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More's Utopia and the Christian Humanism in Petrarch's Latin Prose

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MORE'S UTOPIA AND THE CHRISTIAN HUMANISM IN PETRARCH'S LATIN PROSE

by

Robert Coogan, C.F.C.

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

June

1967
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CHAPTER I

PETRARCH AND THE ENGLISH RENAISSANCE

This dissertation will try to determine whether the Christian humanism in More's *Utopia* rests in the same tradition as the Christian humanism in Petrarch's Latin prose. In *Petrarch and the Renascence*, Whitfield notes:

The beginning of the fifteenth century is dominated by the full gospel of Petrarch. So far there is development, and a crystallisation of his ideas which involves some change, but they are still plainly recognisable; and for the establishment of the foundations Europe owes a debt to Petrarch greater than to any other single figure since.¹

By the time that More wrote *Utopia*, the political, moral, and intellectual developments that were creating the modern world had affected the main principles of Petrarch's humanism. Nationalists were frustrating his desire to see Christendom united under Pope and emperor. Pagan humanists were proposing ethical standards that were the antithesis of Petrarch's Christian morality. The civic humanists were modifying his views on the life of solitude. In Florence, of course, the fiery Savonarola was waging Petrarch's war against corruption within the Church. Erasmus and Colet were rediscovering the treasures in Scripture by employing Petrarch's method of textual study. Ficino's Academy and More's circle were both enriching themselves with the wisdom of Socrates in the Platonic revival that Petrarch had encouraged. In addition to these disparate and dynamic

forces, the invention of the printing press was bestowing an extensive and an enduring glory on the name of Petrarch. Although all of these factors influenced the development of Petrarch's ideal, this study will try to see whether traces of his humanism survive in the *Utopia.*

In *Utopia,* especially the Christian humanist, Raphael Hythloday, embodies Petrarch's thought. As an independent philosopher, a humanist scholar, and a Christian reformer, he represents aspirations that figure prominently in Petrarch. In regard to vice and virtue, Hythloday's views reflect a Renaissance attitude toward life that is proposed in Petrarch's Latin prose and is crystallized in Pico's *Oration on the Dignity of Man.* Finally, bonds link an ideal of man that can be abstracted from Petrarch's works with a corresponding figure that can be derived from More's *Utopia.*

Since there are no major studies that try to define specifically the relationship between Petrarch's Latin prose and the revival of learning in England, it is necessary to determine the nature of Petrarch's influence upon the English Renaissance in general and upon the More circle in particular. Scholarship has focused principally upon the effect of the extremely popular *Canzoniere* to the neglect of the *Triumphs* and the Latin works. This chapter will try to determine whether one should be skeptical of the traditional formula that relates Petrarch to the English Renaissance. This formula, which will be explained at once, looks at Petrarch from three different points of view.
In general, a period of influence is assigned to each category of Petrarch's works—the Latin prose, the Triumphs, and the Canzoniere. Of these three, Petrarch would consider his Latin writings as his most important contribution to letters, for it is here that he proposes and repeats again and again the tenets of his humanism. A rapid survey of the reception granted to the Triumphs and the Canzoniere shows how the customary norms have failed to determine accurately Petrarch's effect upon English thought. Finally, a more detailed study of Petrarch's influence as a humanist leads to a modification of the traditional formula that limits the impact of Petrarch's Latin prose works.

Ernest Hatch Wilkins, a capable scholar, has formulated the traditional view of the relationship between the divisions of Petrarch's works and the degree of influence that Petrarch has exerted upon thought in Europe:

From each of the three divisions there proceeded, beginning in Petrarch's lifetime, a specific wave of influence. . . . In Italy the wave from the Latin works reached its peak in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, diminished thereafter, and virtually disappeared in the seventeenth century. The wave from the Triumphs reached its peak in the fifteenth century, diminished thereafter, and virtually disappeared in the sixteenth century. The wave of the Canzoniere, of lesser strength, until the latter part of the fifteenth century, than the wave from the Triumphs, thereafter gained strength swiftly, rose to a tremendous peak in the sixteenth century, and has diminished gradually since that time, though occasionally resurgent and still existent. ²

²Ernest Hatch Wilkins, "General Survey of Renaissance Petrarchism," Comparative Literature, II (1952), 328.
As far as England is concerned, this theory may be somewhat imprecise and may be summarily stated as follows. The Latin prose works, first noticed during the early part of the fifteenth century, are of greatest importance during the middle of this century and decline in significance during the last quarter of the same century. Introduced during the last part of the fifteenth century, the Triumphs are popular until the middle of the sixteenth century. Finally, the Canzoniere, noticeable in the first half of the sixteenth century, have their greatest effect in the last half of the century. Even though Wilkins himself admits that schemes of this nature must not be applied rigidly, the manifestations of Petrarch's thought in England reveal that a far more flexible view than his must be adopted.

By way of introduction to this question of Petrarchan influence in England, the unique position of Chaucer must be noted. He reveals the influence of two categories of Petrarch's work. In the Clerk's Tale (ca. 1385), Chaucer makes use of Petrarch's Latin prose rendition of Boccaccio's tale of the patient Griselda. Although Petrarch, the moral philosopher, objected to the ribald tales in the Decameron, he admired this tale of Griselda's endurance. In Troilus and Criseyde (ca. 1385; Book I, 400-420), Chaucer uses Petrarch's sonnet "S'amor non è, che dunque è quel ch'io sento?"

Over an hundred years pass before English writers again show a significant indebtedness to the Canzoniere. The sonnets of Wyatt (d. 1542) and Surrey (d.1547) were obviously beholden to Petrarch,
yet they remained relatively unknown until the publication of Tottel's Miscellany (1557)—one of the most important volumes in the history of English poetry. Tottel's work was followed by several imitative Elizabethan miscellanies. A Handful of Pleasant Delights (1566) contained no Petrarchan sonnets. The only sonnet found in The Paradise of Dainty Devices (1576) was removed from later editions. A Gorgeous Gallery of Gallant Inventions (1578) had four sonnets. Although Tottel's Miscellany inspired some minor poets to compose sonnets, this anthology did not create a wave of interest in Petrarch.

The last decade of the sixteenth century is truly the highpoint of interest in the Canzoniere. The publication in 1591 of Sidney's Astrophel and Stella, which was composed between 1580-1584, initiated the rage for the sonnet in England. Although Sidney commends Surrey's lyrics in The Defense of Poesy,3 Sidney's indebtedness to Petrarch originated more on the Continent than in England. His trips to Europe brought him under the sway of Du Bellay and Ronsard. Moved by Sidney's sonnet sequence, Lodge, Daniel, Constable, Spenser, and Shakespeare either wrote or published their sonnets in the last decade of the century.

As a result of this rapid investigation, Wilkins' theory may now be stated with more precision. Any isolated instances similar to Chaucer's use of Petrarch's sonnets deserves acknowledgement—treatment in detail is not necessary. Because of their importance, Tottel's

Miscellany and Sidney's *Astrophel and Stella* must be recognized as germinal texts from which two distinct phases of Petrarchism developed. The first stage centers about Wyatt, Surrey, and the Miscellany. The second and most important period necessarily focuses upon Sidney, his relationship to the Pleiade, and the English sonneteers of the last decade of the sixteenth century.

The *Triumphs*, though not so popular as the *Canzoniere*, fail to conform exactly to Wilkins' theory. They are of particular interest since there is substantial evidence that they guided More's composition of a series of short poems (ca. 1500). A brief examination of Petrarch's *Triumphs* and some of More's early poems shows a relationship between Petrarch and More. Except for a reference in Reed's philological notes to the *English Works*, there appears to be no study of this link between More and the founder of Christian humanism.  

Thus, this analysis can hardly be termed a digression. It not only reveals a bond between More and Petrarch, but it also leads one to believe that More may have been the first poet in England who composed under the inspiration of Petrarch's *Triumphs*.

In his youth, More prepared a painted cloth with nine pageants, with vernacular verses over each one of the first eight pageants, and with Latin verses over the ninth pageant. The first and second pageants, dealing with childhood and manhood, have little

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direct association with the ideas in Petrarch. It is important, however, that six of the remaining seven pageants demonstrate the triumph of love, chastity, death, fame, time, and eternity. They show the same order and the same conquests as Petrarch’s *Triumphs*.

More’s third pageant, "Venus and Cupyde," corresponds to Petrarch’s first poem, "The Triumph of Love." More’s painting on cloth depicts a young man lying on the ground. Lady Venus and Cupid both stand in triumph over the young man. In his verses upon this pageant, More describes the lover made a thrall by the fiery darts of Cupid. The concept of thralldom prevails throughout Petrarch’s "Triumph of Love." Petrarch’s Love seems more severe than does More’s Cupid. Writing at the beginning of his second "Triumph," but referring to the characters that figured in the first "Triumph," Petrarch uses expressions similar to More’s verses; he refers to Venus, her winged son, and Cupid’s fiery darts as the conquerors of youth.

More’s fourth pageant depicts an old and sage father sitting in a chair. Venus and Cupid lie under his feet. More’s verse remarks upon the conquest of love by old age. In addition to the comment that old age—wise and discreet—is the best part of life, More notes that in maturity one labors in weighty matters for the public welfare. In Petrarch’s corresponding poem, "The Triumph of Chastity," there is no reference to the service for the commonwealth. This difference between the two poems may be an illustration of the greater civic-mindedness of the English humanists which is often used to
distinguish between the English and the Italian Renaissance. Petrarch, however, does have a reference to Discretion in the train of virtues that conquer love:

Penser canuti in giovenile etate,
E la concordia ch'è si rara al mondo
V'era con Castità somma Beltate. . . .

On his fifth pageant, More painted an image of Death under whose feet lies the old man who was seen in the fourth pageant. More's Death, a male, is "foule, ugly lene and mysshape." This pageant portrays the subject matter of Petrarch's "Triumph of Death." Petrarch's Death, though a lady, is suitably horrid:

Ed una donna involta investa negra,
Con un furor qual io non so se mai
Al tempo de' giganti fusse a Flegra. . . .

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And sage Discretion, seldom seen below,
Where the full veins with youthful ardor glow;
Benevolence and Harmony of soul
Were there, but rarely found from pole to pole;
And there consummate Beauty shone, combined
With all the pureness of an angel-mind. . . .
The Italian title will be cited as Rime, Trionfi e Poesie latine, the English as Triumphs.

7 English Works, I, 334.

8 Rime, Trionfi e Poesie latine, p. 518; Triumphs, p. 316:
"Another ensign dreadful to mine eye--
A lady clothed in black, whose stern looks were
With horror fill'd, and did like hell appear,
Advanced, and said. . . ."
Although the thought of Petrarch's poem centers on the loss of Laura, both poems express the conventional attitude that pride is to be one of the victims of Death.

More's sixth pageant, the triumph of Lady Fame over Death, depicts Fame living in the voice and in the perpetual memory of the people. Although Petrarch does not describe her in the same way in the Trionfi, he does consider Fame as the voice of the people in the Secretum. Petrarch's Lady Fame expressed the usual belief that Fame is victor over Death. More merely mentions that noble men live in memory; but Petrarch, who has greater opportunity for dilatation, describes some of the heroes of antiquity whose fame overcame Death.

More's seventh pageant, like Petrarch's "Triumph of Time," describes Time as the conqueror of Fame. More's Time, proud and angry, objects to simple Fame's audacious attempt to promise man's name an immortality. Petrarch's Time has the same emotional make-up as More's. It cannot tolerate the competition it has received from men whose fame has lasted thousands of years. It gets its revenge by the conquest of the famous names that have hitherto achieved an equality with Time.

In More's eighth pageant and in Petrarch's "Triumph of Eternity," each poet reveals Time as the mobility of sun and moon and

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as the victim of Eternity. In the picture under More's verses, there
is an image of Lady Eternity, wearing an imperial crown and sitting
upon a throne under a sumptuous cloth of state. In Petrarch's "Triumph
of Eternity," Eternity also reigns alone:

Quel che l'anima nostra preme e 'ngombra:
"Dianzi, adesso, ier diman, mattino e sera"
Tutti in un punto passeran com' ombra.

Non avrà loco "fu" "sara" né "era;"
Ma "è" solo in presente, ed "ora" ed "oggi"
E sola eternità raccolta e'ntera. . . .10

Petrarch's "Triumph of Eternity," in addition to being the
last poem, comments upon the theme of all six Triumphs. It contains
summary generalizations which are relative to More's ninth pageant
on the poet. More's Latin poem and Petrarch's "Triumph of Eternity"
give the moral for all of the preceding poems: man should recognize
the vanity of passing goods and should trust in God. More answers
the question raised by Petrarch's statement upon the theme of the

Triumphs: "In che ti fidi?"

Namque videbit vtì fragilis bona lubrica mundi,
Tam cito non veniunt, quam cito pretereunt,
Gaudia laus & honor, celeri pede omnia cedunt,
Qui manet excepto semper amore dei.

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10 Rime, Trionfi e Poesie latine, p. 556; Triumphs, p. 346:
"Those spacious regions where our fancies roam,
Pain'd by the past, expecting ills to come,
In some dread moment, by the fates assign'd,
Shall pass away, nor leave a rack behind;
And Time's revolving wheels shall lose at last
The speed that spins the future and the past;
And, sovereign of an undisputed throne,
Awful eternity shall reign alone. . . ."
Ergo homines, leuibus iamiam diffidite rebus,
Nulla recessuro spes adhibenda bono.
Qui dabit eternam nobis pro munere vitam,
In permansuro ponite vota deo. 11

These lines of More echo Petrarch's sentiments which state the motif of the Triumphs:

Dapoi che sotto'1 cielo cosa non vidi
Stabile e ferma, tutto sbigottito
Mi volsi al cor e dissi: "In che ti fidi?"

Rispose: "Nel Signor, chi mai fallito
Non à promessa a chi si fida in lui
Ma ben veggio che'l mondo m'à schernito,

E sento quel ch'i' sono e quel ch'i' fui,
E veggio andar, anzi volare, il tempo... . . . 12

11 English Works, I, sig.Giii; The Latin Epigrams of Thomas More, ed. with transl. L. Bradner and C. Lynch (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 238: "For he will see that the elusive goods of this perishable world do not come so readily as they pass away. Pleasures, praise, homage, all things quickly disappear—except the love of God, which endures forever. Therefore, mortals, put no confidence hereafter in trivialities, no hope in transitory advantage; offer your prayers to the everlasting God, who will grant us the gift of eternal life."

12 Rime, Trionfi e Poesie latine, p. 554; Triumphs, pp. 343-344:

"When all beneath the ample cope of heaven
I saw, like clouds before the tempest driven,
In sad vicissitude's eternal round,
A while I stood in holy horror bound;
And thus at last with self-exploring mind,
Musing, I ask'd, 'What basis I could find
To fix my trust?' An inward voice replied,
'Trust to the Almighty: He thy steps shall guide;
He never fails to hear the faithful prayer,
But worldly hope must end in dark despair.'
Now, what I am, and what I was, I know;
I see the seasons in procession go
With still increasing speed... . . ."
In spite of the brevity of More's verses and the influence of the paintings on the cloths, the order and the subject matter selected by More demonstrate a close relationship with Petrarch at the very time when the Triumphs were first noticed in England. One is led to conclude that More, in all probability, not only read the Triumphs but also admired them. The minor differences in subject matter and the use of nine poems by More, as opposed to the six Triumphs of Petrarch, are characteristic of the way that the artists of the English Renaissance modified whatever they had borrowed from foreign sources. As a result of the analysis of these poems, it is safe to say that More had contact with Petrarch's thought. From this relationship, one might conjecture that More was aware also of De remediis, De vita solitaria, De ignorantia, Secretum, and Epistolae familiares—the documents that gave birth to the Christian humanism of the Renaissance.

It is now necessary to return to Wilkins' theory which claims that Petrarch's Triumphs were popular principally during the middle of the sixteenth century, presumably 1540-1560. More's indebtedness to these poems testifies to the interest in them at the beginning of the sixteenth century. In 1554, Henry Parker's translation of the Triumphs attests to their great popularity in mid-century. The general lines of Wilkins' theory receives further verification in Ascham's reference to Petrarch's Triumphs. In The Scholemaster (1563-1568), Ascham's statement that the Triumphs of Petrarch were more revered than the Genesis of Moses would seem to indicate that the culmination of interest
in the Triumphs occurred at the center of the sixteenth century. Yet early in the century, the Triumphs were popular enough to provide the motif for the painted cloth that adorned More's home. As late as 1568, these poems were so popular that they competed with Scripture. Therefore, the thesis that has ascribed particular years of influence to the Canzoniere and other years to the Triumphs needs some careful qualification.

If the system which defines the relationship of Petrarch's vernacular poetry to the English Renaissance needs modification, it is possible that the effect of Petrarch's humanism may not have been accurately described. The traditional opinion which limits the influence of Petrarch's Latin prose can be challenged first by resorting to the records of incunabula and of early printing. Secondly, the vitality of Petrarch can be gauged by measuring the vogue of Petrarch's thought in Italy during the period when the English pre-humanist and humanist travellers visited there. Thirdly, a study of the impression that Petrarch made upon these travellers will help depict the popularity of Petrarch in England. Fourthly, since Erasmus and More were of one mind on many issues, Erasmus' opinion of Petrarch will show, in a general way, how the More circle regarded Petrarch. Finally, a study of More's early poems on Fortune appears to reveal a direct relationship between More and Petrarch's Latin prose. A consideration of each of these elements should help to establish the influence of

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Petrarch's Latin prose on the early English Renaissance as well as on More himself.

First, the dissemination of Petrarch's humanism by the printing presses of Europe reveals that Petrarch's Latin prose was still in demand when More wrote Utopia. Even though no study of incunabula can be considered definitive and the work on the proposed monument of scholarship in this area, the Gesamtkatalog der Wiegendrucke, has ceased as a result of the Second World War, a valid estimate of Petrarch's popularity can be established.

Petrarch was not printed in England at Caxton's press; but Caxton, who was the mouthpiece of the sentiments of the nobility and of the London merchants, had almost no interest in the work of the humanists. It is also noteworthy that England had fewer editions of incunabula than any other major nation. 14

An idea of Petrarch's popularity can be seen in the seven editions of the De vita solitaria published between 1473 and 1517. 15 Fiske's study shows the exceptional popularity of De remediis utriusque fortunae. 16 Exclusive of the editions of De remediis found in the Opera, there were four independent editions between 1474 and 1515.


15 Petrarch, De vita solitaria, ed. Antonio Altamura (Naples: D. Amodio, 1943), pp. 10-11. This edition will be cited as De vita solitaria.

There were nine incomplete editions of *De remediis* between 1460 and 1515. During the last fifteen years of the fifteenth century, *De remediis* was published twice in conjunction with *De vera sapientia*. There were five editions of *De remediis* in Spanish between 1510 and 1534; five editions in German between 1478 and 1539; one Bohemian edition in 1501; and a French edition in 1523. It is interesting to note that the first French translation was ordered by Charles V in 1378, and a second French translation was made for Louis XII in 1503. The first English translation was offered to Queen Elizabeth in 1579. The introduction to the 1503 French translation considers Petrarch as a moral guide who is noted for his eloquence. There is no mention of the *Triumphs* nor of the *Canzoniere*, but Petrarch is commended for the elegance of his Latin. In Thomas Twyne's capable English translation, Petrarch is the moral philosopher who provides comfort in tribulation. The exceptional popularity of *De remediis* is significant. A later chapter will try to show how this book is a seminal document from which a Renaissance concept of man develops.

The standard guide to incunabula, Hain's *Repertorium Bibliographicum*, reveals that before 1500 there were three editions of Petrarch's complete works, four editions of *De remediis*, two editions of *De vera sapientia*, three editions of the *Secretum*, four editions of

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Psalmi poenitentiales, one edition of Rerum memorandarum libri, two editions of De viris illustribus, and two editions of Epistolae familiares. Copinger's supplement to Hain's work adds an edition of De vita solitaria and an edition of Psalmi poenitentiales. Even though records of incunabula and of early printing show that Petrarch's Latin prose was popular, it must be remembered that these records are incomplete. Neither Hain nor Copinger was aware of the 1473 edition of De viris illustribus and the 1489 edition of the Secretum printed by Gerard Leeu in Antwerp. Both of these texts are in the extensive Petrarch Collection at the Cornell University Library. These facts, derived from the history of printing, reveal that Petrarch's Latin prose was popular when More studied at Oxford and when he wrote the Utopia.

In addition to the dissemination of his works by the presses of Europe, Petrarch's thought was kept alive by the Italian humanists. But the influence of Petrarch's humanism on the works of his Italian followers does not have to be treated in depth in this study. Whitfield's Petrarch and the Renascence establishes the permanence of Petrarch's humanism in the works of Coluccio Salutati, Leonardo Bruni, Vittorino da Feltre, Guarino Veronese, Aeneas Sylvius, Lorenzo Valla,

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and Leone Alberti. An immediate inheritor of Petrarch's thought was Coluccio Salutati (1331-1406). He places Petrarch above the writers of antiquity. Petrarch's verse surpasses Virgil's, his prose excels Cicero's. Salutati's praise of the master knows no bounds—"nos autem habemus quem possimus et antiquitati et ipse Graeciae, non dicam obicere, sed preferre: unum hunc Franciscum Petrarcham." Another early humanist, Leonardo Bruni (1369-1444), wrote a biography of Petrarch. Bruni used to gaze on Petrarch's portrait frequently and would desire that he might win like laurels in scholarship. Hans Baron mentions that in one of the debates in Bruni's Dialogi, which were popular after 1460, the author tips the scale in favor of Petrarch.

Later humanists like Valla and Landino carried on Petrarch's endeavors. Valla (1407-1457), who was admired by Erasmus, was a disciple of Bruni. Bruni, reflecting Petrarch's thought, figures in Valla's dialogue, De vero bono, as the defender of the Stoic view that man should live according to nature and should practice only virtue as a means to the summum bonum. The Epicurean views in Valla's work form a part of the humanist background that is evident in Book II of Utopia. In his imaginary conversations, Disputationes Camaldulenses (1468), Cristoforo Landino (1424-1504) has Alberti and Lorenzo the Magnificent

debate the value of the active and contemplative careers. Lorenzo favors service to the state, but Alberti praises the life of rural meditation that Petrarch extols in De vita solitaria. Landino taught Latin to Politian, who, in turn, taught members of the More circle, Grocyn and Linacre, as well as Pico della Mirandola and Reuchlin. Politian, who praises Petrarch in his Nutricia, also is an inheritor of the early humanism:

The humanism of the first and second periods attained to the freedom of fine art in Poliziano. Through him, as through a lens, the rays of previous culture were transmitted in a column of pure light. He realized what the Italians had been striving after—the new birth of antiquity in a living man of the modern world.\(^{23}\)

The thought of Petrarch was kept alive in the major cities of Italy also by the work of his secretary, John of Ravenna. He spread the master's ideas in Florence, Padua, and Venice. Poggio Bracciolini, Francesco Filelfo, Leonardo Bruni, Guarino da Verona, and Vittorino da Feltre were his pupils.\(^{24}\) Hans Baron notes that Guarino da Verona and Vittorino da Feltre were disciples of Petrarch:

During the greater part of the period stretching from 1400 to 1500—the Quattrocento—and especially at its beginning, Renaissance humanists, building on the foundations laid by Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio, were busy creating a culture and literature intended as the common property of educated men in all social classes—laymen as well as clergy. In the famed boarding-schools of humanist educators like Guarino

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da Verona in Gerrara and Vittorino da Feltre in Mantua, the same curriculum of classical studies and physical exercises was required from every pupil. . . .

In regard to this point, Pierre de Nolhac arrives at the same conclusion as Hans Baron. After noting that the great effect of Petrarch on education is that youngsters begin to study the classics at once, De Nolhac identifies the humanism of Petrarch with the humanism of Erasmus and the Italian educators:

Great Italians like Guarino da Verona and Vittorino da Feltre, who had fed on his books, would sketch out a new theory and try the first experiments. Out of humanism the humanists were to rise. And when they flourished in other countries in the sixteenth century, Erasmus, Vives, Budaeus, and Melanchthon were in certain respects but the continuers of Petrarch.

The unique position of Florence in the fifteenth century is due to the influence of the triumvirate of Petrach, Boccaccio, and Salutati. Petrarch’s role as a moral philosopher and his loyalty to the Church are also bonds that keep him united with the later Christian humanists:

Our poet sought in philosophy only a means of becoming a better man; and for this he found a sure and completer means in the practice of the Christian life. Many bold spirits of the next age were to think like him. There is

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a certain eloquent prayer of Petrarch's, where the humanist gives way to the believer, where he kneels "before the God of knowledge, preferring Him to all study and instruction,"—a prayer whose accent we shall find again on the lips of Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola. 28

A final passage from Symonds emphasizes the common heritage between Petrarch and Ficino:

Ficino remained throughout his life an earnest Christian. . . . If he asserted that Socrates and Plato witnessed, together with the evangelists, to the truth of revelation, or that the same spirit inspired the law of Moses and the Greek philosopher—this, as he conceived it, was in effect little else than extending the catena of authority backward from the Christian fathers to the sages of the ancient world. The church, by admitting the Sibyls into the company of the prophets, virtually sanctioned the canonisation of Plato; while the comprehensive survey of history as an uninterrupted whole, which since the days of Petrarch had distinguished the nobler type of humanism, rendered Ficino's philosophical religion not unacceptable even to the orthodox. 29

The brief summary of the position of Petrarch's humanism in Italy during the fifteenth century reveals that his thought was still respected by his followers who remained loyal to the Christian faith after they embraced the New Learning.

It is now necessary to discover the relationship between Petrarch's thought and the journeys made to Italy by the prehumanist and humanist travellers from England. Probably the earliest contact between Petrarch and England was the conversations between Petrarch


and Richard de Bury, a learned advisor of Edward III. Nicholas Bildestone (d. 1441) was friendly with the Italian humanist Poggio when the latter visited England. They both met later in Rome in 1424 when Poggio proved of assistance to Bildestone who had been searching unsuccessfully for Petrarch's Latin works. Weiss notes that Bildestone's anxiety to read Petrarch is discussed in one of Piero du Monte's letters.

John Lydgate (d. 1451), who might have studied in Italy, was very much aware of Petrarch's position as a moral philosopher and guide. In the Fall of Princes, he speaks in some detail on the

De remediis:

Francis Petrark, off Florence the cite
Made a book, as I can reherce,
Off too Fortunys, welful and peruerse.

And ageyn bothe wrot the remedies,
In bookis twyne made a division,
A-mong rehersyng many fressh stories.
The firste book is thus conueied doun,
A dialoge twen Gladnesse and Resoun,
The seconde can ber me weel witnesse,
Maad atwen Resoun and Worldli Heuynesse.

The mater is wondirful delectable,
Thouh wo with ioie haue an interesse. ...
Lydgate speaks respectfully of Petrarch later in the work and considers him as a guide or ideal for others. He makes a fairly complete listing of Petrarch's Latin works, but he does not refer either to the Triumphs or to the Canzoniere. He mentions that Petrarch wrote De remediis, Bucolicum carmen, Itinerarium syriacum, Secretum, Africa, De ignorantia, De vita solitaria, Epistolae sine nomine, and Psalms poenitentiales.

Petrarch was popular among other English travellers. The ability of one Englishman as a scholar must have been quite considerable: John Phreas (d. 1465) was asked to compose an epitaph for Petrarch's tomb. William Grey (d. 1478), who studied at Florence, Padua, and Ferrara, possessed letters of Petrarch and donated a copy of Secretum to Balliol College in 1467. John Whethamstede (d. 1465) was aware of Petrarch because he probably inspected the very important Visconti Library at Pavia which contained Petrarch's collection of manuscripts. Whethamstede studied a commentary on Homer which can only be identified with Petrarch's marginalia in his Latin copy of the Iliad.

Other pre-humanist travellers to give copies of Petrarch's works to Oxford were Richard Bole, who presented the Secretum, and James...
Goldwell, who bestowed De remedios.  

John Russell (d. 1494), who became Bishop of Lincoln in 1480, possessed Petrarch's Epistolarum senilis. More's admiration for Russell is evident in The History of King Richard III:

At whiche counsaille also the Archebishops of Yorke Chauncelloure of Engelande, whiche hadde deliuered vpppe the greate Seale to the Queene, was thereof greatlye reproued, and the Seale taken from hym and deliuered to doctour Russell, bysshoppe of Lyncolne, a wyse manne & a good and of muche experyence, and one of the beste learned menne vndoubtedlye that Engelande hadde in hys time. 

Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, was another pre-humanist traveller whom More commended for his wisdom and learning. Gloucester was a correspondent with the Italian humanist, Decembrio, and their relationship probably terminated because of Gloucester's refusal to buy Petrarch's country house at Garignano for Decembrio. Gloucester possessed De remedios, Rerum memorandarum libri, and De vita solitaria.

The English travellers to Italy who did the most to bring the New Learning back to England were the humanists of the More circle--Linacre, Grocyn, Lyly, and Colet. During his years at Padua, Linacre would have had easy access to Petrarch's works. Arqua, which was a

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40 Ibid., p. 177

41 Ibid.


43 English Works, II, 51.

44 Weiss, Humanism during the Fifteenth Century, p. 60.

45 Ibid., p. 64.
favorite resort of the Paduans because Petrarch had died there, was very close to Padua and was known also as Arqua Petrarca. Linacre's attempts to purify medical studies from Arabian influences also is relevant to Petrarch. Petrarch supplied the greatest initial impetus to the movement which combated the Averroistic approach to Aristotle. 46 In this respect, the encouragement that Petrarch gave to Greek studies bore fruit in Linacre's Latin translation of Galen's *Preservation of Health*. Johnson notes that Petrarch deserves not a small portion of the credit which Linacre won through the latter's efforts to restore pure texts. 47

More could also have come in contact with Petrarch's thought through Grocyn. Grocyn's book list reveals that he had a copy of Petrarch's *Rerum memorandarum libri*. 48 This list may not be complete, for Grocyn may have sacrificed some of his books, like his plate, to buy bread. In Macray's brief biography which is appended to Grocyn's book list, the position of Petrarch at the time of Grocyn's visit to Italy is noted: "Many of the chief writers of the Italian Renaissance, famous in their day, as Ficino, Filelfo, Lorenzo Valla, Aeneas Sylvius, Gaguinus, Perotti, and Harmolae, find their place by the side of

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Petrarch and Boccaccio.\textsuperscript{49}

In regard to Colet, there seems to be a relationship with Petrarch that has received little comment. Describing Colet in a letter to Jodocus Jonas, Erasmus states that Colet read all of Cicero, Plato, and Plotinus. He read most of the Christian fathers. In order that he might not tie himself too much to antiquity, Colet sometimes examined Aquinas and Scotus. Erasmus then mentions that Colet studied the style of vernacular authors in order to be better able to preach the Gospel:

\begin{quote}
Denique nullus erat liber, historiam aut constitutiones continens maiorum, quem ille non evoluerat. Habet gens Britannica qui hoc praestiterunt apud suas quod Dantes ac Petrarca apud Italos. Et horum euoluendis scriptis linguam expoliuit, iam tum se praeparans ad praeconium sermonis Evangelici.\textsuperscript{50}
\end{quote}

Erasmus' statement seems to imply that Colet, who had studied in Italy, looked upon Dante and Petrarch as models of vernacular expression and that studies were made of the style of these two authors by those who preached the Gospel in Italy.

Two other members of the More circle, both Italians, could provide additional links with Petrarch's humanism. Ammonio, a learned friend of Erasmus and More, lived at More's home for a time.\textsuperscript{51} Antonio Bonvisi was particularly close to More for many years. One of More's last letters, written in the Tower of London with a charcoal pencil, was

\textsuperscript{49}Ibid., pp. 368-369.


to Bonvisi. In addition, Edward Surtz notes that More had connections with Italy through his contacts with Thomas Spinelly, Sylvester Gigli, Raphael Maruffo, and Sebastian Giustinian.

Although most of the humanist travellers who have been mentioned were associated with Oxford, Petrarch was apparently well thought of at Cambridge:

The University Library catalogue compiled in 1473 registers only one humanistic work, the *De remediis* by Petrarch, and some texts of classical authors well known during the Middle Ages. Peterhouse had only one neo-classical manuscript, Petrarch's *Letters*. The St. Catherine's Hall catalogue, drawn up in 1475, includes four modern Italian entries, these being two copies of Petrarch's *De remediis*, Bruni's *Ethics*, and Decembrio's *Republic*.

The respect paid to Petrarch and his followers at Cambridge leads to the belief that Petrarch's Latin prose was quite alive near the end of the fifteenth century in England.

The effect of Petrarch on all the travellers is difficult to determine. Those who returned to England with Petrarch's works and who donated the texts to the universities reveal how much they esteemed the thought of Petrarch's Latin prose. The indirect effect of Petrarch upon the humanists can be estimated if one keeps in mind Burckhardt's statement that the veneration of Petrarch in the towns of Italy had

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replaced the honor given to the saints.\textsuperscript{55} In conclusion, the position of Petrarch's Latin prose in England during the last quarter of the century is described by Weiss as follows:

The presence of many works of Italian humanists in this country, suggest strongly that by the last quarter of the century the writings of the most famous Italian men of letters had become accepted here as what one might call, to use a modern expression, "standard authors." Besides Petrarch and Boccaccio, scholars like Bruni, Poggio, and Aeneas Silvius came to be considered writers of authority and passages from their works are to be found quoted along-side with those of medieval authors.\textsuperscript{56}

Now that the position of Petrarch has been established in a general way, it is necessary to define Erasmus' attitude toward Petrarch because Erasmus and More share one another's minds so fully. Rudolph Agricola, Petrarch's biographer and Erasmus' teacher, was a pioneer of Christian humanism in Germany. He wrote a biography which emphasized Petrarch's role as a humanist. The life of no other figure of the fourteenth century, not even Dante, was told more frequently and fully by the writers of the Renaissance than that of Petrarch.\textsuperscript{57} Some of the greatest Italian humanists--Boccaccio, Villani, Bruni, Vergerio, and Manetti--had written lives of Petrarch. Yet, there was no biography by a non-Italian for one hundred years after Petrarch's death until the founder of the new intellectual life in Germany composed


\textsuperscript{56} Weiss, \textit{Humanism during the Fifteenth Century}, p. 178.

\textsuperscript{57} Theodor Mommsen, "Rudolph Agricola's Life of Petrarch," \textit{Traditio}, VIII (1952), 367.
one (ca. 1477). Agricola dedicated it to Antonio Scrogivni, who taught medicine at Pavia about 1493 when Linacre might have been studying there. Mommsen believes that Agricola made an oration (1472) in Pavia that formed the basis of the biography. The figure that Agricola depicts is the humanist of the Latin prose works and not the author of the vernacular poetry. Agricola's interest centers on his subject's devotion to classical studies and on his extensive travels. In regard to Laura, Agricola sees the virtue of Petrarch in his rejection of Pope Urban's encouragement to marry Laura. Agricola shares with Bruni the view that Petrarch not only initiated the New Learning but that he also fostered the erudition of the fifteenth century.

Petrarch's independence also appeals to Agricola. He sees the founder of humanism as the self-made man who revived the studia humanitatis and who continued to spur those studies long after his death.

The attraction that Agricola had for Petrarch probably was passed on to Erasmus. Erasmus was only fifteen years old when he was first introduced to the great humanist who afterwards became his teacher. Erasmus himself regarded Petrarch highly. He recognized that Petrarch was a Magister who possessed philosophy, ardent genius, a great knowledge of general matters, and no ordinary force of speaking. These opinions from Erasmus' Ciceronianus constitute the first sentence of

58 Ibid., pp. 370-371.  
59 Ibid., pp. 377-378.  
60 Ibid., pp. 383-384.  
61 Ibid., p. 385.  
the following quotation which Johannes Herold used in the dedication of the 1554 *Opera* of Petrarch. The remainder of the quoted matter gives Herold's view that the wantonness of the age prevents a proper appreciation of Petrarch:

Itaque reflorescentis eloquentiae Princeps, apud Italos videtur fuuisse Franciscus Petrarca, sua aetate celebris ac magnus, nunc vix est in manibus, ingenium ardens, magnrerum cognitio nec mediocris eloquendi vis.

Ex his siquidem intelligi maxime potest ornamenta illa innumerabilia que dicendi magistro (a quo Philosophia abesse nequit) et necessaria et propria sunt, Petrarcae cumulate adfuisse. Quod vero raro in manibus sit, id petulantiae huius seculi tribuendum puto, quo aures teretes et religiosae, verborum volubilitate demulcere, quam sententiarum pondere prehensare magis consuetum. Certe virum hunc emunctissimi iuditij multa et in se et in alijs desiderasse, aliam quoque in eius mente reconditam habuisse eloquentiae speciem, quam exprimere nec illi nec alij ulli haec tenus concessum, in Libro, que de Sua ipsius et aliorum Ignorantia g~uiter sane et probe disputat, facile deprehenditur. . . .63

It is of interest that in the same dedication, there is a passage from Vives (1492-1540) which commends Petrarch for striking the dust and sediment from the monuments of a hundred of the greatest figures of the past. In addition, Vives sees Petrarch as a Latinist and a moralist. He notes that the Latin tongue owes much to the name of Petrarch; and that Petrarch, though he had tried, was not capable of wiping completely away the squalor of his own age. 64

63 Erasmus, cited in *Francisci Petrarcae . . . opera quae extant omnia*, ed. Johannes Herold (Basel: Henrichus Petri, 1554), sig.+3. This edition will be cited as *Opera*.

64 Vives, cited in *Opera*, sig.+3.
In addition to the reference in Ciceronianus, Erasmus’ letters reveal a great respect for Petrarch. While speaking of satirists, Erasmus links Petrarch’s Invective contra medicum with the satires of such outstanding figures as Homer, Plato, Aristotle, Demosthenes, Seneca, St. Jerome, and Politian. Even as late as 1535, Petrarch’s Latin prose figures in Erasmus’ correspondence. John Angelus Odonus writes to Erasmus and makes reference to Petrarch’s attack on the Avignon papacy. It is to be expected that Petrarch’s Epistolae sine nomine would be popular after the revolt of Luther since these letters are a severe condemnation of the immorality of the papal court. This letter reveals that Petrarch, the moralist, was quite alive as late as 1535:

Quam etiam vrbem palam Petrarcha Italus et Babiloniam et Bacchi Venerisque mancipium et haereseon templum et errorum scholam et viuorum tartarum, denique malorum scelerumque omnium quibus orbis hodie obruitur clamat officinam. Et hactenus ipsius Petrarchae verba retulimus. Piget vero ac pudet referre caetera his foediora multo: quae canonicus ille plissimus ob Christi sponsa zelum ardentibus prolix suspiriiis nec vmo in loco imgemiscit. Atque ista vates egregius canebat annum ab hino supra ducentesimum. Quid vero dicturus, si praesens videret vna cum annis crescentibus creuisse nihil segnius et vitia, quae ille tum in praecepi aiebat constituisse, ideoque coelestem vltionem iam vt festinaret implorabat?

The appreciation that the great humanists like Erasmus and Vives had for Petrarch is evidence of the vitality of his thought. Kristeller and Randall see Erasmus as the culmination of Petrarch’s humanism:

65 Opus Epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami, II, 92.
66 Ibid., XI, 93.
The teaching of the medieval Italian universities was scientific and often anticlerical in its interests, and to such interests the Humanists were opposing their own religious and moral aims. Petrarch, in posing as the defender of religion against the atheism of his Averroist opponents, or Valla, in appealing from philosophical reason to blind faith, is obviously trying to detach theology from its dangerous link with Aristotelian natural philosophy and metaphysics and to join it instead with his own different type of learning, with eloquence or with Humanistic studies. This religious tendency was strong among many of the Humanists and found its culmination in the Christian Humanism of Erasmus.67

Thus far, the study has tried to show how the invention of printing disseminated Petrarch's thought throughout Europe. Its focus then narrowed to reveal the popularity of Petrarch in Italy and in England. Next, the scope of the investigation was restricted to members of the More circle other than More. Now it is necessary to examine what appears to be an unnoticed relationship between More's early poems on Fortune (ca. 1503)68 and Petrarch's Rerum memorandarum libri and his De remediis. The title to More's three poems reveals the occasion of their composition—"Certain meters in english written by master Thomas More in hys youth for the boke of Fortune, and caused them to be printed in the begynnyng of that boke." A. W. Reed's introduction to Volume I of the English Works describes how the casting of dice is related to "the boke of Fortune": the number resulting from a cast of the dice leads the reader to certain kings, philosophers,

67 Paul Kristeller and John Randall, Jr., "General Introduction," The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. E. Cassirer, P. Kristeller, and J. Randall, Jr. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 4-5. This anthology will be cited as The Renaissance Philosophy of Man.

68 English Works, I, 338-344.
and astronomers who, in turn, direct the seeker to the answers of questions that are common in fortune-telling books. 69

Although no known edition of a book of fortune has More’s poems in the parerga, More’s references to dice and to astronomy substantiate A. W. Reed’s assertion that More’s poems were composed for such a book. An examination of one of the earliest extant editions of Spirito’s Le Passetemps de la Fortvne des Dez 70 reveals that his book could supply the occasion, not the inspiration, for More’s verse.

In much the same way that the Triumphs guided More’s early verses for the pageants painted on cloth, Petrarch’s De remediis provides the theme of More’s poems on Fortune. In the first of the poems, Fortune says of her enemies:

And therefore hath there some men bene or this,
My deadly foes and written many a boke,
To my disprayse, And other cause there nys,
But for me list not frendly on them loke,
Thus lyke the fox they fare that once forsoke,
The pleasant grapes, and gan for to defy them,
Because he lept and yet could not come by them.

But let them write theyr labour is in vayne,
For well ye wote, myrth, honour, and richesse,
Much better is than penury and payne.
The nedy wretch that lingereth in distresse,
Without myne helpe is ever comfortlesse,
A very burden odious and loth,
To all the world, and eke to him selfe both. 71

69 Ibid., I, 17.
70 Lorenzo Spirito, Le Passetemps de la Fortvne des Dez (Lyon: Francois Didier, 1502).
71 English Works, I, 338.
Fortune's words describe De remediis. In the Renaissance, there appears to be no other work attacking Fortune which was printed as frequently as Petrarch's De remediis. This text, which was available to More at Oxford, not only defies but actually ignores the power of Fortune.

When he confronts Fortune, Petrarch does not approach her like Dante and Boethius who seek a reconciliation with the Lord's handmaid. Petrarch first posits that strife and hardship are unavoidable. He makes this point in the prefatory epistles to each of the two books that comprise De remediis. Because suffering is inevitable, Petrarch, in opposition to Aristotle and Seneca, proposes that man should prefer ill rather than good fortune. In More's poem, Lady Fortune's words are a direct rebuttal to the thesis of De remediis that "penury and Payne" are preferable to "myrth, honour, and richesse."

In his second poem, "Thomas More to them that trust in fortune," More sides with Petrarch and acknowledges that poverty and hardship should be preferred to good fortune. More opens this poem by mentioning some of the prominent visitations of good fortune that

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72 Petrarch, De remediis in Opera, I, 1-6; II, 121-125; Petrarch, Physicke against Fortune, as well prosperous as adverse, trans. Thomas Twyne (London: R. Watkyns, 1579), I, Ciii-Cvii; II, 153-162. The Latin title will be cited as De remediis in this edition; the English title will be cited as Physicke against Fortune in Twyne's translation.

73 De remediis, p. 3; Physicke against Fortune, p. Ciii-Cv.

74 English Works, I, 343.
Petrarch seeks to remedy in Book I of De remediis:

Thou that art prowde of honour shape or kynne,
That hepest up this wretched worldes treasure,
Thy fingers shrined with gold, thy tawny skynne,
With fresh apparayle garnished out of measure,
And wenest to have fortune at thy pleasure,
Cast up thyne eye, and loke how slipper chaunce,
Illudeth her men with chaunge and varyaunce.\textsuperscript{75}

Petrarch supplies specific remedies for those who are endangered by "honour,"\textsuperscript{76} "shape,"\textsuperscript{77} "kynne,"\textsuperscript{78} "treasure,"\textsuperscript{79} and "apparayle."\textsuperscript{80}

The final two stanzas of More's second poem, "Thomas More to them that trust in fortune," are as much a miniature of De remediis as his verses on the painted cloth epitomize the Triumphs:

Wherefore yf thou in suretye lyst to stande,
Take poverties parte and let prowde fortune go,
Receyve nothyng that commeth from her hande:
Love maner and vertue: they be onely tho.
Whiche double fortune may not take the fro.
Then mayst thou boldly defye her turnyng chaunce:
She can the neyther hynder nor avaunce.

But and thou wylt nedes medle with her treasure,
Trust not therein, and spende it liberally,
Beare the not proude, nor take not out of measure.
Bylde not thyne house on heyth up in the skye.
Non falleth farre, but he that climbeth hye,

\textsuperscript{75}Ibid., 339.
\textsuperscript{76}De remediis, pp. 92-93; Physicke against Fortune, pp. 114-115.
\textsuperscript{77}De remediis, pp. 8-10; Physicke against Fortune, pp. 2-4.
\textsuperscript{78}De remediis, pp. 21-22; Physicke against Fortune, pp. 18-20.
\textsuperscript{79}De remediis, pp. 44-53; Physicke against Fortune, pp. 48-60.
\textsuperscript{80}De remediis, pp. 26-27; Physicke against Fortune, pp. 26-27.
Remember nature sent the hyther bare,
The gyftes of fortune count them borowed ware.

More shows clearly how Petrarch heals the diseases caused by the "double fortune." In the 254 dialogues that comprise the two books of De remediis on good and evil fortune, the cure is always the same. Petrarch's healer, Reason, prescribes hundreds of times the very antidote that More offers:

Love maner and vertue: they be the onely tho,
Whiche double fortune may not take the fro. 82

In his third poem, "Thomas More to them that seke fortune," More refers to the book of fortune which is the apparent occasion for his verses. 83 The affliction of the shrewish wife in More's poem figures in Petrarch's Book II, Dialogue XIX. 84 In this poem, More speaks of the inevitability of evil fortune—a basic presumption in De remediis. The many similarities between More's poems and the thought of Petrarch's De remediis lead one to surmise that More used Petrarch's text for the thematic inspiration of these early poems.

In addition, More appears to employ Petrarch's Rerum memorandarum libri as a source book for the historical allusions in the poems on Fortune. In his second poem, More names the philosophers who are happy because they have chosen the life of poverty. Of these exemplars, Byas receives the most complete delineation:

81 English Works, I, 343.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 De remediis, pp. 147-148; Physicke against Fortune, pp. 193-194.
With her is Byas, whose countrey lackt defence,
And whylom of their foes stode so in dout,
That eche man hastily gan to cary thence,
And asked hym why he nought caryed out.
I bere quod he all myne with me about:
Wisdom he ment, not fortunes brotle fees.
For nought he counted his that he might leese. 85

This stanza is almost a translation of Petrarch's description of Byas:

Cum enim patria eius expugnata et incensa omnes cives quos cladi publice fortuna subduxerat, cariorum rerum sarcinulas efferrent atque ipsum vacuum abeuntem ut idem faceret monerent: "Ita" inquit Bias, "facio: omnia mea mecum porto," quecumque extra animum sunt, nec sua nec bona iudicans, sed fortune. 86

It is possible that More could have taken a very similar characterization of Byas from Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum. 87 Cicero's work teaches that virtue is the sumnum bonum. He describes the rewards and the punishments that human deeds merit. He shows how folly leads to slavery, wisdom to freedom. But Fortune's power is not an issue in Paradoxa Stoicorum. Cicero's work is not in the spirit of More's allusions. It is more likely that More selected his characterization of Byas from Grocyn's copy of Rerum memorandarum libri and not from Paradoxa Stoicorum. The symbol appears next to Rerum memorandarum libri and the names of a few other texts on Grocyn's book list. The

85 English Works, I, 341.
86 Rerum memorandarum libri, XIV, in Edizione Nazionale delle Opere di Francesco Petrarca (Florence: G. C. Sansoni, 1933--), 151. This text will be cited as Rerum memorandarum libri.
editor thinks that this mark designates the works that Grocyn lent to his friends—among whom was More.

In addition, the presence of other historical figures in More's poem seems to indicate that More used *Rerum memorandarum libri* rather than *Paradoxa Stoicorum* for his source book. More names Socrates, Aristippus, Pythagoras, Diogenes, Heraclitus, and Democritus as exemplars of "glad poverty." In *Paradoxa Stoicorum* Cicero mentions only Socrates. Petrarch, however, describes each of More's philosophers, with the exception of Aristippus, as models of detachment. There may even be a relationship between *Rerum memorandarum libri* and the hero of *Utopia*. Petrarch notes that Democritus left his patrimony to his countrymen (*patris sue*):

Democritus immoderato studiorum impetu evectus extimansque [sic] in primis magna molientibus honerosam divitarum sarcinam, reservata sibi ad necessarios ugas modica parte patrimonii, residuum patrie sue dono dedit. 89

In *Utopia*, *persona*-Giles says of Hythloday: "relicto fratribus patrimonio, quod ei domi fuerat (est enim Lusitanus) orbis terrarum contemplandi studio Americo Vespucio se adiunxit." 90

The investigation of More's early poetry and Petrarch's Latin prose helps to verify two aims of this chapter. The thought of Petrarch's Latin works was still alive among the Christian humanists as

89 *Rerum memorandarum libri*, p. 34.
90 *Utopia*, p. 50.
late as the beginning of the sixteenth century. Secondly, there is substantial evidence to show that More in his formative years read Petrarch's Latin texts that had given birth to the Christian humanism of the Renaissance.

This survey of the dissemination of Petrarch's humanism fails to provide a synoptic view. By seeing Petrarch in the eyes of one of his immediate successors and in the eyes of the More circle, the results of this investigation can be summarized. Salutati's apostrophe to Petrarch depicts the glory of the founder of Christian humanism as he was seen by the early humanists:

Salve itaque, summe vir, qui tibi fame eternitatem tum virtutibus tum sapientiae splendore tum eloquentie lumine quesivistis, cui etiam se tota equore non potest antiquitas! etas nostra, iubare tui nominis illustrata, admirabilis, nis fallor, pertransibit in posteros: fame quidem immortalitatem nedum tibi, sed nostris etiam temporibus peperisti! sed quid ego huius clarissimi viri epistolaribus angustiis laudes confinere, quas nec librorum infinita volumina caperent? satius enim fuisset laudes divinas huius sancti viri silentio pertransisse quam parum dixisse? 91

The previously noted sentiments of Erasmus on Petrarch—ingenium ardens, magna rerum cognitio nec mediocris eloquendi vis—reveals his fame among the Christian humanists of the More circle.

At this point, a comparison with the present age would be profitable, but there seems to be no pivotal figure comparable to Petrarch. Such a person would have to synthesize the influence of Darwin, Marx, and Freud in order to affect men of genius in our day as

91 Salutati, Epistolaria, I, 183.
Petrarch determined the thought of writers and thinkers in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Were there such an individual, the difficulty of finding a counterpart for Thomas More would still remain. In regard to More, Jonathan Swift's judgment has stood the test of time:

I [Lemuel Gulliver] had the honour to have much conversation with Brutus; and was told that his ancestor Junius, Socrates, Epaminondas, Cato the younger, Sir Thomas More, and himself were perpetually together: a sextumvirate to which all the ages of the world cannot add a seventh.\footnote{Jonathan Swift, \textit{Gulliver's Travels} (New York: Random House, Inc., 1950), pp. 223-224.}

In conclusion, this study of Petrarch's influence should not be seen as a criticism of Wilkins' scholarship. With qualifications, the Canzoniere and, to a lesser degree, the Triumphs do conform to his theory. It should be remembered, moreover, that the relationship of Petrarch's Latin prose to the English Renaissance has not been subject to intensive study. This chapter has shown that, even though Petrarch was extremely popular as a poet during the sixteenth century, he was still regarded as a Latinist, moral philosopher, and reformer during the first half of the same century.

The dissertation will now focus on More's \textit{Utopia} as a document written in the traditions of Christian humanism as founded by Petrarch. Under the guidance of the humanist motto, "Ad fontes!" this study will try to see More's \textit{Utopia} in its relationship to the Latin prose works of Petrarch, the fount of Christian humanism in the Renaissance.
CHAPTER II

THE INDEPENDENT PHILOSOPHER

In his Areopagitica, Milton eloquently proclaims literature’s ability to safeguard the past. His sentiments imply that the man of genius may preserve in a literary character the spirit of one of humanity’s profound ideas or great movements. Furthermore, he would say that Ulysses, Aeneas, Beowulf, Roland, and Don Quixote immortalize lofty manifestations of human thought and that Raphael Hythloday is not an absolutely dead man—each of these heroes is the "precious lifeblood of a master spirit, embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life." Yet an extension of Milton’s thought can conjure up a somewhat gloomy metamorphosis. The friendly letters of rejoicing humanists surrounding the "Truly Golden Handbook" become somber mourners who encircle a catafalque and lament Hythloday.

Fortunately, England’s Democritus sees differently:

You have no idea how thrilled I am; I feel so expanded, and I hold my head high. For in my daydreams I have been marked out by my Utopians to be their king forever; I can see myself now marching along, crowned with a diadem of wheat, very striking in my Franciscan frock, carrying a handful of wheat as my sacred scepter, thronged by a distinguished retinue of Amaurotians, and, with this huge entourage, giving audience to foreign ambassadors and sovereigns; wretched creatures they are, in comparison with us, as they stupidly pride themselves on appearing in childish garb and feminine finery, laced with that despicable gold, and ludicrous in their

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purple and jewels and other empty baubles. Yet, I would
not want either you or our friend, Tunstal, to judge me
by other men, whose character shifts with fortune. Even
if heaven has decreed to waft me from my lowly estate to
this soaring pinnacle which, I think, defies comparison
with that of kings, still you will never find me forgetful
of that old friendship I had with you when I was but a
private citizen. And if you do not mind making the short
trip to visit me in Utopia, I shall definitely see to it
that all mortals governed by my kindly rule will show you
the honor due to those who, they know, are very dear to
the heart of their king. 2

In More's mind, in his letters, and in his Utopia especially,
Hythloday lives. It is odd, however, that More's Hythloday has never
received the recognition that he deserves. Edward Surtz notes that
"Raphael Hythlodaeus is one of the neglected great figures of European
literature." 3

A study of Hythloday has to consider many factors. It has to
note More's method of character delineation. It must weigh the views
that scholars have of Hythloday. Finally, and most important, it must
apply a recognized standard of Christian humanism to More's humanist
so that Hythloday's lineaments stand out in sharp relief. By employing
Petrarch's ideal of Christian humanism as this criterion, further
values can accrue. One sees the permanence of Petrarch's humanism
as it is expressed in a key document of the early English Renaissance.
If this study of Hythloday's character is to be effective, all the
elements mentioned above, namely, the method of More, the contribution
of scholars, and the ideals of Petrarch, have to be harmoniously

2 Selected Letters, p. 85.

3 Utopia, p. cxl.
controlled.

In order to keep the chapter unified, Hythloday will be studied as he is presented by More in *Utopia*. This approach, used by Edward Surtz, will enable the reader to see how Hythloday develops. In the introduction to *Utopia*, More stresses the dominant trait of his hero and lays the pattern from which Hythloday's character develops. Throughout the remainder of Book I, More has his hero evolve gradually from this foundation. In the discourse on *Utopia* in Book II, More partially withdraws Hythloday, as well as persona-More and persona-Giles from the reader as the description of Utopia engages the reader's attention. Finally, in the intense peroration, Hythloday reappears in the garb of the zealous Christian reformer. In this study of the character of Hythloday, it will be necessary to refer to the various names assigned to different parts of the text of *Utopia*. In order to assist the reader in this regard, the following outline, which modifies and amplifies Hexter's contribution to the study of *Utopia*, is offered:

I. Composed in the Netherlands
   B. Book II: Discourse on Utopia, pp. 111-237.

II. Composed in London
   A. Book I
      1. Dialogue of Counsel, pp. 55-103.
      2. Exordium, pp. 103-109.
   B. Book II
2. Conclusion, pp. 245-247.  

This outline designates the order in which More composed the various parts of *Utopia*. The pagination reveals the sequence of events as they occur in the text of *Utopia*.

In conjunction with the development of Hythloday's character, the relationships with Petrarch's humanism will be noted whenever they are pertinent. The application of Petrarch's Latin prose works in this regard raises a question. There is no problem in associating Hythloday with the humanist ideals of such works as *De remediis*, *De vita solitaria*, *De ignorantia*, *Secretum*, *Rerum memorandarum libri*, and *De viris illustribus*. A qualification must be made in regard to the use of Petrarch's letters which contain much of his humanistic thought.

Petrarch's biography and Petrarch's humanism cannot always be separated. Because Petrarch was the "most renowned scholar and moral philosopher of his age in the entire Western world," his personal experiences and his introspective analyses of these events take on a significance that cannot be assigned to the happenings in the lives of men who lack his stature. Consequently, some associations that will be made should not be seen as comparisons between a fictitious character and a real person, but rather as the coupling of a model and its archetype. Zeitlin would corroborate this use of Petrarch's epistles. When he compares Petrarch's correspondence with the other Latin works, he says:

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Much more of Petrarch is to be got out of the great mass of his letters. These have, to be sure, the same formal characteristics of any of his longer treatises. They are not spontaneous and unconsidered communications arising from the daily occasions of life. When he had ordinary business to transact, he employed the vernacular Italian and took no pains to preserve the record. His Latin correspondence he treated quite differently, carefully nursing it with an eye on glory and posterity.\(^6\)

By comparing Hythloday's character with Petrarch's humanism, one can begin to make amends for the negligence of the past. Although posterity may have neglected Hythloday, More lavished as much care on him as he did on his famous characterization of Richard III. Since More created Hythloday and Richard at approximately the same time,\(^7\) the method that he uses in Richard III is relevant to his description of Hythloday in the introduction of Utopia. There is sufficient evidence to believe that before More created Hythloday and Richard III, he had read Lucian's \textit{Quomodo historia conscribenda sit}.\(^8\) Lucian's work is a classical study that links history with oratory. According to Lucian, the historian, like the sculptor, adds the proportion and lucidity of art to the material. He is an interpreter and composer, not a compiler. His use of artistic devices is functional. The ironical method which is recommended for vituperative portraits is one of the distinguishing features of Richard III.

\(^6\)\textit{De vita solitaria}, pp. 79-80.

\(^7\)Richard III, p. lxv.

Because More works as an artist and teacher rather than as a scientific scholar, he portrays Richard III as a consistent dissimulator even though there is not sufficient historical evidence for this portrait. More makes use of contrast in order to introduce the dissimulator. He presents Richard III's brothers in the first five pages of the history. Edward, loved by his people, was a noble king, "of visage louelye, of bodye myghtie, stronge, and cleane made." Next, More describes Richard's brother, George Duke of Clarence, who was "hastely drowned in a Butte of Malmesey." Richard III is then presented in sharp contrast to Edward:

little of stature, ill fetured of limmes, croke backed, his left shoulder much higher then his right, hard fauoured of visage... He was malicious, wrathfull, enuious, and from afore his birth, euer frowarde.

The picture of Richard III which More draws with seven hundred words at the beginning of the history has lasted for centuries. More, who contemned auguries and divination, cleverly uses the fact that Richard could not be delivered of his mother "vncutte":

Hee came into the worlde with the feete forwarde, as menne bee borne outwarde, and (as the fame runneth) also not vntoathed, whither menne of hatred reporte aboue the truthe, or elles that nature chaunged her course in hys beginninge, whiche in the course of his lyfe many thinges vnnaturallye committed.

Hard upon this unique description of Richard III's birth, More presents

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10. Ibid. 12. Ibid.
the dominant trait of Richard, the dissimulation which is to function in the interpretation of the history. More speaks of Richard as "not letting to kisse whome hee thoughte to kyll. . . . Frende and foe was mucho what indifferent." More's parting stroke in the brief initial portrait applies the mark of Cain to Richard III: "Somme wise menne also weene, that his drifte couerly conuayde, lacked not in helping furth his brother of Clarence to his death." 

Richard's character does not change throughout the rest of the History. All of his thoughts and deeds are consistent with the picture that More draws in the first few pages. It may be noted that Shakespeare, who accepts More's exaggerated view of the dissimulator, also employs More's method of presenting the broad outlines of the character in the first scene.

More gains much by stressing the dissimulation of Richard III at the very beginning of his work. Later, he can put pious sayings in the mouth of Richard III in order to achieve a powerfully ironic effect. When Brackenbury refuses his request to murder the royal children, Richard III says, "Ah whome shall a man trust?" By exaggerating the dissimulation of Richard III, More also gives himself the opportunity to use a more obvious verbal irony. He does so towards the conclusion of his sympathetic description of Jane Shore. Richard, unable to pin the charge of treason on Jane:

13 Ibid., p. 8.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid., p. 83.
layd heinously to her charge, the thing that herself could not deny, that all the world wist was true, and that natheles every man laughed at to here it then so sodainly so highly taken, that she was nought of her body. And for thys cause (as a goodly continent Prince cylene & fautles of himself, sente oute of heauen into this vicious world for the amendement of mens maners) he caused the bishop of London to put her to open penance, going before the crosse in procession vpon a sonday with a taper in her hand.16

Using the dissimulation of Richard III as a guide, Sylvester shows how the incidents involving Buckingham and Shore are relevant to the text. Buckingham, having sold his soul to the devil, pleads the sanctity of Richard's motives in the violation of the sanctuary; and the notorious Jane Shore, having been made a public spectacle of infamy by her puritanical protector, attains her greatest dignity.17

There are three values that More gains through his method. First, by consistently portraying Richard as a dissimulator, More achieves, through characterization, a unity that integrates all action. Secondly, More's irony leads to a double vision. Not only is the reader aware of the tyrant, but he is also led to imagine the figure of a just king who follows the laws of God and man. Lastly, More allows the reader to participate in the act of literary creation in as much as he must constantly interpret all that Richard III says. More uses the same method of characterization in order to achieve similar effects in Utopia.

In the introduction to Utopia, More is as eager to emphasize the independence of Hythloday as he was to reveal the dissimulation of

16 Ibid., p. 54.  
17 Ibid., p. xcvii.
Richard III at the beginning of the History. As in Richard III, the view of Hythloday that More presents in the introduction does not change. All of his subsequent thoughts and deeds are consistent with the first impression. The moderate humanists, Tunstal, Giles, and More, compare with Richard's brothers in that they provide the basic contrast with the hero. Tunstal and More strive to resolve a dispute between King Henry VIII and the future Charles V. Because of a disagreement, they cease negotiations; and, in a sense, they are stranded in the Netherlands. More, dependent upon the return of Charles's councilors, is "exceedingly anxious" to return home after an absence of four months. More, who is only thirty-seven years old, reveals by his anxiety that he feels deeply the restrictions that service to the king puts on his life. In a letter written to Erasmus in 1516, More restates his objections to service as a councilor. During the recess in negotiations, More travels to Antwerp and meets Peter Giles, a moderate young humanist, who also serves the state.

After the moderate humanists in service have been presented, More accomplishes the initial delineation of Hythloday swiftly. He describes Hythloday's external appearance. Advanced in years, with sunburnt countenance and long beard, Hythloday has the look of a sea captain. The reader of Utopia can imagine Hythloday's appearance quite vividly in spite of the fact that More, like Coleridge in the creation of the Ancient Mariner, gives only a few physical qualities. The twenty-nine-year-old Giles is so enthusiastic when he first speaks of Hythloday

18 Utopia, p. 49. 19 Selected Letters, pp. 69-70.
that he prevents More from returning a greeting.\textsuperscript{20} Giles describes Hythloday as an independent voyager who is more like the philosopher Plato than the adventurer Ulysses. He is not at all like the ill-fated seaman Palinurus.\textsuperscript{21} He is autonomous enough to have devoted himself "unreservedly to philosophy."\textsuperscript{22} When he was young, he left his patrimony to his brothers so that he might be free to travel.\textsuperscript{23} While voyaging under Vespucci, he further demonstrated his desire for freedom when he wrested by force (extorsit) the permission to be left behind at the farthest point of the last voyage--"and so he was left behind that he might have his way."\textsuperscript{24} The departure from the farthest point emphasizes Hythloday’s love of liberty. Giles notes the two sayings ever on the lips of Hythloday: "He who has no grave is covered by the sky," and "From all places it is the same distance to heaven."\textsuperscript{25}

By the time the characters begin the dialogue of counsel in Book I, Hythloday’s independence is as clearly defined as is the dissimulation in the initial portrait of Richard III. All of Hythloday’s subsequent activity will be consistent with his independence. In this brief introduction to Book I, More has revealed important facts about the hero. The independent Hythloday is a traveller, a scholar, and a philosopher. When More takes Hythloday by the hand and leads him from the garden at the conclusion of the discourse upon Utopia, the reader is convinced that Hythloday, in addition to being an unattached philosopher

\textsuperscript{20}Utopia, p. 49. \textsuperscript{21}Ibid. \textsuperscript{22}Ibid., p. 51. \textsuperscript{23}Ibid. \textsuperscript{24}Ibid. \textsuperscript{25}Ibid.
who is a unique traveller and humanist scholar, is also in the vanguard of those who cry for the reform of Christian Europe.

In presenting Hythloday's character, More gives the reader a motto which epitomizes the spirit of the unattached philosopher: *uiuo ut uolo*. There are two ways in which More may be indebted to Petrarch for this key statement. Edward Surtz notes that this definition of the philosopher is found in Cicero's *De officiis* and in the works of Renaissance Ciceronians. Petrarch's influence is evident because he is most responsible for the exalted position that Cicero enjoyed during the Renaissance. It is also possible that More could have taken this clause directly from Petrarch's *De vita solitaria*. Petrarch, speaking of the benefits of a philosopher's solitude, says that you are able to live as you please--*uivere ut uelis*.

Although many unattached philosophers would not want to be associated with a particular school of thought, Hythloday must be numbered among the admirers of Plato. In addition to Giles's comparison of Hythloday's travels with the journeys of Plato, More notes that Hythloday's favorite author is Plato. At the conclusion of the dialogue of counsel and in the exordium, Hythloday has recourse to the authority of Plato. He commends the institutions of Plato's ideal state because they are superior to Europe's. In the exordium Hythloday admires

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26 *Utopia*, p. 56.  
28 *De vita solitaria*, p. 47.  
29 *Utopia*, p. 87.  
Plato's refusal to make laws for any nation which will not legislate an equal sharing of all goods. 31

By depicting Hythloday as a philosopher and admirer of Plato, More reflects the Platonic interest of his own circle as well as the Platonic revival of the Florentine Academy of Ficino. The origin of this revival can be traced to Petrarch who possessed precious manuscripts of some of Plato's dialogues and who was one of the first in the Renaissance to emphasize that Plato was the foremost philosopher. 32 The attitude of the Christian humanist toward Plato can be seen in the note that Petrarch appended to his manuscript which contained a Latin translation of the Timaeus: "Happy thou, and yet unhappy, who having all this knowledge of truth, hadst yet no knowledge of its Source." 33 Petrarch, whom

31 Ibid., p. 105.


Douglas Bush aptly calls the godfather of Ficino and Pico della Mirandola, can be classified as an Augustinian Platonist.

The philosopher often puts a screen between himself and the public. Democritus has laughter for a cloak; and Socrates, a classical prototype for Hythloday, wears the disguise of ignorance. Hythloday's stance is associated with the meaning of his name—Well-learned in Nonsense.

There are two advantages in using Hythloday as a mask. Ames shows how Hythloday helps grant More immunity from Tudor absolutism. More had a realistic attitude toward his sovereign:

I believe he [Henry VIII] doth as singularly favour me as any subjecte within [this] realme. Howbeit, sonne Roper, I may tell thee I haue no cause to be proud thereof, for if my head [could] winne him a castle in Fraunce (for then was there warre betweene vs) it should not fail to goe.

In addition to protection from a tyrant, the mask can be an artistic device which emphasizes the intention of the Christian humanist. Erasmus' Folly and More's Hythloday both pose as speakers of foolishness because their age has wandered so far from the message of Christ that the Gospel has again begun to appear the preaching of fools. The practice of


speaking from the viewpoint of an apparently foolish person had been used effectively by Erasmus in *The Praise of Folly*. More's *Hythloday* and Erasmus's *Folly* each have a message which is "foolishness; but to them that are saved ... it is the power of God."\(^{37}\) *Hythloday*'s character as a radical and the apparent foolishness of his message can be seen as a mask for More just as *Folly* had been for Erasmus.

Petrarch made use of a similar device in 1368. Speaking from the standpoint of an ignorant person, Petrarch made his self-defense against detractors in *De ignorantia*. Often the view taken of Petrarch's influence can be too narrow. How Petrarch says something can be as important as what he says. The dedication to the first complete edition of Petrarch's works reveals that the style of *De ignorantia* was admired as late as 1554. A letter, cited above in Chapter I, shows Erasmus' opinion of Petrarch's *Invective contra medicum*. In this letter Erasmus compares Petrarch's ability as a satirist with the artistry of some of the most distinguished authors of antiquity. Petrarch not only revived the classical attitude toward experience; he also stimulated interest in the classical forms—the letter, the dialogue, the invective. The popularity of the mask of ignorance in the Renaissance is rarely associated with Petrarch; but *De ignorantia*, which is a Renaissance document in many respects, is an early example of the artistic use of the mask by a Christian humanist. The rhetorical approach that Petrarch employs in this irenic treatise became customary among humanists and

\(^{37}\) I Cor. 1:18.
stands in contrast with the more rigid method of argumentation that the schoolmen use.

There is always an inner man living behind whatever mask the philosopher dons. If the man is a true philosopher, he will be virtuous. Throughout Book I, More lets the reader know the Hythloday is a man of virtue. He is poor in spirit and clean of heart. More looks upon Hythloday as a foe of evil. Hythloday wants to uproot the "seeds of evil and corruption." His heart's desire is to cure vices. He is eager to preserve his "integrity and innocence." Hythloday's favorite author, Plato, has a particular appeal to the Christian humanists because he esteems the spiritual and contemns the bestial in man. Yet one cannot simply call the independent and Christian Hythloday a Platonic philosopher. His passionate desire to condemn evil stems from revelation and exceeds the corresponding zeal for moral integrity in the Platonic philosopher.

In addition, Hythloday's virtue can be seen in the severity of the attacks that he levels against moral corruption. Hythloday has to possess personal integrity before he would dare to engage in the reform of others.

There is sufficient evidence to show that Hythloday is poor in spirit. In his youth, he separates himself from his wealth and gives his patrimony to his family. Personas—More thinks that Hythloday is

38 *Utopia*, p. 87.  
unworldly, for he comments that Hythloday desires neither riches nor power. More's remark on Hythloday's detachment is interesting especially in view of Plato's theory of the fall of a commonwealth. When avarice and pride are unchecked, the ordered state governed by justice becomes a chaotic state ruled by self-interest. Socrates makes it clear that what he says about a commonwealth's perfection is relative to individual righteousness. He notes that the cause of the decline from integrity is marked by infection due to greed and by corruption due to ambition. More's observation on Hythloday's unworldliness, in view of the relationship between the *Utopia* and the *Republic*, emphasizes that Hythloday is poor in spirit and free from greed.

In addition to being poor in spirit, More's reformer is clean of heart. Hythloday's attitude toward vice can be seen in his condemnation of the wine houses and brothels of England. It is also possible that More wants Hythloday to be considered as a celibate. All that is known of Hythloday's immediate familial relationships is found in two statements—one by Giles, the other by Hythloday himself. Giles says that Hythloday left his patrimony at home to his brothers. Hythloday says of himself:

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46 *Utopia*, p. 69.
"As for my relatives and friends," he replied, "I am not greatly troubled about them, for I think I have fairly well performed my duty to them already. The possessions, which other men do not resign unless they are old and sick and even then resign unwillingly when incapable of retention, I divided among my relatives and friends when I was not merely hale and hearty but actually young. I think they ought to be satisfied with this generosity from me and not to require or expect additionally that I should, for their sakes, enter into servitude to kings."

Hythloday mentions his brothers, relatives, and friends. If he had been married, he would have had to consider his wife in the distribution of his patrimony. Furthermore, Hythloday emphasizes that he was actually young when he became independent of his family. His youthful desire for freedom argues that he would not seek the restrictions that the marriage bond imposes. By considering Hythloday as a celibate, the picture of the unattached philosopher that More wishes to portray becomes clearer.

Hythloday, the celibate, is an obvious contrast to persona-More, the anxious family man. If More intends Hythloday to be a celibate Christian layman, he is presenting a figure who is far different from the cloistered and clerical celibate of the Middle Ages. It is quite relevant that the nonclerical celibate figures prominently in the makeup of the humanist revealed in Petrarch's Latin prose.

Petrarch frequently reveals the philosopher's desire to be free from greed and from passion. Like Hythloday, Petrarch believes that freedom cannot be enjoyed unless one is indifferent to money. The manly philosopher does not account gold and silver as goods.

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48 Ibid., p. 55.
49 Physicke against Fortune, p. 183; De remediiis, 140: "Qui virilius philosophantur, argentum atque aurum inter bona non numerant."
Petrarch shows how greed can be responsible for the loss of the
integrity not only of the individual but also of the commonwealth:

Audeo autem affirmare, licet obstrepat multitudo, nil
magis quam supervacuas divitias obesse virtutibus; et
ne ceteras nationes a radicata medullitis opinione convellam,
quod inter scriptores rerum constat, Romam victricem gentium
vicere divitie, nec dubium est una eademque via et
paupertatem romanam exivisse et peregrina subintrasse
flagitia.50

Petrarch also emphasizes the need to be free from passion; the
philosopher has to be clean of heart in order to ascend to the truth:

Philosophie promiseth not wysedome, but the love of wysedome.
Whosoever therefore wyll have this, he getteth it by lovyng.
This title is not harde and paynefull, as some suppose. If
thy love be true, and the wysedome true whiche thou lovest,
thou shalt be a true philosopher indeede: For none can knowe
or love the true wisedome, but pure and godly mindes.51

Petrarch's attitude toward permissible sense pleasures reveals that he
wants to be independent of the claim of the flesh. The Christian
humanist dresses simply, his home is unadorned, his diet is frugal,
and his senses are mortified.52 In regard to the practice of

50. Le FamiliarI, XI, 16, in Edizione Nazionale delle Opere di
Le FamiliarI are found in Vols. X-XIII, ed. Vittorio Rossi and Umberto
Bosco. These letters will be cited here as Ep. Fam. in Opere.

51. Physicke against Fortune, p. 7; De remediiis, p. 57: "Philosophia
non sapientiam, sed amorem sapientiae pollicetur, quisquis hanc igitur
uult, amando consequitur. Non est ut quidem putant operosus aut
difficultis hic titulus, modo uerus amor sit, et uera quam ames sapientia,
philosophus uerus eris. Veram sane sapientiam non nisi purgatae piaque
animae uel intelligere possunt uel amare."

52. Petrarch at Vaucluse, Letters in Verse and Prose, trans. E.
These translations will be cited as Petrarch at Vaucluse. See Ep. Fam.
XIII, 8, in Opere, XII, 85-87.
mortification, More gives no information on Hythloday; but it may be assumed that Hythloday, like More himself, realized the relationship between mortification and the perfection of man as a philosopher and as a Christian.

The figure of the humanist derived from Petrarch's prose is that of a celibate. As opposed to the medieval ideal of the learned monk who has an evangelical vow of celibacy, Petrarch's humanist does not have the same motive for practicing total continence. The evidence of classical thought is quite strong on this point. Petrarch's attitude toward celibacy is almost identical with the views expressed by Diotima in Plato's *Symposium*. Petrarch writes:

> Uxores habeant, qui muliebri sine fine consortio et nocturnis amplexibus atque conuitijs uagituque infantium, et insomni negotio delectantur, eoque modo, maxime claritatem nominis, et perpetuitatem familiae moliuntur, quo nihil incertius. Nos si dabitur, nostrum nomen non coniugio, sed ingenio, non filijs sed libris, non foeminae, sed uirtutis auxilio propagamus. Parum sibi, parum Deo fidit, qui ad gratiam posteritatis, ac gloriem opem poscit uxoris, uxor enim et filios, et nepotes foecunditate successuum, et curas tibi pariet et laboris. 53

In *De remediis*, Petrarch points out that the wife hinders the scholar's search for wisdom. 54 Celibacy is recommended for the Petrarchan solitary in *De vita solitaris*; the scholar in solitude will avoid women

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53 *Epistolae Seniles*, XIV, 4, in *Opera*, p. 1035. These letters will be cited as *Ep. Sen.* in *Opera*.

54 *Physicke against Fortune*, p. 192; *De remediis*, p. 146.
for they are a "perpetual source of contention and trouble." Petrarch's recommendation of continence is not Gospel-oriented; he does not propose celibacy so that an individual can be more free to love God, but he urges the single life so that the philosopher will be less impeded in his search for wisdom. Petrarch may not have stressed the evangelical counsel of chastity because it was an obvious part of the Christian heritage. He may have felt the need to reaffirm the natural values found in the practice of sexual abstinence. Religious values, however, are inherent in Petrarch's views. The knowledge of God is the ultimate goal of the Platonic philosopher.

Petrarch's actual behavior as distinct from the recommendations in his Latin prose is relevant to the question of the celibate humanist. Although Petrarch had an ecclesiastical position as a canon which committed him to celibacy, he actually lived as an independent celibate layman. Wilkins notes that Petrarch "never felt disposed to undertake the care of souls, and never accepted the offer of any office that would have involved pastoral responsibilities." Since Petrarch's relationship with Laura is one of the major concerns in the third dialogue of the Secretum, it should be considered. He defends his attachment to Laura because he feels that it is not an enslavement. He claims that his love for Laura is neither sensual nor debasing; he thinks that it leads to virtue and that it is ennobling.

55 The Life of Solitude, p. 206; De vita solitaria, p. 83: "perpetuam officinam litium ac laborum."
56 Wilkins, The Life of Petrarch, p. 9.
As can be seen in the *Canzoniere*, Petrarch's love, though not Platonic, is, nevertheless, idealistic. 57

On the other hand, Augustine, viewing the problem in light of the medieval tradition termed *contemptus mundi*, does not accept Petrarch's defense. Petrarch's soul must "renounce the object of its love, never once to turn back, never to see that which it was wont to look for. This is the only sure road for a lover, and if you wish to preserve your soul from ruin, this is what you must do." 58

The involvement of Petrarch with Laura and the fact that Petrarch fathered two natural children need not influence in any serious way the figure of the celibate humanist noticeable in Petrarch's Latin prose. Although Petrarch's conduct before his conversion does not conform with his mature ideals, it is nevertheless true that Petrarch recommends celibacy for the humanist.

Since the inner man of the philosopher has been described, it is now necessary to define the relationship of the unattached philosopher to society. This area is extremely important, for it not only reveals Hythloday in conflict with Giles and More in the dialogue of counsel but also portrays an attitude toward duty that Hythloday shares with Petrarch.

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In this regard, the radical Christian humanist differs from the Platonic philosopher. The philosopher in the *Republic* wishes to avoid involvement in the affairs of state. Having escaped from the darkness of the cave, he gazes upon the light of absolute truth. He acknowledges the futility of trying to enlighten the blind who dwell in the cave. Although he will rule neither for honor nor for money, grim necessity makes him accept positions of responsibility, for he does not wish to entrust an office to an unworthy man. ⁵⁹

The constraint that forces the Platonic philosopher into office is useless against Hythloday. Throughout the dialogue of counsel in Book I, Hythloday checks the attempts of Giles and More to bring him into the council of a king. When Giles begins the debate by suggesting that Hythloday can gain wealth in the service of a prince, Hythloday rejects the idea. He has no interest in material possessions and cannot tolerate servitude to a ruler. Both Hythloday and Petrarch look upon councilship as a form of bondage. Hythloday's answer to Giles—"I think they ought to be satisfied with this generosity from me and not to require or expect additionally that I should, for their sakes, enter into servitude to kings"—echoes a sentiment found in *De remediis*. Petrarch writes:

Joy. I follow the Kyng's busynesse. Reason. It is painful for a man to folowe his owne busynesse: What is it then, thynkest thou, for hym to folow another mans, specially

⁵⁹ *Republic*, I, 81.

⁶⁰ *Utopia*, p. 55.
theyrs that are of myght, whom to please, is perpetual servitude. 61

At the origin of the Renaissance in Italy and in England stands an independent philosopher: Petrarch in Italy and Hythloday in England. After his initial parry with Giles, Hythloday has to contend with the more serious thrust of More who proposes the public interest as a motive for entering service. Hythloday rejects More's offer. He cannot become a councilor, for he would lose his "peace and quiet." 62 Hythloday is a man of peace. He has his inner man so ordered that he has achieved tranquility. If he were to lose his serenity, he implies that he would lose the other qualities which depend upon the harmonious state of his soul and which would make him useful in a council. His learning and experience, and his "truly philosophic spirit" 63—those qualities that More and Giles think would make him an ideal councilor—are the very qualities that would suffer by the loss of his equanimity because of court life.

Hythloday objects to service in a court in Europe not only because he would lose his inner repose but also because the rulers of Europe had little interest in the honorable activities of peace. Hythloday, like Colet, More, Erasmus, and Petrarch, wants peace among men as well as peace of soul. A thorough detestation of war

61 _Physicke against Fortune_, p. 69; _De remediis_, p. 59: "G. Negotiorum gestor regius sum. R. Sua negotia gerere laboriosum est. quid censeas aliena, praecipueque potentium, quibus placuisse perpetua servitus."

62 _Utopia_, p. 57.

63 _Ibid._
is one of the distinguishing marks of the Christian humanist. Hythloday is not like the guardians of Plato's Republic who are taught the arts of war. In his answer to More, Hythloday says that he does not have nor does he desire to have any acquaintance with the pursuits of war. The question of peace is treated in more detail in the dialogue before the French king. There Hythloday advises the king to remain at home, to forsake his warlike ways, and to care for his own people.

64 Peace in the soul and peace among men are a frequent concern in Petrarch's correspondence. The harmonious composure of the struggling elements in man is a goal of Petrarch's moral philosophy. In Epistolarum Familiarum, XXII, 5, Petrarch offers flight from labors and absorption in study as the means to serenity. A letter to Laelius (Lello di Pietro Stefano dei Tosetti), an intimate friend, is an exhortation to tranquility. He urges Laelius to find rest among the rapidly changing hopes and fears that beset man. Petrarch promises to do all that is in his power in order to help his friend achieve the longed-for serenity:

Optimum inter vitae asperitates remedium est quod
nichil stat, omnia humana volvuntur et fugiunt, ut acriter
attendenti nulla hic vel gaudii vel doloris materia magna
sit, nulla metus aut spei causa, dum sepe inter ipsos animi
motus id ipsum quod mulcebat aut angebat quoque vel
minabatur vel blandiebatur effluxerit et inter medios
apparatus evanuerit. Omnia hec, frater, vel leta vel vel

64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., p. 89.
tristia in ictu oculi more somnii transibunt, ut pudeat experrectos de nichilo doluisse seu letatos esse, inanes preterea spes aut metus de nichilo concepisse. Cesset igitur dolor, queso, conquisescat motus omnis gravitate tua indulgus, et si dolendi causa est, cui per me possit occurri, quicquid id est, iube: parebitur. 67

But the Christian humanists do not seek an increase of inner quietude for themselves and their friends alone. They act as Europe's most zealous apostles for peace among nations. Petrarch, like More and Erasmus, was grieved by the wars among Christians. He tried to bring an end to the war between Genoa and Venice. 68 This war was one of the many that plagued the city-states of Italy and that were directly opposed to Petrarch's vision of the Christian princes of Europe living at peace under the Pope and the emperor. Like the humanists of the More circle, Petrarch was horrified over the thought of Christian slaughtering Christian. 69 What may be the greatest of Petrarch's Canzoniere, "Italia mia," though not strictly within the limits of this study, is in the spirit of the Latin prose works more than the other vernacular poetry of Petrarch. In the poem Petrarch deplores war. He pleads for rulers to end their jealous conflicts and to cease using foreign mercenaries. In the envoi, Petrarch, who sends his song among the proud who are hostile to the truth, knows that there will be some who will listen:

67 Ep. Fam., XX, 12, in Opere, XIII, 35.


69 The Life of Solitude, p. 241; De vita solitaria, p. 108: "Gallus et Britannus litigant; quinque iam lustra volvuntur, ex quo non Christus et Maria, sed Mars et Bellona inter illos reges regnant."
Canzone, is t'ammonisco
che tua ragion cortesemente dica
perche tra gente altera ir ti convene,
e le voglie son piene
già de l'usanza pessima et antica,
del ver semper nemica.
Poverai tua ventura
tra magnanimi pochi a chi'l ben piace;
di'lor: "Chi m' assicura?
I'vo gridando: Pace, pace, pace."

After More reveals Hythloday's attitude toward wealth and war in the initial skirmishes in the debate on councilship, he removes himself and Giles from the spotlight and has Hythloday assume control of the dialogue. Hythloday travels in memory to the residence of Cardinal Morton, and in fancy to the courts of the French king and an imaginary king. In each place Hythloday justifies his position in regard to the issue of councilship. Before Morton, Hythloday illustrates dramatically the deleterious effect that flattery and prejudice have on his wise counsels. The contentious lawyer in Morton's court represents the biased and insular thinker who will not even listen to the message of the unattached philosopher. The lawyer knows that there are many thieves being executed everywhere in England. Yet he can still admire the English penal system which has not been able to remedy the serious situation. His limited vision does not take in the dreadful shadow of the gallows, nor is his humanity moved by Hythloday's concern for the afflicted poor. He is so insular that he is unable to imagine how a foreigner like Hythloday can improve England's code of criminal

70 *Rime, Trionfi e Poesie latine*, pp. 187-188.
punishment. All that the lawyer can do is to prepare an argument against Hythloday in a way which is irrelevant to the situation at hand; he follows the usual method of disputants who are more careful to repeat what has been said than to answer it.

Although the prejudice of the lawyer is harmful, it does not seem to be as disruptive an influence as is flattery. Hythloday narrates the humorous debate between the friar and the toady in order to satirize those who would accept error because their minds are not free. The flattering courtiers endorse the absurdities of the hanger-on because Cardinal Morton had not expressly disapproved of them. Except for the attention that his message receives from Cardinal Morton, Hythloday's knowledge of the ancient world and his experiences among the Polylerites make no impression on the courtiers.

Hythloday recalls his experiences with the harmless friar and the contentious lawyer in an entertaining fashion. Yet he cannot narrate in the same witty manner the activities of the evil councilor who disguises falsehood as truth and who inverts the natural order of things so that his unjust counsel will seem just. Such a Machiavellian attitude is repulsive to Hythloday. In the debate before the French king, Hythloday, in opposition to the warmongering councilors, advises love and peace. The French king should not have designs on other kingdoms. He should "love his subjects and be loved by them, live with

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\(^{71}\) *Utopia*, p. 71.  \(^{72}\) Ibid.  \(^{73}\) Ibid., p. 85.
them and rule them gently." They know that this message will not be heard.

In the debate before the imaginary king on domestic policies, the councilors propose among other things, to twist the law and to manipulate the judges so that truth will become a matter of doubt. In such an atmosphere, Hythloday fears for his moral integrity; he feels that he may be seduced into evil if he has as his companions the councilors of the courts of Europe.

Before examining Petrarch's attitude toward royal service, it will be useful to summarize Hythloday's reasons for refusing to serve the rulers of Europe. First, the narrow-mindedness of European courtiers negates his contribution as a councilor; secondly, the Machiavellian system of values which he notices at court poses a threat to his moral integrity; and, finally, the peace and quiet which are essential to his personality and which provide the foundation for his philosophic spirit would be lost.

In relation to the debate on councilship, the figure of the Christian humanist which can be abstracted from Petrarch's Latin prose has special relevance. It must not be thought that Petrarch's views determine More's specific involvement in the debate on councilship. When he wrote Utopia, More was involved in the king's business on the validity of a commercial treaty and was faced with the prospect of prolonged service under Henry VIII. In addition to More's personal

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74 Ibid., p. 91. 75 Ibid., p. 93. 76 Ibid., p. 103.
involvement in the issue, the question of active participation in the affairs of state figures prominently in the works of the humanists. Further on in this chapter Petrarch’s reasons for insisting upon independence will be examined and documented. At present, the broader aspects of the problem must be considered in order to establish Petrarch’s position in the debates of the civic humanists.

Petrarch represents one pole in the arguments. He leads those who are resolute in their refusal to serve. The radical humanist will not endure the bondage of the public servant and will seek a way of life similar to that which Petrarch proposes in his letters and, particularly, in De vita solitaria. In this treatise which was published seven times between 1473-1517 Petrarch resurrects the otium literatum of the ancients. Petrarch offers the advantages of solitude to the philosopher. He portrays the satisfactions of a layman who lives in solitude and who is free from the miseries of the city. More himself had a strong appreciation for the sentiments that Petrarch describes in De vita solitaria. In a letter to Colet (1504), More’s attitude toward the city and the country is the same as Petrarch’s:

For in the city what is there to move one to live well? but rather, when a man is straining in his own power to climb the steep path of virtue, it turns him back by a thousand devices and sucks him back by its thousand enticements. Wherever you betake yourself, on one side nothing but feigned love and the honeyed poisons of smooth flatterers resound; on the other, fierce hatreds, quarrels, the din of the forum murmur against you. Wherever you turn your eyes, what else will you see but confectioners, fishmongers, butchers, cooks, poulterers, fishermen, fowlers, who supply the materials for gluttony and the world and the world’s lord, the devil?
Nay even houses block out from us I know not how large a measure of the light, and do not permit us to see the heavens. And the round horizon does not limit the air but the lofty roofs. I really cannot blame you if you are not yet tired of the country where you live among simple people, unversed in the deceits of the city; wherever you cast your eyes, the smiling face of the earth greets you, the sweet fresh air invigorates you, the very sight of the heavens charms you. There you see nothing but the generous gifts of nature and the traces of our primeval innocence.77

Yet the escape from the city's vice and the enjoyment of nature's innocence merely assist the celibate Christian layman in his search for wisdom. More important than the rural quiet is the humanist's adamant determination to remain independent.

On this point, Petrarch stands very much alone and makes one of his rare departures from a position endorsed by Cicero. When Cicero treats duty to the state, he shows none of Petrarch's antipathy toward the philosopher who forsakes solitude in order to answer the call to service.78 In De officiis, Cicero affirms Plato's judgment that a man should share his life with his country and his friends.79 Petrarch even wrote a letter in which he rebuked Cicero for participation in the active life. In this letter, Petrarch's usual veneration turns to censure, for Cicero should never have engaged in disputes unworthy of a philosopher.80

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77 Selected Letters, pp. 4-5.
79 Ibid., p. 23.
In addition to differing from Cicero, Petrarch is at odds with Plato and the contemplative tradition of the Middle Ages. The Platonic philosopher would rule rather than allow a worse man to guide the affairs of state. In what my be a spurious letter, Plato repeats this same idea and adds the notion that a man should share his life with his country. 81

In the Middle Ages, religious motivation prompted retirement from the world. The cloistered celibate, bound by vows of poverty and obedience, is not the same as Petrarch's solitary. The tradition, \textit{contemptus mundi}, strongly permeates the medieval idea. In Petrarch, the presence and the intensity of the idea of otherworldliness varies greatly. In a monastic seclusion, there is an emphasis upon theological studies, manual labor, and submissive dependence upon superiors. On the other hand, Petrarch places a premium on classical learning and on personal freedom. The ideal Petrarch proposes not only marks a break with the classical and medieval past but also provokes controversy among his own followers.

It is ironic that Petrarch's own works in praise of the active life probably stimulated the reaction against his ideal of the unattached Christian philosopher and inaugurated the debates of the civic humanists. Petrarch sincerely extols the heroes of the active life in \textit{De viris illustribus}, \textit{Rerum memorandarum libri}, and \textit{Africa}. The glorification of the man of action is a prominent feature in the

Latin prose of Petrarch and in the thought of the Renaissance. It is fitting that humanists have praise for such men as Scipio, King Robert of Naples, Cardinal Morton, and King Utopus. Yet admiration for the man of affairs does not lead to imitation. The radical Christian humanist earns applause in other ways.

As Petrarch's disciples followed his example and praised the active life's heroes, they began to reject Petrarch's ideal of the isolated humanist. Coluccio Salutati, one of Petrarch's most avid admirers, initiated the debates of the civic humanists in Florence. The argument originated in Petrarch's censure of Cicero's participation in civic matters. Salutati planned to write *De vita associabili et operativa* as a defense of Cicero's activities in the civil wars of Rome.\(^{82}\) Pier Paolo Vergerio, Salutati's pupil, prepared a reply to Petrarch's letter to Cicero. Vergerio defends Cicero for leaving the peace of solitude and for enduring tribulation on behalf of the commonwealth.\(^{83}\) Vergerio's *De ingenuis moribus et liberalibus studiis adolescentiae* takes offense at Petrarch's claim that Scipio's acts as a student and philosopher surpass his deeds as a warrior.\(^{84}\) In Leonardo Bruni's *Cicero Novus*, the focus changes from apology to eulogy--the admirable Cicero has synthesized the active and contemplative ideals. In this regard, Bruni differs from Petrarch who feels that the effectiveness of the man of action depends


\(^{83}\)Ibid., 89.

\(^{84}\)Ibid., 94.
upon his love of solitude. Although in youth Bruni had venerated Petrarch, in *Le vite de Dante e del Petrarca* he commends Dante, father of a family, as a true citizen and finds fault with Petrarch's excessive independence. A disciple of Bruni, Matteo Palmieri, stands at the opposite pole from Petrarch in this debate. His *Della vita civile* is an act of faith in community.

This glance at the debates of the civic humanists reveals that Petrarch leads those who demand that the humanist must remain independent of service. Yet, a century and a half later, at the beginning of the Renaissance in England, Hythloday states an attitude toward service that reflects Petrarch's position. Hythloday, celibate layman and unattached philosopher, resolutely refuses to serve. Although Hythloday takes the same general stand as Petrarch, these preliminary generalizations fail to define precisely Petrarch's views on service and to mark the distinctions between More's hero and Petrarch's ideal.

A detailed study of Petrarch as a model of the Christian and unattached philosopher shows how he is as eager to preserve his independence as Hythloday is. Wilkins notes that Petrarch refused the honorable and lucrative papal secretaryship which Pope Clement had offered to him. Petrarch mentions that he avoided service under

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three popes. In a strict sense, a secretary was employed because of his linguistic abilities and was chiefly concerned with correspondence. Yet Petrarch was offered an apostolic secretaryship; and, had he accepted, he would be in a position of trust in which he might be called upon for counsel. Since this office offered the prospect of clerical advancement, Petrarch probably foresaw involvement in affairs of state which would check his freedom.

A summary of *Epistolae familiares*, XIII, 5, reveals the length to which Petrarch would go in order to escape an office:

Petrarca relates that his friends had warmly offered to him the office of apostolic secretary, and that... they had remarked that the only drawback was his style... He was then given a theme, on which to compose something extemporaneously.

Petrarca, who dreaded the mere thought of tying himself down to such steady employment, and who considered any encroachment upon his time as nothing short of slavery, here saw his opportunity, and he made the most of it. He assures Nelli that, though the theme suggested to him was in no way worthy of the Muses and of Apollo, he so exerted his every power as to rise to heights to which his auditors could not follow. The verdict of the assembly was that Petrarca should be allowed time to learn the barbaric style characteristic of the chanceries of the day. And Petrarca, breathing freely once again, concludes the letter with congratulating himself upon his narrow escape from the threatened servitude.

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88 "On His Own Ignorance," in *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*, pp. 60-61; *De ignorantia*, p. 26: "Ilud sibi preterea obiecere, quod Romanos pontifices tres proximos pro se quemque certatim me ad sue familiaritatis insignem gradum, nequicquam licet, euocasse, et hunc ipsum qui nunc presidet, Urbanum, de me bene loqui solitum mitissimisque me literis visitasse iam."

Petrarch's dodge reveals that he and Hythloday share the same general desire to escape service, yet they do not have identical motives for their conduct. Differences occasioned by historical developments account for certain distinctions between the philosophers. But both recognize that evils at court are a threat to the intellectual and moral integrity of the humanist. For example, Hythloday objects to the insular thought of the English courtiers. The "proud, ridiculous, and obstinate prejudices" that Hythloday finds in England reveal the conceited smugness and incipient chauvinism that nullifies the counsel of the philosopher. Petrarch, who does not face the same problems as Hythloday, still sees that the man who serves is inclined to color his judgments.

There were four men in Venice who disparaged Petrarch's reputation because he had failed to venerate their idol, Aristotle. One of these men, Tommaso Talenti, was a merchant. The three others may be considered as the fourteenth century's counterparts to the councilors and courtiers who had confronted Hythloday. Leonard Dandolo was a distinguished patrician who had served Venice on military and diplomatic missions. Zaccaria Contarini, a knight, had functioned successfully in ambassadorial assignments. Guido da Bagnolo of Reggio-Emilia was a court physician and a resident minister of the king of Cyprus. Petrarch saw that at Venice, where there was so much freedom of speech, the effect of the wise was negated and values were inverted:

Much freedom reigns there in every respect, and what I should call the only evil prevailing--but also the worst--far too much freedom of speech. Confiding in

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90 *Utopia*, p. 59.
this freedom, the extremely inept often insult famous men, much to the indignation of the good. Of this latter kind there are there so many that I do not know whether as many good and modest people live in any other city. However, the horde of stupid fellows is everywhere so much greater that the indignation of the wise is to no avail. So sweet does the word Freedom sound to everyone that Temerity and Audacity please the vulgar crowd, because they look so much like Freedom.\textsuperscript{91}

The license Petrarch objects to in Venice differs from the prejudice Hythloday encounters in Morton's court. Yet there is a way in which the lawyer in Utopia resembles these men who sat in the palace at Venice. The radical humanist cannot tolerate an atmosphere where judgments depend upon unthinking allegiance. National prejudice and toady ing check the revelation of truth in Morton's court as much as allegiance to Aristotle colors the views of Petrarch's opponents. Neither the lawyer nor the Venetian courtiers are open-minded, and their attitude drives the radical humanist from affairs of state.

In regard to Petrarch's vilification of the court at Avignon, there is a greater similarity between Petrarch and Hythloday. All Christian humanists share the same aversion to a court that ignores Christian standards of morality. The moral depravity openly tolerated at Avignon

\textsuperscript{91}'On His Own Ignorance,' in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, p. 121; De ignorantia, pp. 84-85: "Multa enim rerum omnium, et quod unicum ibi uel maximum malum dixerim, uerborum longe nmia est libertas; qua freti sepe ineptissimi homines claris nominibus insultant, indignantibus quidem bonis, qui ibidem quoque tam multi sunt, ut nesciam in uilla urbe tot boni modestique viri sint; sed tanto major est ubique stultorum acies, ut sapientium indignatio frustra sit. Tam dulce omnibus libertatis est nomen, ut temeritas et audacia, quod illi similes uideantur, uulgo placeant."
forced Petrarch to flee to the solitude of Vaucluse. Because of the political and social emphasis in utopian literature, Hythloday does not describe a court where personal immorality is as shameful as it was at the Avignon court: but, as it has already been noted, Hythloday shuns court life because he fears seduction through evil companionship.

Hythloday's fate after he departs from Antwerp is relevant at this point. Peter Giles's letter to Busleyden contains a reference to Hythloday's later life:

There are various reports circulating about the man. Some say that he died during his travel. Others declare that, after his return to his native land, partly because he could not endure his countryman's ways and partly because he was moved by his longing for Utopia, he made his way back again to that country.92

It is not unreasonable to assume that the folly and the vice of Europe led Hythloday to seek Utopia once again just as the immorality of Avignon made Petrarch flee to Vaucluse.

The shameful condition of the papal court at Avignon compelled Petrarch to compose the *Epistole sine nomine*. In nineteen violent letters, Petrarch lacerates the depravity of the courtiers. The following selection, though brief, captures the spirit of these letters:

Spectat hec Satan ridens atque in pari tripudio delectatus interque decrepitos ac puellas arbiter sedens stupet plus illos agere quam se hortari; ac ne quis rebus torpor obrepat, ipse interim et seniles lumbos stimulus incitat et cecum peregrinis follibus ignem ciet, unde feda passim oriuntur incendia. Mitto stupra, raptus, incestus, adulteria, qui iam pontificalis lasciuie ludi sunt. Mitto raptarum uiros, ne mutire audeant, non tantum auitis laribus, sed finibus patriis exturbatos, queque contumelianiarum grauissima est,

92 *Utopia*, p. 25.
et uiolatas coniuges et externo semine grauidas rursus accipere ac post partum reddere ad alternam satietatem abutentium coactos. Que omnia non unus ego, sed uulgus nouit et se taceat, quamuis, ne idipsum taceat, iam maius est indignatio quam metus et minacem libidinem ulcit dolor. Hec, inquam, uniuersa pretereo. Malo quidem te hodie ad risum quam ad iracundiam prouocare. Ira enim que ulceri nequit in se flectitur et in dominum suum seuit.

Such vicious conduct deeply moves the Christian humanist. As moral philosophers, Petrarch and Hythloday flee the court because they knew that association with evil courtiers would endanger their personal integrity.

In addition to their desire to avoid contagion, both humanists feel that court life disturbs their equanimity. In this respect an additional motive also is seen in Petrarch's flight from court. Petrarch seeks the quiet life so that he may progress in learning. Although he had spent much time with princes, Petrarch admits that they did not restrict him nor check his desire to lead an intellectual life:

Huc etiam illud affers. Bonas me partes temporum, sub obsequio principum perdidisse, hic ne erres, uerum accipe. Nomine ego cum principibus fui, re autem principes mecum fuerunt, unquam me illorum consilia, et perraro conuiuia tenuerunt. Nulla mihi unquam conditio probaretur, quae me uel medicum a libertate et a studiis me is auerteret, itaque cum palatium omnes, ego uel nemus petebam, uel inter libros in thalamo quiescebam. Si dicam nullum diem, falsum dicam, multos perdidi utinam non omnes, uel inertia quadam, uel morbis corporis uel angoribus animi, quos prorsus euadere nullo contigit ingenio. Quid iussu Principum perdiderim iam audies nam et mihi cum Seneca ratio constat impensa.

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93 Petrarcas "Buch ohne Namen" und die Papstliche Kurie, ed. Paul Puir (Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1925), p. 233. These letters will be cited as Epistolae sine nomine in this edition.

In the same letter, Petrarch states that only seven months of his life were lost in the service of princes.

Like Petrarch, Hythloday must have enjoyed the *otium literatum* since he was "no bad Latin scholar, and most learned in Greek." The Greek texts presented to the Utopians by Hythloday also reveal that he must have used his freedom from court in study as well as in travel in order to compile his comprehensive and pertinent library of Greek literature. It is difficult to designate the length of time needed to become as proficient in Greek and Latin studies as Hythloday is. Under ideal conditions, the industrious and intelligent Utopian scholars spent over two years in study in order to read Greek perfectly.

Hythloday, who appears impressed by the linguistic ability of the Utopians, must have spent some period in scholarly solitude after he had decided to devote himself unreservedly to philosophy.

The consideration of the humanist's attitude toward court raises the last issue in regard to the unattached philosopher. The radical Christian humanist's wish to remain free should never be interpreted as a refusal to serve his fellow men. The unattached philosopher does not ignore mankind's needs. As paradoxical as it is, Petrarch, who abhorred the thought of a life of action for himself, had a greater effect upon succeeding generations than any of his contemporaries who

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95 *Utopia*, pp. 49-51.
were in service. Whitfield's comment, which was cited earlier, is pertinent—"for the establishment of the foundation Europe owes a debt to Petrarch greater than to any other single figure since." The solitary figure who possesses the requisite genius proposes more permanent and grander visions for human achievement than does his counterpart who acts in the councils of kings.

Petrarch fulfills his obligation to mankind by his writings in prose and verse. It was not until the last decades of the fifteenth century that poetry began to be considered as an activity in itself which might be approached from an "artistic" or "aesthetic" point of view.98 It is through writing that Petrarch fulfills his obligations to mankind and not through a life of action in the councils of kings. Aldo S. Bernardo see this goal in Petrarch's Africa:

In his Africa Petrarch attempts to evoke ancient Rome in all her pristine glory. But he did this for the benefit of an as yet unborn elite which would live in the "better centuries" that are bound to follow "the Lethean sleep" of his own age, centuries when literary studies would produce the alta ingenia and the anima dociles that are needed to dispel the shadows of evil and ignorance and rekindle the torch of goodness, truth, and beauty...99

Whether he writes as an epic poet or as a moral philosopher, Petrarch looks upon himself as a guide. In his Africa, he tells man that there once was an Age of Gold. The quotation just given from Bernardo's study notes this primitivism in Petrarch. Edward Surtz's comments on the

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primitive strain in *Utopia* reflect Petrarch's desire to restore the vigorous life of the ancient Romans:

It appears in the *Utopia* as an almost universal dissatisfaction with the contemporary situation, not only the economic and social system, but also the cultural and intellectual order. There is a restless desire to break the bonds of an outmoded and complicated civilization and to return to an existence far more simple, far less artificial and oppressive. On the physical level, life in *Utopia* therefore becomes easier because it is simpler, but at the same time it becomes harder because it involves regimentation and renunciation.\textsuperscript{100}

The Stoic Petrarch, like Hythloday, never envisions the euphoric land of Cockaigne. Both humanists offer what Edward Surtz describes as "hard virtue."\textsuperscript{101}

In his other works, Petrarch proposes the same ideal. In his *De viris illustribus*, Petrarch tries to preserve and to restore the memories of heroes so that their lives may stimulate others to virtue. In *De remediis*, he suggests an approach toward life that will render the assaults of Fortune ineffectual. Petrarch must be independent if he is to meet his social responsibilities as a philosopher and as a writer.

In a similar way, Petrarch's letter's reveal his concern for man's welfare. His correspondence with Emperor Charles IV; Pope Urban V; and Francesco de Carrara, the Elder, Lord of Padua, shows how the humanist can counsel the improvement of society while still retaining his independence. If Petrarch were to rouse Italy from the "Lethean sleep," he has to restore the concept that Rome is the heart of the

\textsuperscript{100} *Utopia*, p. clxiii. \textsuperscript{101} Ibid., p. clxv.
empire from which strength flows. He wrote letters trying to convince
the Emperor 102 and the Pope 103 to return to Rome so that the Golden
Age might dawn. Petrarch's epistle to Francesco da Carrara amounts to
a treatise encouraging an absolute ruler to love his subjects and to
treat them kindly. 104 Even though Francesco da Carrara did rule well
and Charles IV and Urban V did return to Rome for a time, these letters
should be seen only as minor influences in the complex political
situation of the time.

Petrarch's major contribution to mankind grows out of the total
effect of his Latin prose. Because Petrarch was free to enjoy scholarly
solitude, he wiped the dust away from the monuments of the past and
offered to man an ideal of conduct that has been attractively realized
not only in literature in the character of Raphael Hythloday but also
in history in the life of Thomas More.

More's Hythloday fulfills his debt to society in a way which is
consistent with Petrarch's humanism. Hythloday's design for the social
order is neither less grand nor less effective than Petrarch's and is
equally dependent upon the personal freedom of the philosopher for its
articulation. If Hythloday had been attached to a ruler, he would not

104 See Petrarch, Rerum senilum liber XIV, Ad Magnificum Franciscum
de Carraria Padue dominum, ed. V. Ussani (Padua: Collegium
typographorum Patavinum, 1922), p. 11.
have been free to travel and to study. He is free so that he may learn
of wise institutions, but he is not so independent that he will not
communicate his findings. Hythloday met More and Giles because he had
travelled to Europe in order to make known the Utopian way of life.

The actions of Hythloday and Petrarch give proof of their desire
to guide society. Petrarch strives to do so mainly by his Latin prose
works; Hythloday, by his discourse spoken in Latin. Hythloday admits
that the philosopher fulfills his social responsibility through
writing. In his letter to Giles, More hints that Hythloday may
write an account of his adventures. The humanist, who does not write,
can counsel reforms in his conversations. Edward Surtz's comments on
More's literary techniques sheds light on this matter:

More has of course selected as his linguistic medium the
Latin language, which, far from seeming antique and
artificial, was living, mature, and up-to-date. Besides, Latin was the only language in which More could communicate
across international borders with his fellow humanists--and
with all cultured and learned men. The second device, the
adoption of which would appear quite natural to them, was
that of dialogue, a genre consecrated from its use by their
beloved Plato--to say nothing of Cicero, Augustine, Petrarch,
and others.

In the congenial atmosphere of the garden, the use of spoken
dialogue appears appropriate for humanists who plan a better world.

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105 *Utopia*, p. 107.
108 Edward Surtz, "Utopia Past and Present," Selected Works of
St. Thomas More, *Utopia* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1964), p. xvii. This essay will be cited as "Utopia Past and Present"; *Utopia* (S.W.).
Hythloday, like Petrarch, addresses men who will be able to spread his ideas and to implement his program of reform. Hythloday speaks with More, Giles, John Clement, and other listeners. It is reasonable to assume that the unknown members of the audience were men like More, Giles, Clement and Hythloday's sailors. Clement was a young man, proficient in Latin and Greek, who taught More's children and who would eventually become an important physician and scholar. Giles held a high position in his town and was "worthy of the very highest position." The future Lord Chancellor of England, Thomas More, engaged in an extremely important diplomatic mission for Henry VIII, makes a written record of Hythloday's narrative on Utopia. Earlier in his life Hythloday offered Cardinal Morton, Lord Chancellor of England, a profitable and humane method of treating criminals. Although Hythloday counsels men of high station who can effect changes in the social structure, he remains as independent of these men as Petrarch did of Francesco da Carrara, Charles IV, and Urban V.

Finally, the paradox noted in regard to the impact of Petrarch's thought applies to Hythloday. Hythloday arrives at a vision far surpassing that of the man of action. A question that Edward Surtz asks shows the extent of the effect of Hythloday's revelation:

_Utopia_ at first sight appears to be a book mad from great learning, but it turns out to be sober truth. What is its mysterious appeal that it should be put into practice by a

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109 _Utopia_, p. 281.

110 Ibid., p. 49.
Spanish judge and bishop among Indians in Mexico and yet should belong to the canonical books of the Communists—that it should be approved by Christian scholars of the Renaissance and by socialistic thinkers of the past two centuries—that it should be revered as a sacred volume by theists, deists, and atheists.  

Hythloday's ideal state endures as viably as Petrarch's ideal man.  

This study of Hythloday as an unattached philosopher leads to the conclusion that More's hero stands in a tradition founded by Petrarch. The radical Christian philosopher who searches for wisdom is a celibate layman. He seeks neither riches nor honors. He admires Plato as the foremost philosopher but does not follow Plato's advice that the philosopher must rule. He refuses to serve because he abhors the ignorance and vice he finds at court. His freedom gives him an opportunity to travel and to study so that he can envision a better way of life for his fellow men. He reveals his vision not only to his contemporaries who can effect changes in society but also to the future generations that still attest to the permanence of the unattached philosopher's vision.  

111"Utopia Past and Present"; Utopia (S.W.), p. vii.
CHAPTER III

THE HUMANIST SCHOLAR

In the introduction to *Utopia*, More employs broad strokes to draw the portrait of Hythloday. When Hythloday enters the garden for the dialogue, the reader knows that he is more than a philosopher. He is an extraordinary traveller who has found "towns and cities and very populous commonwealths with excellent institutions." Furthermore, he has journeyed into the "realms of gold" and discovered the riches of the New Learning. In addition, More's initial picture gives a faint glimpse of Hythloday, the reformer:

To be sure, just as he called attention to many ill-advised customs among these new nations, so he rehearsed not a few points from which our own cities, nations, races, and kingdoms may take example for the correction of their errors.

Throughout the dialogue of counsel, More adds to the details and gives a more complete view of Hythloday as a traveller and as a scholar. In the peroration, More presents the full portrait of Hythloday. When the reader closes *Utopia*, he carries away in his mind the vision of the prophet-like reformer who denounces vicious Europe and extols holy Utopia.

If one wishes to see Hythloday in all his fullness, it is necessary to see More's hero as the traveller, as the scholar, and, most of all, as the reformer.

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1 *Utopia*, p. 53.  
Early in Utopia, the reader sees that Hythloday is a unique traveller. Travel, of itself, is an indifferent issue; but the use made of this experience reveals a humanist attitude toward life. The humanist traveller is the very opposite of the figure described by Newman:

The case is the same still more strikingly where the persons in question are beyond dispute men of inferior powers and deficient education. Perhaps they have been much in foreign countries, and they receive, in a passive, otiose, unfruitful way, the various facts which are forced upon them there. Seafaring men, for example, range from one end of the earth to the other; but the multiplicity of external objects, which they have encountered, forms no symmetrical and consistent picture upon their imagination; they see the tapestry of human life, as it were on the wrong side, and it tells no story. They sleep, and they rise up, and they find themselves, now in Europe, now in Asia; they see visions of great cities and wild regions; they are in the marts of commerce, or amid the islands of the South; they gaze on Pompey's Pillar, or on the Andes; and nothing which meets them carries them forward or backward, to any idea beyond itself. Nothing has a drift or relation; nothing has a history or a promise. Every thing stands by itself, and comes and goes in its turn, like the shifting scenes of a show, which leave the spectator where he was. Perhaps you are near such a man on a particular occasion, and expect him to be shocked or perplexed at something which occurs; but one thing is much the same to him as another, or, if he is perplexed, it is as not knowing what to say, whether it is right to admire, or to ridicule, or to disapprove, while conscious that some expression of opinion is expected from him; for in fact he has no standard of judgment at all, and no landmarks to guide him to a conclusion. Such is mere acquisition, and, I repeat, no one would dream of calling it philosophy.\(^3\)

Since the writer of utopian fiction must try to achieve verisimilitude, one of the more obvious inventions at his disposal is the use of a narrator who has returned from travels in an unknown land.

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In the examination of the travels of Hythloday and Petrarch, some attention must be paid to the extent of their travels so that the range of their experiences may be noted. The major consideration should be devoted to the distinctive attitude that the Christian humanist has toward his experiences.

Even though the Renaissance was marked by startling discoveries and voyages, Hythloday's travels were truly remarkable even for his age. Prior to his journey to England, Hythloday visited Persia. After the suppression of an insurrection of men at Blackheath, Cornwall in 1497, Hythloday spent several months in England and visited the court of Cardinal Morton, Archbishop of Canterbury and Lord Chancellor of England. Giles mentions that Hythloday went on the last three of the four voyages of Vespucci (1497-1504). After his departure from South America, Hythloday, by strange chance, reached Ceylon and Calicut, colonies of Portugal since 1505. It is possible to assume that Hythloday eventually reached Portuguese India by sailing west; thus Hythloday could have anticipated Magellan's circumnavigation of the globe.

A traveller like Hythloday would have had to possess the physical courage necessary to meet the risks that were inevitable in extensive travel at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Hythloday journeyed

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4 *Utopia*, p. 75. 
through a "gloomy and dismal region . . . inhabited by wild beasts and snakes" and by "men no less savage and harmful than are the beasts."  

More important than either the extent of his travels or his personal courage as a traveller is Hythloday's interest in human institutions. Hythloday uses the data gathered in travel in order to establish criteria for evaluating the conduct of his fellow Christians. He did not search out "stale travellers' wonders" but rather "wise and prudent provisions which he noticed anywhere among nations living together in a civilized way."  

Hythloday does show an interest in the physical characteristics of the places he visits; but, even then, he reveals the humanist focus on morality. When he describes the Zapoletans, he implies that there is a relationship between their warlike ways and their land which is "fearsome, rough, and wild."  

While speaking of his journey from Vespucci's fort in South America, he notes a similar coincidence:

To be sure, under the equator and on both sides of the line nearly as far as the sun's orbit extends, there lie waste deserts scorched with continual heat. A gloomy and dismal region looms in all directions without cultivation or attractiveness, inhabited by wild beasts and snakes or, indeed, men no less savage and harmful than are the beasts. But when you have gone a little farther, the country gradually assumes a milder aspect, the climate is less fierce, the ground is covered with a pleasant green herbage, and the nature of the living creatures becomes less wild.  

Frequently, however, Hythloday has little to say about the physical appearance of places he visits. He shows only a passing interest in the

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8 Ibid., p. 53.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., p. 207.
11 Ibid., p. 53.
unique geography of the Polylerites which is described in one sentence. Yet he mentions how the Polylerites take advantage of the protection their mountains afford. By national policy, they rarely visit other lands. They try to keep free from militarism. These prosperous people are similar to the Utopians for they utilize whatever protection nature affords. Hythloday has a particular interest in these people and recalls in great detail their method of treating criminals. He later proposes their penal methods to Cardinal Morton as a realistic solution to a pressing problem in Christian England. Because of the great interest in the New World, one would expect Hythloday to describe the land of the Achorians and of the Macarians; but he simply reveals their geographic position in relation to Utopia. He does, however, reveal how the institutions of the Achorians and of the Macarians can solve a problem in international relations that troubles Christian Europe. Hythloday's presence in Antwerp is motivated by his desire to reveal the excellent institutions of the Utopians. From these examples, it can be seen that the Christian humanist traveller is primarily concerned with the facets of experience that can lead man to a better life.

Like Hythloday, Petrarch was one of the great travellers of his age. Petrarch mentions his visit to Paris, Flanders, Brabant, Liège, Aix-la-Chapelle, Cologne, and Lyons. In another letter, he shows that

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12 Ibid., p. 75.  
13 Ibid., pp. 75-79.  
14 Ibid., pp. 89-91.  
15 Ibid., p. 97.  
16 Ibid., p. 107.  
he has a personal and a detailed knowledge of Italy and of Europe that few in his day could possess. Once he wished to travel to Jerusalem; but, because he suffered from seasickness, he could not make the journey to the Near East. Yet his knowledge of the area was extensive enough for him to write his *Itinerarium Syriacum* for those who had planned the trip. This longing to be always on the move, which was typical of many humanists, is also revealed in the variety of Petrarch's residences: Vaucluse 1337-1353, Milan 1353-1361, Venice 1362-1368, Padua 1368-1370, and Arqua 1370-1374. Because he saw Renaissance Italy as the inheritor of ancient Rome, Petrarch was not a citizen of Europe as Erasmus was. Yet he does reveal some of the cosmopolitan tendencies that are associated with the radical humanist.

In his travels, Petrarch showed the indifference to physical danger that was noted in Hythloday: "How often, at that hour, alone, and not without a mingled sense of pleasure and of horror, did I enter the immense cavern from which the river gushes forth, a place that men dread to enter even in the light of day, and with companions?" The famous ascent of Mount Ventoux also is an example of Petrarch's physical courage. When Petrarch returned to Italy from Germany, his journey took him through the Ardennes forest where bands of roving mercenaries

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19 Petrarch at Vaucluse, p. 206; *Ep. Sen.*, X, 2, in *Opera*, p. 962: "Quotiens hora illa, nullo comite, non sine uoluptate horrida, immane illud fontis specus intrauerim quo vel comitatum luce ingredi horror est?"
harassed travellers. Wilkins comments that Petrarch, a man of peace, scorned this danger. 20

The fortitude of the Renaissance traveller is relevant to the figure of the Christian humanist. A man, by limiting the range of his activities, may choose to be secure. If, on the other hand, he feels that the advantages offered by travel outweigh the risks involved, he will show the necessary indifference towards the dangers that restrict travel. Petrarch's travels brought him to the treasures of the Sorbonne, where, among other classics, he obtained his Latin translation of the Phaedo. In Flanders, he rescued Pro Archia. 21 By risking the dangers of travel, Petrarch unveiled the wisdom of the ancients and the virtuous practices of the peoples he had visited.

More important than Petrarch's intrepidity was his attitude toward his travel experiences. Petrarch visited centers of learning: "I went not only to learned men, but to learned cities too, anxious to return more learned and a better man." 22 He was in daily contact with learned men in all parts of Europe:

Quotidie epystolas, quotidie carmina omnis in caput hoc nostri orbis angulus pluit; nec satis est: peregrinis iam, nec Gallis modo sed Grais et Theutonis et Britannis, tempestatibus literarum pulsor, omnium ingeniorum arbiter,

20 Wilkins, The Life of Petrarch, p. 10.


22 "On His Own Ignorance," in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, p. 68; De ignorantia, p. 34: "Neque uiros tantum, sed urbes quoque doctas adij, ut doctior inde meliorque reuerterer."
mei ipsius ignarus. 23

Like Hythloday, Petrarch was not interested in stale travellers' wonders. When he speaks of such distant peoples as the Brahmans, Hindoos, and the Hyperboreans in De vita solitaria, he is interested only in their moral standards. He commends the colloquy of Dandamus with Alexander, "in which not Alexander alone but practically the entire human race is upbraided with a mass of innumerable crimes—the insatiable thirst for gold, inhuman savagery, universal hate and contempt for God." 24 In one letter, Petrarch comments on the moral condition of almost every place in the West where the Gospel had been preached. His comment on Cyprus is typical: "Cyprus, with no armed enemy, is beset by soft and unarmed idleness, by voluptuousness, and by luxury, evil enemies indeed, and has become a place where no strong man would live. 25

Petrarch's use of the experience that he had gained through contact with other nations and cultures differs from that of Hythloday. In Utopia, More's indirect method contrasts pagan and Christian conduct; and, therefore, Hythloday uses knowledge of pagan institutions in order

23 Ep. Fam., XIII, 7, in Opere, XII, 81.

24 The Life of Solitude, p. 293; De vita solitaria, p. 123: "In qua non illi uni, sed universo propemodum generi humano exprobrantur scelerum innumerabilium acervi, nominatim inexplebilis auri sitis, inhumae feritas odium omnium contemptusque Dei."

25 Petrarch at Vaucluse, p. 99; Ep. Fam., XV, 7, in Opere, XII, 151: "Cyprus armato hoste carens, inermi mollique otio voluptate luxuria, malis hostibus, oppugnator, viro forti sedes inhabilis."
to improve Christian behavior. In his prose works, Petrarch is often trying to establish a correct attitude toward the past. He frequently shows how the customs and heroes of both the pagan and Christian heritage should be exemplars of moral conduct. In *De vita solitaria*, Christ, Jeremias, David, St. Bernard, and St. Francis, as well as Plato, Plotinus, and Democritus, are all used as models of some aspect of the solitary life. Petrarch goes to the past for ideals because of the revulsion from his own age and because of his intense desire to see the former glory of the Roman Church and of the Roman Empire restored. Although their exact use of the knowledge of foreign cultures differs, both humanists had the same general intention of improving human conduct.

Another major difference between the travels of Hythloday and those of Petrarch reveals a significant relationship. Hythloday sought wise institutions; but Petrarch sought texts which would reveal the learning of the ancients. Petrarch wished to spread abroad a newly discovered text as much as Hythloday wished to reveal Utopian ways:

At about the twenty-fifth year of my life, while hurriedly traveling among the Belgians and the Swiss, I reached the city of Liège. Upon hearing that the city contained a goodly number of books, I made a halt there and detained my companions until I was in possession of two orations of Cicero, one copied by the hand of a friend, the second by my own. The latter oration I afterward spread throughout Italy.26

Hythloday was also interested in the dissemination of the classics, for he made many Greek texts available to the Utopians. Hythloday's contribution could hardly have been made if Petrarch had not stimulated a great interest in the rebirth of classical learning. Those who know Petrarch best, Wilkins notes, are those who know him as the "moving spirit in the development of the Renaissance."28

In conclusion, it may be restated that intimate friends of More--Colet, Grocyn, Linacre, and Lyly--all travelled to centers of learning in Italy where they profited by the interest in classical studies initiated by Petrarch. In Italy they found cities where the genius loci was often a classical figure--Aristotle at Padua, Plato at Florence. This same interest is also evident in More's translation of the biography of Pico della Mirandola:

As a desirous ensearcher of the secrets of nature, he left these common trodden paths and gave himself wholly to speculation and philosophy, as well human as divine. For the purchasing whereof (after the manner of Plato and Apollonius) he scrupulously sought out all the famous doctors of his time, visiting studiously all the universities and schools, not only through Italy but also through France."29

Erasmus was so frequent a traveller that he belonged more to Europe than to Rotterdam. More himself went to the universities at Paris and at Louvain; but, because of the emphasis on dialectics at these places, he

27 Utopia, pp. 181-183.
28 Petrarch at Vaucluse, p. v
29 The English Works, I, 351.
was not satisfied with his journey.30

Hythloday, however, surpasses all of these travellers. He possesses the New Learning that they sought; and--because of his trips to strange and unknown lands--he can reveal how the ideals of the ancient learning motivated life among the Utopians. His travels make him an admirable Utopian narrator. His experiences provide a fund of exempla and anecdotes to enliven his discourse. His humanist observations are directed toward standards of conduct so that he can evaluate the wholesomeness and practicality of social and political institutions. His allusions have the freshness of novelty, his judgments possess the wisdom of experience, and his recommendations, as a result of his independence, have a claim to the highest degree of objectivity.

When More first introduces Hythloday, it is evident that he wants the reader to see the narrator as a philosopher and as a traveller. Yet there is still another aspect of Hythloday's character which is presented in the introduction and which is revealed more completely throughout the dialogue of counsel in Book I. No study of Hythloday could be complete without reference to his unique manner of thinking. Hythloday's rejection of late scholastic methodology provides a key which will reveal the principles that govern his thought processes. One of the major premises of the Christian humanist thinker is that he wants knowledge to be relevant to conduct.

The true humanist abhors the study of a body of knowledge that

30 Selected Letters, p. 17.
has lost its human significance and has decayed into a lifeless discipline. The *Summa Theologica* possesses a vigor that attests to the perennial values in Aquinas' system. Nevertheless, in later ages, men, far less gifted than Aquinas, allowed the scholastic method to deteriorate into meaningless mental exercises.

In regard to this educational abuse, there was great unanimity among the humanists. Erasmus' *Folly* satirizes the practice of the schoolmen and contrasts their ineffectual preaching with that of the apostles:

We must put in also those hard sayings, contradictions indeed, compared to which the Stoic maxims which were called paradoxes seem the merest simplicity. For instance: it is less of a crime to cut the throats of a thousand men than to set a stitch on a poor man's shoe on the Lord's day; it is better to choose that the universe should perish, body, boots, and breeches (as the saying is), than that one should tell a single lie, however inconsequential. The methods our scholastics pursue only render more subtle these subtlest of subtleties; for you will escape from a labyrinth more quickly than from the tangles of Realists, Nominalists, Thomists, Albertists, Occamists, Scotists—-I have not named all, but the chief ones only... The apostles also confuted the heathen philosophers and the Jews, who are by nature the stubbornest of all, but they did so rather by their lives and miracles than by syllogisms; and of course they dealt with people not one of whom had wit enough to get through a single quodlibet of Scotus.31

The attitude of Erasmus toward the decadent scholasticism is typical of that of the More circle.

Edward Surtz defines the position of the More circle in regard to the schoolmen in the tenth chapter of *The Praise of Pleasure*. He finds

four causes for More's antipathy toward the scholastics. First, they felt that they could define everything. Second, they accommodated the message of Christ to the thought of their Aristotle. Third, they overemphasized the importance of the rational faculty to the neglect of the emotional element in man. Finally, at least in the eyes of the humanists, the schoolmen devoted too much attention to dialectic and not enough to behavior.32

These views of the More circle figure prominently in Utopia. In the dialogue in Book I and in the discourse in Book II, Hythloday refers to the sophistical dialectic of the schoolmen. In Book I, Hythloday narrates the altercation between the "certain theologian who was a friar" and the toady.33 In this incident, More dramatically reveals a schoolman in action. In his letter to Dorp, More speaks of a "religious who was a theologian."34 This person may have provided the general outline for the friar in Utopia. This theologian who is ignorant of Scripture and indifferent to the truth, argues ingeniously over petty quibbles. In debate, he attacks his opponent fiercely and swears sacred oaths when cornered by his adversary. The friar in Utopia takes scriptural passages out of context in order to defend his own anger:

"Be not angry, good friar. It is written: 'In your patience shall you possess your souls.'"

33 Utopia, p. 83.
34 Selected Letters, p. 30.
Then the friar rejoined—I shall repeat his very words: "I am not angry, you gallow bird, or at least I do not sin, for the psalmist says: 'Be angry, and sin not.'" 35

More's friar blesses his own wrath by calling it a holy zeal; and, in order to heighten the irony directed against the theologian, Hythloday notes how the friar uses scelus instead of zelus so that the mockers of Eliseus felt the "crime" instead of the "zeal" of the baldhead. 36

In Book II, Hythloday commends the Utopians for their inability to match the schoolmen:

But while they measure up to the ancients in almost all other subjects, still they are far from being a match for the inventions of our modern logicians. In fact, they have discovered not even a single one of those very ingeniously devised rules about restrictions, amplifications, and suppositions which our own children everywhere learn in the Small Logicals. In addition, so far are they from ability to speculate on second intentions that not one of them could see even man himself as a so-called universal—though he was, as you know colossal and greater than any giant, as well as pointed out by us with our finger. 37

By satirizing the absurdities of a lifeless scholasticism, More and Erasmus join the humanists Vives, Wimpheling, Valla, and Agricola, who all reveal the folly underlying the position of the schoolmen. 38 In this regard, the education of Rabelais' Gargantua is noteworthy. After fifty-three years, ten months, and two weeks of study under the schoolmen, Gargantua develops into a fool, a sot, and a blockhead who is able to

35 Utopia, p. 83.
36 Ibid., pp. 84-85.
37 Ibid., p. 159.
Although the rejection of the schoolmen's methodology was central to humanism, it should be noted that humanists thinkers like More and Rabelais offer positive programs—Utopian education and the Abbey of Thélème—as constructive reforms to replace devitalized scholasticism. Utopian education rests in a tradition far different from the spirit of the Small Logicals.

Edward Surtz's commentary on the Small Logicals reveals why a humanist thinker like Hythloday rejects the program of the schoolman. More intends to "discourage all unreasonable argument over universals, which are only second intentions viewed under the aspect of predicability to many inferiors." More does not want "to deny universals;" but, by showing "the Utopians as very happy and yet incapable of grasping such refinements he wishes to divert attention of learned men to needed reforms and urgent problems." The "sanity and salvation for Europe," Surtz continues, "is not to be found in the 'subtle inventions' of the Schoolmen."41

Immediately after discoursing upon the Small Logicals, Hythloday narrates how the Utopians profit by their investigation of the heavens and how their chief debate is on the nature of happiness—subjects very different from those debated by the scholastics. By objecting to the


40 Surtz, The Praise of Pleasure, p. 98.

41 Ibid.
Small Logicals and by emphasizing the moral focus in Utopian education, Hythloday places himself among the Christian humanists who trace their origin back to Petrarch.

The position of Petrarch in exalting Plato and in disparaging the scholastics, the dialecticians, the Aristotelians, and the Averroists is one of the major intellectual innovations in the fourteenth century. Kristeller and Randall state that "from Petrarca down the Humanists felt in strong opposition to this professional philosophy of the universities and that their own intellectual defenses and rationalizations were developed in contrast to it." In a letter to Tommaso of Messina, Petrarch states his position toward the schoolmen. He does not object to the study of dialectics in itself since it is a liberal art and is a tool to be used by those who wish to progress to a higher knowledge. Petrarch condemns the use of dialectic as an end:

A wayfarer who forgets the goal he has set to himself because the road is so pleasant is not sound of mind. A traveler is praised if he completes a long journey quickly without ever stopping before its end. And who among us is not a traveler? All of us must cover a long and difficult road in a short set time in bad weather, almost as it were on a rainy winter day. Occupation with dialectic may cover a part of this road; it ought never to be the goal. It may be on the morning schedule but never on that of the evening.  

42 The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, p. 11.

Petrarch's attacks against the dialecticians who venerate Aristotle reveal the humanist attitude toward knowledge. Whenever Aristotle's views are sound, Petrarch will follow him. If Aristotle fails to make sense, Petrarch will stand against Aristotle. He finds that the followers of Aristotle, especially the Averroists and the professional philosophers of the schools, are too concerned with dialectics and logic. He compares the philosophy of the schools to a prostitute who rejoices in empty verbalism.

Petrarch, like More and Rabelais, is not faultfinding. His positive approach to learning stresses the importance of virtue. The pursuit of sanctity is as important as is the search for wisdom. Knowledge of itself is not a worthwhile goal. In an eloquent passage, Petrarch insists that knowledge must lead to virtue and to the love of God:

Cum enim eloquentia sit paucorum valde, virtus autem omnium, quod est paucorum omnes appetunt, quod est omnium nemo. Ne enim hoc grammaticce tantum exprobatum putes, quem michi poetam dabis qui non prius eligat vita claudicare quam carmine? Iam ut percurram reliquos, ostende michi rhetoricum qui non magis orationis deformitatem horreat quam vite, ostende dialeticum qui non ab affectibus propriis quam ab adversarii conclusiuncula vinci malit. Sileo arithmeticos ac geometras, qui omnia numerant, omnia metiuntur, unius anime numeros ac mensuras negligunt. Musici numerum ad sonum referunt, huic studio omne tempus impenditur; hi sunt qui contemptis moribus tractant sonos, ciceronianum illud obliti: "maior et melior est actionum quam sonorum concentus"; ille ne discreparet.

44 See Ep. Fam., XX, 14, in Opere, XIII, 44-45.
45 See Ep. Fam., XVII, 1, in Opere, XII, 222.
elaborandum erat, hic sperni poterat in quo tantopere laboratur. Astrologi celum lustrant, astra connumerant, "ausi rem" ut ait Flinius, "etiam Deo improbam"; quid imperius atque urbibus eventurum sit tam audacter tanto ante denuntiant, quid sibi quotidie eveniat non attendunt; lune solisque defectus provident, presentem eclipsim anime non videntes. Iam qui clarum philosophie nomen habent, vel rerum causas querunt ventosa iactantia, scire autem negligunt quid est Deus rerum creator omnium, vel virtutes loquendo describunt, vivendo destituunt. Postremo, qui sibi nomen honestius presumserunt et divinorum scientiam sunt professi, quo deciderint vides: ex theologis dyaleeticis atque utinam non sophiste; neque enim Dei amatores sed cognitores, neque id ipsum esse cupiunt sed videri; itaque cum alterum silentio sequi possent, alterum strepitu consequuntur. 46

The emphasis on a moral purpose in education is as central for the humanist and is as crucial to Petrarch's program of reform as it is for his followers. For the Christian humanist every phase of knowledge must direct man toward a more perfect mode of conduct. The satire on the Small Logicals can be viewed as More's approval of Petrarch's humanism. The Christian humanist wants no part of the altercations of the logician. In his translation of Pico's life, More reflects the ideals just quoted in Petrarch's letter—it is vanity to know God and not to love Him: "We liefer always by knowledge never find that thing that we seek, than by love to possess that thing which also, without love, were in vain found." 47

Petrarch not only objects to the schoolman's overemphasis on logic and dialectic, but he also laments their influence as teachers.

46 Ep. Fam., XVI, 14, in Opere, XII, 212-213.
47 English Works, I, 358.
Petrarch holds that the humanist should have the ability to stir men's hearts and to lead them to virtue. He feels that Aristotle cannot induce men to lead good lives because he lacks eloquence. When referring to Aristotle's Ethics in the De ignorantia, he says:

I see virtue, and all that is peculiar to vice as well as to virtue, egregiously defined and distinguished by him and treated with penetrating insight. When I learn all this, I know a little bit more than I knew before, but mind and will remain the same as they were, and I myself remain the same. It is one thing to know, another to love; one thing to understand, another to will. He teaches what virtue is, I do not deny that; but his lesson lacks the words that sting and set afire and urge toward love of virtue and hatred of vice or, at any rate, does not have enough of such power. 48

Petrarch and subsequent humanists stress the moral purpose of eloquence. Eloquence should lead man to embrace a better way of life by making virtue attractive and vice repulsive—Quid profuerit autem nosse quid est uirtus, si cognita non ametur? 49 Petrarch's thinking along these lines prepares for the later attempts of humanists to make their teaching as effective as possible. Petrarch's use of satire to achieve reforms is consistent with his concept of a functional eloquence. In a letter to Cola di Rienzo, Petrarch shows how the humanist must assume a responsibility for

48 "On His Own Ignorance," in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, p. 103; De ignorantia, p. 68: "Video nempe uirtutem ab illo egregie diffiniri et distingui tractarique acriter, et que cuique sunt propria, seu uitiio, seu uirtutti. Que cum didici, scio pluscultur quam sciebam; idem tamen est animus qui fuerat, uoluntasque eadem, idem ego. Aliud est enim scire atque aliud amare, aliud intelligere atque aliud uelle. Docet ille, non inficior, quid est uirtus; at stimulos ac uerborum faces, quibus ad amorem uirtutis uitijque odium mens urgetur atque incenditur, lectio illa uel non habet, uel paucissimos habet."

49 "On His Own Ignorance," in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, p. 104; De ignorantia, p. 68.
the conduct of his fellow men and must often resort to satire when there is need for reform: "Pray release me from this most bitter necessity: let not the lyric verses which I have begun to compose in thy praise and over which (as my pen can testify) I have spent much toil, end in satire." 50

In much the same spirit, More's letter to Dorp approves the use of satire in order to achieve reform. 51 Heiserman's study, "Satire in Utopia," claims that More and Erasmus possess a distinctive decorum that separates the Utopia and The Praise of Folly from the extravagances of the Roman satirists. 52 He notes that the "humanist could remove the aura of jeu d'esprit which hovers over satire only by showing that it attacks objects worthy of serious consideration." 53 Heiserman's statements can be applied to Petrarch's use of satire. Hans Nachod notes that in De ignorantia—which is not a jeu d'esprit—Petrarch ridicules the "incoherent, incorrect, and often intentionally distorted notions concerning natural history that stuck to the mind of the average man with a Scholastic education." 54 The satire on the most learned of his four accusers succeeds because Petrarch skillfully contrasts his opponent's


53. Ibid.

54. The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, p. 57.
foolly in mastering fantastic and useless bits of information with his neglect in studying the nature of man, the Law of Moses, and New Covenant.\textsuperscript{55}

The use of satire stems from Petrarch's belief that the humanist should be eloquent and should approach the task of reform with the tools of the poet. More takes the same position as Petrarch and hopes to correct men through eloquent persuasion. He does not use the unemotional method of the schoolmen which lacks the variety of art. In \textit{Utopia}, More provides Hythloday with the practices of the poet. Hythloday varies his discourse and defends his ideals by means of irony, examples, image, and proverbs.

In \textit{Utopia}, there are surprisingly few examples of overt irony, a traditionally effective device in satire. Hythloday is especially effective when his irony focuses upon men whose vocations demand exemplary conduct. The otherwise holy abbots who enclose the land\textsuperscript{56} and the friar—a holy and zealous man—who waves papal bulls in self-defense\textsuperscript{57} are primary targets of Hythloday's irony. Likewise, the reverend and feared Sovereign Pontiffs and the just and good kings who hold treaties holy and inviolable\textsuperscript{58} are objects of direct criticism.

\textsuperscript{55}See "On His Own Ignorance," in \textit{The Renaissance Philosophy of Man}, pp. 56-59; \textit{De ignorantia}, pp. 24-25.

\textsuperscript{56}\textit{Utopia}, p. 67.

\textsuperscript{57}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 85.

\textsuperscript{58}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 197.
In addition to the irony that condemns the base conduct of those in exalted offices, Hythloday varies his discourse by employing his traveller's experiences in *exempla* that further distinguish the vicious "Christians" of Europe from virtuous pagans. Hythloday's experiences among the Polylerites, Achorians, and Macarians enrich the dialogue of counsel. His impressions of Utopian life indirectly offer a forceful commentary on Europe's moral condition.

Hythloday's use of metaphor reveals that like Petrarch, he has the gift of the poet. Although the artistry evident in the metaphors used to describe vice will be treated in a subsequent chapter, it will be useful at this point to refer briefly to some of the outstanding images and symbols in *Utopia*. Hythloday instructs forcefully in Book I by means of the famous image of the all-devouring sheep and the symbol of the ominous gallows. In Book II, the major symbols differ greatly from those in Book I. The dining hall of the Utopians, the wax candle borne before the priest,59 and the sheaf of grain carried in the ruler's hand60 symbolize the prosperity and enlightenment of those who lead virtuous lives.

Hythloday enriches his discourse further by employing proverbs and aphoristic sayings. Since the humanists have such a high regard for the past, it is not surprising that Petrarch, Erasmus, and More collected adages and epigrams. More and Petrarch share an adage with Cicero as they share his motto for the independent philosopher--**siue ut uolo**.

Persona—More uses the proverb, " nisi uideri uelim solem lucerna, quod aiunt, ostendere." 61 Petrarch asks, "Quis lucernam, quaeso, unquam solut videretur adhibuit?" 62

During the debate on councilship, Hythloday's aphorisms seem particularly appropriate. In the introduction, Giles notes the two proverbs ever on the lips of Hythloday: "He has no grave who is covered by the sky"; "From all places it is the same distance to heaven." 63 These two sayings prepare the reader for Hythloday's position in the debate. Describing the futility of the councilor in the courts of Europe where conceit and flattery exist, Hythloday introduces his arguments by an effective proverb: "It is but human nature that each man favor his own discoveries most—just as the crow and monkey like their own offspring best." 64 In the council of the imaginary king, Hythloday quotes the aphorism of Fabricius who said that he would rather be a ruler of rich people than be rich himself. 65

In other instances, too, Hythloday reveals his ability to create aphoristic statements. Speaking of the Achorians who insist that there be one king for one kingdom, Hythloday comments, "No one would care to engage even a muleteer whom he had to share with someone else." 66

Hythloday's ability to see deeply and to express himself succinctly is

61 Ibid., p. 46.
62 De remediis, p. 58.
63 Utopia, p. 51.
64 Ibid., p. 57.
65 Ibid., p. 95.
66 Ibid., p. 91.
evident in one of the more memorable statements in *Utopia*—"Pride measures prosperity not by her own advantages but by others' disadvantages." 67

These last observations of Hythloday reveal something of the type of logic that governs his thought. Hythloday's manner of persuasion is relevant to one of the two types of eloquence noted by rhetoricians. Longinus distinguishes between the eloquence of Cicero and that of Demosthenes. Cicero's mind works like Newman's. Both marshal vast amounts of data and thoroughly surround and overwhelm the subject under consideration. Their eloquence seems to progress with the relentless force of waves at flood tide. On the other hand, the eloquence of Demosthenes is swift and startling. He casts aside befogging issues and lays bare the truth in an instant. Hythloday's mind works like that of Demosthenes. With a single brilliant touch, he can reveal in an instant the ultimate absurdity in the position of those who espouse folly or vice.

Hythloday's use of *reductio ad absurdum* reflects the spirit of *Utopia*. In Utopia, the holy commonwealth, everyone has been instructed in virtuous ways, and order and harmony prevail. In Europe, corruption and injustice rule, for values have been inverted. A veil of deceit hides the decay lying beneath the seemingly normal civilization. Hythloday's mind pierces through the apparently healthy surface and sees a society corrupt to its core. The English economic system, based on

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67 Ibid., p. 243.
self-aggrandizement, makes Hythloday think of the gallows:

In this respect not your country alone but a great part of our world resembles bad schoolmasters, who would rather beat than teach their scholars. You ordain grievous and terrible punishments for a thief when it would have been much better to provide some means of getting a living, that no one should be under this terrible necessity first of stealing and then of dying for it.\footnote{Utopia, p. 61.}

A moment later in the discourse, he reveals to the lawyer an unexpected effect of war—"Of course, . . . you might as well say that for the sake of war we must foster thieves."\footnote{Ibid., p. 63.} In the same discussion, Hythloday recalls Sallust's comment on the absurdity of maintaining standing armies:

This attitude obliges them always to be seeking for a pretext for war just so they may not have soldiers without experience, and men's throats must be cut without cause lest, to use Sallust's witty saying, "the hand or the mind through lack of practice become dulled."\footnote{Ibid., p. 65.}

When Hythloday thinks of God's laws, his use of \textit{reductio ad absurdum} becomes most effective. Considering the English practice of capital punishment, he sees that the commandments have been altered:

"God has said, 'Thou shalt not kill,' and shall we so lightly kill a man for taking a bit of small change? But if the divine command against killing be held not to apply where human law justifies killing, what prevents men equally from arranging with one another how far rape, adultery, and perjury are admissible?"\footnote{Ibid., p. 73.}

It is most significant that Hythloday employs this device when he rejects More's principle of accommodation:

But preachers, crafty men that they are, finding that men grievously disliked to have their morals adjusted to the rule
of Christ and following I suppose your advice, accommodated
His teaching to men's morals as if it were a rule of soft
lead that at least in some way or other the two might be
made to correspond. By this method I cannot see what they
have gained except that men may be bad in greater comfort. 72

These few examples of *reductio ad absurdum* provide a valuable
insight into the character of Hythloday. By seeking the ultimate
absurdities of European practices, he shows that he will not tolerate
half-way measures—"he succeeds in making his readers share his sentiments:
pity, scorn, indignation, hope, love, and admiration," even "if his world
be black and white, if his men be saints or devils, if his communistic
republic is too perfect and his propertied state too villainous. . . ." 73
By having Hythloday use the tools of the poet, More has enriched his
character. The use of irony and *reductio ad absurdum* startles the
reader and lets him see the perspicuity of the reformer. Metaphor,
imagery, and symbolism enlighten the reader so that he can see Hythloday's
dark vision of Europe and his bright view of Utopia. The proverbs and
aphoristic sayings cause the reader to pause and to consider the
profundity and wisdom of Hythloday. Thus, Hythloday as a scholar not
only accepts Petrarch's ideal in regard to what is worth learning but
also embraces Petrarch's method of imparting knowledge.

Since Hythloday possesses so fine a mind, his conduct in the debate
on councilship raises a question: Does Hythloday willingly give More


the upper hand at one part of the argument? Hythloday is truly a learned man who draws on the wisdom of the ages. Furthermore, he is an independent thinker whose thought flashes with the originality of genius. The combination of these qualities reveals a brilliant and a profound mind. Yet in the dialogue of counsel he so orders his arguments that he gives persona-More an opportunity to raise a valid and serious objection to the position of the independent philosopher. In order to solve the problem of theft in England, Hythloday offers the method of treating criminals practiced successfully by the Romans and the Polyleerites. Cardinal Morton, a man experienced in the affairs of state, approves of Hythloday's recommendations. More, having commented upon the wisdom of Hythloday's proposal,\(^7\) is more convinced than ever that Hythloday should serve a king.

Hythloday, a man of great experience in affairs,\(^5\) then proposes the beneficial institutions of the Achorians and Macarians. Although the Achorians have the wisdom to limit their king to a single kingdom, Hythloday certainly realizes that in sixteenth-century Europe a people cannot take counsel and most courteously offer "their king his choice of retaining whichever of the two kingdoms he preferred."\(^6\) The financial plan of the Macarians which limits a ruler to a thousand pounds of gold would never be accepted by a European monarch—as prudent as this advice

\(^7\)\textit{Utopia}, pp. 85-87.  
\(^5\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 57.  
\(^6\)\textit{Utopia}, p. 91.
is. More, like Hythloday, would wish to check a ruler's lust for power and for gold. Yet Hythloday must realize that More will never accept these proposals in the way that they are offered.

It appears that Hythloday, a reformer and not a councilor, may want to lose a battle in order to win the war. By recommending these highly impracticable counsels, Hythloday further reveals his cleverness. His position forces More to state the principle of accommodation. This artful handling of persona-More takes Hythloday to that point in Utopia where he first reveals the intensity of his attachment to Christ.

Hythloday, the moral philosopher, has prescribed practices which are impractical because they are founded on the supposition that virtuous behavior demands a system of conduct foreign to "Christian" Europe's code of honor and system of profit. If Europe must adapt the institutions of pagans who are far below Christian moral standards, the message of Christ—as has already been mentioned—has again become the message of those who speak nonsense. By referring to the Gospel at the end of Book I, Hythloday begins to rise to the full stature that More envisions for him.

Thus far, Hythloday has been presented as the independent philosopher and humanist traveller who conforms quite closely to the pattern of the humanist revealed in Petrarch's Latin prose. Hythloday mirrors with varying degrees of clarity the though of Petrarch on many vital issues—councilship, peace, personal integrity. He not only shares Petrarch's antipathy toward the abuses within scholasticism, but he also reflects Petrarch's views on learning, eloquence, and virtue. In all
these respects, the thought that Petrarch resurrected from the monuments of the past withstood the test of time. The measurement of Hythloday by the standard of humanism revealed in Petrarch's Latin prose justifies Whitfield's observation:

Petrarch is the hinge of the door. His approach to antiquity is the reverse of Dante's, and it is Petrarch who, in giving a personal impulse to the fifteenth century, initiates a line which is visible there, and efficacious afterwards in the development of the European tradition.??

??Whitfield, Petrarch and the Renascence, p. 7.
CHAPTER IV

THE CHRISTIAN REFORMER

As Book I of *Utopia* ends, Hythloday is rising to the full stature More envisions for him. Hythloday becomes more than the unattached philosopher and the humanist traveller who, in the manner of the poet, feels his message so deeply that he goes in speech beyond the truth of history and nature in order to dramatize the crucial importance of his vision. The sense of urgency that surrounds the exordium and the peroration marks Hythloday as a man of the hour. And in the second decade of the sixteenth century, that man is the Christian reformer.

Composing the *Utopia* on the eve of the Reformation, More has Hythloday plead for reform with the immediacy of the Baptist's cry: "Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make straight his paths."¹ Hythloday's cry is so insistent that More must have foreseen imminent dangers to Christian unity. Although Petrarch loathes corruption in the Church, his call for renewal differs significantly from More's. In 1516 the conditions demanding correction in the Church were in a state of crisis. This situation had become noticeable toward the end of the pontificate of Benedict VIII (d. 1303). The removal of the papacy from Rome to Avignon marked a further deterioration in the Church's condition.

¹Matt. 3:2.
Petrarch likened the Avignon court to a Babylon worse that hell. Yet, during his lifetime, Petrarch withheld from publication the Epistolae sine nomine, his spirited attacks against the nefarious curia at Avignon. As a reformer Petrarch excoriates vice but does not demonstrate the singleness of purpose that is characteristic of the sixteenth-century reformers. As strong as it is, his cry for regeneration lacks the sense of urgency that lies imbedded in Hythloday's denunciations of Christian Europe. In Petrarch's lifetime, and in the years following, few thought that the eleventh hour had come. The Church, as far as appearances are concerned, weathered a major crisis—the Western Schism (1378-1417). But the Babylonian Captivity of the Church and the Great Western Schism were the brush fires before the holocaust which blazed openly on October 31, 1517, and which eventually embroiled all of Europe in religious disputes and in open violence. Thus, at the end of Book I and throughout the peroration, Hythloday, a man of his day, sees the storm clouds gather. As he cries for reform, he rises to the stature of a prophet of the New Law.

Although all utopian narrators are reformers, the degree to which they can be said to live as individuals depends upon the power and the vitality of the force which compels them to reform their world. Socrates lives because of the depth of his conviction that justice will lead man

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2Ep. Fam., XI, 6, in Opere, XI, p. 336: "Duo ibi sunt fateor adversa animo, et quod ab Italia locus abest, ad quam me naturalis motus attrahit, et quod vicina nimis est Babilon hec occidentalis, rerum pessima Ereboque simillima, unde me natura itidem dehortatur ac retrahit mea."
to happiness. Gulliver is most alive in the fourth book of *Gulliver's Travels* as he denounces the vicious ways of Europeans who refuse to act according to reason. In *Looking Backwards*, the dull Dr. Leete can hardly be said to throb with life; however, he is most convincing when he speaks of the industrial army which provides the satisfactions necessary for human fulfillment. In Huxley's dystopia, *Brave New World*, Mustapha Mond's vitality is most evident in Chapters III, XVI, and XVII as he eradicates and negates the human values which pose threats to stability. In the *Utopia* it is the force of the Gospel message which fills Hythloday with life and which defines his individuality as he is driven to the reform of Christianity.

There are three crucial moments in *Utopia* when Hythloday refers to Christ. As he concludes the debate on councilship and refers to the superiority of Utopian practices, Hythloday first reveals his dedication to the Gospel. The message of Christ is an absolute standard for Hythloday, and it cannot and must not be accommodated to the perverse morals of men. This is the only place in *Utopia* where More speaks directly of dissimulation. The previous references made to the text of *Richard III* show what More thought of dissimulation at the time he composed *Utopia*. This same antipathy toward dissembling stands out in Hythloday's character, for he refuses to adapt the message of Christ to Europe's unchristian standards. Of all the points that Hythloday makes during the morning in the garden, this one is the strongest. Metaphor

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and irony enforce his argument. In metaphor, Hythloday likens the flexibility of the rule of soft lead to the accommodation of the Gospel in order to show how crafty preachers can dissimulate the Gospel and how they make it conform to human behavior. 4 By the ironic comment that this dissimulation allows men to be "bad in greater comfort," Hythloday lays bare the absurdity of accommodating the Gospel message. 5

When Hythloday speaks of the advent of Christianity among the Utopians, he notes that the communistic Utopians had been impressed when they heard that Christ was pleased by the common way of life practiced by His disciples. Since Hythloday sees Utopian communism as the most efficacious remedy for European ills, it is very significant that he refers to Christ at this point of the discourse. 6 Hythloday believes that the doctrines of Christ are absolute guides that should be preached from the housetops. 7 The truest followers of Christ, he holds, still practice communism. 8 In a word, Hythloday relies so heavily on the law of Christ that he uses it to recommend the most crucial and controversial issue in his program of reform—communism.

In his last reference to Christ, Hythloday insists that the wisdom of Christ urges men to adopt Utopian standards. This particular allusion should be viewed in conjunction with the other references to Christ. Hythloday first mentions Him at the climax of the debate on counsel.

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4Ibid. 5Ibid. 6Ibid., p. 219.
7Ibid., p. 101. 8Ibid., p. 219.
He next uses His name to reveal that Christianity attracts Utopians because Christ approves of their most radical institution, communism. Although each of these instances has a special pertinency, Hythloday reserves his concluding allusion to Christ for the most crucial moment in the intense peroration. If one reads the *Utopia* with Erasmus' comment in mind—More's *Utopia* discloses the causes of evil in the commonwealth—then, this final mention of Christ stands at the very climax of More's masterpiece. The moment after Hythloday calls upon the authority of Christ for the final time, he names the monster that is the ultimate source of evil in European commonwealths:

Nor does it occur to me to doubt that a man's regard for his own interests or the authority of Christ our Savior—who in His wisdom could not fail to know what was best and who in His goodness would not fail to counsel what He knew to be best—would long ago have brought the whole world to adopt the laws of the Utopian commonwealth, had not one single monster, the chief and progenitor of all plagues, striven against it—I mean, Pride.

Although Christ figures in *Utopia* only three times, the nature and position of each reference shows how important the Gospel is to Hythloday. Hythloday's loyalty to Christ surpasses his reverence for the monuments of the past, his love for freedom, and even his devotion to Utopia. Before showing how Hythloday is like Christ, it is necessary to determine the role of Christ in Petrarch's humanism and to examine the role of Hythloday as prophet.

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10*Utopia*, p. 243.
Petrarch recognized the unique role of Christ in his program of reform, but he did not use the Gospel in the same way as More and Erasmus. Erasmus' great contribution to Scripture study was that he not only prepared an edition of the Greek text which in its day was excellent, but that he also rescued the New Testament from the methods of decadent scholasticism which frequently fragmented the text and used the Gospels for polemics and not for conduct. Hexter notes that Erasmus applied to Scripture the method of studying a text that was popularized by Petrarch. 11 Petrarch's scholarly energies were directed toward the pagan classics and not toward Scripture. It is relevant that his judgment on a text depended on the effect of the whole work in addition to the influence of the parts. Unlike the friar in Morton's court, who uses Scripture to hurl maledictions at the toady, Petrarch viewed a book as a whole. He was interested in the total value of a work as a guide to conduct. He would say that the subject matter of Virgil's Aeneid was the perfect man—"sed sub Enee nomine virum fortem perfectumque describat." 12 When Petrarch's approach is applied to the Gospel and the meaning of the entire document is sought, the Christian humanist arrives at the ultimate standard for Christian behaviour and as a polemicist, he never degrades Scripture as the friar does in his spat with the toady.

11 Ibid., p. lxv.
Petrarch's great reverence for the classics seems to lead him to a dualism that is not evident in Hythloday. The thought of the ancients is to Petrarch's mind as his marrow is to his bones:

Legi apud Virgillum apud Flaccum apud Severinum apud Tullium; nec semel legi sed milies, nec cucurri sed incubui, et totis ingenii nisibus immoratus sum; mane comedi quod sero digererem, hausi puer quod senior ruminarem. Hec se michi tam familiariter ingessere et non modo memorie sed medullis affixa sunt unumque cum ingenio facta sunt meo, ut etsi per omnem vitam amplius non legantur, ipsa quidem hereant, actis in intima animi parte radicibus, sed interdum obliviscar auctorem, quippe qui longo usu et possessione continua quasi illa prescripserim duque pro meis habuerim, et turba talium obsessus, nec cuius sint certe nec aliena meminerim.13

In this same letter, Petrarch speaks of Christ as an Apollo and of the Father as a Jove. It is evident that Petrarch seeks to resolve the relationship between the New Learning and the Gospel as harmoniously as he can.

Yet for Petrarch, the Scipio or the Ennius of his Africa are viable ideals in an area of experience where Christ does not figure strongly. Petrarch was aware of this ambivalence when he spoke of the reasons why his friends criticized him:

As far as I understand, none has so much weight as the fact that, though I am a sinner, I certainly am a Christian. It is true, I might well hear the reproach once launched at Jerome, as he himself reports: "Thou liest, thou art a Ciceronian. For where they treasure is, there is thy heart also." Then I shall answer: My incorruptible treasure and the superior part of my soul is with Christ; but, because of the frailties and burdens of mortal life, which are not only difficult to bear but difficult merely to enumerate, I cannot, I confess, lift up, however ardently I should wish, the inferior parts of my soul, in which the irascible and

13 Ep. Fam., XXII, 2, in Opera, XIII, 106.
concupiscible appetites are located, and cannot make them cease to cling to earth. 14

In theory, Christ is the ultimate exemplar for man. In practice, Christ rules the innermost recesses of the heart but shares the stage of life's everyday actions with the heroes of antiquity. This statement should not lead one to think that Petrarch does not have an orthodox respect for the figure of Christ. Petrarch's reverence for the Gospel is seen in his attack upon an Averroist:

I wonder from where these new theologians sprout up who do not spare the Doctors of the Church. Soon they will not respect the Apostles either, nor the Gospel, and eventually they will let loose their frivolous talk against Christ Himself, unless He whom it must concern comes to our aid and tightens the reins of these untamed animals. 15

Petrarch goes on to narrate how this man began to foam and to rage when Petrarch mentioned a passage from Scripture. The Averroist then mocked

14 "On His Own Ignorance," in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, p. 113; De ignorantia, p. 77: "Quarum, ut intelligo nulla potentier, quam quod, licet peccator, certe cristanus sum. Etsi enim forsitan audire possim quod objectum sibi Ieronimus refert: Mentiris, Ciceronianus es, non Christianus. Ubi enim thesaurus tuus, ibi et cor tuum. Respondebo, et thesaurum meum incorruptibilem, et supremam cordis mei partem apud Cristum esse. Sed propter infirmitates ac sarcinas uite mortalis, quas nedor fere, sed enumerare difficile est, non possum, fateor, ut uellem, sic inferiores partes anime, in quibus est irascibilis et concupiscibilis appetitus, attollere, quin adhuc terris inherant."

the Apostle Paul and called him a madman. Seizing the Averroist, Petrarch drove him from his home.

In spite of this spirited defense of the New Testament, Petrarch's ideal of reform was as dependent upon the human values in the pagan classics as it was upon the Gospel. His attempts to restore the papacy to its proper integrity were so intimately bound up with his desire to see the Roman Empire rule a united Christian Europe that he did not stress the intense personal piety which was to be a mark of the Northern Humanists. Petrarch's Golden Age dawns when Christ's will is done, when the Chair of Peter returns to Rome:

\[\text{Incipit, credo, Christus Deus noster suorum fidelium misereri, uult ut arbitrator, finem malis imponere, quae multa per hos annos uidimus, uult pro aurei saeculi principio Ecclesiam suam, quam uagari propter culpae hominum diu sinit, ad antiquas et proprias sedes suas et prisciae fidei statum reuocare.}\]

If pope and emperor reestablish themselves at Rome, Petrarch envisions an Age of Gold in all the glory of ancient Rome and of the pristine Church.

Mythloday differs from Petrarch's humanist in that he finds greater motivation in the Gospel. He does not show the same type of dependence on the pagan classics as Petrarch does. Christ seems more aloof for Petrarch. Petrarch prays to Christ and seeks the restoration of His Church from the Babylonian Captivity at Avignon. The Christ of Erasmus and More seems more immanent. Christ motivates daily activity and lives among men through the efficacy of the Gospel.

\[16\text{Ep. Sen., VII, I, in Opera, p. 903.}\]
In this regard, there are various causes for the disparity between More and Petrarch. The biblical humanism of the More circle accounts for the major differences between More's hero and the humanist revealed in Petrarch's Latin prose. In *Utopia*, there are few direct references to the New Testament. The Old Testament is represented only by the friar's humorous references to the Psalms, Solomon, and Eliseus and by Hythloday's allusion to the severe Mosaic Law. Yet there is a strong scriptural influence in *Utopia*. The commentary to *Utopia* by Edward Surtz shows how More derives the ethic of *Utopia* principally from Plato, Plutarch, Seneca, and Cicero; but there is no evidence showing how the great seers, Isaiah, Amos, and Jeremiah contribute to the ethic of *Utopia*. The dependence on pagan sources is consistent with More's intention, for he wants to make his readers realize that Christian Europe, which had inherited the moral standards of the Christian and Hebrew classics, was "worse . . . than . . . pagan Utopia." Although Plato, Socrates, Cicero, and Plutarch would be better acquainted with the ideas proposed in More's garden than would Amos, Isaiah, and Jeremiah, these prophets--far more quickly than the philosophers--would acknowledge the spirit of reform in *Utopia*.

In his part of the Introduction to *Utopia*, Hexter provides a clue as to the nature of the scriptural influence in More's classic. He

17 *Utopia*, p. 85.

18 *Utopia*, p. 73.

believes that the Utopia was partially the result of More's re-thinking "the implications of Plato's Republic under the influence of Holy Scripture." Later, he makes the identification closer—"in Utopia in 1515-1516 More displays a Christianity evangelical and prophetic in that the main source of its ethic is the moral teaching of Jesus and of those great seers who were also the conscience of Israel." By relating More's use of Scripture to the ethic of Utopia, Hexter shows that the scriptural strain in Utopia may be elusive and oftentimes intangible. More's indebtedness to Plato is quite obvious at times. On the other hand, the traces of the Sacred Writers may be so deeply imbedded within the texture of Utopia that one may fail to see scriptural elements in single words, in attitudes of characters, and in unifying motifs. In order to see how Scripture can permeate the fiber of a text, it is necessary to understand how important the Bible was in the More circle.

More's attitude to Scripture brings to mind an earlier reference which alluded to Petrarch's love of the classics. More, who had the Bible read at his table, must have gone through the Scriptures countless times so that their thought became to his mind as the marrow was to his bones. As he was writing Utopia, Scriptures occupied his mind in a serious manner. In the letter to Dorp (Bruges, 21 October 1515), More defends Erasmus's biblical studies. This same letter refers also to the prophets of the Old Law as predictor—those who foretell what is to come.

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20 *Utopia*, p. xl.
22 *Selected Letters*, p. 105.
This point is of interest, for More portrays Hythloday as a prophet who forecasts the unending prosperity of the Utopian commonwealth.\[^{23}\]

In More's other works he refers to Scripture frequently. The following list shows how often he relies on the Bible in his English Works: there are seven references to Genesis, nine to Exodus, one to Leviticus, one to Numbers, one to Josue, eleven to Kings, twelve to Job, twenty-nine to Psalms, sixteen to Proverbs, five to Ecclesiastes, four to Wisdom, three to Ecclesiasticus, three to Isaias, four to Jeremias, three to Daniel, sixty-five to Matthew, thirty-one to Luke, twenty-nine to John, thirteen to Acts, fifty-five to the Epistles of Paul, six to the Epistles of Peter, five to the Epistle of James, two to the Epistle of John, and five to the Apocalypse. The large number of references to the New Testament demonstrates how heavily More depends upon the Gospels and may account for the Christ-like compassion for the poor that Hythloday possesses.

More probably conceived a deeper interest in Scripture from his intercourse with Colet and Erasmus. The letter to Dorp attests to More's approval of the new epoch in scriptural studies that Erasmus was inaugurating.\[^{24}\] Erasmus, who became one of the world's foremost authorities on Scripture, was completing and edition of the New Testament based on the Greek texts at the time that More was working on *Utopia*.

\[^{23}\textit{Utopia},\ p.\ 245.\]

\[^{24}\textit{Selected\ Letters},\ pp.\ 42\ ff.\]
This edition became a basis for scholarship for decades. It may be noted that Petrarch who read Scripture with devotion, does not appear to have the textual interest in the Bible that figures strongly in the More circle. Though Erasmus' edition is outdated now it still receives commendation from modern scholars.

In addition to his scriptural studies, Erasmus expresses his biblical humanism in his other works. In the *Education of the Christian Prince* (1516), Erasmus proposes Christ as the model for the Christian ruler who should have a thorough knowledge of the Gospels. Scripture figures prominently in the portrayal of the Christian fool at the climax of *The Praise of Folly*. In the major pronouncement of Erasmian spirituality, the *Enchiridion*, the sum of the message is that the Christian ethical code centers about Christ to whom all things must be referred. Because Christ performs a somewhat different role in More's works from that in Petrarch, Erasmus' thought has special relevance.

Since Christ is the supreme exemplar for Erasmus, His position in the spirituality of the Brothers of the Common Life must be mentioned. The *Imitation of Christ*, a dialogue that captures the spirit of this religious group that had educated Erasmus, proposes a personal, subjective, and intense union between Christ and the soul.

In respect to the central position of Christ in the theology of the More circle, Colet's thought should not be neglected; for he may have

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had a greater spiritual effect upon More than Erasmus had. Colet, who along with Grocyn was More's guide through life, brought More "almost from the very gates of hell." In a letter (1504) which refers to this crisis, More mentions his disappointment on not being able to meet with Colet:

But when I heard from him not only that you had not returned, but that you would not return for a long time, I cannot tell you from what rejoicing I was cast into what dejection. For what could be more grievous to me than to be deprived of your most pleasant companionship, whose prudent advice I enjoyed, by whose most delightful intimacy I was refreshed, by whose powerful sermons I was stirred, by whose example and life I was guided, in fine, in whose very countenance and nod I was accustomed to find pleasure? And so when encompassed by these defenses I felt myself strengthened; now that I am deprived of them I seem to languish and grow feeble. By following your footsteps I had escaped almost from the very gates of hell, and now, driven by some force and necessity, I am falling back again into gruesome darkness. I am like Eurydice, except that she was lost because Orpheus looked back at her, but I am sinking because you do not look back at me.²⁶

More's dependence on Colet for spiritual counsel makes it almost certain that he would share Colet's attitude toward Scripture and toward Christ as the Christian's sole exemplar. Colet, unlike Petrarch, belittles the position of the heroes of antiquity. Caesar and Alexander never act on the same stage with Christ.²⁷

Erasmus' description of Colet reveals the strength of the latter's devotion to Christ:

²⁶Selected Letters, p. 4.

The pleasure he took in conversing with friends was extreme, and he would often prolong the talk till late at night. But still it was all either about literature or about Christ. If there was no agreeable person at hand to chat with—and it was not every sort that suited him—a servant would read aloud some passage from Holy Scripture. Occasionally he took me with him for company on a journey, and then nothing could be more pleasant than he was. But a book was ever his companion on the road and his talk was always of Christ. 28

It is difficult to determine how this devotion to Christ was born. Colet must have known something of Savonarola who was directing many to Christ at the time that Colet was in Italy (1493-1496). Colet's sympathy with Pico and Ficino, disciples of Savonarola, supports the inference that Colet was aware of the fiery Dominican who had most of Florence awaiting Christ and the day of doom. Colet mentions that in Italy he became acquainted with certain monks of wisdom and piety. 29 Because there is so little information available, it cannot be stated with certitude that Colet was stimulated to become a reformer as a result of his years in Italy. Nevertheless, upon his return to England he was ordained a priest and began to preach on Scripture. Like Petrarch and Savonarola, he began to insist that it is better to love God than to know Him. 30

Whatever may have been the causes, the message of Christ became a more vital issue in the More circle than it was in Petrarch's Latin prose. Between 1500 and 1505, Colet gave lectures on the New Testament.

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29 Dictionary of National Biography, IV, 778.
30 Ibid., 779.
Colet would approach a subject through an entire Gospel. By employing this method, Colet received an integrated view of Christ who thus became the central personality in the More circle.

This deep interest in Christ and the Scripture reveals itself in two ways in *Utopia*. By using the Bible to provide allusions and by establishing the law of Christ as Hythloday's unalterable standard, More employs the Word of God in a manner that is immediately apparent to the reader. Not at all so obvious, but of as great importance, is the way in which Scripture functions in the role of Hythloday as prophet and in the motif of compassion for the poor which runs from beginning to end of *Utopia*.

The study of Hythloday as the Christian reformer can best be concluded by showing the way in which he is a prophet and the manner in which he conforms most closely to Christ. Some of Hexter's references to Hythloday as a prophet, however, have to be examined first. In his part of the Introduction to *Utopia*, Volume IV of *The Yale Edition of the Complete Works of St. Thomas More*, Hexter presents Hythloday not merely as a humanist but also as a prophet. It seems important to determine the exact way in which Hythloday can be viewed as a prophet. A reformer as zealous as Hythloday merits consideration as a prophet. Yet, if there is too much emphasis on this facet of Hythloday's character, one may fail to see his many sidedness.

In this regard, Hexter seems to overemphasize the serious side of Hythloday. He is correct in saying: "Hythlodaeus was a creation in

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some respects very like More himself, sharing his aspirations, sharing his literary tastes, sharing his moral convictions, sharing his feelings about so many very important things—about justice, and luxury, and pomp, and war, and peace, and study, and work." But Hexter neglects the more pleasant aspects of Hythloday's character. According to Hexter, in Book I More stamped on Hythloday "all that was hard and clear and austere about his own character and nothing that was mild and soft and gentle." Yet, in Book I, Hythloday is the perfect Petrarchan humanist who teaches and delights. In the encapsulated dialogue in Morton's court, Hythloday's satirical description of the lawyer is tolerant and not harsh. His narration of the incident involving the Friar and the toady is quite humorous. The bull-waving climax of the friar's apologia suggests the way a peevish child concludes his arguments. After Hythloday narrates this incident, persona-More states: "To be sure, my dear Raphael, ... you have given me great pleasure for everything you have said has been both wise and witty."

At this point in the dialogue of counsel, persona-More, who is "attached exceedingly" to Hythloday, becomes even more attracted after Hythloday makes More feel that he is home again in England and that he is a boy once more in Cardinal Morton's court. Certainly, More must have found Hythloday to be delightful and pleasant if his discourse had such

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32 More, Utopia, p. xxxvi.  
33 Ibid., pp. xxxvii–xxxviii.  
34 Ibid., p. 71.  
36 Ibid., pp. 85–87.  
37 Ibid., p. 87.
an effect. A humanist like Hythloday, who was welcome in Morton's court and in More's garden, and who would have been at ease in Petrarch's garden at Vaucluse, must have cultivated the social and intellectual qualities that are rarely associated with the stern prophets.

It is in other respects that Hythloday differs from the seers of the Old Law. The prophets might accept Hythloday's approval of non-Christian cultural values but might hesitate to accept his attitude toward Utopian religious toleration. The prophets might not join in Hythloday's disapproval of the over-zealous Christian convert who finds non-Christians worthy of hell fire. Since it is in Jeremiah that one gets the most intimate portrait of the prophet, it will be profitable to see his attitude toward religious tolerance and toward foreign culture. Jeremiah's letter to the captives in Babylon reflects the spirit of Petrarch who respects values in alien civilizations. Jeremiah encourages the Jews to seek the welfare of Babylon and to pray to the Lord for the city of the conqueror. Yet he never allows compromise with the pagan religion. The religious isolation of the Hebrew must be absolute. Jeremiah's contribution to revelation is the vision of a God who completely transcends matter. If Jeremiah wants the Israelite to depend neither on ark nor on temple, he could hardly accept any alien contributions to his position. Jeremiah's wisdom, unlike that of the humanists, has little to do with reason, experience, and the world. Man

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38 Utopia, p. 219.  
40 Jer. 3:16.  
41 Jer. 7:4.
is to glory in God alone:

Thus saith the Lord, Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, neither let the mighty man glory in his might, let not the rich man glory in his riches:

But let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth me, that I am the Lord which exercise lovingkindness, judgment, and righteousness, in the earth: for in these things I delight, saith the Lord.⁴²

Jeremiah is very far from the attitude of the Christian humanist as it is expressed by Petrarch—"Mortalibus utor pro mortalibus, nec immodico vastoque desiderio nature rerum vim afferre molior."⁴³

In addition to his views on religious toleration, Hythloday's position on councilship distinguishes him from the prophets. Hexter claims that the prophet who serves ceases to be a prophet and that there is no room for the seer at the court of the prince.⁴⁴ This statement can be true of any radical who accommodates his message to the enervating effects of popular tribunals. It is as true of the radical humanist as it is true of the prophet. Each of the three prophets mentioned by Hexter—Amos, Isaiah, Jeremiah—did not try to flee the court. Amos, a herdsman turned prophet, was so much in evidence that Amaziah, an official prophet, complained to his ruler about Amos' preaching and told Amos to cease. Amos' courageous answer reveals an involvement that highlights a difference between the denunciations of a prophet and those of an


⁴³Secretum, p. 196; Secret, p. 173: "My wish was to use mortal things for what they were worth, to do no violence to nature by bringing to its good things a limitless and immoderate desire. . . ."

⁴⁴Utopia, p. xci.
unattached humanist philosopher.\textsuperscript{45}

Isaiah, like Jeremiah, was a member of the priestly class. He spent most of his career at court and may have been a member of the king's council.\textsuperscript{46} He seems to have had easy access to the ruling king and to have been called upon to compose dynastic oracles for the accession ceremonies of Hezekiah.\textsuperscript{47}

Jeremiah's position differs somewhat from that of Isaiah. Jeremiah, who was born into a priestly family, never served as a priest. Yet at no time did he desist to obtrude his counsel--submission to Babylon--upon the king. In order to propose his message, he had to withstand the anger of the nobles, of the priests, and even of his own family. When the opposition to his message resulted in his imprisonment, King Zedekiah "sent for Jeremiah to come to the palace for a secret interview."\textsuperscript{48}

The prophet requested that he not be returned to prison in Jonathan's house. The king then kept Jeremiah in the palace compound, which was less confining than his former place of imprisonment.\textsuperscript{49}

This same involvement in the affairs of state figures in the life of the prophet Ezekiel, who may even be responsible for some legislation

\textsuperscript{45}Amos 7:14-17.
\textsuperscript{47}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48}James Hyatt, The Book of Jeremiah, in The Interpreter's Bible, V, 781.
\textsuperscript{49}Ibid.
that limited the priesthood to the Zadokite family. These instances from the lives of the prophets show that they were involved in the life of the nation in a way that cannot be assigned to Hythloday. In regard to councilship, Hythloday reflects the position of the radical Christian humanist revealed in Petrarch's Latin prose more than in the lives and books of the prophets.

Before attempting to define Hythloday's role as a prophet, a final point must be made which will show some distinction between Hythloday's use of language and the nature of the prophetic oracle: Hythloday employs the eloquence of the humanist rather than that of the prophet. By using the power of speech to convince his audience, Hythloday observes one of the major tenets of Petrarch's humanism. It may be recalled here that Colet studied vernacular authors so that he could preach the Gospel more effectively. It is in the peroration, which is admirably suited for rhetorical persuasion, that Hythloday is most convincing. In the Utopia, the peroration has many rhetorical questions. Besides, a basically rhetorical antithesis between Europe and Utopia governs the thought leading up to the climatic denunciation of pride. At one point, Hythloday strikes out sarcastically at the exploiters—"What brand of justice is it that any nobleman whatsoever or goldsmith-banker or moneylender or, in fact, anyone else from among those who either do no work at all or whose work is of a kind not very essential to the commonwealth, should attain a life of luxury and grandeur on the basis of his idleness or his

50 Herbert May, The Book of Ezekiel, in The Interpreter's Bible, VI, 57.
nonessential work?"\(^51\) At another point, using \textit{reductio ad absurdum},
he reveals fraud, a traditional manifestation of evil, as the European substitute for justice:

What is worse, the rich every day extort a part of their daily allowance from the poor not only by private fraud but by public law. Even before they did so it seemed unjust that persons deserving best of the commonwealth should have the worst return. Now they have further distorted and debased the right and, finally, by making laws, have palmed it off as justice.\(^52\)

His realization of these evil conditions finds focus in the image of pride as the serpent entwined about the hearts of men.\(^53\) Hythloday's language is closely associated with the humanist ideal of a functional rhetoric which will move men to pursue virtue and to avoid evil.

Hythloday's sustained eloquence and the concentration of rhetorical devices in the peroration are not found in the prophets. The prophetic utterance is characterized by its blunt brevity. "Thus saith the Lord" and "Saith the Lord" introduce and conclude terse oracles of the prophets. The latter "vary in length from one or two verses to eight or ten verses. . . . These pregnant utterances with their rhythmic and (usually) polished form are clearly too short to be speeches or sermons. . . . They were not the spontaneous utterances of a moment."\(^54\) The typical poems of the prophet differ from the prolonged and sustained eloquence of

\(^{51}\) \textit{Utopia}, p. 239.
\(^{52}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 241.
\(^{53}\) \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 243-245.
\(^{54}\) Scott and Muilenburg, \textit{The Book of Isaiah}, in \textit{The Interpreter's Bible}, V, 154.
Hythloday in the exordium and, particularly, in the peroration.

Although each of the preceding attempts to distinguish Hythloday from the prophets helps to delineate his character as a humanist more precisely, More does cast Hythloday in the role of the prophet. In the next chapter, Petrarch's attacks on the vice of the papal curia at Avignon will be examined in more detail. In the *Epistolae sine nomine*, Petrarch hurls maledictions at the corrupt courtiers in the papal court with all the vigor of a Jeremiah. Since these letters were rarely printed in the fifteenth century, it is better to seek the outlines of Hythloday's prophetic role in the Old Testament and in a person whom More refers to in his English works. In addition to the scriptural prophets, More was aware of a prophet in Renaissance Italy, Savonarola. In his *Life of Pico*, More reveals that "the holy Jerome," was Pico's spiritual guide and had seen a vision of Pico in purgatory. The subscript—*Hieronymi Ferrarensis a Deo missi Prophetae effigies*—to Fra Bartolommeo's portrait of Savonarola indicates that the reformer was looked upon as a prophet by his contemporaries. Members of the More circle who studied in Italy must have been aware of Savonarola's denunciations of those who oppressed the poor:

> In these days there is no grace, no gift of the Holy Spirit that may not be bought and sold. On the other hand, the poor are oppressed by grievous burdens, and when they are called to pay sums beyond their means, the rich cry unto them, Give me the rest. There be some who, having but an income of fifty, pay a tax of one hundred, while the rich pay little, since the taxes are imposed at their pleasure, when widows come weeping, they are bidden to go to sleep.

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*55 English Works, I, 361-362.*
When the poor complain, they are told to pay and pay again.\footnote{Pasquale Villari, \textit{The Life and Times of Girolamo Savonarola} (2 vols.; New York: Scribner and Welford, 1889), I, 126.}

These practices that Savonarola condemns reflect the same attitude toward the exploiter that Hythloday condemns in the dialogue before the imaginary king. Like Hythloday, Savonarola feared the tyrant whose bad ministers afflict the needy:

Tyrants are incorrigible because they are proud, because they love flattery, and because they will not restore ill-gotten gains. They leave all in the hands of bad ministers; they succumb to flattery; they hearken not unto the poor, and neither do they condemn the rich; they expect the poor and the peasantry to work for them without reward, or suffer their ministers to expect this; they corrupt voters, and farm out the taxes to aggravate the burdens of the people.\footnote{Ibid., 129.}

In his laceration of the vicious conduct of Florentines, Savonarola tolerates no halfway measures. His sermon on the evils of gambling shows that the prophet allows no compromise with evil:

If you see persons engaged in gambling in these days, believe them to be no Christians. \ldots{} He that gambles shall be accursed, and accursed he that suffereth others to gamble. \ldots{} Therefore, whoever thou art, thou shalt be accursed if thou dost gamble or allow others to gamble; thou shalt be accursed, I tell thee, in the city, accursed in the fields; thy corn shall be accursed; and thy substance; cursed the fruit of thy land and thy body, thy herds of oxen and thy flocks of sheep; cursed shalt thou be in all thy comings and goings.\footnote{Ibid., 138.}

In addition to his attacks against those who exploited the poor
and who lived corrupt lives, Savonarola preached an apocalyptic vision of the end of the world that terrified pleasure-loving Florentines into penance. He threatened so forcefully that youths formerly given to pleasure became his Red Guard and burned playing cards, paintings, and books.

It is likely that the More circle thought of Savonarola as a prophet who condemned the luxuries of the rich and who sympathized with the plight of the poor. There are two ways in which Savonarola and Hythloday are like the prophets of the Old Law. First, a sense of election derived from the awesomeness of his vision distinguishes the prophet from his fellow men. Secondly, the desire to perform his task forces the prophet to demand an unconditional assent to his message. In these respects Hythloday appears to be a seer.

In his consideration of Hythloday as a prophet, Hexter refers to Isaiah, Amos, and Jeremiah. One of the outstanding traits of these three, as well as of the rest of the prophets, is that they are very much aware of their role as a voice of God. Their election is distinct and dramatic, and their call is often accompanied with visions. Jeremiah's election is associated with a symbolic action: "And the Lord put forth his hand, and touched my mouth: and the Lord said to me: Behold I have given my words in thy mouth." The same idea is repeated later: "Thy words were found, and I did eat them, and thy word was to me a joy and gladness of my heart: for thy name is called upon me, O Lord God 59

59 Jer. 1:9.
of hosts."60 Jeremiah was predestined for his role: "Before I formed thee in the belly, I knew thee; and before thou comest forth out of the womb I sanctified thee, and I ordained thee a prophet unto the nations."61 Amos, although not a member of the priestly class like Jeremiah and Isaiah, had a personal call: "And the Lord took me when I followed the flock, and the Lord said to me: Go, prophesy to my people Israel."62 Amos sees the visions of the locusts, of the devouring fire, and of the plumb line.63 The book of Amos opens with his vision: "The words of Amos, who was among the herdsman of Thaeua: which he saw concerning Israel in the days of Ozias king of Juda."64 The election of Isaiah is also distinct: "And I have put my words in thy mouth, and I have covered thee in the shadow of mine hand, that I may plant the heavens, and lay the foundations of the earth, and say unto Zion, Thou art my people."65 Isaiah's call was accompanied by the famous vision of the seraphim and by the cleansing of the prophet's mouth with the burning coal.66

Nowhere in the dialogue on the best state of a commonwealth does it seem appropriate for More to describe Hythloday's call to the prophetic role. Yet there is sufficient evidence for the reader to deduce that Hythloday has this summons to preach about his vision of the holy city of Utopia. The examination of a problem that strikes some readers of Jeremiah may elucidate the nature of Hythloday's election.

The statement—"Thus saith the Lord"—commences numerous brief oracles of Jeremiah. By interpreting this introductory statement literally, one may believe that the prophet ceases to be an individual and functions solely as a catalyst. But the prophet's personality should not be viewed in too narrow a manner. One senses the ordeal of the prophet as he labors to understand and to embrace his vision. The reader sees the scriptural text as the record of the prophet's election at a particular moment, whereas the prophet throughout his entire life may become aware of different aspects of his vision even though the moment of election effects all other activities. Even after he is convinced of his calling, Jeremiah wishes that he had never been born and feels that God had deceived him and made him a laughingstock. This Jeremiah has no telephone-like connection with the voice of the deity. The prophet lives the arduous life of a man who has to search diligently and has to listen carefully for God's message.

In his youth, Hythloday cuts himself off from his family and, like a prophet, begins his search. When he discovers Utopia, he attains to the conviction of those chosen by God; for he believes that he has found the city whose pattern, as Socrates says, is "laid up in heaven." And like the seer, Hythloday is committed to describe the vision regardless of inconvenience to himself. Hythloday has to leave Utopia in order to

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67 Jer. 15:10.
68 Jer. 20:7.
69 Republic, II, 417.
convince the men of Europe to lead the well-ordered lives of the Utopians. 70

Hythloday's preaching marks the second manner in which he resembles Israel's reformers. Earlier in this study, distinctions were drawn between the sustained eloquence of the humanist Hythloday and the style of the prophetic utterance. Hythloday's discourse, while differing in particular aspects of style from the prophetic oracles, still preserves the form of the seer's preaching. This similarity of expression derives from the strong sense of conviction that characterizes the prophet's message. The prophets and Hythloday teach with authority. At those times when Hythloday is most intense, his speech resembles one of the four forms of the prophetic oracles—reproach, threat, exhortation, or promise. 71

Although Hythloday does not use the exclamations of the prophet—"Oh!" "Woe!" or "Shame!"—his reproaches employ the imperatives that are customary in the seer's oracles. Isaiah's typical command is that the Jews awaken and rouse themselves. In Jeremiah, the people are ordered to return from their backslidings and to look to God. Hythloday's advice to the English is a command—"cast out those ruinous plagues. . . ." 72 The imperative cast, which is used frequently by

70 Utopia, p. 107.
71 Scott and Muilenburg, The Book of Isaiah, in The Interpreter's Bible, V, 154.
72 Utopia, p. 69.
the prophets Jeremiah, Isaiah, and Ezekiel captures the tone of the seer's reproach.

When Hythloday reproaches the leaders of Europe, he also threatens them. In the prophetic statement, this mingling of forms is not uncommon—"especially (as is natural) the reproach and the threat."73 Isaiah's vision of doom, which will be quoted shortly, is the outstanding combination of these forms.74 In the same spirit, but on a minor note, is Hythloday's command that the English cast out dives, brothels, and alehouses. The threat that the English youth are being trained for the gallows follows the order to cleanse England of evil places.75 In a similar manner, he reproaches the warmongering councilors of the French king then threatens that wars will destroy the people of France. Threats bring to an end Hythloday's advice in the dialogue before the French king as well as Hythloday's condemnation of the English economic and penal systems. In these two instances, the threat makes a forceful conclusion. It is common for the prophets to end an oracle emphatically by use of a threat.76

In addition to the reproach and to the threat, Hythloday encourages in the manner of the prophet. He frequently uses hortatory subjunctives so that his words to the French and imaginary kings sound like the advice

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73 Scott and Muilenburg, The Book of Isaiah, in The Interpreter's Bible, V, 154.


75 Utopia, pp. 69-71.

76 Scott and Muilenburg, The Book of Isaiah, in The Interpreter's Bible, V, 154.
of the prophet. The following illustrations, which alter slightly G. C. Richards' translation of Utopia, show the type of exhortation that Hythloday uses: let the king love his subject, let the king live with the people and rule them gently, let the king check mischief and crime. These few examples are like the typical exhortation of the seer: "Sanctify the Lord of hosts himself: and let him be your fear; and let him be your dread." 80

Hythloday's use of the promise, the fourth form of the prophetic utterance, introduces a larger issue. Hythloday, like the prophet, expresses himself with apocalyptic finality. It is as if the seer actually feels good and evil. He actually sees with the eyes of the poet. Jeremiah's astonishment over Israel's apostacy reveals the prophetic vision of good and evil:

If a nation hath changed their gods, and indeed they are not gods: but my people have changed their glory into an idol.
Be astonished, O ye heavens, at this: and ye gates thereof, be very desolate, saith the Lord.
For my people have done two evils. They have forsaken me, the fountain of living water, and have digged to themselves cisterns, broken cisterns, that can hold no water. 81

"The fountain of living waters" and the empty, "broken cisterns" are not the abstractions of the philosopher.

A prophet's vision is either a paradise or an inferno. The great seer portrays the horror afflicting the land that has forsaken the Lord.

77 Utopia, p. 91. 80 Isa. 8:13.
78 Ibid. 79 Ibid., p. 97.
81 Jer. 2:11-13.
Jeremiah's vision of evil can only be sketched. The people, all adulterers, will be scattered in exile. No one can trust anyone else. All living creatures will flee as the Lord makes the cities of Judah desolate because the people walked after Baalim. 82 Jeremiah prophesies a cosmic destruction:

I beheld the earth, and lo it was void and nothing: and the heavens, and there was no light in them. I looked upon the mountains, and behold they trembled: and all the hills were troubled. I beheld, and lo there was no man: and all the birds of the air were gone. I looked, and behold Carmel was a wilderness: and all its cities were destroyed at the presence of the Lord and at the presence of the wrath of his indignation. 83

Isaiah foresees an equally frightening doom. After pronouncing the woes upon those who call evil good and good evil, Isaiah shows the Lord in anger chastising Israel:

Woe to you that call evil good, and good evil: that put darkness for light, and light for darkness: that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter;
Woe to you that are wise in your own eyes, and prudent in your own conceits.
Woe to you that are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at drunkenness:
That justify the wicked for gifts, and take away the justice of the just from him.
Therefore, as the tongue of the fire devoureth the stubble, and the heat of the flame consumeth it: so shall their root be as ashes, and their bud shall go up as dust:
for they have cast away the law of the Lord of Hosts, and have blasphemed the word of the Holy One of Israel.
Therefore is the wrath of the Lord kindled against his people, and he hath stretched out his hand upon them, and struck them: and the mountains were troubled, and their carcasses became as dung in the midst of the streets. For all this his anger is not turned away, but his hand is

stretched out still. 84

Although this part of the study of Hythloday's character focuses primarily on Scripture, it may be noted that Petrarch approaches the prophet's call for the destruction of an evil city. In sonnet CXXXVI of the Canzoniere, his voice sounds like that of the seer as he beseeches heaven to rain fire on Avignon. The note of this denunciation of evil is free of the classical allusions that are common in the Epistolae sine nomine. 85

When Hythloday looks upon Europe, he has the dark vision of the prophet. In Book I, the gallows, towering over England, await the country's youth. 86 The monarchs of Europe are never-failing springs from which flow streams of all that is evil over whole nations. 87 If this evil manifests itself by violence and fraud, the French king and his warmongering councilors who destroy commonwealths in war are as evil as the unrestrained advisors who teach the imaginary king how to ruin his people by deceit.

Because Europe is so vicious, Hythloday approaches reform as Jeremiah does: "I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to destroy it." 88 Persona-More knows that Hythloday sees the evils in Europe with the eyes of the seer and acknowledges that Hythloday is not satisfied unless wrongheaded.

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84 Isa. 5:20-25. 85 See Rime, Trionfi e Poesie latine, p. 201.
86 Utopia, p. 71. 87 Ibid., 57. 88 Jer. 18:7.
opinions can be plucked up by the root.\textsuperscript{89} In the peroration, Hythloday commends the Utopians who look upon vice as the prophets do: "They have extirpated the roots of ambition and factionalism along with all the other vices."\textsuperscript{90} Through communism they have cut away a mass of trouble and pulled up crimes by the roots.\textsuperscript{91} Hythloday's final judgment on Europe is that of the seer. Pride is a serpent from hell "entwined about the hearts of men." This evil is "too deeply fixed to be easily plucked out."\textsuperscript{92} Hythloday's dark vision places him alongside Jeremiah and Isaiah.

Fortunately, none of the seers who realize the nature of evil leave man without a promise. Ezekiel concludes his prophecy with the description of a land for the blessed: "and the name of the city from that day, the Lord is there."\textsuperscript{93} Isaiah foresees the messianic kingdom.\textsuperscript{94} Jeremiah, whose prediction of doom is appalling, prophesies an end to exile and the joy of living with God.\textsuperscript{95}

Like that of the prophets, Hythloday's vision of the promised land contrasts sharply with his view of the evil world of those who have forsaken virtue. Akin to Jeremiah, Hythloday promises a land where virtuous citizens live in the sight of God, a Father, who creates, governs, and blesses what He has made.\textsuperscript{96} And like the prophets, Hythloday envisions a holy city that will "last forever, as far as human prescience

\textsuperscript{89}Utopia, p. 99. \textsuperscript{90}Ibid., p. 245. \textsuperscript{91}Ibid., p. 243.
\textsuperscript{92}Ibid., p. 245. \textsuperscript{93}Ezk. 48:35. \textsuperscript{94}See Isa. 9:1-7.
\textsuperscript{95}See Jer. 32:37-42.
In addition to providing the outline for the character of Hythloday as a prophet, Scripture supplies the motive for Hythloday's love of the poor. In this regard, a distinction can be made between Hythloday and the prophets. Often the prophet is an aristocrat and a member of the priestly class. He attends to the nation's faith in God and concerns himself with the destiny of Israel. He does not concern himself primarily with a program of social reform which will alleviate the sufferings of the afflicted. At times, of course, he will show that he is aware of the poor:

The Lord standeth up to plead, and standeth to judge the people.
The Lord will enter into judgment with the ancients of his people, and the princes thereof: for ye have eaten up the vineyard; the spoil of the poor is in your houses.
What mean ye that ye beat my people to pieces, and grind the faces of the poor? saith the Lord God of hosts.

Amos, the shepherd, as would be expected, cares more for the poor than do the other prophets:

This saith the Lord: For three transgressions of Israel, and for four, I will not turn away the punishment thereof; because they sold the righteous for silver, and the poor for a pair of shoes. . . .
Hear this, O ye that swallow up the needy, even to make the poor of the land to fail,
Saying, When will the new moon be gone, that we may sell corn? and the sabbath, that we may set forth wheat, making the ephah small, and the shekel great, and falsifying the balances by deceit?
That we may buy the poor for silver, and the needy for a pair of shoes; yea, and sell the refuse of the wheat?

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97 Ibid., p. 245.
98 Isa. 3:14-16.
99 Amos 8:4-7.
100 Amos 8:4-7.
Such statements which show a concern for the afflicted poor are rare.

Amos alludes to the cause of the poor four times (2:6; 4:1,5; 5:11; 8:4). Jeremiah feels deeply their plight (5:26-28). Yet, except for this reference, their cause is not noticeable as one of his serious concerns. In Isaiah, there is evidence of a greater sympathy for the exploited than in Jeremiah, but this is true only of Isaiah's early ministry (742-734). Once the reader passes the fifth chapter, he sees that the condition of the afflicted is not an issue for Isaiah. Finally, in Ezekiel there is but one significant reference to the indigent (22:29). Ezekiel has almost no interest in social conditions. It appears that the prophets concern for the poor is the exception rather than the rule.

Isaiah, Amos, and Jeremiah preach doom and exile for the Jewish leaders who have forsaken God and who have turned to idols.

Hythloday differs from the prophets of Israel because he is a Christian humanist who possesses Christ's compassion for the poor. It may be worth mentioning that the Greek philosophers rarely recognize the cause of the poor. The treatment of the slave in Greek society reveals that the lowest class had few protectors. Plato, who condemns the enslavement of Greeks by Greeks, accepts slavery on the ground that some people have inferior minds. 101 Aristotle considers the slave an animate tool. 102 The only philosophical schools to condemn slavery are the Cynics and the Stoics. 103 Although care for the slave is slightly

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102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
noticeable among a few Greek philosophers like Antisthenes, Zeno, and Chrysippus, there is no compassion for the underprivileged comparable to that found in the New Testament. Hythloday's conduct does not appear to be motivated by the Stoics disapproval of slavery. It may be mentioned here that in the Epistolarum sine nomine Petrarch directs his epithets against the vice of the papal court and does not show any special interest in the condition of the poor.

The student must rather trace Hythloday's love for the poor to More's own life and to the Gospel. Using the Elizabethan play on Thomas More, Chambers makes a valid case for the under-sheriff of London as a champion of the underprivileged and afflicted. Although the all-devouring sheep and the shadow of the gallows reflect More's personal interest in the poor, the intensity of Hythloday's peroration can best be explained in the light of the Gospel. Hythloday has Christ's compassion for those who suffer want.

The poor and the afflicted figure so prominently in the life of Christ that His care for them has become a distinctive sign of the New Covenant. The Gospel of Mark begins with Christ selecting poor fishermen to be His intimate followers. After recording Christ's first public sermon, the Evangelist John reveals Christ's concern for the multitude in the miracle of the loaves and fishes. The Apostle Matthew notes Christ's interest in the poor in the opening words of the Sermon on the Mount. Although one can multiply verses, it is hardly necessary to

104Chambers, Thomas More pp. 45-46.
bolster the argument that the love of the poor is a quality usually associated with the New Testament.

Neither in depth nor in frequency do the Hebrew prophets and the Greek philosophers have anything comparable to Christ's compassion for the indigent. Hythloday has this Christ-like sympathy for the miseries of the unfortunate. Hythloday's anxiety for the destitute pervades Utopia as much as the spirit of Christ's love of the afflicted moves through all of the Gospels. In the Gospel of Luke--the Evangelist who shows the greatest concern with the poor--one sees the spirit that lives in Hythloday's fiery denunciation of those who have exploited the humble:

Blessed are ye poor: for yours is the kingdom of God.  
Blessed are ye that hunger now: for you shall be filled.  
Blessed are ye that weep now: for you shall laugh. . . .  
But woe to you that are rich: for you have your consolation.  
Woe to you that are filled: for you shall hunger, Woe to you that now laugh: for you shall mourn and weep.105

Christ whose presence was strongly felt in the More circle, drives Hythloday to awaken Europe to the plight of the exploited. Hythloday does not live as one of the great figures of European literature because he is a scholar, a traveller, or a philosopher but because he captures the spirit of Christ.

The truly memorable characters in literature possess some single and special quality which, if withdrawn, would leave the character lifeless. The courage of Ulysses is meaningless if it is viewed independently of his prudence and sagacity. Aeneas and pietas have

become almost synonymous. Beowulf, deprived of his gentleness, is an Achilles or Siegfried. In a similar manner, Roland cannot be separated from his unequalled bravery. Don Quixote, dreamy and unpractical, is just a frustrated idealist if his essential goodness is removed. Hythloday's lifeblood is his Christ-like love of the poor.

Although this quality dominates the peroration, it is evident everywhere in Utopia. Hythloday condemns the English because they have allowed the avaricious to deprive the poor of a livelihood. He objects to the French king whose warlike policies destroy the nation. He exhorts him to love his people and to rule them gently. He refuses to serve the imaginary king who makes beggars of the populace. In the exordium at the end of Book I, he proposes the communism of the Utopians as the radical solution which alone can remove the "heavy and inescapable burden of poverty and misfortunes for by far the greatest and by far the best part of mankind." In the objectively narrated discourse on Utopia in Book II, Hythloday rarely obtrudes his own comments. Yet in his description of Utopian occupations he sees fit to censure the throng of idle Christians who consume the fruits of other men's labors.

At the close of Book II, the Christ-like love of the poor is inescapable as Hythloday assumes his full stature. In all of European literature, there may be no scene to compare with the one More depicts in peroration. Hythloday is intense and passionate as he condemns the greedy

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106 Utopia, p. 61. 107 Ibid., p. 91. 108 Ibid., p. 95.
109 Ibid., p. 105. 110 Ibid., p. 131.
and vicious Christians who have degraded Christ's poor. The dignified and learned man with the long beard and the sunburnt countenance who looks like a sea captain and who is on the threshold of old age rises, as if transformed by the newly resurrected spirit of the Gospel, to champion the cause of Christ. He recalls that in Utopia there is no poor man and no beggar. The Utopian, who does not fear poverty, lives with a joyful and peaceful mind. In Europe, Hythloday sees the common laborer and farmer "perform work so hard and continuous that beasts of burden could scarcely endure it... Yet they earn such scanty fare and lead such a miserable life that the condition of beasts of burden might seem far preferable." He sympathizes with the workmen who "not only have to toil and suffer without return or profit in the present but agonize over the thought of an indigent old age." Hythloday simply cannot turn his mind from the plight of the poor. They are misused and weighed down with age and disease and utter want. The ungrateful commonwealths of Europe repay the benefits received from their hands with a most miserable death. Evil men with insatiable greed abuse their toil and labor. Hythloday's knowledge of their fear, anxiety, worries, toils, and sleepless nights leads to his asseveration of the corruption of European commonwealths:

Consequently, when I consider and turn over in my mind the

111 Ibid., p. 239.  
112 Ibid.  
113 Ibid., p. 241.  
114 Ibid.  
115 Ibid., p. 243.
state of all commonwealths flourishing anywhere today, so help me God, I can see nothing else than a kind of conspiracy of the rich who are aiming at their own interests under the name and title of the commonwealth. 116

Hythloday brings his fiery denunciation to a fitting climax in the image of pride as a serpent of hell entwined about the hearts of men. 117 He makes the humanists in the garden realize that their society is tormented by the primordial and most dreadful moral evil, pride.

The Utopia ends with More taking the weary Hythloday by the hand and leading him to supper. Erasmus' judgment on Petrarch--he possessed an ardent genius, a great knowledge of affairs, and no ordinary force of speaking--is reminiscent of More's final comment on the intense and eloquent Hythloday: "He is a man of the most undoubted learning as well as of the greatest knowledge of human affairs." 118

116 Ibid., p. 241.
117 Ibid., p. 243.
118 Ibid., p. 245.
CHAPTER V

HYTHLODAY AND VICE

In the commendatory poem which Cornelis de Schrijver prefixed to Utopia, he mentions that More's work would enable the reader "to uncover the original causes of the world's evils and to experience the great emptiness lying concealed at the heart of things."¹ In like manner, Erasmus writes that in the Utopia More wishes to show the source of evils in a commonwealth.² Hythloday, as a moral philosopher and Christian reformer, seeks the renewal of Europe in terms of vice and virtue. In Book I of Utopia Hythloday disapproves of many practices that corrupt men. In Book II he extols the Utopian institutions that ennoble humanity.

Hythloday's concept of vice reflects the thought of Socrates in the Republic. This notion depends upon a view of man which Plato and Petrarch share. Further on in this chapter it will be noted that Petrarch holds the Socratic idea which envisions vice as strife among the rational, spirited, and corporal parts of man. By applying this understanding of human nature to the makeup of Plato's republic, one recognized that evil conduct is the conflict among the artisans, the warriors, and the guardians.³ This struggle disrupts the harmony within man and within

¹Utopia, p. 31.
²Erasmus, The Epistles of Erasmus, II, 503.
³Republic, I, 413-423.
the state and results in confusion and delusion. When the three parts are in accord, the soul and the state are free from disease. 4

An attempt to determine the ultimate cause of evil reveals a distinction between the Christian humanists and the pagan philosopher. Neither More, Petrarch, nor Hythloday would concur with Socrates who acknowledges that he is unable to account for the origin of the flow and ebb of fruitfulness and unfruitfulness in men and in states. 5 More and Hythloday as orthodox Christians agree with Petrarch who considers original sin as the underlying source of corruption in the human experience. 6 On this point, the Utopians appear to side with the Christian humanists and not with Socrates. Socrates, unable to determine the primal cause of evil, lays the blame on unpropitious births. 7 Although the Utopians do not refer to original sin, they have determined that the nature of man, "being prone to change," accounts for corruption and wickedness. 8 Since "not a few" 9 Utopians received the waters of baptism which remove original sin, it is reasonable to think that this doctrine conforms to their thought on the ultimate cause of evil. This consideration of the origin of vice reveals a difference between the concept of Socrates and the thought of the Christian humanists and of

4Ibid., I, 417-419. 5Ibid., II, 245.
6See Ep. Fam., VI, 3, in Opere, XI, 73.
7Republic, II, 245-247. 8Utopia, p. 229.
9Ibid., p. 219.
the Utopians.

In regard to the manifestations of evil, the Christian humanists, at times, seem to be strongly influenced by Platonic thought. Because the Republic has such a great effect upon Utopia, Socrates' description of the fall of a state is pertinent to the study of vice in Utopia. In the ideal state of Socrates, the guardians, or leaders, are noted for wisdom and the warriors for fortitude. Each person practices temperance. If everyone performs his own task and does not meddle in the work of others, justice will exist throughout the state. In his description of the fall of a state, Socrates shows how a vice which corrupts a ruler eventually leads to dissension throughout the entire state. This condition causes a relaxation of the laws which guarantee the equality of possessions and the harmony of operation within the nation. A progressive deterioration follows which terminates in the worst possible condition for the commonwealth and for man—the tyrannical state and the unjust man. Consequently, vice for Socrates is the weakness, the deformity, or the absence of a quality which is necessary for the natural perfection of man and society. The manifestation of corruption becomes more hideous as the individual is gradually infected by the particular vices which cause the state to fall from an aristocracy to a timocracy, to an oligarchy, to a democracy, and, finally, to the worst state of all, despotism. The lust for honor initiates the fall to timocracy, the

10 Republic, II, 347-375.

11 Ibid., II, 245.
eagerness for wealth causes the decline into oligarchy. Pride and avarice
are ultimate sources of the deterioration from the condition of integrity.

In the *Utopia*, More examines vice from the viewpoint of Socrates.
The traditional Christian approach to this subject finds expression in
the enumeration of the seven capital sins by Gregory the Great in the
*Morals on Job*. 12 Petrarch's *Secretum* and More's *Four Last Things*
demonstrate the use of Saint Gregory's rationale by Christian humanists
in the Renaissance. Since the Utopians are without Christian revelation,
it is fitting that More make use of a pagan concept. Therefore, in the
light of Erasmus' statement that More's purpose is to reveal the sources
of evil in a commonwealth, the dialogue in Book I and the discourse in
Book II may be read as revelations leading to the peroration's climactic
exposure of avarice and pride as the sources of evil in the state. 13

Busleyden's letter to More provides a key to Hythloday's expose of
vice in Book I of *Utopia*. He writes that in *Utopia* "there should be a
combination of wisdom in the administrators, bravery in the soldiers,
temperance in individuals, and justice in all." 14 These virtues provide
Hythloday with the standards that reveal the degradation of Europe. In
general, Hythloday shows how the administrators of Europe are without
prudence, the soldiers without bravery, the citizens without temperance,
and all without justice. Hythloday's vision of Europe is so dark that

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12 St. Gregory the Great, *Morals on the Book of Job*, tr. J. Bliss
(3 vols.; Oxford: John Parker, 1850), III, 491.

13 *Utopia*, pp. 241-245.
the reader must remember More stresses Hythloday's independence. A radical view must be expected. More's own judgment on Europe would not be as extreme as is his hero's.

In Book I of the Utopia, Hythloday makes a detailed exposure of European corruption. The administrators of Europe, the kings and the councilors of Book I, are very different from the aristocratic guardians of Plato's Republic and are even farther removed from the loving father that Petrarch envisions as the ideal leader in Christian Europe. The rulers whom Hythloday attacks are not learned philosopher-kings who seek the harmoniously ordered state. They are ambitious war-lords and avaricious princes who lead their states toward chaos. Dialogue—a symbol of open-mindedness, humility, and inquiry—becomes a crafty machination before the French king and a scheming device before the imaginary king. Machiavellian plots subject truth to the task at hand as the French king presides over councilors who advise him to make treaties which he should break at his own convenience. The guardians of the state encourage the king to placate or to purchase potential foes by money, gifts, or marriage promises. Hythloday condemns the French king and his councilors because they lack wisdom. This ruler destroys the people and drains off their resources by all of his warmongering. By

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15 See Petrarch, Rerum senilum liber XIV, Ad Magnificum Franciscum de Carraria Padue dominum, p. 11.
17 Utopia, pp. 87-91.
18 Ibid., pp. 91-97.
using many terms associated with pride, Hythloday establishes this vice as the leitmotiv of the evil counsel—the king is to keep hold on Milan, to bring under his sway Flanders, Brabant, Burgundy, to bring back to his power Naples, to overwhelm Venice, to subjugate the whole of Italy, and to usurp the territory of other nations. 19

Before the imaginary king, Hythloday again shows leaders who lack wisdom as they espouse vice and confuse values. Judgments depend upon money. Dialogue devises schemes that will deceive the people. Money is raised for wars that the king never intends to wage. Behind a mask of justice, he resurrects old and unknown laws which everyone transgresses. Judges—acting on the unsound principle that the king can do no evil—manipulate and twist the law so that truth itself becomes a matter of doubt. These counsels upset everything. They are motivated by avarice, for the imaginary king does these criminal deeds in order to heap up treasures for himself. Hythloday uses these dialogues before the French and the imaginary king not only to show how his own counsel would be useless but also to reveal how corrupt a state can become when the vices of pride and avarice are not checked.

In addition to the rulers, the warrior class in the Republic is superior to European soldiery. Socrates defines fortitude as "the unfailing conservation of right and lawful belief about things to be and not to be feared." 20 The soldiers of Europe described by Hythloday do

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19 Ibid., p. 87.
20 Republic, I, 357.
not possess bravery. He calls the mercenaries of France wild beasts who, instead of protecting the state, will effect its downfall just as mercenaries caused the ruin of Rome, Carthage, and Syria. Because these soldiers do not possess the humanity necessary to determine what ought to be feared, they cannot have the virtue of fortitude even though they might display an animal-like ferocity in combat. In order to emphasize how far the warriors of Europe are from true courage, Hythloday mentions that the English draftees and clodhoppers defeated the French who had been "assiduously trained in arms from infancy." He further belittles the Europeans by referring to the fact that their bodies "once strong and vigorous (for it is only the picked men that gentlemen deign to corrupt), are now either weakened by idleness or softened by almost womanish occupations." By revealing the softness and vincibility of the professional European soldier, Hythloday implies that he must be lacking in fortitude for if he were brave his natural perfection as a soldier would make him hardier and less easily overcome.

In order to impress his audience still more with the vicious condition of Europe, Hythloday explains how the virtue of temperance which should be practiced by all the members of each class is practiced by nobody in Europe. The noblemen, gentlemen, and even some abbots—"though otherwise holy men"—lead idle and sumptuous lives. This condition is not limited to the upper classes: "In addition, alongside this wretched

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21 *Utopia*, p. 65.  
need and poverty you find ill-timed luxury. Not only the servants of noblemen but the craftsmen and almost the clodhoppers themselves, in fact all classes alike, are given to much ostentatious sumptuousness of dress and to excessive indulgence at table."\(^{25}\) The vice of intemperance has replaced the virtue of temperance in Europe.

The crowning virtue in the state should be justice. Writing to the citizens of Florence, Petrarch expresses this political truism that he shares with Plato and More:

\[\text{Fundamentum cive\textit{tatum omnia iustitia est, super quod, si verum queritur, vestri maiores edificatam vobis florentissimam atque firmissimam rempublicam reliquerunt. Id si modo per ignaviam labi permissititis, quid sperare licet aliud quam ruinam?}{^{26}}\]

Because of the triumph of evil in Europe, Hythloday sees the ruin that Petrarch associates with injustice. In Europe there is no one in his proper place who is making his appropriate contribution to the welfare of the state. Driven by pride and avarice, kings, who should love and care for their people, exploit them in order to increase personal wealth and endanger them in order to assume the glory of the conqueror. Councilors, who should advise a king what he ought to do, show him the ways to satisfy his lust for honor and his craving for wealth. Abbots, who should be detached from worldly goods, enclose the land. Instead of fulfilling the obligation to shelter the poor, these "holy" abbots add to their afflictions. Priests, whose calling should inspire them to

\(^{25}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 69.

industrious labor for their charges, are a lazy crowd. Hythloday notes that soldiers, who should be manly, have become almost effeminate and have even been defeated by clodhoppers. Speaking of the farmers who should work the land, Hythloday shows how they have been evicted from their homes and have been reduced to vagrancy, or worse, to thievery. In a Europe where there is no justice, Hythloday finds that everything is out of joint. "All the best things flow into the hands of the worst citizens." In the peroration Hythloday emphasizes this inversion of values that he associates with European injustice. He wonders why the idle attain to a life of ease and luxury while the industrious "lead such a miserable life that the condition of beasts of burden might seem far preferable." In one of his final comments before he concludes his search for the ultimate causes of evil in a commonwealth, Hythloday lists the manifestations of evil that have made Europe a mass of troubles and crimes, namely, fraud, theft, rapine, quarrels, disorders, brawls, and seditions.

At the end of the peroration, Hythloday's concept of vice becomes evident. He had shown that in Europe ignorance, cowardice, licentiousness, and injustice prevail instead of prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice. In the place of virtue he has found avarice and pride. He has revealed how greed inverts values and leads to confusion and delusion.

27 Utopia, p. 131. 28 Ibid., p. 65. 29 Ibid., p. 103. 30 Ibid., p. 239. 31 Ibid., p. 243.
The effect of pride is even worse than that of avarice. Hythloday's final words on this vice point to the emptiness concealed at the heart of things which Cornelis de Schrijver says the reader of Utopia will find. At the climax of the peroration, Hythloday arrives at the impressive truth that pride has no positive existence. It is not an entity in its own right. Its being, dependent upon the disadvantages and miseries of others, is subjective and relative.\(^\text{32}\) Pride would not be made even a "goddess if no poor wretches were left for her to domineer over and to scoff at."\(^\text{33}\) Mention may be made of a relationship between Hythloday's view of this vice and his attitude toward war. In the sixteenth century a chivalric code tried to glorify war by ceremony and ritual. Hythloday, who realizes that honor is to be found in the activities of peace,\(^\text{34}\) looks upon war as a pursuit fit only for beasts.\(^\text{35}\) If Hythloday were asked to name the outstanding manifestation of pride in Europe, he would probably answer that war, an activity most suited for negation and destruction, best represents pride.

This conception of vice in the Utopia does not relate to Petrarch's Latin prose in the same manner that More's delineation of Hythloday's character reflects Petrarch's humanism. The Christian humanist revealed in Petrarch's works is so finely attuned to the initial impulses of the New Learning and to its potential impact upon future thought that this figure is a viable model in 1516. But the variety and the volume of Petrarch's moral comments complicate the task of showing how traces of

\(^{32}\)Ibid. \(^{33}\)Ibid. \(^{34}\)Ibid., p. 57. \(^{35}\)Ibid., p. 199.
his humanist thought on the nature of vice are noticeable in the Utopia. In spite of this problem there appear to be four ways in which More's thinking reflects the Christian humanism that Petrarch founded in the Renaissance. First, both humanists make the eradication of vice a major goal in their programs of reform. Secondly, they employ their knowledge of the past in the same way. Thirdly, they look upon the ultimate sources of evil in a similar light. And, finally, both practice a method of reform that may be termed "Christian Machiavellianism."

It has already been shown that the condemnation of vice is one of the major issues in Utopia. In Petrarch, this same concern is equally important. Nearly all of his prose works attempt to correct human behavior. Petrarch, who was the most renowned moral philosopher of his day, views vice as the worst possible bondage that man can endure. Many of his Epistolorae Familiares and his Secretum seek the eradication of the vices that effect the soul of each man. Other letters--particularly the Epistolorae sine nomine and the letters pertaining to the revolution of Cola di Rienzo--try to check the immoral conduct that brings harm to Church and state. The De ignorantia and De vita solitaria have much to say about the evils that afflict the intellectual. The 254 dialogues of De remediis offer an extraordinary variety of comments and exhortations which encourage the reader to shun vice and to follow virtue--the true remedy against fortune whether it is prosperous or adverse. These few comments on some of Petrarch's major prose works reveal that one of the primary aims of the Christian humanist is to restrain the corrupting influences which man encounters.
In his endeavors to free man from vice, the Christian humanist often mingles the noble thoughts of pagan philosophers with the standards derived from revelation. One of the major effects of the ancient texts that Petrarch helped to revive was that the ideals of conduct put forth in the classics were disseminated throughout Europe and were used as criteria of behavior. It is interesting to note that both Petrarch and More refer to the use of the pagan classics as the act of bringing spoils out of Egypt. In the *De ignorantia*, Petrarch says that "Augustine filled his pockets and his lap with the gold and silver of the Egyptians when he was about to depart from Egypt." In his letter to Oxford University written in 1518, More, speaking of those who make use of philosophy and the liberal arts, remarks that "they adorn the queen of heaven with the spoils of the Egyptians!" In the case of the Christian humanists, these pagan standards were modified by Christian idealism, while the pagan humanists in the Renaissance made no conscious attempt to reconcile classical thought with Christian traditions.

At times, it is difficult to tell how aware an author is of the precise origin of his thought. It is evident that the best state of the commonwealth which More describes in Book II of the *Utopia* is based on reason and that More is consciously indebted to pagan thought. Thus,

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36 "On His Own Ignorance," in *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*, p. 114; *De ignorantia*, p. 78: "Augustino, qui ex Egipto egressurus, Egypiorum auro et argento sinum sibi gremiumque compleuit."

37 *Selected Letters*, p. 99.
this is a *fortiori* argument for a reformed Christianity is an indirect condemnation of "Christian" Europe's vice. Petrarch does not use this indirect method but does employ pagan standards to condemn Christians. Petrarch is explicit. He makes the *fortiori* comparison for the reader.

When a youthful courier to Avignon was savagely maltreated, Petrarch condemns the guilty Christians:

> Who indeed could witness with tranquillity the violation of the law of nations and the scorning of the covenant of humanity in the person of your messenger? . . . Better had your messenger fallen among barbarous enemies than among those whom you had thought to be of Latin blood, whose affection you had deserved.

> Let them search all histories, if indeed they have eyes for aught but the riches they gape after; let them inquire and then answer me: what barbarian people ever violated the rights of envoys, save most rarely, unless there were some substantial cause? . . . How much more inviolate he would have been had he gone to Germany, despite the slaughter of the Teutons and the triumph of Marius, than in coming hither for you, who desire as a son to venerate the Roman Church?

At other times, the Christian humanist, who is steeped in classical thought, may use pagan material unknowingly. In Book I of *Utopia* More may not have had Plato consciously in mind as he has Hythloday substitute a vice for each of the four virtues of the *Republic*. The degree of

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38 Petrarch at Vaucluse, pp. 75-76; *Epistolarum sine nomine*, pp. 169-170: "Quis enim tranquillus hec uideat: uiolatum ius gentium, spreta humanitatis federa in nuntii tui persona? . . . melius inter barbaros hostes fuisset nuntius tuus quam inter eos, quos et rebaris Latinos et beniuolos merebaris. Euoluant historias, si modo quicquam preter quibus inhiant diuitias spectare queunt; inquirant et michi respondeant: que barbaries legatos uioluiit unquam, nisi perraro, nulla presertim causa interueniente? . . . Quanto intractior isset in Germaniam, cessis Theutonis et Mario triumphante, quam huc uenit, te Romanam ecclesiam filialiter uenerante?"
indebtedness to pagan thought in Book I is difficult to determine, yet it is fairly certain that More uses standards less elevated than those of Christianity in order to condemn vice in Europe. Towards the end of Book I, Hythloday says "that the greater part of His [Christ's] teaching is far more different from the morals of mankind than was my discourse."\(^{39}\) Hythloday is severe in his condemnation of the rulers and warriors of Europe. If he were to judge them by the standards of the ideal Christian prince and the perfect Christian warrior, he would certainly have reason to denounce them even more harshly. In Book I More has Hythloday mingle Christian standards along with non-Christian. The Law of Moses, the law of mercy, and the wisdom of Plato all figure in Book I.\(^{40}\) Such a mingling of values is at the core of Christian humanism: "grace builds upon nature, revelation complements reason. . . . God and religion, Christ and revelation, play a clear part in the Utopia, especially at critical junctures."\(^{41}\)

This same blending of the pagan and Christian thought on vice is evident in Petrarch. As in More's case, sometimes it is conscious while at other times it may simply be the result of the fact that Petrarch is so filled with classical thought that it becomes natural for him to merge

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\(^{39}\) *Utopia*, p. 101.

\(^{40}\) *Ibid.*, Law of Moses, p. 73; law of mercy, p. 75; wisdom of Plato, p. 85.

\(^{41}\) Surtz, "*Utopia Past and Present,*" in *Utopia* (S.W.), p. xxvii.
Christian and pagan values. In the second dialogue of the *Secretum*, which was written when Petrarch underwent the conversion that led him from worldly concerns to a more intense practice of his religion and from a study of the pagan classics to a more thorough examination of the Scriptures and the Christian Fathers, Petrarch reveals an interesting combination of pagan and Christian thought. In this dialogue, persona-Augustine, who generally represents *contemptus mundi*, the tradition of the Middle Ages, questions persona-Petrarch, who often expresses the values of the New Learning. Conscious of the pagan tradition, Augustine openly expresses an admiration for the Platonic view of Man: "It is not for nothing that, by those who have divided the soul into three parts, anger has been placed below the seat of reason, and reason set in the head of man as in a citadel, anger in the heart, and desire lower still in the loins."\(^{42}\) There are times when Augustine unknowingly follows a pagan line of thought. Using the Christian concept of the seven capital sins, Augustine tries to determine the condition of Petrarch's soul.

In the lengthy discussion on *acedia*, Augustine seems to forget that he is talking about sin. There is no attempt to have Petrarch acknowledge guilt as there had been in the investigations on pride, envy, avarice, etc. The *acedia* of Petrarch is very different from the sin

\(^{42}\) *Secret*, p. 100; *Secretum*, p. 122: "Cui non frustra rationis sedem superpositam esse diffiniunt hi, qui in tres partes animam diviserrunt: rationem in capite velut in arce, iram in pectore, concupiscentiam subter precordia collocantes."
described by Gregory the Great in his classical enumeration of the capital sins.\footnote{St. Gregory the Great, \textit{Morals on the Book of Job}, III, 491.} Aquinas says that this capital sin, \textit{acedia}, is sadness about one's spiritual good on account of the attendant bodily labor.\footnote{See \textit{Summa Theologica}, II-II, q. 35, a. 1-4, \textit{tr.} by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, (3 vols.; New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc., 1947), II, 1345-1348.} Wilkins notes that at this point in the \textit{Secretum} Augustine is unusually sympathetic as he realizes that Petrarch suffers because of his insecure financial position, his necessary but chaffing dependence upon superiors, and his nostalgia for his native state, Florence.\footnote{Ernest Wilkins, "On Petrarch's Accidia and His Adamantine Chains," \textit{Speculum}, XXXVII (1962), 590.} There is no mention of sadness about one's spiritual good. \textit{Acedia} is approached as a modern's melancholy would be. It is certainly not seen as a capital sin leading an army of dependent sins which could overwhelm Petrarch's soul. Even in the remedy offered, Augustine recommends the \textit{revocatio} of the Epicureans to check the grief--"When you come to any passages that seem to you useful, put marks against them, which may serve as hooks to hold them fast in your remembrance, lest otherwise they might be taking wings to flee away. By this contrivance you will be able to stand firm against all the passions, and not least against sorrow of heart."\footnote{\textit{Secret}, pp. 102-103; \textit{Secretum}, p. 126: "Quod cum intenta tibi ex lectione contigerit, imprime sententias utilibus (ut incipiens dixeram) certas notas, quibus velut uncis memoria volentes abire contineas. Hoc equidem presidio consistes immobils cum adversus cetera tum contra animi tristitiam."} Thus, it can be seen that humanist Petrarch both knowingly and unknowingly uses the
New Learning and the Christian tradition side by side.

The words that Petrarch puts in the mouth of persona—Augustine will not be found in Augustine's works. In his Discourse on the Psalms (civ), Augustine looks upon acedia as a serious condition in which neither sin nor the word of God delights man. In a sermon, Augustine is far more severe than the character in the Secretum—he assigns the slothful servant of the Gospel (Mt. 25:14-30) to hell.

This examination of the mingling of Christian and pagan elements reveals an underlying principle that guides the Christian humanist. He does not reserve the thought of the classics for his study. He employs it to check corruption and to arrive at his standard of perfection. More in Book I of Utopia and Petrarch in his Latin prose fortify themselves for the battle against evil with every effective weapon they can master. The "spoils of Egypt," the Fathers of the Church, and the Sacred Scriptures constitute the arsenal of the Christian humanist.

In regard to the attack on the particular vices of avarice and pride, Petrarch's notions are similar to Hythloday's concepts. It has already been pointed out that Hythloday possesses integrity and seeks neither riches nor power. It was noted that Socrates feels that an individual and a state are secure as long as there is no lust for wealth nor for


honor. When Augustine quizzes Petrarch on the sin of avarice, he links it with a desire for glory and blames these vices for Petrarch’s failure to attain to human perfection:

Verily, I was at your side once, when, quite young, unstained by avarice or ambition, you gave promise of becoming a great man; now, alas, having quite changed your character, the nearer you get to the end of your journey the more you trouble yourself about provisions for the way. What remains then but that you will be found, when the day comes for you to die—and it may even be now at hand, and certainly cannot be any great way off—you will be found, I say, still hungering after gold, poring half-dead over the calendar? 49

Petrarch, like most Christian philosophers, considers pride as the greatest of vices. He expresses an idea on pride that is so similar to the description of the vice in Utopia that Petrarch’s thought, like Hythloday’s, 50 merits the gloss, "extraordinary":

To depreciate others is a kind of pride more intolerable than to exalt oneself above one’s due measure; I would much rather see you exalt others and then put yourself above them than degrade all the world in a heap at your feet, and by a refinement of pride fashion for yourself a shield of humanity out of scorn for your neighbor. 51

49 Secret, pp. 65-66; Secretum, pp. 86-88: "Certe ego presens aderam, cum adhuc adolescentulum te nulla cupiditas, nulla prorsus tangebat ambitio, cum cuiusdam magni futuri viri specimen preferebas. Nunc mutatis moribus, infelix, quo magis ad terminum appropinquas, eo viatici reliquum conquiris attentius. Quid superest igitur nisi ut in die mortis, que forte iam iuxta est et profecto procul esse non potest, aurum sitionis calendario semivivus incumbas?"

50 Utopia, p. 243.

51 Secret, p. 59; Secretum, p. 80: " Multo quidem importunius superbie genus est alios deprimere, quam se ipsum debito magis attollere; longeque maluissem ceteros magnificares, te quanquam ceteris anteferres, quam, calcatis omnibus, ex alieno contemtuo superbissime tibi clipeum humilitatis assumeres."
This concept of pride as dependent which is expressed by Petrarch, by Cornelius de Schrijver, and by Hythloday in the peroration reflects the Augustinian notion of the nothingness of sin. Petrarch is explicit in his expression of this notion when he refers to the humiliation of the courier to Avignon:

"Evil men have succeeded in harming an innocent boy, and in replying thus to your message. What is there great in this? Is it not indeed less than nothing? For if all sin is nothing, then the greater the sin the greater its nothingness. Thus the greatness of this sin, if it can be called greatness, is nothing." 52

Although Petrarch gives the primacy to pride, he centers his reforms for the court at Avignon on avarice. Petrarch cannot tolerate the contrast between the poverty of Christ and the affluence of the Avignon prelates who buy and sell church offices in order to increase their own wealth and power. He objects to the bishops who grow fat as they steal from the poor. They live in splendour as they ignore the poverty of the Apostles. In a letter which is devoted to the corruption at Avignon, Petrarch condemns prelates for their inexcusable greed since they do not have to provide for legitimate offspring. 53 In Utopia, Hythloday emphasizes that this vice inverts values. Petrarch stresses the same point. Prelates who claim religious motives for gathering

52 Petrarch at Vaucluse, p. 76. Epistolae sine nomine, p. 171: "Potuerunt nocere no centissimi hominum innocentia puero et boni nuntii uicem hanc referre. Quid hic magni est, imo quid non nichilo minus? Si enim peccatum omne nichil est, eo magis est nichil, quo peccatum maius. Ita peccati magnitudo, si dici potest magnitudo, nichil est."

wealth are actually afflicting Christ by their cupidity:

Non aurum odit ille sed cupidos, quibus optandi querendique nullus est finis. Primi hominum quod erant, aperte profitebantur: querebant divitias ut abundarent; vos queritis ut ornemis Cristum: pium opus, si spoliis Ille miserorum et non potius virtutibus ac devotione fidelium vellet ornari, et si non fictioni iuncta cupiditas odiosior Deo esset. 54

In his eulogy of gold, Petrarch reduces the avarice of the prelates and the consequent inversion of values to their ultimate result—the betrayal of Christ:

Una salutis spes in auro est. Auro placatur rex ferus, auro immane monstrum uincitur, auro salutare lorum texitur, auro durum limen ostenditur, auro uectes et saxa franguntur, auro tristis ianitor mollitur, auro celum panditur. Quid multa? Auro Cristus uenditur. 55

The examination of Petrarch's thought on avarice and pride reveals that the Christian humanists at the fount of the Renaissance in Italy and in England hold similar ideas. Avarice deludes man because it confuses values. Pride, having no being at all, is the worst vice. It should be noted that the presentation of these concepts appears to be more effective in the Utopia than in Petrarch's Latin prose. This difference may be the result of More's artistry. His brilliant handling of the debates in the garden and in the courts of Morton, of the French king, and of the imaginary ruler, in addition to his admirable characterization of Hythloday as a prophet, drives home More's thought on these evils with great power. Although the force of Petrarch's Epistolae sine nomine cannot be denied, these letters lack the sense of drama that pervades

54 Ep. Fam., VI, l, in Opere, XI, 52.
55 Epistolae sine nomine, p. 201.
much of the Utopia. In the tracts, De ignorantia and De vita solitaria, in the internal dialogue, Secretum, and in the dialogue among allegorical figures of Reason, Hope, Joy, Sorrow and Fear in De remediis, Petrarch has neither the sense of urgency nor the opportunity for characterization that strengthens More's condemnation of pride and avarice.

As far as the concept of vice is concerned, this impression of crisis surrounding the humanists' attacks on evil is relevant to the fourth way in which the Utopia reflects Petrarch's humanism. The humanist's hatred of corruption is so intense that he is forced to take the position of an extremist in his desire to achieve a reform. The fourth chapter of this study has treated Hythloday's radicalism. It may be recalled that Hythloday, a man of the greatest knowledge of human affairs, does not hesitate to overemphasize his dark vision of Europe even though he knows that many virtuous men like More, Giles, and Trunstal are there. Hythloday, like a Christian Machiavellian, sees only the desired goal and exaggerates his view of Europe's condition in order to make men flee vice.

This extremism figures strongly in Petrarch's attempts to purge the Avignon curia of sin. The Epistolae sine nomine outdo Jeremiah. Petrarch, as loyal and as orthodox a Catholic as More, levels so fierce an attack upon the Avignon court that, by comparison, the vicious "Christians" in Book I of Utopia should be commended for their restraint in the pursuit of vice. Although there are many passages in the Epistolae sine nomine that are far more scathing than the following, this selection reveals the extreme view Petrarch takes of corruption:
Vides en populum non modo Cristi adversarium, sed, quod est grauius, sub Christi vexillo rebellantem Christo, militantem Satane et Christi sanguine tumidum atque lascivientem et dicentem: Labia nostra a nobis sunt, quis, noster Dominus est? Populum duricordem, impium, superbum, famelicum, sitientem, hianti rostro, acutis dentibus, procuruis ungibus, pedibus lubricis, pectore saxeo, corde chalybeo, plumbea ucluntate, uoce melliflua, populum cui propriae comuenire dixeris non modo Evangelicum illud atque propheticum: Populus hic labiis me honorat, cor autem eorum longe est a me, sed illud etiam Jude Jscariotis, qui Dominum suum prodens et exosculans aiebat: 'Aue Rabbi', et Judeorum qui indutum purpura, coronatum spinis percutientes et conspuentes illusione amarissima, flexis poplitibus adorabat et salutabat: 'Aue rex Judeorum', quem neque ut Deum neque ut regem divinis aut humanis honoribus, sed ut reum mortis ac blasphemum, contumeliis dignum atque suppliciiis inhumano iudicio destinarant.56

These Epistolae sine nomine depict the curia in so shameful a condition that Morris Bishop asks: "Are these terrific excoriations of the Papal Court true?"57 Hythloday is never so extreme. In regard to these denunciations by Petrarch, it might be well to remember that he, like Milton in the Tetrachordon and the Colastrion, is a poet out of harness. It is the nature of the social critic to be so intense in his endeavor to prevent evil that the rational powers are often checked by the emotional force of his convictions. The reformer is more noted for the passionate intensity of his message than for the precision of his thought. If such reasons are not put forward in defense of Petrarch's probably extreme and exaggerated view of the papal court, it is difficult to tolerate his manipulation of the truth. He gives a hint that he would

56 Petrarch, Epistolae sine nomine, p. 221.
57 Bishop, Petrarch and His World, p. 312.
not think it wrong to practice dissimulation for the sake of renewal. This practice may be called Christian Machiavellianism—"nichil omiseris, imo si vera destituunt, simulata iungantur; non est mendacio imputanda simulatio veri adiutrix." As a reformer Hythloday does not hesitate to use his imagination in the cause of truth as he tries to bring about the regeneration of Europe. It is noteworthy that at the origin of Christian humanism in Italy and in England, an historical personality stands in Italy and a fictional character in England who so abhor vice that they must put aside any moderate approach to reform.

Thus far, this chapter has focused upon the concept of vice in Utopia and in Petrarch's prose. In both of these works there are effective artistic expressions for the denunciation of evil. More uses irony, symbolism, and imagery to depict the decadent Europe which Hythloday finds bereft of moral vitality and motivated by a distorted system of values. In a previous chapter, a brief investigation was made of Hythloday's use of irony in connection with his ability to reduce Europe's immoral practices to their ultimate absurdity. Irony is almost a natural device for the satirist who sees an exalted standard of conduct receive lip service from those who vitiate the ideal. The irony directed against the holy abbots, the revered popes, and the just hangmen emphasizes the subversion of values in Europe. The direct use of verbal irony is rare in Utopia. As has been mentioned, the few examples of this device which More employs directly are especially pointed because they are unexpected.

In Utopia, there is a more pervasive use of indirect irony. Quintilian speaks of *illusio* as a class of allegory involving an element of irony in which the meaning is contrary to that suggested by the words.\(^59\) The whole of *Utopia* is written in a way that makes use of the concept which underlies Quintillian's description of *illusio*. There is a meaning in the *Republic* and in the *Utopia* which is not immediately connected with the author's intention. The *Republic* is not only a political tract. It is very much concerned with telling the reader that the key to personal happiness lies in the practice of justice and that unhappiness results from the life of wickedness. Sylvester, speaking of *Richard III*, notes that it is marked by a double vision. More distinguishes "dramatically between the smooth surface of events and the ruinous moral vacuum that lies beneath them."\(^60\) As in the *Republic* and in *Richard III*, there are two visions in *Utopia*. Book I shows how the European "Christian" lives a subhuman life when judged by pagan standards. Book II reveals how the pagan Utopian is superior to the "Christian." This view is, in a sense, an *illusio*. There is another vision, far more important, beneath the surface of *Utopia*. More wants the reader to realize how wonderful man can be if he does not dissemble the message of his Christian heritage. A Christian state will surpass Utopia. The artistry in the twofold prospect is especially effective in regard to


\(^60\) Richard III, p. xcvii.
vice, for the reader is led to admire the pagan Utopians and to despise the vicious "Christians" who are unaware of their true nobility.

Furthermore, Hythloday's conception of vice is artistically presented in three sets of images found in Utopia. Each cluster deals with the confusion and mortal disease that vice inflicts upon Europe. The first group deals with the problem of enclosure of land. Values are inverted as churches become pens for animals, men of nobility drones, and administrators of justice bad schoolmasters who would rather beat than teach their scholars. In this section, three references to the plague reveal that the diseased condition of Europe is caused not only by the avarice of those who enclose the land but also by the pride of those that employ the standing armies. These images are not so terrifying to our contemporary society, but in More's day the fear of this scourge was probably as appalling as the dread of nuclear weapons is now.

In the dialogue before the French monarch and the imaginary king, the second cluster of images associates vice with confusion and death. Kings, who should be shepherds to their people, act as jail-keepers and incompetent physicians. Values are so distorted in Europe that the unalterable law of the Gospel is made to correspond to the morals of men as if it were a rule of soft lead. The delusion caused by evil is seen

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61 Utopia, p. 67.
62 Ibid., p. 63.
63 Ibid., p. 61.
64 Ibid., pp. 67-69.
65 Ibid., p. 63.
66 Ibid., p. 95.
67 Ibid., pp. 95-97.
68 Ibid., p. 101.
in the counsel to blind the people by the dust of solemn ceremonies celebrating the peace treaty which ends the preparations and taxations for a war that never was to be fought. The same deception is seen in Hythloday's comment that any good man who would dare act as an advisor to a prince would be a screen for the wickedness and folly of the other councilors. Persona-More, aware of Hythloday's belief that European society is diseased, acknowledges that radical action will restore life: "If you cannot pluck up wrongheaded opinions by the root, if you cannot cure according to your heart's desire vices of long standing, yet you must not on that account desert the commonwealth." This image is a repetition of Hythloday's earlier statement: "If I proposed beneficial measures to some king and tried to uproot from his soul the seeds of evil and corruption, do you not suppose that I should be forthwith banished or treated with ridicule?" The condition of Europe is so critical that only drastic remedies will be effective.

At the close of the intense peroration, the final cluster of images (pp. 237-245) strengthens Hythloday's powerful denunciation of pride and avarice. As in the previous instances, things are not as they appear to be for evil has led to confusion. Bankers are actually parasites. The commonwealth is a conspiracy of the rich. The earlier agricultural

69 Ibid., pp. 92-93.
70 Ibid., p. 103.
71 Ibid., p. 99.
72 Ibid., p. 99.
73 Ibid., p. 241.
74 Ibid.
image of uprooting is repeated in order to show how Utopian communism nullifies avarice and pride. The sharing of goods cuts away a mass of troubles and uproots a "crop of crimes"—fraud, theft, rapine, quarrels, disorders, brawls, seditions, murders, treasons, poisonings."75 Hythloday directs the final and greatest images toward pride as he portrays its inherent evil. Using personification, Hythloday says that pride's essence—if such a term can be used—is evil since it domineers over the unfortunate and scoffs at the miserable in order to torment the poor and in order to intensify the sufferings of the afflicted. Because pride, like all other sins, has no positive being, it lives on hatred and is a monster, the sire of all plagues hitherto mentioned. Hythloday reinforces the image by denoting the habitation and the activity of the beast. He compares it to a suckfish keeping man from a better life and to a serpent from hell which "entwines itself around the hearts of men."76 With such a picture of pride in his mind, it is no wonder that Hythloday paints so dark a picture and sees how dreadful the condition of Europe really is. The thought of pride gripping at the heart of man calls forth the final image which again stresses the need for the radical solution offered by communism: "pride is too deeply fixed in men to be easily plucked out."77 In these last images Hythloday brings together all of the force of the previous imagery and climaxes his revelation of the mortal disease and confusion caused by pride and avarice.

75 Ibid., p. 243.  
76 Ibid., pp. 243-245.  
77 Ibid., p. 245.
In *Utopia*, symbolism plays as important a role as imagery in the artistic presentation of vice. The most obvious symbols in *Utopia*, are the handful of grain, the wax candle, the gallows, and the man-eating sheep. The symbols of virtue in Book II provide a sharp contrast to those of vice in Book I. The handful of grain carried before the Utopian governor represents fertility and abundance. The candle borne before the Utopian high priest depicts enlightenment as well as ardor in God's service. In Book I, the omnipresent gallows portrays death. Even though thieves are executed everywhere and few escape execution, avarice and pride are such fatal diseases that the "whole country was still infested with thieves." This symbol of death, differing so much from the life force demonstrated by the handful of grain, is an effective artistic revelation of the destructive power of vice. The chaotic state of values in Europe is best revealed by the man-eating sheep that "devastate and depopulate fields, houses, and towns." These creatures provide a sharp contrast to the symbol of enlightenment carried before the Utopian high priest. In *Utopia* the gallows and the sheep show how death and deception reign in Europe just as they rule in the evil world of Richard III. Thus, by the use of irony, imagery, and symbolism, Hythloday reinforces his representation of vice as an element that

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78 Ibid., p. 195.  
80 Ibid., p. 20.  
82 Ibid., p. 61.  
79 Ibid.  
81 Ibid., p. 65-67.  
83 Ibid., p. 67.
originates in pride and avarice and destroys moral life.

In order to relate Hythloday's artistic presentation of moral depravity to Petrarch, it is necessary to limit the investigation to the examples of Petrarch's craftsmanship that focus upon the Christian humanist's view of evil as dehumanizing and deceiving. If Petrarch has any special symbol of vice's power to distort the truth, it must be Avignon. In the last passage cited from *Epistolae sine nomine*, he portrays the papal city as a rebel against Christ. Yet, as it fights for Satan against Him, it bears His banner while speaking the words of Judas--Ave Rabbi. This symbol, like More's man-eating sheep, exposes evil's power to subvert the truth.

In regard to imagery, Petrarch, like More, wishes to show how vice, the moral disease, leads to confusion. Petrarch and the Utopians associate gold chains with enslavement to vice: "I greatly dread lest the glittering brilliance of your chains may dazzle your eyes and hinder you, and make you like the miser bound in prison with fetters of gold, who wished greatly to be set free but not willing to break his chains." And like More, Petrarch shows the confusion of values associated with evil. Men who seek gold, silver, and sensual pleasures are beasts:

In his tam parvis tuis reliquis exercer quotiens hec loca vel tempora et hos mores oblivisci volo, et semper acri cum indignatione animi adversus studia hominum nostrorum, quibus nichil in precio est nisi aurum et argentum et voluptas, que

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84 Secret, p. 108; Secretum, p. 130: "Multum vereor ne ipse cthenerarum circumradians atque oculos mulcens fulgor impediat; nec forte contingat quod eventurum suscior, si avarus quispiam aureis cathenis vincus in carcere teneretur: solvi enim vellet, sed cthenas nollet amittere."
si in bonis habenda sunt, multo plenius multoque perfectius
non tantum mute pecudis sed immobiliis etiam et insensibilis
elementi quam rationalis hominis bonum erit. 85

Petrarch, who hates the hunt and gambling as much as More and the
Utopians, provides an analogy between the hunter and the hunted beast
which is an example of the dehumanization resulting from vice: "wherefore,
bying unfyt for honest affayres, they dwell in woodes, not to leade a
solytary lyfe, whereunto they knowe them selves as unmeete as for the
lyfe polytike, but to lyve with wyld beasts, and dogges, and byrdes,
which they woulde not delyght to doo, unlesse they were joyned unto them
by some lykenesses. 86 More associates the hunter with bestiality, for the
hunting in Utopia is the "meanest part of the butcher's trade." 87 The
butchers are not free humans, they are slaves and must perform their
activity outside the city walls. In his criticism of the city dweller
who spreads a veil of justice over his litigious quarrels, Petrarch has
the same picture of evil being screened by law that is found in the
encapsulated dialogue before the imaginary king. 88 Although these
artistic presentations of vice by Petrarch are but token selections from
a great number of possibilities, it can be seen that the images of both

85 Ep. Fam., XXIV, 8, in Opere, XIII, 244.
86 Physicke against Fortune, p. 45; De remediis, p. 41: "Ad
honestum igitur nihil idonei, syluas colunt, non uitam solitariam acturi,
cui non minus quam politice se ineptos sciunt, sed feris ac canibus et
uolucribus conviicturi, quod non facerent, nisi illis similitudine aliqua
iuncti essent."
87 Utopia, p. 171.
88 The Life of Solitude, p. 109; De vita solitaria, 22: "Seu litigio
iustitiae velum fando praetendere, seu denique publici privatique aliqud
corrumpere meditatur."
authors portray vice as deceptive and bestial.

The last major issue in this study of the Christian humanist's concept of vice deals with the penalty for evil. Hythloday's ideas in this area are among the more foresighted programs in *Utopia* which men through the years have tried to realize by means of legislation. Hythloday's reform program condemns Christian Europe on two counts. First, the innocent and not the guilty are punished. Secondly, the punishments inflicted are not in proportion to the nature of the crime. He bases the positive aspects of his enlightened and modern proposals upon the practices he had observed among the Polylerites and among the Utopians. Hythloday's radical statements on punishment reveal a shocking contrast between the intelligent pagans and the vicious "Christians" who not only reward vice but also wreak vengeance upon the quasi-innocents who had been driven to theft by the unjust economic system. In Europe, where justice is "more showy than real," the guilty are unpunished.89  

The kings and councilors of Europe practice vice unmolested. No matter how evil their schemes, the leaders meet with no opposition as they satisfy their lust for honor and for wealth. They even handle the legal tribunals for their own interest.90 In like manner, the professional warriors, who are like wild beasts and who bring their nations to ruin, are not the object of punishment in Europe. The noblemen, gentlemen, and abbots who enclose the land and inflict suffering on the lower classes receive monetary rewards for their deeds even though Hythloday identifies

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89 *Utopia*, p. 71.  
their acts with the two traditional manifestations of evil--fraud and violence. To Hythloday, it seems that all of the energy which Europe expends in the punishment of vice is directed against the poor with a vengeance. First their possessions are exploited by the proud and avaricious. Then they are sacrificed as victims to an evil system that is perpetuated by excessive use of capital punishment. Hythloday is almost a determinist on this point--the poor are forced to steal and to be executed because of the vices of the rich.

In objecting to this manner of treating criminals, Hythloday continues to act as a radical. His first demand is that the ultimate cause of the evil be uprooted. Oligopolies must be checked before there can be a fair-minded approach to punishment. Next, he objects to the extreme penalties inflicted upon English thieves. One should not set in equal balance the life of a man and all the goods that fortune can bestow. Placing Scripture before his listeners, Hythloday mentions that the severe and harsh Law of Moses does not require the death of a thief. The new law of mercy demands even greater leniency towards him. If the institutions of Europe can be so manipulated that Scripture is ignored, the eventual danger to the harmony in the state is that the word of God becomes dependent upon mutual human consent. This rejection of absolutes undermines the foundations of all law. Although European punishments are harsh, they are impractical for they do not accomplish

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91 Ibid., p. 66. 92 Ibid., p. 69. 93 Ibid., p. 73.
94 Ibid., p. 73. 95 Ibid., pp. 73-75.
their goal—the number of thieves in England has not been reduced by
capital punishment. Worse still, the severity of the punishment endangers
the life of the innocent since the thief who faces the ultimate penalty
for his deed will not hesitate to murder his victim in order to cover up
his crime. 96

In order to improve the unjust and ineffective institutions of
Europe, Hythloday relies on his memories of the Polylerites. Since the
Utopians have no private property, the problem of retribution for theft
does not exist for them. Yet the Utopians base their theory of criminal
punishment upon the same principles that are in use among the Polylerites.
Either by direct statement or by implication, it can be shown that the
penal system of the Polylerites and of the Utopians differs from that of
Europe in regard to the following basic principles:

1. Virtue must be rewarded and vice punished. Therefore, law should make it easier to
repent of evil than to follow it. 97

2. The criminal is presumed to be corrigible. Punishment is meted out in order to destroy
vice and to save people. 98

3. The attempt at crime is to be considered the same as the deed. 99

4. Punishment should fit the crime. The sentence of slavery for crime is more advantageous to
the state than capital punishment is. 100

96 Ibid., p. 75. 97 Ibid., p. 79. 98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., p. 79; p. 193. 100 Ibid., p. 191.
Working from these general principles, the Polylerites, like the Romans, make the thief productive for the commonwealth.\textsuperscript{101} Whatever he has stolen must be returned to the injured party and not to the state so that the victim does not suffer loss. The Polylerites then make the thief a serving man, not a slave.\textsuperscript{102} No serving man is dehumanized by chains or confinement. He has the hope of gaining freedom if "he accepts his punishment in a spirit of obedience and resignation and gives evidence of reforming his future life."\textsuperscript{103} These practices of the Polylerites would apparently solve England’s problem. The ideas appeal so much to Cardinal Morton that he modifies Hythloday’s suggestions in such a way that they may be tried on an experimental basis and may be applied to England’s problem of vagrancy.\textsuperscript{104}

The Utopian program of punishment is far more comprehensive than that of the Polylerites and is in sharper contrast to European methods. Since the Utopians are superior to the Polylerites, they have, in addition to the four principles listed above, two guide posts which will offer a more perfect system of punishment. First, the commonwealth "never decays except through vices which arise from wrong attitudes."\textsuperscript{105} Secondly, the man who does not believe in human immortality, divine providence, and

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., pp. 75-77.
\textsuperscript{103} Utopia, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., p. 81.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., p. 229.
future retribution would either evade by craft or break by violence the
laws of his country.\textsuperscript{106} Since "the Utopians evidently believe in a
natural connection between religious faith and morality,"\textsuperscript{107} they will
direct their punishments against those who endanger belief as well as
against those who threaten the state's external order.

Prior to the examination of the Utopian methods of punishment, it
will be worthwhile to note the executors and recipients of the penalties.
God, the state, and the family check vice. Those people who are especially
bad are reprimanded by God's representative, the priest. The Utopians
have a great dread of excommunication and sacrilege because they have a
secret fear of religion.\textsuperscript{108} Except for excommunication, all chastisements
for serious offenses which are a danger to public morality are administered
by the governor and other civic officials.\textsuperscript{109} Minor violations are
corrected within the family—"husbands correct wives, and parents their
children."\textsuperscript{110} By law, the Utopians punish vice in every major area of
human experience—church, state, family—so that the integrity of the
commonwealth is not endangered by indifference to evil.

In Hythloday's condemnation of Europe, he notes that the guilty
are untouched. The upper classes are exempt from the laws while the
lower classes are penalized with a vengeance. In Utopia, the leaders
who conspire to overthrow the government or who solicit votes to obtain

\textsuperscript{106}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 221-223.
\textsuperscript{107}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 525.
\textsuperscript{108}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 229; p. 233.
\textsuperscript{109}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 229.
\textsuperscript{110}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 191.
an office are punished. Since the priests of Utopia are holy and few, vicious conduct among them is rare and poses no threat to the state. Therefore, a guilty priest is immune from civil tribunals. But Hythloday notes that the priest is left to God and himself. Everyone else is subject to correction if he violates the laws of Utopia.

In regard to the methods of punishment, the traditional penalties--exile, enslavement, and death--are used within Utopia for two purposes, namely, to check vice and to preserve peace. Utopian concord can be lost by a change in the order of government. Therefore, anyone who takes counsel "on matters of common interest outside the senate or the popular assembly" is guilty of a capital offense. The harmony within Utopia can be upset if an unworthy man is elected to a public office. The Utopians probably believe with Socrates that the best candidate has no desire to rule the state as an official and must be forced to take office. Any Utopian, therefore, who solicits votes for office is considered unworthy and is not allowed to hold any office at all. Since a religious zealot endangers the tranquillity of the commonwealth, anyone who proselytizes in an immoderate fashion is exiled or enslaved.

In order to check vice, the Utopians place in servitude a man who commits a crime. If he rebels against this penalty, he must die.

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111 Ibid., p. 125; p. 193.  
112 Ibid., p. 229.  
113 Ibid., p. 125.  
114 Republic, II, 131.  
115 Utopia, p. 193.  
116 Ibid., p. 221.  
117 Ibid., p. 191.
is difficult for a Utopian to imitate the idle ways of the troublesome European vagrants. If he wanders outside territorial boundaries during his travels and is apprehended without the required certificate from the governor, the Utopian is treated with contempt. A rash repetition of his vagrancy merits enslavement. 118 In the communist state where equality in all things is fundamental, the chastisement of the idler who shirks his duty must be severe. Finally, the Utopians punish those guilty of adultery with the strictest form of slavery. If a relapse occurs, they put the offenders to death. 119 In addition to severe penalties, they do not allow Utopians guilty of fornication to marry unless the governor's pardon remits their guilt. 120

Utopians impose penalties with far greater discrimination than do the Europeans. Serious threats to the vitality of the nation are punished by death. The leader whose ambition threatens the peace of the state, the adulterer whose perversity endangers the family—the bulwark of Utopian society—and the citizen whose heinous crimes have substituted the life of an untamable beast for that of a citizen are the only Utopians who can receive capital punishment.

Slavery in Utopia is not like the penal servitude of the Polylerities. It is a subhuman condition in which individual freedom is lost and the victim is chained. Since he was reared to a virtuous life, the enslaved

118 Ibid., p. 147.
119 Ibid., p. 191.
120 Ibid., p. 187.
Utopian works continually and receives more harsh treatment than foreign-born slaves.121

The punishment of exile is reserved for the zealot. It must be noted that he is not penalized for his beliefs. Slavery or exile await the fanatic only if he disturbs the good order of the state.122 In regard to all crimes not mentioned above, the Utopians have no specific penalties. The senate imposes the punishment on each case "according to the atrocity, or veniality, of the individual crime."123

Punishment in Utopia is directed against bestial or dehumanizing conduct. By disturbing the harmony of the commonwealth, the ambitious leader or the contentious zealot directs the energies which should be devoted to the common good into channels which promise self-aggrandizement. Such antisocial conduct is subhuman in Utopia. The individual who reduces the harmonious state of his soul to chaos by the practice of vice is considered inhuman. The perpetrator of a heinous crime is a beast that needs to be tamed.124 There are neither honors nor positions of trust offered to the man who refuses to believe in the providence of God, the immortality of the soul, and retribution in the afterlife and who thus "has lowered the lofty nature of his soul to the level of a beast's miserable body."125 The chastisement of the bestial in man is consistent with the conceptual and artistic presentation of vice discussed earlier.

121 Ibid., p. 185. 122 Ibid., p. 221.
123 Ibid., p. 191. 124 Ibid., p. 184.
125 Ibid., pp. 221-223.
These views of evil reveal that the vicious man confuses and negates values. The Utopians employ suitable retribution for subhuman conduct—slavery, exile, and death.

The contrast between Europe and Utopia is evident. In Europe the innocent are often put to death. In Utopia the vicious man who disturbs the good order must—like an animal—be restrained. If he proves so wild that he is untamable, he must then be destroyed like a dangerous beast. This contrast makes it easy to see how Bude in his prefatory letter to Utopia could compare European justice to a scullery maid. He recalls also Hythloday's belief that Astraea is not in the zodiac but is in the island of Utopia. 126

The consideration of crime and its punishment in the Utopia shows that More deserves an honored place among the outstanding humanitarians and penologists in European history. Petrarch's name shares a similar glory. Whitfield notes Petrarch's modernity and humanity in regard to the treatment of criminals:

It is Petrarch who, with all his contempt for contemporary legal practice, established a principle of some importance. The degree of guilt depends on pressure of circumstances and unravelling of motives; but punishment is a different process, not expiatory, but preventive: not because sin has been committed, but to prevent it being committed again. In the Inferno souls are punished eternally for their sin in eternal expiation. The theory is depressing, in Aquinas as in Dante. Hell and damnation are good, but not for the damned: the good which emerges is not a preventive, it is the glory and completion of God's justice, and an enjoyable element in the beatitude of the elect, ut de his electi gaudeant. Petrarch, again, stretches his hand back, ignoring this medieval theory; he does not claim originality for his own—it is laudata sententia—but, again, truth is not an invention

126. Ibid., pp. 11-13.
or a monopoly, and a man's worth may be gauged by what he praises. Europe has not since Petrarch bettered the principle which he resurrects, any more than she has always observed the social assessment of punishment which he advances instead of the theological one put forward by St. Thomas Aquinas. But we must not ascribe our faults to Petrarch: the proof that he points the way from the Medieval Christian world is plain enough in this divergence.\textsuperscript{127}

Whitfield's comments express the sanity of Petrarch's concept of temporal punishment for crime and reveal how Petrarch's thought anticipates succeeding generations of humanitarians.

Before considering other aspects of Petrarch's program it is necessary to qualify Whitfield's judgments on Petrarch's condemnation of lawyers and on his attitude toward punishment in the next life. First, Petrarch directs his contempt against the lawyers of his day who degrade justice and prostitute the law rather than against the profession of law in itself. The rational Utopians banish lawyers for the very reason that Petrarch condemns the dishonorable lawyers of his day.\textsuperscript{128} Petrarch and many Christian humanists, lawyer Thomas More included, loathed the quarrels, tricks, and sophistries by which venal advocates abused the law.\textsuperscript{129} Secondly, Whitfield's implications on Petrarch's attitude toward eternal punishment would be difficult to document. Although it is true that Petrarch does not refer frequently to hell, his orthodoxy in this regard can be verified by his denunciations of the papal curia throughout

\textsuperscript{127}Whitfield, Petrarch and the Renascence, pp. 84-85.

\textsuperscript{128}Utopia, p. 195.

\textsuperscript{129}See Ep. Fam., XX, 4, in Opere, XIII, 19.
the Epistolae sine nomine and by his belief that those who take their own life have to face an eternity of punishment. In one of his references to suicide, he writes: "et qui sibi manus iniciunt, eo calle miseriam fugiunt sed falluntur, non videntes brevium fuga in eternas miserias se relabi."\(^{130}\) It is almost unnecessary to mention that More and Hythloday agree substantially with Petrarch's concept of eternal retribution.

In regard to temporal punishments, Whitfield comments accurately upon Petrarch's thought. Writing to Florentines who will have to sit as judges, Petrarch exhorts them to look to the future and not to the past. In a concept similar to the Polylerite principle that punishment should be meted out in order to destroy vice and to save people,\(^{131}\) Petrarch tells the Florentines that they should punish only in order to prevent future evils:

\[\text{Illud quidem admonere non est necesse, quod scelerum vindices non praeterita sed futura respiciunt. Quid enim prodest ad ea que retractari nequeunt, studium adhibere? Similibus tantum malis occurritur, et exemplo terribili humana terrors coercetur; hinc illa nimirum doctissimorum hominum laudata sententia: "Non quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur inventa supplicia." Quo quanquam sint pro huius facinoris immanitate dignissima, quanquam tacitus forsan optare non prohibear, expetere tamen vetor.}\(^{132}\)

Furthermore, in this letter Petrarch states a principle similar to Hythloday's advice that Cardinal Morton should seek to eradicate the

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\(^{130}\) Ep. Fam., XXIII, 12, in Opere, XIII, 184.

\(^{131}\) Utopia, p. 79.

abuses that necessitate penalties for thievery. Although he does not
seek the ultimate cause of theft as Hythloday does, Petrarch counsels
the legal tribunal to seek beyond the apprehended criminal in order to
remedy the evil: "qui amputare vult arborem, a radicibus incipiat; qui
siccare vult rivulos, fontem siccat; qui extinguere vult latrones,
insistat receptatoribus extirpandis." 133

In addition to his advice to Florence, Petrarch's correspondence
with Cola di Rienzo adds two further humanitarian ideas on the treatment
of criminals. He thinks that it is insane to punish Cola di Rienzo in
Avignon for crimes committed in Rome. Furthermore, the victim should have
a public trial and the right of counsel. 134 Although these recommendations
may be taken for granted today, they must be considered liberal and
humanitarian in the light of the despotism that flourished in several
city-states of Italy in Petrarch's age.

In conclusion, it may be stated that Hythloday and Petrarch view
vice through the pagan as well as through the Christian tradition. Both
have such a horror of evil that they take extremist positions in their
denunciation of it. Each reveals that pride and avarice confuse and

133 Ibid., 193.

134 Petrarch, Epistolae de rebus familiaribus et Variae, ed. Josephi
Fracassetti (3 vols.; Florence: Felicis Le Monnier, 1859-1863), Epistola
I in Appendix Litterarum, III, 501-502: "Ubi enim iustius delicta castiges
quam ubi commissa sunt, ubi scilicet et locus ipse memoriam criminis
revocans sceleratis, pars non parva supplicii, et scelerum spectatores
poenae spectaculum aut soletur aut terreat ... at saltem quod ab omni
quae legibus vivat barbarie posci potest, poscite ut civi vestro
audientia publica, et defensionis legitimae non negetur copia."
blind man and lead to a perversion of values. They agree that pride is
a privation. Their somewhat similar artistic presentations of vice
reflect their thinking as moralists on these issues. And, finally, both
are in the vanguard of those who propose a more humane penology for
Europe.
CHAPTER VI

CHRISTIAN HUMANISM AND CLASSICAL VIRTUE

In Book II of the Utopia, More takes the reader's attention away from Hythloday and the humanists in the garden. The drama of the debate on councilship subsides and, in a philosophical calm, all attend to the description of the best state of a commonwealth. As the afternoon wears on, reactions to Hythloday's narrative may vary from laughter and admiration to bewilderment and displeasure. In regard to artificial incubation in Utopia, More's friends may find humor in Hythloday's description of the newly hatched chicks that follow humans as their mothers. The humanists may smile when Hythloday refers to the host of absolutely silent youths who stand in the common dining hall and who wait for their dole of food from elders seated at the tables. Golden chamber pots and the premarital inspection of the naked betrothed provoke Hythloday's audience to laughter. When Hythloday describes the Utopian's contempt for death and his eagerness to be with God, the Christian humanists, even though displeased by the practices of communism and euthanasia in Utopia, will surely be edified.

Hythloday's narration will linger in the minds of More's guests. Like More, they will want "another chance to think about these matters more deeply and to talk them over with him more fully."1 Reflecting on

1Utopia, p. 245.
the afternoon's proceedings, the humanists will certainly think about the ideal of man that grows out of the Utopian concept of virtue. And he will recognize that the Utopians have attained to their admirable view of man because they have constructed their commonwealth with building blocks borrowed from classical monuments. It is possible that a humanist, musing on the nature of virtue in Utopia, will remember the thought in Petrarch's Latin prose.

The term *virtus* stands out more prominently than any other word in Petrarch's Latin works. Figuring on page after page of the letters, virtue, a key issue in *De viris illustribus*, *De ignorantia*, *De vita volitaria*, *Rerum memorandarum libri*, and *Secretum*, is the principal subject of *De remediis*. Petrarch looks upon virtue as the most important driving force in history.²

Petrarch's concept of this force appears to anticipate or give birth to a Renaissance ideal of man that is noticeable in *Utopia*. Standing on the threshold of the modern world, Petrarch tells man of *virtus*. Through it, he can free himself from fortune and create his own destiny. Petrarch's thought on this subject finds an eloquent expression and a mature crystallization in Pico's *Oration on the Dignity of Man* (ca. 1486). Pico states, in epitome, the ideal of man that evolves from Petrarch's understanding of virtue:

> At last the best of artisans ordained that that creature to whom He had been able to give nothing proper to himself

should have joint possession of whatever had been peculiar
to each of the different kinds of being. He therefore took
man as a creature of indeterminate nature and, assigning
him a place in the middle of the world, addressed him thus:
"Neither a fixed abode nor a form that is thine alone nor
any function peculiar to thyself have we given thee, Adam,
to the end that according to thy longing and according to
thy judgment thou mayest have and possess what abode, what form,
and what functions thou thyself shalt desire. The nature of
all other beings is limited and constrained within the bounds
of laws prescribed by Us. Thou, constrained by no limits, in
accordance with thine own free will, in whose hand we have
placed thee, shalt ordain for thyself the limits of thy
nature. We have set thee at the world's center that thou
mayest from thence more easily observe whatever is in the
world. We have made thee neither of heaven nor of earth,
neither mortal nor immortal, so that with freedom of choice
and with honor, as though the maker and molder of thyself,
thou mayest fashion thyself in whatever shape thou shalt prefer.
Thou shalt have the power to degenerate into the lower forms
of life, which are brutish. Thou shalt have the power, out
of thy soul's judgment, to be reborn into the higher forms,
which are divine."

Since Petrarch's concept of virtue has produced a profound effect
upon Christian humanism and since it appears to be noticeable in the
Utopia, the focus usually employed in this study will be altered. In
this chapter, Petrarch's thought on virtue will be examined in detail in
order to reveal the ideas that may be found in the Utopia. This approach
will necessarily limit references to More and his classic. In the next
chapter, the discourse on Utopia will be examined in order to determine
whether or not a motif based on Petrarch's concept of virtue runs through
Hythloday's description of Utopia.

There seem to be three ways that Petrarch's concept of virtue is
relevant to the Utopia. First, Petrarch's theorizing on its generic

3Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola, "Oration on the Dignity of Man,"
nature appears to elucidate a pertinent sixteenth-century comment upon the Utopians. Secondly, his use of antiquity to develop his idea reveals a principle of humanism that More and Erasmus espouse. Finally, Petrarch's thesis that man can free himself from fortune and create his own destiny may underlie a theme revealed throughout the discourse on Utopia in Book II.

In Christendom, prior to Petrarch, philosophers and theologians usually look upon virtue in specie. Gregory the Great and Thomas Aquinas, two outstanding thinkers in the Middle Ages, enumerate the individual virtues and designate their interrelationships with one another. They elaborate paradigms and determine whether a virtue is intellectual, moral, or theological.  

The art works of medieval Christendom reflect the concept of virtue held by men like Gregory the Great and Aquinas. On the stained glass windows of the cathedral of Saint Vincent in Rouen, and artist depicts the virtues in procession behind Adam and Eve in Paradise. Below this scene, the fallen parents lead vices in derisive pomp. Medieval sculptors carve virtues in basrelief and place the corresponding vices on medallions that hang below. Source books like the Psychomachia of Prudentius (ca. 348-405) provide the inspiration for these artists who represent the combat of specific vices and virtues. In medieval

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literature, works like Roman de la Rose, Piers the Plowman, and the morality plays have individual virtues—mercy, meekness, chastity—as allegorical characters. Yet there seems to be little interest in portraying the idea of virtue itself as a separate and independent figure who rules the scene.

In regard to one of his views of virtue, Petrarch differs from the Middle Ages; for he does not try to enumerate a catalogue based on distinctions between intellectual and moral virtues. Since Petrarch stands between two worlds and draws from his medieval as well as from his classical heritage, he presents a concept of virtue that is complicated by almost unavoidable ambiguities. He professes a great admiration for the Plotinian notion of virtue as purgation. On the other hand, throughout the Secretum he employs the medieval system of the capital sins and their corresponding virtues. Yet, in his works, another idea consistently appears. He tries to see manhood as a way of acting. He searches for a definition of virtue that can penetrate each depth, expanse, and movement of human endeavor. He wishes to show how virtus, derived from vir, is not only natural for man, but that without it life is bereft of every blessing. Petrarch seeks to express this idea—virtus in genere—both as a moral philosopher and as an historian.

Because Petrarch's thought on this point is difficult to express

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7 See The Life of Solitude, pp. 139-140; De vita solitaria, pp. 39-41.
8 Ep. Fam., XXIII, 2, in Opere, XIII, 164.
precisely, an analysis of an analogue to his concept may be profitable. Mantegna's (1431-1506) "Wisdom Triumphing over the Vices" and "The Triumph of Scipio" appear to be adequate pictorial representations of Petrarch's thought. Mantegna's paintings are chosen not only because they are appropriate but also because the painter may have had contact with Petrarch's Latin prose. Mantegna's friend, Felice Feliciano, a famed calligrapher, prepared some art work for editions of De viris illustribus as well as for the Canzoniere. In his last years, Mantegna painted under the direction of Isabella d'Este whose family had tenderly cared for an ill Petrarch in 1370.

Mantegna's painting, "Wisdom Triumphing over the Vices," has the allegorical luxuriance of the Middle Ages and the anthropomorphic gods of the ancients. The triumph of moral force is the theme of the painting. Minerva drives monstrous vices—sensuality, ignorance, ingratitude, avarice inertia, and slothfulness—from the grove of virtue where mater virtutum, a laurel tree crowned with a woman's head, is a prisoner. There are sentences in Hebrew, Latin and Greek, on three bands of ribbon flying from mater virtutum. These inscriptions read: "Agite pellite sedibus nostris foeda haec viciorum monstra virtutum collitus ad nos redeuntium"; "Et mihi virtutum matri succurrite divi"; "Otia si tollas perire cupidinis arcus." On clouds in the background, specific virtues—justice,
fortitude, temperance, but not prudence—await the release of mater virtutum.

The allegory in the painting approaches the idea of virtus in genere that Petrarch tries to portray in his Latin prose. Minerva traditionally symbolizes the role played by reason, wisdom, or prudence. She has a significance that is universal, classical, and natural rather than Christian. Under the guidance and protection of reason, mater virtutum flourishes in a garden that can be populated by particular virtues. When mater virtutum is chained, there are no virtues in the garden. When she is free, no vices dwell there.

These ideas in Mantegna’s painting help to elucidate Petrarch’s concept of virtus in genere. Petrarch uses the terms wisdom, prudence, and reason to represent the function performed by Minerva. He sees man’s journey through the darkness of life as a voyage on a ship guided by reason or prudence.\(^{11}\) In De remedii Reason engages in a series of dialogues with Joy and Hope in Book I and with Sorrow and Fear in Book II. She consistently proposes virtue as the sole mode of conduct regardless of how adverse or prosperous the disposition of Fortune may be. The sum of her admonitions has a twofold effect. Like Minerva, Reason banishes every vice and encourages the practice of innumerable virtues. Reason exhorts so many different and admirable ways of acting that no man’s lifetime could suffice for the mastery of a portion of her admonitions. One should see that Petrarch is proposing virtue or virtus in genere as man’s approach to experience. Reason purges all vice and

\(^{11}\)See Ep. Sen., IV, 5, in Opera, pp. 869-871.
frees *mater virtutum* so that all virtues may flourish. Consequently, it may be stated that a fundamental notion in Petrarch is that natural reason leads man to choose virtue as a way of life.

In order to clarify further this hazy idea of *virtus in genere*, it may help to note the philosophical origins of Petrarch's concept in Stoicism and in Platonism. Due to his great admiration for Cicero, Stoic thought is to be expected in Petrarch's concept of virtue. By comparing passages from Petrarch's letters, one may arrive at two conclusions. First, Petrarch looks upon virtue as a type of fortitude, a Stoic endurance. Secondly, the juxtaposition of these passages reveals that what Petrarch calls *fortitudo* in the first letter and *virtus* in the second letter are actually the same quality. These terms represent Petrarch's endeavor to depict *virtus in genere*:

1. Contra fortune impetus fortitudinem esse pro clipeo, pavidos pro inermibus haberis, his qui plus metuunt, plus esse periculi, urgeri profugos, stratos obteri, stantes non posse calcari, corpus esti nolit, animum nisi consenserit, non prostermi: nil volenti difficile, nil importabile sapienti: nil mestum nisi quod mestum creditur, pro arbitrio fingi vel amara vel dulcia, omnia ex opinionibus pendere, forti animo nihil durum, molli autem dura omnia videri, felicibus bene esse si velint.\(^\text{12}\)

2. It is virtue alone that can accomplish all this gain freedom from evils listed earlier in the letter: through virtue you may succeed in living happily and joyously wherever you are; in being untouched by evil even though you are in the midst of evils; in desiring nothing save that which makes you happy; and in fearing nothing save that which makes you miserable. Through virtue also you may learn that nothing that is not of the soul can make you either happy or miserable; that things external to yourself cannot be

\(^{12}\text{Ep. Fam., XXI, 9, in Opere, XIII, 70.}\)
possessed; that all things that are your own are within you; that nothing that is not your own can be given you, and nothing that is your own can be taken away, that your choice of a way of life is your own; that the opinions of the crowd are to be shunned, and the wisdom of the few is to be followed; that Fortune is to be despised high-mindedly; that she has more violence than strength; that she threatens oftener than she wounds; that she rages oftener than she injures; that she has no power over that which is yours, either to lessen or to increase; that her blandishments are not to be trusted and her gifts are to be regarded as fleeting.13

In these quotations, Petrarch recommends virtue and disregards the concept of specific virtues which counteract particular vices. Petrarch expresses the Stoic ideal that "virtues involve one another reciprocally. . . . He who has one virtue will therefore have all the others."14 This concept underlies De remediis. Man must practice virtue rather than individual virtues. He must avoid vice rather than special vices. In addition Petrarch's view of reason, like More's in Utopia, agrees with that of the Stoics who teach that "life according to nature means life according to right reason; and living according to right reason is

13Petrarch at Vaucluse, p. 102; Ap. Fam., XV, 7, in Opere, XII, 152-153: "Virtus sola potens est hec omnia prestare; per illam assequeris ut ubique letus ac felix vivas et in medio malorum nullus ad te aditus malo sit, nichil optes nisi quod felicem, nichil horreas nisi quod miserum facit; nulla autem re nisi animo felicem aut miserum fieri scias; externa quelibet esse non propria, tua omnia tecum esse; nichil alienum tibi dari posse, nichil tuum eripi; quem vite cursum eligas in tua manu situm esse; fugiendas opiniones populorum et paucorum sequendas esse sententias; despicieandam alto animo fortunam scindendumque plus illam impetus habere quam virium et minari sepium quam ferire et rarius obesse quam strepere; nichil illam in propriis tuis bonis posse, nichil non posse; in suis non fidendum blanditiis et quicquid illa donaverit precario possidendum."

living virtuously." In *Utopia* More writes: "The Utopians define virtue as living according to nature since to this end we were created by God. That individual, they say, is following the guidance of nature who, in desiring one thing and avoiding another, obeys the dictates of reason." A marginal gloss by either Erasmus or Giles at this point in the *Utopia* describes this passage as "The Definition of the Stoics." In regard to the Platonic element, Petrarch's concept of *virtus in genere* appears to be best described in Socrates' last words on virtue. In Chapter III it was mentioned that Petrarch obtained a Latin translation of Plato's *Phaedo* from the Sorbonne. In addition to using universal ideas as proofs of the soul's immortality, the *Phaedo* states Petrarch's notion that natural reason directs man to purge vice from his life. Socrates, like Petrarch, notes individual virtues but eventually concludes that virtue is a state or condition for human aspiration. His advice to Simmias shows clearly the idea of *virtus in genere* that Petrarch seeks to express:

Yes, my dear good Simmias: for I fancy that that is not the right way to exchange things for virtue, that exchanging of pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains, fears for fears, small ones for great and great ones for small, as though they were coins; no, there is, I suggest, only one right sort of coin for which we ought to exchange all these things, and that is intelligence; and if all our buying and selling is done for intelligence and with its aid, then we have real courage, real temperance, real justice; and true virtue in general is that which is accompanied by intelligence, no matter whether pleasures and fears and all the rest of such things be added or subtracted. But to keep these apart from intelligence and merely exchange them for each other results, I fear, in a sort of illusory facade of virtue, veritably fit for slaves, destitute of all sound substances and truth;

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16 *Utopia*, p. 163.  
whereas the true virtue, whether it be of temperance, of justice, or of courage, is in fact a purging of all things, intelligence itself being a sort of purge. 18

Klaus Heitmann's exhaustive study, *Virtus und Fortuna*, corroborates this attempt to identify Petrarch's concept of virtue with Platonism. Although Heitmann does not relate Petrarch's ideas specifically to the *Phaedo*, he concludes that Petrarch believed virtue was transcendent. 19 In conclusion, it may be stated that as a moral philosopher Petrarch consistently uses the term *virtus* in order to represent a Stoic type of human perfection whereby natural reason leads man to embrace virtue as a way of life and to purge vice from his soul. Mommsen notes that later humanists popularized this idea of Petrarch in their concept of dea *virtus*. 20

As a historian, Petrarch handles his notion of *virtus in genere* with more facility. He has so apotheosized Scipio, the hero of his epic, Africa, that this character symbolizes virtue. Scipio appears frequently in Petrarch's Latin prose. He is the most eminent person in *Rerum memorandarum libri* and is prominent in *De remediis*, *De vita solitaria*, *Secretum*, and *Epistolae Familiares*. He figures in *De ignorantia*, *Invective contra medicum*, and *De otio religioso*. Scipio stands out conspicuously as the most distinguished personage in *De viris illustribus*. The Scipio of the epic poem is the same person Petrarch represents in *De viris illustribus*. Both of these character portrayals were drawn

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at the same time. In these two works, Scipio, like More's Hythloday, reveals central tenets of the author's humanist thought and provides insights into Petrarch's idea of *virtus in genere*.

In *De viris illustribus*, Scipio, the world's greatest military leader, impresses men by his physical beauty which reflects his moral excellence. Scipio is a complex exemplar of all virtues—"Vix sine nomine Scipionis virtutis nomen invenias." He possesses the virtues of the active and contemplative lives. In *De viris illustribus* Petrarch chooses incidents from the hero's life which show that Scipio is just, generous, faithful, devout, brave, pious, eloquent, magnanimous, constant, continent, astute, stern, clever, and modest. Petrarch places Scipio at the apex of the ancient virtues. He is an exemplar of *virtus in genere*. It is, perhaps, his very excellence that makes him fail as the epic hero. Unlike Achilles and Aeneas, he is so perfect that one cannot conceive of him allowing a Briseis or a Dido to delay momentarily his progress toward glory. Yet he is so wise that he will not let his desire for fame endanger his cause as Roland does. Scipio does not have one or many virtues. He is the man, *vir*, who *is* virtue.

Aldo S. Bernardo, whose study does not focus upon the concept of virtue in Petrarch's prose, so interprets Scipio's character that one

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would think that he is trying to prove the thesis that Scipio is an allegorical representation for *virtus in genere*. Speaking of Petrarch's predilection for Scipio, Bernardo writes:

It was the "poetic" bent of mind that made Petrarch conceive Scipio as an ideal living symbol of what history and philosophy teach us regarding what Man should strive to be. After all, here was a man who, as a living paragon of virtue, valor and glory, had not only saved Rome, the capital of antiquity and of Christianity, in its darkest hour, but had been able to reach into the future and incite his adopted grandson to the final destruction of Carthage and the establishment of Rome as a truly eternal city by appearing to him in a dream having all the earmarks of divine intervention. He was, as it were, Odysseus, Achilles and Aeneas all wrapped into one, and perhaps even superior since he rested on unquestionable historical foundations.23

The idea of *virtus in genere* reflects humanism's antipathy toward the fragmentation of experience. In his studies, a man should not devote himself to one liberal art and should not spend his life mastering one specialized discipline. Likewise, in regard to his behavior, a man should not strive to master one particular virtue. Each act of a humanist should reveal that he is a man of virtue in all that he does. Petrarch's concept of virtue, like his attitude toward learning, appealed to succeeding generations of humanists.

There appear to be traces of Petrarch's teaching on the generic nature of virtue in More's *Utopia*. By contrasting virtue in Plato's *Republic* with that in *Utopia*, one notes a distinction which sheds light on a Renaissance ideal of conduct. Plato founds his commonwealth on the four cardinal virtues. The rulers are wise, soldiers brave. All practice

temperance. If a man does his own job properly and does not meddle in the business of others, he is just.

There seems to be little doubt that Utopians practice the four cardinal virtues. But in his letter to More Busleyden shows how virtue in Utopia differs from that in The Republic:

Since this commonwealth of yours, which you praise so highly, is obviously an excellent blend of these virtues, it is no wonder if on this account it comes to be not only formidable to many nations but also revered by all of them, and likewise worthy to be celebrated through all the centuries. 24

In a similar manner Desmarais' poem, which was prefixed to the 1516 and 1517 editions of Utopia, gives the impression that the Utopians represent virtus in genere while other nations exemplify virtus in specie:

Brave men were the gift of Rome, eloquent men the gift of lauded Greece, frugal men the gift of famous Sparta, uncorrupted men the gift of Marseilles, hardy men of Germany. Courteous and witty men were the gift of the land of Attica. Pious men were once the gift of renowned France, wary men of Africa. Munificent men were once the gift of the land of Britain.

Examples of the different virtues are sought in different peoples, and what is lacking in one abounds in another. The total sum of all virtue for all is the gift of the island of Utopia to earth-born men. 25

Moreover, when the Utopians themselves speak of virtue, they do not look upon it as supererogation. Like Petrarch, they associate virtus with vir. They believe that virtue is living according to man's nature. 26 Every citizen of Utopia is a plebeian Scipio—he is virtue. The cardinal virtues in the Utopian are complemented by industry, humanity, piety, mercy, modesty, chastity, obedience, and other moral virtues. This point marks

24 Utopia, p. 35. 25 Utopia, p. 29. 26 Ibid., p. 163.
a distinction between the Utopia and the Republic. In Plato's state the guardians alone are wise, the soldiers only are brave. But nearly every Utopian is prudent and brave, as well as temperate and just. Virtue in Utopia is not restricted by caste. As in the Republic, each citizen in Utopia behaves temperately and justly. But, unlike the citizens in the Republic, every Utopian has military training and is noted for his fortitude. All Utopians are devoted to learning and, therefore, possess some of the wisdom of Plato's rulers. Since the family is the most important part of the social structure in Utopia, it may be assumed that heads of families are wise. The father must be prudent if he is to judge guilt and administer punishment and if he has to organize the family for its political role. Thus, it appears that the Utopians represent virtue in genere. This concept, as has been noted, is essentially the Stoic idea that "virtues involve one another reciprocally... He that has one virtue will therefore have all the others." It will be shown later that the Utopians practice the "hard virtue" of Stoicism. The concept of virtue in the Utopia, therefore, seems to be the classical idea that Petrarch resurrected in the Renaissance as a result of his readings in Cicero and Seneca.

Petrarch's teaching on virtue in genere and his apotheosis of Scipio raises the second major issue in regard to his concept of virtue--the

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27 Ibid., pp. 201, 211.
28 Ibid., pp. 123, 191.
29 Owens, A History of Western Philosophy, p. 391.
humanist's mingling of Christian and pagan elements. In Christendom before the age of Petrarch there had been regard for classical learning. Virgil and Cicero had been respected throughout the Middle Ages. Aquinas' indebtedness to Aristotle proves the strength of Stagirite's rebirth. But it was in Petrarch's day that the force of antiquity was felt in all its power. Petrarch himself provided much of the enthusiasm and the veneration for the ancient world that was a distinctive feature of trecento and quattrocento humanism in Italy. The ability to employ and to respect what is sacred in the past is a prominent aspect of the Christian humanism of Petrarch and his followers. Petrarch's dependence upon the monuments of the ancients for his concept of virtue is evidence of this attitude.

In an interesting article, Mommsen shows how Petrarch was truly unique in the restoration of a classical idea of virtue. He mentions that prior to the composition of De vita solitaria no one, since the days of antiquity, mentions the selection of a life of virtue by Hercules. Because the predilection of Hercules implies a pagan and secular concept of morality, Mommsen thinks that the incident of Hercules was ignored in the Middle Ages and that Petrarch, for the same reason, fails to emphasize Hercules' attainment of glory through the choice of virtue. Throughout his works Petrarch shows a preference for classical models. In De viris illustribus he had intended to write the biographies of the early heroes of Rome. In its unfinished state in 1343, it contained

twenty-three lives that were devoted chiefly to Roman characters. All the exemplars of poverty commended in Epistolae Familiaris, VI, 3, are Romans. In Rerum memorandarium libri the same predilection for pagan heroism is seen. In De vita solitaria, Petrarch describes Christ, the best model of virtue, in almost perfunctory tones. Scipio, the most admirable exemplar offered by antiquity is more appealing than Christ. Christ affects the highest powers of Petrarch's soul and is hidden from the view of men. Christ is a spiritual ideal, Scipio a secular.

Petrarch's apparent bias for pagan exemplars raises problems similar to those More grapples with in his letter to the University of Oxford (1518). Why does Petrarch give a capable scholar like Mommsen and a theologian like Kenelm the impression that he offers man pagan virtue? Would Petrarch think that he was teaching a natural as opposed to a Christian concept? Since the answers to these questions involve approaches not only to the innermost core of humanism but also to philosophical arguments on the nature of truth, this study can only suggest answers to these queries. Neither Mommsen nor Kenelm investigate Petrarch's motive for juxtaposing Christian and pagan notions and for apparently preferring non-Christian thought. Whenever Petrarch speaks

31 See The Life of Solitude, pp. 254-255; De vita solitaria, pp. 117-118.

32 Bernardo, Petrarch, Scipio and the "Africa"; the Birth of Humanism's Dream, p. 54.


of the two concepts, he does not refer to any conflict of opposing
ideologies. After writing eloquently upon Stoic fortitude, Petrarch
alludes to a higher type of virtue:

Through virtue, also, you may learn, if you rise to higher
station, to attribute it to divine mercy, and if not, to
perceive with equanimity that in the realm of fortune the
good are oppressed and the evil are exalted, whose end you
may understand, as the Psalmist says—being mindful always
that this toilsome road is not the fatherland of the good. 35

Petrarch, who had just spoken in detail on the perfection human
philosophy offers, barely notes the higher maturity dependent upon the
grace of God. The same attitude underlies a passage in De vita solitaria:
"All men with the grace of God may lead a good life. . . . Even in the
practice of human philosophy there are gradations of virtue. Everyone
cannot hold the highest place, otherwise all the lower ones would be
unoccupied." 36 Petrarch briefly mentions the action of grace. On the
other hand, he expands his comment on the gradations of virtue by devoting
the next chapter of De vita solitaria to Plotinus' theory of purgation.
It appears that Petrarch consistently chooses to describe the idea
derived from the classics. He rarely discusses supernatural virtue.

There are two letters which may reveal an insight into this

35 Petrarch at Vaucluse, p. 102; Ep. Fam., XV, 7, in Opere, XII, 153:
"Ad hanc ut si unquam altius ascenderis, divine clementie ascribas; si
minus, equo animo aspicias in regno fortune bonos opprimi, pessimos
attolli, intelligens, ut ait Psalmista, 'in novissimis eorum', memorque
viam hanc laborum esse non patriam meritorum."

36 The Life of Solitude, p. 139; De vita solitaria, pp. 40–41: "Et
possunt omnes Deo largiante bene vivere. . . . Ipsa etiam humanae
philosophiae institutio gradiaria est; non possunt enim summum locum
praehendere, alioquin ima omnia vacarent."
predilection of his. It is significant that Petrarch did not put these epistles in any of his collections—Epistolae Familiaris, Epistolae sine nomine, or Epistolae Seniles. It appears that scholars have made little use of this fact in their attempts to define the relationship between pagan and Christian elements in Petrarch. These letters present an allegory that is as elaborate as those in Petrarch's eclogues. Because of the concatenated nature of allegory and the length of the letters, both will be placed in the appendix. The broad outlines of the fable establish the orthodox Christian teaching that the theological virtues supplement the cardinal. These letters are an artistic representation of Aquinas' instruction that the Christian virtues build upon the foundations of the natural or pagan virtues. 37

In his allegory Petrarch describes an evergreen tree that has four branches bending toward the earth. A farmer, who comes from heaven, cultivates the tree so that three new branches grow and reach high into the sky. The tree becomes far more fruitful and useful for those who seek its shade. In his second letter, Petrarch explains the parable of the tree. The four branches inclining toward the ground are the cardinal virtues that regulate civic and earthly transactions. Christ, the visitor from heaven, is responsible for the tree's added productivity and for the three high-reaching branches—faith, hope, and charity.

The reason why Petrarch fails to place these letters in any of his collections suggests a possible answer to the first question—does

37 S.T., I-II, q. 62, a. 3, in Summa Theologica, I, 852.
Petrarch offer natural virtue alone? Bernardo lists six reasons why Petrarch would not publish a letter among the *Epistolas Familiares*:

1. The contents are much too personal or are of too limited interest.
2. The missive has the aspect of a note or fragment rather than of a letter.
3. The import of the letter lies in the enclosures it accompanies and not in the letter itself.
4. There is little or no intrinsic value in the letter either because of the nature of the contents or because its subject matter has frequent echoes in the *Familiares*.
5. The contents may have proven too compromising or degrading either for Petrarch himself or for the recipient.
6. The composition of the letter contains some obvious fault. 38

The fourth reason appears to be the only likely one for rejecting these letters in question. But this argument does not seem sound since the allegory is one of Petrarch's most specific statements on the relationship between the theological and cardinal virtues. Bernardo thinks that the letters were not published because of the "rather affected form" which was unsuitable for the *Epistolas Familiares*. 39 Petrarch, who uses allegory in other letters (*Epistolas Familiares*, III, 19, and *Epistolas sine nomine*, 13) considers it the duty of the poet to allegorize the truth. It does not seem possible to determine here whether Bernardo's judgment on the affected form is valid and whether style caused the exclusion of the letters from the *Epistolas Familiares*. It does seem

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unlike Petrarch, however, to write two stylistically inferior letters to the same person. Wilkins thinks that these two epistles, taken together, "constitute a thoroughly medieval piece of writing" and were too old-fashioned to be included in the collection of his letters. 40

Wilkins' reasoning may be closer to the truth than that of Aldo. Petrarch, who does not think as a speculative philosopher does, constantly tries to depict a man of renown who can make the message of a moralist as immediate and as humanly relevant as possible. This same characteristic is strong in More who chooses the figure of Richard III to reveal to man the deception and the violence that reign along with a tyrant. Anemolius, poet laureate of Utopia, records a pertinent comment on Nowhere: "what he [Plato] has delineated in words I alone have exhibited in men and resources and laws of surpassing excellence." 41

More and Petrarch in the works that are the fount of Christian humanism in England and in Italy put forward the figure of man acting virtuously. In the second book of De vita solitaria, Petrarch teaches the value of solitude through many brief biographies of outstanding men—Roman, Hebrew, and Christian. Rerum memorandarum libri offers over two hundred miniatures from Roman, non-Roman, and modern times. In regard to this point, comment is unnecessary on the personalities that fill De viris illustribus, Secretum, and Africa. Throughout De remedii and the letters, Petrarch refers again and again to the heroes of pagan and Christian antiquity in order

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40 Wilkins, Life of Petrarch, p. 150.

41 Utopia, p. 21.
to make the glories of the virtuous life as humanly significant as he possibly can. This historical and humanist orientation appears uninterrupted and consistent in Petrarch. Therefore, this study suggests that Petrarch failed to publish the two letters under examination, not because he prefers pagan thought, but rather because they do not teach with a sharp enough focus on man. Petrarch, who shows the greatest respect for the Apostles, Fathers, and Doctors of the Church, seldom puts forth medieval saints or philosophers as guides to conduct. One reason for this apparent omission may be that, like Erasmus and More, he feels that the Christian can perfect himself without recourse to medieval hagiology. The fantastic element in many of these lives accounts for the truism that many saints are to be admired but not imitated. One must remember that Petrarch does not propose a monastic ideal of virtue. There is a pertinent affirmation on the nature of man in the Secretum which elucidates this point:

My principle is that, as concerning the glory which we may hope for here below, it is right for us to seek while we are here below. One may expect to enjoy that other more radiant glory in heaven, when we shall have there arrived, and when one will have no more care or wish for the glory of earth. Therefore, as I think, it is in the true order that mortal men should first care for mortal things; and that to things transitory things eternal should succeed; because to pass from those to these is to go forward in most certain accordance with what is ordained for us, although no way is open for us to pass back again from eternity to time.42

42 Secret, p. 176; Secretum, p. 198: "Est autem aliqua propositi mei ratio. Eam enim, quam hic sperare licet, gloriam hic quoque manenti querendam esse persuadeo ipse michi; illa maiore in celo fruendum erit, quo qui pervenerit, hanc terrenam ne cogitare quidem velit. Itaque istum esse ordinem, ut mortalium rerum inter mortales prima sit cura; transitoriis eterna succedant, quod ex his ad illa sit ordinatissimus progressus. Inde autem regressus ad ista non pateat."
When the dialogue in the Secretum concludes, Petrarch has the last word. He does not accept the ideal, contemptus mundi, of Augustine. He refuses to break off his attachment to the values in the classics. 43

The answer to the question whether Petrarch offers man natural virtue may now be approached. Petrarch depends heavily upon illustrious pagans in order to demonstrate high standards of conduct. He presents these exemplars along with many Christian heroes not because he offers natural virtue but rather because he thinks as a humanist and an historian. He seeks a most viable way to lead men to virtue—the biography of an illustrious figure.

In now remains to answer the question: would Petrarch think that he was teaching a natural as opposed to a Christian concept of virtue? It appears that Petrarch taught the traditional Christian notion that grace builds upon nature. Petrarch's bias for classical exemplars and Stoic thought reveals a dilemma faced by humanists. Mommsen's article helps define one aspect of the difficulty. Although Augustine and Christian theology teach that the great heroes of the Church are illustrious because of God's influence, Petrarch never shows, according to Mommsen, that He is the source of virtus in De viris illustribus. 44 Mommsen claims that Petrarch did not see the hero as Dante did. Dante saw him as a tool of Providence. In Petrarch, he is a man in the fullest sense of the term, vir—one who shapes his own destiny and the history of the race. Mommsen

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43See Secret, p. 192; Secretum, p. 214.
thinks that Petrarch's concept is secular and does not conform to the medieval view which sees God ruling all human affairs. 45

Since Mommsen's study fails to do justice to Petrarch's Christian humanism, it is necessary to comment on his findings. Petrarch may look upon the pagan hero as the instrument of Divine Providence. Recent commentators (1930-1957) have shown that the Africa is a sacred and Christian poem. 46 It has already been noted that Petrarch gave the same characterization to Scipio in the Africa and in De viris illustribus. In these works, Scipio stands for Rome enlightened by the cardinal virtues and prepared to receive the light of the theological virtues. Petrarch and Dante both share this view of Scipio which reflects Augustine's notion of history. 47 God controlled the course of pagan culture and molded the destiny of Rome so that the Church of Christ would rest on the foundations of the Roman Empire. As a historian, Petrarch believed that the glories of pagan Rome were to fuse with the truths of Christianity and were to evolve into a superior civilization under the direction of God's will. Thus, Scipio serves the ends of Christian Providence. 48 It is consistent with Christian humanism to extol pagan examplars as the precursors to more perfect ideals of manhood.

In regard to this important point, Mommsen fails to practice a lesson that Petrarch teaches scholars. Mommsen passes a judgment on

48 Ibid., p. 206.
Petrarch which appears to be based on the works which belong to the second period of Petrarch's intellectual development. The Secretum (1343), which marks the transition into this phase, reflects Petrarch's struggle to reconcile pagan and Christian ideals. The conflict between Augustine, the medieval Christian, and Petrarch, the Renaissance humanist, illustrates the spirit of Petrarch's thought at this time. The appeal of the New Learning that Augustine urges Petrarch to forsake prevails in Africa (1343) and in De viris illustribus (1346). De otio religioso (1347) and Psalmi poenitentiales (1347) belong to the tradition, contemptus mundi, that Augustine defends in the Secretum. De vita solitaria (1346) and Rerum memorandarum libri (1343-1345) reflect the amalgamation of classical and Christian thought which was to become more harmoniously blended in the major works of the last period, De remediis (1366) and De ignorantia (1370). In this last text, Petrarch provides guidance to his own thought when he says: "Philosophers must not be judged from isolated words but from their uninterrupted coherence and consistency. . . . He who wants to be safe in praising the entire man must see, examine, and estimate the entire man."49 In light of this sound advice from Petrarch, the scholar can discover Petrarch's mature thought on the pagan exemplar. Petrarch's earlier thinking appears to lead to a comment on heroes that he makes while speaking of Cicero in De ignorantia:

49 "On His Own Ignorance," in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, p. 87; De ignorantia, pp. 52-53: "Nam philosophos non ex singulis uocibus spectandos, sed ex perpetuitate atque constantia . . . Qui totum tuto uult laudare, totum oportet ut uideat, totum examinet, totum libret."
And all this he does merely to lead us to this conclusion: whatever we behold with our eyes or perceive with our intellect is made by God for the well-being of man and governed by divine providence and counsel. And even when he descends to individuals, when he mentions, if I am right, fourteen outstanding Roman leaders, Cicero adds: "We must believe that without the aid of God none of them was the man he was," and soon afterward: "Without divine inspiration no one was ever a great man." And by inspiration a pious man can doubtless understand nothing but the Holy Ghost.50

Cicero and the pagan Utopians, along with Petrarch, attribute to God "the beginnings, the growth, the increase, the changes, and the ends of all things as they have perceived them."51 More would agree with Petrarch and would recognize that the divine inspiration which motivated great men is the activity of the Holy Spirit. In conclusion, it appears that Petrarch teaches a Christian and not a secular concept of virtue. It is of the nature of Christianity and of humanism to employ Stoic thought and to recognize Divine Providence in the lives of illustrious men.

By offering pagan exemplars to Christians, Petrarch broadens the horizons of later humanists like Erasmus and More. Petrarch's Latin prose increases the respect for classical notions which provide a valid basis for Christian manhood. It will be shown that More and Erasmus acknowledge

50 "On His Own Ignorance," in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, pp. 86-87; De ignorantia, p. 52: "Semper una sit conclusio: omnia quaecumque cernimus oculis uel percipimus intellectu, pro salute hominum et divinitus facta esse et divina prudentia ac consilio gubernari. Imo etiam ad individua condescendens, cum quattuordecim, nisi fallor, insignes Romanos duces nominasset, addidit: 'Quorum neminem, nisi adiuuante Deo, talemuisse credendum est.' Et post paucu: 'Nemo, inquit, uir magnus sine aliquo afflatu divino unquam fuit; quem afflatum quid aliud quam Spiritum sanctum homo pius intelligat?"

51 Utopia, p. 217.
the soundness of Petrarch's humanism in this regard and see that Christian values supplement the contributions of antiquity.

The appreciation of classical thought was so strong in Erasmus that Renaudet, somewhat unjustly, felt that Erasmus was first a humanist and then a Christian—a criticism which could as well be directed against Petrarch: "De même que son spiritualisme, au fond, procède de Cicéron plus que de Saint Paul, son éthique procède de l'antiquité plus que de l'Evangile." Chambers makes a similar statement about More:

There is so much of Plato in Christian teaching that it is often difficult to say whether certain ideas have reached More from his Greek reading or his orthodox Catholic training. But here they are in combination.

Since Petrarch was a "standard author" when More attended Oxford, More could cite him as an authority who attests to the values in classical thought.

The attitude of More and Erasmus toward classical standards of conduct finds clear expression in the *Enchiridion*. This work, published eight times between 1514 and 1518, was completed a short while before Erasmus' stay in More's home in 1505. Speaking of the weapons that are effective in the struggle against vice, Erasmus says:


That we should always be armed with prayer and with knowledge is the wish of Paul, who commands us to pray without ceasing. Undefiled prayer lifts our spirits heavenward, a citadel manifestly inaccessible to the enemy. Knowledge puts the intellect in touch with salutary ideas. . . . I should prefer, too, that you follow the Platonists among the philosophers, because in most of their ideas and in their very manner of speaking they come nearest to the beauty of the prophets and the gospels.\(^{55}\)

In More's environment, his letters, and especially his *Utopia*, Petrarch's concept of the interrelationship between pagan and Christian notions of virtue is evident. More, the Christian humanist, looks upon the values in the *classics* as "sacred"\(^{56}\) and valid foundations on which a Christian ideal of man can rest. In More's lifetime, the pageantry in honor of royalty often emphasized the idea that Petrarch describes in his allegory of the tree of virtue. In the second of six pageants celebrating the arrival of Catherine of Aragon in England (1501), Virtue—"Theoryk and Cardinal"—welcomes Catherine. This character, perhaps equivalent to Petrarch's idea of *virtus in genere*, represents the sum of all virtues and is the true guide to Honor.\(^{57}\) In the sixth tableau, four steps—the cardinal virtues—and three steps—faith, hope, and charity—lead to Honor.\(^{58}\) Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, and Justice figure prominently in the marriage celebration of Margaret of

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\(^{56}\) *Utopia*, p. 251.


\(^{58}\)Ibid., p. 82.
England and King James IV of Scotland (1503) and in the fête welcoming Louis XII's queen into Paris (1513). More, the orator at Charles V's arrival into England (1522), may have had a hand in the general preparation of the pageantry which was under the direction of his brother-in-law, John Rastell. On this occasion, Charles V saw the portrayal of the cardinal virtues as he passed the west gate of London.

In the educational program of Henry VIII's court, as well as in pageantry, classical values were respected:

Henry VIII's own son, Edward, underwent a particularly rigorous study of the De Officiis, especially the opening book with its analysis of the cardinal virtues, from which he was expected to extract sententiae for his moral edification. That Henry, too, had so labored over the work is strikingly evident from a perusal of his textbook copy of it, which survives today, complete with its interlinear glosses and marginal notes in two hands, one that of the royal student, the other alleged to be that of his tutor—John Skelton.

This view of virtue, evident in More's environment, figures in his correspondence.

In his letter to Oxford University, More explains the interrelationship between the classics and conduct. More's advice strongly reflects the thought of Petrarch

Now as to the question of humanistic education being secular. No one has ever claimed that a man needed Greek and Latin, or

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60 Ibid., pp. 174-178.

indeed any education in order to be saved. Still, this education which he calls secular does train the soul in virtue... Moreover, even if men come to Oxford to study theology, they do not start with that discipline. They must first study the laws of human nature and conduct, a thing not useless to theologians... Moreover, there are some who through knowledge of things natural (i.e. rational) construct a ladder by which to rise to the contemplation of things supernatural; they build a path to theology through philosophy and the liberal arts, which this man condemns as secular; they adorn the queen of heaven with the spoils of the Egyptians! 62

More, who thus embraces Petrarch's attitude toward the formative values in the philosophy of the ancients, has elsewhere expressed the function of the theological virtues. In his letter, "To a Monk," More shows how these virtues, gifts from God, are the result of the Holy Spirit's activities. There is no association with learning which is a prominent feature of his views on the cardinal virtues:

But truly Christian faith, through which the name of Jesus Christ is spoken truly in the spirit, truly Christian hope, which distrusts its own good works and places its trust only in God's loving kindness, and truly Christian love, which is not puffed up, is not angered, does not seek its own honor—all are absolutely unattainable except by the grace of God alone, which is the free gift of His good will. The more confidence you put in those universal virtues of Christianity, the less trust you will have in private observance, either those of your order, or of your own; and the less trust you place in those observances, the more beneficial they will be for you. 63

This idea is consistent with the concept of virtue developed in Petrarch's Latin prose. Thus, More's environment and his letters reveal the notion that the cardinal virtues, as in Petrarch's allegory, provide a suitable

63 Ibid., p. 141.
foundation on which the gifts of faith, hope and charity can rest.

In the Utopia, More employs his knowledge of pagan standards of behavior in the same way that Petrarch does. Scipio, triumphant at Zama, conquers for God a barbaric race that threatened to impose a civilization which would have been inimical to Europe's reception of Christianity. Scipio's victory preserves the structure of a society that will embrace Christianity. More's Utopia lays the foundation for a city that will become perfect when it utilizes Christian revelation. In his final comment which states that he admires much about Utopia although he does not agree with all that Hythloday says, 64 More implies that he envisions a more perfect way of life than that realized by the pagan Utopians.

There can be no doubt that in the Utopia More depends upon the works of the ancients as much as Petrarch does in his Latin prose. Modern scholars agree with Edward Surtz who in the Praise of Wisdom writes: "He 65 plans to have Utopian culture represent a state of civilization capable of being achieved solely by the aid of philosophy or reason." An examination of almost any page of Surtz's Commentary on the Utopia reveals More's indebtedness to the classics and his mastery of the thought of the ancients. 66 In his study, Donner asserts that "in Augustine's terminology we may say that in Utopia, More gives us such a

64 Utopia, pp. 245-247.
66 Utopia, pp. 257-585.
description of a *vita socialis*, based only on the four pagan virtues, as most forcibly remind us of our duty by means of an ardent exercise of the three Christian virtues to prepare for the *Civitas Dei*. Chambers acknowledges that *Utopia* is a heathen state whose religion is founded on philosophy and human reason. In conclusion, the affirmation of the values in antiquity and their importance for human development reveals that the concept of virtue in the Christian humanism of More and Petrarch depends heavily upon the standards of conduct in the classics.

The final area for consideration, Petrarch’s thought on virtue and fortune, is particularly important since it gave rise to the Renaissance ideal of man that is expressed in Pico’s *Oration on the Dignity of Man*. The next chapter will try to examine the treatment of this notion in Book II of *Utopia*. This view develops in the Renaissance because Petrarch tells man that he can free himself from the bondage of fortune’s assaults by the practice of virtue. Although Petrarch stresses that virtue conquers chance in many of his works, it is in *De remediis*, a work printed often in the Renaissance, that he makes one of the most comprehensive treatments of the subject in the history of literature. *De remediis* consists of 254 dialogues instructing man how to react to the visitations of prosperous and adverse fortune. It is difficult to imagine any facet of experience which Petrarch has not touched upon in order to show man how he can be

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independent of fortune. From many possible illustrations, the following selections are chosen because they reflect the spirit of the work and state explicitly the relationship between virtue and fortune. In opposition to Aristotle and Seneca, Petrarch fears good more than evil fortune:

Flatteryng fortune is more to be feared, and farre more perilous, than threatenyng fortune. . . . many have indifferently susteyned losses, poverty, exile, imprisonment, punishement, death, and great sicknesses that are more greevous than death: but that would wel beare ryches, honours, and power, I never yet sawe any. 69

By making virtue his sole defense against fate, man will be free:

When other things stand at the courtesie of Fortune, and without her cannot bee purchased, nor preserved: vertue onlie is free from her lawes, and the more shee striveth, the more brightlie shee shineth.70

Petrarch expresses a similar idea aphoristically: "Many tymes whom fortune hath made bonde, vertue hath made free."71

In his defense against fortune, Petrarch relies more strongly on man's innate strength than do medieval thinkers who depend upon a transcendental system of value. Petrarch's remedy against fate is basically Stoical. Man negates the effects of good fortune by moderation,

69Physicke against Fortune, p. v; De remediais, p. 3: "Fateor apud me formidolosior, et quod constat insidiosior est fortuna blanda, quam minax. . . . Nam qui damna, qui pauperiem, qui exilium, qui carcerem, qui supplicium, qui mortem et peiores morte graues morbos, aequo animo tulerint, multos uidi: qui diuitias, qui honores, qui potentiam nullum."

70Physicke against Fortune, p. 164; De remediais, p. 126: "Cum reliqua in arbitrio sint fortuane, nec obstante illa quaeri ualeant, nec servuari. Sola uirtus fortuane legibus libera est atque illa obluctante clarius nitet."

71Physicke against Fortune, p. 171; De remediais, p. 132: "Saepe quem fortuna seruum, liberum uirtus fecit."
of evil by patience. Cassirer comments that this concept of a free man who controls his own destiny is central to the thought of the Renaissance. Furthermore, he acknowledges that Petrarch originates this idea which was developed by later thinkers: "From Petrarch's De remediis utriusque fortuna the path leads past Salutati to Poggio and further to Fontano . . . . Thus, it is virtus and studium that finally defeat all the inimical forces of the heavens."\(^\text{72}\) Cassirer finds that through this concept man does not seek his comfort in the medieval belief in Providence. He concludes his consideration of this aspect of Renaissance thought with a comment that is of special interest:

In the medieval doctrine of two worlds and in all the dualisms derived from it, man simply stands apart from the forces that are fighting over him; he is, in a sense, at their mercy. Though he experiences the conflict of these forces, he takes no active part in it. He is in the stage of this great drama of the world, but he has not yet become a truly independent antagonist. In the Renaissance a different image emerges ever more clearly. The old image of Fortune with a wheel, seizing men and dragging them along, sometimes raising them, sometimes throwing them down into the abyss, now gives way to the depiction of Fortune with a sailboat. And this bark is not controlled by Fortune alone—man himself is steering it.\(^\text{73}\)

More uses the stage and the ship as images in the Utopia in a way that reflects Petrarch's belief that man can check fortune by personal initiative. By criticizing Mythldoy for not being aware of the nature of the play which is on stage, persona—More affirms the idea that man can control the action in the drama so that life does not become a "hodgepodge


\(^{73}\)Ibid., pp. 76-77.
of comedy and tragedy." 74 He restates this notion by telling Hythloday: "You must not abandon the ship in a storm because you cannot control the winds." 75 Petrarch's uses this metaphor in one of his letters. Petrarch places human reason at the helm of a vessel which voyages through the storms and darkness of life. 76 It is interesting that in major works of the founders of Renaissance humanism in Italy and in England—the De remediis and the Utopia—there is the belief that man guides his own way through life.

This denial of fortune's power, a major theme elsewhere in Petrarch, is the link connecting Pico della Mirandola with Petrarch's humanism. 77 Pico's thesis that man is free to determine his own position extends the influence of De remediis—the most popular work of Petrarch for the century following his death 78—to More's own lifetime. In Chapter I More's early poetry on fortune was studied in light of the De remediis. When More was about twenty-five years old, he expressed a sentiment that is identical with Petrarch's concept of the relationship between virtue and fate:

Love maner and vertue: they be onely tho.
Whiche double fortune may not take the iro.

74 Utopia, p. 99.

75 Ibid.


78 Bishop, Petrarch and His World, p. 330.
Then mayst thou boldly defye her turnyng chaunce:  
She can the neyther hynder nor avaunce.79

The entire poem is a miniature for Petrarch's De remedìis. Both works have the same attitude toward the two fold nature of fortune and allude to the myths, heroes, and philosophers of the pagan world. Each work states a preference for adverse rather than for prosperous fortune.

In retrospect, this chapter may be viewed as an attempt to define Petrarch's concept of virtue and to understand some of its outgrowths. Although he refers to both the medieval and classical notions on conduct, Petrarch consistently returns to Stoical views and prefers to think of \textit{virtus in genere} rather than \textit{in specie}. In addition, he reveals a profound debt to the writers of antiquity whose thinking on human behavior makes an admirable preparation for the practice of the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Finally, his attitude toward fortune shows Renaissance man how to realize his dignity as a free agent and how, by the practice of virtue, to create his own destiny. Throughout this chapter More's thought on each of these points has been noted. And, as a result, it can be said that at the fount of Christian humanism in Italy and in England the Italian Petrarch and the English More share similar opinions on the vital issue of virtue and its ramifications.

79\textit{English Works}, I, 343.
CHAPTER VII

VIRTUE IN UTOPIA

In Book II of *Utopia*, More reveals Hythloday's program for the total reformation of Europe. In his discourse on Utopia, Hythloday affirms Petrarch's belief that virtue is the most dynamic force in history and shows how its power has fashioned the best state of a commonwealth in Utopia. In many parts of the description of Utopia, he presents some facet of Utopian life that reflects the concept of virtue that Petrarch proposes in his Latin prose. Petrarch's thought on the role of reason in the practice of virtue, his Stoic moderation and patience in respect to prosperity and adversity, his teaching on the need for learning as a guide to conduct, and his dependence upon truths from religion as motives for righteousness figure prominently in Book II.

In order to examine the concept of virtue in the *Utopia* as coherently as possible this chapter will employ a plan similar to the one used through Chapters II, III, and IV. More's own organizational principle will guide the study of virtue just as the sequence of events in Book I directed our analysis of Hythloday's character. Thus, Hythloday's order of narration in the discourse on Utopia will provide the framework for the investigation of the theme of virtue in *Utopia* which can be related to Petrarch's humanism.

This approach offers advantages, for the text is not fragmented thereby nor are its parts considered in isolation.

Although Hythloday's discourse on Utopia lacks the ingenious design
of the debate on councilship, the reader can see that Hythloday does not haphazardly describe Utopian institutions. Hythloday's plan of narration not only helps one to understand More's concept of virtue in Book II, but it also enables the student to weigh the relative importance of certain issues which are part of the program of reform in the More circle. In the Introduction to Utopia, Volume IV of The Yale Edition of the Complete Works of St. Thomas More, Edward Surtz and J. H. Hexter express different opinions on the significance of sections of Hythloday's discourse. It is possible that their disagreement, which will be commented upon later, illustrates problems in interpretation that can arise when More's structural principle for the second book of Utopia is not realized.

To lay bare the framework of the discourse as accurately as that of the debate on councilship is not possible. The present attempt tries only to reveal an arrangement of items that is consistent with the text and that reflects the thesis of Petrarch: by the use of reason and by the practice of virtue man frees himself from fortune and creates a noble way of life. Throughout the discourse there are two parts, namely, "Virtue and Freedom in Utopia" and "Virtue and the Problem of Evil in Utopia." Each of these parts has three fairly equal sections. The following diagram provides the synoptic view that constitutes the guidelines for this study.

The Theme of Virtue in the Discourse on Utopia (pp. 111-237)

Part I: Virtue and Freedom in Utopia (pp. 111-185)

Section A. . . . Prudence and Freedom from Care (pp. 111-135)

Section B. . . . Justice and Freedom from Folly (pp. 135-159)
Section C ••••• Learning, Virtue, and the Origins of Freedom (pp. 159-185)

Part II: Virtue and the Problem of Evil in Utopia (pp. 185-237)

Section D ••••• Virtue and Freedom from Physical and Moral Evil (pp. 185-197)

Section E ••••• Virtue and Freedom from War (pp. 197-217)

Section F ••••• Religion and the Motives for Virtue (pp. 217-237)

In the first section the emphasis is upon the topography, the government, and the occupations of the commonwealth. Although Hythloday first describes the external and easily recognizable characteristics of a state, he keeps before the reader the prudence of the Utopians which Cicero would define as "the full perception and intelligent development of the true." As would be expected, Hythloday, the humanist, recalls how the Utopians enjoy a peaceful isolation because they skillfully have improved a land already adequate by nature. The existence of Utopia as an island, the protection afforded by moveable landmarks, and the fortification at the mouth of the bay attest to the wisdom of the Utopians. A similar cunning use of nature defends their cities. For example, the Utopians built Amaurotum on a hill, protected its water supply against any enemy attack, and surrounded the city with a high and broad wall. In addition, on three sides they placed a moat "made

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impassable by thorn hedges," and on the fourth side they used the river Anydrus for protection instead of the moat. Hythloday notes how the Utopians have harmoniously situated their urban and rural settlements so that even an entity as indifferent as terrain takes on human significance. These examples of the proper use of reason demonstrate the intelligence of Utopia's founder, King Utopus.

Those rulers who succeeded Utopus and the administrators who governed Utopia during Hythloday's stay there are equally wise. The Utopian commonwealth rests on secure foundations because the leaders, like Plato's guardians, are distinguished by their prudence. The ambassadors, priests, tranibors, and governors are all chosen from the group of men who have studied thoroughly the various branches of knowledge. By adding the sagacity of age to the advantages of learning, the Utopians assure themselves of wise government. The men who meet in the senate at Amaurotum, like the rulers of the rural and urban households, are old and experienced citizens. In order to assure that the deliberations in the senate are judicious, it has been decreed that "nothing concerning the commonwealth be ratified if it has not been discussed in the senate three days before the passing of the decree." Furthermore, in Utopia, "the senate has the custom of debating nothing on the same day on which it is first proposed but of putting it off till the next meeting." Thus, Utopian legislators will speak with prudence

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3 Ibid., p. 119. 4 Ibid., pp. 131-133. 5 Ibid., pp. 115, 135. 6 Ibid., pp. 123-125. 7 Ibid., p. 125.
rather than in haste. By these preliminary observations on the Utopian commonwealth, Hythloday wants to make the learned men in the garden realize that the Utopians trust human reason—a significant constituent in the humanism of Petrarch and his followers.

The Utopian ability to deal with things here and now is similar to Petrarch's concept of prudence. For Petrarch, this virtue is fundamental. Without it, no other virtue can either exist or be understood. In Book III of *Rerum memorandarum libri*, he has gathered exemplars who have shown its three qualities—ingenuity (*solertia*), skill (*calliditas*), and wisdom (*sapientia*). These characteristics are evident in the original Utopian leader and in his successors who have provided the security necessary for a prosperous commonwealth. In addition, it is significant that More emphasizes this virtue at the beginning of Hythloday's discourse. More, who probably read Grocyn's copy of *Rerum memorandarum libri*, would know that Petrarch considers prudence as the gateway to the temple of virtue. One would expect a Renaissance Christian humanist who envisions a state based on virtue to be aware of Petrarch's words:

Ingredienti michi quidem reverenter velut religiosissimi cuiusplam templi fores primogenita sororum occurrit in limine. Ea est prudentia. Que nichil est aliud, ut a Marco Julio diffinitur, nisi 'rerum bonarum et malarum scientia'; sine qua, ut philosophis placet, ne dicam...

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8. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 124.
subsistere, sed ne intelligi penitusulla virtus potest. 11

In Petrarch and in More, the proper use of reason creates an atmosphere in which virtue can flourish.

In addition to prudence, temperance and justice are briefly referred to in this section. Utopian restraint in regard to clothing 12 and drink 13 conforms to Cicero's definition of temperance, namely, "the orderliness and moderation of everything that is said and done." 14 Like most moral philosophers, Petrarch condemns sumptuousness of any sort. Admiring the Emperor Augustus who had his clothes made by his family, Petrarch calls fashionable dress the banner of pride. 15 In respect to food and drink Petrarch recommends restraint and sobriety. 16

The few references to justice in the first section anticipate the strong emphasis upon communism in the following section of the discourse. The diffusive quality of this virtue is evident in Cicero's definition: "Justice is concerned with the conservation of organized society, with rendering to every man his due, and with the faithful discharge of obligations assumed." 17 By levelling distinctions as much as they

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11 Ibid., p. 43.
12 Utopia, p. 127.
13 Ibid., p. 117.
14 Cicero, De officiis, p. 17.
16 Physicke against Fortune, p. 21; De remediis, p. 23.
17 Cicero, De Officiis, p. 17.
possibly can, the Utopians practice justice and preserve their commonwealth. Utopian cities do not differ from one another.\textsuperscript{18} Trained in agriculture, every Utopian helps to bring in the harvest.\textsuperscript{19} Each family is assigned by lot to a new dwelling every ten years.\textsuperscript{20}

If this virtue is to be as pervasive as the ideal of justice demands, there must be some reciprocal action whereby the state will benefit the individual. In Utopia the citizen has more free time for himself than he could expect to receive in a less perfect state. By making each person spend only two years at a time in farm work, the Utopian does not spend prolonged periods in difficult labor.\textsuperscript{21} Each citizen must work so that all have leisure.\textsuperscript{22} "The chief and almost the only function of the syphograts" is to see that no one is idle.\textsuperscript{23} Tranibors settle judicial cases with dispatch.\textsuperscript{24} The prompt repair and care given to homes as well as the simple style and substantial materials used in clothing save the Utopians many hours.\textsuperscript{25} In this section of the \textit{Utopia}, prudence, temperance, and justice protect and liberate the Utopian so that he can devote time to the freedom and culture of the mind.\textsuperscript{26} Most of the Utopians are dedicated to intellectual pursuits and attend the public lectures that are held daily before daybreak.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{18}\textit{Utopia}, p. 113. \textsuperscript{19}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 117, 125. \textsuperscript{20}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 121.


\textsuperscript{27}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 129.
This use of leisure by the Utopians reflects one of Petrarch's many contributions to Renaissance thought. In the preceding chapter, the Utopians were likened to plebian Scipios because of their attachment to virtue. In regard to their devotion to learning, one sees that the otium literatum which Petrarch had revived from the ancients has been presented to the average citizen of Utopia by the democratic More. The Utopians who think that the happiness of life consists in the adornment of the mind are in substantial agreement with Petrarch who finds that life's noblest pleasures lie in the pursuit of knowledge.

The second section begins with a transitional sentence: "But now, it seems, I must explain the behavior of the citizens toward one another, the nature of their social relations, and the method of distribution of goods." This section still deals with the relationship between virtue and the good life. But Hythloday shows less concern with the external characteristics of a state and focuses upon Utopian institutions that have a great moral significance for the individual and that order the inner life of the Utopian. In the first section he shows how the Utopians are free from cares. In this section he reveals how they have been

28 Ibid., p. 135.

29 Ep. Sen., XVI, 2, in Opera, p. 1070: "Verissime mihi videor dicturus, omnium terrestrium delectationum, ut nulla literis honestior, sic nulla diuturnior, nulla suauior, nulla fidelior, nulla quae per omnes casus possessorem suum tam facili apparatu, tam nulla fastidio comitetur."

30 Utopia, p. 135.
liberated from follies which have a harmful effect upon their cultus and humanitas. Throughout this section there appear to be two notions that Petrarch stresses in his Latin prose. Man rises above his sub-human tendencies by freeing himself from the effects of avarice and pride. Man practices temperance in order to check the harmful results of prosperous fortune.

Throughout this section Hythloday reveals how justice purges the Utopians of the follies that stem from man's homage to gold, a material that is "by nature useless." Gold is the operative term that Hythloday employs in showing how the Utopians successfully moderate the prosperity which their industry has merited. The entertaining description of the Anemolian ambassadors, "arrayed in cloth of gold, with heavy gold necklaces and earrings, with gold rings on their fingers," provides an obvious similarity to criminals in Utopia who have "gold ornaments hanging from their ears, gold rings encircling their fingers, gold chains thrown around their necks, and, as a last touch, a gold crown binding their temples." One of the most important statements in this section identifies this display with pride:

No doubt about it, avarice and greed are aroused in every kind of living creature by the fear of want, but only in man are they motivated by pride alone—pride which counts it a personal glory to excel others by superfluous display of possessions. The latter vice can have no place at all in the Utopian scheme of things.  

31 Ibid., p. 157. 32 Ibid., p. 155. 33 Ibid., p. 153. 34 Ibid., p. 139.
This idea is consistent with the recently cited notion of Petrarch which identifies sumptuousness of dress with the banner of pride. The Utopians are free from this vice and its numerous follies because of their communism, which is the political manifestation of an absolute justice throughout the state. It is in this section that Utopian communism, the drastic remedy that Hythloday offers for Europe's ills, is most thoroughly treated.

As odd as it may seem, Hythloday, a lover of peace, first shows justice in this section as a cause for war. The Utopians, who look upon virtue as an act in accordance with nature, "consider it a most just cause for war when a people which does not use its soil but keeps it idle and waste nevertheless forbids the use and possession of it to others who by the rule of nature ought to be maintained by it." Justice is evident in the common markets for distribution of food and in the common banquet halls of the Utopians. The first task at the annual meeting of the senate is to insure that all cities have a just share of the commodities of the island. The administration is so fair that harmony pervades all Utopia and the "whole island is like a single family." The concept of justice so determines Utopian life that even the traveller must fulfill his communal obligations. He is obliged to work so that he will be as useful to the city he visits as if he were a citizen in it. Unlike Europe, there can be no vagrants in Utopia.

Hythloday concludes the section by observing that the Utopians

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35 Ibid., p. 137. 36 Ibid., pp. 147-149. 37 Ibid., p. 147.
cannot understand the foolish practices of other peoples whose institutions are not based on absolute justice. In the unjust state, where the rich receive almost divine honors, the quality of a man is too often dependent upon the texture of the wool he wears; and a man who trusts in money frequently becomes "a mere appendage" to gold coins. In the first section, the prudence of Utopian institutions releases the citizen from time-consuming labors. In the second section, justice emancipates him from the follies born of pride. These freedoms provide the Utopian with the necessary foundations on which to develop his cultus and humanitas. The liberation that the Utopians experience and their ability to rise to a more perfect state of manhood than less virtuous peoples reflect the idealism in Pico's Oration on the Lignity of Man. The Renaissance tradition which teaches that man has the power to overcome fortune and to create a noble destiny for himself was born in the concept of virtue in Petrarch's Latin prose.

More concludes this section with a sentence which summarizes what has just been said and which introduces what will be considered: "These and similar opinions they have conceived partly from their upbringing, being reared in a commonwealth whose institutions are far removed from follies of the kind mentioned, and partly from instruction and reading good books."  

The final section brings the first part, "Virtue and the Good Life in Utopia," to a climax. Hythloday, having sketched the wholesome

38 Ibid., p. 157.  
39 Ibid., p. 159.
existence of the Utopians, turns his attention to the philosophical bases for Utopian institutions. In Utopia virtue is not independent of learning and pleasure. The Utopians, who have a humanist's respect for the accomplishments of the past, avoid vain philosophical quibbling and try to make their knowledge of nature beneficial to man. They acknowledge the limits of reason and depend upon basic religious principles to aid them in their search for truth. As a result of their investigations they have amassed a body of knowledge that measures up to the discoveries of the ancients. The failure of the Utopians to equal the inventions of the modern logicians emphasizes the relationship between learning and morality.

As has already been noted, More and Erasmus look upon the study of the classics as a valuable stimulus to virtue. The moral focus in the reading habits of the Utopians can be seen in the preeminence Hythloday gives to Plato's works. Hythloday brought most of Plato's writings to Utopia because Plato would appeal to the Utopians for the same reason that he was admired by Petrarch and the More circle. Plato's teachings came closer to the high moral standards of the Gospel than did the doctrines of any other pagan philosopher. Since instruction in Utopia is in the hands of priests who emphasize righteous behavior as much as they encourage advancement in learning, it is obvious that Utopian education prepares the citizen to live virtuously.

40 Ibid., p. 109. 41 Ibid., pp. 159-161. 42 Ibid., pp. 161-163. 43 Ibid., p. 159. 44 Ibid., p. 181.
In De remediis Petrarch encourages the reading of good authors whose wholesome instructions lead to higher standards of conduct. He recommends a work like Cicero's Tusculan Disputations which fosters patience and courage. The study of sound authors whose books stimulate the reader to practice virtue appears to be a major educational tenet of Christian humanism.

Another and more important motive for the practice of virtue comes from certain principles of the Utopian religion which have been deduced by human reason: "The soul is immortal and by the goodness of God born for happiness. After this life rewards are appointed for our virtues and good deeds, punishment for our crimes." In a similar way Petrarch sees that reason and faith should be allies in all serious debates. Speaking of those who put faith aside in arguments, he says:

With a temerity that equals their impiety, they scorn all that tends to piety, without regard to who may have said it. Wishing to keep up the appearance of scholars, they are mad enough to assume that what is denied to the humble handmaid is forbidden to the omnipotent master too. You could, furthermore, observe in their tumultuous gatherings that, as soon as a public disputation is started, they are in the habit of declaring emphatically that during the debate they intend to lay aside faith and store it away for the moment. . . . However, I beseech you, in this anything else than seeking the truth

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45Physicke against Fortune, p. iii; De remediis, p. 2.
46Physicke against Fortune, p. 306; De remediis, pp. 228-229.
47Utopia, pp. 161-163.
after having rejected the truth? 48

In addition to stressing the alliance between faith and reason, Petrarch, like the Utopians, acknowledges that it is foolhardy to expect a man to be virtuous if he does not believe in the immortality of the soul:

Unquestionably, even if the soul were mortal, it would be better to think it immortal. For error though it were, yet would it inspire the love of virtue, and that is a thing to be desired for its own sake alone, even if all hope of future reward were taken away from us; and as to which the desire for it will certainly become weaker, as men come to think the soul a mortal thing; and, on the other hand, the promise of a life to come, even if it were to turn out a delusion, is none the less a powerful incentive to the soul, human nature being what it is. 49

This dependence upon a reward in the afterlife marks a distinction between virtue in the Republic and in Utopia. Virtue is not its own reward for the Utopians. The intention of the Republic is to show how justice is profitable in this life. The Utopians agree with Petrarch and

48"On His Own Ignorance," in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, pp. 94-95; De remediis, p. 59: "Omne quod ad pietatem tendit, a quocumque dictum, pari temeritate atque impietate despiciant, et ut docti videantur, insaniunt, quod ancille humili negatum sit omnipotenti quoque domino uetitum opinantes. Quin etiam quod in horum tumultibus aduertere potuisti, ubi ad disputationem publicam uentum est... protestari solent se in presens sequestrata ac seposita fide disserere; quod quia oro est aliud, quam reiecta ueritate uerum querere."

49Secret, p. 112; Secretum, p. 134: "Profecto enim etsi mortalis esset anima, immortalem tamen estimare melius foret, errorque ille salutaris videri posset virtutis incutiens amorem; que, quamvis etiam spe premii sublatâ per se ipsum expetenda sit, disiderium tamen eius procul dubio, propotita anime mortalitate, lentesceret; contraque licet mendax venture vite promissio ad excitandum animos mortalium non inefficax videretur."
believe virtue ought to be desired for its own sake. But they need additionally the promise of recompense and the fear of punishment in a world beyond death as the major motive for the practice of virtue. The Utopians feel that the practice of hard and painful virtue would be extreme madness if there were not rewards in the afterlife. When Erasmus explicates his first rule in the Enchiridion, he makes it clear that even though the majority of mankind look upon belief in heaven and hell as an old wives' tale, the Christian ought not to be disturbed and should be aware of eternal punishment and reward.

The use of religious principles and the belief in an afterlife place the Utopians on the side of Petrarch, More, and Erasmus who do not accept the secularism of the pagan humanists. Since the Utopians apparently follow Epicurus, who does not believe in the immortality of the soul, this section of Utopia raises a question which confronts scholars today. In this section of Utopia a rhetorical display by More, or is it an important pronouncement on virtue?

In the recent edition of Utopia, Hexter feels that the sections on philosophy and religion are not significant. He argues that neither section is intense and that they received no comment in More's day. He holds that the crucial sections of Book II deal with economic and religious problems but that the philosophy section is a humanistic

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50More, Utopia, p. 163.

51Erasmus, The Enchiridion, pp. 85-86.
tour de force. 52 On the other hand, Surtz maintains that these sections of the text are important--particularly the section on religion which occupies one-sixth of Book II and which has the place of climax in Hythloday's narration. 53

There is little doubt that the digression on pleasure is an ingenious use of the declamation by More. He manipulates the term voluptas to mean iucunditas, delectatio, laetitia, suavitas, and commodum. Eventually it signifies "every movement and state of body or mind in which, under the guidance of nature, man delights to dwell." 54 These passages may be more than a clever exercise in the style of the Schoolmen. There may even be here an underlying irony. More uses the Scholastics' method to teach what they should, namely, the greatest pleasure is found in the love and veneration of the divine majesty. 55 This message was vital to the program of the More circle.

A second reason for considering this section important may lie in the philosophical mélange that More creates. For Aristotelians, the sumnum bonum amounts to the actualization of human potential. Man arrives at the highest state of development--the life of contemplation of truth--by the practice of the moral virtues which preserve him from the extremes of excess and defect and by the exercise of the intellectual virtues which illuminate the nature of the supreme good. For the Platonist, the sumnum bonum is assimilation to the divine nature. Zeno

52 Utopia, pp. cvi-cvii. 53 Ibid., p. cxxxii.
54 Ibid., p. 163. 55 Ibid., p. 163.
holds that virtue is the greatest good. For Epicurus, it is the pursuit of pleasure by one of sound body and tranquil soul. In regard to the *summum bonum*, Aristotle would accept Utopian philosophy, for communism protects against insufficiency. The Utopian economic system provides the goods necessary to pursue pleasure, which is defined as behavior according to nature. Nature, or reason, tells man to look on the "practice of virtues and the consciousness of a good life" as his foremost pleasure.\(^{56}\) Aristotelians would admire Utopian moderation which prevents excess.

Furthermore, the Utopians' emphasis upon mental pleasures and upon the contemplation of the truth are acceptable to Aristotelians. Since the Utopians seek the "immense and neverending gladness" of the beatific vision,\(^{57}\) Plato would endorse their thought. As far as the Stoics and Epicureans are concerned, the interrelationship between *voluptas, virtus,* and the *summum bonum* provides grounds for accepting Utopian philosophy. By making the pursuit of pleasure identical with virtue and by using sensual gratifications "only for the sake of health,"\(^{58}\) the Stoics and Epicureans, who apparently are irreconcilable, could live in harmony in Utopia. More's "praise of pleasure" extols virtue and amounts to a syncretism of the philosophical schools that was one of the aims of Pico della Mirandola. In addition, the total effect of this *tour de force* sanctions Petrarch's humanism. The belief that man is not man unless he

\(^{56}\text{Ibid., p. 175.}\)

\(^{57}\text{Ibid., p. 167.}\)

\(^{58}\text{Ibid., p. 177.}\)
is virtuous, the satire on the method of the Scholastics, the stand in the controversy between faith and reason, and the attempt to synthesize divergent philosophical views all involve areas of experience that were crucial to Christian humanism. The issue under consideration in the declamatio is significant not only to More but also to Petrarch. One would think that More's digression on pleasure is an amplification of a passage in which Petrarch, like the Utopians, accepts virtue as the sumnum bonum:

Quid in questione proposita sentiendum putes, ipse videris; nec etas, nec librorum lectio, nec rerum experientia defuerit; apud me quidem rerum non homestruum vel sola consultatio turpis est. Si sententiam extorques, absecta me non modo sumnum sed—quoniam et in hac opinione stoicus quam perypateticos et in omnibus stoicus multo quam epypureus esse malim—ne aliquod quidem bonum in divitiis aut in voluptate reponere. Commoda sunt hec et adminicula vite mortalis; itaque illud fortune, hoc corporis bonum vocant. Bonum vero quod querimus, in animo est, nec corpori serviens nec fortune; cetera vocari bona fateor, sed non esse contendo. Neve me forsan errore lapsum putes inadvertentur hoc dicere, non sum nescius quid de hac re Aristotiles, quid Epypureus sentiat, sed philosophantium autoritas non impedit iudicii libertatem. 59

At the origins of Christian humanism in Italy and in England, Petrarch and More treat the power of virtue as the greatest good for man.

Another factor attests to the importance of this section. In regard to Hexter's point on intensity, it must be remembered that the whole of Book II, except for the peroration which was composed later in London, 60 lacks the energy of Book I. The discourse on Utopia has a philosophical tone which befits the description of an ideal state. Yet

60 Utopia, p. xxii.
there is a slight change in the digression on pleasure which adds to the impressiveness of this part of Utopia. Throughout Hythloday's discourse on Utopia, there is not much awareness of More or Giles. Yet in this section of his monologue, Hythloday asks questions, exclaims on man's blindness in regard to jewelry, and condemns false pleasures with an intensity that is not noticeable anywhere else in the discourse.

In reference to his censure of evil delights, Hythloday actually leaves More and Giles in the garden and speaks directly to the European—"you joyfully exult in hidden treasure, you have shot them so often, you are attracted by the hope of slaughter." In light of the respect Christian humanism has for moral force, one would reasonably expect Hythloday to be more energetic at this point in Utopia. Thus, it appears that Hexter underestimates the importance of the digression on pleasure.

Between the two parts of the discourse, there is no distinct transitional device. Yet there is a change in the nature of the subject matter that Hythloday selects for narration. Thus far, he has described areas of experience where problems can be solved by intelligent legislation, by industrious labor, and by a just distribution of the "matter of pleasure." There are many aspects of life that are often inextricably involved in suffering because of either physical or moral evil. In the second part of the theme, "Virtue and the Problem of Evil

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61 Ibid., pp. 169-171
62 Ibid., p. 169.
63 Ibid., pp. 165-173.
64 Ibid., p. 169.
65 Ibid., p. 171.
66 Ibid.
in Utopia," Hythloday shows how the Utopian responds to bondage, crime, punishment, fornication, adultery, sickness, death, mental and physical deficiency and war. Although Hythloday's narration may appear haphazard at times, the humanist position toward virtue which Petrarch formulates in _De remediis_ provides a coherent principle which can be seen in the sections on slavery and war. Even though More's Utopians have been called dull, faceless, and regimented, they are far more free than are the citizens in the _Republic_, _The City of the Sun_, and _New Atlantis_.

Even before Hythloday begins the discourse, the reader can surmise that freedom will be a respected value in Utopia because Hythloday himself has an extraordinary admiration for this quality. The thesis of _De remediis_ is seen in these two sections of _Utopia_, for the Utopian remains free of evil fortune to the degree that he practices virtue.

The first section of the second part begins abruptly with the problem of slavery. There is no transition to this notion which is normally associated with the problem of evil and which reflects St. Augustine's notion of sin. The abrupt change can be explained by considering the entire discourse. Hythloday has finished his general outline of the Utopian way of life and now changes his focus. Although he has just mentioned that he does not take upon himself a defense of Utopian ways, he actually does offer an _apologia_ for them in the peroration by his appeal to the authority of Christ and by his own eloquence. In the sections on slavery and war he shields the Utopians

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67 _Utopia_, p. 179.
for he proves that their virtue brings freedom from the bondage of sin, sickness, death, and war—the evils that master and enslave the Christians of Europe.

In regard to the first half of this section of *Utopia*, Surtz notes that More loses control of his materials. Although this section does not tie together so well as other areas of the *Utopia*, Hythloday's diction provides a unity because his terms focus on the concept of bondage. Verbs predicating restriction are frequent—detain, clasp, marry, espouse, contract, entrap, cement, serve, bind. Many nouns have a similar connotation—prison, rack, drudge, torture, unick, chain. This type of diction is to be expected since Hythloday wishes to show how virtue negates bondage and offers freedom.

As an orthodox Christian, Hythloday views man as a creature who has been spoiled in some way by a primeval corruption. The various concepts of bondage that are described in this section are due to the effect of either original or actual sin. The first and most obvious condition which restricts freedom is slavery itself. The Utopian who is enslaved has committed some serious crime and has forsaken the ways of virtue in which he had been reared.

Sickness, which the Christian in More's day considered an effect of Adam's sin, is the next evil which Hythloday describes. When illness becomes incurable and agonizing, the prudent Utopians recommend suicide. Throughout the sections on slavery and war, More seems to have European

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68 Ibid., p. cxxxi.
abuses more vividly before his mind than in other parts of the
description of Utopia. The "pious and holy"69 practice of euthanasia
contrasts with Europe's careless treatment of the sick and with an
unchristian fear of death. It is virtuous for the Utopian to die.

More moves from euthanasia to matrimony without transition.
Marriage, a self-imposed restriction, already figured in the depiction
of the anxious persona-More. If the Utopian does not practice the virtues
which preserve his premarital integrity and if he does not respect
his conjugal vows, he can be punished by bondage. It is noteworthy that
the motivation for continence is completely natural. The preservation
of the family determines the Utopian sexual conduct. They do not practice
the continence of the Petrarchan solitary or of the Platonist who wishes
freedom from the flesh so that he may ascend to the truth. Even the
Utopians consider their own celibates less reasonable than their wedded
religious.70 The prudent Utopians will even allow a couple that "agree
insufficiently in their disposition" to divorce and to remarry.71

Another unexpected shift occurs when the fool is treated. More, who
enjoyed the antics of his own fool, Henry Patenson, depicts here that
especial quality which the Utopians have of finding the proper employment
for each manifestation of nature. Since they hold that the fool's only
faculty is to amuse, they enjoy him and see that he receives the proper
care. In regard to the person who has been physically marred by Fortune,
they take a different view. Since the victim must accept what he is

69 Ibid., p. 187. 70 Ibid., p. 227. 71 Ibid., p. 191.
"powerless to avoid," the Utopians consider it a great disgrace to ridicule the afflicted, for mocking is "base and disfiguring." A similar implication can be made in regard to those who use cosmetics. The Utopians believe that pleasure and freedom come from acting according to nature, i.e., virtuously. Therefore it would be servitude to use cosmetics, for they are unnatural. Even when Hythloday describes the Utopians concept of honor, he has behavior in mind. Those who serve Utopia conspicuously are honored by memorials which spur their descendants to virtue. Before he describes the honor paid the governor and the high priest, Hythloday mentions that a citizen who solicits office will never have any fame in Utopia. It can be presumed that the one who canvasses for office was enslaved by vainglory.

The remainder of the section deals with domestic and international law. Hythloday keeps the most important and artistic part of the section on slavery for a conclusion and for a natural transition to the next section. If Utopia had been governed by Christian principles in addition to the cardinal virtues, there would be no penal code in Utopia. In the Augustinian tradition, ordinances are associated with servitude and sin. Since Utopians are virtuous, there is little need for legislation. The Utopian who follows nature and the guidance of reason is inflamed with a love of the divine majesty. Were he a Christian, Augustine would suggest that he needs no laws and can do as he pleases.

The Utopians place their trust in the good will of their fellow

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72 Ibid., p. 193. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid., p. 192.
men and not in regulations. They banish lawyers from their country and accept the most obvious interpretation of a statute as the most fair one. The attitude toward experience and law throughout this section must reveal the prudence of the Utopians to their neighbors, for "these virtues have spurred their neighbors ... to obtain officials from them." 75

International agreements are next mentioned even though the Utopians refuse to make any treaties and accept no bond other than that which is prescribed by nature. 76 At this point More's artistry is evident in one of the few examples of direct irony in Utopia. The injustice of Christian rulers is severely criticized:

In Europe, however, and especially in those parts where the faith and religion of Christ prevails, the majesty of treaties is everywhere holy and inviolable, partly through the reverence and fear of the Sovereign Pontiffs. ... Popes are perfectly right, of course, in thinking it a most disgraceful thing that those who are specially called the faithful should not faithfully adhere to their commitments. 77

Unlike Machiavelli, More would not commend the diplomacy of Alexander VI. This lack of faith among nations is an obstacle to freedom. Justice is bound and chained, and the license of arbitrary judgments rules:

Men think either that all justice is only a plebeian and low virtue which is far below the majesty of kings or that there are at least two forms of it: the one which goes on foot and creeps on the ground, fit only for the common sort and bound by many chains so that it can never overstep its barriers; the other a virtue of kings, which, as it is more august than that of ordinary folk, is also far freer so that everything is permissible to it—except what it finds disagreeable. 78

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75 Ibid., p. 197.  76 Ibid.  77 Ibid.  78 Ibid., p. 199.
Throughout the section on slavery, particular items, as well as a general notion, reflect the thought in Petrarch's prose. As a result of his lifelong interest in the deeds of illustrious men, Petrarch strongly recommends the construction of memorials of wise, learned, and virtuous men so that these honors will spur on future generations to imitate noble conduct. He notes a relationship between sin and bondage which shows that he and the Utopians consider immorality in the same light. He claims that cupidity and passion are gold chains entrapping evil men. Furthermore, he teaches the Stoic doctrine acknowledged by Utopians. The virtuous man must patiently endure the servitude nature imposes when it is beyond his power to alter the course of events. Petrarch, of course, never tolerates suicide but often expresses the fundamental religious idea that grief and pain in this world give way to rest in an afterlife for the just man. The concept that underlies this entire section—the vicious man is a subhuman who deserves bondage—figures prominently throughout Petrarch. He stresses continually that there can never be slavery for the virtuous man.

Hythloday's comments on international treaties lead to the second section of Part II, the Utopian views on war. As in the foregoing section, Hythloday's narrative deals with aspects of the problem of evil which, in spite of intelligent legislation, cannot be remedied. Thus, the distinction made between the first and second parts of the theme is

79 Physicke against Fortune, p. 59; De remediis, p. 49.
80 Secret, p. 108; Secretum, p. 130.
still valid. In regard to war, the dominant qualities that Hythloday describes are fortitude, prudence, and justice. Among the foremost difficulties facing the student of Utopia is the task of understanding the relationship between war and justice. More, who ardently wished for peace, must have sorrowed often during his lifetime when he thought of the many wars in which Christians were slaying one another. His friends, Colet and Erasmus, were quite close to favoring total pacifism. To Erasmus, war is as incompatible with the doctrine of Christ as fire is with water. Hence, it is not easy to reconcile the aspirations of the More circle with those in the Utopia. In addition to wars of colonization, the Utopians will engage an enemy to defend their country, to protect friendly countries from invaders, to save a nation from a tyrant, and to exact vengeance for injuries done to themselves or their friends. Throughout the ages, men have fought just wars for these reasons. But Surtz observes that the implications of three passages (164/19-23, 200/7, 240/18-26) provide the Utopians "with a casus belli against any land they choose." He concludes that there is "some justification for those who see the Utopia as a very revolutionary document in political and diplomatic affairs—if not in esse, at least in posse."

Shortly before Hythloday arrived in Utopia, there was a war which reveals how puzzling this part of the text can be. More sends his

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81 Utopia, pp. 495-496.
83 Utopia, p. 137. 84 Ibid., p. 201. 85 Ibid., p. 499. 86 Ibid.
Utopians into battle on the side of the Nephelogetes to destroy the Alaopolitans. Before the Utopians will fight for allies, they must approve the cause of the war. In this case there was no absolute certainty of a just reason, for Mythloday mentions that the "Nephelogetic traders suffered a wrong, as they thought, under pretence of law." 87 This rather vague offense--"whether right or wrong"--was avenged by a fierce war. 88 The consequences of the conflict were to disturb the foundations of prosperous nations and to result in the enslavement of a superior people to a country "not in the least comparable to them." 89 This incident does not seem to be consistent with all the other actions of the rational and just Utopians who loathe war and regard it as "an activity fit only for beasts." 90

In regard to the conduct of war, More shows how natural wisdom functions successfully. He holds the mirror up to Europe when he praises Utopian cunning and ingenuity--the qualities of prudence noted in Rerum memorandarum libri. The Utopians practice European methods of deceit--bribery, assassination, ambushes, etc. The chivalric code of Europe hypocritically condemns these means as dishonorable and inglorious. But the Utopians celebrate a public triumph for a victory won by cleverness, calculation, and strength of intellect. 91

In battle, the Utopians possess the fortitude that Plato assigns to the warrior class in the Republic. The Utopian knows what to fear.

87 Ibid., p. 201.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid., p. 199.
91 Ibid., p. 201.
He avoids personal service as long as he can. When combat is inevitable, the Utopians are courageous. "Their spirit is so stubborn that they would rather be cut to pieces than give way." The Utopian warrior, who is brave because of his compulsory military training and because of the sound opinions he receives in childhood, can fight with a stubborn spirit for he is certain that if he is harmed his family will be cared for by his fellow Utopians.

Because More goes into considerable detail to describe Utopian methods of warfare, the focus on virtue is not so sharp here as elsewhere in the discourse. Yet parallels can be established between More and Petrarch which will show that the evils of international strife are relative to the theme of virtue. Petrarch, like the Utopians, condemns the use of animal-like mercenaries and associates war with the raging of beasts. The Utopians believe that the "only object in war is to secure that which, had it been obtained beforehand, would have prevented the declaration of war." Referring to a statement of Augustine which corresponds to this notion in the Utopia, Petrarch approves of the agreement of Augustine and Cicero: "In quo quidem Ciceroni consentit, ubi suscipienda bella ait 'ob eam causam ut sine iniuria in pace vivatur.'" In addition, Petrarch reflects the Utopians' contempt for

92 Ibid., p. 211.  
93 Ibid.  
94 Ibid., pp. 207-209.  
95 See Ep. Fam., XVIII, 16, in Opere, XII, pp. 304-305.  
97 Utopia, p. 203.  
98 Ep. Fam., XIX, 18, in Opere, XII, p. 350.
the glory sought in war. He prefers peace to victory. In his comments upon Livy's statement that Hannibal chooses a certain peace to an anticipated conquest, Petrarch reveals that war brings cares, fears, and sadness, but no honors:

"Melior tutiorque inquit, "est certa pax quam sperata victoria." Hec ille vincendi desiderio ardens et qui pacem toto orbe turbaverat. Quid igitur amicus pacis? Nonne potius dicat: "Melior sanctiorque est certa pax quam certa victoria"? Proptererea quod illa quietis et caritatis et gratie, hec laboris et criminum et insolentie plena est. quid autem pace iocundius, quid felicius, quid dulcius? Quid vero sine pace vita hominum, nisi periculum pavorque perpetuus ac tristis curarum immortalium officina?

Petrarch saw so little of value in war that he probably would commend Utopian methods of warfare which reflect his concept of prudence as cunning, ingenuity, and wisdom. In this section on international affairs the Utopians confront problems that are as difficult to control as those described in the section on slavery. In regard to the thesis of De remediis, the Utopians abhor the turmoil and violence of evil, stoically endure what they cannot change, and strive to remedy what they can control by the practice of justice, fortitude, and prudence.

The last section of the second part begins abruptly as Hythloday makes no transition between the section on war and that on religion (pp. 217-237). The final section reveals the other-worldliness of the Utopians which is their strongest incentive to virtue. Before considering the religious motivation of conduct, Utopian moderation in the matter

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99 *Utopia*, p. 201.

100 Ep. Fam., XI, 8, in *Opere*, XI, 343.
of religious controversy must be noted. A member of Hythloday's party who spoke on Christianity with more zeal than discretion was found guilty of stirring up a riot among the people and was exiled. In his desire to avoid wrangling and hatred, Utopus, nevertheless, provided for the possibility that one religion alone might be true:

Even if it should be the case that one single religion is true and all the rest are false, he foresaw that, provided the matter was handled reasonably and moderately, truth by its own natural force would finally emerge sooner or later and stand forth conspicuously.

The restraint of the Utopians in dispute conforms with Cicero's definition of temperance which has already been cited: orderliness and moderation in everything that is said and done.

In order to move their citizens to noble conduct, the Utopians honor the virtuous man. Some Utopians reverence "as the supreme god" a man who was renowned for virtue. The Utopian's attitude toward the dead influences conduct. He recalls the uprightness of the acts of the deceased as an "efficacious means of stimulating the living to good deeds." Furthermore, he believes that the departed relatives continue to move about the living and the "personal presence of their forefathers keeps men from any secret dishonorable deed." The Utopian priests, who are respected among all peoples and who are exceptionally holy, instruct the children in virtue as well as in learning. These saintly

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men are the censors of morals in Utopia where it is considered a great
disgrace to be reproved by them for not leading a virtuous life. 107

In regard to these points, Petrarch's concept of the illustrious
man is especially significant. In Chapter VI, this study notes how
Petrarch tries to encourage commendable behavior by exhibiting the lives
of men who deserve honor. Furthermore, like the Utopians, he believes
in the need for tutelary spirits:

If Cato was ashamed to die with a groan because one was
by to see, how much greater shame shall we feel, if Christ
looks on, to live badly and die badly, or to commit any
base or dishonorable deed in so awful a presence?108

In addition to sharing this view on spiritual guardianship with the
Utopians, Petrarch, as has been seen, strongly emphasizes the importance
of moral training in the educational process.

In this section, More reveals that a great incentive to virtue
develops out of the harmonious relationship between faith and reason.
King Utopus "conscientiously and strictly gave injunction" that the
religious doctrines of immortality, providence, and retribution must be
held by all. 109 Anyone who does not accept these beliefs is regarded
as a beast. 110 Hope in an afterlife accounts for the exemplary conduct
of the Utopians in life as well as for their fearlessness in the face of

107 Ibid., p. 227.
108 The Life of Solitude, p. 147; De vita solitaria, p. 46:
"Etsi de Marco Catone scriptum est, quod puduit gementem, illo teste,
mori, quanto magis pudebit Christo spectante male vivere, male mori,
sunt omnino facinorosum ac turpe aliquid tanto sub teste committere."
109 Utopia, p. 221.
110 Ibid.
death. In addition to these doctrines, the worship of the Utopians leads to righteousness. Utopian children never spend the time for public prayer in foolery. These exercises are the period "in which they ought to be conceiving a religious fear towards the gods, the greatest and almost the only stimulus to the practice of virtues." Petrarch's insistence that reason is not sufficient as a guide for man without the assistance of faith was noted in the study of Utopian philosophy. As would be expected, Petrarch holds the traditional religious belief that man's deeds merit retribution in the next life. He adds the interesting note that reward and punishment begin here on earth where the wicked have a foretaste of hell and the virtuous feel the delights of the life eternal.112

At this point it is appropriate to comment upon the importance of the section on religion. In light of Hexter's concept of the composition of the discourse, this section was the last segment of the Utopia composed in the Netherlands. This section is united with the climax of the first part of the theme by the interrelationship between faith and reason which More stresses in both sections. Here one finds the pattern of the patriarchal structure of Utopian life, for the majority of Utopians call God their father.113 In this unit there are ideas that are central to More, namely, his belief in the natural force of truth to assert itself,

111 Ibid., p. 235.
112 See The Life of Solitude, p. 148; De vita solitaria, pp. 46-47.
113 Utopia, p. 217.
his antipathy toward superstition, his plea for toleration in dispute, and his attitude toward death. The great prayer that concludes the description of Utopia stresses the value of this section, for the thought underlying the petition reflects the Christian humanists' view of the dynamic forces inherent in the New Learning. In the classics they search out the values which are worthwhile and which foster human progress. Furthermore, in his prayer one sees the distinction between the Christian and pagan humanists:

He (the Utopian priest) thanks Him for all the benefits received, particularly that by the divine favor he has chanced on the commonwealth which is the happiest and has received that religion which he hopes to be the truest. If he errs in these matters or if there is anything better and more approved by God than that commonwealth or that religion, he prays that He will, of His goodness, bring him to the knowledge of it, for he is ready to follow in whatever path He may lead him. 114

Recognition of the Fatherhood of God separates Petrarch and the More circle from those Renaissance thinkers who sought to fashion a man-centered society. All of these points help to demonstrate how important the last section of the discourse is.

The prayer of the Utopians is relevant to Petrarch's humanism and to the theme's second part. Even Utopia, the most virtuous and happy commonwealth, suffers bondage, illness, crime, and death. In Utopia there are men who canvass for votes and are slaves to ambition. By adultery and fornication, the very source of life in Utopia can be put in bondage to the lustful. Those who are violent in religious disputes can enslave the

114 Ibid., p. 237.
truth. Through a heinous crime the vicious Utopian subjugates himself to vice and conducts himself like a beast. The Utopians' petitions to God amount to a Stoical resignation to the evils they cannot overcome. By the practice of submission and virtue, the Utopians arrive at the nobility and enjoy the freedom that are the prominent effects of the concept of virtue revealed in Petrarch's Latin prose.

In conclusion, a brief summary of the two parts of the theme reveals that the Utopians approach experience in the manner Petrarch recommends in De remediis. In the first part of the theme, "Virtue and Freedom in Utopia," one sees how they free themselves from care by the use of reason and from folly by the practice of virtue. As a result of this liberation, they enjoy the otium literatum of the ancients which Petrarch made a viable ideal in the Renaissance. Furthermore, they employ their studies for the same reason that Petrarch does—-they strive for self-realization through cultus et humanitas. The first part of the theme comes to a climax in Hythloday's description of Utopian philosophy which strongly reflects Petrarch's humanism. Petrarch and the Utopians teach the Stoic notion that reason guides man to virtue, the summum bonum, and the Christian doctrine that faith and reason mutually aid each other.

In the second part of the theme, "Virtue and the Problem of Evil in Utopia," Hythloday speaks of more serious issues than folly and care. He directs his attention to the unavoidable physical and moral evils in the human experience and shows how the Utopians escape from the enslavement of sin by the practice of virtue. They endure those evils which they cannot evade by the exercise of a Stoic fortitude. The second part of
the theme reaches a climax in the section on religion where Hythloday mentions the principal motives for the practice of virtue. In this section he makes it clear that the ultimate solution to the problem of evil depends upon the interrelationship between faith and reason. This analysis of the discourse on Utopia reveals that the concept of virtue that Petrarch made popular in the Renaissance has many echoes in More's classic. In addition, this reading shows the climactic position as well as the importance of the sections on philosophy and religion. Finally, it demonstrates More's artistry in the harmonious balance found between the two parts of Hythloday's discourse on Utopia in Book II.
CHAPTER VIII

THE IDEAL MAN IN PETRARCH AND IN MORE

In order to provide a synthesis for the humanist thought of Petrarch and More, a study will now be made of the ideal man as he is revealed in Petrarch's Latin prose and as his counterpart is found in Hythloday's discourse on Utopia. This chapter will, of necessity, refer to some elements previously examined. But this consideration should not be prohibitive. The description of an ideal man is a logical climax to a study of Christian humanism, for the quest which lies at the heart of this movement is the search for the highest level of human achievement.

Petrarch's notion of man is in the Platonic and Augustinian traditions. The soul is imprisoned in the body,¹ and life on earth is an exile.² Man's father is God, the earth is his mother.³ The ideal man of Petrarch will struggle to resolve the problems that result from this dichotomy by seeking repose "in God, in whom is our end, or in

¹Petrarch at Vaucluse, p. 154; Ep. Fam. XV, 14, in Opere, XII, 167: "Ibi nunc totam habet animam, et corporis servitio ac terreno carcere liberatus."

²Petrarch at Vaucluse, p. 93; Ep. Fam. XV, 5, in Opere, XII, 146: "Ego sum et peregrinus in terra, sicut omnes patres mei, exul sum viatorque anxius vie brevis."

³Physicke against Fortune, p. 171; De Remediis, p. 132: "Tone hunc pudorem, unus omnium pater Deus, una omnium mater terra."
himself and his private thoughts, or in some intellect united by a close sympathy with his own." 4 This investigation will try to show how Petrarch's ideal man seeks rest in self, in friendship, and in God. The successful execution of this design should reveal the Christian man of letters who replaces the medieval knight and monk as a model for Europe.

The exemplary man of Petrarch wants repose in self. To attain this state, he seeks solitude for three reasons. In De vita solitaria, Petrarch uses Jeremiah as an exemplar of those who long for quiet in order to avoid corruption:

O that I had in the wilderness a lodging place of wayfaring men; that I might leave my people, and go from them! for they be all adulterers, an assembly of treacherous men. 5

The sinfulness of the papal court during its Babylonian Captivity at Avignon motivated Petrarch's flight to peaceful Vaucluse. A second reason for retirement is more positive and intellectual. While speaking of the difficulties one encounters in the search for truth, Augustine warns Petrarch that he must avoid the common beaten track and take the way marked by the steps of the very few. 6 This seclusion enables the Christian man of letters to be independent in his judgment and to avoid the imitation of dangerous guides. Finally, Petrarch says that the

4 The Life of Solitude, p. 105; De vita solitaria, p. 19: "Credo ego generous animum, praeter Deum ubi finis est noster, praeter seipsum et arcanas curas suas, aut praeter aliquem multa similitudine sibi conjunctum animum, nusquam acquiescere."

5 Jer. 9:2.

6 Secret, p. 13; Secretum, p. 34: "Calcatum pubblice callem fugias oportet et ad altiora suspirans paucissimorum signatum vestigiis iter arripias."
solitary life should be embraced by those who want to produce literature. If possible, the ideal man dwells close to the beauty of nature. But if no such retreat is available, one can create an isolation for himself by practicing custody of the senses. Petrarch says of himself:

But when some need compels me to dwell in the city, I have learned to create a solitude among people and a haven or refuge in the midst of a tempest, using a device, not generally known, of so controlling the senses that they do not perceive what they perceive.

This control is essential to the solitary so that he can shun the plague of too many sense impressions which would impede his intellectual activity.

Once the Christian man of letters establishes his solitude, he follows a rigid physical and intellectual program. He does not pamper his body and lives "hardly, sparingly, and soberly." He is not a winebibber, though one may drink wine diluted with water, or simply water. His fare is never sumptuous. Exercise is found in moderate walking, "wherein is both profitable moving of the body and honest stirring

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7 The Life of Solitude, pp. 152-153; De vita solitaria, p. 50: "Vacuitatem vero seu vacatioem dici mavis literarum atque artium fontem esse, si mihi forte non credis, Aristotelis crede, qui, primo, Methaphisicae sue libro, circa Aegyptum constitutas mathematicas artes ait, rationem asserens, quod ibi gens sacerdotum vacare dimissa est."

8 The Life of Solitude, p. 135; De vita solitaria, p. 38: "Sed ita, ut si qua me necessitas in urbem cogat, solitudinem in populo, atque in medio tempestatis portum mihi confiare didicerim, artificio non omnibus noto, sensibus imperitandi, ut quod sentiunt non sentiant."

9 Physicke against Fortune, p. 21; De Remediis, p. 23: "Farce, sobrie atque aspere uiuerunt."
of the mind."\(^{10}\) Petrarch, like most philosophers, delighted in walking. Petrarch's ideal man practices celibacy so that solitude might not be marred by contention. Moderns may shudder at the daily routine of the Petrarchan solitary:

This is the order of my life: I rise at midnight, and go out at dawn, but, whether in the fields or in my house, I think and read and write; and I do all I can to keep sleep from my eyes, softness from my body, indulgence from my spirit, and sluggishness from my toiling. Every day I go over the rocky hills, and through the dewy valleys and caverns. . . . \(^{11}\)

One may be sure that Petrarch's meditations and readings inaugurated the intellectual program of the Christian humanist in the Renaissance. In his austere seclusion, the ideal man seeks to adorn his mind. As the moral depravity of Avignon led Petrarch to his retreat at Vaucluse, so likewise, the lack of pure literature in his own time led him to the monuments of antiquity which provide the solitary with the studies that foster repose in self. Literature in the broad sense of a search for wisdom is the noblest study. One who dedicates himself exclusively to one particular discipline or liberal art is like an old man doing boy's lessons—"melius est puerum mori quam inter puerilia senescentem vivere."\(^{12}\)

\(^{10}\) Physicke against Fortune, p. 34; De Remediis, p. 33: "An ambulatio tranquilla praestaret ubi et membrorum motus utilis et ingenij agitatio honesta est."

\(^{11}\) Petrarch at Vaucluse, p. 177; Ep. Fam., XV, 3, in Opere, XII, 138: "Hec vita mea est: media nocte consurgo, primo mane domo egredior, sed non aliter in campis quam domi studoe cogito lego scribo, somnum quantum fieri potest ab oculis meis arceo, a corpore mollitiam, ab animo voluptates, ab operatione torporem. Totis diebus aridos montes, roscidas valles atque antra circumeo."

\(^{12}\) Ep. Fam., XII, 3, in Opere, XII, 21.
Cicero, Petrarch's favorite classical author, and Seneca are the most influential Roman philosophers studied. Vergil is pre-eminent among the poets. Sallust, Livy, Ovid, Terence, Seutonius, and Lucan are to be studied. Judging by the frequency of references in Petrarch's works, it is safe to say that his program would rely heavily on Plato and Homer. As noted earlier, Petrarch possessed Latin translations of Plato and Homer and precious Greek manuscripts of many of Plato's dialogues. Petrarch regretted his failure to learn Greek from Bernard Barlaam, a Greek monk. Upon Barlaam's appointment as bishop of Calabria, Petrarch's lessons ceased. Boccaccio and others, however, were to imitate the master's desire to learn Greek. As a result of Petrarch's interest in the language, Chrysoloras, on his arrival in Florence in 1395, found the proper environment for the birth of Greek studies in the Renaissance. This nativity attains its prosperous maturity in Ficino and More.

The use of the classics in Petrarch's program reveals a difference between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. With reference to the first storm in the Aeneid, Petrarch, in Platonic terms, compares Aeolus, dominating the mount whose caverns contain the raging winds, to the reason of man ruling anger and other passions which rage in the spirited part of man. Such an allegorical mingling of Vergilian and Platonic elements in order to elucidate aspects of human psychology is quite different from the popular Sortes Vergilianae of the Middle Ages. This use of the ancients in his program is evident in Augustine's recommendation

that Petrarch should call to mind favorite passages from his authors in order to check melancholy. This point is doubly interesting since repose is found in the classics and since the recommendation seems more the Epicurean revocatio than the Stoic praemeditatio. The fact that Petrarch's melancholy is not examined in the tradition of St. Gregory the Great and is not linked with sin and culpability helps reveal the modernity of Petrarch's ideal man.  

In the study program of the Christian man of letters, Augustine, Jerome, and Ambrose are the most important Fathers to be studied. The Scripture, especially the Gospels, St. Paul, and the poet, David, are to be read. Prior to the dramatic incident at Mont Ventoux, Petrarch's love of the classics led him to think sacred literature crude. But after the ascent and through the influence of The Confessions, he pursued sacred literature more intensely.

The juxtaposition of the Christian and pagan classics endangers the program's search for repose, for the two bodies of learning apparently contain elements in need of reconciliation. The ideal Petrarchan man knows that he stands between two worlds and lives in a time of great change. This dichotomy is apparent in the Secretum, a dialogue between persona—Petrarch, who tries to defend the ramifications of the New Learning, and persona—Augustine, who strongly advocates contemptus mundi, the tradition of the Middle Ages. In the ascent of Mont Ventoux, this problem of the ideal man is revealed symbolically in Petrarch's turning

14 St. Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, III, 491.
from the old man, in his climbing by unmarked ways, and in his reading of The Confessions at the top of the mount. A Wordsworthian sentiment would be expected from the completely modern man when he reaches the summit of Mont Ventoux. But Petrarch, deeply affected by the grandeur of the prospect before him, mingles thoughts on conversion and death with ideas on the nobility of nature.

In the face of this dilemma, Petrarch "tried to reconcile and blend the two traditions, to color the classic memories with Christian values and to project pagan values into current teaching. He tried to make Cicero a Christian, himself a Cicero."15 Petrarch sees Vergil as inspired when speaking of the birth of passion in the soul on account of its connection with the body. In the Secretum, Augustine acknowledges that one word of Cicero moved him to write True Religion and that this work draws heavily upon the Platonic and Socratic school.16 Elsewhere Cicero sounds like an Apostle. Plato is nearer the divine than Aristotle. In De ignorantia, Petrarch notes that Augustine "filled his pockets and his lap with the gold and silver of the Egyptians when he was about to depart from Egypt."17 At times, however, Petrarch criticizes the classics

15Bishop, Petrarch and His World, p. 373.

16Secret, p. 44; Secretum, p. 66: "Atqui licet aliter sonantibus verbis secundum catholice veritatis preceptorem decuit, reperies libri illius magna ex parte philosophicam precipuesque platonicae ac socraticae fuisses doctrinam. . . . ut opus illud inciperem, unum maxime Ciceronis tui verbum induisses."

17"On His Own Ignorance," in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, p. 114; De ignorantia, p. 78: "Augustino, qui ex Egipto egressurus, Egiptiorum auro et argento sinum sibi gremiumque compleuit."
for their paganism. His attitude, as well as that of the later Christian thinkers who follow his humanism, is one of judicious selectivity.

Petrarch’s description of the joys of the solitary life provide an eloquent summary to the first area of investigation:

To stand meanwhile as though on a high tower watching the troubled actions of men beneath your feet ... to know that this life is but the shadow of life ... to travel back in memory and range in imagination through all ages and all lands; to move about at will and converse with the glorious men of the past and so to lose consciousness of those who work all evils in the present; sometimes to rise, with thoughts that are lifted above yourself, to the ethereal region, to meditate on what goes there and by meditation to inflame your desire, and in turn, to encourage and admonish self with a fervent spirit as though with the power of burning words—these are not the least important fruits of the solitary life.18

Friendship, the second source of repose, means so much to Petrarch that he would give up solitude rather than friendship if he were forced to a choice. The great friendships of the Middle Ages were often between men and women—Héloïse and Abelard, Tristram and Isoldt, Paolo and Francesca. The type of friendship that Petrarch’s ideal man enjoys is reflected in Horace’s statement that Vergil was half his soul. Erasmus expresses the Petrarchan notion of friendship in his comment on the

18 The Life of Solitude, p. 150; De vita solitaria, p. 48: "Stare interim velut in specula, res curasque hominum sub pedibus intuentem . . . nosse, vitae umbram hanc non vitam . . . Mittere retro memoriam, perque omnia secula, et per omnes terras animo vagari, versari passim et colloqui cum omnibus, qui fuerunt gloriosi viri; atque ita praesentes malorum omnium oplices oblivisci, nonnunquam et teipsum, et supra se elevatum animum inferre rebus aethereis, meditari quid illic agitur, et meditatione desiderium inflammare, teque vicissim cohortari, et ardentium quasi verborum faculas calidis admonere praecordiis, qui quod inexperti non intelligunt, non ultimus solitariae vitae fructus est."
martyrdom of More. Erasmus says that in More's death he seems to have died himself, for they had but one soul between them. 19

In regard to friendship, Petrarch advocates a communal type of living that is similar to the life led by the Utopian scholars. He wanted to live in retirement with Mainardo Accursio (Olympius), Louis of Kempen (Socrates), and Luca Christiano. Bishop makes an interesting comparison between Petrarchan and Rabelaisian humanism:

The dream of living with a group in studious harmony was a familiar one; he propounded it at least five times. This has been called a proposal for a humanistic lay monastery, an Abbaye de Thélème. In this lay monastery Petrarch would indubitably have been Abbot. 20

The scholar's life would not be too gloomy, for they would visit the neighboring cities and the lake country of northern Italy. Speaking sadly of the unaccomplished dream, Petrarch expresses the ideal of friendship which seems to be a part of the humanist spirit:

Animus in quattuor pectoribus unus erat. Itaque gloriabar antiquitatem raris quidem et in diversis seculis vix uno vel altero, etatem vero nostram esse et domum unam brevi fore duobus simul amicorum paribus adornatam. Minus propri' 'paria' dixerim: unum erat, imo ne unum par, sed una omnium mens, ut dixi, quorum in iudicio nos errare diuturnior experientia non sinebat. 21

Such a sentiment describes the great humanist friendships between More and Erasmus, Montaigne and Etienne de la Boëtie, and Petrarch and

20 Bishop, Petrarch and His World, p. 277.
Boccaccio. This idea of sharing his solitude with his friends is an attractive part of Petrarch's personality and of his program. He expresses this idea again in De vita solitaria. 22

In regard to friendship, the genres used by Petrarch are pertinent: the dialogue, the biography of illustrious men, and the epistle. The dialogue reflects humanism's spirit of friendly communication and was used by nearly all Christian humanist writers during the Renaissance.

The De viris illustribus and the letters addressed to classical figures can be viewed as Petrarch's attempt to find repose with the great souls of the past. The largest portion of Petrarch's works is his carefully edited correspondence with fellow humanists which decry the corruption of the papacy, offer guidance to society, and reflect the intellectual concerns of the period.

In regard to these letters, one can gain insight into the important role that eloquence plays in Petrarch's humanism. The humanist believes that sublimity in speech results from majesty of soul. For this reason, the Petrarchan ideal man may rely upon others for ideas, but he must never depend upon anyone else for his manner of writing. At one time Petrarch would not even read Dante, lest a stylistic debt might develop in his vernacular works, which he considered to be much less important than his Latin prose. 23

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22 See The Life of Solitude, pp. 162-166; De vita Solitaria, pp. 55-58.

23 Ep. Fam., XXI, 15, in Opere, XIII, 96: "Michil rebar elegantius necdum altius aspirare didiceram, sed verebar ne si huius aut alterius dictis imbuerer, ut est etas illa flexibilis et miratrix omnium, vel invitus ac nesciens imitator evaderem."
Since eloquent expression can lead men to truth, it does have a relationship with friendship and with repose. Augustine's eloquence as well as his thought influences Petrarch in the Secretum. Fluent and moving articulation is an aid to repose in friendship because discourse comforts a soul in sorrow and heals a soul in sickness. It is worth noting that there is a touch of Petrarch's vanity in this matter of articulation. Petrarch says that "the ultimate goal of all eloquence" is "to have moved the mind of the listener according to my wish and with no trouble." There appears to be here some of the sprezzatura admired in Castiglione's ideal courtier.

Finally, it is by virtue that man reaches God, the third source of repose. Petrarch's views mingle Christian and Platonic elements. Sin, vice, and passion keep man from rest. Iniquity is a ball and chain, and worldliness a foretaste of hell. Passions are golden chains he loves. Cupidity is bondage and a golden yoke.

24 The Life of Solitude, p. 106; De vita solitaria, p. 20: "Sic eveniet, ut et tu in verbis meis tuam sententiam agnoscas, et ergo supremam metam cuiuslibet eloquentis attigisse videar, auditoris animum movisse quo volui, idque nullo negotio."


26 The Life of Solitude, p. 148; De vita solitaria, p. 47: "Et inferni laboris habere primitias crediderim ... peccati mei pondus ac vincula circumferens."

27 Secret, p. 108; Secretum, p. 130: "Multum vereor ne ipse cathenarum circumradians atque oculos mulcens fulgor impediat ... aureis catenis vincus in carcere teneretur."

28 Petrarch at Vaucluse, p. 126; Ep. Fam., XIII, 5, in Opere, XII, p. 67: "Me uno reluctantae acriter ac recusante iugum aureum non aliter quam ligneum aut plumbeum ... ."
In this program to free himself from the bondage of sin, Petrarch favors Plotinus' treatment of the Platonic concept of virtue. Under this system, the civic virtues of prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice set bounds to human activity and dispel false judgments. Few men become God-like in the exercise of these virtues of good citizenship. The purgative virtues, which may have the same names as the civic virtues, are superior. They dispel anger, desire, and grief. They encourage disengagement from the body so that the soul's acts of intellection and wisdom can be performed. These are the virtues of the solitary—of Mary, not Martha.  

Repose in friendship and in solitude involves a leisure, a financial independence, and an education few can possess. But all can be virtuous:

unde fit tolerabilior sit defectus eloquentie aut scientie quam virtutis, quod ille scilicet sunt paucorum, hec est omnium. . . . ut enim veritas intellectus, sic bonitas voluntatis objectum est. . . . Non possunt sane omnes Cicerones esse vel Platones, non Virgilii vel Homeri; boni esse autem possunt omnes, nisi qui nolunt. Et arator quoque piscatorque et pastor, modo vir bonus sit, suum precium habebit; denique si alterutro sit carendum, ut Themistoclis dictum de divitiis ad literas traham, malo virum sine literas quam literas sine viro.  

The high tower is not for the solitary alone. The righteous can dwell on the heights and watch the vanities below.  

One cannot examine Petrarch's notion of virtus without commenting upon his idea of glory, which not only figures prominently in his concept

\[29\text{Ep. Fam.}, \text{III, 12}, \text{in Opere, X, 130.}\]

\[30\text{Ep. Fam.}, \text{XIX, 17}, \text{in Opere, XII, 349.}\]
of the ideal man but which also separates him and More from Socrates. Yet it must be mentioned that in one respect Petrarch views fame in the same way Socrates does. He has an attitude similar to that of Diotima in the *Symposium*—nobility of name is to be found more in virtue and in authorship than in parenthood. In the *Secretum*, Augustine challenges this notion. Meeting Petrarch on his own ground, Augustine accepts Cicero's definitions of fame, that is, "the illustrious and world-wide renown of good services rendered to one's fellow citizens, to one's country, or to all mankind . . . public opinion uttering its voice about a man in words of praise." Immediately, Augustine turns *glory* into the "Breath of the crowd." He warns Petrarch, who abhors the crowd, that literary endeavors are not the noblest, and expresses his thinking in the image of a man meeting disaster by trying to straddle two worlds. Moved by Augustine's eloquence, Petrarch sees that glory is the shadow of virtue and that he should "follow after virtue and let glory take care of itself." In spite of this admission, Petrarch's ultimate position toward honor is "to use mortal things for what they are worth, to do no violence to nature by bringing to its good things a limitless and


32 *Secret*, pp. 166-167; *Secretum*, p. 190: "Illustrem et pervagatam vel in suos cives vel in patriam vel in omne genus hominum meritorum famam . . . frequentem de aliquo famam cum laude . . . flatus est hominum plurimorum."

33 *Secret*, pp. 182-183; *Secretum*, p. 206: "Virtutem cole, gloriam negligere."
immoderate desire, and so to follow after human fame knowing that both myself and it will perish." \[34\]

Although Petrarch objects to the absolute otherworldliness of Augustine in this respect, his insistence on the link between virtue and honor establishes a characteristic of Christian humanism that More accepts. In his own introductory statement to the translation of the life of Pico, More presents Petrarch's view:

But Picus, of whom we speak, was himself so honourable, for the great plenteous abundance of all such virtues the possession whereof very honour followeth (as a shadow followeth a body) that he was to all them that aspire to honour a very spectacle, in whose conditions, as in a clear polished mirror, they might behold in what points very honour standeth . . . \[35\]

This idea that glory follows virtue as a shadow does a body—a basic notion in Petrarch—finds identical expression in a letter to one of his most intimate friends, Laelius (Lello di Stefani dei Josetti): "ut enim corpus umbra sequitur, sic virtutem gloria.\[36\] Surtz notes that this emphasis on virtue reveals a Stoic trait in the "essentially moralistic and voluntaristic cast of mind of More and his fellow humanists." \[37\] In this respect More and Petrarch differ from Socrates who implies that the greatest glory should be bestowed upon him who has ascended to a knowledge of the truth. \[38\]

\[34\] Secret, p. 173; Secretum, p. 196: "Mortalibus utor pro mortalibus, nec immodico vastoque desiderio nature rerum vim afferre molior. Itaque gloriam humanam sic expeto, ut sciam et me at illam esse mortales."

\[35\] English Works, I, 349.

\[36\] Ep. Fam., XV, 1, in Opere, XII, 133.

\[37\] Utopia, p. 460.

\[38\] Republic, II, 373-379.
Before concluding the study of Petrarch's ideal man, it is necessary to return to the notion of learning. Although this concept has been touched on in earlier chapters, it has a special relevance to virtue in the search for repose. Studies that delight and cultivate the mind may be pursued as long as they do not contradict the Gospel. Knowledge must lead to noble deeds and should never be a tool for the ingenious and elaborate quibbles of the logician. A summary of a passage cited earlier provides a suitable conclusion to Petrarch's ideal of human aspiration. In addition, this selection admirably reveals the theocentric focus in Christian humanism. Petrarch complains of the poet who would rather limp in his life than in his verse. He objects to the rhetorician who shudders more at the deformity in speech than in his life and to the dialectician who prefers submission to improper passions than to propositions of adversaries. Petrarch chooses to be silent about the mathematicians who measure all things and neglect the numbering of their sins and about the astrologers who predict eclipses of the sun and moon and forget the darkness of their souls. He criticizes philosophers who seek the causes of all things and neglect God who creates all. Finally, he condemns the theologians who are concerned with the knowledge of God and who do not know Him.39

The desire for repose in the ideal man of Petrarch has many reflections in More's Utopia. Hexter makes a comment on Utopian magistrates which is relevant to the Petrarchan tradition and which applies also to

39Ep. Fam., XVI, 14, in Opere, XII, 212-213.
the average Utopian:

The Utopian magistrates with their appetite for hard work are modeled not on the money-grubber, but on the scholar; the end of their way of life is not to maximize gain or profit or wealth, but to maximize leisure—*otium* in the good sense of time free for study and contemplation. *Industria* and *studium* (104/15, 128/2) have as their ends not the accumulation of riches but *cultus* and *humanitas* (112/5), culture and humanity, *libertas* and *cultus animi*, spiritual freedom and culture (134/19). The very pastimes of Utopians are steeped in the pursuit of learning, and possession of it is the prime qualification for office (128/4-5).40

In many respects, Hythloday is like the Petrarchan solitary. It has already been shown that he looks for prudent and wise ways of life. He makes the classics available and acknowledges the pre-eminence of Cicero and Seneca among the Romans, Plato among the Greeks. He is one who lives as he pleases. His aversion to corruption in Europe and his admiration for the practice of virtue in Utopia reflect Petrarch's attitudes towards Avignon and Vaucluse respectively. Hythloday's return to Europe in order to reveal Utopian ways marks the greater social concern that seems to be one of the acknowledged distinctions between English and Petrarchan humanism.

In the earliest editions of More's classic, the *pererga* contains commendations and letters of distinguished friends so that, in a sense, the *Utopia* was protected from a hostile reception. The work proper opens with *persona*-More extolling those virtues in *persona*-Tunstal and *persona*-Giles which express the humanist ideal of friendship advocated by Petrarch.

40 *Utopia*, pp. lxxix-lxxx.
Virtue is as important for the Utopians as it is for Petrarch. Utopia is a holy state. Many of their practices reflect the civic virtues that Petrarch commends. Their isolation from other nations is an example of prudence. Their distribution of goods and houses is just. Their simple tastes in food and clothing exemplify temperance. They are noted for their fortitude in battle. In general, their institutions foster the goals of the civic virtues as understood by Petrarch, namely, they set bounds on human activity and preserve the people from vanity and folly.

In their studies, the Utopians avoid vain quibbles and make their knowledge as useful as they possibly can. Instructors inculcate knowledge and virtue. To the Utopians the "investigation of nature, with the praise arising from it, is an act of worship acceptable to God."\(^4\) As the Utopian attitude toward learning reflects Petrarch's ideals, so also would their attitude towards death mirror Petrarch's desire for repose in God. The Utopians are so eager for rest in Him that they would rather "die a very hard death and go to God than to be kept from Him even by a very prosperous career in life."\(^5\)

From the few examples cited, it can be concluded that More and Petrarch hold sympathetic views. Both would accept repose in friends through eloquent dialogue and repose in God through virtue as ends worthy of pursuit by the ideal man. Solitude is not a major issue for the citizens in Utopia; but for Petrarch it is essential since his ideal man, as found in his Latin prose works, is the Christian man of letters.

Modified by the times and by the debates of the civic humanists, the standards set forth in Petrarch's works and in the educational system of his successors influence the concept of man in Utopia. More's ideal Utopian is neither prince nor governor, neither monk nor knight. He does not inhabit Augustine's city nor Castiglione's court. He does not dwell in the scholarly solitude of Petrarch's community. Yet, if Petrarch's scholar were less aristocratic and if he labored daily for the material prosperity of the community, he would be very much like the ideal man in Utopia.

More uses directly the noblest thought of pagan antiquity and indirectly the Christian tradition in order to propose the Utopian ideal of manhood. His concern for the average man, like Hythloday's love of the poor, grows out of his Christian heritage. The application of the New Learning to the life of the individual is an effect of the Christian humanist's use of the classical past. More's formula for the perfection of the common man through virtue and study is certainly an outstanding statement in the development of Christian humanism as well as in the history of human thought.

In Utopia the classes are not as distinct from one another as they are in Plato's republic. The activities of the officials, the scholars, the priests, and the religious are so directed that these classes really serve the citizens. In each city there are only thirteen priests and a limited number of scholars. There is no bureaucracy in Utopia. There is a ruler for each city. Three men from each of the fifty-four cities attend the yearly senate in Amaurotum. The prince of each city has as
councilors twenty transibors. There are in Utopia two hundred syphogrants. Yet these particular officials merely emphasize that Utopia is for the average man since the syphogrant represents thirty families. 43

Furthermore, in each of the cities there are rarely more than five hundred citizens who are exempt from work and who are considered different from the ordinary Utopian. 44 For all practical purposes, Utopia functions as a classless society.

In addition to the dignity of the individual citizen, there is another exceptional fact about the ideal Utopian. The examination of Petrarch's concept of virtue reveals his idea of virtus in genere. The study of Book II of Utopia made no attempt to show the outstanding virtue of the Utopian. The Utopian, freed by reason and virtue from the vanities and follies associated with wealth and with pride, is unwearied in his devotion to mental study. 45 He has the prudence of Plato's guardians in addition to the fortitude of Plato's warriors. The ideal Utopian is just and temperate. But he is also industrious, humane, pious, merciful, chaste, modest, forgiving, obedient, and peace-loving. In the Republic, Socrates knows that his state has little chance of political realization but hopes that someday individuals will practice justice. Socrates' dialectic leads to the upright man as conceived in theory. More's Utopian is the just man in action. He is the citizen of Utopia who represents virtus in genere. Since this standard is so lofty, the ideal of More, like that of Socrates is unattainable. Maggiolo sees this notion

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in the philosophy of Petrarch:

La philosophie de Pétrarque, c'est l'aspiration constante de l'âme vers l'inconnu, c'est la recherche d'un idéal de beauté, de science, de vertu, de bonheur, que recule à mesure, qu'on s'en approche davantage, qui est toujours assez prêt pour nous attirer, nous ravin d'admiration, mais jamais assez pour se laisser saisir en quelque sorte et profaner. 46

These generalizations on democracy and virtue in Utopia fail to give a clear picture of the ideal Utopian. This deficiency may be remedied by viewing him as a child first of the family, then of the state, and finally of God. Before showing the Utopian in his family, it is necessary to determine the nature of man as he is revealed in the discourse on Utopia. In this regard, More looks on the Utopian in the light of the Platonic philosophy which Augustine and Petrarch endorse. Although there is no statement in the text to define the tripartite view of man's nature which Socrates describes in the Republic, 47 one infers that this notion underlies More's revelation of the Utopian. As has been noted, the Utopian who submits to the cravings of the body in any lawless way becomes identified with subhuman species and is considered an animal. Like the unjust, bestial man that Socrates describes, 48 this Utopian has allowed the spirited part of his nature to side with the appetitive powers and has rejected the rule of the rational faculty. The Platonic doctrine is seen also in the Utopian belief that the freedom of the soul increases on the death of the body. 49

46 M. Maggiolo, De la philosophie morale de Pétrarque, (Nancy, 1863), p. 599.
47 Republic, I, 413-417. 48 Ibid., I, 417. 49 Utopia, p. 225.
In addition, the first of the genuine pleasures of the Utopian reflects Platonism: "To the soul they ascribe intelligence and the sweetness which is bred of contemplation of the truth." It must be noted that Plato's teachings are modified by the Epicurean element in Utopian philosophy which respects health and bodily pleasures to a degree that cannot be reconciled with rigid Platonic thought.

In regard to their physical endowments, the Utopians possess the three most desired attributes of the man's body—strength, quickness, and agility. In addition, Hythlody notes that these qualities are supplemented by an admirable temperament, for the Utopians are "easygoing, good-tempered, ingenious, and leisure-loving."

The existence of these well-endowed people centers about the home. Hexter notes that a "theme that commentators on Utopia have dealt with scantily or disregarded altogether . . . is that of patriarchal familism." He sees the family—monogamous and patriarchal—as the perdurable milieu for Utopia. Except for a few political and religious activities, the whole day of the Utopian is spent with the family. Hexter observes that living and earning a livelihood were the same in More's pre-industrial society and that these activities were centered in the home.

It is important, therefore, to see the daily domestic routine of the Utopians. There is no suburbia for the average Utopian. He lives in

\[50\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 417.\]  \[51\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 179.\]  \[52\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ xli.\]  \[53\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ xliii.\]
the city and at other times in the country. The rural home of the Utopian would be quite large since forty adults live on the family farms. The dwellings in the city, which they exchange every ten years by lot, are handsome buildings of three stories. These domiciles have folding doors that open easily and give admission to anyone at anytime. Apparently the ideal Utopian cares more for informal neighborliness than he does for privacy. This man is as fond of gardens as More and Petrarch were. These homes of the Utopians are far superior to the cabins and huts that Utopus had first found on the peninsula.54

The day of the Utopian begins before daybreak as the average citizen attends public lectures.55 It is significant that the ideal Utopian starts his day with learning. In addition, the Utopian spends much of his leisure time in intellectual pursuits. Although the subject matter of the lectures varies, it can be presumed that Utopian scholarly life is a natural outgrowth of Utopian education.

Education, a major concern for More, is a central issue for the ideal Utopian. As More's biography reveals, the learning process is lifelong and is not restricted to the formal tuition received in youth. More's contribution to Holt's *Lac puerorum*56 and the scholarly reputation of his daughters—especially Margaret—attest to his influence and success as an educator. Some of the teachers at More's family school were famed scholars—Drew, Herde, Kratzer, Clement, and Gonell.57 An atmosphere

54Ibid., p. 121. 55Ibid., p. 129. 56Chambers, *Thomas More*, p. 81
57Ibid., p. 182.
of kindness and gentleness prevailed in More's school and probably in Utopian educational institutions.

The ideal Utopian approaches learning in the same way as the Petrarchan humanist. With an open mind he searches for the good and the profitable and does not reject truth which may be from an alien culture. This objectivity and adaptability in the Utopian can be seen in his experience with the Romans and Egyptians who had been shipwrecked on Utopia twelve hundred years before the arrival of Hythloday. The Utopians learned from the strangers all the crafts and arts of a practical nature. 58 Petrarch would commend the Utopians for filling their pockets with the gold and silver of Egypt—and Rome. The humanist approach to all knowledge is evident again in their acceptance of the Greek texts that Hythloday brought to Utopia. These works are probably in home libraries, for the Utopians have printed many thousands of copies. 59 In regard to their preference for Greek authors, Surtz comments that the Utopians would approve of the Hellenic attitude towards free will, the Platonic notions of creation and immortality, and the Aristotelian view on the sanctity of marriage. 60

Although the ideal Utopian strives to make his knowledge as practical for daily life as he possibly can, he is far from being a pragmatist. It is true that he uses meteorology in order to forecast the changes in the weather. 61 But the study of medicine is of little practical

58 Utopia, p. 383. 59 Ibid., p. 185.
60 Surtz, Praise of Pleasure, p. 125.
61 Utopia, p. 161.
value to him since the average Utopian is quite healthy. His knowledge of medicine reveals two ideals of Christian humanism that are as important as his attitude towards foreign culture. First, he loves to study simply for the pleasure that it offers.\(^6^2\) Learning, by its nature, attracts him. St. Augustine of the *Secretum* would be as unsuccessful in separating this man from his books as he was in his attempts to check the liberal studies of Petrarch. Secondly, it is noteworthy that Utopian education is not man-centered. The Utopian studies a subject as useless to himself as medicine in order to please the Maker who would approve of his recognition and approbation of His creation.\(^6^3\) In this very important distinction between the pagan and non-Christian humanist, the ideal Utopian is again in the camp of Petrarch who condemns the poets, rhetoricians, astronomers, and theologians who do not relate their studies to God.

The basis of the curriculum of the ideal Utopian is the quadrivium recommended in the *Republic*.\(^6^4\) But the relationship between the student and God in the *Republic* is quite remote. The search for Him becomes immediate in the last stages of the eduction of the guardians. In *Utopia* God is ever present. If the Utopians look for Him in a practical science like medicine, it is safe to assume that they seek God in all their studies. Furthermore, the contemplation of the divine majesty is not restricted to a single class. Unlike those in the *Republic*, all citizens in Utopia—male and female—receive instruction. In addition to this universal education, a select group of people who have an outstanding

\(^{62}\text{Ibid.}, p. 183.\) \(^{63}\text{Ibid.}\) \(^{64}\text{Ibid.}, p. 159.\)
personality, a first-rate intelligence, and an inclination to learning devote themselves solely to study. From these scholars they choose the priests who will teach the Utopians. Since they believe that the laws of nature lead to the study of God, it is fitting that the priest should conduct the education and that he should stress moral as well as intellectual progress. Petrarch—aware that reason directs man to seek the divinity—emphasizes the veneration due to those dedicated to this pursuit:

Quesitum enim est unde poete nomen descendat, et quamquam varia ferantur, illa tamen clarior sententia est, quia cum olim rudes homines—sed nunc veri precipueque vestigande divinitatis studio—quod naturaliter inest homini—flagrantes, cogitare cepissent esse superiorem aliquam potestatem per quam mortalia regerentur dignum adum sunt illam omni plusquam humano obsequio et cultu augustiore venerari.

In addition to the sacredness of the teacher and the moral direction of the instruction, the ideal Utopian reflects the lifelong pursuit of wisdom characteristic of Petrarch. The Utopian, who daily devotes eight hours to rest and six hours to work, spends four or five hours a day seeking cultus and humanitas. Since the Utopians have a natural religion, they have no holy book of revealed truths which is central to their study program. Thus, one must assume that they devote their lifelong studies to all the humanities and the sciences. They would agree with Petrarch and would not dedicate themselves to only one liberal art.

It is safe to surmise that the Utopian youth receives his formal

65 Ibid., pp. 131-133.
education while his parents work. But each Utopian, in addition to conventional training, receives instruction in agriculture and has the honor of providing "the matter of pleasure" for his neighbor. Even the Utopian who lives in the city uses his farming experience, for each year the city dwellers help the country workers to bring in the harvest. Besides agricultural and military studies, each Utopian must learn one craft: "this is either wool-making or linen-making or masonry or metal-working or carpentry."\(^{67}\) Usually the Utopian follows the trade of his father. Each family does its own tailoring of the simple uniform worn by all Utopians. The ideal Utopian works at his trade for three hours in the morning and for three hours in the afternoon.

When the afternoon work finishes, the Utopian has his supper, which is more prolonged than his dinner. Since he is most rational and observant of nature's laws, the ideal Utopian would be temperate at meals. Yet, because of the energy consumed in manual labor, he would not be as abstemious at the Petrarchan solitary. It is almost impossible to describe his eating habits because one does not know how seriously to take More when he describes community dining in Utopia. If a reader spends any time imagining the Utopian dinner, he can see traces of More's humor. More spent many months at an Oxford college, at the inns of Court, and with the Carthusian monks, and was well aware of what community dining could be. In Utopia thirty entire families assemble at the blast of the brazen trumpet. The number of adult diners will be

\(^{67}\) *Utopia*, p. 125.
between 300 and 480. Since they have a remedy for over-population, one may conjecture that the number of children will considerably increase this figure. In the hall the men sit with their backs to the wall so that the women may have the center aisle. This arrangement enables those women who are with child to move as expeditiously as possible whenever they are afflicted by either sickness or pain. All the maidens between five and eighteen years old and all the youths between five and twenty-two years old must stand about the tables and eat whatever is doled them by kindly elders. An ideal Utopian listens carefully to the reading which begins the meal when the group has assembled. Following the reading, the Utopians engage in conversation—neither somber nor dull—under the leadership of the elders who never monopolize the table talk. Musical strains mingle with the din of hundreds dining. More does not mention if it is the slaves or the youths who burn spices or scatter perfumes through the common hall. If this section is read without considering More's sense of humor, then the Utopians—the youth especially—are indeed the most disciplined people imaginable as well as the most somber. In spite of the possibility that More may have his tongue in his cheek, he would still strongly recommend reading good books, listening to music, and enjoying conversation.

After dinner the Utopian recreates in the common hall or the gardens.

68 Ibid., p. 421. 69 Ibid., p. 137. 70 Ibid., pp. 141-143. 71 Ibid., p. 143. 72 Ibid., p. 145. 73 Ibid., p. 143.
He may relax to music, engage in talk, or play games that are instructional or moral and that are far different from "dice and that kind of foolish and ruinous game." Extravagant recreation might be found in travel throughout Utopia with permission from his wife and from his father.

The average day of the Utopian concludes with eight hours of rest. This man is far better off than his European counterpart who labors as a beast of burden and who is deprived of the fruits of his labors. The average citizen of Europe has no opportunity to develop cultus and humanitas.

Outside of his immediate family, the ideal Utopian still sees the patriarchal norms that determine much of his activity within the home. The state itself is organized so that it can best provide the individual with "the matter of pleasure." The way in which each area shares its produce without expecting return makes the citizen look upon Utopia as a family and not as a nation.75 This concept is seen in the ideal Utopian's relationship to the body politic. He is very much aware of what happens within the state, for no Utopian city is so large that the individual citizen becomes insignificant. In addition, the family is the basic unit in the electorate. The vote of thirty families, not the votes of the individual citizens elects the syphogrant.76 Over every ten syphogrants is set a tranibor. More limits the city to six thousand families so that the Utopian government is manageable. More has organized political units

74 Ibid., p. 129.
75 Ibid., p. 149.
76 Ibid., p. 123.
along the lines of the family's structure so that even the common man has contact with the ruling fathers in the assembly of tranibors.

The ideal Utopian has a childlike relationship to his leader, upon whom he looks as a father. The rulers have serious obligations toward the Utopian's family. They effect the life of the Utopian in such essential areas as education, marriage, labor, and death. It is noteworthy that the rulers show concern over individual moral excellence—the aim of the humanists of the More circle.

In regard to rulers, Petrarch makes recommendations similar to Utopian practices. He stresses that the prince should be lovable and that the sure way to win affection is by kindness. He should love his citizens as he does his own son. In addition to these fundamental suggestions, Petrarch in the letter to Francesco de Carrara, which amounts to a treatise on princely government, seems to envision a ruler who would be like King Utopus: he should promote public works, restore buildings, and repair streets. The ideal Utopian would greatly admire one particular recommendation of Petrarch which is in the same spirit as the Utopian practice. Petrarch encourages the lord of Padua to correct the popular custom of noisy lamentation in the processions and ceremonies that

77 Ibid., p. 195.

78 Petrarch, Rerum senilum liber XIV. Ad Magnificum Franciscum de Carraria Padue dominum, p. 11: "Vis esse uerus ciuium pater? Quod filio tuo uis, et ciuibus tuis uelis. Non iubeo ut tantundem unumquemque ciuium ames quantum filium, sed ut filium."
accompany the burial of the dead.\textsuperscript{79}

In conclusion, the ideal Utopian's relationship with his state is as uncomplicated as that with his family. He must do three things in order to conduct himself in an admirable manner. He will labor industriously in order to provide "the matter of pleasure" for his fellow citizens. He will fight bravely for his family and commonwealth if he is called upon to defend Utopia. Finally, he will pay a filial respect to the rulers of his city.

The patriarchal nature of Utopian life guides the ideal Utopian's religious practices. He is among those Utopians who view God in the following manner:

He is a certain single being, unknown, eternal, immense, inexplicable, far above the reach of the human mind, diffused throughout the universe not in mass but in power. Him they call father. To him alone they attribute the beginnings, the growth, the increase, the changes, and the ends of all things as they have perceived them. To no other do they give divine honors.\textsuperscript{80}

This belief in God will be supplemented by faith in immortality, providence, and retribution. These dogmas are important for the welfare of the state.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., p. 46: "Nunc uero an natura ipsa an consuetudine in naturam uersa nobis accidunt ut nostrorum mortes sine dolore et gemitu uix feramus, et eorum exequias sepe tristi uociferatione prosequamur, quem morem vix tam usquam alibi radicatum quam in patria tua uidi. Moritur aliquis seu plebeius ille seu nobilis—quod ad hoc enim attinet, nichil refert, quia non minus, sepe etiam magis, plebeiorum quam nobilium animi quatiuntur affectibus et quod deceat minus uident—mox ut is spiritum emisit, dolor immodicus atque ingens fletus exoritur."

\textsuperscript{80} Utopia, p. 217.
since they provide the most powerful motives for doing good and avoiding evil. In addition, the ideal Utopian avoids intolerant attitudes towards those whose creed differs from his own. Yet the Utopian never endures astrologers: "they utterly despise and deride auguries and all other divinations of vain superstition, to which great attention is paid in other countries."81

In respect to his hostility towards astrology and divination, the ideal Utopian is a man of the Renaissance who follows the leadership of Petrarch in the attempt to be free from superstition. In the Epistolae Familiaris and in the De remediis, Petrarch frequently attacks augurs and astrologers. But nowhere does he state so succinctly his wish to liberate man from this evil as when he writes: "Quid uos liberos natos, insensibilium syderum servos uultis facere?"82 Petrarch's aversion to divination is a common bond between himself, Pico, Erasmus, More, and other Christian humanists. Even Plato is not free from this bondage. He holds that the ultimate cause of a commonwealth's fall is to be found in unpropitious births.83 Petrarch, on the other hand, warns man that the fruit of philosophy is not divining from the planets. Philosophy should teach man to endure. Man must look to the weapons of his mind and not look to the stars. He should not care what Jupiter promises at

81Ibid., p. 225.
82Ep. Sen., I, 6, in Opera, p. 827.
83Republic, II, 245-247.
nativity nor fear what Saturn threatens in conjunction with Mars. Man must know the motions of his own mind. The ideal Utopian, without revelation, acts as a Christian in regard to divination while the Christians of Europe are slaves to pagan practices. Petrarch's denial of the power of the stars is relevant to the Utopian's education because Petrarch desires to ascribe all things to the most glorious creator of the stars among whose creatures none are excluded from the path of virtue, felicity, and glory. Petrarch and the Utopians read the stars not for purposes of divination but for the majesty of God in the works of His hands.

In addition to the Utopian's praise of God through the prayer arising from the study of nature, there is the formal worship conducted on the monthly and annual religious festivals. The ideal Utopian, who practices the exercises of a particular sect within his home, certainly worships with his fellow citizens in the city temples. Although the ideal man does not want images in his temple, he does not neglect the nonessential

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84 Physicke against Fortune, p. 306; De remediiis p. 229: "Arma quidem animi, et bellandi artes, pro diversitate hostium multae et uariae sunt, nec ullum philosophiae munus utilius aut sanctius, quam de his agere, quae ut recr aliquanto magis ad uos pertinent, quam nosse quid agant astra, quid naturam Iupiter intuens promittat, quid Saturno iunctus Mars minetur . . . et non nosse, unde aestus ac tumor tremorque ac debilitas animorum. . . ."

85 Physicke against Fortune, p. 169; De remediiis, p. 130: "Nos tamen ista respuimus, et haec auspicia, et hanc tantam syderum uim negamus, conditori almo syderum omnia reliquentes, a quo creatum nullum penitus ab hoc uirtutis et foelicitatis et gloriae calle secludimus."
religious aids that appeal to the senses. Incense, fragrant substances, and candles are used in the dimly lit Utopian churches.

The Utopian enters the temple in a white garment which symbolizes the purity needed for worship. This external sign complements the confession of faults in the family that the ideal Utopian practices. In the home the Utopian wives fall down at the feet of their husbands and the children at the feet of the parents and, after confessing guilt, beg pardon. Thus they can attend the non-bloody sacrifices with a pure and clear mind. 86 Surtz has well described the attitude of the ideal Utopian toward music and toward prayer: "The music should pray and the prayer should sing." 87

In his final words on the Utopian liturgy, Hythloday mentions another point on which the Utopian and the Christian humanist hold very similar views:

Finally, he prays that God will take him to Himself by an easy death, how soon or late he does not venture to determine. However, if it might be without offense to His Majesty, it would be much more welcome to him to die a very hard death and go to God than to be kept longer away from Him even by a very prosperous career in life. 88

This petition may be made by the rare pagan who, having met with success in his search for wisdom, longs for a liberation from the body. Yet these are not the words of the average man anywhere unless he is either a

86 Utopia, p. 233.
87 Surtz, Praise of Wisdom, p. 312.
88 Utopia, p. 237.
Utopian or a Christian. Petrarch, of course, shares this attitude whereby the good Christian does not fear death. Petrarch's Stoicism, however, does not enable him to see life as pleasantly as the Utopian can:

Ego itaque, ut unde discesseram revertar, a plurimorum opinionibus aversus, sic censeo: lugendam esse malorum mortem, que animam simul et corpus interimit; contraque, bonorum exitum gaudio prosequendum, quod eos Deus ex hac valle miseriarum misericorditer eruens, ad letiora traduxerit. Nisi forte fratris tui mors ideo acerbior visa est, quod eum procul a finibus patriis invasit. Sed non sumus usque adeo rerum ignari; scimus a Poeta verissime dictum esse quod "omne solum forti patriae est", et tamen hoc vero verius est quod ait Apostolus: "Non habemus hic manentem civitatem, sed aliam inquirimus."\textsuperscript{89}

Thus, the ideal Utopian is an average citizen who enjoys the leisure to develop the cultus and humanitas that had become a viable aspiration as a result of the work of Petrarch on the great monuments of the past. The Utopian finds rest in virtue and in study and enjoys the companionship of the family and of the commune rather than the friendship of merely a select group of scholars. Finally, the ideal Utopian, as well as Petrarch's ideal man, seeks his greatest repose in God both now and in the next life.

\textsuperscript{89}Ep. Fam., II, I, in Opere, X, 56-57.
CHAPTER IX

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

The comparison of Petrarch's Latin prose with More's Utopia includes a great variety of issues. Some points are relatively uncomplicated, such as the eagerness of English humanists to possess Petrarch's works and More's inclination to use concepts found in the Triumphs and the Rerum memorandarum libri in his early poetry. On the other hand, complex subjects require extended and intensive treatment. For example, in order to compare the humanistic ideals of More's Hythloday with those expressed in Petrarch's prose, one must consider the philosopher's love of independence, his attitude toward the active life, his views on learning and travel, and his approach to reform. Furthermore, concepts of vice and virtue and representations of an ideal man expand the scope of this study. Therefore, to conclude this thesis as comprehensively and yet as concisely as possible, this chapter will note prominent results in three areas only--first, Petrarch's effect upon the early English Renaissance; secondly, Hythloday's stature as a literary character; and, thirdly, Petrarch and More's vision of human perfection.

In regard to the first point, namely, Petrarch's effect upon the early English Renaissance, one should note that Petrarch's prose had a more extensive reception in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries than has usually been acknowledged. As early as 1424 English travellers to Italy eagerly sought his Latin prose and--judging by the respect paid it
in Lydgate's *The Fall of Princes* (1430-1438)—the English clearly honored Petrarch by mid-century. Renowned as he was, Petrarch's fame grew in magnitude as the printing press spread his works to all of Europe. Toward the end of the fifteenth century, members of the More circle studied in Italy where Petrarch was venerated throughout the Renaissance. At the time More attended Oxford (ca. 1492-1494), Petrarch had the position of a "standard author" there.¹ About the year 1500, printers throughout Europe were publishing editions of Petrarch's works—especially *De vita solitaria* and *De remediis*. One may note that Twyne made his capable English translation of the latter in 1579. Although not in the scope of this paper, there is evidence that even seventeenth-century polemicists studied the *Epistolae sine nomine*, Petrarch's attacks against corruption within the Church. The few facts listed above lead to the following conclusion. Instead of considering Petrarch's popularity as a particular wave of interest in the fifteenth century, one should favor a theory which relates Petrarch's stature to specific movements and historical events, for instance the travels of the pre-humanists and the humanists, the curriculum and the libraries of the English universities, the invention of printing, and the revolution of the Protestants.

The study of Petrarch's effect upon the More circle in particular reveals an even more important conclusion than that which a general survey of the influence of his prose offers. Grocyn possessed *Rerum memorandarum libri* and Colet recognized Petrarch's stature as a model for those who

¹*Humanism during the Fifteenth Century*, p. 178.
endeavored to be eloquent. Erasmus feels that Petrarch is a man of ardent genius, of great knowledge of affairs, and of no ordinary eloquence. Although More himself does not mention Petrarch in any of his writings as they are now extant, he pays Petrarch the homage of imitation. In his early poems which accompany the pageants painted on cloth, More finds his inspiration in Petrarch's Triumphs. Furthermore, in his poems on Fortune, More uses Rerum memorandarum libri as his source book and De remediis for his theme. In Chapter I this study suggests that Democritus in Rerum memorandarum libri and Hythloday in Utopia resemble each other in their love of independence, in their pursuit of truth, and, especially, in the distribution of their patrimony. The relationship between More's poems on Fortune and Petrarch's Latin prose not only links these founders of humanism in Italy and in England but also brings to light More's indebtedness to Petrarch in an area which appears thus far to have received no comment. In addition to this conclusion, this study reveals the need for more investigation of Petrarch's influence on the English Renaissance. For example, Surtz notes that Book II of Elyot's Governor (1531) is partially indebted to Petrarch's De republica optime administranda. Attempts to link Petrarch's humanism with the birth of the New Learning in England may reveal truths necessary for a full understanding of the origins of the English Renaissance.

2Utopia, p. clxxiii, which refers to Leslie C. Warren, Humanistic Doctrines of the Prince from Petrarch to Sir Thomas Elyot: A Study of the Principal Analogues and Sources of the Boke Named the Governour (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1939).
In addition to the preceding conclusions, this dissertation provides an opportunity to comment upon the stature of Hythloday. It tries in some way to make up for the neglect that this memorable character suffers. It is most unusual that Raphael Hythloday, the hero of one of the few perennially popular and world-renowned texts in the history of English letters, has not taken his rightful position alongside of famed Renaissance figures, such as Cervantes' Don Quixote, Rabelais' Gargantua and Pantagruel, and More's own Richard III. In order to show how impressive Hythloday actually is, it is profitable to compare him with other utopian narrators.

The author of utopian literature faces certain artistic limitations in the development of a well-rounded literary character. Since "a utopia should describe in a variety of aspects and with some consistency an imaginary state or society which is regarded as better, in some respects at least, than the one in which its author lives," the writer must stress his ideal state. As a result, the narrator in utopian fiction acts more often as a mouthpiece than as a living personality. In addition to this particular restriction inherent in utopian literature, the genre determines the broad lines along which a character develops. In serious scientific fiction one expects characters like Wells' George and Teddy Ronderevo. In the world of the artist, one usually meets a Stephen Dedalus. In utopian fiction there must be a Hythloday. It is only the extraordinary

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geniuses, men similar to Plato and More, who can overcome the limitations of the genre and who can create living characters like Socrates and Hythloday.

In order to compare utopian narrators, it is useful to investigate the physical, social, moral, and intellectual qualities of various heroes. Furthermore, the narrator's relationship to subordinate characters as well as his response to his milieu provides insights into the achievement of the author. In the present case the narrators of The Republic (ca. 410 B.C.), The City of the Sun (1623), New Atlantis (1626), Gulliver's Travels (1726), Looking Backwards (1888), and Brave New World (1932) will be examined. These texts have not been chosen arbitrarily. The group includes the classical archetype of More's hero, namely, Socrates, the two most famous utopias in the century following More's work, namely, The City of the Sun and New Atlantis, and the single most popular example of utopian fiction from each of the following centuries, namely, Gulliver's Travels from the eighteenth century, Looking Backards from the nineteenth century, and Brave New World from the twentieth century.

The two Renaissance utopias illustrate one pole of artistic development—the narrator as mouthpiece. Bellamy's Dr. Leete and Huxley's Mustapha Mond—more carefully delineated than the figures in Campanella and Bacon—act primarily as spokesmen for the utopist and are not well-rounded literary characters like Socrates and Hythloday. In this alignment of utopian narrators, Swift's Gulliver exemplifies the position opposite to that of the mouthpiece—he is the fictional hero in the adventure story. Moreover, by examining each of the above texts in chronological order,
one notes the effect that economic and social changes have had upon the hero.

As presented in *The Republic*, Socrates, the classical model for Hythloday, is about sixty years old. Younger than Cephalus, he seems to have experienced the cooling of the passions that Cephalus considers one of the advantages of senescence. In regard to his social characteristics, Socrates is a very pleasant person who enjoys the camaraderie of the banquet. Through humorous self-depreciation, he handles the angry guest, Thrasymachus, with consummate skill. He shows great respect for the elderly Cephalus. He enriches his conversation by anecdotes and poetic devices. The enduring popularity of Gyges' ring, of the allegcry of the Cave, and of the myth of Er attests to the power of Socrates' imagination. His constant questioning and the unexcelled organization of his argument through the ten books of *The Republic* demonstrate the force of his brilliant mind.

Like all utopian narrators, he has a sincere interest in the welfare of his fellow man. Although at this time of his life he refrains from active participation in government, he has the moral philosopher's interest in virtuous conduct. Throughout *The Republic* he wishes to establish right opinions in others. He focuses his enquiries on justice and goodness and applies his findings both to the individual and to the state. He proposes an educational system that develops an enlightened and well-rounded person. He recommends arithmetic, geometry, solid

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4 *Republic*, I, viii.
geometry, astronomy, harmonics, mathematics, and dialectic. In addition, each study is not an end in itself. For example, harmonics leads to "the investigation of the beautiful and the good."\(^5\)

In *The Republic* Plato identifies each character with a set of philosophical opinions. Cephalus represents goodness achieved through unreasoned experience. His son, Polemarchus, stands for uncritical youth, deceived by conventional beliefs. Thrasymachus, a type of Sophist, is cynical and unscrupulous. Glaucon and Adeimantus portray puzzled young men who sincerely seek truth. By identifying each person with a specific attitude toward experience, Plato universalizes each figure and emphasizes the subordination of all to Socrates, the true philosopher and wise man who questions from behind the mask of ignorance.

Throughout *The Republic* Socrates doubts his own ability to arrive at the truth. He fears the force of Thrasymachus' arguments and hopes the requests of Glaucon and Adeimantus will not overwhelm him. Socrates' mask, like that of many literary characters, merits careful consideration due to its complexity. In debate it shields him from his opponents. On the other hand, it can represent the philosopher's true belief in the limitations of the human intellect. Most important of all, Socrates' mask gives him the power of the philosopher's stone, namely, dialogue. By communication, Socrates converts ignorance into wisdom and cures blindness by revelation. For Socrates, questioning amounts to dialogue and dialectic—the means whereby man ascends to the truth.

\(^5\) Ibid., II, 193-195.
In regard to his relationship to his own era, Socrates stands as a symbol of the golden age of Greek philosophy as much as Hythloday captures the spirit of the Christian humanism of the Renaissance. Moreover, by his method of questioning and by his respect for the freedom of others, Socrates directly opposes the imposition of fines and punishments and "the torrent of censure and applause" that marks the methods and instructions of the Sophists. 6

In conclusion, Socrates, the classical model of utopian narrators, possesses many qualities that suit him admirably for his role. The experiences of age, travel and learning make him an articulate and entertaining conversationalist. Since he is a true philosopher who is detached from material concerns, he not only observes conduct but also teaches with conviction that justice and goodness alone lead to true progress.

Before considering the Renaissance utopias, one should note that Plato fails to make Socrates as unique as an individual as More has made Hythloday. Nettleship sees the allegorical characters in The Pilgrim's Progress as the closest counterparts in English literature to the figures in Plato's Republic. 7 This judgment cannot be made in regard to Hythloday, who, like Socrates in age, social qualities, and learning, possesses such an ardent love for man and so great a hatred for iniquity that his admiration of Utopian virtue and his denunciation of European

6Ibid., II, 37.

vice give him a prophetic dimension which Socrates' character lacks and which greatly enhances his literary stature.

In *The City of the Sun* and *New Atlantis*, two outstanding Renaissance utopias, Campanella and Bacon show most concern with the institutions of the imaginary state and almost entirely neglect character development. In Campanella's work, the narrator is a sea captain who describes the City of the Sun as he answers straightforward requests for information made by the Grand Master of the Knights Hospitaler. Both of these individuals are subordinate to the social commentary. Neither comes alive. In a similar manner Bacon shows little interest in artistic narration. A faceless governor of New Atlantis reports most of the discourse in the first person plural. Although none of the figures in these utopias are well drawn, both of these works reflect More's use of the sea voyager who reveals the discovery of an ideal state. It is not necessary to comment upon Hythloday's stature in comparison with that of the narrators of *The City of the Sun* and *New Atlantis*.

In the eighteenth century, Swift, unlike Campanella and Bacon, forsakes the dialogue as a medium and employs the hero of the adventure story in order to describe the perfect commonwealth. In an interesting article, Traugott claims that "Swift dresses up More's Hythloday to look like Defoe's Robinson Crusoe." This catchy statement, which appears to bring honor to Defoe also, does note the utopian element in Swift. Since the sixth chapter of each of the first three books and most of the fourth

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book of Gulliver's Travels deal with the best state of a commonwealth, Gulliver may be numbered among utopian narrators even though the primary focus on human folly makes the work less constructive than the average utopia.

Gulliver's physical characteristics are difficult to describe because Swift wants him to be relative to his environment--Gulliver is as grand and as mean as only man can be. His voyages begin when he is thirty-eight and conclude when he is fifty years old. In regard to his social and moral habits, Gulliver reflects his age. In the introduction of the third book, Swift reveals that Gulliver has the amenities and conversational talents of the urban middle class. These facts about Gulliver are more easily determined than are his ethical views. In Book I he is disgusted over the war between the Lilliputians and Blefuscans. Yet in Book II he admires the horrible war machines that he describes to the king of the Brobdingnagians. In Book IV this ambiguity disappears as the mad Gulliver, awakened by his experience among the Houyhnhnms, lacerates European vice and denounces pride in a manner not unlike More's Hythloday and Erasmus' Folly.

The intellectual qualities of Gulliver are particularly relevant. As a bourgeois hero of the eighteenth century, he receives a pragmatic as well as a liberal education. Not being able to complete his course at Cambridge, he studies mathematics and navigation and is apprenticed to a physician. The use of a medical doctor as a narrator shows how the scientist begins to replace the philosopher as the one who observes conduct and proposes reforms.
The mask which Lemuel wears—his gullibility—may reflect this change in the makeup of the genre's hero. He is so naive that Lilliputian and Brobdingnagians are all the same to him. His pragmatic education has trained him neither to make judgments nor to evaluate the relative merits of various societies. He simply observes. This attitude enables him to accept dispassionately the wide range of experiences he is called upon to narrate. Swift allows the reader to weigh the significance of Gulliver's adventures. It is only among the Houyhnhnms that Swift removes the mask from his character. In Book IV the mad Gulliver condemns European customs and proposes the sterile institutions of the Houyhnhnms.

Therefore, as a narrator, Gulliver is mature, widely travelled, and trained for observation. By making Lemuel gullible, Swift invites the reader to participate in evaluating the social commentary. Although Swift's book ranks among the outstanding works in English literature, his hero lacks some qualities necessary for a truly great figure like Hythloday. Although Gulliver denounces vice, he never matches the intensity that Hythloday reaches in the peroration. Even a cursory glance at the condemnation of pride near the end of each text verifies this judgment. Furthermore, Gulliver does not have that deep sympathy for the poor which is so important a part of Hythloday's character. And Hythloday's mental endowments enable him to evaluate different societies as well as to propose temporary and permanent remedies for Europe's moral condition. This ability distinguishes his mind from that of the less discerning Gulliver. Finally, Gulliver's misanthropy and insanity, which enhance the effect of Swift's work and which introduce a tragic element
into the text, do not add to Gulliver’s stature as a literary character.

In the most popular nineteenth-century utopia, *Looking Backward*, Bellamy, similar to Swift, uses the scientifically trained bourgeois hero, Dr. Leete, as narrator. But Dr. Leete, unlike Gulliver, fails to dominate the scene, for the romance between his daughter Edith and Julian West engages the reader’s attention quite frequently. Dr. Leete, about sixty years old, is a family man who unquestioningly endorses the social and moral conditions of the year 2000. When referring to the past, he shows a sympathy for the exploited classes. Yet he never manifests Hythloday’s passionate attitude toward vice and virtue. This difference may occur because the Gospel drives Hythloday to reform, but the shallow Dr. Leete depends upon Dickens for inspiration. 9

Leete’s intellectual qualities are those of a nineteenth-century progressionist. He receives a liberal education until he is twenty years old. After three years of mandatory manual labor, he studies medicine. Upon retiring from his practice at the age of forty-five, he spends his days in study, in recreation, and in the veneration of scientific achievements. In view of his remarks on Europe in the year 2000, he may have been a traveller. Yet his journeys do not figure in his role as narrator. 10 The authors in his library reflect the literary tastes of the nineteenth century: Shakespeare, Milton, Wordsworth, Shelley,


Tennyson, Defoe, Dickens, Thackeray, Hugo, Hawthorne, Irving, and a score of other great writers of his time. Bellamy names neither the Scriptures nor any of the classical works that Hythloday brought to Utopia.

It is interesting to note that Dr. Leete is not a major character in the same sense that the earlier utopian heroes are. Often subordinate to the romance between Julian and Edith, he shares the narrator's task with Edith, who reveals much about the new world to Julian while they are on a shopping trip. Like the characters in *The City of the Sun* and in the *New Atlantis*, Dr. Leete is fundamentally a mouthpiece who is quite unattractive at times. He laughs "heartily," laughs a little "grimly," and regards his companion "musingly." There is little about him that is either great or unique.

In respect to his relationships to other characters, he is static. He lacks Socrates' struggle for the truth and Gulliver's discontent with man. His attitude reflects his age—all is right with his world. Although he manifests some of the basic qualities of the utopian narrator, like the heroes in Campanella and Bacon, Leete does not merit comparison with Hythloday.

Finally, in the twentieth century the narrator must be taken from a dystopia since it is in this negative form that the genre remains most vital. Huxley's *Brave New World* is to the negative utopias what More's classic is to the positive. The narrator, Mustapha Mond, though relegated

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to a minor role like Dr. Leete, still manifests the broad outlines demanded by the genre. Although he is not described in any detail, his conversations in Chapters XVI and XVII reveal that he is older than the other characters in the novel. Even though the way of life he defends is inhuman, he possesses the moral sense his own society would admire.

Mustapha Mond strives to preserve the stability which he thinks is the foundation of the good life. Moreover, by locking the "smut," namely, the Holy Bible, The Imitation of Christ, The Varieties of Religious Experience, and the works of Shakespeare, Newman, and Maine de Biran in his safe, he acts as a censor of public conduct. In keeping with the spirit of a dystopia, Mustapha has few constructive functions. He first appears as an instructor who eloquently sketches the loss of those positive values which were formerly obstacles to stability. History and family are among the first concepts that he denigrates. In his role as Controller he mirrors his age, for he commends the use of modern psychological discoveries in order to deprive man of freedom. As a teacher, he relies on examples taken from daily experience. He speaks of pipes with water under pressure and of gyroscopes in order to describe frustration and guidance respectively. One should note that in his defense of the "Brave New World" in Chapters XVI and XVII he demonstrates the urbanity and friendliness that are characteristic of utopian narrators.


16Ibid., pp. 27, 150.
In his relationship to the other characters, he takes a subordinate role as Dr. Leete does. Except for a brief conversation on the telephone, he appears only in Chapters III, XVI, and XVII. Huxley's intention determines Mustapha's stature. Plato completes *The Republic* with the myth of Er. Hythloday ends the discourse of Book II with the common prayer of the Utopians. Bacon concludes with the veneration of the Inventors, Campanella with the prophecy of the Golden Age, and Bellamy with Julian's return to the haven of 2000. At the termination of his novel, Huxley informs the reader of the suicide of the Savage, the last person in the "Brave New World" who reveres traditional human values. Because of the focus on the Savage, those characters who are closely connected with his activities have the reader's attention. Mustapha is simply a mouthpiece in Chapter III as he describes dystopia. Huxley tries to cover up this deficiency by using the techniques of modern fiction. In Chapter III, he fragments Mustapha's narration and juxtaposes it alongside of three other developments—the brain washing of infants, the conversation of Lenina and Fanny, and the dialogue between Bernard and Henry. These other affairs reveal dystopian ways as much as Mustapha's discourse does. The closest that Mustapha comes to any individuality is during the debates in Chapters XVI and XVII. Because of the minor role he plays, Mustapha cannot be considered a well-rounded literary character.

In summary of these analyses, therefore, the reader may draw the following conclusions on the stature of Hythloday. None of these narrators, not even Socrates, approaches the greatness of Hythloday as a literary character. In fact, few fictional personalities possess either
the manysidedness or the depth that More has given to Raphael. Appearing in Antwerp in the twilight of his life, Hythloday brings into More's garden the finest ideals that mankind has to offer at that time. In his mind he carries—in harmonious blend—the treasures of classical and Christian antiquity. He has journeyed to Persia in the East and the New World in the West in order to tell More and Giles of the unknown lands and of the wholesome institutions that exist in them in their own age. He offers mankind immediate relief for pressing problems and optimistically lays out a pattern for lasting happiness by discoursing upon the holy city of Utopia. In his generosity he not only reveals these truths but also, like Socrates, delights his humanist friends by his spirit and his wisdom. As a narrator he has a storyteller's gifts, a poet's imagination, and some of Thomas More's humor.

At the end of the Utopia, More complements this manysidedness by a depth that makes Hythloday as awesome as Jeremiah. Hythloday hates vice with a remarkable intensity. Evil is not abstract for him. It is a gallows, man-eating sheep, a monster, a plague, a serpent, a suckfish. He has always in mind the victim whether it is the thieves hanging on the gallows or whether it is the poor evicted from their homes. He suffers with those in Europe who have been exploited by the pride and avarice of princes. The afflictions of the oppressed form a litany that runs through Hythloday's mind—fear, anxiety, toil, want, starvation, death. This deep sympathy, a sign of greatness in the true reformer, spurs Hythloday to direct and powerful eloquence in the peroration. In this scene he rises to a fullness that marks him as one of the great figures
of European literature. Although the *Utopia* cannot be viewed as either a tragedy or a comedy, Hythloday shares a tragic dimension with the prophet. As More leads the weary Hythloday from the garden, both certainly realize that Europe does not want the Utopian reforms. Hythloday's tragedy is like that of Jeremiah. The prophet repeats again and again his oracle in spite of the fact that he knows how few, if any, will ever listen to him. The walls of Jerusalem must fall before the voice of Jeremiah will be heard. In a similar sense the goodness in Hythloday's message is wasted in his own day. Spiritual and temporal rulers go on satisfying their lusts for honor and wealth by either violence or fraud and lead men to suspect the integrity of the organizations responsible for the peace and prosperity of society. Like Jerusalem, Christendom refuses to react to the prophet's cry and a cataclysm faces Western Europe. Discord, strife, and open conflict lie in wait for a civilization that has closed its ears to the voice of More's prophet.

In conclusion, the comparison with other utopian narrators reveals not only that Hythloday surpasses them as a literary character but also that he has a depth and a manysidedness which make his neglect by literary custodians somewhat astonishing. His greatness and his vitality pay daily tribute to the Christian humanism of the Renaissance and to Thomas More.

The third major result of this study, namely, Petrarch and More's vision of human perfection, depends upon two premises which define the limits of the Christian humanism of the Renaissance. First, Petrarch is an important founder of this movement. Although there were precursors to
Petrarch just as there were humanists prior to those of the More circle, this paper takes the traditional position that Petrarch—as a result of his extraordinary popularity and because of the content and style of his Latin prose—has to be recognized as the principal figure who initiates the Christian humanism of the Renaissance. The second premise is that the date when Luther defied the established Church, October 31, 1517, marks so great a change in European thought that More's *Utopia* (1516) may be considered as the last monument in the history of the Christian humanism that dates back to Petrarch. In the last pages of this dissertation, many close similarities between More and Petrarch will be noted so that one can see how their ideal of human perfection lies near the core of a clearly defined tradition. After the breakup of Christendom, polemical disputes and divergent orthodoxies hinder any group from claiming the uncontested right to call itself the sole lawful inheritor of Hebrew and classical antiquity. More's own life bears out the truth of these generalities. As a result of Luther's activity at Wittenberg in 1517, More was never again to view experience as he did in the days when he wrote the *Utopia*. In summary, therefore, the two premises may be stated as follows. Petrarch's Latin prose provides the initial impulse and the specific outlines for a Renaissance idea of human perfection which in England culminates in and perhaps attains to its fullest maturity in Thomas More and his *Utopia*. In order to arrive at an accurate description of the ideal that Petrarch and More offer, it is necessary to summarize the major issues treated in Chapter II through Chapter VIII. Freedom, one of the first and most important matters studied, enables the
philosopher to seek a particular kind of wisdom which Erasmus has defined: "Sapientia est virtus cum eruditione liberali coniuncta."\(^{17}\) Petrarch and More, who both share the motto--iuro ut uolo--limit the humanist's liberty by certain intellectual and moral restrictions. Although the independent thinker may disagree with any and every philosophical system, the Christian humanist in the Renaissance depends mainly upon the philosophy of Plato who was the guiding classical spirit in Ficino's academy and in More's circle. Petrarch, who possessed precious Greek texts of Plato, states often that Plato is the foremost of philosophers. Although Petrarch failed to master Greek, his interest in the language and his esteem for Plato--both of which he passed on to his followers--is to be considered as a major stimulus to the Renaissance Platonism which reaches its maturity in Ficino and in More. In addition to Plato, Petrarch and More acknowledge the excellence of Cicero both as a Latinist and as a moral philosopher.

As a result of classical studies and Christian asceticism, the humanist in Petrarch and in More realizes that certain moral disciplines enhance rather than restrict freedom. He knows that the lust for pleasure and the craving for wealth hold the philosopher back from the truth. In his desire to foster detachment, Petrarch recommends celibacy to the non-clerical scholar in De vita solitaria. This Renaissance ideal, which probably originates in Petrarch, may be seen in the Utopia if one accepts the thesis in Chapter II that Hythloday is a celibate. Whether

one admits this position or not, Petrarch and More do stress much the same means for escape from the intellectual and moral obstacles to freedom.

In regard to the issues summarized above, there is a high degree of unanimity between Petrarch and More. When one raises the issue of the philosopher's obligation to society, this conformity, though present, requires qualification. In the dialogue of counsel, Petrarch stands with Hythloday in opposition to persona-More and the principle of accommodation which urges that the wise man should enter a prince's council in order to do the best he can in an environment hostile to intelligent reform. Petrarch and Hythloday refuse to serve because they know they will lose their inner peace which is essential to the completeness of the true philosopher. Both look upon councilorship as a form of slavery and fear that their personal integrity will be compromised by association with corrupt courtiers. Petrarch's seclusion at Vaucluse would appeal to Hythloday, for More's hero knows how futile are the sage's attempts to guide the people. The philosopher is better off safe at home. In most respects, Petrarch and Hythloday defend their freedom for the same reasons. One may note, however, that Petrarch does not feel that his advice would be disregarded. Convinced of the blindness of Europe's rulers, Hythloday realizes that they will either ignore his message or look upon it as folly.

In Petrarch and in More, the Christian humanist uses his freedom in order to lead his fellow men to better ways of life. Both convey

18 Utopia, p. 103.
their message through dialogue—either written or oral—and through the medium of Latin. In their proposals, one consistently hears the Stoic notion that "hard virtue" leads to perfection. It may be merely coincidental that the first vision of the Christian humanism of the Renaissance in Italy depicts an admirable modern man and that its final conception in England portrays an ideal modern state. On the other hand, More's *Utopia* may reflect the debates of the civic humanists who reacted against Petrarch's veneration of solitude. Chapter II traces the development of these arguments which grow out of Petrarch's censure of Cicero for the latter's involvement in affairs of state. In Florence, Salutati initiates the reaction to Petrarch's position. Vergerio and Bruni carry on the discussion which reaches a conclusion in Palmieri's *Della vita civile*. This work, like the *Utopia*, is an act of faith in community.

After a study of the independent philosopher, this dissertation treats the radical humanist's views on travel and knowledge. Petrarch and many members of the More circle were remarkable travellers. Although this aspect of the humanist's makeup is not important in itself, the examination of his travel experiences reveals how he approaches experience. The true humanist shows only a passing interest in the marvels that often completely engage the attention of the ordinary traveller. Instead, Petrarch and Hythloday evaluate the behavior of the citizens of those places they visit. Petrarch comments upon a particular vice that plagues an area. For example, he condemns the idleness of the Cypriotes. Hythloday not only criticizes evil practices
but reveals the wholesome institutions he noted among the Achorians, the Polyclerites, the Macarians, and the Utopians. Furthermore, in their journeys both display the same reverence for the monuments of the past. Petrarch tries to recover and to distribute the texts of the classics. Hythloday provides the Utopians with the works of the ancient Greek writers who enjoyed a rebirth in the movement Petrarch founded.

The attitude of the humanist toward travel mirrors his views of knowledge. Just as he cares little for "stale travellers' wonders"\(^\text{19}\) so also he rejects the ingenious intricacies of the Schoolmen. Because of the emphasis on logic and oversubtle questions, the humanist feels that the educational system of a decadent Scholasticism is incapable of forming the virtuous and learned man. The followers of Petrarch and More had no desire to develop children who would be capable of disputing with Aristotle. The Christian humanist constantly rejects any system of learning that divorces knowledge from behavior. Petrarch's attack against the Schoolmen marks a major trecento innovation. In the sixteenth century, More carries on Petrarch's battle against methods that fail to lead men to virtue.

This opposition to the professional logician figures in the way that the humanist instructs. He has such a great desire to perfect his fellow men that he employs and appeals to the emotional as well as the rational faculties. He rejects total reliance on the closed fist of the Scholastic's logic. In addition to enlightening the mind of man, the

\(^\text{19}\)Utopia, p. 53.
humanist wishes to stir the heart. Therefore, the humanist teaches as a poet. Hythloday's man-eating sheep and gallows and Petrarch's traitorous Avignon reveal more about the nature of evil than ingenious syllogisms do. Petrarch's just man, Scipio, and More's holy city, Utopia, are far more conducive to human perfection than is the Small Logicals of the Schoolman.

Chapter IV points out that the biblical humanism of the More circle marks the major distinction between More and Petrarch. But one should remember that as Petrarch points the way to the Greek studies which flourished in the More circle so also does he prepare the ground for the interest in Scripture which culminates in Erasmus' edition of the New Testament. Petrarch not only stresses the need for a sound and scholarly text, but he also emphasizes that the whole work as well as each of its parts must be examined. His system of study does not fragment a text.

Hexter notes that John Colet applies to Scripture the methods of study Petrarch uses on classical literature. 20 As a result of his study of the Aeneid, Petrarch feels that Vergil has described a perfect man. By applying his method of textual study to the Gospel, one sees how Christ becomes the center of the More circle.

In regard to Christ and His Church, one hardly needs to mention that Petrarch and More, in spite of their attacks against ecclesiastical corruption, consistently remain loyal and orthodox Roman Catholics even though they assign different roles to Christ. It is safe to say that

20 Ibid., p. lxxv.
Christ is the central figure in the More circle. In Petrarch, however, Christ, who receives the greatest homage, appears to function in the hidden recesses of the humanist's soul. His message does not dominate Petrarch as it does More. The Christ-like sympathy for the poor which pervades *Utopia* testifies to this distinction between More and Petrarch. The orthodoxy of each author, as well as his intense desire to reform abuses within the Church, binds the humanism of More to that of Petrarch.

After viewing the biblical humanism of the More circle and its effect upon Hythloday as a reformer, the focus of the paper shifts to Hythloday's program for renewal. The correction of vice is a primary aim of the Christian humanist. In the *Utopia*, there is a progress toward the climactic exposure of the sources of evil in a commonwealth. The same desire to turn man from sin appears throughout Petrarch's Latin prose. In regard to particular vices, both humanists show how pride and avarice are the greatest evils that debase true values and cause moral disease. They consider these vices as privations and employ all their genius as poets in order to reveal how deadly these enemies are. They go to their classical and Christian heritage and use the notions of Plato, Cicero, and Gregory the Great in order to arm themselves for this combat. Employing classical standards of conduct, More and Petrarch use *a fortiori* arguments derived from studies of antiquity in order to reform Christianity and to condemn "Christian" Europe's behavior. In his desire to correct abuses, neither hesitates to use a Christian "Machiavellianism" which paints too dark a vision of conditions in order to make Europe aware of its evil state. The conclusion of Chapter V centers attention
upon the punishment of vice. Even though More goes into far greater
detail on this point than Petrarch does, both have been commended for
their foresight and humanity in regard to their proposals for treatment
of criminals. They have so great a respect for law that they loath the
quarrels, tricks, and sophistries by which venal advocates abuse the
law. In regard to their ideas on punishment, both hold the Catholic
teaching on eternal retribution and both advocate humane treatment of
the criminal. Penalties should be so ordered as to demolish the evil
but save the man.

In Chapter VI the emphasis becomes positive as Petrarch's concept
of virtue receives close attention. Although Petrarch recognizes various
ideas of virtue, he consistently attempts to portray the notion of
virtus in genere as opposed to virtus in specie. Looking upon virtue
as the most powerful force in history, Petrarch proposes the Stoic notion
of fortitude or endurance. Reason plays an important role in Petrarch's
considerations, for he believes that it is this faculty that must lead
man to practice virtue.

In Utopia More expresses similar beliefs. The Utopian, like
Petrarch's Scipio, never represents a single virtue. He symbolizes
virtus in genere and is a man (vir) because right reason tells him it is
his nature to be virtuous. This Stoic note on the relationship between
reason and virtue finds such clear expression in both Petrarch and More
that it may be considered as a prominent belief of the Christian humanists.

The study of Stoic notions brings up the topic of the origin of
Petrarch's concepts. Although Petrarch relies heavily upon classical
sources, he still offers a Christian ideal of virtue and employs the past in the same way that More does. Both emphasize that liberal studies prepare the way for virtue and that Christian revelation supplements classical ideals. Petrarch's Scipio is like More's Utopia in this regard. Scipio, an instrument of Providence, prepares the Roman world for the coming of Christianity. Likewise, Utopia provides a foundation for a superior city which will be realized when the truths of Christianity inform Utopian ideology. The blending of classical thought on the cardinal virtues with Christian belief on the theological virtues is one of the basic tenets of the Christian humanism of the Renaissance. In addition, when he speaks of virtue, the humanist avoids abstract notions in favor of presentations that focus on man. Petrarch relies on the biography of the hero in order to inspire others to noble deeds. More's just man walks the streets of Utopia, a nation which exhibits "men and resources and laws of surpassing excellence." He has a more humanistic existence than Socrates' ideal who lives in the dialectic of The Republic.

The final point in Chapter VI comments upon the relationship between virtue and fortune. Since More's early poems on this subject can be identified with the theme of De remediis and with the characterization of Byas in Rerum memorandarum libri, it appears quite certain that More is indebted to Petrarch. Petrarch's comments on the power of virtue are extremely important for they give rise to the Renaissance ideal of man that one associates with Christian humanism. This view of human

Ibid., p. 21.
nature finds excellent expression in Pico’s *Oration on the Dignity of Man*. Petrarch depicts this idea in the image of man steering himself through the storms of life in order to create his own destiny. Stoic fortitude protects the vessel from the hostile forces of the heavens. The same metaphor of man guiding a ship is in *Utopia*. Persona-More urges Hythloday not to "abandon the ship in a storm because you cannot control the winds."22

In Chapter VII the thought underlying Petrarch's concept of virtue guides a reading of the discourse in Book II of the *Utopia*. The discourse is divided into two parts: "Virtue and Freedom in Utopia" and "Virtue and the Problem of Evil in Utopia." Throughout both parts the focus is on Petrarch's notion that man creates his own destiny and overcomes the effects of prosperity and adversity by the use of reason and by the practice of virtue. In this chapter there are significant insights into the Christian humanism of the Renaissance. In regard to the motivation for virtue, both authors stress the importance of learning. In addition, each believes that the alliance between faith and reason is absolutely necessary. There can be no virtuous conduct if there is no belief in immortality.

In Chapter VII the differing views of Hexter and Surtz on the importance of philosophy and religion in Book II lead to two brief digressions. It is almost idle to enter this area of investigation since Surtz's Commentary to the scholarly addition of *Utopia* and his two

companions to More's classic, *The Praise of Pleasure* and *The Praise of Wisdom*, provide adequate information to solve these and most other problems facing the student of *Utopia*. Yet Chapter VII notes these points because this dissertation's reading of Book II of *Utopia* sees the discussions of philosophy and religion as the respective climaxes to the two parts of the discourse: "Virtue and Freedom in *Utopia*" and "Virtue and the Problem of Evil in *Utopia*.

Before concluding, one inference from this study merits observation. Because More and Petrarch agree on many vital issues, it appears that the Christian humanism of the Northern Renaissance should not be considered independently of the movement originated by Petrarch. The early Renaissance in England should be viewed in relation to the culture and civilization of a united Christendom. Even the distinctive biblical interests of the More circle, though not found *in esse*, do exist *in posse* in Petrarch's humanism.

Finally, it now seems logical to synthesize the foregoing summaries in a manner that will pinpoint the ideal of human perfection which More shares with Petrarch. In order to prevent a misconception from arising, one may recall that the biblical humanism of the More circle--existing *in posse* in Petrarch--amounts to the only notable distinction between the two authors. Their many similarities reflect the accuracy of Surtz's comment that More inherits the "vital tradition of the Christian West during the Renaissance."23 Originating in Petrarch and culminating in

More, this tradition guides man to **Sapientia**, an ideal which demands that the pursuit of knowledge and the practice of virtue complement each other. Even though every individual who makes this ascent looks upon himself as an independent thinker, he, along with others like him, avoids particular intellectual and moral evils and, conversely, embraces certain specific disciplines. In his progress toward self-realization, the open-minded humanist shuns and abhors the blindness imposed, for example, by superstition, astrology, and sterile logic. Yet, because of the inability of the human mind to comprehend fully the nature of God and the immortality of the soul, he acknowledges his weakness and depends upon divine revelation in order to enlighten his darkness. In regard to moral evil, the adaptability of the humanist shows itself in the variety of means he employs as he exhorts his fellow men to escape from enslavement to avarice and pride. Using all the resources of the poet, at one time he may try to make man laugh himself out of his folly, and at another he may endeavor to purge man from vice by prophetic denunciation.

Although the above statements on intellectual and moral evil provide helpful generalizations, the exact goal of Petrarch and More comes into focus when one sees that their discipline arises from the humanist's axiom "**Ad Fontes!**" The Greek, Latin, and Hebrew texts which are the fountainheads of Western civilization contain the body of intellectual truths and moral imperatives which the humanist first masters and then uses for various reasons. These classics can refresh and entertain as well as console and instruct. In addition, the fruits of these studies benefit others. For example, Petrarch's divine man, Scipio, and More's
holy city, Utopia, provide the individual and the state with incentives to virtue.

As a result of the New Learning, Petrarch and More believe that God wants men to reach, for themselves and for society, a high degree of perfection—cultus et humanitas—by assimilating the ideals that He reveals indirectly in the classics and directly in the Scriptures. In regard to the former, these humanists acknowledge the importance of Greek culture and seek a deep understanding of Plato, the foremost philosopher, who comes nearer to the spirit of the Gospel than any other ancient author. Employing Latin for oral and written dialogue with their confreres, they make Cicero preeminent among the Roman writers because of his prose style and on account of the moral focus in his works. Under ideal conditions and in the company of their peers, they master Greek and Latin in a community of scholars where the Fathers of the Church—especially St. Jerome and St. Augustine—complement God's direct revelation in the Scriptures, the only texts which surpass the venerated classics of Greece and Rome. Thus, briefly and simply, Petrarch and More share the Renaissance tradition that encourages men to observe the moral precepts and to understand the intellectual truths which reside in Greek, Latin, and Hebrew classics so that they may ascend to Sapientia. This ideal has eternal significance, for the Christian humanists believe that this wisdom never fails. It leads Petrarch to the repose his restless spirit longs for and More to the merriness he seeks with God.
APPENDIX

TWO LETTERS OF PETRARCH

These two letters are reproduced from *Epistolae de rebus familiaribus et variae*, 3 vols., ed. Joseph Fracassetti (Florence: F. LeMonnier, 1863), III, 440-442, 473-476. For their complete significance, see Chapter VI, above. This chapter refers to an allegory of virtue which Petrarch describes in the following letter, Epistola L.

cuius in circuitu roscidis cespitibus ripisque recentibus
cursum fraenantisbus, undarum late gratissimum murmur strepit.
Haec igitur summa consilii mei set. Arborem hanc quaerite
omni studio ut facitis: inventam cupidis ulnis arripte, et
tenete, et colite, et amate; amari enim ante alias digna est,
sacra comam, ut ait Maro, et cunctis humanorum aestuum vaporibus
inaccesa. Haerete certatim truncu illius usque ad vesperam,
nemo vos inde divellet. Nusquam melius mansuri estis, ibi enim,
mini credite, nec Cancrium timebitis, nec Leonem. Vale amice,
et clarissimum illum virum percussionationis tuae responsique mei
participem, quem, teste animo, profunde diligo, tuo ore meis
verbis iterum atque iterum salvere iube. Mediolani.

In the following letter, Epistola LXI, Petrarch explices the
allegory described above:

Uberem messem parvo de semine messui. Arborem quam stilo
descripseram coloribus designasti; ac memorem Horatianae
sententiae ubi ait:

Segnius irritant animos demissa per aures
Quam quae sunt oculis subiecta fidelibus,

quod auribus ingesseram oculis subiectisti, non contentus nisi
et eius oppositum insuper, et huius vitae arenam habitatam
mortalibus addidisses: ubi ad tempus utrumque permixtum, et
heu! non aequis portionibus confusa sunt omnia, discernenda
novissime, et suprmi flabro iudicii ventilanda. Ostendi
realiter, amice, arborem tibi notissimam, quam, ut de singulis
dubitans philosophico consilio videaret, verbo dicis incognitam.
Est ergo (quoniam haesitatio tua interpretem me videtur
exposcere), est, inquam, arbor illa quam putas, nec te fallit
opinio. Quomodo enim, ut de te sileam, amicum illum magnum,
quem tuae dubitationis tuaeque inqauriae narras indagation.
Est igitur est
utique virtus ipsa quod visum dicis ambobus: virtus olim
quadriditos habens ramos, propter quadripartitam honestatis
speciem, solo nomine late notam: quos ideo spectare terram
dixi, quia quatuor morales, pro ea praesertim parte quam
politiam vocant, civiles actus ac terram respiciunt. Has sane,
quod invitus fator, maioribus nostris constat aliquanto magis
uisse cultas quam nobis, praecipueque principibus; quos
pastorum appellatione notavi, qui usque adeo iam aerei facti
sunt, ut amare homines et curare terrestria vile ducant, ac
praeiudicium maestatis, cum tamen omnes iisdem ex seminibus
qui pro brevi papyro non eam modo de qua loquebar arborem, sed
totum mihi terrarum orbem in membranis descriptum insigni
quidem artificio remisistis: utque ambobus et arboris ostensae
refrigerium, et mentium corporumque valetudinem inconcussam ac
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APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by Brother Robert Coogan, C.F.C., has been read and approved by members of the Department of English.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

May 29, 1967
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Edward Lustz
Signature of Adviser