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Dilemma for the 1980s and Beyond: U.S. Diplomacy and the Palestinian Problem

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DILEMMA FOR THE 1980'S AND BEYOND:
U.S. DIPLOMACY AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM

by
George C. Nelson

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
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VITA

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INTRODUCTION

International tensions presently facing the United States threaten to make the 1980's one of the most significant decades in the history of the United States. Examples of the tensions that endanger American interests in the international arena are plentiful. Differences with our European allies and unrest in El Salvador are prime illustrations of these tensions.

The Middle East, which has always been of great interest to the United States, will be the area of greatest consequence, while also being the most difficult problem for the United States to deal with. The Middle East's importance as a region stems from these facts:

- (1) America's need for Middle Eastern oil will continue and
- (2) The Middle East is strategically important because it is the crossroads to three continents. This strategic consideration becomes even more crucial when recent moves into the area by the Soviet Union are taken into account.

The basic premise of this paper is that American diplomacy in the Middle East always has been and will continue to be a dilemma for the United States. The creation of the State of Israel intensified this dilemma.

The problem facing the United States is that its interests in the Middle East are best served by a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict which has plagued the area for over thirty years. The dilemma

becomes apparent when it is realized that no resolution to the Arab-Israeli dispute can be reached until a successful solution to the Palestinian Problem has been achieved. Even a partial settlement to this problem cannot be reached until all the varied factions involved agree to sit down at the same table and talk.

Realizing this, American policymakers should direct their efforts in the Middle East toward finding a solution to the Palestinian Problem. The search for this solution is the main focus of this study.

This search for the possible solutions to the Palestinian Problem will begin with a short history of the problem that ranges from just prior to the first Arab-Israeli War to shortly before the onset of President Carter's term in office in 1977.

The study will continue with a section that examines the parts played by the Arab countries and Israel in the problem and how the Palestinians themselves fit into the picture. The next segment of the paper looks at some of the people and groups who either claim to be or are recognized as the representatives of the Palestinian people and at recent United States' diplomacy concerning the Palestinian Problem.

The major emphasis of this paper will be on the United States' diplomacy dealing with the problem during the Carter administration and beyond. The Camp David Peace Accords will be of special significance here. The policies of the Reagan administration will also be critiqued.

This study will conclude with a section that makes some suggestions on how the United States should proceed in finding a solution to the Palestinian Problem.

SOURCES OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM

The roots of the Palestinian Problem can be compared to the roots of a large tree. Both kinds of roots are hidden and become entangled or gnarled. The roots of the Palestinian Problem have become so entangled that there is virtually no agreement on the causes of the problem. One of the major obstacles to reaching a solution to the problem is the lack of agreement as to what caused the problem. The distance between parties to the dispute is highlighted by some of the extreme positions taken in the argument. One position maintains that there really are no Palestinians or any Palestinian Problem.

The belief that there is no problem is, of course, ludicrous. According to the people involved, the one thing they can agree on is that some Palestinians did leave Palestine. Aside from this one agreement there has been no common ground between the parties until very recently. Each side to the argument has its own theory as to why the Palestinian exodus took place and its own theory about which side has legitimate rights to the land that was called Palestine.

The major parties involved in the problem are the Israelis, the Arab states that harbor Palestinian refugees, and the Palestinians themselves. Palestinian participation in a resolution of the problem has been hindered by the fact that they do not have their own state. The question over Palestinian representation has also kept the

Palestinians out of any direct attempts at finding a solution to their problem. Although the plight of the Palestinians intensified when Israel won the first Arab-Israeli War, the Palestinian Problem really began in the late 1800's before there ever was a state of Israel.

Prior to 1947, the land that is now occupied by the state of Israel was called Palestine. Palestine was inhabited by both Arabs and Jews, with Arabs in the majority.¹ The British ruled Palestine under the authority of a mandate given them by the League of Nations in April, 1920. During February of 1947 the British government announced it was not going to continue ruling Palestine. This announcement created a vacuum that brought the dispute over Palestine to a head.

Before the British announcement both Jews and Arabs were making claims to Palestine. The Jews, behind a movement called Zionism, declared that Palestine was to become the national home for Jews. Zionists believed that the British gave them permission to create a Jewish national home in Palestine. The Zionists cited the Balfour Declaration of 1918 as proof of their claim. This national home was to become the state of Israel. The creation of the state of Israel was the prime cause of the first Arab-Israeli War. As a result of this war, many Palestinians became refugees in countries such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon.

This is where the theories of each side come into conflict. Two books bring out the conflicting positions of the Arabs and Israelis

very well. The two books are: The Question of Palestine by Edward W. Said² which presents the Palestinian view and Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in Palestine by Samuel Katz³ which represents the Jewish side.

The government of Israel believes that the Palestinians fled from Palestine in 1947 and 1948 under the orders of Arab leaders. The Arab leaders supposedly asked the Palestinian Arabs to leave their homes in Palestine so invading Arab armies could better attack Israel. Katz describes the situation this way:

The Arabs are the only declared refugees who became refugees not by the action of their enemies or because of well-grounded fear of their enemies, but by the initiative of their own leaders. For nearly a generation, those leaders have willfully kept as many people as they possibly could in a degenerating squalor, preventing their rehabilitation, and holding out to all of them the hope of return and of "vengeance" on the Jews of Israel, to whom they have transferred the blame for their plight.⁴

The Palestinians, however, deny that they left Palestine because Arab leaders asked them to. Instead, they believe that they have been the innocent victims of Zionist imperialism. Zionism originated in Europe during the late 1800's as a response to the long-standing discrimination of Jews. This discrimination intensified in the twentieth century and led to the formation of a movement for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. This movement was founded by Theodor Herzl in the 1890's and was called Zionism.⁵

The problem with this view of Zionism was not the creation of a Jewish national home, but that it made no provision for the population

already in Palestine. Palestinians contend that the Zionists intended to just push them off the land. If this is true, how could the Zionists justify this action? Said explains it this way:

As Herzl first conceived of it in the nineties, Zionism was a movement to free Jews and solve the problem of anti-Semitism in the West; later elaborations of this idea took Palestine as the place where the conception was to be materially fulfilled. In addition to being the place where there existed a spiritual bond in the form of a covenant between God and the Jews, Palestine had the further advantage of being a backward province in an even more backward empire. Therefore, the effort of all Zionist apologetics from the beginning was to lay claim to Palestine both as a backward, largely uninhabited territory and as a place where the Jews, enjoying a unique historical privilege, could reconstitute the land into a Jewish homeland.⁶

Said goes on to say that it was always the plan of the Zionist movement to deny the existence of any Palestinian Arab population in Palestine. He states:

It is more likely that there will remain the inverse resistance which has characterized Zionism and Israel since the beginning: the refusal to admit, and the consequential denial of, the existence of Palestinian Arabs who are there not simply as an inconvenient nuisance, but as a population with an indissoluble bond with the land.⁷

Said is convinced that Palestine's fate was never decided in Palestine. Instead, it was decided in Western capitals in Europe by men such as Theodor Herzl and Lord Rothschild. Their plan was to set up a Jewish national home in Palestine after having removed the population already there. A section from the Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl demonstrates what was to be done with this population:

We shall have to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our own country.

Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly.

The Palestinian position in short is that they were pushed out of their homeland by Jews who were followers of a movement called Zionism that started in 1897 and resulted in the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948. Although the Palestinians have been out of Palestine only since the war in 1948, they feel that their plight really began with the formation of Zionism.

They also feel that the Jews had little right to do this and that the Jewish government of Israel has conducted a campaign to keep the truth about their being forced out of Palestine by Zionism a secret. Said believes that ever since the formation of the state of Israel the Jewish government there has denied the existence of a Palestinian-Arab population in Palestine. Said says this campaign continues even today:

For too many people who read the press, who watch television and listen to the radio, who pretend to more than a smattering of political knowledge, who confess to expert opinions on international controversy, the Middle East is essentially the Arab-Israeli conflict and little more. There is a considerable reductiveness in this view, of course, but what is really wrong with it is that most of the time it literally blocks Palestine from having anything to do with the Middle East of today, which since September, 1978 seems entirely symbolized by Menachem Begin, Anwar al-Sadat, and Jimmy Carter locked up together at Camp David. A considerable majority of the literature on the Middle East, at least until 1968, gives one the impression that the essence of what goes on in the Middle East is a series of unending wars between a group of Arab countries and Israel. That there had been such an entity as Palestine until 1948, or that Israel's existence - its "independence" as the phrase goes - was the result of the

eradication of Palestine: of these truths beyond dispute most people who follow events in the Middle East are more or less ignorant, or unaware. But what is most important is the continuing avoidance or ignorance of the existence today of about four million Muslim and Christian Arabs who are known to themselves and to others as Palestinians. They make up the question of Palestine, and if there is no country called Palestine it is not because there are no Palestinians.⁹

According to the Palestinians, the Jews made Palestine their national homeland wrongfully and illegally. The Jews on the other hand say that they have a special religious right to Palestine. Jews claim that their rights and ties to Palestine have existed longer and are more important than any ties the Palestinians have. In order to justify this, the Jews claim that before they came into the area Palestine was nothing more than a political backwater that was lightly populated. Zionists contend that whatever population was there was inferior to the European Jews that would be migrating there. This fact was supposed to further justify the creation of the Jewish national homeland in Palestine.

Zionists also claimed that the Palestinian belief that Jews had no right to Palestine because of the small Jewish presence there is erroneous. The Jews claim that they had both an emotional and physical presence in Palestine. Samuel Katz gives an example of this physical presence:

It is a continuity that waxed and waned, that moved in kaleidoscopic shifts, in response to the pressures of the foreign imperial rulers who in bewildering succession imposed themselves on the country. It is a pattern of stubborn refusal in the face of oppression, banishment and slaughter, to let go of an often tenuous hold in the country, a determined digging in sustained by a faith in the ultimate full restoration of which every Jew living in the homeland saw himself as caretaker and precursor.¹⁰

This physical presence has been denied by the Palestinians. The Palestinians, however, cannot deny that Jews living in Europe and other parts of the world were being discriminated against. Jews had thought of themselves as a people without a nation ever since the Jewish defeat and Diaspora in 70 A.D.

Zionism was a response to this discrimination. The thought of having a homeland in Palestine to escape to gave many Jews some hope in what would otherwise have been a hopeless situation. This was especially true after Hitler came to power in Germany and all through World War II. Here is an example of the form this hope assumed:

Never in the periods of greatest persecution did the Jews as a people renounce that faith. Never in the periods of greatest peril to their very existence physically, and the seeming impossibility of their ever regaining the land of Israel, did they seek a substitute for the homeland. Time after time throughout the centuries, there arose bold spirits who believed, or claimed, they had a plan, or a divine vision, for the restoration of the Jewish people to Palestine.¹¹

These same Jews, in addition to having the hope of returning to Palestine, also believed they had a better right to the land than any other group. They also believed that they were removed from the land illegally. Samuel Katz talks of how deep the feeling of a Jewish right to the land went:

But to the people, the land - as it was called for all those centuries: simply Ha'aretz, unchanging and irreplaceable. If ever a right has been maintained by unrelenting insistence on the claim, it was the Jewish right to Palestine.¹²

Katz also talks about how the Jews feel their land was taken from them and how they never stopped thinking about it:

The Jews were never a people without a homeland. Having been robbed of their land, Jews never ceased to give expression to their anguish at their deprivation and to pray for and demand its return. Throughout the nearly two millennia of dispersion, Palestine remained the focus of the national culture. Every single day in all those seventy generations, devout Jews gave voice to their attachment to Zion.¹³

Samuel Katz reports that aside from believing they had a special right to the land, Jews also believed that the Arabs there did not take care of the land. Jews thought that since the Arabs did not think much of the land they did not have any right to it. Katz makes these points clear in these passages:

Palestine was never more than an unconsidered backwater of the empire. No great political or cultural center ever arose there to establish a source of Arab, or any other non-Jewish, affinity or attachment.

To the Arab rulers and their non-Arab successors, Palestine was a battleground, a corridor, sometimes an outpost, its people a source of taxes and of some manpower for the waging of endless foreign and internecine wars.¹⁴

Katz finishes by saying:

The Arabs did, however, play a significant and specific role in one aspect of Palestine's life: They contributed effectively to its devastation. Where destruction and ruin were only partly achieved by warring imperial dynasties - by Arab, Turkish, Persians, or Egyptians, by the Crusaders or by invading hordes of Mongols or Kharezmians - it was supplemented by the revolts of local chieftains, by civil strife, by intertribal warfare within the population itself.¹⁵

Palestinians respond to these claims by saying they had always lived on the land and loved it. They say their existence is tied to Palestine. Jews answer by saying:

There was never a "Palestinian Arab" nation. To the Arab people as a whole, no such entity as Palestine existed. To those of them who lived in its neighborhood, its lands were a suitable object for plunder and destruction. They were not conscious of any relationship to a land and even the townsmen would have heard of its existence as a land, if they heard of it at all, only from such Jews as they might meet.¹⁶

The historical digests given above demonstrate that the positions of Jews and Arabs are far apart. These differences existed even before the formation of the state of Israel and Israel's victory in the first Arab-Israeli War.

Israel's victory, however, did exacerbate the already tenuous situation. As a result of the war and Israeli victory, many Palestinians had to leave Palestine. These people went to other Arab countries and became the Palestinian refugees. These refugees have become another factor in what was an already serious problem.

In addition to the arguments over which side has a right to the land, the refugees have created some additional arguments. The first argument is over whether or not the Palestinians left of their own accord or were forced out by their own leaders. This problem has already been discussed in earlier sections. The arguments, as noted before, say that Jews claim Arab leaders told the Palestinians to leave while Palestinians state they they left because of the occupation of Palestine by Jews during the war.

Although some Palestinians did leave of their own accord before the war, it is most logical to assume that the majority of

Palestinians were forced out by the Israelis during the war. William Polk states his opinion:

Although extensively a small-scale affair in comparison to European wars, the 1948-49 war was intensively one of the most disruptive in modern times. Upwards of 80 percent - about 800,000 - of the Arab population of Palestine lost their homes, lands, and country.¹⁷

Polk's account of the Palestinians leads to the second argument between Jews and Palestinians. This dispute concerns the number of Palestinians that actually left Palestine. Jews say the number is very low, while Palestinians say that the number is quite high. A good example of this argument are the differences in the figures that Katz and Polk use. Katz believes that there were actually 5,000 or 6,000 people who left Palestine after the war.¹⁸ Polk's figures are much higher, he thinks there were 800,000 Palestinian refugees after the war.¹⁹

Shortly after the war, the United Nations sent an agency into the Middle East to tend to these Palestinian refugees. The name of this organization was the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. This agency set up camps for the refugees in countries such as Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. The plight of the Palestinian refugee was not good for, in addition to having been forced from his home, his new home, the refugee camps, were not very good. William Polk tells of the condition of the refugee camps:

In the camps the refugees lived in a "deplorable material and moral situation". The most employable, the best educated, and the lucky found temporary or permanent homes in Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, or further afield; those who remained in

the camps lived in a limbo in which they initially gave up trying to control their destiny. Their condition was beyond desperation - desperation is, after all, an emotion of one who still actively tries to control his fate.²⁰

The individual refugee in each camp received about 1,600 calories from an insipid diet; which was enough to keep the refugees going physically, but their emotional and intellectual diet was less sustaining.²¹

The problem of poor conditions in the camps was complicated by the fact that the countries that hosted these camps did not receive the refugees with open arms. Jordan was the only country that welcomed the Palestinian refugees. Polk describes the attitude of the host countries toward the refugees:

Dependent upon the United Nations for a monthly dole, they depended upon the inhabitants of the "host country" for everything else. Jobs were few and payment exploitative. Both pitied and resented, they competed for the available jobs and were a constant reminder of Arab weakness. Those in the camps in Lebanon needed but hated - and were used by but annoyed - the Lebanese.²²

The Palestinians were often used as a "political football" by the countries that harbored them. Samuel Katz believes that the governments of these countries inflated the figures on refugee rolls so that they would receive more money from the United Nations. He claims they did this by using the names of refugees who had died and of those who had returned to Israel or gone somewhere else.²³

The conditions that were just described remained the way of life for most Palestinian refugees until the early 1970's, at which time a

number of different groups claimed to represent their cause. A full discussion of these groups will be undertaken in the next section.

Finally, it can be seen that the history of the Palestinians from before the first Arab-Israeli War until the present day has been terribly disruptive. Disputes dominate this history. The questions of why the Palestinians left Palestine and who has a better right to Palestine, Jews or Palestinians, are just two of these disputes.

The history of the Palestinian refugees has also been turbulent. Unwanted, and exploited by most of the countries they now reside in, these people truly do live in a state of limbo. Another important part of the history is the deep feelings among Jews and Palestinians. Their dispute is not just over land, it goes much deeper than that. These incredibly deep feelings will have to be taken into account by anyone trying to find a solution to the Palestinian Problem.

FOOTNOTES FOR SOURCES OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM

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2. Edward W. Said, The Question of Palestine, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).
3. Samuel Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in Palestine, (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1977).
4. Ibid., p. 12.
5. Edward W. Said, The Question of Palestine, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), pp. 15-22.
6. Ibid., pp. 23-24.
7. Ibid., p. 8.
8. Theodor Herzl, Complete Diaries, (New York: Herzl Press and T. Yoseloff, 1960), vol. 1, p. 88.
9. Edward W. Said, The Question of Palestine, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 5.
10. Samuel Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in Palestine, (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1977), p. 87.
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13. Ibid., p. 85.
14. Ibid., p. 112.
15. Ibid., p. 113.
16. Samuel Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in Palestine, (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1977), p. 115.
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18. Samuel Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in Palestine, (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1977), p. 15.

19. William R. Polk, The Arab World, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 232.
20. Ibid., p. 233.
21. Ibid., p. 233.
22. Ibid., p. 233.
23. Samuel Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in Palestine, (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1977), pp. 22-37.

A TENUOUS BOND

The relationship between the Palestinians and certain countries in the Middle East will be one of the topics of this section. This relationship can be termed a tenuous bond. The issue of representation of the Palestinian people will also be examined. Finally, recent diplomatic action by the United States concerning these two issues will be analyzed.

The Palestinians and the Middle East

All of the countries in the Middle East have an interest in the Palestinian Problem. The degree of concern each country feels for the Palestinians determines how much support the Palestinians receive from individual Middle Eastern states. The internal situation present in these countries also dictates the amount of support that can be given to the Palestinians.

Israel has the largest stake in the problem. The countries bordering Israel are also deeply concerned about the problem. These countries are Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Libya also figure prominently.

Most of these countries are host countries for Palestinian refugee camps maintained by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. Conditions in these camps have already been described. Looking

at only these camps, however, is not enough. The Palestinian relationship to Middle Eastern countries goes much deeper.

The first country that will be examined is Iraq. The superficial aspects of Iraq's relationship with the Palestinians can be summed up this way:

On the pan-Arab level, the most important territorial issue for Iraq is that of Palestine and the lands under Israeli occupation since June, 1967. Iraq has persistently and unequivocally demanded a just solution to the Palestine problem.¹

Upon closer inspection, the true situation in Iraq comes to light: the Iraqi government has not been able to give much support to the Palestinian cause. There are two reasons for this. First, Iraq's internal squabbles between the Ba'ath government and Kurdish elements took up a lot of time and resources.

Second, Iraq favors an organization that allows general Arab membership and participation to represent the Palestinians. This stance has isolated Iraq from other Arab countries. Most other Arab countries believe that the organization that represents the Palestinians should have Palestinian members only.

The Palestinian-Iraqi relationship reached its nadir in September, 1970 when Iraqi troops in Jordan did not help Palestinian commandos in their battle against the Jordanian government. Relations on all levels between the Palestinians and the Iraqis improved after the Iraqi government settled its differences with the Kurds. Palestinians in Iraq were then granted rights, such as equal employment.

These moves were an indication of the general softening trend in the Iraqi government's attitude toward the Palestinians. The Palestinian issue once again became a secondary concern when the Iran-Iraq War began in September, 1980.²

Syria's support for the Palestinian cause is unquestioned.

Syria, unlike other Palestinian supporters, devotes much more time and energy to their support. The depth of Syria's support can be seen in this passage:

The Syrian government has considered itself, and generally has been viewed, as the most consistent supporter of the Palestinian cause. There is also an indissoluble link between the Palestinian issue and the larger Arab-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli questions. The questions Damascus has had to face in this area include the extent to which political support should be furnished to the Palestinian cause; the ends for which this support should be provided; the degree of military and logistical assistance to be provided. . .and, directly associated with each of these problems, the specific Palestinian groups to be supported.³

The Palestinians do not, however, receive unlimited support from Syria. The Syrian government keeps close tabs on Palestinian activity by imposing many restrictions on this activity. The Syrians do not intend to lose control of their country to Palestinian commandos, as Jordan did in 1970.

Syrian support for the Palestinian resistance did increase when Israel annexed the Golan Heights in December of 1981. The Golan Heights are a natural border between Israel and Syria. Prior to the 1967 war, Syria held the Golan Heights. Israel captured and has ruled them as occupied territory ever since. Syria will probably escalate its

support of the Palestinian commandos even further in answer to the annexation.⁴

Lebanon has been a country torn by civil war and by the presence of a foreign army within its borders. The civil war began in 1975 and was fought between Sunni and Shi'ite Moslems and Maronite Christians. A Palestinian resistance movement against Israel further complicated this situation. The Palestinians joined forces with the Moslems. Responding to this development, Israel began supporting the Maronite Christians. Syria then sent its army into Lebanon, first to fight the Moslems and then to combat the Israeli-backed Christians.

The civil war kept the Lebanese from maintaining strong control over Palestinian actions within Lebanon. Palestinian commandos were launching raids against Israel from bases in southern Lebanon. These attacks alienated the Palestinians from Moslems living in southern Lebanon. The Shi'ite villagers living there wanted to throw the Palestinian commandos out of the area.⁵

The presence of Palestinian forces in Lebanon has continually brought hardship to the Lebanese people. During the latter part of 1978, the Israelis launched an armored attack that drove deep into Lebanon, all the way to the Litani River. The headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in Beirut, was the target of an Israeli bombing mission in July, 1981. Most recently, Israel conducted air attacks on villages in southern Lebanon. Israel termed this attack a "retaliatory warning".⁶

Writing an article for Time Magazine, Roger Rosenblatt describes the birth of one Lebanese child. The child's name is Palestine. Palestine's strange birth is just one example of the pain the Lebanese endure for the Palestinians:

For want of a standard term, the doctor on the case called the delivery a "caesarean section by explosion". It occurred last July in Beirut, during an Israeli air raid on the Fakhani Street P.L.O. offices, when Palestine's mother, nine-months pregnant, rushed from her apartment house in an effort to escape the bombs. No one is certain what happened next, but when the bombing stopped, Mrs. Halaby was found dead in the rubble. Three meters away, still enveloped in the placenta, lay her new little girl.⁷

Palestinians, however, were not the sole source of concern for Lebanon. The placement of surface-to-air missiles in Lebanon's Bekka Valley by Syria also brought the specter of war with Israel to Lebanon.⁸

Confusion caused by the civil war and the other problems Lebanon has had to face has created a love-hate relationship between the Palestinians and the Lebanese. The Lebanese hope the Palestinians regain their homeland, but the constant threat of Israeli attack has weakened the spirit of Lebanese support for the Palestinians.

Palestinian commandos are so entrenched in southern Lebanon that Jordan's fate of September, 1970 could be relived by Lebanon in the near future.*

Egypt's backing of the Palestinian cause since the 1948 war has been sporadic and troubled. Directly after the 1948 war, Egypt's sympathy for the Palestinians was quite strong:

Since the creation of Israel in 1948 and the ensuing expulsion-emigration of the Arab population from the area constituting the Jewish state, Egypt has consistently supported the "inherent" right of the Palestinian people to return to their homes and lands and to establish an independent political entity in Palestine. Always unequivocal in defending the rights of the Palestinians to regain their territory, Egypt has maintained relations with the various Palestinian organizations that have oscillated between cordiality and enmity.⁹

The 1967 war created even stronger bonds between Egypt and the Palestinians. Good relations, however, eroded over the issue of who was to represent the Palestinians in negotiations. The methods used to

*When Israel won the 1948 war, Jordan's fate became cemented to the fate of the Palestinians. Only Israel has been influenced more by the Palestinians than Jordan. Many of the Palestinians that fled Palestine during and after the war rushed into Jordan. Jordan's government made conditions as liveable as possible for the refugees.

Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Jerusalem in the 1967 war strengthened the ties between Jordan and the Palestinians. The West Bank and Jerusalem had been under Jordan's control since shortly after the 1948 war. The splitting of the East and West Banks fueled a Palestinian resistance movement that had begun in 1966. Palestinian guerrillas used Jordan as a base of operations for their attacks on Israel.

Jordan, and her ruler, King Hussein, did everything possible to aid the guerrillas. Hussein was even thought to be one of the prime representatives of the Palestinian people. Disagreements over the raids into Israel soon brought Hussein and the Palestinians into conflict. Attempts to remove Hussein from power were made in 1970. The situation worsened so much that Hussein was forced to drive the guerrillas out of Jordan in September, 1970. The situation in Jordan in September, 1970 will be discussed more fully in another section.¹⁰

redress Palestinian grievances were also hotly debated:

As far as territorial issues are concerned, there is unanimity among the Egyptians: they are firmly committed to a complete recovery of the Arab lands occupied by Israel since 1967. The unanimity, however, does not extend to the means of achieving this goal.¹¹

Differences with the different Palestinian groups have influenced Egypt's domestic and foreign policy:

These questions have not only created domestic dissension in Egypt but also have caused an occasional deterioration of its relations with Syria, Libya, Jordan, Iraq, and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Neither the charismatic Nasser nor the pragmatic Sadat were able to create a domestic or a regional unity on these issues, which have remained the most agonizing concern of the Egyptian people and their policymakers.¹²

Difficult domestic conditions in the early 1970's led President Sadat to rethink Egypt's foreign policy. Though Egypt's relationship with the Palestinians was of prime concern, Sadat believed he had to concentrate on Egypt's domestic problems before internal uprisings developed. Yet, instead of working on these problems, Sadat launched a surprise attack on Israel in October, 1973. The war was supposed to be a great victory for Egypt which would allow Sadat to repair the troubled conditions in Egypt.

Abraham Wagner details Sadat's attitude toward using Egyptian resources to aid non-Egyptian groups, including the Palestinians, before and after the October War:

There are ample indications that before the October War, Sadat wanted to turn inward and away from pan-Arab issues, such as Palestine, in order to concentrate his efforts on solving Egypt's social and economic problems. The pan-Arab issue, he believed, had deprived Egypt of vital resources desperately needed for domestic development. . . Sadat, who is by no means an isolationist, would prefer to expend his nation's scarce resources and energies in strengthening the economy rather than in encouraging the overthrow of regimes deemed unfriendly to Egypt.¹³

Egypt's defeat in the October War convinced Sadat that violence was not the way to secure peace and prosperity for Egypt. The domestic situation was worsened by the war. Sadat believed that Egypt could not afford, either economically or emotionally, another war with Israel. Sadat's peacemaking journey to Jerusalem in November, 1977 was a direct result of this belief. Sadat hoped that his peace initiative would also help the Palestinians. The impact of Sadat's efforts on the Palestinians will be covered later.

Israel's victory in the 1948 war precipitated the Palestinian Problem. Next to the Palestinians themselves, Israel has become the single most important entity involved in the search for a solution to the Palestinian Problem. Israel's importance to the problem rests in the fact that the land the Palestinians claim to be their home is now occupied by the state of Israel.

Israel's treatment of the Palestinians in the occupied territories is also a matter of debate. Once again Samuel Katz and Edward Said have diverging opinions. Katz feels that Israel's management of the Palestinians in the occupied territories has been more than fair:

The Israeli government has also gone to great lengths, probably unprecedented in the history of military occupations, both to create an easy and relaxed relationship with the people and to improve their lot. From the beginning, it established the principle of not interfering with the tenor and manner of life and of the Arab population, with only two exceptions. First, it insisted on the political propaganda and. . .the second exception consisted in a considerable expenditure of money and effort and expertise to improve the economic condition of the population.¹⁴

Said's opinion of Palestinian life inside the occupied territories is less favorable than the one given by Katz. Said states:

There are Zionism and Israel for Jews, and Zionism for non-Jews. Zionism has drawn a sharp line between Jew and non-Jew; Israel built a whole system for keeping them apart, including the much admired (but completely apartheid) kibbutzim, to which no Arab has ever belonged. In effect, the Arabs are ruled by a separate government premised on the impossibility of isonomic rule for both Jews and non-Jews.¹⁵

Israel's occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Sinai has been a mixed blessing for Israel. One of the good things to come out of the occupation was an improvement in Israel's geographic security. The acquisition of the territories expanded Israel's borders which made the physical defense of Israel somewhat easier. A boost to Israeli morale was another plus provided by the occupation in 1967.

While Israel's security against external attack may have been improved by the increase in territory, her internal security has been greatly threatened by the occupation. The danger to Israel's security comes from the vast resources that must be expended on maintaining a force of occupation in the territories acquired in 1967. Financial and emotional resources must be tapped in order to protect the territories from attack by Palestinian guerrillas.

Management of the occupied territories has become a vicious circle for Israel. In order to protect Israeli citizens from Palestinian attacks, which are in retaliation to the occupation, the Israeli army has become a force of occupation in these areas. The army keeps tight control on the movement and political freedoms of Palestinians in these areas. Lack of political freedoms and freedom of movement lead the Palestinians to subversive action in Israel and give Palestinian groups outside Israel justification to attack Israel in the name of their brothers inside Israel.¹⁶

Thus, actions taken by Israel to enhance security really jeopardize that security. Israel's domestic problems, "a worsening economy, increases in taxes, inflation, unemployment, and emigration",¹⁷ coupled with her security concerns, could bring about Israel's collapse. For this reason and for the emotional well-being of her people it behooves Israel to try and find a solution to the Palestinian Problem.

Improving the quality of life of Palestinians in the occupied territories would go a long way toward paving the road to a solution. Opportunities for Palestinian education is a case in point as this description of the Israeli school system demonstrates:

Parents may send their children to either type of public school--or to private school, some of which are run by various Christian denominations. There is little co-education between Israeli Arabs and Jews. Educational attainment of the Arab population is much lower than the norm, and the university dropout rate is high.¹⁸

Writing in Time Magazine, Otto Freidrich elaborates on the poor condition of Arab education in Israel:

Though Arab and Israeli children now learn each other's languages in Jerusalem classrooms, they still go to separate schools. Officials like to boast not only that many new classrooms have been built (152 last year) but that Arab schools are just as good as Jewish ones (and much better than what the Arabs had in the past). Separate but equal is what the doctrine used to be called in the U.S. and the Supreme Court condemned it forever by ruling that separate schools are inherently unequal.¹⁹

Practices like these have instigated many Palestinian commando raids against Israel. Innocent Israeli families receive the brunt of the violence in these attacks. Roger Rosenblatt details the aftermath of one of these raids:

Einat, 5, and Yael, 2, were both killed in April, 1979 when terrorists entered Nahariya from the sea in a motor-powered dinghy and attacked a four-story apartment house. In one apartment they found Einat and her father, whom they took back to the beach. Danny they shot to death and, when Israeli forces approached, one of the terrorists picked up Einat by the feet and cracked open her head on a rock.

Yael died differently. When the terrorists burst in on their apartment, Semadar and Yael were in a utility room, where they remained in hiding. Yael started to cry. In order to keep her daughter quiet, Semadar clamped her hand over her mouth very hard. It is believed that she inadvertently suffocated the child. When the story was published, it drove the entire nation into profound mourning. There was Israel's history in a single incident: the nation continually at war; the nation as mother protecting her children; the nation unwittingly suffocating her young for the wars in which it was caught.²⁰

A conversation Roger Rosenblatt had with a Palestinian named Nabil depicts the pain felt by Palestinians in the occupied territories. Nabil told Rosenblatt:

One night last year, for instance, three other boys and I were returning home from a dance. A jeep pulled up. The soldiers demanded our identity cards. Then they took us with them. I asked why - when we had our cards. I got slapped for that. We were taken to the military center, where we were made to lie down in the street. Then they transferred us to a cell about 1.5 meters high. You could not sit up. There was almost no air. My friend asked for water; he got slapped for that. 'What makes people behave this way?' I asked one of the soldiers. He said: 'We are not policy-makers. We are just taking orders'.²¹

There will be no end to the mutual suffering the Palestinians and Israelis feel until a settlement of the Palestinian Problem has been reached. No settlement can be hoped for unless the final status of Jerusalem has been agreed upon. Jerusalem's status is another matter of great debate.

While Jerusalem is of great importance to a settlement, its status is hardly mentioned in any discussions or documents. Lord Caradon, a member of the National Defense University, points this out:

Jerusalem means the City of Peace. And in all the surrounding uncertainties, one thing cannot be disputed. There will be no peace in the Holy Land without a peace in Jerusalem.

Yet the question of how peace can be achieved in Jerusalem is postponed, avoided, or neglected. In the Camp David concluding document Jerusalem was not even mentioned.

No problem amongst the many disputes of the Middle East raises more difficulties, excites more deep emotions, or commands more intense loyalties than the question of the future of Jerusalem, and no other danger is treated with such an ominous silence.²²

Lord Caradon believes that there will not be a settlement to the Palestinian Problem and no chance for peace in the Middle East due to the debate over Jerusalem. Caradon says:

The fear is that intense feeling over the future of Jerusalem will increase animosities and stand in the way of a peaceful settlement, eventually bring about bloodshed and destruction on a scale not so far imagined, not only to the Holy City but to all those engaged in the conflict.

What a tragedy it would be if Jerusalem thus became itself the impediment to peace, the central cause of continuing conflict.²³

Otto Freidrich echoes Lord Caradon's thoughts on Jerusalem's importance to peace in the Middle East:

Of all the conflicts between Jews and Arabs, that over Jerusalem is the most complex and intractable. It is so deeply rooted in centuries of political and religious strife that each side is passionately determined to have its way. As there is no settlement, every terrorist bomb on the West Bank contains the danger of escalation: rioting, warfare, spreading oil cutoffs, a new confrontation of the superpowers.²⁴

Passions reign high in the struggle over Jerusalem's future. Arab and Jews have drawn battle lines around their positions from which they will not budge. Teddy Kollek, the mayor of Jerusalem, presents the Israeli case:

There are some Israelis who would give up the Golan, some Israelis who would give up the Sinai, and some who would give up the West Bank. But I do not think you can find any Israelis who are willing to give up Jerusalem. They cannot and will not. This beautiful, golden city is the heart and soul of the Jewish people. You cannot live without a heart and soul. If you want one simple word to symbolize all of Jewish history, that would be Jerusalem.²⁵

Responding to Teddy Kollek, Walid Khalidi makes these remarks:

Without East Jerusalem there would be no West Bank. It is the navel, the pivotal link between Nablus to the north and Hebron to the south. Together with its Arab suburbs, it is the largest Arab urban concentration on the West Bank. It is the former capital of the sanjak (district) of Jerusalem under the Ottomans, as well as of mandatory Palestine. The highest proportion of the Palestinian professional elite under occupation resides in it. It is the site of the holiest Muslim shrines on Palestinian soil...It contains the oldest religious endowments of the Palestinians, their

most prestigious secular institutions - the cumulative and priceless patrimony of a millennium and a quarter of residence. Architecturally it is distinctively Arab. In ownership and property, it is overwhelmingly so. It is the natural capital of Arab Palestine.²⁶

Israel's dominant status in any settlement to the Palestinian Problem will remain solid as long as Jerusalem is under Israeli occupation. The future of Jerusalem will have to be determined before any settlement to the Palestinian Problem can be found. Deep Arab and Jewish emotions toward Jerusalem make this task appear nearly impossible.

Saudi Arabia's involvement in the Palestinian Problem is directly related to the importance of Saudi Arabia to the United States. The United States depends on Saudi oil and on the Saudi's politically moderate stance. Saudi Arabia is one of the few Middle Eastern countries with which the United States has been able to develop a good relationship. The loss of the Iranian ally has made the U.S.-Saudi bond even more important to the United States.

Anything that endangers the stability and security of Saudi Arabia is potentially devastating to the United States. The Palestinian Problem is one issue that could upset Saudi security and stability. Former President Richard M. Nixon makes this point very clear:

The Saudis are concerned that any settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict that does not resolve the Palestinian problem will increase the militancy of the Palestinians. In 1976 the Palestinian Liberation Organization disrupted Lebanon, plunging it into civil war. During my administration they tried twice within three months to assassinate King Hussein of Jordan, they set off a civil war in that country, and they almost succeeded in bringing about the fall of its government. Terrorism is the PLO's stock-in-trade, and Saudi Arabia is extremely vulnerable to terrorist activities; two

thirds of the workers in its oil fields are Palestinians. In addition, anything that strengthens the hand of the Arab radicals as an unsatisfactory settlement would weaken the position of the moderate Saudi leadership.²⁷

Saudi Arabia's value to the United States has been demonstrated in two recent incidents. First, the Saudis were "instrumental in helping the United States control the Syrian missile crisis in mid-1981."²⁸ Secondly, the Saudis were helpful "in arranging the related Israeli-Palestinian cease-fire in Lebanon in July, 1981."²⁹

Writing in his book, The Kingdom, Robert Lacey relates King Faisal's fear of the Palestinians:

What worried him was the bitterness the Palestinians felt towards their brother Arabs. Desperate men with nothing to lose, the Palestinians had, within a matter of years, come to represent a major threat of any Arab regime which had not done enough, in their opinion, to help secure their rights. Placating them was more than a matter of morality; it was a question of survival.³⁰

The latest example of Saudi activism in the search for a settlement to the Palestinian Problem was Crown Prince Fahd's peace proposal in August, 1981. Fahd devised his plan as an alternative to the Camp David peace process, which he branded a failure.³¹

Directly contrasting Saudi Arabia's moderate political positions is the Middle East's most radical state, Libya. Libya's leader, Muammar Gaddafi, is one of the most destabilizing factors in the Middle East. Libya's relationship with the Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation Organization is quite dangerous to a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian Problem.

Writing in the Armed Forces Journal International, Yossef

Bodansky describes the Libyan-Soviet-PLO relationship:

On this level of clandestine activities, the Soviet-Libyan-PLO partnership is the most active. Libya allows PLO troops to train with conventional heavy weapons, particularly aircraft and tanks, which cannot be placed at their disposal anywhere else. In October, 1978, Arafat claimed that Palestinian squadrons stationed in Libya were operating Mig-21, Mig-23, and Mirage 5 aircraft. Tank and missile units are likewise placed at the disposal of the Fatah.³²

In addition to training and arming Palestinian guerrillas, Gaddafi has done much more to upset the delicate balance that barely holds the Middle East together. On August 19, 1981, Libyan fighter planes attacked U.S. naval aircraft that were on maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra. Gaddafi ordered the U.S. planes to be attacked because they had entered the Gulf of Sidra, which he claimed was inside Libya's 200-mile territorial waters. The U.S. planes promptly shot down the Libyan aircraft.

Some observers saw this action as "a deliberate U.S. provocation".³³ Other observers feel that Libya instigated the action by attacking planes that were over international waters.³⁴

Gaddafi has also been linked to assassination attempts on European and American diplomats. There also are questions on Gaddafi's possible role in the assassination of Anwar Sadat. Finally, in December, 1981 U.S. intelligence agencies received information stating that Muammar Gaddafi had sent hit teams to the United States to kill President Reagan and other top U.S. officials.³⁵

The setting in the Middle East is volatile enough without Gaddafi's disruptive influence. Gaddafi's Libya threatens to ruin any possibility for a settlement to the Palestinian Problem. The atmosphere must be just right for negotiations of this kind and Libya's actions continually muddle the atmosphere.*

*For further discussions on the problems between Palestinians and Jews see: Politics in the Middle East by James Bill and Carl Leiden, The Near East by William Yale, and The Battle for Peace by Ezer Weizman.

FOOTNOTES FOR A TENUOUS BOND

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PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION

Representation of the dispersed Palestinian people has been a great question of debate since Israel's victory in the first Arab-Israeli War. The debate moves along a number of levels. First, the debate centered on which country or group should be the sole representative of the Palestinians. Once this was decided, the debate moved to another level. Now the question was how effective could the group representing the Palestinians be, if Israel and other states dealing with the Palestinian Problem would not meet or even acknowledge that group as the representative of the Palestinians.

Prior to 1962, for the most part, there was no universal Palestinian entity. Palestinians living in refugee camps in different countries knew only the Palestinians in that camp or that country. While the desire for return to Palestine may have been universal, there was no single movement, thought, or driving force that united the Palestinians politically.

Edward Said believes this lack of unity causes an identity crisis for Palestinians. He says:

Each Palestinian community must struggle to maintain its identity on at least two levels: first, as Palestinian with regard to the historical encounter with Zionism and the precipitous loss of a homeland; second, as Palestinian in the existential setting of day-to-day life responding to the pressure in the state of residence. Every Palestinian has no state as a Palestinian even though he is "of", without belonging to, a state in which at present he resides.¹

With the exception of a few groups that made commando raids into Israel from Jordan and Lebanon in 1955, the Palestinians were "politically passive until about 1962".²

These military groups operated independently. There was no communication or organized plan between these early Palestinian groups. It was not until the late 1950's and early 1960's that the need for a concerted effort developed and took form. Edward Said describes how the Palestinian consciousness was born:

Limited in purpose, cut off from one another, and clandestine, the groups defy the assemblage of an historical account. No documentary records give a view of their gradual transformation into political organizations. Indeed, we must look essentially to Arabic literature, to poetry and fiction to get some "feel" of the genesis of what later became the guerrilla movement. Put simply, what appears to have occurred is that the young, raised on a blurred memory of childhood, the tales of the elders, the sorrow, privation, and humiliation of refugee life, came to feel a new sense of romantic nationalism.³

The Palestinians needed a model to follow before they could become engaged in an organized battle with the Israeli occupier. William Polk feels the Algerian Revolution is the model the Palestinians needed:

What was it that brought into a single focus this nostalgia and partisan warfare? The most convincing answer, I think, was the distantly perceived example of Algeria.

The Algerian Revolution was adopted as a case study by those Franz Fanon called "The Wretched of the Earth"--and by those who opposed them. Fanon's own book became a clarion cry for radical organizations just as Colonel Roger Trinquier's La Guerre Moderne became a guidebook on counterinsurgency warfare. In the Algerian resistance movement, then apparently also disaffected, leaderless, inchoate, and powerless, but beginning to achieve a kind of heroism, the Palestinians found a family resemblance.⁴

The first two groups to become "the quasi-official representatives of the Palestinian people" were the Harakat at-Tahrir al-Falastini, or Fatah, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, or PLO. Fatah was the first of the organizations to appear on the scene. Fatah emerged in 1965, but was never generally recognized.

The PLO, which became generally recognized as the representative of the Palestinian people by the Palestinians and most Arab states, started a little later. The PLO was the creation of an Arab summit conference held in Alexandria on September 15, 1963. The next spring, a group called the Palestine National Congress met in Jerusalem to discuss the formation of the PLO. King Hussein of Jordan opened the meeting by promising that Jordan would provide camps to train Palestinian guerrillas.

Palestinians criticized the PLO as an organization that did nothing more than soak up Palestinians to prevent them from acting effectively. Ahmad Shuqairi, the PLO chairman, was also criticized as a poor leader. Palestinians claimed he was a puppet of the Arab states that had created the PLO.⁵

Palestinians believed that the true leader of the Palestinian people would have to be an independent, not connected with a particular Arab state. One such leader was Yasir Arafat. William Polk describes Arafat's credentials:

The most significant of the Fatah leaders was Yasir Arafat. Unlike Shuqairi, he was not the "chosen instrument" of any Arab government. Of a poorer background, he had drunk the dregs of the bitter cup of sorrow and humiliation. Able and energetic, he managed to acquire an education and to escape the camp life. Like many of the Fatah personnel, he was technically qualified (as an engineer) but had not risen to a position of prominence in another Arab country.⁶

The PLO's prominence grew after Israel's victory in the 1967 war. More territory had been occupied by Israel, along with the Palestinians living on that territory. The inadequacy of the Arab armies against Israel was also very clear. The time had come for a new and vibrant plan of attack. Leadership for the Palestinian people was essential.

Palestinians of the older generation wanted leadership to come from their own camps, interests, and local authorities. Younger Palestinians, however, thought the guerrillas of the PLO and other organizations should provide the leadership for the Palestinians. It was this difference of opinion between older and younger Palestinians that allowed the guerrillas to gain the upper hand.

Although by now most Palestinians favored the guerrillas, the guerrillas themselves were not united. Aside from the PLO and Fatah, two other groups gained importance after the 1967 war. These two groups were the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Sa'iqah. Sa'iqah was a group of commandos controlled by the Syrian army that operated from the Syrian and Jordanian borders.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was a conglomeration of three different guerrilla groups. The leader of one of these groups, George Habbash, became the leader of the Popular Front. The Popular Front's radical social ideology separated it from the PLO and Fatah.

Fatah was having the most luck with young Palestinians by the end of 1967. Support from Arab countries for the Palestinians was still split among the different groups. An Israeli raid in retaliation to Fatah attacks in Israel may have been the deciding factor as to which group would get Arab support.

On March 21, 1968 the Israeli army attacked the village of Karamah, which was a Fatah staging area. Although the Israelis won militarily, Fatah pronounced the raid a psychological victory for the Palestinian cause. After this victory a Palestine National Council was called in May, 1968. The purpose of this council was to unify the guerrilla groups under one organization, the PLO, which would receive all Arab support. Fatah, the PLO, and Sa'iqah were the major groups that joined. The Popular Front was still having internal disputes over leadership and policies. This argument led some members of the Popular Front to leave and form the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which became part of the PLO.

Fatah assumed leadership of the PLO in a 1969 PLO Congress in Cairo. The Popular Front under George Habbash boycotted the Congress. Yasir Arafat was elected Chairman of the PLO and Fatah took control of

the organization. The Popular Front remained outside of the PLO until the group was forced to help the PLO battle the Jordanian army in 1970. Palestinian unification was almost complete. The guerrillas believed they were near becoming an "effective political community".⁷ Their largest obstacle was the Jordanian government which began fighting the guerrillas. The fighting became heaviest in September, 1970, which became known as "Black September". The removal of the PLO from Jordan was a result of this action.⁸

The early 1970's were very important for the PLO. The United Nations voted to recognize the PLO on October 14, 1974. There were 105 yes votes and 20 abstentions. Israel, the United States, the Dominican Republic and Bolivia cast the only dissenting votes. Later that month, at a meeting of twenty Arab heads of state in Rabat, Morocco, the PLO was recognized as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people on any liberated Palestinian territory". The dates of this meeting were October 26-28, 1974.⁹

The culmination of the PLO's efforts came on November 13, 1974 when its leader, Yasir Arafat, addressed the U.N. General Assembly. This was a truly momentous occasion for "it was the first time that a non-governmental organization had participated in an assembly debate."¹⁰

It would seem that after all that had happened to the PLO in the international arena a settlement to the Palestinian Problem could have been reached somewhat more easily. This was not to be, for Israel

would not deal with the PLO. Israel would rather deal with Jordan than the PLO.

There are two main reasons for Israel's refusal to negotiate with the PLO. The first is that the PLO refuses to recognize the existence of the state of Israel. Secondly, Israel does not trust the PLO because of terrorist acts it has committed in the past. The killing of eleven Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich is just one example of terrorism conducted by the PLO.

Before going any further into the actions of the PLO, it is important to learn something about terrorists in general. The first question to be asked is why terrorists engage in activities such as bombings and airplane hijackings.

According to Jan Schreiber, the terrorist believes his aggressive actions are a reaction to someone else's aggression. Most terrorists view themselves as having been forced by events beyond their control to use violence. In the case of the Palestinians, this is especially true. If the PLO did not undertake operations that spread their actions across the front pages of the world's newspapers, their cause would remain relatively unknown outside the Middle East. Living without a state of their own hampers the Palestinians' ability to sell their cause to the world. Violence, however, has the opposite effect of turning people off of the cause of the group that uses violence.¹¹

In his book, The Ultimate Weapon, Jan Schreiber describes a typical terrorist. This description definitely covers members of the PLO. Schreiber states:

In a world accustomed to placing more value on ends than means, the terrorist is the supreme pragmatist. No deed is too brazen or too grisly, so long as it gets the job done: the change of social structure or the sought-after revolution. Like anyone who deals in the politics of power, he lives in a climate of moral ambiguity. Reknown as a particularly heartless victimizer, he often sees himself, by contrast, as society's victim, someone driven to commit certain appalling acts by the blatant insensitivity of the world to the needs and aspirations of the people he represents.¹²

While the PLO did engage in this kind of activity, the mission of the PLO has changed somewhat since it was accepted in the U.N. Basically, the PLO is less militant now that it is trying a political solution to the Palestinian Problem. Schreiber says that:

Clearly, however, by accepting potential political solutions and the help of the great powers in arriving at them, the PLO had committed itself to changing its image from that of unprincipled cutthroat to patriotic freedom fighter and peace negotiator.¹³

Terrorism and its inherent violence is destabilizing to world security generally and, in particular, to peace in the Middle East. The death and destruction terrorism brings to innocent people the world over threatens to turn the different countries of the world into armed camps.

As noted earlier, the terrorism conducted by the PLO has brought great pain and anguish to many on both sides of the Palestinian Problem. The uncertainty, mistrust, and hatred caused by this terrorism has severely damaged the chances for a settlement to the Palestinian Problem.

Terrorism also upsets the peaceful maintenance of the superpower relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. As in any dispute, sides are taken in the Palestinian Problem. The U.S. sides with Israel and the Soviet Union with the PLO. Were it not for its part in the Palestinian dispute, the Soviet Union would not have as firm a foothold in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

The Middle East and the Persian Gulf are not the only places the Soviet Union has used terrorist activity to its own advantage. Observers note that by supplying and training different terrorist groups, such as the PLO and Red Brigade, the Soviet Union can cause political disruption in areas it normally would have no influence. While using the genuine concerns of local terrorist organizations as bait, the Soviet Union lets these groups unwittingly accomplish tasks that would be politically harmful if conducted by Soviet forces. Responding to these charges, the Soviet Union claims that the CIA is really behind international terrorism.

In his book, The Terror Network, Claire Sterling disputes the Soviet claim and sets the record straight:

Some have suggested that the CIA was egging on the enemy all along. A surprising number of people abroad still think there are no limits to the CIA's capabilities in this regard. I had no access at all to the CIA while gathering material for this book, since its agents were formally forbidden to talk to journalists abroad. I couldn't swear then that the CIA had no connection whatever with the planetary wave of terrorism described here. But it was certainly not the CIA that ran guerrilla training camps for tens of thousands of terrorists in Cuba, Yemen, North Korea, East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. The CIA could not have provided, and evidently did not, the colossal supplies of weapons employed by the terrorists of four continents in Fright

Decade I, or sanctuaries for their fugitives, or intelligence information for their operatives, or diplomatic cover in the United Nations.¹⁴

The PLO's refusal to recognize the existence of the state of Israel has stalemated the process leading toward a settlement of the Palestinian Problem. Israel, as well as the United States, will not deal with the PLO as long as it refuses to recognize Israel. In fact, any country or diplomat who even suggests talking with the PLO suffers the wrath of Israel and her proponents. President Carter's Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, is a case in point:

Many blacks were outraged by what they perceived to be the forced resignation of Andrew Young as ambassador to the United Nations in August, 1979 for holding a conversation with the U.N. representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization. United States' policy, like Israeli policy, was to have nothing to do with the PLO until it disavowed terrorism and recognized Israel's right to exist. After his resignation, Young made clear his opinion that a prohibition on talking to the PLO carried this policy too far and ignored a political reality in the Middle East.¹⁵

Although the PLO must have been pretty successful to have been admitted to the United Nations, the effectiveness of this organization has been questioned. Once again, it is Samuel Katz and Edward W. Said that come down on different sides of the Palestinian fence. Samuel Katz questions the bravery of the PLO and of the support it received from Palestinians:

Fatah operations against Israel, first launched in 1965, were planned in Syria. The fighters first crossed into Jordan or sometimes into Lebanon and from there infiltrated directly into Israel. All the attacks were hit-and-run raids on civilian targets, and seldom did they stray far from the border. For Fatah members could not expect shelter from the Palestinian Arabs, whether in Jordan-occupied Judea and Samaria or in Israel. With few exceptions,

the "Palestinian people" were not involved at all, nor did they offer any substantial cooperation, even passive, in these operations.¹⁶

Edward Said believes the PLO has been very successful and innovative for three reasons:

First, the PLO consciously undertook to be responsible for all Palestinians - those in exile, those under occupation, those inside Israel. . .Secondly, the PLO used its international authority to interpret the Palestinian reality, which had been obscured from the world for almost a century, to the world and, more important, to Palestinians themselves. . .Third, the PLO as a political organization was decisively opened on all sides to admit the entire community to its ranks.¹⁷

The claim, that Palestinian terrorism is no better or worse than the terrorism used by Israelis against the British, is often not heard over the righteous indignation voiced by the Israelis. It should not be forgotten that Israeli terrorist groups such as the Haganah, Stern Group, Irgun and the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel launched raids and attacks against the British that were just as bloody as any conducted by the PLO against Israel in the 1960's. The bombing of the King David Hotel, in which ninety-one people were killed and forty-five wounded, is just one of the more explicit examples. The bombing was conducted by the Irgun, which was headed by Menachem Begin, the present Prime Minister of Israel. In light of his past, any complaints made by Begin about terrorist activities against Israel border on the ironic.¹⁸

Finally, in order to truly represent the Palestinian people effectively, the PLO will have to make some changes in its policy. The PLO will have to recognize Israel's right to exist and halt its acts of terror. Former President Nixon gives his opinion of what policies the

representative of the Palestinians should follow:

First, whatever group does in fact or claims to represent the Palestinians must recognize Israel's right to exist in peace and must reject the use of terrorism or armed action against Israel or Israeli citizens.¹⁹

It remains to be seen if the PLO will heed President Nixon's advice.*

* For a detailed analysis of the forms and causes of guerrilla and terrorist activity, see Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare edited by Sam C. Sarkesian.

FOOTNOTES FOR PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION

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THE PALESTINIANS AND THE U.S.

The Palestinian Problem has been a source of major concern for U.S. policymakers since the formation of the state of Israel. This problem became prominent during the Eisenhower administration and has intensified ever since. Although Secretary of State Dulles presented a plan for the settlement of the problem in 1955, the Eisenhower administration was more concerned about Soviet involvement in the Middle East.

Eisenhower believed that much of the instability in the Middle East was fomented by international communism under the direct control of the Soviet Union. In response to this belief the Eisenhower Doctrine, which called for U.S. military and economic assistance to countries in the Middle East as a means of countering Soviet policy in the area, was formulated by the administration and approved by Congress in March of 1957.¹

Middle East policy did not change much during the Kennedy administration. One reason for this being that President Kennedy's Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, had been a friend and admirer of John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's Secretary of State. William Polk details the attitude of American Middle East policymakers:

Moreover, the Department of State - both in the person of the Secretary and the officers at the "working level" - continued to hold the view of the American long-term interests and objectives in the Middle East which underlay the policy of the previous administration. The emphasis on military overflight rights, continuation of the flow of petroleum on acceptable terms to Europe, and, above

all, prevention of the real or ostensible incursion of the Soviet Union into the Mediterranean area underlay the policies of both administrations.²

Once again the Palestine Problem took a back seat to other considerations. More importantly, the one plan that the Kennedy administration developed never got off the ground because the administration refused to face resistance from Israel and Jewish-American resistance at home. The plan, written by Dr. Joseph Johnson, met such strong resistance because it called for the voicing of preferences by the Palestinians and Israel would have nothing to do with the Palestinians. The lack of U.S. resolve in pursuing its plan is an example of American unwillingness to go against the wishes of Israel. This unwillingness is a problem that still plagues U.S. policy in the Middle East today.³

President Nixon, who took office in 1969, viewed world events almost exclusively from the perspective of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. superpower relationship. Nixon's Middle East policy was therefore set in these terms. The Palestinian Problem once again became a matter of secondary importance. In addition to making U.S. Middle East policy take the wrong approach to the Palestinian Problem, Nixon's obsession with the Soviet Union led to the total eclipse of U.S. Middle Eastern policy by the attention given to the war in Vietnam and the opening of China. These two events were Nixon's means of combatting Soviet communism.

Nixon and his National Security Affairs Adviser, Henry Kissinger, did not deal with the Middle East until events forced them to do so. Further weakening U.S. policy in the Middle East was the fact that

Kissinger was not directly involved. The conduct of U.S. policy in the area was left to Secretary of State William P. Rogers who was neither strong nor assertive. Kissinger's aggressiveness is what was needed for a viable U.S. policy in the Middle East. This difference in personalities led to many clashes in foreign policy until Kissinger later became both National Security Affairs Adviser and Secretary of State.

In addition to differences in personality, there were also differences in the way the White House and the State Department viewed the situation in the Middle East. Writing in his book, Decade of Decisions, William Quandt describes these differences:

The president and Kissinger seemed to be chiefly worried by the global ramifications of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nixon repeatedly used highly colored and explosive imagery in describing the area. Again and again the theme of confrontation between the superpowers was mentioned.

The State Department professionals tended to agree that the situation in the Middle East was dangerous, but their perceptions were more affected by the threats to United States' interests arising from trends in the area. At State, one heard of the "erosion" of American influence, of "deterioration" of the American position, of "radicalization", and of "polarization".⁴

Rogers and the State Department wanted to develop a new policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Busy with Vietnam and China, Nixon allowed Rogers to go ahead in the creation of a new Middle East policy. This policy became known as the Rogers Plan. Although the Rogers Plan if given a chance might have brought a limited peace to the Middle East, it, like most other plans for peace in the Middle East, did not deal with the main cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict. American policymakers had not then learned and are just now realizing that the Palestinian

Problem will have to be settled before any comprehensive peace in the Middle East can be established.

The Jordanian crisis of September, 1970 was one of the few times U.S. policymakers and diplomats dealt with issues directly involved with the Palestinian Problem. Instead of aggressively seeking a settlement to the problem after the crisis, the United States entered a period of "standstill diplomacy" that lasted from 1970 to 1973.⁵

Failure by the U.S. to pursue a vigorous policy in the Middle East, one that would lead to a return of the occupied territories and a settlement to the Palestinian Problem, created a pressure-cooker effect in the Middle East. It exploded into war in October, 1973. Once again the United States and its Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, were presented with an opportunity to do something constructive in the Middle East.

When at last he did take over U.S. policy in the area, in response to the October War, Kissinger's choice of step-by-step diplomacy, while not settling the Palestinian Problem, may have created a situation that would allow negotiations on the problem to take place. Kissinger felt that, by taking different issues separately or one step at a time, a solution to the whole Arab-Israeli problem could be found. Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy helped to produce some success in achieving his step-by-step process.*

* This change of policy was a reaction to the gas lines resulting from OPEC's 1973 oil embargo. See The Middle East: Oil, Politics and Development edited by John Duke Anthony for a detailed discussion of OPEC's threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East.

The main problem with Kissinger's policies was that they did not include the Palestinians. Policymakers believed that a settlement to the problem could be reached after peace had been achieved. William Quandt describes this deadly fallacy:

The United States has refrained from taking a clear position on the issues regarding the Palestinians. In view of their complexity, this may have been a reasonable posture in the short term, but at some point the United States will have to confront the question of Palestinian participation in peace negotiations.⁶

The Carter administration, which took control in 1977, finally changed the American reluctance to deal with the Palestinian Problem. The change in American policy is recounted by William Polk:

The President realized that American Middle Eastern policy had hit a dead end with the conclusion of the Sinai Accord in September, 1975 precisely because it had been designed to avoid the problem of the Palestinians. . . Carter had a remote sympathy for the Palestinians. What they said they wanted or he assumed they wanted made sense to Carter as a man concerned with human rights.⁷

According to Polk, "the Palestinian issue was one on which, apparently, President Carter felt a personal, even a religious, commitment."⁸ President Carter felt so strongly about the Palestinians that he shocked everyone during a town meeting in Clinton, Massachusetts. At this meeting President Carter announced the three conditions he felt were needed for peace in the Middle East. The first two were recognition of Israel's right to exist and the establishment of permanent frontiers. There was nothing new about these conditions for they had been linchpins of American policy for quite a long time. It was President Carter's third condition, the need for a homeland for the

Palestinians had never before been part of an official policy of an American president.

President Carter's beliefs were not unfounded and his actions were soon to be rewarded. President Anwar Sadat made his historic journey to Jerusalem in November, 1977. This visit led to the betterment of relations between Israel and Egypt. These new relations between Israel and Egypt led President Carter to ask Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel and President Sadat of Egypt to come to Camp David for peace negotiations that would be mediated by President Carter himself. The negotiations at Camp David were unique. William Polk explains:

The Camp David meetings were perhaps the most remarkable diplomatic event of this century. Quite apart from the substance of the discussions, the fact that the heads of state from three states suspended all other activities for thirteen days was unprecedented. The informality of the meetings, contrasted sharply with the usual diplomatic interchange in which formality and protocol were nearly as important as substance.⁹

The Camp David Accords, signed on September 17, 1978, were made up of two separate documents. The first document was a "Framework for Peace in the Middle East", written mostly by President Carter, which set up the manner in which peace in the Middle East could be reached. Egypt and Israel also agreed to the concluding of a peace treaty within three months of Camp David. The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty was signed on March 26, 1979 at the White House. This treaty ended the state of belligerency between Israel and Egypt and dictated the start of normal relations between the two countries.

President Carter's "framework" document is far more interesting for it lays out the process by which the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian territories occupied by Israel, were to be dealt with. The plan called for a five-year transition period in which a self-governing authority would be elected by the people in these territories. Once this authority had been elected, Israel would remove its military government and civilian administration from the territories. This was to be done so that full autonomy could be given to the inhabitants of the territory. Jordan would also be asked to participate in the negotiations that would settle the arrangements for this transition period.

The document also stated that Egypt, Israel, and Jordan would determine the manner in which the elected self-governing authority would be established. Negotiations to determine the powers and responsibilities of the authority were also to take place. Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza and any "other Palestinians as mutually agreed" could enter into these negotiations.

The transition period would begin once the self-governing authority or administrative council was established. This period would last five years. By the third year of this transition period, negotiations to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, are to be initiated. These negotiations are to be completed by the end of the transition period. Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza would constitute the committee

that determines the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The committee to conclude the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan would be made up of representatives of Israel, Jordan and the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

The search for a self-governing authority has not yet ended. Autonomy talks between Israel and Egypt, for Jordan has not entered the negotiations, have made little if any progress. The Camp David Accords did bring about a separate peace between Israel and Egypt, but they now can be no more than a guide for any settlement of the Palestinian Problem. Unless drastic measures are taken by the U.S., the Camp David Accords will become just another miserable attempt at settling the problem.

Before discussing the inadequacies of the Camp David Accords and making any suggestions on what U.S. policy should be toward the Palestinian Problem, the Reagan administration will have to be examined.

President Reagan, like other presidents before him, views the world in terms of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. superpower relationship. Reagan, however, lets this view rule his policies to a greater extent than any previous president. Alexander Haig, Reagan's Secretary of State, shares this view. Together they intend to form a "strategic consensus" in the Middle East to protect American interests by keeping the Soviets out. Walid Khalidi examines Haig's attitudes toward the Middle East:

But the predominantly geopolitical lens through which he views the Middle East can only heighten concern. Without as yet having scrutinized the contents of the Middle East box (including, inter alia, the Palestine problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict), Mr. Haig proposes to wrap it in a "strategic consensus" between the Israelis and the Arabs in the face of the U.S.S.R.¹⁰

Reagan and his policymakers' efforts to form a "strategic consensus" against the Soviet Union will delay, if not derail, other efforts being made to settle the Palestinian Problem. A closer relationship with Israel will undoubtedly be the result of this "strategic consensus". According to Khalidi, "All this appears to indicate the Palestinian issue has been shelved by the Reagan Administration."¹¹

These policies could not have come at a worse time and be so harmful to American interests. Reagan thinks that "shelving" the Palestinian Problem and forming a "strategic consensus" with Israel will enhance and protect U.S. interests. Ironically, the opposite is true. By putting the Palestinian Problem aside, Reagan is in reality clearing an open path into the Middle East for the U.S.S.R. Increased U.S. support of Israel at this time will also be harmful instead of helpful to American interests.

Walid Khalidi explains the effect non-resolution of the Palestinian Problem and U.S. support of Israel has had on the Arabs, U.S., and U.S.S.R.:

(1) They have resulted in the deepening and perpetuation of Arab political alienation from the West. . . American sponsorship of Israel and a perceived unwillingness to solve the Palestine problem largely counterbalanced the positive effects of decolonization on Arab-Western relations. With West European colonial disengagement completed, the onus of the non-resolution of the Palestine problem was shifted increasingly to the United States.

(2) At the same time, the attractiveness of Soviet military and diplomatic help has increased in proportion to American backing of Israel. In fact, the Palestine problem provided the main Soviet entree into the Arab world.

(3) The non-resolution of the Palestine problem has supplied the most powerful motivation (and rationalization) for continued (Arab) reliance on the U.S.S.R.

(4) Western military support of Israel has led to Soviet military support of the Arabs. The vicious circle this established has reinforced the Arab emotional and intellectual tilt in favor of the Soviets, especially with the younger generations.¹²

In light of this analysis, it can easily be seen that Reagan's Middle Eastern policies are counterproductive. U.S. policy and diplomacy in the Middle East has generally been shortsighted and, at times, self-defeating. This is especially true with policy concerning the Palestinian Problem. The problem with America's policy in the Middle East is that it is not based on the most important factors present in the Middle East. William R. Polk describes on what the main lines of American policy in the Middle East are based:

In large part, they were inherited from Great Britain, transferred from other areas, or grew out of American domestic attitudes; only in small part were they adjusted to or in resonance with the hopes and fears of Middle Easterners. Therein lies much, but not all, of the cause of their shortfalls and disappointments. Too little did Americans perceive the Arabs and too little did the Arabs perceive Americans, to cushion our joint passage through the stormy postwar generation.¹³

The main problem with U.S. policy and diplomacy in the Middle East has been a failure or unwillingness to recognize the fact that there could not be any peace or security in the Middle East until a just settlement to the Palestinian Problem has been found.

The only way to end the threat of Soviet involvement in the Middle East is to eliminate the justification for Soviet presence in the area. This justification, as aptly demonstrated by Walid Khalidi, is the non-resolution of the Palestinian Problem and the blind support of Israel by the U.S.

President Reagan and his policymakers must realize that shying away from the Palestinian Problem is the worst thing that can be done. The time has come for some immediate and drastic moves by the U.S. to get the problem settled. These moves will be drastic because they will not be what Israel would wish us to do. U.S. policy must start dealing with the Middle East as a whole, without again allowing Israel to become an albatross. American acquiescence to every whim of Menachem Begin and Israel must end if U.S. interests in the area are to be protected.

America's position in the Middle East can be enhanced only if the U.S. makes its own foreign policy instead of letting Israel decide what policies the U.S. should follow. There are many things Israel is doing that endangers peace in the Middle East that the U.S. should be speaking out against. Begin's decision to make Jerusalem the capital of Israel, the increasing number of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, the illegal use of American planes sold to Israel to bomb the Iraqi reactor, and the annexation of the Golan Heights are just a few examples.

The U.S. should have policies designed to punish Israel when acts such as these are committed. The use of American planes in the

bombing destruction of the Iraqi reactor is a special case in point. The agreement between the U.S. and Israel that allowed the sale of the planes said they could be used for defensive purposes only. The bombing can in no way be construed as anything but an offensive act. The bombing, therefore, was in violation of American law and Israel should have been punished.

U.S. support of Israel is important and the U.S. should not abandon Israel, but this support should not go to the extent that it handcuffs U.S. actions, as it does now. Charles McC. Mathias gives one reason why U.S. policymakers are reluctant to go against Israel:

American Presidents, and to an even greater degree Senators and Representatives, have been subjected to recurrent pressures from what has come to be known as the Israel lobby. For the most part they have been responsive, and for reasons not always related either to personal conviction or careful reflection on the national interest. . . It is rather to suggest that, as a result of the activities of the lobby, congressional conviction has been measurably reinforced by the knowledge that political sanctions will be applied by any who fail to deliver.¹⁴

John C. Campbell pinpoints the problem with non-resolution of the Palestinian Problem:

The Palestine question remains a formidable obstacle and burden to U.S. relations with the Arab world. It undermines the moderates and strengthens the wild men. It plays into the hands of the Soviet Union. It threatens to isolate the United States with Israel as the only friend in the region. A settlement may not be possible; nor can we assume that a settlement, if reached, would end Arab-Israeli tension or transform America's relations with the Arab world. Nevertheless, the effort must be made.¹⁵

The U.S. has to make this effort now, before the situation in the Middle East becomes so untenable that another war breaks out. There

are a number of things the U.S. must do to get the negotiations on the settlement of the Palestinian Problem going again. The U.S. must encourage and actively seek the participation of Jordan and the Palestinians, including the PLO, in these negotiations. The PLO must be brought into the discussion whether Israel likes it or not. The U.S. will have to prevail over Israel in the short term for the benefit of long-term peace and security. John C. Campbell explains:

The terms, of course, have to be negotiated by the parties, principally Israel, Jordan and representatives of the Palestinians (not excluding the PLO), and that requires a major endeavor to get those parties talking to each other.¹⁶

The Israelis argue that they will not negotiate with the PLO because of its covenant which denies the legitimacy of the state of Israel. Khalidi believes the "Covenant is maximalist, unrealistic and no basis for a settlement."¹⁷ He also points out that the PLO has softened some of its positions, especially those regarding armed struggle and the formation of a ministate within the post-1967 occupied territories.¹⁸

Khalidi also correctly suggests that the Europeans could be used by the U.S. in its attempt to get the PLO to enter the negotiations. He says:

The Europeans could constructively focus attention on the two principles of "reciprocity" and "coexistence" - the leaven for a modus vivendi. They could draw out the PLO and the Arab radicals on what they have been implying. They could elicit from Israel responses, however guarded, about what in the circumstances it might contemplate. Should the Europeans collectively ascertain the preparedness of this or that protagonist to exchange reciprocal assurances on the basis of coexistence, this should be welcome news. The United States might find the information worthy of building on.¹⁹

The next step American policy should take is to draw Jordan into the negotiations. Jordan's refusal to enter the negotiations has been greatly debated. One reason for this refusal is that Jordan believes the Camp David Accords are a sellout to Israel:

To the Saudis and other moderate Arabs (Jordan) the general framework document that emerged from the summit delegations was at best a repackaged version of Begin's limited autonomy plan, with no promise of any fair expression of self-determination for the inhabitants of the conquered territories. Begin confirmed their suspicions in a speech in New York City immediately after Camp David that seemed to rule out any meaningful exercise of self-determination at the end of the agreed upon five-year transition period.²⁰

Ian Lustick believes that Jordan has very good reasons for not joining the negotiations. He believes that Jordan does not want to have anything to do with control of the West Bank or "the reintroduction of 800,000 West Bank Palestinians into the Jordanian political arena". Lustick also points out that Jordan's domestic situation has improved since the PLO was removed in 1970 and that King Hussein does not want them back. Lustick states:

In fact, it has become increasingly clear that the existence of a growing Palestinian majority on the East Bank is the Hashemite regime's single most dangerous problem and that Israel's continued occupation of the West Bank is the regime's most important asset.²¹

By not joining the negotiations, Jordan has also not been subjected to the same isolation from the Arab world that Egypt has. Taking all these factors into account, Lustick feels that the prospects for bringing Jordan into the negotiations are not good:

Although Hussein would be hard pressed not to accept return of the entire West Bank, including East Jerusalem, the risks of accepting anything less are so high a compromise probably will require a unilateral Israeli willingness to permit the establishment of a Palestinian homeland in the occupied territories. For Hussein would regard a Palestinian entity independent of Jordan as a more dangerous threat to the stability of the East Bank than a Palestinian homeland established under the auspices of, and closely monitored by, the Hashemite kingdom. For the foreseeable future the price of luring Jordan into a settlement will be higher than any government in Jerusalem is likely to be willing or able to pay.²²

Jordan's importance in the negotiations is readily apparent. With the exception of the Sinai, most of the territory Israel has occupied since 1967 was Jordanian. El Hassan Bin Talal also claims that the Jordanians and the Palestinians "are now one people". Any settlement involving the Palestinians will be of great concern to Jordan.

El Hassan Bin Talal gives some reasons for Jordan's concern:

- (1) Half Jordan's population is Palestinian.
- (2) The West Bank and East Jerusalem, both captured by Israel in 1967, were part of Jordan.
- (3) If there is large-scale Palestinian migration as a result of any regional settlement, Jordan will necessarily be greatly affected.
- (4) Virtually all Palestinians currently resident in Jordan are Jordanian nationals.²³

For these reasons Jordan must enter the negotiations. This is in direct contrast to Ian Lustick's beliefs on Jordan's willingness to negotiate. Talal says:

We have seen that Jordan is central to any Arab-Israeli settlement, that Jordanian views must be very seriously considered if any initiative is to have a chance at success. Yet lately we in Jordan have begun to hear and read that "Jordan opposes an Arab-Israeli settlement". Let us be clear on this point: no one, no country, no people wants a settlement more than we do. Certainly,

no one pays a heavier price for the continuation of the conflict than we do here in Jordan.²⁴

The ultimate settlement to the Palestinian Problem will have to come in the form of either an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza or a Palestinian-Jordanian state in the same area. The independent Palestinian state is the best answer. Israel opposes this solution on the grounds that it cannot give up the occupied territories for security reasons. The Israelis also say that an independent Palestinian state bordering Israel would be a security threat.

Israel's security concerns have to be taken into account but giving up the West Bank and Gaza and allowing a Palestinian state to be set up there would not be as dangerous as the Israelis believe. In fact, giving up the West Bank and Gaza would be beneficial to Israel. Ian Lustick describes the problems caused by Israel's continued occupation of these territories:

Indeed, the greatest strain on Israel will be the expenditures that will be necessary to maintain Israel's defense posture, as long as Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza continues. Retention of these areas will preclude achievement of a comprehensive peace agreement with Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and will drive Israel to maintain an increasingly costly military machine.²⁵

Lustick also puts Israeli concern over the creation of an independent Palestinian state into the proper perspective:

The Israeli concern is understandable but overstated. Bordered by Israel with its enormous qualitative military superiority on the one side and by Jordan with its own interests and a larger population on the other, a tiny Palestinian state would not pose an unmanageable threat to its neighbors, especially if it were demilitarized or if the arms it did possess were contractually

limited and monitored. Since the West Bank and Gaza are not economically viable, a Palestinian state would also be weakened by its dependence on outside economic support.²⁶

This information leads to the conclusion that Israel wants to hold onto this land for other than security reasons. In reality Menachem Begin and his Herut Party will not give up the West Bank and Gaza, which they call Judea and Samaria, for religious and historical reasons. They feel that these areas are a part of the biblically promised "Complete Land of Israel".

The U.S. must now get negotiations moving again, but using the Camp David Framework only as a guide and not as the ultimate goal of the negotiations. Israel must stop its policy of creating new settlements. One way to ensure that Israel stops creating new settlements in the West Bank and Gaza is for the U.S. to begin what Lustick calls a policy of "dissociation".

Under this policy the U.S. would no longer be associated with Israeli policies that are harmful to the settlement of the Palestinian Problem. The U.S. would punish Israel by making sure that economic aid to Israel would not be used to create new settlements or harden old ones. At the same time the U.S. would not discontinue military aid to Israel. This "dissociation" would be helpful because it would force Israel to stop plans for future settlements and remove the stigma attached to the U.S. by the Arab world for America's continued support of all Israel's policies.²⁷

Lustick's plan is good as far as it goes. The U.S. should definitely "dissociate" itself from Israel's aggressive policies. Monitoring and limiting U.S. economic aid to make sure it is not used for building new settlements is not enough. Instead the U.S. should hold back a percentage of promised economic and military aid for every new Israeli settlement that has built in the West Bank and Gaza since the Camp David Accords. This policy should also extend to the hardening or improving of settlements already in place.

Next the U.S. should present at least a tentative plan for an independent Palestinian state in the now-occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza. This plan should also include a section on the final status of the city of Jerusalem. The U.S. should lean toward the internationalization of the city.

The U.S. also has to go beyond Walid Khalidi's suggestion of letting the Europeans contact the PLO. The U.S. has to communicate with the PLO directly. If the U.S. does all of these things, Jordan would be able to enter into negotiations and conclude a peace treaty with Israel.

After the successful implementation of this new American policy, the road to a settlement of the Palestinian Problem would be clear. The problem is that the U.S., Israel, and the other parties involved

must realize and accept the fact that there are no easy paths to a settlement of the problem.*

* If U.S. policy does not achieve a settlement to the Palestinian Problem soon, the Middle East will probably be thrown into yet another war. This time active involvement by U.S. troops is very likely. For an excellent discussion of U.S. policy in this kind of conflict, see U.S. Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict edited by Sam C. Sarkesian and William L. Scully.

FOOTNOTES FOR THE PALESTINIANS AND THE U.S.

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25. Ian S. Lustick, "Kill the Autonomy Talks", Foreign Policy, Winter 1980-1981, p. 31.
26. Hermann Frederick Elits, "Improve the Framework", Foreign Policy, Winter 1980-1981, p. 15.
27. Ian S. Lustick, "Kill the Autonomy Talks", Foreign Policy, Winter 1980-1981, pp. 34-37.

CONCLUSION

Reaching a settlement to the Palestinian Problem should be the major concern of U.S. Middle Eastern policy and diplomacy. Although settling the Palestinian Problem would probably not totally end the Arab-Israeli conflict, tensions in the area would be greatly reduced. U.S. relations with the countries in the Middle East would be vastly improved if the problem was settled. This is especially true if these countries are willing to accept a positive and dynamic U.S. role in reaching this settlement.

Israel would also benefit greatly from a settlement accepted by all the parties involved. If Israel negotiated in good faith and agreed to allow the formation of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, all the other Arab countries would join Egypt in recognizing the right of the state of Israel to exist.¹ This recognition has been one of Israel's major concerns since 1947. Israel's territorial concerns, which are based on worries about security, would become a moot issue. Israel's present enemies would cease being hostile once the Palestinian Problem has been settled. Giving up the West Bank and Gaza to the Palestinians would also remove the heavy burden of occupation from Israel's strained resources.

Egypt's position in the Arab world, which has suffered greatly since the signing of the Camp David Accords, would also vastly improve. Egypt has been isolated from the Arab community due to the actions of

the rejectionist front which opposes Egypt's participation in the Camp David Accords. Settling the Palestinian Problem would end the reason for this isolation.²

The non-resolution of the problem also led to the assassination of Anwar Sadat and is one of the prime problems influencing the stability of President Hosni Mubarak's new regime. Resolution of the problem would better both Mubarak's domestic and external positions. According to Stanley F. Reed, the U.S. "has an overriding interest in Mubarak's survival". Helping to achieve a settlement to the Palestinian Problem would ensure his survival.³

The U.S. must remember two things about the Palestinian Problem. First, the problem must be settled very soon. All of America's diplomatic resources in the Middle East must be used to reach a settlement. Second, there is no short cut to a settlement. Unpopular policies will have to be made and implemented. These policies may seem less than desirable in the short run but will turn out to be best in the long run.

President Reagan's plan for a "strategic consensus" will have to wait. Putting his plan aside for the moment is good for a couple of reasons. First, by putting all U.S. diplomatic efforts into reaching a settlement, the settlement would probably be reached. With the end of the Palestinian Problem would also come the major justification for Soviet presence in the Middle East. Reagan's "strategic consensus" would, therefore, be unnecessary.

Finally, increased U.S. military presence in the area without a resolution to the problem would be harmful to both the U.S. and its moderate Arab allies such as Saudi Arabia. In his article, "Don't Engulf the Gulf", Christopher Van Hollen makes this point very clear.⁴

In order to achieve a settlement, the U.S. should immediately embark on the following policy. The U.S. needs to convince Israel to end its policy of creating new settlements and annexation. Getting Israel to give up the West Bank and Gaza so an independent Palestinian state could be formed is also important. The U.S. can make sure these things happen by using the policy of holding back aid if new settlements are created.

All of this also means that the Camp David Accords will no longer be used as the ultimate goal for the settlement of the Palestinian Problem. The final status of Jerusalem should also be resolved. The U.S. should try to convince the parties concerned that making Jerusalem an international city is the best thing for all sides.

Bringing Jordan into the negotiations and keeping Egypt in them is also a matter of great concern for U.S. diplomacy. If the U.S. can stop Israel's annexationist policies, Egypt and Jordan will both become permanent parties to the negotiations. Egypt demands the freezing of the establishment of new settlements and a lifting of the ban on freedom of expression in the West Bank and Gaza.⁵

Jordan has virtually the same objections to Israeli policy which keep it from joining in the negotiations. The absence of the representative

of the Palestinian people, the PLO, also disturbs Jordan.⁶ The U.S. will also have to actively seek PLO participation in negotiations leading to a settlement. There can be no settlement without participation by Jordan and the PLO.

In addition to pursuing the policies already mentioned, the U.S. should attempt to enlist the aid of the United Nations in its quest for a solution to the Palestinian Problem. The United Nations could be helpful in a number of ways. First, the United Nations could offer the use of a multinational peacekeeping force to be deployed along the border of Israel and the new Palestinian state. This peacekeeping force should do much to allay Israeli fears concerning security.

Secondly, the UN could follow a different path and become more vehement in its opposition to Israeli infractions of UN Resolution 242. Every time Israel adds a new settlement or takes over more territory, such as the Golan Heights, the UN could impose serious sanctions on Israel.

Finally, the UN could serve as a meeting place and instigator of talks between the U.S., PLO, and all other parties involved in the Palestinian Problem. The fact that these talks were taking place under the auspices of the United Nations could take away some of the perceived stigma associated with them.

U.S. diplomats could use the UN as a counterbalance to their reluctance to use policies that apply pressure on Israel. The U.S.

could also volunteer sections of the U.S. Army to become the peacekeeping force already mentioned. U.S. forces could be used in much the same way as they are now in the Sinai. This could be done if the UN does not provide the force or as a means of getting the UN to become more actively involved.

Finally it must be noted that due to the many inherent complexities found in the Middle East, no solution to the Palestinian Problem will be easy to reach. Sacrifice and accommodation will have to be the key actions for all parties involved. The problem and the tensions that created it have existed for a long time. None of these things can be expected to disappear with the snap of a finger or overnight. A solution, however, can be reached and the U.S. must take an active role in finding it.

The importance of an active role by the U.S. is clear for it is obvious that the U.S. has a number of interests in the Middle East, the two most important being oil and keeping the Soviet Union out. Some may think that a U.S. policy that concentrates solely on the Palestinian Problem leaves other U.S. concerns unattended. This is not true for none of the other interests of the U.S. can be enhanced or protected until the situation in the Middle East can be brought under control.

U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East can be likened to the economy. Quick fixes which appear helpful in the short term are really harmful to long-term recovery. There can be no quick fixes in U.S. Middle Eastern policy either. The U.S. must announce its goals and policies

to settle the Palestinian Problem and stick to them. Peace and security for the Middle East, the United States and possibly the whole world depends on this.

FOOTNOTES FOR CONCLUSION

1. Shlomo Avineri, "Beyond Camp David", Foreign Policy, Spring 1982, p. 19.
2. Henry F. Jackson, "Sadat's Perils", Foreign Policy, Spring 1981, p. 65.
3. Stanley F. Reed, "Dateline Cairo: Shaken Pillar", Foreign Policy, Winter 1981-1982, p. 184.
4. Christopher Van Hollen, "Don't Engulf the Gulf", Foreign Affairs, Summer 1981, pp. 1064-1078.
5. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "The Foreign Policy of Egypt in the Post-Sadat Era", Foreign Affairs, Spring 1982, p. 774.
6. El Hassan Bin Talal, "Jordan's Quest for Peace", Foreign Affairs, Spring 1982, pp. 802-813.

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