Revisting Gangs in the Post–World War II North American City: A Forum

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City gangs have long been a subject of historical debate. More than a century ago, the muckraking journalist Jacob Riis presented one of the earliest systematic examinations of gang life in American cities. “By day they loaf in the corner-groggeries on their beat, at night they plunder the stores along the avenues, or lie in wait at the river for unsteady feet straying their way,” wrote Riis (1890) in his classic *How the Other Half Lives*. Riis’s examination of gangs over several decades was sensational and melodramatic,¹ a characteristic reinforced a generation later with Herbert Asbury’s (1927) embellished and exaggerated *Gangs of New York*. The themes and images of gang life—that such groups were little more than juvenile terrorists, that they were products of the “vice and corruption” of city life, that members embodied “the worst depravity” of the modern city—persist in contemporary culture, as witnessed by the popularity of Martin Scorsese’s (2002) *Gangs of New York*.

For most of the twentieth century, sociologists have provided the most rigorous and serious study of gangs and inner-city youth subcultures.² More recently, historians of American cities have moved beyond the sensationalized stereotypes, assumptions, and narratives of Riis, Asbury, and others. Eric Schneider’s (1999) *Vampires, Dragons and Egyptian Kings: Youth Gangs in Postwar New York* and Andrew Diamond’s (2009) *Mean Streets: Chicago Youths and the Everyday Struggle for Empowerment in the Multiracial City, 1908-1969* represent some of the most influential and sophisticated attempts to revise and reinterpret this literature. Schneider attributes the emergence of gangs after World War II as an outgrowth of changing conceptions of male identity and masculinity between 1940 and 1970. Diamond, by contrast, believes that ideological and political factors played equally important roles in gang formation during these years.³ In 2002, both debated these points in these pages.⁴ More recently, historian Will Cooley challenged elements of Diamond’s argument.⁵ Accordingly, the *Journal of Urban History* presents the ongoing discussion regarding the importance of political ideology and social circumstance in gang formation in the postwar North American city. The debate continues.

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Andrew Diamond’s Response to Will Cooley

In his article “‘Stones Run It’: Taking Back Control of Organized Crime in Chicago, 1940-1975,” Will Cooley challenges several arguments I make in the last chapter of Mean Streets: Chicago Youths and the Everyday Struggle for Empowerment in the Multiracial City, 1908-1969. Mean Streets offers an even-handed account of the involvement of Chicago’s black supergangs in the politics of black power and community uplift between 1966 and 1969. Cooley structures his article around the idea that scholars like myself and John Hagedorn tend to attribute “prosocial goals” (a term I never used) to Chicago’s gangs of the 1960s while neglecting “the larger history of black organized crime” (p. 911). He uses the case of the Blackstone Rangers to dismiss claims that gang involvement in politics was anything other than a cover for crime. In his zeal to cure the historiographical ill he attributes to me, Cooley makes a straw man out of my analysis and then offers a weakly supported account of his own to disprove it.

Mean Streets is at the center of Cooley’s critique of the recent scholarship dealing with the street gangs of the 1960s. For example, in challenging the book’s analysis for allegedly overemphasizing black community support for gangs, he refers to the statement that “gangs were the most effective (and arguably the only) grassroots organizations capable of bringing such solidarities into existence” (p. 920). Later he quotes Mean Streets again to make a similar point: “Yet instead of ‘crystallizing, organizing and articulating racial sensibilities at the neighborhood level,’ as Andrew Diamond claims, gangs fragmented the black community” (p. 923). These perspectives, according to Cooley, do not apply to the Rangers. Fair enough. The problem is that he takes these words and this argument out of context. In fact, these are observations that pertain not to the black supergangs of the high era of civil rights and black power but rather to certain Mexican and black gangs of the early 1960s. More specifically, I drew these conclusions in trying to make sense of a series of informal street demonstrations (most notably in 1961) that saw such gangs rallying literally thousands of Mexican and black youths into the streets to express their anger about racially charged attacks. These events, which were closely covered in the Chicago dailies, occurred in a West Side neighborhood that was witnessing considerable friction between African American, Mexican, and white ethnic youths. This was a period in which gang memberships numbered in the tens rather than in the hundreds or thousands. Hence, the vast majority of youths that took to the streets to express their anger in these events did so not as members of gangs but rather as members of their surrounding communities. That gangs were at the center of these events is significant.

The timing here is critical because Chicago’s African American street gangs of the late 1950s and early 1960s functioned quite differently than their successors of the late 1960s. What Mean Streets seeks to show is that by 1961, several years before Stokely Carmichael popularized “black power,” before militant political organizations filled black Chicago, before dashikis and natural hairstyles, before supergangs, and before local politics in black, Mexican, and Puerto Rican Chicago became inseparably bound up with racial identities, gangs were sparking collective actions that drew boundaries around communities and raised attention to the racial injustices they faced. Thus, when I speak of gangs creating “solidarities” and “sensibilities” here, I am not discussing support for black supergangs like the Blackstone Rangers, as Cooley mistakenly implies, but rather about “solidarities” and “sensibilities” (“crystallizing” in the late 1950s and early 1960s) that laid the foundations in black, Mexican, and Puerto Rican communities for the identity politics of later years. To be sure, Mean Streets attributes some of these same capacities to the Rangers and other supergangs of the late 1960s, but it also attempts to show that the story becomes much more complicated by gang involvement in criminal activities—as Cooley’s account aptly suggests.
This is not the only example of “‘Stones Run It’” misinterpreting the meaning and chronology of my arguments. For example, in the chapter examining the 1957-1963 period, Cooley writes that I “recognize[] the rise in firearms during the 1960s and 1970s but assert[] that it resulted from white terrorism directed at black residents and the police force’s unwillingness to do much about it,” a view that, he claims, “elides the reality that black gang members were usually firing on black rivals” (p. 922). But this is not the argument. The discussion concerning the rise in firearms refers not to the 1960s and 1970s but to the period between 1958 and 1962, a time of heightened racial conflict on the West Side. As for the idea that Mean Streets “elides” the issue of black-on-black gang violence, the following, a passage from this same chapter, demonstrates this is simply not true:

By 1958, the Lawndale neighborhood to the southwest of the Addams area had given rise to Chicago’s most vicious gang milieu. The rapid proliferation of fighting-gangs in this black ghetto neighborhood had by 1958 led to the spread of coercive recruitment campaigns and a veritable arms race on the streets. While guns were becoming more frequent in other parts of the city as well at this time, violent recruitment tactics were still somewhat unheard of outside of Lawndale, which was home to dozens of large street-fighting groups, the most reputable being the El Commandoes, Van Dykes, Braves, Cherokees, Morphines, Continental Pimps, Imperial Chaplains, Imperial Knights, Comanchees, Vice Lords, Clovers, and Cobras. By 1962, most of these gangs had been absorbed, in most cases forcibly, by either the Vice Lords or Cobras, both of which had become immense federations of street-corner groups capable of rallying several hundred young men for battle.8

In sum, this was just one segment of a long section about intraracial violence in ghetto neighborhoods, which concludes with the statement that “African American gangs were locked in mortal combat within an economy of power on the streets.”9

Ironically, “‘Stones Run It,’” in treating Mean Streets as a historiographical foil, overlooks how much of the book’s analysis of the Rangers (and Vice Lords) supports Cooley’s core argument about how gangs engaged in criminal activities that undermined their “prosocial goals.” In a longer discussion about these matters, the final chapter of Mean Streets argues:

The GIU’s [Gang Intelligence Unit] account of recruitment tactics by Chicago’s most powerful black gangs held some undeniable truth. In September of 1966, for example, the Blackstone Rangers moved to make Woodlawn’s Hyde Park High School off-limits to Disciples. The result was a 25 percent enrollment drop; numerous students applied for transfers, and when their requests were turned down many parents kept their children home from school. After the killing of a local boy scout, a group called Concerned Parents of Woodlawn demanded that police control the Rangers. At a September 26th meeting with police on Disciple turf, enraged residents called for a clampdown, applauding when one person stood up and shouted, “To heck with getting accused of police brutality, let’s use some force on these punks!”

Violence was thus an important means for expanding ranks and maintaining discipline during these years. In areas like Woodlawn on the South Side and Lawndale on the West Side, where gangs were engaged in deadly fights to the finish, there were a good many youths who, whether through their own calculation or through pressure exerted by their parents, wanted little to do with this very dangerous world. . . . Even the former gang leaders and sympathetic community activists who have sought to play down the use of coercive
recruitment methods by gangs like the Rangers and the Vice Lords seem mostly to be employing a different notion of violence rather than denying its presence.\textsuperscript{10}

\textit{Mean Streets} thus strikes a balance between the redeeming vision of gangs as politically significant and the pessimistic view of them as criminal profiteers. While my interpretation supports elements of Cooley’s arguments, the reality lies somewhere between these two perspectives. Consider the evidence found in the little-used Chicago Police Red Squad files housed at the Chicago History Museum. Cooley never exploits this source; instead he relies largely on newspaper accounts for evidence. The Red Squad files include revealing gang surveillance records that demonstrate that police operatives observed gang members spending time and energy attending political meetings and making contacts with local and high-profile activists between 1966 and 1968. (Strict rules prohibit use of these files to identify specific individuals and organizations, but one can utilize them to make general conclusions.) In fact, Cooley would have found rich evidence for his case in these files if he had bothered to examine them, but he also would have stumbled on data that complicates his story. “‘Stones Run It’” relies on only scattered references to sources from the years 1966 to 1968 even though most of the political activities the article seeks to discredit occurred during those years. Indeed, most of the primary sources in “‘Stones Run It’” originate in the 1970s, which problematizes any critique of \textit{Mean Streets}, which concludes in 1969.

“‘Stones Run It’” thus ignores important considerations of chronology and causality. Nearly all of the article’s documentation comes from late 1969 and after, which indicates that a critical turning point occurred during these years. Indeed, Cooley himself admits things changed after 1969. That year the Chicago police assassinated Fred Hampton, Mayor Daley declared his “War on Gangs,” the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) pulled the plug on the Youth Manpower Project, and embezzlement charges against the Rangers covered Chicago’s daily newspapers. By 1970, gangs like the Rangers had few friends left. On this we agree. Yet, evidence found in the Red Squad files undermines Cooley’s brisk dismissal of politically motivated repression as an important factor in this change. The records reveal Gang Intelligence Unit operatives tailing a range of gang leaders almost 24/7 between 1966 and 1968. Did such surveillance have nothing to do with the anti-Machine activities of the Rangers and Vice Lords, including their support for anti-Machine aldermanic candidates and their active promotion of a 1967 mayoral election boycott that dramatically reduced Daley’s vote totals in the so called “plantation wards”? If events spiraled downward for both the Rangers and Vice Lords in the early 1970s, most likely this was the result of Chicago’s political machine marshaling its many resources to fight their increasing involvement with new local political organizations. In other words, the pattern of criminal activity seems to change around 1969. Why then?

“‘Stones Run It’” dismisses such considerations out of hand, preferring the rather monocausal explanation that the fall of the Rangers (and Vice Lords) resulted from their involvement in vice and extortion. Deriving its analysis mostly from newspaper reportage, a handful of archival sources, and a sprinkling of secondary sources, Cooley provides little new insight into the form, extent, and timing of gang involvement in organized crime. He cites the \textit{Wall Street Journal}, \textit{Washington Post}, and \textit{New Republic} while offering no documentation from either the Chicago Police Department or the Chicago Crime Commission. Much of his evidence thus amounts to hearsay—catchy quotes by interested parties culled from newspapers that were hardly neutral observers. They make for good reading, but many of them took form in editorial rooms far away from the streets. This is not to deny the abundance of more compelling data tying the Blackstone Rangers to criminal activities. In fact, if \textit{Mean Streets} does not link supergangs \textit{quite enough} to organized crime—a defensible critique—it is partly because such hearsay and such data have largely dominated the historical record. Rather than writing
against the grain, “‘Stones Run It’” reinforces an already existing narrative. This much seems clear from the broad range of national media sources represented in the endnotes. Mean Streets, by contrast, is an attempt to complicate an oversimplified media-driven story regarding the dysfunctional gangbanger culture of the black ghetto. It seeks to reveal how some gangs in the late 1960s were torn apart by internecine struggles between genuine black nationalists and gangsters—a story largely ignored or never told—and to explain why, in most cases, the gangsters ultimately prevailed.

Finally, discrediting the Blackstone Rangers is a bit like shooting fish in a barrel. By contrast the Vice Lords make a better case study for a “big picture” argument, which “‘Stones Run It’” aspires to be. The Vice Lords of the late 1960s had strong ties to the militant civil rights organization ACT, participated in a range of well-documented civil rights activities, and were ultimately cleared of all charges of fraud and embezzlement. This is not to say that the Vice Lords did not have their detractors. Even Bobby Gore, the former Vice Lord spokesman who served eleven years in prison for a murder he still claims he did not commit, has never tried to candy-coat the story. Interviewed for a History Channel documentary on the Vice Lords several years ago, Gore argued that the GIU’s success in sabotaging the political efforts of the Vice Lords benefitted from the murders and robberies committed by some members of the gang. “We screwed ourselves somewhat,” Gore claimed, “because had it not been for guys doing dumb shit—excuse the expression—they wouldn’t have had the excuse to pounce on us as they did.” To conflate the story of the Vice Lords with that of the Blackstone Rangers obscures rather than illuminates the complicated dynamics at work both within black supergangs and their surrounding communities in the transitional years of the late 1960s, when the end of the story was yet to be written.

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Will Cooley’s Response
In 1967, at a meeting with Coca-Cola executives at the Vernon Park Church of God on Chicago’s South Side, Operation Breadbasket leaders stated that they planned to pressure chain stores to do more business with black-owned sanitation haulers. The Coca-Cola executives warned that this effort was sure to bring “syndicate and union problems.” Operation Breadbasket pushed ahead anyway, securing garbage contracts with forty stores in African American neighborhoods. “What’s more grass-rootsy than garbage?”, Operation Breadbasket head Jesse Jackson later quipped to the media. However, Chicago’s Outfit, the city’s leading crime syndicate, responded as predicted by threatening black workers, destroying refuse containers, and fire-bombing two garbage trucks.11 Clearly, Chicago’s whites-only crime syndicate posed yet another hurdle to black empowerment.

In “‘Stones Run It’: Taking Back Control of Organized Crime in Chicago, 1940-1975,” I detailed how African American gangs repossessed captive rackets in their neighborhoods beginning in the 1960s. The article emphasized interpretive differences with Andrew Diamond’s Mean Streets: Chicago Youths and the Everyday Struggle for Empowerment in the Multiracial City,
Mean Streets was not at the center of my article, as Diamond suggests, as I engaged numerous secondary sources to argue for a fresh understanding of gangs in the 1960s and 1970s.

Diamond and I, however, do view the outlooks and potentialities of gangs such as the Blackstone Rangers in different ways. I contend Diamond is looking in the wrong places for potential radicals. Some gang members had moments of transcendence, but due to a series of factors, including the realities of economic conditions and social marginalization, most gangs were just gangs, not would-be foot soldiers for the revolution. Scholars who see gangs as incipient activist groups browbeaten into criminality by state actions miss out on crucial factors that shaped inner-city life. In the main, Diamond and I disagree over the meanings of politics for gang members, the trajectories of gangs, and the effects of state repression on gang activities. These distinctions connect to the larger historiographical debate over the lost promise of liberalism and radicalism during the Long Sixties. Gang members were ambitious, but their concerns were usually immediate, localized, and nonideological.

Diamond alleges that “‘Stones Run It’” dismisses the role of state repression in the activities of gangs and makes a “rather monocausal explanation that the fall of the Rangers (and Vice Lords) resulted from their involvement in vice and extortion.” This misinterprets my argument. “‘Stones Run It’” offers a multilayered explanation for the rise of black gangs such as the Rangers. The article contextualized gangs by describing the effects of syndicate colonialism, the absence of organized crime mentors for young gang members, a collapsing job market, increasing societal alienation, the influx of firearms, and government repression (one could also add failing schools, which, in retrospect, I did not adequately address). Similar to Diamond, I complicate the depiction of black gangs as “pathological” forces who engaged in “senseless” violence by exploring how organized crime functioned in black neighborhoods. “‘Stones Run It’” demonstrates how black gang members had deep and completely understandable grievances due to the mobsters, politicians, and police officers profiting from rackets in black districts. City officials allowed vice to flourish in black neighborhoods even before the closing of the city’s Levee district in the 1910s. Many blacks grew up in these wide-open settings and faced daily reminders of their race and class oppression not only in mainstream life, but in outlaw capitalism as well. Unsurprisingly, they lashed out. From the perspective of members of the Rangers and other supergangs, the 1960s and 1970s were not a period of descent, but a precipitous upsurge in power, prestige, and income. The decline of the Stones (by then known as El Rukns) did not come until the mid-1980s, when drug convictions and an audacious attempt to shake down the Libyan government closed the book on the gang.

The article does not “discredit” the Blackstone Rangers; instead it gives them credit for seeking the profits involved in lucrative underground markets. Commercial sex, gambling, and other illegal pursuits were often the most available aspects of many ghetto economies. Gang members needed the money, a scarce commodity in ghetto homes, and they frequently justified their move into crime by contending that they were provisioning for themselves and their families. The Stones sought to remove syndicate management of the rackets in black neighborhoods and often viewed this through the lens of Black Power. As a former gang member proudly told the sociologist Sudhir Venkatesh, in the 1970s black gangs finally “kicked the Eye-talian and Jewish mafia” out of his Chicago ward, giving black men jobs in the heroin trade once reserved for whites.12

These young men, though imbued with Black Power rhetoric, were still gang members, and they held tight to the considerations of turf, status, and narrow solidarities that held these groups together. Many of the smaller black gangs that formed in the late 1950s and early 1960s became
the “supergangs” of the late 1960s and 1970s. Gangs did not experience a “turning point” toward heightened intraracial violence and criminal ventures, rather they made a progression from small factions to neighborhood power cliques—a process sealed through violence, intimidation, and fierce recruitment—and the sheer momentum of rumbles and rivalries all but guaranteed that gangs were locked into patterns of conflict and expansion. Any grand race-based solidarities involving gangs were fleeting at best. Gang members were aware that their overarching oppressors were predatory whites outside of the ghetto, but gang violence remained a deadly intraracial affair that damaged African American efforts at wide-scale community mobilization. Initially, some leaders applauded the bold stance that gangs took against white gangsters. As the opening vignette of this response shows, African Americans smarted under the clutches of the syndicate. Gangs, however, were unable to marshal support from neighbors who justifiably feared them. As gang violence increased, groups like Operation Breadbasket/Operation Push were forced to interrupt equality campaigns to take rear-guard action to quell gang mayhem.13

Diamond also charges that “‘Stones Run It’” merely reinforces the predominant narrative casting gangs as undisciplined criminal profiteers. He attributes some of this to my reliance on “hardly neutral” newspaper sources and on my failure to use the Chicago Police Red Squad files. But I was fully aware of media bias and used newspaper sources judiciously. Indeed, newspapers are biased, but are police sources any more trustworthy? More importantly, few scholarly or media accounts have adequately examined supergangs in the longer history of black organized crime and detailed how racism in the rackets warped informal economies within black communities. The syndicate’s unwillingness to make partnerships with African Americans kept them in subordinate positions. African Americans were cut off from developing connections with politicians and law enforcement critical to the success of large-scale crime ventures. Syndicate racism left supergangs bereft of a generation of mentors that could have explained that while violence in organized crime was both necessary and rational, it also worked best under restraint. The leadership cadres of gangs such as the Stones were often young, brash, and reckless; they paid little heed to pleas from community members to curb their aggressiveness. In the 1970s, policy makers worsened the problem with drug laws that encouraged youths to become active market participants. Subsequent black organized crime groups have worked to maintain more favorable relations with local residents. Results have been mixed, but this too partly stems from the continued antagonism between black crime groups and law enforcement, the absence of decent-paying jobs, the easy accessibility of cheap handguns, and the war on drugs. The results were tragic for black residents, but “‘Stones Run It’” demonstrates that the seeds of this tragedy were planted by white racism.

Diamond is correct that some gang members had larger ideological visions. Despite media depictions of gangs as strict hierarchies, most were loosely structured and included men with varying conceptions of mission. Within the Stones, for instance, Leonard Sengali often articulated an expansive view of Black Power and lamented intraracial violence, and gang members in prison argued that to truly battle white racism, gangs needed to become more overtly political. Gang members participated in open-housing marches and demonstrative protests for construction jobs. Yet these activities should not be neatly divorced from struggles to secure markets in the informal economy, as the push for construction jobs and control over rackets were not necessarily mutually exclusive efforts. Both involved gang demands for community control and increasing opportunities for members.

In addition, Richard J. Daley and his allies definitely feared the potentialities of black gangs. Chicago’s political machine demonstrated its anxiety over any unapproved black political activity with surveillance and tyranny, culminating in the notorious murder of Black Panther leaders in 1969. Again, though, in the urban milieu, organized crime and politics cannot be separated. Corrupt police and politicians viewed gangs as a threat to business as usual in part because gangs
challenged the politics/rackets nexus that long existed in Chicago. Perhaps gang activities did lead to declining vote totals for the machine. However, falling support for Daley by the 1960s could also be attributed to a host of factors, including but not limited to increasing black political savvy; segregated, overcrowded schools; inferior, unsafe housing in the congested ghettos; dissatisfaction with the Daley-controlled aldermen dubbed the “Silent Six”; and the arrival of Martin Luther King, Jr. in the city. Black Chicagoleans had a plethora of reasons to sour on their political overlords; they formed a host of organizations and movements to improve their situation. Gangs were minor players in these civil rights dramas and ended up disappointing civil rights leaders such as Jesse Jackson and Ralph Abernathy. The relations between gangs and activists, which were always tenuous, worsened as violence became more chaotic and deadly.

Many gangs simultaneously operated as ethnic support groups and extortionists, protectors of neighborhoods and the bane of neighbors, dichotomies that have made them difficult to categorize. Gangs usually coalesced around ethnicity and almost always by a shared sense of place, but local residents often had the most to fear from gang members of their own racial group. In the 1960s, black supergangs began to stand up to the white organized crime syndicates that had long preyed on them. However, the result was not an overdue triumph of black capitalism. Decades of urban-style racism and disinvestment had left many inner-city residents to fight for a share of an informal economy with low barriers for entry but high stakes for involvement. As sociologist Christopher Adamson finds, while European American youth gangs often facilitated assimilation into mainstream cultures because of their connection to political machines and other powerful organizations, black youth gangs reinforced cultural separation as they were rooted in racially segregated neighborhoods and structures.14 Due to the crippling effects of deindustrialization and capital flight, certain teenagers viewed gang life as a job—a source of income. The fact that these gangs came of age during a period of heightened racial consciousness was significant, but ultimately the gangs’ visions of “community control” sharply contrasted with that of the community at large. Ghetto residents understood this friction better than anyone. They bitterly realized that gang members, who were often relatives and acquaintances, had their life chances constricted considerably by race, class, and location.

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Notes


6. Ibid., 911-32.

7. Diamond, Mean Streets.

8. Ibid., 214-15.

9. Ibid., 217-18. This quote appears on the same page Cooley cites to document my alleged “elision” of black-on-black violence.

10. Ibid., 263-64.


