Heidegger, Ontology, Metontology, and the Turn

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HEIDEGGER: ONTOLOGY, METONTOLOGY, AND THE TURN

by

Kelly Edward Mink

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of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
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VITA

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. HEIDEGGER'S EARLY CONCEPT OF METAPHYSICS</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. LEIBNIZ'S DOCTRINE OF JUDGMENT AND ITS DESTRUKTION</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. NEUTRALITY AND CONCRETENESS OF DASEIN IN ¶10: &quot;THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF BEING AND TIME&quot;</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE SCIENCE OF BEING AND THE TURN</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. &quot;ON THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH&quot; AS A METONTOLOGICAL TREATISE</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY: HEIDEGGER'S WORKS</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY: HEIDEGGER'S WORKS TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOOKS, ARTICLES, AND COLLECTIONS OF ESSAYS</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

The following dissertation has as its purpose an inquiry into the concrete significance of the "turn" in Heidegger's work. The 1928 lecture course entitled Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz yields essential clues to the solution of the problem of the turn, for Heidegger introduces, in this text, a distinction between ontology and metontology [Metontologie] which provides a basis for understanding the transition from the early to the middle period in his work.

The usual formulation of the turn as a "turn from Dasein to Being" is inadequate either as a representation of the progression of Heidegger's work or as a characterization of the sense of the turn itself. According to this perspective on Heidegger's work, usually called the "developmental" view, in the initial phase Heidegger focused upon transcendence as foundational of thought and world; in the later phase, he shifts to a "Being-centered problematic"1. David Krell2 speaks of a "developmentalist bog"3 with reference to the image of the turn as an advance from phenomenology to "the other thinking"; presumably this formulation is meant to characterize Richardson's position in Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought. The worst version of the developmentalist view, according to Krell, is that of Bollnow and Löwith; for them, in the later Heidegger "a mystical and mystifying contemplation of pure Being replaces existential analysis"4.

Krell correctly insists, against every parody of the turn, that
Heidegger continues in his later period to emphasize the "ontic fundament" that supports the thinking of Being. Surely one can ask, however, whether some view of Heidegger's "development" isn't possible which neither runs roughshod over the central concerns of each phase of Heidegger's work, nor which neglects the textual evidence that essential changes occur in Heidegger's approach. Krell, in his own discussion, fails to account for or even recognize the change of approach manifest in Heidegger's middle- and late-period texts. In opposition to the developmentalist view, he says only that "'Heidegger-II' introduces humanity (der Mensch) into his texts far more liberally than does the 'Heidegger-I' who analyzes Da-Sein". Apparently content with merely disputing the claim that Heidegger turns from man to Being in his later work, Krell fails to recognize that it is precisely the problem of the "ontic fundament" which leads to the crisis in Heidegger's work to which the turn is a response.

Even while suggesting that the changes in Heidegger's thought arise from an increasing concern with the problematic of finitude, Krell takes a rationalistic view of the effect of this issue on Heidegger's thought. For he holds that, because Heidegger is aware quite early ("in 1924 or 1925") that the project of ontology is threatened by the concept of the finitude of time, "the difficulty is whether the word Kehre in the developmentalist sense can mean anything at all any more". Krell seems actually to suggest that if a determinate set of problems can be found which Heidegger addresses in his work, then there is no need to attempt to characterize and account for the manifest changes in his work. Thus in his essay "Heidegger's Ostensible Turn-
ing," we find the following remarks:

By now the disadvantage of all such developmentalist approaches—whatever semblance of order they provide—ought to have become apparent. Whether we subdivide Heidegger into two or three or even more parts, the problem remains that the moment we begin to think about any element of any part that element itself turns back and forth to all the remaining elements of Heidegger's thought. . . . Each element of Heidegger's thought turns, showing itself in sundry perspectives. These turnings seem to have had no first beginning in Heidegger's career; they certainly have no final end once we ourselves begin to turn with them.9

That the elements of Heidegger's thought remain, in a certain sense, a constant set, and that Heidegger explores these in different ways at different times, "turning" back and forth among them, is undoubtedly true but of rather minimal significance by itself. What philosopher doesn't reexamine the "elements" of his thought over and over again? Krell's remarks here trivialize the issue. They offer no clue concerning a question which demands a response in this context: Given that there are changes in Heidegger's thought—i.e., reformulations, manifest in the texts themselves, of the issues of central concern in Heidegger's problematic—how can they be characterized and accounted for? It is not at all necessary to suppose, as Krell so strangely does, that the problem of the turn can be formulated only in terms of a change of focus from man to Being (or vice versa) and that it can be answered by saying that Heidegger's attention moves from one element to another at different times. The notion of a "turn" has already entered into the tradition of Heidegger scholarship; the usage of this word is legitimate, as long as it is understood that we cannot presume that we already know in what the turn consists, in any concrete sense. Perhaps the characterization of neither the "developmentalists" nor those who,
like Krell, simply oppose them, is correct. The root of the problem, we maintain, lies in the polemical, and quite "unphenomenological" choice offered us: to defend the identity of the "matter itself" throughout Heidegger's career, and thus to be charged with having to find evidence that his "thought" never changes; or to take Heidegger's work as though a series of position-papers were being offered, so that his "philosophy" changes depending upon whether its focus is transcendence, truth, or time. The question of the turn is, however, first of all a textual issue: Through what changes of focus, transpositions, or reformulations are we conducted as we proceed along the vectors encountered in, and even constitutive of, Heidegger's texts? And the question of unity would then no longer ask about the "unchanging content" of Heidegger's work, but about what fundamental inquiry, pursued with ever-deepening insistence, is responsible for precisely those changes.

What would it mean to deny that essential changes occur in the course of Heidegger's work? Presumably it would mean that Heidegger could, if he liked, have written On the Essence of Truth in 1926, or The End of Philosophy in 1930. Let us suppose, then, that he could, in some literal sense, have written down these words at the beginning of his career. Would that fact help us to understand any of these texts? If we are to suppose that it means anything to call Heidegger's work a "path" of thought, then the sequential character of his work is to some degree constitutive of its meaning, and must therefore be taken into account in any interpretive inquiry. Heidegger himself says, in the Letter to Richardson, that "the reversal is in play within the matter itself"10. One of the functions of The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic is to show how the turn arises as a consequence of the fulfill-
ment of the ontological project. MFL is a transitional text, in which Heidegger deliberately gathers up the work of his "early" period into an interpretation which prepares for the coming "turn."

Before proceeding to our own reading of this and other relevant texts, let us look briefly at what Richardson, with his presumably "developmentalist" view, has to say, in fact, about the "reversal" in Heidegger's thought. The turn from the phenomenological approach to "There-being" results, according to Richardson, from Heidegger's recognition of the primacy of Being in the disclosive process; the latter is now conceived as essentially historical:

Being discloses itself to and in its There, but since it is Being that holds the primacy, Being is conceived as sending itself unto its There. We may speak of this self-sending as proceeding from Being and call it a "self-emitting," or, if we may be permitted a neologism to designate a completely new concept, a "mittence" (Geschick) of Being. We may speak of it, too, as terminating in There and therefore call it a "com­mitting" or "com­mitment" (Schicksal) of There to its privileged destiny as the shepherd of Being.12

Richardson understands the thinking of Being not only as fundamentally "historical" (in the sense of the Seinsgeschichte) but also as addressing the concealment or withdrawal intrinsic to "Being": "To think Being, then, will be to think it as a mittence, not only in its positivity but in its negativity."13 Indeed, the turn is demanded precisely by the original experience of the "negativity" of Being, and is the result of carrying the analysis through to its end:

What is more, this transformation is not an arbitrary thing, determined by extrinsic circumstances. Much less is it an escape into a new problematic necessitated by the dereliction of the old. Rather, the transformation of Heidegger I into Heidegger II is born out of a necessity imposed by the original experience of Being as finite (negative). For the shift of focus from There-being to Being (which, as far as we can see, characterizes the decisive difference between the two periods) was demanded by the
exigencies of the hermeneutic analysis itself, as soon as it became clear that the primacy in the Being-process belongs to Being itself. And when was this? Precisely when the author began to meditate the negativity of truth as such. This we take to be the genuine sense of the "reversal" in WW, for it was then that he began to appreciate the full import of what it means for concealment somehow to precede non-concealment in the coming-to-pass of a-letheia.14

What is missing in Richardson's account is an indication of what specific "exigencies" demanded the "shift of focus"; a precise characterization of how the experience of Being as finite requires the transformation of Heidegger I into Heidegger II; and a concrete understanding, in the light of Heidegger's texts, of what it means to turn from "There-being to Being." Richardson's recognition that there is a "shift of focus" from transcendence to the problem of "mittence," and that a more radical experience of "negativity" plays a role in initiating this shift is undoubtedly correct. Yet Richardson offers, in fact, little more than a topical outline of themes relevant to the question of the turn. When we examine the texts more closely, we will find that the formula "from Dasein to Being" is not of much help as a characterization of the turn, the so far unexplored "logic" of which we are seeking in the present undertaking.

Although Heidegger's later texts are increasingly concerned with the language appropriate to thinking the "withdrawal" of Being, the question for any interpretation of the meaning of the turn is how Heidegger's increasing concern with "negativity"--a questionable term, in any case, with reference to Heidegger's thought of "withdrawal"--emerges in Heidegger's work and how it is developed in the sequence of his texts.

We shall attempt to retrace a part of the movement of Heidegger's
thought, as it manifests itself on the basis of the view that Heidegger himself offers of his early work in the (recently translated) *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*. There we find that Heidegger defines *die Kehre* on the basis of a concept of metaphysics to which he assimilates his own early work. Thus it is, for the Heidegger of *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, at the culminating moment of the development of the first part of metaphysics--ontology--that the turn, as the self-overturning of ontology, occurs and gives rise to the second part of metaphysics, which Heidegger calls "metontology" (*Metontologie*). Here is how Heidegger characterizes the moment of this change, or *metabole*:

> What must be kept in mind, particularly with regard to fundamental ontology, is that it is precisely the radicality and universality of this central problematic, and it alone, which brings us to realize that these problems are indeed central; but for that very reason they are in their import and essentiality never the sole problems. In other words, fundamental ontology does not exhaust the notion of metaphysics.

Since Being is there only insofar as beings are already there, fundamental ontology has in it the latent tendency toward a primordial, metaphysical transformation which becomes possible only when Being is understood in its whole problematic. The intrinsic necessity for ontology to turn back to its point of origin can be clarified by reference to the primal phenomenon of human existence: the being "man" understands Being; understanding of Being effects a distinction between Being and beings; Being is there only when Dasein understands Being. In other words, the possibility that Being is there in the understanding presupposes the factual existence of Dasein, and this in turn presupposes the factual extantness of nature. Right within the horizon of the problem of Being, when posed radically, it appears that all this is visible and can become understood as Being, only if a possible totality of beings is already there.

As a result, we need a special problematic which has for its proper theme being as a whole [das Seiende im Ganzen]. This new investigation resides in the essence of ontology itself and is the result of its overturning [Umschlag], its *metabole*. I designate this set of questions *metontology* ([Metontologie]. (MFL 156-57/199)16

The locus of the turn from Heidegger's early to his middle period is specified here, not as anything like a turn from Dasein to Being, but
as a shift from the problematic of ontology to that of "being as a whole."

Our task is to show how the turn arises, as an issue, in relation to Heidegger's inquiry into the twofold structure of metaphysics. The turn is the locus of what we shall call the "dynamic" relation between the two parts of metaphysics, ontology and metontology. Heidegger assimilates his own work to the concept of metaphysics operative in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic; thus the turn must be interpreted from the twofold structure of metaphysics. Heidegger's first account of ontology and "theology" simply establishes the relation between them in a thematic, external way, and refers to Aristotle's two definitions of metaphysics. What is at stake here is the possibility of a "repetition" of metaphysics. But Heidegger's aim in repeating metaphysics, following the "reduction" of philosophy to metaphysics (the Destruktion), is to recover the source of philosophy as such. Metaphysics, in MFL, means philosophy in its source--its essence, that grounding "activity" which gives rise to philosophy. Thus, in its repetition, metaphysics becomes the "metaphysics of Dasein." The turn arises out of the encounter with the source; it is with the fulfillment of ontology that the necessity of its "overturning" appears.

In the Appendix to MFL, Heidegger speaks of a metabole. The relation between the two parts of metaphysics becomes a "dynamic" one as ontology is overturned (umkehrt) into metontology. Thus it is our task to trace, first in MFL and then in certain of Heidegger's other works, the development of the relation between the two parts of metaphysics. The turn in Heidegger's work can be understood in terms of
this development: The turn from Heidegger I to Heidegger II takes place with the completion of the *metabole* of ontology into metontology.

The following summary of the five chapters of the dissertation is intended to serve as an extended statement of its thesis:

The first chapter, essentially an exposition of Heidegger's own *Introduction to the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* explains the meaning of "metaphysics" for the early Heidegger, and shows how Heidegger conceives of his own project as aiming toward a retrieval of the twofold structure of metaphysics. Ontology, the "first part" of metaphysics, concerns the interpretation of the Being of beings, "being as such"; theology (metontology) concerns the relation of man, as Dasein, to "being as a whole."

In Heidegger's discussion of metaphysics ontology is incorporated, as one element, or one pole, into the larger twofold structure. Thus ontology is displaced from its central role in Heidegger's thought. This displacement (or overturning), however, is effected not by adding a newly discovered element to the framework of Heidegger's thought, but by following the internal "logic" of the development of ontology. The new investigation "resides in the essence of ontology itself" (MFL 157), and arises with the very fulfillment of the ontological project. But in Heidegger's Introduction, the relation between the two parts of metaphysics is first presented in "static" terms as the relation between Aristotelean "ontology" and "theology."

Heidegger makes it clear in his Introduction that he means to undertake a repetition (*Wiederholung*) of this relation. It is through repetition that the relation between the two parts of metaphysics is to
become "dynamic," i.e., that the metabole is to be effected.

Thus, the second chapter shows how Heidegger begins to expand upon the twofold relation within metaphysics in the course of his Destruktion of Leibniz's monadology. In the Destruktion Heidegger dismantles Leibniz's logic down to its ground in ontology; at the same time, he shows how Leibnizian ontology, characterizing the Being of beings as drive, leads immediately to the problem of the individuation of drive, i.e., to the problem of the concretely existing monad. In his discussion of the monadology, Heidegger emphasizes the transformation, in Leibniz's thought, of the traditional metaphysical concepts of "possibility" and "actuality." The problem of metaphysics becomes that of the relation between what Heidegger calls "possibility" and "possible actuality," i.e., between the Being of the monad as drive and the individuation of drive in a unique apperception of the "world." Heidegger shows the internal relation between these two parts of metaphysics. As drive, the monad represents (perceptio) a multiplicity to itself in a unifying act (appetitio) which grasps its own relation to the multiplicity in the very act of unification (apperception). Here the relation is immediate or internal, as it were--the theory of drive as possibility, properly understood, calls for the theory of apperception, which is concerned with the individuation of the monad in relation to a potential multiplicity.

The twofold relation--between the general characterization of Being in terms of the "drive" of the monad, and the individuation of drive in the particular monad, is reduplicated in Heidegger's "retrieval" of Being and Time in §10 of MFL. Thus the third chapter takes
up Heidegger's formulation of the problem of metaphysics as that of the
relation between what he calls the neutrality of Dasein and concretely
existing Dasein. Heidegger calls the twofold the "meta-physics of
Dasein"(139)—metaphysics is now the metaphysics of Dasein. If ontol-
ogy "repeats" the Leibnizian problem of drive, then metontology re-
peats that of individuation, or the concretization of ontology.

The neutrality of Dasein signifies the dimension of fundamental
ontology, which Heidegger interprets, in §10, in terms of possibility,
essence, and origin. The concept of neutrality occupies the place of
the traditional metaphysical concept of essence. Neutral Dasein, like
the Platonic form which is separated from its instances by the chor-
ismos, is "separated" in relation to the concrete facticity of that
humanity, i.e., existing Dasein, which it makes possible. "The pecul-
lar neutrality of the term "Dasein" is essential, because the inter-
pretation of this being must be carried out prior to every factual
[faktische] concretion" (136/171-72).

What is at issue in fundamental-ontological inquiry is the
"source" of the Being of factically existing Dasein, the transcen-
dental-horizontal structure which makes its understanding of Being
possible. But precisely because the neutrality of Dasein means its
possibility, and does not "exist" as neutral (137), the origin cannot,
in the end, be thought in separation from concretely existing Dasein.
Thus metaphysical neutrality is "not an empty abstraction from the
ontic, a neither-nor"; it is rather the "authentic concreteness of the
origin, the not-yet of factual dispersion" (137). Here the same
internal transition takes place that Heidegger discerns in Leibniz's
monadology, where the theory of drive demands an immediate transition to the problem of the individuation of the monad. The monad is always individuated, and in its individuation constitutively "reflects" a world. Similarly, as the "potency of the origin," Dasein is itself already "dispersed" (zerstreut), in every case, into a manifold, in relation to which it has the potentiality of existing "concretely," i.e., effecting a concrete disclosure of that manifold (as a world).

Thus, in the recapitalation of ontology in §10, something like a transition to "metontology," i.e., to the problem of being as a whole, occurs. However, the significance of this transition—wherein lies the whole problem of the turn—is not addressed here. Yet the problem of history (in a sense not yet encountered in the treatment of historicity in Being and Time, since historicity is a function of neutral Dasein) looms on the horizon. The problem can only become an issue in its own right when the principle that "neutral Dasein never exists" is thought through to the end: For the situatedness of every project, including that of fundamental ontology, raises the question of whether it makes sense to think of transhistorical Dasein as foundational of history. In this sense, the problem of history is that of the "origin" of a multiplicity of historical disclosures of the "meaning of Being," when all disclosure is essentially historical. This is the problem of the Seinsgeschichte: how to think origin without addressing a source "transcendent" to history, i.e., to the series of unconcealments of Being. Heidegger's middle period is characterized by the attempt to think the problem of origin in a resolutely "anti-metaphysical" way, if by metaphysics we mean the attempt to ground history in something
superior to or other than history. Even the residue of ontic thinking that remains in the grounding of Being in Dasein—where Dasein is the metaphysically privileged "being"—is rejected in the inquiries of the middle period.

Heidegger has tried to show, first in his *Destruktion* of Leibniz and then in his retrieval of *Being and Time*, how something like a transition to the problematic of concretely existing Dasein is implicit in the fulfillment of the ontological project. Section 10 indicates, furthermore, that it is necessary to think the neutrality of Dasein before the issues connected with the factuality of its concrete existence can be addressed. The overturning of ontology is not possible apart from the full development of ontology. In ontology, the language of metaphysical questioning is articulated for the first time. Thus it would be impossible for metaphysics to "begin" with a survey (say) of the characteristics of a multiplicity of concretely existing "Daseins"—because one would not know where to look: The very concept of Dasein is ontological in character. The significance of the concreteness of factically existing Dasein can only become evident as the result of ontological inquiry. It begins to become evident that ontology has as its aim its own overturning, and is at the same time an essential prerequisite for that overturning.

Chapter IV shows the internal connection between ontology and its overturning into metontology. The inner significance of ontology lies in its *Umschlag* into metontology. The transition from ontology to metontology takes place in both a formal and a radical sense; the latter is the *Umschlag* proper.
We have seen, in connection with Heidegger's interpretation of Leibniz's ontology, that there is an internal relationship between ontology—in Leibniz's case the ontology of drive—and the theory of the individuation of the monad, i.e., the doctrine of apperception. We have also been able to find in §10 of MFL evidence of a necessary transition between the ontology of neutral Dasein and the inquiry into "the authentic concreteness of the origin, the not-yet of factical dispersion" (MFL 137). These transitions remain "formal," in the sense that the "overturning" is in each case is required by the nature of the ontology, but does not yet effect an undermining of the ontological project as such. In Chapters IV and V, we find that the completion of the ontological project in the fullest sense requires the transition to a new method of inquiry; the fulfillment of the project exposes the limitations of a transcendental-horizontal investigation. Heidegger's inquiry into the origin of metaphysics is shifted onto a new ground. It is no longer an ontology, a transcendental-horizontal inquiry into the source of the meaning of Being, i.e., into the nature of Dasein as the ground of metaphysics, but a metontology: an inquiry into how metaphysics arises from the midst of "being as a whole." This shift is the key to the meaning of the "turn" from "Heidegger I" to "Heidegger II."

Chapter IV shows how the transition takes place, both formally or logically—the fulfillment of ontology in the "Temporal science" requires a return to the concrete significance of temporalization, or the "individuation" of Dasein—and radically, for the finitude of time also casts doubt upon the concept of Dasein as fundament, as ground of
the possibility of metaphysics in general. To use the language of ¶10, neutral Dasein never "exists"; Dasein is always individuated or "concrete," so that the very concept of a Dasein which, as such, serves the metaphysically privileged position of ground is called into question. Heidegger is fully aware of the issue in Metaphysical Foundations of Logic:

[P]rojection of the basic ontological constitution of Dasein must arise by constructing one of the most extreme possibilities of Dasein's authentic and total capability of Being. The projection is directed towards Dasein, as a whole, and towards the basic determinations of its wholeness, even though Dasein in each case is only as existent. To put it another way, attaining the metaphysical neutrality and isolation of Dasein as such is only possible on the basis of the extreme existentiell involvement of the one who himself projects. (MFL 139-40)

Ontology is itself a "metontological" project. Ontology, like any other metaphysical project, reveals "the essential finitude of Dasein's existence . . . through and in the service of each possible totality" (140). Thus ontology is a finite project, in service to a "totality" of beings. It does not stand outside a concrete (historical) configuration of beings, but itself belongs to a "time and place," manifesting its own "perspective," its own manner of "apperceiving" beings. The ontological project required the construction of a model of Dasein --an "extreme construction"--standing outside of time and "place," and providing the ground for every possible interpretation of the meaning of Being. (Thus, in Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger locates the origin of the interpretation of Being as "production" in the productive modes of Dasein's comportment.) But the fulfillment of the ontological project shows that such an ahistorical concept of Dasein is doomed to failure. Not only does neutral Dasein never "exist," the
finitude of time makes nonsense of the very concept of the ontological neutrality of the ground, and thus undermines the possibility of something like a transcendental-horizontal inquiry into the foundations of metaphysics. The attempt to grasp Dasein as a whole shows, in the end, that Dasein cannot be "grasped" as a whole, making its self-transparency the prelude to a "science of Being." The turn represents the radical re-origination of the project of "founding" metaphysics, undertaken now as an inquiry into the very possibility of anything like a questioning about the origin of metaphysics. For there can be no origin—neither metaphysical, nor historically manifest—outside the "whole of beings," no privileged standpoint from which to ask about the foundation of metaphysics. Because there can be no such privileged standpoint, Heidegger in the middle period rejects the possibility of the type of inquiry which would locate the ground in relation to any specific Seinsverständnis. Thus in the middle period Heidegger undertakes a radical inquiry into the "problem of origin." How can an origin be thought which is not itself entangled in metaphysical representations of origin? Differently put—how can we think "Being itself"? Thus this enterprise continues, in more radical fashion, Heidegger's attempt to distinguish Being from beings, to refuse to Being any name that derives from beings or even being as a whole. The radicalization of the "question of Being" means that the source of the history of metaphysics can no longer be conceived to be Dasein, the concrete site of a specific understanding of Being (metaphysics), nor can it be conceived on the model of an abstract or neutral meta-being outside the sequence of the concrete, historical disclosures of the
meaning of Being. To question "Being" for its own sake, then, means to undertake the continuing radicalization of the question of Origin.

That questioning begins—or, rather, is re-initiated, on the basis of the failure of ontology and its overturning—in essays written at the end of the early period. In particular, it is in On the Essence of Truth that Heidegger begins the inquiry into the origination of metaphysics in the midst of the whole of beings. Thus On the Essence of Truth is a "metontological" treatise, and it opens up the questioning that continues through the middle period of Heidegger’s work.

The radicalization of fundamental ontology, with its discovery of the finitude of time, results in the turning back of ontology into the "metaphysical ontic" from which it arises and "in which it implicitly always remains" (MFL 158). The metontological problematic concerns the happening of metaphysics—or, in On The Essence of Truth, of the disclosure of beings—in the midst of being as a whole. The turn means the re-origination of the question of the origin of metaphysics on the basis of the metontological problematic, following the overturning of the transcendental-horizontal inquiry.

"Finitude," now, is no longer a property of Dasein but of being as a whole. Heidegger no longer says that "transcendence" is grounded in "finitude," but that unconcealment occurs in relation to the concealment of being as a whole. The regression from truth as correspondence to the "essence" of truth as freedom shows how the "question of the essence of man" (BW 127) remains central to the problem of disclosure. Nonetheless, the regression locates the ground of disclosure, not in the finitude of Dasein, but in the concealment of being as a
whole. Furthermore, the essence of freedom lies in "letting beings be," and this letting-be is possible only on the basis of an attunement to being as a whole. Heidegger writes here of Verhalten or comportment, the relation of man to beings in their disclosure. Comportment is openness to beings. But comportment is already "attuned and in this attunement is drawn up into being as a whole" (131), a being as a whole which remains, as a whole, concealed. The relation between comportment and attunement replaces the interrelationship in Being and Time between understanding and mood. Attunement takes place from out of "being as a whole" itself, so that "finitude" is no longer a function of man, not even as Dasein, but of being (das Seiende) itself. The primordial concealment of being as a whole is "untruth" (Unwesen), and therefore untruth is the essence of truth.

Man can be open to beings, and thus be "insistent" in his bearing (Verhältnis) toward beings--i.e., fall into a concern with beings alone--precisely because the concealment of being as a whole conceals itself in that concealing. As such self-concealing, it is the "mystery." "Mystery" names the whole of man's relatedness to being, and is that relationship which gives rise to history as errance. There is a "turning to and fro" (Zu- und Wegwendung) which is proper to Dasein, and which is a function of the "need" (Not) to which Dasein is bound. "History" is constituted by this turning to and fro, toward what is "readily available" (135) and away from the mystery; indeed, Dasein itself is nothing other than this "turning into need." And the Turn--in Heidegger's "technical" sense, and for this "metontological" text--is nothing other than this turning into need, which "constitutes"
Dasen (history, disclosure). The Turn is a turning into errancy as such, i.e., into that "finitude" which is no longer the finitude of man. Thus the Turn signifies a movement opposite to that which seems to be indicated with the rubric "science of Being." And to inquire into "Being as such" is to inquire into "oblivion as such."

It is not the inquiry into oblivion as such that is undertaken in On the Essence of Truth, however, but the inquiry into the concealment of being as a whole. The inquiry into oblivion, or withdrawal, as such (Heidegger "III"), cannot be undertaken directly because the withdrawal of Being is not an "objective" phenomenon which can be examined in distinction from the event of withdrawal, i.e., the concealment of being as a whole which occurs with every event of disclosure. To make aletheia, the interplay of concealment and unconcealment, into an object of inquiry would be to turn it into a metaphysical origin of the various epochs in the history of Being. To question the origin is not to leave the field of historical disclosure, i.e., being as a whole, but it is rather to question that process which occurs in the event of the unconcealment of being as such and as a whole. It is by questioning this event, which is in every case "concrete" in its occurrence, that the problem of origin is addressed. Thus the questioning of origin never leaves the field of the totality of beings, never departs being into a meta-physical realm. What happens in that questioning is not something that we can follow here, except to say that it becomes the questioning of the "event" as such (Ereignis), that its aim is to develop the language appropriate to the thinking of aletheia, and that it is intertwined with the question of the transformed relationship of
man to language. The phrase "truth of essence" is merely a heuristic phrase in relation to this potential development of the questioning of the essence of truth which, in the original material of On the Essence of Truth, can merely accomplish the regression to the problematic of the concealment of being as a whole. It is in relation to the overturning of ontology into metontology that it can be understood how the central issue of the middle period becomes the Seinsgeschichte. For the latter problem is simply that of the character of the "event" in its concreteness as the series of the disclosures of being as such as a whole. This primary concreteness is now the starting-point for the inquiry into the possibility of such disclosure.

In spite of this reversal, it is clear that Heidegger continues to inquire into the "source of the possibility" of disclosure (of thought; of metaphysics; of philosophy as such; of world). It is in the character of this inquiry as a "questioning of origin" that the continuity and unity of Heidegger's thought consists, since this questioning, pursued to its consequences in the most radical fashion, motivates the changes in Heidegger's work.
NOTES


2. Krell is the first to write in English of the Metontologie, in his Intimations of Mortality: Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger's Thinking of Being, ch. 2, "Fundamental Ontology, Meta-Ontology, Frontal Ontology." Krell recognizes the connection between "meta-ontology" and finitude, but seems to find in this theme only the evidence of Heidegger's recognition of the futility or simple failure of his early transcendental-horizontal project. But metontology is the fulfillment of ontology (cf. Heidegger's interpretation of metabole in his lecture on Aristotle's Physics B,1). Krell places finitude and ontology in a relationship of opposition, in spite of his own recognition that "Heidegger's choice of that word [Umschlag] now aims to exhibit something of the unfolding or maturation of his own question." (p. 39) There is a considerable difference between "unfolding" and "maturation," since one means fulfillment in an overturning, and the other only a "better judgment" with reference to the problem.

5. Krell, p. 98.
10. Richardson, p. xviii.
11. Richardson characterizes the early, "phenomenological" approach as follows:

In the present case, the phenomenon with which we are concerned is There-being itself. The task is to let-be-seen the Being of There-being. . . . To permit the There-being, then, to reveal of its own accord what it is and how it is (as ontological comprehension, existence, finite transcendence), Heidegger will submit it to a phenomenological analysis and thus lay the Being of There-being out (Auslegung) in full view. (Richardson, p. 47)

It is in "There-being" that Being is disclosed, so that the "thinking
of Being" can take place, at this stage of Heidegger's thought, only through the analysis of Dasein.

12. Richardson, p. 20.


15. I have consistently modified all translations, where Sein has been translated "being," to read "Being." There are several reasons for insisting upon translating Sein with the capital "B." In the first instance, Sein is a different word from das Seiende, and many passages read more efficiently with the aid of the capitalization; witness a passage like this from Michael Heim's translation of The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic:

Human Dasein is a being with a kind of being to which it belongs essentially to understand something like being. (p. 16)

More importantly, the real question is why "Being" should not be capitalized in the Heideggerian text, when it is the term of central importance in his thought. Presumably Being has been de-capitalized precisely because it is of such central importance; thus, many interpreters have wanted to resist the reification of the concept of Being, or its elevation into a mystical goal of thought. Being is turned into be-ing, since presumably Sein only means the "being-process," something verbal and not an "object" at all. But does this (quite correct) observation about the verbal character of Being resolve anything at all? Precisely what is mysterious about Being is the fact that it is no being, that it is "nothing." Even the attempt to think Being as an "event" runs aground, again and again, on the representational pull of the language inherited from our metaphysical tradition. The very thinking of Ereignis is to a certain degree a response to the attempt to say in what "be-ing," Being as event, consists. Thus the presumed demystification of Being only has the effect of covering over the profound and genuine difficulties inherent in the attempt to think Being. Being is a mystery; its numinosity for thought is at least suggested by the capitalization.

Furthermore, it is not even quite correct to emphasize, always, the verbal aspect of Sein. The constant questioning of Being means that Being is, for Heidegger's thought, an unknown which is always addressed, which itself originates the questioning, whose multifold meanings enter into play in the questioning, but which we do not yet know how to name. Being is, in an odd way, a cipher which arrives from the tradition but which is not properly addressed therein. Heidegger's thought undertakes a transformation of this very concept, mediating the metamorphosis of Being into Ereignis. The decapitalization of Being suggests that we know what Being is; that we do not is, however, precisely the starting-point and ground of Heidegger's inquiry.

Finally, Heim translates das Seiende im Ganzen as "beings as a whole," but it is often useful to translate it as "being as a whole,"
since the emphasis here is precisely upon the totality of the ontic realm as such, not upon the "collection" of beings which make it up.

16. I shall refer to Heidegger's texts by pagination, within quotation marks, and always with the understanding that the page numbers refer to the last text explicitly designated within quotation marks. Because I usually quote the text in English, I shall give the English page reference first; an "m" following the reference means that I have modified the translation, however slightly (except that I shall not note the modification in changing "being" (Sein) to "Being," or, in the case of Hofstadter's translation of the Grundprobleme, "the Dasein" to "Dasein"); the German textual reference follows a slash, but is included only if I have modified the translation or have referred to the German text within the quotation.

17. For heuristic purposes, I accept Pöggeler's three-stage account of Heidegger's work, as reported by Krell (Krell, p 104):

Pöggeler's first stage comprises Heidegger's Marburg years and the first several years of the second Freiburg period, roughly 1923 to 1930. . . . The second stage comprises the 1930s and 1940s, when the question of the meaning of Being develops in the direction of the truth of Being. . . . The third tier of Heidegger's career rises in the years 1950 to 1964, when Heidegger "modifies" the question of the truth of Being by asking about the site or locale of Being, the topos of the topic.

We need not accept precisely this characterization of the three stages, but I shall work within the framework of this periodization. I am attempting, in this essay, to show how Heidegger enters the second period, and at the same time to show how to characterize the work of that period. My claim is that the turn should be understood through the occurrence announced in the quoted text from MFL, the overturning of ontology into metontology. In that case, however, we might suspect that the third period would be marked by something like a re-turn—to a transformed ontology, i.e., to the problem of language. But this question of the entry into Heidegger's later period is not an issue which I shall address here. Rather, I wish to show through a "practical" criticism how the problem of the turn is first of all a textual issue, since the first question to be asked is what changes do exhibit themselves in the development of Heidegger's work. The essay "On the Essence of Truth" constitutes a demonstration of the direction Heidegger's questioning takes once the principal issue becomes the metontological one of the origin of "truth" in the midst of being as a whole.
Chapter I

Heidegger's Early Concept of Metaphysics

In the texts of the Marburg period, Heidegger writes of founding metaphysics and searches for the "ground of its possibility"; later, his interest in the foundational problem seems to disappear, since in the texts of the middle period he is clearly concerned with something like an "overcoming" of metaphysics. What accounts for this apparent change is that, while in the early texts "metaphysics" is used in a positive sense, in the texts of the later period metaphysics has come to mean the thinking that belongs to the epoch of the oblivion of Being. For the Heidegger of the early period, "metaphysics" names the essence of philosophy. Metaphysics is the goal of the Destruktion, with its regression to the "source-ground" of philosophy, and is the source of the possibility of philosophical thinking as such.

In fact, the problem of metaphysics holds the key to an interpretation of Heidegger's early philosophical project--and with this key the door opens to an understanding of the continuity of his work, as it proceeds by way of the turn to the later concern with the "overcoming of metaphysics." It is by focusing upon the development of the concept of "metaphysics" in the early work that we gain an entryway to the path that leads from the early to the middle period, and thus that we are able to achieve a characterization of the concrete significance of the "turn" itself.
Presumably we could determine the meaning of Heidegger's early concept of metaphysics, simply enough, through a reading of *What is Metaphysics?* But Heidegger raises the question of "what" metaphysics is in the context of his own already developed concept of metaphysics, which receives its clearest formulation in the text of the lectures of the summer session of 1929, published as *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*. In this work, Heidegger attempts to place the fundamental-ontological project of *Being and Time* within a certain context and he does so through the development of a radical concept of metaphysics.

Heidegger's succinct definition of the subject-matter of metaphysics is to be found at the end of the Introduction: "The subject-matter of metaphysics is what lies 'beyond' beings. . . It deals with a) Being as such, b) beings as a whole" (MFL 25). But this straightforward statement follows Heidegger's discussion of Aristotle's understanding of philosophy, and in fact represents a synopsis of the results of that discussion. Is this, then, Heidegger's definition or Aristotle's according to Heidegger? The question as thus formulated cannot suggest the complex relationship of Heidegger's thought to the tradition. Heidegger neither simply takes over the conceptions of the tradition nor does he merely replace them with his own. His inquiry in its relation to the tradition is guided by the notion of *Wiederholung*, which I shall translate, in this essay, as "repetition."

The "method" at work in this text is meant to culminate in a repetition of the traditional concept of metaphysics. Heidegger prefaces his undertaking with methodological remarks which reflect the "circular" structure appropriate to the hermeneutic understanding of
Philosophy can be characterized only from and in historical recollection [geschichtliche Erinnerung]. But this recollection is only what it is, is only living, in the moment of self-understanding [im augenblicklichen Sichselbstverstehen], and that means in one's own free, productive grasp of the task harbored in philosophy. The ways of historical recollection and reflection on the present [augenblickliche Besinnung] are not two ways, but are both essential elements of every way toward the idea of philosophy. (8/9-10)

The elements of geschichtliche Erinnerung and augenblickliche Besinnung together signify the structure of historicity as presented in Being and Time (§74). Recollection based in historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) is not a mere reproduction of opinions or doctrines held in the past. For at its heart lies the Augenblick, the "moment of vision," whereby the past is explicitly taken over on the basis of an envisioning of a possibility latent in it but perhaps hitherto undiscovered. In augenblickliche Besinnung the future (Zukunft) is opened up on the basis of a possibility belonging to what has-been (das Gewesen). Thus the recollection, Erinnerung, of the "past" is the explicit "handing down to itself" which Dasein can undertake on the basis of its moment of vision. Handing down explicitly, however, is repetition: "Die Wiederholung ist die ausdrückliche Überlieferung" (SZ 386). Thus, in the lecture course The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, we find a repetition, in Heidegger's sense, of what the tradition intends by metaphysics. It is our task to trace the path of the Heideggerian transformation of the concept of metaphysics under the aegis of the Wiederholung.

In order to undertake the repetition of the tradition--of the understanding of metaphysics elicited from Aristotle's Metaphysics--a
further methodological strategy is required, in order to effect a clearing of the way for the necessary repetition. What is required is a "disavowal (Widerruf) of that which in the 'today' is working itself out as the 'past'" (BT 438/386). Repetition can take place only if a refusal or disavowal first occurs; in relation to the idea of philosophy this means that a destruction is called for. This is the "way to the idea of philosophy" to be followed in _The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic_. From the standpoint of MFL, the destruction belongs to _geschichtliche Erinnerung_, and constitutes the task of the First Major Part of the text of the lecture series. The _Destruktion_ will address, specifically, the work of Leibniz. But the stage is set for this destruction by Heidegger's reference, already a "retrieval," to Aristotle's concept of metaphysics; in this way the relevance of the destruction to the tradition as a whole is indicated. For Aristotle's concept of metaphysics "oversees" the tradition as a whole, and it is in reference to this concept that the _Wiederholung_ is to be undertaken and achieved.

Concerning the destruction, Heidegger says in _Basic Problems_ that it consists in a "critical dismantling [Abbau] of the traditional concepts, which at first must necessarily be employed, down to the sources from which they were drawn" (BP 22-23m/31). It is, he adds, carried out "_im historischen Rückgang auf die Tradition,_" in a historical regression to the tradition (23m/31). In the destruction, a regression to the sources or _origin_ of the tradition is undertaken. But at the same time, what is sought in such regression is the possibility of a repetition. Heidegger's "method," then, can be characterized in
general as a "regression to the origin," and equivalently as a "regression leading to a repetition." The destruction or repetition is never undertaken for its own sake, to end in an original disclosure covered over by the tradition; the movement toward the origin can only be completed in a repetition. Why this should be so has to do with the character of the "origin" (primordial time), and is a question we shall discuss briefly below, and then examine more closely in Chapter IV. In any case, Heidegger's formulation in MFL makes it clear that the "moment of vision" (Augenblick) lies at the heart of the task of retrieval ("historical recollection") in relation to the tradition, and the Augenblick guides the Wiederholung, as we know from Being and Time (cf. BT 174).

I have suggested that what we shall see in Metaphysical Foundations of Logic is, in view of Heidegger's methodological clues, a "regression to the origin" (here, of course, of "logic"), a regression that has the character of a Destruktion, and an origin whose character we have yet to examine. What is the character of that "origin" which supports and even requires a "repetition"?

Of course, Heidegger has already shown us the character of the origin in Basic Problems of Phenomenology. There the regression to the origin takes place through the threefold methodology implicit in phenomenology, namely, reduction, construction, and destruction. Destruction undertakes a historical regression to, or "upon" (auf) the tradition, and thus to the sources from which it arises. Reduction means the leading back (Rückführung) of phenomenological vision "from the apprehension of a being. . .to the understanding of the Being of
this being" (BP 21/29). Phenomenological construction is the projection of the "antecedently given being upon its Being and the structures of its being" (22), a projection which occurs precisely through the "reductive recursion from beings" (22). The projection, in other words, is not added to the reductive recursion or regression but is disclosed in it. In the end, construction finds in time the "origin of possibility itself" (BP 325); origin of possibility means, as we shall see, the origin of "metaphysics." Construction is an epagoge2, a leading-towards the origin of Seinsverständnis, and is, as such, the culmination of the process of regression. But if the phenomenological methodology culminates in the disclosure of Temporalität as the origin of Seinsverständnis, how can we justify the claim that the Heideggerian regression necessarily ends in a repetition?

Because of the emphasis upon the "scientific" character of ontological inquiry in BP, it may be difficult to see at first how the core of method is in fact repetition. That it is so is clear in MFL; it becomes even more explicitly so in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. But in BP it appears, on the surface, that the phenomenological method fulfills its function in the demonstration that Temporalität is the horizon of all interpretation of Being, and, therefore, in this explicit carrying out of the ontological difference. And of course this is correct, so long as we restrict our inquiry to the announced goal of Basic Problems. Nonetheless Heidegger clearly suggests there that his inquiries are meant not only to "grasp" the meaning of Being but to open up the possibility of a repetition:
in our own interpretation of Being we are attempting nothing other than the repetition of the problems of ancient philosophy in order to radicalize them in this repetition by their own selves. (BP 316)

The reductive recursion or regression implicit in phenomenological method leads to primordial time. What does it mean, however, that time is the "origin of possibility," that time has, in some sense, a "possibility-character"? "Possibility" bears an intrinsic reference to the future, within the structure of primordial time; but repetition itself means the apprehension of a possibility that comes toward one from the future, on the basis of what "has-been" and in the "moment of vision." Primordial time, as the origin of possibility, means the "occurrence" of a repetition; primordial time occurs as repetition. The origin itself exhibits the character of repetition. Thus the path to the science of Being—to Temporal science, ends, in fact, in repetition, even though this is not made explicit within the limitations of the project undertaken in Basic Problems of Phenomenology.

If time means repetition, then the recovery of "possibility" signified by this characterization of time already means something like an overturning (Umschlag) of the scientific result of the inquiry, that is to say, the result signified by the very concept of ontology. Ontology grasps primordial time as the source of all Seinsverständnis. But time itself—and the argument concerning this claim must be reserved for the appropriate place in our discussion (cf. ch. IV)—signifies, because it exhibits the character of repetition, the possibility of a movement beyond itself, the possibility of the origination of something new. The science of Being, even if it is the end of the ontological inquiry, is for Heidegger the beginning of the possibility of a renewal of
philosophy.

What "originates" in the origin is always unique. Temporalization never occurs in abstracto, but only as the temporalization "of" concretely existing Dasein; neutral Dasein is never what "exists" (cf. MFL §10.4; p. 137). The issue here is nothing other than that of the overturning or Umschlag of ontology into metontology, an issue to be examined in detail in chapter IV. The overturning is an immediate consequence of the ontological inquiry itself, since, because it elicits the origin of possibility lying at the heart of philosophy, ontology has no other significance than to make (concrete) philosophy possible. And this means that Heidegger's foundational "science" requires no application and has no "result"—since its sole function is to make philosophy possible!

It might be objected that even if Heidegger is, in the early period, concerned with something like a "new beginning" in philosophy, that nonetheless this new beginning lies in the foundational character of his own thought, i.e., in the science of Being considered as the content of a new "first philosophy." Thus an image of Heideggerian ontology arises whereby "end" means a stopping-place, or a line to be crossed, beyond which philosophy would take its clues from that true insight into its nature proffered in the Heideggerian ontology.

It is difficult to criticize this image tellingly. But its oddly unHeideggerian figuring of the character of time overlooks the features of repetition and possibility which belong to primordial time and which themselves constitute its "foundational" character. Time is the "origin of possibility," the "condition of the possibility of all
projections" (BP 307). It is thus the dimension of the preservation of "possibility as possibility" which constitutes the goal, in Being and Time, of the inquiry into the meaning of death and the attempt to grasp Dasein "as a whole." In other words, the inquiry into the "end" of Dasein eventuates in the irruption of possibility, in an insight into that origin or essence which is the source of the possibility of disclosure as such. Similarly the end of philosophy is something other than the cessation of the tradition; it is the moment of a glimpse into its source and thus into the possibility of its renewal and even transformation.

The dimension of possibility is not the same as that of sequential, chronological time. The task of the "science of Being" is to elicit this primal dimension of time, from which arises all projection of the meaning of Being. Ontology intends to enable philosophy, to make it possible, and to let it remain "possible," solely on the basis of the disclosure of the source of such possibility. In short, what lies beyond ontology is not a "Heideggerian" philosophy based upon the true science of Being, but concrete philosophy--"enabled" by the apprehension of what lets it arise and "come to presence." If future philosophy is transformed because of the accomplishment of the ontological gathering of philosophy into its end--time as the origin, in repetition, of possibility--it is not because future philosophy builds upon a supposed fundamentum inconcussum, but because philosophy can now look to the disclosure in ontology of the possibility of philosophy as such. Ontology is the eidos of philosophy itself.

What precisely is the "way to the [eidos or] idea of philosophy"
undertaken in MFL? And, further: What happens to "philosophy" in this text as Heidegger works out the repetition of the twofold structure of metaphysics? The destruction undertakes a regression, specifically on the basis of the "traditional concept of logic" (¶1). Henceforth, Heidegger will again and again return to traditional logic as a starting-point, and undertake a movement back therefrom into the ground of the received concepts belonging to the discipline. Here he surveys, in a way that becomes characteristic, the traditional field of the discipline. Logic itself "asks about the properties in general of logos, of statement, of that determining where the essence of thinking as such resides" (MFL 2). Logic consists of two branches, material and formal logic. Material logic is investigation of the thinking appropriate to different domains of objects; its concern, in effect, is regional ontology. Formal logic is knowledge of formal thinking, i.e., thinking without respect to specific type of content, "neutral with respect to content" (4). Heidegger characterizes this "general logic" as the logic which treats "that which makes thinking, as such, intrinsically possible" (4), thus already suggesting the fulfillment of the idea of logic in something like a fundamental ontology.

Logic is supposed to be a propaedeutic to philosophy, but academic logic provides no such genuine introduction; the question is "how should a philosophical logic be set in motion? Where can we get even an idea of such a logic?" The answer lies in the appropriate regressus:

We shall try to loosen up the traditional logic in such a way that problems in it become clear, and from the content of these very problems we shall allow ourselves to be led back into the presuppositions of this logic. In this way we shall gain
immediate access to philosophy itself (6).

What is at stake, then, in releasing traditional logic from "petrifaction" (Versteinerung) (6/7) is not so much acquiring a new logic as gaining "an 'intro-duction' which leads into philosophy itself" (7).

The regression intended to "loosen up" traditional logic exhibits the following pattern: A series of terms, representing certain fundamental themes, is elicited from the domain of traditional logic. Hence logic as a discipline is reduced to fundamental problems such as "truth, ground, lawfulness, freedom, concept, Being" (21). None of these terms is reducible to the other—"...none of these basic phenomena is more primordial than the other. They are equiprimordial" (56). The problem becomes, then, the "inner constitution of this equiprimordiality" (56); that is to say, the problem is to open up these themes, as philosophical issues, in such a way that their interrelatedness and mutual irreducibility becomes clear. Finally, the "ground" is sought which makes this equiprimordiality possible (56). Heidegger adds that "these grounds and foundations are attained by metaphysics; thus our title: 'The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic'" (56). We shall see this pattern confirmed in Heidegger's Destruktion of Leibniz's logic (cf. ch. II).

The regressus leads to metaphysics—metaphysics is philosophy dismantled. If destruction returns philosophy to its sources, then these sources lie in metaphysics. And it is in metaphysics that the "grounds and foundations" of logic—and thus of the sciences—are attained. Thus the foundational issue is the central issue of metaphysics. Metaphysics is the heir, in MFL, to the fundamental ontology
of *Being and Time* and to the ontology of *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*; metaphysics takes up the mantle of ontology. In fact, through the development of his concept of metaphysics Heidegger incorporates his earlier work into a more incisive formulation of his own project in relation to philosophy and the philosophical tradition (cf. the Appendix to MFL, "The Idea and Function of a Fundamental Ontology"). It is for this reason that *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* can provide the basis for an interpretation of the full significance of the early project.

With regard to the foundational issue, we soon find that the inquiry into the foundations of logic serves a quite different function from that of supplying the grounds for the advancement of "logic" as an academic discipline. In fact, the disclosure of the foundations will bring into question the relationship of logic and the sciences to the "foundation." Heidegger will "undermine the foundations," but there is no guarantee that the foundational enterprise will be able, by beginning "again from the first foundations," to establish something "firm and lasting in the sciences" (Descartes, Meditation I)5. If the foundations of logic are "hidden" (*verborgen*) (21/27), there is what we might call a caesura or gap between logic and its foundations. In exhibiting what the hidden foundations *already are*, as he does in ontology, Heidegger suggests implicitly that the sciences are in some sense delusively founded (just as is "everyday" existence). For the sciences, traditional philosophy and everyday existence are "founded" upon the forgottenness of Being, i.e. upon the implicit interpretation of Being as presence—upon, as it were, the concealment and distortion
of the foundations. The very disclosure of the foundations of logic in a regression to them may disallow any route back to the concepts traditionally constitutive of logic. This potential "shaking of the foundations" is implicit even in the fundamental ontology of Being and Time, as soon as we recognize what it means to exhibit the fact of the founding of traditional forms of inquiry in the forgottenness of Being. There is no guarantee that recovery of the "meaning of Being" would leave us with the traditional fields of inquiry intact.

Examination of Heidegger's texts shows that in fact he is peculiarly indifferent to any concrete question of the conceptual reorganization of any particular science; he seems interested neither in an attack upon the conceptual structure of any given science nor in a reformation of the fundamental concepts of any "regional ontology." He is, however, concerned with the relationship of existing Dasein to scientific inquiry (cf. MFL 21). From the standpoint of the foundational problem as such, what is at stake in laying the foundations is not a "science" which would provide the basic store of concepts for all other sciences; the issue rather is the possibility of foundational action in general, i.e. of grounding as such. Metaphysics is the inquiry into "that which makes thinking, as such, intrinsically possible" (4)—it is the inquiry into the intrinsic possibility (source or origin) of thought as the original "grounding" activity, without respect to the character of any particular region of inquiry. Because the science of logic seems to be the arbiter in the realm of thought, it is logic that is dismantled in order to discern a more fundamental significance to "thinking" than that provided by the traditional discipline.
The dismantling of logic yields the clue to the character of thinking as the fundamental grounding activity.

To suppose that fundamental regional concepts could be spun out of an inquiry into "thinking" as such represents a basic confusion of "types"—the caesura or chorismos here is that between thinking in general and its "object" in any particular case, between noesis and noema. We must, therefore, reject the assumption that Heidegger's investigations will reflect the traditional conception of the relation of the foundational inquiry to those disciplines to be "founded." This is clearest precisely where Heidegger's language concerning the relationship of the foundational investigation to the positive sciences echoes Kant's:

Whether we learn to think, in the real sense, by way of logic depends on whether we arrive at an understanding of thinking in its intrinsic possibility, that is, with regard to lawfulness, truth, ground, concept, Being, and freedom. When we acquire this understanding for ourselves, even if only in a few outlines, then we will have warrant to clarify the particular positive science we are working in from out of its intrinsic limits, and only then do we take possession of a science, as a free possession. And science, thus appropriated [zugedeignet], and only such a science, is in each case the genuine school for thinking. (21/27)

Here we find the same interrelationship between the limits and the possibility of a science that is exhibited in Kant's treatment of the understanding. But Heidegger says nothing about "establishing" the science of logic. There is rather a contrast implicit in this paragraph between the thinking that subjects itself to the canons of a scientific discipline, and that which is aware of the nature of the foundational activity which underlies the possibility of the construction of the sciences in general. Only such awareness lets science
become a "free possession," and allows the discipline to become a "genuine school for thinking." What is this foundational activity? It is nothing other than the projection of the ontological difference. The following discussion from The Essence of Reasons clarifies the contrast in question:

The basic concepts of modern science do not include "authentic" ontological concepts of the Being of the being it treats, nor can the latter be obtained simply through a "suitable" extension of the former. Original ontological concepts must instead be obtained prior to any scientific definition of "basic concepts," so that only by proceeding from them WILL WE BE IN A POSITION TO EVALUATE the manner in which the basic concepts of the sciences apply to Being as grasppable in purely ontological concepts. The manner in which ontological concepts apply to Being will always be limited to and circumscribed by a definite point of view. The "fact" of the sciences, i.e., the factual constituent of the understanding of Being that is necessarily included in them as in every way of behaving toward being, is neither a tribunal for founding the a priori nor the source of our knowledge of the a priori but merely a possible clue to the primordial constitution of the Being of, for example, history or nature. It is a clue which must itself be constantly subjected to the sort of criticism that has already gotten its bearings in the fundamental problematic of all inquiry about the Being of being. (ER 25--emphasis mine)

The limitation (as well as the possibility) of scientific thinking lies in the limited point of view from which the specific science projects its understanding of the Being of beings, e.g., one derived from the pre-ontological experience of history or nature. That science depends upon such projection can only become clear to ontology. Science is "founded" in ontology solely in the sense that the grounding activity already operative in every science is made explicit for the first time in ontology's "explicitly carrying out the ontological difference," i.e., in its clarifying the nature of the grounding activity as such. It is through ontology's making this "structure" explicit that science becomes a "free possession"; here one can speak of something like a
liberation from what Husserl called the "naiveté of the scientific attitude."

The true concern of the ontological inquiry, as indicated by the phrase I have emphasized in the passage from ER, is to save the understanding of the Being of beings from contamination by concepts derived from the projection at work in the positive sciences. Heidegger is not concerned to "proceed" from ontology to science, but to prevent philosophy's proceeding from science to ontology--except by way of a dismantling of the science.

The route to learning to think is undertaken through the dismantling of logic, and leads to a determination of the activity constitutive of thinking--"grounding"--that makes this activity possible. What is at issue is thus not the methodology, fundamental concepts and articulated content of logic as a particular science, but the recovery of the intrinsic possibility of thinking as such. Through a return to the basic problems brought to light through the dismantling of logic, what is achieved is "a concrete entrance into philosophy itself"--not a new logic or a reaffirmation of the essentials of traditional logic.

Fundamental ontology demonstrates the intrinsic possibility of thinking as such. But what is "thinking," or, equivalently, what is philosophy in its essence? If the "sources" (Quellen) of philosophy lie in metaphysics, what is the nature of metaphysics, such that philosophy can arise from it?

The determination of the idea of philosophy "from historicity," the repetition of metaphysics, requires the destruction for its fulfillment, but at the same time guides the destruction by providing a
preconception of the nature of that idea, namely that the "essence" of philosophy lies in metaphysics. Through the dismantling of traditional concepts, philosophy returns to its own source, metaphysics. As dismantled philosophy, the latter is the "primordial" form of philosophy covered over in the development of the philosophical tradition. But if ancient philosophy is the "gigantic beginning [that] contains within itself a wealth of truly undeveloped and in part completely hidden possibilities" (9), this does not mean that the idea of philosophy is adequately developed by the ancients; it means, on the contrary, that the possibilities of philosophy that emerge with the beginning remain latent. The return to the sources of philosophy in historical recollection cannot directly yield the sought-for idea of philosophy, so that even in this early text, Heidegger aims for something other than a simple recovery of Greek thought in its original form. Nonetheless, it is only ancient philosophy which corresponds to the "present necessity [augenblickliche Notwendigkeit] of bringing problems back to simplicity" (9).

Aristotle in particular is chosen because "he represents the peak of the development of genuine ancient philosophy" (10). But even Aristotle does not bring the conception of philosophy to full clarity; Heidegger's appeal to Aristotle is already informed by the "present vision" which guides his inquiry, and it is on its basis that he is able to elicit the twofold structure of metaphysics.

Aristotle characterizes philosophy as the investigation of the "νοήματα τὰ ἄθρα - beings with regard to Being, i.e. solely with regard to what makes a being the being it is: Being" (10). Knowledge of Being is
knowledge of the "first," of the arche. Philosophy, \( \phi \lambda \sigma \sigma \phi \alpha \), is the striving (\( \phi \lambda \sigma \) ) for understanding (\( \sigma \phi \alpha \) ) "of what precedes everything else, what is earlier, prior to everything else, that is, prior to individual beings" (13); what philosophy strives to understand is thus Being, for Being "is what is first understood before anything like a being can arise anywhere and in any way" (13).

As striving for knowledge, \( \lambda \gamma \sigma \), of the \( \delta \nu \tilde{\gamma} \delta \nu \), philosophy is ontology (13).

But there is another aspect to the Aristotelean characterization of philosophy. Philosophy, for Aristotle, is \( \Theta \epsilon \lambda \gamma \kappa \gamma \). Here, too, philosophy is science "of the highest, of the first" (11). In this case, however, the first is the realm of being as a whole. "\( \Theta \epsilon \lambda \gamma \kappa \gamma \) is a contemplation of the \( \kappa \gamma \sigma \mu \)" (11), i.e. of the heavens [die Himmel]: the encompassing and overpowering, that under and upon which we are thrown, that which dazzles and takes us by surprise, the overwhelming [das Übermächtige]. (11)

Philosophy is thus not only ontology, it is also theology.

Here in the Introduction, Heidegger does not explain further the relation between philosophy as ontology and philosophy as theology. Nonetheless his succinct statement of the subject-matter of metaphysics does indicate the direction to be taken by Heidegger's investigation; he himself suggests the structural relationship between his own task and the twofold characterization of philosophy elicited from Aristotle's Metaphysics. Ontology, as knowledge of Being, is referred to the problem of the understanding of Being; theology, as "knowledge of the overwhelming," concerns itself with that which holds man "in thrall" (12). Therefore "this twofold character corresponds to the
twofold in *Being and Time* of existence and thrownness" (11). Heidegger thus intimates the possibility of interpreting *Being and Time* from the standpoint of the concept of "metaphysics," for "the concept 'metaphysics' encompasses the unity of 'ontology' and 'theology' in the sense already characterized" (25). In fact, to offer such an interpretation concerning the significance of the project of *Being and Time* is one of the purposes of MFL (cf. ¶10 and Appendix).

Metaphysics, then, has two parts, ontology and theology; ontology "deals with . . . Being as such," and theology with "being as a whole." This distinction within the structure of metaphysics defines the structural articulation of Heidegger's own work. Heidegger establishes and interprets his own "problematic" in terms of the relationship between these two parts of metaphysics; indeed, he now understands his own project as the recovery and repetition of the metaphysical project which lies concealed at the heart of the philosophical tradition. Regression to the source of the tradition, metaphysics, is completed in a repetition of metaphysics.

Metaphysics takes up the mantle of fundamental ontology; it "absorbs" the whole of Heidegger's early project, particularly as articulated in *Being and Time* and *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Much of MFL is devoted, as we shall see, to the assimilation of the earlier work to metaphysics, and to the reformulation of its goals in terms of the clearer apprehension of the metaphysical project.

Heidegger writes in the Appendix that

> By a fundamental ontology we mean the basic grounding of ontology in general. This includes: 1) a grounding that exhibits the intrinsic possibility of the Being question as the basic problem of metaphysics—the interpretation of Dasein as
temporality; 2) an explication of the basic problems contained in
the question of Being--the temporal exposition of the problem of
Being: . . . (154)

But we have already learned that there is another part to
metaphysics, "theology," an inquiry which we find, according to the
Appendix, arising out of the full development of ontology itself:

3) the development of the self-understanding of this problematic,
its task and limits--the overturning [Umschlag]. (154/196)

Heidegger thus introduces a "dynamic" relationship (metabole) between
the two parts of metaphysics. Ontology is "overturned" into theology,
and it is nothing other than "the radicalization of ontology [which]
brings about the above-mentioned overturning of ontology out of its
very self" (157).

Heidegger gives to his retrieval of the Aristotelean "theology"
the name metontology (Metontology). Its theme is the problem of man
thrown into the midst of the "overwhelming," i.e., of being as a whole,
a problem which arises out of the "intrinsic necessity" for fundamental
ontology to "turn back to its point of origin" [zurückschlägt, von wo
sie ausgegangen war] (156/199), i.e., to turn back to the "metaphysical
ontic in which it implicitly always remains" (158). The full develop-
ment of the concept of existence requires an inquiry into the condi-
tions determining the factual situatedness of Dasein and thus the
possibilities open to his "projection." Ontology itself is possible
only with the factual existence of Dasein:

. . . Being is there [es gibt Sein] only when man understands
Being. In other words, the possibility that Being is there in
the understanding presupposes the factual existence of Dasein,
and this in turn presupposes the factual extantness of nature.
Right within the horizon of the problem of Being, when posed
radically, it appears that all this is visible and can become
understood as Being, only if a possible totality of beings is
already there [schon da ist].

As a result, we need a special problematic which has for its proper theme being as a whole [das Seiende im Ganzen]. This new investigation resides in the essence of ontology itself and is the result of its overturning [Umschlag], its metabole. I designate this set of questions metontology. (156-57/199)

Heidegger's formulation of the motivation and circumstances of the overturning is precise, and requires closer examination than we can give it in these remarks on the Introduction; this passage will be taken up again in chapter IV. For present purposes it is adequate to observe the "concreteness" of the formulation. The announced theme of metontological inquiry is that of a "possible totality of beings" [mögliche Totalität von Seiendem], of "being as a whole" [das Seiende im Ganzen]. It is in relation to such a whole of beings that ontology "arises." Facticity is brought into relation to the concrete situatedness of Dasein, the specific situation or configuration of being from out of which Dasein emerges in its existence. If ontology is generated by thematizing Dasein's "death," metontology concerns the site of its "birth."

Thrownness and existence are inseparable moments in the constitution of Dasein, and Heidegger has treated them as intertwined, in Being and Time, in a manner we cannot take up here. Nonetheless, Heidegger's investigation in Being and Time is oriented from the beginning toward the question of the meaning of Being ("Being as such," the first half of metaphysics) and thus toward the horizon of projection. "Theology," the relationship of man to das Seiende im Ganzen, is not explicitly elevated in BT to the status of a problem in its own right.

We have already seen that Heidegger identifies the twofold in Being and Time with "the twofold... of existence and thrownness" (MFL
11). Dasein is thrown projection; existence (transcendence) takes over its thrownness as its Gewesenheit or "having-beenness" in the light of its Zukunft, that possibility which comes toward it in the taking over of its authentic "past". The problem here is to show how Dasein originates in a specific "situation," i.e. finds itself in a given world, already disclosed in a particular manner ("everydayness") in its own transcendence. In Being and Time, the analysis says nothing of the situation into which Dasein is thrown as such; the Situation is considered only from the formal standpoint of the analysis of Dasein's transcendence. As thrown, Dasein is for the most part lost in the world of its concern:

"Dasein gets dragged along in thrownness; that is to say, as something which has been thrown into the world, it loses itself in the 'world' in its factical submission to that with which it is to concern itself" (BT 400).

But Dasein can come back to itself in anticipatory resoluteness: "The authentic coming-towards-oneself of anticipatory resoluteness is at the same time a coming-back to one's ownmost Self, which has been thrown into its individualization" (BT 388). Thrownness is understood from the standpoint of Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Either it forgets itself in the 'world' into which it is thrown, or, alternatively, it takes over its thrownness to become that which it already authentically is. But this means that it takes over its 'world' as its own, for the sake of resolute disclosure of the situation in which it finds itself. Thus the "twofold" of SZ, thrownness and existence, are considered together from the standpoint of the problem of transcendence, and thus from the standpoint of the development of a fundamental ontology. But it turns out that it is possible, and indeed necessary,
to conceive of "transcendence" from the standpoint of the "situation" into which it is thrown, and, surpassing which, it discloses in transcendence.

The situation, considered in itself, is nothing other than the "whole of beings" (das Seiende im Ganzen) "into which" Dasein is thrown. The overturning of fundamental ontology is an overturning into the problematic of the realm of "being as a whole" into relation to which is thrown, and in relation to which Dasein's transcendence happens (geschieht). The metontology takes up the issue of the happening of the transcendence of Dasein in relation to the prevailing order into which Dasein is thrown: the "overwhelming," das Übermächtige. Thus "thrownness" can be said to appear twice in the developing problematic of metaphysics: first as subordinated to transcendence, and then in such a way that the problem of transcendence is taken up on the basis of its relation to the whole into which Dasein is thrown. The overturning of ontology means that the event of transcendence must be rethought from the standpoint of the original relatedness of transcendence, as an event, to the "whole" of beings.

The problem of the metontology is that of how Dasein "happens," how it effects an irruption, or rather is as an irruption, into an already extant whole of beings, into an already prevailing 'world'.

We can now understand the change of perspective which has occurred in a text like *What is Metaphysics?*. This text—and the same remains true for virtually all other texts of the "middle period" (the new approach defines the "middle period")—begins with the factical situatedness of Dasein, its finding itself thrown into the midst of
being as a whole. Thus in *What is Metaphysics?* "the question of the nothing proves to be such that it embraces the whole of metaphysics" (BW 110). The nothing is encountered, however, in the fundamental mood of anxiety, which "not only reveals beings as a whole in various ways, . . . this revealing. . . is also the basic occurrence of our Da-sein" (102). What is at stake in the "nihilating" of the nothing, in *WM,* is the occurrence of the transcendence of Dasein, in which nothing less transpires than the irruption by one being called "man" into the whole of beings, indeed in such a way that in and through this irruption beings break open and show what they are and how they are. (97)

Heidegger says furthermore in *WM* that: "Metaphysics is the basic occurrence of Dasein. It is Dasein itself" (112). Heidegger gathers the fundamental ontological inquiry undertaken in his early work into the question of metaphysics, i.e., that of the irruption of Dasein into the midst of being as a whole. "'Metaphysics' is the fundamental event [Grundgeschehen] which comes to pass with the irruption into being of the concrete existence of man" (KPM 251/218). In the lectures and texts following the publication of *Being and Time,* "metaphysics" means the twofold metaphysics of Dasein: the problem of the possibility of something like an understanding of Being (fundamental ontology, the investigation of transcendence, or the ground of the possibility of metaphysics), and the problem of the relation of transcendence itself to that "whole of beings" in relation to which transcendence "occurs."

If we conceive of Heidegger's work as beginning with an inquiry into the "hermeneutics of facticity," then we can say that in the metontology Heidegger returns to his starting-point, bringing the hermeneutic enterprise full circle. But this return within the scope
of the hermeneutic circle does not end in a reiteration of the initial formulation of the problematic of facticity, but to a re-initiation of Heidegger's project on the basis of his retrieval of "metaphysics."

Thus the metontology does not simply recapitulate the relationship between the existentiell and the existential, but represents a sharpening of the problem of the ontic "origin" of Dasein's transcendence. It is now necessary to account for the origin of transcendence on the basis of Dasein's originary situatedness in the midst of being as a whole. The dispersal of Dasein implicit in this conception--since the problem of "being as a whole" implies the problem of the concrete individuation of the event of transcendence, with reference to a particular "configuration" of being--opens up the problem of transcendence to that of history. Metontology leads, as we shall see, to the problematic of the Seinsgeschichte.

Dasein projects an understanding of Being, not in the void of a worldless transcendental subjectivity, but as itself a being already thrown into the midst of a totality of beings. The problematic of the metontology is that of the ontic whole wherein Dasein finds itself situated in the very act of disclosive projection. The metontology overturns the ontological standpoint because it shows that temporalization itself "occurs" in the midst of beings. But this means that temporalization cannot provide the most radical "answer" to the question of the meaning of Being; it means that Dasein cannot be the ultimate source or origin, as fundamental ontology requires it to be, of metaphysics as interpretation of Being. Dasein, the site of the meaning of Being, is itself situated in the midst of beings. One of
the motivations of the so-called "turn" lies in the fact that with
the metontology, a more radical questioning of the origin becomes
necessary.

The problem of the origin is that of the way the question of
Being arises with the existence of man; it is the problem of the
relation of the "basic question of philosophy and the question of man"
(§IV). The problem of that upsurgance of the question of Being which
can occur in human existence is sometimes formulated as the problem of
freedom, as in MFL and On the Essence of Truth. But the investigation
of this problem must also take account of the "finitization" (Verend-
lichung) of human being, an issue emphasized in Kant and the Problem of
Metaphysics and the Introduction to Metaphysics.

The question of Being, Heidegger says,

is not arbitrary and not applied to man externally, but is more
or less stirring in man insofar as he exists at all as human, and
because human Dasein takes this question over, as it were, along
with human existence, this question has, as a burgeoning problem,
its own necessities. This is why the latter manifest themselves
already in the first steps of philosophy (MFL 15).

These "necessities" manifest themselves in the fact that, throughout
the tradition, from Parmenides for whom the "clarification of Being
takes place by way of a reflection on 'thinking,' noein," (15) to
Hegel's defining of substance from the subject, "human Dasein moves to
the center" (15). Here the "field becomes visible . . . upon which the
gigantomachia peri tou ontos takes place, the battle of the giants over
Being" (15).

Thus man is already the site of the polemos, the conflict which
"breaks out from human Dasein as such" (16), that polemos which is the
focus of Heidegger's interpretation, with reference to Heraclitus,
Parmenides, and Sophocles, of the relation of Being and thinking in the

Introduction to Metaphysics. In the later text Heidegger says that

According to Heraclitus what man is is first manifested. . . in polemos, in the separation of gods and men, in the irruption of Being itself. For philosophy what man is is not written somewhere in heaven. We must rather say:

3. The question of what man is must always be taken in its essential bond with the question of how it stands with Being. The question of man is not an anthropological question but a historically meta-physical question. (IM 140)

Heidegger writes also of "the conflict between the overwhelming presence of being as a whole and man's violent being-there" (162).

Where is this conflict enkindled? The "gigantomachia," the battle of the giants, is a battle of Titans, of the gods of the earth. The battle "breaks out from Dasein as such," and Dasein is a being among beings, in the midst of the totality of beings. What is essential, from the standpoint of the problem, resolutely entertained as a problem, is that there is "nothing" beyond beings. The questioning of the relationship of man to the question of Being is resolutely a-theistic. There "is" nothing but being, das Seiende im Ganzen; the problems of freedom and finitude are possible as problems only insofar as it is recognized that the inquiry into the origin of metaphysics excludes consideration of an origin "beyond" being. Man himself is the field of the conflict; the problem of the "beginning" is placed back here into its metaphysical ontic, from which it arises and "in which it implicitly always remains" (MFL 158).

The problem of finitude is that of how transcendence arises on the basis of finitude (KPM, Section IV), and this problem can be formulated with philosophical precision only if every concept of an
"other" to the totality of beings is rigorously excluded. In this sense, Heidegger's questioning is already resolutely anti-"metaphysical." The transcendence of man is founded in his holding himself out into the Nothing; in his finitude, he transcends or "passes beyond" beings to no being, to nothing ontic. That World is "nothing," that in the event of transcendence, the "nothing nothings," must be understood rigorously, to mean that what occurs in transcendence is solely an affair of the realm of beings. The battle takes place on an earthly battlefield.

One of the questions concerning the nature of the "turn" is whether the latter signifies a relaxing of the rigorously a-theistic character of the early questioning, so that "Being"--which is now questioned "by itself"--has something of the character of a transcendent "source" for the happening of truth. An investigation of this question (and whether this question is even correctly posed) we shall defer for the present.

The present section (IV) of the Introduction to MFL has the character of a sketch; the problems which Heidegger surveys here are taken up again and again with increasing rigor, so that here we have only something like an "outline," through which the elements of the problem are placed into relationship with one another. Thus when Heidegger says that "the basic question of philosophy, the question of Being, is in itself, correctly understood, the question of man" (16), and yet that "the important thing is to raise the question of man in view of the problem of Being" (16), we catch only a glimpse of the difficulty of the set of inquiries which the problem of the inter-
relationship of man and Being initiates. As late as 1956, in his Addendum to "The Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger says concerning that text that the relation between man and Being is "unsuitably conceived"--

a distressing difficulty, which has been clear to me since Being and Time and has since been expressed in a variety of versions. (PLT 87)

Before leaving this section, let us take note of the interplay in Heidegger's lecture here of the metaphysical themes of ontology and metontology. Heidegger reminds us that "human Dasein is a being with a kind of Being to which it belongs essentially to understand something like Being. We call this the transcendence of Dasein, primal transcendentance" (MFL 16), and he refers here to the second part of the lecture course--showing, incidentally, that the question of grounding in Metaphysical Foundations of Logic belongs primarily to the "ontological" theme, not the metontological.

But the question of Being is also the question of man, so that ontology is also at once intertwined with the metontological theme:

That the basic ontological question of philosophy has somehow to do with beings as a whole, as well as thereby with human existence and in such a way that the existence of the one philosophizing is in each case decided, this is expressed in Aristotle by the fact that "first philosophy" is, at the same time, theologike. (17)

The two are intertwined in that philosophizing (in which the question of Being is addressed) is only significant in relation to the decision thereby made with regard to the existence of the one philosophizing. "Philosophy, in its innermost ground, is the most radical, universal, and rigorous conceptual knowledge" (17)--i.e., it is ontology. Nonetheless, "the proofstone of philosophical truth consists solely in
the loyalty the philosophizing individual has to himself" (17). Here
the "existential" and the "existentiell" are inseparable. We shall see
that the unity of metaphysics, i.e., the unity of ontology and met­
tonology, is thematized by Heidegger under the rubric of freedom (18).
The latter problem, however, comes into its own only with the "over­
turning" of ontology into metontology, because the problem of freedom
is precisely that of the "happening" of truth in the midst of being as a whole.

Indeed, we shall be able to observe in Metaphysical Foundations
of Logic the initial steps of Heidegger's transition to the "middle
period," with its focus upon the problem of truth as opposed to that of
time. Both the turn-over into the metontology and the reorganization,
to be observed in this text, of the problems of fundamental ontology
around the issue of "ground" are aspects of this change. Of course,
MFL with its inquiry into logic as the "metaphysics of truth" can be
understood to supply the missing fourth chapter of Part Two of Basic
Problems of Phenomenology--just as the latter is supposed to belong to
the missing Third Division of Part One of Being and Time--namely, the
chapter on the truth-character of Being. Thus MFL represents a con­
tinuation of the early ontological project, even while it undertakes
the work of reorganization and transition.

The concept of metontology prepares the way for the reformulation
of Heidegger's inquiry into the "question of the meaning of Being" on
the basis of truth, aletheia, as opposed to the ontological formulation
of the question in terms of the horizon of temporality. Meanwhile the
principal task of the present text is the restatement of the problems
of fundamental ontology on the basis of the issue of grounding. What is at stake in fundamental ontology is, in the end, the nature of the "grounding event," the "happening" of the transcendence of Dasein. Heidegger will show how "world" comes to pass with this event--what is grounded is "world." Focusing upon the problem of ground clarifies the founding nature of the event; this clarification suggests that what is actually at stake in fundamental ontology is not a search for a dogmatic version of the "true" meaning of Being, but an attempt to elucidate the character of the world-instituting event, the origin of world. Nor is what is accomplished in fundamental ontology merely an exhibition of the basis of the positive sciences; more fundamentally, it is a disclosure of the source or "possibility" of the coming-to-pass of a world.

Thus Heidegger's regression upon logic engages the dimension of "thinking," not in order to establish a reformation, however fundamental, of the science of logic, but in order to establish the possibility of the "act" of grounding that takes place in thinking. "Thinking" here is understood as the event of transcendence and has, in the end, nothing to do with subjective processes of ratiocination. Thus in seeking the "grounds which make thinking possible," what is sought are "the bases [Gründe] for understanding, existence, the understanding of Being, Dasein, and primal transcendence" (19). The question is, "How are ground and Dasein related to one another?" (20).

That Heidegger is reorganizing the problems of fundamental ontology around those of ground shows why he chooses Leibniz as an "appropriate place" (geeignete Stelle) (22) for the "critical dis-
mantling of logic down to its hidden foundations" (21). If the problem of ground is that of primal transcendence (metaphysics), then the dismantling of the philosophical tradition itself is accomplished in the dismantling of logic; and the central principle of logic is that of Leibniz's principle of ground. In other words, the *Destruktion* of Leibniz's "doctrine of judgment down to basic metaphysical problems" (27) addresses the central issue in the dismantling of the tradition as a whole: what is the source of the possibility of "thinking" as such?
1. One may object to this translation, since it does not convey the sense of "drawing up again" that is implicit in Wiederholung, and since repetition often signifies mere reiteration in English. In fact, I have sometimes used "retrieval" or even "recovery" as the translation of Wiederholung. Nonetheless, there are reasons to use repetition as the central, if not the only, rendering of this term. The strongest argument in favor of "repetition" is that, even in English, it retains the connection with the tradition which Wiederholung intends, in that (for example) we are familiar with repetition in Plato (Symposium); we can speak of repetition in Kierkegaard, but not retrieval, and we think of Augustine as having a doctrine of repetition (the soul's return to God in self-knowledge). Thus we can say that in Heidegger's work the concept of repetition comes to suggest the whole of the process of retrieval, appropriation and transformation which together constitute the Heideggerian "methodology." But "retrieval" seems to imply bringing back (Wiederbringen) that which once was present, the restoration of a former state—and this is not at all what Heidegger intends by Wiederholung. Furthermore, we should like to be able, in certain contexts, to speak of a repetition where it seems odd to speak of retrieval; for example, with reference to the repetition of the First Major Part of MFL in the Second Major Part.

2. As Rodolphe Gasché points out in his recently published work, The Tain of the Mirror (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 115. Gasché, too, finds in Heidegger's method something like a "retrogression to the origin," although he develops this insight in the context of a comparison with Husserl's methodology in Experience and Judgment (pp. 109 ff.).

3. For an excellent discussion of the relationship of ontology to the problem of the "end" of philosophy and thus to the overcoming of the oblivion of Being, see John Sallis, "End(s)," in Delimitations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), pp. 128-38.


Chapter II

Leibniz’s Doctrine of Judgment and its Destruktion

The destructive analysis of Leibniz’s doctrine of judgment is set into the context of the question of the relation of thinking to beings, of thinking to Being, and of thinking itself as a way of Being (MFL 27). The path undertaken here, meant to be “a concrete path of refection on what makes thinking possible as such” (27), first asks whether Being or thinking is “most proximate” (27); for the modern tradition, it is thinking that is “nearest.” Yet the question remains whether, for Leibniz, thinking (logic) is prior to or dependent upon metaphysics (ontology). The issue of whether logic or metaphysics guides the construction of Leibniz’s system was already a current one in the Leibniz scholarship of Heidegger’s day. Couturat’s La Logique de Leibniz (1901) and Russell’s A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz (1900), especially, are mentioned; both of these works argued for the precedence of logic over metaphysics in Leibniz’s thought. In any case, it is the ambiguity of this relationship within the Leibnizian text that guides the direction of Heidegger’s inquiry. The specific route taken by the Destruktion is the one required in order to resolve this ambiguity.

11. Characterization of the the general structure of judgment

Thus the discussion is oriented by contemporary scholarly attempts to determine whether logic or ontology dominates in the construction of Leibniz’s thought. Heidegger’s analysis begins with the
theory of judgment (logic, "thinking") and will remain alert to the presence of ontological elements within this theory.

The theory of judgment is for Leibniz a theory of inclusion. In every true statement, "the subject must contain the predicate in itself, whether explicitly or implicitly" (32). But what does "subject" mean here? Apparently substance itself is understood "from the viewpoint of the logical subject," although "the converse is also quite possible" (33). Many passages in Leibniz assimilate the ontic subject to the logical, i.e., "substance" to "subject." But this assimilation takes place in each case via the concept of truth. The essence of truth consists, according to Leibniz, in the relation of being-in. But

Inclusion is as such an inclusion in logos, a logical inclusion; and as intending the being itself, it is an ontic inclusion. The peculiarity is that both of these in a certain way coincide. (35)

Thus the situation with regard to the priority of being or logos cannot be clarified until we have "forged ahead to the final metaphysical foundations of this theory of judgment" (35).

The first task is the more precise characterization of inclusion or the inesse.

12. Judgment and the idea of truth. The basic forms of truth

Because "being true is the being true of propositions" (37), the question is how the concept of judgment is to be connected with that of the essence of truth in Leibniz. Heidegger shows that, for Leibniz, the essence of truth lies in identity. Truth means the truth of judgments, so that the problem of truth centers on the connection of the predicate with the subject. This connection, as we have seen, is of
the nature of inclusion, or being-in, *inessen*. For Leibniz, however, the type of statement exemplary of the nature of being true is "the simplest and most primordial true statements, . . . the primary truths" (38), such as "A is A." Statements like these have the character of identities, "propositions in which something is explicitly asserted as itself in its sameness to itself and with regard to that sameness" (38). Furthermore, for Leibniz, all true statements are reducible, through definition or analysis, to such primary identities; therefore "all true statements are finally reducible to identities" (39). Thus the essence of truth "resides in identity" (39).

Heidegger now wishes to show that this definition and the problems connected with it land us immediately in "the ontological problematic, the question about Being as such" (39). In the first instance, identity, which for Leibniz constitutes the essence of truth, is traditionally one of the principal features of Being (a "transcendental"). Heidegger will show, furthermore, that Leibniz's division of truth into original and derivative truths "has its metaphysical, ontological background" (41). Thus he proceeds to resolve the ambiguity between logic and ontology by exhibiting the metaphysical substructure that is concealed in Leibniz's theory of judgment.

In the division into two types of truths, original truths are those primary propositions for which no proof is possible, since "they are in themselves immediately evident" (41). These are the class of explicit identities, identities as such. Derived truths are further classified into two types of truths, necessary and contingent. Necessary truths are "virtual" identities, i.e., they can be reduced to
explicit identities; conversely, they can be deduced by us from identities. Contingent truths "are also identities in essence, but their analysis, their proof, never comes to an end—for finite understanding" (41). For God, however, contingent truths can be analyzed into identities, and therefore can be deduced from these. Implicit in the whole of this scheme is the a priori character of all knowledge.

Heidegger proceeds to show the metaphysical basis of this concept of knowledge, for which even truths of fact are grounded in eternal truths—not, to be sure, in logical identities, but in the "very concept of the subject" (monad) (43). Thus contingent truths, too, would be truths of identity. What is the metaphysical basis of this tendency to assimilate truths of fact to truths of identity?

In the first instance, Leibniz, as a "rationalist," conceives Being, including the Being of facts, from the standpoint of the ratio (43). More importantly, the Scholastic tradition exerts a principal influence here. The Scholastic doctrine of God is "the key to Leibniz's logic" (43).

At this point an indication of a key element in Heidegger's destructive strategy is in order. Having begun with the problematic situation (aporia), the ambiguity encountered in attempting to determine which of logic or ontology is more fundamental in Leibniz's thought, and focusing on the manifestly "logical" theory of the doctrine of judgment, Heidegger shows, in effect, that the issue is undecidable on the basis of the express formulations of the Leibnizian text alone. Heidegger then demonstrates the presence in Leibniz's thought of metaphysical (Scholastic) doctrines guiding his theory of
judgment. The priority of logic or ontology with reference to Leibniz's theory cannot be determined as long as the inquiry remains at the level of the overt, "logical" discourse that constitutes the "given" of Leibniz's text. Heidegger's *Destruktion* wishes to exhibit the sources of the Leibnizian philosophical discourse. This engagement with the sources of the tradition will serve, in the end (as we have already seen in Ch. I), the function of that repetition which seeks a renewal of philosophical thinking from its source. Thus *Destruktion* is not "endless" in principle, but has a determinate goal--one which, to be sure, cannot be achieved forthwith but requires, for Heidegger, the constant "repetition" of precisely this task of retrieval of the source.

Hence the *Destruktion*, as a "regression to the origin," makes use of concrete and, indeed, scholarly procedures as Heidegger locates the sources of Leibniz's theory of judgment in Scholastic metaphysics. There is, in this analysis, something like a *topology* at work, to borrow an expression from Heidegger's later phase. Heidegger discerns in Leibniz's text--to take one example--the *topos* of truth and the relation of the latter to identity. The themes belonging to this *topos* are preserved even while they undergo a certain process of transformation in Heidegger's own work, so that the language of *aletheia* and of the Same remains related to that of traditional metaphysics. I cannot trace the full process of transformation at which Heidegger's "overcoming" of metaphysics aims here; but we can observe the beginnings, at least, of the process of transformation in Heidegger's act of revealing the "place" of the Leibnizian text in relation to the
tradition.

Heidegger traces the source of the Leibnizian ideal of cognition, according to which all truths can be reduced to "original" truths, i.e., truths of identity, to the Scholastic notion of the scientia Dei, the knowledge that belongs to God. Thus he shows how Leibniz's concept of truth originates in the metaphysical tradition. Heidegger's explication of this concept is based for the most part upon Aquinas's article De scientia Dei (Quaestio XIV in Part I of Summa Theologica).

There are two types of divine knowledge, scientia necessaria naturalis, naturally necessary knowledge, and scientia libera, free knowledge. The division is based upon a relationship within divine knowledge to "possibility." God has a knowledge of pure possibilities as such—the essences of things—regardless of whether these possibilities are actualized or not (44). Scientia necessaria naturalis is the knowledge that belongs to the nature of God; namely, "it belongs to God's essence simply to think the totality of what is possible" (44). This is, in effect, "thought thinking itself," noesis noeseos:

In the knowledge of his thinking, God knows what is thought in this absolute thinking, i.e., the totality of reality, the omnitudo realitas, pure possibilities. (44)

Apart from the concept of pure possibility, the notion of the "possible" also means "that which in actuality is not yet but will be . . . all that which is not only in general possible, but also determined" (44). God has perfect precognition of what will thus become actual:

God has, moreover, a precognition of everything actual, a visio, a scientia libera, because whatever does become actual remains ultimately a matter of his willing it. (44)
This visio "is a grasping in the manner of a praesens intuitus...a look which must be taken to range over the whole, as present before God who has everything existing presently before him" (45). The fact that God knows everything, past, present and future, "equally present in his presentness [Gegenwärtigkeit]" (46), bears upon the nature of truth as identity. In finite knowing, knowledge proceeds by composition and division, in the proposition; but "what for us is a separate and successive attribution of predicates is for God an original unity, a sameness, identity" (47). (Thus the logical concept of identity is grounded in a metaphysical concept of the co-presence of all beings before the divine intuitus.)

For God, then, in the visio of scientia libera, contingent truths already have the character of identities. This assimilation of truths of fact to truths of reason is, for Leibniz, the ideal for human cognition. "He defines the idea and essence of human knowledge, i.e., of truth and of the statement, from the idea of the scientia Dei" (47-8).

Following this explication of the metaphysical background to Leibniz's concept of truth, Heidegger now shows how the idea of truth as identity is further related to the principles of knowledge (sufficient reason, non-contradiction).

§3. The idea of truth and the principles of knowledge

In this section, Heidegger notes once again an ambiguity in Leibniz's thought, in this case one that obtains among the principles of knowledge in their relationship to one another. According to the conventional understanding of Leibniz, the two basic principles of knowledge are correlated with the two types of truth: truths of
reasoning with the law of non-contradiction, and truths of fact with the principle of sufficient reason (52). Nonetheless, this straightforward correlation does not represent the true complexity of the situation.

Veritates originarie require no grounding, since they are self-evident: "they are themselves grounds" (53). But both necessary truths, i.e., truths of reason in general, and contingent truths do require grounding.

They fall under the principium rationis, or better, under the principium reddendae rationis, the principle of demonstrating grounds, i.e., the resolutio (the principle of the need for proof). (53)

This seems to be the crux of the matter. Although Leibniz does not fully clarify the issue, even necessary truths, subject to the principium of non-contradiction, are also subject to the principium reddendae rationis. The reason for this is that necessary propositions, subject to the principle of non-contradiction can be reduced to identities. But reducibility is a kind of demonstrability, so in some sense the principle of grounds "is more primordial than the principle of non-contradiction" (53). Furthermore, Heidegger understands Leibniz to say that the principle of sufficient reason follows from the definition of truth as identity, meaning that without the principle of sufficient reason there could be no proof, i.e., reduction to identities, and thus there could be no truth (55). It already begins to appear that the principle of sufficient reason is the basic principle of knowledge.

But Heidegger wishes first of all to show the irreducible interconnectedness obtaining among the principles and terms of
This summary of the principles of knowledge shows their connection with identity as the essence of truth. Identity is, however, the basic feature of the Being of all beings. . . . A connection emerges between reason, or ground, and truth and Being, with reference to identity. (55)

The question is how these terms fit together. What it is important to notice is that no decision is possible with regard to the equiprimordiality of a single term: "[N]one of these basic phenomena is more primordial than the other. They are equiprimordial" (56). Thus Heidegger turns the ambiguity to be found in Leibniz's work regarding the primacy of one term or principle over another, into an equiprimordiality obtaining among the basic terms.

This result, however, is not meant as a solution but provides a way of further sharpening the central problem, which now becomes: "1) the inner constitution of this equiprimordiality, and 2) the ground which makes it possible" (56). Just as one step is taken toward resolving the ambiguity of the relationship between logic and metaphysics in Leibniz's thought by showing the dependence of Leibniz's logical inquiries upon the Scholastic metaphysical tradition--a method of going "outside" the ambiguous structure to show its hidden basis in the tradition--so here another kind of step is taken toward overcoming a fundamental ambiguity in Leibniz's logical theory. The equiprimordiality of the basic logical terms is grounded in something other than logic, namely metaphysics:

The fundamental meaning of the principle of reason first becomes clear. . . . when one realizes that the main principles of Leibnizian metaphysics are based on it and that Leibniz even deduces his metaphysical principles from it. (55-6)

The principle of sufficient reason is not primarily logical, but
metaphysical, since it concerns the grounding of "reason" itself. This transition to a metaphysical ground belongs, as we shall see, to the grounding of thought in general in the transcendence of Dasein; thus Heidegger says here that "the question concerns the nature of the integrity (non-decomposability) of this equiprimordial dimension of the transcendental" (56).

As I have already indicated above, Heidegger's geschichtliche Erinnerung exhibits a pattern that suggests something like a "topology," since Heidegger is seeking to locate logic within its proper dimension. (Cf. note 1, above.) Thus Heidegger insists upon the non-decomposability of the equiprimordial dimension of these elements, i.e., the logical terms, since the dimension of their equiprimordiality, transcendence, is not another element with an independent subsistence, a "one" beyond the "many"; it is nothing other than the "dimension" constitutive of their equiprimordiality.2

Heidegger's discussion here concerns, then, "how the main phenomena of what is discussed in logic refer back to metaphysics" (56-7). But his demonstration of this relationship aims toward something other than a foundation for the rebuilding of logic; for "the dismantling of logic is itself part of the grounding of metaphysics" (57). This requires nothing less than an Auseinandersetzung "with the whole of the previous tradition" (57), and the site of this "confrontation" is, for the present inquiry, Leibniz's doctrine of judgment.

14. The idea of knowledge as such

In the present section Heidegger demonstrates in greater detail the dependency of the Leibnizian ideal of knowledge upon the ideal of
the scientia Dei. The mode of knowledge of the latter, intuitus praesens, which has the character of omnia sibi praesentialiter subjiciens, "bringing everything before itself in its presentness" (58), is deduced, in effect, from the simplicitas of God. The simplicitas Dei is itself the "guiding ideal of what, in the genuine sense, is" (69), and therefore exhibits the grounding of Leibniz's idea of knowledge in an ontology, i.e., in an interpretation of Being.

Heidegger presents an elegant and clear analysis of Leibniz's treatise on the essential characteristics of knowledge, Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis (1684). Here I shall review only the principal elements of that analysis in order to bring out the relevant topoi.

Leibniz writes (Gerhardt IV, 422):

Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear knowledge is either confused or distinct; distinct knowledge is either inadequate or adequate, and also either symbolic or intuitive. The most perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive. (59)

Heidegger summarizes these relations in a diagram:

![Diagram](image)

Obscure notions are those which do not allow for the clear differentiation of things different in themselves, i.e., which do not
allow for the recognition of a thing as of one kind rather than another; clear notions are those which do allow of such demarcation. Even if one has a clear notion, however, one may not be able to "enumerate one by one the marks which are sufficient to distinguish this clearly known thing from others"; in this case, even though one's knowledge is clara it is nonetheless confusa. What is at stake here is the capacity to define a thing through its distinguishing characteristics, as opposed to the capacity to distinguish things at the level of sensory experience. A clear knowledge is distincta when we do indeed have "sufficient marks and characteristics to distinguish the thing from other similar things" (60-1). Here it is possible to have a "nominal" definition of the thing. A nominal definition "does not mean a simple verbal definition," but "a knowledge with content, though not the really primary knowledge" (61)--a knowledge sufficient to enumerate the "marks" of the thing named. Thus a

\[\text{cognitio distincta}\]

is one in which the object named as such is not only clearly distinguished from another, but in which also the marks of its difference are expressly enumerable. (61)

Even though such marks are enumerable, the marks taken by themselves may be confused; in this case knowledge is inadequate, cognitio inadaequata. Knowledge is adequate when analysis is carried out to the end and "confusion is no longer possible" (62).

What is important here is that adequate knowledge represents an ideal of knowledge, since it may be impossible for a human being to carry out such an analysis to the end. Furthermore, "the mathematical ideal of knowledge appears again in connection with this idea of knowledge" (62).
Cognitio adaequata is possible for us only in an indirect way:

"Instead of maintaining ourselves in the total intuition of things, we use signs" (62). This "blind" knowledge is the way that human beings appropriate adequate, i.e., fully analyzed knowledge. It is contrasted with "seeing," intuitive knowledge, which is "not a still higher degree of analysis, but a mode of appropriating the highest state of analysis, i.e., of its result, of cognitio adaequata" (64). It means to look into "the distinct totality simultaneously; to bring to complete presence" (64). This manner of possessing knowledge

implies the orientation to the ideal described earlier as God's way of knowing, the knowledge of the simplest being, ens simplicissimum. Intuitus is therefore: 1) direct grasp, 2) grasp of what is not further analyzable in its wholeness. (64)

Adequate knowledge is thus distinguished from distinct knowledge, not merely by greater clarity, but by what is in effect a different type of knowledge. For here "all marks are present in clarity, and among them 'natures' as well, essential determinations, i.e., what makes the thing itself possible" (64). Heidegger adds that "with Leibniz the distinction between essentia and existentia is again fluid" (64). With the concept of adequate knowledge, the ideal of knowledge moves into the realm of essentia, i.e., that of possibilitas, "the inherent possibility of the thing."

Heidegger is engaged, even in this seemingly straightforward analysis, in something like a repetition of the relation of essentia and existentia, which, relying upon the Leibnizian precedent, will result in a clarification of the relationships to be established between ontology and metontology. If ontology is fundamentally concerned, as we have already seen in our introductory remarks, with
essence or possibility, then we can expect the metontology to constitute the Heideggerian transmutation of existentia or "actuality."

Possibility for Leibniz signifies compatibility among its marks:

Adequate knowledge as knowledge of essence is a priori knowledge of what makes the known itself possible, for it is the clear grasp of thorough compatibility, compatibilitas. (65)

Real definition, definitiones reales, is associated with adequate knowledge, since it is in real definitions that "the thing is established as possible" (65).

Heidegger notes here by way of parenthesis that the Kantian transcendental inquiry constitutes a radicalization of Leibniz's doctrine of possibilitas, to which belongs realitas. Thus the problem of the "objective reality of the categories" is that of their realitas, not empirical determinations of appearances but the way that categories determine objects from their "transcendental reality, a finite, horizontal-ecstatic reality" (65). Kant "grounds ontological knowledge in the transcendental imagination. Intuitus gains a constitutive character" (67).

The problem now is to connect the earlier interpretation of truth as identity to its definition in relation to the idea of knowledge, i.e., as adequate intuitive perceptum esse, "being adequately perceived intuitively" (68). A close examination of what is meant by adequate knowledge enables us to see its connection with identity:

In adequate knowledge that which is known is the totum of the requisita, i.e., that which, as a whole, constitutes the reality of a thing. This thing known is the true, the verum; the totality of the requisita is the possibilitas, that which makes possible the thingness of the thing. This content of the res is compatible with itself, for only by being compatible can it make possible. Incompatibility as conflict breaks apart, as it were, the essence of a thing; it falls apart and "can" not "be." What
is known in adequate knowledge is the coherent connection of the thing's mutually compatible determinations. In fact, the thing, if adequately known, is known precisely with regard to the compatibility of its realities. Adequate knowledge is the total grasp of the harmony of multiplicity" (68).

However, "identity," in relation to the judgment, means that what is grasped in the connectio realis characterizing true judgment not only does not come into conflict with itself, "but all is in itself unified and, as determination, relates to one and the same, to what the thing is, to the identical in its identity" (68).

Thus Heidegger not only shows the relationship of adequate knowledge to identity but arrives at an enriched concept of identity:

Identity is not the negative concept of the absence of all differentiation. It is, conversely, the idea of the uni-sonous unity of what is different" (68).

If truth as "the same" (69) and truth as adequate knowledge are thus linked, then it also becomes clear how the characteristics of truth are derived from the "simplicitas Dei as guiding ideal of what, in the genuine sense, is" (69), and thus how logic is dependent upon ontology or metaphysics. The next step is clarify further Leibniz's interpretation of Being, and at the same time to "find a connection between the interpretation of Being and the theory of judgment" (69), i.e., to show how Leibniz's logic rests upon the interpretation of Being implicit in Leibniz's work.

We have already seen that Heidegger's Erinnerung exhibits something of the character of a "topology," not only in its attempt to locate the metaphysical site of the Leibnizian doctrine of judgment, but also in its manner of delineating the various topoi constitutive of Leibniz's metaphysics. These topoi—which are constitutive not only of
Leibniz's metaphysics, but of metaphysics in general—include identity, presence, possibility, the contrast of essence and existence, and infinite vs. finite knowledge. What is Heidegger's aim in delineating these fundamental themes?

On the one hand, Heidegger is engaged, as we have seen, in a "regression" to the foundations of logic in metaphysics. The regression demonstrates how interrelationships among fundamental terms can only be resolved by placing them in a metaphysical context; thus Heidegger will show that for Leibniz the "site," the concept of the Being of beings at work in his monadology, is named in the concept of drive (cf. §5).

At the same time, the exposition of the metaphysical site of Leibniz's fundamental logical concepts—the geschichtliche Erinnerung, in Leibniz's case—makes it possible to undertake the repetition envisioned in the augenblickliche Besinnung. Heidegger exhibits, in his analysis of Leibniz's doctrine of judgment and its metaphysical basis, the resources which he appropriates and, in the context of the present text, transforms in order to constitute his own concept of "metaphysics." Thus "drive" becomes "transcendence." (Heidegger remarks incidentally how Kant's notion of the transcendental imagination belongs to a radicalization of the Leibnizian problematic, and thereby suggests that it mediates Leibniz's concept of drive and his own concept of transcendence.) We see, then, that the Destruktion of Leibniz's logic unfolds into a repetition. And it is not only the fundamental notion, drive as the interpretation of Being, which is repeated; but also all the topoi of the metaphysical "dimension"—we
see this exemplified in the way that Heidegger already calls identity "the same" here (p. 69). Heidegger's revaluation of metaphysics, even while attempting to effect the most fundamental transformation of metaphysics, remains in the "same" topos as metaphysics. Thus Leibniz's unifying, monadological drive becomes the event of transcendence; possibility becomes the central theme of Heidegger's theory of transcendence and temporalization; and the "uni-sonous unity of what is different" (68) suggests the harmony that characterizes world.

Destruktion as a method is meant from the first to open up the possibility of a positive appropriation and transformation of metaphysics. Something like this "method" remains operative throughout all periods of Heidegger's work, even when Heidegger no longer wishes to retain the name "metaphysics" for the source of the tradition. The strategy of regression to the origin, exposition of the nature of the origin or "site" of metaphysics, and, with this "insight into that which is," the envisioning of a possible transformation of thought, remains characteristic of Heidegger's work from beginning to end. This fact suggests that the unity of his work should be conceived in terms of this "strategic" continuity, rather than (say) on the basis of a determinate philosophical position maintained from beginning to end. Of course, it may also turn out that his "position" can only be conceived on the basis of this "strategy," i.e., that the content and movement of Heidegger's thought are intimately intertwined.

We should note here, too, that because "Being" enters into this process of transformation in Heidegger's work, it is not adequate to focus upon the theme of the "question of the meaning of Being" as the
sole key to his project. That question, it is true, serves as the vehicle of his work, as it carries his project through to that transformation which his thought seeks to work upon the tradition. But for this very reason it is necessary to see that what motivates the question of Being is just this goal of repetition (overcoming) and transformation. Heidegger's questioning of the meaning of Being "destroys" "Being" itself.

§5. The essential determination of the Being of genuine beings

This long section, the crux of Heidegger's analysis, is divided into three subsections. In subsection a), "The monad as drive," Heidegger at last elicits the truly fundamental metaphysical features of Leibniz's monadology; in b), "Intermediate reflections to find the guiding clue for the interpretation of Being," he compares Leibniz's determination of the nature of substance, on the basis of the ego's awareness of itself, with his own concept of Dasein's transcendence and its constitution through the understanding of Being; and in subsection c), "The structure of drive," he shows how the individuation of the monad, its uniqueness, follows from its metaphysical character as drive.

By means of this long analysis of the Leibnizian monadology, Heidegger in effect outlines his own metaphysical program: subsection a) concerns the elements of ontology and subsection c) constitutes a treatise on Leibnizian "metontology." Thus Heidegger presents a preparatory exposition of his own "metaphysics of Dasein." The Second Major Part of MFL is a repetition of the First, so that Heidegger's inquiry into grounding and the metaphysics of truth is offered as a
repetition of the Leibnizian monadology, just as in KPM his "laying of the foundations of metaphysics" in fundamental ontology is presented as a repetition of Kant's own laying of the foundations in the Critique of Pure Reason. We see then the concreteness of the process whereby the metaphysical essence is distilled, as it were, from the work of a thinker, and how Heidegger's own analyses are indeed engaged in the alchemy of transformation with respect to each text. What Heidegger seeks is the metaphysical essence of the metaphysical tradition, an essence (Wesen) which his own work is meant to "liberate" from the obfuscations of the tradition. The "possibility" addressed in the Destruktion is that of the letting-arise of world (truth). be thought again as the letting-arise of thought and world.

Heidegger has been engaged in showing the metaphysical roots of Leibniz's doctrine of judgment, and thus that his logic is grounded in an ontology. In §4 he has demonstrated that a metaphysical content (the ideal of the simplicitas Dei) underlies the concept of truth as identity, and that this concept can be reconciled with the interpretation of truth as intuitus. Heidegger now turns to the interpretation of Leibniz's ontology proper, the monadology, and asks

Is there a connection, and what sort of connection, between the interpretation of Being as identity and the interpretation of Being as monad? Does discovery of this connection give us insight into what we seek: the metaphysical foundations of Leibniz's logic--and with it a paradigmatic insight into the deep roots logic has in metaphysics? (72)

The choice of "monad" as the name for substance lies, indeed, in its signifying "the simple, unity, the one" (72). But Heidegger immediately offers an alternative definition--"it means also: the individual, the solitary" (72); and this alternative definition already suggests
the themes that differentiate metontology from ontology.

In his polemic with Descartes, Leibniz shows how the principle of unity cannot lie in extensio with its passive or purely negative geometrical points, but "the principle of unity is thus to be sought in what is itself positively unifying and thereby active" (75). But the unifying elements sought are not "pieces" of "matter," "but they are the primordial indivisible principle of formation, the forma, the eidos" (77). Monads, in short, are not ontic but are of an ontological character.

Heidegger's analysis in subsection a) concerns the interrelation-ship between the "principle of formation," i.e., drive (Drang), and the problem of unity. "The nature of 'force' must be understood by way of the problem of unity as it is inherent in substantiality" (77). Force interpreted as "drive" is the concept of an activity which is, in its essence, an activity of unification.

Before introducing the concept of drive, however, Heidegger enlarges upon the Scholastic background to Leibniz's principle of vis primitiva. What is important for our purposes in the exposition is the way Heidegger emphasizes the role of possibility in the development of Leibniz's concept of force, "possibility in the sense of that which constitutes the essence of a thing, enabling the thing in its essential constitution aside from whether or not this possibility is ever actualized" (80). The Scholastic roots of the concept of possibility (or "power") are seen in the division of potentia physica into activa and passiva. This division corresponds to a twofold division of actus into actio and forma, second act or "power to accomplish" and first act
or "inclination towards, aptitude." Potentia passiva corresponds to "first act," actus as forma, whereas potentia activa corresponds to "second act," actus as actio. There is a metaphysical hierarchy in evidence here, for second act, the power to accomplish or actio, is possible only if something is already actual.

Power, on the contrary, as power to become something, to allow something to happen with itself, is distinct from actuality, for in this case something which becomes actual is particularly dependent on the disposition of that which allows something to happen to itself. The aptitude is distinct from that which is and can come to be on the basis of the aptitude. The aptitude itself requires no actualization. (81)

Heidegger adds that "these are important distinctions for general ontology, and they have long been inadequately interpreted and assimilated" (81).

Leibniz's concept of vis activa (which Heidegger translates as Drang, drive) is not potentia activa, the capacity to act, but is "midway between the faculty of acting and the act itself" (Gerhardt IV, 469), "a capability, but not a capability at rest" (82). Drive is a capacity for action which is continuously productive (83). In the concept of drive, Leibniz transforms the Scholastic notions of actio and forma by reversing their relationship (subordinating the former to the latter), and combining them into the structure of the metaphysical entity, the monad. The character of drive defines the Being of the monad, and thus constitutes an interpretation of the Being of beings, an ontology.

But Heidegger adds that "we must now anticipate. For, as universal, this interpretation of genuine being must also explain the possibility of beings as a whole" (83). What is "anticipated" here is
the problem of the dual structure of metaphysics, how what is "one" in the monad's metaphysical character as drive gives rise to the problem of its radical individuation, i.e. its unique relation to being as a whole. The question for Leibniz is,

On the basis of this self-unifying monad [on the basis of the ontological character of the monad], how does the entirety of the universe constitute itself in its interconnectedness [the problem, in its Leibnizian version, of "being as a whole"]? (85)

Heidegger interprets drive as the conferral of unity. The nature of this unifying activity is examined in subsection c), "The structure of drive."

One half of this subsection is given over to the further clarification of the structure of drive in its ontological character. The other half concerns what lies beyond ontology for Leibniz's metaphysics: his "meta-ontology." Specifically, the subsection can be divided into four parts with the following themes: 1) drive as the original organizing function, and the relation of perceptio and appetitio; 2) transition (the question of individuation); 3) apperception as the key to the problem of individuation; and 4) review and transition to the (undelivered) §6.

In what we are calling part 1 of §5(c), Heidegger develops the ontological significance of the monad, in effect demonstrating that the monad is characterized by a kind of representing transcendence, namely, by an appetitio or "tendency toward transition" which expresses itself in perceptio.

The "central problem" is that of how "the drive of substance confer[s] unity, how must the drive itself be defined?" (89).

Now, although the monad itself is simple, if it is to be
conceived as conferring unity, then "there must already be something manifold which it unifies," so that "what unifies and that whose essence it is to unify must essentially have a relation to the manifold" (89).

If what unifies is drive, then the manifold itself has the character of drive, and indeed it is drive itself that constantly is pressed on [Ge-drängte], since it possesses the character of movement as such. "There is thus in drive itself a self-surpassing; there is change, alteration, movement" (90).

The problem here is the relation of unity, of the one, to the manifold. "Unity should not be the subsequent assembling of a collection, but the original organizing unification" (90).

This means that the constitutive principle of unification must then be prior to that which is subject to possible unification. What unifies must anticipate by reaching beforehand toward something from which every manifold has already received its unity. The simply unifying must be originally a reaching out and, as reaching out, must be gripping in advance in such a way that the entire manifold is already made manifold in the encircling reach. (90)

Leibniz calls this reaching out and gripping in advance perceptio, "apprehension," which Heidegger characterizes as vor-stellend, representational.3 Heidegger goes so far as to speak of the ek-static character of representing drive (91); that is to say, representation is not a mental faculty but the way in which the manifold is pre-unified "in the simple" (91).

The "striving" that belongs to the structure of drive Leibniz clarifies further with the concept of appetitio. This concept signifies the self-surpassing that belongs to drive. "This means that multiplicity arises in the driving thing itself" (92); the multiplicity
is a multiplicity of manifold succession, i.e., time. This drive to overcome any momentary stage or "trend toward transition is what Leibniz means by appetitus" (92).

The self-surpassing (a precursor of "transcendence") that characterizes drive is a way of anticipating every "possible multiplicity," and at the same time of being able to "deal with every multiplicity in its possibility" (91).

That is, drive must have already surpassed and overcome multiplicity. Drive must therefore bear multiplicity in itself and allow it to be born in the driving. That is its "world" character. It is important to see the essential source of multiplicity in drive as such. (91)

Heidegger will later take up the theme sketched out here, transcendental dissemination, in ¶10 of MFL. Heidegger treats this ancient philosophical problem of the one and the many, furthermore, under the aegis of "world," as we see in this passage. In the Leibnizian context, the "one" is addressed in the function of drive, at once unifying and self-surpassing. In other words, the "one" here has the character of an event. Multiplicity itself can only arise and come to be as a manifold with the unifying event which anticipates a possible multiplicity and provides it with its "possibility." The one, however, is not something over and above the multiplicity--it is the originally unifying event itself (always a "concrete" event), the event that allows "multiplicity to be born" and that bears multiplicity "in itself." (Because it is neither an ontic nor even a "meta-physical"

One, world, as exhibiting the character of event, is "nothing" (cf. MFL 210).)

It is clear that there is not "a" drive apart from this or that
drive that organizes and unifies a possible multiplicity. The ontological significance of drive lies in its possibility-character. But drive, which lets a multiplicity arise in its possibility, always refers to the "individuality" of this particular multiplicity. This means, however, that it must lie in the nature of drive, in the ontology of drive, to individuate itself in this fashion. Heidegger writes, in the transitional "part 2" of §5(c):

As what unifies, drive is the nature of a being. At the same time, every monad has its propre constitution originale. . . What then makes each monad ultimately just this particular monad? How is this individuation itself constituted? . . .

Obviously individuation must also take place, as it were, in that which basically constitutes the essence of the monad, in the drive. Where can and must the ground of the peculiar uniqueness of the monad reside? What essential character in the structure of drive makes a particular individuation possible? To what extent is the primordially unifying self-individuating in its unifying? (94)

These questions lead to the "overturning" (Umschlag), in the Leibnizian context, of ontology into the problematic of radical individuation (meta-ontology). In our examination of the Umschlag of Heidegger's ontology into the metontology, we shall see how the metontology is the immediate result of the full development of the ontology; the turn-over into the metontology is not mediated by anything else, nor does it signify a mere "failure" of the ontology, but arises, just as Heidegger says, with "the development of the self-understanding of this problematic" (154). And for Leibniz the radical individuation of the monad arises immediately from its ontological character: "Inasmuch as it unifies—and that is its essence—the monad individuates itself" (96).

Our part 3 of subsection c), then, constitutes the Leibnizian "metontology." The central issue here is the way the finitude of the
(created) monad is expressed in the monadology. In the Leibnizian context, "finitude means restrictedness [Eingeschränktheit]" (94). Restrictedness is founded in the basic ontological feature of the monad, its unifying drive, because in "representational unifying there is a possession of unity in advance to which drive looks, as representing and tending toward transition" (94-5). This "point" to which drive looks, the "view-point," is already "constitutive for drive" and indeed "regulates in advance the entire drive itself" (95). Thus "perceptio and appetitus are therefore determined in their drive primarily from the viewpoint" (95).

The problem of the individuation of the monad is that of its finitude or restrictedness, and the latter must be interpreted as restrictedness to a "viewpoint." The second feature Heidegger educes in his analysis of the monad's finitude is the so far inexplicit possibility of the monad's also "grasping itself" (95), in its "reaching out and grasping." By virtue of "this dimensional self-openness," the monad "can perceive itself concomitantly; it can apperceive" (95). Thus Leibniz's "apperception" is interpreted here as a function of the finitude or restrictedness of the monad. According to Heidegger it is apperception--the "reflexive" character implicit in drive--that establishes the uniqueness of the viewpoint of the individual monad, for it is only in apperception that the viewpoint becomes possible as a viewpoint; in other words, viewpoint itself means an apperception of the monad's "situation," thereby constituting the monad's unifying relation to its own possible multiplicity. Viewpoint is inherently "reflexive" in this sense.
Thus the third feature of the restrictedness characterizing the monad in its essence as drive is the way that in drive it "unifies the universe represented in advance, only according to the possibility of the perspective" (96).

Each monad is thus in itself a mundus concentratus (Letter to de Volder, June 20, 1703, G. II, 252). Every drive concentrates in itself, in its driving, the world in each case after its own fashion. (96)

Each monad is the "world," but through a "perspectival refraction," so that each monad is reflected in each; all monads together "are oriented in advance toward a pre-disposed harmony, the harmonia praestabilita of the totality of beings [des Alls des Seienden]" (96/119). The totality of beings, the whole of the world, is apprehended, by virtue of its viewpoint, by each monad; but at the same time the monad in its finitude cannot comprehend the world as such a totality. Instead, the monad's apprehension of the world has the character of a finite event: "Each monad is, according to its particular level of awareness, a world-history making the world present" (97). Thus there is a multiplicity, a fundamental dissemination inherent in the concept of the monad as drive (of course, for Leibniz, the divine monad has a privileged perspective, not being finite; it is noteworthy that Heidegger is not concerned with this "absolute" monad, and is concerned solely to explore the consequences of the individuation of the finite monad).

Thus a fourth feature of the monad in relation to its finitude emerges: "the monad is a living mirror of the universe" (97). Heidegger quotes the Letter to de Volder of June 20, 1703:

It is necessary that entelechies <monads> differ from one another or not be completely similar to each other; in fact, they are the principles of diversity, for each differently expresses the
universe from its own way of seeing (representing, Vor-stellung). And precisely this is their peculiar task, that they should be so many living mirrors or so many concentrated worlds. (G. II, 251/52) (97)

Heidegger finds here each of the features already discovered in the analysis of the monad's finitude. Of the last, mirroring, he says that it "is not a fixed copying, but drives as such to ever new predelineated possibilities of itself" (98). Thus re-presentation itself signifies, not a fixed copying, but precisely the perspectival mirroring from the restriction of viewpoint that follows from the self-surpassing character of drive. Representation is "creative" in the sense that it articulates a possible viewpoint upon the whole, while it is only from such a viewpoint that the whole (world) is apprehended.

There is a final aspect of finite drive to be mentioned, namely the negative consequence of particularity that

In every finite drive occurring in a particular perspective, there is always and necessarily something resistant which opposes the drive. Insofar as the monad is always the whole from a viewpoint, it is finite insofar as it is ordered to the universe. That is, the monad relates to resistance, something which it is not but could well be. This passivity, in the sense of what the drive does not drive, belongs to the finitude of drive. (98)

This fundamental passivity is what Leibniz means by "prime matter."

In a conclusion to this subsection and to Section 5, Heidegger reminds us that "it was necessary to interpret the monadology in order to expose the genuinely metaphysical foundation of Leibniz's logic" (99).

At the same time our result needs a still deeper basis: the problem of ens qua essentia and as existentia, of being as something possible which is as such a possible actuality [das Problem des ens als essentia und existentia, als ein Mögliches, das als solches ein mögliches Wirkliches ist]. (100/123)

The discussion of this problem is omitted in the lecture course;
Heidegger refers back to the lectures on the subject from the summer semester of the previous year (Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie). For our purposes, what is important in this remark is its clue concerning the relation of the twofold structure of metaphysics to the traditional problem of Being as essence and as existence: Ontology concerns possibility, and metontology "possible actuality," and these concerns are the locus of Heidegger's repetition of the traditional metaphysical problems of essence and existence. In this text, the repetition is undertaken in the light of the Leibnizian metaphysics, for it is with Leibniz that "the distinction between essentia and existentia is again fluid" (64).4

Heidegger has now finished his commentary on Leibniz, since the final section (¶7) of this Part constitutes a review and overview of the problem of the relation of logic to ontology. Before proceeding, then, to our study of the Second Major Part, let us summarize what our reading of the First Part has brought to light regarding the Destruktion and Heidegger's involvement with Leibniz's metaphysics.

The First Part of MFL is motivated by the geschichtliche Erinnerung (and, of course, is already guided by the envisioned project to be worked out in the augenblickliche Besinnung of Part Two), and takes the form of a Destruktion, "a critical dismantling [Abbau] of the traditional concepts . . . to the sources [Quellen] out of which they were drawn" (BP 23m/31). The regression (Rückgang, BP 31) to the sources has the very concrete sense of a tracing of Leibniz's logical concepts to their origin in Scholastic metaphysics. The regression is motivated here by an ambiguity or undecidability in the Leibnizian text
with regard to whether logic or metaphysics takes precedence in the construction of Leibniz's thought. The ambiguity is resolved by going outside Leibniz's work proper to the historical sources of Leibniz's logic. Here Heidegger merely hints at sources beyond these sources—at the ubiquity of the metaphysical theme of presence, for example in the cognitive ideal of the *scientia Dei* (MFL 45). Thus the regression does not really end with these particular sources; it could be carried through to the source of the fundamental metaphysical *topoi*.

Heidegger actually aims at such a complete regression to the transcendence of Dasein, but he does not continue toward it by means of the "historical" regression to earlier metaphysical sources. Rather, he focuses upon another ambiguity in Leibniz's logical enterprise, namely the question of the primacy of one principle of knowledge over another. This ambiguity cannot be resolved in logical terms. In a sense, it cannot be resolved at all, since the basic principles are "equiprimordial" (56). It is in order to comprehend the ground of this equiprimordiality that Heidegger turns to the metaphysical dimension, which for Leibniz is conceptualized as monadic "drive." Thus, once again, the ambiguity (aporia) is resolved by stepping "outside" the problematic field of logic to find its ground or basis in metaphysical sources. In this second case, the metaphysical basis is discovered in Leibniz's own work. Nonetheless, Heidegger is implicitly undertaking a regression to a source that lies "beyond" Leibniz's own formulations of the nature of drive: The regression aims at the transcendence of Dasein as the ground of "thought," and this regression can be completed only in a repetition. Thus the "regression to the origin" is actually
completed only with the repetition that Heidegger undertakes in the analysis of transcendence in the Second Major Part of MFL. The paradox here is that the "origin" of Leibniz's work only becomes "manifest" through the repetition of Leibniz's work.5

Besides the central, metaphysical concept of drive, the major "topoi" of metaphysics are at least intimated in Heidegger's discussion of Leibniz. Heidegger's repetition of fundamental metaphysical concepts is not intended to transpose thought to a place "outside" metaphysics, but is rather meant to be effective solely as a repetition and transformation of what is essential in metaphysics. The "overcoming" of metaphysics rests upon a transformation "of" metaphysics itself, from its sources, and is in this sense continuous with "metaphysics."

We learn from Heidegger's examination of Leibniz that possibility is the central concept of ontology; indeed, the twofold structure of metaphysics is constituted by the relationship between "possibility" and "possible actuality." Heidegger shows how Leibniz transforms the Scholastic concept of possibility or power into that of vis activa or "drive." In turn, Heidegger elicits from the monadological concept of drive the interpretation of essence or possibility as event, the "happening" of transcendence.

This event is itself "thinking," the grounding event whereby world comes to pass. Heidegger's transposition of the problems of fundamental ontology onto the problematics of ground and the metaphysics of truth is modelled upon the results of his Destruktion of the Leibnizian theory of thinking, i.e., of judgment. The Second Major
part of MFL constitutes a "retrieval" of transcendence on the basis of the new focus upon the problem of ground. Heidegger presents this new perspective on transcendence as a clarification of the sense of his original project: to think the event of "world," to think transcendence as the grounding event, the site of the upsurgance of world. Thus the Destruktion of Leibniz yields, as I have already suggested, the central issue concealed in the tradition, that of the "principle of ground" (which must always be understood in relation to the problem of the "instituting" of world).

The "metaphysics of truth" signifies the complete revision of fundamental ontology via the problematic of ground. In fact, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic is a transitional text, the transitional text, between the early ("transcendence") and the middle ("truth") periods, for it is here that the motivations underlying this change are most clearly expressed and formulated. The "overturning" (Umschlag) of ontology into the metontology regulates the change from the early to the middle period, and it is by tracing the development of the metontology that we achieve the most concrete characterization possible of the so-called "turn" in Heidegger's thought.

With the transition from drive to the problem of individuation, the Leibnizian "metontology" proceeds through a certain sequence of issues. Heidegger's presentation here shows how his own metontology can exhibit such a wide range of significations as we shall find in §10 and the Appendix: The metontology encompasses the problems of individuation, finitude, "reflexivity," multiplicity and dissemination, and the upsurgance of world in the midst of das Seiende im Ganzen.
At the same time, the metontology will provide the key to the blossoming of the "metaphysics of truth" in the middle period. How this is so we shall see on examination of On the Essence of Truth. Meanwhile Heidegger himself completes the First Major Part with a reflection on logic as the metaphysics of truth.

17. Theory of Judgment and the conception of Being. Logic and ontology

In this section, Heidegger surveys once again the field of inquiry and organizes it around the issues that are to be of central concern in the Second Major Part of MFL. Starting with the current situation, that epistemology has become logic, he reviews very succinctly the intentional theory of judgment, according to which "the intentional relation of making statements is itself a relating relationship" (101). The determining judgment is articulated relationally, and the whole of the judgment, in the sense of the act of judging, is itself an intentional relationship of Dasein to the present thing which is bifurcated (into "subject" and "predicate") through the judgment. Since the structures of intentionality and bifurcation are "structures of judging Dasein," the true question concerning judgment and truth is

What is Dasein and how is it that it can make statements and must make them in the manner of a bifurcated intentionality? Wherein is the intrinsic possibility of judgment grounded as the characterized mode of Dasein's activity? We need then to illuminate the Being-constitution of Dasein, first in this one definite aspect, then ultimately with regard to an ontology, a metaphysics of Dasein. (101m/125)

Thus the metaphysics of Dasein concerns the possibility of thought as such, the locus of the determination of beings effected in the bifurcating judgment. This characteristic "mode of Dasein's activity" is
the ground of the possibility of such determination of beings. Ontology, as the metaphysics of Dasein, is about "thinking" as that fundamental activity or event whereby beings are determined in their Being.

The relation of judgment to truth can be examined only through the clarification of "the way truth is related to judging Dasein and to Dasein as such" (102). What is really at stake in "logic" is the question of "the intrinsic possibility of truth. . . . If, however, clarifying the essence of truth can only be carried out as a metaphysics, as an ontology, then logic must be conceived as the metaphysics of truth" (102). But to turn ontology into the metaphysics of truth is the task of the whole of MFL.

Heidegger now reviews the First Major Part. The central theme in relation to the problem of "being true" is that of identity. But identity governs not only logical truths but "existential" truths as well, i.e., the multiplicity constituting the content of a given existing being can be brought together into "a possible coherent whole" only if "the being itself is constituted by an original unity" (102). That unity is monadological.

Thus the monadic structure of beings is the metaphysical foundation for the theory of judgment and for the identity theory of truth. Our dismantling of Leibniz's doctrine of judgment down to basic metaphysical problems is hereby accomplished. (102-3)

Heidegger adds that

Our orientation to Leibniz's logic and its connection with metaphysics has the task of making a horizon of possible problems in this field visible in the first place, so as to remove some of the strangeness from the purely systematic discussions that are to follow. (103)

Heidegger proceeds to a long digression wherein he takes up the argument with "those who believe the primacy of logic over metaphysics
can be conclusively proved" (103). Actually, Heidegger "demonstrates," through the entanglement in the concepts of logic that results through this argument, that there is no exit from logic through argument—he makes, in effect, a sort of "leap":

So the primacy of the rules of thought is thus, for all that, not to be dismissed, however one might twist and turn. In fact, this argument cannot be evaded. But it is especially impossible to evade the question whether the conditions necessary for the operations of thinking are foreordained prior to the essence of thinking and of that wherein thinking as an activity of Dasein is grounded, or whether, conversely, the essence of Dasein and thinking first makes possible the operational conditions of thinking and the way in which they must necessarily be employed. Thinking and rule usage may be inevitable for the operation of all thinking, and thus also for establishing metaphysics as well, but it does not follow from this that the foundation consists in the use of rules. On the contrary, it merely follows that rule usage is itself in need of justification. And it further follows that this apparently plausible argument is not in any position to establish a foundation at all. The argument from the inevitability of using rules can make its appeal solely on this fact, the fact of its inevitability, but it is not even in a position to make this fact, in its intrinsic possibility, into a problem, much less solve it. (105)

The point is that

Insofar as the intrinsic possibility of something that provides a foundation must be prior in order to the actual operation and the conditions of thinking, the explication of the intrinsic possibility of thinking, as such, is the presupposition of "logic" as a science of the rules of thinking. (105)

What is necessary is to show to logic that it "lives and feeds on something" which it cannot itself produce "but which it even believes it must deny" (106). This "demonstration" takes place in a reflexive moment in which one grasps the character of the activity engaged in (the act of grounding) while arguing concerning the primacy of logic or metaphysics; thus the necessity of something like a "leap" through the very inevitability of the entanglement with logic in an argument with it.
Finally, Heidegger insists that "laying the foundation does not mean shoving another fundament under a finished discipline" (106). Here Heidegger explicitly denies that the foundational inquiry will have the effect of grounding the scientific disciplines in their given or traditional form. What, then, does the foundational inquiry accomplish? Its true object is philosophy, and furthermore its aim is the transformation of philosophy itself:

Laying the foundation implies always a new draft of the blueprints. Every foundation for philosophy must transform philosophy itself, but transformation is only possible in seizing and maintaining what is essential. (106)

Thus in the First Major Part of MFL Heidegger focuses upon Leibniz's doctrine of judgment, and then upon the metaphysics underlying it, as an appropriate place (geeignete Stelle), or site, for the geschichtliche Erinnerung (22). Through this historical recollection, he accomplishes a regression from logic to its foundations in metaphysics, undertaken both on a historical and ontological basis. Heidegger shows how Leibniz gathers up into his philosophy and transforms, in his own way, the traditional metaphysical concepts of essentia and existentia. In particular, essence as "possibility" takes on the ontological character of the drive that "anticipates primordially," while existence, as "possible actuality," is understood from the individuation of drive (cf. note 4, above).

In this way, the twofold structure of metaphysics becomes that of a relation between the organizing, unifying event in its essence—the latter conceived in terms of a kind of "potency"—and the individuation of the event, the latter conceived as taking place in relation to a possible multiplicity or "totality of beings" (95-96). Heidegger's own
concept of metaphysics is presented, then, as a "repetition" of this concept of the twofold structure of metaphysics, elicited from the "recollection" of Leibniz's ontology and the meta-ontology consequent upon ontology. Heidegger shortly presents, in §10, the retrieval of the project of Being and Time in terms of Dasein's ontological neutrality and the meta-ontological concreteness belonging to existing Dasein. Hence in Chapter 3 we shall proceed to an examination of the metaphysical twofold on the basis of the interrelationship of these concepts.
NOTES

1. Topology is an anti-"metaphysical" concept, in that it suggests a model of an interrelationship among elements sustained, not by a single dominating element, but by the character of the "space" inhabited by the individual elements. The determining region or dimension of philosophy is transcendence. In The Essence of Reasons, after recapitulating something of his earlier "discussion" (Erörterung) of Leibniz and of the principle of sufficient reason, he says that

To analyze the problem means to gain access to and mark out the realm [Bezirk] within which we should treat the question concerning the essence of reasons. This realm is shown to be the realm of transcendence. (ER 8/9, 10/11)

Although "topology" properly belongs to a later period, we nonetheless find the beginnings of topological method in Heidegger's treatment of Leibniz. His discussion there is topological not only because it takes Leibniz as an appropriate "place" (Stelle) for the dismantling of philosophy, but because its method is a search for the "dimension" constitutive of the realm of inquiry, and thus moves away from the traditional, meta-physical opposition of the "one" determining the "many." One might add that his discussion also suggests an analysis of metaphysics on the basis of topoi rather than system and structure. A "topology" attempts to locate the site of metaphysics for the sake of a transformation of the site; and, along with this, of all of the topoi of metaphysics.

2. Heidegger is aiming at a notion of transcendence as that "event" which gathers a manifold into a unity, but a unity which is not itself "present" in the gathered manifold or "multiplicity." The problematic is that of the relation of the ontic order to the ontological, of the phenomenal to the phenomenon, of representational thinking to its ground. Heidegger seeks a way of thinking the event which will not reduce it to a member of the field of elements, whether ontic, phenomenal, or logical, but which at the same time will avoid turning it into a meta-physical "super" or transcending element. The ground is not another being, or any "type" of being whatsoever. Thus transcendence is "nothing"; it is the event of the coming into being of a "uni-sonous unity," and is, as such an event, itself the unification which comes into being. It escapes every representation of unity. Thus the difficulty of characterizing the "event" as such is one of the motivating factors leading to the language and thinking of Ereignis, the event that cannot be represented, not even as an "event."

3. Heim translates vor-stellend as "pre-hensive," in order to suggest the relationship of perceptio in Leibniz to the prehensive activity of the actual occasion in Whitehead's cosmology (and also, presumably, to suggest a common relationship in the notion of "event" between Heidegger's and Whitehead's philosophies). The term "prehension" in Whitehead does not by itself, however, include the notion of subjective aim and the "unifying unity" that grasps in advance. Prehension signifies
only the moment of relatedness to the multiplicity, not the whole of the complex process of concrescence. But it is this feature of the anticipatory unifying of a possible multiplicity that Heidegger wishes to emphasize. Vorstellen is the mode of apprehension of a possible multiplicity, and the apprehension which makes the multiplicity as such "possible." Furthermore, the emphasis which the word vor-stellend intends to place upon the "representational" character of drive should be recognized and preserved in the translation. I have not retained the hyphen, however, only because the hyphen is meant to emphasize the character of grasping in advance ("vor") that takes place with representation, and this factor is lost in translation.

4. Heidegger expresses the close intertwining of "ontology" and "metontology" very succinctly in discussing the Leibnizian concept of being as identity (ER 31/30):

What makes an ens an ens is "identity." Identity is, properly understood, the simply unity which unites primordially and, in uniting, at the same time individuates. The sort of unification that anticipates primordially ["possibility"] and individuates simply ["possible actuality"], constitutes the essence of being [Seiende] as such.

It would be difficult to understand the structure of this passage and its import if we did not have MFL at hand.

5. Thus it is impossible to conceive of the origin as simply independent of this work of the repetition of the tradition. It cannot be taken to be simply "present," "present to itself." This is particularly true since repetition lies at the heart of transcendence itself.
CHAPTER III

Neutrality and Concreteness of Dasein in ¶10: "The problem of transcendence and the problem of *Being and Time*"

Section 10 divides rather naturally into three subsections: The first (pp. 136-141) comprises an introductory paragraph, a paragraph "a)" containing "a general description" of the problem of *Being and Time* and a paragraph "b)" containing "the guiding principles" thereof, and subdivided into twelve numbered paragraphs. The entirety of the first subsection is concerned with the meaning of the "preparatory analysis" of Dasein.

The second subsection (pp. 141-148) asks why the preparatory analysis of Dasein, "with regard to revealing the possibility of the understanding-of-Being [is] an exposition of the temporality of Dasein" (141). It attempts to justify "connecting the problem of Being with time" (148).

The third subsection (pp. 148-154) explains what is involved in working out the problem of Being as the central problem of philosophy, and what is meant by the required radicalization and universalization of the problem of Being.

Heidegger's introductory paragraph explains why the "problem of *Being and Time*" can be inserted, here, into this text on transcendence and the relation of transcendence to the problem of ground. *Being and Time* must be interpreted from the standpoint of the problem of transcendence because "Seinsverständnis forms the basic problem of

96
metaphysics as such" (136). Metaphysics, as the metaphysics of Dasein, has as its central problem the event of the coming into being of Seinsverständnis. "What does Being mean? This is quite simply the fundamental question of philosophy?" (136) But the basic problem of "metaphysics as such," the "metaphysics of metaphysics," is that of the possibility of the philosophical event, i.e., the coming to pass of the understanding of Being. The problem of the happening of Seinsverständnis encompasses that of "Being": To raise the Being-question in its most radical form means to question the possibility of the event of transcendence, "wherein" Being is understood. Because philosophy arises only within the dimension of transcendence, fundamental ontology asks after the possibility of the question of Being, rather than undertaking to establish a decisive answer to the "question of Being." For the question of Being is always "answered," with the existence of every Dasein, but the task of fundamental ontology is to answer to the problem of the possibility, in general, of such "answers." The problematic relationship of the inquiry into the possibility of Seinsverständnis to the concretization of that possibility in any given understanding of Being is addressed in the present section. In the first subsection in particular, the theme is that of the interrelation between "possible" Dasein and the "possible actuality" of concretely existing Dasein. The problem of the relation between the first and the second parts of metaphysics is taken up under the headings of the neutrality and concreteness of Dasein.

Thus the purpose of fundamental ontology, according to paragraph a), is this: "The understanding-of-Being is to be brought to light by
way of Dasein's mode of Being, which is primarily existence" (136).

What is to be demonstrated, through the analysis of the constitution of Dasein's being, is "the intrinsic possibility of the understanding-of-Being" (136, emphasis mine). Heidegger notes that in Being and Time "the metaphysics of Dasein itself is not yet the central focus" (136), so that the metaphysical significance of fundamental ontology is not evident in Being and Time, and perhaps could not become clear from a reading of Being and Time alone. In short, Heidegger is "retrieving" Being and Time itself for his metaphysical project, interpreting it in the light of his analysis of the twofold structure of the metaphysics of Dasein. In this way, Heidegger completes the self-interpretation of his early project, and therefore completes his early project, since it is "complete" ("teleion") only when gathered up into such a complete view. The present inquiry into the significance of Heidegger's early project is based upon that perspective upon its completion provided by the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic.

Although we shall be concerned in the present chapter only with the first "subsection" of ¶10, it should be noted here that ¶10 represents, not only the revisionary retrieval of the first Division of Being and Time which is the subject-matter of the first subsection, but also a recapitulation of the theme of the temporal analysis of Dasein (second subsection), and therefore of the second Division of Being and Time, and a synopsis of the treatment of the "radicalization" and "universalization" of the problem of Being that constitutes the final aim of Basic Problems of Phenomenology. In short, Heidegger "inserts" the whole of his previous work into the Second Major Part of The
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, so that it is now to be understood as embedded in the inquiry undertaken there into the problem of ground as the "basic problem of metaphysics."

Paragraph b), with its twelve subparagraphs, presents "the guiding principles" for the treatment of the problem of the understanding of Being in Being and Time. Actually it is a somewhat revisionary treatment of the twofold of existence and thrownness, on the model of the problematic of the two parts of metaphysics.

The numbered paragraphs end with these remarks:

These guiding principles should indicate briefly the sort of intent behind the analysis of Dasein and the requirements for carrying out the analysis. The basic intent of the analysis is to show the intrinsic possibility of the understanding-of-Being, which means at the same time the possibility of transcendence. (141)

This "retrieval" of Being and Time in terms of the question of the intrinsic possibility of transcendence is in accord with the interpretation of the project of Being and Time given in other texts of the period, including, in particular, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, which is concerned with the "intrinsic possibility of the grounding of metaphysics." Heidegger's interpretation of fundamental ontology is not a violent wrenching away of the problematic of ontology from its original intent--presumably, to "answer the question of Being"--but constitutes a genuine clarification of the aims already implicit, but not fully and explicitly formulated, in the project of Being and Time. Being and Time is above all concerned with the possibility of the question of Being that occurs with the existence of Dasein.

Before examining the numbered paragraphs in detail, let us take an overview of Heidegger's highly concentrated presentation, in these
passages, of the "metaphysics of Dasein." The first five paragraphs address the ontological themes of possibility, essence, and origin.2 Ontology requires the "metaphysical isolation" of Dasein. Heidegger speaks in this context of the "neutrality" of Dasein. Neutrality signifies Dasein's existence considered solely from the standpoint of its "essence"; thus neutrality usurps the concepts of generality and universality which, in the tradition, would serve as the locus of a philosophical inquiry into essence. Insofar as the analysis of Dasein in BT presents an "eidos" of Dasein, it is presented not as a universal which would define the form of man, without reference to the existence of any particular human being, but rather as offering to existing Dasein an image of the "potency of the origin" which, in any given case, can be the potency only of an existing Dasein. The analysis of neutral Dasein is that of no existing Dasein, so that it can open up the potency of the origin to every possible existing "instance" of Dasein. Thus the presentation of the eidos, which is not a universal, but represents, Heidegger says, an "extreme construction" (189m/243)—is meant to "enable" existing Dasein toward the fulfillment of its authentic possibility of being.

The next five paragraphs take up the motif of the radical individuation of the metaphysical being, i.e. the metontological theme as we have already seen it introduced in reference to the Leibnizian problem of monadological individuation. We have already discussed these passages from the First Major Part:

What then makes each monad ultimately just this particular monad? How is this individuation itself constituted? (94) . . . In this viewpoint the whole universe is in each case held in view, as it were, in a definite perspective of beings and of the possible.
. . . [the view] is refracted in each case according to the monad's possibility for unifying itself in its multiplicity. (95) . . . Inasmuch as it unifies—and that is its essence—the monad individuates itself. . . . In every monad the whole universe is potentially present. (96)

The themes treated here in ¶10 are, in particular, those of the multiplicity and dissemination proper to the concretely existing (individuated) Dasein. It is noteworthy that, for Heidegger, dissemination cannot be understood apart from the unifying, organizational event that transcendence signifies; indeed, Heidegger finds it necessary to speak of "transcendental dissemination" with reference to the total structure of concretely existing Dasein.

The tenth numbered paragraph concerns furthermore the grounding of dissemination in freedom. But the problem of freedom is bound up with that of truth (cf. pp. 191 ff.). Thus the problematic of the metontology culminates, once again, in the metaphysics of truth.

The last two numbered paragraphs interpret the ontological project—Heidegger's own fundamental ontology—as itself an "extreme example" of metontological concretization; that is to say, they show (if we can put it this way) that ontology itself is already submitted to the reflection on finitude articulated in the metontology. It is the finitude of the ontological project itself that demands the the "overturning" of ontology, and so motivates the "turn" in Heidegger's work.

Heidegger's retrieval, in these paragraphs, of the "problem" of Being and Time offers a new perspective upon the thrust of his existential analysis and inquiry into the transcendence of Dasein. For he makes it clear that the "aim" of the existential analysis, however
motivated by a concept of the universality of the existentialia it may be, is something like the "concretization" of possible Dasein. But if the relationship between fundamental ontology and the "actuality" of the factically existing Dasein is not the traditional metaphysical relationship of eidos and fact illustrative of the form, if it cannot be articulated in terms of the traditional distinction between essence and existence, how can this relationship be expressed?

In his revision of metaphysical concepts, Heidegger brings the concept of essence, as we have already indicated, into the vicinity of the ideas of potency or possibility and of origin. These ideas belong to the analysis of the metaphysics of Dasein as concerned with the "event" of transcendence, the coming-to-pass of Seinsverständnis. Essence, Wesen, comes to be understood verbally; it is the "activity" of the origin (transcendence) in surpassing itself toward a possible understanding of Being. Thus it is necessary to analyze transcendence as such and thereby to lay out those fundamental structures of existence which make an understanding of Being "possible." The analysis of such fundamental structures does not yield information about the character of the specific project of any factically existing human being, but rather discloses the ground and possibility of such a project. The analysis is "neutral" with respect to factically existing Dasein; it concerns only the phenomenon of Care or self-concern in general:

1. The term "man" was not used for that being which is the theme of the analysis. Instead, the neutral term Dasein was chosen. By this we designate the being for which its own proper mode of being in a definite sense is not indifferent. (136D)

The self-concern of Dasein, the concern of finitude for itself (cf. remarks on para. 5, below), is the point of origin of the analysis and
the point from which de-pends the whole of the discussion of the neu-
trality of Dasein. Derrida says in "Geschlecht," concerning this
passage, that

It is a matter of reducing or subtracting every anthropological,
ethical or metaphysical predetermination by means of that
neutralization, so as to keep nothing but a relation to itself,
bare relation, to the Being of its being. . . . Neutrality . . . is first of all the neutralization of everything not bearing the
naked trait of this relation to itself, of this interest for its
own Being. (G, 69)

But Heidegger will say that neutralization is not the "voidness of an
abstraction," nor the "indifference" of an empty void, an ontic
nothing, or the nobody and everybody (para. 2)--in other words, not the
result of a reduction or subtraction at all. Indeed, we soon will see
(paras. 6-10) that it is a matter of getting "everything" in. The
"relation to itself" is not the barren one of an auto-affection or
presence to itself, but of that which, as self-concern, has always
already prepared the way for and indeed articulated itself in the
upsurgance of a "world."3 There is no "bare self" for the self to be
related to: "As constituting the selfhood of Dasein, the for-the-sake-
of has . . . universal scope" (MFL 191); "the totality of the
commitment [Bindung] residing in the for-the-sake-of is the world"
(192/247).

Because neutrality means possibility,

2. The peculiar neutrality of the term "Dasein" is

essential, because the interpretation of this being must be
carried out prior to every factical (faktische) concretion. (136)

What is at stake, in fact, is the way in which Dasein "occurs,"
as transcendence, in the midst of beings. The analysis of neutral
Dasein exhibits the possibility of such occurrence. In this sense,
neutral Dasein is not itself a "being"—"neutral Dasein is never what exists [das Existierende]" (137/172). Dasein in its essence is "not this, not that"; it is no-thing. The neutrality of Dasein is its "power" to occur, its *dunamis*:

3. Neutrality is not the voidness of an abstraction, but precisely the potency of the *origin*, which bears in itself the intrinsic possibility of every concrete factual humanity. Dasein is "nothing," but its nothingness is not that of the voidness of an abstraction, i.e., of the generality of a concept, but that of a potency which can be realized through its own nihilating power, the "*nichtet*" of das Nichts. Thus the concept of neutrality looks forward to the analysis of the "nothing" in *What is Metaphysics*?; it also looks back to the treatment of the nothingness of Dasein, revealed in *Angst*, in §40 of *Being and Time*. Neutrality is Dasein's "not" being any being, and at the same time its power of opening up a space within which being as a whole can be understood as "in" being. This nihilating, irruptive power is what is meant by the "potency of the origin." Dasein is "not yet" (137) any thing; this open futurity, however, is what lets Dasein arise in its concrete, factual humanity, letting it be as a being, so that it can belong to a specific sexuality and determinate generation.

This neutrality also indicates that Dasein is neither of the two sexes. But here sexlessness is not the indifference of an empty void, the weak negativity of an indifferent ontic nothing. In its neutrality Dasein is not the indifferent nobody and everybody, but the primordial positivity and potency of the essence. (136-37)

But it is neutrality which allows Dasein to harbor "the intrinsic possibility for being factically dispersed into bodiliness and thus into sexuality" (137). Sexlessness is not "the indifference of an
empty void"--as is the "universality" of genus--nor is it "the weak negativity of an indifferent ontic nothing," the limit of an abstraction from "what is," and thus less than any thing. Nor is Dasein in its neutrality the indifferent das Man. As the potency [Mächtigkeit] of the essence, neutrality is not the opposite of concreteness; being "neither" of the two sexes is not non-sexual being, but signifies rather that which makes it possible for Dasein to have (in its self-dispersal) a determinate sexuality. Thus

4. Neutral Dasein is never what exists; Dasein exists in each case only in its factical concretion. But neutral Dasein is indeed the primal source of intrinsic possibility that springs up in every existence and makes it intrinsically possible. The analysis always speaks only in Dasein about the Dasein of those existing [Existierenden], but it does not speak to the Dasein of the Existent [Existenzen]; this would be nonsense, since one can only speak to those who exist [Existierenden]. (137m/172)

Although neutral Dasein is "neither of the two sexes," this does not mean that Dasein is, in its factical concretion, without sexuality; on the contrary, the "sexlessness" of neutral Dasein is the condition of the possibility of sexual determination.

What would it mean for neutral Dasein to be in its essence "sexual"? The issue is that of the "potency of the origin." "Origin" here means, as always, origin of Seinsverständnis, and, equivalently, of "thought" and of "world." In what is the power of origination founded? If neutral Dasein were sexual, and therefore of a determinate sexuality, then "thought" would necessarily differentiate itself along sexual lines. But it is, as possibility, neutral with respect to Geschlecht--to sexuality, nation, race, and generation. This is not the only metaphysical implication of the neutrality of Dasein: That the locus of origin is Dasein means that theories which ground the
origin of human "culture" (more properly, world) in psychoanalytic
corcepts fail to reach to the essential dimension of the foundation of
human "creativity." The possibility of origination cannot, on Heideg­
ger's analysis, lie in any of the conditions of human embodiment; its
potency means that it arises "before" such determination.

What is at stake in an ontological reflection upon the nature of
the origin is the preservation of the ontological, i.e., "neutral,"
character of the origin, as opposed to a determination of the character
of origin on the basis of an ontic model. For Heidegger, psychoanalyti­
cal and other ontic explanations of the origin of history and "culture"
restrict the possibilities of historical disclosure to those which can
be formulated in the language of the psychology of desire (for exam­
ple). This type of explanation constitutes an inversion, since psycho­
analysis is only one of the historical possibilities of the understand­
ing of human being (and thus, one would have to add, of Being). No
historical event could surpass the explicatory conditions established
for it by psychoanalysis, if psychoanalytic explanations were substi­
tituted for the neutrality of an ontological grounding.

To preserve the radically ontological character of the origin
means that the origin cannot be understood through terms appropriate
solely to any "regional ontology," that is to say, through terms
derived from any specific region of human comportment in relation to
beings. The problem of origin cannot be formulated, then, in terms of
the evolution of the species, nor in terms of physical causality, nor
in terms of the "bicameral mind," nor, in particular can ontology
submit to the natural tendency--since Dasein is always "human being"--
to identify the locus of origin with respect to "thought" (creativity, "culture," world) with its "natural" basis in sexuality or the body.

Ontology must preserve, and indeed present a vision of, possibility "as such," in relation to the possibilities of historical disclosure; it is concerned solely with the "potency of the origin." Thus ontology must affirm the neutrality of Dasein with respect to any identification that would limit the possibilities of Seinsverständnis. Therefore "the interpretation of this being must be carried out prior to every factual concretion" (136). Dasein is "neither of the two sexes" (136); it is sexless. Not only is it "not" sexual and "not" a body, its analysis is "prior to all prophesying and heralding world-views" (137) because world-views are subsequent to historical disclosure, and are wholly dependent upon such prior disclosure. The interpretation of Dasein is not even "wisdom, something available only in the structure of metaphysics" (137), i.e., in a concrete historical disclosure of the meaning of Being. Only within such a metaphysical order can human beings achieve "wisdom," knowledge of the truth of beings, since the latter requires a prior disclosure of Being.

All of this is to emphasize that, to preserve the "potency of the origin," ontological analysis can only be concerned with Dasein in its neutrality. To treat Dasein as "neutral" has the specific function of thinking the "origin as such" and of illuminating it as the ground of possibility. In order to think the origin in genuinely radical fashion (to think possibility as such), ontology must achieve the separation of neutral Dasein from all beings. Dasein is not even "I," even if Dasein is in each case mine:
5. Nor is this neutral Dasein the egocentric individual, the ontic isolated individual. The egoity of the individual does not become the center of the entire problematic. Yet Dasein's essential content, in its Existence [Existenz] to belong to itself, must be taken up along with the approach. The approach that begins with neutrality does imply a peculiar isolation of the human being, but not in the factical existentiell sense, as if the one philosophizing were the center of the world. Rather, it is the metaphysical isolation of the human being.

The origin of the origin, one might say, lies in Care, and indeed in self-concern, as Derrida has pointed out in commenting on this passage and Heidegger's earlier remark that neutral Dasein designates "the being for which its own proper mode of being in a definite sense is not indifferent" (136). In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger speaks of the self-concern of finitude, the concern of finitude with itself:

the finitude of human reason is finitization [Verendlichung], i.e., "concern" [Sorge] about the ability to be finite. . . . the laying of the foundation of metaphysics is rooted in the question of the finitude of man in such a way that this finitude itself can first become a problem. (KPM 224-25)

The origin of interpretation of Being as such lies in this "reflexive," self-questioning character of finitude.

Let us turn briefly to Heidegger's elaboration (in MFL §11) of these remarks in paragraph 5 concerning the metaphysical isolation of Dasein. In section 11, entitled "Freedom and World," Heidegger calls Dasein's self-concern its egoicity (Egoität):

If we say "Dasein is in each case essentially mine," and if our task is to define this characteristic of Dasein ontologically, this does not mean we should investigate the essence of my self, as this factical individual, or of some other given individual. The object of inquiry is not the individual essence of my self, but it is the essence of mineness and selfhood as such. Likewise, if "I" is the object of the ontological interpretation, then this is not the individual I-ness, of my self, but I-ness in its metaphysical neutrality; we call this neutral I-ness "egoicity." But here too there is a danger of a misunderstanding. One
could say, Must not thou-ness, too, become likewise a topic and
must not thou-ness be taken together with I-ness as equiprimordial?
This is certainly a possible problem. But I-ness, as the
phenomenon correlative to thou-ness, is still not metaphysical
egoicity. Here it becomes clear that the term "I" always pushes
in the direction of the isolation of my self in the sense of a
Corresponding severance from the thou. Contrariwise, I-ness does
not mean the factical ego distinguished from the thou; egoicity
means, rather, the I-ness also at the basis of the thou, which
prevents an understanding of the thou factically as an alter ego.
But why is thou not simply a second ego? Because being an ego,
in contradistinction to being a thou, does not at all pertain to
the essence of Dasein, i.e., because a thou is what it is, only
qua its self, and likewise for the "I." Therefore I usually use
the expression "selfhood" [Selbstheit] for metaphysical I-ness,
for egoicity. For the "self" can be said equally of the I and
the thou: "I-myself," "you-yourself," but not "thou-I."

Pure selfhood, understood as the metaphysical neutrality of
Dasein, expresses, at the same time, the metaphysical isolation
of Dasein in ontology. (188)

We will not pause, here, to examine Heidegger's important contrast of
the "I" of the factical ego and the "thou": The "thou" is always a
self in the most fundamental, metaphysical sense (I-ness), but the "I,"
at least as mere ego, is not. What is important in this passage for
the present discussion is the placing of the self "prior" to the
distinction of I and thou--just as it is prior to, and thus "neither"
of, the sexes in their division. What is at stake is that "not-yet"
sexuality which, indeed, gives rise to the possibility of sexuality.
And in this sense, it is, as Derrida says, in some sense "sexual"--
just as it is, because it gives rise to "I" and "thou," to the division
and relation between the two, in some sense "egoic."

We have seen that the task of ontology is to accomplish the
separation of Dasein from every ontical model that might compromise its
neutrality. It must guarantee that Dasein is "neutral" with respect to
any interpretive model derived from a specific Geschlecht; possibility
as such cannot carry any "Schlag," any imprint, in advance. To ground
Dasein ontically would mean to confine "possibility" to the conceptions available in the already articulated domain of a specific region of beings, or to those available to a historical "generation," or even to those dependent upon Dasein's concrete sexuality. The purpose of ontology is to present Dasein with an "extreme construction" (189m/243) of its being, one which will, in its neutrality, ensure that possibility remains possibility.

But through this purification, achieved by means of the analysis of neutral Dasein, the concept arises of an ontological ground, an essence, which is wholly distinct from the existing "particulars" for which it serves as the model. Thus Heidegger seems, at least at this stage of his work, to recapitulate, in his conception of the twofold structure of metaphysics, the traditional role of the chorismos separating essence from existence, even if now in the revised language of the distinction between neutral and concrete Dasein. The first five paragraphs of §10 confirm the metaphysical isolation of Dasein, and thus establish the radical separation of neutral from concrete Dasein— a separation which is established precisely in order, in the end, to be undone.

Indeed, the five paragraphs 6-10 bring this separability of neutral and concrete Dasein into question. These paragraphs show that the "potency of the origin" proper to neutral Dasein is always the potency of a concrete event of origination, i.e., always bears a relationship, as a "potency," to a determinate multiplicity. Just as for Leibniz drive is always the self-surpassing unification of a specific manifold, in the drive of the individuated monad, so in Heidegger's §10 of MFL
origination always occurs with the temporalization of a concretely existing Dasein. There "is" no neutral Dasein anywhere. Possibility, potency, is always the possibility of a specific determination of Being.

Thus we can say that something like an Umschlag occurs between paragraphs 5 and 6--at least on the limited model of the "overturning" that Heidegger finds at work in Leibniz's ontology. In Chapter II we found that the metaphysics of drive leads immediately to the metaphysics of the individuated monad. The corresponding relation here in §10 can be formulated in this way: The radical separation of the origin is first articulated on the basis of the demand placed upon ontology that the "origin" be thought independently of every ontic means of interpretation--that is to say, it must be thought in its neutrality. Thus the chorismos is established. But the closer examination of the neutral "origin" shows that, as potency of the origin, its very essence is to give rise to determinate originations. This recognition does not render ontology unnecessary, since it is not possible without it; indeed, the function of ontology is to articulate the thinkability of (concrete) origination in general. It is not possible to analyze the ap-perceptive character of the individual monad, for example, unless one first grasps the significance of the "monad" and its relation to drive.

This intertwining of neutrality and concreteness will become clearer upon examination of the details of the ontological analysis of Dasein. At present let us note only that temporalization--the crux of the ontological analysis--is always the "historizing" of factual Dasein. The neutrality of the ontological analysis means that Seins-
verst\"{a}ndnis always has a temporal horizon, and thus that the temporal analysis is true for Dasein in general. But at the heart of the analysis of temporality lies the disclosure of the finitude of time. Temporalization means the repetition of a definite "past" in view of a possible "future" and in relation to a receptive "present." Since the potency of the origin lies in temporalization itself, there is no temporalization except in relation to a determinate "there" of Being. Thus in paragraph 6 we find that, because of the intimacy of the relationship between the neutrality of Dasein and its individuation, in its metaphysically neutral concept, Dasein's essence already contains a primordial bestrewnal [Streuung], which is in a quite definite respect a dissemination [Zerstreuung] (138/173) .... multiplicity belongs to Being itself. (138)

We have already seen, in the context of the Leibnizian "metontology," the connection between the radical individuation of Dasein and the concept of "multiplicity." Heidegger introduces multiplicity here in relation to the more precise metaphysical concept of Streuung—which signifies the dispersal intrinsic to Dasein's neutral (ontological) being. To think possibility means to ask how a possible actuality is indeed possible, i.e., how a multiplicity can become determinate in relation to a certain "apperception" of being as a whole.

Thus, to return to the beginning of paragraph 6:

the metaphysical neutrality of the human being, inmost isolated as Dasein, is not an empty abstraction from the ontic, a neither-nor; it is rather the authentic concreteness of the origin, the not-yet of factual dispersion [Zerstreutheit]. (137/173)

Temporalization ("not-yet," futurity) occurs only in relation to a factual dispersal. The potency of the origin, therefore, is that of
the potential of that dispersal and the multiplicity that belongs to it for being gathered into something like a unity. "Potency" makes no sense apart from a relation to such a potential multiplicity.

It is impossible here not to think of other metaphysical (and mythical) models of the origination and organization of the world. Heidegger himself mentions the mythical theme—elaborated, in one version, by Plato's Aristophanes in the Symposium—of the "large primal being becoming ontically split into many individuals" (138). This is the image of an ontic origination of multiplicity (or "multiplication") from a prior unity, and thus of the subsequent reference of all beings back to that prior unity. Unity, in other words, lies, for the myth, in the unity of an ontically primordial source. Freud's concept of Eros in Beyond the Pleasure Principle contains echoes of such an appeal to a primordial unity and the concept of a "return" to it; indeed, this return constitutes for Freud the fundamental meaning of the compulsion to repeat, "beyond the pleasure principle." It is the theme of this metapsychological repetition that introduces into human life a movement toward higher types of unity, and which opposes the dissolution of organic life into its inorganic origin. Thus Freud's metapsychology remains grounded in an ontic concept of repetition.

A comparison with the cosmology of Whitehead would be particularly instructive here, perhaps, since an analogy certainly obtains between the cosmological conception of the prehensive gathering of the many given data into the concrescence (concretization) of a novel actual occasion, and the Heideggerian metontological concept of the
multiplicity achieving unity through the individuation of concretely existing Dasein. However, it is necessary to recognize in Whitehead's concept of prehension the working of a decidedly ontic model, in that the actual occasion, although selective with respect to the subjective forms under which data will be prehended, and in that sense "creative," is creative only in relationship to an already established, determinate multiplicity of past actual occasions. This model differs from the ontologically grounded concept of the individuated event, in that the event of transcendence is primordially constitutive of the "multiplication" it contains. Thus

here we are dealing with something else [than a negative concept, in the concepts of Zerstreutheit and Zwiespältig], with a description of the multiplication [Mannigfaltigung] (not "multiplicity" [Mannigfältigkeit]) which is present in every factically individuated Dasein as such. [What is at issue is] the clarification of the intrinsic possibility of multiplication . . . (137-38/173)

This is why Heidegger speaks of "transcendental dissemination" (para. 7): The manifold can be conceived as such only on the basis of its potential "unity," i.e. the interrelatedness or "harmony" of elements belonging to the same manifold. The elements being unified are not simply "given" prior to the act of unification, but arise as a "multiplication," a field of interrelated elements, only with the originating (potential) act of unification. In the case of the monadology, Heidegger says that "drive develops the manifold [Mannigfältig] in itself" (94/116).

Inasmuch as drive primordially unifies, it must already anticipate every possible multiplicity, must be able to deal with every multiplicity in its possibility. That is, drive must have already surpassed and overcome multiplicity. Drive must therefore bear multiplicity in itself and allow it to be born in the driving. This is its "world" character. It is important to see
the essential source of multiplicity in drive as such. (91/114)

It is important to see the essential source of dispersal in transcendence as such.6

Thus we see that, while it is metaphysically necessary to emphasize the ontological gap that separates neutral from concrete Dasein—and thus the "metaphysical isolation of the human being" (137)—this work of separation, precisely because it converges upon the "potency of the origin," concerns that which "bears in itself the intrinsic possibility of every concrete factical humanity" (137—para. 3). In other words, it is in virtue of its metaphysical isolation that

6. As such, Dasein harbors the intrinsic possibility for being factically dispersed into bodiliness and thus into sexuality. (137)

"Concretely" speaking, then, origination is possible only in relation to the "dispersion" (Zerstreutheit) of Dasein into embodiment and its splitting into the "disunity" (Zwiespältig) of the sexes. There can be no "multiplication"—this, of course, must be understood to mean world—apart from that "embodiment [which] presents an organizing factor" (138).

Since Heidegger is presenting here, in effect, a rewriting of the first Division of Being and Time, these passages can only be understood in the light of certain structural correspondences with, as well as differences from, the fundamental-ontological approach of Being and Time. The first five paragraphs thematize the fundamental-ontological problem, that of Dasein's "existence"; the second five thematize the issue of "thrownness." The progression to the "authentic" existence of Dasein takes place now within the context of a more fundamental empha-
sis upon thrownness as the "original" situation of Dasein. That is to say, we have in the remaining numbered paragraphs a "metontological" context for the development of fundamental ontology. To the ontological themes of neutrality, isolation, transcendence, and temporalization correspond the "metontological" themes of concreteness, multiplication, bestrewal, and spatiality.

In §10, masculinity and embodiment occupy the place belonging in Being and Time to the analysis of the ready-to-hand (Zuhandene). In his "preliminary sketch of Being-in-the-world" (BT §12), Heidegger says that

Dasein's facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed [zerstreut] itself or even split itself up [zersplittert] into definite ways of Being-in. The multiplicity [Mannigfaltigkeit] of these is indicated by the following examples: having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, [etc.]. (BT 83/56)

Thus we find in MFL §10 an alternative presentation of the fundamental mode of Dasein's Being-in: not the multiplicity of concern with the ready-to-hand, but the modes of dispersion belonging to embodiment and sexuality. This particular "retrieval" of the problem of Being and Time shows that there is nothing sacrosanct about the route to ontology undertaken through the analysis of Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit. Heidegger's treatment of these themes in §10 represents an exploration of another potential route to the explication of Being-in-the-world (embodiment as "organizing factor") and transcendence. Heidegger's treatment of dissemination or Dasein's dispersal into embodiment and sexuality represents an alternative formulation of the "ground-condition" of human Dasein. Thus in this alternative treatment Being-
in-the-world is inherently and radically a function of "embodiment" and "sexuality."

But then doesn't this mean that the origin itself, contrary to the sense of the doctrine of neutrality, participates in some way in the "flesh"? But it is from this ground-condition that human Dasein gathers itself if it is to "function" as origin, if its being as the "potency of the origin" is to be fulfilled. The dispersed condition is the condition of potency, but remains merely "potential" if Dasein remains immersed in the initial "entanglement" and "captivation" (para. 8) in its environment. Dasein's "being-a-self is in every case only in its process of realization" (139, para. 11).

It is difficult to avoid a seemingly Gnostic language implying a fall into the flesh and subsequent restoration of the self to itself--as if to a condition of perfect presence to self, to the self's pristine condition of self-presence--when speaking of Dasein's dispersal in contrast to its "process of realization." Heidegger's text is more subtle than this, however. "Realization" is not restoration to self-presence, but the "return" to just that state of freedom which first lets Dasein become entangled in its environment, identifying itself with its own embodiment and its "desire." Thus, in Being and Time, anticipatory resoluteness brings Dasein back into the authenticity of its Situation, the flight from which constitutes inauthenticity. In ¶10 "dissemination. . . ultimately has its ground in the freedom of Dasein as such" (139, para. 10). Thus when Dasein is restored to itself, it does not take flight into the "heavens," nor return to a pristine condition of self-presence: It recognizes itself in its
freedom as the site of the potential disclosure of the manifold as a whole. Dasein is thus "responsible" for the possible disclosure of this whole of being. Thus

7. The transcendental dissemination proper to the metaphysical essence of neutral Dasein, as the binding [bindende] possibility of each factical existentielle dispersion and division, is based on a primordial feature of Dasein, that of thrownness. (138/174)

And thrownness, therefore, is nothing other than the necessary condition for Dasein's disclosure of a particular "world" (multiplication). Neutral Dasein, as potency of the origin, signifies the potential locus of disclosure of a concrete manifold, determined uniquely for each "factual existential dispersion and division."

"Binding possibility" refers back to the theme of being-guilty in Being and Time and that "being-a-basis" which constitutes Dasein's selfhood:

The Self, which as such has to lay the basis for itself, can never get that basis into its power; and yet, as existing, it must take over Being-a-basis. . . . In being a basis—that is, in existing as thrown—Dasein constantly lags behind its possibilities. It is never existent before its basis, but only from it and as this basis. Thus "Being-a-basis" means never to have power over one's ownmost Being from the ground up. This "not" belongs to the existential meaning of "thrownness". . . . what one has in view here is . . . a "not" which is constitutive for the Being of Dasein—its thrownness. The character of this "not" as a "not" may be defined existentially: in its being its Self, Dasein is, as a Self, the entity that has been thrown. It has been released from its basis, not through itself but to itself, so as to be as this basis. (BT 330/284-85; ¶58)

The "nullity" of Dasein's being-a-basis defines the existential meaning of thrownness. In taking over its being-a-basis, in the "nullity" of that thrownness which it can never master, and the impossibility of mastering which determines its being-a-basis, Dasein understands itself
in terms of its possibilities (BT 331). Indeed Dasein "always stands in one possibility or another; it constantly is not other possibilities" (331). Dasein "as projection ... is itself essentially null" (331), since it does not "give itself" its own possibilities originally (nor is the Self ever transparently present to itself, since, as null, it grasps neither a "reason" for its thrownness in relation to this particular whole of being, nor does it determine the possibilities open to it as a Self; the latter it can only choose or fail to choose). In the nullity of its being, which includes the "nullity" of a possible projection, Dasein is free

for its existentiell possibilities. Freedom, however, is in the choice of ONE possibility—that is, in tolerating one's not having chosen the others and one's not being able to choose them. (331)

The "binding possibility," then, is that possibility which represents Dasein's own potentiality-for-Being, the projection that is "thrown" along with the being of Dasein. The nullity of Dasein's being as thrown projection (binding possibility) is definitive of Care (331) and means that "Dasein as such is guilty" (331).

The themes of freedom and guilt or "responsibility" are taken up again in MFL §11:

In the projection of the for-the-sake-of as such, Dasein gives itself the primordial commitment [Bindung]. Freedom makes Dasein the ground of its essence, responsible [verbindlich] to itself, or more exactly, gives itself the possibility of commitment. The totality of the commitment residing in the for-the-sake-of is the world. (MFL 192/247)

Freedom binds Dasein, not to the type of "Self" which would exist beyond or outside its potential world, but to the whole of beings "into" which Dasein is (initially) dispersed and divided:
In choosing itself Dasein really chooses precisely its being-with others and precisely its being among beings of a different character.

In the express self-choice, there is essentially the complete self-commitment, not to where it might not yet be, but to where and how it already always is, qua Dasein, insofar as it already exists. (190)

Dasein's return to itself in choosing itself is nothing other than a return and commitment to that multiplicity into which, in its factical existence, Dasein is "dispersed." But does Dasein then remain dispersed even in its authentic state, i.e., when it "realizes" its freedom? What is the difference between dispersal and unity?

Dissemination is transcendental because it "ultimately has its ground in the freedom of Dasein as such" (139). That is to say, transcendental dissemination—Streuung, bestrewal—is "for-the-sake-of" the potential disclosure of that multiplicity "into" which Dasein is dispersed. Such disclosure occurs on the basis of a projection, and it is in projection that the multiplicity becomes determinate, a manifold or "world." Dissemination is not the rending of a "large primal being" into ontical multiplicity, but the way in which an ontological being (neutral Dasein) finds itself in its being as thrown. Dasein's bestrewal is the condition for its potential disclosure of the manifold as such.

Thus it is only on the basis of dissemination that Dasein can find itself "in" other beings:

8. This thrown dissemination is to be understood metaphysically. It is the presupposition, for example, for Dasein to let itself in each case be factically governed by beings which it is not; Dasein, however, identifies with those beings on account of its dissemination. (138)

The entanglement and captivation of Dasein in "nature," and thus the
origin of **mythology**, is based upon the dissemination of Dasein.

Theories of the rise of "culture" sometimes are formulated in terms of a development of human thought in relation to more original, mythical forms of expression. For Levi-Strauss, for example, rational thought is an attenuated, and therefore derivative, form of thought exhibiting the structures but none of the vitality of myth. Alternatively, a still popular view holds thought to have developed out of the mythical expression of early man through the development of philosophical and scientific rationality, these having conquered their origins as a result of the natural progression of mankind toward rationality.

Heidegger's paragraph 8 is implicitly critical of all such models of origin which represent an ontic continuity between myth and "thought," whether of a structural or historical order. Myth is for Heidegger a function of the dissemination that is inherent in Dasein's neutral or ontological character. Myth arises as the result of Dasein's dispersal into nature, its entanglement and captivation in this other to itself, and thus its finding "itself" in that other. In this way, Dasein reads itself "out" of nature on the basis of its dispersal into nature. Thus "thought," Dasein, is **prior** to myth in the ontological order, even if not in the order of historical succession.

The "not-yet of factual dispersion" can be "the authentic concreteness of the origin" (137) because, in dissemination, Dasein is bound to the possibility of a free projection and hence disclosure of the "multiplication" corresponding to Dasein's existence. Dissemination is of ontological, never of merely ontical, significance. Heidegger therefore would deny the possibility of interpreting
"psychological" phenomena—the Oedipal conflict for example—in merely psychological terms. Such conflicts of identity concern the conflict of freedom with itself; dissemination expressing itself in identification with beings is in conflict with dissemination as a function of freedom, i.e., as the (ontological) basis for the potential disclosure of an ontic manifold. The "psyche" is the locus of the conflict of freedom with itself.

Indeed, Dasein emerges from its immersion in its own sexuality—that is to say, from its involvement, characterized (say) psychologically in terms of libidinal conflict, in the identification of itself with its own sexual and bodily being—to discover its own humanity:

9. The essentially thrown dissemination of Dasein, still understood as completely neutral, appears, among other ways, in Dasein's being-with with Dasein. This being-with with X does not emerge on account of factically existing together; it is not explained solely on the basis of the supposedly more primordial species-being of sexually differentiated bodily creatures. Instead the species-like unification metaphysically presupposes the dissemination of Dasein as such, that is, being-with as such. (139)

There is no sexually (or genetically) grounded explanation of humanity (being-with). The latter is, rather, the ground of the recognition of the "other" as belonging to the same species. It is, furthermore, presumably the ground of the relatedness to the other that is constitutive, for human beings, of the significance of sexuality. Thus sexuality and embodiment are "explanatory" only where Dasein's humanity is occluded or not yet factically developed:

Rather, factical bodiliness and sexuality are in each case explanatory only—and even then within the bounds of the essential arbitrariness of all explanation—to the extent that a factical Dasein's being-with is pushed precisely into this particular factical direction, where other possibilities are faded out or remain closed. (139)
The emergence of Dasein's humanity is to be contrasted with its immersion in nature, along with the mythological forms of expression accompanying this immersion, and its immersion in the conditions of embodiment and sexual being, with those forms of explanation of "human nature" that arise from confusing this "ground-condition" with human being per se. Paragraphs 6-10 can be read as the "story" of Dasein's return to itself in the recovery of its original freedom, the freedom which itself is the ground of dissemination (and which, therefore, is the "same" as dissemination. Dasein's return to itself consists in a withdrawal, an askesis with respect to beings, but for the sake of the development of its freedom, i.e., its letting-be of beings.) The story is the same as that of Being and Time, with some variations, however, in the plot: sexuality and embodiment play the role, here, played earlier by extant and present being; and the story (which corresponds approximately to Division One of Being and Time) ends in a clearer articulation of the role of freedom than does Being and Time, with the latter's central focus upon the concept of Entschlossenheit. Paragraphs 6-10 may be read as mimetic of the return of Dasein's dissemination to the freedom which is the ground of dissemination. Thus it can be understood as a recounting of the (possible) temporal, "experiential" progression of Dasein from sexual/mythical modes of experience and explanation, to the discovery of Dasein's own humanity, and then to the recovery of its own freedom as such. But the story "ends" not in the flight of Dasein from the world "into" which it has been dispersed, but in the discovery of freedom as the ground of its original dissemination: Freedom means the disclosure of the manifold as
such. Dasein remains "committed" "to where and how it already always is." Dasein's thrownness, manifesting itself in the transcendental dissemination of Dasein, is its being bound to the world potentially to be disclosed through Dasein's free projection of that world.

Dasein's initial dispersal into embodiment and sexuality is not incidental, but is ontologically grounded and is the condition for the disclosure of the manifold as such. "Embodiment" is one way of thematizing the finitude of Dasein. But Dasein can become entangled in the situation into which it is thrown, and thus interpret its own Being in terms of that situation, i.e., in terms derived from the conditions of embodiment and sexuality. Thus there can be a kind of Seinsverständnis which is grounded in the bodily and sexual being of Dasein, just as there can be a kind of Seinsverständnis which reflects Dasein's immersion in the field of its concern with beings present at hand. The concept of the "neutrality" of Dasein accounts both for the inadequacy of any such interpretation, from an ontological standpoint, of the Being of Dasein, while also accounting for the "not-yet of factical dispersion" which allows Dasein to interpret itself in these terms.

Dasein is "nearer" to itself in its being-with with Dasein--its humanity--although being-with still belongs to the mode of dissemination. We know from Being and Time that Dasein's being-with can deteriorate into such identification with the other that Dasein interprets itself on the basis of das Man; on the other hand, being-with is possible as a mode of comportment of authentic existence. However

10. Being-with as a comportment of authentic existence is only possible in such a way that every existing-with can be and is authentically itself. (139)
But what does it mean for existing-with to be "itself" authentically? Does Dasein "exist" somewhere other than in being-with with others?

This freedom of with-one-another, however, presupposes the possibility of the self-determination of a being with the characteristics of Dasein as such, and it is a problem how Dasein can exist as essentially free in the freedom of the factical ties of being-with-one-another. (139)

It is a problem because of the possible "identification" with the other being and its possibilities; nonetheless, it is not in a "higher" stage but only here, in the "factical ties of being-with-one-another," that Dasein can recover its freedom. It is here that the turn-around occurs, and Dasein discovers that

Insofar as being-with is a basic metaphysical feature of dissemination, we can see that the latter ultimately has its ground in the freedom of Dasein as such. The basic metaphysical essence of metaphysically isolated Dasein is centered in freedom. (139)

In freedom, i.e., in Dasein's authentic being-with, the Other first "becomes" himself for Dasein.

We have seen that the first five numbered paragraphs of §10 introduce, under the heading of the neutrality of Dasein, the ontological theme of the "potency of the origin." Neutral Dasein is possible Dasein; ontology thinks Dasein in its possibility, addresses the origin of possibility as such. Corresponding to dynamis, possibility, there must be an energeia, actuality. More precisely in this context, "possibility" makes sense only insofar as it can be correlated with a "possible actuality." Thus paragraphs 6-10 undertake a "metontological" account of the "actualization" of Dasein in relation to a given manifold. The dissemination of Dasein is the precondition for the actual disclosure of a determinate "world."
Dasein's freedom is disclosive of the Being of beings. Dasein is constituted a Self only in that resolute openness which brings Dasein back to the Situation as such (cf. note 7, above), letting beings and the other Dasein "be so-and-so as" they already are. Thus, although Dasein does not take flight from beings in being its Self, worldly beings are not disclosed except in relation to an understanding of the Being of beings, i.e., in world-projection. "As free, Dasein is world-projection" (192). The "for-the-sake-of" constitutive of the selfhood of Dasein is that "towards which Dasein as transcending transcends" (191), i.e., the world.

Thus one would expect Heidegger to follow through in the numbered paragraphs with a discussion of the specific project of Dasein, the projection of world, or the projection of the constitution of Being, whereby Dasein "completes" its actualization. Indeed he says

11. This metaphysics of Dasein, first as an analysis, can be attained only in the free projection of the Being-constitution [Seinsverfassung] itself. Dasein always exists as itself, and being-a-self is in every case only in its process of realization [Vollzug (=energeia)], as is also existence [das Existieren]. (139/175-76)

The actualization of Dasein is completed in the free projection of the constitution of Being. But isn't this ontology? What has ontology to do with the metontological concern with the actualization of concretely existing Dasein?

As we have already seen, ontology presents an "extreme model" of the constitution of Dasein; it is in this way that it contributes to the "actualization" of concrete Dasein:

For this reason, projection of the basic ontological constitution of Dasein must arise by constructing one of the most extreme possibilities of Dasein's authentic and total capability of
being. The projection is directed towards Dasein, as a whole, and towards the basic determinations of its wholeness, even though Dasein in each case is only as existent [das Existientendes]. To put it another way, attaining the metaphysical neutrality and isolation of Dasein as such is only possible on the basis of the extreme existentiell involvement [Einsatz] of the one who himself projects. (139-40/176)

The project began with the announcement of the neutrality of "Dasein," "essential, because the interpretation of this being must be carried out prior to every factical concretion" (136m/171-72; para. 2). Here the hermeneutic circle returns to its beginning, however, with the announcement that the ontological project itself has a metontological origination. As realizing an "extreme possibility," it is itself only one possibility; concerning the existential as such, it is itself possible only on the basis of an existentiell involvement. Neutral Dasein, never "existent" by itself, represents the projection of an extreme possibility by (concretely) existing Dasein: Ontology has a metontological (finite) basis. Heidegger's metaphysics of metaphysics is bound to the conditions common to all metaphysics (i.e., thrown projection). It is thus not really a "meta-" metaphysics, but an "extreme possibility" belonging to metaphysics itself. It is a metaphysical reflection upon metaphysics. As such, it is itself subject to the same finitude inherent in all metaphysical projects. But although subject to finitude, it is nonetheless the project disclosive of finitude as such:

This involvement is necessary and essential for the metaphysical project, for metaphysics as such. But it is, therefore, as an individual existentiell component, not authoritative and obligatory within the many concrete possibilities of each factical existence. For the metaphysical project itself reveals the essential finitude of Dasein's existence, which can only be understood existentiell in the inessentiality of the self that only becomes concrete--as can be proven metaphysically-through
and in the service of each possible totality, a whole which becomes manifest in a rather special way in metaphysical inquiry. Nevertheless, it is a problem in its own right: to what extent there is an existentiell guidance, an indirect guidance, in the metaphysical project and in the existentiell involvement of the person who philosophizes. (140)

Heidegger thus places his own project within the context of metontology, that is to say within the context of the finite "individuation" of a project which itself is in the service of a "possible totality." Each of the multiplicity of possible metaphysical projects is "in the service" of a "possible totality"--in the service of some "whole of being" (das Seiende im Ganzen). The relationship of a possible project to the totality to which it is responsive raises the question of "existentiell guidance" (the call of conscience) in each case. Through the ontological project, these "metontological" problems--the finitude of thrown projection, the possibility of existentiell guidance, the "possible totality" which Dasein serves as the "there" of its disclosure--first become manifest. Fundamental ontology is the project "of" projects, i.e., it is the inquiry into the possibility of projection as such.

Most importantly, that Dasein as such exists only in relation to (in the service of) a "possible totality" becomes manifest only through the ontological inquiry. Thus ontology is that unique project which grounds the metontological diversity of possible projects; it is that inquiry into neutral Dasein which lets Dasein become manifest as "the authentic concreteness of the origin." The "origin" is always concrete, for existing Dasein is always the origin of the disclosure of a determinate whole of beings. Furthermore

12. The ontological interpretation of Dasein's structures
must be concrete with regard to the metaphysical isolation and neutrality of Dasein. . . . Real metaphysical generalization does not exclude concreteness, but is in one respect the most concrete . . . . (140)

Wherein lies the concreteness of ontology? It lies in the concreteness in the analysis of the Dasein phenomena, which give direction and content to Dasein's metaphysical projection. (140)

That is to say, the concreteness of fundamental ontology itself lies in showing how direction and content are given (in the call of conscience) to (other) possible projections on the part of (concretely existing) Dasein. Ontology is concrete in showing how the "possible actuality" of existing Dasein becomes, for Dasein, possible. The (metontological) ontological project grounds metontology.

Thus it is a misunderstanding to think that Dasein is concretely committed, in general, to

taking the concrete phenomena of [neutral] Dasein by themselves and [secondly, to] taking them as existentiell absolutes in their extreme, fundamental-ontological conceptualization. (140)

More bluntly put, no concretely existing Dasein need find its "actuality" in the "philosophizing" undertaken in Being and Time; only that which grounds its "possibility" is to be found there.

Indeed, Heidegger finally says that

One may not. . . lose sight of the fact that with such a fundamental-ontological clarification nothing has yet been decided, and what furthermore ought to be shown is that nothing is decidable in this manner. Yet there is also always the factual necessity of a "presupposition" of a factual situation. (140-41)

Heidegger's fundamental ontology is "foundational" with respect to the multiplicity of possible concretizations of existing Dasein. Ontology is foundational of metontological diversity. When Heidegger says that
the basic intent of the analysis is to show the intrinsic possibility of Seinsverständnis, which means at the same time the possibility of transcendence (141/177),

we by now realize that showing this intrinsic possibility, in ontology, determines nothing with respect to the concrete possibilities available to existing Dasein. Showing the intrinsic possibility of transcendence lets possibility first become possibility for existing Dasein.

As we shall see in the chapter to follow, answering the question of the meaning of Being, and thus fulfilling the project of fundamental ontology, means, not designating "Being" as X--giving a "true" definition of Being--and thereby placing future philosophy upon a "secure" basis, but showing how all Seinsverständnis originates in temporalization, and thereby in making Seinsverständnis in general possible. "By a fundamental ontology we mean the basic grounding of ontology in general" (154). The role of fundamental ontology is to show how something like a multiplicity of "ontologies," i.e., of "interpretations of Being," are possible. The difficulty, however, lies not so much in the concept of a "multiplicity," but in the concept of Being, if we think that Heidegger means to grasp in his own ontological inquiry the "true" meaning of Being which the tradition has simply missed. To answer the question of Being means to attain to the source of possibility as such, and this means to explicate, in "Temporal science," the "origin of possibility" through the analysis of time. The "answer" to the question of Being is that time is the source of all possible "answers" to the question of Being, i.e., time is the source of metaphysics as such. The (mis)interpretation of Being as presence founds the tradition; it is an interpretation which is represented by no single
philosophy, but underlies all traditional philosophical understandings of the meaning of Being. There is a multiplicity of such interpretations; there is, in short, a metontological dispersal of ontological projects already evident in the tradition. Although we need not postulate the full concept of the Seinsgeschichte at this period of Heidegger's work, it is evident by now that the metontology establishes the context for the developing problematic of the Seinsgeschichte.

It is clear, then, that Heidegger is in no sense attempting to jettison traditional metaphysics. Rather he takes over and transforms the bipartite division of metaphysics on the basis of his differentiation of neutral from concrete Dasein. This differentiation is, however, immediately questioned and undercut precisely through the reversal which is effected by the transition from neutral to concrete Dasein. The finitude of the ontological project—or, better, the finitude of time itself, disclosed in the fulfillment of the project—means that the neutrality of Dasein is unstable, i.e., that it cannot provide an autonomous grounding for the sequence of metaphysical disclosures. We shall see in Chapter IV how the completion of the ontological project in the "science of Being" demands the overturning of the first part of metaphysics and its displacement by the second ("metontology") as the basis for inquiry into the origin of disclosure as such. The transition between the two parts of "metaphysics" is no longer of a merely formal nature, but constitutes a genuine overturning of the ontological methodology in favor of a new approach to the "question of origin."
NOTES

1. This is Heidegger's explicit formulation of the issue—for instance, in The Essence of Reasons (1929):

We might point out here that the portion of the investigations concerning "Being and time" published so far has as its task nothing more than a concrete, revealing sketch [Entwurf] of transcendence (cf. §§12-83, esp. §69). The sketch is there in order to make the single prominent goal of these investigations possible, a goal that is clearly indicated in the heading of the whole first part: namely, attaining the "transcendental horizon of the question about Being." All concrete interpretations, above all the interpretation of time, should be evaluated strictly as they aim at making the question of Being possible.

The emphases are Heidegger's.

2. These themes taken together constitute the locus of Heidegger's reinterpretation of the traditional concept of "essence," and are part of his attempt to transform the metaphysical twofold (essence and existence) as such. This process becomes explicit with the reading of Leibniz in the First Major Part of MFL; Being and Time is assimilated to this interpretation in §10; and the Appendix to §10 announces this reinterpretation of metaphysics as the basis of his future work.

3. The concept of neutrality is introduced in The Essence of Reasons in the context of a discussion of the concept of world (Chapter II in ER). Here the "self" and "world" are defined in terms of each other:

As a totality, world "is" no particular being but rather that by means of and in terms of which Dasein gives itself to understand [bedeuten] what beings it can behave toward and how it can behave toward them. That Dasein gives "itself" to understand in terms of "its" world means, then, that in approaching being through the world, Dasein makes a self of itself, i.e., a being which is free to be. The Being of Dasein lies in its "potenti- 

al for being" [Seinkönnen]. Better: its Being is such that its potentiality for Being is an issue. Dasein exists "for the sake of its ...." If the world is that, in surpassing to which, selfhood first arises, it is also that for the sake of which Dasein exists. The world has the basic character of the "for the sake of ...." in the primordial sense that it ensures the inner possibility of every factual "for your sake," "for his sake," "for its sake" [deswegen], etc. But that for the sake of which Dasein exists is itself. World belongs to selfhood; it is essentially related to Dasein. (85/84)

This "itself" for the sake of which Dasein exists is its surpassing beings toward world; at the same time, world is that which is disclosed in Dasein's freedom, its "being able" to comport itself toward beings and toward itself.

132
Thus the ontological concept of neutrality (cf. also p. 87) refers to that selfhood which is related to world "prior" to any relation to particular beings. Far from signifying a "bare relation to self," the concept of neutrality means that there is no "self" apart from that relation to world which constitute it a self. Hence the ontological analysis necessarily precedes any possible philosophical discussion of the egoity or sexuality of Dasein, since the latter cannot be understood as possible modes of Dasein's comportment except on the basis of ontology. The neutral analysis first makes the interpretation of Dasein's concrete being possible.

4. Derrida says in "Geschlecht":

At first the concept of neutrality seems quite general. It is a matter of reducing or subtracting every anthropological, ethical or metaphysical predetermination by means of that neutralization, so as to keep nothing but a relation to itself, bare relation, to the Being of its being; that is, a minimal relation to itself as relation to Being, that the being which we are, as questioning, holds with itself and its own proper essence. ("Geschlecht: sexual difference, ontological difference," in Research in Phenomenology, vol. XIII. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1983, p. 69)

Our question (cf. note 3 above) is whether Neutralität is "neutralization," a reduction or minimalization of Dasein to a bare relation to its "own proper essence."

Derrida's reading coincides in several places with our own; but if I do not take up here or respond directly to his treatment of these paragraphs, it is because his own strategy of re-marking the text on the basis of what it excludes, and of questioning the presence in the text of the metaphysical concepts of propriety and essence, fails, it seems to me, to recognize the "processual" and transformative character of Heidegger's own inquiry. It is not that Derrida is "incorrect" in what he discerns still to be at work in Heidegger's text--it is only that his method of reading disrupts and thereby renders ineffective the movement of Heidegger's text, the "process" at work which needs to be respected and recognized on its own terms, if Heidegger's task is to be understood. Derrida's method produces a blindness to the task manifest in the texts. Thus it remains necessary to find a way of reading Heidegger which is independent of Derrida's.

5. Derrida, p. 72.

6. The concept of "transcendental dissemination" is correlated with that of the synthesis of apprehension in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason--it signifies transcendental synthesis insofar as it is oriented toward the apprehension of the manifold as such and in advance. Concerning the synopsis of the manifold in pure intuition, Heidegger says, for example, in KPM:

Time as pure intuition is neither only what is intuited in the
pure act of intuition nor this act deprived of its "object." Time as pure intuition is in one the formative act of intuiting and what is intuited therein. Such is the complete concept of time. (KPM 180)

This is temporalization as "transcendental dissemination."

7. In Being and Time, "resoluteness brings the Being of the 'there' into the existence of its Situation" (BT 347/300). "The Situation is the 'there' which is disclosed in resoluteness--the 'there' as which the existent entity is there" (346/300). Furthermore, when the call of conscience summons us to our potentiality-for-Being, it does not hold before us some empty ideal of existence, but calls us forth into the Situation" (347/300). Prior to the temporal interpretation of the structure of Care, the analysis of Dasein culminates in the concept of anticipatory resoluteness, which is "the way in which Dasein's potentiality-for-being-a-whole has existentiell authenticity" (352/305). In other words, in resoluteness Dasein's commitment to the whole of its existentiell being-there--to the "whole of being" which is constitutive of its Situation--comes into its own. Thereby it comports itself "authentically." The authentic disclosure of the Situation is grounded in what Heidegger calls "freedom" in MFL ¶10.

8. Freedom is never simply the freedom of a subject, but is essentially the letting-be of entities which Dasein encounters: "Ontically, 'letting something be involved' signifies that within our factual concern we let something ready-to-hand be so-and-so as it is already and in order that it be such . . . . Letting an entity be involved, if we understand this ontologically, consists in previously freeing it for [auf] its readiness-to-hand within the environment" (BT 117/84-85).
Chapter IV
The Science of Being and the Turn

In the following pages I wish to show how Heidegger completes his ontological project and how the metontological overturning of ontology is implicit in the very fulfilling of this project. To this end our discussion will first take up the issues of the science of Being, the objectification of Being, and what is meant by the explicit carrying out of the ontological difference. We shall then examine closely Heidegger's horizontal analysis of the projection of the ecstasis of the present upon praesens, and show how his discussion of Temporality contributes to the completion of the ontological project. It will then be possible to show how the result of ontological inquiry is such as to lead immediately to the problematic of finitude ("concreteness") in the formal sense already indicated in our previous discussions, as well as to require the more radical Umschlag that signifies the "turn" in Heidegger's thought.

The first paragraph of the Appendix to MFL presents the total structure of the fundamental-ontological project in a three-stage formulation:

By a fundamental ontology we mean the basic grounding of ontology in general. This includes: 1) a grounding that exhibits the intrinsic possibility of the question of Being as the basic problem of metaphysics—the interpretation of Dasein as temporality [Zeitlichkeit]; 2) the explication of the basic problems contained in the question of Being—the temporal [temporale] exposition of the problem of Being; 3) the development of the self-understanding of this problematic, its task and limits—the overturning [der Umschlag]. (154/196)
The definition of fundamental ontology is followed by a listing of the various "stages" of its development. Each stage contains a statement of the task at that level followed by a formula indicating how the task is fulfilled. Thus, the first task is to exhibit the ground of the question of Being, and this task is accomplished through the interpretation of Dasein as temporality.

Heidegger's statement (1) seems to be ambiguous--does it mean that the grounding exhibits how the question of Being can be the basic problem of metaphysics, i.e. how it is that metaphysics is constituted through Dasein's asking the question of Being; or does it mean that the basic problem of metaphysics is to exhibit the ground of the intrinsic possibility of the question of Being? But the two readings come to the same thing, for the fundamental problem of metaphysics (as fundamental ontology) is to show how the Being-question can be the fundamental problem of metaphysics (ontology in general). 1 Within the self-referential structure of fundamental ontology, what is questioned is the possibility of the question of Being itself (cf. MFL, pp. 214-15). Fundamental ontology grounds the question of Being in the temporality of Dasein--this is the task undertaken in the published portion of Being and Time. 2

There is thus an ambiguity, a twofold sense to the expression "the question of Being." Since the question of Being is the basic problem of metaphysics, metaphysics, in its every occurrence--and the tradition consists in the constant occurrence, the ongoing recurrence, of metaphysics--arises as an "answer" to the question of Being. The "question of Being" designates the nature of that event which takes
place in metaphysics. It is the event of transcendence, the "Being-process," as Richardson calls it, wherein an interpretation of the Being of beings comes to pass.

Thus the "question of Being" is answered in every metaphysical enterprise, in the sense that philosophy, which is always fundamentally "metaphysical," emerges in the question of Being and as a response to it. Philosophy itself is the "answer" to the question of Being.

But fundamental ontology, as an inquiry into the intrinsic possibility of the Being-question, seeks to ground that question in a source giving rise to it as a "possibility." Such a possibility arises only in the movement of transcendence, so that fundamental ontology has as its subject-matter transcendence or Seinsverständnis itself. The task of the existential analysis of Dasein is to show how Dasein is itself constituted by "the question of Being," in its essence, for the "existence" of Dasein, in which its essence lies, takes place as interpretation of Being, and thus in every case as something like an "answering" of the question of Being. The "question of Being," for Heidegger, names the structure of the "act" in which transcendence is realized. Thus the analysis of Dasein must exhibit the horizon upon which the answer, the interpretation of Being, is projected. Dasein projects the meaning of Being upon time. Time itself, as the temporalization of temporality, makes the question of Being possible, and is itself the implicit horizon for any possible answer. Time grounds the possibility of the question of Being.

But if philosophy is always, as understanding of Being, an answer to the question of Being, in what sense does fundamental ontology
answer this question, which it asks for the first time explicitly, and therefore in a more fundamental way than the tradition? Precisely because it asks the question explicitly in an attempt to overcome the "forgottenness" of Being, it can do so only by "going beyond Being" (epekeina tes ousias), and thus showing how the interpretation of Being can only arise in something other than Being, beyond Being, namely, time. Its own way of asking the question, and of "answering" it—for it must exhibit the same structure as any other metaphysical enterprise—has the effect, as we shall see more clearly below, of subordinating Being to something else, so that the "primacy" of Being in the tradition is already threatened at this early stage. The fundamental-ontological answer to the question of Being can be formulated this way: Being is time. We shall examine the paradox implicit in this answer below.

The twofold sense of the question of Being manifests precisely that ambiguity or twofoldness which sustains the Heideggerian enterprise at its center. In this ambiguity we have a clue to the relation to be thematized more explicitly in the relation of fundamental ontology to metontology. We are attempting to establish how this "twofold relation" forms the central issue of Heidegger's early thought.

Fundamental ontology is not directly and immediately "about" Being but attempts to establish the possibility of the understanding of Being, of Seinsverständnis as such. The immediate subject-matter of research in fundamental ontology is not Being but Dasein. Heidegger summarizes, in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology, the outcome of the analysis of Dasein as follows:
In my treatise on *Being and Time*, I set forth what the existential analysis encompasses in its essential results. The outcome of the existential analytic, the exposition of the ontological constitution of Dasein in its ground, is this: the constitution of Dasein's Being is grounded in temporality [Zeitlichkeit]. (BP 228)

In this way the projects of *Being and Time* and of *Basic Problems* are brought into a common framework, inasmuch as Heidegger now proceeds to treat the project of *Basic Problems* as presupposing, and fulfilling, the existential analysis undertaken in *Being and Time*. The second "stage" in Heidegger's outline of fundamental ontology refers to the investigations undertaken in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*—the so-called "science of ontology."

*Basic Problems* undertakes, at least in outline, the investigations that were to have been the theme of the unpublished Part One, Division Three of *Being and Time*, under the title "Time and Being." It is these investigations that Heidegger refers to in the formulation of the second stage of fundamental ontology: "2) the explication of the basic problems contained in the question of Being—the temporal [temporale] exposition of the problem of Being." The "basic problems" are the four basic problems of phenomenology, which together constitute "ontology." Ontology shows how each "problem"—the ontological difference, the basic articulation of Being, the possible modifications of Being and the unity of Being, and the truth-character of Being—has its root in Temporality (Temporalität). "The fundamental subject of research in ontology, as determination of the meaning of Being by way of time, is Temporality" (BP 17). In the lecture course *Basic Problems*, Heidegger gets as far as the temporale exposition of only one problem, that of the ontological difference.
Now Temporalität

means temporality [Zeitlichkeit] insofar as temporality itself is made into a theme as the condition of the possibility of the understanding of Being and of ontology as such. The term "Temporalität" [Temporalität] is intended to indicate that temporality represents the horizon from which we understand Being. (228)

Why does Heidegger seem to have two names for the "same thing," primordial time? How does the second stage of fundamental ontology, in which the goal of fundamental ontology is achieved, differ from the existential analytic—what, in short, is ontology?

The design of the completed portion of Part Two (BP), entitled "The Problem of the Ontological Difference," suggests the character of the relationship between fundamental ontology and ontology, and therefore between Zeitlichkeit and Temporalität:

19. Time and temporality
20. Temporality [Zeitlichkeit] and Temporalität [Temporalität]
21. Temporality [Temporalität] and Being
22. Being and beings. The ontological difference

The chapter on ontological difference is organized according to the model of the Platonic dialectic, with its double route of "ascent" and "descent." In §19 Heidegger elicits the concept of original time (Zeitlichkeit) on the basis of an analysis of the Aristotelean text (Aristotle's "treatise on time" at Physics 4.10-14), and through a phenomenological analysis of ordinary time. By these means, the concept of primordial time is established in advance of further investigation into the relationship between temporality and Seinsverständnis—just in the same way that Plato introduces the concept of
the Good in the Republic (VI.502-509) prior to exhibiting its role in the dialectic.

Heidegger himself introduces a thematic identification of the problematic of time with that of the Good in Plato's Republic: "... we are moving within one of Plato's fundamental problems" (BP 282-83); and he refers to "the Platonic order of inquiry" at BP 282. Heidegger's "ascent" or analysis exhibits the "condition of the possibility" of the understanding of Being (Zeitlichkeit), while the "descent" or synthesis displays the total structure of the relationship between time as horizon (Temporality) and Seinsverständnis. In the Republic Socrates says concerning the double structure of inquiry:

"Understand then," said I, "that by the other section of the intelligible I mean that which the reason (logos) itself lays hold of by the power of dialectics, treating its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses (hypotheseseis), underpinnings, footings, and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting-point of all (pantos archein), and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any object of sense but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas." Rep. VI.511 b-c.4

Section 19 ends with the question: "How does temporality make Seinsverständnis possible" (BP 274/388)? Section 20 undertakes the "ascent" by showing that "temporality is the condition of the possibility of all understanding of Being; Being is understood and conceptually comprehended by means of time" (274). Zeitlichkeit is the ultimate term in the sequence of projections constituting the structure of the understanding (BP 308, ¶21). Here Heidegger repeats, in summary fashion, the analysis of the temporality of Dasein undertaken in Being and Time. Thus, Being and Time itself represents the "ascent" to the
epoikeina tes ousias, Zeitlichkeit as the horizon of the understanding of Being.

Analysis on the Platonic model yields insight (noesis) into the final source of thought and being. Only synthesis, however, yields science (episteme), in that the latter exists only when the interconnections among all ideas, and the relation of these to the Good, are brought into full view. Heidegger's "science of Being" exhibits in explicit fashion the interconnection between the understanding of the Being of beings and time. It is from the standpoint of this "synthesis," this view of the whole, that Zeitlichkeit is called Temporalität. "We call this entire problematic Temporalität" (228). Temporalität is Zeitlichkeit from the standpoint of synthesis, that is, from the standpoint of the possibility of giving an account (logos) of the whole. It is in the demonstration of the horizontal role of Temporality in the understanding of Being that Heidegger completes the project announced in Being and Time of "getting Dasein as a whole into our grasp" (cf BT 281).

The identity of Temporalität with Zeitlichkeit is clearly emphasized. Analysis yields Zeitlichkeit as the condition of the possibility of the understanding of Being. When the "synthetic" question, "how does temporality make such understanding of Being possible?" (274, italics added), is asked, then the question is how "time as temporality [is] the horizon for the explicit understanding of Being as such . . . ?" (274). For this question of the "descent," that is to say "in its role as condition of possibility of the understanding of Being, both pre-ontological and ontological, we shall call Zeitlichkeit
Section 20 undertakes the ascent by showing how Being-in-the-world "is already, as such, understanding of Being" (292), and does so by exhibiting the interconnections between "Being-in-the-world, transcendence, and temporality" (120(e); 294). Being-in-the-world is possible for Dasein because Dasein oversteps beings toward world. "Because Dasein is constituted by Being-in-the-world, it is a being which in its Being is out beyond itself. The epekeina belongs to Dasein's own most peculiar structure of Being" (299). Thus, "Dasein is the transcendent being" (300). Transcendence "makes possible coming back to beings, so that the antecedent understanding of Being is founded on transcendence" (300). But if Being-in-the-world (which manifests the projective structure of "understanding of Being") is founded in transcendence, then it is necessary to ask "in what is Dasein's transcendence itself grounded?" (301). "The ecstatic character of time makes possible Dasein's specific overstepping, transcendence, and thus also the world" (302). The "ascent" is completed in Zeitlichkeit, which is not only "ecstasis" but the horizontal unity of the ecstases: "The transcendence of Being-in-the-world is founded in its specific wholeness on the original ecstatic-horizontal unity of Zeitlichkeit" (301). Thus, "Zeitlichkeit is the condition of the possibility of the understanding of Being" (301).

The understanding's glimpse of "that upon which it projects" "as unveiled" (284), the end of the existential analyses undertaken in Being and Time, does not yet guarantee that the way in which "the understanding of the Being of beings" is "made possible by time" will
be "transparent" (294) to us. Hence the ascent, the existential analysis, only prepares for the task which will complete the investigation undertaken by fundamental ontology into the constitution of Dasein's Being—namely, ontology, the "science of Being." Section 21 undertakes the synthesis:

The task now is to comprehend how, on the basis of the temporality that grounds Dasein's transcendence, Dasein's Temporality makes possible the understanding of Being. (302)

Here we have the program of the "descent" clearly formulated, namely to show, on the basis of the eliciting of temporality as the horizon of the understanding of Being, how that temporality (now Temporality) makes the understanding of Being possible.

We shall examine the movement of "synthesis" (§21) in greater detail below. The issue of the "science of Being" remains Seinsverständnis, the understanding of Being—for there is no "Being" by itself. "Being is given only if the understanding of Being, hence Dasein, exists" (19). It is for this reason that one can say that Heidegger's own name for the "synthesis" is die Kehre, the Turn from "Being and time" to "time and Being." For by showing how Temporality makes the understanding of Being possible, the predominating role of "Being" in its traditional interpretation as praesens is undercut, since "Being" is no longer the ultimate term of metaphysical inquiry. If Being "is there" only where there is understanding of Being, and understanding has its source in the temporalization of temporality, then the inexplicit interpretation of Being as praesens, sustaining both the everyday understanding of Being and that of the tradition, itself rests upon the "forgotten" primacy of time. Heidegger, it is
true, does not announce the significance of this turning. We can catch a glimpse of the difficulty of the issue, why Heidegger does not address it directly, if we use Gadamer's formula, that according to Heidegger "Being is time." This at first offensive formulation captures the entanglement of Heidegger's enterprise in the language of Being, i.e. in the language of metaphysics, and therefore the impossibility of completing it in its own terms. The phrase suggests the infinite series of projections required, in spite of Heidegger's claim regarding the limiting of the series in the projection upon time, if we are to understand anything like "time." If all understanding is understanding of Being, then how is time itself, upon which the understanding of Being is projected, to be understood? How is any discourse concerning time itself possible, except that which reverts to the language of Being (presence) and therefore already depends upon the temporal projection? The "turn" in Heidegger's thought, which at first, at least, we must distinguish formally from the turn as initially conceived (from "Being and time" to "time and Being") is the effect of Heidegger's grappling with the fundamental question of the language required to address the ἐπεκείνα τες οὐσίας, the "origin" of metaphysical understanding, i.e. of the understanding of Being.

The analogy with the Platonic "route of inquiry" has made it clear that the "science of Being" for Heidegger corresponds to the Platonic ἐπιστήμη, the synthetic view of the whole. What has to be shown is how time makes the understanding of Being possible. This means, precisely, to exhibit the interconnection of temporality with the understanding of Being at every level, to exhibit the total
structure of Dasein's transcendence in its grounding in temporali-
zation. The interconnection or "synthesis" is demonstrated in §21 on
the basis of an analysis of the Being of the handy. Being is shown
here to be understood on the basis of a projection upon the ecstatic
horizon of praesens. By thus making explicit what constitutes the
"Being" of beings in the understanding of beings, the science of Being
explicitly accomplishes the differentiation of Being from beings
(§22). The ontological difference signifies the explicit carrying out
of this interpretation of the meaning of Being, otherwise implicit in
all understanding of Being. The synthetic view of the whole, which
presumably makes the Being of Dasein itself "transparent," accomplishes
the explicit carrying out of the ontological difference at the same
time that it establishes how the understanding of Being is grounded in
temporality. For in the process of demonstrating that the projection
of the meaning of the Being of the (handy) being is directed toward
time as its horizon, the investigation shows that the "meaning" of
Being is time (praesens)--indeed, the two theses are demonstrated in
the same gesture. In short, "Being" takes its meaning from the manner
in which it is projected, by everyday (pre-ontological) understanding,
upon time. The "science of Being" shows in what this projection con-
sists; thereby the projection becomes "ontological," i.e. explicit with
regard to the meaning of Being. "Being" does not lie beyond the sphere
of transcendence, but names the interpretive moment determining all
com-portment, all openness, toward beings. In "stepping beyond" beings
to Being, beings are understood from praesens. Being belongs to the
structure of transcendence, even for the "science of Being." To
demonstrate explicitly the manner in which Being is projected in the understanding of Being is the goal of the science of Being and makes up its content. Thus, the science of Being is wholly comprised by the four "fundamental problems of phenomenology" and already makes up the subject-matter of the chapter on ontological difference in Basic Problems of Phenomenology.

There is no indication here that Heidegger envisions a future "science of Being" which will inquire into the true "meaning of Being" --thereby putting philosophy on a secure grounding and turning it, at last, into a science, accurate beyond all interpretation. What is at stake in ontology is not a "science" in the modern sense (a field of inquiry continuing to expand in its research on the basis of methodological directives) but something like an episteme in the classical sense of the grasping of a synthetic interconnection of elements, a view of the whole founded in a grasp of the primal arche. The "whole" here is Seinsverständnis, and it is Seinsverständnis which is the true subject-matter of the science of Being. Being is the "object" of this science, not only because Being is necessarily the "object" of all philosophy, but because it is only by clarifying the way in which Being is projected by the understanding that the nature of the understanding itself can become clear. And this is, in the first instance at least, the aim of ontology: to apprehend the nature of the "event" that takes place with the existence of Dasein, to understand how, in transcendence, philosophy as an interpretation of the Being of beings can arise; how, in the "happening" (Geschehen) that Dasein is, something like Seinsverständnis can come to pass.
We have seen that the function of ontology is to complete the task of fundamental ontology by presenting the "synthesis" of the whole, in the Temporal exposition of the understanding of Being. In this way, the possibility of such understanding is thoroughly grounded in the temporalization of temporality (assuming that the exposition is completed). Section 22 presents the resulting "view of the whole" in the form of an explication of the ontological difference. What is the ultimate goal of this attempt to grasp, in rigorous, "scientific" fashion the "wholeness" of Dasein, i.e. the full structure of transcendence? What finally is achieved with the explicit carrying out of the ontological difference?

The question of ontology is how Seinsverständnis is possible on the basis of temporality. Seinsverständnis, however, is nothing other than the carrying out of the ontological difference, implicitly or explicitly. The understanding of Being is ordinarily "pre-ontological," in that such understanding is usually merely implicit. The aim of §21 was to show what understanding of the Being of beings was indeed implicit in pre-ontological understanding—in everyday comportment toward beings—thereby making it explicit. The "meaning of Being" is, from the perspective of the problem of the ontological difference, precisely that implicit projection made explicit, namely the projection of Being as praesens.

Section 22 recapitulates the result of the ontological inquiry, the explicit carrying out of the ontological difference, in order to show how ontology thereby achieves an "objectification" (Vergegenständigung) of Being, and thereby constituted itself a science.
In order to understand further the "scientific" character of this achievement, we must first recall that the understanding of Being takes two forms, pre-ontological and ontological. In the first, the understanding of Being remains implicit:

Being itself, if indeed we understand it, must somehow or other be projected upon something. This does not mean that in this projection Being must be objectively apprehended or interpreted and defined, conceptually comprehended, as something objectively apprehended. . . . Being is projected upon something from which it becomes understandable, but in an unobjective way. It is understood as yet pre-conceptually, without a logos. (281)

The objectification of Being means to make explicit what is already implicit in pre-ontological understanding. "The understanding of Being in general in the pre-conceptual sense is . . . the condition of the possibility that Being should be objectified, thematized at all" (281). Furthermore, "A scientific investigation constitutes itself in the objectification of what has somehow already been unveiled" (320). This latter statement, representing Heidegger's formal definition of science, is his addition to the classical concept of episteme. Ontology is a science precisely because it clarifies that understanding of Being already operative in the everyday comportment of Dasein. We must be careful, therefore, not to mistake ontology for a distinct "science" with a special "object," "Being," the investigation of which would leave behind the field of inquiry opened up by fundamental ontology. On the contrary, ontology is nothing other than the final moment of the inquiry, the radical clarification of the internal structure (the ontological difference) of that field (transcendence).8

Ontology is accomplished when the understanding can "somehow see, as unveiled, that upon which it projects" (284; note reference to
"seeing the sun" in the Platonic allegory of the cave), i.e., when it can see temporality as the horizon of the projection of Being. This is possible, however, only if this ontological difference is carried out explicitly, if Being is "objectified" and therefore fully distinguished from beings. Thus Heidegger distinguishes between the "distinction" (Unterschied) of Being and beings, and the explicitly carried out difference (Differenz):

The distinction [Unterschied] between Being and beings is there [ist da], latent in Dasein and its existence, even if not in explicit awareness. . . . Existence means, as it were, "to be in the performance of this distinction." . . . The distinction between Being and beings exists pre-ontologically, without an explicit concept of Being, latent in Dasein's existence. As such it can become an explicitly understood difference [Differenz]. (319)9

Ontology comes into its own as a science when it is able to distinguish "the mode of knowing operative in ontology as science of Being, and this requires us to work out the methodological structure of ontological-transcendental differentiation" (20). In the end, the task is to establish the interconnection between Being and time; this aim is served by ontology when it thematizes Being by showing that time is "the condition of the possibility of all understanding of Being" (274). The science of ontology consists in the explicit differentiation of Being from beings, accomplished by showing how Being is dependent upon time—that is to say, how the understanding of Being has its horizon in Temporalität. Ontology makes explicit what interpretation of Being is already implicit in the understanding of beings, namely that Being is praesens. The demonstration that time is the horizon of the understanding of Being has effected the carrying out of the ontological difference, and has therefore established the science of
What, then, is achieved when the ontological difference is carried out explicitly in the science of Being, and therefore the essence of all understanding of Being is made manifest? This question is equivalent to that concerning the ultimate significance of ontology itself.

Pre-ontological understanding is the basis for the positive sciences, which "constitute themselves in the objectification of beings where the objectification holds itself in the tendency of everyday direct apprehension" (321). In short, the positive sciences are founded in a projection based upon this pre-ontological awareness (321). More importantly for understanding what is at stake in ontology, such a projection also underlies traditional ontology. But everyday understanding does not distinguish clearly between Being and beings, so that, in traditional ontology, "Being itself is even treated at first like a being and explained by means of determination of beings, as at the beginning of ancient philosophy. . . . and at bottom this interpretation has remained the usual one in philosophy right down to the present day" (318-19).

In view of this reference to the tradition, what "difference" does the explicit carrying out of the ontological difference make? Does ontology add, to the series of possible philosophies, one more philosophy, even if the final one, founded at last in a scientific inquiry? Or is it not clearly the case that ontology makes explicit what is already implicit at the heart of all traditional philosophy (that Being is understood as praesens)? What, then, is the status of
ontology? Is ontology the "true philosophy" at last, or does it accomplish anything more than an exposition of the "forgottenness" of Being in the tradition—and hence initiate the Destruktion?

Or is it not possible that both accomplishments are essentially equivalent in view of the fundamental "methodology" which is at work even, as Heidegger tells us, in this "scientific" text:

Reference to the fact that the Greeks understood Being by way of the present, by means of praesens, is a confirmation not to be overestimated for our interpretation of the possibility of understanding Being by time; but it nevertheless does not establish it basically. Still, it is testimony that in our own interpretation of Being we are attempting nothing other than the repetition of the problems of ancient philosophy in order to radicalize them in this repetition by their own selves. (315-16)

The radicalization of philosophy, whereby the forgottenness of Being is overcome, takes place in the self-repetition of the problems of philosophy. Repetition makes explicit what is already at work—the interpretation of Being as praesens, the Temporal horizon of the understanding of Being—in the tradition. Ontology, the central moment in repetition, overcomes the forgottenness of Being by showing what "Being" truly is in the tradition. Ontology discloses the essence of philosophy, the carrying out of the ontological difference; since it shows how philosophy answers the ontological question (the question of the Being of beings), it constitutes, in the terms of MFL, the first half of metaphysics. Metaphysics is just the "essence" of philosophy; it is the event always implicitly at work in philosophy. The carrying out of the ontological difference (transcendence) is the explication of the structure of this event which determines philosophy as philosophy.

The moment of ontology, which exhibits what is concealed in the tradition, i.e. it exhibits the concealed "essence" of philosophy, is
not by itself the goal of repetition. Ontology overcomes the forgottenness of Being in "objectifying" Being, but this means that Temporality is shown to be the horizon of the interpretation of Being. At the very moment of overcoming the forgottenness of Being, the center of metaphysics is shifted from Being to time. It is now seen that "Time is the origin of possibility." As origin, time can give rise to possibilities not envisioned in the tradition. The goal of repetition is renewal, is, indeed, the transformation of the tradition. If we keep in view the structure of Heidegger's project as a whole (the two sides of the metaphysics of Dasein) then we can see that ontology serves as the moment of turning in philosophy, that it constitutes itself as the passageway whereby the tradition itself can give rise to the renewal of philosophy. The overcoming of the forgottenness of Being is meant to result, not in a new textbook on the true meaning of Being, but in the potential transformation of philosophy qua philosophy.

Heidegger's own work does not, by itself, attempt to determine the specific form of future philosophy--this remains true even for the later work--but has as its sole aim the "transformation of the site" of thinking, for the sake of a renewal of what, for the present, we can call the possibilities of thinking. This project is deeply radicalized after the "turn" in Heidegger's thought, but the aim of the project remains the same throughout Heidegger's work.

"In fact, that 'place' is, in every philosophy, an occupied place, and it is in each case transformed" (MFL 157/200). It is the passage through the "place" of fundamental ontology that enables the transformation of philosophy, which never exhibits, concretely
speaking, the bare neutrality of ontology, but always takes place in relation to a specific "whole of being"—so that a metontology is required to complete the metaphysics of Dasein. Philosophy always "occurs" as a transformation of philosophy.

Ontology returns the traditional interpretation of Being to its source. This source is time, "the origin of possibility itself" (BP 325). But the return and gathering of philosophy into its source, temporalization, raises several further issues, particularly when we look more closely at the nature of time.

"Time" answers the question of the meaning of Being; we find a formulation of this answer at the end of §20 of Basic Problems:

The transcendence of Being-in-the-world is founded in its specific wholeness on the original ecstatic-horizontal unity of temporality. If transcendence makes possible the understanding of Being and if transcendence is founded on the ecstatic-horizontal constitution of temporality, then temporality is the condition of the possibility of the understanding of Being.

(302)

The task that now follows, Heidegger says at the beginning of §21, "is to comprehend how, on the basis of the temporality that grounds Dasein's transcendence, Dasein's Temporality makes possible the understanding of Being" (302). This task, as we have already suggested, constitutes the "synthetic" inquiry following the "ascent" to temporality; it therefore constitutes the science of Being proper. In this section, Heidegger demonstrates how Temporality (temporality in the "descent") makes the understanding of Being possible in a specific sense, "namely, the understanding of Being in the sense of extantness in its broadest signification" (302). In the second part, (b), of this section, Heidegger will show how Kant's interpretation of Being as
"position" has the same source as the understanding of Being in its extantness. Thus his analysis of the horizon of this understanding of Being (praezens) relates back to the concept of Being which underlies the tradition. It therefore constitutes the climax of the Destruktion, since it exhibits the source of that understanding of Being which is operative in the tradition. It is precisely at this culminating point that a repetition becomes possible. Indeed, Heidegger says here that in our own interpretation of Being we are attempting nothing other than the repetition of the problems of ancient philosophy in order to radicalize them in this repetition by their own selves. (316)

To return to Heidegger's Temporal interpretatin of "handiness":

The overriding issue is how "Being-in-the-world itself [is] possible as a whole" (301). The problem, then, is the interconnection of world and temporalization. Heidegger goes so far here as to identify Dasein's transcendence with "world-understanding" (302). Seinsverständnis itself is always a "world-understanding." Heidegger introduces the concept of openness (one way of saying "world") here: "The being we call Dasein is as such open for... . . . Openness belongs to its being" (300). (See MFL 210: "Time is essentially a self-opening and expanding into a world.") "There would be nothing like a horizon for us if there were not ecstatic openness for... and a schematic determination of that openness, say, in the sense of praezens" (308). The concept of the horizon is that of a limitation (schematic determination) placed upon openness, so that beings can have a "determinate" way of appearing within the open domain. The horizon should not, of course, be conceived as "out-side" the open region but rather as the "schema" of the region itself. Both horizon and schema are ways of
expressing the "limit" character intrinsic to openness, without which there would not be any determinate beings or relatedness among beings. The type of relatedness approp-riate to the ecstasis of the present is functionality (Bewandtnis); functionality is the "way of Being" of the type of being that we encounter most "nearly," equipment (Zeug) en countered in its handiness. Praesens is the "horizontal schema of the ecstasis of enpresenting" (equipment is "made present" in enpresenting) because it is the way the Being of equipment is "sketched out" in advance for its being encountered within the open realm. The horizon determines the character of its "appearing." That praesens is a schematic determination of openness means that the "world" manifested in beings is fundamentally a world of functional relations. Praesens signifies that which makes functionality as such "possible" and thus lets the handy be encountered as handy.

That openness and thus world as such is determined as a "whole" by the horizon of praesens means that it is not possible to separate self-projection, ecstasis, and horizon, as if there were first of all "something" (or someone) that projected across an open space toward an already-established horizon. Rather, the "something" is just temporalization (self-projection) which, in each ecstasis, "has a horizon that is determined by [the ecstasis] and that first of all completes that ecstasis' own structure" (306). Temporalization is, as Heidegger will soon say (MFL 209) "worlding" of world, so that self-projection, ecstasis and horizon can only be conceived as belonging in a unity to this event as a whole. Self-projection is temporalization, the event as such; the event has a projective character, i.e., it
occurs in ekstases; and the event is determinate in character, i.e., it takes place in relation to a horizon or "schematic determination."

Thus we should not reify any of the aspects of Heidegger's analysis of temporalization, the unity of which Heidegger expresses as follows:

"Temporality in general is ecstatic-horizonal self-projection simply as such, on the basis of which Dasein's transcendence is possible. (312)"

We now turn to the demonstration of how a specific understanding of Being is indeed made possible through Temporality. It is through such a demonstration that the ontological difference is carried out explicitly, since it is here that the usually implicit dependence of our understanding of beings upon a temporal determination of Being is made explicit.

On a day-to-day basis, beings for the most part are encountered as extant, as beings accessible to us in the sense that we know something about them but, perhaps, do not really know how to "manage" with them, in the way that a shoemaker, for example, understands how to "deal appropriately" with the equipment found in his shop. Although we usually encounter beings in the privative mode of unfamiliarity, i.e., as merely extant, "this privative mode of the uncoveredness of the extant can be comprehended ontologically only from the structure of primary familiarity" (304). But this primary familiarity lies in dealing with beings appropriately—the capacity to do this is to "understand" beings in their mode of Being as equipment. Heidegger has already shown, in §20 (not to mention §15-18 of BT), how "the understanding of equipment traces back to the understanding of functionality, significance, and world, and hence to the ecstatic-horizonal constitution of Dasein" (305). He has also already shown (in
how commerce with the handy "constitutes itself with respect to its temporality in a retentive-expectant enpresenting of the equipment contexture as such" (304). The problem now is to exhibit how temporality is, indeed, constitutive (as ecstatic-horizontal) of the understanding of the handy as such; to show, in other words, how "handiness" is understood on the basis of the complete ecstatic-horizontal structure of temporality, i.e. of Temporality.

Handiness is not by itself a merely "positive" phenomenon—as extantness seems to be—but the handiness of the handy is encountered just as much in the unavailability of a piece of equipment as in its indeed being "at hand." Thus handiness is not understood through "categories" like being (being-extant) and not-being, but through "variations of a single basic phenomenon, which we may characterize formally as presence and absence, and in general as praesens" (305). Heidegger defers further analysis of this double structure of praesens until later in the section (pp. 309 ff.). Here he is concerned to show how, if handiness has a "praesensial meaning, then this would signify that this mode of Being is understood Temporally" (305). Thus the question is what praesens does indeed mean with respect to "time and temporality in general" (305).

Heidegger first distinguishes praesens from the "now." The now characterizes intratemporality, i.e., temporal relations among the handy and the extant, "whereas praesens is supposed to constitute the condition of possibility of understanding of handiness as such" (305). Now, the very description of the handy as intratemporal presupposes that we already understand handiness as such and, presumably,
understand it through something like praesens.

Again, the saying of the "now" is the way that the enpresenting of something, and therefore the moment, the Augenblick, can express itself. But the Augenblick (for example) is one of the ways that time temporalizes itself, specifically in the enpresenting of the present. Therefore, it would seem, praesens is identical with the present in the sense of "the enpresenting of . . ." [das Gegenwärtigen von . . .] (306/434-5), i.e., with one of the ecstasis of temporality. But this is not correct:

The name "praesens" itself already means that we do not mean by it an ecstatic phenomenon as we do with present and future, at any rate not the ecstatic phenomenon of temporality with regard to its ecstatic structure. (306)

The focus is, rather, upon something else: the horizontal structure whereby the ecstasis completes itself. Thus praesens is distinguished from enpresenting as horizon (of projection) is distinguished from ecstasis (projection as an "act"). But we must be careful here. The "horizon" (and thus Temporality) does not represent a pre-established framework already somehow "ready" for the projection of the ecstasis upon it. Heidegger emphasizes very sharply that the "connection between present and praesens" (306) is not accidental. The connection lies in the fact that the horizon belongs to the ecstasis and is determined by it: "Instead, each ecstasis as such has a horizon that is determined by it and that first of all completes the ecstasis' own structure" (306, emphasis mine). Indeed, it is the ecstasis which is "the condition of possibility of a specific 'beyond-itself,' of transcendence, the projection upon presence" (306). That praesens as horizon lies "beyond the ecstasis as such" is due to the character of
the ecstasis" (306, emphasis mine). Strictly speaking, then, Temporality is not the "horizon" of temporalization, but is simply temporalization in its complete structure: "Temporality [Temporalität] is temporality [Zeitlichkeit] with regard to the unity of the horizontal schemata belonging to it, in our case the present with regard to praesens" (307/436).

The connection between enpresenting and that upon which it projects is this: The projection of enpresenting upon praesens means that

As the condition of the possibility of the "beyond itself," the ecstasis of the present has within itself a schematic predesignation of the where out there this "beyond itself" is. (306)

There are two essential consequences of this interconnection between horizon and ecstasis, between praesens and the present. First:

Because praesens arises with and in the projecting (the ecstasis) itself, and because "as removal to . . . , the present is a being-open for what is encountered (Offen-sein für Begegnendes) which is thus understood antecedently upon praesens" (306-7m/436), then the Being of present beings is indeed understood "from the original horizontal schema of the ecstasis of temporality" (307). Thus "understanding" which itself is "being-open for what is encountered," is "schematized" in its (temporalizing) ecstasis by praesens. What is encountered in the open already has its Being "sketched in," schematically pre-determined, as "something present":

Everything that is encountered in the enpresenting [the ecstatic opening-out toward . . . ] is understood as something present [Anwesendes]—that is, understood upon presence—on the basis of the horizon, praesens, already removed in the ecstasis. If handiness and unavailability signify something like presence and absence—praesens modified and modifiable thus and so—the Being
of the beings encountered within the world is projected praesensially, which means, fundamentally, Temporally. (307)

This is what Heidegger has set out to prove. Of course, the "proof" here does not consist in establishing a relationship between already received philosophical notions, but rather in constructing the concepts of praesens, ecstasis, and Temporality by exhibiting their interrelationship on the basis of the inquiry into the horizontal character of time. In this way the "wholeness" of Dasein, with respect to the constitution of its Being, is brought into view, and the project of Being and Time, insofar as it lies in an attempt to get "Dasein as a whole into our grasp," is completed—or is, rather, completed with respect to the one ecstasis of the present. Through the disclosure, in this way, of the Being of Dasein as a whole, Heidegger has shown how temporality is the basic condition of transcendence as such:

Temporality is itself the basic condition of the possibility of all understanding that is founded on transcendence and whose essential structure lies in projection. (307)

But this leads us to the second conclusion to be drawn from the disclosure of the complete (i.e., ecstatic-horizontal) structure of transcendence. Temporality is "original self-projection simply as such" (307). That the complete structure of self-projection is articulated in the disclosure of its ecstatic-horizontal unity means that there can be no projection "beyond" the horizon, upon which the schemata themselves would be further projected:

Because the ecstatic-horizontal unity of temporality is intrinsically self-projection pure and simple, because as ecstatic it makes possible all projecting upon. . . . and represents, together with the horizon belonging to the ecstasis, the condition of possibility of an upon-which, an out-toward-which in general, it can no longer be asked upon what the schemata can on their part be projected, and so on in infinitum. The series, mentioned
earlier, of projections as it were inserted one before the other --understanding of beings, projecting upon Being, understanding of Being, projection upon time--has its end at the horizon of the ecstatic unity of temporality. (308)

To establish this in a more primordial way, Heidegger says, "we would have to go into the problem of the finitude of time" (308).

What does the finitude of time mean? At the horizon of the ecstatic unity of temporality not only each ecstasis but temporality itself "has its end" (308). "But," Heidegger adds, "this end is nothing but the beginning and starting point for the possibility of all projecting" (308). It is the unity of end and beginning that constitutes the finitude of time. The concept of primordial time is, in fact, that of a unity in which end and beginning are somehow the "same." What is involved in this relationship, not of identity, but of sameness constituted, as we maintain, by repetition?

By now we are quite familiar with the fact that the highest ontological concept is that of possibility, and that the theme of possibility is so intimately related to that of finitude that it is precisely at the point at which possibility as such comes fully into view that ontology gives way to the problematic of finitude, that is, to metontology. This is the "formal" transition from ontology to metontology. The investigation into the constitution of Dasein as a whole comes to an end with the discovery of Temporality, the origin of possibility:

Fundamentally it must be noted that if we define temporality as the original constitution of Dasein and thus as the origin of the possibility of the understanding of Being, then Temporality as origin is necessarily richer and more pregnant than anything that may arise from it. This makes manifest a peculiar circumstance, which is relevant throughout the whole of philosophy, namely, that within the ontological sphere the possible
is higher than everything actual. (308)

The question, if we are to understand the Umschlag, is how possibility does give rise to concrete possibilities, "possible actuality": What is the connection between Temporality as origin and concretely existing, finite Dasein?

The "finitude of time" is discussed most extensively in §§65 and 74 of Being and Time, and is discussed there in terms of repetition and possibility. The concretization of possibility occurs through the repetition of a concrete possibility.

In order to exhibit properly the extent to which Being and Time is itself concerned with the "concretization of possibility" it would be necessary to undertake an extensive interpretation of the second Division of BT. This is not possible here; all that we shall attempt is to indicate certain issues in §§65 and 74 that show how the analysis of primordial time contains within itself the impetus for an "over-turning" into metontology, i.e., into the problematics of finitude.

We recall that in Heidegger's discussion of Leibniz, the primordial unifying character of drive is "concretized" only in the restrictedness of the viewpoint, which in turn is constitutive for drive.

From the standpoint of the problematic of Dasein's existence, temporalization is significant only in relation to Dasein's concrete, factical existence. Thus, in §65 of BT we read that "anticipatory resoluteness ... is Being towards one's ownmost, distinctive potentiality-for-Being" (372). But

This sort of thing is possible only in that Dasein can, indeed, come towards itself in its ownmost possibility, and that it can
put up with this possibility as a possibility in thus letting itself come towards itself—in other words, that it exists. This letting-itself-come-towards-itself in that distinctive possibility which it puts up with, is the primordial phenomenon of the future as coming towards. (372)

Given then that the "primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future" (378), Heidegger proceeds to demonstrate the unity of temporality in its three ecstases. Here he is engaged in "opening up" the meaning of Care in its temporal structure. Anticipatory resoluteness, which "understands Dasein in its own essential Being-guilty" (373) takes over thrownness; but this lets futural Dasein "be its . . .'been' ['Gewesen']" (373/326). "Anticipation of one's uttermost and ownmost possibility is coming back understandingly to one's ownmost 'been'" (373). At the same time, "resolute being-alongside what is ready-to-hand in the Situation . . . is possible only by making such an entity present" (374). Heidegger summarizes his analysis of the temporality disclosed in anticipatory resoluteness as follows:

Coming back to itself futurally, resoluteness brings itself into the Situation by making present. The character of "having been" arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which "has been" . . . releases itself from the Present. This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as "temporality." Only in so far as Dasein has the definite character of temporality, is the authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole of anticipatory resoluteness, as we have described it, made possible for Dasein itself. Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care. (374)

Heidegger is here effecting a transition between his earlier analysis of the way in which resoluteness, as authentic disclosedness, "brings the Being of the 'there' into the existence of the Situation" (347). "[W]hen the call of conscience summons us to our potentiality-
for-Being, it does not hold before us some empty ideal of existence, but calls us forth into the Situation" (347). This, says Heidegger later on in the text, is "the primordial truth of existence" (355).

What is at stake in resoluteness, which brings Dasein into, and maintains it in, the Situation, is that it "be held open and free for the current factical possibility" (355). And it is here that the question of the potentiality-for-Being-a-whole is factically answered by Dasein (357). In other words, it is in the sort of "openness" to beings and to Others that is constitutive of the Situation that Dasein finds its wholeness at this initial level of the analysis. In its wholeness, Dasein is disclosive of the "reality" of its Situation. But this is a way of being finite--for Dasein to hold resolutely to the truth of its Situation (in the midst of beings), and thereby to disclose the truth of the Situation.

Heidegger's opening up of the temporal dimension of the Situation raises the issue of historicity, which must be understood as a historicity belonging specifically to situated Dasein. That is to say, the disclosure of the meaning of Dasein's Being as primordial temporality takes place on the basis of the analysis of the Situation and as an elaboration of it. Temporalization itself does not "depart from" the Situation, does not take place in vacuo, but shares in its finitude:

The authentic future is temporalized primordially by that temporality which makes up the meaning of anticipatory resoluteness; it thus reveals itself as finite. (378)

Indeed, temporality actually "constitutes" the finitude of the Situation, since the nullity (being-guilty as being-the-basis of a nullity) which we understand in resoluteness, and which brings us into the
Situation, is itself founded in futurity:

The primordial and authentic future is the "towards-oneself" (to oneself!), existing as the possibility of nullity, the possibility which is not to be outstripped. The ecstatical character of the primordial future lies in the fact that the future closes one's potentiality-for-Being; that is to say, the future is closed to one, and as such makes possible the resolute existentiell understanding of nullity. Primordial and authentic coming-towards-oneself is the meaning of existing in one's ownmost nullity. (378-79)

At the present level of the analysis, the "possibility of nullity" constitutes the meaning of the "primordial finitude of time."

With the further development of the analysis of the "temporality of Being-in-the-world," it becomes possible to further "concretize" the significance of temporalization. Dasein's temporalization in its full concreteness is its "historizing" [Geschehen] (427/375). In his discussion of "The Basic Constitution of Historicality [Geschichtlichkeit]" (¶74; 434/382), Heidegger expands, so to speak, his earlier analysis of the Situation on the basis of a richer analysis of temporalization. It is here that the concept of "possibility" becomes most concrete:

The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current factical possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them in terms of the heritage which that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over. In one's coming back resolutely to one's thrownness, there is hidden a handing down to oneself of the possibilities that have come down to one, but not necessarily as having thus come down. . . . The more authentically Dasein resolves--and this means that in anticipating death it understands itself unambiguously in terms of its ownmost distinctive possibility--the more unequivocally does it choose and find the possibility of its existence, and the less does it do so by accident. Only by the anticipation of death is every accidental and 'provisional' possibility drive out. Only Being-free for death, gives Dasein its goal outright and pushes existence into its finitude. Once one has grasped the finitude of one's existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one . . . and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate [Schicksals].
This is how we designate Dasein's primordial historizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen. (435/383-84)

But, Heidegger says, "the resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, then becomes the repetition of a possibility of existence that has come down to us" (437). **Possibility is concretized in repetition.**

The indications that we have elicited from Being and Time concerning the nature of the concretization of possibility for Dasein—and thus of the nature of the metontological transition at what are calling its "formal" level—are not meant to constitute a proof of the way that primordial temporality necessarily gives rise to a determinate possibility of repetition, and therefore contains within itself the concept of a "possible actuality" in this sense. In order to complete a proof, the horizons of the future and of the past would have to be investigated in the same manner in which Heidegger analyzes the horizon of the present in praesens. In other words, the full structure of time in its finitude would have to be exhibited. It would then, presumably, become clearer still that the finitude of time means that temporalization always "occurs" in relation to the thrownness of Dasein, and thus in relation to the possibility of its taking over determinate possibilities made available to it through its very "situatedness."

Whether we think of the situatedness of Dasein in terms of its Situation or its historizing, that Dasein is thrown means that it has available to its potentiality-for-Being only certain possibilities for disclosure, possibilities which belong, indeed, to its "time" and "place." "Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes
to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein" (436). The first and formal sense of the metontological Umschlag is this: Implicit in the ecstatic-horizonal character of temporalization itself lies the necessity that disclosure take place in a "historizing" ("historizing" is the metontological term for "temporality"), i.e., in the taking over of a determinate possibility in relation to a determinate tradition from out of a determinate situation (of which one's "generation" is an element). The concept of the finitude of time, arrived at through the ontological analysis—in the terms of ¶10 of MFL, on the basis of the neutrality of Dasein—gives rise to the concept of Dasein's essential concreteness. This means that Heidegger's own project stands under the law of finitude, and cannot stand outside the tradition to establish its basis and measure in a genuinely neutral, i.e., ontologically independent, Dasein. Rather than abandoning the project, however, Heidegger undertakes a more decisive questioning of finitude as the "source" of Dasein (cf. KPM 244). "The laying of the foundation of metaphysics is rooted in the question of the finitude of man in such a way that this finitude itself can first become a problem" (KPM 225). Regarding the finitude of the ontological project, Heidegger says in KPM:

In any case, there is reason to believe that the explication of the essence of finitude required for the establishment of metaphysics must itself always be basically finite and never absolute. . . . It remains, therefore, only to develop the problematic of finitude as such. (KPM 245)

This development can occur, however, only insofar as the "ontological" project places itself into the tradition in such a way as to repeat, on the same ground as that which gives rise to the tradition,
the source of the possibility of "the laying of the foundation" of
metaphysics. The role of ontology is taken over by a questioning which
is intrinsically historical: "[T]he basic attitude of the questioning
is in itself historical; it stands and maintains itself in happening,
inquiring out of happening for the sake of happening" (IM 45). The
finitude of fundamental questioning means that it places itself within
happening [Geschehen] for the sake of a renewal of "philosophy" (as
"happening") on the basis of a transformation occurring within the
"event," happening, itself. This transformation takes place with the
Verwindung, torsion, of metaphysics upon itself, and gains its signifi-
cance from die Kehre, the turning "of" the history of Being.

The metontological problematic is that of the irruption of meta-
physics, i.e., of the understanding of Being, into the midst of being
as a whole. The possibility of such an event is what Heidegger means
by "history." Human existence, as finite, is "for" such happening:

With the existence of man there occurs an irruption into
being as a whole such that, by this event, being becomes mani-
fest in itself, i.e., manifest as in being. . . . However, this
prerogative of not simply being one being among other beings,
which latter are not manifest to one another, but, in the midst
of beings, of being delivered up to them as such and of being
answerable to oneself as in being, in short, this prerogative of
existing, involves in itself the necessity of an understanding of
Being. (KPM 235-36/205-6)

Here "Being" means first of all the "beingness" of beings. The meton-
tological "turn" means that questioning turns to the problem of the
possibility of this event, the irruption into the midst of beings of an
understanding of Being, whereby beings become manifest as such and as a
whole.

The metontological overturning of the transcendental-horizontal
from of inquiry follows also from the second consequence of the finiteness of primordial time, namely that the ontological project undercuts its own possibility by destroying the feasibility of a "science of Being" in the very act of completing it.

The aim of fundamental ontology is to "get Dasein as a whole into our grasp"; the aim of the inquiry into the question of the meaning of Being is to make the Being of the questioner transparent to itself. The aim of ontology is to "objectify" Being, that is, to make explicit the understanding of Being already implicit in pre-ontological awareness, and to do so on the basis of a Temporal analysis of the horizon of the understandability of Being. Through this analysis, which is finally to make Dasein transparent to itself, understanding is to be made to "somehow see, as unveiled, that upon which it projects" (BP 284). But the "basic condition for the possibility of understanding the actual as actual is to look into the sun, so that the eye of knowledge should become sunlike" (285). But that which gives "luminous brightness" is the horizon itself (284). Thus in looking upon the horizon itself, the understanding sees the "sun," the luminous source of understanding; and, in doing so, it understands the horizon, and therefore understands understanding itself. Seinsverständnis becomes transparent to itself.

But if all understanding is projection, the question remains, in spite of Heidegger's asseveration concerning the limited number of projections in the series of projections (308), in relation to what horizon the horizon itself is understood. Is the ecstatic-horizonal structure of Temporality understood in terms of that ecstatic-horizonal
structure? But in that case no "ground" is obtained for that understanding--since it is its own ground--and it becomes difficult to see in what sense the understanding is made "transparent." But if, on the other hand, the series of projections does not come to an end with Temporality, then the understanding is also in this case not made transparent to itself. Here the problem is the ancient one of the possibility of the "knowledge of knowledge," with its involvement in the issues of self-reference and of finitude. For if primordial time is finite, then this means that in the ontological project finitude "grasps" finitude. Can finitude, in principle, become transparent to finitude? Is not the very meaning of finitude that it cannot become transparent to itself, that it cannot "leap over its own shadow"? The question arises whether the ontological project, as a project of horizontal inquiry, does not undercut its own possibility through the results of the inquiry. The finitude of the project makes it impossible that it should become transparent to itself--but that it should become transparent to itself is essential to the completion of the project: the objectification of "Being" in the explicit carrying out of the ontological difference, whereby the possibility of ontology in general is exhibited. The project of gathering philosophy into its "end" cannot be carried through to its end; the foundation cannot be established and the Turn cannot be carried out in the (foundational) terms of traditional metaphysics.

The failure of the transcendental-horizontal inquiry, implicit already in the concept of the finitude of time, leads to the second or radical sense of the metontological Umschlag. Here the "metontologi-
cal," i.e. finite, character of the project is recognized and carried out in its consequences.

David Krell, in his essay on metontology, seems to suggest—if I read him correctly—that the failure of the ontological project and the recognition of the radical finitude of inquiry leads, in essence, to the abandoning of the project of "fundamental" inquiry as such. In other words, finitude is to be equated with failure, rooted so deeply in any human project that any such project is permeated through and through with error. Here there seems to be a kind of incipient nihilism, as if thought had to be abandoned in the face of the finitude of all questioning inquiry.

If this were the case, then it would not be possible to determine that human thought is finite, since this itself is the "positive" result of a determinate course of inquiry. If finitude is identical with error (in the sense of the untrue) then finitude is not true, either—and there is no reason to speak of the failure of thought attendant upon finitude.

Heidegger's response to the radical problematization of finitude is of a different order. Now the problem of the "origin of metaphysics" takes on the character, not of a fundamental-ontological inquiry into the horizon of the meaning of Being, but of an inquiry into the possibility of the "irruption" of finite Dasein into the midst of being as a whole. Indeed, what we called, in Chapter One, the rigorously atheistic character of Heidegger's questioning becomes even more severely "anti-meta-physical" in that the problem becomes how anything like the question of Being, and thus "Being," can arise from the midst of
the "extant" whole of beings. The metontological inversion means that "transcendence" must be understood from the standpoint of the problematic of finitude (KPM, Part Four); that ontology returns to the "metaphysical ontic" from which it takes its rise (MFL, Appendix); that the unconcealment of beings takes place only in relation to the concealment of beings as a whole (On the Essence of Truth). We shall proceed shortly to an examination of the last of these documents, which we shall take as the exemplary "metontological treatise." We now turn to the metontological problematic of the happening of truth, the unconcealment of beings in the midst of the concealment of being as a whole.
1. Fundamental ontology, in Being and Time, consists in questioning the questioning entity Dasein. The fundamental-ontological question is how the question of Being as such is possible—and this questioning is itself the radicalization of the question of Being. The ontological questioning of metaphysics constitutes a doubling of the question of Being; this doubling is correlated with the double structure of metaphysics, as ontology (the questioning of metaphysics, i.e., of the possibility of the question of Being in general) and metontology (the questioning of Being in any concrete "instance" of metaphysics).

2. Being and Time must be read as "about" the question of the meaning of Being, so that its goal is not something like a "theory of Being" but is rather about the structure of all understanding of Being in general. The first half of Being and Time inquires into the constitutive structure of Dasein as a whole (Care) and the second half addresses the temporal significance of that structure. There is very little about "Being" in Being and Time but much about temporalization and world. The question of Being is, formally understood, nothing other than the "movement" of temporalization itself.

3. Richardson, p. 36.


7. The "achievement" of the explicit carrying out of the ontological difference is that philosophy is gathered into its "end" and the oblivion of Being is "overcome," as Sallis notes in the article referred to above.

8. Heidegger notes, in a "digression" required in order to ward off a fatal misunderstanding" (BP 281), that what is accomplished in finding in temporality that upon which "Being itself, as Being, is projected" (282) is nothing other than ontology:

   The basic act of objectification . . . has the function of explicitly projecting what is antecedently given upon that on which it has already been projected in pre-scientific experience or understanding. If Being is to become objectified—if the understanding of Being is to be possible as a science in the sense of ontology—if there is to be philosophy at all, then that upon which the understanding of Being, qua understanding [my italics], has already pre-conceptually projected Being must
become unveiled in an explicit projection (281-82).

9. One should add, even if only parenthetically, that Heidegger has already introduced here the theme of the "thinking of difference as difference"—so that Identity and Difference will have to be seen as something like a "repetition" of the present ontological investigation in Basic Problems of Phenomenology.

10. There is an essential connection between repetition and transformation. The repetition of the "essence" of philosophy, in effecting a retrieval of the origin, introduces the possibility of a transformation of "metaphysics." But such transformation could only be the "effect" of the slow process of retrieval, and not a directly obtainable goal.

11. Thus Heidegger calls the problem of temporality, in MFL §10, a "metontological" problem.

12. See our response to Krell in the Introduction, above.
CHAPTER V

"On the Essence of Truth" as a Metontological Treatise

In the Appendix to The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic Heidegger sketches the "logic" of the metontological reversal:

Since Being is there only insofar as beings are already there [im Da], fundamental ontology has in it the latent tendency toward a primordial, metaphysical transformation which becomes possible only when Being is understood in its whole problematic. The intrinsic necessity for ontology to turn back to its point of origin [von wo sie ausgegangen war] can be clarified by reference to the primal phenomenon of human existence: the being "man" understands Being; understanding-of-Being effects a distinction between Being and beings; Being is there only when Dasein understands Being. In other words, the possibility that Being is there in the understanding presupposes the factual existence of Dasein, and this in turn presupposes the factual extantness of nature. Right within the horizon of the problem of Being, when posed radically, it appears that all this is visible and can become understood as Being, only if a possible totality of beings [Totalität von Seiendem] is already there.

As a result, we need a special problematic which has for its proper theme being as a whole [das Seiende im Ganzen]. This new in-vestigation resides in the essence of ontology itself and is the result of its overturning [Umschlag], its \( \mu \epsilon \tau \gamma \sigma \iota \chi \lambda \). I designate this set of questions metontology [Metontologie]. (MFL 157m/199)

Ontology turns back into the "metaphysical ontic in which it implicitly always remains" (158) because, like every project of finite Dasein, even ontology itself is the project of a being. Ontology has an ontical foundation (BP 19), and the first task of ontology is the characterization of this ontical foundation (BP 20); that is to say, the first task of ontology is the investigation of the ontical-ontological entity Dasein.

The second task of ontology (BP 20) is completed with the Temporal analysis of Dasein. As we have seen, however (Chapter IV),
"precisely the radicalization of fundamental ontology brings about the above-mentioned overturning of ontology out of its very self" (MFL 157). The horizontal analysis results in the discovery of the radical finitude of time, and thus of the essential situatedness of all questioning of Being, including that of the fundamental-ontological inquiry itself. As a result, a special problematic is needed which investigates that situatedness as such: Because Dasein is ontical, this inquiry takes the form of an investigation of the "metaphysical ontic," the "possible totality of beings" from which ontological questioning takes its rise.

The metontological inquiry is the result of the overturning of ontology that takes place with the disclosure of the finitude of time. But this "overturning" means that the problem concerning the question of Being becomes how it can arise in the midst of "being as a whole." This problem, in a certain sense, goes beyond even that of the "finitude" of Dasein. For the problematic of finitude arises in view of a conception of transcendence itself as the "locus" of the disclosure of Being, so that finitude is conceived as a property, as it were, of Dasein considered by itself. But the metabole signifies, not a mere reiteration of the ontological problematic (as if Being and Time were to be written a second time, as the result of the return of the hermeneutic circle to its "point of origin"), but a radicalization of the problem of "origin," i.e. of the problem of the locus of disclosure of the Being of beings. The new "special problematic" is concerned with the unconcealment of beings in the midst of being as a whole, and the problem of finitude becomes that of the interrelation of
unconcealment to the concealment of being as a whole.

Thus the temporal analysis results in the

Turn [Kehre], where ontology itself expressly runs back into the metaphysical ontic in which it implicitly always remains. Through the movement of radicalizing and universalizing, the aim is to bring ontology to its latent overturning [Umschlag]. Here the Turn [Kehre] is carried out, and it is turned over into the metontology. (MFL 158m/201)

In its concrete significance, the Turn means the metontological overturning of ecstatic-horizonal inquiry--i.e., of the inquiry into the horizontal "source" of the understanding of Being--into the questioning of how unconcealment can "occur" in the midst of being as a whole.

The problem becomes how "with the existence of man there occurs an irruption into the totality of being such that, by this event, being becomes manifest in itself, i.e., manifest as being" (KPM 235m). This is the question of the origin of metaphysics, which is the "fundamental event which comes to pass with the irruption into being of the concrete existence of man" (251m). In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics the problem of the ground of the possibility of metaphysics is still conceived in terms of the finitude of man: "Dasein must be constructed in its finitude and with regard to that which makes the comprehension of Being intrinsically possible" (241). Finitude, however, is already brought into connection with the oblivion of Being: "The finitude of Dasein--the comprehension of Being--lies in forgetfulness [Vergessenheit]" (241). Thus

An analytic of Dasein must, from the beginning, strive to uncover the Dasein in man according to that mode of Being which, by nature, maintains Dasein and its comprehension of Being, i.e., primordial finitude, in forgetfulness. (242)

Heidegger is clear about the difficulty of a reflection on
finitude, since finitude must problematize itself in such a reflection:

In any case, there is reason to believe that the explanation of the essence of finitude required for the establishment of metaphysics must itself always be basically finite and never absolute. It follows that this reflection on finitude, which is always to be renewed, cannot succeed by exchanging and adjusting various points of view in order finally and in spite of everything to give us an absolute knowledge of finitude, a knowledge which is surreptitiously posited as being "true in itself." It remains, therefore, only to develop the problematic of finitude as such. (245)

But the development of the "problematic of finitude as such," as the problematic of the "dependence of Dasein on being as a whole" (244), can only be accomplished through the articulation of the nature of that "dependence." It is with this task that the essay "On the Essence of Truth" (ET) is concerned. Let us turn, then, to an examination of this text.

There are two foci to ET, one overt and one hidden. The first is that previously treated under the rubric of finitude; the second is that of history (Geschichte). Richardson, in his commentary, sees both issues, but he does not see that human "finitude" no longer is the issue per se, but rather the concealment of being as a whole. Nor does he distinguish Heidegger's meditation here on historical occurrence from his earlier inquiry into the historicity of Dasein in Being and Time. It is these developments in Heidegger's thought which must be emphasized, however, if we are to understand the concrete consequences of the metontological Umschlag. At the same time, we wish to try to grasp the "movement" of this text as a whole in order to understand it as the "metontological" treatise par excellence.
Section 1. The Usual Concept of Truth

The analysis proceeds, as is Heidegger's wont, from the "given" situation of thought to the ground or conditions of the possibility of that initial state. Thus Heidegger offers neither a criticism of the concept of truth as correspondence nor a more refined version of that theory—in fact, Heidegger is not engaged in developing a "theory" of truth, but in opening up the conditions underlying the possibility of such theories, which are based, in our tradition, on the experience of truth as homoiosis or adaequatio. Heidegger accepts that experience as the "given" which initiates the movement of inquiry. Philosophy for Heidegger cannot escape beginning with that which is "proximal and for the most part"—the everydayness of Dasein, the received scholarly tradition concerning Leibniz, the traditional understanding of judgment in logic, or the common view of the nature of truth—but, as is appropriate to the finitude of the inquirer, must begin with what is "given" to it. In the end, distance is obtained from this necessary beginning through the explication of how it is possible for the initial situation to arise; for example, the everyday understanding of time is explicated through the structures of primordial temporality. In this way the hermeneutic circle is "completed." But the opening up of the hermeneutic circle constitutes the "clearing" whereby the meaning, implicit in the original situation, is first discovered.

Heidegger's inquiry into the essence of truth shows how it is possible for the truth of essence to be hidden as an issue; it therefore shows, after having begun with the traditional question of the essence of truth, why it is indeed "necessary" to begin this way. Our
attention necessarily falls first of all upon beings and their interrelationships, including the relationship of statements to complexes of fact. The latter relationship is understood ontically as a problem of "correspondence" because the condition of the manifestness of beings is overlooked in such manifestness, and this precisely because "manifestness" occurs for the sake of the disclosedness of beings.

Section 2. The Inner Possibility of Accordance

Thus Heidegger's first step is to call attention to the "open region" within which objects appear. The immediate question is how it is possible for two such dissimilar things as a statement and, say, a coin to "correspond."

In order to bring out the character of the "initial situation" already coming into clearer focus at this stage of the analysis, I shall translate verstellen as "to represent" in the following crucial passage:

Correspondence here cannot signify a thing-like approximation between dissimilar kinds of things. The essence of the correspondence is determined by the kind of relation that obtains between the statement and the thing. . . . the statement regarding the coin relates "itself" to this thing in that it represents it [vor-stellt, places-it-before] and says of the represented thing how, according to the particular perspective that guides it, it is disposed. What is stated by the representational statement is said of the represented thing in just such manner as that thing, as presented, is. The "such-as" has to do with representing and what it represents . . . . to represent here means to let the thing stand opposed as object. As thus placed, what stands opposed must traverse an open field of opposedness [Entgegen] and nevertheless must maintain its stand as a thing and show itself as something withstanding [ein Ständiges]. This appearing of the thing in traversing a field of opposedness takes place within an open region, the openness of which is not first created by the representing but rather is only entered into and taken over as a domain of relatedness. (BW 123-24m)

In this discussion of the "essence" of correspondence Heidegger
presupposes the whole of his analysis of the Kantian ontology in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. The open region is a field of opposedness; the ontology appropriate to it is that which concerns the grounding of objectivity and of objective, representational presentation. But here Heidegger does not focus on the "internal" structure of that open region (its transcendental horizon), but seeks to place the open region itself, as it were, upon its "ground" in the concealment of being as a whole. Although the term "metontology" is never again used by Heidegger after MFL, we see in the present text the operation of the metontological *Umschlag* discussed in MFL, namely the task of accounting for "ontology" on the basis of the problematic of *das Seiende im Ganzen*.

The "ontology" with which we have begun, however, is the "natural" one appropriate to representational thinking. (We read in KPM: "An insight into the primordially representational character of thought is not less important for our interpretation than is an exact comprehension of the sensible character of the imagination" (KPM 154).) In the representing statement's subordinating "itself to the directive that it speak of beings such-as they are" (BW 124), it achieves the conformity to beings that we call "correctness," truth in the ordinary sense. Correctness is possible because of the openness of comportment (*Verhalten*):

> for only through the latter can what is opened up really become the standard for the representing correspondence. Open comportment must let itself be assigned this standard. This means that it must take over a pregiven standard for all representing. (124)

Heidegger's term *Verhältnis*, the "bearing" which originally and always
comes to prevail as comportment [Verhalten]" (124), suggests the finite relatedness of Dasein to what-is as a whole. Verhalten means the revealing relatedness to beings characteristic of Dasein, the comportment which "stands open to beings. Every open relatedness is a comportment" (124). It is on the basis of open comportment that speech can conform to beings, because comportment enables speech to take its directive from beings, to take beings as its standard. But comportment can do this because it itself takes over the pregiven standard of objectivity for its representing. The question, then "arises of the ground of the inner possibility of the open comportment which pregives a standard" (125).

Section 3. The Ground of the Possibility of Correctness

The representative statement can be predirected to an accord with the object

only if this pregiving has already entered freely into an open region for something opened up which prevails there and which binds every representing. (125)

But the "openness of comportment as the inner condition of the possibility of correctness is grounded in freedom. The essence of truth is freedom" (125).

Heidegger adds that "in this connection 'essence' is understood as the ground of the inner possibility of what is initially and generally admitted as known" (125). Here "essence" serves the role performed, in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, by "transcendence," which is there the dimension sought through the regression. We find in ET the same movement of regression to the "ground of the inner possibility of" the "given"; the different result of the regressus marks the
distinction between the approaches of ET and MFL. Of course, in MFL the regression arrives at transcendence, and thereby at freedom, as the ground of the possibility of "logic." Here, however, the regression continues, as we shall see, "beyond" freedom to the "essence" of freedom itself.

The regression to essence shows that truth as correspondence is possible only on the basis of freedom. Part of the meaning of "freedom" as an issue is that truth has an intrinsic relationship to man. Thus Heidegger raises the question here whether "to place the essence of truth in freedom--doesn't this mean to submit truth to human caprice?" (126). The rhetorical question merely marks the topos of the problem of this relationship. But it allows Heidegger to remind us of the traditional metaphysical conception of the division between truth as it is in itself, "the imperishable and eternal," and the essentially un-true character of the human realm, so that truth "can never be founded on the transitoriness and fragility that belong to man's essence" (126). This metaphysical motif is brought up in order to highlight the reversal in the concept of essence undertaken in the Heideggerian text--essence is not otherworldly, "metaphysical," but it concerns an origination which takes place in the midst of being as a whole, and in relation to the existence of man. The problem of this origination is the "metontological" problem.

Section 4. The Essence of Freedom

If we can allow that we do not know what freedom is, nor what man is, nor what the relation between freedom and man is, then we may be prepared for a "transformation of thinking" (127). What is at stake in
this transformation of thinking is suggested by the route taken in the present essay, in particular by the movement toward the turn from the question of the essence of truth to the question of the truth of essence. In ET, Heidegger seeks, through the regression to essence, to engage just that dimension of "possibility" which "enables" something like "truth" to arise. That is to say, the same pattern is repeated here in ET that characterizes Heidegger's work in general: A "destruction" is undertaken of the given position through a regression to the "ground of the possibility" of that position. Specifically, here the destruction consists in a regression to the ground of the possibility of the view of truth as correctness. The sought-for "essence" signifies that which makes possible the traditional position; but to elicit the essence means to awaken, as it were, possibility itself. The "repetition" achieved at the crux of the inquiry opens up the dimension of possibility as such, so that the traditional view is no longer the sole necessary "offspring" of the source. This is what is meant by the turn from the essence of truth to the truth of essence: the turn from the "single vision" of correspondence to the possibility of a multiplicity of "truths" arising from the source of possibility itself. The constant horizon of Heidegger's inquiry remains the "transformation of thinking" (127).

With the reminder that the connection between truth and freedom involves us in the "question of the essence of man" (127), Heidegger proceeds to a deepening of the question of essence, i.e., of the essence of freedom. Freedom is significant only in relation to beings: "Freedom now reveals itself as letting beings be" (127). What does
"letting be" mean?

To let be—that is, to let beings be as the beings which they are—means to engage oneself with the open region and its openness into which every being comes to stand, bringing that openness, as it were, along with itself. (127)

Let us note the doubleness or ambiguity introduced here with the concept of "letting beings be." This "anti-metaphysical" concept signifies the way in which freedom (as the essence of truth) is oriented toward the "ontic"; freedom is, one might say, for the sake of the disclosure of beings as what they are; indeed, there "are" only beings. But precisely because freedom is determined "as freedom for what is opened up in an open region" (127), freedom is also engagement with the open region and its openness. This subtle duality replaces the metaphysical duality of the sensuous and the supersensuous. Engagement with beings is at the same time engagement with the open region, apart from which beings could not come to stand within it. Thus while on the one hand we could not conceive of "beings" apart from an engagement with the open region (so that positivist and empiricist traditions overlook the dimension which enables us to encounter beings), on the other hand there is no meta-physical supersensuous realm which lets beings be. The chorismos or metaphysical gap is no longer to be conceived as a "vertical" distance opened up between two subsistent orders, but is itself the open dimension which constitutes the possibility of the appearance of beings as such.

The "truth itself" then is not meta-physical but is the open region which the Greeks designated as ta aletheia (127). Heidegger in the 1930 essay translates aletheia as '"unconcealment' rather than 'truth'" (127), in order to think the ordinary conception of truth as
correctness "back to that still uncomprehended disclosedness and disclosure of beings" (128). Thus Heidegger wishes at the period of this essay to preserve the distance between "primordial" truth and the "truth" of everyday conception by using different names for each. Perhaps it is in part for this reason that he once again retracts the translation "truth" for aletheia in the late period:

Insofar as truth is understood in the traditional "natural" sense as the correspondence of knowledge with beings, demonstrated in beings, but also insofar as truth is interpreted as the certainty of the knowledge of Being [meta-physical truth], aletheia, unconcealment in the sense of the opening may not be equated with truth. Rather, aletheia, unconcealment thought as opening, first grants the possibility of truth. For truth itself, just as Being and thinking, can be what it is only in the element of the opening. (BW 388-89 (The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking))

Likewise, Heidegger in On Time and Being no longer uses "time" to mean primordial time, and he restricts "Being" to its meaning as "Presence."

The engagement with the open region lets beings be by withdrawing in the face of beings in order that they might reveal themselves with respect to what and how they are and in order that representative correspondence might take its standard from them. As this letting-be it exposes itself to beings as such and transposes all comportment into the open region. Letting-be, i.e., freedom, is intrinsically ex-posing, ek-sistent. . . . Ek-sistence, rooted in truth as freedom, is exposure to the disclosedness of beings as such. (128)

What is at stake in the concept of ek-sistence is the problem of the foundation of history (Geschichte).

The historical issue here is not to be confused with the issue of the historicity of Dasein in Being and Time. It is here that Richardson founders in his commentary on ET, failing to see what amounts to its central issue. On the Essence of Truth is a metontological text, meaning that it is no longer concerned with the analytic of Dasein
(though this analytic is of course not "jettisoned"), but with the foundations of the historical being of humanity. "Historical" signifies the relationship of the emergence of an interpretation of the Being of beings, something that takes place with ek-sistence, to a possible totality of beings. The problem of Geschichte is that of the "happening" of disclosure in the midst of being as a whole. Heidegger's early period is defined by his fundamental-ontological inquiry, whereas the present text addresses the metontological problematic of the historical "irruption" of the Da-sein in man for the sake of the disclosure of beings in their Being.

Exposure to the disclosure of being as such (128) begins with the questioning that asks what beings are. Ek-sistence means this exposure to unconcealment as such and not simply to beings; in questioning, the opening up of beings occurs, the unconcealment, as Heidegger says, of "beings as such as a whole" (129). In this formula we find the expression of a new restriction in the concept of metaphysics. Whereas Heidegger uses the term "metaphysics" in MFL to refer to the dual structure of 1) the fundamental questioning concerning the possibility of the event of transcendence (ontology) and 2) the concrete event made possible through ontology, he now uses "metaphysics" to refer to the dual structure of the concrete event itself. That is to say, "ontology" now means the understanding of the beingness of beings, and is conceived as a moment in the structure of every metaphysics; "theology" is that second moment in metaphysics which takes into account the "grounding" of being as a whole in a highest being (cf. Identity and Difference, pp. 57-61). The twofold structure of metaphysics is
retained (as onto-theology), but is itself conceived as a "residue," one might say, of the genuine twofold: the questioning of the possibility of anything like the historical irruption of "metaphysics" in the midst of being as a whole. This questioning of the possibility of metaphysical disclosure constitutes the burden of the texts of Heidegger's middle period. The context of the questioning and its "object," as it were, is the series of historical "irruptions" of metaphysics (Seinsgeschichte). Thus the twofold of "ontology" and "metontology" is preserved in the more radical questioning of the middle period. The "questioning" takes the place of ontology (and can be conceived as a radicalization of the latter), and what it questions is the possibility of the irruption of metaphysics into the whole of beings. To inquire into the possibility of the sequence of metaphysical transformations of the beingness of beings, each of which takes place in relation to being as a whole (here the "metontology" has become the Seinsgeschichte) is what Heidegger means in the Letter on Humanism when he says that "thinking is the thinking of Being" (BW 196). Here he also calls Being the "quiet power of the possible" (196).

On the Essence of Truth is an inquiry into the "conditions" which make the disclosure of "being as such and as a whole" possible. As such, it does not yet treat of the "sequence" of transformations of metaphysics (Seinsgeschichte), but of the conditions of any such disclosure, as an unconcealment occurring in relation to the concealment of being as a whole, "in general." On the Essence of Truth is about the "foundations" of history (Geschichte):
History begins only when beings themselves are expressly drawn up into their unconcealment and conserved in it, only when this conservation is conceived on the basis of questioning regarding beings as such. (ET 129)

Thus the phrase "ek-sistent Da-sein" no longer refers to the "existing" individual per se, but rather to the historical event (ek-sistence) of disclosure (Da-sein). Thus "truth" does not belong to man, and placing the essence of truth in freedom does not reduce truth to human proportions; rather freedom, ek-sistent, disclosive Da-sein, possesses man—so originally that only it secures for humanity that distinctive relatedness to being as a whole as such which first founds all history. (129)

It can hardly be strongly enough emphasized that at the heart of Heidegger's work is the question of man, in the sense that the question of Being (which is now the question of the possibility of unconcealment in general) can only be taken up as the question of the relationship of the possibility of disclosure to man, to the humanity "by" which such disclosure must occur. "Freedom" is the locus of the question of this relationship, a question which is at the same time the question of the foundation of history. For freedom signifies the possibility of the occurrence of such disclosure (of "being as such as a whole") among any "segment" of historical humanity. The problem of history is that of how, first of all for Western, "metaphysical" man, and then also for any possible humanity, something like an interpretation (being as such, beingness) of being (as a whole, i.e., world) can arise.

The inquiry remains bound at every step to the problematic relationship of the event of disclosure to human being.

That man ek-sists now means that for historical humanity the history of its essential possibilities is conserved in the
disclosure of being as a whole. The rare and the simple
decisions of history arise from the way the original essence of
truth essentially unfolds. (129-30)

If "truth" is not separable from man, placed over against him in a
meta-physical realm, then neither is untruth simply the property of
fallible man. "Rather, untruth must derive from the essence of truth"
(130). But if the essence of truth is freedom, in what does the
essence of untruth consist, and how are "truth" and "untruth" thereby
related? If the two are interrelated in essence, then it turns out
that we can speak of the essence and non-essence of truth.

Section 5. The Essence of Truth

The principal theme of this section is attunement (Gestimmtheit):
"As engagement in the disclosure of being as a whole as such, freedom
has already attuned all comportment to being as a whole" (131). What
is at stake in the concept of attunement is the relation of man to
being.

The discussion of attunement completes the analysis of ek-
sistence as comportment. Comportment, Verhalten, has replaced Ver-
stehen as the central term signifying the manner of man's relatedness
to beings. Referring back to Section 2: "Comportment stands open to
beings. Every open relatedness is a comportment. Man's open stance
varies depending on the kind of beings and the way of comportment"
(124). Comportment takes its standard from beings, so that statements
can stand in a relation of representative correspondence with them.
Thus the inquiry into the essence of truth, in determining that the
openness of comportment is grounded in freedom, and thus that the
essence of truth is freedom, has taken the lead from man's "natural"
comportment toward beings.

But attunement concerns, not the representative presentation of beings but precisely what is not openly presented along with such representation, namely being as a whole. "Every mode of historical man's comportment—whether accentuated or not, whether understood or not—is attuned and by this attunement is drawn up into being as a whole" (131). In this way the unconcealment of beings is "placed" in relation to the Other that is its ground, the concealment of being as a whole. We are witnessing, in On the Essence of Truth, the transformation of the twofold of metaphysics (ontology/metontology) into the twofold of unconcealment/concealment (aletheia).

That which the theme of attuning addresses is the Other to the openness of beings, "forgotten" precisely through the openness of comportment to beings. Whereas in Being and Time Verstehen takes precedence in the analysis over Befindlichkeit, and thus existence over thrownness, in ET the analysis of attunement is more "fundamental" than the discussion of comportment.

The concealing of being as a whole is the condition which allows for the disclosure of beings:

Precisely because letting beings be always lets beings be in a particular comportment which relates to them and thus discloses them, it conceals being as a whole. Letting-be is intrinsically at the same time a concealing. (132)

It is "being as a whole" (not "Being") itself which "brings everything into definite accord" (132). Thus it is not man, nor even man's "mood" which attunes, but man in his comportment is brought into attunement along with the openedness of being as a whole. The attunement is more primary than comportment, in that it "prevails throughout and
anticipates all the open comportment that flourishes" in letting beings be (131).

Section 6. Untruth as Concealing

We can now begin to see why untruth is spoken of as the "non-essence" of truth, rather than as the essence of untruth. What is at stake is not untruth as the "opposite" to truth, but the full structure of the essence of truth, i.e. of aletheia.

The concealment of being as a whole, untruth proper, is older than every openedness of this or that being. It is also older than letting-be itself which in disclosing already holds concealed and comports itself toward concealing. (132)

The openedness of beings rests, as a possibility, upon the concealment of being as a whole, the essence of truth upon its non-essence.

As we have seen, what is at issue in On the Essence of Truth is no longer "finitude" but "the concealing of what is concealed as a whole" (132): Heidegger calls this the mystery. To be sure, "mystery ... as such holds sway throughout man's Da-sein" (132-33); but it is clear in this very line that the inquiry into the essence of truth has moved into a region more fundamental than that of the being of "man." Even if Da-sein is "man's," the mystery holds sway throughout it and is more primordial than the ek-sistence of Dasein. Thus the level of analysis has moved beyond that of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, with its grounding of the question of Being in the finitude of man.

"Finitude" now belongs to Being:

[T]he Un- of the primordial Unwesen of truth, as untruth, points to the still unexperienced domain of the truth of Being (not merely of beings). (133)

The "resolutely open bearing [das entschlossene Verhältnis]" in
which all comportment is grounded is a bearing toward concealment which "conceals itself in the process." "Verhältnis" signifies the totality of man's relatedness to being, i.e., attunement and comportment in their unity. But in taking his bearings toward beings, on the basis of his comportment toward beings, he tends to acquiesce "in this or that being and its particular openedness" (134). This is the way that the entschlossene Verhältnis conceals itself: by residing "in what is readily available" (134), and thus "letting forgetfulness of the mystery take precedence and disappearing in it" (134). At the same time, it is precisely because of this forgetfulness of the mystery that man can carry on his daily affairs in his concern with the "everyday":

Thus left, humanity replenishes its "world" on the basis of the latest needs and aims, and fills out that world by means of proposing and planning. From these man then takes his standards, forgetting being as a whole. (134)

In this way Heidegger "derives" the possibility of taking beings as the standard (in "representation"). Representational thinking is at least schematically "overcome" in such a demonstration, since the latter undermines the authority of the sole legitimacy of the appeal to beings as a standard in representation and representational thinking. What remains undone, and what cannot be accomplished in On the Essence of Truth, is to show how other "standards" are possible than the objectifying standard derived from the open comportment toward beings as present.

Man's forgetting of being as a whole is not something he "does" but is based upon that "bearing by which Dasein not only ek-sists but also at the same time in-sists, i.e., holds fast to what is offered by beings, as if they were open in and of themselves. As ek-sistent,
Dasein is insistent" (135). It is Dasein's very ek-sistence which delivers him over to his in-sistence; Dasein's open comportment after all, his freedom, is for the sake of letting beings be. Dasein does not leave his own nature behind in taking beings as the standard, by falling into a concern with beings alone. It is precisely by virtue of his relatedness to being as a whole that he is led into a neglect of being as a whole. Man's openness toward beings is possible only on the basis of the mystery, or the concealing, not only of being as a whole, but the concealing of that very concealing.

Thus "mystery" names the total structure of man's relatedness to being. It is not only forgotten in and with that very relatedness, but is the ground of the forgetting itself. Heidegger's analysis then, does not "change" anything in our relationship to being as a whole and beings, but opens up the character of that relatedness in order to let it remain in its own "essence" (non-essence). Thus the goal of inquiry is not to make explicit what was implicit, but rather to let the "implicit" remain "implicit." No "science of Being" is possible. The concept of "mystery" has replaced that of "phenomenon."

Section 7. Untruth as Errancy

The insistent turning toward [Zuwendung] what is readily available and the ek-sistent turning away [Wegwendung] from the mystery belong together. They are one and the same. Yet turning toward and away from is based on a turning to and fro proper to Dasein. Man's flight from the mystery toward what is readily available, onward from one current thing to the next, passing the mystery by--this is erring [irren]. (135/196)

This turning to and fro is itself the "ground" of history, and itself belongs to a "finitude" more fundamental than the finitude of man. Dasein is "constituted" through this turning; man's being is impaled
upon the "cross" of a contradiction constitutive of his essence:

The full essence of truth, including its most proper non-essence, keeps Dasein in need by this turning to and fro. Dasein is a turning into need [Wendung in die Not]. (137/198)

Dasein is so radically bound to this "need" that there is no metaphysical realm into which Dasein might flee from his relatedness to beings and to being as a whole. Even an inquiry into the essence of truth remains within that turning into need, from which arises the necessity (Notwendigkeit) of thought. The Turn itself signifies this "turning into need," whereby thought remains true to its own finitude:

"Then resolute openness toward the mystery [Ent-schlossenheit zum Geheimnis] is under way into errancy as such" (137/198). The Turn means a turning into finitude—which can no longer be conceived as the "finitude" of man. And openness toward the mystery releases Dasein into errancy as such. Here we have a "clue" to the nature of the overcoming of metaphysics in Heidegger's difficult thought of the Turn as a turning into "oblivion as oblivion" and man's transformed relationship to Being as a "corresponding" to the withdrawal of Being itself. We shall restrict our remarks on the Turn to the context provided by "On the Essence of Truth."

The essay "On the Essence of Truth" manifests the structure, and therefore the essential "content," of Heidegger's "regressive" inquiry. Thus the "regression to origin" is undertaken through Section 5, wherein Heidegger locates the essence of truth in ek-sistent freedom. The structure of the twofold begins to come to the fore in Section 6, as the relationship between the unconcealment of beings and the concealing of being as a whole. This relation is now thematized as turning in
Section 7. The fundamental themes of Heidegger's work are here laid out in order and in their "methodological" interconnection: regression to origin, the twofold, the turning within the twofold. Regression to origin establishes the thought of that "unity" which, when thought through to the end, necessarily fulfills itself in an overturning (Umschlag) into that other to ontology (das Seiende im Ganzen) which "precedes" it. But this metabole is actually constitutive of the relationship between the moments of the twofold (see in this respect Heidegger's full development of the concept of metabole in his lecture on Aristotle's Physics B,15).

The "turning to and fro" [Zu- und Weg-wenden] of Dasein is a turning "within" the twofold, i.e., within the full structure of the "mystery." The "regression to origin" situates Dasein within that original condition--thrownness in Being and Time, but here, more fundamentally, the mystery--from "out of which" the question of Being arises and "to which" it returns in a reflection on its own origins. Heidegger speaks in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic of the "recoil" of the question of ground "back into one ground (thrownness in itself)" (MFL 215). In Introduction to Metaphysics we read:

But if we consider the question of Being in the sense of an inquiry into Being as such, it becomes clear to anyone who follows our thinking that Being as such is precisely hidden from metaphysics, and remains forgotten--and so radically that the forgetfulness of Being, which itself falls into forgetfulness, is the unknown but enduring impetus to metaphysical questioning. (18-19)

To inquire into "Being as such" means first of all to inquire into that unknown impetus, namely the oblivion of Being as such--the matter of thought is the "mystery."
Section 8 will bring the whole of the previous discussion in ET into relation to the meaning of philosophy as such—a question that remains the constant issue of Heidegger's work. Section 9, the "Note" added in 1943, situates the essay itself within the question of the possibility of the Turn and brings into play the theme of "transformation." In this essay, then, the whole of the fundamental structure of Heidegger's work—the themes of origin, twofold, and turn, bounded by the fundamental "context" of "finitude" and by the essential "aim" of transformation—is brought into play.

At the present juncture, we have found that Dasein "is" the turning to and fro within the twofold, i.e., within the "structure" of the mystery. The Turn means first of all the turning to and fro within the mystery, and therefore the "movement" of all history; Heidegger's own thought, therefore, insofar as it thinks the Turn, is in a certain sense distinguishable from any other philosophy only in that it is itself the thought of this movement. Heidegger's enterprise does not attempt to take a position "beyond" the movement constitutive of philosophy, i.e., of Dasein. In thinking finitude, it attempts to enter into the movement proper to finitude and thus to disclose it. This disclosure, however, eventuates, not in an objectification of finitude, but in a more decisive "turn" into it. Heidegger's thought wishes to be "under way into errancy as such" (137). To see how this is so, let us return to a consideration of the theme of errancy in Section 7.

"History" is founded in errancy. We have already encountered this foundation in the ek-sistent freedom of Dasein, the "fulfillment
and consummation of the essence of truth in the sense of the disclosure of beings" (129). The ek-sistence of man means "that for historical humanity the history of its essential possibilities is conserved in the disclosure of beings as a whole" (129-30). The happening of "truth"—here the openedness of beings—takes place with ek-sistence (in Being and Time, "projection"). In ek-sistence, however, man takes his standards from beings, and is thereby turned away from the mystery. Man's ek-sistent insistence is not a mere "happenstance," but is fundamental to man's being; it is founded in a "flight from the mystery," and this is "erring" (135). "Errancy is the free space [Spielraum] for that turning in which in-sistent ek-sistence adroitly forgets and mistakes itself constantly anew" (136/196). But it is only because of errancy that any historical "openedness of beings"—for the sake of which insistent ek-sistence "adroitly" forgets itself—can occur and take its course. "The errancy in which any given segment of historical humanity must proceed for its course to be errant is essentially connected with the openness of Dasein" (136). "History" is the history of "error."

Errancy, the heir to the "falling" of Being and Time, characterizes Dasein's relationship to the mystery. It is not a "flaw" in an otherwise pristine type of being, because it belongs to the "turning to and fro," in relation to the mystery, which is fundamentally characteristic of Dasein's being. The falling movement, Wirbel or "turbulence" of Being and Time6 is now understood as the "turning to and fro proper to Dasein." This movement is constitutive of the structure of human "finitude," and is the foundation of the very possibility of history.
The turning to and fro could not be thought apart from the possibility of a glimpse of the constant "center"--the mystery--which lets us think this turning as such. This is the way that Heidegger puts it in *Grundfragen der Philosophie* (1937/38):


Approximately:

Only one thing is immediately clear: In this age of utter questionlessness philosophy as the questioning evocation of the question-worthiest inevitably becomes something most strange. Accordingly it is the most necessary thing. The necessary has its most powerful shape in the Simple. But the Simple is what we call that unpretentious gravity which, when it is, appears to everyone at once and henceforth as the most facile and easiest to grasp, and yet incontestably remains the most serious. The Simple (Onefold) is the most burdensome, because the Manifold allows and encourages dispersal and all dispersal confirms, as the counterpart to gathering, man in his constant flight before himself--not to mention before his relation to Seyn itself--and thus relieves him of the burden of Dasein and sets it aside. The Manifold is the facile--precisely where concern makes travail appear. For: The advance from one to another is always alleviation, and just this advance denies the Simple and compels to constancy, and to a constantly enriched return to the Same. Only if we dare the Simple, do we come into the region [Spielraum] of the necessary. The greatest necessity of philosophy--supposing
that it must again become something most strange—is that simple question, through which this, namely questioning, is first brought to itself: the question concerning truth.

What is striking in this difficult passage is the intertwining of the Simple and the Manifold, in the sense that it is precisely the "alleviating" advance within the Manifold that compels this very advance to a "constantly enriched return to the Same." This return does not, therefore, represent an "escape" from the turbulence in the sense of an event which lifts Dasein out of or above history; it is rather a moment, as it were, in that very movement whereby that movement comes "home" to itself. It is as part of the "turning to and fro" constitutive of Dasein that the "turn" to the Simple itself occurs. Thus whenever Heidegger says in ET that

... as leading astray, errancy at the same time contributes to a possibility that man is capable of drawing up from his ek-sistence—the possibility that, by experiencing errancy itself and by not mistaking the mystery of Da-sein, he not let himself be led astray (136), he does not mean that Dasein simply "escapes" from errancy. It is precisely in experiencing errancy itself, "as such," that man "turns" into the mystery and thereby is no longer led astray. But because the mystery is not a phenomenon to be grasped in its transparency, but is rather concealment and even the concealment of concealment, to arrive at the "mystery," in the sense of "resolute openness toward the mystery," is to be "under way into errancy as such" (137).

It is only here, with the turning into errancy as such, that "the question of the essence of truth gets asked more primordially"; it is only here that "the ground of the intertwining of the essence of truth with the truth of essence reveals itself" (137). What is at stake here
in the turning from the essence of truth to the truth of essence is a possible transformation of thinking, effected through the "glimpse" into the mystery; the glimpse into the mystery "changes" nothing except to liberate thinking into that mystery which, in errancy, always remains the concealed ground of thinking. The "essence of truth"—truth as conformity to the representational presentation of beings, the interpretation of beings in terms of presence—has its ground in the mystery which, concealing itself, makes possible Dasein's taking the standard of its comportment from beings themselves. The turn toward the mystery brings the disclosure that "freedom itself originates from the primordial essence of truth, the rule of the mystery in errancy" (137). In this way the authority, as it were, of beings in their disclosedness, and therefore Dasein's propensity to take its standard from beings, is undercut. But this does not mean that Dasein now dwells in the metaphysical "truth," stable in itself and free from the transformations of history. Rather, Dasein opens itself in a new way to that very process of transformation itself (into the "truth of essence"). All of philosophy takes its rise from this very same "moment" of "glimpse into the mystery" (137) (cf. the essay "The Turn" with its discussion of "insight into that which is"). Heidegger says that

The glimpse into the mystery out of errancy is a question—in the sense of that unique question of what being as such is as a whole. This questioning thinks the question of the Being of beings, a question that is essentially misleading and thus in its manifold meaning is still not mastered. The thinking of Being, from which such questioning primordially originates, has since Plato been understood as "philosophy" and later received the title "metaphysics." (137)

Heidegger's own attempt to think the mystery as such repeats the
question which constitutes philosophy as such. Therefore it is not necessary to assume that Heidegger's thought breaks free of the "finitude" constitutive of human thought as such. Even in the "ontological" question man is "especially subjected to the rule of the mystery and the oppression of errancy" (136). The "thinking of Being" that Heidegger's work undertakes has, in fact, precisely the task of showing how, within the "needful condition of being constrained by the one [mystery] and the other [errancy]" (137-37), something like the question of Being can arise.

The "thinking of Being" cannot go "beyond" the domain of this "needful condition"; it cannot escape the "turning to and fro," but rather represents a unique intensification of Dasein's relation to that turning which is "constitutive" of metaphysics. The thinking of Being means to think this turning as such (which itself "is" Da-sein). To think Being "by itself" means to radicalize the thought of the "relationship" within the twofold until that relationship (aletheia) can be thought "as such." Thus, with the metontological inversion, Heidegger addresses the possibility of there being anything like the question of Being, and thus "Being," arising in the midst of being as a whole. At the initial stage of the questioning--in this metontological re-initiation of the question concerning the possibility of the question of Being--it cannot be assumed that there is any "other" to the whole of beings. In this sense, Heidegger remains radically anti-meta-physical. The metontological problem, definitive of the "middle period," is how "Being" can be thought from the condition of the "needful condition" of man. And because Heidegger's own thinking, like all
"thinking," is a "turning into need," it cannot escape this condition, but can only "turn" within it.

Section 8. Philosophy and the Question of Truth

A concern with the meaning of "philosophy" is always at work in Heidegger's thought. In one sense, the central concern of his work is the meaning of philosophy ("thinking"). Here he brings philosophy immediately into proximity with language:

In the thinking of Being the liberation of man for existence, the liberation that grounds history, is put into words. These are not just the "expression" of an opinion but are always already the ably conserved articulation of the truth of being as a whole. (138)

Heidegger contrasts philosophy with sophistry, which bases itself upon the unquestioned character of being as it is already opened up. Thus philosophy, which puts the "liberation that grounds history" into words, has sophistry as its "insistent" counterpart. But sophistry with its foundation in common sense does not reach to the "original truth of being as such as a whole" (138).

Philosophy itself, however, has an essentially discordant structure, i.e., one which is "split in two":

But because the full essence of truth contains the non-essence and above all holds sway as concealing, philosophy as a questioning into this truth is intrinsically discordant [in sich zwiespältig]. Philosophical thinking is gentle releasement [Gelassenheit der Milde] that does not renounce the concealment of being as a whole. Philosophical thinking is especially the stern and resolute openness [Ent-schlossenheit der Strenge] that does not disrupt the concealing, but entreats its unbroken essence into the open region of understanding and thus into its own truth. (138/199)

Here Heidegger harmonizes the discordancy of the twofold. Metaphysics fails to understand itself as thus "ambiguous," as sustaining an
inherent relationship to the concealment of being as a whole even while opening up the disclosure of beings as such.

Heidegger concludes chapter 8 with the following paragraph:

The present undertaking takes the question of the essence of truth beyond the confines of the ordinary definition provided in the usual concept of essence and helps us to consider whether the question of the essence of truth must no be, at the same time and even first of all, the question concerning the truth of essence. But in the concept of "essence" philosophy thinks Being. In tracing the inner possibility of the correctness of statements back to the ek-sistent freedom of letting-be as its "ground," likewise in pointing to the essential commencement of this ground in concealing and in errancy, we want to show that the essence of truth is not the empty "generality" of an "abstract" universality but rather that which, self-concealing, is unique in the unremitting history of the disclosure of the "meaning" of what we call Being--what we for a long time have been accustomed to considering only as being as a whole. (139)

Here the question of Being is raised as a question in relation to the way that metaphysics understands it, i.e., as the manner of Being of being as a whole; it is furthermore correlated with the turning from the essence of truth to the truth of essence. That is to say, the domain of the essence of truth, i.e., of the openedness of beings (the unconcealment of being as such as a whole) is that of metaphysics, the province of the traditional understanding of Being. To raise the Being-question anew is to raise the question of the truth of essence, i.e., of the source of the possibility of "truth," of unconcealment as such. In "On the Essence of Truth," Heidegger has arrived at the point of commencement for any such questioning: the relation between disclosure and its "ground" in the concealment of being as a whole.

The regression to the "ground" of historical disclosure, undertaken in "On the Essence of Truth," can only arrive at the "condition" for the possibility of any such disclosure, namely the mystery and its
concealment in errancy. The issue concerns the relatedness of man to being as a whole (das Seiende im Ganzen). The movement of regression can only grasp the basis for "any" given moment of history--the inquiry in ET is, as it were, restricted to the synchronous moment of disclosure. As a regression to the ground of the essence of truth, it can locate the "origin" of disclosure in the concealment of being as a whole, and therefore understand historical disclosure as such, but it cannot thereby provide the means to understand the relation among various possible moments of disclosure. The question of this relationship is what is meant by the problem of the "truth of essence": what is the "source" of the sequence of historical disclosures? "On the Essence of Truth" establishes the starting-point for an inquiry into the Seinsgeschichte, but does not provide the "means" for such an inquiry. Indeed, it cannot do so, as Heidegger points out in the "Note" of 1943 (140).

How, then, is the source or origin of the sequence of transformations of metaphysics to be addressed? But this is precisely the problem of Heidegger's "middle period," with this introduction to which we shall bring our own investigations to an end. Here we can do no more than to suggest what it means to question Being "by itself": To question Being means, not to "leave" being as a whole behind--something that is impossible for finite Dasein--but to question self-concealment ever more radically. To question Being means to articulate the "language" of the interrelationship of concealment and unconcealment (aletheia, the twofold). Thinking the truth of Being means to think self-concealment "as such" and as the source of unconcealment.
Section 9: Note

"Truth signifies sheltering that lightens as the basic characteristic of Being" (140). There is no longer any mention here of "being as a whole." Thus "the answer to the question of the essence of truth is the saying of a turning [die Sage einer Kehre] within the history of Being [Seinsgeschichte]" (140). The Turn itself is visible in the transformed language regarding concealment:

Because sheltering that lightens belongs to it, Being appears primordially in the light of concealing withdrawal. The name of this lighting [Lichtung] is aletheia. (140) The "truth of essence" is the "source" of the essence of truth because "sheltering that lightens is—i.e., lets essentially unfold—accordance between knowledge and beings" (140). Although the questioning in ET seems to remain "on the path of metaphysics," "it accomplishes a change in the questioning that belongs to the overcoming of metaphysics" (141).

What Heidegger seeks is something on the order of a transformation of thinking. Indeed, he says that the truth of Being is sought "as the ground of a transformed historical position" (141).

The course of the questioning is intrinsically the way of a thinking which, instead of furnishing representations and concepts, experiences and tries itself as a transformation of its relatedness to Being. (141)

The transformation occurs with die Sage einer Kehre, and is therefore a transformation which occurs "in" language, and which is at the same time a transformation "of" language.7
NOTES

1. From the Letter on Humanism:

The lecture "On the Essence of Truth," thought out and delivered in 1930 but not printed until 1943, provides a certain insight into the thinking of the turning from "Being and Time" to "Time and Being." This turning is not a change of standpoint from Being and Time, but in it the thinking that was sought first arrives at the location of that dimension out of which Being and Time is experienced, that is to say, experienced from the fundamental experience of the oblivions of Being. (BW 208)

2. Cf. Richardson, pp. 211 ff.


4. The concept of standard is, we might point out, a "topological" theme, and the problem of the "transformation of the site" of metaphysics is that of opening up the possibility of other "standards," topological measures, than that appropriate to objectifying, representational thinking. The question of such non-metaphysical "standards" is the issue of what Heidegger calls "poetizing thinking."

5. This text is essential to an understanding of the structure of Heidegger's work.

6. What Wirbel makes manifest in Being and Time is that thrownness "has the character of throwing and of movement" (BT 223/179). In "On the Essence of Truth" Heidegger finds that "movement" to have the character of "turning to and fro," which, as we are attempting to show, is constitutive of history.

The theme of Wirbel seems to have its roots in Plato; specifically, perhaps, in the "Myth of the true Earth" with which the Phaedo concludes (111c-112b). The "hollows" mentioned there suggest that something like finitude is at issue.

7. The problem of "transformation" cannot be discussed without reference to language, nor can the explication of the "inquiry into origin" be completed without an explanation of the relation of that inquiry to the "problem" of language. It is the inquiry into language that enables Heidegger to "solve" the problem of origin without having to leave behind the finitude of Dasein. We cannot take up this difficult and very fundamental issue here.

208
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209
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212


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The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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