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Civil Discourse and Religion in Transitional Democracies: The Cases of Lithuania, Peru, and Indonesia

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On January 19, 2004, world-renowned German political theorist Jürgen Habermas met with Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (later Pope Benedict XVI) to discuss religion as one of the cultural foundations of the democratic state. Two points of convergence emerged from their discussion. First, both agreed that reason alone cannot sustain respect for individual dignity and the common good without more substantive faith commitments. Second, they agreed that these values, however complementary they might be philosophically, are difficult to harmonize in practice. Agreeing on policies that respect the right of each to pursue his or her own conception of the good appears all but impossible in light of incommensurable belief commitments and especially so whenever these commitments are viewed as divine commands whose truth cannot be doubted and whose prescriptive meaning cannot be compromised.

This chapter focuses on the duty of citizens living in democracies to wrestle with this dilemma in a civil manner. Recent events surrounding the Arab Spring confirm that religion can be a powerful weapon in furthering the transition to democracy, now recognized as crucial to the realization of peaceful coexistence and respect for human rights. Democracy sustains a
stable and enduring respect for the rule of law because citizens recognize its legitimacy as a fair procedure. This chapter argues that the capacity of religion to promote democratic reform in a way that respects this procedure must extend beyond its recognition of the liberal principle of human rights and toleration. It must also extend to recognizing the republican principle of non-domination.

Non-domination goes beyond guaranteeing individual freedom from government encroachment and the freedom to elect government officers. Such liberal freedoms still permit majorities to impose unilaterally their interpretation of rights and public welfare on minorities. To avoid this tyranny, republicanism recommends constitutional checks and balances that divide power, including provisions guaranteeing effective political representation of minorities and other vulnerable groups, such as women. Beyond these institutional arrangements, republicanism urges the cultivation of free and inclusive political deliberation aimed at the common good, but in a manner that respects, rather than suppresses, basic religious differences.

The question here is whether such deliberation requires citizens to refrain from imposing policies that restrict basic constitutional liberties whenever the rationales underlying these policies are based exclusively on premises whose authority cannot in principle be universally accepted. The argument here is that it cannot, for the simple reason that what counts as publicly reasonable in any given polity will reflect shifting value commitments that ultimately rest on particular authoritative traditions and comprehensive beliefs.

Deliberative civility will often (but not always) require framing political arguments in terms of this substantive public reason. Rules of civility will depend on the degree of ideological pluralism as well as on the establishment (or lack thereof) of democracy out of transitional process. Following discussions of Lithuania, Peru, and Indonesia, this chapter holds that the very dynamics of democratic deliberation offer strategic incentives to religious parties for becoming increasingly more respectful of difference and less sectarian by arguing for social justice positions that have broad appeal across groups. Such moderation of religious discourse can lead, in turn, to forging a more inclusive and balanced public reason for morally principled (not merely strategic) reasons. That said, republican embrace of political pluralism, even when morally principled, need not incorporate respect for individual rights unless institutional guarantees (above all, independent judges) protect this liberal value against communitarian domination.

First, a clarification is needed of what is meant here by civil deliberation grounded in public reason. A citizen’s feeling morally obligated to
voluntarily abide by a law she opposed is dependent on her belief that those backing the law tried to convince her of its rightness by appeal to evidence she could recognize as authoritative, even if she did not judge the evidence to be compelling. However, expecting religiously motivated citizens to provide generally acceptable reasoning cannot be construed in such a way as to restrict their freedom of religious expression. Believers should not have to subordinate their faith to secular reason. To demand that persons who are guided by divine revelation abstain from political life because they cannot yet formulate reasons based on more commonly accepted authorities, the natural sciences, for example, imposes a burden on them that their more secularly minded co-sociates do not carry. For this reason, some proviso to the effect that such reasons be given in due course (as Rawls recommends) or that nonbelievers equalize the burden by taking it upon themselves to reformulate religious arguments in more secular language (as Habermas recommends), seems eminently reasonable. Indeed, everyone (nonbelievers included) should try to translate their dogmatic, comprehensive core commitments into language that others find acceptable.

The antagonism of liberals toward Catholicism in Europe and Latin America was linked to fear of religion intruding into politics. Well into the twentieth century, the Roman Catholic Church opposed liberalism and democracy. These ideas and their accompanying social movements threatened the authority of the pope as guide to all things moral and spiritual. Yet it was precisely the Catholic Church’s decision to participate in democratic politics that eventually restrained its hegemonic demands and enabled it to support political frameworks of public reasoning congenial to its values.

As discussed by Marcia Hermansen and Peter Schraeder in this volume, Samuel Huntington observes that the “third wave” of democratization from 1974 to 1990 was “overwhelmingly a Catholic wave,” with roughly three-quarters of the thirty countries transitioning to democracy being predominantly Catholic. Among the beneficiaries of this wave were Peru and Lithuania. In Peru, the Catholic Church took an active role in organizing the urban and rural poor in accordance with liberation theological precepts while condemning guerrilla- and government-sponsored violence. Meanwhile, in Lithuania, with a Catholic majority of 81 percent, the Church opposed the communist regime by strongly advocating on behalf of liberal constitutional principles and human rights.

What made the Church’s role as a promoter of liberal democratic reform possible in these countries? In both Peru and Lithuania, Catholicism was
part of the national identity while it simultaneously stood apart from the state proper. The separation of the Church from the state in these countries enabled the Church to become more accepting of liberal democracy and vice versa. Hence, it is not surprising that the Church’s authority in pushing authoritarian regimes toward democracy was strongest in situations where it refused state accommodation (e.g., Poland) and weakest where it accepted it (e.g., Spain).

The Lithuanian Catholic Church’s leading role in resisting communist “Russification” reflects a third outcome midway between that of Spain and Poland. The reasons for the diminished prestige of the Church today are complex, ranging from the peculiar nature of the Lithuanian reform movement prior to post-Soviet independence, to what many scholars perceive to be the incursion of secular attitudes among a population that remains highly distrustful of any institutional authority. The chapter by Nerija Putinaite in this volume goes far in explaining this phenomenon. Lithuanian perestroika was headed by the 1988 Lithuanian Reform Movement Sąjūdis and supported by the Lithuanian Communist Party. Hence, it was divided between factions that sought only national autonomy from the USSR and factions that sought full liberal democracy within a multiparty system. The Catholic Church saw itself (and was seen by most Lithuanians) as primarily a defender of national religious and linguistic identity, rather than an advocate of liberal democratic reform. Economic liberalization has since trumped the social agenda proposed by the Church, with most of the significant political parties and organizations within civil society representing labor and business interests.

Lithuania’s fragmented political environment seems to call for a recommitment to the republican ideal of democratic solidarity, but it is uncertain whether the Catholic Church can lead in this area. Some critics defend a secular morality based on Kantian notions of individual freedom and responsibility, seeing that as more in keeping with modern notions of liberalism. Others argue that the moral skepticism generated by fifty years of Communist dictatorship “in the name of the common good” instilled in Lithuanians a shallow version of liberal toleration. This shallow toleration eliminated commitment to fraternity, the civic virtue that prevents liberal democracy from degenerating into a winner-take-all contest. With this in mind, it would seem that greater Church involvement in Lithuanian political life will require an expansion of its agenda to address social justice issues and refocus its commitment to defending republican solidarity. This move would require bridging Church doctrine and secular economic theory.
If the Peruvian Catholic Church has had more success in reaching out to the broader public, it is because its strong commitment to the poor has found greater appeal among a population that is less willing to embrace neoliberal economic policies. Again, the Church’s defense of human rights against predations by both revolutionary movements and government forces, as well as its promotion of reconciliation based on a full disclosure of the truth concerning war atrocities, has enabled it to appear as the chief defender of republican civility, public reason, and the common good.

Although the Church has had a long history of defending the rights of indigenous people, at least conceptually, dating back to the colonial era, its advocacy on behalf of the poor and disadvantaged in Latin America achieved unprecedented political impact with the emergence of the Liberation Theology Movement in the late 1960s. In 1976, the Episcopal Commission for Social Action established its own department of human rights and became a major force for raising popular consciousness regarding human rights abuses during the second phase of the military government. Given its singular responsibility for organizing poor rural and urban communities (not to mention its vital role in being the primary conduit for almost all donations, voluntary services, and international aid targeting the disadvantaged), the Church today is regarded as the one public institution that Peruvians trust most in administering resources for human development.

Thanks to its unrivaled prestige among all sectors of civil society, the Church has maintained its high profile by branching out to other sectors. As described in Soledad Escalante’s contribution to this volume, having lost its status as the official state religion in 1980, the Catholic Church remains officially recognized (see Article 86 of the 1979 Peruvian Constitution) as “an important element in the historical, cultural, and moral formation of Peru” with which the state offers its cooperation, in conjunction with collaborating with other confessions. Despite its privileged status, the Church had also endured a tense relationship with the state antedating the Constitution and the subsequent concordat with the Holy See (1980).

At times, this has placed the Church in the uncomfortable and unpopular position of having to defend its particular vision of public morality against both state and public opinion. The Peruvian Catholic Church opposed liberalization of abortion and divorce by the Fujimori government, yet it had earlier supported the distribution of birth control pills for purposes of family planning and poverty reduction. The Church later aligned with public opinion and the growing woman’s movement (itself a major force in the advancement of human rights) in opposition to forced government sterilization of poor women. Today, the gender stud-
ies program of the Catholic University of Peru is regarded as one of the strongest in the Andean region.

In recent years, Church involvement in the political life of the country has been subdued due to internal political divisions between conservatives and progressives. During the “dirty war” of the 1990s, the Church hierarchy was split in its criticism of the Fujimori government. While the Council of Bishops sided with most local priests in criticizing the government for its human rights abuses, the archbishop of Lima adopted a more forgiving attitude toward the government’s brutal counterinsurgency policy. Since the departure of Fujimori in 2000, the Church base (if not its hierarchy) remains united in promoting social justice and human rights. Catalina Romero, Dean of the School of Social Sciences at Peru’s Catholic University, notes that the Peruvian Catholic Church continues to enjoy so much public prestige as a political force today precisely because of its ability to pluralize without fragmenting.

The Peruvian and Lithuanian cases illustrate different outcomes for the Roman Catholic Church in negotiating the separation of church and state. The privileged place enjoyed by the Peruvian Catholic Church above all other religions and public institutions is partly a function of its independence from the state (not to mention the internal independence of its own public spheres) and partly a function of its official status as a quasi-governmental institution responsible for dispensing health, welfare, and education. In playing a predominant role in Peru’s democratic civil society, it has had to present both a public face, as defender of human rights and the common good, and a private face as promoter of an orthodox creed that increasingly finds less support among Peruvians, who are more open to alternative lifestyles. The less favored position enjoyed by the Lithuanian Catholic Church reflects, by contrast, its relative inability to break out of a narrow sectarian standpoint and diversify its message so as to embrace broader struggles for social justice.

The case of the Catholic Church in Indonesia presents a fascinating comparison in relation to the Lithuanian and Peruvian situations. There, Catholics represent a small minority of the majority Muslim population. Yet, the debate over whether Islam is compatible with democracy reflects, in some measure, the same concerns expressed over Catholicism, though with several striking differences. To begin with, although both Islam and Catholicism have had to confront the threat of modern secularization, they have experienced this threat differently. Muslim countries, unlike majority Catholic ones, experienced this threat as a foreign export imposed by Western colonial powers, retained by domestic rulers bent on suppressing traditional
religious sects as rivals to their power. For instance, coercively imposed religious privatization and pluralization in Iran under the Pahlavi dynasty (1925–1979) provoked an Islamist backlash. This backlash adopted the revolutionary hegemonic aims of rival Marxist dissidents without their Western humanist ideology.

Not all Islamic fundamentalists who reacted against religious pluralization and privatization, the roots of which are in Western modernity, sought to impose their hegemonic aims by a centralized state apparatus. Although fundamentalist Muslim scholars have entered into tactical alliances with Islamist ruling elites in exchange for maintaining or increasing their local pedagogical and juridical authority, they have also used this expanded authority to challenge the Islamist state for not being Islamic enough. It is from certain of these scholarly traditions that many contemporary Muslim reformers draw their commitment to democracy and religious pluralization.14

Indonesia’s young constitutional government arguably approximates liberal and republican ideals more closely than any other Muslim majority country in the world.15 Indonesia’s democracy followed upon the resignation of General Suharto and his often-brutal “New Order” regime that ruled from 1965 to 1998. Baskara Wardaya’s chapter in this volume clearly outlines these developments. Like the Islamic democracy that emerged in the wake of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the 1999 reform was a response to the corruption, ineptitude, and oppression (economic as well as religious and regional) of authoritarian government. Although the government it replaced was not consistently secular (the Suharto regime increasingly advanced Islamic policies to divide the opposition and gather popular support), it was still condemned by many pious Muslims. This condemnation was for siphoning off vast amounts of wealth for its own privileged elites and ignoring the spiritual and material needs of its poorest citizens.16 Indonesians thus supported democratic reform in direct opposition to a corrupt and brutal dictatorship that often masqueraded as Islamist.

Not surprisingly, Islamic organizations were at the forefront of the 1999 reform. Abdurrahman Wahid, a senior Islamic cleric, headed Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization, the Awakening of Religious Scholars, or Nahdlatul Ulama. Amien Rais, who joined Wahid in the struggle against Suharto, led the second largest Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah, and helped focus student demands on democracy. While Rais went on to create a new non-Islamist political party with leadership shared with non-Muslims (the National Mandate Party), Wahid formed his own Islamic political party, the National Awakening Party, which expressly rejected the idea of 
an Islamic state in favor of a religiously pluralistic one. In keeping with the pluralistic tenor of his party, Wahid joined in an alliance with the secular nationalist party of Megawati Sukarnoputri, the Indonesian Democratic Party—Struggle, which included secular Muslims, Christians, and non-Muslim minorities. Wahid was subsequently elected the fourth president of the nation and the second president in post-Suharto Indonesia.

Toleration of political Islamist organizations within civil society induces a corresponding paradox, whereby these organizations both moderate and broaden their political platforms and arguments. Importantly, these organizations have managed to combine strategies for partially fulfilling strictly religious aims, such as the passage of blasphemy laws, with commitment to republican ideals of civil discourse. To cite the authors of an important study on Indonesian democracy and the transformation of political Islam:

The transformation of political Islam has been one of normalization of Islamist party politics, whereby single-issue Islamist parties have become ever more similar to Indonesia’s larger mass-based parties in terms of their broad campaign messages and inclusive political strategies. At the same time, however, we observe the transformation of Indonesian democracy through what we term insider Islamization, through which Islamists mobilize political support for individual Islamist policies on a case-by-case basis with the goal of influencing the substantive outcomes of the policymaking process. This is a strategy through which Islamists change the substantive policies enacted under Indonesia’s democratic government so as to fulfill Islamists’ political demands without requiring them to prevail in competitive elections.

While liberals have criticized Indonesia’s Islamist anti-blasphemy statute, no standard of public reasonableness is neutral vis-à-vis secular and religious values. Recall that debates over the humanity of non-European descended peoples (today extended to the unborn) were resolved by religion before they were resolved by science. The fact that anti-blasphemy statutes descend from religion makes them no less reasonable than anti-obscenity laws. Failure to demonstrate the harmfulness of such incivilities will not compel those offended to desist from suppressing them unless it can be shown that suppression is more harmful than toleration. However, Indonesia’s blasphemy law may eventually be moderated by the republican doctrine of Pancasila, which emphasizes deliberative democracy as well as social justice and the dignity of the individual.

Deliberative democracy was on full display during the transition to the new regime in 1999. Following Suharto’s resignation, groups representing
almost all sectors of society pushed for elections to legitimate whatever new political order would come into existence. In the 1999 elections, it became apparent that Islamic parties that did not focus on single-issue messages based on political Islam fared better than those (such as the Crescent Star Party) that did. The message was clear: Pious Muslims who constituted a large segment of the population were also interested in issues revolving around their emerging market economy, such as health, welfare, security, jobs, and basic subsistence. Political Islamist parties, such as the Prosperous Justice Party, which abandoned single-issue politics in order to broaden their appeal to moderate and liberal Muslims, saw dramatic improvements in their popularity in the elections of 2004 and 2009. Another step forward occurred in 2009, when the Prosperous Justice Party and the United Development Party joined with the nonpolitical Islamic National Mandate Party and the National Awakening Party to re-elect the government of former army general and corruption fighter, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, himself a member of the secular Democratic Party.

The mainstreaming of political Islamist parties has had a reciprocal impact on substantive legislation in Indonesia. Policies that permit local shari’a ordinances and ban blasphemy are moderated by the fact that they are often enacted with the support of many secularists. For instance, in 2009 the legislator of Aceh, a special region of Indonesia on the island of Sumatra, passed a “stoning law” based on shari’a that expressly punished adulterers and other religious offenders. Less publicized was the fact that the passage of this law was intended as a parting shot by a legislative majority that had just been voted out of office. The law was vetoed by Aceh’s democratically elected governor, Irwandi Yusuf, himself a pious Muslim, and has not been taken up by the new legislature. Yusuf himself worked to reign in Aceh’s Islamic “police” in his pursuit of social policies revolving around increased spending on education and welfare and restrictions on logging. Although Yusuf was voted out of office in 2012 for allowing palm oil concessions in protected habitats, Aceh’s legislature continues to demonstrate a commitment to democratic accountability that exhibits a considerable degree of republican civility on the part of moderate Muslims and all who are principally concerned with environmental protection and other pressing universal issues that transcend religion.

In the absence of a strong constitutional separation of powers with independent courts that are empowered to intervene forcefully in the protection of minority rights, Indonesia’s Pancasila-based efforts at instituting non-domination will remain incomplete. Furthermore, without the cultivation of liberal toleration and republican civility in the public sphere (again, secured by government-sponsored consciousness-raising
campaigns and educational reforms) the exercise of public reason will remain equally partial. Since willingness to entertain viewpoints that clash with one’s own is essential to deliberative democracy, Islamic reform movements must learn to relinquish some of their power and platform for the sake of furthering liberal and republican ideals.

Indeed, Islam can be a legitimate force within democracy only if it actively promotes both republican and liberal values. Russell Powell makes a convincing case for this point in his discussion of Turkey in this volume. As with Catholicism, this outcome favors polities wherein multiple religions compete for political influence through embracing social justice concerns, political cultures encourage deliberative compromise and constitutional power sharing, and judges aggressively defend freedom of speech and minority rights.

It would be premature to conclude that religion can embrace these values without relinquishing at least some of its power to secular authority. Nevertheless, the question remains: How can religion embrace liberal democracy when it claims to be the sole proprietor of divine truth? As this chapter argues, a paradox exists in enlisting this truth in service to a merely mundane end whose realization would entail its partial denial. Born out of an uncompromising dual commitment to social justice and the dignity of the individual, only a faith that moves mountains can risk life itself for the sake of ending oppression and realizing on this earth that always-imperfect semblance of God’s Kingdom.

Today there is mounting evidence that democracies, which incorporate both liberal and civic republican values, are the best worldly approximations of that Kingdom. That the dignity of the individual instantiated in the liberal defense of human rights can degenerate into a destructive worship of unrestrained individual self-assertion unless coupled with a civic republican devotion to the common good has been a mainstay of democratic theory for over three hundred years. A democracy that does nothing more than protect against tyrants and aggregate selfish preferences still permits the tyranny of the dominant preference to reign supreme. Conversely, a democracy premised on a common good that stifles individual freedom and suppresses diversity of belief and lifestyle permits an even worse tyranny: totalitarianism.

Authentic democracy, a democracy premised on the principle of non-domination, must somehow fuse the dignity of the individual with an orientation to the common good. The ideal of civic deliberation is one way to accomplish this aim. In upholding the possibility of achieving consensus on a common good, this ideal retains a belief in something transcendent and unconditional that it shares with religion in resisting the subjectivism
of unexamined individual preferences. In upholding the superiority of
dialogue over personal revelation as a method for discovering this truth,
the ideal invokes the fallibility and open-endedness of mutual criticism. It
thus leaves open the possibility that consensus may not be reached, that
something like an agreement to disagree, coupled with an agreement to
compromise on some issues and tolerate individual differences of opinion
on others, may be inevitable.

The risking of one’s faith in civic deliberation, in a form of Socratic
dialogue, explains part of the ambivalence religion has toward democracy.
Indeed, if what has been argued in this chapter is true, then the moderation
of religious conviction in civic discourse, coupled with its “contamination”
by more mundane concerns, is a price religion must pay for remaining a
legitimate political force within democracy, as opposed to surviving solely
as a matter of private conscience. By contrast, those philosophers who
invoke the language of public reason as a touchstone for civil political
engagement have something different in mind. Public reason for them
must consist of rational disputation in which all premises descend from
commonly accepted authorities whose presumed neutrality extrudes any
reference to religion.

The motivation behind this suggestion—to avoid the totalitarian impos-
tion of religion—is entirely laudable, but the strategy of avoiding religious
language ignores the fact that our public reason is not an abstract universal
devoid of historical tradition. Even when it assumes the outward form of
secular common sense, what is reasonable always reflects but the temporary-
ly settled history of an evolving ideological struggle for recognition. The
historical confrontation of Catholicism and democracy in the twentieth
century and the parallel confrontation of Islam and democracy in the
twenty-first century might suggest that this struggle invariably resolves
itself in the form of a strategic modus vivendi. Here, toleration of the other
is suffered out of necessity rather than embraced for its own sake. Such may
be the case initially, but the stories told here offer hope for a more civil reso-
lution wherein “the other” is not just tolerated outwardly but internalized
dialogically.

NOTES

1. Their dialogue was published under the title The Dialectics of Secular-
Press, 2006).

Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 144; Jürgen Haber-

4. In his encyclical, Mirari vos, Gregory XVI (1831–1846) strongly condemned liberty of conscience and freedom of speech. Although his successor Pius IX (1846–1878) began his pontificate expressing more sympathy for liberalism, The Syllabus of Errors that accompanied his encyclical Quanta cura (1864) retracted this sentiment. Leo XIII (1878–1903) reaffirmed Gregory’s attack in Liberates humana (1888), defending toleration only in non-Catholic nations as a necessary expedient (a view that later gave rise to the thesis/hypothesis distinction in Church policy), although earlier (1885) in Immortale Dei he allowed that non-monarchical government might be acceptable. Leo’s successor, Pius X (1903–1914), continued to lash out against modernism, liberalism, and democracy following passage of France’s secularism law (1905), while Pius XI (1922–1939) reconciled Catholicism with Italian and German Fascist dictatorships (1929 and 1933) before changing his mind (1937). There were still restrictions on the rights of Protestants to proselytize in Spain and Colombia when Pius XII issued his 1944 Christmas message defending “liberty and equality” and “true democracy.”


9. Ibid., n30.


11. The Peruvian Constitution recognizes freedom of religion and state-church separation. However, in accordance with the agreement between the Peruvian government and the Holy See of 1980, the Catholic Church enjoys special privileges in areas of education, taxation, government funding, immigration of clerical personnel from abroad, and in military ministry. All public
schools are required to teach the Catholic religion, an exemption from religious instruction is provided to non-Catholics and nonbelievers.


15. Elections in Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh are all marked by corruption and instability; Malaysia is a multiethnic and multireligious nation whose democratic monarchy is founded on the structural dominance of a coalition uniting three ethnic parties (Chinese, Indian, and Malay), with the last having a Muslim presence.


19. Pancasila combines two Sanskrit words: *Panca* (five) and *sila* (principle). The five principles it incorporates are a belief in (1) the one and only God; (2) just and civilized humanity; (3) the unity of Indonesia; (4) democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives; and (5) social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia. These principles were fashioned by later president Sukarno in 1945 as a synthesis of monotheism, socialism, and nationalism and incorporated into the Constitution. While the first principle has been criticized for excluding polytheism, atheism, and agnosticism, its major thrust is support for a transcendent foundation for respecting the inherent dignity of the individual and humanity.

20. In his first election to the presidency Yudhoyono ran on a platform of prosperity, peace, justice, and democracy and had the support of several political Islamist parties, the National Awakening Party, the Crescent Star Party, and the Reform Star Party.
