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## Affection, Anger, or Ambivalence? an Examination of Tunisian and Two Groups of American Students' Attitudes Toward American Politics and Popular Culture

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LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

AFFECTION, ANGER, OR AMBIVALENCE?

AN EXAMINATION OF TUNISIAN STUDENTS' ATTITUDES TOWARD  
THE UNITED STATES

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO

THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

PROGRAM IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

BY

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## ABSTRACT

Attitude ambivalence is the attitude actor's simultaneous possession of both negative and positive affect toward an attitude object. The competing affects produce tension, creating attitude ambivalence. In the present project, the attitude object is the United States of America. Students ( $n = 17$ ) in Tunisia (a predominately Muslim nation) were asked specific questions about American foreign policy and American popular culture. These two aspects of the "America" attitude object are expected to produce attitude ambivalence as the Tunisian students should express positive affect toward American popular culture and negative affect toward American foreign policy. A pencil and paper survey was administered featuring several questions about specific foreign policy tenets (e.g., America's activities in the Middle East, America's diplomatic relationship with the Arab and Muslim world) and popular culture (e.g., attitudes about American movies, music, television, and the reconciliation of American values with the values of Islam in pop culture media). The study found that this demarcation of the "America" attitude object into foreign policy and popular culture is not one that produces ambivalence but rather strong feelings about foreign policy and indifference toward popular culture. Two groups of American students, one group with presumed foreign policy knowledge ( $n = 26$ ) and one without such knowledge ( $n=29$ ) were also questioned to provide contrast. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) found no statistically significant differences in attitude ambivalence scores among the surveyed groups ( $F(2, 65) = .390, p = .678$ ).

## INTRODUCTION

Attitudes are central to the study of social psychology. From attitudes, one can begin to predict emotions and behaviors as straightforward as like or dislike, approach or avoidance, or as complicated as political preference and brand loyalty. The literature on attitudes has shown that there is a disadvantage to reducing attitudes to its most simplistic possibilities. Often, attitude formation is more complex, an intersection of spectrums based on evaluations, affect, intensity, and salience as a function of space and/or time. These dimensional properties of attitudes also inform the understanding of attitudinal ambivalence – the competing, conflicting, or contradictory assessment of an attitude object.

The present research is an attempt to apply theories of attitude ambivalence to Tunisian students' opinions about the United States. As an attitude object, the United States exists both as a single entity (e.g., the "American Dream") and as a shifting amalgamation of political and cultural ideas and ideals. At times, the dominant definition of "America" may be cultural yet, in other instances, the dominant definition may be political. What follows is an analysis of a survey that attempted to measure the United States both as a unified concept as well as the sum of its parts. With theories of attitude ambivalence serving as the foundation for this study's hypothesis, it was theorized that surveyed individuals, a group of Tunisian students and two groups of American students



with differing levels of expertise on the surveyed subject matter will express varying degrees of ambivalence. Specifically, the Tunisians' attitudinal conflict will be sourced in a positive affect toward America's pop cultural exports while the nation's political export, foreign policy, will engender negative affect. Combined, these should reveal an overall ambivalence toward the United States. The two groups of American students provide contrast. The first group of American students, the American Abroad group, presumably possesses above-average knowledge of politics and international relations. They are expected to be more empathetic to American foreign policy as a result of this knowledge. Their feelings toward foreign policy will be more important and more favorable than their feelings toward popular culture. The second group of American students, the Psychology Undergraduates, serves as proxy for the "Average American" in that their knowledge of geo-politics is not surmised to be as high as the American Abroad group. Their feelings toward foreign policy and popular culture are not known. A range rather than a type of specific attitudes is expected from this group.

### **What is an Attitude?**

Eagly and Chaiken's (1993) definition of an attitude recognizes individual components (affective, cognitive, and behavior) that create an attitude but also its evaluative nature, namely favor or disfavor toward the attitude object (Huskinson and Haddock, 2007, pp. 82-83). Beyond this definition, the social psychology literature has produced several models of attitudes that incorporate these components but also speculate as to their origins, their combinations, and their consequences. These models suggest that the attitude construct is in fact a union of key components whose combination produces a

final evaluation. These components do not work sequentially nor does one component play a consistently larger role than the other components. Descriptions of two models of the attitude construct follows.

#### Models of Attitude Structure:

##### Tripartite and Bipolar Models and their Structural Components

The tripartite model of attitudes sees the attitude as a union of affect, cognition and beliefs, and behavior (Fabrigar, MacDonald, Wegener, 2005, p. 79). Whether they are distinct, necessary contributors to the final assessment or if they are merely foundations from which the elements in a more unified assessment springs is a subject of debate (Fabrigar, MacDonald, Wegener, 2005, p. 79). However, these three elements factor into an individual's overall evaluation of an attitudinal object.

At its most basic, affect is simple like or dislike, a feeling of favorable or unfavorable sentiment toward the attitude target (Fabringar, MacDonald, Wegener, 2005, p. 79). Schimmack and Crites (2005) however suggest a taxonomy that partitions affect into experience (emotions versus moods), quality (pleasant versus unpleasant) and magnitude (intensity, duration, and frequency) (p. 400). These qualities are indicative of the temporal nature of affect (moods are more than likely temporary and without lasting effects), the perceived positive or negative value of the attitude object (like or dislike, acceptance or rejection and how these value based judgments are activated), and the subjective importance of the affective feeling based on how the affect is experienced –

how often one believes they have experienced that emotion, how aroused they are by the attitude object and ensuing emotion, and how long the affective response lasted (pp. 412, 417, 420).

To this, we add cognitions, the second component of the tripartite model. Cognitions are also termed “belief structures” (Wegener and Carlston, 2005, p. 503). These belief structures are the intellectual knowledge bases for attitudes (Wegener and Carlston, 2005, p. 503). As they are based in fact (or more accurately, what the individual perceives as fact), it is fitting that the role of beliefs has often been described as units in an equation of evaluation. One determines their attitude toward the target by computing the number of beliefs that are favorable/unfavorable (Wyer and Albarracin, 2005, p. 297). Beliefs, particularly in the realm of attitude formation are often subject to situational and temporal values; the beliefs used to form an attitude may not be the most relevant but rather, the most available as a result of cues in the environment or experience (e.g., recent use of similar belief structures places the relevant belief at the forefront of one’s “storage bin”) (Wyer and Albarracin, 2005, pp. 274, 280). So, the accessibility of a belief or cognition also plays a role in attitude formation.

Finally, there is one’s behavior in relation to the attitude object. Does one intend to accept/approach the object or does one wish to reject/withdraw from the object? Behavior in the context of the attitude construct is often seen as confirming one’s attitude or as a cue to one’s attitude (Olson and Stone, 2005, p. 223). When reconciling behavior with attitudes individuals strive toward psychic harmony and away from dissonance. (Olson and Stone, 2005, p. 226) The push toward harmony can occur at any point in the

formation of an attitude – prior to attitude formation as the impetus for a new attitude (e.g., I'm doing something fun therefore I have positive affect toward this activity) and following attitude formation as an attempt to reduce attitude/behavioral dissonance (e.g., I've spent a lot time on this activity so I must like it) (Olson and Stone, 2005, p. 255).

While the tripartite model of attitudes suggests that one's evaluation of an attitude object is based on several components, the bipolar model of attitudes places an individual's evaluation on a positive-negative spectrum. This is an “antagonistic” model of attitudes in that the determination of “good” is also the default rejection of “bad” (Kaplan, 1972, p. 362). Though simplistic, there is a utility in the conceptualization of objects as either-or, neither-nor. A simple good/bad designation of objects encountered in the environment is efficient and expedient. Such efficiency and expediency allows for smoother interactions with objects and others as well as simple blueprints for navigating one's environment. A consideration of all possible information in the evaluation of an attitude target could be both cognitively taxing and socially stagnant. Elaborations and extrapolations to the presented variables can be considered only when necessary (Cacioppo and Berntson, 1994, p. 404).

The above relates to the present research in that the examination of all of these components -- affect, cognitions and behaviors -- and place on the evaluative spectrum can reveal both the contents, direction, and extremity of one's attitude. Individuals may not consciously equate their attitudes with these separate components but several measures of attitude, particularly those that measure ambivalence, encourage the examination of an attitude at its most elemental level (Thompson, Zanna, Griffin, 1995).

To truly understand the sum of an attitude, one must understand its parts. Though the preceding discussion presented the two attitude models separately, there is much intersection and overlap particularly when considering the source (or components), strength, and consequence of ambivalent attitudes. In the ambivalence literature, it is imperative to discern possible sources of conflict and in turn, probe respondents for their subjective perception of those sources.

### **What is Attitude Ambivalence?**

Fabrigar, MacDonald and Wegener (2005) describe attitude ambivalence as the “tension associated with one’s attitude because the summary includes both positive and negative evaluations (p.84).” Beliefs, affects, and action tendencies may consist of both pro and anti, favorable and unfavorable elements and they may or may not be absolute. The result is “mixed feelings” and “competing tendencies (Kaplan, 1972, p. 367).” Intensity of the tendency and the individual’s personal affective/emotional involvement with the attitude target in question are also considered in the final evaluation (Kaplan, 1972, p. 361; Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin, 1995, p. 363 ). All of these elements contribute to the definitive evaluation (Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin, 1995, p. 362). In essence, the individual sees value in all presented opinions (as well as internal cognitions and beliefs) regardless of whether or not the opinions are in opposition. This subjective equivalency of value may be coupled with a subjective equivalency of importance or intensity of the presented attitude options (Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin, 1995, p. 363). In the end, the individual may find that an absolute attitude is unattainable because

information input and subsequent information processing are not producing a resolution that is weighted toward a conclusive response.

This conflict also points to other characteristics of attitudinal ambivalence. First, the attitude's accessibility: limited accessibility may be the result of the individual's reluctance (some have argued that ambivalence is really negative evaluations masquerading as indecisiveness) or information processing (de Liver, van der Pligt, and Wigboldus, 2007, p. 321). An attitude may be activated simultaneously with its opposite (one attitude is rejected in favor of its opposite), in the presence of its opposite (with no impact), or in concurrent proportion with its opposite (Schimmack and Crites, 2005, p. 417). Attempted reconciliation of competing attitudes can make an attitudinally based response less accessible because its automaticity is compromised by the time needed for conflict resolution (de Liver, van der Pligt, and Wigboldus, 2007, pp. 319, 324). Intensity of the competing attitudes influences conflict as well: conflict between low intensity attitudes produces weak ambivalence whereas conflict between high intensity attitude produces strong ambivalence (Breckler, 1994, p. 359).

The foregoing describes the tension in the attitudinal evaluation as one that pits the positive against the negative. This conceptualization in one respect suggests that attitudes travel along linear spectrums with defined endpoints of "maximally positive to maximally negative" and/or weak and strong (Cacioppo, Gardner and Berntson, 1997, p. 5; Breckler, 1994, p. 355). This would fit with the bipolar model of attitudes. However, some research has suggested a multidimensional approach to attitudes, one that places the

attitude in three dimensional space and time. This may be particularly apt for ambivalence. A three dimensional conceptualization implies an intersection of and connections among the various linear spectrums of weak and strong, favorable and unfavorable, pro and anti, etc (Cacioppo, Gardner and Berntson, 1997). In terms of time, the changing of an attitude, particularly from ambivalence to definitively positive or definitively negative may come as a result of one's psychological distance from the attitude target, making it not purely "time" but rather a combination of emotional and temporal distance.

In order to capture the ambivalent attitude of interest for the present research, respondents were asked to describe their ambivalence as separate positive and negative components. Rather than measuring such attitudes on a single positive to negative continuum, this project employed two uni-polar continua (slightly positive to extremely positive and slightly negative to extremely negative). Though the present research does not employ a methodology that explores the dimensional nature of respondents' attitudes or ambivalence, these issues are touched upon in terms of questions regarding other factors that can influence affect toward the attitude object of the United States (e.g. favorability and familiarity with important individuals, attitude toward foreign policy, use of media, etc.).

The research that follows measured attitudes in the twilight of President George W. Bush's administration, August 2008. At this time, attitudes toward the United States were based on both the perceived legacy of the current administration (e.g. the War in Iraq) as well as the impending election of either the Republican or Democratic challenger. A similar questionnaire given today would almost surely yield different results regarding America's reputation abroad – the intensity of the anger toward the Bush Administration coupled with the positive reception of President Obama in the Muslim world community could inspire a shift from ambivalence to favorability. Furthermore, as respondents move further away in time from the Bush administration's policies (e.g., less presence or resigned acceptance of American presence in the Middle East), attitudes toward the United States could become considerably more favorable. This change in attitude as a result of time is discussed later in this paper both as a feature of attitudinal ambivalence and also as a limitation of the present research. It is noted here as this conundrum sums up the multi-dimensional nature of ambivalence discussed above and also previews the approach of this survey. While the goal of the project was to capture Tunisians' attitudes toward the United States at a point in time, the predicted ambivalent nature of the attitudes was based on accepted conjecture about Muslim affect (liking and/or disliking the United States as a political or cultural force in the world), cognitions (beliefs about America's intentions as a participant in the Middle East and generally as a global hegemon) and behaviors (the Tunisians' and in turn international Muslim citizenry's attraction to or revulsion by the United States).



### **Ambivalence in the American/Muslim relationship**

Tunisia and the United States share in the fact that their current culture is a patchwork of foreign cultures' historical imprints. Tunisia's cosmopolitan culture is a result of visitors that have been for the most part, a succession of conquerors. The armies of Rome are responsible for the classical architectural remnants scattered throughout the country and the still abundant centuries old olive trees. The Romans brought infrastructure and agriculture (and perhaps a penchant towards a cosmopolitan, multicultural society), and the Arab conquerors brought Islam; the majority of Tunisians are adherents today (Jacobs and Morris, n.d., pp. 70, 490-492; BBC News, 2008). The influence of the modern European colonizers can be found most notably in language (French co-sharing language supremacy with Arabic), popular culture, and tourism (Geyer, 2003, pp. 16-17). The more accurate assessment of Tunisian culture is one that acknowledges the myriad of cultural influences, both East and West and as an Arab nation with a majority Muslim populace.

#### American Pop Culture Influence

It must be noted that because of the historical influence of the Roman empire, neighboring Arabs, and European visitors past and present, American influence in a Muslim nation and/or former colony such as Tunisia, is comparably superficial. Superficial but not absent. American pop culture influence in Muslim nations can be found in the success of American style television programming and music. However, these shows embrace Islamic themes and values. In an attitudinal conundrum that

embodies the potentially bipolar nature of attitudes, this “Islamic Pop” is simultaneously a rejection and acceptance of “America” – America’s unique pop culture style is attractive (e.g., music genres such as rap or television genres such as reality show competitions) but its values (i.e., women as wanton sexual objects or ruthless, selfish competition) are rejected in favor of Islam’s comparably more conservative and traditional themes (Kraidy, 2006, ¶s 3, 4, 6). For example, singer Sami Yusuf is on the surface, a pop singer. Though he has good looks and a smooth singing voice, Mr. Yusuf differs from singers such as Justin Timberlake or Usher in that he sings about his Islamic faith. His American style celebrity however has garnered some criticism as he is accused of inspiring female fans to behave in a way that is contrary to ideal Islamic womanhood namely, shouting at concerts (Khan, 2007).

#### American Political and Diplomatic Influence

A similar acceptance/rejection can be found in Tunisia’s embrace of American foreign policy. Like the United States, Tunisia has recognized Israel and been adamantly opposed to terrorism based in Islamic fundamentalism. (Murphy, 2002., p. 253). However, these may be best described as official positions of the infamously pragmatic Tunisian government. While not an Islamic state, Tunisia *is* nation of Muslims. Within this Muslim nation are Christians and Jews (who are officially protected and supported by the secular government) but the Tunisian “Street” enthusiastically supports the Palestinians in their struggle against the state of Israel. (Freedom House, ¶ 12, 2007; Murphy, 2002, p. 253). This support for the Palestinian cause exists even in a nation that

is, when compared to other majority Muslim states, decidedly less fundamentalist. In fact, all levels of adherence to Islam can be found on the streets of Tunisia's major cities, most notably in the women. Though dressed more conservatively than their American counterparts, women in Tunisia wear everything from the latest designer fashions to the traditional burka cover-up. Furthermore, women in government employ are forbidden from wearing the traditional *hijab* or headscarf. (Holmes-Eber, 2002, p. 20). This restriction accompanies greater rights for women in terms of divorce and property rights. (Holmes-Eber, 2002, p. 4; U.S. Department of State Country Report 2007) America has celebrated these progressive aspects of Tunisian government.

America's approval of Tunisia's treatment of its female population stands in contrast to Washington, D.C.'s disapproval of the authoritarian government of Ben Ali. As a rule, American foreign policy is opposed to dictatorships or totalitarian regimes of any kind but, the government of Tunisia given its aforementioned treatment of women, its ideological and geographical position in the War on Terror, its economic stability, and its actions that suggest some semblance of individual freedom (e.g., women's rights, religious tolerance) has given the North African nation some rope with the White House. Two state dinners have been held in honor of visiting Tunisian heads of states (Bush 41, Bush 43) (Papers of George Bush; BBC News) . The United States has not expressed any intention to force democracy on Tunisia either politically or militarily as it has elsewhere in the past (i.e. Vietnam, the recent Iraq conflict). (Entelis, 2005; Hochman, 2007, p. 78) America has given Tunisia a free pass when it comes to full scale democracy.

### Ambivalence between and within the Political and Cultural Domains?

The components used to compute ambivalence, the multiple spectrums and their intersections, suggest that it may be possible to discern ambivalence within ambivalence. Katz and Hass (1988) suggests that whites' attitudes toward blacks (finding blacks to be both "deviant" and "disadvantaged") is a conflict between their humanitarian-egalitarian outlook and their belief in the Protestant work ethic. The resulting attitude toward blacks is one that contains both aversion and sympathy (pp. 894, 902). Similarly the Tunisian students (who in conversations with the researcher presented themselves as Muslims) may find themselves engaged in a comparable internal conflict based on Muslim core values. A respect and deference for authority can result in admiration for America's power and influence. But, this value for respect can produce negative attitudes, particularly in the context of America's actions in Islamic holy places. In terms of popular culture, again, there is respect for America's influence (Islamic Pop suggests there is an acknowledgement of the American pop culture template) but America's acceptance of homosexuality, materialism, and promiscuity in its popular culture is a turn-off. So, while in the broad sense the expected ambivalence in Tunisian attitudes toward the United States is the tension between policy and popular culture, there may be further conflict within each of these domains. This project suggests that the Tunisian students' overall attitude toward the United States will be as complicated as the diplomatic relationship between Washington, D.C. and Tunis and as nuanced as the cultural exchange between East and West.

### **The Present Research Project: An Outline**

The most immediate goal of this research project is to explore what the diplomatic and political literature sees as the most likely source of ambivalence in Tunisian attitudes toward the United States. This research project hypothesizes that the Tunisian students will reveal an attitude toward the United States that is ambivalent because of positive attitudes toward American popular culture that conflict with negative attitudes toward foreign policy. Specific aspects of culture that will be included in this assessment are American music, movies, and television. Specific aspects of American foreign policy that are included are the Bush Administration's initiation of military action in Iraq and the country's relationship with the rest of the Middle East including Israel. The possession of both this negative assessment of foreign policy as well as the positive assessment of popular culture will add up to attitude ambivalence. Because the attitude object (the United States) and the attitude actor (the Tunisians) are multi-level, complex entities, a multi-faceted measurement approach is employed to yield the most thorough result.

Using a combination of forced choice and open-ended responses, Likert-type scales and semantic differential, the survey was an attempt at triangulating methods to obtain the most robust data possible. The domains of ambivalence, policy and popular culture, were also presented to respondents in a variety of ways such as recognition of international celebrities (American and non-Americans, Muslims and non-Muslims) and

agreement/disagreement with issues relevant to the American/Islamic political and cultural relationship.

The design of this research exercise includes Tunisian students but also two groups of American students who were surveyed in order to provide contrast. The Tunisian students were the study's proxy for the international Muslim community while the American students represented two possible American views -- one that had a working knowledge of international foreign policy and another group that presumably did not. In addition to Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin's (1995) presentation of Griffin's equation for ambivalence, a measure of the similarity and intensity of positive (P) and negative (N) components of an attitude, the results were analyzed using correlations and analysis of variance (ANOVAs). The data were examined within each of the surveyed groups and across groups.

The paper concludes with data based inferences about the nature of the relationship between Tunisians and the United States. These conclusions are discussed in the context of their domains (politics or popular culture) as well as across domains. There is also a discussion about how the presented constructs of foreign policy and popular culture are appropriate or inappropriate focuses of study as elements of the "America" attitude object. Finally, an examination of the limitations of this research in terms of the questionnaire's administration (group membership, language fluency, and missing data) points towards issues future survey projects may want to consider.

## HYPOTHESES

### **Hypothesis 1: The Tunisians' Attitude Ambivalence**

During the George W. Bush administration, there was a perception of Muslim nations being in the crosshairs of the White House's foreign policy agenda (Zaharna, 2002, ¶s14, 20; Holbrooke, 2001, ¶ 20). The survey at the center of this research project attempts to assess how citizens of a Muslim nation viewed America's standing in the world as an impetus of international change through its foreign policy and its popular culture. Because the administration of this survey occurred during the twilight of the Bush administration (when the centerpieces of their foreign policy in the Middle East had come to considerable fruition) it was assumed that the Muslim perception of the United States as a diplomatic and political entity would be negative. Conversely, there is a favorable attitude toward popular culture, as evidenced by the proliferation of American styles of mass entertainment in the Islamic world (e.g., rap and other popular music genres, reality shows) (Kraidy, 2006). Combined, these assessments will produce attitude ambivalence toward the United States.

Surveys of nations with large Muslim populations suggest that ambivalence is the prevalent attitude toward the United States (Kohut, 2003). Within these populations are various sub-populations based on socioeconomic status (e.g., elites versus the so-called "Arab Street") and type of Islam (fundamentalist versus liberal/progressive). The Tunisian students were surveyed are a unique intersection of these variables. First, the type of Islam practiced in Tunisia is decidedly less conservative than the Islam of other Muslim nations (Versi, 2004; Fleishman, 2007). Because Tunisian Islam is overall,

comparatively liberal, Tunisians may simply take less offense to foreign influence in general. Tunisia is Muslim, but it is not an Islamic state. However, one cannot discount Islam as a cultural if not religious influence in Tunisia. Regardless of the type of Islam that is practiced, Tunisians still identify themselves as part of the *umma* or trans-global Muslim community. In the *umma*, citizens are not Iraqis, Senegalese, or Tunisian but rather united by faith (Abdel-Alim, 2005, ¶ 3). As such, issues of importance to international Islamic citizenry (i.e., the Israeli/Palestinian conflict) are significant to Tunisians.

The Tunisians surveyed may strongly identify with the *umma* but they may also identify with the international community as well. The Tunisian respondents' study of American law makes them a distinctive group within the larger Tunisian population. This group should be surveyed as they are the likely future decision makers in the region (Sidanius, Henry, Pratto, and Levin, 2004, p. 414). In Hashem's (2005) typology of Arab classes and their attitudes toward the United States, the Tunisians students would most likely fall into the categories of 'Professional' or 'Learned' – educated individuals with connections to the West (through business or education), access to media beyond a newspaper, and language fluency that allows for increased engagement with Western culture either through media, travel, or career (Hashem, 2005, ¶15). These groups oppose negative portrayals of Arabs and Muslims in American media but “tend to have a bifurcated view of American culture. They see it as overly commercial on one hand, but they appreciate its practicality on the other.” Unlike the “common man” these groups have a positive attitude toward American success in the international community (they



attribute it to hard work, democracy, and an educated populace) and do not take satisfaction in attacks on the United States in the name of Islam (Hashem, 2005, ¶s16 and 18). Finally, these groups have a pragmatic view toward Islam – they recognize the need for Islam as a contributor to the buildup of Muslim society but they do not wish to see “low-educated cleric diffuse a culture of poverty” or “Islamist[s] steer popular momentum toward rigid goals.” (Hasham, 2005, ¶ 22)

Even with these religious and socioeconomic caveats, it is expected that the Tunisian students will find fault with American foreign policy and favor with American popular culture:

[In Muslim countries], opinions about the U.S. are complicated and contradictory. As among other people around the world, U.S. global influence is simultaneously embraced and rejected by Muslim publics. America is nearly universally admired for its technological achievements and people in most countries say they enjoy U.S. movies, music and television programs (Kohut, 2003, p. 3).

With the above in mind, the first hypothesis:

H<sub>1</sub>: Tunisian students will exhibit an ambivalent attitude toward the United States. The magnitude and intensity of the students’ positive attitudes (toward American pop culture) and negative attitudes (toward foreign policy) are similar as they are equally important constructs in the Tunisians’ overall attitude formation.

### **Hypothesis 2: The American Abroad Students’ Empathetic Response**

The students in this group are travelling to Tunisia as part of an experiential study abroad course. The course is offered through the Loyola University Chicago’s Political

Science department. In addition to an immersion in Tunisian culture, there will also be daily readings and instruction on Tunisian foreign policy and the North African nation's relationship with the United States. (Please note that the survey was administered prior to any formal instruction in Tunisian culture or political policy).

Assuming that this group consists primarily of individuals studying political science, international relations, religion or some other field of study that requires familiarity with diplomacy or Islamic culture, this group should possess an above average knowledge of international affairs and foreign policy. This expertise could combine with their first hand experience with American politics, not as students of policy but as citizens. For example, in their assessment of individual politicians, Americans consider candidates' personal life and character attributes in addition to party affiliation and party platform (Ottati, Edwards, and Krumdick, 2005, pp. 717, 702-723). And, as the survey is being administered during an election year, the information on candidates and policy in general is at its zenith; the American Study Abroad students' overall access to media and campaign coverage is considerably higher and of greater detail than the Tunisians. The union of expertise and inside information may produce an empathetic view toward American policy, one that considers both the (alleged) practical necessities of the United States' actions abroad and the minutiae of American politics. Also, Tunisians like the rest of the world, are on the receiving end of American actions abroad and may not possess the American Study Abroad students' insight on the nuances (political and otherwise) of policy formation. Instead, Tunisians only experience the results.

Access is also an issue when considering the Americans' hypothesized attitude toward popular culture. Americans experience exponentially more popular culture than their Tunisian counterparts. While American cultural dominance internationally is undeniable, it should be noted that Tunisians are also receiving cultural imports from Europe, namely France and Italy (Geyer, 2003, pp. 16-17). Comparatively, there is more European pop culture in Tunisia than American (Battenburg, 1997). With this in mind, it is hypothesized that the American Study Abroad group may be indifferent or even negative about American popular culture. Their indifference could have its origin in the prevalence of American popular culture – they have an intimate knowledge of it and perhaps even take it for granted. Negative attitudes also have their origins in the ubiquity of American popular culture for this group – they know the good, the bad, and the ugly while what is exported abroad (more importantly imported by the Tunisian government who is notorious for its censorship of the media) may be the best of the best (Geyers, 2003, p. 35; Reporters without Borders, 2008). The international audience gets the most successful of American popular culture while native audiences are forced to deal with the “also-rans” of American media on a regular basis. Like their political opinion, the American Abroad students must reconcile several pieces of information in forming their opinion.

The second hypothesis is:

H<sub>2</sub>: The American Abroad students' attitudes toward American foreign policy and American popular culture will not produce ambivalence toward the United States as these variables are not of equal magnitude and intensity.

Attitudes toward American foreign policy will be both more positive and more important than attitudes toward popular culture in the American Abroad students' attitude formation.

### **Hypothesis 3: The Psychology Undergraduate Students as Proxy for the "Average American"**

There are no theoretically based expectations for this final group of students as their characteristics cannot be confirmed. Ideally, they would represent all possible aspects of American society e.g., both involved and apathetic, Christian and Muslim, native and foreign born, etc. The survey methodology cannot confirm or deny this. However, when compared to the Tunisian students or the American Abroad students they should differ in the following ways. Presumably, they possess neither the expertise of the American Study Abroad group nor are they a member of a group that is on the receiving end of American political policy and/or culture. Their awareness of politics and pop culture is not expected to be informed by deep study (i.e., the American Abroad group) or direct personal experience (the Tunisian students). Like the American Study Abroad group, they are exposed to the same political minutiae and *ad nauseam* pop culture but they cannot approach or appreciate either through the lens of an expert. Also, this group may lack the personal passion for politics or dogmatic view of culture that the Tunisians may possess as a result of their faith. However, it is possible that there may be a Muslim student or a student from an area of study that includes examination of international politics or media. Even with this possibility, on average, the Psychology Undergraduate students are not expected to possess the same qualities (expertise and experience) that are

thought to affect the Tunisian students or the American Abroad students' opinions. The inclusion of the Psychology Undergraduate students is meant to provide something of a control, a neutral point of comparison between the Tunisians and the informed Americans. Their opinion of the United States in terms of foreign policy and/or popular culture should range from indifferent to positive.

The third and final hypothesis is:

H<sub>3</sub>: The lack of homogeneity in this group prevents the creation of a theoretically based hypothesis. There is no way to predict if the presented components of foreign policy and popular culture will or should provoke the emotional or intellectual significance and subsequent tension requisite to attitude ambivalence. A range of overall attitudes based on unknown individual differences is the anticipated result.

## METHOD

This study hypothesizes that ambivalence toward the attitude object, the United States of America, will be the result of a positive attitude toward American popular culture and negative attitude toward American foreign policy. These attitudes will be in conflict, hence the ambivalence. The respondents' group membership (Tunisian, American Abroad, or Psychology Undergraduates) will impact the intensity of their ambivalence.

To test these hypotheses, a paper and pencil survey was administered to all three groups.

## **Participants**

Seventy two students completed the survey -- 17 Tunisian students, 26 American Study Abroad students, and 29 Psychology Undergraduate students.

### **Tunisian Participants**

As Muslims (Tunisia is 98% Muslim), the Tunisian students were the respondents of interest (BBC News, 2008). The students surveyed are a part of a Common Law program at the University of Tunis taught by Dr. Peter Schraeder of Loyola University Chicago. Access to the Tunisian students was assured by Dr. Schraeder and supported by Dr. Hamadi Redissi of the University of Tunis.

### **American Students: American Abroad and the Psychology Undergraduates**

While we can make informed guesses on the demographic makeup of the Tunisian students (much of the information on ethnic and religious breakdowns of the Tunisian people reveal a fairly homogenous society), the same cannot be said for either group of American students. Such data was not collected for any group of survey participants to assure the best possible level of confidentiality. This precaution was taken to protect the identity of the Tunisian students. However, we can assume that the American Abroad group somewhat mirrors their Tunisian counterparts in terms of interest in international politics considering the nature of the course, an experiential study of Tunisian culture and foreign policy.

A final group of American students, one drawn from Loyola University Chicago's psychology undergraduate subject pool served as a contrast to the both the Tunisian and American Abroad students.

### **Survey Instrument**

The survey was designed to primarily gauge Tunisian attitudes toward the United States and the level of ambivalence in these attitudes. American student results are meant to provide comparison and contrast on points where these two populations are expected to diverge. The researcher created this survey based on the existing literature's common themes of international Islamic disenchantment with the United States, the global appeal of America as a cultural force, and the advice of Dr. Peter Schrader, an expert on the sociopolitical climate of the African continent and the continent's diplomatic relationship with the United States. Dr. Schraeder also possess an intimate knowledge of Tunisian society as a result of his extensive travel in the North African nation.

The layout of the survey is modeled after Gentzkow and Shapiro's (2004) examination of survey data from Muslim nations. The survey consisted of nine parts:

Part One.....Awareness, Like/Dislike of international celebrities

Part Two.....Media Usage

Part Three.....Familiarity with the United States

Part Four .....Attitude toward the United States -- Americanism,  
Political Policies

Part Five .....Semantic Differential

Parts Six .....	Repeat of Four and Five but with Questions on Popular and Seven	Culture
Part Eight.....	International Travel	
Part Nine.....	Attitude toward the United States – American Branding/Style	

Part One, the familiarity/unfamiliarity and like/dislike of international celebrities is included as an indirect measure of general political awareness. The list (please see Appendix) is dominated by Americans, but also includes politicians and entertainers of international renown such as U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and French soccer superstar Zinedine Zidane (Gentzkow and Shaprio, 2004, p. 119). Famous Muslims on the list (rapper Mos Def, Muhammad Ali, King Abdullah, and King Muhammad VI) were included more as a measure of Americans' familiarity with the Islamic world.

Following these questions on awareness and favorability, respondents reported on the frequency and type of their media usage (i.e., newspaper, television, radio, and internet). These questions serve as a measure of exposure to news and entertainment. Next on the survey were questions on the proportion of media coverage that originated in the United States.

Information about the United States may also come from interpersonal relationships and so respondents were asked if they knew anyone in the United States and if so, how often they spoke with those individuals. Firsthand experience with the United States perhaps through a trip abroad can also influence attitudes so respondents were asked if they had ever visited the United States and if not, would they like to visit in the



future (Kendrick and Fullerton, 2005, p. 306). Questions were also included about general international travel outside of one's country of birth.

After the initial questions on familiarity and media usage (type and frequency), a series of questions on the presence of attitude ambivalence, the simultaneous possession of favorable and unfavorable affect towards an attitude object based on properties of the target object, were presented (Kaplan, 1972, p. 364). Another opened ended question asked participants to define "Americanism", a closed ended companion question asked respondents to evaluate the degree and value of its proliferation around the world. This provides both a quantitative and qualitative measure of ambivalence to use in the data analysis (Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin, 1995, p. 378).

The next major section focused on foreign policy. Participants answered questions about the state of American and Tunisian diplomatic relations, American and Islamic diplomatic relations, and specifics of American foreign policy. Statements were based on the Pew Global Attitude Reports results that measure the issues of importance for the international Islamic community (Pew Research Center, 2008). These issues included:

- America's support for the state of Israel -- this support is thought to be withheld from Palestinians in the region who desire their own state.
- America's role as destabilizing the socioeconomic structure of the Middle East -- destabilization comes in the form of faulty diplomacy and unnecessary military interventions.

- America as a hypocritical hegemon – while the rallying cry for war in the region is the proliferation of democracy, America’s true interest is in the region’s resources, namely its oil.

Respondents indicated their agreement or disagreement with these and other foreign policy issues. The section on foreign policy concluded with a series of modified semantic differentials in which participants rated how well each descriptive described American foreign policy on a scale of one through seven.

The section on American popular culture followed a similar format. Attitude statements asked respondents to indicate agreement with issues associated with American music, movies, and television. Again, results from the Pew Global Attitudes Reports (2008) provided a framework for issues of interest:

- American popular culture is a likeable, even welcome export.
- American popular culture presents a decadent and debauched lifestyle that is in direct opposition to traditional Islamic values.
- American popular culture depicts everyday life in the United States.

Following this section was a second series of modified semantic differentials this time including words or phrases that described positive, negative, and neutral aspects of America’s popular culture. Participants again rated the aptness of the presented words and phrases on a scale of one to seven.

The final section of the survey included attitude statements designed to measure the presence of and preference for the fusion of American branding with Islamic sensibilities, the so-called “Islamic Pop.” Respondents reported not only on their

attitudes but the perceived attitudes of others toward these hybrid products. These questions also provide a measure of the strength of the American brand as a type of default packaging for popular and leisure culture.

At this point, it would be pertinent to mention that although originally conceived as two separate surveys, one with questions targeted at Tunisians and the other with questions targeted at Americans, the final survey was in fact a combination of the “Tunisian” and “American” surveys. This final survey was administered to all participants, regardless of group membership and included questions that were obviously meant to measure Tunisian attitudes (e.g. “Have you ever visited the United States?” or “I actively avoid American entertainment that is inconsistent with Islamic teachings,”) with the remainder of questions meant to elicit differences, if any between the two groups (e.g. “The diplomatic actions of the United States have contributed to instability in the Middle East,” or “ I feel that deep down, Americans and Muslims share similar core values,”). While this made for a longer than conventional survey (101 questions), it also helped to dispel any possible suspicions on the true nature of the questionnaire (Dillman, 2000, p. 18; De Winter, 2004). Respondents in all groups were instructed to ignore any questions that they felt did not pertain to them.

### **Procedure**

The Tunisian group and the American Abroad group completed the survey in Tunisia in August of 2008. Under the advice of Dr. Schraeder, The Tunisian and American Abroad students completed the survey on the same day at the same time. This

was done to ameliorate any notions of favoritism, targeting, or any other possible suspicions. A consent form was not obtained to ensure the confidentiality of the Tunisian students. All respondents listened to a recruitment script read by the researcher and were given a statement of informed consent for their records. The informed consent form included the researcher's contact information (university email and on campus office phone number). This statement stated that their completion of the survey is their consent. By obtaining consent in this way, a signature is unnecessary and adds an additional layer of confidentiality. The researcher also stated this verbally. After the surveys were passed out, respondents completed the survey at their own pace.

A note about the Tunisian students: concurrent with their study of American laws is their study of the English language. For the Tunisian students surveyed (and among the larger Tunisian population), English is at best, a third language; most Tunisians speak both their native language of Arabic and the language of the country's former colonial occupiers, French (Battenburge, 1997). As such, participants were instructed to ignore questions that they felt they did not understand for any reason including language comprehension.

Though respondents were not told that the survey was designed with Tunisian students in mind, respondents were told to ignore any questions they felt did not pertain to them for any reason. When students decided they had completed the survey to their satisfaction, they returned the survey to the researcher who then explained the purpose of the research project. No compensation was provided to either the Tunisian or American Abroad students for their participation.

The final group, the Psychology Undergraduates, completed the survey during the Spring 2009 semester on the Loyola University Chicago campus. Respondents were recruited via Experimentrix. While the precautions taken to ensure the Tunisian students' confidentiality were not taken here, these students did not provide any identifying information on their individual surveys. However, to ensure that proper course credit (one hour) was awarded to each student (their compensation for participating), students did sign in next to their name upon arrival to the survey site and their informed consent form. These students were read a recruitment script and given an informed consent form for their records. Upon completion of the survey, students were debriefed as to the survey's purpose.

## RESULTS

### **Hypothesis 1: Tunisian Students will Exhibit Ambivalence toward America**

The first hypothesis of the study states that the equal intensity and magnitude of positive and negative affect will result in attitude ambivalence for the Tunisian students. Tension between the Tunisians positive affect toward American popular culture and negative affect toward American foreign policy is the source of their ambivalence. To measure the ambivalence present at the time of survey administration, the researcher used Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin's (1995) presentation of Griffin's equation (Figure 1) for ambivalence, a measure of the similarity and intensity of positive (P) and negative (N) components of an attitude, to generate ambivalence scores for the Tunisian students (see Appendix B).

Figure 1.

$$\frac{P + N}{2} - |P - N|$$

Positive and Negative scores came from the Tunisians responses to Question 12 (Considering only the **positive** qualities of your attitude toward the United States and ignoring the negative qualities, how positive is your evaluation (please circle one: 1 = Slightly Positive, 2 = Very Positive, 3 = Extremely Positive)?) and Question 15 (Now, considering only the **negative** qualities of your attitude toward the United States and ignoring the positive qualities, how negative is your evaluation (please circle one: 1 = Slightly Negative, 2 = Very Negative, 3 = Extremely Negative)?). Overall, the Tunisian students may be characterized as having mild to moderate ambivalence. While only two respondents display no ambivalence in their attitude toward the United States (one student's attitude can be described as 'Extremely Positive' the other 'Extremely Negative' as the ratio of their positive and negative scores equaled '0'), there is no dominant modal score or type of ambivalence exhibited by the Tunisian students. However, looking at the ambivalence scores (Appendix B) there does appear to be a higher number of students (62%) giving more negative scores to negative qualities than more positive scores to positive qualities (23%); these students' negative scores are more negative than their positive scores are positive. The remaining students (15%) gave equal evaluations to positive and negative components and two students did not respond to these questions (see Appendix B).

In addition to providing a numerical score, respondents were asked to list those qualities that inspired the score. The negative qualities enumerated by the Tunisians illustrates that they find the most fault with America's foreign policy. Nearly all the of the open-ended responses make mention of America's actions abroad (Appendix A). The uniformity of response coupled with the more negative (than positive is positive) scores suggests that this may be *the* point of contention between Tunisians and the United States. The positive responses lack the homogeneity of the negative responses (Appendix A). There is mention of freedom and democracy but also of the role of the United States in the world. There is one mention of popular culture, the "production of cinema movies." The Tunisians appear to see foreign policy as the most salient negative aspect of the America construct. Based on the prevalence of foreign policy as a negative quality, this part of the thesis—that Tunisians will have a negative opinion of foreign policy--is supported. However, popular culture does not appear to provoke any measure of intense response or even acknowledgement, therefore, we cannot say that it is the tension between these two constructs that is the source of any ambivalence. There is additional evidence that for whatever reason, Tunisian attitudes hover between positive and negative. Though not a theoretically supported measure of attitude ambivalence, Question 10 (What is your overall attitude toward the United States?) furthers the notion of Tunisians' attitude ambiguity toward the United States. With '3' serving as the midpoint ('Neither Positive or Negative') on a five point Likert-type scale (1 = 'Very Positive' and 5 = 'Very Negative', Tunisian students' ratings produced a mean of 2.93. A one-way ANOVA comparing the Tunisian students' results to that of the two

American groups (American Abroad,  $M = 2.20$ , Psychology Undergraduate,  $M=2.24$ )

revealed significant differences across the three groups,  $F(2, 67) = 3.219$ ,  $p = .046$ .

Tukey's post hoc tests also show that the Tunisian students differed significantly from the American Abroad group but not the Undergraduate Pool.

Another examination of Tunisian's reconciliation of American politics and American popular culture in their attitude formation can be found in the recognition and favorability of American political and cultural celebrities. Other than rapper Mos Def, the lowest level of recognition was 80% for actor George Clooney. Though politicians were also very familiar to the Tunisian students (the lowest was for former vice president Al Gore at 80%), the favorability responses could hardly be described as overwhelmingly positive. Then candidate Barack Obama did receive a majority favorable response (60%) but former president George W. Bush received a majority unfavorable response (80%) along with fellow Republican, then candidate John McCain (53.3%). Hillary Clinton who was at the time, a candidate for the Democratic Party's nomination for president received a majority neutral response from the Tunisian students (60%).

Using the exemplars of American cultural and political celebrities presented in Questions 2 and 3, six scales were created: Familiarity and Favorability with American Politicians (**AmPolFam** and **AmPolFav** = Former President George W. Bush, former Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, former Vice President Al Gore, former Republican Senator John McCain, and former Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama), Familiarity and Favorability with American Entertainers (**AmEntFam** and **AmEntFav** = singer Mariah Carey, actor George Clooney, rapper Mos Def, former



boxer Muhammad Ali, actress Angelina Jolie, actor Brad Pitt, and talk show host Oprah Winfrey), International Politicians Familiarity and Favorability (**IntPolFam** and **IntPolFav** = King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, the Dalai Lama, King Muhammad VI of Morocco, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy), and International Entertainers Familiarity and Favorability (**IntEntFam** and **IntEntFav** = lead singer of U2 Bono, Senegalese singer Youssou N'Dour, and French superstar Zinedine Zidane).

A Pearson's correlation was conducted to examine the possible relationship between each of these scales and Tunisian participants' response to Question 10 ('What is your overall attitude toward the United States?'). A significant positive correlation was found for both familiarity with American entertainers ( $r = .580$ ) and for favorability toward American politicians ( $r = .561$ ) with overall attitude toward the United States. The remaining correlations are presented in Table 2. Increased familiarity with American celebrities correlates with increased liking for the United States while increased favorability of American politicians correlates with increased liking for the United States.

Table 1

*Familiarity and Favorability Correlations for the Tunisian Students*

---

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Question 10	--								
2. IntEntFav	.567	--							
3. IntPolFam	.380	.720**	--						
4. IntEntFam	.699*	.812**	.699**	--					
5. IntPolFav	.595*	-.133	.013	.072	--				
6. AmEntFav	-.084	.224	.238	.065	.000	--			
7. AmPolFam	.374	.685*	.982**	.679	.012	.186	--		
8. AmEntFam	.580*	.684*	.406	.631*	.112	.130	.425	--	
9. AmPolFav2	.561*	.374	.346	.575	.373	.473	.354	.410	--

---

With the positive correlation between celebrity awareness and positive attitude toward the United States in mind, we can look at Tunisian's response to questions on American pop culture's ability to influence attitudes. In other words, do Tunisians see popular culture as a vehicle for attitude change? Questions 99, 100, and 101 asked if American movies, music, and television can have a positive influence on foreigners' attitude toward the United States. The Tunisian students were more optimistic than their American counterparts on the impact of these media. With the exception of television, mean scores suggest that Tunisians agreed that movies ( $M = 2.17$ ) and music ( $M = 2.17$ ) have a positive impact on foreigners' attitudes toward the United States. Differences in

the responses to this series of questions were significant across groups. Tunisians differed significantly from both groups on whether American movies can have a positive influence on foreigners' attitudes ( $F(2, 62) = 10.612, p = .000$ ). The same statistically significant pattern of difference was found for music, ( $F(2, 61) = 7.038, p = .002$ ).

The semantic differential reveals some significant differences regarding Tunisians' affect toward popular culture when their responses are compared to the two groups of Americans. Tukey's post hoc tests show that Tunisian students differed from the American Abroad group on semantic differential questions regarding decadence ( $F(2, 60) = 3.295, p = .044$ ) and the inspirational nature of American popular culture ( $F(2, 62) = 3.189, p = .048$ ). Tunisians differed from both groups of Americans on questions of materialism ( $F(2, 61) = 7.445, p = .001$ ) and accuracy ( $F(2, 62) = 9.250, p = .000$ ). In all of these instances, the Tunisians were much more forgiving:

- Only 33% of Tunisians described American popular culture as 'Decadent' (choosing '1', '2', or '3') compared to 42% of the American Abroad group and 41% of the Psychology Undergraduate;
- Sixty-six percent of Tunisians described American popular culture as 'Inspiring' (choosing '1', '2', or '3') compared to only 42% of the American Abroad group and 50% of the Psychology Undergraduate;
- Only 47% of Tunisians described American popular culture as 'Materialistic' (choosing '1', '2', or '3') compared to 88% of the American Abroad group and 100% of the Psychology Undergraduate;

- Forty percent of Tunisians described American popular culture as 'Accurate' (choosing '1', '2', or '3') compared to 7% of the American Abroad group and 21% of the Psychology Undergraduate.

In fact, many of the responses for the Tunisians clustered around the affirmative ends of the semantic differential responses. This could mean that 1) the Tunisians see American popular culture overall as embodying all the presented descriptives, good, bad or neutral 2) they are seeing some aspects of American popular culture as embodying the presented descriptive but may be not describing popular culture holistically; they are making mental distinctions that cannot be communicated via the questions' format or 3) this could simply be testing fatigue.

Though they may have been more forgiving in terms of the presented descriptives, there was a negative correlation between the amount of American media consumption and attitude toward the United States among Tunisians,  $r = -.58$ ,  $p = .037$ . An increase in American media accompanies a less favorable attitude toward the United States. Not confined to one medium, Tunisian students showed significantly different levels of consumption from their American counterparts in both groups. And more importantly, these significant differences (with the exception of the Internet where levels were similar across groups) were found for news sources rather than entertainment sources. In terms of the newspaper, Tunisian students reported reading the newspaper approximately three to five times a week ( $M=1.87$ ), which Tukey's post hoc revealed as significantly higher than the Undergraduate Pool ( $M=3.28$ , approximately once or twice a

week) but not the American Abroad group ( $M=2.19$ , approximately three to five times a week).

### **Hypothesis 2: American Abroad Group**

This group was hypothesized to be more empathetic than the other groups, particularly toward American foreign policy. Also, this group would hold foreign policy in comparably higher esteem than popular culture. Their ambivalence scores (Appendix B) would reflect this attitudinal disparity between constructs.

The American Abroad group (26.1%, 6 out of 23 students gave the positive and negative qualities equal ratings) produced a level of ambivalence that was slightly lower than the Psychology Undergraduate group (31.0%, 9 out of 29 gave the positive and negative qualities equal ratings). The percentage of students in the American Abroad group with scores suggesting ambivalence is considerably higher than the proportion of Tunisian students (15.4%, 2 out of 13 gave the positive and negative qualities equal ratings). However, there were no statistically significant differences across groups for level of ambivalence ( $F(2, 65) = .390, p = .678$ ) (Tunisian Students,  $M = .89$ ; American Abroad,  $M = .83$ , Psychology Undergraduates,  $M = 1.02$ ;  $SD = .79$ ).

A higher percentage of students in this group gave the negative qualities (43.5%) a higher rating than the proportion of students who gave the positive qualities a higher rating (30.4%). The remaining 26.1% gave the positive and negative qualities equal ratings. Similar to the Tunisian students, there was a general theme in the positive qualities listed by the American Abroad students in their open-ended responses

(Appendix A). Nearly every student alluded to freedom, democracy, or liberty. When asked what was the most important of the positive aspects, only one student made a reference to popular culture ('People, entertainment (sports, movies, etc.)') and only one student explicitly stated 'foreign policy, environmental concern (with foreign policy; war, economic sanctions, etc.)'. Foreign policy as a theme *does* make an appearance when students listed the negative qualities of the United States (Appendix A). But, when asked to name the most important negative quality of the United States, foreign policy finds itself competing with niche issues such as consumerism, healthcare, and 'Arguments against women's rights/abortion; liberal policies toward illegals, racial tensions.' This group's competing tendencies seem to be between foreign and domestic issues rather than between foreign policy and pop culture. Arguably, this finding supports hypothesis two's assertion that this group will see foreign policy as more important than popular culture but this appears to have occurred by omission rather than an active consideration of each construct's qualities. In the absence of any prompt, these students do not take this dichotomous view of America, rather they see the America construct as one embodying at its very best freedom and democracy and at its very worst a lack of domestic tranquility.

Though an ANOVA found significant differences between this group and the other two groups of respondents on some issues of foreign policy, they don't indicate that this group has an overall favorable attitude. A more accurate description is that this group has a less negative attitude than their counterparts in the Tunisian group or their fellow Americans in the Psychology Undergrad group. Ratings on the semantic

differential, a scale ranging from 1 through 7 with '1' being the absolute affirmative and '7' being the absolute negative of each adjective illustrates this group's neutrality:

- Students in this group clustered around 'Neutral' ( $M = 4.42$ ) when asked if U.S. foreign policy was Fair on Not Fair; post hoc tests found this to be significantly different from the Tunisian students ( $M = 5.69$ ) but not the Psychology Undergraduates ( $M = 4.69$ ), ( $F(2, 65) = 4.195$ ,  $p = .019$ ). The means of the other two groups were toward the 'Not Fair' end of the semantic differential
- Students in this group clustered around 'Neutral' ( $M = 4.58$ ) when asked if U.S. foreign policy was 'Catastrophic' or 'Not Catastrophic'; post hoc tests found this to be significantly different from the Tunisian students ( $M = 2.71$ ) but not the Psychology Undergraduates ( $M=4.24$ ),  $F(2, 66) = 6.361$ ,  $p = .003$ ). Tunisian students were clustering around the affirmative end of the semantic differential while the Psychology Undergrads were clustering around 'Neutral'
- Students in this group clustered around 'Neutral' ( $M = 4.35$ ) when asked if U.S. foreign policy was 'Immoral' or 'Not Immoral'; post hoc tests found this to be significantly different from the Tunisian students ( $M = 2.62$ ) but not the Psychology Undergraduates ( $M=3.97$ ),  $F(2, 65) = 7.458$ ,  $p = .001$ ). Tunisian students were clustering around the affirmative end of the semantic differential while the Psychology Undergrads were clustering around 'Neutral'

Though popular culture is not an automatically recalled trait in the ‘America’ attitude entity, there is some data suggesting that in keeping with this study’s hypothesis, this group views popular culture as inconsequential in impacting attitudes abroad. When asked to consider the possible impact of American movies, music, and television on foreigner’s attitudes toward the United States, there were significantly different opinions between this group and the other groups of respondents in the survey. In all instances, post hoc tests found that this group differed significantly from the Tunisian group but not the Psychology Undergrad (Tables 2 thru 4). The American Abroad Group was less optimistic than the Tunisian group about the impact of media on foreigners’ attitudes.

Table 4

*ANOVA: American movies have a positive impact on foreigners’ attitude toward the United States.*

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F
Between Groups	13.752	2	6.876	11.272**
Within Groups	35.990	59	.610	
Total	49.742	61		

\*\*p < 0.01

Table 5

*ANOVA: American television has a positive impact on foreigners’ attitude toward the United States.*

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F
Between Groups	12.399	2	6.199	10.124**
Within Groups	37.351	61	.612	
Total	49.750	63		

\*\*p < 0.01



Table 6

*ANOVA: American music has a positive impact on foreigners' attitude toward the United States.*

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F
Between Groups	7.687	2	3.844	7.038*
Within Groups	33.313	61	.546	
Total	41.00	63		

\* $p < 0.05$

The Tunisian students agreed ( $M = 2.09$ ) with the statement 'American movies have a positive influence on foreigners' attitude toward the United States' and also on a similarly worded statement about music ( $M = 2.17$ ). Both the American Abroad (Movies:  $M = 3.43$ ; Music:  $M = 2.96$ ) and the Psychology Undergrad groups (Movies:  $M = 3.14$ ; Music:  $M = 3.10$ ) chose 'Neutral' in response to these statements. On the statement about television, the American Abroad ( $M = 3.74$ ) differed from both the Tunisians ( $M = 2.58$ ) and the Psychology Undergrad students ( $M = 3.00$ ).

Other significant findings suggest that this group may simply have a more positive view of the United States overall. Students in this group disagreed ( $M = 3.88$ ) with the statement, 'The United States is responsible for most of the world's problems', a finding that is significantly different from the Tunisian group (who agreed with the statement,  $M = 2.47$ ) but not the other group of Americans who also disagreed ( $M = 3.57$ ) ( $F(2, 65) = 9.170, p = .000$ ).

### **Hypothesis 3: The Psychology Undergraduates**

Unlike the previous groups of study participants, there are no theoretically based predictions for the group of Psychology Undergraduates. Beyond their participation in the Undergraduate subject pool, there are no known unifying characteristics that could point toward a consensus. As such, the finding predicted for this group is not so much as a lack of ambivalence but rather a range of attitudes – positive, negative *and* ambivalence. There is no overall group prediction for tension (or the lack thereof) between popular culture and foreign policy.

Scores for this group ranged from 0 to 3 with every point in between (Appendix B). Unlike the Tunisian students, but similar to their American counterparts, a higher percentage (44.8%) gave higher ratings to the positive qualities rather than the negative qualities. As previously stated, there was no significant difference between this group of American students and the Tunisians for Question 10 (What is your overall opinion of the United States?) but the results of the Tukey's post-hoc test suggest that they were approaching significance ( $p = .067$ ). Their responses to the positive and negative qualities mirrored that of the American Abroad group with many references to freedom and democracy along with a few allusions to lifestyle (e.g., education, "pretty landscapes", and opportunity). The most important of these qualities appear to be "freedom" as it received the most mentions.

Though this group's positive affect toward the United States was unified behind the concept of freedom, the sources of their dissatisfaction were specific. There were

explicit references to the war in Iraq, George W. Bush, and to America's actions as a global hegemon:

- The horrible economy, pointless *war in the Middle East*, taxes.
- *We get into too many foreign problems*
- *War in Iraq*, lack of political will in Washington DC
- *War in Iraq, alliance with Israel*
- *We're a bully*, economy, cocky, *Bush, the war*
- *Our interference w/ other countries, we tend to get power hungry*
- Politics. *The country is somewhat a bully to other nations.*
- Brutal torture techniques, *controlling the world with military power*
- Our debt, *how we are perceived by other nations*
- The economy, the loss of jobs/unemployed, *the war*
- *I mostly think of U.S. interference in foreign affairs*
- The state of the economy, *our military aggressiveness*

This does not amount to a theme of overall negative affect toward America's action abroad but it is the only issue that was mentioned with any consistency. Similar to the American Abroad group, domestic issues that may or may not reflect a personal bias make up the remaining negative qualities listed (Appendix A). Also similar to the American Abroad group was the group's tug of war between domestic and foreign policy issues when asked for the most important characteristics. America's actions overseas competed with the economy, the neo-conservatives, and underage drinking laws. One characteristic that can be applied to this group is an overall dissatisfaction with the

progress of military actions in the Middle East. No one in this group agreed with the statement 'I agree with the United States' actions in the War on Terror'. Other groups had at least one person who agreed with this statement whereas in this group, respondents were neutral or disagreed. Again, this may be a function of time--the election of Barack Obama to President of the United States suggests that this was a popular sentiment. The candidate ran on a platform of ending the current conflict in Iraq. These students knew that there would be a change in administration from Republican to Democrat and that the president would be Barack Obama.

Though the American Abroad group was hypothesized to be more empathetic to foreign policy concerns, there were no foreign policy instances on which these groups differed significantly. In fact, on several issues, the significant differences were cast as Tunisian versus American rather than Tunisian versus American Abroad versus Psychology Undergraduate:

- Both groups of American students (American Abroad,  $M = 3.88$ ; Psychology Undergraduates,  $M = 3.57$ ) disagreed with the statement 'The United States is responsible for most of the world's problems.' The Tunisian students ( $M = 2.47$ ) agreed with this statement.
- Both groups of American students (American Abroad,  $M = 3.35$ ; Psychology Undergraduates,  $M = 3.31$ ) were neutral toward the statement 'If a Republican wins the 2008 presidential election, the foreign policy of the United States will improve.' The Tunisian students ( $M = 4.13$ ) disagreed with this statement

- Both groups of American students (American Abroad,  $M = 4.58$ ; Psychology Undergraduates,  $M = 4.27$ ) hovered around the middle of the semantic differential when asked if they would describe the United States' foreign policy as 'Catastrophic' or 'Not Catastrophic'. The Tunisian students hovered around the affirmative end of the spectrum, closer to 'Catastrophic' ( $M = 2.71$ ).
- Both groups of American students (American Abroad,  $M = 4.35$ ; Psychology Undergraduates,  $M = 3.97$ ) hovered around the middle of the semantic differential when asked if they would describe the United States' foreign policy as 'Immoral' or 'Not Immoral'. The Tunisian students hovered around the affirmative end of the spectrum, closer to 'Immoral' ( $M = 2.62$ ).

Though there were some significant differences regarding issues of popular culture that followed a similar pattern of American versus Tunisian, the groups weren't always so far apart on the scale. For example, though there was a significant difference for "Materialistic/Not Materialistic", the means indicate that all groups were on the affirmative end of the spectrum rather than the negative: American Abroad,  $M = 1.76$ ; Psychology Undergraduate,  $M = 1.38$ ; Tunisian,  $M = 2.80$ , ( $F(2, 61) = 7.462$ ,  $p = .001$ ). A second significant finding from the pop culture semantic differential questions was that of 'Accurate/Not Accurate' ( $F(2, 62) = 12.779$ ,  $p = .000$ ). For this characteristic, the groups fell into the American vs. Tunisian pattern. Both American groups clustered

around the negative end of the spectrum (American Abroad = 5.29; Psychology Undergraduate = 5.03) while the Tunisians were toward the middle of the spectrum but still on the affirmative ( $M = 3.00$ ). Finally, the pattern reappears when both groups of American students differed from Tunisians regarding the impact of movies ( $F(2, 59) = 11.272, p = .000$ ), television ( $F(2, 61) = 10.124, p = .000$ ), and music ( $F(2, 61) = 7.038, p = .002$ ). For all three, both American groups hovered around 'Neutral' with the American Abroad group heading toward disagreement on the impact of television. In contrast, the Tunisian students clustered around agreement; they, the foreign individuals in this study, have more faith in these mediums' impact on *their* attitudes.

## DISCUSSION

In looking at the attitudes of three groups of students toward the United States, one group of Tunisian students, and two groups of American students with presumed differing levels of foreign policy knowledge, this study found that though there were some students with ambivalent attitudes, they were not necessarily a result of group membership. Group scores were not statistically significant from each other. This study predicted significant differences based on group membership. Groups' sociocultural differences were hypothesized to have an impact on group members' favorable or unfavorable view of American foreign policy and popular culture. Open ended questions asking respondents to list what characteristics of the United States informed the positive and negative aspects of their attitude show that affect toward the United States was not due to the tension between surveyed individuals' attitudes toward

foreign policy and their attitude toward popular culture. A wide range of attitudes based on an equally wide range of qualities and traits associated with the United States characterized the results of this study. However, foreign policy was the most consistent response offered by participants, regardless of membership, when citing America's most negative aspect. Popular culture was rarely mentioned in either a positive or negative connotation.

**America the Construct –  
Foreign Policy and Popular Culture, Foreign Policy vs. Popular Culture, or Neither**

The role of foreign policy in the America construct

If we are using the Tunisians as a proxy for the international Muslim community, the preceding suggests that America's image at the end of the Bush administration was indeed tarnished. Overall, America's foreign policies are a significant source, if not the primary source, of discontent and disenchantment. However, looking at the most heterogeneous group of respondents, the Psychology Undergraduate group, we can see that the disillusionment is not unique to Tunisians. The survey results suggest that to differing degrees, Americans (regardless of foreign policy knowledge) and Tunisians agree that the Bush White House's foreign policy was flawed. This is important for two reasons. First, respondents appear to agree that the policies were not necessarily permanent. A change in administration particularly that of the then current Republican one to a Democratic administration may precipitate change toward a universally acceptable foreign policy. Over half of each group's respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement 'If a Democrat wins in the 2008 presidential election, the

foreign policy of the United States will improve.’ Only 20.7% of the Psychology Undergraduates and 19.2% of the American Abroad group agreed with the statement “If a Republican wins in the 2008 presidential election, the foreign policy of the United States will improve.” None of the Tunisian students agreed with this statement. The correlation between politician favorability and positive affect toward the United States suggest that even Tunisians can envision a different foreign policy path. The subsequent positive response of Muslims around the world to the election of Barack Obama somewhat confirms this result. Candidate Obama’s campaign promises of diplomacy and outreach and President Obama’s interview with Al Arabiya (his first major interview as President) was perceived as an olive branch, a sign of respect, and an acknowledgement of the previous administration’s failing in winning the “hearts and minds” of the Muslim world. Second, this result suggests that neither foreign policy nor popular culture is essential to the definition of ‘America’. This runs contrary to the study’s hypothesis. If we were to create a definition of America based on all participants’ responses to the open ended questions, America would be defined by its freedom, equality, and fairness. This is a definition that transcends a given administration’s foreign policy decision. The War on Terror and the Bush Administration was not an undoing of America but rather an episode in America’s (political) history. Americans and Muslims believe in “America” but agree that the Bush Doctrine did not embody its best ideals (Tribune Staff, 2008).

Though the construct of ‘America’ exists regardless of changes in the political, diplomatic, or military climate, the salience of certain aspects of the construct differs based on group membership, specifically, country of origin. Each group sees problems



but they see different problems or they see the same problems but to varying degrees of importance and urgency. This is especially true when we compare the issues of importance to the American groups of students to those that were important for the Tunisians students. While the American students mentioned issues such as the economy or even niche social issues (race, gender, etc.) alongside foreign policy concerns, *the* source of the Tunisians' discontent with the United States is the nation's foreign policy. The negative scores used to calculate the Tunisian's ambivalence revealed that the negatives were more negative than the positives were positive and those negatives were predominately criticisms of America's actions in the Middle East. In some ways, this reflects the disparity between Tunisians as the receivers of foreign policy and the American groups who are not so much exporters but rather uninvolved with foreign policy. Americans are immune to its immediate effects. The responses of the American students show that they are also, if not equally, concerned with domestic issues as well as foreign policy issues (though, the only specific foreign policy issues that is explicitly mentioned is that of the War in Iraq). For the Tunisians and other members of the Muslim world community, the actions of the United States begin as foreign policy but the consequences are domestic. This may explain the prominence of the issue for the Tunisian students.

### The Irrelevance of Popular Culture

While America's foreign policy is of extreme importance, particularly to those outside of the United States, the popular culture is of less than hypothesized importance

to the construct of “America.” It appears to be secondary and possibly disposable. This may be due to the fact that pop culture is not as immediately threatening as foreign policy. In terms of the present study, this could also be due to the surveyed population, a group from a secular Muslim country. American entertainment was not viewed by this group to be as offensive as prior surveys in the Muslim world have suggested. In fact, Tunisians expressed more faith in America’s pop culture’s ability to change foreign attitudes than both American groups. They also expressed more forgiving attitudes toward qualities that were universally seen as negative by both groups of American students. Again, there are issues of quality and even quantity (only 20% of media diet in general is American) of American entertainments received by the Tunisians. A correlation revealed that increased media consumption accompanied a decrease in American favorability for the Tunisian students. This could be a similar phenomenon as the American students (who could be suffering from information overload) namely a diffusion of quality as quantity increases.

Quantity, specifically availability of popular culture increases as America’s influence expands globally. When explicitly presented to respondents as a major influence on what make *America America* the results suggest indifference. However, pop culture appears to be important to the definition of ‘Americanism’. When asked to define this concept, participants in all groups mentioned culture, some explicitly stating pop culture (see Appendix). Also, it is not limited to celebrities but rather encompasses the lifestyle of the proto-typical American:

### Tunisians

- Influence of *culture*, politics, habits
- Is to make a world live as American style of life or [unt]
- *Way of life*, blind capitalism, war
- *Leading to a way of living, thinking and [unt] as an American citizen do*

### American Abroad

- *Culture and perception of Americans spread globally*
- *The spread of our culture mainly through democracy and commerce*
- *Globalization of American culture and ideals*
- *Capitalism, “McWorld”*
- *McDonalds (E.g. chain restaurants – negative because [it] eats away at other cultures)*
- *Consumerism, media consumption, materialism*
- *Globalization...McDonalds effect...*
- *The consumption of American Movies, Music and other entertainment and the creation of governments which support US foreign policy*
- *It's the American culture: television shows, the English language as it is spoken in America, things of that nature.*
- *Anything that has to do with American lifestyles and culture*
- *Buying American items, American media, and political values*
- *Spread of American culture and ideas*
- *American culture, beliefs, etc.*

- The influence of *American culture*, traditions, and customs to other countries; *can be in the form of entertainment*, food, laws, etc...
- *A spread of the culture* and political ways of America
- Applying attitudes, *culture*, values, ideas, business, *entertainment*, (all forms of life) to other societies (replacing their versions of those things)
- Spreading the ideas, beliefs, and *culture of Americans*
- Exaggerated *pop culture*, over use of power

#### Psychology Undergraduates

- Every facet of American *pop culture from music to clothing to materialism* and consumerism in general
- Spreading American superiority, *culture*, news, icons, etc.
- I don't know how to explain it in words really. I guess like our *pop culture*.
- Westernization. Wanting shopping malls. Working more. Becoming money & fashion oriented.
- *Pop culture*; corporations like McDonald's in other nations
- *Culture – pop [culture]*. Fame, fast food cheap products but lots of them
- Food chains and store chains in strip malls in suburbs. Very bland – knowing exactly what you want and where to get it with ease.

The above suggests that pop culture is not something that American *is* but rather, something that America (or her citizens) does. It is interesting that it would appear in response to a definition of “Americanism” seeing as foreign policy is also action oriented. Perhaps the difference lies in the relatively intangible nature of popular culture when

compared to foreign policy. Foreign policy, especially as embodied by the war in Iraq, is boots on the ground, the wounding and killing of family and neighbors, and the impacts of living in a nation at war (e.g., inflation, scarcity of goods). Popular culture on the other hand is not as overtly confrontational. It is not something you see, or even something you realize. It simply happens.

### **Limitations and Future Directions**

It should be noted that the above conclusions are subject to the following limitations.

*Sources of bias.* Though the construct of ‘America’ may not be in flux, the opinion of America changes with shifts in the global sociopolitical climate. Though history is often an issue in survey administration, this project in particular falls victim to a point in time where there were clear divisions between the recent past and the very near future. Administrated during an election year, one in which there was a candidate who appealed to Tunisians because of his personal history (African, Muslim father), party (Democrat), and campaign platform (opposed to the war in Iraq) stood in direct opposition to the Bush administration (perpetrator of the foreign policy transgressions), it is not beyond the realm of belief to believe that administration of the survey at a later date would produce vastly different results. The welcome overtures to the Muslim world community by President Obama may produce an entirely different result altogether. As French President Nicolas Sarkozy said upon President Obama’s selection as this year’s recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, “[President Obama’s selection] confirms finally

America returns to the hearts and minds of the people of the world.” (Davis, 2009).

Another source of bias is that of the respondents – young, educated students. The inclusion of the Psychology Undergraduate students somewhat ameliorates the selection bias for American opinions. They can serve as proxy for the “average” American while the American Abroad students serve as stand-ins for the elites. The Tunisian students, well-read, urban, English speakers are not the average Tunisian (NOTE: upon the conclusion of the survey administration, this was the most vocal criticism of the project from Tunisians). Even with this bias, the information may be useful as elites are the primary decision makers in the Arab world (Sidanius, et al., 2004, p. 414). As Zaharna (2002) points out, the current diplomatic model of American communication with Arab countries is one that occurs behind closed doors with leaders rather than in the sphere of public opinion (§ 12).

*Methodological concerns.* No survey is perfect be it because of the aforementioned history/bias effect or because of its construction. Though this survey can boast a consistency across groups in terms of survey administration, there was an inconsistency based on language fluency (the two American groups are presumably more fluent in English than the Tunisians, impacting both reading, writing, and communicating thoughts). Another methodological issue concerns the measure of ambivalence itself. Though a thoroughly researched measure, its application here to an issue as complex and nuanced as geopolitical sociocultural relations may have missed some of the complexities that lie within the constructs of “foreign policy” and “popular culture”. The survey used in this study did not present the constructs but rather allowed respondents to present their

own criteria, positive and negative, in forming their attitude toward the United States. Future studies may wish to employ a methodology or measure that allows for a more targeted appraisal of the constructs of interest as well as one that triangulates such measure, employing several different methodologies. This should boost both reliability and validity of results.

*Ignorance could be a two way street.* This research project created a scale based on familiarity and favorability of American politicians and celebrities to gauge Tunisians' attitude toward the United States as a function of their recognition and affect. Though the scales showed a significant correlation between attitude toward the United States and favorability with American politicians and familiarity with American celebrities, better exemplars may have yielded results with regard to favorability of American celebrities (and in turn, affect toward American popular culture) and familiarity with American politicians (and in turn awareness of the nuances of American politics including the issues that inform the creation of foreign policy). American participants had lower levels of familiarity with well-known international figures. However some international figures were not contrasted with American or even Western counterparts. For example, soccer star Zinedine Zidane may not be a household name in America but perhaps David Beckham or Pele would have garnered higher levels of recognition. It should also be noted that this survey was administered during the European Cup, a time when soccer was a front page story in Tunisia. This is akin to asking Americans if they recognize Peyton Manning during the week before the Super Bowl. Future surveys may wish to include sports figures that may be celebrities only to Americans such as Brett Favre

(famous for playing a sport that is popular only in the United States) or one who is internationally well known but thoroughly American such as Tiger Woods. The same is true for celebrities such as Mos Def. The inclusion of Mos Def was an attempt to include a famous American Muslim celebrity. Also, rap music is reportedly gaining popularity in the Islamic world because many rappers are devout Muslims and it is the music of protest (Abdel-Alim, 2005, ¶s 5, 13). Mos Def was far more recognizable to the American students. Future incarnations of the survey may wish to include indigenous counterparts – celebrities whose celebrity does not extend beyond their country's borders. However, upon the advice of Dr. Schrader, no Tunisians, politicians, movie stars, or otherwise were included because of the government's notorious suppression of speech. The administrator did not wish to make Tunisians uncomfortable or fearful of reprisal because of their candid responses.

*Opinion about media.* The present survey measured opinion about American media but there were no questions about media in general beyond usage. The press in Tunisia has been called closed and repressive by international monitoring agencies such as Reporters without Borders (2008). It is an open secret that the press is censored. How could this affect the average Tunisian's opinion about media in general? Could this engender more trust of foreign media or would mistrust be directed toward all media?

*Clarification of information sources.* The present survey measured frequency of media use and also quantity and attitudes towards American media but did not measure other sources such as neighboring African and Arab states, Europe, or even Tunisian. Again, in the case of Tunisian sources, questions directly about Tunisia were avoided or



worded very broadly. For Arab, African, and European sources, knowing the prevalence and attitudes (favorable or unfavorable) toward non-Tunisian, non-American media would provide a more complete picture of where Tunisians get their information, further informing why they may or may not hold certain opinions toward the United States. Another aspect of this is measuring the ubiquity of American popular culture both objectively and perceived by participants. This is particularly meaningful in terms of the Tunisian students' belief in the accuracy of American popular culture. The combination of the 'America' seen in the movies and the 'America' seen on CNN and Al Jazeera may at best be inaccurate and at worst radicalizing.

*Individual differences.* One major individual difference for the Tunisian students is language fluency. This is especially impactful on the source and comprehension of American media. As far as demographic information, identifiers beyond group membership (American or Tunisian) were not collected in consideration of the repressive climate of Tunisia; this offered the best layer of protection for the Tunisian respondents. However, the unfortunate result is that the present survey cannot tell what type of Tunisian likes America for its foreign policy, its culture, or both or neither. Or if this "type" exists at all. To maintain consistency across groups, Americans were not asked for demographic information either. This would be revealing for Americans as well as affiliations such as politics, religion, race, or gender which are often telling predictors of ideologies and attitudes.

*Perspective.* This survey was perhaps most adept at revealing the differences in point of view despite each group's profession of shared values. Future surveys may wish to probe all groups' opinion about the nation's foreign policy towards other regions of the world, not just the Middle East. Do Muslims feel targeted? Do Americans see the nuances of foreign policy? This is another area where demographics would have been revealing as a predictor of sentiments toward foreign policy toward other parts of the world.

APPENDIX A  
PARTICIPANT RESPONSES

**APPENDIX**  
**Attitude Survey**  
**Frequency Results**

1. I am one of the following:

TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
24%	36%	40%

2. Please list your familiarity with the following individuals by placing an 'X' in the appropriate column.

**King Abdullah**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>I have heard</b> of this person.....	93.3%	65.4%	51.7%
<b>I have not</b> heard of this person.....	6.7%	30.8%	48.3%
No Response.....	--	3.8%	--

**Bono**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>I have heard</b> of this person.....	40.0%	96.2%	93.1%
<b>I have not</b> heard of this person.....	46.7%	--	6.9%
No Response.....	13.3%	--	--

**George W. Bush**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>I have heard</b> of this person.....	100%	96.2%	100%
<b>I have not</b> heard of this person.....	--	3.8%	--

**Gordon Brown**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>I have heard</b> of this person.....	80.0%	61.5%	27.6%
<b>I have not</b> heard of this person.....	13.3%	38.5%	72.4%
No Response.....	6.7%	--	--

**Mariah Carey**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>I have heard</b> of this person.....	100%	100%	100%
<b>I have not</b> heard of this person.....	--	--	--

**Hillary Clinton**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>I have heard</b> of this person.....	100%	100%	100%
<b>I have not</b> heard of this person.....	--	--	--

**George Clooney**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>I have heard</b> of this person.....	80.0%	100%	100%
<b>I have not</b> heard of this person.....	6.7%	--	--
No Response.....	13.3%	--	--

**Mos Def**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>I have heard</b> of this person.....	33.3%	88.8%	69.0%
<b>I have not</b> heard of this person.....	53.3%	11.5%	31.0%
No Response.....	13.3%	--	--

**Al Gore**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>I have heard</b> of this person.....	80.0%	100%	100%
<b>I have not</b> heard of this person.....	20.0%	--	--

**Muhammad Ali**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>I have heard</b> of this person.....	93.3%	100%	100%
<b>I have not</b> heard of this person.....	6.7%	--	--

**Angelina Jolie**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
I <b>have heard</b> of this person.....	100%	92.3%	100%
I <b>have not</b> heard of this person.....	--	7.7%	--

**Ban Ki-Moon**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
I <b>have heard</b> of this person.....	80.0%	42.3%	32.1%
I <b>have not</b> heard of this person.....	20.0%	53.8%	67.9%
No Response.....	--	3.8%	3.4%

**Dalai Lama**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
I <b>have heard</b> of this person.....	80.0%	100%	100%
I <b>have not</b> heard of this person.....	20.0%	--	--

**John McCain**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
I <b>have heard</b> of this person.....	93.8%	96.2%	100%
I <b>have not</b> heard of this person.....	6.7%	3.8%	--

**King Muhammad VI**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
I <b>have heard</b> of this person.....	100%	57.7%	33.3%
I <b>have not</b> heard of this person.....	--	42.3%	66.7%
No Response.....	--	--	6.9%

**Youssou N'Dour**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
I <b>have heard</b> of this person.....	73.3%	30.8%	17.2%
I <b>have not</b> heard of this person.....	26.7%	65.4%	82.8%

**Barack Obama**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>I have heard</b> of this person.....	100%	100%	100%
<b>I have not</b> heard of this person.....	--	--	--

**Brad Pitt**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>I have heard</b> of this person.....	100%	100%	100%
<b>I have not</b> heard of this person.....	--	--	--

**Nicolas Sarkozy**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>I have heard</b> of this person.....	100%	80.8%	60.7%
<b>I have not</b> heard of this person.....	--	15.4%	39.3%
No Response.....	--	--	3.4%

**Oprah Winfrey**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>I have heard</b> of this person.....	93.3%	100%	100%
<b>I have not</b> heard of this person.....	6.7%	--	--

**Zinedine Zidane**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>I have heard</b> of this person.....	100%	19.2%	42.9%
<b>I have not</b> heard of this person.....	--	76.9%	57.1%
No Response.....	--	3.8%	3.4%

Please give your opinion of the following persons by placing an 'X' in the appropriate column.

### King Abdullah

<i>My opinion of the person is...</i>	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>favorable</b> .....	26.7%	3.8%	7.1%
<b>neutral</b> (neither favorable or unfavorable).....	33.3%	73.1%	89.3%
<b>unfavorable</b> .....	40.0%	11.5%	3.6%
No Response.....	--	11.5%	3.4%

### Bono

<i>My opinion of the person is...</i>	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>favorable</b> .....	33.3%	46.2%	37.9%
<b>neutral</b> (neither favorable or unfavorable).....	46.7%	50.0%	41.4%
<b>unfavorable</b> .....	--	3.8%	20.7%
No Response.....	20.0%	--	--

### George W. Bush

<i>My opinion of the person is...</i>	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>favorable</b> .....	6.7%	15.4%	24.1%
<b>neutral</b> (neither favorable or unfavorable).....	6.7%	11.5%	24.1%
<b>unfavorable</b> .....	80.0%	69.2%	51.7%
No Response.....	6.7%	3.8%	--

### Gordon Brown

<i>My opinion of the person is...</i>	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>favorable</b> .....	6.7%	15.4%	7.7%
<b>neutral</b> (neither favorable or unfavorable).....	66.7%	73.1%	88.5%
<b>unfavorable</b> .....	20.0%	--	3.7%
No Response.....	6.7%	11.5%	10.3%



**Mariah Carey**

<i>My opinion of the person is...</i>	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>favorable</b> .....	6.7%	7.7%	37.9%
<b>neutral</b> (neither favorable or unfavorable).....	80.0%	65.4%	51.7%
<b>unfavorable</b> .....	13.3%	26.9%	10.3%

**Hillary Clinton**

<i>My opinion of the person is...</i>	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>favorable</b> .....	20.0%	34.6%	37.9%
<b>neutral</b> (neither favorable or unfavorable).....	60.0%	26.9%	31.0%
<b>unfavorable</b> .....	13.3%	38.5%	31.0%
No Response.....	6.7%	--	--

**George Clooney**

<i>My opinion of the person is...</i>	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>favorable</b> .....	26.7%	46.2%	62.1%
<b>neutral</b> (neither favorable or unfavorable).....	60.0%	46.2%	31.0%
<b>unfavorable</b> .....	6.7%	7.7%	6.9%
No Response.....	6.7%	--	--

**Mos Def**

<i>My opinion of the person is...</i>	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>favorable</b> .....	6.7%	23.1%	46.4%
<b>neutral</b> (neither favorable or unfavorable).....	73.3%	65.4%	50.0%
<b>unfavorable</b> .....	--	11.5%	3.6%
No Response.....	20.0%	--	3.4%

**Al Gore**

<i>My opinion of the person is...</i>	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>favorable</b> .....	46.7%	46.2%	62.1%
<b>neutral</b> (neither favorable or unfavorable).....	40.0%	38.5%	20.7%
<b>unfavorable</b> .....	13.3%	15.4%	17.2%

**Muhammad Ali**

<i>My opinion of the person is...</i>	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>favorable</b> .....	80.0%	38.5%	75.9%
<b>neutral</b> (neither favorable or unfavorable).....	13.3%	57.7%	20.7%
<b>unfavorable</b> .....	6.7%	3.8%	3.4%
No Response.....	--	--	--

**Angelina Jolie**

<i>My opinion of the person is...</i>	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>favorable</b> .....	46.7%	38.5%	58.6%
<b>neutral</b> (neither favorable or unfavorable).....	53.3%	50.0%	20.7%
<b>unfavorable</b> .....	--	11.5%	20.7%
No Response.....	--	--	--

**Ban Ki-Moon**

<i>My opinion of the person is...</i>	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>favorable</b> .....	20.0%	23.1%	8.3%
<b>neutral</b> (neither favorable or unfavorable).....	53.3%	61.5%	83.3%
<b>unfavorable</b> .....	26.7%	--	8.3%
No Response.....	--	15.4%	17.2%

**Dalai Lama**

<i>My opinion of the person is...</i>	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>favorable</b> .....	40.0%	84.6%	82.8%
<b>neutral</b> (neither favorable or unfavorable).....	40.0%	11.5%	13.8%
<b>unfavorable</b> .....	13.3%	--	3.4%
No Response.....	6.7%	3.8%	--

**John McCain**

<i>My opinion of the person is...</i>	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>favorable</b> .....	13.3%	34.6%	34.5%
<b>neutral</b> (neither favorable or unfavorable).....	20.0%	34.6%	37.9%
<b>unfavorable</b> .....	53.3%	30.8%	27.6%
No Response.....	13.3%	--	--

**King Muhammad VI**

<i>My opinion of the person is...</i>	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>favorable</b> .....	40.0%	3.8%	3.4%
<b>neutral</b> (neither favorable or unfavorable).....	33.3%	80.8%	82.8%
<b>unfavorable</b> .....	20.0%	--	3.4%
No Response.....	6.7%	15.4%	10.3%

**Youssou N'Dour**

<i>My opinion of the person is...</i>	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>favorable</b> .....	53.3%	--	79.3%
<b>neutral</b> (neither favorable or unfavorable).....	33.3%	80.8%	6.9%
<b>unfavorable</b> .....	--	19.2%	86.2%
No Response.....	13.3%	--	13.8%

**Barack Obama**

<i>My opinion of the person is...</i>	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>favorable</b> .....	60.0%	76.9%	72.4%
<b>neutral</b> (neither favorable or unfavorable).....	20.0%	7.7%	17.2%
<b>unfavorable</b> .....	13.3%	15.4%	10.3%
No Response.....	6.7%	--	--

**Brad Pitt**

<i>My opinion of the person is...</i>	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>favorable</b> .....	46.7%	42.3%	58.6%
<b>neutral</b> (neither favorable or unfavorable).....	53.3%	46.2%	31.0%
<b>unfavorable</b> .....	--	7.7%	6.9%
No Response.....	--	3.8%	3.4%

**Nicolas Sarkozy**

<i>My opinion of the person is...</i>	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>favorable</b> .....	40.0%	23.1%	27.6%
<b>neutral</b> (neither favorable or unfavorable).....	13.3%	46.2%	58.6%
<b>unfavorable</b> .....	46.7%	23.1%	3.4%
No Response.....	--	7.7%	10.3%

**Oprah Winfrey**

<i>My opinion of the person is...</i>	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>favorable</b> .....	33.3%	26.9%	58.6%
<b>neutral</b> (neither favorable or unfavorable).....	60.0%	50.0%	27.6%
<b>unfavorable</b> .....	6.7%	19.2%	13.8%
No Response.....	--	3.8%	--

**Zinedine Zidane**

<i>My opinion of the person is...</i>	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
<b>favorable</b> .....	53.3%	11.5%	34.5%
<b>neutral</b> (neither favorable or unfavorable).....	46.7%	65.4%	55.2%
<b>unfavorable</b> .....	--	3.8%	3.4%
No Response.....	--	19.2%	6.9%

4. Please describe how often you engage in the following activities (check one response for each activity).

**Read the newspaper**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Daily.....	40.0%	26.9%	6.9%
3 to 5 times a week.....	40.0%	38.5%	17.2%
1 to 2 times a week.....	13.3%	15.4%	24.1%
Less than once a week.....	6.7%	19.2%	44.8%
Never.....	--	--	6.9%

**Watch television (news)**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Daily.....	93.3%	26.9%	24.1%
3 to 5 times a week.....	--	42.3%	27.6%
1 to 2 times a week.....	--	15.4%	24.1%
Less than once a week.....	6.7%	11.5%	20.7%
Never.....	--	3.8%	3.4%

**Watch television (entertainment)**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Daily.....	60.0%	26.9%	34.5%
3 to 5 times a week.....	26.7%	34.6%	34.5%
1 to 2 times a week.....	13.3%	26.9%	17.2%
Less than once a week.....	--	11.5%	6.9%
Never.....	--	--	6.9%

**Listen to the radio (news)**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Daily.....	53.3%	23.1%	3.4%
3 to 5 times a week.....	6.7%	19.2%	3.4%
1 to 2 times a week.....	13.3%	19.2%	13.8%
Less than once a week.....	26.7%	23.1%	37.9%
Never.....	--	15.4%	41.4%

**Listen to the radio (entertainment)**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Daily.....	33.3%	23.1%	24.1%
3 to 5 times a week.....	13.3%	23.1%	13.8%
1 to 2 times a week.....	26.7%	26.9%	13.8%
Less than once a week.....	13.3%	3.8%	31.0%
Never.....	13.3%	23.1%	17.2%

**Surf the web (news)**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Daily.....	80.0%	69.2%	55.2%
3 to 5 times a week.....	6.7%	19.2%	20.7%
1 to 2 times a week.....	--	7.7%	17.2%
Less than once a week.....	6.7%	3.8%	6.9%
Never.....	6.7%	--	--

**Surf the web (entertainment)**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Daily.....	66.7%	61.5%	82.8%
3 to 5 times a week.....	13.3%	19.2%	10.3%
1 to 2 times a week.....	--	19.2%	--
Less than once a week.....	16.3%	--	6.9%
Never.....	6.7%	--	--

**Watch movies**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Daily.....	26.7%	3.8%	13.8%
3 to 5 times a week.....	46.7%	3.8%	10.3%
1 to 2 times a week.....	26.7%	53.8%	27.6%
Less than once a week.....	--	38.5%	48.3%
Never.....	--	--	--

5. Approximately what percent of your newspaper, television, and radio, internet and movie consumption is American (please circle one)?

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
80 to 100 percent.....	6.7%	73.1%	65.5%
60 to 80 percent.....	13.3%	15.4%	27.6%
Approximately 50 percent..	13.3%	3.8%	3.4%
30 to 50 percent.....	26.7%	3.8%	3.4%
10 to 30 percent.....	20.0%	--	--
0 to 10 percent.....	20.0%	--	--
No Response.....	--	3.8%	--

6. Have you ever visited the United States (please circle one)?

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Yes.....	--	Not	Not
No.....	100%	Applicable	Applicable

7. If you have not visited the United States, would you like to visit in the future (please circle one)?

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Yes.....	100%	Not	Not
No.....	--	Applicable	Applicable

8. Do you have close friends or relatives in the United States (please circle one)?

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Yes.....	60.0%	Not	Not
No.....	40.0%	Applicable	Applicable

9. How often do you speak to these close friends or relatives in the United States (phone, email, text message, etc.) (please circle one)?

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Frequently.....	40.0%		
Sometimes.....	26.7%	Not	Not
Never.....	--	Applicable	Applicable
I do not have friends or relatives in the U.S.....	33.3%		

10. What is your overall attitude toward the United States (Please circle one)?

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Very Positive.....	6.7%	15.4%	13.8%
Positive.....	33.3%	57.7%	58.6%
Neither Positive or Negative.....	20.0%	11.5%	20.7%
Negative.....	26.7%	11.5%	3.4%
Very Negative.....	6.7%	--	3.4%
No Response.....	6.7%	3.8%	--



11. When considering the positive qualities of the United States, what did you consider?

#### TUNISIAN

- The people attitudes, the life there, the support of the government
- Society, education
- Democracy, freedom of speech
- The cooperation with indigenous Arab countries. The production of cinema movies.
- A very rich history and a key role played in the building of the nowadays world
- American dreams of being more powerful country
- Opportunity for doing business
- American people
- Freedom of speech and the right to privacy are the most important things in the U.S. also democracy and citizenship principle
- Political people involvement/organizations involvement in world conflicts
- Could be better if the political regime changes
- Helping poor people/[humanitarian] intervention

#### AMERICAN ABROAD

- Our rights/liberties compared with those who have few
- No official religion
- The people and the overall government
- Daily life, rights, education
- It is a good country to live in because I feel like I have strong rights that are not found in many other countries around the world
- Freedom, advantages, stability, economy
- “fairly” progressive in terms of equality
- the freedom and opportunities that it provides
- liberties, economy, culture
- overall, the USA as an entity
- the people’s outlook, the youth in America’s willingness to make a difference, level of education, Freedom, Democracy, Protection of civil liberties
- history of democracy promotion and humanitarian efforts
- the government and way of life
- education
- freedom, democracy
- standard of living, human rights, equality, democracy
- Democracy, liberties that other countries do not exercise
- The rights and freedoms awarded to us and the general countryside and people
- People, entertainment (sports, movies, etc.), opportunities, humanitarian work (volunteer, relief, [unt], etc.), variety of people, geography, cultures
- Freedom, opportunity, rights (protection)
- Personal freedoms
- Economy in a global sense, diversity, freedoms of democracy

PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRAD

- The government, our view, by other countries, the economy, our politicians, unemployment.
- Patriotism, values of people, government
- America has lost all respect from me as a country. Middle-class people are suffering and no one cares.
- My life & freedom/opportunities
- Cutting edge social & scientific progress, openmindedness, strength, ingenuity, ambition, diversity
- The opportunities
- How the gov't treats its people.
- Everybody can become educated and useful if they are willing to work hard
- My home, where I grew up. The freedom we have here.
- Pretty landscapes
- The freedom I have to make choices & the people.
- Court system, freedom of religion, speech
- Decent education if you're willing to pay, some human rights
- The recent election. The new direction the country is heading in.
- It's a free country, the land or opportunity. I didn't give it very positive because of some of the political decisions we have made when George W. Bush was president.
- Democracy, freedom, judicial system, free elections, freedom of speech, bill of rights
- Black president, freedom of speech, liberty
- Job opportunities. Better living. Better health care. Technology
- Independence, equality, moral righteousness
- Our freedoms that we have, how we are for the most part stable and our power
- The people. It's standard of living
- Democracy
- Government, politics, my life/lifestyle
- Our attitudes are becoming more open (we now have a black president)
- How they support citizens of the U.S. how they support other countries, the war we are involved in
- Capitalism, free-speech
- Desire for freedom, for democracy, place for diversity, anyone can make it – "American Dream"
- Some of the laws, racial diversity, freedoms & opportunities that aren't available to people in other countries
- The way the people I know and have encountered act towards each other and the opportunities these people are presented with

12. Considering only the **positive** qualities of your attitude toward the United States and ignoring the negative qualities, how positive is your evaluation (please circle one)?

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Slightly Positive.....	33.3%	19.2%	20.7%
Very Positive.....	46.7%	53.8%	51.7%
Extremely Positive.....	6.7%	23.1%	27.6%
No Response.....	13.3%	3.8%	--

13. Of the positive qualities you listed in Question 11, what is the most important?

TUNISIAN

- The people's attitudes
- Education
- Democracy
- The cooperation and partnership with Arab countries
- Rich history
- Power
- Freedom of speech
- Organization involvement
- Cultural variety open

AMERICAN ABROAD

- civil rights of minorities
- life there, the support of the government
- the people
- human rights
- rights as women
- freedom
- foreign policy, environmental disconcern (with foreign policy: war, economic sanctions, etc.)
- freedom
- liberties / freedoms
- freedom to disagree
- Freedom/Democratic
- Humanitarian efforts
- The government
- Education
- Freedom
- Human rights
- Liberties
- Rights
- Variety of people, geography, culture, opportunities
- Freedom & opportunity
- Freedoms of democracy

PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRAD

- Our freedom
- Togetherness as a country
- Can't find anything positive.
- Freedom?
  - Freedom/opportunities
  - Ingenuity
  - Education
  - Opportunity to succeed
  - Freedom
  - All
  - My freedom
  - Freedom of religion, speech
  - Human rights
  - Results of recent election
  - Land of opportunity
  - Democracy
  - Freedom of speech
- Life style
- Independence (Freedom)
- Freedom
- Standard of living
- Freedom & equality
- My life/freedom
- Our individuality
- That they provide/look out for their citizens
- They are both sort of one in the same
- Anyone has the chance to do anything
- Freedom
- The opportunities this country offers.

14. When considering the negative qualities of the United States, what did you consider?

TUNISIAN

- The racism, crimes...
- U.S. Foreign policy
- The unilateralism which shifts sometimes to arrogance
- The support of Israel, and the War against Iraq
- Poor education, little knowledge about the outside world, news and history
- Good country
- Politics
- The involvement of big corporations in the U.S. foreign policy, and the Bush administration
- Military involvement/political pressure/not being neutral concerning some conflicts/lobbying/economic pressure
- US policy
- Interfering in other 'countries' affairs

### AMERICAN ABROAD

- The lack of public [unt], the mistakes of government
- Current administration and some peoples' attitudes
- Conflict resolution, corruption, agendas
- U.S. foreign policy and the current war on terror (and how it is being conducted – e.g. Guantanamo)
- Crime
- Foreign policy
- The relations with other countries (NOTE: 'people' was crossed out), policys toward the environment
- Healthcare, politics
- The points on which I disagree
- Ignorance (lack of knowledge outside the U.S.) a slight level of cultural insensitivity
- Exploitation of poor [unt], illegal war, human rights abuse
- Politicians and bad policies and decisions made at home and abroad
- Economy, political system, violence
- Americans are very ignorant
- Foreign policy!
- The negative effect of media and the general misunderstanding America has of other countries
- Selfish foreign policy, focus on money/business above others, individualistic society
- Taking advantage of legal protection (law suits), polarity of politics, racism
- Close-mindedness, number of poorly educated

### PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRAD

- Our politicians, oversight, unemployment
- Economic standing, values of people and their current state of mind.
- The horrible economy, pointless war in the Middle East, taxes.
- Backwater hick America. Bible belt rednecks. Neo-conservatives, televangelists, religious fundamentalists, dogmatist, radical conservatives, "Christian" right, abstinence only education
- A lot of things
- Too much gov't, poverty, friendliness of people I've encountered
- Too much social regulation
- We get into too many foreign problems
- We love money too much
- Political corruption. Too money oriented.
- Hypocritical, racism, biases
- Our interference w/ other countries, we tend to get power hungry
- Politics. The country is somewhat a bully to other nations.
- Brutal torture techniques, controlling the world with military power
- Poverty & Racism
- Our debt, how we are perceived by other nations
- The economy, the loss of jobs/unemployed, the war
- Capitalisms, free-speech
- Inflated views of superiority/arrogance. Closed mindedness to certain cultures, puritan-based view of sexuality that

- Crime & violence
  - Differences between minority & majority groups
  - Pretty much everything
  - War in Iraq, lack of political will in Washington DC
  - War in Iraq, alliance with Israel
  - High cost of private education
  - We're a bully, economy, cocky, Bush, the war
- does not allow for the true appreciation of the human body & human sexuality
  - I mostly think of U.S. interference in foreign affairs
  - The state of the economy, our military aggressiveness

15. Now, considering only the **negative** qualities of your attitude toward the United States and ignoring the positive qualities, how negative is your evaluation (please circle one)?

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Slightly Negative.....	26.7%	42.3%	41.4%
Very Negative.....	26.7%	30.8%	34.5%
Extremely Negative.....	33.3%	15.4%	24.1%
No Response.....	13.3%	11.5%	--

16. Of the negative qualities you listed in Question 14, what is the most important?

TUNISIAN

- Racism
  - US Foreign policy
  - The arrogance
  - American support to Israel
  - Ignorance of history and concerns of other nations
- Conservative administrations
  - The influence of big corporations in U.S. policy
  - Political pressure
  - Attitude toward Arabs
  - War everywhere

### AMERICAN ABROAD

- Lack of public healthcare
- life there, the support of the government
- current administration
- corruption
- Guantanamo
- Vast consumerism, individualism
- Relations with other countries
- Health care
- Arguments against women's rights/abortion; liberal policies toward illegals, racial tensions.
- Insensitivity
- Human rights abuses
- Poor policy decisions abroad
- Violence
- Foreign policy
- Misunderstanding
- Focus on money above others
- Close-mindedness

### PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRAD

- Politicians
- Economics
- The economy
- Neo-conservatives/"Christian" right
- Public [unt]
- Current political standings
- Rules regarding nightlife before age of 21
- Foreign affairs
- All
- Violence
- Differences in social classes
- Fairness & openness of gov.
- Lack of political will
- The money we send to Israel, even though we're way over budget as a country
- Not many people really think individually in a democracy
- The war
- Politics
- Hypocritical
- Interfering w/ other countries too much
- Military threats
- Our economy
- The economy/loss of jobs
- Arrogance
- The foreign policy of the military

17. 'Americanism' is spreading around the world (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	40.0%	11.5%	17.2%
Agree.....	40.0%	61.5%	62.4%
Neutral.....	6.7%	11.5%	6.9%
Disagree.....	13.3%	11.5%	6.9%
Strongly Disagree.....	--	--	6.9%
No Response.....	--	3.8%	--

18. The spreading of 'Americanism' around the world is a good thing (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	6.7%	--	--
Agree.....	20.0%	15.4%	17.2%
Neutral.....	20.0%	34.6%	44.8%
Disagree.....	33.3%	34.6%	34.5%
Strongly Disagree.....	20.0%	7.7%	3.4%
No Response.....	--	7.7%	--

19. Please define 'Americanism' as it means to you:

#### TUNISIAN

- Americanism is a phenomenon that means that America influence many countries in all the [fields] of life
- The American unilateralism, interventionism
- Influence of culture, politics, habits
- Americanism is the range of values belonging to America that influence other nations around the world
- Americanism is the adoption of the "One" model which means the "One" idea and the "One" culture and obviously it's a bad thing
- Is to make a world live as American style of life or [unt]
- Let him work let him do
- Way of life, blind capitalism, war
- It means the principle on which the U.S. was created as the freedom and activism
- Leading to a way of living, thinking and [unt] as an American citizen do  
Trying to spread the American principles and ideas everywhere



### AMERICAN ABROAD

- Culture and perception of Americans spread globally
- The spread of our culture mainly through democracy and commerce
- Globalization of American culture and ideals
- Capitalism, “McWorld”
- McDonalds (E.g. chain restaurants – negative because [it] eats away at other cultures)
- Consumerism, media consumption, materialism
- Globalization...McDonalds effect...
- I think it’s a silly term → truthfully meaningless and frequently overused and overplayed
- The consumption of American Movies, Music and other entertainment and the creation of governments which support US foreign policy
- It’s the American culture: television shows, the English language as it is spoken in America, things of that nature.
- Anything that has to do with American lifestyles and culture
- Buying American items, American media, and political values
- Spread of American culture and ideas
- American culture, beliefs, etc.
- The influence of American culture, traditions, and customs to other countries; can be in the form of entertainment, food, laws, etc...
- A spread of the culture and political ways of America
- Applying attitudes, culture, values, ideas, business, entertainment, (all forms of life) to other societies (replacing their versions of those things)
- Spreading the ideas, beliefs, and culture of Americans
- Exaggerated pop culture, over use of power
- Fast-paced, unhealthy living, capitalistic society

### PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRAD

- The understanding that freedom and liberty are paramount and should be enforced.
- Certain values we hold as a country whether negative or positive they are normally a general consensus
- Sharing Western ideals (beliefs, religion, values & customs) with the rest of the world.
- Consumerism & capitalism
- Every facet of American pop culture from music to clothing to materialism and consumerism in general
- Spreading American superiority, culture, news, icons, etc.
- Globalization of American ideals
- Having strong pride in America, Believing we are the best
- Westernization. Wanting shopping malls. Working more. Becoming money & fashion oriented.
- Pop culture; corporations like McDonald’s in other nations
- The freedoms we possess.
- It is similar to westernization but has a negative connotation. It is American imperialism
- Consumerism, capitalism
- Our way of life, individuality, industrialization
- Having a capitalistic economy, a democratic government. Ideals based on

- Aspects of American culture specific to its people
  - Making other countrys act the way we do. Forcing them to change to fit us; Intentionally or not
  - Western idealism, capitalism, democracy
  - Anything pertaining to American culture
  - Spread of west ideas. Democracy.
  - American attitude – apathy
  - ‘Americanism’ puts a priority on freedom of the individual and freedom to pick leaders. It also is a consumer based society
  - I don’t know how to explain it in words really. I guess like our pop culture.
  - Democracy, capitalism, everyone helping each other out. This comes with not many great individuals but a majority rule. Generalizations
- the individual and basically becoming materialistic
  - Culture – pop cuture. Fame, fast food cheap products but lots of them
  - Belief in freedom & rights for those who not only were born on American soil but wish to align themselves with American ideals
  - To me Americanism is qualities that associate with the U.S., having similar priorities and judgments. I thin kits pretty much imitating consumerism of the U.S.
  - Food chains and store chains in strip malls in suburbs. Very bland – knowing exactly what you want and where to get it with ease.
  -

20. American has earned its position in the world through hard work and playing by the rules (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	13.3%	7.7%	3.4%
Agree.....	40.0%	15.4%	13.8%
Neutral.....	20.0%	19.2%	37.9%
Disagree.....	13.3%	146.2	41.4%
Strongly Disagree.....	13.3%	7.7%	3.4%
No Response.....	--	3.8%	--

21. What do you think is the overall view of the United States held by the average Tunisian (please circle one)?

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Very Positive.....	--	--	--
Positive.....	33.3%	42.3%	3.4%
Neither Positive or Negative.....	20.0%	26.9%	37.9%
Negative.....	33.3%	26.9%	44.8%
Very Negative.....	--	--	3.4%
No Response.....	13.3%	3.8%	10.3%

22. America and Tunisia have good diplomatic relations (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	40.0%	--	--
Agree.....	40.0%	69.2%	--
Neutral.....	20.0%	23.1%	72.4%
Disagree.....	--	--	17.2%
Strongly Disagree.....	--	--	--
No Response.....	--	7.7%	10.3%

23. The political and diplomatic relationship between the American and Tunisian governments is better than the relationship between America and other Muslim nations (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	33.3%	11.5%	3.4%
Agree.....	20.0%	57.7%	31.0%
Neutral.....	20.0%	19.2%	51.7%
Disagree.....	26.7%	3.8%	3.4%
Strongly Disagree.....	--	--	--
No Response.....	--	7.7%	10.3%

24. The relationship between America and other Muslim nations unfairly favors America's interests (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	26.7%	11.5%	6.9%
Agree.....	46.7%	26.9%	48.3%
Neutral.....	20.0%	34.6%	24.1%
Disagree.....	6.7%	15.4%	20.7%
Strongly Disagree.....	--	3.8%	--
No Response.....	--	7.7%	--

25. What do you think is the overall view of the United States held by Muslim nations (please circle one)?

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Very Positive.....	6.7%	--	--
Positive.....	--	3.8%	3.4%
Neutral.....	6.7%	11.5%	17.2%
Negative.....	60.0%	53.8%	51.7%
Very Negative.....	20.0%	30.8%	27.6%
No Response.....	6.7%	--	--

26. Please indicate how many Americans have a **positive** view of Islam

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Most if not all.....	6.7%	--	3.4%
Approximately half of all Americans.....	6.7%	19.2%	34.5%
Less than half of all Americans.....	33.3%	69.2%	51.7%
Americans do not have a positive view of Islam	53.3%	11.5%	10.3%

27. Please indicate how many Americans have an **accurate** view of Islam

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Most if not all.....	6.7%	--	
Approximately half of all Americans.....	20.0%	7.7%	6.9%
Less than half of all Americans.....	33.3%	65.4%	65.5%
Americans do not have a positive view of Islam	20.0%	26.9%	24.1%
No Response.....	20.0%	--	--

28. The United States is at war with the Muslim world (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	20.0%	3.8%	6.9%
Agree.....	20.0%	11.5%	20.7%
Neutral.....	20.0%	15.4%	20.7%
Disagree.....	33.3%	34.6%	37.9%
Strongly Disagree.....	6.7%	30.8%	13.8%
No Response.....	--	3.8%	--

29. I feel connected to Muslims in the United States the same way that I feel connected to Muslims around the world

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	20.0%		3.4%
Agree.....	33.3%		6.9%
Neutral.....	26.7%		31.0%
Disagree.....	--		51.7%
Strongly Disagree.....	13.3%		--
No Response.....	6.7%		--

30. I feel that deep down, Americans and Muslims share similar core values.

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	--	26.9%	20.7%
Agree.....	53.3%	46.2%	31.0%
Neutral.....	33.3%	15.4%	24.1%
Disagree.....	--	7.7%	20.7%
Strongly Disagree.....	6.7%	--	3.4%
No Response.....	6.7%	3.8%	--

31. The military actions of the United States have contributed to instability in the Middle East (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	40.0%	23.1%	34.5%
Agree.....	26.7%	50.0%	48.3%
Neutral.....	13.3%	7.7%	6.9%
Disagree.....	6.7%	19.2%	10.3%
Strongly Disagree.....	6.7%	--	--
No Response.....	6.7%	--	--

32. The diplomatic actions of the United States have contributed to instability in the Middle East (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	46.7%	15.4%	10.3%
Agree.....	13.3%	46.2%	62.1%
Neutral.....	13.3%	3.8%	17.2%
Disagree.....	20.0%	26.9%	10.3%
Strongly Disagree.....	6.7%	--	--
No Response.....	--	7.7%	--

33. The current United States' foreign policy in the Middle East does not respect international goals or rules of conduct (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	33.3%	15.4%	20.7%
Agree.....	40.0%	50.0%	31.0%
Neutral.....	6.7%	11.5%	31.0%
Disagree.....	20.0%	38.5%	17.2%
Strongly Disagree.....	--	19.2%	--

34. America communicates with Muslim nations with the same respect and consideration with which it communicates with non-Muslim nations (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	6.7%	--	--
Agree.....	13.3%	11.5%	17.2%
Neutral.....	26.7%	23.8%	27.6%
Disagree.....	20.0%	38.5%	44.8%
Strongly Disagree.....	33.3%	19.2%	6.9%
No Response.....	--	7.7%	3.4%

35. The United States favors Israel over all other nations in the Middle East (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	53.3%	19.2%	31.0%
Agree.....	33.3%	46.2%	27.6%
Neutral.....	6.7%	11.5%	37.9%
Disagree.....	6.7%	15.4%	--
Strongly Disagree.....	--	--	--
No Response.....	--	7.7%	3.4%

36. The United States' recent actions in the Middle East are an attempt to control the region's resources, particularly its oil (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	53.3%	15.4%	17.2%
Agree.....	26.7%	42.3%	62.1%
Neutral.....	20.0%	15.4%	10.3%
Disagree.....	--	15.4%	10.3%
Strongly Disagree.....	--	3.8%	--
No Response.....	--	7.7%	--

37. The United States' is responsible for most of the world's problems (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	20.0%	3.8%	3.4%
Agree.....	33.3%	3.8%	13.8%
Neutral.....	33.3%	15.4%	17.2%
Disagree.....	6.7%	50.0%	48.3%
Strongly Disagree.....	6.7%	23.1%	13.8%
No Response.....	--	3.8%	3.4%

38. The United States lives up to its own ideals of democracy (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	20.0%	--	3.4%
Agree.....	33.3%	38.5%	34.5%
Neutral.....	40.0%	11.5%	31.0%
Disagree.....	--	34.6%	27.6%
Strongly Disagree.....	--	11.5%	3.4%
No Response.....	--	3.8%	--



39. I agree with the United States' actions in the War on Terror (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	6.7%	7.7%	--
Agree.....	--	3.8%	--
Neutral.....	33.3%	15.4%	37.9%
Disagree.....	33.3%	38.5%	41.4%
Strongly Disagree.....	26.7%	34.6%	20.7%

40. The foreign policy of current U.S. president George W. Bush has been bad for America's image abroad (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	80.0%	53.8%	51.7%
Agree.....	6.7%	34.6%	41.4%
Neutral.....	13.3%	--	3.4%
Disagree.....	--	3.8%	3.4%
Strongly Disagree.....	--	7.7%	--

41. If a **Democrat** (Barack Obama or Hillary Clinton) wins in the 2008 U.S. presidential election, the foreign policy of the United States will improve (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	26.7%	11.5%	13.8%
Agree.....	40.0%	42.3%	48.3%
Neutral.....	26.7%	23.1%	24.1%
Disagree.....	6.7%	11.5%	13.8%
Strongly Disagree.....	--	11.5%	--

42. If a **Republican** (John McCain) wins in the 2008 presidential election, the foreign policy of the United States will improve (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	--	--	--
Agree.....	--	19.2%	20.7%
Neutral.....	33.3%	38.5%	31.0%
Disagree.....	20.0%	30.8%	44.8%
Strongly Disagree.....	46.7%	11.5%	3.4%

43. American foreign policy encourages the spread of democracy and the American way of life around the world (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	13.3%	7.7%	17.2%
Agree.....	33.3%	53.8%	48.3%
Neutral.....	13.3%	11.5%	34.5%
Disagree.....	20.0%	15.4%	--
Strongly Disagree.....	20.0%	--	--
No Response.....	--	11.5%	--

The following questions (44 thru 58) present different words and phrases. For each question, please place an 'X' next to how well you think each word describes U.S. foreign policy.

44. U.S. foreign policy is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Democratic	(1)	13.3%	3.8%	6.9%
	(2)	--	26.9%	37.9%
	(3)	20.0%	42.3%	20.7%
	(4)	6.7%	3.8%	13.8%
	(5)	26.7%	11.5%	6.9%
	(6)	6.7%	7.7%	6.9%
Not Democratic	(7)	20.0%	3.8%	--
No Response		6.7%	--	6.9%

45. U.S. foreign policy is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Arbitrary	(1)	13.3%	3.8%	--
	(2)	33.3%	3.8%	6.9%
↑	(3)	6.7%	15.4%	20.7%
	(4)	6.7%	38.5%	55.2%
↓	(5)	6.7%	3.8%	10.3%
	(6)	6.7%	26.9%	--
Not Arbitrary	(7)	20.0%	3.8%	3.4%
No Response		6.7%	--	3.4%

46. U.S. foreign policy is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Engaging	(1)	20.0%	11.5%	13.8%
	(2)	6.7%	19.2%	27.6%
↑	(3)	6.7%	34.6%	20.7%
	(4)	20.0%	23.1%	24.1%
↓	(5)	6.7%	3.8%	6.9%
	(6)	13.3%	--	6.9%
Not Engaging	(7)	6.7%	3.8%	--
No Response		20.0%	3.8%	--

47. U.S. foreign policy is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Invasive	(1)	40.0%	30.8%	24.1%
	(2)	6.7%	34.6%	27.6%
↑	(3)	20.0%	23.1%	41.4%
	(4)	13.3%	7.7%	3.4%
↓	(5)	6.7%	3.8%	3.4%
	(6)	--	--	--
Not Invasive	(7)	--	--	--
No Response		6.7%	--	--

48. U.S. foreign policy is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Fair	(1)	--	--	--
	(2)	6.7%	3.8%	-
↑	(3)	--	23.1%	17.2%
	(4)	6.7%	23.1%	31.0%
↓	(5)	13.3%	15.4%	24.1%
	(6)	33.3%	23.1%	20.7%
Not Fair	(7)	26.7%	7.7%	6.9%
No Response		13.3%	--	--

49. U.S. Foreign policy is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Tyrannical	(1)	33.3%	11.5%	3.4%
	(2)	6.7%	7.7%	24.1%
↑	(3)	13.3%	7.7%	27.6%
	(4)	6.7%	23.1%	20.7%
↓	(5)	20.0%	19.2%	10.3%
	(6)	6.7%	23.1%	6.9%
Not Tyrannical	(7)	6.7%	7.7%	6.9%
No Response		6.7%	--	--

50. U.S. foreign policy is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Good	(1)	--	3.8%	--
	(2)	6.7%	7.7%	3.4%
↑	(3)	6.7%	26.9%	17.2%
	(4)	26.7%	23.1%	34.5%
↓	(5)	13.3%	19.2%	17.2%
	(6)	26.7%	11.5%	24.1%
Not Good	(7)	13.3%	7.7%	3.4%
No Response		6.7%	--	--

51. U.S. foreign policy is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Catastrophic	(1)	40.0%	7.7%	--
	(2)	20.0%	7.7%	6.9%
	(3)	--	3.8%	20.7%
	(4)	13.3%	23.1%	34.5%
↑	(5)	6.7%	26.9%	20.7%
	(6)	6.7%	19.2%	13.8%
↓	(7)	6.7%	11.5%	3.4%
Not Catastrophic	(7)	6.7%	11.5%	3.4%
No Response		6.7%	--	--

52. U.S. foreign policy is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Concerned with human rights	(1)	26.7%	3.8%	--
	(2)	6.7%	26.9%	13.8%
	(3)	20.0%	19.2%	37.9%
	(4)	13.3%	23.1%	6.9%
↑	(5)	--	15.4%	17.2%
	(6)	13.3%	7.7%	20.7%
↓	(7)	13.3%	3.8%	3.4%
Not concerned with human rights	(7)	13.3%	3.8%	3.4%
No Response		6.7%	--	--

53. U.S. foreign policy is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Bad	(1)	6.7%	3.8%	3.4%
	(2)	26.7%	11.5%	20.7%
	(3)	26.7%	7.7%	31.0%
	(4)	13.3%	34.6%	27.6%
↑	(5)	--	3.8%	10.3%
	(6)	--	30.8%	6.9%
↓	(7)	20.0%	3.8%	--
Not Bad	(7)	20.0%	3.8%	--
No Response		6.7%	3.8%	--

54. U.S. foreign policy is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Respectful	(1)	--	--	--
	(2)	--	7.7%	6.9%
↑	(3)	20.0%	23.1%	17.2%
	(4)	13.3%	19.2%	24.1%
↓	(5)	13.3%	19.2%	10.3%
	(6)	33.3%	15.4%	31.0%
Not Respectful	(7)	13.3%	15.4%	6.9%
No Response		6.7%	--	3.4%

55. U.S. foreign policy is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Moral	(1)	6.7%	--	--
	(2)	--	7.7%	--
↑	(3)	13.3%	23.1%	20.7%
	(4)	20.0%	23.1%	37.9%
↓	(5)	6.7%	15.4%	24.1%
	(6)	40.0%	19.2%	13.8%
Not Moral	(7)	--	11.5%	3.4%
No Response		13.3%	--	--

56. U.S. foreign policy is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Indifferent	(1)	13.3%	7.7%	3.4%
	(2)	20.0%	11.5%	6.9%
↑	(3)	20.0%	3.8%	10.3%
	(4)	--	26.9%	17.2%
↓	(5)	6.7%	11.5%	27.6%
	(6)	6.7%	23.1%	24.6%
Not Indifferent	(7)	20.0%	15.4%	6.9%
No Response		13.3%	--	--

57. U.S. foreign policy is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Controversial	(1)	53.3%	53.8%	48.3%
	(2)	--	30.8%	24.1%
	(3)	20.0%	15.4%	20.7%
	(4)	6.7%	--	6.9%
	(5)	--	--	--
	(6)	6.7%	--	--
Not Controversial	(7)	--	--	--
No Response		13.3%	--	--

58. U.S. foreign policy is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Immoral	(1)	20.0%	3.8%	3.4%
	(2)	20.0%	7.7%	3.4%
	(3)	26.7%	15.4%	27.6%
	(4)	13.3%	26.9%	34.5%
	(5)	6.7%	23.1%	20.7%
	(6)	--	15.4%	10.3%
Not Immoral	(7)	--	7.7%	--
No Response		13.3%	--	--

59. What is your overall attitude towards American movies (please circle one)?

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Very Positive.....	--	19.2%	24.1%
Positive.....	53.3%	57.7%	58.6%
Neutral.....	33.3%	19.2%	13.8%
Negative.....	6.7%	3.8%	3.4%
Very Negative.....	--	--	--
No Response.....	6.7%	--	--

60. What is your overall attitude towards American music (please circle one)?

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Very Positive.....	33.3%	15.4%	31.0%
Positive.....	33.3%	57.7%	48.3%
Neutral.....	26.7%	26.9%	13.8%
Negative.....	--	--	6.9%
Very Negative.....	--	--	--
No Response.....	6.7%	--	--

61. What is your overall attitude towards American television (please circle one)?

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Very Positive.....	6.7%	3.8%	17.2%
Positive.....	20.0%	46.2%	44.8%
Neutral.....	60.0%	11.5%	17.2%
Negative.....	6.7%	34.6%	20.7%
Very Negative.....	--	3.8%	--
No Response.....	6.7%	--	--

62. I look forward to seeing new American movies (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	20.0%	23.1%	34.5%
Agree.....	40.0%	42.3%	55.1%
Neutral.....	26.7%	30.8%	10.3%
Disagree.....	6.7%	3.8%	--
Strongly Disagree.....	--	--	--
No Response.....	6.7%	--	--



63. I look forward to seeing new American television shows (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	6.7%	7.7%	17.2%
Agree.....	33.3%	46.2%	44.8%
Neutral.....	46.7%	23.1%	27.6%
Disagree.....	--	19.2%	10.3%
Strongly Disagree.....	--	3.8%	--
No Response.....	6.7%	--	--

64. I look forward to hearing new American music (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	26.7%	15.4%	34.5%
Agree.....	40.0%	57.7%	55.2%
Neutral.....	20.0%	19.2%	6.9%
Disagree.....	--	3.8%	3.4%
Strongly Disagree.....	--	3.8%	--
No Response.....	13.3%	--	--

65. American movies provide an accurate portrayal of what life is like in the United States (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	6.7%	--	3.4%
Agree.....	6.7%	3.8%	10.3%
Neutral.....	53.3%	19.2%	20.7%
Disagree.....	20.0%	65.2%	58.6%
Strongly Disagree.....	--	11.5%	6.9%
No Response.....	13.3%	--	--

66. Overall, American movies, television, and music contradict Islamic teachings (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	6.7%	--	--
Agree.....	13.3%	38.5%	27.6%
Neutral.....	33.3%	34.6%	51.7%
Disagree.....	26.7%	15.4%	10.3%
Strongly Disagree.....	6.7%	3.8%	--
No Response.....	13.3%	7.7%	10.3%

67. I actively seek American entertainment that is consistent with Islamic teachings (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN
Strongly Agree.....	--
Agree.....	20.0%
Neutral.....	26.7%
Disagree.....	6.7%
Strongly Disagree.....	13.3%
No Response.....	33.3%

68. I prefer local or regional entertainment that is American in style (e.g. rap music but in local languages or with Islamic themes) (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN
Strongly Agree.....	13.3%
Agree.....	20.0%
Neutral.....	26.7%
Disagree.....	20.0%
Strongly Disagree.....	--
No Response.....	20.0%

69. I prefer locally or regionally produced products that are American in style (e.g. dolls or restaurants that look similar to American products but reflect Islamic beliefs) (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN
Strongly Agree.....	--
Agree.....	20.0%
Neutral.....	33.3%
Disagree.....	6.7%
Strongly Disagree.....	6.7%
No Response.....	33.3%

70. I actively avoid American entertainment that is inconsistent with Islamic teachings (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN
Strongly Agree.....	6.7%
Agree.....	13.3%
Neutral.....	33.3%
Disagree.....	--
Strongly Disagree.....	20.0%
No Response.....	26.7%

71. American movies have influenced my attitude toward the United States (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN
Strongly Agree.....	--
Agree.....	33.3%
Neutral.....	33.3%
Disagree.....	--
Strongly Disagree.....	6.7%
No Response.....	26.7%

72. American television has influenced my attitude toward the United States (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN
Strongly Agree.....	--
Agree.....	26.7%
Neutral.....	40.0%
Disagree.....	--
Strongly Disagree.....	6.7%
No Response.....	26.7%

73. American music has influenced my attitude toward the United States (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN
Strongly Agree.....	--
Agree.....	26.7%
Neutral.....	40.0%
Disagree.....	--
Strongly Disagree.....	6.7%
No Response.....	26.7%

74. American popular culture encourages the spread of the American way of life and democracy around the world (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	6.7%	3.8%	6.9%
Agree.....	40.0%	50.0%	51.7%
Neutral.....	20.0%	11.5%	13.8%
Disagree.....	--	3.8%	27.6%
Strongly Disagree.....	6.7%	7.7%	--
No Response.....	26.7%	23.1%	--

The following questions (75 thru 88) present different words and phrases. For each question, please place an 'X' next to how well you think each word describes U.S. popular culture.

75. U.S. popular culture is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Decadent	(1)	6.7%	7.7%	--
	(2)	6.7%	34.6%	24.1%
	(3)	20.0%	16.4%	17.2%
	(4)	6.7%	26.9%	41.4%
↑	(5)	--	3.8%	6.9%
	(6)	6.7%	3.8%	10.3%
↓	(7)	20.0%	--	--
	Not Decadent			
No Response		26.7%	7.7%	--

76. U.S. popular culture is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Inspiring	(1)	20.0%	--	10.3%
	(2)	13.3%	11.5%	20.7%
	(3)	33.3%	30.8%	17.2%
	(4)	--	23.1%	20.7%
↑	(5)	--	11.5%	13.8%
	(6)	--	15.4%	6.9%
↓	(7)	6.7%	7.7%	6.9%
	Not Inspiring			
No Response		26.7%	--	3.4%

77. U.S. popular culture is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Invasive	(1)	20.0%	11.5%	10.3%
	(2)	13.3%	3.8%	3.4%
	(3)	26.7%	34.6%	41.4%
	(4)	6.7%	11.5%	20.7%
	(5)	--	11.5%	13.8%
	(6)	--	23.1%	10.3%
Not Invasive	(7)	26.7%	--	--
No Response		26.7%	3.8%	--

78. U.S. popular culture is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Racist	(1)	--	7.7%	3.4%
	(2)	13.3%	11.5%	6.9%
	(3)	13.3%	19.2%	44.8%
	(4)	20.0%	15.4%	20.7%
	(5)	6.7%	23.1%	6.9%
	(6)	6.7%	19.2%	17.2%
Not Racist	(7)	13.3%	3.8%	--
No Response		26.7%	--	--

80. U.S. popular culture is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Respectful	(1)	6.7%	--	--
	(2)	20.0%	3.8%	3.4%
	(3)	6.7%	19.2%	24.1%
	(4)	26.7%	15.4%	20.7%
	(5)	--	30.8%	20.7%
	(6)	6.7%	23.1%	27.6%
Not Respectful	(7)	6.7%	7.7%	3.4%
No Response		26.7%	--	--

81. U.S. popular culture is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Violent	(1)	13.3%	15.4%	13.8%
	(2)	13.3%	23.1%	34.5%
	(3)	13.3%	23.1%	27.6%
	(4)	20.0%	15.4%	17.2%
↑	(5)	6.7%	19.2%	6.9%
	(6)	6.7%	--	--
↓	(7)	6.7%	--	--
	No Response	20.0%	3.8%	--

82. U.S. popular culture is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Entertaining	(1)	--	26.9%	31.0%
	(2)	26.7%	30.8%	41.4%
	(3)	26.7%	11.5%	13.8%
	(4)	13.3%	19.2%	10.3%
↑	(5)	6.7%	3.8%	3.4%
	(6)	6.7%	--	--
↓	(7)	--	3.8%	--
	No Response	20.0%	7.7%	--

83. U.S. popular culture is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Materialistic	(1)	13.3%	57.7%	62.1%
	(2)	20.0%	19.2%	37.9%
	(3)	13.3%	11.5%	--
	(4)	13.3%	--	--
↑	(5)	--	7.7%	--
	(6)	--	--	--
↓	(7)	6.7%	--	--
	No Response	33.3%	3.8%	--

84. U.S. popular culture is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Attractive	(1)	20.0%	23.1%	27.6%
	(2)	33.3%	19.2%	41.4%
	(3)	20.0%	15.4%	13.8%
	(4)	6.7%	26.9%	10.3%
	(5)	--	7.7%	6.9%
	(6)	--	3.8%	--
Not Attractive	(7)	--	--	--
No Response		26.7%	3.8%	--

85. U.S. popular culture is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Escapist	(1)	--	7.7%	10.3%
	(2)	13.3%	23.1%	3.4%
	(3)	20.0%	23.1%	37.9%
	(4)	26.7%	34.6%	34.5%
	(5)	--	--	6.9%
	(6)	--	7.7%	--
Not Escapist	(7)	40.0%	--	6.6%
No Response		26.7%	3.8%	3.4%

86. U.S. popular culture is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Accurate	(1)	13.3%	--	--
	(2)	13.3%	3.8%	6.9%
	(3)	13.3%	3.8%	13.8%
	(4)	40.0%	7.7%	13.8%
	(5)	--	34.6%	10.3%
	(6)	--	30.8%	44.8%
Not Accurate	(7)	--	11.5%	10.3%
No Response		20.0%	7.7%	--



87. U.S. popular culture is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Liberal	(1)	33.3%	23.1%	20.7%
	(2)	6.7%	34.6%	27.6%
	(3)	13.3%	15.4%	31.0%
	(4)	20.0%	15.4%	17.2%
	(5)	6.7%	--	3.4%
	(6)	--	3.8%	--
Not Liberal	(7)	--	--	--
No Response		20.0%	7.7%	--

88. U.S. popular culture is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Vulgar	(1)	6.7%	15.4%	20.7%
	(2)	6.7%	19.2%	20.7%
	(3)	20.0%	30.8%	37.9%
	(4)	26.7%	15.4%	17.2%
	(5)	--	7.7%	--
	(6)	13.3%	7.7%	3.4%
Not Vulgar	(7)	--	--	--
No Response		26.7%	3.8%	--

89. U.S. popular culture is (please pick one of the seven responses):

		TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Immoral	(1)	--	3.8%	--
	(2)	6.7%	7.7%	17.2%
	(3)	6.7%	23.1%	24.1%
	(4)	33.3%	38.5%	37.9%
	(5)	6.7%	11.5%	10.3%
	(6)	20.0%	7.7%	6.9%
Not Immoral	(7)	--	--	3.4%
No Response		26.7%	7.7%	--

90. Please describe your overseas travel (circle all that apply):

**The United States**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Yes.....	6.7%	Not	Not
No.....	73.3%	Applicable	Applicable
No Response.....	20.0%		

**North America (not including the United States)**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Yes.....	13.3%	69.2%	58.6%
No.....	66.7%	23.1%	41.4%
No Response.....	20.0%	7.7%	--

**Central and South America**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Yes.....	13.3%	50.0%	34.5%
No.....	66.7%	42.3%	65.5%
No Response.....	20.0%	7.7%	--

**Western Europe**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Yes.....	20.0%	73.1%	51.7%
No.....	60.0%	19.2%	48.3%
No Response.....	20.0%	7.7%	--

**Eastern Europe/Russia**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Yes.....	6.7%	19.2%	13.8%
No.....	73.3%	73.1%	86.2%
No Response.....	20.0%	7.7%	--

**Asia**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Yes.....	13.3%	7.7%	17.2%
No.....	66.7%	84.6%	82.8%
No Response.....	20.0%	7.7%	--

**Australia**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Yes.....	6.7%	--	6.9%
No.....	73.3%	92.3%	93.1%
No Response.....	20.0%	7.7%	--

**Sub Saharan Africa (Not including North Africa)**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Yes.....	--	--	--
No.....	80.0%	92.3%	100%
No Response.....	20.0%	7.7%	--

**Tunisia**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Yes.....	Not	Not	--
No.....	Applicable	Applicable	100%
No Response.....			--

**North Africa (not including Tunisia)**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Yes.....	33.3%	3.8%	6.9%
No.....	46.7%	88.5%	93.1%
No Response.....	20.0%	7.7%	--

**The Middle East (Not including North Africa)**

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Yes.....	20.0%	3.8%	6.9%
No.....	60.0%	88.5%	93.1%
No Response.....	20.0%	7.7%	--

91. Do you have close friends or relatives who live outside your country of birth?

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Yes.....	80.0%	57.7%	62.1%
No.....	--	34.6%	37.9%
No Response.....	20.0%	7.7%	--

92. If you said 'Yes' to Question 91, how often do you speak to these close friends or relatives (phone, email, text message, etc.)?

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Frequently.....	53.3%	23.1%	13.8%
Sometimes.....	26.7%	34.6%	34.5%
Never.....	--	38.5%	13.8%
No Response.....	20.0%	3.8%	37.9%

93. Muslims in the United States have the same political, social, and religious opinions as Muslims around the world (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	--	--	--
Agree.....	26.7%	7.7%	20.7%
Neutral.....	33.3%	19.2%	31.0%
Disagree.....	13.3%	53.8%	44.8%
Strongly Disagree.....	6.7%	3.8%	3.4%
No Response.....	20.0%	15.4%	--

94. I feel that deep down, Americans and Muslims in other countries share similar core values (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	--	--	3.4%
Agree.....	33.3%	53.8%	37.9%
Neutral.....	33.3%	30.8%	24.1%
Disagree.....	6.7%	3.8%	27.6%
Strongly Disagree.....	6.7%	--	3.4%
No Response.....	20.0%	11.5%	3.4%

95. Overall, American movies, television, and music contradict Islamic teachings (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	--	3.8%	--
Agree.....	13.3%	26.9%	37.9%
Neutral.....	33.3%	26.9%	44.8%
Disagree.....	33.3%	19.2%	10.3%
Strongly Disagree.....	--	7.7%	--
No Response.....	20.0%	15.4%	6.9%

96. Muslims like entertainment that is American in style (e.g. rap music) but in native languages and/or with Islamic themes (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	6.7%	--	--
Agree.....	13.3%	19.2%	27.6%
Neutral.....	26.7%	46.2%	51.7%
Disagree.....	33.3%	3.8%	20.7%
Strongly Disagree.....	--	3.8%	--
No Response.....	20.0%	26.9%	--

97. Muslims like products that are American in style (e.g. Barbie dolls or fast food restaurants) that look similar to American products but reflect Islamic beliefs (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	6.7%	--	--
Agree.....	20.0%	34.6%	34.5%
Neutral.....	33.3%	42.3%	48.3%
Disagree.....	20.0%	--	17.2%
Strongly Disagree.....	--	--	--
No Response.....	20.0%	23.1%	--

98. Muslims actively avoid American entertainment that is inconsistent with Islamic teachings (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	6.7%	--	3.4%
Agree.....	33.3%	11.5%	24.1%
Neutral.....	26.7%	42.3%	55.2%
Disagree.....	13.3%	19.2%	17.2%
Strongly Disagree.....	--	--	--
No Response.....	20.0%	26.9%	--

99. American movies have a positive influence on foreigners' attitude toward the United States (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	13.3%	--	3.4%
Agree.....	40.0%	11.5%	17.2%
Neutral.....	26.7%	26.9%	37.9%
Disagree.....	--	50.0%	37.9%
Strongly Disagree.....	--	--	--
No Response.....	20.0%	11.5%	3.4%

100. American television has a positive influence foreigners' attitudes toward the United States (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	6.7%	--	3.4%
Agree.....	26.7%	--	24.1%
Neutral.....	40.0%	34.6%	41.4%
Disagree.....	6.7%	42.3%	31.0%
Strongly Disagree.....	--	11.5%	--
No Response.....	20.0%	11.5%	--

101. American music has a positive influence on foreigners' attitude toward the United States (please circle one).

	TUNISIAN	AMERICAN ABROAD	PSYCHOLOGY UNDERGRADS
Strongly Agree.....	13.3%	--	--
Agree.....	46.7%	23.1%	17.2%
Neutral.....	13.3%	50.0%	55.2%
Disagree.....	6.7%	11.5%	27.6%
Strongly Disagree.....	--	3.8%	--
No Response.....	20.0%	11.5%	--

APPENDIX B  
PARTICIPANT RESPONSES



**APPENDIX B**  
**Ambivalence Scores**

*Tunisian Students Ambivalence Scores*

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ID number	Positive qualities rating	Negative qualities rating	Ambivalence Score
1770	3	1	0
2036	1	3	0
1637	2	1	0.5
9517	2	1	0.5
1862	1	2	0.5
9057	1	2	0.5
6781	1	2	0.5
6800	1	1	1
9389	2	3	1.5
2494	2	3	1.5
9813	2	3	1.5
6340	2	3	1.5
8260	2	2	2

---

*American Abroad Students' Ambivalence Scores*


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ID number	Positive qualities rating	Negative qualities rating	Ambivalence Score
1289	2	2	2
4870	2	2	2
6917	2	2	2
7072	2	2	2
7900	2	2	2
5572	1	1	1
8703	1	3	0
6066	3	1	0
1442	3	1	0
6519	3	1	0
9342	3	1	0
4801	3	1	0
5509	3	1	0
3022	1	2	0.5
9721	1	2	0.5
8314	1	2	0.5
2504	2	1	0.5
9157	2	1	0.5
1943	2	1	0.5
9222	2	1	0.5
6486	2	3	1.5
1370	2	3	1.5
7984	2	3	1.5

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*Psychology Undergraduate Students' Ambivalence Scores*

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ID number	Positive qualities rating	Negative qualities rating	Ambivalence Score
9710	2	2	2
2657	2	2	2
4950	2	2	2
7055	2	2	2
9811	2	2	2
2187	2	2	2
7605	3	3	3
9052	1	1	1
9073	1	1	1
6339	1	3	0
4522	1	3	0
3439	1	3	0
3451	3	1	0
6055	3	1	0
8193	3	1	0
2303	3	1	0
5997	1	2	0.5
0732	2	1	0.5
7844	2	1	0.5
6999	2	1	0.5
3826	2	1	0.5
2322	2	1	0.5
6615	2	1	0.5
2616	3	2	1.5
4467	2	3	1.5
7298	2	3	1.5
7745	2	.	1.5
1116	3	2	1.5
1035	3	2	1.5

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The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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