Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2014

Publication Title

International Negotiation

Volume

19

Issue

1

Pages

221-256

Publisher Name

Brill

Abstract

Why do some militarized interstate disputes involve multiple third party attempts to resolve the dispute, while others seemingly end before movement towards peace is possible? This paper examines third party commitment to international conflict resolution. I argue that a third party’s commitment reflects strategic interests, barriers to entry and the conflict’s prospects for peace, which encourage third party involvement while having a dampening effect on their commitment. I also explore the role of bias in management onset and third party commitment. Analysis of conflict management in militarized interstate disputes from 1946 to 2001 offers significant support for the hypotheses.

Comments

Author Posting. © Brill, 2014. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of Brill Publishers for personal use, not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in International Negotiation, (2014) http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718069-12341277

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.

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