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The Distribution of Recreational Facilities in Chicago: An Empirical Analysis of the Public Policy of the Chicago Park District

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THE DISTRIBUTION OF RECREATIONAL FACILITIES IN
CHICAGO: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC
POLICY OF THE CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT

by

Greg Slusarczyk

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
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LIFE

The author, Greg Slusarczyk, is the son of Joseph and Florence Slusarczyk. He was born September 13, 1956 in Chicago, Illinois.

His elementary education was obtained at Assumption B.V.M in Chicago. He graduated from Marist High School in Chicago in 1974.

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In September, 1978, he entered the graduate program in Political Science at Loyola University of Chicago and was granted an assistantship.

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CHAPTER I
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The beginning of a sustained effort to monitor the distribution of services at the local level can be traced to the events and political realities of the 1960s. Although there were earlier attempts to analyze public administration and review the success of certain welfare programs, those initiatives were sporadic and uncoordinated.¹ However, in the 1960s, community action groups and the Civil Rights movement focused attention on pressing urban problems and apparent inequities in the delivery of basic services. The Kerner Commission disclosed that "one principal cause of the racial disorders of the 1960s was dissatisfaction with municipal governments and their outputs."² But as the process of suburbanization continued, the capacity of central cities to raise the revenue necessary to finance redistributive and renewal policies declined. In addition, the multiplication of special districts established to administer particular services may have actually impeded the effort to insure uniform standards of equality in the distribution of services. Major policy-making officials in urban areas, operating within a fiscally strained and fragmented

¹See G. Lyons, The Uneasy Partnership: Social Science and the Federal Government (New York: Russell Sage Foundations, 1969).

²Robert L. Lineberry, Equality and Urban Policy (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977), p. 13.

governmental system, were confronted with rising demands for efficient and equitable allocations of services. Coincidentally, a body of research developed that was exclusively concerned with the provision of municipal services.³

While past studies of political participation tended to focus on voting behavior, an increasing number of political scientists recognized the theoretical importance of the relationship between the outcome of service distribution policies and political participation. Accordingly, studies of service distribution were typically advanced in the following terms:

A singular focus on the electoral process and the variety of interest groups and their access to decision-makers...is unquestionably important...but neglects another element of politics which is implicit in much that is written about political participation. This neglected element is the manner in which individuals enjoy the fruits of participation or apathy; it concerns the degree to which people obtain valued goods and services.⁴

One can reasonably suggest that, for the majority of citizens, political involvement is related to the efficiency with which governmental systems deliver services, with participation in politics a function of perceptions of equity and efficiency in the administration of services.

Similarly, service distribution research is often linked to

³See Donald M. Fisk and Richard E. Winnie, "Output Measurement in Urban Government: Current Status and Likely Prospects," Social Science Quarterly 54 (1973/74): 725-740.

⁴Herbert Jacob, "Contact With Government Agencies: A Preliminary Analysis of the Distribution of Government Services," Midwest Journal of Political Science V16 (1972), p. 123.

Laswell's definition of the science of politics as the discovery of "who gets what, when and how."⁵ As Rich states:

...the discussion which follows is predicated on the assumption that public services are the prizes of urban politics. The game is not played only to determine who will get available services, but also to determine which services will be provided, what units of government will provide them, and who will bear their costs.⁶

Levy, Meltsner and Wildavsky suggest that both scholars and citizens are intent on discovering the rationale of distributive policy: (for example) "the Park Department favors the poor, or it discriminates against black neighborhoods, or it spends too much money for what it produces."⁷

Others treat services as policy outputs indicative of an "authoritative allocation of values." For those concerned with political behavior and the policy process, service distribution is an especially salient topic. "The city is seen as a service dependent environment, whose viability as a social unit directly depends on the continuous provision of services."⁸ In view of Easton's systems model of the policy process, patterns of service distribution will reflect the relationship between the demands of recipient groups and the

⁵Harold Laswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When and How (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936).

⁶Richard C. Rich, "Neglected Issues in the Study of Urban Service Distributions: A Research Agenda," Urban Studies 16 (1979): 143.

⁷Frank Levy, Arnold J. Meltsner and Aaron Wildavsky, Urban Outcomes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 1.

⁸Robert L. Lineberry and Robert E. Welch Jr., "Who Gets What: Measuring the Distribution of Urban Public Services," Social Science Quarterly 54 (1973/74): 700-712.

priorities of policy-makers.⁹ Associations between partisan activity, socioeconomic indicators and variations in allocation patterns substantiate the relevance of perceiving public policy to be the product of the interaction between environmental demands and the political idiosyncrasies of governmental institutions.

This study will analyze the distribution of quantities of public recreational facilities in Chicago with the intent of revealing who benefits and who bears the costs; how are distributive patterns in a significant number of wards related to measures of partisan strength, race and ethnicity and to what extent is the policy of the Chicago Park District, as it may be manifested in that relationship, efficient and equitable. Relevant past studies have relied too heavily on anecdotal inferences related to the eccentricities of partisan politics in Chicago.¹⁰ Other empirically oriented studies have failed to adequately address the effects of administrative peculiarities that characterize service delivery environments.

In particular, Mladenka's investigation of the distribution of recreational facilities in Chicago is fundamentally flawed. It is theoretically founded on a dubious proposition. Namely, that

⁹David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965).

¹⁰See Len O'Connor, Clout: Mayor Daley and His City (Chicago: Regency Press, 1975). Also see Milton Rakove, Don't Make No Waves, Don't Back No Losers (Bloomington: University of Indiana, 1975).

progressive reforms and the rise of urban service bureaucracies have, in effect, rendered urban partisan machine organizations inoperable and inconsequential. To those acquainted with the political nuances of the Chicago governmental system, that assertion is thoroughly unacceptable. Mladenka failed to control for the concentration of a large percentage of public recreational facilities in a small number of wards containing major lakefront attractions. The inclusion of those outlying cases produced misleading findings and led Mladenka to endorse a number of implausible generalizations. Mladenka's major conclusion, that politics has no effect on the allocation of quantities of public recreational facilities in Chicago, appears to be a methodological artifact; the result of a flawed technique which neglects to consider an essential peculiarity of the service environment. Therefore, this study intends to contribute to a critical body of research which presumes that service distribution patterns reflect the underlying priorities of those institutions and officials responsible for the distribution and administration of services. The efficacy of that intention rests specifically on a research design which corrects the methodological errors of that portion of Mladenka's earlier study devoted to the distribution of public recreational facilities in Chicago.¹¹

¹¹See Kenneth Mladenka, "The Urban Bureaucracy and the Chicago Political Machine: Who Gets What and the Limits to Political Control," American Political Science Review 74 (1980): 991-998.

Given the diversity of urban settings and the variety of services delivered by municipal governments, a number of observations regarding the rationale of distributive policy have been offered. Those observations have led to the development of three major hypotheses concerning the distribution of services by municipalities.¹²

The underclass hypothesis relates patterns of distribution to the dispersal of social classes. Since the process of urbanization involves the clustering of racial, ethnic and social classes into distinct areas, the distribution of services inevitably benefits some groups of citizens while depriving other groups of citizens.¹³ Nivola suggests that equity is feasible only where a high degree of homogeneity exists: In heterogeneous urban areas, the maldistribution of services is a predictable outcome of urban settlement patterns.¹⁴

Jones and Kaufman describe the distinctiveness of urban neighborhoods and suggest that distributive patterns reveal the priorities and attitudes of policy-makers and administrators.

¹²For a general discussion of the major hypotheses, consult Harlan Hahn and Charles Levine, Introduction to Urban Politics: Past, Present and Future (New York: Longman Inc., 1980). Also Robert L. Lineberry, Equality and Urban Policy (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1978). Also Bryan D. Jones and Clifford Kaufman, "The Distribution of Urban Public Services: A Preliminary Model," Administration and Society 6 (1974): 337-360.

¹³Robert L. Lineberry, "Equality, Public Policy and Public Services: The Underclass Hypothesis and the Limits to Equality," Politics and Policy 4 (1975): 67-84.

¹⁴Pietro S. Nivola, "Distributing A Municipal Service: A Case Study of Housing Inspection," Journal of Politics 40 no.1-2 (1978): 59-81.

(They note that)...urban governments have the opportunity to distribute their services such that some kinds of citizens enjoy more of the benefits of government activities than do other kinds of citizens...by distributing services unequally to neighborhoods, governments are distributing those services unequally to categories of citizens.¹⁵

The discriminatory attitudes that pervade society regularly influence distributive decisions and service deprivation occurs deliberately and systematically. Support for that view is primarily drawn from legal suits instituted by citizens seeking a more equitable distribution of services.

In a 1969 editorial, the New York University Law Review asserted the need for active judicial intervention in the area of municipal service provision. It stated:

The need is long overdue for judicial recognition of a legal right to adequate municipal services. Remedies must be made available against abuse of discretion by public officials.¹⁶

Consequently, an increasing number of urban residents sought to redress apparent service inequities through the courts; to demonstrate that maldistributions of services constituted violations of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.

¹⁵Bryan Jones and Clifford Kaufman, "The Distribution of Urban Public Services: A Preliminary Model," Administration and Society 6 (1974): 337.

¹⁶"The Right to Adequate Municipal Services," New York University Law Review 44 (1969): 774. Also see Kenneth W. Bond, "Toward Equal Delivery of Municipal Services in the Central Cities," Fordham Urban Law Journal 4 (Winter 1976): 263-287. Robert L. Lineberry, "Mandating Urban Equality: The Distribution of Municipal Public Services," Texas Law Review 53 (Dec 1974): 26-59. A.E Merget and W.M Wolff Jr., "The Law and Municipal Services: Implementing Equity," Public Management 58 (1976): 2-8. R.L Graham and J.H Kravitt, "The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education, Municipal Services and Wealth," Harvard Law Review 7 (1972): 103-213.

The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides for the implementation of equitable remedies where the effect of state and local action has been to discriminate invidiously against an identifiable class of persons deprived of a guaranteed right or important benefit generally enjoyed by society at large.¹⁷

Various groups of citizens in a number of cities utilized the equal protection clause to seek a more equitable allocation of services.

In *Hawkins v Shaw* (1971), a Court of Appeals ruled that the paving of streets and dispersal of sewers in Shaw, Mississippi followed a racially discriminatory pattern; black neighborhoods were deprived of services regularly accorded to white areas.¹⁸

In *Hadnott v City of Prattville*, the Court declared:

...a municipality may not discriminate in the delivery of services to black neighborhoods without acting in violation of the equal protection clause, whether the discrimination was intentional or merely the result of an arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness... once discrimination in delivery based on race is demonstrated, the court will employ the strict scrutiny test.¹⁹

In both cases, the municipalities were ordered to remedy the effects of discriminatory distributive decisions.

However, in *San Antonio School District v Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the United States Supreme Court ruled unfavorably towards the unqualified application of equal protection to the delivery of services. The court refused to identify education as a fundamental right and further asserted that apparent inequities could be justified by certain compelling arguments (e.g fiscal dilemmas).

¹⁷Bond, "Toward Equal Delivery of Municipal Services," 263.

¹⁸*Hawkins v Shaw* 437 F2d. 1286 (1971).

¹⁹Bond, "Toward Equal Delivery of Municipal Services," 270.

The Court also unequivocally stated that the maldistribution of services was a legislative and not a judicial concern.

In view of that ruling, legal challenges to municipal distribution policies declined and subsequent cases were rarely adjudicated in favor of dissatisfied underclasses. In *Goldstein v City of Chicago*, a district court judge declared that "refuse collection was one of the numerous social welfare benefits which governmental units have voluntarily undertaken to provide, but was certainly not a fundamental right."²⁰ In *Towns v Beame*, a district court was not persuaded by evidence alleging racial discrimination in fire protection services; the court found no violation of equal protection because New York's policy of closing certain facilities was justified by the need to reduce services in response to a budgetary crisis.²¹

For those inclined to a pluralist orientation to community power (Robert Dahl), discriminatory distribution patterns are implicit to a pluralistic system. Active and efficiently organized groups procure a sufficient allocation of services, while those groups unable to adequately articulate their interests are

²⁰*Goldstein v City of Chicago* 504 F2d. 989 (7th Cir. 1974) 991. Similar judgements were rendered in *Beal v Lindsay* 468 F2d. 287, 292 (2nd Cir. 1972). Also *Davis v Weir* 497 F2d. 139 (5th Cir. 1974). Also *Burner v Washington* 389 F.Supp. 44 (D.D.C 1975). And *Fine v City of Winner* 352 F.Supp. 925 (D.S.D 1972). For a general discussion of the effect of *San Antonio v Rodriguez*, consult Martin A. Schwartz, "Municipal Services Litigation After Rodriguez," Brooklyn Law Review 40 (1974): 93-114.

²¹*Towns v Beame* 386 F.Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y 1974).

deprived of needed services.²² Various groups do not benefit equally in terms of service outputs and outcomes, not because of deliberately discriminatory policies, but, rather, because certain ethnic and socioeconomic traits confer organizational and, therefore, political advantages within a service delivery network. A number of authors have asserted that the capacity to organize collectively is related to ethnic political culture. If distributive decisions reflect patterns of group activism, one would expect that allocation patterns favor those ethnic clusters more disposed to political participation and collective organization.²³ Dale C. Nelson found large differences in levels of participant culture existing among ethnic groups, with a particularly strong correlation between Irish ethnic identity and political involvement.²⁴ Similarly, Terry Clark observed that the Irish are more inclined to personalize politics and have more resources of significance for engaging in politics than other groups.²⁵

²²See Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

²³See Werner Z. Hirsch, "The Supply Side of Urban Public Services," in Issues in Urban Economics, eds. Harvey S. Perloff and Lowdon Wingo Jr. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp.447-526. Also Michael Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification," American Political Science Review 11 (1967):717-726.

²⁴Dale C. Nelson, "Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status as Sources of Participation: The Case for Ethnic Political Culture," American Political Science Review 73 pt.2 (1979): 1024-1038.

²⁵Terry Nichols Clark, "The Irish Ethic and the Spirit of Patronage," Ethnicity 2 (1975): 305-359).

A number of groups may also cooperate to secure certain services. Rich suggests that: "The more community organizations representative of an area, and the more powerful those groups are, the better and more efficient will be the services provided for that area."²⁶ Citizen demands shape distributive policy, as their neighborhood spokesmen influence the policy choices of officials and bureaucrats. Service distribution patterns are related to patterns of collective neighborhood organization. Rich asserts:

It is important to study the access of different groups to the decision processes involved in service distribution...the effectiveness of neighborhood associations in mobilizing the technical expertise necessary to interact with municipal officials.²⁷

...community efforts may condition public service delivery patterns as bureaucrats are attracted to areas in which they receive greater cooperation or see more fruits from their labors, or as they direct resources away from neighborhoods that help themselves and reduce their need for outside help.²⁸

Inequities in services among distinct groups, then, are seen as the implicit outgrowth of pluralism, rather than the result of intentional discrimination by those who formulate distributive policy and administer services.

For the elitists (Floyd Hunter), the existence of a disadvantaged underclass deprived of needed services substantiates the predominance of wealthy elites in city government. Those who hold political power, namely economic notables, will distribute

²⁶Jones and Kaufman, "The Distribution of Public Services," 340.

²⁷Richard C. Rich, "Neglected Issues," 150.

²⁸Ibid, 151.

services in a manner approximating patterns of socioeconomic affluence. Although the affluent possess greater individual resources and can more easily acquire privately supplied services, the allocation of public services will tend to favor the wealthy.²⁹ They would argue that "normally demands from neighborhoods are unlikely to play an important part of the process; they are usually sporadically generated and difficult to fit into the daily routine of service provision."³⁰

The structural hypothesis posits a relationship between the organization of partisan political strength and the distribution of supporters. Allocations of services will reflect the attitudes and priorities advocated by predominant party organizations as they consolidate support and political power. Unlike the underclass hypothesis, which focuses on discrimination of a sociological nature, relating the distribution of services to racial bias, ethnic pluralism, or class consciousness, the structural hypothesis emphasizes the inequities that result from political favoritism, as officials of the predominant party find it expedient to distribute services preferentially to party supporters. In considering the distribution of services, it is crucial to compare the services rendered to broad aggregates of partisan loyalists with the

²⁹See Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1954).

³⁰Bryan D. Jones, "Distributional Considerations in Models of Government Service Provision," in The Politics and Economics of Urban Services, ed. Robert L. Lineberry (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1978), 38.

services rendered to a broad category of non-supporters. The structural hypothesis suggests that variances in services will approximate varying levels of categorical support for the dominant political party. There is a critical distinction between the distributive policies that characterize older unreformed governmental structures and more recent reformed formats that have progressively sought to diminish the influence of party organizations. Presumably, then, where older forms of municipal government persist, the aggregate structure of partisan political strength is an especially relevant consideration.

Traditional machine organizations consolidated partisan support by dispensing patronage and preferentially servicing an ethnic constituency. Machines developed simultaneous with urbanization and immigration, as local party officials capitalized on the opportunity to secure a mass base of electoral support; ethnic groups which desired needed services, but who were unfamiliar with the contours of the political system, came to rely on their informal contacts with party representatives. Thus, Banfield and Wilson describe the machine as an agency for allocating tangible incentives to an ethnic constituency through a centralized partisan organization.³¹ As Cornwell states:

Ethnicity is essential to the machine. Any disciplined grass roots political organization rests upon a docile mass base

³¹Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1963).

which has in some manner been rendered dependable, predictable and manipulable.³²

Hence, in unreformed cities where machine organizations may have predominated, the distribution of services might be expected to reflect varying levels of categorical partisan strength.

However, there is a paucity of empirical studies dealing with the structural hypothesis. Kasperson analyzed voting patterns in Chicago's mayoral elections of 1951, 1955 and 1959, dividing the city into concentric zones of Democratic strength. The core area of greatest electoral support was characterized by a concentration of poor black and ethnic groups. Kasperson suggested that:

Here greater value is placed on neighborhood needs, material gifts and favors and family and ethnic ties...politicians capitalized on the poverty stricken and more transient population of this area to erect a political machine with its accompanying corruption.³³

While the inference is that levels of services will be higher in those inner zones of support as a matter of political expedience, no empirical association between patterns of service distribution and varying levels of electoral support were demonstrated.

Oliver Williams has described urban policy as "the use of space to structure social access," thereby noting the importance of varying life style values among different classes of citizens. Where more non-essential services, like recreation, are at issue or in cases where services are significantly related to the

³²Elmer E. Cornwell Jr., "Bosses, Machines and Ethnic Groups," in The City Boss in America: An Interpretive Reader, ed. Alexander B. Callow Jr. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 124.

³³Roger E. Kasperson, "Toward A Geography of Urban Politics: Chicago, A Case Study," Economic Geography 41 (1965): 103.

maintenance of certain life styles, service disparities may be preferable.³⁴ Since life styles and demands vary in a heterogeneous setting, the underclass hypothesis may be an insufficient means of generally appraising the service distribution policies of municipal governments.

Furthermore, studies to date have not revealed any consistent pattern of discrimination in the distribution of services. In their study of the distribution of parks and libraries in Houston, Mladenka and Hill showed distributional inequities to be dispersed rather than cumulative; park acreage and facilities were allocated equally, while locational patterns selectively favored low income areas. The distribution of library resources favored upper income neighborhoods, while the spatial distribution of libraries favored black and low income neighborhoods.³⁵ There also appears to be no evidence that the more affluent influence policy officials to manipulate the distribution of services in a manner detrimental to an underclass.³⁶ Nor do policy officials consistently serve the needs of the underclass to the detriment of the more affluent.³⁷

³⁴Oliver Williams, Metropolitan Political Analysis: A Social Access Approach (New York: The Free Press, 1971).

³⁵Kenneth Mladenka and Kim Quaille Hill, "The Distribution of Benefits in an Urban Environment: Parks and Libraries in Houston," Urban Affairs Quarterly 13 (1977-78): 73-82.

³⁶See Rich, "Neglected Issues,"

³⁷See G. Antunes and W. Plumlee, "The Distribution of an Urban Public Service: Ethnicity, Socioeconomic Status and Bureaucracy as Determinants of the Quality of Neighborhood Streets," Urban Affairs Quarterly 12 (1976-77): 313-332.

Nor are there any studies indicating cumulative inequalities on the basis of ethnicity. In short, the trend is one of sporadic inequities in some service functions, but not in others.³⁸

Based on those observations, and in view of the professionalization of municipal government, a number of scholars have asserted the efficacy of a bureaucratic decision-rule hypothesis. Progressive reforms of the electoral process and administrative innovations have eroded the effectiveness of party machines in urban areas. In the majority of American cities, professional managers and special service bureaucracies have been installed to impartially allocate and oversee service distribution.³⁹ If inequities occur, they are seen as a function of varying life style preferences or as the result of spillovers from rule based decisions designed to resolve other problems.⁴⁰ Neither partisan leaders, nor economic notables, exert an overbearing control of municipal policy, especially where administrative goals supercede political ambition in reformed settings.⁴¹

³⁸See Lineberry, *The Politics and Economics of Urban Services*.

³⁹See Mladenka and Antunes, "The Politics of Local Services and Service Distribution," in *The New Urban Politics*, eds. Louis Masotti and R.L. Lineberry (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing, 1976), pp. 37-69.

⁴⁰See Lineberry, *Equality and Urban Policy*.

⁴¹See Demetrios Caraley, *City Government and Urban Problems* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977).

The bureaucratic decision-rule hypothesis is advanced in a number of studies. Nivola analyzed Boston's housing inspection program in 1973 and concluded that service patterns were dictated more by the internal imperatives of the administrative process than by the dynamics of local politics.⁴² Mladenka analyzed the distribution of parks, fire protection, refuse collection and educational facilities in Chicago, correlating service outputs with electoral results and socioeconomic indicators: Finding only minimal associations among the variables, he concluded that distributive patterns were primarily a function of bureaucratic inter-agency procedures.⁴³ In a study of police protection in Houston, Mladenka and Hill attributed the pattern of service responses to the police department's rule of dispatching aid on the basis of the seriousness of reported crimes in progress.⁴⁴ Jones, Greenberg, Kaufman and Drew examined the service outputs of Detroit's Environmental Protection Agency, Sanitation Department and Parks and Recreation Department: In each instance, they found that service distribution was best explained by the internal structure of each agency and standard rule based productivity

⁴²See Nivola, "Distributing A Municipal Service: A Case Study of Housing Inspection."

⁴³See Mladenka, "The Urban Bureaucracy and the Chicago Machine."

⁴⁴Kenneth Mladenka and Kim Quaille Hill, "The Distribution of Urban Police Services," Journal of Politics 40 no.1-2 (1978): 112-133.

considerations.⁴⁵ Typically, those endorsing the bureaucratic decision-rule hypothesis conclude:

...recent research reveals that the distributional decisions in large cities are made by professional administrators who rely upon technical rather than political criteria to guide distributional choices...resource allocation is little effected by electoral outcomes, income levels or the racial makeup of neighborhoods.⁴⁶

Whatever hypothesis one subscribes to, there must be a greater awareness of the limitations of service distribution research. Conclusions drawn from limited studies cannot be unequivocally endorsed in a doctrinaire fashion. In a dynamic urban setting:

Service decisions are the product of the urban policy-making process. That process occurs within a structure composed broadly of urban elites, elected officials, interest groups and the delivery bureaucracies of municipal governments.⁴⁷

In addition, a heirarchy of services may exist; certain services may involve greater expenditures, or be appraised as more valuable by influential leaders and client groups than other "softer" services. Hence, different hypotheses may be applicable to different services within the same system. "The particular pattern of service distribution observed seems to depend on the service studied and the service indicator employed."⁴⁸

⁴⁵Jones, Greenberg, Kaufman and Drew, "Service Delivery Rules and the Distribution of Local Government Services: Three Detroit Bureaucracies," Journal of Politics 40 no.1-2 (1978): 332-368.

⁴⁶Mladenka, "The Urban Bureaucracy and the Chicago Machine," 991.

⁴⁷Lineberry, Equality and Urban Policy, p. 17.

⁴⁸Jones et. al. Service Delivery Rules and the Distribution of Local Government Services," 339.

One should also be cognizant of a number of methodological issues: Municipal records may be unavailable, obscure or unreliable. The choice of variables used to measure underlying concepts and operationalize hypotheses may be inadequate. The distinction between quantitative and qualitative dimensions of service delivery constrains hypothetical judgements. How are services best measured? In terms of quantities of facilities and personnel, the promptness and frequency of service, the nature of the personnel-client relationship, or service consumption.⁴⁹

Clearly, the most critical factor in analyzing patterns of service allocation and distributive policy is a recognition of environmental and political transition. The Chicago school of sociology emphasized the need to be sensitive to "ecological succession;" the replacement of one neighborhood population or land use by another.⁵⁰ Changes in the composition of neighborhoods produce dynamic variations in patterns of life style values, the organization of community interests and the emergence of client based needs. Meanwhile, political leadership often changes substantially. Given the mobility of the urban population, distributive decisions targeted to serve the needs of particular categories of citizens may be rendered inconsequential, especially where services are delivered through fixed facilities. There

⁴⁹See Lineberry, The Politics and Economics of Urban Services.

⁵⁰See Howard Aldrich, "Ecological Succession in Racially Changing Neighborhoods: A Review of the Literature," Urban Affairs Quarterly 10 (1974-75): 327-348.

is a need, then, to utilize time series analysis and variables sensitive to the realities of transition, methods which have been overlooked in past research endeavors.

Finally, one is faced with the issue of interpretation and evaluation. In evaluating patterns of distribution, the literature tends to promote standards of equity and responsiveness. Given the reality of ecological succession and urban heterogeneity, one must distinguish equality of outputs from equitable outcomes: "The provision of equal service outputs to groups of consumers who are in highly unequal circumstances may produce inequitable outcomes."⁵¹ Policy tradeoffs are an inherent feature of a fiscally strained system and disparities in the services given to citizens may actually reflect progressive innovations in policy, as specific areas are targeted for special experimental programs. Consequently, evaluating the public policy of a specialized service agency involves establishing permissible ranges of variance from equity based on an awareness of the disruptive effects of ecological succession, fiscal strain and varying life style demands, as well as the constraints intrinsic to bureaucratic procedural rules and administrative prerequisites. With those considerations in mind, the following research project will reveal the pattern of distribution of public recreational facilities in Chicago and assess the public policy of the Chicago Park District.

⁵¹Rich, "Neglected Issues in the Study of Urban Service Distributions," 154.

CHAPTER II
RESEARCH DESIGN

In view of the fiscal problems being encountered by local governments, the Illinois state legislature, in April 1934, passed a Park Consolidation Act which combined twenty-two separate park districts in Chicago into a single district. Whereas recreational services had previously been financed by variable local tax levies, the Consolidation Act enabled the district to finance bonds and support programs through a uniform tax levy on real estate in Chicago. Under its charter,

...the Park District has power to levy taxes and make special assessments; it may issue bonds, which must be approved by the voters in a referendum. It may enact and enforce ordinances, rules and regulations for the maintenance and protection of property under its jurisdiction, and it may acquire land by gift, purchase or condemnation.⁵²

A non-salaried board of five commissioners appointed by the mayor assumes general responsibility for policy, and a general superintendent is empowered to oversee the day to day operations of ten major departments. Since 1934, the Chicago Park District has extended its jurisdiction, so that it currently maintains over 580 parks (7,340 acres), in addition to nine major museums, Lincoln Park Zoo, numerous harbor facilities and Soldier's Field.⁵³

⁵²Chicago, The Key to Our Local Government, prepared by the League of Women Voters, 1978, p. 86.

⁵³Chicago Park District: Records and Estimates Division-Planning Group, Table of Parks and Park Facilities, 1980.

This research project is designed to analyze the distribution of recreational facilities in Chicago; to explain variances in the dispersal of public recreational facilities in terms of patterns of partisan strength, racial and ethnic diversity and socioeconomic affluence. Theoretically, the issue is one of determining the relative explanatory power of several competing theses in regards to the allocation of recreational facilities in Chicago. The underclass hypothesis posits the existence of a disadvantaged clientele, deprived of needed or desired services because of deliberate discrimination, the realities of a pluralistic (competitive) system, or influence of class conscious elites. Those who favor a structural hypothesis assert that distributive policy is an extension of partisan politics, as a broad coalition of loyalists and supporters receive greater benefits. In view of the professionalization of city government and progressive reform of electoral procedures and hiring practices, a number of scholars endorse a bureaucratic decision-rule hypothesis; patterns of distribution are a function of bureaucratic interagency procedures. Methodologically, the primary consideration is the need to develop measures and procedures sensitive to the reality of political change and urban mobility.

Therefore, this study attempts to answer a number of inter-related inquiries: 1) How is the distribution of public recreational facilities in Chicago related to racial differences, ethnic pluralism and levels of affluence (tests the underclass hypothesis)? 2) How is the distribution of public recreational facilities in

Chicago related to partisan politics (tests the structural hypothesis)? 3) If there is no significant relationship between the distribution of facilities and those aforementioned indicators, is the bureaucratic decision-rule hypothesis applicable? 4) Does the relative explanatory power of each independent factor (race, ethnicity, affluence, partisan strength, bureaucratic procedures) in regards to the distribution of quantities of facilities persist or change substantially over time? 5) Finally, in view of those findings, how efficient and equitable is the public policy of the Chicago Park District?

The data necessary to the exploration of those questions was readily available. Although access to data of a more qualitative nature (personnel records, financial statements, employee performance) is restricted, the Chicago Park District's Division of Records annually compiles a detailed public disclosure of numbers of parks and park facilities and their location. Measurements of partisan political strength can be adapted from election statistics maintained by the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners. Racial, ethnic and socioeconomic profiles can be obtained from Census Reports.

Since Chicago is a ward based political system, with census figures broken down accordingly, aggregate ward profiles appeared to be an appropriate unit of analysis: The majority of aldermen have direct contact with a sizable number of their constituents, and the coincidence of the location of wards with comparatively

homogenous ethnic and socioeconomic clusters reinforces the use of aggregate ward statistics.


Similarly, numbers of park facilities could be easily tabulated by ward. However, of the 7,340 acres devoted to the provision of public recreational services, 2,720 acres, or nearly 34 percent of property maintained by the Chicago Park District is devoted to major lakefront attractions (Burnham Park, Grant Park, Jackson Park, Lincoln Park, Navy Pier and Northerly Island).⁵⁴ These major parks are designed and preserved as a civic obligation, in order to promote the general attractiveness of the lakefront area. As such, those services are not targeted to the demands or needs of any specific constituency. Furthermore, such a large concentration of facilities in a limited area and limited number of outlying wards would frustrate any empirical attempt to explore the discretionary dimensions of recreational policy. The functional distinction between the maintenance of major lakefront attractions, as opposed to the delivery of recreational services to distinct groups of citizens clustered elsewhere, warrants the need to reduce the number of cases. Accordingly, those ten wards containing major lakefront attractions (Wards 1, 2, 4, 5, 42, 43, 44, 46, 48, 49) are eliminated in order to insure a sample of cases conducive to investigating the substantive theoretical questions of service distribution research.

⁵⁴Chicago Park District: Records and Estimates Division-Planning Group, Table of Parks and Park Facilities, 1966.

Thus, this research project will attempt to explain variances in the distribution of recreational facilities across 40 wards in terms of varying levels of racial, ethnic and socioeconomic diversity and partisan support. (See Illustrations/Figure 1-1, 1-2, pp. 26, 27)


After calculating the number of Park District facilities in each ward, several facilities were selected to serve as the dependent variables. Football and soccer facilities are fairly representative of a group of outdoor facilities (See Appendix A, p.76). Because certain qualitative indicators proved to be unavailable, it was incumbent to select facilities whose locational distribution might involve some qualitative fiscal dimension. Fieldhouses and recreation buildings represent an extensive capital investment and are more highly prized by local interests and were naturally included in the analysis. Finally, a measure of all total facilities per ward was also included. (Profiles of the Park District facilities contained in each ward can be found in Tables 2-1, 2-2, 2-3 and 2-4, pp. 28-31)

FIGURE 1-1
WARD MAP OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO 1960



Source: 1960 Census of Population and Housing:
Numbers Coincident with July 23, 1961 Ward
Boundaries in the City of Chicago--Compiled by
J.R. Godwin, Research Division, Department of
City Planning.

FIGURE 2-2
WARD MAP OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO 1970



Source: 1970 Census of Population and Housing: Numbers Coincident With July 28, 1971 Ward Boundaries in the City of Chicago--Compiled by J.R. Godwin, Research Division, Department of City Planning.

TABLE 2-2
CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT FACILITIES 1970

| WARD | TOTAL FACILITIES '76 | SR. BASEBALL FIELDS | JR. BASEBALL FIELDS | BASKETBALL STANDS | DAYCAMPS | FTBL. & SCR. FIELDS '75 | HORSESHOE COURTS | PLAYGROUNDS | SHUFFLEBOARD CRTS. | SKATING AREAS | SOFTBALL FIELDS | SWIMMING POOLS | TENNIS COURTS | VOLLEYBALL CRTS. | PASSIVE REC. AREAS | ART CENTERS | AUDITORIUMS | CLUBHOOKS | CRAFTROOM'S | DRAMA CENTERS | FIELDHOUSES '76 | GYMNASIUMS | KITCHENS | MUSIC CENTERS | RECREATION BLDGS. '77 |
|------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------|-------------------------|------------------|-------------|--------------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|---------------|------------------|--------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|-------------|---------------|-----------------|------------|----------|---------------|-----------------------|
| 1 | 196 | 02 | 06 | 42 | 03 | 08 | 03 | 12 | 03 | 08 | 31 | 03 | 22 | 08 | 00 | 04 | 03 | 20 | 03 | 02 | 03 | 06 | 03 | 01 | 00 |
| 2 | 218 | 5 | 11 | 48 | 4 | 8 | 9 | 14 | 1 | 6 | 10 | 2 | 14 | 20 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 30 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 2 |
| 3 | 44 | 1 | 3 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 4 | 88 | 1 | 3 | 24 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 10 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 5 | 128 | 5 | 1 | 20 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 16 | 0 | 4 | 13 | 1 | 38 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| 6 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 7 | 67 | 1 | 3 | 11 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 6 | 6 | 1 | 14 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 8 | 133 | 4 | 2 | 13 | 3 | 4 | 11 | 6 | 11 | 4 | 14 | 2 | 10 | 10 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 16 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| 9 | 216 | 8 | 7 | 36 | 4 | 10 | 5 | 9 | 3 | 9 | 27 | 5 | 23 | 17 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 21 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 5 | 1 | 2 |
| 10 | 262 | 11 | 11 | 27 | 6 | 9 | 24 | 15 | 4 | 12 | 19 | 3 | 32 | 15 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 35 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 8 | 6 | 1 | 5 |
| 11 | 164 | 4 | 6 | 24 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 12 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 6 | 11 | 10 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 24 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 7 | 2 | 1 | 5 |
| 12 | 91 | 4 | 3 | 20 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 6 | 8 | 1 | 10 | 6 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| 13 | 189 | 8 | 8 | 23 | 4 | 6 | 8 | 9 | 4 | 10 | 13 | 0 | 29 | 16 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 19 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| 14 | 168 | 5 | 6 | 30 | 4 | 6 | 9 | 9 | 0 | 9 | 9 | 4 | 12 | 15 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 24 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| 15 | 100 | 5 | 4 | 13 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 8 | 12 | 1 | 4 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 17 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| 16 | 60 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 17 | 98 | 5 | 4 | 12 | 2 | 3 | 7 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 9 | 1 | 12 | 8 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 |
| 18 | 188 | 7 | 12 | 28 | 7 | 9 | 4 | 8 | 4 | 10 | 14 | 0 | 12 | 19 | 0 | 5 | 4 | 22 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| 19 | 242 | 6 | 8 | 24 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 13 | 2 | 16 | 21 | 1 | 32 | 14 | 10 | 4 | 2 | 34 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 6 |
| 20 | 103 | 7 | 2 | 22 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 11 | 3 | 11 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 21 | 280 | 9 | 19 | 50 | 9 | 8 | 6 | 13 | 8 | 13 | 10 | 4 | 20 | 32 | 1 | 7 | 5 | 32 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 7 | 8 | 4 | 5 |
| 22 | 105 | 3 | 2 | 32 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 8 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 16 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 12 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| 23 | 203 | 7 | 8 | 34 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 12 | 18 | 2 | 14 | 19 | 0 | 6 | 3 | 29 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 7 |
| 24 | 86 | 3 | 2 | 28 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 8 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 16 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| 25 | 162 | 6 | 4 | 39 | 1 | 7 | 10 | 13 | 4 | 7 | 6 | 3 | 18 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 13 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| 26 | 41 | 3 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 27 | 96 | 1 | 1 | 12 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 14 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| 28 | 141 | 4 | 5 | 27 | 0 | 4 | 14 | 13 | 0 | 5 | 12 | 2 | 24 | 6 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 12 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| 29 | 145 | 3 | 1 | 20 | 1 | 4 | 14 | 8 | 0 | 4 | 15 | 3 | 26 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 21 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 0 |
| 30 | 40 | 0 | 2 | 11 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 31 | 102 | 3 | 2 | 14 | 6 | 2 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 30 | 6 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 32 | 81 | 0 | 2 | 16 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 14 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| 33 | 159 | 2 | 1 | 25 | 1 | 6 | 12 | 10 | 4 | 7 | 13 | 2 | 12 | 8 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 30 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 1 |
| 34 | 43 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 35 | 168 | 0 | 6 | 14 | 4 | 5 | 15 | 8 | 4 | 8 | 8 | 5 | 19 | 10 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 31 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 3 |
| 36 | 232 | 5 | 8 | 37 | 5 | 5 | 14 | 10 | 15 | 9 | 19 | 1 | 25 | 17 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 30 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 1 |
| 37 | 136 | 2 | 5 | 14 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 14 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 24 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 8 | 0 | 1 |
| 38 | 118 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 13 | 4 | 0 | 5 | 8 | 0 | 13 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 26 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 1 |
| 39 | 178 | 1 | 1 | 21 | 5 | 4 | 13 | 10 | 2 | 12 | 12 | 0 | 21 | 10 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 32 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 8 | 1 | 1 |
| 40 | 199 | 6 | 9 | 28 | 5 | 7 | 23 | 12 | 4 | 8 | 14 | 2 | 16 | 15 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 26 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 1 |
| 41 | 225 | 5 | 12 | 33 | 9 | 7 | 15 | 14 | 6 | 17 | 9 | 1 | 17 | 15 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 35 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 8 | 2 | 3 |
| 42 | 93 | 1 | 4 | 14 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 7 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 16 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 0 |
| 43 | 179 | 5 | 8 | 21 | 4 | 5 | 13 | 18 | 5 | 9 | 9 | 1 | 31 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 19 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| 44 | 130 | 5 | 8 | 9 | 2 | 4 | 15 | 14 | 5 | 6 | 9 | 0 | 31 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| 45 | 173 | 4 | 3 | 20 | 6 | 5 | 22 | 10 | 0 | 9 | 13 | 1 | 22 | 11 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 23 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 6 | 1 | 1 |
| 46 | 126 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 15 | 15 | 5 | 5 | 9 | 1 | 31 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| 47 | 179 | 3 | 9 | 28 | 3 | 4 | 33 | 16 | 4 | 6 | 8 | 3 | 14 | 6 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 20 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| 48 | 139 | 5 | 8 | 7 | 3 | 5 | 15 | 16 | 5 | 6 | 12 | 1 | 31 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| 49 | 193 | 7 | 10 | 20 | 5 | 7 | 16 | 17 | 8 | 10 | 16 | 0 | 12 | 10 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 21 | 3 | 5 | 9 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 1 |
| 50 | 176 | 3 | 5 | 36 | 4 | 3 | 6 | 13 | 4 | 12 | 7 | 0 | 18 | 11 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 26 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 4 |

TABLE 2-3
CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT FACILITIES 1976

| HARD | TOTAL FACILITIES %12 | SR. BASEBALL FIELDS | JR. BASEBALL FIELDS | BASKETBALL STANDS | DAYCANTS | FTEL. & SCR. FIELDS %6 | HORSESHOE COURTS | PLAYGROUNDS | SHUFFLEBOARD CRTS. | SKATING AREAS | SOFTBALL FIELDS | SWIMMING POOLS | TENNIS COURTS | VOLLEYBALL CRTS. | PASSIVE REC. AREAS | ART CENTERS | AUDITORIUMS | CLUBROOMS | CRAFTROOMS | DRAMA CENTERS | FIELDHOUSES %10 | GYMNASIUMS | KITCHENS | MUSIC CENTERS | RECREATION BLDGS. %11 |
|------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------|------------------------|------------------|-------------|--------------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|---------------|------------------|--------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|------------|---------------|-----------------|------------|----------|---------------|-----------------------|
| 1 | 198 | 02 | 07 | 46 | 01 | 08 | 03 | 18 | 03 | 08 | 30 | 03 | 22 | 09 | 01 | 01 | 03 | 17 | 02 | 00 | 03 | 06 | 03 | 00 | 00 |
| 2 | 223 | 5 | 11 | 50 | 5 | 8 | 4 | 17 | 2 | 6 | 9 | 4 | 14 | 22 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 33 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 2 |
| 3 | 166 | 8 | 7 | 30 | 4 | 7 | 4 | 8 | 5 | 4 | 7 | 4 | 15 | 7 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 21 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 1 |
| 4 | 110 | 1 | 3 | 46 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 15 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 10 | 12 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 5 | 174 | 5 | 1 | 41 | 1 | 5 | 6 | 27 | 0 | 5 | 14 | 1 | 42 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| 6 | 73 | 2 | 2 | 16 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 7 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 7 | 77 | 1 | 3 | 8 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 8 | 0 | 16 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| 8 | 186 | 6 | 9 | 29 | 4 | 7 | 15 | 6 | 8 | 9 | 14 | 4 | 22 | 14 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 19 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 2 |
| 9 | 164 | 6 | 7 | 35 | 3 | 8 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 6 | 21 | 2 | 20 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 15 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 1 |
| 10 | 233 | 10 | 13 | 31 | 6 | 8 | 15 | 16 | 0 | 11 | 17 | 1 | 24 | 15 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 33 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 7 | 6 | 1 | 4 |
| 11 | 206 | 5 | 6 | 31 | 6 | 6 | 10 | 14 | 8 | 10 | 8 | 4 | 9 | 12 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 37 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 5 |
| 12 | 141 | 5 | 11 | 30 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 2 | 21 | 7 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 13 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 7 | 3 | 4 | 2 |
| 13 | 201 | 7 | 9 | 25 | 6 | 7 | 10 | 8 | 4 | 12 | 14 | 0 | 28 | 16 | 0 | 6 | 5 | 24 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 3 |
| 14 | 142 | 4 | 8 | 22 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 10 | 0 | 11 | 7 | 3 | 10 | 12 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 17 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 6 |
| 15 | 99 | 6 | 3 | 14 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 10 | 1 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 17 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| 16 | 73 | 1 | 5 | 20 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 17 | 108 | 5 | 5 | 27 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 10 | 1 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| 18 | 182 | 7 | 11 | 28 | 5 | 9 | 4 | 9 | 4 | 12 | 14 | 0 | 12 | 18 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 22 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 4 |
| 19 | 216 | 4 | 10 | 24 | 7 | 9 | 8 | 11 | 2 | 15 | 15 | 2 | 25 | 13 | 10 | 4 | 2 | 32 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 4 |
| 20 | 118 | 6 | 2 | 31 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 11 | 5 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 14 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| 21 | 196 | 7 | 12 | 41 | 6 | 5 | 0 | 10 | 6 | 10 | 12 | 3 | 24 | 10 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 18 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 5 |
| 22 | 98 | 2 | 4 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 12 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 23 | 199 | 6 | 11 | 46 | 7 | 6 | 8 | 10 | 3 | 9 | 11 | 1 | 10 | 17 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 25 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 6 |
| 24 | 92 | 4 | 2 | 31 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 15 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| 25 | 129 | 6 | 4 | 38 | 2 | 7 | 10 | 16 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| 26 | 82 | 5 | 2 | 18 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 9 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| 27 | 119 | 1 | 2 | 25 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 10 | 4 | 8 | 7 | 3 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 16 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| 28 | 140 | 2 | 5 | 37 | 1 | 4 | 14 | 15 | 0 | 3 | 11 | 1 | 26 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 29 | 78 | 2 | 6 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 9 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 12 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| 30 | 180 | 1 | 5 | 22 | 5 | 5 | 14 | 10 | 12 | 8 | 11 | 0 | 15 | 8 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 33 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| 31 | 83 | 3 | 7 | 18 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 12 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| 32 | 125 | 2 | 7 | 27 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 13 | 4 | 8 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 15 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| 33 | 92 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 12 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 6 | 8 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 13 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| 34 | 171 | 4 | 17 | 34 | 8 | 5 | 5 | 8 | 4 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 14 | 21 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 17 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 4 |
| 35 | 147 | 0 | 2 | 14 | 4 | 3 | 15 | 6 | 0 | 5 | 11 | 1 | 16 | 9 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 29 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 2 |
| 36 | 197 | 4 | 10 | 35 | 6 | 4 | 12 | 8 | 11 | 10 | 14 | 1 | 21 | 17 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 20 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 2 |
| 37 | 84 | 0 | 2 | 12 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 6 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 14 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 0 |
| 38 | 165 | 7 | 7 | 12 | 5 | 5 | 18 | 5 | 0 | 10 | 5 | 1 | 22 | 5 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 30 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 0 | 1 |
| 39 | 151 | 1 | 4 | 23 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 9 | 2 | 12 | 6 | 1 | 14 | 14 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 28 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 1 | 1 |
| 40 | 237 | 6 | 14 | 32 | 5 | 8 | 23 | 18 | 2 | 12 | 11 | 1 | 20 | 14 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 34 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 7 | 2 | 3 |
| 41 | 231 | 5 | 14 | 38 | 5 | 7 | 10 | 14 | 6 | 15 | 7 | 1 | 16 | 13 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 36 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 0 | 2 |
| 42 | 104 | 2 | 5 | 18 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 18 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| 43 | 198 | 6 | 7 | 31 | 4 | 5 | 23 | 20 | 6 | 7 | 11 | 0 | 37 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 18 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| 44 | 135 | 5 | 4 | 13 | 2 | 4 | 15 | 17 | 5 | 4 | 10 | 0 | 33 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 |
| 45 | 125 | 2 | 5 | 17 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 11 | 0 | 8 | 7 | 0 | 11 | 9 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 22 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 1 |
| 46 | 176 | 5 | 5 | 10 | 4 | 5 | 18 | 20 | 8 | 5 | 13 | 2 | 33 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 18 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 0 |
| 47 | 129 | 2 | 5 | 16 | 3 | 5 | 15 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 24 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| 48 | 151 | 5 | 4 | 17 | 3 | 4 | 15 | 18 | 5 | 5 | 11 | 0 | 33 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 0 |
| 49 | 108 | 2 | 2 | 15 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 11 | 5 | 8 | 6 | 0 | 8 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 14 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 3 |
| 50 | 109 | 2 | 2 | 26 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 10 | 0 | 10 | 4 | 0 | 12 | 6 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 17 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 |

TABLE 2-4
CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT FACILITIES 1980

| WARD | TOTAL FACILITIES Y16 | SR. BASEBALL FIELDS | JR. BASEBALL FIELDS | BASKETBALL STANDS | DAYCATS | FTBL. & SCR. FIELDS Y13 | HORSESHOE COURTS | PLAYGROUNDS | SHUFFLEBOARD CRTS. | SKATING AREAS | SOFTBALL FIELDS | SWIMMING POOLS | TENNIS COURTS | VOLLEYBALL CRTS. | PASSIVE REC. AREAS | ART CENTERS | AUDITORIUMS | CLUBROOMS | CRAFTROOMS | DRAMA CENTERS | FIELDHOUSES Y14 | GYMNASIUMS | KITCHENS | MUSIC CENTERS | RECREATION BLDGS. Y15 |
|------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------|-------------------------|------------------|-------------|--------------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|---------------|------------------|--------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|------------|---------------|-----------------|------------|----------|---------------|-----------------------|
| 1 | 175 | 02 | 07 | 34 | 00 | 08 | 03 | 19 | 01 | 04 | 16 | 02 | 32 | 07 | 01 | 02 | 03 | 18 | 02 | 00 | 03 | 05 | 02 | 01 | 01 |
| 2 | 191 | 5 | 10 | 39 | 3 | 9 | 4 | 16 | 2 | 0 | 9 | 4 | 14 | 21 | 0 | 5 | 4 | 28 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| 3 | 168 | 9 | 9 | 28 | 5 | 8 | 0 | 11 | 5 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 19 | 7 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 21 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| 4 | 98 | 0 | 4 | 28 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 16 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 10 | 11 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 5 | 137 | 5 | 1 | 25 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 26 | 0 | 2 | 10 | 1 | 39 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 6 | 76 | 3 | 3 | 16 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 7 | 117 | 3 | 3 | 17 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 7 | 10 | 2 | 12 | 1 | 22 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| 8 | 146 | 4 | 11 | 27 | 4 | 6 | 10 | 6 | 4 | 8 | 8 | 3 | 16 | 12 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 13 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| 9 | 158 | 6 | 7 | 35 | 3 | 8 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 19 | 2 | 20 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 15 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 |
| 10 | 237 | 8 | 15 | 36 | 6 | 8 | 15 | 15 | 0 | 7 | 19 | 1 | 29 | 14 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 32 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 6 | 0 | 4 |
| 11 | 208 | 4 | 7 | 39 | 6 | 7 | 15 | 15 | 4 | 7 | 8 | 4 | 14 | 13 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 36 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 7 | 3 | 0 | 4 |
| 12 | 130 | 5 | 12 | 26 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 21 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 13 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| 13 | 197 | 7 | 9 | 29 | 10 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 4 | 6 | 15 | 0 | 28 | 16 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 25 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| 14 | 127 | 4 | 8 | 25 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 12 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 10 | 13 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 16 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 5 |
| 15 | 104 | 6 | 3 | 14 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 9 | 1 | 10 | 11 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 17 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| 16 | 67 | 2 | 3 | 16 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 17 | 111 | 5 | 5 | 35 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 3 | 10 | 1 | 12 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| 18 | 190 | 7 | 17 | 32 | 7 | 8 | 4 | 8 | 10 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 12 | 20 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 21 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 4 |
| 19 | 210 | 4 | 15 | 30 | 8 | 11 | 7 | 13 | 0 | 8 | 10 | 2 | 24 | 12 | 10 | 3 | 2 | 31 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 4 |
| 20 | 112 | 6 | 2 | 29 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 12 | 5 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 18 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| 21 | 175 | 7 | 12 | 48 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 8 | 6 | 4 | 12 | 2 | 20 | 12 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 20 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 4 |
| 22 | 58 | 2 | 4 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 11 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| 23 | 200 | 6 | 14 | 46 | 11 | 7 | 9 | 10 | 5 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 16 | 16 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 25 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 6 |
| 24 | 95 | 4 | 2 | 25 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 15 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 12 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 12 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| 25 | 141 | 6 | 4 | 32 | 2 | 7 | 6 | 16 | 0 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 14 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 2 |
| 26 | 89 | 5 | 2 | 20 | 4 | 2 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| 27 | 109 | 1 | 2 | 26 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 9 | 4 | 2 | 8 | 2 | 8 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 15 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 3 |
| 28 | 121 | 2 | 5 | 27 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 15 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 1 | 26 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 29 | 78 | 2 | 6 | 10 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 14 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| 30 | 174 | 1 | 5 | 26 | 5 | 5 | 12 | 11 | 8 | 4 | 11 | 0 | 15 | 8 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 35 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| 31 | 86 | 3 | 9 | 18 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| 32 | 127 | 3 | 7 | 29 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 13 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 15 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| 33 | 79 | 1 | 2 | 18 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 11 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| 34 | 167 | 4 | 17 | 34 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 8 | 4 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 14 | 21 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 3 |
| 35 | 147 | 0 | 3 | 16 | 6 | 3 | 15 | 7 | 0 | 6 | 8 | 1 | 18 | 8 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 29 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 2 |
| 36 | 182 | 4 | 10 | 32 | 5 | 4 | 14 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 12 | 1 | 21 | 16 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 20 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 2 |
| 37 | 85 | 0 | 2 | 16 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 6 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 14 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| 38 | 171 | 8 | 8 | 18 | 5 | 5 | 20 | 5 | 0 | 4 | 6 | 1 | 22 | 6 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 30 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 1 |
| 39 | 153 | 1 | 8 | 29 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 12 | 0 | 7 | 5 | 1 | 18 | 15 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 24 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 1 |
| 40 | 216 | 5 | 16 | 34 | 5 | 8 | 22 | 18 | 0 | 4 | 9 | 1 | 21 | 14 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 34 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 3 |
| 41 | 202 | 7 | 12 | 34 | 9 | 6 | 8 | 13 | 2 | 7 | 7 | 1 | 18 | 9 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 31 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 0 | 2 |
| 42 | 77 | 2 | 4 | 18 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 0 |
| 43 | 194 | 7 | 8 | 25 | 4 | 11 | 30 | 21 | 6 | 4 | 7 | 0 | 37 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 18 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| 44 | 152 | 5 | 6 | 16 | 4 | 10 | 28 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 33 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 0 |
| 45 | 133 | 2 | 8 | 23 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 11 | 0 | 3 | 7 | 1 | 11 | 7 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 24 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 0 |
| 46 | 165 | 5 | 7 | 13 | 4 | 11 | 30 | 8 | 8 | 4 | 9 | 0 | 33 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 12 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| 47 | 102 | 2 | 5 | 14 | 4 | 3 | 10 | 7 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 14 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| 48 | 155 | 5 | 6 | 21 | 3 | 10 | 28 | 9 | 5 | 3 | 7 | 0 | 33 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| 49 | 112 | 2 | 2 | 18 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 12 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 10 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 14 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 3 |
| 50 | 157 | 3 | 6 | 44 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 13 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 0 | 24 | 12 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 17 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 |

Is the distribution of recreational facilities related to patterns of racial dispersion, ethnic competition, or class consciousness? (tests of the underclass hypothesis)

If the intentional version of the underclass hypothesis is applicable, one would expect patterns of distribution to reflect deliberate discrimination against racial minorities. A number of prominent Black spokesmen in Chicago, especially Reverend Jesse Jackson and Alderman Clifford Kelly have alleged that services are distributed in a racially discriminatory manner. As recently as 1981, the Chicago Sun Times asserted that:

Chicago Park District Commissioners traditionally have performed like trained seals, barking on cue from their dictatorial keeper, Supt. Edmund L. Kelly. This enabled Kelly to run the parks like his own private plantation, showering money on the ones in white neighborhoods, while those in minority areas deteriorated.⁵⁵

Activists speaking for minorities have regularly charged that areas containing white majorities receive both more and better services. The Black voter registration drive and the emergence of Hispanic activists is illustrative of an increasing disaffection with service outputs and distributive policy among minority groups in Chicago.⁵⁶ Inequities in distribution patterns are attributed to intentionally discriminatory policies and inadequate minority representation in policy-making institutions. Thus, drawing on information supplied in the 1960 and 1970 Census Reports, this study includes measures of percent Black (x_1 and x_5) and percent

⁵⁵"The Park District Board Wakes Up," Chicago Sun Times (Jan. 30, 1981), p. 33.


⁵⁶Jorge Casuso and Cisco Garcia, "In Clout City, Hispanics Are Hungry for Power," Chicago Sun Times (Oct. 27, 1981); 4, 32.

Hispanic (Puerto Rican + Mexican/ x_{14} and x_8) per ward.

The pluralistic version of the underclass hypothesis attributes service inequities to the competition between groups implicit to a democratic system. Consequently, those groups whose cultural traits dispose them to actively participate in politics and actively strive to acquire the benefits incidental to distributive policy receive larger preferments of services. While Chicago is distinguished by a large Polish population, the Irish are portrayed as the most politically active of a number of ethnic groups. Kraus discloses that, in 1969, Irish politicians held eleven of the top sixteen offices in Chicago and Cook County, with administrative control of more than 72,000 jobs.⁵⁷ Again, this study utilizes the information provided in the 1960 and 1970 Census Reports to develop measures that summarize the degree of Polish and Irish ethnicity per ward; calculated as the number of Polish and Irish foreign stock/total ward population in 1960 and 1970. (percent Irish foreign stock= x_2 and x_6 , percent Polish foreign stock= x_3 and x_7)

The elitist version of the underclass hypothesis proposes that the more affluent are likely to possess political influence and power, and are predisposed (class consciousness) to effect a distribution of services skewed toward more affluent areas. One indicator of affluence is the quality of housing, so that

⁵⁷Peter R. Kraus, Chicago: A One Party State (Champaign, Ill: Stysis Publishing Co., 1972).



affluence per ward (x_{34}) is measured as the proportion of dilapidated and deteriorated housing within a ward (the lower the number, the greater the affluence). Median income is another viable measure of affluence (x_{35}) (the greater the median income, the greater the affluence), and this study utilizes both measures to assess the efficacy of the elitist approach.

If deliberate discrimination in the distribution of recreational services occurs, one would expect to find clear winners and losers among racial aggregations. Negative correlations (numbers of facilities decline as indicators of race increase) between quantities of facilities per ward and percentages of Black or Hispanic residents per ward would tend to suggest intentionally discriminatory distributive policies. Positive correlations (facilities increase as indicators of ethnicity increase) between quantities of facilities and greater percentages of those ethnic groups more likely to participate in politics (the Irish) would tend to affirm the pluralist version of the underclass hypothesis. If greater quantities of services are rendered to affluent areas, an elitist interpretation of the underclass hypothesis would be suggested.

(Racial and ethnic ward profiles can be found in Tables 2-5 and 2-6, pp. 35, 36. Profiles of ward affluence are listed in Table 2-7, p. 37).

TABLE 2-5
POPULATION DATA-WARD PROFILES 1960

| WARD & TOTAL POPULATION | BLACK AND PERCENT BLACK x_1 | IRISH FOREIGN STOCK AND % IR. FOR. STK. x_2 | POLISH FOREN. STOCK AND % POL. FOR. STK x_3 | TOTAL FOREIGN STOCK AND % TOT. FOR. STK | HISPANIC & PERCENT HISPANIC x_4 | |
|-------------------------------|--|--|--|---|--|-----------|
| 1 | 76834 | 22067 .29 | 245 .00 | 1168 .02 | 28333 .37 | 13095 .17 |
| 2 | 73681 | 68403 .93 | 47 .00 | 110 .00 | 2095 .03 | 249 .00 |
| 3 | 65270 | 64861 .99 | 6 .00 | 12 .00 | 611 .01 | 26 .00 |
| 4 | 75609 | 65242 .86 | 229 .00 | 336 .00 | 4915 .07 | 245 .00 |
| 5 | 79250 | 46675 .59 | 633 .01 | 880 .02 | 13266 .17 | 2075 .03 |
| 6 | 74430 | 68696 .92 | 384 .01 | 358 .00 | 3394 .05 | 1041 .01 |
| 7 | 75938 | 157 .00 | 2960 .04 | 8788 .12 | 36091 .48 | 1363 .02 |
| 8 | 79726 | 21360 .27 | 3052 .04 | 2845 .04 | 26617 .33 | 779 .01 |
| 9 | 77547 | 10471 .14 | 1108 .01 | 6956 .09 | 31667 .41 | 532 .00 |
| 10 | 77893 | 2589 .03 | 1056 .01 | 8042 .10 | 36270 .47 | 5416 .07 |
| 11 | 65091 | 8693 .13 | 1477 .02 | 7387 .11 | 24104 .37 | 1660 .03 |
| 12 | 60654 | 37 .00 | 829 .01 | 13746 .23 | 31046 .51 | 565 .01 |
| 13 | 80261 | 9 .00 | 3158 .04 | 8245 .10 | 39743 .50 | 152 .00 |
| 14 | 63780 | 6030 .09 | 3477 .05 | 2525 .14 | 26476 .42 | 1786 .03 |
| 15 | 62760 | 12 .00 | 1090 .04 | 6305 .10 | 30999 .49 | 177 .00 |
| 16 | 66045 | 23240 .35 | 4348 .07 | 1104 .02 | 18220 .28 | 431 .01 |
| 17 | 72117 | 49144 .68 | 1753 .02 | 280 .00 | 8600 .12 | 369 .01 |
| 18 | 79215 | 3 .00 | 10049 .13 | 2396 .03 | 32568 .41 | 161 .00 |
| 19 | 79775 | 218 .00 | 4964 .06 | 1706 .03 | 23963 .30 | 133 .00 |
| 20 | 74937 | 73070 .98 | 160 .00 | 28 .00 | 1140 .02 | 249 .00 |
| 21 | 79715 | 34397 .43 | 2016 .03 | 1738 .02 | 22563 .28 | 448 .01 |
| 22 | 62178 | 18894 .30 | 304 .00 | 7379 .12 | 23376 .38 | 1177 .02 |
| 23 | 77769 | 2690 .03 | 955 .01 | 12753 .16 | 33104 .43 | 497 .01 |
| 24 | 70611 | 69747 .97 | 27 .00 | 111 .00 | 1132 .02 | 361 .01 |
| 25 | 79080 | 20636 .26 | 306 .00 | 9097 .12 | 27732 .35 | 6229 .09 |
| 26 | 68200 | 8726 .03 | 268 .00 | 15059 .22 | 31714 .47 | 4628 .07 |
| 27 | 70908 | 43483 .61 | 310 .00 | 389 .01 | 6754 .10 | 6435 .09 |
| 28 | 57941 | 16969 .29 | 1250 .02 | 1297 .02 | 16792 .29 | 1409 .02 |
| 29 | 66353 | 37895 .57 | 551 .01 | 641 .01 | 10464 .16 | 4264 .06 |
| 30 | 67597 | 2243 .03 | 4602 .07 | 3244 .05 | 29474 .44 | 986 .01 |
| 31 | 61599 | 118 .00 | 483 .01 | 11613 .19 | 34790 .56 | 2696 .04 |
| 32 | 64784 | 937 .01 | 198 .00 | 17835 .28 | 30085 .46 | 3934 .06 |
| 33 | 69165 | 141 .00 | 1102 .02 | 6268 .09 | 32236 .47 | 5170 .01 |
| 34 | 66361 | 7 .00 | 736 .01 | 8236 .12 | 30463 .46 | 822 .01 |
| 35 | 63224 | 8 .00 | 1027 .02 | 13202 .21 | 32323 .51 | 177 .00 |
| 36 | 68894 | 15 .00 | 1492 .02 | 9235 .13 | 28817 .47 | 139 .00 |
| 37 | 61712 | 19 .00 | 4957 .08 | 1853 .03 | 28817 .47 | 116 .00 |
| 38 | 71928 | 0 .00 | 1378 .02 | 9321 .13 | 36434 .51 | 80 .00 |
| 39 | 61116 | 20 .00 | 1494 .02 | 4681 .08 | 30750 .50 | 93 .00 |
| 40 | 72783 | 342 .00 | 1114 .02 | 8263 .11 | 44054 .61 | 253 .00 |
| 41 | 69131 | 15 .00 | 1483 .02 | 7601 .11 | 30106 .44 | 35 .00 |
| 42 | 60229 | 21477 .36 | 623 .01 | 618 .01 | 11171 .19 | 2915 .05 |
| 43 | 65722 | 2888 .04 | 1231 .02 | 1396 .02 | 23616 .36 | 8252 .05 |
| 44 | 76759 | 119 .00 | 1807 .02 | 2537 .03 | 34261 .45 | 8215 .02 |
| 45 | 71981 | 18 .00 | 1642 .02 | 8299 .12 | 35061 .49 | 101 .00 |
| 46 | 73615 | 106 .00 | 2028 .03 | 2082 .03 | 34648 .47 | 1590 .02 |
| 47 | 79166 | 27 .00 | 2555 .03 | 2301 .03 | 38591 .49 | 8027 .00 |
| 48 | 72672 | 369 .01 | 1611 .02 | 2010 .03 | 28022 .39 | 1447 .02 |
| 49 | 75445 | 99 .00 | 2718 .04 | 3315 .04 | 35891 .48 | 209 .00 |
| 50 | 82953 | 85 .00 | 2098 .03 | 6218 .07 | 46472 .56 | 84 .00 |

Source: Adapted from 1960 Census of Population and Housing: Numbers Coincident With July 28, 1961 Ward Boundaries in the City of Chicago-- compiled by J.R. Godwin, Research Division Department of City Planning.

TABLE 2-6
POPULATION DATA-WARD PROFILES 1970

| WARD & TOTAL POPULATION | BLACK AND PERCENT BLACK x ₅ | IRISH FORN. STOCK AND % IR.FOR.STK. x ₆ | POLISH FORN. STOCK AND % POL.FOR. STK. x ₇ | TOTAL FOREIGN STOCK AND % TOT.FOR.STK. | HISPA'IC & PERCENT HISPA'IC x ₈ |
|-------------------------------|---|---|--|--|---|
| 1 68950 | 24672 .36 | 183 .00 | 1138 .02 | 26468 .28 | 21008 .30 |
| 2 69075 | 69075 .100 | 69 .00 | 131 .00 | 2715 .04 | 741 .01 |
| 3 67657 | 67657 .100 | 13 .00 | 8 .00 | 443 .01 | 407 .01 |
| 4 68549 | 62427 .91 | 85 .00 | 266 .00 | 3157 .05 | 528 .01 |
| 5 67530 | 38482 .57 | 375 .01 | 634 .01 | 11469 .17 | 1228 .02 |
| 6 66919 | 65886 .98 | 22 .00 | 31 .00 | 1111 .02 | 550 .01 |
| 7 68077 | 18312 .27 | 1021 .01 | 6140 .09 | 25237 .37 | 12406 .18 |
| 8 66869 | 51350 .77 | 435 .01 | 1216 .02 | 8643 .13 | 1644 .02 |
| 9 66932 | 18957 .28 | 715 .01 | 3416 .05 | 19693 .29 | 1820 .03 |
| 10 66666 | 6159 .09 | 666 .01 | 5415 .08 | 25273 .38 | 5608 .08 |
| 11 67160 | 7513 .11 | 1281 .02 | 5303 .08 | 22331 .33 | 8221 .12 |
| 12 66709 | 3540 .05 | 1334 .02 | 12293 .18 | 30554 .46 | 3551 .05 |
| 13 66708 | 13 .00 | 2971 .04 | 6177 .09 | 26273 .39 | 652 .01 |
| 14 67141 | 4136 .06 | 2500 .04 | 9805 .15 | 26817 .40 | 4269 .06 |
| 15 67030 | 5587 .08 | 4794 .07 | 2923 .04 | 28061 .42 | 1593 .02 |
| 16 68234 | 62782 .92 | 136 .00 | 42 .00 | 1318 .02 | 1693 .02 |
| 17 67926 | 66884 .98 | 132 .00 | 10 .00 | 948 .01 | 846 .01 |
| 18 67694 | 19126 .28 | 3930 .06 | 2018 .03 | 17304 .26 | 664 .01 |
| 19 67047 | 1485 .02 | 4749 .07 | 1365 .02 | 19303 .29 | 292 .00 |
| 20 68872 | 67723 .88 | 7 .00 | 23 .00 | 1171 .02 | 660 .01 |
| 21 67045 | 58058 .87 | 939 .01 | 314 .00 | 4833 .07 | 969 .01 |
| 22 67342 | 15989 .24 | 308 .00 | 4613 .07 | 27708 .41 | 15727 .23 |
| 23 66437 | 68 .00 | 1020 .02 | 10227 .15 | 26217 .40 | 1331 .02 |
| 24 67369 | 66412 .99 | 12 .00 | 29 .00 | 404 .01 | 252 .00 |
| 25 66131 | 23986 .36 | 88 .00 | 3870 .06 | 21994 .33 | 17038 .26 |
| 26 68092 | 3241 .05 | 171 .00 | 10982 .16 | 29983 .44 | 22200 .33 |
| 27 67816 | 60868 .90 | 125 .00 | 100 .00 | 2641 .04 | 1417 .02 |
| 28 69902 | 57853 .84 | 179 .00 | 271 .00 | 4388 .06 | 1936 .03 |
| 29 67290 | 59366 .88 | 352 .01 | 158 .00 | 3442 .05 | 753 .01 |
| 30 66927 | 197 .00 | 1061 .02 | 8019 .12 | 28716 .43 | 5767 .09 |
| 31 67336 | 960 .01 | 442 .01 | 7731 .11 | 29328 .44 | 22160 .33 |
| 32 67316 | 2638 .04 | 275 .00 | 9319 .14 | 22965 .34 | 17313 .26 |
| 33 67308 | 217 .00 | 720 .01 | 6093 .09 | 25795 .38 | 12515 .19 |
| 34 67482 | 45053 .67 | 553 .01 | 724 .01 | 9198 .14 | 1239 .02 |
| 35 67131 | 11 .00 | 1285 .02 | 11153 .17 | 29852 .44 | 1527 .02 |
| 36 67680 | 30 .00 | 2002 .03 | 9181 .14 | 36666 .54 | 645 .01 |
| 37 67098 | 8380 .72 | 3334 .05 | 3449 .05 | 25786 .38 | 2826 .04 |
| 38 67739 | 326 .01 | 1424 .02 | 7613 .12 | 29773 .47 | 592 .01 |
| 39 67141 | 444 .06 | 1468 .02 | 4772 .07 | 32471 .48 | 2646 .04 |
| 40 66764 | 496 .01 | 1499 .02 | 4120 .06 | 37629 .56 | 3123 .05 |
| 41 66981 | 27 .00 | 1578 .02 | 7151 .11 | 27177 .41 | 446 .01 |
| 42 69355 | 27168 .40 | 630 .01 | 911 .01 | 13498 .19 | 3445 .05 |
| 43 68229 | 3417 .05 | 1321 .02 | 1259 .02 | 23416 .34 | 7516 .11 |
| 44 67519 | 117 .00 | 1294 .02 | 1471 .02 | 26728 .40 | 10167 .15 |
| 45 66848 | 37 .00 | 1814 .03 | 7099 .11 | 30598 .46 | 449 .01 |
| 46 67085 | 217 .00 | 848 .01 | 1455 .02 | 23248 .35 | 8649 .13 |
| 47 67470 | 27 .00 | 2046 .03 | 1187 .02 | 30345 .45 | 3641 .05 |
| 48 67697 | 435 .00 | 1295 .02 | 1787 .03 | 30978 .46 | 8193 .12 |
| 49 67653 | 520 .00 | 1472 .02 | 2728 .04 | 29024 .43 | 2919 .04 |
| 50 66431 | 116 .00 | 1436 .02 | 5873 .09 | 37968 .57 | 1514 .02 |

Source: Adapted from 1970 Census of Population and Housing: Numbers
Coincident With July 28, 1971 Ward Boundaries in the City of Chicago---
compiled by J.R. Godwin, Research Division, Department of City Planning.

TABLE 2-7
AFFLUENCE-WARD PROFILES 1960/70

| W A R D | TOTAL HOUSING UNITS 1960-29 | DILA- PIAD. UNITS 60-70 | UNITS DETACH. PLUMB. x31 | UNITS LACK PLUMB. x32 | TOTAL DIL+DET UNITS x33 | % DL DET. UNITS x34 |
|------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1 | 25267 | 2490 | 3111 | 2352 | 7953 | .31 |
| 2 | 22855 | 1975 | 3152 | 3249 | 8376 | .37 |
| 3 | 21703 | 2119 | 4844 | 3593 | 10556 | .49 |
| 4 | 26971 | 1026 | 2827 | 2261 | 6114 | .23 |
| 5 | 32439 | 1413 | 3162 | 2985 | 8060 | .23 |
| 6 | 23586 | 639 | 2612 | 578 | 3829 | .16 |
| 7 | 30642 | 243 | 669 | 250 | 1162 | .04 |
| 8 | 26932 | 157 | 1241 | 96 | 1494 | .06 |
| 9 | 23115 | 517 | 1793 | 216 | 2526 | .11 |
| 10 | 22398 | 485 | 1753 | 705 | 2943 | .13 |
| 11 | 19855 | 779 | 2737 | 1026 | 4542 | .23 |
| 12 | 19810 | 296 | 1499 | 306 | 2101 | .11 |
| 13 | 24387 | 144 | 1010 | 23 | 1177 | .05 |
| 14 | 19665 | 400 | 1993 | 581 | 2964 | .15 |
| 15 | 21315 | 94 | 795 | 68 | 957 | .04 |
| 16 | 19409 | 430 | 3160 | 227 | 3817 | .20 |
| 17 | 20811 | 829 | 3296 | 950 | 5075 | .24 |
| 18 | 23719 | 46 | 689 | 23 | 758 | .03 |
| 19 | 23512 | 84 | 710 | 25 | 819 | .03 |
| 20 | 25008 | 1157 | 4758 | 2542 | 8457 | .34 |
| 21 | 22673 | 582 | 1887 | 113 | 2582 | .11 |
| 22 | 19014 | 154 | 2018 | 461 | 2633 | .14 |
| 23 | 22503 | 91 | 809 | 70 | 900 | .04 |
| 24 | 16757 | 919 | 3897 | 751 | 5567 | .33 |
| 25 | 22063 | 1546 | 3981 | 1394 | 6927 | .31 |
| 26 | 22520 | 1217 | 3198 | 1891 | 6306 | .28 |
| 27 | 24368 | 3034 | 3453 | 5422 | 11909 | .49 |
| 28 | 19545 | 275 | 2013 | 724 | 3012 | .15 |
| 29 | 18928 | 162 | 2024 | 326 | 2512 | .13 |
| 30 | 21484 | 82 | 1497 | 179 | 1758 | .08 |
| 31 | 20413 | 197 | 2216 | 448 | 2861 | .14 |
| 32 | 22238 | 875 | 3208 | 1658 | 5741 | .26 |
| 33 | 24737 | 238 | 1600 | 186 | 2024 | .08 |
| 34 | 23455 | 658 | 2817 | 380 | 3855 | .16 |
| 35 | 22154 | 75 | 600 | 46 | 721 | .03 |
| 36 | 22577 | 121 | 932 | 64 | 1117 | .05 |
| 37 | 22971 | 32 | 495 | 92 | 619 | .03 |
| 38 | 23103 | 199 | 749 | 45 | 973 | .04 |
| 39 | 21020 | 108 | 1015 | 57 | 1180 | .06 |
| 40 | 24623 | 82 | 996 | 19 | 1097 | .04 |
| 41 | 21155 | 36 | 475 | 24 | 535 | .03 |
| 42 | 29832 | 2396 | 2017 | 4865 | 9278 | .31 |
| 43 | 28685 | 1174 | 2767 | 1818 | 5759 | .20 |
| 44 | 35472 | 297 | 2787 | 1555 | 4639 | .13 |
| 45 | 23811 | 105 | 547 | 28 | 690 | .03 |
| 46 | 33537 | 184 | 1756 | 1869 | 3809 | .11 |
| 47 | 30337 | 227 | 5603 | 617 | 6447 | .21 |
| 48 | 39102 | 378 | 1826 | 2191 | 4395 | .11 |
| 49 | 33574 | 109 | 1280 | 179 | 1558 | .05 |
| 50 | 28908 | 50 | 758 | 30 | 838 | .03 |

Source: Adapted from 1960 Census of Population and Housing: Numbers Coincident with July 29, 1971 Ward Boundaries in the City of Chicago—compiled by J.R. Godwin, Research Division,

| W A R D | MEDIAN INCOME 70 x35 |
|------------------|----------------------------|
| 1 | \$7169 |
| 2 | \$6463 |
| 3 | \$6018 |
| 4 | \$6463 |
| 5 | \$10035 |
| 6 | \$8916 |
| 7 | \$10242 |
| 8 | \$11650 |
| 9 | \$10285 |
| 10 | \$11895 |
| 11 | \$9515 |
| 12 | \$11110 |
| 13 | \$12485 |
| 14 | \$10155 |
| 15 | \$11065 |
| 16 | \$7710 |
| 17 | \$7669 |
| 18 | \$12705 |
| 19 | \$14115 |
| 20 | \$7097 |
| 21 | \$11455 |
| 22 | \$9084 |
| 23 | \$12665 |
| 24 | \$6731 |
| 25 | \$8081 |
| 26 | \$8247 |
| 27 | \$5949 |
| 28 | \$7717 |
| 29 | \$8576 |
| 30 | \$10735 |
| 31 | \$9132 |
| 32 | \$8492 |
| 33 | \$9798 |
| 34 | \$11875 |
| 35 | \$11125 |
| 36 | \$12010 |
| 37 | \$11105 |
| 38 | \$12460 |
| 39 | \$12070 |
| 40 | \$12030 |
| 41 | \$13225 |
| 42 | \$9285 |
| 43 | \$11885 |
| 44 | \$10350 |
| 45 | \$12520 |
| 46 | \$9504 |
| 47 | \$10730 |
| 48 | \$10410 |
| 49 | \$11825 |
| 50 | \$13205 |

Source: Adapted from Chicago Department of Development and Planning, Chicago Statistical Abstract, 1970

Measurement of affluence 1960= x_{34} (percent of dilapidated and deteriorated housing units)

*the lower the percentage, the greater the affluence

$$x_{34} = \frac{x_{33}}{x_{29}}$$

or

$$x_{34} = \frac{x_{30} + x_{31} + x_{32}}{x_{29}}$$

Measurement of affluence 1970= x_{35} (Median income)

*the greater the median income, the greater the affluence

Is the distribution of numbers of recreational facilities related to the organization of partisan political strength? (tests of the structural hypothesis)

The structural hypothesis assumes that the evaluation of service distribution patterns cannot be considered apart from the idiosyncrasies of partisan politics. That is, an informal structure of party loyalties and political expedients dictate the manner in which services are allocated and administered. Thus, it is essential to consider the eccentricities of partisan politics in Chicago if one seeks to explain variances in the distribution of public recreational facilities.

Like most older American cities, Chicago has a mayor-council form of government, with the mayor theoretically subservient to the City Council. In practice, however, power has been centralized in the Democratic party, with the office of the mayor the focal point of a partisan machine type organization. Chicago aldermen are elected from wards containing roughly 60,000 to 80,000 residents. Large increases in population and pressing fiscal problems have mandated the institution of a plethora of agencies and special districts to deal with the administration of city services.

The Democratic machine in Chicago, like machines in other large cities, developed as local politicians capitalized on the immigration of large numbers of ethnics (unfamiliar with the nuances of the political system) to create a constituent base of electoral support, while also regularly dispensing patronage

to secure party discipline and loyalty.

The first genuine citywide machine to amalgamate all ethnic groups and wards into a single organization was built by Anton Cermak in 1931. After Cermak's assassination in 1933, the Democratic machine was consolidated by Ed Kelly and Pat Nash during the 1930s and 1940s and was refurbished and expanded under four term mayor Richard Daley from 1953 to 1976.⁵⁸

The distribution of patronage was crucial to the growth of the machine; workers were hired and promoted on the basis of partisan loyalty. In turn, they delivered services in a personalized fashion to a politically unsophisticated constituency, those who readily came to vote on the basis of personable impressions of their exchanges with party workers. Kilian, Fletcher and Ciccone assert that almost one of every ten city workers are precinct captains, responsible for providing services and favors and producing votes.⁵⁹ The most revealing information about Chicago's patronage system is found in depositions to the Shakman suit against the Democratic organization of Cook County.⁶⁰ The Cook County Democratic Central Committee and the City of Chicago admitted to giving preference in hiring to those applicants sponsored by Democratic ward committeemen and other officials. The city also admitted to the practice of requiring applicants hired in that manner to do precinct level

⁵⁸See Kraus, Chicago: A One Party State.

⁵⁹Michael Kilian, Connie Fletcher and F. Richard Ciccone, Who Runs Chicago? (New York: St. Martins Press, 1979).

⁶⁰Michael M. Shakman and Paul M. Lurie et. al. v the Democratic Organization of Cook County et.al. Case no. 69 C 2145 in U.S District Court, Deposition by William R. Quinlan, Corporation Counsel and Attorney for the Defendant City of Chicago.

political work.⁶¹

Meanwhile, a handful of powerful Democratic aldermen, working in tandem with the mayor, control the City Council when key issues are considered. This is accomplished by controlling committee assignments, especially those of the Finance Committee. Since ward committeemen determine who will be slated on the party's ticket in the ward, and appoint and dismiss precinct captains, it is incumbent on elective officials to follow the dictates of the party.⁶²

In retrospect, the machine has exhibited an enduring capacity to win elections, despite the emergence of independent factions and contenders and the decline of immigration and continuing assimilation of ethnics. That ability is attributable to the consistent support of a long-standing electoral coalition. Those supporters live in the oldest third of Chicago (the river wards); an area inhabited by lower income workingmen and Blacks, who have an almost genetic affinity for the Democratic party. Although they represent only a third of Chicago's voters, their strong support of Democratic candidates offsets the machine's customary losses in more competitive zones of the city.⁶³

⁶¹Dick Simpson, "Chicago Politics and Government," in Illinois: Political Processes and Governmental Performance, pp.236-250 ed. Edgar G. Crane Jr. (Dubuque,Iowa: Kendall-Hunt Publishing Co., 1980).

⁶²See Kasperson, "Toward A Geography of Urban Politics."

⁶³Ralph Whitehead Jr., "The Organization Man," in Contemporary Readings in American Government, pp. 101-107 eds. Byron W. Daynes and Raymond Tatalovich (Lexington, Mass: D.C Heath and Co., 1980).

Throughout its history, the Park District is said to have maintained a working relationship with the Chicago Democratic machine. Critics immediately refer to its mayoral appointed board, a unique arrangement in that the trustees of all other Illinois park districts are elected. The general superintendent has also often been a major functionary of the Democratic party, and many view his office as a political instrumentality; to distribute the estimated 3,000 patronage jobs available in the District. Kilian, Fletcher and Ciccone imply that Ed Kelly, then a 47th ward committeeman, was appointed general superintendent of the Park District by Mayor Daley because he recognized that the position would enable Kelly to wrest control of the ward from the Republican party.⁶⁴

In Political Influence, Edward Banfield discusses the role of the Park District in the political maneuvering surrounding the 1950s Exhibition Hall Project.⁶⁵ Tribune official Robert L. McCormack provided the rationale of the original proposal; the Hall was seen as a means of attracting trade shows and conventions. A professional engineer commissioned to survey proposed sites suggested the use of a 180 acre tract of land owned by the Park District. When the estimated cost superceded existing funds, two bills were introduced in the state legislature; one to

⁶⁴Kilian et. al., Who Runs Chicago?.

⁶⁵Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence
(New York: The Free Press, 1961).

create a Metropolitan Fair and Exhibition Authority as a municipal corporation empowered to issue revenue bonds, and another bill authorizing the Park District to lease the proposed 180 acre Burnham Park site. Both bills passed and the Authority applied for a lease of the site in 1956. The commissioners approved the lease and the Park District conducted public hearings regarding the project. Fred Kramer, the President of the Metropolitan Housing and Planning Council, voiced objections to the encroachment on recreational space reserved for crowded sections of the city. In his testimony before the board, he stated: "We do not believe the Park District would intentionally subordinate the recreational needs of the people to the interests of certain groups."⁶⁶ Various citizens committees also expressed their disapproval, but the mayor, the newspapers and the Park District board supported the project. It was approved, but a number of legal suits were initiated in an attempt to enjoin the Park District from leasing the proposed tract. They were summarily dismissed by the Illinois Supreme Court and the Hall was constructed. Banfield suggests that: "it seems clear that there is a tension between the nature of the political system and the requirements of comprehensive planning and consistent policy."⁶⁷

⁶⁶Ibid, p. 203.

⁶⁷Ibid, p. 324.

More recently, the nature of Park District concession contracts were scrutinized: A Chicago Tribune article disclosed an arrangement by which a politically connected food vending firm held a no-bid concession contract with the Park District for more than 35 years. The firm, Cafe Brauer, owned by Michael T. Skrak and Paul J. Hecker, a regular contributor to the Cook County Democratic party, was given an exclusive contract to sell food, beverages and confections at public parks and beaches north of the Chicago River. Although other firms attempted to bid on the contracts, the arrangement with Cafe Brauer was perfunctorily renewed every three to five years. Another firm, Consolidated Concessions Inc., headed by William J. Burns, an administrative assistant to Cook County Board President George Dunne, held a similar contract to sell food and beverages at Soldier's Field and parks south of the Chicago River for more than 30 years.⁶⁸

In Chicago, the distribution of services is regularly seen in the context of partisan favoritism. Although recreational services represent a softer, less essential, service, the preceding disclosures suggest that it would be inappropriate to view the distribution of recreational facilities in a manner which de-emphasizes the partisan political context. Consequently, this study includes indicators of partisan strength per ward. Since the mayoral election is the focus of partisan politics, measures

⁶⁸William Crawford and Ronald Koziol, "Non-Bid Park Food Pact Bared," Chicago Tribune Mar.9, 1978 (Newsbank 22: B3). Also Crawford and Koziol, "Vending Pact to Dunne Aide," Mar.10,1978 (Newsbank 22:B4).

of partisan strength are adapted from mayoral election returns. Because the strength of the machine is usually evaluated in terms of its capacity to generate a sizable turnout of disciplined party supporters, Democratic strength per ward (x_{13} , x_{18} , x_{23} , x_{28}) is calculated as the difference between the number of applications for ballots and the margin of victory for the Democratic mayoral candidate in the general election (the lower the difference, the greater the strength). A positive correlation (facilities increase as Democratic strength increases) between the distribution of quantities of recreational facilities and levels of Democratic strength would tend to suggest the validity of the structural hypothesis. (Profiles of Democratic strength per ward are provided in Tables 2-8, 2-9, 2-10 and 2-11, pp. 45-48)

TABLE 2-8
DEMOCRATIC STRENGTH-HARD PROFILES 1963

| W A R D | AFILI- CATIONS FOR BALLOTS x_9 | (D) VOTE FOR DALEY x_{10} | (R)VOTE FOR ADAM- OWSKI x_{11} | MARGIN OF DEM. VICTORY x_{12} | MEAS- URE OF DEM. STNGTH x_{13} |
|------------------|--|---|--|--|---|
| 1 | 18453 | 13238 | 4697 | 8541 | 6912 |
| 2 | 19540 | 15796 | 2906 | 12890 | 6650 |
| 3 | 27192 | 22334 | 3482 | 18852 | 8340 |
| 4 | 19228 | 15312 | 2985 | 12327 | 6901 |
| 5 | 19308 | 14086 | 4289 | 9797 | 9511 |
| 6 | 21591 | 15494 | 4917 | 10577 | 11014 |
| 7 | 29592 | 13062 | 15704 | -2642 | 32234 |
| 8 | 28618 | 14939 | 12770 | 2169 | 26449 |
| 9 | 25920 | 10537 | 14654 | -4117 | 30037 |
| 10 | 27964 | 11881 | 14616 | -2735 | 30699 |
| 11 | 24456 | 17291 | 6606 | 10685 | 13771 |
| 12 | 25386 | 11034 | 13534 | -2450 | 27835 |
| 13 | 35100 | 12589 | 21260 | -8671 | 43771 |
| 14 | 22804 | 13152 | 8991 | 4161 | 18643 |
| 15 | 27553 | 11153 | 15709 | -4556 | 32109 |
| 16 | 20354 | 12830 | 6749 | 6081 | 14273 |
| 17 | 17925 | 12455 | 3931 | 8524 | 9401 |
| 18 | 34300 | 16306 | 17248 | -942 | 35242 |
| 19 | 36188 | 14842 | 20575 | -5733 | 41921 |
| 20 | 24806 | 19198 | 4178 | 15020 | 9786 |
| 21 | 30368 | 14750 | 14055 | 695 | 29673 |
| 22 | 22484 | 12746 | 8891 | 3855 | 18629 |
| 23 | 32464 | 10230 | 21291 | -11061 | 43525 |
| 24 | 18828 | 17429 | 968 | 16461 | 2367 |
| 25 | 25150 | 17934 | 6596 | 11338 | 13812 |
| 26 | 23085 | 15269 | 6923 | 8346 | 14739 |
| 27 | 17142 | 14518 | 2122 | 12396 | 4746 |
| 28 | 16268 | 10390 | 5228 | 5162 | 11106 |
| 29 | 19117 | 16561 | 1958 | 14603 | 4514 |
| 30 | 22568 | 12139 | 9747 | 2392 | 20176 |
| 31 | 23767 | 15250 | 7747 | 7503 | 16264 |
| 32 | 20381 | 10658 | 8984 | 1674 | 13707 |
| 33 | 27129 | 11865 | 14362 | -2497 | 29626 |
| 34 | 21460 | 8781 | 12072 | 3091 | 18369 |
| 35 | 27434 | 9130 | 17547 | -8417 | 35851 |
| 36 | 30558 | 12070 | 17563 | -5493 | 36051 |
| 37 | 26593 | 13447 | 12434 | 1013 | 25530 |
| 38 | 33205 | 11456 | 20764 | -9308 | 42513 |
| 39 | 26208 | 11684 | 13843 | -2159 | 28367 |
| 40 | 31185 | 19061 | 11210 | 7851 | 23334 |
| 41 | 31778 | 8308 | 22735 | -14427 | 46205 |
| 42 | 19703 | 14200 | 4938 | 9262 | 10441 |
| 43 | 16171 | 9137 | 6362 | 2775 | 13396 |
| 44 | 25059 | 13580 | 10593 | 2987 | 22072 |
| 45 | 32849 | 9428 | 21895 | -12467 | 45311 |
| 46 | 21813 | 11906 | 9182 | 2724 | 19089 |
| 47 | 30205 | 12651 | 16625 | -3974 | 34179 |
| 48 | 19970 | 10268 | 8453 | 1815 | 15155 |
| 49 | 29866 | 16747 | 12211 | 4536 | 25330 |
| 50 | 34922 | 20325 | 13605 | 6720 | 28202 |

Democratic Strength 1963

$$(x_{13}) = x_9 - x_{12} \text{ or } x_9 - (x_{10} - x_{11})$$

*the lower x_{13} , the greater the strength of the Democratic party

Source: Adapted from Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago, Chicago Heights and Berwyn, Canvassing Sheet for the Mayoralty, Judicial and Supplementary Aldermanic Elections, April 1963.

TABLE 2-9
DEMOCRATIC STRENGTH-WARD PROFILES 1967

| WARD | APPLI- CATIONS FOR BALLOTS X ₁₄ | (D) VOTE FOR DALEY X ₁₅ | (R) VOTE FOR WALKER X ₁₆ | MARGIN OF DEM. VICTORY X ₁₇ | MEAS- URE OF DEM. STNGTH X ₁₈ |
|------|--|--|---|---|--|
| 1 | 17765 | 14044 | 1343 | 12701 | 3064 |
| 2 | 14886 | 11654 | 1760 | 9894 | 4992 |
| 3 | 23057 | 19100 | 2281 | 16819 | 6239 |
| 4 | 17658 | 13998 | 1757 | 12241 | 5417 |
| 5 | 16020 | 11427 | 2292 | 9797 | 6885 |
| 6 | 18154 | 12268 | 2657 | 9611 | 8543 |
| 7 | 24770 | 16340 | 6606 | 9734 | 15036 |
| 8 | 27305 | 17816 | 5621 | 12195 | 15110 |
| 9 | 21077 | 14144 | 6920 | 7224 | 13853 |
| 10 | 22833 | 15736 | 6508 | 9228 | 13605 |
| 11 | 23082 | 20122 | 2588 | 17534 | 5548 |
| 12 | 22372 | 15281 | 6678 | 8603 | 13769 |
| 13 | 32562 | 19333 | 11924 | 7409 | 25153 |
| 14 | 20268 | 16278 | 5562 | 10716 | 9552 |
| 15 | 24193 | 15715 | 8027 | 7688 | 16505 |
| 16 | 16392 | 12034 | 3901 | 8133 | 8259 |
| 17 | 16778 | 12697 | 1963 | 10734 | 6044 |
| 18 | 31496 | 21504 | 3533 | 17971 | 13525 |
| 19 | 31755 | 21274 | 9763 | 11511 | 20244 |
| 20 | 20414 | 15770 | 2793 | 12977 | 7437 |
| 21 | 33751 | 23946 | 6081 | 17365 | 16386 |
| 22 | 18408 | 13976 | 5750 | 8226 | 10182 |
| 23 | 30056 | 16097 | 3868 | 12229 | 17827 |
| 24 | 16951 | 15208 | 925 | 14283 | 2668 |
| 25 | 22049 | 18539 | 3064 | 15475 | 6574 |
| 26 | 19887 | 16666 | 2724 | 13942 | 5945 |
| 27 | 18255 | 16780 | 842 | 15938 | 2317 |
| 28 | 13529 | 10333 | 1909 | 8424 | 5105 |
| 29 | 17947 | 15570 | 1209 | 14361 | 3586 |
| 30 | 16455 | 12374 | 4043 | 8331 | 8124 |
| 31 | 21377 | 17645 | 3407 | 14238 | 7139 |
| 32 | 17111 | 12586 | 4120 | 8466 | 8645 |
| 33 | 22392 | 14230 | 1981 | 12349 | 10043 |
| 34 | 16115 | 11440 | 5375 | 6065 | 10050 |
| 35 | 22632 | 13254 | 9007 | 4247 | 18385 |
| 36 | 26995 | 18199 | 8257 | 9942 | 17053 |
| 37 | 22675 | 16754 | 5463 | 11291 | 11384 |
| 38 | 30397 | 19314 | 10510 | 8804 | 21593 |
| 39 | 23216 | 16147 | 6516 | 9631 | 13585 |
| 40 | 26250 | 19713 | 5344 | 14371 | 11879 |
| 41 | 27820 | 15563 | 11678 | 3885 | 23935 |
| 42 | 19592 | 15659 | 3209 | 12450 | 7142 |
| 43 | 15941 | 16655 | 4316 | 12339 | 3502 |
| 44 | 21852 | 16032 | 5175 | 10857 | 10995 |
| 45 | 26634 | 15161 | 10704 | 4457 | 22777 |
| 46 | 18447 | 13341 | 4536 | 8805 | 9642 |
| 47 | 24726 | 15011 | 9205 | 5806 | 18920 |
| 48 | 24996 | 18305 | 4296 | 14009 | 10987 |
| 49 | 27355 | 19729 | 6639 | 13030 | 14325 |
| 50 | 39005 | 29114 | 8681 | 20433 | 18572 |

Democratic Strength 1967

$$(x_{18}) = x_{14} - x_{17} \text{ or } x_{14} - (x_{15} - x_{16})$$

*the lower x_{18} , the greater the strength of the Democratic party

Source: Adapted from Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago, Chicago Heights and Berwyn, Canvassing Sheet for the Mayoralty, Judicial and Supplementary Aldermanic Elections, April 1967.

TABLE 2-10
DEMOCRATIC STRENGTH-WARD PROFILES 1971

| W A R D | APPLI- CATIONS FOR D BALLOTS x ₁₉ | (D) VOTE FOR DALEY x ₂₀ | (R) VOTE FR. FRIED- MAN x ₂₁ | MARGIN OF DEM. VICTORY x ₂₂ | MEAS- URE OF DEM. STNGTH. x ₂₃ |
|------------------|---|--|---|---|---|
| 1 | 15652 | 12571 | 2857 | 9714 | 5938 |
| 2 | 15406 | 10358 | 4755 | 5603 | 9803 |
| 3 | 15507 | 12215 | 2776 | 9439 | 6068 |
| 4 | 19756 | 14988 | 4379 | 10609 | 9147 |
| 5 | 19892 | 8818 | 10723 | -1905 | 21797 |
| 6 | 18360 | 10900 | 7086 | 3814 | 14546 |
| 7 | 18490 | 11493 | 6645 | 4848 | 13642 |
| 8 | 20094 | 11606 | 8055 | 3551 | 16543 |
| 9 | 18060 | 12297 | 5513 | 6774 | 11286 |
| 10 | 21395 | 15640 | 5427 | 10213 | 11155 |
| 11 | 27833 | 25162 | 2311 | 22851 | 4982 |
| 12 | 25857 | 19414 | 6040 | 13374 | 12483 |
| 13 | 30392 | 21096 | 4796 | 12300 | 18092 |
| 14 | 23716 | 19232 | 4135 | 15097 | 8619 |
| 15 | 23530 | 16975 | 6223 | 10752 | 12778 |
| 16 | 12716 | 8999 | 3397 | 5602 | 7114 |
| 17 | 14832 | 10724 | 3561 | 7163 | 7669 |
| 18 | 25354 | 18783 | 6221 | 12562 | 12792 |
| 19 | 28097 | 19087 | 8739 | 10348 | 17749 |
| 20 | 16937 | 11777 | 4723 | 7054 | 9883 |
| 21 | 20282 | 11778 | 8022 | 3756 | 16526 |
| 22 | 19101 | 14352 | 3439 | 10913 | 7188 |
| 23 | 26598 | 17854 | 8326 | 9528 | 17070 |
| 24 | 17973 | 15761 | 1885 | 13876 | 4097 |
| 25 | 17188 | 14734 | 2197 | 12537 | 4651 |
| 26 | 19618 | 16281 | 2962 | 13319 | 6299 |
| 27 | 16957 | 14494 | 2083 | 12411 | 4546 |
| 28 | 10821 | 7733 | 2732 | 5001 | 5820 |
| 29 | 14509 | 11970 | 2541 | 9429 | 5380 |
| 30 | 22595 | 15508 | 6735 | 8773 | 13812 |
| 31 | 22182 | 19327 | 2536 | 16791 | 5391 |
| 32 | 19252 | 15243 | 3683 | 11560 | 7692 |
| 33 | 18080 | 12254 | 5530 | 6724 | 11356 |
| 34 | 16204 | 11941 | 3741 | 8200 | 8004 |
| 35 | 25028 | 15925 | 3646 | 7279 | 17749 |
| 36 | 30516 | 21394 | 8676 | 12718 | 17795 |
| 37 | 22353 | 16264 | 5787 | 10477 | 11876 |
| 38 | 27287 | 18846 | 8099 | 10747 | 16540 |
| 39 | 25259 | 16710 | 8245 | 8465 | 16794 |
| 40 | 25143 | 15196 | 9665 | 5531 | 19612 |
| 41 | 29932 | 18335 | 11244 | 7091 | 22841 |
| 42 | 21708 | 13546 | 7804 | 5742 | 15966 |
| 43 | 24571 | 11600 | 12976 | -976 | 25547 |
| 44 | 21775 | 12243 | 9187 | 3056 | 18719 |
| 45 | 29367 | 19305 | 9642 | 9623 | 19744 |
| 46 | 18255 | 10697 | 7227 | 3470 | 14785 |
| 47 | 23005 | 14470 | 9000 | 5470 | 18335 |
| 48 | 20321 | 11296 | 4709 | 2587 | 17739 |
| 49 | 25201 | 14351 | 10514 | 3837 | 21364 |
| 50 | 31128 | 18604 | 12134 | 6470 | 24658 |

Democratic Strength 1971

$$(x_{23}) = x_{19} - x_{22} \text{ or } x_{19} - (x_{20} - x_{21})$$

*the lower x_{23} , the greater the strength of the Democratic party

Source: Adapted from Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago, Chicago Heights and Berwyn, Cannassing Sheet for the Mayoralty, Judicial and Supplementary Aldermanic Elections, April 1971

TABLE 2-11
DEMOCRATIC STRENGTH-WARD PROFILES 1975

| W A R D | APPLI- CATIONS FOR BALLOTS x ₂₄ | (D) VOTE FOR DALEY x ₂₅ | (R) VOTE FOR HOELLEN x ₂₆ | MARGIN OF DEM. VICTORY x ₂₇ | MEAS- URE OF DEM STRENGTH. x ₂₈ |
|------------------|--|--|--|---|--|
| 1 | 10789 | 9455 | 964 | 8491 | 2298 |
| 2 | 9609 | 7695 | 1178 | 6517 | 3092 |
| 3 | 7812 | 6657 | 669 | 5988 | 1824 |
| 4 | 10905 | 8648 | 1410 | 7238 | 3667 |
| 5 | 14628 | 7000 | 4494 | 2506 | 12122 |
| 6 | 10141 | 7757 | 1512 | 6245 | 3896 |
| 7 | 12180 | 8533 | 6354 | 2179 | 5826 |
| 8 | 10249 | 7868 | 6469 | 1400 | 3781 |
| 9 | 6776 | 5428 | 918 | 4510 | 2266 |
| 10 | 13976 | 11367 | 1905 | 9662 | 4314 |
| 11 | 27154 | 25554 | 1209 | 24345 | 2809 |
| 12 | 19324 | 16006 | 2870 | 13136 | 6188 |
| 13 | 25325 | 20920 | 4000 | 16820 | 8505 |
| 14 | 16495 | 14150 | 1349 | 12331 | 4164 |
| 15 | 13500 | 11088 | 1918 | 9170 | 4330 |
| 16 | 8027 | 6802 | 632 | 6170 | 1857 |
| 17 | 9424 | 7071 | 1152 | 5919 | 3505 |
| 18 | 16741 | 13964 | 2203 | 11761 | 4980 |
| 19 | 26055 | 19315 | 5779 | 13536 | 12549 |
| 20 | 9204 | 7382 | 1042 | 6340 | 2864 |
| 21 | 10849 | 8221 | 1563 | 6658 | 4191 |
| 22 | 12024 | 10056 | 1543 | 8513 | 3511 |
| 23 | 18907 | 15027 | 3498 | 11529 | 7378 |
| 24 | 8461 | 7519 | 502 | 7017 | 1444 |
| 25 | 11638 | 10352 | 931 | 9421 | 2217 |
| 26 | 13747 | 11927 | 1308 | 10619 | 3128 |
| 27 | 9861 | 8910 | 521 | 8389 | 1472 |
| 28 | 5638 | 4766 | 482 | 4284 | 1354 |
| 29 | 6627 | 5778 | 486 | 5292 | 1335 |
| 30 | 14435 | 10327 | 3675 | 6652 | 7783 |
| 31 | 15113 | 13279 | 1400 | 11879 | 3234 |
| 32 | 12692 | 10362 | 1901 | 8461 | 4231 |
| 33 | 11240 | 8156 | 2733 | 5423 | 5817 |
| 34 | 9233 | 7433 | 1041 | 6392 | 2841 |
| 35 | 18640 | 12115 | 5593 | 6522 | 12118 |
| 36 | 22564 | 16981 | 4991 | 11990 | 10574 |
| 37 | 11877 | 9624 | 1813 | 7811 | 4066 |
| 38 | 21748 | 15626 | 5575 | 10051 | 11697 |
| 39 | 16580 | 11671 | 4469 | 7202 | 9378 |
| 40 | 14822 | 9785 | 4508 | 5277 | 9545 |
| 41 | 24243 | 16281 | 7443 | 8838 | 15405 |
| 42 | 14074 | 10016 | 3325 | 6691 | 7383 |
| 43 | 19477 | 9591 | 6908 | 2683 | 16794 |
| 44 | 12432 | 8240 | 3452 | 4798 | 7644 |
| 45 | 24104 | 15844 | 7373 | 8471 | 15633 |
| 46 | 11060 | 7601 | 2853 | 4748 | 6312 |
| 47 | 18771 | 11559 | 6666 | 4893 | 13878 |
| 48 | 16030 | 9367 | 5142 | 4225 | 11005 |
| 49 | 14412 | 9644 | 3812 | 5872 | 8540 |
| 50 | 19294 | 13929 | 4545 | 9384 | 19294 |

Democratic Strength 1975

$$(x_{28}) = x_{24} - x_{27} \text{ or } x_{24} - (x_{25} - x_{26})$$

*the lower x₂₈, the greater the strength of the Democratic party

Source: Adapted from Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago, Chicago Heights and Berwyn, Canvassing Sheet for the Mayoralty, Judicial and Supplementary Aldermanic Elections, April 1975

If there is no significant relationship between the distribution of numbers of facilities and those factors, is a bureaucratic decision-rule hypothesis valid?

In view of the progressive reform of city government and the growth of independent special districts, others assert that it is preferable to analyze service allocation apart from the context of partisan politics. Any service inequities are viewed as the result of interagency priorities, as bureaucracies attempt to balance fiscal imperatives with varying life style demands, especially in the case of the distribution of softer services.

Whereas those endorsing a structural hypothesis point to the essential importance of partisan politics to explain distributive choices, a bureaucratic interpretation rests on the assumption of the erosion of party influence or the capacity of partisan organizations to centralize control and induce party discipline. In terms of Chicago politics, one need only refer to the effects of the Shakman decree on the political uses of patronage:

Shakman, a political independent, filed the case as a class action, claiming the constitutional rights of all voters were infringed by patronage hiring..Judge Nicholas Bua eventually declared that patronage hiring was illegal and in a recent series of related actions, Mayor Byrne was rebuked for trying to fire several dozen city workers for political reasons.⁶⁹

Furthermore, a number of commentators have observed that:

...the party has lost its reputation for delivering victories for the top candidate it endorses. Mayor Bilandic, Senator Kennedy and Alderman Edward Burke were all endorsed by the organization, but lost..and Mayor Byrne has failed to demonstrate

⁶⁹Brian J. Kelly, "Shakman Case Slowly Changes Way City Runs," Chicago Sun Times (Aug.22, 1982), p. 50.

the type of control over the court system and other county offices that Mayor Daley had.⁷⁰

An increasing number of independent candidates have been elected and Don Rose, a prominent campaign consultant, remarks: "This is an historic tide that won't be reversed. The Shakman federal court decision, the increasing independence of voters and television are among factors that ruin chances for the return of a monolith."⁷¹

In addition, the recent factionalization of the machine coincides with several reforms within the Park District. The Park District was named as a defendant institution in the Shakman suit and concession contracts were opened to public bidding in 1978. The power of the general superintendent was reduced while the Park District board was entrusted with the authority to improvise five major committees to oversee parks administration in concert with various public committees. Given those developments, it may be appropriate to attribute the distribution of public recreational facilities to impartial bureaucratic decision-rules.⁷²

By utilizing multiple regression and standardized regression coefficients (beta), the relative influence of partisan, racial, ethnic and socioeconomic factors on the distribution of quantities of selected recreational facilities among 40 wards can be explored.

⁷⁰Basil Talbot Jr., "The Machine is Gone-Now there are Machines," Chicago Sun Times (Dec.20, 1981) Sec. 2, p. 1, 4.

⁷¹Ibid, p. 4.

⁷²See Dolores McCahill, "Park District Board Creates 5 Policy Committees," Chicago Sun Times (Apr.15, 1981), 12.

The ability to accurately measure the relative explanatory power of a group of independent variables using multiple regression rests on certain assumptions. The most prominent prerequisite is that the independent variables are not highly collinear; the explanatory power of predictive variables is valid only in cases where each may have some degree of unique effect. Where high multicollinearity among independent predictors exists, the effort to measure uniquely explained variance is eroded. Given the interrelationships among the major hypotheses that purport to explain variances in service distribution patterns, one might expect independent variables which are indicative of those hypotheses to be somewhat interrelated. This study is characterized by a number of intercorrelated independent variables. (Table 2-12)

TABLE 2-12

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|----------------------------|-------------|-------------|------|------|------|-----|-----|
| 1.Democratic Strength 1963 | 1.0 | | | | | | |
| 2.Democratic Strength 1967 | .95 | 1.0 | | | | | |
| 3.Affluence 1960 | <u>-.75</u> | <u>-.70</u> | 1.0 | | | | |
| 4.Percent Black 1960 | <u>.70</u> | <u>.57</u> | -.69 | 1.0 | | | |
| 5.Percent Irish 1960 | <u>-.32</u> | -.24 | .45 | -.35 | 1.0 | | |
| 6.Percent Polish 1960 | -.31 | -.22 | .23 | -.62 | -.25 | 1.0 | |
| 7.Percent Hispanic 1960 | .46 | .53 | -.49 | .07 | -.33 | .21 | 1.0 |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 1.Democratic Strength 1971 | 1.0 | | | | | | |
| 2.Democratic Strength 1975 | .87 | 1.0 | | | | | |
| 3.Affluence 1970 | <u>-.82</u> | <u>-.72</u> | 1.0 | | | | |
| 4.Percent Black 1970 | <u>.64</u> | <u>.61</u> | -.64 | 1.0 | | | |
| 5.Percent Irish 1970 | -.46 | -.42 | .64 | -.52 | 1.0 | | |
| 6.Percent Polish 1970 | -.27 | -.39 | .35 | -.78 | .13 | 1.0 | |
| 7.Percent Hispanic 1970 | .41 | .25 | -.29 | -.31 | -.29 | .38 | 1.0 |

Figures listed=simple correlations between pairs of independent variables

Democratic strength per ward is strongly related to percent Black per ward (the greater the number of Black residents in a ward, the greater the support for the Democratic party in that ward). Thus, it may be difficult to discover the unique effect of race versus partisanship on the distribution of facilities. Similarly, there are significant correlations between levels of affluence and percent Black (the greater the number of Black residents in a ward, the less affluent the ward). Thus, it may be difficult to assess the unique effect of race versus affluence in regards to the distribution of facilities.

Although there are no statistical procedures that entirely solve problems of collinearity, a number of alternative methods have been devised to minimize its confounding effects. One alternative is to increase the size of the sample in order to increase the likelihood of achieving statistically significant results. However, in this study, the reduced number of cases, 40 wards, is set by the need to control for the disruptive effect implicit in the concentration of major facilities in wards containing lakefront parks and attractions. Another possibility is to combine the intercorrelated variables into a single indicative measure.⁷³ However, since each offending variable is individually significant in terms of the competing hypotheses, that option is theoretically unacceptable. Finally, one may discard the offending variables in a manner that maintains the major theoretical basis of the study.

⁷³see Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Applied Regression: An Introduction (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980).

Because the issue of the unique influence on distributive policy attributable to race versus partisanship is especially intriguing, those variables are not combined. Rather, since affluence bears such a strong relationship to race, the indicator of affluence is discarded. When that independent variable is discarded, the correlations among the remaining independent variables are as follows: (See Table 2-13, p. 54)

TABLE 2-13
MATRIX OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

| | Democratic Strength 1963 | Percent Black 1960 | Percent Irish 1960 | Percent Polish 1960 | Percent Hispanic 1960 |
|------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Democratic Strength 63 | 1.0 | | | | |
| Percent Black 1960 | .70 | 1.0 | | | |
| Percent Irish 1960 | -.32 | -.35 | 1.0 | | TIME I |
| Percent Polish 1960 | -.31 | -.62 | -.25 | 1.0 | |
| Percent Hispanic 1960 | .46 | .07 | -.33 | .21 | 1.0 |

| | Democratic Strength 1967 | Percent Black 1960 | Percent Irish 1960 | Percent Polish 1960 | Percent Hispanic 1960 |
|------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Democratic Strength 67 | 1.0 | | | | |
| Percent Black 1960 | .57 | 1.0 | | | TIME II |
| Percent Irish 1960 | -.24 | -.35 | 1.0 | | |
| Percent Polish 1960 | -.22 | -.62 | -.25 | 1.0 | |
| Percent Hispanic 1960 | .53 | .07 | -.33 | .21 | 1.0 |

| | Democratic Strength 1971 | Percent Black 1970 | Percent Irish 1970 | Percent Polish 1970 | Percent Hispanic 1970 |
|------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Democratic Strength 71 | 1.0 | | | | |
| Percent Black 1970 | .65 | 1.0 | | | TIME III |
| Percent Irish 1970 | -.46 | -.52 | 1.0 | | |
| Percent Polish 1970 | -.27 | -.78 | .13 | 1.0 | |
| Percent Hispanic 1970 | .41 | -.31 | -.29 | .38 | 1.0 |

| | Democratic Strength 1975 | Percent Black 1970 | Percent Irish 1970 | Percent Polish 1970 | Percent Hispanic 1970 |
|------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Democratic Strength 75 | 1.0 | | | | |
| Percent Black 1970 | .61 | 1.0 | | | TIME IV |
| Percent Irish 1970 | -.42 | -.52 | 1.0 | | |
| Percent Polish 1970 | -.39 | -.78 | .13 | 1.0 | |
| Percent Hispanic 1970 | .25 | -.31 | -.29 | .38 | 1.0 |

*Figures listed=simple r/simple correlation between variables

Does the relative effect of the independent variables (partisan strength, race, ethnicity) in regards to the distribution of recreational facilities persist over time?

Aside from methodological concerns, there is also a substantial need to assess the relationship among the variables (the relative explanatory power of the different hypotheses) over time, especially in view of the dynamic and transitional nature of Chicago politics and society. Therefore, this study assesses the variance in the distribution of quantities of recreational facilities among the 40 wards over a 20 year time period, roughly 1960 to 1980. Since recreational services are delivered through fixed facilities, it may happen that facilities targeted to serve the needs and demands of a specific clientele might miss their mark. For that reason, hypothetical pronouncements concerning the distribution of services at a specific time are always suspect, since any apparent patterns may have occurred spuriously, as populations move from area to area and inherit previously affixed facilities. In short, the reality of ecological succession, or the mobility of the urban population, warrants the need to analyze patterns of distribution over time, in a manner sensitive to the nature of the urban environment. Unfortunately, the use of change variables is precluded by the redistricting of wards (reapportionment), which prevents comparisons of facilities per ward over extended periods of time. However, if one employs consistent methodological procedures, it is possible to compare the relative influence of independent predictors in separate time periods. In essence, will a relationship which

characterizes an earlier time period continue in successive time periods, despite transitions in leadership personnel and demographic changes, or will distributive policy be altered substantially in light of those developments. Time series analysis, in effect, allows for the recognition of results that are attributable to unpredictable shifts in population, thereby assuring a less tenuous evaluation of distributive policy. This study proceeds as:

Selected facilities per ward for 1966-football and soccer fields(y_1), fieldhouses(y_2), recreation buildings(y_3) and total facilities(y_4) are each regressed with a number of independent variables-percent Black 1960(x_1), percent Irish foreign stock 1960(x_2), percent Polish foreign stock 1960(x_3), percent Hispanic 1960(x_4) and Democratic strength 1963(x_{13})-per ward. (TIME I)

Selected facilities per ward for 1970-football and soccer fields(y_5), fieldhouses(y_6), recreation buildings(y_7) and total facilities(y_8) are each regressed with a number of independent variables-percent Black 1960(x_1), percent Irish foreign stock 1960(x_2), percent Polish foreign stock 1960(x_3), percent Hispanic 1960(x_4) and Democratic strength 1967(x_{18})-per ward. (TIME II)

Selected facilities per ward for 1976-football and soccer fields(y_9), fieldhouses(y_{10}), recreation buildings(y_{11}) and total facilities(y_{12}) are each regressed with a number of independent variables-percent Black 1970(x_5), percent Irish foreign stock 1970(x_6), percent Polish foreign stock 1970(x_7), percent Hispanic 1970(x_8) and Democratic strength 1971(x_{23})-per ward. (TIME III)

Selected facilities per ward for 1980-football and soccer fields(y_{13}), fieldhouses(y_{14}), recreation buildings(y_{15}) and total facilities(y_{16}) are each regressed with a number of independent variables-percent Black 1970(x_5), percent Irish foreign stock 1970(x_6), percent Polish foreign stock 1970(x_7), percent Hispanic 1970(x_8) and Democratic strength 1975(x_{28})-per ward. (TIME IV)

CHAPTER III

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

When quantities of selected park district facilities per ward are regressed with a number of independent variables per ward across four time periods, the following statistics are generated:

TABLE 3-2
REGRESSION RESULTS
SELECTED FACILITIES WITH ALL INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES ACROSS FOUR TIME PERIODS

TIME I

| | | | |
|--------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| Fieldhouses 1966 with: | beta (significance) | Total Facilities 1966 with: | beta (sig.) |
| Democratic Strength 1963 | -.61 (.01) | Democratic Strength 1963 | -.72 (.01) |

TIME II

| | | | |
|------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| Fieldhouses 1970 with: | beta (significance) | Total Facilities 1970 with: | beta (sig.) |
| Percent Black 1960 | -.68 (.05) | Democratic Strength 1967 | -.58 (.01) |
| Percent Irish 1960 | -.41 (.05) | Percent Polish | -.48 (.05) |

TIME III

| | | | |
|------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| Fieldhouses 1976 with: | beta (significance) | Total Facilities 1976 with: | beta (sig.) |
| Percent Black 1970 | -.87 (.05) | Percent Hispanic 1970 | -.60 (.05) |
| Percent Irish 1970 | -.50 (.05) | | |

TIME IV

| | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|
| Total Facilities 1980 with: | beta (significance) |
| Percent Black 1970 | -.98 (.05) |
| Percent Hispanic 1970 | -.68 (.01) |

*Only statistics achieving a .05 level of significance or better are reported

In TIME I and TIME II, the distribution of fieldhouses per ward is most significantly influenced by Democratic strength per ward. One can reasonably predict that the greater the level of Democratic strength in a ward, the less will be the number of fieldhouses (beta = $-.61$). Also, the greater the level of Democratic strength in a ward, the less the number of total facilities (beta = $-.72$). Because Black wards strongly support the Democratic party (intercorrelation = $.70$), the distribution of greater numbers of facilities to wards in which Democratic strength is less has the effect of disadvantaging Black wards; or white wards which do not support the Democratic party as strongly as Black wards will likely receive greater quantities of fieldhouses and total facilities.

In TIME III and TIME IV, the distribution of quantities of total facilities is negatively related to percent Black and percent Hispanic per ward; the greater the percentage of Blacks or Hispanics in a ward, the less the number of total facilities (betas = $-.60$ Hispanic, $-.98$ Black).

The structural hypothesis is clearly inapplicable in regards to the allocation of quantities of facilities. Although Blacks offer strong support for the Democratic candidate, Black wards receive less facilities than less supportive wards. Given the collinearity between percent Black and Democratic strength, is that pattern of distribution related to a policy of directing quantities of services to non-supporters, or is that pattern a function of a policy which favors white wards to the detriment of

Black wards, with race the primary consideration?

There are two possible approaches to the problem of appraising the unique variance attributable to race versus partisanship. The unique variance accounted for by each variable can be calculated by comparing the differences in R Squared; or the proportion of variance explained by the independent variables for a regression including all independent variables versus regressions eliminating one of the collinear variables. (Table 3-3,62)

In TIME I and TIME II, the proportion of total variance in the number of total facilities per ward explained uniquely by Democratic strength is greater than the amount of variance uniquely explained by percent Black. However, since only a small number of wards contained substantial percentages of Blacks, with those wards characterized by extremely strong Democratic support, the distribution of cases diminishes the significance of any statement regarding the independent effects of race versus partisanship.

In TIMES III and IV, the Black population is more dispersed, as greater percentages of Blacks came to reside in wards where Democratic support is less pronounced and which had previously benefitted from greater preferments of fixed facilities. Presuming increased numbers of Blacks have come to live in wards previously characterized by white majorities, the unique variance attributable to race should decline (if apparent inequities were merely a spurious occurrence) as Blacks inherit greater numbers of previously affixed facilities (in previously less supportive wards).

However, the unique variance explained by race increases from .02 to .10 between TIME I and TIME IV. (See Table 3-3, p.62)

Although the increase is slight, one would expect that unique variance attributable to race would decline as the Black population became more dispersed and greater percentages of Blacks inherited greater quantities of facilities previously affixed in less supportive wards. Because the factor of race increased in importance in relationship to the distribution of facilities, one can assert that race is apparently more influential than partisanship when distributive policy is at issue.

TABLE 3-3
VARIATION IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF QUANTITIES OF
TOTAL FACILITIES UNIQUELY EXPLAINED BY DEMOCRATIC
STRENGTH(PARTISANSHIP) VS PERCENT BLACK (RACE)

TIME I

Total Facilities 1966 with All Independent Variables R SQUARE=.49 (.01 significance)

Total Facilities 1966 with All Independent Variables
 Except Democratic Strength 1963 R SQUARE=.32 (.01 significance)

Total Facilities 1966 with All Independent Variables
 Except Percent Black 1960 R SQUARE=.47 (.01 significance)

Unique variance explained by Democratic strength(partisanship)=.17

Unique variance explained by Percent Black (race)=.02

TIME II

Total Facilities 1970 with All Independent Variables R SQUARE=.41 (.01 significance)

Total Facilities 1970 with All Independent Variables
 Except Democratic Strength 1967 R SQUARE=.27 (.05 significance)

Total Facilities 1970 with All Independent Variables
 Except Percent Black 1960 R SQUARE=.36 (.01 significance)

Unique variance explained by Democratic strength(partisanship)=.14

Unique variance explained by Percent Black (race)=.05

TIME III

Total Facilities 1976 with All Independent Variables R SQUARE=.33 (.05 significance)

Total Facilities 1976 with All Independent Variables
 Except Democratic Strength 1971 R SQUARE=.33 (.01 significance)

Total Facilities 1976 with All Independent Variables
 Except Percent Black 1970 R SQUARE=.26 (.05 significance)

Unique variance explained by Democratic strength(partisanship)=.00

Unique variance explained by Percent Black (race)=.07

TIME IV

Total Facilities 1980 with All Independent Variables R SQUARE=.35 (.01 significance)

Total Facilities 1980 with All Independent Variables
 except Democratic Strength 1971 R SQUARE=.34 (.01 significance)

Total Facilities 1980 with All Independent Variables
 except Percent Black 1970 R SQUARE=.25 (.05 significance)

Unique variance explained by Democratic strength(partisanship)=.01

Unique variance explained by Percent Black (race)=.10

*Only statistics achieving at least a .05 level of significance are reported

A second option is to control for strong Black support of the Democratic party by excluding those wards in which Black support for the Democratic party is greatest. Although reducing the number of cases may decrease the likelihood of obtaining significant statistics, the removal of those outlying cases creates a sample of wards in which the relationship between percent Black per ward and Democratic strength per ward is less pronounced. Collinearity is reduced and a more accurate appraisal of the independent influence of race versus partisanship is possible. However, because there is only a minimal number of wards containing substantial numbers of Blacks in TIME I and TIME II, controlling for the effects of strong Black support is impractical in those times. (See Table 3-4, p.64) In TIMES III and IV, the greater dispersal of Blacks (more wards contain substantial numbers of Blacks) enhances the use of such controls; the exclusion of extremely supportive Black wards does not dilute the representativeness of the sample in regards to racial distribution (12 wards containing substantial numbers of Blacks remain). When that control procedure was applied, the correlation between race (percent Black) and partisanship (Democratic strength) is reduced to .48 in TIME III and .52 in TIME IV (See Table 3-5, p. 65) The distribution of facilities in those time periods among 34 wards is characterized by racial discrimination, as both Black and Hispanic wards receive less facilities (betas= -.80 and -.76/See Table 3-6, p. 66).

TABLE 3-4
RANK OF WARDS ACCORDING TO DEMOCRATIC STRENGTH
BY RACIAL COMPOSITION ACROSS FOUR TIME PERIODS

| TIME I | | | TIME II | | | TIME III | | | TIME IV | | |
|------------------|--|------------------------|------------------|--|------------------------|------------------|--|------------------------|------------------|--|------------------------|
| W A R D | DEMO- CRATIC STNGTH 1963 x13 | PER BLK 60 x1 | W A R D | DEMO- CRATIC STNGTH 1967 x19 | PER BLK 60 x1 | W A R D | DEMO- CRATIC STNGTH 1971 x23 | PER BLK 70 x5 | W A R D | DEMO- CRATIC STNGTH 1975 x22 | PER BLK 70 x5 |
| 24 | 2367 | .97 | 27 | 2317 | .61 | 24 | 4097 | .99 | 29 | 1335 | .88 |
| 27 | 2746 | .61 | 24 | 2668 | .97 | 27 | 4546 | .90 | 28 | 1354 | .84 |
| 29 | 4514 | .57 | 29 | 3586 | .57 | 25 | 4651 | .36 | 24 | 1444 | .99 |
| 3 | 5340 | .99 | 23 | 5105 | .29 | 11 | 4992 | .11 | 27 | 1472 | .90 |
| 17 | 9401 | .68 | 11 | 5548 | .13 | 29 | 5390 | .88 | 3 | 1824 | .100 |
| 20 | 9786 | .99 | 26 | 5945 | .03 | 31 | 5391 | .01 | 16 | 1857 | .92 |
| 6 | 11014 | .92 | 17 | 6044 | .68 | 28 | 5820 | .94 | 25 | 2217 | .36 |
| 28 | 11106 | .29 | 3 | 6239 | .99 | 3 | 6068 | .100 | 9 | 2266 | .28 |
| 11 | 13771 | .13 | 25 | 6574 | .26 | 26 | 6299 | .05 | 11 | 2809 | .11 |
| 25 | 13812 | .26 | 31 | 7139 | .00 | 16 | 7114 | .92 | 34 | 2841 | .67 |
| 16 | 14273 | .35 | 20 | 7437 | .98 | 22 | 7188 | .24 | 20 | 2864 | .98 |
| 26 | 14739 | .03 | 30 | 8124 | .03 | 17 | 7669 | .98 | 26 | 3128 | .05 |
| 31 | 16264 | .00 | 16 | 8259 | .35 | 32 | 7692 | .04 | 31 | 3234 | .01 |
| 34 | 18369 | .00 | 6 | 8543 | .92 | 34 | 8004 | .67 | 17 | 3505 | .98 |
| 22 | 18629 | .30 | 32 | 8645 | .01 | 14 | 8619 | .06 | 22 | 3511 | .24 |
| 14 | 18643 | .09 | 14 | 9552 | .09 | 20 | 9883 | .98 | 8 | 3781 | .77 |
| 32 | 18707 | .01 | 33 | 10043 | .00 | 10 | 11185 | .09 | 6 | 3896 | .98 |
| 30 | 20176 | .03 | 34 | 10050 | .00 | 9 | 11286 | .28 | 37 | 4066 | .12 |
| 40 | 23334 | .01 | 22 | 10182 | .30 | 33 | 11356 | .00 | 14 | 4164 | .06 |
| 37 | 25580 | .00 | 37 | 11394 | .00 | 37 | 11876 | .12 | 21 | 4191 | .87 |
| 8 | 26449 | .27 | 40 | 11879 | .01 | 12 | 12483 | .05 | 32 | 4231 | .04 |
| 12 | 27836 | .00 | 18 | 13525 | .00 | 15 | 12778 | .08 | 10 | 4314 | .09 |
| 50 | 28202 | .00 | 39 | 13595 | .00 | 18 | 12792 | .28 | 15 | 4330 | .08 |
| 39 | 28367 | .00 | 10 | 13605 | .03 | 7 | 13642 | .27 | 18 | 4980 | .28 |
| 33 | 29626 | .00 | 12 | 13769 | .00 | 30 | 13812 | .00 | 33 | 5817 | .00 |
| 21 | 29673 | .43 | 9 | 13853 | .14 | 6 | 14546 | .98 | 7 | 5826 | .27 |
| 9 | 30037 | .14 | 7 | 15036 | .00 | 21 | 16526 | .87 | 12 | 6188 | .05 |
| 10 | 30699 | .03 | 8 | 15110 | .27 | 38 | 16540 | .01 | 23 | 7378 | .00 |
| 15 | 32109 | .00 | 21 | 16386 | .43 | 8 | 16543 | .77 | 30 | 7783 | .00 |
| 7 | 32334 | .00 | 15 | 16505 | .00 | 39 | 16794 | .06 | 13 | 8505 | .00 |
| 47 | 34179 | .00 | 36 | 17053 | .00 | 23 | 17070 | .00 | 39 | 9378 | .06 |
| 18 | 35242 | .00 | 23 | 17827 | .03 | 19 | 17749 | .02 | 40 | 9545 | .01 |
| 35 | 35851 | .00 | 35 | 18385 | .00 | 35 | 17749 | .00 | 36 | 10574 | .00 |
| 36 | 36051 | .00 | 50 | 18572 | .00 | 36 | 17798 | .00 | 38 | 11697 | .01 |
| 19 | 41921 | .00 | 47 | 18920 | .00 | 13 | 18092 | .00 | 35 | 12118 | .00 |
| 38 | 42513 | .00 | 19 | 20244 | .00 | 47 | 18335 | .00 | 19 | 12549 | .02 |
| 23 | 43525 | .03 | 38 | 21593 | .00 | 40 | 19612 | .01 | 47 | 13878 | .00 |
| 13 | 43771 | .00 | 45 | 22177 | .00 | 45 | 19744 | .00 | 41 | 15405 | .00 |
| 45 | 45311 | .00 | 41 | 23935 | .00 | 41 | 22841 | .00 | 45 | 15633 | .00 |
| 41 | 46205 | .00 | 13 | 25153 | .00 | 50 | 24658 | .00 | 50 | 19294 | .00 |

Wards in which Blacks represent more than 20% of the total population:

1960=13 wards

1970=17 wards

TABLE 3-5
MATRIX OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES REMOVING THOSE SIX OR SEVEN WARDS CONTAINING
BLACK MAJORITIES AND WHICH ARE MOST SUPPORTIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (4 TIMES)

| | Democratic Strength 1963 | Percent Black 1960 | Percent Irish 1960 | Percent Polish 1960 | Percent Hispanic 1960 |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Democratic Strength 1963 | 1.0 | | | | |
| Percent Black 1960 | .47 | 1.0 | | | |
| Percent Irish 1960 | -.20 | -.25 | 1.0 | | |
| Percent Polish 1960 | .25 | .00 | -.62 | 1.0 | |
| Percent Hispanic 1960 | .61 | .38 | -.36 | .45 | 1.0 |

| | Democratic Strength 1967 | Percent Black 1960 | Percent Irish 1960 | Percent Polish 1960 | Percent Hispanic 1960 |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Democratic Strength 1967 | 1.0 | | | | |
| Percent Black 1960 | .42 | 1.0 | | | |
| Percent Irish 1960 | -.11 | -.25 | 1.0 | | |
| Percent Polish 1960 | .23 | .00 | -.62 | 1.0 | |
| Percent Hispanic 1960 | .61 | .38 | -.36 | .45 | 1.0 |

| | Democratic Strength 1971 | Percent Black 1970 | Percent Irish 1970 | Percent Polish 1970 | Percent Hispanic 1970 |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Democratic Strength 1971 | 1.0 | | | | |
| Percent Black 1970 | .48 | 1.0 | | | |
| Percent Irish 1970 | -.36 | -.18 | 1.0 | | |
| Percent Polish 1970 | .00 | -.50 | -.36 | 1.0 | |
| Percent Hispanic 1970 | .70 | .09 | -.58 | .20 | 1.0 |

| | Democratic Strength 1975 | Percent Black 1970 | Percent Irish 1970 | Percent Polish 1970 | Percent Hispanic 1970 |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Democratic Strength 1975 | 1.0 | | | | |
| Percent Black 1970 | .52 | 1.0 | | | |
| Percent Irish 1970 | -.23 | -.18 | 1.0 | | |
| Percent Polish 1970 | -.06 | -.50 | -.36 | 1.0 | |
| Percent Hispanic 1970 | -.52 | .09 | -.58 | .20 | 1.0 |

*Figures listed=simple r/simple correlation between variables

TABLE 3-6
REGRESSION RESULTS
SELECTED FACILITIES WITH ALL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
AMONG WARDS IN WHICH BLACK SUPPORT FOR THE DEMOCRATIC
PARTY IS LESS PRONOUNCED

TIME I

| Total Facilities 1966 with: | beta | (significance) |
|-----------------------------|------|----------------|
| Democratic Strength 1963 | -.64 | (.01) |

TIME II

| Total Facilities 1970 with: | beta | (significance) |
|-----------------------------|------|----------------|
| Democratic Strength 1967 | -.62 | (.01) |

TIME III

| Total Facilities 1976 with: | beta | (significance) |
|-----------------------------|------|----------------|
| Percent Hispanic 1970 | -.80 | (.01) |

TIME IV

| Total Facilities 1980 with: | beta | (significance) |
|-----------------------------|------|----------------|
| Percent Hispanic 1970 | -.76 | (.01) |
| Percent Black 1970 | -.76 | (.05) |

*Only statistics achieving at least a
.05 level of significance are given

Before any conclusions are presented, it is essential to reiterate the parameters of this study: This project is restricted to an analysis of the distributive patterns that typify the delivery of a single service, recreation, within a single city, by a single agency, the Chicago Park District. The parameters of the study suggest that the results cannot be unilaterally applied to the distribution of other services, nor can they explain distributive patterns in other unique environments (in other cities). One must consciously avoid the overgeneralizations which characterize past service distribution research. However, in regards to the distribution of public recreational facilities in Chicago and the public policy of the Chicago Park District, a number of assertions can be specified.

Among 40 wards in the City of Chicago, it is apparent that:

- 1) Black wards receive less quantities of total facilities than white wards, despite their strong support for the predominant (Democratic) party.
- 2) The intentional version of the underclass hypothesis (deliberate racial discrimination) offers the most valid explanation of that pattern of distribution. Although significant numbers of Blacks have moved into wards containing greater quantities of previously affixed facilities, a negative relationship between percent Black per ward and total facilities per ward persists. In addition, the variance in the total facilities per ward uniquely explained by race has increased over time, despite the increasing intensity of Black community groups.

That conclusion is supplemented by recent legal actions instituted against the Park District by the Justice Department. A suit, filed by U.S Attorney Dan Webb, charges the Park District with extensive acts of discrimination against parks in Black and Hispanic inner city neighborhoods.

A press release from Webb's office said: "The defendants have provided and continue to provide fewer recreational facilities, instructional programs, recreational personnel and less money for capital improvements and building maintenance in predominantly black and Hispanic communities than have been provided in predominantly white areas of Chicago."⁷⁴

Specifically, it seeks a permanent injunction against those practices, which violate the provision of the 1974 Housing Act prohibiting discriminatory actions by municipal agencies receiving federal assistance under the terms of the Act.

Moreover, there is no indication that the pluralist version of the underclass hypothesis accounts for service discrepancies among classes of citizens. Although the Irish are a highly involved ethnic culture (politically) and hold significant policy-making positions in Chicago, there is no indication that wards containing greater percentages of Irish foreign stock receive greater quantities of facilities (betas = -.41 in TIME II and -.50 in TIME III (See Table 3-2, p. 58).

⁷⁴William Clements and Maurice Possley, "Park District Racial Bias Charged in Suit by U.S," Chicago Sun Times 1 December 1982, p. 3.

Finally, in view of those findings, Mladenka's assertion of the applicability of the bureaucratic decision-rule hypothesis in regards to the distribution of public recreational facilities in Chicago is fundamentally wrong; the product of a flawed technique which fails to control for the concentration of facilities in major parks along the lakefront.

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APPENDIX A MATRIX OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES

| FACILITIES 1980 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | |
|------------------------|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| SENIOR BASEBALL FIELDS | 1 | 1.0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| JUNIOR BASEBALL FIELDS | 2 | .49 | 1.0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| BASKETBALL STANDARDS | 3 | .51 | .55 | 1.0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DAYCAMPS | 4 | .37 | - | .48 | 1.0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| FOOTBALL & SOCCER FLDS | 5 | .56 | .68 | .63 | .57 | 1.0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| HORSESHOE COURTS | 6 | .16 | .25 | .09 | .33 | .30 | 1.0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLAYGROUNDS | 7 | .78 | .16 | .45 | - | .43 | .17 | 1.0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SHUFFLE BOARD COURTS | 8 | .11 | .10 | .24 | .17 | .12 | .09 | .20 | 1.0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SKATING AREAS | 9 | .20 | .62 | .40 | .59 | .54 | .42 | .11 | .03 | 1.0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SOFTBALL FIELDS | 10 | .34 | .20 | .38 | .24 | .48 | .35 | .05 | .30 | - | 1.0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TENNIS COURTS | 11 | .44 | .47 | .51 | .44 | .63 | .30 | .25 | .13 | .42 | .61 | 1.0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| VOLLEYBALL COURTS | 12 | .29 | .70 | .52 | .58 | .51 | .26 | .09 | .36 | .65 | .22 | .34 | 1.0 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PASSIVE REC. AREAS | 13 | .07 | .24 | .10 | .23 | .33 | .14 | .08 | .12 | .34 | .14 | .15 | .03 | 1.0 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| CLUB ROOMS | 14 | .27 | .52 | .40 | .71 | .61 | .64 | .33 | .09 | .60 | .36 | .47 | .52 | .20 | 1.0 | | | | | | | | | | |
| SWIMMING POOLS | 15 | .11 | .06 | .14 | .08 | .10 | .13 | .17 | .15 | .01 | .13 | .22 | .26 | .04 | .08 | 1.0 | | | | | | | | | |
| ART CENTERS | 16 | .28 | .58 | .37 | .65 | .45 | .47 | .00 | .17 | .48 | .26 | .45 | - | .12 | - | .16 | 1.0 | | | | | | | | |
| AUDITORIUMS | 17 | .28 | .47 | .47 | .56 | .43 | .16 | .21 | .07 | - | .37 | .40 | .44 | .12 | .63 | .14 | - | 1.0 | | | | | | | |
| DRAFTROOMS | 18 | .21 | .32 | .04 | .48 | .30 | .54 | .03 | .13 | .29 | .11 | .22 | .09 | .29 | .62 | .05 | .63 | .40 | 1.0 | | | | | | |
| DRAMA CENTERS | 19 | - | .24 | .21 | .27 | .27 | .27 | .02 | .23 | .15 | .27 | .35 | .20 | .14 | .43 | .14 | .53 | .38 | .51 | 1.0 | | | | | |
| FIELDHOUSES | 20 | .11 | .25 | .25 | .46 | .29 | .47 | .26 | .01 | .50 | .10 | .24 | .10 | .29 | .72 | .12 | .62 | - | .57 | - | 1.0 | | | | |
| GYMNASIUMS | 21 | .52 | .48 | .52 | .48 | .47 | .20 | .36 | .16 | .31 | .30 | .31 | .28 | .10 | - | .28 | .37 | .63 | .30 | .33 | .44 | 1.0 | | | |
| KITCHENS | 22 | .23 | .51 | .31 | .56 | .43 | .35 | .14 | .15 | .48 | .24 | .36 | .37 | .23 | .77 | .16 | .79 | .61 | .60 | .52 | .69 | .41 | 1.0 | | |
| MUSIC CENTERS | 23 | .30 | .35 | .22 | - | .22 | .01 | - | .06 | .00 | .07 | .29 | .04 | .11 | .11 | .06 | .29 | .12 | .31 | .46 | .06 | .25 | .21 | 1.0 | |
| RECREATION BUILDINGS | 24 | .35 | - | .55 | .51 | .49 | .19 | .19 | .14 | .47 | .20 | .28 | .70 | .09 | .35 | .03 | .25 | .29 | .00 | .00 | .07 | .37 | .09 | .01 | 1.0 |

* Indicates negative correlations

APPENDIX B: SIMPLE CORRELATIONS-ALL DEPENDENT VARIABLES WITH
ALL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

| TIME I PARK FACILITIES 1966 | DEMOCRATIC STRENGTH 63 | PERCENT BLACK60 | PERCENT IRISH 60 | PERCENT POLISH 60 | PERCENT HISP.60 | AFFLU- ENCE 60 |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| SENIOR BASEBALL FLDS | -.37 | -.12 | .10 | -.03 | -.04 | .21 |
| JUNIOR BASEBALL FLDS | -.45 | -.21 | .17 | -.07 | -.19 | .26 |
| BASKETBALL STANDS | -.48 | -.35 | .20 | .05 | -.19 | .38 |
| DAYCAMPS | -.55 | -.27 | .24 | -.05 | -.27 | .40 |
| HORSESHOE COURTS | -.45 | -.20 | -.08 | -.07 | -.08 | .35 |
| PLAYGROUNDS | -.34 | -.33 | .12 | -.13 | -.14 | .29 |
| SHUFFLEBOARD COURTS | -.21 | -.31 | - | -.08 | -.13 | .15 |
| SKATING AREAS | -.69 | -.14 | .26 | .17 | -.15 | .51 |
| SOFTBALL FIELDS | -.51 | -.54 | .27 | -.09 | -.18 | .45 |
| TENNIS COURTS | -.29 | -.19 | .00 | -.09 | -.05 | .35 |
| VOLLEYBALL COURTS | -.56 | -.34 | - | .03 | -.24 | .38 |
| PASSIVE REC.AREAS | -.30 | -.11 | .23 | -.20 | -.26 | .23 |
| CLUBROOMS | -.58 | -.46 | .14 | .10 | -.17 | .50 |
| SWIMMING POOLS | .08 | - | -.14 | .18 | .26 | -.07 |
| ART CENTERS | -.55 | -.34 | .22 | -.00 | -.09 | .33 |
| AUDITORIUMS | -.39 | -.33 | .08 | .05 | .01 | .27 |
| CRAFTROOMS | -.28 | -.35 | .08 | .09 | -.13 | .20 |
| DRAMA CENTERS | -.37 | -.25 | .19 | -.02 | -.20 | .27 |
| GYMNASIUMS | -.22 | -.26 | .09 | .24 | .22 | .14 |
| KITCHENS | -.49 | -.39 | .18 | .01 | -.15 | .41 |
| MUSIC CENTERS | -.24 | -.01 | .21 | -.07 | .07 | .00 |

| TIME II PARK FACILITIES 1970 | DEMOCRATIC STRENGTH 67 | PERCENT BLACK60 | PERCENT IRISH60 | PERCENT POLISH 60 | PERCENT HISP.60 | AFFLU- ENCE 60 |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| SENIOR BASEBALL FIELDS | -.34 | -.09 | .10 | -.06 | -.04 | .20 |
| JUNIOR BASEBALL FLDS | -.52 | -.26 | .32 | -.05 | -.25 | .34 |
| BASKETBALL STANDS | - | .01 | -.08 | -.08 | -.11 | .05 |
| DAYCAMPS | -.59 | -.39 | .27 | .12 | -.24 | .47 |
| HORSESHOE COURTS | -.39 | -.34 | -.03 | .00 | -.05 | .30 |
| PLAYGROUNDS | -.30 | - | .01 | -.09 | .01 | .21 |
| SHUFFLEBOARD CRTS | -.27 | .15 | .08 | -.08 | -.14 | .17 |
| SKATING AREAS | -.66 | -.51 | .25 | .14 | -.21 | .54 |
| SOFTBALL FIELDS | -.42 | -.26 | .17 | -.07 | -.16 | .42 |
| TENNIS COURTS | -.37 | -.24 | -.00 | -.01 | -.04 | .40 |
| VOLLEYBALL COURTS | -.49 | -.28 | .25 | .00 | -.21 | .39 |
| PASSIVE REC.AREAS | -.33 | -.10 | .21 | -.18 | -.26 | .24 |
| CLUBROOMS | -.59 | -.47 | .17 | .09 | -.19 | .53 |
| SWDMMING POOLS | .26 | .21 | -.27 | .01 | .25 | -.37 |
| ART CENTERS | -.52 | -.33 | .20 | - | -.21 | .42 |
| AUDITORIUMS | -.29 | -.25 | .11 | -.01 | .02 | .20 |
| CRAFTROOMS | -.38 | -.39 | .07 | .17 | -.16 | .31 |
| DRAMA CENTERS | -.31 | -.23 | .09 | -.01 | .02 | .21 |
| GYMNASIUMS | -.17 | -.23 | .06 | .18 | .21 | .12 |
| KITCHENS | - | -.36 | .16 | .04 | -.18 | .42 |
| MUSIC CENTERS | -.17 | .07 | .29 | -.30 | .04 | .05 |

| TIME III PARK FACILITIES 1976 | DEMOCRATIC STRENGTH71 | PERCENT BLACK70 | PERCENT IRISH70 | PERCENT POLISH70 | PERCENT HISP.70 | AFFLU- ENCE70 |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| SENIOR BASEBALL FLDS | -.02 | .05 | .09 | -.05 | -.15 | .16 |
| JUNIOR BASEBALL FLDS | -.25 | -.14 | .18 | .08 | -.23 | .51 |
| BASKETBALL STANDS | -.04 | .16 | -.16 | -.06 | -.22 | .07 |
| DAYCAMPS | -.45 | -.33 | - | .29 | -.34 | .65 |
| HORSESHOE COURTS | -.33 | -.27 | .17 | .10 | -.21 | .30 |
| PLAYGROUNDS | .06 | -.09 | -.12 | .01 | .14 | -.05 |
| SHUFFLEBOARD COURTS | -.13 | -.02 | .10 | -.04 | -.06 | .10 |
| SKATING AREAS | -.57 | -.48 | .47 | .31 | -.24 | .74 |
| SOFTBALL FIELDS | -.32 | -.08 | .31 | -.04 | -.40 | .37 |
| TENNIS COURTS | -.46 | -.13 | .20 | .07 | -.37 | .49 |
| VOLLEYBALL COURTS | -.32 | -.31 | .37 | .19 | -.21 | .61 |
| PASSIVE REC.AREAS | -.29 | -.08 | .34 | -.15 | - | .34 |
| CLUBROOMS | -.53 | -.50 | .40 | .26 | -.30 | .59 |
| SWIMMING POOLS | .42 | .33 | -.29 | -.13 | .13 | -.45 |
| ART CENTERS | -.61 | -.27 | .31 | .16 | -.53 | .62 |
| AUDITORIUMS | -.33 | -.35 | .24 | .21 | -.16 | .44 |
| CRAFTROOMS | -.24 | -.24 | .28 | .13 | -.20 | .22 |
| DRAMA CENTERS | -.45 | -.20 | .13 | .11 | -.38 | .30 |
| GYMNASIUMS | .02 | -.13 | -.00 | .22 | -.02 | .07 |
| KITCHENS | -.54 | -.41 | .30 | .24 | -.31 | .60 |
| MUSIC CENTERS | -.11 | -.05 | .31 | .01 | -.23 | .21 |

| TIME IV PARK FACILITIES 1980 | DEMOCRATIC STRENGTH75 | PERCENT BLACK70 | PERCENT IRISH70 | PERCENT POLISH70 | PERCENT HISP.70 | AFFLU- ENCE70 |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| SENIOR BASEBALL FLDS | .06 | .04 | .09 | -.01 | -.14 | .17 |
| JUNIOR BASEBALL FLDS | -.22 | -.22 | .29 | .09 | -.25 | .62 |
| BASKETBALL STANDS | -.11 | .03 | -.04 | -.01 | -.25 | .25 |
| DAYCAMPS | -.47 | -.44 | .41 | .38 | -.31 | .64 |
| HORSESHOE COURTS | -.34 | -.40 | .15 | .28 | -.10 | .37 |
| PLAYGROUNDS | -.08 | -.10 | -.08 | .00 | .10 | -.06 |
| SHUFFLEBOARD COURTS | -.00 | - | .23 | -.07 | -.14 | .14 |
| SKATING AREAS | -.41 | -.41 | .31 | .28 | -.10 | .66 |
| SOFTBALL FIELDS | -.03 | -.00 | .13 | -.12 | -.32 | .22 |
| TENNIS COURTS | -.33 | -.14 | .17 | .07 | -.38 | .44 |
| VOLLEYBALL COURTS | -.20 | -.29 | .43 | .13 | -.22 | .61 |
| PASSIVE REC.AREAS | -.32 | -.11 | .33 | -.10 | -.13 | - |
| CLUBROOMS | -.46 | -.47 | .36 | .29 | -.24 | .56 |
| SWIMMING POOLS | .41 | .28 | -.32 | -.09 | .20 | -.47 |
| ART CENTERS | -.53 | -.33 | .31 | .25 | -.42 | .62 |
| AUDITORIUMS | -.30 | -.36 | .21 | .27 | -.10 | .44 |
| CRAFTROOMS | -.42 | -.45 | .41 | .31 | - | .42 |
| DRAMA CENTERS | - | -.18 | .26 | -.02 | -.28 | .27 |
| GYMNASIUMS | .09 | -.19 | .00 | .25 | .08 | .11 |
| KITCHENS | -.47 | -.39 | .36 | .22 | -.29 | .59 |
| MUSIC CENTERS | -.16 | .05 | .08 | -.05 | -.25 | .19 |

APPENDIX C SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS

| Regression: Independent variables with selected faci- lities across four times | with all inde- pendent vars. | without Demo- cratic stgh. | without % Black | contrlg. for Black spprt. | with all independent variables | without Demo- cratic stgh. | without % Black | controlling for Black support |
|---|---------------------------------|---|--------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------|
| TIME I | Fieldhouses 1966 | | | / | Total Facilities 1966 | | | |
| Democratic Strength 1963 | -.61 .01 | -.61 .01 | -.61 .01 | | -.72 .01 | -.59 .01 | -.64 .01 | |
| Percent Black 1960 | | -.80 .01 | | | | .01 -1.74 | | |
| Percent Irish 1960 | | -.53 .01 | | | | | | |
| Percent Polish 1960 | | | | | | | | |
| Percent Hispanic 1960 | | | | | | | | |
| R Square | .42 .01 | .39 .01 | .32 .01 | | .49 .01 | .32 .01 | .47 .01 | .45 .01 |
| TIME II | Fieldhouses 1970 | | | / | Total Facilities 1970 | | | |
| Democratic Strength 1967 | | | | | -.59 .01 | -.75 .01 | -.82 .01 | |
| Percent Black 1960 | -.68 .05 | -.81 .01 | | | | -.83 .01 | | |
| Percent Irish 1960 | -.41 .05 | -.45 .05 | | | | | | |
| Percent Polish 1960 | | | | | -.48 .05 | -.37 .05 | | |
| Percent Hispanic 1960 | | | | | | | | |
| R Square | .33 .05 | .32 .01 | | | .41 .01 | .27 .05 | .36 .01 | .37 .05 |
| TIME III | Fieldhouses 1976 | | | / | Total Facilities 1976 | | | |
| Democratic Strength 1971 | | | | | | | | |
| Percent Black 1970 | -.87 .05 | -.88 .05 | | -.66 .05 | | -.73 .05 | | |
| Percent Irish 1970 | -.50 .05 | -.51 .05 | | | | | | |
| Percent Polish 1970 | | | | | | | | |
| Percent Hispanic 1970 | | -.48 .01 | | | -.60 .05 | -.59 .01 | -.80 .01 | |
| R Square | .34 .05 | .34 .01 | | .35 .01 | .33 .05 | .33 .01 | .26 .05 | .33 .05 |
| TIME IV | Fieldhouses 1980 | | | / | Total Facilities 1980 | | | |
| Democratic Strength 1975 | | | | | | | | |
| Percent Black 1970 | | | | | -.98 .05 | -.74 .05 | | -.76 .05 |
| Percent Irish 1970 | | | | | | | | |
| Percent Polish 1970 | | | | | | | | |
| Percent Hispanic 1970 | | | | | -.64 .01 | -.56 .01 | | -.76 .01 |
| R Square | | | | | .35 .01 | .34 .01 | .25 .05 | .35 .05 |
| | | no significant statistics were obtained | | | | | | |

APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Greg Slusarczyk
has been read and approved by the following committee:

Dr. John Williams, Director
Professor, Political Science

Dr. James Wisner
Professor, Political Science

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis
and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any
necessary changes have been incorporated and that the thesis is now
given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Jan 31, 1983
Date

John Williams
Director's Signature