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Sociopolitical Orientation and Self-Presentation in the Measurement of Moral Judgement

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SOCIOPOLITICAL ORIENTATION AND SELF-PRESENTATION
IN THE MEASUREMENT OF MORAL JUDGMENT

by

Jeffrey M. Kunka

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	ii
VITA	iii
LIST OF TABLES	vi
LIST OF FIGURES	viii
CONTENTS OF APPENDICES	ix
INTRODUCTION	1
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE	5
The Cognitive-Developmental Model	5
Sociopolitical Orientation and Moral Judgment	9
Empirical Evidence of Sequential Development	17
Moral Judgments as Self-Presentations	36
The Anticipatory Opinion Effect	46
Integrative Complexity	66
Design and Hypotheses	73
METHOD	79
Subjects	79
Materials	80
Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory	80
New Left Scale	82
Defining Issues Test	83
Good Impression Scale	86
Moral Position Survey	87
Demographics Survey	89
Postexperimental Questionnaire	90
Procedure	90
Integrative Complexity Coding	96
RESULTS	99
Check on Assignment to Treatments	100
Sociopolitical Characteristics of the Sample	102
Sociopolitical Orientation and Moral Judgment	112
Accountability and Sociopolitical Attitudes	127

Accountability and Moral Judgment	139
Awareness of Anticipatory Shifts	160
Integrative Complexity	171
DISCUSSION	176
SUMMARY	218
REFERENCES	220
APPENDIX A	226
APPENDIX B	230
APPENDIX C	233
APPENDIX D	236

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory (WPAI) Conservatism Scale Means and Standard Deviations for All Groups	101
2. Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory (WPAI) Subscale Means and Standard Deviations by Type of Sociopolitical Orientation (No Accountability Condition)	103
3. Intercorrelations among Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory (WPAI) Subscale Scores in the No Accountability Condition	105
4. New Left Subscale Means and Standard Deviations by Type of Sociopolitical Orientation (No Accountability Condition)	107
5. Intercorrelations among New Left Subscale Scores in the No Accountability Condition	108
6. Intercorrelations among the Three Measures of Sociopolitical Orientation in the No Accountability Condition	111
7. Means and Standard Deviations for Defining Issues Test (DIT) Scores by Type of Sociopolitical Orientation (No Accountability Condition)	114
8. Intercorrelations between Measures of Sociopolitical Orientation and Moral Judgment in the No Accountability Condition	116
9. Intercorrelations between Action-choice Scores and Measures of Sociopolitical Orientation in the No Accountability Condition	118
10. Correlations between Refined MPS Conservatism Scale and Defining Issues Test (DIT) Measures in the No Accountability Condition	122

11.	Refined Moral Position Survey (MPS) Conservatism Scale Means and Standard Deviations for All Groups	130
12.	Refined Moral Position Survey (MPS) Conservatism Scale Means and Standard Deviations for the Moderate Subgroups	133
13.	Defining Issues Test (DIT) Stage 4 Means and Standard Deviations for All Groups	142
14.	Defining Issues Test (DIT) Stage 4 Means and Standard Deviations for the Moderate Subgroups	145
15.	Defining Issues Test (DIT) P Score Means and Standard Deviations for All Groups	151
16.	Defining Issues Test (DIT) P Score Means and Standard Deviations for the Moderate Subgroups	154
17.	Defining Issues Test (DIT) Meaningless (M) Item Means and Standard Deviations for All Groups	159
18.	Postexperimental Questionnaire Item Means and Standard Deviations for Accountable Groups	161
19.	Self-Defined Social Position Mean Ratings and Standard Deviations for All Groups	165
20.	Correlations between Refined MPS Conservatism Scores and Postexperimental Questionnaire Item Ratings for Accountable Conservatives and Liberals	170

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Mean Refined Moral Position Survey (MPS) Scores for Each Type of Sociopolitical Orientation Across Accountability Conditions	131
2. Mean Refined Moral Position Survey (MPS) Scores for the Moderate Subgroups and Sociopolitical Extremes Across Accountability Conditions	134
3. Mean Stage 4 Scores for Each Type of Sociopolitical Orientation Across Accountability Conditions	143
4. Mean Stage 4 Scores for the Moderate Subgroups and Sociopolitical Extremes Across Accountability Conditions	146
5. Mean P Scores for Each Type of Sociopolitical Orientation Across Accountability Conditions	152
6. Mean P Scores for the Moderate Subgroups and Sociopolitical Extremes Across Accountability Conditions	155
7. Mean Self-Defined Social Position Ratings for Each Type of Sociopolitical Orientation Across Accountability Conditions	166

CONTENTS OF APPENDICES

	Page
APPENDIX A Moral Position Survey	226
APPENDIX B Demographics Questionnaire	230
APPENDIX C Postexperimental Questionnaire	233
APPENDIX D Defining Issues Test Results	236

INTRODUCTION

For some time now, Lawrence Kohlberg's (1969, 1976) work on moral development has attracted a great deal of attention. While psychologists remain sharply divided as to the merits of Kohlberg's model, its popularity appears to be growing steadily among educators (Kuhmerker, Mentkowski, & Erikson, 1980; Sommers, 1984; Wilcox, 1979). This trend is not particularly remarkable in itself, for in modern education the responsibility for satisfying traditional and societal concerns about encouraging moral behavior is coupled with a receptiveness toward psychologistic models and techniques. Yet to the extent that Kohlberg's views are influencing the approach to moral education in this country, the soundness of his theory of moral development is a matter of practical importance. This is reason enough for submitting the cognitive-developmental model to closer scrutiny.

Moral development according to Kohlberg (1969, 1976) is a universal and invariant process of cognitive-structural change, governing the way individuals organize their understanding of moral problems. That process is characterized as a stepwise sequence of distinct cognitive structures, referred to as the stages of moral reasoning. Because the theory conceptualizes moral development as the progressive

unfolding of an innate cognitive potential, it treats moral education as a matter of facilitating the emergence of those latent structures, and not as one of promoting particular moral values (or what Kohlberg describes, rather disparagingly, as the "old bag of virtues").

Kohlberg's abandonment of the teaching of traditional values has been decried as undermining moral authority and the role of discipline in moral training (Sommers, 1984). However, the force of those objections depends in large part upon whether the stage hierarchy is indeed structural and contentless, as Kohlberg claims, or whether it only promotes a different "bag of virtues" under the guise of an empirical model.

Being hierarchical in nature, cognitive-developmental theory operates from the perspective of the highest stage in the series. The highest stage constitutes the goal of moral development and defines the limitations of the prior stages. According to the model, the apex of moral development is the morally autonomous individual who defines his or her values in terms of self-chosen principles. This form of moral reasoning is dubbed "postconventional," because it succeeds the conventional reasoning displayed by persons who have identified with or internalized the shared rules and expectations of their social group.

Kohlberg claims that these are descriptions only of the structural characteristics of moral reasoning, but some

psychologists have their doubts. Hogan and Emler (1978), for example, charge that Kohlberg's model confounds structure and content. Whereas Kohlberg explains the distinction between the conventional and postconventional forms of moral judgment in terms of developmental differences in the cognitive-structural complexity and adequacy of individuals' reasoning about moral problems, Hogan and Emler argue that among adults this distinction reflects individual differences in sociopolitical orientation (conservative versus liberal) having no cognitive-developmental basis. Furthermore, whereas Kohlberg claims that the form of reasoning an individual displays is determined solely by his or her level of moral maturity, Hogan and Emler argue that the individual's moral judgments are a function of his or her sociopolitical reference group and of the specific sociopolitical identity that he or she wishes to present. Finally, Hogan and Emler suggest that Kohlberg's hierarchical ordering of conventional and postconventional reasoning is an unwitting projection of his own liberal value-system and not a fact of cognitive development.

If Hogan and Emler are correct, there should be a systematic relationship between individuals' sociopolitical orientation and the level of moral judgment they display. There is already some evidence to this effect (Emler, Renwick, & Malone, 1983). Moreover, if the moral judgments that individuals report are an expression of their socio-

political identity, then the level of moral judgment they display should vary systematically across conditions under which individuals tend to modify their self-presentations. An upward shift in level of moral judgment merely in response to the context within which those judgments are reported would be inconsistent with Kohlberg's claim that the forms of moral reasoning are solely a function of level of maturity.

The present study was designed to investigate these possibilities, employing Rest's (1979) Defining Issues Test to measure level of moral judgment and borrowing Tetlock's (1983a) manipulation of subjects' expectations of accountability, shown to be effective in eliciting shifts in self-reported political attitudes.

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

The Cognitive-Developmental Model

By most accounts, the recent wave of interest in moral development originated in the pioneering work of Lawrence Kohlberg (1969, 1976). Kohlberg's model delineates a sequence of six stages in the development of an individual's capacity to reason about moral problems. This developmental sequence is held to be universal and invariant, each stage representing an advance over the previous one both in terms of its cognitive-structural complexity and in terms of the adequacy of its solutions to moral conflict. Each advance in moral reasoning requires the prior attainment of a parallel stage of logical reasoning as defined by Piaget (1967).

Kohlberg's stages are grouped into three levels: the preconventional (Stages 1 and 2), conventional (Stages 3 and 4), and the postconventional or principled (Stages 5 and 6). Stage 6, the last in the developmental sequence, is characterized by the explicit and impartial application of the principle of distributive justice as a means of resolving moral conflict. Although a lack of empirical support for its existence has persuaded Kohlberg (1978) to treat Stage 6 as a theoretical construct only, it is retained in the model to represent the ideal culmination of the moral-developmental process. Consequently, Stage 5

postconventional thought is now considered the most advanced form of moral reasoning actually achieved by the subjects studied by Kohlberg and his associates.

Although Kohlberg's model has become exceedingly elaborate over time (see Kohlberg, Levine, & Hower, 1983), its basic elements are unchanged. The three levels of moral reasoning are characterized by different types of relationships between the self and society's rules and expectations (Kohlberg, 1976). The structural features of each level are generated by, and unified in, the sociomoral perspective or point of view that an individual operating at that level adopts vis à vis that relationship. Within each of the three levels, the second stage associated with that level is believed to represent the more complete development of the perspective acquired at the first stage of that level.

Briefly, the preconventional level (Stages 1 and 2) of moral reasoning is defined by a point of view that Kohlberg labels the "concrete individual perspective," from which the individual perceives rules and expectations as external to himself and focuses exclusively upon his own interests and those of the particular persons with whom he is involved. An individual operating at Stage 1 perceives morality solely in terms of power and punishment, but the Stage 2 individual displays a concrete awareness of the benefits of mutual self-interest. The shift to the conventional level (Stages 3 and 4) comes with the ability to

comprehend the relationship between an individual and society from the "member of society" perspective, i.e., the shared viewpoint of the participants of a social group, in which the interests of each individual are subordinated to those of the group. Whereas the Stage 3 individual defines moral obligation only in terms of his or her participation in ongoing personal relationships, the individual operating at Stage 4 considers the good of society as a whole. The postconventional level (Stages 5 and 6) is said to be achieved by the further shift to a "prior to society" perspective, from which the individual comes to identify fundamental and universal moral principles that are the standard against which any particular society's laws and conventions must be judged. While the Stage 5 individual views moral obligations mainly within the framework of the social contract and overall utility, the moral obligations characteristic of Stage 6 derive from a personal commitment to universal ethical principles of justice.

Kohlberg emphasizes that these levels and corresponding stages of moral development refer specifically to the structural characteristics of the way individuals reason about moral problems. Accordingly, he holds that these cognitive structures are neutral with respect to the moral content of the problems addressed or of the particular solutions generated. In other words, his stage model describes only the manner in which particular judgments are drawn and

defended. Theoretically, two individuals might perform the same cognitive operations and yet generate opposite conclusions, depending upon the norms or background values that they introduce as content while formulating their conclusions (Colby, 1978).

In order to lend plausibility to this feature of the model, Kohlberg and his associates have made an effort to devise stage-scoring systems in which stage structure and content categories are completely orthogonal and independent of one another. Yet even among cognitive-developmentalists (e.g., Rest, 1979) there is some doubt as to whether structure and content are entirely independent. It is questionable, for example, whether arguments characteristic of postconventional reasoning can even be advanced in support of certain solutions to the moral dilemmas employed by Kohlberg--e.g., whether a plausible postconventional argument can be made for affirming the value of property over that of a human life in the Heinz dilemma. Some research suggests that individuals operating at certain stages do tend to favor certain solutions to certain moral dilemmas (Rest, 1979; Wilcox, 1979). But cognitive-developmentalists are quick to point out that when the six-stage sequence is taken as a whole, there is no linear relationship between stage of reasoning and tendency to favor particular outcomes, and hence no evidence that moral development is merely a content-dominated movement toward a particular position

on moral issues (Rest, 1979). Nevertheless, this defense is largely irrelevant in the face of those critics (e.g., Emler & Hogan, 1981) who by and large acknowledge a cognitive-developmental basis for the first three stages of moral development while arguing that individual differences in the moral reasoning of adults--differences measured by Kohlberg in terms of the conventional versus postconventional distinction--are a matter of content as well as of structure.

Kohlberg's cognitive-structural interpretation of individual differences in adult moral reasoning has largely been taken for granted because empirical support for the first three or four stages of the model has seemed so strong (Weinreich-Haste, 1983). As a result, various correlates of moral reasoning have been viewed in a rather one-sided manner, namely, through the prism of Kohlberg's hierarchical perspective. This is particularly apparent in cognitive-developmentalists' treatment of the relationship between sociopolitical attitudes and level of moral reasoning.

Sociopolitical Orientation and Moral Judgment

Research over the years has disclosed a systematic relationship between subjects' sociopolitical orientation and the type of moral reasoning they display (Alker & Poppen, 1973; Candee, 1976; Emler, Renwick, & Malone, 1983; Fishkin, Keniston, & MacKinnon, 1973; Fontana & Noel, 1973;

Haan, Smith, & Block, 1968; Rest, 1979; Sullivan & Quarter, 1972). Although these studies varied considerably in terms of approach, their findings have been rather consistent. They reveal significant positive correlations between Stage 4 conventional reasoning and conservative or right-wing attitudes (particularly the so-called "law and order" conservatism) and between postconventional reasoning and liberal or left-wing attitudes. In short, the results suggest that individuals with a conservative orientation are likely to reason at the conventional level, whereas individuals with a liberal orientation are likely to reason at the post-conventional level.

Not surprisingly, Kohlberg and his associates interpret this relationship in a manner consistent with their theory of moral development. As was just indicated, the forms of moral reasoning identified by Kohlberg are characterized as steps in a developmental sequence of successively more complex and more adequate ways of resolving moral conflict. Each level of moral reasoning represents a certain sociomoral perspective and concept of justice, and the transition from one level to the next involves the adoption of a more inclusive perspective and a more universal concept of justice. It follows from this account that the attitudinal correlates of any given level of moral reasoning must be the product of the cognitive operations that define that level (inasmuch as the relationship is one of content to struc-

ture). Thus, Kohlberg (1980) and Rest (1979) are led to conclude that the conservative and liberal positions only reflect the sociomoral perspectives and concepts of justice characteristic of conventional and postconventional thought, respectively. Although the next logical step would be to grade the relative adequacy of conservative and liberal solutions to specific sociomoral problems according to the hierarchical status of the levels of moral reasoning they reflect, this conclusion is only rarely made explicit (e.g., Candee, 1976).

Nevertheless, such rather profound implications follow unavoidably from the cognitive-developmentalists' notion that an individual's sociopolitical orientation is a function of his or her level of maturity of moral reasoning. It suggests, for one, that as an individual operating at the conventional level matures further, he is likely to abandon his conservative attitudes in favor of more liberal ones. Furthermore, it suggests that individuals who persevere in their adherence to the conservative orientation do so because--for whatever reason--their cognitive-moral development has been arrested prematurely.

These implications may seem neither surprising nor disconcerting to the majority of social scientists, who tend to be considerably more liberal than the general population (Wilson, 1973). However, a conservative spokesman is likely to object strongly to the conclusion that he is developmen-

tally immature by virtue of the opinions he holds. Such objections must not be taken as a measure of the validity or invalidity of the argument, of course, but it should give one reason to consider it more carefully. Although cognitive-developmentalists insist that their hierarchical ranking of stages refers only to the philosophical adequacy of the respective modes of reasoning and does not imply a grading of the moral worth of any individual (Rest, 1979; Wilcox, 1979), the disclaimer itself conveys an attitude of moral condescension.

It may be argued back and forth whether the principles embodied in liberal ideologies and said to be characteristic of postconventional reasoning are indeed superior on moral-philosophical grounds to those embodied in conservative ideologies and displayed in conventional-level reasoning. Kohlberg (1971, 1980) is unusual among contemporary researchers in devoting considerable attention to that debate. Yet establishing a hierarchical relationship between conventional and postconventional patterns of reasoning (along with their respective attitudinal correlates) on the basis of philosophical argument is a task separate from that of determining empirically whether the two are related in terms of a developmental sequence. Furthermore, even if it can be demonstrated that postconventional reasoning is a developmentally later stage in an invariant sequence, this does not in itself prove that postconventional reasoning is

superior to conventional reasoning. Developmental succession implies developmental progress only within a certain framework of assumptions that must themselves be submitted to examination. The failure to distinguish clearly among these three issues has led some cognitive-developmentalists to draw premature and possibly unwarranted conclusions from their data, e.g., Candee's (1976) claim that the tendency for postconventional reasoners to favor certain positions was evidence that those positions were in fact objectively right.

Robert Hogan and Nicolas Emler (Emler, 1983; Emler & Hogan, 1981; Hogan & Emler, 1978) have challenged Kohlberg's interpretation of individual differences in moral reasoning along just these lines. Their argument is essentially that the conventional and postconventional perspectives (Stages 4 and 5 in particular) constitute alternative sociopolitical ideologies and value-systems--i.e., differences in the ideological content of adult individuals' attitudes toward justice and moral obligation. They reject the notion that these perspectives represent successively more adequate levels of cognitive-moral development, and with it the notion that postconventional reasoning arises out of some inherent need to overcome the structural limitations that supposedly characterize Stage 4 conventional thought. Instead, they suggest that the perspective or orientation that an individual acquires as an adult is a reflection of his

or her social identity, reference group and accomodation to the social matrix in which he or she is embedded.

Hogan and Emler support their position with three types of argument: (1) addressing what they contend is an ideological bias in Kohlberg's approach to moral reasoning, (2) criticizing the manner in which that bias purportedly infects Kohlberg's methodology, and (3) questioning the extent to which research supports the cognitive-developmentalists' claims regarding the superiority of postconventional over conventional reasoning.

Most of Hogan and Emler's arguments are of the first sort, directed at exposing an ideological bias in the cognitive-developmental approach. This emphasis is understandable, and perhaps even justified, given that underlying assumptions play a crucial role in the way the data on moral reasoning and its correlates are interpreted.

Hogan and Emler charge that Kohlberg approaches the data on variations in adult moral reasoning from a point of view that already assumes the moral superiority of the liberal philosophy of social relations, justice and moral obligation--which, in their view, is what the sociomoral perspective and attitude toward justice embodied in Stage 6 actually represents. They point out that the cognitive-developmental model defines the prior stages from the perspective of this presumed apex of moral reasoning. In their own words, Kohlberg's model "is a theory of how to get to

stage 6, which is...different from showing that Stage 6 is where you get if you go far enough" (Hogan & Emler, 1978, p. 525). According to them, the lack of empirical data from which Stage 6 principles could have been ascertained forces one to conclude that this perspective is no more than a projection of Kohlberg's own views.

This allegation calls into question Kohlberg's account of the transition from conventional to postconventional reasoning. On the one hand, the theory states that this movement is impelled by the need to overcome certain structural limitations inherent in the Stage 4 perspective (Kohlberg, 1971, 1976). Yet Hogan and Emler (Emler, 1983; Emler & Hogan, 1981) argue that the characteristics of the Stage 4 perspective to which Kohlberg refers are limitations only from the point of view of the liberal thinker. To an impartial third party, the purported limitations of the Stage 4 perspective and the purported solutions to be found in postconventional reasoning are merely the values that distinguish the conservative and liberal ideologies.

In effect, Hogan and Emler claim that Kohlberg is mistaken in believing that he has been able to separate structure and content at the higher levels of his stage theory. As was indicated earlier, the issue of structure versus content is of immediate importance in interpreting the correlation between level of moral reasoning and socio-political orientation. By Kohlberg's account, the entire

sequence of stages reflects an invariant developmental process of removing internal contradictions in moral reasoning through successive reorganization of its underlying structure; the significance of each stage lies not in the position taken, but rather in how that position is justified. As long as one accepts this account, and with it the corollary that content does not determine structure, one must interpret the correlation between level of moral reasoning and sociopolitical orientation as one would the relationship between an independent and a dependent variable (Emler, 1983). Hogan and Emler reject this interpretation, arguing instead that the correlation reflects the fact that moral perspective and sociopolitical orientation constitute overlapping domains--in other words, that most political judgments are moral judgments, inasmuch as they involve choices regarding human values, and most moral judgments (particularly those elicited by Kohlberg's "moral dilemmas") entail political or social considerations. Consequently, what the cognitive-developmentalists identify as cognitive-structural stages in adult moral reasoning are actually patterns of sociopolitical attitudes having no hierarchical relationship to one another based upon developmental sequence.

Hogan and Emler support their position with a second line of argument, namely, that Kohlberg's research strategy only serves to support his equation of moral development with the development of reasoning defined in terms of logi-

cal operations (Emler, 1983; Hogan & Emler, 1978). They claim: (1) that by employing moral dilemmas that pit one moral principle against another, instead of a moral principle against a desire or pragmatic consideration, Kohlberg has based his studies upon an atypical and even largely irrelevant type of moral conflict; (2) that subjects are encouraged by Kohlberg's approach to consider the dilemmas hypothetically, removed from the context of situational ambiguities and real-life consequences, thereby promoting a reliance upon the views that are held in an abstract way (as possibly distinguished from those that determine actions) and supporting the illusion that an individual first thinks, then decides and then acts; and (3) that the interview method used to elicit moral reasoning involves an element of covert negotiation with the subject regarding the kind of responses that are acceptable, inducing the subject to offer "reasons" as defined by the theory (all other responses being treated as unscorable). The combined result of these methodological peculiarities, according to Hogan and Emler, is that cognitive-developmentalists are virtually guaranteed of finding the kind of data that the theory predicts.

Empirical Evidence of Sequential Development

Emler (1983) suggests that the controversy over Kohlberg's claim that the conventional and postconventional per-

spectives constitute a developmental sequence may ultimately be reduced to two questions: first, whether the sequence is logically necessary (i.e., representing an order of increasing adequacy) and, second, whether change actually occurs in that sequence. The first question is mainly a theoretical concern, but the second is a matter of empirical evidence. Unfortunately, there is relatively little research on adult moral reasoning to support either side in its claims.

Ideally, longitudinal data should provide the clearest indication of the direction of moral development. However, whereas the developmental progression from Stage 1 to Stage 4 has been well-documented (Kohlberg, 1976; Kuhn, 1976; Turiel, Edwards, & Kohlberg, 1978), the evidence for a developmental transition from Stage 4 to Stage 5 is uncertain at best. Owing to inconsistencies (e.g., stage regressions) in the pattern of development within Kohlberg's original sample (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969), the stage-scoring system has undergone considerable modification. This has had the effect of depressing the higher stage scores, and the few subjects identified as employing Stage 5 reasoning still rely to a great extent upon Stage 4 (Colby, 1978). There is, moreover, some evidence of a tendency among adults to shift from Stage 5 to Stage 4 (Holstein, 1976).

Even if Kohlberg's original longitudinal study had provided clear evidence of a transition from Stage 4 to Stage 5 reasoning, there would still be some question as to

whether this supported the cognitive-developmental interpretation. Those subjects matured during the late 1960's and early 1970's, when the popularity of the liberal attitude was at its peak. Thus, a Stage 4 to Stage 5 movement might be characteristic only of those cohorts. Individuals tested now, when conservative sociopolitical values are in resurgence, might not display that shift.

In lieu of data on the higher stages of development obtained using Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, some theorists (e.g., Thornton & Thornton, 1983) have sought evidence of that cognitive-developmental sequence in studies employing James Rest's Defining Issues Test, or DIT (Rest, 1975, 1979; Rest, Cooper, Coder, Masanz, & Anderson, 1974). The Defining Issues Test is a paper-and-pencil measure of moral judgment requiring subjects to select from a list of stage-specific statements those that they consider most important in resolving certain specified moral dilemmas. Both the longitudinal and cross-sectional data reported by Rest (1975) do indicate a decline in Stage 4 reasoning in late adolescence with a corresponding increase in postconventional reasoning (Stages 5 and 6).

Nevertheless, several questions may be raised regarding the significance of these findings. First of all, inasmuch as Rest's (1975) subjects were studied at a time when young people were turning to liberal solutions to social problems, the same doubt expressed with regard to Kohl-

berg's longitudinal data may be raised here. Moreover, all of the subjects represented in Rest's cross-sectional data were students, so the tendency for older subjects to display postconventional reasoning might be only a reflection of the well-documented liberalizing influence of higher education (Wilson, 1973).

Beyond this, one must bear in mind that Rest's DIT and Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview are not equivalent measures of moral reasoning. This is immediately evident in the fact that, in contrast to Kohlberg's findings, Stage 5 reasoning as measured by the DIT tends to replace Stage 4 reasoning among older subjects. Moreover, whereas Kohlberg eventually dropped the Stage 6 scoring category from his system, Rest's older subjects received relatively high Stage 6 scores (albeit never superceding Stage 5).

Rest (1979) and Kohlberg (1976) agree that their instruments tap different aspects of moral reasoning. Kohlberg's measure is said to reveal the subject's ability to produce spontaneously the moral arguments characteristic of a given stage, whereas Rest's measure purportedly indicates the subject's ability to comprehend the relative adequacy of each stage perspective, in terms of the importance the subject assigns to various considerations typical of the focus of each perspective. Rest (1976, 1979) explains the consistently higher stage scores obtained on the DIT as the result of a systematic developmental lag between the ability

to comprehend a stage-specific argument and the more difficult task of reproducing it spontaneously. Rest points to the correlation of .68 between the DIT and Kohlberg's scale as evidence that his instrument is still a valid measure of maturity of moral judgment. Yet, all things considered, it remains questionable how far Rest's data on the movement from Stage 4 to Stage 5 moral reasoning can be used to support the cognitive-developmental position in lieu of evidence based on Kohlberg's measure.

A second empirical approach to evaluating whether the conventional-postconventional distinction is a hierarchically sequential one is to examine the relationship between level of moral reasoning and some characteristic known to be developmental. Given Kohlberg's emphasis upon the development of logical reasoning as a necessary condition for the advance of moral reasoning, one should expect to find that persons displaying Stage 5 reasoning have achieved a higher level of logical development than those who display Stage 4 reasoning. Research suggests that the relationship between logical reasoning and moral reasoning does hold true for the earlier stages of development, concrete operational thought being necessary for Stage 2 reasoning (Smith, 1978) and formal operational thought for the transition from Stage 3 to Stage 4 (Tomlinson-Keasey & Keasey, 1974). However, there is no substantive evidence that persons who display Stage 5 reasoning are more advanced in formal oper-

ational thought than those who reason no higher than Stage 4 (Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg, & Haan, 1977).

A number of studies have addressed different aspects of Kohlberg's claim that moral development is a function of one's ability to comprehend successively higher forms of moral reasoning. According to the theory, as one begins to comprehend the social perspective and moral arguments that define the stage immediately above one's own--owing to developments in one's level of logical reasoning and role-taking ability, as well as to exposure to higher stage reasoning--one begins to recognize the limitations and internal contradictions in one's current form of reasoning and to appreciate the greater adequacy of that next stage. As a result, one begins to gravitate toward that higher form of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1976).

One testable consequence of this is that exposure to moral arguments characteristic of the stage immediately above one's own should stimulate the transition to that stage of reasoning, whereas exposure to moral arguments several stages beyond one's current level should have a lesser effect upon moral development. Most studies of this sort have involved children operating at the early stages of moral reasoning, and the evidence suggests that shifts in the predicted direction below the postconventional level can be hastened (e.g., Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975). Colby (1973) reported that a program of moral discussion facilitated some

movement toward Stage 5 thinking among students who had previously operated exclusively at the conventional level of reasoning. This finding remains somewhat equivocal, however, in view of the sociopolitical climate at the time these subjects were tested. It is interesting in this last regard that Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Kuhmerker, 1980) accounts for the greater incidence of Stage 5 reasoning among college students during the 1960's in terms of the atmosphere of conflict and reform that typified those years; according to Kohlberg, that atmosphere was more conducive to moral development beyond Stage 4 than is the present (conservative) climate.

A different approach was tried by Rest (1973), who compared subjects' own level of moral reasoning with their ability to comprehend statements characteristic of each stage of reasoning (Stages 1 through 6). In keeping with predictions drawn from the cognitive-developmental model, he found that subjects were typically able to comprehend the arguments characteristic of the stages below their own predominant stage, and in most cases were able to comprehend the arguments characteristic of their own stage as well. In addition, about half of the subjects--principally those who made substantial spontaneous use of reasoning higher than that of their predominant stage--were able to comprehend arguments at least one stage beyond their own. Rest concluded that these results supported the claim that each suc-

ceeding stage is more difficult to comprehend than the one that precedes it, and that an individual's stage of moral development is systematically related to his or her ability to comprehend arguments typical of each stage. Rest also argued that the tendency for subjects to prefer reasoning characteristic of the highest level they could comprehend was consistent with the claim that each succeeding stage was conceptually more adequate, but this inference seems rather dubious, even apart from the finding that those of his subjects who gave no evidence of comprehending the higher stages still indicated a preference for them.

Rest's evidence of a systematic relationship between level of moral reasoning and level of comprehension for Stages 4 and 5 was rejected as inconclusive by Emler (1983). According to Emler, the data suggested that Stage 4 subjects were as capable of comprehending postconventional reasoning as were those subjects classified as postconventional reasoners; he cited the figures that 4 of the 12 Stage 4 subjects versus 3 of the 6 Stage 5 subjects were able to comprehend postconventional arguments. However, Thornton and Thornton (1983) have responded that Emler's account of the data was misleading, inasmuch as it failed to include Rest's finding that the highest stage of reasoning spontaneously employed by the subject was a better predictor of comprehension than was the stage predominantly employed (i.e., the stage at which the subject was typed). They pointed out

that of the 16 subjects operating no higher than Stage 4, only one was able to comprehend postconventional arguments, whereas 12 of the 15 subjects who comprehended postconventional arguments themselves employed postconventional reasoning to at least some extent.

Although this clarification of Rest's findings renders Emler's specific objection less plausible, it does not remove all doubt regarding the soundness of Rest's conclusion. It is evident that Kohlberg's original scoring system was used to type subjects' stage of reasoning, given that five of the subjects were identified as predominantly Stage 6--a category eliminated entirely from Kohlberg's later scoring systems. As was mentioned earlier, changes in the system of scoring have had the effect of depressing scores for the higher stages. One can only speculate as to how Rest's data would look if the stricter scoring system had been employed, but it is not implausible that a number of subjects originally classified as postconventional reasoners would be reclassified as Stage 4 subjects. Inasmuch as this reclassification would affect subjects' scores for spontaneous stage usage without in any way affecting their comprehension scores, the most likely result would be a net increase in the number of Stage 4 subjects who were found to have comprehended postconventional reasoning. Interestingly enough, this would once again lend plausibility to the sort of objection raised by Emler and seemingly over-

turned by the Thorntons.

Another consideration, although admittedly a highly speculative one, should nevertheless be included when evaluating the significance of data on moral comprehension for Kohlberg's hierarchical model. Without disputing Rest's (1973) conclusion that conventional subjects were unable to comprehend postconventional reasoning according to the criteria laid down by cognitive-developmentalists, one may still question whether those criteria contain an implicit bias favoring individuals who accept the moral principles that characterize the postconventional position, while discriminating against those who reject those principles in favor of some others. If indeed Hogan and Emler (1978) are correct in charging that the postconventional perspective merely represents the liberal sociopolitical position, it should come as no surprise that individuals identified as postconventional reasoners were able to rephrase postconventional arguments more accurately than those to whom such arguments were foreign. This would not constitute evidence that postconventional reasoners were cognitively more advanced, however, for a conservative--who reasons at the conventional level, according to the research cited earlier--might just as well argue that postconventional individuals possessed no more than a superficial understanding of his own position. Rest's finding that postconventional reasoners were able to comprehend conventional arguments would not

necessarily invalidate this claim, inasmuch as Rest's criteria for comprehending conventional arguments were based on a postconventional understanding of the conventional perspective. If the criteria for comprehension had been established by representatives of the conventional position, the results might have been different. Obviously, this point would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to settle on an empirical basis, for the criteria employed in any study of comprehension are a reflection of preexperimental assumptions. Nevertheless, the lesson in this is that data from comprehension studies of the sort conducted by Rest are not as compelling as might first appear.

Other questions raised by Rest's (1973) study concern subjects' preferences among the various stages of moral reasoning. When asked to rate and to rank stage-specific moral arguments in terms of the overall persuasiveness of each, subjects tended to prefer the reasoning characteristic of the highest stage of reasoning they could comprehend, rather than that of their own predominant stage of reasoning. Frequently, subjects preferred the highest stages of reasoning even when they gave no evidence of having comprehended those arguments. Rest suggested that this observed order of preference was consistent with the notion that each succeeding stage was conceptually more adequate, and that the subjects recognized them as such even when they could not make spontaneous use of the higher forms of reasoning.

Rest admitted that this interpretation was open to question in view of the finding that higher stage arguments were preferred even when evidence of comprehension was lacking. But whether or not the data on subjects' preferences provide additional support for the cognitive-developmental model, they do pose a problem for the rival position put forward by Hogan and Emler (1978). If, as they suggest, the type of moral reasoning (Stage 4 versus postconventional) that a person displays is a reflection of his or her sociopolitical orientation (conservative versus liberal), then one might expect the person to show a preference for that type of reasoning and to reject the type of reasoning associated with the opposite sociopolitical orientation. Yet a clear preference for postconventional arguments (associated by Hogan and Emler with the liberal position) was expressed by both conventional and postconventional subjects. This would argue against the claim that moral reasoning followed sociopolitical preference, unless an alternative interpretation of Rest's data can be found.

Perhaps the most plausible alternative is the one suggested by Rest himself to account for the consistent preference for higher stage arguments regardless of level of comprehension--namely, that the subjects were attracted to the more complex and abstract wording of the postconvention-statements rather than to their meaning, and were either projecting their own ideas onto those statements or merely

responding with the sort of answer that they believed to be more appropriate to the test-taking situation (Rest, 1973). But, as Rest points out, there is nothing in the data themselves that allows one to evaluate these alternatives.

The latest empirical contribution to the controversy over the relationship between comprehension and level of moral reasoning is a study by Emler and his associates (Emler, et al., 1983). Emler had speculated that if the differences between conventional and postconventional forms of reasoning were essentially a reflection of sociopolitical preferences, then conservatives and liberals should be able to predict one another's moral responses equally well. Only if the differences were a function of moral development and dependent upon level of comprehension would conservatives (who tend to use the conventional form of reasoning) be unable to reproduce postconventional responses as accurately as liberals (who tend to use postconventional reasoning) could reproduce conventional responses. In order to put this speculation to the test, subjects who had previously defined themselves politically as right-wing, moderate or left-wing were instructed to complete Rest's Defining Issues Test (DIT) twice--once from their own perspective and once from the perspective of someone with either extreme conservative views or radical (i.e., extreme liberal) views.

Other attempts had previously been made to influence DIT scores by manipulating the instructional set, with

mixed results. McGeorge (1975) demonstrated that subjects were able to lower their scores for postconventional reasoning when instructed to respond with the lowest possible level of moral judgment, but were unable to raise their postconventional scores when instructed to respond with the highest possible level of moral judgment. Rest (1979) took that as evidence that the DIT was a valid measure of moral development; he claimed that cognitive-developmental theory would have predicted that subjects should be able to recognize as being less adequate the moral arguments characteristic of the stages through which they had already passed (and hence should be able to "fake bad"), while being unable to reason beyond their own level and recognize the superiority of the moral arguments characteristic of the later stages (and hence unable to "fake good").

Actually, this interpretation is a bit puzzling in view of Rest's (1973) discussion of subjects' preferences for the highest stages of reasoning, for there he had suggested that subjects were able to recognize that the highest stages of reasoning were morally more adequate even though they could not spontaneously employ those arguments themselves. Rest might be accused of trying to have it both ways, for he invokes his alternative interpretation of that preference data to account for Yussen's (1976) findings in another study manipulating instructional set. Yussen had instructed subjects to respond on the DIT as they imagined

an "average philosopher" would, and found that subjects were indeed able to raise their postconventional reasoning score. Rest (1979) dismissed this finding as being the result of subjects' tendency merely to associate the more abstract wording of the postconventional response alternatives with the style of reasoning they imagined to be characteristic of a philosopher, without any real understanding of the superiority of those alternatives.


Emler and his associates (Emler, et al., 1983) argued that McGeorge's (1975) results could be explained another way. If individual differences in level of moral reasoning were a function of differences in sociopolitical orientation --i.e., if the conventional versus postconventional distinction reflected no more than the distinction between conservative and liberal attitudes--then instructing conventional (conservative) subjects to "fake good" should not be expected to result in an increase in postconventional reasoning scores. Postconventional responses would represent for them the liberal values that they had rejected in favor of conservative values, so would not be considered superior to their own conventional responses. Therefore, there was no need to invoke the cognitive-developmental notion of moral maturity to explain conventional subjects' failure to raise their postconventional reasoning scores. Again, it is only from the liberal perspective implicit in cognitive-developmental theory that postconventional reasoning is superior.

In contrast, instructing conventional subjects to respond from the perspective of a liberal would be expected to result in an increase in their postconventional reasoning scores, if indeed the postconventional responses reflected the liberal value-system. The results of Emler et al.'s (1983) investigation appear to bear out this speculation. They found, first, that left-wing subjects achieved significantly higher scores for postconventional reasoning than did moderate and right-wing subjects, whereas right-wing subjects obtained higher scores for Stage 4 conventional reasoning than did moderate and left-wing subjects. This was consistent with previous research on the relationship between political orientation and level of moral reasoning. More importantly, all three groups raised their postconventional reasoning scores to the same level when responding from the radical perspective, while lowering their scores to the same level when responding from the conservative perspective; likewise, all three groups raised their Stage 4 scores to the same level when responding from the conservative perspective, while lowering their scores to the same level when responding from the radical perspective.

Emler et al. drew several conclusions from these findings. First, the extreme conservative and extreme liberal viewpoints apparently constitute two distinct response patterns that subjects are able to identify and reproduce on the Defining Issues Test. Second, inasmuch as these two

patterns correspond to the response patterns that typify stage 4 conventional and postconventional reasoning, respectively, the DIT scoring system discriminates accurately between alternative sociopolitical orientations. Finally, inasmuch as conventional-type subjects were able to reproduce the postconventional pattern of response as well as postconventional subjects were able to reproduce the Stage 4 pattern, it is unlikely that conventional reasoners differ from postconventional reasoners in terms of their ability to employ alternative perspectives. Conventional subjects could indeed offer postconventional solutions to moral problems when instructed to respond from that perspective, although they chose not to employ those arguments when deciding for themselves (as in McGeorge's, 1975, study) which solutions were best.

Thus it appears that adherence to the conventional perspective is not the result of an individual's inability to comprehend postconventional reasoning, at least when comprehension is operationalized as the ability to generate a pattern of response indistinguishable from that of individuals identified as postconventional reasoners. It might be argued that this definition of comprehension is inadequate, i.e., that the ability to reproduce postconventional arguments is not sufficient evidence that those arguments are truly understood. From the cognitive-developmentalists' perspective, comprehension must also involve an appreciation



of the moral superiority of the postconventional position. In that case, however, the only criterion for evaluating an individual's level of comprehension would be his or her acceptance of the cognitive-developmentalists' assumption that the postconventional position was indeed morally more adequate--an assumption that remains questionable on empirical as well as moral-philosophical grounds. If this were carried a step further, even the critics of the cognitive-developmental model could be accused of failing to comprehend the postconventional position--thereby insulating the theory quite effectively from any intellectual assault.

Thornton and Thornton (1983) argued that Emler et al. had failed to demonstrate that right-wing (conventional) subjects actually understood the postconventional arguments that they were able to reproduce. In their view, these subjects might have identified arguments characteristic of the left-wing (postconventional) perspective on the basis of cues that were peripheral to an understanding of that perspective--e.g., the fancy and rather vague wording of the postconventional items on the DIT or their implicit questioning of the existing social order. This interpretation is somewhat less compelling than when applied to Yussen's (1976) results, if only because one may question how peripheral such characteristics are to the identity of the post-conventional perspective. One must already presume that the distinction between structure and content is sound in order

to argue that a response to the content of the postconventional items is irrelevant to an understanding of their structure. Indeed, the main thrust of Emler et al.'s study is to cast further doubt upon the validity of that distinction.

Emler and his associates considered the possibility that the increase in postconventional reasoning scores among conservative (conventional) subjects was merely fortuitous, the result of their simply choosing responses that differed from their own spontaneous preferences. However, the performance of the moderate groups--who were consistently able to raise or lower their scores as expected--suggested that subjects had indeed been guided by some understanding of the two approaches to resolving moral problems, identified as conservative and radical yet corresponding to the conventional and postconventional perspectives. Unfortunately, Emler et al. did not address the possibility that their subjects' understanding involved no more than the ability to recall and employ political stereotypes--a strategy that would not demand comprehension of the positions to which those stereotypes referred. That is, the conservative (conventional) may have been able to predict rather accurately the (postconventional) responses that a radical respondent would choose, but without necessarily understanding why the radical respondent would choose those responses.

This rival interpretation of the data cannot be dis-

counted, and in this regard Emler et al.'s (1983) study falls short as a test of the cognitive-developmentalists' claim about comprehension and level of moral development. On the other hand, their study does call into question the validity of Rest's Defining Issues Test as a measure of moral development, if for no other reason than that the test apparently cannot discriminate between respondents who spontaneously employ reasoning characteristic of certain moral stages and those who attempt to project a certain sociopolitical identity. Given the strong relationship between sociopolitical orientation and the pattern of DIT scores, the test might be considered as much a measure of sociopolitical attitudes as one of level of moral reasoning. Furthermore, if that relationship is an imperfect one, the test may rate an individual as morally more mature in the cognitive-developmentalists' sense when in fact he or she is merely expressing liberal attitudes acquired without comprehension of their underlying rationale. In this case, the argument that the ability to reproduce the postconventional response pattern need not imply comprehension becomes a two-edged sword, capable of undercutting Rest's Defining Issues Test as well as defending it.

Moral Judgments as Self-Presentations

Although Emler et al.'s (1983) conclusions regarding the relationship between comprehension and level of moral

reasoning may be questioned, their results do at least lend credibility to the interpretation that individual differences in adult moral judgment are a function of sociopolitical orientation. Beyond the objections to Kohlberg's model reviewed earlier, Hogan (Emler & Hogan, 1981; Johnson & Hogan, 1981) has offered a positive account of the sorts of findings obtained in the Emler et al. study. This account was formulated initially in response to a report by Meehan, Woll and Abbott (1979), which was critical of his own measure of moral judgment, the Survey of Ethical Attitudes, or SEA (Hogan, 1970). Nevertheless, according to Hogan, his remarks apply equally well to the cognitive-developmentalists' measures of moral reasoning.

Meehan et al. (1979) had employed an approach similar to the one used by Emler et al. (1983). In this case, subjects were instructed to complete the Survey of Ethical Attitudes (SEA) as if they were applying for a job with either a politically conservative or politically liberal organization. Meehan et al. found that subjects consistently raised their SEA scores in the "fake conservative" condition and consistently lowered their scores in the "fake liberal" condition. According to Hogan (1970), high and low SEA scores correspond to two opposing perspectives on moral issues, referred to as the "ethics of social responsibility" and "ethics of personal conscience," respectively. Inasmuch as subjects were able to reproduce these opposing response pat-

terns by merely adopting a certain political set, Meehan et al. concluded that the SEA was better understood as a measure of political attitudes than as a measure of moral judgment. Furthermore, they expressed serious doubts over the validity of the SEA as a measure of attitudes--moral or political--given its obvious susceptibility to dissimulation in the form of political role-playing.

Meehan et al.'s study of Hogan's Survey of Ethical Attitudes more or less parallels Emler et al.'s study of Rest's Defining Issues Test, both in its results and in its conclusions. Yet Hogan's response is decidedly different from the one offered by the cognitive-developmentalists. To begin with, Hogan (Johnson & Hogan, 1981) acknowledged the strong relationship between the two types of moral attitudes measured by his test and the conservative and liberal political orientations, noting that this had already been established more directly elsewhere (Lorr & Zea, 1977). Meehan et al. were mistaken in interpreting this as evidence that his measure of moral judgment was contaminated by political and social attitudes, however, inasmuch as moral and political attitudes were essentially both aspects of an individual's orientation to others in society. According to Hogan, Meehan et al. were operating under the assumption (popularized by Kohlberg) that morality and politics could be separated from one another. As was indicated earlier, Hogan and Emler reject this assumption, on the grounds that both moral

and political attitudes rest on choices regarding human values and that the issues on which subjects in moral judgment research are asked to render judgments have political as well as moral implications. Consequently, Hogan argued, all measures of adult moral judgment were unavoidably also measures of political judgment. The only difference between his own approach to measurement and the one promoted by Kohlberg and Rest was that his did not presume a hierarchical relationship between alternative politico-moral orientations, whereas they had allowed their own ideological bias to insinuate itself into their interpretation of individual differences in adult moral judgment.

The more novel aspect of Hogan's response pertains to Meehan et al.'s conclusion that the influence of explicit role-playing instructions on SEA scores detracted from the validity of his instrument as a measure of moral attitudes. Hogan conceded that this conclusion was sound within the context of the traditional view of test-item responses--namely, that an ideal self-report test should elicit responses about the subject's true behavior and attitudes, and should be immune to role-playing or impression management inasmuch as these constituted distortions of actual behavior. However, test taking could also be interpreted as a form of self-presentation (Mills & Hogan, 1978), akin to that which occurs in most social interaction, rather than as a report of actual behavior or attitudes. In this light, subjects

would be seen as using their test responses as an opportunity to communicate their underlying self-image, or the way in which they would like to be regarded by others.

One aspect of an individual's self-image is his or her sociopolitical identity. Expressions of specific political or moral attitudes--whether in social interactions or on measures of moral judgment--might therefore be viewed as the individual's way of informing others as to his or her identity and social alignments (Emler & Hogan, 1981). These self-presentations would vary both as a function of the individual's social role--i.e., the structure of the social relationships in which he or she is involved--and as a function of the specific impression that the individual wished to create vis à vis an actual or imagined audience.

From this perspective, Hogan concluded, it was only to be expected that Meehan et al.'s subjects would respond differently under standard and role-playing conditions. Given the standard instructions, with no particular audience specified, subjects could only act on their own expectations as to whom they were presenting themselves. In this case, their test responses would reflect the politico-moral orientation that they tended to project to the "generalized other."

It is worth noting at this point that Hogan used the results from another aspect of Meehan et al.'s study to dispute their claim that social desirability concerns might

systematically influence test scores under standard conditions. When Meehan et al. instructed subjects only to present themselves in a favorable manner on the SEA, no consistent pattern emerged; 12 subjects raised their scores, 8 subjects lowered their scores, and 5 subjects displayed no change. According to Hogan, that indicated that subjects differed in their conception of what constituted a "good" response. As long as no particular audience was specified--information that might lead subjects to define "looking good" in terms of their audience's values and expectations--subjects had to fall back upon their own definition of a good response, based upon their own politico-moral value-system. This would seem to vindicate Hogan's claim that his test was a valid measure of politico-moral attitudes. It may also be recalled that the argument about the relativity of the "good" response was later used by Emler et al. (1983) as an alternative explanation of McGeorge's (1975) similar findings with the Defining Issues Test.

Returning to Hogan's main argument, it may be observed that under political role-playing instructions, the test respondent's audience becomes explicit and well-defined. Because most respondents are generally familiar with the pattern of attitudes that characterizes such an audience, they are able to make appropriate modifications in their self-presentations so as to foster a good impression in that situation. Hence, according to Hogan, it was no problem for

subjects in the Meehan et al. study to modify their responses on the Survey of Ethical Attitudes in the appropriate direction, resulting in test scores resembling those obtained under standard conditions by representatives of that sociopolitical orientation. Yet, Hogan concluded, subjects were making no different use of their test item responses than usual--namely, as a vehicle for self-presentation--albeit with a more focused and deliberate aim than would otherwise have been the case.

In Meehan et al.'s study of the Survey of Ethical Attitudes, as well as in Emler et al.'s (1983) study of the Defining Issues Test, subjects were given explicit instructions to alter their responses so as to conform with a particular political orientation. Thus, the shifts in test scores could be described as the result of dissimulation. Yet Hogan (Johnson & Hogan, 1981) disapproved of that term as a general description of the self-presentational strategy of test item responses, arguing that no clear line could be drawn between authenticity and dissimulation as long as individuals spontaneously presented themselves differently to different audiences in everyday life.

Of relevance in this regard is Hass' (1981) suggestion that an individual's attitude toward any given issue be characterized not as a single fixed point on a scale, but rather in terms of the range of opinions to which that individual would register some degree of assent--in his terms,

the individual's latitude of acceptance. According to this model of attitude-as-latitude, an individual might emphasize different points within his or her latitude of acceptance, depending upon any of a number of situational variables, without overpassing the bounds of that latitude and engaging in what would then accurately be considered dissimulation. Indeed, Hass' research indicates that individuals tend to be less aware of shifts within their latitude of acceptance than of shifts that constitute a misrepresentation of their beliefs. This interpretation of attitude shifts avoids the unattractive implications of the impression management theories currently used to explain anticipatory shifts in reported attitudes. On the one hand, when the view that attitudes are situationally determined is pressed far enough, it may be taken to imply that the concept of internalized attitudes is superfluous; on the other hand, in defending the concept of stable internalized attitudes, one is led to the conclusion that much of an individual's nearly ubiquitous impression management behavior amounts to deliberate deceit.

Applied to Hogan's account of self-presentational strategies, Hass' attitude-as-latitude model suggests that individuals exhibit a certain latitude of acceptance with regard to moral and political issues, presenting one or another aspect of that latitude as demanded by the situation and the individual's situation-specific interests--e.g., to

ingratiate or to persuade, to avoid embarrassment, or merely to minimize the possibility of interpersonal conflict. It would be only under exceptional circumstances, such as intense social pressure, experimental role-playing instructions, or a deliberate motive to deceive, that an individual's self-presentations would no longer represent to some extent his or her accepted beliefs.

The main thrust of Hogan's (Johnson & Hogan, 1981) argument, then, is that any attempt to measure social or political attitudes must take into account the element of self-presentation in the respondent's test-taking strategy. In light of the foregoing discussion, spontaneous test item responses on any measure of moral judgment should be viewed as a function of two essential factors: first, the socio-political reference group of the respondent, which by and large establishes the extent of his or her latitude of acceptance with regard to moral issues, and second, the respondent's expectations as to the audience to which his or her self-presentations are addressed, which determines the specific attitudes within that latitude of acceptance that the respondent will express.

In his conclusion, Hogan (Johnson & Hogan, 1981) indicated that although Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview and Rest's Defining Issues Test had not been critically evaluated in terms of their susceptibility to self-presentational effects, such an examination should demonstrate that

they were similar to his own Survey of Ethical Attitudes in that regard.

Following this speculation, the present investigation was designed to assess the susceptibility of Rest's Defining Issues Test to self-presentational effects, as well as to extend Emler et al.'s (1983) examination of the relationship between sociopolitical orientation and level of moral judgment as measured by that instrument.

Emler et al. have already shown that there is a systematic relationship between an individual's sociopolitical reference group and his or her DIT score, in keeping with the first point of Hogan's account of test-taking as self-presentation. However, their study does not provide definitive evidence as to Hogan's second point. Although the results indicate that individuals could indeed use their DIT item responses as a vehicle for false self-presentation when instructed to do so, this does not demonstrate that their test responses reflect a self-presentational strategy as a matter of course. Nevertheless, following Hogan's speculation, one would expect individuals to display some degree of spontaneous shift in their reported attitudes--registered as a shift in DIT scores--merely as a function of the audience to whom those self-reports were addressed. Moreover, given the apparent relationship between sociopolitical orientation and moral judgments on the DIT, variations in the sociopolitical identity of the audience to whom the respondents must

present themselves should have a noticeable impact upon their DIT scores.

The present study had two basic aims. The first was to attempt to reproduce Emler et al.'s (1983) finding of a systematic relationship between sociopolitical orientation and DIT scores. The second aim was to seek evidence of a systematic relationship between respondents' DIT scores and their expectations as to the sociopolitical orientation (conservative versus liberal) of the audience to whom they were reporting their moral judgments via their test responses. Such a relationship would suggest that the respondents were engaging in a strategy of selective self-presentation, i.e., of selectively modifying the presentation of their moral attitudes according to the sociopolitical identity of their audience.

The Anticipatory Opinion Effect

Self-presentational strategies of the sort just described are not unfamiliar to social psychologists. Researchers have provided ample documentation that subjects commonly alter their reported opinions on an issue in anticipation of having to confront someone representing a certain position on that issue, or of having their opinions monitored following exposure to some partisan communication on that issue (Cialdini & Petty, 1981; Hass, 1981). This phenomenon, generally referred to as the anticipatory opin-

ion effect, has principally been studied in terms of subjects' response to forewarning that they would later be exposed to a persuasive message (Hass & Grady, 1975), but a number of studies have shown that such an effect also occurs when subjects expect to be involved in some exchange of views on an issue (Deaux, 1968; Sears, 1967; Snyder & Swann, 1976; Tetlock, 1983a). The anticipatory opinion effect is perhaps better described as a class of effects, for under various experimental conditions subjects have been shown to become either more resistant or more susceptible to a persuasive communication, or to shift their opinions either toward or away from the position of the anticipated communication. The various factors that influence the direction of anticipatory shifts have been detailed by Cialdini and Petty (1981).

As was just indicated, the major aim of the present study was to manipulate subjects expectations regarding the sociopolitical orientation of the audience to whom they were presenting themselves via their Defining Issues Test responses, in order to determine whether there would be a corresponding shift in subjects' test scores. So far, however, this discussion has referred to the self-presentational strategy only in general terms, without specifying the direction in which self-reported moral judgments might shift in response to the sociopolitical identity of the anticipated audience.

Certainly any systematic shift in test scores as a function of the orientation of the respondent's anticipated audience would be noteworthy, inasmuch as it would indicate that the scores obtained on such measures of moral judgment could not be interpreted accurately apart from the sociopolitical context in which they were obtained. This would have particularly serious implications for an instrument such as Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, which involves face-to-face interaction with an examiner who, by virtue of his or her acceptance of the cognitive-developmental model, implicitly represents the postconventional position (and, if Hogan and Emler are correct, the liberal position as well). But such a finding would have broader implications--for example, as regards subjects' impressions of the test administrator and of the manner and setting in which the test was introduced, and even changing expectations as to which sociopolitical identities were most socially desirable. One might also speculate that if individuals engaged in the strategic self-presentation of moral attitudes in a test-taking situation, they would probably do so in interpersonal situations as well; that dimension would have to be taken into account in any model of moral behavior.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider the probable direction of strategic shifts in self-reported judgments. Research on anticipatory opinion shifts indicates that subjects sometimes shift their views toward those of the anti-

icipated communication or communicator, and sometimes shift in the direction opposite that represented by the anticipated communication/communicator (Cialdini & Petty, 1981). Polarization or entrenchment of the subjects' opinions is likely to occur when the topic is one of great personal importance, when subjects have been given the opportunity to prepare themselves beforehand, or when they have been informed that the intent of the upcoming communication is explicitly to persuade. On the other hand, shifts toward the position of the communication/communicator are likely to occur when the topic has little personal relevance, when the subjects have had no opportunity to prepare themselves beforehand, or when they anticipate positive consequences contingent upon their agreement or negative consequences contingent upon their disagreement.

In either case, it seems that one essential condition must be met in order for the anticipatory opinion effect to occur: Subjects must believe that their attitudes will be monitored by someone, whether it be the experimenter or the communicator himself. This consideration, along with the finding that subjects either fail to display a shift or else quickly revert to their original position when the anticipated communication is cancelled, has led some researchers (Cialdini, Levy, Herman, Kozlowski, & Petty, 1976; Hass & Mann, 1976) to conclude that anticipatory shifts are indeed tactical in nature. That is, these shifts represent a stra-

tegy of impression management, by which the subject attempts to maximize whatever rewards he or she perceives in the impending situation by making appropriate modifications in his or her self-presentation. For example, if it is important that one presents a strong, confident image, one might polarize one's position, whereas one might minimize differences in opinion in order to avoid conflict or embarrassment. As was indicated in the discussion of Hass' (1981) attitude-as-latitude model, subjects need not even be conscious of the fact that they are engaging in such a strategy. The important point here is that anticipatory shifts do not represent attitude change in the usual sense of a permanent alteration of one's former position, although--again according to the attitude-as-latitude model--neither must these shifts be considered merely a matter of deception.

One last point needs to be considered in this regard. Although anticipatory shifts in the direction of the communicator's position had originally been thought to represent agreement with the communicator for reasons of compliance or ingratiation, it has more recently been suggested that such shifts may actually represent a strategy of moderation rather than one of conformity (Cialdini, Levy, Herman, & Evenbeck, 1973; Hass, 1975). There are several reasons why subjects in anticipatory opinion effect studies might favor a moderate or neutral stance. Such a position is more flexible and more easily defended, it enables one to project

the socially desirable image of open-mindedness, and it permits one to assess both sides of an issue before making any commitment.

Unfortunately, early studies had employed only message positions that were opposite the subjects' own, so it was impossible to determine on that basis whether movement in the direction of the communicator represented a shift toward a more moderate stance or an attempt to conform to the communicator's position. For this reason, Cialdini et al. (1973) and Hass (1975) each conducted a series of experiments in which the forewarning either did not indicate the position of the communicator or indicated that the communicator held similar but more extreme views. In the first case, subjects displayed a shift toward the center of the opinion scale, consistent with the moderation hypothesis but inexplicable in terms of conformity. In the second, subjects shifted slightly toward the center rather than becoming more extreme themselves, also consistent with the moderation hypothesis in terms of direction but of a lesser magnitude than would have been expected if the strategy had been exclusively one of moderation. The latter result led Cialdini et al. and Hass to conclude that both conformity and moderation pressures were operative in producing anticipatory shifts. They suggested that the two tendencies would enhance one another and produce sizable shifts in the direction of a communicator holding an opposite view, whereas the

two would work against one another when the communicator held a similar but more extreme view, resulting in smaller shifts less predictable in direction.

In light of these findings, predictions regarding the direction of anticipatory opinion shifts must be formulated carefully. There is little doubt as to the probable direction of shift for subjects whose preexperimental position on the issue in question is opposite that of their anticipated audience. As long as the issue is one of relatively low relevance to subjects' immediate personal interests, they should shift their responses toward those characteristic of their audience, for in this situation the direction of conformity and that of moderation coincide. However, in order to predict whether subjects whose preexperimental position is already similar will shift further toward their audience (i.e., conform) or away from it (i.e., moderate), one must have some idea of the relative strength of the pressures to conform and to moderate that are specific to the conditions of the experiment.

The design of the present experiment was patterned after an investigation of anticipatory opinion shifts conducted by Tetlock (1983a). Unfortunately, however, Tetlock's data were not sufficient to make a confident assessment of the relative strength of the conformity and moderation pressures that may have operated within that design. Tetlock's study will be described in detail further on, but

his results are of relevance in this regard. Tetlock (1983a) found that subjects who had been forewarned that the political orientation of their audience would be liberal reported opinions that were more liberal than those of subjects who had received no forewarning; likewise, subjects who had been forewarned of a conservative audience reported opinions that were more conservative. A more curious finding was that when the forewarning did not specify the orientation of the audience, subjects did not shift toward a more moderate position at the center of the opinion scale, as would have been predicted on the basis of Cialdini et al.'s (1976) and Hass & Mann's (1976) results. Instead, the subjects shifted slightly in the liberal direction. Tetlock speculated that this shift represented a best guess on the subjects' part as to the probable orientation of the audience (identified in the forewarning as a university student).

Although it appears initially that the pressure to conform was consistently more powerful than the pressure to moderate under the experimental conditions created by Tetlock, this cannot be decided without knowing each subject's initial position vis à vis the anticipated audience. Tetlock's data are silent in that regard. Yet by modifying Tetlock's design to include subjects' initial sociopolitical orientation as a second independent variable, the present experiment was able to avoid that ambiguity. By analyzing subjects' response to the forewarning in terms of

their initial orientation, it was thought possible to determine whether an observed shift represented a strategy of conformity or of moderation. The data on subjects identified as moderates on the sociopolitical scale could be particularly revealing, for Hass (1975) has suggested that subjects who perceive themselves as already holding a moderate position relative to the anticipated communicator may feel little pressure to shift their views. For these subjects, then, the three possible strategies for dealing with a partisan audience--conformity, moderation and polarization--would be clearly distinguishable.

While the anticipatory opinion effect is of interest in its own right, the present study was concerned primarily with the role of self-presentational strategies--specifically of sociopolitical self-presentations--in the reporting of moral judgments. In this regard, it was of secondary importance whether anticipatory shifts represented conformity or moderation. Evidence of any shift in reported judgments could constitute a serious problem for the cognitive-developmental model.

As was noted before, if self-reported moral judgments are shown to be systematically influenced by the sociopolitical character of the context in which they are made, then such reports (and possibly other forms of moral behavior as well) should no longer be interpreted apart from that context. As long as it could be argued that anticipatory opin-

ion effects were indeed shifts in opinion--that is to say, merely a matter of the content of the respondent's judgment, and not of its structural character--then this would not represent a major threat to the cognitive-developmental position.

However, this argument becomes considerably less compelling if (as Hogan and Emler contend) there is a systematic relationship between the sociopolitical identity that an individual projects and the cognitive-developmental level of moral reasoning that he or she displays. Such a relationship would suggest that any strategic shift in the content of an individual's moral judgments, reflecting his or her attempt to modify that sociopolitical self-presentation, might also result in a shift in what Kohlberg and his associates had conceptualized as the structural level of moral judgment. In short, a strategic shift in the sociopolitical identity an individual displayed might be accompanied by a shift in the moral stage perspective from which he or she appeared to operate.

The evidence reviewed earlier indicates that when an individual anticipates having to confront some representative of an opposing position, that individual tends to shift his or her views toward those of that representative.

(Whether this shift represents a strategy of conformity or of moderation is irrelevant in this regard.) One would expect a sociopolitically liberal individual to shift his or

her reported opinions in the conservative direction when anticipating a conservative audience. Now, if the liberal orientation is closely related to the postconventional pattern of moral judgment, one might expect that a liberal individual anticipating a conservative audience would display a shift from the postconventional response pattern toward the conventional pattern of response.

Even this downward shift across stages might not be particularly troubling for the cognitive-developmentalists. As should be recalled from the discussion of Rest's (1973) comprehension study, postconventional individuals are believed to have an understanding of the conventional perspective--having already passed through it themselves--so it is not inconceivable that they could temporarily regress (so to speak) in the interests of impression management and adopt the conventional pattern of response. However, this sort of argument would be of no use in explaining the opposite case, i.e., an upward shift across stages. If the hypothesized relationship holds for conservatives as well as for liberals, one might expect a conservative individual anticipating a liberal audience to display a shift from the conventional response pattern toward the postconventional pattern of response.

According to the cognitive-developmental model, the transition from conventional to postconventional forms of moral judgment is a function of maturity of moral reasoning,

which is purportedly a cognitive-structural variable and not a content variable. A spontaneous shift from a conventional response pattern to a postconventional one merely as a function of the sociopolitical orientation of the respondent's anticipated audience would suggest that the stage character of the respondent's reported moral judgments was not determined solely by his or her cognitive-developmental level. Moreover, it would suggest that the respondent was not constrained by his or her measured level of maturity of moral reasoning from producing responses of a purportedly more advanced form.

Several possible interpretations of such a result could be proposed. The one that would be least damaging to cognitive-developmental theory is similar to the argument used by Thornton and Thornton (1983) to explain away Emler et al.'s (1983) findings. Respondents who ordinarily operate at the conventional level might be able to present themselves to a liberal audience as being more liberal themselves by choosing responses on that measure of moral judgment that simply sound like stereotypical liberal arguments. This interpretation would do no harm to the cognitive-developmental model per se, inasmuch as it did not concede the possibility that conventional reasoners might actually be able to shift into a postconventional perspective. On the other hand, it would undermine claims regarding the validity of the stage measure in question. The argument would virtually acknow-

ledge that the structural level of the items of that instrument were confounded with their sociopolitical content. Furthermore, it would cast doubt upon the data generated thus far using that stage measure, for without knowing the extent to which the subjects in those studies had engaged in strategic response shifts, one could draw no conclusions as to their actual level of moral reasoning.

Of course, the most damaging interpretation would be the one consistent with Hogan and Emler's objections to the cognitive-developmental model, i.e., that there is no cognitive-developmental basis for the distinction between conventional and postconventional types of moral judgment, and that the two simply represent alternative positions on the sociopolitical scale. An individual's typical position on that scale would be explained in terms of his or her social identity and reference groups, rather than in terms of his or her level of moral maturity. According to this interpretation, there are no unidirectional maturational barriers to the comprehension of either alternative position, so an individual would be able to shift his or her judgments according to the demands of the situation and his or her expectations as to the most rewarding self-presentational strategy.

A third possible interpretation, based on the attitude-as-latitude model of anticipatory shifts (Hass, 1981), might be invoked as a way of partially salvaging both the cognitive-developmental model and the measures of moral

judgment based upon it. Instead of viewing an individual's level of moral reasoning as a single point on the cognitive-developmental scale, it would be viewed as a range of perspectives, with only the upper extreme (in terms of cognitive-structural complexity) fixed by that individual's degree of moral maturity. He or she might operate anywhere within that range, depending upon situational demands, and thus might be observed at times to employ a form of reasoning more advanced than the one usually employed. Actually, Rest's (1976) description of an individual's cognitive stage structure in terms of probabilities of response implies something similar to this, but it should also be said that Kohlberg (1976) rejects that approach in favor of the fixed-point model of level of moral reasoning.

Although this level-as-latitude interpretation is mentioned here as one possibility, it would undoubtedly be subject to criticism from both camps. From Hogan and Emmer's perspective, the assumption that the upper limit of an individual's latitude constituted a developmentally more advanced position could be disputed on the same grounds as those cited in regard to the current cognitive-developmental model. From the cognitive-developmentalists' perspective, on the other hand, the level-as-latitude interpretation might be seen as blurring the structural distinction between conventional and postconventional forms and as allowing social factors--as opposed to cognitive-developmental factors

--too great a role in determining the character of an individual's moral judgments.

The foregoing considerations serve to illustrate that, whatever the interpretation, strategic shifts in patterns of moral judgment would have unavoidable implications for cognitive-developmental theory. It was the aim of this investigation to document whether such shifts could be observed as a function of the sociopolitical orientation of the respondent's anticipated audience. In order to do so experimentally, it was necessary to ascertain the respondents' initial sociopolitical orientation (i.e., their spontaneous sociopolitical self-presentation), to manipulate systematically their expectations regarding the sociopolitical identity of the audience monitoring their responses and, finally, to measure the level of their subsequent moral judgments. As was indicated earlier, all of these requirements were met through appropriate modification of an experimental design employed recently by Tetlock (1983a).

Tetlock (1983a) was interested specifically in assessing the impact of an individual's expectation of accountability upon the structural complexity of his or her reasoning about controversial social issues. Accountability is defined as the pressure to justify one's opinions or behavior to an evaluative audience; the expectation that one will have to account for one's position on some issue thus constitutes the kind of situation in which anticipatory shifts

commonly occur. Tetlock had speculated that when subjects were forewarned of the position of the audience to whom they would be accountable, they would adopt the cognitively effortless approach of strategically shifting their own position in that direction, thereby ensuring that their responses would be acceptable or that the negative consequences of the experience (e.g., conflict or embarrassment) would be minimal. On the other hand, when the forewarning did not include information as to the position of the audience, subjects would strategically adopt a moderate position, but would also engage in more conceptually complex and multi-dimensional thinking on that issue so as to be prepared for a variety of critical reactions to their response.

Tetlock tested these hypotheses by dividing his subjects into four groups and providing each a different set of instructions. All subjects were informed that they would be required to indicate their positions on three current social issues by responding to a brief questionnaire. Subjects in the three experimental groups were also forewarned that their questionnaire responses would afterwards be revealed to another subject, to whom they would be asked to explain and justify those responses in face-to-face discussion. The forewarning given to the first group did not indicate the position of the discussion partner, whereas the forewarning to the second and third groups indicated that the discussion partner's views on those issues were either consistently

conservative or consistently liberal. The fourth group received no forewarning whatsoever, thus serving as a no accountability control. In order to obtain a sample of subjects' reasoning on the issues--and thereby be able to assess its structural complexity--Tetlock had his subjects write down their thoughts on each issue before committing themselves to a position on the attitude questionnaire. Because he was interested here in tapping the subjects' private thought processes rather than their self-presentational strategies, he emphasized to subjects in the experimental groups that their written thoughts would not be revealed to their discussion partners along with their questionnaire responses.

Most of Tetlock's findings were in accord with his predictions. His findings regarding anticipatory opinion shifts have already been mentioned. Briefly, the attitude scale responses of subjects accountable to a conservative tended to be more conservative than those of the no accountability group, whereas the responses of subjects accountable to a liberal tended to be more liberal. The one unexpected result was that subjects accountable to an unidentified partner did not moderate their opinions, i.e., shift toward the center of the opinion scale. Their responses were slightly more liberal than those of the no accountability subjects, although the difference was not statistically significant. Tetlock interpreted this as a shift toward what

these subjects inferred was the most likely orientation of their partner, but an alternative explanation might be that these subjects perceived themselves as moderate enough and thus felt no need to shift.

Tetlock's findings regarding the structural complexity of subjects' thoughts conformed to his predictions. Subjects accountable to an unidentified partner displayed significantly more complex and more multidimensional thinking than did subjects in the other three conditions. There were no differences among the latter groups in this regard. Finally, by assessing the relative number of liberal and conservative thoughts in the subjects' written reports, Tetlock was able to compare their private orientation with the orientation of their public self-presentation. Subjects accountable to a liberal or to a conservative displayed considerably greater shifts in their attitude scale responses than in their written reports, suggesting that these shifts represented a strategy of impression management, serving either as an expedient (cognitively "lazy") approach to arriving at opinions easily justified to the anticipated audience or as a way of ensuring a positive response from that audience.

Overall, Tetlock's results indicated that the experimental manipulation basic to his design could be effective in inducing anticipatory shifts in reported attitudes, and was thus suitable for use in the present experiment.

In place of the controversial social issues employed by Tetlock, moral dilemmas from Rest's Defining Issues Test were presented. Subjects could register their judgments by means of their responses on the Defining Issues Test questionnaire. Subjects' expectations regarding the sociopolitical orientation of the audience to whom those responses were addressed were established by forewarning them that their responses would be revealed to an individual whose views were either consistently conservative or consistently liberal. Because one of the factors known to increase the likelihood of an anticipatory shift is the expert status of the communicator (Cialdini & Petty, 1981), subjects were informed that the individual to whom they would have to explain and justify their questionnaire responses was a university instructor (rather than another student subject, as in Tetlock's study).

Tetlock's unknown orientation condition was omitted from the present study on the assumption that results such as those obtained by Tetlock would be too ambiguous to be of much value. But the no accountability condition was of course retained so as to have a control group against which shifts in moral judgment due to accountability could be measured.

As was indicated earlier, one shortcoming of Tetlock's design was rectified by categorizing subjects according to their initial sociopolitical orientation. The present experiment thus became a three by three factorial design,

in which the first factor was the subject variable, sociopolitical orientation, consisting of three levels--conservative, moderate and liberal. The second factor was the manipulated variable, expectation of accountability, consisting of the three conditions just described--no accountability, accountability to a conservative and accountability to a liberal.

Categorization of subjects by sociopolitical orientation was essential to the two basic aims of this study. First, the examination of subjects' level of moral judgment in the no accountability condition as a function of their sociopolitical orientation would constitute an independent test of Emler et al.'s (1983) hypothesis that conservatives tend to be Stage 4 conventional reasoners while liberals tend to reason at the postconventional level. Whereas Emler et al. categorized their subjects on the basis of self-defined political orientation, subjects in the present study were categorized on the basis of their scores on a standardized measure of sociopolitical orientation, the Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory (Wilson, 1973, 1975). The second reason for including the factor of sociopolitical orientation has already been noted. By knowing the subjects' initial orientation, it might be possible to determine not only whether they engaged in strategic shifts, but also whether those shifts represented a moderation of their initial position or an attempt to conform to the position of their anti-

cipated audience.

Integrative Complexity

One aspect of Tetlock's (1983a) design in particular distinguished it from other approaches to studying anticipatory opinion effects. This was its inclusion of an unstructured writing task, for the purpose of obtaining a record of the spontaneous thoughts that subjects entertained before committing themselves to a public position on some issue. Through an analysis of such written records, Tetlock was able to assess the structural complexity of his subjects' reasoning, as distinct from the content of their opinions (which was measured by means of the attitude questionnaire). This unique feature was turned to advantage in the present study, both for the purpose for which it was employed by Tetlock and for a purpose specific to moral judgment research.

The concept of the structural complexity of an individual's reasoning--or conceptual complexity, for short--is of interest in the context of research on moral judgment because one of the basic assumptions of the cognitive-developmental model is that each higher stage of moral judgment reflects a cognitively more complex way of reasoning about moral issues (Kohlberg, 1976). It does appear that at the early stages of moral reasoning the transition from one stage to the next depends upon developments in logical rea-

soning (Smith, 1978). However, research seems to indicate that by the time individuals display Stage 4 conventional reasoning, they have already achieved the level of formal operational thought (Kuhn, et al., 1977), and the dearth of evidence regarding differences in logical reasoning between conventional and postconventional thinkers has been interpreted to mean that the distinction is not a cognitive-developmental one (Emler, 1983). Obviously, it would be of considerable interest to examine whether there were differences in the structural complexity of individuals' reasoning about moral dilemmas corresponding to the distinction between conventional and postconventional types of thought.

The model of conceptual complexity employed by Tetlock (1983a) was one developed some years ago by Schroder and his associates (Schroder, 1971; Schroder, Driver, & Streufert, 1967). The model is based upon the notion that whenever an individual is thinking, judging or valuing, he or she is engaged in an activity of information processing. An individual processes information by means of a structure, or interrelated set, of conceptual rules that organize or combine the particular units of information into meaningful constructs. The complexity of this conceptual structure is described in terms of two fundamental properties of thought. The first property of thought is its degree of differentiation, i.e., the extent to which different dimensions or characteristics of a given stimulus domain are identified

and discriminated. The second is the degree to which those differentiated characteristics are integrated, i.e., organized and interrelated. The level of integration of an individual's thinking is a reflection of the number of rules that he or she employs in combining various units of information, and especially of the kinds of connections that exist among those combinatory rules. Thus, two individuals considering an issue might display the same degree of differentiation and yet process that information in very different ways.

Schroder et al.'s (1967) model delineates four structural levels of integrative complexity. At the low end of the scale are conceptual structures that involve a single combinatory rule or set of rules; thinking of this sort tends to be concrete and categorical. Somewhat more complex are structures consisting of multiple unconnected rules, which make possible alternate interpretations of the same stimulus under different conditions; although less rigid than the single-rule structure, thinking at this level may appear compartmentalized or inconsistent, inasmuch as the only relationship between alternate perspectives is one of conditionality. The third level of integrative complexity is characterized by the emergence of higher order rules for interrelating alternate perspectives; individuals operating at this level are able to consider several points of view simultaneously, permitting them to make adjustments in their

overall interpretation of an issue on the basis of their mutual implications. At the highest level of structural integration there emerge even more complex superordinate rules for systematizing a variety of interacting substructures; it is at this level that the capacity for highly abstract thinking develops, and with it the possibility of generating theoretical constructs and universal rules or principles.

Schroder and his associates used this model to develop a set of criteria for rating the integrative complexity of written samples of a subject's thinking (Schroder et al., 1967, Appendix 1). This scoring system has been used successfully with a variety of written materials to assess systematic individual differences in integrative complexity and the impact of various situational variables (e.g., Porter & Suedfeld, 1981; Schroder, 1971; Schroder et al., 1967; Tetlock, 1983a, 1983b, 1984).

Following Tetlock's (1983a) procedure, subjects in the present experiment were required to record their thoughts on the moral dilemmas taken from the Defining Issues Test, in order to determine whether there were systematic differences in integrative complexity as a function of the type of moral judgment they displayed on the Defining Issues Test. This was thought to constitute a valid test of Kohlberg's hypothesis that the stages of moral reasoning are characterized by successively more complex cognitive structures, particularly in view of the marked similarity between

the structural criteria delineated by Schroder et al. and descriptions of the cognitive-structural features that purportedly differentiate the conventional and postconventional forms. According to Wilcox (1979), for example, moral reasoning at the Stage 4 conventional level is characterized by dichotomization--what, in Schroder et al.'s view, might be considered a multiple rule structure governed mainly by principles of conditionality--whereas postconventional reasoning is characterized by dialectical thinking that samples and seeks to reconcile opposing alternatives--clearly a conceptual structure involving higher order combinatory rules.

Even if an analysis of the integrative structure of subjects' thinking on moral dilemmas did reveal a systematic relationship between conceptual complexity and type of moral judgment, interpreting that relationship might be more problematic than the cognitive-developmentalists would like. This would depend upon whether or not the data also indicated a systematic relationship between sociopolitical orientation and type of moral judgment. It will be recalled that conservatives have consistently been found to employ conventional moral arguments whereas liberals have been found to employ more postconventional arguments. These observations are relevant because several studies have suggested that individuals differ in the integrative complexity of their thinking on various social issues according to their political orientation (Russell & Sandilands, 1973;

Tetlock, 1983b, 1984). Moreover, the relationship is such that liberals tend to display reasoning that is structurally more complex than that of conservatives. Taken together, these suggest that the conventional thinker might be found to be both sociopolitically conservative and conceptually less complex, while the postconventional thinker was both sociopolitically liberal and conceptually more complex.

The cognitive-developmentalists' interpretation of such a result would probably be rather straightforward. Inasmuch as postconventional reasoning constitutes the perspective of the impartial observer, it would be by definition structurally more complex. Thus, if postconventional reasoners tended to adopt liberal values it must be because these were judged as providing morally more adequate solutions to social problems.

Other interpretations might be equally plausible, however. One is suggested by Tetlock's (1983b, 1984) discussion of integrative complexity and political orientation. Tetlock speculated that liberals were forced by their own system of values to think about social problems in conceptually more complex ways. Following Rokeach (1973), he characterized the liberal ideology as attaching equal importance to the principles of individual freedom and social equality, in contrast to the conservative ideology, which emphasizes freedom over equality, or to the ideology of the radical left, which emphasizes equality over freedom. Be-

cause important social issues frequently involve some tension between equality and freedom, liberals must develop more complex strategies in order to reconcile their interests. Conservatives, on the other hand, should not experience as much cognitive conflict in such situations because their ideology already favors one alternative over the other, so they are under considerably less pressure to develop complex strategies. In support of this model, Tetlock pointed out that representatives of the far left--who, like their conservative counterparts on the far right, possess a monistic (one-value) ideology--tended to interpret issues in an integratively less complex manner than did representatives of the moderate left (i.e., liberals).

Tetlock (1984) also cautioned against assuming that one ideological group would always be integratively more complex than another, pointing out instead that the level of complexity displayed may be partly a function of the extent to which a given issue pits values considered equally important against one another. The kinds of issues that appear in the moral dilemmas employed by Kohlberg and his associates are typically conflicts between personal conscience and the legitimate limits of authority (Hogan & Emler, 1978). One might expect that on such issues the conservative solution would be more straightforward than one acceptable to the liberal thinker; consequently, it would not be surprising if the reasoning displayed by liberals in that situation

was--out of necessity--more complex than that displayed by the conservative thinker.

Thus, the cognitive-developmentalists' approach to assessing moral judgment may itself introduce a selection bias that significantly distorts their results. Certainly the suggestion is that sociopolitical content may play a more crucial role in determining the character of moral reasoning than the cognitive-developmentalists are willing to grant. Moreover, the adoption of particular sociopolitical values may be more important in determining the structural character of moral reasoning than any innate cognitive-developmental factor.

Although the present experiment can provide no basis for choosing between these alternatives, it was designed to clarify at least whether the multiple relationships hypothesized above do in fact appear. For compelling evidence regarding the nature of moral development we must await more extensive longitudinal studies, preferably including some that do not share the apparent biases of the cognitive-developmentalists' approach. Until then, the considerations just reviewed ought to be kept in mind to avoid premature or unwarranted inferences from other sources of data, including the present experiment.

Design and Hypotheses

In summary, the present experiment employed a three

by three factorial design. The first factor was sociopolitical orientation, consisting of three levels: conservative, moderate and liberal. Subjects were categorized on the basis of their scores on the Conservatism scale of the Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory (Wilson, 1973, 1975). The second factor was expectation of accountability, and consisted of three conditions: expectation of accountability to a conservative, expectation of accountability to a liberal, and no expectation of accountability. Subjects' expectations of accountability to a specific audience (conservative or liberal) were manipulated by informing them that their responses on the Defining Issues Test questionnaire would be revealed to an instructor from the university identified as holding either conservative or liberal views, and that they would be required to explain and justify their responses to the instructor at that time. Subjects in the no accountability condition received instructions that omitted the accountability forewarning.

Subjects received the appropriate set of accountability instructions after having completed the Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory and the New Left Scale (Gold, Christie, & Friedman, 1976), the measure of sociopolitical attitudes employed by Emler et al. (1983). Attached to the accountability instructions were two booklets: the story booklet, consisting of three moral dilemmas from the Defining Issues Test along with ruled paper for subjects to write down their

thoughts on each problem, and the questionnaire booklet, consisting of the DIT questionnaire itself along with a second questionnaire based upon its items (to be described below). The instructions for the story booklet informed subjects that after reading each story problem they were to write down all of their thoughts on that problem; subjects were also informed that their written thoughts would remain anonymous. After completing the story booklet, they turned to the questionnaire booklet and answered the questions contained therein; the instructions for this booklet reminded subjects in the two accountability to an audience conditions that their responses would be revealed in their upcoming discussion.

When subjects completed the questionnaire booklet, they were administered several supplementary questionnaires, including a demographics survey, a postexperimental debriefing questionnaire, and the Good Impression scale of the California Psychological Inventory (Gough, 1969). Subjects in the two accountability conditions also engaged in a brief discussion of their DIT responses with the experimenter before being dismissed.

The dependent measures of primary interest were subjects' scores on the Defining Issues Test and ratings of the level of integrative complexity of subjects' written reports.

There were four basic objectives to this study. The

first was to ascertain whether subjects differed in the type of moral judgments they displayed as a function of their sociopolitical orientation. To this end, the sociopolitical orientation and moral judgment scores of subjects in the no accountability condition were examined. In keeping with Emler et al.'s (1983) findings, it was predicted that conservatives would score higher on Stage 4 conventional reasoning and that liberals would score higher on postconventional reasoning, relative to moderate subjects.

The second objective was to determine whether subjects' moral judgment scores differed as a function of their expectations regarding the sociopolitical orientation of the audience to whom they would be accountable. Following the anticipatory opinion effect research discussed earlier, it was expected that subjects accountable to an audience of the opposite sociopolitical orientation would display the type of moral judgment characteristic of that audience. That is, liberals accountable to a conservative audience would obtain higher Stage 4 scores and lower postconventional scores than liberals in the no accountability condition, and that conservatives accountable to a liberal audience would obtain lower Stage 4 scores and higher postconventional scores than conservatives in the no accountability condition.

The third objective was an extension of the second. This was to examine the direction of any anticipatory shift in moral judgment scores on the part of subjects accountable

to an audience of the same sociopolitical orientation, so as to assess whether those shifts were more characteristic of conformity or of moderation. If Tetlock (1983a) was correct in inferring that his design generated a greater pressure to conform than to moderate, then both moderates and conservatives accountable to a conservative audience should display higher Stage 4 scores and lower postconventional scores than moderates and conservatives in the no accountability condition; likewise, both moderates and liberals accountable to a liberal audience should display lower Stage 4 scores and higher postconventional scores than their counterparts in the no accountability condition. However, if the pressure to moderate is actually greater, then conservatives accountable to a conservative should display lower Stage 4 scores and higher postconventional scores than no accountability conservatives, while liberals accountable to a liberal should display higher Stage 4 scores and lower postconventional scores than no accountability liberals. In that case, following Hass (1975), moderates would be expected to display little or no shift in their moral judgment scores in response to the accountability forewarning.

The last objective was to assess the integrative complexity of subjects' written thoughts as a function of their sociopolitical orientation and as a function of the type of moral judgments they displayed. Following Tetlock (1983b, 1984), it was predicted that liberals would obtain the high-

est integrative complexity scores and that conservatives would obtain the lowest scores, with moderates somewhere in between. On the basis of Kohlberg's (1976) claims and the expected relationship between sociopolitical orientation and level of moral reasoning, it was expected that integrative complexity scores would be directly related to postconventional reasoning scores and inversely related to Stage 4 scores.

METHOD

Subjects

One hundred and thirty-five undergraduates, 59 males and 76 females (mean age = 18.56 years, SD = 1.01), served as subjects. They were obtained through the Psychology Department subject pool and participated in return for course credit. Subjects were categorized according to sociopolitical orientation--conservative, moderate or liberal--by means of their Conservatism scores on the Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory, which was administered and scored by the experimenter at the beginning of the experimental session. The cut-off scores used to define type of sociopolitical orientation were established on the basis of the distribution of scores obtained from students in two large, intermediate-level psychology courses at the same university. This approach yielded three groups of equal size, each having the appropriate sociopolitical identity. Upon categorization, members of each group were randomly assigned to one of three accountability conditions--no accountability, accountability to a conservative, and accountability to a liberal. Thus, there was a total of nine cells with 15 subjects per cell. Participation in each experimental session was limited to six subjects.

Materials

The test materials consisted of four standardized psychological tests and three questionnaires prepared by the investigator. Sociopolitical orientation was measured by the Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory (Wilson, 1973, 1975) and the New Left Scale (Gold, Christie, & Friedman, 1976). Level of moral reasoning was measured by the Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1979). The Good Impression scale of the California Psychological Inventory (Gough, 1969) was included to assess subjects' concern about making a good impression. The investigator's questionnaires included the Moral Position Survey, designed to assess the conservatism of subjects' positions on the Defining Issues Test issues, as well as a demographics survey and a postexperimental questionnaire.

Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory. The Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory (Wilson, 1973, 1975) is a 50-item self-report questionnaire designed to measure sociopolitical attitudes. Each item consists of a brief label or catch-phrase representing some familiar social controversy--e.g., "death penalty," "evolution theory," and "white superiority." The respondent indicates his or her position on that item by answering "Yes" (favors or believes in that item), "No" (does not favor or believe in that item), or "?" (absolutely uncertain). According to Wilson (1973), this format eliminates the problem of acquiescence response bias fostered by other attitude measures due to the ambi-

guity, multinegative grammar and evaluative wording of their items. The inventory yields an overall Conservatism score, as well as five subscale scores. Sociopolitical conservatism is defined in terms of seven basic characteristics: (1) religious fundamentalism, (2) a right-wing (pro-Establishment) political orientation, (3) an insistence upon strict rules and punishments, (4) ethnocentrism and intolerance of minority groups, (5) a preference for the conventional in art, clothing and institutions, (6) an anti-hedonistic outlook (i.e., the tendency to regard pleasure--particularly sexual pleasure--as intrinsically bad), and (7) superstition and resistance to scientific progress. The first four subscales, consisting of 12 items each, represent the major attitude content areas of the overall Conservatism scale. The Militarism-Punitiveness subscale contains items related to authoritarian concerns, e.g., the maintenance of military strength, harsh punishment and political conservatism. The Anti-hedonism subscale items represent matters of sexual freedom, as well as pleasure-seeking as a general philosophy of life. The Ethnocentrism subscale deals with racial prejudice and intolerance of minorities and socially deviant subcultures (e.g., "hippies"), as well as with the role of women in society. The Religion-Puritanism subscale items relate to fundamentalist religious dogma and to issues involving human reproduction such as legal abortion and birth control. The fifth subscale, consisting of 36 items,

is labelled Realism (versus Idealism). Ostensibly similar to Eysenck's (1954) concept of toughmindedness, Realism refers to the tendency to be racialistic, punitive, hedonistic and conforming, and to be guided by selfish and expedient interests rather than by any systematic ideology.

New Left Scale. The revised form of the New Left Scale (Gold, et al., 1976) is a 60-item self-report questionnaire originally developed for use with college students as a measure of political attitudes. Each item is an opinion statement with a 7-point Likert-type scale (from disagree strongly to agree strongly). The inventory is scored for five 12-item subscales. The Traditional Moralism subscale measures adherence to a conservative, status quo view of society, valuing hard work and the maintenance of social order. The Machiavellian Tactics subscale reflects agreement with a pragmatic outlook on life and the opportunistic use of various strategies for interpersonal manipulation. The Machiavellian Cynicism subscale taps pessimistic beliefs about people and the existing social order. The New Left Philosophy subscale measures disillusionment with modern society and the belief that society has corrupted human nature. The Revolutionary Tactics subscale reflects a rejection of existing social institutions and approval of violent measures to bring about change. Gold et al. (1976) found that politically conservative respondents typically achieved higher scores on the first two subscales, whereas political-

ly liberal respondents scored higher on the last three subscales.

Defining Issues Test. The Defining Issues Test (DIT) is a self-report measure of moral reasoning designed to identify the kinds of issues that the respondent considers most crucial in formulating judgments on particular moral dilemmas (Rest, 1979). After reading a hypothetical moral problem, the respondent is required to indicate which of two conflicting outcomes he or she favors; the respondent also has the option of indicating that he or she cannot decide between them. The respondent must then indicate the level of importance (on a 5-point scale from "great importance" to "no importance") that he or she ascribes to each of 12 statements of issues to consider in deciding about the problem. Finally, the respondent must rank order the four statements that were judged as being the most important. The statements accompanying each story problem involve issues characteristic of Stages 2, 3, 4, 5A, 5B and 6 in Kohlberg's typology, so the respondent's choices indicate the relative prominence of the various stage-characteristic ways of thinking in his or her reasoning about moral dilemmas. The questionnaire also includes several issue statements characteristic of an antisocial orientation (A items), as well as several meaningless (M) items for detecting any tendency to endorse statements merely for their high-sounding language.

The present study employed a short form of the Defining Issues Test, consisting of three of the six stories that comprise the long form. Rest (1979) reported that such short forms had been used successfully where it was necessary to economize on subjects' time. The stories included in the questionnaire were "The Doctor's Dilemma," "Escaped Prisoner," and "Student Takeover." These were selected by the investigator on the basis of two criteria: (1) the content of the stories was such that the outcome favored in each case would be likely to vary as a function of sociopolitical orientation, and (2) the number of Stage 4 statements and postconventional (Stages 5A, 5B and 6) statements accompanying each story were comparable (three versus four for the first, four versus three for the second, and three versus four for the third).

Three sets of measures were chosen from the various indices for summarizing respondents' DIT judgments (Rest, 1979). These were as follows:

(a) Stage scores. Stage scores are the indices most commonly employed in studies using the DIT. These are obtained by assigning weights of four, three, two and one to the statements ranked as first, second, third and fourth most important, respectively. The weights assigned to statements representing each type of item are then summed across all stories, yielding a weighted score for that type of item. Weighted scores were obtained for Stages 2, 3, 4, 5A,

5B and 6, as well as for the antisocial (A) and meaningless (M) items. Following Rest (1979), the weighted scores for Stages 5A, 5B and 6 were combined to produce a single score for "principled" or postconventional reasoning (designated the P score).

(b) Importance ratings. These ratings are the respondent's judgments on the 5-point scale of the importance he or she assigns to each of the issue statements, prior to ranking the four statements considered most important. Importance ratings are not generally used in typing respondents because these tend to have lower test-retest reliability than do the weighted stage scores (Rest, 1979). Nevertheless, they were included here on the speculation that they might be more sensitive to anticipatory shifts than the weighted stage scores. Importance ratings were established by assigning weights of four, three, two, one and zero to statements rated as having great, much, some, little and no importance, respectively. A mean weight was then calculated for each type of item, yielding a mean importance rating for that type of item. A postconventional item rating (P item rating) was obtained from the mean weight assigned to statements representing Stages 5A, 5B and 6.

(c) Action-choice scores. Action-choice refers to the solution or outcome of the hypothetical moral dilemma favored by the respondent. A measure of action-choice was included in order to determine whether subjects' action-

choices were systematically related either to their level of moral reasoning or (given the politically controversial nature of the issues raised in the DIT stories--euthanasia, crime and punishment, and civil disobedience) to their socio-political orientation. An action-choice score for each story was derived by designating one outcome the conservative solution and the other the liberal solution. (The outcomes designated conservative solutions were: for the Doctor's Dilemma, the doctor should not give the overdose; for the Escaped Prisoner dilemma, Mrs. Jones should report Mr. Thompson to the police; and for the Student Takeover dilemma, the students should not have taken over the administration building.) In each case, the conservative action-choice was assigned a score of "2", the "can't decide" option a score of "1", and the liberal action-choice a score of "0".

Good Impression Scale. The Good Impression scale of the California Psychological Inventory (Gough, 1969) consists of 40 items presented in a true-or-false format. It is employed as a measure of the respondent's level of concern about how others react to his or her self-presentation, as well as of the respondent's capacity for creating a favorable impression. Its items inquire into matters that typically stimulate social desirability concerns. The Good Impression scale was included in the test materials to determine whether any observed shift in subjects' reported

attitudes under conditions of accountability was related to subjects' level of concern about making a good impression (as would be suggested by the impression management theory of anticipatory shifts).

Moral Position Survey. The Moral Position Survey (MPS) was a 33-item forced-choice questionnaire composed by the investigator and based on the issue statements contained in the short form of the Defining Issues Test (see Appendix A). It was designed to elicit subjects' pro-or-con positions on the issues presented in those statements. In constructing this questionnaire, the DIT items were recast in the form of position statements, to which the respondent would have to indicate agreement or disagreement by answering either "True" or "False." For example, the DIT item "Whether only God should decide when a person's life should end" was rendered as "Only God should decide when a person's life should end." Whereas in the DIT questionnaire the respondent was instructed to ascribe some level of importance to the issue, irrespective of his or her own position on the issue, the Moral Position Survey required the respondent to take an explicit stand on that issue. Of the 36 items on the DIT questionnaire, all but three were included in the new inventory. Two of the three excluded items were the meaningless issue statements used to assess the validity of the DIT record, and the third ("Was Mrs. Jones a good friend of Mr. Thompson?") was a Stage 3 response that could not be

rendered as a position statement on which the respondent could register an opinion. In recasting the DIT items as position statements, two requirements were observed: (1) the need to construct a grammatically correct statement, while (2) minimizing the extent to which the original DIT item was altered.

Subjects' MPS judgments were sought in order to assess whether there was a systematic relationship between the importance subjects ascribed to an issue on the DIT questionnaire and their pro-or-con position on that issue. The rationale here was that if the Defining Issues Test constituted an indirect measure of the content of subjects' attitudes toward certain moral issues--as opposed to the content independent structural level of their moral reasoning--then the positions subjects reported on the Moral Position Survey might correspond to their importance ratings for those issues on the Defining Issues Test.

Subjects' MPS judgments were also sought in order to assess whether there was a systematic relationship between subjects' sociopolitical orientation and their pro-or-con position on each issue. Following Emler and Hogan (1981), it was considered likely that opposing positions on the issues presented on the DIT questionnaire were polarized along liberal-conservative lines. An MPS Conservatism scale was devised by designating one response alternative for each MPS item as being the conservative position. (For example, for

the MPS item "Only God should decide when a person's life should end," the response "True" was designated the conservative position.) The designation for each item followed the criteria for sociopolitical conservatism outlined in Wilson (1973). This scoring key is included in Appendix A. Conservative responses were each assigned a score of "2" and liberal (i.e., nonconservative) responses were assigned a score of "0". Items not endorsed either way were assigned a score of "1". Thus, MPS Conservatism scores could range from zero through 66, with a higher score indicating a more conservative position across the issues.

Besides providing an estimate of the conservatism of subjects' positions on the issues presented on the DIT questionnaire, this scale provided a sociopolitically oriented measure of the impact of the accountability for warning upon subjects' self-reports.

Demographics Survey. The Demographics Survey (see Appendix B) was a one-page questionnaire designed by the investigator to obtain the following background information on each subject: the subject's age, sex, undergraduate class, intended major and intended career; the subject's current religious preference (if any), along with that of each parent; the occupation and the racial and/or ethnic background of each parent. In addition, subjects were asked to rate their views on economic issues and on social issues, along with the social views of each parent, using a 7-point scale

of sociopolitical orientation (from "extremely liberal" through "moderate" to "extremely conservative").

Postexperimental Questionnaire. A postexperimental questionnaire (see Appendix C) was prepared for subjects in the two accountability conditions as part of the postexperimental debriefing. It consisted of five items inquiring into the subjects' perceptions of the impact of various aspects of the accountability forewarning upon their test responses.

The foregoing materials were organized into a series of test packets and presented to subjects in the manner described below.

Procedure

Upon arrival, subjects seated themselves at desks prearranged in order to ensure their relative isolation during the experimental session. No more than six subjects participated in any session. When all subjects were seated, the experimenter delivered the following introduction:

The purpose of our study is to investigate how people think about social problems. We have a series of questionnaires that we would like you to complete. The instructions for each questionnaire are printed on the first page of each one, so please read the instructions carefully before you begin that questionnaire. I would prefer not to take any questions, and there should of course be no discussion during the experimental session. When you have finished with a questionnaire, just turn it over on your desk and I will be in shortly to pick it up and give you the next one.

The experimenter then distributed to all subjects the first

packet of test materials, consisting of an instruction page and the Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory. The instructions read as follows:

The purpose of this study is to investigate how people think about social problems. For this reason, we will be asking you to complete a series of brief questionnaires.

The first questionnaire is attached to this page. Please read the instructions before you begin. Work quickly and answer every item. Your responses will remain entirely anonymous, so please be candid.

When you have finished, the experimenter will collect this questionnaire and provide you with the next one.

After having been completed by all subjects, this questionnaire was removed and the second packet of test materials was distributed. The second packet consisted of an instruction page, the New Left Scale questionnaire, and a separate answer sheet. The instructions read as follows:

Attached to this page you will find the second questionnaire, along with an answer sheet.

Please read the instructions carefully before you begin. Mark your responses on the answer sheet and not in the questionnaire booklet. Your responses will remain entirely anonymous, so please be candid.

When you have finished, the experimenter will collect this questionnaire and provide you with the next one.

While subjects were completing the second questionnaire, the experimenter scored their Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory responses and assigned them to treatment conditions randomly as indicated above.

Upon completing the New Left Scale, subjects received the third packet of test materials. Although the questionnaires contained in this packet were identical for all sub-

jects, the accompanying instruction pages differed according to the treatment condition to which each subject had been assigned.

The opening instructions for subjects in the no expectation of accountability condition were as follows:

In this part of the study, we would like you to give us your opinions on the problems described in the following stories. Different people often have different opinions on these problems, so there are no "right" answers in the way that there are right answers to math problems.

Once you have had an opportunity to organize your thoughts on these problems, we would like you to indicate your position on each problem by answering a brief questionnaire.

Your responses will remain entirely anonymous, so please be candid.

Turn now to the Story Booklet and follow the instructions given there.

In the opening instructions for subjects in the two accountability conditions, the statement assuring confidentiality was replaced by the following forewarning of accountability:

After you have completed the questionnaire, you will be asked to explain and justify your positions to an instructor from this university. Your questionnaire responses will be used as a starting point for your discussion.

In order to satisfy the methodological requirements of experimentation, it is necessary to have a balanced representation of viewpoints. Therefore, you have been assigned to explain and justify your responses to the instructor who takes a position on social issues that is consistently

___ conservative ___ moderate ___ liberal.

Turn now to the Story Booklet and follow the instructions given there.

Subjects assigned to the accountability to a conservative condition received an instruction page indicating that the

instructor took a conservative position, whereas the instructions for subjects in the accountability to a liberal condition indicated that the instructor's position was liberal.

The test packet contained two booklets, the story booklet and the questionnaire booklet. The story booklet contained the three stories from the Defining Issues Test, one story per page. Each story page was followed by one ruled page, upon which subjects were to record their thoughts about the story problem. The instructions for the story booklet for subjects in the no accountability condition read as follows:

This booklet contains three short stories. Each story describes a situation in which the characters are confronted with a particular social problem. After reading the first story, please consider your position on that problem. Then turn the page and use the space provided to write down your thoughts and opinions on that problem, explaining the reasons for your decision. Follow the same procedure for the remaining stories.

This booklet is your opportunity to collect your thoughts on each problem before committing yourself to a position on the opinion questionnaire. Your responses will remain entirely anonymous, so please be candid.

You should take five minutes to report your thoughts on each problem.

Respond to the problems in the order in which they are presented, and do not turn to the questionnaire booklet until you have finished writing down your thoughts.

For subjects in the two accountability conditions, the second paragraph of these instructions read instead as follows:

This booklet is your opportunity to collect your thoughts on each problem before committing yourself to a position on the opinion questionnaire. The thoughts you report in this booklet will therefore remain confidential and will not be revealed during your upcoming discussion.

Upon completing the story booklet, subjects proceeded directly to the questionnaire booklet. This booklet consisted of the three stories presented in the story booklet, each accompanied by the corresponding questionnaire items from the Defining Issues Test; the Moral Position Survey was included at the end of the booklet. The instruction page for the questionnaire booklet given to subjects in the no accountability condition read as follows:

This booklet contains the three stories that you have just read, along with a series of questions about each story. Please answer the questions according to the instructions given there.

Your responses will remain entirely anonymous, so please be candid.

For subjects in the two accountability conditions, the second paragraph read instead as follows:

Your responses on this questionnaire will be revealed to your assigned instructor as a starting point for discussion. You will be asked to explain and justify your responses at that time.

When subjects completed the questionnaire booklet, the experimenter distributed the fourth packet of test materials. Subjects in the no accountability condition received the Demographics Survey. Subjects in the two accountability conditions received the Demographics Survey plus the postexperimental questionnaire.

Upon completing these questionnaires, subjects were provided the last packet of test materials, consisting of an instruction page, the Good Impression scale and a separate answer sheet. The instructions were the same for all

subjects:

Attached to this page you will find the last questionnaire, along with an answer sheet.

Please read the instructions carefully before you begin. Mark your responses on the answer sheet and not in the questionnaire booklet. Work quickly and answer every question. Your responses will remain entirely anonymous, so please be candid.

When you have finished, the experimenter will collect this questionnaire and provide you with your final instructions.

Because subjects assigned to the two accountability conditions had been led to expect a face-to-face interaction as part of the experiment, they were interviewed individually by the experimenter at the end of the session. Subjects assigned to the no accountability condition were not invited to participate in an interview, inasmuch as they had been promised that their questionnaire responses would remain anonymous.

The interviews were conducted privately in an adjoining room. Each interview entailed asking the subject to explain his or her reasons for choosing the four statements ranked as most important in the story questionnaire booklet for one of the three story problems. When the subject was seated, the experimenter delivered the following introduction:

I am the instructor to whom you have been assigned to explain and justify your questionnaire responses. You have before you a copy of the questionnaire, open to the problem about -----. I have your questionnaire here. For this problem, you chose question number -- as the first most important issue to consider in making a decision. Please explain why you chose that issue as your first most important consideration.

After the subject explained his or her reasons for the rankings indicated on the questionnaire, the experimenter asked "Why didn't you choose issue number --?" about any item from a predetermined list that was not among the subject's rankings. In the accountability to a conservative condition, the list consisted of the items scored as Stage 4 responses; in the accountability to a liberal condition, this list contained the items scored as postconventional responses (i.e., 5A, 5B or 6). This element of the procedure was included to establish the identity of the instructor as one who took a position on social issues that was consistently either conservative or liberal, thereby satisfying the conditions that the subject had been instructed to expect.

After the subject's responses were reviewed in this manner, the subject was debriefed and dismissed.

Integrative Complexity Coding

The thoughts that subjects recorded in the story booklet were rated for level of integrative complexity using the coding system developed by Schroder, Driver and Streufert (1967). Subjects' written thoughts consisted of three short paragraphs, one per page, in response to the three story problems taken from the Defining Issues Test.

As defined by Schroder et al. (1967), the integrative complexity of an individual's thoughts on any issue refers to the number of aspects or considerations taken into ac-

count and the extent to which these are combined and inter-related. Thus, in rating the integrative complexity of a response, two structural properties of the individual's reasoning are recognized: degree of differentiation (the number of aspects considered) and level of integration (the extent to which interrelationships among those differentiated aspects are developed). Integrative complexity ratings are unrelated to the specific content of the individual's position on the issue, inasmuch as any position may be supported by reasoning that is structurally simple or complex.

The integrative complexity scoring system employs a 7-point scale, representing a continuum from low to high levels of integrative complexity. Points 1, 3, 5 and 7 constitute the nodal levels of conceptual structure, with points 2, 4 and 6 representing intermediate or transitional forms. A rating of 1 (low differentiation with low integration) would be assigned to a response that displayed a single, fixed perspective. If the response made reference to alternative but unconnected perspectives, it would be given a rating of 3 (moderate or high differentiation with low integration). A response would be assigned a rating of 5 (moderate or high differentiation with moderate integration) if it demonstrated that different perspectives had been considered jointly and viewed as having interactive implications. A rating of 7 (high differentiation with high integration) would be reserved for a response demonstrating that

the outcomes of comparisons among alternative perspectives were themselves subject to joint consideration and fitted into a more inclusive framework. More detailed criteria for assigning integrative complexity ratings to written responses are given in the scoring manual prepared by Schroder et al. (1967, Appendix 2).

The level of integrative complexity of each subject's written thoughts was represented by the mean integrative complexity rating across the three paragraphs comprising the subject's thought protocol. All integrative complexity ratings were performed by the investigator. The paragraphs comprising each thought protocol were separated beforehand and coded for later identification, in order to ensure that the ratings would be performed independently and without knowledge of the subject's sociopolitical orientation or treatment condition.

In order to assess the reliability of the investigator's ratings, two judges were recruited to perform independent ratings on a sample of subjects' paragraphs. Neither judge had had any prior experience with the integrative complexity coding system. After receiving approximately one hour of training, the judges rated a sample of 20 paragraphs. Pearson product-moment correlations with the investigator's ratings were .65 and .59. (In each case, 85% of the judges' ratings were within one scale-point of the investigator's ratings.)

RESULTS

The results of this experiment are presented in the same order as the hypotheses detailed at the end of the Review section. Following a check on assignment to treatment conditions, the sociopolitical orientation scores (on the Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory, New Left Scale and Self-defined Social Position) for subjects in the no accountability condition are examined to provide a more detailed profile of the sociopolitical characteristics of the sample and of specific differences across the three types of orientation. The hypothesized relationship between sociopolitical orientation and level of moral judgment among subjects in the no accountability condition is then explored in terms of the aforementioned measures of sociopolitical orientation and the measures of moral judgment derived from the Defining Issues Test (Stage 4 score and item rating, P score and item rating, and Action-choice scores). Subjects' pro-or-con positions on the Defining Issues Test issues--as indicated by their Moral Position Survey responses--are also examined in relation to both the measures of sociopolitical orientation and measures of moral judgment.

Following this, the Moral Position Survey Conservatism Scale scores for subjects at each level of sociopoli-

tical orientation across the three accountability conditions are examined as a check on the effectiveness of the experimental manipulation. The second major aim of the study, which was to assess the impact of the accountability forewarning on subjects' self-reported moral judgments, is then accomplished by analyzing subjects' Stage 4 scores and P scores at each level of sociopolitical orientation across accountability conditions. These analyses also constitute a test of the competing explanations of accountability shifts (i.e., conformity versus moderation). Postexperimental questionnaire responses and Good Impression Scale scores are then examined to determine whether the tendency to display anticipatory opinion shifts was related either to the self-perceived impact of accountability or to the level of concern over making a good impression.

Finally, the level of integrative complexity of subjects' written thoughts are examined in terms of their sociopolitical orientation, level of moral judgment and degree of anticipatory opinion shift.

Check on Assignment to Treatments

Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory (WPAI) Conservatism Scale means and standard deviations for subjects at every level of sociopolitical orientation in the three accountability conditions are presented in Table 1. A two-way ANOVA (Type of Orientation by Type of Accountability)

Table 1

Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory (WPAI)
 Conservatism Scale Means and Standard Deviations
 for All Groups

Type of Orientation	Treatment Condition		
	Accountable to Conservative	No Accountability	Accountable to Liberal
Conservative			
<u>M</u>	57.27	59.07	57.93
<u>SD</u>	2.22	3.03	4.33
Moderate			
<u>M</u>	49.53	49.67	49.20
<u>SD</u>	2.72	2.32	2.27
Liberal			
<u>M</u>	39.87	39.53	38.40
<u>SD</u>	4.64	3.70	3.79

Note. Scores could range from 0 to 100.

on WPAI Conservatism scores confirmed that the assignment procedure had been effective in yielding three distinct levels of conservatism, with no significant differences in overall conservatism across the treatment conditions at any level. The main effect for sociopolitical orientation was highly significant, $F(2, 126) = 357.65, p < .001$. There was no significant main effect for accountability, $F(2, 126) = .84$, and no interaction effect, $F(4, 126) = .57$.

Sociopolitical Characteristics of the Sample

The scores for subjects in the no accountability conditions on the WPAI, the New Left Scale and the self-defined position scales provide a more detailed sociopolitical profile of the overall sample and of specific differences across the three types of orientation. Although these results were generally as expected, there was some evidence that these groups did not adequately represent the full range of sociopolitical positions with which they were identified.

Means and standard deviations for the three orientation groups--conservative, moderate and liberal--on each WPAI subscale are given in Table 2. One-way ANOVAs were significant for four of the five conservatism subscales, with all differences in the predicted direction. For the general Conservatism (C) scale, a Newman-Keuls test revealed significant differences ($p < .01$) among all three orienta-

Table 2
 Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory (WPAI)
 Subscale Means and Standard Deviations
 by Type of Sociopolitical Orientation
 (No Accountability Condition)

Subscale		Type of Orientation		
		Conservative	Moderate	Liberal
Conservatism ^a	<u>M</u>	59.07	49.67	39.53
	<u>SD</u>	3.03	2.32	3.70
Militarism- Punitiveness ^b	<u>M</u>	14.60	11.53	9.60
	<u>SD</u>	2.64	1.77	2.64
Anti-hedonism ^b	<u>M</u>	15.87	13.93	10.73
	<u>SD</u>	3.02	1.53	2.74
Ethnocentrism ^b	<u>M</u>	8.67	7.27	6.20
	<u>SD</u>	3.35	2.58	2.54
Religion- Puritanism ^b	<u>M</u>	17.20	14.67	12.07
	<u>SD</u>	2.43	2.77	3.10
Realism ^c	<u>M</u>	27.67	26.33	31.20
	<u>SD</u>	5.72	3.87	5.28

^aScores could range from 0 to 100.

^bScores could range from 0 to 24.

^cScores could range from 0 to 66.

tion groups. For Militarism-Punitiveness (MP), there were significant differences between conservatives and liberals and conservatives and moderates ($p < .01$), and between liberals and moderates ($p < .05$). For Anti-hedonism (AH), there were significant differences between liberals and conservatives and liberals and moderates ($p < .01$), and between conservatives and moderates ($p < .05$). For Religion-Puritanism (RP), there were significant differences between liberals and conservatives ($p < .01$), and between liberals and moderates and moderates and conservatives ($p < .05$). The three orientation groups were not significantly different on the Ethnocentrism (E) subscale, although their scores were still in the predicted direction.

The ANOVA for the Realism (R) subscale was also significant. However, the pattern of scores was different from that displayed on the conservatism subscales, moderates having scored higher than either conservatives or liberals. Only the difference between moderates and liberals reached a significant level ($p < .05$).

Pearson product-moment correlations among the WPAI subscales are given in Table 3. As expected, each of the four subfactors of conservatism contributed significantly ($p < .001$) to the general conservatism score. In this sample, AH and RP were significantly related to one another ($p < .001$), but not to either MP or E; conversely, MP and E were marginally related ($p < .05$). In accord with its defi-

Table 3

Intercorrelations among Wilson-Patterson Attitude
Inventory (WPAI) Subscale Scores in the
No Accountability Condition
($N = 45$)

	MP	AH	E	RP	R
Conservatism (C)	.61**	.73**	.48**	.66**	-.30*
Militarism- Punitiveness (MP)		.17	.25*	.19	.25*
Anti-hedonism (AH)			.22	.47**	-.58**
Ethnocentrism (E)				-.04	.23
Religion- Puritanism (RP)					-.52**
Realism (R)					--

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .001$.

dition, the Realism factor yielded a positive correlation with MP ($p < .05$) and negative correlations with AH and RP ($p < .001$).

Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations for each orientation group on the five New Left subscales. Although reliable differences had been anticipated in each case, one-way ANOVAs were significant only for Traditional Moralism (TM), the factor that bore the closest resemblance to general conservatism. The Newman-Keuls test on TM scores yielded significant differences between liberals and conservatives ($p < .01$) and between liberals and moderates ($p < .05$).

It should be noted that the difference between TM subscale means for the liberal and conservative groups in this sample was approximately two-fifths the difference between left-wing and right-wing groups in Emler et al.'s (1983) study; in addition, the mean TM score for this liberal group was somewhat higher (i.e., more conservative) than for Emler et al.'s moderate group. Similarly, the mean TM score for the entire sample was higher--and the standard deviation lower--than for any student sample reported by Gold et al. (1976). Altogether, these comparisons suggest that the present sample was sociopolitically both more homogeneous and more conservative than samples studied elsewhere.

The intercorrelations among the New Left subscales are given in Table 5. For the most part, these did not fol-

Table 4

New Left Subscale Means and Standard Deviations
by Type of Sociopolitical Orientation
(No Accountability Condition)

Subscale		Type of Orientation		
		Conservative	Moderate	Liberal
Traditional Moralism	<u>M</u>	4.12	3.94	3.47
	<u>SD</u>	.55	.52	.59
Machiavellian Tactics	<u>M</u>	3.58	3.74	3.51
	<u>SD</u>	.80	.74	.86
Machiavellian Cynicism	<u>M</u>	3.46	3.97	3.83
	<u>SD</u>	.36	.69	.69
New Left Philosophy	<u>M</u>	3.48	3.46	3.75
	<u>SD</u>	.48	.58	.79
Revolutionary Tactics	<u>M</u>	3.04	3.18	3.04
	<u>SD</u>	.47	.48	.62

Note. Scores could range from 0 to 7.

Table 5

Intercorrelations among New Left Subscale Scores
 in the No Accountability Condition
 (N = 45)

	MT	MC	NLP	RT
Traditional Moralism (TM)	.05	-.28*	-.09	-.12
Machiavellian Tactics (MT)		.00	.04	.18
Machiavellian Cynicism (MC)			.29*	.20
New Left Philosophy (NLP)				-.03
Revolutionary Tactics (RT)				--

*p < .05.

low predictions based upon Emler et al.'s results or those reported by Gold et al. The only expected correlations that actually reached a significant level ($p < .05$) were between Machiavellian Cynicism (MC) and New Left Philosophy (NLP) and between MC and TM. Particularly surprising was the absence of a significant negative correlation between the conservative TM subscale and either NLP or Revolutionary Tactics (RT), the subscales that represent liberalism and radicalism, respectively. It is uncertain whether these anomalies are attributable to the relative homogeneity of the sample.

The third measure of sociopolitical orientation was subjects' self-defined position on economic issues and on social issues, from the Demographics Survey. Each rating was on a 7-point scale, from extremely liberal (a rating of 1) through moderate (4) to extremely conservative (7). Means and standard deviations for conservatives, moderates and liberals on Self-defined Economic Position were 4.27 ($SD = .88$), 3.93 ($SD = 1.03$) and 3.93 ($SD = 1.53$), respectively. For Self-defined Social Position, these were 4.33 ($SD = 1.35$), 3.40 ($SD = 1.18$) and 2.93 ($SD = 1.58$), respectively. As expected, although the two ratings correlated significantly, $r(43) = .55$, $p < .001$, subjects reported a much narrower range of views on economic issues. Only the one-way ANOVA for Self-defined Social Position was significant; the Newman-Keuls test revealed a significant differ-

ence ($p < .05$) in the predicted direction between the conservative and liberal groups.

In light of indications that the entire sample was rather conservative, it is curious to note that the mean Self-defined Social Position for conservative subjects was only slightly to the sociopolitical right of moderate--i.e., only slightly above the midpoint of the scale. This discrepancy between standardized measures and self-ratings of sociopolitical orientation may indicate a systematic distortion in subjects' perceptions of their own views (e.g., a tendency to think of themselves as moderate, regardless of the content of their position). Alternatively, it may be merely the reflection of changes in the definition of conservatism and liberalism over time. The data offer no basis for deciding this question.

Finally, the intercorrelations among the three measures of sociopolitical orientation are presented in Table 6. As expected, the three primary indices of sociopolitical conservatism--the WPAI C scale, the New Left TM subscale and Self-defined Social Position--were significantly related to one another. Although Self-defined Social Position also correlated significantly ($p < .05$) with all four WPAI sub-factors of conservatism, the TM subscale correlated significantly only with MP ($p < .01$) and AH ($p < .05$). The remaining nonsignificant correlations were unexpected, particularly the absence of significant negative correlations between

Table 6

Intercorrelations among the Three Measures of Sociopolitical
Orientation in the No Accountability Condition

(N = 45)

New Left Scale	Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory (WPAI) ^a						Self- defined Social Position
	C	MP	AH	E	RP	R	
Traditional Moralism	.44***	.36**	.28*	.22	.23	-.09	.34*
Machiavellian Tactics	-.01	.28*	-.24	.11	-.13	.30*	.06
Machiavellian Cynicism	-.19	-.22	-.07	.03	-.15	.01	-.10
New Left Philosophy	-.09	-.14	-.10	.20	-.09	.23	-.01
Revolutionary Tactics	.02	-.12	.03	-.02	.22	-.26*	-.19
Self-defined Social Position	.43***	.30*	.26*	.32*	.27*	-.03	--

^aWPAI subscales are Conservatism (C), Militarism-Punitiveness (MP), Anti-hedonism (AH), Ethnocentrism (E), Religion-Puritanism (RP), and Realism (R).

*p < .05.

**p < .01.

***p < .005.

the various measures of conservatism and either New Left Philosophy or Revolutionary Tactics.

Overall, the foregoing results indicate that the liberal and conservative groups were significantly different on most measures of sociopolitical conservatism, with the pattern of scores across all three types of orientation conforming to predictions. However, subjects in this sample may represent a somewhat narrow range of sociopolitical attitudes, somewhere in the moderate-to-conservative region of the sociopolitical spectrum.

Sociopolitical Orientation and Moral Judgment

The relationship between sociopolitical orientation and moral judgment among subjects in the no accountability condition was explored in terms of the sociopolitical measures just discussed and four Defining Issues Test (DIT) scores--the Stage 4 score, P score, and mean importance ratings for Stage 4 items and for postconventional items. Action-choice scores for each DIT story problem were examined along with the stage measures of moral judgment.

The intercorrelations among these measures of moral judgment were generally as expected: There was a significant correlation between the Stage 4 score and P score, $r(43) = -.61$, $p < .001$. The Stage 4 score was significantly related both to the Stage 4 item rating, $r(43) = .31$, $p < .025$, and to the postconventional item rating, $r(43) =$

-.45, $p < .001$. The P score was significantly related to the postconventional item rating, $r(43) = .65$, $p < .001$, but it was unrelated to the Stage 4 item rating, $r(43) = .01$.

Contrary to expectation, the significant correlation between Stage 4 item rating and postconventional item ratings was positive rather than negative, $r(43) = .35$, $p < .01$. However, it should be noted in this regard that subjects' ratings were frequently concentrated at either the upper or the lower end of the rating scale. This tendency, which according to Rest (1979) renders item ratings inferior to the stage scores based on item rankings, could result in a positive correlation between the two types of item regardless of their actual relationship to one another. In view of this possibility, correlations involving Stage 4 ratings and P item ratings should be interpreted cautiously.

Finally, there were no significant correlations among the three Action-choice scores, and no significant correlations between Action-choice and DIT scores except for Action-choice One ("Doctor's Dilemma") and Stage 4 score, $r(43) = .30$, $p < .05$.

Table 7 gives the means and standard deviations for the DIT scores and Action-choice scores of subjects at each level of sociopolitical orientation in the no accountability condition. Planned comparisons between liberal and conservative groups indicated that differences were significant for Stage 4 scores, $F(1, 42) = 8.85$, $p < .005$, and P scores,

Table 7
Means and Standard Deviations for
Defining Issues Test (DIT) Scores
by Type of Sociopolitical Orientation
(No Accountability Condition)

Score		Type of Orientation		
		Conservative	Moderate	Liberal
Stage 4 Score ^a	<u>M</u>	12.73	10.60	8.73
	<u>SD</u>	2.52	4.52	3.73
P Score ^b	<u>M</u>	8.07	11.93	13.40
	<u>SD</u>	3.20	4.54	5.72
Stage 4 Rating ^c	<u>M</u>	2.47	2.41	2.23
	<u>SD</u>	.52	.60	.43
P Item Rating ^c	<u>M</u>	2.24	2.50	2.59
	<u>SD</u>	.53	.40	.64
Action-choice 1 ^d	<u>M</u>	1.33	1.13	.60
	<u>SD</u>	.90	.99	.91
Action-choice 2 ^d	<u>M</u>	.67	.67	.13
	<u>SD</u>	.82	.90	.35
Action-choice 3 ^d	<u>M</u>	1.80	2.00	1.73
	<u>SD</u>	.56	.00	.59

^aStage 4 Scores could range from 0 to 40.

^bP Scores could range from 0 to 44.

^cItem Ratings could range from 0 to 5.

^dAction-choice scores could range from 0 to 2.

$F(1, 42) = 10.07, p < .005$. The differences between liberals and conservatives were not significant for either Stage 4 item ratings, $F(1, 42) = 1.57, p < .25$, or postconventional item ratings, $F(1, 42) = 3.25, p < .10$. However, all differences were in the predicted direction, with moderates scoring between the liberal and conservative extremes.

With regard to Action-choice scores, there were significant differences in the predicted direction between liberals and conservatives for Action-choice One, $F(1, 42) = 4.62, p < .05$, and Action-choice Two ("Escaped Prisoner"), $F(1, 42) = 4.08, p < .05$, but not for Action-choice Three ("Student Takeover").

The intercorrelations between measures of sociopolitical orientation and moral judgment are set out in Table 8. For the WPAI subscales and DIT scores, all results were in the predicted direction. The general Conservatism (C) score correlated significantly with the Stage 4 score and P score ($p < .005$) and with the Stage 4 and postconventional item ratings ($p < .05$). The only subfactors of conservatism significantly related to both the Stage 4 score and P score were AH ($p < .005$) and RP ($p < .05$); the correlation between the E subscale and Stage 4 score was also significant ($p < .05$).

However, contrary to predictions based upon Emler et al.'s (1983) findings, there were no significant correlations between DIT scores and either the New Left subscales

Table 8

Intercorrelations between Measures of
Sociopolitical Orientation and Moral Judgment
in the No Accountability Condition

(N = 45)

	Stage 4 Score	P Score	Stage 4 Rating	P Item Rating
Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory				
Conservatism	.43***	-.43***	.26*	-.25*
Militarism- Punitiveness	.15	-.12	.14	-.11
Anti-hedonism	.42***	-.44***	.26*	-.22
Ethnocentrism	.32*	-.23	.26*	-.09
Religion- Puritanism	.26*	-.29*	.12	-.26*
Realism	-.12	.14	.04	.15
New Left Scale				
Traditional Moralism	.20	-.24	.12	-.09
Machiavellian Tactics	-.05	-.05	-.14	-.14
Machiavellian Cynicism	-.13	.07	.16	.12
New Left Philosophy	-.11	-.07	.08	.05
Revolutionary Tactics	.05	-.09	-.30*	-.36**
Self-defined Social Position	.07	.04	.17	.00

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .005.

or Self-defined Social Position. The only correlations that approach significance in the predicted direction were between TM and the Stage 4 score and P score ($p < .10$).

Correlational analysis of sociopolitical measures and Action-choice scores also yielded mixed results. As indicated in Table 9, there were low significant correlations in the predicted direction between the WPAI C score and Action-choices One and Two ($p < .05$). In addition, there were significant correlations ($p < .05$) between Action-choice One and RP and between Action-choice Two and both MP and AH. These relationships were congruent with the content of the story problems, which dealt with euthanasia and criminal justice, respectively. The only significant correlation with a New Left subscale was between NLP and Action-choice One ($p < .05$). Self-defined Social Position was not significantly related to any Action-choice score.

Overall, the foregoing results support the prediction that the Stage 4 scores obtained by conservatives on the Defining Issues Test would be significantly higher than those obtained by liberals, whereas the P scores obtained by liberals would be significantly higher than those obtained by conservatives. However, although conservatives and liberals displayed a slight tendency to favor different outcomes on two of the three story problems, the results do not suggest that favoring a particular outcome was appreciably related to subsequent DIT performance.

Table 9

Intercorrelations between Action-choice Scores
and Measures of Sociopolitical Orientation
in the No Accountability Condition

($N = 45$)

	Action-choice		
	One	Two	Three
Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory			
Conservatism	.25*	.27*	.03
Militarism- Punitiveness	.04	.26*	-.09
Anti-hedonism	.20	.26*	.05
Ethnocentrism	.20	.18	-.04
Religion- Puritanism	.28*	-.02	.12
Realism	-.25*	-.03	-.06
New Left Scale			
Traditional Moralism	.09	-.06	-.06
Machiavellian Tactics	-.16	.14	.07
Machiavellian Cynicism	-.20	-.02	.03
New Left Philosophy	-.31*	.04	-.16
Revolutionary Tactics	.09	.02	.10
Self-defined Social Position	.07	.24	-.20

* $p < .05$.

Analysis of subjects' forced-choice judgments on the Moral Position Survey (MPS) provided additional insight into the relationship between their sociopolitical orientation and DIT responses. In order to assess the extent to which the alternatives implicit in the DIT items represented opposing sociopolitical perspectives on the issues addressed, the corresponding MPS items were scored according to a key that designated one alternative conservative and the other liberal (see Appendix A). The resulting MPS Conservatism score, which represented the number of conservative alternatives favored, correlated significantly with the WPAI C score, $r(43) = .56$, $p < .001$. Analysis of the individual MPS items revealed correlations with the WPAI C score that ranged between .42 and .00. Of the 33 MPS items, 11 items correlated at or above .25 ($p < .05$), with another 7 items at or above .19 ($p < .10$). All of these correlations were in the predicted direction, as indicated in the scoring key. Finally, when the MPS items were ranked in terms of the absolute magnitude of their correlation with the WPAI C score, the mean rank for the 10 Stage 4 items was 16.00 ($SD = 6.17$), whereas the mean rank for the 11 postconventional items was 16.46 ($SD = 11.48$).

These results suggest that the alternative positions implicit in many of the DIT items could be identified as sociopolitical positions, and that when subjects were asked to take a position on the issues raised in the DIT--as opposed

to simply rating the importance of considering those issues--their choices reflected their sociopolitical orientation. A comparable number of Stage 4 issues and postconventional issues were included among those that could be polarized along sociopolitical lines.

The failure of a number of MPS items to correlate with sociopolitical attitude implied that the direction of scoring those items on the MPS Conservatism scale was arbitrary. Therefore, a Refined MPS Conservatism scale was constructed for use in subsequent analyses. This scale consisted of the 14 items that correlated with the WPAI C scale at or above .24 in absolute magnitude: two Stage 3 items, four Stage 4 items, six postconventional items and two anti-social items. These items are indicated in Appendix A. The Refined MPS scale and the original MPS scale were highly correlated, $r(43) = .93$, $p < .001$. Coefficient alpha for the Refined MPS scale was .78, or near the .80 level generally considered the criterion of internal consistency for an attitude scale.

The Refined MPS scale proved to be significantly related to every measure of sociopolitical orientation. Its strong correlation with the WPAI C scale, $r(43) = .63$, $p < .001$, is not remarkable, given the criterion by which its items were selected. Its correlations with three of the four WPAI subfactors of conservatism were significant beyond the .005 level (.43 for MP, .40 for AH, and .44 for RP),

with the fourth significant at the .025 level (.29 for E). Furthermore, the Refined MPS scale was significantly related both to the New Left TM subscale and to Self-defined Social Position, $r(43) = .27$, $p < .05$, in each case. Not unexpectedly, then, the difference between the MPS scores of conservatives and liberals in the no accountability condition proved to be a highly significant one, $F(1, 42) = 29.27$, $p < .001$.

The correlations between the Refined MPS Conservatism scale and the DIT measures of moral judgment are given in Table 10. These were significant for the Stage 4 score ($p < .001$), P score ($p < .025$), and Stage 4 item rating ($p < .005$), as well as for Action-choices One ($p < .001$) and Two ($p < .025$). Altogether, these results suggest that the positions held by subjects on an array of issues drawn directly from the DIT were related not only to their socio-political orientation, but also to the relative importance they assigned to various stage-specific issues on the DIT itself.

Further evidence of the relationship between subjects' positions on the DIT issues and the importance they assigned to those issues comes from the correlational analysis of subjects' individual MPS responses and the importance ratings assigned to the corresponding DIT items. Correlations between subjects' position on an issue and their rating of its importance ranged from .85 to .05. Of the 33

Table 10

Correlations between Refined MPS Conservatism Scale
and Defining Issues Test (DIT) Measures
in the No Accountability Condition
($N = 45$)

DIT Measure	Correlation with MPS Scale
Stage 4 Score	.60***
P Score	-.31*
Stage 4 Rating	.38**
P Item Rating	-.24
Action-choice 1	.48***
Action-choice 2	.34*
Action-choice 3	.17

* $p < .025$.

** $p < .005$.

*** $p < .001$.

items, 16 items correlated at or above .25 ($p < .05$), with another 4 items at or above .19 ($p < .10$). When the MPS items were ranked according to the absolute magnitude of their correlation with the corresponding DIT item rating, the mean rank for the 10 Stage 4 items was 11.00 ($SD = 6.89$), whereas the mean rank for the 11 postconventional items was 22.27 ($SD = 9.09$).

In short, for about half of the DIT items there was a significant relationship between the position taken on the issue in question and the importance assigned to that issue. This relationship was twice as common among Stage 4 items as among postconventional items.

Because the indices most commonly employed to summarize DIT performance are the stage scores based on the ranking rather than the rating of issue importance, a correlational analysis was performed on the relationship between subjects' individual MPS responses and whether or not the corresponding DIT items appeared in subjects' rankings of the most important issues in each story problem. The results were essentially the same as those obtained with item ratings. Correlations between subjects' position on an issue and the frequency with which it was ranked ranged from .70 to .01. Of the 33 MPS items, 16 items correlated at or above .25 ($p < .05$), with another 4 items at or above .19 ($p < .10$). When the MPS items were ranked according to the absolute magnitude of their correlations, the mean rank for

the 10 Stage 4 items was 11.70 ($\underline{SD} = 8.49$), whereas the mean rank for the 11 postconventional items was 22.27 ($\underline{SD} = 9.34$).

Thus, as was the case with item ratings, for about half of the DIT items there was a significant relationship between the position taken on the issue in question and the frequency with which it was ranked as being among the most important to consider. Again, this relationship was twice as common among Stage 4 items as among postconventional items.

The pattern of correlations between individual MPS items and their corresponding DIT items, whether rated or ranked, along with the correlations between the Refined MPS Conservatism scale and the four DIT indices, suggests that the relationship between MPS position and DIT response was more significant overall for Stage 4 items than for postconventional items. In other words, the level of importance that subjects assigned to many of the Stage 4 items on the DIT was systematically related to their position on the issues involved, whereas the level of importance assigned to most of the postconventional items was unrelated to their position on those issues. However, it does not necessarily follow from this that subjects treated the two types of item differently--as, for example, by responding to Stage 4 items in terms of their positions on the issues involved while responding to postconventional items in a manner indifferent to their positions on those issues.

On the contrary, the data are not inconsistent with the possibility that the subjects did in fact respond to all of the DIT items in terms of their positions on the issues involved. In order to infer from the apparent independence of any MPS position and corresponding DIT response that the two were actually unrelated, one must assume that all subjects had made the same interpretation of the item in question and would have ascribed the same meaning to a given response. If subjects did differ among themselves in either respect, any systematic relationship between position and response on that item would have been obscured.

Unfortunately, the data cannot reveal whether or not subjects differed in their interpretation of the DIT items and the meaning of their responses. Nevertheless, several considerations may be brought to bear upon this question. First, there may be nothing intrinsically different about Stage 4 issues and postconventional issues in themselves, inasmuch as subjects' MPS positions on both types of issue were consistent with their sociopolitical orientation when the alternatives were made explicit and subjects were required to indicate which alternative they favored. However, the items on the Defining Issues Test differ from their corresponding MPS items in one important respect, namely, in that they present the issue in the form of direct or indirect questions rather than as explicit position statements. As a result, the degree to which one's position on an issue

can be expressed unambiguously by means of an importance rating varies considerably from one item to the next. It is possible, therefore, that the magnitude of the observed relationship between MPS position and DIT response reflected the degree to which subjects interpreted that item similarly. The fact that the distinction between DIT item responses that did or did not display a systematic relationship to MPS position cut across all types of item further suggests that the salient factor was some characteristic specific to the individual items rather than to the type of issue they represented.

The relative dearth of postconventional items among those that correlated significantly with MPS position may actually be consistent with this possibility, inasmuch as the postconventional items are generally acknowledged as being more abstract and even more ambiguous than other types of DIT item. Indirect support for this characterization might be gleaned from the manner in which subjects handled these items during the discussion phase of the experiment. Whereas subjects referred to Stage 4 items only in the context of conservative arguments, they were able to interpret several postconventional items as supporting either liberal or conservative positions.

The foregoing analysis of the relationship between sociopolitical orientation and DIT performance may be summarized as follows: First, the results indicate that con-

servative and liberal groups could be differentiated on the basis of their DIT scores, with conservatives obtaining significantly higher Stage 4 scores than liberals and liberals obtaining significantly higher P scores than conservatives. Second, an examination of MPS responses showed that the alternative positions implicit in many of the DIT items could be identified as representing opposing sociopolitical viewpoints--conservative versus liberal--and that subjects' positions on those issues followed their sociopolitical orientation. Third, a comparison of subjects' MPS responses and DIT responses revealed that for many of the DIT items, there was a significant relationship between the subjects' position on an issue and both the level of importance at which it was rated and the frequency with which it was ranked as among the most important issues to consider. There is some evidence that the magnitude of the observed relationship between MPS position and DIT response for any item was a function of the degree to which subjects interpreted that item similarly on the DIT, although the data are not conclusive in this regard.

Accountability and Sociopolitical Attitudes

The discussion period at the end of the experimental session afforded the experimenter the opportunity to note subjects' individual interpretations of the accountability forewarning. The surprise that some subjects showed at actu-

ally being directed to engage in a discussion signalled to the experimenter that a number of subjects had distrusted the authenticity of the forewarning. He subsequently asked subjects to rate on a scale from 1 to 10 the degree to which they had believed the forewarning instructions. The most frequent was a rating of 7, but a few subjects indicated that having recently participated in an experiment involving deception, they had become somewhat distrustful of all experiments. In addition, it was evident that a few subjects had not read the instructions carefully and had believed that their test responses would be revealed to the instructor of the course for which they were receiving subject pool credit. The impact of the accountability forewarning in that case is a matter of speculation. Because data on subjects' interpretations of the forewarning were not collected from the outset, it is impossible to say more than that such failures may have reduced the impact of the forewarning, thereby resulting in an underestimation of the accountability effect.

Refined MPS Conservatism scale scores at each level of sociopolitical orientation across accountability conditions were examined for two reasons: first, as a check on the effectiveness of the accountability manipulation in eliciting anticipatory opinion shifts and, second, as the strongest test of the competing explanations for such shifts (i.e., conformity versus moderation). Because the accounta-

bility forewarning made salient the sociopolitical identity of the anticipated audience, it was expected that the impact of the manipulation would be most apparent on a measure of the sociopolitical attitudes these subjects subsequently displayed. As was indicated above, the Refined MPS Conservatism scale correlated highly with the WPAI Conservatism scale in the no accountability condition. Thus, it was thought to constitute an adequate measure of the conservatism of subjects' attitudes toward the issues presented in the DIT questionnaire booklet.

The Refined MPS Conservatism scale means and standard deviations for the three sociopolitical orientation groups under the three accountability conditions are given in Table 11. The pattern of mean MPS scores for these groups, illustrated in Figure 1, conforms precisely to the pattern predicted under the moderation hypothesis of anticipatory shifts. As was noted before, both the conformity hypothesis and the moderation hypothesis specify that sociopolitically extreme subjects accountable to a sociopolitically opposite audience--i.e., conservatives to a liberal audience and liberals to a conservative audience--should score closer to the middle of the attitude scale than their counterparts in the no accountability condition. However, whereas the conformity hypothesis specifies that extreme subjects accountable to a similar audience--i.e., conservatives to a conservative audience and liberals to a liberal audience--should obtain

Table 11


Refined Moral Position Survey (MPS) Conservatism Scale
 Means and Standard Deviations
 for All Groups

Type of Orientation	Treatment Condition		
	Accountable to Conservative	No Accountability	Accountable to Liberal
Conservative			
<u>M</u>	16.07	18.87	12.47
<u>SD</u>	5.38	4.76	5.74
Moderate			
<u>M</u>	13.13	13.40	13.33
<u>SD</u>	6.36	6.61	6.65
Liberal			
<u>M</u>	12.13	8.53	11.13
<u>SD</u>	5.58	3.96	5.51

Note. Scores could range from 0 to 28.

Figure 1

Mean Refined Moral Position Survey (MPS) Scores
for Each Type of Sociopolitical Orientation
Across Accountability Conditions



more extreme scores than their no accountability counterparts, the moderation theory holds that they should respond similarly to subjects accountable to an opposite audience and obtain scores that are less extreme. Consistent with the moderation hypothesis, the mean MPS scores for conservatives and liberals held accountable to either type of audience were in each case less extreme than those of conservatives and liberals who were not accountable.

The results depicted in Figure 1 are somewhat misleading with respect to the MPS responses of moderate subjects. The mean scores for moderates across the three accountability conditions suggest that the forewarning had no impact upon their MPS responses. However, when the three moderate groups are divided into moderately conservative and moderately liberal subgroups on the basis of their WPAI C scores, it becomes apparent that their response to the accountability forewarning was similar to that of the conservative and liberal groups. Table 12 gives the Refined MPS Conservatism scale means and standard deviations for the moderately conservative and moderately liberal subgroups across accountability conditions. The mean MPS scores for these moderate subgroups are depicted in Figure 2, along with the means for the liberal and conservative groups.

Figure 2 illustrates that the mean MPS scores for the moderately conservative and moderately liberal subgroups held accountable to either type of audience were in each

Table 12

Refined Moral Position Survey (MPS) Conservatism Scale
 Means and Standard Deviations
 for the Moderate Subgroups

Subgroup	Treatment Condition		
	Accountable to Conservative	No Accountability	Accountable to Liberal
Moderately Conservative			
<u>M</u>	13.13 ^a	17.43 ^b	12.38 ^a
<u>SD</u>	7.08	6.60	6.32
Moderately Liberal			
<u>M</u>	13.14 ^b	9.88 ^a	14.43 ^b
<u>SD</u>	5.98	4.42	7.35


Note. Scores could range from 0 to 28.

^an = 8.

^bn = 7.

Figure 2

Mean Refined Moral Position Survey (MPS) Scores
for the Moderate Subgroups and Sociopolitical Extremes
Across Accountability Conditions



case less extreme than those of the corresponding moderate subgroups who were not held accountable. Thus, at each of the four levels of sociopolitical orientation depicted in Figure 2, subjects in the no accountability condition displayed more extreme attitudes than did subjects accountable either to a conservative or to a liberal.

Following the procedure employed by Murphy, DeWolfe and Mozdierz (1983), a binomial test was performed to assess the statistical significance of this result. Given a probability of .33 that at any level of orientation the no accountability mean would be more extreme than the two accountability means, the appearance of this pattern in four out of four cases yields a binomial $z = 2.85$, $p < .01$. Thus, it seems likely that subjects who received the accountability forewarning did in fact moderate their reported sociopolitical attitudes in anticipation of their encounter, irrespective of the orientation of their audience.

Two complementary sets of analyses were performed in order to clarify the significance of the differences in MPS scores across accountability conditions and types of sociopolitical orientation.

First, planned comparisons were performed at each level of sociopolitical orientation between the MPS scores of subjects in the no accountability condition and those of subjects in each of the two accountability conditions. Only one difference proved to be statistically significant, viz.,

between conservatives in the no accountability condition and conservatives accountable to a liberal, $F(1, 126) = 9.53$, $p < .005$. So the magnitude of the apparent shift in MPS scores across treatment conditions at each level of orientation was rather low relative to the variability of MPS scores within those groups.

However, if the differences in MPS scores across accountability conditions were indeed the result of moderation shifts, then at best their magnitude should not much exceed that of the interval between an extreme position score and a moderate one. Because the magnitude of this interval is equal to approximately one half the difference between the MPS scores of liberals and conservatives in the no accountability condition, it is a function of the heterogeneity of the sample. In other words, the smaller the initial difference between the extremes, the lower the ceiling on potential moderation shifts. Although the MPS scores of liberals and conservatives in the no accountability condition were found to be significantly different, there was also evidence that the present sample represented a somewhat narrow range of sociopolitical positions. If so, then rather small shifts in response to the accountability forewarning would have to be expected.

Although this constraint upon the magnitude of differences in MPS scores across accountability conditions renders the results of the planned comparisons somewhat

equivocal, it has no effect upon the second approach to assessing the impact of the accountability manipulation. This was the simple effects analysis of sociopolitical orientation under each of the accountability conditions. The rationale is straightforward and the test recommends itself on the basis of its practical significance: If subjects tended to moderate their sociopolitical positions in response to an accountability forewarning, then the differences apparent among conservatives, moderates and liberals in the no accountability condition should diminish or disappear under conditions of accountability. In keeping with the results already discussed, the simple effect of orientation upon MPS scores in the no accountability condition was highly significant, $F(2, 126) = 12.43$, $p < .001$. In contrast, the simple effect of orientation was not significant under either the accountability to a conservative condition, $F(2, 126) = 1.94$, or the accountability to a liberal condition, $F(2, 126) = .57$.

The foregoing analysis indicates that the differences in MPS scores among conservatives, moderates and liberals are statistically significant under the no accountability condition and not significant under either of the two accountability conditions. However, this result does not ensure that the range of mean MPS scores in the no accountability condition was significantly greater in magnitude than the range of mean MPS scores in the two accountability conditions. Therefore, a second binomial test was performed to

establish whether the differences among the means in the no accountability condition exceeded the corresponding differences among the means in the two accountability conditions. Five comparisons among pairs of means in the no accountability condition and the two accountability conditions were treated as legitimate. (Using the upper, middle and lower means as the basis for determining the pairs, the five comparisons were as follows: the interval between upper and lower no accountability means with the two intervals between upper and lower accountability means; the interval between upper and middle no accountability means with the intervals between upper and middle and between middle and lower accountability means; and the interval between middle and lower no accountability means with the intervals between upper and middle and between middle and lower accountability means.) For any single comparison, the probability of the difference between no accountability means being the greatest by chance is .33.

Examination of the mean MPS scores revealed that in five out of five comparisons the interval between the pair of means in the no accountability condition exceeded the interval between both pairs of accountability condition means, yielding a binomial $\underline{z} = 3.17$, $p < .01$. This result indicates that the differences in mean MPS scores among conservatives, moderates and liberals in the no accountability condition were significantly greater in magnitude

than the differences among conservatives, moderates and liberals who had anticipated being held accountable for their responses.

The examination of Refined MPS Conservatism scores for the three sociopolitical orientation groups across accountability conditions thus suggests that subjects who had initially presented themselves on the WPAI as having relatively extreme sociopolitical attitudes (either conservative or liberal) tended to report sociopolitically more moderate positions on the MPS when forewarned that they would be held accountable for their views. Inasmuch as subjects shifted toward the middle of the scale irrespective of whether the sociopolitical identity of their anticipated audience was opposite or similar to their own, the results support the moderation hypothesis of anticipatory opinion shifts. Although in most cases these moderation shifts were of low magnitude, their combined effect was to reduce the range of mean MPS scores among accountable conservatives, moderates and liberals to the extent that (in contrast to their counterparts in the no accountability condition) the mean MPS scores for these groups were not significantly different.

Accountability and Moral Judgment

The foregoing analysis of MPS scores demonstrates that the accountability forewarning was effective in eliciting

ing discernable anticipatory shifts on an explicit measure of sociopolitical attitudes. However, the main point of the study was to determine whether the accountability forewarning would result in comparable shifts on the Defining Issues Test. Hence, the same analyses performed on MPS scores were applied to the Stage 4 scores and P scores of subjects in the three orientation groups across treatment conditions.

This approach requires one basic assumption, namely, that there is a systematic relationship between subjects' typical sociopolitical orientation and the stage-specific types of moral judgment that they ordinarily employ. It assumes, in other words, that subjects grouped according to their initial sociopolitical orientation would obtain predictable, reliably different DIT scores if tested under standard conditions. This assumption is indispensable because subjects were not pretested on the DIT to determine their baseline performance. Hence, in order to assess the impact of the accountability manipulation, the initial level of moral judgment of subjects receiving the forewarning must be estimated on the basis of their initial sociopolitical orientation.

The evidence already reviewed with regard to the relationship between sociopolitical orientation and DIT performance in the no accountability condition suggests that this assumption is essentially sound. Both the Stage 4 scores and P scores of the three sociopolitical orientation

groups were significantly different, conforming to predictions based on previous research. Given that subjects at each level of orientation were randomly assigned to treatment conditions, the accountability groups should initially have been similar in this respect. Nevertheless, type of sociopolitical orientation constituted an imperfect estimator of level of moral judgment. As the correlations between the WPAI Conservatism scale and the Stage 4 score and P score (.43 and -.43, respectively) indicate, sociopolitical orientation failed to account for a considerable amount of the variance in DIT scores. This shortcoming was tolerated inasmuch as it did not increase the risk of crucial Type I error; on the contrary, it could only have reduced the likelihood of detecting any genuine experimental effect.

The Stage 4 means and standard deviations for the three sociopolitical orientation groups under the three accountability conditions are given in Table 13. The mean Stage 4 scores for these groups are depicted in Figure 3.


Figure 3 illustrates that the mean Stage 4 scores for both liberals and conservatives in the accountability to a liberal condition were less extreme than those for their counterparts in the no accountability condition. In fact, the two means were nearly identical and about midway between their no accountability counterparts. The mean Stage 4 score for conservatives accountable to a conservative was also less extreme than that for conservatives in the no ac-

Table 13
 Defining Issues Test (DIT) Stage 4
 Means and Standard Deviations
 for All Groups

Type of Orientation	Treatment Condition		
	Accountable to Conservative	No Accountability	Accountable to Liberal
Conservative			
<u>M</u>	11.80	12.73	10.93
<u>SD</u>	4.04	2.52	5.59
Moderate			
<u>M</u>	10.27	10.60	9.93
<u>SD</u>	5.80	4.52	3.45
Liberal			
<u>M</u>	8.80	8.73	11.13
<u>SD</u>	4.04	3.73	5.07

Note. Scores could range from 0 to 40.

Figure 3
Mean Stage 4 Scores for Each Type
of Sociopolitical Orientation
Across Accountability Conditions



countability condition, although this difference was not as pronounced. There was almost no difference between the Stage 4 scores for liberals accountable to a conservative and liberals in the no accountability condition.

This configuration of results suggests that the forewarning had a moderating effect upon the Stage 4 scores for both conservatives and liberals accountable to a liberal. However, evidence of a similar effect in the accountability to a conservative condition is limited to the conservative group.

Mean Stage 4 scores for the moderate groups indicate that the accountability forewarning had little impact at this level of orientation. Yet, as was the case with MPS scores, a different picture emerges when the moderate groups are divided into moderately conservative and moderately liberal subgroups on the basis of their WPAI Conservatism scores. Table 14 gives the Stage 4 means and standard deviations for the moderately conservative and moderately liberal subgroups across accountability conditions. The mean Stage 4 scores for these moderate subgroups are depicted in Figure 4, along with those for the conservative and liberal groups.

It is evident from Figure 4 that the accountability forewarning did have an impact upon the Stage 4 scores of moderate subjects. The pattern of mean scores across accountability conditions for each of the moderate subgroups

Table 14

Defining Issues Test (DIT) Stage 4
Means and Standard Deviations
for the Moderate Subgroups

Treatment Condition

Subgroup	Treatment Condition		
	Accountable to Conservative	No Accountability	Accountable to Liberal
Moderately Conservative			
<u>M</u>	9.88 ^a	13.14 ^b	8.25 ^a
<u>SD</u>	6.38	5.18	3.49
Moderately Liberal			
<u>M</u>	11.86 ^b	8.38 ^a	11.86 ^b
<u>SD</u>	4.67	2.39	2.34


Note. Scores could range from 0 to 40.

^an = 8.

^bn = 7.

Figure 4

Mean Stage 4 Scores for the
Moderate Subgroups and Sociopolitical Extremes
Across Accountability Conditions



resembles the pattern for the conservative or liberal extreme to which it corresponds: The mean scores for moderately conservative subjects were lower under accountability conditions than in the no accountability condition, whereas the mean scores for moderately liberal subjects were higher under accountability conditions than in the no accountability condition. Following the procedure employed earlier with regard to mean MPS scores, the binomial z was established for the pattern of Stage 4 means depicted in Figure 4. In four out of four cases, the no accountability mean was more extreme than the mean for either accountability group at the same level of sociopolitical orientation, yielding a $z = 2.85$, $p < .01$. However, the effect must be considered somewhat weaker than is suggested by this result, owing to the virtually negligible difference between no accountability liberals and liberals accountable to a conservative (8.73 versus 8.80).

Aside from their conformity to the pattern observed previously, the moderate subgroup profiles display two unexpected, yet prominent features. First, the mean Stage 4 scores for the two moderate subgroups in the no accountability condition were no less extreme than those for the conservative and liberal groups to which they corresponded. Second, the differences across accountability conditions for each of the moderate subgroups were considerably greater in magnitude than the differences for either the conservative

or liberal groups; in one case, the difference actually spans the interval between the conservative and liberal no accountability extremes.

Given the small size of the moderate subgroups, coupled with their rather high within-group variance, the significance of these unexpected findings is questionable. Nevertheless, the overall pattern of Stage 4 scores for the moderate subgroups seems to demonstrate that the accountability forewarning had a systematic impact upon moderate subjects. Evidence that the forewarning had a comparable effect upon the Stage 4 scores for the moderate subgroups across both accountability conditions is particularly worth noting, inasmuch as the results for the liberal and conservative groups raised some doubt as to whether the forewarning had been effective in the accountability to a conservative condition.

As had been done in the case of MPS scores, planned comparisons were performed at each level of sociopolitical orientation between the Stage 4 scores of subjects in the no accountability condition and those of subjects in each of the two accountability conditions. No differences proved to be statistically significant. However, these results are of questionable value in evaluating the impact of accountability upon the Stage 4 scores of subjects in the present sample, at least with regard to the hypothesis of moderation shifts. No shift to the middle of the scale could have proved signi-

ficant, inasmuch as neither interval between moderate and extreme Stage 4 scores in the no accountability condition represented a statistically significant difference.

For this reason, the simple effects analysis of sociopolitical orientation under each of the accountability conditions again constitutes a more balanced test of the impact of the accountability forewarning. Consistent with results discussed earlier, the simple effect of orientation upon Stage 4 scores in the no accountability condition was significant, $F(2, 126) = 3.08$, $p < .05$. In other words, when subjects were not accountable for their responses, the Stage 4 scores of conservatives, moderates and liberals were significantly different. In contrast, the simple effect of orientation was not significant under either the accountability to a conservative condition, $F(2, 126) = 1.73$, or the accountability to a liberal condition, $F(2, 126) = .32$. In short, when subjects were held accountable for their responses, there were no significant differences among the Stage 4 scores for conservatives, moderates and liberals.

As before, a binomial test was performed to establish whether the differences among the means in the no accountability condition exceeded the corresponding differences among the means in both of the accountability conditions. Examination revealed that this was the case in five out of five comparisons, yielding a binomial $z = 3.17$, $p < .01$. This result indicates that the differences in mean Stage 4

scores among conservatives, moderates and liberals in the no accountability condition were significantly greater in magnitude than the differences among conservatives, moderates and liberals who anticipated being held accountable for their responses.

Inspection of Stage 4 scores for the three sociopolitical orientation groups across accountability conditions thus reveals a pattern similar to that observed with respect to MPS Conservatism scores--a pattern interpreted as evidence that accountable subjects had engaged in a strategy of anticipatory moderation. Subjects who were accountable either to a liberal or to a conservative obtained less extreme Stage 4 scores than did unaccountable subjects with the same initial sociopolitical orientation. Although the individual shifts attributed to accountability were not large, their combined effect was to reduce the range of mean Stage 4 scores among accountable conservatives, moderates and liberals to the extent that (in contrast to their counterparts in the no accountability condition) the mean Stage 4 scores for these groups were not significantly different.

The P score means and standard deviations for the three sociopolitical orientation groups under the three accountability conditions are given in Table 15. The pattern of mean P scores for these groups, depicted in Figure 5, differs in two important respects from the pattern common to both MPS scores and Stage 4 scores. First, the only defi-


Table 15
 Defining Issues Test (DIT) P Score
 Means and Standard Deviations
 for All Groups

Type of Orientation	Treatment Condition		
	Accountable to Conservative	No Accountability	Accountable to Liberal
Liberal			
<u>M</u>	13.60	13.40	12.93
<u>SD</u>	5.25	5.72	4.82
Moderate			
<u>M</u>	12.40	11.93	12.13
<u>SD</u>	4.32	4.54	4.19
Conservative			
<u>M</u>	11.60	8.07	13.87
<u>SD</u>	4.69	3.20	4.07

Note. Scores could range from 0 to 44.

Figure 5

Mean P Scores for Each Type
of Sociopolitical Orientation
Across Accountability Conditions



nite shifts in mean P scores across accountability conditions were on the part of the conservative groups. Whereas liberals had displayed shifts in both MPS scores and Stage 4 scores comparable to those displayed by conservatives, there were only negligible differences in their mean P scores across accountability conditions. Second, although the P score shifts displayed by conservatives were consistent with their MPS and Stage 4 shifts in terms of direction--namely, toward the middle of the scale--they were of considerably greater magnitude relative to the interval between extremes in the no accountability condition. In the case of conservatives accountable to a liberal, the shift actually spanned that interval.

Examination of the mean P scores across accountability conditions for moderates divided into two subgroups on the basis of their WPAI C scores does not substantially alter this picture. Table 16 gives the P score means and standard deviations for the moderately conservative and moderately liberal subgroups across accountability conditions. The mean P scores for these subgroups are depicted in Figure 6, along with the means for the conservative and liberal groups. The profile reveals small shifts toward the middle of the scale for both moderately conservative subgroups who received the accountability forewarning, but a comparable shift to a less extreme position on the part of moderately liberal subjects was evident only in the accountability to

Table 16
 Defining Issues Test (DIT) P Score
 Means and Standard Deviations
 for the Moderate Subgroups

Subgroup	Treatment Condition		
	Accountable to Conservative	No Accountability	Accountable to Liberal
Moderately Liberal			
<u>M</u>	13.00 ^a	12.88 ^b	11.43 ^a
<u>SD</u>	5.03	4.22	3.56
Moderately Conservative			
<u>M</u>	11.88 ^b	10.86 ^a	12.75 ^b
<u>SD</u>	3.87	4.98	4.89


Note. Scores could range from 0 to 44.

^a_n = 7.

^b_n = 8.

Figure 6

Mean P Scores for the
Moderate Subgroups and Sociopolitical Extremes
Across Accountability Conditions



a conservative condition.

As before, the binomial z was established for the pattern of mean P scores depicted in Figure 6. In only two out of four cases--namely, at the conservative and moderately conservative levels--was the no accountability mean more extreme than the two accountability condition means, yielding a nonsignificant $z = .72$. This result provides no basis for concluding that the pattern of mean P scores depicted in Figure 6 was the result of a strategy of anticipatory moderation, where the pattern indicative of moderation is defined as a shift toward the middle of the scale on the part of both extremes under conditions of accountability.

Planned comparisons revealed that the P scores for conservatives in the no accountability condition were significantly lower than the P scores for both conservatives accountable to a conservative, $F(1, 126) = 4.46$, $p < .05$, and conservatives accountable to a liberal, $F(1, 126) = 12.01$, $p < .001$. There were no significant P score differences across accountability conditions for either liberals or moderates.

The results of the simple effects analysis of socio-political orientation under the three accountability conditions for P scores are similar to those obtained for MPS scores and Stage 4 scores. The simple effect of orientation upon P scores in the no accountability condition was significant, $F(2, 126) = 5.42$, $p < .01$, indicating that the P

scores of conservatives, moderates and liberals were significantly different when subjects were not held accountable for their responses. On the other hand, the simple effect of orientation was not significant under either the accountability to a conservative condition, $F(2, 126) = .72$, or the accountability to a liberal condition, $F(2, 126) = .54$. In other words, when subjects were held accountable for their responses, there were no significant differences among the P scores for conservatives, moderates and liberals.

As before, a binomial test indicated that the interval between pairs of P score means in the no accountability condition exceeded the corresponding intervals between accountability condition means in five out of five comparisons, yielding a binomial $z = 3.17$, $p < .01$. This result confirms that the differences in mean P scores among conservatives, moderates and liberals in the no accountability condition were significantly greater in magnitude than the differences among conservatives, moderates and liberals who anticipated being held accountable for their responses.

In short, the analysis of P scores for the three types of sociopolitical orientation across accountability conditions yields mixed results compared to those obtained for MPS scores and Stage 4 scores. On the one hand, while conservatives held accountable for their responses displayed significant shifts toward the middle of the scale relative to their no accountability counterparts, there was no com-

parable shift on the part of accountable liberals. On the other hand, the magnitude of the accountability shifts displayed by conservatives was so great that the net effect of the accountability forewarning was the same as for MPS scores and Stage 4 scores, namely, to reduce the range of mean P scores among accountable conservatives, moderates and liberals to the extent that (in contrast to their no accountability counterparts) the mean P scores for these groups were not significantly different.

Finally, the DIT meaningless (M) item scores for subjects at each level of sociopolitical orientation across accountability conditions were examined to determine whether the large increases in P scores on the part of conservatives in the two accountability conditions were accompanied by any increase in subjects' endorsement of the two meaningless items appearing in the DIT short form. M score means and standard deviations for all groups are given in Table 17.

Rest (1979) had argued that the increase in P scores Yussen (1976) obtained under role-playing conditions was the result of subjects' endorsing postconventional items merely because of their abstract and high-sounding language; on that basis, Rest had proposed that further analysis would have revealed a corresponding increase in M scores, rendering those test results invalid. Nevertheless, in the present experiment planned comparisons on M scores between the no accountability condition and each of the two accounta-

Table 17

Defining Issues Test (DIT) Meaningless (M) Item
Means and Standard Deviations
for All Groups

Type of Orientation	Treatment Condition		
	Accountable to Conservative	No Accountability	Accountable to Liberal
Conservative			
<u>M</u>	.13	.80	.67
<u>SD</u>	.35	1.01	1.05
Moderate			
<u>M</u>	.60	1.00	.13
<u>SD</u>	1.30	1.51	.52
Liberal			
<u>M</u>	.47	.33	.40
<u>SD</u>	1.06	.90	.74

Note. M scores could range from 0 to 8.

bility conditions confirmed that there were no significant increases in M scores associated with accountability for any sociopolitical orientation group. This suggests that subjects who significantly raised their P scores in response to the accountability forewarning displayed a level of comprehension sufficient to discriminate between those abstract and high-sounding items that were meaningful (i.e., post-conventional items) and those that were meaningless.

Means and standard deviations for the remaining DIT scores--Stage 3 scores, Stage 2 scores and Antisocial (A) item scores--for each type of sociopolitical orientation across accountability conditions are provided in Appendix D. There were no significant differences among conservatives, moderates and liberals in the no accountability condition on any of these measures, and no evidence of any systematic shifts associated with accountability.

Awareness of Anticipatory Shifts

The five-item postexperimental questionnaire (Appendix B) explored the accountable subjects' own perceptions of the impact of the forewarning instructions. Mean item ratings and standard deviations for the three sociopolitical orientation groups in the two accountability conditions are presented in Table 18.

The first item asked subjects to rate on a 5-point scale the importance of knowing that they would have to explain

Table 18

Postexperimental Questionnaire Item Means
and Standard Deviations for Accountable Groups

Item	Accountable to Conservative			Accountable to Liberal		
	Conservative	Moderate	Liberal	Conservative	Moderate	Liberal
Importance of Discussion						
<u>M</u>	2.73	2.87	2.73	2.73	2.67	3.47
<u>SD</u>	1.22	1.30	1.39	1.10	1.11	.99
Importance of Instructor						
<u>M</u>	3.00	2.87	2.67	2.60	2.87	3.67
<u>SD</u>	1.20	1.25	1.29	1.06	1.25	1.05
Impact on Questionnaire						
<u>M</u>	1.73	1.93	1.27	1.60	1.80	1.47
<u>SD</u>	1.22	.96	.46	.83	1.15	.74
Impact on Written Thoughts						
<u>M</u>	1.80	1.73	1.33	1.60	1.67	1.67
<u>SD</u>	1.27	1.03	.62	.80	.98	.98

Note. Higher scores indicate greater importance/impact.
Ratings ranged from 1 to 5.

and justify their responses to someone, irrespective of that person's identity. A two-way ANOVA (Sociopolitical Orientation by Type of Accountability) revealed no significant effects, indicating that regardless of their sociopolitical orientation or treatment condition, subjects attributed an equivalently moderate degree of importance to their anticipation of face-to-face accountability.

The second item asked subjects to rate on the same 5-point scale the importance of knowing that the person to whom they would be accountable was an instructor, irrespective of that person's views. Again, a two-way ANOVA revealed no significant effects, indicating that regardless of their orientation or treatment condition, subjects attributed an equivalently moderate degree of importance to their awareness that it was an instructor to whom they would be accountable.

The third and fourth items asked subjects to rate on 5-point scales how much their questionnaire booklet responses and their written thoughts had been influenced by their knowledge of the instructor's viewpoint. Two-way ANOVAs revealed no significant effects on either item. In short, regardless of their sociopolitical orientation or treatment condition, subjects reported that their awareness of the sociopolitical orientation of the anticipated audience had had very little impact upon either their DIT/MPS questionnaire responses or their written thoughts.

The last item gave subjects the opportunity to indicate specifically how their knowledge of the instructor's viewpoint had affected their test responses; whether their responses remained as conservative, as moderate, or as liberal as usual, whether their responses became more conservative or more liberal, or whether their responses shifted from conservative to moderate or from liberal to moderate. Of the 90 accountable subjects, only 12 reported that the orientation of their DIT/MPS responses shifted as a result of the forewarning; these subjects were not concentrated at any level of orientation or in either treatment condition. Furthermore, in only three cases did the direction of the self-reported shift correspond to the direction of shift observed for the group to which the subject belonged.

Overall, the postexperimental questionnaire results indicate that subjects did not differ significantly in their self-reported perceptions of the impact of the accountability forewarning. Irrespective of their sociopolitical orientation or the identity of their anticipated audience, subjects reported that the contents of the forewarning instructions were of some importance to them. However, despite evidence that subjects displayed substantial shifts on the DIT/MPS questionnaire, they reported that the forewarning had had very little effect on their test responses.

Subjects' Self-defined Social Position ratings from the Demographics Survey were then examined to assess whether

subjects who had been exposed to the accountability forewarning subsequently rated their own sociopolitical orientation differently from subjects at the same level of orientation in the no accountability condition. Mean ratings and standard deviations for Self-defined Social Position for all types of sociopolitical orientation under the three accountability conditions are given in Table 19. The mean self-ratings for these groups are depicted in Figure 7.

It was not expected that accountable subjects' self-ratings would differ significantly from those reported by their no accountability counterparts, inasmuch as they had been informed that--unlike the DIT/MPS responses for which they were being held accountable--their self-ratings would remain entirely anonymous. Nevertheless, the mean self-ratings illustrated in Figure 7 follow the pattern of moderation shifts displayed by MPS scores and Stage 4 scores. Analysis of the simple effect of sociopolitical orientation under the three accountability conditions yielded similar results as well: Whereas the simple effect of orientation upon self-defined position was significant in the no accountability condition, $F(2, 126) = 3.75, p < .05$, it was not significant under either the accountability to a conservative condition, $F(2, 126) = 1.06$, or the accountability to a liberal condition, $F(2, 126) = 1.00$. Furthermore, the binomial test revealed that in four out of five comparisons the interval between the pair of means in the no accounta-


Table 19
 Self-Defined Social Position
 Mean Ratings and Standard Deviations
 for All Groups

Type of Orientation	Treatment Condition		
	Accountable to Conservative	No Accountability	Accountable to Liberal
Conservative			
<u>M</u>	4.00	4.33	3.80
<u>SD</u>	1.51	1.35	1.01
Moderate			
<u>M</u>	4.20	3.40	3.47
<u>SD</u>	1.57	1.18	.92
Liberal			
<u>M</u>	3.47	2.93	3.07
<u>SD</u>	1.55	1.58	1.22

Note. Ratings were on a 7-point scale from 1 (extremely liberal) through 4 (moderate) to 7 (extremely conservative).

Figure 7

Mean Self-Defined Social Position Ratings
for Each Type of Sociopolitical Orientation
Across Accountability Conditions



bility condition exceeded the corresponding intervals between accountability condition means, $z = 2.22$, $p < .05$.

In short, subjects who had earlier been exposed to the accountability forewarning produced ratings of their own sociopolitical position that were less extreme than the self-ratings of subjects in the no accountability condition. Although these shifts were not great in magnitude, their combined effect was to reduce the range of mean self-ratings among accountable conservatives, moderates and liberals to the extent that (in contrast to their no accountability counterparts) the mean self-ratings for these groups were not significantly different.

Although subjects' postexperimental questionnaire ratings of the impact of the accountability forewarning have already been considered in terms of group means, it was also of interest whether individual differences in subjects' self-reports were systematically related to the magnitude of the opinion shifts they had displayed. The extent to which each subject had modified his or her initial position could not be determined exactly, inasmuch as no measure of sociopolitical attitude was administered both before and after the accountability forewarning was given. Nevertheless, the probability that a given subject had engaged in an anticipatory opinion shift was estimated from the magnitude of the deviation of that subject's MPS score from the mean MPS score for subjects at the same initial level of orientation

in the no accountability condition. (MPS scores were used, first, because the MPS scale was explicitly a measure of sociopolitical attitude and, second, because comparable shifts in MPS scores had been obtained across accountability conditions and levels of orientation.)

Inasmuch as the mean MPS scores for subjects at each level of orientation were more moderate when subjects were held accountable for their responses--irrespective of the identity of the anticipated audience--only deviations toward the middle of the MPS scale were assumed to represent probable accountability shifts. Accordingly, for conservatives in either accountability condition, the lower the MPS score, the more likely it represented an accountability shift. Conversely, for liberals in either accountability condition, the higher the MPS score, the more likely it represented an accountability shift. This approach was ruled inapplicable for estimating accountability shifts at the moderate level of orientation, insofar as the direction of shifts appeared to differ for moderately conservative and moderately liberal subjects. The option of combining these moderate subgroups with the corresponding extremes was also rejected, for there was no assurance that their initial positions were comparable.

Given this rationale, the relationship between subjects' self-reports of the impact of the accountability forewarning and the magnitude of their anticipatory opinion

shifts was examined by means of correlations between each postexperimental questionnaire item and subjects' MPS scores. It was expected that if subjects' ratings of the impact of the forewarning were directly related to the magnitude of their opinion shifts, then the correlation between rating and MPS score would be negative for accountable conservatives and positive for accountable liberals.

The correlations between Refined MPS Conservatism scores and postexperimental questionnaire item ratings for accountable conservatives and liberals are given in Table 20. Examination reveals no significant result for any self-report item at either level of orientation, as well as no consistent pattern with regard to the direction of the correlations. In short, there appears to be no systematic relationship between subjects' ratings of the impact of the accountability forewarning and the extent to which their MPS scores deviated from those of their no accountability counterparts.

The same approach was used to examine the relationship between accountable subjects' scores on the Good Impression Scale and the magnitude of their MPS shifts (i.e., the degree to which their MPS scores deviated from the mean MPS score for subjects in the corresponding no accountability group). It had been speculated that subjects who were particularly concerned about how others reacted to them--and who were therefore more likely to obtain high scores on the

Table 20

Correlations between Refined MPS Conservatism Scores
and Postexperimental Questionnaire Item Ratings
for Accountable Conservatives and Liberals

Postexperimental Questionnaire Item	Correlation with MPS Score	
	Accountable Conservatives (<u>n</u> = 30)	Accountable Liberals (<u>n</u> = 30)
Importance of Discussion	-.17	-.03
Importance of Instructor	-.17	-.11
Impact on Questionnaire	.14	.23
Impact on Written Thoughts	.16	.15
Acknowledgment of Shift	-.05	.10

Good Impression Scale--might be particularly susceptible to the accountability manipulation and more likely to display anticipatory opinion shifts. Following the rationale outlined above, if subjects who scored high on the Good Impression Scale also tended to moderate their opinions in response to the accountability forewarning, then the correlation between Good Impression score and MPS score would be negative for accountable conservatives and positive for accountable liberals.

Examination of the actual correlations reveals no significant result either for conservatives, $r(28) = .11$, or for liberals, $r(28) = .00$. Apparently, then, there was no systematic relationship between subjects' degree of concern about making a good impression (as inferred from their Good Impression scores) and the extent to which they had moderated their MPS responses.

Integrative Complexity

Subjects' written thoughts were rated for level of integrative complexity using Schroder et al.'s (1967) 7-point scale and examined in terms of subjects' sociopolitical orientation, level of moral judgment, and degree of anticipatory opinion shift. In each case, there was no evidence to support the hypothesized relationship between integrative complexity and the variable in question.

With regard to sociopolitical orientation, liberals

had been expected to display a somewhat higher level of integrative complexity than conservatives when subjects' written thoughts were obtained under standard (no accountability) conditions. However, mean integrative complexity ratings were nearly identical for all three sociopolitical orientation groups: 2.00 ($SD = .58$) for conservatives, 2.22 ($SD = .73$) for moderates, and 2.02 ($SD = .54$) for liberals. A one-way ANOVA confirmed that these mean ratings were not significantly different, $F(2, 42) = .58$. In order to assess whether the integrative complexity ratings for these groups differed across the three story problems, a two-way ANOVA (Level of Orientation by Story Problem) was also performed. This, too, yielded no significant results. Conservatives, moderates and liberals could not be differentiated in terms of the integrative complexity of their written thoughts on any of the story problems, and their written thoughts did not differ significantly in integrative complexity from one story problem to another.

Correlational analysis revealed no relationship between level of integrative complexity and any measure of sociopolitical orientation. Correlations with the mean integrative complexity rating across the three story problems were as follows: for the WPAI Conservatism scale, $r(43) = .05$; for the New Left TM subscale, $r(43) = .04$; for Self-defined Social Position, $r(43) = -.06$; and for the Refined MPS Conservatism scale, $r(43) = .06$.

With regard to level of moral judgment, it had been speculated that subjects in the no accountability condition who favored postconventional arguments on the Defining Issues Test might display a higher level of integrative complexity in their written thoughts on the story problems. This proved not to be the case, however. The correlation between the mean integrative complexity rating across the three story problems and the DIT P score was neither significant nor in the predicted direction, $r(43) = -.10$. In short, subjects who displayed a higher level of integrative complexity in their written thoughts on the story problems were no more likely to go on to endorse a greater number of postconventional items on the Defining Issues Test.

Before examining the relationship between integrative complexity and degree of anticipatory opinion shift, a two-way ANOVA (Level of Orientation by Type of Accountability) was performed to assess the overall impact of the accountability forewarning upon level of integrative complexity. Integrative complexity ratings had been expected not to differ significantly across accountability conditions. Although the integrative complexity ratings for subjects accountable to a conservative were in fact slightly lower, and the ratings for subjects accountable to a liberal slightly higher, than those for subjects in the no accountability condition, the main effect for accountability was not significant, $F(2, 126) = 2.36$, $p < .10$. The differences are too

small to suggest a systematic response on the part of accountable subjects to the sociopolitical identity of the anticipated audience, but the pattern does indicate that accountability per se had no consistent effect upon level of integrative complexity (i.e., of consistently either raising or lowering the level of integrative complexity of subjects' written thoughts).

Finally, with regard to the degree of anticipatory opinion shift, it had been expected that subjects who did not shift their opinions in response to the accountability forewarning might instead display a higher level of integrative complexity in their written thoughts. As before, the deviation of a subject's MPS score from the mean MPS score for subjects at the same level of orientation in the no accountability condition was used as an estimate of that subject's anticipatory opinion shift. Again, all anticipatory opinion shifts were assumed to be toward a more moderate position. Thus, if subjects who did not engage in a moderation shift instead recorded thoughts that were integratively more complex, then the correlation between integrative complexity rating and MPS score would be positive for conservatives and negative for liberals.

Examination of the actual correlations revealed no significant result either for conservatives, $r(28) = .19$, or for liberals, $r(28) = -.03$. Apparently, then, subjects who did not moderate their opinions in response to the accounta-

bility forewarning recorded thoughts that were similar in level of integrative complexity to those of subjects who did engage in moderation shifts.

DISCUSSION

The sociopolitical orientation data reviewed earlier suggested that the subjects of this study were sociopolitically more homogeneous and more conservative than student samples reported on by other investigators (e.g., Emler et al., 1983; Gold, et al., 1976; Wilson, 1973). These characteristics may be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that subjects were drawn from the undergraduate population of a major Jesuit university. The sample was predominantly Roman Catholic, with 71% of the subjects reporting this as their current religious preference. Except for religious fundamentalists, Roman Catholics tend as a group to be more conservative than members of other denominations (Wilson, 1973). Assuming that most of these students were also raised in the parochial school system, with its rather uniform atmosphere of social and moral values, neither the relative homogeneity nor the conservatism of their sociopolitical attitudes is particularly remarkable. Aside from the influence of religious affiliation, the relative conservatism of this sample may also reflect the current trend in sociopolitical attitudes among American college students.

There is no question that the subjects assigned to the liberal and conservative groups failed to represent the extremes of the sociopolitical scale. For example, the mean

WPAI Conservatism score for the liberal group (39.27) was about 22 points higher than for a sample of students identified as socialists, and nearly 9 points higher than for a sample of scientists and physicians; the mean score for the conservative group (58.09) was about 15 points lower than for a sample of John Birch Society members. In comparison to these representatives of left-wing and right-wing attitudes (reported in Wilson, 1973), the subjects in the present study might be described as rather moderate.

Nevertheless, for the purposes of this research it was essential only that the three orientation groups display significantly different sociopolitical attitudes along the liberal versus conservative dimension. The analysis of WPAI subscale scores across types of orientation demonstrated that this minimum requirement had been satisfied. The restricted range of attitudes represented by the sample merely reduced the likelihood of detecting individual differences that correlated imperfectly with sociopolitical orientation.

Despite this limitation, the two main predictions were both supported by the data: First, there did appear to be a systematic relationship between sociopolitical orientation and level of moral reasoning as measured by the Defining Issues Test. Second, it was possible to elicit shifts both in sociopolitical position and in DIT scores by manipulating subjects' expectations of accountability. These will be discussed in turn.

The systematic relationship between sociopolitical orientation and Defining Issues Test performance for subjects in the no accountability condition followed the results obtained by Emler et al. (1983). That is, conservatives obtained Stage 4 scores that were significantly higher than those obtained by liberals, whereas liberals obtained significantly higher postconventional reasoning (P) scores than did conservatives; moderates scored between the extremes in each case.

Moreover, the difference between conservatives and liberals in each case was of considerable magnitude: The difference in percentage scores for the Stage 4 items was 13.3 and for the postconventional items was 17.8. Particularly for the P score, which is the most commonly used index of moral reasoning on the DIT, this range of mean scores is remarkable. By comparison, composite data provided by Rest (1979) indicate that the difference in P scores between junior high school students and college students is only about 20.0. Further research may establish whether the P score difference between liberals and conservatives increases further as sociopolitically more extreme groups are sampled.

In considering the magnitude of the correlations between DIT scores and measures of sociopolitical attitude, it should be recalled that these scores were obtained using a short (three story) form of the Defining Issues Test. Davison (1979) indicates that such correlations tend to be some-

what lower than those based on the full DIT form, owing to the somewhat lower reliability of the short form. Correlations might be reduced even further in a homogeneous sample.

Nevertheless, the correlations between WPAI Conservatism (C) scores and both Stage 4 scores and P scores were highly significant. For this sample, at least, the subfactor of general conservatism that proved to be most strongly related to DIT performance was Anti-hedonism (the AH subscale of the WPAI). The subfactor dubbed Religion-Puritanism (RP)--with which AH tends to be closely related--also correlated significantly with both Stage 4 scores and P scores. On the other hand, Ethnocentrism (E) correlated significantly only with Stage 4 scores, and the Militarism-Punitiveness (MP) subfactor failed to correlate significantly with either one, although the relationships were still in the predicted direction.

Anti-hedonism and Religion-Puritanism might be described as the more explicitly "moral" subscales of the WPAI, dealing with issues such as are the main focus of the so-called "Moral Majority" movement; for example, chastity, moral training, pot smoking, pornography and censorship (all items included on the AH subscale), and Divine Law, evolution theory, legalized abortion and miracles (on the RP subscale). By contrast, the Militarism-Punitiveness subscale involves matters that are more political or legalistic, such as patriotism, disarmament, the death penalty and corporal

punishment.

In short, although subjects' DIT scores were significantly related to the general factor of conservatism, their judgments appear to have had more in common with their attitudes toward pleasure and religion than with their attitudes toward political and legalistic matters. This distinction between the explicitly moralistic and the authoritarian dimensions of conservatism may prove important in understanding the relationship between the levels of moral judgment and the liberal-conservative dimension. Rest (1979) cited extensive evidence of either very low or inconsistent correlations between the DIT and various measures of political attitudes to support his claim that DIT results could not be explained in terms of the construct of liberalism-conservatism. However, the measures of political attitudes employed in those studies were mainly of the sort that tapped the authoritarian subfactor of conservatism rather than the moralistic subfactor. Thus, Rest's conclusion may prove to be an unwarranted generalization. Further research into the relationship between DIT performance and the subfactors of conservatism--preferably across a variety of populations--may settle the question.

It is not entirely clear why the New Left subscale correlations with the DIT failed to reach the level of significance obtained by Emler et al. (1983), but this may have to do with the comparatively narrow range of New Left sub-

scale scores displayed by the present sample. The New Left Scale may simply be less sensitive than the WPAI to small differences in sociopolitical orientation. As was indicated earlier, even the intercorrelations among the New Left subscales and between those subscales and the WPAI failed to conform very well to the predicted pattern.

The most likely explanation for the near zero correlations between Self-defined Social Position and the DIT is more straightforward. Many subjects did not identify their own sociopolitical orientation very accurately. Assuming that subjects were candid in their item endorsements on the WPAI, it was apparent that in many cases the position subjects ascribed to themselves did not correspond to their attitudes toward issues clearly indicative of a conservative or liberal orientation. This is evident in the surprisingly low correlation between self-defined position ratings and WPAI Conservatism scores. The nature of the criteria that these subjects used in evaluating their own orientation cannot be determined from the data, but would be of interest in its own right.

The Moral Position Survey (MPS) data from the no accountability condition offered evidence of a different sort that subjects' sociopolitical orientation and DIT judgments were related. To begin with, the MPS results supported the speculation that the content of the issues presented for consideration on the DIT fell within the sphere of sociopoli-

tical concerns. Merely asking subjects to indicate their positions on those issues proved to be a reasonably accurate measure of their sociopolitical orientation. In fact, the correlation of .56 between the initial MPS Conservatism scale and the WPAI Conservatism scale exceeded that of any comparison between the sociopolitical measures themselves. Analysis of individual MPS items revealed that the opposing positions implicit in about half of the corresponding DIT issue statements were polarized along the liberal-conservative dimension. It is not unlikely, then, that in considering those issue statements respondents' own sociopolitical attitudes were spontaneously engaged.

However, this is not in itself sufficient to suggest that the Defining Issues Test is no more than an indirect measure of sociopolitical attitude. Although the correlations between the MPS Conservatism scale and DIT scores indicate some relationship between subjects' positions on the issues and their preference for a particular type of item, it does not necessarily follow that subjects' DIT responses were dictated by their positions. Inasmuch as the MPS scale was shown to function as a measure of sociopolitical orientation, its relationship to the DIT may be no more direct than the relationship between the WPAI and the DIT.

It may be argued that, unlike the Moral Position Survey, the Defining Issues Test does not require that subjects indicate their position on each issue in question. It re-

quires only that subjects decide how much importance should be attached to that issue when considering the moral problem to which it refers. The test assumes, in short, that subjects' responses reflect their understanding of the moral relevance of that issue, irrespective of their pro-or-con position on the issue itself. The format of the test items as well as the accompanying instructions appears to have been designed to thwart any tendency on the subjects' part to use their importance ratings as a way of registering their pro-or-con positions.

Nevertheless, there is evidence that DIT responses may reveal subjects' sociopolitical attitudes. Emler et al. (1983) demonstrated earlier that subjects could reproduce the response patterns typical of liberals and conservatives by selectively favoring certain DIT items, thus implying that subjects had identified and exploited some relationship between the DIT response alternatives and the two opposing orientations. However, although Emler et al.'s results indicated that sociopolitical attitudes could be reflected in subjects' DIT responses under deliberate role-playing conditions, some question remained as to whether this would generalize to standard test-taking conditions.

To the extent that the no accountability condition of the present study approximated standard conditions, it appears that subjects' spontaneous DIT responses may also reveal their sociopolitical attitudes. The analysis of the

relationship between subjects' MPS position on each issue and their rating of the corresponding DIT issue statement yielded significant correlations for about half of the items. In other words, there was a systematic relationship between the pro-or-con position that subjects took on these issues and the level of importance they assigned to the corresponding DIT issue statements.

This finding is not particularly remarkable when one examines the individual DIT items, for in some cases it is an exceedingly fine line between ascribing importance to an issue and taking a position on the issue itself. For example, consider the Stage 4 issue statement, "Whether only God should decide when a person's life should end." Here the respondent's belief system is clearly liable to dictate whether the issue is considered crucial or irrelevant. The importance rating for this issue correlated .84 with the MPS position statement, "Only God should decide when a person's life should end." Similarly, for a respondent with a conservative orientation, it may be a foregone judgment that certain issues are important--e.g., "Wouldn't it be a citizen's duty to report an escaped criminal, regardless of the circumstances," which correlated .53 with the position that it was indeed a duty.

This is not to suggest that the rated importance of an issue invariably corresponded in such direct fashion to that subject's position--that, for example, the rating

"great importance" simply implied agreement and "no importance" implied disagreement. In many cases, the relationship between the two was undoubtedly more complex and varied. For example, on the postconventional DIT item, "Does the state have the right to force continued existence on those who don't want to live," the subjects who rated this issue as being important were more likely to believe that the state did not have such a right--opposite what would have been expected if subjects had merely registered their level of agreement in terms of level of importance. In this case, the importance rating may have reflected the intensity of the negative reaction on the part of some subjects to the claim implicit in the issue statement.

Apart from issue statements that seem to carry an implicit sociopolitical bias, there are some that could serve as effective rhetorical devices to support both liberal and conservative positions--e.g., the postconventional item, "Can society allow suicides or mercy killing and still protect the lives of individuals who want to live." The correlations between importance rating and MPS position were generally rather low for such items, which may imply that liberals and conservatives interpreted their importance differently. For other issue statements--e.g., "How would the will of the people and the public good best be served?"--the importance ratings simply defy interpretation as covert position responses. In these cases, subjects' importance

ratings may indeed represent how well they feel each issue statement conforms to their definition of the problem in question, as Rest (1979) assumes.

Nevertheless, this still leaves unsettled whether individual differences in subjects' definitions of the problem are primarily a function of the sociopolitical attitudes they have acquired or of the level of moral maturity they have attained. The foregoing results indicate that there is a systematic relationship between sociopolitical orientation and the type of moral argument favored on the Defining Issues Test; they even suggest that in some cases the level of importance attributed to a particular DIT issue statement may be related to the position taken on that issue. However, as with any strictly correlational evidence, the data do not reveal the nature of the relationship between subjects' sociopolitical identity and their DIT responses.

Yet it is on just this point that the controversy between the cognitive-developmentalists and their critics ultimately turns. The opposing interpretations have already been reviewed: On the one side, having maintained that the cognitive structures defining moral problems are developmental in origin, Kohlberg and Rest insist that the conventional and postconventional forms of reasoning represent successive levels of moral maturity; thus, any evidence of a systematic relationship between the form of reasoning individuals display and the sociopolitical perspective they

adopt must be interpreted as indicating that the latter is also a function of their level of cognitive-structural development. On the other side, Hogan and Emler contend that the conventional and postconventional forms do not represent stages in an invariant cognitive-developmental sequence, but are themselves the reflection of individual differences in sociopolitical perspective engendered by the interaction of character structure and social context.

When applied to the Defining Issues Test, these interpretations lead to very different conclusions about the meaning of individual differences in DIT scores among adult respondents. On the one hand, if sociopolitical perspective and style of moral reasoning are but complementary aspects of an individual's level of cognitive-moral development, then the observed relationship between sociopolitical orientation and DIT scores is not inconsistent with Rest's claim that his test is a valid measure of moral maturity. On the other hand, if the conventional and postconventional constructs are simply terminologically different characterizations of the conservative and liberal orientations, with no basis in developmental differences, then the correlational data support the opposing claim that the Defining Issues Test is merely an indirect measure of sociopolitical attitude.

Clearly, then, the significance of the relationship between sociopolitical orientation and DIT scores hinges

upon whether the type of moral argument one favors is a function of one's level of moral maturity or of one's character structure and social context. The experimental conditions included in the present experiment were designed so as to pit these competing interpretations against one another.

As was indicated earlier, when subjects are forewarned that they will be held accountable for their position on some issue, they tend to modify their initial attitudes in preparation for their encounter with the anticipated audience. Previous research suggests that such shifts represent a situation-specific strategy of selective self-presentation (e.g., impression management) rather than a persistent change in subjects' attitudes (Cialdini & Petty, 1981; Hass, 1981). Accordingly, by exposing subjects to a forewarning of accountability, it was possible to evaluate Hogan's hypothesis that subjects' DIT responses were instances of self-presentation and thus susceptible to modification under conditions known to influence self-presentations.

According to cognitive-developmental theory, although the content of individuals' moral beliefs may be influenced by social context, the structure of their beliefs (i.e., the form of reasoning by which they justify those beliefs) is fixed by their level of cognitive-moral development. Thus, if the Defining Issues Test is indeed a measure of the structure of adult subjects' moral reasoning--conventional

versus postconventional--then accountability pressures should have no appreciable impact upon their DIT scores. In any case, there should be no upward shift in subjects' postconventional reasoning (P) scores, inasmuch as the cognitive-structural adequacy of their moral judgments can supposedly never exceed that of their level of moral maturity. But a shift in subjects' DIT scores in response to the accountability forewarning would suggest that their responses had been influenced by social context, and thus were not solely a function of their level of maturity. Furthermore, an upward shift in subjects' P scores would indicate that they were not constrained by maturational factors from generating responses of a purportedly more advanced type; in this event, subjects' habitual preference for conventional arguments over postconventional arguments would have to be explained in terms of nondevelopmental factors--e.g., subjects' sociopolitical reference group.

Inasmuch as the forewarning instructions made salient the sociopolitical identity of the anticipated audience, it was expected that any effect attributable to accountability would be most apparent on a measure of sociopolitical attitude. Therefore, evidence of anticipatory opinion shift was sought first in subjects' scores on the Refined MPS Conservatism scale, a measure that had been shown in the no accountability condition to be an adequate index of sociopolitical attitude.

As expected, subjects in both accountability conditions displayed systematic shifts in their MPS scores relative to the scores of subjects in the no accountability condition. Besides serving as a check on the effectiveness of the experimental manipulation, these results provided a clear test of the two rival explanations for the anticipatory opinion effect, namely, the strategies of conformity and moderation. As was explained earlier, the direction of the shift displayed by subjects accountable to a sociopolitically similar audience indicates the predominant strategy employed, inasmuch as in that situation the positions representing conformity and moderation are on opposite sides of the subjects' own initial position. The MPS data support the moderation hypothesis of anticipatory shifts, inasmuch as both conservatives and liberals reported opinions that were more moderate than those of their counterparts in the no accountability condition, irrespective of the sociopolitical identity of their anticipated audience.

The pattern of MPS scores across accountability conditions for the sociopolitically moderate subjects seems at first to support another aspect of the moderation hypothesis: that subjects who are already relatively moderate should display little or no shift in their position (Hass, 1981). However, when the moderate subjects were divided into moderately conservative and moderately liberal subgroups, it became apparent that the initial results had masked the

the presence of opposite shifts on the part of each subgroup. Inasmuch as the subgroup shifts conformed to the pattern displayed by the corresponding extremes, this finding does not alter the conclusion that the strategy employed by accountable subjects was one of moderation. Unfortunately, it was not possible to determine whether the opinion shifts of the more moderate subjects were significantly smaller than those of the more extreme subjects, for no precise measure of the magnitude of each subject's opinion shift was available. Such a pattern would be consistent with both the moderation hypothesis and the data just reviewed.

In short, then, the MPS results indicate that when subjects anticipated being held accountable to a sociopolitically partisan audience, they tended to display a sociopolitically more moderate position on the MPS issues than would have been predicted from measures of their preexperimental orientation. Irrespective of the sociopolitical identity of that anticipated audience, the MPS scores of both conservatives and liberals appeared to shift to the moderate region of the MPS Conservatism scale.

Inasmuch as the present study did not include an accountability condition in which the sociopolitical identity of the audience was left unspecified, some question may be raised as to whether the anticipatory opinion shifts were a response to accountability per se or to the fact that the dimension of sociopolitical attitude had been made salient

in the accountability situation (by identifying the orientation of the audience). In other words, was an explicit reference to sociopolitical attitude a necessary element of the accountability forewarning in order to induce anticipatory opinion shifts of the sort observed here? Replication of the experiment with additional accountability conditions could settle this question, but it seems plausible that the content of the questionnaire itself rendered sociopolitical attitude salient and that subjects would have moderated their responses in a similar manner whether or not it had been raised explicitly in the forewarning instructions.

Because the issue of authenticity versus role-playing or dissimulation in subjects' self-reported attitudes was raised in regard to the generality of Emler et al.'s (1983) findings, it is worth considering whether subjects' test responses under the accountability conditions here represented an honest account of their own attitudes or a deliberate attempt to create a deceptive self-presentation.

As was noted in the results, the accountability condition subjects indicated in their postexperimental questionnaire ratings that the forewarning instructions had had little or no impact upon their reported attitudes. In view of the substantial shifts in MPS scores they displayed, this suggests that these subjects either intentionally misrepresented their response to the forewarning or were actually unaware that they had moderated their sociopolitical opin-

ions. Although intentional misrepresentation cannot be ruled out entirely, several considerations favor the second alternative. Citing a number of studies in which subjects had been found to be unaware of measured changes in their attitudes, Hass (1981) argued that such results were consistent with his attitude-as-latitude model of anticipatory opinion shifts. According to Hass, persons tend not to be aware of shifts in attitude unless these are so extreme as to exceed their typical latitude of acceptance, at which point they begin to perceive themselves as misrepresenting their true beliefs.

Indirect support for this comes from subjects' comments during the discussion phase of the experiment. A number of subjects remarked spontaneously that they had not altered their opinions in response to the forewarning. It was the investigator's impression that these subjects felt such a response would have compromised their personal integrity or betrayed their personal values. These spontaneous remarks indicate, first, that these subjects either felt pressured to modify their opinions or felt that the investigator had assumed they would and, second, that they appeared honestly to believe that they had not succumbed to such pressures and had thereby preserved their integrity. In this light, it is at least plausible that these subjects would have defended their test responses as representing no deviation from their usual position, even when these were more

moderate than would have been predicted from initial measures of their sociopolitical attitudes.

In further support of this interpretation, it was found that subjects exposed to the accountability forewarning subsequently gave ratings of their own sociopolitical position that were significantly more moderate than those of subjects at the same initial level of orientation in the no accountability condition. Although this effect is undoubtedly attributable to the impact of the accountability forewarning, it is questionable whether the accountable subjects' self-ratings were motivated directly out of concern about their own accountability. Accountable subjects were aware that their self-defined position ratings would not be disclosed to their anticipated audience. It seems more plausible that their self-ratings reflect how they perceived their own preexperimental orientation between the time they received the accountability forewarning and the time they were asked to evaluate its impact upon their test responses. It is not possible to determine from the data whether subjects inferred their sociopolitical orientation from the moderate character of their DIT/MPS responses, or whether they responded to the DIT/MPS questionnaire in accord with a more moderate perception of their initial position. However, as long as their test responses and the perception of their initial orientation were congruent, subjects could assert to the best of their knowledge that they had not shift-

ed their positions in response to the forewarning.

Taken together, these considerations suggest that subjects were essentially unaware that they had moderated their positions in response to the accountability forewarning. This implies, in turn, that subjects had not engaged in deliberately false self-presentation, but rather that their moderation shifts were a spontaneous and subconscious response to the social context of accountability. This conclusion is consistent with Hass' (1981) notion that most accountability shifts represent subconscious shifts in emphasis within the latitude of attitudes acceptable to the subject.

Finally, the MPS results reported here point to the importance of securing data on each subject's initial attitude toward the issue in question when studying the impact of accountability upon attitude. Otherwise, systematic individual differences in the magnitude and direction of anticipatory shifts in attitude may be overlooked. The lack of such pretest data may be responsible for Tetlock's (1983a) conclusion that the anticipatory shifts displayed by his subjects represented a strategy of conformity. Having employed an accountability manipulation modelled after Tetlock's, the present study casts doubt upon that conclusion. When only the main effect of accountability is examined, the results are similar in direction (although not in magnitude) to those obtained by Tetlock--i.e., a shift in each case

toward the position of the anticipated audience, relative to that of the no accountability group. However, when the interaction of initial orientation and type of accountability is examined, it becomes apparent that the predominant effect is one of moderation and not of conformity.

The anticipatory MPS shifts are instructive in terms of the support they lend to the moderation hypothesis, and perhaps to Hass' attitude-as-latitude model as well. Aside from this, the MPS accountability results served two basic functions: first, to demonstrate that the accountability manipulation had been effective in eliciting shifts in self-reported sociopolitical attitudes and, second, to indicate the direction and character of those shifts. This information provided the necessary context for interpreting the data of primary interest, namely, the mean DIT scores of the three sociopolitical orientation groups across accountability conditions.

It had been expected that under conditions known to influence subjects' self-presentations, e.g., the anticipation of accountability, subjects would respond similarly on measures of sociopolitical orientation and measures of moral judgment. Overall, the results of the analysis of DIT scores for the Stage 4 and postconventional forms of moral judgment conformed to this expectation. The MPS data revealed that under both sets of accountability instructions the liberal and conservative extremes shifted toward the

middle of the MPS scale relative to their no accountability counterparts, with the net effect of reducing significantly the differences in mean MPS scores among the three socio-political orientation groups. Although the pattern of shifts displayed by Stage 4 scores and P scores differed in some important respects from one another and from the pattern displayed by MPS scores, the net effect of the accountability forewarning was still the same. In each case, the differences in mean scores among conservatives, moderates and liberals were significantly less under conditions of accountability than in the no accountability condition, owing to shifts on the part of some subjects toward the moderate region of the scale (i.e., toward the group mean for the moderate group in the no accountability condition).

Before addressing the specific problems for interpretation posed by the differences in the patterns of anticipatory shift displayed by MPS scores, Stage 4 scores and P scores, some preliminary remarks regarding the initial hypothesis are in order. It was predicted at the outset that subjects' test scores would vary systematically as a function of their anticipations as to the sociopolitical identity of their audience. The finding that subjects exposed to the accountability forewarning displayed systematic shifts in their test responses relative to those of subjects in the no accountability condition was consistent with the main thrust of this prediction. However, the expectation that

subjects' responses would differ according to the sociopolitical identity of their anticipated audience--an expectation based jointly upon the conclusion drawn by Tetlock (1983a) and the speculation offered by Hogan (Johnson & Hogan, 1981)--proved not to be supported by the data. For DIT scores as for MPS scores, the anticipatory shifts displayed by accountable subjects were toward the middle of the scale irrespective of the identity of the anticipated audience.

Nevertheless, the overall effect of the accountability forewarning upon subjects' DIT scores indicates that subjects can (and do) spontaneously modify their self-reported preferences for certain types of moral argument on the Defining Issues Test, merely in response to the social context within which they must report those judgments. With certain reservations to be discussed further on, this lends support to Hogan's claim that moral judgment questionnaire responses constitute instances of strategic self-presentation, and that the character of these self-presentations is partly a function of the respondent's expectations regarding his or her audience (Johnson & Hogan, 1981).

Where the conclusion of the present study differs from Hogan's is with respect to the relevance of the sociopolitical identity of the anticipated audience. Whereas Hogan seems to operate with the assumption that individuals' strategic shifts in self-presentation are typically designed to conform to the attitudes and/or expectations of their

specific audience, the MPS results at least imply that individuals tend to employ a more uniform strategy of moderation in response to accountability pressures, regardless of the orientation of their specific audience. However, as both Cialdini and Petty (1981) and Hass (1981) point out, a strategy of anticipatory moderation may be even more effective than one of conformity in fulfilling the aims of selective self-presentation.

One important implication of the foregoing DIT results is that although adult respondents may display large individual differences in Stage 4 scores and P scores when the Defining Issues Test is completed under standard conditions, these same respondents would be likely to obtain Stage 4 scores and P scores within a much narrower range when subjected to accountability pressures. (Such pressures might vary from an awareness that their responses were being monitored to the expectation that they would actually be required to justify those responses to someone.) Thus, the measurement of individual differences in level of moral judgment by means of the DIT may be seriously compromised by the respondents' expectations of accountability. This conclusion carries with it two serious implications, one practical and the other theoretical.

The susceptibility of the DIT to accountability pressures calls into question the assumption that DIT scores constitute a valid index of respondents' "true" preferences

for certain forms of moral argument. Even if one accepts the cognitive-developmentalists' claim that individual differences in moral reasoning are a reflection of differences in level of cognitive-moral development--a claim which itself will be questioned shortly--the evidence is that DIT scores are not solely a function of organismic variables. Rather, DIT scores may vary systematically with respondents' expectations regarding the social context within which measurement occurs. Thus, as a purely practical matter, this dictates that when DIT scores are reported, the conditions under which the results were obtained ought to be specified as well.

A case could be made for considering respondents' "true" DIT scores to be those obtained under standard conditions, inasmuch as research suggests that anticipatory opinion shifts tend to be transient and reverse themselves once accountability pressures have been removed (Cialdini & Petty, 1981). If legitimate, this argument might secure the credibility of the body of DIT results obtained under standard conditions. However, one of the more popular uses of the DIT at present is as a tool for assessing interventions designed to stimulate moral development (e.g., programs in moral education). DIT scores obtained under these conditions should be treated with some suspicion, inasmuch as moral interventions are likely to introduce situational cues that could shape subjects' expectations and thus their self-

presentations.

Although the considerations under discussion here bear specifically upon the Defining Issues Test, they may be particularly relevant to Kohlberg's own Moral Judgment Instrument (MJJ). Inasmuch as that measure typically employs a face-to-face interview with the respondent, it is reasonable to expect that it would generate relatively intense accountability pressures. Determining whether or not such pressures actually do lead to self-presentational effects on the MJJ similar to those observed on the DIT should be a priority for future research.

Nevertheless, the foregoing concerns are of secondary importance to the more fundamental question raised by the DIT accountability results: namely, whether even under standard conditions the DIT constitutes a measure of maturity of moral judgment. The assumption underlying the cognitive-developmental model is that the structure of subjects' moral reasoning is immutable except as it undergoes developmental change. If the DIT is strictly a measure of the structural level of subjects' moral reasoning, then DIT scores should also be relatively unaffected by variations in the social context in which subjects' moral judgments are made.

However, as was indicated before, the DIT accountability results run counter to this conclusion. Inasmuch as subjects' DIT responses varied systematically with their

expectation of accountability, it cannot be argued that DIT scores invariably correspond to certain fixed forms of cognitive structure. On the contrary, the similarity in the overall impact of the accountability forewarning upon MPS scores and DIT scores--i.e., the systematic shifts toward the level characteristic of sociopolitical moderates--suggests that, like measures of sociopolitical attitude, the DIT constitutes a vehicle for selective self-presentation, and that subjects have the ability to modify their DIT responses spontaneously for strategic purposes.

At this point the pivotal question becomes whether the observed shifts in DIT scores represent a strategy of anticipatory moderation, similar to the shifts in MPS scores, or whether a different explanation must be invoked to account for the impact of the accountability forewarning in each case. This question requires some deliberation because of specific differences in the patterns of accountability shifts displayed by MPS scores, Stage 4 scores and P scores, beyond their overall similarity with regard to the net effect of the accountability forewarning upon the range of mean scores across levels of sociopolitical orientation.

Although the pattern of MPS shifts conforms clearly to the one characteristic of anticipatory moderation, neither the pattern of Stage 4 shifts nor the pattern of P score shifts shows the same sort of symmetry. With respect to the Stage 4 pattern, only three of the four sociopoliti-

cally extreme accountable groups displayed the expected shift toward the mean score obtained by sociopolitical moderates in the no accountability condition. The fourth extreme group--liberals accountable to a conservative--exhibited no detectable shift relative to its counterpart in the no accountability condition. Although the conformity of the moderate subgroup shifts to the expected pattern lends additional support to the conclusion that Stage 4 shifts do indeed represent anticipatory moderation, the absence of a Stage 4 shift on the part of that one extreme group cannot be dismissed without comment.

The anomaly cannot be explained in terms of a failure of the accountability manipulation, for the same group displayed a rather large MPS shift in the moderate direction. In fact, it is this discrepancy between the MPS result and the Stage 4 result that creates a problem for interpretation. It implies that a shift in position on the issues presented on the DIT is not invariably accompanied by a shift in Stage 4 item endorsements. Considered in isolation, this might support the cognitive-developmentalists' claim that the content and the structure of subjects' moral judgments are independent. However, in order to conclude that this was the case, one must assume that a shift in position was not accompanied by a shift in the way the corresponding DIT item was interpreted. In other words, one must reject the possibility that accountable subjects were able to ascribe

a more moderate interpretation to the same DIT response. This cannot be decided on the basis of the accountability data, but the MPS results from the no accountability condition did at least raise the possibility that differences in interpretation might occur.

In any case, moderation shifts in MPS positions on the issues presented on the DIT were accompanied by Stage 4 shifts toward the middle of the scale for the other three sociopolitically extreme groups and for all four moderate subgroups. The results thus weigh in favor of interpreting the Stage 4 shifts as evidence of anticipatory moderation. The significance of the anomalous finding will ultimately be decided on the basis of whether or not it recurs when the experiment is replicated.

The pattern of P score shifts constitutes a more difficult problem for interpretation, inasmuch as the convergence of the sociopolitically extreme groups is attributable almost entirely to shifts on the part of the conservatives. Although these results do not display the symmetry characteristic of the MPS and Stage 4 profiles, a plausible argument can be made that the P score shifts still represent a strategy of anticipatory moderation. However, the pattern might also be interpreted as evidence that the shifts in DIT scores have a different source altogether, so this possibility must be considered as well.

Undoubtedly the most significant feature of the P

score profile is the magnitude of the upward shift in P scores on the part of the conservative groups. The increase in percentage scores from the no accountability conservative group was 11.8 for conservatives accountable to a conservative and 19.3 for conservatives accountable to a liberal. It seems reasonable to conclude that upward shifts in P scores of this magnitude merely in response to accountability pressures are entirely inconsistent with the notion that subjects are unable to generate DIT responses beyond their characteristic level of cognitive-moral maturity.

Consequently, if one wishes to defend the claim that the form of subjects' moral judgments is fixed by their level of moral development, one may have to question the validity of the DIT as a measure of moral maturity. As long as the DIT is not considered a valid measure of the cognitive structure of subjects' moral reasoning, then the mutability of DIT scores cannot be used as evidence against the theory that individual differences in moral judgment have a developmental basis. However, this is hardly an attractive option for most cognitive-developmentalists, inasmuch as the evidence marshalled to support their interpretation of individual differences in adult moral reasoning is derived largely from studies in which the DIT was used.

The pattern of accountability shifts associated with anticipatory moderation has been characterized so far in terms of a convergence of both sociopolitical extremes upon

the position held by unaccountable moderates. Although the liberal extreme failed to display a P score shift comparable to that displayed by the conservative extreme, certain features of the P score profile suggest that it is still consistent with a pattern of anticipatory moderation.

First of all, it appears that moderates and liberals were initially much more similar in their attitudes toward the importance of postconventional items than were moderates and conservatives: Whereas the P score difference between moderates and conservatives in the no accountability condition was significant statistically, $F(1, 42) = 5.29$, $p < .025$, this was not the case for the difference between moderates and liberals, $F(1, 42) = .76$. If this is taken to suggest that the liberals already maintained a relatively moderate position with respect to their endorsement of postconventional items, then little or no shift in P scores should be expected. When the profiles for the liberal group and the moderately liberal subgroup are compared, these appear to be nearly identical. Furthermore, the relatively large initial difference between conservatives and moderates implies that a strategy of moderation would require a rather large shift in P scores. This is precisely what was observed.

In light of earlier comments on the relatively conservative character of the overall sample and the suggestion that the subjects identified as liberal were in fact rather

moderate, this result may not be particularly remarkable. Nevertheless, a replication of this study with subjects more representative of the liberal extreme would provide clearer support for the conclusion that the P score shifts did indeed represent a strategy of anticipatory moderation.

Pending evidence of this sort, some consideration should be afforded to an alternative interpretation of the upward shift in P scores in the absence of any corresponding downward shifts. It might be argued that the impact of the accountability forewarning upon subjects' DIT responses was attributable solely to the pressure it exerted upon subjects to articulate their thoughts more clearly in anticipation of having to explain and justify their responses. In other words, subjects held accountable for their responses may have made a greater effort to adopt a morally more adequate position and not a sociopolitically defensible one. According to cognitive-developmental theory, postconventional responses are morally more adequate than conventional ones. Consequently, when forced to think carefully about the DIT issue statements, the conservatives may have recognized that the postconventional arguments were superior and endorsed them more frequently than did their counterparts in the no accountability condition, whereas liberals became more secure in their judgments and so did not abandon their endorsement of the postconventional items.

At first glance, this interpretation might seem to

offer cognitive-developmentalists an escape from the unfavorable implications of these DIT accountability results. However, upon further consideration it becomes clear that this apparent solution creates its own problems for the cognitive-developmental model. For example, if the upward shift in P scores on the part of the conservative subjects was due to more careful thought, it is legitimate to ask why the moderate and liberal subjects did not also display upward shifts in their P scores. After all, the mean P scores for the liberal groups were still considerably short of the levels attained by some adult samples. It might be argued that the conservatives had mobilized some latent ability to comprehend more advanced moral arguments, whereas the liberals had already reached the ceiling imposed by their level of cognitive-moral maturity. Yet this would imply, first, that some subjects had access to a latent comprehension of more advanced moral arguments while others did not, and, second, that individual differences in the comprehension of postconventional arguments were greatly attenuated under conditions that stimulated that ability. Neither of these implications fits very well into the cognitive-developmental model.

Aside from such problems, this interpretation suffers from the fact that it must posit two separate mechanisms to account for similar overall effects: the strategy of anticipatory moderation to account for the MPS accountability

shifts, and the mobilization of latent comprehension to explain the shifts in DIT scores. The more parsimonious interpretation is that both MPS shifts and DIT shifts represent a similar response to the accountability forewarning, namely, the adoption for strategic purposes of a sociopolitically more moderate position on the issues raised on the Defining Issues Test.

If a shift in DIT scores toward the level typical of sociopolitical moderates is equivalent to the adoption of a sociopolitically moderate stance, it seems unlikely that subjects differentiated between sociopolitical position and moral judgment in the way specified by cognitive-developmental theory. Rather, it implies that subjects may have seen moral judgments as expressive of sociopolitical attitudes, and that under accountability conditions they modified the moral judgments they reported as a means of manipulating the sociopolitical identity they presented to their audience. This conclusion conforms to Hogan and Emler's claim that respondents present themselves differently on measures of moral judgment depending upon the identity they seek to project (although, as noted earlier, their speculation that these self-presentations would vary systematically with the sociopolitical context or identity of the audience was not supported in the present case).

Actually, there is a serendipitous aspect to the finding that accountability shifts followed a pattern of antici-

patory moderation rather than conformity. The Emler et al. (1983) study had left unresolved whether in reproducing the conventional and postconventional response patterns their subjects had responded merely to such superficial characteristics as the relative abstractness of certain DIT items, without truly comprehending the type of moral reasoning that generated those response patterns spontaneously. If the anticipatory shifts in the present study had followed the pattern characteristic of conformity, these could have been discounted on similar grounds--namely, that they might have been merely the result of role-playing based on superficial cues. Moderation shifts cannot be dismissed in this way. If the strategy of moderation is to be considered a form of role-playing at all, then at least it represents a more complex achievement than role-playing either extreme. In order to adopt a moderate position, the subject must have not only an awareness of the extreme positions, but also of the balance or interplay between them. With respect to the DIT, this suggests that subjects had a broader comprehension of the range of moral arguments than cognitive-developmental theory would have allowed.

Before closing this discussion, some comment should be made regarding the integrative complexity results. As reported, none of the predictions involving the integrative complexity of subjects' written thoughts--its relationship to level of sociopolitical orientation, to level of moral

reasoning or to the employment of strategic anticipatory shifts--was supported by the data. However, at least two reservations should be considered before any specific conclusions are drawn from these results. The first is that the range of sociopolitical attitudes represented in this study may simply have been too restricted to reveal differences in level of integrative complexity. The studies by Tetlock (1983b, 1984) that demonstrated a relationship between sociopolitical orientation and integrative complexity involved subjects representing nearly the entire sociopolitical spectrum (U.S. senators in the first study and members of the British House of Commons in the second). In comparison, the differences in position among the sociopolitical orientation groups in the present study were undoubtedly rather small.

The other consideration is more subtle, but may ultimately prove equally important. The instructions for the story booklet in which subjects recorded their thoughts stated explicitly that they were to indicate their position on each story problem and to explain the reasons for their decision. These instructions could have led subjects to give their written thoughts a narrower focus than they might otherwise have done, concentrating upon defending a particular position rather than considering the problem in its various aspects. Although such a bias in the instructions should not wipe out all differences in integrative complex-

ity, it might have constrained subjects enough to render those differences less distinct.

With these questions in mind, it is probably wiser to reserve judgment on the hypotheses that pertain to integrative complexity, pending further research with a sample more representative of the sociopolitical extremes and instructions less likely to bias subjects' written reports.

The purpose of this investigation has been to examine the relationship between sociopolitical orientation and moral judgment in light of Hogan and Emler's critique of Kohlberg's cognitive-structural model of moral development. Whereas the cognitive-developmentalists explain individual differences in adult moral judgment in terms of developmental levels of cognitive-structural complexity in reasoning about moral problems, Hogan and Emler maintain that differences in adult moral judgment are an expression of differences in sociopolitical orientation, reflecting one's social reference group and not one's level of cognitive-moral maturity.

Both sides agree that there is a systematic relationship between sociopolitical orientation and type of moral judgment--conservatives tending to display Stage 4 conventional reasoning and liberals tending to display postconventional reasoning. The disagreement surrounds how to interpret that relationship. Cognitive-developmentalists interpret the relationship within the framework of their model,

thereby implying that if postconventional reasoners display liberal values it must be because liberal values offer a structurally more adequate solution to social and moral problems. Against this interpretation, Hogan and Emler charge that it is only cognitive-developmentalists' own liberal bias that leads them to accept that conclusion so readily, and that there is no good evidence to support the view that the conventional and postconventional forms of moral reasoning constitute an invariant developmental sequence.

From the cognitive-developmental perspective, the character of an individual's self-reported moral judgments is fixed by his or her level of maturity of moral reasoning; consequently, an individual operating at the conventional level should be unable to generate moral judgments characteristic of postconventional reasoners. Hogan and Emler reject the notion that an individual is constrained by cognitive-developmental factors, arguing instead that the moral judgments an individual reports are a reflection of the sociopolitical position with which he or she identifies and the specific sociopolitical identity that he or she wishes to project in a given situation.

These two interpretations generate opposing predictions as to the impact of social context upon self-reported moral judgments. If Hogan and Emler are correct that the moral judgments individuals report are an expression of their sociopolitical identity, then the type of moral judg-

ment they display should vary systematically across conditions under which individuals tend to modify their sociopolitical self-presentations. However, any shift in level of moral judgment--and especially any upward shift--merely in response to the context within which those judgments were reported would be inconsistent with the cognitive-developmental model.

The results of the present investigation are generally consistent with Hogan and Emler's account of the nature of self-reported moral judgments, while constituting a serious problem for cognitive-developmentalists. The analysis of the relationship between sociopolitical orientation and level of moral judgment for subjects who had not received the accountability forewarning yielded the expected outcome: Conservatives obtained significantly higher Stage 4 scores on the Defining Issues Test than did liberals, whereas liberals obtained significantly higher P scores than did conservatives. These results speak neither for nor against the cognitive-developmental model, inasmuch as the mere fact that this relationship exists is not in dispute. The only novel findings in the no accountability condition pertain to the analysis of the Moral Position Survey responses. The MPS data indicate, first, that the alternative positions implicit in a majority of the issues presented in the DIT are polarized along sociopolitical lines and, second, that the degree of importance subjects assign to an issue statement

on the DIT is frequently related to their pro-or-con position on that issue. The first finding suggests that in considering the DIT items, subjects' own sociopolitical attitudes may be spontaneously engaged. The second suggests that once those attitudes are engaged, subjects' DIT responses may be determined by them.

The most important findings of the experiment pertain to the impact of the accountability forewarning upon DIT scores. The first is that the accountability forewarning appeared to have a similar overall effect upon Stage 4 scores and P scores as it had upon the Refined MPS Conservatism scale scores--namely, that of eliciting shifts toward the middle of the scale, significantly reducing the range of mean scores among conservatives, moderates and liberals relative to their no accountability counterparts. This result implies that individuals who obtained widely different DIT scores under standard (no accountability) conditions might be indistinguishable in terms of level of moral judgment when tested under conditions of accountability. Clearly, this does not fit well with the notion of fixed and discrete stage-structures.

Although the pattern of shifts displayed by Stage 4 scores and P scores differed from one another and from the MPS profile in some respects, it was concluded that these were most likely all indicative of a strategy of anticipatory moderation. In other words, it appeared that subjects

had modified their self-reported moral judgments so as to project the moral response style of a sociopolitically moderate individual. This result is consistent with Hogan's claim that subjects use their moral judgment test responses as a vehicle for strategic self-presentation, although it suggests that moderation rather than conformity is the favored strategy when individuals anticipate confronting a partisan audience. Furthermore, the evidence that subjects were able to identify and adopt the moral response style characteristic of a sociopolitical moderate suggests that moral judgment and sociopolitical attitude are (as Hogan and Emler contend) not as discrete as cognitive-developmentalists claim.

The other significant finding with regard to the impact of the accountability forewarning is the very large upward shift in P scores on the part of the accountable conservative groups. As mentioned before, the movement from conventional to postconventional moral judgment merely in response to social context runs counter to cognitive-developmental theory, but is entirely consistent with the account offered by Hogan and Emler.

It should be noted that the foregoing results bear directly only upon Rest's claim that his Defining Issues Test constitutes a valid measure of his respondents' level of moral maturity. In that regard, the conclusion of this investigation is that respondents' DIT scores more likely

reflect the sociopolitical identity they seek to project than the level of cognitive-structural development in moral reasoning they have attained.

Of course, the cognitive-developmental model itself could be insulated from the findings presented here if the Defining Issues Test were abandoned as a measure of moral maturity. However, inasmuch as a great deal of the evidence used to support the cognitive-developmentalists' interpretation of individual differences in adult moral reasoning has been derived from DIT research, any serious question about the validity of the DIT would challenge the credibility of that interpretation. Thus, the results of this study should at least raise some concern as to whether the cognitive-developmentalists' account of the nature of adult moral reasoning is as well-established as its popularity and influence might suggest.

SUMMARY

Individual differences in the moral judgments of adults have been interpreted by Kohlberg and his associates in terms of cognitive-structural levels of maturity of moral reasoning. However, critics have argued that moral judgments reported by adults are instead a reflection of the politico-moral ideology of their reference group and of the specific sociopolitical identity they seek to project.

This study explored two implications of that challenge to cognitive-developmental theory. First, it sought confirmation of previous findings that sociopolitical conservatives were more likely to employ Stage 4 conventional reasoning whereas liberals were more likely to employ the purportedly more mature postconventional reasoning. Second, it exploited the tendency for subjects expecting to justify their views to a partisan audience to display strategic anticipatory shifts in opinion relative to their preexperimental position. If self-reported moral judgments do constitute sociopolitical self-presentations, then subjects held accountable for their opinions on moral issues should display similar patterns of anticipatory shift in the sociopolitical orientation and level of moral reasoning of their judgments.

Subjects identified as conservative, moderate or lib-

eral by their Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory Conservatism scores completed a moral judgment questionnaire under one of three conditions: expecting their responses to be anonymous or expecting to justify their responses to a conservative or liberal. The questionnaire included a short form of Rest's Defining Issues Test (DIT), measuring level of moral reasoning via judgments of the relative importance of various stage-specific issues in resolving specified moral dilemmas, plus a specially constructed Moral Position Survey (MPS), consisting of the DIT items reworded to elicit subjects' pro-or-con positions on those issues. Subjects also recorded their thoughts on each dilemma, so the conceptual complexity of their reasoning could be assessed.

Results showed the expected relationship between sociopolitical orientation and level of moral reasoning. Moreover, accountable subjects displayed shifts in both DIT scores and MPS Conservatism scores toward the level characteristic of sociopolitical moderates, irrespective of audience. The increase in postconventional reasoning by accountable conservatives was sizable. Results challenge the view that the DIT measures moral maturity, calling into question evidence supporting cognitive-developmentalists' claims.

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APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

MORAL POSITION SURVEY¹

Instructions

Below are a number of statements about the stories you have read. Read each statement, decide how you feel about it, and then mark your answer next to that statement. If you agree with the statement, or believe that it is true, circle "True". If you disagree with the statement, or believe that it is not true, circle "False".

Work quickly and answer every item. Do not refer back to the previous section of the questionnaire.

1. The doctor's decision should depend on whether or not the woman's family is in favor of giving her the drug. (F)
2. The doctor is obligated by the same laws as everybody else if giving her an overdose would be the same as killing her. (T)
- *3. People would be much better off without society regimenting their lives and even their deaths. (F)
4. The doctor's decision should depend on whether he could make it appear like an accident. (F)
5. The state has the right to force continued existence on those who don't want to live. (T)

¹Direction of scoring for the MPS Conservatism Scale is indicated in parentheses (T = True; F = False). Items marked with asterisk were included in the Refined MPS Conservatism Scale.

- *6. The doctor should have more sympathy for the woman's suffering than care about what society might think. (F)
- *7. Helping to end another's life is sometimes a responsible act of cooperation. (F)
- *8. Only God should decide when a person's life should end. (T)
- *9. The doctor should follow the values he has set for himself in his own personal code of behavior. (F)
- 10. Society cannot afford to let everybody end their lives when they want to. (T)
- *11. Society should be able to allow suicides or mercy killing and still protect the lives of individuals who want to live. (F)
- 12. Mr. Thompson has been good enough for a long enough time to prove he isn't a bad person. (F)
- 13. Everytime someone escapes punishment for a crime, that just encourages more crime. (T)
- 14. We would be better off without prisons and the oppression of our legal systems. (F)
- *15. Mr. Thompson has really paid his debt to society. (F)
- 16. Society would be failing what Mr. Thompson should fairly expect if he isn't returned to prison. (T)
- *17. It would be cruel and heartless for someone to send Mr. Thompson to prison. (F)
- 18. It would not be fair to all the prisoners who had served out their full sentences if Mr. Thompson was let off. (T)
- *19. It is a citizen's duty to report an escaped prisoner, regardless of the circumstances. (T)

- *20. The will of the people and the public good would best be served by reporting Mr. Thompson. (T)
- *21. Going to prison would not do any good for Mr. Thompson or protect anybody. (F)
- 22. The students were really taking over the building to help other people and not just for kicks. (F)
- 23. The students had no right to take over property that didn't belong to them. (T)
- 24. The students realized that they might be arrested and fined, and even expelled from school. (F)
- 25. Taking over the building would in the long run benefit more people to a greater extent. (F)
- 26. The president stayed within the limits of his authority in ignoring the faculty vote. (T)
- 27. Such student takeovers anger the public and give all students a bad name. (T)
- 28. Taking over the building was consistent with principles of justice. (F)
- *29. Allowing one student takeover would encourage many other student takeovers. (T)
- 30. The president brought this misunderstanding on himself by being so unreasonable and unresponsive. (F)
- *31. Running the university ought to be in the hands of the administrators and not in the hands of all the people. (T)
- *32. The students were following principles which they believed were above the law. (F)
- 33. University decisions should always be respected by students. (T)

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B

DEMOGRAPHICS SURVEY

Instructions

Please provide the following demographic information about yourself. Your responses will remain entirely anonymous, so please answer every item.

1. Your sex: Male ___ Female ___ 2. Your age: _____
3. Your intended major: _____
4. Your intended career: _____
5. Your class: Fresh. ___ Soph. ___ Jr. ___ Sr. ___
6. Your current religious preference, if any:
(specify denomination) _____
7. Your parents' religious preference, if any:
Father _____
Mother _____
8. Your parents' occupations:
Father _____
Mother _____
9. Your racial and/or ethnic background:
Father _____
Mother _____

Please refer to the following scale in answering the remaining questions:

- | | |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|
| 1 - extremely liberal | 5 - somewhat conservative |
| 2 - mostly liberal | 6 - mostly conservative |
| 3 - somewhat liberal | 7 - extremely conservative |
| 4 - moderate | |

Circle the number that corresponds to your response:

10. How would you describe your views on most economic issues:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

11. How would you describe your views on most social issues:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

12. How would you describe your parents' views on most social issues:

Father: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Mother: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX C

POSTEXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE

Instructions. Please answer the following questions as honestly as you can:

1. Of how much importance was it to you that you would have to explain and justify your questionnaire responses to someone, irrespective of his or her identity:

5 4 3 2 1
great much some little none at all

2. Of how much importance was it to you that you would have to explain and justify your questionnaire responses to an instructor, irrespective of his or her views:

5 4 3 2 1
great much some little none at all

3. How much were your responses on the story questionnaire influenced by knowing the viewpoint of the instructor to whom you would have to explain and justify your responses:

5 4 3 2 1
great much some little none at all

4. How much were the thoughts and opinions you wrote down in the story booklet influenced by knowing the viewpoint of the instructor to whom you would have to explain and justify your responses:

5 4 3 2 1
great much some little none at all

5. Which of the following best describes the effect of knowing the viewpoint of the instructor to whom you would have to explain and justify your responses?

- (1) my responses became more conservative
- (2) my responses remained as conservative as usual
- (3) my responses shifted from conservative to moderate
- (4) my responses remained as moderate as usual
- (5) my responses shifted from liberal to moderate
- (6) my responses remained as liberal as usual
- (7) my responses became more liberal

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX D

DEFINING ISSUES TEST RESULTS

Percentage Scores and Standard Deviations for All Groups

Percentage Score		No Accountability			Accountable to Conservative			Accountable to Liberal		
		Con.	Mod.	Lib.	Con.	Mod.	Lib.	Con.	Mod.	Lib.
P%	<u>M</u>	26.9	39.8	44.7	38.7	41.3	45.3	46.2	40.4	43.1
	<u>SD</u>	10.7	15.1	19.1	15.6	14.4	17.5	13.6	14.0	16.1
Stage 4%	<u>M</u>	42.4	35.3	29.1	39.3	34.2	29.3	36.4	33.1	37.1
	<u>SD</u>	8.4	15.1	12.4	13.5	19.3	13.5	18.6	11.5	16.9
Stage 3%	<u>M</u>	19.6	14.9	18.0	17.1	16.2	18.7	12.9	21.3	11.3
	<u>SD</u>	11.2	11.3	13.7	9.8	12.2	14.2	9.7	14.0	7.3
Stage 2%	<u>M</u>	1.8	1.3	1.3	2.4	1.3	1.6	.0	1.1	.9
	<u>SD</u>	4.0	3.0	3.7	3.9	3.5	3.3	.0	3.5	3.4
A%	<u>M</u>	6.7	5.3	5.8	2.0	4.9	3.6	2.2	3.6	6.2
	<u>SD</u>	7.3	5.6	7.5	4.1	7.8	7.2	5.3	4.4	7.1
M%	<u>M</u>	2.7	3.3	1.1	.4	2.0	1.6	2.2	.4	1.3
	<u>SD</u>	3.4	5.0	3.0	1.2	4.3	3.5	3.5	1.7	2.5

Note. Maximum percentage scores were as follows: 96.7 for the 11 P score items; 93.3 for the 10 Stage 4 items; 83.3 for the 8 Stage 3 items; 40.0 for the 3 Anti-social items; 26.7 for the 2 Stage 2 items and for the 2 Meaningless items.

APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by Jeffrey M. Kunka has been read and approved by the following committee:

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The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

8/6/85
Date

Alan S. DeWolfe
Director's Signature