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Review: One Hundred Years of Homosexuality: And Other Essays on Greek Love

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myself do not believe that the Works and Days alludes to the Theogony any more than I believe that the Odyssey alludes to the Iliad) and was not persuaded by some of his specific arguments, these reservations scarcely lessen the force of his basic insight, which I found perceptive and convincing.

Finally, the Johns Hopkins University Press deserves kudos for another volume in this hardcover monograph series that is handsome to look upon and pleasant to hold.

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This, the most significant study of Greek homosexuality since the pioneering work of K. J. Dover, does not aim for an exhaustive or systematic treatment of Greek love but rather to formulate a theory of the erotics of male homosexuality and to apply it to a selected number of aspects in literature, philosophy, and Athenian social life. Accordingly, part one presents a lucid exposition of the two currently competing theories of homosexuality, essentialism and constructionism. Halperin is firmly in the camp of the latter and argues forcefully that homosexuality, and indeed all sexuality, is a social construct rather than an innate universal phenomenon. Although essentialists and readers of John Boswell’s Christianity, Homosexuality, and Social Tolerance may not be convinced, they will still find the book provocative for its constructionist analyses of Greek paederasty and male prostitution. In the process of formulating his theory, the author provides a good introduction to the thought of Michel Foucault, the figure most influential in shaping Halperin’s own views.

Part two consists of three essays, which may be read individually or as a unit: “Heroes and their Pals”, “The Democratic Body: Prostitution and Citizenship in Classical Athens”, and “Why is Diotima a Woman?”. The first of these is a comparative study of Gilgamesh and Enkidu, David and Jonathan, and Achilles and Patroclus. In it Halperin demonstrates the common structures and social ideologies in these stories of male bonding. The essay on prostitution, using Aeschines’ Against Timarchus as a starting point, examines Athenian notions of manhood, citizenship, and the boundaries between public and private. The Diotima chapter, in which Halperin works very hard at being “politically correct” (whatever that may mean), contains an excellent discussion of the question of Diotima’s historicity as well as much acute analysis of the “feminine” imagery and language of Socrates’ discourse. All three essays exhibit solid command of both ancient and modern sources, and all three illumine significant aspects of antiquity through their fresh perspective and originality.
This rich and stimulating book has something to offer to the general reader of Homer and Plato as well as to the specialized theorist of human sexuality. Halperin's research is very much "on the cutting edge" of classical studies and is sure to be an influence in the field for years to come.

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Gill examines several notoriously difficult issues in Aristotle's metaphysics, concentrating on the role matter plays in generation and composite substances. Her emphasis on matter is salutary since it enables her to delineate with unusual clarity a potential dilemma facing Aristotle, "the paradox of unity". The paradox is as follows. Aristotle believes that ordinary concrete particulars are paradigm examples of substance; they are the basic items of our thought and ontology, not being reducible to more fundamental entities. Yet, they also are subject to change: they come into existence, persist through time, and perish. Remaining constant throughout these changes and thereby enabling us to understand them, Aristotle argues, is their matter. If matter, however, possesses a distinct set of properties that underwrite and explain change, it should be possible to distinguish matter's specific contribution in any given substance. But if we can isolate a more basic component in ordinary particulars, it is unclear why we should not alter our ontological commitments accordingly. Thus, Aristotle seems to want it both ways. He insists that ordinary particulars remain the fundamental, irreducible units of ontology, yet appears committed to a conception of substantial change that makes matter ontologically basic.

Gill rejects two common explanations of this tension. Denying that it reflects different stages in Aristotle's thinking, she steers clear of developmental accounts. Moreover, she questions the prevailing view that in the Metaphysics Aristotle eventually abandons the claim that matter partially determines the nature of individual substances. Instead, she argues that Metaphysics Zeta-Theta licenses a theory that retains matter as a substrate with distinguishable properties, but prevents it from undermining the unity of particulars. While Gill's discussion of individual passages is often admirable, matter must fulfill so many incompatible functions in her account that one suspects the initial paradox of mostly being relocated. For instance, bits of actual matter must become strictly potential (though simultaneously capable of contributing actual properties) when in a composite—a disappearing act that saves the unity of particulars and the theory, perhaps, but is still fairly