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The Relations Among Moral Orientation, Sex, Motive, and Ego Development

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THE RELATIONS AMONG MORAL ORIENTATION,
SEX, MOTIVE, AND EGO DEVELOPMENT

by

CINDY J. NOWINSKI

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate
School of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
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VITA

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CHAPTER I

MORAL ORIENTATION

Every day there are countless numbers of decisions made, actions taken, and problems wrestled with. These are aspects of life we are all familiar with. But why do some people faced with seemingly similar situations choose to act in opposite ways? Why do certain situations and actions pose thorny problems for some people but not others? The answers to these and similar questions lie in the different ways people characteristically meet life and the ways in which they experience and define their world. Understanding these various approaches to living is fundamental to an understanding of human beings.

This study examines how people approach one area of social life, the moral domain. Moral domain and morality are difficult concepts to define. Many competing and widely divergent definitions have been proposed, none of which can ultimately be justified on purely rational grounds (MacIntyre, 1984). In this study, no definition of morality is put forth although certain assumptions about its nature are made. The term morality will be used to refer to the problem of what is right or wrong in the conduct of an individual as it affects his or her own life and the lives of other persons in the group. This morality is considered to be a product of the person's reciprocal interaction with the environment and to have both cognitive and affective components. Com-

mitment to a moral code (the rules, principles, and values that regulate moral conduct) is seen as depending on the use of reason and also on attachment to other persons and to social groups. Other researchers, such as Vine (1983), have also conceptualized morality in this way.

In this project it is also assumed that within the limits of the above conceptualization, people have different orientations toward morality. That is, that they construct, resolve, and evaluate moral problems in their lives in characteristically different ways. This means that one person's moral conflict may not be another's and the same moral issue may be seen in a variety of ways. One purpose of this project is to assess the kinds of moral orientations young adults evidence in their descriptions of real-life moral dilemmas.

Moral orientation is only a single aspect of a person's functioning. It does not exist in isolation and it is expected to be related to other characteristics of the person. The larger purpose of this study is to investigate the relations among the moral orientations of young adults and the person variables of ego development, sex, and individual differences in motives of intimacy and power.

I will proceed by first describing the care and justice moral orientations (MOs) and some criticisms of the dominant model of moral development that are relevant to this study. In later chapters I will discuss those factors expected to be related to moral orientation.

Carol Gilligan (1982) hypothesized the existence of two different orientations toward morality, one centered around an ethic of care and responsibility and the other around an ethic of justice. These two ori-

entations define morality differently and are based upon different perceptions of experience, self, and relationships to others. As a result, the conflictual issues, mode of moral reasoning and moral conduct vary with the type of orientation.

In the care MO, morality is defined interpersonally in terms of responsibilities in relationships. Individuals with a care MO perceive themselves as intimately connected to others. Their moral conflicts take the form of a problem in relationships (e.g., self versus others' needs) and center around issues of selfishness, attachment, and responsibility to others. For them, to act morally is to respond to others in others' terms, that is, by "considering their situations as if one were in them oneself" (Lyons, 1983, p. 135). People with a care orientation take moral action in consideration of the consequences to all involved. Their thinking is practical, contextual, and inductive.

In the justice orientation, morality is a matter of abstract principles and individual's rights. Persons with a justice MO view themselves as essentially separate from others. Their conflicts involve exercising their own rights without interfering with the rights of others. To act morally is "to treat others as you would like to be treated" (Lyons, 1983). Their moral dilemmas consist of conflicting principles or standards and arise over issues of equality, fairness and the protection of rights. Their mode of reasoning is abstract, objective, and logically formal. They assume that a universally "right" answer exists.

These two orientations are not mutually exclusive. Gilligan sug-

gests that women are more likely to hold a care MO and men a justice MO possibly because of differing social experiences. However, she adds that these two orientations are complementary rather than opposing and that the developmental task for both sexes is to recognize the value of the other perspective and integrate it into a more comprehensive morality of rights and responsibilities.

Gilligan's thesis challenges the currently dominant psychological model of moral development, that of Lawrence Kohlberg (1968, 1976, 1981). Kohlberg has proposed a cognitive-structural model of moral development. According to Kohlberg, moral development occurs through the progressive transformation of basic cognitive structures. Cognitive structures (products of the individual and his or her interaction with the environment) are the rules, procedures, and processes that the person uses to organize and interpret experience. As development proceeds, these structures become increasingly differentiated, integrated and complex. Kohlberg has identified a hierarchical, invariant sequence of moral reasoning stages with each stage characterized by the use of a specific cognitive structure. (See Table 1.) As the person moves up the hierarchy the cognitive structure employed becomes more and more adequate for making moral decisions.

Kohlberg and those researchers using his system assess moral development with his Moral Judgment Interview or some variation of it. This method of assessment requires the subject to respond to a hypothetical moral conflict situation by telling what the protagonist of the

Table 1

Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Reasoning

	What is Right	Reasons for Doing Right
<hr/>		
Level I - PRECONVENTIONAL		
Stage 1 Punishment and obedience orientation	Goodness and badness of an action determined by its physical consequences; obedience for its own sake.	Avoidance of punishment, and the superior power of authorities.
Stage 2 Instrumental relativist orientation	Right action is that which meets one's own interests or needs or those of others. Right is also what's fair, a deal, an agreement.	To serve one's own interests while recognizing that other's have their own interests, too.

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

	What is Right	Reasons for Doing Right
<hr/>		
Level II - CONVENTIONAL		
Stage 3 Interpersonal concordance or "good boy - nice girl" orientation	"Being good" is important and means having good mo- tives, showing concern for others and living up to people's expectations of you. It also means keeping mutual relationships such as trust, loyalty, respect and gratitude.	To be a good person in your own eyes and those of others. Belief in the Golden Rule. Desire to maintain and support the social order
Stage 4 Law and order orientation	Doing one's duty, showing respect for others, and maintaining the social order for it's own sake. Uphold- ing the law.	To keep the institution going as a whole, to avoid the breakdown in the sys- tem "if everyone did it." To satisfy one's defined obligations.

Table 1 (continued)

	What is Right	Reasons for Doing Right
<p>Level III - POST-CONVENTIONAL OR PRINCIPLED</p>		
<p>Stage 5 Social-contract, legalistic, utilitarian orientation</p>	<p>Right action defined in terms of general individual rights and in terms of standards which have been agreed upon by society. Awareness of the relativism of most values and rules and the universality of others such as life and liberty.</p>	<p>A sense of obligation to law because of one's social contract to make and keep laws for the welfare of all and the protection of rights. Emphasis on procedural rules for reaching consensus. "The greatest good for the greatest number."</p>
<p>Stage 6 Universal ethical principles</p>	<p>Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles that are universal principles of justice; the equality of human rights.</p>	<p>The belief as a rational person in the validity of universal, abstract moral principles and a sense of personal commitment to them. Recognition that persons are ends in themselves and must be treated as such.</p>

^aAdapted from Kohlberg, 1976

dilemma should do and then justifying that course of action. The subject's moral reasoning is elicited in either a free-response (interview) or standardized questionnaire mode (Rest, 1975) and then scored for developmental level. The subject is assigned a stage score (i.e., moral maturity level) corresponding to the structure of his or her moral reasoning.

The Kohlbergian model is based on a liberal, individualist, justice-based ethic and in it a "more adequate" moral judgment refers to a "more adequate" comprehension of what is most just or fair. Kohlberg's model embodies the justice orientation described by Gilligan, and she accepts it as being applicable to one aspect of moral development and understanding. She also adopts, as does Kohlberg, a constructivist and developmental approach to understanding morality. However, she opposes his assumption that justice lies at the core of all morality and that the use of formal, abstract reasoning is the most important component in moral decision-making.

Kohlberg's highly cognitive system gives little weight to irrational but morally relevant emotions such as compassion, sympathy and love and deals primarily with prohibition-oriented dilemmas. Gilligan and others (Gilligan, 1982; Haan, 1978; Kurdek, 1981) charge that with its emphasis on formal, logical thought and the resolution of abstract, hypothetical dilemmas, it focuses on only one type of moral understanding to the exclusion of other, different conceptions of morality. This may account for there being little evidence to show any consistent relation between moral structure and moral conduct (Blasi, 1980; Haan, 1978)

or between moral reasoning in a hypothetical versus real situation (Gilligan & Belenky, 1980; Haan, 1975, 1978).

Gilligan claims that to find evidence of these differing conceptions one should look at people's spontaneous thinking about their real-life moral problems. Gilligan herself did this, deriving much of her own theory from a series of three studies she conducted to assess the relations between subjects' view of themselves and their thinking about morality to their experiences of moral conflict and the making of life choices.

The subjects in these studies (male and female) participated in semi-structured interviews in which they were told to describe themselves and asked how they defined morality and what kinds of experiences they interpreted as conflicts in their lives. She found evidence for two distinct approaches to morality which she subsequently called the care and justice moral orientations.

The validity of her evidence has not gone unchallenged, however. Broughton (1983) has criticized Gilligan for selectively presenting excerpts from the interview data that support her theory while failing to present contrary evidence contained within the interviews. He re-analyzed, in their entirety, several of the interviews that Gilligan had presented in support of her theory. He concluded that there was no strong evidence that women reasoned differently than men.

The purpose of the present study is to gain a better understanding of the care and justice orientations and the factors related to them. As in Gilligans' research, subjects will be asked to describe their own

experiences of moral conflict rather than being presented with moral problems. In this way, those elements associated with the two orientations will be given greatest freedom to appear. A given individual's moral orientation influences that individual's definition of moral dilemmas as well as his/her moral reasoning and conduct. Therefore, the characteristics of moral conflicts are expected to differ for people with a care MO as opposed to those with a justice MO and it is expected that these differences will be reflected in their descriptions of the moral conflicts that they have experienced.

This study will also examine three factors expected to be related to MO. An important feature of both Gilligan's and Kohlberg's theories is the constructivist view of human development and nature adopted in each. This view is, as noted earlier, the assumption that human beings are in an interactive and reciprocal relationship with the external world and they affect that world. It assumes that humans actively construct their experience, including moral experience. Moral orientation refers to the ways in which a person characteristically constructs his/her moral experience. This study will examine three variables (sex, stage of ego development, and motive) that are hypothesized to influence peoples' constructions of experience and are therefore expected to be related to moral orientation. In the following sections, a more detailed presentation of these variables and their expected relationships to MO will be made.

CHAPTER II

SEX DIFFERENCES IN MORAL ORIENTATION

Kohlberg's theory of moral development and his scoring system have been criticized for being sex-biased (Gilligan, 1982; Haan, 1977; Holstein, 1976). Gilligan asserts that Kohlberg's model emphasizes traditionally masculine values such as rationality, individuality, impersonality and justice, and places less importance on feminine concerns for welfare, caring, and responsibility. This results in women being placed at lower stages than men because their traditional orientation to empathy, and concern for and sensitivity to the needs of others is associated with Stage 3 reasoning (a less advanced stage) in Kohlberg's system.

Gilligan theorized that men and women, as a group, have qualitatively different orientations toward morality (i.e., care vs. justice) because of differing perceptions of self, other and relationships. She states:

The moral judgments of women differ from those of men in the greater extent to which women's judgments are tied to feelings of empathy and compassion and are concerned with the resolution of real as opposed to hypothetical dilemmas (1982, p. 68).

Gilligan formulated an alternative stage sequence for the development of women's moral reasoning that revolves around changes in self-concept and in the understanding of the relationship between self and

other. Movement proceeds from an initial concern with survival and the self as the sole object of concern (Level I), to a focus on "goodness" as self-sacrifice (Level II), and finally, to an adoption of non-violence and caring as a universal obligation and the most adequate guide to the resolution of conflict in human relationships (Level III). The central moral problem for women is the conflict between self and other; i.e., how to maintain connection and care for others while still valuing oneself. Transition between stages involves a re-interpretation of the conflict between selfishness and responsibility.

Gilligan describes female gender identity as being defined through attachment. For women, the self is experienced as intrinsically connected to others. Their very sense of being initially comes through connection and is maintained through connection (e.g., the mother-daughter relationship). Women perceive the world as a "web" of human relationships and within this web the primary moral problem is how to care best for all involved, or alternatively, how to inflict the least hurt. Women's strongest qualities are those associated with relationship such as empathy, nurturance, caring, interpersonal responsibility, interdependence, and sensitivity and responsiveness to the needs of others. These qualities are reflected in the ways women construct, resolve, and evaluate moral problems.

Gilligan proposes that for men, however, identity is defined through separation (e.g., becoming distinct from mother). A man's most basic experience of himself is as a separate individual. His world is that of a "hierarchy of conflicting rights" (Reimer, 1983) held together

by systems of rules. Each person is striving to achieve his or her own aims in an equitable and just fashion. The fundamental moral concern is how to apply principles of fairness and equality to opposing claims. Masculine strengths are those qualities associated with autonomy, individuation, and formal systems and include mastery, assertion, rationality and logical thought. These qualities are expressed in a justice orientation to morality.

In summary, Gilligan postulates that males and females have different perceptions of self, others, and relationships and show strengths in different areas of personality functioning (e.g., empathy vs. mastery). These differences are manifested in the adoption of either the care or justice orientations to real-life moral dilemmas.

There is evidence to support Gilligan's hypotheses about masculine and feminine functioning although not necessarily her notions of care and justice ethics. Carlson (1971) conducted a series of studies to assess sex differences in personality functioning. In his first study, Carlson asked male and female college students to do a series of tasks designed to assess their representations of self, others, and experience. There were 37 males and 39 females in his sample. Subjects were required to complete an adjective checklist and Kelly's Role Construct Repertory Test (self-representation); to write a brief personality sketch of someone they knew fairly well (representation of others); to write a description of the physical environment of their childhood milieu (representation of physical space); and to describe the type of person they expected to be in 15 years and what they expected to be

doing (representation of time). His results indicated that, in general, males represent experiences of self, others, space and time in individualistic, objective, and distant ways while females represent the same experiences in relatively interpersonal, subjective and immediate ways. Males tended to differentiate themselves from their environment while women experienced themselves as intrinsically connected to their milieu and to others.

In a second study, Carlson asked male and female college students to describe critical experiences of seven affects. These were the negative affects of shame, fear, anger and disgust, and the positive affects of joy, excitement and surprise. He found that a larger proportion of males than females described incidents involving such themes as achievement, separateness, aggression and sexuality as drive or conquest. A greater proportion of females reported experiences of social acceptance, togetherness, receptivity, dependence, altruism, and sexuality as belonging.

Carlson did not attribute these differences in personality functioning to sex, per se, as there was considerable overlap between males and females in the studies he conducted. Rather, he explained them in terms of Bakan's formulation of agency and communion (1966) which accommodates sex differences as well as overlap. Bakan's theory and its relevance to moral orientation will be discussed more fully in the later section on power and intimacy motives.

More recently, Lyons (1983) directly tested several hypotheses derived from Gilligan's theory. She studied a group of 36 people con-

sisting of 2 males and 2 females at each of the following ages: 8, 11, 14-15, 19-22, 27, 36, 45, and 60 or more years. The subjects were given a semi-structured interview designed to assess how individuals construct their experiences of self and the moral domain. The data were analyzed for modes of self-definition (separate or connected), moral orientation within considerations of real-life moral dilemmas (care or justice), and correlations between mode of self-definition and moral orientation. In general, her results supported the hypotheses that there are two different orientations toward morality (care and justice) and that these orientations are not mutually exclusive although individuals usually use one mode predominantly.

Lyons also investigated sex differences in self-definition and understandings of relationships and their relation to moral orientation. She found that women more frequently characterized themselves and their relationships to others in terms of connection while men more frequently did this in terms of a separate/objective self. As regards moral orientation, Lyons found that females more frequently evidenced a care ethic and men a justice ethic. However, regardless of sex, those individuals characterizing themselves predominantly in connected terms most frequently used a care and responsibility orientation while those individuals characterizing themselves in separate/objective terms used a rights and justice orientation. Her results also suggested that there are distinctive kinds of developmental shifts for men and women in the frequency of their use of the two orientations, with women after age 27 showing increased consideration of rights in their conceptualizations of

morality, and adolescent males showing a greater consideration of response than males at other ages. She concluded that the relationship between sex and MO is not a simple one and that "in real-life moral conflict, individuals...call upon and think about both care and justice considerations but use predominantly one mode which is related to but not defined or confined to an individual by virtue of gender" (p. 138).

Numerous studies have examined sex differences in specific qualities that logically may be associated with either the care or justice orientations to morality. However, research in the area of sex differences is fraught with problems (Deaux, 1984; Jacklin, 1981) and the literature is often conflicting and difficult to interpret. It must be remembered, also, that even when studies show sex differences in constructs that are related to Gilligan's theory, these studies are not direct tests of her theory and therefore provide only indirect support for her claim that there are differences in the morality of men and women. With that said, a presentation and discussion of some of the conclusions regarding male and female functioning in areas related to morality (e.g., affiliation, nurturance, helping behavior, and empathy) is made in the following paragraphs.

In support of Gilligan's hypotheses, reviewers have found females to be more affiliative than males in both self-report and fantasy (Tavris & Offer, 1977), and behavior (Hoyenga & Hoyenga, 1979). Females also tend to concentrate their social life in a few close attachments while males' social life tends to be diffused over many superficial relationships (Seward & Seward, 1984). In addition, females in compari-

son to males have been found to be more nurturant, (Seward & Seward, 1984), more likely to use nurturant behaviors when helping people with problems (Hoyenga & Hoyenga, 1979), more sensitive to social stimuli (Hoyenga & Hoyenga, 1979), and more empathic (Hoffman, 1977).

In contrast, other reviewers have concluded that there are no consistent sex differences in affiliation (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974), nurturance (Deux, 1984; Hoyenga & Hoyenga, 1979), prosocial orientation and altruistic behavior (Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg, 1977), or empathy (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974).

These opposing conclusions illustrate the impossibility of coming to any definitive conclusions regarding sex differences given the present state of our knowledge in this area. Nevertheless, as methods and constructs become more refined, sex differences are sometimes revealed in areas where earlier they had not been thought to exist. The opposing conclusions of Hoffman and Maccoby and Jacklin regarding empathy is a case in point. As noted, Maccoby and Jacklin found no differences in empathy between males and females. Hoffman, however, came to a different conclusion when employing a more specific definition of empathy than that used by Maccoby and Jacklin. He defined it as "the observer's vicarious affective response to another person" and differentiated it from cognitive perspective-taking skills (Maccoby and Jacklin did not). After analyzing those studies reviewed by Maccoby and Jacklin as well as more recent research, Hoffman concluded that females were more empathic than males throughout the life cycle, but that there were no differences in their respective abilities to recognize others' affective or cogni-

tive states (i.e., perspective).

Hoffman's findings are of special interest because they may help explain some of the differences in moral orientation found by Lyons (1983). Her results indicated that individuals with a justice orientation respond to others as they would like to be responded to if they were in the other's place. Those with a care orientation, on the other hand, respond to the other as the other would like to be responded to. This seems to imply the ability to imagine oneself as the other (and not simply oneself in the other's place) which may be related to a greater capacity to feel as the other feels. These two modes of responding, then, may reflect the difference between a cognitive understanding of the other's perspective versus an empathic experiencing of the other person's situation.

The evidence thus far seems to support the hypothesis that differences in personality functioning are associated with different moral orientations, but is equivocal in regard to sex differences in specific traits or behaviors thought to be related to MO. There is some evidence for sex differences in moral orientation but this finding has not been replicated.

Gilligan also made the assertion, noted previously, that women's greater use of the care ethic results in their being scored at a lower stage of moral development in Kohlberg's system than are males. This claim has not been supported by a recent comprehensive review of investigations utilizing Kohlberg's method of assessment (Walker, 1984). Walker analyzed 108 studies and found that only 8 of these significantly

avored males. Of these, several were methodologically flawed (e.g., sex and occupation/education were confounded) and most relied on early stage definitions and scoring procedures that have since been revised. As Walker points out, however, this does not necessarily mean that sex differences in moral reasoning do not exist. There are several possible explanations for a finding of no sex differences in moral judgment as assessed by Kohlberg's measure. For instance, the differences may exist in content within a stage (i.e., what the individual is valuing, judging, or appealing to; particular norms) or in the usage of a characteristic orientation when making a moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1982).

A study by Gibbs, Arnold and Burkhart (1984) lends support to these alternative explanations. They found no sex differences in stage level but they did find a difference in the kinds of justifications (modes of content usage) males and females use in support of their decisions. The subjects (60 males and 118 females comparable in age, education, and socioeconomic level) were given a paper and pencil measure of reflective moral thought that provided stage and content information. The experimenters discovered that a significantly greater number of females than males used empathic role taking as a reason for their moral judgment. In addition, females at this stage made a greater use of conscience appeals (self-approval or -disapproval). The researchers hypothesized that these differences in content usage may be a reflection of a greater female orientation to empathy or caring.

Another explanation for the finding of no sex differences in moral judgment stage might be that sex differences in preference for one or

the other orientation do exist, but that there are no differences in males' and females' abilities to utilize either orientation. That is, both sexes may be able to use the care and justice MOs equally well while preferring (given the choice) to use one over the other. If so, it is unlikely that such a difference would be revealed in moral reasoning applied to hypothetical, abstract, justice- and rights- oriented dilemmas that "pull" for the use of a justice ethic. This study will attempt to avoid "pulling" for a specific orientation by asking subjects to describe their own experiences of moral conflict and then using these real-life dilemmas to test the hypotheses that females more frequently use a care than a justice MO and males more frequently use a justice than a care MO.

CHAPTER III

EGO DEVELOPMENT AND POWER AND INTIMACY MOTIVES

Loevinger's Model of Ego Development

Loevinger (1976) defines the ego as "the process that provides the frame of reference that structures one's world and within which one perceives the world" (pp. 9-10). Her conception of the ego emphasizes the individual's integrative processes and the overall "framework of meaning" (Hauser, 1976) the individual imposes on experience. Ego development occurs through the progressive transformation of these frames of reference, with each succeeding frame or structure being represented by a stage further along the developmental continuum. Each step in the sequence must be completed before going on to the next although people proceed at different rates and all may not reach the later stages.

Each ego stage is associated with a specific pattern of reasoning and behavior and thus the developmental continuum provides a measure of individual differences. A person at a given stage exhibits a characteristic orientation to self and world and develops a certain "character style."

Ego development proceeds in the direction of a more integrated, complex, differentiated and comprehensive perception "of one's self, of the social world, and of the relation of one's feelings and thoughts to those of others" (Candee, 1974). Development occurs along the dimen-

sions of impulse control (moral style), conscious concerns, and interpersonal and cognitive styles, and these dimensions differ for each stage. The seven stages and three transitional levels are shown in Table 2.

Loevinger's theory of ego development and Kohlberg's and Gilligan's theories of moral development all share an emphasis on frameworks of meaning (i.e., the constructivist approach) and an assumption of sequential, hierarchical stages of development. Each stage is more complex than the last and involves a transformation in structure.

There seems to be a similar developmental trend in all three models. The lower stages are marked by egocentricity and a concern with the self: with survival, one's own needs, reward and punishment. The next step involves an inclusion of the expectations and needs of others. This is expressed in the desire for external validation and approval and in adherence to group norms. At the higher and more abstract levels, there is equal valuing of self and other; recognition and toleration of internal conflict; and adherence to internal norms and standards not necessarily tied to conventional criteria or judgments.

Loevinger considers moral development to be part of ego development. In his review of the literature, Hauser (1976) reported a moderate though inconsistent correlation between ego stages and Kohlberg's moral development stages. More recently, Lutwak's (1984) results also support the conclusion that these two systems are related although each addresses reasonably separate areas of development. As Lutwak points out, ego development theory seems to have a broader focus than

Table 2

Stages of Ego Development^a

Stage	Impulse control, "moral" style	Interpersonal style	Conscious preoccupations	Cognitive style
Presocial (I-1) Symbiotic (I-1) Impulsive (I-2)	Impulsive, fear	Autistic Symbiotic Receiving, dependent, exploitive	Self v. nonself Self v. nonself Bodily feelings, especially sexual and ag- gressive	Stereotypy, con- ceptual confu- sion
Self-protective (Delta)	Fear of being caught, external- izing blame, op- portunistic	Wary, manipula- tive, exploi- tive	Self-protection, wishes, things, advantages, control	
Transition from self-protective to conformist (Delta/3)	Obedience and confor- mity to social norms; simple and absolute rules	Manipulative, obedient	Concrete aspects of traditional sex roles physi- cal causation as opposed to psycho- logical causation	Conceptual sim- plicity, stereotypes
Conformist (I-3)	Conformity to exter- nal rules, shame, guilt for breaking rules	Belonging, help- ing, super- ficial niceness	Appearance, social acceptability, banal feelings, behavior	Conceptual sim- plicity, stereotypes, cliches

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

Stage	Impulse control, "moral" style	Interpersonal style	Conscious preoccupations	Cognitive style
Transition from conformist to conscientious; self-consciousness (I-3/4)	Dawning realization of standards, contingencies, self-criticism	Being helpful, deepened interest in interpersonal relations	Consciousness of the self as separate from the group, recognition of psychological causation	Awareness of individual differences in attitudes, interests and abilities, mentioned in global and broad terms
Conscientious (I-4)	Self-evaluated standards, self criticism	Intensive, responsible, mutual, concern for communication	Differentiated feelings, motives for behavior, self-respect, achievements, traits, expression	Conceptual complexity, idea of patterning
Transition from conscientious to autonomous	Individuality, coping with inner conflict	Cherishing of interpersonal relations	Communicating, expressing ideas and feelings, process and change	Toleration for paradox and contradiction

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

Stage	Impulse control, "moral" style	Interpersonal style	Conscious preoccupations	Cognitive style
Autonomous (I-5)	Add: Coping with conflicting, inner needs ^b	Add: Respect for autonomy	Vividly conveyed feeling; integra- tion of physio- logical and psychological causation of behavior; develop- ment; role concep- tion, self-ful- fillment, self in social context	Increased con- ceptual com- plexity; com- plex patterns, toleration for ambiguity, broad scope, objectivity
Integrated (I-6)	Add: Reconciling inner conflicts, renunciation of unattainable goals ^b	Add: Cherishing of individuality	Add: Identity	

^aFrom Loevinger and Wessler, 1970; Hoppe, 1972.

^b"Add" means in addition to the description applying to the previous level.

Kohlberg's model. It is concerned with global aspects of the self and both emotional and cognitive experience. Kohlberg focuses on a single facet of development, moral reasoning, and his model is almost exclusively cognitive in orientation.

The relationship between ego development and moral orientation has, to this researcher's knowledge, not yet been investigated. However, given that the care and justice orientations are tied to different experiences of self and other it is reasonable to expect that moral orientation will be related to the changes in self and other perception that occur during ego development. The conflict between independence and dependence, between the self as separate and the self as connected, is a basic theme in ego development. Resolution, or at least toleration, of the conflict occurs only at the highest levels. At the lower ego stages the self appears to be experienced primarily as either separate or as connected but not both. This may be due to the conceptual simplicity operating at these stages. At higher stages, however, these two polarities become progressively more integrated so that by Stage I-5 an individual recognizes both the need for "and also the limitations to autonomy, that emotional interdependence is inevitable" (Loevinger, 1976, p. 23).

I described earlier how individuality and separateness are integral to the justice MO and connection and relationship are central to the care orientation. Further, these two orientations appear complementary and the integration of the two is a major developmental task. This leads to several hypotheses about the relationship between ego stage and

moral orientation. First, it is expected that individuals at lower stages of ego development (below I-4) will show primarily a justice or a care orientation in their descriptions of moral problems. Second, it is hypothesized that individuals at higher ego stages (I-4 and above) will show both the care and justice moral orientations in their descriptions of real-life moral dilemmas.

Power and Intimacy Motives

Motives are directing and energizing forces driving individuals to action and influencing which aspects of their environment are most salient to them. Motives point to a tendency or disposition on the part of the person. Individuals with a high degree of a given motive show a recurrent preference for certain kinds of behavior and experiences "within the context of constraints and opportunities afforded by the environment" (McAdams, 1985).

People are impelled by a variety of motives. The two that I will focus upon in this study are motives of intimacy and power. The strength of these motives is customarily assessed by means of the Thematic Apperception Test.

Intimacy motive guides the person towards communion and the merging of self, other, and environment. It is expressed interpersonally in closeness, openness, sharing, and cooperation. It is manifested in the desire for contact and communication with another. For example, research shows that individuals high in this motive spend a greater amount of time thinking about and communicating with people than those low in this motive (McAdams & Constantian, 1983), more frequently engage

in dyadic as opposed to large group interactions (McAdams, Healy & Krause, 1984), and place a great value on trust in friendships (McAdams, 1984).

Power motive prompts people toward the separation of self from other and context. It is manifested in a preference for feeling strong and for mastering and having an impact on one's environment. Investigations show that it is associated with a tendency to engage in large-group rather than dyadic interactions, and with the adoption of an active, assertive or controlling role in friendships (McAdams, Healy & Krause, 1984). For men, but not for women, high power motive has been found to correlate with aggressiveness, impulsivity and difficulties in love relationships (Stewart & Rubin, 1976; Winter, 1973).

Intimacy and power motives are conceptually related to Bakan's (1966) formulation of agency and communion (McAdams, 1985). Bakan held that these two dialectical forces comprise the basic polarity underlying all human existence. He regarded them as the two fundamental modalities of life. Human beings exist both as individuals via the modality of agency, and as individuals participating in and belonging to a larger group via communion.

According to Bakan, agency is the modality of separation. It manifests itself in self-protection, self-assertion, self-expansion and the urge to master. Psychologically, it is experienced in the differentiation of self from field and in intellectual functions involving separating and ordering. Agentic interpersonal styles are characterised by objectivity, competitiveness, exclusion and distance.

Communion is the modality of non-separation. It involves contact, openness, and union with others. Psychologically it is experienced as a merging of self and field and as the sense of being at one with others. Communion is evidenced in those intellectual functions that are communicative in nature such as verbal and language skills. Communion's presence is felt in those styles of relating that are subjective, cooperative, accepting and close.

Bakan's theory, and also the intimacy and power constructs if they are accepted as rough indices of communion and agency, was given impressive support by the series of studies conducted by Carlson (1971). These studies were described in Chapter 2 of this paper. Carlson, as may be recalled, found that distinct patterns of agency and communion were evidenced in subjects' perceptions of themselves, others, and their world. His results also indicated that communion was more characteristic of females as a group and agency was more characteristic of males as a group. There was considerable overlap between the sexes, however, indicating that the relationship between sex and modality (agency or communion) was not necessarily true for a given individual. As for motive, there is no consistent evidence for sex differences in either the strength or frequency of power (Stewart & Chester, 1982) and intimacy motives (McAdams, 1984).

Motives and Moral Orientation

Intimacy motive and the care MO emphasize many of the same qualities i.e., those of communion. Power motive and the justice MO both emphasize agentic qualities. This might reasonably lead one to expect a relationship between MO and motive in the form of care being related to intimacy and justice being related to power motive. However, the question remains as to the nature of this connection. In other words, what is fundamentally common to both motive and MO that results in similar emphases in each? The hypothesis adopted here is that motive and MO are connected by way of the central roles perception of self and other play in each. Both motive and MO revolve around particular conceptualizations and experiences of self, other, and self-other relationships. At the heart of power motive and the justice orientation lies the experience of self as individual and separate from others. For intimacy motive and the care orientation, the basic experience of self is as connected and in union with others. Thus, I am assuming that the relationship between motive and moral orientation is mediated by particular perceptions of self and world.

This study will test two hypotheses regarding motive and moral orientation. First, it is hypothesized that intimacy motive will be correlated with a care orientation to morality. Second, it is expected that power motive will be correlated with a justice orientation towards morality.

Morality, Motive, Ego Development, and Sex

There are no published studies investigating the relations among moral orientation, motive, ego development, and sex. McAdams (1985) did, however, assess the relationships of moral orientation as expressed in students' religious ideologies to sex and motive. McAdams asked 56 undergraduate students (26 male and 30 female) to complete a series of questionnaires regarding their religious beliefs and religious experiences. These questionnaires included open-ended and multiple choice questions and rating-type items. The students were also administered the TAT and Loevinger's sentence completion test (WUSCT). McAdams devised a scoring system to assess content themes of responsibility, compassion, and care (i.e., a care orientation), and themes of rights, laws and principles (i.e., a justice orientation) in subjects' responses. Such themes were found to be present in 45% of the students' responses. In regards to sex differences, McAdams found that women were more likely to emphasize themes of care and responsibility in their responses than men (43% to 19%, respectively). This result neared statistical significance. There were no differences in men's and women's emphases on content themes of rights, laws, and principles in their personal religious ideologies. In addition, McAdams found no correlation between scores of intimacy and power motivation and moral orientation as expressed in religious ideologies.

Block (1973) also did a study pertinent to the present investigation. She assessed the relations of agency and communion to sex role, moral development and ego development. Block asked male and female uni-

versity students from 6 different countries (including the U.S.) to describe their ideal self by using an Adjective Q-Sort. She found that women more frequently chose adjectives reflecting qualities of communion (e.g., interdependence, mutuality, and relatedness) while men chose those reflecting agentic qualities (e.g., self-assertion and self-extension). Block also predicted that personal maturity would be associated with a greater integration of agency and communion within the personality and this would be reflected in individuals' self-descriptions. Using Loevinger's SCT method as an index of maturity she discovered that for a sample of 144 male and 141 female high school students, those scoring at the Conscientious level (the highest in the sample) did give self-descriptions combining both agency and communion.

If one accepts that communal qualities are emphasized in the care MO and agentic qualities in the justice MO, then together these findings offer some support for the hypotheses that males will more frequently have a justice MO and females a care MO and that the two orientations will be integrated by individuals at higher levels of maturity regardless of their sex.

Block also found that integration of agency and communion was associated with higher stages of moral development as measured by Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview. The problem of sex bias in this sample makes interpretation of this finding difficult, however. There were 71 males but only 47 females scored at the Principled level (stages 5 and 6) compared to 105 females and 57 males scored at stage 3. Moreover, the self-descriptions of females at the Principled level suggested

only a tendency towards agency.

The present study differs from Block's both in purpose and in method. The overall purpose of this study is to test the hypotheses that have been made regarding the separate relations of gender, ego maturity and motive to MO.

CHAPTER IV

METHOD

Subjects

The subjects were 129 students enrolled in any one of several introductory psychology courses at a midwestern college. There were 67 males and 62 females in the sample. The student body at this college is ethnically and culturally diverse but with the majority of students being white and from the middle class socioeconomic level. All of the subjects took the ego development and moral orientation measures. All but 30 students were assessed for strength of intimacy and power motives. However, due to missing data, the intimacy and power motivation scores used in the data analysis were from separate groups of students. This left a sample of 53 students for whom there were intimacy motivation scores and 35 students for whom there were power motive scores. Thirty-two subjects were omitted from the sample for the final data analysis because either their protocols had been used to derive the MOQ scoring system or they had not complied with instructions when completing the MOQ.

Measures

Sentence Completion Test. (SCT). The SCT was devised to assess subjects' stage of ego development (Loevinger, 1976). The shortened form of the SCT was used in this study (Holt, 1980). It consists of 12 sentence stems which the subject completes. Subjects' responses to the sentence stems are individually scored as being at one of the nine levels of ego development in Loevinger's system. These individual scores are then used to determine the subject's core level of ego functioning. This final score is considered to be the subject's ego development level.

Thematic Apperception Test. (TAT). The TAT was first designed by Henry Murray (1943) as a projective measure of personality characteristics. Subsequent modifications have allowed it to be used as a measure of intimacy and power motivation. In the standard group administration, subjects write stories in response to each of six pictures. In order of administration the pictures are (a) two figures sitting on a bench next to a river, (b) a man sitting at a desk on which is a picture of a family, (c) a male ship captain talking to another man, (d) two female scientists in a laboratory, (e) a man and woman on a trapeze, and (f) an older man and a younger woman walking through a field with horses and a dog. Pictures (a) and (b) can be found in McClelland and Steele (1972) and pictures (c), (d) and (e) can be found in McClelland (1975). In this study, the same set of pictures was given to both sexes in accordance with McAdams's (1982a) argument that valuable results concerning

intimacy and power motivation can be obtained this way provided that the pictures do not represent scenes that are stereotypically masculine or feminine. Further, Stewart and Chester (1982) have concluded that the sex of the stimulus figures in TAT pictures is usually not a significant determinant of variance in motive scores between the sexes.

Moral Orientation Questionnaire. (MOQ). A paper and pencil instrument was devised for this study to assess the moral orientation construct. The instrument requires subjects to describe four moral dilemmas that they had personal experience or knowledge of. In their descriptions, subjects are asked to incorporate the answers to each of ten questions. These questions focus on those dimensions of moral conflicts proposed to be connected to the moral orientation construct. These include affective, behavioral, cognitive and relational aspects of the conflicts (See Appendix A).

Six scoring categories were developed on the basis of theoretical speculations about the care and justice ethics and an examination of 15 protocols (60 dilemmas) randomly selected from the entire sample. Each category, or scale, was devised to focus on a particular aspect of the care or justice orientation. A complete description of the scoring system can be found in Appendix B. The names of the scales are listed in Table 3. Briefly, scale Relational Dilemma (RD) assesses whether there is a person involved in the dilemma who has a significant relationship with the subject or to whom the subject expresses concern for or a desire to take care of. Score Principled Dilemma (PD) assesses the sub-

jects use of rules, principles, norms, and standards to describe the dilemma. These two scales address the way in which the subject constructs the dilemma. The next four scoring categories assess the kinds of considerations the subject uses to arrive at a moral decision or action. Consequences to Self (CS) refers to the subject's decision to act so as to avoid some negative consequence or achieve some positive consequence. Concern for Others (CO) refers to both general expressions of care and concern for another's well-being and concern about specific consequences to the other. Maintenance of Relationship (MR) refers to the subject's desire to keep, strengthen, or minimize the conflict in a relationship. Empathy (E) refers to a cognitive understanding and/or affective experiencing of another's situation. These were not the only kinds of considerations subjects cited as reasons for their moral behavior. However, these were chosen as a focus in this study because of their expected connection to the care and justice MOs and their ability to be scored. Every dilemma was scored on each scale with 1 = presence and 0 = absence. These scores were then summed on each scale so that every individual had six final scores (RD, PD, CS, CO, MR, and E scores). These separate scores were used in the data analysis. High scores on RD, and use of the CO, MR, and E categories were considered to indicate use of the care MO. High PD was considered to be indicative of a justice orientation. No specific hypotheses were made about the CS score.

Table 3

MOQ Scales

RD	Relational Dilemma
PD	Principled Dilemma
CS	Consequences to self
CO	Concern for others
MR	Maintenance of relationship
E	Empathy

Procedure

The SCT and MOQ were both administered in the course of a single session to groups of 5 to 15 students at a time. All subjects were initially given a statement of informed consent to read and sign. If, after this, they agreed to participate in the study, they were given the SCT followed by the MOQ. Subjects were directed to follow the instructions printed on each measure. The order of presentation remained the same for all subjects. The TAT was group administered as part of a separate research project.

The SCT was scored in the standard manner by an individual trained in the scoring procedure. TAT stories were scored for power and intimacy motivation according to the systems devised by Winter (1973) for power and McAdams (1980) for intimacy. The TAT coders' agreement with expert scoring of practice stories in the scoring manuals met acceptable standards for research.

The MOQ was scored by three individuals, two female and one male, according to the instructions reprinted in Appendix B. Interrater reliabilities ranged from .94 for the RD category to .68 for PD to the .40's for the moral consideration categories. Because of the low base rate of occurrence for these latter categories, interrater reliability was also computed in terms of percentage of agreement. Results showed that interrater agreement for the CS category was 75% and in the 80% to 95% range for the remaining categories.

CHAPTER V

RESULTS

The numbers and percentages of males and females scored at each ego developmental level are presented in Table 4. For the purpose of data analysis subjects were divided into High ego (I-4 and above) and Low ego (below I-4) groups. A Chi-square analysis was used to evaluate any differences in the numbers of males and females in the high versus low groups. Results indicated that there were a significantly greater number of females at higher ego stages and males at lower ego stages, $\chi^2(1) = 11.38, p < .01$.

Descriptive statistics for males and females on intimacy and power motivation are presented in Table 5. The t -tests revealed no significant differences in mean scores for males and females on intimacy, $t(51) = -1.05, ns$, or power motive, $t(33) = .43, ns$.

Sex Differences

The first hypothesis proposed that in their descriptions of real-life moral conflicts females would more frequently use a care MO than would males and males would more frequently use a justice MO than females. While testing this hypothesis it was decided also to assess

Table 4

Frequencies of Males and Females at Each Ego Stage

Ego Stage	Males (N = 51)		Females (N = 46)		Total	
	<u>F</u>	%	<u>F</u>	%	<u>F</u>	%
Delta	1	1%	0	0%	1	1%
Delta/3	6	12%	1	2%	7	7%
I-3	12	24%	2	4%	14	14%
I-3/4	14	28%	11	24%	25	26%
I-4	6	12%	22	48%	28	29%
I-4/5	8	16%	4	9%	12	12%
I-5	4	8%	6	13%	10	10%

Table 5

Comparison of Males and Females on Intimacy and Power Motivation

	Males (<u>N</u> = 51)				Females (<u>N</u> = 56)				<u>t</u>
	<u>n</u>	<u>M</u>	SD	Range	<u>n</u>	<u>M</u>	SD	Range	
Intimacy	24	4.04	3.14	0-12	29	5.00	3.45	0-13	-1.05, <u>ns</u>
Power	22	4.63	3.65	0-10	13	4.08	3.75	0-11	0.43, <u>ns</u>

any effects for ego development stage and for an ego by sex interaction. Because of the intercorrelated nature of the scores on the dependent measure, a two-way multivariate analysis of variance was performed with sex and ego stage as the independent classifying variables. A regression approach was used to correct for the unequal frequencies of males and females at higher versus lower ego stages. Results of the multivariate F tests revealed a main effect for sex across scoring categories, $F(1,93) = 2.413$, $p < .05$, but no effect for ego, $F(1,93) = 1.15$, ns , and no interaction $F(1,93) = .67$, ns . Univariate tests were performed and indicated a significant difference for sex on the PD scale, $F(1,93) = 8.87$, $p < .01$, and a nonsignificant trend on the CO scale, $F(1,93) = 2.86$, $p < .09$. The means, standard deviations, and ranges for males and females, together with the results of the univariate tests are presented in Table 6.

To understand the nature of these differences, the group means for males and females in the PD and CO categories, taken separately, were compared using t -tests. The results are presented in Table 7. Contrary to expectations, females made greater use than males of principles, rules, and norms when constructing moral dilemmas, $t(95) = -3.13$, $p < .01$. Results also revealed that the trend for a sex difference in CO suggested by the univariate analysis favored females, $t(95) = -1.72$, $p < .05$. As hypothesized, females more frequently cited concern for others as a reason for moral action than did males.

Table 6

Comparison of Males and Females on MOQ Scales

	Males (<u>N</u> = 51)			Females (<u>N</u> = 46)			<u>F</u>
	<u>M</u>	SD	Range	<u>M</u>	SD	Range	
Relational Dilemma (RD)	2.02	.09	0-4	2.26	1.02	0-4	1.26
Principled Dilemma (PD)	1.59	1.20	0-4	2.39	1.33	0-4	9.6*
Consequences to self (CS)	2.59	1.13	0-4	2.47	1.07	0-4	.24
Concern for Others (CO)	.88	.84	0-3	1.20	.96	0-4	2.89**
Maintenance of Relationship (MR)	.43	.78	0-3	.52	.69	0-2	.36
Empathy (E)	.08	.27	0-1	.07	.25	0-1	.06

*p < .05**p < .09

Table 7

Comparison of Males and Females on Principled Dilemma (PD) and Concern for Others (CO) Scales

	Males (<u>N</u> = 51)		Females (<u>N</u> = 46)		<u>t</u>	<u>p</u>
	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>		
Principled Dilemma (PD)	1.58	1.20	2.39	1.33	-3.13	.001
Concern for Others (CO)	.88	.84	1.20	.96	-1.72	.05

Ego Development

There were two hypotheses made about the relationship between ego development and moral orientation. First, it was proposed that individuals at lower stages of ego development (below I-4) would primarily show either a justice or a care orientation in their descriptions of moral dilemmas. Secondly, it was proposed that people at higher ego stages (I-4 and above) would show aspects of both the care and justice MOs in their descriptions of real-life moral conflicts.

For the purpose of data analysis the CO and PD scales were chosen as the best single representatives of the care and justice MOs, respectively. They were chosen on the basis of theory and a factor analysis of the MOQ scales. The factor analysis, with a varimax rotation, revealed the presence of three factors. Factor 1 had its highest loadings on CO (.79) and RD (.49), Factor 2 on MR (.86) and RD (.50), and Factor 3 on E (.81) and PD (.70). Factors 1 and 2 seemed most closely associated with the care orientation and therefore CO was chosen to represent this MO. Factor 3 seemed most closely associated with the justice ethic, as the empathy scale included the cognitive perspective-taking congruent with a justice MO. However, the PD scale rather than the E scale was chosen to represent the justice ethic because of the low frequency of E responses.

Using the CO and PD scales to represent the care and justice MOs respectively, subjects were divided into three groups on the basis of their scores in both categories. Subjects who scored above the mean on CO and PD were classified as Both ($\underline{n} = 16$), those who scored above the

mean on either CO or PD were classified as One ($\underline{n} = 39$), and those who did not score above the mean on either category were classified as Neither ($\underline{n} = 42$). Due to some overlap between the PD and CO scales (i.e., CO included concern for other's rights) the number of CO responses that evidenced concern for other's rights was assessed and these responses were not included in the subsequent analysis. Elimination of these responses did not necessitate any regrouping of the subjects into different MO usage groups.

A Chi-square analysis was performed to evaluate the proposed differences in MO usage. The observed and expected frequencies are shown in Table 8. The results of the analysis indicated a significant association between ego development and MO use, $\text{chi-square}(2) = 8.70, p < .05$. Inspection of Table 8 reveals that the high ego group tended to show either concern for others or the use of propositions but not both together. There was no significant difference in how frequently this group used the care MO versus the justice MO. If the CO and PD scales are accepted as representing the care and justice MOs, then it appears that contrary to expectations, the high ego group tended to make use of one MO predominantly while the low ego group did not use either MO to any significant extent. The two ego groups did not differ in their use of both orientations. Thus, neither hypothesis was supported.

Table 8

Analysis of Moral Orientation Usage by Ego Development Level

Ego Group	<u>Orientation Usage</u>		
	Both	One	Neither
High	9 Expected = 8.25	26 E = 17	15 E = 24.7
Low	7 Expected = 7.75	13 E = 15.99	27 E = 23.26

Note: Both = Persons above the mean on care and justice orientation usage.

One = Persons above the mean on either care or justice orientation usage.

Neither = Persons not above the mean on either one.

Power and Intimacy Motivation

There were two hypotheses made regarding motive and moral orientation. First, it was hypothesized that intimacy motivation would be correlated with a care orientation to morality. Second, it was proposed that power motivation would be positively correlated with a justice MO.

To evaluate the relationships between the two motives and the two MOs, a Pearson correlation analysis was performed. The correlations are presented in Table 9. Results indicated that intimacy was positively correlated with PD, $r(51) = .245$, $p < .05$, and MR scores, $r(51) = .315$, $p < .01$. In addition, intimacy motivation showed a nonsignificant negative correlation with Empathy scores, $r(51) = -.191$, $p < .09$. Power motivation was found to have a significant positive association with CO scores, $r(33) = .288$, $p < .05$, and a significant negative correlation with CS scores, $r(33) = -.305$, $p < .05$. No other significant correlations were found.

Table 9

Correlations of Intimacy and Power with Moral Orientation Scores

	Intimacy (<u>N</u> = 53)	Power (<u>N</u> = 35)
Relational Dilemma (RD)	-.128	.088
Principled Dilemma (PD)	.245*	.000
Consequences to Self (CS)	.044	-.305*
Concern for Others (CO)	.004	.288*
Maintenance of Relationship (MR)	.315**	.017
Empathy (E)	-.191	-.064

*p < .05**p < .01

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION

Before discussing the results of this study, there are several methodological problems that need to be addressed. These problems lie with the dependent measure, the Moral Orientation Questionnaire. The open-ended questions on the MOQ allow maximum freedom for subjects to respond and provide fewer prompts than an interview format. However, they also have the disadvantages of being more difficult to score and hence less reliable. Only one scale, RD, was found to have a high interrater reliability. The other category scales were found to be only satisfactory in terms of interrater reliability and percentage of interrater agreement.

A second problem with the MOQ is the unknown validity of the scoring categories. The scales were derived on the basis of theory and data but their validity has not been assessed. The very broadness of some of the category scales makes it difficult to specify accurately what they are measuring. Of course, success or failure in finding the expected relationships between the MOQ scales and other, reliable measures can itself be an indication of validity.

The methodological weaknesses of this study make any interpretation of these results highly speculative. With that caveat in mind, the following tentative interpretations are made.

Sex Differences

The first hypothesis stated that females would show greater evidence of a care orientation in their moral conflicts than males, and males would show greater evidence of a justice orientation in their dilemmas than would females. The lack of a significant sex difference on all but one of the MOQ scales suggests that this is not the case. This is further indicated by the finding that the women in this sample made greater use of rules, norms, and principles to construct their dilemmas than did males. This suggests that not only do women sometimes use a justice orientation, which is in keeping with the findings of other research (Lyons, 1983), but that they may make greater use of some aspects of the justice ethic than do men.

Males and females in this sample did not differ in their use of a desire to maintain a relationship as a reason for moral action, nor in their use of an empathic reaction as a moral consideration. This lack of sex differences in empathy is in contradiction to the results of Gibbs, Arnold, and Burkhart (1984) and Hoffman (1977). However, Gibbs et al. found this difference only for people who scored at Kohlberg's Stage 3 level of moral development. The subjects in the present study were not divided into moral development levels and therefore any sex differences in empathy in this sample may have been obscured. The definition of empathy employed in this study was not the same as that adopted by Hoffman. Hoffman (1979, p. 713) defines empathy as a "vicarious affective response to another" and distinguishes it from a cognitive awareness of another's feelings. Since in this study, cognitive

understanding was not differentiated from affective response, its results are not comparable to Hoffman's research. Future studies of empathy and morality would do well to take this distinction into account as Hoffman's definition of empathy appears logically related to the care MO and the conception of cognitive perspective-taking to a justice orientation.

Women did take moral action out of consideration for the welfare of others more frequently than did men. This trend, although nonsignificant, provides partial support for the original hypotheses. If one considers this in connection with the finding that women in this sample also make greater use of principles and norms than did men, however, other, alternative interpretations emerge. One possibility is that due to some sex-specific developmental shift during this age range women make greater use of both orientations than do men at this age range. Another, perhaps more plausible interpretation is derived from Broughton (1983). Broughton argues that despite Gilligan's assertion that women construe moral situations in concrete, contextual and relativistic ways, in actuality she accords the virtues of care and responsibility the status of absolute, prescriptive, and universal principles. As such, her conception of a care orientation to morality resembles the justice-oriented morality of Kohlberg. This study did not divide subjects into hierarchical stages of development within the justice and care orientations and therefore does not address the issue of increased abstraction and universality at higher stages of moral development. The results do suggest, however, that women may use prescriptive norms and principles

to express a care ethic, and point to the need for further research to clarify the issue of contextualism versus universality and to more fully distinguish a care from a justice orientation.

Ego Development

This study revealed an association between ego development and moral orientation but not in the predicted direction. Individuals who scored at higher ego stages did not use both orientations together more frequently than did those who scored at lower ego stages. People at higher ego stages did, however, show greater use of a single orientation in their descriptions of moral dilemmas than did people at lower ego stages. A significant number of individuals at lower ego stages failed to evidence any distinct moral orientation in their moral conflicts.

The meaning of these findings is unclear. They support Loevinger's (1976) assertion that there is greater differentiation at higher ego stages but do not support the prediction of greater integration at these stages. It appears that individuals at high ego stages tend to recognize and use elements of one or both MOs while people at low ego stages tend to approach moral conflicts in a diffuse and vague manner. This may be a function of differentiation, so that there is failure to recognize distinct orientations at lower ego development levels. One mark of ego maturity can be the degree to which an individual has basic life commitments, including ethical commitments (Bourne, 1978). It may be that people at high ego development levels not only recognize distinct aspects of a moral orientation but also commit themselves to their use. As Emmerich and Goldman (1983) point out; moral commitment is

essential to moral behavior. This commitment may be due to the greater internalization that takes place at higher ego levels or to the achievement of a stable, coherent, ego identity (Bourne, 1978). It would be informative to assess the relationship between moral development or moral orientation and ego maturity level as assessed by other ego developmental measures such as Marcia's Identity Status Interview (1966) to see what role commitment, and commitment to certain values plays in morality.

The problem of possible sex bias in this sample (e.g., the greater number of females in the high ego group) makes the above interpretations of the results concerning ego development and moral orientation uncertain. It is unknown how this bias may have affected the results. Future investigations of ego development and morality should investigate the effect of sex, perhaps by having equivalent numbers of males and females at each ego stage level. This would help clarify the role of sex (if any) in the relationship between moral and ego development.

Intimacy and Power Motivation

Support for a connection between intimacy motivation and the care MO was found in only one category. Intimacy motivation was positively associated with the maintenance and preservation of a relationship as a reason for making a particular moral decision. This is consistent with a conception of intimacy as involving a preference for connection. However, the expected association between intimacy motivation and a concern for others' well-being was not found. This result conflicts with those of a study by McAdams, Healy, and Krause (1984) which found inti-

macy motivation to be associated with an emphasis on trust and concern for the well-being of others as reasons for friendship.

There is a possible explanation for this contradiction. It may be that concern for others is most frequently seen in personally meaningful relationships. Intimacy motive has been linked to a tendency to engage in dyadic relationships (McAdams, Healy & Krause, 1984) and in this study it was expected that intimacy motivation would be associated with moral conflicts in which the dilemma involved a problem in significant relationships. This was not found and, in fact, there was a negative although nonsignificant correlation between intimacy motivation and relational dilemmas. Instead, intimacy motivation was connected to conflicts involving the rules, principles and norms characteristic of a justice ethic. Perhaps intimacy motivation is associated with a tendency not to see conflicts in significant interpersonal relationships as moral problems, or perhaps there are fewer conflicts in the relationships of people high in intimacy motivation. Research has shown that high intimacy motivation is related to more positive affect and perceived harmony in relationships (McAdams & Constantian, 1983) and this may partly account for the negative correlation between intimacy motivation and relational dilemmas found in this study.

The kind of experience that subjects were asked to describe may also have affected the results. McAdams (1982) found that intimacy motivation was associated with intimacy themes in subjects' memories of peak experiences, satisfying experiences and great learning experiences, but not with memories of neutral or unpleasant experiences. Also,

intimacy motivation is conceived of as corresponding to a communal approach in relationships; one that is marked by being rather than doing, and research supports this (McAdams, Healy & Krause, 1984). In this study subjects were asked to describe relatively unpleasant (i.e., conflictual) experiences that involved some action on their part. The elements of action and unpleasantness may partially explain the failure to find the expected relationship between intimacy motive and certain aspects of the care orientation.

The proposed connection between power motivation and the justice orientation was not substantiated. Power motivation was not associated with the use of rules, principles and standards, nor with concern for one's own welfare. Thus, the elements of self-protection and objectivity thought to be linked with power motive were not expressed in this samples' moral conflicts. Further, power motivation was found to have a significant positive correlation with concern for other's welfare as a basis for moral action. This finding contradicts the original hypothesis but is in keeping with the agentic ways that power motivation can be manifested in relationships e.g., taking charge of a situation, assuming responsibility, and helping another. As McAdams (1985) points out, helping is an active assertion of the self. It may be that power motivation is frequently manifested in giving and helping behaviors whenever socialization experiences have fostered the development of a caring orientation toward weaker others (McClelland, 1975). There is some support for this possibility. McAdams (1984a) found that individuals high in power motivation described the high points of their friendships as those

times when one friend offered to help the other. To better understand the relationship between power motivation and helping, it would be helpful to know the reasons behind high power individuals' desires to help others. Perhaps such a desire is due to a preference for feeling strong and having an impact on others. Or perhaps it is a specific kind of concern for others, a concern that is limited to those who are perceived as being in a hierarchical relationship with the helper e.g., weaker, less able. It would be interesting to discover the differences between the concern for others evidenced by people high in power motivation as compared to those high in intimacy motivation, and the differences in the kinds of helping behaviors they might exhibit. This might also help clarify how concern for others might be expressed differently in the care and justice MOs.

In summary, there was no evidence to support the hypotheses concerning power motivation and the care and justice ethics and only meager support for the hypothesis that intimacy motivation would be positively associated with a care MO. Before completing this discussion of the results concerning intimacy and power motivation and their relationships to the care and justice MOs, it is necessary to point out another limitation of the present study. The power and intimacy motive scores used in the analysis were those of separate individuals and therefore it was impossible to compare the combined effects of the two motives. Future research should attempt to look at high and low levels of both motives in combination to see how they are related to moral reasoning and behavior.

Concluding Comments

The major hypotheses of this study concerning the separate relationships between moral orientation and gender, ego development stage, and intimacy and power motivation were, for the most part, not supported. However, due to the questionable reliability and unknown validity of the dependent measures this study may not have been an adequate test of the relationships between these factors and moral orientation. To make such a test, a standardized, reliable and valid measure of the care orientation needs to be devised. Lyons (1983) has taken the first step in this direction. She has developed a scoring system and semi-structured interview method that, she proposes, assesses moral orientation and perceptions of self and self-other relationships. This measure should be tested for reliability and validity and made available to other researchers to make further tests. At the present time there is little empirical evidence to support Gilligan's thesis that a care orientation exists, and the availability of a standardized measure of the care MO would help answer this question. Given a standardized assessment instrument, researchers might investigate the relationships between a care orientation and affective responses, empathy, helping and other behaviors, social desirability, prosocial moral reasoning (Eisenberg-Berg, 1979), interpersonal moral reasoning (Haan, 1978), as well as the factors examined in this study, in order to delineate more clearly what a care orientation is. It would also be important to determine how such a measure relates to Kohlberg's system of assessment. Longitudinal studies would also be necessary to determine whether or not the stage

sequence described by Gilligan is actually exhibited in subjects' lives.

Gilligan's claim of sex differences also requires closer examination, as her claim lacks any strong support. It will be necessary to assess the relative importance of biological, psychological and socio-cultural factors in moral understanding and behavior. As Reimer (1983) notes, "the values and qualities associated with women are not psychologically predetermined and inevitable but also related to complex social and cultural factors" (p. 5). Many have emphasized the important influence that the societal and cultural environment has on an individual's development (Brabeck, 1983; Miller, 1976). It may be that the socio-cultural context of peoples' development is a more critical factor in their moral orientation than is biological sex. One way to investigate this would be to assess the moral orientations exhibited by males and females from different age cohorts and cultures.

The larger and most fundamental question that needs to be addressed by research concerns the relationship between Gilligan's conception of a care ethic and the justice- and reason- oriented morality embodied in Kohlberg's system. Gilligan originally seemed to propose the care orientation as something distinct (at least in the initial stages of development) from the justice MO. This is questionable. Rather than discovering a new kind of morality, Gilligan's greatest contribution seems to have been to broaden our conception of moral development and what is true about morality (Brabeck, 1983; Kohlberg, 1982).

The care and justice ethics both speak to fundamental but in some ways opposing aspects of human life. Kohlberg's model reflects ration-

ality, justice, universality, the primacy of the individual, the need for independence and autonomy. Gilligan's theory adds to and complements Kohlberg's system by bringing in affect, care, context, relationships, and the needs for interdependence and connection. Kohlberg focuses on what one "should" do as being universally morally right, and Gilligan focuses on what one "would" do in a specific moral context (Kohlberg, 1982). But these do not appear to be two different kinds of morality but rather different aspects of one larger morality that integrates reason with affect, autonomy with connection, content with structure, and judgment with action. The task that now lies before theoreticians and researchers is to integrate Kohlberg's and Gilligan's theories into a single conception of morality (Brabeck, 1983) and, just as it is the developmental task of every individual, to unite care with justice.

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APPENDIX A

MORAL ORIENTATION QUESTIONNAIRE

This is a questionnaire about morality. Its purpose is to discover the kinds of moral conflicts that people experience in their lives and how they deal with and think about those conflicts. On the following pages please describe 4 of the most significant moral conflicts that you have faced in your life, at least 2 of which have occurred within the last two years. By moral conflicts we mean situations in which you faced a dilemma concerning right and wrong, good and bad. Be sure to describe real situations that you have experienced. Describe each situation in detail (one per page), answering the following questions:

When and where did the conflict take place?

What events led up to the conflict? What caused it?

Who, if anybody, was responsible for the conflict having occurred?

If there were other people involved, who were they and what was their relationship to you?

Why did the situation represent a moral conflict to you?

How did you deal with the conflict?

Why did you deal with it in that way?

What kinds of things were important in making your decision?

What was the outcome of the dilemma?

How do you feel about the outcome?

Remember, describe each situation as it really happened, not as you

think it should have happened. We are interested in experiences and there are no right or wrong experiences. Please do not identify yourself or others in your accounts. All responses will remain confidential.

APPENDIX B

I. Give each dilemma a score in both categories.

Relational Dilemma. (RD).

2-- The dilemma involves at least one of the following (A or B):

- A). a significant personal relationship
e.g., family member, lover, good friend, boy/girl friend, mentor
- B). the subject clearly expresses concern about harming or hurting the there; or, responsibility to care for or in some way give to the other

1-- Neither A nor B

Principled Dilemma. (PD).

2-- The subject states or strongly implies an abstract principle, law, social or institutional norm that tells how one should or ought to act. It is a standard for behavior. The subject may imply a moral proposition by using words such as "believe," "taught," "right," and "wrong"

Examples for scoring PD = 2

It is wrong to _____ (cheat, steal, 'do that', etc.)

People shouldn't steal, cheat, etc.,

_____ wouldn't be right, fair, just, etc.,

I've always believed that _____.

My parents always told me _____.

I was taught that _____.

I've been brought up to _____.

I've never agreed with _____. (premarital sex, stealing, etc.)

One should help others.

Children should obey their parents.

Life is more important than liberty or happiness.

Honesty is the best policy.

When one makes an agreement, one sticks with it.

_____ is a sin.

_____ is against the Church.

It's against my principles, beliefs, etc.

I've always been against _____ (stealing, hurting people, drugs)

I didn't think it was right to _____.

1-- No moral proposition is put forth or implied.

CONSIDERATIONS

- II. Score any of the following types of considerations that the subject uses to make his/her decision. Considerations are what the subject states are his reasons for deciding to act in a certain way. The subject may use more than one category of considerations. Score each category that applies. If the subject does not use any of the categories listed, than do not score anything.

Categories and Examples

Consequences to the Subject. (CS).

The subject decides on an act in order to experience positive and/or avoid negative consequences. i.e., in order to gain something or to avoid losing something. The focus is on how the subject would be affected.

Types of consequences include:

Affective: pleasant or unpleasant feelings. Moral emotions such as guilt, shame, pride in oneself, etc. are not included in this category.

Material: loss or gain of money, material goods, social position, etc.

Physical: health concerns, physical danger

Others'

Reactions: gain or loss of others' approval or acceptance; to avoid negative emotional reaction in the other because the emotion will be turned against the subject. e.g., fear that if the other is made angry he will retaliate against the subject.

Other examples

Affective

for:

fun, excitement
 enjoyment
 a thrill
 good times
 the "experience"

to avoid:

boredom
 sadness
 doing something hateful or distasteful
 feeling stupid
 embarrassment

because of fear (not specified)

Material

consequences that concern loss or gain of:

money
 goods
 possessions
 status
 power convenience e.g., It would be difficult, hard, inconvenient...
 reward
 school grades
 compensations for subject's effort
 a job
 influence

to avoid "getting in trouble"

Physical

phrases such as:

would be bad for them
 would make them sick
 it's unhealthy
 good for their body
 might get them pregnant
 would be physically dangerous
 unsafe
 might get hurt
 not good for them

an indication that they've seen the ill effects of some action on others
 e.g., what drinking has done for their friends

Others' Reactions

to gain (or avoid losing) others'

approval
 acceptance
 affection
 trust

respect
liking

to avoid:

being laughed at
rejection
being disappointed by someone
being blamed, chastised, punished, retaliated against
making the other angry, mad, upset, hostile (not because of concern
for how the other is affected by the emotion but because of how
the subject will be affected)
fear of what the other would 'think' of them
other phrases indicating CS:
I wouldn't want to end up that way

Concern for Others. (CO).

The subject decides on the basis of the consequences to another person
or group of people.

Others' rights; so as not to violate others' rights or to promote
their rights. Matters of justice or fairness to
the other.

Others' affective states: The subject focuses on the impact of the
other persons' feelings on that person. This
is a selfless concern in that the subject is not
worried about how the other person will react
toward the subject. e.g., He/she/they/would feel
angry, hurt, upset, bad, or happy, good

Others' needs: (physical, emotional, material)
The other needs or lacks something and/or could
potentially benefit from the subjects' actions.

Rights

It would be unfair or unjust to them
They don't deserve that
It would be taking advantage of them

Affect

It would make them feel better
I don't want to hurt, upset them
She wouldn't be happy
to restore harmony in the group
to help everyone get along

Needs

they can't take care of themselves
 they need money, a favor
 they need blood, a transplant
 he'd be in danger
 she needs my help
 I don't want to see them get in trouble (ruin their life)

General

because I care about them

Maintenance of Relationship. (MR).

The subject focuses on the relationship itself, and not on any single person involved. e.g., the friendship, marriage, love relationship, etc.

The subject acts in order to:

1. avoid loss of the relationship or
2. minimize conflict for the sake of the relationship or
3. strengthen the relationship

Examples

We will be better friends
 we are so close
 I don't want to lose him/her
 the time we share together is so important
 because we are friends

Empathy. (E).

The subject clearly expresses empathy for the other person. They show that they understand and/or sympathize (empathize) with the other's situation and feelings.

Examples

I knew (understood) how he felt
 I put myself in her place
 I could see their position
 I'd feel pretty bad/good if....(whatever happened to the other)
 I could imagine what it was like
 I knew it must be terrible
 If I was in his place I'd....
 I sympathized with them

APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by
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The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the thesis is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts.

11/25/85
Date

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