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Justice Efficacy and Argument Strength in Mock Juror Decision-Making in a Civil Trial

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LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

JUSTICE EFFICACY AND ARGUMENT STRENGTH IN MOCK JUROR DECISION-
MAKING IN A CIVIL TRIAL

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
PROGRAM IN APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

BY

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CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

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ABSTRACT

The decisions civil juries render on a day-to-day basis affect the personal and professional lives of numerous people. In 2005, 48,300 state and federal civil jury trials occurred in the United States (National Center for State Courts, 2009). Approximately 15% of the verdicts juries render are inaccurate (Spencer, 2007). Therefore, it is of utmost important to increase juror accuracy. The current study investigated jurors' justice efficacy as it relates to persuasion in the courtroom. In this context, justice efficacy was defined as one's belief in possessing the capabilities to render a fair and accurate verdict. Two-hundred and sixty-five college students participated in the study. Mock jurors' levels of justice efficacy were manipulated by giving them false feedback (positive or negative) on a moral reasoning task. Participants then read a civil trial summary, which was written in a way that participants should lean towards the defendant's side. Afterwards, they received weak or strong statements arguing for the plaintiff case. Results indicated that the relation between argument strength and verdict did not depend on whether participants were in the positive feedback, positive feedback, or control condition. However, there was a marginally significant Feedback x Initial liability judgment interaction predicting the final verdict x confidence measures. Participants who received positive feedback were more influenced by the arguments than participants who received negative or no feedback. Methodological issues of the current study and recommendations for future research are discussed.

Literature Review

Jury decision-making

Juries represent a distinguishing feature of the American legal system, which originally is based on English common law. According to the 6th and 7th Amendments to the United States Constitution as part of the Bill of Rights, the defendant in criminal prosecution always has the right to a jury trial, while this right only applies to civil cases “[...] where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars [...]” (U.S. Const. amend. VII). Thus, panels of ordinary citizens oftentimes are summoned to court in order to hear and evaluate evidence. Afterwards, the jurors deliberate and decide on the court case. Because of jurors’ enormous responsibility, it is not surprising that social science research has paid much attention to the topic of juror and jury decision-making. Modern jury research began to flourish with the University of Chicago’s Jury Project in the mid-1950s. The legal scholars Kalven and Zeisel undertook an enormous nationwide survey study interviewing numerous judges, which was supported by a \$1.4 million grant. This led to the influential publication of *The American Jury* in 1966. Ever since, hundreds of research projects have studied mock as well as real juries, and have investigated numerous factors that might affect a juror’s decision-making process when trying to reach a verdict.

For example, research has shown that jurors have difficulty understanding jury instructions because they oftentimes include jargon and very specific linguistic

instructions. Altering jury instructions by omitting or rephrasing difficult terminology generally increases comprehensibility (Charrow & Charrow, 1979). Moreover, inadmissible evidence relates to biased evidence that is presented during trial. Although the judge instructs or admonishes the jury not to take the information into consideration when deciding on a verdict, studies have shown that this biased evidence, nevertheless, influences jury decision-making (Wolf & Montgomery, 1977). For example, Thompson, Fong, and Rosennhan (1981) found that inadmissible evidence supporting acquittal of the defendant had an effect on the verdict, although jurors believed it did not, while jurors believed that inadmissible evidence in favor of conviction of the defendant influenced their judgment, but it did not. Pretrial publicity also has received much attention in the literature. Mehrkens Steblay, Besirevic, Fulero, and Jimenez-Lorente (1999) examined 44 empirical studies and came to the conclusion that negative pretrial publicity about the defendant led to more convictions than less negative, neutral, or positive pretrial publicity. This effect was even greater for participants drawn from an actual jury pool compared to college students as participants. Moreover, jurors' demographic characteristics and attitudes can have influence on the verdict (Hepburn, 1980). One of the main concerns relates to racial bias. Research has shown that white jurors sentence black defendants more harshly than white defendants (Sweeney & Haney, 1992). Despite the vast literature that is available on juror decision-making, research has not paid much attention to self-efficacy as an individual difference and the basic processes underlying influence among jurors during a jury trial.

Self-efficacy

According to Bandura (1997, p. 3), “perceived self-efficacy refers to the beliefs in one’s capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required to produce given attainments.” On the one hand, a strong sense of self-efficacy generally enhances feelings of accomplishment and personal well-being. Moreover, people approach difficult tasks as challenges that they are able to master, and show a strong commitment to goals. On the other hand, a weak sense of self-efficacy relates to low levels of ambition and weak commitment. These individuals oftentimes shy away from difficult tasks.

Four sources of self-efficacy exist. Mastery experiences contribute to a strong sense of self-efficacy because hard work, persistence, and obtained goals lead to feelings of success. Moreover, seeing other people who are similar to oneself (i.e., social models) succeed at certain tasks makes the person believe that he or she also has the capabilities of mastering the same or comparable task. Accordingly, vicarious experience represents another source for self-efficacy. The ways people perceive their emotional and physical reactions when, for instance, encountering stress, determines the levels of self-efficacy. The fourth source represents verbal persuasion because it serves as a means of strengthening people’s beliefs that they are capable of accomplishing a specific task (Bandura, 1997).

High levels of self-efficacy are related to various positive behaviors and concepts. For example, self-efficacy beliefs have a positive and moderate relationship with athletic performance (Moritz, Feltz, Fahrback, & Mack, 2000). Moreover, people with high levels

of self-efficacy usually have a broader range of career options, while low self-efficacious people tend to be more indecisive with regards to their future career choices (Lent, Brown, & Larkin, 1986; Taylor & Betz, 1981). With regards to health behaviors, self-efficacy is associated with quitting smoking, controlling weight, using contraception, decreasing alcohol use, and exercising (Strecher, McEvoy DeVellis, Becker, & Rosenstock, 1986). High efficacious students also adjust better to college and show superior academic performance (Chemers, Hu, & Garcia, 2001; Multon, Brown, & Lent, 1991). Thus, self-efficacy positively relates to all types of behavior and many different situations. It is surprising that past research has not examined its possible effects on juror decision-making.

Social Influence

Chaiken (1980) proposed the systematic processing model, which suggests two different routes to persuasion. Systematic processing represents an analytic orientation to information processing. People who take this route put much cognitive effort in the task by actively attempting to evaluate the presented arguments and their validity. In contrast, when using the heuristic route, people pick up on environmental cues without thoroughly scrutinizing and comparing information. These heuristic cues include the number of arguments presented, message length, likeability as well as credibility of the source. The elaboration likelihood model, developed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986), is very similar to the systematic heuristic processing model; it also involves two routes to persuasion. When using the central route, people carefully consider the arguments and examine them thoughtfully, thus engaging in deep processing. They are highly motivated and/or have

the ability to think about the message. In contrast, the peripheral route refers to superficial processing, which means that external factors (e.g., communicator's attractiveness) influence the person's attitude. When using this route, people generally lack the ability to engage in deep processing and/or have low motivation to do so. With regards to juror decision-making, jurors are expected to evaluate the task (i.e., rendering a verdict) as important because they are ultimately deciding the outcome of a trial. Therefore, they should be motivated to use the central/systematic route when processing the other juror's arguments during deliberation. However, jurors with low levels of self-efficacy rather might be inclined to use the heuristic route to process the presented information.

The current study manipulated the level of justice efficacy and the strength of arguments from other potential jurors in a civil trial in order to examine whether these factors influence jurors' individual verdict preference and their confidence in making this decision. Within this context, justice efficacy was defined as one's belief in possessing the capabilities to render a fair and accurate verdict. Participants received false feedback (positive, negative, or no feedback) on how they presumably did on a justice reasoning task. They then completed measures of self-esteem, self-efficacy, and their current mood. After reading a civil trial summary including strong and weak arguments favoring the defendant's case, they were expected to believe that the defendant should not be held liable. Participants then read arguments that could be stated by other jurors participating in a similar trial, and those included either strong or weak reasons for why they would hold the defendant liable. Finally, they rendered their verdict decision, including their

confidence levels, and filled out a questionnaire regarding their experience of participating in the study.

I hypothesized that receiving positive feedback (i.e., high justice efficacy) would give participants the conviction to stay with their own judgment. These participants would be less likely to change their verdict preference than participants in the negative (low justice efficacy) and control feedback conditions, thus using the systematic route to information processing. Moreover, participants receiving positive feedback were expected to show the most confidence in their verdict decision. Therefore, these participants should show less influence by the other jurors, particularly after reading weak arguments, which should lead to a highly confident not liable verdict decision. Moreover, participants who received negative feedback (i.e., low justice efficacy) should be influenced by the other jurors regardless of the strength of the arguments. Therefore, they should be using the heuristic route to information processing. Accordingly, they should be less confident that the company is not liable, and might lean even more towards a liable verdict judgment. Finally, mock jurors who receive no feedback should be influenced by the weak as well as the strong arguments, but not as much as those participants who receive negative feedback. Overall, I expected a main effect of feedback as well as a feedback by argument strength interaction.

Method

Participants

Participants included 265 undergraduate students from a Midwestern university, who received course credit for an introductory psychology course in exchange for their

participation in the research study. Eight participants were dropped because an error in the set-up of the MediaLab program file occurred during the first few days of data collection. After dropping these participants, 257 students served as the sample. The ages of the participants ranged from 18 to 50 with a median age of 18.00 ($M = 18.91$, $SD = 2.41$). Female participants made up 39.3% of the sample. Furthermore, 68.5% of the participants classified themselves as Caucasian, 12.5% as Asian, 11.3% as Latino/a, 2.3% as Middle Eastern, 1.9% as African American, and 3.5% as Other.

Design

The experiment adhered to a 3 (positive, negative, or no feedback) x 2 (strong or weak arguments) factorial design. Thus, participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions. Participants' individual verdict preference, which was weighted by confidence, measured their susceptibility to influence/persuasion.

Materials

Justice dilemmas. The participants read ten justice scenarios, and were asked to decide whether they agree with the decision a specific character made or is about to make in the dilemma. Moral dilemmas normally are administered to interpret people's moral reasoning skills by asking them to provide open-ended responses. Because the main interest of the current study was participants' levels of justice efficacy, pre-constructed justice dilemmas substituted moral dilemmas, so these could be used as part of the manipulation for justice efficacy. Moreover, in order to make the scoring system more believable, participants were not asked to provide open-ended responses, but rather had to

choose between “yes” or “no” instead. The following represents an example of one of the scenarios:

Mr. Cummings eventually filed for divorce because his wife did not make an effort to stop drinking and to use drugs. Ever since their daughter was born three years ago, her mother’s unhealthy behavior increased to the extent that she was not capable of taking care of their daughter. Accordingly, the court granted Mr. Cummings full custody of the child, and Mr. Cummings decided that his ex-wife should not have contact with her daughter until she completely sobers up and leads a responsible lifestyle. Six months later, Mrs. Cummings told her ex-husband that she is completely clean now, has been working at the local grocery store for the past month, and wishes more than anything to see her child. She asks Mr. Cummings for permission to take their daughter to the zoo this weekend. Should Mr. Cummings allow his ex-wife to take their daughter to the zoo?

Yes

No

Self-esteem. In order to measure the participants’ self-esteem, the Rosenberg self-esteem scale was employed (Rosenberg, 1989). It constitutes a ten-item measure with a four-point scale ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” For example, people indicate their responses to the statement “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.” Higher scores correspond to higher levels of self-esteem. The Rosenberg self-esteem scale has shown high construct and convergent validity as well as reliability (Goldsmith, 1986; Hagborg, 1993; Macan, Shahani, Dipboye, & Phillips, 1990).

Self-efficacy. Participants’ levels of self-efficacy were measured with the ten-item general self-efficacy scale developed by Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995). Responses can range from “not at all true” to “exactly true.” This unidimensional measurement scale assesses a person’s perceived belief that one can perform a novel or difficult task (e.g., “When I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several

solutions.”). It has shown high reliability and validity (Scholz, Gutiérrez-Doña, Sud, & Schwarzer, 2002; Schwarzer, 1994).

Mood. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) was administered to measure participants’ current mood. Participants responded to 20 items on a five-point scale ranging from “very slightly” to “extremely”. The negative and the positive scale both are highly reliable and valid (Crawford & Henry, 2004).

Civil case. The civil case represented a hypothetical case lawsuit modified from an actual case (Bornstein & Rajki, 1994; Bornstein, Whisenhunt, Nemeth, & Dunaway, 2002), which was presented to all participants in the study. The case included the plaintiff, Kathy Summers, who is suing a large chemical manufacturing company. She claims that a chemical, called Metolachlor, which the company stores at a dump one mile from her house, has seeped into the neighborhood’s water supply. Mrs. Summers asserts that regularly drinking the contaminated water had caused her bladder cancer.

Trial summary. The trial summary included the plaintiff as well as the defendant case. Both summarized three witness testimonies. Because it should become fairly clear to the participant reading the trial summary that the company should not be held liable, the plaintiff’s case is supported by many weak arguments, while the company’s case covers many strong arguments. All witness statements were pilot tested in order to ensure that most participants would prefer a not liable verdict. The case materials were identical for participants in all conditions. For instance, one argument favoring the plaintiff case

included Ms. Summers stating that “she does not have any family history of cancer and never had experienced any major health problems.” On the other hand, a representative of the chemist working for the United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) testified that the US EPA classified Metolachlor as a Category C pesticide, which indicates limited evidence of its ability to produce cancer.”

Arguments. The arguments other jurors might bring up in the current civil trial were either weak or strong and generally argued for the company being liable. In each condition, two jurors provided three arguments each, and they overlapped in one. In addition, strong arguments were longer (162 words) than short arguments (104 words). The strength of all the arguments were pilot tested.

Post-task questionnaire. The post-task questionnaire included questions regarding the participants’ general experience with the study. For example, “How difficult was it to reach your final verdict decision?” It asked participants to state their main reasons for why they reached a specific verdict. Moreover, items included “Before you read the other jurors’ arguments, did you think the company was liable or not?” and “Did you take other jurors’ arguments into consideration when making your verdict decision?” for instance. A more direct measure of justice efficacy also was included: “How confident did you feel about using the evidence in the case to make a sound judgment?” Participants were probed for suspicion as well.

Procedure

Participants completed the experiment individually in a computer lab could hold up to six participants at the same time. MediaLab was employed to conduct the study. Therefore, participants responded to all the questions and did all the tasks individually on a lab computer. However, an experimenter gave participants an overview about the study, collected their informed consent forms at the beginning of the study, and debriefed them at the end. The experimenter was present in the room for the duration of the experiment. The experimenter read all of the information off a pre-developed script to standardize the method of instruction, specifically in order to avoid instances in which experimenters phrase directions differently. This ultimately could lead to an inaccuracy of the results.

After greeting the participants and asking them to take a seat in front of the computer, the experimenter, who was one of three research assistants, explained that the participants will take part in a study dealing with moral decision-making processes. The experimenter claimed that the study consists of two parts; the first part looks at how people respond to a moral reasoning task. During the second part of the study, participants will be asked to take on the role of a juror in a civil trial who will have to come to a verdict decision after having been presented with information about the case. As mentioned above, both parts of the study were administered through MediaLab, which has several advantages. First, using computer software leads to efficiency in conducting the study because several students, compared to only one student, can participate at the same time. Second, it allows for an immediate “scoring” of the results, which most likely will make the feedback participants receive much more believable. Third, experimenters’ characteristics cannot influence the perception and understanding of the task. Finally, the

use of computer software is likely to release some of the participants' uneasiness and embarrassment that they might feel when receiving (false) feedback with regards to how they did in the justice reasoning task. Only they would know how they presumably did, which would not be the case if the experimenter was the one giving them the feedback in person.

After telling the participants about the purpose of the study, the experimenter informed them that all the information the participants will provide throughout the study will be treated with utmost confidentiality, and nobody will be able to identify the participants personally. Participants then were asked to read and sign the informed consent form.

Afterwards, the experimenter directed the participants' attention to the computers. He or she told them that from now on, they will find all the directions for the study on their individual computer screens. The participants also were asked to stay in the laboratory until all the other participants have completed the study as well. This request was made to avoid any possible distraction (e.g., additional noise in the lab environment), but most importantly to have the opportunity to debrief the participants at the end of the experiment.

The participants were provided with instructions asking them to read the following justice scenarios and then to indicate their responses. The participants then read ten justice dilemmas that appeared consecutively on the screen. After each scenario, the participant was asked whether he or she agreed with the particular decision that a particular character in the scenario made and was about to make. The justice scenarios

were completely unrelated to the civil court case used later. In general, there were no right or wrong answers, and numerous strong arguments could be provided for why a person would respond in a certain way. Participants were not asked to provide open-ended responses, but rather answer with “yes” or “no,” because a computer can easily score these by computing a total score (although for the purpose of the current study, a participant’s score depended on the condition he or she was assigned to). Moreover, this provided the participants with a scoring method that would omit any doubts about the truthfulness of their results. If participants had described their reasoning underlying their decisions, they might wonder how a computer program possibly could read and assess fairly detailed responses in a short amount of time, and thus they might have had reservations about the feedback they received. Only this way was it possible to give them plausible feedback. Accordingly, instructions on the computer screen informed the participants that the researchers are completely aware of the fact that they will only be able to choose among two extreme options, while the scenarios they will be reading are not that “cut-and-dried,” and usually would call for more elaborate responses. Therefore, the participants were asked to pick the answer (i.e., “yes” or “no”) that they felt best represented their position at that time given no other constraints or caeats.

Depending on the condition, participants either received positive, negative, or no feedback (i.e., control condition). After the participants had provided their answers to each of the scenarios, individuals in two of the three feedback conditions received a score and descriptive feedback with regards to how they presumably did in the moral reasoning task. These participants also read that the researchers compared their answers to the

responses experts on ethical behavior made. Although this was not the case, it serves as an attempt in making the scores and the feedback more believable to the participants. The researcher pre-crafted the scores and the feedback, and thus, these were completely arbitrary. Accordingly, these comments did not reflect their true moral reasoning skills in any way. Participants in the same conditions received the exact same feedback, no matter how they responded to the justice dilemmas. Specifically, participants in the positive feedback condition obtained eight out of ten possible points and read a statement affirming that college students score on average six out of ten points, and therefore the participant did a better job in responding to the justice scenarios than the average student. On the other hand, participants in the negative feedback condition received six out of ten possible points, including a description stating that college students generally obtain eight out of ten points. Accordingly, the participant read that they did worse in the moral reasoning task, compared to the average student. The type of feedback participants received represents the manipulation for justice efficacy. While participants in the positive feedback condition were expected to have high levels of justice efficacy after having read their feedback, participants in the negative feedback condition were expected to be low on justice efficacy. In the control condition, participants' levels of justice efficacy were expected to stay the same (i.e., neutral) throughout the experiment.

After the participants had received feedback, they were asked to respond to standard questionnaires assessing their general self-efficacy, self-esteem, and mood. These measures served as controls for the manipulation of self-efficacy. Through these measures, the researcher was able to determine whether the manipulation worked, and

also whether it led to changes in the participants' mood and self-esteem in addition to self-efficacy. Furthermore, the completion of these measures served as a filler task, so the participants did relate the first part of the study to the second part.

Next, the participants were told that this was the end of the first part of the study, and now they would take part in the second part. Thus, they should take on the role of a juror serving in a civil trial. In order to make sure that all the participants understood legal jargon, they were provided with short definitions of "plaintiff," "defendant," "defense attorney," "plaintiff's attorney," and "liability." They then read summaries of a civil case and the trial. As in a real courtroom, the trial summary began with the plaintiff case followed by the defendant case. The case was pilot tested before the main experiment in order to ensure that most participants (67%) favored not liable. However, a few people still would support the plaintiff. This probability was a crucial aspect of the experiment because it was assumed that most participants would favor of the company without asking them about their initial preference. Past research has shown that when people are asked for their opinion and then again at a later time, they are more likely to stick to their initial attitudes (Asch, 1946; Rosenhan, 1973). Thus, by avoiding asking participants about their initial preference, the likelihood of changing their initial attitudes is increased. In particular, because this present study looks at the impact on self-efficacy and argument strength, the aim is to avoid other possible influences, e.g., participants' initial attitudes. In order to make the participant lean towards supporting the chemical company, the defendant case was supported by mainly strong arguments, while mostly

weak arguments were provided in the plaintiff case. The strength of each argument also was pilot tested.

After reading the trial summary, participants read on their computer screens that if they were a real juror serving on a real trial in a courtroom, they would interact with other jurors. While the present study main focus is on an individual level, the researchers would still like to give the participants some other people's perspectives that might occur during a trial like this. Participants then read two other people's preferred verdict decision and the reasons for why they arrived at this decision. The researcher pre-crafted these in order to manipulate the strength of the attempted persuasion. Depending on the condition, participants either read two strong or two weak reasons supporting the plaintiff's (i.e., Kathy Summers) case. These arguments were expected to conflict with the initial positions of most of the participants. In both conditions, one of the arguments was the same for each "mock juror," while the other one was different. The arguments were designed in this specific way in order to make the manipulation stronger. If two people present the same reason, the participants might have been more inclined to believe them, and thus would have been more likely to go along with their decision. Thus, each participant saw a total of three arguments provided by the two "other potential" jurors.

The participants then were asked to come to a verdict decision. They were instructed to determine the facts solely from the evidence presented in the case, and that the defendant is legally liable only if the defendant is more likely than not to have caused the plaintiff's injury. The options included "liable" and "not liable." Moreover, participants were asked to indicate how confident they felt about their decision. The

confidence rating was given on a 7-point scale from “not at all confident” to “extremely confident.” Finally, the participants responded to a brief questionnaire.

When all the participants had completed the study, the experimenter debriefed them both orally and in written form by telling them the actual purpose of the experiment. Specifically, the experimenter stated that they were wrongly informed that the study consisted of two separate parts, but that these two parts actually were related. Moreover, the experimenter told the participants that the scores they received in the first part of the study did not reflect their responses to the justice scenarios. The experimenter explained that some of the participants received positive and others received negative feedback, and who received what was determined at random. The participants were deceived because the researchers were interested in how beliefs about one’s ability in judging a trial in a reasonable manner can impact the verdict decision. So participants who received negative feedback in the beginning were expected to be less confident about their verdict decision. Moreover, the experimenter made clear that the arguments that they read were drafted by the researchers as well, and some participants read strong arguments, while others read weak arguments. Deception was necessary here as well because only this way was it possible to manipulate the strength of the arguments. The experimenter then responded to any additional questions the participants asked. He or she then thanked the participants for their participation and provided them with a debriefing statement including the purpose of the study and the principal investigator’s contact information.

Results

Reliability of the scales

The general self-efficacy scale, the Rosenberg self-esteem scale, and the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule all had adequate internal consistency with Cronbach's coefficient α score greater than .70: $\alpha = .80$, $\alpha = .90$, $\alpha = .84$, respectively. A table of the means, standard deviations, and correlations among the scales is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Correlations between measures, means, and standard deviations

Scale	1	2	3	4	M	SD
1. General Self-efficacy scale	1.00	.45**	.35**	-.30**	32.39	3.45
2. Rosenberg Self-esteem scale	.45**	1.00	.35**	-.42**	5.61	.98
3. Positive Affect scale	.35**	.35**	1.00	.07	32.46	7.67
4. Negative Affect scale	-.30**	-.42**	.07	1.00	16.49	5.74

Note: $p < .01^{**}$

Manipulation checks

Self-efficacy manipulation. I computed a total general self-efficacy score for each participant by adding all the values for each response. The one-way ANOVA of feedback (positive, negative, or no) on self-efficacy revealed that there was a significant difference in self-efficacy scores across the three feedback conditions, $F(2, 254) = 3.47$, $p = .03$, $\eta^2 = .03$, indicating that my manipulation was successful. Post-hoc analyses (REGWQ) showed that, as expected, participants who received positive feedback ($M = 33.00$) had higher self-efficacy scores than participants who got negative feedback ($M = 31.67$), Cohen's $d = .36$. However, neither the positive nor negative feedback means differed from the no feedback mean ($M = 32.57$). I also computed a total self-esteem

score by reverse coding the appropriate items, and then averaging the values for each item. In addition, I independently computed a total positive affect score as well as a total negative affect score by summing up the values of the items corresponding to each constructs. Three one-way ANOVAs revealed that feedback had no effect on self esteem ($F(2, 254) = .60, p = .55, \eta^2 = .01$), positive affect, ($F(2, 254) = 1.48, p = .23, \eta^2 = .01$), or negative affect ($F(2, 254) = .11, p = .89, \eta^2 = .00$). Thus, the only dependent variable affected by the manipulation was self efficacy

Strength of arguments manipulation. To determine the effectiveness of my strength of arguments manipulation I conducted a t-test comparing participants in the strong arguments and weak arguments conditions on to what degree they felt that the other juror's arguments were weak or strong. This analysis revealed that participants who received strong arguments ($M = 4.52$) reported that these arguments were significantly stronger as compared with participants who received weak arguments ($M = 3.39$), $t(254.74) = 5.83, p < .001$. This suggests that the manipulation worked as expected.

Results on verdict measure

I coded the response "liable" as -1 and "not liable" as +1 and then multiplied this value (i.e., -1 or +1) by the participants' confidence ratings in order to obtain a continuous measure verdict. Accordingly, this final verdict measure ranged from -7, meaning "very confident liable," to +7, meaning "very confident not liable."

I conducted a 3 (Feedback Condition: positive feedback, negative feedback, no feedback) x 2 (Argument strength Condition: strong arguments, weak arguments) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on participants' final verdict measure. The analysis

revealed that effect of feedback was not significant, $F(2, 251) = 1.40, p = .25$, partial $\eta^2 = .01$. This suggests that participants who received positive feedback ($M = -.96$), participants who received no feedback ($M = .40$), and participants who received no feedback ($M = -.37$) did not differ in their final verdict decisions. Moreover, there was no significant main effect of Argument strength on the final verdict decision, $F(1, 251) = 2.20, p = .14$, partial $\eta^2 = .01$. This suggests that participants who read strong arguments ($M = -.79$) and participants who read weak arguments ($M = .19$) did not differ in their final verdict decisions. There also was no significant Feedback condition x Argument strength condition interaction predicting participants' final verdict, $F(2, 251) = 1.24, p = .29$, partial $\eta^2 = .01$. That is, the relation between argument strength and verdict did not depend on whether participants were in the positive feedback, negative feedback, or control condition.


In the pilot data, I initially found that 67.2% of the participants chose not liable. Thus, I expected most participants to choose not liable, so that I could assess the degree to which the social influence would move people toward liable. However, in the main study only 46.3% of the participants chose not liable as their final verdict decision. Thus, I added participants' initial liability judgment, which was obtained as a response to a question in the post-task questionnaire, into the Analysis of Variance as a factor to see whether the participants' initial position moderated the effects of the other independent variables.

I conducted a 3 (Feedback Condition: positive feedback, negative feedback, no feedback) x 2 (Argument strength Condition: strong arguments, weak arguments) x 2

(Initial liability judgment: liable, not liable) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on participants' verdict measure. Once again, there was no significant effect of feedback, $F(2, 245) = .48, p = .62, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .00$. This suggests that participants who received positive feedback ($M = -.96$), participants who received negative feedback (.40), and those that received no feedback ($M = -.37$) did not differ on the final verdict measure. However, there was a significant main effect of Argument strength on the verdict measure, $F(1, 245) = 3.91, p = .05, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .02$. This suggests that participants who read strong arguments ($M = -.74$) felt more confidently that the company was liable than participants who read weak arguments ($M = .12$). In addition, there was no significant Argument strength x Feedback interaction, $F(2, 245) = .82, p = .44, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .01$. Nevertheless, there was a significant main effect of Initial liability judgment on verdict measure, $F(1, 245) = 331.33, p < .001, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .58$. This suggests that participants who reported that they initially felt that the company was liable ($M = -4.26$) were more confident in the liable verdict than participants who reported that they initially felt that the company was not liable ($M = 3.65$). I also found a marginally significant interaction between participants' Initial liability judgment and Feedback condition, $F(2, 245) = 2.36, p = .097, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .02$. Post-hoc tests showed that participants who initially preferred not liable and who received positive feedback ($M = 2.74$) gave less extreme ratings (thus were potentially more influenced by the other jurors arguments) as compared to participants who received negative feedback ($M = 3.80$), Cohens' $d = -.28$, and participants who received no feedback ($M = 4.39$), Cohen's $d = -.44$. The extremity of their ratings did not differ between participants who initially preferred not liable and who

received negative feedback and those that received no feedback. For participants who initially thought the company was liable, there was no difference in how much they were influenced as a function of whether they received positive feedback ($M = -4.02$) or negative feedback ($M = -4.15$, Cohen's $d = .04$) or positive or no feedback ($M = -4.61$, Cohen's $d = .20$). The means for the marginally significant Initial liability judgment x Feedback condition are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Predicting participant's final verdict score from feedback condition and initial liability judgment



In addition, there was not a significant Argument strength x Initial verdict judgment interaction, nor a significant three-way interaction predicting the verdict measure – $F(1, 245) = .32, p = .57$, partial $\eta^2 = .00$, $F(2, 245) = 1.86, p = .16$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$, respectively.

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of feedback and the strength of other jurors' counter-arguments on mock juror's verdict preference and related confidence. After responding to moral dilemma-type scenarios, participants received false or no feedback on their performance. Participants in the feedback conditions received either positive or negative feedback. Then, mock jurors read a civil trial summary, which should have led them to conclude that the defendant is not liable. This type of trial was used in this study to enable the researcher to pre-craft arguments that favored the less preferred verdict alternative. Afterwards, participants read strong or weak arguments that favored the plaintiff's (less preferred) side. Finally, individuals made their verdict decision and also indicated how confident they were. In general, participants who received positive feedback were expected to be highly efficacious, which should have led to little or no influence due to the counter-arguments. On the other hand, participants who received negative feedback were expected to have low levels of justice efficacy. This should have led to verdict preference changes for both strong and weak arguments (a more peripheral or heuristic route of change).

In general, results showed that the manipulation of self-efficacy worked. Giving participants positive feedback increased their levels of self-efficacy, while it did not influence their self-esteem or current mood. Likewise, participants who received negative feedback showed lower levels of self-efficacy, but did not have lower self-esteem or a more negative mood. In addition, the manipulation of argument strength was successful.

In the post-task questionnaire, participants rated the strong arguments as being stronger than the weak arguments.

Contrary to my original hypothesis, no differences in verdict preference strength were found based on feedback and argument strength. Mock jurors in all feedback and argument strength conditions were equally confident that the company was liable or not liable. These results could suggest that mock jurors' levels of self-efficacy and the arguments other jurors might make in a similar trial do not affect their final verdict decision and confidence ratings. Accordingly, whether people receive false or no feedback and read strong or weak counter-arguments does not influence whether they process information systematically or peripherally when making verdict decisions. However, it would be more likely that, although the manipulation of self-efficacy was successful, it might not have worked the way I expected it to play out. It is possible that increases/decreases in self-efficacy created by feedback on the ethical dilemma judgments did not translate to feelings of efficacy in the verdict decisions. Receiving (bogus) feedback on individual judgments made on ethical dilemmas might lead to changes in self-efficacy, which then might affect decision-making in this context positively or negatively, depending on the valence of the feedback. However, this might not translate directly into making verdict decisions and confidence ratings in a civil jury trial. Therefore, the mechanisms underlying decisions on how specific people should or should not behave in ethical dilemmas they encounter could be very different from those used in determining whether a defendant should be liable or not. Consequently, the

manipulation of “civil trial justice efficacy” may not have been successful, even though changes in “general self-efficacy” were observed.

One problem with interpreting the results from this study is that the results from the pilot test were not replicated in the main study. It was essential to the study design that the majority of participants would think that the defendant should not be held liable for its actions. Only if this was true would the influence of the arguments supporting the company being held liable be easy to ascertain. Unfortunately, less than half of the participants in the main study initially favored not liable prior to receiving the arguments favoring liable. This outcome obviously made it more difficult to find the expected results.

When initial liability judgment was included in the analyses, it did not moderate the relationship between feedback and argument strength, and the final verdict measure. However, it had an effect on the final verdict measure. Not surprisingly, participants who initially believed that the company is liable were more confident that the company is liable when making their final verdict decision. In addition, mock jurors that indicated at first that the defendant was not liable also were more confident in their not liable verdict decision at the end of the study. This shows that participants generally trusted their initial responses, which translated into making a more confident verdict decision that corresponded with their initial liability judgment.

Moreover, the marginally significant Feedback x Initial liability judgment showed that participants who initially believed that the defendant was not liable became less confident in this decision when they received positive feedback compared to

participants in the negative or control feedback conditions. Thus, it appears they were more, rather than less, influenced by arguments provided by the other jurors. These results were counter-intuitive because I expected participants with higher levels of self-efficacy, not lower levels, to stick with their initial verdict decision and not to be influenced by the arguments more often because it was the correct one, therefore engaging in systematic information processing more frequently. It is interesting to note that descriptively, participants who received no feedback tended to show more confidence in their initial verdict judgments as compared to participants receiving either positive or negative feedback. For both feedback conditions, participants learned that they responded to at least some of the dilemma items erroneously. This may have made participants somewhat more cautious in their judgments in the civil trial. It is possible that simply learning that ethical judgments are not always easy to make led to reduced confidence in the trial portion of the study. Such caution would have attenuated the predicted effects.

Because the general findings were not extremely informative in the context of self-efficacy and social influence in mock juror decision-making, it would be best to address the limitations in a different study with a similar design. Accordingly, it would be a good idea to re-write the trial in a way that it would lean even more towards one side, so that it becomes more likely that results from the pilot test would emerge in the actual study. Moreover, I recommend using dilemmas that are more similar in the context of judging a civil trial instead of employing scenarios that do not have anything in common with serving as a judge in a civil trial. This way one can ensure that the manipulation of

self-efficacy translates to the actual task. It would also be important to examine the effects of self-efficacy and argument strength on the final verdict decision in an actual deliberation. This could be done by either employing confederates that argue against the participant's initial belief, and/or by coding the deliberation for changes in opinion and the strengths of arguments that participants (i.e., mock jurors) bring up during discussion.

APPENDIX A:
STIMULUS MATERIALS

JUSTICE DILEMMAS

Instructions: You will now see ten scenarios that present justice dilemmas. Justice dilemmas are situations where a decision must be made that has ethical implications but for which the most just option is not immediately clear. Please read each scenario thoroughly. At the end of each scenario you will be asked to respond to a question. Specifically, you will be asked to state whether you would or would not respond in a particular way to the justice dilemma. There are no clear wrong or right answers. However, according to experts on ethical behavior, one of the positions is more defensible than the other. You will not be asked to justify your answer, but only to choose between “yes” or “no.” If you are not certain how you would respond, simply mark the answer that indicates which way you are leaning. Please try to respond to all 10 scenarios.

1. Mr. and Mrs. Ramirez have been working as prep-cooks at a popular Italian restaurant for over four years. They both enjoy their work and get along with their co-workers well. One day, the restaurant gets inspected by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency, and all the employees are asked for documentation. Because Mrs. and Mr. Ramirez came to the United States illegally 15 years ago, they can only show expired passports that were issued in their home country El Salvador, and they do not have a work visa either. They explain to one of the officers that they have a 13-year-old son who was born and raised in the United States. The authorities cannot deport the son because he is an American citizen. Husband and wife plead with the officer to grant them that they can stay in the United States for one more week, so they can come up with a solution for their son’s living arrangements, and sort things out for his future. The officer has the authority to grant them that week. What do you think? Should the officer overlook their illegal status and allow them to stay in the United States for one more week, although he would be deviating from the rules a little bit?

Yes

No

2. The clerk of a liquor store just confiscated another fake identification a teenager showed him. He is very concerned that the authorities are going to close down the store when they find out that this would be the fourteenth time this week that a person under age has tried to buy alcohol with a fake ID. The owner of the store warned the clerk last week that the more fake identification he confiscates, the higher is the likelihood that authorities will wonder how many times the clerks of the liquor store do not notice somebody with a fake ID, and therefore would suspect that many more people buy alcohol illegally at this particular store. The clerk knows that he would risk the closing of the store and losing his job if he reported the teenager. On the other hand, he undoubtedly would get in a lot of trouble if the authorities found out that he did not report the incident. Should the

clerk report keep the incident to himself, destroy the fake identification, and pretend it never happened?

Yes

No

3. Mrs. Thompson is grading the final exam of her history class and comes across Joanna's exam. Joanna's score is a 268. The teacher knows that Joanna has been struggling a lot lately. Her mother got very sick a couple of months ago, and because she is the oldest of four siblings, Joanna started taking on a lot of responsibility. She began working full-time and taking care of her siblings. Not surprisingly, Joanna's grades dropped tremendously, and Mrs. Thompson is aware of the fact that if Joanna does not receive a 270 the final exam, she will lose the funding for her schooling. She talked about her worries with other teachers, and tried hard to come up with a plan that would allow Joanna to continue getting funded, despite of getting a 270 in the final. Mrs. Thompson considers giving every student in her class two points more, and thus increasing the entire distribution of exam scores in order to raise Joanna's grade. To her dismay, the other teachers have not been supportive at all, and told Mrs. Thompson to grade her as she would any other student because they believe it would not be fair to just give everybody a better score. Mrs. Thompson knows that the other teachers might become suspicious and question her grading if she only gives Joanna a 270, but also believes that the other teachers might not be happy if she adds two points to the distribution. Should Mrs. Thompson risk giving every student an extra two points?

Yes

No

4. A woman in worn-down clothes holding a crying toddler is walking into a drugstore and ordering Tylenol at the pharmacy. She then browses the stores, and picks up some diapers and other toiletries. Mrs. Graham who works at the drugstore is observing the woman. Because they live in a small community, Mrs. Graham's neighbor told her that the father of the child left the woman over night and took all their belongings. Furthermore, she heard that the woman has not been able to find a job because she needs to take care of her child. The woman now is approaching the exit of the drugstore without appearing as if she intends to stop at the cashier. However, from where she is standing, Mrs. Graham cannot see whether the woman is still carrying the items or not. Therefore, calling the woman out if she was not stealing anything would be embarrassing to both the woman and Mrs. Graham. Should Mrs. Graham pretend as if she did not see the woman?

Yes

No

5. While walking down the hallway of her high school, Carol sees a 20-dollar bill slipping out of the jeans pocket of the girl walking approximately 30 feet ahead of her. Carol runs toward the spot where the girl lost the money, picks up the bill,

and is about to shout out to the girl in front of her. However, at that moment, the girl turns around and Carol realizes it is Angela, a girl in her class who has been bullying her constantly over the past year and half. Carol hesitates, and does not know what she should do. What would you do? Would you keep the 20 dollars?

Yes

No

6. Anna and Susie are as close as sisters can be. They are best friends, do everything together, and share most of their secrets with one another. Susie noticed a while ago that Anna has been stealing money from their mother's wallet on a regular basis. A couple of days ago, she approached Anna, and asked her how much money she has been stealing so far, and for what she needs it. Anna responded that it is none of her sister's business, and she has not been stealing a whole lot of money anyways. Susie told her to stop stealing the money, and that otherwise she would have to tell their mother who has been struggling making ends meet for a while now. However, Anna responded that if Susie told on her, she would never talk to her again. Ever since, Anna has kept on stealing a couple of dollars every week, and Susie has no idea what to do. Should Susie tell their mother about Anna's behavior?

Yes

No

7. On his way home, a police officer notices a group of teenage boys trying to steal bicycles from the local school yard. While crossing the street and approaching the three boys, he notices that one of them is his best friend's son who has been getting in trouble a lot lately. His friend has told him that if his son gets caught doing something illegal again, he will most likely have to go to juvenile detention. The officer knows that his friend has been trying to do everything to keep his son out of trouble. He realizes that if he arrests the boy now, it would break his friend's heart. On the other hand, it is his duty to do his job. Should the police officer arrest the boys?

Yes

No

8. Mr. Cummings eventually filed for divorce because his wife did not make an effort to stop drinking and to use drugs. Ever since their daughter was born three years ago, his wife's unhealthy behavior increased to the extent that she was not capable of taking care of their daughter. Accordingly, the court granted Mr. Cummings full custody of the child, and Mr. Cummings decided that his ex-wife should not have contact with their daughter until she completely sobers up and leads a responsible lifestyle. Six months later, Mrs. Cummings told her ex-husband that she is completely clean now, has been working at the local diner for the past month, and wishes more than anything to see her child. She asks Mr. Cummings for permission to take their daughter to the zoo this weekend. Should Mr. Cummings allow his ex-wife to take their daughter to the zoo?

Yes

No

9. A police officer rings the door bell of Mr. and Mrs. Jones, and asks them to disclose any information they might have about the possible whereabouts of their son Tommy, a 33-year-old bartender. Apparently, his good friend had seen him at the scene of a burglary. The police officer cannot provide any more details, but assures the parents that everything is going to be okay. What do you think? Should the parents tell the police officer where their son currently might be?

Yes

No

10. Although he had passed his driver's license exam on the first trial, Robert is not a safe driver. He has been in three accidents within the past six months, and his parents are not comfortable letting him drive anymore. Therefore, when his mother and father are about to leave on a business trip they tell Robert that he is not allowed to drive the car at all during their time gone because they are very concerned for his and other people's safety. They take away his license, but the father promises Robert to sign him up for additional driving classes as soon as they come back. A few days later, Robert receives a call from his best friend's mother who tells him that his friend is in the hospital and nobody knows what is wrong, but that his friend is not doing well at all. The mother desperately begs Robert to pick up some clothes and her phone book from their house because she has been staying with is friend in the hospital for two nights already, and she does not have any other phone numbers to contact anybody else. Robert is the only one who can do her the favor. This way he would also find out more about his friend's well-being. Should Robert take his parents' car against their wishes and without having his driver's license?

Yes

No

POSITIVE FEEDBACK

Thank you for responding to the previous scenarios!

The previous justice scenarios tested to what extent you are capable of making sound and fair judgments.

We compared your responses to what answers experts on ethical behavior provided. According to this scoring system, you obtained 8 out of 10 possible points. Because respondents score on average 6 out of 10 possible points, you did better responding to the justice scenarios than most other college student.

NEGATIVE FEEDBACK

Thank you for responding to the previous scenarios!

The previous justice scenarios tested to what extent you are capable of making sound and fair judgments.

We compared your responses to what answers experts on ethical behavior provided. According to this scoring system, you obtained 6 out of 10 possible points. Because respondents score on average 8 out of 10 possible points, you performed somewhat worse on the justice scenarios than most other college student.

NO FEEDBACK

Thank you for responding to the previous scenarios!

DEFINITIONS

Instructions: You now will begin with the second part of the study assessing juror decision-making. The following paragraph contains some legal definitions that are usually used in law enforcement. Although you are probably familiar with most of these, please read over them. Then, click the “Next” button to proceed.

In the courtroom, the **plaintiff** is the person who initiates the lawsuit and is suing (*here: Kathy Summers*) the **defendant** (*here: Chemco Chemicals, Inc.*). The **defense attorney** represents the defendant, while the **plaintiff’s attorney** represents the plaintiff. In a civil court case, **liable** means legally responsible.

CIVIL CASE SUMMARY

Instructions: Now, please think of yourself as an individual juror for a civil trial. Imagine that you have been selected to serve on a jury, and you will be asked to determine whether the defendant is legally responsible for the plaintiff's injury. The civil case and trial summary will appear on your screen shortly. First, you will see the case summary, and then you will be presented with the trial summary. Please read the summaries thoroughly, as you would if you were serving on a real jury in a real courtroom. Feel free to take as much time as you want to consider and scrutinize all the evidence presented during trial. After reading the summaries, you will be asked to make a decision regarding the defendant's liability. Thus, it is very important that you examine each argument carefully.

Kathy Summers v. Chemco Chemicals Inc.

Kathy Summers is suing the large chemical manufacturing company Chemco Chemicals Inc. She claims that a chemical, called Metolachlor, which the company stores at a dump one mile from her house, has seeped into the neighborhood's water supply, and that regularly drinking the contaminated water caused her bladder cancer.

If Metolachlor leaked from the dump into the neighborhood's water supply and Metoachlor causes cancer, the chemical company is liable (i.e., legally responsible) for compensatory damages. If not, then the chemical company is not liable (i.e., not legally responsible).

CIVIL TRIAL SUMMARY

Plaintiff case:

Kathy Summers was the first witness called by her attorney. The 63-year-old woman stated that she moved to the neighborhood three months ago and she had been diagnosed with bladder cancer six weeks ago. She also said that she regularly had been drinking tap water and is certain that the contaminated water caused her cancer. She does not have any family history of cancer and never had experienced any major health problems. During cross-examination, it came out that Mrs. Summers is uncertain about the chemical composition of Metolachlor and does not know in what way it could cause cancer.

Next, Timothy Warren, a representative of Greenpeace, an environmental watchdog organization, was called as a witness. He is certain that the water contains toxic chemicals because a disproportionately high number of wildlife has been dying in the area. During cross-examination Warren admitted that he is unsure about what specific chemicals are contaminating the water, and whether they actually can cause cancer.

The third witness in the plaintiff case was Melanie Grey, a Ph.D. in chemistry working for the International Agency for Research on Cancer. Dr. Grey stated that her research shows that drinking water including high levels of Metolachlor is hazardous, and could even be deadly to someone's health. The risk of developing bladder cancer among people drinking water with Metolachlor is 57% higher than that of those drinking uncontaminated water. Dr. Grey also testified that she had been taking specimen from the water, and found that some samples contained Metolachlor, but results from other samples turned out to be inconclusive. When the defense attorney questioned her about the incubation time relating to bladder cancer, she said that when lab rats drank water, which was highly contaminated by Metolachlor, in most of the rodents' systems bladder cancer became readily apparent after twelve weeks.

Defendant case:

The president of Chemco Chemicals Inc., Robert Smith, was the first witness called by the defense. He admitted that Metolachlor leaked from the dump into the neighborhoods water supply, but its levels were so low that it could not have lead to any health problems after drinking the water. When asked by the defense, what constitutes low levels of Metolachlor and how much milligrams of Metolachlor contained in water would be likely to produce bladder cancer, Mr. Smith was unable to give an answer.

The defense then called Dr. Henry Cole, Associate Director for Ecology within the United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA). Dr. Cole testified that the US EPA classified Metolachlor as a Category C pesticide, which indicates limited evidence of its ability to produce cancer. Due to this reason, he affirmed that there is no set maximum concentration for Metolachlor that is allowed in drinking water. Moreover, he stated that Metolachlor commonly is solved in drinking water causing no harm to the

general population because it has been detected in ground and surface water throughout the United States.

Next, the defense attorney brought out Susan Miller, Mrs. Summers' neighbor. Mrs. Miller stated that while having coffee with the plaintiff a while ago, Mrs. Summers told her that she barely ever drinks tap water because she prefers flavored beverages over plain water. Mrs. Summers also confided in Mrs. Miller that she is indebted to the degree that she does not know how to pay for her medical bills and her son's college education, and that she needs to figure out a way to make money fast. During cross-examination, it came out that the plaintiff recently started working overtime at the local grocery store.

STRONG ARGUMENTS

Instructions: If you were a real juror serving on a real trial in a courtroom, you would interact with other jurors. While the present study's main focus is on an individual level, we would still like to give you some other people's perspectives that might occur during a trial like this. Please read over the positions that two other jurors could take.

Juror 1:

I thought that the company should be held accountable for Mrs. Summers injury because a Greenpeace representative gave evidence that much wildlife has been dying all of a sudden and in the same area that the plaintiff lives in, which supports the point that the drinking water contains high levels of the chemical, which lead to the death of plants and animals. Also, a reputable chemist testified that high levels of Metolachlor are very dangerous and could lead to serious health problems. It has been shown that the likelihood of a person getting bladder cancer after drinking water that is contaminated with this chemical is 57% higher than after drinking water that does not contain this chemical. The neighbor's testimony seems pure hearsay. Mrs. Summers could have still drunk tap water in addition to other beverages. Because she was diagnosed with bladder cancer and drinking water contains this chemical, which undoubtedly can lead to bladder cancer, the company should be held liable.

Juror 2:

I am convinced that the chemical company is definitely legally responsible. The CEO of the chemical company admitted that there was a leakage and the chemical undoubtedly spilled from the dump into the water supply, which is unacceptable and puts people at immense risk of developing health problems, even if the concentration is low. It is surprising that Kathy Summers developed bladder cancer, although she had always been very healthy before the spill and nobody in her family had ever experienced bladder cancer. In addition, Dr. Grey, who is a chemist and very involved in research on cancer, found in her research that the probability of developing bladder cancer is 57% higher when a person drinks water containing this chemical compared to when the person consumes drinking water that does not contain the chemical. Thus, it is without a doubt more likely than not that Mrs. Summers drank water that contained the chemical, and this caused her to have bladder cancer now.

WEAK ARGUMENTS

Instructions: If you were a real juror serving on a real trial in a courtroom, you would interact with other jurors. While the present study's main focus is on an individual level, we would still like to give you some other people's perspectives that might occur during a trial like this. Please read over the positions that two other jurors could take.

Juror 1:

I found the company legally responsible because Mrs. Summers said that she had been drinking tap water, and she is sure that it caused her bladder cancer. There is no reason for her to lie because she stated this under testimony in court. It is pretty obvious that she must have gotten the cancer from drinking water that was contaminated with a dangerous chemical. A chemist also did research and proved that rats developed bladder cancer when they drank water that contained the chemical. I am sure that Mrs. Summers got bladder cancer from the chemical, and this is the fault of the company.

Juror 2:

I believe that the chemical company is guilty. Dr. Grey who is working for a big research agency found in her research that rodents developed bladder cancer twelve weeks after they had drunk water that contained the chemical. Although the woman got bladder cancer after a shorter time period, the incubation time can just be different for humans compared to rats. The fact is that Mrs. Summers has bladder cancer, and she testified that she got it after she moved to the neighborhood. So the water supply must contain the bad chemical. There is no other way that she could have gotten bladder cancer.

APPENDIX B:
QUESTIONNAIRES

ROSENBERG SELF-ESTEEM SCALE

The next measure is a global measure of your feelings about yourself. Please answer the next ten items using the following scale.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
disagree very much much			neither agree nor disagree			agree very

_____ I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others.

_____ I feel that I have a number of good qualities.

_____ All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.

_____ I am able to do things as well as most other people.

_____ I feel I do not have much to be proud of.

_____ I take a positive attitude toward myself.

_____ On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.

_____ I wish I could have more respect for myself.

_____ At times I feel that I am useless.

_____ At times I think I am no good at all.

GENERAL SELF-EFFICACY SCALE

Instructions: Please indicate how much you believe the statements are true, using the following scale. Please write the number you think fits best next to each statement.

- 1 = Not at all true
- 2 = Hardly true
- 3 = Moderately true
- 4 = Exactly true

I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough.

If someone opposes me, I can find means and ways to get what I want.

It is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals.

I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events.

Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen situations.

I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort.

I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my coping abilities.

When I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several solutions.

If I am in trouble, I can usually think of something to do.

No matter what comes my way, I'm usually able to handle it.

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE AFFECT SCHEDULE

The scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment. Use the following scale to report your answers:

1	2	3	4	5
very slightly or not at all	a little	moderately	quite a bit	extremely

<p>_____ interested</p> <p>_____ distressed</p> <p>_____ excited</p> <p>_____ upset</p> <p>_____ strong</p> <p>_____ guilty</p> <p>_____ scared</p> <p>_____ hostile</p> <p>_____ enthusiastic</p> <p>_____ proud</p>	<p>_____ irritable</p> <p>_____ alert</p> <p>_____ ashamed</p> <p>_____ inspired</p> <p>_____ nervous</p> <p>_____ determined</p> <p>_____ attentive</p> <p>_____ jittery</p> <p>_____ active</p> <p>_____ afraid</p>
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VERDICT

Instructions: Now, please indicate your individual decision regarding the defendant's liability. Please determine the facts solely from the evidence provided in the case. The defendant is legally liable only if the defendant is more likely than not to have caused the plaintiff's injury.

Do you think the defendant (i.e., Chemco Chemicals Inc.) is liable or not liable?

Liable (i.e., should be held accountable for Mrs. Summers health)

Not liable (i.e., should not be held accountable for Mrs. Summers health)

How confident do you feel about your decision?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not confident at all						Extremely confident

DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE

Please respond to the following demographic questions.

1. What is your age? _____
2. What is your gender?
 - a. Male
 - b. Female
3. What is your ethnicity?
 - a. Caucasian
 - b. African-American / Black
 - c. Asian
 - d. Latino/a
 - e. Middle Eastern
 - f. Other (please indicate): _____

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VITA

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