly relations with Jews (Grosser et al., 1978).

It is also important to note the gradual development of Christian anti-Jewish hostilities at this point, for it mirrors the above Egyptian paradigm. During the early Christian period (325-500) activity was limited to discrimination in which the Jewish national identity was severely threatened. The Land of Israel could no longer be called a Jewish state (except in the minds of the Jews themselves), and their civil, economic, political, and even marital rights were significantly restricted, making them totally dependent on the arbitrary whims of the ruling power. The refusal to convert brought in its wake greater oppression where the primary objective was no longer to break the Jew's sense of national identity, but rather to break his Talmudic spirit rendering him maleable to Christian influence. Forced conversions, confiscation of land, childnapping, and prohibitions against observing the precepts of the Oral Law were some of the more salient forms of persecution used to destroy the people's distinctiveness.

Following therefrom, when this plan of action failed, the body of the Jew became endangered. Although there does not appear to be any direct decree issuing from the Church to annihilate the Jews, the random torture and slaughter of literally hundreds of thousands of Jews during the Crusades (1000-1348), the Black Death (the Bubonic Plague) (1348-1357), the Inquisition (1366-1500), and the Eastern European pogroms (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) in the name of Christianity (Grosser et al., 1978) seems to belie the declared objective of spreading Christianity throughout the Jewish world.

More astonishing than the brutal persecutions wrought on the Jewish people was their superhuman tenacity to persevere. While Christianity was losing its political clout with the formation of nation-states in the latter part of the Middle Ages and was being internally ruptured by the up and coming Protestant movement, the Jews in their poverty and total insecurity were turning out Talmudic scholars and literature which most contemporary Talmudic scholars consider vastly superior to the Jewish scholarship of today. (For example, present day Talmudists would be seriously hampered in understanding Talmudic literature if it were not for these medieval commentators who in light of their scope of knowledge from primary Talmudic sources were able to explain and clarify the intricacies and dialectics of Talmud to future generations.)

Muslim Anti-Jewish Hostility

Islam was the second major religion to spring forth from Judaism (Prager et al., 1983), but as distinct from Christianity, its founder was not a Jew and it was not originally a Jewish sect. Islam, like Christianity had a universal mission to save the world, but in contrast to Christianity was armed with the sword of the state almost at its inception (Grosser et al., 1978).

With the advent of Islam in the seventh century C.E. there was a large Jewish population in Medina where the first Muslim community was established (Prager et al., 1983). Muhammad, the founder of Islam, was greatly influenced by Jewish religious practices and ideas (Flannery, 1965). Moses is mentioned in the Quran (The Muslim scripture) over one hundred times and presents the predominant figure in it (Prager et al., 1983). In the Quran (Sura 46:11) Muhammad writes "Yet before it was the Book of Moses for a model and a mercy; and this is a Book [i.e., the Quran] confirming." Muhammad also adopted the Jews' founding Father Abraham as the new faith's founding father, and in complete disrespect for the Hebrew Scriptures from which he based his new religion, inserted Ishmael as one of the Hebrew Patriarchs (Baidawi on Sura 2:27), and subsequently traced his own geneology through Ishmael to Abraham. Muhammad also granted legitimacy to Christianity and although he denied the divinity of Jesus, he accepted the Nazarene as the last of the Hebrew

prophets while considering himself the Messenger of G-d and "the Seal of all the Prophets." Paradoxically while accepting most of the narratives of the Hebrew Bible he accused the Jews of deleting from the Bible predictions of his coming (Katsh, 1962).

According to Abraham Katsh (1962)

Muhammad never intended to establish Islam as a new religion. He considered himself the rightful custodian of the Book sent by Allah (G-d) to "confirm" the Scriptures. It is for this reason that in the beginning he saw no difference between Judaism and Christianity and believed that both Jews and Christians would welcome him. It is only later, when he realized that he could never gain support from either of them, that he presented Islam as a new Faith. (Introduction, p. 10)

For example, in the early days Muhammad's followers prayed in the direction of the Jew's holy city, Jerusalem, and observed the most solemn Jewish holiday, Yom Kippur. Only when Muhammad concluded that the Jews were unwilling to accept him as their prophet did he substitute Mecca for Jerusalem, and the Fast of Ramadan for Yom Kippur (Prager et al., 1983). It is important to note that Judaism was not intolerant of Islam as a viable monotheistic faith for non-Jews (as was the case concerning Christianity), but only rejected Islam as a substitution for the over two thousand year old tradition of Oral Law Judaism.

The consequence of the Jews' rejection of Islam was almost inevitable. No group could validate Muhammad's claims as could the Jews, and no group could so seriously undermine his claims as the Jews could. As a result Muhammad turned

against them. His hostile reactions concerning the Jews' rejection of him and his teachings were then recorded in the Quran, giving Muslims throughout history divinely based antipathy towards Jews everywhere (Prager et al, 1983).

In response to the Jewish refusal to convert, the Jewish communities in the area of Medina were attacked and either slaughtered or forced to migrate. The Jews living north of Kaibher were besieged by the Army of Islam and the siege was eventually lifted in exchange for tribute. After Muhammad's death the Kaibhar Jewish community was expelled and the northern Arabian peninsula was purged of all infidels (Grosser et al., 1978).

Although there were periodic physical persecutions, mass expulsions, and massacres of Jews in the name of Islam from the eighth through the nineteenth century (Grosser et al., 1978) in Muslim dominated lands, the primary focus of Muslim anti-Jewish hostility was one of political subjugation, social humiliation, and officially decreed religious inferiority (Peters, 1976). Islam's anti-Jewish activities focused almost exclusively on Jewish independence. Jews and Christians were able to physically exist in Muslim lands as "people of the book" as opposed to pagans who would have to choose Islam or the sword. They were also officially allowed (though not always in practice) religious freedom, thus allowing them to continue their Oral Law tradition. Thus it appears that Islam did not feel the need to attack the Jewish spirit

via religious persecution or to annihilate the Jewish collective body. Islam only required that Jews and Christians alike be relegated to inferior positions in society in order to retain a secure position as the true religion.

Official Islamic legislation which delineated the restriction of liberties and conditions of life, for Jews and Christians, were proclaimed in the seventh-century Covenant of Omar (Muhammad's successor) which if transgressed was punishable by death. According to the Covenant, Jews were compelled to wear a distinctive costume with a ribbon, and a yellow piece of cloth as a badge, they were not permitted to perform their religious practices in public, or to own a horse; they were forbidden to drink wine in public; and they were required to bury their dead without allowing their grief to be heard by Muslims. Islam's law decreed the lightest of penalties for killing a non-Muslim, and the testimony of a non-Muslim against a Muslim was considered invalid. As payment for being allowed to live, the non-Muslim paid a special head and property tax. These and other harsh restrictions of the Covenant were carried down through the centuries, and implemented with varying degrees of cruelty depending upon the particular Muslim ruler (Peters, 1976). The guiding principle of Islam's treatment of Jews and Christians was (and is) that Islam dominates and is not to be dominated. Once non-Muslims were willing to forfeit the civil liberties enjoyed by the Muslim majority they were able to physically

and even spiritually exist, but once Jews would receive equal status in Muslim dominated territory, and needless to say, once they would forge their own independent state in the area, the Jewish "threat" would become overly intimidating and unbearable.

This is what actually happened in the twentieth century with the mass immigration of Jews back to their historic homeland. The "demeaned subjects" had the impudence to claim independence over "Muslim land." As Yehoshafat Harbabi, a leading scholar of the contemporary Arab world put it: "A Jewish state is incompatible with the view of Jews as humiliated or wretched" (Prager et al., 1983, p. 123). All the while Jews and Christians were subjugated to Muslims in the Middle East, Islam could claim (via extensive rationalizations) superiority as the true faith, which had displaced the older monotheistic creeds. With the advent of Israel as an independent Jewish state the foundations of Islam were shaken. The "inferior" somehow prevailed casting serious doubt on the legitimacy of Islam, and with each successive Muslim defeat the tension became that much greater. Consequently, Muslim anti-Jewish hostility has reached such proportions over the last sixty years that today it is not only three million Israeli Jews who are endangered but, in light of Arab fanaticism, the entire world.

According to the above historical account it was not out of some utilitarian strategy manipulated to foster uni-

fication that Khomeini in his book Confronting Israel proclaimed:

Oh brothers! Let us not regard this holy and sacrificial war as a war between Arabs and Israel. Let us regard it as a war of all Moslems together against Jews and their leaders. It is the responsibility of all the Islamic governments with their peoples, with all their forces, and potential to aid and support Fedayeen (guerillas) on the lines of fire. (Davis, 1984, p. 133)

The similarities between Muslim anti-Jewish hostility and those preceding it are clearly visible. Judaism was considered a serious competitive threat to Islam from its inception. At the outset Jews (and Christians) obstinately refused to accept the majority religion even amidst harsh persecution and discrimination. Also, the type of anti-Jewish (or in this case anti-non-Muslim) hostility was one of the three forms delineated above, where strict limitations of civil liberties and a total negation of Jewish statehood (i.e., nationalism) were diligently enforced. Although religious and physical attacks have been constant since the early part of the twentieth century, the attacks are not targeted specifically at the Jewish body or religion (as distinct from Christianity), but rather at Jewish statehood which is anathema to any G-d fearing Muslim.

Another common theme present here is the tenacity of the Jewish people. Although it appears almost anticlimatic when placed vis a vis Jewish pertinacity prior to Islam, the remarkable perseverance of the Jews can also be seen here when compared to Christian communities residing in

Middle East "Muslim territory." As mentioned above Muslim anti-Jewish legislation also applied to Christians. However, whereas Jewish communities often flourished (in spiritual terms), few Christian communities even managed to survive amidst Muslim hostility. The above is often lost sight of when favorably comparing Islam's anti-Jewish hostility with Christian activity, but the conversion to Islam of nearly every pre-Islamic Christian community in the Muslim world bears testimony to what the Jewish people endured under Muslim oppression (Prager et al., 1983).

Russian and Communist Anti-Jewish Hostility

Just as many scholars in the world of science today hold on almost religiously to the basics of Darwin's theory of evolution, [though plagued today with more problems than it had when it was originally formulated (Marcell, 1978; Goldman, 1978; Spetner, 1978)], many also implicitly believe in the tenets of social Darwinism, which loosely speaking stresses an evolution of progress in the social realm as well (Mason 1968). Both in Europe and America with the advent of the industrial revolution, a promising economic order via capitalism, political upheavals ushering in democracy and socialism, and all pervaded by a spirit of enlightened liberalism, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were to be a positive turning point for mankind. Unfortunately for the Jews it turned in the wrong direction. For the Jew the

nineteenth and particularly the twentieth century would wreak the likes of discrimination, persecution, and massacre heretofore never experienced.

From almost the beginning of Russia's history, a tradition of autocracy and devotion to Eastern Orthodox Christianity shaped a policy of suspicion toward European influence and specifically toward Judaism (Flannery, 1965). This distrust was heightened, almost to the point of paranoia when Poland was partitioned in the late eighteenth century. Russia then became governor over the largest body of Jews in the world. Almost simultaneously with their admission into the new empire Jews were restricted to live only in the newly won provinces, the "Pale of Settlement" (Flannery, 1965). Even within the Pale itself, Jews suffered severe economic restrictions, extra taxes, and other hardships. For example, in 1808 the Czar, Alexander I issued an edict for the expulsion of the Jews from the villages and countryside and approximately a half million were driven like cattle into the cities and left in the open squares (Grosser et al., 1978).

Alexander's successor Nicholas I introduced hundreds of disabling laws curbing Jewish activities and went further than his predecessors, who in most part only stripped the Jews of their civil liberties to live, own land and work where and as they pleased. Nicholas I determined to complete the Russification of the Jews attacked the Jewish spirit by forcibly conscripting Jewish youths of twelve and even nine

to an extended military service of twenty-five years (the twenty-five year obligation did not begin until the boy turned eighteen). These boys were brought to the farthest outpost of the empire, and beaten and tortured in an effort to "persuade" them to convert to Russian Orthodoxy (Flannery, 1965; Grosser et al., 1978). When Nicholas failed to break the Jewish Oral Law spirit (i.e., they obstinately refused to convert) he turned his attention to Jewish education. He decreed that Jewish children were only to go to special Jewish schools where Talmud was not to be taught, and where Judaism was taught according to Russian Orthodoxy (Flannery, 1965; Grosser et al., 1978). Nicholas eventually abolished the state schools, for conversion was not being achieved.

A third type of Russian anti-Jewish activity was initiated in 1881, when Czar Alexander III, under the influence of his chief advisor Pobedonstsev, formulated his "anti-revolutionary program" with its primary target Russian Jewry. The Jewish problem was to be simply solved, one-third was to emigrate, one-third was to die, and one-third was to convert (Flannery, 1965). On Easter of 1881 the massacres commenced and over a twenty-five year period (1881-1906) thousands of Jews were murdered while tens of thousands were left maimed and destitute (Grosser et al., 1978).

In 1915 Grand Duke Sergei, Commander-in-chief of Russia's military, relocated 600,000 Jews to interior Russia. Approximately 100,000 Jews died from exposure or starvation

during the relocation (Grosser et al., 1978). In 1917, during the Russian Revolution massacres of Jews were organized and implemented by the Ukrainians and the Whites. In the Ukraine 200,000 Jews were slaughtered, and 300,000 children were left homeless and orphaned. During the Revolution and the ensuing civil war Jewish civilian populations were accused by both sides as being members of the opposing forces, and were accordingly dealt with. During this period it was considered a mercy to be killed outright instead of gradually being tortured to death. Parents were forced to watch the torture of their children, and children of their parents. Jewish women were subjected to obscene acts and mutilation before they were granted the privilege to die (Grosser et al., 1978).

It was within the above context that the Russian people collectively "converted" to Marxism and set out, like their predecessors to bring salvation to the world. Paradoxically, the pious Russian populace, metamorphosed almost overnight from devout religionists into progressive communists (i.e., the transition from Eastern Orthodoxy to Communism over a relatively short period of time did not appear particularly overbearing). The Jews, on the other hand, remained "infamously" Jewish. The only real change was that while the pre-revolutionary chauvinistic Russia attacked only those Jews residing within the borders of the Russian empire, the Marxist Russia would strike at Jews everywhere.

As depicted above the Jewish presence appeared too intimidating for Russian governments of the nineteenth century to peaceably cohabit with, and their paranoia was blatantly transparent. With the inception of the Marxist doctrine, the Russian government needed no longer to fear the indignation and repulsion of the Western world for oppressing Jews. They were now universalists, furthering the idealism of one of the century's greatest thinkers, and like a chapter out of a fiction novel, the ideology just happened to be inherently anti-Jewish.

Karl Marx, a Jew, whose father had him baptized at the age of six in order that he should not have to suffer from anti-Jewish oppression (Prager et al., 1983) became the new legitimizing force aimed at uprooting and destroying the Jewish "cancer." Karl Marx, who descended from a long list of distinguished rabbis (McLellan, 1973), but who knew little of the Oral Law tradition argued against emancipation for the Jews until they abandon their "exclusive religion, morality, and customs" (Rotenstreich, 1983).

Marx theorized that the role of economics had been the key determinant in the development of human history. He believed that world peace could be achieved once man would restructure the economic order (Fisch, 1984). Therefore, when he wrote in his book On the Jewish Question:

It is from its own entrails that civil society ceaselessly engenders the Jew. . . .

Money is the jealous god of Israel, beside which no other god may exist. . . .

The chimerical nationality of the Jew is the nationality of the trader, and above all of the financier.

. . .
As soon as society succeeds in abolishing the empirical essence of Judaism-huckstering and its conditions--the Jew becomes impossible, because his consciousness no longer has an object. (Bottomore, 1964, pp. 36-40)

he irrevocably set the stage for hostility toward Jews in all lands his theories were accepted.

Marxist nations today attack the Jewish people via all three anti-Jewish strategies mentioned above. They attempt to break Jewish nationalism by defining Zionism as "a reactionary movement . . . which denies the class struggle and strives to isolate the Jewish working masses from the general struggle of the proletariat" (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 1952, p. 144 in Prager et al., 1983). The Soviets continue on this line of strategy in associating Zionism with Nazism, and ever since the Six-Day War in 1967, the Soviet media has consistently referred to the Jewish State as a Hitlerian state (Prager et al., 1983). In addition, requests by Soviet Jews to immigrate to Israel are fraught with hardships ranging from losing one's job, to an extended prison term, to exile in Siberia.

Concomitantly, the Soviets have been continually attempting to destroy the Jewish Oral Law spirit. Synagogues are seized and converted into Communist Youth Clubs. Rabbis and religious teachers are imprisoned. All forms of Jewish education are barred, and the teaching of the Hebrew language

is outlawed (Fisch, 1984). Their attempt to annihilate the Jewish collective body is more indirect today, but equally as contemptible as their other anti-Jewish activities. They do this by providing untold amounts of organizational and military training together with sophisticated military hardware to Israel's most hostile Arab adversaries, while these adversaries openly call for the complete liquidation of Israel. Although it is tempting to say that the Soviet Union's opposition to Israel is based primarily on Israel's form of government together with its close ties to the United States, the fact that Soviet verbal and active antagonism toward Israel has immeasurably exceeded its opposition to other American allies seem to imply otherwise.

After describing both Muslim and Marxist's sources and type of anti-Jewish hostility, it is interesting to note an overt historical contradiction. Following from the above analysis it should have been clear that any effort to create a third Jewish commonwealth in the Middle East would be met with zealous and unrelenting opposition from both Muslim and Marxist camps. If the people of Israel posed a dire threat in a stateless and powerless condition, how overwhelmingly intimidating they would be when living independently in their own land. Although these logical consequences should have been foreseen, they were not. In fact, Theodore Herzl, the father of "modern" Jewish nationalism (and also a Jew who knew little of Oral Law Judaism), and his successors declared

throughout the decades preceding the establishment of Israel, that the creation of a Jewish homeland was the only effective response to anti-Jewish hostility (Grayzel, 1968). With all due respect to the Founding Fathers, modern history tends to support the above analysis that not only has a Jewish state failed to reduce anti-Jewish hostility, but it may be argued that the founding of Israel has actually exacerbated the already precarious Jewish predicament.

German Nazi Anti-Jewish Hostility

Theoretically, the juxtaposition of Soviet leftist ideology with Nazi rightwing fanaticism appears absurd. Is it logically possible (barring war-time alliances) for two radical movements which are ideologically at opposite ends of the spectrum, and accordingly anathema to one other claim as their most inherent enemy the same seemingly innocuous Jewish people? More ridiculous, it seems, is that each movement casts on the Jews the guise of the other. Soviet leftists have often referred to Jews as Nazi collaborators and Israel as a Hitlerian state (e.g., Will, 1979; Kochan, 1967), and Nazis have often referred and continue to refer to Jews everywhere as Communists (e.g., Anti Defamation League, 1982).

According to the present historical analysis this apparent contradiction is no contradiction. Just as the Russian incapacity to tolerate Judaism in all its various forms predated communism, so to did Hitler's pathological

hostility toward Jews predate Nazi rightwing ideology. Both movements merely bequeathed to their adherents an ideological base, from which to "justify" the persecution and mass slaughter of Jews.

Hitler's paranoia of Jews was unusually blatant from the start. Hitler's Nazism was not an independent movement which gradually incorporated into it anti-Jewish dogma once Jews and their Judaism were deemed intolerable. Rather, the foundation of Hitler's Nazism was specifically Aryan superiority over the Jew and the threat of the "Jewish peril." As early as the 1920s he called for the elimination of the Jews who were "contaminating" the "Aryan race" (Goldberg, 1981).

In Mein Kampf, which Hitler wrote while in prison in 1923-1924, he blamed the defeat of Germany in World War I on the "Marxist leaders," and argued that had "twelve or fifteen thousand of these Jews who were corrupting the nation been forced to submit to poison gas," the millions of deaths at the front "would not have been in vain" (Dawidowicz, 1975, p. 3). In Hitler's twisted mind Jew-hatred came first, and only afterwards was Nazi racial ideology required to justify his "final solution." For example, neither the Japanese nor the Arabs were denigrated by the so-called racially ideological Nazis (both were Nazi allies) (Prager et al., 1983). According to Hitlerian logic the racial impurities disseminated by Jews were the Jews' subversive value system and

alien ideas. As Hitler put it, "the Jews speak German, but they think Jewish" (Prager et al., 1983, p. 153).

In truth, the "racial" war of Hitler was focused against the Jew. Most everything Hitler did in the political arena centered around the Jews. Hitler's first political speech as well as his last will and testament contained charges against the Jews. Even the swastika represented for Hitler the battle between the "pure" Germanic race and the "inferior" Jew. In writing about the Nazi flag, he said the swastika symbolizes "the mission to struggle for the victory of the Aryan man and at the same time the victory of the idea of creative work, which is eternally anti-Semitic and always will be anti-Semitic" (Goldberg, 1981, p. 207). Albert Speer, one of Hitler's ministers wrote in Spandau: The Secret Diaries that Hitler was capable of tossing off quite calmly, between the soup and the vegetable course, 'I want to annihilate the Jews in Europe'" (Goldberg, 1981, p. 207).

Fantastic as it may seem, the Nazis under Hitler did not necessarily attack Jews in order to achieve power, but it can be argued that their drive for power was primarily propelled by their passion to destroy Jews (Dawidowicz, 1975). For example, late in the war when the Nazis were being defeated, German troops were deliberately taken from Allied Fronts in order to continue the mass murder of Jews. In 1944, when the Germans needed every one of their trains

in order to evacuate Greece, not one train was diverted from those taking Jews to death camps. And, while addressing the German people for the last time in 1945, Hitler proclaimed:

Above all I charge the leaders of the nation and those under them to scrupulous observance of the laws of race and to the merciless opposition to the universal poisoner of all peoples, international Jewry. (Davidowicz, 1975, p. 28)

The insanity of Hitler abetted by a pervasive anti-Jewish prejudice worldwide (Morse, 1968; Gilbert, 1975) set the stage for the unprecedented massacre of 6,000,000 civilian Jews, in a war which consumed close to 50,000,000 people. In the authors opinion, Hitler's ultimate desire (in brief, making himself god) was aptly expressed in a simplistic but revealing Nazi youth song that went "Pope and Rabbi shall be no more. We want to be pagans once again. No more creeping to churches. We are the joyous Hitler Youth. We do not need any Christian virtues. Our leader, Adolf Hitler, is our Savior" (Prager et al., 1983, p. 160).

There is one minor inconsistency in the present analysis when superimposed on the Nazi German era. The apparent problem seems to be Hitler's explicit intent to exterminate the Jewish people from the outset. He, unlike his predecessors, made no initial attempt to break the national identity of the Jew, and also neglected any attempt to uproot the Jewish Oral Law spirit. This particular deviation is unusual for as illogical as it may seem, Hitler's war of "race" was

based on the unbiological differences in mentality he discerned between the German Jew and the German non-Jew (Prager et al., 1983). Although the German anti-Jewish legislation did follow this pattern (i.e., [1] discrimination and subjugation, [2] physical and religious persecution, and ([3] total annihilation), it was clear from the start (or it is clear now) what Hitler's original intentions actually were.

Hitler's almost immediate intention to annihilate the Jews without going through the above general process is not necessarily problematic, and may in fact, lend support to the analysis. As with other anti-Jewish movements discussed above, Hitler found the Jewish people's failure to totally assimilate (in mind as well as body) unbearably threatening. This Jewish threat throughout history (as discussed above) has taken three forms: (1) Jewish nationalism, (2) Jewish Oral Law tradition, and (3) the Jewish physical presence, and anti-Jewish hostility was always directed against one or more of these three forms. Hitler's immediate intent to annihilate the Jewish Collective Body was possibly because that was what tangibly remained of the Jewish phenomenon in twentieth-century Germany.

In the one hundred years preceding Hitler the newly created Jewish Reform movement succeeded in stripping the Jewish masses in Germany of any separate national consciousness, based on the Jewish relationship to the Land of Israel. It is important to note that the Jews unflinching relationship

to the Land of Israel made them voluntary sojourners in strange lands for 1,800 years. The national and international movements of the world attempted to uproot this "insolent" nationalism by severely restricting Jewish civil liberties (for a subjugated people in a strange land is a far cry from independent nationalists) but failed. In contrast, the Reform movement totally severed its relationship to the "antiquated" Middle East wasteland, and endeavored in body and soul to become as German (or even more-so!) as the Gentile Germans themselves.

The Reform movement in Judaism also denied the Divine origin of the Oral Law, and therefore its observance was not binding. Jews were finally "free" to flex their intellectual muscles in the great universities of Europe. Without Talmud and its concomitant tradition of observance the historical Jewish spirit and character were also lost. Without a trace of Jewish nationalism and stripped of any direct Talmudic influence the Jews absurdly still posed for Hitler a competitive threat. Hitler's paranoia of the Jewish collective presence seemed to find no respite unless all Jews were annihilated. In the end the Hitlerian monster died out, while his crippled and badly beaten arch adversary lived on to create an independent state in the Land of Israel.

Putting the Pieces Together

Just as the subtitle states, in this subsection an

attempt will be made to explain the above historical analysis in order that a parsimonious, and unambiguous theory may emerge. Before proceeding further it should be emphasized that even without the following interpretations, the present historical account has gone two steps further than most others. One, consistent themes throughout history have brought all major periods of anti-Jewish hostility together, and two, the anti-Jewish process is depicted as existing from the inception of Jewish nationhood in ancient Egypt. Irrespective of the above novelties several questions still demand explication before the above historical analysis can be considered a legitimate theory of anti-Jewish hostility. It is the author's opinion that the major questions still needed to be addressed are:

1. Conceptually, what are the social-psychological dynamics underlying the above historical processes?
2. What is the significance of the three target areas (Nationalism, Torah, and Collective Body) which powerful movements throughout history have so diligently attempted to destroy? and
3. Is there any empirical method to test the above theoretical analysis or must it be accepted exclusively on the basis of history?

1. Social-Psychological Dynamics

Conceptually what are the social-psychological dy-

namics underlying the above historical process? As depicted above the primary catalyst of anti-Jewish hostility was Jewish distinctiveness and the psychological threat it posed to national and international movements whose objective to totally dominate ran counter and collided with Jewish separatism. Two political and/or religious entities claiming "chosenness" (albeit in highly disparate ways) are, by definition, contradictory and throw doubt, from external and internal sources alike, on the true nature of the entities involved.

In order to bring the world over to their way of thinking these anti-Jewish movements were psychologically pressured to crush all forms of resistance. As John Horrocks (1966, p. viii) put it, "Social norms that support group self-concepts of superiority or nurture group awareness of inferiority lead only to intergroup hostility." If the activities and goals of the interacting groups conflict, then the characteristics attributed to the competing group are invariably negative and derogatory (Sherif, 1966).

Unfortunately for these self-proclaimed deities the Jewish nation (with its Oral Law lifestyle) was not like other nations and refused to die. All the while the Jewish presence existed (sometimes as free men, and other times as veritable slaves) the declared supremacy of the various movements was brought into question and absolute dominion was psychologically withheld. Accordingly, in order to foster

a sense of political and/or spiritual security these various movements throughout history attempted to completely eliminate Jewish distinctiveness.

This obstinate Jewish distinctiveness was already documented by Josephus in the first century of the common era when Jews were being relentlessly persecuted by the great Roman empire. He wrote:

. . . they have a passion for liberty that is almost unconquerable, since they are convinced that G-d alone is their leader and master. They think little of submitting to death in unusual forms and permitting vengeance to fall on kinsmen and friends, if only they may avoid calling any man master (Permuter, 1982, p. 54).

This "interolerable" distinctiveness was also expressed by Adolf Hitler some 1,900 years later:

It is true we are barbarians that is an honored title to us. I free humanity from the shackles of the soul, from the degrading suffering caused by the false vision called conscience and ethics. The Jews have inflicted two wounds on mankind; circumcision on its body and "conscience" on its soul. They are Jewish inventions. The war for domination of the world is waged only between the two of us, between these two camps alone; the Germans and the Jews. Everything else is but deception (Scherman, 1985, p. xiv).

As demonstrated above it was this self-motivated Jewish distinctiveness which lay at the foundation (or better put, the primary cause) of historical anti-Jewish hostility. This perspective is supported by Muzafer Sherif (1966) who contends that the primary cause of inter-group conflict is not "displacement of individual aggressive tendencies, individual ignorance, individual observation, or experience

with members of the despised group" but rather it is a primary outgrowth of competition among groups.

If Jews would have totally assimilated into the majority cultures like most other conquered people (who had the chance to do so) then by definition, they would not have suffered as a minority group. Other discriminated-against groups (e.g., women, Blacks under Arab and White dominion, American Indians, etc.) were not as fortunate as the ^{male} Jews for they lacked the capacity to physically mingle without being detected. These groups, in light of their distinct physical characteristics were forced to remain, to some extent, separate. The Jews, in contrast, could have totally integrated without being detected.

The Jewish competitive threat was that they, logically speaking, could have totally assimilated into all of the above societies and yet, irrespective of their vast cultural interaction, most often refused to totally disavow their Jewish identity. This unusually adamant refusal to be one with the ruling or majority population inevitably created intergroup competition, which (according to the present analysis) brought in its wake much Jewish suffering. And, when this competition was based, loosely speaking, on the concept of "ultimate truth" the discrimination and persecution became understandably more intense.

As Muzafer Sherif (1966), based on much experimentation and analyses of intergroup processes concluded:

. . . intergroup conflict has shown that neither cultural, physical, nor economic differences are necessary for the rise of intergroup conflict, hostile attitudes, and stereotyped images of out-groups. Nor are maladjusted, neurotic, or unstable tendencies necessary conditions for the appearance of intergroup prejudice and stereotypes.

The sufficient condition for the rise of hostile and aggressive deeds . . . was the existence of two groups competing for goals that only one group could attain, to the dismay and frustration of the other group. (p. 85)

2. Significance of Target Areas

The second question, "What is the significance of the three target areas (i.e., Nationalism, Torah, and Collective Body) which powerful movements throughout history have so diligently attempted to destroy?, follows from the first. If the inherent competitive nature of Jewish distinctiveness lay at the core of anti-Jewish hostility, then an attack against the Jews should be, in effect, an attack against those Jewish components most responsible for creating and maintaining divisiveness.

All the while a relationship is perceived between the Jewish people and their distinctive (albeit universal) G-d, conflict and tension is maintained. The logical means of dealing with the competitive Jewish threat was to destroy those components which most emphasize this perceived relationship. In the author's opinion it was not fortuitous that anti-Jewish movements throughout history have attacked (1) Jewish nationalism, (2) the Jewish Oral Law spirit (as embodied in the Torah and Commandments), and/or (3) the Jewish

Collective Body individually or in combination. For it is these three components which seem to represent the source of Jewish distinctiveness (i.e., the relationship of the Jewish people to their G-d).

Anti-Jewish movements throughout history have seemingly detected the sources of Jewish distinctiveness and have focused their attacks accordingly. The first strategy usually employed (as discussed above) is an attempt to break Jewish separatism (which is a direct by-product of Jewish nationalism). This is accomplished by expelling the Jews from the Land of Israel, by prohibiting their return, and by denying them the same civil liberties granted to the rest of the population. By denying the Jews the usual liberties granted to others, they are in effect, relegated to vassal status where their communal existence becomes totally dependent on the arbitrary whims of the ruling power. This type of treatment should theoretically create a servile type of people, far and irreversibly removed from the status of independent nationalists, and a seemingly easy prey to assimilate. When Jewish distinctiveness obstinately remains intact the strategy focuses next on the Jewish spirit via pillaging, childnapping, rape, torture, and prohibitions against the study of Talmud and the observance of the Laws following therefrom. When this eventually fails the only remaining alternative is to destroy the Jewish collective presence in toto.

The following paragraphs will attempt to explain, via traditional Jewish sources, the perceived significance (both for the Jew and Jew-hater alike) of (1) Jewish nationalism, (2) the Jewish Oral Law spirit, and (3) the Jewish presence which competitive movements throughout history have attempted to eradicate.

Jewish Nationalism

The following are examples of the relationship between the Land of Israel to the people of Israel according to the Jewish tradition.

1. Nearly two-thirds of the Oral Law, as we have it today embodied in the Talmud deals with the Land of Israel (Wasserman, 1963). This fact becomes all the more prominent when understood that the Talmud, like no other literature, has literally molded Jewish individual and communal existence during the Jews' 1,800 year sojourn in the Diaspora.

2. One of the leading Talmudic scholars of the thirteenth century (Moses Nachmonides) wrote in his Hosafot to Sefer Hamitzvot:

The commandment is that we should inherit the land given by G-d, exalted be He, to our forefathers Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and that we should neither let it fall to any of the other nations nor let it grow into a wasteland. . . . This is a positive commandment for all time unto eternity. It is obligatory on each and every one of us, even in times of exile and dispersion, as evident from many places in the Talmud. (Yaakobi, 1984, pp. 47-48)

3. "For the Lord has chosen Zion; He has desired it for His habitation" (Psalms 132:13).

4. "A Land [The Land of Israel] which the Lord thy God cares for; the eyes of the Lord thy God are always upon it" (Deuteronomy 11:12).

5. If I forget thee, O Jerusalem,
Let my right hand forget her cunning.
If I do not remember thee,
Let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth;
If I do not set Jerusalem
Above my highest joy. (Psalms 137:5-6)

6. "Everyone who lives in the Land of Israel is similar to someone who has a G-d and every Jew who dwells elsewhere is similar to one who hasn't a G-d as it is written (in Leviticus 25:38). 'To give to you the Land of Canaan, to be for you G-d'" (Talmud, Ketuboth 110B). (Translation Kaplan, 1979)

7. "Even after one dies it is important to be buried in the Land of Israel because of its holiness, for everyone who is buried in the Land of Israel is as if buried under the altar of the Temple" (Talmud, Ketuboth 111A). (Translation Kaplan. 1979)

8. Probably the most important detail in understanding the relationship between the Jews and the Land is to point out their (unprecedented) active relationship to the Land over their 1,800 year period (135 C.E. to 1948) of exile. The adherents of Oral Law Judaism (the only form of Judaism with any semblance of longevity) whether in neighbor-

ing Persia, or in warm Italy or Spain, whether they found homes in cold Eastern Europe, found their way to North America, or came to live in the southern hemisphere where the seasons are reversed, celebrated the Land of Israel's seasonal change. They prayed for dew in May and for rain in October. On Passover, they ceremoniously celebrated the liberation from Egyptian bondage, the original national establishment in the Promised Land. They prayed three times daily facing Jerusalem, and requested in each prayer to be brought back to Israel with all the exiles. They asked for the rebuilding of Jerusalem after eating bread, and made explicit mention of their exile, their hope, and their belief in the return to the Land during weddings as well as deaths.

9. A further remarkable phenomenon concerning Jewish existence (irrespective of contemporary Soviet and Arab propaganda calling the Jewish mass movement to the Middle East illegitimate), is that Israel is the only country on earth today that is inhabited by the same nation, with the same religious culture (i.e., the Oral Law tradition), speaking the same language as that which lived in it some 3,200 years ago (despite two great exiles where the last one extended 1,800 years).

The Jewish Spirit

The following is an attempt to explain the significance of the Torah (a term oftentimes used to denote both

the Written and Oral Law) which Jewish antagonists have so diligently tried to uproot via traditional Jewish sources.

1. According to the Talmud (Shabbos 88A), G-d's purpose in creation required that Israel accept the Torah. If not, all creation would have lost its reason for being, and would have ceased to exist.

2. The Torah is the only means through which the Jews can fulfill His purpose in creation (Rabbi Yehuda Halevi, in the Kuzari, 1964).

3. In Deuteronomy (6:24-25), "The Lord commanded us to do all these statutes . . . for our good always."

4. The main immediate benefit of following the Torah is spiritual, bringing the person closer to G-d (Zohar Acharey Mot). Each law acts as nourishment for the soul, strengthening it, and increasing a person's spiritual fortitude (Talmud, Yoma 39A).

5. The many laws associated with daily life serve to teach self discipline (Maimonides, 1960). The Talmud (Avodah Zarah 5B) states "when Israel is occupied with the study and practice of the Torah they master their desire, and are not mastered by it." It is similarly expressed in Numbers (15:39) "You shall remember all G-d's commandments and keep them, and not stray after your heart or after your eyes, by which you are led astray" (translation Kaplan, 1979).

6. Torah Law acts as a survival mechanism, enabling Judaism to remain vital even through the harshest persecutions

(Halevi in the Kuzari). Only the Jewish people who have followed the complete Torah (Written and Oral) have existed throughout history, while a single generation's lapse has led to major spiritual (and physical) debilitation (Kaplan, 1979).

7. The Torah sets limits through which a Jew can fulfill G-d's purpose while living in a world that is essentially hostile to it. Through the Torah, one can be part of the world, and at the same time, dedicated to the spiritual (Talmud, Berakoth 35B).

The Jewish Collective Body

1. In Jeremiah (2:3) the people of Israel are seen as G-d's ambassadors to the world: "Israel is holy to the Lord; the first fruits of his increase: all that devour him shall be held guilty; evil shall come upon them."

2. According to the Jerusalem Talmud (Taanith 2:6), the Jewish people are to be the ones to continuously represent the fact of G-d's presence in the world.

3. In Isaiah (43:10), Israel is seen as having a mission to bear witness to G-d's existence "You are my witnesses . . . and My servant whom I have chosen."

4. In Isaiah (59:21) G-d made a covenant with Israel that they would continue to be the bearers of His word for all time.

5. Isaiah (42:4) "[Israel] shall not fail nor be

crushed until he has rectified the world, for the islands await his teachings" (translation Kaplan, 1979).

6. Isaiah (51:16) "I have put My words in thy mouth, and I have covered thee in the shadow of My hand, that I may plant the heavens and lay the foundations of the earth, and say to Zion, Thou art my people."

7. The people of Israel are traditionally portrayed as having the incessant mission of proclaiming G-d's teachings to the world. The objective is not to convert anyone to Judaism with the burden of carrying out the 613 commandments, but rather to inform the peoples of the world G-d's universal message as it is stated in Isaiah (42:6): "I, G-d, have called you in righteousness . . . and have set you up as a covenant of the people, for a light to the nations" (translation Kaplan, 1979).

8. Israel is thus seen as being the means through which G-d's essence becomes more strongly revealed in the world. It is thus written, "[to] give strength to G-d is the duty of Israel His pride" (Psalms 68:35) (translation Kaplan, 1979).

Before proceeding onward it is important to explain in brief the concept of "Chosen People." The concept has negative connotations in contemporary western society for it smacks of racism with all its ugly manifestations (the very type of attitudinal and behavioral set the Jews have suffered so tragically from). In truth the Jewish concept

of "chosen" is quite different in thought and in deed from the many groups in history who have relegated to themselves the title of chosen (in one form or another).

In contrast to most other groups, the Jewish meaning of chosen has considerably more to do with obligations than it does with benefits. The Bible makes it clear that man was created to emulate G-d's righteousness on earth. At first, all of mankind was chosen for this task but early man failed and allowed corruption and violence to predominate over justice and kindness. Thereafter punishment for failure was to be on a national rather than universal level. In addition, according to the Bible, G-d chose one nation who were to act as G-d's model nation on earth whose purpose was to demonstrate to mankind how to individually and collectively conduct themselves (Gervirtz, 1980).

According to Biblical and Talmudic sources the people chosen for the above purpose were the descendents of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Abraham agreed to a pact with G-d which was considered a guarantee that Abraham's descendents would receive Divine favor provided they followed G-d's teachings as expounded in the Written and Oral Law. These commitments meant that Jews had to meet many obligations not required of others. They were expected to maintain a higher level of moral purity and their self-control and devotion to a spiritual ideal would be more severely tested than others. Jews who did not live up to the standards set by the Written

and Oral Law would be causing a lessening of G-d's esteem in the eyes of mankind, and would be held directly accountable for such behavior. In return for their allegiance to G-d's Law, the Jews would become an extraordinarily prosperous nation. They would play a positively unique role in the history of the world, and would acquire a homeland brimming with Divine favor (Gervirtz, 1980).

3. Empirical Support

The final question addressed in this section is: Is there any empirical method to test the above theoretical analysis, or must it be accepted solely on the basis of history? The present author is of the opinion that the theory can be empirically tested, and all that is required is a little imagination without going beyond the conceptual limits of the above theory. The conceptualized anti-Jewish paradigm portrayed above is that of a totalitarian world power attempting to dominate mankind both physically and spiritually, and therefore seeing in the Jewish presence a formidable competitor. But this paradigm is not an absolute, and without deviating from the theory we could generalize and say that any movement whether non-Jewish or Jewish whose legitimacy (and therefore existence) is implicitly challenged by an inherently competitive Jewish presence should feel the need to strike out against this presence, as it is manifested in Nationalism, Torah, and/or Collective Body. The forms of

attacking Jews and Judaism has changed over the ages but the process (according to the present theoretical analysis) has been consistent. In addition, it has not been a random variation of Jews throughout history who have consistently presented this competitive threat, but rather one group (i.e., Oral Law or Orthodox Judaism) which has obdurately maintained a continuity throughout millennia. Therefore, it seems reasonable in the upcoming comparisons to posit Oral Law (Orthodox) Jewry as a true manifestation of Judaism (this does not necessarily imply that other Jewish groups are illegitimate, but only that this millennia-old group is, beyond suspicion, representative).

Following from the analysis any movement whose legitimacy is seriously threatened by the Jewish presence would perforce (1) attempt to sever Jewish nationalism, (2) attempt to break the Jewish people's bond to the Torah, and (3) attempt to destroy the Jewish collective body, each strategy by itself or in combination. One way to test empirically the above analysis is to locate a group whose basic ideology puts it in direct conflict with present day Oral Law Judaism, and to empirically investigate if this group (i.e., their leaders) is to some extent, fostering (whether implicitly or explicitly) the severance of the Jewish people from the (1) Land, (2) The Torah, and/or (3) the annihilation of the Jewish Collective Body. There does seem to be movements today whose legitimacy is threatened by the Jewish presence and

whose activity may lend itself to measurement. According to the theory, these movements should follow a pattern of activity similar to those historical anti-Jewish movements discussed above.

The groups posited today as distinctively anti-Jewish are ironically two contemporary Jewish movements. Reform and Conservative Judaism are depicted in the subsequent analysis as fitting the present study's theoretical anti-Jewish profile. Although superficially these movements appear to have little in common with classical anti-Jewish hostility the following pages will attempt to explain the theoretical relationship between them and their non-Jewish counterparts.

The Reform movement in Judaism originated in Germany in the early nineteenth century, and was transported to America during the large German immigration, which began in the 1840s. In the last half of the nineteenth century it appeared evident that the future of Judaism in America would be Reform (Sklare, 1983). The Conservative movement in Judaism is an American phenomenon originating as a reaction to Reform Judaism which it deemed as "too Reform" (Liebman, 1983), and this brand of Judaism eventually achieved primacy (i.e., numbers of constituents) in America after World War II. Today these two movements constitute a major percentage of American Jewry. Although with seemingly different philosophies both movements deny the binding authority of the Oral Law, and claimed from their inception the unadaptability

of Oral Law (Orthodox) Judaism in America (Sklare, 1983; Liebman, 1983). They declared themselves legitimate alternative forms of Judaism, and although they never called Oral Law Judaism illegitimate, they deemed it outdated, an anachronism that must change with the times. They pictured their types of Judaism as succeeding the antiquated Oral Law tradition, and leading the Jews of America and elsewhere through the Space Age and ages to come.

Reform and Conservative Judaism are posited in the present analysis as competing with Oral Law Judaism for the allegiance of the Jewish people. It is this theoretical competitive factor which would place these groups conceptually on par with other anti-Jewish groups throughout history. The competitive nature of these Jewish groups is not obvious for their purported intent at their inception was not to aggressively displace Oral Law Judaism (as other anti-Jewish movements have explicitly declared) but rather to provide for the Jewish people, particularly in America, a viable and adaptable modern form of Judaism. They allegedly were not attempting to uproot traditional Judaism, but rather to provide a positive spiritual experience for Twentieth-Century American Jewry who could "obviously" not adapt the American lifestyle to Oral Law Judaism. Therefore, there was apparently no conflict of interests and no real competition, for these modern movements were presumably not competing with Oral Law Judaism but rather attempting to save those millions

of Jews who, without a viable alternative would have left Judaism completely.

Accordingly, these movements should not be depicted as competing with Orthodoxy, but rather as complementary forms of Judaism whose purported goals did not conflict with Oral Law Judaism. According to their claims, they were not trying to sever the Jews' relationship with traditional Judaism, but were rather attempting to save those Jews who presumably could not adapt. Although this was their claim, the following three arguments present evidence which tends to support the theory that these movements (i.e., the leaders of the movements) were more interested in breaking with traditional Oral Law Judaism than they were in providing American Jewry with a positive spiritual experience.

1. Their claim to succeed Oral-Law Judaism was based on the alleged inability of traditional Judaism to adjust and adapt to the American way of life. Historically, in complete contradiction to their claim (as delineated above) the only Jewish movement to ever adapt (i.e., adaptation as a viable contemporary Jewish entity within the majority non-Jewish population) to all types of cultures and societies throughout history was the very same so-called unadaptable form of Judaism known as the Oral Law tradition. Therefore, either the Reform and Conservative leaders were ignorant of Jewish history or else the claim was a trumped up canard used to rationalize their break with tradition. The spuriousness of their

claim is so glaring that it is amazing how so few writers have taken these movements to task on it. (In fact, literally millions of Jews in the post World War II period seemingly accepted their claim as fact. The argument that Reform and Conservative leaders' understanding of history was different than the understanding previously introduced implies that the transition from Central and Eastern Europe to America was qualitatively more pronounced than Jewish migrations in the past. It is the author's belief that to assume that the mass Jewish immigration to America was more diverse in type than, for example, the Jewish mass migration from Judea to Babylonia or from Babylonia to Spain, Spain to Western and Central Europe, or from Western and Central Europe to the Slavic lands of Russia appears historically unfounded.

2. The second argument which casts serious doubt on the Reform and Conservative leaders' original intention concerns the "attempt" made by these leaders to adapt the tenets of traditional Judaism to the new American lifestyle. Even if we do credit the Reform and Conservative leaders with an abysmal ignorance of Jewish history, the question still needed to be asked is how much of an effort was made, and how many generations of Jews in America had passed before these leaders concluded that traditional Oral Law Judaism was passe and unadaptable. The answers to both questions is nil. Support for the above argument is based on the number of Jews residing in America during the turn of the century.

In 1880, and 1900 the percentage of Jews in America was approximately 5 and 15 percent respectively of what it was in 1972. This astonishing growth rate was on account of the mass immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe (Gartner, 1983). The mores and language of America was completely foreign to these immigrants whose primary (and sometimes only) thought was to provide their families with food and shelter. In essence their lifestyle was and remained primarily Eastern European and the only thing that tangibly changed was their new residence. It was their children, the first generation of Jews en masse born in America who had the first opportunity to create an optimal synthesis between traditional Judaism and the American way of life. (The number of Jews who arrived from Germany in the 1840s was insignificant in comparison with the number of Eastern European Jews who arrived at the turn of the century. In addition, these German Jews brought with them the religious "tradition" of Reform Judaism.) This opportunity was never capitalized on, for the first generation-born Jews in America, who started raising families of their own immediately preceding and following World War II, followed the Reform and Conservative leaders' claim concerning the unadaptability of traditional Judaism. In essence, this was the first generation of Jews in America who had the opportunity to test Oral Law Judaism's resilience, but instead accepted their mentors' ahistorical and non-empirical claims concerning the "dated" Judaism of their fore-

fathers. Further statistical support for the above analysis is that from 1940 to 1968 the total number of Jewish families in America affiliated with the Reform movement grew from 59,000 to 260,000 (Schwartzman, 1971), and over the same span of time the conservative movement grew even faster (Sklare, 1983).

3. Reform and Conservative Judaism are not too dissimilar from other Jewish sects in the past (e.g., Saducees, Bitosim, and Karaites) whose objective (which was fully realized only after the damage was done) was to abrogate the binding authority of the Oral Law in order to free themselves from the "antiquated" and restraining precepts of their forefathers. Officially, both Reform and Conservative Judaism do not "believe" that the Oral Law was given by G-d, and in regards to the Written Law (the Pentateuch) there is a variation of opinion within the groups themselves. This denial of the Divine nature of the Oral Law (and to a lesser degree the Written Law) should not be taken lightly for it implies (1) that the redactors of the Talmud (the Sages) lied (to suggest that Reform and Conservative leaders knew ancient Jewish history better than the Sages who lived 1,500 to 2,200 years prior, is ludicrous) when they officially stated that the Oral Law was given by G-d (e.g., Talmud Tractate Shabbos 31A, Tractate Berochot 5A, and Tractate Gittin 60B), and that some or most of the multiple places throughout the Pentateuch where it states "And G-d spoke to Moses" (and

other varied introductions with the same expressed meaning) is a fabrication. (To claim that these statements are open to interpretation like other more obscure passages in the Talmud and Bible is to deny objective communication among people, and in a sense objective reality), and (2) that the millions of Jewish men, women, and children who were savagely raped, pillaged, tortured and murdered throughout history only because they believed the Oral and Written Law were given by G-d were dead wrong.

The present author is not claiming to support or refute the Reform and Conservative leaders' assertions on the above point, but is rather attempting to illustrate the crucial implications of their seemingly benign ideology. In essence, to "save" Jewish souls from completely assimilating they did not need to deviate so substantively in religious perspective. However, to intentionally sever the Jewish people's relationship to the Oral Law tradition this strategy of perspective was of utmost importance.

In light of the above, it may be argued that Reform and Conservative leaders were more intent on breaking with the Oral Law tradition (and replacing it with their own form of Judaism) than they were with developing an intellectually-honest form of Judaism in America. In fact, their call to break with traditional Judaism (by positing and emphasizing its "undaptability") seems to be inextricably intertwined with the firm establishment of their own movements, which

is not dissimilar, in procedure, from anti-Jewish movements throughout history.

It is important to remember that American Reform and Conservative Judaism are products of nineteenth and twentieth-century America, whose "justification" in breaking with Oral Law tradition was that it was deemed unadaptable to contemporary life in America (Sklare, 1983; Liebman, 1983). Following therefrom, the Oral Law tradition in 1985 America should be a dying breed (if at all still in existence), and in contrast, the more "modern" Reform and Conservative movements should be the dynamic forces propelling American Jewry today. However, if the present hypothesis is correct the reverse (concerning present day young adult Jewish America who are, in the vast majority of cases, first and second generation American born) may be occurring. The present study's first empirical analysis is to pit Reform and Conservative claims against the arguments presented above. Simply speaking, if these movements' assertions are correct, then the affiliation of second generation American-born Jews should support their claim. In short, second generation American-born Jews should have significantly abandoned the "outmoded" and "unadaptable" Oral Law tradition. Conversely, if their claims were originally specious, with the ulterior intent of displacing Oral Law Judaism, then traditional Judaism should be in the process of adapting itself to American society (as it has done in every culture through-

out millennia). [See Figure. 1 where four groups differentiated on the variable of religious affiliation are compared on (1) rate of inter-movement increase or decrease over one generation, and (2) overall growth rate over one generation.]

In addition, if these two Jewish movements are truly complementary forms of Judaism only interested in saving Jews who seemingly cannot adapt Orthodoxy to the American scene, then they themselves should be growing (or at least maintaining themselves). In contrast, according to the present theory, if these movements are not complementary but rather competing for Jewish supremacy, in which their original objective was more to wean Jews from the Oral Law than to create something spiritually positive themselves, then their movements should have had difficulty in maintaining themselves over the last generation (i.e., lack of positive spirituality should produce a lack of commitment among their respective Jewish constituencies). [See Figure 1]

Other Hypotheses to be Tested Empirically

According to the present theoretical analysis the Orthodox (Oral Law) presence should represent a competitive threat to Reform and Conservative Judaism. Not because of its popularity, wealth, or power (it is probably least in all three categories), but its continuous presence is seen

A. Differences In Maintenance Among Jewish Religious Groups in America

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Dependent Variables</u>
Jewish Religious Group Affiliation:	
A. Non-Affiliated	1. Inter-Movement Rate of Increase- Decrease Over One Generation
B. Reform	
C. Conservative	
D. Orthodox (Oral Law)	2. Overall Growth-Rate Over One Generation

B. Differences in Relationship to the Land of Israel

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Dependent Variables</u>
Jewish Religious Group Affiliation:	
A. Non-Affiliated	1. Intention to settle in Israel
B. Reform	2. Number of Visits to Israel
C. Conservative	3. Attitudes towards Israel
D. Orthodox	4. Knowledge of Arab-Israeli Conflict

C. Differences in Fundamental Knowledge of Judaism

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Dependent Variable</u>
Jewish Religious Group Affiliation:	
A. Non-Affiliated	1. Level of Fundamental and Elementary Knowledge of Judaism
B. Reform	
C. Conservative	
D. Orthodox	

Figure 1. Diagramatic Representation of Variables Under Empirical Investigation for Chapter I

as silently challenging the legitimate nature of the two other Jewish religious movements.

Obviously the threat of Oral Law Judaism cannot be dealt with in the same manner as in the past (via non-Jewish movements), for they would perforce, be proclaiming their own illegitimacy. Their level of attack must be considerably more concealed, but (according to the theory) equally as desperate as their predecessors. Following therefrom, they should attempt to attack Jewish nationalism and/or the Torah in order to quell the Oral Law (Jewish) competitive threat. They logically would not strike out against the Jewish collective body for they would be reducing their own potential constituency (which apparently contradicts their purpose in being), but by significantly reducing the Jewish people's relationship to the Land and/or knowledge of Torah, would in effect, be suppressing the competition and concomitantly be given the opportunity to legitimize their own gods (i.e., by rewriting the traditional laws of antiquity they have in essence established for themselves new gods).

Correspondingly, the ideologies of both the Reform and Conservative movements today officially emphasize their tangible positive relationship to the Land of Israel. For example, on the one-hundredth anniversary of the founding of the Hebrew Union College (The Reform movement's institution for training American rabbis) in 1975 the Reform movement issued their statement of principles called the Centenary

perspective and proclaimed in connection to the Land and State of Israel

We are privileged to live in an extraordinary time, one in which a third Jewish commonwealth has been established in our people's ancient homeland. We are bound to that land and to the newly reborn State of Israel by innumerable religious and ethnic ties. We have been enriched by its culture and ennobled by its indomitable spirit. We see it providing unique opportunities for Jewish self-expression. We have both a stake and a responsibility in building the State of Israel, assuring the security and defining its Jewish character. We encourage aliya (immigration) for those who wish to find maximum personal fulfillment in the cause of Zion (Rosenthal, 1978, pp. 69-70).

The Conservative movement like its Reform counterpart has also declared officially its inexorable relationship to the Land of Israel. For example one of its founding fathers Solomon Schechter was active in the Zionist Organization of America and was a delegate at several Zionist congresses and conventions. As early as 1928 the Conservative Rabbinical Assembly at its annual convention publicly called for support of colonists in Palestine and aid to the Zionist movement (Rosenthal, 1978). Rabbi Robert Gordis (1978) one of the leading proponents today of the Conservative movement writes:

In particular, no other aspect of Jewish experience is even remotely comparable to the impact of the people and the State of Israel in rekindling the "spark of the Jew" in the hearts of our youth the world over. In a world that has seemed to vow death and destruction for the Jewish people, Israel has given us a new gift of life. (p. 100)

The affinity to the modern secular state of Israel should be all the more intense among Reform and Conservative constituencies in that Israel's official policy, like their

own, is not bound (in the great majority of situations) by Oral Law tradition (although approximately 20 percent of the state could be described as Oral Law adherents). Accordingly, there should be no significant differences among the adherents of the three movements concerning their relationship to the Land of Israel. However, according to the present theory, any movement whose legitimacy is threatened by the Jewish "phenomenon" as reflected in (1) nationalism, (2) Torah, and (3) the Jewish presence would perforce, strike out at one or more of the phenomenon's components. If the Reform and Conservative movements are truly competitive (and not complementary) forms of Judaism, then these movements should be psychologically pressured to sever any real relationship their adherents may have to the Land (even if it contradicts their official platform). Following therefrom, the present study expects to find a significantly weaker relationship among adherents of Reform and Conservative Judaism than among their Oral Law counterparts.

It should be mentioned at this point that the type of data collected in the present study (irrespective of outcome) are not sufficient to conclusively support the above hypothesis (alternative interpretations will be discussed in Chapter VI, Conclusions). However, these data are necessary to support the hypothesis, and conversely sufficient to refute it (i.e., if Reform or Conservative adherents have as strong or stronger a relationship to the Land as their

Oral Law counterparts, then the present theory's validity is seriously suspect). [See Figure 1 where four groups differentiated on the variable of religious affiliation are compared on (1) intention to ever settle in Israel, (2) visits to Israel, (3) attitudes towards Israel, and (4) knowledge of the Arab-Israeli conflict.]

Jewish Education (The Torah)

Jewish education is another area where the official platforms of all three movements converge. In theory, all consider a broad Jewish education to be a highly important aspect of Judaism. For example, in the Guiding Principles of Reform Judaism, which was accepted by the Reform movement in 1937, its emphasis on Jewish education was clearly asserted: "The perpetuation of Judaism as a living force depends upon religious knowledge and upon the education of each new generation in our rich cultural and spiritual heritage" (Schwartzman, 1971).

The Conservative emphasis on Jewish education was put down very succinctly by Rabbi Robert Gordis (1978) in his Seven Principles of Conservative Judaism in Principle No. 4:

Jewish knowledge is the privilege and duty of every Jew, not merely of the rabbi and the scholar. A Hebrewless Judaism that has surrendered to ignorance and has ceased to create new cultural and spiritual values, is a contradiction in terms, and must perish of spiritual anemia. The regular study of Torah on whatever level is incumbent on every Jew, a supreme commandment second to none. (p. 217)

Although officially all three movements encourage the

strengthening of the Jewish spirit via Jewish education, according to the present theory this should not be realized in practice. If Reform and Conservative Judaism are psychologically forced to uproot the traditionally competitive Jewish presence, their "best interests" would be served (contrary to their official platforms) by uprooting traditional Jewish knowledge. Following therefrom, the present study hypothesizes that the followers of Reform and Conservative Judaism will be significantly less knowledgeable about fundamental and elementary Judaism than their Oral Law kin. (It is important to emphasize that here also these data collected are not sufficient to conclusively support the present hypothesis, but are sufficient to refute it.) [See Figure 1 where four groups differentiated on the variable of religious affiliation are compared on the level of fundamental and elementary Jewish knowledge.]

In conclusion, the above historical analysis has helped delineate the reoccurring process of anti-Jewish hostility, and in consequence a theory has been developed which lends itself to empirical support. The theory as yet, falls short for it only describes the primary root cause of the malady, without explaining how or why the common people, the masses, have turned against the Jews so vehemently throughout the ages. It appears farfetched to compare the masses' motivation to the motivation of the leaders.

Historically, the common people's savage attacks

against Jews seem to be motivated by constant misinformation and slander about Jews and Judaism. The primary catalyst remains the Jewish "threat" but lies and their dissemination seem to be needed in order to push the masses into action. Slander about Jews and Judaism would then be considered a secondary cause of anti-Jewish hostility affecting the masses. Without the masses' assistance the leaders' efforts to destroy the Jewish phenomenon would be greatly hampered.

In the following two Chapters the hypothesized secondary (Chapter II) and tertiary (Chapter III) causes of anti-Jewish hostility will be explored. It is important to keep in mind that in exposing the multiple lies used against the Jewish people throughout history we are indirectly lending support to the above theory. Lies are only necessary when truth is too embarrassing or unbearable to utter, but paradoxically, the more lies, the clearer the truth actually becomes.

CHAPTER II

THE HYPOTHESIZED SECONDARY CAUSES OF ANTI-JEWISH HOSTILITY

Several theories have been advanced to explain the phenomenon of anti-Jewish hostility. According to Gordon Allport (1954), in his book The Nature of Prejudice the theorist usually selects for special emphasis one of six approaches to explain the forces operating in the formation of prejudice. These six general categories are: (1) historical, (2) sociocultural, (3) situational, (4) psychodynamic, (5) phenomenological, and (6) the stimulus object approach. Although the present analysis cannot claim that all of the above categories are theroretically and simultaneously operative in the etiology of anti-Jewish hostility, it may be able to integrate most of these theory types if depicted hierarchically. According to the above historical analysis a primary factor in the etiology of anti-Jewish hostility could be considered psychodynamic in nature. The Jewish "competitive threat," as explained above is usually created by the anti-Jewish movements' unrelenting drive to totally dominate (both physically and spiritually) in which

the Jews' relationship to their G-d (as specifically manifested in three forms) presents a formidable impasse.

It is interesting to note the correspondence between the above historical analysis and the widely acclaimed psychodynamic interpretation of prejudice which focuses on the "Authoritarian" personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford, 1950). Regarding some features which characterize the authoritarian character type Erich Fromm (1941) writes:

. . . The most important feature to be mentioned is the attitude towards power. For the authoritarian character, there exists, so to speak, two sexes: the powerful ones and the powerless ones. His love, admiration and readiness for submission are automatically aroused by power, whether of a person or an institution. (pp. 44-45)

Maslow (1943) further corroborates the above historical analysis by postulating the basic philosophy or worldview of the authoritarian personality. He states:

Like other psychologically insecure people, the authoritarian person lives in a world which may be conceived to be pictured by him as a sort of jungle in which man's hand is necessarily against every other man, in which the whole world is conceived of as dangerous, threatening, or at least challenging, and in which human beings are conceived of as primarily selfish or evil or stupid. To carry the analogy further, this jungle is peopled with animals, who either eat or are eaten, who are either to be feared or despised. One's safety lies in one's own strength and this strength consists primarily in the power to dominate. (p. 46)

T. W. Adorno (1950) further interprets the dynamics of the relationship between the "Authoritarian" personality and hostility toward the Jewish people in reference to the Jews' "intolerable" instituted separateness. He elucidates

in the following the "Authoritarian" personality makeup:

. . . they are highly projective and suspicious. An affinity to psychosis cannot be overlooked: they are "paranoid." To them, prejudice is all-important: it is a means to escape acute mental diseases by collectivization, and by building up a pseudoreality against which their aggressiveness can be directed without any overt violation of the "reality principle." Stereotypy is decisive: it works as a kind of social corroboration of their projective formulae, and is therefore institutionalized to a degree often approaching religious beliefs. . . . In order to confirm to each other their pseudoreality, they are likely to form sects, often with some panacea of "nature," which corresponds to their projective notion of the Jew as eternally bad and spoiling the purity of the natural. Ideas of conspiracy play a large role: They do not hesitate to attribute to the Jews a quest for world domination, and they are likely to swear by the Elders of Zion (an early twentieth century Czarist Russian forgery alleging a Jewish conspiracy to control the world). (p. 765)

According to Sanford, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, and Levinson (1950):

. . . hostility that was originally aroused by and directed towards ingroup authority is displaced unto outgroups . . . the authoritarian must, out of an inner necessity, turn his aggression against outgroups. He must do so because he is psychologically unable to attack ingroup authorities. (p. 233)

The above statements when superimposed on the present problem implies that it may not be Jews or Judaism per se that so frustrates the ruling power, but rather their inability (and the frustration which follows therefrom) to create their desired form of society. In essence, it seems to be their own failure to create a smoothly running society which then breeds discontent among the masses, and correspondingly calls into question their divine authority which so disturbs and frustrates these leaders. To forcefully

and explicitly silence the questioning within their own group would be to openly cast doubt on their self-proclaimed divinity. This ultimate frustration is then best displaced on some out-group, whose antagonistic nature is not too dissimilar in kind from those disturbing "voices" within their own following. In addition, attacking the out-group would be more easily rationalized as something positive and may in the process help to create an artificial unification among members of the in-group. In consequence, this hypothesized unification based on some external "competitive threat" may help suppress internally any physical or spiritual challenge that may arise.

On a secondary level, the ways and means by which these leaders have been able to foster general animosity towards Jews has been via the simple but vile tactic called slander. It is the author's opinion that only through the incessant propagation of malicious lies have leaders succeeded in directing the anger of the masses at Judaism and at the Jew. According to the above categorization then, the secondary causes of anti-Jewish hostility would be phenomenological-historical in nature. Phenomenological in the respect that a person's prejudiced behavior proceeds immediately from his view of the situation confronting him, and his reactions to the world correspond to his definition of that world (Allport, 1954). The propagation of misinformation, misconceptions, and outright lies have precipitated anti-Jewish

activity consistently throughout history (Flannery, 1965). As Josef Goebbels, Hitler's propaganda expert and leading proponent of the Big-Lie tactic claimed, "If a lie is repeated often enough, it will come to be perceived as truth" (Cohen, 1984, p. 22). In fact, according to the research done over the last twenty-five years, negative stereotyping has often been found to be related to anti-Jewish prejudice (Bettelheim & Janowitz, 1964; and Quinley & Glock, 1983).

It is historical in the sense that a continuous bombardment of anti-Jewish slander over the centuries has seemed to set the stage for subsequent slander and its believability. Correspondingly, just as present-day slander needs the support of prior slander in order to effect the desired results, so do present truths need the staunch backing of prior truths. Therefore before describing the present propaganda being used against the Jewish people today it is important to note their historical antecedents. Accordingly, the following exposition will attempt to reveal several general-historical forms of slander oftentimes used to wreak havoc on the Jews, and only afterwards will attempt to describe contemporary slander and its potentially dire consequences. At the conclusion of this chapter an empirical study will be presented with the proposed objective of studying (with the hope of effectively countering) the anti-Jewish propaganda programs of today.

It may be difficult for some people to accept the

premise that truth can be so totally manipulated. On a common sense level it may sound absurd that large populations of individuals throughout history have literally believed that "up is down and down is up" when it comes to Jews. In order to make the following anti-Jewish exposition more believable the slander heaped on another target group (the United States of America) will be briefly described.

In his address to the Assembly of Captive European Nations (September, 1984), Constantine Visoianu, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Rumania stated:

The United States is one of the very rare guiltless powers. America has set free territories that were under its jurisdiction; it has assisted in the liberation of many nations; it has helped almost every country you can name to save its independence and to restore its economy. In one way or another the United States has displayed a generosity that is without parallel in history.

Now let us look at Soviet Russia. That country has set at nought every treaty it has ever signed; it has violated every principle of international law; it has never ceased working by subversive means to overturn the political order and to destroy the independence of other countries; it has, most notably of all, subjugated by force nine countries of Europe, each of which has an impressive record of freedom and independence. It can be asserted without hesitation that Soviet Russia's aggressions are unmatched both in number and in scope.

And yet the United States is criticized and suspected throughout the greater part of the world, whereas Soviet Russia has become the champion--if you please--of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, and the defender of the independence of states (Dunham, 1961, pp. xiii-xiv).

From 1960 to 1980 the powerful Soviet propaganda machine, which is rigorously deployed throughout the world, religiously disseminated "information" which consistently accused the United States of exploiting the developing world,

promoting the Cold War, opposing Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), etc. (Shultz & Godson, 1984). The United States, not unlike the Jewish people throughout history, is not the Soviet's scapegoat but rather the Soviet's most formidable adversary. America represents one of the last real threats standing between Soviet Russia and total world domination. It is within this context that a brief (non-exhaustive) historical review of slander used against the Jewish people begins.

Ancient Egyptian and Persian Anti-Jewish Teachings

Consistent with the historical analysis in Chapter I, the propagation of misinformation concerning Jews originates in ancient Egypt. It should be reemphasized that only 80 years before Pharaoh (King of Egypt) began offering his "reasons" for enslaving the Jews (Miller, 1968), Joseph the son of Jacob (Israel) had singlehandedly saved Egypt from ruination. In addition, Jewish tradition relates how the Hebrews had made themselves integral features of cosmopolitan Egypt (Midrash-Tanchuma), and also their patriotic activity in respect for Pharaoh himself (Talmud-Tractate Sotah 11a). Despite the above setting, Pharaoh, emperor of the most powerful and cultured nation of the world (during that particular time period) and self-proclaimed divinity (Midrash-Shemot rabbah) declared:

Behold, the people of the children of Israel are too

many and too mighty for us [they had arrived eighty years earlier with no more than seventy males]; come let us deal wisely with them, lest they multiply, and it come to pass, that, when there happens any war, they will join our enemies, and fight against us (Exodus 1:9-10).

Haman (the prime minister of the vast empire of Persia), with the explicit intent of totally annihilating all of Jewry, convinced King Ahasverosh with the following argument:

There is a certain people scattered abroad and dispersed among the people in all the provinces . . . and their laws are diverse from those of every people, neither keep they the king's laws, therefore it profiteth not the king to suffer them (Ester 3:8).

The speciousness of Haman's argument is that according to the Laws themselves, there is an obligation upon all Jews to follow the civil laws of the ruling country in which they reside (Talmud, Tractate Gittin 10B).

Greek and Roman Anti-Jewish Propaganda

Hecataeus of Abdera, a Greek historian of the early third century B.C.E. in an account of Jewish origins asserted that Moses "in remembrance of the exile of his people, instituted for them a misanthropic and inhospitable way of life" (Reinach, 1895). Manetho, an Egyptian priest and historian, embroidered the story by describing how the Jews, who were in "actuality" Egyptian lepers and diseased, were expelled by the Egyptian king and led by Moses who taught them impudently "not to adore the gods" (Reinach, 1895). The themes of leprous origins and misanthropy were rarely

absent from Greek and Roman anti-Jewish literature (Flannery, 1968). It is important to note that the allegation of misanthropy was also employed against the early Christians (Flannery, 1968). Democritus, in his On the Jews, following his predecessors, claimed that Jews adore the golden head of an ass and, according to the historian Suidas, charged that "every seven years they capture a stranger, lead him to their Temple, and immolate him by cutting his flesh into small pieces" (Reinach, 1895). The infamous "ritual murder" libel was born which (in various forms), was to be used against the early Christians and again against the Jews from the twelfth century on. This ritual murder libel would eventually leave an untold trail of Jewish blood in its wake (Flannery, 1965).

According to Flannery (1965) Roman fabrications concerning Jews can be traced back to Cicero in 59 B.C.E. Occasion to display his feelings was presented in a trial for the defense of a Roman official Flaccus who had despoiled the Jewish treasury. "Their kind of religion and rites," he stated

has nothing in common with the splendor of the empire, the gravity of our name, and the institutions of our ancestors . . . and, conquered and enslaved, how little the immortal gods care for them (Flannery, 1965, p. 19).

The full realization of Roman anti-Jewish slander was expressed well by Tacitus. According to this celebrated historian Jews descended from lepers expelled from Egypt, and

followed a band of wild asses out of the desert. From these repugnant origins the Jewish rites were derived. According to Tacitus Jews worship the ass, which is "consecrated in Jewish temples." They abstain from pork in remembrance of their leprosy, an affliction to which the pig, Tacitus thought, is subject. Their use of unleavened bread on Pass-over symbolizes the food they stole in Egypt, their Sabbath represents the day on which they escaped and to which in their indolence became attached. The other institutions of theirs are "sinister, shameful, and have survived only because of their perversity" (Flannery, 1965). It is interesting to note that as Christianity became more and more differentiated from Judaism in the second and third centuries they were likewise fanatically accused by Roman writers of ritual murder, infanticide, sexual perversion, worshipping an ass, and cannibalism (Grosser et al., 1978).

Christian Anti-Jewish Propaganda

Christian anti-Jewish slander, consistent with the above historical description of Christian anti-Jewish hostility (see Chapter I), does not appear to lay at the base of Christianity. It seems that the most vicious and destructive vilification of Jews by the Church came about decades (and possibly even centuries) after Jesus and his Apostles had laid the foundations of Christianity. Only after Christianity had severed its integral relationship to Judaism

did Pontius Pilate, known throughout history for his ruthlessness, become vindicated in his execution of Jesus (Goldberg, 1979). Accordingly, early Gospels do not single out the Jews in general as at fault for the crucifixion, but the last in the series of Gospels to be written down does, and ironically turns out to be the most anti-Jewish and pro-Roman of the Gospels (Goldberg, 1979). Hence, Pontius Pilate, the Roman ruler, is sympathetically portrayed in deferring to Jewish pressure, a deference he failed to exhibit in his other dealings with the Jews (Goldberg, 1979). This image of the Jew as Christ killer (until of course, he or she converts) became the foundation and progenitor for multitudes of ritual murder, desecration of the Host, and Jew as Devil charges. These libels continued for 1,500 years and accounted for countless occurrences of pillage, rape, torture, and slaughter (Flannery, 1965; Grosser et al., 1978; Ruether, 1974; and Trachtenberg, 1943).

In light of the injury the portrayal of the Jew as Christ killer has wreaked, a brief exposition of its inaccuracy is deemed necessary. First, crucifixion was never a Jewish form of punishment. The Talmud (Sanhedrin 49B) specifically describes the legal forms of capital punishment, and crucifixion is not one of them. This was a Roman form of punishment, used by Romans to kill enemies of the state. In fact, during the siege of Jerusalem, the Romans crucified as many as five hundred Jews a day (Goldberg, 1979). As

for the alleged influence of the Pharisees (i.e., Oral Law adherents) on the Roman ruler to carry out the crucifixion, the English churchman James Parkes in his book Anti-Semitism writes concerning the Christian Clergy:

With sublime indifference to the evidence of the Synoptic Gospels themselves (which contain no mention of the Pharisees in the events of the arrest, trial, and death of Jesus) they lay the blame for the crucifixion on Pharisaic shoulders (Goldberg, 1979, p. 55).

The Catholic Church in 1965 finally put to rest much of this destructive falsehood with its statement on the Jews issued by the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council. According to The Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions it was officially declared that the crucifixion of Jesus

cannot be charged against all the Jews, without distinction, then alive, nor against the Jews of today. Although the Church is the new people of G-d, the Jews should not be presented as rejected or accursed, as if this followed from the Holy Scriptures (Goldberg, 1979, p. 57).

Vatican II finally broke the long-standing theme of Jewish collective and eternal complicity in the crucifixion of Christ, but in the process much immeasurable destruction and suffering was wrought.

Muslim Anti-Jewish Propaganda

Unlike Christianity, the negative stereotype of the Jew in Islamic literature is as old as the religion itself. In fact, one need not go further than the Quran (i.e., Islam's sacred texts believed to contain the revelations made by

Allah to Mohammad) to understand Islam's official stereotype of the Jew (and Christian) which has given rise to severe oppression over the centuries. Not only has Islamic dogma led to a life of degradation and insecurity for Jews in Muslim lands (as depicted above in Chapter I), but since the inception of Israel in 1948, has been used to justify the ongoing attempt to liquidate the Jewish state.

Muhammad charged the Jews with falsifying their Bible by deliberately omitting the prophecies of his coming.

And when a book came unto them from G-d, confirming the scriptures which were with them, although they had prayed for assistance against those who believed not, yet when that came into them which they knew to be from G-d, they would not believe therein: therefore the curse of God shall be on the infidels (Quran: in Grosser et al., 1978, p. 376).

In several other places in the Quran Muhammad speaks unabashedly about the "vile disbelieving" Jews. ". . . they brought on themselves indignation on indignation; and the unbelievers shall suffer an ignominious punishment" (Quran: in Grosser et al., 1978, p. 376).

They are smitten with vileness wheresoever they are found; unless they obtain security by entering into a treaty with G-d [i.e., convert to Islam] . . . and they draw on themselves indignation from G-d, and they are afflicted with poverty. This they suffer, because they disbelieved the signs of G-d, and slew the prophets unjustly; this because they are rebellious, and transgressed (Quran: in Grosser et al., 1978, p. 376).

"Thou shall surely find the most violent of all men in enmity against the true believers to be the Jews, and the idolaters" (Quran: Grosser et al., 1978. p. 376).

Muhammad also declared that Jews, as their Christian counterparts, were not true monotheists, a charge he supported by claiming that the Jews believed the prophet Ezra to be the son of G-d. "The Jews say: Ezra is the son of God' . . . God assail them! How they are perverted!" (Quran 9:30)."

Russian and Communist Anti-Jewish
Propaganda

The father of Marxist ideology and modern Communism was Karl Heinrich Marx (1818-1883). Marx's father had converted to Christianity before Karl's birth in order to retain his law practice (forbidden to Jews under the new Prussian laws), and baptized his children so that they would not have to suffer from further anti-Jewish legislation. It was into this identity negating world that Marx was born (Prager et al., 1983). The poisonous anti-Jewish rhetoric sowed by the great "emancipator" was to set an intellectual precedent which would be subsequently manipulated to "justify" the ongoing Communist oppression of Soviet Jewry, and denunciation of Jewry worldwide.

On the Jewish Question Marx writes:

Let us consider the real Jew: not the Sabbath Jew . . . but the everyday Jew.

Let us not seek the secret of the Jew in his religion, but let us seek the secret of the religion in the real Jew.

What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical need, self interest. What is the worldly cult of the Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money.

Very well: then in emancipating itself from huckster-

ing and money, and thus from real and practical Judaism, our age would emancipate itself. . . .

We discern in Judaism, therefore, a universal anti-social element of the present time, whose historical development, zealously aided in its harmful aspects by the Jews, has now attained its culminating point, a point at which it must necessarily begin to disintegrate.

In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of mankind from Judaism. . . .

Money is the jealous god of Israel, beside which no other god may exist. . . .

The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism (emphasis added). (In Fisch, 1984, pp. 173-174).

Lest the reader believe that Russian anti-Jewish slander originated with the advent of the Russian revolution, it is important to note other vile misinformation Russian governments had previously disseminated. The infamous government instigated pogroms (1881-1906) which destroyed hundreds of Jewish communities (Grosser et al., 1978) was blamed (by the Czarist government) on Jewish "exploitation" of the peasants, and on Jews as Christ-killers (Flannery, 1965).

The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion the forger of the century was the handiwork of Czarist Russia (Flannery, 1965). The Protocols first appeared in 1905 printed by the government press and were alleged to be extracts from the 1897 World Zionist Congress in Basel which dealt with plans to conquer the world that date back to King Solomon in 929 B.C.E. In essence, the Protocols were claimed to be a series of lectures on plans and techniques for subjugating the world and establishing a Jewish world state (this alleged Jewish conspiracy was similar to its medieval forerunner,

where the Jews were held responsible for the Black Death in their "attempt" to destroy all of Christendom). Despite the Protocols' exposure as a crude forgery they received excited attention throughout Europe and beyond, and reached their peak of influence in Nazi Germany (Flannery, 1965).

During the Russian revolution (1917) and subsequent Civil War it is estimated that over 250,000 Jewish civilians perished. These civilians were slaughtered primarily by the Ukrainians and the Whites who were convinced of the Jewish communist nature (Grosser et al., 1978). It is interesting to note that these "avid Marxist-Communist" Jews according to the Russian Whites, were none other than the same "exploiting capitalists," as described in length by Marx himself.

Nazi Anti-Jewish Propaganda

The foundation for most (if not all) of the pathological lies used by Nazi Germany to "justify" the annihilation of six million Jews can be found in Hitler's Mein Kampf. Mein Kampf, which Hitler wrote in 1923-1924 while serving a prison term, was an attempt by Hitler to put his ideas together in the form of an autobiography, ideological doctrine, and party manual all in one. The following are excerpts from Mein Kampf taken from Lucy Davidowicz's (1975) classic The War Against the Jews which vividly describe, along with the ludicrous lies, Hitler's unrelenting paranoia of the Jewish presence.

The effect of Jewry will be racial tuberculosis of nations. (p. 21)

If the Jews were alone in this world, they would stifle in filth and offal. (p. 24)

Concerning democracy, he stated "only the Jew can praise an institution which is as dirty and false as he himself" (p. 26).

"The Jewish doctrine of Marxism," Hitler contended, rejects "the aristocratic principle of Nature." The goal of Marxism "is and remains the destruction of all non-Jewish national states." Marxism itself, Hitler believed "systematically plans to hand the world over to the Jews" (p. 26).

It is the inexorable Jew who struggles for his domination over nations. No nation can remove this hand from its throat except by the sword. Only the assembled and concentrated might of a national passion rearing up in its strength can defy the international enslavement of peoples. Such a process is and remains a bloody one.

The Jew would really devour the people of the earth, would become their master.

The international world Jew slowly but surely strangles us.

The Jew destroys the racial foundations of our existence and thus destroys our people for all time. (p. 211)

Hence today I believe that I am acting in accordance with the will of the Almighty Creator: by defending myself against the Jew, I am fighting for the work of the Lord. (p. 220)

On April 15, 1945, after six million Jews had been systematically slaughtered, Hitler gave his last military order:

For the last time our mortal enemies the Jewish Bolsheviks have launched their massive forces to the attack. Their aim is to reduce Germany to ruins and to exterminate our people. (p. 223)

Contemporary Anti-Jewish Propaganda

Although the Western world (both Jews and Christians alike) would probably like to believe that the propaganda process against Jews is no longer a serious problem, the post World War II period has brought with it a new wave of virulent propaganda aimed at vilifying the same millenia-old target group. However, this time the allegations are not directed against a highly vulnerable minority group, and this time the group is not seen as craftily attempting to undermine society. Rather, today the allegations are directed against a powerful majority population (the Jews of Israel), a group portrayed by Communist and Arab-Muslim propagandists alike, as savagely and imperialistically subduing and attempting to eradicate an entire Palestinian Arab nation. The primary platform for disseminating this vile slander is none other than the beacon of "Fraternity," and "good will toward men" itself, the United Nations (Givet, 1982; Seidman, 1982).

Israel's former chief delegate to the United Nations, Yehuda Blum, while addressing the United Nations general assembly succinctly asserted:

In this building [U.N.], Southern Yemen, East Germany, or Afghanistan are democracies. In this building, Libya, Vietnam, and Iraq are peace loving states. In this building, Cuba is a non-aligned country. In this building, the Soviet Union is the leader of an alleged peace camp, and any challenge in this regard is always refuted by the representatives of Budapest, Prague, Kabul, and Warsaw, who can testify to the Soviet Union's peaceful intentions. In this building, the Arab aggressors who

are ganging up on my country since its establishment as an independent state, and who openly profess their desire to see it disappear from the face of the earth--are proclaimed as victims of aggression, and Israel, the target of their sinister design, is branded an aggressor. (Seidman, 1982, p. 5)

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, wrote in an article for The New Leader in November, 1979:

It would be tempting to see in this propaganda nothing more than bigotry of a quite traditional sort that can, sooner or later, be overcome. But the anti-Israel, anti-Zionist campaign is not uninformed bigotry, it is conscious politics. We are dealing here not with the primitive but with the sophisticated, with the world's most powerful propaganda apparatus--that of the Soviet Union and the dozens of governments which echo it. Further, this fact of world politics creates altogether new problems for those interested in the fate of democracies in the world, and of Israel in the Middle East. It is not merely that our adversaries have commenced an effort to destroy the legitimacy of a kindred democracy through the incessant repetition of the Zionist-racist lie. It is that others can come to believe it also. Americans among them. (Givet, 1982, pp. xii-xiii)

Former United States ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick seemed to sum it up when she declared:

The Holocaust did not begin with building gas chambers. It began with uttering evil words, with defamation. The United Nations, today, is following the same path by poisoning the atmosphere with hatred against Israel, Zionism, and Judaism. (Seidman, 1982, p. vii)

In the present author's opinion, the more sophisticated Arab propaganda themes, based on scholarly written pro-Arab English literary works (which are currently disseminated in the West), goes something like the following:

At the onset of the British mandate of Palestine there was close to three-quarters of a million Arabs living in Palestine who had been on the land since time immemorial. The land of Palestine was a land flowing with milk and honey adorned with beautiful mountains and luxurious valleys; the rocks producing excellent water; and no part empty of delight or profit. The Palestinian people were a socially, culturally, politically, and economically identifiable people whose language and religion were Arabic and Islam respectively. The Palestinian people are a people with an indissoluble bond to the land.

Contrary to the popular view, Zionism is not rooted in the history and culture of the Jews. It is a very recent movement. Palestine was revered, as it has always been in Judaism, but only in a purely religious, not a political sense. Zionism is a product of the modern age. It represents the translation of diasporan religious orientation into a secular ideology inspired by the political thought of Gentile Europe. The crucial advantage eventually achieved by Zionism in Palestine resulted from the identification of the movement with the historical phenomenon of Western imperialism as it expanded and consolidated its dominance over the Afro-Asian world during the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

What the Zionists had failed to buy, they eventually expropriated when they announced the establishment of the State of Israel. The Palestinian Arabs fled their homes and possessions for fear of death. The terrorism, made convincing by local measures, to which the Israelis resorted in order to clear the Arabs out was the prime motivating force behind the Palestinian exodus. The Israelis, by force of arms, accomplished within little more than a year what decades of Jewish migration had failed to do, namely, to effect a complete demographic transformation of Palestine. Except for the extermination of the Tasmanians, modern history recognizes no cases in which the virtually complete supplanting of the indigenous population of a country by an alien stock has been achieved in as little as two generations.

It is a very sad commentary that there is such an avoidance or ignorance of the existence today of about four million Muslim and Christian Arabs who are known to themselves and to others as Palestinians. In order to mitigate the presence of large numbers of natives on a desired land, the Zionists convinced themselves that these natives did not exist, then made it possible for them to exist only in the most rarefied forms. This is not only the policy of the Zionists toward the native Arabs, but also the policy of Israel toward its Arab

colonies, and the true character of the Israeli occupying forces on the West Bank and Gaza after 1967 (Abu-Lughod, 1971; Said, 1979).

The above reconstruction of history has been taken up and embellished by Third World leaders of all kinds, by the Chinese, by the Soviet Communist Bloc, by many "progressive" Europeans and by United Nation officials. In the United States elements of the Left, "liberal" Clergy, Reform Rabbis, Jewish university students, and even alienated Israelis have all been spokespeople promoting and disseminating a similar historical account as the one depicted above (Guttman, 1975).

A major problem in attempting to expose current and popular propaganda themes is that while they are in vogue, any efforts to uproot the prevailing misconceptions are themselves depicted as fabrications politically serving the other side. For example, trying to convince the European populace of the Middle Ages that the Jews were not responsible for the Black Death, and that the Jews themselves were drinking from the same supposedly poisonous wells would probably have been a very difficult task. In Nazi Germany, explaining to the German people that Hitler's accusations and hostility toward Jews were based on little more than the man's pathological hatred would probably have been totally futile. In like fashion, attempting to explain the Palestinian problem in a light which completely contradicts the Arab and Soviet versions would, at best, appear to many Americans (Jews in-

cluded) as a second biased version of the same historical phenomenon.

Unfortunately, historical accuracies usually only surface after the issues have lost political and social import. Historically for Jews, it is usually only after the destructive consequences that, in retrospect, the untruths behind the tragedy are revealed. In light of this social-psychological reality the author will not attempt to portray the pro-Israeli version of the Palestinian problem as factual, but will call the pro-Israeli version simply the pro-Jewish version. In the present author's opinion the pro-Jewish version of the Palestinian refugee problem could read something like the following:

The land called Israel today was governed by its own inhabitants only during the periods of Jewish sovereignty (i.e., there never was an independent or even autonomous Palestinian Arab nation). The Land of Israel was depopulated and laid waste by the Romans (second century C.E.) in which condition it remained until the mass Jewish immigrations began in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Jewish presence on the Land (albeit as a minority) has been continuous during the Jews 1,800-year period of exile. This presence was maintained despite consistent discrimination and persecution usually perpetrated by the Arabs of the region.

Only after the Jews had started cultivating and building up the land did the great majority of Arabs immigrate in order to find work. This Arab immigration process was fostered by the British government who stringently upheld the Jewish immigration quota (despite British cognizance of the fact that masses of Jews were being slaughtered in German dominated territories), but were flagrantly negligent when dealing with Arab immigrants. Israeli independence was declared in 1948 and the infant state was immediately attacked by six Arab states from without in conjunction with the Arab army from within. Many Arabs were urged by their Muslim leaders outside the Land to leave until victory was assured. After the

victory they were to return to gather in the spoils. Only when the Jewish forces began to prevail, and panic overwhelmed the hostile Arab population (for two basic reasons: (1) their own malicious propoganda concerning Jewish "savagery" which had been used in the past to incite Arabs against Jews now worked against them and created a mass panic, and (2) they were familiar with their own forms of brutal revenge and failed to comprehend another type of justice) did Arab leaders begin commanding their people to stay put. Ironically the embryonic Jewish government in several cases also urged the Arab populace to remain in their places via radio and leaflets.

The less than 600,000 Arabs that left the land were then refused citizenship in all the surrounding Arab lands except Jordan. They were instead placed in refugee camps where a great bulk of them still remain today, some thirty-seven years later! The 160,000 Arabs who remained, are full Israeli citizens today. Conversely, during approximately the same time period some 800,000 Jewish refugees fled their homes and possessions from Arab lands after facing increased discrimination and persecution. They (i.e., the approximate 600,000 who came to Israel), in contrast, were immediately given Israeli citizenship.

Two generations of Arab refugees in the Arab refugee camps have been fed continuous hate propoganda regarding Israel. They have also been indoctrinated on their glorious national and cultural Palestinian past which, historically speaking, never was. The product of living in these camps with their "unique" educational process has been the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO is little more than an international terrorist organization backed by Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union, with its prime objective being the liquidation of the State of Israel (Davis & Decter, 1982; Peters, 1984).

The logical consequences in adopting one of the above versions are more profound than most people believe. Belief in the pro-Arab version which bestows legitimacy on the Palestinian national movement and creates genuine sympathy for the Palestinian cause while simultaneously condemning Israeli "racist" and "imperialistic" actions is potentially the "moral" justification needed to carry out a future genocide.

Looking at the conflict from a secular perspective, American weaponry in the hands of the Israelis is the factor most responsible in preventing the Arab eradication of Israel. This opinion becomes more clear when one realizes the virtually unlimited monetary and military (via Arab Oil States and the Soviet Union respectively) resources the Arab states have at their disposal, in their relentless attempt to totally annihilate the Jewish State of Israel.

It is the author's opinion that the American public's abandonment of Israel on "moral" grounds (i.e., via the pro-Arab version of the Palestinian problem) could lead to a world supported Arab attack against a completely isolated (both economically and militarily) Israeli people. An Arab victory may not mean a small state for the Palestinians, for both King Hussein of Jordan and the PLO have declared that Jordan is Palestine and Palestine is Jordan (Davis et al., 1982), but it would mean the total eradication of Israel as officially canonized in the Palestinian National Covenant of 1968. Even a position of indifference adopted by the United States (based on the middle-of-the-road belief that a symmetry of truth and non-truth exists in both versions) could also produce seriously harmful consequences for the Jewish state. In effect, this apathy or neutrality would be pitting Israel against Arab money and Soviet armaments.

Consistent with the pro-Arab version is that the Palestinian refugee plight lays at the heart of the more

general Arab-Israeli conflict. This theme is regularly expressed by Arab leaders (e.g., Hussein, 1982; Johnson, 1982; Muller, 1982). The implications of this seemingly innocuous theme is that the Arab States of the Middle East are not directly inimical to the Jewish State of Israel, but rather their hostility reflects the injustice done to their Palestinian brethren by the Israelis. The tacit corollary of this theme (at least the one circulated in the Western world) is that once the Palestinians have their own small state, the Arab nations would then recognize Israel's right to exist.

The pro-Jewish version of the Palestinian refugee plight does not depict the refugee problem as the source of the conflict, but rather as a result of it (Davis et al., 1982). For example, in 1937 the British government recommended a tripartite partition of Western Palestine (Eastern Palestine had already been severed by Britain in 1922 and comprises the Arab state known today as Jordan) which would entail a small Jewish state, a larger Arab state, and a continued British Mandate over the Jerusalem-Bethlehem area, with a corridor to the sea. The Palestinian Arab leaders unflinchingly rejected the proposals. The pro-Jewish version would also cite the fact that six Arab states (in 1948) together with the Arab population from within, attempted to destroy the State of Israel before there ever was a refugee problem. In addition, when the United Nations voted to partition Palestine giving both Jews and Arabs approximately

half the land in 1947, the Arab world unanimously refused another opportunity to form a second independent Palestinian Arab State (the country of Jordan being the first). Pro-Jewish proponents also cite the fact that while the country of Jordan had sovereignty over the West Bank from 1948 to 1967 no attempt was ever made to establish a second independent Palestinian Arab State in the area. Jordan, in fact, annexed the West Bank making it officially part of Jordan. In addition, the belief that the Arab nations have initiated four wars with Israel in behalf of the Arab refugees seriously contradicts other activity of theirs in the region. For example, from the inception of the problem in 1948 to the present, none of the Arab nations, except one, have been willing to grant the Arab refugees citizenship. This is despite the Arab's vast oil resources, their limited populations, and their total area which comprise 640 times more land than the State of Israel. By refusing to absorb the refugee population, they have in effect, forced them to remain in their wretched refugee camps. Jordan, the only country to grant the refugees citizenship, showed its "love" for the refugees in 1970-1971. During that period, King Hussein's army slaughtered thousands of civilian refugees and forced 20,000 others to flee to Lebanon (Muller, 1982).

According to the pro-Jewish version, the Arab States themselves created the Arab exodus from the land. They have also deliberately maintained them in refugee camps to be

used as political and military pawns. The claim that the Palestinian plight is at the heart of the conflict is seen as no more than a powerful propaganda ploy used to cast aspersions on the Jewish State while concealing the Arab and Muslim States' ultimate objective, which is the total eradication of Israel. To advocates of the pro-Jewish version, this would constitute another form of the Big Lie tactic with the potential of producing another Jewish holocaust. By repeatedly emphasizing Israel's guilt for the Palestinian problem in conjunction with the problem's key position in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab States and their allies ostensibly purge themselves of any reproach or responsibility. They are seemingly undeserving of reproach and bear no moral responsibility regarding their continual active hostility toward Israel, or for their terrorist tactics directed against pro-Israeli Western targets, for Israel has "stolen" their brethren's land, "subjugated" its people, and therefore has in effect, "forced" the poor Arab refugees to remain in their deplorable condition over the last thirty-seven years!

By way of contrast it is interesting to note that the number of refugees throughout the world in 1982 totaled more than 10 million, including well over 2 million African refugees, 1 million Asians, and the 2.6 million Afghans fleeing Pakistan. Yet that figure was significantly reduced from the number reported two years prior in 1980 where 12.6

million refugees, including 6 million Africans and 2 million Asians were reported. As the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reported "communities, institutions, cities and nations have generously opened their doors to refugees" (Peters, 1984). Ironically, the "peace-loving" Arab-Muslim nations seem to be an exception to the rule when dealing with their own people.

The United States Committee for Refugees noted that more than a million Indochinese refugees were resettled between 1975 and 1981. That report also made mention that among those African refugees recorded, "substantial numbers of the refugees . . . are 'settled in place.'" To be "settled in place" or "resettled in a third country" is considered by the United Nations as a "durable solution" for the Indochinese, the Africans, and in fact all the world's refugees (Peters, 1984), unless the refugees happen to be Arabs vying for the Land of Israel.

Unlike the Afghans, or the Ethiopians, or the Vietnamese, or the Cambodians, the Arabs largely went to places only a few miles from where they left. Most of the Arab "refugees" who fled still remained within "Palestine." Yet, it is the Arab refugee problem toward which the United Nations, the media, and consequently the public focus the great majority of their attention (Peters, 1984).

Unfortunately for the Jews the pro-Arab version, in one form or another, is the version adopted by most of the

world today (not unlike other popular anti-Jewish propaganda circulated in the past). The Communist bloc, the Third World bloc, and even the majority of Western European nations (as represented by the European Economic Community) all hold Israel responsible for the ongoing Palestinian refugee plight. Following therefrom, they have also adopted the Arab thesis that the refugee problem is at the core of the conflict (Seidman, 1982).

The ingenuity of Arab propaganda is that while the world accepts the assertion that the Palestinian plight is the core issue (and is therefore caught up in attempts to force Israel's hand at making territorial concessions) the assertion (much less the tangible actions to accompany it) concerning Arab responsibility for the refugee plight never becomes an issue. In other words, if the pro-Jewish version is correct, the energy, the money, and the time spent for what the vast majority of the world believes (or at least rationalizes) is a humanitarian and altruistic endeavor may be the very foundation for another Jewish holocaust.

It should be reemphasized at this point that pro-Arab advocates (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 1971; and Said, 1979) have their own "irrefutable facts" and interpretations of the Arab-Palestinian refugee problem which when presented alone also appear quite convincing. However, in light of over three millenia of vile slander (with its horrid consequences) used repeatedly against Jews and Judaism, several thoroughly documented his-

torical facts which are conspicuously missing (or are blatantly misrepresented) in scholarly pro-Arab works, and the fact that the pro-Arab version is the version most often accepted and presented throughout the world today (e.g., United Nations), the present author feels little compunction in presenting a seemingly biased portrayal of the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, and the Arab-Palestinian refugee problem in particular.

At present, the United States is Israel's closest ally. As stated above, without American weaponry Israel would probably not be able to contend with its Arab neighbors and their allies. Although public and congressional support for Israel has been strong over the last ten years (Kessler & Schwaber, 1984), Arab propaganda has started to make inroads via the mass media and among senior government officials. The American news media's latent "sympathy" for the Arab cause surfaced during Israel's 1982 invasion into Lebanon. During the three- to six-month interval immediately following the initial invasion, the news media of television, newspapers and magazines seemed to unite in a holy war aimed at condemning the State of Israel. Gross exaggerations of casualties, fatalities, and displaced persons were a common phenomenon during this period. Scenes of wanton destruction juxtaposed to Israeli war-like activities were shown nightly on national television despite the tenuous relationship between the two (Muravchik, 1983).

A salient example of this type of biased news coverage was reported by Ilya Gerol, a correspondent for The Citizen daily newspaper of Ottawa, Canada. Mr. Gerol visited Lebanon a few months after the outbreak of the war. The following are excerpts from his article in The Citizen dated October 30, 1982.

With a group of other Western correspondents, I crossed the Israeli-Lebanese border expecting to see destroyed cities, burned villages and other signs of fierce battles. Like everybody in the Western world, we arrived there after watching daily reports from Lebanon via NBC, CBS or ABC.

NBC commentator John Chancellor, only a few days before my departure for the Middle East, was talking about the destroyed cities of Sidon and Tyre. The films of destroyed houses, falling bombs, the sounds of screams and fear were shocking indeed. Who would have doubted Chancellor's statements about tens of thousands of civilian victims and cities being in ruins during the first weeks of the Lebanon conflict.?

Those were my thoughts when I arrived in the city of Tyre. For the first few minutes after driving through the streets it looked as if we had missed our road and were maybe even in a different country.

There was no destruction. The cafes were full of people, schools were operating, stores were open and Lebanese policemen regulated the traffic. We asked one policeman how to get to the mayor's office. "It's just around the corner," he said. "Not far from Television Alley."

Later the mayor showed us "Television Alley"--the only street where several blocks had been destroyed by bombs. He said: "All 11 destroyed buildings were occupied by the PLO headquarters and offices."

The mayor was very busy. After our conversation, he had to accompany a new group of television crews to the same famous alley to film the "total destruction" of Tyre. I asked an ABC man: "How did you manage to make a picture of apocalyptic destruction out of only 11 ruined houses?"

"We just had to film them from different angles," was the answer.

Another example demonstrating the media's a priori

intent to condemn Israel may be seen in its coverage of the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camp massacres. In early September, 1982, 460 people (425 of them were adult men) were killed by Lebanese Christian units. The nation's four leading dailies (i.e., the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Christian Science Monitor) devoted nearly 8,000 column-inches of news copy to the massacres, focusing primarily on Israel which, at worst, had only indirect responsibility. Yet, the same four newspapers allocated only 6,000 column-inches of news space to the combined coverage of the ten bloodiest massacres of the past decade in which a total of over three million men, women and children were put to death. Furthermore, the word mas-
sacre appeared at least 99 times in headlines related to Sabra and Shatilla while showing up in just 24 headlines pertaining to the other ten massacres combined (C.O.M.A., 1983).

Probably the mass media's most demonstrated bias had to do with its failure to report the Israeli invasion in its historical context. It is the opinion of the author that had Americans known about the PLO bombings of civilian targets in northern Israel (Davis et al., 1982), PLO terrorist attacks against Jews and non-Jews throughout the world (Merari, 1983), the PLO's massive stockpiling of arms in southern Lebanon (Mendel, 1982), the PLO's official platform to liquidate the State of Israel (Palestinian National Covenant,

1968), the PLO's terrorizing of Lebanon from 1975 to 1982 (Britain Israel Public Affairs Committee, 1982), and the PLO's use of large civilian populations as human barricades against the advancing Israelis (Tal, 1982) that public support for Israel would probably not have dropped to a ten-year low (Kessler et al., 1984).

Notwithstanding much anti-Israeli sentiment in the American news media (by Gentile and Jew alike) possibly buttressed by the power of Arab monies, the question of how these media giants who argue so vociferously and self-righteously for their prerogatives under the First Amendment, could collectively so pervert such explicit realities demands interpretation. An inkling to the process, which sheds much light on the above question, is furnished by Zeev Chafets (1985), Director of the Israeli Government Press Office, in his book Double Vision. The following excerpts should help to significantly clarify the media's biased coverage of happenings in the Middle East.

During the past decade no region in the world has been more important to the United States than the Middle East. . . . And yet, despite the torrent of media coverage and commentary, surprisingly little is actually known about the region. (p. 17)

This has a great deal to do with the fact that:

American journalists in some parts of the Arab world have been the victims not only of exclusion but of physical intimidation. The Syrians, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and to a lesser extent, some other Arab regimes have practiced terror as a tool of news management. They have subjected unfriendly reporters to threats, harassment, assault, and even murder. (p. 19)

As John Kifner of the New York Times once wrote (in February, 1982): "To work here [in Beirut] as a journalist is to carry fear with you as faithfully as your notebook. It is the constant knowledge that there is nothing you can do to protect yourself, and nothing ever happened to any assassin. In this atmosphere a journalist must decide when, how, and even whether to record a story." (p. 51)

The decision to practice self-censorship is often humiliating and many reporters justify it to themselves by rationalization. "Faced with undefined threats," says Mort Rosenblum, "reporters may inadvertently withhold sensitive information by convincing themselves that their perfectly reliable sources are not good enough." (pp. 51-52)

To work in Beirut one needed the help and sponsorship of the PLO. Bill Marmon put it this way: "The PLO was able to play on the willingness of journalists to meet it more than half way. Generally in the Arab world it is necessary, to an extent unknown in Israel or the West, to prove you are a friend, and you try to do this to the extent possible without totally sacrificing your integrity. I did it myself. Often you must have a patron. He's crucial, and sometimes that relationship comes at the expense of hard hitting journalism." After a while, though, the pretense of friendship and sympathy can ripen into the real thing! There is a sort of contract you make with organizations like the PLO--and they are skillful at extracting a good price from the press. One way it's done is through the "I'm a Friend, you should talk to me" kind of arrangement. You know, you tell the guy, I'm pro-PLO and anti-Israel, that sort of thing. The problem is that once you start that, some people really begin to believe it." (p. 78)

If the press in Beirut was not reporting fully out of a fear of Arab reprisal, then Israel was being forced to fight the war for Western public opinion with one hand tied behind its back. People who knew little about the PLO's operations in southern Lebanon or its connections with international terrorist groups or about the internal situation in Syria often found Israel's concern about these matters "paranoid" and its attempt to deal with them overreactive. Moreover, when Israel tried to point out what was happening in Lebanon or Syria, its arguments had little credibility--after all, people reasoned, there were plenty of American and European reporters in Beirut who would surely be aware of a Palestinian "mini-state" in south Lebanon if one existed, or of large-scale massacres in Syria. (p. 93)

Another disquieting phenomenon to advocates of the

pro-Jewish version is that important American government officials today seem to be accepting, to a significant extent, the Arab version of the Palestinian problem. For example, United States Presidents Carter and Reagan have both expressed, with only slight variation, the claim of the PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, that the main issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the Palestinian problem (Peters, 1984). Former Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Charles Percy, stated that "there is no real basis of lasting peace without resolving the Palestinian problem." The Arab mayor of Bethlehem told reporters that Percy had agreed that the Palestinian issue was the crux of all problems in the region (Chicago Tribune, 1981). Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the current Secretary of State George Shultz have both expressed the urgent need to settle the Palestinian refugee problem as a major step in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict (Sancton, 1982; Smith, 1982), and Vice President George Bush in his 1984 nationally televised vice presidential debate lectured to Congresswoman Ferraro on the core issue of the Mideast conflict, of course "the Palestine problem."

As emphasized above (via the pro-Jewish version) the thesis which depicts the resolution of the Palestinian Arab plight as a precursor to an Arab-Israeli peace treaty is based on fundamentally untenable assumptions. As the Arab leaders shifted (after the six-Day War in 1967) from

outraged proclamations calling for the total destruction of Israel to sympathetic rhetoric in behalf of the Palestinians, the adjusted approach granted a rationalization to those already opposed to the existence of a strong Jewish state, and blurred general understanding of the Arab world's role in the conflict. The peculiar aspect of the above phenomena unique to the present study is that (according to the pro-Jewish version) once again the Jews are victimized by propaganda based on misconceptions and distortions. Once again, the group most responsible for propagating this misinformation is the same group which has publicly declared its intention of eradicating a large Jewish population. And, once again the great majority of the surrounding population (this time the entire world) accepts most of the assertions at face value. (This assertion is most aptly represented by the United Nation's General Assembly adoption [November, 1975] of the resolution which labeled Zionism as a form of "racism and racial discrimination." The vote was 72 to 35 with 32 abstentions.)

The Objectives and Hypotheses Following from Chapter II

Arab propoganda directed against the Jewish State of Israel has achieved a new level of sophistication and credibility in the Western World today (Kessler et al., 1984). Pro-Jewish organizations in America have endeavored to counter this propoganda process by attempting to explain

to both Jewish and Christian audiences alike, the irrationality of Arab allegations. It is the opinion of the present author that these accusations and defensive elucidations by pro-Arab and pro-Jewish factions respectively, over crucial Middle-East issues are, in the long run, only to the detriment of the Jews in Israel. The reason being that it creates an image of mutual culpability which will become increasingly more difficult to diffuse as time goes by.

This symmetry of blame in the context of a virtually inexhaustible supply of Arab petrodollars, continued Western dependency on Arab oil, and the threat of a nuclear war resulting from tension in the Middle East will inevitably weaken public support that has, in the past, been based on perceptions of Israel's moral and ethical superiority. Unless Jewish organizations offensively initiate programs to explain the pro-Jewish version of the Mideast conflict, support for Israel in the United States may begin to dissipate at a rapid pace.


However, in order to educate the public, it is first necessary to recognize what the public does and does not know. Thousands of dollars are allocated by Jewish organizations yearly to ascertain the American public's perception and attitudes toward Israel (e.g., Gallup 1973-1983), but little money, if any, is allocated to measure the public's level of knowledge concerning the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. Being that knowledge about Jews and their activities

has been found to significantly correlate with the public's perception and attitude toward them (Quinley et al., 1983), the present study will attempt to measure the American public's general awareness of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and then to correlate what people know about the conflict to their attitudes toward Israel. [See Figure 2].

Consistent with the above discourse concerning the news media's coverage of the Middle East, the author expects to find that the American public knows little concerning several fundamental and crucial Middle East issues. Based on the assumption that misinformation is correlated with attitudes, the public's level of knowledge on the above key issues are expected to correlate significantly with attitudes toward Israel.


A second goal of the present study will be to address the relationship of attitudes toward Jews to attitudes toward Israel. This association has been theoretically advanced and argued against (e.g., Forster & Epstein, 1974; Pilzer, 1981), but hard data to empirically support or refute the relationship is conspicuously lacking. The present study will attempt to test this relationship empirically. [See Figure 2]

Although according to the historical analysis presented in Chapter I, which portrayed the attack against Jewish nationalism as an integral aspect of anti-Jewish hostility, a more empirical measurement which would correlate attitudes



The above diagram can be understood by positing each box as a variable and each arrow as a relationship between variables. The dull side of each arrow represents the causative variable, whereas the sharp side represents the effected variable. For example, Knowledge and Perceptions of the Arab-Israeli Conflict are hypothesized as producing an effect on Attitudes Towards both Jews and Israel, and is inversely depicted as being effected by News Media Usage.

B. Comparison of Various Magazines and Their Hypothesized Effects



The above diagram depicts the hypothesized effects different magazine-types are to produce in the general non-Jewish population. For example, the Pro-PLO Magazine and Oral-Law based Magazine are hypothesized to produce an inverse polarization of opinions towards Israel. The two other magazines are depicted as producing moderately pro-Arab opinions.

Figure 2. Diagrammatic Representation of Variables Under Empirical Investigation for Chapter II

towards Jews with attitudes towards the Jewish state is deemed necessary. In essence, if attitudes towards Jews were not related to attitudes towards Israel the above historical analysis which posits the inextricable relationship between the two would be seriously challenged. Inversely, if a relationship is detected then the above historical analysis is further supported. If a significant relationship is found, reactions towards Israel should not be viewed as reactions towards just another political entity, but rather towards something specifically Jewish in nature. Consequently, in application any educational campaign on behalf of Israel would then need to take into account the "Jewish factor" when planning its educational strategy.

A third objective concerns the news media. Although the propagation of misinformation is not deemed the primary cause of anti-Jewish hostility, it is seen as the vehicle most often used to express such attitudes. In light of the role slanderous material and misinformation has played historically in both the expression and cause (secondary in nature) of anti-Jewish hostility, the effects of various news media will be investigated. The effect these news media have on individuals will be experimentally tested in the present study. Four magazines seen as representing American, Arab, Jewish Secular, and Jewish Religious (Oral Law) orientations will be content analyzed (see Chapter IV, Methodology) concerning their portrayal of the Palestinian Arab

refugee problem. Subsequently, the perceptual effect these seemingly different magazines have on the American non-Jewish and non-Arab public will be compared and analyzed.

In light of the negative coverage Israel received during its invasion into Lebanon in June, 1982, it is hypothesized that the magazine representing mainstream America, and needless to say the Arab sponsored magazine, will portray the Arab Palestinian problem, given a latitude of variation, in consonance with the Arab version as discussed above. In addition, the effect these two magazines have on the public's perception of Israel should be significantly more negative than the effect produced by a Jewish religious magazine. Furthermore, according to the above theory (see Chapter I), the Jewish secular magazine, indirectly echoing the philosophy of Reform and Conservative Judaism, should be no less hostile toward Israel nor less sympathetic for the Arab refugee plight than its American counterpart (i.e., If the Reform and Conservative movements have in practice attempted to sever the Jewish relationship to Israel, then the magazine following their lead should represent more an American orientation than a Jewish one). [See Figure 2]

CHAPTER III

THE HYPOTHESIZED TERTIARY CAUSES OF ANTI-JEWISH HOSTILITY

Although an attempt has been made to interpret and elucidate the primary and secondary causes of anti-Jewish hostility there still remains at least two serious problems which need to be addressed before the theory can claim any semblance of completeness. The first problem is based on common sense while the second is based on empirical support. It is the author's belief that although the two problems are distinctly different in type, their solution is one and the same.

The first problem simply asks: How could the cognitive process of slander (albeit malicious and vile) motivate large populations throughout history to pillage, torture, and murder literally millions of innocent Jewish men, women and children? We all, at times become recipients of negative misinformation about various minority groups, but unrestrained and brutal violence is not necessarily a direct corrolary of misinformation and perception. The second of the two problems, asks the question: How does the present theoretical analysis interpret the various theories which posit the rela-

tionship between pathological-type variables and anti-Jewish prejudice without dogmatically ignoring or denying their existence, particularly when these alternative theories are empirically based?

In the author's opinion a parsimonious resolution to the above questions can be made by temporarily leaving the theoretical realm of prejudice and entering that of aggression. More specifically, the drive theory of aggression as defined by L. Berkowitz (1978) may be implemented to explain away both of the above problems. Berkowitz suggests that various adverse external conditions (e.g., frustration, harsh physical conditions, or loss of face) serve to arouse a strong motive to engage in aggressively directed behavior, and that this drive, in turn, leads to the performance of overt assaults against others. Several experiments (e.g., Green, 1968; Berkowitz, Cochran, and Embree, 1981) have empirically corroborated the claim that negative affect from almost any source can produce an aggressive drive. Therefore, individuals who are suffering pain (in a potentially unlimited number of ways) may be predisposed to attack and harm other individuals simply because of the discomfort or displeasure they are experiencing.

Berkowitz (1978) also suggested some of the stimulus characteristics which are associated with the target recipients, and which prepare them as ready stimuli for this seemingly arbitrary automatic aggressive response. He states:

My guess is that these characteristics involve associations with two types of events: with earlier painful incidents or with prior reinforcements for aggression. Thus, a potential target will be attacked more strongly than it otherwise might have been to the extent that it is associated with aversive experiences, while other objects can intensify the violence that is performed if they are connected with positive reinforcement for aggression. (p. 703)

Historically, Jews have seemed to fit Berkowitz's stimulus paradigm throughout millennia. In light of the vile and treacherous misinformation religiously disseminated about Jews (as depicted in Chapter II) by the leaders (with the avid assistance of the intelligentsia) in most anti-Jewish epochs, the non-Jewish perceptual association of Jews should be, at best, disturbing. The perception of the Jew as Christ-killer, as the exploiter of the masses, or as the heretic par-excellence are images that evoke aversive experiences whether vicariously or otherwise. In addition, the positive reinforcement achieved by doing the "will" of G-d (plus the added bonus of pillage and rape) has probably made the ruthless slaughter of Jews by aggressively driven individuals highly appealing.

Correspondingly, it is no secret that many mass killings of Jews by the non-Jewish masses were precipitated by growing frustration and pain. For example, the exploitation of the Ukrainian peasants by the Polish nobility in the seventeenth century brought in its wake retaliation against the Poles. During this retaliatory period 100,000 to 500,000 Jews were savagely tortured and massacred (Grosser et al.,

1978). Accordingly, the German peoples' understandably great frustration after their defeat in World War I, and temporary loss of national self-respect accompanied by economic disaster would be considered in the previous theory as Berkowitz's aggressive-drive-component which only required an adequate stimulus object upon which to aggress.

According to the above exposition the original two problems (stated in the beginning of the present chapter) may be resolved by positing tertiary causes of anti-Jewish hostility. The first of the two problems is resolved by postulating mediating variables (i.e., Berkowitz's aggression-drive hypothesis) which would be the key in interpreting how highly negative perceptions are transformed into overt aggression. The second problem is equally interpretable. These aggression-type tertiary causes of anti-Jewish hostility may be those suggested by the empirically based theories mentioned above, but as yet untouched in the present analysis. In essence, the present theory postulates that the more frustrated or in pain the individual is (for any number of reasons, some of which will be discussed below) the more tangibly affected he or she will be by Big Lie propaganda. Therefore, the forthcoming approaches and theories which Allport (1954) and others would describe as viable theories of prejudice are depicted in the present theoretical context as nothing more than theories which have identified various aggression-arousing mediating variables, which indirectly

throughout history have become part of the overall prejudice process. The following pathological-type variables to be discussed represent the variables investigated in the present study and are not meant to be theoretically exhaustive. The primary reason these variables were selected (other than their hypothesized relationship to anti-Jewish prejudice) had to do with their facile implementation in a telephone interviewing setting.

The Sociocultural approach of prejudice emphasizes cultural causation. One theory of this type contends that the predisposition toward prejudiced behavior is heightened during transition periods of changing societal conditions. Rapid social change may be accompanied by a loss of predictability in life, accelerated disruption of social structure, and an abrupt diminution of preexisting social values. This disintegration of societal structure and values in times of social change has been called anomie and has been found to correlate significantly with anti-Jewish attitudes (Hoge & Carroll, 1975). Individuals in society suffering from anomie are predisposed to feelings of anxiety and insecurity, and in short, heightened emotional stress.

Another general approach formerly used to describe the direct causes of anti-Jewish hostility is the Situational approach. This approach may be differentiated from the sociocultural perspective in that it deals exclusively with the current forces (as opposed to the development of these forces)

impinging on the individual and society. It is proposed by several social scientists (e.g., Ettinger, 1969; Parsons, 1980) that threats of economic, political, and military disaster reinforce anti-Jewish attitudes and behavior. The fear of a serious up and coming economic, political, or military crisis which the individual is not directly in control of, is conceived as a disturbing and frustrating experience. Bettelheim and Janowitz (1964) have interpreted these aggressive-type attitudes and actions as reflecting a regressive response, which enables the individual to combat insecure feelings threatening his or her emotional well being.


A different and more individual type approach is the Psychodynamic approach. These types of theories contend that prejudicial attitudes and behavior are a reflection of the individual's personality traits, in contrast to the historical and social points of view mentioned above. A popular theory of this type is the frustration theory of prejudice (which is also known as the scapegoat theory). The theory posits that when the cause of frustration is either too intimidating or obscure, people often redirect their hostility against an available, identified group unlikely or unable to fight back. The fact that the group is innocent of the evils which have befallen the frustrated individual or group is irrelevant (Meyers, 1983).

Another psychodynamic variable found related to prejudicial attitudes and behavior is the individual's sense

of identity (Rosenman, 1977; Tumin, 1971). It is hypothesized that those who fail to achieve an effective personal identity may be predisposed to promote discriminatory behavior in their attempt to establish a "solid" sense of self. In light of the fact that traditional paths for establishing a sense of identity through, for example, one's occupation or religion have become less readily available, the individual may seek to secure this sense-of-self in various ways, including the path of aggression. Acts of aggression (whether verbal or physical) may temporarily block a diffusion of self by projecting on others unacceptable tendencies residing within the unstable individual himself (Bettleheim et al., 1964). It also reduces anxiety, for it suggests to the person or group that he or they are better than others.

In the present empirical analysis the several variables mentioned above will be measured, and their relationship to attitudes toward both Jews and Israel will be examined.

[See Figure 3]



The three rectangles in the middle and arrows jutting out from each represent (1) The three theoretical approaches discussed above, (2) the variables utilized in the present study which represent each approach, and (3) the hypothesized relationship of these variables to attitudes towards Jews and Israel. For example, two variables represent the Psychodynamic Approach in the present study. The Life Satisfaction Scale, and the Purpose of Life Test were used to represent the frustration theory of prejudice, and the Ego-Strength Scale was implemented to represent the individual's sense of identity. All scales were hypothesized as being related to both the Jewish and Israel Attitude Scales.

Figure 3. Diagrammatic Representation of Variables under Empirical Investigation for Chapter III

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

The present project was carried out in two stages in which at each stage a distinct population was examined. Therefore, the present chapter is divided into two studies (one study for each stage) and is presented in the order which represents the above theoretical analysis.

Study No. I

A. Participants

A sample of 811 Jewish adults (over twenty-one) from Chicago proper participated in the present study. Three-fourths of the respondents were randomly selected from the Chicago city phonebook on the basis of "Distinctively Jewish Names." This sampling procedure is commonly used when conducting surveys of Jewish populations, and no differences have been found between Jews with commonly Jewish names and those without (Cohen, 1983). In the present study seventy common Jewish names were taken from Kaganoff's (1977) A Dictionary of Jewish Names and Their History, and only those names which had, at least, sixty listings in the Chicago telephone book were randomly sampled from.

Approximately 200 (one-fourth) of the participants were randomly drawn from mailing lists of all large orthodox (Oral Law) Jewish organizations in the city of Chicago. These lists were said to cover anywhere from 80 to 100 percent of all Orthodox Jewish household in Chicago. The reason for this deviation in procedure was because Orthodox households in Chicago account for less than 10 percent of the city's total Jewish population and a relatively large sample of Orthodox (Oral Law) Jewry was crucial for the present empirical analysis. In light of the fact that the mailing lists comprised a vast majority (if not all) of the Orthodox households in the city, comparisons among the Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox were seen as representing valid comparisons among the three populations.

In any case, the comparison between Orthodox Jews and others is only superficial for not all people who consider themselves Orthodox are consistent followers of the Oral Law tradition (although it could be assumed that the great majority do follow the tradition). The only way to reliably differentiate between Oral Law adherents and others was to construct a Religious Observance Scale, and the only effective and acceptable way to obtain a large and representative sample of Oral Law adherents was to sample a population, which in name at least, represented the Oral Law tradition. In addition, because many telephone numbers were on more than one

mailing list, all numbers were fed into a computer which subsequently deleted all duplicates.

B. Materials

In this study all participants received the same demographic, knowledge, behavioral, and attitudinal questions. The following types of questions and scales constituted the complete questionnaire.

1. The Israeli Attitude Scale. Items were constructed by the present author in conjunction with Professors Edwards and Bryant from Loyola University of Chicago. The content of the scale in part is based on anti-Israeli literature currently being disseminated in the United States. In addition, thirty people from Chicago proper were randomly sampled and asked (by telephone) their thoughts and feelings concerning the State of Israel. Their comments together with the above literature formed the content base from which 20 items were then developed. These 20 items were administered to 75 undergraduate students from Loyola University of Chicago. The eleven items with the highest item-total correlation then underwent factor analysis with varimax rotation. The remaining nine items which loaded highest on two factors produced a Cronbach alpha of .83.
2. The Mideast Knowledge Scale. Twenty original items

were produced by the present author based on historical and contemporary literature. These 20 items were then sent to four Jewish activists who were considered to have some level of expertise on the subject. The four activists were asked to study the questions, and to delete any questions they thought were inappropriate and/or add those they felt were missing. Professors Edwards and Bryant were also involved in the refinement of the original 20 items. A 17-item scale was then developed based on the comments and criticisms of the above. These items were then distributed to the 75 undergraduates from Loyola University of Chicago and underwent the same type of statistical analyses as above. Based on the analyses, 8 items produced a Kuder-Richardson-20 reliability coefficient for dichotomous response categories of .69. In the light of the difficulty in reaching a consensus of scholarly opinion concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, Middle East historical and current-day information as presented by Peters (1984), and Davis et al. (1982) were chosen as references from which to score the present Mideast Knowledge Scale.

3. The Religious Observance Scale. These questions were devised by three Orthodox Rabbis, and were piloted

on 15 respondents in order to weed out any ambiguity in interpretation. The Kuder-Richardson 20 reliability coefficient for dichotomous response categories was .91 when computed for 546 participants. In addition, when correlated with movement identification (i.e., Non-affiliated, Reform, Conservative, Orthodox coded 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively) the obtained concurrent validity coefficient was .84.

4. The Jewish Information Scale: These questions were devised by two Orthodox Rabbis and one religious school teacher, with the objective of broaching several fundamental Jewish subjects in the most elementary manner possible. The questions were then piloted on the above 15 respondents. The KR-20 was computed for 637 respondents and a reliability coefficient of .92 was obtained.
5. Demographic Questions: Questions concerning education, religious affiliation, and family tree information were constructed by the present author and piloted on the above 15 respondents.
6. Attachment to the Land Questions: Questions concerning the participant's behavioral relationship to the Land of Israel were constructed by the present author and piloted on the above 15 respondents.

The complete survey instrument used in Study No. 1 is presented in Appendix C.

C. Procedure

The present data were collected at the Bernard Horwich Jewish Community Center of Chicago where two rooms and ten telephones were obtained for a period of four weeks. The telephones were the property of the Jewish United Fund of Chicago who generously donated their services for the above prescribed period of time.

The interviewing took place five nights a week (Sunday through Thursday) from 6:30 P.M. to 9:30 P.M. Twenty young men and women with university degrees or presently working on their degrees underwent training (given by the author) before the actual process of collecting data began. Coding, key punching, and verification procedures were done by several of the above interviewers in an effort to significantly limit any experimenter bias effect. Accordingly, managerial work was also carried out by trained personnel other than the author himself. (See Figure 4, flow chart representing the present study's major variables.)

Study No. II

A. Participants

A sample of 400 non-Jewish and non-Arab adults¹ (ages

¹Jews and Arabs were screened out from the present study in order to obtain data from a seemingly disinterested population.

The complete survey instrument used in Study No. 1 is presented in Appendix C.

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


Figure 4. Flow Chart Representing Major Variables Examined in Study No. 1.

twenty-five and over)¹ was randomly selected from the city of Chicago proper to participate in a telephone research survey. The selection process was executed via random digit dialing according to computer-generated sets of random numbers.

B. Materials

In the present survey, the same demographic, knowledge, and attitudinal questions were asked of each respondent. The following types of questions and scales constituted the complete questionnaire.

1. Demographic Questions. Questions were taken from Asking Questions (Sudman & Bradburn, 1982).
2. Political, Economic, and Military Two-Item Rating Scales. These scales were constructed by the present author in conjunction with Professors Edwards and Bryant from Loyola University of Chicago.
3. Media Usage Questions. These questions were constructed by the present author in order to locate the public's primary sources of Middle-East information.
4. Life Satisfaction Scale, by Converse and Robinson (1965). The authors "found a correlation (Kendall's

¹A general effort was made to sample from the general working class population.

Tau) of .59 between reported satisfaction at one time and satisfaction reported in an interview four to six months earlier." In addition, consistent relationships between life satisfaction and other psychological variables (e.g., social adjustment and personal competence) were found.

5. The Thomas-Zander Ego Strength 6-Item Guttman Scale, by Thomas and Zander (1960). The authors found a .71 test-retest correlation.
6. Anomie Measure, this 4-item anomie scale was implemented by Bryant and Veroff (1984). Two of the items were adapted from comparable items in Srole (1956).
7. An Abridged Purpose-in-Life Test. The present author distributed the Purpose-in-Life test (Crumbaugh, 1968) to 75 undergraduate students from Loyola University of Chicago. The 10 items with the highest item-total correlation were then selected from the original 20-item scale. These 10 remaining items underwent factor analysis in which only one factor was extracted precluding further rotation analysis. A Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficient of .87 was then obtained for four of the most heavily loaded items. In addition, response categories were modified for telephone usage.

8. The Jewish Attitude Scale: Twenty items were selected from Levinson and Sanford's (1944) Anti-Semitism Scale, Selznic and Steinberg's (1969) study on Anti-Semitism in Contemporary America, and from the Harris Poll (1975) of Attitudes of Americans Toward Jews. The 20 items were administered to 75 undergraduate students from Loyola University of Chicago. The eleven items with the highest item-total correlation then underwent factor analysis with varimax rotation. Eight of the remaining items with the highest loadings on factor one produced a Cronbach alpha coefficient of .90. Two additional items from Selznic et al. (1969) were eventually added onto the scale.
9. The Israeli Attitude Scale (see Study No I)
10. The Mideast Knowledge Scale (see Study No. I)
11. Paragraphs and Questions on the Arab-Palestinian Refugee Problem. Four sets of eight sentences each were developed, which attempt to reflect how four seemingly different magazines portray the Arab-Palestinian refugee plight. The four magazines were chosen because they represent four dissimilar orientations. The news magazine representing America (based on national circulation), and the magazine representing secular (i.e., non-Oral Law) Jewish America (based

on a survey of over 800 Jews) were both content-analyzed for their portrayal of the Palestinian plight. Over 80 percent of the weekly issues of both magazines from June, 1982 to January, 1983 were content-analyzed. The less than 20 percent not analyzed was in light of the fact that some of the American magazine issues could not be located, and some of the Jewish issues were missing a table of contents. The reason this time period was chosen was that it represented the first six months of the Israeli invasion into Lebanon. During this period, the American mass media was said to have collectively censured the State of Israel (Muravchik, 1983).

Articles in the two weeklies mentioned above were analyzed via their table of contents. Anything in their table of contents intimating, however slightly, an Israeli-Arab conflict was thereupon studied and categorized. The Arab-Palestinian problem was divided (on an a priori basis) into ten categories and any paragraph (regardless of length) relating to one of the ten categories was then recorded. The categories were found to conceptually exhaust all references to the Arab-Palestinian problem. The ten categories were:

1. Jewish right or connection to the land
2. Arab right or connection to the land
3. Arab mistreatment of Jews

4. Israeli mistreatment of Arabs
5. Origins of Jewish Middle-East refugees
6. Origins of Arab-Palestinian refugees
7. The Jewish (Middle-East) refugee present condition (sympathetic)
8. The Jewish (Middle-East) refugee present condition (unsympathetic)
9. The Arab-Palestinian refugee present condition (sympathetic)
10. The Arab-Palestinian refugee present condition (unsympathetic)

After the number of paragraphs for each of the ten categories was tallied, the percentage of paragraphs for any given category in relation to the total number of paragraphs was then calculated. For example, if there was found a total of 100 paragraphs which discuss the Arab-Palestinian problem as defined by the ten categories above, and if Category I had 10 paragraphs, then Category I would comprise 10 percent of all that was found (for that magazine) on the Arab-Palestinian problem. Subsequently eight sentences were constructed according to these percentages. For example, if for any given magazine 100 percent of all its paragraphs were located in the first four categories and these paragraphs were evenly distributed among categories (i.e., 25 percent each), then its eight-sentence representation would be comprised of two sentences for each of the four categories. Obviously, in this particular case, the other six categories would not be represented. The other two magazines used in the analysis

were a pro-Arab monthly (recommended by the PLO office in Chicago), and a religious (Oral-Law based) Jewish weekly (the most widely circulated English-speaking Jewish magazine in the world). The same type of 8-sentence construction was done for these magazines as described above, but the process of analysis was a little different. One difference was the time period of analysis. Issues of the pro-Arab magazine were studied from June, 1982 (as above) to August, 1984. This was due to the limited number of issues available during the above specified six-month interval. Another discrepancy in procedure was that a random sample of ten issues only was used for analysis in contrast to the first two magazines, where the great majority of issues were analyzed. The rationale was that the portrayal of the problem by each of these two magazines would be so apparent from the very beginning, that a more extensive analysis would be useless. This rationale proved to be accurate. The final deviation in procedure had to do with the religious Jewish magazine. This magazine had no specified table of contents, so in order to conduct the analysis the present author inspected each issue, page by page, studying the captions of all articles (instead of the table of contents) for each of the issues under analysis.

A reliability check was then carried out on 36 percent of all material analyzed. The reliability check was done by a male accountant with a Bachelors degree from Northwestern

University. The accountant did not independently begin to analyze the material until he and the author reached a consensus on ten consecutive paragraphs, taken from magazine articles not relevant to the analysis proper. Dividing the number of paragraphs agreed upon by the total number of paragraphs analyzed, the present analysis had a reliability ratio of .83.

Each respondent in the study was read eight sentences over the telephone representing the view portrayed in one of the four types of magazines, as explained above. The respondent was then asked several questions on the Arab-Palestinian problem, and was urged to answer based only on the eight sentences he/she had just heard. The complete survey instrument used for both the experimental and correlational aspects of the present study may be found in Appendix D.

C. Procedure

The present study entailed both a correlational research design and a controlled experiment which were both part of a single telephone interview.

In the correlational part of the interview, the attitude questions and scales used in the survey facilitated the investigation of situational, psychodynamic, and socio-cultural variables, in an attempt to measure their relationship to attitudes toward Jews and Israel. As discussed in Chapter III, one hypothesized sociocultural factor producing

prejudice is anomie (i.e., the disintegration of societal structure and values). The 4-item anomie scale implemented by Bryant and Veroff (1984) was employed in the present study to measure this variable.

The situational emphasis in explaining prejudice deals with the current forces impinging on the individual. Fear and insecurity concerning threats of economic, political, or military disaster are seen as reinforcing anti-Jewish attitudes and actions. In order to empirically test this relationship, the author constructed one-item rating scales for each of the above variables.

Two psychodynamic approaches mentioned above (see Chapter III) postulate that frustration and a fragmented sense of self predispose the individual to prejudicial thinking and action. The present study has attempted to measure individual frustration via the Life Satisfaction Scale (Converse et al., 1965), and by the author's abridged and modified Purpose in Life Test (Crumbaugh, 1968). The Thomas-Zander Ego Strength Scale (Thomas et al., 1960) was employed to investigate the individual's sense of identity, and as the above variables, was studied in its relationship to attitudes toward Jews and Israel. In addition, several demographic variables (e.g., Age, Race, Gender, etc.) were examined in their relationship to attitudes towards Jews, attitudes towards Israel, and level of Mideast knowledge. The phenomenological approach was investigated via the Mideast Knowledge

Scale, direct questions on various Arab-Palestinian Issues, and Media Usage in their relationship to attitudes towards Jews and Israel.

During the experimental phase of the interview all respondents participated in an experiment where four distinctly different types of magazines were manipulated. They were: (1) a popular American news magazine, (2) a secular (non-Oral Law based) Jewish magazine, (3) an Arab-oriented magazine, and (4) a religious (Oral Law based) Jewish magazine.

Eight sentences representing one of the four magazine's portrayal of the Arab-Palestinian problem was read over the telephone. Subsequently, all respondents were asked the same questions regardless of the news source being represented. Subjects were urged to base their responses exclusively on the sentences just read.

In summary, in the experimental part each respondent listened to one of the four news-source representations concerning the Arab-Palestinian problem, and was then questioned on the perceptions the sentences evoked. (See Figure 5, flow chart representing the present study's major variables.)




Figure 5. Flow Chart Representing Major Variables Examined in Study No. II

CHAPTER V

RESULTS

Chapter 1 Hypotheses and Results

The statistical analyses conducted to test the stated hypotheses in Chapter I were based on an all-Jewish sample of 811 respondents (see Methodology for sampling procedures).

A. The following demographics are presented here in order to give the reader some understanding of the sample used in the upcoming analyses.

Gender

Male (N=407) = 50%
Female (N=404) = 50%

Synagogue Affiliation

Reform (N = 80)	= 10%
Conservative (N=114)	= 14%
Orthodox (Oral Law Judaism) (N=231)	= 30%
Non-Affiliated (N=324)	= 41%
Other (N=49)	= 6%

Born in U.S.

Yes (N=702) = 87%
No (N=104) = 13%

Age

21 to 40 (N=370)	= 47%
41 to 54 (N=114)	= 14%
55 and over (N=309)	= 39%

Formal Education Level
Last Grade Completed

12 and under (N=141)	= 18%
Some College or Vocational School (N=183)	= 23%
Bachelors Degree (N=179)	= 23%
Some Graduate School (N=67)	= 8%
Masters Degree (N=129)	= 16%
*Doctorate Degree (N=97)	= 12%

B. The analysis in Chapter I attempted to show historically that the anti-Jewish phenomenon is different (both quantitatively and qualitatively) from other minority group experiences. According to the historical analysis the primary attack against the Jews is not against the Jews per se, but rather against what they have represented. This representation was seen as manifesting itself in three Jewish-core components. Accordingly, primary attacks against Jews were seen as attempts to uproot (1) the Jewish people's relationship to the Law, and/or (2) the Jewish people's relationship to the Land, and/or (3) the Jewish collective body. It was theorized that historical anti-Jewish movements (i.e., the leaders of the movements), whose explicit or implicit ideologies were competitively threatened by the "Jewish presence" (as manifested in one or more of the above components, were

*In the present study a Law degree was considered a doctorate degree.

psychologically pressured to eradicate this "presence" by attacking one or more of its three core components.

It was also explained that there has been only one form of Judaism (i.e., Oral Law Judaism, which is known today as Orthodox Judaism) which has persevered throughout millennia, and that this variable of longevity has been a major factor in creating an atmosphere of anti-Jewish activity (i.e., if Jews would have assimilated like other groups that had the opportunity, they would obviously not have suffered as Jews). Given the above, Orthodox Judaism was posited in the forthcoming analysis as a true representation of Judaism (not to suggest that other Jewish movements are illegitimate in light of their lack of longevity, but only that this millennia-old group is, beyond suspicion, representative).

The groups posited in Chapter I as potentially anti-Jewish (anti-Jewish in the respect that the nature of Oral Law Judaism poses a competitive threat, and that this threat has been challenged historically by attacking one or more of the above three components) were the Reform and Conservative Jewish movements in America. The present study's first empirical analysis was to investigate the reliability of the claims made by Reform and Conservative Judaism concerning the unadaptability of Orthodox Judaism. According to their claims, the younger generation of American Jews (ages 21 to 40) should have significantly abandoned the "outmoded" Oral Law tradition. In addition, if these two contemporary Jewish

movements are not inherently competitive (and therefore their prime objective would not be to wean the Jewish masses from the Oral Law tradition), but rather true complementary forms of Judaism then their respective constituencies should, at the very least, be maintaining themselves (i.e., any contemporary positive expression of spirituality should be able to maintain itself over one generation).

Group maintenance over one generation was computed in the following ways: (see Methodology Study No. 1 for sampling and questioning procedures).

1. All 811 Jewish respondents were asked what type of synagogue they and their children and/or grandchildren (over the age of 20) belong to. A cross-tabulation based on the religious affiliation of parents to that of their children (between the ages of 21 to 40 years old) was then computed. The percentages in Table 1 stand for the affiliation-scatter of children whose parents were affiliated with any one movement.

An example of how Table 1 is to be understood can be seen in the following description of parents who are presently affiliated with the Reform movement: 94 parents who had children between the ages 21 to 40 were affiliated with the Reform movement. Of their children (between 21 and 40) 61% today are non-affiliated, 21% affiliated with the Reform movement, 12% affiliated with the Conservative movement, 3% affiliated with the Orthodox movement, and 3% affiliated

TABLE 1.--Parent-Child Intergroup Movement

		<u>Children's Religious Affiliation</u>				**Total
		(N=253) *NA	(N=44) R	(N=84) C	(N=164) O	
Parents Religious Affiliation	NA (N=92)	83%	4%	3%	7%	= 97%
	R (N=94)	61%	21%	12%	3%	= 97%
	C (N=182)	47%	8%	35%	8%	= 98%
	O (N=173)	17%	3%	2%	76%	= 98%

*NA = Non-Affiliated

R = Reform

C = Conservative

O = Orthodox (i.e., Oral Law Judaism)

**Respondents and children belonging to other Jewish religious movements were deleted in the present analysis.

with other Jewish religious movements unspecified in the present table.

The one-generation affiliation differential between children between the ages of 21 and 40, and their parents, based on responses of parents and grandparents was:

Non-Affiliated	= +175%
Reform	= - 53%
Conservative	= - 54%
Orthodox	= - 5%

These percentages were obtained by dividing the number of children presently affiliated with one of the four groups by the number of parents presently affiliated with one of the four groups. For example, 44 children (between the ages of 21 and 40) are presently affiliated with the Reform movement as opposed to 94 parents who are Reform affiliated. By dividing the number of children (44) by the number of parents (94) the number .47 (or 47%) is obtained which represents the movement's maintenance level over one generation. In more understandable terms we can say that the movement has decreased 53% (as represented above) over one generation (i.e., $100\% - 47\% = 53\%$). By using the same formula for the non-affiliated groups we obtain $253 \div 92 = 2.75$ (or 275%), and in order to depict the pure rate of increase we subtract 100% (or 92) from the above equation and obtain a one-generation increase of 175% (as represented above).

2. When examining inter-group movement from the perspective of the child between the ages of 21-40 (i.e.,

instead of basing the statistics on what parents and grandparents knew about their children and grandchildren, the following statistics were based on what children knew concerning their parents' religious affiliation) the following cross-tabulation was obtained:

*TABLE 2.--Child-Parent Intergroup Movement

		<u>Children's Religious Affiliation</u>				<u>Total</u>
		(N=155) NA	(N=23) R	(N=36) C	(N=129) O	
Parents Religious Affiliation	NA (N=34)	77%	0%	3%	18%	= 98%
	R (N=73)	69%	22%	4%	3%	= 98%
	C (N=114)	51%	5%	25%	18%	= 99%
	O (N=130)	15%	1%	2%	75%	= 93%

*Respondents in Table 2 were mutually exclusive of those in Table 1. In addition, chances that the same parent-child relationship was being tapped twice was insignificantly slight.

Table 2 is to be read in the following manner: 155 respondents (ages 21 to 40) claimed to be non-affiliated, 23 affiliated with the Reform movement, 36 affiliated with the Conservative movement, and 129 affiliated with the Orthodox movement. Of their parents, 34 were non-affiliated, 73 were Reform, 114 were Conservative and 130 were Orthodox. Of the 34 parents said to be (or had been if deceased) non-affiliated 77% of their children remained non-affiliated,

0% became Reform, 3% became Conservative, and 18% became Orthodox.

The one-generation differential between children (21-40 years old) and their parents based on the responses of the children was:

*Non-Affiliated	= +	356%
Reform	= -	68%
Conservative	= -	68%
Orthodox	= -	1%

3. When both above samples were pooled in which the number of children = 916, the change over one generation was:

Non-Affiliated	= +	224%
Reform	= -	60%
Conservative	= -	59%
Orthodox	= -	3%

For example the number of children (ages 21 to 40) who were non-affiliated in the two tables were 253 and 155 respectively. The sum of these numbers (i.e., 253 + 155 = 408) divided by the number of non-affiliated parents in the two tables (92 and 34 respectively) produced a quotient of 3.24 (408 ÷ 126 = 3.24). In order to calculate the pure rate of increase, 100% (or 126) was subtracted from the above equation and a one-generation increase of 224% was obtained (as represented above).

In brief, the Non-Affiliated Group was the most productive over the last generation (+224%) whereas both the

*These percentages were computed in the same manner as in Table 1.

Reform and Conservative movements appear to have substantially diminished (-60% and -59% respectively). The Orthodox movement over the last generation appears to be maintaining itself (-3%).

4. The maintenance of any group is not exclusively dependent on the inter-generational drop-out rate. It is, in addition, dependent on the birth rate of its members together with converts from other religions. Because the conversion rate to Judaism today is trivial only the birthrate among the four groups will be compared in the following analyses. The birthrate of respondents ages 55 and over were compared. The birthrate of these middle-aged to elderly Jews is seen as representing another criterion for judging the maintenance of the various groups over one generation:

TABLE 3.--Differential Birth Rate Respondents 55 and Over

$$\begin{array}{l} (N=122) \\ \text{Non-Affiliated} = \frac{203 \text{ (No. of Children)}}{122} + 2.1 \text{ (zero)} \\ \text{ (replacement)=.79} \\ \text{ (level)} \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} (N=50) \\ \text{Reform} = \frac{85}{50} + 2.1 = .81 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} (N=65) \\ \text{Conservative} = \frac{144}{65} + 2.1 = 1.05 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} (N=61) \\ \text{Orthodox} = \frac{149}{61} + 2.1 = 1.16 \end{array}$$

$$F = 7.85, \text{ df } (3, 294), p < .001.$$

When differential birthrate was taken into account together with inter-group movement (based on the pooled sample

of children ages 21-40 [N=916]) the change over one generation has been:

Non-Affiliated	= + 177%
Reform	= - 68%
Conservative	= - 57%
Orthodox	= + 13%

For example, the pooled rate of increase over one generation for the Non-Affiliated group was 224%. When the birthrate of the Non-Affiliated group was taken into consideration the overall increase over one generation was 177% (i.e., $224\% \times .79 = 177\%$). In light of the differential birthrate among the groups the Non-Affiliated group has increased 177% over one generation, the Reform and Conservative have decreased -68% and -57% respectively and Orthodoxy appears to be on the increase (+13%).

C. According to the theoretical analysis in Chapter I, Orthodox Judaism was hypothesized as representing a competitive threat to both Reform and Conservative Judaism. If (according to the hypothesis) the Reform and Conservative movements are genuinely competing with Orthodox Judaism, then these movements should be psychologically pressured to break any real relationship their adherents may have to the Land of Israel (notwithstanding their official claim to the contrary). Accordingly, the present statistical analyses expected to find a significantly weaker relationship among adherents of Reform and Conservative Judaism than among their Orthodox counterparts. It was already mentioned in Chapter

I that the following findings (regardless of outcome) are not sufficient to unequivocally support the hypothesis, but they are considered sufficient to refute the hypothesis.

The criterion for measuring respondents' relationship to the Land was based primarily on two behavioral indices, and on a secondary level of importance on respondents' attitudes towards the Jewish state together with their general level of Mideast knowledge. According to Biblical and Talmudic sources (as expressed in Chapter I) the Jewish relationship to the Land is not some intangible ideal, but rather the concrete desire of actually living and being there.

Therefore the first index in measuring the Jewish people's relationship to the Land was to ask:

If things in the U.S. remain as they are, do you have any real intention of ever settling in Israel?

Results to the above question (N=788) when compared according to synagogue affiliation were:

TABLE 4.--Intention to Settle in Israel

		<u>Synagogue Affiliation</u>			
		(N=318) NA	(N=79) R	(N=113) C	(N=221) O
Intention to Settle in Israel	Yes:	8%	1%	7%	51%
	No:	92%	99%	93%	49%

F = 84.26, df (3, 727), p < .001.

According to the above table, the percentages of

Non-Affiliated, Reform, and Conservative respondents who had the intention of someday settling in Israel were 8%, 1%, and 7% respectively. In contrast, the percentage of Orthodox Jews (51%), who intended to someday settle in Israel vastly exceeded the other three groups.

When Non-Affiliated, Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox synagogue affiliations are coded 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively and then correlated with the *10-item Jewish Religious Observance Scale (N = 676) an r statistic of .79 was obtained. This extremely strong relationship was expected in light of the fact that, officially, Orthodox Judaism assumes the binding authority of all the Laws, Conservative Judaism less so, Reform Judaism advocates less ritual observance than Conservative, and Non-Affiliated is as its name implies non-binding, and non-advocating. The religious observance group breakdown can be seen in Table 5.

In order to conceptually simplify and methodologically economize the statistical analysis an **Abridged 3-item (items 2, 3, and 7) Observance Scale was constructed which produced a KR-20 reliability coefficient of .93 (N = 800) and correlated .90 with the larger 10-item Observance Scale. These particular three items were chosen because (1) they repre-

*On an N of 546 the Jewish Observance Scale produced a Kinder-Richardson 20 reliability coefficient of .91.

**The higher the scaled score the more observant the individual.

TABLE 5.--Jewish Observance Scale

	(N=79) R	(N=114) C	(N=231) O	(N=322) NA
1. Do you refrain from eating bread and bread products on Passover?				
Yes	56%	75%	99%	37%
No	44%	25%	1%	63%
2. Do you refrain from driving on Saturday?				
Yes	1%	9%	91%	8%
No	99%	91%	9%	92%
3. Do you keep Kosher?				
Yes	5%	31%	96%	10%
No	95%	69%	4%	90%
4. Do yo believe in G-d?				
Yes	92%	91%	100%	81%
No	8%	9%	0%	19%
5. Do you fast on Yon Kippur?				
Yes	69%	80%	99%	48%
No	31%	20%	1%	52%
6. Do you eat pork?				
Yes	61%	40%	1%	67%
No	39%	61%	99%	33%
7. Do you fast on Tish Abav?				
Yes	1%	8%	87%	5%
No	99%	92%	13%	95%
8. Do you believe in a "world to come" after one dies in this world?				
Yes	16%	39%	92%	34%
No	84%	61%	8%	66%

	(N=79) R	(N=114) C	(N=231) O	(N=322) NA
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9. Do you believe that the Bible was given to the Jews by G-d?

Yes	38%	70%	97%	46%
No	62%	30%	3%	54%

10. Do you attend Synagogue services weekly?

Yes	21%	22%	73%	4%
No	79%	78%	27%	96%

*11. [FOR MEN ONLY] Do you put on Tefillin daily?

	(N=38)	(N=68)	(N=96)	(N=174)
Yes	3%	6%	90%	6%
No	97%	94%	10%	94%

*12. [FOR WOMEN ONLY] Do you light Sabbath candles?

	(N=42)	(N=47)	(N=135)	(N=148)
Yes	48%	60%	99%	18%
No	52%	40%	1%	82%

*This item was not part of the 10-item scale for it pertained exclusively to only one of the genders.

sented the three highest item-total correlations among the ten items, (2) in light of their extremely high reliability coefficient, and (3) in light of the strong relationship between the three-item scale and the total observance scale. An interesting property of this abridged scale was that 86% of all respondents either observed all three religious activities or none at all. Therefore in order to accentuate the following differences while still representing the vast majority of these data (i.e., 86% of it) only these two groups in the forthcoming analysis will be shown. However, a Pear-

son's r Statistic and the probability level representing these entire data (i.e., all levels of the Jewish observance variable) will be presented as well.

When comparing respondents who observe all of the above three religious activities with those who do not observe any of the three we are, in effect, comparing the Orthodox group against the others combined. For example, 85% of all Orthodox respondents were found to observe all three religious activities, whereas among the Non-Affiliated, Reform, and Conservative only 5%, 0%, and 5% respectively observed all three. Conversely, the percentages of Non-Affiliated, Reform, and Conservative respondents who do not observe any of the three were 87%, 93%, and 67% respectively. In contrast, only 3% of Orthodox respondents reported not to observe any of the three. Accordingly, separating respondents into the above two groupings (i.e., those that observe all three and those that do not observe any of the three) represents a slightly finer delineation between Oral Law adherents and non-Oral Law adherents than the distinction produced by comparing Orthodox adherents with the other three groups separately. In other words, Oral Law adherents are specifically Jews who observe the Oral Law, and therefore by comparing Jews who keep the Laws with Jews who do not, we are in effect, creating a purer comparison between Oral Law adherents and non-Oral Law adherents.

When the Intention to Settle in Israel variable was

correlated with the Abridged Observance Scale (N=763) results were $r = .53$, $p < .001$. When the comparison presented in Table 6 was analyzed, results were: $r = .55$, $p < .001$.

TABLE 6.--Intention to Settle in Israel (II)

II	Observe all Three (N=222)	Do Not Observe Any (N=453)
Yes	54%	5%
No	46%	95%

The above results demonstrate that the more observant the individual is the more inclined he/she will be to someday settle in Israel. For example, 54% of Oral Law adherents (as defined by observing all three religious activities) intend to someday settle in Israel whereas only 5% of non-Oral Law adherents (as defined by not keeping any of the three observances) intend to someday settle in Israel.

The second index used to measure the relationship to the Land, albeit more indirect than the first but nevertheless a tangible-behavioral criterion, was based on the number of visits to Israel. Although two blatant confounding variables appear to favor the Reform and Conservative constituencies on this index (they are: [1] Being that a trip to Israel is very expensive, the wealthier of the constituencies should have greater opportunities, and [2] the following questions did not inquire into the lengths of stay, which would not take into account the many Orthodox individuals

and families who spend extended periods of time in Israel) the comparisons were still carried out.

The first question asked was:

1. Have you ever visited Israel?

TABLE 7.--Visits to Israel (I)

		Synagogue Affiliation			
		(N=323) NA	(N=80) R	(N=113) C	(N=227) O
Have you Ever Visited Israel	Yes:	37%	61%	58%	83%
	No:	63%	39%	42%	17%

According to Table 7 the percentage of Orthodox Jews (83%) who have ever visited Israel appears to significantly exceed the other three groups. In addition, the percentages of Reform and Conservative Jews who have ever visited Israel (61% and 58% respectively) seem to significantly exceed the percentage of Non-Affiliated Jews.

The second question asked was:

2. How many times have you visited Israel?

Results based on the total sample (N=802) are shown in Table 8.

Using the Non-Affiliated group as an example, Table 8 may be understood according to the following description. The mean number of visits to Israel per person for the Non-Affiliated group was .75. In addition, when the number of

TABLE 8.--Number of Visits to Israel

Non-Affiliated (N=323): Mean = .75; 1st Quartile = 0, 2nd Quartile = 0, 3rd Quartile = 1 (Range was from 0 visits to 19 visits)

Reform (N=80): Mean = 2.53; 1st Quartile = 0, 2nd Quartile = 1, 3rd Quartile = 2 (Range was from 0 visits to 38 visits)

Conservative (N=113): Mean = 1.27; 1st Quartile = 0, 2nd Quartile = 1, 3rd Quartile = 2 (Range was from 0 visits to 25 visits)

Orthodox (N=227): Mean = 2.89; 1st Quartile = 1, 2nd Quartile = 2, 3rd Quartile = 3 (Range was from 0 visits to 50 visits)

F = 18.42, df (3, 739), p < .001.

visits per person was broken down into quartiles the following results were obtained. Starting from the least number of visits to Israel and working upward the maximum number of visits for any one person in the Non-Affiliated group in the first quartile (i.e., the first 25% of all Non-Affiliated respondents) was 0. In the 2d quartile (50% of all Non-Affiliated respondents) the maximum number of visits per person remained 0, and in the third quartile (75% of all Non-Affiliated respondents) the maximum number of visits per person was 1.

Six individual comparisons between the four groups were then implemented. The following comparisons were found significant at the .005 level:

1. Non-Affiliated (Mean = .75) vs. Reform (Mean = 2.53)
t = -4.03, df (739), p < .001
2. Non-Affiliated (Mean .75) vs. Orthodox (Mean = 2.89)
t = -7.00, df (739), p < .001

3. Conservative (Mean = 1.27) vs. Orthodox (Mean = 2.89)
 $t = -4.00$, $df (739)$, $p < .001$.

Although the mean number of visits between Reform and Orthodox respondents did not significantly differ, there did seem to be a substantial difference when quartiles were compared. The possibility that a few very high numbers had artificially inflated the Reform group's mean was investigated by deleting all respondents who had traveled to Israel 11 or more times. Over 98% of all respondents had visited Israel 10 times or less so the deletion of less than 2% had little effect on the individual Ns.

A one-way analysis of variance produced:

$F = 39.19$, $df (3,725)$, $p < .001$.

When individual comparisons were subsequently done the following comparisons were found significant at the .005 probability level.

(N=219)	(N=322)
Orthodox (Mean = 2.31)	vs. Non-Affiliated (Mean = .69)
$t = -10.72$, $df (725)$, $p < .001$	

(N=219)	(N=76)
Orthodox (Mean = 2.31)	vs. Reform (Mean = 1.24)
$t = -4.68$, $df (725)$, $p < .001$	

(N=219)	(N=112)
Orthodox (Mean = 2.31)	vs. Conservative (Mean = 1.05)
$t = -6.27$, $df (725)$, $p < .001$.	

According to the individual contrasts above, the Orthodox group has visited Israel significantly more times than the other three groups. In addition, there did not appear to be any significant difference among the other three

groups themselves (i.e., after the maximum number of visits to Israel had been truncated to 10).

When the variable Have You Ever Visted Israel was related to Oral Law adherence (i.e., respondents who observe all three religious activities vs. respondents who do not observe any of the three) results were:

TABLE 9.--Visits to Israel (II)

		Observe All Three (N=229)	Don't Observe Any (N=458)
Have you ever Visited Israel	Yes:	86%	43%
	No:	14%	57%

According to the above table the percentage of Oral Law adherents who have at one time visited Israel is twice as large as the percentage of non-Oral Law adherents who have ever visited Israel (i.e., 86% to 43%).

When Number of Visits to Israel was then correlated with the Abridged Observance Scale, results were $r = .41$, $p < .001$. Following therefrom, the breakdown between respondents who observe all three activities and respondents who do not keep any is presented in Table 10.

Results show that the more religiously observant the individual is, the more often he/she will ever likely visit Israel. In addition, Oral Law adherents have visited Israel significantly more ($M = 2.98$) than non-Oral Law adherents ($M = 1.06$).

TABLE 10.--Number of Visits to Israel (II)Observe All Three (n=229)

Mean = 2.98

(Range was from 0 to 50 visits)

1st Quartile = 1

2nd Quartile = 2

3rd Quartile = 4

Don't Observe Any (N=458)

Mean = 1.06

(Range was from 0 visits to 38 visits)

1st Quartile = 0

2nd Quartile = 0

3rd Quartile = 1

r = .43, p < .001

The following two variables (i.e., Israel Attitude Scale and the Mideast Knowledge Scale) were deemed secondary in importance when evaluating the relationship between American Jews to the Land of Israel in light of the variables' intangible and overly general nature. Intangible in the respect that attitudes and knowledge concerning Israel may demonstrate an interest in the Jewish State, but are far removed from the traditional relationship (which all three religious movements ostensibly advocate) Jews throughout history have maintained. Overly general in the respect, that a positive Jewish identity (regardless of movement affiliation) should by itself predispose the individual to positive attitudes and a heightened interest in the modern state of Israel.

Theoretically, positive attitudes and knowledge concerning the secular State of Israel should be innocuous and non-threatening to the Reform and Conservative movements.

Furthermore, the attitude and knowledge scales address specifically the modern secular State of Israel, and not necessarily the traditional relationship between the Jewish people and the Land of Israel (this distinction may appear to be too fine, but in reality this distinction is consistently expressed in many Orthodox circles). Therefore it would not be surprising to find stronger positive attitudes and a heightened awareness concerning the secular State of Israel per se, among Reform, and Conservative adherents than among their Orthodox counterparts.

Individual mean scale scores for the *Israel Attitude Scale in the upcoming analyses have been categorized in the following manner:

- 1.00 to 1.49 = Strong Negative Attitudes
- 1.50 to 2.49 = Somewhat Negative Attitudes
- 2.50 to 3.49 = Somewhat Positive Attitudes
- 3.50 to 4.00 = Strong Positive Attitudes

The significant individual contrasts (i.e., $p < .005$) among the four groups based on separate variance estimates were:

1. Conservative (M=3.63) vs. Non-Affiliated (M=3.46)
t = -4.12, df (238), $p < .001$
2. Orthodox (M=3.75) vs. Non-Affiliated (M=3.46)
t = -9.42, df (547), $p < .001$
3. Orthodox (M=3.75) vs. Reform (M=3.54)
t = -4.75, df (118), $p < .001$
4. Orthodox (M=3.75) vs. Conservative (M=3.63)
t = -3.08, df (183), $p < .002$

*Based on a N of 637 the Israel Attitude Scale produced a Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficient of .72.

TABLE 11.--Israel Attitude Scale*Israel Attitude Scale (SCI) (N=809)

<u>Overall Frequency</u>	Strong Negative Attitudes	0%
	Somewhat Negative Attitudes	2%
	Somewhat Positive Attitudes	29%
	Strong Positive Attitudes	69%

Non-Affiliated (N=324)

Strong Negative Attitudes	0%
Somewhat Negative Attitudes	5%
Somewhat Positive Attitudes	41%
Strong Positive Attitudes	54%

Reform (N=80)

Strong Negative Attitudes	0%
Somewhat Negative Attitudes	0%
Somewhat Positive Attitudes	40%
Strong Positive Attitudes	60%

Conservative (N=113)

Strong Negative Attitudes	0%
Somewhat Negative Attitudes	1%
Somewhat Positive Attitudes	26%
Strong Positive Attitudes	73%

Orthodox (N=230)

Strong Negative Attitudes	0%
Somewhat Negative Attitudes	0%
Somewhat Positive Attitudes	12%
Strong Positive Attitudes	88%

F = 27.63, df (3,743), p < .001.

*The full 9-item scale with individual response breakdown among groups can be found in Appendix A.

According to the above comparisons Orthodox adherents have significantly more positive attitudes towards the modern state of Israel (Mean = 3.75) than do adherents of the other three groups. These results become all the more pronounced when one realizes that the scale, which was originally designed for a non-Jewish population, seemed to produce a ceiling effect in the Jewish sample. The Conservative group also produced significantly more positive attitudes towards Israel (Mean = 3.63) than did the Non-Affiliated group (Mean = 3.46).

When the Israeli Attitude Scale is correlated with the Abridged Observance Scale (N=763) the resulting $r = .29$, $p < .001$. When the Abridged Scale was then dichotomized results were:

TABLE 12.--Israel Attitude Scale (II)

Observe All Three (N=233)

Strong Negative Attitudes	=	0%
Somewhat Negative Attitudes	=	0%
Somewhat Positive Attitudes	=	15%
Strong Positive Attitudes	=	85%

Don't Observe Any (N=460)

Strong Negative Attitudes	=	0%
Somewhat Negative Attitudes	=	3%
Somewhat Positive Attitudes	=	38%
Strong Positive Attitudes	=	59%

$r = .30$, $p < .001$

According to the above the more religiously observant the individual is the more positive attitudes towards

the modern state of Israel he/she is likely to have. Correspondingly, the Oral Law adherents had significantly more pro-Israel attitudes than did non-Oral Law adherents. For example, 85% of Oral Law adherents registered strong positive attitudes towards Israel whereas only 59% of non-Oral Law adherents produced strong positive attitudes towards Israel.

The following variable was Mideast Knowledge Level.

Table 13 represents the breakdown in scores among the four groups.

TABLE 13.--Mideast Knowledge

*Mideast Knowledge Scale (N = 811)

<u>Overall</u>	0-2 correct	5%	
<u>Frequency:</u>	3-4 correct	23%	
	5-6 correct	42%	
	7-8 correct	30%	
<u>NA (N=324)</u>			<u>R (N=80)</u>
9%	0-2 correct		5%
27%	3-4 correct		28%
40%	5-6 correct		43%
24%	7-8 correct		25%
<u>C (N=114)</u>			<u>O (N=231)</u>
5%	0-2 correct		1%
25%	3-4 correct		15%
44%	5-6 correct		45%
26%	7-8 correct		39%

F = 12.23, df (3,745), p < .001

*Based on an N of 637 the Kuder-Richardson 20 reliability coefficient was .47. The full 8-item scale with individual response breakdown among religious groups can be found in Appendix A.

The significant individual contrasts (i.e., $p < .005$) among the four groups were:

1. Orthodox *($M=1.74$) vs. Non-Affiliated ($M=1.64$)
 $t = 5.89$, $df (745)$, $p < .001$
2. Orthodox ($M=1.74$) vs. Reform ($M=1.65$)
 $t = 3.39$, $df (745)$, $p < .001$
3. Orthodox ($M=1.74$) vs. Conservative ($M=1.66$)
 $t = 3.37$, $df (745)$, $p < .001$

According to the above comparisons, the Orthodox group seems to have significantly greater knowledge of Mideast happenings than the other three groups. No significant differences (i.e., $p < .005$) were found when the other three groups were compared with one another.

When the ****Mideast Knowledge Scale** was correlated with the **Abridged Observance Scale** ($N=763$) the resulting $r = .22$, $p < .001$. When the Observance Scale was then dichotomized results were as shown in Table 14.

According to the analyses below, the more religiously observant the individual is, the more Mideast knowledge he/she is likely to have. In addition, Oral Law adherents' level of Mideast knowledge was significantly greater than the level of Mideast knowledge registered by the non-Oral Law group. For example, only 16% of Oral Law adherents obtained a score

*The maximum range of mean scores went from 1.00 (none correct) to 2.00 (all correct).

**The higher the scaled score the more knowledgeable the individual.

of 50% or less whereas 35% of non-Oral Law adherents scored 50% or less.

TABLE 14.--Mideast Knowledge Scale (II)

Observe All Three (N=234)

0-2 correct = 2%
 3-4 correct = 14%
 5-6 correct = 43%
 7-8 correct = 41%

Don't Observe Any (N=461)

0-2 correct = 8%
 3-4 correct = 27%
 5-6 correct = 43%
 7-8 correct = 23%

r = .24, p < .001

D. A solid Jewish education is another area where the official platforms of all three movements positively converge (see Chapter I). Officially, all three movements consider a strong fundamental Jewish education highly important. Although officially they encourage the strengthening of the Jewish spirit via Jewish education, according to the theoretical analysis presented in Chapter I this should not be realized in practice. If Reform and Conservative Judaism are internally pressured to uproot the traditionally competitive Jewish presence, their "best interests" would be served by uprooting traditional Jewish knowledge among their respective constituencies (to implicitly uproot Jewish knowledge from among other constituencies would be virtually impossible,

and therefore any attempt would be highly impracticable). Following from the theoretical analysis in Chapter I, the forthcoming statistical analyses expected to find that Jews affiliated with the Reform and Conservative movements are significantly less knowledgeable about fundamental and elementary Judaism than are Jews affiliated with Orthodox Judaism. As in prior analyses, the *findings presented below, regardless of outcome, are not sufficient to conclusively support the above hypothesis, but are considered theoretically sufficient to refute the hypothesis.

**The index for measuring Level of Fundamental Jewish Knowledge was a set of ten questions (see Methodology for scale construction details) which covered the areas of Jewish history, Jewish holidays, Bible, Talmud, Prophets, Prayer, and Hebrew Language in the most elementary and superficial manner the scale's authors could conceive. Based on a N of 546 the scale produced a Kuder-Richardson 20 reliability coefficient of .91. The following results in Table 15 were based on a N of 805.

The percentages of Non-Affiliated, Reform, and Conservative respondents who obtained scores of 25% correct or lower were 72, 58, and 48 respectively. In contrast, only

*See Appendix A for other comparisons among the four groups.

**A comparison among groups on all ten questions can be found in Appendix A.

TABLE 15.--Elementary Jewish Knowledge Scale

<u>NA (N=323)</u>		<u>R (N=80)</u>	
72%	0-2 Correct	58%	
16%	3-5 Correct	30%	
7%	6-8 Correct	11%	
5%	9-10 Correct	1%	
<u>C (N=112)</u>		<u>O (N=231)</u>	
48%	0-2 Correct	7%	
31%	3-5 Correct	10%	
16%	6-8 Correct	25%	
5%	9-10 Correct	58%	

$F = 241.26, df (3,742), p < .001$

7% of Orthodox respondents scored 25% or lower.

Correspondingly, the percentages of Non-Affiliated, Reform, and Conservative respondents who obtained scores of 90% correct or higher were 5, 1, and 5 respectively. In contrast, 58% of Orthodox respondents scored 90% or higher.

Six individual comparisons between the four groups were then made. The following comparisons were found significant at the .005 probability level.

1. Conservative *(Mean = .33) vs. Non-Affiliated (Mean = .23)
 $t = -3.66, df (742), p < .001$
2. Orthodox (Mean = .80) vs. Non-Affiliated (Mean = .23)
 $t = -25.81, df (742), p < .001$
3. Orthodox (Mean = .80) vs. Reform (Mean = .28)
 $t = -15.83, df (742), p < .001$
4. Orthodox (Mean = .80) vs. Conservative (Mean = .33)
 $t = -15.83, df (742), p < .001.$

*The maximum range of mean scores was from .00 (none correct) to 1.00 (all ten correct).

The above data demonstrate the vast differences in level of elementary Jewish knowledge between the Orthodox group and the other three. In addition, there appears to be no substantial differences among the mean scores of the three other movements. [Although a statistically significant difference was obtained when the Conservative group was compared to the Non-Affiliated group, in actuality the slight difference between their extremely low mean scores (.33 to .23) attenuates any serious implications of the difference between the two.]

When the Elementary Jewish Knowledge Scale was correlated with the Abridged Observance Scale (N=763) the resulting $r = .77$, $p < .001$. When the Observance Scale was then dichotomized results were:

TABLE 16.--Elementary Jewish Knowledge Scale (II)

Observe All Three (N=233)

0-2 Correct = 4%
 3-4 Correct = 9%
 5-6 Correct = 23%
 7-8 Correct = 64%

Don't Observe Any (N=458)

0-2 Correct = 69%
 3-4 Correct = 22%
 5-6 Correct = 9%
 7-8 Correct = 1%

$r = .81$, $p < 001$

According to the above analyses, the more religiously

observant the individual is, the greater his or her knowledge of elementary Judaism will be. In addition, Oral Law adherents' level of elementary Judaism was vastly greater than the Jewish knowledge elicited by the non-Oral Law group. For example, only 13% of Oral Law adherents scored 50% or lower, while an extremely large 91% of the non-Oral Law group scored 50% or lower.

Chapter 2 Hypotheses and Results

The statistical analyses conducted to test the stated hypotheses in Chapter II were based on an American non-Jewish, and non-Arab sample of 400 respondents (see Chapter IV, Methodology for Sampling and Interviewing Procedures).

A. The following demographics are presented here in order to give the reader some understanding of the sample used in the upcoming analyses.

Gender (N=397)

Female = 53%
Male = 47%

Race (N=396)

White = 57%
Black = 36%
Other = 7%

Religion (N=396)

Catholic = 46%
Protestant = 39%
Other = 15%

Age (N=381)

25 to 40 = 49%
41 to 54 = 32%
55 and Over = 19%

(N=396)

Country of Citizenship

U.S.A. = 98%
Other = 2%

(N=396)

Born in U.S.

Yes = 92%
No = 8%

***Primary Country of Ancestors (N=238)**

Ireland	= 17%
Germany	= 17%
Poland	= 14%
Italy	= 8%
England	= 6%
Sweden	= 6%
Other	= 32%

Last Year of Formal Education Completed (N=387)

Grade 1 thru 11	= 13%
High School Degree	= 27%
Some College	= 26%
Bachelors Degree	= 16%
Some Graduate School	= 5%
Masters or Doctorate Degree	= 12%

Individual 1984 Income Before Taxes (N=366)

Less than \$10,000	= 37%
Less than \$15,000	= 10%
Less than \$20,000	= 13%
Less than \$30,000	= 20%
Less than \$50,000	= 16%
More than \$50,000	= 3%

Employed or Retired (N=368)

Employed or Retired	= 82%
Unemployed	= 18%

*Only white respondents were asked country of ancestors.

*Occupational Status Level (N=213)

<u>Value</u>		
1	=	3%
2	=	16%
3	=	5%
4	=	10%
5	=	24%
6	=	5%
7	=	1%
10	=	1%
11	=	3%
12	=	3%
13	=	21%
14	=	2%
15	=	3%
16	=	1%
17	=	4%

*The higher the value the lower the occupational status level as devised by Otis Dudley Duncan's "A Socioeconomic Index for All Occupations" (Backstrom & Hursh-Cesar, 1981).

B. The following analysis attempted to measure the American public's general awareness of the Arab-Israeli conflict and to correlate this awareness with attitudes toward Israel. Consistent with the discourse in Chapter II (concerning the American news media's coverage of the Middle East), the author expected to find the public's lack of information about various fundamental and crucial Middle East issues substantial.

1. Eight questions were constructed (see Methodology for details) with the intent of measuring the public's general knowledge of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Response categories were True, False, or Don't Know. This implies that by guesswork only, respondents should have scored on the average 50%, which would be represented as an individual score of

3. Arab hostility toward Jews began with the start of Jewish nationalism in the late 1800s. Is this true or false?

T = 25%

F = 36%

DK = 40%

4. Middle-East Arab nations openly hostile to the State of Israel have spent over three times the amount of money in military equipment than Israel has. Is this true or false?

T = 41%

F = 25%

DK = 34%

5. Over the last ten years, Saudi Arabia's voting record in the United Nations has shown a strong connection between itself and the United States. Is this true or false?

T = 40%

F = 24%

DK = 36%

6. Israel's past actions have expanded its borders so that it now almost equals in size the area of all its Middle-East enemies put together. Is this true or false?

T = 23%

F = 48%

DK = 29%

7. Over the last ten years, Saudi Arabia has been openly dedicated to the destruction of Israel. Is this true or false?

T = 40%

F = 37%

DK = 24%

8. In 1948, Israel took control of less than one-fifth of the land identified by the League of Nations as Palestine. Is this true or false?

T = 45%

F = 15%

DK = 41%

For instance in item No. 1, 28% of all respondents answered correctly while 37% had misinformation, and another 36% had lack of information. In total, 73% of all respondents did not know that Palestine was not an independent Palestinian state over the last 300 years.

Based on the theory that misinformation is correlated with attitudes, the public's level of Mideast knowledge was

hypothesized as correlating significantly with attitudes toward Israel. In order to examine this relationship an Israel Attitude Scale was constructed (see Chapter IV, Methodology) and was then correlated with the above 8-item *Mideast Knowledge Scale. Based on a N of 234 the Israel Attitude Scale produced a Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficient of .76. The Mideast Knowledge Scale (N=400) produced a Kuder-Richardson 20 coefficient of .55. Several attempts were made to bring up the .55 reliability coefficient (via deletion of items, factor analysis, and alternate coding strategies) but all proved unsuccessful.

The Pearson Product-Moment correlation (based on an N of 360) between the two scales resulted in a correlation of .26 where $p < .001$. Although equivocal (in light of the small reliability coefficient) there does appear to be a significant relationship between the two, but the actual strength of that relationship needs to be further investigated pending a more reliable Mideast Knowledge Scale. Tentatively, it does appear that attitudes toward Israel may be significantly enhanced if the public were more factually aware of fundamental Mideast issues.

In light of the Mideast Knowledge Scale's relatively weak reliability coefficient (.55) all eight items were cor-

*In the present and forthcoming correlational analyses the eight-items were coded in the following manner: 1 = Incorrect (irrespective of whether the value was based on misinformation or lack of information), and 2 = Correct.

related individually with the Israel attitude scale. Of the eight items, four turned out to be significantly related (i.e., $p < .005$) to the Israel scale. They were:

N=370

*Item 1; $r = .22$, $p < .001$

Item 2; $r = .24$, $p < .001$

Item 3; $r = .24$, $p < .001$

Item 6; $r = .33$, $p < .001$

It is important to note that the first three items (i.e., items 1, 2, and 3) deal with the Palestinian Arab's historical relationship to the Land and/or to the Jewish people. In addition, an incorrect response to Item 6 bespeaks an abysmal knowledge of Mideast issues, and particularly this item correlated highest (.33) with attitudes towards Israel. Accordingly, this item more than any other seems to reflect the relationship between lack of information and negative attitudes towards Israel.

C. Another objective of the study was to examine the relationship between attitudes towards **Jews with attitudes toward Israel. Based on an N of 360 the Pearson Product-Moment Correlation produced an r of .57, $p < .001$. This finding implies a very strong relationship between attitudes towards Jews with attitudes towards israel in which 32% of the variance was accounted for (i.e., $r^2 = .32$). These data

*See pp. 202-3, which presents each item in full.

**Individual items on the Jewish and Israel attitude scale with their response breakdown can be found in Appendix B.

support the theory that there does exist a real and integral relationship between the above two variables.

D. The final objective in Chapter II was to study the news media and its relationship to attitudes and information towards and about Israel. The first media question was:

What is your primary source of news about International Affairs?

The closed-ended response breakdown was:

(N=395)

Radio	=	10%
Television	=	50%
Newspapers	=	28%
Magazines	=	11%
Other	=	2%

When these five response categories were compared (via Analysis of Variance) on both The Middle East Knowledge Scale and the Israel Attitude Scale no significant differences (i.e., $p > .005$) were found.

Another news-media question asked was:

From which local channel do you get most of your international news and information?

The closed-ended response breakdown was:

(N = 211)

Channel 2	=	32%
Channel 5	=	12%
Channel 7	=	48%
Channel 9	=	5%
Channel 11	=	2%
Other	=	1%

When these six response categories were compared on both

the Middle-East Knowledge Scale and the Israel Attitude Scale no significant differences were detected.

A third news-media question was:

From which TV news person do you get your largest amount of international news?

The open-ended response breakdown was:

(N = 116)

Dan Rather	= 23%
Ted Koppel	= 15%
Walter Jacobson	= 13%
Peter Jennings	= 15%
Other	= 35%

When a general comparison was made, no significant differences were found on either the Middle-East Knowledge Scale or on the Israel Attitude Scale.

A fourth question was:

From which newspaper do you get your largest amount of international news?

The open-ended response breakdown was:

(N = 92)

<u>Chicago Tribune</u>	= 47%
<u>Chicago Sun-Times</u>	= 39%
Other	= 14%

When these three response categories were compared on both the Mideast Knowledge Scale and the Israel Attitude Scale no significant differences were found.

The final news media question was:

From which magazine do you get most of your international news?

The open-ended response breakdown was:

(N = 47)

<u>Time</u>	= 47%
<u>Newsweek</u>	= 23%
<u>Other</u>	= 30%

When these three categories were then compared on both the Mideast Knowledge Scale and the Israel Attitude Scale no significant differences were detected.

E. In the forthcoming analysis the content and perceptual effects of four news periodicals were examined. Periodicals representing American, Arab, Jewish Secular, and Jewish Religious (Oral Law) orientations were content analyzed (See Chapter IV, Methodology) with regards to their portrayal of the Palestinian-Arab refugee problem. Subsequently, the perceptual effect these seemingly different periodicals have on the non-Jewish, non-Arab American public were compared and analyzed. Samples from three of the periodicals (i.e., American, Jewish secular, and Jewish religious) were drawn from issues dated anywhere between June 6, 1982 and December 31, 1982. It was believed that during this seven-month period the American news media devoted much time and space to the Lebanese invasion in general, and the Arab-Palestinian problem in particular. Issues of the Arab periodical were drawn from publications dated between June, 1982 and August, 1984.

In light of the negative news coverage Israel received during its invasion into Lebanon, it was hypothesized that the periodical representing mainstream America, and needless to say the Arab periodical, would portray the Arab-Palestinian

problem, given a latitude of variation, significantly less pro-Israel than the Jewish religious periodical. Accordingly, it was also predicted that these two magazines would produce significantly less positive perceptions of Israel, than perceptions evoked via the Jewish religious periodical. In addition, according to the theoretical analysis discussed in Chapter I, the Jewish secular magazine, depicted as indirectly echoing the philosophy of Reform and Conservative Judaism, should be no less hostile towards Israel, nor less sympathetic for the Palestinian Arabs than its American counterpart.

The following ten categories were used to content-analyze all of the news literature compared in the present analysis.

Categories

- I. Jewish right or connection to the land.
- II. Arab right or connection to the land.
- III. Arab mistreatment of Jews.
- IV. Israeli mistreatment of Arabs.
- V. Origins of Jewish Middle-East refugees.
- VI. Origins of Arab-Palestinian refugees.
- VII. The Jewish Middle-East refugee present condition (sympathetic).
- VIII. The Jewish Middle-East refugee present condition (unsympathetic).
- IX. The Arab-Palestinian refugee present condition (sympathetic).

- X. The Arab-Palestinian refugee present condition (un-sympathetic).

The category breakdown for each periodical was then done according to (a) Number of paragraphs in each category, (B) Percentage of paragraphs for any given category in relation to total number of paragraphs, and (C) Number of sentences per category allocated to each 8-sentence set based on the above percentages.

TABLE 17.—Sentence Breakdown for the four periodicals

1. Secular American Periodical:

Category	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X
A. No. of Paragraphs	6	12	6	22	0	0	0	0	68	0
B. Percentage	5	11	5	19	0	0	0	0	60	0
C. No. of Sentences	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	5	0

2. Secular Jewish Periodical:

A. No. of Paragraphs	2	18	28	71	0	0	0	0	104	5
B. Percentage	1	8	12	31	0	0	0	0	46	2
C. No. of Sentences	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	4	0

3. Pro-PLO Periodical:

A. No. of Paragraphs	3	24	1	37	0	*12	0	0	30	0
B. Percentage	3	22	1	36	0	11	0	0	28	0
C. No. of Sentences	0	2	0	3	0	1	0	0	2	0

4. Religious Jewish Periodical:

A. No. of Paragraphs	25	2	82	0	**1	**3	0	0	11	38
B. Percentage	15	1	51	0	1	2	0	0	7	23
C. No. of Sentences	1	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	2

*Pro Arab

**Pro Israeli

After a reliability coefficient of .83 was obtained for 36% of all material analyzed, the following four sets of sentences were constructed. The vast majority of wording

was taken directly from the respective magazines themselves.

Arab Magazine

A Jewish professor stated that the Israeli army has committed atrocities against the Palestinian people.

The racist character of Zionism is amply manifested in Israel's imperialistic and settler-state policies.

During Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli army trampled on its victims destroying everything in its path and unleashed on Beirut a rain of death and destruction.

The Palestinians have been victims of extermination, persecution, and indifference since 1948.

Most of the world's governments today have come to recognize that the Palestinian problem is the root-cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Jews have displaced the Palestinians from their land via abominations.

Jews have no real Biblical justification for building a Jewish State in Palestine.

The polls have shown that the American people think that the Palestinian struggle to return to their land is justified.

American News Magazine

President Carter said that the continued deprivation of Palestinian rights by the Israelis is contrary to moral and ethical principles of both the U.S. and Israel.

The Israelis arranged for the Christian militiamen to enter the Palestinian refugee camps in 1982 where there were very bloody consequences.

Senior American officials feel the necessity for solving the Palestinian plight on the West Bank.

An Israeli victory in Lebanon did not settle the issue of a place for the Palestinians to live.

Because the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the PLO,

suffered defeat in Lebanon, the moderate policies of Yasser Arafat may be rejected for more ruthless tactics.

The Arab leaders of the Middle-East have called for the creation of an independent Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital.

The leader of the PLO Yasser Arafat has unflagging energy and absolute determination to regain a homeland for his people.

The Lebanese President stated that the Palestinians should be allowed to live in peace and freedom with self-determination in their land.

Jewish Secular Magazine

Israel will never obtain the security it wants by using force.

The Israeli government has tried to destroy the Arab political elite in the occupied territories by ousting mayors, closing universities, and restricting the circulation of literature in the Arab-dominated areas.

Many governments throughout the world have held Israel responsible for the massacre of Palestinian civilians in the Palestinian refugee camps.

According to the U.S. State Department, there are 4,300,000 Palestinians scattered around the world.

The European Parliament Assembly has expressed solidarity with the Palestinian people.

The Arabs call for a Palestinian State represented by the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the PLO.

The moderate Arab states, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt, are troubled by the Palestinian plight.

A PLO leader who surrendered to the Israelis said that he was ashamed of its terrorist tactics.

Jewish Religious (Oral-Law) Magazine

The State of Israel is the historic homeland of the Jews.

The Palestinian Liberation Organization, the PLO, is an unprincipled terrorist organization.

The PLO has vied for the total liquidation of Israel.

PLO operations in Lebanon up to 1982 was the center for international terrorism worldwide.

Up until 1982, Israel's northern border has been consistently bombed by PLO terrorists.

Since June of 1981 to December of 1982, a total of 150 terrorist attacks have been made against Israel by the PLO.

The President of Lebanon said, in Paris, that Arafat, the leader of the PLO, is the cause of the Palestinian's problems.

Jordan is the key obstructionist in settling the Palestinian refugee problem by not admitting that his state is actually Palestine.

Eight fixed-response questions followed the reading of each set of sentences (the questions may be found in Appendix D). The eight questions (N=348) based on the readings produced a Kuder-Richardson 20 coefficient of *.69. The mean for the 8-item scale was 1.53 with a standard deviation of .317 (the higher the scaled score the more pro-Israel the responses, the minimum possible mean score was 1 and the maximum possible mean score was 2).

An analysis of covariance, comparing the four periodicals on the subsequent eight questions while controlling for differences attributed to Race, Age, Gender, and Attitudes Toward Israel, was then done. A highly significant F statistic of 28.23, $df(3,339)$, $p < .001$ resulted.

	(N=84)	(N=88)
<u>Version:</u>	American;	Jewish Secular
Mean:	1.51 ;	1.45
Adjusted Mean:	1.51 ;	1.46

*Attempts to bring up the reliability coefficient via deletion of items and factor analysis were unsuccessful.

	(N=90)	(N=86)
<u>Version:</u>	Jewish Religious;	Arab
Mean:	1.76 ;	1.38
Adjusted Mean:	1.75 ;	1.38

Subsequently, the six possible individual comparisons were statistically analyzed. The following contrasts represent only those which produced statistically significant differences ($p < .005$).

Significant Contrasts

Jewish Religious-Arab	: $t=-7.49$, $df(369)$, $p<.001$
Jewish Religious-Jewish Secular	: $t=-5.84$, $df(369)$, $p<.001$
Jewish Religious-American	: $t=-8.65$, $df(369)$, $p<.001$

According to the above mean scores, the mean value as predicted, of the Jewish religious periodical ($M=1.76$) represented the most pro-Israel of the four periodicals. The Arab magazine produced the most anti-Israel responses ($M=1.38$), and the American and Jewish secular magazines produced mean scores of 1.51 and 1.45 respectively. After individual comparisons were implemented, only differences between the Jewish religious periodical and each of the other three magazines proved statistically significant.

Afterwards, four questions (three of them taken directly from the eight questions asked at the end of each respective reading) were asked at the conclusion of the interview in order to examine the carryover effect of the readings. With the four readings posited as the independent variable; $F = 1.94$, $df(3,351)$, $p > .005$.

In addition, the Israel Attitude Scale (which was also administered at the end of the interview) was examined concerning the readings' effect on it. Again, with the four readings posited as the independent variable; $F = 2.25$, $df (3, 374)$, $p > .005$.

In conclusion, it appears that the results were specifically a function of the readings themselves, and had little to do with the respondents' prior attitudes. Correspondingly, the effects of the readings were shortlived which was probably a function of the repetitive nature of the directions given. For instance, immediately preceding the readings respondents were told to base their responses only on their understanding of the sentences. In addition, they were told that the sentences they were about to hear "come from an actual magazine which does not necessarily represent the real situation." Immediately following the reading of the sentences they were told again to base their "answers only on the sentences" they "just heard and not on any prior knowledge or attitudes" they might have. To further affirm the directives, respondents were asked to respond only according to the readings on each question (e.g., "According to what you heard who is to blame for the continuing Palestinian refugee problem. Is it . . .").*

*Other incidental statistics pertaining to the above readings and questions thereof can be found in Appendix B.

Chapter 3 Analyses and Results

The forthcoming analyses deal with variables which are commonly depicted as factors directly involved in promoting prejudice. However, in the present theoretical context they are viewed as aggression-arousing mediating variables which have only indirectly become part of the overall prejudicial process. The following social-psychological variables have been shown in the past to correlate significantly with anti-Jewish prejudice (see Chapter 3--Tertiary Cause of Anti-Jewish Hostility). In the present study these variables have been analyzed in relation to attitudes towards both Jews and Israel.

F. The disintegration of societal structure and values in times of rapid social change has been coined anomie and has been found to correlate significantly with anti-Jewish attitudes (Hoge et al., 1975). Individuals suffering from anomie are seen as being prone to feelings of anxiety and insecurity, in short, heightened emotional stress which may predispose them to hate propaganda against Jews or any other group who happens to be the target of the respective propaganda.

The 4-item Anomie Scale, as implemented by Bryant and Veroff (1984), produced in the present study a Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficient of .65 based on a N of 382. No significant relationship (i.e., $p > .005$) was registered between the Anomie Scale and the Israel Attitude Scale (N=360,

$r = .14$).^{*} However, a significant Pearson Product-Moment Correlation ($r = .25, p < .001$) was obtained when correlated with the **Jewish Attitude Scale (N=360).

Despite the fact that the scale's reliability coefficient was a bit below the usual minimal-level of acceptance (i.e., .70), a small but substantive relationship does appear to exist between the Anomie and Jewish Attitude Scales. In other words, the emotional stress brought about by anomie could be seen as a contributing factor promoting anti-Jewish attitudes, and to a lesser and non-significant extent, anti-Israel attitudes.

G. It has been advanced that threats of economic, political, and military disaster reinforce anti-Jewish attitudes and behavior (e.g., Ettinger, 1969; Parson, 1980). Fear of an economic, political, or military catastrophe, which is out of the individual's personal control, was depicted (see Chapter III) as a potentially disturbing and frustrating experience. Theoretically, this fear was conceptualized as predisposing the individual to hostile-type attitudes and actions directed against vulnerable individuals or groups.

In the present analysis a ***6-item Opinion-Fear

^{*}The higher the scaled score the more positive the attitude.

^{**}The higher the scaled score the more positive the attitude.

^{***}The higher the scaled score the more negative the attitude.

Rating Scale was correlated with both the Jewish and Israel attitude scales. The 6-item scale based on a N of 361 produced a Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficient of .76. Results were:

1. Jewish Attitude Scale
(N=360), $r = -.17$, $p = .001$
2. Israel Attitude Scale
(N=360), $r = -.22$, $p < .001$.

The 6-item scale was then broken down into two 3-item scales which conceptually represented (1) Fear of an impending economic, military, or political crisis, and (2) Opinions concerning impending economic, military, or political crises. Based on a N of 361 (for both scales) the Fear Scale produced a Cronbach Alpha of .72, and the Opinion Scale produced one of .59. When these scales were then correlated independently with the Jewish and Israel attitude scales results were:

*3-Item Fear-Crisis Scale

1. Jewish Attitude Scale
(N=360), $r = -.13$, $p > .005$
2. Israel Attitude Scale
(N=360), $r = -.17$, $p = .001$

*3-Item Opinion-Crisis Scale

1. Jewish Attitude Scale
(N=360), $r = -.17$, $p = .001$
2. Israel Attitude Scale
(N=360), $r = -.21$, $p < .001$

*The higher the scaled score the more negative the attitude.

As discussed above and corroborated in the present analysis there does seem to be a significant correlation between respondents' perceptions of an impending national crisis and attitudes towards both Jews and Israel. In other words, the apprehension and/or frustration created by perceived impending crises is seen (according to the present analysis) as a contributing factor promoting anti-Israel, and to a lesser extent anti-Jewish attitudes. However, after a multiple regression analysis was performed in which both the Israel and Jewish scales were simultaneously regressed on the 6-item Opinion-Fear Rating Scale only the Israel Scale's partialled correlation obtained *significance. Beta values were:

Israel Attitude Scale = $-.19$, $p = .002$

Jewish Attitude Scale = $-.07$, $p > .05$

This implies that the relationship between Attitudes toward Jews and the Opinion-Fear Scale may be primarily a function of the relationship between the Israel Attitude Scale and the Jewish Attitude Scale.

The complete 6-item scale was, in addition, broken down into three 2-item scales which conceptually represent

*In the present analysis as well as other forthcoming multiple regression analyses where Beta values are examined, the level of significance usually employed in both studies (i.e., $p < .005$) was lowered to $.05$ in light of the Beta statistic's inherent nature, whose value may be considerably reduced because of the possibility confounds or collinearity among independent variables.

(1) Military Crisis Scale, (2) Economic Crisis Scale, and (3) Political Crisis Scale. Based on a N of 361 for all scales the Military Crisis Scale produced a Cronbach Alpha of .59. The Economic Crisis Scale and the Political Crisis Scale produced Cronbach Alphas of .62 and .47 respectively. When the above scales were correlated with the Jewish and Israel attitude scales results were:

*2-Item Military Crisis Scale

1. Jewish Attitude Scale
(N=320), $r = -.13$, $p > .005$
2. Israel Attitude Scale
(N=320), $r = -.20$, $p < .001$

*2-Item Economic Crisis Scale

1. Jewish Attitude Scale
(N=320), $r = -.13$, $p > .005$
2. Israel Attitude Scale
(N=320), $r = -.15$, $p > .005$

*2-Item Political Crisis Scale

1. Jewish Attitude Scale
(N=320), $r = -.19$, $p = .001$
2. Israel Attitude Scale
(N=320), $r = -.22$, $p < .001$

According to the above analyses, the perceived impending crises found to be related to attitudes towards Israel are more of a military and political nature than they are

*The higher the scaled score the more negative the attitude.

economic. When related to attitudes towards Jews, only those of a political nature proved to be significant (although the differences between the political r and the other r's are probably not significant).

H. The frustration (scapegoat) theory of prejudice postulates that when the cause of frustration is either too intimidating or obscure, people often redirect their hostility against an available, identified group unlikely or unable to fight back. The present analysis attempted to measure individual frustration via the *Life Satisfaction Scale (Converse et al., 1965), and the abridged and modified (for telephone usage) 4-item *Purpose in Life Test (Crumbaugh, 1968).

The Life Satisfaction Scale (N=353) did not significantly correlate (i.e., $p > .005$) with either the Jewish ($r = .06$) or Israel ($r = .05$) attitude scales. However the 4-item Purpose-in-Life Test, which produced a Cronbach Alpha of .56 (N=358), correlated significantly with both the Jewish and Israel scales as demonstrated below:

1. The Jewish Attitude Scale
(N=360), $r = .22$, $p < .001$
2. The Israel Attitude Scale
(N=360), $r = .15$, $p = .004$

Although the above relationships were statistically significant, the fact that the scale's reliability coefficient was only .56 throws a damper on the reliability of the

*The higher the scaled score the more positive the attitude.

results. However, based on the above exploratory analysis it does appear that the lack of meaning (purpose) a person experiences in life (and consequently the more existential frustration) the more inclined he/she may be to anti-Jewish and/or anti-Israel activity.

In Chapter 3 the hypothesis was presented that an individual who fails to achieve an effective personal identity may be predisposed to prejudicial behavior in an attempt to establish a stable sense of self. The Thomas-Zander Ego Strength Scale (Thomas et al, 1960), was employed in the present analysis, and like the above variables was studied in its relationship to attitudes towards Jews and Israel.

Based on a sample of 370 the *7-item Ego-Strength Scale produced a reliability coefficient of only .40 (deleting item(s) and factor analysis proved unsuccessful in substantially increasing the reliability coefficient). Neither the Jewish ($r = .06$) nor Israel ($r = .12$) attitude scales were significantly correlated (i.e., $p > .005$) with the Ego-Strength Scale, but pending a more reliable measurement the results are, at best, inconclusive.

In light of the Ego-Strength Scale's inadequate reliability coefficient, all seven items individually were subsequently correlated with both the Jewish and Israel scales. Of the seven items, two items turned out to be significantly

*The higher the scaled score the more positive the attitude.

correlated (i.e., $p < .005$) with the Jewish Attitude Scale, and none of the seven items correlated significantly with the Israel Attitude Scale. Correlations for the two Ego Strength Items (Items No. 1 and 2 in the Scale) were:

Jewish Attitude Scale

Ego Strength Item No. 1 (N=361)

$r = .16, p = .002$

Ego Strength Item No. 2 (N=369)

$r = .21, p < .001$

Israel Attitude Scale

Ego Strength Item No. 1 (N=361)

$r = .10, p > .005$

Ego Strength Item No. 2 (N=369)

$r = .13, p > .005$

To repeat, as can be seen from the above, both Ego-Strength Items 1 and 2 correlated significantly (.16 and .21 respectively) with the Jewish Attitude Scale, while neither of the two items were found to be significantly related to the Israel Attitude Scale.

Two simultaneous-multiple-regression analyses were then implemented in which all the psychological variables mentioned above (in addition to Level of Formal Education) were regressed on both the Jewish and Israel attitude scales.

Results were:

1. Jewish Attitude Scale (N=370)

Independent Variables	Partial Correlations
Anomie Scale	.15, $p < .006$
Ego-Strength Scale	-.05, $p > .05$
Life Satisfaction Scale	-.05, $p > .05$
Abridged Purpose in Life Scale	.20, $p < .001$

Opinion-Fear Rating Scale	- .10, $p < .05$
Level of Formal Education	.14, $p < .02$

Multiple R = .36, $p < .001$

2. Israel Attitude Scale (N=367)

Independent Variables	Partial Correlations
Anomie Scale	.02, $p > .05$
Ego-Strength Scale	.04, $p > .05$
Life Satisfaction Scale	-.05, $p > .05$
Abridged Purpose in Life Scale	.11, $p > .05$
Opinion-Fear Rating Scale	-.19, $p < .001$
Level of Formal Education	.09, $p > .05$

Multiple R = .28, $p < .001$

Based on the above, it does appear that various social-psychological variables are independently associated with attitudes towards Jews. The present analysis supports prior research which has shown that the more emotionally disturbed, frustrated, or fearful the individual, the more predisposed he/she may be to develop anti-Jewish attitudes. It should also be made clear that although a substantial relationship has been detected ($R = .36$, which indicated that 13% of the variance is accounted for) the great majority of the variance (i.e., 87%) is still unexplained. In other words, the above social-psychological variables should not be considered more than minor contributions in the overall etiology of anti-Jewish attitudes.

In examining the beta values it was found that the variables (i.e., Anomie, Purpose in Life, and Opinion-Fear Scale) which were significantly correlated with the Jewish scale in bivariate relationships remained significantly cor-

related in a multivariate analysis. This implies that the four significant correlations (i.e., the three scales above plus Level of Formal Education) are independently associated with attitudes towards Jews.

Not only was the Multiple R less for the Israel attitude scale than it was for the Jewish scale (i.e., .28 and .36, respectively), but five of the six beta values failed to reach the .05 level of significance. The only variable found to correlate significantly both separately, and after the partialing process was the 6-item Opinion-Fear Rating Scale.

I. According to the phenomenological approach to prejudice (Allport, 1954) individuals' prejudiced behavior proceeds immediately from their view of the situation confronting them, and their reaction to the environment corresponds to their definition of that world. As depicted in Chapter II misperceptions of Jews and Judaism have historically precipitated anti-Jewish activity. Furthermore (as shown in Chapter II), the most virulent anti-Jewish (anti-Israel) propaganda currently being propagated concerns the Arab Palestinian refugee problem. According to the discussion in Chapter II, the propaganda which bestows legitimacy on the Palestinian "national" movement and arouses sympathy worldwide for the "palestinian cause" while simultaneously casting aspersions on the "racist" and "imperialist" nature of the Jewish state, was conceptualized as providing the

"moral justification" (in the eyes of the world) for the implementation of another Jewish holocaust.

In light of the above, four questions pertaining specifically to the Arab Palestinian refugee problem were asked of all respondents. A KR-20 reliability coefficient was computed for the four items *(N=154) and resulted in .39. Various combinations of these four items failed to substantially increase the reliability coefficient (the highest reliability coefficient based on a scale of items 1 and 2 was .50). It was therefore deemed necessary to correlate each item separately with both the Jewish and Israel attitude scales. In the following analyses each item will be presented in full.

****Item No. 1 (N=219)**

"In your opinion, who is to blame for causing the Palestinian refugee problem. Is it Israel or the Arabs"?

Jewish Attitude Scale; $r = .18, p > .005$

Israel Attitude Scale; $r = .39, p < .001$

Item No. 2. (N=237)

"In your opinion, who are the rightful inhabitants of the land which today is called Israel and before 1948 was called Palestine. Are the rightful inhabitants the Arabs or the Jews"?

*Many respondents were unwilling to answer these 4 items in light of their inherent nature which demanded either a pro-Israel or pro-Arab response (i.e., there were no middle-of-the-road response categories).

**Coding procedures for Items 1, 2, and 4 were:
Pro-Arab response = 1; Pro-Israel response = 2

Jewish Attitude Scale; $r = .19$, $p = .003$
 Israel Attitude Scale; $r = .25$, $p < .001$

*Item No. 3 (N=275)

"The fairest solution for the Palestinian Arab refugees would be resettlement in Israel, Jordan, or some other place"?

Jewish Attitude Scale; $r = .06$, $p > .005$
 Israel Attitude Scale; $r = .22$, $p < .001$

Item No. 4 (N=297)

"In your opinion, is the Palestinian Refugee Problem, the underlying and central problem, in the Arab-Israeli conflict?" (The implicit response categories were Yes or No.)

Jewish Attitude Scale; $r = .32$, $p < .001$
 Israel Attitude Scale; $r = .35$, $p < .001$

According to the above, all four items correlate significantly with the Israel attitude scale, but items 1 and 4 in particular, correlate most highly (.39 and .35 respectively) with attitudes towards Israel. These results imply that perceptions of the Arab Palestinian refugee problem may play an important part in the formation of attitudes towards Israel.

The Jewish attitude scale correlated significantly ($p < .005$) with items 2 and 4. However, the relationship between the the Jewish scale and item 2 appears to be more an artifact of the relationship between attitudes towards Jews with attitudes towards Israel. This was seen by simul-

*The coding procedure for Item 3 was: Resettlement in Israel = 1; resettlement in Jordan or some other place = 2.

taneously regressing both scales on Item 2. Results were:

Dependent Variable: Item 2

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Beta Values</u>
Jewish Attitude Scale	.08, $p > .05$
Israel Attitude Scale	.20, $p < .007$

When the same analysis was done on Item 4, results were:

Dependent Variable: Item 4

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Beta Values</u>
Jewish Attitude Scale	.17, $p < .02$
Israel Attitude Scale	.25, $p < .001$

Although a considerable amount of the Jewish scale's variance is accounted for when the Israel scale is introduced into the equation, enough remains to imply that the Jewish attitude scale is independently related to Item 4.

J. The following statistical analyses examine several demographic variables in their relationship to (1) Attitudes towards Jews, (2) Attitudes towards Israel, and (3) Knowledge of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

1. Independent Variable:* Primary Country of Ancestors

Dependent Variables: Jewish Attitude Scale;
 $F = 1.70, df(6,222), p > .05$

Israel Attitude Scale;
 $F = .97, df(6,222), p > .05$

Mideast Knowledge Scale;
 $F = .96, df(6,231), p > .05$

*Black respondents were not asked country of ancestors.

Based on the above analyses, the variable of primary country of ancestors does not appear to significantly differentiate on attitudes towards Jews, Israel, or Mideast Knowledge.

2. Independent Variable: Occupational Status (N=200)

Dependent Variables: Jewish Attitude Scale;
 $r = -.07, p > .05$

Israel Attitude Scale;
 $r = -.11, p > .05$

Mideast Knowledge Scale;
 $r = -.11, p > .05$

The variable of Occupational Status does not appear to be significantly related to attitudes towards Jews, Israel, or Mideast Knowledge.

3. Independent Variable: *Religion

Dependent Variables: Jewish Attitude Scale;
 $F = .70, df(2,381), p > .05$

Israel Attitude Scale;
 $F = 1.52; df(2,371), p > .05$

Mideast Knowledge Scale
 $F = 2.65, df(2,393), p > .05$

The variable of Religion does not appear to significantly differentiate on attitudes towards Jews, Israel, or Mideast Knowledge.

4. Independent Variable: Individual Income for 1984.

Dependent Variables: Jewish Attitude Scale (N=320)
 $r = .13, p > .005$

*Jews and Arabs were initially screened out in the present study.

Israel Attitude Scale (N=320)
 $r = .18, p = .001$

Mideast Knowledge Scale (N=320)
 $r = .15, p > .005$

The variable of Individual Income for 1984 does not appear to significantly differentiate on attitudes towards Jews, or on Mideast Knowledge, but was significantly correlated with attitudes towards Israel. However, there does not seem to be significant differences among the three r's.

5. Independent Variable: *Are You Employed or Retired, (Yes or No)?
 (N=336)

Dependent Variables: Jewish Attitude Scale;
 $r = .08, p > .005$

Israel Attitude Scale;
 $r = .03, p > .005$

Mideast Knowledge Scale;
 $r = -.01, p > .005$

The variable of Are You Employed or Retired, (Yes or No)? does not appear to be significantly related to attitudes towards Jews, Israel, or Mideast Knowledge.

6. Independent Variable: Age (N=320)

Dependent Variables: Jewish Attitude Scale;
 $r = -.01, p > .05$

Israel Attitude Scale;
 $r = .17, p = .003$

Mideast Knowledge Scale;
 $r = .05, p > .05$

*Direction of coding was: Unemployed = 1; Employed or Retired = 2.

The variable Age does not appear to be significantly related to attitudes towards Jews or Mideast Knowledge. However, there does seem to be a slight but significant relationship between Age and Attitudes Towards Israel. The direction of the relationship implies that the older a person is the more pro-Israel he/she is likely to be.

7. Independent Variable: *Gender (N=360)

Dependent Variables: Jewish Attitude Scale;
 $r = .04, p > .005$

Israel Attitude Scale;
 $r = -.14, p > .005$

Mideast Knowledge Scale;
 $r = -.06, p > .005$

The variable of Gender does not appear to be significantly related to attitudes towards Jews, Israel or Mideast Knowledge. However, there does seem to be a slight non-significant relationship between Gender and Attitudes Towards Israel. The direction of this relationship implies that males may have stronger pro-Israel attitudes than females.

8. Independent Variable: Formal Education Level (N=360)

Dependent Variables: Jewish Attitude Scale;
 $r = .27, p < .001$

Israel Attitude Scale;
 $r = .18, p = .001$

Mideast Attitude Scale;
 $r = .18, p = .002$

The variable Formal Education Level appears to correlate

*Directional key: Male = 1; Female = 2.

significantly with all three of the above scales.

9. Independent Variable: *Race

Dependent Variables: Jewish Attitude Scale;
(N=341)
 $r = .19, p < .001$

Israel Attitude Scale;
(N=336)
 $r = .16; p = .003$

Mideast Knowledge Scale;
(N=352)
 $r = .04, p > .05$

The variable Race does not appear to be significantly related to Mideast Knowledge. However, Race did correlate slightly but significantly with attitudes towards both Jews and Israel. White respondents were found to be more pro-Jewish and pro-Israel than their Black counterparts.

However, after a multiple regression analysis was performed in which both the Jewish and Israel scales were simultaneously reressed on Race only the Jewish Scale's partialled correlation proved significant (Beta values were: Jewish Scale = .17. $p < .008$; and Israel Scale = .06, $p > .05$). This suggests that the relationship between Race and Attitudes towards Israel is primarily a function of the relationship between Attitudes towards Jews with Attitudes toward Israel.

K. Two simultaneous-multiple-regression analyses

*In light of the fact that the third racial group "Other" had a N of only 23, and because of its heterogeneous character, only the racial groups of White and Black were compared in the following analyses. Coding for Race was Black = 1, and White = 2.

were then implemented where the demographic variables of Gender, Age, Race, and Education were regressed on all three scales. Results were:

1. Dependent Variable: Jewish Attitude Scale (N=341)

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Beta Values</u>
Gender	.06, $p > .05$
Age	-.02, $p > .05$
Race	.15, $p < .007$
Education	.22, $p < .001$

Multiple R = .29, $p < .001$

The two variables (Race and Education) which were significantly correlated with Attitudes Towards Jews in bivariate relationships remained significantly correlated in the above multiple correlation analysis.

2. Dependent Variable: Israel Attitude Scale (N=336)

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Beta Values</u>
Gender	-.14, $p < .01$
Age	.13, $p < .02$
Race	.17, $p = .001$
Education	.16, $p = .003$

Multiple R = .31, $p < .001$

Three of the above four variables were found significantly correlated with Attitudes Towards Israel in bivariate relationships, and remained significantly correlated in the above multivariate analysis. The variable Gender, which failed to reach the .005 level of significance in its bivariate relationship with the Israel scale reached significance in the above multivariate analysis after the significance level was lowered to .05.

3. Dependent Variable: Mideast Knowledge Scale (N=352)

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Beta Values</u>
Gender	-.10, p > .05
Age	p > .05
Race	.02, p > .05
Education	.23, p < .001

Multiple R = .26, p < .001

The one variable (Education) which was found significantly correlated with the Mideast Knowledge Scale in a bivariate relationship remained significantly correlated in the above multivariate analysis.

L. The following interaction effects failed to reach the .005 level of significance on each of the three dependent variables (i.e., Jewish Attitude Scale, Israel Attitude Scale, and Mideast Knowledge Scale).

1. Race x Age
2. Race x Gender
3. Race x Education
4. Race x Income
5. Education x Gender
6. Education x Age
7. Gender x Age
8. Race x Education x Age

M. In conclusion, four simultaneous multiple-regression analyses were conducted in which most of the above psychological and demographic variables were regressed on both the Jewish and Israel Attitude Scales. Two analyses for each scale were implemented. The first analysis combined most of the demographic variables and all of the psychological variables (except for the Arab-Palestinian issue questions). The second analysis included the four Arab-Palestinian issue

questions. The reason for this rather awkward strategy was that by integrating one or more of the 4 Arab-Palestinian items into the analyses the N was substantially reduced. Therefore, in order to maximize the N while not deleting the Arab-Palestinian items (in light of the significant correlation between these items and both scales) it was deemed necessary to carry out both types of analyses. Results were:

TABLE 18.--Multiple Regression Analysis on the Jewish Attitude Scale (N=306)

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Beta Values</u>
Race	.12, p = .05
Mideast Knowledge Scale	.12, p = .04
Ego-Strength Item 2	.10, p > .05
Age	-.04, p > .05
Gender	.02, p > .05
Religion	.01, p > .05
Life Satisfaction Scale	-.10, p > .05
Ego-Strength Item 1	.08, p > .05
Income	--, p > .05
Opinion-Fear Crisis Scale	-.05, p > .05
Anomie Scale	.10, p > .05
Purpose in Life Scale	.19, p = .003
Education	.10, p > .05

Multiple R = .41, p < .001

In Table 18 in which the Jewish scale was simultaneously correlated with most of the demographic and psychological variables previously discussed, and where N=306, the multiple R = .41 (p < .001). This means that 17% of the scale's variance was accounted for by the thirteen variables in the equation. The three variables which remained independently related (based on the probability level of .05 or

less) were Race, the Mideast Knowledge Scale, and the abridged Purpose in Life Scale. The five other variables (i.e., Education, Anomie scale, Opinion-Fear scale, and Items 1 and 2 of the Ego Strength scale) which proved to be slightly but significantly correlated in bivariate analyses, but failed to achieve significance in the above analysis was probably due either to confounds or to error variance engendered by the thirteen independent variables, or to a combination of the two. This point becomes clearer when one recognizes that many of the psychological and demographic variables correlated significantly (albeit their correlations were not strong enough to assume multi-collinearity) with one another, and yet the differences between their significant bivariate correlations and their insignificant Beta values were not too dissimilar. For example, Ego-Strength Item 1 correlated significantly ($r = .16$) in a bivariate equation, but proved insignificant ($\text{Beta} = .08$) when twelve other variables were entered into the analysis.

In Table 19 in which the Jewish scale was simultaneously correlated with most of the demographic variables and all of the psychological variables previously discussed (and where $N=133$), the multiple correlation (R) obtained was .53 ($p < .001$). In this analysis, when the four Arab-Palestinian Issue Items were included, the Multiple R was significantly increased, and the proportion of the Jewish scale's variance accounted for, by these seventeen variables, was 28%. Al-

TABLE 19.--Multiple Regression Analysis on the Jewish Attitude Scale (N=133)

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Beta Values</u>
Arab-Palestinian Item 4	.15, p > .05
Religion	-.13, p > .05
Arab-Palestinian Item 3	.18, p = .03
Age	.09, p > .05
Gender	--, p > .05
Arab-Palestinian Item 2	.17, p > .05
Education	.05, p > .05
Ego-Strength Item 1	.07, p > .05
Mideast Knowledge Scale	.03, p > .05
Life Satisfaction Scale	-.12, p > .05
Ego-Strength Item 2	.16, p > .05
Arab-Palestinian Item 1	.19, p = .03
Opinion-Fear Crisis Scale	--, p > .05
Purpose in Life Scale	.07, p > .05
Income	.07, p > .05
Anomie Scale	-.04, p > .05
Race	--. p > .05

Multiple R = .53, p < .001

though the proportion of variance accounted for in the present analysis was considerably greater than in the prior analysis (Table 18), the amount of variance unaccounted for (i.e., 72%) was still substantially large. In this analysis the Arab-Palestinian Issue Items 1 and 3 only, remained independently related to the Jewish attitude scale.

In Table 20 in which the Israel Attitude Scale was simultaneously correlated with most of the demographic and psychological variables in the study and where N=302, the Multiple R was .47 (p < .001). In other words, 22% of the scale's variance was accounted for by the present thirteen predicting variables. Most of the variables which were significantly correlated with the Israel scale in bivariate analyses remained significantly correlated (i.e., p < .05)

TABLE 20.--Multiple Regression Analysis on the Israel Attitude Scale (N=302)

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Beta Values</u>
Race	.10, p > .05
Purpose in Life Scale	.16, p = .007
Mideast Knowledge Scale	.21, p < .001
Age	.15, p < .006
Gender	-.16, p < .006
Religion	--, p > .05
Ego Strength Item 2	.07, p > .05
Ego Strength Item 1	.06, p > .05
Opinion-Fear Crisis Scale	-.13, p = .02
Income	.01, p > .05
Life Satisfaction Scale	-.08, p > .05
Anomie Scale	.04, p > .05
Education	.04, p > .05

Multiple R = .47, p < .001

in the present multiple correlation analysis. Exceptions to the rule were the variables Race, Education, and Income which in the present analysis failed to reach the .05 level of significance. (The interpretation rendered above for the slight discrepancy between bivariate analyses previously described and Beta values in table 18 is equally appropriate in the present context.)

In Table 21, in which the Israel scale was simultaneously correlated with most of the demographic variables and all of the psychological variables discussed above (and N=134), the Multiple R was .66 (p < .001). Accordingly, 44% of the scale's total variance was accounted for in the present analysis. However, in spite of the significant increase from the prior analysis in Table 20, the amount of variance

TABLE 21.--Multiple Regression Analysis on the Israel Attitude Scale (N=134)

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Beta Values</u>
Arab-Palestinian-Issue Item 4	.15, p < .05
Religion	--, p > .05
Arab-Palestinian-Issue Item 3	.21, p = .005
Age	.18, p = .02
Gender	-.14, p > .05
Arab-Palestinian-Issue Item 2	.13, p > .05
Education	-.05, p > .05
Ego Strength Item 1	.04, p > .05
Mideast Knowledge Scale	.17, p < .03
Life Satisfaction Scale	-.06, p > .05
Ego Strength Item 2	-.01, p > .05
Arab-Palestinian-Issue Item 1	.27, p < .001
Opinion-Fear Crisis Scale	-.12, p > .05
Purpose in Life Scale	.14, p > .05
Income	.09, p > .05
Anomie Scale	.03, p > .05
Race	--, p > .05

Multiple R = .66, p < .001

still undetermined was 56%. The five variables which retained a significant independent relationship with the Israel Attitude scale were Items 1, 3, and 4 of the Arab Palestinian Issue Items, the Mideast Knowledge Scale, and Age.

The considerable change in predictor values once the Arab-Palestinian Issue Items were entered into the equation (for both the Jewish and Israel scales) suggests that several of the variables may be artifacts of the relationship between perceptions of the Arab-Palestinian problem and attitudes towards both Jews and Israel, or that the respondents who answered either pro-Arab or pro-Israel to these items (as mentioned above, other responses to these items were discarded) were a distinctly different subgroup. In light

of the difficulty in conceptualizing the relationship between the Arab-Palestinian items and the other psychological and demographic variables, it appears more likely that a distinct subgroup produced the difference in models. This subgroup seems to be affected (i.e., concerning attitudes towards both Jews and Israel) almost exclusively by their perceptions and information level (i.e., the phenomenological approach) of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

When the two scales' set of predictors are compared (i.e., without the Arab-Palestinian Items in the equation) some differences, but many more similarities appear. For instance, the Beta values of nine of the thirteen predicting variables in the equation do not appear to be significantly differentiated on the two scales. The Beta values of three of the remaining four predictors (i.e., Age, Gender, and the Opinion-Fear Rating Scale) reached significance in relation to the Israel scale, but not in relation to the Jewish attitude scale. The Mideast Knowledge Scale was independently related to both the Jewish and Israel scales (.12 and .21 respectively), but its relationship to attitudes towards Israel appears significantly greater.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The final section of this manuscript is divided into four major sections. The first three sections present a review and discussion of the hypothesized primary, secondary, and tertiary causes of anti-Jewish hostility based on the studies' major empirical findings. In each of the three sections, when applicable, the subject matter of alternative interpretations, limitations of study, significance of the findings, and direction for future empirical work will be addressed. The final section will deal with the broader implications of anti-Jewish hostility based on a synthesis of the dissertation's historical and empirical analyses.

Chapter I Conclusions

As portrayed in Chapter I the primary catalyst of anti-Jewish hostility was Jewish distinctiveness and the psychological threat it posed to national and international movements whose objective to dominate ran counter and collided with Jewish separatism. In order to bring the world over to their way of acting and thinking these movements were obligated to crush all forms of resistance. Unfortunately

for these psychologically intimidated movements the Jewish nation (with all its Oral Law ramifications) was not like the other nations and refused to be extinguished. All the while the Jewish presence existed (sometimes as free men, and other times as veritable slaves) the declared supremacy of the various movements was brought into question and absolute dominion was perforce withheld. Accordingly, these movements in order to foster a sense of political and/or spiritual security attempted throughout history to eradicate Jewish distinctiveness.

This process of eradication has taken three general forms. The first form was usually to break Jewish nationalism (i.e., the Jewish people's relationship to the Land of Israel). When this failed, the Jewish spirit (based on the Oral Law tradition) was then attacked, and when the Jewish presence obstinately refused to capitulate, total annihilation remained the only viable alternative.

This Jewish stiffnecked effrontery was documented by Josephus in the first century of the Common Era when Jews were being relentlessly persecuted by the great Roman empire. He wrote:

. . . they have a passion for liberty that is almost unconquerable, since they are convinced that G-d alone is their leader and master. They think little of submitting to death in unusual forms and permitting vengeance to fall on kinsmen and friends, if only they may avoid calling any man master (Perlmutter, 1982, p. 54).

Or again, poignantly expressed by Adolf Hitler some 1900 years later:

It is true we are barbarians that is an honored title to us. I free humanity from the shackles of the soul, from the degrading suffering caused by the false vision called conscience and ethics. The Jews have inflicted two wounds on mankind; circumcision on its body and "conscience" on its soul. They are Jewish inventions. The war for domination of the world is waged only between the two of us, between these two camps alone; the Germans and the Jews. Everything else is but deception (Scherman, 1985, p. xiv).

This self-motivated distinctiveness appears to have been the cause or catalyst of anti-Jewish discrimination and persecution throughout history. If Jews would have totally assimilated into the majority culture like most other conquered people (who had the chance to do so) then by definition, they would not have suffered as a minority group. Other discriminated-against groups (e.g., women, Blacks under Arab and White dominion, American Indians, etc.) were not as fortunate as the Jews for they lacked the capacity to physically mingle without being detected. These groups, in light of their distinct physical characteristics were forced to remain, to some extent, separate. The Jews, in contrast, could have totally integrated (i.e., by accepting the ruling powers' laws, customs and religions as subjugated people throughout history have done) without being thereafter detected. The Jewish threat was that they, logically speaking, could have totally assimilated into all of the above societies (see Chapter I) and yet, irrespective of their

vast cultural interaction, refused to totally disavow their Jewish identity. This unusually adamant refusal to be one with the ruling or majority population inevitably created seemingly unwarranted intergroup competition, which brought in its wake untold Jewish suffering.

As Muzafer Sherif (1966), based on much experimentation and analyses of intergroup processes put it:

. . . intergroup conflict has shown that neither cultural, physical, nor economic differences are necessary for the rise of intergroup conflict, hostile attitudes, and stereotyped images of out-groups. Nor are maladjusted, neurotic, or unstable tendencies necessary conditions for the appearance of intergroup prejudice and stereotypes.

The sufficient condition for the rise of hostile and aggressive deeds . . . was the existence of two groups competing for goals that only one group could attain, to the dismay and frustration of the other group. (p. 85)

The glaring lesson to be learned from Professor Sherif (which Jews have seemingly failed to learn throughout millennia) is that positive human interaction is based on commonalities and similarities and where possible (especially in areas as highly sensitive as religion) differences should be kept to a bare minimum. The non-Jewish world throughout history has understood this reality and has, in consequence, allowed itself to be fully integrated into the majority or ruling culture. The Jews, in contrast, have failed to learn what seems so obvious to everyone else that when you are not forced to be distinct or separate, don't.

The Jewish threat was that, historically, Jews were unwilling to call any man or deity (except their own), G-d.

They were not willing to fully accept any ruling power whose acceptance meant the abandonment of their perceived incorporeal, indivisible, omniscient, omnipresent, and universal G-d. In essence, the psychological intimidating characteristic of the Jew which has been felt throughout four millennia seems to have been, as Josephus put it, the Jewish "passion for liberty that is almost unconquerable, since they are convinced that G-d alone is their leader and master" (Perlmutter, 1982). It appears that it was this distinctive, competitive Jewish threat which was the primary cause of anti-Jewish hostility. In addition, it has not been any random variation of Jews throughout history who have consistently presented this competitive threat, but rather, only one group (i.e., Oral Law Judaism) which has been the only Jewish group to have stubbornly survived. Therefore, it seemed logical in the present study to designate Oral Law Judaism as a true representation of Judaism.

One way to test empirically the above historical analysis was to locate a group whose legitimacy appears psychologically threatened by present-day Oral Law Judaism (i.e., Orthodox Judaism) and to see if this movement (i.e., the leaders) has fostered or is fostering (whether implicitly or explicitly) the severance of the Jewish people from the (1) Land, (2) the Law, or (3) an attempt to destroy the Jewish collective body, each strategy by itself or in combination.

Ironically, two present day Jewish groups (i.e.,

Reform and Conservative Judaism) were depicted as competing with Oral Law Judaism for the Jewish people's allegiance. It was this competitive factor which placed these groups conceptually on par with other anti-Jewish (anti-Jewish in the sense that an attack was made on, at least, one of the three integral Jewish components) groups throughout history. The competitive nature of these Jewish groups was not obvious, for their claim at their inception was not to aggressively displace Oral Law Judaism (as other anti-Jewish movements throughout history have declared) but rather to provide for the Jewish people, particularly in America, a viable and adaptable modern type of Judaism. Their objective was ostensibly not to usurp traditional Judaism, but rather to provide a positive spiritual experience for Twentieth Century American Jewry who could "obviously" not adapt Oral Law Judaism to the American scene. Therefore, there was superficially no conflict of interests and no real competition, for these modern movements were allegedly not competing with Oral Law Judaism but rather attempting to save those millions of Jews who without a viable alternative would have left Judaism completely.

According to their respective platforms, these movements could not be portrayed as competitive Jewish movements whose goals conflicted with Oral Law Judaism. Rather (according to their claims) they were not competitive but complementary. Although this is what they promulgated, the dubious

nature of their assertions was outlined at the end of Chapter I. In brief, the three arguments which seem to seriously challenge the sincerity of their assertions were:

(1) Historically in contradiction to their claim of unadaptability (as delineated throughout Chapter I) the only Jewish movement to ever adapt to all kinds of societies throughout history was the same "unadaptable" Oral Law tradition. Therefore, either the Reform and Conservative leaders were ignorant of Jewish history, or else the claim was an excuse used to favorably rationalize the Jewish people's break with tradition.

(2) Even if we do credit the Reform and Conservative early leaders with an abysmal ignorance of Jewish history, the question still needed to be asked is how much of an effort was made, and how many generations of Jews in America had passed before these leaders concluded that traditional Oral Law Judaism was unadaptable? In essence, the answer to both questions is nil. The attempt to adapt Oral Law Judaism to the lifestyle of America was never really given a chance by the leaders of these movements. This was seen by the fact that first generation-born American Jews, who in the vast majority of cases started raising families of their own immediately preceding and following World War II, followed faithfully, en masse, the Reform and Conservative leaders' religious assertions. This was the first generation of Jews in America who had the opportunity to test Oral Law Judaism's

resilience (German Jews who had arrived earlier came, already, with a Reform orientation), but instead accepted their mentors' ahistorical and non-empirical assertions.

(3) The denial of the divine origin of the Oral Law (and to a lesser extent the Written Law) implies: (a) that the redactors of the Talmud lied (whether knowingly or unknowingly) when they declared that the Oral Law was given by G-d, and that many places in the Pentateuch where it states that G-d communicated with the Jewish people, Moses, etc., is a canard, and (b) that the millions of innocent Jews who have been brutally massacred throughout history only because they believed in the divinity of the Oral and Written laws, terribly erred for themselves and posterity. It was the present author's belief that Reform and Conservative Judaism did not need to deviate so substantively from tradition if their real objective was only to prevent American Jewry from totally assimilating. However, in order to intentionally sever the Jews' traditional relationship to the Oral Law this ideological strategy was sorely needed.

The first empirical analysis was to pit the Reform and Conservative claims against the arguments presented above. Very simply if their assertions are accurate, then the present young adult generation of American-born Jews (i.e., ages 21 to 40) should support their claim. In essence, the young adult generation of American-born Orthodox Jews should have significantly abandoned this "outmoded" and "un-

adaptable" form of Judaism. In contrast, following from the three arguments above, Oral Law Judaism may very well be maintaining itself. In addition, if these two Jewish movements are truly complementary forms of Judaism only interested in saving Jews who seemingly cannot adapt Orthodoxy to the American scene, then they themselves should be growing (or at least maintaining themselves). In contrast, according to the present theoretical analysis, if these movements are not complementary, but rather competing for Jewish supremacy in which their original objective was more to wean Jews from the Oral Law than to create something spiritually positive, then their movements should have had difficulty in maintaining themselves (i.e., lack of real spirituality should produce a lack of commitment among their Jewish constituencies).

Obviously the mere finding that Oral Law Judaism has maintained itself over the last generation is not conclusive proof that the other movements had ulterior motives when declaring the unadaptability of Oral Law Judaism (which, in effect, created a need for a more "adaptable" form of Judaism). However, the present hypothesized outcome taken into conjunction with the above three arguments (expressed more fully in Chapter I) would seem to support the theory, which posits the Reform and Conservative movements as competing and not complementary forms of Judaism. In contrast, results substantially corroborating their claim as to the unadaptability of Oral Law Judaism would significantly challenge

the present theoretical analysis. In addition, the extent of the Reform and Conservative's accretion or diminution over the last generation is admittedly inconclusive in and of itself, but when combined with the above arguments and data, may help to more fully support or refute the present theoretical analysis.

Before discussing the present results, which theoretically pertain to the primary cause of anti-Jewish hostility, it is important to mention the discontinuity which exists between the study's theory and the methodology used to examine the theory. According to the theory the primary impetus of anti-Jewish hostility is attributed to the leaders of various movements, who, historically have been "threatened" by Jewish distinctiveness and have attacked accordingly. However, the present study does not directly measure leaders' attitudes and behavior, but rather knowledge, attitudes, and behavior of followers, which are interpreted as indirectly representing the attitudes and behavior of their leaders. This gap between theory and methodology attenuates the confirmatory strength of the present study, for it does not rule out alternative conceptual analyses which will be discussed below.

According to the results, Oral Law Judaism in Chicago seems to have maintained itself over the last generation, and when birthrate is taken into consideration has grown by 13 percent. In contrast, Reform and Conservative constituencies in Chicago have decreased approximately 68 percent,

and 57 percent respectively, over the last generation. The results fail to refute the present theory and, in effect, lend support to the theory that Reform and Conservative Judaism are competing forms of Judaism and could therefore, in the present context, be described as competitive religious movements whose thrust should be to uproot one or more of the three distinctly Jewish components, in an attempt to firmly establish their own legitimacy.

The above results in conjunction with the above three arguments seem to imply that the original objectives of Reform and Conservative Judaism were more of a competitive rather than complementary nature. Therefore, according to the present theoretical analysis, these movements should be psychologically pressured to attack and uproot the essence of traditional Judaism as represented by (1) the Jewish relationship to the Land, (2) the Jewish relationship to the Torah, and/or (3) the Jewish collective body. The Reform and Conservative movements would logically not strike out against the Jewish collective body (for they would be reducing their own numbers in the process), but by significantly severing the people's relationship to the Land and/or to the Torah would be substantially reducing the historical Jewish "threat."

Notwithstanding the Reform and Conservative movements' claim concerning their indissoluble relationship to the Land of Israel, the present analysis expected to find a significantly weaker relationship among adherents of Reform and

Conservative Judaism than among their Oral Law counterparts. Results implied, as hypothesized, that the Reform and Conservative movements are failing in their "attempt" to foster a strong and tangible relationship between their constituencies and the Land of Israel. Not only was the Orthodox group substantially more attached to the Land, but these two groups failed to significantly differentiate themselves from Jews who are not affiliated with any synagogue or temple.

In light of the large discrepancy between what the Reform and Conservative movements officially say and what they have accomplished (i.e., in light of the discrepancy between themselves and Orthodoxy in conjunction with the insignificant differences recorded between themselves and the Non-Affiliated group), it appears that their failure is more systematic than fortuitous. When these results are combined with the above three arguments (which seriously question their original sincerity), and in conjunction with the dissertation's historical analysis which predicted these results on an a priori basis, a case can be made that these two movements (like other anti-Jewish movements throughout history) have attempted (whether consciously or unconsciously) to attenuate the historical relationship between the Jewish people and the Jewish land in light of this relationship's intimidating characteristic.

A solid Jewish education is another area where the official platforms of all three Jewish movements positively

converge. Officially, they all consider a strong fundamental Jewish education highly important. Although formally they encourage Jewish education, according to the present theory, this should not be realized in practice. In short, the results did demonstrate a disastrous failure on the part of the Reform and Conservative movements to educate their constituencies on the basics of Judaism. In these analyses there was an extremely large discrepancy in scores between the Orthodox group and the other three. Although, statistically speaking, there appeared to be a significant difference between the Conservative and Non-Affiliated group, this difference (mean scores of .33 and .23 respectively) on a practical level was trivial. For example, their mean scores imply that the Conservative group received an average of approximately three items (per 10-item scale) correct while the Non-Affiliated group averaged approximately two items correct. In real terms, the abysmal ignorance reflected in the scores of the three groups on the Elementary Jewish Knowledge Scale is substantially more revealing (based on the present theory) than the trivial one-answer difference between the Conservative and Non-Affiliated groups. This point is further corroborated by the fact that the Reform Group (mean = .28) failed to differentiate itself from either the Conservative or Non-Affiliated group. According to the present theoretical analysis this failure may be seen as a result of attempting to displace the traditional Jewish spirit,

which historically, has been based on knowledge of the Written and Oral Law.

In brief, the relationship between non-Jewish anti-Jewish movements and the present hypothesized Jewish anti-Jewish movements is not readily apparent. However, it is the opinion of the author that once this surface dissimilarity is broken down, the underlying dynamics appear quite comparable. As hypothesized, the first stage posits a competitive conflict which makes it virtually impossible for the two groups to live ideologically in harmony. The second stage is to create lies (see the three arguments above which call into question the claims of Reform and Conservative Judaism) which would legitimize the activity of uprooting the traditional Jewish presence. And the third and final stage is to motivate the masses (whether non-Jewish or Jewish) at a psychologically and/or socially vulnerable period in history.

Limitations of the Above Analyses

The first limitation of the above analyses which would affect all three variables (i.e., [1] intergroup movement, [2] relationship to the Land, and [3] basic Jewish knowledge) is the restriction in population from which the sample was selected. The sample was drawn from a Jewish population living in Chicago proper, who have commonly Jewish names, and who are listed in the Chicago telephone book.

The last two restrictions (i.e., common Jewish names and being listed in telephone book) do not appear to be too severe for most (metropolitan or national) polls of Jewish populations are equally or more circumscribed than the present population.

However, selecting individuals exclusively from Chicago proper presents two major problems. (1) Suburban Jews might be significantly different from city Jews on the above variables, and (2) Jews living in New York or conversely in small cities and towns throughout the United States may be distinctly different from those in the Chicago area. Although it does not seem logical to postulate that suburban Reform and/or Conservative Jews are different from their city counterparts concerning their relationship to the Land of Israel or to the Torah, it is possible that suburban Jews identify more with the Reform and Conservative movements (as opposed to being Non-Affiliated or Orthodox) than do Jews in the city. The reason is that suburbia usually attracts families with children as opposed to single individuals. Many Jewish parents (even today) like to give their children some sort of religious identification and in many cases the child's religious education, perforce, creates a temporary bond between parents and the educational institution (i.e., the synagogue or temple). In addition, most synagogues in suburbia are not Orthodox (primarily because

of the distances involved in driving on the Sabbath which Orthodoxy prohibits).

Correspondingly, Jews living in other geographical areas of the United States (other than the Midwest) may have had different religious experiences than have Jews in Chicago. Jewish experiences in the New York area where there are over two million Jews, or the Jewish "experience" in the south or west (excluding Florida and California) where there are relatively few Jews, may be quite different than those experienced by Chicago Jews who are surrounded by a substantial number of other coreligionists, but who still represent a trivial proportion of the total population. These demographic differences may be reflected on the above variables, but the fact that Chicago does represent a balance between large concentrated areas of Jews and its opposite appears to make Chicago an ideal place to sample from, if resources and time are limited (as they were in the present study).

A further limitation of the above analyses is that the variables of Relationship to the Land could have been more thoroughly explored. One tangible expression of Jews' relationship to the Land of Israel which was not investigated was the amount of money given or invested in Israel. The reason this variable was not investigated was that the author felt that the greater proportion of investment or charity, per income, obviously favored Orthodoxy, and was therefore

a foregone conclusion. Afterwards he discovered that many Reform and Conservative Jews do not share the same opinion. For example, Reform and Conservative adherents cite figures from large Jewish organizations (e.g., J.U.F.) which show that the vast majority of money is donated by non-Orthodox Jews. However, these individuals forget that (1) there are many times more non-Orthodox Jews in Chicago than there are Orthodox, (2) the wealth is primarily in the hands of the non-Orthodox, and (3) many Orthodox households give directly to Torah institutions and the poor in Israel, which these large Jewish organizations tend, for the most part, to ignore.

Another limitation of the above analyses concerns the Jewish Knowledge Scale. This scale was constructed by Orthodox rabbis and teachers, and it is possible (though improbable) that a fundamental Jewish knowledge scale when constructed by Reform or Conservative rabbis or teachers would produce significantly different results than those obtained in the present study.

The final limitation of the above analysis concerns the time frame or cross sectional nature of the study. According to the present analysis it is difficult to discern whether the vast majority of original adherents to Reform and Conservative Judaism (i.e., anywhere between 30 to 60 years ago) were less committed to the Land and/or to basic Jewish knowledge than were their Orthodox counterparts, or whether the discrepancy found in the present study is really

(as hypothesized) a function of the movements themselves. If archival data of this type were present the above dilemma would be resolved, but given that these types of data cannot be obtained, a longitudinal study measuring the above variables on new members of the three movements over a period of several years, would apparently help to resolve the above problem. A major difficulty here may be to obtain a sizable sample of newly involved Reform and Conservative constituents who will remain affiliated for more than just a few years (in the present study these groups do not seem to be attracting many new members). In addition, it is generally accepted today that the differences in overall Jewish religious perspective between the adherents of all three movements some 40 years ago, was considerably less polarized than it is today. Therefore, any longitudinal study initiated today may be of little help in interpreting the results obtained in the present study.

Alternative Interpretations

The most obvious interpretation of the above results is, plainly speaking, that the Reform and Conservative movements have just failed. Not that they had any original intention of competing with or displacing Oral Law Judaism, but rather that their purely "complementary" nature proved unsuccessful. Without the above historical analysis and a priori predictions following therefrom, together with the

above three arguments which make their original claims highly suspect, in conjunction with the present results which depict a catastrophic failing on the part of both Reform and Conservative Judaism, the innocuous claim of "just failing" could be accepted. However, when the above is taken into consideration the dissertation's theoretical analysis appears to be the more valid of the two interpretations.

Another alternative interpretation asks; why would a significant difference between Oral Law Judaism and the other American Jewish movements, concerning Jewish education and the Land of Israel, imply that these movements have deliberately attempted to uproot these traditional Jewish components? Is it not possible that the Jews who have flocked to these movements have different lifestyles, different attitudes, and different experiences than their Oral Law counterparts, and that it is these very differences among group adherents, which makes for differences concerning the above core components and not necessarily the movements themselves? In response, it may be argued that most social-psychological differences seen today between the groups are perfectly confounded with group classification. In other words, the basic factor differentiating Oral Law adherents from others, on various social-psychological indices, may be considered their very allegiance to the Oral Law tradition. Judaism in its traditional (Oral Law) form is not merely a system of beliefs and rituals, but rather an elaborate societal blueprint which

carefully delineates the everyday pragmatic laws by which Jews historically have patterned their behavior and attitudes on both the individual and collective levels. Therefore in the present comparison, most behavioral-attitudinal differences presently existing between Oral Law adherents and others may be considered attributed to the ideological and legislative differences among the movements rather than differences in the people themselves. Correspondingly, when the groups' official platforms and ideologies do converge on various Jewish issues (e.g., Jewish education and the Jewish relationship to the Land of Israel) no significant discrepancy among groups should logically be found.

In essence, the present data are inconclusive concerning whether it was the movements themselves which affected the present findings, or whether it was the original differences in commitment among the various types of adherents. In other words, was it the lack of Jewish commitment (which should have been general, taking into account all aspects of Jewish life) among the different constituencies, or was it primarily the Reform and Conservative movements themselves who promoted this lack of religious commitment? If Reform and Conservative Judaism have, indeed, been the primary agents affecting religious commitment (or better put, lack of it), then their adherents' lack of elementary Jewish knowledge and tangible relationship to the Land should

be seriously questioned in light of their official platforms which substantively advocate both activities.

In truth, the real cause probably lies somewhere in-between the two arguments, and therefore the most appropriate question would not be if the movements themselves have produced a lack of commitment among their constituencies, but rather; how much of this lack of commitment can be attributed to the movements, and how much to the original differences among the adherents themselves? However, it should be emphasized again that in light of the historical analysis presented on Chapter I with its a priori hypotheses following therefrom, together with the above three arguments (which cast the Reform and Conservative movements in a more competitive than complementary light) in conjunction with the present data, the present theoretical claim that Reform and Conservative Judaism have unofficially attempted to sever the Jewish people's relationship to the Land and to the Torah should not be taken lightly.

A further interpretation of the above results, specifically concerning the variables of Relationship to the Land, and Fundamental Jewish Knowledge, has to do with these variables inherent relationship to the three movements. It may be argued that since adherence to the Oral Law means adherence, by definition, to the Torah and to the Land of Israel, then comparing these apparently inherent relationships with the same relationships which are seemingly not inherent among

other groups would, by definition, produce group differences.

In response, the author believes that the relationships between Reform and Conservative Jews with the above two variables should be no less "inherent" than that of their Oral Law counterparts for two major reasons. (1) Reform and Conservative Judaism did not spring out of a vacuum but rather (as they rightly declare) were outgrowths of traditional (Oral Law) Judaism which have the same history, Bible, and the same Talmud as their Oral Law kin. The only things not inherently Oral-Law in these movements is where they themselves decided to deviate (e.g., disbelief in the divinity of the Oral Law and abrogation of many Laws which they felt were outmoded), but in areas where they officially did not deviate (e.g., relationship to the Land and, fundamental Jewish education), these areas should be considered as inherently Jewish to them as they are to Orthodoxy. (2) Even if we could say that Reform and Conservative Judaism are distinctly different representations of Jewish spirituality, the fact that their official platforms call for a strong relationship to the Land of Israel and basic Jewish knowledge, would seem to make these variables as inherent for them, as does the Orthodox platform for its adherents.

Two examples of historical groups to support this second point, are the Kutheans and Christians. The Kutheans, better known as the Samaritans came from Assyria and after the expulsion of the 10 tribes (approximately 722 B.C.E.)

occupied the vacant cities in the northern part of Israel, and became half assimilated with the remaining native Israelites. Although they worshipped the G-d of Israel and kept many of the commandments they also clung to their idols (Isaacs, 1975). It is about these very people which the Talmud (Gittin, 10A) states "Whatever commandments the Kutheans kept (i.e., officially observed) they kept more diligently than the Israelis themselves." (Translation mine)

Christianity is another case in point where according to the above contention it may be argued, that being that Christianity is a direct offshoot from Oral Law Judaism, and being that the precepts of love, compassion, and humility were originally Oral Law concepts, only later adopted by the Christian faith, then Oral Law adherents should be significantly more loving, compassionate, and humble than Christians because these concepts were originally and therefore inherently Oral Law commandments. Without belaboring the issue it is assumed that many intelligent people would argue vociferously against the above contention. Accordingly, the argument that the relationship to the Land and to the Torah is more inherent in Orthodox Judaism (in light of their established precedent in time) than they are to Reform and Conservative Judaism is seriously rebutted by the above two examples.

The final alternative interpretation of the present data (which superficially seems to refute the entire theoretic-

cal analysis concerning the Reform and Conservative movements) contends that the fact that Reform and Conservative Judaism are not drawing substantial numbers away from the Orthodox movement and vice versa implies that these movements are truly complementary. Notwithstanding a more detailed rebuttal of this argument (which follows immediately) it should be noted, that according to this logic the Non-Affiliated group is the most competitive (and therefore, potentially anti-Jewish) movement of them all!

There appears to be little doubt that if Reform and Conservative Judaism are indeed competitive movements, that they would seriously attempt to attract Oral Law adherents. However, their success or failure in such a venture is irrespective of their competitive or complementary nature. In short, they may be attempting to attract current Oral Law adherents, but are failing in the process. Hence, their competitive or complementary nature must be investigated according to the parameters extant (as in the present analysis where their claims and constituencies could be examined) and not according to hypotheticals of what would have happened, if they would have succeeded.

Conversely, the fact that Orthodox Jewry is not attracting large numbers from the other three groups (although over 10 percent of both the Non-Affiliated and Conservative group have come over to Orthodoxy within the last generation) says little concerning the present theoretical analysis.

Although in the present analysis Reform and Conservative Judaism are depicted as ideologically threatened by Orthodoxy, Orthodoxy is not seen as threatened by either movement as was the case throughout history. Orthodox Judaism would certainly like to see all Jews observing the Oral Law, but not because it is psychologically pressured to delegitimize the other movements. Oral Law Judaism's self worth or legitimacy has never been and is not currently psychologically threatened by other Jewish movements, and therefore Orthodoxy's competitive or complementary nature was never considered in the present dissertation a theoretical issue.

Significance of the Findings

Besides helping to support the present theory concerning the primary origins and common processes of anti-Jewish hostility throughout history, the above findings may also provide pragmatic benefit in the following five ways. Stated briefly, starting from the more seemingly trivial and proceeding to the more important the five perceived benefits are:

1. To Refute Arab Propaganda: One of the many propaganda themes circulated by Arabs throughout the world is that Zionism or the resettlement of the Jewish people in the Middle East has nothing to do with Judaism, but is rather an outgrowth of secular European imperialism. Notwithstanding the non-reality represented in the above contention based

on the activities of modern Zionism since 1880 in conjunction with historical Judaism, the present study adds an extra dimension by showing clearly that the concept of Zionism (i.e., the living and being in Zion, a name used by the Prophets some 2,700 years ago in reference to the Land of Israel and/or Jerusalem) in Chicago, at least, is an almost exclusively Oral-Law religious concept and phenomenon far removed from secular European imperialism.

2. To Foster a Sense of Historical Ethics: For over three thousand years, literally millions of Jews have been pillaged, raped, tortured, and mercilessly massacred because they would not renounce their Jewish nationalism or Torah, and yet according to the present findings (and extrapolating to the entire United States) literally millions of Jews have significantly relinquished both their nationalism and Torah within one (at maximum two) generations in the name of Judaism itself! The present study indicates that Jews in America have been led into abandoning their rich cultural and spiritual heritage without being fully cognizant of their abandonment. Jews (like all other groups) deserve the right for their own sake, and for the sake of their ancestors to con-
sciously choose to abandon their traditions without being implicitly pressured into doing so while unaware of what is truly transpiring (i.e., by remaining ignorant of Judaism and believing, without doubt, in the legitimacy of the Reform

and Conservative movements, the Jewish masses are perforce prevented from making any well thought out decision regarding their abandonment of traditional Judaism).

3. To Protect Young and Naive Spiritual-Seeking Jews:

An inordinate amount of young American Jews (i.e., many times over their proportion in the general American population) who had reached adolescence in the 1960s and 70s have been recruited over the last twenty years into religious cults such as the Moonies, Hare Krishna, or imported to America eastern religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism in their search for spirituality (whether the cult or religion is intellectually gratifying is immaterial) (Fisch, 1984). These Jewish youth seeking sincere religious experiences are not products of Orthodoxy, but rather (in the vast majority of cases) from families who have had some sort of affiliation with the Reform or Conservative movements (Fisch, 1984). All the while Reform and Conservative Judaism are depicted as legitimate forms of true Judaism these youth will never return to their indigenous culture, and other Jewish youth will inevitably follow their lead. Their sincere response is simply "We know all about Judaism (i.e., Reform and Conservative) for we grew up in it and found it devoid of any true meaning, and therefore we are looking elsewhere." Without exposing Reform and Conservative Judaism for what they appear to be according to the present study's historical

and empirical analyses, many other Jewish youth will probably become emotionally entangled in these and other various religious cults. (Although the adoption of Hinduism or Buddhism would seem as legitimate as converting to any established age-old religion, the fact is that when these religions are imported to America by various Hindu Gurus or Zen Buddhists they take on a cult-like appearance which tends to disorient young American Jews and create serious familial problems [Fisch, 1984].)

4. To Attenuate Jewish Suffering: According to the historical analysis in Chapter I the primary factor responsible for anti-Jewish hostility is the Jewish people's self-proclaimed distinctiveness. This distinctiveness can be looked at as a blessing or as a curse, but concerning Reform and Conservative Judaism can only be regarded as a curse. Jewish distinctiveness can have its origins in only one of two ways. Either G-d wants the Jewish people to remain distinct and therefore, perforce, they will continue to remain distinct, or else this distinctiveness is a man-made artifact obstinately displayed by the Jewish people which has no real historical precedent or imitation thereafter.

If the latter is true, then all Jewish people holding on presumptuously to their Jewish identity, in one manner or form, have indirectly generated their own suffering and the suffering of succeeding generations. Conversely, if the

former is true then we need only look at the blessings and curses outlined in two books of the Bible (i.e., Leviticus and Deuteronomy). In these Biblical passages it states very clearly that when Jews collectively are acting according to the Law they will be blessed, and cursed when they are not.

Reform and Conservative adherents do little of what is required of them according to Jewish Law (this fact is widely known, and was corroborated in the present study when questions of religious observance were asked). Therefore, without pulling punches, the Reform and Conservative leaders and adherents could be literally described (whatever the reason may be for Jewish distinctiveness) as being the primary agents of their own suffering. In other words, whichever position one takes, Reform and Conservative Jews are responsible for their own suffering. If Judaism is a man-made phenomenon, then by obstinately retaining their Jewish identity instead of completely assimilating like most other national and religious groups (who had the opportunity) have done throughout history, their obstinance (and arguably arrogance) has, and probably will, continue to cause them great suffering. Inversely, if the Torah is accurate they are also (as is clear from the Bible) sowing the seeds of affliction (this point will be more fully elaborated on in the last Section of the present chapter).

5. To Promote Universal Peace and Brotherhood: Tra-

ditional Judaism may have pragmatic and workable answers for world peace, but as long as Reform and Conservative Judaism are allowed to dominate American Jewry these insights, prophecies, and knowledge will probably never reach a large mass audience. For instance, if the world knew (or at least the American public) the vivid descriptions of what the world will be like before the coming of the Messiah according to the Jewish Prophets, the Talmud, and the Zohar (i.e., Jewish mysticism) and its unusual correspondence with present-day happenings, the entire world (according to Jewish theology) may be spared untold grief and suffering if the proper preventive measures are taken accordingly.

Although the above may appear to many as hollow platitudes for other groups, as well, claim similar benefits if everyone would adopt their brand of religion or ideology, there are, at least, two substantive differences between traditional Jewish claims and others. (1) Traditional Judaism, in contrast to most other major national or international movements, does not demand or even suggest that the world's population turn Jewish, but rather that the Jewish people follow their many Laws in order that the peoples of the world may reap the benefits. (2) Jewish prophecy via many various prophets has concretely materialized over a period of approximately 1,000 years (our present knowledge comes from recorded history accepted by most of the "civilized" world today, and the historical validity of these records has been cor-

roborated by literally hundreds of archaeological finds over the last century). No other movement can compete with the above assertions. Therefore in light of Judaism's unusually accurate prophetic track record (which is theologically based on G-d's active presence in the world), prophecies which seem to describe the present era should not be taken lightly.

The present author is not denying the fact that wonderful values can be learned from all religions, but rather that if traditional Jewish theology goes tangibly beyond the worldly (as its accurate prophesy seems to indicate) then its predictions and advice concerning the present era demands further scrutiny.

Direction for Future Investigation

The direction for future investigation corresponds to the present study's limitations which are:

1. Suburban as well as city dwellers should be sampled.
2. Other areas of the country should be sampled.
3. The variable "Amount of Money Invested or Donated to the Land of Israel" and others (e.g., investment of time) should be included in examining the Jews' relationship to the Land.
4. Reform and Conservative leaders should be recruited in the development of a "Fundamental Jewish Knowledge Scale."
5. A longitudinal study spanning several years should be undertaken to measure the above variables in relation to the movements' new members. In doing so, the experimenter should effectively obtain a base

rate for all participants (something missing in the present analysis).

6. To more conclusively determine whether the Reform and Conservative movements are significantly directing Jewish commitment among their constituencies, or if their constituencies' original commitment remains primarily unchanged. To accomplish this, other variables which the Reform and Conservative movements officially advocate, and which theoretically would not be considered psychologically threatening should be investigated. If there were no differences between these groups and Orthodoxy, or if substantial differences were found between them and the Non-Affiliated [in conjunction with the present findings which show the groups differing on what they should (i.e., religious observance)] the claim that these movements are significantly effecting the present results would be greatly enhanced.

and,

7. Although brief comparisons between Judaism and other social movements were made sporadically throughout Chapter I, a more thorough investigation via archival and/or contemporary research on group ideology and conflict would be appropriate. It appears highly relevant to the historical analysis in Chapter I to compare and contrast (in a more complete manner) other social movements, their ideologies, their activities, their history, and their sources of conflict (both internal and external) with Judaism.

Chapter II Conclusions

The historical analysis in Chapter I attempted to explain the root cause of anti-Jewish hostility but it failed to explain why the masses have so vehemently attacked the Jews throughout millennia. In Chapter II it was theorized that the savage attacks of the masses were primarily motivated by constant propagation of misinformation and slander about Jews and Judaism. The primary catalyst remained the distinctive Jewish threat but the dissemination of vile slander

was required in order to drive the masses into action. The defamation of Jews and Judaism was then postulated as the secondary cause of anti-Jewish hostility which, historically, has been manipulated to foster Jew-hatred on a mass scale. It was theorized that without the assistance of the common individual, anti-Jewish hostility would have remained more a potential threat than an actuality.

Although the Western world would like to believe that vile propaganda against Jews is a thing of the past, a new wave of virulent propaganda is again today directed against the Jews. Today the aspersions are directed against the Jews of Israel, a group depicted by Communist and Arab-Muslim propagandists alike, as brutally subduing and attempting to eradicate an entire "Arab-Palestinian nation."

Arab propaganda directed against the Jewish state has achieved a new level of sophistication and credibility in the West today. It was the opinion of the author in Chapter II that accusations and counter arguments by pro-Arab and pro-Israel factions respectively are, in the long run, only to Israel's detriment. The reason being, that it creates an image of mutual culpability that will become increasingly more difficult to change as time goes on. This symmetry of culpability in the context of a virtually inexhaustible supply of Arab petrodollars, continued Western dependency on Arab oil, and the threat of World War III erupting from tension in the Middle East favors the Communist-Arab strategy which

aims to seriously weaken the relationship between America and Israel. It was postulated (at the end of Chapter II) that unless pro-Israel advocates begin to offensively initiate research, and programs following therefrom, to effectively disseminate the pro-Jewish version of the conflict, Israel may find itself isolated among nations in the not too distant future. The following analyses and conclusions were aimed specifically at providing research, which would help prevent the above hypothetical consequences from occurring.

Although according to the historical analysis in Chapter I which depicted the attack on Jewish nationalism as an integral aspect of anti-Jewish hostility, a more empirical measure which would correlate attitudes towards Jews with attitudes towards the Jewish state was deemed necessary. In essence, if attitudes towards Jews were not related to attitudes towards Israel the above theory which postulates the integral relationship between the two would be considered by some, equivocal at best. Inversely, if a relationship is detected then reactions and activity towards Israel cannot be portrayed as reactions toward just another political entity, but rather towards something specifically Jewish in nature.

The results ($r = .57$) supported the hypothesis that attitudes towards Israel are a characteristically Jewish phenomenon, where the state of Israel and American Jews are (in the minds of the American public) closely intertwined.

In addition, the correlates of both attitude scales considerably converged. For example, of the fifteen major variables examined in the present study six were significantly related (i.e., $p < .005$) to both scales, six were found unrelated to either scale, and only three proved to be related to one of the attitude scales without being significantly related to the other. The significance of this finding appears two-fold: (1) In attempting to counter anti-Israeli propaganda the presentation of historical facts concerning the conflict is incomplete without a concomitant elucidation of historical anti-Jewish slander. Without the later presentation the former will probably be held suspect, at best, or considered fraudulent propaganda at worst.

(2) The American government's and/or the American public's hypothetical antagonism towards Israel (most probably created by a seemingly objective news media) could have dire consequences for American Jews. The relationship appears strong enough to suggest that a future oil embargo or protracted tension involving the killing or kidnapping of non-Jewish Americans by Arab terrorists may have the unwarranted effect of creating heightened animosity against American Jews in general.

Knowledge and Perception of Israel and the Mideast Conflict

A second objective following from Chapter II was to measure the American public's general perception of the state

of Israel, their general knowledge of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and to correlate the two. It was reasoned, that in order to educate the public, it is first necessary to recognize what people do and do not know. The author found that much money is allocated yearly by Jewish organizations to ascertain the public's perception of Israel, but was unable to find one study which measured the public's level of knowledge concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In light of the news media's seemingly anti-Israeli stance (which is usually rationalized as an evenhandedness, irrespective of who the murderer and who the victim are) which was discussed in Chapter II (and will be elaborated below) the author expected to find that the American public knows little concerning several fundamental and crucial Middle East issues. The results, based on responses to the 8-Item Mideast Knowledge Scale, supported this hypothesis and showed that despite the barrage of Mideast news coverage over the last several years, very little is actually known about the area and the history of the conflict.

An area (as discussed above) where Jewish organizations funnel much money into, is the area of polling public opinion concerning Israel. For instance, over the last ten years the Gallup Poll has been commissioned to gauge the American public's sympathy for Israel as opposed to their sympathy for the Arabs. Consistently, over the last ten years, when the public is asked "In the Middle East situation,

are your sympathies more with Israel or the Arab nations?" the public has sided four to seven times more with Israel than with the Arabs (Kessler et al., 1984). These results correspond somewhat with the present study's findings (based on the Israel Attitude Scale) which found that 70 percent of the public appeared pro-Israel.

However, the above general findings are misleading and when the Israel Attitude Scale is factor analyzed two conceptually distinct factors become apparent. The first factor deals primarily with Arab-Communist propaganda themes currently being disseminated in the West (Goot & Rosen, 1983), and the second factor deals with themes particularly interesting to Jewish and Israeli advocates, but considerably ignored by Arab and Communist propagandists. For instance, Arab propaganda over the last three years has emphasized strongly (1) the Arab-Palestinian plight, (2) the "belligerent" Israeli war machine, (3) Israel's "brutality" in Lebanon, and (4) Israel's "imperialistic" tendencies (e.g., the military administration of the so-called West Bank). These themes are the very topics which the public seemed to have mixed feelings about (i.e., 50 percent positive and 50 percent negative). In contrast, when general topics which Arab propagandists rarely touch upon were asked, such as (1) Israeli people are hard working, (2) I respect the State of Israel, and (3) Israel must be military strong, then the public proved overwhelmingly pro-Israel (i.e., 87 percent positive, 13

percent negative). The above findings imply that the Arab-backed propaganda process is highly effective, possibly without even Israel or the American Jewish public consciously aware of it (i.e., its efficiency).

Correlation Between Knowledge and Attitudes

The complete Israel Attitude Scale was then correlated with the Mideast Knowledge Scale in which a significant correlation of .26 was generated. However, in light of the low reliability coefficient (.55) of the Mideast Knowledge Scale, the actual strength of the relationship is unclear. Therefore in order to more fully examine the relationship between knowledge and perceptions of Mideast happenings with attitudes towards Israel, individual items were examined separately. In the 8-item Mideast Knowledge Scale 4 items correlated significantly (i.e., $p < .005$) with the Israel Attitude Scale. Three of the items have a very important historical bent, while the fourth bespeaks total ignorance of Mideast happenings (which apparently plays right into the hands of Arab and Communist propagandists).

The first significantly correlated item ($r = .22$) was:

Palestine was an independent Palestinian State over the last 300 years until the creation of Israel. Is this true or false?

Seventy-three percent of all respondents failed to know that the correct answer to this question was False (if

they would have guessed, approximately 23% more would have scored correctly). Factually speaking, there never was a separate Arab state in Palestine and there never was a separate Palestinian Arab nation. Palestinian Arab nationalism was a post-World War I (British Mandate) phenomenon. Palestinian Arabs were never, at any time, autonomous. They never created their own self contained unit nor any semblance of separate political or social identity (Davis, 1984) until 1948 when masses of them left or fled the Land following the War of Independence, which they and their Arab brethren initiated. In essence, only after 1948 (primarily in the refugee camps) was a distinct Arab-Palestinian "national character" created.

In the author's opinion the above information is a mandatory prerequisite for properly understanding the Arab-Israeli conflict. To understand present day Palestinian "nationalism" in the context of a hostile response to an independent Jewish state, as opposed to a historical positive entity in and of itself, sheds light on the subject which should have (and according to the correlation apparently does have) far-reaching ramifications. On an ethical level, this difference in understanding should make a substantive difference regarding whether to support Israel's claim for secure defensible borders, or Arab claims for a second Palestinian state (Jordan being the first).

The second significantly correlated item ($r = .24$) was:

From the time many Jews started arriving in Palestine in the late 1800s until the creation of Israel in 1948, thousands of Arabs were kicked out of the land by the Jewish settlers. Is this true or false?

Sixty-eight percent of the respondents failed to know that the correct answer was false. Not only were Arabs not kicked out of the land but according to British census figures [which failed to take into account the myriad of Arabs who with the help of the British succeeded in entering the land illegally (Peters, 1984)], the Arab population in Palestine during the British mandate period rose by 75.2% as compared with a 25% increase in relatively fecund Egypt. Most importantly, the Arab increase was greatest in areas of intensive Jewish development. For example, the Arab population in Haifa increased by 216%, and in Jaffa and Jerusalem by 134% and 90% respectively. In contrast, when there was an absence of Jewish development the Arab population increased substantially less. For example, in Nablus, Jenin, and Bethlehem increases over the same period of time were 42%, 40%, and 32% respectively (Gottheil, 1975; and Palestine Royal Commission Report, 1937).

The third item ($r = .24$) was:

Arab hostility towards Jews began with the start of Jewish nationalism in the late 1800s. Is this true or false?

Sixty-four percent of all participants responded incorrectly. In light of the historical relationship between

Arab-Muslims and Jews delineated in Chapter I, the participants inaccuracy requires little further corroborating evidence to poignantly depict the public's misperception of this highly important Mideast issue.

The fourth item discussed in which 52% of all respondents answered incorrectly (though more answered correctly on this item than on any other) was:

Israel's past actions have expanded its borders so that it now almost equals in size the area of all its Middle East enemies put together. Is this true or false?

Just taking into account Israel's more active and verbal enemies in the Middle East (e.g., Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran) the present land area ratio is more than 250 to 1, to the disadvantage of "imperialistic" Israel. The importance of this datum is that despite relentless and detailed American News coverage concerning almost every apparent Israeli blemish, the ignorance of facts, which apparently makes a substantive difference in the public's perception of Israel is abysmal.

In conjunction with and corroborating the above relationship between the public's misconceptions of historical Mideast issues and attitudes towards Israel were the relationships found between the four Arab-Palestinian Issue Items and the Israel Attitude Scale. These questions did not ask for knowledge, but rather for the respondent's opinion (which is presumably based on his/her perception of the situation) on various Arab-Palestinian Issues. All four questions

(though not phrased as questions on history) requested an opinion based perforce on a particular historical perspective. All four items, as expected, were significantly ($p < .005$) correlated with attitudes towards Israel. In other words, participants whose historical perceptions appeared accurate were significantly more pro-Israel than those whose perceptions were not.

The significance of the above findings which revealed the public's unawareness of broader issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict with its relationship to attitudes towards Israel, in conjunction with the apparent efficacy of Arab propaganda (which appears to be successfully molding perceptions of Israel) should not be taken lightly. Hypothetically speaking, in times of crisis this anti-Israel propaganda (which appears rather innocuous at present) could be the very foundation for rationalizing the abandonment of Israel, and possibly for even attacking American Jews. Unless Israeli, Jewish, or even non-Jewish organizations aggressively begin to educate the American public on basic Mideast issues, the above hypothesized consequences, following from an American crisis, are not too fantastic to actually occur.

Effects of the Media

Democracy in the United States is based on the faith that the individual's best thinking will emerge if he/she is adequately informed of the facts affecting the world around

him/her. "Informed people will be more likely to decide on reasonably practical, just, and humanitarian policies because in the long run it is in their interest and their countries to do so" (Cirino, 1974). Today's local, national, and international news is obtained by most people in the public marketplace of the mass media. It was estimated in 1974 that over 90 percent of the people in America depended exclusively for their information on magazines (e.g., Time, Newsweek), daily newspapers, radio, and television (Epstein, 1974). If the basic purpose of disseminating news information is, in the words of the Federal Communications Commission "the right of the public to be informed, rather than any right on the part of the government, any broadcasting license or any individual members of the public to broadcast his own particular views on the matter" (Epstein, 1974), then the transmitting of factual, unbiased, and historically accurate news is an indispensable element seemingly inherent in news coverage.

Unfortunately, concerning the media's coverage of Israel over the last three years, this idea has rarely been met. Much non-factual reporting and slanted opinions concerning the Israeli invasion into Lebanon was promulgated by the most respected and influential news media of today (Muravchik, 1983). In addition, it is the opinion of the present author that the American news media in general has focused the public's attention on non-representative scenarios

concerning the more general Arab-Israeli conflict. In light of at least the last forty years of history, sympathetic stereotypic scenarios of the Palestinian plight, and the "friendly moderate" Arab States taken together with the "belligerent" State of Israel appears to be a distortion of facts at best.

In light of the role slanderous material and misinformation has played historically in both the expression and cause (secondary in nature) of anti-Jewish hostility, the content and perceptual effects of four news periodicals were examined. Periodicals representing American, Arab, Jewish Secular, and Jewish Religious orientations were content analyzed with regards to their portrayal of the Arab-Palestinian refuge problem. Subsequently, the perceptual effect these seemingly different periodicals had on the Chicago public were compared.

It was predicted that the periodical representing mainstream America, together with the Arab periodical, given a latitude of variation, would be significantly less pro-Israel than the Jewish religious periodical. In addition, it was predicted that the Jewish secular magazine, depicted as indirectly echoing the ideology of Reform and Conservative Judaism, would show no less hostility towards Israel, nor less sympathy towards the Arab-Palestinians than its American counterpart.

Results supported the above predictions that the

Jewish religious periodical would present the Arab-Palestinian problem in a significantly more pro-Israel perspective than the other three magazines, and would likewise produce a significantly more pro-Israel cognitive effect than the others. The surprising and troubling (i.e., to pro-Israel advocates) aspect of this analysis is that, after content analysis, when the periodicals' paragraphs were categorized on a pro-Israel vs. pro-Arab scale regarding the Arab-Palestinian problem, it was found that the American and Jewish secular (which can be conceptualized as implicitly espousing the Reform and Conservative philosophy) magazines were respectively 89 and 85 percent pro-Arab. The Arab magazine proved 96 percent pro-Arab, and in contrast, the Jewish religious magazine was 92 percent pro-Israel.

The above results are very disturbing for people who believe in the Jewish version of the Arab-Palestinian problem, for they imply that during the times of international pressure and condemnation the general American and American-Jewish secular media will most probably take (whether voluntarily or not) pro-Arab positions. Potentially this could lead an economically independent Israel into doing what it did in 1973 (the Yom Kippur War). Although receiving intelligence reports in full that Egypt and Syria were about to attack, the Israeli government opted not to make a pre-emptive strike, for fear of world-wide condemnation (Sachar, 1980). This irresponsible move on the part of the Israeli government

cost the state of Israel thousands of Jewish lives.

In the opinion of the author, Israel's primary propaganda foe is not the Arabs (i.e., the explicit and avowed enemies of Israel can be dealt with) but rather the American and American-Jewish secular media. Their danger is that while displaying a guise of objectivity (and even pro-Jewish concern) these media, as depicted in the above analysis (which was investigated during a time of international crisis, seven months following the initial Lebanese invasion), appear latently pro-Arab. The peril involved is that the American public (both non-Jew and Jew alike) most probably accept their Middle-East scenarios in light of their seemingly objective (or pro-Israel) positions.

These results are representative of the news media in general during the first several months of Israel's invasion into Lebanon (Muravchik, 1983; Chafets, 1985). In the following discussion five reasons are given to explain the news media's seemingly latent anti-Israeli position. It is important to bear in mind that these reasons are not mutually exclusive.

1. Arab Monies: Granted the present author has little support for the present claim, but based on Arab pocketbook power in conjunction with their "special" relationship with many large American corporations, the possibility that the major American (not Jewish) news media are to some extent

cooperating with the Arabs appears not totally slanderous. For example, according to a 1974 report of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, the ARAMCO consortium (Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, and SOCAL) attempted to block America's emergency airlift to Israel in 1973 during exceedingly desperate times (in the beginning of the Yom Kippur War). During the same war these companies also cooperated closely with Saudi Arabia to deny oil and fuel to the United States Navy (Davis et al., 1982).

2. Latent Anti-Jewish Hostility: This latent hostility could derive from a myriad of sources. Some of the more salient sources could be jealousy of American-Jewish success, negative past experiences with Jews whether vicarious or real, and/or negative religious orientations concerning Jews and Judaism.

3. Intimidation: The physical intimidation constantly present while covering Mideast happenings in Arab lands was described in Chapter II.

4. The Liberal Media's Identification with the Left: Many Jews are aware that they are not the only group reviled and condemned, but fewer are aware that they are the only group against whom discrimination has been officially sanctioned by both the Far Right and Far Left (Perlmutter, 1982). An incisive essay, written by Jack Newfield a liberal journal-

ist in a Leftist periodical The Village Voice sums up the present-day American Leftist movement's relationship with Jews and Israel. It is this leftwing ideological thrust which the American and Jewish secular news media, in general, identify with:

The thing that troubles me about a part of the American left doesn't have an official sociological name. It's more than anti-Zionism, and different from traditional anti-Semitism. Its impact is often in omissions --the injustice not mentioned, the article not written, the petition not signed. It is often communicated in code words. But it is essentially a series of dual standards. It is a dual standard for the human rights of Jews in certain countries. It is a dual standard that questions Israel's right to exist by denying to Zionism the same moral legitimacy that is granted to every other expression of nationalism in the world. And it is an amnesia of conscience about the creation of Israel, and about the Holocaust, symbolized by Noam Chomsky writing an introduction to an insane, anti-Semitic book that alleges the Holocaust is a Zionist hoax. And by Jesse Jackson saying he is sick and tired of hearing about the Holocaust. (Perlmutter, 1982, p. 137).

5. Jewish Self-Hate: It is known that a large number of Jews hold very important and influential positions in the major American news media (Chafets, 1984). Therefore the question is asked "Why would Jews (both in the American and Jewish secular media) blatantly misrepresent their own people?" Answers to this perplexing question may possibly be found in Satre's (1976) Anti-Semite and Jew in which Satre presents a psychological exposition of the assimilated Jew. He writes:

He (the assimilated Jew) has allowed himself to be persuaded by the anti-Semites, he is the first victim of their propaganda. He admits with them that, if there

is a Jew, he must have the characteristics with which popular malevolence endows him, and his effort is to constitute himself a martyr, in the proper sense of the term, that is, to prove in his person that there are no Jews. (pp. 94-95)

They (assimilated Jews) have allowed themselves to be poisoned by the stereotype that others have of them, and they live in fear that their acts will correspond to this stereotype. . . . Thus many inauthentic Jews play at not being Jews. . . . (pp. 95-96)

The Jew who encounters another Jew in the drawing room of a Christian is a little like a Frenchman who meets a compatriot abroad. Yet the Frenchman derives pleasure from asserting to the world that he is a Frenchman, whereas the Jew, even if he were the only Israelite in a non-Jewish company, would force himself not to feel that he was a Jew. When there is another Jew with him, he feels himself endangered before the others, and he who a moment before could not even see the ethnic characteristics of his son or his nephew now looks at his coreligionist with the eyes of an anti-Semite, spying out with a mixture of fear and fatalism the objective signs of their common origin. . . .

He is so afraid of the discoveries the Christians are going to make that he hastens to give them warning, he becomes himself an anti-Semite by impatience and for the sake of others. Each Jewish trait he detects is like a dagger thrust, for it seems to him that he finds it in himself, but out of reach, objective, incurable, and published to the world. . . . (pp. 102-3)

. . . in anti-Semitism he (the Jew) denies his race in order to be no more than a pure individual, a man without blemish in the midst of other men. (p. 109)

Accordingly, many Jews in the news media could be depicted as bending-over-backwards in an attempt to sympathetically portray the Arab position for fear of being accused of partisan reporting, and in effect the fear of being publicly exposed as Jewish (something they had tried so desperately in the past to escape).

The above points are disturbing to pro-Israel advocates, for they imply that during times of international pressure and condemnation the general American and American

Jewish secular news media will most probably adopt pro-Arab positions. To repeat, the primary propaganda antagonist of Israel does not appear to be the Arabs, but rather the American and American Jewish secular news media. Their dire threat is that while ostensibly displaying a guise of objectivity, these media are latently pro-Arab (or more appropriately anti-Israel). The grave danger involved is that the American public will most probably accept their news coverage as fact, in light of their apparently evenhanded political stance.

Limitations of Analyses and Directions for Future Study

Some major limitations will be talked about in the following discussion.

1. In the present study a total of 400 people were randomly sampled from the city of Chicago proper. In addition, the only sizable racial groups in the sample were Whites and Blacks. Orientals and Hispanics were conspicuously missing and Jews and Arabs were screened out initially in order to prevent their biasing effects (i.e., In light of limited financial resources which precluded sufficiently large samples of Jews and Arabs for individual group comparisons, it was felt that Jews and Arabs would be inordinately pro-Jewish or pro-Arab respectively, and that their biases when combined indiscriminately with the general Christian population would introduce undesired extra variance into the analysis).

In future studies it will be important to measure

attitudes and knowledge from other geographical locations other than the Midwest, and to sample from suburban and rural areas as well as the big city (the population sampled in the present study was limited in light of insufficient financing). It will also be important to obtain sizable samples of Orientals, Hispanics, Arabs, and Jews to determine both geographical and group differences.

2. The Mideast Knowledge Scale was not a particularly reliable instrument (reliability coefficient = .55). One reason given above for its relative unreliability was that responses were of a True-False-Don't Know nature which left ample room for guesswork. In order to deal effectively with this confound, it would be wise in the future to create a new Mideast Knowledge Scale whose questions would be open-ended.

3. In the above content analyses and contrasts, only the news media of magazines were empirically compared. Based on these comparisons results were generalized to other news media. This extrapolation is not necessarily correct or even logical. Accordingly, it is important in future experimentation to content analyze other forms of news media (e.g., television, newspapers, radio) and, like the above, to examine the effects these media forms have on the American public.

4. In the present study the link between news media content and attitudes towards Israel was only indirect (i.e.,

via content analysis). Future studies should explore the relationship more directly. For example, magazine or newspaper articles may be read by subjects and subsequently their attitudes, perceptions, and knowledge may be tapped. In addition, radio or television news broadcasts may be played to participants and afterwards their attitudes and perception measured. By implementing it directly, the problem of creating a highly valid representation (e.g., via content analysis) of the particular news media under investigation is eliminated.

5. Another area unexplored in the present study (yet very important for practical application purposes) deals with the public's exposure to and acceptance of news reports via the mass media. In essence, if the news media cannot be pressured to refrain from biased reporting concerning Israel, then people's trust (pending there is some) in the "evenhandedness" and "objectivity" of the news media may be mitigated. In other words, if the mass news media refuses to change (which it almost certainly will) a strategy can theoretically be devised to sensitize the public to the news media's implicit bias against Israel.

In the author's opinion a potent way to sensitize the American population would be to expose publicly the media's bias, and their exploitative play on the emotions of the public. By vividly delineating the news media's selective processing procedures in conjunction with a brief background

sketch of what is actually happening (and has happened) in the region, the American public should get an idea of how they have been emotionally manipulated, and consequently should become more difficult to sell in the future.

The above strategy corresponds to "inoculation theory" (McGuire, 1964). McGuire suggested that people could be made more resistant to a persuasive message by inoculating their initial attitudes. According to Petty and Cacioppo (1981):

The inoculation treatment consists of exposing people to a few pieces of counter-attitudinal propaganda prior to exposure to the threatening message and showing them how to refute this initial discrepant information. The presentation of refuted weak counter-arguments presumably produces resistance to subsequent stronger attacks, because the inoculation poses a threat that motivates people to develop bolstering arguments for their somewhat weakened attitude, and it helps them counter-argue the attacking message. (p. 230)

Accordingly, exposing to the American public how they have been perceptually manipulated regarding happenings in the Middle East may enable the public to produce their own counter-arguments when faced with similar reporting in the future.

6. The origins of any news media bias should be more fully investigated. In the above discussion several reasons were given why the news media might promote a pro-Arab slant (in light of recent history any balance of blame showed to both the Arab and Israeli camps is itself considered poignantly pro-Arab) but the discussion was overly simplistic.

Therefore, in future studies these overly superficial guidelines (as well as others) should be more thoroughly examined (e.g., via archival data, content analyses, personal interviewing of media personnel, etc.).

Chapter III Conclusions

The following discourse will be divided into two sections (Demographic and Psychological variables). Afterwards, the limitations of the analyses and directions for future study will be discussed.

Demographics

In the subsequent discourse only the variables of educational level, age, and race in their relationship to attitudes towards Jews and Israel will be discussed. The reason is, that these variables produced significant differences (i.e., $p < .005$) on, at least, one of the two attitude scales.

Educational Level

The significant correlation obtained between Educational Level and attitudes towards both Jews and Israel suggests that the more educated a person is the more pro-Jewish and pro-Israel he/she is likely to be. However, after a multiple regression analysis was implemented in which both Jewish and Israel attitude scales were simultaneously regressed on Education only the Jewish scale's partialled cor-

relation proved significant (Partialled Correlations were: Jewish Scale = .22, $p < .001$; and Israel Scale = .04, $p > .05$). This implies that the relationship between Education and Attitudes towards Israel is primarily an artifact of the relationship between Attitudes towards Jews with Attitudes towards Israel.

Quinley and Glock (1983) suggested three general reasons why educational level may be related to attitudes towards Jews: (1) education enables individuals to develop their rational abilities and to think critically and independently, (2) attending school is a social phenomenon. It exposes individuals to environments which are more liberal and tolerant than most others, and (3) education is one way of purchasing a ticket of admission into middle class society. It may favorably influence attitudes towards Jews by placing individuals in settings where prejudice is less acceptable or less likely.

Although it seems highly illogical to push for the education of the masses with the intent of attenuating anti-Jewish hostility (even if the total American population could be "fully" educated there will always be a lower and lower-middle socio-economic class in America regardless of the educational level of its people), the clue that less educated people are more potentially hostile towards Jews and indirectly towards Israel is an important finding. Its importance lies in the observation that any educational cam-

campaign waged to counter anti-Jewish and/or anti-Israel propaganda must not be monolithic but varied in its instructive strategies, in order to reach individuals of diverse intellectual and socio-economic strata. Quinley and Glock (1983) in their book Anti-Semitism in America have presented several strategies for combatting anti-Jewish prejudice, of which three appear to have special application in the present discussion. They are:

1. . . . instruction should deal with minority group stereotypes both openly and directly. That anti-Semitic beliefs exist should be acknowledged. . . . Pointing out the distortions in such beliefs will serve to expose factual errors . . . and should expose the ideological character of anti-Semitic thinking. (p. 201)
2. To teach people how to use the rules of logic and inference and to understand what can or cannot be said about group differences. . . . Instruction is also needed to assist people to look beyond surface characteristics and easy explanations and to discover the more subtle and important reasons for human behavior. (p. 201)

and,

3. . . . special instruction is needed about how group differences came about. This involves instruction in the historical background of different religious, ethnic, and racial groups in America, the unique cultural heritage and values of these groups, and the social and economic positions they have come to occupy in society. (p. 202)

Race

The significant correlation between *Race and attitudes towards both Jews and Israel suggests that Whites are

*The variable Race after being partialled by the variables Age, Education, and Gender remained significantly correlated with both the Jewish Scale ($p < .007$) and the Israel Attitude Scale ($p = .001$).

more likely to be pro-Jewish and pro-Israel than their Black counterparts. However, like Education, after a multiple regression analysis was implemented in which both Jewish and Israel Attitude Scales were simultaneously regressed on Race, only the Jewish Scale's partialled correlation proved significant (Partialled Correlations were: Jewish Scale = .17, $p < .008$; and Israel Scale = .06, $p > .05$). This implies that the relationship between Race and Attitudes towards Israel is primarily a function of the relationship between Attitudes towards Jews and Attitudes towards Israel.

Quinley and Glock (1983) interpreted this relationship in economic terms. They cite the fact that Blacks who have more dependent economic contacts with Jews via patronizing Jewish-owned stores, working for Jewish employers, or having Jewish landlords have considerably more negative attitudes towards Jews than Blacks that do not. In other words, unequal-status-contact between Blacks and Jews seems to be the primary variable in accounting for anti-Jewish prejudice among Blacks.

To counter Black anti-Jewish attitudes it is important to know the source of this potentially hostile mindset. Is it directed specifically towards Jews or is it more a reaction to overall White-American society? Black Americans may not be responding to having a Jew as a landlord or boss per se, but rather in experiencing a White person in a position of superiority over them.

Selznick and Steinberg's (1969) findings suggest that most Blacks see little difference between having a Jew or having another White as an employer, store owner, or landlord. The authors found a close correspondence between Black respondents' positions on a White (non-Jewish) attitude scale and on their Jewish attitude scale. In total, only 4 percent of city-dwelling Blacks scored as anti-Semitic but not anti-White (non-Jewish White), while another 4 percent were anti-White but not anti-Semitic.

Although the above may be comforting to some (i.e., misery loves company) it is disconcerting to others for to break Black hostility towards White America (and consequently towards Jews) appears to be an unusually formidable task. In addition, because Jews (in the minds of Blacks) seem to represent the "exploiting" White race, and in addition present a highly vulnerable minority group, they could easily become the stimuli upon which Blacks may someday actively vent their hostilities.

In light of the Jews' particularly precarious situation vis-a-vis Blacks it behooves Jewish leaders and organizations to aggressively remind Blacks that it was not Jews who enslaved them for hundreds of years in Christian and Moslem lands. In fact, it would be hard to find another group in America who have taken such an active role in the civil-rights movement, in the nourishment of the infant NAACP and the Urban League as the Jewish people have done in behalf

of American Blacks. It is these facts which need to be consistently communicated to the Black population and not the "facts" of Jesse Jackson and Louis Farahkan.

In addition, if Blacks knew the real relationship of modern Zionism to their own cause vis a vis Arab subjugation of Blacks, their sympathies in the Middle East would probably be reversed and very few would probably adopt for themselves the religion of Islam. For example, modern secular Zionism's founder Theodore Herzl wrote in 1902 in his book Old-New Land:

. . . There is still one other question arising out of the disaster of the nations which remains unsolved to this day, and whose profound tragedy only a Jew can comprehend. This is the African question. Just call to mind all those terrible episodes of the slave trade, of human beings who, merely because they were black, were stolen like cattle, taken prisoner, captured and sold. Their children grew up in strange lands, the objects of contempt and hostility because their complexions were different. I am not ashamed to say, though I may expose myself to ridicule in saying so, that once I have witnessed the redemption of the Jews, my people, I wish also to assist in the redemption of the Africans. (Perlmutter, 1982, p. 186)

In contrast to the above, it is interesting to note Arab-Muslim's historical treatment of Blacks (whom a significant number of Black Americans today identify with, in the Arab's ongoing war with Israel). The following excerpts are taken from Davis (1985):

The Arabs, who ran the world's black slave markets for centuries, continue to engage in the slave trade among themselves.

Recent incidents of chattel slavery have been cited in Saudi Arabia--which "abolished" it years ago--and in Mauritania, Kuwait, Yemen, Oman, Qatar, and Sudan, ac-

ording to British correspondents and observers.

Britain's Anti-Slavery Society notes that slavery was legal in much of the Arab world until 1962 and that vestiges of the practice survive today.

In the case of Mauritania, however, the Anti-Slavery Society charges that slavery still flourishes openly to this day. In late 1981, the society accused the Arab League members of maintaining "at least 100,000 slaves and 300,000 semi-slaves." although the Mauritanian government decreed the abolition of slavery in July 1980, the British anti-slavery group labelled the decree a maneuver to improve Mauritania's international standing.

Former Black Panther leader Eldridge Cleaver, who returned to the United States in 1975 from exile in Algeria, reported in The Boston Herald in January 1977, that "having lived intimately for several years among the Arabs, I know them to be amongst the most racist people on earth. This is particularly true of their attitude toward black people. . . . Many Arab families that can afford it keep one or two black slaves to do their menial labor. Sometimes they own an entire family. I have seen such slaves with my own eyes." (pp. 139-40)

It is the present author's opinion that if the above type of information was intelligently disseminated among American Blacks, Israel would most probably have a staunch ally in the Black community of America, and this positive relationship would invariably carry over to attitudes towards Jews in general.

Age

A slight but significant relationship was found between the variables Age and Attitudes Towards Israel. The direction of the relationship suggests that the older a person is the more pro-Israel he/she is likely to be.

This relationship may be a function of the Arab's public relations metamorphosis following their 1967 defeat

in the 6-Day War. This change in Arab propaganda, which shifted from proclamations calling for the eradication of Israel to sympathetic rhetoric in behalf of their Palestinian "brothers" can conceptually be understood to have affected the younger generation more than the older. It may affect the younger generation more because they know and viscerally perceive little of what was explicit before 1967, but only implicit thereafter, and therefore have been more effectively manipulated by Arab- and Communist-backed propaganda. Young America has seemingly only perceived Israel in the role of "Goliath" whereas the older generation (irrespective of their lack of fact) have in person witnessed the Holocaust and the subsequent miraculous birth of a Jewish state.

Already in 1977, Marvin Feuerwerker wrote:

For much of today's younger Congress . . . the Holocaust is a vague memory and the creation of Israel is not recalled as a meaningful and vivid realization of an urgent Jewish need nor as the near-miraculous redemption of a persecuted people. (p. 24)

He went on to quote from a former Administration official who stated:

. . . younger members . . . haven't experienced the Holocaust personally or seen the newsreels depicting the death camps or watched the Nuremberg trials. These members don't have a vivid image of the war, and they don't understand what the State of Israel means. (pp. 24-25)

The younger generation (e.g., between the ages 18-40) are the future members of Congress, the future State and Defense Department officials, future members of the mass media, and the mainstream American constituency in the not

too distant future. Unless a concerted effort is made to educate the younger generation (both Gentile and Jew alike), the Jewish state of Israel will probably meet stiff American opposition in the future. In the author's opinion the younger generation should not only be educated regarding the more salient facts of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but concomitantly should be presented with historical anti-Jewish slander and hostility. Just as the older generation are seemingly able to connect both cognitively and emotionally the Holocaust with the birth of a Jewish nation, so should the younger generation be educated on contemporary anti-Israeli propaganda in light of historical anti-Jewish propaganda.

Another interpretation concerning the discrepancy among age groups may be the general political alignment which generally varies across age groups. The older generation tends to be more conservative (the Right) while the younger generation tends to be more liberal (the Left), oftentimes indiscriminately (Keniston, 1971). In light of the fact that Israel superficially represents the "establishment," or conservative Right, its image alone may repel a good many emotionally sincere, but cognitively shallow young Americans.

A further interpretation of the above data may reflect the emphasis and placement of Arab propaganda over the last twenty years, which has become increasingly more powerful and sophisticated. Already in 1955, Eleanor Roosevelt noted:

"Arab propaganda on American college campuses across the country is beyond the wildest imagination" (Drayer & Kanner, 1983, p. 27).

In October, 1964 a Near East Report special survey of the anti-Israel campus campaign cautioned that:

Arab propagandists have recognized the possibilities for affecting American public opinion at the college level. College newspapers resound with their pronouncements. College lecterns shake with the force of their oratory. As the Arab approach becomes more sophisticated, Arab distortion of history becomes more palatable to young Americans. (p.4)

In recent years anti-Israel propagandists in the United States have made college campuses a still higher priority (Kessler & Schwaber, 1984). When Harten Hussein (the PLO's Deputy Permanent Observer to the United Nations) was interviewed by the Saudi Report in 1982, he was asked if he spoke on many college campuses. He retorted that he had lectured "to some colleges" (Halsell, 1982). But the truth of the matter was that 17 of the 20 speeches Hussèini delivered in the prior six month period had been on college campuses. In fact, 85 percent of Hussein's lectures from 1980 to 1984 have been on American college campuses, though college students in America comprise less than 1 percent of all Americans (Kessler & Schwaber, 1984).

According to the above discussion the present results may reflect Arab propaganda over the last twenty years, which has targeted (and seemingly succeeded) to influence the younger generation of Americans. In conclusion, the above

three interpretations are by no means mutually exclusive, and the possibility that there exists a strong relationship between the three should not be precluded in preparing educational campaigns. Following therefrom, pro-Israel information campaigns should probably be prepared to deal with each of the three interpretations separately and in combination.

Psychological Variables

Social scientists and historians who refrain from mentioning the relationship between psychological maladjustment and attitudes towards Jews shun a tremendous amount of literature which supports this relationship (e.g., Adorno et al., 1980; Bettelheim et al., 1964; Saenger, 1969). However, social scientists who focus almost exclusively on this relationship promote little more than pessimism. In theory, if psychological maladjustment is the exclusive cause of anti-Jewish hostility as some writers imply, then by definition, the only way to stamp out anti-Jewish hostility would be to eliminate international crises, mental illness, and overly frustrating experiences (or conversely to educate the masses on how to effectively cope with, at least, international crises and overly frustrating experiences). As long as the world remains as we perceive it today, the elimination of societal and individual maladies appears virtually impossible. Correspondingly, an attempt to arouse Jewish

optimism by the "reasoning" that a significant drop in collective and individual suffering would considerably alleviate anti-Jewish hostility is analogous to passifying a frightened child on a ten-drop roller-coaster by informing him/her after the first drop, that things are getting progressively better.

In essence, if anti-Jewish hostility was primarily dependent on these psycho-social illnesses, the prognosis for future Jewish suffering would be grim indeed. In the present theoretical analysis psychological variables are not overlooked, but are depicted as only indirectly related to anti-Jewish hostility. By positing various psychological variables as tertiary in nature the present author is not eschewing the empirical realities mentioned above, but is able to avoid describing a bleak seemingly uncontrollable phenomenon which could ironically cause more pessimism and worry than good. In fact, the constant anxiety involved in thinking about which individuals are maladjusted (and therefore according to the other theories are prone to anti-Jewish hostility) would most likely present serious cognitive and emotional discomfort.

In contrast, the present theory posits that the Jewish people themselves are capable of attenuating anti-Jewish hostility. From making an authentic decision to remain Jewish or not (see Discussion in Chapter I) to fighting against the proliferation of anti-Jewish propaganda (see Discussion in Chapter II) to organizing educational campaigns to reach

those groups most susceptible to anti-Jewish and/or anti-Israeli propaganda the present theory (and action following therefrom) is by no means pessimistic, as opposed to other theories which posit the etiology of anti-Jewish prejudice as primarily pathological in nature.

The primary reasons for bringing these psychological variables into the present study (even though they, by themselves, lead to little positive application) was twofold, (1) to provide a comprehensive theory of anti-Jewish hostility which is consistent with other empirical findings, and (2) to further test several of these empirical findings in an attempt to detect the more salient sources of fear, frustration, and/or pain which when the primary and secondary causes of anti-Jewish hostility are operative, would be considered the catalyst needed to produce further discrimination and persecution of Jews.

Two variables found to correlate significantly with Attitudes Towards Jews both in bivariate and multivariate analyses were the Anomie Scale, and the Abridged Purpose in Life Scale. The Anomie Scale corresponds to the disintegration of societal structure and values in times of rapid social change. The progressively heightened pace of American society (or, in fact, the world in general) with its concomitant weakening of traditional values, in an atmosphere of "living for today" for fear of future happenings should logically create a heightened degree of anomie. Accordingly, the lack

of a structured and predictable social environment should only exacerbate anti-Jewish hostility all the while misinformation of Jews, Judaism, and Israel is believed.

The Abridged Purpose in Life Scale corresponds to the lack of meaning and purpose the individual may experience in life. Although any prognostication must be considerably tempered by the instrument's relatively low reliability coefficient (.56), the fact that an optimistic future outlook may appear to many people today as highly unrealistic, the relationship of the above two variables is logically consistent, and therefore if left unchecked should increasingly become more intense in the future.

The Opinion-Fear Rating Scale was found to correlate significantly with Attitudes Towards Jews and with Attitudes Towards Israel in both bivariate and multivariate regression analyses. However, the relationship between Attitudes Towards Jews and the Opinion-Fear Crises Scale was understood as a corollary of the latter scale's relationship to Attitudes Towards Israel. Conceptually, perceptions of an impending national catastrophe or crisis places the individual in a state of helplessness. In this disturbing state of mind the individual may (1) stoically resign himself/herself to getting-on-with-life despite the many obstacles, (2) become depressed, or (3) strike out at a tangible and vulnerable entity whose direct actions have little to do with the ongoing crisis.

A case in point is the recent hijacking (June of '85) of a T.W.A. airline, with many American citizens on board, by Arab terrorists. The main demand of the terrorists was the release of over 700 Arabs from Israeli detainee camps. These detainees were taken as prisoners while Israel was in the process of expeditiously departing from Lebanon, in an effort to ward off any more terrorist attacks (which were consistently taking place) against Israeli soldiers, who were very visibly making their way out. At the outset, the Israeli government made it clear that these detainees would be released once Israel had fully retreated, and once there was relative calm on the Israeli-Lebanese border. In fact, before the hijacking took place Israel had already begun releasing prisoners. Despite the above scenario, public opinion towards Israel, when the hostages' fate was as yet undecided, dropped to an all-time low.

Following from the above, it does not require too much imagination to understand what could be the American people's reaction to future Mideast outbreaks, where quantitatively and qualitatively the crisis may be more intense than the above episode. Although the above scenario is not a pleasant one (for all parties concerned), it is believed that had the American news media not shown implicit sympathy for the terrorists (in the Mideast in general and in Lebanon in particular the word terrorist can be applied to a large network of individuals and political entities all working towards

a common goal), and had not been previously inclined to provide for the terrorists a platform for influencing the American public, the hijacking probably never would have occurred. In fact, future terrorist attacks against American targets throughout the world would probably have been significantly reduced.

Another interpretation of the relationship between the apprehension or anticipation of an impending national crisis and attitudes towards Israel can be described on a cognitive level (as opposed to an emotional level discussed above). Theoretically, the association between anticipation of crisis and attitudes specifically towards Israel may be seen as manipulated by Arab and Communist propagandists and further buttressed by the American news media.

The general message (as discussed in Chapter II) received in the West (via our own news media) is that the Palestinian problem lies at the heart of Middle East instability. According to the message, once this problem is resolved (via an abrogation of the Jewish state, or the granting of a second Arab-Palestinian state on the West Bank) there should be peace in the region, and the U.S. which is often the target of Arab hostility will then enjoy a stable and enduring alliance with the Arab world. Conversely, another Arab-Israeli war could produce an economic crisis in the Western world (as it was seen to have done in 1973) which could have serious political ramifications. In addition,

the superpowers could get drawn into the action.

Portraying Mideast tension almost exclusively in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict, while simultaneously casting blame on Israel for creating or at least exacerbating the situation, depicts Israel, at best, as the perennial troublemaker, and at worst, as humanity's arch adversary. Accordingly, it is possible that the above misrepresented stereotype of Israel vis a vis Mideast instability may have significantly helped to produce the present statistical relationship. As Benjamin Netanyahu (1983), Israel's present ambassador to the U.N. wrote, this portrayal of the Mideast conflict fails to correspond with many other realities in the region:

In the last 30 years, virtually every Arab state has been at war or on the verge of war with at least one of its Arab neighbors. . . . In North Africa, Libya has clashed with Egypt and Tunisia, threatened Sudan and financed efforts to topple other Arab regimes. Egypt under Nasser invaded Yemen and now trades threats with Quadhafi. Algeria has waged surrogate warfare against Morocco using the Polisario forces in the Sahara.

In the Arabian peninsula, the two Yemens have been warring intermittently for years. Saudi Arabia, while trying to buy off all potential enemies in the Arab world in turn seeks to dominate the smaller states of the Gulf and has pressed territorial claims against all of them. Kuwait frets over Saudi encroachment on its territory, but worries even more about Iraq, which claims Kuwait in its entirety. And in the heart of the Middle East, Syria has attacked Jordan, jostles with Iraq and has made a shambles of Lebanon in seven years of ruthless occupation. . . .

The Arab world is littered with broken agreements. At the first sign of a neighbor's vulnerability, aggression erupts against the potential victim, to be checked only by the perception or presence of countervailing power. Thus when Saadam Hussein of Iraq perceived post-revolutionary Iran as weak and ripe for plunder, he swiftly revoked the border agreement he had signed five years earlier with the Shah and invaded Iran's oil-rich

provinces. As early as 1928, T. E. Lawrence characterized the Arab regimes as "tyrannies cemented with blood" and said that "it will be generations before any two Arab states join voluntarily." Fifty-five years later nothing has changed. . . .

None of these conflicts has anything to do with Israel. None of this violence has Israel as its target. Yet most of the discussions about achieving "peace" in the Middle East focus exclusively on the Arab-Israeli conflict and ignore the pervasive violence that characterizes the Arab world.

Irrespective of the above, it may also be argued that people who are generally apprehensive may also be generally prejudiced. In other words the above relationship may not be Israel-specific, but rather prejudice-specific which may target any arbitrary out-group regardless of race, creed, activity, or region. This latter interpretation is also consistent with the theoretical tertiary nature of prejudice discussed above (in the present chapter and in Chapter III).

Limitations of the Analyses and Directions for Future Study

1. Although the variable Age proved to be significantly correlated with Attitudes towards Israel it is hypothesized that this relationship would be even stronger if a broader range of age groups were more thoroughly sampled. For example, in the present study only adults 25 years of age and older were sampled (the author initially did not want to mix college students who generally live in a more isolated and sheltered environment with the general working population). In addition, only 19 percent of the respondents were 55 years of age and older while 49 percent were between

25 and 40. In future studies a broader and more proportional cross section of the population should be required.

2. In the present analyses two of the psychological scales, The Abridged Purpose in Life Scale, and the Ego-Strength Scale produced relatively low reliability coefficients (.56 and .40 respectively) which made their relationship with the Jewish and Israel Attitude Scales suspect. Therefore, it is important to develop or adopt other psychological scales (or revised versions of the present ones) which measure comparable constructs in order to more fully investigate their true relationship.

3. In the present study respondents were asked all questions orally over the telephone. It is highly possible that respondents consciously refrained from portraying themselves in a negative light to the study's anonymous interviewers (irrespective of the interviewer's claim that they were calling for Loyola University of Chicago). In essence, the relationships between the several psychological variables and attitudes towards Jews and Israel may in actuality be significantly greater than the present results showed, but because of the stigma (albeit justified) involved in candidly revealing oneself to a stranger, the real correlations may have been substantively diminished. Therefore, future studies should attempt to gather this information in a less threatening manner (e.g., via in-person interviews, mail, or group

sit-down administrations) and then only correlate the data with attitudes towards Jews and Israel.

4. A major limitation of the present study is the amount of variance in both the Jewish and Israel attitude scales unaccounted for. After simultaneously regressing most of the variables in the present study on both the Jewish and Israel scales, over 50% of the Israel scale's variance and approximately 70% of the Jewish scale's variance remained unaccounted for. The following points attempt to explain where some of the unaccounted for variance may be:

A. According to the Jewish and Israel scales' frequency count they both are considerably skewed (negatively). The skewness may reflect the actual population distribution or it may be an artifact of the instruments themselves. In either case, the skewness may have significantly attenuated the strength of the relationship between many of the independent variables and the two scales. Further research should attempt to discern the approximate population distribution of the two constructs, and if one or more truly approximates the normal distribution a more valid instrument should subsequently be designed.

B. There are several variables that may have produced significant relationships (e.g., social mobility, authoritarian personality type, general index of prejudice, media believability, etc.), but because the data of one of the original variables (i.e., social mobility) was lost, others

discounted because of limited interviewing time, and still others were only thought of post-hoc, these potential relationships were not examined. It seems fairly certain that had the above variables and others been more rigorously measured in the present study, the variance of both scales would probably have been substantially affected. However, in light of the limitations of a telephone survey in conjunction with the novel nature of the present study (i.e., there was little literature direction for choosing the most appropriate variables for the present theoretical scheme) several important variables were inadvertently missing.

C. There were certain variables in the study which although theorized to be significantly related to anti-Jewish hostility were not found to be significant (i.e., Ego-Strength Scale, Life Satisfaction Scale). Although these scales were checked for their reliability and/or validity before the study was implemented, the fact that most of the psychological scales implemented in the present study were previously tested as self-administering scales, but in the present study were used in a telephone interviewing situation may have considerably damaged their construct validity (i.e., they were operationalized as self-administering scales and not as telephone interviewing scales). Even those scales which obtained significance (e.g., Anomie, Purpose in Life) may have been significantly hampered by the interviewing situation, which

may have substantially limited the amount of variance these variables were actually capable of accounting for. In future analyses of this type, all variables under investigation should be tested in the same setting as their eventual implementation.

D. Certain theories or approaches to prejudice do not lend themselves to inclusion in cross-sectional, limited geographical area survey methods. This is especially true of theories which are historical in nature. For example, two approaches to prejudice discussed above (i.e., historical, and socio-cultural type theories) demand, in most part, longitudinal or post-hoc archival type methodologies to adequately deal with their inherent historical nature. In light of the present dissertation's emphasis on history, these types of variables are seen as highly relevant components of the overall anti-Jewish scheme, and conceptually may account for a substantial proportion of the total variance.

Broader Implications

The present discussion will endeavor to go beyond the overall theoretical analysis heretofore presented. This will be attempted by using the dissertation's comprehensive analysis as a base from which to theoretically explore solutions to the ever-spreading cancerous anti-Jewish phenomenon. In light of the limitations of space usually allotted to this concluding section the following discourse will, per-

force, be superficial. A more thorough discussion would necessitate a second dissertation, as will become evident in the forthcoming discussion.

Twenty to forty years ago major interpreters of the anti-Jewish phenomenon (e.g., Adorno, et al., 1950; Allport, 1954; and Bettelheim, et al., 1964) depicted the etiology of the problem primarily in terms of psychological maladjustment and/or unfortunate social circumstances. The primary problem with these types of theories (as already discussed in the present chapter) was that they were inherently pessimistic. Pessimistic in the sense, that the anti-Jewish phenomenon was seen as primarily dependent on individual and social well being, and if history be our guide, a world or nation relatively free (for any extended period of time) from considerable social and psychological disease is extremely unlikely. In fact, an argument may be made that despite the money and human energy devoted to social and individual ills over the last twenty-five years in Western countries (particularly America), the proportion of collective suffering is on the increase.

Over the last twenty years the cognitive (phenomenological) approach to understanding the origins of anti-Jewish prejudice (e.g., Quinley et al., 1983; Selznick et al., 1969) has superceded the above pathological-type theories. According to these authors, the solution to the problem is not some elusive strategy to prevent or alleviate universal illness

(and presumably curtailing the anti-Jewish cancer in the process), but rather the concrete implementation of mass educational campaigns to directly combat the phenomenon. If hostility and prejudice towards Jews is primarily a cognitive phenomenon, then a reeducation program, en masse, concerning Jews and Judaism would seem to be the logical solution.

Unfortunately, these last theorists and experimenters who spent many years (and absorbed \$500,000 of Jewish organizational money in the process) investigating the anti-Jewish phenomenon in America, failed to see the shallowness of their half-million dollar solution. In the process of teaching us "all" about anti-Jewish hostility and prejudice in America, these authors themselves failed to research the problem adequately. If they would have investigated the phenomenon historically, they would have discovered (as seen in the present dissertation) that the vile slander and misinformation historically disseminated about Jews, which consequently resulted in untold suffering was primarily generated, augmented, and fervently pursued by the ruling national or international power. If these ruling powers had not been preoccupied in condemning Jews and Judaism the residual anti-Jewish prejudice (i.e., the carry-over effect from preceding anti-Jewish epochs) would have been relatively innocuous. Consequently, in non-anti-Jewish environments (i.e., when the ruling power is not psychologically threatened by the Jewish

presence) where the problem is of a relatively minor nature (i.e., a residual nature) a mass reeducation program can (as the above authors suggest) be implemented. However, in an anti-Jewish environment (where this educational process would be of utmost necessity) any effort to benevolently educate the masses would logically be thwarted from its inception. In other words, the very places where these educational programs would be truly needed are the very places where they could never be realized in practice!

An Evolving Solution

According to the analysis in Chapter I the primary cause of anti-Jewish hostility is Jewish distinctiveness (with its corollary psychological threat represented by three core components). Historically, this Jewish "threat" has been the catalyst for the most severe persecution (both in terms of its extensiveness and intensity) of any one group throughout recorded history. Correspondingly, in the present discourse the onus of change is seen devolving on the Jews themselves (expecting competitive-type movements or groups to refrain from discriminating or persecuting Jews is, according to the present analysis, a psychological impossibility). Therefore, in order to free themselves and posterity from further psychological and physical torment, Jews should relinquish their distinctive Jewish identity. Just as Jews historically have obstinately and consciously made every

effort to salvage their distinctiveness (when logically speaking, no immutable difference was apparent) so must they now in the enlightened latter part of the twentieth century make every effort possible to disband and become one with the majority.

Jews in general (as visible to all), are not a cognitively and psychologically fixated people. They are inherently a dynamic, intellectual, adaptable, and even pace-setting minority group functioning exceptionally well in every society where they reside (or have resided). They quickly learn the laws, customs, language, dialect, and even begin to look like the majority population in an unusually short period of time. In other words, their intellect, similar physical characteristics, and adaptable psychology should present little problem in totally assimilating with the respective majority population wherein they reside. The Jewish culture could remain in the form of historical archives (as is the case with every great culture [e.g., Egyptian, Greek, Roman, etc.]) where all humanity could unabashedly learn, without the unpleasant consequences of being different, from traditional Jewish culture. In order to live unmolested and without fear in the real world Jews must make a concerted organized effort to totally disband and become one with the respective majority population wherein they, at present reside.

Although the above strategy may seem outlandish to

some, the truth of the matter is that it is currently taking place. (Therefore the present author is not espousing something fantastic, but is rather granting intellectual legitimacy to the ongoing process.) This process can be seen worldwide. For example, there are roughly thirteen million Jews today. Approximately six million reside in the United States where intermarriage is rampant (i.e., anywhere from 40 to 60 percent of all American Jews today are marrying non-Jews). Of these intermarriages only a small minority of non-Jewish spouses convert to Judaism. (In the present study 42 percent of all Non-Affiliated Jews were intermarried where the spouse did not convert.) In Russia where approximately two and one half million Jews live, Jewish culture, for all practical purposes is banned. The younger generation, for the most part knows little to nothing of its Jewish roots. In such circumstances (over a period of another generation or two), in both America and Russia, the identifiable Jewish community should, naturally speaking, be reduced to a small number of diehards, which according to the present perspective would save literally millions of Jews from future suffering. In France, where a quarter of a million Jews reside there is approximately a 70 percent intermarriage rate today. In other regions throughout the world (excluding Israel) there appears to be a similar assimilation process as the one described above taking place. Oral Law Jews will probably not assimilate, but world Jewry is approximately 90 percent

non-Oral Law, and therefore the multitude of Jews to be saved in the process is potentially and realistically immense (in the present context there appears to be no solution for Oral Law adherents, but then again, they are a small minority).

In Israel the picture is not as bleak as it may first appear. Hundreds of thousands of Jews are emigrating from Israel to the lands of opportunity and will probably assimilate (given an extra generation or so) like their more indigenous Jewish kin. Jews remaining in Israel could en masse convert to Islam which would most probably redefine the "illegitimate" nature of the state. Such a strategy is not too farfetched for the founder of modern Zionism, Theodore Herzl, after ruminating on Jewish suffering originally suggested that all Jews convert to Christianity. Only after realizing that a Jewish state was more palatable to the Jewish masses than conversion did Herzl vigorously and tenaciously begin advocating mass return to the Jewish homeland. The present author is of the belief that had Herzl known that a Jewish state would bring more (not less) Jewish suffering in its wake, he would probably have persevered in his original strategy. Today in light of the serious Jewish situation in Israel and in the spirit of Theodore Herzl the founder and father of modern-day secular Zionism, it follows that all secularists should aggressively pursue the alleviation of Jewish suffering via the mass conversion (of remaining Israelis) to Islam. In conclusion, it is the author's opinion

that educational campaigns, instead of targeting non-Jewish populations, should target Jewish populations with the same amount of money, organization, and energy in an effort to influence and educate world Jewry on the dire need for total assimilation.

The Historical Paradox

Notwithstanding the above, an unusual phenomenon which appears to militate against the above strategy pertains to the inconsistent policy non-Jewish national or international powers have had, historically, towards Jews. This inconsistency does not find a place in most (if any) scholarly analyses of anti-Jewish hostility. The inconsistency (or more properly termed paradox) is that although anti-Jewish powers throughout history have always fervently attempted to completely assimilate the Jews into their respective empires, and have most often been met by intransigence, the various periods in history (e.g., late medieval Spain, Russia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany) when large Jewish populations were visibly in the process of relinquishing their Jewish identity (and logically speaking, within a generation or two there would have been few Jews left) they were met by unprecedented persecution. In fact, the unbridled contempt for Jews during those trying times was aimed primarily at those assimilated Jews, which only by a stretch

of the imagination could still be considered Jews. Although in these periods of assimilation all Jews suffered (i.e., both the assimilated and unassimilated ones) the prime focus of attack was specifically those Jews who so fervently desired to be one with their non-Jewish compatriots, and who for many years prior (in those very lands) were the primary targets for assimilation.

The special import of this phenomenon rests in its ability to counter the claim that Jewish suffering is a direct consequence of the Jews' historical stiff-necked and obstinate refusal to assimilate. Ironically, the very forces which so incessantly tried to assimilate Jews were now the chief antagonists obstructing the rampant assimilation process, and creating an incisive division between Jew and non-Jew which even Jewish separatism, in its most extreme form, could not compare with.

The importance of this historical paradox is that it seriously challenges the claim that Jewish suffering is a direct consequence of the Jews' stiff-necked and almost arrogant refusal to assimilate. In the opinion of the present author, the above paradoxical phenomenon is as historically unprecedented as Jewish longevity. As with Jewish longevity, the claim could be made that this paradox is just coincidence, a quirk of fate, serendipity which just happened to befall the Jewish people, or one could transcend secular social, psychological, and political theory (which is predicated on

commonalities and consistencies among individuals, groups, and political entities) to the realm of theology which has its own peculiar interpretations of Jewish suffering.

An important general approach to anti-Jewish prejudice that Gordon Allport (1954) did not speak of in his classic work The Nature of Prejudice is the theological approach. Three major religions (Christianity, Islam and Judaism) all have well-defined but divergent opinions concerning the anti-Jewish phenomenon.

The Quran (the Moslem Scripture) explains that by the Jews' unwillingness to accept Allah's revelations, as communicated by his prophet Muhammad, were cursed for all time to live an existence of "humiliation and wretchedness" (Prager, et al., 1983). The curse is obviously not binding once the Jew converts to Islam (Grosser et al., 1978).

Christianity's interpretation of Jewish suffering was officially enunciated by St. John Chrysostom and St. Augustine in the fourth century. Both envisaged for the Jew, an endless state of misery for their role in the crucifixion of Christ. This "rejection and dispersion" by G-d would only be terminated by an acceptance of Jesus (Flannery, 1965).

Both Islam and Christian interpretations appear inadequate for at least two major reasons. One, Jewish discrimination, persecution, and expulsion (from the Land of Israel) predates both Islam and Christianity by several hun-

dred years. Two, from the inception of both Islam and Christianity up to the twentieth century, the vast majority of discrimination and persecution has been meted out in the name of these two religions themselves. This point is not meant to deprecate or discredit the teachings or beliefs of the two religions, but rather to indicate that their interpretations of the anti-Jewish phenomenon appear inadequate.

The Jewish Theory

Why were Jews so different from other groups and nations who stayed together (in both a national and religious sense) only while in the majority or in the capacity of rulers, but quickly disbanded (if given the opportunity) after being conquered (and certainly after being dispersed). The Jews not only remained separate in such circumstances, but amidst the most brutal persecution and multiple expulsions over an extraordinarily long period of time tenaciously maintained a separate identity and lifestyle (while a good deal of the time becoming an integral part of the larger society). A traditional Jewish explanation which accounts for the Jews continued existence (and contradictory and paradoxical status vis a vis the ruling power) is expressed in traditional Jewish literature, which to a great extent, is the foundation of traditional Christianity and Islam as well. The following are examples of traditional Jewish literature which (according to these sources) seem to explain both the Jewish secret

of longevity, and their apparent incapacity to totally assimilate.

1. In the Hebrew Bible written over 3,000 years ago, G-d promised that the descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob would never be completely abandoned (Exodus 32:13) even if they transgressed his Torah (Law) (Leviticus 26:44).

2. In the Jerusalem Talmud (Tractate Taanith 2:6) redacted some 1,500 years ago, but having its origin 1,700 years prior (Talmud-Berakoth 5A) states that Jacob's (his name later to be changed to Israel) offspring would always survive as a distinctive group.

3. In Leviticus (20:26) "I have set you apart from all other peoples" (translation Kaplan, 1979).

4. In Isaiah (54:17) "No weapon that is raised against you shall be successful. Every tongue that shall rise against you in judgment shall be condemned by you. This is the heritage of G-d's servants, and their reward from Me" (translation Kaplan, 1979).

5. Isaiah (60:15) "Although you have been hated and foresaken, so that no man is concerned with you, I will make you an object of eternal pride and never-ending joy."

6. Despite the Jewish people's backslidings G-d promised that they would always continue to exist as a nation as is written in Isaiah 54:10: "The mountains may depart, and the hills may be removed, but My kindness will not depart

from you, neither will My covenant of peace be removed" (translation Kaplan, 1969).

7. The non-Jewish prophet Bilam prophesized concerning the people of Israel "They are a people who will dwell separately and among the nations of the world will not be counted" (Numbers 23:9) (translation Kaplan, 1979).

The before-the-fact (some thousands of years before) predictions above seem to explain the secret behind Jewish longevity. According to these traditional Jewish sources the secret force accounting for Jewish longevity and their paradoxical circumstances (vis a vis the non-Jew) is the G-d of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob who is considered G-d of the entire universe, but has chosen Jacob's sons and their descendents (and anyone else who has seriously adopted Judaism) in a mutual covenant for all time to create a model society in their own land. This model civilization is to be based on G-d's many commandments from which all non-Jewish nations, throughout the world, may learn and derive benefit.

Jewish Suffering

A question which needs to be asked at this time is: If Jews are supposedly so intimately connected to G-d (as expressed via Biblical and Talmudic sources) how and why have they been so savagely treated throughout history? The traditional Jewish source for interpreting Jewish suffering is derived from the Jewish Bible (the Old Testament). In the

five Books of Moses written some 3,200 years ago (Bieberfeld, 1948), the concept of future Jewish suffering plays a prominent role. Jewish suffering is predicted and elaborated on in the books of Leviticus and Deuteronomy, and throughout the Old Testament Books of the Prophets and Holy Writings. Suffering is said to be contingent on the actions of the Jewish people collectively. Benedictions are to be forthcoming for following the Torah (The Law), and maledictions for acting to the contrary. The covenant of G-d with the Jewish people is understood as irreversible, obligating the Jewish nation to remain separate among the nations of the world via adherence to the Mosaic Law, or conversely (i.e., they will perforce remain separate) through severe suffering.

According to Rabbi Sh'muel Eliezer (one of the leading Talmudic scholars in Poland during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and better known as the Maharsha) this severe suffering does not emanate from G-d for only goodness emanates from G-d. Rather, it is the Jewish people's unwillingness to keep G-d's commandments which causes Divine protection to depart from the Jewish people, and consequently leaves them highly vulnerable vis a vis their most ruthless adversaries (Maharsha, Talmud Baba Kama 60B). Unfortunately for the Jews, in light of their unique situation which has created a people fated to be distinct (according to the above Biblical sources), this means that when they collectively (i.e., a considerable proportion) ignore the Commandments, they (all

of them) are inevitably and inadvertently pitted against any and all totalitarian-like (and therefore psychologically threatened by the Jewish presence) hostile (i.e., towards outsiders) nations and international movements.

The following Biblical excerpts (transcribed over 3,000 years ago) present a taste of Jewish prophesy (which can be found throughout traditonal Jewish literature) whose unprecedented validity (i.e., the total range of prophesy and not just the following) can be attested to by anyone who possesses a solid knowledge of Jewish history.

In the third book of the Pentateuch (Leviticus) Chapter 26 it states:

If you follow My laws and are careful to keep My commandments, I will provide you with rain at the right time, so that the land will bear its crops and the trees of the field will provide fruit. [You will have so much that] your threshing season will last until your grape harvest, and your grape harvest will last until the time you plant. You will have your fill of food, and [you will] live securely in the land.

I will grant peace in the land so that you will sleep without fear. I will rid the land of dangerous animals, and the sword will not pass through your land. You will chase away your enemies, and they will fall before your sword. Five of you will be able to chase away a hundred, and a hundred of you will defeat ten thousand, as your enemies fall before your sword.

I will turn to you, making you fertile and numerous, thus keeping My covenant with you.

You will continue eating the previous year's crops long after their time, and you will eventually have to clear out the old crops because of the new.

.....
 [But this is what will happen] if you do not listen to Me, and do not keep all these commandments. If you come to denigrate My decrees, and grow tired of My laws, . . . I will then do the same to you. I will bring upon you feelings of anxiety, along with depression and ex-

citement, destroying your outlook and making life hopeless.

.....
 You will plant your crop in vain, because your enemies will eat it. I will direct My anger against you, so that you will be defeated by your foes, and your enemies will dominate you. You will flee even when no one is chasing you.

.....
 If this is not enough to discipline you, and you are still indifferent to Me, then I will also be indifferent to you, but I will again increase the punishment for your sins sevenfold. I will bring a vengeful sword against you to avenge [My] covenant, so that you will huddle in your cities. I will send the plague against you, and give you over to your enemies.

.....
 I will thus have grown tired of you. I will let your cities fall into ruins, and make your sanctuaries desolate. No longer will I accept the appeasing fragrance [of your sacrifices]. I will make the land so desolate that [even] your enemies who live there will be astonished. I will scatter you among the nations, and keep the sword drawn against you. Your land will remain desolate, and your cities in ruins.

.....
 I will bring such insecurity upon those of you who survive in your enemies' land that the sound of a rustling leaf will make them flee from the sword. They will fall with no one chasing them. They will fall over one another as if [chased] by the sword, even when there is no one pursuing. You will have no means of standing up before your foes.

You will thus be destroyed among the nations. The land of your enemies will consume you.

The few of you who survive in your enemies' lands will [realize that] your survival is threatened as a result of your nonobservance. [These few] will also [realize] that their survival has been threatened because of the nonobservance of their fathers. They will then confess their sins and the sins of their fathers for being false and remaining indifferent to Me. [It was for this] that I also remained indifferent to them, and brought them into their enemies' land.

But when the time finally comes that their stubborn spirit is humbled, I will forgive their sin. I will remember My covenant with Jacob as well as My covenant with Isaac and My covenant with Abraham. I will remember the land. [For] the land will have been left behind by them, and will have enjoyed its sabbaths while it lay in desolation without them. The sin [they had committed]

by denigrating My laws and growing tired of My decrees, will [also] have been expiated.

Thus, even when they are in their enemies' land, I will not grow so disgusted with them nor so tired of them that I would destroy them and break My covenant with them, since I am God their Lord. I will therefore remember the covenant with their original ancestors whom I brought out of Egypt in the sight of the nations, so as to be a God to them. I am God. (translation Kaplan, 1985)

In Deuteronomy Chapters 28-30 it further says:

If you obey God your Lord, carefully keeping all His commandments as I am prescribing them to you today, then God will make you highest of all the nations on earth. As long as you listen to God your Lord, all these blessings will come to bear on you.

Blessed will you be in the city, and blessed in the field.

Blessed will be the fruit of your womb, the fruit of your soil, and the fruit of your livestock, the calves of your herds and the lambs of your flock.

Blessed will be your food basket and your kneading bowl.

Blessed will you be when you come and blessed when you go.

If any enemies attack you, God will make them flee from you in panic. They may march against you on one road, but they will flee from you in seven directions.

God will grant a blessing in your granaries and all your [other] endeavors. He will bless you in the land that He, God your Lord, is giving you.

If only you keep the commandments of God your Lord and walk in His paths, God will establish you as His holy nation, as He promised you. All the nations of the world will realize that God's name is associated with you, and they will be in awe of you.

God will grant you good surplus in the fruit of your womb, the fruit of your livestock, and the fruit of your land. [You will thus flourish] on the good land that God promised your ancestors to give you. God will open His good treasury in heaven to give your land rain at precisely the right time, and to bless everything you do. You will lend many nations, but you will not have to borrow.

God will make you a leader and never a follower. You will be on the top and never on the bottom. You must merely obey the commandments of God your Lord, as I am prescribing them to you today, carefully keeping them.

.....

If you do not obey God your Lord and do not carefully keep all His commandments and decrees as I am prescribing them for you today, then all these curses will come to bear on you.

God will send misfortune, confusion and frustration against you in all you undertake. It will destroy you and make you rapidly vanish because of your evil ways in forsaking my [teachings].

The skies above you will be like brass, and the earth below you like iron. God will turn your rain into powder and dust, and it will come down from the skies to destroy you.

God will make you panic before your enemies. You will march out in one column, but flee from them in seven. You will become a terrifying example to all the world's kingdoms. Your corpses will be food for all the birds of the sky and beasts of the land, and no one will chase them away.

When you betroth a woman, another man will sleep with her. When you build a house, you will not live in it. When you plant a vineyard, you will not enjoy its fruit. Your ox will be slaughtered before your eyes, but you will not eat from it. Your donkey will be stolen right in front of you, but you will not be able to get it back. Your sheep will be given to your enemies, and no one will come to your aid.

Your sons and daughters will be given to a foreign nation. You will see it happening with your own eyes, and will long for them all day long, but you will be powerless. A strange nation will consume the fruit of your land and all your toil. You will be constantly cheated and crushed.

You will go insane from what you will have to witness. . . .

. . . You will be an object of horror, a by-word and an abject lesson among all the nations where God will lead you.

You will have sons and daughters, but they will not remain yours, since they will be taken into captivity.

The alien among you will rise higher and higher over you, while you will descend lower and lower. He will make loans to you, but you will not be able to lend him anything. He will become the master, while you will be the vassal.

All these curses will thus have come upon you, pur-

suing you and catching you so as to destroy you, all because you did not obey God your Lord, and [did not] keep the commandments and decrees that He prescribed to you.

[These curses] will be a sign and proof to you and your children forever.

When you had plenty of everything, you would not serve God your Lord with happiness and a glad heart. You will therefore serve your enemies when God sends them against you, and it will be in hunger, thirst, nakedness and universal want. [Your enemy] will place an iron yoke on your neck so as to destroy you.

Where you were once as numerous as the stars of the sky, the survivors among you will be few in number, all because you did not obey God your Lord. As happy as God was to be good to you and increase you, so will He be happy to exile you and destroy you. You will be torn up from the land which you are about to occupy.

God will scatter you among the nations, from one end of the earth to the other. There you will serve idolators who worship gods of wood and stone, unknown to you and your fathers. Among those nations you will feel insecure, and there will be no place for your foot to rest. There God will make you cowardly, destroying your outlook and making life hopeless.

Your life will hang in suspense. Day and night, you will be so terrified that you will not believe that you are alive. . . .

A future generation, consisting of your descendants, who rise up after you, along with the foreigner from a distant land, shall see the punishment directed against that land, and the plague with which God has struck it, and they will say, "Sulphur and salt has burned all its oil. Nothing can be planted and nothing can grow--not even grass can grow on it. It is like the destruction of Sodom, Gomorrah, Adma and Tzevoyim, [the cities] that God overturned in His anger and rage."

All the nations will ask, "Why did God do this to the land? what was the reason for this great display of anger?"

They shall answer, "It is because they abandoned the covenant that God, Lord of their fathers, made with them when He brought them out of Egypt. . . . God displayed anger against this nation, bringing upon it the entire curse written in this book. God drove them from their land with anger, rage and great fury, and He exiled them to another land, where they remain even today."

There shall come a time when you shall experience

all the words of blessing and curse that I have presented to you. There, among the nations where God will have banished you, you will reflect on the situation. You will then return to God your Lord, and you will obey Him, doing everything that I am commanding you today. You and your children [will repent] with all your heart and with all your soul.

God will then bring back your remnants and have mercy on you. God your Lord will once again gather you from among all the nations where He scattered you. Even if your diaspora is at the ends of the heavens, God your Lord will gather you up from there and He will take you back.

God your Lord will then bring you to the land that your ancestors occupied, and you too will occupy it. God will be good to you and make you flourish even more than your ancestors. God will remove the barriers from your hearts and from the hearts of your descendants, so that you will love God your Lord with all your heart and soul. Thus will you survive.

God will then direct all these curses against your enemies and against the foes who pursued you.

You will repent and obey God, keeping all His commandments, as I prescribe them to you today. God will then grant you a good surplus in all the work of your hands, in the fruit of your womb, the fruit of your livestock, and the fruit of your land. God will once again rejoice in you for good, just as He rejoiced in your fathers.

.....
 This mandate that I am prescribing to you today is not too mysterious or remote from you. It is not in heaven, so [that you should] say, "Who shall go up to heaven and bring it to us so that we can hear it and keep it?" It is not over the sea so [that you should] say, "Who will cross the sea and get it for us, so that we will be able to hear it and keep it?" It is something that is very close to you. . . .

See! Today I have set before you [a free choice] between life and good [on one side], and death and evil [on the other].

I have commanded you today to love God your Lord, to walk in His paths, and to keep His commandments, decrees and laws. You will then survive and flourish, and God your Lord will bless you in the land that you are about to occupy.

.....
 I call heaven and earth as witnesses! Before you I have placed life and death, the blessing and the curse. You must choose life, so that you and your descendants will survive. (translation Kaplan, 1985)

The correspondence between ancient Hebrew prophesy and events which ensued over the following 3,200 years was expressed by one Jewish traditionalist, Simcha Meiri (1984):

Try to imagine how amazed we would be if we were to uncover an ancient papyrus thousands of years old which describes events that actually occurred generations later, or even in modern times. It would be that much more astounding if those events were of an extraordinary nature, as were those recorded in Jewish history. But such a manuscript does exist, in fact several do--the books of the Scriptures, which are unquestionably older than the events they describe, and although these events could not have been anticipated as they run counter to all accepted laws of history, they did, in fact, occur just as the prophets foretold (as corroborated by hundreds of archeological finds over the last hundred years) [p. 104].

The Academic Bias

If the above is so obvious why have contemporary historians and social scientists so conspicuously "failed" to see the qualitatively unique aspects of the anti-Jewish phenomenon (as discussed throughout the present dissertation). In the author's opinion the answer to this question lies specifically in the almost inevitable implications of the analysis.

Jewish history seems to run counter to the laws of history, which every other nation throughout history has fallen prey to. According to the historic laws of nations where "Might Is Right" only the Hebrew nation has conspicuously survived as an extreme deviation from the rule. (Christianity and Islam are religious belief systems which have no national origin, and by their own definitions are universal

in doctrine and perspective. In addition, their ability to grow [and even to survive] had depended almost exclusively on their majority status.) Jews have not only survived under the most insurmountable odds, but amid their generally hostile and predatory type environments have managed to create societies which have grown intellectually, spiritually, and when allowed economically throughout millenia (Grayzel, 1968).

Just as the odds against a random Big Bang cosmic phenomenon creating the universe, or spontaneous formation of a living cell from inanimate matter are astronomically fantastic (Levi, 1983), so does the continued existence of the Jewish people, their paradoxical status in non-Jewish lands, the realization of their millenia-old prophesies, and other anomalous characteristics (too lengthy to be discussed in the present dissertation) seem to defy the natural (or consistent) laws of history. And just as the physical science community accepts almost religiously the above physical theories (and many would argue laws) of evolution despite much evidence to the contrary (e.g., Etkin, 1978; Goldman, 1978; Gross, 1978; Marcell, 1978; Rifkin, 1983; Simon, 1978; Spetner, 1978) without ever positing the possibility of a Prime Creator, so have the social science and historical communities "explained" unflinchingly the Jewish phenomenon without having to acknowledge the possible involvement of the super physical (and certainly not a Jewish One!).

William Etkin (1978), explains the philosophical

origins of the scientific perspective today which many contemporary academicians unwittingly accept as truth.

To the intellectual of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the rationality of nature attested to the rationality of the Creator. . . . Thus the Argument From Design reconciled science with the belief in a G-d.

. . . Darwinism, the concept of evolution by natural selection, turned the Argument From Design upside down to reverse the conclusion. . . . Types of thinking and behavior that were not consistent with nature were eliminated in the course of human evolution and what was left is then, of course, a method of thinking called rational which is consonant with the way nature is constructed. Reason, then, mirrors nature, and not the other way around. . . . Like them, its success testifies not to the mind and intention of the Creator but to the efficiency of natural selection. (pp. 31-32)

Elkin then cogently demonstrates that progress of contemporary science has forced an overturning of the Darwinian view in much the same way that Darwinism had reversed the previous outlook. He explains how much of science today "operates on the basis of a self-confidence in the ability of the human mind to transcend common-sense rationality" which parallels the mode of thinking that lies at the foundation of religious faith. Accordingly, in interpreting anti-Jewish hostility (and indirectly the phenomenal continuity of the Jewish people), a rationale based on the natural laws of history appears schizophrenic.

Another reason why many scientists may shy away from theological support is that secular academia, predicated on the ideals and objectives of the Enlightenment, represents in its original form a severance from the dogmatism of or-

ganized religion. Although a severance seemed to be in order in light of the many barbarous activities legitimized in the name of G-d, an academia (based on the scientific method) ostensibly seeking truth which blatantly avoids the psychological, social, political, and historical ramifications of a religious perspective (i.e., from an absolute perspective as well as a relative one) is itself dogmatically ignoring a most popularly accepted phenomenon. The present author is not, by any means, espousing that scientists accept religious dogma, but rather, that various religious perspectives need to be investigated objectively (i.e., as best we are able), for whether we like it or not, the social ramifications of religious dogma are still the most powerful motivating social forces known to man. Paradoxically, contemporary social scientists (following their physical science counterparts' lead) may feel great professional and/or personal pressure to "justify" their obsessive non-theological stance concerning the Jewish phenomenon in the name of good science itself!

Universal Interests

"Rabbi Yochanan said: Woe to the non-Jews who lost something (extremely important) and are not even aware of what they lost. When the Beit Hamikdash (the Temple in Jerusalem) was standing it would atone (and bring good fortune) for them and now who (or what) atones for them?" (Talmud,

Succah 55B) (translation mine). According to Rabbi Sh'muel Eliezer (The Maharsha) based on the Midrash, the non-Jewish loss should be considered even greater than the Jewish one.

Not all of Jewish prophecies have been fulfilled. The last and most important (for both Jew and non-Jew alike) prophecies concerning the End of Days has yet to be realized: "And it shall come to pass in the last days, that the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established on the top of the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills; and all the nations shall flow unto it" (Isaiah 2:2).

According to traditional Jewish literature the Final Redemption for all humanity is assured, but the process of getting there (i.e., via worldwide destruction or supernal benevolence) is dependent primarily on the collective actions of the Jewish people. For instance, in the Talmud (Sanhedrin 98A), it states:

The son of Levi cites a contradiction, in the prophet Isaiah it is written "in its time" (i.e., the Final Redemption will come in its time) and it is also written there "I will hurry it up" (i.e., G-d will bring the Final Redemption before its appointed time)? (The Talmud explains) If they (the Jews) merit I (G-d) will hurry it up, if they do not merit, it will come in its prescribed time. (translation mine)

The Maharsha explains: If the Jews merit by repenting and coming back to G-d's Torah, G-d will have compassion on them (and indirectly on the entire world), but if they do not return to the Torah (i.e., do not merit) G-d will delay the Redemption until the prescribed final period in history,

and will only then redeem them (amidst great destruction and suffering for them and the non-Jewish world, as will be seen in the following pages) even if they are not repentant.

In the Zohar (Acharey Mot, p. 66), which is the primary classic of Jewish mysticism attributed to the school of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai (approximately 120 C.E.), it is written:

We learned that all the time Israel (i.e., the people of Israel) are in exile, if they merit G-d will have compassion and take them out of exile, and if they do not merit (G-d) will delay them until the prescribed time. If the time comes and they are not fit to be redeemed, then G-d in the honor of His own Name will not forget them completely. (translation mine)

It should be emphasized from the beginning that it is not the Jews per se who are held responsible for the prophesized great destruction (to be discussed in the forthcoming pages) before the "End of Days" (or better known as the pre-Messianic era) if it comes in its prescribed time. However, they are seen as having the potential of preventing it. The Oral Law tradition gives many signs of what life will be like before (the term "before" is used loosely, and may represent a period of one year or one hundred years depending on one's personal understanding of the following signs) the Messianic age, if the Final redemption comes in its prescribed time. For example:

1. In the future the sons of Ishmael (i.e., the Muslims, for Mohammad claimed to be a direct descendent of Abraham's first son Ishmael) will rule in the holy

land while it is a wasteland for a prolonged period of time, and will hinder Israel from returning to their (i.e., Israel's) land (Zohar, Vaara, p. 32).

2. There is no surer sign for the "immediate" coming of the Messianic era than when the land of Israel becomes fertile again for the Jewish people (Talmud, Sanhedrin 98A).
3. If you see a period of time where constant and frightful sorrow confronts the Jewish people, anticipate the arrival of the son (i.e., descendent) of King David (who according to tradition is said to be the Messiah) (Sanhedrin, 98A).
4. Before the "immediate" coming of the Messiah all the peoples of the earth will be frightened and dismayed by the excess of ongoing wars and tension between nations (Midrash, Bereshet raba 42; and Midrash Yalkut Shemoni, Isaiah 60).
5. In the future G-d will pay heed to the people of Israel's sorrow from what the sons of Ishmael will attempt to do to them (Midrash, Pirkey Rabbi Eliezer, 32).
6. The Talmud Sotah (49B) enumerates various happenings that will occur "immediately" before the Messianic era, some of them are:
 - A. The Jewish government will be run by non-Oral Law adherents.

- B. The wisdom of the Rabbis will be laughed at.
- C. Pious Jews will be scorned.
- D. There will be great inflation.
- E. This inflation will not be on account of lack of supply,

and,

- F. Truth will be conspicuously missing.

In addition, the wars predicted to occur immediately before the Messianic era (i.e., if the Redemption comes in its prescribed time) are briefly reviewed in the following:

1. "The son of (King) David (i.e., the Messiah) will not appear until the 'Roman' nation spreads out over the entire world" (Talmud Yoma, 10A).
2. According to the prophet Daniel (7:23-24) ten nations will spring forth from the fourth empire (Rome), and the last of the ten will be different from the others.
3. According to the Talmud (Yoma, 10A), it is this last nation from Rome who will eventually spread out and consume the entire world.
4. According to the prophet Ezekiel (38:2) this tenth nation from Rome will come from the land of Magog.
5. According to Josephus (Book of Antiquities), who lived during the first century C.E., the land of Magog is Scythia. ("According to the ancient Greeks [Scythia was] a vast, undefined region lying north and east

of the Black and Caspian Seas" [i.e., present day Russia] (Brittanica World Language, 1954).

6. The Jerusalem Talmud (Megilla 1:9) says that the land of Magog is Gothia (Goth).

According to the Encyclopaedia Brittanica (1954) the Goths (first century C.E.) inhabited the middle part of the basin of the Vistula River (i.e., central to eastern Poland), but under their sixth king (who was more contemporary in time with the redaction of the Talmud) migrated into Scythia (i.e., present day Russia).

After the destruction of the Western Roman Empire by the Teutons, only Constantinople remained as the capital of the (Eastern) Roman Empire (i.e., the Byzantine empire). And from the day the Russian king (Ivan III) betrothed the only niece (Sophia) of the last Byzantine emperor (Constantine Palaeologus), the Russian autocrats considered themselves the successors of the Byzantine emperors. In addition, the Russian aristocracy claimed that since the Greeks had been punished for their apostasy, their succession had to pass to the third Rome (Constantinople was the second) which was Moscow (Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 1954). The Russians also carried on their flag the double eagle sign of the Byzantine (Roman) empire (Eisenberg, 1970).

7. According to the Zohar (Vaara, p. 32) the mechanics of the final war (again if the Redemption comes in

its prescribed time) will proceed in the following manner:

- A. The sons of Ishmael (the Muslims) will attempt to keep Israel from returning to their homeland.
- B. The Sons of Ishmael (Muslims) will effect fierce wars in the world, and Rome (Russia) will wage war against them in order to take over their land and the land of Israel.
- C. Rome (Russia) will succeed in taking over Muslim lands but the land of Israel will not be taken over.
- D. One nation at the end of the world together with many other nations will come to fight Russia, but these nations after a period of three months, will eventually fall to Russia.
- E. After all the nations have fallen, then will Russia attempt an all out concerted attack against Israel. At that time G-d will defend Israel, and Russia together with her allies will fall.

The Final Resolution

The upshot of the present dissertation is that the primary responsibility for ameliorating or conversely, exacerbating anti-Jewish hostility devolves primarily on the Jews themselves. If G-d did not give the Jewish people in particular, special commandments to follow, then why be dis-

tingly Jewish? (To suggest that G-d chose the Jewish people to be a model for mankind without instructing them on how to create that model is absurd and borders on racism.) Why in the name of some man-made ideology (which most Jews desist from following in any case) or historical identity (which most conquered nations, who have the opportunity, eventually relinquish) should individuals allow themselves and posterity to be hated, discriminated against, persecuted, and even slain? Must Jews continue to make the same errors as their forefathers who for reasons of ignorance, obstinacy, arrogance or others preferred poverty, torture, and murder to fraternity and opportunity? If the only reason for sticking together is to promote the most hated man-made ideology and lifestyle in history, then Jews must immediately disband.

However, if G-d, indeed, gave the Torah with its multiple commandments specifically to the Jewish people, then by abandoning their responsibilities (regardless of whether they remain Jews in name or not) they are again creating their own misfortune and indirectly the misfortune of the non-Jew. Just as some 2,700 years ago Alijah the prophet (Kings I, 18:21) said to the Jewish people "How long will you waver between two opinions? if the Lord be G-d, follow Him; but if (you believe in) Baal (the most popular form of idol worship at the time), follow him" so must contemporary Jewish leaders demand no less from the Jewish people today (if the people are truly their first concern).

From a purely social-psychological perspective both Christianity and Islam do not need to be true in order to defend their constituencies, for in their respective regions they are the majority and most powerful force. Christian and Moslem masses are less obligated (via external forces) to come to terms with their religious convictions in light of their majority status. Jews, both in the diaspora and in Israel (in light of Israel's externally inflicted isolation), are not as fortunate, and must be more intellectually and emotionally honest with themselves. They cannot straddle between two opinions (and remain undisturbed), but must categorically decide for their own sake, the sake of their children, and possibly for all of mankind what they truly believe (i.e., after intelligent investigation) and to follow accordingly.

In conclusion, it is highly ironic (although irony when concerning Jews appears more the rule) that the very people (i.e., the Jews) whom Jean-Paul Sartre (1948) so often cites as representing the proverbial inauthentic existence, are the very people whose authenticity has in the past and continues to be in the present so thoroughly tested.

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APPENDIX A

MISCELLANEOUS STATISTICS FOR STUDY NO. 1

Study No. 1Reliability Coefficients for All Scales Used in the Following Analyses:

- A. Jewish Religious 10-Item Observance Scale
(N=546), .91 Kuder-Richardson 20.
- B. Abridged Jewish Religious 3-Item Observance Scale
(N=800), .93 Kuder-Richardson 20. (Items 2, 3, and 7).
- C. Elementary Jewish Knowledge Scale
(N=637), .92 Kuder-Richardson 20.
- D. Israel Attitude Scale
(N=637), .72 Cronbach Alpha.
- E. Israel Attitude Positive-Items Scale
(N=647), .51 Cronbach Alpha. (Items 2, 4, 5, and 9).
- F. Israel Attitude Negative-Item Scale
(N=647), .71 Cronbach Alpha. (Items 1, 2, 6, 7, 8).
- G. Middle-East Information Scale
(N=637), .47 Kuder-Richardson 20.

Abbreviation and Directional Key for All Variables Used in the Following Analyses:

- A. TS = Type of Synagogue Affiliation:
1 = Non-Affiliated, 2 = Reform, 3 = Conservative, 4 = Orthodox.
- B. PA = Parents Affiliations:
1 = Non-Affiliated, 2 = Reform, 3 = Conservative, 4 = Orthodox.
- C. C = Number of Children
- D. MS = Marital Status:
1 = Married, 2 = Widowed, 3 = Separated or Divorced, 4 = Single.
- E. OA = Jewish Organization Membership:
1 = No, 2 = Yes.

- F. SR = Spouses' Religion:
1 = Non-Jewish Spouse, 2 = Born or Converted Jewish Spouse.
- G. E = Last Year of Formal Education Completed.
- H. SCR = Jewish Religious Observance Scale (10 items).
The higher the scaled score the more observant.
- I. SCR 2 = Abridged Jewish Religious Observance Scale (3 items).
The higher the scaled score the more observant.
(Items 2, 3, and 7).
- J. II = Intention to Settle in Israel
1 = No, 2 = Yes.
- K. NVI = Number of Visits to Israel.
- L. SCI = Israel Attitude Scale.
The higher the scaled score the more positive the attitude.
- M. SCIP = Israel Attitude Positive-Items Scale.
The higher the scaled score the more positive the attitude. (Items 2, 4, 5, and 9.)
- N. SCIN = Israel Attitude Negative-Items Scale.
The higher the scaled score the more positive the attitude. (Items 1, 3, 6, 7, 8.)
- O. SCRK = Elementary Jewish Knowledge Scale.
The higher the scaled score the more knowledgeable the respondent.
- P. SCK = Middle East Knowledge Scale.
The higher the scaled score the more knowledgeable the respondent.

**	TS	PA	C	SCK	OA	*SR	E	SCR	SCR2	II	NVI	SCI	SCIP	SCIN	SCRK
TS		.42	.37	.21	.46	.28	-.06 p>.05	.79	.79	.42	.22	.36	.13 p=.001	.37	.66
PA			.27	.14	.32	.24	-.14	.48	.43	.24	.14	.33	.23	.30	.39
C				.18	.38	.20	-.12 p=.001	.38	.39	.15	.20	.25	.05 p>.05	.28	.37
SCK					.20	.19	.23	.22	.23	.21	.21	.35	.13 p=.001	.37	.39
OA						.26	.08 p=.05	.43	.40	.19	.22	.33	.23	.29	.34
*SR							-.13 p=.003	.34	-.23	-.16	.12 p=.007	.35	.17	.34	.21
E								-.09 p=.02	-.02 p>.05	.01 p>.05	.01 p>.05	-.03 p>.05	-.06 p>.05	.00 p>.05	.19
SCR									.90	.51	.23	.36	.16	.36	.73
SCR2										.54	.24	.29	.06 p=.04	.32	.77
II											.20	.21	.05 p>.05	.23	.53
NVI												.16	.05 p>.05	.17	.26
SCI													.61	.94	.31
SCIP														.31	.02 p>.05
SCIN															.37
SCRK															

*The correlations of SR are based on a n of 501.

**When significance-level probability is missing $p < .001$.

Midwest Knowledge Scale

	(N=80) <u>R</u>	(N=114) <u>C</u>	(N=231) <u>O</u>	(N=324) <u>NA</u>
1. Palestine was an independent Palestinian State over the last 300 years until the creation of Israel. Is this true or false?				
True	17%	18%	7%	17%
False	74%	71%	86%	74%
Don't Know	10%	11%	7%	10%
2. From the time many Jews started arriving in Palestine in the late 1800s until the creation of Israel in 1948, thousands of Arabs were kicked out of the land by the Jewish settlers. Is this true or false?				
True	6%	11%	4%	12%
False	89%	84%	90%	80%
DK	10%	5%	6%	8%
3. Arab hostility toward Jews began with the start of Jewish nationalism in the late 1800s. Is this true or false?				
True	24%	26%	31%	24%
False	48%	51%	57%	54%
DK	29%	23%	12%	22%
4. Middle-East Arab nations openly hostile to the State of Israel have spent over three times the amount of money in military equipment than Israel has. Is this true or false?				
True	56%	60%	76%	53%
False	16%	13%	5%	17%
DK	28%	27%	19%	30%
5. Over the last ten years, Saudi Arabia's voting record in the United Nations has shown a strong connection between itself and the United States. Is this true or false?				
True	33%	27%	20%	28%
False	44%	46%	56%	42%
DK	24%	27%	24%	30%

(N=80)

(N=114)

(N=231)

(N=324)

RCONA

6. Israel's past actions have expanded its borders so that it now almost equals in size the area of all its Middle-East enemies put together. Is this true or false?

True	5%	6%	4%	4%
False	90%	90%	94%	88%
DK	5%	4%	2%	9%

7. Over the last ten years, Saudi Arabia has been openly dedicated to the destruction of Israel. Is this true or false?

True	65%	73%	78%	63%
False	25%	15%	14%	24%
DK	10%	12%	9%	13%

8. In 1948, Israel took control of less than one-fifth of the land identified by the League of Nations as Palestine. Is this true or false?

True	63%	57%	60%	57%
False	10%	13%	11%	12%
DK	28%	30%	29%	31%

Israel Attitude Scale

	(N=78) <u>R</u>	(N=108) <u>C</u>	(N=225) <u>O</u>	(N=309) <u>NA</u>
1. The Palestinian refugee problem is the result of Israel's warlike behavior. Do you . . .				
Strongly Agree	1%	2%	1%	3%
Somewhat Agree	8%	4%	1%	9%
Somewhat Disagree	18%	17%	9%	23%
Strongly Disagree	73%	79%	89%	66%
2. The people of Israel are dedicated and hard-working people. Do you . . .				
Strongly Agree	88%	84%	85%	79%
Somewhat Agree	12%	15%	12%	18%
Somewhat Disagree	0%	1%	2%	2%
Strongly Disagree	0%	1%	1%	1%
3. The State of Israel is too warlike. Do you . . .				
Strongly Agree	5%	5%	2%	9%
Somewhat Agree	20%	15%	6%	21%
Somewhat Disagree	35%	19%	19%	29%
Strongly Disagree	39%	62%	73%	42%
4. The U.S. needs to continue to support Israel. Do you . . .				
Strongly Agree	91%	92%	94%	87%
Somewhat Agree	8%	7%	4%	11%
Somewhat Disagree	1%	1%	1%	1%
Strongly Disagree	0%	0%	1%	2%
5. I greatly respect the State of Israel. Do you . . .				
Strongly Agree	84%	92%	82%	77%
Somewhat Agree	13%	8%	13%	21%
Somewhat Disagree	1%	0%	3%	2%
Strongly Disagree	3%	0%	2%	1%

	(N=78) <u>R</u>	(N=108) <u>C</u>	(N=225) <u>O</u>	(N=309) <u>NA</u>
6. Israel showed its brutality in its war in Lebanon. Do you . . .				
Strongly Agree	7%	7%	3%	11%
Somewhat Agree	22%	11%	3%	20%
Somewhat Disagree	32%	23%	19%	25%
Strongly Disagree	39%	59%	75%	44%
7. The Palestinian refugee problem is the core of the Arab-Israel conflict. Do you . . .				
Strongly Agree	11%	10%	7%	14%
Somewhat Agree	15%	17%	10%	22%
Somewhat Disagree	31%	28%	24%	24%
Strongly Disagree	43%	44%	58%	39%
8. Israel's military goal is to gain extra land from its Arab neighbors. Do you . . .				
Strongly Agree	1%	5%	1%	4%
Somewhat Agree	13%	4%	2%	8%
Somewhat Disagree	17%	16%	11%	20%
Strongly Disagree	69%	76%	86%	68%
9. The State of Israel must be militarily strong because of all its hostile neighbors. Do you . . .				
Strongly Agree	90%	90%	96%	86%
Somewhat Agree	8%	10%	4%	11%
Somewhat Disagree	1%	0%	0%	1%
Strongly Disagree	1%	0%	0%	2%

Jewish Religious Knowledge Scale

	(N=80) R	(N=112) C	(N=231) O	(N=323) NA
1. Could you tell me the name of the Jewish New Year?				
Correct	80%	80%	96%	76%
Incorrect	20%	20%	4%	24%
2. On what date was the 1st and 2nd Temple in Jerusalem (The Beit Hamikdosh) destroyed?				
Correct	16%	21%	78%	10%
Incorrect	84%	79%	22%	90%
3. On which Jewish holiday do some Jews wave around a palm branch (A Lulav)?				
Correct	55%	61%	95%	36%
Incorrect	45%	39%	5%	64%
4. What were the names of the three Jewish Patriarchs?				
Correct	47%	45%	89%	33%
Incorrect	53%	55%	11%	67%
5. Could you give me an example of what is meant in the Bible by an <u>Eye For an Eye</u> ?				
Correct	3%	8%	59%	7%
Incorrect	98%	92%	41%	93%
6. Who brought the Jewish people into the Land of Canaan after they had left Egypt?				
Correct	14%	17%	66%	13%
Incorrect	86%	83%	34%	87%
7. What is the Oral Law?				
Correct	17%	21%	69%	14%
Incorrect	84%	80%	31%	86%
8. What is the name of the morning prayer?				
Correct	11%	28%	88%	10%
Incorrect	89%	72%	12%	90%

(N=80)
R(N=112)
C(N=231)
O(N=323)
NA

9. Could you tell me who the chief commentator of the Talmud is whose commentary is found on the same page as the Talmud itself?

Correct	11%	26%	74%	12%
Incorrect	89%	74%	26%	88%

10. And finally, could you spell for me the word Shabbat in Hebrew?

Correct	22%	29%	83%	19%
Incorrect	79%	71%	17%	81%

Formal Education Level (N = 785)
Last Grade Completed

<u>Frequency:</u>	1. 12 and under	18%
	2. Some College or Vocational School	23%
	3. Bachelors Degree	23%
	4. Some Graduate School	8%
	5. Masters Degree	16%
	*6. Doctorate Degree	12%

Reform (N = 78)

1	18%
2	17%
3	28%
4	12%
5	17%
6	9%
Mean = 3.19	

Non-Affiliated (N = 318)

1	20%
2	21%
3	20%
4	8%
5	18%
6	14%
Mean = 3.25	

*A Law Degree was considered a doctorate degree in the study.

Conservative (N = 112)

1	18%
2	28%
3	19%
4	10%
5	8%
6	18%

Mean = 3.16

Orthodox (N = 229)

1	15%
2	25%
3	27%
4	8%
5	18%
6	8%

Mean = 3.12

 $F = .29, df (3, 733), p > .05.$

APPENDIX B

MISCELLANEOUS STATISTICS FOR STUDY NO. 2

II. Abbreviation and Directional Key for Variables Used in the Following Analyses

- A. Scale K = Middle-East Knowledge Scale.
The higher the scaled score the more knowledgeable the respondent.
- B. Scale J = Jewish Attitude Scale.
The higher the scaled score the more positive the attitude.
- C. Scale I = Israel Attitude Scale.
The higher the scaled score the more positive the attitude.
- D. Scale Ips = Israel Positive-Items Attitude Scale.
(Items 2, 4, 5, and 9).
The higher the scaled score the more positive the attitude.
- E. Scale Ing = Israel Negative-Items Attitude Scale.
(Items 1, 3, 6, 7, and 8).
The higher the scaled score the more positive the attitude.
- F. Scale P = Abridged and Modified Purpose in Life Scale.
The higher the score the more positive the attitude.
- G. Scale An = Anomie Scale.
The higher the score the more positive the attitude.
- H. Scale ES = Ego-Strength Scale.
The higher the score the more positive the attitude.
- I. Scale CF = Combination Opinion-Fear Crises Scale.
The higher the score the more negative the attitude.
- J. Scale CO = Crises Opinion Scale.
The higher the score the more negative the attitude.
- K. Scale F = Crises Fear Scale.
The higher the score the more negative the attitude.
- L. Scale CF1 = Nuclear War Crisis Scale.
The higher the score the more negative the attitude.
- M. Scale CF2 = Economic Crisis Scale.
The higher the score the more negative the attitude.
- N. Scale CF3 = Political Crisis Scale.
The higher the score the more negative the attitude.

- O. G = Gender
Male = 1; Female = 2.
- P. E = Education
Last year of formal education completed.
- Q. Inc = Individual Income for 1984.
- R. SAT = Life Satisfaction Scale.
The higher the score the more positive the attitude.

*Correlation and Level of Significance (N = 360)

	Scale K	Scale J	Scale I	Scale Ips	Scale Ing
Scale K	1.000 .999	.189 .000	.256 .000	.209 .000	.227 .000
Scale J	.189 .000	1.000 .999	.565 .000	.402 .000	.492 .000
Scale I	.256 .000	.565 .000	1.000 .999	.741 .000	.861 .000
Scale Ips	.209 .000	.402 .000	.741 .000	1.000 .999	.323 .000
Scale Ing	.227 .000	.492 .000	.861 .000	.323 .000	1.000 .999
Scale AN	-.037 .483	.253 .000	.140 .008	.067 .202	.133 .011
Scale EP	.089 .092	.218 .000	.153 .004	.101 .055	.166 .002
Scale ES	.113 .033	.064 .226	.118 .025	.080 .129	.104 .049
Scale CF	-.006 .906	-.173 .001	-.219 .000	-.090 .088	-.259 .000
Scale CO	.006 .905	-.168 .001	-.213 .000	-.082 .119	-.255 .000
Scale F	-.013 .800	-.132 .012	-.173 .001	-.082 .120	-.197 .000
**G	-.059 .295	.038 .496	-.143 .011	-.066 .236	-.173 .002
**Age	.047 .401	-.009 .867	.168 .003	.193 .001	.083 .140
**E	.176 .002	.265 .000	.183 .001	.050 .375	.227 .000
**Inc	.146 .009	.126 .024	.177 .001	.114 .042	.182 .001

*All correlations appear twice in the present matrix.

**N=320 for all correlations involving this variable.

Scale AN	Scale EP	Scale ES	Scale CF	Scale CO	Scale F
-.037	.089	.113	-.006	.006	-.013
.483	.092	.033	.906	.905	.800
.253	.218	.064	-.173	-.168	-.132
.000	.000	.226	.001	.001	.012
.140	.153	.118	-.219	-.213	-.173
.008	.004	.025	.000	.000	.001
.067	.101	.080	-.090	-.082	-.082
.202	.055	.129	.088	.119	.120
.133	.166	.104	-.259	-.255	-.197
.011	.002	.049	.000	.000	.000
1.000	.163	.231	-.240	-.245	-.182
.999	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001
.263	1.000	.330	-.132	-.099	-.126
.000	.999	.000	.012	.062	.017
.231	.330	1.000	-.133	-.075	-.150
.000	.000	.999	.011	.156	.004
-.240	-.132	-.133	1.000	.867	.879
.000	.012	.011	.999	.000	.000
-.245	-.099	-.075	.867	1.000	.527
.000	.062	.156	.000	.999	.000
-.182	-.126	-.150	.879	.527	1.000
.001	.017	.004	.000	.000	.999
.100	.097	-.132	.208	.158	.210
.075	.085	.018	.000	.005	.000
-.013	.121	.278	-.121	-.086	-.127
.822	.030	.000	.030	.123	.023
.350	.208	.233	-.246	-.266	-.206
.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
.173	.147	.202	-.153	-.131	-.136
.002	.008	.000	.006	.019	.015

Continued

	Scale K	Scale J	Scale I	Scale Ips	Scale Ing
*Scale CF1	-.012 .830	-.127 .023	-.198 .000	-.107 .056	-.208 .000
*Scale CF2	.030 .591	-.129 .021	-.154 .006	-.084 .132	-.166 .003
*Scale CF3	.025 .657	-.193 .001	-.221 .000	-.066 .242	-.276 .000
*SAT	.001 .991	.061 .280	.051 .361	.000 .999	.087 .122

* N = 320 for all correlations involving this variable.

Scale AN	Scale P	Scale ES	Scale CF	Scale CO	Scale F
-.166 .003	-.056 .320	-.187 .001	.797 .000	.641 .000	.749 .000
-.219 .000	-.085 .128	-.064 .254	.848 .000	.727 .000	.747 .000
-.262 .000	-.082 .144	-.032 .563	.764 .000	.713 .000	.630 .000
.181 .001	.416 .000	.260 .000	-.137 .014	-.127 .023	-.113 .043

Continued

	G	Age	E	Inc	Scale CF1	Scale CF2	Scale CF3	SAT
Scale K	-.059 .295	.047 .401	.176 .002	.146 .009	-.012 .830	.030 .591	.025 .657	.001 .991
Scale J	.038 .496	-.009 .867	.265 .000	.126 .024	-.127 .023	-.129 .021	-.193 .001	.061 .280
Scale I	-.143 .011	.168 .003	.183 .001	.177 .001	-.198 .000	-.154 .006	-.221 .000	.052 .361
Scale Ips	-.066 .236	.193 .001	.050 .375	.114 .042	-.107 .056	-.084 .132	.066 .242	.000 .999
Scale Ing	-.173 .002	0.83 .140	.227 .000	.182 .001	-.208 .000	-.166 .003	-.276 .000	.087 .122
Scale An	.100 .075	-.013 .822	.350 .000	.173 .002	-.166 .003	-.219 .000	-.262 .000	.181 .001
Scale P	.097 .085	.121 .030	.208 .000	.147 .008	-.0-56 .320	-.085 .128	-.082 —	.416 .000
Scale ES	-.132 .018	.278 .000	.233 .000	.202 .000	-.187 .001	-.064 .254	-.032 .563	.260 .000
Scale CF	.208 .000	.121 .030	-.246 .000	-.153 .006	.797 .000	.848 .000	.764 .000	-.137 .014
Scale CO	.158 .005	-.086 .123	-.226 .000	-.131 .019	.641 .000	.727 .000	.713 .000	-.127 .023
Scale F	.210 .000	-.127 .023	-.206 .000	-.136 .015	.749 .001	.747 .000	.630 .000	-.113 .043
G	1.000 .999	.012 .827	-.099 .078	-.249 .000	.182 .001	.129 .021	.186 .001	-.027 .624
Age	.012 .827	1.000 .999	-.131 .019	.040 .480	-.172 .002	-.081 .147	-.1029 .610	.076 .175
E	-.099 .078	-.131 .019	1.000 .999	.354 .000	-.149 .008	-.170 .002	-.283 .000	.181 .001
Inc	-.249 .000	.040 .480	.354 .000	1.000 .999	-.157 .005	-.102 .067	-.113 .044	.097 .082

	G	Age	E	Inc	Scale CF1	Scale CF2	Scale CF3	SAT
Scale CF1	.182 .001	-.172 .002	.149 .008	-.157 .005	1.000 .999	.542 .000	.364 .000	-.107 .055
Scale CF2	.129 .021	-.081 .147	-.170 .002	-.102 .067	.542 .000	1.000 .999	.501 .000	-.155 .006
Scale CF3	.186 .001	-.029 .610	-.283 .000	-.113 .044	.364 .000	.501 .000	1.000 .999	-.064 .255
SAT	-.027 .624	.076 .175	.181 .001	.097 .082	-.107 .055	-.155 .006	-.064 .255	1.000 .999

Israel Attitude Scale
N = 378

*Frequency

Strong Negative Attitudes	=	2%
Somewhat Negative Attitudes	=	28%
Somewhat Positive Attitudes	=	57%
Strong Positive Attitudes	=	13%

*A scaled score based on the mean of all nine items in the scale produced a range of 3 (minimum = 1, maximum = 4). The individual mean scores were then rounded to the nearest integer which resulted in the following ranges for each of the above categories.

Strong Negative Attitudes	=	1.00 to 1.49
Somewhat Negative Attitudes	=	1.50 to 2.49
Somewhat Positive Attitudes	=	2.50 to 3.49
Strong Positive Attitudes	=	3.50 to 4.00

The same categorization process was done for the Jewish attitude scale.

1. The Palestinian refugee problem is the result of Israel's war-like behavior. Do you

(N=332)	STRONGLY AGREE	= 14%
	SOMEWHAT AGREE	= 25%
	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	= 36%
	STRONGLY DISAGREE	= 25%

2. The people of Israel are dedicated and hard-working people. Do you

(N=348)	STRONGLY AGREE	= 62%
	SOMEWHAT AGREE	= 31%
	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	= 5%
	STRONGLY DISAGREE	= 2%

3. The State of Israel is too war-like. Do you

(N=348)	STRONGLY AGREE	= 31%
	SOMEWHAT AGREE	= 26%
	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	= 23%
	STRONGLY DISAGREE	= 21%

4. The U.S. needs to continue to support Israel. Do you

(N=350)	STRONGLY AGREE	= 35%
	SOMEWHAT AGREE	= 26%
	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	= 19%
	STRONGLY DISAGREE	= 19%

5. I greatly respect the State of Israel. Do you

(N=345)	STRONGLY AGREE	= 37%
	SOMEWHAT AGREE	= 39%
	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	= 15%
	STRONGLY DISAGREE	= 10%

6. Israel showed its brutality in its war in Lebanon. Do you

(N=316)	STRONGLY AGREE	= 26%
	SOMEWHAT AGREE	= 30%
	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	= 25%
	STRONGLY DISAGREE	= 19%

7. The Palestinian refugee problem is the core of the Arab-Israel conflict. Do you

(N=316)	STRONGLY AGREE	= 27%
	SOMEWHAT AGREE	= 29%
	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	= 26%
	STRONGLY DISAGREE	= 18%

8. Israel's military goal is to gain extra land from its Arab neighbors. Do you

(N=334)	STRONGLY AGREE	= 25%
	SOMEWHAT AGREE	= 23%
	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	= 27%
	STRONGLY DISAGREE	= 26%

9. The State of Israel must be militarily strong because of all its hostile neighbors. Do you

(N=348)	STRONGLY AGREE	= 57%
	SOMEWHAT AGREE	= 26%
	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	= 10%
	STRONGLY DISAGREE	= 7%

Jewish Attitude Scale
(N = 388)

Frequency:

Strong Negative Attitudes	=	3%
Somewhat Negative Attitudes	=	17%
Somewhat Positive Attitudes	=	49%
Strong Positive Attitudes	=	31%

1. Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get ahead. Do you

(N=365)	STRONGLY AGREE	= 13%
	SOMEWHAT AGREE	= 13%
	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	= 33%
	STRONGLY DISAGREE	= 42%

2. Jews don't care what happens to anyone but their own kind. Do you

(N=373)	STRONGLY AGREE	= 10%
	SOMEWHAT AGREE	= 8%
	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	= 32%
	STRONGLY DISAGREE	= 50%

3. When it comes to choosing between people and money, Jews will choose money. Do you

(N=354)	STRONGLY AGREE	= 19%
	SOMEWHAT AGREE	= 11%
	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	= 27%
	STRONGLY DISAGREE	= 42%

4. Jews take the proper interest in community problems and good government. Do you

(N=360)	STRONGLY AGREE	= 44%
	SOMEWHAT AGREE	= 36%
	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	= 13%
	STRONGLY DISAGREE	= 7%

5. Jews may have moral standards which they apply in their dealings with other Jews, but with Christians they are ruthless. Do you

(N=350)	STRONGLY AGREE	= 11%
	SOMEWHAT AGREE	= 12%
	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	= 33%
	STRONGLY DISAGREE	= 45%

6. A major fault of the Jews is their conceit and overbearing pride. Do you

(N=357)	STRONGLY AGREE	= 16%
	SOMEWHAT AGREE	= 18%
	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	= 30%
	STRONGLY DISAGREE	= 36%

7. Jews are a revengeful people. Do you

(N=350)	STRONGLY AGREE	= 13%
	SOMEWHAT AGREE	= 11%
	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	= 29%
	STRONGLY DISAGREE	= 47%

8. In general, Jews are a people filled with prejudice.
Do you

(N=364)	STRONGLY AGREE	= 10%
	SOMEWHAT AGREE	= 16%
	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	= 31%
	STRONGLY DISAGREE	= 43%

9. Jews have too much power in the United States today.
Do you

(N=363)	STRONGLY AGREE	= 17%
	SOMEWHAT AGREE	= 10%
	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	= 32%
	STRONGLY DISAGREE	= 41%

10. Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America. Do you

(N=339)	STRONGLY AGREE	= 20%
	SOMEWHAT AGREE	= 15%
	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	= 32%
	STRONGLY DISAGREE	= 33%

Comparison of the Three-Item Scale Administered Immediately
After the Respective Readings, with the Identical Scale
Administered at the Completion of the Interview

	(N=230) After Magazine Readings	(N=165) At Completion of Interview
<u>Reliability Coefficients</u> :	.47 ;	.47
<u>Means</u> :	1.55 ;	1.70
<u>Variances</u> :	.24 ;	.21
<u>Inter-Item Correlation Mens</u> :	.23 ;	.22
<u>Separate Item Means</u> :		
<u>Item 1</u>	1.47 ;	1.65
<u>Item 2</u>	1.51 ;	1.70
<u>Item 3</u>	1.67 ;	1.74

Factor Analysis on the Eight Questions Following the
Readings, After Varimax Rotation

	<u>Factor 1</u>	<u>Factor 2</u>
Version Question 1	.76	.24
Version Question 2	.75	.23
Version Question 3	.26	.66
Version Question 4	.22	.45
Version Question 5	.49	.22
Version Question 6	.71	-.06
Version Question 7	.09	.52
Version Question 8	-.01	.76

The eight questions were then broken down into two scales based on the above analysis and a Kuder-Richardson-20 reliability coefficient was obtained for each, as shown below.

<u>Factor 1</u>	<u>Factor 2</u>
(Questions 1, 2, 5, & 6) with (N=172) = <u>.66</u>	(Questions 3, 4, 7, & 8) with (N=172) = <u>.50</u>

Correlation Matrix (N=335)

<u>Israel Attitude Scale</u>	<u>Questions (Complete) (8 Items)</u>	<u>Questions (Factor 1)</u>	<u>Questions (Factor 2)</u>
Israel Attitude Scale	.22 p < .001	.23 p < .001	.15 p = .007
Questions (Complete) (8 Items)		.85 p < .001	.82 p < .001
Questions (Factor 1)			.42 p < .001
Questions (Factor 2)			

Correlations between 8-item scale and

- A) Jewish Attitude Scale (Scale J)
- B) M.E. Knowledge Scale (Scale K)
- C) Israel Attitude Scale (Scale I)

Respondents receiving

1) Arab Version (N=89)
8-Item Scale

Scale J - .08, $p > .05$
 Scale K - .08, $p > .05$
 Scale I - .20, $p > .05$

Respondents receiving

2) American Version (n=84)
8-Item Scale

Scale J - -.03, $p > .05$
 Scale K - .01, $p > .05$
 Scale I - .13, $p > .05$

Respondents receiving

3) Jewish Secular Version (N=82)
8-Item Scale

Scale J - -.13, $p > .05$
 Scale K - .04, $p > .05$
 Scale I - -.06, $p > .05$

Respondents receiving

4) Jewish Religious Version (N=92)
8-Item Scale

Scale J - .35, $p = .001$
 Scale K - .05, $p > .05$
 Scale I - .42, $p < .001$

APPENDIX C

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STUDY NO. 1

INTRODUCTION

Hello, is this _____ ?

My name is _____, and I'm calling for the Jewish Social Research Center of Chicago. We're conducting a survey of Chicago area residents' opinions concerning issues in the Middle East. All answers will be confidential and participation is voluntary.

For this survey, I need to speak with a man or woman over 21 who is Jewish or of Jewish descent. Does anyone in your household fit this category?

[IF ABOVE CRITERIA ARE NOT MET, POLITELY TERMINATE]

[IF ELIGIBLE PERSON IS NOT HOME, DETERMINE WHEN TO CALL BACK]

Q1. GENDER: MALE.....1
 FEMALE.....2

[CONTINUE WHEN SPEAKING TO ELIGIBLE PERSON; REPEAT INTRO IF NECESSARY]

In addition to questions about issues in the Middle East, throughout the survey I'll also be asking you some background questions.

STARTING TIME _____

Q2. What is your primary source of news about international affairs?
Is it...

Radio.....1
 Television.....2
 Newspapers.....3
 Magazines, or.....4
 Some other source.....5 (Specify _____)
 DK.....9

Q3. What is your primary source of news about the Middle East?

Radio.....1
 Television.....2
 Newspapers.....3
 Magazines, or.....4
 Some other source.....5 (Specify _____)
 DK.....9

Q4. What are your two most widely read Jewish magazines or newspapers?

Q5. Of these two, which one would you say is more widely read?

During the past 30 years, Americans have heard a lot about the Arab-Israeli conflict. It's important for us to learn what people know about the history of the conflict. For each statement I read, please tell me if it's true, false, or if you don't know. If you don't hear or understand the question completely, I'll be happy to repeat it for you.

	<u>T</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>DK</u>
Q6. Palestine was an independent Palestinian State over the last 300 years until the creation of Israel. Is this true or false?.....	1	2	9
Q7. From the time many Jews started arriving in Palestine in the late 1800s until the creation of Israel in 1948, thousands of Arabs were kicked out of the land by the Jewish settlers. Is this true or false?.....	1	2	9
Q8. Arab hostility toward Jews began with the start of Jewish nationalism in the late 1800s. Is this true or false?.....	1	2	9
Q9. Middle-East Arab nations openly hostile to the State of Israel have spent over three times the amount of money in military equipment than Israel has. Is this true or false?.....	1	2	9
Q10. Over the last ten years, Saudi Arabia's voting record in the United Nations has shown a strong connection between itself and the United States. Is this true or false?.....	1	2	9
Q11. Israel's past actions have expanded its borders so that it now almost equals in size the area of all its Middle-East enemies put together. Is this true or false?.....	1	2	9
Q12. Over the last ten years, Saudi Arabia has been openly dedicated to the destruction of Israel. Is this true or false?.....	1	2	9
Q13. In 1948, Israel took control of less than one-fifth of the land identified by the League of Nations as Palestine. Is this true or false?.....	1	2	9

I now need to read some statements with which some people agree and others disagree. There are no right or wrong answers. For each one, please tell me if you agree or disagree.

Q14A. The Palestinian refugee problem is the result of Israel's war-like behavior. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 Don't Know.....9 [Skip to Q15A]

Q14B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

Q15A. The people of Israel are dedicated and hard-working people. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 Don't Know.....9 [Skip to Q16A]

Q15B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

Q16A. The State of Israel is too war-like. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 Don't Know.....9 [Skip to Q17A]

Q16B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

Q17A. The U. S. needs to continue to support Israel. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 Don't Know.....9 [Skip to Q18A]

Q17B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

Q18A. I greatly respect the State of Israel. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 Don't Know.....9 [Skip to Q19A]

Q18B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

Q19A. Israel showed its brutality in its war in Lebanon. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 Don't Know.....9 [Skip to Q20A]

Q19B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

Q20A. The Palestinian refugee problem is the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 Don't Know.....9 [Skip to Q21A]

Q20B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

Q21A. Israel's military goal is to gain extra land from its Arab neighbors. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 Don't Know.....9 [Skip to Q22A]

Q21B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

Q22A. The State of Israel must be militarily strong because of all its hostile neighbors. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 Don't Know.....9 [Skip to Q23]

Q22B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

I now am going to ask you some questions about several religious activities which some Jewish people do and some Jewish people do not do.

[NA MEANS NO ANSWER, REFUSED, OR DON'T KNOW]	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>NA</u>
Q23. Do you refrain from eating bread and bread products on Passover?.....	1	2	8
Q24. Do you refrain from driving on Saturday?.....	1	2	8
Q25. Do you keep Kosher?.....	1	2	8
Q26. Do you believe in G-d?.....	1	2	8
Q27. Do you fast on Yom Kippur?.....	1	2	8
Q28. Do you eat pork?.....	1	2	8
Q29A. Do you Fast on Tish Abav?.....	1	2	8
Q29B. Do you believe in a "world to come" after one dies in this world?.....	1	2	8
Q30. Do you believe that the Bible was given to the Jews by G-d?.....	1	2	8
Q31. Do you attend Synagogue services weekly?.....	1	2	8
[FOR MEN ONLY]			
Q32A. Do you put on Tefillin daily?.....	1	2	8
[FOR WOMEN ONLY]			
Q32B. Do you light Sabbath candles?.....	1	2	8

Now I'd like to finish by asking some background questions to help analyze the data.

Q33. Have you had some type of formal Jewish education?

Yes.....1
No.....2 [SKIP TO Q36]

Q34A. What type of Jewish education was it? _____

Q34B. Was this educational institution affiliated with the Reform, Conservative, Orthodox, or some other Jewish movement?

Q35. How many years of this education did you have? _____

Q36. Do you presently belong to a synagogue?

Yes.....1
No.....2 [SKIP TO Q38]

Q37. Is your synagogue Reform, Conservative, Traditional, or Orthodox?

REFORM.....1
CONSERVATIVE.....2
TRADITIONAL.....3
ORTHODOX.....4
OTHER.....5 [SPECIFY _____]
NOTHING.....6
REFUSED.....8

Q38. Would you consider yourself Reform, Conservative, Orthodox, or non-affiliated?

[IF RESPONDENT SAYS TRADITIONAL, ASK: Would you say you are closer to Conservative or Orthodox?]

REFORM.....1
CONSERVATIVE.....2
ORTHODOX.....3
OTHER.....4 [SPECIFY _____]
NON-AFFILIATED.....5
REFUSED.....8

Q39. Are or were your parents Reform, Conservative, Orthodox, or non-Affiliated?

REFORM.....1
CONSERVATIVE.....2
ORTHODOX.....3
NON-AFFILIATED.....4
OTHER.....5 [SPECIFY _____]
REFUSED.....8

Q40. Are or were your grandparents Reform, Conservative, Orthodox, or Non-Affiliated?

REFORM.....1
 CONSERVATIVE.....2
 ORTHODOX.....3
 NON-AFFILIATED.....4
 OTHER.....5 [SPECIFY _____]
 REFUSED.....8

Q41. Do you belong to a Jewish organization aside from a synagogue or synagogue-related group?

Yes.....1 [SPECIFY _____]
 No.....2 (no more than two)
 Refused.....8

Q42. Are you presently married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been married?

MARRIED.....1
 WIDOWED.....2
 DIVORCED.....3
 SEPARATED.....4
 NEVER MARRIED.....5 [SKIP TO Q58]
 REFUSED.....8 [SKIP TO Q58]

Q43. Is (was) your spouse Jewish or of Jewish descent?

Yes.....1
 No.....2
 Convert.....3 [SPECIFY BY WHOM] _____
 Refused.....8

Q44. How many children do you have?

Q45. What are your children's ages?

[IF NO CHILDREN 21 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER, SKIP TO Q58]

Q46. Do your children who are 21 years of age or older belong to a synagogue or attend synagogue services regularly?

[SPECIFY FOR EACH CHILD OVER 21]

[IF NONE BELONG OR ATTEND, SKIP TO Q48]

Q47. What type of synagogue do these children belong to or attend?
Is it...

Reform.....1
 Conservative.....2
 Traditional, or.....3
 Orthodox.....4
 Other.....5 [Specify _____]
 Refused.....8

Q48. Do your children 21 and over belong to a Jewish organization aside from a synagogue or synagogue-related group?

[SPECIFY FOR EACH]

Q49. Are your children presently married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have they never been married?

[IF NONE HAVE EVER BEEN MARRIED, SKIP TO Q58]

[SPECIFY FOR EACH]

Q50. Of your children who are or were married, are or were their spouses Jewish or non-Jewish?

[SPECIFY FOR EACH]

Q51. Do your married children have children of their own?

[SPECIFY FOR EACH CHILD AND OBTAIN SPECIFIC AGES OF GRANDCHILDREN]

[IF NONE, SKIP TO Q58]

[IF NONE 21 OR OLDER, SKIP TO Q58]

Q52. Do your grandchildren 21 years of age or older belong to a synagogue or attend synagogue services regularly?

[SPECIFY YES OR NO FOR EACH]

[IF NONE BELONG OR ATTEND, SKIP TO Q54]

Q53. What type of synagogue do these grandchildren belong to or attend?
Is it...

Reform.....1
 Conservative.....2
 Traditional, or.....3
 Orthodox.....4
 OTHER5 [SPECIFY _____]
 REFUSED.....8

Q54. Do your grandchildren 21 and over belong to a Jewish organization
aside from a synagogue or synagogue-related group?

[SPECIFY FOR EACH]

Q55. Are your grandchildren presently married, widowed, divorced,
separated, or have they never been married?

[SPECIFY FOR EACH]

[IF NONE HAVE EVER BEEN MARRIED, SKIP TO Q58]

Q56. Of your grandchildren who are or were married, are or were their spouses Jewish or non-Jewish?

[SPECIFY FOR EACH]

Q57. Do your grandchildren have any children of their own?

NO1
YES.....2

[SPECIFY FOR EACH GRANDCHILD AND OBTAIN AGES]

Q58. In what year were you born? _____

REFUSED.....88

Q59. Were you born in the United States?

YES.....1 [SKIP TO Q62]
NO.....2

Q60. In what country were you born?

Q61. What was the highest grade or year of school you completed?

NONE.....	00
ELEMENTARY..01..02..03..04..05..06..07..08	
HIGH SCHOOL.....09..10..11..12	
SOME COLLEGE.....	13
VOCATIONAL SCHOOL.....	14
BACHELOR DEGREE.....	15
SOME GRADUATE SCHOOL.....	16
MASTER DEGREE.....	17
DOCTORATE DEGREE.....	18
REFUSED.....	88

Finally to conclude this survey, I need to ask you some questions about Zionism and Judaism.

Q62. Have you ever visited Israel?

YES.....1
 NO.....2 [SKIP TO Q64]
 REFUSED.....8

Q63. How many times have you visited Israel?

Q64. If things in the U. S. remain as they are, do you have any real intention of ever settling in Israel?

YES1
 NO.....2
 REFUSED.....8

Q65. Could you tell me the name of the Jewish New Year?

Q66. On what date was the 1st and 2nd Temple in Jerusalem (The Beit Hamikdosh) destroyed?

Q67. On which Jewish holiday do some Jews wave around a palm branch (A Lulav)?

Q68. What were the names of the three Jewish Patriarchs?

Q69. Could you give me an example of what is meant in the Bible by an Eye For an Eye?

Q70. Who brought the Jewish people into the Land of Canaan after they had left Egypt?

Q71. What is the Oral Law?

Q72. What is the name of the morning prayer?

Q73. Could you tell me who the chief commentator of the Talmud is whose commentary is found on the same page as the Talmud itself?

Q74. And finally, could you spell for me the word Shabbat in Hebrew?

Thank you, that completes the survey. Thanks very much for your cooperation.

FINISHING TIME _____

APPENDIX D

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STUDY NO. 2

SURVEY INTRODUCTION

Hello, is this _____? [VERIFY TELEPHONE NUMBER]

My name is _____, and I'm calling for Loyola University of Chicago. We are conducting a survey concerning Chicago residents' opinions about international affairs, and specifically concerning issues in the Middle East. All answers will be confidential and participation is voluntary.

For this survey, I need to speak with a man [woman] 25 years of age or older. Does anyone in your household fit into this category?

[IF MAN (WOMAN) IN HOUSEHOLD IS NOT 25 YEARS OR OLDER, POLITELY TERMINATE]

[IF ELIGIBLE MALE (FEMALE) IS NOT HOME, DETERMINE WHEN TO CALL BACK]

[IF TOLD NO MAN (WOMAN) LIVES IN HOUSEHOLD, POLITELY TERMINATE]

S1. GENDER: MALE.....1
FEMALE2

[CONTINUE WHEN SPEAKING TO ELIGIBLE MALE (FEMALE), REPEAT INTRO IF NECESSARY:]

In addition to questions about international affairs and the Middle East, throughout the survey I will also be asking you some questions about yourself. Now I'll begin by asking you three short background questions.

S2. What is your racial background? Are you...

Asian.....1	[POLITELY TERMINATE]
Black.....2	
Hispanic, or.....3	[POLITELY TERMINATE]
White?.....4	
OTHER.....5	[POLITELY TERMINATE]
REFUSED.....8	[POLITELY TERMINATE]

S3. Are you of Arabic or Jewish decent?

YES.....1	[POLITELY TERMINATE]
NO.....2	
REFUSED.....8	[POLITELY TERMINATE]

S4. What is your religious preference? Are you...

Catholic.....1	
Protestant.....2	
Jewish, or.....3	[POLITELY TERMINATE]
Something else? (specify _____)4	
REFUSED.....8	[POLITELY TERMINATE]

STARTING TIME _____

During the past 30 years, Americans have heard a lot about the Arab-Israeli conflict. It's important for us to learn what people know about the history of the conflict. For each statement I read, please tell me if it's true, false, or if you don't know. If you don't hear or understand the question completely, I'll be happy to repeat it for you.

	<u>T</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>DK</u>
Q1. Palestine was an independent Palestinian State over the last 300 years until the creation of Israel. Is that true or false?.....	1	2	9
Q2. From the time many Jews started arriving in Palestine in the late 1800s until the creation of Israel in 1948, thousands of Arabs were kicked out of the land by the Jewish settlers. Is that true or false?.....	1	2	9
Q3. Arab hostility toward Jews began with the start of Jewish nationalism in the late 1800s. Is that true or false?.....	1	2	9
Q4. Middle-East Arab nations openly hostile to the State of Israel have spent over three times the amount of money in military equipment than Israel has. Is that true or false?.....	1	2	9
Q5. Over the last ten years Saudi Arabia's voting record in the United Nations has shown a strong connection between itself and the United States. Is that true or false?.....	1	2	9
Q6. Israel's past actions have expanded its borders so that it now almost equals in size the area of all its Middle-East enemies put together. Is that true or false?.....	1	2	9
Q7. Over the last ten years Saudi Arabia has been openly dedicated to the destruction of Israel. Is that true or false?.....	1	2	9
Q8. In 1948 Israel took control of less than one-fifth of the land identified by the League of Nations as Palestine. Is that true or false?.....	1	2	9

Now I'll read some statements that describe the way some people feel about themselves. For each statement, please tell me how true they are for you.

Q9. "No one cares much about what happens to me." Thinking about yourself, is that...

very true.....1
 pretty true, or.....2
 not true at all.....3
 DON'T KNOW.....9

Q10. "I often wish that people would listen to me more." Is that...

very true.....1
 pretty true, or.....2
 not true at all.....3
 DON'T KNOW.....9

Q11. "I often wish that people liked me more than they do." Is that...

very true.....1
 pretty true, or.....2
 not true at all.....3
 DON'T KNOW.....9

Q12. "These days I really don't know who I can count on for help." Is that...

very true.....1
 pretty true, or.....2
 not true at all.....3
 DON'T KNOW.....9

Now I'm going to read some statements about how people are spending their lives these days. Please tell me how these statements apply to you.

Q13. When thinking about your life, do you more often wonder why you exist, or do you more often see a reason for being here?

WONDER WHY	1
SEE A REASON	2
RF	8
DK	9

Q14. Would you say your life is . . .

empty,	1
somewhat empty, or	2
not at all empty?	3
RF	8
DK	9

Q15. Is facing your daily tasks more often a source of pleasure and satisfaction, or is it more often a painful and boring experience.

PLEASURE/SATISFACTION	1
PAINFUL/BORING	2
RF	8
DK	9

Q16. If you should die today, would you feel that your life has been . . .

very worthwhile,	3
somewhat worthwhile, or	2
not at all worthwhile?	1
DON'T KNOW	9

Q17. In general, how satisfying do you find the way you're spending your life these days? Would you call it . . .

completely satisfying,	3
pretty satisfying, or	2
not very satisfying?	1
DK	9

[VERSION PPP]

I now need to read you a group of sentences and then ask you a few questions which you are asked to answer based only on your understanding of these sentences.

The sentences you will hear come from an actual magazine with a particular political point of view. The information in the sentences does not necessarily represent the real situation, but only this magazine's way of explaining it.

[READ SENTENCES:]

A Jewish professor stated that the Israeli army has committed atrocities against the Palestinian people.

The racist character of Zionism is amply manifested in Israel's imperialistic and settler-state policies.

During Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli army trampled on its victims destroying everything in its path and unleashed on Beirut a rain of death and destruction.

The Palestinians have been victims of extermination, persecution, and indifference since 1948.

Most of the world's governments today have come to recognize that the Palestinian problem is the root-cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Jews have displaced the Palestinians from their land via abominations.

Jews have no real Biblical justification for building a Jewish State in Palestine.

The polls have shown that the American people think that the Palestinian struggle to return to their land is justified.

Now, before I ask you the final set of questions, would you like me to repeat the sentences one more time? (IF NOT, GO RIGHT TO QUESTIONS.)

[VERSION JRP]

Finally, to conclude this survey, I need to read you a group of sentences and then ask you a few questions which you are asked to answer based only on your understanding of these sentences.

The sentences you will hear come from an actual magazine with a particular political point of view. The information in the sentences does not necessarily represent the real situation, but only this magazine's way of explaining it.

[READ SENTENCES:]

The State of Israel is the historic homeland of the Jews.

The Palestinian Liberation Organization, the PLO, is an unprincipled terrorist organization.

The PLO has vied for the total liquidation of Israel.

PLO operations in Lebanon up to 1982 was the center for international terrorism worldwide.

Up until 1982, Israel's northern border has been consistently bombed by PLO terrorists.

Since June of 1981 to December of 1982, a total of 150 terrorist attacks have been made against Israel by the PLO.

The President of Lebanon said, in Paris, that Arafat, the leader of the PLO, is the cause of the Palestinian's problems.

Jordan is the key obstructionist in settling the Palestinian refugee problem by not admitting that his state is actually Palestine.

Now, before I ask you the final set of questions, would you like me to repeat the sentences one more time? (IF NOT, GO RIGHT TO QUESTIONS.)

[VERSION JSMP]

Finally, to conclude this survey, I need to read you a group of sentences and then ask you a few questions which you are asked to answer based only on your understanding of these sentences.

The sentences you will hear come from an actual magazine with a particular political point of view. The information in the sentences does not necessarily represent the real situation, but only this magazine's way of explaining it.

[READ SENTENCES:]

Israel will never obtain the security it wants by using force.

The Israeli government has tried to destroy the Arab political elite in the occupied territories by ousting mayors, closing universities, and restricting the circulation of literature in the Arab-dominated areas..

Many governments throughout the world have held Israel responsible for the massacre of Palestinian civilians in the Palestinian refugee camps.

According to the U. S. State Department, there are 4,300,000 Palestinians scattered around the world.

The European Parliament Assembly has expressed solidarity with the Palestinian people.

The Arabs call for a Palestinian State represented by the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the PLO.

The moderate Arab states, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt, are troubled by the Palestinian plight.

A PLO leader who surrendered to the Israelis said that he was ashamed of its terrorist tactics.

Now, before I ask you the final set of questions, would you like me to repeat the sentences one more time? (IF NOT, GO RIGHT TO QUESTIONS.)

[VERSION ASMP]

Finally, to conclude this survey, I need to read you a group of sentences and then ask you a few questions which you are asked to answer based only on your understanding of these sentences.

The sentences you will hear come from an actual magazine with a particular political point of view. The information in the sentences does not necessarily represent the real situation, but only this magazine's way of explaining it.

[READ SENTENCES:]

President Carter said that the continued deprivation of Palestinian rights by the Israelis is contrary to moral and ethical principles of both the U. S. and Israel.

The Israelis arranged for the Christian militiamen to enter the Palestinian refugee camps in 1982 where there were very bloody consequences.

Senior American officials feel the necessity for solving the Palestinian plight on the West Bank.

An Israeli victory in Lebanon did not settle the issue of a place for the Palestinians to live.

Because the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the PLO, suffered defeat in Lebanon, the moderate policies of Yasser Arafat may be rejected for more ruthless tactics.

The Arab leaders of the Middle-East have called for the creation of an independent Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital.

The leader of the PLO Yasser Arafat has unflagging energy and absolute determination to regain a homeland for his people.

The Lebanese President stated that the Palestinians should be allowed to live in peace and freedom with self-determination in their land.

Now, before I ask you the final set of questions, would you like me to repeat the sentences one more time? (IF NOT, GO RIGHT TO QUESTIONS.)

Now, please remember, base your answers only on the sentences you have just heard and not on any prior knowledge or attitudes you might have.

Q18. According to what you just heard, who is to blame for causing the Palestinian refugee problem? Is it...

Israel, or.....1
 The Arabs?.....2
 BOTH.....3
 NEITHER.....4
 DIDN'T SAY.....5
 DON'T KNOW.....9

Q19. According to what you heard, who is to blame for the continuing Palestinian refugee problem. Is it...

Israel, or.....1
 The Arabs?.....2
 BOTH.....3
 NEITHER.....4
 DON'T KNOW.....9
 DIDN'T SAY.....5

Q20. Who are the rightful inhabitants of the land which today is called Israel and before 1948 was called Palestine? Is it...

The Jews, or.....1
 The Arabs?.....2
 BOTH.....3
 NEITHER.....4
 DON'T KNOW.....9
 DIDN'T SAY.....5

Q21. Who is responsible for the Jewish refugee problem from the Arab lands?

The Arabs, or.....1
 The Jews?.....2
 BOTH.....3
 NEITHER.....4
 DON'T KNOW.....9
 DIDN'T SAY.....5

Q22. Who is to blame for the harsh treatment of the Palestinian Arabs? Is it...

The Israelis, or.....1
 The Arabs?.....2
 BOTH.....3
 NEITHER.....4
 DON'T KNOW.....9
 DIDN'T SAY.....5

Q23. Who is to blame for Palestinian Arab assaults on Israeli civilians?
Is it...

The Arabs, or.....1
The Israelis?.....2
BOTH.....3
NEITHER.....4
DON'T KNOW.....9
DIDN'T SAY.....5

Q24. The fairest solution for the Palestinian Arab refugees would be
resettlement in...

Israel.....1
Jordan, or.....2
Some other place?.....3
BOTH PLACES.....4
NO RESETTLEMENT.....5
DON'T KNOW.....9
DIDN'T SAY.....6

Q25. Love for the land once called Palestine and presently called Israel
has been traditionally expressed most by...

The Palestinian Arabs, or.....1
The Jewish People?.....2
DON'T KNOW.....9
DIDN'T SAY.....3

Now I'm going to ask you some questions about where you get your news about world affairs.

Q26. What is your primary source of news about international affairs. Is it...

Radio.....1
Television.....2
Newspapers.....3
Magazines, or.....4
Some other source.....5
DK.....9

Q27. Now after _____ [READ ABOVE SOURCE] _____, what's your next main source of news about international affairs?

RADIO.....1
TELEVISION.....2
NEWSPAPERS.....3
MAGAZINES, or.....4
SOME OTHER SOURCE?.....5
DK.....9

Q28. What is your primary source of news about the Middle East? Is it...

Radio.....1 [Skip to Q30A]
Television.....2
Newspapers.....3 [Skip to Q31A]
Magazines, or.....4 [Skip to Q32A]
Some other source.....5 [Skip to Q33]
DK.....9 [Skip to Q34, PAGE 9]

Q29A. From which local channel do you get most of your international news and information? (PROBE FOR ONLY ONE CHANNEL)

CHANNEL 2 (WBBM).....1
CHANNEL 5 (WMAQ).....2
CHANNEL 7 (WLS).....3
CHANNEL 9 (WGN).....4
CHANNEL 11 (WTTW).....5
OTHER.....6
DK.....7

Q29B. What time of the day do you usually watch international news on that channel?

_____ : _____ AM PM (Circle one)

Q29C From which TV news person do you get your largest amount of international news?

[SKIP TO Q34]

Q30A. From which radio station do you get most of your international news?

Q30B. From which radio news person do you get your largest amount of international news?

[SKIP TO Q34]

Q31A. From which newspaper do you get most of your international news?

Q31B. From which columnist or section of the paper do you get your largest amount of international news?

[SKIP TO Q34]

Q32A. From which magazine do you get most of your international news?

Q32B. From which columnist or section of the magazine do you get your largest amount of international news?

[SKIP TO Q34]

Q33. Where do you get most of your news about the Middle East?

Now, please tell me if the following are True or False for you.

- | | <u>T</u> | <u>F</u> | <u>DK</u> |
|------|---|----------|-------------|
| Q34. | I have very definite established goals in life
which I intend to pursue at all cost..... | | 1....2....9 |
| Q35. | Often I find myself doing and saying things that turn
out to be things that shouldn't have been done or said.. | | 1....2....9 |
| Q36. | Sometimes I don't care whether I get anywhere in
life or not..... | | 1....2....9 |
| Q37. | There are odd moments now and then when I suspect
I might go to pieces..... | | 1....2....9 |
| Q38. | Every now and then I lose my temper when
things go wrong..... | | 1....2....9 |
| Q39. | Every now and then I can't seem to make up my
mind about things..... | | 1....2....9 |
| Q40. | I am one who <u>never</u> gets excited when things
go wrong..... | | 1....2....9 |

The following are statements about Jewish people with which some people agree and others disagree. There are no right or wrong answers. For each one, please tell me if you agree or disagree.

Q41A. Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get ahead. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 DON'T KNOW.....9 [Skip to Q42A]

Q41B. Do you strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

Q42A. Jews don't care what happens to anyone but their own kind. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 DON'T KNOW.....9 [Skip to Q43A]

Q42B. Do you strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

Q43A. When it comes to choosing between people and money, Jews will choose money. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 DON'T KNOW.....9 [Skip to Q44A]

Q43B. Do you strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

Q44A. Jews take the proper interest in community problems and good government. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 DON'T KNOW.....9 [Skip to Q45A]

Q44B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

Q45A. Jews may have moral standards which they apply in their dealings with other Jews, but with Christians they are ruthless. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 DON'T KNOW.....9 [Skip to Q46A]

Q45B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

Q46A. A major fault of the Jews is their conceit and overbearing pride. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 DON'T KNOW.....9 [Skip to Q47A]

Q46B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

Q47A. Jews are a revengeful people. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 DON'T KNOW.....9 [Skip to Q48A]

Q47B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

Q48A. In general, Jews are a people filled with prejudice. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 DON'T KNOW.....9 [Skip to Q49A]

Q48B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

Q49A. Jews have too much power in the United States today. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 DON'T KNOW.....9 [Skip to Q50A]

Q49B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

Q50A. Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 DON'T KNOW.....9 [Skip to Q51]

Q50B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

Q51. In your opinion, how likely is it that the United States will experience a nuclear war by the year 2000? Is it...

Very likely.....1
Somewhat likely, or.....2
Very unlikely?.....1
DON'T KNOW.....9

Q52. How likely is it that the U. S. economy will become much worse in the near future? Is it...

Very likely.....3
Somewhat likely, or.....2
Very unlikely?.....1
DON'T KNOW.....9

Q53. With the large political differences in the U. S. today, how likely is it that extreme political changes will occur in the near future? Is it...

Very likely.....3
Somewhat likely, or.....2
Very unlikely?.....1
DON'T KNOW.....9

Q54. How fearful are you of the possibility of nuclear war in your lifetime? Are you...

Quite fearful.....3
Somewhat fearful, or.....2
Not at all fearful?.....1
DON'T KNOW.....9

Q55. How fearful are you of the possibility of a serious economic crisis in the U. S. in your lifetime? Are you...

Quite fearful.....3
Somewhat fearful, or.....2
Not at all fearful?.....1
DON'T KNOW.....9

Q56. How fearful are you of the possibility of an extreme political change in the U. S. in your lifetime? Are you...

Quite fearful.....3
Somewhat fearful, or.....2
Not at all fearful?.....1
DON'T KNOW.....9

Now I'd like to finish by asking some background questions to help analyze the data.

Q57. In what year were you born? _____
Refused.....8888

Q58. Are you presently married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been married?

MARRIED.....5
WIDOWED.....4
DIVORCED.....3
SEPARATED.....2
NEVER MARRIED.....1
RF.....8

Q59. Are you a U. S. citizen?

YES.....1 [Skip to Q61]
NO.....2

Q60. What is your country of citizenship?

_____ [SKIP TO Q62]

Q61. Were you born in the United States?

YES.....1 [Skip to Q63]
NO.....2

Q62. In what country were you born?

_____ [IF BLACK, SKIP TO Q64]

Q63. Which country do your ancestors come from?

_____ [IF MORE THAN ONE, PROBE: "Of these, with which group do you most identify with?"]

Q64. What was the highest grade or year of school you completed?

NONE.....00
ELEMENTARY: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
HIGH SCHOOL..... 09 10 11 12
SOME COLLEGE.....13
VOCATIONAL SCHOOL.....14
BACHELOR DEGREE.....15
SOME GRADUATE SCHOOL.....16
MASTER DEGREE.....17
DOCTORATE DEGREE.....18
RF.....88

Q65. Are you employed full time, part time, unemployed, retired, a student or something else?

EMPLOYED FULL TIME.....	6	
EMPLOYED PART TIME.....	5	
UNEMPLOYED.....	4	[Skip to 67]
RETIRED.....	3	[SKIP TO 67]
STUDENT.....	2	[SKIP TO 67]
SOMETHING ELSE.....	1	[SKIP TO 67]
RF.....	9	[SKIP TO 67]

Q66. What do you presently do to support yourself?

Q67. In 1984, is your own personal income before taxes [NOT HOUSEHOLD INCOME] going to be more than...

\$10,000?.....NO.....	2
\$15,000?.....NO.....	3
\$20,000?.....NO.....	4
\$30,000?.....NO.....	5
\$50,000?.....NO.....	6
YES.....	7
REFUSED.....	8
DON'T KNOW.....	9

Q68. What did you do five years ago, in 1979, to support yourself?

[IF RETIRED, ASK OCCUPATION BEFORE TIME OF RETIREMENT]

(FOR MALE RESPONDENTS)

Q69A. What does or did your father do for a living?

[SKIP TO PAGE 15]

[IF RETIRED, ASK FATHER'S OCCUPATION AT TIME OF RETIREMENT]

(FOR FEMALE RESPONDENTS)

Q69B. What is or was your mother's occupation?

Finally, to conclude this survey, I need to read some statements with which some people agree and others disagree. There are no right or wrong answers. For each one, please tell me if you agree or disagree.

Q70A. The Palestinian refugee problem is the result of Israel's war-like behavior. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 DON'T KNOW.....9 [Skip to Q71A]

Q70B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

Q71A. The people of Israel are dedicated and hard-working people. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 DON'T KNOW.....9 [Skip to Q72A]

Q71B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

Q72A. The State of Israel is too war-like. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 DON'T KNOW.....9 [Skip to Q73A]

Q72B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

Q73A. The U. S. needs to continue to support Israel. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
 Disagree.....2
 DON'T KNOW.....9 [Skip to Q74A]

Q73B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
 SOMEWHAT.....2

Q74A. I greatly respect the State of Israel. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
Disagree.....2
DON'T KNOW.....9 [Skip to Q75A]

Q74B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
SOMEWHAT.....2

Q75A. Israel showed its brutality in its war in Lebanon. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
Disagree.....2
DON'T KNOW.....9 [Skip to Q76A]

Q75B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
SOMEWHAT.....2

Q76A. The Palestinian refugee problem is the core of the Arab-Israel conflict. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
Disagree.....2
DON'T KNOW.....9 [Skip to Q77A]

Q76B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
SOMEWHAT.....2

Q77A. Israel's military goal is to gain extra land from its Arab neighbors. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
Disagree.....2
DON'T KNOW.....9 [Skip to Q78A]

Q77B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
SOMEWHAT.....2

Q78A. The State of Israel must be militarily strong because of all its hostile neighbors. Do you...

Agree, or.....1
Disagree.....2
DON'T KNOW.....9 [Skip to Q79A]

Q78B. Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY.....1
SOMEWHAT.....2

Q79. In your opinion, who is to blame for causing the Palestinian refugee problem? Is it...

Israel, or.....1
 The Arabs?.....2
 BOTH.....3
 NEITHER.....4
 DON'T KNOW.....9

Q80. In your opinion, who are the rightful inhabitants of the land which today is called Israel and before 1948 was called Palestine? Are the rightful inhabitants...

The Arabs, or.....1
 The Jews?.....2
 BOTH.....3
 NEITHER.....4
 DON'T KNOW.....9

Q81. The fairest solution for the Palestinian Arab refugees would be resettlement in...

Israel.....1
 Jordan, or.....2
 Some other place?.....3
 NO RESETTLEMENT.....4
 DON'T KNOW.....9

Q82. In your opinion, is the Palestinian Refugee Problem the underlying and central problem in the Arab-Israel conflict?

YES.....1
 NO.....2
 DON'T KNOW.....9

Thank you, that completes the survey. Thanks very much for your cooperation, and have a good evening.

FINISHING TIME _____.

APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by Bradley (Benzion) Allswang has been read and approved by the following committee:

Dr. John D. Edwards, Director
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The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Ph.D.

September 9, 1985
Date

John D. Edwards
Director's Signature