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Recommended Citation

M. Therese Lysaught. "Eucharist as Basic Training: Liturgy, Ethics, and the Body." In *Theology and Lived Christianity*, edited by David M. Hammond, 257-286. Mystic, CT: Twenty-Third Publications, 2000.

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Eucharist as Basic Training: The Body as Nexus of Liturgy and Ethics¹

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What does it mean to “live Christianity”? One might suggest that “lived Christianity” refers to particular things that only Christians do, that to examine “lived Christianity” means to study Christian practices. One aspect of lived Christianity to which scholars might attend, then, would be liturgical practices such as the Eucharist. Alternatively, one might suggest that “lived Christianity” refers to how Christians live, that to examine “lived Christianity” means to study if or how being Christian makes a difference in the kinds of choices one makes, the values one holds, the virtues one embodies, and so on. In short, lived Christianity, then, would be about ethics. A third approach, however, suggests that neither Eucharist nor ethics can be examined in isolation from the other, but rather that Christianity truly lives in lives shaped by Christian practices. Thus, we are challenged to explore the relationship between the Eucharist and the Church as a community of discipleship and moral formation.²

This latter claim serves as the starting point for this article. How might one describe the relationship between the

Eucharist and the Church as a community of discipleship and moral formation? More generally, how do Christian practices shape practitioners' lives? I will argue that any consideration of the relationship between Christian practices and the Christian life must necessarily attend to the ways in which bodies are engaged and produced.

Before proceeding, however, two initial caveats are in order, for in speaking of Eucharist and ethics, two dangers present themselves. First, to posit a relationship between Eucharist and "moral" formation risks construing "morality" as somehow separable from, and perhaps more important than, other dimensions of the Christian life, such as politics or truth or worship or prayer. In the Eucharist, however, these are always inextricably integrated. In fact, in resisting the analytic reduction of the Christian life to morality, the Eucharist points to a wider reality—that in naming the moral, one signals both one's political commitments as well as the God or gods one worships. In the Eucharist, God does not call us to be "moral" people; God calls us to be much more—to be disciples who live in and toward the Kingdom. Clearly, "morality" resonates through the Christian life of politics and praise, but care must be taken not to abstract the "moral" from the story.

Relatedly, in speaking of Eucharist and ethics, a second danger lies in the tendency to allow the terms following the conjunction—ethics, moral formation, social justice—to become the controlling terms in the relationship. Certainly, whether worshipers or scholars, we cannot help but come to the Eucharist with a particular hermeneutic or set of questions. We must take care, however, that the Eucharist not simply be read through the lens of the particular issue or interest of the day, not be used simply as a resource, mined so as to warrant ends defined *a priori* and driven by alien agendas. Instead, re-read through the prism of the Eucharist, such issues and interests will often be significantly recast. As the Eucharist challenges and reshapes our lives, so it must

always be allowed to challenge and reshape our agendas, however noble, as well.

For the Eucharist, and attendant Christian practices, are not primarily concerned with ethics or social justice or individual moral formation but rather with the worship of God and the formation of the Church as a community of discipleship. In Henri de Lubac's classic phrase, the Eucharist makes, or produces, the Church.³ The Eucharist produces Church as the Body of Christ. It is this Body—and only this Body—which is both charged with the task of discipleship and truly capable of following Jesus, of performatively embodying the Kingdom of God in the world. Adapting the Foucaultian claim that the body is the site at which power is contested, it is likewise this Body that is called to and capable of resisting the powers that would otherwise determine God's creation. Discipleship then, as a mode of performance and resistance, is principally a mark of the Church and is rooted in the Eucharist.

However, for the Church to fulfill its call to discipleship, to be active in the world concretely and materially, the Body of Christ must literally be embodied. Such embodiment comes in the shape of Christians. In producing the Church as the Body of Christ, the Eucharist simultaneously, through the breaking of the bread, produces us "individually as members of it."⁴ The nature of this production is what I wish to explore in this article. More specifically, I will argue that discipleship—that is, authentic, lived Christianity—requires the production of Christian bodies. Through a matrix of practices, central to which is the communal celebration of the Eucharist, the Church seeks to reconfigure bodies precisely as Christian. So reconfigured, the bodies of Christians, like the Church, become the site at which power is contested, capable of performatively living the kingdom in the world and of resisting the powers that would otherwise determine our lives.⁵

In the following, I will sketch the broad outlines of this

claim. A brief overview of recent reflections on liturgy and ethics demonstrates that the body has been overlooked within the contemporary academic debate. Two analogies—the military and athletics—and one example from the early Church then display how bodies are “produced” in different contexts. These examples highlight seven key aspects of such production: (1) that bodies are produced, over time, through a consistent regimen of bodily practices; (2) that different sets of practices produce different sorts of bodies; (3) that a key dimension of such production is tacit or implicit; (4) that such practices produce bodies capable of distinctive actions; (5) that over time such actions become “natural” or instinctive; (6) that performance is often also resistance; and (7) that performance and resistance have a dual locus, simultaneously deployed by individual bodies as well as by a *corps*, for the sake of whose purposes such bodies have been produced in the first place. As will become clear, these seven points are far from exhaustive but rather are offered as suggestive starting points for reflecting on how we might understand the Eucharist and other related practices as producing Christian bodies and thereby fostering the Christian life.

Liturgy and Ethics: The Erasure of the Body

The relationship between Eucharist and moral formation—or at least its broader configuration as the relationship between “liturgy” and ethics—has received considerable attention from liturgical theologians and theological ethicists.⁶ Within this growing corpus, the link between liturgy and ethics is generally described in one of four ways: cognitively, affectively, communally, or dramaturgically.

First, liturgy is seen as effecting ethical behavior at the cognitive level. By conveying particular conceptual beliefs, communicating knowledge, or changing consciousness, liturgy “opens [the] minds” of the participants and “underscore[s] the[ir] awareness” of God.⁷ A number of cognitive motifs are employed. Some describe liturgy as a model, pat-

tern, mirror, or "paradigm" for living and acting. As Geoffrey Wainwright notes:

The Eucharist provides enabling paradigms for our ethical engagement in the world: [it] allows us to learn, absorb, and extend the values of God's kingdom.... In terms of ethical theory, the eucharistic paradigm points us in the right direction: it sets the vector within which the difficult concrete decisions and actions of everyday life have to be taken and performed if they are to be authentically Christian.⁸

Others use the metaphor of "vision." Liturgy is described as shaping the vision, perceptions, and imaginations of participants, providing participants with an alternative construal of the world. Through liturgy, we come to "see ourselves" differently; we are given a "worldview."⁹ Still others draw on the notion of narrative, arguing that liturgy shapes vision by providing a narrative context into which participants enter and locate themselves, a universe of discourse into which we become situated.¹⁰ In entering into the narratives of the Christian life, the stories become the "grammar" of our lives, as we learn "the language of God"; they thereby help us to "read the world."¹¹

A second approach holds that the link between liturgy and ethics is not primarily cognitive but rather emotional or affective. Kathleen Hughes maintains, for example: "We do not celebrate the liturgy in order to think about ideas, however worthy.... Liturgy is less a matter of the head than of the heart...."¹² Liturgy is seen to shape participants' affections, sensitivities, virtues, character, personality, motivation, and dispositions, as well as change their hearts. Liturgy, then, enters the ethical equation at the point of intention, motive, or will.

A third approach holds that liturgy becomes translated into ethics *vis à vis* its social and communal dimension.

Liturgy constitutes the unity of those who participate by putting us into "proper relationships with ourselves, others in the community, and God."¹³ In doing so, it simultaneously challenges autonomous individualism and constitutes the self: "An individual becomes a person in and through engagement with a community."¹⁴ Given that ethics is about relationships between persons, and that the essence of justice is right-relationship, only selves communally constituted will be capable of ethical engagement in the world.

Finally, others locate liturgy's effectiveness in its essential nature as dramatization or dramatic reenactment. For Paul Ramsey, the Christian narrative is dramatically presented in liturgy:

It could be asserted that the story of the Christian Story that is the *principium* of both *credendi* and *bene operandi* can best be told by the dramaturgy, the rehearsal, the reenactment, the repetition that belongs to the nature of liturgy.¹⁵

As participants again and again act out the script of the Christian story, the dramaturgical nature of liturgy provides a nexus through which the cognitive, affective, and communal coalesce into one grand synthesis.

Each of these approaches highlights an important aspect of liturgical practice. One crucial dimension, however, seems consistently to be overlooked. Consider, for example, the marvelous Orthodox rite of Chrismation, cited by Vigen Guroian in his article "Seeing Worship as Ethics":

Sweet ointment in the name of Jesus Christ is poured upon thee as a seal of incorruptible heavenly gifts.

The eyes [are then anointed]:

This seal in the name of Jesus Christ enlighten thine eyes, that thou mayest never sleep unto death.

The ears:

This holy anointing be unto thee for the hearing of the divine commandments.

The nostrils:

This seal in the name of Jesus Christ be to thee a sweet smell from life unto life.

The mouth:

This seal in the name of Jesus Christ be to thee a guard for thy mouth and strong door for thy lips.

The hands:

This seal in the name of Jesus Christ be to thee a cause for good works and for all virtuous deeds and conduct.

The heart:

This seal establish in thee a pure heart and renew within thee an upright spirit.

The back:

This seal in the name of Jesus Christ be to thee a shield of strength thereby to quench all the fiery darts of the Evil One.

The feet:

This divine seal direct thy goings upon life everlasting that thou mayest not be shaken.¹⁶

Guroian cites this rite to display an ethical imperative that derives in part from the rite's ontological effect but also in its "call...to [conscientiously] cultivate a certain disposition and character."¹⁷ In doing so, however, he does not mention the fact that in this rite, the candidate's body is anointed...again and again and again—the eyes, the ears, the nostrils, the mouth, the hands, the heart, the back, the feet. As the candidate is anointed, the words of the rite—the theological concepts it conveys, the dispositions it invokes—are physically inscribed onto the body by the community (in whose midst the candidate stands as their representative anoints). The internal wisdom of the rite is intrinsically embodied. In

Guroian's account of worship as ethics, however, this bodily dimension is not addressed.

On this point, Guroian is not alone. Neither Ramsey nor Saliers, for example, include the bodies of participants in their analysis of the dramaturgical dynamic of liturgy. As quickly becomes evident, nowhere in the methodological literature on the relationship between liturgy and ethics is the human body mentioned, discussed, or taken into account.¹⁸ This might be unremarkable except for the fact that liturgy, as one liturgical theologian notes, is "not a matter of 'ideas' but of 'bodies' or, better, of 'corporeality.'"¹⁹ Liturgy, Eucharist, and the broader matrix of Christian practices that texture the Christian life are intrinsically corporeal.

Thus, liturgical practices, such as the Eucharist, inherently impact and engage bodies. But not only this. Return for a moment to the text of the Orthodox rite of Chrismation outlined above. Not only is the body richly and excessively anointed again and again; the words of the rite themselves seek to shape and direct the candidate's body in a particular way: the ears are guided toward God's commandments; the mouth becomes "guarded"; the hands are steered toward good works and virtuous conduct; the feet are grounded on the path toward everlasting life; and the back is fortified as a shield. Chrismation, then, intends that the bodies—and thereby lives—of those anointed become distinctively reconfigured. Through chrismation and the lush matrix of rites and practices in which it is embedded, Orthodox Christianity seeks to produce particular Christian sorts of bodies. Only insofar as such bodies are produced will they be capable of the types of performance and resistance required to sustain the Church as a community of discipleship.²⁰

Corpus/Corps: Soldiers, Athletes, and Martyrs

The Orthodox, of course, are not alone in employing practices so as to reconfigure distinctive bodies capable of specific actions. This same dynamic appears in a myriad of

contexts. Two analogies and an example from the early Church may assist in displaying the particulars. These three realms of practice which aim at the production of particular sorts of bodies are the military, athletics, and martyrial asceticism.²¹

The military, for example, knows that "catechesis" is far from enough to turn an average, ordinary citizen into a soldier. Instead, what is required is a physical and physically grueling program of drills, penalties, uniforms, and communal living designed not only to deconstructively break recruits of any vestiges of individuality but also to constructively produce military bodies.²² Only bodies so produced will be able to kill systematically and efficiently, whether on command or by instinct, unquestioningly obey orders, or kill or even die to protect one's comrades. These are not actions that come "naturally," but through embodied practices they become so. Bodies so produced often are so for the duration; military bodies are easy to pick out of a crowd—standing, sitting, walking, speaking in a particular way—even if the person left the military long ago. Moreover, the military seeks not only to produce military bodies but a "corps" as well—a confederation of soldiers who, functioning as a unit at the service of the powers of the State, will be capable of embodying the will of those who rule, dominating or resisting other powers as required.²³

Likewise, one might consider athletics. Even more explicitly than the military, athletics aims to produce particular types of bodies. Clearly, the type of body produced differs with the sport: football, weight-lifting, basketball, gymnastics, baseball, track, hockey, all shape bodies differently. Again, physical and physically grueling programs of training, drills, practice, and competition produce bodies that are powerful, fast, agile, precise, can hit, catch, shoot, throw, bend, balance with significant levels of endurance and toleration of pain. So produced, athletic bodies are capable of doing things both that they formerly could not do and that

most average, ordinary bodies cannot. And generally, athletic training seeks to produce a team, a coalition of athletic bodies that together are capable of performing specific actions (playing the sport) better than any other team while resisting the power that others bring.²⁴

One need not, however, look only to a secular context to find examples of this dynamic in action; instances of this process are replete within the Christian tradition as well. Nothing displays this as well as the practices of asceticism and martyrdom by which the early Church produced bodies capable of resisting Imperial torture. As Maureen A. Tilley persuasively argues, ascetic practices of the early Church provided training and preparation for the possibility of martyrdom. Specific practices of fasting, sleep deprivation, physical mortification, sexual continence, and simple repetitive prayer served to reconfigure Christian bodies to withstand the tortures of martyrdom. As Tilley notes:

...the torture victim cannot control either the intensity or the duration of the torture, but the martyrs could and did simulate both in their practice of asceticism. The type of ascetic preparation for martyrdom was tied to the sorts of tortures the martyrs would undergo, especially deprivation of food and water. Christian communities would begin fasting as soon as they realized police action was imminent.... Such pre-torture practices actually helped change their metabolism so that they survived longer under torture.... Tertullian exhorted his readers to prepare for prison.... What they would suffer there would not be any penalty but the *continuation of their discipline*. One trained for prison...In undergoing pain, the confessors engaged in a cosmic battle in which the torturers did not merely attack the bodies of the martyrs; they even strove against God. Ascetic training brought the power of God to bear on the battlefield of the body. Christians taught

their martyrs to endure pain either by escaping it or by reconfiguring its meaning.... Correspondence between Cyprian and the confessors at Carthage shows him teaching them to turn each instrument of torture and pain in each part of the body into a means of uniting themselves to the passion of Christ and training them in the skill of reconfiguring their own bodies.²⁵

Bodies so produced, then, were capable of what seemed to be superhuman endurance and of, more astoundingly, glorifying God and rejoicing in their salvation in the midst of agonizing torment. Under great duress, they could almost unconsciously utter over and over, "I am a Christian," "Thank you, God," and "Christ have mercy."²⁶ In so doing, they not only thwarted the objectives of their torturers individually, i.e., they neither recanted their faith nor would make sacrifice to the Imperium. They also enabled the Church to withstand the intended annihilation, as their examples and stories taught the faithful to be strong in persecution and prepared the victims to be victors. Their bodies became battlegrounds between God and the demonic; Caesar would not determine their salvation or the meaning of their deaths. For this reason, not just anyone could be a martyr—"voluntary" martyrdom was strongly discouraged. True asceticism took time.²⁷ Those not properly produced would not only not be able to withstand the torture, their failure would both empower the enemy and undermine the morale of the persecuted community, threatening it with dissolution.

Eucharistic Bodies, Practically Produced

These examples illustrate at least seven features of practical bodily production relevant to consideration of the relationship between the Eucharist, Christian bodies, and the Christian life, namely, that: (1) bodies are produced, over time, through a consistent regimen of bodily practices; (2)

different sets of practices produce different sorts of bodies; (3) a key dimension of such production is tacit or implicit; (4) such practices produce bodies capable of distinctive actions; (5) over time such actions become "natural" or instinctive; and (6) performance is also resistance; and (7) performance and resistance have a dual locus, simultaneously deployed by individual bodies as well as by a *corps*, for the sake of whose purposes such bodies have been produced in the first place.²⁸

First, bodies are produced, over time, through a consistent regimen of bodily practices. The two points of emphasis here are "over time" and "consistent regimen." The sort of reconfiguration witnessed in the case of martyrs or athletes does not happen overnight but rather over months, if not years, of training. As is most evident with the military analogy, it is often first necessary to deconstruct a body's initial form before it can be reconfigured. Progress may initially be made quickly; then, as anyone who has exercised or tried to develop a regimen of prayer knows well, one hits a plateau. The body resists. Daily practice is an effort, a chore; one seems to be regressing rather than progressing. Such obstacles can be worked through, but only with disciplined consistent attention to practice. And once a desired state is achieved, it must be vigilantly maintained through both practice and performance. It is a case of "use it or lose it."

Thus, the production of "Eucharistic" bodies requires, at minimum, the sustained discipline of regular participation in the Eucharist over a lifetime. De Lubac observes that such is the case even for the Church, that "The Church and the Eucharist make each other, every day, each by the other."²⁹ If such is the case for the Church, for the Body of Christ, how much more so for its individual members? The *Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy* signals this continuous, recursive dynamic when it notes: "The liturgy daily builds up those who are in the Church, making of them a holy temple of the Lord, a dwelling-place for God in the Spirit."³⁰

However, throughout the Christian tradition, the Eucharist—the summit toward which the activity of the Church is directed and the fount from which all her power flows³¹—has never stood alone as sufficient. To be properly productive, eucharistic practice must be located within a *regimen* of practices that shape various aspects of the body on a consistent basis. Especially for contemporary Catholic communities, where the communal celebration is a weekly event, or for Protestant communities where celebration is less frequent, daily auxiliary practices are required to both get one “in shape” and to maintain the body’s configuration. Thus, throughout the tradition, a variety of practices have developed—the praying of the Office and the Liturgy of the Hours, fasting, hospitality, group Bible study, the sacrament of reconciliation, contemplation, the Spiritual Exercises, praying of the rosary, the corporal works of mercy, devotions to Mary and the saints, and so on. Oriented toward the communal celebration of the Eucharist in the Mass as their norm, these practices are likewise productive.

However, as the second point above notes, different sets of practices will produce different sorts of bodies. Clearly, practices as diverse as contemplation, singing in the choir, or giving testimony inform the body with different capabilities. This effect is multiplied through different configurations of practices. Thus, Dorothy Day, shaped by daily Mass, the use of the breviary and Little Office, and the corporal works of mercy (among other things) embodies the Christian life quite differently from Thomas Merton, shaped similarly through the daily Mass, the breviary and the Liturgy of the Hours, and the practice of contemplation.³² Moreover, what looks like the same practice ostensibly—for example, the practice of fasting—may differ in its performative productivity depending on context. In the context of persecution, fasting helped the martyrs withstand starvation as a means of torture; in contemporary U.S. culture, fasting alternatively may serve to produce bodies that can withstand the seductions of

a culture of consumption and desire.

Third, a key dimension of the production of bodies is tacit or implicit. Catherine Bell notes that practices like the Eucharist invest the body with a "sense [which] exists as an implicit variety of schemes whose deployment works to produce sociocultural situations that the ritual body can dominate in some way."³³ This concise phrase encompasses three important claims. Chiefly, embodied practices produce a "sense"—not a "feeling" but rather a faculty, a capacity or capability analogous to taste or sight or smell or hearing or touch—a faculty whereby we encounter, perceive, and interpret the world and which is crucial for facilitating action. Thus, just as a seasoned batter can sense whether it will be a fastball or a slider, low and away, before the ball leaves the pitcher's hand, so someone formed by the practice of contemplation can sense God's presence even in the most unlikely of places.

Moreover, both the production of this "sense" and its deployment operate tacitly. Bell describes ritual practice as "a particularly 'mute' form of activity," reconfiguring bodies in such a way that they neither perceive that they are being reconfigured nor the substance of that reconfiguration.³⁴ Thus, bodies are produced not primarily through "messages" communicated during a practice but rather implicitly through the various activities in which participants engage. These activities, repeated again and again over time, slowly and subtly reconfigure participant bodies.

Two examples illustrate this point. Consider the act of kneeling, an act in which any attendant at worship may engage. As Bell notes:

The act of kneeling does not so much communicate a message about subordination as it generates a body identified with subordination. In other words, the molding of the body within a highly structured environment does not simply express inner states. Rather, it primarily acts to

restructure bodies in the very doing of the acts themselves. Hence, required kneeling does not merely *communicate* subordination to the kneeler. For all intents and purposes, kneeling produces a subordinated kneeler in and through the act itself.... [W]hat we see in ritualization is not the mere display of subjective states or corporate values. Rather, we see an act of production—the production of a ritualized agent able to wield physically a scheme of subordination and insubordination.³⁵

Thus, while few communicants may consciously articulate the thought “I am subordinate to God,” anyone raised in a Catholic context knows how hard it is to approach the altar without genuflecting. Even lapsed Catholics or those who consciously resist hierarchical, austere images of God and wish to approach the altar as Jesus’ friend, may find their bodies resisting their wills, bending them toward their knees.

Likewise consider the contemporary Rite of Christian Initiation of Adults in the Roman Catholic Church. Here catechumens and candidates join the congregation for the Liturgy of the Word. Before the Offertory, however, they are asked to stand, week after week, addressed by the celebrant, and then, as the congregation stands and sings, ritually and ceremoniously *marched* out of the sanctuary, marshaled by their catechists. This process does not merely *communicate* a message of exclusion; rather, the catechumens and candidates are constructed as bodies that are valued (they merit special attention within the Mass) but not yet fully incorporated into the Body of Christ, not yet ready to stand in the presence of the holy mysteries, not ready to share in the Eucharist. The rites reconfigure their bodies as desirous of the sacraments and full communion, whose lack will only be fulfilled—and then joyously—by re-creative incorporation into Christ and the Church on Easter Sunday. As such,

although they might powerfully wish or resolve to return to the congregation for the Eucharist, their bodies would resist.³⁶

Clearly, careful attention to each particular component of the Eucharist could multiply examples.³⁷ This brings us to our fourth point, that such practices produce bodies capable of distinctive actions. Following Bell's definition above, a practice as complex as the Eucharist is capable of producing bodies invested with a variety of schemes. In addition to becoming subordinated kneelers, they are likewise produced as: "other" from the world, as communal, as living in and toward the kingdom, as repentant sinners condemned yet mercifully forgiven, as attentive to and desirous of God's Word, as Psalm-speakers, as witnesses, as offerers of their goods and selves to God and others, as forgivers, reconcilers, and peace-givers, as open to and dependent upon God, as "become Christ," as praise-singers, as constituted by and constitutive of others in the community, as sent into the world bearing God's peace, as blessed, all at once, and more.

Invested with these schemes cultivated over time, such bodies will deploy them distinctively in the world. Examples worth exploring include the kiss of peace and the practice of testimony.³⁸ Although theologically rich, the kiss of peace in Caucasian Catholic services has, admittedly, become rather rote. Prior to the Offertory or Communion, congregants turn to those within arm's length to "offer each other a sign of peace." Usually a handshake, family members and friends may be treated to a hug or even an actual kiss. Even in its most minimalist incarnation in the most homogeneous of congregations, however, such a gesture can counter culturally inscribed individualistic tendencies, reconfiguring us as those who turn to the neighbor, to the "other," reaching out to them, speaking peace to them, touching them, reconciling with them, and receiving from them their hand and their blessing. In more diverse urban congregations, however, the power of this simple gesture is more profound, as the face of

the neighbor becomes truly "other"—the elderly, the poor, the homeless, the disabled, the mentally handicapped, those of different ethnicity or race. Through this simple gesture, we become capable of seeing, touching, speaking, and reaching out to—and being touched by—those who are often invisible or from whom we have been taught to recoil.

The practice of giving testimony likewise reconfigures the practitioner. In giving testimony, one is called to stand before the congregation to give witness to "how I have seen God working in my life." This action shapes the one testifying in at least two ways. First, through giving testimony, one engages in a culturally difficult task—of speaking of God out loud and of giving witness to God's presence and power in particular situations. Second, she who gives testimony becomes configured as one who gives witness to God out loud *in public*. Clearly, hearing the testimonies of others is important for learning the language of witness and for learning how to see God's presence in one's life. But only in stepping up to the lectern and saying the words do we become those capable of speaking publicly of God.

Such deployment, though, is largely implicit as well. As the fifth point notes, over time characteristic actions practically incorporated become "natural," that is, instinctive, intuitive, or unreflective. In short, practices and the characteristics they incorporate become habit. Stephen Buckland elaborates this dynamic:

Habits are, by definition, not reflectively conscious.... There may, of course, be initial instruction...and subsequent explanation or commentary; but postures and gestures are learnt principally by imitation and soon become "natural" and unreflective...appropriated by repetition over time. Bodies are shaped, "memory" incorporated, by familiarization through time with movements in space, of eye or hand, lip or limb; in time and over time, instruction, explanation, commentary

become unnecessary. With the habitual skills are incorporated human values and dispositions which, in time and over time, come to be "natural." Such knowledge is largely unspoken: literally embodied, profoundly, secretly effective...the power of bodily practices to constitute "memories" of past experiences depends, paradoxically, on their remaining unreflected upon and, apparently, "natural."

To suggest a mundane example, my body has been "produced" to drive a car with manual transmission. To first learn, of course, required quite a bit of instruction, apprenticeship at the hand of one who had mastered the skill, education as to the "theory" behind the process (i.e., how the clutch works, what is going on within the engine during acceleration) as well as error and trial (mostly for the truck). Now, however, I generally do not "think" about what to do—when to push the clutch, when to shift; my body simply does it naturally. While this is clearly useful on a day-to-day basis, it might prove particularly valuable in an emergency situation when I do not have time to think; my body will simply do the right thing. The extent of this embodiment becomes apparent when I, on occasion, drive an automatic. My foot "naturally" goes for the clutch, my hand to the stick, even though they are not there. Eucharistic practices likewise have the power to so habituate. By practicing the kiss of peace week after week, literally extending a hand to the stranger becomes natural. As one gives testimony again and again, it becomes increasingly natural, increasingly instinctive to speak of God in public.

The habituated character of such schemes becomes quickly apparent when it confounds us: when the context changes and/or they conflict with alien agendas. I recognize how profoundly I am configured as a manual driver only when my context changes and I drive someone else's car. The distinctiveness of Amish embodiment only becomes strikingly

apparent when members of an Amish community travel public roads or sojourn into town. This aspect of bodily configuration signals both that such production is context-dependent and that the twin face of performance is resistance. As the example of martyrial asceticism cited earlier attests, practical production of bodies necessarily occurs within a larger sociocultural situation. As such, however, and as the persecuted Church illustrates explicitly, the performance of schemes in any sociocultural context inevitably entails, as part of its productive negotiation, resistance.

This mention of resistance brings us to the seventh and final point, namely, that performance and resistance, as achievements of specifically configured bodies, have a dual locus, simultaneously deployed by individual bodies but more importantly by a *corps* for the sake of whose purposes such bodies have been produced in the first place. The production of bodies is linked, recursively, with the production of a social body, a *corps*. Three implications of this claim merit brief elaboration. First, practices, by definition, cannot simply be individually generated modes of personal formation. Practical production is necessarily communally mediated. While individual martyrs themselves both resisted their torturers and performed acts of witness and glorification, it is doubtful that they could have done so if not located within a particular community. The local Church communities trained its members for the battle. To maintain such rigorous training required tutelage, exhortation, the company of comrades both as co-trainers (e.g., during periods of fasting) as well as conscience (e.g., to keep one from abandoning continence). Moreover, the local Church communities attended the apprehended in prison with material support and spiritual encouragement, prayed for them unceasingly, and refused to disband their communal practices, i.e., to dissolve under the threat.

Second, as bodies navigate the matrix of practices that comprises any *corps*, they incorporate an identity; one might

say that they become "traditioned." As Chauvet notes:

To be initiated is not to have learned "truths to believe" but to have received a tradition, in a way through all the pores of one's skin. Initiation comes about through a process of education which is like life: it is not the end of a simple intellectual course (indispensable though such courses may be today) but originally an identity.³⁹

Clearly, practical formation is not formulaic; practices are appropriated by particular bodies, located within very particular socio-historical and personal circumstances. As such each appropriation is singularly negotiated, resulting in slight variations each time. However, in spite of this creativity in appropriation, authentic practices resist individuation and individualism. In becoming so traditioned, in assuming such an identity, bodies incorporate historied schemes of performance and resistance. In this way, practices both produce and sustain a particular *corps*.

Moreover, and thirdly, in the end, although the process of production is recursive, it is primarily for the sake of such a *corps* that bodies are produced and schemes of performance and resistance are wielded. One is produced as a Marine primarily for the sake of the Corps and for the defense of the nation; to learn to kill for one's own sake would rather be regarded as a socio-pathology. One is produced as an athlete solely for the sake of a team; one cannot play football alone. While individual martyrs certainly understood their deaths as benefiting their souls personally, their deaths effectively strengthened the Church itself; the truth and faith it witnessed and preached emerged publicly before its pagan detractors as something worth dying for.

Conclusion

Thus, the vector that connects the Eucharist and attendant practices with the Christian life necessarily runs through

bodies—the bodies of Christians and the Body of Christ. Hopefully, the preceding account dispels any naive notion that eucharistic reconfiguration is facile or instantaneous,⁴⁰ and demonstrates rather that it is a gradual process of “incubation” or habituation over time dependent upon an arduous, complex, and lengthy regimen of physically mediated practices. Eucharistic reconfiguration requires a tapestry of practices beyond the liturgy itself, although ultimately such practices must be normed by and oriented toward the Eucharist. Nor does this process find a terminus; just as discipleship is a lifelong journey, the process of reconfiguration is an ongoing activity, requiring vigilance to resist the atrophy that comes with disuse as well as to resist those powers which would reconfigure us differently.

While the preceding account provides a first step toward a fuller articulation of these relationships, it also points toward a number of issues that merit further exploration. Clearly, an important next step will be to broaden the perspective provided here and to display the interconnections between practices, discourses, and the institutions that sustain them, for discourses and institutions are equally crucial for bodily production.

Moreover, while practiced bodies become capable of distinctive modes of performance and resistance, neither configuration nor deployment is univocal. A broader account of Christian practices will also take into consideration a concomitant to any process of bodily production, namely, the cultivation of resistance to that very production and the authority behind it. Even apparent global uniformity and therefore consensus among practitioners may belie more deeply rooted disagreements or conflicts. Many women in the Roman Catholic Church, for example, faithfully and joyfully participate in the practices of the Church—from daily or weekly Mass, to corporal works of mercy through service, to the practice of theology, to private devotions such as praying the rosary and daily reading of the lectionary or breviary.

Many of these very practitioners, however, may simultaneously find deeply problematic the Church's position on ordination. Within this context, practices that embody consent may also serve as practices of critique and resistance. As Bell notes, "ritual *can* be a strategic way to 'traditionalize'...but in so doing it can also challenge and renegotiate the very basis of tradition to the point of upending what had been seen as fixed previously or by other groups."⁴¹

Moreover, a fuller account will likewise explore the rich diversity that has characterized the Christian life from the beginning. Just as configuration resists univocity, so does deployment. Different sets of schemes are wielded by individuals, whose particular negotiation of appropriation finds an even wider context of play at the point of engagement. Schemes incorporated are enacted in an infinite variety of socio-historical contexts. Thus Bell notes that practical knowledge "is not an inflexible set of assumptions, beliefs, or body postures; rather it is the ability to deploy, play, and manipulate basic schemes in ways that appropriate and condition experience effectively."⁴²

This perspective likewise provides those interested in articulating the connection between liturgy and the Christian life a critical starting point from which to analyze what sorts of bodies current liturgical practices are producing, to critique liturgical practices which produce bodies inconsistent with Christian norms, and to suggest what types of bodies liturgical practices ought to seek to produce. By paying particular attention to the sorts of bodies our practices produce, we can ask whether our liturgies simply reinforce the bodies of worshipers as they have already been produced by culture, what sorts of culturally produced bodily configurations need first to be deconstructed, and what sorts of resistance need to be cultivated in diverse cultural settings. Finally, it may lead to a critique of the lack of embodiment in our current liturgical practices.

It is indisputable that liturgy in contemporary Western,

white churches has become rather static and minimally embodied.⁴³ It may be the case that the liturgies of Western Christianity will become more bodily, following the example of the far more embodied liturgical celebrations of African-American and Hispanic churches. In these churches, where embodied participation is not suppressed, one often finds a greater linkage between worship and life. Absent this revision, it may be unlikely that Eucharist will have any significant impact on the lives of parishioners or, therefore, on ethics.

In the end, however, this account provides an alternative way of envisioning the link between Eucharist and ethics. Only bodies reconfigured through Christian practices will be capable of reproducing, through their actions and their lives, the substance of the kingdom and of facilitating the Church's call to discipleship. Only as one participates in the Body does participation in the life of discipleship become possible.

Notes

1. The genesis of this article was a session at the College Theology Society, Forty-Fifth Annual Convention, in June 1999. I am grateful to Elizabeth Newman, Ken Homan, and Paul LeMasters for organizing the CTS/NABPR Joint Session on "Eucharist and Ethics: A Roundtable Discussion." I would also like to thank my co-panelists, Gary Macy, Barry Harvey, and Gaile Pohlhaus, for engendering a lively and substantive discussion, and my colleagues Terry Tilley, Dennis Doyle, and Curtis Freeman who read and helpfully commented on earlier drafts of this paper.
2. This phrasing comes from the discussions of the panelists prior to the convention, as we sought to determine a good starting point for the session's conversation.
3. Henri de Lubac, *The Splendour of the Church* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956), 92; translation of *Méditation sur l'Eglise* (Paris: Aubier, 1953). See also de Lubac, *Corpus Mysticum* (Paris: Aubier, 1949). In his classic double formula, de Lubac uses the term "fait," as in "fait l'Eucharistie" and "fait l'Eglise." "Fait" can be translated either as

"makes" or "produces"; in the following, I will take the liberty of using "produces." For further explication of de Lubac's claim, in dialogue with the ecclesiology of John Zizioulas, see Paul McPartlan, *The Eucharist Makes the Church* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993). I am grateful to Dennis Doyle for introducing me to McPartlan's work.

4. 1 Corinthians 10:16; 12:27.

5. I am indebted to Curtis W. Freeman for helping me to articulate this more precisely.

6. The beginning of serious efforts to attend to the relationship between liturgy and ethics among theological ethicists is marked by a plenary at the annual meeting of the Society of Christian Ethics in 1979, which featured papers by Paul Ramsey and Donald Saliers and a response by Margaret Farley (see *JRE* 7/2 [1979]). However, liturgical theologians staked out this territory much earlier and more extensively than the ethicists, due to the influence of the work of Virgil Michel and the Catholic Liturgical Movement as well as the initiative for liturgical renewal following the Second Vatican Council. These influences, combined with the Catholic Social Encyclical tradition, have resulted in a heavy—indeed, almost exclusive—focus in this literature on the topic of social justice and the transformation of society.

7. Marva Dawn, "Worship and Ethics," *Dialog* 32 (1993): 300; see also John T. Pawlikowski, "Worship after the Holocaust: An Ethician's Reflections," *Worship* 58 (1984): 321, and Rembert G. Weakland, "Liturgy and Social Justice," in *Shaping English Liturgy*, ed. Peter C. Finn and James M. Schellman (Washington, DC: Pastoral Press, 1990), 347. Dawn further notes, "various elements of worship create certain perspectives and understandings about God and specific attitudes and habits of being which affect how we think, speak, and act" (297). R. Kevin Seasoltz in "Liturgy and Social Consciousness," in *To Do Justice and Right Upon the Earth*, ed. Mary E. Stamps (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1993), 54, suggests that "the liturgy as ritual behavior is itself a way of coming to know theologically." That is, liturgy assists people in developing "a right understanding of theology." Less specifically, some see the function of liturgy as "raising consciousness" (see Pawlikowski, 321 and John A. Gurrieri, "Catholic Liturgical Sources of Social Commitment," in *Liturgical Foundations of Social Policy in the Catholic and Jewish Traditions*, ed. Daniel F. Polish and Eugene J. Fisher (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 31.

8. Geoffrey Wainwright, "Eucharist and/as Ethics," *Worship* 62 (1988): 134, 136; see also Geoffrey Wainwright, "Between God and World: Worship and Mission," in Kenneth Stevenson, ed., *Liturgy Reshaped* (London: SPCK, 1982), 107, and Seasoltz, 56.

9. Seasoltz, 55. Paul Wadell, "What Do All These Masses Do For Us? Reflections on the Christian Moral Life and the Eucharist," in *Living No Longer for Ourselves*, ed. Kathleen Hughes and Mark R. Francis (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1991), 163, for example, describes "the Eucharist as a training in moral vision...as the ritual activity through which a people's vision is cleansed and healed. More strongly put, through worshipping together in Eucharist, we should gradually take on God's view of things." Vigen Guroian concurs: "The church must strive to transform perception and understanding of what is morally at stake in the lives people lead." "Tradition and Ethics: Prospects in a Liberal Society," *Modern Theology* 7 (1991): 223. Guroian further suggests, 221, that liturgy be understood as iconic: "Liberal agency models almost never speak of attraction but rather of argument, persuasion, and power in their efforts to describe the nature of the church and its mission. The emphasis of such agency theory is on reason and will, whereas the theology of the icon takes into account imagination, perception, and interpretation. The power of the icon, writes Anthony Ugolnik, is in its capacity 'to prepare the believer to look outward, even into the secular world, to find the image of the Creator. This claim on the imagination will allow the very act of interpretation, the structures of meaning that the Christian assigns to the world and experience, to transfigure the culture of his or her people.'"

10. As Donald E. Saliers notes in "Liturgy and Ethics: Some New Beginnings," *JRE* 7 (1979): 174: "The concretization of the moral life requires a vision of a world, and the continuing exercise of recalling, sustaining, and reentering that picture of the cosmos in which norms and practices have meaning and point.... In short, the possibility of religious ethics...rests upon available *mythoi*—stories and narratives of human existence in which a picture of the moral good and associated ideas are expressed."

11. Wadell, 159. Wadell's discussion parallels Ramsey's appropriation of the work of Hans Frei. Ramsey, "Liturgy and Ethics," *JRE* 7 (1979): 147, notes: "Perhaps it is also the task of Christian ethics to 'recreate a universe of discourse' and 'put the reader in the middle of it, instructing him in the use of that language by showing how—extensively, and not only by stating the rules and principles of the discourse.' This seems to me remarkably like the task of 'liturgics' as well." More generally it is held that Christian narratives so learned can be juxtaposed to those of the world, challenging contemporary ideologies and offering an alternative point of departure for construing the world; see, for example, Vigen Guroian, "Seeing Worship as Ethics: An Orthodox Perspective," *JRE* 13 (1985): 354.

12. H. Kathleen Hughes, "Liturgy and Justice: An Intrinsic Relationship," in Hughes and Francis, 45-46. Saliers, "Liturgy and Ethics," 175, notes: "the relations between liturgy and ethics are most adequately formulated by specifying how certain affections and virtues are formed and expressed in the modalities of communal prayer and ritual action. These modalities of prayer enter into the formation of the self in community." In keeping with the formula of *lex orandi lex credendi*, Saliers deems liturgical actions as "the rule-keeping activities of the affections [desires, emotions, attitudes, beliefs, and actions]" (179, 1740; see also Don E. Saliers, "Symbol in Liturgy, Liturgy in Symbol: The Domestication of Liturgical Experience," in *The Awakening Church: 25 Years of Liturgical Renewal*, ed. Lawrence J. Madden (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1992), 78. Elsewhere, liturgy is seen to shape character (Dawn, 302), virtues (Guroian, "Seeing Worship as Ethics," 338), moral sensitivities or sensibilities (Pawlikowski, 321; Gurrieri, 24), effect a "change of heart" (Gurrieri, 24), and provide motivation (Weakland, 355).

13. Seasoltz, 54; see also Guroian, "Seeing Worship as Ethics," 343.

14. Seasoltz, 50.

15. Ramsey, 146; see also Ralph A. Kiefer, "Liturgy and Ethics: Some Unresolved Dilemmas," in Hughes and Francis, 69. Likewise, Seasoltz holds, 54: "Liturgical celebration is like a dress rehearsal for the end time. We put on Christ and act and relate to one another as Christ relates to us." For Saliers, "Liturgy and Ethics," 175, 176, 179, 188, it is this dramatic dimension that impacts affectivity: "Beliefs about God and world and self which characterize a religious life are dramatized and appropriated in the mode of the affections and dispositions focused in liturgical occasions.... In the very activity of re-presenting and rehearsing features of existence described in the Scriptures, worshippers articulate their fundamental relations to one another and to the world.... The exercise of such affects requires a continual re-entry of the person in to the narrative and teachings that depict the identity of Jesus Christ.... Liturgy is the non-utilitarian enactment of the drama of the divine-human encounter."

16. Guroian, "Seeing Worship as Ethics," 342-343. This critique ought not suggest that I do not value Guroian's work, which has been so important for my own.

17. *Ibid.*, 343.

18. To what might this oversight be attributed? While a thorough analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, a number of issues may be compounding traditional suspicions of the body. These

accounts may well presuppose Cartesian or Romantic anthropologies that equate individual identity with mind or feeling. Experiential-expressivist accounts of religion may also be operative as well as accounts of "ethics" that privilege rationality, intention, or will. Moreover, these accounts present precisely the epistemological assumptions criticized by Roberto Goizueta in his article included in this volume, "A Ressourcement from the Margins: U.S. Latino Popular Catholicism as Lived Religion" (see above, 3-37). Over and over again, the language employed presupposes a pre-existent, autonomous realm of beliefs or reality separate from the rites that embody them; the idea is to "get at" what is "behind" the rites. A slight variation on this theme, liturgy is portrayed as the medium that synthesizes or reintegrates these separated entities insofar as participants narratively or dramaturgically "act out," express, or perform these conceptual orientations. This bifurcation between belief/feeling and action belies an epistemological breach between sign and signified, appearance and reality, form and content, truth and meaning. Catherine Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) likewise criticizes the field of ritual theory on these same grounds. Ritual theory, Bell argues, is premised on the assumption that thought and action stand in a bifurcated, dichotomous relationship with "thought" being accorded a privileged, autonomous status (19). A danger in such bifurcation, she notes, is that "one might accept beliefs but not the ritual activities associated with them...therefore, 'beliefs could exist without rituals; rituals, however, could not exist without beliefs.'" Moreover, as action becomes subordinated to thought, actors (i.e., those who participate in the rituals) become subordinated to the thinkers (i.e., the scholars and analysts).

19. Louis-Marie Chauvet, "Liturgy and the Body: Editorial," in *Liturgy and the Body*, ed. Louis-Marie Chauvet and Francois Kabasele Lumbala, [Concilium 1995/3] (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1995), viii.

20. In making this claim, I do not want to counter reductionisms of the mind and affections with a reductionism of the body. Certainly cognitive, affective, and communal dimensions of liturgy, Eucharist, and other Christian practices remain important. My account presumes this but focuses on the body in order to compensate for its erasure elsewhere. My thanks to Beth Newman for making me clarify this.

21. Two additional analogies are those of music and dance; both can be construed so as to capture the *corps* dimension as outlined below, although they do not present as clearly how the body serves as the site at which power is contested. Paul Connerton details the former in *How Societies Remember* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 91-

92. As his work suggests, different types of music—jazz, classical, grunge rock—will produce different types of bodies. I am grateful to Philip Thompson for bringing this very useful book to my attention. For a discussion of dance, see Arthur W. Frank, "For a Sociology of the Body: An Analytical Review," in *The Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory*, ed. M. Featherstone, M. Hepworth, and B. Turner (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1991), 36-102. Furthermore, ascetic practices remained central to the Christian life beyond the period of persecution in the early Church, but clearly, they served to reconfigure bodies differently as the identity of the Church, and the nature of that which threatened it, changed. For one example, see Patricia Cox Miller, "Desert Asceticism and 'the Body from Nowhere,'" *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 2/2 (1994): 137-153 on how the later practices of desert asceticism, which from one perspective could be construed as rejecting and disfiguring the body, aimed at least in part at producing "angelic" bodies.

22. For an illuminating account of this process see Dave Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*, ed. by G. Kloske (New York: Little Brown and Co., 1996).

23. This analogy shows why it ought to be impossible for Christians to serve in the military, a point brought to my attention by Leslie (Bud) Gerber.

24. This latter "team" dimension is where some athletic analogies will break down, especially those activities that most average, ordinary Americans participate in, such as "working out," aerobics, or (like myself) running. Anyone who takes part in these sorts of activities regularly will recognize how the practices, slowly and over time, produce one's body (we become capable of doing things formerly "impossible"); these sorts of things become second nature. However, as practices of contemporary culture, they are highly individualistic, even if engaged in with a group (e.g., an aerobics class or a running club). Unless, that is, one construes them as supporting the *corps* of the market (aerobics's embodiment of aesthetic standards of consumption) or the state (running's embodiment of fitness as a public health endeavor).

25. Maureen A. Tilley, "The Ascetic Body and the (Un)Making of the World of the Martyr," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 59 (1991): 471-474.

26. *Ibid.*, 470. As Dennis Doyle observed, this echoes the breathing training in Lamaze.

27. *Ibid.*, 474. As Tilley notes, voluntary martyrs "tried to run a marathon before learning to walk."

28. Again, I focus solely on bodily practices here simply for purposes of emphasis. Bodies, of course, are situated at the nexus of practices, discourses, and institutions, the latter two of which are likewise crucial to the production of bodies. (See Frank.) A more comprehensive account of bodily production would require consideration of the roles of discourses and institutions, with special attention to the issues of authority and power.
29. De Lubac, *Corpus Mysticum*, 292.
30. Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, 1963. *The Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy (Sacrosanctum Concilium)* in A. Flannery, ed., *Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents, Study Edition* (Northport, NY: Costello Publishing Co., 1986), no. 2.
31. *Ibid.*, no. 10.
32. Brigid O'Shea Merriman, *Searching for Christ: The Spirituality of Dorothy Day* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 97, comments on the centrality of the Mass for Day's vision of the Catholic Worker: "Dorothy...in addressing a group of would-be Catholic Workers in the early 1940s admonished them that 'the Mass is the Work!'" Day's own words, as found in "The Council and the Mass," *Catholic Worker* 29 (September 1962): 2, richly resonate the link between liturgy and life, in terms most corporeal: "[The Mass brings] us into the closest of all contacts with our Lord Jesus Christ, enabling us literally to 'put on Christ,' as St. Paul said, and to begin to say with Him, 'Now, not I live but Jesus Christ in me.' With a strong consciousness of this, we remember too those lines 'without Me, ye can do nothing,' and 'with Me you can do all things'...Only by nourishing ourselves as we have been bidden to do by Christ, by eating His body and drinking His blood, can we become Christ and put on the new man" (cited in Merriman, 98). This linkage in her thought and life reflect in part, no doubt, her friendship with Virgil Michel.
33. Bell, 98. As will be clear, this section draws heavily on Bell's work.
34. *Ibid.*, 93.
35. *Ibid.*, 100, citing Roy A. Rappaport, *Ecology, Meaning, and Religion* (Richmond, CA: North Atlantic Books, 1979), 200. Stephen Buckland, in "Ritual, Body and Cultural Memory," in Chauvet and Lumbala, 51, marshals a similar argument in order to challenge the epistemological bifurcation of action and "meaning." Arguing that actions themselves are productive, he maintains: "theories which speak of symbols as 'standing for' or 'representing' something else inevitably suggest that the meaning of a ritual is to be discovered 'behind' the action, in what it 'represents'.... But gestures or postures, like words, do not acquire

meaning simply in the sense of correlating a meaning which lies 'behind' them; their meaning is negotiated in and through the practices in which they are found."

36. I am grateful to Terry Tilley for this example.

37. I am here construing Eucharist in its broadest sense, as the Liturgy of the Word in conjunction with the Liturgy of the Eucharist in the Mass.

38. I include testimony in recognition of our Baptist colleagues of the National Association of Baptist Professors of Religion who greatly enriched this conference by meeting concurrently with the College Theology Society and co-sponsoring this session.

39. Chauvet, 31. Buckland concurs: "From its earliest moments a child is taught how to control and use [its body...] Through such practices which shape its body, a child develops and expresses its own individuality and comes at the same time to incorporate the identity of its family, class, and community.... Through such habitual bodily practices, the experiences of previous generations are 'sedimented' in bodies. Through such practices, a body 're-members' its identity. That is to say, it discovers and reinvents, enforces, and reinforces its identity," 51.

40. At least, for most of us. God, of course, does retain the prerogative of the "instantaneous infusion" method.

41. Bell, 124.

42. *Ibid.*, 221.

43. As Jyoti Sahi, "The Body in Search of Interiority," in Chauvet and Lumbala, 92, notes: "Christian forms of liturgical action have often been dominated by the need to listen to the Word of God. So we note that as the verbal dimension becomes more and more important the physical participation of the worshiper recedes in value. The worshiper is expected just to sit still...it is a passive state, which is meant to allow the individual to listen more attentively to what is spoken. The body, as far as possible, is meant to be ignored."