The Triumph of Collectivism: An Analysis of the Factors Involved in the Election of 1932

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THE TRIUMPH OF COLLECTIVISM
AN ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE ELECTION OF 1932

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER
OF ARTS IN LOYOLA UNIVERSITY

JUNE 1949
VITA

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. THE CANDIDATES</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert Hoover - Background - Pre-Convention Activities - Democratic Candidates - Alfred E. Smith - Franklin D. Roosevelt - Pre-Convention Activities</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. THE CONVENTIONS</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican - Setting and Preliminaries - Keynote Address - Nominations - Democratic - Keynote Address and Preliminaries - Maneuvering for Position - Nominations</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. THE ISSUES</strong></td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV. THE CAMPAIGN</strong></td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt's Acceptance Speech - Campaign Organization - Campaign Funds - Early Campaign Addresses - Hoover Versus Roosevelt - Roosevelt's Western Trip - Drawing the Issues - Hoover Fights back - Excerpts from both Candidates Speeches - The Eve of the Election</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V. THE ELECTION</strong></td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results - Some Analyses of the Vote - Trends Manifested in 1932 Election - Influence of the Campaign - Triumph of Collectivism</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An Annotated Bibliography | 93 |
CHAPTER I

THE CANDIDATES

An analysis of an election in the United States demands the careful study of several elements. Perhaps the chief among these is an actual knowledge of the lives of the individual candidates, at least insofar as their lives prepared them for their bid for the Presidency. This is especially true in the United States where the two major political parties present different viewpoints rather than different basic philosophies of government for consideration by the voters. The actual candidate and his personality play an important role in the garnering of votes, which is, after all, the way to win an election. In order to understand the election of 1932, it is essential to know the candidates and what they did to qualify themselves for their bid for the Presidency.

There were many political parties with definite platforms in the depression year of 1932. For the sake of completeness, their names were: Progressive Democratic, Liberty, Farmer-Labor, Industrial, Industrialist, Jobless, Jobless Independent, Communist, Independent Communist, Socialist, Socialist Labor, Independent Socialist Labor, Prohibition, Democratic and Republican. But the only parties necessary to study in an analysis of
the election are the Republicans and Democrats. Only 1,163,181 votes out of almost 40,000,000 went to the "other" parties. Of that number 825,640 were cast for parties pledged to the nominee of the Democratic Party. Out of the entire nation, only 347,672 votes were given to the "other" candidates.

The Republican Party was incumbent in 1932. A Republican administration had occupied the White House since 1921, when the nation had swept Harding into the Presidency in the aftermath of the war. Harding had been succeeded by Calvin Coolidge, Coolidge by Herbert Clark Hoover in 1928. Hoover was completing his first term in 1932.

The election of 1932 cannot be understood without a knowledge of Hoover's background and, in particular, a knowledge of his actions during his four years as President. He had been inaugurated in an era of great prosperity. The problems he was expected to solve as President were few in number. In fact, there were only three main difficulties before the executive; the enforcement of the prohibition laws, limited tariff changes, and some relief to the farmer, who was lagging behind his prosperous countrymen in the "boom" of 1928. It was felt that Hoover was an engineering wizard who could surmount all obstacles placed in his way. In fact, he had been inaugurated "As a superman whose engineering genius would reform
and elevate the art of government." There was no inkling in 1928 of the magnitude of the problems which would confront Mr. Hoover before another election occurred.

Who was this genius who would lead the United States to even greater prosperity than it was experiencing in the "roaring twenties?" Herbert Clark Hoover was born in West Branch, Iowa on August 10, 1874. He was the son of Jesse C. Hoover and Hulda Randall Minthron. He received an A.B. degree from Stanford University in California as a mining engineer in 1895, and had gone immediately to work with the United States Geological Survey in the Sierra Nevada mountains. His engineering activities took him to Australia in 1897, and two years later to China where he became Chief Engineer of the Chinese Imperial Bureau of Mines. He took part in the Boxer Rebellion while in Tientsin in 1900. The mining profession took him to many other parts of the globe as well.

Hoover's record of public service began as a representative to the Panama-Pacific Exposition in Europe in 1913 and 1914. He became famous throughout the world when sent to London as chairman of the American Relief Committee and for his work on the Belgium Relief Commission after the war broke out.

President Wilson appointed Mr. Hoover as Food Administrator for the United States of America in 1917, a position he held until 1919.

Upon the election to the Presidency of Warren G. Harding, Herbert Hoover was appointed Secretary of Commerce in 1921, a position he held until 1928. After the war he had likewise been elected President of the American Mining Engineers Association, and had membership in other engineering groups. Mr. Hoover had officially retired from business in 1914, but he held stocks in mining corporations all over the world. He was estimated to be worth over $4,000,000 upon his retirement. However, he had lost heavily during the depression and by 1932 was reputedly worth $700,000. He had been elected President of the United States over Alfred E. Smith in 1928, carrying forty states, and was inaugurated on March 4, 1929.

Mr. Hoover had three problems to face as President. The first was the enforcement of the prohibition laws. In many sections of the land police, politicians, and bootleggers worked together to evade the unpopular statute. The President formed the Wickersham Commission to investigate the problem. The eleven man group reported in favor of repealing or amending the eighteenth amendment. This was contrary to the President's views so he disowned the committee and continued the attempts at enforcement. The problem continued unsolved.

2 Ibid., 237.
Hoover's attempts in his first year in office to solve the farmer's problems were no more successful. The president sought to encourage the farmers to decrease their acreage voluntarily. When this failed to produce results the administration sat back and tried to tell the farmers that it had at least tried. By this farm policy, "Hoover... lost the support of progressives in his own party, notable Senator Borah of Idaho."

The problem of revising some tariffs in order to benefit agriculture was the third task before the President during 1929. Mr. Hoover left it to the Congress to solve the problem with the result that the usual log-rolling process so delayed any action that it was June, 1930 before any tariff measure was enacted. This act, many months after the crash, was the famous Hawley-Smoot tariff which Mr. Hoover signed over the protests of one thousand leading American economists. As one author puts it:

For his failure to assume leadership on the tariff issue, the Democrats opened a fierce barrage upon Mr. Hoover which, rightly or wrongly, impressed the country. Even so stalwart an advocate of Republicanism as William Allen White agreed that the President had played his cards badly on the deal.4

Such, then, were Mr. Hoover's attempts to face

3 Ibid., 6.
4 Ibid., 7.
the problems before the nation between his inaugural and October 1929. Even with a Republican Senate and House, his solutions were not successful. The fact, however, that the United States was enjoying great prosperity softened criticism of the President for his lack of success. In fact, few people, except those directly concerned, were particularly interested in these matters. But before the end of October, 1929, the dream world in which Americans were living suddenly disappeared, and the people were forced to face the hard facts of depression, poverty, and hunger. Then it was that all turned to Washington for leadership, and for relief from the throttling grip of economic collapse. Then it was that the people became very interested in their government and its leaders. The government which had been enjoying the cake with them, was now looked to for the mere bread of sustenance. The government's ability to provide or not to provide aid would result in either acceptance or repudiation of its leaders. Hoover faced a giant's task. But had he not been inaugurated as a genius who could accomplish anything?

The President's actions from the stock market debacle of October 24, 1929 onward are important in the analysis of the 1932 election because he had to stand or fall in his bid for reelection on the record he had made during his first term. It is outside the scope of this study to attempt a complete history of this period, but it is essential to survey the major developments
before delineating Mr. Hoover's campaign for re-nomination, which actually overlaps the era.

After the crash, the President, along with the majority of people in the country believed that the nation had merely suffered a temporary blow, "an isolated phenomenon of no great significance to the business world in general." His policies reflected this belief that nothing particularly disastrous had occurred. Mr. Hoover urged voluntary cooperation with business, states, and cities. He felt that it was not the government's task to inaugurate new and radical measures, but rather to aid existing institutions in every way possible.

Even in 1932, Mr. Hoover remained adamant in this policy of individualism. His speech in acceptance of re-nomination contains his analysis of the depression.

Being prosperous, we became optimistic—all of us. From optimism some of us want to overexpansion in anticipation of the future, and from overexpansion to reckless speculation. In the soil poisoned by speculation grew those ugly weeds of waste, exploitation, and abuse of financial power. In this overproduction and speculative mania we marched with the rest of the world.

After this analysis, the President declared that

5 Ibid., 8.
retribution came upon us by the "inevitable slump in consumption of goods, in prices, and unemployment." He stoutly maintained that the depression was the normal penalty for such a boom, and that the United States always weathered these regular periods of decline safely.

Mr. Hoover's bid for re-election was based on the assumption that he had done a good job in leading the nation through his first term. In the light of even more acute depression in 1932 than in 1929, his justification of that leadership is important. Upon what did he predicate his claim? His own words show us better than any other source the principles for which he stood, and his evaluation of his success. Mr. Hoover was essentially a conservative. His way of combatting the depression was representative of a definite philosophy of government. He expressed it thus:

Two courses were open. We might have done nothing. That would have been utter ruin. Instead we met the situation with proposals to private business and Congress of the most gigantic program of economic defense and counter attack ever evolved in the history of the Republic. We put it into action. . . . We have maintained the financial integrity of our government. We have cooperated to restore and stabilize the situation.

7 Ibid., 19.
abroad. As a nation we have paid every dollar demanded of us. We have used the credit of the government to aid and protect our institutions public and private. We have provided methods and assurances that there shall be none to suffer from the cold. . . . Above all we have maintained the sanctity of the principles upon which this Republic has grown great.8

The federal government, in the President's estimation, had done everything within its constitutional jurisdiction to fight the depression. He, as President, had provided as much leadership as our system of government allowed. Hoover felt that "government by the people has not been defiled," and that individual liberty and freedom had been preserved by his handling of the crisis. In fact, it seemed more important to Hoover to preserve what he considered the traditional relationship of government to individual during this period of crises than to change it for emergency needs. "It is not the function of the government to relieve individuals of their responsibilities to their neighbors, or to relieve private institutions of their responsibilities to the public, or of local government to the states, or of the state governments to the federal government." He felt that that responsibility for the national welfare rested with the individual.

8 Ibid., 17, 18.
9 Ibid., 19.
10 Ibid.
This philosophy of government, so out of date today, was Hoover's justification for his leadership from 1929 to 1932. He felt, apparently with sincerity, that he had done his utmost, consistent with his principles of American government, to bring the nation through the perilous period. The majority of the population did not agree, and he was defeated in 1932. But he went down fighting for the individualistic theory of American government. Collectivism won out with the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Whether the people of the United States recognized this distinction is doubtful. But the distinction nonetheless existed. Mr. Hoover's noble ambition was "to keep the Presidency the same as we received it. We have not resorted to short cuts to temporary success which would ultimately undermine the system built during one hundred and fifty years."

So Herbert Hoover felt that his record justified renomination by the Republican Party in 1932, despite the fact that economic conditions in the country had become worse instead of better. Hoover advocated, and Congress had passed the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, and the Glass-Steagall Act to reform the Federal Reserve System. Both of these measures had helped somewhat to combat the recession, but the nation still was foundering, with unemployment increasing on all sides.

11 Ibid., 21.
"America", in the words of one author, "demanded more heroic measures to bring back prosperity. ... It was his (Hoover's) fate that individualism as a philosophy of government and as a system met its deathblow with the crash of the stock market in October, 1929."

This brief survey of Mr. Hoover's background and of his leadership during his term as President, bringing in as it does some mention of the national picture prior to 1932 is essential to any understanding of that election. However, before studying the other candidates, Mr. Hoover's actual bid for renomination must be considered.

The New York Times on Sunday, June 12, 1932, two days before the opening of the Republican Convention in Chicago, speaking of Hoover's re-nomination said, "this, of course, will be the principal business of the gathering, and it was all settled months ago." In other words, Mr. Hoover's re-nomination was assured long before the convention. But the story is not quite as simple as that. The Republican Party was far from enthusiastic about Mr. Hoover during 1931 and 1932. "A great many Republican bigwigs had never liked him personally ... and the President did not go out of his way to win their favor."

12 Peel and Donnelly, 14, 15.
14 Peel and Donnelly, 19, 20.
Even among the ordinary Republican voters of the nation, there was apathy towards a President who was so widely blamed for the depression.

It is, though, an established tradition that a president who wants a second term should be re-nominated by his party. There are very few exceptions to this in American political history. If Mr. Hoover had expressed a desire not to run, many Republicans would have been happier over their prospects. But once he let it be known that he wanted another chance, his nomination was a certainty. The President controls the patronage and the party organization and it is next to impossible for his own party to oppose him. Then, too, there was the widespread feeling that the party would have to stand or fall in November, 1932 on the basis of its record during Hoover's administration. That record could not be repudiated if there was to be any chance of success at the polls.

The Republican factions that did express hostility to Mr. Hoover usually spoke of either Senator Dwight Morrow, of New Jersey or a return to Calvin Coolidge. Morrow's popularity had been greatly enhanced by his daughter's marriage to Charles Lindbergh, the popular hero. But upon Senator Morrow's death and Coolidge's definite refusal to run, there was no one of any prominence mentioned to supplant Hoover.

Once it was decided that Hoover wanted the 1932
nomination, he and his chief advisers set to work on the tremendous problem of building up the President's popularity before the nation. This pre-convention campaign was begun in January, 1931. Letters went out from Robert H. Lucas, executive director of the Republican National Committee, to all precinct leaders in the nation admonishing them to "defend the President." It was hoped that such tactics would help to counteract the widespread criticism of the President.

Mr. Hoover's relationship with the Washington correspondents had not been very friendly. Through these sources, his policies, ideas, opinions, even pictures went out to the nation. There was a "widespread public belief that Mr. Hoover was a hardboiled and coldblooded individual who was totally unmoved by the distress of the working classes. . . . Instead of radiating confidence and good cheer in the presence of the economic crisis, his portraits made one want to sell short, get the money in gold, and bury it." In addition, many derogatory stories were circulated about him which did much to lessen his popularity.

Realizing the President's mounting unpopularity,

15 Ibid., 50.
16 Ibid., 51.
positive attempts were made to change this bad impression of him. Theodore Joslin and James West went to work to build Hoover support. The former had charge of "humanizing" him, the latter was to attempt to convince the nation that the President was an effective leader. The fact that the press saw through this scheme and went to work to scuttle it, instead of cooperating, did not daunt Hoover's aides.

In general their campaign failed. By promising, for example, in May that the "worst was over" and then having unemployment increase in June, they hurt the executive's chances more than they aided them. The one point upon which they enjoyed some success was their retaliation against Democratic criticism of the administration by pointing to the Democratic controlled House of Representatives. The Democrats had won a majority in the 1930 congressional elections. Under the leadership of Speaker Garner the House had not been noted for its efficiency. "Look at the House under Democratic rule!" was the stock reply of Republicans to critics. It was a good one, because the House got entirely out of Garner's control. Undoubtedly this phase of Hoover's pre-convention campaign saved many votes for the Republicans. Yet the attempt to build confidence in the President

18 Peel and Donnelly, 53, 54.
19 Ibid., 55.
by a new publicity campaign was not in general effective in the face of continuing unemployment and depression. Hoover's popularity during the thick of this fight to "humanize" him was really at its lowest point. The country was inundated with cruel stories about him which easily balanced all attempts of his publicity chiefs. An example of one of these is recounted by F. R. Kent in *Scribners*. "The President asked Mr. Mellon to lend him a nickel to buy a friend a soda. Mellon answered, 'Here's a dime, treat 'em all.'"

Herbert Hoover had declared that he wanted renomination, therefore, according to political procedure, he was certain to be the candidate in November, 1932. If he had succeeded in bringing prosperity back to the nation by June 1932, when the convention assembled in Chicago, the Republicans would not have met in an atmosphere of gloom. Republican attempts to whip up enthusiasm had failed. Public apathy to the G.O.P. convention was shown by the drastic price-cutting of admission tickets two days before the convention opened.

"Under the circumstances experienced political observers had no hesitation in prophesying a Democratic victory; the Democratic nomination therefore was a prize of real value.

20 *Scribners*, November, 1932, F. R. Kent.
as it had been in 1912, and there were numerous contestants for it." Among the most prominent of those mentioned were Alfred E. Smith, Franklin D. Roosevelt, John N. Garner, Governor Albert C. Ritchie of Maryland, and James A. Reed of Missouri. However, Roosevelt and Smith early emerged as the leading candidates, and the others were mentioned, if at all, as "dark horses." In such a study as this, which is primarily of the election, not the conventions, it is only necessary to show how Mr. Roosevelt won the nomination. To do this, however, his chief opposition, Alfred E. Smith, must be considered.

Alfred E. Smith was born in New York City on December 30, 1873. He went into politics at the age of twenty-one as Clerk of the New York City Jury Commission. Later he was elected to the State legislature where he served for twelve years. He followed that by becoming Sheriff of New York County from 1915 to 1917, and President of the Board of Aldermen during 1917 and 1918. He was Governor of New York during 1919 and 1920, and from 1923 to 1928. Mr. Smith was nominated for President by the Democratic Party in 1928, but lost the election.

Alfred E. Smith had not relinquished his nominal leadership of the party after 1928, even though he was generally

quoted as not wishing to run for President again. Smith had a
large personal following due to his record, his lovable character
and magnetic personality. And despite all official utterances,
by 1931 he was thinking of the Presidency. "Smith's actions of
1931 and 1932, though under cover for the most part, revealed
him as a man with his heart set on being re-nominated."

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the popular Governor of
New York was the other outstanding candidate for the nomination.
In fact, he was one of the few among the myriads of Democratic
candidates who was definitely "available." Roosevelt had set
his presidential boom in motion after his re-election as Governor
of New York in 1930. He gave James A. Farley freedom to go to
work to secure the nomination, when both felt that Smith really
meant his 1928 withdrawal.

Franklin D. Roosevelt was the son of James Roosevelt
and Sara Delano. He was educated at Groton School, Harvard,
and the Columbia University law school. He married Anna Eleanor
Roosevelt in 1905 and was admitted to the bar in 1907. He was
of Dutch ancestry and an Episcopalian. Four sons and a daughter
made up his family.

24 Peel and Donnelly, 28.
25 James A. Farley, Jim Farley's Story, The Roosevelt Years,
Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New York-Toronto,
1948, 10.
His political career began with election to the New York Senate in 1910 and 1912. During the war, President Wilson appointed him Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Mr. Roosevelt was nominated for Vice-President of the United States by the Democratic Party in 1920. He was a delegate to the Democratic National Conventions in 1920, 1924, and 1928. It was he who nominated Alfred E. Smith in 1924 and 1928. Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected Governor of New York in 1928 and re-elected in 1930.

Mr. Roosevelt's business connections were in law and banking. He had been a member of the New York firm of Carter, Ledyard and Millium from 1907 to 1910. In 1910 he became associated with the law firm of Langdon P. Marvin and Henry S. Hooker. He became eastern manager and a vice-president of the Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland in 1920 and continued this connection until his election to the Presidency. In addition, he was a partner in the law firm of Roosevelt and O'Connor from 1924 to 1933.

Franklin D. Roosevelt's wealth was computed at $300,000 in 1932. This, however, does not include the Hyde Park, New York estate nor his mother's $500,000 estate, both of which would go to him upon her death. He had lost about $5,000 during the depression from 1929-1932.

26 Who's Who, 1932, 2891.
27 Peel and Donnelly, 236.
Mr. Roosevelt was the Democratic candidate for nomination with the greatest assets and fewest liabilities. The fact that Mr. Hoover had declared that "Roosevelt was his favorite candidate, the one he was told he could most easily beat," only showed Hoover's political judgment to be bad. Franklin D. Roosevelt's assets included his courageous battle against infantile paralysis which had won him the respect of many Americans. His placing of Smith's name in nomination in 1924 and 1928 had also built up Roosevelt's popularity. His association with Woodrow Wilson, his victories in New York State, even in Republican years nationally, had helped keep his name in the public eye. As Peel and Donnelly sum it up, the "East considered him wet and not radical, the West considered him a progressive, the South a 'reasonable wet and a Protestant." Mr. Roosevelt's chief liability was the antagonism of Smith who really did desire the nomination.

Roosevelt's bandwagon secured a long lead early due to the skilled work of James A. Farley and Louis McHenry Howe. Democratic leaders in every corner of the land were visited in person by Farley and told of the certainty of Roosevelt's nomination and election. Polls were taken, all of which predicted Roosevelt's success. These polls helped create public support.

28 Time, July 11, 1932, 7.
29 Peel and Donnelly, 31.
for him. People who read their results climbed aboard the bandwagon to be with the winner. "Truly, no piece of strategy in the pre-convention period was more successful than these surveys. Furthermore, their use must be reckoned the most unique maneuver of the campaign."

Franklin D. Roosevelt had specifically announced his candidacy on January 23, 1932; Smith on February 6. Smith's hope, in view of the Roosevelt bandwagon, was to hold enough votes away from him to prevent the two-thirds majority required by the Democratic convention. Thus, by deadlocking the assembly he could either get himself elected or name the candidate. Smith's definite candidacy brought out some other candidates who would not have declared themselves had he not. The "dark horses" began to gain a little hope.

The Democratic pre-convention campaign ended in doubt. Franklin D. Roosevelt had a majority of pledged delegates, but not two-thirds. Smith did not have one-third. The unpledged and the favorite son states would have to be bargained for. The story of the convention is one of political maneuvering and hard bargaining. It is the story of the success of James A. Farley.

30 Ibid., 61.
The Republican National Convention of 1932 opened on June 14, in Chicago in an atmosphere of deep dissension. But that dissension was not caused by the presidential nomination task facing the delegates. As Arthur Krock, veteran political reporter for The New York Times wrote:

For the first time since 1912 a Republican Convention assembled to renominate an incumbent of the White House is reflecting deep inner dissension. The arguments are now over the prohibition question and on the renomination of Vice President Charles Curtis. . . .

The gathering thus far is marked by an air of great quiet, variously explained as reflecting the serious industrial condition of the nation, the uphill fight which many believe lies before the party and the lack of personal popularity of the President and Vice President. 1

As has been shown in the first chapter, Mr. Hoover's renomination was a dead certainty. He was the President, and he desired another term. Therefore, no one could oppose him with much chance of success. It might also be added that in 1932 there were few prominent Republicans seeking the nomination. To many, the cause seemed hopeless and they did not want to be associated prominently with a losing team.

Chicago businessmen had contributed $150,000 to the Republican National Committee in order to play host to the convention. It was said officially that the "windy city" was selected because of its central location and hotel accommodations. But the fact that Illinois is an important state politically, coupled with the cash outlay, is not to be disregarded in studying this choice.

Newspaper and radio coverage of the convention was at an all time high. Comments on the eve of its opening reflect the general attitude towards Mr. Hoover and his party. Will Rogers wrote, "The whole town is on edge, just waiting for the Democrats to come." Jouett Shouse, chairman of the Democratic National Executive Committee referred to the Republican Convention as a "lodge of sorrow" in which Hoover would be "grudgingly nominated." Elmer Davis, another correspondent, wrote: "Thirty-six hours before the great gathering is due to open Chicago is about as lively as a college town after the college has closed for the summer. . . . The only business before the convention is the heaping of praise and honor on a man most of them would like to drop into the Potomac with a millstone tied around his neck, if they could." Arthur Sears Henning:

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
"The President inspires no enthusiasm. He is going to be re-nominated because his rejection would be a confession of party failure that would be fatal to the Republican fortunes in the election."

The convention was called to order by the national chairman, Senator Fess of Ohio, at eleven o'clock in the morning. It became evident early that the administration was in control of the convention, in the seating of some disputed delegates and the appointment of committees. Following the preliminaries, the keynote address was given by Senator L. H. Dickinson of Iowa, a blood and thunder orator of the bombast school. It was necessary for the Republicans to find a goat to blame for the depression which was neither Republican nor American. The Republican keynote address of 1932 was not an easy one to give. Even before the convention opened, critics were waiting expectantly for the party to "point with pride" to its record so that they could laugh such statements to scorn.

The speech is marvelous in the way it avoids all controversial issues, praises Hoover's administration and blames the Democrats for practically all the nation's evils. It failed

5 Chicago Sunday Tribune, June 12, 1932.
to even mention prohibition, the most debatable issue before the convention. Many leaders and one third of the delegates were absent as Dickinson began his speech. The hall was even emptier at its conclusion. The actual issues of the campaign, including the platforms of both parties, will be treated in another chapter, but it seems essential in tracing Mr. Hoover's nomination to at least scan some of the ideas in the keynote speech, which reflected the President's thought. For in the campaign to follow, Hoover's bid for the reelection would have to stand on the record of his administration. This record was recounted by Senator Dickinson.

The keynote address began by recounting the Republican record of the last four years. He showed how Mr. Hoover had done infinitely more to combat the depression than any other President "In the fourteen major economic dislocations which have gone before." The senator recounted Hoover's use of the Federal Reserve Board, prevention of wage disturbances, unemployment relief, increase of government building projects, cooperation with state highway and other construction efforts, and ending of practically all immigration. The speaker contrasted these real measures with the lack of leadership abroad. The President

6 Peel and Donnelly, 84.
7 Republican Campaign Textbook, 45.
had preserved "a stable social order, the people united in aid to their less fortunate fellows."

The keynote address then took up, in order, Mr. Hoover's reconstruction plans, and Democratic obstructionists. The former were greatly hampered by the latter. Dwelling on the Democratic opposition especially since 1930, Senator Dickinson said:

For two long years they hampered the President at every turn. Through a highly subsidized press bureau, Democratic Congressmen sought to distort his every word, to belittle his effort at human and economic relief; to impugn his every motive; to frustrate his every move. Their orders were to 'smear Hoover.'

After this opening blow, the keynoter went on to discuss the record in a more detailed manner, heaping more and more blame on the Democrats for the nation's evils. He accuses them of causing the agricultural evils of the entire decade because of the policies of the Wilson administration -- drastic deflation, free trade policy on farm products. Taking up the omnipresent tariff problem, the keynoter defended the Hawley-Smoot Act of 1930, with out which "we would long since been inundated by a flood of cheaply produced foreign products."

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8 Ibid. 46.
9 Ibid. 48.
10 Ibid. 50.
11 Ibid. 53.
He charged that despite their frequent denunciation of the act, the Democrats had furnished the margin of votes necessary to enact it, and despite their control of the House since 1930, not a single tariff rate had been lowered.

The address treated of many other issues, but the tenor can be seen from these examples. The Republican National Committee apparently was trying to capitalize on its most telling point, criticism of Democratic leadership. It will be remembered from the first chapter how this line of attack, planned by Mr. Hoover's boosters, had been the most successful. The keynoter had carried it into the convention.

The speech ended on the expected note of party loyalty. Senator Dickinson in a fervid burst of oratory concludes:

"Today partisanship is sublimated before patriotism. And yet to my mind there is no greater patriotism than the employment of every effort towards the restoration of normal conditions. And there can be no more dependable means to this end than the re-election of Herbert Hoover as President of the United States."

Press reaction to the keynote address was quite consistent. Arthur Sears Henning, covering for the Chicago Tribune, noted the conservatism of the speech as indicative of the appeal President Hoover wished the Republican Party to

12 Ibid., 57.
make the people during the campaign. "It will base its case on the record of the Hoover administration, but it will avoid so far as possible discussion of the prohibition issue. . . . The Republican Party will go to the people as the party of conservatism, warning the country of the dangers of radicalism which will be imputed to the Democrats." Even a stalwart Republican newspaper, the New York Herald Tribune, noted, in an editorial, the absence of mention of vital issues. "The people of this country are keenly interested at the moment in knowing not only what the Republican Administration and party have done but also what they propose to do."

Most delegates were much more interested in the prohibition issue than in Hoover's renomination, the keynote address or any other convention business. A glance at the newspapers of the period will suffice to show how the great interest was centered in the platform plank on prohibition. The only real excitement of the Republican Convention of 1932 was caused by this issue. On Wednesday night, June 15, a four hour battle was begun in the presence of twenty thousand spectators, lasting until one-fifteen o'clock Thursday morning. The Republican platform had been dictated from Washington by the President and

his associates. The convention sat in silence until the prohibition plank was read, little concerned with the grave economic issues facing the nation. The platform straddled the prohibition issue, promising more adequate enforcement of the liquor laws, and leaving an opening for states by passage of a new amendment to let their citizens decide for or against repeal, but always under federal control. This plank touched off a scene of turmoil in the Chicago Stadium. But despite the reading of a minority report favoring outright repeal of the eighteenth amendment, and several hours of debate, the convention decided 681 to 472 to accept the platform as read. This vote showed surprising strength among the forces of repeal, but also proved that "from the beginning to end the meeting was firmly under the control of Mr. Hoover."

With the platform adopted, the next order of business was the nomination of President. This was done on Thursday, June 17. Mr. Hoover's name was placed in nomination by Joseph L. Scott of California. Of course this touched off a demonstration which lasted half an hour. The only other candidate nominated was former Senator Joseph I. France of Maryland who had no real support from any section of the country. Maryland was not even

15 Peel and Donnelly, 90.
for him. President Hoover was renominated on the first ballot. The vote on the nomination for President was:

Herbert Hoover Of California. 
John J. Blaine of Wisconsin. 
Calvin Coolidge of Massachusetts. 
Jospeh I. France of Maryland. 
Charles G. Dawes of Illinois. 
James W. Wadsworth of New York. 
Absent or not voting.

Very little time elapsed before candidates for the Vice-President's office were placed in nomination. Here a real revolt against Hoover had threatened for weeks, and broke out on the convention floor. Many Republicans desired a younger, more vigorous, and more colorful personality than Charles Curtis. On the first ballot Curtis was nineteen votes short of a majority of 578, but a switch of seventy-five votes by Pennsylvania sent him across the line. No other candidate was even close to Mr. Curtis in total votes, but twelve nominees split almost half of the votes between them. The second highest total belonged to Hanford MacNider of Iowa with 182\(\frac{3}{4}\) to the Vice-President's final 634\(\frac{1}{2}\).

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16 Chicago Daily Tribune, June 17, 1932.
So the Republican Convention came to an conclusion on the afternoon of June 16. It had been completely dominated by administration forces. The nominees, the platform, and the appointment of party officials had followed Mr. Hoover's wishes. The Republican Party had no new faces, and only a slightly modified platform with which to woo the 1932 voters. There was nothing or no one to counteract the unpopularity of the men who had run the nation during its greatest financial crisis. The Republicans had to stand on their record. They had to defend Hoover. They had to defend Prohibition. For thus their convention had decided.

"The Republicans had met in apprehension that defeat was just around the corner. In contrast, the Democrat's met with the joyous enthusiasm of crusaders." Thus wrote James A. Farley, a man who should know how the Democrats felt because of his inner party contacts. It is a well known fact that the Democrats assembled in Chicago on June 27, 1932 with the scent of a Presidential victory in the air. Excitement, gaiety, joy filled their gatherings. The supporters of various candidates were on hand early to cajole, implore, demand or bargain for the delegates' votes. This feud which had developed between Alfred

17 Farley, 14.
E. Smith and Franklin D. Roosevelt was simmering in the hotel room meetings and threatened to boil over at any minute and pour its torrid steam out upon the very convention floor. "Delegates arriving in Chicago found their leaders already locked in a struggle which might make or break their party."

Some of the press comments on convention eve are illuminating. Always ready with a quip, the irrepressible Will Rogers in his regular column wrote, "If this convention stopped right now two days before it starts, it's been a better convention that the Republican one. . . . The plan is to 'stop' Roosevelt, then everybody 'stop' each other." Most reporters agreed that the delegates would see some fireworks before the convention was very old. Time said, "Where Republicans smother their differences in committee, Democrats fight theirs out in public. Where Republicans represent the People, Democrats are the People — noisy, emotional, opinionated." Nor was the press wrong. The Convention's anticipated strife simmered under cover during the first day as National Chairman Raskob opened the proceedings, Commandant Evangeline Booth of the Salvation Army prayed, Mayor Anton J. Cermak of Chicago went from his speech of welcome into a partisan harangue, and Senator Alben Barkley

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18 Time, July 4, 1932, 10.
20 Time, July 4, 1932, 10.
delivered the keynote address. Not that these were necessarily dull or unwelcome, but because they all steered clear of the "Roosevelt versus Everybody" Presidential fight, most delegates applauded quietly and waited calmly for the beginning of hostilities.

Before going into the maneuverings of the candidates, it is necessary to take a glance at the keynote address. Perhaps the Democratic keynote speech is less important than the Republican in 1932, since the Republican speaker had to defend Mr. Hoover's administration, while Senator Barkley had merely to attack -- always the easier task. Barkley's address had been previewed by Governor Roosevelt who had been instrumental in the selection of the Kentucky Senator as the keynoter, so the speech forecast the character of Roosevelt's campaign, if nominated.

The theme of the address was that President Hoover had woefully mismanaged the government, beguiled the country with false promises and demonstrated his unworthiness to hold his job. As might be expected he blasted the Republican tariff policy, agriculture program and relief measures. "Our house was on fire and we could not stop to dispute over the brand on the hook and ladder." On the most popular of the issues, prohibition,

21 Ibid., 12.
22 Chicago Daily Tribune, June 27, 1932.
Mr. Barkley, himself dry, speaking for a wet candidate recommended the submission of a resolution repealing the eighteenth amendment. "A re-expression of the will of the people is advisable and justified."

The keynote address ended with an appeal for a "new commander." "There's nothing wrong with our people except that they have followed prophets who were false, blind and insensible."

In 1932, the Senator maintained the American people would elect the Democratic candidate who would be one to serve "the whole nation without regard to class or creed or section." The speech took two hours to deliver, and was followed by a twelve minute marching demonstration which constituted the chief thrill of the opening session.

The second day of the convention, Tuesday, opened with the Stadium packed to its ceiling in anticipation of the first tests of strength among the various Democratic camps. "Three floor fights were in the agenda for the day, and on their outcome hinged the fate of the Roosevelt candidacy." The first two fights affected the seating of delegates from Louisiana and Minnesota. The votes on these issues reflected quite clearly that Roosevelt supporters were in control of the convention.

23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Time, July 4, 1932, 12.
26 Peel and Donnelly, 95.
processes. This show of strength "caused certain Roosevelt delegations that had shown signs of weakening to stay with him."

The third fight was over the appointment of the permanent chairman. The Roosevelt forces felt that a friendly chairman would be helpful to their cause, so they rallied behind Senator Walsh of Montana, rather than support Jouett Shouse, Smith's candidate. The vote on this issue was 626 to 528, a smaller margin of victory than in the first contests. As one authority expressed it, "The lure of the bandwagon was too strong after Roosevelt victories" in seating questions.

Senator Walsh, in his acceptance speech, uttered a paragraph which might really form the basis for the difference between Republicans and Democrats. It is a direct challenge to the Hoover theory of government:

The theory that national well-being is to be looked for by giving free rein to the captains of industry and magnates in the field of finance, and accommodating government to their desires, has come through the logic of events to a tragic refutation. So complete has been its failure that even from within the favored circle has been advanced the proposal that government thereafter plan and limit individual enterprise, in other words, that 'rugged individualism' of which we have heard so much be scrapped.

27 Ibid., 96.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
The third day's session was scheduled to open in the afternoon. But Wednesday afternoon found the resolutions committee still closeted with the platform. Chairman Walsh turned the gavel over to the popular actor Eddie Dowling to keep the delegates amused until the platform was ready. For an hour the gathering was entertained by such notables as "Amos 'n' Andy", Will Rogers, Clarence Darrow, Gene Tunney, Reverend Charles Coughlin, "The Shepherd of the Air", and many others. The delegates sat back and enjoyed this parade of talent, and after it was over Senator Walsh had to dismiss the delegates as the platform was not yet ready. The convention recessed until evening.

The Wednesday night session was called to order and Senator Gilbert Hitchcock of Nebraska, chairman of the resolutions committee began reading the platform before a hushed and expectant throng. Each plank was cheered as read. Finally the tenseness in the air became almost tangible as he reached what everybody was awaiting - - the prohibition proposal. "We favor repeal of the eighteenth amendment."

The moment Senator Hitchcock uttered these words, the Chicago Stadium was rocked to its West Madison Street depths.

31 Ibid.
by a spontaneous mob scene which overshadowed anything the convention had yet seen. As the Times put it, "The promise of beer was the touchstone." A parade of delegates wound its way around the convention floor as thousands of spectators stood in their places and cheered. Only a few states stayed out of the wet parade. Kansas, Delaware, Georgia and the Philippines were among those who kept their standards in place as the Stadium roared for almost a quarter of an hour.

The reading of the rest of the platform came as an anti-climax. The audience, however, gave Senator Hitchcock a cheer as he finished reading and moved the report's adoption. Before the vote could be taken, it was necessary for the delegates to hear the minority prohibition report which was more conservative than the plank read by Hitchcock. Senator Cordell Hull's reading of this report was roundly booed and hissed when the assembly realized his purpose. A few other minority reports on other matters were given. These were followed by debate on the adoption of the platform. Among the speakers was Alfred E. Smith who favored the majority report on prohibition. His appearance was hailed with joy and enthusiasm by an ovation

32: Ibid.
which lasted until Mr. Smith's own strong voice quieted it. Mr. Roosevelt left his delegates free to vote as they wanted on this issue. The debate lasted so long that Chairman Walsh asked for a vote only on the prohibition issue, putting the other matters off until Thursday. A roll call vote favored the majority plank 934 2/3 to 213 1/3. The convention adjourned at 12:58 A.M. until noon Thursday.

Finally, the day of days dawned. Thursday, June 30, 1932 was the day for which the entire nation waited. Nominations for the Presidency were in order. Did Franklin Delano Roosevelt have enough pledged delegates to win? Could Alfred E. Smith stop the New York Governor's bid for nomination? Who were the "dark horses"?

After the remaining issues of the platform were settled, the completed document was adopted by a voice vote. Containing about 1500 words, it was the shortest platform in history. Then began the nominating speeches, demonstrations for each candidate, and seconding speeches. These occupied ten hours of the afternoon and evening of June 30. Those nominated were in order, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Governor of New York, John N. Garner, Speaker of the House, Alfred E. Smith, Harry F. Byrd, Governor of Virginia, Albert C. Ritchie, Governor of Maryland, Melvin A. Traylor, Chicago industrialist, James A. Read, Senator from Missouri, George White, Governor of Ohio, and William H.
Murray, Governor of Oklahoma. If quality of speeches was a deciding factor Roosevelt would have gotten the least votes and Smith would have won. But such is not the case in conventions.

As each candidate's name was placed in nomination, wild demonstrations were staged. There are some who consider the length of the demonstrations related to the candidates strength, so each candidate's manager attempts to make his demonstration longer and louder than all the rest. The Roosevelt demonstration, organized by Mr. Farley, being first, had no time at which to aim, so in length it finished second to Smith's. Alfred E. Smith's nominating speech, given by Governor Ely of Massachusetts, was the best of the convention, and the thousands of Chicagoans packed into the Stadium's balconies were overwhelmingly in favor of him, so it is easy to understand why his demonstration was the longest of all. The galleries frequently booed mention of Roosevelt, and wildly cheered allusion to Al Smith. But again, neither the oratory nor the enthusiasm of the crowds nominated the candidates for the Presidency. That is a matter of cold politics decided by the political leaders of each state's delegation in the relative quiet of the caucus room. James A. Farley had been working many months organizing Roosevelt support, selling his candidate

to the Chairmen of Democratic state and county groups. Farley had taken the time and trouble to call on leaders in Oregon, Texas, Kansas, and Maine, as well as in every other state. He had written thousands of letters to practically every hamlet, village, and city in the United States of America. He had talked of the "magic" of the Roosevelt name the length and breadth of the country. He had promised the rewards of victory to those who would support his candidate. Every action of Roosevelt's for months had been carefully planned and plotted. Every angle of the convention had been studied and every move anticipated. There was very little guess work. Farley's indefatigable labors had paid off. Those leaders he had sold on Franklin Roosevelt in the quiet familiarity of their own living rooms or local meeting halls were now in Chicago, surrounded with unfamiliar faces begging their support for first one and then another candidate. But through all the shouting, through all the oratory, through all the closed room meetings, the face of James A. Farley stood out. He was the one who had come out to Oregon or Kansas. He had ridden a bus beyond the last train stop to meet a chairman in South Dakota or Arizona. He was the one who had taken the trouble to meet the delegates "back home". He was the one they trusted. His candidate was theirs.

When all the nominations had been made, mid-night had long since come and gone. Efforts to adjourn before the ballot-
tong began were blocked by the Roosevelt forces who wanted a ballot immediately in order to keep their candidate's delegates firmly in the fold. Now that there were eight nominees, fears of deals behind the scenes among two or more of them caused Roosevelt's managers to demand immediate voting and not to permit a recess. So at five o'clock on the morning of July 1, the first ballot was taken. "Roosevelt showed his expected strength of 666 2/3, but his leaders were disappointed if they hoped enough delegates would switch before the roll-call was completed to give him the necessary two-thirds of 769 1/3."

It should be noted here that the Roosevelt forces had attempted to repeal the two-thirds rule which the Democrats employed at that time. Anticipating the deadlock, in the week preceding the convention, an attempt had been made to alter the convention rules to permit a simple majority of the votes to be satisfactory. This maneuver had ended in the only rebuff Roosevelt's supporters received. Roosevelt himself had called Chicago to choke off this motion which was working against him, because it gave his opponents a common reason for opposition.

The second ballot followed right on the heels of the first and on this one Roosevelt finished with 677 2/3 votes to 194 1/2 for Smith. Garner was third with 90 1/2 votes. The Roosevelt

34 Peel and Donnelly, 101.
organization, had hoped to pick up enough votes on the second ballot to win. Their lack of success began to cause them apprehension lest the convention deadlock. If Roosevelt could not be shown to be gaining substantially, the way could be opened to a compromise candidate to break the deadlock. Roosevelt had to win early, or anything could happen. After the second ballot, the Roosevelt managers, who had kept the delegates in the hall when many had wanted to adjourn, asked a recess. But now the delegates refused, and a third ballot was taken. The results of this ballot were Roosevelt 682, a slight gain, but not enough to make it significant; Smith 190, and Garner 101. After this ballot, completed at nine o'clock in the morning, a recess was granted until nine o'clock that evening. "While Roosevelt's followers were disappointed that he had not won on the first three ballots, the Pro-Smith group was equally surprised that the Roosevelt lines had held so firmly."

Farley and the other Roosevelt organizers were quite worried at this point, and they went to work between sessions to swing enough Roosevelt votes to win. A look at the third ballot showed that if Mr. Garner's 101 votes were added to Roosevelt's total the New York Governor would have more than the required

36 Ibid.
37 Peel and Donnelly, 101.
two-thirds. So an all out behind the scenes campaign was waged to get Garner's votes. Prior to this move, Farley said, "Our heaviest efforts were directed on Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio because there was considerable sentiment for Roosevelt within the delegations." But these states hesitated to begin the swing towards Roosevelt. Everybody likes to be with the winner and the leaders in these states were not sure Roosevelt was going to win.

Particularly true was this in the Illinois delegation. Farley had attempted to gain Illinois' mighty bloc of fifty-eight delegates before the convention opened. He had conferred with Senator J. Hamilton Lewis in March, 1932. The senator was Illinois' favorite son candidate and as such was scheduled to receive the state's votes on the first few ballots. Mr. Farley found Lewis friendly to Franklin D. Roosevelt's candidacy at that time, and he felt optimistic as to Roosevelt's chances of garnering this third largest bloc of votes after the token vote for Senator Lewis.

When two days before the convention Mr. Lewis withdrew his name from consideration, Roosevelt's, Smith's, and the others' forces stormed Illinois for votes. It was known that

38 Farley, 19.
the fifty-eight delegates from Illinois were not in general agreement on any candidate. There was known support for Smith as well as for Roosevelt. However some of the leaders of the Illinois delegation hoped to use the state's votes to swing the nomination. If these fifty-eight votes could nominate Roosevelt or stop him definitely and open the way to Smith's or a "dark horse's" nomination, the Illinois politicians wanted to be able to take the credit for the convention results. In short, the political leaders in Illinois wanted to have the next President grateful to them. The delegation was greatly influenced by the Chicago city organization which numbered Mayor Cermak and Michael Igoe among its leaders. Of a pre-convention meeting where the Roosevelt manager was bidding for Illinois votes he wrote, "Cermak professed to be friendly (to Roosevelt) but he said little could be done because Senator Lewis was insisting upon a complimentary vote. Igoe was personally friendly but would go along with the Chicago Organization."

Instead of favoring Smith, Roosevelt or one of the other leading candidates, Illinois, on the withdrawal of Lewis, nominated a second favorite son in the person of Melvin A. Traylor, a Chicago banker. It was known that there was strong Smith support within the delegation, but the leaders were angling to be

on the winning side when the proper time came. Anyone in the Chicago Stadium during the Convention knew that there were many Chicagoans for Alfred E. Smith. The Illinois delegation must have reflected this popular feeling. But they kept their fight behind the caucus room door by nominating Traylor. The Smith managers had received many promises of votes when the delegation should be released. Even Farley admitted that only "a few of the delegates came over to our side."

The situation in Illinois remained thus as the balloting began. Between the first and second ballots Farley "pleaded with Mayor Tony Cermak of Chicago to use his influence to switch Illinois, knowing that Indiana would follow if that could be done. Tony was friendly, but the appeal was in vain because he insisted that the delegation had agreed not to switch without a caucus, which was impossible while the balloting was in progress" Illinois bided its time waiting for a break which would enable it to take a decisive step. The delegation leaders were certainly not listening to their fellow citizens in the crowded Stadium. "The forgotten men in the Stadium gallery were heart, soul, throat and hands for Al Smith." Illinois held to Melvin A. Traylor through the first three ballots. After his

40 Ibid., 121.
41 Ibid., 142.
42 Time, July 11, 1932.
early attempts with Illinois Farley turned his attention to other delegations.

Between sessions the deal was consummated. William Gibbs McAdoo, former Secretary of the Treasury was the controlling voice in the California delegation which along with Texas had voted steadily for Garner. He was, according to The New York Times, speaking for the well known publisher William Randolph Hearst. Hearst, the article continued, feared that a convention deadlock might result in a swing to Newton D. Baker or another candidate whose international ideas were not in accord with his. Thus to prevent deadlock he sent word to support Roosevelt. "Before the convention met at nine that evening, it was generally known that Speaker Garner had traded his ninety votes to Roosevelt for the vice-presidency."

As the fourth ballot roll-call began, Alabama, Arizona and Arkansas, the first three states, cast their votes for Roosevelt as they had done on the first three. But when the fourth state, California, was called, Mr. McAdoo took the platform to explain a change in vote. He said that "California had not come to Chicago to deadlock the convention." He explained that California and Texas would support Roosevelt. These ninety

44 Peel and Donnelly, 101, 102.
Crippled Roosevelt assurred the nomination, and one by one the rest of the states climbed on the bandwagon until the final count read 945 for Roosevelt, 190\textfrac{1}{2} for Smith, 3\textfrac{1}{2} for Ritchie, 5\textfrac{1}{2} for Baker and 3 for White. Four states stuck with Smith to the last.

The next day manager Farley executed his end of the deal when he secured Speaker Garner's nomination for the Vice-Presidency by acclamation. Then he hurried from the Stadium to the Chicago airport to meet Mr. Roosevelt on his precedent-breaking flight direct to the convention city to address the assembled delegates. It was commonly known that this flight and address were designed to prove the crippled Roosevelt a "man of action". Farley pushed his way through the crowd to have Roosevelt grasp his hand saying, "Jim, old pal -- put it right there -- you did great work."

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46 Time, July 11, 1932, 10.
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CHAPTER III
THE ISSUES

The two major parties had selected their presidential candidates four months before the election. Four months remained for the Republicans to justify their continuation in office. The same length of time was given the Democrats to make a successful bid for the executive office. This rather long period is an outgrowth of earlier days when it took delegates long days to return to their homes and proclaim their nominees. In the day of radio and rapid transportation there is really no need for so long a period between nomination and election. Normally, the candidate was notified by an official committee some time after his nomination, at which time he delivered a well-prepared acceptance speech.

During this period the issues are drawn. Ordinarily, the platforms drawn up at the respective conventions serve as the bases on which all candidates from President downward take their stand. But frequently only a few of the planks become matter

1 The Saturday Evening Post, June 11, 1932, Article by Alfred E. Smith.
for real controversy between party candidates. A nominee will take his stand on the whole platform of his party, but actually he only disputes a few of the planks with his opponent. These few issues serve as indications of his policy. Few people in the United States ever actually read or know the entire party platform, but most people know the candidates’ positions on several main points which are sufficient to serve as indications.

Before looking into some of the specific issues on which President Hoover and Governor Roosevelt locked horns, it is necessary to survey briefly the platforms of the two parties as necessary background for the campaign. In reality, there were only two issues which greatly concerned the people --- prohibition and the depression. But the platforms provide specific ways and means of tackling these two problems in 1932.

There is no need here to give the platforms word for word, but rather to compare them one against the other in order to show their differences. First of all, on the important question of economy, the Republican platform urges prompt and drastic reduction of public expenditure; resistance to appropriations, national or local, not essential to government. The

2 Complete texts of the platforms may be found in the Republican Campaign Textbook, 1932, as well as in the newspapers published during both conventions.
Democratic platform urges the same cuts in expenditures, but by the abolition of useless commissions, and the consolidation of departments and bureaus, to bring at least twenty-five percent reduction. So both parties agree in the need for economy in government, the Democrats even pledging a twenty-five percent cut.

The Republicans oppose currency inflation and demand the maintenance of government credit. They favor United States' participation in an international conference on monetary questions. The Democratic platform urges sound currency and calls for an international conference to rehabilitate silver.

On the ever-important tariff question, the Republicans advocate increases in duties necessary to equalize domestic with foreign costs of production, as well as the extension of protection to natural resources industries. The Democrats urge competitive tariff for revenue only, reciprocity by agreement with other nations, and an international conference to restore trade and credits. Here the issue was a well-defined one with each party sticking to its traditional policy.

Another real point at issue which was to have far-reaching effects was the problem of unemployment relief. On this vital issue the Republican Party favored the administration policy which regarded relief problems as ones of state and local responsibility; advocates Congress creating an emergency fund to
be loaned temporarily to the states, and opposes the federal government giving direct aid to individuals. On this point the Democratic platform is definitely opposed for it urges the extension of federal credit to the states. It also advocates the extension of federal public works to combat unemployment, the reduction of hours to spread employment, and unemployment and old age insurance under state laws.

The great agricultural problem was met by the Republicans through the promise of revision of the tariff to maintain protection for farm products; by assistance to cooperative marketing associations, and by diversion of submarginal land to other uses than crop production. The Democratic platform of 1932 urges better financing of farm mortgages through reorganized farm agencies at low rates of interest, extension and aid to cooperatives, and control of surpluses.

Veterans are promised hospital care and compensation for the incapacitated by the Republican Party, as well as provision for their dependents. The G. O. P. likewise promises to eliminate inequalities and effect better economy in the administration of veteran relief. The Democratic plank simply urges full justice for all who suffered disability or disease caused by or resulting from actual service in war, and for their dependents.

The foreign policy planks present an interesting study of the times. How out of date they appear today! The
Republicans urge acceptance by America of membership in the world court; promotion of the welfare of independent nations in the western hemisphere, and the enactment by congress of a measure authorizing our participation in international conference should the peace of the Treaty of Paris be threatened. They also go on record in favor of maintaining our national interests and policies throughout the world. They urge the elimination of war as a resort of national policy. The foreign policy plank of the Democrats urges a firm policy of peace and settlement by arbitration; no interference in the internal affairs of other nations; adherence to the world court with reservations. It advocates international agreement for armament reduction, maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, and opposes cancellation of debts.

On the question of insular possessions the Republicans favor continuation of the status quo for Hawaii, inclusion of Porto Rico in all legislative and administrative measures enacted for the economic benefit of the mainland, and the placing of citizens of Alaska on an equality with those in the states. This Republican plank seems to be a masterpiece of double-talk. The Democrats make no mention of Hawaii or Alaska, but urge independence for the Philippines and ultimate statehood for Porto Rico.

The Prohibition question was one of the most vital
and popular issues of the 1932 election. The Republican platform urged that the party continue to stand for the constitution and against nullification of law by nonobservance by state or individuals. The plank goes on to explain how the constitution may be amended. It condemns referendums without constitutional sanction, and says that prohibition is not a partisan political question. The Republican plank holds that no member of the party should be forced to choose between party affiliation and his honest conviction upon prohibition. The people should be given an opportunity to pass upon a proposed amendment which shall allow states to deal with prohibition, subject to the power of the federal government to protect citizens from the return of the saloon. This amendment shall be submitted to state conventions by congress.

The stand of the Democrats on the prohibition question was quite opposed to this Republican attitude. Their platform urged outright repeal of the eighteenth amendment. It called for immediate action by congress to submit repeal to state conventions called to act on that sole question. The Democratic plank calls on the states to enact laws to promote temperance and prevent return of the saloon. It pledges the federal government to protect dry states from shipments, and urges the immediate action by congress to modify the Volstead Act to permit beer in order to provide revenue for the government.
On the question of national defense, the Republican platform of 1932 urges perfection of economic plans for any future war during time of peace. The party believes the army has reached an irreducible minimum. The navy should be maintained on a parity basis with that of any other nation. The Democrats merely urge an army and navy adequate for national defense, and a survey to eliminate some of the expenditures involved.

The last issue treated in common was the banking situation. The Republicans urged the revision of banking laws to protect depositors, closer supervision of affiliates of banks and broader powers for authorities supervising banks. The Democrats go into greater detail on this point. Their platform urges the filing with the government and the publication of full facts in regard to all foreign bonds offered for sale; the regulation by the government of holding companies which sell securities; the regulation of utilities companies in interstate commerce, of exchanges trading in securities and commodities. The platform advocates protection for bank depositors, closer supervision of national banks, divorce of investment banking business from commercial banking and restriction of the use of bank funds in speculation.

This concludes the platform planks which deal with identical issues. However, the Republican platform has sixteen
additional planks and the Democratic four. To finish the shorter one first, it can be noted that the Democrats inscribed planks demanding the breakup of monopolies by strict enforcement of anti-trust laws, urged an annual balanced budget, advocated reorganization of the judicial system to make justice speedy and more certain, and demanded publication of campaign contributions and expenditures to eliminate corrupt practices.

The long and detailed Republican platform which few people ever bothered to read treats of many more issues. It urges home loan financing, shorter work week and days in government and private employment, restricts immigration and approves collective bargaining in an effort to obtain the labor vote. The platform feels called upon to urge freedom of speech, press and assemblage. It urges a federal power commission to charge for electricity transmitted across state lines, appropriate regulation of railroads, equality for all common carriers, development of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway, and federal cooperation with states in building of highways. The platform promises to aid to states to stamp out gangsterism and narcotic traffic. It urges continuation of the merit system in appointments to public office, a wise use of natural resources freed from monopolistic control, and reorganization of government bureaus. Finally, the platform urges fullest protection of property rights for Indians, continuation of equal opportunity
and right for negro citizens, and the continuation of child welfare efforts. Attached to the platform is a plea for party fealty in the interest of party solidarity so that "party disintegration may not undermine the very foundations of the Republic."

This brief analysis of the two platforms is rather sketchy in nature but it does give a comparison of the attitude of the nation's two major political parties on national problems. As the campaign progressed some of the issues were more sharply drawn, some were ignored, but both candidates had been instrumental in drawing up the platforms and agreed with their respective details.

Before proceeding to a study of the actual campaign, it might be helpful to look ahead momentarily and list here the leading issues upon which the rival candidates are to break lances before election day. For this campaign was one in which the people were very interested, and before they voted they listened to the candidates. Perhaps they were aroused to vote for a variety of reasons but the issues of the campaign figured into them. As one scholar wrote, "the campaign of 1932 . . . was marked by the intense interest aroused and the expectation

of a decided shift of votes from former allegiance."

Strictly speaking, the only real issues are those which rest on reasonable differences of opinion, but even the most discerning and intelligent voters are swayed by considerations which are irrelevant and immaterial. At this point an attempt is made only to analyze the relevant and material proposals of the two candidates.

Two of the leading issues of 1928 were absent — Tammany and religion. The prosperity issue was reversed. The emphasis on the remaining issues was definitely shifted. But a large number of educated people felt that there was nothing new or original in the positions in 1932. "The masses, on the other hand, believed that the major parties really did have contrasting and opposing programs."

The issues which received the most attention were the depression and the way out, with each party condemning the other for the state of affairs in 1932; the tariff question, where a difference in policy may be noted from the platform planks; the method of unemployment relief, the agricultural problem, foreign policy public utilities, taxation and currency, reduction of government expenditures, and prohibition. There were

5 Peel and Donnelly, 124.
nine real points at issue out of the two wordy platforms.

The republican party, traditionally conservative, believed in helping those individuals in the nation who helped themselves. This attitude will be noted in the next chapter in many of Mr. Hoover's speeches — his Madison Square Garden speech, for example. Opposed to that philosophy is Mr. Roosevelt and his party. The New York Governor, to cite one instance, said:

I am pleading for a policy that seeks to help all simultaneously, that shows an understanding for the fact that there are millions of people who cannot be helped merely by helping their employers, because they are not employees in the strict sense of the word — the farmers, the small business man, the professional people.

The policy of the Democratic party, as declared by Mr. Roosevelt in his Jefferson Day Address of 1932, is that there is a "concert of interests," each of which should be aided by the government. These two policies are sometimes referred to as "individualism" — the Republican ideology, and "collectivism" — the Democratic brand. Therein lies the basic philosophic difference between the two candidates.

On the prohibition issue the candidates' views are

quite clear. Hoover was torn between principle and practice. In his acceptance speech he admitted the difficulty that existed in the enforcement of the eighteenth amendment: "A spread of disrespect not only for this law but for all laws, grave dangers of practical nullification of the Constitution, a degeneration in municipal government and an increase in subsidized crime and violence." Nevertheless Mr. Hoover feels that a "return to the old saloon with its political and social corruption" is not the way out. He proposes that common ground can be found by giving each state its share of enforcement, while at all costs avoiding a "return of the saloon!" During the campaign, Hoover admitted the failure of prohibition and, seeing the handwriting on the wall, only demanded that the rights of dry states be protected. In reality, he took the issue out of the campaign, but the voters, continued to look upon the Republican party as the dry side. Because of the great publicity given the Democratic convention's adoption of the repeal plank, and because Governor Roosevelt and all Democratic candidates argued for repeal, the people looked to them as the wet party.

The Republicans held that the depression was due to

8 Republican Campaign Textbook, 28.
9 Ibid., 29.
10 Ibid.
foreign causes and that the administration had done everything in its power to mitigate the effects of it. Their opponents flatly contradicted the charge and demanded drastic changes in governmental economic policies. Both parties held that unemployment should be corrected through the assistance of the federal government.

Both of the major candidates pointed the way out of the depression, but they pointed vaguely in all directions. Time and again they listed the steps to be taken to restore prosperity. No reputable economist was willing to lend his name to the clamor for a balanced budget, but all of the politicians were in favor of it. They could not agree as to what constituted a balanced budget. Nor could they agree on the details of a sound re-employment program, or on a plan for increasing revenues, or on the means of stimulating industry, objectives which all of them sponsored in theory. 12

The Republicans stood by their traditional tariff policy through the 1932 campaign. Protection of industry and protection of the farmer would promote higher prices and living standards. Roosevelt avoided mention of the tariff as much as he could, but there was at least one statement of his that the Republicans disagreed with. In his Seattle speech, Mr. Roosevelt described his policy as being based in large part

12 Peel and Donnelly, 1930.
upon the simple principle of profitable exchange, arrived at through negotiated tariff, with benefit to each nation."

Here Mr. Roosevelt was taken up by his adversaries and attacked for being willing to let other nations dictate our tariff policy. This tariff issue of 1932 was a twisted, subtle one. In the actual study of the campaign it may be seen just how equivocally it was handled. The Democrats always had to get around the charge that many of them had voted for the Hawley-Smoot Act, which their candidates were condemning.

These have been the outstanding issues of the campaign. Others appeared on the scene from time to time, but were always in a subsidiary role. But the fact remains that despite candidates' stands on issues, many people vote with little knowledge of or concern for the issues. The Republicans administration had to carry the burden of discontent and dissatisfaction always to be expected in the time of financial depression and economic uncertainty. Hoover had to defend his record and the party's and the record was not a happy one. Roosevelt could take the offensive and point to the conditions in the country under Hoover's leadership. Whether Hoover was guilty or not made little difference. Emotion can easily triumph over

13 Roosevelt, 725.
reason when men are hungry and out of work. And even if they had reasoned, there is no indication that Hoover would have won. The election of 1932 "was marked by evidence of deep-seated feeling and few indications of desire for clear-cut thinking."

14 Robinson, The Presidential Vote, 29.
CHAPTER IV
THE CAMPAIGN

James Farley wrote that "after the epic struggle of the convention, the campaign itself was a breeze." He went on to say that the Republicans were making blunders right and left, that all the Democratic leaders considered the election a foregone conclusion, and even urged Franklin D. Roosevelt to stay at home. Some even said that he could go to Europe for the next four months and still beat Hoover.

But despite Mr. Farley's words the fact remains that Hoover received 39.65% of the vote and had 742,732 more votes than Smith in 1928. Almost forty per cent of the vote cannot be brushed aside with the remark "no contest". President Hoover received many votes and in order to see how both candidates gained and lost votes it is necessary to study their respective campaigns. Chronological order is perhaps the simplest way to recount the 1932 campaign.

Mr. Roosevelt fired the opening gun when he flew to Chicago to accept the nomination in person. In a fighting,
vigorous speech, written in great part by the brilliant Raymond Moley, he won his first battle -- the one with his party. Writing of an assembly containing many Democratic delegates who had remained against their nominee to the end, Farley says, "the Roosevelt charm was on full blast and captured the convention hall."

I pledge you, I pledge myself to a new deal for the American people. . . . Give me your help, not to win votes alone, but to win in this crusade to restore America to its own people. 4

Mr. Roosevelt's whole acceptance speech was aggressive and bespoke the man of action. At this early point in his campaign he spoke out for the collectivist theory of government which would triumph in his election. It was embodied in these words. "Popular welfare depended on the granting of what the great mass of people want and need."

Needless to say, Mr. Roosevelt's acceptance speech was wildly cheered by the assembled delegates. His magnetic personality had won this crowd, almost to a man. The only sour note in the Democratic keyboard was the unfeigned disappointment of Alfred E. Smith who had left Chicago before Franklin Roosevelt arrived. There was some talk of a conservative "bolt"

3 Farley, 26.
4 Ibid.
5 Peel and Donnelly, 104.
of the party to Smith but Roosevelt's speech and Farley's activity kept the insurgents in line and even succeeded in winning over some prominent Republican leaders.

After Roosevelt's address in Chicago there was a period of relative quiet on both sides. The next few weeks saw the organizing of party machinery, the collecting of funds and other behind the scenes labor preparatory to a political campaign. Mr. Farley was named national chairman of the Democratic Party because of his success as Franklin Roosevelt's pre-convention manager. He succeeded John J. Raskob and was assisted by Louis McHenry Howe, Governor Roosevelt's confidential secretary, Arthur McMullen, Frank C. Wasker, Evans Woolen, Harry F. Byrd, Robert Jackson and Charles Michaelson. Others played more or less important roles in the campaign organization but these were most prominent. Mr. Roosevelt himself played a major part in his campaign moves, ably assisted by three of his "brain-trusters", Raymond Moley, Rexford Guy Tugwell and A. A. Berle.

The Republicans had chosen Everett Sanders of Indiana as national chairman. He had served three terms in the House and had been an adviser to Calvin Coolidge. "Political observers thought this appointment signified a bid for midwest and old Coolidge support." Among the other national officers were

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6 Ibid., 108.

A difficulty that both parties had to face was the raising of campaign funds in a depression year. There are some interesting and enlightening tables compiled by Dr. Louise Overacker in her little book, *Presidential Campaign Funds*, which illustrate the size and distribution of campaign contributions. It seems sufficient here merely to record that the Democrats received $2,139,817 in contributions, and the Republicans $2,527,249. Both parties had their strongest financial support in the Northeast, and leaned heavily on banking interests. "More than half the larger Republican contributions came from persons who could be identified as bankers or manufacturers; the Democrats received more than forty per cent of their larger contributions from this source." The party with the smaller campaign chest elected the President for the first time since 1916.

Mr. Roosevelt had accepted the presidential nomination on July 2, 1932. The Republican candidate waited, according to precedent, until late in the summer to accept formally the nomination.

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7 Ibid., 118.
tion. On August 11, Mr. Hoover made his first campaign speech in which he accepted "the great honor" his party had given him. In a long and detailed oration, Mr. Hoover reviewed the years of his Presidency and propounded once again his individualistic political philosophy. He asserted that he had put into action "the most gigantic program of economic defense and counterattack ever evolved in the history of the Republic." Where Franklin Roosevelt had accepted the nomination with the statement, "Statesmanship and vision, my friends, require relief to all at the same time," President Hoover countered with, "It is not the function of the Government to relieve individuals of their responsibilities."

So the real issue was laid down in the very beginning of the campaign -- individualism versus collectivism. Although few people in the United States realized it at the time, the two leading political parties were giving them a choice of political philosophies which would affect the nation to its very core. The campaign speeches cover scores of issues. Both candidates detail their arguments on agriculture, foreign policy,

9 Hoover and Coolidge, Campaign Speeches of 1932, 5.
10 Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses, 651.
11 Hoover and Coolidge, Campaign Speeches of 1932, 7.
banking, natural resources, and a host of other topics. But through it all the real issue dominates. Should the government stand aloof from the masses and point the way, or should it stoop down, put the masses on its broad shoulders and carry them?

Reaction to his acceptance speech was very gratifying to President Hoover. Baskets of telegrams flooded the White House the day after his speech. Among prominent signees were Henry Ford and Walter Chrysler of the automobile companies.

From all corners of the land poured congratulations on a speech which one ardent supporter claimed, "rivaled Lincoln at Gettysburg."

Roosevelt carried his presidential drive outside of New York state for the first time since the Chicago Convention on August 20, when he journeyed to Columbus, Ohio to address thirty-thousand jubilant Democrats in the Municipal Stadium. In this speech, the candidate attacked the Republican Party's leadership whose unwise building "made the whole structure collapse." Here Mr. Roosevelt declared that "the major issue in the campaign is the economic situation." Following this, he proceeded to recount the history of the United States since

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12 Time, August 22, 1932, 7.
13 Ibid.
14 Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses, 670a
15 Ibid.
1929 under Mr. Hoover's leadership, charging the administration with negligence, incompetence and even failure to tell the truth. He speaks of empty White House prophecies on recovery. Nominee Roosevelt summed up by declaring the Hoover Administration "encouraged speculation and overproduction . . . attempted to minimize the crash . . . forgot reform."

Picking phrases out of Hoover's acceptance speech, Governor Roosevelt continued:

Now I believe in the intrepid soul of the American people; but I believe also in its horse-sense. . . . I, too, believe in individualism . . . but I don't believe that in the names of that sacred word a few powerful interests should be permitted to make industrial cannon-fodder of the lives of half the population of the United States. I believe in the sacredness of private property, which means that I do not believe it should be subjected to the ruthless manipulation of professional gamblers in the stockmarkets. . . . I propose an orderly, explicit and practical group of fundamental remedies. These will protect not the few but the great mass of average American men and women who, I am not ashamed to repeat, have been forgotten by those in power. 17

The Democratic candidate concluded his Columbus address by listing his nine remedies for the economic trouble of the day.

16 Ibid., 677.
17 Ibid., 680, 681.
These remedies generally call for increases in federal authority in order to regulate the nation's economy -- a collectivist ideal.

The Columbus speech was a slashing attack on the G.O.P. And though the Republicans cried "Demagogue" and "Childish", many Americans swayed by the flash and fire of the speech began to swing to Franklin D. Roosevelt for national leader.

Once begun, Mr. Roosevelt continued hammering away at his opponent and stating the issues of the campaign in various speeches. Mr. Hoover, after his acceptance speech, had buried himself in the cares of the Presidency and had refused to make any campaign speeches for the present. In fact, part of the Republican strategy was to portray their candidate as a man so engrossed in leading the nation to recovery that he had no time to get out and make campaign speeches. It was only after Roosevelt's popular orations seemed to be drawing more and more support that the President took to a genuine campaign tour in October, 1932.

In truth, Mr. Hoover gave the impression at the outset of the campaign that he was pleased at Governor Roosevelt's nomination. As one periodical put it: "For months he (Hoover) had a hunch that the Democrats would pick Roosevelt to run against him. Mr. Roosevelt was his favorite candidate, the one he was told he could most easily beat."

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18 *Time*, July 11, 1932, 7.
Meanwhile, the New York Governor's organization was swinging into high gear. At no time did the Roosevelt group fear defeat. But this does not mean they endured no difficulties whatsoever. As Farley wrote, the troubles of the campaign were "vexations but not damaging." One of these was the removal proceedings against Mayor James J. Walker of New York. Roosevelt had to sit in the trial of "Tammany's darling" in the midst of his presidential campaign. The opposition of Tammany also was felt against Roosevelt's choice to succeed himself as New York Governor, Herbert Lehman. This opposition in his own state was more irritable than it was harmful to Franklin D. Roosevelt's campaign.

The only real problem facing the Democratic candidate during his campaign was built around another New Yorker. As Farley said; "Perhaps our biggest problem was Alfred Emmanuel Smith." And James Farley should know of what he is speaking in this instance. Whispers were heard in various quarters that Al Smith considered Roosevelt "unfit, untrustworthy, and unreliable." This did not help the Democratic cause. But when Smith and Roosevelt shook hands at the New York convention when

19 Farley, 28.
20 Ibid., 29.
21 Ibid.
Lehman was nominated, the Tammany opposition melted away: Farley, who had engineered the event, in a choice piece of understatement wrote, "The reconciliation was a great help to us."

A week after the Columbus address, Governor Roosevelt, on August 27, spoke at Sea Girt, New Jersey on the important prohibition question. He called the Republican stand "high and dry" at one end and at the other end "increasing moisture!" And he said that the Democratic Party had met the issue fairly and squarely. "It adopted, by an overwhelming vote, a plank so plain and clear and honest that no one could doubt its meaning and the candidates accepted this statement one hundred per cent."

He concludes:

Here, as before, I emphasize that the deep question is one of confidence in leadership — in leaders. The measure of the truth of what they say is what they have said; the measure of what they will do is what they have done.

After a rest of two and a half weeks, the Democratic candidate embarked upon a campaign speaking tour. Hoover's refusal to debate the issues, coupled with Franklin D. Roosevelt's extraordinary oratorical ability made the Democratic managers anxious to exhibit their nominee throughout the land as an aid

22 Farley, 30.
23 Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses, 684.
24 Ibid., 688.
25 Ibid., 692.
to local candidates. However, despite their confidence in the
election's outcome, no details were left uncared for by Mr.
Farley and his assistants. In his own words, "No trip was more
carefully planned." The passengers on the candidates' special
train were each picked for a purpose. To refute the occasional
rumors of Roosevelt's radical philosophy and lack of party
support such responsible leaders as Senators Walsh, Pittman and
Wheeler accompanied him. To advise the candidate and write his
speeches, Moley, Kennedy and Flynn; to handle the press,
Stephen T. Early and Marvin H. McIntyre -- later to become
White House secretaries. The official gladhander was none other
than that master of inside politics, James A. Farley.

The first speech of the trip was delivered by Mr.
Roosevelt on September 14, at Topeka, Kansas. As might be
expected this speech was a bid for the farm vote. The candidate
discussed farm relief, land use, reciprocal foreign tariff
adjustments, Republican neglect of the farmer, and the Federal
Farm Board. Mr. Roosevelt said he knew farm problems personally
because he had lived on a New York farm for fifty years, and
had run a farm in Georgia for eight years, had travelled exten-
sively observing farms, and had been Governor of the fifth or

26 Farley, 28.
sixth ranking důrm state in the nation. An important statement of this address was, "I seek to give to that portion of the crop consumed in the United States a benefit equivalent to a tariff sufficient to give you farmers an adequate price." 27 A collectivist note was injected into this agricultural speech in Mr. Roosevelt's conclusion:

May those of us who intend a solution and decline the defeatist attitude join tirelessly in the work of advancing to be a better ordered economic life. The time has come. The hour has struck. 28

Three days later on September 17, the nominee spoke at Salt Lake City, Utah on the subject of railroads. Collectivist philosophy again was urged as the candidate declared the railroad mesh to be the warp on which the nation's economic web was fashioned. He stated that railroads had made possible the rise of the West. "These are not matters of private concern. ... The system must become, as it should be, secure, serviceable, national in the best sense of that word." 29

Before President Hoover was drawn out of his silence, his opponent spoke five more times. Each of these speeches was aimed at the entire nation through the press and radio, but directed primarily to the locale in which it was delivered.

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27 Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses, 704.
28 Ibid., 711.
29 Ibid., 722, 723.
Franklin D. Roosevelt spoke on reciprocal tariff negotiations in Seattle, a shipping town; on Public Utilities and the development of hydroelectric power in Portland, Oregon; on progressive Government to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, an organization concerned with governmental methods on a non-partisan basis. The Democratic nominee also delivered another address on agriculture and the tariff on his way back east at Sioux City, Iowa, and one on social justice in Detroit, an industrial city that had felt the social collapse of the depression more keenly than many other areas. The Detroit address concluded the New York Governor's principal speaking tour. He had won many supporters by his folksy, local-directed, yet keenly shrewd political addresses. He had spoken on a variety of subjects, but through all of his orations flows the philosophy of government support of the nation's economy and social welfare. His tour had been effective. Its success was dramatically proven by the Republican Party's increased activity to present its side of the issues.

The Detroit speech had been delivered on October 2. Two days later, Mr. Hoover was speaking at Des Moines, Iowa on agriculture. After acknowledging the prostrate condition of the farmers, the President attacked his opponent with these words:

I come to you with no economic patent medicine especially compounded for
farmers. I refuse to offer counterfeit currency or false hopes. I will not make any pledge to you which I cannot fulfill. ... The very basis of safety to American agriculture is the protective tariff on farm products. ... We are rapidly restoring short-term credits to agriculture. ... I conceive that in this civilization of ours, and more particularly under our distinctive American system, there is one primary necessity to its permanent success. That is, we must build up men and women in their own homes, on their own farms, where they may find their own security and express their own individuality.

Here is the basic issue between the two men. All the details of each one’s agricultural, tariff, labor, foreign policy programs need not be set down. The details but express collectivism on the side of Franklin Roosevelt and individualism on Herbert Hoover’s side. Their policies are colored by their political philosophies. To a nation stricken with the economic chaos of 1932, the promise of federal aid, price supports, extraordinary measures to promote prosperity fell on fertile ground. Mr. Roosevelt’s theory was the more timely. People who were hungry, out of work, uncertain of their futures, lacking security did not care too much about the theoretical

results of collectivist government. Roosevelt promised help here and now to a stricken nation. He held out bread for immediate consumption by a hungry people, and few were concerned about future payment to the baker. Mr. Hoover sincerely believed this to be a dangerous trend and condemned it. He felt that the people had to rebuild their economy from the bottom upward, not from the top downward. It would be a more difficult struggle this way, but the Republican candidate felt the results would be sounder.

The chief hurdle that President Hoover had to clear if he was to sound convincing was his own record. For almost three years he had been attempting to combat the depression by individualist methods and the results were not apparent to large segments of the population. If the country was to regain its prosperity through Republican measures, why after three years was it not reviving? Was individualism enough? Had it not been tested and found wanting? Want was the difference if collectivism was new? In a democracy the people have the right to be governed as they want, not necessarily as they always have been.

The day after the Des Moines speech, Herbert Hoover made a brief train stop address at Fort Wayne, Indiana. In this speech he lashed out at Mr. Roosevelt for bringing personalities into the campaign, and he accused the Democratic
nominee of uttering falsehoods. Here is Mr. Hoover fighting back. He has been drawn out of his shell.

I shall say now the only harsh word that I have uttered in public office. I hope that it will be the last I shall have to say. When you are told that the President of the United States, who by the most sacred trust of our Nation is the President of all the people, a man of your own blood and upbringing, has sat in the White House for the last three years of your misfortune without troubling to know your burdens, without heartaches over your miseries and casualties, without summoning every avenue of skillful assistance irrespective of party or view, without using every ounce of his strength and straining his every nerve to protect and help, without using every possible agency of democracy that would bring aid, without putting aside personal ambition and humbling his pride of opinion, if that would serve -- then I say to you that such statements are deliberate, intolerable falsehoods.

The next day, October 6, Mr. Roosevelt took to the air waves to address the nation on the interdependence of business interests with those of agriculture and labor. After a few paragraphs of introduction he began to take up some of Hoover's words and to develop them. Prior to this speech there had been little opportunity for this, due to the Republican's

silence. Roosevelt expressed himself as happy that the President finally had come to agree with him when at Des Moines Mr. Hoover had said that farmer, worker and business man were in the same boat and must come to share together. "I am glad also that he thereby admits that the farmer, the worker and the business man are now all of them very much at sea!"

The candidate goes on in this speech to clarify once again his policies for returning the nation to prosperity. He again refers to his program as a concert of interests -- North, South, East, West, agriculture, industry, mining, commerce and finance. "'New Deal' is plain English for a changed concept of the duty and responsibility of Government toward economic life." Roosevelt expresses his tariff program once again in direct contradiction of what Mr. Hoover had uttered a few days before.

It is true that many business men have been taught the glittering generality that high tariffs are the salvation of American business. You and I today know the final absurdity of a tariff so high that it has prevented all outside Nations from purchasing American-made goods for the simple reason that because of our exclusive tariff they could not pay up in goods, and did not have the alternative of paying us in gold.

32 Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses, 781.
33 Ibid., 782.
34 Ibid., 784, 785.
Hoover continued his campaign in a radio address on October 7. He claimed the nation faced three tasks; recovery from depression, correcting the evils that caused it, and advancement of social welfare throughout the country. Mr. Hoover also asserted that his administration had been and was yet laboring at these tasks. He went on to detail the steps that had been taken. His basic theory again was expressed in these words: "Good government is the gift of good people to themselves, for the fountain of social justice cannot rise higher than its source."

On October 12, with less than a month remaining, Hoover addressed the American Bar Association Meeting in Washington, D.C. He urged lawyers to perform the duties of citizenship. This speech was crammed full of his governmental philosophy. Roosevelt addressed the nation by radio on October 13. His subject was unemployment and social welfare.

From this point until the eve of the election the two candidates made seventeen more campaign addresses in various cities in the East and Midwest. Roosevelt made seven more, Hoover ten. There is no need to go into the details of these. The candidates' attitudes on the issues should be clear.

35 Myers, 328.
from their earlier speeches. However, a few of the highlights of this last month of campaign might be in order.

Some of Franklin D. Roosevelt's most effective speeches dealt with the subject of federal expenditures and the need for economy. He had accused the Hoover Administration, in the Sioux City speech, of being the greatest spending Administration in peace time in the history of the United States. At Pittsburgh, on October 19, Roosevelt again referred to Hoover's "inexcusable fiscal administration" as a cause of economic disaster. The Democratic candidate promised a twenty-five per cent reduction in government expenditures. He continued: "I regard reduction in Federal spending . . . as the most direct and effective contribution that Government can make to business."

Governor Roosevelt concluded his campaign in a great Madison Square Garden rally on November 5, 1932. In a brief address he summarized his position, restating his ideas on government in the same rather general terms he had employed throughout the campaign. He stated that his program was dedicated to the conviction that "every one of our people is entitled to the opportunity to earn a living, and to develop himself to the fullest measure consistent with the rights of his fellow men." His program, he continued, was the spontaneous

36 Harlow, 530.
37 Ibid.
38 Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses, 861.
expression of the aspirations of individual men and women. "We must put behind us the idea that an uncontrolled, unbalanced economy, creating paper profits for a relatively small group means or ever can mean prosperity."

Mr. Roosevelt appealed in his speech to the women to stand behind his policies for social welfare and unemployment relief; to the men in business to cooperate for prosperity; to the laboring men to have confidence in his policies for their security; to farmers so that their harvests would be profitable in the future; to all men to join with him for their hope and safety. "It may be said, when the history of the past few months comes to be written, that this was a bitter campaign. I prefer to remember it only as a hard-fought campaign. There can be no bitterness where the sole thought is in the welfare of Americans."

Mr. Hoover wound up his campaign on his way home to vote. In St. Paul, on November 5, he presented a point by point outline of what his administration had specifically accomplished. It was masterfully ordered. He followed this with a numbered outline of what the Democratic leadership of the House of Representatives had accomplished since 1931. He complained of Roosevelt's misrepresentation of many facts. He

39 Ibid., 865.
40 Ibid.
analyzed some of the Democratic nominee's proposals and found them vague, general and impracticable. He said of his opponents: "This refusal to recognize the facts, this attempt to mislead the people, disqualifies them for the Government of the United States. . . . They expounded here and elsewhere through their candidate a philosophy of government that would destroy the foundations of the Republic."

On the night before the election, November 7, President Hoover made a brief radio address in which he summarized his stand. He said that he hoped the people would realize the great crises the nation had successfully passed and his Administration's measures which had protected and restored the American system of life and government. He reiterated that the United States was once again on the road to prosperity. He attacked his chief opponent by contrasting Roosevelt's "appeal to destructive emotion" with his own "truth and logic." "I have tried to dissolve the mirage of promises by the reality of facts." He went on to appeal, as Roosevelt had done in his final speech, for Divine guidance of the nation. He thanked the young people of the nation, the veterans, the women, and the men for their support and encouragement. He concluded:

41 Myers, 470.
42 Ibid., 477.
Four years ago I stated that I conceived the Presidency as more than an administrative office; it is power for leadership bringing coordination of the forces of business and cultural life in every city, town and countryside. The Presidency is more than executive responsibility. It is the symbol of America's high purpose. The President must represent the Nation's ideals, and he must also represent them to the nations of the world. After four years of experience I still regard this as a supreme obligation. 43

43 Ibid., 479.
CHAPTER V

THE ELECTION

November 8, 1932 dawned at last. It was the day for which the nation had been awaiting expectantly. Election day in the United States has an atmosphere all its own. The tension in the air can be sensed at once. Throughout the length and breadth of the land in 1932 some forty million citizens were proceeding in quiet, orderly fashion to cast their ballots. By nine o'clock that night it was obvious to even the staunchest Republicans that Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected. At nine-seventeen o'clock, President Hoover telegraphed congratulations to Democratic headquarters. Mr. Roosevelt, assured of the Presidency, told his headquarters staff: "There are two people in the United States more than any one else (sic) who are responsible for this great victory. One is my old friend and associate Colonel Louis McHenry Howe and the other is that great American, Jim Farley."

The results of the election almost exactly reversed. Governor Roosevelt obtained 22,815,539 votes to Hoover's 15,759,930 a plurality of 7,055,609 votes for the Democrat. Roosevelt carried forty-two states while Hoover carried only six.

1 Time, November 14, 1932, 26.
In the electoral college the winner received 472 votes to 59 for the Republican candidate. Smith, with eight states to his credit, had 87 electoral votes in 1928 to Hoover's 444.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt had been elected President of the United States. A casual observer might judge that therefore the people of the United States had embraced his collectivist philosophy; that they had turned their backs on individualism. But no student of American politics could make this judgment. There are many reasons for this. First of all, forty-three per cent of the voters had not supported the New York Governor in the 1932 election. (39.6 per cent had voted for Hoover, 2.9 for other candidates.) It is interesting to note that Roosevelt did not win in 1932 by as large a majority as Hoover had in 1928, although more votes were cast for him. Hoover in 1932 received 742,732 more votes than Smith in 1928. An additional reason that must be considered is the one of voter intelligence. How many people who voted for Roosevelt actually understood or even considered his philosophy of government? This is a question that defies answer. Certainly many voters cast their ballot against Hoover rather than for Roosevelt. "The Republican administration had to carry the

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2 Peel and Donnelly, 215.
3 Robinson, The Presidential Vote, 32.
the burden of discontent and dissatisfaction always to be expected in time of financial depression and economic uncertainty. Whichever party one supports he must agree that 1932 was not a year conducive to unbiased, enemotional political reasoning. As one author writes: The election of 1932 "was marked by evidences of deep-seated feeling and few indications of desire for clear-cut thinking."

While it is true that collectivism triumphed in 1932 due to Franklin D. Roosevelt's election, it is only true in an associated sense. Mr. Roosevelt, a collectivist, was elected and therefore his philosophy became the Administration's. There is no proof that a majority of the people subscribed to this theory merely because they cast a vote for the Democratic candidate. Nevertheless, the election of 1932 can be called the triumph of collectivism because de facto the nation's policies became collectivist.

But with Roosevelt elected there yet remains one survey to be made in order to round out an analysis of the 1932 election. Who actually voted for him? What effect had his speeches had on various areas of the land? Where had Hoover derived his forty per cent of the vote? The section

4 Ibid., 29.
5 Ibid.
to follow should be read with the preceding chapter in mind. Only then can the true value of the campaign be judged.

The electoral vote had gone to the Democratic nominee by an impressive majority -- 472 to 59. There was a great discrepancy between it and the popular vote, which is an indication of close contests in many states. There is little discussion possible on the electoral vote of 1932, as all President Hoover's votes came from the Northeast with the exception of one state, Pennsylvania. He carried six states: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and Vermont. This area of the country had voted Republican in every presidential election since the Civil War. The only New England state carried by Mr. Roosevelt was Massachusetts. This electoral defeat was an overwhelming one but in the American system of choosing a President by electors there can be a great discrepancy between the percentage won in the electoral college and the percentage nationally. This occurred in 1932.

Analyzing the six states carried by President Hoover some important trends may be shown. All six states had voted

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Republican in 1928, so President Hoover cannot be credited with having won a single new state for the Republicans. The popular vote shows that only Maine, Vermont and Pennsylvania were won by substantial margins. The other states could have gone to Roosevelt, as they did in 1936, by a switch of thirteen thousand votes out of almost one million cast in the three. So even in the six states he carried, Mr. Hoover did not run up an impressive victory.

The forty-two states Governor Roosevelt won show some interesting trends. Of the forty states that had voted Republican in 1928, he won thirty-four in 1932. However, President Hoover managed to make a very respectable showing in many of the states he lost. One fact that really shows the trend is that Roosevelt carried 283 United States' counties that had never before voted Democratic. State contests are frequently variable, but when counties switch allegiance the change is noteworthy. Outside of the six states he carried, Hoover got at least forty per cent of the state vote in Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Ohio, Rhode Island, Utah, West Virginia, Wyoming, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey,

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7 For these figures I have used tables in The New York Times and Robinson's, Presidential Vote from which I made my own computations.

8 Robinson, Presidential Vote, 30.
New York and Indiana. Fourteen states -- many of them key states -- in his favor would have changed the picture considerably. In fact, these fourteen states in the Republican column would have given Hoover eleven more electoral votes than he needed for election.

Viewed in this light, the election was not as overwhelming as it appeared at first glance. Although Franklin D. Roosevelt carried his collectivism into the White House with him in triumph, it would be difficult to prove that a majority of the people actually favored it. Rather, they favored him regardless of his political philosophy. They were not really opposed to individualism. They were merely opposed to Hoover. And even at that, forty per cent of the nation voted for the Republican candidate. A great section of the American people opposed Mr. Roosevelt, even in his first election. This fact should not be overlooked. As Robinson writes: "We tend to underrate the importance of dissent." In support of the contention that Roosevelt's victory was not a mandate from the people in favor of collectivism, the same author says:

acceptance of this view as to the essential nature of the Roosevelt leadership forces the conclusion that in American democracy, programs and platforms, even political parties are matters of secondary importance. Group leadership, meaning thereby skill in combining diverse elements in a continental population, is the one supreme test. 10

Franklin D. Roosevelt's election resulted in, rather than from, the triumph of collectivism. The United States has become more collectivist because of the Democratic victory of 1932. But it is another thing to say that the Democratic victory of 1932 was made possible by a desire for collectivism.

In conclusion, a brief survey of the vote in states where major campaign addresses were delivered should help to illustrate the nature of this election more clearly. On his tour of the nation Governor Roosevelt gave addresses in Kansas, Utah, Washington, Oregon, California, Iowa, and Michigan. All of these states had voted Republican in 1928. Each of them was in Roosevelt's column when the ballots were counted in 1932. His speeches in Massachusetts, New Jersey, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Ohio and New York also helped him gain these states. The only major address given in a state that was to favor Hoover was at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Roosevelt won Pittsburgh but lost the state.

10 Ibid.
President Hoover, on the other hand, did not win a single state in which he had spoken. No campaign address had been delivered by the Republican nominee in any of the six states he did win. This method of election study -- the comparison of campaign speeches with ultimate state vote -- ends up in complete chaos and invalidity when the analyst discovers that in Wisconsin, Montana and many other ordinarily Republican states, where neither candidate made a speech, Roosevelt won an overwhelming majority. So it cannot be said conclusively that the speeches played an important role in the election. Hoover won six states in which he did not make a single campaign address. He lost every state in which he spoke. Roosevelt won in addition more than twenty-five states in which he never appeared. It seems valid to conclude that many citizens cared little for the arguments on either side. They just did not want Hoover no matter what he said. They did want Roosevelt and did not care much what he said. It must be realized, however, that the press and radio projected the candidates words far beyond the orbit of listeners in any one place. Because no address was delivered in a given state did not mean the candidate's personality was unknown to that area.

So Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected President in 1932. President Hoover claimed to have done much, but the results were small. Mr. Roosevelt capitalized on this and gave
only vague assurances of his future policies. The people elected him President without knowing how he would put his policies into effect. His methods were collectivist. Since 1932, the government of the United States has been in the control of the Democratic Party. The Democratic victory of 1948 means that no other party can control the Administration at least until 1952. These twenty years of Democratic rule will have been devoted to the furthering of the collectivist philosophy of government which Franklin D. Roosevelt brought with him to the Presidency. The effect of this concept of government on the nation has been of tremendous importance. But sixteen years of it has left a great percentage of Americans still hostile. The collectivism which triumphed in 1932 has by no means wiped out the deep strain of individualism in the American temperament. This individualism is manifest on all sides. Perhaps it will one day reassert itself.
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4. ROOSEVELT:


5. PERIODICAL LITERATURE:

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APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Richard Anthony Matre has been read and approved by three members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

May 20th, 1949
Date

Signature of Adviser