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1982

Power, Politics and Public Policy: Bureaucratic Power in the Policy Process

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Recommended Citation

POWER, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY:

BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN THE POLICY PROCESS

by

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A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School

of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

February

1982

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

VITA

The author, Donald L. Schultz, is the son of Lloyd Schultz and Geraldine (Ryan) Schultz. He was born November 17, 1952, in Chicago, Illinois. He was married October 1, 1977, and is the father of two children

His elementary education was obtained in the public schools of suburban Chicago, Illinois, and secondary education at Argo Community High School, Summit, Illinois, where he graduated in 1970 as a member of the National Honor Society and as recipient of the John F. Kennedy Award, issued in recognition of scholastic and athletic achievements.

In September, 1973, he entered Carthage College, Kenosha, Wisconsin, and in May, 1976, received the Degree of Bachelor of Arts with a major in History and Political Science. His Bachelor's Degree was obtained Summa Cum Laude with Honors in Political Science. He was elected a member of National Blue Key and Phi Alpha Theta in 1976. While attending Carthage College, he served as Vice-President of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Law Society, Assistant Editor of the College Newspaper, and served on numerous Student-Faculty Committees.

In September, 1976, he was granted an assistantship in the Department of Political Science at Loyola University of Chicago. He was elected a member of Alpha Sigma Nu in 1978. While attending Loyola University, he served as a Lecturer in Political Science in the Community College System and as an Administrative Manager with a Chicago-based manufacturer (1977-1981).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Examination of contemporary analyses of the American Political System reveals an almost radical shift in the major emphasis of political research, in general, and in the methodological designs of political scientists, in particular. Historically, political scientists have concerned themselves with the institutions and structures of government, with describing the functions and arrangements of formal governmental bodies, and with detailing evident behaviors and processes of political activity. Analyses of this nature have concentrated on specific constitutional aspects of the political system - federalism, separation of powers, judicial review, delegations of authority, intergovernmental relations; on the institutional arrangements and detailed powers and functions of Congress, the President, and courts; on the duties, configuration and operations of major executive, legislative and judicial agencies; and on the structure and powers of relevant political actors. Immersed in analyses of this nature were also attempts to offer a philosophical justification of government, concentrating on the philosophical, ideological and ethical principles of democratic regimes.

Through the development of methodological designs more closely aligned with principles of scientific research and through efforts to concentrate on explicit activity rather than institutions, the traditional, descriptive-institutional framework slowly gave way to a more demanding, albeit often sterile, analysis of specific processes and behaviors associated

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with governmental activity. Foremost have been studies of the sociological and psychological foundations of individual and group political behavior. Herein researchers have given attention to the determinants of electoral voting and participation; to the behavior of individuals operating within executive, legislative, and judicial arenas; to the attitudes, opinions, and behavior of relevant political actors; and to emergent group properties which may not be reducible to the mere sum of individual behavioral patterns.

Recently, however, political scientists have come to shift their energies from the study of institutions and political behavior to the examination of public policy - to the processes, causes, and consequences of government activity. Thus, rather than focusing on specific institutions and behavioral patterns of groups and individual political actors, contemporary policy analysis seeks to diagnose the actual workings of governments by concentrating on specific policy areas and program specifications. Policy analysis has thus come to focus on four key issues: (1) what governments do; (2) who decides what governments do; (3) why they do it; and (4) what difference government activity makes.

Since governments are called upon to act throughout the whole of the social system - in areas of health, education, foreign relations, national defense, environmental protection, housing, welfare, transportation, urban development, social security, police and fire protection, communications, and so on, it is enough simply to be able to specify what governments do in so many diverse fields. When the analysis is expanded to include examination of why governments do what they do in each area, to specify the relevant political actors in each activity, and to delineate the consequences

of diverse activities for society, policy analysis begins to take on a
most serious challenge which, when attempted, often results in research
lacking in theoretical significance and reliability. And, though social
scientists and policy planners have long recognized the myriad problems
besetting governments - functional and geographic fragmentation, decen-
tralizations of power and authority, competing agencies and jurisdictions,
the relative inability and/or unwillingness of most citizens to influence
the policy process, and uncertain task environments, to name but a few,
the very breadth of the task and the inadequacies of present methodological
designs have prevented political scientists from fostering a common focal
point of analysis and in developing an integrated and comprehensive theory
of the policy process.

An examination of current literature on the subject reveals that
political scientists have instead moved without a real sense of direction
between the product and process of governments, drawing attention to the
particularity of each and the relationship between the two. When focusing
on the product of politics the emphasis has been on discerning what factors,
if any, influence the ultimate policy choices of governmental bodies. Public
policies are themselves posited as "dependent variables" which can be ex-
plained by reference to various "independent variables" - political, social,
economic or technological forces in society hypothesized to be determin-
ants of public policy. Relative disparities between various state and com-
munity policies are then seen as a direct consequence of some social,
economic, political or technological characteristic of the policy environ-
ment hypothesized to be of determining significance. On the other hand,
when focusing on processes of policy formulation, overriding consideration

has been given to the ways in which particular problems become public problems in the process of issue identification and problem definition and how such problems receive attention via the formulation of specific policies. In so doing, many policy analysts have focused on the interactions between the actors and institutions engaged in the formulation phase of the policy process. When the two distinct approaches are combined it can be suggested that the major emphasis in present-day policy analysis has been to delineate the hypothesized determinants of specific government activity (policies) and to specify the location, source and configuration of political power in the policy process.

Although the present analysis makes note of the limitations of such efforts in acquiring a full understanding of politics and public policy, it cannot be denied that both areas of inquiry represent legitimate concerns of political scientists. The analysis of policy determinants evolved from the awareness that there exists a general disparity between the policies pursued by different state and community governments and that such differences must be attributable to some social, economic, political or technological factor determining the availability and feasibility of specific policy choices. Research of this nature is founded on the fact that policy choices are not completely free choices. The existence of limited resources and incomplete information prevent policy-makers from addressing each and every societal problem. A choice must thus be made between competing problems demanding attention, and oftentimes the selection of one problem precludes focusing attention on others. Secondly, a choice must be made from among alternative policy responses. And if the expenditure of resources are demanded, then decisions must be made regarding levels of

appropriation and allocation. Even further choices must then be made from among alternative means perceived capable of satisfying policy objectives, including the selection of the implementing body. Each phase of this process is beset by opportunity costs: resources expended for the alleviation of one problem cannot be used for the solution of others. By focusing on those factors hypothetically viewed as determining what problems are addressed and the very nature of the policies, themselves, determinants analysis assumes that policy-makers are constrained from as well as encouraged to follow one policy position over that of others by some environmental characteristic. Now, although such research has enhanced our general understanding of the underlying reasons for the variance in policies among states and communities, its narrowly confined methodological focus on expenditures and revenue variables and its noteworthy exclusion of important organizational and political variables has detracted from an analysis of the actors involved in the formulation and implementation of the policies of American governmental bodies. Not only has it underscored the importance of politics on things political but has completely ignored bureaucratic variables which may have an indirect, if not independent, effect on the policy process.

In addressing the question of influence and power in the policy process a body of research has developed which seeks to define the configuration of community power structures. Traditionally this has taken root in analyses of variations in formal and legal structures and, more recently and in greater detail, in defining the power relationships that really affect what transpires in the political decision-making process. Whereas some have focused on those individuals holding major formal positions

of responsibility, others have concentrated on how individuals perceive the power structure in their individual communities, and still others have analyzed how decisions are made and have thus focused on the parties directly engaged in formulating policy responses to perceived societal problems. Thus, of the totality of elements comprising the policy process, primary attention has been devoted to the steps necessary for the initial formulation of public policy.

It is this writer's contention that the overriding emphasis on how the environment affects the policy choices of decision-makers and on specifying the precise location of political power in society have led political scientists to focus almost exclusively on that phase of the policy process concerned with the initial determination of policy choices and with the actors involved in the preliminary formulation of public policy. Although these concerns have added much to our general understanding of the policy process, they tell us little about the actual application or implementation of public policy. They thus fail to clearly delineate the crucial link between policy and performance. Thus lacking is a true understanding of how the political system succeeds or fails in transforming policy goals, objectives, and intentions into specific and meaningful public services, or how well policy outcomes conform to policy objectives.

However, rather than ask why so much attention has been given to the methods and manner of policy formulation, we should instead question the conspicuous and unfortunate absence of a viable theory of implementation. It has been suggested that this neglect is due in part to the "implicit assumption in most models that once a policy has been 'made' by a government, the policy will be implemented and the desired results of the policy

will be near those expected by the policy-makers."[1] The implementation

process is thus seen as consisting of a series of rather mundane decisions

and interactions, whereby the party or parties assigned major responsi-

bility for applying a given policy to the task environment carry out

activities substantively and procedurally consistent with the policy ob-

jectives of elected public officials. This rather naive conception of

the politics of implementation fails to capture the great gulf which

often exists between what elected decision-makers say the policy is and

what ultimately transpires once the policy is administered and thus de-

livered. This present analysis, on the other hand, contends that policy

is ordinarily modified, if not actually made, in the process of implemen-

tation. This being so, it is further held that program administrators and

bureaucrats wield an aspect of political power heretofore underestimated,

if not ignored, by the political science community, and that bureaucratic

and organizational factors have a significant and independent effect on

the policy process which is relatively unexplored in current determinants

research.

This analysis further maintains that the public bureaucracy not only

determines the operational content of public policies but is indeed active

in each phase of the policy process, and that implementation analysis pro-

vides yet another means of locating the source and variety of power con-

figurations in society. To this end, this analysis seeks to show both

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[1] Thomas B. Smith, "The Policy Implementation Process," 4 Policy
Sciences (1973), 197-209, at p. 197-198; Also, see Donald S. Van Meter
and Carl E. Van Horn, "The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual
Framework," 6 Administration and Society, No. 4 (Feb., 1975), 445-488.

where we have been and where future energies need to be expended so as to facilitate a viable conceptualization of the whole of the policy process. Thus, by critically reexamining, first, that portion of the literature devoted to an analysis of the determinants of public policy, and, secondly, that which is concerned with the location of political power in society, the objective will be to demonstrate how present analyses are methodologically and ideologically oriented toward a single stage analysis of those elements common to the initial formulation of public policy. Throughout this analysis it will be argued that single stage analyses of the determinants of policies formulated by elected officials and of the actors deemed influential in the formulation and adoption of specific policies has led to a radical underestimation of the power resources and the potential policy-making authority of administrators and bureaucrats, thereby creating an incomplete conceptualization of the policy process.

What we are proposing is the development of a positive theory of policy formation - one amenable to the study of the whole of the policy process - from issue identification and problem definition, to the mobilization of resources, to the formulation of specific public policies, to the politics of implementation, through to the ultimate performance of government activity. Since governments are ultimately judged on the basis of what they actually do rather than by what they promise, policy analysis will need to consider how extensive delegations of authority to administrative agencies have created a situation in which bureaucracies (1) structure policy agendas, (2) define the alternatives for elected officials, (3) exercise significant degrees of discretion in the initial interpretation and ultimate application of statutory objectives, and (4) wield

CHAPTER II

CONTEMPORARY ANALYSES OF THE DETERMINANTS

OF STATE AND COMMUNITY POLICIES:

THE INSTABILITY AND UNRELIABILITY OF PRESENT METHODOLOGIES

If one accepts the premise that "political science is concerned with how various formal and informal institutions, economic, social, philosophical, and geographic conditions influence the adoption and implementation of policy,"[1] the recent proliferation of scholarly attention to the determinants of state and community policy outputs is well founded.[2] Within the past twenty years the study of public policy, both domestic and foreign, has received an unparalled proportion of the political scientist's attention, especially students of the American political system as well as those eager to compare the services of pluralist, democratic government with those of other forms of governance. This has produced several studies not only specifically focused upon the American policy system but a number

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[1]
Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," 25 _Journal of Politics_ (May, 1963), 265-289; at p. 265.

[2]
Public policy, policy outputs, policy outcomes, and _policy impacts_ have been differentially conceptualized in the literature. The inability to arrive at a common definition has created a wealth of confusion in inter- and intra-disciplinary communication. So as to provide greater clarity to what follows, we contend that public policy represents patterns of activity designed to produce either tangible or symbolic effects on the environment; policy outputs represent the service levels effected by these activities - the most evident manifestation of which are expenditures; policy outcomes represent the ultimate performance of the policy; and policy impacts represent the effect such activities have on an environment.

of cross-national surveys as well.[3] Unfortunately, even with a prolifer-

ation of scholarly interest, "no clear theory or methodology for the

study has evolved."[4] This is so even though primary attention has been

given to those factors viewed as essential considerations inherent in the

formulation phase of the policy process.

When reviewing the policy literature we find that within the past

two decades determinants analysis has emerged as the principal device

employed by political scientists for developing a theory of the policy

process and for gauging the importance of political system variables on

the policy choices of elected decision-makers. This concern evolved as

an alternative to the exploration and description of the operation of

governmental institutions that characterized traditional political science,

and was both an attempt to document the explanatory power of political

system variables in accounting for variations in policy choices among

states and communities and a reaction to earlier studies by economists

which purportedly documented the direct influence of economic factors on

policy outputs.[5] Embarking upon non-experimental, multivariate comparative

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[3]
    For Example, see T. Alexander Smith, The Comparative Policy Process
(Santa Barbara, California: Clio Press, Inc., 1975).
[4]
    Richard I. Hofferbert, The Study of Public Policy(New York: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1975), p. 24.
[5]
    For Example, see Solomon Fabricant, The Trend of Government Activ-
ity in the U.S. Since 1930 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research,
1950); Glenn W. Fisher, "Determinants of State and Local Government Expen-
ditures: A Preliminary Analysis," National Tax Journal, 14 (Sept 1961), 349-
355; G.W. Fisher, "Interstate Variation in State and Local Government Expen-
ditures," National Tax Journal, 17 (March 1964), 57-74; Seymour Sachs and
Robert Harris, "The Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures
and Intergovernmental Flows of Funds," National Tax Journal (March 1964),
75-85; Roy Bahl and Robert Saunders, "Determinants of Change in State and
Local Government Expenditures," National Tax Journal, 18 (March 1965), 50-67.

research, political scientists have sought to demonstrate both the importance of political system characteristics, processes, and structures as determinants of public policy, and the salience of democratic pluralist structures and values on the content of state and local policies. However, in so doing, political scientists have suffered from what Thomas Dye has termed "professional and ideological myopia."[6] That is, in seeking to document the direct influence of political factors on the policy process, the discipline has limited its attention to governmental institutions and political processes. In so doing, political scientists have asserted the determining impact of political system characteristics without fully considering the range of economic, social, cultural, historical, and technological forces shaping public policy.[7] In addition, the ideological commitment to democratic "pluralism" has predisposed the discipline to transform cherished political values (e.g., participation, electoral processes and behaviors, interest group activity, and party competition) into determinants of the causes and consequences of public policy.[8]

However, even when the prevailing professional and ideological predisposition of political scientists is taken into consideration, the greater proportion of studies of the linkages between environmental conditions, political system characteristics, and public policies has testified that much of the variation in state and community policy outputs is explained by socio-economic factors, rather than by characteristics of

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[6]
    Thomas R. Dye, Policy Analysis(University,Ala: University of Alabama Press, 1976), especially pp. 22-24.
[7]
    Ibid., pp. 22-23.
[8]
    Ibid., p. 23.

the political system.[9] The continuing search for more precise indicators
of the variables in question and measurement techniques amenable to the
study of the relationship between various environmental factors and the
policy outputs of governmental units, as well as the formulation and in-
clusion of multiple measures of policy outputs, assures us that the debate
is far from over. It also assures us that the discipline will not im-
mediately recognize the narrow confines and limited utility of single
stage analyses of the policy process. It is our contention that deter-
minants analysis, as presently employed, (1) neglects to consider the
factors which may have a determining effect on multiple stages of the
policy process; (2) fails to distinguish between factors effecting the
initial decision-making process from those bearing upon a policy's per-
formance; and (3) ignores the effect bureaucratic and organizational
variables have on what actually transpires within the policy environment.

I

Even the most cursory review of the literature would indicate that
what has most captivated the policy literature have been comparative and
systematic analyses of those factors assumed to be related to federal,
state, and local provisions of goods and/or services. The dominant ques-
tion has been, "what determines the specific policy outputs of states
and communities and can therefore explain variations in governmental ac-
tivity?" For example, "what relationship, if any, exists between the

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[9] A brief yet comprehensive summary of this literature is pre-
sented below.

economic character of a state or community and the provision of educa-
tional assistance?"[10] "What relationship exists between the structure of
urban government and its taxing and spending policies?"[11] "What influence
does inter-party competition have on expenditures for education, health
care services, welfare benefits, and highway improvements?"[12] "What dif-
ference does it make whether a state's inhabitants are primarily urban or
rural, educated or uneducated, situated near the poverty line or the up-
per socioeconomic strata, relatively transient or settled in terms of
policy expenditures?"[13] "Does party identification have a significant

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10 e.g., Solomon Fabricant, The Trend of Government Activity in the
United States Since 1930; Glenn W. Fisher, "Determinants of State and Lo-
cal Government Expenditures: A Preliminary Analysis;" Glenn W. Fisher,
"Interstate Variation in State and Local Government Expenditures;" Roy
Bahl and Robert Saunders, "Determinants of Change in State and Local Gov-
ernment Expenditures;" Otto A. Davis and George H. Haines, "A Political
Approach to a Theory of Public Expenditures: The Case of Municipalities;"
Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the
American States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Ira Sharkansky, "Economic
and Political Correlates of State Government Expenditures: General Tend-
encies and Deviant Cases," 11 Midwest Journal of Political Science (May
1967), 173-192; Ira Sharkansky, "Environment, Policy, Output and Impact:
Problems of Theory and Method in the Analysis of Public Policy," in Ira
Sharkansky (ed.), Policy Analysis in Political Science (Chicago: Markham
Publishing Company, 1970), 61-79.

11
    e.g., Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and
Public Policies in American Cities," 61 American Political Science Review
(September, 1967), 701-716.

12
    e.g., Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Com-
petition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States,"
25 Journal of Politics (May, 1963), 265-89; Charles F. Cnudde and Donald
J. McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States,"
63 American Political Science Review (September, 1969), 858-866; Ira
Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Eco-
nomics, and Public Policy," 63 American Political Science Review (Septem-
ber, 1969), 867-879.

13
    e.g., Glenn W. Fisher, "Interstate Variation in State and Local
Government Expenditures."

impact on the formulation of public policies?"[14] "Is there a regional variation in policy outputs?"[15] "To what extent can differences in political culture explain observed variations in state and local policies?"[16]

These and similar questions have long been of interest to social scientists in general and political scientists in particular. They also reflect the tendency to treat public policy, as formulated by elected officials, as the major dependent variable of interest to political scientists. The role of political science has thus come to be one of finding and explaining the independent and intervening variables which account for policy differences. Readily apparent is a predominant interest in explaining the relationship between various environmental factors (economic, social, cultural, political, and geographic), the objectives of policy-makers (as delineated within the formulation phase of the policy process), and the ultimate policy choices of the governing body. Equally apparent is the failure of such efforts to account for the eventual outcomes of government activity.

This is not to suggest that policy research has been totally confined to the types of interests noted above. In fact, when reviewing the public policy literature we are confronted with a number of distinctions within the perspectives regarding the specifics of policy. The once

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[14] E.g., Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States."

[15] E.g., Ira Sharkansky, "Regionalism, Economic Status, and the Public Policies of American States," Social Science Quarterly (June, 1968), 9-26.

[16] E.g., Daniel J. Elazar, "Marketplace and Commonwealth and the Three Political Cultures," in Sharkansky (ed.), Policy Analysis in Political Science, pp. 171-185.

predominant school of thought urged the expansion of our understanding of how policies are formulated, how policies surface, and how various institutional arrangements are brought into play in the several stages of conflict resolution. This "process approach ... tends to focus on political processes within political institutions, emphasizing political realities more than political formalities and concentrating on the behavior of the participants in the process."[17] Policy decisions are seen as products of a specific process, as the output of a particular system or subsystem.[18]

It can be suggested that the traditional concern for process evolved from and is maintained by a desire to develop a "positive theory" of the American political system.[19] It is assumed that a better understanding of how policies are formulated will improve the output of the system. However, there is no single blueprint formula depicting how all policies are made, and there does not exist any individual procedure which is systematically employed in cranking out all policy decisions. Process

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[17] Charles O. Jones, An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1970), p. 2.

[18] James C. Charlesworth notes this development when he suggests that "political science...is concerned not with the potentially infinite content of all public decisions, but with the process by which these decisions are reached." See, Charlesworth (ed.), A Design for Political Science: Scope, Objectives, and Methods(Phil, Pa: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1966), p. 31. For specific descriptions of the policy process, see: Charles E. Lindblom and David Braybrooke, A Strategy of Decision(New York: The Free Press, 1963); Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968); Lewis A. Froman, The Congressional Process(Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1967).

[19] For a description of the nature of positive theory, see Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 4.

analyses have consequently uncovered what often appears to be a muddled mass of confusion, with many demands being placed on many different aspects of governmental machinery, with many political actors vying for the acceptance of particular policy orientations, with the interrelated activities of numerous institutions, interest groups, and a highly complicated bureaucratic structure, with distinct policy goals, proposed courses of action, and desired outcomes.

Due to repeated discoveries of rather dissimilar processes of policy formulation working in different substantive areas, an alternative approach to the study of policy has been to focus on the particular problems perceived to be in need of a specific response by the political community. It has been noted that most studies of policy formulation have usually given but scant attention to the nature of public problems; they are ordinarily taken as given, and policy analysis proceeds from there.[20] This approach is unfortunate, however, because in many respects the way in which policy-makers approach decision-making and the very structure of the policy process itself often depends upon the nature of the issue confronting the policy environment. In other words, this second perspective holds that the particular issues under examination determine the type of process employed in the making of policy. Viewed in this manner policy issues function as independent variables and process as the dependent factor. Thus, whereas a process orientation views the "tangible manifestation" of policy (the policy output) as dependent upon particular processes

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[20] James E. Anderson, Public Policy-Making, 2nd Ed (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 55.

of formulation, a policy issue perspective asserts that the type of process employed is determined by the issue being addressed. The underlying basis of this perspective can be seen in Lewis Froman's observation that the United States does not have a single process that systematically turns out all policies, but several different processes, each of which operates in a particular arena.[21]

Although this may seem a rather trite point, it must be understood that there is an important distinction between the substantive area of policy decisions and particular policy issues. The substantive policy area refers to a particular aspect of the total environment. Policy issues, on the other hand, refer to perceived problems in that particular substantive area. For example, energy resources, transportation, education, taxation, foreign governments or ideologies are substantive areas for policy decisions. In and of themselves substantive policy areas do not constitute policy issues. Policy issues corresponding to the above named substantive areas may refer to "shortages of oil," "overcrowded highways," "inefficient educational facilities," "inequitable tax payment schedules," "spread of communism and foreign aggression," respectively. In other words, policy issues are problems in need of relief, primarily through the activity of public officials.

We can therefore suggest that a focus on policy issues involves a somewhat independent concentration on the types of public problems perceived as requiring government attention. One of the by-products of this

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[21] Lewis Froman, Jr., "The Categorization of Policy Contents," in Austin Ranney (ed.), <u>Political Science and Public Policy</u>(Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 41-52.

specialized concentration has been the construction of several distinct policy categories, each generating its own set of theoretical propositions.[22] For example, Theodore J. Lowi, although not explicitly concerned with individual policy issues per se, has offered a typology which has served as the foundation for a variety of policy categorizations[23] The premise advanced by Lowi is that the anticipated outcome of particular problems (issues) greatly determines the pattern of conflict in policy formulation from its inception until resolved by some specific policy decision. When considered in this manner there are principally three types of policies - distributive, redistributive, and regulative, each tending to generate its own arenas of power with special sets of actors, conflict resolution points, political structures, political processes, elites, and group relations.[24]

Underlying Lowi's schema are three interrelated propositions: "(1) The types of relationships to be found among people are determined by their expectations - by what they hope to achieve or get from relating

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[22] Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory," 16 World Politics (July, 1965), 677-715; Robert H. Salisbury, "The Analysis of Public Policy: The Search for Theories and Roles," in Austin Ranney (ed.), Political Science and Public Policy (Chgo: Markham, 1968), 151-178; Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities," 29 Journal of Politics (February, 1967), 94-108; Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis," 62 American Political Science Review (March, 1968), 124-143; T. Alexander Smith, The Comparative Policy Process (California: Clio Press, Inc., 1975); David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision (New York: The Free Press, 1963); Charles O. Jones, "Speculative Augmentation in Federal Air Pollution Policy-Making," 36 Journal of Politics, No. 2 (May, 1974), 438-464.

[23] Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory."

[24] Ibid., pp. 689-690.

to others. (2) In politics, expectations are determined by governmental outputs or policies. (3) Therefore, a political relationship is determined by the type of policy at stake, so that for every type of policy there is likely to be a distinctive type of political relationship."[25] Lowi thus defines policies in terms of their "impact or expected impact on society." And "when policies are defined this way, there are only a limited number of types; when all is said and done, there are only a limited number of functions that governments can perform."[26] In effect, due to the ephemeral nature of individual issues, single issues are in fact resolved on the basis of established expectations and a history of prior policy decisions of the same type.[27] This categorization does not suggest that every related issue always brings about an identical policy response, but rather that specific policy types are dependent upon the particular societal impact policy-makers hope to achieve.

Whereas Lowi has categorized policies in terms of expectations and clientele, T. Alexander Smith prefers to distinguish between policies in terms of the degree of conflict attending the discussion and resolution of public problems.[28] Policies can be divided into four primary groups - distributive, sectorally fragmented, emotive symbolic, and redistributive - differing in terms of conflict intensity, institutional responsibility, and group relations.[29]

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[25] Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory," p. 688.

[26] Ibid., p. 689.

[27] Ibid.

[28] T. Alexander Smith, The Comparative Policy Process, passim.

[29] Ibid., pp. 7-8.

(1) Distributive policies display little, if any, conflict and are settled quietly in executive and/or legislative committees. Party discipline is unaffected.

(2) Sectorally fragmented policies display moderate conflict among interests representing primarily economic sectors and are resolved on the legislative floor by coalitions of legislators bargaining with ministers or other bureaucrats who oversee the particular sectors. Party discipline remains relatively strong in most cases.

(3) Emotive symbolic policies display wide conflicts of deep intensity over "way-of-life" issues in which governments refuse to stake out positions and in which individual legislators reject leadership controls over their actions. Party discipline is virtually nonexistent.

(4) Redistributive policies display wide conflicts of deep intensity between classes and are settled by "peak" associations of labor and management negotiating with presidents and prime ministers (legislatures are relatively quiescent). Party discipline is relatively high.[30]

Although Smith credits Lowi for inspiring many of the positions advanced in his policy categories,[31] we can note a marked variance in focus among their approaches. On the one hand, Lowi suggests that there is a great variety of issues confronting policy-makers, all of which cannot be resolved by the same set of political actors, group relations, institutions, and political processes. And, further, what determines the particular process employed in formulating public policies is not the peculiar issue confronting policy-makers but, rather, the expected impact they hope to make on society. Since there exists a multiplicity of issues and a number of varying ways in which single issues may be perceived, we cannot

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[30] T. Alexander Smith, The Comparative Policy Process, pp. 7-8.

[31] "In developing my own perspective, I should say at the outset that I owe a profound intellectual debt to Professor Theodore J. Lowi of Cornell University. His work in the American policy field provided inspiration for many of the positions adopted in this book." See, Smith, p. v.

state with any degree of certainty that all educational issues, transportation issues, communication issues, taxation issues, or any other political, economic, or social problem will be resolved according to one established policy-making process. However, since policy-makers ordinarily pursue public problems with certain objectives in mind, Lowi suggests that policies be differentiated on the basis of the impact policy makers hope to achieve through proposed courses of government action.

T. Alexander Smith, on the other hand, suggests that the nature of the policy-making process (the involvement of particular political actors, institutions, and group relations) is determined by the scope and intensity of the conflict attending the resolution of policy issues. Different conflict relationships and not policy issues, per se, determine the nature of the process by which policy decisions are formulated. Thus, whereas Lowi's proposed typology concentrates on the objectives of decision-makers, Smith's schema differentiates between policy types in terms of the degree of conflict attending particular public problems. Although concerned with different elements of an issue concentration, both policy classification schemes seek to improve our general understanding of the inner workings of the policy process.

An important contribution of Smith's classification to the study of public policy is its emphasis on the manner in which processes of issue identification and problem definition influences the policy-making process. This logic is founded upon a number of prior studies in which policies had been categorized according to one's understanding of the problem environment. For example, David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom had previously created a four-tier public policy typology, with each element

corresponding to a particular relationship between two variables (under-
standing of the problem and the degree of desire for change), each dichot-
omized into "high" and "low" categories.[32] Four specific processes are
thus discernible: "rational," "administrative," "disjointed incremental-
ism,"[33] and "speculative augmentation."[34]

For example, when policy-makers have achieved a high level of under-
standing of the problem, enabling them to assess the "costs and benefits"
of each alternative policy and to select that which promises the greatest
"net value achievement," and when the desire for change is so great that
the public will consciously scrutinize the details of government activity,
processes of policy formulation will follow a rational design. On the
other hand, authority to formulate policies affecting small or incremental
changes on the basis of a high level of comprehension of the problem are
ordinarily delegated to administrative agencies. Such agencies are nor-
mally perceived as expert in their area of concern and thus better able to
satisfy policy demands than "generalist" public officials. When policy-
makers confront a particular issue in which there exists both a low level
of understanding of the specifics of the problem and a relatively low de-
sire for change, such issues are addressed and resolved in a piece-meal
fashion. Ultimate policy decisions are thus approached incrementally.
And, finally, when policy-makers have a relatively inadequate (i.e., low)

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[32] David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision,
pp. 66-79.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Charles O. Jones, "Speculative Augmentation in Federal Air Pol-
lution Policy-Making," pp. 438-464.

understanding of the issues but the desire for change is high, the process
by which policy is formulated is characteristic of what Charles O. Jones
has termed "speculative augmentation."[35] Federal air pollution policy-
making is representative of this policy type. For example, although there
is a great desire for change (as measured by the scope and intensity of
demands placed on public officials to alleviate air pollution), there is
lacking a clear understanding of the problem and of the ways in which
cleaner air can be achieved. Under such conditions agencies may be es-
tablished (e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency) to satisfy public
demands for government action. However, when all is said and done, there
is but token recognition of the problem and the government's attempt to
set up agencies authorized to make policy is merely one method of giving
the impression that an effective government response has been initiated.
Once again we note an instance where issues become a basis for establishing
a typology for increasing our understanding of the policy-making process.

In addition to the categories thus far considered, Lewis A. Froman
has suggested that we distinguish between "areal" and "segmental" policies
on the basis of the scope of the issue being addressed.[36] Areal policies
are those which evolve in response to problems encompassing entire popu-
lations (e.g., pollution and, as suggested by Froman, municipal annexa-
tion). Segmental policies, on the other hand, evolve in response to prob-
lems peculiar to particular segments of society (e.g., urban renewal).

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[35] Jones, "Speculative Augmentation in Federal Air Pollution Policy-
Making," pp. 438-464.

[36] Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities,"
94-108.

Froman thus suggests that there are certain problems peculiar to particular populations and others affecting entire settings. In practice, however, such neat boundaries are not so easily drawn. In fact, as Ira Sharkansky has so aptly noted, Froman's categories are not "mutually exclusive and discrete." Whereas Froman suggests that municipal annexation and inter-municipal cooperation are "areal" in affecting the entire population of a city, and urban renewal is "segmental" in affecting a portion of the population, the opposite may very well hold true. That is, "it appears likely that an annexation may affect only the neighborhood that is made part of the city, while an urban renewal project may affect a whole city through its impact on expenditures, taxes, and political controversy."[37]

As is all too well apparent, the categories noted above do not attempt to present descriptions of individual issues, per se, but instead a classification of how different issue characteristics determine different processes of policy formulation. This is not to suggest that there have not been attempts to categorize policy types according to some other scheme. Thomas Dye and Ira Sharkansky, for example, have attempted to group policies in terms of traditional nominal (substantive) categories - education, welfare, agriculture, highways, health, natural resources, and public safety.[38] Although such categorizations may increase our understanding of individual substantive areas, they contribute little to the

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[37] Ira Sharkansky, "Environment, Policy, Output and Impact: Problems of Theory and Method in the Analysis of Public Policy," in Ira Sharkansky, op. cit., 61-79; at p. 62.

[38] Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and Public Policy in the American States; and Ira Sharkansky, op. cit.

development of more encompassing theoretical conceptualizations. Much more useful are those studies which seek to discern the relationship between issue characteristics and policy types. Unfortunately, however, very little has been done in the way of testing most categorizations with specific data. It has thus been suggested that policies be grouped in terms of their mutual covariance, discovered in a comparative context.[39] What is indeed obvious is that no single policy category has yet been developed to determine the impact different issues have on the policy process. Although the literature abounds with various classifications, there is lacking true empirical verification of varying theories. The fact that most policies evolve in response to a number of issues makes it extremely difficult to state with any degree of reliability the specific issue the policy is intended to resolve. An alternative strategy has thus been to concentrate on the policy's impact on the environment.[40]

Briefly stated, impact analysis refers to the analysis and evaluation of policy outcomes. In contrast with an examination of the specific activities of political actors, impact analysis focuses on the consequences of policy on the overall political system, on the economic and social environment, on political actors and institutions, and even on the

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[39] Richard I. Hofferbert, The Study of Public Policy, p. 266.

[40] The first coherent body of impact research was developed in the field of public law to assess the impact of Supreme Court decisions. This research is summarized in two excellent studies: Theodore L. Becker (ed.), The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions (NY: Oxford, 1969); and Stephen L. Wasby, The Impact of the U.S. Supreme Court (Homewood, Ill: Dorsey, 1970). Impact analysis in substantive areas: urban renewal - Martin Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964); public housing - Leonard Freedman, Public Housing (NY: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 1969); welfare- Gilbert Y. Steiner, The State of Welfare (Wash., D.C.: Brookings, 1971); selective service - James W. Davis, Jr. and Kenneth M. Dolbeare, Little Groups of Neighbors: The Selective Service System (Chicago: Markham, 1968).

policy process itself. When focusing on the consequences of government actions, researchers seek to measure a policy's impact on the target situation or group, on situations or groups other than the target, and on future as well as immediate conditions. In addition, a conscious effort is made to assess both direct (in terms of resources devoted to the program) and indirect (including loss of opportunities to do other things) costs of the policy.[41]

It may be suggested that the task of assessing policy impact would be relatively simple if all government activity brought forth intended consequences. However, this is rarely, if ever, possible. Such an ideal assumes that the issue in need of government attention is clear and singular in form, that it has been perceived and defined in accordance with "real world" conditions, that policy-makers specify objectives in an unambiguous and coherent fashion, that the means chosen are appropriate and designed to satisfy policy objectives with little or no spillover effects, and that we possess the ability to state with precision the actual impact of the policy. However, several factors pose as serious constraints in formulating policies in accordance with societal demands, as well as direct limitations on the overall effectiveness of policies in resolving societal demands. Thomas R. Dye has summarized these as follows:

1. Some societal problems are incapable of solution because of the way in which the problems are defined. If problems are defined in relative rather than absolute terms, they may never be resolved by public policy.

2. Expectations may always outrace the capabilities of government.

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[41] Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, 3rd Ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1978), p. 312.

3. Policies which solve the problems of one group in society may create "problems" for other groups.

4. It is quite possible that some societal forces cannot be harnessed by governments, even if it is desirable to do so.

5. People adapt themselves to public policies frequently in ways which render the policies useless.

6. Societal problems may have multiple causes, and a specific policy may not be able to eradicate the problem.

7. The solution to some problems may require policies which are more costly than the problem.

8. The political system is not structured for completely rational decision-making.[42]

Impact analysis, we can reasonably argue, cannot be undertaken completely isolated from alternative perspectives on public policy. To a great extent the impact of a particular policy may be dependent upon the other phases of the policy process. How the precipitating issue is initially defined significantly determines what, if any, government activity develops. If the issue is defined as some particular problem in need of attention, there should then develop a purposive course of action specifically geared toward alleviating the problem. Certain resources will then be committed which are perceived to be best suited to the problem at hand. The result of such activity is a particular policy output, a particular government action. The output of this process is intended to bring about certain consequences, namely, to achieve a certain objective, to affect a certain group, situation, or aspect of the environment. The effectiveness of the policy is then measured in terms of its impact on society (i.e., what are the specific outcomes?). Did the policy alleviate

[42] Thomas R. Dye, _Understanding Public Policy_, 3rd Ed., p. 331-332.

the problem? Did it create new problems? Did it affect other sectors of the environment? Was it more costly than the problem. Was the objective realized? Can the consequences be measured? These are questions that must be addressed following a particular policy output, and the answers of which determine the relative success of the policy. Thus, the assessment of policy impact is not an isolated examination but, rather, the final stage of the policy process. Viewed as such, we can see that there is (1) a precipitating problem, (2) a particular process by which a governmental response is formulated in the form of policy, (3) an appropriation and allocation of resources for resolving the problem, (4) a particular governmental action or pattern of activity congruent with the policy objectives, and (5) a particular consequence of government activity (i.e., an impact on society). Each step is interrelated and interdependent, existing as part of the overall policy framework.

Finally, when we set out to measure the impact of a particular policy we may find that we are oftentimes trying to measure the immeasurable, which is, of course, another way of saying that not all consequences are subject to quantification. It is especially difficult, if not impossible, to give weights to individual values, attitudes, and perceptions. And,

> at a minimum, policy evaluation requires that we know what we want to accomplish with a given policy (policy objectives), how we are going to do it (programs), and what, if anything, we have accomplished toward attainment of the objectives (impact or outcomes, and the relation of policy thereto). And, in measuring accomplishment, we need to determine that not only some change in real-life conditions has occurred, such as a reduction in the unemployment rate, but that it was due to policy actions and not to other factors, such as private economic conditions.[43]

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[43] James E. Anderson, <u>Public Policy-Making</u>, p. 134-135.

Now, although policy planners and analysts have sought to analyze the specific outcomes of governmental policies and thereby gauge both the intended and unintended consequences of public policies, it is important to bear in mind that there exists a substantial body of literature which, although considered a special form of impact analysis, operates at the opposite end of the policy framework. This second type of impact analysis, termed "determinants analysis," seeks to uncover the impact of various environmental factors on the ultimate policy decisions of those entrusted with policy-making authority. The objective of such research endeavors has been to explain state and community variations in policy outputs in terms of various social, economic, political, demographic, institutional, or historical characteristic of the environment hypothetically perceived to have a determining impact on policy decisions.

It should first be noted that the examination of policy outputs received its impetus from a myriad of studies conducted on the state level. Setting the framework for this literature was V. O. Key's Southern Politics in State and Nation.[44] Herein Key proposed that state variations in policies addressing such issues as welfare, taxation, education, health and medical care, among others, were due to the varying political characteristics of the states. Whereas multifactional one-party systems with little continuity of competition tended to pursue policies benefitting upper socioeconomic classes, states with bifactional one-party competition tend to formulate policies biased toward the "have-nots."[45] Similarly, in 1959

[44] (New York: Knopf, 1951); also, see V. O. Key, Jr., American State Politics: An Introduction (New York: Knopf, 1956).

[45] V.O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation, p. 298-314.

Duane Lockard, focusing on the New England community, found that two-party states pursue more liberal policies than one-party states.[46]

Though neither study employed systematic analyses of the effects of other potentially significant variables (such as socioeconomic development), both implied a cause and effect relationship between inter-party competition and state policy outputs. Also noteworthy is that each neglected to account for the contrary opinion that public policies are closely related to the economic resources available to decision-makers. For example, in his 1950 study of the Trend of Government Activity in the United States Since 1900,[47] Solomon Fabricant found that over 70 percent of the variation in total spending among states can be explained by three socioeconomic characteristics: per capita income, population density, and urbanization.[48] And, when broken down by functional area (e.g., highways, education), these socioeconomic variables continued to explain from 29 to 85 percent of the interstate variance. Fabricant concluded that, over-all, income was the principal determinant, even though urbanization proved to be most important in the areas of fire prevention, sanitation, and welfare.[49] Unfortunately, however, Fabricant neglected to elaborate upon the varying aggregate explanatory power of his three variables. There was thus no attempt to explore the possible implications of the findings.

Reflecting the research interests of his predecessors, Robert T.

[46] New England State Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959).

[47] (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1950).

[48] Ibid., p. 123.

[49] Ibid., p. 130.

Golembiewski, in 1958, presented what may be considered the first systematic analysis of the relationship between socioeconomic conditions and state political processes. Examination of his data shows significant relationships between various indicators of socioeconomic development (per capita income, urbanization, and industrialization) and the degree of inter-party competition.[50] He thus concluded that (1) the greater the degree of socioeconomic development (and most notably urbanization), the greater the degree of inter-party competition, and that (2) the greater the degree of inter-party competition, the greater the likelihood that policies will be oriented toward the "have-nots."[51]

Though such scholars as V. O. Key and Robert Golembiewski documented statistically significant relationships between various indicators of socioeconomic development and the degree of inter-party competition, they failed to analyze whether inter-party competition independently affects the activities policy-makers pursue, or whether both inter-party competition and policy outputs are affected by socioeconomic conditions. They thus failed to test whether inter-party competition acts as an intervening variable between socioeconomic conditions and policy outputs.

Equally perplexing is the manner in which a number of economists sought to extend Solomon Fabricant's research throughout the early sixties and which appeared in a series of articles in the National Tax Journal.[52]

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[50] "A Taxonomic Approach to State Political Party Strength," The Western Political Quarterly, 11 (1958), 494-513.

[51] Ibid., p. 510.

[52] Glenn W. Fisher, "Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures: A Preliminary Analysis;" Fisher, "Interstate Variation in State and Local Government Expenditures;" Sachs and Harris, op. cit; Bahl and Saunders, op. cit.; and Otto A. Davis and George H. Haines, "A Political Approach to A Theory of Public Expenditures: The Case of Municipalities," National Tax Journal, 19 (September, 1966), 259-275.

Although a number of new explanatory variables were added to the list and although greater emphasis was placed on isolating various categories of expenditures, the highlight of this research was the discovery that the explanatory power of the three independent variables examined by Fabricant decreased over time to account for only 50 percent of the variance in total per capita expenditures in 1957.[53] Unfortunately, however, all such efforts were overwhelmingly atheoretical and unguided by any model of the policy-making process. Perhaps this shortcoming somewhat accounts for how researchers were able to note the decreasing explanatory power of Fabricant's variables without simultaneously hypothesizing that some kind of "threshold" effect might be occurring. That is, perhaps after a certain level of socioeconomic development has been reached, incremental increases in such areas as urbanization and industrialization are relatively unimportant in terms of policy outputs.[54]

Although this economic research of the early sixties discredited the singular importance of various socioeconomic variables in explaining variations in state policy outputs over time, it did add greater credence to Fabricant's observation that environmental variables have a differential impact across expenditure categories. Once again, however, no one attempted to discern why this is so.[55] It can be suggested that, for the most part, economists have been disposed to examine the singular impact

[53] Fisher (1961), p. 352.

[54] George W. Downs, Jr. Bureaucracy, Innovation, and Public Policy (Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath and Company, 1976), p. 3.

[55] For example, see: Glenn W. Fisher, "Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures: A Preliminary Analysis," p. 352; and Roy Bahl and Robert Saunders, "Determinants of Change in State and Local Government Expenditures," p. 53.

of socioeconomic variables on policy outputs with little or no thought given to their theoretical significance. During the early stages of determinants analysis researchers were not interested in constructing a theory of policy-making or in formulating basic strategies of social change. Political scientists, during this period, however, appear to have lacked the technical sophistication to confront the findings of the early economic research and, at the same time, were relatively predisposed to concentrate solely on process characteristics. The isolation of the two disciplines ended in 1963, however, with an important publication by Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson.[56]

Dawson and Robinson's "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States" represents the first in a series of articles designed to test the Key-Lockard hypothesis that increased interparty competition leads to a higher level of welfare expenditures and that, in general, there exists a relationship between state and community political characteristics and policy outputs. It was their contention that multiple indicators of political characteristics (e.g., the degree of interparty competition, voter participation, Democratic and Republican control of seats in government, and the degree of malapportionment) may not be as important in shaping policy outputs as once predicted. Having examined the relationship between socioeconomic conditions (income, degree of urbanization, and industrialization), the degree of interparty competition, and nine welfare policies, their initial finding was that policy variables are related to socioeconomic development variables, and

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[56] "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," Journal of Politics, 25 (1963), 265-289.

that policies are in turn correlated with socioeconomic factors. And,
holding system variables constant, it was found that socioeconomic fac-
tors influence the political process, and that process variables influ-
ence the adoption of public policy choices along with socioeconomic con-
ditions. Finally, by holding wealth constant, they concluded that the
effect of interparty competition on policy outputs greatly declined. It
was thus discovered that:

> High levels of interparty competition are highly interrelated both
> to socioeconomic factors and to social welfare legislation, but the
> degree of interparty competition does not seem to possess the im-
> portant intervening influence between socioeconomic factors and lib-
> eral welfare programs that our original hypothesis and theoretical
> schemes suggested.[57]

Unlike the earlier research endeavors of economists, Dawson and
Robinson's study was, first of all, guided by theoretical considerations.
The Key-Lockard hypothesis was tested, and the substantial implications
of the negative findings raised "serious doubts about the relevance of
many variables that most political scientists had valued for their ability
to explain public policy."[58] And, secondly, their exploration was guided
by a model of the policy-making process which many believed would put an
end to research involving "the undirected statistical manipulation of any
variables at hand."[59]

Continuing this research, Thomas R. Dye, in 1965, sought to test
the widely shared belief that malapportionment seriously affects the policy

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[57] Ibid., p. 289.

[58] Richard I. Hofferbert, "State and Community Policy Studies," in
James A. Robinson (ed.), Political Science Annual, 3 (1972), 1-72, at p. 6.

[59] George W. Downs, Bureaucracy, Innovation, and Public Policy
(Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath and Company, 1976), p. 5.

choices of state legislatures.[60] Past literature suggested that there is
substantial variation between urban and rural constituencies and that mal-
apportionment, by over-representing rural interests, grants rurally situ-
ated interests a real advantage in policy-making. Although such scholars
as Duane Lockard and Herbert Jacob expressed a noticeable degree of skep-
ticism on this point, many others took it to be an evident fact.[61] Con-
trolling for the effect of urbanization, industrialization, income, and
education, Dye concluded that "on the whole, the policy choices of mal-
apportioned legislatures are not noticeably different from the policy
choices of well apportioned legislatures. Most of the policy differences
which do occur turn out to be a product of socioeconomic differences
among the states rather than a direct product of apportionment practices."[62]
Again, socioeconomic conditions were found to be more significant than
political characteristics in shaping public policies.

In this same year Phillips Cutright, embarking upon a cross-national
correlational analysis, found that the degree of social security coverage
of a nation's population is highly correlated with its level of economic
development.[63] In a similar vein, Harold L. Wilensky's 1975 analysis of
The Welfare State and Inequality suggested that economic development is
the fundamental determinant of welfare services, and that economic resources

[60] Thomas R. Dye, "Malapportionment and Public Policies in the
States," Journal of Politics, 27 (February, 1965), 586-601.

[61] See, Duane Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government
(New York: MacMillan, 1963), p. 319; and Herbert Jacob, "The Consequences
of Malapportionment," Social Forces, 43 (December, 1964), 256-261.

[62] Thomas R. Dye, "Malapportionment and Public Policy in the States,"
p. 599.

[63] "Political Structure, Economic Development, and National Social
Security Programs," American Journal of Sociology, 70 (March 1965), 537-50.

explain 83 percent of the variance among nations in the proportion of GNP devoted to welfare programs.[64] Political factors were thus hardly noticeable in both cross national analyses. They also suggest that political factors are more important for their symbolic meaning than for actually influencing government activity.[65]

Three additional works surfaced in 1966 which not only gave greater impetus to policy determination research, but seem to have added even greater confusion to the already befuddled state of the literature. In "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States,"[66] Richard I. Hofferbert posed the questions: "What is the relationship between certain major structural aspects of state governments and the content of policies adopted in the states? Do socioeconomic environments of the states relate significantly to political structures or the type of policies enacted?"[67] Following the research activity of Dawson and Robinson, Hofferbert argued that socioeconomic factors have more influence on public policies than do political process variables. Drawing almost exclusively from the measures utilized by Dawson and Robinson, Hofferbert added to their list of political process variables two of his own: the degree of malapportionment in state legislative districts and the extent of divided control of state governments (e.g., where the houses and governorship are controlled by opposing parties). After having found insignificant relationships between these two variables and

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[64] (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1975).

[65] Ibid., p. 47.

[66] American Political Science Review, 60 (March, 1966), 73-82.

[67] Ibid., p. 73.

between each of the two and welfare orientation, Hofferbert concluded:

> The line of investigation suggested here seems to justify the recent
> concentration of scholarly efforts seeking to discover the impact of
> environmental factors on the shape and operation of state politics.
> Structural characteristics and, if one prefers to give partisan vari-
> ables a separate berth, the nature of the party system and its opera-
> tion do not seem to go very far toward explaining the kind of poli-
> cies produced in the states.[68]

The year 1966 also witnessed the publication of Thomas R. Dye's Poli-
tics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States,[69]
which firmly established quantitative policy analysis in the mainstream of
political science. Utilizing a theoretical framework similar to that of
Dawson and Robinson, Dye used correlation techniques to analyze the rela-
tionship between four indicators of socioeconomic development (levels of
urbanization, industrialization, income, and education), four political
system variables (Democratic or Republican control of state government,
the degree of interparty competition, the level of voter turnout, and the
extent of malapportionment), and fifty-four easily quantifiable policy out-
puts (principally expenditure levels), encompassing education, health,
welfare, highways, corrections, taxation, and public regulation, using as
the varying factor the role of state governments in spending with respect
to each.

Using simple, partial, and multiple correlation analysis, Dye found
the effect of political system characteristics on policy outputs less sig-
nificant than that of environmental conditions. Although he noted in-
stances in which political system characteristics did have an effect on
policy, he found the association to be a product of the fact that economic

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[68] Ibid., p. 82.

[69] (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

factors influence both policy outputs and political configurations. The
long honored association between political system characteristics and
policy outputs, he thus argued, was based on a spurious relationship.
And, consistent with the findings of Dawson and Robinson, Dye observed
that:

> Economic development shapes both political systems and policy out-
> comes, and most of the association that occurs between system
> characteristics and policy outcomes can be attributed to the influ-
> ence of economic development. Differences in the policy choices of
> states with different types of political systems turn out to be
> largely a product of differing socioeconomic levels rather than a
> direct product of political variables. Levels of urbanization,
> industrialization, income, and education appear to be more influ-
> ential in shaping policy outcomes than political system character-
> istics.[70]

Thus, pictorially, Dye observed the following relationships.

Dye's more elaborate technique and the very multiplicity of his
measures served to give further credence to the earlier work of Dawson
and Robinson and to that of Hofferbert. He believed it was thus con-
clusive that "economic development variables are more influential than
political system characteristics in shaping public policy in the states."[71]

Although Dye's pronouncements opened a serious debate within the
political science community regarding the insignificance of political sys-
tem characteristics on matters "political," it must be understood that his

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[70]
    Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public, p. 293.

[71]
    Ibid., p. 296.

results are somewhat more ambiguous than his rhetoric would have us believe. Indeed, in a number of areas political variables appear to have an independent impact worthy of further exploration. And, further, his research suffers from several theoretical and methodological shortcomings, a large part of which may be a result of his using "outputs" and "outcomes" interchangeably.[72] In analyzing the impact of various economic and political variables on public policy, the dependent variable becomes the particular activities of governmental bodies. That is, the focus is on the relationship between environmental factors and what governments do (i.e., policy outputs). Policy outcomes, on the other hand, refer to the consequences of government activity and not to the activity itself. Now, the environmental factors which hypothetically influence policy-makers in their selection of issues to address and in the specification of expenditure levels may or may not have a significant bearing on the final outcome of policy actions. Much more important in understanding the outcomes of government activity are the manner and processes of implementation, not solely formulation.

Although such objections as those raised above can and have been offered,[73] and even considering the fact that environmental factors (though important) still left an average of almost two-thirds of the variation in

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[72] For an example of the confusing shift from outputs to outcomes, with no attempt to differentiate the nature of the two, the reader is referred to Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public, Chapter 1, "A Model for the Analysis of Policy Outcomes," pp. 1-19; esp., pp. 23-24.

[73] For example, see: Ira Sharkansky, "Environment, Policy, Output and Impact: Problems of Theory and Method in the Analysis of Public Policy," in Ira Sharkansky (ed.), Policy Analysis in Political Science (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 21-38.

outputs unexplained,[74] Dye's findings were most disturbing to those polit-
ical scientists who continued to hold that the subject matter of their
discipline is extremely important in understanding how policy decisions
are made. For example, in the same year as Dye's work, John H. Fenton
published a report indicating a significant relationship between inter-
party competition and policy outputs independent of socioeconomic condi-
tions.[75]

In each case (Dawson and Robinson, Hofferbert, Dye, and Fenton)
varying techniques and indicators of specified variables were employed.
And, although Fenton's study expressed findings contrary to other reports
which noted the relative insignificance of a few prominent political vari-
ables, it would appear that by 1966 findings were undisputably balanced
in favor of "economic determinists." Many members of the political science
community were, to put it mildly, reluctant to refuse waving the banner
of the importance of political factors on matters political. For example,
writing in 1967, Ira Sharkansky suggested that:

> Studies by economists have paid little attention to political vari-
> ables that might influence government spending. A finding common
> to several studies employing economic and political variables is
> that economic characteristics of a jurisdiction outweigh character-
> istics of the political system in their influence upon expenditures.
> Yet it is likely that research techniques are responsible for these
> findings. Authors who make such findings typically use few polit-
> ical variables among their measures of potential influences upon
> expenditures, and they combine state and local government spending
> as their dependent variable. It is legitimate to combine state and
> local government expenditures for the purpose of studying the in-
> fluences upon the state-local political system. However, the findings

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[74] Richard I. Hofferbert, "State and Community Policy Studies," p. 39.

[75] "Two-Party Competition and Governmental Expenditures," in Fenton,
People and Parties in Politics (Glenview: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1966).

of such research may differ from findings about the influences upon the expenditures of state governments, per se.

The present study introduces new measures of political characteristics, it focuses on the expenditures of state governments, and it finds political variables to be more important than economic variables with respect to state expenditures.[76]

What were these neglected political variables that Sharkansky found to be associated with the level of spending? Cryptically stated, eight such variables were addressed: (a) previous expenditures, (b) federal aid, (c) tax effort, (d) revenue allocated to the state, (e) revenue from non-local sources, (f) state employees per 10,000 population, (g) per capita personal income, and (h) population size. Further, by means of step-wise regression, Sharkansky found that "contrary to the findings of previous research, there is little positive association between measures of economic development and state expenditures per capita."[77] There are, however, several questions which need to be addressed concerning Sharkansky's study.

Although Sharkansky specifies that variables a-f measure several features of state politics previously ignored in professional journals, one is hard pressed to accept his interpretation and conceptualization of variables a-e as political system or even "political" variables. All except "the number of state employees per 10,000 population" are, by no real stretch of the imagination, considered as measures of economic development, or at least as the quantity and source of government resources. By including these measures in his analysis and by labelling them "political factors," Sharkansky has (inadvertently) presented evidence of the greater

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[76] Ira Sharkansky, "Economic and Political Correlates of State Government Expenditures: General Tendencies and Deviant Cases," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 11 (1967), 173-192; at p. 174.

[77] Ibid., p. 178.

importance of economic conditions in explaining variations in government spending.[78]

Especially confusing is the manner in which some scholars (such as Sharkansky) conceptualize "outside money" (such as federal aid) as a political variable which offsets the effect of economic resources on state policy. Perhaps this can be attributed to the fact that such economic resources as federal aid are dependent upon a number of political decisions made at the federal level, thereby leading some to categorize such funding programs as "political variables." Or, perhaps it exemplifies the professional and ideological predisposition of political scientists to preempt the effect of economic resources on state policies. James C. Strouse and Phillip Jones have suggested that political scientists have seen fit to label federal aid as a "political variable" rather than an "economic resource" so as to demonstrate the increasing importance of politics in explaining variations in state policy.[79] However, as Thomas Dye so aptly reasoned, "the importance of economic resources, whether derived from within the state or from the federal government, in shaping state policy cannot be altered by conceptual relabeling of packages."[80]

Now, it has already been noted that the explanatory power of three principal environmental variables - income, population density, and urbanization - declined from 72 percent in 1942 to slightly over 50 percent in

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[78] It should also be noted that variable "a," previous expenditures, could also have been environmentally determined, and would in any case account for a large proportion of the variance.

[79] James C. Strouse and Phillip Jones, "Federal Aid: The Forgotten Variable in State Policy Research," Journal of Politics, 36 (February, 1964), 200-207.

[80] Thomas R. Dye, Policy Analysis, p. 38.

1957.[81] Especially evident is the decline in the explanatory power of

these three variables in the areas of welfare (from 45 percent in 1942

to 11 percent in 1957) and health (from 72 percent in 1942 to 44 percent

in 1957).[82] Although it can be suggested that this decline may be attri-

buted to the fact that some kind of threshold effect might be occurring,

Seymour Sachs and Robert Harris attribute the decline to the intervening

effect of federal grants-in-aid.[83] Federal grants (as forms of "outside

money") free state and local government officials from constraints imposed

by their own limited resources. And, as Thomas Dye observed when he rep-

licated the Sachs and Harris study for the year 1970, the inclusion of

per capita federal grants-in-aid as independent variables greatly increases

the proportion of explained variance relative to that explained by income,

education, and urbanization.[84] For example, when federal aid is included

as an independent variable in explaining state variations in welfare poli-

cies, the proportion of explained variance increases from 17 to 48 per-

cent.[85] For all other functions, however, "per capita income remains the

most important determinant of expenditures even after the federal aid

variables are added."[86] As a form of funding which supplements the resources

available to the states, federal aid mirrors the commonly held conceptual-

ization of an economic variable, not a "political factor" as offered by

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[81] See, _Infra._, p. 32.

[82] Seymour Sachs and Robert Harris, "The Determinants of State and
Local Government Expenditures and Intergovernmental Flow of Funds," _op. cit._

[83] _Ibid._

[84] Thomas R. Dye, _Understanding Public Policy_, pp. 284-288.

[85] _Ibid._, p. 288.

[86] Seymour Sachs and Robert Harris, "The Determinants of State and
Local Government Expenditures and Intergovernmental Flow of Funds," p. 207.

some.

Other studies during 1967 also attempted to examine the relationship between environmental factors, political conditions, and policy outputs. In one such study, Ira Sharkansky tested the assumption that the amount of money spent in any one locality is a true measure of the nature of the services provided.[87] Sharkansky hypothesized that three measures most likely to have an influence on public services are (1) combined state and local government expenditures per $1,000 of personal income, (2) combined state and local government expenditures per capita, and (3) combined state and local expenditures for each major function as a percentage of total expenditures. His initial reasoning was that "if the level of government spending actually reflects the quality and quantity of public services, then each of these spending measures should show a positive relationship with service indicators."[88] His findings, however, ran contrary to previous expectations: "government spending does not exert a pervasive influence upon the nature of public services."[89]

Now, drawing from another context, Sharkansky made the following distinction between public policy, policy outputs, and policy impacts:

> In brief, public policy represents actions taken by government; policy outputs represent the service levels which are affected by these actions; and policy impacts represent the effect which the service has on a population.[90]

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[87] "Government Expenditures and Public Services in the American States," American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), 1066-1077.

[88] Ibid., p. 1067.

[89] Ibid., p. 1074.

[90] Ira Sharkansky, "Environment, Policy, Output and Impact: Problems of Theory and Method in the Analysis of Public Policy," p. 63.

For example, state governments pursue a number of activities in the areas
of education, public welfare, public safety, and transportation, among
others. Each activity is allocated a certain level of funding and the
performance of each activity is assessed in terms of some quantitative or
qualitative criterion. Since it is often argued that most policies fail
to attain their objectives due to insufficient funding, Sharkansky sought
to test the hypothesis that government spending is positively associated
with policy achievement. However, the discovery that the level of govern-
ment spending does not reflect the quality or quantity of public services
carries with it substantial implications for consideration by policy-
makers. Indeed, if government expenditures do not affect the ultimate
success or failure of government policies, then a program's performance
must be measured in terms of its overall effectiveness, not in terms of
its initial budget allocations. The general finding that increased spending
in the field of education does not noticeably improve the quality of educa-
tion in the city (as measured by such factors as teacher-pupil ratio, exam-
ination scores, median education levels, percent graduating secondary
schools, and percent receiving college credits), recommends that increased
attention be given to the activities of those administrators responsible
for implementing the policies formulated by elected public officials. For,
indeed, our contention is not only that program effectiveness depends
upon the willingness and capacity of administrators and bureaucrats but
that, collectively, administrators and career bureaucrats have greater
influence over the policy-making process and in determining the ultimate
outcome of public policies than any other single class of individuals, in-
cluding elected public officials and economic elites.

It would thus appear that by 1967 no definitive word had yet been spoken. In most studies, the amount of variance left unexplained by the arsenal of environmental and political variables thus far considered greatly surpassed that which was explained. Further, although there have been moments when various factors have proven significant in explaining variations in state policies, they have also proven rather unstable both across policy categories and from one time period to another. And thirdly, the studies thus far considered have been of limited utility to those responsible for policy making and to those interested in bringing about social change. Indeed, prescriptive concerns have rarely been evident in the determinants literature. Perhaps this deficiency flows from the nature of the explanatory or independent variables included in determinants analysis, or from the way such variables are hypothesized to relate to state and community policies, or perhaps even from the pessimism which naturally emanates from the sterility of the findings.[91] This is especially evident in political science - primarily because the influence of political variables have proven less important than economic resources in explaining policy variations among states. However, as far as most political scientists were concerned, the debate was far from over.

For example, although the greater proportion of determinants research has noted the paucity of the relationship between political system characteristics and state and local policy outputs, a study undertaken by Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler in 1967 suggested that political

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[91] For a most insightful critique of determinants analysis following the general argument developed here, see: George W. Downs, Jr., _Bureaucracy, Innovation, and Public Policy_, pp. 9-13.

reform can change the complexion of city taxing and spending patterns, as well as the very responsiveness of city government.[92] In an analysis of 200 American cities of 50,000 or more, the authors found that reformed cities (i.e., cities with manager governments and at-large, non-partisan elections) tend to tax and spend less than unreformed cities (i.e., cities with mayor-council governments and ward constituencies). Of particular importance to political scientists was the finding of the greater responsiveness of reformed cities to the socioeconomic composition of their populations. That is, reformed cities were found to pursue policies in the interests of the community, rather than biased toward select economic and social elites. Reformism was thus seen as the means by which to remove the spoils system and its by-products from the policy process.

In measuring responsiveness, Lineberry and Fowler divided their sample cities on the basis of three criteria: government type, election type, and constituency type. These variables were further subdivided into types of governance (mayor-council, manager, and commission); types of elections (partisan and non-partisan); and constituency types (district and at-large). They then proceeded to make a comparison of the means and standard deviations of socioeconomic characteristics of reformed and unreformed cities. The independent variables used in the analysis were population, class composition, and the homogeneity of the city. And, finally, each independent variable was similarly subdivided into several indicators of the phenomenon, with statistical operations performed on each relationship.

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[92] Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review, 61 (Sept., 1967), 701-716.

Interpretation of their data indicates that many significant correlations exist between taxing and spending policies and income, educational, occupational, religious, and ethnic characteristics of the population of unreformed cities, whereas no such relationship holds true for reformed cities. If not careful, one can easily misconstrue their findings. What Lineberry and Fowler detected was that unreformed cities are more responsive to various socioeconomic factors and to the enduring conflicts of political life than are reformed cities. Our first inclination would probably be to suggest that governments should be responsive to such factors. However, as Lineberry and Fowler observe, unreformed cities are responding to "artificial" cleavages (e.g., race, religion, and ethnicity), and not to the overall policy needs of the city. Reformed cities, on the other hand, are relatively immunized from social conflicts. Thus, social cleavages are not reflected in public policy. As they conclude, "nonpartisan elections, at-large constituencies, and manager governments are associated with a lessened responsiveness of cities to the enduring conflicts of political life."[93]

Encouraged by the findings of such research, Richard I. Hofferbert and Ira Sharkansky continued their efforts into the latter years of the 1960s, each time testing new hypotheses and utilizing new techniques and alternative indicators of the variables under question. In 1968 Hofferbert again tested the relationship between economic resources, political factors, and public policies - this time examining the period 1890-1960.[94] Echoing

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[93] Ibid., p. 715.

[94] "Socioeconomic Dimensions of the American States, 1890-1960," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 2 (August, 1968), 401-418.

the findings of previous research, Hofferbert's study indicated that a long-term analysis of public policies reveals a pattern whereby economic resources are initially the strongest determinant of the types of policies initiated by the states, but that the relationship lessens in importance with the passage of time. This much was already known. As communities develop economically, they gradually come to free themselves from the constraints imposed by the initial shortages of economic resources. Able to muster the funds necessary to carry out a number of separate activities, policy-makers are better able to loose themselves from some of the initial problems of choice, and can initiate new policies and programs in other areas. However, choices still must be made concerning the degree of change to enact in previous programs, as well as what new issues will receive a place on the policy agenda. The implication of Hofferbert's analysis is that once economic development reaches the point that limited resources no longer pose a crippling constraint the attitudes and behavior of policy-makers take on new significance in explaining the variance in state policies and spending patterns.

In another context, (again reflecting the professional and ideological predisposition of political scientists), Ira Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert suggested that political system characteristics have not proven significant in determining state and local public policies because of problems inherent in the conceptualization and measurement of the central variables.[95] By locating other multiple measures of the independent variables,

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[95] Ira Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," American Political Science Review, 63 (September, 1969), 867-880.

they reasoned that:

> Because we deal with factors and not isolated variables, we can speak with improved precision of which <u>dimensions</u> of policy respond to what <u>dimensions</u> of politics and economics. Our findings show that different social and economic characteristics have different relevance for policies, and their relevance varies between substantive areas of policy. Furthermore, central features of state politics are important for some policies, even when socioeconomic variation is controlled.[96]

Now, although Sharkansky and Hofferbert are indeed warranted in asserting that no single, unidimensional independent variable is sufficient in explaining policy variations among particular governmental units, and in noting that the determining factors vary according to the particularity of the policy area, they still fail to capture the significance of bureaucrats and bureaucratic variables on the policy-making process. It is now well known that many key policy decisions are made by bureaucrats rather than by legislators or other elected officials. Since the comparative state policy literature has thus far neglected to include bureaucratic or organizational factors as major independent variables, it should come as no great surprise that political variables often fail to have a significant independent effect on state and local policy.

Further, although the greater percentage of studies concerned with the determinants of policy outputs have been undertaken at the state level, several have sought to analyze the relationship between political system characteristics, socioeconomic conditions, and policy outputs, measured as an aggregate of state and local activities. It has been and is most difficult to assert with complete certainty that all hypothesized relationships are equally true for both state and local environments. However,

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[96] <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 867.

Amos Hawley's study of the association between urban renewal policies and socioeconomic characteristics of cities and Maurice Pinard's study concerning flouridated water supplies, suggest that socioeconomic conditions constrain the policy initiatives of both state and city governments.[97]

Similarly, the relationship between political system characteristics and state and local policy-making has also received the attention of those researchers interested in the policy choices of urban decision-makers. For example, Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian have suggested that local governments ordinarily assume one or more of the following roles: (1) promoting economic growth; (2) providing or securing life's amenities; (3) maintaining (only) traditional services; and (4) arbitrating among competing interests.[98] They then proceeded to analyze the effect different governmental types have on the specific role or function assumed by policy-makers. In particular, they found that policies of economic growth and amenities are generally supported by middle and upper class communities and opposed by low-income individuals. Caretaker policies (i.e., those intended to provide minimal public services and low tax burdens), on the other hand, are preferred by low-income citizens, small cities serving rural areas, and by working class communities. Furthermore (a) nonpartisanship reduces the working class vote and the forces supportive of caretaker government; (b) by increasing the aggregate effect of low-income voters, ward elections strengthen caretaker government; (c) to the extent

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[97] Amos Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Services," _American Journal of Sociology_ (January, 1963), 422-431; Maurice Pinard, "Structural Attachments and Political Support in Urban Politics: The Case of Flouridation," _American Journal of Sociology_ (March, 1963), 513-526.

[98] "Community Types and Policy Differences," in James Q. Wilson (ed.), _City Politics and Public Policy_ (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968).

that cohesive ethnic blocks strengthen the working class vote, caretaker government is likewise strengthened; and (d) professional city managers support values associated with economic growth. And, finally, it was found that the economic climate of the city is insufficient in itself in determining the direction of civic policies. All in all, the policy choices of urban society are dependent upon the value orientations of decision-makers.[99]

Although we have not considered any of the studies in great length, and though we have presented but a small kernel of the studies acknowledged as major contributions to the policy literature, enough has been noted indicating that this research area is in a relative state of flux. No final word has been spoken. No systematic body of knowledge exists. What has thus far been established, however, is the beginning of a policy science. As Thomas R. Dye rightly observed:

> Policy research is still very exploratory; no body of literature can be thought of as the final word in understanding public policy. But systematic policy research to date is sufficiently challenging to the traditional professional concerns of political science, and to the long standing assumptions of democratic pluralist ideology, to warrant a serious reconsideration of the traditional assumptions of our discipline.[100]

However much we assent to Dye's pronouncement that "policy research is still very exploratory," and that the literature of policy determination

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[99] Ibid., p. 36. Also, see: Robert Eyestone and Heinz Eulau, "City Councils and Policy Outcomes: Developmental Profiles," in Wilson (ed.), City Politics and Public Policy, pp. 37-65; Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes," American Political Science Review, 62 (March, 1968), pp. 124-144; Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt, Labyrinths of Democracy: Adaptations, Linkages, Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973); Robert Eyestone, The Threads of Public Policy (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971).

[100] Thomas R. Dye, Policy Analysis, p. 55.

challenges the traditional concerns of political science and the assumptions of democratic pluralist ideology, we cannot help but be somewhat cynical of the utility of the research findings to date. The suggestion that public policies are influenced by the economic resources available to decision-makers is analogous to saying that an individual's spending decisions are also a function of his or her available resources. And the response to each is the same - "So What!" Of greater theoretical interest is the observed variations between policy outputs of cities with similar socioeconomic characteristics. Through ordinary observation we can note two equally affluent or "poor" cities which may easily differ in terms of street conditions, lighting, protected crossings, park facilities, sidewalks, museums, libraries, as well as other physical traits, readily observed with but scant examination. Why would we expect cities with similar socioeconomic characteristics to differ in policy responses to similar community needs?

Robert Eyestone and Heinz Eulau addressed their research endeavors to the very conditions noted above.[101] In an analysis of 88 cities in the San Francisco Bay region, the authors suggested that differences in meeting common environmental challenges are due to the fact that different cities are in different stages of urban policy development. By computing an aggregate measure of each city's "policy profile," with the medians for planning and amenities expenditures used as determining factors, Eyestone and Eulau constructed a typology of policy development consisting of five stages: retarded, emergent, transitional, maturing, and advanced.[102] To

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[101] "City Councils and Policy Outcomes: Developmental Profiles," in Wilson (ed.), City Politics and Public Policy, pp. 37-65.

[102] Ibid., pp. 42-43.

control for the effects of economic resources on policy orientations, the
88 cities were further subdivided into two groups, "using the median of
per capita assessed valuation for all cities as the dividing line between
high and low resource capability."[103] And, finally, 304 councilmen were
interviewed and questionaires compiled to determine the value orientations
of policy-makers. Among the many significant findings were:

> Policy orientations of policy-makers concerning development and scope
> of government activities are not related to city size, growth, or re-
> source capability.

> The more favorable the policy-makers' orientation toward development,
> the more developed the city is likely to be.

> Regardless of size, growth, or resource capability, the more favor-
> able the policy-makers' orientations toward development, the more
> developed the city is likely to be.[104]

We are thus informed that "the relationships we have been able to demon-
strate will help restore the political scientist's belief in the importance
of politicians in the policy process."[105]

In a similar fashion, in _Labyrinths of Democracy_, Heinz Eulau and
Kenneth Prewitt reported that their comparative analysis of 82 city coun-
cils in the San Francisco Bay region uncovered significant relationships
between the goals, perceptions, and policy orientations of city councilmen
and public expenditures in their cities for planning and amenities.[106] In
particular, it was found that councilmen enter public office with estab-
lished attitudes concerning the past and present policy orientations of

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[103] Ibid., p. 47.

[104] Ibid., pp. 52-53.

[105] Ibid., p. 65.

[106] Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt, _Labyrinths of Democracy: Adap-
tations, Linkages, Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics_, passim.

the city's governmental structure. Such attitudes may be either "factual" expressions of what the city had in fact accomplished or attempted, or they may be more or less "normative" assessments of how well the city had confronted the problems (as they see them). These attitudes, in turn, are transmitted with the private person when he/she assumes his/her public role as a member of the city council. Individuals thus assume public office with various policy preferences and perceptions concerning the future role of government. Now, although these personal preferences may be somewhat modified during the course of his/her interactions with other members of the council, each council ultimately develops a recognized policy orientation agreeable to the greater proportion of councilmen. These "images" ultimately determine the types of policies pursued by the city.[107]

Since previous research noted significant variations both between states and between communities, first, in terms of the policies pursued by different states and communities, and, secondly, in terms of the degree of commitment exhibited by policy-makers of different states and communities within substantive policy areas (as measured by expenditure levels), the relationships uncovered by Eulau and Prewitt are certainly important contributions to the policy literature. This is especially evident when we take into consideration the great amount of variance left unexplained by the economic and political system variables traditionally employed in determinants research. Unfortunately, the independent effect of councilmanic attitudes on city policies is far from certain. This is so because the authors also found significant relationships between councilmanic

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[107] Ibid., especially Chapter 27, "Policy Maps: II. Images and Positions," 533-549.

attitudes and characteristics of city populations and between population characteristics and policy decisions. Without testing the proposition that councilmanic attitudes independently affect city policies we cannot infer that political ideologies are, in fact, important policy determinants.

However, in The Threads of Public Policy, Robert Eyestone systematically compared councilmanic attitudes, images, and ideologies with certain environmental variables (e.g., population density, growth rate, per capita expenditures, assessed property value, city size, tax rate, and revenues from property taxes, among others) to gauge their relative impact on public policy.[108] When councilmanic attitudes on "development problems," "zoning problems," and "amenities improvements" are utilized in the same multiple regression problem on amenities with density, property value, city size, and growth rate, population density proves to be the best predictor of city policies. In fact, whereas population density explains 72%, 58%, and 72% of the variation in amenities expenditures in "Core Cities," "Suburbs," and "Fringe Cities," respectively, the combined total variance explained by councilmanic attitudes on zoning problems, development problems, and amenities improvements for the three groups is 2.9%, 8.1%, and 6.6%, respectively.[109] Councilmanic attitudes regarding the "future role of government," on the other hand, were found to be independently related to planning expenditures in "Core Cities" and "Suburbs"

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[108] Robert Eyestone, The Threads of Public Policy, especially, pp. 146-149, Tables 6-1 to 6-3.

[109] Ibid., p. 146-147, esp., Table 6-1. The three elements of the urban realm typology are defined as follows: "Core Cities" - 'traditional core and preautomotive industrial cities, prairie cities and noncentric cities; "Suburbs" - railroad suburban cities and noncentric residential cities; and "Fringe Areas" - urbanizing cities and nonmetro cities" (p.133).

(explaining 12.3% and 46.0% of the total variance, respectively), and councilmanic attitudes on zoning problems were found to be independently related to planning expenditures in "Fringe Cities" (explaining 67.6% of the total variance).[110]

Although it can be argued that "councilmanic attitudes seldom stray far from the constraints placed upon them by the environment,"[111] it would appear that the policy preferences of decision-makers may very well be of determining influence on public policy. This is especially evident when we consider the fact that the constraints posed by limited economic resources have been shown to diminish over time, thus making it possible for city policy-makers to increase their efforts in some substantive policy-areas and to begin new activities in areas previously neglected. All other things being equal, policy-makers come to have greater latitude in choosing from among alternative policy areas and from among competing strategies of action. And, ultimately, the goals, perceptions, and policy positions of policy-makers play an integral role in the decision-making process.

Whether or not councilmanic attitudes independently affect public policy is, of course, an empirical issue. And, although available evidence does not clearly demonstrate the independent impact of attitudes on policy decisions, it must be remembered that the San Francisco Bay region project (of which these studies were a part) was carried out during a limited time dimension: 1966-1967. Councilmanic attitudes were thus correlated with public policies and environmental conditions at a single point in time.

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110 Ibid., pp. 148-149; especially Table 6-2.
111 Thomas R. Dye, Policy Analysis, p. 76.

No effort was made to measure the impact of changes over time. It cannot be denied that many attitudes are influenced by environmental conditions and that as the environment changes so do attitudes, but what is the relationship between councilmanic attitudes and public policy when important environmental factors (such as the level of economic development) remain relatively static? What thus appears necessary are longitudinal, comparative analyses of the relationship between the goals, perceptions and policy orientations of policy-makers and public policy, and not research designs confined by a limited (two-year) time dimension.

Even taking into consideration the possible shortcomings of the San Francisco Bay region project, the significance of its findings (by Eulau and Prewitt and by Eyestone, in particular), at least for our present purpose, is the reported importance of the value orientations of policy-makers in determining the form and content of public policy. They thus equally allude to the importance of understanding the linkages between power configurations in American society and the types of policies pursued by decision-makers. However true this may be, (as our analysis will suggest) studies of community power structures have not sufficiently distinguished between overt and implicit (covert) exercises of power, nor have they adequately analyzed the power relations which ensue after the initial formulation of the policy. The major point of contention is that the growth and resources of bureaucracy (on all levels of government), and the power inherent in processes of policy implementation, have placed administrators and career bureaucrats in the limelight of the policy process - a role greatly underestimated in contemporary policy research. This criticism applies to both the determinants research thus far considered, as well as

to community power studies - to which we now turn.

CONCLUSION

Within the past twenty-five years, social scientists, policy analysts, and publicists have shown a relentless interest in accounting for the significant variations which purportedly exist in state and community policies. This research has progressed from the initial atheoretical efforts of a few economists - who operated without a clearly defined model of the policy process - to the complex multivariate designs of later economists, political scientists, and sociologists. However, even when guided by useful models and previous research, most researchers have been constrained by the professional and ideological predispositions of their discipline, even though such disciplinary blinders have been shown to result in rather sterile and limited findings. Whereas economists have shown an inordinate inclination toward documenting the independent influence of economic variables on state and community policies, political scientists have been inclined toward political system characteristics and sociologists toward environmental and sociological factors in their analyses of variations in state and community policies. Each discipline has thus been concerned with demonstrating the determining influence of its disciplinary interests on the policy choices of decision-makers.

However, when such disciplinary biases are controlled, it is evident that most researchers have reported the greater explanatory power of state and community economic conditions over that of political system variables in determining the policy activities of decision-makers. And, although

some political process variables appear significant in at least some policy areas, their effect often appears to be a by-product of economic resources. Political scientists have, however, found at least some consolation in the knowledge that the goals, perceptions, and attitudes of policy-makers may very well be important determinants of such policy areas as development and amenities expenditures. Unfortunately, however, their independent effect is far from certain.

It is equally difficult to gauge the ultimate significance of what we do know about policy variations among states and communities when we consider the fact that almost two-thirds of the variance is yet unexplained. This is not to suggest that the policy literature should be soundly criticized for failing to explain all of the variance - indeed, to do so would be impossible without a research design employing an insurmountable number of factors, and even then the study would suffer from both theoretical and conceptual insignificance - but rather to suggest that researchers (especially political scientists) have failed to consider a number of variables which may have a significant and independent effect on governmental policies.

For example, there is an extensive body of literature emphasizing the fact that an ever-increasing proportion of policy decisions are being made by public bureaucracies; and, yet, bureaucratic or organizational variables are grossly underrepresented (if not nonexistent) in most determinants research. Although a number of reasons may be suggested for this omission, it would seem that most omissions can be attributed to problems of cost and time, the inability to quantify all bureaucratic variables in the same manner as is done with per capita income, tax receipts, levels of federal aid, voter participation, party competition, and the number of state and local employees, as well as the researcher's unfamiliarity with

most areas being addressed. Although these factors all possess at least
some merit, an even more significant reason for this neglect appears to
be the traditional concerns of political scientists with the legislative
and/or policy-making process. This has led to a disproportionate analy-
sis of formal bodies of decision-making and a resultant neglect for the
ways in which bureaucracies influence the policy process.

Why this has occurred is not so easy to answer. In a preliminary
fashion, however, let it be suggested that the once held politics-adminis-
tration distinction still appears to hold some persuasive power. According
to this view, politics is the concern of elected public officials who are
entrusted with responsibility for formulating public policies, and proc-
esses of administration reside within the province of bureaucracies that
implement those policy decisions. If this is so, bureaucracies do not de-
termine the policy decisions of state and communities - instead, they merely
carry out those decisions. Quite elementary. Too elementary in fact. The
rigid politics-administration distinction has long ago been eroded by the
broad delegations of authority to bureaucracies which allow for administra-
tive decision-making. This being so, administrators now possess a degree
of power in structuring the agendas and in defining the alternatives for
elected officials unrecorded by determinants research. Their influence
has not been linked to policy decisions in determinants research by means
of testable hypotheses.

Of even greater importance is the fact that bureaucracies not only
possess "advisory" significance, but do in fact ultimately determine what
actually becomes of policy decisions as formulated by formal institutions
of government. Thus, even if omitted in analyses of the determinants of

policy decisions, bureaucracies cannot be ignored in considerations of policy performance - in studies of what did or did not take place after the policy was promulgated.

This is not meant as a singular criticism directed at political scientists bent on analyzing the courses of action selected by decision-makers, but also as a charge against organization theorists who at one time note the importance of bureaucracies and yet neglect to clearly specify what dimensions of administrative activity are important. Researchers are thus not only left unguided, but recent determinants research is left unchallenged. Their research does not establish any reasonable guide for those responsible for formulating policies who must ensure the workability of their programs.

Our point of contention is thus four-fold: (1) a great degree of variance left unexplained by determinants research may be an artifact of the professional and ideological predispositions of researchers; (2) an even greater percentage of unexplained variance may be attributed to the neglect of the explanatory power of bureaucratic variables; (3) although interesting, by examining those factors hypothetically related to public policies, determinants research has thus far suffered from an inability to guide policy-makers through the complex maze of policy-making to the ultimate achievement of policy objectives; and (4) bureaucracies continue to be the unexplored variable in policy analysis. This last criticism applies equally well to studies of community power - to which we now turn.

CHAPTER III

THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

As the emphasis on public policy readily accentuates, the study of American politics involves an examination of how scarce resources within a community are distributed within the social system. The systematic analysis of policy outputs previously cited in Chapter II give substantial credence to the general observation that not all people share equally in resource allocations, or in the decision-making process by which such allocations are made. Since the decisions by which allocations are made receive formulation in the political arena, we may wish to know what factors, if any, have a predominant influence on the form and content of policy responses to community needs; but, in so doing, care should be taken to examine the value orientations of individual decision-makers. If all decision-makers shared the same interests, reacted to similar pressures, were held accountable by identical elements, received primary support from the same sources, and supported a single conception of the role of government, then the question as to who makes policy would be largely irrelevant. However, this hardly being the case, one must give special consideration to the very structure of political power - for it is within the context of the exercise of power that politics takes place.

Similarly evident in the literature of the policy process is the basic assumption that there exists in the community a particular power structure or structures that make decisions binding upon the public. There are, however, marked disagreements as to the specific actors and/or

institutions contained within a city's power structure. Equally evident is the fact that there does not exist a universally accepted conceptualization of the phenomenon of power, or a single method by which it is measured. This is unfortunate for the validity and reliability of research endeavors is, at the very least, dependent upon the appropriateness of the conceptualization and empirical operationalization of the concept being explored. Indeed, we contend that methodological and ideological differences account for the varying conclusions as to the location of community power.

As a preliminary to our analysis of the literature of community power and of the relative power of public bureaucracies in processes of policy implementation, it is important that we have an appreciation for the ways in which "power" has been variously conceptualized and for the ways in which its location has been ascertained. To facilitate this objective, let us review the spectrum of definitions presently advanced.[1]

Goldhammer and Shils:	A person has power "to the extent that he influences the behavior of others in accordance with his own intentions."
Weber:	Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will, despite resistances, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.
Bierstedt:	Power is latent force.
Dahl:	A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that he would not otherwise do.

[1] As summarized by Paul E. Mott, "Power, Authority, and Influence," in Michael Aiken and Paul E. Mott (eds.), The Structure of Community Power (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 3-16; at p. 5.

>Blau: Power is the ability of persons or groups to impose their will on others despite resistance through deterrence either in the form of withholding regularly supplied rewards or in the form of punishment, inasmuch as the former as well as the latter constitute, in effect, a negative sanction.

>Lasswell and Kaplan: Power is "participation in the making of decisions."[2]

The one common element present in these definitions is the notion that power, to use G. David Garson's terminology, entails the exercise of command - as the ability to successfully impose one's will on others.[3] Does an individual, however, have to directly participate in the decision-making process in order for one to say that he has power, as Lasswell and Kaplan suggest? In other words, what constitutes power and who possesses it? According to some, power is the possession of elected decision-makers, for others it signifies the possession of valued resources, while for others

>Every individual has his own quantum of power - physical, persuasive, etc. - and every group has some measure of social power. Groups are centers of power. Some groups are centers of greater power than others, depending on the number of people, the degree of their organization, the relative level of their technology, the social value of resources they control and the degree of their control of them, the transitiveness of their structural position, etc...[4]

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[2] Herbert Goldhammer and Edward Shils, "Types of Power and Status," American Journal of Sociology, 45 (Sept. 1939), 171-182; at p. 173; Max Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. by A.M. Henderson and T. Parsons (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1947), p. 152; Robert Bierstedt, "An Analysis of Social Power," American Sociological Review, 15 (Dec. 1950), 730-738; at p. 733; Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science, 2 (July 1957), 201-215; Peter M. Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life (NY: Wiley, 1964), p. 117; H.D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 74.

[3] G. David Garson, Power and Politics in the United States (Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath and Company, 1977), p. 5.

[4] Paul E. Mott, "Power, Authority, and Influence," p. 8. For a similar analysis, see Carol A. Greenwald, Group Power (NY: Praeger, 1977).

Power is thus dependent upon a number of factors or resources, any one of which alone may not be sufficient to bring about the successful imposition of one's will over that of others. Although the primary objective of this chapter is to indicate those resources and events which have functioned to thrust the public bureaucracy into central prominence in the policy process, it is imperative that we first review a number of the most significant studies to date and delineate their methodological and ideological assumptions and deficiencies.

WHO GOVERNS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY?

Researchers interested in the nature of community power structures have been influenced by a body of literature which suggests that all societies are controlled by a small ruling class which reigns supreme over the nonruling majority.[5] For example, writing in the mid-nineteenth century, Gaetano Mosca asserted that:

> In all societies - from societies that are very meagerly developed and have barely attained the dawning of civilization, down to the most advanced and powerful societies - two classes of people appear - a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first, in a manner that is now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary and violent, and supplies the first, in appearance at least, with material means of subsistence and with the instrumentalities that are essential to the vitality of the political organism.[6]

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[5] For example, Vilfredo Pareto, _Mind and Society_ (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1935); Gaetano Mosca, _The Ruling Class_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939); Harold Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, _The Comparative Study of Elites_ (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952); C. Wright Mills, _The Power Elite_ (New York: Oxford, 1956); Robert Michels, _Political Parties_ (New York: Free Press, 1962; originally published in 1915).

[6] Gaetano Mosca, _The Ruling Class_, p. 50.

And, in a similar fashion, a contemporary social scientist, Robert Lynd,

has expressed the opinion that:

> It is the necessity in each society - if it is to be a society, not
> a rabble - to order the relations of men and their institutional ways
> of achieving needed ends...Organized power exists - always and every-
> where, in societies large or small, primitive or modern - because it
> performs the necessary function of establishing and maintaining the
> version of order by which a given society in a given time and place
> lives.[7]

This sentiment was once again echoed in no uncertain terms by Harold Lass-

well and Daniel Lerner: "The discovery that in all large-scale societies

the decisions at any time are typically in the hands of a small number of

people," pays homage to a long-held belief: "Government is always govern-

ment by the few, whether in the name of the few, the one, or the many."[8]

Much of this elitist thinking was confirmed by Robert and Helen Lynd

in their two studies of community power relations in "Middletown" (Muncie,

Indiana).[9] What they found was a monolithic power structure - one in which

all facets of community life (religious, political, economic, and social)

were controlled by a single family. They further found that the source of

this family's power rested upon their control of the economy through the

labor market and the extension of credit. The extent of this family's power

is cryptically captured in the following comment by a Middletown man in 1935:

> If I'm out of work, I go to the X plant; if I need money I go to the
> X bank, and if they don't like me I don't get it; my children go to

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[7] Robert Lynd, "Power in American Society," in Authur Kornhauser
(ed.), Problems of Power in American Society (Detroit: Wayne State Univer-
sity Press, 1957), pp. 3-4.

[8] Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, The Comparative Study of
Elites, p. 7.

[9] Robert and Helen Lynd, Middletown (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.,
1937); and Middletown in Transition (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1937).

> the X college; when I get sick I go to the X hospital; I buy a
> building lot or house in the X subdivision; my wife goes down-
> town to buy X milk; I drink X beer, vote for X political parties,
> and get help from X charities; my boy goes to the X YMCA and my
> girl to their YWCA; I listen to the Word of God in a X subsi-
> dized church; if I'm a Mason, I go to the X Masonic temple; I read
> the news from the X morning papers; and, if I'm rich enough, I
> travel via the X airport.[10]

Unfortunately, however, the Lynds did not specify the methods by which

the "X" family was identified as the center of Middletown's political

arena. Thus they did not provide a specific methodology through which

future studies could find direction, nor did they provide a sufficient ac-

count of the indicators used as their measures of community power.

Lloyd W. Warner undertook a similar analysis of the power structure

of Morris, Illinois (which he called Jonesville) in the 1940s and encoun-

tered a monolithic structure paralleling that documented by the Lynds in

Muncie.[11] These findings were confirmed by August B. Hollingshead in his

1949 analysis of the same town (which he preferred to call Elmtown).[12]

In brief, as these early studies report, the elitist interpretation

of American politics contends that it is the few who have power in society,

and that it is the preferences and values of the few that determine the

nature of public policy.[13] The following ideas are contained in elitist

thinking about community power:

> 1. Society is divided into the few who have power and the many who
> do not. Only a small number of persons allocate values for society;

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[10] Robert and Helen Lynd, <u>Middletown in Transition,</u> p. 74.

[11] Lloyd W. Warner, et. al., <u>Democracy in Jonesville</u> (New York:
Harper, 1949).

[12] August B. Hollingshead, <u>Elmtown's Youth</u> (NY: Wiley and Sons, 1949).

[13] Elite theory is explained at length in Thomas R. Dye and Harmon
Zeigler, <u>The Irony of Democracy,</u> 3rd Ed. (Belmont, Calif: Wadsworth, 1975).

the masses do not decide public policy.

2. The few who govern are not typical of the masses who are governed. Elites are drawn disproportionately from the upper socioeconomic strata of society.

3. The movement of nonelites to elite positions must be slow and continuous to maintain stability and avoid revolution. Only nonelites who have accepted the basic elite consensus can be admitted to governing circles.

4. Elites share consensus in behalf of the basic values of the social system and the preservation of the system. In America, the bases of elite consensus are the sanctity of private property, limited government, and individual liberty.

5. Public policy does not reflect demands of masses but rather the prevailing values of the elite. Changes in public policy will be incremental rather than revolutionary.

6. Active elites are subject to relatively little direct influence from apathetic masses. Elites influence masses more than masses influence elites.[14]

The contention that only a small proportion of the population ever attains a position in society whereby political power may be exercised is particularly unsettling in a democratic society which professes an unwavering attachment to mass participation in the governmental process. Whereas elitism contends that the masses have but an indirect influence over the decision-making behavior of elites, an alternative perspective - often labeled "pluralism" - maintains that although it is undoubtedly true that an elite few, rather than the masses, directly govern the affairs in America, the essentially democratic character of American society is preserved through a number of alternative channels:

1. While individuals do not participate directly in decision-making, they can join organized groups and make their influence felt through

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14 Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, 3rd Ed., p. 26.

group participation.

2. There is competition between leadership groups that help protect the individual - countervailing centers of power, which check each other and guard against abuse of power.

3. Individuals can choose between competing groups in elections.

4. Leadership groups are not closed; new groups can be formed and gain access to the political system.

5. There are multiple leadership groups in society - "polyarchy." Leaders who exercise power over some kinds of decisions do not necessarily exercise power over other kinds of decisions.

6. Public policy may not be majority preference, but it is the rough equilibrium of group influence and therefore a reasonable approximation of society's preferences.[15]

As outlined above, modern pluralism does not refer to a commitment to "pure democracy" in the Aristotelian sense involving direct participation by citizens in decision-making. Rather, the modern pluralist is conscious of the impracticality of renewing the town-meeting type of pure democracy in a highly urbanized and industrialized society. It is also recognized that American society has witnessed a great rise in giant industrial, financial, and commercial organizations which pose a threat to individual liberty. At the same time, however, it is hoped that various "countervailing" centers of power will help diminish the net power of corporations and safeguard the interests of the individual. Competition among business, labor, and government, the fragmentation of authority, the fluidity of citizens in organized activity, the influence of elected public officials, public opinion, and periodic elections are all perceived by pluralists as important determinants of public policy and as checks on the dominant economic

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[15] Thomas R. Dye, Who's Running America: Institutional Leadership in the United States (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), p. 10.

interests.

Pluralists thus contend that no single interest or group dominates the life of a community. Rather, "different small groups or interested and active citizens in different issue-areas with some overlap, if any, by public officials, and occasional intervention by a larger number of people at the polls," rules in the community.[16] Although elected public officials hold formal positions of power in the community, actual leadership includes those interested individuals and groups that concentrate their efforts on one or two issue-areas. Community power is thus fluid - changing hands in accordance with the issue being considered.

As is readily apparent, the elitist and pluralist schools of thought contain quite divergent assumptions concerning politics and power in American society. Even more perplexing is the fact that there exists varying descriptions of who the power-holders really are even within each perspective. Thus, we are informed by some that power is held by "the power elite," or by "the ruling class," or by "economic notables," or by "elected decision-makers," or by "the liberal establishment," or by "the military-industrial complex," or by "those of reputation." And there are those who contend that power is not an attribute of individuals, but of institutions and organized interests. Further, just as there are a multitude of interests in society there are an equal number of power-holders.

Now, however interesting such notions may be, they are further proof of the literature's inability to arrive at a systematic definition of who

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[16] Aaron Wildavsky, _Leadership in a Small Town_ (Totowa, New Jersey: Bedminster Press, 1964), p. 8.

the power-holders are, how they can be identified, how they came to power, and how their power is ultimately exercised or neglected. Herbert Kaufman and Victor Jones have credited the very elusiveness of the concept for this development:

> There is an elusiveness about power that endows it with an almost ghostly quality. It seems to be all around us, yet this is "sensed" with some sixth means of reception rather than with the five ordinary senses. We "know" what it is, yet we encounter endless difficulties in trying to define it. We can "tell" whether one person or group is more powerful than another, yet we cannot measure power. It is as abstract as time yet as real as a firing squad.[17]

An even more graphic reason for the present state of confusion, however, lies in the fact that not only do these perspectives differ in terms of conceptual and theoretical underpinnings and in terms of preferred research strategies and methodologies, but that such differences have been elevated to the point of becoming ideological in nature.[18] The implications of each school are at such great odds with those of the other that research very often appears to be carried out more for the sake of defending a particular point of view than for purposes of scholarship and the pursuit of new knowledge. Thus, after having examined this literature and the recent attacks and counterattacks among proponents of each school, Thomas J. Anton observed that "the point has now been reached where studies are no longer undertaken to 'discover' and 'understand' the nature of political systems; they are undertaken to 'disprove' another man's theories, not in

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[17] Herbert Kaufman and Victor Jones, "The Mystery of Power," Public Administration Review, 14 (Summer, 1954), p. 205; quoted in Thomas R. Dye, Who's Running America, p. 11.

[18] Stephen P. Hencley, "The Study of Community Politics and Power," in Marilyn Gittell and Alan G. Hevesi (eds.), The Politics of Urban Education (New York: Praeger, 1969), 21-34; at p. 21.

a scientific sense, but in an ideological and political sense."[19]

The fact that each school differentially defines power and employs rather conflicting strategies in locating its source brings into question what must occur for one to say that power exists at any particular time and place. The definitions of power previously cited emphasize those situations in which there exists a confrontation between power-holder and person influenced; whereby the former compels the latter to behave in some manner he would not otherwise behave, and that to successfully control the activities of others the power-holder may activate his control of both positive and negative reinforcement schedules. Power relations of this sort are overt and thus directly observable.

However, there are power relations of the implicit variety in which there does not exist a direct confrontation between power-holder and person influenced. Although the overt exercise of power may be observed when one individual compels another to do something he would not otherwise do, what do we make of those instances when the party influenced freely cooperates with the will of the power holder? Individuals may very well comply with the will of others simply because they have been more or less indoctrinated to either desire or accept the norms, goals, and ideals of the power-holder. When power is viewed as the "production of intended effects,"[20] both categories of relations would involve a power-holder and a follower. Thus, as

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     Thomas J. Anton, "Rejoinder," Administrative Science Quarterly, 8 (September, 1963), p. 268; quoted in Hencley, The Study of Community Politics and Power, p. 21; also, see: T. J. Anton, "Power, Pluralism, and Local Politics," Administrative Science Quarterly, 7 (March, 1963), 425-457.
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     Bertrand Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis (London: Allen and Unwin, 1938), p. 35.

G. David Garson aptly noted, "... there is no clear line between overt power (in which the one influenced does what he or she would not otherwise do) and implicit power (in which the will of the power-holder is fulfilled because the one influenced has been indoctrinated, trained, or socialized to desire or accept the same goals as the power-holder)."[21] This being so, power may be present even though it is not overtly exercised. Indeed, it can be argued that the full weight of power is wielded and felt when it no longer needs to be overtly exercised because "the socialization into obedience is complete."[22]

Unlike overt power relations, which some contend can be studied directly through a decision-making approach (which seeks to locate the parties actively engaged in formulating public policies and who thus exercise a degree of power within the social system), the study of implicit power relies upon indirect measurements of power relations. Indirect measures, it is argued, tap the net effect of both overt and implicit power relations, reflects the effect of power over a multitude of decisions and social interactions, considers the exercise of power in the private sector, and, in sum, locates the "power behind the scenes." Further, it rests on the assumption that power-holders can be identified by (1) their reputations, and by (2) their institutional positions within the social, political, and economic systems.

As will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter, these three approaches differ not only methodologically, but ideologically as well.

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[21] G. David Garson, Power and Politics in the United States, p. 9.

[22] Ibid., p. 9.

Similarly, each approach embarks upon its own "self-fulfilling prophecy." That is, each school (1) begins with the assumption that an identifiable power structure (or structures) exists in American society, (2) defines the specific configuration of the structure(s), and (3) establishes a methodology for identifying the power-holders consistent with its theoretical underpinnings. It will be noted that those who perceive an elitist power structure in American society employ a methodological strategy naturally biased toward their theoretical commitments. Methodologically, this normally consists of indirect measures of power relations. Likewise, those ideologically committed to democratic pluralism utilize research strategies which are methodologically biased toward finding multiple power sources. This normally consists of identifying those elected decision-makers and interested individuals and groups with at least some voice in decision-making.

To this end, the sections which follow will look first at two perspectives and methodologies supportive of the elitist interpretation of politics and power in the United States (the reputational and the institutional) and one which finds evidence favoring democratic pluralism (the "power as decision-making" approach). The ultimate objective is to demonstrate how all such strategies are not only ideologically and methodologically biased but how each fails to analyze significant power relations in the governmental system. Especially evident is their failure to arrive at a measure of bureaucratic influence.

A. The Elitist Perspective

1. The Positional Approach

Prior to 1953 and the publication of Floyd Hunter's Community Power

Structure,[23] the positional approach was the most widely used technique

for identifying community power-holders.[24] In essence, when employing

this approach, researchers assume that those making key decisions direct-

ly or indirectly affecting the lives of most community residents are per-

sons occupying important offices or positions in the community; elected

political leaders, business executives, higher civil servants, officials

of voluntary associations, heads of religious groups, leaders of labor

unions, and others in positions of social prominence are all perceived

as holders of some degree of power in community political affairs. Meth-

odologically, the typical procedure has been to gather extensive lists

of formal positions of office, assign numerical values to each position

(as a weighted value of the degree of authority possessed by each), assign

the names of individuals holding each position, and compute the sum power

score of each individual representing the number of times his or her name

appears on the list and the level of authority of each position. Top

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[23]
        (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of N. Carolina Press,
1953).
        [24]
        Though Hunter's research added a new spark to the power literature,
positional assumptions have continued to receive extensive investigation.
For example, see: Robert O. Schulze and Leonard U. Blumberg, "The Deter-
minants of Local Power Elites," American Journal of Sociology, 63 (Nov.
1957), 290-296; Charles Freeman and Selz C. Mayo, "Decision Makers in Rural
Community Action," Social Forces, 35 (May, 1957), 319-322; Robert O.
Schulze, "The Role of Economic Dominants in Community Power Structures,"
American Sociological Review, 23 (Feb., 1958), 3-9; M. Kent Jennings, "Pub-
lic Administrators and Community Decision-Making," Administrative Science
Quarterly, 8 (June, 1963), No. 1, 18-43; and Thomas R. Dye, Who's Running
America: Institutional Leadership in the United States, passim.

leaders are then assumed to be those with the highest scores.

The institutional basis of power stems from the conviction that power is not an individual act, but rather the potential for control in any society that is obtained by occupying various roles in the social system. In this sense, power is viewed as a particular relationship between two or more persons in which one perceives the other as possessing the potential for exercising some control over his conduct. Thus one individual has power only to the extent that he has the capacity to effect his will on others, including the further requirement that such a capacity is perceived by others as a real possibility.

"Institutionalists" thus propose that, within any social system, power is simply the capacity of persons occupying certain roles to make decisions affecting the lives of others. Accordingly, Robert O. Schultze has reasoned that:

> ... a few have emphasized that act as such rather than the potential to act is the crucial aspect of power. It seems far more sociologically sound to accept a Weberian definition which stresses the potential to act. Power may thus be conceived as an inherently-linked property, an attribute of social statuses rather than of individual persons... Accordingly, power will denote the capacity or potential of persons in certain statuses to set conditions, make decisions, and/or take actions which are determinative for the existence of others within a given social system.[25]

Now, it is one thing to say that power-holders are those occupying certain roles and enjoying a certain status in the social system and quite another to specify the types of roles and statuses conducive to the exercise of power. Everyone occupies some type of role in society and each

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[25] Robert O. Schultze, "The Bifurcation of Power in a Satellite City," in Morris Janowitz, ed., Community Political Systems (Glencoe: Free Press, 1961), 19-80; at p. 20.

person has a certain status relative to the rest of the community, but not

everyone is in a position to make decisions affecting the lives of others.

For these reasons, institutionalists contend that power is an attribute of

social organizations, and that power-holders are those individuals occupy-

ing positions of authority in society's large institutions. And, although

not all power is institutionalized in the manner we have come to regard

the actions of such institutions as Congress, the Presidency, labor unions,

civic associations, religious organizations, private clubs, and the like,

C. Wright Mills has informed us that the truly significant power-roles are

found only in institutional positions.

> No one ... can be truly powerful unless he has access to the com-
> mand of major institutions, for it is over these institutional
> means of power that the truly powerful are, in the first instance,
> powerful.[26]

And, as Mills furthered reasoned, it is the position itself which makes a

man powerful, not any personal quality, ability or motivational character-

istic of the individual; remove the person from the position and his power

is lost:

> If we took the one hundred most powerful men in America, the one
> hundred wealthiest, and the one hundred most celebrated away from
> the institutional positions they now occupy, away from their re-
> sources of men and women and money, away from the media of mass
> communication...then they would be powerless and poor and uncele-
> brated. For power is not of a man. Wealth does not center in the
> person of the wealthy. Celebrity is not inherent in any person-
> ality. To be celebrated, to be wealthy, to have power, requires
> access to major institutions, for the institutional positions men
> occupy determine in large part their chances to have and to hold
> these valued experiences.[27]

In support of this perspective for understanding community power,

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[26] C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1956), p. 9.

[27] Mills, The Power Elite, p. 9.

and recognizing that institutional leadership is as inherent in the corpor-
ate and public interest sectors as it is in the governmental sector, Thomas
R. Dye has proposed three separate indicators of national power-holders.[28]
Operationally, elites representing each of the sectors are defined as fol-
lows:

Corporate Sector: those individuals who occupy formal posi-
tions of authority in institutions that
control over half of the nation's corpor-
ate assets.

Public Interest Sector: those individuals who occupy formal posi-
tions of authority in the mass media, the
prestigious law firms, the major philan-
thropic foundations, the leading universi-
ties, and the recognized national civic and
cultural organizations.

Governmental Sector: those individuals who occupy formal posi-
tions of authority in the major civilian
and military bureaucracies of the national
government.[29]

An across-the-board analysis of institutional leadership in both the
private and public sector examines potential sources of power within the
whole of the social system. Dye's three-tier operationalization of power
thus presents a more theoretically interesting and valid conceptualization
than that of earlier studies which focused primarily on governmental struc-
tures. Researchers employing the institutional approach thus start with
the basic assumption that key decisions affecting the lives of community
residents are made by persons in positions of authority outside the formal
political structure.

Strict adherence to the institutional approach is not without its

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[28]
Thomas R. Dye, Who's Running America? Institutional Leadership
in the United States (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1976).
[29]
Ibid., pp. 12-13.

critics. First, efforts to operationalize a concept as elusive as an institutional elite have generated discussions "over the inclusion or exclusion of specific actors, institutions, or positions."[30] The selection of units and elements of analysis often appear to be determined by the availability of data, apriori reasoning concerning the link between institutional leadership and community decision-making, and subjective judgments about the importance of some institutions, positions, and sectors over that of others. Secondly, the validity and utility of the positional approach has been criticized because of the variation in terminology employed by different associations in designating similar offices.[31] In order to generalize their findings across institutional boundaries researchers must concentrate on the responsibilities of each member of the organization, rather than on the specific titles given to top ranking members. When such is the case, misclassification becomes a real possibility. And, thirdly, when the relationship between institutional leadership and decision-making is tested as a hypothesis, rather than treated as an apriori assumption, research findings to date are at best inconclusive.[32] Whereas some studies appear to support the relationship, others contradict it. For these reasons, the institutional approach works best when used in

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[30] Dye, Who's Running America, p. 13.

[31] James E. White, "Theory and Method for Research in Community Leadership," American Sociological Review, 15 (February, 1950), 50-60.

[32] Support for the relationship is offered by James E. White, op. cit; Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, Small Town in Mass Society (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1960). Clearly contradicting this theory is Charles M. Bonjean, "Community Leadership: A Case Study and Conceptual Refinement," American Journal of Sociology, 68 (May, 1963), 672-681; Robert Presthus, Men at the Top: A Study in Community Power (NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 1964).

conjunction with the approaches discussed below.

For example, whereas the institutional approach concentrates on a person's capacity to exercise power because of the institutional position he or she occupies in the private or public sector of society, another approach, often termed the "sociology of leadership" approach, focuses instead on the social status of institutional leaders. Although both approaches start with assumptions relating position and power, the former concerns itself with the institutional position itself, while the latter concerns itself with the socioeconomic status of governing officials. Each, however, supports an elitist interpretation of politics and power in American communities.

Underlying the sociology of leadership approach is the assumption that the overt and implicit aspects of power can both best be indicated by the manner in which top office-holders are relatively concentrated or dispersed within institutional arrangements on the basis of social class. If power is concentrated in the hands of the upper class, as indicated by the number of socioeconomic notables within the political institutional framework, then the distribution of power may be viewed as elitist. If, however, no such relationship is found between official governmental position and social class, then the power distribution more closely follows the pluralist model. Thus the precise configuration of power structures is determined by the social characteristics of decision-makers.

Although the ordinary citizen would most likely suggest that American politics in general and his city's political structure in particular is fully dominated by upper-class influentials, such opinions may result from a perception of an inequitable distribution of government benefits to a

minority of citizens or from a belief in the numerical superiority of public officials from the upper socioeconomic strata. The sociology of leadership approach, as an indirect measure of the location of political power in American society, seeks to find empirical support for its theoretical (if not ideological) commitments by first identifying the members of the upper class, and, secondly, by locating their positions in the political, economic, and social hierarchy.

Although various studies by David Stanley, Dean Mann, and Jameson Doig,[33] Thomas R. Dye,[34] and Robert Presthus[35] have shown that it is the upper-middle, as opposed to the upper, class that is disproportionately represented in the formal positions of government, the institutional structure is nonetheless unrepresentative of American society at large. In addition, though these studies took some of the spark out of the elitist contention that upper class persons fully dominate the American political system, researchers have still been able to use a hybrid of the sociology of leadership approach to support the elitist argument. This is most evident when researchers focus not on the social position of those holding political office, but on the relationship between class origin and political recruiting patterns. C. Wright Mills, for example, has questioned the validity of the traditional image of the political career pattern which maintains that top governing officials begin their political careers on the local level and proceed through a number of intermediate positions

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[33] Men Who Govern (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1967), pp. 78-79.

[34] Dye, Who's Running America, op. cit.

[35] Presthus, Elites in the Policy Process (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

before obtaining national-level leadership.[36] Instead, Mills found that

top leaders ordinarily surface from business and upper-class backgrounds.

In fact, of the top fifty governmental leaders (president, vice-president,

cabinet members, major agency heads, and top presidential advisers) during

the Eisenhower administration, only 6 percent were professional politi-

cians.[37] Of the remainder, clearly 75 percent of the political outsiders

were linked with the corporate sector.[38] Elitists interpreted such find-

ings as undisputable evidence of the relationship between social class and

the degree to which one shares in the distribution of political power.

Thus the higher the social class, the greater is one's ability to share

in and influence the making of governmental decisions.

This oft-cited link between social class and political power is not,

however, without its detractors.[39] It may be suggested that the sociology

of leadership approach is too indirect an indicator of power. Does it real-

ly make a difference if upper-class persons hold a disproportionate number

of social, economic, and political leadership positions in terms of the

policy activities of local or national decision-makers? Although top lead-

ers may be unrepresentative of the class structure of American society,

they may nonetheless formulate policies on the basis of societal needs,

rather than on the basis of personal attributes and preferences. Noting

the inherent limitations of an approach he himself has practiced, C. Wright

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[36] Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).

[37] Ibid., p. 232.

[38] Ibid.

[39] For example, see: John Mollenkopf, "Theories of the State and Power Structure Research," The Insurgent Sociologist, 5 (Spring, 1975), 245-264.

Mills has set forth with clarity the following precaution:

> We cannot infer the direction of policy merely from the social ori-
> gins and careers of the policy-makers. The social and economic
> backgrounds of the men of power do not tell us all that we need to
> know in order to understand the distribution of social power. For:
> (1) Men from high places may be ideological representatives of the
> poor and humble. (2) Men of humble origin, brightly self-made, may
> energetically serve the most vested and inherited interests. More-
> over, (3) not all men who effectively represent the interests of a
> stratum need in any way belong to it.
> For the most important set of facts about a circle of men is the
> criteria of admission, of praise, of honor, of promotion that pre-
> vails among them; if these are similar within a circle, then they
> will tend as personalities to become similar. The circles that com-
> pose the power elite do tend to have such codes and criteria in com-
> mon. The co-optation of the social types to which these common val-
> ues lead is often more important than any statistic of common origin
> and career that we might have at hand.[40]

Thus, although the sociology of leadership approach sets forth evi-

dence supportive of an elite theory of American politics, even practicing

proponents of this view (such as Mills) note the qualifications one must

be willing to make when social class is found to be related to decision-

making roles. Even if it is true that top institutional positions are oc-

cupied by upper-class individuals, it cannot be inferred that the activities

of these institutions are class biased. In order to do so, it must be fur-

ther shown that (1) public policy favors the upper-class minority, (2) class

is determinative of political beliefs and practices, and that (3) other

decision-makers are co-opted by upper-class influentials. The sociology of

leadership approach does not provide evidence completely supporting any of

these propositions.[41]

Finally, the sociology of leadership approach fails to adequately

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[40] Mills, The Power Elite, pp. 280-281.

[41] These criticisms are cryptically discussed in G. David Garson,
Power and Politics in the United States, p. 170.

document an elite theory of American politics primarily because, although numerous, upper-class influentials are a minority of top decision-makers. Much more numerous are those upper-middle and middle-class professionals (lawyers, administrators, career bureaucrats, and professional politicians) who may or may not be co-opted or socialized representatives of a social or economic elite. This is however an empirical question in need of systematic analysis of how problems are perceived and defined, the manner in which certain issues reach the policy agenda, who is involved in formulating the policy response to the problem, what policy objectives are ultimately established, what individual or body of individuals are assigned the responsibility of program implementation, and how does the consequences of their activities square with that intended by the policy-makers?

Although socioeconomic notables have a greater likelihood of attaining top levels of decision-making than any other class of individuals, (thereby placing them in potentially powerful roles) this alone does not infer that they are, in fact, the truly powerful. Thus, Floyd Hunter, for one, has proposed an alternative methodological approach focusing not on institutional positions or social backgrounds, but rather on the reputations certain persons acquire for having the capability of exercising control over the policy process.[42] Although Hunter has come to conclusions consistent with elitist interpretations of the institutional and sociology of leadership approaches, the theoretical and methodological components of his reputational model have generated such debate between the elitist and pluralist schools of thought that it warrants a significantly more in-depth analysis.

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[42] Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1953).

2. The Reputational Approach

Like so many other professionals and policy analysts in the late
1940's and early 1950's who had become greatly concerned with both the
inability of policy-makers to develop workable programs of civic improve-
ment and with the great influx of "nonpolitical experts" in the decision-
making process, Floyd Hunter began to reflect upon the much debated ques-
tion: "who really runs our cities?" Recognizing the inability of tradi-
tional investigations of formal institutions and agencies of local govern-
ment to account for the growing influence of political outsiders on policy
decisions affecting the lives of community residents, Hunter sought some
means by which the "power behind the scenes" could be identified. Although
other researchers used a similar technique to study positions of status,[43]
Hunter was the first to use the reputational approach in a study of com-
munity power. His analysis in turn did much to popularize the elite theory
of American politics.

Defining power as a word "used to describe the acts of men going
about the business of moving other men to act in relation to themselves
or in relation to organic or inorganic things," and as "the ability of men
to command the services of other men," Hunter proceeded to identify those
roles that were both salient and centrally involved in determining the policy
activities of "Regional City" (Atlanta, Georgia).[44] Starting with the as-
sumption that the affairs of every city are in some way managed by a select

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[43] For example: August B. Hollingshead, Elmtown's Youth (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1949); and Lloyd W. Warner, et. al., op. cit.
[44] Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure, pp. 2, 4.

few who are perceived by others as capable of exercising power either directly or indirectly within the community, Hunter hypothesized that such individuals must eventually acquire a reputation for power. One's reputation thus becomes the identifying factor.

Although this approach has several variations, essentially it consists of asking certain informants to name and rank the power-holders in their community.[45] The informants may be an expert panel or a random sample of community residents, or they may be selected by what is referred to as the "snowball" technique. The final list of reputed power-holders then consists of those persons receiving the greatest number of nominations or of all persons whose average ranking exceeds an arbitrarily set limit.

Methodologically, Hunter took it as axiomatic that "community life is organized life, and that persons occupying 'offices' and public positions of trust would be involved in some manner in the power relations of the community."[46] Thus by interviewing the top leaders in major organizations Hunter was able to formulate a preliminary sketch of institutionalized power relations. However, since this preliminary sketch neglected the influence of persons outside the normal organizational chain of command, Hunter sought a comprehensive list of reputed civic, governmental, business, and status leaders in Regional City. For this purpose, preliminary lists were provided by the Community Council, the Chamber of Commerce, the League of Women voters, newspaper editors, and civic leaders. The Community

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[45] For a sample of studies that have employed the reputational approach exclusively or in combination with another approach, see: Hunter, Community Power Structure; Schulze and Blumberg, op. cit.; M. Kent Jennings, op. cit.; Freeman and Mayo, op. cit.

[46] Hunter, Community Power Structure, p. 263.

Council provided preliminary lists of leaders in community affairs. The Chamber of Commerce provided lists of business leaders of establishments employing more than 500 employees and of financial houses doing the largest volume of clearances. The League of Women Voters provided a list of local political officials with at least major governmental committee chairman-ship status. And newspaper editors and other civic leaders provided information about society leaders and leaders of wealth.[47] In all, 175 potential leaders were identified by three preliminary lists.

In order to reduce the four preliminary lists to the top leaders in each area, fourteen judges were employed to rank order the top ten leaders in each category. And, finally, a prepared interview schedule was administered to the twenty-three consenting persons of the list of forty.[48] One of the objectives of the interviewing was to elicit from the 40 reputed power-holders a final list of those persons (who may or may not have been included in the list of 40) they perceived to be the true leaders in the community.

Of the final list of 40, it was disclosed that eleven served in top positions of private enterprise (such as owners, chairmen of the board, or presidents in large commercial centers), seven in banking and investment firms, and five in industrial companies. Hunter thus concluded that "the dominant factor in political life is the personnel of economic interests." And that, in fact, governmental departments are essentially subservient to the combined interests of economic elites.

[47] Hunter, Community Power Structure, especially pp. 262-271.
[48] The properties of this schedule are presented in Hunter, op. cit., pp. 262-271.

It is true that there is no formal tie between the economic inter-
ests and government, but the structure of policy-determining com-
mittees and their tie-in with the other powerful institutions and
organizations of the community make government subservient to the
interests of these combined groups. The governmental departments
and their personnel are acutely aware of the power of key individ-
uals and combinations of citizens' groups in the policy-making
realm, and they are loathe to act before consulting and "clearing"
with these interests.
    ... The structure is that of a dominant policy-making group
using the machinery of government as a bureaucracy for the attain-
ment of certain goals.[49]

These are men and women of "dominance, prestige and influence," the deci-

sion-makers for the total community, "able to enforce their decisions by

persuasion, intimidation, coercion, and, if necessary, force."[50]

By examining the impression knowledgeable people have about the

power-holders in their community, the reputational approach seeks to un-

cover what many refer to as the "power behind the scenes." That is, it

is designed to identify those individuals exercising power who are not

visible within the institutional and social class perspectives. However,

like the institutional and sociology of leadership approaches, Hunter's

preferred methodology starts with the assumption that a certain elite dom-

inates the total life of the community and then constructs a procedure

for identifying such persons methodologically biased toward "proving" the

initial assumption. And even if one accepts his dictum that institutions

and formal associations play a "vital role in the execution of determined

policy," but that the "formulation of policy often takes place outside

these formalized groupings,"[51] Hunter's methodology does not allow him to

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[49]. Ibid., p. 102.

[50] Ibid., p. 24.

[51] Ibid., p. 82.

infer any more than that those persons outside institutions and formal associations are <u>perceived</u> by others as "powerful." Leadership and the reputation for leadership may not at all times be synonymous.

Because this method of inquiry tends to support the belief that elected representatives are dominated by the interests of an economic superstructure, it runs counter to the traditional democratic pluralist ideology. In brief, pluralists have questioned the validity of the reputational method on five specific points.

First, in employing the reputational methodology, Hunter takes for granted precisely what he should have set out to prove, namely: Regional City exhibits a monolithic power structure. By asking people "what persons dominate community affairs," "what are these people like," and "what contacts do they have with each other," Hunter assumes that his initial assumption of a ruling elite had already been established. This practice predetermined his findings and subsequent conclusions.[52]

Second, there is no assurance that persons will be nominated because of their reputation for power, rather than for their publicized status in the community. There is no reason to suppose that power figures and status figures are one and the same.

Third, since ordinary citizens are usually ill-equipped to speak with complete knowledge about actual power systems in communities, their responses are problematic and may not represent "anything more than a report

[52] Herbert Kaufman and Victor Jones, "The Mystery of Power," <u>Public Administration Review</u>, 14 (Summer, 1954), No. 3, 205-212; and Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," <u>American Political Science Review</u>, 52 (June, 1958), 463-469.

[53] Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model;" and Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of Community Power," <u>American Sociological Review</u>, 25 (December, 1960), 636-644.

of public opinion on politics."[54] The relationship between perceptions
and actual behavior must be empirically determined, rather than presumed.

Fourth, even if we could reasonably assume a high correlation between
power and the reputation for power per se, the reputational approach may
not reliably identify leaders because of (1) the unreliability of respond-
ents, (2) varying conceptions of power held by the interviewer and re-
spondent, and (3) the discretion accorded the researcher in establishing
the manner in which final rankings are tabulated and divided into power
and non-power holders. If the cut off point is set too high, many leaders
may be omitted. And if set too low, the final rank-ordered list may in-
clude followers as well as leaders.[55]

Fifth, by failing to "specify scopes in soliciting reputations for
influence," reputational researchers "assume that the power of their leader-
nominees is equal for all issues."[56] This is, however, an empirical ques-
tion which demands that analysts carefully examine a series of concrete
decisions and note (1) the actors involved in the decision-making process,
(2) the interactions among actors, and (3) the constancy of participation
across issue boundaries.[57]

Thus, although the reputational approach may identify a group that
possesses a high potential for control, a major contention of pluralists
is that it does not distinguish potential from actual power relations. To

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[54] Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of Community
Power," p. 642.

[55] Bonjean and Olson, op. cit., at p. 205. For a discussion of
each of these criticisms see Wolfinger, op. cit.

[56] Nelson W. Polsby, "Three Problems in the Analysis of Power,"
American Political Science Review, 24 (December, 1959), 796-803; at p. 797.

[57] See Part B: The Pluralist Perspective - discussed at length below.

do so requires that researchers concentrate on the manner in which coalitions are formed and decisions actually made in the policy environment.

And finally, to the criticisms advanced by pluralists, students of public administration have been quick to note that the reputational approach has seriously underestimated the role played by the bureaucratic substructure.[58] In particular, they have objected to Hunter's assertion that once consensus is reached among the ruling elite concerning the direction of community activities, the struggle for control of policy development is complete. Hunter thus mistakenly assumes that once programs are established and passed along to administrators, what follows is a simple process of abiding by directions. However, our major point of contention is that the power to implement policy is the power to make, or otherwise modify, policy. One can further argue that since the innovating ideas for many social welfare programs and community improvement projects come from experts in national, state, and local bureaucracies, administrators and career bureaucrats are the invisible power-holders that even reputationalists fail to uncover. Thus, let us now turn to see if pluralist assumptions and methodologies fair any better.

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[58] See, Kaufman and Jones, "The Mystery of Power," especially Part III, pp. 209-210.

B. The Pluralist Perspective:

The "Decisional" or "Event Analysis" Approach

Nelson Polsby, in a powerful critique of the elitist theory of strat-ification, has maintained that essentially five propositions characterize such approaches to the study of power in American communities: (1) the up-per class rules in the life of local communities; (2) political and civic leaders are subordinate to upper class influentials; (3) a single "power-elite" rules in the community; (4) this upper class power elite rules in its own interests; and (5) social conflict takes place between upper and lower social classes.[59] If one was to accept the institutional and socio-logy of leadership approaches as empirically verifiable theories of com-munity power merely because the former links power with institutional re-sources and potentialities, and because the latter relates social class origin to the numerical superiority of upper class professionals in top leadership positions, they would be hard pressed to prove that institutional position and class composition alone determine the distribution of govern-ment services and benefits. Even if institutional position and social class origin are regarded as potentially valuable resources of power, one must be attuned to the distinction between the possession of a resource and the actual exercise of that for which it is a resource, namely, power.

In a similar vein, Robert Dahl, in an attack which specifically ob-jected to the methodology of Floyd Hunter and C. Wright Mills, has expressed dissatisfaction with an approach that allows the researcher to "infinitely

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[59] Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).

regress" in the face of empirical evidence to the contrary. And that:

> whatever else it may be, a theory that cannot even in principle
> be controverted by empirical evidence is not a scientific theory.
> The least that we can demand of any ruling elite theory that pur-
> ports to be more than a metaphysical or polemical doctrine is,
> first that the burden of proof be on the proponents of the theory
> and not on its critics; and, second, that there be a clear criteria
> according to which the theory could be disproved.[60]

The model of a ruling elite was thus criticized, first for failing to dis-
tinguish between resources of power (e.g., institutional leadership, so-
cial class origins, and reputation) and power itself, and, secondly, for
neglecting to consider power in its situational aspects.

The alternative view by Dahl and others of the pluralist persuasion
is that although social and economic elites have greater influence over
city governmental decision-making than the average citizen, they do not
fully dominate city politics. Rather, the community power structure is
essentially pluralistic, whereby power is widely dispersed among a number
of decision-makers, and in which economic elites,

> far from being a ruling group, are simply one of the many groups out
> of which individuals sporadically emerge to influence the policies
> and acts of city officials. Almost anything one might say about the
> influence of the Economic Notables could be said with equal justice
> about a half dozen other groups in the community. Sometimes the
> notables have their way and sometimes they do not.[61]

In his study of power relations in New Haven, Dahl employed what is
commonly referred to as the decisional approach. Essentially this approach
involves tracing the actions of leaders in regard to decision-making within

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[60] Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," p. 463.

[61] Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American
City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 72. Although this study
represents the classic example of the decisional approach, other equally
important statements of the pluralist perspective can be found in the vari-
ous studies cited in FN # 62.

the context of specific issues.[62] Pluralists thus claim that only by
tracing the historical development of community decisions on political
issues (via extensive interviews, attendance at organizational and commit-
tee meetings, speeches, newspaper accounts, and so on) can one hope to
show evidence of a ruling elite. Institutional leadership, social class
origin, and reputations do not guarantee control. Consequently, Dahl and
other pluralists prefer methodologies designed to identify overt power
rather than power potential.

Underlying decisional analysis is the first and perhaps most funda-
mental presupposition of the pluralist perspective which states that "no-
thing categorical can be assumed about power in the community."[63] Instead
the stratification thesis (stating that some elite group necessarily dom-
inates a community) is rejected and substituted with the assumption that
"at bottom nobody dominates in a town."[64] With the matter of whether or
not anyone at all dominates community affairs open to question, pluralists
attempt to study specific outcomes of community conflict (as evidenced in
particular patterns of decision-making), in order to determine whose will
actually prevails in community decision-making.

For example, in applying decisional analysis to power relations in

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[62] Studies employing this approach include: Dahl, op. cit.; Elaine
Burgess, Negro Leadership in a Southern City (Chapel Hill, N. C.: Univer-
sity of North Carolina Press, 1960); Warner Bloomberg, Jr., and Morris
Sunshine, Suburban Power Structures and Public Education (Syracuse, New
York: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1963); Robert Presthus, Men At the Top: A Study
in Community Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); and Benjamin
Walter, "Political Decision-Making in Arcadia," in F. Stuart Chapin, Jr.
and Shirley F. Weiss, eds., Urban Growth Dynamics (NY: Wiley, 1962), 141-87.

[63] Nelson W. Polsby, "How To Study Community Power: The Pluralist
Alternative," Journal of Politics, 22 (August, 1960), 474-484; at p. 474.

[64] Ibid., p. 475.

the New Haven community, Dahl reconstructed the historical development of
what he perceived to be the most significant decisions.[65] Included in his
analysis were eight major decisions in the New Haven Redevelopment program
(which was at that time the largest in the country when measured by out-
lay per capita), eight in the area of public education (which was the most
costly item on the city's budget), and the nominations by the two political
parties for seven elections. After having gathered data via extensive in-
terviews, attendance at organizational and committee meetings, reconstruc-
tion of newspaper accounts, and on-the-spot analysis of individual behavior
(which was aided by the placement of interns in "strategic locations"),
Dahl found that power was widely dispersed throughout the community, with
no single group dominating each and every policy decision. Instead, con-
trary to stratification theory's presumption that power relations are a
more or less permanent aspect of social structure, Dahl noted that power
relations in New Haven are tied to issues. Since issues may be persistent
or ever-changing, power relations may easily change in their permanency.
And, furthermore, Dahl found that even those notables exhibiting at least
some influence, did so in no more than a single issue area; no single so-
cial or economic notable proved so influential that his/her will dominated
different decision processes. And of the persons who did appear to influ-
ence the whole of the policy process, not one was a social or economic
notable. All such individuals were elected or appointed city officials.

Although it is comforting to learn that the stratification theory of

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[65] Dahl, _Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City_, _pas-
sim_. For a description of how particular issues are selected for study,
see: Nelson W. Polsby, "How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Al-
ternative, esp., pp. 474-484.

elite dominance may not be all that valid, and that the policy process receives input from a varying number of groups and individuals, many contend that much less can be derived from the study of community decisions in issue areas than "decisional analysts" or pluralists suggest.[66] In fact, it has been proposed that decisional methodologies are deficient in at least six areas.[67]

First, "pluralists misunderstand the way influence expresses itself in the community."[68] That is to say, although the exercise of power can be detected when competing groups struggle for acceptance of their particular views, the values and policy preferences of the elite are transmitted to nonelites by a conscious and unconscious "mobilization of bias."[69] By creating the false impression that they share the same values as other community residents, elites are able to block many issues from becoming public problems in need of government action. This particular exercise of power will not then surface in the decision-making process.

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[66] For a cryptic analysis of research critical of the decisional approach, see: Richard M. Merelman, "On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power, _American Political Science Review,_ 62 (June, 1968), 451-60. Studies representative of this perspective include: Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," _American Political Science Review,_ 56 (Dec., 1962), 947-52; Bachrach and Baratz, "Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytic Framework," _American Political Science Review,_ 57 (September, 1963), 632-642, and _Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice_ (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); E.E. Schattschneider, _The Semisovereign People_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960); and Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, _Small Town in Mass Society_ (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960). These views will be discussed in greater length in the conclusion to this chapter.

[67] See, especially those sources cited in FN # 66; and Bonjean and Olson, _op. cit._, pp. 284-286.

[68] Merelman, _op. cit._, p. 452.

[69] Schattschneider, _op. cit._, chapters i-iii, et. _passim._

Second, "pluralists are most successful in assessing power when conflict is occurring."[70] However, when individuals perceive that they have little chance of winning a direct confrontation with the "powerful," they will refrain from raising issues for consideration. Thus there is "no conflict, no visible issue, and no decision."[71] Under these conditions, the decisional method is of little or no utility.

Third, "pluralists unduly stress decisions made in the governmental realm."[72] Even if issues are initiated, they may still be blocked from reaching the stage of governmental decision-making. And, even if issues are decided upon, various administrative constraints may prevent the execution of the decision. Power is as much a part of execution as it is of issue initiation and policy formulation. Unfortunately, decisional analysis treats power relations as if confined solely to the policy-making process.

Fourth, given the fact that decisional analysts seek to identify overt power relations (and thus confine their attention to stages of issue initiation and policy formulation), they are hard pressed to justify the starting place for their investigation. If they assume that power-holders can be identified by observing committee meetings and sessions of the executive council, they are, in effect, accepting the same relationship between leadership positions and decision-making common to the institutional approach. Since they have no way of determining in advance whether or not decisions had been informally made prior to these formal meetings, they cannot legitimately infer that organization members, councilmen, and

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70 Merelman, op. cit., p. 452.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.

other participants are the real power-holders. And, if interviews are conducted to identify informal influences, decisional analysts are susceptible to the same criticisms levied against reputationalists.

Fifth, since no study can investigate the historical development of all issues and decisions, or identify the actors in each issue and decision area, decisional analysts must select specific cases for analysis. Whereas some single out what they consider to be the "most important" cases for analysis, others follow the preference of reputationalists in eliciting the judgment of community residents or "expert" informants. A degree of uncontrollable subjectivity is inherent in each.

And, sixth, decisional analysis may require a substantial time investment, or (as in the case of Dahl's New Haven) the assistance of a collaborator with access to "highly strategic locations."[73] The study of decision-making patterns may therefore be limited to single community case studies, rather than comparative analyses across communities and issue areas. For these reasons, a multifaceted analysis encompassing aspects of each of the alternative approaches are of greater utility than any one taken alone. And, then, if and only if researchers remove their professional and ideological predispositions and their methodological blinders which commit them to an almost unwavering attachment to power relations within the policy-making process, and proceed to measure the influence of policy administrators (who are normally considered outside the traditional channels of policy-making) can even multiple approaches be of any avail.

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[73] Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City, p. vi.

CONCLUSION

Methods of Studying Community Power:
An Appraisal and Proposed Alternative

How does one go about reconciling the competing conclusions drawn by
the institutional, sociology of leadership (positional), and reputational
approaches, which tend to uncover an elite dominating community affairs,
and the decisional approach, which creates the impression of a pluralistic
power distribution? Do the power structures of Regional City (Atlanta)
and New Haven differ as significantly as Hunter's and Dahl's analyses con-
clude, or are the research findings simply an artifact of the methodologies
employed? Would findings be significantly different if both cities were
restudied using an alternative method of analysis. Probably so. In fact,
research findings are often a function of the research design and mode of
instrumentation. Whereas available evidence indicates that the institu-
tional approach tends to emphasize the power inherent in organized bodies
and the significant influence of persons of leadership status, a reputational
approach tends to identify a monolithic power structure composed of persons
of notoreity, a positional approach uncovers a presumed link between social
class and decision-making, and a decisional analysis ultimately leads to
the finding of a democratically pluralist community power structure. How-
ever, as Robert Presthus demonstrated in his analysis of two cities in New
York, studies employing some combination of alternative strategies indicate
that each separate approach tends to locate the sources of power in a
relatively small number of persons.[74]

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[74] Robert Presthus, Men at the Top: A Study in Community Power
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), passim.

It is clearly evident that studies employing the institutional approach start with the assumption that power is an attribute os social institutions, and that power-holders are those persons occupying positions of authority in society's large institutions. Although it seems reasonable to expect to find persons in roles of institutional leadership wielding a significant degree of control over community decision-making, this is an assumption to be tested rather than a statement of fact. In fact, systematic analysis may very well uncover that institutional leaders are merely carrying out the preferences of persons not normally included in formal membership and leadership roles.

Equally deficient is the notion that social class representation is an adequate indicator of community power. What does it mean to say that American politics is dominated by a ruling elite comprised primarily of members of the upper class? Is this upper class elite formulating policies congruent with its own self-interest, or is it one that acts on the basis of some utilitarian conception of the role of government? Are these elite (or upper class) values transmitted to upper-middle and middle-class professionals, or is class and decision-making unrelated. Since it is often difficult to discover the intentions of this elite, it is relatively impossible to state with any degree of certainty that they are exercising power or merely carrying out the will of the majority. And, further, could it not be suggested that an upper class elite assumes leadership on the basis of merit, education, ability, and overall qualifications necessary for positions of authority, which may be taken as attributes of the upper strata but not divided and controlled by considerations of social class.

It is equally clear that studies employing the reputational approach

tend to select persons who are perceived by others as being influential because of their wealth, prestige, position, and/or visibility in the community. However, merely because an individual is a social or economic notable does not necessarily imply that he/she is actually powerful in settling conflicts or in allocating resources in the community. It may even be that the opposite holds true: social and economic notables may intentionally avoid political participation for the sake of personal and business-related interests. The underlying reason why social and economic notables often appear to be the centers of power in a community when influentials are identified by the reputational approach may simply reflect the prestige we assign to persons of high status.

Although position, social class, and reputation may serve as indirect indicators of power, they are not equivalent to its possession. These attributes may place persons in situations where they have the potential for control, but we cannot assume that the supposed connections necessarily hold true. Instead, many researchers have advocated an approach designed to identify those persons actively engaged in community decision-making. However, this approach, too, is not without its limitations.

Although the decisional approach notes the distinction between actual and potential power, it too fails to consider power in all of its manifestations. Though correct in observing that a person may possess a great many resources that could possibly place him/her in a position to exercise a degree of potential power and yet still not demonstrate an outward expression of this resource, power may be exercised in a manner other than participation in the decision-making process. Further, as Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz have suggested, the decisional methods of the pluralists

concentrate solely on those instances in which they are able to select significant decisional issue-areas for study, and thus neglect those situations in which decision-makers fail to get involved.[75] Since the decisional approach as employed by Dahl sought to gauge the relative power of political actors on the basis of their ability to initiate and veto proposals, these critics charge that the power inherent in limiting the scope of initiation was ignored. Through the context of a "mobilization of bias," decision-makers can thwart latent or manifest changes to the status quo. Thus by utilizing an existing bias of the political system (such as a precedent, a rule, a norm, or a procedure), it is possible for power to be exercised in the form of "nondecision-making." Nondecision-making, as an exercise of power to thwart change seekers, may be exercised both overtly and covertly, ranging from force, to intimidation (i.e., potential deprivation of valued things), to co-option (i.e., potential rewards).[76] In order to account for this other "face of power," researchers

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[75] These views are expressed in three specific works. See, Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review, 56 (December, 1962), 947-52; Bachrach and Baratz, "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework," American Political Science Review, 57 (September, 1963), 632-42; and Bachrach and Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970). Also, for a critique and defense of their views, see: Geoffrey Debnam, "Nondecisions and Power: The Two Faces of Bachrach and Baratz," American Political Science Review, 69 (September, 1975), No. 3, 889-99; Pater Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Power and its Two Faces Revisited: A Reply to Geoffrey Debnam," in the same issue, 900-04; and Geoffrey Debnam, "Rejoinder to 'Comment' by Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz," in the same issue, 905-07.

[76] Bachrach and Baratz, "Power and its Two Faces Revisited," p. 900; and Bachrach and Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice, pp. 47-51.
Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A.
(See, Bachrach and Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," p. 951.

would need to employ a new approach to identifying community power struc-

tures:

> Under this approach the researcher would begin - not, as does the
> sociologist who asks, "Does anyone have power?" - but by investi-
> gating the particular "mobilization of bias" in the institution
> under scrutiny. Then, having analyzed the dominant values, the
> myths and the established political procedures and rules of the
> game, he would make a careful inquiry in which persons or groups,
> if any, gain from the existing bias and which, if any, are handi-
> capped by it. Next, he would investigate the dynamics of nondeci-
> sion-making, that is, he would examine the extent to which and the
> manner in which the status quo oriented persons and groups influ-
> ence those community values and those political institutions which
> tend to limit the scope of actual decision-making to safe issues.[77]

There is a further methodological problem inherent in the decisional

approach which goes beyond its failure to consider aspects of nondecision-

making, and which can also be directed toward the other approaches thus

far examined. As pointedly expressed by Nelson Polsby and repeatedly em-

phasized by Robert Dahl, the central question this approach addresses is

"How can one tell, after all, whether or not an actor is powerful unless

some sequence or event, completely observed, attests to his power?"[78] The

problem lies not so much with the question as it does with the boundaries

established for observation. According to the pluralists, if we were to

look at the sequential pattern of issue identification and policy formula-

tion, we would find that different persons have a stake in different con-

flicts and/or community issues. It would thus appear that there does not

exist one unitary attentive public that engages in the making of policy

for each and every area, and that "virtually no one, and certainly no group

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[77] Bachrach and Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," p. 951.

[78] Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory, p. 60.
Also, see Robert Dahl, Who Governs, passim.

of more than a few individuals, is entirely lacking in some influence re-
source."[79] However, by focusing on conflict situations within the decision-
making process, or on the reputations acquired by persons perceived to be
important in setting the political agenda, or on the class composition of
members of top leadership, or on persons in roles of institutional leader-
ship, political scientists have disproportionately examined the politics
of issue initiation and policy formulation at the expense of other aspects
of the policy process. Research has thus tended to underestimate the power
resources of other actors in the process.

If "power-holders" or "community influentials" are viewed simply as
those individuals directly engaged or perceived to be engaged in the process
of setting the political agenda and in formulating public policies, is power
no longer held and exercised after the initial making of policy? Are the
individuals authorized to implement the policy decisions of city governmen-
tal officials simply carrying out the expressed will of the powerful and
therefore relatively powerless in and of themselves? Both responses, we
contend, must be made in the negative. Various forms of political power
may be (and are) exercised as much, if not more, after policies receive
their initial formulation as they are before and during their stages of
development. And the administrative branch, we further contend, exercises
varying degrees of power during each developmental stage of policy formu-
lation and program implementation. By broadening the focus to include
those events and actors within the implementation process, the role of
the bureaucrat and his/her institutional setting can be further appreciated.

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[79] Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?, p. 228.

As an initial step in such an analysis, the political, technical, and organizational resources of public bureaucracies warrant a further note of elaboration.

CHAPTER IV

BUREAUCRACY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLICY PERFORMANCE

In the two preceding chapters we sought to show, first, the over-
riding concern of political scientists in explicating the processes of
issue identification and policy formulation and, second, to propose that
the dominant approaches employed in the study of community power struc-
tures are both ideologically and methodologically biased and deficient
in drawing the needed distinction between policy outputs and policy per-
formance. They thus fail to detail adequately how policy decisions are
transformed into public services, and consequently neglect to consider
the potential and actual power resources of those actors responsible for
applying and implementing the policy objectives of urban governments.

Further, if policy is defined in the narrow sense as a "projected
program of goal values and practices,"[1] it may be legitimate to focus on
how policies are formulated and on the actors engaged in the process of
establishing the objectives of government activities as a way of identify-
ing the power-holders in community affairs. However, the question we pose
is whether the power-holders are solely those individuals who actively
participate in the struggle over the establishment of governmental pri-
orities, as evidenced in the politics of policy formulation. Or is it
more meaningful to speak of policy as a "purposive course of action or

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[1] Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, _Power and Society_ (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1950), p. 71.

or inaction followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem of concern."[2] If the latter conceptualization is adopted, as we think it should be, then power must be broadened to include consideration of those responsible for applying policy to a given situation, and who thereby influence the net impact (i.e., performance) of the policy on an intended target. In applying or implementing the policy decisions of elected officials, policy administrators substantially modify, elaborate upon, or even negate the content of policy and its impact on those affected. Since administrators do not always apply precisely what legislators or other policy adopters decide, intentions and performance may be substantially dissimilar. Since policy administrators can ultimately make policy in the process of implementation, the policy process cannot be fully comprehended without considering the power capacity of public bureaucracies.

Although one would expect these views to be self-evident, determinants analyses and community power studies have essentially ignored the so-called "administrative" functions of the bureaucrat in favor of the "political" activities of elected officials. These studies have thus failed to take advantage of an extensive body of theoretical and case-study material emphasizing the fact that an ever-increasing proportion of policy decisions are being made by public bureaucracies. In general, elected officials frequently do not possess the time, information, interest, or expertise necessary to deal with complex social, economic, or technical issues. And even when legislators do possess the necessary time, knowledge,

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[2] James E. Anderson, Public Policy-Making (New York: Praeger Publishing Company, 1975), p. 3.

and technical sophistication to rationally confront community issues, the legislative body itself may be divided over the course of action to follow in resolving perceived problems. Due to the degree of legislative conflict present whenever competing interests seek to have particular views ultimately adopted, agreement can be reached only by leaving some matters essentially nebulous and unsettled. Furthermore, many policy decisions must be made that elected officials may consider politically unfeasible. This is especially evident in issue areas where elected officials risk alienating a significant proportion of their constituencies regardless of which alternative strategy they select. And some issues do not receive the concentrated attention of elected officials because their constituents are so indifferent to the outcome that there is no "political payoff" to be gained from addressing the problem. Under such conditions, elected officials have been inclined to delegate substantial policy-making responsibility to administrative agencies.[3] Unfortunately, this development has been slighted by most features of determinants analysis and studies of community power structures.

Although some form of power is unmistakably exercised whenever policy decisions are made by administrative bodies, it is evident that bureaucratic specialization grants ranking administrators a high degree of influence in structuring agendas and defining alternatives for elected officials. What is not so evident, however, is that even when policy decisions

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[3] For example, see: Theodore J. Lowi, The End Of Liberalism (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969); Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucratic Power in National Politics, 2nd Ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1972); Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy, 2nd Ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1976); and Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, 3rd Ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1977).

are made by elected officials, administrators still possess the potential
for determining the operational content of those decisions through imple-
mentation process activities.

For example, common sense and experience both suggest that the mere
passage of an ordinance by the city council does not materially change the
object of its actions. By alerting the citizenry of their awareness of
the problem and of their desire to activate needed change, the initial
formulation of a policy response by city councilmen contains an inherent
symbolic significance, but in and of itself does not alleviate community
problems. The passage of an ordinance to pave a portion of a street, or
one that limits the speed of motor vehicles, or that defines regulations
for the construction of buildings, does not, in and of itself, change the
appearance of the street, regulate the speed of all drivers, or ensure
compliance by all builders. Instead, as Carl A. McCandless suggests:

> A part of the total political process was consummated when, probably
> after a number of compromises were achieved, the council finally
> passed an ordinance, but the total process is not complete until
> some means is available to grade and pave the street, patrol the
> streets and apprehend violators of the legal limits, and make on-
> site inspections of construction projects.[4]

Thus, although the legal authority to initiate binding city policies
resides within the executive and legislative departments of city govern-
ment, nonelected city administrators and career bureaucrats can determine
their operational content. Consequently, the ultimate success of govern-
mental programs very often depends upon the ability, willingness, policy
orientations, and other technical, economic, organizational, and political

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[4] Carl A. McCandless, Urban Government and Politics (New York: Mc-
Graw-Hill Book Company, 1970), p. 259.

resources of bureaucracies. The following two chapters are thus intended first, to present a portrait of the resources available to and inherent within bureaucracies, and second, to suggest a conceptual framework for increasing our understanding of those factors which have a potentially significant impact on the power capacity of bureaucrats during the implementation process.

The Bureaucratic Phenomenon:
Power and its Exercise

We should note at the outset that no policy system, no matter how well-developed and efficient, can address each and every community issue demanding attention; nor can any system guarantee the ultimate and unqualified success of those policies which are created in response to particular problems. At best, policy-makers can only hope that they have accurately perceived the real nature of the problem, properly assessed the relative weights of possible policy objectives, analyzed each and every alternative strategy for resolving the problem, selected that strategy best able to alleviate the problem and achieve the desired objectives with little or no residual effects, selected the most appropriate means of implementing the policy decision, and bestowed upon program administrators the resources necessary for ensuring policy success. Regretably, but understandably, these expectations are rarely, if ever, fully satisfied. The obstacles to rational policy-making are often insurmountable.[5]

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[5] For an explanation of the obstacles to rational policy-making, see: Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review, 19 (Spring, 1959), 79-88; David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision (New York: Free Press, 1963); Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964).

Thus, in selecting a policy response to some perceived problem, norms of rationality dictate that policy-makers must: (1) know all of society's value preferences and their relative weights; (2) know all of the policy alternatives available; (3) know all of the consequences of each policy alternative; (4) calculate the ratio of achieved to sacrificed societal values associated with each policy alternative; and (5) select the most efficient policy alternative.[6] Due to problems of uncertainty, however, elected officials may elect to either (a) take no action at all, rather than risk program failure, or (b) delegate policy-making authority to an agency they believe is better able to satisfy policy demands. That is to say, when confronted with an uncertain task environment in which legislators may lack the necessary technical sophistication, organizational ability, and/or political capacity to confront community needs, norms of rationality have operated to remove legislative bodies from their policy-making obligations. And of the two possible courses of action or inaction, delegations of authority to administrative agencies has led to the assumed - but unexamined - dictum that power in modern society now centers in the halls of public bureaucracies.

On the other hand, even when legislators do assume full policy-making responsibility, the degree of uncertainty present is often such that policies tend to be formulated with incomplete knowledge of the totality of the problem area and of the means by which community needs may best be satisfied. Policies thus tend to be couched in terms of general outlays of expenditures, with little or no explicit guidance as to the means by which

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[6] See, Yehezkel Dror, Public Policy-Making Re-examined (San Francisco: Chandler, 1968), Part IV.

programs must be administered. Hence, one way in which bureaucracies have increased their overall strength in the policy process, though by no means the only way, is through their interpretation and implementation of vague and/or ambiguous policy guidelines. In so doing, policies are modified, if not actually made by administrators and bureaucrats.

It should be noted, however, that legislative inefficacy is not the only, or the prime, reason for the advance of the administrative process. Rather, many consider the administrative process to be the most capable structure for formulating policy responses to social, economic, environmental, and political complexities of modern-day government. This argument stems from the general belief that only a specialized organization possesses the necessary skills and expertise to make determinations concerning (1) what the desired outcomes of governmental activity should be, and (2) cause/effect relationships. In this sense, then, it is held that administrators and career bureaucrats, who deal with specific societal problems on a day-to-day basis, enter the policy process with the specialized knowledge necessary for making a rational assessment of the problem and for deciding how the problem can best be resolved. It is this property of expertise that Max Weber saw as the attribute giving bureaucracy its dominant station in the policy process.

> The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization. The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production.
> Under normal conditions, the power position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always overpowering. The 'political master' finds himself in a position of the 'dilettante' who stands opposite the 'expert,' facing the trained official who stands within the management of administration.[7]

[7] Excerpted in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1946), pp. 214, 232.

Though it cannot be denied that fully developed bureaucratic organizations are technically superior to other forms of organization, this quality alone is not sufficient in accounting for the power potential of bureaucracy. Technical sophistication is a valuable resource, but it is not a guarantee of power in decision-making. Instead, Francis E. Rourke, in a most significant study of bureaucratic roles in policy-making, has posited that the relative strength of an organization depends upon its ability to achieve and maintain both internal and external sources of power and support.[8] Internally, the ability of an agency to exercise a degree of influence within the policy system depends upon its level of expertise. To this end, organization is itself one source of expertise. Men and women joined in an organization are able to pool their resources, their individual skills and experiences, and thereby achieve results individuals acting alone could not hope to accomplish. Consider a bureaucratic organization the size of an urban police force. It cannot be denied that the total resources of a police force in terms of specialized training, experiences, technology, and manpower places it in an advantageous position of specifying the needs and problems of the community regarding law enforcement, thereby enhancing the probability that the advice given by its administrators to the city's elected representatives will be adopted. The same can be said regarding welfare agencies, public works departments, sanitation departments, public housing bureaus, fire departments, and highway departments, to name but a few.

Second, the urban bureaucracy is broken down into hundreds of units,

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[8] Francis E. Rourke, *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy*, Chapters I, II, et. _passim_.

each of which is responsible for implementing decisions, recommending governmental actions, and even formulating policies in specific areas. Bureaucrats can thus give concentrated attention to specific community problems. Able to study a problem on a day-to-day basis, bureaucrats achieve a degree of technical sophistication and acquire a working knowledge of particular affairs which can only come from experience. Third, unlike elected public officials, bureaucrats enjoy a continuity in office which makes it possible for this acquired knowledge to be put to public service on a continuous basis. There should thus develop continuity in public policy which, as Peter Woll has emphasized, is a major factor for the continuing support given the administrative branch.[9] And fourth, the accumulation of specific knowledge, continuity in office, and concentrated attention to specific matters places administrators in the advantageous position of having a monopolistic or near monopolistic control of the "facts." Most often the facts gathered by administrators are not subject to independent verification or disproof. Control of the facts thus significantly increases the power of bureaucracies in the policy process.

We must ask, however, what specifically is this animal we call bureaucracy? That is, what requirements must an organization satisfy to be considered a bureaucracy? In response to this query, Max Weber offers the following defining characteristics of the bureaucratic structure:

> 1. "The regular activities required for the purposes of the bureaucratically governed structure are distributed in a fixed way as official duties."
> 2. "A Specified sphere of competence ... has been marked off as part of a systematic division of labor..."

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[9] Peter Woll, _American Bureaucracy_, 2nd Ed. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1977), p. 27.

3. The official is "subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of his office."

4. All operations are governed by a "consistent system of abstract rules ... and consist in the application of these rules to particular cases."

5. "The organization of offices follows the principle of hierarchy; that is, each lower office is under the control and supervision of a higher one."

6. Officials are "subject to authority only with respect to their impersonal obligations."

7. "Candidates for bureaucratic positions are selected on the basis of technical qualifications. In the most rational case, this is tested by examinations, or guaranteed by diplomas certifying technical training, or both. They are appointed, not elected."

8. Being a bureaucratic official "constitutes a career. There is a system of promotions according to seniority or to achievement, or both."[10]

It was Weber's contention that if an organization is arranged on the basis of specialization and hierarchical control, and if its members look upon their employment as a career (thereby separating the private from the public aspects of their lives), organization, planning, and achievement of organizational objectives will proceed in the most efficient manner.[11]

However, to say that administrative agencies are efficient and to say that they have an unequivocal hold on political power in urban society are not synonymous declarations. When we say that the public bureaucracy is part of the community power structure we are, in effect, emphasizing its ability to have its will successfully prevail. Each department within the bureaucratic network has interests it seeks to have supported by the urban political system. To the extent that the goals of administrators

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[10] Max Weber, Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1946), 196-204; and Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (NY: Free Press, 1947), 329-336. Summary reprinted in Peter M. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chgo: Univ. of Chgo. Press, 1955), pp. 1-2.

[11] It should be noted that organizational principles of hierarchy and specialization often results in the separation of power from knowledge (in the superordinate-subordinate relationship). This must be taken into consideration in any discussion of the rationality of administrative decision-making.

are accepted by or otherwise imposed upon city policy-makers, we can suggest that they have been influential. To the extent that the goals of administrators prevail over the will of others, and to the extent that their activities have a direct impact on the performance and outcome of urban policies, we can suggest that they have the potential to exercise a significant degree of power in the community. Thus, on the one hand, administrators may influence the policy-making process by advising policy-makers of alternative program strategies and policy objectives, and, on the other hand, may exercise its own style of power by (1) interpreting vague and/or ambiguous policy statements in accordance with their own specific policy orientations, (2) exercising its discretion in applying policies in specific instances, and (3) substituting the initial objectives of policy-makers with their own through processes of implementation.

Externally, the power of city administrators and career bureaucrats depends upon their ability to mobilize political support from either (a) the outside community, (b) the legislature, and/or (c) the executive branch.[12] The greater the degree of public support for an agency's scope of activities, the greater is the likelihood that it will exercise a significant degree of influence in the policy process. Furthermore, the delegation of legislative authority to administrative agencies has shifted the general group struggle from the legislative to the administrative arena. While outside interests seek to influence agency action (and thereby substantially affect the direction and impact of public policies), the agency itself can benefit by the support of attentive groups. This is

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[12] Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy, Chapter II, "The Mobilization of Political Support," pp. 42-80, et. passim.

especially evident in all instances in which city agencies are empowered to bestow benefits, in the form of city contracts, to outside interests.

For example, city programs designed to improve the streets and highways, or park facilities, or to renovate existing structures, are not only sought by the director of the department responsible for carrying out the project but also by the outside construction firms, landscapers, cement companies, land developers, among others, who stand to benefit via city contracts. These same parties seek to influence the policy process via lobbying, campaign contributions, personal favors, and of course, through graft. Their part in the policy process serves to enhance the power of the administrator responsible for the particular project.

From the foregoing discussion, we can propose that the political power of city administrators and career bureaucrats resides in their ability to determine the operational content of urban policies. First, since the public bureaucracy is considered expert in the area of its general jurisdiction, and have almost complete control of the facts, the advice and proposals of administrators are usually quite influential as the basis for decisions made by elected officials. Second, city administrators and career bureaucrats use outside group activity to impose their will on city governors via lobbying, collective bargaining, public relations, and even through threatened and actual strikes. Third, and of even greater significance, is the fact that since city administrators and public bureaucrats are delegated the authority to make decisions regarding the implementation of policies and programs, they have invariable opportunities for (1) fixing their details and setting the boundaries of their application, and (2) reshaping all or portions of those policies they personally

disapprove of, thus making policy via selective enforcement or modified implementation.[13]

This power of discretion, i.e., the ability of a public officer to choose from among alternative courses of action or inaction, is the most far-reaching and controversial source of administrative power, and the one which has received the most attention from political scientists, in general, and administrative law theorists, in particular.[14] An administrator's potential for discretion results from the fact that city policies and programs, as set forth in charter provisions, legislation, or executive orders, are presented in the most general terms and/or susceptible to varying interpretations. Thus those who implement city policy decisions have continual opportunities for shaping the operational content of the policy in accordance with their own perception of what the program should accomplish.

Remembering Weber's "ideal type," organizational behavior is guided and constrained by a formal body of rules and regulations. In actual practice, however, city administrators are often free to select not only from among desired outcomes but also from among alternative means. The ability to exercise discretion in those instances in which such activity is not strictly prohibited via clearly defined charters, legislative mandates, or executive orders, or restrained by formal checks and "codes of conduct," has led to the assertion that "discretion is the very lifeblood of admin-

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[13] Demetrios Caraley, City Governments and Urban Problems (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 249.

[14] See, Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (Urbana, Ill: Univ. of Ill. Press, 1971), p. 4, et. passim.

istration."[15] Although it is not sufficiently clear whether the administrative process could function effectively without such powers, the impact of discretion on the scope and nature of bureaucratic power and on intended policy objectives cannot be disputed.

The impact of administrative discretion can be seen in both the everyday decisions of government agencies as well as in the major unprecedented, innovative, trend-setting activities of organizational life. Herbert Simon has classified these two types of administrative decisions as "programmed" and "non-programmed," respectively.

> Decisions are programmed to the extent that they are repetitive and routine, to the extent that a definite procedure has been worked out for handling them so that they don't have to be treated de novo each time they occur... Decisions are non-programmed to the extent that they are novel, unstructured, and consequential.[16]

And elsewhere, James G. March and Herbert Simon have specified three varieties of the former and one of the latter type of discretionary decision.

> First, when a program involves search activities, the actual course of action depends on what is found. We may regard the choice of a course of action after search as discretionary.
>
> Second, when a program describes a strategy, application of the strategy to specific circumstances requires forecasts or other estimates of data. We may regard the application of the strategy to select a course of action as discretionary.
>
> Third, a program may exist in the memory of the individual who is to apply it, having arrived there either as a result of extraorganizational training (e.g., professional training or apprenticeship), or as a product of learning from experiences rather than as a result

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[15] See, Marshall E. Dimock, "The Role of Discretion in Modern Administration," in John M. Gaus, Leonard D. White, and Marshall E. Dimock, eds., The Frontiers of Public Administration (Chicago: University of Chgo. Press, 1936), p. 59.

[16] Herbert A. Simon, The New Science of Management Decisions (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. 5-6.

of formal instructions. Under these circumstances we often regard him as behaving in a discretionary fashion.[17]

In each of these cases the decision process may be regarded as highly "routinized" and yet discretionary in terms of the form of the performance program or the source from which it was acquired. As such, they must be distinguished from the fourth meaning of discretionary:

> A program may specify only general goals, and leave unspecified the exact activities to be used in reaching them. Moreover, knowledge of the means-ends connections may be sufficiently incomplete and inexact that these cannot be very well specified in advance. Then discretion refers to the development and modification of the performance program through problem-solving and learning processes.[18]

As Michael Lipsky has discussed with reference to "street level bureaucrats," the most routine, everyday decisions of government agencies are representative of the discretionary potential of programmed activities.[19] Although it can be argued that the rank and file members of city bureaucracies are constrained in their activities by rules and regulations of the organization and that administrators of specialized departments can exercise a significant degree of discretion in interpreting urban policies and programs, Lipsky holds that, for the average citizen, the activities of street level bureaucrats constitute the actual performance of American government. These are the people that citizens turn to for help, and they are the people perceived to be the formal channels of government.

To the average citizen, then, public policy is neither equivalent

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[17] James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 148.

[18] Ibid., p. 148-149.

[19] Michael Lipsky, "Street Level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of Urban Reform," Urban Affairs Quarterly, 6(June, 1971), 391-409.

to what elected officials say it is (i.e., the verbal or written declara-
tions of intent as set forth in city charters, legislative mandates, or
executive orders), nor is it simply the proposed course of action with
its corresponding mobilization of resources. Rather, policy manifests
itself through a series of actions or inactions and particular patterns
of behavior through which governing bodies seek to obtain particular ob-
jectives within a specified target population. Consequently, from the
point of view of the citizen, who is in some way affected daily by the
activities of governing officials, and even from the perspective of the
policy analyst concerned with a policy's impact on the environment, the
most important questions are not of policy formulation, but of policy
performance. Thus, when the focus of analysis shifts from the politics
of policy-making to an examination of actual and perceived policy outcomes,
attention naturally centers on those individuals and organizations that
can directly affect policy performance through their chosen patterns of
behavior. According to Lipsky (and this writer), it is the activities
of bureaucrats that have the greatest potential for determining the nature
of community life.

To be sure, the manner in which policies are implemented by admin-
istrators and career bureaucrats determines in large part their opera-
tional content and their ultimate consequence. One of the basic problems
inherent in contemporary studies of community power structures is that in
locating sources of community power they disregard the events following
the formulation and adoption phase of the policy process. They thus
neglect to account for the determining impact of bureaucracy on the whole
of the policy process. For example, consider the opportunities accorded

street-level bureaucrats to make choices of significant importance:

1. <u>Inspectorial personnel</u> of different departments (e.g., health, fire, buildings, markets). Their largely unsupervisable failure to enforce regulations against violators either because of laziness, inefficiency, or corruption leads to highly uneven burdens of compliance among regulatees. If widespread enough, that failure of enforcement negates regulatory policies adopted by city government altogether. (It may also be that various inspectors do not agree with the policy as promulgated; that is, they may consider the offense minor, the penalty too stiff, etc., and thus select to ignore the violation and, in the process, formulate their own conception of what the policy should actually promote).

2. <u>Welfare caseworkers</u>. Their idiosyncratic leanings of openhandedness or tight-fistedness can determine whether particular individuals will be accepted as welfare beneficiaries, what level of payments they will receive, and whether various special grants will be awarded or denied.

3. <u>Public school teachers</u>, especially those in the lower grades in slum ghetto schools. Their attitudes, friendliness, energy, devotion, preparation, and effort will have a large impact on whether the students in their classes will come to look at schools as places of learning or as semipunitive custodial institutions.

4. <u>Police officers</u>. Their day-to-day discretionary acts decide not only such insignificant events as which from a massive number of traffic offenders actually will have to answer for their violations. They also determine more weighty matters: the extent and openness of illegal prostitution, drug-peddling, and gambling in various neighborhoods; the unnecessary "stopping and friskings" and excessive physical force to which various parts of the citizenry, especially in slum areas, will be subjected; and whether, in the process of police investigations of subjects, making arrests, or controlling mass demonstrations, various initial "incidents" will escalate into more serious disruptions including riots.[20]

In all such cases, bureaucrats are undoubtedly making policy and exerting substantial influence on community affairs through their various actions and/or inactions.

This recognition of the relative power of bureaucrats to shape the day-to-day operations of city governmental agencies and thus to directly

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[20] Michael Lipsky, "Street Level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of Urban Reform," 391-409; Caraley, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 252-253. For a more in-depth analysis of police discretion, see: James Q. Wilson, <u>Varieties of Police Behavior</u> (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968); and Kenneth Culp Davis, <u>Discretionary Justice</u>, p. 8, et. <u>passim</u>.

affect the performance of urban policies strikes at the very center of our present analysis. Throughout this paper we have suggested that the location of political power in urban society cannot simply be viewed as a constellation of actors directly engaged in the formulation and adoption phase of the policy process, or that it can be completely accounted for merely by attempting to discover those factors hypothesized to be determinants of policy decisions. Research devoted to discovering those social, economic, demographic, and political factors responsible for particular policy outputs and for explaining variations among states and communities in terms of the types of policies promulgated, does not take into consideration variations within communities, or the idiosyncratic tendencies of individual decision-makers. Research endeavors of this type thus fail to isolate initial factors from ultimate and determinative considerations.

Further, Lipsky's analysis of the discretionary potential of administrative actions raises serious questions about both elitist and pluralist models of community power. The conclusions of both perspectives suggest that, first, the number of significant decision-makers is small, and that, second, the potential influence of these participants derives from either their social status in the community or from their positions of institutional leadership. However, the failure of both approaches to examine the set of actors involved in and the consequences of policy implementation has led to a general neglect of the substantial institutional changes that have occurred within the governmental process and of the rising significance of functionally organized bureaucracies. Unable or unwilling to formulate and carry out specific policies for each and every community issue, city policy-makers have transferred what amounts to legislative, executive, and

judicial powers to administrative agencies, which are created, maintained, and distinguished from others on the basis of functional responsibilities. Each such agency (e.g., public housing, public works, highways and street departments, health and hospital boards, police, fire, and sanitation departments), are bequeathed with significant degrees of governing authority in its own functional sphere of expertise. At the same time, each agency develops its own organization, identifies its own vested interests, and ultimately forms close ties with those special interest groups most affected by its actions.

This development has led many to reflect upon the implications of administrative power in democratic societies.[21] John J. Harrigan's "functional fiefdoms,"[22] and Theodore J. Lowi's "functional feudalities"[23] are terms which have been coined to describe the ties between city bureaucracies and their related interest groups. The contention is that cities are now divided both geographically and functionally, that public bureaucracies are near feudal lords in controlling policy decisions affecting their particular vested interests, and that these bodies are unaccountable to the community and unaffected by electoral votes. According to Lowi, they have become the "new machines" in the urban political system:

> The new Machines are machines because they are relatively irresponsible structures of power. That is, each agency shapes important

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[21] For example, see: Victor A. Thompson, "Bureaucracy in a Democratic Society," in Roscoe C. Martin, ed., Public Administration and Democracy (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965), 205-226.

[22] John J. Harrigan, Political Change in the Metropolis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976), Chapter V.

[23] Theodore J. Lowi, At the Pleasure of the Mayor (New York: Free Press, 1964), esp., Chapter VII; and "Machine Politics - Old and New."

public policies, yet the leadership of each is relatively self-perpetuating and not readily subject to the controls of any higher authority.

The New Machines are machines in that the power of each, while resting ultimately upon services rendered to the community, depends upon its cohesiveness as a small minority in the midst of the vast dispersion of the multitude.[24]

If the public bureaucracy is as important in the power structure of the community as many suggest, why does it not appear as such in the elitist and pluralist models of community power? The answer, we believe, lies in the predisposition of political scientists to focus on the more overt expressions of power, as demonstrated in the conflicts inherent in the formulation and adoption phases of the policy process, at the expense of the more complex process of implementation. Prior to implementation, the role of the bureaucrat in policy-making is relatively invisible to the general public. Unlike elected public officials, whose activities are usually attended by news reports and public debate, the role of the bureaucrat usually takes the less noticeable form of advising formal city officers. However, once public agencies are entrusted with full responsibility for undertaking the means necessary to achieve policy objectives, if not even for determining both the ends and means of governmental activity, the power of bureaucracies can no longer be underestimated or brushed aside as a temporary aberration. In order to state with any degree of certainty the extent of such powers, it is necessary that we transfer the present focus of the discipline to factors operating within processes of policy implementation.

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[24] Lowi, "Machine Politics - Old and New," op. cit., p. 86.

CHAPTER V

FROM POLICY OBJECTIVES TO POLICY PERFORMANCE:

BUREAUCRATS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

Despite the growing awareness of the influence of public bureau-
cracies in the American policy process, systematic research attempting
to link the activities of bureaucrats to the final outcomes of policy de-
cisions has only recently gained predominant interest. Except for those
studies specifically concerned with bureaucratic organization and behavior,
few attempts have been made to critically and systematically analyze the
implementation links between the initial formulation of policy objectives
and a policy's ultimate outcomes (performance). Though many studies
(such as those reported in Chapter IV) have alluded to the potentially
significant power of program administrators and career bureaucrats in
determining the operational content of policy decisions, many analysts of
public policy seemingly support the rather naive assumption that a particu-
lar policy (P) implies or leads to specific and desired outcomes (O),
almost as if policies are themselves self-executing and their consequences
unfailingly predictable.[1] As Erwin Hargrove, however, aptly noted, poli-
cies do not themselves lead anywhere; instead they must be applied to the
problem area for which they are formulated.[2] Implementation, the process

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[1] This assumption is amply supported by the overriding concern given
to the identification of those elements and actors having either direct or
indirect influence on the policy-making process, as if once policies are
formulated predictable consequences will naturally ensue.

[2] Erwin Hargrove, The Missing Link: The Study of the Implementation
of Social Policy (Washington: The Urban Institute, 1975), p. iv.

through which initial policy decisions are transformed into specific government programs, is thus the missing link between policies and outcomes.

This being so, we should expect to find a rather detailed body of literature devoted specifically to delineating how bureaucrats have a determinative impact on the policy outputs of decision-making bodies. However, by divorcing processes of policy formulation from that of policy implementation, researchers have thus far failed in their initial objective of formulating a positive theory of policy formation. By neglecting to consider how bureaucrats and policy implementers may ultimately set the policy agenda as well as carry out programs in accordance with their own personal policy predispositions, policy analysts have failed to bridge the gap between policy objectives and policy performance. Such considerations are not to be found in the literature of determinants analysis precisely because both economists and political scientists have been unnecessarily bounded by the professional and ideological predispositions of their disciplines. Economists, for their part, initially set out to examine the policy process guided not by a theoretical framework but by a conviction that economic development ultimately determines the course of governmental actions. So strong was this conviction that most researchers did not find cause to examine why the explanatory power of economic factors have a differential impact across expenditure categories or why the importance of economic variables seem to decrease over time.

Political scientists, on the other hand, with their initial preoccupation with process characteristics, did not fully capture the significance of socioeconomic conditions; and even when they did, almost two-thirds of

the variation in outputs within and between policy areas remained unex-
plained. For the most part, then, researchers interested in discovering
why certain policies are pursued by some governmental bodies but not by
others and why the degree of commitment varies even when they do decide
upon similar actions have thus far neglected to identify the nature of
the linkage between the environment and policy outputs, have not specified
the time span in which environmental constraints are operative, and have
not fully addressed the considerable amount of variation left unexplained
by the environmental, political, and few organizational variables utilized
to date.[3]

One may suggest that part of the explanation for the dominance of
economic variables over the past two decades of determinants analysis by
both economists and political scientists is attributable more to the de-
fault of the latter than to the theoretical insight of the former. That
is, regardless of their theoretical significance, political scientists
have almost wholly relied upon such political factors as interparty compe-
tition, voter turnout, degree of reform possessed by governmental struc-
tures, and party affiliation of decision-makers in measuring the extent to
which political characteristics influence the nature of policy outputs.
Conspicuously and unfortunately underrepresented in determinants analysis
are indicators of bureaucratic and organizational influences on the policy
process. Thus, although it is well recognized that ever-increasing delega-
tions of authority to public bureaucracies have undeniably transformed the
nature of American politics, the ever-expanding power of bureaucrats in

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[3] See, George W. Downs, Jr., Bureaucracy, Innovation, and Public
Policy, pp. 7-9.

both the formulation and implementation of policy decisions is almost
wholly absent in the policy literature.[4]

On the other hand, determinants analysis has succeeded in bringing
to light the determinative influence of the idiosyncratic value predispo-
sitions of decision-makers on the policy making process.[5] Having dis-
covered that there does not exist one single determinant of all policy
decisions, researchers have had cause to propose that governments under-
take policy activities in line with the individual policy positions and
value orientations of those persons perceived to be influential in the
policy-making process. This assumption has been at the root of a lengthy
body of literature devoted to discovering the power-holders in community,
state, and national decision-making. Underlying such research is the
belief that a so-called "power-class," consisting of individuals and
interests capable of having their will prevail in the policy process,
ultimately determines the very nature of governmental activity. Method-
ologically, such influentials have been identified by either their (1)
reputations for power, (2) social class, (3) institutional position, or
by their (4) direct participation in the formal decision-making process.
Power has thus been equated only with those parties perceived to be of
some influence in establishing governmental priorities in the initial
processes of policy-making. In this sense, the exercise of power is no
longer considered once the preliminary conflicts governing the selection
of particular policy positions are resolved. And, accordingly, policy

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[4] For example, see Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, passim.

[5] See, Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt, Labyrinths of Democracy:
Adaptations, Linkages, Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics.

implementation is perceived as a relatively simple process of carrying out rather mundane decisions consistent with a policy's original objectives.

Thus, in neither the literature of determinants analysis nor in analyses of political power structures do we find what can be considered a legitimate attempt to link activities in the policy-making process with what ultimately transpires once administrators assume responsibilities of implementation. Although we would expect policy implementers to be of theoretical significance to both determinants research and power analyses, they are not included in the methodological designs of either concern. This is especially troublesome when we consider that an extensive and well-developed body of theoretical and case study material has repeatedly emphasized the fact that an ever-increasing proportion of policy decisions are being made by bureaucrats. The literature of administrative law and organization theory has informed us that extensive delegations of authority to administrative agencies have created a situation in which bureaucracies structure policy agendas, define the alternatives for elected officials, exercise a significant degree of discretion in the initial interpretation and ultimate application of statutory objectives, and ultimately wield great autonomy in administrative decision-making.

Despite this growing body of literature cognizant of the ever-increasing power of the bureaucracy, determinants research severely underrepresents bureaucratic or organizational variables in its analysis and political power studies fail to examine how power is exercised most effectively by those parties engaged in processes of implementation. And though we continue to be told that the workings of administrators are important, implementation still remains the lost and neglected element in

the policy process. As Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky recently lamented, considering the fact that everything in public policy ultimately revolves around processes of implementation, the absence of an implementation literature lies as an unsolved mystery in policy research.[6] Their bewilderment was expressed in no uncertain terms:

> There is (or there must be) a large literature about implementation in the social sciences - or so we have been told by numerous people. None of them can come up with specific citations to this literature, but they are certain it must exist... It must be there; it should be there; but in fact it is not. There is a kind of semantic illusion at work here because virtually everything ever done in public policy or public administration must, in the nature of things, have some bearing on implementation. Analytical study (as opposed to mere mention) of implementation seems so eminently reasonable that few can imagine it does not exist. Nevertheless, except for the few pieces mentioned in the body of this book, we have been unable to find any significant analytic work dealing with implementation.[7]

To a certain extent one cannot help but share Pressman and Wildavsky's dissatisfaction over the direction policy studies have taken to date and of the secondary status accorded the actors engaged in administering policy decisions. However, several factors other than short-sightedness have accounted for this development. First, researchers have been inclined to support the general assumption that the greatest political conflicts concern the manner in which particular issues are selected out of the host of demands for government attention. In this sense, then, researchers have been most interested in those conflicts inherent in (1) the selection of policy alternatives, (2) the specification of resource

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[6] Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973). Contained herein is a masterful treatment of implementation within an analytic framework combined with an in-depth case-study.

[7] Ibid., p. 267.

commitments, and (3) the delineation of policy objectives. Studies following this perspective have further assumed that once such conflicts are resolved the resulting policy will be implemented as directed and that the ultimate outcomes will be near those anticipated by the policy-makers. In holding that most of the significant conflicts have been resolved with the adoption of a particular policy, researchers have been inclined to view implementation as a series of rather simple and mundane decisions consistent with statutory directives. Political scientists, especially, have traditionally confined their analyses to conflicts inherent in the making of policy, thereby ignoring the shift of conflict to the administrative arena in the process of implementation.

Second, the general call for a scientific analysis of political phenomenon has led to a radical proliferation of studies in which researchers can employ statistical methods of contemporary social science. This has created an enormous wealth of research devoted to finding correlational, if not even causal (which many determinants analysts mistakenly assume is statistically possible) relationships between quantitative indicators of economic, political, and social variables and quantifiable policy outputs (thereby ignoring qualitative assessments of policy outputs). And where concepts are employed where operationalization is especially difficult (e.g., power and influence), researchers have used indirect indicators (e.g., an individual's reputation, institutional position, or social class) or measures which do not adequately envelop every possible manifestation of the concept (e.g., direct participation in the decision-making process). Implementation analysis, on the other hand, raises serious methodological obstacles. The actors engaged in administering

policy decisions are difficult to identify, their decisions impossible to isolate, and the time dimension of their activities beyond boundary specification. Unable to clearly measure, if not identify, the significant bureaucratic and organizational ingredients of the administrative process, researchers have been unable to apply contemporary methodologies to implementation analysis.

And, third, policy implementation has proven to be of greater interest to policy-makers, who are concerned about the successful application of their programs, than to policy analysts, who have evidenced a greater concern for the processes of policy formulation. This latter concern has created a general desire to analyze the workings of and interactions between formal institutions of government. By focusing on the activities of formal governmental bodies, policy analysts have unwittingly deemphasized the role of public bureaucracies in transforming initial objectives into meaningful policy outcomes. So conceived, implementation is treated as an administrative, rather than as a significantly political, concern. Such analytic frameworks have failed to capture the dynamic nature of the policy process, and have thereby tended to maintain the long disputed constitutional and normative "politics-administration" dichotomy.

However important these three factors may once have been in deterring policy analysts from systematically considering the politics of implementation as an independent variable related to the ultimate performance of public policies, a review of the literature reveals that implementation studies are not only on the upswing, but also that efforts outside the immediate realm of public policy contain bits and pieces of

the multitude of factors necessary for an understanding of policy imple-mentation. For the most part, however, this literature owes its emergence not to some general desire to increase one's understanding of the role of bureaucrats in the policy process, but rather to a demand for greater ef-ficiency in the initial making of policy. That is, starting with the assumption that policies fail to achieve specified objectives due to problems inherent in processes of administration, implementation analysis has recently emerged as a useful tool for policy-makers.

For example, prior to the massive social reform programs of the Johnson Administration and the accompanying decline in expectations of even the most optimistic reformers, the systematic study of implementa-tion had been relatively neglected in most analyses of public policy. In fact, until most recently implementation had been totally ignored by some, briefly mentioned by others, and defined but not analytically specified by still others. However, the actual or presumed failure of various policies in the mid-1960s and early 1970s have set in motion a number of efforts addressing the general question of why programs fail to achieve their desired objectives in such fields as education,[8] health

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[8] Stephen Bailey and Edith Mosher, ESEA: The Office of Education Administers a Law (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968); David K. Cohen, "Politics and Research: Evaluation of Social Action Programs in Education," Review of Educational Research, 40 (April 1970), 213-238; Jerome Murphy, "Title I of ESEA: The Politics of Implementing Federal Education Reform," Harvard Educational Review, 41 (February 1971), 35-63; Jerome Murphy, State Education Agencies and Discretionary Funds (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1974); Milbrey W. McLaughlin, Evalua-tion and Reform: The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Title I (Cambridge, Mass: Lexington Ballinger Pub., 1975); Milbrey W. McLaughlin, "Implementation of ESEA Title I: A Problem of Compliance," Teachers College Record, 77 (February 1976), 397-415; Paul Berman, "Implementation of Educational Innovation," The Educational Forum, 40 (March, 1976), 347-370.

care,[9] economic development,[10] environmental protection,[11] civil rights,[12] and income redistribution.[13] Attempts have thus surfaced which seek to account for the too frequent radical gap between the intentions of policy-makers and the actual performance of adopted programs. This has pre-cipitated a consequent shift from addressing how policies are formulated to how they are implemented (as if programs fail merely because of in-efficiencies and decay in the implementation process).

This shift also evidences a recent reawakening to the oft-noted belief that the words of a statute do not in and of themselves resolve conflict or precipitate change. Rather, statutory constructions set in motion the process whereby initial goals are transformed into explicit policy decisions (outputs) which are, in turn, modified and applied to a particular set of conditions having certain consequences (outcomes). Kenneth Dolbeare and Phillip Hammond have noted this pattern of activity in no uncertain terms:

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[9] Eugene Bardach, The Skill Factor in Politics: Repealing the Mental Commitment Laws in California (Berkeley: University of Calif Press, 1972).

[10] Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, op. cit.; Carl Van Horn, "Implementing CETA: The Federal Role," Policy Analysis, 4 (Spring 1978), 159-183.

[11] A. Myrick Freeman, III and Robert H. Haveman, "Clear Rhetoric and Dirty Water," The Public Interest (Summer 1972), 51-65; Henry Jacoby and John Steinbruner, Cleaning the Air (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1973); Charles Jones, Clean Air (Pittsburg: Pittsburg University Press, 1975); Paul Downing and Gordon Brady, "Implementing the Clean Air Act: A Case Study of Oxidant Control in Los Angeles," Natural Resources Journal, 18 (April 1978), 237-284.

[12] Fred Wirt, The Politics of Southern Equality (Chicago: Aldine, 1970); Harrel Rodgers and Charles Bullock, Coercion to Compliance (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1976).

[13] For example, see: Gilbert Y. Steiner, The State of Welfare (Wash-ington, D.C: Brookings, 1971); Theodore R. Marmor, ed., Poverty Policy (New York: Aldine/Atherton, Inc., 1971).

Very little may really be decided by the words of a decision or a statute: the enunciation of such national policy may be just the beginning of the decisive process determining what will happen to whom, and understanding this further stage is essential to a full understanding of politics.[14]

For the most part this concern had initially prompted a number of atheoretical case studies identifying the factors threatening successful implementation in specific policy areas: education, health care, economic development, urban planning, environmental protection, civil rights and poverty. Although such studies have increased our general understanding of the implementation process in particular areas, their claims to generality are questionable because (1) the cases cannot easily be compared; (2) they apply to a specific set of circumstances; and (3) they use terms peculiar to the context and in the jargon of specific policy sectors. Further, most studies of implementation consider problems endemic within one level of a policy sector or, at most, between two levels. Such analyses thus fail to document and examine the whole of the complex chain from policy input to outcomes. And, finally, far too little attention had been given to the breadth of power exercised by public bureaucracies in determining the operational content of policy decisions and thus the ultimate outcomes of government activity.

In a sense, although it may be argued that one can construct an integrated model of the implementation process illuminating the significant role played by bureaucracies by drawing bits and pieces from the studies of implementation in unrelated areas, such efforts have proven informative

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[14] Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Phillip E. Hammond, The School Prayer Decisions: From Court Policy to Local Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 149.

yet inadequate. To date, attempts at integrating the findings of rather disparate case studies of implementation have focused on a variety of factors that may either aid or hinder successful implementation, some of which may be manipulated by the policy framers. The argument posed by such conceptual frameworks is that in order to ensure achievement of policy objectives, policy makers must be cognizant of the multitude of elements affecting the application of their policy to a particular set of circumstances. Policies cannot then be formulated in a manner insulated from problems of implementation. Instead, various characteristics of the internal and external environment of implementation must be made a part of the initial discussion concerning the setting of goals and commitment of resources. The output of such efforts has been the presentation of various recipes useful in gauging the potential realization of policy objectives.

Thus far, eight major efforts have sought to provide such conceptual integration to the analysis of policy implementation and to thereby place individual and unrelated case studies within their wider sectoral context. In one of the initial attempts, Thomas B. Smith offered what one can define as a strategizing model of the implementation process. In so doing, Smith prompted a number of competing models proclaiming specific strategies for use by policy-makers in minimizing those disruptive tensions which can result in a mismatch between policy outcomes and policy expectations. Starting with the premise that policy implementation serves as a tension generating force in society, Smith reasoned that in applying policies tensions are generated between and within four components of the implementation process: idealized policy, implementing organization, target

group, and environmental factors. Any such tension in implementation

may result in various transaction patterns (which may further crystallize

into institutions) that may or may not ensure a perfect match between

policy expectations and policy outcomes. And, finally, transaction pat-

terns and institutions may again generate tensions which, via feedback

to policy-makers and implementers, may support or reject further imple-

mentation of the policy.[15]

A second effort to construct a model of policy implementation was

undertaken two years later by Donald Van Meter and Carl Van Horn.[16] Recog-

nizing the interrelationship between policy formulation and policy imple-

mentation, they followed the patterns set by Theodore J. Lowi[17] and Lewis

A. Froman[18] in constructing a theoretical framework which takes into ac-

count the variable nature of the implementation process on the basis of

policy types. They thus reasoned that policies can be classified by two

distinguishing characteristics: "the amount of change involved, and the

extent to which there is goal consensus among the participants in the

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[15] Thomas B. Smith, "The Policy Implementation Process," _Policy Sciences,_ 4 (1973), 197-209.

[16] Donald Van Meter and Carl Van Horn, "The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework," Administration and Society, 6(Feb. 1975), No. 4, 445-488. A second version of their framework dropped the two-variable classification of policies (i.e., amount of change involved and degree of goal-consensus). See Van Meter and Van Horn, "The Implementation of Intergovernmental Policy," in Charles O. Jones and Robert Thomas (eds.), Public Policy-Making in a Federal System, Vol. 3 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976), pp. 39-62. For an application of this model to a specific policy area, see: Van Horn, "Implementing CETA: The Federal Role," Policy Analysis, 4 (Spring 1978), 159-183.

[17] Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory, World Politics, 16 (July 1964), 667-715.

[18] Lewis A. Froman, "The Categorization of Policy Contents," in Austin Ranney (ed.), Political Science and Public Policy (Chicago: Markham, 1968), 41-52.

implementation process."[19] Having then formulated a number of variable

relationships between policy type and the execution of public policy,

Van Meter and Van Horn set forth a systems model of the implementation

process consisting of six major factors affecting program performance:

(1) policy standards and objectives; (2) policy resources (basically

funds but including other forms of incentive); (3) inter-organizational

communication and enforcement activities; (4) characteristics of the

implementing agencies; (5) economic and social conditions; and (6) the

disposition of implementers.[20]

Third, unlike the first two efforts which outlined a form of

"strategizing behavior model" for policy makers, Walter Williams em-

barked upon an alternate route focusing on the role of the policy

analyst in the analysis and assessment of implementation.[21] In so

doing Williams presented a somewhat idealized six stage process char-

acterizing what ought to occur when major social policy decisions are

made or when a large and complex social experiment is undertaken.

First, decision-makers should move from preliminary specification to

(2) identification of policy alternatives to (3) explicit policy de-

cisions. Implementation, the stage between policy decisions and

ultimate operations, then starts with the development of (4) program

guidelines or design specifications; moves to (5) what may be a lengthy

stage of field implementation involving the working through of a myriad

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[19] Van Meter and Van Horn, "The Policy Implementation Process,"
p. 458.

[20] Ibid., pp. 462-478.

[21] Walter Williams, "Implementation Analysis and Assessment,"
Policy Analysis, I (Summer 1975), 531-566.

of technical, administrative, staff,and institutional problems that face a new activity; and (6) ends when the specific experiment is ready to test or when the nonexperimental activity is judged fully operational.[22]

Once having outlined an admittedly abstract model of the sequence from policy formulation to field operations, Williams presented four questions decision-makers must address when considering major program innovations: what is the likelihood that an innovation "1) will produce positive outcomes?; (2) will be accepted by higher-level decision-makers?; (3) can be put in place properly with available resources?; and (4) will be accepted by those in the field who must either implement or operate the innovation?"[23] The function of implementation analysis then involves identifying those elements affecting decision-makers' responses to questions (3) and (4). That is, implementation analysis "should investigate (1) the technical capacity to implement, (2) political feasibility, and (3) the technical and political strategies for implementation."[24] Implementation assessment, on the other hand, attempts to measure the change in the actual outputs of organizations after the introduction of an innovation.[25] In all cases analysis and assessment must be undertaken throughout the policy process rather than after policy decisions are implemented.

Fourth, Martin Rein and Francine F. Rabinovitz have offered a theoretical framework of implementation emphasizing three potentially

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[22] _Ibid._, pp. 532-537.

[23] _Ibid._, p. 557ff.

[24] _Ibid._, p. 558.

[25] _Ibid._, p. 560.

conflicting imperatives confronting program administrators: "the legal imperative to do what is legally required; the rational-bureaucratic imperative to do what is rationally defensible; and the consensual imperative to do what can establish agreement among contending influential parties who have a stake in the outcome."[26] They thus suggest that the politics of implementation can be best understood as an attempt to resolve conflicts among these imperatives. The manner in which such conflicts are resolved is a function of the purposes (their clarity, saliency, and consistency), the resources (kind, level, and timing), and the complexity of the administrative process of implementation."[27]

Fifth, somewhat akin to Rein and Rabinovitz's classification of conflicting imperatives besetting implementers, Paul Berman has focused on the rational-bureaucratic and consensual imperatives in describing how the problem of policy failure can be understood only by distinguishing between macro- and micro-implementation.[28] In so doing, Berman started with the assumption that implementation problems stem primarily from the interaction of a policy with its institutional setting. Since federal policy takes shape in a highly interactive setting in which many actors compete for controlling voice in determining the benefactors of government policy, and since policy tends to become transmuted by successive levels of implementing operations, local deliverers, rather than federal

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[26] Martin Rein and Francine F. Rabinovitz, "Implementation: A Theoretical Perspective," in Walter Dean Burnham and M. W. Weinberg (EDS) American Politics and Public Policy (Cambridge: MIT, 1978), 307-335; at 308.

[27] Ibid., p. 333.

[28] Paul Berman, "The Study of Macro- and Micro-Implementation," Public Policy, 26 (Spring 1978), 157-184.

administrators, tend to possess the power to determine policy outcomes.
Within the local system, on the other hand, implementation consists of
the mutual adaptation of the local policy and local organizational
characteristics. This adaptation inevitably leads to uncertainty in
how policies will be implemented. In both instances, policy is repeatedly
adjusted by federal bureaucracies resistant to change and by local service
delivery organizations sensitive to their political environments.

Sixth, Eugene Bardach, concentrating on the strategizing behavior
of various actors within the implementation process, likened implementation
to a series of games in which program administrators and policy-makers
compete for ultimate control of program elements necessary for realizing
specific outcomes.[29] And, in accounting for the failure of most policies
to achieve statutory objectives, Bardach listed: (1) diversion of resources
to private actors or bureaucratic empire-building; (2) deflection of
program goals overtime; (3) inability of program managers to assemble
the necessary support because of resistance, lack of qualified personnel,
etc., and (4) the general dissapation of energies as actors seek to protect
turf, avoid responsibility, and enhance their reputations.[30]

Seventh, though not an explicit conceptualization of the implementa-
tion process, Richard F. Elmore has noted the futility of present efforts
designed to explain policy failures by focusing on the process by which
policies are translated into administrative action via implementation
without a working knowledge of how organizations work.[31] Instead of

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[29] The Implementation Game (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1977).

[30] Ibid., Chpts 3-6; especially pp. 51-57.

[31] Richard F. Elmore, "Organizational Models of Social Program
Implementation," Public Policy, 26 (Spring 1978), 185-228.

constructing a single analytic model of the implementation process, the
present body of organizational theory contains four distinct models, each
of which maintains an alternative view of implementation and bureaucratic
behavior.

> The systems management model treats organizations as value-maxi-
> mizing units and views implementation as an ordered, goal-directed
> activity. The bureaucratic process model emphasizes the roles of
> discretion and routine in organizational behavior and views imple-
> mentation as a process of continually controlling discretion and
> changing routine. The organizational development model treats the
> need of individuals for participation and commitment as paramount
> and views implementation as a process in which implementers shape
> policies and claim them as their own. The conflict and bargaining
> model treats organizations as arenas of conflict and views imple-
> mentation as a bargaining process in which the participants con-
> verge on temporary solutions but no stable result is ever reached.[32]

And, finally, Paul Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian are presently
working on what thus far appears to be the most comprehensive and analy-
tical treatment of the implementation process, especially in terms of how
various implementation problems affect regulatory policy objectives.[33]
Starting with the basic proposition that the goal of implementation
analysis is to identify the factors affecting the achievement of statutory
objectives throughout the policy process, Sabatier and Mazmanian have
identified three major independent variables operating within the stages
of implementation: (1) the tractability of the problem(s) being addressed
by the statute; (2) the ability of the statute to favorably structure
the implementation process; and (3) the net affect of a variety of
'political' variables on the balance of support for statutory objectives.[34]

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[32]   Ibid., pp. 185-186.

[33]   Paul Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian, "Toward A More Adequate Con-
ceptualization of the Implementation Process --- With Special Reference
to Regulatory Policy," MS (July, 1978).

[34]   Ibid., p. 6ff.

Collectively and singularly these variables affect one or more of the five stages of the implementation process: (a) policy outputs of implementing agencies; (b) compliance with policy outputs by target groups; (c) actual impacts of policy outputs; (d) perceived impacts of policy outputs; and (e) major revision in statute.[35]

Unlike previous frameworks which focused almost exclusively on the individual strategizing behavior of major actors in the policy process, Sabatier and Mazmanian have offered a more analytic specification of variables affecting successful implementation. Although also concerned with providing basic strategies for improving program performance, they rejected earlier models which divorce individual strategizing behavior from both socio-economic conditions and statutory variables which ultimately determine what, if any, actions are taken by policy implementers. And of the two, the manner in which statutes structure the implementation process by (1) the number of veto/clearance points; (2) the formal access of various actors to the implementation process; and to some extent, (3) the policy predispositions of implementing officials, is most important for understanding the politics of implementation.

Collectively, antecedent case studies and these efforts at conceptual integration provide a reasonably sufficient overview of how policy decisions are transformed into explicit program outputs and of the variety of factors that can either assure or impede successful implementation. Along the way researchers have (1) identified implementation problems in specific policy-areas; (2) suggested how various social, economic, political,

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[35] Ibid., especially Figure I, page 7.

historical, and cultural factors affect the behavior of policy-makers and policy implementers; (3) identified the role of the policy analyst in determining the causes of policy failure and for suggesting ways in which policy-makers can improve policy performance; (4) offered blue-print formulas for increasing and improving individual strategizing behavior of actors engaged in various stages of the policy process; and (5) critically assessed the organizational models of social program implementation.

Now although such efforts have looked at implementation from a number of alternative perspectives and have concentrated on a number of dissimilar variables, they nonetheless seem to converge on three areas of general agreement: (1) There seems to be a commonly held conception of the meaning of implementation and the nature of the implementation problem. (2) Researchers seem to agree that a policy's implementation problems derive not from its design, but rather from its relationship to its institutional setting. (3) Most researchers consider the study of the implementation process as a process, essential for identifying key policy levers in the social policy arena.[36]

For the most part, however, analyses of the politics of implementation tend to digress to the point of providing strategic portfolios for policy-makers, rather than analytic discussions of the interrelationship between policy-making and policy implementation. In addition, they are guided (at least implicitly) by a model of the policy process which can no longer be accepted unequivocably. In general, studies of policy implementation have focused almost exclusively on factors threatening achievement

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[36] Berman, "The Study of Macro- and Micro-Implementation," p. 159.

of policy objectives and in so doing have described a myriad of factors that must be considered, and even controlled and manipulated by policy-makers in the process of policy development. In addition, implementation problems have ordinarily been classified as problems of coordination and control, or of bargaining among a number of competing interests. Thus, rather than describing the manner in which implementers ultimately determine the operational content of policy decisions and thereby exercise a degree of power in the policy process which may be beyond the control and manipulation of policy-makers, present conceptualizations of the implementation process assume that a number of variables affecting bureaucratic behavior can be manipulated by policy-makers. The political, organizational, technical, and personal powers of bureaucracies have thus been either totally neglected (as being unverifiable or subject to change), simply denied, or conceived as a temporary aberration.

One possible reason for the continual neglect of bureaucracies by policy analysts has been the assumption of hierarchy in organizations. That is to say, integral to all past discussions of implementation has been the assumption that the closer individuals and governmental units are to policy formulation, the greater is their influence on policy development and thus on the outcomes of political activity. And, from the other extreme, the closer they are to applying policy, the less is their direct influence on policy. When policy is made and implemented within a single organization, researchers have assumed that policy is set by actors at the top of the agency who then delegate responsibility for implementing their policy decisions to subordinates. And, when policy is made by elected bodies (e.g., city councils) and then passed on to the head of

some particular department functionally related to the policy area being addressed, it has been assumed that (1) policy makers establish the objectives and manner of government action, (2) department heads follow faithfully the directives of policy-makers, and (3) members of the implementing agency carry out specific programs in a manner consistent with the objectives established by superiors.

For heuristic purposes, the assumption of hierarchy has worked quite well in bringing a sense of order to a rather complex and problematic process. If one accepts the classic Weberian contention that the ideal relationship between superiors and subordinates is one where policies are made by top level officials and then passed on to and faithfully implemented by subordinates whose discretion is acutely limited, then policy analysts may then have been justified in addressing their attention to questions of coordination, control, and compliance in implementing agencies. However, several studies have shown that the relationship between policy objectives of elected officials and actions of implementing agencies and between top level officials and actions of the bodies they direct are at best problematic. It is often the case that the intentions of policy-makers do not guide the behavior of policy-implementers. Thus when the assumption of hierarchy breaks down, no clear line can be drawn between policy-makers and policy-implementers; operationally, they become one and the same.

For example, studies have recorded the extraordinary power of such "lower-participant" groups as attendants in mental hospitals, maintenance

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[37] T.J. Scheff, "Control Over Policy By Attendants in a Mental Hospital," Journal of Health and Human Behavior, 2(1961), 93-105.

workers in factories,[38] forest rangers,[39] patrolmen,[40] school teachers,[41] and social workers[42] in pursuing courses of action inconsistent with or in direct opposition to the policy directives of superiors that it can no longer be assumed that the intentions of policy declarers are always authoritative. Indeed, if it is true that different actors in the policy process not only have a degree of authority over some aspect of the policy environment but also differing sets of objectives, then it cannot be assumed that there is one single objective governing behavior. When objectives are hard to identify, as they so often are when different participants dominate different stages from policy development to policy implementation, analyses based solely on comparisons between policy outcomes and initial (and somewhat ideal) expectations tend merely to lend greater confusion to an already complex and muddied process.

These criticisms notwithstanding, present efforts at conceptualization treat policy-making by lower-participants as deviations from the general pattern. They thus posit as the norm a pattern of policy activity whereby elected officials or individuals highest in the formal chain of command in organizations establish policy objectives and ultimately end with an inventory of factors accounting for the gap between intentions and outcomes as realized by implementing agencies.

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[38] M. Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).

[39] Herbert Kaufman, The Forest Ranger (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1960).

[40] James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968).

[41] Richard Weatherley and Michael Lipsky, "Street-Level Bureaucrats and Institutional Innovation: Implementing Special Education Reform," Harvard Educational Review, 47, No. 2 (May, 1977), 171-197.

[42] T.H. Marshall, Social Policy in the 20th Century (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1965).

Integral to so many case studies of the relationship between superiors and subordinates (or between policy-makers and policy-implementers) has been the general conclusion that the gap between intentions and outcomes cannot be empirically supported as a departure from some presumed norm. Instead, many students of complex organizations view lower-level policy-making as manifestations of a general pattern. David Mechanic, for one, has suggested that lower-participants (by acquiring control over persons, resources, communication channels and information flow, and instrumentalities) can wield a significant degree of power in determining the operational content of policy decisions that is not ordinarily associated with their formal positions.[43] In fact, when the full breadth of administrative power is considered we find that organizations "are continuously at the mercy of their lower participants."[44]

These studies of lower-participant group activity thus inform us that we should not expect to find a perfect fit between one's position in an organization's hierarchical chain of command and the amount of power an individual possesses within the policy process. Recognizing this apparent mismatch, Lawrence Baum has proposed that "instead of viewing any power possessed by lower participants as aberrant, we may begin with the assumption that they alone will determine the content of the policies they execute."[45] Thus, rather than starting with the basic assumption that the superior-subordinate relationship is such that implementing

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[43] David Mechanic, "Sources of Power of Lower Participants in Complex Organizations, Administrative Science Quarterly, 7 (Dec. 1962), 349-64.

[44] Ibid., p. 351.

[45] Lawrence Baum, "An Organizational Theory of Judicial Impact." Ohio State University (mimeo); quoted in Van Meter and Van Horn, "The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework," p. 456.

agencies are guided by explicit directives from policy-makers and that they will consequently act in a manner consistent with policy objectives, we should instead "discover the forces which counteract autonomy rather than taking them for granted."[46]

One cannot then understand the politics of implementation without first recognizing that there are many instances when those charged with carrying out policy are accorded substantial latitude. This is especially evident in areas where public employees (such as social workers, teachers, police officers, inspectors, judges, parole officers, and the like) are oftentimes required to use discretion in their interactions with citizens. Such individuals effectively make policy ehenever they are free to choose not only from among alternative means but even from among alternative ends. Thus, it is their behavior, and not that of the policy-developer, that should set the focal point in understanding the problematic nature of the implementation process.

When it is finally admitted that many implementers (or lower participant groups) do indeed ultimately make policy, then it only seems natural for implementation analysts to focus on those who are charged with administering policy rather than on those who are said to formally make and convey it. Or, as Michael Lipsky has cryptically proposed, implementers often enjoy such substantial latitude that "studies of implementation should be turned on their heads."[47] Instead of focusing on how policy-

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[46] Ibid.

[47] Michael Lipsky, "Standing the Study of Public Policy Implementation on its Head," in Walter Dean Burnham and Martha Weinberg (eds.), American Politics and Public Policy (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1978),

makers can achieve their initial objectives, policy analysts should focus on how the processes of implementation are experienced by policy deliverers. Thus, "rather than considering them at the end of a policy chain, the policy deliverers would instead be seen as primary actors."[48]

This is not meant to suggest that those who carry out policy are in all instances free to deviate from the path prescribed by their superiors, but rather that there are numerous conditions when both inter- and extra-organizational control mechanisms are so weak that assumptions of hierarchy and authority cannot be taken for granted. This would seem to be the case when policy implementers (1) operate under conditions of wide discretion; (2) operate within a context of multiple objectives and the policy in question is not salient enough to warrant strict monitoring by superiors; and (3) confront proposed shifts in ongoing practices to which they have formed particular preferences.[49] When any of these conditions prevail, policy implementers will be found to wield substantial power in both blocking realization of intentions of policy-makers and in deciding what should actually transpire based upon their own policy predispositions.

Given this extensive and well-developed body of theoretical and case study material devoted to analyses of bureaucratic decision-making containing repeated documentation of the increasing power of bureaucracies in processes of policy implementation, policy analysts have nonetheless failed to capitalize on such findings in contemporary determinants research. That is to say, given the recognized power of bureaucracies in determining the operational content of public policies and thus in determining the ultimate outcomes of policy decisions, we should expect to find

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[48] Ibid., p. 398.

[49] Ibid., p. 399-400.

the systematic inclusion of bureaucratic or organizational variables in determinants research. Without such considerations, determinants research can neither hope to analytically specify the nature of the impact bureaucrats have come to realize on the policy process nor improve upon its less than successful attempts to fashion a powerful positive theory of policy formation. Only by escaping from its previously held theoretical and methodological commitments can determinants research improve upon the present instability of its findings, increase the explanatory power of its research designs, and formulate an analytic model of policy formation without the prescriptive sterility of past efforts. This can be accomplished only by incorporating elements of bureaucracy and bureaucratic behavior in future modelling efforts.

If the influence of bureaucrats in the policy process is as great as we believe it is, then why have bureaucratic or organizational variables been consistently underrepresented in determinants research? Surely part of the blame must be placed on the researchers, themselves, for slavishly following the theoretical and methodological predispositions of their disciplines, even though traditional methods have failed to tell us very much about the ultimate determinants of policy outcomes. However, determinants analysts need not shoulder the entire blame. Organizational theorists, for their part, although willing to extol the importance of bureaucracy, have been reluctant to identify the dimensions of bureaucracy and bureaucratic behavior that may be responsible for observed variations in policy outputs. Is the size of bureaucracy important? Its age? Its degree of centralization? Formalization? Professionalization? Complexity? Autonomy? By failing to specify those aspects of bureaucracy

most likely to affect policy outputs, organizational theorists have given little or no significant guidance to determinants researchers.

If researchers are to improve the explanatory power of available modelling efforts and simultaneously correct for their past theoretical and prescriptive sterility, both theoretical and methodological changes are in order. Now although some such changes require at most minor modifications in present definitions of a policy determinant or somewhat more complex causal modelling of the policy process which links initial policy decisions with that policy's ultimate performance, the explanatory strength of most modelling efforts can only be improved by (1) reexamining the empirical foundation of those underlying assumptions regarding the hierarchical arrangement of actors in the policy process, (2) expanding the definition of a power-holder to include those individuals capable of deciding a policy's operational content via processes of implementation, and (3) including variables hypothetically related to each phase of the policy process within methodological designs.

On the one hand, although major modelling efforts have taken root within a large body of determinants research, most studies continue to suffer from an unmistakable lack of theoretical significance. Though researchers have long sought to identify those factors responsible for specific policy outputs, they have succeeded neither in systematically specifying the nature of the linkages among variables nor in explaining the ultimate outcomes of governmental activities. Within narrowly drawn disciplinary boundaries, economists and political scientists alike have attempted to measure the influence of various factors on the policy choices of decision-makers and to predict a community's policy position

given its particular level of economic and political development without first specifying the exact manner in which variables interact. The overriding emphasis on prediction rather than explanation has precluded systematic causal modelling and had even encouraged many to make rather serious inferences on the basis of spurious relationships.

When it is further taken into consideration that the possibility of environmental determinism suggested by most researchers has yet to explain almost an average of two-thirds of the variance in most output categories, we begin to question not only the appropriateness of present research designs but even the manner in which many variables are literally thrown into the analysis with no thought to their theoretical significance. Also questionable is the reluctance of most political scientists to include bureaucratic or organizational variables in their determinants research. Rather than abiding by the belief that socioeconomic conditions set the policy agenda of governmental units, researchers should have at least considered the possibility that although the level of economic development supplies the resources necessary to alter present levels of policy outputs, such political and bureaucratic variables as partisanship and professionalism may provide the initial motivation. Though such factors may lack an independent and direct impact on policy outputs, they could nonetheless serve a contributing function.[50] Their inclusion in determinants research could only then increase the explanatory power of most modelling efforts.

Secondly, researchers must divorce themselves from assumptions of hierarchy and authority in organizations which are not empirically supported

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[50] See, Lawrence B. Mohr, "Determinants of Innovation in Organizations," American Political Science Review, 64 (1969), 111-126.

with direct reference to the policy process. The inability of environmental conditions to explain all of the observed variation in and between output categories and the tendency of communities with dissimilar political structures to pursue different policy options had naturally urged many researchers to extol the importance of politics on things political and to consequently include characteristics of formal decision-making bodies in determinants research. Although there may exist many situations when environmental conditions are so compelling that decision-makers are not free to choose from among assorted policy alternatives, few policies receive formulation in complete isolation from the political climate. This being so, differences in political characteristics may explain some degree of variation in policy outputs. But such differences are not those which are commonly included in most modelling efforts.

Determinants researchers, and here we are referring primarily to political scientists, have concentrated major attention on policy conflicts inherent in legislative bodies. Recognizing that every policy has both its supporters as well as its detractors, researchers have sought to measure the impact of specific legislative characteristics and political conditions on the policy-making process. With the underlying assumption that policy decisions grow out of conflict and bargaining within formal decision-making bodies, researchers have given inordinate consideration to elected public officials and characteristics of the electoral process. In so doing, they have assumed that elected officials occupy positions of highest authority in the policy process. It is held that once policy is made and its exact output level determined, legislators delegate mundane administrative details to public bureaucracies. Thus, in terms of the

setting of initial policy outputs, characteristics of administrative

bodies as well as administrators, themselves, are considered relatively

unimportant.

Now although it is true that bureaucrats do not maintain formal

positions of policy-making authority, ever-increasing delegations of power

from legislators to administrative bodies has given bureaucrats such an

independent voice in deciding the ultimate conduct of political activity

that administrative policy-making can no longer be viewed as some sort

of deviation from the general pattern. Indeed, there now appears to be

no question that for public bureaucracies the task of policy-making has

assumed parity with that of policy implementation. Modelling efforts

based on assumptions of hierarchy are theoretically suspect and when de-

void of variables representative of bureaucratic organization and behavior

they are equally methodologically deficient.

Third, even if researchers investigating the determinants of policy

outputs suddenly picked up the clew that bureaucrats do have an impact

on policy decisions and proceed to include bureaucratic or organizational

variables in their analyses, present models would still be unable to ex-

plain a significant degree of output variation without expanding the

usual definition of determinant. For the most part, when measuring the

impact of certain political characteristics on the policy process, re-

searchers have only considered features of governmental units that can

be measured independently from an output attribute. For example, the

impact of such governmental characteristics as party dominance, electoral

activity, reformism, and legislative structure have been investigated in

a manner unrelated to the given outputs. Researchers have assumed that

characteristics of the governmental unit are important without specifying
the nature of the relationship. Only after strong correlations are found
do researchers hypothesize as to why certain relationships exist. Most
often the same pattern develops when environmental conditions are given
the hypothetically independent status.

Now, given these considerations, suppose researchers interested in
explaining inter-state variations in welfare benefits find that output
levels increase in direct proportion to increases in the state's level
of economic development when controlling for both characteristics of the
governmental unit and for attributes of bureaucratic organization. A
strong case would then no doubt be made for the independent impact of
economic conditions on the level of state welfare benefits. In fact, the
same conclusion would be drawn for any one of the three assumed independent
variables if a strong correlation was found between one and some output
level when controlling for the other two. Certainly few would quarrel
with conclusions proposed by such a study. Let us suppose, however, that
output levels were found to differ even in states with similar economic,
political, and bureaucratic characteristics. In such an instance, the
usual definition of determinant would be found wanting.

Under such conditions researchers would see the need to expand the
usual definition of determinant to include not only characteristics of
the economic environment, governmental unit and bureaucratic organization,
but also characteristics of the choice situation. Such variables as "need"
and "output uncertainty" fall into this category since they characterize
the relationship that may exist between a given governmental unit and
policy output, and thus provide referents outside the governmental or

economic unit. Characteristics of the choice situation should especially be included as potential determinants in all cases where certain geographic regions with like governmental and socioeconomic conditions pursue quite dissimilar policy options.

Finally, and even more germane to the issue presently at hand, determinants researchers may very well be investigating a series of questions that are both theoretically and prescriptively sterile. Though determinants analyses have increased our understanding of the policy-making process by alerting us to those factors which may ultimately determine both the initial setting of policy objectives and the establishing of specific output levels, they have not focused attention on what really seems to matter to both policy-makers and policy affectees, namely, did the policy achieve its initial objectives, and, if so, at what cost? The answer to these questions is dependent on one's analysis of policy outcomes rather than policy outputs. When the focal point is changed in this fashion, identification of key policy determinants must necessarily center on the administrative rather than the governmental or socioeconomic unit. By failing to broaden their definition of policy determinant to include characteristics of the administrative organization, determinants analysts have been unable to formulate a truly functional model of the policy process able to account for sizeable output variations within and between specific policy areas and governmental units.

Though it may be asserted that determinants analysis has not specifically focused on individual power resources, per se, and thus should not be too critically reviewed for failing to document the significant power potential of bureaucrats in determining policy outcomes, the contention

that bureaucrats are ultimately the holders and exercisers of power in national, state, and community affairs has not received the documentation necessary to support the charge even by those studies specifically concerned with community power structures. Instead, various theoretical and methodological constraints have also operated within the power studies literature contributing to rather questionable portfolios of community power holders. Indeed, either a large and growing body of theoretical and case study literature supportive of our claim is seriously mistaken, or community power studies have approached their research project from a rather shaky foundation. In order for the power studies literature to balance its findings with what organization theorists have fully documented concerning the power capacity of bureaucrats, several changes must be made in the manner in which "power" is conceptualized and ultimately operationalized in present studies of community power structures.

Though exceptions do exist, most studies concerned with locating the source of political power in American society can be categorized in one of two principal theoretical perspectives, each of which is dependent upon distinct methodological approaches. On the one hand are studies that start with the premise that there exists in all societies a small class of individuals that can ultimately be identified as the "true power-holders" because of their dominant voice in making decisions affecting and binding upon the general public. This "elitist" view of American society holds that power is held by the few whose will prevails over that of the many. Opposing this perspective is the opinion that though it may be the few who actually make policy decisions, the exact composition of this "power class" varies from one issue area to another. Those holding

this view are appropriately termed pluralists because they see power as a resource that is dispersed among a broad range of groups that exercise a certain degree of influence in specific policy areas.

Though each perspective has a number of proponents that employ differing methodological strategies, both are led by individuals who strongly voice one particular approach for identifying community power-holders. For example, as noted in Chapter III, paving the way for most elitist interpretations of American political life is the reputational approach as developed by Floyd Hunter. Researchers following this particular approach have been led by the growing knowledge that an ever-increasing proportion of political activity is performed by "political outsiders" and that such individuals inevitably exercise significant power over policy decisions affecting the political, economic, and social life of area residents. In recognizing the inability of the traditional focus on political institutions and elected officials to account for the growing influence of political outsiders, Hunter and others sought some means by which the true "power" behind the "scenes" could be identified. In so doing, these researchers posited the opinion that the affairs of every city are in some way managed by a select few who are perceived by others as capable of exercising power either directly or indirectly within the community. And, furthermore, their ultimate degree of influence is so great that they inevitably acquire a certain reputation for power. It has thus been asserted that an individual's reputation can be used as the identifying factor in gauging the location of political power in any one particular community.

Though it cannot be denied that such an approach differs markedly

from studies centered on social class, public office, and institutional position, and in so doing uncovers a body of power-holders significantly different from those identified by earlier approaches, its theoretical and methodological foundations are such that the power potential of public bureaucracies have not been adequately identified. First, by starting with the assumption that a power class does in fact exist and that it can be identified by the reputations of its members, reputation-alists have taken for granted that which they should have instead sought to prove. Secondly, the precise location of political power is an empirical problem and thus one that must be approached by examining particular actions and/or inactions that affect the policy process, rather than by acquiring a subjective measure of one's degree of power by rank-ordering individuals in certain "high-power,low-power" categories on the basis of individual perceptions. "Real power" and "reputed power" cannot be treated as if synonymous. Thirdly, and more importantly, the power studies literature, in general, and reputationalists, in particular, assume that once consensus is reached among the ruling group concerning the direction of community activities, the struggle for control of policy development is complete. Though the reputational approach may identify individuals who are publicized as key personnel in the policy-making process, in so doing it is methodologically suspect because it treats consensus-building in policy formulation as the end rather than the be-ginning of the process. The fact that public bureaucracies not only provide many of the innovating ideas in American government but also most often have the ability to modify, if not make, policy in the process of implementation and program administration and thereby determine a policy's

operational content, goes unnoticed in studies employing the reputational approach. Since their activities are not ordinarily publicized and their positions not subject to public election and accountability, bureaucrats fail to gain the reputation for power accorded elected officials and individuals of highly publicized status.

This is not to suggest that the leading methodology of the elitist perspective is wholly inadequate, but rather that certain key elements are missing from its design. First, increasing delegations of policy-making authority to public bureaucracies has shattered the myth that administrators merely follow faithfully the directives of elected officials. Since the power they do hold almost invariably goes unnoticed or is seen as directly related to specific policy instructions of others, or even as a temporary aberration, they do not attain the sort of reputation that others can perceive. Thus, when using the reputational approach, researchers must be careful not to equate power as reputedly exercised in the making of policy with that which ultimately arises when policy is administered. Secondly, reputationalists cannot assume that an individual's power potential is constant across all policy sectors. Thus, if the researcher asks a number of knowledgeable people to name the power-holders in their community, how can one be sure that they are identifying persons with power in all policy areas, in some, or in a single, highly publicized instance? An effort must be made to determine the degree of power exercised by certain individuals in specified policy areas. And, thirdly, due to the unpublicized nature of most administrative activities, researchers need to employ their specific methodology with key members of the bureaucracy. This can be accomplished by (1) distributing the

questionaire to all public bureaucrats who are in a position to identify
key power-holders within their specified area of expertise, and by (2)
segregating policy activity into specific issue-related categories and
then proceeding to question both key community influentials and adminis-
trators responsible for implementing policies in those issue-areas. How-
ever, even when researchers do proceed that one step further and consider
the reputations of key policy administrators, there still exists the
danger that so-called "power-holders" may only be perceived as such be-
cause of their leadership position within the administrative body and
not because of their determinative role in policy development and per-
formance. Thus the relationship between one person's behavior and
another's perception of that behavior must be empirically determined.
This can only be accomplished by examining the total political activity
of public bureaucrats, i.e., their advise-giving functions, interpretations
of policy decisions, and ultimate application of policy directives.

The suggestion that researchers employing the reputational approach
expand their list of respondents to include members of bureaucracy and to
then attest to the validity of their findings by considering the specific
policy behavior of reputed power-holders in the policy environment has
received at least partial consideration in the type of decisional analy-
sis undertaken by members of the pluralist persuasion. In brief, plural-
ists have sought to show that the specific make-up of individuals and
coalitions committed to and directly involved in particular policy decisions
varies from one issue area to another, and in so doing, have demonstrated
that power very often appears to be dispersed among a broad range of
individuals, groups, and institutions. Starting with the belief that the

exercise of power must be examined in its institutional setting, pluralists have sought to identify power-holders by tracing the historical development of particular policy decisions from the setting of the political agenda to the specification of policy output levels. In so doing, they have attempted to identify those individuals most prominent in the decision-making process.

Though decisional analysis has allowed researchers to identify those individuals actively engaged in processes of agenda-setting, decision-making, and output specification, like the reputational methodology, it has treated policy formulation as the end rather than the beginning of policy development. Bureaucrats have not been identified as key policy levers even by decisional analysts because they, too, have been constrained by a rather limited definition of their subject, power. Since researchers are most often interested in conflicts inherent in the formulation of policy decisions they have failed to consider the ways power is exercised by those individuals and institutions responsible for applying policy and therefore for bringing about initial objectives. Even when policies have been enacted, various administrative constraints may prevent execution of the decision in the manner prescribed by policy-makers. If researchers are to fully address the nature of power relations in the American governmental process, they will need to trace the total sequence of the policy process from issue specification to policy outcomes. Only by examining the activities of bureaucrats can researchers begin to understand the full power capacity of policy administrators in translating initial policy decisions into explicit and meaningful outcomes. And, since governments are most often judged by what they deliver rather than

by what they promise, the increasing role of public bureaucracies must take on added significance in studies of the American policy process.

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184

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The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the require-
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April 20, 1982

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