The New Politics of Sports Franchise Policy Innovation in Chicago

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PART II

LINKING SOCIAL EQUITY TO DEVELOPMENT
THE NEW POLITICS OF SPORTS
POLICY INNOVATION IN CHICAGO

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ABSTRACT

The urban regime in Chicago was an integral player in the determination of sports policy during the 1980s and early 1990s. As the mediator of every major sports issue, the regime orchestrated the policy response in innovative ways. Regulatory powers were used to control night baseball in Wrigleyville, ultimately appeasing the team owners and most neighborhood residents. Economic development policies were adapted to keep the White Sox, but these were adopted with a major regulatory component and the progressive regime also wove a major social benefit into the redevelopment of the ballpark neighborhood. Although an accommodation to appease the football Bears has yet to be achieved, the regime has worked tirelessly to develop unique solutions. All of this represents a departure from the way in which the Democratic Party machine made policy for Chicago and demonstrates the effectiveness of a working progressive regime in Chicago in recent years.
The politics of many American cities has changed with the rise of progressive politics and the election of more progressive leaders to the offices of mayor and city council. A corresponding change in cities is also apparent in their policies. Economic development programs, fiscal austerity measures, and new regulatory policies have been among the new policy developments in the nation's cities. So too are policies for a unique group of corporations in selected cities—professional sports franchises. In this paper we examine innovative policy developments involving sports issues and we focus on developments during the 1980s in Chicago. The Chicago Cubs, Chicago White Sox, and Chicago Bears owners each made demands on city policymakers during this decade and into the 1990s. The government response to each was shaped by Chicago's governing coalition, which during most of the period studied was led by the city's first black and progressive mayor, Harold Washington. The stories and policy developments are both distinctive and innovative and they teach us some things about urban regimes and sports in American cities.

**URBAN REGIMES AND POLITICAL INNOVATION**

The theory of urban regimes, or "governing coalitions," represents the emerging paradigm in the study of urban politics. According to Clarence Stone (1989:6), an urban regime is "the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions." This informal group is composed of those with public authority, such as city government officials, and those with access to private resources, such as businessmen and civic leaders. Each component is dependent on the other to accomplish its objectives in the urban community, and so they informally come together to cooperate and facilitate action (Stone, 1989:4-5). The regime becomes the powerful mediator of public policy, and as such, helps to manage conflict in the community. But more importantly, the regime is not a neutral structure through which policy is adopted; rather, the regime "shapes policy" (Stone, 1989:6).

For example, some cities have a history of political machine dominance. The machine represents a kind of regime—one which was based in geographic territories (i.e., wards) of a city and mediated policy for party members and businesses through its informal arrangements with city institutions. Machine bosses clearly shaped policy in the classic machine city. Other cities have been known for their strong links to the downtown business community. By fostering an informal coalition of city officials and business leaders these communities choose policies through a "corporate regime," like that found in Dallas (Elkin, 1987). Further, even in cities with more progressive politics, a governing coalition determines policy. In the so-called "progressive regime" the private interests are as likely to reflect neighborhood objectives as they are to embrace
business concerns (Body-Gendrot, 1987), but as in other regimes, the progressive group fosters the cooperation that is necessary for the shaping of public policy (see Whelan, 1987).

If urban regimes are viewed as the mediators and fashioners of public policy, then it follows that political innovation is possible only through the cooperative efforts of the governing coalition. By innovation, we refer to the undertaking of new and perhaps risky policy that marks more than just an incremental difference from the status quo. Often, regimes will be reluctant to explore innovation because of the need to maintain the current cooperative process within the governing coalition. Regimes will innovate when the need for cooperation in a policy realm dictates that this is the best course to follow for purposive action. It follows that the process of political innovation in the city is most likely to occur when the regime finds it necessary to adapt to environmental changes, social change, new actors, or “potential break-downs through conflict or indifference” (Stone, 1989:9).

Consider some examples of political innovation in communities from the 1960s to the 1980s. The power of the leader of the governing coalition—the mayor in most cases—is critical to the success of innovative policy initiatives. This fact is confirmed by Rosenthal and Crain’s (1966) classic study of fluoridation decision-making which showed that the mayor’s position was the key factor in the outcome. When the mayor favored innovation—treating drinking water with fluoride—the majority of cities adopted the policy. When mayors opposed this, an even greater majority of cities rejected the idea. Research also suggests that policy innovation is more likely following adoption of the council-manager form of government. Managers have been shown to be more inclined to adopt innovative ideas, in part due to their professional backgrounds, associations, and familiarity with more business-style policies (see, e.g., Bingham, 1976).

Public-private partnerships in cities constitute a 1970s innovation in urban policy. Coming at the end of the period of massive urban renewal and at the beginning of the reduction in federal aid to cities which would be a staple of President Reagan’s approach to federalism in the 1980s, they represent a response to changing fiscal and economic conditions in cities. Urban leaders began to orchestrate the public-private linkage as a device to revitalize and redevelop urban areas. With this came new forms of urban “renewal”—public support for such projects as industrial redevelopment, downtown revitalization, convention centers, performing arts, and sports facilities. Judd and Collins (1979) found that city leaders seldom had any alternatives to subsidization of growth policies because of the need to expand the tax base. This has often led to new policies to promote tourism for a community—with wide business sector support and local politicians leading the charge for political benefits. A similar finding is apparent in Whitt’s (1988) report on the use of the performing arts as an innovative policy approach to urban
redevelopment in Louisville. A governing coalition of local businessmen, the media, and state government leaders has successfully brought about this innovation in urban policy in numerous cities across the United States (Whitt, 1988:57).

Public subsidization of sports stadiums and legislation designed to aid sports franchises is a relatively new area of policy innovation, although the seeds for this activity were laid with the move of the Dodgers and Giants out of New York (Rosentraub, 1988: 75-77). In the 1980s, the construction of sports stadiums and other sports facilities has been a key ingredient in economic development policies, despite the documented nature of stadiums as "loss-leaders" (Doig, 1987). Again, business leaders and public officials have joined efforts to promote the "public good" of sports for the entire community. A recent extension of the sports facility as a redevelopment strategy, however, has been found in cities with more progressive regimes. In these cities, such as Chicago, the objective has been to initiate innovative policies, including sports-related policies, that embrace social as well as economic goals for the community.

Osborne (1988) has eloquently argued that an emerging new political paradigm in U.S. state governments has recognized the need to have government be a leader of innovation. He believes that government must make innovation a part of daily practice, a notion that is seemingly embraced in economic development programs. But what is most interesting about the new political paradigm is that state governors and their governing partners have combined policy innovation with a concern for bringing the poor into the growth process. In essence, governors have combined a drive to be innovative on economic growth policy with a social agenda designed to achieve greater social justice. Has this kind of innovation occurred at the community level?

Major innovations often come with a new administration, especially a new mayor committed to a sharp break with his predecessors. If the mayor has a majority in the council and can replace leading positions in the administration, new policies are more likely to be able to be implemented. Still, controversy often surrounds change in such top positions. One way that mayors often bring new policies is to build on a new political base—of subsets of citizens and/or organized groups. For instance Clark and Ferguson (1983) showed that major changes came with New Fiscal Populist mayors in many cities in the late 1970s, along with taxpayer revolts and opposition to established groups like unions.

Clavel (1986) has found innovation follows progressive administrations in cities. The economic and federalism changes that forced public-private partnerships to prominence in urban policy-making presented city leaders with opportunities to innovatively alter policy outcomes. For example, in the 1970s progressive city council leader Nicholas Carbone in Hartford pushed innovative city programs that benefitted city residents along with the business
community through the city council (Clavel, 1986:30-47). Clavel (1986) further documented the innovations in public planning and economic development programs that occurred in such cities as Berkeley, Burlington (VT), Cleveland, and Santa Monica due to the rise to power of progressive governing coalitions. In each city, progressive leaders had a significant role in changing the process and outcomes of policy.

Policy innovation is also apparent in cities that elect black or Hispanic mayors for the first time (see Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, 1990; Eisinger, 1984; Preston, Henderson, and Puryear, 1987). In many cases, these are also "progressive" administrations, or what we refer to as progressive regimes in cities. Chicago's progressive regime and its role in sports policy innovation is the subject of this paper. Chicago changed from essentially a city governed by the prevailing Democratic Party machine/regime from 1931-1979. By the early 1980s, the progressive elements in Chicago's political environment had organized to produce a winning electoral coalition, resulting in the victory of Mayor Harold Washington in 1983. And although Washington's regime would suffer a serious setback with his death in 1987, his mayoral successors, Eugene Sawyer and Richard M. Daley—two products of the machine era—were forced to accommodate progressive governing partners in their own regimes. Although neither would fit the description of a true "progressive," both succeeding mayors worked within the same progressive regime that continues to influence Chicago policy today. In the pages to follow we show how a change in the governing coalition in Chicago produced innovation in sports policymaking in the 1980s. First, we set the stage for sports and politics in Chicago.

CITIES AND SPORTS

Chicago has a rich sports heritage. It is currently home to two major league baseball teams—the White Sox and the Cubs,—the National Football League Bears, the National Hockey League Blackhawks and the National Basketball Association Bulls. The city's sports history includes such legends as George "Papa Bear" Halas, the double-play combination of Tinkers to Evers to Chance, shortstop Luke Appling, the Golden Jet—Bobby Hull—and legend-in-the-making Michael Jordan. Chicagoans have celebrated World Series, Stanley Cup, Super Bowl, and NBA Championships and suffered through the Black Sox scandal and many losing seasons by those loveable Cubs. Through it all, there has been a close relationship between Chicago's sports and political worlds.

In many ways, this sports-politics connection is not unique. Most nineteenth-century professional baseball teams in America had some sort of political connection. Club officials were often public officeholders and several powerful urban machines were involved with baseball. Providing financial backing for
a team could mean votes, and for some politicians it was a way to launder the profits of graft (Vincent, 1981:98-99). In several cities, partisan politics were involved. For a time, rival teams existed for the Democratic and Republican parties in Boston, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Philadelphia and St. Louis (Vincent, 1981:99).

Professional baseball rapidly expanded after the turn of the century, primarily the result of economic prosperity, urbanization and advances in transportation and communication. In addition, team owners and sportswriters promoted the game as an exercise in self-improvement as well as national betterment (Riess, 1980:13). Baseball was credited as a source of community integration as spectators developed affection for the home team, and the local franchise was an indicator of a town's status. A baseball team was valuable advertisement for a city and was thought to attract new businesses and residents (Riess, 1980:18-19).

The prestige of metropolitan areas was also affected by the presence and status of professional clubs. Many thought Detroit's lack of a major league franchise between 1888 and 1901 diminished its reputation as a major urban area. Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia and St. Louis all had two major league teams, enhancing their prestige, while the presence of three teams in New York solidified its position as the nation's leading urban center (Riess, 1980:20-21). As baseball moved into the twentieth century, then, city politics and politicians exerted significant influence on the game while it, in turn, affected, at least symbolically, the economic and political strength of the city.

As in many other cities, political connections played an important role in Chicago baseball during the early professionalization of the sport. Team owners and investors were often prominent businessmen and political figures, and their influence helped keep licensing fees at a manageable level and police protection at games free (Riess, 1980:53-61). Political clout was perhaps most useful when it came to gaining inside information about potential sites for ball park construction. Political friends helped team owners find land that was cheap but accessible by mass transit, protected the team against community opposition and secured a variety of city services for the club (Riess, 1980:110).

This strong political connection of baseball owners declined after the 1920s as teams were sold to wealthy men who viewed the game as primarily a diversion rather than a business and as the sport became firmly established (Riess, 1989:199). For its part, professional football never had the ties to politics that characterized baseball. The early teams often were factory-sponsored, as were the Staley Starchmakers, precursor to the Chicago Bears, and industrial financing was critical (Vincent, 1981, 8-9; Vass, 1971:25-27). In its infancy, the National Football League was unstable, franchises were cheap and profits were minimal; as late as the 1930s football was still a minor sport (Riess, 1989:233). Stability and success did not come to the game for another twenty years.
The absence of strong political ties to football during the early years and the decline of overt political connections of baseball ownership after the 1920s does not diminish the impact that politics has had on professional sports. Indeed, every aspect of sport has political implications and is affected by governmental policies. The federal tax laws, labor-management relations statutes and the constitutional power of eminent domain are all relevant to the business of sports. Of course, the application of antitrust principles to professional sports leagues, with the exception of a judicially-created antitrust exemption for baseball, has ensured a long-standing relationship between government and sports. In fact, the fear of team owners that Congress might pass anti-monopoly laws against the leagues for restricting the number of franchises contributed to the significant expansion that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s (Riess, 1989:237-238).

The politics of cities and states are also entwined with professional sports, perhaps no more evident in recent years than in the bidding wars that have accompanied franchise relocation. In the 1950s, mayors and other community leaders began aggressively to attract professional teams or prevent them from leaving by building expensive stadiums and offering a variety of other inducements (Riess, 1989:239). Because the presence of a franchise is thought to provide a significant boost to a city's economy and bring big league status to its image, political officials have generally been more than willing to open the public purse for team owners who know that the demand for their product is greater than the supply (Riess, 1989:240).

Sports Policy Innovation in Chicago

In the past, sports franchise owners typically got what they wanted from their host community or moved to jurisdictions that would accommodate their demands. Perhaps the most storied franchise relocation in professional sports was the Dodgers' move from Brooklyn to Los Angeles. A significant factor contributing to Dodger owner Walter O'Malley's decision to take his team to California was the unwillingness of New York City officials to acquire the land O'Malley wanted to buy for construction of a new stadium. Los Angeles, on the other hand, was anxious to have a major league baseball team, and the city agreed to use its power of eminent domain to seize the Chavez Ravine site that now houses Dodger Stadium (Sullivan, 1987:162-175). Similarly, the construction of Giants Stadium in the Meadowlands gave Wellington Mara everything he wanted, and more, to move his football franchise from the Bronx to New Jersey (Harris, 1986:84-85). More recently, government and business leaders in Phoenix were happy to open their hearts and checkbooks in order to provide a new home to the (formerly St. Louis) football Cardinals.

Chicago represents a departure from this typical pattern. Chicago's professional sports franchises have not left the city—for the suburbs or for
another state (at least not yet). But keeping the teams in Chicago has not been the result of simply caving in to owners' demands. Chicago has managed to keep its teams because the local governing coalition has been willing to accommodate team interests in new public policy without ignoring the needs of team neighbors. Specifically, Chicago has used its regulatory powers, economic development program, and social policies to develop innovative responses to sports issues. The discussion to follow analyzes the recent response of the urban regime to the demands that have been placed on the city's agenda by the Cubs, White Sox, and Bears.

Cubs

The Cubs play in Wrigley Field in the residential area of Lake View on Chicago's north side. Built in 1914, Wrigley Field is the oldest ballpark in the National League and, until recently, the only major league park without lights. Chewing gum magnate Philip K. Wrigley had repeatedly assured the Lake View residents that he would never put lights in the park, believing night baseball would have a deteriorating effect on the neighborhood (Elie, 1986:290).

In 1981 the team was sold to the Tribune Company, prompting speculation that the new owners would install lights. In 1982, the Illinois legislature passed an amendment to the state Environmental Protection Act, preventing nighttime noise pollution. It read in part:

Baseball, football, or soccer sporting events played during nighttime hours, by professional athletes, in a city with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants, in a stadium at which such nighttime events were not played prior to July 1, 1982, shall be subject to nighttime noise emission regulations promulgated by the Illinois Pollution Control Board (Note, 1987: 372).

Claiming that the Cubs could not compete with the other teams in its division without lights, the team's General Manager, Dallas Green, announced in 1983 that he would seek corporate approval for the installation of lights when the Cubs became contenders. The Chicago City Council responded by passing an ordinance introduced by the local aldermen and supported by a cross-section of progressive and old machine council members, which amended the Public Places of Amusement section of the Municipal Code of Chicago, making it unlawful to produce any sporting event if any part of the game takes place between 8:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m., and is held in a stadium that is not totally enclosed and contains more than 15,000 seats where any such seats are located within 500 feet of 100 or more dwelling units (Elie, 1986: 293; Note, 1987: 372). Both pieces of legislation in effect prohibited night games at Wrigley Field.

After the 1984 baseball season, the Commissioner of Major League Baseball encouraged the Cubs to file suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1982 statute and the 1983 ordinance were
unconstitutional under the provision of separation of powers, state and federal guarantees of due process and equal protection and the Special Legislation Clause of the Illinois Constitution. The Lake View Citizens Council (LVCC), comprised of grassroots organizations and individuals residing near Wrigley Field, was allowed to intervene as a defendant. In March, 1985, the circuit court ruled against the Cubs on every issue, and, on direct appeal in October of the same year, the Illinois Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the decision (Elie, 1986: 293-297; Note, 1987: 373-382).

The Cubs’ loss in the legal area prompted threats to leave Chicago, threats that Mayor Washington and his progressive regime took seriously. Washington could ill afford to have the Cubs, an operation that generates $90 million a year, flee the city (Devall, 1986; Golden, 1986). Rather than considering only the corporate demands of the Cubs, however, the mayor sought a compromise on lights at Wrigley. In late 1986 and 1987, several “summit conferences” were scheduled with top executives from the Cubs organization, city department heads, elected officials and a number of north side community groups, including the leading anti-lights group, Citizens United for Baseball in the Sunshine (CUBS).

While promising that the Cubs would remain primarily a day baseball club, team officials sought to host 18-regular season night games plus post-season play at Wrigley. To win neighborhood support for limited night baseball, the Washington-led regime put together a 28-point checklist of improvements that could be made around Wrigley Field, including guaranteed residential parking, computerized traffic signals, a local hiring program for ballpark jobs, and an insurance plan to protect against any drop in property values that night baseball might bring (McCarron, 1987a). Still neighborhood groups and local political leaders representing the Lake View area who were not part of Harold Washington’s governing coalition remained adamant in their opposition to lights at Wrigley (McCarron, 1987b).

A new survey undertaken by the city’s Economic Development Commission in the fall of 1987 showed twice as many city residents favored night baseball at Wrigley than opposed it, and a majority of those living near the ballpark were willing to support night games if limited to 18 dates (McCarron, 1987c). Two weeks before his death, Mayor Washington endorsed a “middle course” that he hoped would allow the corporate team owners to have limited night games but would not contradict his commitment to the neighborhoods. He proposed that in return for being allowed to play 18 regular-season night games, the Cubs would give up most of their 3:05 starts, schedule no night games on Fridays and stop the sale of beer to fans after the 7th inning (McCarron, 1987d). On February 25, 1988, the city council ended the six-year battle over lights at Wrigley by approving a measure to allow 8 night games in 1988 and 18 in future seasons. Washington’s successor, Mayor Eugene Sawyer, signed the
ordinance after the Cubs made a qualified commitment to play home games at Wrigley until 2002 (Crimmins, 1988).

Chicago's response to the issue of lights at Wrigley reflects an innovative accommodation of corporate and community demands, quite different from the days preceding the construction of Wrigley Field. Though area merchants applauded the announcement that a stadium (originally known as Federal Park) would be built in the Lake View area, residential property owners complained bitterly to then Mayor Carter Harrison II. Their claims that the crowds would "disturb the peace and quiet of the neighborhood and destroy the district as residential property," however, fell on deaf ears (Riess, 1980:99). Likewise, the late 1980s compromise that allowed lights at Wrigley in exchange for a number of concessions to Lake View residents represents a different posture than the government's use of its regulatory powers to prohibit night baseball by the enactment of a state statute and city ordinance earlier in the decade.

White Sox

What is clearly new in the case of the Chicago White Sox is the regime response to the baseball franchise's threats to leave Chicago. The policy response would ultimately embody a publicly-built stadium with a generous lease arrangement for the team. Never before had a Chicago regime built a stadium for a sports franchise. The machine-dominated regime of the late 1950s barely uttered a concern when the Chicago Cardinals, one of two professional football teams in the city until 1960, began plans to leave the state. In contrast, losing one of the city's two professional baseball teams was not an option that the progressive regime of the 1980s was willing to tolerate.

Essentially, the nature of the response from city leaders is innovative on three different levels. First, the city and state governing coalitions developed their response to the White Sox owners desire to abandon Comiskey Park within the general framework of urban economic development policy. Interestingly, the original "Chicago White Stockings" franchise was begun in part as an urban development strategy more than 120 years earlier. According to Riess (1989:195), leading business and government leaders of the 1870s wanted to use baseball as a way to showcase Chicago to the rest of the country, hopefully bringing economic returns to the city.

When the 1980s owners of the White Sox and Comiskey Park began arguing that the stadium, built in 1910, was rapidly becoming structurally unsafe, the team's future in Chicago became open to much speculation. White Sox owners tried to implement a plan to move to the western suburbs with state support for a publicly-built stadium. However, a series of setbacks, including the opposition of suburban residents, ultimately killed the plan. While this was going on in early 1985, Mayor Harold Washington and his progressive
administration were faced with their first set of policy demands from sports franchise owners. Not only were the White Sox looking for a new stadium, but so too were the Chicago Bears owners who were tiring of an economically unattractive lease arrangement at Soldier Field, operated by the Chicago Park District. A cautious Mayor Washington advanced an initial proposal in April 1986 that was designed to mediate the demands of both teams. He proposed that a multi-team stadium for football and baseball become the linchpin of an economic redevelopment package for the South Loop. The Washington regime's goal was to accommodate the team owners in a fashion that represented broad economic goals rather than subsidization of sports franchises. Redevelopment and the dual-utility stadium would be financed through $255 million of industrial revenue bonds and would have state and county financial support as well (Crain Communications, 1986). However, neither sports franchise wanted to share space with the other and the Washington regime would soon find itself responding separately to the two teams' demands.

The innovative use of sports stadiums as economic development anchors would come up again in Chicago—this time in the redevelopment of the existing Comiskey Park neighborhood for a new Comiskey Park. What occurred in the economic development plans for the new stadium represented another facet of policy innovation in Chicago. In this second innovative policy response, the city and state assembled a public authority to regulate the development, land acquisition, relocation, demolition, construction, and operation of the New Comiskey Park. By keeping the new stadium a publicly-owned facility, the government would control both the public and private interests in the development and subsequent stadium operation.

In December 1986, at the urging of the Washington regime and the White Sox owners, the Illinois General Assembly created the Illinois Sports Facilities Authority (ISFA) to build and operate a stadium across the street from the existing Comiskey Park. Under the original terms of the innovative legislation, the White Sox would rent the $120 million facility for $4 million annually. The team would receive all gate receipts and would be assessed higher rent only when attendance and skybox revenues reached significantly higher levels than current operations yielded. A combination of the lease payments and a two percent tax on Chicago hotel rooms was designated for construction bond retirement. The Washington regime also agreed to split operating losses that could reach $10 million per year with the state of Illinois (Egler and McCarron, 1986). The governing coalition was also pleased with the potential control that it would have of the ISFA board through the mayor's power to appoint nearly half of the members and to jointly select the authority chair with the governor. This could well insure that the regime's objectives in economic development would be achieved in the Sox stadium development.
With the stadium issue seemingly resolved, many began to openly wonder why a business that employed about 538 full-time equivalent (FTE) employees should be considered for a multi-million dollar economic development package by state and local governments. However, the city economic development department estimated that the White Sox provided revenues to the Illinois economy in the $93-112 million range. Thus the city expected to reap some economic development gain, while at the same time attempting, at least in part, to satisfy team ownership. But instead of signing a lease agreement, the White Sox owners spent much of 1987-1988 detailing their dissatisfaction with sections of the legislation, lack of progress in organizing a stadium authority, and neighborhood complaints about redevelopment. The team owners even went so far as to suggest that they were seriously considering rejecting the innovative policy response of city and state leaders and accepting an offer to relocate to St. Petersburg, Florida. But an eleventh hour deal mediated by the Washington regime and Governor Thompson produced satisfactory policy changes to keep the White Sox in Chicago. Specifically, the amended agreement of June, 1988 provided for $150 million (an increase of $30 million from 1986) and additional revenue opportunities for the team. The ISFA agreed to a construction completion date of March 1, 1991, or be required to pay $5 million in penalties to the team. It also would assume the costs of continuing operations at Comiskey Park until it was demolished to make way for parking. Further, the ISFA must pay the White Sox a maintenance subsidy of $2 million per year (with an increase after the 10th year), and should attendance fall below 1.5 million per year in the second decade of operations, the ISFA must buy 300,000 tickets for such years (Kass and Egler, 1988). To the policymakers in Chicago and Springfield, this policy change was simply the cost of keeping the White Sox in Chicago. The regulation of the team would be possible in future years because it would become a tenant of the ISFA—another innovation in regulatory policy advanced by the progressive administration of Harold Washington.

Finally, the reliance upon the tools of economic development by the Washington regime followed the pattern of other progressive administrations—it included social goals in its plans for redevelopment of the stadium area and in the construction of the stadium itself. This type of innovation in policy was not apparent in earlier machine-dominated regimes of Chicago. In fact, some argue that just the opposite was true—neighborhood interests and social goals were often rejected by a regime that supported economic rather than social objectives (see, e.g., Royko 1971: 12).

The first big issue facing the ISFA was how to acquire the land necessary to build the new stadium and parking lots. Perhaps as many 100 families, dozens of businesses, a school, a church, and some industrial sites would need to be relocated and the land cleared. The neighborhood hit hardest by the stadium site redevelopment was South Armour Square—mostly working class
black families who had lived in the area for generations. The state legislation had given the ISFA "quick-take" power of eminent domain to acquire land needed for redevelopment. The progressive regime had supported this relatively unique power for a public authority—power normally only granted for highway right-of-way. Quick-take meant that the ISFA could acquire most land within 30 days of notification of the property owner who had little recourse to condemnation even in the court system. The use of this power later became a big issue with the normally docile Chicago City Council that had stayed out of the Sox fray for several years. On May 3, 1988 the Committee on Economic Development held a rare meeting to consider a bill by Ald. Patrick Huels who represents the ward which includes the stadium to try to stop the ISFA from acquiring the properties. Even this small, unsuccessful response was new to Chicago policymaking.

At the same time, the neighbors, through the South Armour Square Neighborhood Coalition, were pursuing court action to stop the acquisition process. The community opposition was emotional and vocal. Mayor Washington pushed for a favorable settlement for all neighborhood residents in South Armour Square who would be relocated because of stadium construction. He did not want to appear as the mayor who was selling them out to the corporate interests of the White Sox, so he used his influence over the process to try to secure an improvement in their quality of life. The mayor's stadium and economic development advisers worked with the ISFA to overcome opposition to the stadium site. But a solution to the issues of relocation and fairness eluded Washington during his tenure as mayor. Following his death and during the caretaker administration of Eugene Sawyer the regime mediated a solution that resulted in residents agreeing to relocate without a court fight.

The social objectives of the regime were met in part. Home owners received market price for their homes plus a $25,000 cash bonus to move, moving expenses, and legal costs. Most ended up in a better middle-class neighborhood. Renters received moving expenses plus $4,500 bonuses and a $250 monthly rental differential for rent in new areas for one year. Homeowners could opt to have a new home built for free if their mortgage was paid off; or they could obtain mortgage payments identical to what they were currently paying (McCarron, 1988a). Again, this represents an innovative solution—more than market value—to secure social goals.

Mayor Washington and his governing coalition did achieve an accommodation on another social front—a fair share of contracts for minorities in the construction and operation of the new ballpark (Hornung, 1987:1). In particular, he moved the ISFA minority contracting policy from the state-mandated 5 percent of contracts to the city's more progressive 25 percent, plus an additional 5 percent for female-headed firms. During the construction year of 1990, 27 percent of contracts went to minority firms. Like
other progressive regimes, the Washington regime was able to achieve broad social goals within the economic development program for the new stadium.

The Washington-Sawyer coalition of 1983-1989 delivered an acceptable stadium package to the White Sox while successfully mediating the competing needs of social and economic development in Chicago. The policy response was innovative when it came to the use of economic development tools, eminent domain, regulation, public authority, and social policy.

Bears

In many ways, Chicago's progressive regime's responses to the Bears' interest in a new stadium reflects the same elements of economic development and social objectives that were evident in its negotiations with the White Sox. To date, however, no new stadium is being built, and the Bears continue to threaten to leave the city.

The issue of a new stadium for the Bears was placed on the public agenda in 1986 when Bears president Michael McCaskey, grandson of George "Papa Bear" Halas, stated that the team's long term goal was to move from Soldier Field (McCarron, 1986a). McCaskey had frequently contended that the Bears' lease on its lakefront stadium, publicly owned and operated by the Chicago Park District, was the worst in the National Football League and limited the team's opportunities for profit.

Early consideration of a west suburban Roselle site was replaced with interest in a privately-financed stadium immediately south of Soldier Field. This lakefront site was favored by the Chicago Area Central Committee, a group comprised of the city's downtown business elite (McCarron, 1986b). Despite opposition from the boards of three museums in the area and a coalition made up of the Metropolitan Planning Council, League of Women Voters, the South Side Planning Board, the Open Lands Project and Friends of Parks, Mayor Washington tentatively endorsed the site near the end of 1986 (Strong and McCarron, 1986).

After Washington's re-election in April, 1987, efforts to build a new stadium for the Bears shifted to the city's west side. Governor Thompson was favorably disposed to this location and, though initially cautious, the mayor supported a west side plan upon the recommendation of a blue-ribbon committee (the executive director of the Metropolitan Planning Council, the president of the Chicago Park District board and a mayoral adviser who had been instrumental in negotiating the deal for the White Sox) he had established to evaluate potential stadium sites (Reardon, 1987; Kass and Lipinski, 1987). A new football stadium was seen as an integral part of a large urban renewal program that was to include "parks, stores, housing for low-and-moderate income families and an 'urban economic development zone'" (McCarron and Pierson, 1987)—once again a clear incorporation of social benefits into an economic
development package. The Midwest Community Council, headed by an influential adviser to the mayor, hoped that the plan would offer improvements for one of Chicago's poorest neighborhoods (McCarron and Wilson, 1987).³ In August the city and the Bears signed a “Memorandum of Mutual Intent” and Washington created the West Side Development Committee, comprised of progressive supporters and financial and civic leaders who were key players in his governing coalition (McCarron and Galvan, 1987; McCarron, 1987e).

Though at the time of Harold Washington's death in late 1987 it was still uncertain whether the West Side stadium would come to fruition, city officials unveiled two alternative plans and held community hearings on them in early 1988. The proposals called for the demolition of 475-524 housing units and delineated a residential displacement policy for owner occupants, public housing tenants and renters in privately-owned properties. It was estimated that some $30 million of public and private funding would be necessary to build replacement housing; the Bears and their developer proposed to finance the $130 million stadium themselves (McCarron, 1988c). In the summer of 1988, however, Illinois legislators failed to grant Mayor Eugene Sawyer's request for $30 million in state funds for infrastructure improvements necessary for stadium construction, thereby effectively putting an end to the West Side plan (Strong, 1988). Legislators argued that the city had more pressing items on its agenda: “schools, mental health, day care, public aid cost-of-living increases, and saving an American League franchise for the state” (Devall and Franklin, 1988).

In 1989 Bears executives sought political support for a new stadium south of the Loop. Running into more road blocks, McCaskey responded with a veiled threat. “I'm working with my third mayor and still getting nowhere.” He said that he did not “want to have to precipitate a crisis” in order to get a new football stadium back on the public agenda, but added, “If that's what it comes down to, I can tell you there’s a very hot market for NFL franchises” (McCarron, 1989).

The 1990s have brought new efforts to make a Bears stadium part of an economic development package. Proposals called for a domed football stadium attached to the already existing McCormick Place convention center near the lake. Though McCaskey expressed little early enthusiasm for the plan, he was soon convinced by Governor Thompson and Mayor Daley that a dome linked to McCormick Place was the team's last chance for a publicly-subsidized stadium (McCarron, 1990a). Though the Bears signed a 30-year, fixed rate rental agreement to play in the proposed domed stadium (McCarron, 1990b), the issue of McCormick Place expansion and a domed stadium was unresolved when the spring session of the Illinois General Assembly came to a close (Egler and Pearson, 1990a; Egler and Pearson, 1990b).

Throughout the summer and fall several attempts to revive McDome were made. The chief executive officer of the Metropolitan Pier & Exposition
Authority, operators of McCormick Place, pledged to work toward a goal of giving minorities and females 32 to 50 percent of the jobs and subcontracts on the $1.4 billion expansion of McCormick Place and a domed stadium (Mount, 1990). Organizers of the project also released the details of the proposed stadium lease with the Bears, a contract which would require the team to pay a net $8 million in annual rent to play in the $300 million stadium. For their part, state lawmakers were asked to support the project with $80 million a year raised through new taxes on hotel rooms, car rentals, restaurant meals, and cab and bus rides to the airport (McCarron, 1990). The project was endorsed by the Chicago Federation of Labor which contended that it would provide 6,000 construction jobs and 14,000 permanent convention industry jobs (Egler and McCarron, 1990), and drew support from a newly formed group called Women for Economic Progress (McCarron and Egler, 1990). Nevertheless, days before the General Assembly’s fall veto session, Governor Thompson, Mayor Daley and four top legislative leaders announced that there would be no last-ditch effort to push for McDome in 1990 (Hardy and Egler, 1990). Bears president Michael McCaskey responded to the news by renewing his threats to move to a suburban location, claiming that when the team’s lease with Soldier Field expires in 1999, the Bears will have another stadium. In particular, McCaskey blamed Daley for declining to put his political clout behind McDome (Egler and Mitchell, 1990). Though Thompson expressed optimism that an accommodation on the proposed stadium could be reached in 1991, Daley’s response to McCaskey took the form of a pet phrase of Bears coach Mike Ditka: “No one in life likes to be threatened.” And Alderman Robert Shaw, who sponsored a resolution declaring that state money would be better spent on financing education and fighting drugs than building a new stadium for a football team, announced that he would “provide a Greyhound bus ticket for a ride on a bus with a toilet to insure that he [McCaskey] will not have to stop in getting out of town” (Davis and Egler, 1990). On April 23, 1991, the Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority removed the $375 million stadium from the McCormick Place expansion plans and declared McDome officially dead (Wilson, 1991).

The search for a new home for the Bears reflects some of the same concern for economic development and social objectives that characterized Chicago’s recent sports policy regarding the Sox and the Cubs. A West Side stadium was viewed as an integral part of economic rejuvenation in a blighted neighborhood and preliminary plans for meeting the needs of residents who would be displaced by stadium construction were developed prior to the demise of the West Side project.

Economic development was also at the core of the McDome package, but there seemed to be less emphasis placed on social concerns. The early push for a domed stadium came primarily from political leaders such as Governor Thompson and, in a less aggressive way, Mayor Daley, who were supported
by corporate elites comprising the Illinois Leadership Coalition (Camper, 1990). While some mention was made of the new jobs that would be spawned by McCormick Place expansion, the executive director of the Chicago Jobs Council argued that such jobs would be part-time, low-wage and racially stratified. Similarly, the Chair of the Metropolitan Planning Council task force on McCormick Place and one of that group's board members noted that plans for expansion had not been accompanied by an understanding of how the project would affect the viability of more than 90 businesses that support nearly 3000 jobs in the affected area. Nor had plans been made to find suitable sites in the city for companies that would have to relocate. The pastor of a church just outside the condemnation zone seemed to summarize the project's lack of attention to the welfare of the community: "I'm not coming out four-square against it. We're not anti-development or anti-progress. We just want to know which way this thing is headed and who's going to be affected." (McCarron, 1990d; Goodman and Miles, 1990).

In the end McDome failed for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was political timing. Though Thompson actively pushed the project, his decision to leave the gubernatorial office after 14 years made him a lame duck during much of the negotiation with the legislature. The new governor, Jim Edgar, having come off a campaign in which he pledged not to raise taxes, was reluctant to endorse $80 million in annual state revenues for a project that would benefit a professional sports franchise. And Mayor Daley, facing reelection in 1991, felt compelled to be largely non-committal on the project. Though some parts of the McCormick Place expansion proposal were approved in 1991, McDome was not part of the deal. Because the project did not win approval before January 1, 1991, the city lost $100 million in tax-exempt bonds that Congress set aside for construction of a sports stadium in Chicago (Karwath and Pearson, 1990), and the Bear's lease with the Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority was to take effect only if funding was secured by January 31, 1991 (McCarron, 1990c).

Finally, it may be the case that it is intrinsically less attractive for the urban regime to support subsidization of a football facility than a baseball stadium. While a major league baseball team guarantees at least 81 home dates, it is unlikely that a professional football franchise will play at home more than a dozen times a season.

CONCLUSION

The urban regime in Chicago was an integral player in the determination of sports policy during the 1980s and early 1990s. As the mediator of every major sports issue—from lights and parking at Wrigley Field, to redevelopment of South Armour Square for the New Comiskey Park, to adding a domed football
stadium to the convention center—the regime orchestrated the policy response in innovative ways. Regulatory powers were used to control night baseball in Wrigleyville, ultimately appeasing the team owners and most neighborhood residents (but not the fans' interest group that sought to limit games to daylight hours). Economic development policies were adapted to save the Sox from a flight to Florida, but these were adopted with a major regulatory component in the form of the ISFA. The progressive-led regime also wove a major social benefit into the redevelopment of the ballpark neighborhood—helping residents to move, to buy or rent better homes, and to improve their quality of life. Again, not all were satisfied; but the regime mediated a solution that accommodated the majority of interests. And although the Bears may not find a solution to their problems in Chicago, it will not be because of any lack of effort on the part of the several Chicago regimes. From the lakefront to the West Side to the abandoned railyards near the convention center, the governing coalition tried to offer an economic development policy that had wide benefits for both the football team and the community.

In each of the cases, we argue that Chicago’s regimes—particularly the progressive regime of Harold Washington and his successor Eugene Sawyer—created new solutions to sports franchise issues. The solutions were innovative both by Chicago standards and by comparison to other cities that faced similar problems with sports franchises. A few illustrations will highlight this distinction.

The Cotton Bowl, original home of the Dallas Cowboys, is located in one of Dallas’ low-income communities. As the Cowboys became more popular, dissatisfaction with the stadium’s location increased. The team claimed that the fans did not feel safe at the Cotton Bowl, especially at night. Team officials developed four separate plans for a new facility, ranging from the demolition of the old structure and replacing it with a new Cotton Bowl on the same site, to building a stadium in the downtown area. None of the plans were accepted by the corporatist regime of Dallas, and as frustration grew between the team and city leaders, negotiations were begun with the city of Irving to build a new stadium on the Irving side of the Dallas-Irving border. The city of Irving eventually built Texas Stadium and leased the facility to the Cowboys. The lack of flexibility on the part of Dallas city leaders resulted in the loss of the Cowboys to Irving. They were not willing to compromise with the team on a location that would have allowed the Cowboys to develop the kind of facility they wanted (Rosentraub, 1988: 83-84; Rosentraub and Nunn, 1978: 396-397.)

One could also argue that a lack of innovative policy behavior on the part of New York's regime, especially Mayor Abraham Beame, was partially responsible for the departure of the New York football Jets for New Jersey. Mayor Beame did relatively little to assist the Jets in renegotiating an unsatisfactory lease with city-owned Shea Stadium (Harris, 1986: 284-288). We might also speculate that the absence of sports policy innovation in San
Francisco could result in the relocation of the baseball Giants. The defeat of a new stadium ballot proposition in 1987 prompted team owner Bob Lurie to announce that the Giants will be looking for a new home. While the Giants are still playing at San Francisco’s Candlestick Park, the city has done little to appease the ballclub, and it will not be surprising if the Giants do move to a new home.

Chicago may have proved that compromise and mediation by the regime with major league owners is possible. Innovations like those that kept the Cubs and Sox in the city might have resulted in the Jets staying in New York or the Cowboys in Dallas. Moreover, San Francisco may do well to study the Chicago solutions if local officials wish to keep the Giants in the city by the bay.

The uniqueness of Chicago’s progressive regime’s solutions typically involved combining a satisfactory corporate/franchise policy with a social/community objective so that both team owners and the public interest could be served in some way. Urban regimes have made a difference in solving urban problems and in developing innovative policy options. But at the same time, we must recognize that sports is unique in urban policy-making. Interest in sports cuts across economic and social lines. Thus, as a policy area it allows for coalitions that may include groups as diverse as the business elite on the one hand and neighborhood action committees on the other. If the urban regime is willing to foster an accommodation between franchise demands and other community concerns, it may couch its policy response to sports issues as being in the public interest while saving itself from charges that it lost a major source of civic pride and affection to another locale.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This research was supported by a small research grant from the Office of Research Services, Loyola University Chicago.

NOTES

1. Two owners who were heavily involved in local politics were Tim Mara, who established the Giants in 1925, and Arthur Rooney, who founded the Pittsburgh Steelers in 1933 (Riess, 1989:233).

2. Like football, professional basketball originated as a highly regionalized sport. Though the first league was established in 1898, basketball struggled for many years. The National Basketball Association was created in 1949 but several franchises—including Chicago’s—dropped out the first year. It was not until 1966 and league expansion that the city got its current NBA franchise, the Chicago Bulls.

In contrast, the Chicago Blackhawks were one of the original franchises comprising the National Hockey League. Created in 1922, the NHL enjoyed tremendous stability until the 1960s expansion (Riess, 1989:234,239).
One neighborhood group that had been part of Washington’s electoral coalition did oppose the West Side plan. The Interfaith Organizing Project strongly denounced the stadium as “a playground for the wealthy” that would displace more than 1,000 low-income residents (Wilson, 1987). In fact, Rev. Arthur Griffen, head of the Interfaith Organizing Project, credited God for the ultimate failure of the project. He insisted that Mayor Washington’s fatal heart attack was punishment from God for agreeing to a West Side stadium. “It was a base and immoral decision that represents the antithesis of all that is decent and humane, and so he (Washington) was soon removed. If acting Mayor Eugene Sawyer persists...he too will soon be removed because ‘God don’t like ugly’ and this pitiful display of hedonistic pleasure for the rich at the expense of the poor is ugly, ugly, ugly.” It should be noted that Griffen’s brother owned tax-delinquent slum properties on the West Side that would have been condemned for the stadium project (McCarron, 1988b).

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