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Greek Religion and Epigraphic Corpora: What’s Sacrae about Leges Sacrae?

Laura Gawlinski

The Latin phrase *leges sacrae* and its various translations (sacred laws, lois sacrées, heilige Gesetze) have been applied since at least the nineteenth century to various collections of inscribed documents.¹ It is a modern invention born out of the German Wissenschaft ideology of systematic, scientific, comprehensive methods of inquiry. This rubric and the collecting of Greek inscriptions under it have always been recognized as problematically subjective, and in the last decade or so a flurry of scholarship has critiqued the corpora more directly.² Much of this analysis has focused on the *leges* half of *leges sacrae*: whether “sacred law” corresponds to an ancient category, what legal aspects of sacred laws distinguish them from other laws and decrees, and how their terms might have been enforced. What has been less examined, however, is what defines the subject matter that led to the classification of these documents as *sacrae*. What is sacred about Greek sacred law?

In order to bring this question more explicitly into the conversation, I approach the corpora in which the so-called sacred laws have been collected from a historiographic perspective, treating each corpus as a document that captured a scholarly moment in time and in turn influenced subsequent collections and other scholarship on the subject.³ By investigating the standards of the compilers of the corpora, whether spoken or not, their underlying distinctions between sacred and not sacred can be uncovered. What kinds of texts did each scholar choose to include or
exclude? What choices lasted and which were changed? Can we determine how closely this modern academic enterprise reflects anything ancient, in concept or practice?

1. Why Corpora?

The collecting of sacred law has gone on for over a century. The first corpus, *Leges Graecorum Sacrae*, was compiled by Johannes von Prött and Ludwig Ziehen in two volumes published separately in 1896 and 1906 (*LGS* I and II). Franciszek Sokolowski supplemented and updated their work (but did not make it completely obsolete) in the 1950s and 1960s: *Lois sacrées de l’Asie mineure* (*LSAM*, 1955) collected the inscriptions from Asia Minor that had not been included in *LGS*; *Lois sacrées des cités grecques: Supplement* (*LSS*, 1962) presented the newest inscriptions; and *Lois sacrées des cités grecques* (*LSCG*, 1969) revised *LGS* and added a few more. Georges Rougemont edited thirteen texts for the first volume of the *Corpus des Inscriptions de Delphes, Lois sacrées et règlements religieux* (*CID* I, 1977); it is thus far the only site-specific corpus. The next generation of interest was sparked in 2005 by Eran Lupu’s *Greek Sacred Law: A Collection of New Documents* (*NGSL*), which included a collection of inscriptions mostly discovered after the publication of *LSCG*. A second edition followed in 2009 with a postscript and corrections. In 2016, the *Collection of Greek Ritual Norms* (*CGRN*) by Jan-Mathieu Carbon, Saskia Peels, and Vinciane Pirenne-Delforge first appeared online, a work-in-progress to which new texts and commentary can be added as the project progresses.
Although this latest corpus has chosen “to move beyond this designation” of sacred law, it is still a part of the historical trajectory of that designation.  

Sacred laws are the texts collected by Sokolowski in his three volumes of sacred law: this oft-repeated joke about circularity underscores how influential the corpora have been for the perception of this category.  

As scholars now emphasize, the category is a modern construct; not just the corpora, but the very idea of *leges sacrae* owe much to their editors. But if “there is no ‘sacred law’”—as Petrovic so succinctly puts it—why do we have so many collections of it?  

Almost every corpus compiler has cited “usability” as the driving force behind the task. Von Prott opened the introduction to *LGS* I by pointing out that inscriptions concerning sacred things were scattered throughout corpora and periodicals and having them in one place would help scholars and provide a foundation for future work in Greek religion. Sokolowski echoed these sentiments in the introduction to *LSS* when he explained that it would be useful to bring to the forefront the inscriptions that had appeared since the corpus of von Prott and Ziehen.  

Carbon and Pirenne-Delforge defend their decision to include excerpts alongside whole inscriptions in their corpus by arguing that “[it] would doubtless render the collection more useful for historians of Greek religion.” And in limiting their texts to “ritual norms,” they say they do so in order to “ensure that a circumscribed but useful collection of inscriptions is presented for the benefit of scholars of Greek religion.” The editors of the corpora had to choose the inscriptions that they thought the rest of the scholarly community would find the most useful for studying Greek
religion; it is for this reason that the corpora offer a view towards how the definition of religion is reflected in and formed by this scholarship.

2. Calendars of Sacrifice

From the beginning, choices were made not only about types of documents but also about how texts would be categorized and divided. Von Prott set out the division of labor for *LGS* in his preface: he would collect sacred calendars, the *fasti sacri*, and Ziehen would take care of the other ritual and priestly laws in a subsequent volume. The separation of the calendars as a subcategory did not persist in later collections, but their inclusion as sacred laws did become traditional; this classification is not, however, unproblematic. These texts referred to as sacred calendars are lists, organized by time, that primarily record sacrifices. The information given typically includes the month, the day, whether the sacrifice occurred yearly or by another schedule, the receiving deity, the animal or offering received, sometimes what was due to priests or other officials, and the money set aside for all items, to be paid by whatever body issued the calendar. Von Prott’s choice of term for these texts, *fasti sacri*, implies that there are other kinds of calendars, secular ones. It is true that the Greeks had multiple systems of reckoning time, one based on months often named for festivals, and another based on the meetings of political bodies (most familiar from the Athenian prytany system). However, the term “calendar” in the sense of a physical template, like our modern desk or wall calendars, is really only appropriate for describing these so-called sacred calendars, and it is not even entirely accurate for them. The
lack of parallel secular calendric lists in the Greek world is clear from Jon Mikalson’s work on Athenian calendars. His sources for the dates used in building his secular calendar are literary references and preambles in inscriptions; there are no secular calendars in Athens of the sort that we find for sacrifices.

Beyond terminology, there are other issues with the character of these texts. Critiques about their inclusion in the corpora have been made on the basis of both their legal quality and their sacral quality. First, there is disagreement over whether sacrificial calendars should be considered laws or regulations. Robert Parker notes that they are problematic because “they do not contain threats or injunctions addressed to ordinary citizens or charges imposed on them,” but he still considers them sacred laws because of the involvement of legislators in their production as well as their inclusion within the Solonian code. Similarly, Harris points out that unlike other laws, they inform rather than order, but notes that priests are subject to punishment if the sacrifices are not performed. Stephen Lambert goes even further and leaves calendars out of his discussion of Athenian religious regulations because they are “not explicitly laws passed by the nomothetai or decrees of the Athenian council and/or Assembly.” In Bradley McLean’s discussion of the classification of inscriptions, he separates “ritual calendars” from sacred laws, including them instead under the heading “Other Sacred Inscriptions,” indicating that he considers these texts sacred, but not legal.
Because their status as law is disputed, it is subject matter that played the most important role in securing a privileged place for calendars within the initial corpora of sacred law. But even the sacredness of their subject matter has been questioned. In his re-publication of a sacrificial calendar from the Attic deme of Erchia, Michael Jameson offers this interpretation of sacred inscriptions: “Although this inscription provides us with more information on the ‘modalités’ of sacrifice than do most Attic calendars, its very existence results from a financial need, namely, to distribute the expenses five ways. This is a forceful reminder that the majority of our epigraphic so-called leges sacri and fasti sacri are not in the first instance ritual texts, though such may be included or alluded to, but severely practical documents of public and private organizations assigning official and financial responsibilities…The ritual information is precious, but it is incidental, even casual.”21 The view that the primary purpose of calendars was not what we might think of as religious, but financial and administrative, has been very influential, and it does find some support from similar Greek texts. There are a handful of inscribed lists from Greek cities other than Athens that are organized by dates, though none have ever been referred to as “calendars” by scholars. All the ones of which I am aware are lists compiled with financial purposes and implications, such as sales, loans, and contributions to gymnasia.22 Placing sacrificial calendars alongside these documents highlights the qualities they share with non-religious accounts.

Lupu challenged this notion that sacred calendars are not sacred by arguing for a greater recognition of their ritual content and function.23 While he admits that they can be seen as financial, he emphasizes that the reason at least one of them was published—the calendar of the
genos of the Salaminioi—was to solve factional problems that had affected cultic observance. He thus concludes: “The publication of these calendars makes the necessary information available to those responsible for cult performance; it has an added value in the way of accountability.”

Similarly, calendars of sacrifice are included in the newest corpus of Carbon and Pirenne-Delforge, whose focus on “ritual norms” makes any problems with their legal character less relevant. The standard is that the inscriptions include a certain minimum of information about sacrificial ritual, and that the sacrifices mentioned are meant to be “recurrent.” They do point out a potential problem with the “normative” character of the information, however, since it is “more descriptive than prescriptive.”

It is undeniable that the information provided by the calendars touches on aspects of religion, but what is in dispute is the purpose for which that information was provided. Were these religious texts that also happened to be useful for financial administration, or were they administrative documents whose subject happened to be the finances of cult? I doubt that the Greeks themselves made this distinction; they clearly believed the lists had religious repercussions, whether religion was a part of their intended purpose or not. For example, the chorus in Aristophanes’ Clouds asserts that changes to the Athenian calendar did a disservice to the moon: she was blamed by the gods when they were fed when they should have been fasting, and vice versa (lines 606–26). This joke plays on the fear that human methods of organization might not meet the gods’ expectations, and this fear surfaced in other situations, too. The prosecution speech in the case against Nikomachos, an official involved with the re-publication of the Solonian law code, criticizes him especially because the new calendar ruptured the observance of ancestral sacrifices.
([Lysias] 30.18–21). Isocrates likewise concentrates on ancestral sacrificial practice, highlighting timing and expenses—two fundamental features of sacrificial calendars—as what the Athenians must continue to uphold (7.29–30). Some aspects of state festivals outlined by Plato in the *Laws* touch on the contents of calendars (828–9). Plato underscores the combination of human and divine roles in arranging festivals by having the Delphic oracle decide the identity of the gods and the nature of the sacrifices, but leaving it to human lawmakers to choose the timing and the number of the sacrifices (828A). Even if the inscribing and posting of the lists of sacrifices was done so that a city could keep orderly accounts, there was an explicit awareness that those accounts affected the relationship with the gods.

3. Administration vs. Ritual

The choice to include sacrificial calendars is particularly significant because other documents with a similarly heavy emphasis on finance and administration have not been accorded the same treatment. A different approach is found in the second volume of the first corpus, published by Ziehen after von Prott’s death. Although most of his explanations for exclusions concerned editorial matters, such as avoiding excerpts or excessively fragmentary texts, some of his reasons do focus on content and are worth exploring. A group of texts he chose to exclude almost entirely was inscriptions about sacred money and land. His argument for the decision was that, in addition to it making his work manageable, those kinds of laws should be excluded because they do not touch upon sacred things. Ziehen is suggesting that the economics of cult and cultic
space—sale or rent of sacred lands, payment for animals—are not considered a part of religion. He did, however, make exceptions for a few laws in this category, which allows us to examine his reasoning more closely. He explains, for example, that he selected the regulations of the sanctuary of Kodrus, Neleus and Basile (LGS II 13 = IG I³ 84) and that of the hero Egretes (LGS II 43 = IG II² 2499) because he felt that the sacred matters discussed within them were especially serious. Precisely what makes the matters serious enough for inclusion in the corpus is not explained, but I suggest that what sets these decrees apart from others that manage land rental is their reference to ritual. LGS II 13 does not simply arrange for the land to be rented, but also requires that the boundaries of the space be marked out first (lines 4–8). The orgeones that stipulates the terms for renting Egretes’ shrine in LGS II 43 includes price and payment schedule, but also makes arrangements for continued sacrifices at the site (lines 24–30). A hierarchy that privileges ritual is implied: demarcating a sacred space is a sacred act, or at least sacred enough to warrant attention by the scholarly community, but the continued dealings with that space through management of construction and cost are less serious and, by extension, less sacred.

The criterion of ritual is also present in Rougemont’s collection of the sacred laws and religious regulations of Delphi (CID I). Choosing the texts for this corpus was complicated by the fact that it is part of a multi-volume, site-based series. This was the first volume published in that series, and, as the author notes in his introduction, there were no rules for how the inscriptions were to be divided. He therefore excluded some inscriptions because he felt they belonged in another volume, even though they could be considered sacred laws. For example, he explains that Sokolowski’s LSS 44 and LSCG 80 and 81 would fit better in the collection of Attalid material.
His reason for excluding *LSS* 43 and *LSCG* 79, however, had little to do with the nature of the Delphi series; he explains that he felt they did not have a strong connection with the cults. Both of those inscriptions concern sanctuary building and land, the protection of the stoa of Attalus II (*LSS* 43) and the setting apart of space for sacred herds (*LSCG* 79). They were published in a later volume among the amphictionic documents (*CID* IV 85 and 108), but the decision to exclude them from *CID* I indicates a lower profile for the space in which cult action took place.

The most complete overview of the shape of the corpus of sacred laws is found in *NGSL*, where Lupu reserves over 100 pages for an examination of the character and contents of sacred law before presenting the newer texts. This account is primarily descriptive rather than innovative, since it is “aimed at a general review of the evidence, aiming at making the contents of the corpus of Greek sacred laws more accessible to the general classicist.” The definition of sacred law which Lupu presents includes both legal and religious aspects: “an inscription must be prescriptive; its subject matter and main focus must be or pertain to religion and particularly cult practice, on the whole recurrent in nature, or at least set within the framework of ordinary worship.” He also notes “that matters pertaining to religion and cult practice be less a means to an end and more an end in their own right, occupying an indisputable first place.” For Lupu, cult *practice*—especially *recurrent* rituals—and *intent* are the major qualifications. He discusses two seemingly similar inscriptions to illustrate how these criteria work in practice, *LSCG* 75 from Orchomenos and *I.Oropos* 290. Both decrees involve fountains in sanctuaries, but only one was included among the sacred laws collected by Sokolowski. Lupu supports that decision based on the requirement of intent; in the one left out, he argues, the offerings at and funding of
the sacred fountain are merely secondary to other activities, construction at the sanctuary and the publication of the stele. In Lupu’s definition, religious actions are key. If a law does not make ritual its focus—even when the sacred space in which rituals takes place is involved—then it should not be included.\textsuperscript{39} The management of sacred space is only considered sacred if the ultimate concern is ritual.\textsuperscript{40}

Carbon and Pirenne-Delforge seek to release themselves from some of the baggage inherent in “sacred law” through \textit{CGRN}, and it is ritual that they have chosen to meet that goal: in their words, “Consideration of the intended audience for past corpora suggests that instead of a unified epigraphic corpus, which ‘sacred laws’ could never truly constitute in any case, one should instead try to build a collection of inscriptions which benefit scholars of Greek religion. However, this is still too wide a body of material to be presented in a single project…it has seemed to the present authors that the preferable solution for moving beyond Greek ‘sacred laws’ is to collect those inscriptions which, whether in full or in part, contain sacrificial and purificatory ritual norms” (171).\textsuperscript{41} Thus this focus on ritual is even more explicit—and in fact the guiding principle—in the newest, modified corpus.

\section*{4. Ruler Cult and the Dead}
The management of sacred space and the finances of cult are not the only subjects that have a weak connection to sacred law as defined in the corpora. The exclusion of two categories of texts has become standard simply because of the way the corpora have formed: inscriptions relating to the cult of rulers and the dead. The first omission is explained in Ziehen’s introduction to *LGS II*; in addition to the *fasti sacri*, von Prott was also collecting the inscriptions pertaining to the cult of Alexander and his successors, but the work was left unfinished at his death. Sokolowski maintained this lacuna and solidified a second, previously unspoken one. For his corpus of texts from Asia Minor (*LSAM*), he remarks that he only collected the sacred laws, properly speaking, and so left out texts related to the Hellenistic kings and the cult of the dead. However, he later implies in *LSCG* that those kinds of texts are a part of sacred law, but a part worth collecting separately, which he planned to do for a later volume (but never did). Lupu followed this precedent: “The exclusion is somewhat artificial; rectifying the situation must, however, await a revision of the entire corpus.” Although the choice to keep these inscriptions out of the corpora did not intentionally reflect an ideology about what religion is, it has, however, affected the way that they have been viewed and studied in relation to sacred laws.

The situation of the second class of excluded texts, those for the dead, is complicated by the fact that three laws on funerary rites do appear in the corpora, but it is unclear why they were chosen from among the rest: *LSAM* 16 from Gambreion (= *CRGN* 108), *LSCG* 77 C from Delphi (= *LGS II* 74 C; *CID* I 9 C 19–52; Rhodes and Osborne 2003, no. 1; *CGRN* 82), and *LSCG* 97 from Keos (= *LGS II* 93; *CGRN* 35). Parker finds the status of funerary regulations in the corpus problematic because their status as laws is questionable. He describes them as law-like because
they are not really enforceable; some do not have sanctions, and others contain sanctions that he considers merely “religious,” such as LSAM 16. 47 Separating religious sanctions from secular, at least in this case, is probably misleading. In this law (nomos, line 4), the women of Gambreion who do not follow the rules receive a type of curse and are banned from sacrificing for ten years (lines 20–27). Because a ritual like sacrifice was public, religious punishments had significant social consequences, especially true for women whose roles in the public sphere were limited. 48 Parker further poses a parenthetical, unanswered question in his conclusion that deserves more attention: “were laws ‘about the dead’ sacred…?” 49 Many actions performed at the tomb were the same as those for gods and heroes (libation, sacrifice, decoration, other offerings), but funerals and contact with the dead caused pollution, and most of the gods wanted nothing to do with death. But the dead certainly required ritual attention: how do those rituals relate to religious rituals? The relationship between death and the sacred in the Greek world is one that must be examined more critically before determining how regulations for the dead should relate to leges sacrae. 50

5. Conclusions: Ancient vs. Modern

The defining features of the subjects included in the modern corpus of “sacred law” are as follows: (1) sacrificial calendars are central texts despite their uneasy fit in form and purpose, (2) ritual is the primary factor in defining what is sacred, (3) finance, building and other administrative matters are not strong enough on their own to define a text as religious, and (4)
most documents concerning the dead and the cults of Hellenistic kings have been excluded because of tradition rather than subject matter. What might the ancient Greeks think of such a collection?

Content and (quasi-)legal form are the primarily features used for inclusion in the corpora, but regulations sent by gods through dreams or oracles may have had additional, or at least more explicit, divine authority. In addition, the ancient Greeks of various cities did indeed occasionally use the term hieros nomos, sacred law, to describe inscriptions that could easily find a place in the corpus as currently defined. However, most of these laws have not been included in any of the corpora, and the texts that use the term have not been collected systematically in their entirety. From the examples that have been organized and examined so far, the general conclusion is that hieros nomos tends to have been used as a descriptive term and was not a firm ancient category—arguably not very different from the way most scholars use “sacred law” today. Its use varied from city to city, and at least sometimes referred to actual dossiers. Some of these texts would not be included in any of the modern corpora, and hieroi nomoi remains an interesting semantic category in its own right that does not map onto leges sacrae.

In at least some cities, most notably Athens, assemblies discussed hiera, sacred matters, separately from other matters. But while many of the sacred laws as we define them may have had their origins during such a section of the assembly, it is certain that not all of them did. Connor has argued that the use of the terms hiera and hosia in combination “was frequently used
in discussions of public finance” and that good management of both sacred and secular funds was related to the overall well being of society and its relationship with the gods.\textsuperscript{57} In the Greek world, maintaining the houses of the gods and tabulating the cost of doing so was more central to religion than what we might think based simply on the texts in the corpus of sacred law.

In the \textit{locus classicus} for the definition of Greekness, Herodotus 8.144.2, the historian places an account into the mouths of the Athenians that includes aspects related to religion, \textit{θεων ἱδρύματα τε κοινὰ καὶ θυσίαι,} “temples of the gods and sacrifices held in common.” Parker has argued that although this is often used as a definition of Greek religion itself, the phrase rather refers specifically to the panhellenic sanctuaries; local ways of worship varied, but all Greeks—and only Greeks—could come together at a few sites where they would do the same things.\textsuperscript{58} When Herodotus calls on religious commonality here, he specifically cites the things that are done and the places where those things are done.\textsuperscript{59} Most of the so-called sacred laws that have been collected do deal precisely with these two things: the regulation of ritual actions and sacred spaces. Ritual, in fact, has been one of the requirements that practically ensure entrance into the corpus. In contrast, many of the laws that deal with the “temples of the gods” have been excluded because certain aspects of the management of sacred space have not been deemed religious enough. I would argue that the modern concept of sacred law should be revised to better reflect the value placed on place in antiquity.
The epigraphic corpora of *leges sacrae* are defined not by genre, location, time period, material, or issuing body, but by subject matter. Although the burgeoning bibliography of sacred law is now very self-reflective, scholars outside of that conversation are still misled into using it uncritically; even the freshest research can suffer when it is built on data collected using nineteenth-century criteria. In a time when the study of Greek religion is shifting away from orthopraxy and the *polis* to consider other factors like belief and materiality, how will legal documents focused on ritual be used? We must remember that we are the ones responsible for defining the limits of our data, so it is often ourselves who are limiting our potential for understanding Greek religion: “Religion is solely the creation of the scholar’s study. It is created for the scholar’s analytic purposes by his imaginative acts of comparison and generalization...For this reason, the student of religion, and most particularly the historian of religion, must be relentlessly self-conscious...The student of religion must be able to articulate clearly why ‘this’ rather than ‘that’ was chosen as an exemplum.”

1 The approach to sacred law that I take here had its origin in a paper I presented at the Inaugural Meeting of the Society of Ancient Mediterranean Religions (“What’s Religious about Ancient Mediterranean Religions?,” Rome, 2009); I am indebted to the formal response delivered by Sandra Blakely there. I am grateful for the opportunity afforded by NACGLE 2 to revisit this issue. This paper was completed in 2016 (before *CGRN* was available online!) and lightly updated in 2019.

2 The most substantial critical discussions of sacred law are Parker 2018: 27–30; Carbon and Pirenne-Delforge 2017; Petrovic 2015; Harris 2015; Carbon and Pirenne-Delforge 2012; *NGSL*: 3–112, 501–9; Chaniotis 2009; Naiden 2009; Parker 2005; Carbon 2005; and Parker 2004. Other

3 The formation of each corpus is reflective of its place in the history of the study of Greek religion. Here I focus on the contents themselves to highlight the inclusions and exclusions that became traditional by circumstance rather than design.

4 Petrovic 2015: 341–8 provides an accessible, thorough outline of the history of the corpora, so I will not rehash all the details here. See also NGSL: 3–4.

5 The second edition contains a postscript with further thoughts and corrections and there are a few minor editorial corrections throughout. I cite the 2009 edition, but the pagination remains the same as the first edition except for the postscript.


7 A variation of this quip is used in print by Parker 2004: 58.

8 Petrovic 2015: 339.

9 “Leges Graecorum sacras…componi atque inlustrari duabus potissimum de causis utile videtur,” (LGS I: v).

10 “…[J]e crois utile de fournir au large cercle de chercheurs un supplément…” (LSS: 5).


Sacred calendars are found in all the corpora except for Delphi (where none are attested). Sokolowski inserted the calendars among the other laws based on location (he comments on his decision at *LSCG*: vii) and Lupu followed suit (see also his discussion of calendars, *NGSL*: 65–70, 507). Lupu also lists all certain and probable calendars known at the time of the publication of his first edition in 2005, *NGSL*: 65 n. 325.

The use of Latin of course calls to mind the Roman *fasti sacri*. Those texts are remarkably different documents, organized somewhat more like modern calendars and including information about both secular and religious activities together in one document. It is reasonable to suggest that the expectations created by those inscriptions may have influenced the way the very different Greek inscriptions were approached and categorized. Rives 2001: 128 notes the fundamental differences between the two.

Mikalson 1975. For a few non-Athenian lists that could arguably be called calendars, see below.

Parker 2004: 59.


Lambert 2005: 125 n. 3.


These are not always presented in list form, but they do follow the general structure of date, person or item, and then monetary amount. The following texts are cited as evidence for non-Athenian chronology in Samuel 1972: *IG* IX 2 109, manumission lists from Halos (81); *IG* XII 5...
872, catalogue of sales from Tenos (101); *IG* XII Suppl. 236, list of loans from Keos (103); and
*IG* XII 14, oil contribution for a gymnasium on Rhodes (108). *IG* IV 108–17, lists of expenses
for the Asklepeion at Epidaurus (91) are especially worth noting since sanctuary and treasury
expense records are not included in the corpus (the vast majority are not laws).


24 *NGSL*: 68.


27 Samuel 1972: 58 argues this passage “illustrates that the festival calendar was seriously out of
accord with the moon, and that the Athenians were aware of that fact.”

28 “nullum fere ipsas res sacras tangebat,” (*LGS* II: iii).

29 *LGS* II: iii–iv.

30 *LGS* II: iv. Neither are currently included in *CGRN*.

31 *CID* I: 1.

32 He did include two inscriptions that had been left out of previous corpora of *leges sacrae*, *CID*
I 1 and 2; both are very short and not well preserved.

33 *CID* I: 1. There is not yet a volume that collects that material. *LSCG* 81 is not in *CGRN*, but
*LSS* 44 (= *CGRN* 204) and *LSCG* 80 (= *CGRN* 202) are.

34 “[Q]ui me paraissent n’avoir pas grand rapport avec les cultes,” (*CID* I: 1). Neither are in
*CGRN*.

35 *NGSL*: 504.

36 *NGSL*: 8.

37 *NGSL*: 7.
It is important to note again that Lupu’s definition is based on the documents already included within the corpus. He must formulate this argument for why one text is in *LSCG* and the other is not because Sokolowski himself did not provide an explanation. Neither of these texts are currently in *CGRN*.

Lupu’s additional comments in the postscript (*NGSL*: 502–4) focus primarily on legal and formal matters of the inscriptions (laws vs. decrees, prescriptive quality, issuing authority) in order to take into account Parker 2004 and 2005. He even states that all sacred laws have in common “their subject matter” (503), repeating Parker’s phrase. However, in discussing why some laws have been left out of the corpus, he states that for some of them the reason could be “because the events regulated were not considered to be primarily of religious meaning (always a tricky matter in my mind),” (502).

Lupu does identify a class of inscriptions as those concerning “Sanctuaries and Sacred Space,” (*NGSL*: 9–40). These texts include administrative details, though he notes elsewhere that they are concerned “perhaps above all, but not only, with maintaining and protecting their ritual integrity (or purity) or physical integrity,” (504). Elsewhere Lupu notes that he “would have liked the corpus to be more inclusive in respect to documents prescribing the building and furnishing of sanctuaries and temples,” (9 n. 30).

Carbon and Pirenne-Delforge 2012: 171. For further explication of their goal, see Carbon and Pirenne-Delforge 2017.

*LGS II*: iii.

*LSAM*: 5.

*LSCG*: vii.

*NGSL*: xii.
NGSL: 75–7; Parker 2004: 61. LSCG 77 C, a portion of the cippus of the phratry of the Labyades, is particularly intriguing because it is one of the few texts that break the rule against including partial inscriptions in LGS or LSCG. Rougemont include all sides of the monument, but notes that he does not consider all of it to be sacred law (CID I: 1). Ziehen and Sokolowski only include face D and the portion of face C about funerals; these are the same sections included in CGRN 82.

Parker 2004: 61–2. It may also be relevant that because of its focus on the period of mourning, LSAM 16 has more in common with purity regulations (which have always had a home in the corpus) than do LSCG 77 C and LSCG 97, which focus on the actual funeral and the corpse.

Naiden 2009 argues that when sanctions (of any kind) are included, it is because the community believes someone’s actions could disrupt the relationship with the gods for more than just that individual.


Warnings inscribed on tombs require a closer look in relation to sacred laws, especially because they threaten either fines or curses; these sanctions are found in both Greek religious and secular law. For a collection of some of these texts, see Strubbe 1997.


This phrase does appear a few times in the corpora: LSS 45 lines 69 and 75 uses the plural and at LSCG 154 A line 6 (= CGRN 148) it is plural and paired with patrios. The singular is restored for LSCG 150 A lines 10–11 and the alternate hiera di graphe is restored for LSCG 155 A line 8.

One of Parker (2004)’s examples, *OGIS* 383 (the term *hieros nomos* appears at line 111), would never be found in any modern corpus of sacred law since it deals with a new Hellenistic cult for Antiochus I Kommogene. But compare the headings found in two of the funerary regulations that are included in the corpus: οἶδε νόμοι περὶ τῶν καταφθιμέων, (laws about the dead, *LSCG* 97, line 1 [= *CGRN* 35]), and ἡ ὅδε ὁ τεθμός πὲρ τῶν ἐντοφήμων (about burial objects, *CID* I 9, face C, lines 19–20 [= *CGRN* 82]).


Parker 2004: 66 notes that sacred laws “overlap with the matters treated on the sacred section of an agenda of the assembly, but are not co-extensive with them. Some ‘sacred’ matters concerning temple property are confessedly omitted from the collection of ‘sacred laws.’” Harris 2015 examines the range of types of authority behind “sacred laws.”


Parker 1998: 12.

Inclusion or exclusion from a ritual or a place can be used to define any group. Parker 1998: 12, with n. 23, points out that “other comparable texts speak not of common religion but of shared altars in just the same way.”

Smith 1988: xi.
Abbreviations


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