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The Holy Ghost Beyond the Church Walls: Latino Pentecostalism(s), Congregations, and Civic Engagement

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LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

THE HOLY GHOST BEYOND THE CHURCH WALLS: LATINO
PENTECOSTALISM(S), CONGREGATIONS, AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PROGRAM IN SOCIOLOGY

BY

NORMAN ELI RUANO

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

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To Negrita, Cachetes, and Flaco: it is my gift to you!

To those that have lived in the shadows of world religion for over one hundred years!

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ABSTRACT

In what ways is Pentecostalism a catalyst or an inhibitor of congregational and congregant civic engagement among U.S. Latinos? And how does this compare to other religious traditions, specifically Catholicism, Evangelicalism, and Mainline Protestantism?

Against the backdrop of recent social scientific debates about social capital, civic skills, and civic engagement, this dissertation considers the U.S. Latino Pentecostal community to see whether in fact some of the most disadvantaged members of society (immigrants, the urban poor, single mothers, minorities, and others) actually gain civic skills and opportunities for civic engagement within and beyond the walls of the church, skills and opportunities that ultimately contribute to the health of society. Now that the Latino community is the largest ethnic minority in the U.S., understanding the power and transformative potential of this community is more important than ever, particularly when it disrupts stereotypes and assumptions.

Undergirding my research is the dataset collected in the last few years through the Chicago Latino Congregations Study conducted by the Center for the Study of Latino Religion of the University of Notre Dame. In this study, a random stratified sample of 100 Latino congregations was chosen from a universe of 606 Latino congregations. Eighty-two of the one hundred churches participated in all of the data collection phases (leadership interview/survey, self-administered leadership survey, adult survey, and

youth survey). Twenty-six of the thirty-two Pentecostal churches participated in the study.

To answer the research question of this study, I develop typologies of Latino Pentecostal congregations, and of congregational and congregant civic engagement, being careful to identify the congregation type effect on the civic engagement behavior of congregants. Finally, I compare the civic engagement of Latino Pentecostal congregations with the civic engagement of Latino Catholic, Evangelical, and Mainline congregations and their congregants.

The dissertation argues that Latino Pentecostal congregations, depending on a variety of reasons such as demographics, congregant place of origin, and leader's education, can either be very conservative, inward-looking, and otherworldly, or progressive and this-worldly—in addition to many other options along this continuum. Such findings are particularly important given the common social scientific research assumption that Latino Pentecostal congregations are generally conservative, inward-looking, and otherworldly. After surveying a representative sample of Latino Pentecostal churches in Chicago, I found all Latino Pentecostal churches and their congregants are engaged both within the walls of the church and beyond their walls in the community and in society. The difference among the different types of churches is not whether they are engaged or not; rather, their differences have to do with their intensity and focus of engagement. In fact, significant numbers of Pentecostal churches are involved in providing social services such as the distribution of food, clothing, emergency financial help, and job placement to their members and the surrounding community while others

participate in protests and marches, such as the immigration marches that recently swept the country. Still other congregations connect their members and the surrounding community with structured networks of social services provided by nonprofits or the government while still others partner with nonprofits to provide health fairs, basic educational services, and financial and economic development training.

This research confirmed the existence of “traditional” and “progressive” congregations, and the newly emerged “neo-conservative” Pentecostal church. The “traditional” church is the home of the disfranchised of the Latino community, while the other types are quickly becoming the places of worship for the upwardly mobile in the community. “Progressive” congregations are very progressive in all ways except for moral issues (all Latino Pentecostal churches were found to be very religious and very morally conservative), while “neo-conservative” churches are also progressive, but diminishingly so. Surprisingly, “traditional” churches are not the inward-looking and otherworldly churches many people believe them to be. Although they have significant limitations, they are active at all levels of engagement, and, with a few exceptions, rival “progressive” churches in their progressive stances.

In summary, there are different types of Pentecostal congregations and those differences are reflected in their civic engagement behavior. “Progressive” and “traditional” Latino congregations are not just leaders in civic engagement among Pentecostal but also among Latino churches from all faith traditions. “Neo-conservative” congregations are, on the other hand, somewhat less progressive than their “traditional” counterparts and share similarities with Latino Evangelical churches.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The Opening

It was a beautiful late afternoon in a small village in a country of Central America. The footsteps of forty or fifty people became audible as they approached the colorful cemetery where the ceremony was to take place. Sons and grandchildren carried on their shoulders the coffin holding the remains of Ms. Josefina and as they approached the grave site the weeping of Ms. Josefina's oldest daughter (seventy-five years of age) became uncontrollable and the sobbing in the crowd widespread. Although Ms. Josefina had been born to a rural land-owning family, she had endured her share of hard times before she died at the age of ninety four. After giving birth to eight children, Ms. Josefina was widowed at age thirty four and never remarried, raising her children on her own. This sad afternoon her children and the children of her children had come to mourn the death of the matriarch and to see her one last time.

As the casket approached the grave site, one by one the family members gathered around it, and the oldest son, a former alcoholic and womanizer turned Pentecostal pastor, began the ceremony along with Rev. Maria, Ms. Josefina's pastor. The homily focused on heaven as the resting place for those who like Ms. Josefina believed in Jesus and lived a devout Pentecostal life. The pastor emphasized the hope with which Ms. Josefina had lived of one day going to be with the Lord; he challenged the audience to do the same so that one day they too could go to be with the Lord and see Ms. Josefina once again, but this time in heaven. As Pastor Carlos concluded his remarks, Rev. Maria sang the song Ms. Josefina most loved...

*Más allá del sol
Más allá del sol
Yo tengo un hogar, hogar bello hogar
Mas allá del sol*

*Well beyond the sun
Well beyond the sun
I have a home, a beautiful home
Well beyond the sun*

*Aunque en esta vida, no tengo riquezas
Se que allá en el cielo, tengo mi mansión*

*Although during life, I did not enjoy wealth
I know that in heaven I have a beautiful home*

*Más allá del sol
Más allá del sol*

*Well beyond the sun
Well beyond the sun...(song translated by Norman E. Ruano, 2007)*

Although a sociologist of religion might have concluded that this ritualized event was simply a familiar manifestation of Pentecostal otherworldliness, the fact is that Ms. Josefina left a very complex legacy to her family. For over thirty years, Ms. Josefina had indeed been a very devout Pentecostal; even though she was illiterate, she had mastered the Bible and the Pentecostal oral traditions. She had been responsible for the conversion to Pentecostalism of the majority of her children and a sizable portion of her extended family.

However, Ms. Josefina had also lived a very civically engaged life; she had been an aggressive and fearless social activist, a grass-roots neighborhood activist in the capital city. After an earthquake leveled many of the poor suburbs of the capital city, Ms. Josefina, along with other neighborhood activists, fought tirelessly day and night to get the government to provide homes, health clinics, schools, and basic water and electric services to the victims. When the earthquake crisis was over, Ms. Josefina continued the fight for the poor, organizing them to take over vacant city lots to force the government to address their housing needs. She also organized protests, vigils, and direct confrontations with the security forces to address insecurity, police brutality, and arbitrary increases to public bus fares, among many other issues—all of this in the midst of one the bloodiest civil wars in Latin American history.

That afternoon in August, after her oldest daughter (one of the few non-Pentecostals in the audience) hugged the casket, whispering her Catholic prayers obscured by the sounds of the weeping crowd and the Pentecostal songs, the casket was lowered into the grave. As Ms. Josefina's sons slowly sealed the grave, one of the grandsons—a sociologist and Pentecostal who had been deeply influenced by his grandmother's life and who saw her as a model for social commitment—playing in his mind the movie of his life experiences with the grandmother who raised him, could not stop thinking of the weight of the matriarch's legacy: a deeply committed Pentecostal and a fearless social activist, a lover of Jesus and his teachings, and a tireless defender of the poor.

The life story of Ms. Josefina represents the very essence of what this dissertation is all about. As I have studied Pentecostals, particularly U.S. Latino Pentecostals, for more than a decade, I have wondered many times whether Pentecostalism is an inhibitor

or a facilitator of civic engagement. Is Ms. Josefina the exception to the rule when it comes to civic engagement, or does she exemplify a poorly understood aspect of Pentecostalism? Was Ms. Josefina a social activist that converted to Pentecostalism and simply did not let her religion get in the way, or is civic engagement a key aspect of the Pentecostal ethos? Do we even have evidence through which to tease out these realities?

Although the Pentecostal movement traces its origins to the early 1900s, only one hundred year ago, it is quickly becoming a global phenomenon of gigantic proportions. Until recently the numbers of Pentecostals around the world have been a subject of timid or wild guesses. However, a recent global study of the Pentecostal and Charismatic movements by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2006) confirms what many have been guessing but were unable until then to demonstrate with data. In the Americas, the study shows, twenty percent of Guatemalans, fifteen percent of Brazilians, nine percent of Chileans (none of the previously mentioned in the U.S.), and five percent of Americans claim to be Pentecostal, a total in those countries alone of more than 40 million people (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006, p. 2). When the percentage of Charismatics (both Catholic and non-Pentecostal Protestant) are added to the Pentecostal figures, sixty percent of Guatemalans, thirty percent of Chileans, forty-nine percent of Brazilians, and twenty-three percent of Americans, more than 150 million people in only four countries of the Americas, claim to be Pentecostal or descendents of Pentecostalism through the various Charismatic movements (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006, p. 2).

The same study also claims that fifty-six percent of Kenyans, twenty-six percent of Nigerians, thirty-four percent of South Africans, forty-four percent of Philipinos, and

eleven percent of South Koreans claim to be either Pentecostal or Charismatic (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006, p. 2). These numbers document the emergence of a huge and quickly growing religious movement that has altered the landscape of world Christianity and has the potential of very soon becoming the largest strand of Christianity worldwide.

Although Pentecostalism has been present in the U.S. from the movement's very origins in the early 1900s, especially among racial minorities and the lower classes, more recently different expressions have been imported into this country by immigrants particularly those of Latin American descent. Among U.S. Latinos, Protestant Pentecostalism (not taking into consideration the Catholic Charismatic movement) is growing dramatically becoming an influential force in Latino barrios throughout the country. Gaston Espinoza and his colleagues (2003, p. 15) found that 4.5 million Latinos identified themselves as Protestant Pentecostals (twelve percent of the total U.S. Latino population), and an amazing sixty-four percent of all Latino Protestants in the country. Given that the majority of Latinos in this country originate from Catholic Mexico, this is indeed astonishing. This trend is partly fueled by the continued immigration flow from Central America (particularly in the last twenty-five years) with its high rates of Pentecostal affiliation, but is also a result of immigrants' continued defection from the Catholic church once on U.S. soil.

As the Pentecostal movement and its derivative movements have traveled the Americas and the world, they have also increasingly become an important social, economic, and political force especially among the poor and disenfranchised (Martin, 1990, 2002; Cleary & Stewart-Gambino, 1997; Stoll, 1991). Besides understanding the

religious underpinnings of this gigantic movement, the challenge for sociologists is to also understand its political and social implications for the world, the societies and communities where it is present, and ultimately for the individuals that profess it.

General Literature Review

This dissertation, therefore, seeks to understand some of the social and political implications of Pentecostalism by studying the intersection of Pentecostalism and civic engagement. Recent research has started to shed light on the centrality of religion to civic engagement in the United States and around the world (Kniss & Numrich, 2007; Smidt, 2003; Miller & Yamamori, 2007), but considerable more research and discussion is needed.

But what is civic engagement? For Robert Putnam (1995, p. 665) civic engagement is “people’s connections with the life of their communities, not merely with politics.” Robert Wuthnow (1988) defines it as behavior understood by actors as engaging and maintaining the civic order in pursuit of the common good. Loveland (2005, p.142) goes further and proposes that civic engagement is “individuals working toward a shared vision of a good society, and engaging in the social, public acts that are required to achieve the desired ends while at the same time submitting to the basic authority of a yet more broadly shared civic culture.” More specifically, Loveland adds that much civic engagement is directed at causing change (2005, p.142).

The civic engagement debate started in the 90s and continues on its course today. It is actually part of a larger debate over what is happening to American democracy (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999). According to Skocpol and Fiorina, there seem to be many and recent contradictory changes in American democracy, some of which “have clearly

enhanced democracy and others undercut our shared public life” (1999, p. 1). The fact is that even when U.S. democracy has become more inclusive significant numbers of Americans seem to be drawing back from involvement with community affairs and politics—being less civically engaged (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999, p. 2).

Although a lot of the groundwork for studying such civic engagement had already been put in place by the work of James Coleman (1988) who dealt with issues of social ties and culture and brought to the academic spotlight the concept of “social capital” (defined as social ties and shared norms that can enhance economic efficiency and help individuals to become better educated, find jobs, amass economic capital, raise well-socialized children, and make careers), it was Robert Putnam who made the social capital and civic engagement debate a hot national topic (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999).

In *Bowling Alone* (2000), Putnam argued that social capital and civic engagement were fundamental for democracy and had been major components of the life of the United States, but that the country has experienced a sharp decrease of social capital as of late. In fact, instead of joining churches, unions, clubs, and many other voluntary associations, Americans were now doing things alone, individually, as a result of declining social trust and the unraveling of social connections (Putnam, 2000). Although Putnam has been critiqued for using unreliable data sources for some of his claims, and as a result of a Durkheimian perspective of focusing too much on the issue of trust (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999), his book, and the subsequent movie, sparked the fire of debate which has resulted in the proposal of competing perspectives that seek to shed light on the very essence of social capital and civic engagement.

While the “social capital” approach (Putnam, and others) focuses on the socialization of individuals into shared norms and cooperative societal action, the “rational choice” approach focuses on the ways in which institutions and organizations create incentives for individuals to engage in various kinds of behavior (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999). The “rational choice” scholars (Coleman, Fiorina and others) are indeed skeptical about the benefits of involvement in public affairs. Another approach, the “historical institutionalist approach,” (Skocpol and others) deemphasizes trust as fundamental for democracy and proposes that conflict and distrust produced democracy in the first place (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999). Consequently, voluntary associations matter as sources of “popular leverage, not just as facilitators of individual participation and generalized social trust” (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999, p. 15).

In the end, the majority of analysts agree that American democracy is going through important changes that have affected civic engagement and, as a result, now it is often the most privileged citizens who are organizing and directing the democratic apparatus. In light of this, it is essential to look again at the eternal concerns of power and inequality especially as they relate to the most disenfranchised in society (Schlozman, Verba, & Brady, 1999).

The social capital and civic engagement debate and the empirical work conducted to address it has found that religion plays a fundamental role in this matter (Wuthnow, 1999, 2004; Kniss & Numrich, 2007; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; Schlozman, et al., 1999; Ammerman, 2005; Cnaan, 2002; Chavez & Higgins, 1992; McRoberts 1999, 2003; Smidt, 2003; Wood, 2002). Above all, it has become clear that “civic involvement has been deeply influenced by the nation’s preponderant commitment to its religious

organizations“ (Wuthnow, 1999, p. 331). Although some questions are being raised about modern religion’s capacity to produce civic engagement beyond the walls of the church, the reality is that there is still a consistent relationship between the two (Wuthnow, 1999; Smidt, 2003). A recent study by the Institute of Latino Studies at the University of Notre Dame found that for Chicago Latinos, church membership (thirty-three percent of the Latino population of the city were church members) is the main form of community organizational membership (Ready, Knight, & Sung-Chang, 2006, p. 3). The authors concluded that “it is clear that church membership is an important pathway into faith based social action groups, the second most cited form of organizational membership in Chicago” (Ready, Knight, & Sung-Chang, 2006, p. 3).

Although the relationship between religion and civic engagement is unquestionable, it plays out differently in various religious traditions. As has been extensively documented, there has been a decline of Mainline Protestant religion, a religious sector that has been on the vanguard of religious civic and social involvement, while Conservative Protestant religion has experienced dramatic growth, a sector characterized by less civic and social involvement at least beyond the walls of the church (Wuthnow, 1999). The author (Wuthnow, 1999) is careful to clarify that it is not that Conservative Protestants do not become civically engaged at all; instead they are more inclined to become engaged in the local congregation. Although this is still civic engagement, it is limited to within the walls of the church and has little impact in the wider society (Wuthnow, 1999, pp. 345-46).

Even with the differences already outlined, there is no doubt that congregations in general provide opportunities for participants to develop civic skills that are transferable

to the world beyond the walls of the church, including the political arena (Wuthnow, 1999; Verba et al., 1995). Verba and his colleagues even argue that religion is one of the few places left in civil society where the inequalities so obvious in the population in terms of education and income are radically reduced and where citizens, especially the seriously disfranchised from society, have a more even participatory field (1995). In fact, Wuthnow (1999) found that volunteering is very important for people active in religion and although Evangelicals tend to participate less in nonreligious organizations, thus limiting their civic skills mainly to the environment of religion, they were as likely as other religious people to participate in politics.

Besides providing opportunities for congregants to develop civic skills and offer opportunities to use them inside and outside the walls of the church, congregations themselves have also been very active in providing social services both to their congregants and the communities beyond their walls (Ammerman, 2005; Chavez, 2004; Cnaan, 2002; Cnaan, Hernandez, & McGrew, 2002; Kniss & Numrich, 2007; Wuthnow, 2004; McRoberts, 2003). In many instances, congregations serve as a greatly needed safety net for populations (immigrants and other populations in need) that do not have access to other safety nets (Cnaan, 2002; Cnaan, Hernandez, & McGrew, 2002).

How about Pentecostalism and civic engagement? Up until recently very little work had been done on Pentecostalism and civic engagement. In 2007, Donald Miller and Tetsunao Yamamori published the most complete study on the topic. In *Global Pentecostalism*, the authors argue that there are different types of Pentecostalism(s) and that one of the growing types is “progressive Pentecostalism” (2007). Although this strand of Pentecostalism recently emerged, its dynamic civic engagement is evidenced in

the width and depth of the social services it provides to its members and the community at large and with a one-person-at-a-time model deals with numerous social problems (Miller & Yamamori, 2007). Miller and Yamamori are generally positive about the civic engagement among “progressive Pentecostals,” but they also emphasize that there are significant numbers of Pentecostals who are “other-worldly” and do not become civically engaged and that even “progressive Pentecostals” are just now beginning to address structural social problems because of their inclination to stay out of the political arena (2007).

While Miller and Yamamori focused on the civic engagement of Pentecostalism outside the United States, Greeley and Hout in a recent study about white U.S. Conservative Christians concluded that Pentecostals are the “super-conservative Christians of the American religious landscape” (2006, p.163). However, the authors were pleasantly surprised to find out that when it came to voting, Pentecostals were more inclined to vote for Democrats—not that the majority voted for Democrats—than is generally the case among other Conservative Christians in this country (Greeley & Hout, 2006, p. 171).

Even though there are no congregational studies that focus exclusively on Pentecostal congregations, other congregational studies that had as part of their sample a few Pentecostal churches have provided some understanding of the intersection of Pentecostal congregations and civic engagement. The work of McRoberts (1999) among “activist” Pentecostal churches in a northeastern city found that several African American Pentecostal churches became “activist” churches mainly as a result of visionary leaders

who had been involved in the Civil Rights Movement and who still continue to take their social role very seriously.

Some of this work has also started to shed light on Latino Pentecostalism and civic engagement. Kniss and Numrich (2007), McRoberts (2003), Cnaan, Hernandez, and McGrew (2002), and Wood (1994), while looking at congregations in specific localities (Cnaan and colleagues in Philadelphia, for instance) and as part of larger samples of congregations, found that Pentecostal congregations, including Latino Pentecostal congregations, were important parts of the congregational life of the geographical areas of study. McRoberts (2003) looked at African American and Latino Pentecostal congregations in a neighborhood and analyzed “if” and “how” they became active in the community; he found that the majority of congregations provided social services to their members while some provided services to both members of the community and their own members. A few congregations were found to be very active in the community engaging the social, economic, and political structures at play in the neighborhood (McRoberts, 2003).

Qualitative work on three congregations by Richard Wood (1994) also shed some light on the political participation of congregations, one of which was Pentecostal. From his results, Wood (1994) concluded that Pentecostal congregations are not very likely to actively participate in direct political action because their meaning structures made them look in other directions.

In another study, Cnaan, Hernandez, and McGrew (2002), while studying the provision of social services by congregations in Philadelphia, found that the majority of Latino Pentecostal congregations they came across provided a very diverse array of social

services both to their members and to the community at large. In fact, it was documented that these churches provided more services to community members at large than to the members of the congregation.

These studies show the existence of different types of Pentecostal congregations as they relate to civic engagement. While some congregations are “activist” (McRoberts, 1999), others provide social services to their members and the community at large (McRoberts, 2003; Cnaan, Hernandez, & McGrew, 2002), and others simply do not get involved in direct political action (Wood 1994).

Research Question

Although more and more research is being conducted on religion and civic engagement, mainly through the lens of congregational studies, the intersection of Pentecostalism, particularly Latino Pentecostalism, and civic engagement is still poorly understood. With a few exceptions (McRoberts 1999, 2003; Cnaan, Hernandez, & McGrew, 2002; Kniss & Numrich, 2007; Wood 1994; Miller & Yamamori 2007; Greeley & Hout 2006), there are few studies that have looked at the subject. It is important to note that only McRoberts (1999), and Miller and Yamamori (2007) focus exclusively on Pentecostal congregations while the other studies have in their samples some Pentecostal congregations.

To date, there has been no comprehensive study of Latino Pentecostalism and civic engagement that compares different strands of Pentecostalism and their civic engagement practices with those of other religious traditions. Both the McRoberts (1999) and the Miller and Yamamori’s (2007) studies are up to the present the most comprehensive work on the subject, but they either mainly focus on other places but the

United States (Miller & Yamamori, 2007), or focus narrowly on Pentecostals of one community (McRoberts, 1999) preventing a comparison among the various racial and ethnic groups and Pentecostals with other faith traditions.

Furthermore, Miller and Yamamori exclusively focus on progressive Pentecostal congregations and fail to do a comprehensive comparison between those and other types of Pentecostal congregations (2007). By using a qualitative approach, Miller and Yamamori (2007) are also not able to provide a concrete picture of the prevalence of civic engagement within Pentecostalism in comparison to other faith traditions.

While Cnaan and colleagues (2002), and Greeley and Hout (2006) used quantitative approaches, the former only focuses on social services provision and not on other types of civic engagement, while the latter, in a few pages, compares the morality and voting behavior only of exclusively white Pentecostals with other Conservative Christians in the U.S.

Even though some work has already proposed typologies of Pentecostal congregations as it relates to civic engagement (Miller & Yamamori, 2007; McRoberts, 1999), the model used is static—a Pentecostal congregation is deemed classical, progressive, or activist—which fails to take into account the evolutionary path of many congregations. Namely, it is possible that a classical Pentecostal congregation might, in the not too distant future, become a progressive one. In previous research I have conducted, I have found that some progressive congregations split from their classical origins because they were dissatisfied with their lack of engagement in the public square (Ruano, 2007).

Furthermore, very little research (with the exception of Cnaan, Hernandez, & McGrew, 2002; Kniss & Numrich, 2007) has looked at Pentecostalism and civic engagement in the context of immigrant communities in the United States. The “mature” democratic system of this country offers immigrants a variety of opportunities for civic engagement while engulfing them in an individualistic consumer-driven culture. Therefore, is migration a variable that inhibits or facilitates civic engagement? How, if at all, does this variable affect Latino Pentecostalism’s civic engagement?

Despite the fact that a significant number of Latino Pentecostals are poor, immigrants, single mothers, and women in general, including people with low levels of education, there is no research that has looked at the opportunities that exist in Latino Pentecostal congregations to develop civic skills and how those skills are potentially transferred to the individual’s life and community outside of the church including the public square. This is an important area of research because it has the potential to illuminate the role Pentecostal congregations play as potential contributors to the development of human and social capital for the disenfranchised.

I also think it is important to question certain assumptions underlying some of the religion and civic engagement literature. For instance, even though Wuthnow (1999) is careful to indicate that being involved in the congregation and its activities is still civic engagement, there is a tendency to argue in favor of engagement in the public square as the only socially beneficial type of engagement. I would suggest, instead, that civic engagement both inside and beyond the walls of the congregation is beneficial to society because it develops the stock of social capital in individuals. In fact, for many people in congregations, civic engagement may be an evolutionary process. By being involved in

their churches and the ministries and programs they offer, congregants may develop civic skills and an awareness of themselves, their communities, and their environment. Some may choose to engage their communities and society through congregational and other religious organizational means, while others may choose to do so directly through non-religious means. I would, therefore, argue that within-church engagement may actually serve as a stepping stone into other forms of civic engagement. Furthermore, I would propose that choosing to engage communities and societies through congregations or religious means does not have any less societal or individual value than choosing to do so through non-religious means—one is not any less than the other and both have the potential of addressing some of the most pressing issues in society, even the ones that are structural or systemic in nature.

Finally, there is not a lot of research that sheds light on the effect of specific types of congregations on the social perceptions and civic engagement behavior of Pentecostals in general let alone on Latino Pentecostals. Are Pentecostals who belong to progressive Pentecostal congregations as opposed to classical congregations more or less engaged inside the congregations, in their communities, and even the public square?

In summary, the lack of research on the various aspects of Pentecostalism and civic engagement, particularly Latino Pentecostalism and civic engagement, may in fact result in blanket statements and conclusions about a huge movement that spans the world and includes hundreds of millions of people—a movement that some research (Miller & Yamamori, 2007; McRoberts, 1999; Ruano, 2007) suggests is quickly diversifying even in its civic engagement practices. So we must ask to whom Greeley and Hout are referring when they conclude that Pentecostals (in this case U.S. Pentecostals) are “ultra-

conservative Christians”—with the caveat that they do not tend to vote as Republican as their Evangelical brethren—or “fundamentalist” or simply “otherworldly conservative Evangelicals” (2006)? Which Pentecostals are they talking about? Are they talking about classical, progressive, or other types of Pentecostals? Are they including them all? The lack of research on the subject and the way some of the research was conducted does not readily allow adequate answers for these questions.

Therefore, I propose that it is imperative to identify the different strands of Pentecostalism and whether that affects the congregations’ and their congregants’ civic engagement practices. In other words, it is important to know why and how Latino Pentecostal congregations and their congregants get civically involved and if there are different patterns of engagement (for instance, some emphasize more within-church engagement while others community and public square engagement) for the different types of churches and their congregants. Given the fact that a significant number of Latino Pentecostal congregations are located in immigrant barrios with high levels of poverty and other social problems and given that their members are largely members of the surrounding communities, it is also imperative to understand the types of civic skills and civic engagement opportunities afforded to the congregants and whether they translate into engagement outside the church, and if so, under what circumstances.

Due to the limitations in the study of Pentecostalism, Pentecostalism and civic engagement, and Latino Pentecostalism and civic engagement, in particular, this dissertation attempts to fill some of the gaps in the literature. The dissertation deals with how different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations get civically involved, how those different types of congregations influence their congregants in the development of civic

skills and civic engagement behavior, and how the civic engagement of different types of Pentecostal congregations compares to the civic engagement of Latino Catholic, Evangelical, and Mainline Protestant churches.

I use “evangelical” as a separate category for comparison to test whether, in regards to civic engagement, Pentecostals and Evangelicals are in fact different. Although in the non-Latino religious context, Pentecostals are a small minority of the “Evangelical” tradition, in the Latino context Pentecostals are the majority making it necessary to study the movement and its followers in their own right and uniqueness and in relation to Latino Evangelicals. The fact is that in the Latino context Evangelicalism has been greatly influenced by Pentecostalism and not necessarily the other way around, as is the case in the non-Latino context (Espinoza, 2004).

So What?

In light of the decline of Mainline Protestantism as of late and the concomitant decline of the dynamic civic engagement that characterized it while other forms of Conservative Protestantism that are not as inclined to civic engagement in the public square are on the rise (Wuthnow 1999), a systematic understanding of Pentecostalism and civic engagement would show if “progressive” and other strands of Pentecostalism can actually fill the void left. This is especially important for the Latino community of the United States. Besides experiencing unprecedented demographic growth rates, this community is also experiencing significant religious landscape changes away from Catholicism towards Pentecostalism—mainly from a dynamic migratory flow from countries that have high levels of affiliation with Pentecostalism and from conversion once on U.S. soil (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007).

Because Pentecostalism since its very origin has been the refuge for significant numbers of the disfranchised of the world (although this reality may be changing according to Miller and Yamamori, 2007) including the poor, the uneducated, immigrants, women in general, single mothers, gang bangers, drug users and abusers, and people that suffer all kinds of social and individual dislocations (Brusco, 1995; Chesnut, 1997), a systematic understanding of Pentecostalism and civic engagement would show whether, in fact, Pentecostal congregations are also important sites for the development of social capital for those that most need it. Are they places where the inequalities so obvious in the population are radically reduced and where people, especially the seriously disfranchised from society, encounter a more even playing field (Verba et al., 1995)? More important, systematic research on the intersection of Latino Pentecostalism and civic engagement would clarify if Pentecostal congregations are indeed places that provide opportunities for congregants, including the disfranchised, to develop civic skills that can ultimately help them address the multitude of social problems in their communities and that can even be used in the political arena (Wuthnow, 1999; Verba et al., 1995).

Given the precarious financial situation of many disenfranchised sectors in society and particularly in the Latino community (immigrants, single mothers), a systematic understanding of Latino Pentecostal congregations and their civic engagement would also allow us to understand how they provide social services to their members and the communities around them serving as a social safety net otherwise not available to many people in urban barrios.

Finally, by comprehensively studying Latino Pentecostalism and civic engagement, we would be able to understand whether Pentecostal congregations serve as facilitators or inhibitors of the integration of Latino immigrants into the mainstream of U.S. society. Do they promote an education and a work ethic that produces upward mobility and that is aligned with U.S. economic values? Are Latino immigrants that belong to different types of Pentecostal congregations more effective at integrating into American society than those that are not church members or those that attend congregations of other religious traditions?

My Claim

Present academic research on Pentecostalism generally divides it into historical sub-movements (classical Pentecostalism, neo-Pentecostalism, the Charismatic Renewal) and proposes (with a handful of exceptions, Miller & Yamamori, 2007; McRoberts, 1999; Ruano, 2007) that the congregations and the respective congregants of each of these sub-movements are monolithic in belief and civic engagement practice, portraying the majority generally as being inward-looking and otherworldly, and thus not very concerned with civic engagement beyond the walls of the congregation. I propose, however, that there are different strands of U.S. Latino Pentecostalism, even within what would be considered classical Pentecostalism, that see their role in the world differently, resulting in different modes of civic engagement both by congregations and their congregants. In fact, while many U.S. Latino Pentecostal congregations and their congregants are indeed very conservative, inward-looking, and otherworldly, others are progressive and even activist, outward-looking, and thisworldly, and other potential options along this continuum.

In order to address my research question(s) and to test the validity of my thesis, I develop a typology of Latino Pentecostal congregations emphasizing how congregations are dynamic, not static, and change through time and under different circumstances—for instance, a classical Latino Pentecostal congregation can become a progressive Pentecostal congregation. I also propose a typology of congregational civic engagement that takes into consideration various modes of civic engagement both inside and outside the walls of the congregation.

I then analyze the factors and the conditions under which different Pentecostal congregations (a comparison between different types of Pentecostal congregations) become civically engaged and the types of civic engagement in which they, as organizations, get involved in—from addressing the needs of individuals to dealing with the needs of communities that surround them to tackling systemic, structural forces in the society around them. I also analyze the various ways, both formal and informal, in which different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations provide their congregants with an opportunity to develop civic skills, and how different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations through their religious or nonreligious practices inside and outside the walls of the congregation may ultimately affect the civic engagement behavior by their congregants within the church and beyond the church walls. As a result, I develop a typology of congregant civic engagement.

Finally, I compare Latino Pentecostal congregations with Latino Evangelical, Mainline Protestant, and Catholic congregations in relation to civic engagement. In the U.S., the tendency is to include Pentecostals under the umbrella of Evangelicalism (Smith, 1998), but I will test to see if by studying Pentecostal congregations in their own

category important differences (as they relate to civic engagement) are found when compared to Evangelical churches. At the same time, based on the civic engagement experience of different Latino Pentecostal congregations, I analyze whether the present dualistic Conservative Protestantism versus Liberal Protestantism framework used by some sociologists of religion (Wuthnow, 1999, 2002) needs revision to include a Moderate Protestantism component.

Plan of Dissertation

In chapter two, I review the relevant literature regarding social capital and civic engagement, religion and civic engagement, and Pentecostalism and civic engagement. I pay special attention to the literature that deals with typologies of congregations and congregational civic engagement, congregants and civic engagement, and the effects of specific types of congregations on the civic engagement perceptions and behavior of the congregants. I also review the literature that deals with U.S. Latino Pentecostalism and civic engagement emphasizing comparative literature that deals with the civic engagement of various religious traditions. In the end, I identify and outline the shortcomings and the gaps in the literature as they relate to religion and civic engagement and Pentecostalism/Latino Pentecostalism and civic engagement.

In chapter three, I review the methodology used for this study. This dissertation mainly uses the dataset generated by the Chicago Latino Congregations Study conducted by the Center for the Study of Latino Religion of the University of Notre Dame from 2003 to 2007. From the universe of 606 Latino congregations found in Chicago, a random stratified sample of one hundred Latino congregations (defined as congregations with more than fifty percent of Latino congregants in traditional Latino neighborhoods

and thirty percent or more of Latino congregants in new Latino dispersion areas of Chicago) was chosen. The sample was stratified on the basis of the faith traditions found in the Latino community, Catholicism, Pentecostalism, Evangelicalism, and Mainline Protestantism. The stratified sample included thirty-two Pentecostal congregations. Eighty-two (N= 82) of the one hundred churches participated in all of the data collection phases (leadership interview/survey, self-administered leadership survey, adult survey, and youth survey). Twenty-six (N=26) of the thirty-two Pentecostal churches participated in the study. This dataset of Latino Pentecostal congregations and their congregants is by far the most complete Latino Pentecostal dataset ever collected in the U.S.

I then complement the quantitative data with qualitative data from three different Latino Pentecostal congregations representative of the typology of Pentecostal churches developed in the dissertation. The qualitative data was collected using participant observation, focus groups, formal and informal interviews, and content analysis.

In chapter four, using the congregations as the unit of analysis, I hypothesize a typology of Latino Pentecostal congregations and test it using cluster analysis. I then extensively discuss the religiosity, demographics, and social and political perspectives of the different types of Pentecostal congregations identified. I conclude with further research questions and issues and concerns about the findings.

In chapter five, I develop a theoretical typology of civic engagement and test, by use of descriptive statistics, its relationship to the different Latino Pentecostal churches identified in chapter four. The objective is to show that there are different strands of Pentecostalism and that different types of U.S. Latino Pentecostal congregations engage

in different types of civic engagement, dispelling the perspective that Pentecostal congregations are generally monolithic in their civic engagement or lack of it.

In chapter six, I outline how U.S. Latino Pentecostal congregations serve as facilitators for the development of civic skills that can ultimately be used in local communities and the political realm to address social concerns. I also show how the type of Pentecostal congregation an individual attends affects his/her civic engagement behavior both inside and outside the congregation.

In chapter seven, I compare the civic engagement practices of U.S. Latino Pentecostal congregations with those of congregations of other Latino religious traditions focusing on Latino Evangelical, Mainline Protestant, and Catholic congregations. Ultimately, I identify in this chapter the similarities and differences that exist between congregations and tease out whether they result from culture, social context, from religious tradition, or from a combination of all of these. Finally, I also address the dualistic theoretical Liberal/Conservative framework generally used by sociologists of religion to describe the religious landscape in the U.S., and question whether indeed the experience of U.S. Latino Pentecostals provides compelling evidence for the modification of this framework.

In chapter eight, I summarize the main arguments and contributions of this dissertation and outline the implications of the findings for the study of religion and civic engagement, and Pentecostalism/Latino Pentecostalism and civic engagement, and propose future research while identifying key questions still in need of answers.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Besides the already well-known demographic transformation of the U.S. population by Latinos in the last decades, there is another transformation that has not until recently received much attention—the transformation of the nation’s religious landscape. A study by the Pew Hispanic Center concluded that “religious expressions associated with the Pentecostal and Charismatic movements are a key attribute of worship of Hispanics in all major religious traditions—far more so than among non-Latinos” (2007, p. 3). The authors of the study conclude that practice of this distinctive form of Christianity is transforming the nation’s religious landscape (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007, p. 3).

Latino religion is experiencing a move away from Catholicism (whereas 74 percent of the foreign-born adult Latino population identifies with Catholicism, this dramatically drops to only 58 percent of the native born) and into Protestantism (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007, p.12). On the other hand, while only 16 percent of foreign-born Latinos identify with Protestantism, 26 percent of the native-born do so (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007, p.12). The majority of Latinos (70 percent) that identify themselves as Protestant also identify themselves as born-again or Evangelical, but more importantly, 57 percent identify themselves as “renewalists”(an umbrella term used by the Pew

Hispanic Center that refers to both Pentecostals and Charismatics)—31 percent self identify as Pentecostal and 26 percent as Charismatic (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007, p. 31). In contrast, less than 20 percent of non-Hispanic Protestants identify themselves as “renewalists,” Pentecostal or Charismatic (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007, p. 31). What is even more revealing is that the majority of Hispanic Catholics, 54 percent, also identify themselves as Charismatics while only around 10 percent of non-Hispanic Catholics self identify in this manner (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007, p. 31).

The implications of these trends to U.S. religion are monumental. By now a third of all Catholics in the U.S. are Latinos and the Pew Hispanic Center projects that their share will continue to grow dramatically (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007, p. 3). At the same time, as Catholic Latinos turn more and more to renewalism and Protestantism and those that convert to Protestantism turn more and more to renewalism, both Pentecostal and other Protestant Charismatic, the American religious landscape will surely see a turn towards renewalism in the years to come.

Consequently, the religious, social and political implications of this Latino turn towards renewalism, especially Pentecostalism, must be seriously studied. Although Latinos are by now the largest ethnic minority in the country (46.1 million) and have made some advancement in their educational and economic status, still millions of Latinos (especially the undocumented—estimated at about 10 million people) continue to suffer from poverty, are employed in some of the least promising sectors of the economy, live in urban areas with endless social problems, do not have health insurance, do not have adequate access to education and other vital services, and, as if that were not

enough, are presently the target of anti-immigration campaigns led by some of the most politically conservative, and nationalistic sectors of U.S. society.

Unfortunately very little research has looked at the implications of Latino Pentecostalism for the individuals that practice it, the communities they live in, and the country as a whole. That is, as Latinos choose Pentecostalism and other renewalist movements, it is imperative to develop an in-depth understanding of the social and political implications for Latinos and the country at large particularly as it relates to civic and political engagement within and beyond the walls of the church. Is Pentecostalism a facilitator or an inhibitor of civic and political engagement? This research must, however, evade the easy temptation of lumping Latino Pentecostals together with American or Latino Evangelicals. Due to the fact that Pentecostals represent a small percentage of the U.S. and even the Evangelical landscape, Pentecostals are not generally studied in their own right. Instead Pentecostals are lumped with Evangelicals resulting in a disappointing lack of knowledge about Pentecostal religious beliefs, practice, and civic engagement behavior. In the Latino context, however, it is important to highlight the uniqueness of Pentecostalism, its differences from Evangelicalism, and the implications of that for social and political engagement because Pentecostalism exerts a lot more influence over Evangelicalism than the other way around (Espinoza, 2004).

In this chapter, I will review the literature that is directly related to the topic of this dissertation. The objective is to provide the theoretical and academic context that informs the work I do in this dissertation. The literature review will go from a more general review of the work related to social capital and civic engagement to later become more specific about religion, social capital, and civic engagement. At the end, I will

review the literature that addresses Pentecostalism, Latinos, social capital and civic engagement to finish with a discussion about the research areas that need clarification, modification, or addition. I am confident that this literature review will provide an understanding of how my dissertation work fits within the larger social science, sociological, sociology of religion, and Pentecostal debates and hopefully show how my work will make a contribution to these debates and the academic work being conducted to address them.

Social Capital and Civic Engagement

But what is civic engagement? For Robert Putnam (1995, p. 665) civic engagement is “people’s connections with the life of their communities, not merely with politics,” and Robert Wuthnow (1988) defines it as behavior understood by actors as engaging and maintaining the civic order in pursuit of the common good. Loveland (2005, p. 142) adds that civic engagement is “individuals working toward a shared vision of a good society, and engaging in the social, public acts that are required to achieve the desired ends while at the same time submitting to the basic authority of a yet more broadly shared civic culture.” Loveland emphasizes that much civic engagement is directed at causing change (2005, p. 142).

The civic engagement debate started in the 1990s and continues on its course today. It is actually part of a larger debate over the state of American democracy and the related debate about social capital (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999). According to Skocpol and Fiorina (1999, p. 1), there seem to be many and recent contradictory changes in American democracy, some of which “have clearly enhanced democracy and others undercut our shared public life.” The fact is that even when U.S. democracy has become more

inclusive, significant numbers of Americans seem to be drawing back from involvement with community affairs and politics—that is, they are becoming less civically engaged (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999, p. 2).

Although a lot of the groundwork had already been put in place by the work of James Coleman (1988) who dealt with issues of social ties and culture and brought to the academic spotlight the concept of “social capital,” it was Robert Putnam who made the social capital and civic engagement debate a hot national topic (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999).

In *Bowling Alone* (2000), Putnam argued that social capital and civic engagement were fundamental for democracy and had been major components of the life of the United States, but that the country has experienced a sharp decrease of social capital as of late. In fact, instead of joining churches, unions, clubs, and many other voluntary associations, Americans are now doing things alone, individually, as a result of declining social trust and the unraveling of social connections (Putnam, 2000). Many social scientists have followed Putnam’s lead in the study of social capital while others have intensely opposed him (Edwards & Foley, 1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b; Portes & Landolt, 1996; Skocpol, 1999; Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999).

But why is civic engagement and social capital so vitally important? The answer finds its origins in the work of Alexis de Tocqueville’s, *Democracy in America* (1969). De Tocqueville (1969) argued that democracy requires the presence and vitality of civic associations that are not political in nature and that serve as sources of meaning and social engagement. In fact, according to de Tocqueville associational life actually “provided the foundation for democratic life, because democracy could not survive unless

citizens continued to participate actively, joining with others of similar mind and interest to address matters of common concern” (Smidt, 2003, p. 1). Robert Putnam (1993), following the lead of de Tocqueville, maintains that associational life contributes to the formation of social capital, which in turn fosters civic engagement.

But why is civic engagement that important? Ultimately, according to Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (1999, p. 427), the participation in voluntary activities matters for several reasons: “the development of the capacities of the individual, the creation of community and the cultivation of democratic virtues, and the equal protection of interests in public life.”

Corwin Smidt (2003, p. 4) defines social capital as “features of social organization (friendship networks, norms, and social trust) that facilitate working and cooperating together for mutual benefit. Accordingly, social capital can be viewed as a set of “moral resources” that lead to increased cooperation among individuals. James Coleman (1990, pp. 302-304), one of the main proponents of the social capital framework of analysis, adds that social capital, like other forms of capital, is productive making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence. Social capital is then important because it has the ability to bind together “autonomous individuals into communal relationships...transform self-interested individuals exhibiting little social conscience and weak feelings of mutual obligation into members of a community expressing shared interests and a sense of the common good” (Smidt, 2003, p. 5).

According to Putnam (1993, p. 70), social capital has two key components that makes it so important for civic life—trust and reciprocity. The argument goes that by

participating in voluntary associations, individuals interact with each other and that one result of this is increasing the likelihood of mutual trust. This in turn “helps to broaden the scope of the individual’s interests, making public matters more relevant... [it also increases] members’ level of information, trains them in social interaction, fosters leadership skills, and provides resources for effective public action” (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995).

The main proponents of the social capital framework, Coleman and Putnam, see social capital residing in different places. For Coleman (1990, p. 302) social capital resides in the structure of the relations between and among persons within a particular context. It is not the property or characteristic of an individual, but rather is embedded in particular relationships. On the other hand, Putnam (2000, p. 20) recently—it is important to note that he has recently changed his stance because he used to follow Coleman’s lead—argued that “social capital has both an individual and a collective aspect.” As an individual resource, social capital can be moved along by the individual from relationship to relationship becoming another form of human capital (Smidt 2003, p. 9). Social scientists that see social capital as something possessed by an individual see in survey research the correct approach to study social capital and focus on assessing “the individual involvement in associational life and the attitudes and orientations that may be linked to such life” (Smidt 2003, p. 9). On the other hand, social scientists that see social capital as embedded in personal relationships study it with qualitative techniques such as participant observation.

Despite the fact that there has been an abundance of research that has used the social capital framework of analysis as its base, there is a variety of issues related to the

“concept and the theoretical foundation upon which it is based. These issues relate to the adequacy of its theoretical explanatory power, its conceptual clarity, its posited empirical relationships, and its normative perspective” (Smidt, 2003, p. 7). A key theoretical critique of the social capital framework is that it is “too simplistic and that it neglects or downplays crucial factors [such as the role institutional structures, particularly the state, play in the formation and continuation of associational life and that social capital formation besides having social also has structural dynamics] that also serve to shape the nature of democratic life” (Smidt, 2003, p. 7). The other theoretical critique advanced by both Smidt (2003, p. 8) and Foley and Edwards (1998, p. 13), two of the most ardent critics of Putnam and other social capital proponents, has to do with how associational life produces social capital, especially how the trust that results from face-to-face interactions becomes generalized social trust. According to these critics the mechanisms for the production of social capital and the expansion of trust have not yet been clearly articulated.

Empirically, Putnam has been critiqued for making a case for the decline of formal membership levels in long-standing organizations (e.g. the Parent Teacher Association) as a reflection of a decline in civic engagement (Putnam, 2000). However, his critics argue that Putnam ignores growth in membership that has occurred in newly formed membership organizations (e.g. the American Association of Retired Persons); they suggest he has simply confused change with decline because membership may be shifting and not declining (Smidt, 2003, p. 10).

Another important critique of Putnam’s social capital framework has to do with how “crucial” voluntary associations really are in the production of social capital. Some

wonder, “Is not the social capital produced by the family and even the educational system more important than the one produced by voluntary associations” (Smidt, 2003, p. 10)? Others argue that it is likely that not all types of associational membership are equal in terms of the production of social capital (Smidt, 2003, p. 10). Foley and Edwards (1998, p. 15) succinctly conclude that the issue is not whether involvement in voluntary associations generates interpersonal trust, fosters habits of cooperation and norms of reciprocity, but “what kinds of associations do so, under what circumstances, and with what effects to the polity?”

Although the social capital framework has been widely publicized and used by academia and the press, there are other competing approaches that shed light on important aspects of democracy and civic life.

While the “social capital” approach (Putnam and others) focuses on the socialization of individuals into shared norms and cooperative societal action, the “rational choice” approach focuses on the ways in which institutions and organizations create incentives for individuals to engage in various kinds of behavior (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999). The “rational choice” scholars (Coleman, Fiorina and others) are, in fact, skeptical about the benefits of involvement in public affairs.

Another approach, the “historical institutionalist approach,” (Skocpol and others) deemphasizes trust as fundamental for democracy and proposes that conflict and distrust produced democracy in the first place (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999). Consequently, voluntary associations matter as sources of “popular leverage, not just as facilitators of individual participation and generalized social trust” (Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999, p. 15).

In the end, the majority of analysts agree that American democracy is going through important changes that have affected civic engagement where the most privileged citizens may be organizing and directing the democratic apparatus. In light of this, it is essential to look again at the eternal concerns of power and inequality especially as they relate to the most disenfranchised in society (Schlozman, Verba, & Brady, 1999).

Religion, Social Capital, and Civic Engagement

One of the unequivocal results of the social capital and civic engagement debate and the empirical work conducted to address it in the last twenty years has been the finding that religion plays a fundamental role in the production of social capital and civic engagement (Putnam, 2000; Wuthnow, 1999, 2004; Verba, et al., 1995; Schlozman et al., 1999; Ammerman, 2005; Cnaan 2002; Kniss & Numrich, 2007; Chavez & Higgins, 1992; McRoberts, 1999, 2003; Smidt, 2003; Wood, 2002). In fact, Putnam (2000, p. 66) categorically states that “faith communities in which people worship together are arguably the single most important repository of social capital in America.” In spite of this recognition, Putnam himself has treated religion as one form, among many such forms, of association paying little attention to its uniqueness; religious associations are viewed to be similar to other kinds of associations in which individuals get involved (Smidt, 2003, p. 2; Kniss & Numrich, 2007, p. 216).

In response, the work of Smidt (2003), in *Religion as Social Capital*, provides a focused and comprehensive analysis of the uniqueness of religion for the formation of social capital and how religious social capital shapes the civic engagement that ultimately shapes public life. In order to address the uniqueness of religious social capital, Smidt (2003, p. 216) poses some fundamental questions: “to what extent, then, is there

something distinctive about religious social capital that serves to differentiate it from other kinds of social capital? Or is all social capital basically similar in nature, regardless of its origins?”

In order to answer these questions, Smidt (2003) and other analysts (for instance, Kniss & Numrich, 2007) have looked at the role congregations, para-church organizations, religious individuals, and nonreligious demographic variables play, together or individually, in the production of religious social capital and its subsequent impact on civic engagement. I will now turn to a review of the literature that addresses these issues.

Congregations, social capital, and civic engagement. One of the main observers of religion and civic engagement has noted that it is clear that in this country “civic involvement has been deeply influenced by the nation’s preponderant commitment to its religious organizations“(Wuthnow, 1999, p. 331). In fact, for some analysts (Kniss & Numrich, 2007), the local congregation is intimately related to social capital and civic engagement, a fact that is not surprising given that the congregation is the “locus of activity for American Christianity” (White, 1968). According to Cnaan, Boddie, and Yancey (2003, p. 20), “the impressive, and often unrecognized, role that the local congregations play in building human and social capital is more than a current social phenomenon; it is a long-held and enduring social norm. In essence, it is a norm that dictates the way in which people that come to worship together also become involved in community service.” Cnaan and colleagues (2003, p. 20) conclude that joining a congregation in the United States “necessarily involves accepting a set of norms—

including the norms of contributing to the building of human and social capital and of being willing to participate in civic affairs.”

This is not surprising given the active participation of Americans in religion and the local congregation. A recent study (Smidt, Green, Guth, & Kellstedt, 2003, p. 157) found that while more than 40 percent of Americans claim to attend church either regularly or frequently, only 20 percent of Canadians report the same. On the other hand, only 16.7 percent of Americans report rarely attending church while 32.9 of Canadians do so (Smidt et al., 2003, p. 157). The same study found that only 9.6 percent of Americans believe that the concept of God is an old superstition, that 84.3 percent of Americans believe in salvation through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, that 83.3 percent of Americans believe that the Bible is the inspired word of God, and that 59.9 percent of Americans have committed their life to Christ (Smidt et al., 2003, p. 158). The results of this study, besides showing the extent of the religiosity of Americans in comparison with another developed Western country (Canada), also show that Americans are a lot more likely to be members of a “religious or church-related group” in comparison to Canadians—33 percent versus 20 percent (Smidt et al., 2003, p. 159). In another study, Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (1999, p. 427) found that more than 60 percent of Americans are, in fact, members of a church.

It is important to note, however, that the local congregations’ role in the formation of social capital and the facilitation of civic engagement has been found to be multi-dimensional and complex. In a national study of student volunteers in America, Robert Wuthnow (1996, p. 9) concluded that “churches and synagogues remain the primary place where instruction is given about the spiritual dimension of caring.” Cnaan and

colleagues (2003, p. 29) add that all major religions emphasize collective responsibility for social justice and the welfare of other human beings. In fact, local congregations' theological teachings emphasize mutual responsibility, the need to assist strangers in need, and the legitimate claim of the weak and needy upon the community (Cnaan, Boddie, & Yancey, 2003, p. 29). These teachings serve to socialize those that come in contact with the congregation, especially the younger generations, and become road maps for them of desired behaviors of compassion and caring (Cnaan, Boddie, & Yancey 2003, p. 29).

In the end, the socialization experienced by the church members results in civic engagement, within and beyond the congregation, characterized by a strong motivation to participate for religious, social, and altruistic reasons and less for self-interested material motives (Harris 2003, p. 135).

This socialization of individuals at the local congregation is also accomplished by the uniqueness of the role religious language plays in motivating individuals to get involved and to giving them the reasons to do so. Schwadel (2005, p. 169) clearly states that "what is preached from the pulpit and talked about in the pews influences church members' activities, not just in the church but also outside of the church." In fact, Rhys Williams (2003) argues that religious language is a form of social capital that can foster a democratic public politics. Williams (2003) maintains that religious discourse is a cultural resource that, if used correctly, can contribute to doing public collective activity because it is democratically available along with serving as a motivating force that is available and resonates well with a variety of populations in American society. Although Williams (2003, p. 189) expresses his concern with "what kinds of religious language

gain currency in our political culture,” he concludes that “it is only when religious language is fully engaged with the problems, issues, and challenges of organizing human life that it is capable of contributing to emancipation as well as righteousness, to justice alongside morality”—religious language needs to find a seat at the public table. In other words, it is not only socializing individuals within the walls of the congregation that is important, but religious language also has a role as a public voice that addresses the concerns of a particular society.

Besides being caring and social responsibility learning sites, local congregations also “regularly and straightforwardly act as communication networks that foster civic volunteerism” (Coleman, 2003, p. 34). Robert Wuthnow (2003, p. 242) adds that “religious organizations tell people of opportunities to serve, both within and beyond the congregation itself, and provide personal contacts, committees, phone numbers, meeting space, transportation, or whatever it may take to turn good intention into action.”

Furthermore, one of the most important contributions of local congregations to society may be their ability to generate civic skills for their members and to give them opportunities to use them both within and beyond the congregation (Wuthnow, 1999, p. 346; Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995). Verba, Scholzman, and Brady (1995, p. 394) define civic skills as “the communications and organizational abilities that allow citizens to use time and money effectively in political [and social] life.” According to Wuthnow (1999, p. 346), civic skills are learned when people learn to work together on committees, lead meetings, and serve as officers and in other capacities at the local congregation. What is important about civic skills is that they are transferable to other spheres of life such as the workplace and the political arena (Wuthnow, 1999, p. 346).

Verba, Scholzman, and Brady (1995, p. 320) emphatically maintain that in regards to civic skills local congregations are one of the few places left in civil society where the inequalities so obvious in the population in terms of education and income are radically reduced and where citizens, especially the seriously disenfranchised from society, have a more even participatory field. In other words, congregations distribute the opportunity for the development of civic skills and their practice more democratically than do other groups in society.

However, not all congregations have been found to provide the same opportunities to develop and practice civic skills (Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995; Wuthnow, 1999). In fact, analysts observe that Protestant congregations with their horizontal organizational structure and their emphasis on lay participation may indeed provide more opportunities to develop and practice civic skills for their members than Catholic parishes with their more hierarchical or vertical organizational structure (Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995, p. 321; Wuthnow, 1999, p. 348). Wuthnow (1999), however, qualifies this conclusion and shows that Evangelicals “do learn certain skills...The only problem is that evangelicals are less likely to hold membership in nonreligious organizations to which they can transfer these skills” (p. 348). In other words, Protestant congregations may have an advantage over Catholic parishes in the ability of the members to develop and use civic skills, but not all Protestant and Catholic churches experience the same reality.

Besides providing opportunities for congregants to develop civic skills and offer opportunities to use them inside and outside the walls of the church, congregations themselves have also been very active in providing social services both to their

congregants and the community beyond their walls (Ammerman, 2005; Chavez, 2004; Cnaan, 1997, 2002; Cnaan, Boddie, & Yancey, 2003; Kniss & Numrich, 2007; Cnaan, Hernandez, & McGrew, 2002; Wuthnow, 2004; McRoberts, 2003). Cnaan, Boddie, and Yancey (2003, p. 24) argue that in regular times and in times of disaster local congregations are organizing the provision of care because the local congregation, along with local schools, are viewed “as trusted local pillars and spaces where the community can feel at “home.”

According to Cnaan (1997) congregations are involved in housing projects and economic development, along with their involvement in the provision of social services mainly to the community outside the congregation. Cnaan and colleagues (2003) in a study of congregations found that churches provided on average 4.04 social programs that favored 4 to 1 the serving of non-members. The main social services provided included food pantries, clothing closets, community fairs, choral groups, recreational programs for teens and children, hospital visitation, tutoring, soup kitchens, and services through alliances with neighborhood associations, among others. Cnaan and colleagues add that most services, around 80 percent, were provided on congregations’ premises (1997). The vast majority of these programs (74 percent) reported “the use of volunteers...[and] the church’s financial commitment allocated to social ministry was also significant—17.4 percent of the congregation’s operating budget” (Cnaan, Boddie, & Yancie, 2003, p. 25). In many instances congregations serve as a greatly needed safety net for populations (e.g. immigrants, single moms, and other populations in need) that do not have access to other safety nets (Cnaan, 2002; Cnaan, Hernandez, & McGrew, 2002).

But not all congregations have the same missional view of their role in the public square and the communities that surround them (Roozen, McKinney, & Carroll, 1984; Kniss & Numrich, 2007). In an effort to understand the ways congregations see their role in the public square, Roozen, McKinney, and Carroll (1984, p. 87) developed a typology of congregational mission orientations. The typology is organized into two main dimensions. While one axis looks at a “this-worldly” versus an “other-worldly” orientation, the other axis looks at a “membership-centered” versus “publicly proactive” orientation (Roozen, McKinney, & Carroll, 1984, p. 87). The four mission orientations that resulted are the following: civic orientation, membership centered and this-worldly; sanctuary orientation, membership-centered and otherworldly; activist orientation, publicly proactive and this-worldly; and evangelistic orientation, publicly proactive and otherworldly (Roozen, McKinney, & Carroll, 1984, p. 87). Although the authors found that major denominational congregations studied, conservative Protestant, Catholic, and Mainline Protestant, contain some strong congregations in each orientation, they found that the majority of conservative Protestant churches are strongly evangelistic, almost half of the Catholic congregations embody a strong activist orientation, and Mainline Protestant congregations do not show any strong orientation—maybe a sign of a late twentieth-century Mainline Protestant “crisis of identity or failure of conviction” (Roozen, McKinney, & Carroll, 1984, 89). The authors also conclude that maybe as a result of proximity to need, congregations in the city, regardless of their religious tradition, are more likely to have strong activist orientations than congregations located in the suburbs or rural areas (Roozen, McKinney, & Carroll 1984, p. 89). Other typologies

of congregational public orientation/civic engagement have found similar results (Kniss & Numrich, 2007; McRoberts, 2003; Wood, 1994).

Although the role of the local congregation is without a doubt fundamental in the development of social capital and the facilitation of civic engagement, there is another religious organization that works together with the congregation to produce and facilitate civic engagement—the para-church organization. Para-church organizations are special purpose groups that are “independently incorporated and autonomous from congregations and denominations” which at the local levels provide a variety of social services, but work with congregations mainly as a source of volunteers (Coleman, 2003, p. 39).

In a study of para-church organizations in the United States, Coleman (2003, p. 39) found that congregations and para-church organizations exist in “symbiotic relationship—in both creating and investing social capital.” In fact, these two religious organizations may need each other to generate an effective public church because many local congregations “do not really know how to use the social capital they generate in more public settings. They lack, at times, the practical or organizational skills to turn it effectively toward broader civic engagement and public policy” (Coleman, 2003, p. 39). In turn, para-church organizations use the preexisting networks and communities they find in the congregation, forge linkages between and across congregations, religions, social classes, and ethnic and racial groups with the purpose of teaching church members “how to put their faith into concrete action and have larger civic consequences” (Coleman, 2003, p. 40). Coleman (2003, p. 41) concludes that “precisely because of the widespread taboo against introducing controversial political issues into the local congregation, even when they have some clear religious or moral overtones, para-church

groups serve local congregations by providing outlets for social and public faith without dividing the congregation as such.”

Wood, after analyzing the results of a study of church-based organizing by faith-based organizations concludes that “democratic social capital indeed helps foster democratic action, but to be effective it must be mobilized politically” (2003, p. 85). In Wood’s (2003, p. 86) view any efforts at democratic reform that marginalizes religious faith is headed for failure particularly in poor urban areas where religious institutions

generate social capital, giving poor folks the resources they need to work together. They feed and clothe multitudes of the most desperate victims of rising economic inequality. They help many others emerge from the ravages of addiction or destructive behavior. They organize politically, sometimes calling the powerful to new accountability. They sustain hope when much of what the poor see around them is cause for despair. And when all else falters they offer consolation and comfort. In all of these ways religion matters—both politically and in ways that transcend politics.

Religious individuals, social capital, and civic engagement. One important way that religion, mainly through local congregations and other religious organizations, contributes to the formation of social capital and the facilitation of civic and political engagement is through its impact on individuals (Kniss & Numrich, 2007, p. 217). In fact, much of the academic work that has been done on social capital, civil society, and civic engagement—to the dismay of a few analysts (Curry, 2003; Wuthnow, 2003)—focuses on the behavior and beliefs of individuals (Curry, 2003, p. 139). Therefore, because it is possible to assess the individual patterns of memberships in voluntary associations and almost impossible for social analysts to observe the full range of formal and informal relationships between people, considerable attention has been given to associational membership as an indicator of the rate of formation or destruction of social

capital (Smidt, Green, Guth, & Kellstedt, 2003, p. 154). That is, according to the quantitative analysts that use this approach and use survey data to do their analysis, the engagement in civic associations “helps socialize individuals, teaching them mores with regard to how one should think and behave—mores necessary for maintaining a healthy society and polity, and fosters engagement politically through greater public awareness, broadened interests, and enhanced skills” (Smidt, Green, Guth, & Kellstedt, 2003, p. 154).

But how does religiously-based social capital affect individuals that come in contact with religion? It has been found that...

church attendance and religious tradition help to explain differences in levels of civic engagement well beyond that which can be explained by education, age, gender, race, and differences in social trust alone. On the other hand, such religious factors only help explain differences in levels of political participation indirectly through civic engagement itself” (Smidt, Green, Guth, & Kellstedt, 2003, p. 169).

In the same study the authors found that with growing levels of church attendance, there is also an increase in non-church associational membership, and an increased likelihood of volunteer activity (Smidt, Green, Guth, & Kellstedt, 2003, p. 169). In a study of voluntarism in America, Campbell and Yonish (2003, p. 94) confirm previous findings that “the proportion of people volunteering increases as church attendance increases;” more important, however, is the fact that more church attendance results in more nonreligious, informal, and advocacy volunteering along with religious volunteering. The authors also found that “church is always one of the most common pathways to volunteering” –be it religious volunteering or not (Campbell & Yonish, 2003, p. 95).

Campbell and Yonish (2003, p. 105) conclude with a cautionary note indicating that “church-based voluntary activity is not always directed to the wider community. Rather, among volunteers, the more one attends church, the less likely one is to engage in non-church voluntary activity” (Campbell & Yonish 2003, p. 105). This is the same case, however, with secular organizations and the authors conclude that more research is needed to determine if this is a result of a ceiling on people’s time or if attitudinal and worldview aspects affect the involvement in nonreligious activities (Campbell & Yonish, 2003, pp. 105-106).

According to Nemeth and Luidens (2003, p. 107), although Americans in general are generous contributors to charity (more than two thirds of American households contributed to charities from 1987 to 1995 with an average household contribution of about \$1,000), members of “religious organizations are far more likely to contribute to charities, and to contribute greater amounts than are those who report that they do not belong to such religious organizations.” But is it that members are just giving money to their congregations and other religious organizations? Or is it that charitable giving is simply a central part of the ideology of most religious groups? The authors conclude that more Americans contribute to religious organizations than to any other type of charity (it may be a result of the intense involvement of religious members in their organizations and the religious social capital characterized by trust and familiarity!) and that they “do so in substantially greater amounts” (Nemeth & Luidens, 2003, p. 120). Members of religious organizations are also more likely than those who are not members to “make contributions to non-religious charities and to contribute to these charities in greater amounts” (Nemeth & Luidens, 2003, p. 120). Nemeth and Luidens (2003, p. 120)

conclude that the social capital that is produced in the social networks of the church results in greater giving in both religious and nonreligious charities among those that are actively involved.

More important, however, for many analysts (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; Kniss & Numrich, 2007; Schwadel, 2005; Wuthnow, 1999; McRoberts, 1999; Wood, 2003; Smidt, Green, Guth, & Kellstedt, 2003) is the question of whether in fact religious social capital actually influences the political participation of individuals. But what is political participation? According to Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, p. 9) political participation is activity intended to have “the consequence of affecting, either directly or indirectly, government action.” In a recent study, the authors conclude that there is no doubt that religious factors help shape patterns of civic engagement, but do they also make a further important contribution to political participation (Smidt, Green, Guth, & Kellstedt, 2003, p. 166)? They found that there is a strong relationship between civic engagement and political engagement (one measure of civic engagement has a strong and monotonic impact on levels of political participation), but key religious variables such as church attendance and religious tradition have little direct impact on political participation (Smidt, Green, Guth, & Kellstedt, 2003, p. 167). The authors explain, however, that the religious effects on political participation “are more indirect, through their particular contribution to civic engagement, than direct in nature”—because religion has a profound impact on civic engagement and civic engagement on political participation (Smidt, Green, Guth, & Kellstedt, 2003, p. 167). On the other hand, Wuthnow (1999, p. 353) in a study of the political participation of individuals from various religious traditions concluded that church attendance was significantly related to

voting in national and local elections for all religious traditions, to working to solve local community problems for Evangelicals and Mainline Protestants, and to having contacted local officials for Catholics.

Warren (2003, p. 50) adds that faith-based organizations (e.g. Communities Organized for Public Service—COPS, and the Industrial Areas Foundation—IAF), a variety of para-church organizations, have been very successful in politically engaging many Americans often excluded from political participation in the urban areas. This is mainly a result of their conscious effort to engage religious communities in political action (Warren, 2003, p. 50). Then too, a recent study by the Institute of Latino Studies at the University of Notre Dame, found that for Chicago Latinos, church membership (thirty three percent of the Latino population of the city were church members) is the main form of community organizational membership and that “it is clear that church membership is an important pathway into faith based social action groups, the second most cited form of organizational membership in Chicago” (Ready, Knight, & Sung-Chang, 2006, p. 3).

Warren contends that it is a combination of authority and participation that makes the faith-based organizations successful at their organizing efforts and that the real question for “democratic renewal, at least in low-income communities, may be how to develop forms of accountable, authoritative leadership that encourages broad participation and collective responsibility (2003, p. 68). The author concludes that the “vigor of American religious institutions and religious culture brings comparative advantages for projecting political power into public life” (Warren, 2003, p. 84), and this is especially true of political organizing done by faith-based organizations. In the end,

there is no doubt that faith-based organizations affect the way congregants get involved in daily politics.

But why is political participation so important? Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, p. 1) categorically explain that “citizen participation is at the heart of democracy. Indeed, democracy is unthinkable without the ability of citizens to participate freely in the governing process...political participation provides the mechanism by which citizens can communicate information about their interests, preferences, and needs and generate pressure to respond.” The same analysts conclude that religious institutions are key social capital sites for increasing political participation particularly for low income and minority populations. In fact, churches in particular, can play a role in equalizing political participation for segments of the population that presently experience inequality in that area (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Warren (2003, p. 52) is cautious, however, and explains that “denominations vary in their theological traditions and their institutional structures in ways that might affect the potential for religious communities [and their members] to become engaged in politics.”

In fact, Robert Wuthnow (1999, p. 332), concerned about what he saw as a shift in the center of gravity in American religion towards more conservative, Evangelical, and fundamentalist religion away from Mainline Protestant and even Catholic religion, set out to study how religious tradition and organization affects the civic and political engagement of the individuals in Evangelical, Mainline Protestant and Catholic traditions. The author argues that the most significant change in the composition of religious participation is the “decline of so-called Mainline Protestant denominations and the relative rise of some evangelical and independent churches” (Wuthnow, 1999, p.

336). All Mainline Protestant denominations lost members after the 1960s and some of them as much as a quarter of their membership by the '80s while conservative Evangelical denominations and churches have quickly grown (Wuthnow, 1999, p. 336). Wuthnow concludes that by 1991, 61 percent of Americans were in Evangelical denominations and churches, up from 56 percent in 1974 (1999, p. 336).

How is this related to civic and political engagement? Wuthnow (1999, p. 338) maintains that while Mainline Protestant churches “participated in progressive social betterment programs during the first half of the twentieth century, evangelical churches focused more on individual piety.” When members of the different religious traditions are compared with regards to their membership in nonreligious voluntary association, it is found that Mainline Protestants are a lot more likely than Catholics and Evangelicals to get involved—Evangelicals actually being the least likely to participate (Wuthnow, 1999, p. 341). Wuthnow contends that Evangelicals may actually be more involved in their congregations and thus have less time to get involved in other organizations and that “many evangelicals attend churches that emphasize separation from “the world” or distinctive beliefs that may discourage them from mingling with outsiders” (1999, p. 344). At the same time, Evangelicals were found to volunteer a lot less with nonreligious organizations while Mainline Protestants and Catholics were found to volunteer more with nonreligious organizations (Wuthnow, 1999, p. 351). What is interesting, however, is the fact that when political participation was analyzed “evangelicals are just as likely as Mainline Protestants or Catholics to be mobilized by their religious involvement to participate in politics” (Wuthnow, 1999, p. 353). Wuthnow (1999, p. 357) concludes that “despite their apparent emphasis on their own congregations, evangelical religious

involvement does not discourage participation in other voluntary associations; with the exception of voting, it just does not encourage it...the fact that Mainline Protestant churches have declined in recent decades, therefore, means that civic engagement is probably not as strong as it would have been if these churches had not declined.”

Schwadel (2005, p. 159) confirms Wuthnow’s (1999) findings and concludes that “a conservative congregational context limits church members’ activity in non church organizations, potentially limiting their opportunities to build heterogeneous social networks and social capital that bridges church members to other people in their communities.” Why should this matter? According to Curry (2003, p. 140), bonding social capital is inward-looking, reinforcing exclusive identities and homogeneity, while bridging social capital is outward-looking and encompasses diverse groups of people. Putnam (2000, p. 22), who originally proposed that social capital can be either bonding or bridging, explains that bonding social capital is good for developing specific reciprocity and building solidarity, while bridging social capital is better to link to external assets and institutions as well as to flows of information. In fact, “without bridging to outside institutions and resources, bonding social capital might be of little worth because it lacks the information and ability to mobilize outside resources for the benefit of the community (Gittel & Vidal, 1998, pp. 15-16).

The conservative religion versus liberal religion framework of analysis used by various analysts and that has been found to have important implications for social and political engagement (Wuthnow, 1999; Schwadel, 2005) may have to be modified to address important deviations that have been documented with minority populations, and minority religious expressions—particularly among African Americans, Latinos, and

Pentecostals. African Americans have been found to be morally conservative, but otherwise fairly liberal in their approach to social and economic issues (Harris, 1999; Greeley & Hout, 2006). Latino Protestants, particularly Evangelicals, have also been found not to be as conservative as many analysts may think. In fact, although Latino Evangelicals are more conservative than African Americans, they have been found to be more liberal in social and economic issues when compared to white Evangelicals with the exception of moral issues where they tend to be more conservative (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007).

Finally, although white Pentecostals have been found to be very conservative in the majority of social, political, and moral issues, they have also been found to be more likely to vote Democrat than their other Evangelical brothers and sisters (Greeley & Hout, 2006). Consequently it is imperative to conduct comparative analysis of white Pentecostals with African American and Latino Pentecostals because, at least from the literature discussed here, it would seem that African American and Latino Pentecostals may in fact be fairly liberal in social and economic issues when compared to white Pentecostals. African Americans and Latinos do not seem to fit well the conservative Protestant mold into which they have been thrown.

Besides the empirical and theoretical issues I have reviewed in this chapter, it is also important to address other issues especially as they relate to how other analysts have done their work and some key variables that have been found to be important, either by themselves or in conjunction with religious variables, in explaining individual civic and political engagement.

First, in an effort to operationalize civic engagement, several analysts have proposed various typologies of individual civic engagement. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, p. 48 and pp. 74-76) proposed and used a typology that divided civic engagement into two large categories—political activity/participation and nonpolitical activity/participation. Under political activity/participation, which they defined as “activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action—either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people that make those policies,” they included voting, campaign work, campaign contributions, contacting an official, protesting, informal community work, membership of a local board, affiliation with a political organization, and contribution to a political cause (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995, p. 48). Under nonpolitical activity, the authors included affiliation with a non-political organization, attending a meeting of non-political organization, attending church services, giving time to church work, church contributions, giving time to charitable work, and charitable contributions (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995, pp. 74-76). Although this typology is fairly comprehensive, it leaves out important nonpolitical participation activities such as church membership. Then too, non-political activity is too large and fuzzy a category; some organizations such as churches promote both political and nonpolitical activities.

Although not as clearly outlined as Verba and colleagues’ (2005), Wuthnow (1999) also developed and used a typology based on the civic and political engagement questions asked by the General Social Survey of 1997. The typology has two main components: civic engagement and political engagement (Wuthnow, 1999, p. 348 and p. 353). The civic engagement includes among others membership in civic organizations,

churches, serving on committees, doing active work in nonreligious groups, doing work in religious groups, writing to newspaper or magazine for the organization, and giving money in addition to regular dues (Wuthnow, 1999, p. 348). Political engagement includes voting in 1984, working with others to solve political problems, contacting local officials, attending political meetings or rallies, and trying to show people why they should vote for one party or candidate among others (Wuthnow, 1999, p. 353). Although this typology added some variables that Verba and colleagues (1995) did not include, it still lacks depth particularly as it relates to civic engagement in church and para-church organizations.

Finally, it is also important to point out that education, gender, age, income and race have been found likewise to be important predictors of civic and political engagement, with education being the most important one (Verba, Scholzman, & Brady 1995; Smidt, Green, Gruth, & Kellstedt, 2003; Harris, 2003; Scholzman, Verba, & Brady, 1999). In combination with religious factors such as church attendance and religious traditions, these demographic and economic variables can be strong predictors of civic and political participation (Smidt, Green, Gruth, & Kellstedt, 2003). In his work, Putnam (2000, p. 67) categorically concluded that “religiosity rivals education as a powerful correlate of most forms of civic engagement.”

Pentecostalism, Latinos, Social Capital and Civic Engagement

A related issue of debate has been the implications of Pentecostalism for the public square, for civic engagement and for political action. Although up until recently very little work had been done on the specific topics of Pentecostalism, civic engagement and political engagement, fortunately (although not extensively) some of these questions

were addressed by the older generation of researchers dealing with Pentecostalism in Latin America (Williams, 1967; D'Epinay, 1968; Bastian, 1990).

The first generation of researchers simply concluded that Pentecostalism was otherworldly escapism, and as such not interested in social justice, or in dealing with the evils of oppression, classism, racism, and other types of discrimination. In fact, Pentecostalism was assumed to be apolitical and concerned only with matters of private morality, participation in church activities, and intragroup identity and solidarity (Cleary & Stewart-Gambino, 1997). At best, Pentecostalism was reactionary and allied with North American conservative interests, and the dictators and ruling classes of Latin America (Cleary & Stewart-Gambino, 1997).

There is no doubt that some sectors of Pentecostalism have dark histories of alliances with dictators in Guatemala (Efraim Rios Montt), Chile (Augusto Pinochet), and Brazil. However, recent scholarly work on the politics of Pentecostals has started to paint a different picture. David Stoll (1990) argues that Protestantism in Latin America should not be seen as a political instrument of dominant interests. Instead, Stoll (1990) maintains that Pentecostalism is a generator of social change whose direction is not predestined; in fact, the politics of Pentecostalism in Latin America are contested between progressive and conservative camps. In the same way that there are examples of conservative inclinations, the support of a significant portion of Chilean Pentecostals for Salvador Allende (the leftist President of Chile) clearly indicates the opposite (Stoll, 1990). The author recognizes that at present the conservative camp may have the upper hand because of the influence U.S. conservative Protestantism has been exerting, but he suggests that in the end the indigenous structure of Pentecostalism and the pressing social needs of its

adherents may result in revolution, reform, and even acceptance of the status quo—it can go in any direction (Stoll, 1990).

Recently, Peterson (2004), using a social capital and networks approach, argued that Pentecostalism in Latin American can best be understood as a social movement that has gone from being insignificant to generating a critical mass of social networks that currently number over 50 million people. By creating parallel institutions and organizations, Pentecostals have accumulated social capital and expanded their networks, two fundamental ingredients for entrance into the national arena of politics and civil society (Peterson, 2004). However, the author argues that the weak democracies in Latin America characterized by lack of spaces for participation makes the Pentecostal entry into politics a very slow one, and the author concludes that instead many Pentecostals have opted for using community efforts and institutions as a viable alternative to direct political involvement (Peterson, 2004).

Cleary and Stewart-Gambino (1997) add that although much of the faith and discourse of Pentecostals could be understood as apolitical, Pentecostals' flexible faith and the needs of their adherents often lead them to substantial local community and even national social service involvement which easily have political implications. The authors argue that the problem is that scholars have been looking for Pentecostal activism in the wrong places. Pentecostals, they propose, have from the very beginning been involved in local, autonomous, and often fragmental social service and community activity (Cleary & Stewart-Gambino, 1997). Furthermore, this has recently translated into the formation of political parties that are explicitly Pentecostal in El Salvador, Brazil and other countries of Latin America (Cleary & Stewart-Gambino, 1997).

The research conducted among Latin American Pentecostalism is informative in bringing to our attention the need to look at the political-state context in which Pentecostalism operates, and how that affects its present and future engagement in the public square. At the same time, the issue of social capital and network building is fundamental because a significant number of Pentecostals and the congregations they attend originate and work with some of the poorest and most disenfranchised members of society—groups that do not have the same access to educational, and economic resources that have been found to be important for civic and political engagement (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). The fact that Pentecostalism seems to be developing alternative ways of being active in the community is very revealing because it shows that it is still attempting to address the social challenges of its surroundings even with huge limitations.

Unfortunately, the majority of the academic work on Pentecostalism and Pentecostals paints a monolithic picture of Pentecostals and their congregations—that is, that they all do and believe the same thing. Whereas the first generation of Pentecostalist scholars saw Pentecostals and their congregations as inward looking, otherworldly and apolitical, the new generation of scholars is starting to articulate a different perspective that sees Pentecostalism as potentially revolutionary and politically progressive (Martin, 1990; Cleary & Stewart-Gambino, 1997; Stoll, 1990). However, these scholars still show a tendency to see Pentecostals as monolithic and lack the refinement needed to observe differences among Pentecostals and Pentecostalism(s). Is it possible that some are inward looking, otherworldly and apolitical while others are outward looking, thisworldly and politically active, and other permutations between these two extremes (Ruano 2007)?

Recently, Donald Miller and Tetsunao Yamamori (2007) published one of the most complete studies on Pentecostalism and civic engagement ever. In *Global Pentecostalism*, the authors argue that there are different types of Pentecostals and that one of the growing types is “progressive Pentecostalism” (Miller & Yamamori, 2007). Although this strand of Pentecostalism recently emerged, its dynamic civic engagement is evidenced in the width and depth of the social services its congregations provide to its members and the community at large—with a one-person-at-a-time social model, it deals with numerous social problems (Miller & Yamamori, 2007). The authors are generally positive about civic engagement among “progressive Pentecostals,” but they also emphasize the fact that there are significant numbers of Pentecostals who are “other-worldly” and not very civically engaged. Even “progressive Pentecostals” are just now beginning to address structural social problems because of their inclination to stay out of the political arena (Miller & Yamamori, 2007).

Although Miller and Yamamori’s work (2007) is timely and is in line with the work I have been doing among Pentecostals in the last few years (Ruano 2007), their work focuses on congregations all over the world except the United States. Unfortunately, there are but a couple of studies in the United State that focus exclusively on Pentecostal congregations—the work of McRoberts (1999) is very informative. However, congregational studies that, as part of their sample, included Pentecostal congregations have provided some understanding of the intersection of Pentecostal congregations and civic and political engagement (Kniss & Numrich, 2007; McRoberts, 2003; Cnaan, Hernandez, & McGrew, 2002; Wood, 1994).

Kniss and Numrich (2007), while studying immigrant congregations in Chicago, studied Victory Outreach—a Latino non classical Pentecostal church that focuses its ministry on the troubled and down trodden of society. After conducting in-depth qualitative research, the authors concluded that “Victory Outreach sees its primary moral project as the rescue, reform and rehabilitation of individuals, accomplished by introducing each one to faith in Jesus and a personal encounter with the power of the Holy Spirit.” (Kniss & Numrich, 2007, p. 54). As a consequence, the authors add, the church has a “deep distrust of collectivist solutions or action and develops citizens who are engaged in public life as individuals confronting other individuals in parks and on street corners.” (Kniss & Numrich, 2007, p. 54).

The work of McRoberts (1999) among “activist” Pentecostal churches in a northeastern city reveals that several African American Pentecostal churches became “activist” churches mainly as a result of visionary leaders who were involved in the Civil Rights Movement and who decades later continued to take their social role very seriously.

Some of the work has also started to shed light on Latino Pentecostalism and civic engagement. McRoberts (2003), Cnaan, Hernandez, and McGrew (2002), Kniss and Numrich (2007), and Wood (1994), while looking at congregations in specific localities (Cnaan and colleagues in Philadelphia) and as part of larger samples of congregations, found that Pentecostal congregations including Latino Pentecostal congregations were important parts of the congregational life of the geographical areas of study. McRoberts (2003) looked at African American and Latino Pentecostal congregations in a neighborhood and analyzed “if” and “how” they became active in the community; he

found that the majority of congregations provided social services to their members while some provided services to both community and church members. A few congregations were found to be very active in the community through the engagement of the social, economic, and political structures in the neighborhood (McRoberts, 2003).

Qualitative research on three congregations by Richard Wood (1994) also shed some light on the political participation of congregations, one of which was Pentecostal. From his results, Wood (1994) concluded that Pentecostal congregations are not very likely to actively participate in direct political action because their meaning structures made them look in other directions.

In another study, Cnaan, Hernandez, and McGrew (2002), while studying the provision of social services by congregations in Philadelphia, found that the majority of Latino Pentecostal congregations they came across provided a very diverse array of social services to both their members and to the community at large; in fact, more services were provided to the community at large than to the members of the congregation.

The results of these studies show the existence of different types of Pentecostal congregations as it relates to civic and political participation. While some congregations are “activist” (McRoberts, 1999), others provide social services to their members and the community at large (McRoberts, 2003; Cnaan, Hernandez, & McGrew, 2002, Kniss & Numrich, 2007), and yet others simply do not get involved in direct political action (Wood, 1994).

Although there has not been a lot of academic work that has looked at Pentecostalism and civic and political participation in the United States, the little work that has been done has mainly focused on congregations (McRoberts, 1999, 2003; Cnaan,

Hernandez, & McGrew, 2002; Kniss & Numrich, 2007; Wood, 1994). Fortunately, as of late, some important work has been done on Pentecostals (individuals) and civic and political engagement—albeit indirectly as exemplified by the Pew Hispanic Center work (Greeley & Hout, 2007; Pew Hispanic Center, 2007; Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006).

Greeley and Hout (2006, p. 163) in a recent study about white U.S. conservative Christians concluded that Pentecostals are the “ultimate-conservative Christians” of the American religious landscape. However, the authors were pleasantly surprised to find out that when it came to voting, Pentecostals were comparatively more likely to vote for Democrats (not that the majority voted this way) than their other Conservative Christian brethren in this country (Greeley & Hout, 2006, p. 171).

Other research from the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2006) and Pew Hispanic Center (2007) may suggest that the ultra conservatism that Greeley and Hout (2006) found among white Pentecostals may be a function of race and/or culture more than a function of Pentecostalism itself. In other words, Pentecostalism in the context of white race and culture may certainly look ultra conservative with a couple of exceptions, while Pentecostalism in the context of African American race and culture, and Latino ethnicity and culture may actually look very moderate and even liberal in social and political issues and ultra conservative in moral issues—even more so than for white Pentecostals.

The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life conducted the most comprehensive study on global Pentecostalism, *Spirit and Power* (2006), comparing Pentecostals from ten different countries, including the United States, on various issues including their civic

and political participation. The study found that on the majority of social, economic, and political issues American Pentecostals are a bit more liberal than Pentecostals in the rest of the world with a few exceptions (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006).

When it came to the war in Iraq, only 19 percent of American Pentecostals opposed it and in the majority of countries with the exception of the Philippines and India, Pentecostals opposed it in the range of 36 to 71 percent (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006, p. 52). At the same time, while the majority of U.S. Pentecostals agreed that the government should aid citizens in need, Pentecostals in all other countries studied agreed with it from 1 to 18 percent more (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006, p. 52). What is interesting, however, is that American Pentecostals agree with the government aiding citizens 11 percent more than do “other Christians,” which is the category used by the study for all other Christians in the U.S. that are not Pentecostal or Charismatic (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006, p. 52).

In fact, when it came to civic engagement as measured by belonging or participating in voluntary associations, U.S. Pentecostals were a lot more likely than all other Pentecostals around the world to be civically involved in voluntary organizations such as social welfare service agencies, cultural organizations, labor unions, political organizations or parties, community action groups, women’s groups, and other groups (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006, p. 49). What is revealing, however, is that American Pentecostals were not a lot less likely to participate in voluntary associations when compared to “other Christians” with the exception of cultural, social welfare services organizations, political parties, and other groups; in all of those the difference between American Pentecostals and “other Christians” was only 1 or 2

percentage points while the difference for political party participation was 8 percentage points in favor of “other Christians” (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006, p. 49).

The results of this study show that once all Pentecostals are combined, white, African Americans and Latinos, American Pentecostals are more liberal than other Pentecostals around the world on social, economic, and political issues with the exception of the war in Iraq and agreeing that the government should help people in need (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006). Even when Pentecostals in the U.S. are compared to “other Christians” (this is a catch-all category that includes Mainline Protestants, Catholics, and other Christians that are not Pentecostal or Charismatic and as such may not say much), they are more conservative but not by much (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006). In some cases, American Pentecostals are more liberal than “other Christians.” For instance, they are more liberal in agreeing that the government should aid their citizens, and in agreeing that religious groups should express their views on political questions (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006).

This study, (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006) supports the results of other studies that indicate that Pentecostals are liberal in certain areas and conservative in others (Greely & Hout, 2006; McRoberts, 1999, 2003), but several important questions remain unanswered. How do Pentecostals in the U.S. compare in their civic and political engagement with Evangelicals, Mainline Protestants, and Catholics? Furthermore, is race or ethnicity a key variable that affects the civic and political engagement of U.S. Pentecostals? Namely, are Latino and African American Pentecostals more or less likely to become civically and politically active than white Pentecostals?

A recent study by the Pew Hispanic Center, *Changing Faiths* (2007), provides an imperfect picture of Pentecostal civic and political engagement. It is an imperfect, but very useful, picture because the “Latino Evangelical” category used by the Pew Hispanic Center’s study (2007) includes Pentecostal and non Pentecostal Evangelical Latinos, but it can be used as a proxy for Pentecostals. The fact is that Latino Evangelicals represent the majority, 70 percent, of non-Catholic Latino Christians (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007, p. 9). The study found that 35 percent of Latino Protestants identify themselves as classical Pentecostals, but once independent and nondenominational Protestants are added to that category (these people are very likely to be Pentecostal in orientation) the share of Pentecostalism moves up to 51 percent of Protestants (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007, p. 9). Therefore, given that the majority of Latino Evangelicals in the U.S. claim to be Pentecostal, Charismatic, or spirit-filled (Espinosa, Elizondo, & Miranda, 2003, p. 16), the results of the Pew Hispanic Center’s (2007) study are informative about the civic and political perspectives and involvement of Latino Pentecostals keeping in mind that the category “Latino Evangelical” is not an ideal proxy for Latino Pentecostal. It is also important to keep in mind that Latino Pentecostals may be more liberal than Evangelicals, especially more liberal than Baptists who represent 16 percent of Latino Protestants in this country (Pew Hispanic Center 2007, 9).

The Pew Hispanic Center (2007) study found that although Latino Evangelicals (a category used by the authors to lump together Latino Pentecostals and non-Pentecostals) are more conservative than white Evangelicals in a few areas, they are also more liberal than their white counterparts in several other areas. That is, while 86 percent and 77 percent, respectively, of Latino Evangelicals oppose gay marriage and believe that

abortion should be illegal, only 67 percent and 61 percent of white Evangelicals do so (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007).

However, on the majority of issues, Latino Evangelicals are more liberal than white Evangelicals. For instance while 49 percent of Latino Evangelicals agree that using force in Iraq was the right choice, 60 percent of white Evangelicals agree (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007). Whereas 46 percent of Latino Evangelicals favor the death penalty, 73 percent of white Evangelicals do so. Surprisingly the percentage for Latino Evangelicals that attend church at least weekly and favor the death penalty actually drops to 43 percent; in other words, the more they attend church the more they oppose the death penalty (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007).

More important, Latino Evangelicals express fairly liberal views on economic issues when compared to white Evangelicals. In fact, 70, 66, and 57 percent of Latino Evangelicals, respectively, favor government guaranteed health insurance, would rather pay higher taxes for more government services, and say that poor people have hard lives due to lack of government services, while 58 percent and only 42 percent of white Evangelicals favor government guaranteed health insurance and say that people have hard lives due to lack of government services (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007, p. 73).

In terms of political party identification and participation, 36 percent of Latino Evangelical registered voters identify themselves as Republican and 36 percent as Democrat, while 50 percent of white Evangelicals identify themselves as Republican and only 25 percent as Democrat (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007). At the same time, Latino Evangelicals are more inclined to say that Democrats would do a better job than Republicans in three of seven areas identified while they favor both Democrats and

Republicans equally in protecting civil rights. They favor Democrats in dealing with the economy, dealing with immigration, and protecting the environment, and they favor Republicans in improving the educational system, making wise decisions about what to do in Iraq, and improving morality in the country (Pew Hispanic Center 2007, p. 82). What is even more revealing is the fact that out of all Latino religious groups that are eligible to register to vote, Latino Evangelicals lead voter registration at 90 percent followed by Catholics at 77 percent (Pew Hispanic Center 2007, p. 84).

Although the Pew Hispanic Center's (2007) study shows that Latino Evangelicals are more likely to identify themselves as Republican than Latino Catholics and Mainline Protestants (36 percent compared to 17 percent of Catholics and 22 percent of Mainline Protestants), in several areas Latino Evangelicals are more liberal than Latino Catholics (favoring government guaranteed health insurance, paying higher taxes for more government services, and opposing the death penalty).

These results are very important given the active role that Latino Evangelicals claim their religion plays in their social and political perceptions. Namely, Latino Evangelicals are a lot more likely than Latino Catholics and Latino Mainline Protestants to say that their religious beliefs are a very important influence on their political thinking—62 percent compared to 36 percent for Catholics and 38 percent for Mainline Protestants (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007). Latino Evangelicals are also more likely to say that houses of worship should express views on social and political questions. In fact 65 percent of Latino Evangelicals favor it, while 57 percent of Latino Catholics and 52 percent of Latino Mainline Protestants do so (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007). Finally Latino Evangelicals are more likely than Latino Catholics and Mainline Protestants to say that at

their place of worship their clergy speak out on abortion, 64 percent, homosexuality, 58 percent, candidates and elections, 30 percent, and the importance of voting, 67 percent (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007, p. 62).

This evidence presents a very unique and revealing picture of Latino Evangelicals—used in this dissertation as an imperfect proxy for Latino Pentecostals. In some social and political areas, Latino Evangelicals are more conservative than Latino Catholics and Mainline Protestants but in other areas they are more liberal and even more engaged. When compared to white Evangelicals, Latino Evangelicals are a lot more conservative in a couple of areas, but significantly more liberal in the majority of areas. In fact, the political party identification among Latino Evangelicals with Republicans is a lot lower than that for white Evangelicals. At least from this preliminary evidence, it seems that the move towards Evangelicalism and “renewalism” by Latinos is causing a religious landscape shift in the country towards moderate and liberal stances and less towards conservative stances with morality issues being the exception. This evidence also shows that the Latino move towards Evangelicalism and renewalism does not necessarily mean ultra conservatism when compared to Latino Catholicism (where the majority of Latino Evangelicals and Pentecostals originate!). Latino Evangelicals are more conservative in some areas when compared to Latino Catholics, but they are also more liberal and more civically engaged than Latino Catholics in several other areas.

Research Gaps

In the end, there seems to be evidence that “there are particular qualities about religious social capital that help to differentiate it from other forms of social capital and that serve to make it distinctive in nature, whether qualitatively or quantitatively” (Smidt,

2003, p. 216). First, the quantity of religious social capital makes it unique because “the social capital generated in American society through religious means far exceeds the level of social capital produced by other means” (Smidt, 2003, p. 217). Second, Smidt (2003, p. 217) argues that religious social capital may well be more durable than other types of social capital because religion provides a different type of motivation to be involved and that “motivation to remain faithful may well sustain such efforts.” Third, the author argues that religious social capital is also distinctive in range (Smidt, 2003). Because religion socializes people to deal positively with others regardless of personal benefits, many religious people get involved in giving a “voice to the voice-less” while getting involved in a wide range of activities such as voting, jury service, and giving to charity (Smidt, 2003, p. 217).

Religion also seems to have a distinctive capacity to nourish social capital by sustaining reciprocity among the actors, and this in turn may indeed provide a stronger basis for group cooperation (Smidt, 2003, p. 217). Finally, Smidt (2003, 218) argues that religious social capital is distinctive because “of the disproportional benefits it wields within particular segments of American society.” Religious social capital is generated more democratically than the social capital generated in other areas of society as such it provides with civic skills and other opportunities for civic and political engagement to the most disenfranchised segments of the population. The disenfranchised do not typically have the same opportunities as other groups to get educational and economic resources, in the workplace and the in family—resources that are vital for civic and political participation (Smidt, 2003, p. 218; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995).

Although more and more research is being conducted on religion and civic engagement, mainly through the lens of congregational studies, the intersection of Pentecostalism, particularly Latino Pentecostalism, and civic engagement is still poorly understood because, with a few exceptions (McRoberts, 1999, 2003; Cnaan, Hernandez, & McGrew, 2002; Wood 1994; Miller & Yamamori 2007; Greeley & Hout, 2006; Kniss & Numrich, 2007), there is still a lot of research needed on the subject. Only McRoberts (1999), and Miller and Yamamori (2007) focus exclusively on Pentecostal congregations while the other studies have in their samples some Pentecostal congregations.

To date, there is no comprehensive study on Latino Pentecostalism and civic engagement that compares different strands of Pentecostalism and their civic engagement practices with those of other religious traditions. Both the McRoberts (1999) and the Miller and Yamamori (2007) studies are to date the most comprehensive work on the subject, but they either mainly focus on other places but the United States (Miller & Yamamori, 2007), or focus narrowly on Pentecostals of one community (McRoberts, 1999) preventing comparisons between Pentecostals of different racial and ethnic backgrounds and Pentecostals with other faith traditions.

Furthermore, Miller and Yamamori exclusively focus on progressive Pentecostal congregations and fail to do a comprehensive comparison between those and other types of Pentecostal congregations (2007). By using a qualitative approach, Miller and Yamamori (2007) are also not able to provide a concrete picture of the prevalence of civic engagement within Pentecostalism in comparison to other faith traditions.

While Cnaan and colleagues (2002), and Greeley and Hout (2006) used quantitative approaches, the former only focuses on social services provision and not on

other types of civic engagement, while the latter, in a few pages, compares the morality and voting behavior only of exclusively white Pentecostals with other conservative Christians in the U.S.

Even though some work has already proposed typologies of Pentecostal congregations as it relates to civic engagement (Miller & Yamamori, 2007; McRoberts, 1999), the model used is static—a Pentecostal congregation is deemed classical, progressive, or activist—which fails to explore the evolutionary path of many congregations. Namely, it is possible that a classical Pentecostal congregation might, in the not too distant future, become a progressive one. In research I have conducted, I found that some progressive congregations split from their classical origins dissatisfied, among other things, with their lack of engagement in the public square.

Furthermore, very little research (with the exception of Cnaan, Hernandez, & McGrew, 2002 and Kniss & Numrich, 2007) has looked at Pentecostalism and civic engagement in the context of immigrant communities in the United States. The “mature” democratic system of this country offers immigrants a variety of opportunities for civic engagement while engulfing them in an individualistic consumer-driven culture. Therefore, does migration status inhibit or facilitate civic engagement? How does this variable affect Latino Pentecostalism’s civic engagement, if at all?

Despite the fact that a significant number of Latino Pentecostals are poor, immigrants, single mothers and women in general, including people with low levels of education, there is no research that has looked at the opportunities that exist in Latino Pentecostal congregations to develop civic skills and how those skills are potentially transferred to the individual’s life and community outside of the church including the

public square. This is an important area of research because it might illuminate the role Pentecostal congregations play as potential contributors to the development of human and social capital for the disenfranchised.

I also think it is important to question several of the assumptions underlying much of the religion and civic engagement literature. For instance, even though Wuthnow (1999) is careful to point out that being involved in the congregation and its activities is still civic engagement, there is a tendency to argue in favor of engagement in the public square as the only socially beneficial type of engagement. I would suggest, instead, that civic engagement both inside and beyond the walls of the congregation is beneficial to society because it develops the stock of social capital in individuals. In fact, for many people in congregations, civic engagement may be an evolutionary process. By being involved in their churches and the ministries and programs they offer, congregants may develop civic skills and an awareness of themselves, their communities, and their environment. Some may choose to engage their communities and society through congregational and other religious organizational means, while others may choose to do so directly through non-religious means. I would, therefore, argue that church engagement may actually serve as a stepping stone to other forms of civic engagement. Furthermore, I would propose that choosing to engage communities and societies through congregations or religious means does not have any less societal or individual value than choosing to do so through non-religious means: one is not any less than the other and both have the potential of addressing some of the most pressing issues in society, even the ones that are structural or systemic in nature.

Finally, there is not a lot of research that sheds light on the effect of specific types of congregations on the social perceptions and civic engagement behavior of Pentecostals let alone of Latino Pentecostals. Are Pentecostals who belong to progressive Pentecostal congregations as opposed to classical congregations more or less engaged inside the congregations, in their communities, and in the public square?

In summary, the lack of research on the various aspects of Pentecostalism and civic engagement, particularly on Latino Pentecostalism and civic engagement, may in fact result in blanket statements and conclusions about a huge movement that spans the world and includes hundreds of millions of people—a movement that some research (Miller & Yamamori, 2007; McRoberts, 1999; Ruano 2007) suggests is quickly diversifying even in its civic engagement practices. It must then be asked who are Greeley and Hout referring to when they conclude that Pentecostals (in this case U.S. Pentecostals) are “ultra-conservative Christians”—with the caveat that they do not tend to vote as Republican—or “fundamentalist” or simply “otherworldly conservative evangelicals” (2006)? Which Pentecostals are they talking about? Are they talking about classical, progressive, or other types of Pentecostals? Are they including them all? The lack of research on the subject and the way some of the research was conducted does not readily allow adequate and accurate answers for these questions.

In the last decade, I conducted research among Latino Pentecostals in Chicago and found that many of the previously discussed research assumptions simply could not be confirmed in the field (Ruano, 2003). As I studied family life, intra-Pentecostal conflict, and immigrant dynamics, the diversity of opinion and the lived social and religious lives of the different Pentecostal traditions and their congregations questioned

the generally accepted notion of Pentecostalism as a fairly monolithic, otherworldly, inward-looking, and an ultra conservative religious movement (Bastian, 1990; Cleary & Stewart-Gambino, 1997; D'Epinay, 1969; Greely & Hout, 2006; Williams, 1967; Wood, 1994). I did find evidence that supported some of the old assumptions, but I also interviewed Pentecostals and observed congregations where things “seemed” different. Many of the congregants and their leaders were college educated, young, showed a degree of progressive thinking, and more importantly defined themselves not in opposition to Catholics (which was common practice among Latino classical Pentecostals) but in opposition to “los legalistas” (“the legalists”)—“esos de la senda antigua” (“those of the old way”)—in other words, classical Pentecostals (Ruano, 2003). Some of the younger leaders told the story of a split and “massive” departure of the younger and/or more educated leaders and congregants from the old denominations into new denominations or simply into independent churches.

Significant tensions followed these events because classical Pentecostal churches lost and continue to lose members, churches, and potential converts to the new types of congregations that emerged. “Los liberales” (“the liberals”), as the classical Pentecostals call them, were reportedly younger, more educated, and cared about “cosas mundanas” (“mundane things”). This tension even spilled onto the radio and TV waves where both groups went at it for a while (I studied these events a few years ago as part of my research on intra-Pentecostal conflict).

From the perspective of leaders on both sides of the fence, Latino Pentecostalism in Chicago had experienced a tumultuous and permanent change. The Pentecostal landscape had been irreversibly redrawn and the consequences religiously and socially

were to come. Given the gigantic size of world Pentecostalism, its major and quickly growing significance in Latin America and among U.S. Latinos, I wondered if the events among Chicago Latino Pentecostals were a microcosm of the evolutionary changes the movement was experiencing or was to experience in other places of the world (Ruano, 2003).

Originally I had been drawn to the study of Pentecostalism because of its prevalence among the disadvantaged in society including immigrants, the poor, the poorest of the poor, the uneducated, the elderly, and single women. My research interest was particularly focused on finding out if Pentecostalism was or could be a catalyst for social empowerment or if it was an inhibitor of civic engagement and indeed the “opium of the people” that many researchers assumed to be (Bastian, 1990; Cleary & Stewart-Gambino, 1997; D’Epinay, 1969; Williams, 1967; Wood, 1994). What I found, particularly the story of a major split within the movement among Chicago Latinos, made Pentecostalism attractive as an audience to whom to address my social empowerment questions. Was there a new strand of Pentecostalism? Was it progressive? How progressive? How different was it from classical Pentecostalism? Given the story of a split in the movement, meaning that the new strand(s) of Pentecostalism evolved from the classical version, could it be that there would be more steps in the evolutionary process? In the future might we actually see strands of Pentecostalism that address social structural issues in their civic engagement the way some Mainline Protestant traditions do?

My research showed that Latino Pentecostalism in Chicago was not merely continuing its dynamic growth, but was also experiencing major internal changes that

dared to defy the assumptions in the halls of academia (Ruano, 2003). The changes observed, therefore, required in-depth study and observation.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I reviewed all the relevant social capital and civic engagement, religion and civic engagement, and Pentecostalism and civic engagement literature. I paid particular attention to the outlining of the literature that deals with typologies of congregations and congregational civic engagement, congregants and civic engagement, and the effects of specific types of congregations on the civic engagement perceptions and behavior of the congregants. I also extensively reviewed the literature that deals with U.S. Latino Pentecostalism and civic engagement emphasizing comparative literature that addresses the civic engagement practices of different religious traditions. In the end, I discussed the shortcomings and the gaps in the literature.

In chapter three, I will review the methodology used for this study and I will extensively discuss the Chicago Latino Congregations Study conducted by the Center for the Study of Latino Religion of the University of Notre Dame from 2003 to 2007, which collected the data used for this dissertation. Finally, I will discuss the role I played in the study and collection of the data.

CHAPTER THREE

DATA AND METHODS

Introduction

In this chapter, I outline the need for the use of a mixed methodology in this dissertation, placing a special emphasis on why and how that mixed methodology was developed by the research team (of which I was part) of the Chicago Latino Congregations Study conducted by the Center for the Study of Latino Religion at the University of Notre Dame. I emphasize that although the design included a mixed methodology, the main data produced was quantitative—through interviews and surveys of church pastors or key leaders and surveys of youth and adult congregants. The qualitative data collected, through various case studies, supplements the quantitative data by providing depth and detail to important social realities observed through the quantitative research phase.

I use a process approach for this chapter, outlining through time the various steps that were taken to design the methodology, identify the population, create the sample, design the instruments, collect the quantitative data, choose the case studies, collect the qualitative data, and choose the methods used for data analysis. Consequently, this chapter moves from a section on mixed methodology, to one on quantitative data, ending with a section on qualitative data and one on access issues.

Mixed Methodology

This dissertation is designed to be an empirical dissertation that was a product of a mixed methodology. That is, although the dissertation is mainly based on the results of the extensive quantitative data collected by the Chicago Latino Congregations Study conducted by the Center for the Study of Latino Religion at the University of Notre Dame from 2003 to 2007, as it relates to Latino Pentecostals, qualitative research was also conducted via three separate case studies. The fieldwork conducted at the three sites sought to obtain in-depth data to inform the social patterns that emerged in the quantitative data analysis. In that sense, it is a quantitative dissertation that used qualitative methods to obtain more details to triangulate and confirm larger patterns observed from the representative sample of congregations and their congregants used in the study.

A cursory look at recent sociological work shows that mixed methods approaches have of late become more common (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p. 39). In fact, some sociologists argue that, “given the limitations and biases inherent in each of the main approaches—indeed inherent in all research procedures—the best way to study most research topics is to combine methodological approaches” (Singleton & Straits, 1999, p. 393). Silverman and Marvasti (2008) add that, “many research questions can be thoroughly addressed by combining different methods, using qualitative research to document the detail of, say, how people interact in one situation and using quantitative methods to identify variance” (p. 12).

A mixed methods approach allows triangulation, which is defined as the use of multiple independent approaches to a research question to obtain answers and information (Singleton & Straits, 1999, p. 393). The authors propose that

The key to triangulation is the use of *dissimilar* methods or measures, which do not share the same methodological weaknesses—that is, errors and biases. The observations or “scores” produced by each method will ordinarily contain some error. But if the pattern of error varies, as it should with different methods, and if these methods independently produce or “zero-in” on the same findings, then our confidence in the results increases (Singleton & Straits, 1999, p. 394).

Other researchers warn, however, to “think carefully before adapting multiple methods. Many models suggest that we cannot simply aggregate data in order to arrive at an overall “truth.” Choose simplicity and rigor rather than the often-illusory search for the full picture” (Silverman & Marvasti, 2008, p. 159).

The Chicago Latino Congregations Study, directed by Dr. Edwin I. Hernandez, was an unprecedented effort to study Latino churches with the objective of understanding the factors that contribute to the growth and vitality of Latino congregations, the social impact of these churches in their communities through their assistance programs, the way Latino churches relate to other faith-based organizations and secular non-profits to more effectively provide services, and the role and needs of the leaders and their congregants to continue to be socially engaged. The study was conducted by the Center for the Study of Latino Religion, a program of the Institute for Latino Studies of the University of Notre Dame. This comprehensive study was funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts, the Richard and Helen DeVos Foundation, the Louisville Institute, and the Annie E. Casey Foundation. The study’s methodological intricacies are described in “The Chicago Latino Congregations Study (CLCS): Methodological Considerations” published in 2010 and

located at the center's web site. The research team applied for and received IRB approval from both the University of Notre Dame and Loyola University Chicago which directly covered the work done for this dissertation. Prior to this dissertation, two other reports were published by the Center for the Study of Latino Religion using the data collected by this study: "Answering the Call: How Latino Churches Can Respond to the HIV/AIDS Epidemic," (2007) and "Healing Hands: The Health of Latino/a Churchgoers and Health Outreach among Latino Congregations in Chicago" (2010).

The research team located over six hundred (N = 606) Latino churches in Chicago, more than half of which were Pentecostal churches, once all the "unknown" churches were identified (N= 325). The study defined "Latino church" as one with a Latino membership of fifty percent and more for Protestant congregations, or thirty percent and more for Catholic parishes (Center for the Study of Latino Religion, 2010, p. 4).

A proportionate stratified random sample (by religious tradition) of one hundred churches was then selected to participate in the study. A total of five "religious traditions were defined in the stratum: Catholic, Mainline Protestant, Evangelical, Pentecostal, and Unknown" (Center for the Study of Latino Religion, 2010, p. 7). Eighty-two (N= 82) churches participated in almost all the quantitative data collection phases (face-to-face structured interview and take-home surveys with the church pastor or key leader, and youth and adult surveys) once the non-response churches were replaced (Center for the Study of Latino Religion, 2010, p. 8). Of the 82 congregations, 74 completed the adult surveys, and 63 the youth surveys. Six churches, three of them Pentecostal, were chosen

to participate in the qualitative phase of the study. They were chosen either by their exemplary ability to engage in the community, or by how well they fit with the theoretical typology of Pentecostal churches that I developed for and use in this dissertation (“traditional,” “progressive,” “activist”).

As a Research Assistant that was involved, from the very beginning, in the methodological design of the Chicago Latino Congregations Study, I was involved first-hand in the choice of methods and the instruments and other research tools used to conduct the study. The research team decided that given the complexity of our research questions, which sought to understand Latino religion and churches and how they engaged in social service provision and other forms of civic engagement, a mixed methodology was the appropriate strategy to achieve our research goals. In summary, our mixed methodology included surveys with youth and adult church congregants, structured interviews and take-home surveys with the congregation’s pastor or a key leader, and several congregational case studies.

The cases studies included, at a minimum, one focus group with a fairly representative sample of the church’s congregants, participant observation at events and/or services, and analysis of literature and other documents available at the church (focusing on documents that provided an insight into the congregation’s and participants’ engagement in social service provision and other forms of civic engagement).

I personally administered the youth and adult surveys at a large number of Pentecostal churches in our sample, conducted and administered the majority of structured interviews and take-home surveys with Pentecostal pastors (in the Pentecostal

churches only pastors participated in the interviews at their own preference), and conducted the field work at the three Pentecostal case studies included in this dissertation.

Quantitative Data

All the quantitative data analyzed for this dissertation was collected, between 2003 and 2007, by the research team of the Chicago Latino Congregations Study. The research team, including me, took an active part in the research design and instrument design stages of the project. As such, I had an opportunity to design questions and contribute to the understanding of topics that were relevant to the life of Latino Pentecostal churches and their congregants.

The research design included a very detailed strategy on how to locate and gain access to Latino congregations in Chicago. Although we were able to locate hundreds of churches through the use of published denominational church directories, the yellow pages, City of Chicago church lists, and web-based church directories, it became apparent early on that a significant number of Latino churches needed to be found in more organic ways. Organic tactics were particularly important when it came to locating highly mobile, unstructured, small, immigrant congregations, many of which were Pentecostal. To address this need, we drove along every single street in majority Latino neighborhoods and new Latino dispersion areas looking for congregations. In the end, we drove several hundred miles inside the City of Chicago in search of churches. We also developed relationships with well-respected Latino religious leaders from several denominations to help us identify the congregations we might have missed.

These approaches were very successful in assisting us locate churches that would have been impossible to locate given some of the patterns we observed in the field.

Namely, we found two or three churches in the same building, but many times they were not all publically identified in the church's sign. This was particularly relevant when Latino churches shared a facility with a non-Latino church—some Pentecostal churches shared facilities with Methodist or Lutheran non-Latino churches. We found churches that had changed their names. We also found large percentages of independent Pentecostal churches that lacked an affiliation with a denomination and were not in any list of Chicago churches. We learned about churches, particularly Pentecostal ones, that had disappeared and moved but nobody knew where they had gone. Finally, we located Latino churches in non-Latino neighborhoods mainly as a result of Latino dispersion into new areas or because of the availability of facilities at non-Latino churches.

Once the population of six hundred and six ($N = 606$) Latino congregations was identified, the research team produced a proportionate stratified random sample of one hundred churches. In stratified random sampling “the population is first subdivided into two or more mutually exclusive segments, called strata, based on categories of one or a combination of relevant variables. Simple random samples then are drawn from each stratum, and these subsamples are joined to form the complete, stratified sample” (Singleton & Straits, 1999, p. 150). Each stratum represented a specific faith tradition paying special attention to the Latino religious landscape that has large numbers of Pentecostal, Baptist, and Catholic churches, but very few Mainline Protestant ones. The sample included Catholic, Mainline Protestant, Evangelical, Pentecostal, and Unknown (Center for the Study of Latino Religion, 2010, p. 6).

Another Research Assistant and I focused on the thirty-two (32) Pentecostal churches that were part of the sample and the rest of the team focused on the rest of the

congregations. We contacted and visited denominational offices (for those that belonged to denominations) to inform them about the project and to request their support. We also recruited local well-respected Pentecostal leaders from the various strands of Pentecostalism to assist in creating awareness about the study and to get pastors and leaders to participate. We visited the churches during services and other events to speak to the pastor(s) about the study and to recruit them for participation. The study's promotional literature and all the instruments were in Spanish and English making it accessible to the particular population we were studying.

After much work and significant amounts of time spent locating pastors, answering their questions, and working around their very busy schedules (the majority of Pentecostal pastors are dual-career, either pastor volunteers or part-time paid pastors), we got twenty six ($N = 26$)—an eighty-one per cent response rate—of the Pentecostal congregations to complete all the quantitative phases of the study. We had several pastors from the original stratified sample that declined to participate, and most of those were replaced with randomly selected Pentecostal congregations some of which eventually participated. The churches that did not respond and did not participate in the study were from all faith traditions, large and small. The Mainline Protestant, Evangelical, and Unknown had the highest rate of non response, while the Catholic and the Pentecostal ones the lowest (Center for the Study of Latino Religion, 2010, p. 9).

Out of one hundred congregations in the sample, eighty-two ($N = 82$) completed all the pastor/leadership phases of the quantitative portion of the study, an eighty-two percent response rate. Seventy four churches completed the adult surveys (74 percent response rate), and 63 completed the youth surveys (63 percent response rate). For more

methodological information for this study refer to “The Chicago Latino Congregations Study (CLCS): Methodological Considerations,” 2010.

Congregational data. Each pastor (the respondents for all Pentecostal congregations were the church pastors, but at other congregations some key leaders also participated) had to complete two instruments as part of Phase I of the study. The first instrument (Version A) consisted of nine parts and was administered in a face-to-face structured interview format. The majority of the time the instrument was administered after having lunch or dinner at a restaurant and lasted approximately two hours. The second instrument, Version B, also consisted of nine parts and was administered as a take-home survey. On average, the pastors or leaders reported taking approximately one hour to complete it. The instrument was given to the pastor or leader the day of the face-to-face interview and arrangements were made for pick-up by the Research Assistant one to two weeks later. The recovery of Version B required a significant amount of follow-up and time but eventually all surveys from participating Pentecostal pastors were recovered.

Version A of the instrument, with over one hundred and fifty questions, focused on the congregation, social service referrals, pastor or leader background in ministry, current position in the congregation, social services offered, and top programs, ministries, or services. Version B of the instrument, with ninety-nine questions, focused on physical facilities, the congregation’s financial information, staffing and leadership dynamics, satisfaction in ministry, the pastor’s perspective on political and social issues, the pastor’s religious background, the church’s belief structure, leadership profile, and the pastor’s financial information.

Congregant data. Phase II of the Chicago Latino Congregations Study focused on the collection of data from youth and adult congregants. The research team decided that the best way of making sure the majority of the congregants completed the surveys was to administer them either during the Sunday service or right after it; ideally the service would finish from forty-five to sixty minutes early to allow enough time for the completion of the surveys. Even with this strategy, it was very challenging for the research team to administer surveys at Catholic churches due to the average parish's size and tight Sunday service logistics—they tend to have one mass right after the other throughout the day. However, this strategy worked very well at Protestant churches, particularly at Pentecostal and Evangelical churches (Baptist, Seventh-Day Adventist, and others). The Pentecostal churches tended to have, on average, seventy-five congregants on a given Sunday making the logistics and the time it took to administer the surveys more manageable.

At some of the Pentecostal churches, the pastor decided to administer the surveys at the end of their service program, without closing the service, only closing the service once everyone had filled out the surveys. At other churches, the pastor closed the service early and told the congregants “they could not leave until the surveys were completed;” typically the majority of the congregants would indeed leave only after they had completed and submitted their surveys. Regardless of the method, at Pentecostal churches, more than eighty-five percent of the congregants present, both youth and adults, completed the surveys.

Logistically some issues emerged. Given a lack of research culture among Latino Pentecostals, special attention was paid to making sure that all the adults read and signed

their consent forms, and the consent forms of their teenagers if they were less than eighteen years of age. Other issues that required a team of research assistants included figuring out who needed the surveys in English, helping those that struggled in reading and writing complete the surveys (we made sure one of the research team members focused on this task), and answering questions on how to use the survey—questions that mainly came from the older adults. On average, people took about sixty minutes to complete the survey, but there were several people (particularly the elderly and those that struggled with reading, writing, and survey instruments) at each congregation, that took a lot longer.

The youth survey was designed with seven parts including asking for information about: you and your congregation, about your faith, background information, your school experiences and activities, your family, your opinions about yourself/attitudes and life experiences, and social service and civic activism. The survey contained ninety-five questions and it took on average thirty minutes to complete. The youth, used to taking these types of surveys at school, had very few questions, answered mainly in English, and submitted their surveys with very little missing data.

The adult survey, similar to the youth survey, was designed with seven parts including asking for information about: you and your congregation, about your faith, public life issues, family life, personal background, health and life experiences, and family life if children under twenty-one live at home. This survey was designed with one hundred and thirty-two questions and it took on average sixty minutes to complete. The majority of the participants answered the survey in Spanish, and a portion of them asked questions about the survey design and how to answer it, or about the meaning of specific

questions. A small percentage of the participants, particularly older women, required our assistance in reading the questions and writing the answers for them. Given these circumstances, some of the adult surveys submitted do have some missing data, but it is not a high percentage given the barriers just described.

Once all the phases of the quantitative research were completed, the Chicago Latino Congregations Study research team had collected data from eighty-two (N= 82) Latino congregations, twenty-six (N= 26) of which were Pentecostal. At the same time, it had surveyed two thousand three hundred sixty-eight (N=2368) adult congregants, nine hundred and seventy-seven (N=977) of which were Pentecostal, and several hundred youth, many of them Pentecostal. After making some modifications to the original sample (for instance, one Pentecostal church was incorrectly categorized as Evangelical because it is affiliated to a U.S. non-Latino Evangelical denomination. However, the pastor and the majority of the congregants identified themselves as Pentecostal), the study ended up with data for 32 Pentecostal congregations (N= 32). Of those, only 31 were used for this dissertation because one was dropped for having an excessive amount of missing data for pastor and congregant surveys.

Contrary to original expectations, the Pentecostal and other Evangelical churches were the most participative in the study. Although Catholic parishes were also participative, important challenges were faced given their size and complex logistics. The most difficult to engage for participation were the Mainline Protestant congregations; perhaps this was a result of their small size and minimal representation within the Latino religious landscape.

The data produced by the Chicago Latino Congregations Study is without a doubt the most comprehensive set of data ever collected on Latino congregations and their congregants in this country. Of particular importance is the fact that this set of data also contains the most complete set of quantitative data that has ever been collected on Latino Pentecostal churches in the U.S. By having congregational (contextual) and congregant (individual) data, these data allow sophisticated analysis of not just congregations as organizations and congregants individually, but also of how contextual church factors affect individual behavior.

Statistical analysis. Due to the nature of the research questions this dissertation addresses, there was a need to use a variety of statistical methods. To address how different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations get civically involved, it was necessary to develop a typology of Pentecostal churches by the use of cluster analysis. I then used descriptive statistics (cross tabulations and comparisons of means) to analyze the relationship between the resulting typology of Pentecostal congregations and my theoretically developed typology of civic engagement. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test whether the differences observed through comparisons of means were statistically significant and Pearson Chi-Square was used to do significance testing for the rest of the variables with the exception of the pastor's language where Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square was used. It is important to mention that given the small N for the church and congregant data (N = 31), several of the relationships were not found to be statistically significant. This may have resulted from having less than 5 counts for several of the cells. Namely, relationships that were found to be statistically significant with the congregant

data (large N), were, on the other hand, found to be statistically not significant with the pastors (small N).

The Chicago Latino Congregations Study was very successful at collecting data from Latino churches and congregants. In fact, congregant missing data averaged only from 10 to 18 percent with very few instances going above 20 percent. When it came to pastor/leader surveys, the missing data is even less, ranging from 3 to 10 percent. For the purposes of this dissertation, missing data was imputed with the series mean—a conservative approach to handling missing data.

To be able to generalize from the stratified sample to the population of Pentecostal congregations in Chicago, a weight variable was added to the analysis. This is only applicable to the church data and not the congregant data because the congregants were surveyed because they were present at a chosen (already weighted) church—for more information see Center for the Study of Latino Religion, 2010, p. 13.

In order to address the effect of different types of Pentecostal congregations on their members developing civic skills and getting civically involved, it was necessary to use logistic regression due to the dichotomous nature of the civic engagement dependent variables. And to address how the civic engagement of different types of Pentecostal congregations compares to the civic engagement of Latino Catholic, Mainline Protestant, and Evangelical congregations, a theoretically developed civic engagement typology was used and the relationship was analyzed with descriptive statistics—specifically cross tabulations and comparisons of means.

The thesis of this dissertation is that there are different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations, and for that matter of Latino Pentecostals, which results in various modes

of civic engagement. Based on research and theoretical considerations (Martin, 1990, 2002; McRoberts, 1999, 2003; Miller & Yamamori, 2007; Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006; Ruano, 2007), I hypothesized that there are three different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations—traditional, progressive, and activist.

As a result, the first task in my data analysis was to develop, using cluster analysis, a typology of Pentecostal congregations to verify if my hypothesized typology was confirmed by the data. Besides this present discussion, I go into this in-depth in chapter four of this dissertation.

For the first part (typology of Pentecostal congregations) and the second part (typology of civic engagement) of the analysis, the unit of analysis—“the entities (objects or events) under study...these include individual people; social roles, positions, and relationships; a wide range of social groupings such as families, organizations, and cities” (Singleton & Straits, 1999, p. 67)—is the congregation, the organization and not its congregants, the individuals. As such, I was very aware that the focus of the first task of my analysis, Latino congregations, had a small number of cases ($N = 31$). From the original stratified sample of one hundred congregations, of which thirty-two were Pentecostal, twenty-six Pentecostal churches (81 percent) participated in all phases of quantitative research in our design and five more were added as already discussed for a total of thirty-one (31). Although this meant a high participation rate, this also meant that the statistical tools needed for the development of both the congregation and the civic engagement typologies had to be flexible enough to deal with a small N and not produce large amounts of error.

In order to create the typology of Latino Pentecostal congregations, I chose, on the basis of theoretical considerations (Loveland, 2005; Miller & Yamamori, 2007; Ruano, 2007; Schwadel, 2002, 2005), a variety of independent variables from the congregational surveys (Version A and Version B) the pastor or key leader had completed including the pastor's age and education and the church's budget and membership size (see Table 1). I then proceeded to create several composite variables including the congregants' average age and annual household income (see Table 1)—congregational variables created from congregant responses—that were also used as independent variables in the model. The result was that for each case, or each Pentecostal congregation, I had several variables that covered a range of important issues and that were added to the model as independent variables.

Once all the chosen variables were entered for each case, or each Pentecostal congregation, I used cluster analysis to organize and look for relationships among the cases. Cluster Analysis, also called segmentation analysis, “seeks to identify homogeneous subgroups of cases in a population. That is, cluster analysis is used when the researcher does not know the number of groups in advance but wishes to establish groups and then analyze group membership” (Garson, 2009, p. 1). This statistical method achieves this by identifying a “set of groups which both minimize within-group variation and maximize between-group variation. Later, group ID values may be saved as a case variable and used for other procedures such as cross tabulations” (Garson, 2009, p.1).

Although some variations of cluster analysis, K-means clustering, and two-step clustering, are used for very large numbers of cases ($N > 1,000$), hierarchical clustering is appropriate for smaller samples ($N < 250$) making it the appropriate variation for my

analysis (N = 31). To determine how many clusters best fit the data, hierarchical clustering allows for the selection of a definition of distance and a linking method for cluster formation (Garson, 2009, p. 1).

The first step in cluster analysis is the “establishment of the similarity or distance matrix. This matrix is a table in which both rows and columns are the units of analysis and the entries are a measure of similarity or distance for any pair of cases” (Garson, 2009, p. 1). Once the clusters were generated, using hierarchical clustering, I verified the validity of the clusters using a three-criterion method suggested by Garson (2009, p.1). The ultimate objective of the validity test is to evaluate the utility of the clusters generated to see if the clusters aligned with my hypothesized conceptual propositions (my typology of Pentecostal congregations).

The three criteria used to evaluate validity included size (all clusters must have enough cases to be meaningful, very small clusters indicate that there are too many clusters in the model, and very large clusters indicate there may be too few clusters in the model), meaningfulness (the meaning of each cluster should be clearly reflected from the variables used to create the clusters), and criterion validity—the cross tabulation of the cluster ID by other known variables to correlate with the concept which clustering is supposed to reflect should reveal the expected level of association (Garson 2009, p.1). Because this dissertation uses a mixed methodology that includes qualitative data, the criterion validity step also included a qualitative analysis of the congregations in each cluster to determine if the clusters made empirical sense. As a result of the qualitative evaluation, a couple of changes were made to the final clusters used for the rest of the analysis.

After completing my first task, the creation of a typology of Pentecostal congregations, my second task was the creation of a typology of civic engagement that applied to both congregations and congregants. I chose on the basis of theoretical considerations (Loveland, 2006; Miller & Yamamori, 2007; Pew Forum on Religion and Public life, 2006; Putnam, 2000; Roozen et al., 1984; Ruano, 2007; Schwadel, 2002, 2005; Skocpol & Fiorina, 1999; Smidt, 2004; Verba et al., 1995) several variables for the creation of the civic engagement typology. Similar to the independent variables selected for the model, several of these variables were taken from the congregational surveys (Version A and Version B) that the pastor or key leader had completed (see Table 10 and Table 11).

Because my theoretical interest was to understand the continuum of civic engagement congregations and their congregants participate in, I developed a theoretical typology that included three different levels of engagement: within the church (having a leadership role, among others), in the surrounding community (volunteering outside of the church, among others), and in the outer society (voting, among others). Besides creating several composite variables that reflect the civic engagement activities of the congregants expressed in congregational, organizational terms (percentage of the congregants that participate in protests, for instance), I also created several dummy variables (see Table 10 and Table 11) for each civic engagement activity in which the congregation got involved. I was careful to indicate in several of the composite variables the frequency with which the church gets involved in those activities to give an idea of the depth of the congregation's involvement in the various activities.

This typology was then used to determine the variation in civic engagement practices of the different types of Pentecostal congregations and their congregants, and was also later used to compare and contrast the civic engagement of the various types of Pentecostal congregations with that of Mainline Protestant, Catholic, and Evangelical churches (chapter seven). Descriptive statistics—specifically cross tabulations and comparison of means—were used to analyze these relationships.

In order to address my third task, how different types of Pentecostal congregations affect their members in developing civic skills and getting civically involved, I had to perform several steps culminating with the use of logistic regression due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables chosen.

Because more than eighty-five percent of the congregants present in the service when the adult survey data was collected actually participated (very close to a census of the attendees), I ran descriptive statistics, cross tabulations and comparisons of means, to describe the congregant population of Pentecostal churches. I particularly focused on congregants' civic skills, social, political, and moral perspectives, and civic engagement behavior. This produced (see chapter four) a profile of the typical congregant. Second, I ran more descriptive statistics, this time adding control variables to determine if some congregants were more likely to engage in certain civic engagement activities than others (for instance, young people are more likely to participate in protests while older people are more like to volunteer at the church's food pantry).

Third, to determine if there was variation in congregant civic engagement behavior from one type of Pentecostal congregation to the next, I once again ran descriptive statistics (cross tabulations and comparison of means) on the individual types

of civic engagement activities in relation to the different types of Pentecostal churches. Given the large percentages of undocumented and documented non U.S. citizen congregants, the cross tabulations to test voting and political party participation only included U.S. citizens.

Finally, I used logistic regression with several models designed to test the effect of the different types of Pentecostal congregations (contextual effect) on a variety of congregant civic engagement behaviors. For the last two models, voting and political party participation, logistic regressions were only run with U.S. citizens. Relevant individual independent variables were added to the models.

This was the most complicated step in the data analysis required for task three due to the nature of logistic regression and the complex interpretation of its results. Logistic regression is used “to predict a discrete outcome based on variables which may be discrete, continuous, or mixed” (Gaur & Gaur 2009, p. 121). There are two types of logistic regression, a form of regression that can be used depending on the number of outcomes of the dependent variable. Binary or binomial logistical regression is used for dichotomous dependent variables, while “multinomial logistic regression exists to handle the case of dependents with more classes than two...” (Garson, 2010, p. 1).

Logistic regression is useful in determining the “effect size of the independent variables on the dependent; to rank the relative importance of independents; to assess interaction effects; and to understand the impact of covariate control variables. The impact of predictor variables is usually explained in terms of odds ratios” (Garson, 2010, p.1). Instead of applying ordinary least of squares (OLS) techniques, logistic regression uses maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) after transforming the dependent variable

into a logit, the natural log of the odds of the dependent variable occurring or not (Garson, 2010, p.1).

Unlike multiple regression, interpreting the logistic regression coefficients is difficult (Bohrnstedt & Knoke, 1994; Gaur & Gaur, 2009). The values may vary from – infinite to + infinite. The positive value means that the “odds are in favor of the event and the event is likely to occur while a negative value indicates the odds are against the event and the event is not likely to occur” (Gaur & Gaur, 2009, p. 122). Bohrnstedt and Knoke (1994) conclude that a “coefficient can be interpreted similarly to a linear regression parameter, as long as you remember that the dependent variable is *not* a probability, but rather a logarithm of the odds of the two probabilities” (p. 343). For instance, being a Republican, holding conservative political views, and being white (all with positive coefficients) each increases the odds of voting for Bush, while being more educated (with a negative coefficient) decreases the odds of voting for him (Bohrnstedt & Knoke, 1994, p. 343).

Multiple regression provides an exact R square—which tells how much of the variation of the dependent variable can be accounted for by the variation of the independent variable(s), the strength of the relationship—instead, logistic regression provides two approximations: the Cox & Snell R Square and the Nagelkerke R Square (Gaur & Gaur, 2009). Some procedures, goodness-of-fit tests, are available to assess the overall fit of the logistic equation to the data, model appropriateness (Bohrnstedt & Knoke, 1994, p. 344; Garson, 2010, p. 1).

Unlike OLS regression, logistic regression does not assume “linearity of relationship between the independent variables and the dependent one, does not require

normally distributed variables, does not assume homoscedasticity, and in general has less stringent requirements” (Garson, 2010, p. 1). Garson concludes that the predictive success of logistic regression can be assessed by “looking at the classification table [and] showing correct and incorrect classifications of the dichotomies, ordinal, or politomous dependent” (Garson, 2010, p. 1).

The last task of this dissertation was to compare the civic engagement of different types of Pentecostal congregations with that of Mainline Protestant, Catholic, and Evangelical congregations. That is, I went back to the organizational unit of analysis (N = 82 including the Pentecostal congregations, N = 31). Because I had already analyzed different types of Pentecostal congregations and civic engagement in task two of the data analysis, I proceeded to replicate that analysis with Mainline Protestant, Catholic, and Evangelical congregations. Once that was completed, I compared the results of this analysis with the previous analysis to see how more or less civically active different types of Pentecostal congregations and their congregants were, but this time in relation to Latino congregations of other religious traditions (see chapter seven).

Similar to the procedure used for task two, I used descriptive statistics (cross tabulations and comparisons of means) to articulate these relationships. Given the large percentages of undocumented and documented non U.S. citizen congregants, the cross tabulations to test voting and political party participation only included U.S. citizens. I also used the same typology of civic engagement I developed for task two (the scale goes from church activity, to community activity, to societal activity) to assure that the results could be compared to those obtained in task two of this analysis. Once all results were obtained, I compared them to those obtained for task two to identify the civic engagement

similarities and differences of the different types of Latino congregations (see chapter seven).

In what would be considered an unusual and maybe an unnecessary practice by many a sociologist of religion, I separated Pentecostals from Evangelicals because in this dissertation I argue that, in the Latino context, that categorization does not at all reflect the religious landscape. That is, because there are so many more Pentecostal congregations and Pentecostals than all other Evangelical traditions combined—the Chicago Latino Congregations Study located 198 Pentecostal churches, 33 percent of the universe, 126 Evangelical, 21 percent of churches, and 77 Mainline Protestant churches, 13 percent of churches, and 85 unknown, many of which were later found to also be Pentecostal—the lumping together of Pentecostal churches under the Evangelical umbrella obscures the influence Pentecostals have, numerically and more importantly culturally, over the Latino Evangelical, the Mainline Protestant, and even the Catholic traditions (Center for the Study of Latino Religion, 2010, p. 14). It is also imperative to keep in mind that through the Catholic Charismatic movement, Latino Pentecostalism has exerted a large amount of influence on its eternal rival—the Catholic Church.

Therefore, it is of vital importance to understand not just the differences and similarities among the various types of Pentecostal congregations as it relates to civic engagement, but also how they compare to the civic engagement of Evangelical, Catholic, and Mainline Protestant congregations.

Qualitative Data

The qualitative portion of this dissertation's methodology was designed to shed more light and provide in-depth detail on the main patterns observed from the results of

the quantitative methods. This portion of the research methodology is based on the case study approach with the use of various qualitative methods including participant observation, focus groups, and analysis of documents related to the life of the congregation and its congregants as it pertains to social service provision and other forms of civic engagement.

The “case study” has been defined as a tool to “get in-depth understanding of something—a program, an event, a place, a person, an organization” (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p. 43). Punch (1998) explains that, “the basic idea is that one case (or perhaps a small number of cases) will be studied in detail, using whatever methods seem appropriate. While there may be a variety of purposes and research questions, the general objective is to develop as full an understanding of that case as possible” (p. 150). In a case study, the focus is on the process—how things work and why—rather than variations in outcomes, in contexts rather than specific variables, in discovery rather than theory testing (Yin, 2008). Not unlike other research approaches, case studies can “involve many data collection methods, including direct and indirect observation along with structured and unstructured interviewing” (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p. 43).

In this dissertation, the type of case study used is the “instrumental case study” defined by Stake (2000) as a case “examined mainly to provide insight into an issue or to revise a generalization. Although the case selected is studied in depth, the main focus is on something else” (pp. 437-438). The “something else” in this dissertation comes from both the analysis of the quantitative data that was the backbone of the Chicago Latino Congregations Study and a typology of Pentecostal congregations I developed on the basis of theory (McRoberts, 1999; Miller & Yamamori, 2007; Ruano, 2007).

In that sense, the three case studies chosen are both a theoretical and a random sample. Mason explains that theoretical sampling is the done by “selecting groups or categories to study on the basis of their relevance to your research questions, your theoretical position...and most importantly the explanation or account which you are developing” (Mason, 1996, pp.93-94). The three case studies were chosen to represent the three types of Pentecostal congregations in my theoretical typology—“traditional,” “progressive,” and “activist.” Once the typology was empirically tested using Cluster analysis, a “neo-conservative” church instead of an “activist” one was found. However, it was actually confirmed (by verifying where the churches appeared within the clusters) that the three case study congregations actually matched the three churches produced by the empirical testing: “traditional,” “neo-conservative,” and “progressive.”

At the same time, the three congregations were part of the probability sample (in this type of sampling “all cases in the population are randomly selected and have a known probability of being included in the sample” —Singleton & Straits, 1991, p. 141) of Pentecostal congregations that were part of the Chicago Latino Congregations Study. The pastors and congregants of the three congregations had gone through the quantitative data collection portion of the study and agreed to be one of the Pentecostal case studies. Because the case study congregations were part of a probability random sample, it makes it possible, albeit with significant caution, to make some inferences about the whole population of Pentecostal churches in Chicago in ways that would not be possible if the case study congregations were not part of a probability sample (Silverman & Marvesti, 2008, p. 163). By having three case studies instead of one, it is also possible to compare and contrast the research results of the congregations and identify nuances that make a

difference in ways that are relevant in light of my theoretical typology of Latino Pentecostal congregations.

One of the methods used at each of the case study congregations was focus groups. Seven to ten participants were recruited for each focus group and the participants were carefully chosen to represent age (only those older than eighteen years of age), gender, national origin, immigrant status, and leadership position in the congregation. Silverman and Marvasti (2008) define focus groups as “group discussions usually based upon stimuli (topics, visual aids) provided by the researcher” (p. 508). If well moderated, focus groups are an effective way of eliciting responses to a set of open-ended questions from a group of participants. The group setting “stimulates discussions that would not occur in simple two-person interactions and encourages people to explore similarities and differences of opinion” (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p. 40).

That said, the authors recognize that focus groups develop a social dynamics that jeopardize the independence of participants’ responses (they feed off one another) and limit the distribution of responses in the group because some may dominate while others become passive observers (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p. 40). As a result, a skilled moderator is required to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the focus group method and reduce the effect of its weaknesses.

Keeping all these issues in mind, I conducted three focus groups, one in each Pentecostal congregation chosen, using a focus group protocol designed by the Chicago Latino Congregations Study research team (see Appendix A). The focus group protocol consisted of four parts with a total of eighteen open-ended questions. Part I dealt with religious and spiritual life, Part II with civic and community engagement, Part III with

labor issues, and Part IV with religious identity. Each part consisted of three to seven questions and for each question the research team designed several probes that the moderator used to elicit as much information as possible. Depending on the number of participants, the focus group was designed to last between one and two hours.

I chose each congregation on the basis of how it fitted my theoretical, literature based, typology of Pentecostal churches (“traditional,” “progressive,” and “activist”). Cluster analysis and qualitative validity later modified my theoretical typology. Instead of an “activist” type, a “neo-conservative” type was found. I had obtained in-depth knowledge about each congregation from the structured interviews I conducted with the pastors and their congregants’ responses to the adult surveys—the youth data collected by the Chicago Latino Congregations Study was not used for this dissertation.

A focus group was conducted at what I consider, on the basis of my typology, a “traditional” Pentecostal church of about fifty members (after the empirical testing was conducted using Cluster analysis this church was confirmed as a “traditional” type). The church owns its own building, with capacity for around one hundred people in the sanctuary, and it is affiliated to a Latin American denomination that originated and is headquartered in Puerto Rico. The majority of the congregants are of Puerto Rican descent, but the pastor, a woman in her late fifties, is from another Latin American Caribbean country. Although the services in this church are conducted exclusively in Spanish, three of the nine participants (all young people in their early twenties) asked to answer the questions in English. Of the nine participants, five were women which was the overwhelming majority of the congregants—three in their fifties and sixties, one in her forties, and one in her twenties—and four were men (two in their early twenties, one in

his thirties, and one in his forties). All participants, with the exception of a lady in her sixties, actively participated in the focus group. At the end of the focus group, the pastor showed up to hear the questions that I was asking her congregants and asked to participate and gave answers to a couple of the questions.

I also conducted another focus group at what I consider, on the basis of my theoretical typology, a “progressive” Pentecostal church (after the empirical testing was conducted using Cluster analysis this church was confirmed as a “neo-conservative” type). This church owns two buildings with capacity for approximately two hundred people in the sanctuary and several spaces allocated to a numerous ministries. This is an independent church, but the pastor, a Latino woman in her fifties, defected from a “classical” Latin American Pentecostal denomination where she had been a leader for over twenty years. The majority, if not all the congregants, are Latinos—mainly Puerto Rican but with other Latino national groups also represented—and the services were simultaneously conducted in Spanish and English. In fact, the pastor preached in both Spanish and English and some of the songs were sang in Spanish while others were sang in English.

The focus group was conducted in English with seven participants. Five of them were women, who represent more than seventy-five percent of the congregants of this church, and two men. Of the women, two were in their twenties, two in their thirties, and one in her forties. Both men were in their thirties. All actively participated in the focus group and there were no inconveniences.

Finally, I conducted a focus group at a church that I qualify as “activist” on the basis of my Pentecostal congregation typology (after the empirical testing was conducted

using Cluster analysis this church was confirmed as a “progressive” type). This church owns its own building with capacity for around two hundred and fifty people in the sanctuary and its pastor, who has a doctor in ministry degree from a liberal Mainline Protestant seminary, actively engages in issues related Latinos in Chicago. The pastor, a Latino in his forties, is a self-declared leftist who also originated in a “classical” Latin American denomination but left and founded an independent church.

Although some songs are sung in Spanish and others in English, the services are conducted in Spanish. The focus group was conducted in both English and Spanish, the questions were asked in both languages. All participants were Latinos of various generations and of various Latino national origins with the exception of one who was an African immigrant who felt “at home” at this church. The focus group was conducted with ten participants—six women and four men. The men were all in their thirties except one that was in his late forties. Of the women, one was in her sixties, one in her fifties, one in her forties, and two in their thirties. All participants actively engaged in the conversation and stayed for the two hours the focus group lasted.

As part of the study of the three Pentecostal case studies, I also conducted participant observation of their Sunday services. I focused on their Sunday services because I was interested in researching the differences and similarities among the three churches when it came to dress code (a major differentiator for different types of Pentecostal churches), religious practice (preaching, speaking in tongues, healing), leadership roles, and social and religious themes that emerged through the religious discourse.

Participant observation is a research method that “puts you where the action is, lets you observe behavior in a natural context (behavior that might be otherwise impossible to observe) and lets you collect any kind of data you want” (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p. 41). According to the authors, participant observation involves the act of putting yourself as a researcher in the social environment of the subjects and experiencing the lives of the people being studied; it means “establishing rapport and learning to act so that people go about their business as usual when you show up” (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p. 41).

Although participant observation is a very effective method to collect qualitative data, it also has its inherent risks. Singleton and Straits (1999) warn that there is a need to balance participating and observing, for the latter tends to create a marginal existence for the researcher (p. 330). Namely, the researcher “participates in an alien setting, with a desire to be accepted but also a constant sense of separation from those observed that is part and parcel of the observer role” (Singleton & Straits, 1999, p. 330). Bernard and Ryan (2010) summarize the challenge of the participant observer as one that involves “immersing yourself in a culture and learning to remove yourself every day from that immersion so you can intellectualize what you’ve seen and heard, put it into perspective, and write about it convincingly” (p. 42).

Although the participant observation I conducted was not as extensive as the one conducted by researchers using it as their sole research method, I did face the challenge of “immersion and removal.” This was particularly challenging for me because as I researcher that grew up in a Pentecostal environment, albeit a different Pentecostal environment than two of the churches I studied, I was very cognizant of the risk of going

native—“the researcher who ceases to be conscious of the observer role” (Singleton & Straits, 1999, p. 330).

In spite of the risks faced, I felt competent to conduct the observation and also used an observation protocol designed by the research team of the Chicago Latino Congregations Study (see Appendix B). The protocol consisted of four parts, each with four to fifteen specific items to observe. The protocol identified the item to be observed and asked one to two questions about each providing very specific examples of how and what to observe. Part I of the protocol focused on the spatial map and was subdivided into physical structures, aesthetics, religious and cultural symbols, and neighborhood context. Part II addressed the social map, Part III dealt with the temporal map, and Part IV focused on the Pentecostal practice (I added this part to the protocol to observe Pentecostal specific realities).

As a result, I was able to collect very rich data from each of the case study congregations including the songs they sang, who sang them and how, the messages preached, the way the services were conducted, the way space was organized and used by each church, the technology that was used, the social composition of the congregants, the Pentecostal religious practices, the community that formed before, during, and after the service, the feel and look of the buildings, the literature they had posted and distributed, the way people become engaged during and after the service, the leadership roles and who held those, the generational roles, and the gender roles, among several others.

There is no doubt that the qualitative data collected not only contributed a deeper understanding of the similarities and differences among the various types of Latino Pentecostal churches and their congregants, but also humanized my research endeavor. In

other words, it made it possible to experience, first hand, the variety of beliefs, practices, and discourse of the various modes of Latino Pentecostal existence and it made the statistics gleaned from the quantitative portion of the research alive and real.

Access

It is also important to note that gaining access to Latino congregations was an enormous challenge for the research team that worked on this study. Gaining access to Pentecostal congregations was particularly challenging given the isolated nature of many of these churches and the dual-career reality of the majority of their pastors, which limits their availability. Even after the pastor or key leader had participated in the structured interview and had completed the take-home survey, and their congregants had taken the youth and adult surveys, setting up the logistics to conduct participant observation and the focus groups took a very long time. At times, I wondered if I was going to be able to complete all phases of the research design.

On several occasions, I had to recruit the help of one of the leaders of the church (a hands-on person) other than the pastor, to obtain permission from the pastor and to assist with the logistics. This approach was very effective because I had already known several of the leaders and even the pastors for ten to twenty years, and more than one saw their participation as a way of “helping” further my education. Something that really caught my attention was the seriousness with which Pentecostal congregants treated their pastor’s request to participate. If the pastor asked for the congregants to stay to take a survey, the majority (in most cases over eighty-five percent of those present) stayed and completed the surveys, even those that struggled with reading and writing. Once the logistics and pastor approval had been secured, the overwhelming majority of the

assigned focus group participants showed up on a Saturday morning to be part of it “at the request of the pastor.”

Once the participants were in the room, there were very few inconveniences in conducting focus groups at the three congregations. Generally people were engaged and stayed for the length of the event. Some people, particularly mothers, had to walk out of the room for a few minutes to watch over their children waiting outside. The issue of bilingualism came up in all the focus groups. Several members of the younger generation, less than thirty years of age but particularly those in their early twenties, requested that I repeat the questions in both Spanish and English and they mainly responded in English. At times, I translated their answers if there were people in the room that did not speak English. A couple of the older focus group participants asked very direct questions about my religious affiliation and beliefs. To evade undue influence over them and on their responses, I would ask if we could wait to talk about those issues until the focus group was completed.

I felt welcomed to these churches' events, mainly services, when I conducted participant observation. The majority of the time I was allowed to sit in the back pew to be able to observe the social dynamics unfold, and fortunately very few people looked at me wondering what I was doing. The majority of the people would approach me at the beginning and end of the event and greet me with “Dios le bendiga! (May God bless you!),” the formal greeting of Latino Pentecostals, and on numerous occasions I was kissed and hugged as part of the social interaction that occurs in these congregations.

There were several first-time visitors for the Sunday service and on a few occasions I went through their visitor tracking process. This involved the filling out of a

visitor slip that asked for my information, the reason for my visit (including spiritual and/or other types of need), whether I wanted to be visited by church leaders, and whether I had “accepted Christ as my lord and savior.” I was then introduced to the congregation as a visitor along with the other four or five visitors that showed up that day.

All the case study congregations had a team of ushers that assisted me if I had any questions and they were instrumental in getting me written information about their church, their denomination, and various other documents they had on display or available for congregants and visitors to take home.

Conclusion

In this chapter I discussed the research design of the Chicago Latino Congregations Study, which produced the data that I collected and used for this dissertation. I outlined how and why I used a mixed methodology and how the quantitative and qualitative data were collected. I paid particular attention to the data analysis process used for the quantitative data and explained the different statistical techniques used and the reasons for their use in this dissertation.

Given the depth and variety of data that was collected with the mixed methodology used by the Chicago Latino Congregations Study and the data’s particular usefulness in exploring Pentecostal congregations and their congregants allowing the study of their similarities and differences and how they differ from other types of Latino congregations, this approach afforded me the opportunity to do a more comprehensive study than would have been possible otherwise.

In chapter four, I will discuss the typology of Latino Pentecostal congregations I developed and extensively discuss Latino Pentecostal churches' similarities and differences using a variety of organizational, and pastor and congregant demographic characteristics. I then compare and contrast the different types of Latino Pentecostal churches, their pastors and congregants, on a variety of religiosity, moral, social, and political measures.

CHAPTER FOUR

LATINO PENTECOSTAL CONGREGATIONS

Introduction

In this chapter, I create a typology of Pentecostal congregations that is subsequently analyzed in relation to three levels of engagement—within church, in community, and in wider society—which are part of the theoretical typology of civic engagement discussed in chapter three. I propose that the ever-pervasive perspective of Pentecostalism as an ultra conservative, inward-looking, and otherworldly religious tradition must be revised on the basis of this study's results. The fact is that in the last couple of decades Pentecostalism has grown significantly, but more importantly has evolved into several currents some of which are characterized by progressive social thinking and action (Miller & Yamamori, 2007; Ruano, 2007). Little research (McRoberts, 2003; Miller & Yamamori, 2007; Norman, 2007) has documented the emergence and development of various strands of Pentecostalism including the progressive type, and this dissertation looks squarely at this phenomenon and its prospects for the future.

I look at Latino Pentecostalism in Chicago, both churches and their congregants, to shed light on this very important religious phenomenon. I pay particular attention to the movement's implications for communities and society recognizing its present size and growth patterns among the Latino community of this country and around the world.

I start the chapter with a very brief theoretical review of congregational research, its strengths and weaknesses, congregational typologies, and how I apply this literature to Latino Pentecostalism. I then hypothesize a typology of Latino Pentecostal congregations and use hierarchical clustering and qualitative verification to test it, and descriptive statistics (cross tabulations and comparisons of means) to analyze similarities and differences between the different types of Pentecostal churches.

In the end, I extensively discuss the results of this analysis and compare them to those obtained by other research that studied U.S. Latinos in general (at a national level) and other U.S. Pentecostals. It is imperative to keep in mind, however, that there has been very little research conducted exclusively on U.S. Pentecostals limiting the scope of these comparisons. I conclude with a summary of findings, issues and concerns, and questions in need of further research.

Theoretical Considerations

Putnam (2006) categorically stated that, “faith communities are arguably the single most important repository of social capital in America” (p. 66). Smidt takes the argument to a higher level and proposes that religious social capital is not just the most important repository of social capital, but that it is different and that consequently the resulting civic engagement is distinctive (2003, p. 3).

The congregation is the theater where religious social capital emerges and from where its resulting civic engagement emanates. Wuthnow (1999) concludes that, “civic involvement has been deeply influenced by the nation’s preponderant commitment to its religious organizations” (p. 331). More succinctly, Cnaan and colleagues (2003) state that joining a congregation in the United States “necessarily involves accepting a set of

norms—including the norms of contributing to the building of human and social capital and of being willing to participate in civic affairs” (p. 20).

It has been found, however, that the role churches play in the formation of social capital and the facilitation of civic engagement is a very complex one. Yet, the socialization experienced by the churched results in civic engagement within and beyond the congregation characterized by a strong motivation to participate for religious, social, and altruistic reasons, a socialization not necessarily mirrored by the unchurched (Harris, 2003, p. 135).

Congregations are particularly important in providing disadvantaged groups in society the ability to develop civic skills that are transferable to other spheres of life including the political arena (Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995; Wuthnow, 1999). These same authors found that Protestant congregations are more effective at developing and providing opportunities for practicing civic skills. Evangelical congregations, however, may not be as effective at transferring those skills to the outside world, thus limiting the production of bridging social capital (Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995; Wuthnow 1999).

This dissertation seeks to address, through the Latino Pentecostal context, some of the most important religion and social capital, and religion and civic engagement issues raised by the scholars discussed. Latino Pentecostal congregations in Chicago have for decades served the most disadvantaged segments of the community and they are fertile soil for the study of the development and transfer of civic skills and the study of civic engagement behavior. However, before the Chicago Latino Congregations Study was conducted (2003 to 2007), there was no other study that had comprehensively looked at

Latino Pentecostal congregations in this country. Some congregational studies (McRoberts, 2003; Cnaan, Hernandez, & McGrew, 2002; Kniss & Numrich, 2007; Wood, 1994) looked at some Latino Pentecostal churches, but came short of analyzing the similarities and differences within Latino Pentecostalism in relation to their civic engagement practices.

The research team that conducted the Chicago Latino Congregations Study faced numerous challenges to develop a universe of Pentecostal congregations and to later recruit them to participate (see chapter three). Surprisingly 26 of the 32 congregations in the stratified sample participated—an 81 percent participation rate. After making some modifications to the original sample (for instance, one church was incorrectly categorized as Evangelical because it is affiliated to a U.S. non-Latino Evangelical denomination. However, the pastor and the majority of the congregants identified themselves as Pentecostal), the study ended up with data for 32 Pentecostal congregations ($N = 32$), and 977 of their adult congregants ($N = 977$). Of those, only 31 were used for this dissertation because one was dropped for having an excessive amount of missing data for both surveys. Of the 31 churches left in the sample, more than 85 percent of the congregants present when the surveys were administered completed them. Consequently, the Chicago Latino Congregations Study collected the most comprehensive and complete set of data that has ever been collected on Latino Pentecostal congregations and their congregants in this country.

The interest to research Pentecostal congregations and civic engagement came about as I first conducted qualitative research in their midst starting almost a decade ago (Ruano, 2003). As I studied family life, intra-Pentecostal conflict, and immigrant

dynamics, the diversity of opinion and the lived social and religious lives of the different Pentecostal traditions and their congregations questioned the generally accepted notion of Pentecostalism as a fairly monolithic, otherworldly, inward-looking, and an ultra conservative religious movement (Bastian, 1990; Cleary & Stewart-Gambino, 1997; D'Epina, 1969; Greely & Hout, 2006; Williams, 1967; Wood, 1994). I did find evidence that supported some of the old assumptions, but I also interviewed Pentecostals and observed at congregations where things “seemed” different. Many of the congregants and their leaders were college-educated, young, showed a degree of progressive thinking, and more importantly defined themselves not in opposition to Catholics, which was common practice among Latino classical Pentecostals, but in opposition to “los legalistas” (“the legalists”)—“esos de la senda antigua” (“those of the old way”)— meaning classical Pentecostals (Ruano, 2003). Some of the younger leaders told the story of a split and “massive” departure of the younger and/or more educated leaders and congregants from the old denominations into new denominations or simply into independent churches.

Significant tensions followed these events because classical Pentecostal churches lost and continue to lose members, churches, and potential converts to the new types of congregations that emerged (Ruano, 2003). “Los liberales” (“the liberals”), as the classical Pentecostals call them, were reportedly younger, more educated, and cared about “cosas mundanas” (“mundane things”). This tension even spilled into the radio and TV waves where both groups went at it for a while (I studied these events a few years ago as part of my research on intra-Pentecostal conflict).

Originally I had been drawn to the study of Pentecostalism because of its prevalence among the disadvantaged in society including immigrants, the poor, the

poorest of the poor, the uneducated, the elderly, and single women. My research interest was particularly focused in finding out if Pentecostalism was or could be a catalyst for social empowerment or if it was an inhibitor of civic engagement and the “opium of the people,” as many researchers assumed Pentecostalism to be (Bastian, 1990; Cleary & Stewart-Gambino, 1997; D’Epinay, 1969; Williams, 1967; Wood, 1994). What I found, particularly the story of a major split within the movement among Chicago Latinos, made Pentecostalism attractive to address my social empowerment questions. Was there a new strand of Pentecostalism? Was it progressive? How progressive? How different was it from classical Pentecostalism? Given the story of a split in the movement, it meant that the new strand(s) of Pentecostalism evolved from the classical version, could it be then that there would be more steps in the evolutionary process? Might we actually see in the future strands of Pentecostalism that address social structural issues in their civic engagement the way some Mainline Protestant traditions do?

This dissertation addresses many of these questions and it does so with both quantitative and qualitative data. The Chicago Latino Congregations Study produced an unprecedented set of data on Latino congregations and their congregants and as such it allows the analysis of different strands of Pentecostalism and their congregations in comparison to Catholic, Evangelical, and Mainline Latino traditions.

Based on the qualitative research I conducted among Pentecostal churches (participant observation and content analysis), their leaders (interviews), and many congregants (focus groups and interviews) since 2001, I hypothesized that there were at least three types of Pentecostal congregations—“traditional,” “progressive,” and “activist.” I hypothesized the “traditional” type to be the classical Pentecostal

congregation that finds its roots in the original Pentecostal movement of the early nineteenth hundreds. “Traditional” congregations have been the majority of Pentecostal churches and have represented the movement for decades particularly among Latinos.

On the other hand, “progressive” and “activist” congregations are the newcomers to the Latino Pentecostal landscape; they became prevalent in the last two to three decades and have now taken a leadership role in Chicago. I also hypothesized that the “progressive” type evolved from the “traditional” one, but with time there would be “progressive” churches originating from other “progressive” churches with little or no direct roots to the “traditional” types. Finally the “activist” type evolved from the “progressive” church and is on the vanguard of the movement particularly as it relates to civic and political engagement. “Activist” congregations address the social and structural inequalities prevalent in society for the benefit of the most disadvantaged segments of the population. They are a small minority of Pentecostal congregations, but they have the potential of showing the way for other churches to follow, and more important they have the ability to seriously empower the most disadvantaged segments of society.

With time, “progressive” congregations eventually take the quantitative leap into becoming “activist” ones. As they do this, besides providing internally for the needs of their congregants, “activist” churches get more involved in the surrounding communities and engage social structures to address social issues relevant to their congregants and the most disadvantaged in society. Finally, I hypothesized that the various types of Pentecostal congregations influenced their congregants’ beliefs and practices. The congregants’ civic and political engagement behavior reflects the influence of the type of Pentecostal congregation they attend.

There was another important trend I noticed in my research of Latino intra-Pentecostal conflict several years ago. The new types of congregations seemed to have major disagreements among themselves particularly in regards to prosperity theology (a teaching that emphasizes material possession, consumerism, and upward mobility) that has become central to the life of many Pentecostal churches. Therefore, I hypothesized that even though some “progressive” congregations would eventually evolve into “activist” ones, others would remain as “progressive” types modeling themselves around U.S. Pentecostal churches that emphasize prosperity theology.

Cluster Analysis of Pentecostal Congregations

Given the hypothesized Latino Pentecostal church typology—“traditional,” “progressive,” and “activist”—I used cluster analysis to test if the thirty one Pentecostal churches in my sample would cluster in such a way as to confirm or disprove the typology. The literature on cluster analysis (Garson, 2009) warned that a large enough N was needed for the procedure to produce accurate results (low levels of error). An N of 31 (the number of Pentecostal congregations in the sample) was low and likely to produce high levels of error. I, however, did not have any other statistical option and decided to use a mixed methods approach. This approach required the use of cluster analysis in an exploratory way and the use qualitative validity (based on an extensive qualitative knowledge of the congregations) to verify the accuracy of the resulting clusters. Consequently, it is important for future research with a large enough N to statistically confirm, via cluster analysis, the final Pentecostal church typology that was developed with this mixed methodology.

Cluster analysis “seeks to identify homogenous subgroups of cases in a population. That is, cluster analysis is used when the researcher does not know the number of groups in advance but wishes to establish groups and then analyze group membership...Cluster analysis implements this by identifying a set of groups which both minimize within-group variation and maximize between-group variation” (Garson, 2009, p. 1). I chose hierarchical cluster analysis as my method because it allows the selection of a definition of distance, a linking method for forming clusters, and a determination of how many clusters best suit the data (Garson, 2009). Whereas other clustering approaches such as K-means and two-step clustering require a large N, hierarchical clustering works well with an N of less than 250 (Bacher, 2002, p. 3; Garson, 2009).

I clustered the cases in an exploratory mode (namely, only specifying the variables and cases to be used) without specifying the exact number of clusters desired. I then chose an agglomerative approach in which each cluster consists of one single object (case or variable) and the clusters are combined step by step. In each step, two clusters with the smallest dissimilarity or the highest similarity are merged and iteration is continued until all objects are in one single cluster (Bacher, 2002, p. 44).

I used the Ward linkage, which has a fixed dissimilarity measure, as the agglomerative hierarchical method because it uses criteria that are well known from other procedures (such as, cluster sum of squares) and it does not minimize the sum of squares for a specific solution (Bacher, 2002, p. 55). The Ward linkage method also allows for a clear interpretation and guarantees a continuous increase of agglomeration levels (Bacher, 2002, p. 55). More important, Ward linkage is recommended as the method of choice for the clustering of cases when the variables are interval-scaled variables

(numerical) or can be treated as such (Bacher, 2002, p. 54). This approach was a good fit for this study taking into consideration that more than half of my variables are interval scaled variables while the rest are dummy variables. In the end, all the variables were converted into Z scores as a way of standardizing the data for analysis.

Simulation studies that have looked at the factors that influence the results of cluster analysis have demonstrated that even when outliers, irrelevant variables, and incorrect dissimilarity measures are added to the model only about 9.7 percent of wrong classification has occurred (Bacher, 2002, p. 98). Although researches have concluded that the selection of variables and the inclusion of irrelevant variables are the most important factors affecting the results of cluster analysis, the risk is not very significant (Bacher 2002, p. 98).

Once the analysis is run, clusters are identified using the dendrogram, and the icicle plots produced. The dendrogram (Figure 1) shows the pattern of clustering the cases with connecting lines to the right indicating more distance between cases and clusters (Garson, 2009, p. 8). The icicle plot is a “visual way of representing information on the agglomeration schedule but without the proximity coefficient information” (Garson, 2009, p. 9). In the vertical icicle plot (Figure 2), the bottom row shows all cases on the model as separate one-case clusters except the first pair clustered while subsequent rows show further clustering steps (Garson, 2009, p. 9).

In order to empirically create a typology of Pentecostal congregations, I used several important variables that have been identified in the sociology of religion and social capital and civic engagement literatures (Chavez, 2004; Greeley & Hout, 2006; Loveland, 2005; Schlozman, et al., 1999; Smidt, 2003; Putnam, 2000; Verba, et al., 1995;

Wuthnow, 1999, 2004) including variables for both the pastor or key leader of the congregation and its congregants. These characteristics of churches and pastors include the pastor's age and education, the church's membership size and budget, and the congregants' average age and annual household income (see Table 1 for more details).

Table 1. Church/Pastor and Congregant Variables Used for Cluster Analysis

Congregant Variables	Church/Pastor Variable
Immigrant status	Latino origin
Gender	Denominational status
Number of children	Paid staff
Home ownership	Church budget
Annual household income	Size of church membership
Religious orientation	Language of worship services
Educational attainment	Pastor's religious orientation
Latino origin	Pastor's language
Age	Pastor's age
Language	Pastor's gender
Religious switching	Pastor's education
	Pastor's immigrant status
N = 977	N = 31

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), and Surveys 2, and 3 (Pastor/Leader), 2007.

Note: the congregant variables were converted into aggregate variables before being analyzed. For example, the mean age of the congregants was used as a congregational variable.

While the pastor or key leader variables included in the analysis came directly from the surveys the pastor or key leader completed, the congregant variables had to go

through a process of conversion to be used as aggregate congregational variables. For instance, the mean of the age of the congregants (obtained from each congregant survey) was used as a congregational variable.

The hierarchical clustering technique I used produced two clearly distinguishable clusters of congregations (see Figure 1 and Figure 2): one with seventeen churches, and the other with fourteen.

According to Garson (2009), the utility of clusters must be assessed by three criteria. First, the issue of size—all clusters need to have enough cases. One or more very small clusters indicate the researcher has chosen too many clusters, and a very large dominant cluster may be evidence that too few clusters have been chosen (Garson, 2009, p. 1). Second, the resulting clusters should be “substantially interpretable” (meaningfulness); and third, the results should pass the test of criterion validity. Namely, the cross tabulations of the cluster “identification numbers by other variables known from theory or prior research to correlate with the concept which clustering is supposed to reflect, should in fact reveal the expected levels of association” (Garson, 2009, p. 1).

The assessment of the two clusters using Garson’s criteria produced generally satisfactory results. Namely, Cluster 1 had seventeen congregations, 55 percent of all congregations, while Cluster 2 had fourteen or 45 percent—each of the clusters was large enough. I proceeded to conduct an evaluation of substantive meaningfulness and validity by running cross tabulations of relevant variables and by qualitatively analyzing the clusters based on first-hand knowledge of most of the churches in the sample. After analyzing the results of this evaluation, I concluded that the fourteen congregations in Cluster 2 were “traditional” while the seventeen in the other cluster were “non-

traditional” churches. Important differences were identified between these two types of congregations after running cross tabulations and comparisons of means on key demographic and social and political orientation variables.

For instance, it was found that while 89 percent of the “non-traditional” Latino Pentecostal pastors had completed a Bible institute certificate or had an undergraduate degree or more, 79 percent of the “traditional” congregation pastors had done so. The results of other cross tabulations further confirmed the differences. For instance, while 50 and 37 percent of “traditional” and “non-traditional” Pentecostal church pastors, respectively, stated that the Bible is the word of God that must be taken literally. Then too, 50 percent of “traditional” church pastors claimed to be conservative religiously speaking, but only 27 percent of their “non-traditional” counterparts made such a claim.

Also, only 43 percent of “non-traditional” congregation pastors compared to 50 percent of the “traditional” ones stated that abortion is never acceptable. Finally, while 43 percent of “non-traditional” church pastors reported mainly speaking English at home and with friends, none of their “traditional” counterparts reported the same.

Therefore, cluster analysis clearly produced two fairly distinctive types of Pentecostal congregations, “traditional” (Cluster 2) and “non-traditional” (Cluster 1). Of relevance is the fact that 55 percent of congregations were found to be “non-traditional.” In other words, “traditional” Latino Pentecostal churches were found to be in the minority. When all the “traditional” churches were analyzed based on their denominational affiliation and other qualitative knowledge, it was found that an overwhelming majority are classical Pentecostal congregations, the original Latino

Pentecostal church. This preliminary analysis hints at the fact that there are now more Latino Pentecostal congregations that are not classical in nature.

While inspecting these clusters, I concluded that three of the congregations in Cluster 1 (cases 2, 4, and 20) and three in Cluster 2 (cases 22, 25, and 26) were not similar to the other churches in their respective clusters. From first-hand qualitative knowledge of those congregations, it did not make substantive and empirical sense to place them in the cluster were they had been placed. The case 2 and 4 churches were found to be different than the rest of Cluster 1 churches because they were affiliated, for decades, to Church of God which in the Latino context is a very conservative and traditional denomination. The churches' pastors were also known for being very classical in their belief and practice. Case 20 was also found to be different than their peers in Cluster 1 because it is affiliated to one of the most conservative U.S. Latino Pentecostal denominations in Chicago. In fact, this church is one of the oldest Latino Pentecostal churches in the city (54 years of age) and has always been affiliated to the same conservative denomination. Its pastor is without a doubt one of the most conservative Pentecostal pastors in the city of Chicago. I proceeded to switch Case 2, 4, and 20 from Cluster 1 ("non-traditional") to Cluster 2 ("traditional") in order to reflect the qualitative knowledge of the congregations.


The Case 25 and 26 churches were also found to be different than the rest of Cluster 2 churches because they were affiliated from their very founding with Central American denominations that are well documented as not being classical in their belief and practice. At least one of them is a well-known Latino mega church (300 to 500 members) and it attracts large segments of the Central American middle classes of the

city. The Case 22 church was also found to be different than its peers in Cluster 2 because it has, from the very beginning, been affiliated to the Assemblies of God which in the Latino context is a fairly moderate denomination and not very classical in its belief and practice. The pastor is also known for his prosperity theology teachings. I proceeded to switch Case 22, 25, and 26 from Cluster 2 (“traditional”) to Cluster 1 (“non-traditional”) in order to reflect the qualitative knowledge of the congregations.

After having switched Cases 2, 4, 20, 22, 25, and 26, I re-inspected the clusters qualitatively, and I was satisfied that all the churches in the “traditional” cluster (Cluster 2) were indeed very similar to each other. However, a similar re-inspection of the churches in the non-traditional Cluster 1 showed that a handful of the churches included in that cluster (Cases 1, 10, 15, 18, 21) were not very similar to their peers nor were they similar to Cluster 2 churches. Cases 1, 10, and 15 are recently founded independent churches that trace their origins back to classical Pentecostal churches but they left their denominations due to irreconcilable differences. Their pastors are very young and highly educated and well known for getting involved in a variety of social causes. At least one of the churches has a sister church which is one of the largest Latino mega churches in the City. The other two churches share very interesting commonalities. First, they are both affiliated to conservative denominations; in fact, one of them is affiliated to the most conservative U.S. Latino denomination in the city. However, both pastors, who are highly educated (one of them having a doctorate’s degree from a well-known liberal Mainline Protestant seminary), do not align with their denominations’ beliefs and practices. Both are well known for their liberal stances and the causes they get involved in.

Five churches (case 10, 21, 1, 18, and 15) were separated from Cluster 1 and further quantitative analysis was conducted to verify if the pattern observed qualitatively could be confirmed quantitatively.

Figure 1. Dendrogram



Cross tabulation and comparisons of means were conducted to analyze education, political affiliation, and social, religious, and political perspectives of Pastors and congregants comparing the five churches isolated from Cluster 1 (“non-traditional” churches) to the twelve churches left in Cluster 1 (this after the three churches described before had been switched from Cluster 2 to Cluster 1).


The results of the analysis show major differences between the churches. In fact, while 80 percent of 5-church cluster pastors had a B.A. or more, 58 percent of the rest of the pastors in Cluster 1 had similar levels of education. Also, whereas none of the 5-church cluster pastors reported being religiously conservative, the majority (54 percent) of the rest of the pastors in Cluster 1 reported such a stance. The difference in political party affiliation was even more dramatic—60 percent of 5-church cluster pastors compared to 23 percent of the rest of the pastors in Cluster 1 reported affiliating to the Democratic Party.

In other words, there is no question that “non-traditional” congregations are significantly different than “traditional” congregations. However, “non-traditional” congregations also showed large variation among themselves. It was, therefore, found that the “non-traditional” category served as an umbrella for two fairly distinctive types of congregations, the “progressive” and “neo-conservative” types. Consequently, the final analysis produced three distinctive, although somewhat different than I originally hypothesized, types of Chicago Latino Pentecostal congregations: “traditional” (45 percent), “neo-conservative” (39 percent), and “progressive” (16 percent).

The Chicago Latino Congregations Study as a result of its qualitative data collection phase also collected in-depth data at one of each of these three types of

congregations. I conducted focus groups, performed participant observation at services and other events, analyzed printed documents about the congregation, and also analyzed literature they had for display or distribution. Although I originally thought I was conducting research at a “traditional,” a “progressive,” and an “activist” church (my theoretical typology of congregations), cluster analysis results confirmed (based on the cluster that each church ended up in) that they were a “traditional,” a “neo-conservative,” and a “progressive” church instead.

Figure 2. Icicle Plot



Legend: Neo = Neo-Conservative, Trad. = Traditional, Prog. = Progressive

As a result of the analysis, my hypothesized typology of Latino Pentecostal congregations underwent changes. Two types of congregations were confirmed (“traditional” and “progressive”), but instead of an “activist” type, a “neo-conservative” type was found (see Figure 2).

Overview of traditional, neo-conservative, and progressive churches. In general (more detail to be provided in the next sections), the results of the analysis show that “traditional” Pentecostal congregations are attended and pastored by very religious individuals that are also very morally conservative. However, they are also socially and politically progressive—much more so than expected! They are, generally, immigrant congregations where worship services and activities are mainly conducted in Spanish, and the majority of the congregants are women, poor, or borderline poor, and with relatively low levels of education. A large number of these congregations are affiliated to U.S. Latino or Latin American Pentecostal denominations and very few are independent churches. The pastors are more educated than expected both theologically through Bible institutes and secularly with undergraduate degrees.

“Neo-conservative” congregations, on the other hand, have a mixture of long-term immigrants and U.S. born Latinos (the overwhelming majority of the members are U.S. citizens), almost half of whom mainly speak English at home and with friends, and the congregation’s services are mostly conducted in English or bilingually. Surprisingly, the pastors are not as educated as would have been expected. Although they have the highest levels of theological education through Bible institutes, they have significantly lower levels of higher education when compared to “traditional” church pastors. Their

congregants, however, have some of the highest levels of higher education (if the “some college” education category is added) among all Latino Pentecostal congregants.

Although many “neo-conservative” churches originated in “traditional” congregations (they are now affiliated to U.S. non-Latino Pentecostal denominations (Church of God, Assemblies of God and others), U.S. non-Latino Evangelical denominations even when the church self identifies as Pentecostal (Swedish Evangelical Covenant, Christian and Missionary Alliance, among others), or are simply independent. “Neo-conservative” churches are almost as morally and religiously conservative as “traditional” ones, and are certainly more morally and socially conservative than “progressive” ones. In fact, they are also more conservative on some important social and political issues than their “traditional” counterparts.

“Progressive” congregations, on the other hand, are comparatively more progressive than their Pentecostal brethren morally, and are socially and politically significantly more progressive. What is revealing is that many if not the majority of “progressive” churches also originated from “traditional” ones. Most of the churches are independent or are affiliated with non-Latino U.S. denominations. The pastors of these congregations tend to be highly educated (in fact, two pastors have doctor in ministry degrees from a well-known liberal theological seminary in Chicago) and their congregants also have higher levels of education and income. Services are generally conducted in both English and Spanish, and both languages are spoken by congregants and pastors.

Surprisingly, although “traditional” Latino Pentecostal congregations are very morally conservative, they are generally socially and politically progressive, even more

so than “neo-conservative” ones. “Neo-conservative” churches are as conservative morally and religiously as “traditional” ones, and socially and politically more so. Only “progressive” congregations show some moral progressiveness, and significant social and political differences in comparison to both “traditional” and “neo-conservative” churches. However, I emphasize that “traditional” churches are not far behind “progressive” ones in several social and political issues. “Progressive” congregation pastors are by far the most educated pastors; almost all of them have a B.A. degree or more. All Latino Pentecostal congregations, without exception, are very religious with strong Bible beliefs.

The qualitative research conducted among the representative case study congregations seemed to hint that while “progressive” congregations, particularly their pastors, displayed a humanistic perspective of life and their role in society, “traditional” churches had a spiritualistic perspective. Whereas “progressive” pastors and even their congregants seemed to believe, as reflected by their discourse, that it is human beings that cause problems and fix them with the help of God, their “traditional” brothers believed that it is angels and demons that influence people to do what they do and God, after defeating the devil and his evil soldiers, fixes it—mainly supernaturally and sometimes through the use of his anointed. Research may show that both of these mind sets are operational at the same time, but certain types of Pentecostals emphasize one more than the other at a given time or place. The “neo-conservative” pastors and their congregants aligned more with what was observed with their “progressive” brethren than with “traditional” types.

Demographic Profiles of Traditional, Neo-Conservative, and Progressive Churches

Significance testing using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), Chi-Square (Pearson and Likelihood Ratio) was performed on all congregant and pastor relationships. All congregant relationships with the exception of having three or more children were significant ($p < .05$). Given the small N for pastors ($N = 31$) resulting in small cell counts, three relationships (age, gender, and U.S. citizenship status) were not statistically significant, but the rest were all significant at $p < .05$ with the exception of one (language) which was significant at $p < .10$.

The mean age of congregants at the three different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations is very similar ranging from 38 to 41 years of age. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test whether the age differences observed among different types of Latino Pentecostal congregants were significant. The null hypothesis (there are no age differences for the congregants of the three different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations) is rejected ($p = .025$). A similar pattern is observed with the gender structure of the congregations; women are the majority of the congregants ranging from 58 to 66 percent with “neo-conservative” congregations experiencing the highest point in the range and “traditional” ones the lowest. This was the extent of the demographic similarities among Latino Pentecostals in Chicago.

Among the churches, significant differences are observed on immigration and citizenship status, language, education, and the annual household income of congregants (Table 2). Whereas 25 percent of the congregants of “traditional” churches have some college education or more, 42 and 43 percent of those that attend “neo-conservative” and “progressive” churches, respectively, report the same. Even more important, while 75

percent of “traditional” church congregations report having H.S./GED or less, 58 and 57 percent of their “neo-conservative” and “progressive” counterparts, respectively, report the same.

The educational achievement of the congregants directly affects their annual household income. Therefore, while 39 percent of those that attend “traditional” congregations report an annual household income of \$24,999 or less, those numbers drop to 31 and 32 percent, respectively, for those attending “neo-conservative” and “progressive” churches.

Even more important is the fact that Latino Pentecostal congregations, particularly “traditional” ones, are still havens for the poor and disfranchised of society—still there after one hundred years. In fact, 25 percent of “traditional” church congregants report annual household incomes of \$14,999 or less and it drops to 23 and 18 percent for those that attend both “progressive” and “neo-conservative” congregations, respectively. On the other hand, 18 percent of “neo-conservative” church congregants report annual household incomes of \$50,000 and more (only 1 percent higher than “progressive” church congregants), which is three hundred percent more than the 6 percent of “traditional” church congregants that report the same annual household income.

These data are starting to paint a revealing picture of the Latino Pentecostal churches of Chicago. It shows that all Latino churches are the homes of women, the poor, and working classes, but it also reveals that both “neo-conservative” and “progressive” congregations although still having the poor and uneducated in their midst are also quickly becoming the home of the college educated and middle classes of the Latino

community. More important, these data confirm that “traditional” Pentecostal churches continue to be the home of the truly disadvantaged of the Latino community.

Table 2. Selected Demographic Characteristics of Latino Pentecostal Congregants by Church Type

Characteristic	Traditional	Neo-Conservative	Progressive	Total
Mean age	38	41	39	39+
<i>Percentage</i>				
Women	58	66	63	62*
Citizenship				
Undocumented	27	5	9	14*
Legal Resident	40	22	22	28*
U.S. citizen	31	73	69	58*
Household Income				
< \$15,000	25	18	23	34*
< \$25,000	39	31	32	22*
< \$50,000	94	82	83	86*
\$50,000 and above	6	18	17	14*
Education				
H.S./GED or less	75	58	57	63*
Some college plus	25	42	43	37*
Have 3 or more children	49	51	49	50**
Language at home and with Friends				
More or only English	4	30	27	20*
Only or more Spanish	79	48	44	57*
Both languages equally	17	22	29	23*
N	480	312	185	977

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007

*Significant at $p < .05$ for Chi-square test of independence.

**Significant at $p < .10$ for Chi-square test of independence.

+ Significantly different from an overall mean at $p < .05$

These data are starting to paint a revealing picture of the Latino Pentecostal churches of Chicago. It shows that all Latino churches are the homes of women, the poor, and working classes, but it also reveals that both “neo-conservative” and “progressive”

congregations although still having the poor and uneducated in their midst are also quickly becoming the home of the college educated and middle classes of the Latino community. More important, these data confirm that “traditional” Pentecostal churches continue to be the home of the truly disadvantaged of the Latino community.

The annual household income and education reported by the congregants of the different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations is directly related to their immigrant and citizenship status in this country. Whereas 27 percent of those that attend “traditional” congregations report being undocumented, this drops precipitously to only 9 and 5 percent for “progressive” and “neo-conservative” churches respectively. On the contrary, only 31 percent of “traditional” church attendees report being U.S. citizens compared to a very high 73 and 69 percent for those attending “neo-conservative” and “progressive” congregations, respectively. In fact, 30 percent of “neo-conservative” church congregants report speaking more English than Spanish or only English at home compared to 4 percent of those attending “traditional” congregations. In other words, “traditional” church congregants are generally recent Latino immigrants that are not well integrated into mainstream U.S. culture, while those that attend the other Latino Pentecostal churches are generally Latinos born in the U.S. or long term immigrants that are better integrated into this country’s culture. Several of these patterns were confirmed with the qualitative research. When the focus groups were conducted at “neo-conservative” and “progressive” congregations, it was necessary to do them mainly in English (“neo-conservative” church) or bilingually (“progressive” church) because the majority of the congregants could not fully participate in Spanish.

When looking at the national origin of those that attend the different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations, it is evident that the majority of “traditional” church attendees are of Mexican descent (58 percent), followed by those of Central American (20 percent) and Puerto Rican (9 percent) origin—these three Latino origin groups represent an amazing 87 percent of those that attend “traditional” churches. However, the distribution quickly reverses for “neo-conservative” and “progressive” congregations. “Neo-conservative” churches have 43, 23, and 14 percent, respectively, of Puerto Rican, Mexican, and Central American descent congregants. This same pattern is observed at “progressive” churches. Congregants of Puerto Rican descent represent almost half of Latinos that attend “progressive” congregations at 48 percent followed at a distance by those of Mexican origin at 20 percent and those of Central American descent at 12 percent.

A review of these statistics clearly shows that although there are some similarities among Latinos Pentecostals, particularly related to gender and age, there are significant differences among them in education, annual household income, immigration and citizenship status, language, and even national origin. In essence, Latino Pentecostal congregations are not as heterogeneous as might have been thought. They are either attended by immigrants (significant numbers of which are undocumented) with lower levels of education, many of which live on less than \$24,999 of annual income, mainly speak Spanish at home and with friends, are women, and of Mexican descent (“traditional” congregations) or are attended by Latinos that are almost exclusively U.S. citizens, many of whom speak more English or only English at home and with friends, live on more than \$24,999 of annual income, are women, have medium levels of

education and are of Puerto Rican descent (“neo-conservative” congregations). Latinos that attend “progressive” congregations are more similar to those that attend their “neo-conservative” counterparts than they are to those that attend “traditional” churches.

In other words, Latino Pentecostal congregations are hardly diverse religious organizations that mirror the diversity of national origin and the wide social diversity of the Latino community. Instead these churches seem more and more to attract national groups and social classes with a growing distinction between those that exist primarily to serve the needs of the truly disadvantaged and disfranchised of the Latino community (‘traditional’ churches) and those that focus on serving the needs of the working and middle classes, the upwardly mobile, of the Latino community (the “progressive” and “neo-conservative” churches, particularly the latter ones).

Further evidence of this disparity was found when I attended church events to conduct participant observation. Although all the churches were located in Latino neighborhoods, the “progressive” and “neo-conservative” congregations had comfortable larger facilities where they conducted services and delivered programs—both buildings were church buildings. The “traditional” church, although it owned its own building, was housed in a facility that had a rental apartment in the second floor and was in need of repair—it was in essence a storefront church. In fact, we had a hard time finding space adequate to conduct the focus group. Further evidence to underscore this was obtained when the make and model year of the cars parked at the churches’ parking lots was observed.

Do some of the same patterns observed with congregants also hold true with the church pastors? Because several of the pastor relationships were not found to be

statistically significant, the analysis of the results of those relationships does not allow for comparisons of the different types of Pentecostal pastors to be made (see Table 3).

However, the results clearly show that the overwhelming majority Latino Pentecostal pastors (84 percent) are male and although some variation among the different types is hinted it cannot be confirmed because gender was not found to be statistically significant. Having 16 percent women pastors is not a significant sign of equal sharing of power at the highest level in Latino Pentecostalism, but the number serves to illustrate the power spaces that women have enjoyed among Pentecostals from the very beginning—spaces that they presently do not even enjoy in many Christian traditions. In fact, both the “neo-conservative” and the “traditional” Pentecostal church case studies included in this dissertation were pastored by women, while the “progressive” one was pastored by a man.

When it comes to age, 60 percent of all Latino Pentecostal pastors are 50 years of age or younger. Although some differences among the various types of Pentecostal pastors are hinted by the data, they cannot be confirmed because age was found not to be statistically significant. What is clear is that the majority of Latino Pentecostal pastors are fairly young. An overwhelming, 93 percent, majority of Latino Pentecostal pastors report being U.S. citizens while only 2 percent report being undocumented. This is a major difference when compared with their congregants. What is really telling is that none of the “traditional” church pastors claim to speak more or only English at home and with friends in comparison to 46, and 40 percent of those that pastor “neo-conservative” and “progressive” congregations, respectively. In fact, 93 percent of “traditional” church pastors report speaking more or only Spanish at home and with friends.

Table 3. Selected Demographic Characteristics of Latino Pentecostal Pastors by Church Type

Characteristic	Traditional	Neo-Conservative	Progressive	Total
<i>Percentage</i>				
< 50 years old	57	64	60	60
Men	80	92	80	84
Citizenship				
Undocumented	7	0	0	2
Legal Resident	13	0	0	4
U.S. citizen	80	100	100	93
Education				
Some college or less	21	14	0	12*
Bible institute or diocesan lay program	43	64	20	42*
B.A. degree or more	36	21	80	46*
Language at home and with friends				
More or only English	0	46	40	29**
More or only Spanish	93	46	60	66**
Both languages equally	7	8	0	5**
N	14	12	5	31

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Surveys 2, and 3 (Pastor/Leader), 2007

Weighted to represent the population of pastors of Latino churches in Chicago.

*Significant at $p < .05$ for Chi-square test of independence.

** Significant at $p < .10$ for Chi-square test of independence.

A huge difference is also observed when the pastor's education is analyzed.

Whereas 21 percent of "neo-conservative" church pastors report having a B.A. degree or more, 36 percent of their "traditional" and 80 percent of their "progressive" counterparts

report the same. Namely, there is a significant education gap (almost sixty percentage points) between the education of “neo-conservative” and “progressive” church pastors and (more than forty percentage points) between the education of “traditional” and “progressive” congregation pastors. By far, the level of education is the largest difference observed among the pastors of the different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations in Chicago.

Surprisingly, “traditional” church pastors report having higher levels of education than their “neo-conservative” counterparts. Once the “some college” educational category is considered, “neo-conservative” church pastors significantly go up to 35 percent compared to 57 percent for their “traditional” counterparts. It seems, however, that “neo-conservative” church pastors have emphasized, by far, a Bible institute education more than a seminary one where higher education degrees are granted. Namely, 64 percent of “neo-conservative” pastors report having a Bible institute certificate compared to 43 and 20 percent of their “traditional” and “progressive” colleagues, respectively. Qualitative research showed that several Latin American denominations have, in the last ten years, started to send missionaries to open churches in Latino barrios in U.S. cities. One pastor explained that he was recruited to come to the U.S. once he had completed his seminary education in Central America. This may be the reason why “traditional” church pastors report higher levels of education than “neo-conservative” ones. The education differences observed should, at least in theory, result in differences in religious, social, and political beliefs and practice.

The differences among Latino Pentecostal pastors were confirmed through qualitative research. Both the “progressive” and “neo-conservative” case study church

pastors went back and forth from English to Spanish as they preached in the Sunday service. The “neo-conservative” church pastor preached in both languages doing her own simultaneous translation. Then too, the “progressive” church pastor has a doctorate in ministry degree from a well-known Mainline Protestant seminary in Chicago.

In summary, when the pastors of the different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations are compared on a variety of social and demographic dimensions, significant differences emerge particularly in education and the use of the English language. The differences are more significant between “traditional” congregation pastors and both “neo-conservative” and “progressive” ones than they are between these last two types. That is not to say that “progressive” and “neo-conservative” pastors are very similar, it is just that their differences are less marked than the differences with “traditional” church pastors.

The analysis up to this point shows that whereas the majority of Latino Pentecostal church congregants are women, the overwhelming majority of the pastors are men who pastor very young congregants with a mean age of 39. More important, there is a very significant education gap between the congregants and the pastors of “progressive” congregations, a pattern that is not completely replicated at “traditional” and “neo-conservative” churches. This same pattern is repeated with immigrant and citizenship status where there is a significant U.S. citizenship gap between the pastors of “traditional” congregations and that of their congregants (93 versus 58 percent). In other words, at least at “traditional” congregations, whereas the pastor is a long term immigrant or U.S. born citizen, the majority of the congregation is either undocumented or documented but more recently arrived in the United States.

The education gap between “progressive” church pastors and their congregants does not seem to have been a major barrier. A congregant from one of these churches indicated that she thinks the church has grown significantly in the last few years because “you are accepted just the way you are, your opinion really counts in this church. At the same time, our pastor teaches at a level that we can all understand.” The same lady added that “he does not use a lot of technical terms and whenever he does he explains them in a way you can understand. He uses a lot of examples; he uses himself as an example which teaches me that he is just the same as me.”

Religiosity, Social, and Political Profiles of Traditional, Neo-Conservative, and Progressive Churches

An analysis of the different Latino Pentecostal congregations’ attendees and their pastors as it relates to religious, social, political, and moral issues also illustrates significant differences among the different types of congregations. Results of significance testing show that all the relationships tested for congregants are significant at $p < .05$. Although most relationships tested for pastors were also found to be significant at $p < .05$, three of them (abortion, giving undocumented immigrants a path for legalization, and the U.S. intervention in Iraq) were not statistically significant.

Of major importance is the fact that while 54 and 50 percent “neo-conservative” and “traditional” congregation pastors, respectively, claim to be religiously conservative, the number dramatically drops to 0 percent for pastors of “progressive” churches (see Table 4). In fact, 40 percent of “progressive” church pastors claimed to be religiously liberal or progressive and none of the other pastors made such a claim. Similarly, although 54 and 50 percent of both “neo-conservative” and “traditional” church pastors,

respectively, believe the Bible to be the literal word of God, only 20 percent of their “progressive” congregation counterparts believe so. These numbers clearly demonstrate that both “neo-conservative” and “traditional” church pastors are fairly religiously conservative and that a huge difference exists when both are compared to “progressive” pastors. Even more interesting, however, is that “neo-conservative” pastors are more conservative, religiously, than their “traditional” church counterparts, albeit by only a few percentage points.

Table 4. Selected Religiosity Characteristics of Latino Pentecostal Pastors by Church Type

Behavior/Perspective	Traditional	Neo-Conservative	Progressive	Total
<i>Percentage</i>				
Religiously conservative	50	54	0	35*
Bible-literal word of God	50	54	20	41*
N	14	12	5	31

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Surveys 2, and 3 (Pastor/Leader), 2007
Weighted to represent the population of pastors of Latino churches in Chicago.

* Significant at $p < .05$ for Chi-square test of independence.

When it comes to moral issues, however, the differences among the pastors of the different types of Latinos Pentecostal congregations generally disappear (Table 5). The fact is that almost all Pentecostal pastors, regardless of the type of congregation, disagree with granting homosexuals the right to same-sex marriage. Only 20 percent of “progressive” church pastors agree with such a proposal (none of the other pastors follow suit) while 93 percent of “traditional” and 92 percent of “neo-conservative” church

pastors strongly disagree. When it comes to the abortion issue, only 45 percent of Latino Pentecostal pastors believe that it is never acceptable. I certainly expected the number to be higher.

As this evidence shows, when it comes to moral issues (others may call them social issues), there has been a significant liberalizing of beliefs in relation to abortion. However, almost all Pentecostal pastors continue to stand against homosexual marriage albeit with a little less opposition from “progressive” congregation pastors (60 percent oppose it).

The area where the majority of Pentecostal pastors, with the surprising exception of those of “neo-conservative” churches, show significant progressive perspectives is in relation to a gamut of social and political issues (see Table 5). For instance, 93 of Latino Pentecostal pastors, respectively, favor giving undocumented immigrants the opportunity to legalize their situation in this country. In fact, a leader of one of the “progressive” churches, talking about his pastor’s immigration views, clearly put it: “when it comes to immigration, this church following the teachings of the pastor is going to do everything necessary to defend those that are not fortunate to have their legal documents.” He continued, “I have seen the pastor cry when a brother has to leave the country [due to their immigration status]; he has gone to the City and other representatives to see what can be done for those brothers to stay.”

Furthermore, while 100 percent of “progressive” church pastors disagree or strongly disagree with the death penalty for individuals convicted of murder, 64 percent of “traditional” church pastors join them in that belief (in fact, only 7 percent strongly

agree or agree). Surprisingly, a mere 23 percent of “neo-conservative” congregation pastors disagree or strongly disagree with the death penalty.

Table 5. Selected Social and Political Perspectives of Latino Pentecostal Pastors by Church Type

Perspective	Traditional	Neo-Conservative	Progressive	Total
<i>Percentage</i>				
Abortion—never acceptable	50	46	40	45
Same-sex marriage—disagree	93	92	60	82*
Undocumented immigrants—agree to legalize	93	85	100	93
Death penalty—disagree	64	23	100	62*
Ordination of women—agree	50	69	100	73*
Gender equality at home—agree	93	77	100	90*
Iraq War—disagree	50	31	80	54
Politically conservative	64	62	20	49*
Democratic Party—affiliation	43	23	60	42*
Republican Party—affiliation	0	15	20	12*
N	14	12	5	31

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Surveys 2, and 3 (Pastor/Leader), 2007

Weighted to represent the population of pastors of Latino churches in Chicago.

* Significant at $p < .05$ for Chi-square test of independence.

The pattern of “neo-conservative” congregation pastors holding more conservative stances than even their “traditional” church counterparts also holds true for the equality of men and women at home. Whereas 100, and 93 percent of pastors from

“progressive” and “traditional” congregations believe that in the home men and women are equal and should share equally in all decision making that number drops considerably to 77 percent for “neo-conservative” pastors.

Although there may be some variation between the various types of Latino Pentecostal pastors when it comes to the U.S. intervention in Iraq, those cannot be analyzed because the relationship was not statistically significant. However, 54 percent of pastors disagree with the intervention.

With respect to the ordination of women, “progressive” pastors once again are on the vanguard of Latino Pentecostalism. Whereas 100 percent of “progressive” congregation pastors believe that women should be allowed to be ordained and pastor churches, 69 and 50 percent of pastors of “neo-conservative” and “traditional” churches believe the same. The ordination of women is the only issue where “neo-conservative” congregation pastors show relatively more support than their “traditional” counterparts.

When it comes to politics, there are also relevant differences among the pastors of the different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations. For instance, while 64 and 62 percent of “traditional” and “neo-conservative” pastors described their current stand on political issues as conservative, only 20 percent of “progressive” pastors did so. More important, 40 percent of “progressive” pastors identified themselves as liberal politically speaking while none of the “traditional” and “neo conservative” pastors identified themselves in that manner. Even then, 60, 43, and 23 percent of “progressive,” “traditional,” and “neo-conservative” church pastors, respectively, lean to or are solidly affiliated with the Democratic Party. The highest percentage of affiliation (leans to or are solidly) to the Republican Party was 20, which surprisingly came from “progressive”

pastors. This may, in fact, be as a result of the prosperity theology prevalent in several of these churches. The fact that the majority of “traditional” church pastors claimed to be politically conservative and still none of them had an affiliation to the Republican Party is outright puzzling. Even more surprising, however, is that “neo-conservative” congregation pastors once again, this time in politics, confirm their conservative inclination in comparison to those of “traditional” churches by affiliating a lot less with the Democratic Party.

The differences observed so far among the different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations do not hold true when political efficacy is analyzed. In fact, the pattern is reversed. While 60 percent of “progressive” pastors claim that their congregations have a lot of influence over local/city government decisions, 31 and 29 percent of “neo-conservative” and “traditional” pastors, respectively, agree with the same statement. Namely, “traditional” church pastors (closely followed by “neo-conservative” ones) feel the least power to affect local government. This seems to indicate that those that lead and serve the needs of the powerless may also feel politically powerless even though both “traditional” and “neo-conservative” church pastors are overwhelmingly U.S. citizens.

With a few exceptions and to my surprise, “traditional” church pastors come second after those of “progressive” congregations in their progressive, even liberal, stances on several key social and political issues. Even more surprising is the fact that “neo-conservative” congregation pastors, although assimilated to U.S culture, rank last on social and political issues. That is not to say that “neo-conservative” pastors are generally socially conservative; the results of the analysis simply do not support such a conclusion. They are, instead, conservative in some issues and progressive in others.

What is not arguable is the fact that “neo-conservative” pastors are politically more conservative than their “traditional” counterparts who claim to be conservative but ultimately in practice are not.

The analysis so far shows that when it comes to social and political issues there are significant differences among the various Latino Pentecostal traditions, at least as demonstrated by the perspectives of their pastors. However, the churches’ differences are considerably reduced when it comes to religious and moral issues. “Progressive” pastors demonstrate having very progressive perspectives in all aspects analyzed except in the issue of homosexual marriage where they are comparatively more progressive but conservative nonetheless. “Traditional” church pastors, on the other hand, have very conservative religious and moral views, but unusually progressive views on a gamut of social and political issues, even more so than their “neo-conservative” colleagues. “Neo-conservative” church pastors are without a doubt a lot less liberal than “progressive” pastors in religious and moral issues, and even appear to be the most conservative of all Latino Pentecostal pastors on several social and on all political issues with the exception of the ordination of women where they show more support than their “traditional” counterparts.

When the different Latino Pentecostal congregations’ attendees are studied, similar patterns are observed in relation to religious, social, political, and moral issues albeit with less variation than those observed with their pastors (see Table 6 and Table 7). A very high 84, 82, and 75 percent of “traditional,” “neo-conservative,” and “progressive” church congregants, respectively, believe that the Bible is the word of God to be taken literally. In fact, 80 of all Latino Pentecostal church congregants report

praying on a daily basis, while 55, 48, and 45 percent of “traditional,” “neo-conservative,” and “progressive” church attendees, respectively, read the Bible daily.

There is no doubt that the great majority of Latino Pentecostal congregants, with minor variation among the various types, are a very religious bunch. So far, significant gaps are evidenced between the religiosity of the congregants and that of their pastors. This is particularly the case with “progressive” Pentecostals.

Table 6. Selected Religiosity Characteristics of Latino Pentecostal Congregants by Church Type

Behavior/Perspective	Traditional	Neo-Conservative	Progressive	Total
<i>Percentage</i>				
Religiously conservative	24	31	23	26*
Bible-literal word of God	84	82	75	80*
Daily praying	80	80	80	80*
Daily Bible reading	55	48	45	49*
Weekly church attendance—once or more	94	92	89	92*
Very or extremely close to God	85	76	82	81*
N	480	312	185	977

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007

* Significant at $p < .05$ for Chi-square test of independence.

The pattern thus far observed with congregants is replicated with moral issues (for some people these are also social issues)—Table 7. Whereas 83 percent of “traditional” congregants believe that the moral teachings of the church are unchanging, 74 and 81 percent of “neo-conservative” and “progressive” congregants, respectively, believe so.

Furthermore, 79, 68, and 65 percent of “traditional,” “neo-conservative,” and “progressive” church congregants, respectively, believe that abortion is never acceptable. In summary, when it comes to moral issues, once again, the evidence shows that the differences among the various types of Pentecostal congregants are not that large. It can be safely said that the majority of Latino Pentecostal congregants is morally conservative including those that attend “progressive” churches. In fact, all congregants are a lot more morally conservative than their pastors particularly as it relates to abortion. Because the focus group results (for the “neo-conservative” and “progressive” church case studies) indicate that a significant number of the participants had switched from “traditional” churches, it is not surprising that all Latino Pentecostal congregants are religiously and morally very similar and very conservative. Although the “progressive” church pastor studied came out of a “traditional” denomination, he consciously and actively decided to depart from their beliefs and practices. It is important to keep in mind that both the “neo-conservative” and the “progressive” case studies (the pastors and many of the focus group participants) came out of “traditional” churches.

Like “traditional” and “progressive” pastors, their congregants hold progressive views on social and political issues. Namely, while 89 percent of “traditional” church congregants agree that undocumented immigrants should obtain legal status in the U.S., 77 and 82 percent of their “neo-conservative” and “progressive” counterparts, respectively, see it the same way. Almost 50 percent of all Latino Pentecostal congregants disagree with going to war in Iraq while no more than 10 percent agree with it. Whereas 88 percent of those that attend “traditional” congregations believe that men and women should be equal in decision making at home, 87 and 86 percent of Latinos

that attend “progressive,” and “neo-conservative” churches, respectively, agree. However, when it comes to the role of women in the highest spheres of power at the church, the pattern observed up to now changes. Namely, while 83 percent of “progressive” church congregants believe that women should be allowed to be pastors, it significantly drops for those attending both “neo-conservative” (62 percent) and “traditional” (42 percent) churches. It is surprising that “traditional” church congregants would hold such beliefs when out of all types of Latino Pentecostals, they seem to have the largest percentage, along with “progressive” churches, of women pastors. One of the focus group participants (conducted at a “neo-conservative church), a lady in her mid forties, when asked about her pastor being a woman answered, “I was very close to the other pastor that I had [a man] but I could never be as close as I am to her because she is a female.” A young lady added, “I tell a lot of people that my pastor is a woman, and they look at me and say “a woman,” like they never heard of it.”

There is no doubt that while the majority of Latino Pentecostal congregants are a very religious bunch, they also demonstrate to be a socially progressive bunch. “Neo-conservative” Pentecostals congregants, however, lag behind “progressive” types except in disagreement with the War in Iraq where they are tied with “traditional” church attendees. “Traditional” church congregants lead in all areas, except in support of women’s ordination, and are closely followed by those from “progressive” congregations.

The progressive social perspectives of Latino Pentecostal congregants also extend to the realm of politics. An impressive 72 percent of “traditional” congregants claim to be affiliated (leaning or solid) with the Democratic Party while 71 and 69 percent of “progressive” and “neo-conservative” congregants make such a claim. Remarkably, only

14 percent of Latino Pentecostal congregants claim any affiliation (lean or solid) with the Republican Party.

Table 7. Selected Social and Political Perspectives of Latino Pentecostal Congregants by Church Type

Perspective	Traditional	Neo-Conservative	Progressive	Total
<i>Percentage</i>				
Abortion—never acceptable	79	68	65	71*
Undocumented immigrants—agree to legalize	89	77	82	83*
Ordination of women—agree	42	62	83	62*
Gender equality at home—agree	88	86	87	87*
Iraq War—disagree	47	47	44	46*
Democratic Party—affiliation	72	69	71	71*
N	480	312	185	977

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007

* Significant at $p < .05$ for Chi-square test of independence.

The analysis of Latino Pentecostal congregants provides a very telling and unique picture. On the one hand, these congregants are very morally and religiously conservative (81 percent of them claim to feel very close or extremely close to God most of the time), but, on the other hand, they are very progressive and liberal, with a few exceptions, in social and political issues. In order to assess how progressive Latino Pentecostal congregants really are in the larger religious landscape, the results discussed will be compared later on in this dissertation to those of Latinos and whites from other religious traditions.

A couple of important qualifiers are necessary at this juncture. Although all Latino Pentecostal congregants have the puzzling duality of being very conservative and fairly progressive at the same time (a phenomenon that is unusual for American religion with the exception of what is typically observed with African Americans), “traditional” congregants, with one exception—the ordination of women—lead the way in both directions. They are the most morally and religiously conservative and the most socially progressive, leading all others in affiliation with the Democratic Party, albeit by only a few percentage points. Second, it must be clearly stated that when it comes to social and political issues, only in the ordination of women, do “progressive” congregants show a significantly more liberal stance than their counterparts because in all other areas all Latino Pentecostal congregants are progressive with minimum variation in their stances.

These data also confirm the existence of a pastor-sheep gap among Chicago Latino Pentecostals. Pastors in general but particularly the “progressive” ones, are a lot less religious and morally conservative, at least based on their religious orientation, perspective of the Bible and abortion, than their congregants. A similar pattern is replicated in all social and political issues; however, congregants are found to be more politically liberal than their pastors with the marked exception of “progressive” church pastors. In fact, the difference in Democratic Party affiliation of the congregants and their pastors is an amazing 29 percentage points.

Given the findings of the analysis of Latino Pentecostal congregations and their congregants, how do they in general, but particularly those who attend “progressive” congregations, compare to non-Latino U.S. Pentecostals? This comparison should be enlightening at this point particularly because those that attend church more often in the

non-Latino context have been found to be more conservative than those that do not (Greeley & Hout, 2006). Andrew Greeley and Michael Hout's analysis in *The Truth about Conservative Christians* is very informative in addressing this question (2006). Their study very ably compares individuals from different U.S. Christian traditions on a variety of beliefs and practices. It includes the typical Mainline Protestant versus Conservative Protestant analysis, among others. What is unique to their study is the comparison of beliefs and practices of Pentecostals (white Pentecostals) with other Conservative Protestants.

The authors conclude that with very few exceptions Pentecostals are "easily the most conservative of Conservative Christians" (Greeley & Hout, 2006, p. 171). However, they do not vote the way they "should." That is, "one would expect...they would be more likely to vote for Republican candidates than Democratic in the presidential elections. In fact the opposite is the case" (Greeley & Hout, 2006, p. 171). The authors clarify that "it does not follow that the majority of them voted for Democrats but only that they were more likely to vote for Democrats than their fellow Conservative Christians" (Greeley & Hout, 2006, p. 171).

A comparison between Chicago Latino Pentecostal congregants and their white Pentecostals counterparts (as reported by Greeley & Hout, 2006) shows that the latter are a lot more religious and Bible believing as demonstrated by every variable analyzed. Namely, 80 percent of Latino Pentecostal congregants (75 percent of "progressive" ones) believe that the Bible is the word of God to be taken literally, and 73 percent of white Pentecostals believe the same. Whereas 49 percent of those that attend Latino Pentecostals churches (45 percent of "progressive" ones) read the Bible daily, 45 percent

of white Pentecostals do so. In fact, 92 percent of Latino Pentecostal congregants (89 percent of “progressive” ones) attend services once or more a week compared to 60 percent of white Pentecostals. And 80 percent of Latino Pentecostal church attendees (same percentage for “progressive” ones) pray daily compared to 78 percent of white Pentecostals who do so. Finally, whereas 81 percent of Latino Pentecostals congregants (82 percent of “progressive” ones) claim to be either very close or extremely close to God, only 57 percent of white Pentecostals claim the same (a proxy was used for this variable because the question asked was different—“working with God as partners”).

This analysis shows that if white Pentecostals are the super religious and Bible Christians of Conservative Protestants in the U.S. as Greeley and Hout (2006) conclude, Latino Pentecostal congregants are indeed the ultra religious and ultra Bible Pentecostals of U.S. Pentecostalism. What is really fascinating is that the same ultra religious and ultra Bible believing Latino Pentecostals are significantly more politically progressive than their white Pentecostal brethren (as reported by Greeley & Hout, 2006). Although the Chicago Latino Congregations Study includes a significant number of social and political variables on Latino Pentecostals, Greeley and Hout (2006), unfortunately, mainly analyzed politics (p. 171). It is important to keep in mind that voting for a political party candidate is not the same as affiliating with a political party, but this is the best possible comparison given the differences in the two research studies. Whereas 71 percent of Latino Pentecostals (the same for “progressive” ones) affiliate with the Democratic Party, the authors found that the majority of white Pentecostals do not vote for the Democratic Party. Instead the authors clarified that ” it does not follow that the majority of them

voted for Democrats but only that they were more likely to vote for Democrats than their fellow Conservative Christians” (Greeley & Hout, 2006, p. 171).

Although the comparison is not of Latino Pentecostals with white Pentecostals, but instead of white Pentecostals with Latino Pentecostal congregants, tentative conclusions can be made. Namely, Latino Pentecostal congregants in general, including the “progressive” types, seem to be a lot more religious and Bible believing than white Pentecostals. At the same time, they also seem to be a lot more politically progressive, including the “neo-conservative” types, than their white counterparts. Unfortunately, Greeley and Hout’s limited analysis of social and political variables does not allow for a more extensive comparison, but a trend seems to emerge. Latino Pentecostals congregants seem to be the ultra religious and ultra Bible believing Pentecostals with the huge caveat that they are socially and politically progressive. This comparison seems to confirm that Latino Pentecostal congregants have a distinctive duality that is atypical in the landscape of U.S. religion with the notable exception of the Black church and its followers.

What seems to be certain at this point is that all Latino Pentecostal congregations are socially and politically progressive with the “progressive” and “traditional” types leading the way and the “neo-conservative” types less so (the “neo-conservative” pastors were actually found to be fairly conservative in several areas particularly in politics). In other words, a split from the “legalistas” (“legalists” as many “neo-conservative” and “progressive” Pentecostals call those from “traditional” churches) has not necessarily resulted in a significant advancement of a Latino Pentecostal progressive agenda because “traditional” congregations—where a lot of the new types of churches originated—have

been documented in this dissertation to be already socially and politically progressive. Instead, it seems that the emergence of “neo-conservative” congregations, depending on the route they take as part of their evolutionary trajectory, may in the future cause a backlash to that progressive agenda to the detriment of the most disadvantaged in the Latino Pentecostal community.

What this research shows is that as Latino Pentecostals have become upwardly mobile with higher levels of education and income, and as they have assimilated to U.S. culture, some have taken the path of progressive religion while others (the majority of the new churches) have not done so as much. It may, in fact, be that “neo-conservative” congregations are still maturing before taking the leap into the “progressive” camp. On the contrary, these congregations may also be on the brink of taking the path towards conservative religion similar to non-Latino U.S. Evangelical and Pentecostal religion.

Several issues may actually contribute to help understand why so many Latino Pentecostal congregations have become “neo-conservative” instead of “progressive” types. The majority, of “neo-conservative” churches are recent arrivals (58 percent of the churches are 16 years of age or younger) and as such may still be trying to figure out their role and identity in the landscape of Latino and American religion. In their search for identity and resources, many churches and their congregants have engaged white Pentecostal and Evangelical denominations and individual congregations, the majority of which are conservative. Surprisingly, very few Latino congregations look at Black churches with their fascinating mixture of intense religiosity, conservative morality, and liberal politics as a model to emulate. Instead many “neo-conservative” church congregants and pastors listen to conservative Evangelical radio, read their literature,

attend their seminaries, enjoy their music, and even join their denominations. That is, a significant portion of “neo-conservative” church congregants and their pastors have become consumers of white Evangelical and Pentecostal religion and culture and have in so doing effectively distanced themselves from the U.S. Latino or Latin American Pentecostal movement and the social and political realities of their communities and even a portion of their own congregants.

“Neo-conservative” Latino Pentecostal churches and their congregants are, at least at present, more progressive than both white Evangelicals and white Pentecostals, particularly in their social and political views, but important questions remain. Although the evolution of Latino Pentecostal congregations will be extensively discussed later on in this chapter, several questions are relevant at this point. Will “neo-conservative” churches evolve into “progressive” congregations that advance a more liberal agenda that ultimately addresses some of the problems faced by the most disadvantaged? Or will they go in the opposite direction joining the American conservative Protestant status quo that contributes to perpetuating the system? Are “neo-conservative” churches simply a different type of Latino Pentecostal congregation that are more conservative than their brethren in some areas, but still generally progressive and will remain so in the future?

The answers to these questions are very important. The fact that a large number of Latino Pentecostals in Chicago are part of the truly disadvantaged and that the share of those that choose to join this religious tradition is increasing makes the evolution of Latino Pentecostalism an important social phenomenon to watch. Almost 20 percent of Latino congregations are already “progressive” types. Will these become “activist” congregations that proactively address the great structural problems of this society? At

least one of the “progressive” church pastors who was interviewed for this study identified himself as a “leftist.” That same pastor has been very active in the immigration debate and in an intra-racial dialogue among whites, African Americans, and Latinos. These are indeed encouraging signs.

Empowerment of the Disenfranchised

As it relates to social empowerment, has the rearrangement of the landscape of Latino Pentecostalism in Chicago, as documented in this chapter, resulted in significant improvements for the most disadvantaged groups in society? A closer look at the results of this study shows that women are still the majority of congregants at 62 percent for all Latino Pentecostal churches. All the types of Pentecostal congregations serve and are attended by significant numbers of working class people (39, 32, and 31 percent of congregants have an annual household income of \$24,999 or less at “traditional,” “progressive,” and “neo-conservative” congregations, respectively). Even more pronounced is the fact that 25, 23, and 18 percent of those that attend the same churches, respectively, have a household income of \$14,999 or less. Namely, a quarter of “traditional” church congregants are the poorest of the poor. When education is looked at, a similar pattern emerges. A very high 75 percent of “traditional” congregation attendees have H.S./GED education or less (58 percent of “neo-conservative” and 57 percent of “progressive” ones report the same). Finally, whereas 67 percent of “traditional” church congregants are not U.S. citizens, only 27 and 31 percent of those attending “neo-conservative” and “progressive” congregations report the same (see Table 2).

“Traditional” congregations have their hands full serving the needs of their own congregants. In fact, almost half of all congregants (similar to “neo-conservative” church

attendees) report that the church or someone in church helped them with food and clothing—this is 10 percentage points higher than what “progressive” church congregants reported. Similar numbers report that “traditional” churches or someone in it helped them find a job. Finally, 29 percent of those that attend “traditional” congregations claim to have received help to find housing (24 and 23 percent of “neo-conservative” and “progressive” church congregants report the same).

These data show that even though Latino Pentecostal churches in Chicago generally continue to be a haven for women (62 percent), the working classes (34 percent have household incomes of \$24,999 or less while 50 percent of families report having three children or more), the very poor (22 percent live on a household income of \$14,999 or less), immigrants (14 percent are undocumented) and the uneducated (63 percent have H.S./GED less), it eloquently highlights the fact that as congregations become “neo-conservative” and even “progressive,” they increasingly lose significant ground with the most disadvantaged groups of the Latino community (see Table 2).

It is very telling that although 27 percent of congregants at “traditional” churches are undocumented immigrants, the number drops precipitously to 9 percent at “progressive” and even more to 5 percent at “neo-conservative” ones. Whereas 25 percent of “traditional” church congregants have household incomes of \$14,999 or less—the poorest of the poor of the Latino community—18 percent of “neo-conservative” congregation attendees do so. This trend is pervasive among those that have lower levels of education. While 75 percent of “traditional” church congregants have a H.S./GED education or less that number drops significantly to 57 percent for “progressive” congregations (see Table 2).

Without a doubt Latino Pentecostal congregations continue to be attended by and serve the most disadvantaged groups in society—immigrants and undocumented immigrants, women, the working classes, the very poor, and the uneducated. However, as Latino churches become less “traditional,” (less classical) they also progressively lose touch with some of these groups. On the other hand, “traditional” Pentecostal congregations, faithful to a history of over one hundred years, continue to be the haven of the disenfranchised. In fact, this analysis suggests that as Pentecostal congregations evolve to address the needs of the upwardly mobile (the lower and middle middle classes and the college educated) of the Latino community, the “traditional” church consolidates itself more and more as the home of the truly disadvantaged. The problem is that “traditional” congregations are quickly losing ground in the Latino Pentecostal landscape of Chicago going from leading the movement just a couple of decades ago to becoming a diminishing minority at present.

Evolution of Latino Pentecostal Congregations

Both the quantitative and qualitative data generally support my original hypothesis that proposed that Latino Pentecostal congregations have taken an evolutionary path through time. In fact, a clear pattern is observed by studying the age of the different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations (see Table 8). Whereas 50 percent of “traditional” Pentecostal churches were founded 16 or less years ago, the number climbs to 58 percent for “neo-conservative” churches and 60 percent for “progressive” ones (See Table 8). In fact, the oldest Latino Pentecostal church in the sample that was studied was a “traditional” church founded 80 years ago while the youngest one was a “progressive” one founded just 2 years ago. In other words, although “neo-conservative”

and “progressive” congregations still have older congregations in the midst, the majority of their congregations are either new churches altogether or new churches that split from other churches or denominations in recent years as shown by their founding date. The qualitative information collected from the three case study congregations confirms this pattern.

Table 8. Frequency of Year of Founding of Latino Pentecostal Churches

Traditional	Neo-Conservative	Progressive
1998	1978	1998
1984	1927	2003
1926	1983	1991
1997	1993	1952
2001	1968	1970
1985	1991	
1975	1982	
1993	1997	
2000	1995	
1988	1998	
1995	1993	
1951	1990	
2000		
2000		

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 3 (Pastor/Leader), 2007

The “traditional” case study congregation is lead by an older woman pastor that was ordained by a conservative Latin American denomination over twenty years ago and

continues to be affiliated with that denomination. In fact, this congregation took over the building that was left empty when the original owner—one of the case study churches already discussed—left that denomination over doctrinal and leadership differences almost twenty years ago. The denominational leadership, all of them in their late 50s and 60s, accused the younger and more progressive leadership of the church of violating foundational beliefs and practices of “el evangelio completo” (the complete gospel) and tolerating behavior unbecoming to Pentecostal Christians.

Both the “neo- conservative” and one “progressive” case study congregations originated in a conservative Latin American denomination, probably the most conservative one of all. Both pastors grew up and later became youth leaders in “traditional” churches. They left the denomination fifteen to twenty years ago over “irreconcilable doctrinal and leadership differences” and founded independent churches that have remained so up to the present.

One pastor, who was ordained at the conservative Latin American denomination, immediately after leaving founded a “neo-conservative” congregation; she was followed by a significant number of people from her old denomination and continues to be a “neo-conservative” congregation. In a recent conversation she indicated that she had registered at a liberal seminary to complete her Master in Divinity degree. The other pastor was actually ordained at an independent “neo-conservative” congregation that had split from the same conservative Latin American denomination. He left his church to open a new “progressive” church.

The survey data also shows that some “neo-conservative” and most “progressive” Latino Pentecostal congregations emerged in response to and from a split with

“traditional” churches in Chicago (some “neo-conservative” congregations have from the very beginning been affiliated with U.S. non Latino Pentecostal denominations). In fact, 80 percent of “progressive” and 36 percent of “neo-conservative” church pastors reported switching or changing religious denomination or tradition and only 20 and 33 percent, respectively, reported being affiliated to a U.S. Latino or Latin American denomination. Although 40 percent of “progressive” congregations are independent, this drops dramatically to 17 and 7 percent for “neo-conservative” and “traditional” churches, respectively. By contrast, 43 percent of “traditional” churches are affiliated to U.S. Latino or Latin American denominations, and some “neo-conservative” congregations have from the very beginning been affiliated to U.S. non Latino Denominations. In fact, 57 percent of Latino “neo-conservative” Pentecostal churches reported being presently affiliated to non Latino or non Latin American denominations (only 21 percent reported being affiliated to U.S. Latino or Latin American denominations) and 64 percent reported never switching denominations before.

In other words, the split produced three important organizational patterns among Latino Pentecostal congregations. First, almost half of “traditional” and many of the “neo-conservative” types are affiliated with Latin American or U.S. Latino denominations, the norm in the past. When many leaders and their churches left, a large portion became independent congregations (this is particularly the case with “progressive” churches). But many also affiliated with non-U.S. Latino or non-Latin American denominations, mainly the “neo-conservative” ones. In fact, several churches affiliated with non-Pentecostal and non-Latino denominations even though the church is

still Pentecostal in its belief and practice—the Evangelical Swedish Covenant Church and the Christian Missionary Alliance are two good cases in point.

I hypothesized that Latino Pentecostal congregations would evolve from “traditional” to “progressive” to “activist” with an ever-increasing emphasis on community and societal engagement. However, the results of this research have shown that the “activist” church does not presently exist, at least not in the Latino context of Chicago, and it may or may not be the next stage of development for “progressive” churches. Given the contested nature of “progressive” congregations, resulting from the fact that many espouse prosperity theology and its emphasis on unrestrained materialism, individualism, and upward mobility (not necessarily the virtues of Christian leftists), the “activist” church, if it emerges, may end up being a small portion of the Latino Pentecostal universe, at least in the near future. One of the leaders of a “progressive” Pentecostal church, talking about her experience at another church where prosperity theology was taught, said “in those churches they focused on how you were dressed, what you had on, and they did not give freedom to the Holy Spirit to do with the brothers and sisters what he desired.” She added, in this church “they do not see how you come, if you have expensive clothes on, what matters here is that you come to receive from the Lord and that I did not use to feel at the other church.”

Furthermore, the unexpected progressive social and political stances of “traditional” congregations (to the point of rivaling those of “progressive” churches) contrasted with the “less” progressive stances of “neo-conservative” ones, particularly those of their pastors, make it necessary to rethink the evolution of Latino Pentecostal congregations. Instead of Pentecostal congregations necessarily evolving into ever more

progressive types, it may also be possible, this research suggests, that they evolve into less progressive churches (“neo-conservative” churches) that may or may not eventually become “progressive” types.

Given the fact that even “progressive” Latino Pentecostal congregations seem to lose touch with the truly disadvantaged in the Latino community (in the sense of attracting them to be members of their congregations) and that “traditional” congregations were found to be socially and politically progressive—a lot more than expected—and the haven of the truly disadvantaged, will “traditional” congregations ever take an active role in addressing oppressive social structures? Is it for them an issue of limited resources or of limited perspective?

Unfortunately, the systematic answering of these questions is beyond the scope of this dissertation. A lot more research, particularly longitudinal congregational research, is needed to effectively do so. What is clear is that the answers are central to help untangle the role Latino Pentecostal churches will take in society—to confront the social structures that afflict the most disadvantaged or to contribute to the perpetuation of those structures.

Summary and Conclusion

In this chapter, I discussed the need to understand Latino Pentecostal congregations and their congregants particularly focusing on the diversity among this very large religious movement in Chicago. In an effort to systematically study their similarities and differences, I proposed a typology of congregations: “traditional,” “progressive,” “activist.” Cluster analysis was then used to empirically test the proposed typology. The analysis produced a typology with two types of congregations—“traditional” and “non-traditional.” Further analysis of the resulting “non-traditional”

churches by use of a qualitative validation produced two types of churches (the “progressive” and the “neo-conservative” types) which were confirmed by use of cross tabulations and comparisons of means. In summary, the use of the methodology described produced three distinct types of Latino Pentecostal congregations: “traditional” (45 percent), “neo-conservative” (39 percent), and “progressive” (16 percent). In other words, the proposed theoretical typology was only partially confirmed by the empirical testing. Instead of an “activist” congregation, a “neo-conservative” one was found.

Because the majority of both “progressive” and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal congregations emerged from a major split that occurred within Latin American and U.S. Latino denominations, I argued that Latino Pentecostal churches have taken an evolutionary path. As a result, several questions beg for an answer. Will “progressive” congregations become “activist” ones and fight social structures in pursuit of social justice for the most disadvantaged segments of society? Will “neo-conservative” congregations eventually evolve into “progressive” ones or will they consolidate themselves as conservative churches that contribute to perpetuating the status quo? Are there two trajectories these congregations take, one towards progressive religion and the other towards conservative religion? Is there even another step of development for these churches?

With some exceptions, the new types of congregations discussed emerged from the “traditional” type. Consequently, it follows, I propose, that other types of congregations will eventually also emerge from those that were at one point the new types and little by little there will be more distance from the original type.

Because my ultimate interest is the empowerment of the most disadvantaged groups of the Latino community (women, undocumented immigrants, the poorest of the poor, and the uneducated) the answers to these questions are very important.

Unfortunately, tackling these issues is beyond the scope of this dissertation, and so further research, particularly the longitudinal type, will be needed to tease them out.

The comparison of the different types of Chicago Latino Pentecostal churches produced very informative results. What is truly remarkable is that at least in the Latino Pentecostal context, religiosity (particularly that of congregants) does not seem to be a good predictor of social and political beliefs and practice. With minor differences, all Latino Pentecostals, pastors and congregants, are intensely religious. Although 62 and 54 percent of “progressive” and “traditional” church congregants respectively (compared to 51 percent of “neo-conservative” ones) claimed to be religiously moderate or liberal, their religious practices do not at all support this. The fact is that church membership ranges from 80 to 91 percent for “progressive” and “traditional” churches respectively. As discussed earlier, similarly high numbers of Latino Pentecostal congregants report attending worship once or more a week and praying daily. In summary, all Latino Pentecostal congregants, regardless of the church type they attend, are profoundly and uniformly religious.

What is even more fascinating is that the ones that are the most intensely religious of all, the congregants of “traditional” churches, are also the most progressive in a variety of areas including the legalization of undocumented immigrants, equality of women at home, and opposition to going to war in Iraq. What was truly unpredictable is the fact

that 72 percent (the highest of any Latino Pentecostal congregant group) of those that attend “traditional” churches affiliate with the Democratic Party.

Whereas the higher levels of education, annual household income, U.S. assimilation, among other variables, may provide an indication of why “progressive” church congregants show progressive stances in key social and political indicators, a different set of forces may be operating to influence those that attend “traditional” congregations. Namely, it seems that “traditional” church congregants are pragmatists. They either do not let their intense religiosity get in the way of dealing with daily life challenges (they are the most religious and morally conservative Latino Pentecostals) or their religiosity fuels their progressive social and political stances. Because the majority of those that attend “traditional” churches are women, it is understandable why they want gender equality; because they themselves are immigrants and many of their family members and friends are undocumented, they also want legalization for undocumented immigrants. Finally, because many of their children and the children of poor and working class families they know are in the military, it is understandable why they oppose the war in Iraq.

Of significance is the fact that “traditional” Latino Pentecostal churches and their congregants have little contact with non-Latino U.S. Pentecostal and Evangelical churches and denominations. They are not assimilated to the U.S. Evangelical establishment and are strongly connected to other Latino congregations in the U.S. and in Latin America. That is, “traditional” congregations and their congregants seem to have a very indigenous mode of belief and existence and may, in fact, be operating with the

social and political liberal ethos characteristic of some portions of the masses in Latin America with their decisive turn to leftist politics in the last decade.

In conclusion, among Latino Pentecostals, particularly among those that attend “traditional” congregations, religiosity does not seem to be a good predictor of social and political beliefs and practices the way it is for other religious groups in this country (Putnam, 2000; Wuthnow, 2003). If political affiliation is used as the indicator, Latino Pentecostals that attend “traditional” churches are extremely progressive in comparison to their white Pentecostal counterparts.

Then too, the evolution of Latino Pentecostal churches from “traditional” to “neo-conservative” and “progressive” has not made any of those congregations and their congregants a lot less religious or Bible believers. What it has caused instead is for a new type of congregation, the “neo-conservative” one, to emerge as one whose congregants are as religious as all other Latino Pentecostals, but are socially and politically, in comparison to “traditional” churches, a little more conservative. This is a puzzling finding in itself because many, if not most, “neo-conservative” congregations originated in “traditional” ones. This is not to say that Latino Pentecostals that attend “neo-conservative” congregations are socially and politically conservative. The results of this analysis do not support such a conclusion. Instead, these congregants are progressive but at a diminishing rate particularly as compared to “traditional” congregations. Instead of becoming more progressive with education, higher income, and assimilation, they are becoming more conservative. That is really the case with “neo-conservative” church pastors who were found to be conservative in several areas, but particularly in politics. It is important to keep in mind that education generally has a mixed effect on liberalism—

education tends to increase liberalism, but education also increases wealth which in turn decreases liberalism.

More important of all, “progressive” congregations have emerged where pastors and their congregants are also religious, arguably less so than the others, but more progressive than all other Pentecostals—congregants but particularly pastors—on almost all social and political indicators. It is important to note, however, that there is a significant gap between the views and beliefs of “progressive” church pastors and those of their sheep.

The results of the analysis of Latino Pentecostalism in Chicago paint a fairly different picture than I originally hypothesized. The Latino Pentecostal landscape has indeed radically and irreversibly changed. Instead of being the majority, “traditional” churches are now only 45 percent of the total. The majority of churches is now a combination of “neo-conservative” (39 percent) and “progressive” (16 percent) congregations. What has not changed much is the religiosity of Latino Pentecostals; all of them are indeed, by every measure used, a very religious and Bible-believing sector of the Latino religious universe. However, Latino Pentecostals from “progressive” churches are experiencing a diminishing religiosity, particularly the pastors.

More important, it is very surprising that “traditional” church congregants and their pastors are a lot more progressive socially and politically than I originally hypothesized to the point that they are on all social and political issues (with the marked exception of the ordination of women) more progressive than their “neo-conservative” brothers and sisters. Once all social and political variables are analyzed, “progressive” churches, their congregants and pastors, lead the way in progressive perspectives,

followed by “traditional” congregations leaving the “neo-conservative” ones last. It is important to emphasize that all Latino Pentecostals, congregants and pastors, are socially and politically progressive (with the noted exception of “neo-conservative” church pastors) except that those that attend “traditional” congregations are more so than expected and those that attend “neo-conservative” are less so than expected.

Another important finding is that “traditional” not “progressive” Latino Pentecostal congregations are the haven of the truly disadvantaged in the Latino community. That is, although all types of Latino Pentecostal congregations have the disadvantaged among them, they only represent the majority of congregants in “traditional” churches and a diminishing minority in “progressive” and “neo-conservative” ones. It appears that even though “progressive” congregations may believe in addressing the plight of the disadvantaged, large portions of the disadvantaged have instead chosen to keep as their home the “traditional” Pentecostal church.

In chapter five I will discuss the typology of civic engagement I developed and extensively discuss the results of the testing of the relationship between the different Latino Pentecostal churches identified in this chapter and the different levels of civic engagement included in the typology.

CHAPTER FIVE

LATINO PENTECOSTAL CONGREGATIONS AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT Introduction

I start the chapter with a very brief theoretical review of civic engagement and civic engagement typologies, and a short description of how I apply this literature to Latino Pentecostalism. I then develop a theoretical typology of civic engagement and test how it relates to the typology of Latino Pentecostal congregations developed and tested in chapter four. I use descriptive statistics (cross tabulations and comparison of means) to analyze relationships between the types of Pentecostal congregations and different levels of engagement.

I developed a theoretical typology of engagement paying special attention to the work of several researchers that have specifically studied congregations (McRoberts, 2003; Roozen, McKinney, & Carroll, 1984; Kniss & Numrich, 2007; Wood, 1994), and those that have proposed typologies of individual civic engagement (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; Wuthnow, 1999).

I extensively discuss the results of this analysis and compare them to those obtained from Latinos in general (at a national level) and other U.S. Pentecostals. It is imperative to keep in mind, however, that there has been very little research conducted exclusively on U.S. Pentecostals, and that this limits the scope of any comparison. I conclude with a summary of findings, issues and concerns, and research questions needing further study.

Theoretical Considerations and Typology of Civic Engagement

One of the key questions this dissertation seeks to address is whether the evolution of Latino Pentecostalism from a landscape almost exclusively dominated by “traditional” congregations twenty years ago to one now dominated by both “neo-conservative” and “progressive” churches has resulted, or has the potential of resulting, in increased civic engagement.

Unlike other researchers (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; Wuthnow, 1999), I propose that engagement within the congregation’s walls is as important as engagement in the community and in wider society. In other words, I question the notion that somehow within the church walls engagement is really not “civic engagement” or is of lesser importance. I emphasize that although much of the effort of congregations and their congregants go towards self-maintenance and the advancement of their religious beliefs, a key focus of those beliefs, as some researches argue, is the advancement of social justice and the welfare of human beings (Cnaan, 1997; Cnaan, Boddie, & Yancie, 2003). A focus group participant discussing the role they played in the immigration marches in Chicago, a couple of years ago, mentioned that they were part of the organizing effort and the marches because it was part of what they had been taught biblically about social justice.

The addressing of social inequalities and injustice and the confrontation of oppressive structures is not only the mission of secular organizations and their members. The fact is that congregations, their leaders and congregants, are as capable and instrumental in confronting those as any other organization or group in society. The instrumentality of the Black church, their congregants and leaders, to the origin and

ultimate success of the Civil Rights Movement clearly exemplifies this point. Although it is important that churches form strategic partnerships and alliances with all kinds of organizations that fight for the same causes, it is also important to understand that community and societal change can be effectively caused through the church.

As a result of the racial and social class segregation prevalent in American suburbia and many city neighborhoods, and the flight of white churches (even those of liberal conviction) from the inner city, the social and geographical distances between the haves and the have-nots, the advantaged and the disadvantaged, have considerably increased. By necessity, then, the conviction and the act of socially engaging to address the needs of the disadvantaged requires a mediating structure capable of reducing those distances. In that sense, the local church with its community approach is not the most effective vehicle at reaching the needy on the other side of town unless it does so through partnerships with other churches or other types of organizations. Instead, a secular or a para-church organization with a wider mission and reach becomes the better channel for civic engagement. It makes perfect sense to join in membership, contribute financially, and even devote a substantial amount of time to these organizations—for they can be an effective channel for civic engagement.

However, because Latino Pentecostal congregations serve the truly disadvantaged of society inside their own walls and right outside their doors, within church engagement becomes an effective channel for civic engagement. Congregants of “traditional” Pentecostal churches do not have to go to the other side of town looking for the hungry, the exploited, and the outcast, nor do they have to use extra church mediating organizations to link them to the needy. They simply have to see who is sitting next to

them in the pew and they are likely to be staring at the disadvantaged in society. With so much need around them, their imperative is to start from the inside out.

Not only are the disadvantaged of society recipients of services at church but, as Verba and colleagues (1999) point out, they also get a unique opportunity to participate in the life of the congregation and in the process learn and practice civic skills. Both Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) and Wuthnow (1999) argue that the development of civic skills and the opportunity to apply them is very prevalent in Protestant congregations, even more so at the less structured ones. This is particularly the case at Latino Pentecostal congregations where there is a long and established tradition of using volunteers to run even the most complex of administrative tasks. Even when the church develops its organizational structures and secures a healthier budget that allows the hiring of paid staff (generally no more than one or two), church congregants are expected to actively participate in the design, delivery, and administration of church services, programs, and even full departments. When asked about leadership opportunities in the congregation and how the pastor would react to an initiative to start a new program, a focus group participant answered, “she’ll [the pastor] say go for it, what do you need, how long is it going to take, what are you waiting for, when do you want to do it?”

In other words, for the truly disadvantaged, engaging within the walls of the Latino Pentecostal congregation is really a training camp to learn and use civic skills that can be potentially transferred to the local community and the wider society. The question some researchers have asked is whether the transferring of skills and experience really occurs? Wuthnow (1999) found that Evangelical Christians are not nearly as effective as Mainliners in successfully making that transfer. They, in fact, are less involved in non-

religious organizations where those skills and experience can be instrumental (Wuthnow, 1999). I propose, instead, that the transferring of skills and experience beyond the congregation is only one of several possibilities. Another important possibility is the active use of those skills and experience in addressing community and social problems through church or para-church organizations' programs. To somehow assume that the joining of secular or extra church organizations is necessary to civically engage is to dismiss the fact that there are a variety of ways and means to engage in the resolution of the community's and society's problems. The church is one of those legitimate channels and it can be very effective at causing change for the collective good.

Consequently, I argue in this dissertation that an adequate typology of engagement should have at least three levels—within congregation, in community, and in society at large. That is, for Latino Pentecostals, many of whom are the most disadvantaged in society, engaging in congregations is not just a training camp to acquire and practice civic skills but also an effective means of addressing the needs of the community albeit one person and one community at a time. It is also important to keep in mind that Latinos, besides joining civic organizations, may also be getting involved in community through informal social networks and one-on-one assistance. That is, the lack of membership in civic organizations (so much promoted by Putnam and Wuthnow) does not necessarily equate to an absence of engagement. Instead, the mode of community engagement may, in fact, be an informal one.

I hypothesize that Latino congregations in Chicago all engage at the church, community, and societal levels. The question is not whether or not they engage at all levels. Instead, it is a matter of degree and priority, which is largely determined by both

social commitment and available resources. I use a scale to hypothesize the engagement of congregations. The scale goes from high level, the most engagement, to low level, the least engagement.

I propose that “traditional” congregations and their congregants mainly and intensely focus (high level) on within church engagement with moderate (medium level) engagement in the community and even less so in wider society (low level)—see Table 9. “Neo- conservative” congregations and their congregants also intensely focus on within church engagement (high level), and moderately on both community (medium level) and wider society. Finally, “progressive” churches and their congregants, on the other hand, intensely focus on within church engagement but at a lesser rate than their “traditional” and “neo-conservative” counterparts (high/medium level), and intensely on both community (high/medium level) and societal (high/medium level) civic engagement.

Table 9. Hypothesized Typology of Congregational Civic Engagement (N = 31)

Type of Pentecostal Congregation	Type of Civic Engagement		
	Within Congregation	In Community	In Wider Society
Traditional	High	Medium	Low
Neo-Conservative	High	Medium	Medium
Progressive	High/Medium	High /Medium	High/Medium

Note. The engagement levels were determined qualitatively and are meant to provide an idea about the intensity and priority each type of congregation gives to the various levels of engagement.

For disadvantaged segments of the Latino community that have not had the opportunity at work or in school to learn about civic engagement and to develop the skills

necessary to do so, within congregation engagement becomes a great first step and one of the very few opportunities available to them to learn the ropes that could potentially result in community and societal engagement (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). At church, people learn about public speaking, teaching, planning and running activities, programs and even full departments, conflict management, financial planning and budget management, and more importantly problem solving and decision making which are both based on a critical thinking foundation. Congregants, particularly those that get involved, learn about legal issues and some key characteristics of the “system” such as interfacing with City departments and other organizations. In other words, by getting involved in church, congregants are able to develop both the human and social capital that is so important to the individual’s success in the family and at work and is also instrumental in addressing community and societal problems.

Civic Engagement

I used cross tabulations and comparisons of means (Pearson Chi-Square and Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square were used for significance testing) to test the different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations against a variety of variables that were chosen to represent different levels of civic engagement.

It is very telling that although the average church congregant is fairly young, 39 years old (they could be doing other things with their lives!), a full 87 percent of all Latino Pentecostal congregants are members of their churches with little variation among the various types of churches (see Table 10). Furthermore, a remarkable 64 percent of all congregants report having a leadership role in the congregation and another 79 percent indicate they have helped organize an event at church often or sometimes. The

overwhelming majority of Latino Pentecostals (70 percent) report spending three hours or more a week in church-related activities. Given the low annual household income of large numbers of Latino Pentecostal congregants, an amazing 51 percent also report contributing from \$50 to \$200 per month to their church. Without a doubt the majority of Latino Pentecostals are very engaged in their congregations either as members, leaders, or assistants; they also spend a lot of time in church-related activities, and contribute significant financial resources. With the exception of the “traditional” Pentecostal congregation case study where congregants did not seem to be as hopeful and energetic, “progressive” and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal congregants seemed very “happy” overall. In fact, focus group participants expressed very positive experiences. One lady explained that “at my church it is not about what you wear or how you look on the outside, it’s about what’s inside, what you are going through, what you are dealing with. Let us help you build from the inside out.” A lady from another congregation indicated, “I like everything about this church, the sisters, it does not matter about your history, and they accept you for who you are. They are not trying to change anything about you, because they know it is not their job.”

An important trend is that those that attend “traditional” and “neo-conservative” congregations are more engaged within their churches, albeit minimally so, than those that attend “progressive” ones. Specifically, congregants that attend “traditional” churches report church membership at 91 percent (89 and 80 percent for those from “neo-conservative” and “progressive” congregations, respectively), leadership roles at 64 percent (64 and 63 percent for those from “neo-conservative” and “progressive” churches, respectively), and helping with the organization of an event, sometimes or

often, at 85 percent (78 and 74 percent for those from “neo-conservative” and “progressive” congregations, respectively). The majority of those that attend “traditional” churches (74 percent) also reports spending three hours of more in church related activities (75 and 60 percent of those that attend “neo-conservative” and “progressive” congregations, respectively, do the same). Finally, 56 percent of “traditional” church congregants contribute from \$50 to \$200 per month to the church—49 percent for those from “neo-conservative” and “progressive” congregations report similar contributions. In other words, although “traditional” church congregants, in general, have lower annual household income than their Pentecostal brethren, they contribute more. Even though they may be working longer hours to make ends meet, these same congregants also invest more time than their “progressive” church counterparts in church-related activities.

It is important at this juncture to discuss not just active participation but the meaning that individuals get from participating particularly if it is done in a context of “freedom” and “acceptance” as many “neo-conservative” and “progressive” congregants claimed their engagement to be. The focus group conducted among “traditional” Pentecostal congregants revealed some apathy towards involvement in church particularly from the younger participants. One of the younger participants in the focus group mentioned that, “I think parents are always on top of us to come to church, but it should be God that should make you go to church.” One of the church leaders added that the church imposes all kinds of rules on the youth and that is why “the denomination has experienced a large decrease in the interest and attendance of young people.”

Table 10. Selected Civic Engagement Behavior of Latino Pentecostal Congregants by Church Type

Civic Engagement Behavior	Traditional	Neo-Conservative	Progressive	Total
<i>Percentage</i>				
Church member	91	89	80	87*
Church leader	64	64	63	64*
Event organizing— sometimes/often	85	78	74	79*
Church activities--three hours or more weekly	74	75	60	70*
Monthly contribution--\$50 to \$200	56	49	49	51*
Outside of church volunteering—> once a month	57	48	54	53*
Helping needy in community—sometimes/often	80	79	74	78*
Helping someone find job— sometimes or often	82	80	77	80
Lending money to non family—sometimes or often	73	75	77	75
Voted in 2004 election	75	74	77	75**
Attend political party events— sometimes or often	11	13	20	15*
N	480/150 ^a	312/227	185/128	977/505

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007

a. Only U.S. citizens were analyzed both for voting and attendance to political party events.

* Significant at $p < .05$ for Chi-square test of independence.

** Significant at $p < .10$ for Chi-square test of independence.

The civic engagement analysis so far has shown that all Latino Pentecostals are intensely engaged within the walls of their congregations and that those that attend “traditional” and “neo-conservative” congregations are particularly engaged while those that attend “progressive” churches are less so mainly as it pertains to church membership,

number of hours invested in church related activities on a weekly basis, and assisting in organizing church events. However, both from the participant observation and the focus groups it was clear to the researchers that there was a sense of freedom, desire to participate, to be part of the organization, pride of belonging, and meaning in both “neo-conservative” and “progressive” churches, but that was not observed at the “traditional” church studied.

Given the amount of time and financial resources invested inside the walls of the church, do congregations and their congregants also get involved beyond the walls of the church in their surrounding communities? This research shows that Latino Pentecostal churches, pastors and congregants, all get involved in the community (Table 10 and Table 11).

The congregation itself makes a variety of programs and services available for congregants and community members. Besides benefiting the congregants as recipients of services, it also provides them with an opportunity to actively participate in the delivery of a gamut of those services. On average Latino Pentecostal churches offer 28 programs and services for church and community members. Because this relationship was not statistically significant, it is not possible to quantitatively analyze differences among the various types of churches. However, due to the average size of “neo-conservative” congregations (54 percent of “neo-conservative” churches have 151 members or more, and 29 and 0 percent of “traditional” and “progressive” churches, respectively, boast of that), it was expected that they would have had many more services than the other types. Interviews with the pastors and leaders of the congregations show that that “progressive” churches place a significant emphasis on programming and

services. This is not the case with “neo-conservative” churches, which, though typically larger than their “progressive” counterparts, offer fewer services and programs.

Table 11. Selected Civic Engagement Behavior of Latino Pentecostal Churches and Pastors by Church Type

Civic Engagement Behavior	Traditional	Neo-Conservative	Progressive	Total
# of church programs for church and community members	25	29	31	28
# of organizing/advocacy issues the church is involved in	5	3	6	5
<i>Percentage of Pastors</i>				
Contacted public representative	71	85	80	79
Signed a petition	27	39	60	42
Hold membership in 4 or more associations/organizations	36	85	100	74
Voted in 2000 election	72	92	100	88*
Participated in direct action	20	0	40	20
N	14	12	5	31

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Surveys 2, and 3 (Pastor/Leader), 2007
Weighted to represent the population of pastors of Latino churches in Chicago.

*Significant at $p < .05$ for Chi-square test of independence.

How formal are the programs and services offered for church and community members? The qualitative research revealed that Latino Pentecostal churches in general, but particularly “progressive” and “neo-conservative” churches offer a variety of fairly formal services and programs. In fact, some of the churches did so much that when asked if they volunteered through non-religious organizations, one of the participants said “we get ourselves involved in everything; we seriously don’t have time with everything we do here.”

An analysis of the nature and number of specific services offered hints at the formality, volume, and target audience of the services and programs offered. There are important differences among the various Latino Pentecostal congregations particularly related to the audience they target. Namely, “progressive” congregations lead the way in the provision of community services at an average of 3 programs (1.7 and 2.1 for “traditional” and “neo-conservative” churches, respectively), health services at 5.2 (3.2 and 4.0 for “traditional” and “neo-conservative” churches respectively), and services for low-income people at 4.2 (3.4 and 3.7 for “traditional” and “neo-conservative” churches, respectively). Despite their size, “progressive” congregations also lead all Latino Pentecostal congregations in programs and services for adults and families, children and youth, cultural, and educational and job services. In fact, of the eleven categories measured, “progressive” congregations lead in seven while “traditional” ones lead in two (programs and services for seniors and for immigrants), and “neo-conservative” ones only lead in two (programs and services for international causes and for economic development and housing issues).

These results indicate that “progressive” congregations lead the way in programming and services, and they particularly focus on those that not only serve congregants but more importantly serve the community at large. In fact, one of the leaders of a “progressive” congregation put it very clearly when she stated that “the vision that we all share in this church is to go to the community; staying within the four walls of the church is worthless.” She added “God has placed us here together to do great things for God and for the community. We are not here for ourselves, if anyone needs us, we are going to be there for them.”

Although “traditional” congregations trail “neo-conservative” ones in the number of services and programs offered, they (besides being the main provider of programs and services in two categories) lead “neo-conservative” churches in three categories—educational and job services, services for immigrants and services for seniors—while being tied with them on services for adults and families. This is indeed remarkable because “traditional” congregations, in general, have a lot less resources than all other Latino Pentecostal churches. To my surprise, 36 percent of “traditional” congregations have annual budgets of \$30,999 or less and none have budgets over \$100,999. On the other hand, 23 percent of “neo-conservative” congregations have annual budgets of \$100,999 or higher and none have annual budgets of \$30,999 or less.

Also remarkable is the fact that although “progressive” congregations offer more programs and services than “neo-conservative” ones, 40 percent of “progressive” congregations have annual budgets of \$50,999 or less while none of the “neo-conservative” churches fall in that category. In other words, given the size and budget of the different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations, “progressive” and “traditional” congregations lead the way in services and programs for congregants and the community. “Neo-conservative” congregations do not provide nearly as many services and programs given their size, their annual budgets, and their human resources.

There are also other ways that Latino Pentecostal congregations engage the communities around them. They also get involved by themselves or in partnership with other organizations in addressing important community issues. On average, Latino Pentecostal churches are involved on five organizing or advocacy issues.

The results of qualitative research have also shown that although “neo-conservative” churches may not have as many programs as “progressive” churches, they do share with them a deep commitment to serving the community. A “neo-conservative” church congregant, when asked about how important civic engagement was for them, stated that it is very important “because there’s less fortunate people and we’re showing them that we care, that there is a God up there that cares.” When asked about the church’s commitment to involvement in the community, a participant responded that, “she’s [the pastor] pretty much involved in everything, in every sense of the community.” He concluded that, “her [pastor’s] concern is the people out there and what is going on around us.” When asked if the church is supposed to be involved, another participant asked, “What would Jesus do?” Another followed and said, “He [Jesus] was the perfect example. He was not always around the high classes and the religious people; he really went to people and presented what he was all about.”

Unfortunately, the community commitment observed among “neo-conservative” and “progressive” churches was not observed at the “traditional” church studied. After discussing their food pantry, the participants were asked if there were any other ways the church and its congregants could get involved in the community, one of the participants responded that “where there’s a will there’s a way, it could be done but I don’t know we just have not done it.” When asked if there are needs in the community around the church, the same participant responded “there is, there is, and I just didn’t really think about that until now.” Another participant added, “I feel like we can do stuff but I think that the church is not that big enough...we do not have sufficient funds...”

Besides the involvement of the church as an organization, the church pastor as a representative of that church also gets involved in the community (see Table 11). When asked about attending a meeting regarding a social and educational issue, 68 percent of the pastors of report doing so. As regards signing a petition, 42 percent of Pentecostal church pastors had done so and another 79 percent reported contacting a public representative to address issues relevant to their congregations and community. When asked about their participation in community organizations and associations other than the church, 74 percent of church pastors reported participating in up to four of them. That is, when it comes to community involvement by Latino Pentecostal church pastors are fairly involved. It was not possible to analyze differences among the various types of Latino Pentecostal pastors because none of these community engagement relationships were statistically significant.

Are the patterns of community civic engagement documented of churches as organizations and their pastors also replicated among their congregants? Besides formally engaging in their communities by volunteering to do community service outside the local church, congregants also get involved informally (see Table 10). Informal engagement in the Latino community is as relevant as formal engagement. Through existing networks significant amounts of resources, financial and otherwise, flow to address community members' needs. Given the immigrant nature of the majority of Latino Pentecostal congregations and the role that networks play in immigrant communities, it is not unusual that those same networks are at play at churches affording congregants with an opportunity for civic engagement.

When congregants were asked about their volunteering outside the local church to do community service, 57 percent of those that attend “traditional” churches reported doing it more than once a month while 54 and 48 percent of those that attend “progressive” and “neo-conservative” churches, respectively, reported the same. Even more prevalent was the congregants’ reported informal involvement in addressing the needs of the community. While 80 percent of “traditional” church congregants reported often helping the needy in the community, 79 and 74 percent of those that attend “neo-conservative” and “progressive” congregations, respectively, reported the same. As important was the fact that 80 of Latino Pentecostal church congregants claimed to have helped someone, sometimes or often, find a job in the previous twelve months. In fact, one of the congregants mentioned, “when I worked at [department store], one of the members of the congregation got me started working there temporarily. I kind of was hesitant to apply, but he put in a good word for me, and I think that’s what helped me get the job.” Finally, 75 percent of church congregants reported lending money to non-family members sometimes or often in the previous twelve months.

In other words, not only are all Latino Pentecostals similarly engaged in their communities through membership and voluntarism in civic organizations, they are also very engaged in informal ways. The differences among the different types of Pentecostal churches are not very large; however, “traditional” church congregants lead in volunteering and in helping the needy in the community.

In summary, the results of the civic engagement analysis after looking at within church and community engagement practices of Chicago Latino Pentecostal churches and their congregants show that they are all very much engaged within their congregations

and that the different types of churches, led by the “progressive” ones, offer a gamut of programs and services to their congregants and the community. “Traditional” church pastors are not nearly as engaged as their “progressive” counterparts with “neo-conservative” pastors in between. However, “traditional” church congregants lead the way in community engagement closely followed by “progressive” and “neo-conservative” ones. When other factors such as the size of the congregation, its annual budget, and available human and other resources are taken into consideration, “progressive” congregations (counting both congregant and pastor engagement) are undoubtedly the trail blazers followed by the “traditional” and the “neo-conservative” types.

Finally, political engagement, which is emphasized a lot in the social capital and civic engagement literature (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady 1995; Schwadel, 2005; Wuthnow, 1999; McRoberts, 1999; Wood, 2003; Smidt, Green, Guth, & Kellstedt, 2003), is also important in the life of all Latino Pentecostal congregations in Chicago. In fact, 100 percent of “progressive” congregation pastors reported voting in the 2000 election compared to 92 and 72 percent for their “neo-conservative” and “traditional” church counterparts. Then too, 20 percent of Latino Pentecostal church pastors reported participating in direct action such as protests or rallies in the last three years. In terms of political efficacy, 60 percent of “progressive” church pastors believe that their congregation has a lot of influence over local/city government decisions, but this drops dramatically for “neo-conservative,” and “traditional” church pastors (31 and 29 percent, respectively) who believe the same.

Do the societal engagement patterns observed with the pastors of Latino Pentecostal congregations hold true with their church's congregants? Whereas 77 percent of "progressive" church congregants reported voting in the 2004 election, 75 and 74 percent of "traditional" and neo-conservative" church attendees, respectively, reported the same. Then too, of those that attend "progressive" congregations, 20 percent reported sometimes or often participating in political party activities in the last twelve months. That number drops considerably to 13 percent for "neo-conservative" and 11 percent for "traditional" church congregants. Given the large percentages of undocumented and documented non U.S. citizen congregants, the cross tabulations to test voting and political party participation only included U.S. citizens.

There is no doubt that "progressive" Latino Pentecostal congregations and their attendees are the most politically engaged by every measure analyzed. "Neo-conservative" churches come second helped by the engagement of their pastors, and "traditional" congregations come last, not far behind "neo-conservative" ones.

Given that 71 percent of registered Latino voters voted at a national level in 2000, the fact that 75 percent of Latino Pentecostal church congregants who are U.S. citizens (77 percent of "progressive" ones) voted in the last election, in 2004, is encouraging (Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation, 2004). Also relevant is the finding that while 16 percent of registered Latino voters nationally attended a political party meeting or function, 15 percent of Latino Pentecostal church congregants, who are U.S. citizens, in Chicago reported attending such events (Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation, 2004). In other words, the societal civic engagement behavior of Latino Pentecostal congregants in general, but particularly the behavior of the "progressive" Pentecostal

types, is either at or above the level reported of Latino registered voters nationally. This is an encouraging finding given the already discussed perspective of Latino Pentecostals as inward looking and other-worldly, not very concerned with the here and now.

The observed patterns of engagement clearly indicate that “progressive” congregations and their congregants are very engaged within the congregation (a bit less than is the case for “neo-conservative” and “traditional” churches). They are also actively engaged in their local communities by providing a variety of services and programs and participating in organizing efforts and other activities relevant to their communities. Finally, “progressive” churches and their congregants are also significantly engaged in the wider society as measured here by their voting record and their participation in political party activities.

“Traditional” congregations and their attendees were found to be most engaged within the congregation, and less engaged in their community and wider society particularly in comparison to “progressive” churches and their congregants. However, when compared to “neo-conservative” churches, “traditional” congregations and their attendees are a little more engaged within their congregation, in the surrounding community, and even in wider society with the exception of congregant participation in Political party activities.

Although these results largely confirm the hypothesized civic engagement behavior of Latino Pentecostal congregations (see Table 9), it also shows that I underestimated the engagement of “traditional” congregations and their attendees in both community and wider society. In fact, “traditional” church congregants are the most engaged both formally and informally. At the same time, there is no doubt that

“traditional” congregation pastors vote at lower rates than their “progressive” church counterparts and that their congregants also replicate that pattern, but “traditional” Pentecostal congregations concentrate a large number of the less educated and poor members of the Latino community who have traditionally been less engaged in politics regardless of their religion.

The conclusion, therefore, is that “progressive” congregations and their congregants are not just intensely engaged within their congregations but are also actively and significantly engaged in their communities and wider society—they were documented to have a strong commitment to the lives of their communities. “Traditional” and “neo-conservative” congregations and their attendees are very much engaged within their congregations and engaged in their communities and wider society to a lesser degree. In fact, “traditional” churches were found to be more engaged in the surrounding community and in the wider society (in voting) in comparison to “neo-conservative” ones. In other words, “traditional” churches and their congregants were not found, as originally expected, to be the Latino Pentecostals that are the least engaged beyond the walls of the church. Although “neo-conservative” congregations were documented through the qualitative data to be very committed to the lives of their communities, similar to “progressive” ones, that was not the case with “traditional” churches. It may be, however, that “traditional” churches are more engaged in the community informally due to the strong immigrant networks they belong to and that the services offered are mainly for those that belong to the community of faith. Even if that is the case, it is important to keep in mind that “traditional” churches are typically places where the most disadvantaged of the local communities go.

Summary of Findings and Proposed Explanations

Table 2 clearly shows that a significant number if not the majority of those that attend “traditional” Pentecostal congregations have comparatively lower levels of education, are mainly women, are recent immigrants, and live on an annual household income that barely provide subsistence in an expensive city like Chicago. Furthermore, a very large percentage of these congregants are also the poorest of the poor including undocumented immigrants that do not speak English or barely get by. This means that the “traditional” Pentecostal congregation is in itself a place where the needy and disadvantaged go seeking assistance—many if not most of the congregants themselves are the needy and the disadvantaged from the communities surrounding the church. In other words, Latino Pentecostal congregations in general serve as a place where the needy get services and assistance, but this is particularly the case at “traditional” churches.

The evidence analyzed by this dissertation does not support the notion that “traditional” churches and their congregants are inward-looking and otherworldly. These churches and those that attend them do focus more on within congregation engagement but not exclusively so; they are still actively engaged in their communities and in wider society, albeit at lower rates than “progressive” churches and their congregants, and engaged in more informal ways. It is reasonable to conclude that “traditional” churches and their congregants may be more engaged within their congregations because of the immense needs of those that join them and the communities that surround them. Given their limited resources, providing for internal needs first and then for those of the surrounding community is a legitimate rational choice.

It is indeed remarkable that even with so many barriers and internal needs, and a cultural and political system that is not designed to integrate the truly disadvantaged (a system that is difficult to understand and navigate even for the native born), that “traditional” Pentecostals and their churches are that much engaged in their communities and wider society. It takes resources, human, social, and financial, to run programs and services for church congregants and the community. It takes time, effort, and know-how to organize and mobilize people for social causes. Given the “traditional” church’s limited resources (many of them cannot even afford a full-time pastor), looking beyond the walls of the congregation, it seems to me, is a sign of social commitment.

It is, on the other hand, understandable how and why “progressive” churches and their congregants are much more engaged in community and society. Higher incomes, higher levels of education, English language skills, U.S. citizenship and consequently knowledge of this society and its systems all give these congregations and their congregants a comparative advantage. These churches are better equipped to address issues that afflict them and those around them and to take advantage of the opportunities in their communities and wider society. Aided by healthier annual budgets, significantly more human resources and social capital, “progressive” Pentecostal churches are well positioned not just to engage within their congregations, but to also lead the way in civic engagement beyond the walls of the church. What is surprising, however, is that “neo-conservative” churches and their congregants are only as engaged within the church walls as “traditional” congregations are, and comparatively less so in community and wider society even when they have a significant resource and social capital advantage over both their “traditional” and “progressive” counterparts .

Conclusion

In this chapter, I discussed the need to understand Latino Pentecostal congregations and their congregants particularly as it related to their civic engagement practices. I proposed and developed a typology of engagement that included, besides the commonly accepted community and societal civic engagement, within church engagement. The argument is that for the disadvantaged in society (who are the majority of “traditional” church congregants and important portions of those that attend “progressive” and “neo-conservative” churches) within church engagement is not only a way to develop instrumental civic and organizational skills and civic engagement awareness, but it is also a unique opportunity to practice those skills while serving the needy. Discounting within church engagement as irrelevant or unimportant undermines how large proportions of the disadvantaged start their civic engagement careers. It also biases our understanding of civic engagement by simply focusing on the community and societal types when in fact many people may actually only get to those levels of engagement through the church or only after learning at church.

When the different types of Pentecostal congregations were compared to the chosen types of civic engagement behavior via the use of carefully chosen variables, it was documented that all Latino Pentecostal churches and their congregants are involved in all three levels of engagement. Instead, the difference was found to be the focus and priority given to each of the levels. While “traditional” churches and their congregants are very involved within their church, they place a lesser emphasis on community and societal engagement at least in comparison with their “progressive” counterparts. On the other hand, while “progressive” congregations and their attendees are also very engaged

within their churches (less so than “traditional” churches), they also very actively engage the community around them and society at large. Surprisingly, “neo-conservative” congregations and their congregants mirror very closely the within church engagement of “traditional” ones. However, “traditional” churches and their attendees are more engaged in community and in society than their “neo-conservative” counterparts once the issue of undocumented and non-citizen legal residents is taken into account.

It can safely be said that the emergence of “neo-conservative” congregations has not resulted in more community and societal engagement or a more progressive agenda. Instead, the opposite seems to be happening. That is not to say that “neo-conservative” churches and their congregants are conservative. In fact, all Latino Pentecostals and their congregations are fairly progressive, but in some key social and political indicators “neo-conservative” churches and their congregants (particularly their pastors) are more conservative than “traditional” congregations when the opposite, at least as hypothesized, was expected (see chapter four). What is not in question is the commitment “neo-conservative” congregations, at least as documented though the case study, have to their local communities, a commitment that was only surpassed by “progressive” churches.

What is surprising is how engaged “traditional” congregations are given their limited human, social, and financial resources. These churches and their congregants are still fairly engaged in community and society even when they have their hands full serving the multifaceted needs of their own congregants who also happen to be some of the most disadvantaged of the Latino community. It is important to mention, however, that the results of the “traditional” church case study showed involvement in the community but more through informal and individual means than organizational ones.

Even then, the fact is that the truly disadvantaged have chosen “traditional” Latino Pentecostal churches to serve and to be served by and not “progressive” congregations as might have been expected.

In chapter six, I will analyze and discuss the effects of the various types of Latino Pentecostal congregations on their congregants’ civic engagement behavior. I will use the typology of engagement developed in this chapter—church, community, and society—to test if congregants that attend different types of congregations are more or less likely to get involved in different forms of engagement.

CHAPTER SIX

LATINO PENTECOSTAL CONGREGANTS AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT Introduction

In this chapter, using the typologies of Latino Pentecostal congregations and civic engagement developed in chapters four and five, I analyze the factors that contribute to the understanding of different modes of congregant civic engagement. I am particularly interested in studying if and how the type of Pentecostal church the individual attends affects his or her civic engagement behavior. The same variables used to study congregational civic engagement in the previous chapter will also be used for congregants. The civic engagement typology already developed and tested in chapter five includes three levels of engagement: within church, in community, and in society. The results obtained in chapter five allowed us to conclude that all Latino Pentecostal congregations are engaged at each of the three levels with a difference in intensity and focus.

In order to build a model to understand the effect, of any, the type of Pentecostal church the individual attends has on his or her civic engagement behavior, relevant variables documented in the literature will be included as controls (Chavez, 2004; Greeley & Hout, 2006; Loveland, 2005; Schlozman, et al., 1999; Smidt, 2003; Putnam, 2000; Verba, et al., 1995; Wuthnow, 1999, 2004). Other important variables identified through the analysis of congregational civic engagement in the Latino context (chapter five) will also be added to the model(s). Finally, congregational variables will be added to

the model to test the effect, if any, the church has on the civic engagement behavior of its congregants.

I start the chapter with a very brief theoretical review of engagement keeping in mind that most of the civic engagement literature, including the one that looks at religion, has mainly researched individuals (as the unit of analysis) which may or may not later be connected to a congregation. In my case, however, the individual congregants were only studied because they were present at a church (congregation being the main unit of analysis) that was part of our stratified sample. In essence, the conclusions of this study can be widely generalized to all Chicago Latino Pentecostal churches, but conclusions about individuals can only be made about the congregants of those churches and not about Latino Pentecostals in general because I have a convenience sample.

Therefore, in drawing parallels in the literature, one must be extremely careful not to confuse how and at what level the data was collected. For instance, when comparing the voting of Latino Pentecostal congregants and that of national Latino registered voters one must bear in mind that the comparison is between “Latino Pentecostal congregants” and “national Latino registered voters” (two different units of analysis) and not “Latino Pentecostals” and “national Latino registered voters.”

I then proceed to create several models to test if the hypotheses proposed about the effect of the control and congregational variables on different types of civic engagement behavior are accepted or rejected. I use logistic regression (the binary type) to run all the proposed models.

I extensively discuss the results of this analysis, in light of the results and conclusions of church civic engagement discussed in chapter five, and conclude with a summary of findings, issues and concerns, and questions needing further research.

Theoretical Considerations

Although there is a considerable amount of research that has looked at religious individuals and their civic engagement (Greeley & Hout, 2006; Schlozman et al., 1999; Smidt, 2003; Verba et al., 1995; Wuthnow, 1999, 2004), very little research has analyzed the individual within the congregational context (Kniss & Numrich, 2007; Loveland, 2005). After analyzing the contextual effects on the behavior of individuals using hierarchical modeling with the United States Congregational Life Survey (CLS) national dataset collected by Cynthia Woolever and Deborah Bruce in 2001, Loveland (2005) concludes that “the missing theoretical step is to demonstrate that contextual factors of congregations influence the behavior of individuals” (p. 7). In a similar vein, Kniss and Numrich (2007) conclude that their research shows “the powerful influence congregations and congregational leaders exert on their members and affiliated constituents.” (p. 217).

Some research has specifically looked at the religious context and its influence on attitudes, particularly focusing on abortion and support for public figures, and has generally found that congregations influence the attitudes of individuals (Cook, Jelen, & Wilcox, 1993; Huckfeldt, Plutzer, & Srague, 1993; Jelen, 1992). Although attitudes and beliefs certainly influence the behavior of individuals, it is the study of the effect of churches on concrete civic engagement behaviors that is the missing link and still needs attention. More recently, Loveland (2005) studied congregational impacts on voluntary

association membership, community organizing, and evangelism and found that church networks (social ties) are important because they “serve as conduits of information about opportunities to participate in public life” (p. 137). The author concludes that the church context affects the congregants’ behavior and that “congregations matter, independently of personal characteristics, in the civic lives of their members” (Loveland, 2005, p. 135).

Therefore, there still remains much to be done in order to develop an in-depth understanding of how churches affect their congregants’ civic engagement behavior. I use what we presently know about contextual effects and apply it, in this chapter, to Latino Pentecostals in Chicago.

Models

Past research has found that several factors are important predictors of civic engagement. Putnam (2000, p. 67) documented that religiosity and education are key predictors, while others have found that gender, age, marital status, and income are also important (Chavez, 2004; Greeley & Hout, 2006; Loveland, 2005; Schlozman et al., 1999; Smidt, 2003; Putnam, 2000; Verba et al., 1995; Wuthnow, 1999, 2004). From the analysis of congregational civic engagement (the civic engagement of churches as organizations) conducted in chapter five, it seems that, in the Latino Pentecostal context, the citizenship status of congregants along with language, national origin, and whether they switched denominations in the past also matter.

As a result, the models I use to test the contextual church effects on congregants include as control variables the congregant’s education, income, age, gender, citizenship status, church attendance, language, marital status, national origin, and denominational switching (see Table 6.1). In order to test the specific congregational effect on the

individual, three other variables were added to all the models: the type of Latino Pentecostal church attended, the education of the congregation's pastor, and the church's denominational affiliation. The first contextual variable, type of Latino Pentecostal church attended, includes the three types of congregations found to exist in the Latino Pentecostal context of Chicago—"traditional," "neo-conservative," and "progressive." The education of the pastor was included because it was found, as I record in chapter four, that by far the most significant differences among the different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations was the pastor's education. Finally, the church's denominational affiliation was also included because the analysis in chapter five seemed to indicate that it plays an important role in explaining the civic engagement patterns of the different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations.

These variables, entered as independent variables, will be used to help predict changes in the different forms of civic engagement behavior (see Tables 12 and 13 for all variables included in models). Given the three-level civic engagement typology developed in chapter five, which includes engagement within the congregation, the community, and the wider society, specific models were developed for each of the levels. Each model tests the control and contextual effects on a specific civic engagement behavior. For the within church level of engagement (Level 1), church membership (Model 1), currently having a leadership role in the church (Model 2), and the frequency of helping organize an event or program at church (Model 3) were used.

The participants' civic engagement behavior at the community level (Level 2) was tested with community volunteering outside of the church more than once a month (Model 4), frequency of helping the needy in the community (Model 5), frequency of

helping someone find a job in the previous twelve months (Model 6), and frequency of lending money in the previous twelve months to someone outside the family (Model 7).

Finally, the congregant's civic engagement behavior in society at large (Level 3) was also tested. The specific behaviors to be analyzed include voting in the 2004 presidential election (Model 8), and participating in political party activities (Model 9).

Table 12. Independent Variables for All Logistic Regression Models (N = 977)

Independent Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Education (congregant)	2.16	.914	1	4
Gender (congregant)	1.39	.487	1	2
Age (congregant)	38.58	11.904	0	93
Annual household income (congregant)	2.14	.900	1	4
Citizenship status (congregant)	1.65	.751	1	3
Language (congregant)	1.54	.765	1	3
Religious switching (congregant)	1.39	.489	1	2
Marital status (congregant)	1.70	.459	1	2
Latino origin (congregant)	2.23	1.359	1	5
Church attendance (congregant)	.92	.268	0	1
Abortion perspective (congregant)	.27	.446	0	1
Pentecostal church type	1.70	.768	1	3
Denominational affiliation (church)	11.86	1.425	10	14
Education (pastor)	.36	.481	0	1

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007

By looking at each of the nine models individually, it will be possible to determine the effects of the control variables on the specific civic engagement behavior. More important, however, this analysis will show the existence, if any, of contextual church effects on each of the chosen congregant civic engagement behaviors. In the end, by aggregating the control and contextual effects (in the results discussion), a larger perspective of the effect on the general civic engagement behavior of Latino Pentecostal church congregants will be obtained.

Table 13. Dependent Variables for All Logistic Regression Models (N = 977*)

Civic Engagement Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation
Level 1: Within Church Engagement		
Church membership	.88	.324
Leadership role	.63	.482
Helping organize event or program	.80	.398
Level 2: Community Engagement		
Volunteering outside of church	.36	.479
Helping needy in community	.78	.413
Helping someone find a job	.81	.395
Lending money to non-family members	.75	.435
Level 3: Engagement in Wider Society		
Voting in 2004	.56	.497
Participating in political party activities	.14	.350

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007

*Only U.S. citizen Pentecostal congregants were used for voting in 2004 and participating in political party activities (N = 505).

Hypotheses. From both the literature reviewed and the descriptive findings of congregational civic engagement discussed in chapter five, several hypotheses can be proposed and tested (see Table 14).

Given that education was found in the literature and in chapter four to be a very strong predictor of civic engagement, it is expected that Latino Pentecostal congregants with higher levels of education will be more engaged in general than those with less education (Putnam, 2000). Relatively better educated congregants will be more likely to be engaged in the community (Level 2), which should be reflected in Models 4, 5, 6, and 7, and in society (Level 3), reflected in Models 8, and 9, due to a better knowledge and understanding of the “system.” Those with less educational achievement will be more likely to be engaged within the congregation (Level 1), reflected in Models 1, 2, and 3, as a result of familiarity and attachment to the local faith community and church network. Education should, in fact, rival Latino Pentecostal congregation type as the factor with the most impact on the civic engagement behavior of congregants.

Because Latino Pentecostal women were found to be the majority of the congregants and very active participants in the lives of the three case study congregations researched be it as leaders (two of the case study churches were led by women pastors) or assisting with the various activities and administrative functions of the church, it is expected that women will be more active than men at the congregational level (Model 1, 2, and 3). Women are also hypothesized to be more active than men at the community level (Models 4, 5, 6, and 7) because it can be argued that community caring is not a farfetched extension of the care work that women already perform in the family and at church; it is all caring for others.

Table 14. Hypothesized Relationship Effects (N = 977*)

Independent Variable	Civic Engagement Models								
	Within Church			Community			Society		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Education (better educated versus less educated)	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
Gender (women versus men)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-
Age (older versus younger)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Annual household income (higher versus lower)	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
Citizenship status (non U.S. citizen versus U.S. citizen)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		
Language (Spanish versus English)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-
Religious switching (switched versus not switched)	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-
Marital status (not married versus married)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Latino origin (Central American & Mexican versus Puerto Rican)	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-
Church attendance (once a week or > versus less often)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Abortion perspective (favor versus oppose)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pentecostal church type (“progressive” versus others)	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
Denominational affiliation (independent versus others)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Pastor’s education (B.A. or more versus less education)	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007

*Only U.S. citizen Pentecostal congregants were used for voting in 2004 and participating in political party activities (N = 505). Notes: + = positive effect; - = negative effect; 0 = no hypothesized effect. All variables are congregant variables, except Denominational affiliation (church variable), and Pastor’s education.

On the other hand, women are expected to be less engaged in society (Models 8 and 9). With so much time and energy invested in the family, at church, and the community (there may be a time ceiling), the realm of politics may take the least priority. It is also important to keep in mind that significant numbers of Latinos, particularly those that were born in Latin America, have also been deeply disappointed by the democratic system and its political establishment in their countries of origin which may, at present, negatively affect the political efficacy and participation of Latinos in this country.

Also, as household income increases, Latino Pentecostal congregants are expected to be more engaged particularly at the community (Models 4, 5, 6, and 7) and societal levels (Model 8 and 9). With an increase in household income, which typically results from higher levels of education, people have more at stake socially and politically but at the same time have access to other activities and pastimes that compete for time and resources with various forms of civic engagement.

Citizenship status is expected to have a mixed effect on the civic engagement behavior of Latino Pentecostal church congregants. Those who are recent and even undocumented immigrants are expected to be more engaged at the congregation and community levels. For one, they cannot vote, and are also not likely to be integrated into the political and social culture of this country. Given their knowledge of the culture, the system, and their high stakes in this country, U.S. citizens, on the other hand, are expected to be engaged at all levels particularly at the societal level. Because of the large percentage of non U.S. citizen documented and undocumented Latino Pentecostal congregants, it was decided that only U.S. citizens would be analyzed for Model 8 (voting) and Model 9 (participation in political party activities).

When it comes to language, the expected civic engagement behavior is similar to that of citizenship status. English language skills are pretty much a prerequisite for engagement in society while less so for engaging in the community. More important, the English language is not at all a prerequisite for engagement at the Latino Pentecostal church, especially at the “traditional” types, because services and other activities are mainly conducted in Spanish.

National origin is expected to produce very different results for the various Latin American national groups. Because there are by default no “undocumented” immigrants from Puerto Rico and they are birthright U.S. citizens, Puerto Ricans are expected to be engaged at all levels of civic engagement particularly in wider society. The exception may be those that attend “traditional” congregations as a result of a lesser focus on beyond-the-church-walls engagement. Due to their recent arrival and the larger numbers of undocumented immigrants in their midst, Mexicans and Central Americans are expected to engage a lot more in their congregations (Models 1, 2, and 3) than in the community. For the same reasons, they are expected to be the least engaged in society (Models 8 and 9).

Denominational switching is hypothesized to produce complex patterns of congregant civic engagement. Congregants that switched from other churches are expected to be less engaged at the community and society level than those that had not switched at all. As was documented in chapter four, in the last couple of decades there has been a significant defection out of “traditional” Pentecostal congregations and into “neo-conservative” and “progressive” types. These congregants may be more inclined to participate within the church and even in the community, but less so in society. On the

other hand, congregants that have never switched denominations and that are either new at their churches or have always been at those churches (particularly those that attend “progressive” congregations) are more likely to engage at all levels.

Although it is important to test the impact of the control variables to verify if the results of past civic engagement research are replicated in the Latino Pentecostal context, and to test the effect of new variables observed (qualitatively and quantitatively) through this study to be relevant to the Latino reality, the particular focus of this chapter is the study of the contextual church effects on the civic engagement behavior of congregants. Namely, the congregational variables in the model will allow us to verify, through the use of logistic regression, whether the church really has an effect on the civic engagement behavior of those that attend Latino Pentecostal congregations and if it does, how much and through which factors.

The type of Pentecostal church attended is hypothesized to show that those that attend “progressive” congregations are to be more engaged in community (Models 4, 5, 6, and 7) and society (Models 8 and 9) than those that attend “neo-conservative” and “traditional” congregations. Those that attend “traditional” and “neo-conservative” churches are expected to be similarly engaged in church while those who attend “progressive” ones less so. The type of congregation the individual attends should be the most important factor explaining, in most if not all models, the different forms of civic engagement.

With the evolution of Latino Pentecostalism and the emergence of new types of congregations, new denominational forms or lack thereof have emerged which, I propose, ultimately affect the civic engagement behavior of congregants. Namely, being affiliated

to a U.S. Latino or Latin American denomination is expected to increase the congregants' within church engagement and to reduce their community and societal engagement.

Those that attend independent churches, on the other hand, are expected to be as engaged within the walls of the church, but to more actively engage both at the community and society levels. Because of the independent churches' lack of connection with a larger religious organization, a denomination, they build relationships with organizations like their own and with community-based organizations. At the same time, this affords them the freedom and flexibility to plan and execute civic engagement interventions on their own, or in partnership with others of similar interests, and in response to the pressing needs they see around them.

Finally, through the qualitative and quantitative data of this research, it was consistently found that the education of the pastor is a very important factor for understanding the civic engagement practices of the congregation. Could it be possible that the pastor's education has a contextual effect on the civic engagement behavior of their congregants? After all, pastors, through their teaching, preaching, and actions, play a fundamental role in their congregants' socialization and the development of their social and political values. It is then hypothesized that the more educated the pastor, the more engaged the congregants will be in general but particularly at the community and societal levels. This factor should in fact have a large impact on civic engagement behavior when compared to the other factors included in the models.

The confirmation or rejection of these hypothesis, determined on the basis of the established civic engagement literature, the results of the descriptive analysis presented in chapter four, and the results of the qualitative portion of this study, should shed light on

the intricacies of the civic engagement behavior of Latino Pentecostal church congregants in Chicago. Their confirmation or rejection is particularly relevant for understanding the effect contextual church factors have on the behavior of their congregants.

Results

Logistic regression was chosen as the statistical method to test each of the nine models developed (one for each type of civic engagement behavior) and it is used “to predict a discrete outcome based on variables which may be discrete, continuous, or mixed” (Gaur and Gaur 2009, p. 121). There are two types of logistic regression (a form of regression) used by researchers depending on the dependent variable’s number of outcomes. Binary or binomial logistic regression is used for dichotomous dependent variables, while “multinomial logistic regression exists to handle the case of dependents with more classes than two...” (Garson, 2010, p. 1).

Logistic regression can be used to determine the “effect size of the independent variables on the dependent; to rank the relative importance of independents; to assess interaction effects; and to understand the impact of covariate control variables. The impact of predictor variables is usually explained in terms of odds ratios” (Garson, 2010, p.1). Instead of applying Ordinary Least of Squares (OLS) techniques, logistic regression uses Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) after transforming the dependent variable into a logit—the natural log of the odds of the dependent variable occurring or not (Garson, 2010, p.1).

Unlike multiple regression, interpreting the logistical regression coefficients is difficult (Bohrnstedt & Knoke, 1994; Gaur & Gaur, 2009). The values may vary from – infinite to + infinite. The positive value means that “odds are in favor of the event and the

event is likely to occur while a negative value indicates the odds are against the event and the event is not likely to occur” (Gaur & Gaur, 2009, p. 122). Bohrnstedt and Knoke (1994) conclude that a “coefficient can be interpreted similarly to a linear regression parameter, as long as you remember that the dependent variable is *not* a probability, but rather a logarithm of the odds of the two probabilities” (p. 343). For instance, being a Republican, holding conservative political views, and being white (all with positive coefficients) each increases the odds of voting for Bush, while being more educated (with a negative coefficient) decreases the odds of voting for him (Bohrnstedt & Knoke, 1994, p. 343).

Multiple regression analysis provides an exact R square, which tells how much of the variation of the dependent variable can be accounted by the variation of the independent variable(s), the strength of the relationship. Instead, logistic regression provides two approximations: the Cox & Snell R Square and the Nagelkerke R Square (Gaur & Gaur, 2009). Some procedures and goodness-of-fit tests are also available to assess the overall fit of the logistic equation to the data, or what is known as the model appropriateness (Bohrnstedt & Knoke, 1994, p. 344; Garson, 2010, p. 1).

Unlike OLS regression, logistic regression does not assume “linearity of relationship between the independent variables and the dependent one, does not require normally distributed variables, does not assume homoscedasticity, and in general has less stringent requirements” (Garson, 2010, p. 1). Garson concludes that the predictive success of logistic regression can be assessed by “looking at the classification table [and] showing correct and incorrect classifications of the dichotomies, ordinal, or polytomous dependent” (Garson, 2010, p. 1).

In summary, logistic regression was necessary for running all the models developed in this chapter because all the dependent variables (all the types of congregant civic engagement behavior) were dichotomous, dummy, variables.

The results of the logistic regression testing of the nine models are summarized in Table 15 (See also Appendices D through L). The discussion that follows will first focus on the results of the individual models and how the control variables and, more important, the contextual variables affect specific congregant civic engagement behaviors. The second part of the discussion will focus on the aggregate impact of the same variables, particularly the contextual ones, on congregant civic engagement behavior per level of engagement and then for civic engagement in general.

Based on the nine different models developed, the following null hypotheses apply:

Null hypothesis: Model 1. There is no association between the independent variables included and being a member of a Latino Pentecostal congregation.

Null hypothesis: Model 2. There is no association between the independent variables included and currently having a leadership role in the congregation.

Null hypothesis: Model 3. There is no association between the independent variables included and assisting, sometimes or often, in organizing an event or program at church.

Null hypothesis: Model 4. There is no association between the independent variables included and volunteering to do community service (outside of the church) more than once a month.

Null hypothesis: Model 5. There is no association between the independent variables

included and helping, sometimes or often, the needy in the community.

Null hypothesis: Model 6. There is no association between the independent variables

included and helping someone, sometimes or often in the last twelve months, find a job.

Null hypothesis: Model 7. There is no association between the independent variables

included and lending money, sometimes or often in the last twelve months, to someone outside one's family.

Null hypothesis: Model 8. There is no association between the independent variables

included and voting in the 2004 presidential election.

Null hypothesis: Model 9. There is no association between the independent variables

included and participating, sometimes or often in the last twelve months, in political party activities.

Of the nine models tested, all except Models 6 (helping someone find a job) and 7 (lending money to non-family members) were highly statistically significant (see Table 15). In fact, with the exception of Model 4 (helping the needy in the community) and 8 (participating in political party activities), all the models that were statistically significant were so at $p < .000$. Model 4 and Model 8, instead, were significant at $p < .001$. The p , probability value, tells us the "likelihood that the degree of statistical dependence observed in a sample is simply due to the luck of the random draw" (Kendrick Jr., 2000, p. 478). In fact, the lower the p value, the less likely it is that the relationship observed in a sample is a result of chance. By rule of thumb in statistics, to reject the "null hypothesis [the hypothesis of no association between variables] we have to reach the critical value of the chi-square associated with the .05 alpha level" (Kendrick Jr., 2000, p. 478).

Consequently all null hypotheses, except those for Models 6 and 7, are rejected due to the fact that there is enough evidence that demonstrates that there is an association between the independent variables in the model(s)—all the models have the same independent variables—and the dichotomous dependent variable that measures civic engagement behavior for each model. On the other hand, there is not enough evidence that demonstrates (the two models were not statistically significant at $p < .05$) that there is an association between the independent variables in Models 6 and 7 and the dependent variables and that as such the null hypotheses, one for each, cannot be rejected.

Table 15. Logistic Regression Models Results (N = 977*)

Model	Statistical Significance ($p < .05$)	Negelkerke R Square	Null Hypotheses
Within Church Engagement–Church Membership	.000	.210	Rejected
Within Church Engagement–Leadership Role	.000	.095	Rejected
Within Church Engagement–Helping organize event	.000	.138	Rejected
Community Engagement–Volunteering outside of church	.001	.078	Rejected
Community Engagement–helping needy in community	.000	.103	Rejected
Community Engagement–helping someone find a job	.108	.058	Not rejected
Community Engagement–lending money to non family	.086	.056	Not rejected
Societal Engagement –voting in 2004	.001	.138	Rejected
Societal Engagement–participating in political party activities	.000	.196	Rejected

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007

*Only U.S. citizen Pentecostal congregants were used for voting in 2004 and participating in political party activities (N = 505).

The analysis will proceed with seven out of the nine original models. Despite dropping two models because they were statistically insignificant, there are still three models to test the civic engagement of Latino Pentecostal church congregants within the congregation (Level 1), two models to test their engagement in the community (Level 2), and two models to test their engagement in society (Level 3).

Even though Model 6 (helping someone find a job) and Model 7 (lending money to non-family members) were not statistically significant, they tell us plenty about the community engagement practices of Latino Pentecostal congregants. Namely, not being statistically significant means that there is not a lot of variation among Pentecostal congregants when it comes to these two types of civic engagement. Congregants similarly perform these engagement behaviors. Chapter five showed that all congregants, regardless of the type of Pentecostal congregation they attended, were very engaged in helping someone find a job, and lending money to nonfamily members.

Model 1 is intended to verify not just whether there is association between the set of independent variables included in the model with being a member of a Latino Pentecostal church, but also to test which of the independent variables is statistically significant in that association (Table 15). The results show that not being married, being affiliated to an American, U.S. Latino, or Latin American denomination, and attending worship services once a week or more are all statistically significant factors ($p < 05$). Namely, this model reveals that a Latino Pentecostal church congregant who attends a church that is affiliated to an American, U.S. Latino, or Latin American denomination is positively and significantly associated with being a church member. In fact, the odds of

church membership are two to three times higher (factor of 5.008) for congregants in U.S. Latino denominationally-affiliated churches compared to congregants in independent churches.

At the same time, attending worship services at least once a week is also positively and strongly associated with church membership in comparison to not attending that frequently. Not being married, however, negatively and significantly affects the odds of being a church member as opposed to being married. In fact, the odds of being a Latino Pentecostal church member compared to not being one are multiplied by a factor of .532 by not being married rather than married or living together.

In other words, in the Latino context, regardless of the type of church attended, the congregant is likely to actively participate in that community of faith by becoming a member. As expected, the individual is also more likely to be a church member if he or she attends worship services at least once a week. Unmarried congregants, on the other hand, are also less likely to be members of the congregation. Although those that attend non-independent congregations might have been expected to be more likely to be church members, the increase in the odds of being a member of such churches is surprising.

Model 2 which tested the association of the independent variables with currently having a leadership role in the congregation produced very revealing results. Attending worship services at least once a week, speaking more or only Spanish at home and with friends, and the congregant's age were all found to be statistically significant factors ($p < .05$). It was found that speaking more or only Spanish at home and with friends was significantly and negatively associated with currently having a leadership role in the congregation as compared to speaking more or only English at home and with friends. On

the other hand, both age and attending worship services at least once a week are positively associated with having a leadership position at church.

The odds of currently having a leadership role are multiplied by a large factor of 2.915 if a congregant attends worship services at least once a week rather than not doing so. Then too, speaking more or only Spanish at home is significantly but negatively associated with currently having a leadership role in the congregation. In other words, the odds of currently having a leadership role at church compared to not currently having a leadership role are multiplied by a factor of .579 by speaking more or only Spanish at home and with friends rather than speaking more or only English at home and with friends. On the other hand, being older is significantly and positively associated with currently having a leadership role in the congregation, all other things being equal, when compared to being younger.

In the Latino Pentecostal context those that attend worship services at least once a week are more likely to have leadership roles in the church than those that do not, replicating the pattern for those that are older. The lack of English skills has been documented to reduce leadership opportunities at the workplace, but to find a similar pattern at church is surprising. It is through leadership opportunities, primarily, that individuals learn, develop, and practice civic skills. For the most disadvantaged sectors of the Latino community, not learning those skills at church means that they may not have other venues to do so.

The results of Model 3, which tested the association of the independent variables with assisting, sometimes or often, with the organizing of an event or program at church show that four factors were statistically significant at $p < .05$. Being a U.S. citizen,

attending a “traditional” Pentecostal church, having an annual household income of \$14,999 or less, and attending worship services at least once a week were all significant factors in the model. Being a U.S. citizen ($p = .008$), attending a “traditional” congregation ($p = .004$), and attending worship services at least once a week ($p = .000$) are positively associated with assisting, sometimes or often, with organizing an event or program at church. On the other hand, having an annual household income of \$14,999 or less ($p = .007$) is negatively associated with helping out at church.

The analysis indicated that the odds of helping out compared to not helping out at church are significantly improved (multiplied by a factor of 2.287) by being a U.S. citizen rather than an undocumented immigrant, controlling for all other variables in the model. As strong of a relationship was found with citizenship status. The odds of assisting with organizing an event or program at church compared to not doing so are multiplied by a factor of 4.406 by attending church at least once a week rather than attending less often, controlling for all the variables in the model. These results are really not surprising because those that attend worship services frequently tend to do so because they are invested in the church and by the mere fact of being present are more available to help out. The fact that undocumented immigrants are also less likely to assist with organizing an event or program in the congregation may be a function of the long hours many of them have to work to make ends meet. The low wages earned by the majority of undocumented immigrants in this country make it necessary to work two jobs or longer hours to barely survive. This is confirmed by the fact that the odds of a congregant with an annual household income of \$14,999 or less helping out at church are just .369 the odds of a congregant that has an annual household income of \$50,000 or more.

Table 16. Hypothesized vs. Actual Relationship Effects (N = 977*)

Independent Variable	Civic Engagement Models								
	Within Church			Community				Society	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Education (better educated versus less educated)	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+/-	+
Gender (women versus men)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-
Age (older versus younger)	0	0/+	0	0	0/+	0	0	0/+	0
Annual household income (higher versus lower)	-	-	-/+	+	+	+	+	+	+/+
Citizenship status (non U.S. citizen versus U.S. citizen)	+	+	+/-	+	+	+	+		
Language (Spanish versus English)	+	+/-	+	+/-	+/+	+	+	-/-	-/-
Religious switching (switched versus not switched)	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-
Marital status (not married versus married)	0/-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Latino origin (Central American & Mexican versus Puerto Rican)	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-
Church attendance (once a week or > versus less often)	0/+	0/+	0/+	0	0/+	0	0	0	0
Abortion perspective (favor versus oppose)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0/+
Pentecostal church type ("progressive" vs. others)	-	-	-/-	+	+	+	+	+	+/+
Denominational affiliation (independent versus others)	+/-	+	+	+/-	+/-	+	+	+	+/-
Pastor's education (B.A. or more versus less education)	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+/+	+

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007

*Only U.S. citizen Pentecostal congregants were used for voting in 2004 and participating in political party activities (N = 505). Notes: + = positive effect; - = negative effect; 0 = no hypothesized effect. Only models and relationships found to be statistically significant are reported in bold typeface. All variables are congregant variables, except Denominational affiliation (church variable), and Pastor's education.

Attending a “traditional” Pentecostal congregation also increases the likelihood of helping out at church so much so that the odds, controlling for other variables in the model, of helping out compared to not helping out are multiplied by a very large factor of 2.530 by attending this type of church rather than a “progressive” one. In other words, “traditional” Pentecostal congregations are relatively more inclined to provide civic engagement opportunities for their congregants even if that means helping out with the organizing of events or programs.

The results produced by the first three models, all of which focused on three separate dimensions of within congregation civic engagement—church membership, having a leadership position in church, and assisting with organizing an event or program at church—indicate that there are several variables that are important to understanding these types of civic engagement. Namely, frequency of church attendance was relevant to all models, while attending a “traditional” congregation, not being married, speaking more or only Spanish at home, being a U.S. citizen, having an annual household income of \$14,999 or less, being older, and attending a church that is affiliated with an American, U.S. Latino, or Latin American denomination were all relevant for at least one model. From these results, there is no doubt that frequency of church attendance is the most prevalent factor in helping explain within congregation civic engagement—those that are present can certainly participate. The other factors listed are also important but to a lesser degree.

While the first three models tested the civic engagement of congregants within their own churches (Level 1), Models 4 and 5 tested it at the community level (Level 2). Specifically, Model 4 addresses community volunteerism outside of the church more than

once a month. Speaking both English and Spanish at home, and attending a church affiliated with an American Pentecostal denomination were all found to be statistically significant at $p < .05$ for this model. While being both English and Spanish language dominant ($p = .000$) is positively associated with volunteering in the community, the association is negative if one attends a church that is affiliated with an American denomination ($p = .052$). That is, the odds of volunteering in the community more than once a month compared to not doing so are improved (multiplied by a very much larger factor of 2.362) by being both English and Spanish language dominant rather than just English language dominant, controlling for other variables in the model. On the other hand, the odds of volunteering in the community more than once a month compared to not doing so are multiplied by a factor of .583 by attending a church that is affiliated with an American denomination rather than an independent one. About 58 American denomination church attendees volunteer in the community more than once a month per 100 independent church attendees.

It is indeed very surprising that no other variable such as education, gender, and even citizenship status plays a significant role in community voluntarism among Latino Pentecostal congregants. Instead those that dominate both the English and Spanish languages and those that attend independent congregations are more likely to volunteer in the community more than once a month. Being fully bilingual may also be an added benefit to volunteering in the community because it allows for the interaction with larger numbers of people particularly if the volunteering is taking place at both Latino and non-Latino communities. At the same time, these results show that Latino congregations that

are affiliated to American denominations may put less emphasis on involvement in community, at least through volunteering outside of the church.

After testing Model 5 which focuses on helping the needy in the community sometimes or often as a form of community civic engagement, four variables were found to be statistically significant: age ($p = .000$), attending worship services at least once a week ($p = .000$), speaking more or only Spanish at home ($p = .054$), and attending a church affiliated with a U.S. Latino denomination ($p = .56$). All variables were found to be strongly and positively associated with helping the needy in the community. In fact, the odds of helping the needy in the community sometimes or often compared to not doing so are multiplied by a large factor of 2.653 by attending church at least once a week rather than not doing so. Also, per a one-year increase in the age of the congregant, the odds of the person helping the needy in the community (sometimes or often) are multiplied by a factor of 1.028, controlling for other variables in the model. Then too, the odds of helping the needy in the community sometimes or often compared to not doing so are multiplied by a very large factor of 1.986 by attending a church affiliated with a U.S. Latino denomination rather than in an independent church. Finally if the congregant speaks more or only Spanish at home, the odds of helping the needy in the community sometimes or often compared to not doing so are multiplied by a large factor of 1.660.

In other words, those that attend church frequently, more mature individuals (as demonstrated by their age), those that speak mainly Spanish at home, and those that attend churches affiliated with U.S. Latino denominations are more likely than other Pentecostals to help the needy in the community. Once again, religiosity measured in this case as attending church at least once a week, is very important in predicting the odds of

helping the needy in the community—a form of community civic engagement. It is very telling that the type of Pentecostal congregation attended (“traditional,” “neo-conservative,” or “progressive”) was not found to be statistically significant.

Both Models 4 and 5 specifically looked at the effect of the various independent variables on two different forms of community civic engagement, volunteering in the community outside of the church at least once a month, and helping the needy in the community sometimes or often. Both language and denominational affiliation were significant predictors for both models while age and frequency of church attendance were significant for only one of the two models. It is important to note that gender, type of Pentecostal congregation, education, and income were not statistically significant contributors in understanding the community civic engagement behavior of Latino Pentecostal congregants in Chicago.

Unfortunately, Models 6 and 7 were not found to be statistically significant. They both intended to test two important dimensions of community civic engagement—helping someone find a job and lending money to non-family members, respectively. These two forms of community engagement are very important for Latino Pentecostals because they represent informal dimensions of community civic engagement. As such, it is surprising they were not found to be significant, but as discussed before in this section, that may be a result of the fact that Latino Pentecostal congregations in general are similarly engaged in both types of engagement.

Finally, Models 8 and 9 are designed to test civic engagement behavior in wider society (Level 3). Whereas Model 8 looks at political engagement, considered by many as the ultimate expression of civic engagement behavior (Schlozman et al., 1999; Smidt,

2003; Putnam, 2000; Verba et al., 1995; Wuthnow, 1999, 2004), Model 9 tests the participation of the congregants in political party activities.

The results of Model 8 show that the predictors included in the model have an important impact on congregant voting behavior in the 2004 presidential election (Nagelkerke R Square = .138). Several predictors were statistically significant including the congregant's age, having less than a H.S./GED education, speaking more or only Spanish, and the church's pastor having completed a B.A. degree or more. Having less than a H.S./GED education ($p = .007$) and speaking more or only Spanish ($p = .043$) are negatively associated with having voted in the 2004 presidential election. On the other hand, the congregant's age ($p = .001$), and the congregation's pastor having completed at B.A. degree or more ($p = .097$) are all positively associated with voting.

In other words, the odds of having voted in the 2004 presidential elections compared to not voting are multiplied by a factor of .354 by having less than a H.S. education rather than a B.A. or more. That is, congregants with higher levels of education are a lot more likely to vote than those that do not have the same level of educational achievement. This is certainly not surprising because the same voting patterns are observed in the general public, whether Latino or non-Latino. Similarly, speaking more or only Spanish at home (which is a proxy for how recently the person came to the U.S.) is also negatively associated with getting involved in political party activities.

Furthermore, the odds of having voted compared to the opposite are also multiplied by a large factor of 1.548 when the respondent's pastor has completed a B.A. degree or more compared to not having completed that level of education, controlling for other variables in the model. Namely, the congregation's pastor having achieved higher

levels of education increases the likelihood of having voted in the 2004 presidential election. This finding is not surprising and is aligned with chapter four findings where it was confirmed that the pastor's education is by far the most important factor differentiating the different types of Latino Pentecostal churches. This time, it also appears to be an important contextual variable affecting the civic engagement behavior of their congregants at the highest level (societal engagement)

Finally, the results of Model 8 also show that age is positively associated with having voted. In fact, for each one-year increase in the age of the congregant, the odds of the person having voted is multiplied by a factor of 1.030, controlling for other variables in the model. In other words, the older the congregant, the more likely it is he or she would have voted in the 2004 Presidential election. This finding also aligns with what is known about the voting patterns of the general public: the younger the individual the less likely he or she is to vote.

After closely looking at the predictors that are statistically significant in this model, it is more than evident that a congregant's relative lack of education, and English language limitations predictably affects voting habits in a negative way while age (that is, more age!), as expected, positively influences the likelihood of voting, as does the pastor's education.

The results of Model 9, which looks at congregant involvement in political party activities (including voting registration drives, campaign involvement, and financial donations to political parties), show that the model predictors moderately impacted the participation in these types of activities (Nagelkerke R Square = .196). That is, this logistic regression model explains 20 percent of the variation in congregant involvement

in political party activities. Nonetheless, a total of four model predictors were found to be statistically significant (the same number as Model 8). Attending a church that is affiliated to an American denomination (at $p = .013$), having an annual household income of \$35,000 to \$49,999 (at $p = .044$) and believing that abortion is acceptable at least sometimes ($p = .006$) are positively associated with participation in political party activities. On the contrary, speaking more or only Spanish at home and with friends ($p = .000$) is negatively associated with participating in political party activities.

This model's results show that the odds of getting involved in political party activities compared to not doing so are multiplied by a very large factor of 2.394 when the congregant speaks more or Spanish at home or with friends. Namely, English language barriers are negatively associated with getting involved in political party activities.

On the other hand, attending a congregation that is affiliated with an American denomination positively influences congregants' involvement in political party activities. That is, the odds of getting involved in political party activities compared to not doing so are multiplied by a large factor of 3.205 when a respondent attends a congregation that is affiliated with an American denomination rather than an independent church, controlling for other variables in the model. These findings are not surprising given the fact denominational affiliation tends to mobilize political activity as a result of the information, organizational networks, and leadership provided by denominations to their affiliated churches. At the same time, large numbers of Latino churches that are very engaged in society (for example, "progressive" Pentecostal types) have been found, as shown in chapter four, to be independent and without the support of a denomination. This

requires further research to clarify the relationships that were found to be statistically significant by this model.

Also, having an annual household income of \$35,000 to \$49,999 positively influences congregants' involvement in political party activities. That is, the odds of getting involved in political party activities compared to not doing so are multiplied by a large factor of 2.394 when a respondent has an annual household income of \$35,000 to \$49,999 rather than an annual household income of \$50,000 or more, controlling for other variables in the model.

Finally, believing that abortion is sometimes acceptable was found to be significant and positively associated with getting involved in political party activities. In fact, the odds of getting involved in political party activities compared to not doing so are multiplied by a large factor of 2.230 when a respondent believes that abortion is sometimes acceptable rather than believing that it is not, controlling for other variables in the model. In other words, those that believe that abortion is at least sometimes acceptable are more likely to participate in political party activities demonstrating that this issue is also a politically mobilizing issue in the Latino community the way it is for millions of people around the U.S. In the Latino Pentecostal context, however, it is not those opposed to abortion the ones that are more engaged, as may be the case with white Evangelicals and Pentecostals, but the ones that believe that it is sometimes acceptable.

Models 8 and 9 sought to understand the effect of the model predictors on voting and involvement in political party activities. Unexpectedly, education (the pastor's and congregant's) and not religiosity—measured in these models with the at least once a week church attendance predictor—was a significant predictor in explaining civic

engagement in the wider society but only in Model 8. At the same time the congregant's abortion stance, language, age, and denominational affiliation were also important in understanding both the voting behavior of Pentecostal congregants and their involvement in political party activities.

When it came to involvement in political party activities, it is understandable why those that speak more or only Spanish at home are not as likely to get involved. What is surprising, however, is that the likelihood of getting involved in political party activities significantly increases for those that attend churches affiliated to American denominations because a large number of "progressive" Pentecostal churches are independent. More research is needed to better understand these dynamics.

In the end, several of the proposed hypotheses were confirmed by this research but with important qualifiers (see Table 16). Namely, although I hypothesized that Latino Pentecostal congregants with higher levels of education would be more engaged in community and society, education was only a significant factor for voting (one of the two forms of societal engagement studied) confirming that congregants with lower levels of education engage much less in society than those with a B.A. degree or more.

Although women were hypothesized to be actively engaged within church and in the community and less so in society, the results of this study show that gender was not statistically significant for a particularly civic engagement model. This means that gender was similarly relevant to all civic engagement models. Also, annual household income was predicted to play an important role in explaining both community and societal civic engagement, and it did play an important role. That is, annual household income was found to be a relevant predictor in helping organize an event at church (within church

engagement); those with annual household incomes of \$14,999 or less are significantly less likely to help with event organizing than those congregants with annual household incomes of \$50,000 or more. It was also found those congregants with annual household incomes of \$35,000 to \$49,999 are significantly more likely to get involved in political party activities than those with incomes of \$50,000 or more.

When it comes to immigrant status, non-U.S. citizens were expected to be very active in the congregation and less so in the community and society. The results of this research show, however, that being a non-U.S. citizen was not a relevant explanatory factor for any of the models. It is important to keep in mind that for Model 8 (voting) and Model 9 (participating in political party activities) only U.S. citizens were analyzed. Being a U.S. citizen was relevant to one of the models: helping in organizing an event at church (within church engagement). Although I hypothesized that U.S. citizens would be engaged at all level of civic engagement, their citizenship status was not found to be an important predictor of community engagement. It was, however, very important for Models 8 and 9 because the analysis was conducted with U.S. citizens.

It was originally hypothesized that language was to play an important role in understanding civic engagement at all levels—within church, in community, and in larger society. This study confirmed that it certainly did, but not necessarily in the way it was expected. For instance, speaking more or only Spanish at home and with friends significantly decreased the odds of being a leader at church when compared to the congregant that spoke more or only English at home and with friends. Congregants that speak both languages equally at home and with friends were significantly more likely to volunteer outside the church than those that spoke more or only English. Then too,

speaking more or only Spanish at home and with friends significantly increased the odds of helping the needy in the community when compared to those that spoke more or only English. Finally, Latino Pentecostal congregants that spoke more or only Spanish at home and with friends were significantly less likely to be involved in political party activities than those that spoke only or mainly English at home and with friends. There is no question that language was found to be one of the main predictors of Latino Pentecostal congregant civic engagement at all levels, with the exception of Model 9 (participation in political party activities), the role of language, although very important, was different than expected.

Even though Latino origin (nationality) was expected to play an important role in explaining civic engagement among Latino Pentecostal congregants, it was not significant for any of the models. Denominational switching was also hypothesized to produce complex patterns of civic engagement (at all levels). Instead, it was not found to be relevant for any of the models tested.

On the other hand, both marital status and abortion perspective were found to be predictors of civic engagement behavior among Latino Pentecostal congregants, albeit not as important as other factors. Even though age was not even hypothesized to play a relevant role as a civic engagement explanatory factor, it was one of the top four explanatory factors relevant for each of the civic engagement levels studied. This is also the case for religiosity as measured by attending worship services at least once a week. Namely, it was found that religiosity is an important factor in explaining within church and community engagement and not so for societal engagement, voting and participation in political party activities—the area of civic engagement where it has been found to be

important in the literature (Wuthnow, 1999, 2003). Religiosity was found to be positively and significantly related to being a church member, a church leader, and a church event assistant. It was also positively and significantly related to helping the needy in the community. In fact, religiosity along with church denominational affiliation, and language were found to be the most important predictive factors for all models of Latino Pentecostal congregant civic engagement.

The review of the results produced by the logistic regression testing of the nine models did confirm several of the original hypotheses but also disconfirmed many others. It also documented new relationships among the variables. Ultimately, however, this chapter sought to study the contextual effect on the civic engagement behavior of Latino Pentecostal congregants in Chicago. It did so by studying the effect of Pentecostal church type, the church's denominational affiliation, and the pastor's education—all factors documented in chapter four to be important for the understanding of civic engagement among Latino Pentecostals.

Although the congregation's denominational affiliation was, as hypothesized, important in explaining civic engagement at all levels, the testing of the models show both confirmation and deviation from the proposed relationships. For instance, it was found that being affiliated with an American, Latin American or U.S. Latino denomination results in a lot higher within church involvement than being unaffiliated at all (that is, part of an independent church). It was also confirmed that being affiliated to an American denomination significantly reduces the odds of volunteering outside the church in comparison to being an independent church. These two align with the hypothesized relationships. On the other hand, being affiliated with a U.S. Latino

denomination makes the congregant more likely to help the needy in the community than if they were part of an independent church. And being affiliated with both an American denomination makes it a lot more likely for the congregants to get involved in political party activities than congregants that attend independent churches. In short, attending an independent congregation was not relevant to any of the models tested, but attending churches that are affiliated to denominations was an important predictor of civic engagement behavior. These results certainly are different than originally predicted.

Furthermore, the education of the pastor was hypothesized to have an important contextual effect on the civic engagement behavior of congregants. It was proposed that the more educated the pastor, the more engaged the congregants would be at the community and societal levels (Level 2 and 3). The results show that the pastor's education was only relevant for one of the models—voting. It was confirmed that if the pastor had completed a B.A. degree or more, the congregants were more likely to vote than if the pastor had not done so.

Finally, Pentecostal church type was hypothesized to be the most relevant factor explaining, in most if not all the models, congregant civic engagement. The fact is that it was not. It was not even one of the top four explanatory factors (religiosity, denominational affiliation, language—all significant in four models, and age—significant in three models). Pentecostal church type was only significant in 2 of the 7 statistically significant models that were analyzed. It was relevant to within church and societal engagement. Attending a “traditional” congregation was strongly and positively related to helping organize an event at church compared to those that attended “progressive” churches. In the end, although Pentecostal church type was not found to be the most

important explanatory factor, some of the hypothesized relationships (“traditional” church congregants engaging less in society) were confirmed while others—the prominent role “progressive” church congregants were to play—only partially so. This may be a reflection of the fact that all Latino Pentecostal congregants, as gleaned from chapter four, are fairly similar in their behavior, with some variations. The major differences seem to be between “progressive” church pastors and their counterparts.

In summary, the three contextual factors hypothesized as playing an important role in the civic engagement behavior of Latino Pentecostal congregants were indeed confirmed by the results. At least one of the three factors, Pentecostal church type, pastor’s education, and church’s denominational affiliation, was statistically significant in five of the seven models analyzed. However, the most relevant factor was denominational affiliation and not Pentecostal church type and the pastor’s education was only relevant for one model.

Conclusion

In summary, the analysis of the results of the nine logistic regression models used to test the civic engagement behavior of Latino Pentecostal congregants—looking at nine different types of behaviors—shows that all but two of the models were statistically significant (Table 15). Basically, the predictor independent variables used (the eight models included the same independent variables) explained the variation in the various types of civic engagement behavior from a low 7.8 percent for Model 4, voluntarism in communities outside the church, to a high 21.0 percent for church membership (the Nagelkerke R square was used).

Although two models were dropped from the analysis (Model 6—helping someone find a job— $p = .108$, and Model 7—lending money to non-family members— $p = .086$), those two models also tell us a lot about the community civic engagement practices of Latino Pentecostal congregants in Chicago. The fact that the models were not statistically significant tell us that there was not a lot of variation among the different types of congregants when it comes to helping someone find a job and lending money to non-family members. In chapter five, it was found that Latino Pentecostal congregations are in general very engaged through these two types of engagement.

Table 17. Significant Civic Engagement Predictors (N = 977*)

Predictor	Importance
Church attendance—religiosity (congregant)	Very important (4 of 7 models)
Denominational affiliation (church)	Very important (4 of 7 models)
Language (congregant)	Very important (4 of 7 models)
Age (congregant)	Very important (3 of 7 models)
Pentecostal church type	Important (2 of 7 models)
Immigrant status (congregant)	Important (2 of 7 models)
Education (congregant)	Less important (1 of 7 models)
Education (pastor)	Less important (1 of 7 models)
Marital status (congregant)	Less important (1 of 7 models)
Annual income (congregant)	Less important (1 of 7 models)
Abortion perspective (congregant)	Less important (1 of 7 models)

*Only U.S. citizen Pentecostal congregants were used for voting in 2004 and participating in political party activities (N = 505).

The models that were statistically significant allowed the testing of the civic engagement behavior of Latino Pentecostal congregants in all three levels of civic engagement, within the church, in the community, and in the wider society.

What is evident after analyzing all models and the statistically significant predictors for each is that there are a few factors that are very important in understanding the civic engagement of Latino Pentecostal congregants in general (Table 17). Namely, in at least four of the seven models, religiosity (here measured as at least once a week church attendance or more), denominational affiliation, and congregant's language were all important predictors closely followed by congregant's age and Pentecostal church type. Other factors that were also relevant and statistically significant but for only one of the models include marital status, annual household income, abortion perspective, and the education of both the congregant and the church pastor. Surprisingly, neither education nor income played a very significant role in understanding the civic engagement behavior of Latino Pentecostal congregants. It is important to keep in mind that the Chicago Latino Congregations Study's sample is not a national sample. As a result, a local sample, in this case focused on Chicago, may reduce the variability of the characteristics studied which may ultimately result in an inability to detect otherwise statistically significant effects.

It is, indeed, very telling that although gender and national origin were included as part of the independent variables, they were not significant for any of the models and failed to contribute to our understanding of civic engagement behavior among Latino Pentecostal congregants. This may also mean that there are no differences in civic engagement by gender and national origin, given the other variables in the model.

Because the majority of those that attend Latino Pentecostal churches are women and there are significant national differences among the various types of congregations, this requires further research.

This analysis shows that when it comes to Latino Pentecostal congregants some already well-known predictors, such as religiosity, help explain their civic engagement behavior. On the other hand, in this context other variables are also very important if one is to understand congregant civic engagement, specifically denominational affiliation, congregant's language and age, Pentecostal church type, and citizenship status. The fact is that predictors, such as education, income, and moral values, all of which have been successfully used by researchers to predict the civic engagement of other religious groups, were shown to be only partially significant in the Latino Pentecostal context. It was categorically demonstrated that other factors (religiosity, denominational affiliation, language, and age) were more important predictors of civic engagement behavior among Latino Pentecostal congregants than Pentecostal church type.

It is important to emphasize at this point that religiosity (as measured by once a week or more church attendance) was found to play an important role in predicting civic engagement but particularly at the church. It was also found to be a positive predictor of community engagement particularly in helping the needy. In other words, in the Latino Pentecostal context, being very religious encourages engagement inside the church and in the community, but not so in the larger society.

Even when several of the hypotheses originally proposed were confirmed, many more were either not confirmed or the relationships found to operate differently. Notwithstanding that the results are significantly different than expected, this analysis has

contributed invaluable to the understanding of civic engagement practices among Latino Pentecostal congregants.

In chapter seven, I will compare the civic engagement behavior of Latino congregations and their congregants with those of other Latino religious traditions—Evangelical, Mainline Protestant, and Catholic. I will then compare Latino Pentecostal congregants with non-Latino Evangelicals, keeping in mind that I will be comparing, for instance, Pentecostal congregants with Evangelicals in general (not Evangelical congregants). At the end, the dualistic liberal/conservative framework will be addressed in light of the findings of the chapter. Does the experience of Latino Pentecostals provide compelling evidence to modify the liberal/conservative framework of analysis?

CHAPTER SEVEN

LATINO CHURCHES AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

Introduction

In this chapter, using the typologies of Latino Pentecostal congregations and civic engagement developed in chapters four and five, I compare and contrast Latino Pentecostal churches with their Latino Evangelical, Mainline Protestant, and Catholic counterparts. The main objective is to outline the similarities and the points of departure particularly as it relates to different types of civic engagement behavior within the congregation, in the community and in wider society (the three different levels included in the civic engagement typology developed in chapter five).

By comparing and contrasting the main Latino religious traditions (in this case different congregations and their congregants), my goal is, first, to determine whether Latino Pentecostals—particularly the “progressive” types—are more or less civically engaged when compared to their counterparts. Second, given the argument I have made throughout this dissertation that Latino Pentecostals are different than Latino Evangelicals, comparing these two traditions’ civic engagement practices is very informative to test if the data supports the hypothesis. Finally this analysis also seeks to test whether the well established paradigm of liberal religion being associated with Mainline Protestantism and conservative religion associated with Evangelical and Pentecostal traditions is actually replicated in the Latino community (Greeley & Hout, 2006; Smidt, 2003; Stark, 2008; Wuthnow, 1999, 2004).

Of special interest for this dissertation is the testing of the hypothesis that the liberal/conservative religious paradigm so prominent in the study of religion in the U.S. needs revising given the religious landscape changes occurring as a result of the growing influence of U.S. Latinos. Because of the duality documented among Latinos (see chapter four)—where they are conservative in some areas but liberal in others—I propose that it is imperative to include a moderate category to the existing paradigm in order to more accurately categorize the beliefs and practices of Latinos and other groups that may experience the same reality but are outside of the mainstream of white Christianity.

I use cross tabulations and comparisons of means (Chi-Squares—Pearson and Likelihood Ratios—and Analysis of Variance—ANOVA—were used to test for statistical significance) to compare and contrast congregations and their congregants on a variety of demographic, religiosity, social and political, and civic engagement variables. I start the chapter with a brief analysis of demographic similarities and differences and then move on to a comparison of religiosity. Another section of the chapter delves into the social and political differences of Latino congregations in Chicago. These comparisons will serve the purpose of drawing a picture that illustrates whether Latino Pentecostal churches and their congregants are, in fact, different from their counterparts in other religious traditions, and if so, how different they are.

The most important section of the chapter analyzes the civic engagement practices of Latino Pentecostals, the churches and their congregants, in comparison to other Latino faith traditions. Particular attention is paid to the civic engagement practices of “progressive” Pentecostals to test if they are in fact trail blazers, as found in chapter five, or not. Using a variety of studies (Greeley & Hout, 2006; Pew Research Center, 2007,

2008; Stark, 2008), a brief comparison is also drawn between the different Latino religious traditions and their U.S. counterparts. This comparison is limited because the studies available are national surveys of the U.S. population (for instance, a national survey of Catholics), instead the Chicago Latino Congregations Study surveyed congregants, those that were present at the worship service when the survey was completed.

Although there were high response rates among all Latino congregation pastors or leaders, this was not replicated with congregants. The overwhelming majority of congregants from Pentecostal, Evangelical, and Mainline Protestant congregations completed the surveys, but given the size and fast pace of Catholic parishes, a smaller number of those present at the mass completed the survey. In most cases, far less than fifty percent of the attendees completed it. Consequently, in making comparisons and drawing conclusions, it is imperative to bear in mind that the data has close to a census of Latino Protestant church pastors and their congregants (this is particularly the case with Latino Pentecostals), but it has a lot less representation for Catholic congregants. There were specific reasons, although unknown, for those that completed the survey to do so.

I conclude with a summary of findings, issues and concerns, and discuss questions needing further research.

Demographic Profiles of Latino Churches

Not surprising, the age structure of Latino church congregants is very similar for all faith traditions ranging (mean age) from 39 to 43 years of age. Although the mean age for Latino Mainline Protestants is 43 years old, the youngest, the Pentecostal ones, are 39 years old—only 4 years younger. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test if the

age differences observed among different types of Latino congregants were significant. The null hypothesis (there are no age differences for the congregants of the four different types of Latino congregations) is rejected ($p = .000$). When it comes to gender, the picture unexpectedly changes. Namely, while 62 percent of those that attend Latino Pentecostal churches are women (63 percent for “progressive types), the number climbs to 66, 70, and 75 percent for Evangelical, Catholic, and Mainline Protestant churches respectively. While 38 percent of Latino Pentecostal congregants are men, only 25 percent of those that attend Mainline Protestant churches are men. In other words, all Latino churches primarily serve the needs of women with Catholics leading the way while Pentecostal churches are the most effective at attracting (or retaining) men to the pews. In general, Latino congregations are attended by younger people with a mean age of 40 years old for all congregations (a clear reflection of the Latino age structure in the U.S.). Mainliners are the oldest and Pentecostals the youngest (see Table 18).

Also the education accomplishments of the various groups defy preconceived notions. Although the majority of Latino church congregants in Chicago, 66 percent, only have a H.S. diploma, GED, or less, the churches with the highest percentage, 73 percent, in this category are the Mainliners. In fact, the congregants with less representation in this educational category are Evangelicals (63 percent), and Pentecostals (63 percent)—“progressive” church congregants have the lowest representation in this category at 57 percent. Although Mainline Protestant church congregants lead in having a B.A. degree or more with 15 percent, they are closely followed by their Evangelical and Catholic counterparts with 14 and 13 percent respectively. They are all followed at a distance by Pentecostal congregants at 9 percent (even “progressive” ones report the same

percentage). However, when those that have some college and more are analyzed, Pentecostal congregants and Evangelicals lead the way with 37 percent each (“progressive” ones report 43 percent, the highest for all Latino congregants), followed by those that attend Catholic churches—Mainliners lag behind with 27 percent. That is, when it comes to education Pentecostal congregants have the lowest rates in the high school, GED, or less and also the lowest rates in the B.A. degree or more categories.

However, those that attend Pentecostal churches (along with their Evangelical brethren) have the highest percentage of all congregants with some college and more, particularly those that attend “progressive” churches. This may indicate that Pentecostal congregants are little by little becoming more educated even in comparison to their counterparts in the other Latino faith traditions.

When it comes to annual household income, all Latino congregants, regardless of the type of church they attend, report very similar numbers with the important exception of those that attend “progressive” Pentecostal churches. In general, all Latino congregations serve a significant number of poor people (23 percent of congregants report annual household incomes of \$14,999 or less) with the highest number not being reported by Pentecostals but instead by Mainliners (22 vs. 26 percent)—“traditional” Pentecostal congregants do report 25 percent in this category. Once working-class congregants (\$24,999 or less) are added, 36 percent of Latino church congregants are either poor or working class. Evangelical and Pentecostal churches lead the way at 53 and 52 percent, respectively, with lower middle-class congregants (\$25,000 to \$49,999 in annual household income), and “neo-conservative” and “progressive” Pentecostal churches have the highest percentage of congregants with incomes of more than \$50,000

at 18 and 17 percent, respectively—five percentage points higher than all other Latino faith traditions at 12 percent. Latino Pentecostal congregants are, in general, not the poorest (“traditional” Pentecostal churches do have the highest percentage of poor people along with Mainline ones). Instead, “progressive” and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal congregations have the highest percentage of attendees with annual household incomes of \$50,000 or more—they are hardly the destitute of society. On the other hand, both Mainline and “traditional” Pentecostal churches report the highest percentages of very poor congregants.

In terms of language, 65 percent of all Latino church congregants report speaking only or more Spanish at home. Evangelical congregants report the highest number with 79 percent followed by their Catholic (71 percent) and Mainline Protestant counterparts at 68 percent. Those that attend Pentecostal churches report the lowest numbers at 57 percent particularly the “progressive” types at 44 percent. “Traditional” Pentecostal congregants report 79 percent, the same as their Evangelical counterparts. On the other hand, Pentecostal congregants report the highest number for all Latino congregants (20 percent) in speaking only or more English at home while Evangelicals report the lowest at 7 percent. However, when the different Pentecostal types are looked at, “neo-conservative” Pentecostal attendees report the highest of all Latino congregants at 30 percent and “traditional” ones the lowest at 4 percent. That is, the overwhelming majority of Latino congregants speak only or more Spanish at home, with Latino Pentecostal congregants reporting both the highest numbers for Spanish and for English.

Table 18. Selected Demographic Characteristics of Latino Congregants by Church Type

Characteristic	Trad.	Neo-Con.	Pgs.	Evg.	MI.	Cath.	Total
Mean age	38	41	39	41	43	42	41+
<i>Percentage</i>							
Women	58	66	63	66	75	70	66*
Citizenship							
Undocumented	27	5	9	22	3	16	14*
Legal resident	40	22	22	33	38	30	31*
U.S. citizen	31	73	69	44	59	53	55*
Household Income							
< \$15,000	25	18	23	20	26	23	23*
< \$25,000	39	31	32	35	38	39	36*
< \$50,000	94	82	83	88	88	88	87*
\$50,000 and more	6	18	17	12	12	12	13*
Education							
H.S./GED or less	75	58	57	63	73	68	66*
Some college plus	25	42	43	37	27	33	35*
3 or more children	51	51	49	47	52	56	51**
Language spoken at home and with friends							
More or only English	4	30	27	7	12	11	15*
Only or more Spanish	79	48	44	79	68	72	65*
Both languages	17	22	29	15	20	17	20*
N	480	312	185	602	110	679	2368

Legend: Trad. = Traditional; Neo-Con. = Neo-Conservative; Pgs. = Progressive; Evg. = Evangelical; MI = Mainline; Cath. = Catholic.

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007

*Significant at $p < .05$ for Chi-square test of independence.

**Significant at $p < .10$ for Chi-square test of independence.

+ Significantly different from an overall mean at $p < .05$.

Not surprising, the majority of Latino congregants are either U.S. citizens (55 percent) or have another legal status in the country (31 percent), while a significant minority, 14 percent, are undocumented immigrants. Mainline congregants report the

highest rate of U.S. citizenship at 59 percent and the lowest rate of undocumented immigrants at 3 percent while their Evangelical counterparts report the lowest citizenship rates (44 percent) and highest undocumented immigrant rates at 22 percent. However, when the various types of Pentecostal congregations are looked at, the “traditional” types have both the lowest rate of citizenship (31 percent) and the highest rate of undocumented immigrants at 27 percent. “Progressive” congregants report the highest rate of U.S. citizenship at 69 percent. In other words, Pentecostal congregations experience very diverging realities when it comes to citizenship status.

Finally, when the national origin of Latino church congregants is reviewed, those of Mexican descent represent the largest national group at 45 percent followed at a distance by those of Puerto Rican (20 percent), other Caribbean (15 percent), and Central American (14 percent) descent. At 60 percent, congregants of Mexican descent represent the overwhelming majority of Catholic parish congregants. Although congregants of Mexican descent have an important presence in all Protestant traditions (ranging from 34 percent at Mainline and Pentecostal churches to 37 percent at Evangelical ones), congregants of Puerto Rican descent are well represented in both Mainline (32 percent) and Pentecostal (33 percent) churches and significantly less at Evangelical congregations (13 percent). Congregants of Central American descent are mainly concentrated in Evangelical (22 percent) and Pentecostal (15 percent) churches with little representation in Catholic and Mainline churches, 4 percent for both. When different types of Pentecostal congregations are analyzed, the majority of “traditional” church congregants are of Mexican descent (58 percent) while almost half (48 percent) of those that attend “progressive” churches are of Puerto Rican descent.

The analysis of a variety of demographic factors related to Latino congregants in Chicago reveals similarities and differences. Both the age and gender structures are very similar for all congregations with few differences. In general, congregants are fairly young with a mean age of 41. Also, Catholic parishes, not Pentecostal churches, have the highest rate of female congregants (Pentecostal churches have the highest rate of male congregants). Pentecostal churches have both the lowest rates of congregants with H.S. diploma, GED, or less and with B.A. degrees or more. Surprisingly, Pentecostal churches also have the highest rate of Latino congregants with some college (in fact, “progressive” church attendees have the highest rate of all). Mainline churches have both the highest rate of those with B.A. degrees or more (closely followed by Catholic and Evangelical churches) and the highest rate of those with only a H.S. diploma, GED, or less.

All Latino congregants report similar annual household incomes. “Progressive” Pentecostal congregants report the highest rate of congregants with household incomes of \$50,000 or more while those that attend “traditional” churches (along with Mainline Protestant ones) report the highest rate of poor people and the lowest rate of those with annual incomes of \$50,000 or more. When it comes to the language spoken at home, the overwhelming majority of Latino congregants report speaking more or only Spanish at home. “Traditional” Pentecostal congregants (along with their Evangelical brethren) report the highest rates of speaking more or only Spanish at home while “progressive” types report the highest rate of speaking more or only English at home and with friends.

When it comes to U.S. citizenship “progressive” Pentecostal congregants and those from Mainline Protestant churches lead the way, and they both report the lowest numbers of undocumented immigrants. On the contrary, “traditional” Pentecostal

churches, followed at a distance by Evangelical ones, report both the lowest rates of U.S. citizenship and the highest rates of undocumented immigrants. Finally, although Latino churches are very diverse in the Latino origin of their congregants and those of Mexican descent are represented in both Catholic and Protestant churches, congregants of Mexican descent are the overwhelming majority at Catholic parishes. Congregants of Puerto Rican descent are well represented in Mainline and Pentecostal congregations particularly the “progressive” ones and those of Central American descent are also well represented at Evangelical and Pentecostal congregations and a lot less so at Catholic and Mainline churches.

In comparison to other Latino religious traditions, it is obvious that “traditional” and “progressive” churches experience very divergent realities in several areas. While “Progressive” church congregants lead in higher household income and in education, their “traditional” counterparts lead in levels of poverty, lack of education, and undocumented immigrant status, among others.

How similar or different are the demographic characteristics of church pastors or key leaders (some of the respondents at Catholic parishes were key leaders. For the sake of simplification, I will call them all pastors in this dissertation) in comparison to their congregants? This is a very important issue taking into consideration that, as documented in chapter four, significant gaps exist between Pentecostal pastors, particularly “progressive” church pastors, and their congregants (see Table 19).

The majority (63 percent) of Latino pastors is less than 50 years of age. Unfortunately, this relationship is not statistically significant and, as a result, a

comparison of the different types of Latino churches is not possible. However, it is clear that the average pastor is significantly older than the average congregant.

Table 19. Selected Demographic Characteristics of Latino Pastors by Church Type

Characteristic	Trad.	Neo-Con.	Pgs.	Evg.	MI.	Cath.	Total
<i>Percentage</i>							
< 50 years old	57	64	60	57	75	67	63
Men	80	92	80	91	88	69	83
Education							
Undocumented	7	0	0	9	0	6	4
Legal resident	13	0	0	30	33	24	17
U.S. citizen	80	100	100	61	67	71	80
Education							
Some college or less	21	14	0	4	13	19	12*
Bible institute or diocesan lay program	43	64	20	17	0	19	27*
B.A. degree or more	36	21	80	78	88	63	61*
Language spoken at home and with friends							
More or only English	0	46	40	4	12	25	21**
More or only Spanish	93	46	60	83	63	56	67**
Both languages equally	7	8	0	13	25	19	12**
N	14	12	5	21	9	20	81

Legend: Trad. = Traditional; Neo-Con. = Neo-Conservative; Pgs. = Progressive; Evg. = Evangelical; MI = Mainline; Cath. = Catholic.

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Surveys 2, and 3 (Pastor/Leader), 2007
Weighted to represent the population of pastors of Latino churches in Chicago.

*Significant at $p < .05$ for Chi-square test of independence.

**Significant at $p < .10$ for Chi-square test of independence.

At the same time, almost all Latino church pastors are men (83 percent). The generalized belief (with the exception of Catholics) in the ordination of women has not pragmatically translated into the actual appointment of women as pastors of Latino congregations. The results of the analysis show that whereas Latino congregants in Chicago are overwhelmingly female and younger, the pastors are almost exclusively male and older—major gaps indeed.

When education is analyzed, major gaps are also revealed between church pastors and their congregants. For instance, while only 5 percent of pastors have a H.S. diploma or less, 61 percent have a B.A. degree or more and another 27 percent have a Bible institute or diocesan lay certificate. There are significant education differences among the pastors of the various Latino religious traditions. While 88, 78, and 63 percent of Mainline, Evangelical, and Catholic pastors, respectively, have a B.A. degree or more, only 46 percent of their Pentecostal colleagues report the same. When the education of Pentecostal pastors is closely looked at, however, an impressive 80 percent of “progressive” church pastors and 21 percent of “neo-conservative” ones have a B.A. degree or more. That is, Pentecostal pastors both have one of the highest (only surpassed by their Mainline Protestants counterparts) and lowest levels of B.A. degree or more educational attainment of all Latino pastors. Another important point is that although barely a fifth of “neo-conservative” Pentecostal pastors have a B.A. degree or more, the majority of them (64 percent) have a Bible institute certificate, leading all other pastors in this type of theological training.

The gap between pastors and their congregants is replicated with U.S. citizenship status. Whereas only 4 percent of Latino pastors report being undocumented immigrants,

80 percent are U.S. citizens. Although the large majority of pastors are U.S. citizens, the majority also retains the Spanish language. Namely, 93 percent of “traditional” Pentecostal pastors report speaking only or more Spanish than English at home and with friends; they are closely followed by Evangelical pastors at 83 percent. The numbers quickly drop for “progressive” Pentecostal, Mainline, and Catholic pastors (60, 63, and 56 percent, respectively). In other words, although the overwhelming majority of Latino pastors are U.S. citizens, they have, in general, successfully retained the Spanish language, particularly those pastors from “traditional” Pentecostal and Evangelical congregations.

While the overwhelming majority of Catholic pastors are of Mexican descent (63 percent), the majority of Pentecostal church pastors are of Puerto Rican (55 percent) and a significant portion of Central American descent (14 percent). A large percentage (44 percent) of Mainline Protestant pastors is also of Puerto Rican descent followed by those of Cuban and Colombian descent (22 percent each). On the other hand, Evangelical pastors are primarily of Mexican (26 percent), South American (30 percent), and Central American (22 percent) descent. Simply stated, pastors of Mexican descent are mainly concentrated in Catholic parishes while those of Puerto Rican descent are concentrated in Mainline and Pentecostal congregations. Central American pastors have an important representation in Pentecostal and Evangelical congregations and very little in Catholic and Mainline ones. Pastors of South American origin mainly serve in Evangelical and mainline churches. Given the large numbers of Chicago Latinos that originate in Mexico and Puerto Rico, these results are hardly surprising. Central and South Americans are definitely overrepresented in the pastor ranks given their share of the Latino population.

This research has documented a significant gap in age, gender, education, and citizenship status and to a lesser extent in language and national origin between Latino pastors and their congregants. It would not be surprising if that same gap is found in the religiosity, and the social and political perspectives of pastors in comparison to their congregants.

Finally it is important to highlight that while the majority of Catholic parishes (65 percent) have 1,000 congregants or more, 50 percent of Mainline Protestant congregations have between 25 to 50 congregants. On the other hand, over 90 percent of both Pentecostal and Evangelical churches have 200 congregants or less, and 43 and 48 percent of the same congregations have less than 100 congregants. In summary, Catholic churches are generally mega churches, Mainline Protestant ones very small churches, and Pentecostal and Evangelical ones medium in size.

Given the size of the congregations, it is not surprising that the annual operating budgets of Latino congregations are very small (with the noted exception of Catholic parishes). Whereas 30 percent of Catholic parishes have a budget of \$100,999 or less, 89, 71, and 61 percent of Mainline, Pentecostal, and Evangelical churches, respectively, report the same. Surprisingly while 26 percent of Evangelical churches report an annual budget of \$201,999 and more, only 8 percent of Pentecostal congregations do so—in fact, only one “traditional” church reports more than \$100,999 in annual budget. Due to their size, 56 percent of Catholic parishes report an annual budget of \$201,999 and more. With some exceptions, the majority of Latino churches in Chicago are medium size with budgets of less than \$100,999.

Religious Profiles of Latino Churches

Religiosity has been used by researchers to predict a variety of social and political beliefs and behaviors in the U.S. (Greeley & Hout, 2006; Smidt, 2003; Stark, 2008; Wuthnow, 1999, 2004). Consequently, it is important to test whether religiosity is found to be an effective predictor of social and political beliefs and practice among Latino congregants and their pastors in Chicago. If it is, are there significant differences among the congregants and the pastors of the different Latino churches? See Table 20 and Table 21.

Surprisingly, while 32 percent of Catholic congregants claim to be conservative religiously speaking (the highest for all Latino congregants), those that attend Pentecostal churches report the lowest percentage at 26 percent (the lowest of all is reported by “progressive” ones at 23 percent). Then too, 47 percent of all congregants report being moderate and only 9 percent liberal, religiously speaking. Catholic congregants at 11 percent report the highest rates of liberal self-identification, but are closely followed by their Pentecostal and Mainline counterparts at 10 percent each. Not surprising, “progressive” Pentecostal church congregants report both the lowest conservative rate (23 percent) and the highest liberal rate (17 percent) while those that attend “traditional” churches report the lowest (6 percent) liberal rate of all Latino congregants in Chicago.

Although almost half of all Latino congregants claim to be religiously moderate, this claim is not reflected in their religious beliefs and practices. For instance, 83, 80, and 76 percent of Evangelical, Pentecostal (75 percent of “progressive” church congregants agree), and Mainline congregants believe the Bible to be the word of God to be taken literally—56 percent of Catholic ones believe the same. That is, while Catholic

congregants are the least likely to believe in the inerrancy of the Bible, those that attend “traditional” Pentecostal churches are most likely to believe in it (84 percent). At the same time, 80 percent of both Pentecostal and Evangelical congregants claim to pray at least once a day (this number drops considerably to 64 and 62 percent, respectively, for those attending Mainline and Catholic churches). “Progressive” Pentecostal church congregants report similarly high numbers as all other Pentecostals.

Table 20. Selected Religiosity Characteristics of Latino Congregants by Church Type

Behavior/Perspective	Trad.	Neo-Con.	Pgs.	Evg.	MI.	Cath.	Total
<i>Percentage</i>							
Religiously conservative	24	31	23	29	30	32	28*
Bible-literal word of God	84	82	75	83	76	56	76*
Daily praying	80	80	80	80	64	62	74*
Daily Bible reading	55	48	45	51	21	18	40*
Weekly church attendance—once or more	94	92	89	89	72	81	86*
Very or extremely close to God	85	76	82	78	73	70	77*
N	480	312	185	602	110	679	2368

Legend: Trad. = Traditional; Neo-Con. = Neo-Conservative; Pgs. = Progressive; Evg. = Evangelical; MI = Mainline; Cath. = Catholic.

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007

*Significant at $p < .05$ for Chi-square test of independence.

When it comes to daily reading of the Bible, both Pentecostal and Evangelical congregants report similarly high rates at 51 and 49 percent, respectively (“traditional” Pentecostal congregants actually report the highest of all Latino congregants at 55 percent). Daily reading of the Bible is, however, not as prevalent among Mainline and

Catholic congregants who report rates of 21 and 18 percent, respectively. All Latino congregants, 86 percent, also report extremely high levels of church attendance (once or more a week). Although those that attend Pentecostal churches report the highest attendance at 91 percent—94 percent for “traditional” and 89 percent for “progressive” church congregants—they are closely followed by their Evangelical (89 percent) and Catholic (81 percent) counterparts. In fact, even the absolute majority, 72 percent, of Latinos who attend Mainline Protestant congregations go to church once or more a week.

In summary, the overwhelming majority of Latino Pentecostal and Evangelical congregants are very religious—even though they do not see themselves in that manner. “Traditional” Pentecostal congregants are the most religious by every measure used, closely followed by Evangelical and “progressive” Pentecostals. With the exception of daily Bible reading, both Catholic and Mainline Protestant congregants are also fairly religious albeit less so than their Pentecostal and Evangelical counterparts. There is no doubt that Pentecostal congregants, including the “progressive” types but particularly the “traditional” types, are the most religious of all Latino congregants, but they are very closely followed by their Evangelical brothers and sisters.

The analysis of the demographic characteristics of pastors and congregants documented a significant gap between the two. Is there also a gap between pastors and congregants as it relates to religiosity? Yes, there is one, but it is not as wide (see Table 21). The evidence shows that when it comes to religious orientation, both pastors and their congregants show similar results. When asked about how they saw themselves religiously speaking, 52 percent of Latino pastors claimed to be moderate, 30 percent conservative, and 10 percent liberal. While 35 percent of Pentecostal pastors claimed to

be conservative, only 13 percent of Catholic priests or leaders claimed the same. On the contrary, 25 and 19 percent of Mainline and Catholic pastors identify themselves as liberal or progressive, but a smaller number, 13 and 4 percent, respectively, of their Pentecostal and Evangelical counterparts do the same. What is really telling is that while 54 percent of “neo-conservative” Pentecostal church pastors (the highest rate for all Latino faith traditions) identify themselves as conservative, none of the “progressive” types do so. More important, whereas 40 percent of “progressive” church pastors see themselves as liberal or progressive religiously speaking (the highest for all Latino faith traditions), none of their “traditional” or “neo-conservative” counterparts make such a claim. This evidence suggests that there are significant gaps particularly among “traditional” and “progressive” Pentecostal pastors and their congregants. Namely, “progressive” church pastors are much more progressive than their congregants while “traditional” ones are a lot less progressive than those that attend their churches. Either way, there is a significant Pentecostal pastor-sheep gap that is not observed in any other Latino faith tradition, at least not at the same level.

Only 26 percent of Latino pastors believe the Bible to be the literal word of God and another 49 percent maintains the Bible to be the word of God but warn that not everything should be taken literally. There are major differences in the Bible views of the various Latino faith traditions. Although 41 and 33 percent of Pentecostal and Evangelical pastors, respectively, believe the Bible to be the literal word of God, none of their Catholic and Mainline Protestant counterparts believe so. When the beliefs of Pentecostal pastors are analyzed closely, it is found that both “traditional” and “neo-conservative” church pastors profess the belief in Biblical inerrancy at high rates (50 and

54 percent respectively) with that not being the case with “progressive” ones—20 percent. In other words, Latino Pentecostals show very divergent patterns of beliefs, even as it relates to the Bible, depending on the strand of Pentecostalism they practice.

Table 21. Selected Religiosity Characteristics of Latino Pastors by Church Type

Behavior/Perspective	Trad.	Neo-Con.	Pgs.	Evg.	MI.	Cath.	Total
<i>Percentage</i>							
Religiously conservative	50	54	0	35	25	13	30*
Bible-literal word of God	50	54	20	33	0	0	26*
N	14	12	5	21	9	20	81

Legend: Trad. = Traditional; Neo-Con. = Neo-Conservative; Pgs. = Progressive; Evg. = Evangelical; MI = Mainline; Cath. = Catholic.

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Surveys 2, and 3 (Pastor/Leader), 2007
Weighted to represent the population of pastors of Latino churches in Chicago.

*Significant at $p < .05$ for Chi-square test of independence.

In summary, most Latino pastors, with the exception of the “traditional” and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal types, are mainly moderate and to a lesser extent liberal in their religious beliefs creating a gap between themselves and their congregants. This is particularly the case between “progressive” Pentecostal pastors and their sheep (pastors more liberal than their sheep), and “traditional” and “neo-conservative” pastors and theirs (pastors a lot more conservative than their sheep in religious orientation).

Social and Political Profiles of Latino Churches

Does the intense religiosity of Latino Pentecostal and Evangelical congregants and their pastors and to a lesser extent that of their Catholic and Mainline counterparts translate into conservative social and political beliefs? Research has documented that in the U.S. high levels of religiosity are directly related to conservative social and political

stances but as religiosity declines, those stances also become less conservative (Greeley & Hout, 2006; Stark, 2008; Wuthnow, 1999, 2004). See Table 22 and Table 23.

The overwhelming majority of Latino congregants (74 percent) lean to or are solid Democrats while only 11 percent lean to or are solid Republicans. While 88, 77, and 71 percent of Mainline, Catholic, and Pentecostal congregants report leaning to or being Democrat, 66 of their Evangelical counterparts do so. Amazingly 72 percent of “traditional” and 71 percent of “progressive” Pentecostal congregants report the same. Even though Latinos that attend “traditional” Pentecostal churches are by far the most religious of all Latino congregants, they have similar Democratic Party affiliation to Catholic and both are only surpassed by Mainline Protestant congregants. Evangelical congregants, although still overwhelmingly Democrat, are less so than Pentecostals and along with their “neo-conservative” counterparts pledge the highest support for the Republican Party at 16 percent. In fact, “neo-conservative” Pentecostal congregants display almost the exact same support for the Democratic and Republican parties as their Evangelical brethren. This data shows that the Republican Party does not even enjoy high levels of support among the relatively most conservative segments of the Latino congregant population.

Given the liberal political affiliation observed, it is not surprising that the great majority of Latino congregants in Chicago (83 percent) support giving undocumented immigrants a path to legalize their status in this country. In fact, all Latino religious traditions range from 82 to 85 percent in support for this issue with the Mainline Protestant congregants taking the lowest point in the range. However, when the different types of Pentecostal congregants are analyzed, 89 percent of “traditional” —the highest

of all—and 77 percent of “neo-conservative” congregants, the lowest of all, support providing a path for the legalization of the status of undocumented immigrants.

Table 22. Selected Social and Political Perspectives of Latino Congregants by Church Type

Perspective	Trad.	Neo-Con.	Pgs.	Evg.	MI.	Cath.	Total
<i>Percentage</i>							
Abortion—never acceptable	79	68	65	68	51	50	64*
Undocumented immigrants—agree to legalize	89	77	82	85	82	84	83*
Ordination of women—agree	42	62	83	52	64	29	55*
Gender equality at home—agree	88	86	87	88	95	92	89*
Iraq War—disagree	47	47	44	52	60	65	53*
Democratic Party—affiliation	72	69	71	66	88	77	74*
N	480	312	185	602	110	679	2368

Legend: Trad. = Traditional; Neo-Con. = Neo-Conservative; Pgs. = Progressive; Evg. = Evangelical; MI = Mainline; Cath. = Catholic.

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007

*Significant at $p < .05$ for Chi-square test of independence.

When it comes to going to war in Iraq, 53 percent of Latino congregants in Chicago disagree with it and only 8 percent agree. Catholic congregants are particularly opposed to the war at 65 percent, closely followed by Mainliners at 60 percent. Although the opposition drops to 52 and 46 percent among Evangelical and Pentecostal congregants, respectively, their support for it was also minimal at 9 percent each.

So far this analysis has not at all supported the notion that being very religious, in the Latino context, results in political and social conservatism. Instead, a very large

majority of Latino congregants in Chicago are politically and socially liberal. With a few differences, Latino congregants overwhelmingly support the Democratic Party, giving undocumented immigrants legal status, and they generally disagree with the war in Iraq. Surprisingly, “traditional” Pentecostal congregants, in general, are as liberal as their Catholic and Mainline counterparts, albeit a little less. Not only is the religiosity hypothesis not supported in the Chicago Latino context, but it seems that the argument that Evangelicalism and Pentecostalism equal conservative religion and politics does not get support either. It must be said that Latino Evangelical congregants have been found to be less supportive of liberal social and political causes when compared to Pentecostal ones, but not so much so as to mirror the patterns observed with white Evangelicals in this country (Greeley & Hout, 2006; Pew Research Center, 2008; Stark, 2008).

Furthermore, 89 percent of all Latino congregants in Chicago believe that at home men and women should be equal in all decision making. This belief ranges from 95 percent of Mainline Protestant congregants to 86 percent among their Pentecostal brothers and sisters (88 and 87 percent of “traditional” and “progressive” church congregants, respectively, agree). By contrast, when asked about the ordination of women, the results are very different. Mainline church congregants are the most supportive of the ordination of women at 64 percent (only 8 percent disagree) and Catholics the least supportive with 29 percent agreeing and 36 percent disagreeing. When Latino Pentecostals are looked at closely, 83 percent of “progressive” congregants agree while 42 percent of “traditional” ones agree (27 percent disagree). Namely, the most supportive of the rights of women are “progressive” Pentecostal congregants while the least supportive are their Catholic counterparts.

In spite of the liberal social and political beliefs held by the majority of Latino congregants, their views of abortion are unquestionably ultra conservative. Bluntly put, only 2 percent of Latino congregants believe that abortion is always or mostly acceptable. In fact, 64 percent of the same congregants believe that abortion is never acceptable. Although there are some differences among the various Latino religious traditions (50 and 71 percent of Catholic and Pentecostal congregants, respectively, reject abortion as never being acceptable), the fact is that the overwhelming majority of Latino congregants either reject abortion altogether or believe that is acceptable only in extreme circumstances (34 percent). “Traditional” Pentecostal congregants are by far the most opposed to abortion (79 percent believe it is never acceptable) closely followed by those that attend Evangelical and the other types of Pentecostal churches.

In summary, when it comes to social and political issues, Latino congregants of all religious traditions are surprisingly liberal with a very few exceptions. Mainline, “traditional” and “progressive” Pentecostal congregants lead the way in several areas while those that attend Evangelical and Catholic churches, although still liberal, are less so in several areas. However, when it comes to moral issues (which some call political or social issues), Latino congregants are also in general very conservative. Although Pentecostal and Evangelical congregants lead the way, closely followed by those that attend Mainline and Catholic churches, the overwhelming majority either believes that abortion is never acceptable (64 percent) or acceptable only in extreme circumstances (34 percent). This shows once again that Latinos, in this case Latino congregants, embody an unusual duality (at least unusual for the U.S. with the exception of African Americans) comprised of both liberal and conservative beliefs. More specifically, Latino congregants

are socially and politically liberal, but morally conservative. It was also found that Latino Pentecostal congregants are not the most conservative in the Latino religious landscape. Instead, they seem to be more politically and socially liberal than Latino Evangelical congregants, but at the same time the most morally conservative of all Latino congregants.

With more education and moderate religious perspectives, it is expected that Latino church pastors will have more liberal and progressive social and political beliefs than those that attend their congregations. At the same time, pastors are hypothesized to have less conservative moral views than their congregants.

Whereas 49 and 44 percent of Pentecostal and Evangelical pastors, respectively, claim to be politically conservative, only 13 and 19 percent of their Mainline Protestant and Catholic counterparts make such a claim. In fact, 64 percent of “traditional” Pentecostal congregation pastors (the highest of all Latino pastors) identify themselves as politically conservative and only 20 percent of “progressive” church pastors do so. On the other hand, while 25 and 13 percent of Mainline Protestant, Catholic, and Pentecostal (same as Catholics) pastors claim to be political liberals, it drops to 0 percent for Evangelical ones. Of significance is the fact that an impressive 40 percent of “progressive” Pentecostal pastors (the highest of all Latino pastors) claim to be political liberals while none of their “traditional” and “neo-conservative” brothers and sisters claim such a label. That is, once again “traditional” and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal, and Evangelical pastors claim to be the most politically conservative while the “progressive” types are the most liberal of all Latino pastors in Chicago.

Table 23. Selected Social and Political Perspectives of Latino Pastors by Church Type

Perspective	Trad.	Neo-Con.	Pgs.	Evg.	MI.	Cath.	Total
<i>Percentage</i>							
Abortion—never acceptable	50	46	40	26	13	50	38
Same-sex marriage—strongly disagree	93	92	60	75	0	50	62*
Undocumented immigrants—agree to legalize	93	85	100	100	100	94	95
Death penalty—disagree	64	23	100	42	75	75	63*
Ordination of women—agree	50	69	100	52	100	31	67*
Gender equality at home—agree	93	77	100	87	100	88	91*
Iraq War—disagree	50	31	80	50	78	82	62
Politically conservative	64	62	20	44	13	19	37*
Democratic Party—affiliation	43	23	60	13	44	50	39*
Republican Party—affiliation	0	15	20	29	0	0	11*
N	14	12	5	21	9	20	81

Legend: Trad. = Traditional; Neo-Con. = Neo-Conservative; Pgs. = Progressive; Evg. = Evangelical; MI = Mainline; Cath. = Catholic.

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Surveys 2, and 3 (Pastor/Leader), 2007
Weighted to represent the population of pastors of Latino churches in Chicago.

*Significant at $p < .05$ for Chi-square test of independence.

This is not supported by the church pastors' reported political affiliation. Whereas 29 percent of Evangelical pastors affiliate with the Republican Party, only 12 percent of their Pentecostal and 0 percent of their Mainline and Catholic counterparts, respectively, do so. Only 11 percent of all Latino pastors in Chicago affiliate with the Republican

Party, and just another 39 percent pledge affiliation to the Democratic Party. In fact, the majority of Latino pastors in Chicago are independents at 50 percent. Whereas 50, 44, and 42 percent of Catholic, Mainline Protestant, and Pentecostal pastors, respectively, declare themselves as Democratic, only 13 percent of their Evangelical counterparts claim the same. What is really interesting is that a whole 43 percent of “traditional” Pentecostal pastors and a very high 60 percent of “progressive” ones (the highest of any Latino faith tradition) pledge their support for the Democratic Party. Unexpectedly, none of the “traditional” Pentecostal pastors support the Republican Party.

These results do not at all align with the congregant findings and show significant gaps between pastor and sheep particularly among Evangelicals, some Pentecostals, and Mainliners. In all cases congregants are found to be more progressive than their pastors. It must be clarified, however, that “traditional” and “progressive” Pentecostal and Catholic pastors’ liberal political beliefs are more closely aligned with those of their congregants.

When it comes to the issue of granting undocumented immigrants an opportunity to obtain legal status, an absolute majority of Latino pastors in Chicago (95 percent) agree or strongly agree with such a proposition. In this issue, Latino pastors, in general, show more progressive stances than their own congregants.

A similar pattern is observed when the pastor’s position on the U.S. intervention in Iraq is analyzed. That is, 62 percent of Latino pastors disagree or strongly disagree with the intervention while 20 percent agree or strongly agree. This evidence shows a significant gap between pastors and their congregants in their position towards the

intervention in Iraq. Latino pastors strongly oppose the war, more so than their congregants.

Very much aligned with the social perspective of their congregants, the overwhelming majority of Latino pastors in Chicago (91 percent) believe that at home men and women should be equal in decision-making. The agreement with this proposal ranges from 100 percent for Mainline Protestant pastors to 77 percent for their Evangelical counterparts. In fact, 100 and 93 percent of “progressive” and “traditional” Pentecostal pastors, respectively, believe the same while 77 percent of “neo-conservative” Pentecostal pastors (the lowest for all Latino pastors) agree with them.

When it comes to the ordination of women, similar to what was observed with congregants, Mainline Protestants and “progressive” Pentecostal pastors lead the way with 100 percent agreement (agree or strongly agree) followed by “neo-conservative” Pentecostal (at 69 percent), Evangelical (at 52 percent), “traditional” Pentecostal (at 50 percent), dropping considerably to 31 percent for Latino Catholic pastors. Once again both Mainline Protestant and “progressive” Pentecostal pastors show a significant gap between their beliefs about the ordination of women and those of their congregants.

With the exception of a conservative to moderate political self-identification and lesser commitment to the Democratic Party by Evangelicals, pastors are generally progressive in their social and political perspectives. Mainline Protestant, “progressive” Pentecostal, and Catholic pastors lead the way while “neo-conservative” Pentecostal and Evangelical, although progressive in the majority of issues, are less so. In reality, congregants seem to be, generally, less progressive than their pastors (the hypothesis about pastors did hold true) with the exception of political affiliation.

As stated before, it is expected that in relation to moral issues Latino pastors in Chicago will be more progressive than their sheep. The abortion issue will serve as the litmus test to test this hypothesis. Only 38 percent of Latino pastors believe that abortion is never acceptable.

The analysis in this section has shown that Latino pastors are generally progressive in social and political issues with a handful of exceptions, and they are generally more progressive than their congregants. Latino pastors are also more progressive than their sheep in moral issues—at least as it relates to the abortion issue.

Civic Engagement Profiles of Latino Churches

Although understanding the differences in demographic characteristics and the social, political, and moral perspectives between the Pentecostal and other Latino faith traditions (in this case as measured by the pastor and congregant data) is important, the ultimate objective of this chapter is to determine if those differences substantially affect the civic engagement behavior of the church, the pastors, and their congregants. The civic engagement typology developed in chapter five which looks at civic engagement behavior within the congregation, in the community, and in the wider society will be used for this section. The hypothesis is that Latino Pentecostals in general are as civically engaged as Catholics and more engaged than Evangelicals. Latino “progressive” Pentecostals are as engaged as Mainline Protestants while the “neo-conservative” types are as engaged or less engaged than their Evangelical counterparts.

In order to study the first level of civic engagement, within congregation, several congregant behaviors will be analyzed including church membership, holding a leadership role, and helping organize an event or program at church (see Table 24). At

the same time, the weekly time commitment to the church will be analyzed to determine exactly how much time Latino congregants are committing to their churches and if that time commitment is similar for the different Latino religious traditions.

Table 24. Selected Civic Engagement Behavior of Latino Congregants by Church Type

Civic Engagement Behavior	Trad.	Neo-Con.	Pgs.	Evg.	MI.	Cath.	Total
<i>Percentage</i>							
Church member	91	89	80	82	68	72	80*
Church leader	64	64	63	59	58	51	60*
Event organizing— sometimes/often	85	78	74	76	81	67	77*
Church activities--three hours or more weekly	74	75	60	63	36	32	57*
Monthly contribution--\$50 to \$200	56	49	49	54	41	38	48*
Outside of church volunteering—> once a month	57	48	54	50	56	59	54*
Helping needy in community—sometimes/often	80	79	74	74	68	61	73*
Helping someone find job— sometimes or often	82	80	77	81	79	76	79
Lending money to non family—sometimes or often	88	87	84	89	86	89	87
Voted in 2004 election	75	74	77	81	83	84	79**
Attend political party events— sometimes or often	11	13	20	10	22	18	16*
N	480/ 150 ^a	312/ 227	185/ 128	602/ 263	110/ 65	679/ 362	2368/ 1195

Legend: Trad. = Traditional; Neo-Con. = Neo-Conservative; Pgs. = Progressive; Evg. = Evangelical; MI = Mainline; Cath. = Catholic.

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Survey 4 (Adult Churchgoers), 2007

a. The number of U.S. citizens analyzed for both voting and attendance at political party events.

*Significant at $p < .05$ for Chi-square test of independence.

**Significant at $p < .10$ for Chi-square test of independence.

Whereas 86 percent of the Latino Pentecostal congregants (the highest of all Latino congregants) reported being a member of their church, 82, 72, and 68 percent of their Evangelical, Catholic, and Mainline Protestant brethren, respectively, reported the same. However, once the Pentecostal category is broken down into its different types, the “traditional” ones report the highest membership rates for all Latino traditions at 91 percent followed by the “neo-conservative” types at 89 percent (80 percent of “progressive” congregants are also members of their church). There is no doubt that when it comes to commitment to the church by formally engaging it and making a commitment to being a member, “traditional” Pentecostal congregants lead the way closely followed by “neo-conservative” congregants and to a lesser extent by Evangelical and “progressive” Pentecostal ones. At 68 percent, Mainline Protestant congregants, closely followed by Catholic ones, report the lowest church membership rates of all Latino congregants in Chicago.

An important question to ask at this juncture is whether an active engagement as a church member also results in active participation either assisting in organizing events or programs or in taking a leadership role in the church. Besides attending worship services and being part of the liturgical life of the congregation, are Latinos developing civic skills and practicing them through service to other congregants and the community?

An impressive 60 percent of Latino congregants from all faith traditions report having a leadership role in their congregation. Consistent with church membership findings, Latino Pentecostals at 63 percent lead in congregant involvement in leadership positions compared to 59, 58, and 51 percent of Evangelical, Mainline, and Catholic congregants, respectively, who are also similarly involved. All Latino Pentecostal

congregants report similar rates when asked about their engagement as church leaders. These findings support the literature (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady 1995; Wuthnow, 1999, 2004) which found that Protestant congregations are more likely to offer opportunities for the development of civic skills and administrative experience in comparison to Catholic parishes. It was, therefore, not surprising that Pentecostal churches, in general, led the way given their generalized lack of financial resources and a long-standing tradition of voluntarism to run the congregation's administrative and programmatic functions. It was also not surprising that Catholic parishes and their congregants scored the lowest (51 percent) because many parishes and their program are run by paid professionals.

Because the majority of Latino congregants are women, it means that women are developing important civic and administrative skills. In fact, an impressive 65 percent of Pentecostal women congregants report holding a leadership position in church (61 percent of men report the same) while only 51 percent of Catholic women report the same. Of major importance is the fact that 68 percent of "progressive" Pentecostal women congregants claim to have a leadership role, whereas only 55 percent of their male counterparts do so. In none of the Latino faith traditions in Chicago do more men than women report having leadership positions. In other words, besides having influence and power at home, Latino women also have influence and power at the church—the majority of the leaders of Latino churches in Chicago are women. It is important to emphasize that this is the case at all Latino churches in Chicago but it is particularly so at "progressive" and "traditional" Pentecostal churches.

Holding a leadership position is only one way of engaging in the local congregation. Countless congregants also make themselves available to assist in the

organization of events or programs. Seventy-seven percent of congregants claim they sometimes or often assist in this manner; of this total 29 percent do it often. Pentecostal congregants once more lead the way in those that claim to often assist in organizing events or programs at 32 percent; they are closely followed by those that attend Evangelical churches at 30 percent. Those that attend Mainline and Catholic churches report the lowest rates at 26 and 23 percent respectively. Of significance is the fact that 34 percent (the highest for all Latino congregants in Chicago) of those that attend both “traditional” and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal churches report engaging in this manner. That is, the majority of Latino congregants assist in organizing events or activities sometimes or often at their churches. When those that do it often are analyzed, Latino Pentecostal congregants, particularly the “traditional” and “neo-conservative” types, lead the way while their Catholic counterparts report the least engagement in this manner.

Up to now the results of this analysis show that Latino congregants in Chicago are very engaged in their congregations, particularly the Pentecostal and Evangelical types, but what does that mean in terms of a weekly time commitment to their congregations? While 35 percent of all Latino congregants spend from 3 to 7 hours a week in church-related activities, another 22 percent spend more than 7 hours a week doing so. In fact, when the numbers are looked at closer, 33 percent of Pentecostal congregants spend more than 7 hours a week, while just 19, 8, and 7 percent of Evangelical, Mainline, and Catholic congregants, respectively, do the same. In fact, 38 percent of “traditional” Pentecostal congregants (the highest of all Latino congregants) report spending 7 or more hours a week in church-related activities closely followed by those that attend

“progressive” Pentecostal churches at 29 percent. In summary the majority of Latino congregants in Chicago spend a significant amount of time (more than three hours a week) in church-related activities. Pentecostals, particularly the “traditional” types, lead the way in how much time they invest in their congregations.

When it comes to the first level of civic engagement, within congregation, there is no doubt that Latino congregants from all faith traditions significantly engage in their churches. It is important to emphasize that Latino Pentecostal congregants, particularly “traditional” ones, lead the way, closely followed by their Evangelical counterparts. Both Mainline Protestant and Catholic congregants, although still actively engaged in their congregations, are much less engaged when compared to Pentecostals and even Evangelical ones.

Congregants can only be engaged in their congregations because those churches make available to them a variety of ways of getting involved. Participating in the liturgical life of the congregation, organizing and running events and programs for church congregants and the outer community, and managing administrative aspects of the organization are only a few examples of the many ways churches provide opportunities for involvement within their walls.

In order to understand the second level of civic engagement, in the community, a handful of congregant behaviors will be looked at including helping the needy in the community, helping someone find at job, and volunteering to do community service outside of local church. I hypothesize that congregants from all Latino faith traditions will engage in these activities but at different degrees. Mainline, “progressive” and “traditional” Pentecostal, and Catholic congregants are expected to be the most engaged

while those that attend Evangelical and “neo-conservative” churches the least engaged in their communities. In other words, I propose that there is a variation in community civic engagement depending on the Latino faith tradition the congregant belongs to.

An impressive 73 percent of all Latino congregants in Chicago help the needy in the community sometimes or often (18 percent do so often). Once again, Latino Pentecostal congregants lead with 77 percent (21 percent do it often) closely followed by Evangelical (18 percent do so often) and Mainline (19 percent report doing it often) congregants at 74 and 68 percent respectively. Those that attend Catholic congregations follow at a distance at 61 percent (15 percent do it often) in reporting helping the needy sometimes or often. Of Pentecostals, 80 percent of those that attend “traditional” congregations report the same (the highest of all Latino congregants). Although the majority of Latino congregants are engaged in their immediate communities by helping the needy, those in Pentecostal congregations, particularly the “traditional” ones, lead the way followed closely by those who attend Evangelical and Mainline churches. Catholic congregants, surprisingly, report helping the needy the least in comparison to all other Latino congregants.

Because Latino churches are an integral part of the extensive immigrant networks through which all kinds of resources flow, helping someone find a job is an important deliverable in Latino communities. Given the undocumented status of a large number of church congregants and the recent arrival of many others who are legally in the country, a job (which is the main reason why the overwhelming majority of Latinos are in this country anyway) is a valued asset. Therefore, helping someone find a job is an important community service both inside the congregation and in the immediate community.

Consequently, it is not surprising that 79 percent of Latino congregants claim to have helped someone find a job sometimes or often in the previous twelve months (14 percent did it often). This data clearly shows that besides helping the needy in the community with hospital visitation, and feeding the hungry, among others, the overwhelming majority of Latino congregants in Chicago are also engaged in helping people find jobs. That is, helping people find jobs, although informal in nature in the majority of cases, is an important way of engaging in the Latino community.

Finally, volunteering in the community to do community service has been found to be an important way of addressing community issues (Putnam, 1993; Smidt, 2003; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; Wuthnow, 1999, 2004). Fifty-four percent of Latino congregants report volunteering to do community service outside of their local church more than once a month. Although the numbers are very similar for all Latino faith traditions, Catholic congregants with 59 percent lead the way closely followed by their Mainline and Pentecostal brothers at 56 and 53 percent respectively. Those that attend Evangelical churches report the least volunteering more than once a month at 50 percent. Despite the differences among Latino religious traditions, the majority of Latino congregants report volunteering outside of their churches to do social service work at least once a month. Unfortunately, the survey did not obtain in-depth data to figure out if the volunteerism reported is facilitated by the local congregations, para-church organizations, secular non-profit organizations, or by government agencies.

There is no question that Latino congregants are also very engaged in their communities by helping the needy, helping someone find a job, or by volunteering to do social service work beyond the walls of the church. With the exception of community

voluntarism, Pentecostal congregants lead the way in community civic engagement. In fact, Mainline, “progressive” Pentecostal, and Catholic congregants were not found to be the most actively engaged in the community. Instead, those that attend “traditional” Pentecostal and Evangelical churches were found to be the most active in the community. However, the differences among all Latino congregants were not very large and all Latino congregants, by every measure used, are very engaged formally and informally in their communities.

The various Latino churches also make available to the community a variety of programs and services that not only give the congregants the opportunity to engage in a church activity but to do so serving the needs of those in the community. Food pantries, day care services, and after school programs are only a few of the services offered.

At the same time, Latino pastors also get involved in addressing the needs of the communities around them (see Table 25). In fact, 74 percent of all Latino pastors reported contacting a public official to address a church or community issue. Furthermore, when asked about participation in community organizations or associations in the last two years, 22 percent of all Latino pastors in Chicago report to never having done so. However, 85 percent of Latino pastors report holding membership in four or more associations or community organizations.

The commitment for community civic engagement is also demonstrated by the pastors’ encouragement of it. In fact, 68 percent of all Latino congregants maintain that their pastors often, through their sermons or homilies, have encouraged them to serve or volunteer in the community in the last year. Both “progressive” Pentecostal and Catholic pastors are reported to encourage their congregants more often (76 percent for both)

closely followed by Evangelical pastors (67 percent) while “traditional” Pentecostal and Mainline pastors (59 and 62 percent respectively) are reported to do it less often.

When it comes of the engagement of Latino congregations in their immediate communities, Latino Pentecostal churches lead the way, closely followed by Evangelical and Mainline churches. Surprisingly, Catholic churches are the least engaged in their surrounding communities.

To study the third and last level of civic engagement, in wider society, two congregant behaviors (voting and attending political party activities) will be analyzed. It is expected that all Latino congregants engage in these activities; however, those who attend Mainline Protestant, “progressive” Pentecostal, and Catholic congregations will show a higher degree of engagement than those that attend Evangelical, “traditional” and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal churches.

Due to the large number of undocumented or documented non U.S. citizen immigrants in Latino churches, only U.S. citizens were studied for voting and attending political party activities. Of Latino congregants who are U.S. citizens, seventy nine percent reported voting in the 2004 Presidential election. As expected, Catholic and Mainline Protestant congregants voted at somewhat higher rates, 84 and 83 percent respectively, while 75 and 81 percent of Pentecostal and Evangelical congregants did so. There were no significant differences in the percentages of Pentecostal congregants who voted across the three types of churches. Overall 75 percent of them reported voting in the 2004 presidential elections. In summary, non-Pentecostal Latino congregants do vote at higher levels than their Pentecostal counterparts, but the differences are not very large.

Table 25. Selected Civic Engagement Behavior of Latino Pastors by Church Type

Civic Engagement Behavior	Trad.	Neo-Con.	Pgs.	Evg.	MI.	Cath.	Total
<i>Percentage</i>							
Contacted public representative	71	85	80	83	75	50	74
Signed a petition	27	39	60	30	50	50	43
Hold membership in 4 or more associations/organizations	86	83	100	67	89	85	85
Voted in 2000 election	100a	92	100	89	75	100	93*
2000 election—voted for:							
Al Gore	55	40	60	45	100	73	62*
George W. Bush	45	60	40	55	0	27	38*
Participated in direct action	20	0	40	22	38	50	28
N	14/11b	12/10	5/5	21/11	9/5	20/15	81/57

Legend: Trad. = Traditional; Neo-Con. = Neo-Conservative; Pgs. = Progressive; Evg. = Evangelical; MI = Mainline; Cath. = Catholic.

Source: Chicago Latino Congregation Study Surveys 2, and 3 (Pastor/Leader), 2007
Weighted to represent the population of pastors of Latino churches in Chicago.

a. The number of U.S. citizens analyzed for voting.

b. The number of pastors that voted was analyzed for their choice of candidate.

*Significant at $p < .05$ for Chi-square test of independence.

When it comes to participating in political party activities such as voter registration drives, political campaigns, and giving money to a party, of Latino congregants who are U.S. citizens, 16 percent reported engaging in such activities sometimes or often. Both Mainline Protestant and “progressive” Pentecostal congregants lead the way with 22 and 20 percent, respectively, reporting participating in political party activities followed by their Catholic brothers at 18 percent. Those who attend Evangelical churches, as expected, report the lowest participation rate at 10 percent while their “traditional” and

“neo-conservative” Pentecostal counterparts report 11 and 13 percent respectively. In other words, a small percentage of Latino congregants who are U.S. citizens do engage in political party activities, outside of voting, but with major differences among the various religious traditions.

Latino Pentecostals in Chicago continue to show an important duality that demonstrates once again the diversity in their midst. The results of this analysis certainly document the existence of a “progressive” strand among them. Evangelical, “traditional” and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal congregants all engage in political activities less than their counterparts in other Latino religious traditions, supporting my original hypothesis.

The congregation’s pastor also gets civically involved in the larger society. When voting behavior was analyzed, 93 percent of all Latino pastors reported voting in the 2000 presidential elections—this is an extremely high voter turnout taking into consideration that 80 percent of all pastors are U.S. citizens and thus allowed to vote. “Progressive” Pentecostal pastors at 100 percent voted the most, followed by “neo-conservative” Pentecostal, Catholic, and “traditional” Pentecostal (92, 75, and 72 percent, respectively). Although Mainline Protestant pastors reported voting the least at 50 percent, they were closely followed by their Evangelical colleagues at 54 percent.

However, once only U.S. citizens were included in the calculation, “progressive” and “traditional” Pentecostal and Catholic pastors voted the most at 100 percent. They were closely followed by “neo-conservative” Pentecostal and Evangelical pastors at 92 and 89 percent, respectively, with Mainliners reporting a 75 percent voting rate. In other words, although the absolute majority of the Latino pastors that are able to vote (U.S.

citizens) do so, “progressive” and “traditional” Pentecostal and Catholic pastors lead the way while their Mainline counterparts report voting the least.

But for whom did they vote? Of those that voted in the 2000 presidential election, 62 percent voted for the Democratic candidate (Al Gore) and 38 percent for the Republican one (George W. Bush). Mainline Protestant pastors led the way voting for the Democratic candidate at 100 percent and Catholic, “progressive,” and “traditional” Pentecostal pastors followed at 73, 60, and 55 percent, respectively. On the other hand, the majority of Evangelical and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal pastors at 55 and 60 percent, respectively, voted for the Republican candidate. Once again, Pentecostals are at both extremes of the issue: “progressive” and “traditional” pastors mainly voted for the Democratic candidate while their “neo-conservative” brothers mainly voted for the Republican one. When it comes to voting, both Mainline and Catholic Latino pastors led the way in supporting the Democratic Party candidate. At the same time, 28 percent of all Latino pastors reported having participated in direct action such as protests and rallies in the previous three years.

In fact, 50 percent of Latino congregants in Chicago claim that their pastor, in the last year, encouraged them sometimes or often to get involved in politics. Those that attend “progressive” and “traditional” Pentecostal churches and Catholic parishes lead with 63, 53, and 59 percent, respectively, while Evangelical and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal congregants, at 38 and 44 percent, respectively, report the least pastoral encouragement.

The data show that when it comes to the third level of civic engagement, societal engagement, “progressive” Pentecostal and Catholic congregations and their congregants

lead the way followed closely by Mainline Protestants. Evangelical, “traditional” Pentecostal, and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal churches and their congregants lag behind the other Latino religious traditions. The lack of leadership in regards to societal civic engagement by Latino Mainline Protestant congregations and their congregants is a major surprise. It is a clear reminder that the paradigms that apply to the U.S. religious landscape, in general, may actually make a poor fit in the complex Latino context. Furthermore, the fact that “neo-conservative” Pentecostal churches, their pastors, and congregants, are only as engaged as their “traditional” counterparts is very significant given my hypothesis of their evolution from their “traditional” origins. In fact, with the exception of the pastor’s voting behavior, Evangelical churches are more civically engaged in wider society than their “neo-conservative” Pentecostal cousins.

The analysis of the civic engagement behavior of Latino churches, their pastors and congregants, has produced some expected and many more unexpected results. That is, when it comes to the first level of engagement (within the walls of the church), as expected, both Pentecostal and Evangelical congregations are very active with Mainline and particularly their Catholic counterparts following at a distance. All Latino churches experience intense civic engagement within their walls, but more so in Pentecostal (particularly the “traditional” types) and Evangelical congregations. This means that congregants at Pentecostal and Evangelical congregations have more opportunity to develop civic and administrative skills than if they attended any other Latino church. Because the majority of Pentecostal and Evangelical church congregants are women, immigrants, and the poor and working classes, these congregations offer an invaluable

opportunity to the disfranchised to obtain the skills and experience they are unlikely to get anywhere else in this society (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995).

Surprisingly Mainline and Catholic congregants were not found to be the most active in community civic engagement. Instead Pentecostal congregants, particularly the “traditional” types, were the most engaged in helping the needy and even in social service volunteering in the community. In fact, Evangelical congregants were also found to be more active in their communities than their Catholic and Mainline brothers and sisters. Similar to what was found for within church engagement, Pentecostal churches (in this case the “progressive” types) lead the way in community engagement, followed by Evangelical and Mainline ones. Catholic churches lag considerably behind at this level of engagement.

At the third level of civic engagement, societal engagement, both “progressive” and Catholic congregations lead the way. Mainline Protestant churches show an active participation by their congregants but a disappointing one by their pastors (at least as it relates to voting). With the exception of voting, both “traditional” and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal churches showed significant disengagement. Evangelical churches joined them in that disengagement particularly as reflected by the pastor’s low voting turnout and the congregant’s low involvement in political party activities (both were the lowest of all Latino congregants and pastors).

In summary, the analysis of the civic engagement among Latino churches in Chicago, their pastors, and congregants shows that Pentecostal churches are extremely engaged in their congregations (more than any other church) and are also actively engaged in their communities—less so than within the walls of the church. When it

comes to the societal realm, however, only the “progressive” types are very engaged; in fact, along with Catholic parishes, “progressive” Pentecostal congregations are the most engaged politically of all Latino congregations in Chicago. Both “neo-conservative” and “traditional” Pentecostal churches along with their Evangelical counterparts were the least engaged politically of all congregations.

Evangelical churches were found to be very engaged within their congregation, less so than Pentecostal ones, and also fairly engaged in their communities—also less so than their Pentecostal counterparts but more so than Mainline and Catholic churches. Along with “neo-conservative” and “traditional” Pentecostal churches, they were also found to be the most politically disengaged of all Latino churches.

With the exception of the political activism of Mainline Protestant congregants, Mainline Protestant churches were found to be not as engaged in their congregations and in their communities in comparison to churches of other Latino religious traditions. In fact, they lagged behind Evangelical churches at both levels. In political engagement (against expectations), Mainline Protestant pastors also lagged behind both “progressive” Pentecostal and Catholic pastors. This study shows that Latino Mainline Protestant churches in Chicago are certainly not the leaders of the Latino religious landscape when it comes to civic engagement behavior (including the three levels of engagement).

Catholic congregations, with the noted exception of congregant community voluntarism, were not found to be as engaged within their congregations and in their communities as their Pentecostal and Evangelical counterparts. However, they led, along with “progressive” Pentecostals, in political engagement—both pastors and their congregants showed a very dynamic engagement.

If the perspective is advanced that community voluntarism and political engagement is the true civic engagement (as many researchers have done in the past), then Latino Catholics, “progressive” Pentecostals, and Mainliners are without a doubt the leaders in civic engagement. However, if all levels of engagement are included in the equation, then Latino Pentecostals, particularly the “progressive” and “traditional” types are the leaders. As I have argued before, the study of civic engagement, particularly in the Latino religious context, must include all levels of engagement—within the church, in the community, and in wider society. They are all important in causing change, and in engaging individuals to address issues that are individually and communally relevant.

Pentecostal versus Evangelical

In the U.S., Pentecostalism is generally lumped under the category of Evangelicalism and very little research is conducted to study it separate from and in comparison to other faith traditions (see Greeley & Hout, 2006; Pew Research Center, 2006, 2008 for some exceptions). I have argued in this dissertation, however, that in the Latino context Pentecostals need to be studied separately from Evangelicals for a couple of important reasons. First, Latino Pentecostal churches and their congregants are a lot more numerous than Evangelical ones and exert a lot of influence over them—we found 64 percent more Pentecostal than Evangelical Latino churches in Chicago (Center for the Study of Latino Religion, 2010, p. 14). Second, the majority of Latino Evangelical churches is affiliated with American denominations and is, consequently, directly influenced by the U.S. Evangelical movement. That is not the case with Latino Pentecostal congregations, which are quickly experiencing a trend towards denominational independence or at worst are affiliated with Latin American or U.S.

Latino denominations (“concilios”). In other words, in the Latino context the separation of Pentecostals and Evangelicals for the purpose of understanding is not a nicety but a research necessity.

Although some similarities between Latino Evangelicals and “neo-conservative” Pentecostals have been documented in this dissertation, significant differences exist when Evangelicals are compared to other types of Pentecostal congregants. Whereas Latino Pentecostal congregants and pastors (with the exception of the “neo-conservative” types) are strong supporters of the Democratic Party, this is not necessarily the case among Latino Evangelicals. That is, it is true that the majority of Evangelical congregants affiliate with the Democratic Party, but their pastors along with “neo-conservative” Pentecostals are the only ones among all Latino pastors in Chicago to mainly vote for the Republican Party.

In other words, although there are some similarities between Latino Evangelicals and Pentecostals, particularly with the “neo-conservative” types, there are also significant differences mainly as regards their social and political perspectives and civic engagement in wider society.

In fact, Latino Evangelicals are as conservative or even more so than their white Evangelical counterparts. According to Pew, while 59 percent of white Evangelicals voted for the Republican candidate in the presidential election of 2000, this dissertation found that 55 percent of Latino Evangelical pastors did so (Pew Research Center, 2008). There is, however, a large difference in political affiliation between Latino and white Evangelicals. While 28 percent of white Evangelicals affiliated with the Democratic Party in 2004, this dissertation found that 66 percent of Latino Evangelical congregants

did so (Pew Research Center, 2008). When it comes to abortion, Latino Evangelical congregants are definitely more conservative than their white counterparts. Whereas 19 percent of white Evangelicals believe that abortion should be illegal in all cases, this dissertation found that 68 percent of Latino Evangelical congregants believe that it is never acceptable (Pew Research Center, 2008). This is certainly an imperfect comparison because Latino Evangelical pastors and congregants are being compared to white Evangelicals in general.

In the end, it is very important to separate Latino Evangelicals and Pentecostals for the sake of research. Although Latino Evangelicals have some similarities with Pentecostals (moral issues, for instance), particularly with the “neo-conservative” types, they also have significant differences in social and political views and civic engagement behavior—mainly with the “progressive” and “traditional” Pentecostal types.

Summary and Conclusion

In summary, it is very clear that the Latino religious landscape of Chicago has radically changed and with it the involvement of churches in the public arena. “Progressive” Pentecostal churches now compete with Catholic parishes for political influence and Pentecostal congregations, in general, lead in all levels of civic engagement. Even though “traditional” and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal churches are very active within their congregations and in the surrounding communities, they are less so in wider society (particularly the “neo-conservative” and “traditional” types). Evangelical churches also have significant influence in the new landscape of Latino religion. Even when they are very involved within the church and in their communities, they lack very active involvement in wider society. Surprisingly, Mainline Protestant

congregations, even when fairly engaged at all levels, are not the civic engagement leaders of the Latino religious landscape. Finally, although their congregants and pastors are not as involved within the walls of their churches and in their communities, Catholic parishes share the leadership in political engagement along with their “progressive” Pentecostal counterparts.

One thing is certain of Latino churches in Chicago: the majority of the congregations and their congregants are actively involved at all levels of civic engagement with varying degrees of focus and intensity for the different religious traditions. All Latino churches and their congregants demonstrate a commitment to progressive social and political perspectives with some exceptions such as the conservative politics of “neo-conservative” and Evangelical pastors. However, Latinos pastors and their congregants are a very religious bunch, particularly the Pentecostal and Evangelical ones, and have strong moral convictions. It is without a doubt a fascinating duality.

I proposed early on in this dissertation that a new category, moderate, was needed to be included in the dominant liberal versus conservative religion paradigm that has been used extensively in this country (Greeley & Hout, 2006; Smidt, 2003; Wuthnow, 1999, 2004). I think the results of this dissertation point to the fact that a person can be very religious, the way a significant portion of Latinos were found to be, and still be socially and politically progressive. Although the study found that Latinos are, in general, social and political progressives, it is undeniable that they are also very religious and staunch moral conservatives. Does having a conservative morality make you a conservative when you consistently believe and behave as a social and political progressive? The fact is that

Latinos, particularly the Pentecostal and Evangelical types, are presently categorized as conservatives when in fact, with a few exceptions, they have been documented to be social and political progressives that happen to be religious and who possess a conservative morality. At the very least, when all their beliefs and practices are looked at, Latinos (congregants and pastors) are moderates, but certainly not conservatives.

Given the low levels of education, financial resources, and class status (the majority are poor or working class) among “traditional” Pentecostals, it is really surprising how engaged they are at all levels civic engagement. In fact, in many areas of engagement, particularly in within the church and in the community categories, “traditional” Pentecostals are the most active, and are not that far behind their “progressive” Pentecostal and Catholic counterparts in wider society engagement.

The analysis in this chapter also confirms the pastor-sheep gap that was observed in chapter four, except this time it was documented among all Latino religious traditions. “Progressive” Pentecostal pastors continue to outpace their congregants in wider society engagement and politics and in several social and political views. At the same time, Evangelical and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal pastors are more conservative politically than their congregants and even in some key social and political issues.

Finally, the separation of Evangelicals and Pentecostals for the sake of analysis has been a fruitful one. The data shows that although Latino Evangelical congregants are similar to their Pentecostal cousins in a variety of areas, particularly in their demographic characteristics, religiosity, and some social and political beliefs, they are also very different in other areas. Latino Evangelical congregants are different than Pentecostal ones in their political behavior and their engagement in wider society; they are

particularly so in comparison to the “progressive” Pentecostal types. This is surprising given the high levels of education reported by the Evangelical pastors in comparison to the very low levels reported by their “traditional” Pentecostal colleagues.

In chapter seven, the conclusion, I will summarize the main arguments and contributions of this dissertation. I will then outline and discuss the implications of my findings for the study of religion and civic engagement, but more importantly for the study of Pentecostalism and civic engagement. I will then discuss several key questions that still need answering and propose future research.

CHAPTER EIGHT

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Summary

I engaged in this project with the ultimate objective of shedding light on Pentecostalism, which is a huge and growing religious movement that has traveled to even the least known corners of the world. As a sociologist, I am very interested in the empowerment of the poor and disfranchised around the world, but particularly of those that make the urban setting their home. Given Pentecostalism's origin among racial minorities, immigrants, women, and the disfranchised in Los Angeles, California, over one hundred years ago, I have spent almost a decade trying to understand if this movement and its ethos are a facilitator or an inhibitor (a type of "opium of the people") of social and political empowerment.

Even though Pentecostalism originated in the United States, it has received scant research attention in this country. The fact is that until recently, with some exceptions, Pentecostalism had not also received a lot of attention around the world even when it was estimated that its followers were counted in the hundreds of millions. It was not until 2006 when the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life published its global, ten-country, study of Pentecostalism that a comparative in-depth look of the movement was even possible.

Despite the fact that the United States was included as one of the countries analyzed by the 2006 Pew report, the Pentecostal movement was studied as a monolithic

movement and no differentiation was made about its internal diversity particularly as it relates to different expressions that result from the lived experiences of multiple racial and ethnic groups. Given the humble origins of Pentecostalism and its prevalence among Latino immigrants, the focus of this dissertation is Latino Pentecostalism and its intersection with civic engagement. Is Pentecostalism a facilitator or an inhibitor of civic engagement for U.S. Latinos, who, along with African Americans, are one of the most disadvantaged groups in American society?

Given the conclusions of recent research (Miller & Yamamori, 2007; Ruano, 2007), I argue in this dissertation that there are different strands of U.S. Latino Pentecostalism that see their role in the world differently and that this ultimately results in varying emphasis and modes of civic engagement behavior for both churches and their congregants. That is, while some Pentecostal churches and their congregants may be conservative, inward-looking, and otherworldly, others, in fact, may be progressive outward-looking, and thisworldly—with the possibility of other options along this continuum.

In order to answer the research questions of this dissertation and to test its thesis, I used the Chicago Latino Congregations Study data collected from 2003 to 2007 by the Center for the Study of Latino Religion at the University of Notre Dame. This data set contains the most comprehensive data ever collected on U.S. Latino Pentecostal churches, pastors, and congregants. Because the study included all major Latino faith traditions in Chicago, it allows an in-depth comparative analysis of Latino churches and their congregants. I used cluster analysis, logistic regression, cross tabulations, and comparisons of means to analyze the quantitative data. Due to the fact that the Chicago

Latino Congregations Study used a mixed methods approach, qualitative data on several case study congregations and their congregants was also collected and analyzed. As a result, this dissertation is primarily quantitative in nature, but it also uses qualitative data for depth and detail to complement the larger patterns observed through the quantitative analysis.

In order to understand the intersection of Latino Pentecostalism and civic engagement, a typology of Pentecostal congregations and one of civic engagement were developed. I originally hypothesized that there were three different types of Pentecostal congregations—“traditional,” “progressive,” and “activist”—but the research results besides confirming the existence of two of the types also showed that instead of an “activist” type a “neo-conservative” type existed. These three types of congregations were then analyzed in relation to the three levels of engagement that were part of the civic engagement typology I developed—within church (Level 1), in community (Level 2), and in wider society (Level 3). Each of the levels was operationalized through the use of several variables that went from church membership and leadership role to voting and participation in political party activities. The analysis included congregant, pastor, and church variables.

Once the typologies had been developed, several models were developed and tested using logistic regression analysis. The objective was to identify the factors that contribute to different modes of congregant civic engagement. In the end, the civic engagement behavior of the different types of Pentecostal congregations, their pastors and congregants, was compared to that of Mainline Protestant, Evangelical, and Catholic churches. The goal was to find out how the civic engagement behavior observed of the

different types of Pentecostal churches and their congregants compared to that of other Latino faith traditions.

The data showed that “traditional” Pentecostal congregations (the quintessential classical churches), although declining, still command the largest portion of the Latino Pentecostal landscape in Chicago with 45 percent of the churches. They are followed by the newly emerged and dynamically growing “neo-conservative” churches with 39 percent of all Latino Pentecostal churches. Finally, “progressive” congregations, with 16 percent of all churches, are also new arrivals and aggressively growing, but they are different than their other Pentecostal brethren.

Although it was hypothesized that “traditional” congregations would be the most conservative, inward-looking, and otherworldly and as such the least engaged in community and wider society, this research results outright disproved it. Instead it was found that “traditional” churches are surprisingly socially and politically progressive, enjoy very dynamic engagement within the walls of their churches, are very actively engaged in their surrounding communities, and even rival for leadership in wider society civic engagement. In fact, “traditional” Pentecostal congregations were leaders of Level 1 and Level 2 civic engagement (their pastors, however, were documented to be the least engaged in the community), and they provided both the most and the richest opportunities of all Latino churches for the development and practice of civic and administrative skills.

The majority of “traditional” Pentecostal church pastors and congregants affiliate with the Democratic Party, vote for democratic candidates, and hold very progressive social and political perspectives. The “traditional” Pentecostal church is the unapologetic Latino immigrant church with the highest percentage of undocumented immigrants and

the largest concentration of the poor and the very poor (of all Chicago Latino churches) of the Latino community.

What is even more puzzling, at least in comparison to white Pentecostals, is that besides being very progressive, the “traditional” Pentecostal church is, by every measure used, the most religious and morally conservative of all Latino Pentecostal and all Latino churches in Chicago. Bluntly stated, “traditional” Pentecostal congregants and their pastors embody both some of the most progressive and some of the most conservative perspectives known in American religion.

Although “neo-conservative” Pentecostal churches and their congregants were hypothesized to be moderates in their religious, social and political views and to be actively engaged within the church and in the community and less so in wider society, they were found only partially to live up to those expectations. They were, however, found to be very religious, very morally conservative (just like all other Pentecostals), more integrated to U.S. society than their “traditional” Pentecostal brethren, and comparatively less progressive in several social and political issues. “Neo-conservative” pastors (along with their Latino Evangelical colleagues) were documented to be the only Latino Pentecostal pastors who mainly voted for the Republican Party in a clear departure from even their own congregants. On the other hand, living up to expectations, “neo-conservative” Pentecostals were active in all levels of civic engagement, but less so than their “traditional” brothers and sisters. These are very interesting findings due to the higher availability of human, educational, and financial resources these churches have at their disposal (they have the largest annual budgets of all Pentecostal churches) particularly in comparison to their “traditional” counterparts. There is no question that

“neo-conservative” Pentecostal churches are not the conservative churches white Pentecostal churches have been found to be (Greeley & Hout, 2006), but they are unequivocally the most conservative in the Latino Pentecostal landscape. In fact, their beliefs and practices resemble Latino Evangelical churches, which this dissertation found are the most politically conservative of all Latino churches in Chicago, and along with “neo-conservative” Pentecostal churches the overall most conservative Latino church in the city.

On the contrary, although “progressive” Pentecostal churches, along with their “neo-conservative” counterparts, are the most integrated into U.S. society, they are also the most progressive of all Pentecostals even surpassing both Mainline and Catholic churches on most issues. Even though they (and particularly the pastors) are the most supportive of the Democratic Party, they are also very religious and morally conservative. Their pastors and, to a lesser extent their congregants, have the highest levels of education of all Latino pastors and the highest annual household incomes (along with “neo-conservative” ones) of all Latino congregants. Yet, their congregations are smaller and with fewer financial resources than their “neo-conservative” brethren. Even with size and financial limitations, “progressive” churches experience dynamic within church engagement and are actively involved in the community, albeit at lower levels than their “traditional” counterparts, particularly if informal engagement is emphasized. “Progressive” congregations do offer the largest number of formal programs and services for congregants and community members of all Latino Pentecostal churches. Of the different types of Pentecostal churches, the “progressive” congregations lead in wider society engagement and share with Mainline Protestant churches and Catholic parishes

leadership in this area. Although their congregants, along with all other Pentecostals, are extremely religious and morally conservative, “progressive” Pentecostal pastors are less morally conservative than their members, which resulted in a wide pastor-sheep gap.

Because qualitative research shows that the majority of “neo-conservative” and “progressive” Pentecostal congregations evolved from “traditional” ones, several questions beg for answers. Will “neo-conservative” churches eventually evolve into “progressive” types, or will they consolidate themselves as the conservative Pentecostal type in line with their conservative white Pentecostal and Evangelical counterparts? Will “progressive” congregations become “activist” types—actively engaging the oppressive social structures of society in search of social justice—or will they remain the same? Given the proliferation of prosperity theology among some of the “progressive” Pentecostal churches, is it possible that many will become conservative and abandon their progressive ways? More important, will “traditional” congregations remain as an important force in the Latino Pentecostal landscape? Will they develop the ability and vision to more actively and directly engage social structures given the fact that they are not the ultra conservative, inward-looking, and otherworldly churches they were hypothesized to be?

Even more important, for the sake of this study, is whether the typologies of Pentecostal congregations and civic engagement I developed for this dissertation proved to be useful in understanding the reality of Chicago Latino Pentecostals and their civic engagement behavior. I would argue that the use of the typologies produced fresh and important knowledge about Latino Pentecostals and that this will contribute to our poor understanding of this seriously understudied branch of Christianity.

In fact, the use of these typologies resulted in the identification of similarities and differences among Latino Pentecostals. That is, whereas “traditional” churches are the refuge of recent Latino immigrants (including the undocumented) and the truly disadvantaged of the Latino barrios, their “progressive” counterparts are the home of the more educated and emerging middle classes of the Latino community. The typologies and the results they produced were particularly instrumental in conducting comprehensive comparisons between the identified types of Pentecostal congregations with those of all other Latino faith traditions.

Shortcomings

Even when the data collected by the Latino Congregations Study produced the most complete data sets of Latino congregations in the country (containing in-depth information of all Latino faith traditions), it was not uniformly collected at all churches. There were differences in the rate of success between Catholic and Protestant congregations. The pastor data was collected successfully and uniformly for all faith traditions, but that was not the case with congregant data. The issue is not one of excessive missing data among Catholic congregants, but of congregant response rates. Unlike Protestant churches where close to a census of the congregants present when the data was collected was achieved, at Catholic parishes (because of logistical reasons that result from having multiple masses one right after the other) small percentages of the parishioners at the mass filled the surveys out.

Consequently, one must be careful in comparing Catholic congregants with their counterparts in the other Latino faith traditions. The Catholic congregants that completed

the survey are not fully representative of congregants in that church making it hard to generalize about that parish let alone about Latino Catholic congregants in general.

Also, the Chicago Latino Congregations Study focused on congregants and their pastors in Chicago; as a result, it is not possible to generalize about all Latino Pentecostals or Evangelicals, for instance. Instead the results can only be generalized to Chicago Latino churches, their congregants and pastors. Then too, by using a convenience sample of congregants, the results may be biased toward attendees.

As important is also the fact that the Chicago Latino Congregations Study did not target the whole Chicago metropolitan area, but instead it focused on Chicago and a couple of adjacent suburbs (Cicero and Berwyn). This may bias the results in favor of the Democratic Party given the high affiliation rates, particularly among minority groups, this party enjoys in the city—for instance, in Chicago, Puerto Ricans tend to generally affiliate to the Democratic Party.

Finally an issue that was not predicted in research design but that became relevant in the data analysis phase of this study relates to the fact that an increasing number of Latino Pentecostal congregations join U.S. non Pentecostal denominations (the Swedish Evangelical Covenant Church, for instance) in search of stability and resources but remain Pentecostal churches. Those congregations, in practice and through the pastor's self-definition, are Pentecostal, but because they are affiliated with non-Pentecostal denominations were coded as Evangelical churches. Because the recoding of churches was done manually following a tedious process, I am not completely sure that all Pentecostal congregations in the sample were properly coded.

Future research must adequately tease out those details to prevent, among Latinos, an undercounting of Pentecostal congregations and an over counting of other faith traditions. Besides congregant and pastor self-identification as Pentecostals, I recommend the inclusion of a battery of questions that test the central Pentecostal beliefs and practices (speaking in tongues, healing, the active role of Holy Spirit in the daily life of the individual, and others).

Implications

This study has implications not just for the sociology of religion and the particular study of Pentecostalism, but also for the understanding of the dynamics at play in the social and political empowerment of the most disadvantaged in society. First, this study, against my own predictions, documented that “traditional” Latino Pentecostal churches are not the ultra conservative, inward-looking, and otherworldly fundamentalists many people may believe them to be as a result of research among some Pentecostals (Greeley & Hout, 2006; Wood, 1994). With the noted exceptions of their intense religiosity and ultra conservative morality (which is similar for all Latino Pentecostal churches), “traditional” Pentecostal churches and their congregants are actually very progressive in almost all social and political areas. They definitely do not vote Republican simply because of the abortion and gay rights issues as is the case with many Conservative Protestants in the U.S. Instead they show a pragmatism that reflects their daily social reality as immigrants, minorities, and the disfranchised, and/or in line with their Latin American origins (keeping in mind that Latin America in the last ten years has decisively gone to the political left).

Because the “traditional” Pentecostal church attracts and serves the most disadvantaged of the Latino community and offers them opportunities for the development and practice of civic and administrative skills, it is certainly the church that empowers the most disadvantaged of the Latino community. Unfortunately, the “traditional” Pentecostal church is quickly declining and has even lost the leadership position it once commanded in the Latino Pentecostal landscape of Chicago. If the decline continues, the empowerment of the poor and disfranchised of the urban Latino community may significantly suffer.

This study also found that there are indeed different types of Latino Pentecostal congregations, but the main difference between the types of churches is the pastors more than the congregants. Whereas “progressive” church pastors are a lot more liberal than their sheep, “neo-conservative” pastors are generally more conservative than theirs. Either way the pastor makes the difference. It is important, therefore, to seriously study pastors and the role they play in the development of Pentecostal congregations particularly as it relates to civic engagement.

Also, “progressive” Pentecostal churches are on the vanguard of civic engagement in wider society competing with Catholic parishes and Mainline churches for leadership in that area. Yet they are also less and less the refuge of the truly disadvantaged. They are, instead, quickly becoming the home of the upwardly mobile of the Latino community. In addition their social and political commitments may be compromised by the growing influence of prosperity theology and its embrace of individualism and materialism—hardly the core values of Christian leftists. Some of the qualitative research results seem to indicate that some of the “progressive” churches are

already exhibiting a desire to confront the oppressive social structures of society, to become “activist” congregations. What is really telling, however, is the fact that while “progressive” Pentecostal churches may have chosen the cause of the poor and oppressed, the poor and oppressed have, instead, chosen “traditional” churches. As “progressive” Pentecostal congregations continue on their civic engagement journey, they will need to also look internally, in critical ways, and see how they can be more effective at attracting and retaining those they have chosen to defend.

What is truly perplexing is not that “traditional” Pentecostal churches are not what they were hypothesized to be, but that they have given birth to a new type of congregation, the “neo-conservative” church, that is less progressive than its progenitor. This has and will continue to produce a significant rearrangement of the Latino Pentecostal landscape of Chicago with important consequences socially and politically for the most disadvantaged of the Latino community. This certainly requires further research. “Neo-conservative” Pentecostal pastors have the lowest rate of higher education (B.A. degree or more) of all Latino pastors in Chicago. As they become more educated, will they become more progressive? Some of the qualitative research results seem to indicate that instead of looking for educational opportunities at conservative seminaries, some of the “neo-conservative” pastors are starting to look at liberal seminaries which are institutions that are more accepting of “Pentecostals just as they are,” as one “progressive” church pastor who attended a liberal Mainline seminary put it.

The data seem to indicate that instead of modeling themselves after the Black churches (characterized by intense religiosity, moral conservatism, and liberal social and political perspectives) next door, Latino “neo-conservative” churches are looking at white

suburban churches for models. That is, it seems that as many Latino Pentecostals assimilate to American culture, they also assimilate to white Evangelicalism and Pentecostalism at the expense of their own unique Pentecostal traditions and practice. More important of all, many (particularly the pastors) seem to acculturate to the Conservative Protestant establishment at the expense of their predecessors' social and political commitments.

In general, the findings of this study seem to suggest that Pentecostal congregations, with some variations among the different types, are not inhibitors of civic engagement. In fact, judging from the pastors' encouragement of their members to get involved in the community and politics, and the civic engagement behavior of both congregants and their pastors, Pentecostal congregations operate as facilitators of civic engagement with some types being more effective at it than others. Even more, Pentecostal congregations, with some variation, do not seem to be a factor contributing to the making of their congregants into overall conservative Christians. The fact is that at present the majority of Latino Pentecostals in Chicago (with the exception of "neo-conservative" pastors) supports the Democratic Party and hold very progressive social and political stances with the already noted exception of their moral conservative perspectives. Where Latino Pentecostals will go from here, particularly the "neo-conservative" and "progressive" types, is a research question for a future project.

It is not Latino Mainline churches, as some might have expected, that lead in civic engagement in the Latino context. Instead, when all civic engagement behaviors are considered, both "progressive" and "traditional" Pentecostal congregations lead all Latino churches in Chicago. At the societal level, "progressive" Pentecostal, Mainline

Protestant, and Catholic churches lead while both “progressive” and “traditional” Pentecostal churches lead at the community level. In terms of within church engagement, it is clear that “traditional” and “neo-conservative” Pentecostal churches lead all Latino churches in Chicago closely followed by their “progressive” Pentecostal and Evangelical counterparts.

Latino Evangelical churches were, on the other hand, found to be the most conservative of all Latino churches and the least engaged in society along with their “neo-conservative” Pentecostal counterparts. They were, in fact, found to mirror several of the conservative white Evangelical church features. This clearly indicates that at least in the Latino context, and even in the U.S. religious context, the separation of Pentecostals and Evangelicals for the sake of research may actually be a necessity and not a nicety.

Future Research

This research project’s results can only be generalized to Latino Pentecostal churches and their congregants in Chicago. However, how much of the framework developed can be used to study other Pentecostal groups around the country and the world? Will similar results be obtained if this framework is applied to study African American and white Pentecostal churches in urban versus rural areas?

This dissertation sheds light on only a few aspects of the civic engagement behavior of Latino Pentecostals, but a lot more research is needed to understand the theological and social mind set of the different types of Pentecostals and how that affects their views of the world, and their responsibility to themselves, their families, their surrounding communities and their society. The qualitative research conducted among

the representative case study congregations seemed to hint that while “progressive” congregations, particularly their pastors, displayed a humanistic perspective of life and their role in society, “traditional” churches had a spiritualistic perspective. Whereas “progressive” pastors and even their congregants seemed to believe, as reflected by their discourse, that it is human beings that cause problems and fix them with the help of God, their “traditional” brothers believed that it is angels and demons that influence people to do what they do and God, after defeating the devil and his evil soldiers, fixes it—mainly supernaturally and sometimes through the use of his anointed. Research may show that both of these mind sets are operational at the same time, but certain types of Pentecostals emphasize one more than the other at a given time or place.

A lot more research is also needed to understand if and how Pentecostals actually transfer the civic skills and administrative experience they obtain in church to their families, communities, and wider society. Are they better able to manage their homes and finances? Are they better able to compete for promotions at work? Are they more likely to join in local organizations and pressure groups to address the problems that affect their communities?

Also, more research, particularly the longitudinal type, is needed to track the evolutionary trajectories, through time, of Latino Pentecostal congregations. The fact that the majority of “non- traditional” churches originated from “traditional” ones really hints at a very dynamic evolutionary process among Latino Pentecostal churches.

Understanding what triggers the evolutionary process and the factors that contribute to a congregation becoming “progressive” versus “neo-conservative” (the education of the congregants and/or of the pastor, for instance) are important.

Although the social capital theoretical framework and the literature on religion and civic engagement, particularly the work of Wuthnow (1999, 2004), Loveland (2005), Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (1999), Schwadel (2002, 2005), Smidt (2003), Cnaan (2002), and Cnaan, Hernandez, and McGrew (2002), was very helpful in understanding the intricacies of the role religion plays in civic engagement, some important issues need addressing. While some work places a lot of importance on the individual's participation in civic organizations, very little attention is paid to within congregation engagement, and the role churches, but particularly pastors, play in influencing the civic engagement behavior of their congregants. Given the importance of the Pentecostal pastor within the congregation, a lot more research is needed to understand how and why these pastors lead Latino Pentecostal congregations in different trajectories as congregations ("traditional," "neo-conservative," or "progressive") and in their civic engagement practices. As important is finding out how church pastors affect their congregants as they engage within and beyond the walls of the church.

APPENDIX A
FOCUS GROUP PROTOCOL

Adult Focus Group Interview Schedule
General Questions about Church Life, Community Ministry, Labor Issues, and
Religious Identity

INSTRUCTIONS: Your church is one of four congregations that have been selected to be studied in depth. This is a conversation in which we would like everyone to participate. There is no right or wrong answer. We simply want to know your feelings, beliefs, and opinions about different aspects of your congregation. What you say in this conversation is confidential. No one will ever be able to connect your answers to your name. We will be recording the conversation. We need you to sign the consent form before we begin. We expect our conversation with you today to take approximately XXXX. Thank you for your time and cooperation.

[Instructions for Interviewers: Please make sure to ask the “probe” questions. Many times people will have other comments, so we want to elicit information about these areas as well]

I. Religious and Spiritual Life: Individual Practices and Communal Norms

- 1) Think about the first time you came to this church. What attracted you most to this church? Be specific. *Probe: Did a family member or friend invite you? Describe for us your very first visit to this church. What still attracts you most to this church?*
- 2) This church has been growing in numbers in recent years. From your perspective what are the key reasons for this growth? *Probe: What role do pastors, key leaders, programming, warm/friendly culture play in this growth? Do you do things with other churches, support their ministries?*
- 3) From your perspective, what are the greatest challenges that parents face in supporting the development of their children’s faith? *Probe: Be specific - how does your church help people in dealing with the needs of their children? Does the church have programs or initiatives that help to support the development of children or adolescents’ faith?*

II. Civic/Community Engagement: The Collective Story of the Church’s Work in the Community

- 4) What do you think is the most important way in which your church serves the local community? What social issues does the church engage? **[Note to Interviewers: we are talking about programs that mostly serve people outside of the church.]** *Probe: How does the church address this issue? In what way are you involved in any ministries or programs that serve the community? What do you do? What does it mean to you to be involved in this way?*

- 5) Is getting the church involved in social service ministry an important mission/value of your church? **[For interviewer: Wait for answer and discussion, then ask]** If so, how is this made evident to the members? ***Probe: Through preaching, teaching, key lay-leaders, etc.?***
- 6) What types of things do you do as a church to minister to families in need? ***Probe: From your perspective how well is your church ministering to their needs? Has this church ever helped you or your immediate family with any type of assistance (housing, cash assistance, counseling)?***
- 7) How does your church work with other churches or other community organizations when doing community outreach and ministry? **[For Interviewer: Don't cut off discussion]** ***Probe: With whom do you work most closely? Do you ever work with non-religious groups? Why or why not? Do you work with churches outside of your tradition? What have you done? Do you work with non-Latino churches? Why or why not?***
- 8) Do you in any way volunteer with a community organization outside of your church? If so, how are you involved? ***Probe: Do you volunteer as an individual or with other people from your church? Does your pastor or others at the church encourage you to be involved in volunteering outside of the church?***

III. Labor Issues:

Now, we'd like to talk to you more specifically about how your church has helped people with work related issues.

- 9) Have you or anyone you have known been helped, through your church (or through a member of the church) to find a job? If yes, how were you/they helped?
 - Were you referred to another organization?
 - Is there an informal network of people who help people in your church find jobs?

Probe: Who helped them find the job? What did that person do? Referral? Introduced me to a business? Wrote a letter? Was it individual help or did they get help through a program?

- 10) Have you helped someone from your church get a job? ***(If yes) Probe: Can you describe how you helped them—what specifically did you do for them to help them find a job?***
- 11) Does your church have a specific program or work with a specific organization (or send people to that organization) to help people find work or improve their job skills? ***Probe: ask them to talk about the program and if they've been involved or someone they know has been involved in the program. What was the***

experience like? If there is no program, ask them about other churches or community groups that they might work with or refer people to when a job-related issue arises – what does that group do? How is the church involved with them?

- 12) Does your pastor or priest ever talk about labor issues during mass or other worship services? [**For Interviewer: If not specifically, do religious leaders at the church ever mention work in the context of discussions about immigration?**] *Probe: does your minister ever mention the importance of good working conditions or fair wages? Does your pastor encourage getting involved politically to address a work-related issue? If your pastor doesn't say anything publicly, have you had private conversations with him/her about this issue?*
- 13) Are you or anyone you know at your church involved with a union? *Probe: In your opinion, does the church support members' involvement in unions?*
- 14) Have you ever approached your pastor/priest or someone at church because of a work-related issue? *Probe: If so, who did you approach? What was it about? What did that person do? Were you referred to a community organization or other group that works on job-related issues?*
- 15) Is there anything that your church isn't doing that you think they should do in terms of outreach to the community? *Probe: Why don't you think there is any ministry right now addressing this issue? What is keeping the church from forming a ministry or program around this issue? How likely is it that the church would start a ministry like that?*

IV. Religious Identity:

Now, we'd like to talk to you more specifically about your and your church's religious identity.

- 16) Religiously speaking, what faith tradition does this church belong to? *Probe: Is it Pentecostal, Baptists, Methodist? Is it different than other Pentecostal churches and how? Is it part of a denomination? Why or why not? Does it make a difference?*
- 17) With what faith tradition do you identify with (Pentecostal, Methodist)? *Probe: Where you always...or have you changed in the last years?*
- 18) What is it to be Pentecostal, and are there different types of Pentecostalism? *Probe: Do you know other Pentecostal that believe and practice faith differently?*

APPENDIX B
OBSERVATION PROTOCOL

Field Note Guide for Observations at Latino Churches

Name _____

:

Date: _____

Organization: _____

This information will help us to understand the life of Latino churches in Chicago. As you are conducting participant observation, any materials you might pick up at the site are relevant to include with your notes: brochures, bulletins, or religious booklets, etc. As you are participating in services and church activities, please keep in mind these areas and include them in your field notes if they are relevant to the particular activity that you are observing.

1. Spatial Map

A. Physical Structures

- In what type of structure is the church housed (office building, school, church, retail space, old industrial facility)?
- Is there more than one building related to/owned by this organization?
- Did the main building used to be a church of another denomination?
- Is there parking? How much space is allotted for cars? Is it zoned?
- What is the arrangement of the church space (sanctuary upstairs, fellowship hall in basement, education classes in another building?)?
- What is the condition of the building on the outside? What are indoor spaces like? (new, modern, freshly painted, multiple bathrooms)?
- Are there other churches/organizations using the space?
- Is the space conducive to the types of activities taking place (is there enough seating, is the sound system good, do they have space for multiple groups of people, such as children, the elderly, the disabled?)? Is there ample space in the reception/waiting areas?
- What types of technology does the church have (large sound system, computers in church offices, multiple microphones?)?

B. Aesthetics: Religious and Cultural Symbols

- Are there religious symbols around the buildings (cross, banners, Virgen de Guadalupe)?
- Are there cultural or national symbols in the space (Puerto Rican flag, etc.)?
- Are the aesthetics reflective of the groups that use the space? That is, the choice of posters, paint, etc., --what does it say to people about who uses the space? Is it geared so that Latinos (or perhaps, more specifically, a particular group, such as Mexicans) feel that the programs or organizations value and welcome them?
- Was there religious literature in the vestibule, fellowship hall, or other areas in the church (besides the sanctuary?)? What did the literature address?

- Were there any types of posters, brochures, or flyers hanging on the walls or scattered around the church? If yes, what topics did they address (HIV/AIDS posters, pamphlets on domestic violence, flyers for community protests, cultural festivals, etc.)?

C. Neighborhood Context

- Briefly describe the immediate neighborhood where the church is located (1-2 block area) — socio-economic aspects, racial/ethnic composition, housing stock, green space, if any.
- Is the building where the church is located visible and easily identifiable?
- Is the building accessible to public transportation?
- Are there other churches and/or community based organizations in the immediate proximity (1-2 blocks)? If identifiable, which faith communities and/or issues do they address (San Lucas Worker's Rights Center, Salon de Testigos de Jehova, etc.)?

2. Social Map

- D. Approximate # of people in church at particular activity you are observing
- E. Demographic characteristics: Age, gender, race of participants
- F. How many different groups were at the site (children under 12, adolescents and young adults, middle-aged adults and the elderly)? Were there non-church members there or people from the community?
- G. Who appear to be the leaders (women, men, Latinos, Anglos, ages, etc.)?
- H. Does leadership appear to be shared? Are there multiple members of one family in leadership positions in the church?

3. Temporal Map

- I. What activities were going on?
- J. What is the interaction between congregants like? (people interacting, talking, sitting alone, praying together, was there much physical contact? Crying? Quiet meditation, praying in tongues or praying out loud?)?
- K. Were there outside groups/people (non-church people) coming in and out of the space?
- L. What is the interaction like between leaders and congregants? Between men and women, young and old? Latinos and non-Latinos (if applicable)?
- M. What types of issues did the leaders and congregants discuss? What themes emerged in sermons, prayer meetings, youth groups, or other activities?
- N. What types of activities are going on in the street/sidewalk, immediately outside of the church?

4. Pentecostal Practice

- O. What type of attire did they wear or not wear (particularly the women)? (Pants, make-up, jewelry)

- P. What are some of the Pentecostal religious practices evident through the event? (speaking in tongues, healing, etc.)
- Q. How were these particular Pentecostals similar or different than those of other churches you observed at? (discourse, religious symbols, music, etc.)

APPENDIX C
SURVEY INSTRUMENTS

Three survey instruments were used to collect the quantitative data used for this dissertation (see chapter three for more detail on the adult congregant survey, pastor/leader structured interview survey, and the pastor/leader take-home survey). The research team of the Chicago Latino Congregations Study designed all the instruments. Due to their length, they are not included as appendices to this dissertation. They are, however, available through the Center for the Study of Latino Religion at the University of Notre Dame Institute for Latino Studies. The center's web site is <http://latinostudies.nd.edu/cslr/>

APPENDIX D

LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS

Church Engagement: Odds of Church Membership vs. Attendance (N = 977)

Effects	Coefficient (B)	S. Error	P-value	Exp(B)
Less than H.S./GED	.143	.409	.726	1.154
H.S. or GED	.693	.396	.080	1.999
Some College ¹	.338	.394	.391	1.402
Female ²	-.002	.232	.994	.998
Age	.015	.010	.112	1.016
Less than \$14,999	-.154	.426	.717	.857
\$15,000 to \$34,999	-.078	.398	.845	.925
\$35,000 to \$49,999 ³	.366	.485	.450	1.441
U.S. Citizen	.551	.383	.150	1.735
Legal Resident ⁴	.374	.338	.269	1.453
More or Only Spanish	-.440	.373	.239	.644
Both Languages Equally ⁵	-.675	.366	.065	.509
Never Switched ⁶	.027	.230	.906	1.027
Not Married ⁷	-.632	.238	.008	.532
Mexican or Mexican American	.394	.377	.297	1.482
Puerto Rican	.259	.382	.498	1.296
Central American	.577	.427	.176	1.781
South American ⁸	-.359	.560	.522	.699
Attend Church Once/Week or + ⁹	1.847	.286	.000	6.339
Abortion ¹⁰	-.172	.239	.471	.842
Traditional Pentecostal	.159	.426	.708	1.173
Neo-Conservative Pentecostal ¹¹	.479	.381	.209	1.615
Other Denomination	.628	.333	.060	1.874
American Denomination	.982	.378	.009	2.670
U.S. Latino Denomination	1.611	.458	.000	5.008
Latin American Denomination ¹²	1.186	.466	.011	3.273
Pastor: Completed B.A. or More ¹³	.019	.326	.952	1.020
Constant	-1.542	.867	.075	.214
Nagelkerke R Square = .210				

¹Reference = B.A. or more; ² = Male; ³ = Over \$50,000; ⁴ = Undocumented; ⁵ = More of Only English; ⁶ = Switched from Other Denomination; ⁷ = Married or Living Together; ⁸ = Other; ⁹ = No; ¹⁰ = No; ¹¹ = Progressive Pentecostal; ¹² = Independent; ¹³ = No.

Church Engagement: Taking Leadership Role (N = 977)

Effects	Coefficient (B)	S. Error	P-value	Exp(B)
Less than H.S./GED	.069	.289	.812	1.071
H.S. or GED	.151	.272	.578	1.163
Some College ¹	.153	.281	.587	1.165
Female ²	.102	.147	.486	1.108
Age	.012	.006	.053	1.012
Less than \$14,999	-.465	.279	.096	.628
\$15,000 to \$34,999	-.197	.254	.437	.821
\$35,000 to \$49,999 ³	.319	.305	.295	1.376
U.S. Citizen	.013	.239	.956	1.013
Legal Resident ⁴	.051	.215	.811	1.053
More or Only Spanish	-.547	.239	.022	.579
Both Languages Equally ⁵	-.133	.248	.591	.875
Never Switched ⁶	-.029	.146	.841	.971
Not Married ⁷	-.145	.161	.368	.865
Mexican or Mexican American	-.382	.243	.115	.682
Puerto Rican	.056	.263	.830	1.058
Central American	-.334	.278	.230	.716
South American ⁸	-.512	.438	.243	.600
Attend Church Once/Week or + ⁹	1.070	.258	.000	2.915
Abortion ¹⁰	-.136	.159	.392	.873
Traditional Pentecostal	.303	.273	.267	1.354
Neo-Conservative Pentecostal ¹¹	-.142	.262	.587	.868
Other Denomination	.406	.247	.101	1.501
American Denomination	.325	.268	.226	1.384
U.S. Latino Denomination	-.029	.288	.921	.972
Latin American Denomination ¹²	.508	.300	.090	1.663
Pastor: Completed B.A. or More ¹³	.109	.209	.600	1.116
Constant	-.610	.608	.316	.543
Negelkerke R. Square = .095				

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Church Engagement: Helping to Organize Events (N = 977)

Effects	Coefficient (B)	S. Error	P-value	Exp(B)
Less than H.S./GED	.027	.353	.939	1.027
H.S. or GED	.013	.331	.968	1.013
Some College ¹	.188	.344	.584	1.207
Female ²	-.268	.186	.149	.765
Age	.012	.008	.119	1.012
Less than \$14,999	-.997	.370	.007	.369
\$15,000 to \$34,999	-.515	.349	.140	.598
\$35,000 to \$49,999 ³	-.450	.393	.252	.637
U.S. Citizen	.827	.312	.008	2.287
Legal Resident ⁴	.252	.266	.342	1.287
More or Only Spanish	-.028	.288	.921	.972
Both Languages Equally ⁵	-.203	.291	.484	.816
Never Switched ⁶	.238	.179	.184	1.269
Not Married ⁷	-.149	.194	.442	.862
Mexican or Mexican American	.117	.291	.689	1.124
Puerto Rican	-.158	.307	.606	.854
Central American	.451	.338	.182	1.569
South American ⁸	.068	.510	.894	1.070
Attend Church Once/Week or + ⁹	1.483	.265	.000	4.406
Abortion ¹⁰	.212	.200	.291	1.236
Traditional Pentecostal	.928	.321	.004	2.530
Neo-Conservative Pentecostal ¹¹	-.010	.306	.973	.990
Other Denomination	.157	.288	.586	1.170
American Denomination	-.325	.306	.288	.722
U.S. Latino Denomination	.187	.358	.601	1.206
Latin American Denomination ¹²	-.460	.354	.194	.631
Pastor: Completed B.A. or More ¹³	.068	.247	.783	1.071
Constant	-.734	.727	.313	.480
Nelgelkerke R. Square = .138				

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Community Engagement: Volunteering Beyond the Church Walls (N = 977)

Effects	Coefficient (B)	S. Error	P-value	Exp(B)
Less than H.S./GED	-.499	.281	.076	.607
H.S. or GED	-.426	.262	.104	.653
Some College ¹	-.499	.269	.064	.607
Female ²	-.183	.146	.209	.833
Age	.006	.006	.319	1.006
Less than \$14,999	.327	.273	.231	1.386
\$15,000 to \$34,999	.114	.244	.641	1.121
\$35,000 to \$49,999 ³	.112	.283	.692	1.119
U.S. Citizen	-.006	.242	.979	.994
Legal Resident ⁴	-.126	.221	.568	.881
More or Only Spanish	.320	.235	.173	1.378
Both Languages Equally ⁵	.860	.235	.000	2.362
Never Switched ⁶	-.194	.145	.183	.824
Not Married ⁷	-.134	.162	.408	.874
Mexican or Mexican American	.330	.250	.187	1.391
Puerto Rican	.340	.265	.199	1.405
Central American	.159	.285	.576	1.173
South American ⁸	-.388	.494	.433	.679
Attend Church Once/Week or + ⁹	.401	.279	.150	1.493
Abortion ¹⁰	.243	.157	.122	1.275
Traditional Pentecostal	-.387	.270	.152	.679
Neo-Conservative Pentecostal ¹¹	-.102	.254	.688	.903
Other Denomination	.181	.242	.454	1.198
American Denomination	-.539	.278	.052	.583
U.S. Latino Denomination	.262	.288	.363	1.299
Latin American Denomination ¹²	-.020	.298	.945	.980
Pastor: Completed B.A. or More ¹³	.000	.205	.998	1.000
Constant	-1.138	.610	.062	.320
Negelkerke R. Square = .078				

¹Reference = B.A. or more; ² = Male; ³ = Over \$50,000; ⁴ = Undocumented; ⁵ = More of Only English; ⁶ = Switched from Other Denomination; ⁷ = Married or Living Together; ⁸ = Other; ⁹ = No; ¹⁰ = No; ¹¹ = Progressive Pentecostal; ¹² = Independent; ¹³ = No

Community Engagement: Helping the Needy (N = 977)

Effects	Coefficient (B)	S. Error	P-value	Exp(B)
Less than H.S./GED	-.362	.347	.297	.697
H.S. or GED	-.294	.328	.370	.746
Some College ¹	-.264	.334	.429	.768
Female ²	-.118	.172	.493	.889
Age	.028	.008	.000	1.028
Less than \$14,999	-.478	.329	.146	.620
\$15,000 to \$34,999	-.346	.301	.252	.708
\$35,000 to \$49,999 ³	-.176	.346	.611	.839
U.S. Citizen	.275	.287	.338	1.317
Legal Resident ⁴	.053	.254	.833	1.055
More or Only Spanish	.507	.262	.054	1.660
Both Languages Equally ⁵	.376	.263	.152	1.457
Never Switched ⁶	-.116	.173	.500	.890
Not Married ⁷	.088	.187	.638	1.092
Mexican or Mexican American	-.012	.285	.965	.988
Puerto Rican	-.117	.300	.697	.890
Central American	-.036	.319	.910	.964
South American ⁸	.063	.498	.900	1.065
Attend Church Once/Week or + ⁹	.976	.263	.000	2.653
Abortion ¹⁰	.048	.186	.796	1.049
Traditional Pentecostal	.062	.318	.845	1.064
Neo-Conservative Pentecostal ¹¹	.323	.298	.278	1.382
Other Denomination	-.372	.282	.187	.689
American Denomination	.247	.313	.431	1.280
U.S. Latino Denomination	.686	.360	.056	1.986
Latin American Denomination ¹²	-.085	.345	.806	.919
Pastor: Completed B.A. or More ¹³	-.232	.227	.307	.793
Constant	-.540	.705	.444	.583
Negelkerke R. Square = .103				

¹Reference = B.A. or more; ² = Male; ³ = Over \$50,000; ⁴ = Undocumented; ⁵ = More of Only English; ⁶ = Switched from Other Denomination; ⁷ = Married or Living Together; ⁸ = Other; ⁹ = No; ¹⁰ = No; ¹¹ = Progressive Pentecostal; ¹² = Independent; ¹³ = No

Community Engagement: Helping Someone Find a Job (N = 977)

Effects	Coefficient (B)	S. Error	P-value	Exp(B)
Less than H.S./GED	-.649	.364	.075	.523
H.S. or GED	-.305	.348	.381	.737
Some College ¹	-.317	.354	.371	.729
Female ²	-.439	.183	.016	.645
Age	.005	.007	.524	1.005
Less than \$14,999	-.051	.313	.871	.950
\$15,000 to \$34,999	.489	.291	.093	1.630
\$35,000 to \$49,999 ³	.498	.344	.148	1.646
U.S. Citizen	-.028	.294	.924	.973
Legal Resident ⁴	.299	.273	.273	1.348
More or Only Spanish	-.225	.275	.412	.798
Both Languages Equally ⁵	.249	.285	.382	1.283
Never Switched ⁶	-.053	.176	.764	.949
Not Married ⁷	.044	.195	.820	1.045
Mexican or Mexican American	.121	.293	.680	1.128
Puerto Rican	-.205	.303	.499	.815
Central American	.372	.348	.286	1.450
South American ⁸	-.146	.496	.768	.864
Attend Church Once/Week or + ⁹	.280	.292	.338	1.323
Abortion ¹⁰	-.033	.191	.864	.968
Traditional Pentecostal	.269	.311	.387	1.308
Neo-Conservative Pentecostal ¹¹	.113	.299	.704	1.120
Other Denomination	.138	.286	.629	1.149
American Denomination	-.047	.307	.879	.954
U.S. Latino Denomination	-.163	.339	.629	.849
Latin American Denomination ¹²	-.137	.348	.694	.872
Pastor: Completed B.A. or More ¹³	-.033	.244	.893	.968
Constant	1.256	.714	.079	3.511
Nelgelkerke R. Square = .058				

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Community Engagement: Lending Money to Non-Family Members (N = 977)

Effects	Coefficient (B)	S. Error	P-value	Exp(B)
Less than H.S./GED	-.294	.321	.359	.745
H.S. or GED	-.046	.304	.879	.955
Some College ¹	-.287	.309	.353	.751
Female ²	-.481	.166	.004	.618
Age	-.005	.007	.451	.995
Less than \$14,999	-.295	.296	.319	.745
\$15,000 to \$34,999	.266	.273	.331	1.304
\$35,000 to \$49,999 ³	.106	.313	.734	1.112
U.S. Citizen	.106	.267	.692	1.112
Legal Resident ⁴	.183	.243	.451	1.201
More or Only Spanish	-.062	.257	.809	.940
Both Languages Equally ⁵	.200	.263	.448	1.221
Never Switched ⁶	.327	.158	.038	1.387
Not Married ⁷	.110	.178	.535	1.117
Mexican or Mexican American	.439	.263	.096	1.550
Puerto Rican	-.105	.277	.705	.900
Central American	.105	.298	.725	1.110
South American ⁸	.448	.497	.367	1.565
Attend Church Once/Week or + ⁹	.014	.283	.960	1.014
Abortion ¹⁰	.061	.177	.730	1.063
Traditional Pentecostal	-.257	.297	.387	.773
Neo-Conservative Pentecostal ¹¹	.113	.285	.691	1.120
Other Denomination	-.143	.267	.592	.867
American Denomination	.066	.297	.823	1.069
U.S. Latino Denomination	.050	.312	.873	1.051
Latin American Denomination ¹²	.018	.328	.957	1.018
Pastor: Completed B.A. or More ¹³	.266	.222	.231	1.305
Constant	1.161	.658	.077	3.194
Negelkerke R. Square = .056				

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Societal Engagement: Voting (N = 505—U.S. Citizen Congregants Only)

Effects	Coefficient (B)	S. Error	P-value	Exp(B)
Less than H.S./GED	-1.040	.387	.007	.354
H.S. or GED	-.516	.345	.134	.597
Some College ¹	-.091	.339	.789	.913
Female ²	-.150	.205	.465	.861
Age	.029	.009	.001	1.030
Less than \$14,999	.356	.350	.310	1.427
\$15,000 to \$34,999	-.448	.290	.123	.639
\$35,000 to \$49,999 ³	.162	.338	.632	1.176
More or Only Spanish	-.560	.277	.043	.571
Both Languages Equally ⁵	-.032	.263	.904	.969
Never Switched ⁶	-.214	.204	.292	.807
Not Married ⁷	-.244	.224	.275	.783
Mexican or Mexican American	.483	.392	.217	1.621
Puerto Rican	.305	.357	.393	1.357
Central American	.049	.453	.914	1.050
South American ⁸	.062	.656	.924	1.064
Attend Church Once/Week or + ⁹	-.165	.371	.657	.848
Abortion ¹⁰	.103	.212	.629	1.108
Traditional Pentecostal	.296	.341	.386	1.345
Neo-Conservative Pentecostal ¹¹	.176	.308	.568	1.193
Other Denomination	-.233	.292	.425	.792
American Denomination	.412	.336	.220	1.510
U.S. Latino Denomination	.423	.385	.273	1.526
Latin American Denomination ¹²	.432	.401	.281	1.540
Pastor: Completed B.A. or More ¹³	.437	.263	.097	1.548
Constant	-.491	.768	.523	.612
Negelkerke R. Square = .138				

¹Reference = B.A. or more; ² = Male; ³ = Over \$50,000; ⁵ = More of Only English; ⁶ = Switched from Other Denomination; ⁷ = Married or Living Together; ⁸ = Other; ⁹ = No; ¹⁰ = No; ¹¹ = Progressive Pentecostal; ¹² = Independent; ¹³ = No

**Societal Engagement: Political Party Activities (N = 505—U.S. Citizen
Congregants Only)**

Effects	Coefficient (B)	S. Error	P-value	Exp(B)
Less than H.S./GED	-.822	.529	.120	.440
H.S. or GED	-.574	.452	.204	.563
Some College ¹	-.656	.424	.122	.519
Female ²	-.133	.295	.652	.876
Age	.020	.013	.122	1.020
Less than \$14,999	.355	.484	.464	1.426
\$15,000 to \$34,999	-.214	.424	.614	.808
\$35,000 to \$49,999 ³	.873	.434	.044	2.394
More or Only Spanish	-1.726	.453	.000	.178
Both Languages Equally ⁵	-.185	.334	.580	.831
Never Switched ⁶	.426	.310	.170	1.531
Not Married ⁷	.061	.327	.853	1.063
Mexican or Mexican American	.235	.541	.664	1.265
Puerto Rican	.170	.482	.724	1.185
Central American	.114	.668	.865	1.121
South American ⁸	-.204	1.191	.864	.815
Attend Church Once/Week or + ⁹	-.333	.475	.483	.717
Abortion ¹⁰	.802	.290	.006	2.230
Traditional Pentecostal	-.549	.459	.232	.577
Neo-Conservative Pentecostal ¹¹	-.514	.450	.253	.598
Other Denomination	.103	.450	.820	1.108
American Denomination	1.165	.470	.013	3.205
U.S. Latino Denomination	.858	.554	.121	2.359
Latin American Denomination ¹²	.040	.572	.944	1.041
Pastor: Completed B.A. or More ¹³	-.437	.417	.294	.646
Constant	-1.856	1.098	.091	.156
Negelkerke R. Square = .196				

¹Reference = B.A. or more; ² = Male; ³ = Over \$50,000; ⁵ = More of Only English; ⁶ = Switched from Other Denomination; ⁷ = Married or Living Together; ⁸ = Other; ⁹ = No; ¹⁰ = No; ¹¹ = Progressive Pentecostal; ¹² = Independent; ¹³ = No

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VITA

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