Sartre, Camus and a Marxism for the 21st Century

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Ever since Marx, philosophy must lead to action. Otherwise it is irrelevant. . . . Philosophers must be angry, and, in this world, stay angry.

--Jean-Paul Sartre (1972)¹

I. The Quarrel

On June 30, 1952 Albert Camus sent a seventeen-page letter to the journal Les Temps Modernes, a response to Francis Jeanson’s harshly critical review of his recently published book, The Rebel. The letter was not addressed to Jeanson, a junior member of the Les Temps Modernes editorial board, but to “M. Le Directeur,” i.e., Sartre. Its penultimate paragraph was direct and personal:

I am beginning to get a little tired of seeing myself—and even more, of seeing former militants who have never refused the struggles of their time—endlessly receive lessons in efficacy from critics who have never done anything more than turn their theater seat in the direction of history.²

In the August issue of the journal, Sartre responded:

My dear Camus,

Our friendship has not been easy, but I shall miss it. If today you break it off, doubtless that means it would inevitably have ended some day. Many things brought us together, few separated us. But those few were still too many: friendship, too, tends to become totalitarian; there has to be agreement on everything or a quarrel, and those who don't belong to any party themselves behave like members of imaginary parties. I shall not carp at this: it is as it must be. But, for just this reason, I would have preferred our current disagreement to be over matters of substance and that there should not be a whiff of wounded vanity mingled with it. [. . .] I did not want to reply to you. Who would I be
convincing? Our enemies, certainly, and perhaps my friends. And you—who do you think you are convincing? Your friends and my enemies. To our common enemies, who are legion, we shall both give much cause for laughter. That much is certain.

Unfortunately, you attacked me so deliberately and in such an unpleasant tone that I cannot remain silent without losing face. I shall, therefore, reply: without anger, but, for the first time since I've known you, without mincing my words. A mix of melancholy, conceit and vulnerability on your part has always deterred people from telling you unvarnished truths. [...] Sooner or later, someone would have told you this, so it might as well be me.3

Sartre’s response did end the friendship. The two men never spoke to one another again.4

What was the substance of this celebrated “quarrel”? Jeanson himself was a Marxist. Sartre did not so self-identify at that time, although he had been moving in that direction. Some months earlier, Jacques Duclos, head of the French Communist Party, was arrested on the pretext that he had been using carrier pigeons to coordinate the demonstrators in Paris who were protesting the visit of an American general. Later, recalling that moment, Sartre explains its effect:

An anti-Communist is a dog. I couldn’t see any way out of that one, and I never will.

[...] After ten years of ruminating, I had come to the breaking point, and needed only that one last straw. In the language of the church, this was my conversion. [...] In the name of those principles which it had inculcated in me, in the name of its humanism and its “humanities,” in the name of liberty, equality, fraternity, I swore to the bourgeoisie a hatred which would only die with me.5
By contrast, Camus was becoming ever more identified as an anti-Communist, an identification solidified with the publication of *The Rebel* and its fierce attack on the “rational terrorism” of Marxism.

But what, specifically, was so wrong with *The Rebel*? The book purports to explicate the tragic consequences of rebellion turning to revolution. With the “death of God,” the history of which he analyzes in detail, the universal values that might have served to restrain historical rebellion disappeared. Thus followed the excesses of the French Revolution, the “irrational terror” of fascism, and the "rational terror" of Marxism. For the latter, its “scientific” certainty that a peaceful, harmonious, glorious future lay in store for humankind entails that no moral scruples should stand in the way of hastening the arrival of that new dawn—hence Stalinism.

Camus argues for a sense of moderation, rooted not in God but in human nature, a sense of those transcendent values that shine forth in the act of rebellion, values that tend to disappear when rebellion becomes revolution.

What is the problem here? Why is it that, when Sartre asked that, for the sake of his friendship with Camus, nothing bad be said about the book, no one at *Les Temps Moderne* stepped forward to do the review? Simone de Beauvoir recalls, “none of us could think of anything good” to say. Ultimately, Sartre dropped the restrictive condition, and gave the assignment to Jeanson.6

But what was the problem? Camus, after all, was not a reactionary. In *The Rebel*, he explicitly endorses “revolutionary trade unionism;” he calls for the immediate suppression of the death penalty; he sees “Scandinavian societies today” as approximately just, and hence worthy of emulation.7 Camus doesn’t reject all violence, although he does insist that it “must be bound, if it cannot be avoided, to a personal responsibility. […] Authentic acts of rebellion will only
consent to take up arms for institutions that limit violence, not for those which codify it."8 In general, “a revolutionary action which wishes to be coherent […] would express fidelity to the human condition. Uncompromising as to its means, it would accept an approximation as far as ends are concerned and, so that the approximation should become more and more accurately defined, it would allow absolute freedom of speech.”9

In his reply to Camus, Sartre offers an analysis—an unsparing one—of Camus himself rather than arguments in The Rebel. Sartre’s basic criticism is that Camus has abandoned the struggle to change the world: “When a man sees the present struggles merely as the imbecile duel between equally despicable monsters [rapacious capitalism and equally rapacious Communism], I contend that that man has already left us: he has gone off alone to his corner and is sulking.”10

In particular, what is missing both from The Rebel and from Camus’s worldview is any real sense of class struggle. “When a child dies, you condemn the absurdity of the world, and that deaf, blind God you had created so as to be able to spit in His face. But the child’s father, if he is a laborer or unemployed, condemns human beings. […For he knows that] in poor districts the child mortality rate is twice what it is in the wealthy suburbs.”11 Sartre would go deeper to claim that the root problem is Camus’s conception of history: “You remain within our great classical tradition, which, since Descartes and with the exception of Pascal, have been entirely hostile to history”12 Sartre acknowledges Camus’ commitment for devoting himself “unreservedly to the Resistance” at a great cost, but notes that Camus’ “first contact with history assumed for … [him] the aspect of sacrifice.13 As Sartre tells Camus,

In short, it was not your intention to “make history,” as Marx says, but to prevent it from being made. Proof lies in the fact that, after the war, you merely had in mind a return to
the status quo ante. [...] After serving your five years with history, you thought you (and
the whole of humanity) could return to the despair in which man must find his
happiness. Sartre laments, "How we loved you in those days. We too were neophytes of history and endured
it with repugnance. [But that's because we didn't understand...] that the war of 1940 was but one
mode of historicity--neither more nor less so than the years that preceded it." But now,
appraising the situation differently, Sartre accuses Camus (and perhaps his former self) of giving
up on the real struggles of concrete persons in order to grapple with the metaphysical anguish
occasioned by a world in which a supposedly good God lets innocent children die in agony. For
Sartre, these anguished ruminations are—to people with real problems—"mere aristocratic
amusements."

Sartre tells Camus that everything became clear to him after rereading “Letter to a
German Friend” (published after the war), in which Camus says, “for years now, you have tried
to get me to enter History.”

“Good Lord,” I said to myself, "since he believes he stands outside history, no wonder he
lays down his conditions before coming inside.” Like a girl testing the water with her toe
and asking, “Is it warm?” you regard history warily. You stick in a finger, then very
quickly pull it out again, asking, “Has it a meaning?” You didn't hesitate in 1941, but
then you were being asked to make a sacrifice. It was quite simply a question of
preventing the Hitlerian madness from smashing a world where solitary elation was still
possible for some, and you were willing to pay the price for your future moments of
elation.

Sartre continues:
Things are different today. It is no longer a question of defending the status quo, but of changing it. […] If I thought as you do, that history is a pool of mud and blood, I would do as you do, […] and look twice before diving in. […] But suppose you receive the answer Marx would give you: "History does nothing. […] It is real living men who do everything; history is merely the activity of human beings pursuing their own ends." If this is true, the person who believes he is moving away from history will cease to share his contemporaries' ends, and will be sensible only to the absurdity of human restlessness. But if he rails against that restlessness, he will, against his will, re-enter the historical cycle, for he will involuntarily provide the side that is on the defensive (that is to say, the one whose culture is dying) with arguments for discouraging the other.17

II. Camus’s Criticisms of Marx

Before evaluating Sartre's critique, let us go back to Camus to examine his criticisms of Marx. His critique of Marx himself is far less scathing than his critique of Marxism—that the sublime future it posits justifies employing hideous means for getting there—but he does hold Marx responsible for effects he possibly did not intend.18 According to Camus, Marx "blends in his doctrine […] a Utopian Messianism of highly dubious value."19 He traces this to Marx's appropriation of what is essentially a Christian worldview.

In contrast to the ancient world, the unity of the Christian and Marxist world is astonishing. […] The Christians were the first to consider human life and the course of events as a history that is unfolding from a fixed beginning toward a definite end. [Indeed,] the originality of Christianity lay in introducing into the ancient world two ideas that had never before been associated: the idea of history and the idea of punishment."20
These ideas are prominent in Marx, who has said that, "All the houses, in our time, are marked with a mysterious red cross. The judge is history, the executioner is the proletariat."\(^21\) From this claim Camus infers:

That is the mission of the proletariat: to bring forth supreme dignity from supreme humiliation. Through its suffering and its struggles, it is Christ in human form redeeming the collective sin of alienation. [...] But this Christ is, at the same time, an avenger.

According to Marx, he carries out the sentence that private property passes on itself.\(^22\)

Now, from a Marxian point of view, Camus's reasoning here is specious. Marx was anything but a fiery agitator for revolutionary violence. (The above quotation from Marx comes from a little-known address not intended for publication.\(^23\)) Marx was not a pacifist, but he was no Bakunin.\(^24\) He did not deny the obvious truth that revolutionary change usually involves violence—no one familiar with the English or American or French Revolution could pretend otherwise. What he did suggest was the possibility, at least in certain circumstances, of a relative peaceful, democratic supersession of capitalism.\(^25\)

Moreover, to think that any so convulsive event as the Russian Revolution and its degeneration into Stalinism can be "explained" by quoting a rhetorical flourish uttered by Marx a half century earlier, or to argue that Stalin and those around him were motivated primarily by a hypnotic Utopian vision that desensitized them to the crimes they were committing, is surely an "idealism" of the first order. It ignores the concrete, material circumstances of the time: the failure of the revolution in backward Russia to spread to the more "advanced" parts of Europe; the desperate need to industrialize before a hostile capitalist world, whose expeditionary forces in support of the White armies had failed, could regroup and attack more massively; the transfixing
appeal of U.S.-style mechanized agriculture, which could be introduced only by breaking up those small-scale holdings to which the peasants were so deeply attached, etc.

Marxists will also be irritated by Camus’ false claims about Marx, including, for example, that Marx "found any form of beauty under the sun completely alien," or that his "fatalism excludes all reforms, in that there would be a risk of mitigating the catastrophic aspect of the outcome, and, consequently delaying the inevitable result." Of course, Camus was unaware of Marx's discussion of the "emancipation of the senses," or his claim that human beings, unlike other animals, "create also according to the laws of beauty," since Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, wherein these discussions occur, had not yet been published. Still, Camus offers no evidence—since none exists—that Marx considered beauty an alienating concept. As for his claim that Marx’s fatalism “excludes all reforms,” he must have missed that section of the Communist Manifesto (hardly an obscure publication), where Marx and Engels argue that "the first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to establish democracy," and then, to "use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie." They even provide a list of ten reforms that will be "generally applicable" in most advanced countries, among them "a heavy progressive or graduated income tax," and "free education for all children in public schools."27

Marxists may be irritated by Camus, but it must be acknowledged that his lengthy treatment of Marx himself (some fifty pages) is, on balance, far from harsh. Camus writes:

It has undoubtedly been correct to emphasize the ethical demands that form the basis of the Marxian dream. It must, in all fairness, be said, before examining the check to Marxism, that in them lies the real greatness of Marx. The very core of this theory was that work is profoundly dignified and unjustly despised. He rebelled against the
degradation of work to the level of a commodity and of the worker to the level of an object. He reminded the privileged that their privileges were not divine, and that property was not an eternal right. He gave a bad conscience to those who had no right to a clear conscience, and denounced with unparalleled profundity a class whose crime is not so much having had power as having used it to advance the ends of a mediocre society deprived of any real nobility. To him we owe the idea which is the despair of our times—but here despair is worth more than any hope—that when work is a degradation, it is not life, even though it occupies every moment of a life. […] By demanding for the worker real riches, which are not the riches of money but of leisure and creation, he has reclaimed, despite all appearance to the contrary, the dignity of man.28

This encomium is followed by the section of *The Rebel* entitled, "The Failing of the Prophesy." Here Camus does look at concrete material conditions, and finds them at variance with what Marx predicted. He lists the failures:29

1) Economic crises, which should have occurred with increasing frequency, have become, on the contrary, more sporadic: capitalism has learned the secret of planned production.

2) With the introduction of companies in which stock could be held, capital, instead of becoming more concentrated, has given rise to a new category of small shareholders, whose interests are at variance with those of the proletariat.

3) Small enterprises have been, in many cases, destroyed by competition, as Marx foresaw, but the complexity of modern production has generated a multitude of small factories around great enterprises. […] These small industrialists form an intermediary social layer, which complicates the scheme that Marx imagined.
4) Reforms and trade unions have brought about a rise in the standard of living and an amelioration in working conditions.

5) The proletariat has not increased in numbers indefinitely. The very conditions of industrial production have improved, to a considerable extent, the conditions of the middle class, and even created a new stratum, the technicians.

Camus also charges Marx with ignoring "the phenomenon of the nation in the very century of nationalism. [...] As a means of explaining history, the struggle between nations has proved to be at least as important as the class struggle." Marx also failed to realize that "poverty and degradation have never ceased to be what they were before Marx's time: factors contributing to servitude and not revolution." Camus notes,

One third of the working class was unemployed in 1933. Bourgeois society was then obliged to provide a means of livelihood for these unemployed, thus bringing about the situation that Marx said was essential for revolution. But it is not a good thing that future revolutionaries should be put into the situation of expecting to be fed by the State. This unnatural habit leads to others which are less good, and which Hitler made into doctrine.

These are serious charges--and they are, for the most part, true--although, as shall see, less true now than when Camus was writing, during those relatively egalitarian postwar years dubbed as "les trente glorieuses." Capitalist governments, informed now by Keynesian analysis, have been quick to intervene when recessions break out—sometimes massively, as in 2008. Far more people own shares of stock now than was the case in Marx's day (or even Camus'), and thus tend to see their interests as aligned with those of the capitalist class. Small businesses have not disappeared, despite the ever-growing size and scope of now-multinational corporations. Labor
unions and social welfare measures, although currently under fierce attack, have been successful in raising workers' living standards and (for those unionized) enhancing job security.

It's also true that workers of the world have rallied to their own nations, and slaughtered each other, and that the Great Depression did not lead to socialist revolution in capitalist countries like Spain, Italy and Germany, but rather to the triumph or consolidation of fascism. At the present moment, in Europe and the U.S., the Right appears to have been significantly more successful than the Left in mobilizing popular discontent and channeling it in support of its own agenda. Clearly, Camus's critique, offered more than sixty years ago, is not irrelevant today. But has it, as Camus argues, discredited Marxism?

III. What is Marxism, Anyway?

In his famous essay, Search for a Method (1960), Sartre proclaims Marxism to be the philosophy beyond which we cannot go, "as long as man has not gone beyond the historical moment which [it] expresses." The living philosophy of an age is, he says, "a totalization of knowledge, a method, a regulative idea, an offensive weapon for a rising class, and a community of language;" it is a "vision of the world" which "ferments rotten societies;" it "becomes the culture and sometimes the nature of a whole class." However, says Sartre, for all its power and promise, Marxism is in trouble: “Marxism, after drawing us to it as the moon draws the tides, after transforming all our ideas, after liquidating the categories of our bourgeois thought, abruptly left us stranded. It did not satisfy our need to understand. […] Marxism stopped.” Sartre adds,

We must be clear about all this. This sclerosis does not correspond to normal aging. It is produced by a world-wide combination of circumstances of a particular type. Far from being exhausted, Marxism is still very young, still in its infancy. […] It remains,
therefore, the philosophy of our time. We cannot go beyond it because we have not gone beyond the circumstances that engendered it.\textsuperscript{36}

For Sartre, what Marxism needs is a healthy dose of existentialism. He doesn't say that exactly, but calls existentialism "an ideology," a "parasitical system living on the margin of Knowledge, which at first it opposed, but into which today it seeks to be integrated".\textsuperscript{37} For Sartre “ideology” is not a pejorative term. Ideologists are “those intellectuals who come after the great flowering and who undertake to set the system in order or who use new methods to conquer territory not yet fully explored, those who provide practical applications for the theory and employ it as a tool to destroy and construct.”\textsuperscript{38}

Sartre is, in fact, calling for an existentialist Marxism, a Marxism without its dogmatism, and, above all, its determinism. In a sense his reply to dogmatic Marxists is his reply to Camus eight years earlier,

"Does history have a meaning," you ask? "Does it have a purpose?" In my view it is the question that is meaningless. For history, considered apart from those who makes it, is merely an abstract, static concept. […] The problem is not one of knowing its purpose, but of giving it one.\textsuperscript{39}

I want to argue that Sartre is right. Marxism is the philosophy of our time. We cannot go beyond it because "we have not gone beyond the circumstances that engendered it," i.e.,capitalism.

Sartre is also right that a dogmatic Marxism is a dead philosophy. A living Marxism requires supplementation, not only by an existentialist ethic centered on human freedom, but by the theoretical and practical insights of the great transvaluationary movements of the post-war period: anti-colonialism, anti-racism, feminism, anti-war activism, the struggles for gay rights and the rights of the "disabled" and for ecological sanity.
I will not attempt a full-blown defense of Sartre’s claim here. Before saying more about a living Marxism that incorporates insights from both Sartre and Camus, let me offer an evaluation of the basic tenets of Marxism. In my view, Marxism is comprised of three core components: a critique of capitalism; a vision of the future (“communism”); a theory of history (“historical materialism”).

Regarding the critique of capitalism, few will deny these days that our current economic system is serious flawed. Many would argue that our economic system must be changed substantially if our species is even to survive. Of course, the Marxist claim that we need to move beyond capitalism itself is more contentious, but it is difficult to deny the validity of Marx's central claims:

- Under capitalism one must sell one's capacity to work to those who own the means of production, competing with one's fellow workers for positions that are almost always in short supply, for capitalism requires a "reserve army of unemployed" to function properly.40

- Under capitalism, one has little or no control over conditions of work, despite the importance of meaningful work to human flourishing. The owners of the means of production decide the pace of work, the division of labor within the enterprise, the technology to be employed, etc., not those whose well-being are most immediately affected by these decisions.

- Under capitalism, citizens have little democratic control over the deployment of its economic surplus, i.e., its investment priorities, notwithstanding the fact that a society's future is shaped in large measure by these decisions.
• A capitalist economy is inherently unstable, plagued by crises unimaginable in pre-capitalist times, the production of too much stuff relative to consumer purchasing power. A Marxist today would add at least one more:

• A healthy capitalism requires constant, relentless growth, and yet our species is now massively threatened by the “externalities” of our increasingly mindless, ever increasing consumption, above by all those invisible gases that are relentlessly raising the temperature of our planet. Marx would surely have agreed with economist Kenneth Boulding: "Only a madman or an economist could believe that exponential growth can go on forever in a finite world."  

Regarding Marx's vision of the future, can we not imagine a world without economic insecurity in which people find satisfaction in their work, a world that has, in essence, realized the famous slogan: "from each according to ability, to each according to need"? After all, we have the technological capacity to provide for everyone's basic needs. This is an astonishing fact, but it's true.  

An even more astonishing fact: at this moment in human history, when we have acquired the technological capacity to determine beyond reasonable doubt that our massive utilization of fossil fuels is causing the temperature of our planet to rise, which will have, if not checked, catastrophic consequences, we have actually developed technological capacity to replace those energy sources on a global scale, with sustainable alternatives.  

It is not unimaginable, then, that if we applied our inventive genius to humanizing technology and workplace organization so as to make work meaningful, we could move toward a sustainable world in which good work and a decent level of consumption are available to all. We can go even further. Can we not imagine a world in which we are all "rich in human needs," to
use Marx's phrase, a world in which, to be deprived of creativity, love, friendship, beauty, literature, art, music, etc., would be consciously experienced as a serious lack? We must admit, I think, that Marx's vision of a "higher communism" is a worthy goal, the achievement of which appears to be within our technical capacity.

We can now say even more than that. We can now specify, in rather concrete detail, what a viable transitional economy would look like, what Marx referred to as the "first stage" of communism: "a communist society, not as it has developed on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, just as it emerges from capitalist society; which is thus [...] stamped with the birth marks of the old society from whose womb it emerges." As we know, Marx said little about this stage, and not without reason. There was no data available at that time with which to assess the economic viability and social consequences of various alternative possibilities. But a living Marxism is well positioned today to fill in this lacuna. This topic has been the focus of my own research for many decades. An economically viable alternative to capitalism is not so hard to envisage. The famous (infamous) “There Is No Alternative” argument, so beloved by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan is bogus. Another world is possible, a more democratic world, a far, far better world.

IV. Historical Materialism: A Closer Look

Marx's critique of capitalism has held up remarkably well over time, and his vision of the future is surely a worthy goal. But what about historical materialism? How has Marx's theory of history held up?

Certainly, it is hard to deny Marx's fundamental insight that economic factors condition virtually all other aspects of a society: family and kinship structures, gender relations, educational institutions, political formations, ethical values, the role and character of religion, the
art, music, literature and other manifestations of higher culture. He is surely right that "forces of production," (the material and technological resources of a society) and "relations of production," (who owns the means of production, what rights this ownership entails) are fundamental explanatory variables.

He is surely right, too, that technological changes, motivated by economic considerations, have consequences far beyond the spheres of production and consumption. If we avoid the crude reductionism of which Sartre is so critical, and don't take "fundamental" to mean "primary, in all instances," almost everyone who thinks carefully about these matters accepts these aspects of historical materialism. We are all Marxists now, at least to that degree.

But historical materialism is also a teleology. Marx has taken over from Hegel the conviction that reality is becoming ever more rational, the conviction that history has a direction, and it is a direction that inspires hope.

Of course, seeing history as teleology is not unique to Hegel and Marx. Camus is not wrong to see Christianity as having introduced this concept into Western culture, nor in seeing Marxism as an extension of the Christian message. Indeed, the basic thesis of the Communist Manifesto is a beatitude that Jesus might have uttered when he delivered his Sermon on the Mount. “Blessed are the working class,” he could have said, “for they shall inherit the earth!” It can scarcely be denied that it is this aspect of historical materialism—not its explanatory power, but its message of hope—that has fired the imagination of millions.

Marx's theory of history inspires hope. But is it true? To be sure, we must jettison the determinism, both with respect to explanation and prognostication. As for prognostication, historical materialism is intended to be a scientific theory, but no science can predict the future with apodictic certainty. Marx knew that. He acknowledged that class struggle sometimes results
in "the mutual ruination of the contending classes." Nevertheless, Marx was clearly confident that in our historical epoch, the proletariat is destined to win. Recall his pronouncement in the closing pages of the penultimate chapter of *Capital*:

Hand in hand with this centralization, or this expropriation of many capitalists by few, develop, on an ever increasing scale, the co-operative forms of the labor-process, the conscious technical application of science, the methodical cultivation of the soil, the transformation of instruments of labor only usable in common, the economizing of all means of production by their use as the means of production of combined, socialized labor, the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world market, and with all this, the international character of the capitalistic regime. Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with it too grows the revolt of the working-class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labor at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated. For historical materialism, the problem is more serious than abstract determinism, which is easily enough remedied with a dose of existentialist commonsense. True to his conviction that historical materialism, unlike Hegelian idealism, is scientific, Marx gave *arguments* in support of
his prediction, *materialist* arguments. He did not gesture to the World Spirit, ineffably working itself out in history. He pointed to specific tendencies inherent in capitalism. One the one hand, he argues that capitalism is essentially unstable, prone to crises of ever-increasing intensity. It also generates ever greater inequality—ever increasing and ever more concentrated wealth at the top, ever-increasing immiseration at the bottom.

On the other hand, Marx argues that tendencies intrinsic to capitalism will generate workers’ class consciousness, an awareness that the present system is irrational and unjust, and that, since working people are many and the capitalists are few, the system will be successfully challenged and changed. This awareness will come about, not because humans of all classes are inherently rational, but because capitalists will bring workers into close proximity with one another (unlike the widely dispersed peasantry who could rarely act collectively) and will be compelled to educate them so that they could operate the increasingly sophisticated technologies that the system is generating. Moreover, among these technologies are means of communication and transportation that will themselves facilitate collective worker consciousness and coordination.

Such are Marx's arguments. How have they fared over time? Marx predicted economic crises of increasing frequency and intensity. Camus argued that capitalism has learned how to avoid such crises. He has hardly been alone in this belief. A half century later, University of Chicago economist and Nobel laureate Robert Lucas, declared in his 2003 Presidential Address to the American Economics Association that "the central problem of depression prevention has, for all practical purposes, been solved, has, in fact been solved for many decades." It is time, he suggested, for the profession to move on. As another Nobel Laureate, Paul Krugman, points out: “Looking back from only a few years later, with much of the world in the throes of a financial
and economic crisis all too reminiscent of the 1930s, these optimistic pronouncements sound almost incredibly smug."48

As for increasing inequality and immiseration, Camus argued that reforms and trade unions had greatly ameliorated the conditions of the working class. He was right about this, at least in First World countries. The years following World War II did indeed see a "great compression" in incomes and wealth. For three decades, during what is now often referred to as capitalism's "Golden Age," wages moved up in tandem with productivity gains, while highly progressive income and estate taxes kept the rich from getting too rich.

In hindsight it is pretty obvious that the threat of communism—a virus that could infect one's own proletariat—and the immediate post-war sense of entitlement on the part of returning soldiers, sailors and airmen, had much to do with the concessions made by the capitalist class for several subsequent decades. But as time dimmed the memory of wartime egalitarianism, and the allure of communism faded, when, by the mid-1970s, it became obvious to all that the Soviet economic system was not going to overtake us, was not going to "bury us," in Nikita Khrushchev's memorable phrase, the gloves came off. Policies changed. Workers began losing ground, while the fortunes of the wealthy soared, as Thomas Piketty has so clearly documented.49 In the United States, more than a half-century after President Johnson declared an "unconditional war on poverty in America," the U.S. Census Bureau reports that 12.7% of Americans live in poverty. Globally, almost half the world’s population live on less than $2.50/day, 80% of which live in countries where the income gap is widening.50

It would seem, therefore, that Marx’s arguments regarding capitalist instability, inequality, and immiseration have held up rather well. But clearly, not his arguments concerning class consciousness. Ironically, the most cogent and compelling explanations for the failure of Marx's
prediction here are historical materialist explanations. The material conditions for the emergence of a proletarian class consciousness widespread enough to generate a social movement powerful enough to break the power of the capitalist class have not been right.

It is certainly the case that the working class today is better educated than any time in its history. The new technologies, however, have not brought workers into ever tighter proximity with each other. They did for awhile, but that trend has been reversed. The automobile broke up working class neighborhoods and dispersed workers into the suburbs. Communication and transport advances have broken up the mega-factories, distributing production facilities not only around the country but around the globe. Those factories that remain have become leaner and meaner, outsourcing and downsizing. Chain-stores and franchising have proletarianized retailing and much other service work, but not by bringing employees into closer proximity to one another. To be sure, the new information technologies have given individuals far easier access to information, and to means of interpersonal communication, but they also encourage fragmentation into distinct groups, many of whose members communicate only with their likeminded peers who feed each other’s prejudices. So we really don’t know, indeed can't know, how this is all going to play out, particularly if, as seems likely, the global economy is entering a period of prolonged, systemic stagnation or worse, and, as is more than just “likely,” climate-change-induced disruptions become ever more severe.

We certainly cannot assert with confidence that the future beyond capitalism will be qualitatively better than capitalism. We know that a sustainable, far-better world is possible, but as Sartre has remarked:
Tomorrow, after my death, some men may decide to establish Fascism, and the others may be so cowardly or so slack as to let them do so. If so, then Fascism will then be the truth of man, and so much the worse for us.51

Ironically, tragically, Francis Fukuyama’s famous proclamation that “Western liberal democracy” and capitalism mark the end of history could turn out to be true—not just the end of history, but the end of the human species.52

V. What Is To Be Done? Insights from Camus and Sartre?

These are the best of times—and the worst of times—to be a Marxist. On the one hand, Marx's critique of capitalism is more compelling now than at any time since the Great Depression, and our deep conviction that another, far better world is within our technical capabilities has survived scientific scrutiny. Yet class consciousness among the workers of the world is at least as fragmented as it has ever been. Moreover, the democratic process, our best hope for relatively peaceful social change, is, increasingly dysfunctional, due in no small part, to the fact that, since the mid-70s, there has been a coordinated, beneath-the-radar, well-financed, largely-successful, ongoing effort, not only to keep “Democracy in Chains,” but to tighten those chains more and more so as to shield the wealthy from democratic discontent.53

Not good news for Marxists hoping to “win the battle of democracy.” At the same time the prospects for a violent revolution by progressive forces (as opposed to a right-wing military coup) are essentially zero. (A successful storming of the White House? A guerilla army swooping down from the Appalachian Mountains?)

Times are very different now from what they were when Sartre and Camus quarreled. At mid-twentieth century, it was by no means obvious that the working classes of Europe were not
capable of revolution. In France and Italy in particular, the Communist Parties—dominant players in the Resistance—were large and powerful. Indeed, the PCF was the largest political party in France after the war. In Italy, had the CIA not intervened, the PCI, in alliance with the Italian Socialist Party, would likely have come to power democratically in 1948.

Not only did the war foster support for socialism throughout Europe, but revolutionary fervor was running high throughout the Third World. The European colonial empires were collapsing, the Chinese Communist party had triumphed, Vietnamese communists were defeating the French. In the "backyard" of the world's most powerful—and rabidly anti-Communist—nation, a young Fidel Castro and some comrades were making plans.

Today, there is no revolution in sight. Yet Marxism, with its still cogent critique of capitalism and its still-feasible, ultimate vision, remains, in my view, the horizon of our (still capitalist) time. Do Sartre or Camus have anything to offer us today?

Perhaps we should turn to The Plague, Camus’s beautiful novel written four years before The Rebel. In his letter to “M. Le Directeur,” Camus states what he thinks should be obvious: “If there is an evolution from The Stranger to The Plague, it has gone in the direction of solidarity and participation.”

You will recall the story: One day, in Oran, rats begin coming into the open to die, and soon enough, people are dying of bubonic plague. Oran is cut off from the outside world. After an initial period of disorientation, various people take on the life-threatening, perhaps hopeless, task of mitigating the plague’s effects: quarantining the infected, lancing boils to reduce the pain, disposing of the bodies. Among them are the young doctor Bernard Rieux, the journalist Raymond Rambert, the traveler Jean Tarrou, the clerk Joseph Grand, the Jesuit priest Father
Paneloux (the latter having preached a fiery sermon telling his parishioners that the plague was a punishment for their sins, which he repudiates upon witnessing the anguished death of a child).

Some of these volunteers die, some survive. But while doing their “work,” all experience something akin to what Rieux and Tarrou experienced the day they take a break and go for a nighttime swim:

Before them the darkness stretched out into infinity. Rieux could feel under his hand the gnarled, weather-worn visage of the rocks, and a strange happiness possessed him. Turning to Tarrou, he caught a glimpse on his friend’s face of the same happiness, a happiness that forgot nothing. […] Later they dressed and started back. Neither said a word, but they were both conscious of being perfectly at one, and the memory of this night would be cherished by them both.54

Solidarity and participation. When we with others against “a plague,” moments of meaning and happiness are possible. But in this struggle there are only temporary victories that give rise to collective, justifiable jubilation, such as occurred in Oran as the plague retreated. However, Rieux remembered that such joy is always imperiled. He knew what those jubilant crowds did not know but could have learned from books: that the plague bacillus never dies or disappears for good; that it can lie dormant for years and years in furniture and linen-chests; that it bides its time in bedrooms, cellars, trunks, and bookshelves; and that perhaps the day would come when, for the bane and enlightening of men, it would rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.55

These are the closing lines of the novel.

Thus Camus presents us with a powerful ethical vision, one that is particularly salient in non-revolutionary times, when the forces aligned against transformative change of the Marxian
sort appear to be omnipotent, and the consequences of climate change appear ever more severe. (It is hard not to read *The Plague* today without thinking of climate change.) Struggle on anyway, Camus seems to say, for you can find happiness in solidarity and participation.

Sartre finds Camus’s allegory problematic, not because of its validation of solidarity and participation, and not just because Camus’s ethical worldview is utterly ahistorical. He points to something else as well. In his “Reply to Camus,” Sartre makes explicit reference to *The Plague*, which was widely read as an allegory of the Resistance. But in the novel, Sartre observes, the part of the Germans are “played by microbes without anyone realizing the mystification.”

What mystification? Sartre continues, “In this way, a combination of circumstances [...] enabled you to conceal from yourself that man’s struggle against Nature is both the cause and effect of another struggle, just as old and even more ruthless: the struggle of man against man.56

For Sartre, history is indeed a struggle of human beings against nature—against natural calamities, for example, and against the “natural” extinction of our individual lives. We also struggle to learn the *secrets* of nature, to discover the *laws* of nature, so that we might use them to our advantage. These struggles give rise to those technological developments that are central to Marx’s conception of history. But there is another, equally primordial struggle. *The Communist Manifesto* proclaims, “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.”57 Sartre would say, not only class struggle, but doubtless, history cannot be understood apart from that often ruthless struggle of man against man. This struggle has a radically different character from the struggle of human beings against nature. To conflate them, as Camus tends to do, is a mystification. It is, in a sense, a *comforting* mystification, for it allows one to think of oneself as part of that larger entity, humanity, battling implacable Nature,
proclaiming human dignity in the face of an absurd universe. Solidarity and participation. Us against It. But what if it is Us against Them?

Two issues emerge here that need to be distinguished, the question of historicity (what it means to see oneself as an historical being) and the question of violence. In *The Plague*, since the battle is against microbes, the question of violence—and the agonizing moral dilemmas this question entails—do not arise.\(^{58}\) To be sure, Camus allows that violence against other human beings is sometimes justifiable, but only under the most stringent conditions. (The only figures in *The Rebel* who engage in justifiable violence are the “fastidious assassins,” that small band of Russian anarchists who, for the love of humanity, were willing to kill, but who embraced their own executions as fitting atonement.)

Sartre, as we know, is *not* so fastidious. Recall his famous (some would say, “notorious”) Preface to Franz Fanon’s *The Wretched of the Earth*:

> When the peasant takes a gun in his hands, the old myths grow dim and the prohibitions are one by one forgotten. The rebel’s weapon is proof of his humanity. For in the first days of the revolt you must kill: to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time: there remains a dead man and a free man: the survivor, for the first time, feels a national soil under his foot.\(^{59}\)

I suspect that these words make most of us feel squeamish today. So much blood was spilled during the twentieth century by those aspiring to a truly human future. So much killing. So many revolutions gone awry.

It must be said, however, that Sartre’s position at the time was extraordinarily courageous, resulting in numerous death threats and two bombings of his apartment, one nearly taking the life
of his mother. Can we imagine an *American* intellectual writing, then or even today: “When a Vietnamese peasant kills an American soldier, he kills two birds with one stone—an oppressor and the man he oppresses.”?

As noted above, we, today, can no longer *imagine* a violent revolt against capitalism that would usher in a democratic socialist society, certainly not in an advanced capitalist society. Not only do the modern technologies of repression preclude such an event, but a violent “people’s revolution,” if (*per impossible*) successful, would create utter, prolonged chaos in so complex an economy as our own. For better or for worse, at this historical moment, a democratic road to socialism is the only road, if there is any road at all.

Times were different when Sartre and Camus had to confront the question of violence. The wretched of the earth were in revolt against their colonial masters, who employed massive violence to retain control. Would the anti-colonial revolts have been successful *without* violence, or at least the threat of violence? Would the world be a better place now had the oppressors’ violence succeeded, and those revolts *failed*? In any event the question of revolutionary violence is *not* the question with which we must grapple. (At least not yet.⁶⁰)

The question of historicity remains, and the lack of which, in Camus, is also evident. (We do not *know* that rats will always come forth, or that the rock will always roll back down to where it was before. History is *not* an endless cycle, with nothing new under the sun.)

We are historical beings. We all know that. We are all historical materialists, in that we know that our identities and our life prospects have been shaped by such material circumstances as our race, class, gender, nationality, occupation, etc. We all agree with Marx on another point: “Men make their own history, but not spontaneously, under conditions they have chosen for themselves; rather on terms immediately existing, given and handed down to them.”⁶¹
But Sartre takes us a step further, going beyond a non-controversial statement of fact to a moral imperative. Men (and women) make history. We all make history. The question is, do we accept the responsibility for this making? We are free beings, so we are responsible. Do we accept this responsibility, or do we withdraw to the sidelines, pretend there is nothing we can do, and watch the spectacle unfold?

If we acknowledge our Sartrean responsibility, then we must make conscious choices. In particular, if we conclude that the world is rife with injustice and oppression, then we must ally ourselves with others who are struggling against this injustice and oppression. If we do, if one consciously takes on the project of “making history,” everything changes. As Sartre tells us:

The person who, in contrast [to the person who tries to remain aloof from history], subscribes to the aims of concrete human beings will be forced to choose his friends, because, in a society torn apart by civil war, one can neither accept nor reject everyone’s aims at the same time. But as soon as he chooses, everything acquires a meaning; he knows why the enemies resist and why he fights. For only in historical action is the understanding of history given.62

Sartre is right, is he not? Consider this: if you choose to engage with others in the struggle for human emancipation, your thought is reorganized, your worldview changes. You now read history differently. People and events take on new significance. If you see the struggle as anti-capitalist, you become intensely interested, for example, in the debates among Marxists following the Bolshevik Revolution. You want to know what went wrong. You become intensely interested in the evolution of China since their revolution, during which time more people have been raised out of poverty than ever before in human history. Is this achievement to be credited to Chinese socialism, or to Chinese capitalism? You become interested in historical
“experiments” that may (or may not) be harbingers of good things to come. You worry about the survival of the Cuban revolution and about the success or failure of worker-cooperatives around the world. You become a different person. Your identity changes.

To be clear, a living Marxism, if it is indeed the philosophy “beyond which we cannot go, because we have not gone beyond the circumstances that engendered it,” has to be about more than class struggle. Marxism aspires to be the philosophy of human emancipation, and so must be attentive to the myriad other forms of structural oppression as well (race, gender, sexual orientation, etc.) It must seek to understand the complex intersections of these forms, for it aims at, in Sartre’s words, “a totalization of knowledge.”

A Sartrean, existentialized Marxism also demands of an adherent a commitment to action. Remember No Exit and Inès’s rejoinder to Garcin, who has been searching his soul for evidence that he is not a coward. “A man is what he wills himself to be,” says Garcin. To which Inès replies: “Prove it. Prove it was no dream. It’s what one does, and nothing else, that shows the stuff one’s made of.”

This commitment to action need not be grandiose, but one must do something. As Sartre says, again in his “Reply to Camus,”

It is not a matter of establishing whether history has a meaning, and whether we deign to participate in it, but, given that we are in it up to our necks, of trying to give it what seems to us the best meaning, by not refusing our participation, no matter how small, in any of the concrete actions that require it.

One hear an echo here of a more famous proclamation: “Philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways. The point, however, is to change it.”
1 John Gerassi, *Talking with Sartre: Conversations and Debates* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 178. The quote is from a conversation that took place in April, 1972.


4 Sartre did write a moving, appreciate eulogy to Camus on the occasion of his death in an automobile accident, January 1960. See *Portraits*, 173-78.

5 Aronson, 128.

6 Ibid., 135


8 Ibid., 292

9 Ibid., 290.

10 Sartre, “Reply,” 151-2

11 Ibid., 162

12 Ibid., 156.

13 Ibid., 158.

14 Ibid., 160

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., 164.

17 Ibid., 169-70.

18 "It is possible that Marx did not want this," says Camus, "but in this lies his responsibility." *The Rebel*, 210.

19 Ibid., 188.

20 Ibid., 190.
21 Ibid., 206.

22 Ibid.

23 I'll admit, I was taken aback a bit by that quote. It's not one I'd seen before. So I did a search on marxists.org. The exact quote is this: "To revenge the misdeeds of the ruling class, there existed in the middle ages, in Germany, a secret tribunal, called the "Vehmgiricht." If a red cross was seen marked on a house, people knew that its owner was doomed by the "Vehm." All the houses of Europe are now marked with the mysterious red cross. History is the judge—its executioner, the proletarian." Marx made these remarks in London in 1856, at a dinner celebrating the 4th anniversary of the Chartist newspaper, the People's Paper. They were not intended for publication, but a local newspaper printed the text of the short speech. cf: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1856/04/14.htm

24 Marx’s anarchist contemporary and ideological rival, famous for such slogans as “Destroy or be destroyed—there is no middle way! Let us then be the destroyers!”

25 In his Hague speech in 1872, Marx noted that in those countries where bureaucracy and standing army did not dominate the state, "the workers may attain their goal by peaceful means [although]in most continental countries the lever of revolution will have to be force." https://www.marxists.org/archive/hallas/works/1983/06/vote.htm

26 The Rebel, 193, 206.


28 The Rebel, 208-9.

29 Ibid., 212ff.

30 Ibid., 213.

31 Ibid. 214.


34 Ibid., 6.


36 Ibid., 30.

37 Ibid., 8
38 Ibid. It should be noted that in 1975, Sartre repudiates his embrace of Marxism in an interview with Michel Rybalka. When Rybalka asked, “And you no longer consider yourself a Marxist?” Sartre replied, “No. I think that we are witnessing the end of Marxism.” But he added, “Which does not mean that the main notions of Marxism will disappear; on the contrary, they will be taken up again […] but there are too many difficulties in preserving the Marxism of today.” Quoted in Ronald Aronson, “Marxism and Existentialism,” unpublished manuscript. Aronson suggests, quite plausibly in my view, that “It is as if Sartre is trying to salvage existentialism from a dying Marxism in order to assert its continuing vitality.”

39 Ibid., 170.

40 The necessity of unemployment has been acknowledged by contemporary economists. Milton Friedman called it “the natural rate of unemployment,” but it has since been rebranded as LSUR (the lowest sustainable rate of unemployment), below which inflation inevitably set in.

41 Cited by Mancur Olsen and Hans Lansberg, The No-Growth Society (New York: Norton, 1974), 97. Although it is commonplace to argue that Marx belongs to the "promethean" tradition of the Enlightenment, which celebrated man's "domination of nature," recent research on Marx contradicts this view. Marx was far more aware of capitalism's despoliation of the environment than is commonly acknowledged. See, for example, his section on "Modern Industry and Agriculture," in Volume One of Capital. For further evidence see John Bellamy Foster, Marx's Ecology (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000).


46 The Communist Manifesto, 9.


49 Thomas Piketty, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014). More recently, Oxfam’s 2018 data show that in the United States, the top three billionaires now own more wealth than the poorest half of the country. Globally, the top forty-two billionaires have more wealth than the bottom half of humanity.


51 Jean-Paul Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism," available at www.marxists.org.

52 Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, 1992). I put “Western liberal democracy” in quotes, since “Western liberal democracy” is anything but “rule by the people.”


56 Sartre, *Portraits*, 162.

57 *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 9

58 Simone de Beauvoir offers a powerful analysis of such dilemmas in the “The Antinomies of Action” section of *The Ethics of Ambiguity* (New York: Citadel, 1948).

59 Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Grove Press, 1968), 8.

60 It shouldn’t be forgotten that the capitalist class in Germany, forced to choose between Hitler and the socialist-communist alternative, threw their support behind the former. U.S. capitalists also became engaged. Would our billionaires today behave differently? Perhaps even more disturbing is “The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America,” the subtitle of Kathleen Belew’s *Bring the War Home* (Harvard University Press, 2018). Our own Freikorps ready and waiting.

61 Karl Marx. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852) [https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm)


64 Ibid., 171-2.

65 Karl Marx, “11th Thesis on Feuerbach” (1845).