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Woodrow Wilson's Relations with the Democratic Party 1919 - 1924

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WOODROW WILSON'S RELATIONS WITH THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY 1919 - 1924

By

MARYBELLE DONOVAN

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT

OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

IN

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY

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CHAPTER I

RIFT OVER CONDUCT OF WAR

In the guidance of a country through a war involving the nations of the world, it is inevitable that the one on whom the responsibility for this direction rests, will be made the object of criticism. The difficult period of a war time presents problems which place a strain on relationships which might in time of peace remain secure. The World War offered to the Democratic followers of Woodrow Wilson a challenge to remain in accord with their president in his conduct of the war.

In the late months of 1916 and the early part of 1917, when Germany was becoming increasingly menacing in her submarine conduct, Wilson was confronted with the task of maintaining neutrality, and his actions regarding America's entrance into war offered an early opportunity to the Democratic group to question his views.

On December 18th, 1916, ill feeling toward Wilson was prompted when, in a note sent by Robert Lansing, American Secretary of State to Ambassador James Gerard in Berlin, he called upon the belligerent governments to state the objects for which they were fighting, saying, "Never yet have the authoritative spokesmen of either side avowed the precise
objects which would, if attained, satisfy them and their people that the war has been fought out.\footnote{1}

The response of the congressmen attests to the mixed feelings with which they accepted this move. Senator McCumber of North Dakota, a Republican, boldly stated that the note was ill-advised and ill-timed and, in his opinion, should not have been sent.\footnote{2} Another Republican, Senator Gronna of North Dakota concluded that the note made the United States ridiculous in the eyes of the world.\footnote{3} Senator Townsend, Republican, of Michigan considered the note an example of the lack of understanding between the Senate and the President. \textquoteleft\textquoteleft Of course we have no light on the real situation as it may be known to the President. That has been the trouble right along. The administration has not been frank with the Senate.\textquoteright\textquoteright \footnote{4}

Comments of the press and periodicals illustrate that many new critics of Wilson were added as a result of the note. The \textit{New York Tribune} expressed its regret that the President made such a mistake. \textquoteleft\textquoteleft Now American influence for real peace ... is abolished.\textquoteright\textquoteright \footnote{5} The \textit{New York Herald} stated that

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Congressional Record,} 64 Cong., 2 sess., 634 Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1916
\item \textit{Chicago Daily Tribune,} Dec. 22, 1916, 2
\item \textit{Ibid.,} 2
\item \textit{Ibid.,} 2
\item \textit{The Literary Digest,} New York, Dec. 30, 1916, 1694
\end{enumerate}
political leaders in Washington anticipated that resentment against the United States would be aroused by the President's actions. The New York Times, Independent Democratic paper, criticized Wilson's statement expressed in the note, that, "The objects which the statesmen of the belligerent Powers on both sides have in mind on the war are virtually the same." This paper pointed out that there was no similarity in the objects. The Republican paper, the Buffalo News stated, "President Wilson's note on the subject of peace elicited just what was expected - a profound surprise, a little ridicule and a measure of contempt." Others characterized the President's note as, "...an opportune message inopportune ly sent, a rational request irrationally presented." 

More favorable comments were made by several Democratic papers. The New York World expressed its opinion as follows: "The President's note is a definite assertion that the United States has something of its own at stake, and that its standing in court is not to be ignored." The Rochester Union and Advertiser believed the nations could not be offended by the note and would seize the opportunity to ex-

6. The Literary Digest, Dec. 30, 1916, 1694  
7. The Outlook, New York, Jan. 3, 1917, 16 (Editorial)  
8. Ibid., 16  
9. Ibid., 13  
10. Ibid., 15
press their sincerity in desiring peace.\textsuperscript{11} The St. Louis Globe-Democrat favored the note and felt that its friendly spirit was not likely to give offense.\textsuperscript{12} Nevertheless, the reception of this move made by Wilson was illustrative of the fact that a note of doubt of the President's wisdom in his dealings with the warring nations was injected into the Democratic group.

The members of the Cabinet, also, found much about which to be impatient with Wilson. William McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, urged the President to sever diplomatic relations with Germany as he believed further delay would be fatal. Any argument presented by Wilson was swept aside and answered by McAdoo's insistent demands for immediate action.\textsuperscript{13} On February 17th, 1917, at a meeting of the Council for National Defense, David Houston, Secretary of Agriculture and Franklin Lane, Secretary of the Interior, discussed the delay of Wilson and agreed that he must not be allowed to delay further.\textsuperscript{14} On February 23rd, 1917, at a Cabinet meeting, McAdoo incurred the displeasure of Wilson when he insisted that the President arm the merchant ships, regardless of Congress.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{11} The Outlook, New York, Jan. 3, 1917, 16 (Editorial)
\textsuperscript{12} The Literary Digest, Dec. 30, 1916, 1694
\textsuperscript{13} David F. Houston, \textit{Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet} Doubleday Page & Co., New York, 1926, Vol. 1, 234
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid, 235
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid, 235
On February 7th, 1917 the Senate indorsed the action of Wilson in severing diplomatic relations with Germany. However, the disputes of various Democratic members who questioned this action of Wilson when a resolution approving this action of the President was considered in the Senate, were marked by intense bitterness. Senator Vardaman stated, "The way to meet an issue is not to follow the President or any one else. ---I do not believe that the President's course was wise, prudent, justified at this time by the facts and for the best interests of the American people---" 16 Senator Kirby opposed the resolution, believing that the time had not come to make a declaration of War. "The time has not come in my opinion when it should be done and we should commit ourselves by the adoption of this resolution to any policy that the President may hereafter pursue. Under the Constitution and the law he has no power to declare war, but he has the power to plunge the Nation into war...and he has almost done so." 17 Senator Lane vehemently stated, "I would say to those who want to go across the dead line where there are submataines and zeppelins..... "Go, and God go with you; but go at your own risk. Go and get killed if you want

16. Congressional Record., 64 Cong., 2 sess., 2734
17. Ibid., 2737
to but we, the people, will not fight for you ——.”18

Senator Townsend, a Republican, openly admitted during the debate that there were many senators antagonistic to the president, but because they wished to hide this fact from the nations of the world they had remained silent. He therefore, censured those who brought up the resolution for discussion.19 Senator Underwood, a Democrat, expressed the views of many other Senators, who voted for the resolution in order to present a united stand with the President when he stated that he considered the resolution ill-advised, but would uphold the President.20

In the closing date of February, 1917, Wilson was the object of a storm of criticism from every source. A write, who was in a position to follow the public opinion, stated that, "Every agency of worth let out its rage. Newspapers, politicians, the pulpit ——, clubs, unions, associations, suddenly became organs of vituperation directed at Germany, then —— aimed at the President for what they called his supine attitude."21 The press openly stated that Wilson was in danger of being repudiated. Arthur Sears Henning, writing from

18. Congressional Record., 64 Cong., 2 sess. 2747
19. Ibid., 2747
20. Ibid., 2736
21. William Allen White, Woodrow Wilson, The Man, His Times and His Task

Houghton Mifflin Co., New York, 1924, 335
Washington, claimed that the need for definite action on the part of the President was imperative. "The President has been informed that unless he speedily takes this step the Democratic leaders may not be able to stem the development of sentiment in the direction of outright repudiation of the Administration." The action was urged that Wilson submit definite plans to Congress. Again, the same idea was expressed, "If Germany fulfills her threat war will inevitably follow. Not even the President could hold the impatient Nation in leash if he desired to do so."23

That Wilson was cognizant of the disfavor in which he was held by his own group and was deeply wounded by it is attested by Joseph Tumulty, his Secretary.24 Wilson expressed his feelings in the Cabinet room on April 6, 1917 after he had given his war message to Congress. "There are few who understood this policy of patience. I do not mean to say this in spirit of criticism. Indeed, many of the leading journals of the country were unmindful of the complexities of the situation which confronted us."25

22. Chicago Daily Tribune, Feb. 26, 1917, 1
23. "America's Duty", (Editorial)
   The Outlook, Feb. 14, 1917, 263
24. Joseph Patrick Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I Knew Him
   Doubleday, Page & Co. New York, 1921, 256
25. Ibid., 257
The Democratic Party came to a realization in 1917 that their leader had not been able to command the united support of Congress at a time when that support was a vital necessity. In February and March, 1917 the Senate displayed an open hostility to the war moves of Wilson, and in the Summer of the same year went to the length of attempting to create a War Cabinet, thereby, displaying to the nation that Wilson's conduct of the War was being severely questioned.

When the Sixty-Fourth Congress adjourned on March 4, 1917 the members of the Senate carried away the memory of a successful attempt on the part of a few members to refuse the President powers necessary to permit him to carry out his duties. To these members, the President's urgent appeal for authority to arm merchant ships was an answer to their desire for an opportunity to thwart his plans. The House had approved the bill and more than seventy-six Senators had pledged their willingness to sanction it. However, it was impossible to bring it to a vote as a small group of Senators, led by La Follette, utilized all parliamentary known procedures to filibuster for a period of twenty-six hours and were in the

26. The Outlook March 14, 1917, 445
midst of a dispute when the hour for adjournment came. Among those active in the filibuster were the Democrats, Kirby, Lane, Gorman, Stone and Vardaman.  

Wilson publicly denounced this action, and expressed his indignation. "--- a little group of wilful men, representing no opinion but their own, have rendered the great Government of the United States helpless ---".  

Again full control had been denied Wilson, when on February 22, 1917, Congress refused to give him authority to use the armed forces of the United States as he saw fit. The reasons advanced by Mr. Lansing, Secretary of State, for the need of such a move were regarded as vague by the committee among whom were to be found many Democrats. During the month of February sentiment became strong against supporting Wilson in his attempt to gain authority to make certain war moves, and this sentiment was shared by Democratic Congressmen. The Senate Military Committee openly opposed Wilson when they introduced in February 1917 a military service measure which they definitely knew would not meet the approval of the Secretary of War or Wilson. Senator Chamberlain, a Democrat,

27. Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 12 sess., 5013  
28. The Outlook, March 14, 1917, 445  
29. Chicago Daily Tribune, Feb. 23, 1917, 1  
30. Ibid., Feb. 24, 1917, 4
led this group and was joined by other Democrats, who did all in their power to oppose Wilson.31

In July, 1917 a movement was begun in Congress to create a Committee of both houses to assist the President in the conduct of war. The purpose of the Committee as stated was, "It shall be the duty of said Committee to keep itself advised with regard to the expenditure of all appropriations bearing on the conduct of war made by Congress ----." 32 The movement was supported by the Democratic element even though it was common knowledge that the President opposed a War Cabinet. The character of the discussion in the Senate Chambers shows an utter disregard for the wishes of the President.

Senator Thomas Hardwick, Democrat, expressed his utter amazement that Wilson was not thankful that he might share responsibility for the expenditure of the money appropriated by Congress for the conduct of War with a joint committee.33 Senator Gore, Democrat, showed the necessity for an investigation and attacked the practice of the Government of paying thirty-five dollars a thousand for lumber to build can-

32. Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 5838
33. Ibid., 5840
tonments, while twenty-two dollars and fifty cents a thousand was the cost to private individuals. Senator Williams, Democrat, explained the attempt to create a war cabinet as an attack upon the President and acknowledged that suspicion and lack of trust in him were the motives for the attack.

President Wilson challenged the Senate in this move, threatening a veto of the Food Bill to which the bill creating the war cabinet was added as an amendment. In a letter to Representative Lever, he reminded congressmen that there were sufficient means of investigation already established and that an inquiry regarding any phase of military action could be ordered at any time by Congress. He stated, "The constant supervision of executive action which it contemplates would amount to nothing less than an assumption on the part of the legislative body of the executive work of the administration."

The press seized this opportunity to picture Wilson unfavorably and such comments were made as, "It is high time that Wilson set his house in order in Washington. The nation needs a leader who knows how to lead and it will get one very soon."-

34. Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 1 Sess., 5840
35. Ibid., 5841
36. "The War, the Executive, and Congress" The Nation, Aug. 2, 1917, 113
37. "Wanted a War Cabinet" - H. J. Wigham Metropolitan Magazine, Sept. 1917, 1
Wilson's decisions in the matter of appointments to important war time positions were made the object of a strong attack. Not only did he incur the resentment of the people of the nation, but also stirred the anger of Theodore Roosevelt making of him a bitter enemy.

On February 2, 1917, Roosevelt, in a letter to the Secretary of War, Newton Baker, requested permission to raise a volunteer infantry division. Baker, however, answered on February 9th, "No action in the direction suggested by you can be taken without the express sanction of Congress. Should the contingency occur --- it is to be expected that Congress will complete the legislation relative to volunteer troops and provide --- for the appointment of officers." Roosevelt awaited his time and when war was declared visited Wilson at the White House on April 2nd. He proposed to Wilson that he be allowed to lead a division of volunteers and assured him that over three hundred thousand men would readily join such an army. Wilson, after receiving this request, kindly assured him that the subject would be dis-

38. Theodore Roosevelt, Foes of Our Own Household
George Doran Co., New York, 1917, 304
39. Ibid., 307
40. James Kerney, The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson
Century Co. New York, C. 1926, 405
cussed with the Secretary of War, and the General Staff. Roosevelt was supported by public demand and Wilson was urged to acquiesce to his wishes by many, including Georges Clemenceau, who wrote to Wilson requesting that Roosevelt's plea be accepted.

The subject of Roosevelt's volunteer army became the cause of bitter dispute in Congress and tended to widen the breach between Congress and the President. April 7, 1917, Baker discussed the Selective Service Law with the House Committee on Military Affairs and urged its passage. If there was any doubt concerning the views of Wilson he made his views definite when he informed Congress that the passage of the law was essential to the safety of the nation.

Congress, however, showed no inclination to allow Wilson to go ahead with his plans, but rather the Democratic leaders led a stubborn opposition demanding that the volunteer system be tried. In the House, the bill was passed but only after a bitter debate. Speaker Clark, a Democrat, influenced many by his remark. "So far as Missourians are concerned there is precious little between a conscript and

42. Ibid., 405
44. Ibid., 76
a convict". In the Senate, an amendment was adopted granting Mr. Roosevelt the authority to raise a volunteer group of Four Divisions. Another debate followed and on May 15th, it was agreed to allow the President the right to decide concerning his acceptance of the Roosevelt plan. On May 18th, Roosevelt sent a telegram to Wilson asking permission to raise two divisions for immediate service. The following day, Wilson replied, "I very much regret that I cannot comply with the request of your telegraph of yesterday, --- my conclusions were based entirely upon imperative consideration of public policy and not upon personal or private choice." The appointment of Pershing was announced by Wilson and he issued the statement that it would have been a pleasure to pay Roosevelt the compliment of sending him across, but added that it was not the time for compliment.

Serious criticism also was directed at Wilson, when General Leonard Wood was not sent to France but was placed in the camps at home. The fact that his reputation as a trainer of troops had been ignored was considered by many of the country

45. Paul McKown, Certain Important Domestic Policies of Woodrow Wilson, University of Penn., Philadelphia, 1932, 54
46. Roosevelt, Foes of our Own Household, 338
47. Ibid., 339
48. Kerney, 406
as an insult.49 Those who hurled the blame for this move on Wilson seemed not to care that this assignment was not decided by Wilson, but was not made because General Pershing did not request that General Wood be sent to France as he did not wish him there.50

The appointment of Dr. Carey T. Grayson, physician of Wilson to the office of Medical Director of the Navy occasioned disappointment throughout the country. A widely circulated periodical made the following announcement in regard to the appointment, "--- there is no evidence of conspicuous fitness". 51 The New York Tribune expressed its feelings "Mr. Wilson's strength is rather in his handling of ideas, rather than as a picker and use of men".52

49. Dodd, 255  
50. Creel, 87  
51. The Outlook, March 28, 1917, 539  
52. "Mr. Wilson as War President", The Literary Digest, Feb. 2, 1918, 5
The conduct of Theodore Roosevelt and Senator George Chamberlain of Oregon, Chairman of the Senate Committee of Military Affairs, was a force instrumental in influencing Democratic opinion. These two men, one a violent critic, attempting to remove the control of military affairs from the President and one swayed by personal ambition conducted a bitter fight opposing the President.

Early in September, 1917, Roosevelt began his attack to poison the minds of the people against Wilson. One has only to read the material presented by Roosevelt in his *Foes of Our Own Household* to realize the seriousness of his intent. Such declarations as "We sluggishly drifted stem-foremost into war", 53 or "We owe our ignoble safety, we owe the fact that we are not at this moment cowering under the heel of an alien conqueror solely to the protection given us by the British fleet and French and English armies during these months" 54 convinced many that the country's affairs were in a state of serious neglect. He was rewarded by the response of the public, encouraging his criticism of Wilson.55

53. Roosevelt, *Foes of Our Own Household*, 35
54. Ibid., 31
55. Dodd., 256
In the periodicals of the day, Roosevelt publicly denounced Wilson's conduct of the war and furnished an account of the investigation being conducted. Editorials pictured the condition of war affairs and recounted such facts as the example of a General Greble receiving no answer from the War Department to his frequent requests for clothing for the troops under his command. Reference was also made to the General's report that twelve men were forced to sleep in one tent, and it was disclosed that the War Department had answered with a suggestion that fewer men be placed in the tents.56 No statement was too strong for Roosevelt to use. It was not uncommon to see such statements of his publicly appear, as "For the past three years our foremost duty to ourselves and to the world had been to prepare. This duty we have shamefully neglected, and our neglect is responsible for the dragging on of the war, and for the needless sacrifice of myriads of lives."57 His contributions to the Kansas City Star followed out the same trend of thought and such statements appeared in his editorials as, "Mr. Wilson's Administration officially declares that we shall persist in

56. "Making Bricks Without Straw" (Editorial) The Outlook, January 9, 1918, 47-49
57. "Must we Be Brayed in a Mortar Before Our Folly Departs From Us? The Metropolitan, September 1917, 5
our own folly until we are brayed in the mortar of dire calamity".\textsuperscript{58}

On January 23, 1918, Roosevelt flagrantly encouraged opposition to Wilson when he took up residence in Washington, where he received the support of other critics of Wilson. It is said that, "Chamberlain and scores of other members of Congress, besides admirals and diplomats, called to pay respects."\textsuperscript{59} Senator Chamberlain was able on December 12, 1917 to promote a vote for an investigation of the war department. He was joined in this proposal by Senator Gilbert Hitchcock, Democrat of Nebraska and Senator James Reed, Democrat of Missouri.\textsuperscript{60} From this time on Chamberlain used every device possible to embarrass the President, and Roosevelt and General Woods united their efforts to his. At a dinner in New York held by the Republicans on January 19, 1918 Chamberlain announced that inefficiency in the department had caused a breakdown in the military establishments of America.\textsuperscript{61}

The investigation of the War Department was an exhaustive attempt to bring to light the details of what was alleged

\textsuperscript{58} Theodore Roosevelt - Roosevelt in the Kansas City Star Houghton Mifflin Co. Boston 1921, 68
\textsuperscript{59} Dodd, 262
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 258
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 260
to be delay and wasteful expenditure of money and labor by
the Government. The members of the investigation committee
consisted of, in addition to the Chairman Chamberlain,
Gilbert M. Hitchcock of Nebraska, Duncan U. Fletcher of Flor-
ida, Henry L. Meyers of Montana, Charles S. Thomas of Colorado,
Morris Shepard of Texas, J. C. Beckham of Kentucky, William
Kirby of Arkansas and James Reed of Missouri. During the
investigation lengthy interviews were conducted with all
parties connected with the issue in question. For example,
in an investigation of a complaint submitted to Washington by
an attorney at law, that the selection of the site for an
aviation field was ill-advised and the price which was paid
was too high, testimony of colonels in the army, statements
of those in charge of the naval air stations and letters from
the Miami Chamber of Commerce in the area of the aviation
fields, were introduced. Likewise, the nature of the in­
vestigation is illustrated by the details of an examination
of the fact that photographs, picturing the manufacturing of
airplanes and engines, were sent to newspapers. All members
of the committee on Public Information, as well as George
Creel, Chairman of the Committee, were closely questioned.

62. Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs
United States Senate, 65 Cong., 2 sess.,
63. Ibid., 2483
64. Ibid., 2501 - 2535
Senator Chamberlain appeared before the Senate on January 24th, 1918 and in a three hour address related the tragedies of a badly conducted war. The reception of the speech is described as follows. "Senator Tillman sat in his seat with tears rolling down his cheeks; Senator Wadsworth covered his face with his hands. In the gallery many were audibly crying." 65

Newspaper opinion regarding Wilson's management of war placed a direct blame on him. The St. Louis Star questioned, "Were Germany's military leaders right when they said the United States would be a negligible quantity in the war because we could not exert our strength?" The New Republic of New York believed that "Any friend of the administration who failed at the present time to speak frankly about the effect produced by the break-down in the management of the war is doing the President a most indifferent service." The Chicago Daily Tribune pictured the failure of the ship building program and other war programs, declaring that "It is a disappointing and un-American picture - a nation of a hundred million baffled and impotent." 66

It is, therefore, evident that the criticism evoked by Wilson

65. The Outlook, Feb. 6, 1918, 207 - 209
66. The Literary Digest, Feb. 2, 1918, 5 - 7
as a result of his conduct of the war, his break with Congress and the wave of hostility directed at him as an outcome of the attack his enemies, brought to the country the realization that there were many forces at work to destroy Wilson in his position as leader of the Democratic group.
CHAPTER II.

THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS OF 1918

In a most convincing manner, the Democratic party was made aware by the outcome of the Congressional Elections of 1918, of the country's refusal to allow Wilson to continue in control. As a factor determining the later conduct of the Democratic group, the importance of these elections must be considered.

Early in October 1918, the attention of the voters of the country was directed to the fact that a decision must be made in regard to the choosing of a group in Congress, who would be concerned with the vital issues connected with the peace time problems of the nation. They were also aware that the voting would decide whether Wilson would be supported in his peace time moves by Democratic followers or forced to conduct his affairs in the face of opposition.

The selection of Congressmen came at a time when dissatisfaction with the Administration in regard to Wilson's conduct of the war was at its height. A further cause for criticism was found in Wilson's appeal to the people of the country to elect a Democratic Congress. The responsibility for this plea was not that of Wilson alone, but was approved by Vance McCormick, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee and
also by Scott Ferris, leading Democrat. A. S. Burleson, Postmaster General, in a letter to Newton Baker, described the events which led up to the issuance of the plea as follows: 67 In September 1918, Burleson advised Wilson to make a speech at Indianapolis in which he would command members of Congress who had supported him and express his desire that the people would support them. This, Burleson believed, would be a suitable disposition of the many requests made to the President that he grant them letters indorsing their candidacy to Congress. Several days after Burleson had made this suggestion, Wilson informed him that he had written a letter which was in the possession of Tumulty, and wished him to consider its contents. After reading, Burleson commented to Tumulty as follows, "This letter will not do. It will be charged that the President is reflecting upon the loyalty of Republicans in the prosecution of the war." Tumulty admitted that this possibility had been discussed but that it was decided that the message would not be misunderstood.

On October 25, 1918, the addressed the people of the country as follows, "If you have approved my leadership and wish me to continue to be your unembarrassed spokesman in affairs 67. White, 512, 5, 4
at home and abroad, I earnestly beg that you will express yourself to that effect by returning a Democratic majority to both the Senate and the House of Representatives. 68 Deep resentment against Wilson was stirred by this speech. Republican leaders, including Fred H. Gillett, Floor Leader in the House, Senator Reed Smoot, Chairman of the Republican Senatorial Committee, Simon Fess, Chairman of the Republican Congressional Committee, and Senator Borah, held a three hour conference in the room of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. The result of the meeting was an expression of their indignation which they sent to Wilson in a note, "This is not the President's war but a war of the United States, of the allied powers, and of the civilized world against the barbarism of Germany. In this great burden and responsibility, the Republican Party, representing more than half of the people of the country, demands its rightful share." 69

A review of the press comments of the day collected by the Chicago Daily Tribune discloses that by this plea Wilson lost many votes for his party. 70 The Des Moines Capitol admitted that the appeal was the cause of Iowa voting Republican. "The ef-

69. The New York Times, October 26, 1918, 1
70. Chicago Daily Tribune, October 28, 1918, 4
fect of the President's letter will undoubtedly be to elect a solid Republican delegation to Congress from Iowa, something that otherwise would not have been done." The St. Louis Globe-Democrat disagreed with the President that a Democratic majority was necessary. "The tendency of President Wilson's act will be to disrupt the unity of spirit ----." An ominous note was sounded by the Minneapolis Journal when it prophesied that Wilson would live to regret having made such a statement. The Lincoln Nebraska Journal characterized Wilson's words as being a slap in the face for Americans. "Free America will vote --- to rebuke party leaders, who have succeeded in entangling the President in his partisanship and have induced him to insult the intelligence of the country."

The Omaha Bee warned that the political drive from the Capitol was concerned only with winning the election and was unmindful of the war. The Detroit Free News and the Detroit Times berated the President for assuming such an openly partisan action. Also included in this same collection of newspaper comments are statements from representative Eastern papers giving similar views regarding the effect of the appeal.71 The New York Evening Sun considered the President's request for a Democratic Congress a demand that the voters sacrifice their own ideals and principles and be zealots, 71. Chicago Daily Tribune, October 28, 1918, 4
rather than thinking voters. According to the Providence Journal, the President defiled the honor of the American voters. "---he attempts to substitute for the public will his own personal desires for the perpetuation of his own party powers." The Hartford Courant described it as an offense to half the voters of the country. The President was accused of entering into partisan politics by the Philadelphia Inquirer. While pledging its support, the Washington Herald expressed its strong disapproval at which it considered the President's attempt to become a dictator.

To William Taft and Theodore Roosevelt, the appeal gave an unexpected opportunity to plead their cause against Wilson. Taft publicly accused Wilson of desiring the power of the Hohenzollerns, the family of power in Prussia during several centuries. "The character of the President's appeal discloses his utter misunderstanding of our Constitutional form of Government. The appeal is a demand for power during the next two years equal to that of the Hohenzollerns ---." 72 Warren Harding depicted the confidence of the nation as shattered due to the demand for a partisan Congress, and claimed that Wilson considered only himself and was forgetful of the nation and the country's cause. 73

72. The New York Times, November 2, 1918, 2
73. Chicago Daily Tribune, November 3, 1918, 7
some writers ascribe the repudiation of Wilson in the Congressional Election of 1918 directly to his error of making the speech for a return of a Democratic Congress. The consensus of the opinion of many is expressed by a writer, "--- he shocked the people by a partisan appeal for the election of a partisan Congress. It marked him in the world conference as a leader of a faction rather than the embodied hope of humanity ----. He had a chance to be President; he preferred to be a party Chief."

However, in light of the evidence, it would appear that this political blunder of Wilson, along with other facts, influenced the country to return a Congress against him. It injected an interest in the campaign, making it a political struggle, commanding the attention of thousands of voters, who might otherwise have remained away from the polls.

74. Dr. Frank Crane, "Who Killed Wilson" Current Opinion, May 1921, 595
The exchange of notes in October 1918 between Wilson and Germany proved to be a disturbing influence in the Congressional election of 1918. In answer to a note received on October 5, 1918 from the Imperial Chancellor of Germany, Prince Maximilian, asking for an armistice on the basis of the fourteen points, which had been enumerated to Congress on January 8, 1918. Wilson wrote Maximilian requesting that he be advised if Maximilian meant that the German Government accepted the fourteen points, if the military leaders would agree to withdraw their armies from the occupied territories, and if Maximilian was speaking for the old group who waged the war, or for those who had been freed.

The country found it difficult to understand this move of Wilson and many Americans allowed it to influence their voting in the election of the following month. The resentment with which it was received is evidenced by the tone of public expression regarding it. Members of Congress, who were interviewed immediately following the exchange of notes, expressed their disappointment that Wilson had not definitely refused the overture of Germany. Senator Fletcher of Florida felt

75. Bolling, 255 - 259
76. Tumulty, 317
77. The New York Times, October 9, 1918, 1, 3
that it was not the time for an armistice and no dealings should be had with Germany until she completely surrendered. Likewise, Senator McKellar, Democrat from Tennessee shared this same view that only an unconditional surrender should be discussed. Senator Lodge stated, "I believe in a dictated, not a negotiated peace." Senator New from Indiana considered the note distinctly disappointing to the people. From the evidence, it would seem that he was correct in his summary of the feelings of the people when he said, "I do not think the American people are in a frame of mind that will permit of any temporizing with an enemy whose proposals for peace are so vague that we must inquire their meaning before we can find voice to reply. More violent in speech was Senator Kirby of Arkansas. "We are organized to whip --- Germany and I think we had better do it before we quit." The South Carolina Senator, Benet, expressed his opposition to any attempt to parley with the Germans, claiming that the only method to use in treating an outlaw of the country was to make him feel the sword.

Leading figures of the country, both Democratic and Republican, denounced Wilson. George W. Wickersham, ex-Attorney General, in an address to the Canadian Society at the Hotel Biltmore in New York on October 8, 1918 elicited from the large group in attendance an expression of their desire to
gain an unconditional surrender from Germany. Loud and
vehement cries of "No" and "Never" came as a response to
his question, addressed to the group, "Should we stop now
and allow these villains, these destroyers of women and
wreckers of cities to gain the advantage of negotiation be­
fore they have shown any signs of repentance?"78 He con­
tinued by discussing the improbability of the American
people being content with peace negotiations at that time,
stating that it would be too much to expect of a people with
two million soldiers overseas.

Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor
spoke critically of the peace move.79 John R. Alpine, Act­
ing President of the American Federation of Labor, telegraphed
to the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy. "The
workers of our country refuse to be deluded by what we be­
lieve to be this last attempt to deceive."80 Joseph Tumulty
anticipated the severe tone of the criticism which was raised
against Wilson and wrote him to that effect on October 7,
1918, "---every bit of information that comes to me is along
one line --- that an agreement in which the Kaiser is to
play the smallest part will be looked upon with grave sus­
picion ----. In my opinion, it will result in the election

78. The New York Times, October 9, 1918, 3
79. Ibid., 2
80. Ibid., 2
of a Republican House and the weakening if not impairing
of your influence throughout the world." 81

A glimpse of press comment of the day regarding the note shows
the reluctance of the people to accept Wilson's diplomatic
move. The Public Ledger of Philadelphia considered the dis-
appointment of the people in Wilson because of his move a
natural one as the whole tone of the country was that of a
firmness against parley. 82 The views of Americans as ex-
pressed by the Herald of New York was that they had just be-
gun to fight and the President's note was a sign of
diplomatic weakening. 83 Although concluding that the Presi-
dent must have been governed by wisdom, his action was
questioned by The Star of Indianapolis, which admitted that
the note was not what had been expected or hoped for. 84

Unconditional Surrender Clubs were formed throughout the
country, 85 The cry that went up on all sides was, "We
demand the unconditional surrender of Germany and we prefer
it on German soil." 86

81. Tumulty, 317
82. The New York Times, October 9, 1918, 2
83. Ibid., 2
84. Ibid., 2
85. David Lawrence, The True Story of Woodrow Wilson
G. H. Doran & Co., New York, 1924, 239
86. "The President's Reply and The People's Reply (Editorial)
The Literary Digest, October 19, 1918, 1
As a result of the Congressional Elections, the entire picture of Congress changed. The four hundred thirty-five members of the House of Representatives had been placed up for re-election, while a third of the members of the Senate had submitted themselves to the voters. Before the election, there was a Democratic majority of eight as there were fifty-two Democrats and forty-four Republicans in the Senate. In the House, there were two hundred and fourteen Democrats and two hundred and ten Republicans, besides one Progressive and one Prohibitionist.\(^7\) The election placed forty-nine Republicans and forty-seven Democrats in the Senate, two hundred thirty-six Republicans, one hundred ninety-eight Democrats and one Socialist in the House.\(^8\) An analysis of the political complexion of the newly organized Congress shows that the majority in the Senate was a close one. It was evident that Robert La Follette of Wisconsin would have to be made the object of conciliation by the Republicans if they wished to maintain control.\(^9\)

Of great importance was the selection, when Congress convened in May, 1919, of Frederick Gillett of Massachusetts as Speak-

\(^7\) The New York Times, November 2, 1918, 10
\(^8\) The New York Times, November 7, 1918, 1
\(^9\) Dodd, 275
er of the House of Representatives. It was anticipated that Gillett would guide the group in the interest of the industrial states which he represented and his selection was an example of a sectional change from those representing the South as formerly, to those concerned with the industrial interests of the North and West.

Several of the chairmanships of the most important committees in Congress went to bitter opponents of Wilson. The Committee on Military Affairs was to be headed by Representative Julius Kahn of California. Mr. Kahn was known to be enthusiastic for the investigation of the war. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge was chose as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. This close friend of Roosevelt and established critic of Wilson was placed in a position to deal with treaty making and the animosity which he had shown to Wilson presuaged danger to Wilson.

Severe loss in support was suffered by Wilson in the defeat of James Hamilton Lewis by Medill McCormick. Mr. Lewis had championed Wilson's cause in the Senate and was replaced by a close friend of Theodore Roosevelt. A most able supporter of the Democratic group in the House as Chairman of the Com-

90. Congressional Directory, 65 Cong. 3 Sess., January 1919, 43
91. The New York Times, November 7, 1918, 4
mittee on Appropriations, Swager Sherley of Kentucky was defeated by Mr. Butler of Pennsylvania. 92

Mr. Tumulty in describing the President's feelings, when he witnessed the defeat of his party, claimed that Wilson gave an address to members of the Democratic National Committee February 28, 1919 in which he stated that the attitude of the country as expressed in the election was a natural one in as much as any party encouraging reforms that affected so many interests was bound to bring about a reaction. He added, "But in assessing the cause of our defeat we ought to be perfectly frank and admit that the country was not any more sure of us that it ought to be." 93 It appears from later evidence that from the beginning Wilson, discouraged by his defeat made little attempt to win over his opponents.

When the Democratic Party reviewed the Congressional Elections of 1918, several important facts were obvious. The results clearly showed that by the Nation's choice many seats in Congress formerly occupied by Democrats were filled by Republicans. Wilson, by his actions had changed the favor of the country from them and it was an established fact that the country was definitely not with Wilson as it refused to provide him with the support of his own party in Congress at a time, when he needed it most. As a curtain raiser for 92. The New York Times, November 6, 1918, 1 93. Tumulty, 334
the election of 1920 the Congressional Elections of 1918 were highly indicative.
On December 4, 1918, Wilson left America to attend the Peace Conference at Versailles. He left behind him a country, which severely questioned his departure. The spirit of "America first", to predominate at the time, was struck a blow by what was considered to be a deliberate attempt on the part of Wilson to desert the country at a time when he should be directing his attention to matters of reconstruction.

Had Wilson been less reticent in his dealings with the Senate and the Cabinet regarding his going he might have been spared this early antipathy. On November 26, 1918, when he mentioned for the first time to the Cabinet members his intention to go to Paris he made no reference to the membership of the Commission to attend the Conference, but merely gave his reasons for going, including the fact that various European leaders were desirous of his attendance and that he believed it was duty to direct the negotiations. He invited no comment from the members, although they would readily have expressed their belief that he was displaying poor judgment in his decision.

The reception of Wilson's speech in Congress on December 2,
1918, announcing his decision to go to Paris was indicative of the animosity with which the members of Congress, both Republicans and Democrats, received the decision. Neither his admission that he realized the inconvenience his going would entail, or his assurance of his accessibility to them served to allay their bitter feeling toward him. His appeal for the united support of Congress was met by cheers which were significantly confined to the Democratic Representatives. There was an almost pathetic attempt of several strong partisans of the Administration to arouse the cheers of the Democrats. Congressman Heflin of Alabama began a hearty hand clapping, but most of the Democratic Senators and practically all the Republican Representatives and Senators refused to join. Even when several Democratic Representatives stood to cheer and Senator Simmons of North Carolina beckoned to his colleagues, only a few responded. The members of the Supreme Court appeared to be undecided as to their conduct. However, when one of their members arose, the others followed with much hesitation. The partisan feeling was not to be denied when the applause of the Republicans was completely lacking as the President left the chamber after his speech.

3. Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., December 2, 1918, 5-9
4. The New York Times, December 3, 1918, 1
   Also, Houston, Vol 1., 353
5. Ibid., 2
The sessions of the Senate on the two days following the President's speech were marked by a bitter denunciation of him by both Democrats and Republicans. Lawrence Sherman, a Republican of Illinois, claimed that the Constitution prohibited the absence of a President in a foreign country and introduced a resolution to proclaim the Vice-President a President until the election of another leader took place in 1920. He considered the President's going an example of personal government and an attempt to satisfy his vanity. "He takes an iconoclastic delight in overriding every constitutional provision". An excerpt from the Washington Post which claimed that even the friendly Democratic newspapers were questioning the wisdom of the President's departure, was inserted in the Congressional Record. Senator Borah, Republican of Idaho, found agreement among the Senators with his statement that many of the Senators would have expressed their disapproval had the President consulted them regarding his going. Senator Reed, Democrat from Missouri, engaged in a lengthy argument with the Democratic Senator, John Williams of Mississippi, who championed Wilson and censured the Congressmen for their partisan spirit. Reed prophesied that the American people would never consent to submit their interests to a tribunal made up of enemies.

6. Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 3 sess., December 3, 1918, 27
7. Ibid., December 4, 1918, 119
of the country. "That doctrine... stated to the American people would be repudiated in every hamlet and village in America." 8 He introduced a letter of Honorable D. J. Hoff, of Kansas City, Missouri, prominent lawyer associated with the organization of the National Security League, in which he questioned the intelligence of anyone who believed that the people were ready for what he claimed to be a "United States of the World and said, "Fools are running around dreaming foolish dreams, making much noise and disturbing sober thought." 9

Both Democrats and Republicans agreed that the President had made a serious mistake in refusing to take the American public into his confidence. 10 Joseph Frelinghuysen, Republican of New Jersey, introduced a motion that the President give his interpretation of the Fourteen Points to the public. Thomas Walsh, Democrat of Montana, deplored the embarrassment the country was suffering in not having an understanding of the President's views. The California Senator, Hiram Johnson, a Republican, believed that the first duty of the President was to interpret his views to the American people instead of leaving them to guess at his meaning. A Senate resolution to create a Commission of eight Senators to be present at Paris was reported back to the Senate by Senator Hitchcock, Chair-
8. Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 91
9. Ibid., 94
10. Ibid., 69
man of the Foreign Relations Committee. John Shafroth, Demo-
crat of Colorado, believed the President's presence at the
conference would be an inspiration and Frank Kellog, a Repub-
lican of Minnesota, while believing the Senate should have
been given more consideration by the President, warned them
that they should be mindful only of the good of the nation
and act accordingly. Some Republican Senators went so far
as to direct their criticism to the extravagance of Wilson in
taking twelve automobiles with him to Paris. Senator Sherman
sarcastically referred to the appropriateness of this pur-
chase at a time subsequent to the many months of saving,
dieting, and giving by the American people. The temper of
the time relative to the dissapproval of Wilson by the pub-
lic finds expression in the statement of the Democratic
Senator Johnson of South Dakota, "We hear this criticism on
the streets, in the trains, in the hotels and in Congress."11

Wilson made no attempt to explain his action relative to his
selection of members of the Peace Commission, but included
Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, General Tasker Bliss,
Henry White, Republican and Colonel Edward M. House. It is
to be wondered at, perhaps, that he would turn his back upon
the Democratic group. There were many who believed that much
antagonism would have been avoided had Elihu Root, ex-Secre-
11. Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 358
tary of State or ex-President Taft, had been selected. Tumulty gave as Wilson's reasons for not inviting Elihu Root, the fact that Mr. Root was too conservative. It is also to be remembered that there had been a strained relationship between Wilson and Root when Root was active with Senator Chamberlain in his attack of Wilson during the war. From the evidence, the views of Professor Dodd regarding Wilson's relation with the Democratic party at this point seem most accurate. It was obvious to Wilson that discord would exist among any group of Senators which he would select to accompany him to Paris and he could not afford to invite quarrels which would work to the detriment of his peace plans. Then too, he knew that an announcement of his program would invite sectional and party difficulty.

When the President sailed out of the American harbor toward Paris he carried with him the sound of the farewell cheers of a large number of Americans, but he also had with him a picture of his hostile Senate, the damaging taunt of Theodore Roosevelt that the Fourteen Points were not an expression of the will of the American People, and the knowledge that he lacked the support of the Democratic group. Knowing that he was playing a lone hand, it is perhaps natural that the night before his sailing he spoke to Tumulty, "I shall rely upon

12. Creel, 154
13. Dodd, 286 - 287
you to keep me in touch with the situation on this side of
the water. When you think I am putting my foot in it, please
say so frankly." 15

While Wilson was proving himself a vigorous leader of the
Peace Conference in Paris, public opinion in America was
growing in a direction which indicated that only complica-
tions would be met by him, when he was ready to submit the
League of Nations to his own country. Democrats, as well as
Republicans shared in the shaping of this opinion.

Many feared that secrecy would surround the proceedings of
the Conference and publicly expressed resentment that Wilson
would permit this. Particularly, was this issue made a
point of attack by Senator Lodge, who asserted that it would
be a fatal step if Wilson continued to keep the nation in
ignorance of the Conference. 16 Others publicly expressed
the same view. 17 The Democratic Senator Thomas of Colorado
bluntly stated that it was the right of the people to be
informed of whatever was done by Wilson, which had a direct
bearing on the peace terms. Senator King, a Democrat of
Utah, agreed that all arguments relating to the vital
questions of the peace should be revealed to the people.

Representative Arthur Devalt, Pennsylvanian Democrat, con-

15. Tumulty, 341
16. The New York Times, December 22, 1918, 1
17. The New York Times, January 17, 1919, 2
considered that an observance of secrecy would be a great mistake as the entire world was interested in the proceedings. That a secret peace conference was in direct opposition to all ideas of the new diplomacy was the view of Henry D. Flood, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

On December 30, 1918, when Senator Reed addressed a large gathering of the Society of Arts and Sciences at the Hotel Biltmore in New York, he boldly expressed his views that a League of Peace would not be effective enough to maintain peace when nations had been angered enough to desire war. As an agency making America a party to every European quarrel, he believed the League should be denounced. Professor F.H. Giddings of Columbia University, who shared the program with Senator Reed on this occasion, reiterated the views as held by Reed. His criticism was based on the fact that the League would place the country under the control of nations, which represented European interests. Senator Poindexter, a Republican of Washington, pointed out to three hundred guests at a Republican dinner on February 1, 1919, the perilous position into which the League would plunge the United States. He claimed that the American people were more interested in internal problems. "They take precedence over the future of Mesopotamia," he sarcastically said.

18 The New York Times, December 30, 1918, 2
19 Ibid., 2
20 The New York Times, February 1, 1919, 1
On February 14, 1919, Wilson presented his report on the League of Nations to the Conference and sailed for America with the purpose of conducting the business associated with the closing of the Sixty-fifth Session of Congress. Anticipating difficulty in the Senate regarding the League, he cabled the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs before he left Paris, extending an invitation to them to join him at dinner at the White House on February 26, so that he might discuss the provisions of the League with them. This did not pacify the group and they took exception to the fact that he intended to speak in Boston and New York relative to the League before he discussed the matter in Washington.21

The Democrats, it is interesting to note, refused to comment at this point on the League as it was then drafted, but early statements were forthcoming from the Republicans.22 Senator Borah denounced it as a renunciation of the Monroe Doctrine. Senator Spencer of Missouri, a Republican, found little substance to the League and after his examination found it full of generalities. Senator Frelinghuysen was provoked to repeat his adherence to the traditions of Americanism and to the Monroe Doctrine, which he felt was violated. Similar views were expressed by Senators New and Smith.

22. Ibid., 1
Without waiting to secure an explanation from Wilson, the Senators began their attack on the League in the Senate on February 19, 1919. The first to voice a violent opposition was Senator Poindexter. He pointed out that a decision on the League was a decision as to whether the country was to adhere to the doctrine of Washington and Monroe to avoid becoming involved in entangling alliances or was to accept a League, which would commit the country to an alliance with many nations of the world. He condemned the President for desiring to deprive the people of the high esteem with which they were regarded in the international affairs of the world. He urged action, "So we are requested, while the advocates of this super government of the world are making arguments in its favor, to remain silent."\(^{23}\) Applause from the Senate gallery greeted his accusation that the American people were being blindly led into an abyss.

Senator Reed was the next to attack. In the Senate on February 22, 1919, he read each article of the draft and severely criticized them. There was no attempt to spare Wilson as he expressed his amazement that any one could have proposed such a compact. In scathing words he inquired, why abandon the nationalism that has done so much for our country for the desperate experiment of internationalism?\(^{24}\) He termed the

\(^{23}\) Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 3 sess., 3746
\(^{24}\) Ibid., 4033
League as a solemn pledge that the United States would become a party to every nation's controversy. He appealed to the American people, claiming that it would not be necessary for them to watch the actions of their representatives, should the League of Nations be adopted, but they would be distressed in watching foreign nations supervise. Senator Lodge's attack on February 28, 1919, in the Senate indicated the need for the drafting of another League other than the one presented. In his opinion, the Monroe Doctrine had completely disappeared under the terms of the League as drafted. "Now in a twinkling of an eye the Washington policy is to be entirely laid aside and we are to enter a permanent and indissoluble alliance."25

There is little information available as to the actual details of the dinner at the White House on February 26, 1919. With the exception of Senator Borah and Senator Fall of New Mexico, all the members of the Foreign Relations Committee attended and all but a few of the House Committee were present. A Senator, unidentified by the press, commented on the fact that those in attendance maintained a good relationship with the President and while there were a few outspoken questions, there was no indication of an open breach.26

John Jacob Rodgers of Massachusetts, a Republican, member of the House

25. Congressional Record 65 Cong., 3 sess., 4521
26. The New York Times, February 27, 1919, 1
Foreign Relations Committee, claimed that Wilson answered all questions with frankness and vigor and did not show any signs of irritability. Senator McCumber openly stated in the Senate that President Wilson had given a fair presentation of the case. Referring to Wilson's actions, he said, "He subjected himself to every inquiry that might be made and answered every inquiry fairly and justly and in a spirit of conciliation, with a desire to make all matters perfectly clear." Senator Lodge was conspicuous by maintaining an aloofness from the discussion. Although David F. Houston, Secretary of Agriculture, claimed that Wilson gave assurance to those in attendance that the various defects which they pointed out would be closely considered, the evidence as presented by others associated with the event does not bear out this statement and it is said that Wilson indicated that he was unwilling to change the "Fourteen Points". It would appear that this latter view was more consistent in the light of Wilson's subsequent actions.

It was soon evident that the Senate intended to thwart the very purpose which Wilson had in returning to Washington by refusing to sign the appropriation bills needed to restore...

28. Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 3 sess., 4881
29. Houston, Vol. 1, 368
30. Ibid., 368
31. Kerney, 427
Also The New York Times, February 27, 1919
the country in post-war period. They also intended, not only to embarrass him in this manner, but also to require him to call a special session to conduct this business, thus enabling a Congress made up of those selected in the Congressional election of 1918 to exercise its authority in regard to a decision on the League of Nations. A filibuster, conducted in a deliberate fashion by Senators Sherman, France of Maryland and Senator La Follette, prevented the passage of the Water power Bills, the Leasing, the Homestead Bill, a bill authorizing appropriation needed for the demobilization of the army, and other necessary appropriations.32 Bitterly disappointed, on March 5, 1919, Wilson returned to the Peace Conference in Paris. On March 4, 1919, Senator Lodge offered a resolution to the Senate, "... the constitution of the League of Nations, in the form now proposed to the Peace Conference, should not be accepted by the United States." He also included a clause that the United States should immediately concern itself with negotiating with Germany and with the nations associated in the war with Germany, taking up the matter of permanent peace at a later time.33 When Claude Swanson, a Democrat, objected to the resolution, there was no discussion, but Senator Lodge presented a resolution accompanied by the signatures of thirty

32. Homer S. Cummings, "Leadership in Public Affairs" Current Opinion, New York, October 30, 1919, 222
33. Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 3 sess., 4975
seven Republicans who claimed that "We the undersigned would have voted for the resolution if we had the opportunity." This daring step, unprecedented, was considered by many to mark the defeat of the Treaty and such an opinion was expressed in The New York Sun, "Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations died in the Senate today." 35

The discussion concerning the League of Nations, during the closing days of the Sixty-fifth Session was centered about the views of two Democrats. Lawrence Sherman of Illinois, likened the executive council of nations, as proposed by the League, to the setting up of an oligarchy, and said, "It orders Congress today to send half a million young men into Central Asia to be hacked to pieces on the plateau of Tibet. Tomorrow, Egypt is assailed by desert hordes and more levies are sent to slaughter in a struggle that does not remotely concern our peace." More figuratively, he condemned the League, "The Constitution of the United States is a Pandora's box of evil to empty upon the American people the aggregated calamities of the world ....". He also pointed out the length that Wilson had departed from the Democratic platform of 1900 and invited the President to an open combat, claiming that Wilson would agree to this if he was not a coward involved in politics and government. Senator Hardwick of Georgia, 35. Fleming, 159
36. Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 3 sess., 4864-69
who spoke on March 1, 1919, gave one of the most lengthy discourses offered during the entire consideration of the League by the Senate. His recommendation embraced a speedy passage of a peace treaty and a later consideration of permanent peace. His discussion centered about an attempt to show that the proposed League of Nations was likely to keep the entire world at war and that it violated not only the Constitution of the United States but the fundamental principles upon which the government was based. He expressed his unwillingness to allow the United States to become a policeman of the world and claimed that Wilson was impracticable and that, "He will have all he wants before this thing is over". He proposed a set of questions which he believed should be given to the American voter before he passed on the League. Among the questions were to be found, "Are you willing to pull down the stars and stripes? Are you willing that the American Eagle will shrink back into its shell?" He climaxed his denunciation with the criticism that Wilson, showing a contempt for Congressional sentiment, intended to hand over the power that he had taken from the Senate to a League of Nations.

The special session of Congress, when it began work on May 19, 1919, was predominated by determination on the part of the majority group to destroy the prestige of Wilson. There

37. Congressional Record, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 4699-4705
were few friends on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Knox, Borah and Lodge led groups, alike in their opposition to Wilson, varying only in their respective views in opposition to the Treaty. As members of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Democrats had little opportunity to report favorably on the League. Senator Hitchcock, a Democrat, attested to this, when he accused the Senate members of making a political issue out of the League and censured the Republicans for selecting for the Committee of Foreign Relations only those who had pledged themselves against accepting the League as offered by Wilson. The success, which the opposition had achieved, even before Wilson presented the Treaty to the Senate, is described by David Houston, who had noticed the feeling both in Washington and throughout the West during a tour.

Senator Hitchcock, however, as early as June 28, 1919, as spokesman of the administration in the Senate, expressed his confidence that the Treaty would receive a favorable vote. He elaborated his statement that only fifteen Republican Senators could be counted upon to oppose the ratification of the Treaty and said, "They cannot obtain a majority for the Knox resolution, the Fall resolution or the resolution of Mr. Root. These will be voted down by Democrats with assistance.

38. The Congressional Record, 66 Cong., 1 sess., 791
39. Houston, Vol. 11, 4
from Republicans. It is certain that there will be more than two Republicans, who will aid us in accomplishing this result. The Democrats are solid. Other Democrats attempted to allay the spirit of doubt, which the Republicans had injected into the minds of the public and upon which they intended to capitalize politically. Senator Pomerene of Ohio, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, stated that it could not be hoped that united approval would be secure regarding the provisions of the League, but that its great importance should be considered by those who planned to vote against it because all provisions were not satisfactory. Senator Gerry, Democrat of Rhode Island, considered the League a great triumph for the President and expressed his belief that the country felt that the Senate should hasten to approve the Treaty. The California Democrat, Senator Phean, also spoke enthusiastically about the League as a triumph of Wilson, while Senator Root of Arizona, approved the speedy action of the Senate and Senator Ashurst, Democrat of Arizona summed up his approval with, "I am going to follow the flag." However, at the same time, every Republican Senator interviewed by a press correspondent, expressed the improbability of the League being accepted by the Senate without a quali-

40. The New York Times, June 28, 1919, 1
41. The New York Times, June 29, 1919, 3
42. Ibid., 3
43. Ibid., 3
fying resolution.44

While these views were being speculated upon by the people of the nation, Wilson formally presented the Treaty to the Senate on July 10, 1919, and left the Senate with the thought, "The stage is set, the destiny disclosed, we cannot turn back."45 Realizing a discussion might aid his cause, he held a conference on August 19, 1919, with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at the White House for the purpose of offering an opportunity to exchange views.46 The full report of the Conference shows a spirited discussion dominated by the attempt to impress Wilson with the need for reservations. Senator Brandegee pointed out that there was opposition to the entire covenant, to the various parts of the League and a decided opposition to the Shantung provisions. He brazenly referred to the proposed council of nations as a rope of sand. Throughout the discussion Wilson maintained his poise and answered the questions in a calm, decisive manner, using such phrases as, "Yes, I assume so." "If I interpret it rightly." "I admit that there are those difficulties." It is interesting to note that Senator Lodge spoke only a few words in the beginn-

44. The New York Times, June 29, 1919, 1
45. Senate Document 59, 66 Cong., 1 sess., 13
46. Senate Document 76, 66 Cong., 1 sess., 1 - 50
ing of the discussion, asking if it was intended that the United States should receive any part of the reparation funds and if any provision was made for an island for naval purposes. It is not to be wondered at that Wilson commented to David Houston at a Cabinet meeting, subsequent to the conference, on the fact, that Senator Harding had a dull mind. During the discussion, Senator Harding made it necessary for Wilson to repeat his views, and although severely tried when Harding inquired as to the value of Articles X and XI if there was only a moral obligation binding the league members, Wilson merely stated, "Why, Senator, it is surprising that question should be asked. If we undertake an obligation, we are bound in the most solemn way to carry it out". There was little gained in support of the Treaty by the conference. Senator Lodge stated that the Committee members were no wiser when they left the meeting and the President was not able to give the information desire.

By September 1919, Wilson was aware that the Senate was obdurate and that his only hope was to appeal personally to the people of the country. Accordingly, on September 4, 1919 he began a tour of the West. Before leaving, he discussed the treaty with Senator Swanson, Democrat of Virginia, and

47. Houston, Vol. 2, 4
48. Houston, Vol. 2, 19
49. Henry Cabot Lodge, The Senate & the League of Nations, Charles Scribner's Sons, N.Y. 1925
Senator Hitchcock. In his discussion with Senator Swanson, he announced himself as opposed to changes which would involve sending the Treaty back to Paris. Also in his talk with Hitchcock, he expressed the hope that the treaty would be ratified without amendments and reservations that would involve it being reconsidered at Paris. He was reassured by Senator Hitchcock that Democratic Senators would defeat all amendments.

At Indianapolis, St. Louis, and Des Moines, Wilson was received enthusiastically and it is reported that representative audiences cheered him. A large group of prominent men seemingly aided the acceptance of the Treaty by publishing an account of its worth. In the West, in the states of Oregon, Washington and California, Wilson was made to feel that there was a distinctive approval of the Treaty. However, on September 25, 1919, his speaking tour in behalf of the League was halted at Wichita, Kansas where he collapsed.

With Wilson inactive, leadership was taken from the group of Democrats that supported the Treaty. Further loss of leadership was suffered when Senator Martin of Virginia withdrew his leadership from the Senate because of illness. Through--

50. The New York Times, September 3, 1919, 1
51. The New York Times, September 4, 1919, 1
52. The New York Times, September 5, 67, 1919, 1
53. The New York Times, September 13, 1919, 1
54. Dodd, 376
out the consideration of the treaty during the following months, Wilson steadfastly maintained his policy of refusal to accept any of the proposed amendments. In November he wrote to Hitchcock, expressing his hope that the friends of the Treaty would vote against the Lodge resolutions. His wishes were sustained when the Democrats, together with the irreconcilables voted against the Lodge reservations, fifty to thirty-nine.

On March 19, 1920, the treaty with the Lodge reservations was given a final vote, forty-nine voting for the Lodge reservations, while thirty-five opposed the Treaty in this form, not establishing a two-thirds majority. Twenty three Democrats, along with twelve Republicans voted against the Lodge reservations, while twenty-one voted for it. Few of the Democratic Senators from the Northern or Western States supported him.

In accounting for the defeat of the treaty, the personal hatred felt for Wilson is given great importance and Senator Walsh of Montana gives some indication of this when he stated that nine out of ten letters he received from the public protesting the Treaty, were characterized by an intense feeling of hatred toward Wilson.

55. Bolling, 296
56. Fleming, 396
57. Congressional Record, 66 Cong., 3 sess., 4599
58. W. Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate
The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1933
Wilson's comment to Tumulty, when the defeat of the Treaty was made known to him, was, "They have shamed us in the eyes of the world." He then expressed his sorrow that his health prevented him from convincing the people of the value of the League. 59

59. Tumulty, 455
CHAPTER IV.

WILSON'S DOMESTIC POLICY - A THORN

The domestic policy followed by Wilson brought him in conflict with many groups, included among which was a large number of democrats. At a time when Americans were anxiously hoping for a rapid restoration of peacetime conditions, the apparent unconcern of Wilson and his complete absorption in the Treaty of Versailles angered many.

The apathy of the President towards solution of domestic problems was openly criticizes in the Senate. Senator Kellogg pointed out how far removed Wilson was from touch with the condition of the country, and claimed that any matter connected with the railroads, one of the pressing problems, was the work of the Director General of the Railroads. Senator Kellog did not believe that the President was remotely concerned with the problems. ¹ Senator Reed considered that the American government had more than enough problems to concern itself with at home rather than attending to the affairs of other countries. He claimed that predominance should be given to home conditions, advising, "Look after great problems that concern the bread and butter ... and housing of our own country ...²"

Representative Reddich of Montana blamed Wilson for his in-
1. Congressional Record, 66 Cong., 1 sess., August 4, 1919, 3595
2. Ibid., 3595
difference and lamented the fact that Wilson had not made even the slightest effort to discourage profiteering, although it had been thriving for four or five years.3

By the summer of 1919, the cost of living had reached such a high peak that its accompanying problems claimed the attention of the entire nation. Those who were affected by the high prices did not hesitate to express their resentment. The statement of a clerk in a store with a thirty dollar income is indicative of the feelings of many. He lamented the fact that he could not depend upon representation in Congress for assistance and said, "Nobody cares a hang about our interests or how we may continue to meet the increased cost of living without an increase in our weekly pay."4

A period of unrest accompanied this condition. There were reports that starvation was to be expected and the Children's Bureau of the Department of Labor reported that six million American children were underfed.5 The Richmond Dispatch dared to anticipate, "If hunger leads to Bolshevism, how doubly dangerous must that leadership be when that hunger ends in a country ... whose storehouses are full to brimming."6 Governor Lowden of Illinois was among those who urged that the

3. New York Times, August 6, 1919, 2
4. The Literary Digest, August 30, 1919, 15
5. "Onslaught on High Prices" (Editorial) The Literary Digest, August 16, 1919, 12
6. Ibid., 12
grave conditions be studied and remedies be proposed immediately. He asserted that the steady increase in the cost of living was hampering the future peace of the country and added, "Until that the increase is checked and the tendency starts in the other direction there will be no permanent industrial peace." William G. Lee, President of the Brotherhood of Train Men, caught some of the unrest of the day when he asserted that an upheaval in the nation was imminent and that the country was nearer war than when, as he expressed it, "... the Kaiser threw down the gauntlet in Europe." 7

Homer S. Cummings, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, returned early in August, 1919 from a two months' survey of the country and is reported to have impressed upon Wilson the deep resentment of the people regarding the high cost of living and to have pointed out the necessity for an immediate solution of the problem.8 It was immediately after this that Attorney General Palmer called a conference of Cabinet Officers and other officials to discuss the high cost of living. As an outgrowth of this meeting, a Committee of Three, composed of Director General of Railroads, Mr. Hines, Assistant Secretary Leffingwell of the Treasury Department and Commissioner Colber of the Federal Trade Commission were appointed to recommend a solution to the problem. At the

7. The New York Times, August 1, 1919, 1
8. Ibid., 1
meeting, it was proposed that the price of wheat and other grains might be reduced.  

Wilson, realizing that the temper of the people demanded that he act quickly toward a solution of the problem, announced his plans in an address which he delivered at a joint session of the House and the Senate on August 8, 1919. He recommended an extension of the Food Control Act in force at the time and asked that it be made to apply to additional commodities. He asked that Congress pass laws to regulate cold storage and pointed out the need that the packages be marked with the price of goods representing the cost to the producer before they were sent to other states. He recommended that a law be formulated which would require a federal license of all corporations engaged in interstate commerce and that this license should contain specific regulations aimed to establish competitive selling and prevent an unreasonable profit in marketing.

There was severe criticism of Wilson's speech. It was said by some, including Speaker Gillett and Speaker Mondell that Wilson had been negligent in using the powers which he already had and the governmental departments were not in need of further appropriations. Senator Watson of Indiana made a forcible objection to the proposal for an extension of the Food Control

10. Dodd and Baker, Vol. 6, 558 - 571
11. The New York Times, August 9, 1919, 2
Act and the placing of the business of the country under a licensing system. To be expected perhaps was Senator Reed's reaction as expressed in his statement, "... I am opposed to putting the business of the country in leading strings to be manipulated by a lot of Jacks in Washington." An equally strong feeling was that of Senator Gronna, Chairman of the Senate Agricultural Committee, who opposed Wilson's recommendation for additional legislation to deal with the profiteers. He claimed, "So far as I am concerned the President has all the power he will ever get from the Committee on Agriculture." Many construed Wilson's purpose, as given in the address, to be an attempt to extend his power, and the packers met his proposals with a cut in the prices, which they would pay to the farmers. Some indication of the response of the packers is given in a survey of conditions in the Chicago Stock Yards on August 28, 1919. On this day the selling price of pork was a dollar and twenty-five cents to two dollars lower than the previous day, representing a decline of more than three dollars per one hundred pounds in two days. It was estimated that eighteen thousand hogs were unsold. Likewise, the average price of pork was seventeen dollars and seventeen cents per one hundred pounds, a decrease of one dollar and forty-five cents.

12. The New York Times, August 9, 1919, 2
13. Ibid., 2
14. Ibid., 2
15. The New York Times, August 29, 1919, 11
in comparison the trading the previous day and a five dollar decrease under the record high price of the last day of July 1919. The cause of the serious drop was ascribed to the fact that the packers refused to buy on the high and loaded the market. The cooling rooms were full as the housewives were using meat sparingly. Something of the stockmen's plight can be gleamed from the report of the same day that the cattle and sheep markets were paralyzed and the stockmen were in danger of being victims of a heavy loss, as they had paid exceptionally high prices for feed for the stock.

From this time on, the discontent of the large farmer group with Wilson as a leader grew. Their resentment against him and the Administration had been frankly evidenced previous to this time. One writer gave an insight into the attitude of the farmer in 1919 when he summarized under three headings what he believed to be their feelings. He claimed that they were disgusted with the Secretary of Agriculture and were demanding, along with his resignation, an investigation of the Department of Agriculture. Also, he commented on the ability of the farmer to have his demands met, claiming that no Congress could refuse the request of this large group. Finally, he stated that while there were as yet inadequate opportunity for a national concerted drive of the farmers, they were vi-

tally interested in a union on a national scale and had a watchful eye on the Non-Partisan League. The success of this group in conducting experiments in the control of grain elevators and flour mills by the state and encouraging other reforms in North Dakota was heartening to the farmer. Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas, in close contact with the farmer group, saw an increasingly rapid shifting of the farmers away from the Democratic party.\(^{17}\)

The farmers did not hesitate when they saw how deeply they were touched by the economic situation, but sent their representatives to present their plea to Wilson on August 14, 1919.\(^{18}\) Their delegation consisting of members of the National Federation of State Farm Bureaus from Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Iowa, urged Wilson to reduce the cost of living without lowering the price of grain. They attributed the high cost of living to profiteering, stagnation in business and extravagance on the part of the public. They refused to place the blame on the greed of the producers. Their dinner, at eleven dollars a plate, was used to illustrate these facts and one of their members explained to Wilson, "Of this eleven dollars, the price of the food, the farmer got; beef, two pounds, thirty-six cents, potatoes thirteen cents, bread two cents, corn seven cents, coffee, cream and sugar four cents, corn twenty

17. R.M. Boeckel, "What the Farmer Wants," The Independent, July 5, 1919, 20
18. The New York Times, August 15, 1919, 1
cents, total eighty two cents, or seven per cent of the total." During the conference, the farmer indicated to Wilson that they were not willing to work alone. They would allow a cut in their prices only if there was a corresponding cut in the prices of all other commodities. They signified their intention to encourage increased production if it was believed this would remedy this situation, but added that they would not work alone and would expect all other lines of endeavor to work jointly.

One who has made a close study of the farmer of this period presents a picture in which the farmer is seen as resentful and bewildered at his condition and susceptible to the advice that he patiently wait for a Republican Administration to restore his prosperity. The abandonment by the farmer group of the leadership of Wilson was evident to the Democratic party and it was seen that this important element of strength was to be dined to him.

The dangerous spirit of unrest in the country due to the mounting cost of living was evidenced in a large number of strikes which became a national problem by August 1919. A Professor of Social Economics estimates, as a result of his study, the number of strikes in 1919 to be two thousand six hundred and sixty five, with four million one hundred and sixty thousand

The Macmillan Company, New York, 1931, 203 - 204
three hundred and forty eight employees involved and claimed that the coal and steel strikes alone were participated in by nearly one million people. Some idea of the alarming situation can be gained from the comment of the Los Angeles Times, which, at the close of August 1919, asserted that there had been a loss of one million dollars during the preceding six months due to strikes and many thousands had been inconvenienced. It was not unusual to find an announcement in daily newspapers regarding from one to ten new strikes in addition to articles regarding to developments in those already begun. In the midst of these disturbances it is not to be wondered at that the people of the nation turned questioning eyes toward their President or that his unpopularity increased at the many signs of disorder, such as the mailing of bombs to men of prominence, including Attorney General Palmer, who had the misfortune to have one explode on the doorstep of his home.

Particularly was the strike movement identified with the crisis in the railroad situation. The rising cost of living was loudly protested by the American Railway Brotherhoods and

22. The High Cost of Strikes, (Editorial) The Literary Digest August 30, 1919, 15
23. Ibid., 15
by August 1919 their demands for wage increases had reached an enormous amount. To appreciate the seriousness of the situation one has only to review their plans at this time. These included a threat of a nation wide strike on January 1, 1920 of one million five hundred thousand organized railroad employees, aiming to force the Government to keep the railroads under Government management. Secondly, plans include a nation wide strike on October 1, 1919 of one hundred forty thousand train men if the Government had not increased their wages by one million dollars by this time and an immediate strike of four hundred and fifty thousand shopmen if their demands for a two hundred and ten million dollar wage increase was not met. In addition to these demands, various groups of railroad employees urged that the Government increase their wages in order to enable them to cope with the increased cost of living.

On August 3, 1919 a statement was issued by the Railway Trainmen, the Locomotive Engineers, the Locomotive Firemen and the Railway Conductors, which approved the Federal control of the railroads as a means of reducing the cost of living. Their implication was not to be overlooked as the statement read, "The railroads are in no mood to brook the return of the lines to their former control since all the plans suggested for this

25. The New York Times, August 2, 1919, 2
26. Ibid., 2
settlement of the problems leave labor essentially where it has stood and where it is determined to stand."27 That those concerned with the railways were in a defiant mood is affirmed by Warren S. Stone, President of the Brotherhood of Engineers, who said, "We are going far enough to win the fight, and we are going to win."28 He made a threat that in two months' time over a million railroad men would have brought pressure upon Senators and Congressmen and the issue would in time become identified with the Presidential campaign.

When Wilson recommended the establishment of a Federal Commission to adjust wage disputes and to dictate rates he found bitter opposition voiced by organized labor, represented by the railway shopmen. In a conference with him the shopmen flatly refused to accept his recommendation and threatened to strike on September 2, 1919. They let it be know that they controlled five hundred thousand men in the United States and ten thousand in Canada and that they had the satisfaction of knowing that other Unions were also against his plan.29 Likewise Mr. Jewett, the acting President of the Railway Employees Department, expressed his disapproval of Mr. Wilson's plans by saying, "The Railroads will be tied up so tightly, they will never run again if that legislation is passed."30

27. The Congressional Record, 66 Cong., 1 sess., 3647
28. The New York Times, August 4, 1919, 1
29. The New York Times, August 5, 1919, 1
30. Ibid., 1
Thoughts regarding the seriousness in a political light of the situation should Wilson break with the Railroad group ran through the minds of many. Senator Thomas reminded his colleagues that there were six million men identified with the Railrods with whom it would be necessary to reckon.31 Glenn E. Plumb, the originator of the Plumb plan for the solution of the Railroad problem, also commented on the large number of people who were ready to force the issue and claimed, "We have behind this movement today more votes than any political party has ever cast...."32 His plan which was urged by many called for the purchase of the railroads by the Government at a valuation which would be determined by the courts, operation by dictatorate of fifteen members, five to be chosen by the President to represent the public, five to be elected by the operating officials and five by class employees, and an equal division of the surplus.33

The rising flood of anger against Wilson took form in the walk out of thousands of shop men on August 6, 1919, with additional strikes the following day.34 On August 8th Wilson addressed a letter to Director General Hines in which he authorized Mr. Hines to advise the railroad shop employees that

31. Congressional Record, 66 Cong., 1 sess., 3649
32. "Demands of Railroad Unions" (Editorial) Current History
   New York, August 1919, 447
33. Ibid., 447
34. The New York Times, August 6 & 7, 1919, 2
their demands for wage increases would be considered by the Director General who would confer with the credited representatives of the shop employees. He urged an immediate return of the men to work. The response of the shop men was favorable and their return to work put the railroad problem in the background for a short period of several weeks as far as serious strikes were concerned. However, the railroad employees had not been appeased and late in August the shop men again made their demands for higher wages and threatened a walk out. Wilson immediately urged co-operation of the railway employers and sent a letter to the Representative of the Railway Employees Department of the American Federation of Labor on August 25th in which he requested that the shop men be asked to reconsider the whole matter as the major problem before the country was the reduction of the high cost of living. He feared that a general increase in the level of wages would harm any plan and would be a serious draw back to the country.

The following day, Wilson realizing the need for public statement made public his views regarding the pending crisis. His attitude was briefly expressed in his main statement that the request of the railway shopmen would be deferred until normal conditions were restored.

35. The New York Times, August 8, 1919, 1
37. Ibid., 584 - 587
is said were startled by the attitude of Wilson as expressed in this public message. 38 Regardless of the feeling of the American Federation of Labor Wilson carried out his threat to inflict penalty of military intervention when he authorized the United States Railroad Administration to use the entire power of the Government to restore the operation of railroad systems in Nevada, Arizona and California, where strikes had occurred. Federal District Attorneys were ordered to aid in the arrest and prosecution of anyone who was found interfering with transportation. 39

Again the President came in contact with the Federation of Labor when they championed the cause of the steel mill workers. The steel workers had decided by August 21, 1919 that if the officials of the corporations refused to confer with union representatives a conference committee of six headed by Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor and representing twenty four unions of the steel industry, would authorize a strike. The demands which the representatives were to present, if given a hearing were twelve, among which was an eight hour day, an increase in wages to enable American standards of living to be maintained, the right of collective bargaining and a standard scale of wages for the crafts. 40

Elbert H. Gary of the United States Steel Corporation was

38. The New York Times, August 26, 1919, 1
39. The New York Times, August 29, 1919, 1
40. The New York Times, August 21, 1919, 1
notified by a committee of the steel workers that a strike would be called if he refused to grant an interview, but no answer from Mr. Gary was made.

While Wilson was touring the West to bring his message of the treaty of Versailles to the people, he received a telegram from Samuel Gompers urging him to use his influence to arrange a conference between the United States Steel Corporation officials and the unions. 41 Four days later when a conference with the President of the International Unions of the steel industry was held a telegram was sent to Wilson again urging him to call a conference between Mr. Gary and the heads of the union within twenty four hours, but as no answer was received from Wilson when the executive council of the American Federation of Labor met after the twenty four hours had lapsed, the strike was authorized. Later John Fitzpatrick who had been in charge of the meeting in place of Samuel Gompers who had gone to Dorchester Massachusetts to attend the burial of his father, made public a statement that he had not received the message sent by President Wilson to Samuel Gompers until several hours after the meeting had been adjourned. In this telegram Wilson had asked the steel men to postpone their move until after an Industrial Conference was held in October, 1919. 42 The steel workers accounted for their action to

41. The New York Times, September 6, 1919, 1
42. The New York Times, September 12, 1919, 2
Wilson, expressed in a telegram, "We regret that for the first time your call upon organized labor can not be met with favorable response. Believe us, the fault is not ours." 43

One has only to consult the periodicals which upheld the cause of labor to realize the effect of Wilson's handling of the steel workers problem. The New Republic advised that Wilson take lessons in history as well as economics and claimed that the solution of the wage problem could not lie in the reduction of the cost of living. 44 The New York Call a spokesman of labor criticized Wilson's recommendation that the workers defer their grievances by saying, "The workers have never done anything else ... but be patient...." 45 The Secretary-Treasurer of the United Mine Workers of America insisted that labor in general could not be satisfied with President Wilson's request that the demands for wage increases be postponed. 46 Harsh criticism was that of the Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, which claimed "He is now for political reasons, trying to dazzle the public mind here in America with hints of a new order of things that will wipe out the inequalities of the old order...." 47

Prohibition also furnished a reason for many to turn from the

43. The New York Times, September 19, 1919, 1
44. "Labor's Duty to the Public" (Editorial) The Literary Digest
45. Ibid., September 6, 1919, 15
46. Ibid.,
47. A Labor Truce - Or A Smash, The Literary Digest September 13, 1919, 12 - 14
leadership of Wilson. Again his interest in the Versailles Treaty appeared to prevent him from working out a plan regarding this domestic problem which would have led him into less disfavor with the people. He appeared to have not been favorable to a stringent enforcement act. An excellent dissertation on the political effects of Wilson's attitude toward prohibition is presented by Professor Dodd. 48

He claimed that Wilson's leadership was affected by the fact that the Democratic party of the North were against prohibition while the opposite attitude was taken by the Democratic party of the South. The labor groups of the North were also against prohibition. This was affirmed by Joh Fitzpatrick a spokesman for labor who claimed that prohibition was one of the chief causes of unrest among the working classes and that the workers lived in fear that other rights would be taken from them. 49 Professor Dodd concluded that the prohibitionists brought pressure to bear as they had begun to question Wilson's attitude and this aroused a bitter feeling against Wilson. He said, "This divided the Democratic Party, it angered Labor, it gave men an excuse to abandon Wilson...." 50

Judging from the attitude of these various groups who scorned Wilson's handling of their problems, one can readily appreci- 48. Dodd, 366
49. The New York Times, July 21, 1919, 1
50. Dodd, 366
ate the difficult position in which the Democratic leaders found themselves in 1920, the year which was to decide the status of their party by presidential selection.
CHAPTER V.

THE ELECTION OF 1920

While the Democratic party leaders were anxiously considering
the approaching Presidential election of 1920, they were dealt
a blow by Wilson's message to them, when they gathered for
their annual Jackson Day dinner at Washington on January 8,
1920. The latter, as read, was considered to have been pre-
pared for his signature but was a true expression of his
views. It left no doubt of his stand on the Treaty of Ver-
sailles as he clearly stated, "We cannot rewrite this treaty.
We must take it without changes which alter its meaning, or
leave it ...." He claimed that he did not accept the action
of the Senate as being the decision of the people and pro-
posed that, if there was any doubt regarding their views, the
issue should be voted upon in the election as, "... the clear
and simple way out is to submit it for determination at the
next election to the voters of the nation, to give the next
election the form of a great and solemn referendum...."3

This aroused consternation among the Democrats and to add to

1. Lawrence, 291
2. James Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
   Covering the Second Term of Woodrow Wilson,
   Bureau of National Literature, New York, 1921, 8822
3. Ibid., 8823
the difficulty, William Jennings Bryan agered by Wilson's veto of the Volstead Act, began a campaign to crush him by publicly announcing himself as holding an opposite view to Wilson in regard to the League of Nations, inasmuch as he approved the ratification of the Treaty with the proposed amendments.\(^4\)

The seriousness of this political anomosity on the part of Bryan as a disturbing influence in the Democratic party is presented in a collection of press comments regarding his split with Wilson.\(^5\) The decision of the New York Sun is found in a headline, describing the Democratic party as being split wide open by Bryan. The Dallas News claimed that "...the President has made a decision that is harmful to his great fame, detrimental to the country and menacing to the world." The Brooklyn Eagle decided that the temper of the country in regard to the Treaty was known more accurately by Bryan than by Wilson. According to The New York Times, "The Democrats do not want to make their campaign upon the Treaty issue because the country would loudly protest against this new prolongation of a debate, already protracted beyond the limit of its patience." "Trouble on the Eve of Battle" was the headline of the Arkansas Gazette, and the Nebraska State Journal anticipated that the fight between Wilson and Bryan

\(^4\) Kerney, 454
\(^5\) The Literary Digest, January 17, 1920, 11-13
would rival the Georges Carpentier and Jack Dempsey fight. 6

Wilson further defined his stand on the Treaty as an issue when he sent a telegram on May 10, 1920 to a group of Democrats in Oregon, who were selecting delegates for the convention. He insisted again that the Treaty of Peace with the League of Nations be approved without the proposed reservations. Mr. Fess, prominent Republican expressed the doubt with which the message was received among both Democrats and Republicans, when he commented, "The message also means either that the President will ask for re-election or the election of some one named by him." 7

In the midst of the uncertainty as to whether Wilson intended to attempt a third term on the strength of the Treaty, there is no evidence that Wilson made his views clear to his Democratic followers. His next contact with his party, of which there is a record, was on May 31, 1920, when he conferred with Homer S. Cummings, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, Senator Glass of Virginia and Mr. Colby, Secretary of State. An interview which a press correspondent conducted with Mr. Cummings shortly after he met with Wilson, failed to disclose that Mr. Cummings had secured any definite statement from Wilson, regarding a preferred candidate. Mr. Cummings gave his expression of his co-operation with Wilson, 6. The Literary Digest, January 24, 1920, 15-16 7. The New York Times, May 11, 1920, 1
"... President Wilson and I are wholly in accord on questions of the moment, and I now have his views regarding some necessary details." There is evidence that Mr. Cummings had only Wilson's definite statement that the Administration was not endorsing any particular candidate for the presidency, and that it was expected that Cummings would direct the party to endorse Wilson's views regarding the League of Nations.

The position of the Democratic party leaders facing the Convention proceedings was a difficult one. All attempts to elicit a statement from Wilson regarding his third term aspirations, or his endorsement of any candidate, were failures. When Mr. Palmer, the Attorney General, sent a message to Wilson with Joseph Tumulty, that he was considering announcing his candidacy and would resign from the Cabinet if Wilson would be embarrassed by the decision, he was answered by a statement from the President that he was welcome to follow his own personal opinion, as Wilson had no personal choice and desired the Convention to be left to act freely. Wilson commented to Tumulty regarding his silence, "Other Presidents have sought to influence the naming of their successors. Their efforts have frequently brought about scandals and factional disputes that have split the Party. This must not happen to us."
on June 17, 1920, Wilson favored Louis Seibold, Washington correspondent of The World, with an interview. He definitely refused to discuss candidates but expressed his confidence that the delegates at the Convention would respect his views regarding the League. "...I have the greatest faith in the intelligent appreciation by the delegates who will assemble in San Francisco ...to write the platform and nominate the standard bearers of our Party. They will have from whom to choose ...a number of excellent men. I should not want to express any preference or any opinion ...which might influence the minds of the men, whose votes will ultimately decide....".  

This interview tended to increase the talk regarding Wilson's acceptance of a third term nomination. None of the Democratic leaders or those closely connected with the Administration were able to give an authoritative statement as to the Convention's plans to consider his nomination. It is claimed that a prominent Democrat, who refused to allow the press to reveal his identity, said, "The President has not been a candidate for the nomination. I do not think the President would permit his name to be used except in one case". The one case to which he referred was the possibility of Wilson allowing his name to be brought up, in the event that it could be used to induce a rallying for the cause of the League.  

12. The New York Times, June 18, 1920, 1  
considered a safe guess that the President was not a candidate and would not be one unless circumstances forced him into the position. 14 Cabinet members and the few who were in contact with Wilson claimed that Wilson had not discussed the matter with them. 15

That the delegates to the convention were bewildered regarding the third term speculation is confirmed by Arthur Sears Henning, correspondent of the Chicago Tribune, who accompanied a large group of delegates on a special train to San Francisco. He described the eager manner with which the delegates grasped all information concerning the attitude of the President. According to him, two theories were apparent. One was that the President was seeking the nomination in a form of a tribute from the party. The other theory held was that the President had not at any time considered the third term, but that propriety forced him to remain silent as he could not decline in advance the honor that his party might intend to confer upon him. 16

At this point, Mr. Cummings was forced to issue a statement regarding the President's acceptance of the third term. His abrupt statement that the report regarding the fact that the President was anxious to have a third term was absurd was fol-

lowed by the statement, "I have received no recent dictation from the White House. I know nothing regarding any third term movement." During the last days of June, there is evidence that a suspicious remained among the delegates that the President would like to be named for a third term. Although there was no evidence of this ambition, the fact that the President gave no endorsement to the candidacy of Mr. William McAdoo, his son-in-law, led many to read into this action a desire on the part of Wilson for a re-nomination.

A solution of the political mystery regarding the true feelings of Wilson on the acceptance of the third term, has claimed the attention of many, and the views offered have been at great variance. A view is held that Wilson had no intention of accepting a third term, but expected a complimentary nomination which he intended to refuse. Another opinion is held that Wilson was not ambitious for a third term. As supporting evidence for this belief, Wilson's actions, when he read an article in the London Times written by a newspaper correspondent, who had toured the United States during the early part of 1919, are cited. As this article contained the statement that a tour of the country had revealed a sympathy on the part of the people for the League, but that but that the cause of the League would be strengthened if

17. The New York Times, June 24, 1920, 1
19. White, 456
the people were not afraid that Wilson would use it to secure a third term for himself, Wilson cabled from Paris to Tumulty, requesting that Tumulty attempt to investigate the truth of this statement. He also asked Tumulty's opinion regarding the need for the immediate issuance of a statement that he would not run for a third term. Tumulty advised him that the necessity for such an action was not apparent.20 Others, assert that Wilson had not considered a third term as he would have gone against all traditions and also his health prevented him from so doing.21

From the available facts, it would appear that Wilson had not considered a third term. The spirit of anti-Wilsonism, so apparent, even among his own party group was evident to him. He realized that he could expect only opposition from the Democratic state organizations. His health would not permit his acceptance of the third term, for on October 4, 1919, he suffered a stroke caused by a blood clot in one of the blood vessels on the right side of his brain. The motor nerves of the left side and his sensatory nerves were impaired and the gravity of his condition is gained from the statement of his Doctor Francis Dercun, a specialist who was called to consult with Dr. Grayson, Wilson's private physician. Dr. Dercun was not optimistic regarding even partial recovery and asserted

20. Lawrence, 299
21. Dodd, 410
that Wilson might live five minutes or five years.\textsuperscript{22} Although the President gained strength and was able to attend to some of the official duties of his office, the physical impossibility of assuming the responsibility for a continued presidency was apparent. From the evidence, it would appear that his relations with the Democratic party as the convention convened, were determined by his fervent desire for the acceptance of the League of Nations. He realized that there was no candidate, with the exception of Mr. McAdoo, who could be placed before the convention as wholly representing his views and there was little to be done other than to allow the selection of a candidate to rest upon the convention group as long as he was assured that the platform of the Party would contain an endorsement of his League of Nations.

The opening session of the Democratic Convention at San Francisco, June 28, 1920, was characterized by a half hour period of cheering for Wilson, which broke out as an illuminated portrait of him was uncovered.\textsuperscript{23} The opening speech of Homer Cummings was a tribute to Wilson and the party record, as he declared that the Treaty of Versailles was the Monroe Doctrine of the world and commented, "In one sense it is quite immaterial what people say about the President. Nothing we can say can add or detract from the fame that will go down

\textsuperscript{22} Tumulty, 339
\textsuperscript{23} The New York Times, June 29, 1920, 1
the unending channels of history. Whether history records... he is immortal."\(^{24}\)

The platform, as completed, gave a complete endorsement to the record of Wilson. This was the only alternative as Wilson's record was the party's only record.\(^{25}\) The press carried the headline, "Wilson Supreme in Sub-committee."\(^{26}\) The members of the Resolution Committee debated from seven thirty in the evening until three thirty the following morning regarding the acceptance of an amendment to the League resolutions which would permit the Democratic senators, who had voted for the Lodge resolutions, to explain their actions during the course of the campaign. As no agreement could be reached a committee of nine was appointed to draft the final views regarding this point.\(^{27}\) A united praise for the courage of the President and an accusation that the refusal of the Senate to approve the Treaty was based on the fact that it was the work of Democrats, were to be found in the platform. The platform stated, "The Democratic Party favors the League of Nations as the surest, if not the only practical means of maintaining the peace of the world..."\(^{28}\)

\(^{24}\) The New York Times, June 29, 1920, 6
\(^{26}\) The New York Times, July 1, 1920, 1
\(^{27}\) Fleming, 458
\(^{28}\) The Democratic National Committee, The Democratic Text Book, 1920, New York, 1920, 3
The President communicated with the Convention group only to respond to a message that was sent to him, endorsing his record. His message, which was read by Homer Cummings, expressed his appreciation for the message sent to him by the convention and said "It is a source of profound pride with me to receive such evidence of the confidence of the great party, which derives its principles direct and untainted from the founders of our government." 29

As the Democrats had no outstanding candidate, they began their balloting with four leading members. Governor Smith, however, dropped from the field, having William McAdoo, James M. Cox of Ohio and Attorney-General A. M. Palmer in the contest. On the sixteenth ballot, when Cox had secured four hundred and fifty four and a half votes, McAdoo three hundred and thirty seven and Palmer one hundred sixty four and a half, Davis fifty two, an appeal was sent to Wilson to indicate a preference, but the President maintained his silence. The report that President Wilson had indicated a choice was denied by Senator Glass, who stated, "The President has not communicated with me regarding a candidate." 30 On the twenty second ballot Wilson's name came before the convention but claimed only two votes from the delegates. It is said that two delegates had taken this means to relieve the monotony of the

deadlock and were hopeful of creating some excitement.31 On the thirty eighth ballot the votes which were released from Attorney-General Palmer were given to Cox, who on the forty fourth ballot won the nomination. A review of the supporters of James Cox indicates that they were composed of old time party bosses, many who had acquired a dislike for Wilson, although they had been past supporters, those who were anticipating that Cox would run on a wet plank, all attempting to show the wisdom of separating from Wilson.32

Wilson indicated his pleasure in the selection of Cox by the Democratic party by sending a telegram to the convention, addressing Cox, "Please accept my hearties congratulations and cordial best wishes."33 It is said that Cox was not at the time of his nomination an ardent advocate of the League of Nations.34 However, on July 19, 1920, when he visited the President at the White House he assured the President that he would give his best efforts for the cause of the League, and there was every indication that harmony would exist between the two as Cox stated, "What he promised, I shall, if elected, endeavor with all my strength to give."35 He carried out this promise in his acceptance speech at Dayton,

31. Current History Magazine, 938
32. Ibid., 938
33. The New York Times, July 5th, 1920, 1
34. Kent, 454
35. The New York Times, July 17, 1920, 1
Ohio, on August 7, 1920, when he announced that the first duty of the country would be to ratify the Treaty. During
the campaign, Wilson remained in the background. One reason for this was his ill health. When Hamilton Holt, a Republican, who admired the League of Nations and had deserted his party, visited Wilson in October 1920 he found Wilson too ill to enter into the pre-election activities.

Election day brought a Republican avalanche giving an electoral majority of two hundred and seventy seven to Warren Harding, and a popular vote of sixteen million, one hundred and fifty two thousand, two hundred and twenty votes for Harding in comparison with nine million, one hundred and forty seven thousand, five hundred and fifty three for Cox. The Republicans secured a majority of three hundred and nine to one hundred and thirty two members in the House and controlled the Senate by fifty nine to thirty seven. Even the vote of the South was lost to the Democrats. The Baltimore Sun commented on the voting of the South, "Tennessee marks the first break in the solid South in a national election since the overthrow of a carpet bag government after the Civil War." The New York Evening Mail gave further details of the hold which the Republicans had gained in the South by commenting,

36. Democratic Text Book, 45
37. Current History Magazine, 938
38. Fleming, 470
39. The Literary Digest, Nov. 20, 1920, 15
"We have a Republican Congressman from Texas, we have two Republican Senators from Maryland and Maryland's electoral votes; we have a Governor and the vote of Tennessee. Oklahoma has joined the marching hosts and Louisiana is breaking up." There was a loss in every section of the country and in every state except South Carolina and Mississippi. Although many considered the vote a repudiation of the League, the evidence points more strongly to the fact that the consideration of other issues directed the vote against Wilson. Calvin Coolidge, Vice-President elect, expressed doubts that the League of Nations was the dominate issue. The New York World considered it an expression of the country's desire for a change as, "The one thing... is that the country is highly resentful from the economical reactions from the war and has visited its resentment on the party in power in the belief it can return to pre-war conditions. A study made by one who considered the election a repudiation of the administration rather than a denouncement of the League of Nations showed that Senatorial candidates, who opposed the League received less votes than Harding while the Democratic opponents were votes ahead of Cox. For example, in Connecticut, Senator Brandbridge received twelve thousand, four

40. The Literary Digest, Nov. 20, 1920, 15
42. Fleming, 470
43. The Literary Digest, Nov. 13, 1920, 13
hundred and forty six votes less than Harding in comparison with the eleven thousand one hundred and three votes which his opponent received ahead of Cox. In New Hampshire and New York, Republican candidates, who showed opposition to the League found their majorities reduced. It would appear therefore, that the electoral returns presented an expression of an accumulated resentment against Wilson.44

Tumulty records the broken spirit of Wilson when the election returns were made known to him, at which time he remarked, "They have disgraced us in the eyes of the world. The people of America have repudiated a fruitful leadership for a barren independence. Of course, I am disappointed by the results of the election, for I felt sure that a great program that sought to bring peace to the world would arouse American idealism and that the nation's support would be given to it."45

44. Fleming, 470
45. Tumulty, 501
MR. WILSON

When Wilson returned from the White House in March, 1921, he took up residence on S. Street, Washington, D. C. The condition of his health at this time permitted only limited activity as his left side was paralyzed, and he could walk only with assistance. It was anticipated that he would devote himself during his retirement toward furthering the establishment of world peace. Many, who were unaware of the seriousness of his health condition, expected that he would write a history. However, on February 23, 1921, he assured a delegation from the Woodrow Wilson Club of Harvard University, who called at the White House, that he had no intention of writing a history.

It was not until June 10, 1921, that he discussed the affairs of the country for probably the first time since his retirement. George White, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, visited him on this date. Mr. White, in recounting the interview, asserted that Wilson was genuinely interested in the attitude of the Democrats, and expressed his pleasure, when he was informed that the Democrats were enthusiastic in the desire to return to power. Mr.

1. Tumulty, 462
2. The New York Times, November 30, 1920, 1
3. Ibid., February 23, 1921, 5
White added that this attitude was manifested by the encouraging reception given a series of broadcasts which he had made. Mr. White gave an insight into the private life of Wilson by describing him as having few visitors and allowing his Secretary to manage his correspondence.

The fact that the Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, conferred with Wilson, would seem to indicate that the Democratic party leaders intended to keep Wilson in the political picture, at least for the purpose of consulting with him. At this early date, Wilson did not commit himself as to his plans in regard to participation in public affairs. To a group of four undergraduates of Princeton University, who called on him on June 14, 1921, to pay their respects to him in the name of six hundred Princeton men, he expressed his determination to keep the public aware of his ideals and keep in touch with the political developments.

Wilson's activity in regard to the interests of the Democratic party was limited to the sending of messages of encouragement to various groups throughout the country. His belief in the future of the party was expressed in a telegram, which he sent to Mrs. Clara Hogue, Treasurer of the Women's Essex County Democratic Organization, on October 27th, 1921. The message read, "May I not send to the ladies who are assembled

4. The New York Times, June 11, 1921, 1
5. Ibid., June 14, 1921, 1
here today my warmest greetings and say to them that in my judgment the duty of the Democrats was never clearer than it is now or their hopes of the future more entirely justified." This opinion was also expressed by Senator Harrison of Mississippi, who claimed that he had noticed a more harmonious feeling among groups of Democrats than had been present for some time. He cited the attitude of the Democrats who were attending a meeting of the Democratic National Committee in St. Louis on November 2, 1921 as follows: "The Democrats are militant. They see victory in the air and the nation will yet see the principles for which Woodrow Wilson fought vindicated."7

There appears to have been a more kindly spirit growing toward Wilson. At his first public appearance after March 1921, on the occasion of services held to honor the Unknown Soldier on November 12, 1921, he received a hearty reception. After the services, he was greeted by Joseph Tumulty, A. Mitchell Palmer, Hamilton Holt, who was the spokesman for the Pro-League of Nation Independents, Edward F. Goltra, the former Democratic National Committeeman from Mississippi, John Sharp Williams, Senator from Missouri, and the brother of Mrs. Wilson, R. W. Bolling. In answer to the cheers of a large group assembled outside his home, Wilson stepped out on the veranda. Sup-

6. The New York Times, October 9, 1921, 2
7. Ibid., November 3, 1921, 7
ported by Mrs. Wilson and able to speak only in a whisper, his few words were "Mr. Holt and friends - I wish I had voice enough to express my appreciation. God bless you."

During 1922, while the Democratic party was discussing plans for a return to power in 1924, there is much evidence that their former leader was not forgotten. Meetings of various groups of Democrats usually found occasion to send Wilson a message, even if only a brief telegram. Such a recognition was given to him by the St. Louis County Democratic Committee in March 1922. During their convention, they wired him that he was "...assured recognition, as the leader of the Democratic party." They were rewarded with an answer from Wilson who expressed his belief that the party would be re-established within a short time. Likewise, Palmer D. Edmunds, Chairman of the Service Men's group, invited Wilson to discuss the political issues of the day. Wilson refused, but sent a cheery note that he believed his principles would be adopted, saying, "I believe that triumph to be immediately at hand and that we shall ... wipe away the ugly record we made in failing to fulfill the objects for which our gallant comrades fought."

Again, at the Jefferson Day dinner of the National Democratic

8. The New York Times, October 9, 1921, 2
10. Ibid., 8
11. Ibid., March 29, 1922, 17
Club on April 8th, 1921, the fifteen hundred in attendance, among whom were many Tammany members who had been very sparing in their support of Wilson, enthusiastically cheered each time his name was mentioned. In the speeches given, Mr. Cox took the opportunity to praise Wilson highly and Senator Patrick Harrison referred to him as a wounded soldier who would soon gain the recognition of the world.12

Some of the favor with which Wilson was now regarded was lost to him, when they were notified by him that a message, read at the dinner, and alleged to have originated with him, was not sent by him or authorized by him to be conveyed to the group by anyone else.13 The message to which he referred was "Say to the Democrats of New York that I am ready to support any man who stands for the salvation of America and the salvation of America is justice to all classes." Thomas E. Rush, Chairman of the Dinner Committee, as well as other members of the club refused to send an explanation to Wilson, although Mr. Rush publicly stated that in answer to his telephone call to Mr. Tumulty in which he requested Tumulty to bring a message from Wilson, Tumulty had given him the message when he arrived at the dinner.14 Tumulty's explanation was that the message consisted of a part of a conversation, which he had with Wilson, and was not an authorized statement,

12. The New York Times, April 9th, 1922, 1
13. The New York Times, April 14th, 1922, 1
14. Ibid., 1
as "He sent no telegram. He simply gave a casual message to me in a casual manner. It had nothing to do with any individual or any particular political situation."\(^{15}\)

There is no record that Wilson made a formal appearance at any meeting of the Democratic group. He was too ill to do so as he was almost fully incapacitated.\(^{16}\) A year away from the White House had not marked an improvement in his health and on March 28, 1922 when over a thousand delegates to the Women's Pan American Conference called at his home they were shocked to find him unable to turn toward them without the assistance of an attendant. He appeared frail and was so weak that his voice could be heard only for a distance of a few yards. He admitted his physical weakness saying, "I thank you very much for the compliment. I appreciate it deeply. I am sorry I am not strong enough to make an address."\(^{17}\)

The spirit of Wilson was not lacking among the Democrats, in the Congressional Election of 1922. Many campaign speeches were characterized by reference to Wilson and his League of Nations.\(^{18}\) Only once during the campaign did Wilson commit himself in regard to the candidate. This was in answer to a letter from Doctor James F. McCaleb of Carlisle, Mississippi

15. The New York Times, April 14, 1922, 1
16. Irwin Hodd Hoover, Forty Two Years in the White House Houghton, Mifflin Co. Boston, 1933, 103
17. The New York Times, March 29, 1922, 16
18. Ibid., July 8, 1922, 2
asking Wilson to review the record of Senator Vardaman, a candidate. Unusual in its open hostility coming from Wilson, it read, "... I can sum up my impression of him in a single sentence. I think he is thoroughly fake and untrustworthy and that it would be a great detriment to Mississippi and to the nation if he should be returned to the Senate."19

Although the Democrats were highly encouraged by the results of the Congressional Election which returned many of their members to Congress there appears to be no evidence which would justify ascribing the outcome to a renewed hope in Wilson. Wilson's comment on the election gave no indication of his political views but rather he pointed out the duty of the Democrats to select a candidate who would give the country the service it needed.20.

Immediately after the Congressional Election there was talk among the Democrats that Wilson would be a factor in 1924. A group of Democrats vacationing at French Lick, Indiana, when interviewed gave their impression that he would determine the issue of the presidential campaign.21 When Wilson sent a message to Governor Sweet of Colorado asking that he appoint Huston Thompson to the Senate in place of Sam Nicholson, who had died, the action was interpreted to indicate

20. Ibid., November 12, 1922, 2
21. Ibid., November 25, 1922, 1
that Wilson intended to take an active part in the campaign as an advisor. The possibility of Wilson as a candidate was again discussed when George Brennan of Chicago, a leader of the Democratic group, conferred with Wilson. Mr. Brennan was reported as convinced that Wilson would accept the candidacy if his health permitted and if he thought he was necessary for the success of the party.

It is not to be wondered at that the Democrats anxiously awaited Wilson's Armistice Day radio speech in 1923. Although Josephus Daniels claimed that Wilson spent hours in preparing the message, he appears to stand apart in this view as other writers agree that from the evidence it may be concluded that he was not the author of the speech. The speech was an assertion of his regret that the peace issue had been rejected. He claimed that the country had ignored their responsibility to establish permanent peace, and accused France and Italy of making waste paper of the Treaty of Versailles.

Newspaper reports following the speech indicated that Wilson's voice would be heard in the campaign. The New York Evening Post expressed amazement regarding the influence which

24. Baker and Dodd, Volume 2, 536
25. Baker and Dodd, Volume 2, 540-541
26. The Literary Digest, November 24, 1923, 10-11
Wilson still had on the people, even though an invalid. The Philadelphia Record claimed, "both the country and Europe are now beginning to understand the idealism of Woodrow Wilson is the most practical thing in the world." The Raleigh News and Observer described Mr. Wilson as still in the fighting line and "... he still holds aloft the banner which would lead the world into a better understand...." It was claimed that the nation was no longer afraid of foreign entanglements and that Wilson was a logical candidate for the Presidency. Such articles appeared as that which contained the statement, "The career of Woodrow Wilson needs no restatement. His qualifications for the highest position of respect and leadership are universally conceded."27

Wilson's death came on February 3, 1924. That he was planning to again renew his relations with the Democratic Party in a third presidential campaign seemed evident. James Kerney, who was an intimate friend and a frequent caller at the Wilson home during the last month of Wilson's life, asserted that Wilson was confident to the end that he would be allowed by the Democrats to dictate the issues of the 1924 campaign.28 Mr. Kerney also claimed that Wilson, although realizing that his health would not permit him to be a candidate, did not give up the hope that he might be able to

27. Forum, New York, December 1923, 2222-2224
28. Kerney, 466
again lead the party and be vindicated in the election of 1924.29

There is much of the tragic in the relationship of Wilson with his party in the years 1919 to 1924. Tragic, in that a dramatic downfall followed an accumulation of events, which caused his party to repudiate him. Tragic, also in that illness left him crushed and broken and incapacitated him when he was giving his full strength to force the people to accept the principles which were so dear to him. His followers, at the time of his death caught some of this tragedy and their feelings toward him had softened. They had not however forgotten the circumstances which returned the vote, fatal to their party. They did not see in him one who had been forced to handle their affairs at a time when any leader would have suffered. With them, it was not the times, it was the leader.

29. Kerney, 466
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

It is to be regretted that many intriguing phases of Woodrow Wilson's relationship with the Democratic party will remain comparatively obscure until some of the private letters and other documents of Wilson are made available. At the present time, Mrs. Wilson has limited the documentary evidence of many of her husband's actions, which she has made accessible to the public.

Several compilations of public addresses, messages and other writings have been attempted. One, edited by Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1927 is helpful as information is complete as to the date of writing of the messages, addresses and state papers given by Wilson to the end of his career. The authors, one a reputable historian and the other a personal friend of Wilson and manager of the American press agents, who accompanied Wilson to Europe show a sincere desire for the authentic. The two volumes, War and Peace were particularly useful.

Another authentic collection is that of James Richardson, Messages and Papers of the President, Bureau of National Literature, New York, 1921. Mr. Richardson's collection was prepared under the direction of a joint committee on print-
A biographical sketch and editorial notes accompany President Wilson's State Papers and Addresses, published by the Review of Reviews Company, New York, 1918. The value of the entire group of papers is destroyed as subsequent to September 4, 1919, the speeches of Wilson are presented in a condensed form including elimination of paragraphs.

The Democratic Party has left its record in the election of 1920 in the Democratic Text Book, 1920 issued by the Democratic National Committee and the Democratic Congressional Committee, New York, 1920.

Other primary sources included the Congressional Record, which was extensively used covering the years 1916 to 1924. The discussion called forth by the gripping problem of the period, the vituperation of Democratic Congressmen toward Wilson and the general hostility are authentically portrayed in the proceedings of Congress. For an account of President's Wilson's relations with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Documents 59 and 76 of the 65th Congress, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. were consulted. Other Government publications included the Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs 65th Congress, 2nd Session,
Government Printing Office, 1918. This was necessary to understand the investigation made by the War Department.

One would naturally look expectantly to the private secretary of Wilson as a valuable source. Joseph P. Tumulty, *Woodrow Wilson as I Knew Him*, Doubleday, Page and Company, New York, 1921, carries out the purpose of the author, which is clearly recognized to be a presentation of a defense of Wilson. Personal recollections and correspondence carried on between Wilson and Mr. Tumulty make up the book. The author is not always convincing. Irreconcilable with other facts, Tumulty presents Wilson as dependent on others for advice before he made a move. The book is unique in presenting a speech of Wilson in which he disclosed his feelings regarding the election of 1920, which has not appeared in other collections of Wilson's speeches.

Two members of Wilson's Cabinet have written of their experiences. David F. Houston, *Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet*, Doubleday, Page and Company, New York, 1926 gives the account of the Secretary of Agriculture regarding his contact with Wilson. Volume 2 carries the story from the time Wilson left for Paris, which period concludes volume one. Although Houston was an eye witness of the events about which he writes, it would appear that the impressions of the interven-
ing years influenced the writing. The book is valuable however in understanding Wilson's relations with Cabinet members and other officials. Josephus Daniels, The Life of Woodrow Wilson, John C. Winston Company, Chicago, 1924 is useful in its portrayal of Wilson as a political leader. Mr. Daniels, as Secretary of the Navy from 1919 to 1921 had personal knowledge of the events about which he wrote. Mr. Daniels presents the human qualities of Wilson, which accounted for his relationship with the Democratic group.

James Kerney's book, The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson Century Company, New York, 1926 is well written. As editor and publisher of the Trenton Evening Times, the author was in a position to observe the reaction of the Democrats to Wilson. There was a mutual admiration maintained between Wilson and Mr. Kerney, who was among the few visitors during the last months of Wilson's life. This admiration does not find expression in a defense of Wilson, rather there is the newspaper man's attempt to give the story.

To appreciate the bitterness of the attack of Theodore Roosevelt on Wilson one has only to review Theodore Roosevelt, Foes of Our Own Household, George Doran Company, New York, 1917. Roosevelt's personal hatred took the form of criticism of the policies of Wilson and endeavored to teach the world the great danger of his policies. Roosevelt also used the outlet
of editorials in the *Kansas City Star*. His editorials are flagrant denunciations and are found in *Theodore Roosevelt, Roosevelt and the Kansas City Star*, Houghton Mifflin Co. New York, 1921.
SECONDARY WORKS

An attempt to write the life of Wilson has been made by William E. Dodd, *Woodrow Wilson and His Work*, Doubleday, Page and Company, New York, 1927. Mr. Dodd a professor of history, is obviously a deep admirer of Wilson. However, while partisan in spirit his work is that of a scholar as his sources are reputable and he concedes that it is difficult to pass judgment on Wilson's relationship with his Democratic following.

Current History magazine, *Woodrow Wilson, a Biography*, published by the *New York Times*, New York, 1924, is a concise account, gathered from details of events found in the *New York Times* files.

Acquaintance of a newspaper man in Emporia, Kansas with those who knew Wilson was the source of material presented by William Allen White, *Woodrow Wilson the Man, His Times and His Task*, Houghton, Mifflin and Company, Boston, 1924. While the testimony of this newspaper man can not be relied upon wholly, there is a sincerity in his writings which allows acceptance of several interesting phases of his account.

David Lawrence, *The True Story of Woodrow Wilson*, G. H. Doran and Company, New York, 1924 is also an attempt to explain many of Wilson's actions. Mr. Lawrence represented the As-
sociated Press with Wilson, when he was Governor and was placed in charge, when war broke out, of news for the Associated Press regarding relations with Germany.

Another, who considered that Wilson should be vindicated, was George Creel, *The War, the World and Wilson*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1920. Although some phases of Mr. Creel's presentation seemed in the light of further evidence not acceptable, his discussion of Wilson's war appointments throw some light on this controverted subject.

A write, who is a consistent supporter of Woodrow Wilson but who does not forget his duty as a historian to attempt to maintain an unbiased viewpoint is Robert Edward Annin. In his *Woodrow Wilson, A Character Study*, Dodd, Mead and Company, New York, 1925, he freely criticized policies or actions of Wilson.

Henry L. Stoddard, *As I Knew Them*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1927 may be classed as the interpretations of a newspaperman man who made no attempt to furnish proof of his statements. He develops the idea that third term aspirations were not foreign to Wilson, but is not conclusive as to his reasons.

William K. Winkler, *Woodrow Wilson, the Man Who Lives On*, Van-
Gard Press, New York, 1933, leaves one with the impression that the author is familiar with many sources and his conclusions appear justified, but unfortunately he does not mention his sources. There is a familiar ring of the New York Times throughout his work.

John Randolph Bolling, Chronology of Woodrow Wilson, Stokes New York, 1927, has made a rather ineffective record of the events of Wilson's life. The only value would be the most notable addresses made by Woodrow Wilson in their proper setting.
Conclusions regarding the failure of the Democratic Party in the election of 1920 have been many. Edward Eugene Robinson, *The Presidential Vote*, Stanford University Press, California, 1933 gives a helpful interpretation of the election returns, adequately substantiated by statistics. Also, Frank R. Kent, *The Democratic Party, A History*, The Century Company, 1928, gives a scholarly interpretation of the election. Mr. Kent himself a Democrat, was a political reporter for the *Baltimore Sun* for 10 years. Several books which he has written on politics are the works of a man who was well educated and was familiar with the political situation.


Hatred of Wilson permeates the pages of Henry Cabot Lodge, *The Senate and The League of Nations*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1925. It is necessary to complete the study, however, as the force of Lodge's influence in defeating the Treaty could not be denied.
Since concern was only with the Treaty of Versailles as it influenced the relations of the Democratic Party, the authors who treated the subject in this manner were limited in number. Denna Frank Fleming, *The United States and the League of Nations*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1932 was by far the most helpful. A Professor of Social Science, Mr. Fleming appears to have made an exhaustive study of the attitude of the country toward the Treaty and he has drawn his conclusions only after consideration of all available sources.

The domestic policy of Woodrow Wilson as it affected the Democratic Party was treated by Paul McKown, *Certain Domestic Policies of Woodrow Wilson*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932. A thesis submitted for the Doctors Degree at the University of Pennsylvania, it reaches a high standard and its sources are numerous.

An enigma such as the life of Woodrow Wilson presents could not fail to offer interesting subject matter and the contributions to periodicals concerning him are overwhelming in quantity. One must proceed cautiously in reviewing these offerings as many are the work of those, who were inspired only by a personal hatred of Wilson.

Most useful was the Literary Digest (New York, 1890) as a collection of press comments, furnishing the story of the attitude of the Democratic party toward Wilson. This magazine was closely read and was an excellent means of determining what the Democratic group were thinking and saying about Wilson.

Current Opinion, New York, was used particularly to secure information regarding the attitude of the Democratic party toward Wilson's call for a Democratic Congress in the Congressional election of 1918. It was necessary to weigh the source of each article as they were illustrative of the many determined views held regarding Wilson.

Articles, which were valuable as a summary of material regarding the attitude toward Congressmen toward Wilson, rather than for an interpretation were presented by The Nation (New York, 1965).
Scholarly contributions regarding the candidacy of Woodrow Wilson were found in the Forum, New York. For the most part they were favorable to Wilson, some even to the point of booming him for the 1924 candidacy.

Current History, (New York, 1914) published by the New York Times was found to be excellent for its detailed reporting of events. Its value was enhanced by the fact that it made no attempt to interpret the actions of the Democratic party, but rather presented a wealth of facts.

During the late months of 1916 and the early part of 1917, The Outlook, (New York 1870), reflected the impatient spirit shown toward Wilson for his delay in severing relations with Germany. The chief value of these articles was an illustration of the animosity toward Wilson, so noticeable in Congress and among the people.

Articles printed in The Metropolitan Magazine in New York, 1917, illustrated the attack of Roosevelt against Wilson. Editorials, some the work of Roosevelt, appeared with startling frequency showing the tragedies of an ill conducted war, the need for war cabinet and the crime of unpreparedness. The disapproval of Congressmen toward Wilson's war moves was eagerly recounted in these monthly issues.
The Independent, (New York 1848 to 1928), carried the work of partisans and every opportunity to present the view of a group hostile to Wilson was seized. Particularly was the attitude of the farmers given a full sway.

Useful to gain a knowledge of the railroad crisis of 1919 was the World's Work, New York. Those well qualified to discuss the subject were among the contributors.

Likewise, The American Review of Reviews opened its pages to scholarly contributors. This was the only magazine to gain the views of such men as Albert B. Cummins, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce.

Invaluable material on the crisis in economic affairs in 1919 is offered by The American Journal of Sociology, a product of the University of Chicago Press. A wealth of facts, substantiated by statistics present a picture of the gloomy days of 1919.

Turning to newspapers, major attention is focused on The New York Times which with the aide of the New York Times Index were examined from the year 1916 to 1924. Full accounts of the happenings in the White House, in Congress and in the country were given daily. It was singular to note that a check of letters and statements, as published, disclosed that when compared with authentic documents, these publications
were found not to have been altered. Although favorable to Wilson, the New York Times did not attempt to omit any news which might prove detrimental to him.

The Chicago Daily Tribune was used to gain an impression of the attempt that was made throughout the country to criticize the war ventures of Wilson. Its use was abandoned from that time on as the partisan interpretation of many facts was apparent.
The thesis "Woodrow Wilson's Relations with the Democratic Party, 1919-1924," written by Marybelle Grace Donovan, has been accepted by the Graduate School with reference to form, and by the readers whose names appear below, with reference to content. It is, therefore, accepted as a partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree conferred.

Rev. Joseph Roubik, S.J.                      March, 1936

Paul Kiniery, Ph.D.                           April, 1936