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11-2018

Dealing with the Fragmentation of Knowledge: The Complex Grounds for Faith in Newman, Adorno, and Later

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Recommended Citation

Chapter Seven

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The Complex Grounds for Faith in Newman, Adorno, and Latour

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INTRODUCTION

Modernity inaugurated an epistemological shift in human understanding that frequently granted reason the role of sole arbiter in religious matters. The eventual turns within late modern, and even postmodern, philosophy toward the ontological (existential), the ethical, the linguistic and, eventually, the religious have however subsequently demonstrated that the reduction toward merely the epistemological was a limitation waiting to be diversified and made that much more complex. In more recent memory, philosophical inquiry has even extended itself toward economic and political themes that have only continued to broaden the scope of investigation. In this chapter, I want to examine how each of these disciplinary routes need not be undertaken separate from one another, as if one would take precedence over another in an endless cycle of contestations, but rather how each strand must develop in interlocking fashion alongside the others. Though such a reading is perhaps still difficult for many to grasp, it was not wholly unfamiliar to those in pursuit of alternative routes within the modern period.

For example, if modernity was a crisis in human history for John Henry Newman, it was reflected by the decline of religious belief in the face of a solely rational epistemological certainty. Newman contested the narrative of secularization, because it reduced reason to the only significant actor within a much vaster reality of relations. In taking this critical stance, Newman opened a general understanding of the human person toward a more complex sense of self that incorporates religious dimensions of existence, among others, in order to promote the web of relations that actually comprise reality. Alongside Newman, the later work of Theodor Adorno likewise pointed in a

direction that attempted to deal with the fragmentation of systematic thought within modern philosophy, while Bruno Latour's more recent contention that "we have never been modern" offers the chance today to recover the significance of the religious within the (post)modern era. As I will show, Newman, Adorno and Latour share an understanding of the complexity of reality that redefines human relations with the external world: in Newman, expressed as a series of probabilities; in Adorno, as constellations of thought; and, in Latour, as a system or network of relations. Placing stress upon faith as a form of relationship that symbolically embodies the complexity of multiple modes of existence interaction, each author defies a monolithic sense of the rationality-dominated individual self propagated by modernity.

My argument is that Newman's emphasis upon the religious dimension as fundamental to human beings actually foreshadows Adorno and Latour's critiques of modernity. Newman implicates more than just the religious dimensions of human existence; he provides us with a glimpse of how such a critique of modernity reformulates our perceptions of humanity entirely. Newman's insights illuminate a more complex reality than the modern religious/secular divide would have us understand. Seeing this complexity entails not simply a condemnation of a particular secular narrative of modernity, but an opportunity to develop Newman's thought more fully in dialogue with the forces of secularization and its critics. It also points toward other modes of existence beyond solely the religious or the secular. These interventions show how combatting the modern religious/secular divide does not mean choosing one side over another. It means deepening the complex relations that undergird specific historical processes—something that Newman championed through his notion of development, and which was elaborated upon indirectly by both Adorno and Latour, as I will show.

THEODOR W. ADORNO

It is well known that the events of the Second World War, most notably the existence and horrors of Nazi concentration camps, were devastating to the German philosopher, and co-founder of the school of thought known as Critical Theory, Theodor W. Adorno. Such were the destabilizing effects of these mass atrocities at the hands of those supposedly educated and cultured at the heart of western civilization, that Adorno would declare the fabric of thought itself to be torn asunder and poetry declared an impossibility or at least a barbaric enterprise. Though he would later qualify his comments on poetry, his philosophical project of formulating a negative dialectics that sought to isolate the nonidentity at the heart of all identities, bears the mea-

sure of one who had connected precisely with humanity's inability to connect, with itself, with its "others" and even with those animal species that dwell around it. His controversial comments comparing the inhumane functioning of animal slaughterhouses and the existence of modern concentration camps, such as Auschwitz, are deeply disturbing, but also perhaps resonate with the experiences of distanciation, and the accompanying violences, that humanity perpetuates. Comprehending such relationships, however, is necessary for understanding the foundations of modern culture.[1]

Adorno's work stepped firmly into the breach opened in modernity through the loss of a totalized vision of reality that had characterized the pre-modern world and essentially sutured the vast metaphysical propositions that justified an ordered cosmos. Though he would maintain a certain distance from the destruction of metaphysics that Martin Heidegger had claimed removed all previous onto-theological scaffolding for philosophical thought, Adorno nonetheless recognized that the totalizing metaphysical claims that had once undergirded western humanity and its myriad institutions were at an end.[2] Unlike Heidegger, or Sartre for that matter, who both envisioned sovereign power migrating from the position of the monarch to the freedom and choice of the individual, and so gave rise to their particular brands of existentialism, Adorno sought to undo all claims for the individual *as* sovereign in order to explore the possibilities for life lived beyond the confines of modern individualism.

What Adorno's suggestive philosophy on the destruction of all identities makes abundantly clear is that what modern individuals have traditionally taken as the grounds for their general epistemological claims are anything but secure—the situation is much more complicated, and so open to manipulation, than is typically anticipated. Take, for example, a passage from his *Minima Moralia*—subtitled "Reflections on a Damaged Life"—which offers something like a reconsideration of the way in which knowledge is comprehended:

[. . .] the demand for intellectual honesty is itself dishonest. Even if we were for once to comply with the questionable directive that the exposition should exactly reproduce the process of thought, this process would be no more a discursive progression from stage to stage than, conversely, knowledge falls from Heaven. Rather, knowledge comes to us through a network of prejudices, opinions, innervations, self-corrections, presuppositions and exaggerations, in short through the dense, firmly-founded but by no means uniformly transparent medium of experience.[3]

What should strike us as significant in this quote reaches far beyond the quickly dissolving and familiar philosophical terrain in which Adorno had been trained and toward a complexly interwoven network of related, but

distinct, forces. His list is quite impressive, in fact, and cannot be easily dis-
entangled: what comprises the realm we consider to be knowledge is really a
hodgepodge of "prejudices, opinions, innervations, self-corrections, presup-
positions and exaggerations." It is the experiences of such received and devel-
oped conditions that shape the various knowledges that circulate within each
individual and among individuals, and within a given society or globally on
the whole. Such were the effects of what he elsewhere called "constellations"
of thought, or the immeasurable bundles of experience that resonated together
at times in order to foment new ideas and perspectives.[4] The fact that Adorno
does not subsequently elucidate relations between these states that form a
constellation for thought is not a failure on his part, but rather an indication,
and of a piece with his negative dialectical method, that no such systematic
tidiness between these parts can be established. The apparent fragmentation
of knowledge was, in reality, an admittance that knowledge cannot be sutured
together or totalized, as easily as some might prefer.

Adorno, writing in tandem with Max Horkheimer, had pointed out the
ways in which modernity feigned enlightenment through its recourse to par-
ticular myths of reason. This was the celebrated *Dialectic of Enlightenment*
that could only be presented, as its subtitle indicated, as a series of "philo-
sophical fragments" not presumptuous enough to parade itself as systematic
or complete in any sense.[5] Maintaining this point of view, for both authors,
had meant being willing to risk what Adorno had described as an "intellectual
dishonesty" that was really the only way of being "honest" about the insights
one presents. In tones that echo Nietzsche's genealogical efforts to dislodge
the perceived meanings that dominated western thought, Adorno realized
the failure of presenting knowledge as "a discursive progression from stage
to stage" that merely underlies systematic thought. Knowledge is not, as he
states, that which "falls from Heaven"; it is what we are left with as a result
of the workings of a vast and ultimately incalculable network of experiences.
Modernity, accordingly, must be revealed as "a qualitative, not a chronologi-
cal, category. Just as it cannot be reduced to abstract form, with equal neces-
sity it must turn its back on conventional surface coherence, the appearance
of harmony, the order corroborated merely by replication."[6]

The fact that Adorno's philosophical fragments, in particular his *Negative
Dialectics*, have proved so instructive to theological writers since the latter
half of the last century, especially for those contextual theologians who have
also beheld the demise of systematic rigor, is a highly significant sign. His
fragmentary philosophy illuminates a path toward comprehending both faith
and philosophical thought that had only rarely been seen for what it is: a light
of hope shining in the darkest corners of modernity. Adorno's was not the
only gesture made in such a direction, however.

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN

If Adorno's (non)philosophy was made possible by the disintegration of past philosophical forms and aspirations for totalization, John Henry Newman's reflections from the century prior on the nature of knowledge and its relation to faith were likewise possible through a gap in received knowledge: the peculiar opening within the history of philosophy and theology wherein Scholasticism had lost its authoritative position, but wherein also Neo-Scholasticism had not yet laid its claims upon the Catholic magisterium. As he would opine in his *Oxford Sermons*, the state of received knowledge was in apparent disarray and most (certainly Catholics, but many others as well) were seeking not to hasten such disorder toward its "fragmentary" conclusion, as Adorno had declared a possibility, but rather to undo the perceived damage to totalized logics so that metaphysical speculation might continue unabated. Yet, as Newman would declare, "The love of order and regularity, and that perception of beauty which is most keen in highly-gifted minds, has too often led men astray in their scientific researches. From seeing but detached parts of the system of nature, they have been carried on, without data, to arrange, supply, and complete."[7] It was exactly this love of completion to what must remain ultimately incomplete that had caused the more philosophically rigorous to also be "[. . .] liable to be deceived by false appearances and reasonings, to be biassed by prejudice, and led astray by a warm fancy."[8]

The main problem that Newman isolated in his sermons concerning the terms of knowledge accumulation was that a basic category mistake had been the source of much philosophical and theological confusion. The conditions for establishing knowledge with regard to the exercise of reason alone were not sufficient for philosophical or theological certainty as they were for parallel claims in the hard sciences or mathematics. Reason by itself rests upon "strong"—because empirically verifiable—claims, whereas faith, as he would eventually paint the portrait of their relations, rested upon "weak" claims that arose from a series of complex probabilities that cannot be identified in easily partitioned quantities.[9] The perceived weakness of such complexity is, however, if seen from another point of view, a possible strength in terms of its depth, though a strength that relied upon a vast network of relations not easily quantified or mapped. This configuration of faith does not lessen the certainty of one's beliefs; rather, it merely highlights the way in which faith comes to manifest itself in a person's life in a manner parallel to the certainty of love.[10] As he would frame matters, "No one can deny to the intellect its own excellence, nor deprive it of its due honours; the question is merely this, whether it be not limited in its turn, as regards its range, so as not without intrusion to exercise itself as an independent authority in the field of morals and

religion."[11] Newman would suggest when contemplating the freedom granted to individuals within modernity that there must be some boundary or limit to individual freedom for freedom to truly exist in a person's life.[12] Here both reason and faith have their limits, but such a proposition does not endanger human freedom—it enriches it beyond measure.

In his *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*, Newman describes faith as grounded upon an "accumulation of probabilities" that are so complex as to be truly unfathomable in terms of making a clear exposition of them.[13] Claiming that such a constellation of probabilities—to borrow Adorno's phrasing—worked together, though often so subtly as to be unconscious, in order to give shape to an individual's moral sensibilities, or conscience, as well as the certainty of faith in a person's life, was not simply a critical dismissal of faith. It was rather the very conditions upon which faith develops in an individual's life and no one should want to remove such a series of complex conditions; such is rather how the sentiment of love, for example, evolves within, restores and even lays the roots for a person's life. The probabilities, in this sense, are not statistically measurable, but arrived at organically.[14] Declaring such a state of existence as a "weakness" was actually a wholly positive claim, as this is the only way to recognize and validate the complexities of faith and experience.

> It is plain that formal logical sequence is not in fact the method by which we are enabled to become certain of what is concrete; and it is equally plain, from what has been already suggested, what the real and necessary method is. It is the cumulation of probabilities, independent of each other, arising out of the nature and circumstances of the particular case which is under review; probabilities too fine to avail separately, too subtle and circuitous to be convertible into syllogisms, too numerous and various for such conversion, even were they convertible.[15]

Newman's listing of probabilities that bring a person to faith parallel Adorno's suggested and incomplete list of that which bequeaths knowledge: experience, opinion, hopes, desires, relationships (especially familial, communal and with one's beloved), traditions (religious, cultural, linguistic and the like), revelations (individual or collective and possibly religious), presumptions (prejudices, as that which we "prepossess"[16]), one's worldview, what one loves, but also argumentation and the solid fruits of logic and reason. Indeed, reason cannot be separated from the interpretation of either experience or faith as it allows either to "flourish" through the role that it plays. It is in this sense that Newman can rightly claim that there is a reasonable certitude to be found in a belief based on the accumulation of probabilities, as reason does play a vital role in establishing one's faith. A belief can be formed that is so certain in fact that it maintains "[. . .] the utter absence of all thought, or expectation, or fear of changing."[17]

Of course, one's beliefs do change over time, as Newman would immediately acknowledge. "A spontaneous resolution never to change is inconsistent with the idea of belief; for the very force and absoluteness of the act of assent precludes any such resolution."[18] In other words, the complexity of accumulating probabilities meant that change was an inevitable feature of faith, much as Adorno had signaled that it was permanently attached to any established knowledge. Newman recognized that the way in which such probabilities functioned was not restricted to the realms of faith or theology alone, but that it affected all knowledge and philosophical speculation—all learning in fact:

> [. . .] I would rather have to maintain that we ought to begin with believing every thing that is offered to our acceptance, than that it is our duty to doubt of every thing. This, indeed, seems the true way of learning. In that case, we soon discover and discard what is contradictory; and error having always some portion of truth in it, and the truth having a reality which error has not, we may expect, that when there is an honest purpose, and fair talents, we shall somehow make our way forward, the error falling off from the mind, and the truth developing and occupying it. Thus it is that the Catholic religion is reached, as we see, by inquirers from all points of the compass, as if it mattered not where a man began, so that he had an eye and a heart for the truth.[19]

Though many have taken Newman's claims to be a sure bulwark of faith against the onslaughts of modern critical reasoning, his recognition that "it mattered not where a man began" in order to reach the truth is an almost *post*modern sentiment that recognizes the complex developments and evolutions that take place within the entirety of one's life—something that no one can take in all at once in systematic or totalizing fashion.[20]

What Newman presents us with, as much as Adorno too, is an alternative model for exploring the various modes of existence that filter experience into an individual life. This model is not dependent upon the solely epistemological claims that modern voices frequently favor. To my mind, this alternative model to an overreliance on the "strong claims" of reason alone is what makes each reading of Newman's work so entirely relevant to a decidedly *post*modern context which has yet to make its full reckoning with modernity. It also presents a reality that overlaps a good deal with yet another interlocutor among those wishing to revisit our relationship to modernity.

BRUNO LATOUR

The final figure to examine is the contemporary French philosopher of science and networks, Bruno Latour. Latour's work assists us in understanding

how the claims made by Adorno and Newman are also a critical rejoinder to modernity on the whole. Latour's insights help solidify the connection between Adorno and Newman. What Latour encourages in particular is a vision of modernity as its own system of belief, one that denies (religious) belief while maintaining its own system of belief pretending to be a rigorous, and "strong," science of certainty. If Adorno critiqued the myth of enlightenment through his use of constellations of knowledge, and if Newman critiqued the use of reason alone through his focus on the complex probabilities of faith, Latour critiques modernity through an exploration of the various "modes of existence." These modes speak in different registers and with different, rich vocabularies, but which are more often than not silenced through the monolithic imposition of a modern, scientific mindset. His infamous claim that "we have never been modern" is, in this light, not only an opening toward the complexity of knowledge, but also of religious belief (among other modes of existence), which makes its claims in the language of lovers and not of law or science.[21]

In his more recent work *An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns*, Latour describes a complex pluralism that harnesses the intersubjective relations between all things, human and not, that are inherent to lived reality and experienced in a variety of modes of existence, of which there are *at least* fifteen for Latour. The modes that all things are in, but which we frequently fail to distinguish between (because at times all of existence is, by definition, practically unable to sort them into separate realms) include but are not limited to: politics, technology, law, religion, fiction and morality, which name institutional categories, and also, habit, reproduction, metamorphosis, reference, attachment, organization, network, preposition and "double click" (which is his phrasing for the mistaken belief in absolute immediacy or certainty). Each of these modes interact with the others and in ways that are more or less veiled or transparent. Such complexity makes it very difficult to isolate a given mode from another, though humans at least frequently attempt to do just that so that one mode might dominate over the others.[22] This is an imposition of order or power that other, animal or inanimate subject-actors often refrain from introducing, or find impossible to introduce, into the schema of relations. Yet, from the human point of view, there is too long of a history of political and religious oppressions for such possibilities to be absent from human interventions in this world.

The "unknown" within whatever is qualified as "known" represents for Latour a moment indicating the "presence of other modes whose equal dignity epistemology, despite all its efforts, has never allowed to be recognized."[23] Taking a much wider view of the networks that actually constitute a given discovery or knowledge, Latour describes in vivid, realistic detail how

knowledge forms within a given historical context or complex situation, such as in the complex scientific, political, economic and religious contexts that gave rise to early scientific progress (as with Pasteur's discovery of penicillin, e.g., which was involved with multiple modes at once). Within such a viewpoint, his targeted criticism falls most squarely upon the way in which modernity has attempted to impose the discourse of one mode of existence upon a separate mode—a fundamental category mistake that recalls Newman's own distinction between "strong" and "weak" modes of knowing. When, for example, one attempts to replicate the certainty achieved in the scientific laboratory or the courtroom in matters of love, a categorical mistake has been made in which individuals are potentially damaged, not to mention highly confused. An individual cannot prove or render certain a relationship that is much more complex than a laboratory experiment. In this sense, knowledge that arises from a particular mode is limited to describing itself with the language that guides and limits that mode specifically, and though it will yet overlap in so many ways with other modes in a vastly complex reality (which, by definition, lacks any comprehensive or universal language to describe all such interactions). Though one mode will undoubtedly overlap with other modes in terms of combined interactions in the "real world," there is a difference between the terms that define one modal inquiry and another. Nonetheless, as Latour also clarifies, isolating one particular mode and its operations is fairly difficult to do because no mode acts in complete isolation from the other modes, and so the complexity of the various modal interactions often makes it hard to contemplate overly simplistic explanations in terms of causes and effects.

Modern points of view, Latour claims, routinely fall into the trap of presuming that other modes operate according to the epistemological rigor of "strong" scientific claims alone.[24] His claim that "we have never been modern" is little more than a demonstration that "weak" claims are just as prevalent and active in the modern era as in the premodern. Much of his work on modal ontologies flows from this initial argument and so aims to upend the heavy reliance upon "strong" scientific claims within modernity.[25]

What he clamors for then is a form of "ontological pluralism" that functions as a sort of ecology, recognizing the various and diverse modes of existence that cannot function alone, but only through a recognition of their interdependence upon one another (e.g., how religious propositions are also political, economic and cultural claims, among other modal claims, at the same time).[26] The complex intersubjectivity that results from such a reconfiguration of relations is one that, in turn, opens human beings to perceiving anew their nonhuman neighbors, whether animal, organic or inorganic matter.[27] In this way, the dualisms that typically structure philosophical and theological thought

(e.g., human/non-human) are potentially reformulated in much more complex terms.[28] The aim of going beyond such dualisms, in point of fact, is to accede to a way of being-as-other, which entails encountering alterity "through multiplicity, through relations."[29] Embracing the complexity of these relations means also continuously negotiating and re-negotiating our access to our own humanity, or, as he puts it,

> [. . .] there is nothing true except what is instituted, thus what is relative: relative to the weight, the thickness, the complexity, the layering, the multiplicity, the heterogeneity of institutions; but relative especially to the always delicate detection of the leap, the threshold, the step, the pass necessary for its extension.[30]

What we encounter here is, as Christopher Watkin has phrased it in the context of Latour's work, a "polyphonic composition" of humanity, animality, inanimate objects and so on. There is present in this world a plurality of modes, multi-modality or "parliament of modes," in Watkin's language, to match Latour's call for a "parliament of things."[31] It is the stress placed upon the "weak" claims of a relational nature that, in turn, point for Latour toward the domain of religious speech as the ultimate symbol for what draws human beings into the complexities of love, faith and reality—all things and experiences that cannot be separated, and which point toward even more modes of existence than Newman had previously envisioned.[32]

Through such a dramatic re-envisioning of relations Latour's plurality of modes of existence aligns in near perfect symmetry with Adorno's constellations and Newman's probabilities, as all of these models demonstrate the possibility of moving toward a more complex network of interrelations that can be reduced or simplified only at the cost of jettisoning the fullness of one's own humanity and the complexity of other lives—even non-human lives—around us.

CONCLUSION

As I have argued, Latour's emphasis on the complex interactions beyond our ever fully understanding them is akin to a postmodern sensibility wherein the diversity of seemingly incompatible representations are forced together simultaneously in a sort of bricolage or "schizophrenic" assemblage, as Frederic Jameson has put it.[33] Jameson's comment might register as a critique that lacks systematic or totalizing rigor. Yet perhaps what we encounter in the self-reflexivity of postmodernism, whatever such a thing is or is not in the end, is a juxtaposition that may only appear to disclose a plurality of incompatible modes of existence, but which, in terms of actual existence, as

Adorno, Newman and Latour have each described it, presents us with a complex network of interdependent relations that deserve a better understanding. They do not simply deserve a potentially dismissive label of existing as a "schizophrenic" assemblage.

Though it is true that religious discourse has tried historically to dominate over the other modes of existence, frequently introducing hierarchies and orders that oppressed and subordinated various humans, animals and other parts of material existence on the whole, what each author points toward, at the least, is the significance of the religious today, even if just symbolically, as a mode of existence that stresses the importance of relationships that value complexity rather than reduce it—as then an extremely valuable discourse to bring perspective to how all of the various modes of existence might better align themselves in our world.[34] Though there are undoubtedly various religious fundamentalisms that would put forth a narrowed and simplistic view of religious belief as that which appears to counter the modern reliance upon the "strong" claims of reason, what is offered through the lenses of these three thinkers is another, richer vision of the religious as that which opens humanity toward the complexity of existence it is permanently enmeshed within. The genuinely religious, from this point of view, is something that traditional, institutional religion has actually often neglected in its attempts to dominate through orderly imposition, but which needs to be seen for what it is. What religion is rather concerned with is being a discourse on transformation—or conversion, as Latour words it—something that takes place on an entirely immanent level of human existence.[35] It is a language of lovers and of passionate commitment much as Newman had understood it to be that allows for much complexity within the various modes of existence—a point that Latour drives home in his lengthy essay on "the torments of religious speech."[36]

What each of these authors work to provide is a fuller perspective on the complexity that truly underlies existence, a point whose time has come and toward which humanity must work in harmony to see it bear more fruitful relations with other cultures, nations and peoples, but also with non-human actors who are part of this world and who need political representation in order to survive. Perhaps, if humankind can see this far ahead, it is the religious mode of existence that will bring such relations to the fore of human discourse and provide more solid grounds for investigative inquiry than it has ever done before.

NOTES

1. See, among other places in his writing, Theodor W. Adorno, *Can One Live after Auschwitz? A Philosophical Reader*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).

2. See the commentary in Peter Gordon, *Adorno and Existence* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).

3. Theodor W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life*, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 2006), 80.

4. Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 2004), 162–63.

5. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).

6. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, 218.

7. John Henry Newman, *Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford: Between A.D. 1826 and 1843* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 9.

8. Newman, *Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford*, 12.

9. Newman, *Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford*, 185.

10. See also Newman's remarks on "Faith and Doubt" in *Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002).

11. Newman, *Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford*, 57.

12. We might note how Newman speaks of modernity in general in his *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, ed. Ian Ker (New York: Penguin, 1994).

13. John Henry Newman, *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 406. See also the commentary offered in Ian Ker, *John Henry Newman* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 618–50.

14. The probabilities are arrived at in a manner parallel to how Newman famously describes passionate commitment: "The heart is commonly reached, not through the reason, but through the imagination, by means of direct impressions, by the testimony of facts and events, by history, by description. Persons influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us. Many a man will live and die upon a dogma; no man will be a martyr for a conclusion. [. . .] No one, I say, will die for his own calculations; he dies for realities." John Henry Newman, *Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), 293.

15. Newman, *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*, 281.

16. Newman, *Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford*, 187.

17. Newman, *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*, 186.

18. Newman, *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*, 186.

19. Newman, *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*, 371–72.

20. Such is the reason that Newman himself declared, "Many a man will live and die upon a dogma: no man will be a martyr for a conclusion." Dogma, seen from this point of view, was a complex and richly interwoven part of the religious life, not simply a logical teaching on a particular issue. Newman, *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*, p. 90. See the argument put forth in John Henry Newman, *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).

21. See, among other places in his work, Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).

22. Latour in fact uses instances of reformation within the history of the Church as a prime example of just how complex these networks can be, but also how particular modes are emphasized over others for specifically ideological reasons. Bruno Latour, *An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns*, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 44.

23. Latour, *An Inquiry into Modes of Existence*, 85, de-emphasized from the original.

24. Latour, *An Inquiry into Modes of Existence*, 17–18.

25. See Graham Harman, *Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics* (Melbourne: re.press, 2009) and Gerard de Vries, *Bruno Latour* (London: Polity, 2016).

26. Latour, *An Inquiry into Modes of Existence*, 95.

27. Adam Miller, *Speculative Grace: Bruno Latour and Object-Oriented Theology* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 115. Latour's analysis draws, in part, from the work of Gilbert Simondon, *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*, trans. Cecile Malaspina (Minneapolis, MN: Univocal, 2017).

28. Latour, *An Inquiry into Modes of Existence*, 142, 311.

29. Latour, *An Inquiry into Modes of Existence*, 279.

30. Latour, *An Inquiry into Modes of Existence*, 280, de-emphasized from the original.

31. Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, 142–45. See also Christopher Watkin, *French Philosophy Today: New Figures of the Human in Badiou, Meillassoux, Malabou, Serres and Latour* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 202–5.

32. Bruno Latour, *Rejoicing, or the Torments of Religious Speech*, trans. Julie Rose (Cambridge: Polity, 2013).

33. Frederic Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), 375. It is interesting to read Jameson's account of a "postmodern Adorno" in light of the thesis I have been arguing regarding the union of negative dialectics and the complexity of networks as an outgrowth of something akin to a postmodern outlook. See Frederic Jameson, *Late Marxism: Adorno or the Persistence of the Dialectic* (London: Verso, 1990).

34. Latour, *An Inquiry into Modes of Existence*, 315.

35. Latour, *An Inquiry into Modes of Existence*, 298–99.

36. Latour, *Rejoicing*. See also Barbara Herrnstein Smith, "Anthropotheology: Latour Speaking Religiously," *New Literary History* 47:2/3 (2016), 331–51.

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