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ANTI-FOREIGNISM IN THE CHINESE
COMMUNIST APPEAL

by

John E. Kai-Cheng Fu

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Institute of Social and
Industrial Relations of Loyola University in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of
Master of Social and Industrial Relations

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LIFE

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INTRODUCTION

During recent years some Western observers asserted that the Chinese Communist movement is a real nationalistic campaign, without showing in detail just how the Chinese Communists have been conducting this nationalistic campaign. The writer, as a native Chinese, felt that some interpretation should be made of the matter for Western observers. Thus, the topic of this thesis, "Anti-Foreignism in the Chinese Communist Appeal," was adopted at the suggestion of a member of the Loyola University Faculty.

The subject matter of this paper is not intended to disprove such Western interpretations; it is intended rather to supplement them by showing how the Chinese Communists have utilized the historical Chinese anti-foreign movement to induce the Chinese people to hate foreigners. Within the subject matter there are two aspects to be dealt with, namely, anti-foreignism itself and the Chinese Communist appeal to it. The latter aspect is the most important and is mainly discussed in Chapters II, III and IV.

The term "anti-foreignism" is one adopted by Western writers. Most of Chinese intellectuals do not concede that there was or is any anti-foreignism in China. These Chinese intellectuals use the term "patriotism" in place of anti-foreignism, though the meanings

of these two terms are in discrepancy. They use the "patriotism" because they regard activities against foreigners as defensive and patriotic movements. The writer, however, believes that basically there is anti-foreignism in China, and that it might even be regarded as race prejudice. He believes that because of the repeated military defeats of China in the past, anti-foreignism has become stronger than ever before. Therefore, he is inclined to think that the term "anti-foreignism" is more suitable.

Chapters are arranged chronologically. The first chapter attempts to show the characteristics of anti-foreignism before the Revolution of 1911. In this way, the problem of terminology mentioned above---anti-foreignism and patriotism---would be solved. Further, although evidences of modern Communism did not appear before the Revolution, some examples of the anti-foreign movement cited in the first chapter have been repeated under Communist operation during the revolutionary course of China. Therefore, it might be said that the anti-foreign events in the early days are relevant to those of more recent times.

The second chapter, which covers the period 1911 to 1930, discusses the anti-foreign movement's new tide under the influence of Communism: first, the influence of Communism on Sun Yat Sen in carrying on the anti-imperialist tasks, with an analysis of Sun's influence on his followers; second, the Communist theories on the anti-imperialist revolution were selected because they were

regarded as applicable and attractive for the Chinese revolutionary mind. Consequently, some cases of the attacks against foreigners are cited in this chapter. Evidences of the Communist influence and cooperation behind the scene of anti-foreign events were introduced.

From 1931 to the last World War resistance against Japan had been the Chinese public demand, and the "United Front" against Japan became the main tactical slogan of the Chinese Communists. Therefore, in Chapter III discussion is concentrated on the Communist anti-Japanese campaign, which had greatly aided the development of the Chinese Communist movement.

The recent Communist "anti-American and pro-Russian" program must be dealt with, of course, and this is the subject of Chapter IV. Emphasis is put on anti-American movement in keeping with the subject.

Materials concerning Communist statements and propaganda were collected either from the writings of Communists themselves or from other writers, most of whom have been first-hand observers in the Chinese Communist areas. No material was taken from Kuo Min Tang sources in order to avoid possible misinterpretation or exaggeration.

A great percentage of materials concerning the Chinese anti-foreign movement used in the opening two chapters was taken from Western writers, who are assumed to be fairly objective. Most

of them have been in China.

This thesis strives to evaluate the Chinese anti-foreign movement as a social factor in Chinese Communist growth. But it does not conclude that Communism in China is a "new nationalism" as Clement Attlee insisted in August, 1954. The Chinese Communists have made use of nationalism to help them in their struggle toward their Communist goal.

Furthermore, since the Chinese Communists came into power, they have made every effort to create a new anti-American and pro-Russian movement, which is contrary to the Chinese traditional feeling. Traditionally, the attitude of the Chinese public toward Americans is rather more favorable than toward Russians. According to the Communist teachings everything American is evil, and everything Russian is good. Thus, inevitably a great deal of fabrication and exaggeration has been inserted in the Communist teachings, as we shall see in Chapter IV. Psychologically speaking, if the Chinese Communists continue to teach their people that only America is the imperialist and the enemy of the Chinese people, and that only Russia is the democratic leader and the friend of the Chinese people, which is contrary to the fact and the Chinese feeling, a general psychical reaction would renew a deep hatred against Russia and the Red regime. This expectation is also the purpose of this paper.

CHAPTER I

THE ROOT AND NATURE OF ANTI-FOREIGNISM BEFORE 1911

As a preliminary to a discussion of the Communist influence on the anti-foreign movement in China, anti-foreignism itself must be evaluated. The root and nature of anti-foreignism must be explained, since Chinese intellectuals have rationalized anti-foreignism as patriotism, since anti-foreignism is traditional and responsible for the attacks on foreigners of the last few decades, and since it created the Chinese psychological demand, which has been utilized by the Chinese Communists in their campaign against "foreign imperialism."

In explaining the cause of anti-foreignism, Chinese intellectuals used to assert that the foreign aggressors put an "imperialist yoke on China"; the foreigners "despise Chinese"; the Great Powers intend to "slice up China." However, any real explanation must deal with what might be called Chinese "ethnocentrism," the psychological factor revealed by Chinese history, which accounts for the hostile attitude toward foreigners.

In the early days, the Chinese knew little or nothing about the other peoples of the world. They held in their minds a

picture of themselves as a nation of superiority and supremacy. They did not like intercourse with the foreigners, whose conduct they despised.¹ It may be worthwhile to present some specific examples of ethnocentrism or the Chinese feeling of supremacy.

The Portuguese after 1514 made the first real attempts to establish diplomatic relations with China for the purposes of trade. In 1517 Thomas Pires was sent to Canton as ambassador by the King of Portugal. But at the end of 1519, because of a rumor, he and his companies were accused of being spies and imprisoned under an order of the Son of Heaven. Later, the Portuguese government sent Simon d'Andrede to be an ambassador. In his dealing with the Chinese officials he got trouble. He was attacked by a Chinese fleet in a Chinese coast and only a storm which scattered the ships enabled him to escape.² The reason for such treatment is simple. The Son of Heaven in Peking reigned in ceremonious majesty, and refused to accept any other ruler as an equal. He consistently endeavored to reduce dangerous contacts with outer world.³ The Spanish and Dutch, following the Portuguese, had the same trouble with China during the years 1588 to

¹Chao Kao-Min, Essay on Chinese and Foreigners, (Mukden, China, 1925), p. 20.

²G.F. Hudson, Europe and China, A Survey of Their Relations, From the Earliest Times to 1800, (London, 1931), pp. 236-237.

³Ibid., p. 235.

1655.⁴

Before the end of eighteenth century England made a great effort to open direct diplomatic relations with China and to obtain a treaty regulating the trade. In 1792 Lord Macartney was appointed ambassador to China and sent out with instructions to press for the opening of ports, but he was unsuccessful. In 1816 England tried once more but failed again. The mandate of the Chinese Emperor Ch'ien Lung to King George III implied that China, being the only civilized nation of the world, had no use for foreign goods.⁵

As time went on, the efforts of foreigners to obtain trade with China met with some success, because Chinese merchants came to desire foreign trade. The provincial authorities, for a consideration, permitted it, and the officials of the central government pretended not to notice it, as long as there was no question of diplomatic recognition. Since the foreign traders were looked upon as "barbarians", the Chinese provincial authorities set up certain rules regulating the behavior of both the Chinese and foreign traders in order that the Western "barbarians" could not contaminate the "superior" Chinese. It was forbidden that Chinese merchants be in debt to foreigners; on no account could Western

⁴S. Wells Williams, A History of China, (New York, 1897), pp. 80-81, pp. 83-85.

⁵Hudson, p. 266.

traders hire Chinese servants. Europeans were prohibited from using sedan chairs; no foreign traders were allowed to row on the river except at specified times three days a month when they had to be accompanied by a Chinese interpreter who was held accountable for their misdeeds; when the trading season was over, the foreign traders had to leave China; only a few foreigners could live in the Chinese factories; if a trader strayed, it meant certain death.⁶

In the sixteenth century the Chinese spoke of themselves as "we," the chosen people, the people of glorious destiny, the saviours of civilization, whereas "they"---the foreigners---were the inferior people, the unworthy. The physical appearance and the conduct of Westerners were so uncouth and "barbaric" according to Chinese "standards" that they were looked upon in no sense truly human by the Chinese people. One scholarly Chinese observer who met a number of Jesuit priests in his travels wrote a letter to his friend that these "ocean men" are tall beasts with deep sunken eyes and beak-like noses; they had hair on their bodies like the monkeys of Southern China; they seem to possess none of the mental faculties of men, although they are in some aspects clever and go from place to place with self-reliance of a man of scholarship; it is quite possible that they are susceptible

⁶Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, (London, 1934), II, 232.

to training and could be taught the modes of conduct proper to a human being, but it would take considerable patience.⁷

As time went on, new forms of hatred against "foreign devils" appeared. A Western expert on China, who was the former president of the Imperial University of Peking during the Manchu dynasty, stated: "So far from being new, an anti-foreign spirit is the normal state of the Chinese mind Where everything is changing, the temper of people has undergone a change. They have become restless as the sea and fickle as a weather wave. The friends of yesterday are become the enemies of today; and a slight or petty annoyance is enough to make them transfer man or country from one to the other category. Murderous outbreaks, rare in the past, have now become alarmingly frequent."⁸ An instance of such an outbreak would be the Boxers' Rebellion of 1900, in which more than three hundred Westerners were killed. The slogan of Boxers was "Fu-Ch'ing Mieh-Yang" ("assist Ch'ing Dynasty and destroy ocean men!")

Christianity came from the West to China. Consequently Christianity was looked upon as merely another foreign thing by the Chinese literati; the missionaries were denounced as seditious disturbers of the civilized Chinese society. The Christian mission

⁷Richard T. La Piere and Paul R. Farnsworth, Social Psychology, 2nd ed., (New York, 1942), p. 154.

⁸W. A. P. Martin, The Awakening of China, (London, 1907), p. 244.

was never to enjoy uninterrupted prosperity in China. In 1616 a severe persecution arose because a Chinese official, jealous of the Catholic scholars, hated them. Under his agitation an edict was enforced at Peking and Nanking; several foreign missionaries were apprehended and sent to Macao. In 1622, due to the activity of the same hostile official, the persecution was renewed and again the missionaries were forced either to flee or to go into hiding. Again the reason urged was that foreign missionaries were seditious.⁹

The work of Christianity in China during the last years of the Ming dynasty (1368-1643) and the first years of the Manchu dynasty (1644-1911) was rudely interrupted. Chinese astronomers, jealous of the Jesuits who had imported the Western calendars, in 1664 took advantage of the ignorance of the very young ruler, K'ang Hsi, to launch an accusation against the foreign missionaries. As a result of this accusation twenty-five missionaries were taken to Canton and imprisoned, and three of them died of their sufferings.¹⁰

From 1723 to 1736 the Church was overtaken by a more severe persecution than it had known before. The basic cause are that the Chinese literati had a deep-seated distrust of the white

⁹Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christian Mission in China, (New York, 1929), p. 103.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 115.

missionaries, and there was a fear that the increasing numbers of missionaries might lead to foreign aggression. In December 1723 and in January 1724 a great number of missionaries in Fuchow were expelled and the church buildings were confiscated, and the Christians had to renounce their faith under edict.¹¹

In the year 1747 a violent attack on the Church broke out in Fukien Province. The Spanish priests and the Vicar Apostolic of Fukien were arrested and strangled. Two European Jesuits also were strangled.¹²

As time went on the anti-Christian movement became more and more fierce. The Chinese people, like the pagans of ancient Rome, charged the foreign missionaries with horrible crimes, and seized the slightest occasion for murderous attack. Cases of murdered missionaries and of fabricated accusations against them were fairly common in the past history of China.¹³ The missionaries were accused of killing the little children in the mission orphanages and foundling hospitals for the sake of obtaining their hearts and eyes for magical purposes. Such accusations occurred in the cities of Kuangtung and Szechuan in 1884 and 1886, respectively. In 1890-1891 the attacks on missionaries occurred

¹¹Ibid., pp. 159-161.

¹²Ibid., p. 163.

¹³Martin, p. 262.

in widely separated localities and were accompanied by much violence.¹⁴ These charges or accusations were usually made by the masses, and led by the prominent members of gentry.¹⁵ Similar charges are made by the Chinese Communists of the present.

Charges of kidnaping children and selling them for immoral purposes were also made in the Chinese Courts. In May 1870, a number of children had disappeared in Tientsin, and rumor charged the Catholic orphanage with responsibility. As a result of this charge the Catholic Cathedral, orphanage, and French Consulate were destroyed; priests, nuns, and French men and women were killed.¹⁶ "In China," Martin wrote, "if a man falls in the street the priest and Levite consult their own safety by keeping at a distance; and if a good Samaritan stoops to pick him up it is at peril."¹⁷

The Chinese people over the centuries have hated foreigners; at the same time they held a prejudice against those Chinese who adopted, more or less, Western culture or who studied abroad. An instance to show how a Chinese official reflected this bias toward students studying overseas is reflected in the experience

¹⁴Edward Thomas Williams, A Short History of China, (New York, 1928), pp. 353, 389.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 354.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 324-325.

¹⁷Martin, p. 262.

of Yung Wing, the first Chinese student who studied in America. He was graduated by Yale University in 1854. He later became the Commissioner, then of the Government of Manchu, and sent one hundred and twenty Chinese students to study in the United States. These students, before completing their curricula, were called back in 1881. The recall was due to the intrigues of biased officials. One of the hostile officials was Woo Tze-Tung, Yung Wing's new co-commissioner. He opposed Yung Wing's plan and in 1876 sent Peking reports with malicious misrepresentations about the students. Yung Wing in his own biography wrote about Woo Tze-Tung as follows;

Instead of laying those complaints before me, he clan-destinely started a stream of misrepresentations to Peking about the students; how they had been mismanaged . . . how they had been allowed to enjoy more privileges than was good for them; how they imitated American students in athletics; how they play more than they studied; that they formed themselves into secret societies, both religious and political; that they ignore their teachers and would not listen to the advice of the new commissioner; that they were allowed to have their own way, they would soon lose their love for their own country, and on their return to China, they would be good for nothing or worse than nothing; that most of them went to Church, attended Sunday school and had become Christians; that the sooner this educational enterprise was broken up and all the students recalled, the better it would be for China, etc.¹⁸

Why were the Chinese usually so hostile to the learning of Western ways of life as above? A typical interpretation of another

¹⁸Yung Wing, My Life in China and America, (New York, 1909), pp. 204-205.

Chinese official who had resided in England for years asserted that "Our civilization is . . . a moral order; while in yours we detect only an economic chaos." And European civilization "has produced manners so coarse, morals so low, and an appearance so unlovely" that there could be no comparison with Chinese standards.¹⁹

About religion this Chinese official said, "Your religion has less influence on your society; you profess Christianity, but your civilization has never been Christian."²⁰ Again he went on, "your religion is less practical and it is not for the unity of human race." Furthermore, "Your religion! Alas, it is in the name of that you are doing unnamable deeds!"²¹ The teachings of the Church on asceticism, priesthood, heaven and hell, and spiritual and temporal life, are all satirized by the same Chinese official.²² What is the Chinese religion? "Ours is Confucian through and the through! But to say that it is Confucian, it is moral!"²³

¹⁹Letters From A Chinese Official (Being an Eastern View of Western Civilization), [originally published in England, and then published the U.S.,] (New York, 1903), pp. 5, 10.

²⁰Ibid., p. 6.

²¹Ibid., pp. 6, 24, 54.

²²Ibid., p. 55.

²³Ibid., p. 6.

Concerning arts and literature, the official criticized the West this way: "Your outer sense as well as your inner is dead, you are blind and deaf."²⁴ His idea was essentially that everything concerning China is better than the things of the West; even to send children to school in Europe could not do any good for the family and society since the Chinese did not send their children to school.²⁵ Europeans are "poor", "incompetent", and "foolish" in comparison with Chinese people.²⁶ It is curious enough that the official also wrote that "no man in China is isolated," and "it is not so easy for him to starve;" also a Chinese "has no temptation to cheat and oppress."²⁷

This Chinese official reflected a general attitude of the Chinese intellectuals toward Western civilization and an opposition to the learning of the West. The Chinese students who studied in foreign countries returned in disgrace, and the old literati looked upon them with suspicion. This is true even in the writer's experience. Students returning from abroad heard sarcasm, such as "The moon in a foreign country must be brighter than that in China since everything of foreigners is better than that of

²⁴Ibid., p. 29.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 2, 8.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 24, 27.

²⁷Ibid., p. 27.

Chinese; your parents are no longer your parents because you are democratic now!" The writer has heard from his former teachers in China that "We have everything what the foreign countries have, don't self-belittle! Many things had been learned from China by Westerners. Weapons and guns, making paper, printing, compass, and so forth, were invented by Chinese, which the Westerners learned from us; we have a civilization of five thousand years, while other countries are small and have but short histories." This is the general notion of Chinese and something that Chinese people like to talk about.

The Chinese not only despised Caucasoid foreigners; they despised the Japanese as well. According to Chinese history, the Japanese people have nothing of a native culture except that which they learned and adopted from China, and the ancestors of the Japanese are the Chinese who were sent to Japan in 219 B.C. by the Shi Huan Ti, the king of the T'sing dynasty. Since the Japanese people are physically shorter than the Chinese in general, the appellation of "Japanese" was not used by the Chinese in ancient times. The Japanese had been called "Wo Nu" ("shortie-slave") from the beginning of sixth century by the Chinese. After the fourteenth century the Japanese had been nicknamed "Wo Kow" ("shortie-pirate") by the Chinese historians of the Tang dynasty. Therefore "Wo Nu" or "Wo Kow" has been used in the textbooks of modern China, and the country of Japan has been styled as "Wo Kuo"

("shortie-nation"). The Chinese people, particularly women, do not like to marry Japanese. Although some instances of mixed marriages occur, a Chinese who married a Japanese would evoke the criticism of his countrymen. The basic reason is that the Japanese is regarded as "brutal", "wild" or "short". Realistically, while the Chinese have contempt for the Japanese, they also have a fear of them because of repeated defeats at the hands of the Japanese; contempt and fear engender hatred. "Down with the small Japan!" became a slogan in China.

There is now a general agreement among the Chinese intellectuals that during the very early days the Chinese acted against foreigners because of ignorance, which is not, of course, to be justified; but that in more recent times the anti-foreign attitude and movement should be justified on the ground that the Chinese people had to fight for abolition of the unequal treaties. Dr. Sun Yat Sen laid down his teaching that "the aim of revolution is to achieve the freedom and equality of China." However, when we study the very nature of the anti-foreign attitude in modern China, we will discover it is not entirely as interpreted. For instance, during the twentieth century no fairminded person would insist that missionaries are "culture aggressors," but they, particularly the Catholic foreign priests, are looked upon with suspicion. The seminarians in China, regarding their education in the "foreign" mission seminary, used to say that "we are under the

slave-education!" For another example, a servant of the Catholic foreign priest would sometimes say that "we have the worst food, while they, the foreign priests, have the best; there is no equality of man to man!"

It is worth noting that the writer holds that the Chinese anti-foreignism is intrinsically rooted in the "ethnocentrism," aggravated by a history of diplomatic humiliations, which have brought about a psychological tendency of hostility toward all "foreign devils." And, psychologically speaking, such a general tendency has been exploited by Chinese Communists in their struggles for power. Since this chapter was basically intended to deal with the Chinese anti-foreignism before the Revolution, the nature of historical anti-foreignism in modern China will be analyzed more broadly in the following chapters when the Chinese Communist appeal to it is considered.

CHAPTER II

THE "NEW TIDE" OF ANTI-FOREIGNISM UNDER COMMUNIST INFLUENCE (1911-1930)

After the outbreak of the Republic Revolution in 1911, something in China began to be new. A magazine edited by the founder of the Chinese Communist Party was renamed New Youth in September 1915. Between 1917 and 1921 nearly four hundred student reviews appeared in China, most of them containing the character for "new" in the title, such as: New Women, New Light, New World and even New Tide.¹ In an atmosphere receptive to new ideas, Huxley's Evolution and Ethics, Darwin's Origin of Species, Kidd's Social Evolution, Spencer's Principles of Sociology, Mill's On Liberty, Montesquieu's The Spirit of Law, Rousseau's Social Contract, and Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations became favorite readings and provided questions for discussion in student circles.² The rise

¹Robert Payne, Mao Tse-Tung, Ruler of China, (New York, 1950), pp. 56-57.

²Kiang Wen-Han, The Chinese Student Movement, (New York, 1948), p. 22.

of modern Communism was contemporary and communist influence gave a new impetus to the anti-foreign movement.

In dealing with the Communist influence on the new tide of anti-foreignism, the teachings of Sun Yat Sen must be discussed at first, because the anti-imperialist movement received its early impetus from Sun, who was influenced by Communism.

Sun Yat Sen's Teachings

What is the feeling of Dr. Sun Yat Sen, the Father of the Republic Revolution, regarding the "imperialist" pressure on China? His early declaration shows: "Our strong neighbours look down upon us and despise us for the reason that we are not one at heart If we do not rouse ourselves in time, our thousands of years of fame and culture, our many generations of traditions and morals will be destroyed, utterly ruined."³

In a message to the Chinese people from overseas, he repeated his feeling that "we are men without a country. When we go to foreign lands we are assaulted."⁴ But later he expressed his feeling in terms of their political importance. "China has been

³Sun Yat Sen, "An Address to Hsing-Chung-Hui" (Association for the Regeneration of China), [made in 1894], The Teachings of Sun Yat Sen, selections with introduction by N. Gangulee, (London, 1945), p. 17.

⁴Sun Yat Sen, "A message to the Chinese People" (written in 1903), Gangulee, p. 29.

under the political domination of the West for a century," Sun stated, and "during the past century China has lost a huge amount of the territories."⁵ Economically, he realized that "China has already endured several tens of years of economic domination from the Powers The result is that China is everywhere becoming a colony of Powers."⁶ Stung by intolerable humiliation, he devoted his life to lead the task of the "emancipation of China from the imperialist yoke." It is Sun Yat Sen who advanced the slogan, "Down with Imperialism," writes a Western observer.⁷ To fight imperialism Sun Yat Sen preferred to use methods evolved by Communist theory, though he also adopted some of his ideas and principles from the American president Lincoln.

That his attitude should be oriented to Communism is rather easily explainable. During 1896-1898 he studied Marxism in Europe and was influenced by it.⁸ Moreover, the success of the Russian Revolution of 1917 appealed to him deeply. Early in 1918 he sent a congratulatory message to Lenin. He was informed that Lenin was giving his attention to the oppressed peoples of the East and

⁵Sun Yat Sen, San Min Chu I (Three People's Principles), trans. Frank W. Price, (Chungking edition, 1943), p. 33.

⁶Ibid., pp. 37-38.

⁷Gustov Amann, The Legacy of Sun Yat Sen, (New York, 1929), p. 81.

⁸Tang Leang-Li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution, (London, 1930), p. 25.

had the intention of presenting a united front against the imperialist nations of the West.⁹ In addition, the Paris Peace Conference of 1918 offered only disappointment for China. Chinese intellectuals were so shocked that they cried that the foreign nations were still selfish and militaristic and all were great liars. About ten thousand students paraded in the streets to demonstrate against the Paris Conference.¹⁰ Besides all this, on July 4, 1918, Chicherin, then Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Russia, declared that Bolshevik Russia had unilaterally renounced all unequal Czarist treaties with China, as well as its agreements with Japan and other countries relating to China. This declaration was again set forth in a manifesto issued on July 25, 1919.¹¹ In the years between 1919 and 1921 several members of the Comintern were working for the development of Communism in China. In 1921 Lenin sent his secretary Mahlin to influence Sun Yat Sen. In October, 1923, Borodin arrived at Canton and said to Sun: "Your aim is to fight foreign imperialism which is also our aim The ultimate aims of the Kuo Min Tang and the Third International are not in conflict."¹² Borodin even became the adviser of Sun and

⁹Ibid., pp. 154-155.

¹⁰Kiang Wen-Han, p. 37.

¹¹Harold Robert Isaac, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, 2nd ed., (Stanford, 1951), p. 60.

¹²Tang Leang-Li, p. 159.

of the Foreign Ministry thereafter.¹³ Thus, it is not surprising that Sun's teachings implied some Communist ideology.

According to Sun's own testimony there was no such capitalist problem in China as in Europe.¹⁴ And "China has not yet large land owners up to the present time," wrote Sun, "she only has had small landowners," therefore "all the Chinese people must be counted as poor Most places in China have been quiet and content under this system and no trouble has arisen between the people and landowners."¹⁵ Nevertheless, Sun added, "In recent years, however, since the currents of Western economic life have begun to rush into China, all of our old systems have undergone a process of change. The land question has felt the first and most serious effects of the modern Western impact."¹⁶ He used Marxist theory in forming his "Principle of People's Livelihood" which was intended to solve the "economic domination" and "serious impact" of Western Powers. After a lengthy explanation of his principle he concluded that "I can put distinction today between Communism and the Min-Shen-Principle [Principle of People's Livelihood] in this way; Communism is an ideal of Livelihood, while the Min-Shen

¹³Ibid., pp. 160, 212, 233, 274.

¹⁴Sun Yat Sen, The International Development of China, 2nd ed. (London, 1928), pp. 10, 139, 166.

¹⁵Sun Yat Sen, San Min Chu I, pp. 417-418.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 418.

Principle is practical Communism. There is no real difference between the two principles, the difference lies in the methods by which they are applied."¹⁷ He went on, "What is the Principle of People's Livelihood? It is communism and socialism."¹⁸ At another time he added that the "Russian Revolution is the same as that of San Min Chu I."¹⁹ Although Sun in some places attacked Marx's theory,²⁰ he called Marx "the most famous scholar of the world," claimed "he [Marx] found the truth," and "his [Marx'] book is the complete work for the human social thought of thousands of years!"²¹ At the same time, Lenin, according to Sun, was "a genius among the revolutionists, and the best standard of the Revolution."²² Such words of praise are common in Sun's writings.

To achieve the aim of the Republic Revolution Sun felt that some sort of unity with Lenin's U.S.S.R. was indispensable. He stated, "Russia aims to check the strong and help the weak; it advocates justice Russia's new policy aims at the over-

¹⁷Ibid., p. 416.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 428.

¹⁹Sun Yat Sen, an address on "The Interpretation on the Establishment of the Republic Government", (made in 1923,) quoted in Tsue Shu-Tien, Sun Chung-Shan Yu Kung-Chien Chu I (Sun Yat Sen and Communism), (Hong Kong, 1954), p. 8.

²⁰Sun, San Min Chu I, pp. 401-406.

²¹Quoted in Tsue Shu-Tien, pp. 6, 7.

²²Quoted in Tsue Shu-Tien, p. 7.

throw of imperialism in the whole world; it aims at the overthrow of the capitalism of the world."²³ A letter of Sun sent to the Central Executive of the U.S.S.R. before his death in 1925 stated:

While I lie here, my thoughts are turned toward you and towards the fate of my Party and my country.

You are at the head of the Union of free Republics ---that heritage left to the oppressed peoples of the world by the immortal Lenin. With the aid of that heritage the victims of imperialism will inevitably achieve emancipation from that international regime whose foundations have been rooted for ages in slavery, wars, and injustice.

I leave behind me a Party which, as I always hope, will be bound up with you in the historic work of the final liberation of China and other exploited countries from the yoke of imperialism

Therefore I charge the Kuo Min Tang to continue the work of the revolutionary nationalist movement, so that China, reduced by the imperialists to the position of semi-colonial country, shall become free.

Taking my leave of you, dear comrades, I want to express the hope that the day will soon come when the U.S.S.R. will welcome a friend and ally in a night, free China, and that in a great struggle for the liberation of the oppressed peoples of the world both those allies will go forward to victory hand in hand.²⁴

The importance of Sun's teachings is obvious. One might raise the question of whether or not Sun Yat Sen was a Communist. Although neither the Kuo Min Tang nor Chinese Communists claimed that Sun Yat Sen was a Communist, some Western authors hold a doubtful attitude.²⁵ The important thing is that he made statements

²³Sun Yat Sen, San Min Chu I, pp. 17, 18, 20.

²⁴Quoted in Hu Hua, Chung Kuo Hsin Min Chu Chu I Ko Ming Shih (The History of Chinese New Democratic Revolution), (Peking, 1952) pp. 56-57. The letter also is in Gangulee, pp. 55-56.

²⁵Lyon Shorman, Sun Yat Sen. His Life and Its Meaning. (New

which can be effectively used by Communists in the fighting of foreign imperialism. To study Sun Yat Sen's teachings was required in all Chinese middle schools and universities for some years after the beginning of the period of political tutelage under the Kuo Min Tang. Students who learn the history of the repeated military defeats of China, are likely to be susceptible to Sun's principles.

Furthermore, after March 1927, the Kuo Min Tang under the leadership of Wang Chin-Wei (1884-1944) and Chiang Kai-shek began to expel the Communist Party from the collaboration government, which had been established by Sun Yat Sen in 1924. Military clash between the Kuo Min Tang and the Chinese Communists had ensued from that time. On April 18, 1927, Chiang arrested some Communist leaders in Shanghai; again on April 21 he arrested the Soviet Union "adviser" Borodin; and under Chiang's order more than one hundred Red leaders were executed in Shanghai without trial.²⁶ Moreover, from 1927 to 1931 the Kuo Min Tang government broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, which had been directing the Chinese Communist conspiracy to capture the Kuo Min Tang. Such events did not conform to the teachings of Sun, as illustrated in the last letter to the Central Executive of the U.S.S.R.,

York, 1934), pp. 280-281. According to the present writer, Chinese Communists do not regard Sun Yat Sen as a Communist because Sun did not adopt Marxism absolutely.

²⁶The New York Times. April 21, 1927. p. 1.

quoted above. The Chinese Communists, therefore, from early days had cried out: "Kuo Min Tang's men are the traitors of Sun Yat Sen and his revolution," "Kuo Min Tang is the running dog of imperialists," and "Kuo Min Tang is the anti-revolution camp." The young Chinese students, remembering the words of Sun, could hardly be unimpressed by such charges.

Four Chinese Communists' Theories on Fighting Foreign Imperialism

Chen Tu-Hsiu: Chen Tu-Hsiu (1881-1942), the co-founder and the first leader of the Chinese Communist Party, believed that the repeated defeats of China were due to the Manchus' ignorance of "democracy and science." In his writings before 1919 Chen did not fall into Leninism absolutely. To liberate China Chen insisted that "democracy and science" were the principal needs. Since he realized the Republic Revolution failed, he accepted Marxism-Leninism in toto by September 1920.²⁷ In December 1920 Chen's magazine New Youth carried his article which exclaimed: "They accuse the Bolsheviks of disturbing the peace. Do not the Great Powers disturb the peace when they violate the sovereignty of small and weak countries?"²⁸

According to communist theory, the class struggle of peasantry

²⁷ Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), p. 29.

²⁸ Quoted in ibid., p. 22.

and proletariat against the bourgeoisie is the important stage of the development of Communism. But to the Chinese Communist mind such struggle "is not only compatible with, but necessary to, the Chinese anti-imperialist, national revolution."²⁹ Therefore, a great emphasis was put on this aspect by the Chinese Communist leaders.

Since Chen believed that the basic aims of the Chinese revolution should be "to overthrow the oppression of international imperialism and to achieve the complete independence of the Chinese nation," he considered that the bourgeoisie [mainly the intellectuals] ought to lead the proletariat and peasantry in the struggle against foreign imperialism,³⁰ because the latter were immature for political action and they would incline toward conservatism.³¹ Also, Chen was willing to support the policy of collaboration with the Kuo Min Tang, which had been decreed by the Comintern.

Later Chen changed his attitude. In 1926 he stated, "The peasantry constitutes the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people, and is, of course, a great force in the national

²⁹"Circular Letter of the CC [CCP] to all Party Members," (August 7, 1927), cited in Benjamin I. Schwartz, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), p. 104.

³⁰Hu Chiao-Mu, Thirty Years of Communist Party of China, (Peking, 1951), pp. 6, 9; also Victor A. Yakhontoff, The Chinese Soviets, (New York, 1934), pp. 122, 125.

³¹Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, p. 48.

revolution."³² Chen concluded that "if the Chinese revolution does not enlist the peasants, it will be most difficult for it to succeed as a great national revolution."³³ At the same time Chen evaluated highly the role of the proletariat. "Because the world has already moved into the stage of the world revolution," wrote Chen, "and because the Chinese proletariat has already demonstrated that it has its own independent political power and that it is actually the leader of the present revolution, our aims . . . are national independence and the overthrow of the feudal society."³⁴

In his same statement Chen insisted that the Chinese revolution is a part of the world revolution. Therefore, Chen maintained that "in conjunction with the tide of world revolution we shall combine our forces with the forces of the world revolution" to achieve Chinese national independence.³⁵

Formerly Chen had supported the policy of the Kuo Min Tang-Communist alliance, mentioned above. But in April 1927, he

³²Chen Tu-Hsiu, Chun Kuo Kuo Min Ko Ming Yu Sheh Hui Ko Chieh Chi (The Chinese Revolution and the Various Classes of Chinese Society), p. 41., cited in Schwartz, ibid., p. 65.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Chen Tu-Hsiu, "Tu Chen Chi Shen" ("The Voice of Readers"), Hsin Tao Chow Pao (Weekly Guide), No. 160 (June 30, 1926), cited in Schwartz, ibid., p. 63.

³⁵Ibid.

declared: "It would be a mistake to consider the Kuo Min Tang as a revolutionary Party" and "it is only a bloc of leaders," and "we have before us the task of beginning to build a real revolutionary government."³⁶

Li Ta-Chao: Li Ta-Chao (1889-1927), the co-founder of the Chinese Communist Party, was as much attracted by Lenin's revolution as was Chen Tu-Hsiu. In an article dated October 1918 he conceived the victory of Bolshevism as the foundation of the Chinese Revolution. "The real victory is not the victory of allies against Germans, but the victory of Bolsheviks Henceforth all national boundaries, all differences of classes, all barriers to freedom will be swept away The Russian Revolution has shaken off the last dismal autumn leaves from the tree of world Thus, the victory of Bolshevism is the victory of the spirit of all mankind."³⁷

Li founded the Ma-Ko-Ssu-Chu-I Yen-Chiu-Hui (The Society for the Study of Marxism) at Peking University in 1918. Its members were made up primarily of students. Li also was the editor of Hsin Chao (New Tide) and co-editor of Chen's New Youth. Both periodicals carried Li's many articles advocating Bolshevism as

³⁶Cited in Leon Trotsky, Problem of the Chinese Revolution, trans. Max Shachtman, (New York, 1932), p. 73.

³⁷Li Ta-Chao, "Bolshevik Ti Shen-Li" ("The Victory of Bolshevism") Hsin Ching Nien, V, No. 5 (1918), pp. 443-447., quoted in Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, p. 14.

the instrument to rescue China from imperialist oppression. According to Li, the proletariat and the peasantry should be made conscious of the national independence and aware of the evils of capitalists and imperialists in China. Most of the foreigners were accused by Li of being imperialists.

In 1926 and 1927 Li opposed the Communist collaboration with the Kuo Min Tang on the ground that "there is confusion of thought in the Kuo Min Tang and its principles are extremely unclear regarding the Chinese revolution."³⁸ During the earlier period of the Chinese revolution Li's influence on the student circles was no less than that of Chen Tu-Hsiu.

Li Li-San: After Chen Tu-Hsiu was removed from the position of general secretary of his Party in August 7, 1927, the leadership actually fell to Li Li-San, though the general secretary of the Party was Chu Ch'iu Pai. Li's doctrine prevailed from the end of 1927 until he was reprimanded and exiled by the Party to Moscow in January 1931. Li stubbornly bent his efforts to organize the working class in the cities. In November 1928 under his leadership a party circular insisted that without the proletariat in the city, there could be little prospect of victory in the rural area. Later, he felt that the time was ripe for general armed revolt in the cities. The city, he maintained, is the center of foreign

³⁸Quoted in Schwartz, ibid., p. 41.

imperialism and capitalism, the main supports of the reactionary camp.³⁹

Originally, Li and most of Chinese Communists felt that American financial imperialism was quite willing to countenance a program of sham reform in China on the part of its bourgeois puppets. But the Comintern of Moscow refused to allow the Chinese Communist Party to differentiate between the American and other forms of "imperialism." A letter from Executive Committee of Communist International to the Chinese Communist Party dated February 9, 1929, censured this whole line of reasoning: "The American policy toward China like that of British and Japanese is an imperialistic policy. The difference lies only in the methods of application. The American 'open door' policy is not designed to remove China from a colonial status. It is a liberal hypocrisy meant to prettify imperialist aggression."⁴⁰

In a confession of past errors which appeared in party-circular of April 1929, the leadership stated: "We must encourage

³⁹Robert S. Elegant, China's Red Masters, (New York, 1951), p. 209; "Mu-Ch'ien Cheng-Chih Hsing-Shih Yu Ch'u-Chung Kung-Tso" ("Present Political Conditions and Mass Activities"), p. 42., cited in Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, p. 129.

⁴⁰"Kun-Chien Kuo-Chi Chi-Hsin Wei-Yun-Hui Yu Chung-Kuo-Kun-Chien Tang Shu" ("Letters of Executive Committee of Communist International to the Chinese Communist Party"), quoted in Schwartz, ibid., pp. 130-131.

the masses to oppose imperialism, particularly American imperialism for while the masses can rather easily grasp the evils of Japanese and British imperialism, the crafty policy of the United States might easily lead the masses astray, particularly since they have been subject to the bourgeois reformist deception. We must therefore stress the aggressive policies of the United States which wishes, as it were, to suck the marrow of our bones and which is a hundred times worse than Great Britain or Japan."⁴¹

Of course Li, as the other Communists, insisted that "the victory of our revolution must fix irrevocably the victory of the world-wide revolution."⁴² However Li could not hold his leadership permanently because he lost the struggle for political power within the Party. During the last twenty years leadership fell into the hands of Mao Tse-Tung.

Mao Tse-Tung: Mao's main policy was mobilizing the poor peasants. Mao in 1926 stated that in semi-colonial China the landlords and compradors have been the vassals of the international bourgeoisie, depending upon foreign imperialism for their existence and development.⁴³ The poor peasants, who constitute 70 per cent of

⁴¹"Fan-Chun-Fa Chan-Cheng-Chung Ti Kun-Tsou Fang-Chin" ("Our Policy on Activities against the Wars among the Militarists"), quoted in Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, pp.131-132.

⁴²Elegant, p. 210.

⁴³Mao Tse-Tung, "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society" (written in March, 1926), Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung (London, 1954), (pp. 13-20) I, 13.

the Chinese rural population,⁴⁴ have been exploited and oppressed by the imperialist elements for years. Therefore, "the leadership of the poor peasants is absolutely necessary"; "without the poor peasants there can be no revolution."⁴⁵

According to Mao, the middle class---"national bourgeoisie"---would not favor the Chinese revolution.⁴⁶ A certain group among the petty bourgeoisie---"students, school teachers, lower government functionaries, office clerks, and petty traders"---, who had been economically self-supporting and victimized by the oppression and exploitation of the imperialists, began to realize the foreigners as "foreign devils."⁴⁷ But this group, Mao believed, have felt uncertain of the success of the movement against the imperialists and have refused to join the revolution because the foreigners have had so much power behind them.⁴⁸ However, Mao continued, when the revolutionary upsurge could arise and the dawn of victory would be discernible, the small group and even the rest of the petty bourgeoisie would come to join the anti-imperialist revolution.

⁴⁴Mao, "Report of an Investigation into Peasant Movement in Hunan" (written in March, 1927), ibid., (pp. 21-59), 31.

⁴⁵Ibid., 32.

⁴⁶Mao, "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society," ibid., 14.

⁴⁷Ibid., 15, 16.

⁴⁸Ibid., 16.

Mao also regarded the proletariat---"industrial workers"---as an important force in the revolutionary movement. The industrial workers were able to fight foreign imperialists because they had been subjected to the most ruthless treatment by the capitalists and imperialists.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, the proletariat in China, according to Mao's estimation, only numbered two million at that time.⁵⁰ For the earlier period of the revolution, the proletariat could not carry the heavy burden of military task. The main force of the Chinese revolution must come from peasants, particularly poor peasants. This idea had been repeatedly insisted on by Mao Tse-Tung in his later reports.

Concerning the peasants, Mao's tactic was that the Communists must expand political agitation among the peasants. The Communists should utilize every opportunity to enrich the content and clarify the meaning of these slogans---"Down with the imperialists," "Down with the local bulies and bad gentry," "Freedom," "Equality," and "Unequal treaties!" These slogans, as Mao saw them, would be more useful than "ten thousand schools of law and

⁴⁹Ibid., 19.

⁵⁰Ibid. Mao did not indicate whether the term "proletariat" included all worker or only factory workers. In comparison with other estimations which were made in the early period of the Republic China it seems that Mao defined the proletariat as factory workers. For the details of the number of workers see W. Woodhead, ed., The China Year Book, 1931, (Shanghai, 1931), pp. 501-502.

political science" for the peasant militance.⁵¹ To show his theory correct Mao reported what he saw: "These political slogans are flying about everywhere, entering into the heads of adults, youngsters, old men, children and women in countless villages . . . If a group of children is at play and if you see one of them get angry at another, you will instantly hear the shrill cry, "Down with imperialism!"⁵²

In 1928 Mao changed his ideas somewhat. He called on the Communist members to pay a balanced attention to the rural peasantry and the urban proletariat and petty bourgeoisie. For the industrial workers employed in the foreign factories the Communists must widely propagate the slogan of "all factories to the workers." For the urban bourgeois the Communists must carry out the policy of "turning them into proletarians and then forcing them into the revolution." He particularly warned that an "ultra-Left" policy of attacking the petty bourgeois would drive most of them to the side of imperialist-warlord camp.⁵³

In early 1930 Mao made an analysis of the revolutionary phenomenon in China based on the "Political Resolution of Sixth

⁵¹Mao, "Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan," Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, I, 49, 50.

⁵²Ibid., p. 50.

⁵³Mao, "Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist?" (written in October 1928), Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, (pp. 63-70), I, 63, 64, 65.


National Congress of the CCP" of September 1928.⁵⁴ He stated that all imperialist countries have contended for China; as the imperialists' contention for China intensifies, both the contradiction between the imperialist powers and the whole Chinese nation and the contradiction among the imperialists themselves develop simultaneously in China, a daily intensifying strife thus will ensue among the various cliques of the "reactionary rulers" who have been supported by the imperialist powers. Under this phenomenon of contradictions the Chinese Communists should arouse the largest numbers of the masses in the shortest possible time. At the same time the students and the workers in the cities must be stimulated to widen strikes and demonstrations against imperialists. The Red Army henceforth would be expanded, and the revolutionary upsurge would arise very soon.⁵⁵

Other Theorists on China

Important to the Chinese Communist theory on anti-imperialism are the opinions of the leaders of Moscow. For convenience we summarize with selected words of Trotsky and Stalin in the following paragraphs.

⁵⁴The text of "Political Resolution of the Sixth National Congress of the CC[P]" (September 1928) is quoted in Schwartz, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, pp. 117-119.

⁵⁵Mao, "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire" (written in January 1930), Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, (pp. 121-128), I, 120-121.



Trotsky: Trotsky in 1927 stated that "China is an oppressed semi-colonial country. The development of the productive forces of China . . . demands the shaking off of the imperialist yoke."⁵⁶ In another work of the same year Trotsky insisted: "Imperialism, which violently hampers the economic development of China by its customs, its financial and military policy, condemns the workers to beggary and the peasants to the cruelest enslavement." The pressure of foreign-imperialism, as Trotsky regarded it, is in no sense an external and mechanical pressure which welds all the classes together. Thus he states, "The Chinese commercial and industrial bourgeoisie carries behind it the supplementary force of foreign capital and foreign bayonets in every one of its serious collisions with the proletariat."⁵⁷ Therefore, he went on, "if one wants to drive out foreign-imperialism . . . then his [the imperialist's] peaceful, normal hangman's and robber's work in China must be rendered impossible." The victory over foreign-imperialism" can only be won by the means of the toilers of town and country driving it out of China."⁵⁸ Since Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuo Min Tang at that time had begun to discover the Communist conspiracy, it had been regarded by Trotsky as "an instrument of

⁵⁶Trotsky, p. 26.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 116.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 117.

compradors and imperialism," "the center of conspiracy," and "a dictatorship of the bourgeois counter-revolution."⁵⁹

Stalin: Chinese intellectuals found the words of Stalin on the Chinese question more attractive than those of Trotsky.

On November 24, 1918, Stalin stated: "The foreign imperialists look upon the Orient as the source of their fortune because there is natural wealth The imperialists not only want the natural wealth, but also want the honest people of the colony and semi-colony . . . who would be exploited by the imperialists to fight against themselves within their own nation."⁶⁰

In his report made before the Fourteenth Plenum of the Party, December 18, 1925, Stalin asserted that the Chinese Revolution is for truth and justice; it is aimed at the emancipation of the Chinese people from the imperialists and at the unity of China. Anyone who overlooks the character of Chinese Revolution will arrive at failure.⁶¹

On November 30, 1926, he asserted: "The foreign-imperialist power in China is not only political but also economical. The Chinese railways, mines, factories, and banks all are under the

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 28, 36, 45.

⁶⁰Joseph Stalin, Lan Chung Kuo Ko Ming Wing Ti (On the Questions of Chinese Revolution), trans. Sino-Russian Friendship Association, (Peking, 1949), pp. 36-37.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 41-42.

foreign-imperialist control."⁶²

While he instructed the CCP to build up the Red Army he opposed the Communist withdrawal from the Kuo Min Tang,⁶³ because he realized it would be impossible to control Chiang Kai-Shek directly. In a speech of April 5, 1927 he said "At the present time we need the "Right" (the "Right" Kuo Min Tang).⁶⁴ However a short period later, he sharply criticized Chiang and insisted that the CCP must withdraw from the Right. He realized there was danger for the CCP in the coalition government since Chiang's hostility against the CCP was becoming fiercer.

In his speech of November 30, 1926, we find Stalin insisting that city riots must be the first phase of the efforts to destroy foreign imperialists in China, while to arm peasants must be the second.⁶⁵ But on May 13, 1927, in addressing Chinese students in Moscow Stalin emphasized that it was time to teach the poor peasants and to arm them, so that they might be an important part of the liberation of China from imperialism.⁶⁶

The effect of the above statements of the Communists on the

⁶²Ibid., p. 45.

⁶³Ibid., pp. 53, 54, 58.

⁶⁴Isaac, p. 185.

⁶⁵Stalin, p. 69.

⁶⁶Ibid., pp. 119, 127.

Chinese intellectual circles, can be seen in the statement of a Chinese author, whose words read: "Bolshevism in China . . . may defy the predatoriness of foreign-imperialism This is the kind of Bolshevism that appeals to the most sensitized and the most articulate elements of the nation, the nationalists and the intelligentsia."⁶⁷

Attacks on Foreigners under Communist Influence

General Attack. During the early period of the Revolution Chen Tu-Hsiu was the head of the Literature Department of the University of Peking, and Li Ta-Chao professor of history at the same university. Because of their intellectual eminence Chen and Li had great influence on the students in the educational centers. Religion being the opium of the people, according to Marxism-Leninism, the "foreign religion" became the first target of the attackers. In fact, during the early period of the Republic the conservative idea was as strong as before. The general attitude was that China had its own superior moral teachings of Confucius and did not need the "heretic" religion from the West.⁶⁸ This general attitude made easy the Communist movement against the Church. The slogans for anti-religion at the beginning were

⁶⁷Ken Shah-Wei, Russo-Chinese Diplomacy, (Shanghai, 1928), p. 325.

⁶⁸Kiang Wen-Han, p. 53.

"Religious faith is anti-knowledge" or "religion is the opiate of people," A proclamation sent out by the Anti-Christian Student Federation in March, 1922 read: "Christianity and the Christian Church have created many evils in the history of mankind The present Christianity and Church are the evils that support the property-holding class to exploit and oppress the non-property holding class."⁶⁹ But such attacks, however, as Chapman said, had less effect than attacks which said that Christianity was a "foreign religion," managed and subsidized by foreigners, an imperialistic system elaborately organized with its literature, its churches, schools, and hospitals, for the purpose of dominating and enslaving the Chinese people.⁷⁰ The missionaries, of course, were reviled as "spies of imperialists" and "capitalist forces" and accused of catching the young life of China for their own imperialistic purpose; the Chinese Christians were accused as "the running dogs of the imperialists," or "you submit yourselves to the imperialists and capitalists who are exploiting you."⁷¹ Hughes, as a witness in China during the early days, saw that the Communist propaganda at that time was making advances in student

⁶⁹Quoted in ibid., p. 62.

⁷⁰H. Owen Chapman, The Chinese Revolution, 1926-1927, (London, 1928), pp. 172-173.

⁷¹Quoted in E. R. Hughes, The Invasion of China by the Western World, (London, 1937), pp. 95, 192.

circles in the North and was destined soon to be legitimized in the South; the intelligentsia were entirely conversant with communist agitations.⁷² Other early experts on China witnessed the same thing.⁷³

There was another prevalent feeling regarding the foreigners. A Chinese student, in the Weekly Review of November 1, 1924, made a declaration: "The prevalent feeling in China has been that foreigners as such are superior to the Chinese; it is this feeling which sets China to be a pupil of the West. The result is material improvement, but spiritual degeneration. Man in China begins to lose his self-respect, becomes a mere imitator."⁷⁴ The student went on that the Chinese must attack those foreigners who had a "superior air" and "looked down upon all Chinese."⁷⁵ Psychologically speaking, self-belittling plays a role of resentment. Since the foreign missionaries made up a large percentage of the Westerners in China, Chinese resentment became fixed on

⁷²Ibid., p. 95.

⁷³H. H. Gowen and J. W. Hall, An Outline History of China, (New York, 1926), p. 422; Chapman, pp. 73, 171-173; Macartney and others, Survey of International Affairs, for 1925, II (London, 1928), 320, 322; Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, For 1926, (London, 1928), 283-285.

⁷⁴Quoted in Gowen and Hall, pp. 422-423.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 423.

the missionaries as a consequence. The resentment burst out into violent riots against missionaries.

Outrage against Christianity. History shows that the flame of violent riots against Christianity came to peak intensity from 1924 to 1927. A few cases will be illustrative.

In May 1924 some American priests were arrested, and two other missionaries were killed at Kweilin.⁷⁶ In December a group of Catholic priests and nuns were captured near Hankow.⁷⁷ In May 1925, two missionaries were captured at Linchow.⁷⁸ In February 1926 an American mission at Kashek, on the Island of Hainan, was destroyed by students and soldiers.⁷⁹ In the same place, a French orphanage was similarly attacked a year later.⁸⁰ In March 1926, the Canton Hospital, an American philanthropic institution, was compelled to close, because the Communist Worker's Union caused the Chinese staff to seize control of the orphanage by cutting off water, electricity, and food supplies.⁸¹ The same thing happened to the Canton Christian College and the Anglo-Chinese College at

⁷⁶The New York Times, May 2, 1924, p. 26., May 27, 1924, p. 6.

⁷⁷Ibid., December 8, 1924, p. 1.

⁷⁸Ibid., May 3, 1925, p. 28., May 7, 1925, p. 9.

⁷⁹Toynbee, pp. 338-339.

⁸⁰The Times (London), February 18, 1927, p. 14.

⁸¹Ibid., March 11, 1926, p. 11; March 15, 1926, p. 13.

Swatow.⁸² At Wuchow, the American mission station and schools were closed and the missionaries were expelled because the Chinese did not want the white people to "degrade" the young Chinese.⁸³ At Chengtu a Canadian woman missionary was murdered in the street on the seventh of June.⁸⁴ There was anti-Christian riot at Nanchowting in Hunan, in which the property of the mission was damaged.⁸⁵ At Changsha, there was a riot against the America Mission College; the student Union under Communist agitation demanded the control of the administration from American hands.⁸⁶ In January, 1927, an outrage against the Spanish mission at Fuchow occurred. The story was spread that the mission orphanage was maintained to procure children whose eyes and other organs would be removed to make drugs. The agitators throughout several provinces were using tales of this kind to excite the populace against foreign missionaries.⁸⁷ On April 1, 1927, three missions were looted at Kweiling, and widespread anti-Christian riots

⁸²Ibid., March 19, 1926, p. 13; March 29, 1926, p. 14.

⁸³Ibid., April 6, 1926, p. 10.

⁸⁴Ibid., June 22, 1926, p. 16; June 28, 1926, p. 14.

⁸⁵Ibid., November 22, 1926, p. 14.

⁸⁶The New York Times, December 17, 1926, p. 7; The Times (London), January 19, 1927, p. 13.

⁸⁷The New York Times, January 18, 1927, p. 4; January 20, 1927, p. 3.

happened in Chunking.⁸⁸ Two days later two churches and the Mahan School were seized by students and soldiers at Shanghai.⁸⁹

Concerning the systematic violent attacks on foreign missionaries some British observers in December 1926 reported that Communist agents were furiously trying to bolshevize the Chinese people and to promote the Chinese nationalist sentiment against foreigners by gross misrepresentation.⁹⁰

Also, an American official, after three months in China, reported in July 1927 that in the previous years attacks against missionaries and foreigners were due to Red influence.⁹¹

Riots against Foreign Factories and Concessions. As we know labor problems have provided stimulation to the Communist movement. The Chinese laborers, as the other Chinese people, had the traditional anti-foreign attitude, and also as the Communists stated, they realized that they were under the oppression of foreign-imperialists and capitalists because of their direct contact with the foreigners.⁹² After the First Congress of CCP on July 1, 1921, labor unions were organized by the Communist leaders in many

⁸⁸Ibid., April 1, 1927, p. 1.

⁸⁹Ibid., April, 3, 1927, p. 3.

⁹⁰Ibid., December 17, 1926, p. 7.

⁹¹Ibid., July 3, 1927, Section 1, p. 6.

⁹²Hu Hua, Chung Kuo Hsin Min Chu Chu I Ke Ming Shih, pp. 29, 54; also see footnote 49.

cities.⁹³ In the Second Congress of the CCP, July 1922, a decision to exploit laborers in the fight against foreign-imperialism was put on record.⁹⁴

On the other hand, the concessions, which allowed foreigners to have their own troops, post offices and courts in the extraterritories, were considered as a great humiliation to the Chinese people. Communist policy decided that the masses must attack the foreign extraterritories without previous diplomatic negotiation. Thereupon a "New Boxer's Spirit" arose stronger than the spirit which prompted the riot of 1900.

The year 1922 brought the strike of Chinese seamen in Hong Kong. This lasted two months. The men asked for a large increase in their scale of wages, but it was soon observed that agitators, acting for political motives, were back of it.⁹⁵ This strike has been called the first victory for Chinese labor on the part of the Chinese Communists.⁹⁶ The year 1923 saw fifty-one labor disputes in Shanghai, but they were not so serious as the strike of the previous year. For some reason the activities of Bolsheviks and their agitators had been less vigorous during 1923.⁹⁷ From July

⁹³Hu Hua, pp. 27, 29.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 41.

⁹⁵Macartney and others, II, 318-320.

⁹⁶Hu Hua, pp. 29-31.

⁹⁷Macartney and others, 320.

15 to August 19, 1924, in Canton a general strike took place, the basis of which was clearly political. On June 19, 1924, a bombing attempt was made in the British concession at Canton against the governor of French Indo-China, and there were numerous European casualties. The authorities of the concession therefore instituted regulations for the control of the Chinese in the concession. These regulations were resented by the Chinese, and a general and violent strike ensued led by Communist agitators.⁹⁸

In 1925, the so called "Wu San Tsen An" or the "Incident of 30th of May" occurred. Originally forty Chinese employees of a Japanese mill at Shanghai were dismissed on February 4, 1925. As a consequence 313,000 Chinese workers were made idle. Machinery was destroyed, the manager was killed, and some other Japanese employers wounded. On May 14 because two Chinese foremen in a Japanese factory were dismissed again, the Chinese workers destroyed machinery again, and some Chinese were wounded by Japanese fire. About five thousand students paraded the main streets of the International Settlement, distributing anti-imperialist pamphlets and making speeches. The students called for united action against the capitalist and imperialist states of France, America, Great Britain, and Japan. In the following few days there were

⁹⁸Ibid., 321; also The Times (London), July 17, 1924, p. 13; July 23, 1924, p. 13; July 31, 1924, p. 11.

continuous outbreaks and attacks on foreigners.⁹⁹ This general riot was led by Li Li-San, the Communist Chairman of All Labor Federation, and another Communist, Liu Hua.¹⁰⁰ Moscow revealed that the Comintern aided the general outbreak with 30,000 rubles.¹⁰¹ Not only the Chinese Communists admitted that they had incited this disturbance; at the same time foreign reporters at the scene saw much evidences of the Communist agitation. An interesting feature of the trial of the students arrested in connection with the riot was the production by the prosecution of a mass of Bolshevik literature discovered in many colleges.¹⁰²

Another milestone in the history of Chinese Communist agitation against foreigners is the attack on the British concession at Hankow on January 3, 1927. This attack was led by Liu Shao-Chi, the discipliner of the CCP, and former vice-president of Red Government of Peking. Since the Chinese people at that time resented the British who had fired upon the Chinese on the occasion of the Communist celebration of their anti-imperialist

⁹⁹Marcartney and others, 381-382.

¹⁰⁰Hu Hua, pp. 62, 63.

¹⁰¹The New York Times, June 4, 1925, p. 12.

¹⁰²The Times (London), June 10, 1925, p. 14; for further evidence to show the Communist agitation in the riot of 30th May see ibid., June 1, p. 10; June 2, p. 12; June 3, p. 12; June 4, p. 12; June 6, p. 12; June 8, p. 14.

Labor Union,¹⁰³ the police could not control the mob. The mob swarmed into the British concession. The foreign residents of the concession were chased. A Westerner walking in the street was no longer safe from stone throwing. The yell of the mob was "Kill the foreign dogs!" And on January 6, the British flag was hauled down.¹⁰⁴ Comment in the New York Times stated that the seeds of hate sown two years before by the Communist agents had grown copiously.¹⁰⁵

The American consulate at Chunking was subjected to a similar catastrophe. On March 31 of the same year, the American Consulate was stoned and the consul was forced to flee to a warship. The American flag was also torn down. The accusation was "American-Britain imperialist cooperation against China."¹⁰⁶ The Communist operation behind the scene was evident as interpreted by the American reporters.¹⁰⁷

All these outrages against foreigners cited above were hailed in August 1927, by the Chinese Communist Party as "the glorious

¹⁰³Hu Hua, pp. 84, 85.

¹⁰⁴The New York Times, January 4, 1927, p. 27; January 5, 1927, p. 1; January 6, 1927, p. 1.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., editorial, January 5, 1927, p. 20.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., April 1, 1927, p. 1.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., April 16, 1927, p. 2; April 17, 1927, p. 9.

page of history of the Chinese Communist movement."¹⁰⁸

In viewing the description given in this chapter, we might conclude that during the beginning of the Chinese revolution Communism was concordant with the Chinese new nationalist spirit, and that the various attacks operated by the Communists were rather the outlet for this spirit. But a revolutionary chaos always provides the opportunity for the development of Communism, particularly so in anti-foreign China.

¹⁰⁸"Circular Letter of the CC [CCP] to All Party Members" (August 7, 1927), cited in Schwartz, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, p. 103.

CHAPTER III

"UNITED FRONT" AGAINST JAPAN

(1931-1945)

The traditionally ethnocentric attitude of the Chinese toward the Japanese has been mentioned in the first chapter. Now some interpretation must be added here. The Chinese call the Japanese "small Japanese." A Chinese designated by the nickname, "small Japanese," would deeply resent it. A Chinese who has a round face and short body would have his countrymen say, "He looks like a Japanese!" If a Chinese girl has bowed legs the young boys might say that no one would want to marry her because her legs are like those of a Japanese woman.

Schools have helped to foster hatred of the Japanese, since students are taught the history of Japanese aggression against China. "The small Japanese have forgotten their ancestors, their parents," is not merely a saying used by the common people, but is to be heard in speeches made by officials before the public. The children in China like to play a Chinese-Japanese battle game: one group plays the role of the Japanese; the other, of the Chinese.

Sticks are their guns and stones are their hand-grenades. Such games are in vogue even among college students.¹

The peasants in the rural areas did not know of British, French, and American "imperialism" until they were taught about it by the Chinese Communists. However, the term "Japanese imperialism" was well known to them. The peasants did not, and still do not, like to use the right appellation---Japanese; instead of this, "Japanese devil," or "devil" is customarily used. When the Communists moved into the country and began to prepare the uneducated peasantry to fight the Japanese, they found a hatred of the Japanese already established.

The Sino-Japanese Conflicts after 1931

The Chinese people, still remembering Japanese hostilities against China in the past, were subjected again to aggression in summer of 1931. On July 2, 1931, as the result of a dispute between Chinese and Korean farmers in Wanpaoshan, Kilin Province, 127 Chinese inhabitants were killed and 393 Chinese were wounded by Japanese and Koreans in Seoul, Korea.² Following this incident, the Japanese began an invasion of Manchuria on September 18, 1931.

¹For college students playing the battle game in early days see Agnes Smedly, Battle Hymn of China, (New York, 1943), p. 109.

²Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, for 1931, (London, 1932), p. 434.

In the following few months Japan sent her troops deep into Manchuria and bombarded many cities. On February 16, 1932, a puppet regime of Manchuria was set up, and on January 28 and 29, 1932, Japanese forces attacked the Chapel district of Shanghai. Japanese warships bombarded Nanking on the 2nd of February, and the Chinese Government was forced to withdraw to Loyang, Honan Province. On January 3, 1933, Japanese forces bombarded and occupied Shanhaikwan. Ignoring the League Committee of Nineteen, which had met for discussion of the Sino-Japanese conflict, Japanese troops advanced into Jehol Province on the 24th of February, and by March 5th, launched an invasion across the Great Wall, in inner Mongolia. By March 30th, Japanese troops entered Chahar Province. During April and May they rushed on south of the Great Wall and occupied the Luan River district and threatened Peiping and Tientsin. On May 31st, the Chinese Government was forced to sign the Tangku Agreement, by which Chinese troops evacuated Tangku, and Chinese Government promised to cease hostilities against Japan.³ On November 15, 1935, the Japanese made an attempt to enlarge the "autonomous" puppet state of Yin Ju-Keng in the eastern part of Hopei Province. In December they conducted air and army campaigns to force the Chinese Government to recognize

³The Tangku Agreement is referred to by Westel W. Willoyghby, The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations, (Baltimore, 1935), pp. 507-508.

the "Autonomy of North China," and on December 15th, the "Autonomous Political Council for Hopai and Chahar" was formally inaugurated. On January 18, 1936, Japanese again set up an "Autonomy of Inner Mongolia," which was allied to the Manchuria Puppet State. From January to November of the same year the Japanese with their puppet troops made sporadic attacks in North China. The anti-Japanese movement gained great momentum in China as a consequence.

Anti-Japanese Movement

When the news of the Wanpaoshan and Mukden incidents reached Shanghai, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai decided to lead a nation wide anti-Japanese boycott. On November 24, 1931, thirty-five thousand workers were called out at the Japanese port area in Shanghai. By the beginning of December about 800,000 workers struck in protest against Japanese aggression.⁴ During the same period in Yunnan the anti-Japanese movement forced twenty-five Japanese residents to leave. On October 10, 1931, at Canton Chinese refused to sell goods to the Japanese and waged a general boycott on the loading and unloading of Japanese ships. During the same period simultaneous outbreaks of the same character happened at Swatow, Amoy, Foochow, Wenchow, Hanchow, and in North

⁴The number of workers is given in Hu Hua, Chung Kuo Hsin Min Chu Chu I Ko Ming Shih, p. 153.

China. For example, on September 28, 1931, fifteen Japanese residents at Chenghow found it advisable to leave. At Tientsin violent attacks on Japanese were made on November 8, 1931.⁵ During the following years the murder of Japanese in the cities became quite common.⁶

It is difficult to determine what role the Communists played in those outbreaks. However, Mao Tse-Tung has asserted that the Communists supported any anti-Japanese movement, particularly, aiding the Shanghai boycott with a great deal of money.⁷ Communist writers boasted that many cases of anti-Japanese outbreaks were promoted and led by Communists.⁸

The Chinese students also plunged into action to demand a united front against Japan. On September 28, 1931, a host of students stormed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Nanking and inflicted physical injuries upon the Foreign Minister C. T. Wang on account of his lack of success in his negotiations with the

⁵The summary of the anti-Japanese movement in various cities is referred to Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, for 1931, pp. 463-465.

⁶For details of murder cases see ibid., pp. 468-470; also ibid., for 1932, p. 514; also ibid., for 1936, pp. 201, 911, 917, 918, 920-921.

⁷Mao Tse-Tung, "Report of the President of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic," Yakhontoff, The Chinese Soviets, (New York, 1934), (Appendices, pp. 249-283), p. 252.

⁸Hu Hua, p. 153.

League of Nations.⁹ Late in November, 1931, about fifty thousand students, including many from Shanghai and Hangchow, gathered in the capital, Nanking, to petition the Government to drive out the Japanese. The students refused to withdraw until Chiang Kai-Shek addressed them personally.¹⁰ On December 9 other bands of students stormed and captured the municipal office of Shanghai, cowed the municipal authorities, defied the police and disarmed the officers. Finally they wrecked the local headquarters of the Kuo Min Tang.¹¹ On December 15, about eighty thousand students from different cities converged upon Nanking and for the second time wrecked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and attacked the Central Headquarters of Kuo Min Tang. Several top officials were physically attacked.¹²

The students transferred their resentment against Japan to their own government primarily because the government tried to avoid a military conflict with Japan by appealing to the League of Nations. This governmental policy worked to the advantage of the Communists. A Chinese writer at that time stated that Communist influence was growing among the students who participated in Communist demonstrations in large cities; that in at least some

⁹Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, for 1931, p. 414.

¹⁰Kiang Wen-Han, The Chinese Student Movement, p. 103.

¹¹Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, for 1931, p. 415.

¹²Ibid.

of the student strikes in various cities there was a directing hand of the Communist Party.¹³ This writer also pointed out that in spite of the Kuo Min Tang's suppression of Communism, Communist literature still was secretly distributed: "One would, for example, come across a book with a cover entitled 'Paul, the Friend of Youth' published by the 'Christian Literature Society, Shanghai, 1930' and would be surprised to find on the first page that it was really the Communist International Monthly. Or one would be attracted by the title of a popular novel on another book cover and find propaganda in the form of folk song"¹⁴

Moreover, the Communist books and the works of left-wing writers constituted a great percentage of books read during that period.¹⁵ It is reasonable to say that the students' outbreaks were definitely influenced by Communist propaganda.

On December 9, 1935, students burst out again in protest against Japan's forcible demand of separation of North China. Students from nearly all colleges and schools in Peiping took part in the demonstration.¹⁶ Minor clashes occurred between the police

¹³Wu Yao-Tsung, "Movement Among Chinese Students," China Christian Yearbook, 1931, ed. Frank Rawlinson, (Shanghai, 1931), (pp. 259-274), p. 262.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 265.

¹⁶The New York Times, December 10, 1935, Sect. 1, p. 14.

and students. A number of students were beaten with clubs or wounded by swords of the police while the writer was at the scene. Another city wide student demonstration was launched in Peiping on December 16, 1935. About seven thousand students participated in the parade. Their slogans were: "Down with Northern Militarists!" "Down with Japanese Imperialism!" "China for the Chinese!" The police tried to stop them with firehoses and clubs. The students cried "Chinese police, do not fight Chinese students!" and "Chinese, arise to save China!" as the writer heard at that time.¹⁷ Subsequently, a series of student demonstrations took place in Nanking, Tientsin, Shanghai, Kaifeng, Hankow and other cities.¹⁸

The Peiping Student Union worked out a synopsis of its program for the use of its propaganda teams, revealing something of the Communist role in the student demonstrations. The synopsis asserted that China, being a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country could only have a future by struggling against imperialism and feudalism, but that just then the paramount task was to defeat Japanese imperialism; that the policy of appeasement of the Kuo Min Tang was causing more concern than the invasion of the enemy,

¹⁷ Ibid., December 17, 1935, Sect. 1, p. 18., for details see Hubert Freyn, Prelude to War, (Shanghai, 1939), Chapter III.

¹⁸ The New York Times, December 18, 1935, Sect. 1, p. 1; December 19, 1935, Sect. 1, p. 16; December 20, 1935, Sect. 1, p. 17; December 21, 1935, Sect. 1, p. 7; December 22, 1935, Sect. 1, p. 21; December 24, 1935, Sect. 1, p. 9.

and hence there should be a united opposition against civil war; that China could not be isolated from the rest of world; and that the Chinese problem was only a part of the world problem, so that China must join hands with the other oppressed races and nations in a common struggle; and that for national emancipation the students could not do the fighting alone but must promote a "united front" with the masses of the people.¹⁹

This synopsis led the Nanking Government to condemn the Communist influence behind the student movement.²⁰ An expert on the Chinese Communist movement said that Communists took advantage of the student "patriotic" demonstrations and that many of the leading demonstrators later became Communist officials.²¹ An ex-Communist who had worked with the Chinese Communist Party for eighteen years indicated that Communists had played an important role within the student anti-Japanese movement, and that student resentment against Japan was transferred to the Nanking Government at the Communist Party's instructions.²²

On March 28, 1936, a Chinese Student Union was inaugurated at Shanghai. It claimed to represent two hundred thousand students

¹⁹Cited in Kiang Wen-Han, pp. 106-107.

²⁰The New York Times, December 17, 1935, Sect. 1, p. 18.

²¹Hu Tsiou-Yuan, "Preface" for Szu Ma-Lu, Tow-Chien Shih Pa Nien (Eighteen Years Struggle), (Hong Kong, 1952), pp. 3-4, 8.

²²Szu Ma-Lu, pp. 17-22.

of universities and middle schools. In its "Call to the Nation" it said that this organization had aimed to establish a national anti-Japanese united front to struggle for the existence of Chinese nation.²³ This was in keeping with the Communist propaganda--- "United Front against Japan," which will be dealt with later.

The Policy of Kuo Min Tang

The policy of the Kuo Min Tang toward any foreign country was made clear in a declaration issued as early as January 22, 1927, by Eugen Chen on behalf of the National Government at Wuhan. This declaration made it clear that the Kuo Min Tang would not use armed conflict with foreign nations, even Japan, to solve the international problems. It insisted that all unsolved problems between National Revolutionary China and foreign powers should be regulated by negotiation and agreement.²⁴

Although Japan committed unprecedented aggressions against China, Chiang Kai-Shek still endeavored to avoid armed conflict with Japan. Chiang tried through the League of Nations to restrain Japanese aggressions, at least temporarily. The opponents of Chiang criticized his policy as "non-resistance." Actually, Chiang

²³The Voice of China, I, No. 3 (April 15, 1936), 8, quoted in Kiang Wen-Han, p. 107.

²⁴The text of the manifesto issued by Chen quoted in Tang Leang-Li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution, p. 336.

saw that Japan was strong, while China was weak; that defeat would be inevitable if China got involved in a large-scale war with Japan. Knowing this, the Japanese then made every effort to find a pretext for immediate war with China, but Chiang Kai-Shek ordered Chang Hsueh-Liang, the governor of Manchuria, to retreat from Manchuria without a fight. He also issued an order to Tsai Ting-Ke, the commander of Nineteenth Route Army, to cease resistance against the Japanese at Shanghai. Before World War II Chiang Kai-Shek always insisted that China could not fight "an unprepared war with Japan." China must bide its time, Chiang believed. The popular assertion of Chiang Kai-Shek was that "we shall not forsake peace until there is no hope for peace. We shall not talk lightly of sacrifice until we are driven to the last extremity which makes sacrifice inevitable."²⁵

The Chinese traditional policy was: first, pacification within the nation, and then resistance to foreign aggression. The Kuo Min Tang Government believed that the first task of resistance against Japan should be to unify China, since there was the existence of provincialists and the opposition of the Communists. While Chiang Kai-Shek was using persuasive tactics to win control of the warlords, he was using the armed forces in five campaigns

²⁵The statement was made at the Fifth National Congress of the Kuo Min Tang in November, 1935. The English quotation quoted in T. A. Bisson, Japan in China, (New York, 1938), p. 93.

against Communists between the end of 1930 to autumn of 1934.²⁶ After the fifth campaign the Chinese Communists were forced to move through the country, from south to northwest China.

In the cities, the Kuo Min Tang followed a policy of suppressing the anti-Japanese movement. From 1931 to 1937 the most common problem was opposition to the Kuo Min Tang's policy of nonresistance to Japanese encroachments. Against the anti-Japanese movement the Kuo Min Tang's secret police, or "Blue Shirts," were kept busy arresting and killing the demonstrators and the Red agitators. For instance, in 1931 a collection of reports from only six provinces produced a total of 39, 778 executions.²⁷ This was the "White Terror," so called by the Chinese Communists and some foreign reporters.²⁸

Under the unceasing Japanese pressure the Kuo Min Tang was compelled to make its policy clearer than before. On June 10, 1935, it promulgated a "Goodwill Mandate" which said that "All citizens should observe the proper amenities towards friendly

²⁶ According to the Kuo Min Tang there was four campaigns, but the Chinese Communists count five. The difference is due to the period of June to September, 1931, which the Communists divided into two periods.

²⁷ The figure is given in Isaac, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, p. 296. According to Isaac's interpretation, this figure is not very accurate, but not seriously exaggerated.

²⁸ For a discussion of the "White Terror" see Smedley, pp. 104-121. Smedley has been a sympathizer with the Chinese Communists.

nations;" and that "no organizations whatsoever can be formed which might be detrimental to international relations."²⁹ Later, on February 19, 1936, an emergency law was issued authorizing the troops or police to "use force or other effective measures to suppress all 'patriotic' meetings and demonstrations."³⁰ However, the Kuo Min Tang were not traitors; they made use of the anti-Japanese tendency to inject anti-Japanese spirit and discipline into the pick of their army; the teachers in the schools retained the materials concerning Japanese aggressive history. But the Kuo Min Tang felt that the people had to be kept quiet in order to prevent Communist exploitation and to deprive the Japanese of a pretext for further aggression.

The Communist Appeal to Resistance against Japan

Because the Kuo Min Tang did not resist Japanese aggression in Manchuria, it left itself open to a psychological attack by the Communists. On April 26, 1932, a telegram of "Declaration War Against Japan" was issued by the "Soviet Republic of China."³¹ The heart of this declaration is as follows:

²⁹Quoted in Bisson, Japan in China, p. 58.

³⁰The English translation quoted in Hubert Feryn, Prelude to War, pp. 65-66.

³¹The text of "Declaration War against Japan" is in Yakhontoff The Chinese Soviets, (Appendices), pp. 236-238.

The counter-revolutionary Kuo Min Tang Government and the militarists of all cliques following their general practice of capitulation to imperialism, surrendered Manchuria, Shanghai, Woosung . . . to Japanese imperialism, leaving unchecked the slaughter of Chinese people. At present, the Kuo Min Tang, under the pretext of negotiating for peace, is selling the whole of China. It is exerting the utmost effort to hasten the imperialist partition of China. To demonstrate its loyalty to imperialism, the Kuo Min Tang with the all means at its disposal suppresses the nation wide anti-Japanese . . . movement, all anti-Japanese organization, breaks all anti-Japanese strikes of the workers, shoots down the anti-Japanese masses The so-called "Prolonged resistance," the so-called "negotiate peace while offering resistance" of the Kuo Min Tang . . . are in reality nothing but phrases concocted to fool the masses.³²

This declaration also insisted that the "government of the Soviet Republic of China" would unite and lead the workers, peasants, students and other groups, and the Red Army to engage in the national "revolutionary war" to drive the Japanese out of China, to oppose the "imperialist partition" of China. However, the first step for driving imperialism out of China, the declaration asserted, must be the overthrow of the Kuo Min Tang regime. Only in this way, as it was pointed out, could the Communists directly and unhinderedly fight against the Japanese imperialists.³³

On April 15, 1933, under the names of Mao Tse-Tung, Chu Teh, and Chang Kuo Tao, another declaration was issued.³⁴ This message

³²Ibid., p. 236.

³³Ibid., p. 237.

³⁴The text of this declaration originally appeared in China Forum (May 4, 1933), quoted in Yakhontoff, (Appendices), pp. 238-241.

is a repetition of the Declaration of War against Japan. But its conclusion emphasized the appeal: "We appeal to all toilers and soldiers to work for the acceptance of our national revolutionary policy among the broad masses. We appeal to the toiling masses and soldiers to help us to defend China and the rights of its people."³⁵

On January 22, 1934, Mao Tse-Tung made a comprehensive report to his Party.³⁶ In this report we find two important aims: to urge on the anti-Japanese movement, and to arm and organize the peasants and toiling classes. Mao stated that the Kuo Min Tang had sold many parts of China to the foreign imperialists and suppressed the anti-Japanese masses. So the Soviet district, Mao insisted, was the real anti-Japanese imperialist area; the Communists must continue to create anti-Japanese volunteers and to support the anti-Japanese movement in any part of China.³⁷ To Mao Tse-Tung the Japanese imperialism was not isolated in its aggression against China. He declared that the fight against "British, American, French, and Japanese imperialists" should be made

³⁵Yakhontoff, p. 241.

³⁶The report was made before the Second Soviet Congress held at Chuchin, a small town of Kiangsi Province and then the Red Capital. The whole text originally appeared in the Chinese Worker's Correspondence (an official news agency of the CCP), IV, No. 11 (March 31, 1934), quoted in Yakhontoff, (Appendices), pp. 249-283.

³⁷Yakhontoff, pp. 252, 258, 282.

simultaneously, because he thought that "British, American, and French imperialists" intended "to wreck the Chinese Soviet power and to completely enslave the Chinese nation as a preliminary step toward the war against the U.S.S.R."³⁸

Mao Tse-Tung also instructed his Party: "The historical task of the Soviet is: to mobilize broad worker-peasant masses to join the Red Army . . . to enlarge the local armed forces and partisans; to agitate for broad partisan wars . . . to develop the class-struggle . . . to promote the militance of the worker-peasant masses."³⁹ According to Mao, his aims were not only in line with Marxist revolutionary theories, but were also made inevitable because of Japanese aggression and the Kuo Min Tang's attack upon the Chinese Communists.

On July 15, 1936, a Communist controlled organization sent out a message of appeal to all Chinese people to take united action against Japan.⁴⁰ Mao Tse-Tung on August 10, 1936, made a public and adroitly timed statement.⁴¹ In replying to public demands for a cessation of civil war and for immediate action against Japan,

³⁸Ibid., p. 251.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 251, 259.

⁴⁰For the text of the message of the Communist controlled organization, All China National Salvation Union, see Mao Tse-Tung and others, China: The March Toward Unity, (New York, 1937), pp. 51-59.

⁴¹The text of Mao's statement is in ibid., pp. 70-82.

Mao stated that the Chinese Communists after the events of September 18, 1931, were the first to offer their cooperation in the struggle against Japan to all groups throughout the country.⁴² He added that the Communist Party had no grounds whatever for giving up their anti-Japanese policy or discontinuing anti-Japanese activities.⁴³ Mao went on, "We are ready to devote our entire strength to this movement and to . . . engage in joint struggle together with all parties, groups, and people who do not want to become slaves, who want to fight against the destruction of China."⁴⁴

It was a time when the situation was critical for the Communists because of the Long March.⁴⁵ Chiang Kai-Shek in August, 1936, declared that within three or five weeks he would destroy the Red Army completely. Mao Tse-Tung, facing this critical moment, appealed as follows: "In view of the fact that the life of the whole nation is almost on brink of total prostration, we have no interest whatever in continuing a civil war in which Chinese fight

⁴²Ibid., p. 71.

⁴³Ibid., p. 74.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 77.

⁴⁵Long March is a great event of the Chinese Communist history. From 1934 to 1936 the Red Army under the Kuo Min Tang's suppression were forced to carry out a general retreat. They walked through five provinces of Southwest China and finally arrived at Northwest Shensi. This has been the so-called "Long March" of the Chinese Communists.

against Chinese If the troops of the Central Government or other armed forces fight Japan and refrain from suppressing the mass patriotic movement, we are ready to help them sincerely"⁴⁶

The policy of Kuo Min Tang toward Japan, as mentioned previously, was unification of China first and resistance to Japan second. Mao Tse-Tung had this in mind when he said "The enemy has already placed the Central and local governments of China under strict surveillance and is devouring one province after another."⁴⁷ And he continued: "It should be clearly realized that to unite China by armed force means interminable civil war for China We are not against pacification, but we are opposed to civil war and traitors."⁴⁸

The Chinese wealthy classes and the Kuo Min Tang's officers held the Communists in great fear lest their wealth and land would be confiscated by the Reds. Mao, with this in mind, told them that the Communist Party had changed its policy and that "the Communists would not confiscate the land of the rich peasants, if they come to the Communists to fight against Japan," and that "the Communists would not confiscate the land of anti-Japanese officers."⁴⁹ Mao

⁴⁶Mao Tse-Tung and others, China: The March toward Unity, p. 72.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 73.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 80.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 75.

finally emphasized that "the Communists are not hostile to those people who take an anti-Japanese stand;"⁵⁰ and that "our slogan for the united front is: all parties and all classes, unite to fight Japan and the traitors."⁵¹

The Chinese Communist Party, following Mao Tse-Tung's appeal of the tenth of August, addressed an open letter to the Kuo Min Tang on August 25, 1936.⁵² Realistically, this letter was not aimed at the Kuo Min Tang itself, but at the intellectuals and the general public. The Chinese intellectuals talked about this letter with great enthusiasm when it appeared in the newspapers. This open letter contained the same message as the declaration by Mao two weeks previous. To Communists, such repetition of their appeal was advantageous because a general demand for immediate war against Japan arose from the "All-China National Salvation Union." And in addition, Chiang Kai-Shek having already pacified all the provincial armies, was concentrating his troops to destroy the Red army. It was a time when the general confidence in Chiang Kai-Shek was on the increase. The Communists wanted to bring the people to distrust Chiang.

The open letter at first made a systematic recount of the

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 76.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 78.

⁵²The text of the open letter is in ibid., pp. 18-32.

aggressive activities of Japan, and then stated: "Japanese imperialism will never relinquish its robber plan of enslaving China until that plan is smashed to atoms at one determined blow by all the forces of China mobilized for battle. The Changes in the form and direction of the aggression of Japanese imperialism . . . in no measure signify that Japanese imperialism intends to cease its aggression, but are only an attempt to facilitate its rapacious assault. And anyone who thinks he can assert that there are any fresh hopes of peace . . . is only deceiving himself."⁵³

The letter emulated Chiang's policy---first unification within the nation, then resistance to foreign aggression---by repeating that the Communists always had desired to unite with any party in the fight against Japan; and that if Chiang Kai-Shek would accept the Communist Party as an equal political party in the national government, "the Red Army is prepared to subordinate itself to the command of the united anti-Japanese army, and to fight on any definite section of the front . . . and fulfill the fighting tasks entrusted to it."⁵⁴ To show how attractive was the Communist appeal we quote it at length:

There are two alternatives: to form an anti-Communist front, i.e., a united front to enslave the country, together with Japanese imperialism and national traitors, or a united anti-Japanese front, a united front to save

⁵³Ibid., pp. 21-22.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 24.

the country, together with the Communist Party of China and the whole of our people. The moment has come for the final choice. All hesitation and delay will lead only to the ruin of the country and the people, and will serve the purpose of Japanese imperialism

When a united front has been set up between us and you . . . we will have the right to cry aloud: "Let the cowardly traitors and scoundrels cry out in the face of Japanese imperialist violence: 'China is not strong enough to fight Japan.'"⁵⁵

The influence of Communist propaganda should not be underestimated in judging the situation in China at that time. One example of the effect of Communist influence can be found in the Sian Case, in which Chiang Kai-Shek was held as hostage by Chang Hsueh-Liang.

The details of the Sian uprising are still not fully known. According to facts supplied from different Chinese and foreign sources it seems certain that Chang Hsueh-Liang was influenced by the Communists. When Japan marched into Manchuria, Chang Hsueh-Liang following Chiang's order withdrew his native troops from Manchuria and moved to northwest districts of China. In February, 1934, Chang was appointed commander of the forces assigned to suppress "Red Banditry." During the battles with the Red Army some officers of Chang were captured.

When these officers were released by the Red Army, they brought back to Chang glowing accounts of the morale and organization in the Soviet districts, but specially of the Red Army's

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 31-32.

"sincerity" in its appeals to stop civil war, to unify China by peaceful democratic methods, and to unite to oppose Japanese aggression. Chang was impressed. As a result slogans became current in Chang's army, such as, "Chinese must not fight Chinese," and "unite all forces and fight back to our home, Manchuria."

In addition Chang could not forget that his father, Marshal Chang Tsuo-Lin, had been killed by Japanese action. It seemed to Chang that "Chinese fighting Chinese" was illogical. Through Communist agents he finally reached agreement with the Red Army to cease hostilities in Shensi Province.

In December, 1936, Chiang Kai-Shek arrived at Sian, the capital of Shensi, to confer with Chang and urged him to hasten the task of fighting Communists. On the night of December 12 Chang revolted and detained Chiang, and under Communist prompting dispatched a circular telegram to the Nanking Government making eight demands, all of which were borrowed from the Communist program, "united front against Japan."⁵⁶

Chiang Kai-Shek was forced to accept a good portion of the Communist united front policy. In July of 1937 the Sino-Japanese war broke out. An "agreement," "understanding," and "guarantee" between Communists and the Kuo Min Tang was signed on the 22nd of

⁵⁶For details of Sian uprising and the Communist role in it see I. Jack, "A United National Anti-Japanese Front in China," Mao and others, China: The March Toward Unity, pp. 2-17; also Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, (New York, 1938), pp. 20-29; 395-429.

September. However, there was no real "united front" during the War.

From the summer of 1939 to the beginning of 1940 China was in serious danger. China was close to surrendering to Japan. Wang Chin-Wei, the former chief of cabinet of the Kuo Min Tang, had secretly surrendered to Japan in 1939 and set up a puppet government in Nanking for the purpose of uniting with the Japanese against the Chinese Communists. Because the Communists felt that Wang had some sort of agreement with Chiang Kai-Shek,⁵⁷ hostilities were renewed.

However, Mao Tse-Tung, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, issued several declarations which again called for a united-front resistance to Japan instead of attack against the Kuo Min Tang. Now the Kuo Min Tang's resistance against Japan was fully apparent. Likewise, Communists saw that without the resistance of the anti-Japanese Kuo Min Tang they could not carry on against the Japanese. Therefore, Mao declared: "Support the Kuo Min Tang-Communist cooperation and overthrow the anti-Communist policy of Wang Chin-Wei." Concerning the new hostilities between the Communists and Kuo Min Tang, Mao simply stated: "Strengthen national solidarity and eliminate internal

⁵⁷Mao Tse-Tung, "Unite All the Anti-Japanese Forces and Combat the Anti-Communist Die-Hards" (A speech made February 1, 1940), Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, III (London, 1954), (161-166), 161.

friction!"⁵⁸ From that time on Mao unceasingly repeated his emphasis on appeal to avoid national friction, which of course would either enhance the tendency of surrendering to Japan or endanger the Red Army. Such statements were well received by Chinese public opinion in Chungking. The idea had begun to grow that even Chinese Communist control of China would be better than surrender to the Japanese; "China for the Chinese, rather than for foreigners!"

Some Specific Activities in Resistance against Japan

The Chinese Communists accomplished a great deal, both in the cities and the countryside, in winning support to them. Their achievements in the cities before World War II have been detailed in the paragraphs dealing with the anti-Japanese movement. During the War their aim in the cities was mainly to attract those students and teachers who lived in the cities occupied by Japan.⁵⁹ But the Communists' achievement in rural areas during the War is more interesting and important. There, Communist activities were more successful during the War than before the War. The following

⁵⁸Mao Tse-Tung, "Overcome the Danger of Capitulation-Strive to Mend the Situation" (a directive written on January 28, 1940), Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, III (157-160), 159.

⁵⁹For details of how Communists endeavored to attract students and teachers from Japanese areas see the Communist documents, quoted in Michael Lindsay, Notes on Educational Problems in Communist China, (New York, 1950), pp. 101-102, 127-129, 130.

section discusses these activities.

Anti-Japanese Self-defense Corps. The mobilization of the peasantry was the basic tactic of Mao Tse-Tung in his Communist revolution. But after 1931, and particularly after 1937, the Japanese invasion gave Mao new opportunities to capitalize on the mass-resentment against Japanese, as Mao himself admitted.⁶⁰ He started to arm the masses into a "Self-defense Corps" as part of an anti-Japanese program as early as 1931, but his success became significant only during the Second World War.

The Self-defense Corps was an "excellent institution for militarization of the entire people in the anti-Japanese war," as Mao Tse-Tung himself said.⁶¹ All men and women between the ages of sixteen and forty-five were organized into the Self-defense Corps, without distinction according to social classes.⁶²

The methods of organizing the masses were complex. Here we simplify them to show the basic procedure. When the Reds occupied a town or a village they first set up a mass meeting to give the peasants a theoretical lecture. The Communists would declare that the policy of confiscation of lands and properties would apply only

⁶⁰Nym Wales, Inside Red China, (New York, 1939), pp. 264, 265; also Mao Tse-Tung, Aspects of China's anti-Japanese Struggle, (Bombay, 1948), p. 21.

⁶¹Mao, Aspects of China's anti-Japanese Struggle, p. 37.

⁶²Ibid., pp. 21, 37.

to the Kuo Min Tang's officers and the rich, and would be a policy to liberate Chinese people from Japanese imperialists because the Kuo Min Tang and rich had not opposed the Japanese, while the Red Army was the real anti-Japanese army.⁶³ Then the Red political workers set out to "persuade" villagers to join in an anti-Japanese Self-defense Corps.⁶⁴

It was very important to arouse patriotism in order to get the ignorant people to join in the anti-Japanese organization, as a reporter explained.⁶⁵ They were taught a brief history of Japanese aggression, which was traced from the early days, through the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, to the last War. This history was given partly through the medium of drama and Harvest Dance or Yang-Ko, which will be dealt with later, partly through "Winter School,"⁶⁶ partly through leisure time during the evening after farming work. In brief, whenever it was possible, illiterate peasants were imbued with a deep-seated hatred for the Japanese.⁶⁷

⁶³Snow, p. 195.

⁶⁴Smedley, p. 154.

⁶⁵Gunther Stein, The Challenge of Red China, (New York, 1945), p. 335.

⁶⁶According to the writer's knowledge, the Communist "Winter School" is the informal educational institution in the Red rural districts. No certain days of attendance were set. The Communists principally gave the peasants political training.

⁶⁷Lindsay, pp. 69, 70, 74, 121.

The duties of the Self-defense Corps, according to Mao Tse-tung's instructions, were: local vigilance, watch, and patrol, information about the enemy, rounding up of traitors, aid to anti-Japanese regular troops and guerillas in the transportation of military supplies and wounded soldiers, cleaning of battle-fields and participating in coordinated warfare.⁶⁸

According to Mao's instructions, some details of these activities are given below. In each village and town there were many units of the Self-defense Corps.⁶⁹ In each unit there were certain persons loyal to Communists, the "hard core." It was these loyal persons who controlled the unit and made its members perform their duties in the Red rear area.

The people of Self-defense Corps played a considerable role in Red military operations. They were part of the Red Army's intelligence organizations which functioned so well that the Communists could always rely on considerable advance information of enemy moves.⁷⁰ For example, if a person of village A saw the enemy moving, he must inform village B immediately, regardless of weather; village B must inform village C; village C and the rest followed the same procedure until the information reached the Communist

⁶⁸Mao, Aspects of China's Anti-Japanese Struggle, p. 40.

⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 40-41.

⁷⁰Stein, p. 336.

center. Walking was substituted for telephone wires!

To show how the Communists utilized the peasants for warfare, we cite some interesting cases. At the end of 1949 the Red governors of several provinces made their respective reports. Kuo Tze-Hua, then the governor of Shantung Province, which has a population of thirty millions, reported that within three years Shantung provided 14,040,000 peasant-soldiers. Hsio Wang-Tung, then the governor of the north part of Kiangsu Province, with a population of about one hundred fifty millions, reported that his area provided 1,075,000 men and women peasant-soldiers for the Hsuechow (city) Battle alone, and 1,660,000 for the Yantze River Battle. T'zen Hsi-Wang, then the governor of north part of Anhui Province, which has a population of about twenty millions, reported that his area provided more than 8,000,000 men and women for the Yantze River Battle alone.⁷¹

Such large numbers of the organized masses were never used to fight Japan; instead they were used to fight the Kuo Min Tang.

Youth Utilization. The Communist Youth League, established in 1931, had great importance for the Communist movement. Its purpose was to attract and organize youth to provide the Chinese Communists of the future. Meanwhile, it was advisable to utilize

⁷¹These reports are cited in the writer's diary of 1949, based upon the Chinese Communist newspapers. Women went to the battle for cooking and supplying water and food, making shoes and uniforms, and so forth.

the youngsters to strengthen the rear. In 1933 this organization found seventy thousand recruits in the south central Red districts.⁷² In 1937 there were some 40,000 members in the Northwest Soviet Districts.⁷³

The C.Y.L. divided the youngsters into two camps; the group between eleven and sixteen was called Young Vanguard, who were a branch of the Red Army, and the group between seven and fourteen was called "Erh Tung Tuan" or "Children's Brigade." The latter was also known by the name of "Hsio Kwei Tseh" or "Little Devil Corps."⁷⁴ They did not participate in battle. In the following paragraphs we will simply describe the latter group.

For training the youth in the rural areas the Anti-Japanese Military and Political Academy in the Central Soviet District sent out college students for three-month periods to the countryside to train the youngsters.⁷⁵

Principally the children had to learn some Communist words and simple slogans. For examples it began with the words such "man" or "human being," and went on to "worker," "peasant," and "soldier," then to "army," "Japanese Army," "Red Army." Later the

⁷²Wales, pp. 99, 101.

⁷³Snow, p. 333. According to the writer, the decrease of the number of C.Y.L. is due to the result of the Anti-Communist campaign. In 1936 the Red Army numbered only 30,000 men.

⁷⁴Raymond J. de Jaegher, The Enemy Within, (New York, 1952), p. 201.

⁷⁵Wales, p. 307.

children were taught questions and answers: "A peasant produces rice; a worker weaves cloth. Why can't the peasant eat the rice he produces and the weaver wear the cloth he weaves?" "Why is there distinction between the poor and the rich?" "Why are both the rich and poor anti-Japanese today?" "Why is it that the Japanese are the most cruel on earth?" "Why is it that the Red Army is the anti-Japanese Army?" and so forth.⁷⁶

An important program in the children's training was to give them the ability to use Communist slogans. Even a child of twelve or fourteen at a mass meeting could make a simple but competent explanation of the current political situation, and parrot the reasons why the Red Army wanted to stop civil war and form a "united front" with all against Japanese aggression.⁷⁷

Children learned games, sports and crude shooting, everything done in the spirit of Communism, of fighting Japanese, and of opposing the Kuo Min Tang. They also had to learn propagandist songs and dances. They had their own slogan squads, singing squads, and dancing and dramatic troupes.⁷⁸

The duties of the children were various---most important to work as orderlies, spies, "teachers" of the illiterate peasants,

⁷⁶Smedley, p. 468.

⁷⁷Snow, p. 335.

⁷⁸Wales, pp. 100-101.

and dancers. When they worked as orderlies, they were armed with short, stout sticks. If a traveler were not quick enough in responding to their peremptory cries of "stop," he would find himself in trouble. If a traveler failed to show his pass,⁷⁹ the Little Devils would accuse him of being the Kuo Min Tang's or Japan's spy. The children's activities as spies were generally devoted to collecting information about those who opposed the Communists, including their own parents, but often they were sent to Japanese and Kuo Min Tang borders to procure information.

Children who taught the old, illiterate peasants often became nasty, spoiled by having more knowledge than the older generation. If the old people lacked the patience to memorize or understand the Communist terms they were accused of having "feudalist heads," people who "do not like to resist the Japanese."⁸⁰

Drama and Dance. The whole history of the Communist movement has been a grand propaganda tour. There is no more powerful weapon in the Communist arsenal of propaganda than the Red dramatic troupes of the Jen-Min K'ang-Erh Chu-She or "People's Anti-Japanese Dramatic Society." This dramatic organization was selected and formed from the Vanguard Brigade, made up of boys and girls. It

⁷⁹The travel pass, aimed to avoid espionage, is a very serious thing in the Red districts. According to the Communist regulations if a person wants to travel five Li ($1\frac{2}{3}$ miles) away, he must apply for a pass from the Communist local officer.

⁸⁰de Jaegher, p. 202.

was these youngsters who travelled ceaselessly back and forth in the Red districts, spreading the gospel of resistance and awakening the slumbering nationalism of the peasants. When the Reds occupied new areas, it was these dramatic troupes who calmed the fears of the people, gave them rudimentary ideas of the Communists and won the people's confidence.

However badly they had erred, however exaggerated had been made the emphasis here or the stress there, the Communists had the propaganda aim to arouse the peasants of rural China; to awaken in them a belief that the Communists were the real fighters against Japanese aggressors and that the Kuo Min Tang were not. The peasant, although he knew "small Japan" invaded China, did not know the brutality of the Japanese. These teen-agers made the picture vivid in the peasants' minds.

A reporter gives us an example of the Red dramas which he saw personally in the Soviet area.⁸¹ This drama was a combination of playlets, dancing, singing and pantomime. The "props" were primitive, but the drama was more effective for the peasantry than the elaborate Chinese opera because it dealt with living issues.

The first playlet was called "Invasion." It opens in a Manchurian village, in 1931, with the Japanese arriving and driving out the "non-resisting" Chinese soldiers. In the second scene,

⁸¹This example is in Snow, Red Star Over China, pp. 101-102.

Japanese officers banquet in a peasant's home, using Chinese men for chairs, and drunkenly making love to their wives. Another scene shows Japanese dope peddlers selling morphine and heroin and forcing every peasant to buy a quantity.⁸² A youth who refused to buy is singled out for questioning.

"You don't buy morphine, you don't love Manchukuo [Manchuria puppet State]. You are an anti-Japanese bandit." And the youth is promptly executed. A scene in the village market-place shows the Japanese soldiers buying pork without payment. When the merchant asks for money, they look at him in astonishment. "You ask for money? Why, Chiang Kai-Shek gave us Manchuria, Jehol, Chahar, the Tangku Truce, the Ho-Umetsu Agreement . . . ⁸³ without asking for a single penny! And you want us to pay for a little pork!" Whereupon, they impale him as a "bandit."

In the end, of course, all this proves too much for the villagers. Merchants turn over their stands in the market-place, farmers rush forth with their spears, women and children come with knives, and all swear to "fight to the death" against the Erh Pen Kuei Tze---The Japanese Devils.

The Yang-Ko or Harvest Dance was another propaganda instrument

⁸²The sale of narcotics by the Japanese in North China and Manchuria was prevalent before the War and during the War, but the Chinese were not forced to buy it.

⁸³Ho-Umetsu Agreement is the result of the Autonomous Movement of North China, 1935.

which was used to arouse the militance of peasants. Its origins date back to the Sung Dynasty, a thousand years ago, the traditional harvest dance performed chiefly at New Year's and other festival days. But the Communist artists reformed it for propaganda purposes in rural China.

There are various subjects depicted in the harvest dances. Mostly they deal with battle affairs: the story of a village traitor, the heroism of a soldier's wife, the atrocities of the Japanese in their mopping-up campaigns.⁸⁴

The Harvest Dance is exquisitely done by a group of girls or boys, or both. Barefooted, clad in peasant trousers and coats and fancy vests, with silk bandannas on their heads, they performed with unison and grace, gesturing and speaking. The story is told both by gestures and speech. Pantomime and gesture realistically conveyed the spirit of dance. The Harvest Dance gets more emotional effect than any Communist indoctrinational speech can get.

Popular among the Harvest Dances was the "United Front Dance," which depicted the mobilization of villagers to resist Japan. A group of youths wearing sailors' white jumpers and caps appeared as a cavalry formation, another group appeared as an aviation corps, another performed as foot-soldiers, and the rest as navy.⁸⁵

⁸⁴Harrison Forman, Report from Red China (New York, 1945), p. 84.

⁸⁵Snow, Red Star over China, pp. 102-103.

Whenever an anti-Japanese battle was fought, no matter how small the battle might be, a Harvest Dance was performed immediately to exaggerate the Red Army's power and to win the peasants' confidence. During the latter period of the Sino-Japanese war the Harvest Dance was mainly performed to induce the people to distrust the Kuo Min Tang. Such dances were so attractive that many college professors devoted themselves to performing such shows, during the beginning of the Red regime set up in Peking.

To sum up, basically most of the Chinese had prejudice against the Japanese. Because of the Japanese military hostilities against China the general anti-Japanese resentment became fiercer. The Kuo Min Tang's policy concerning Japan was not well understood by the Chinese public. The Communists, therefore, took a full advantage of psychology to perform a campaign of the "united front against Japan." Before the last World War the Chinese Communists won a great number of the "patriots" in the cities. During the War the Communists again taking advantage of the consensus of the public opinion on resistance against Japan expanded the Red Army in rural areas. Concerning such Communist movement an American reporter gave a comment that anti-Japanese slogans had become the core of Communist propaganda, and that it was the anti-Japanese campaign which sustained the Communists through several years of hardship.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ Snow, The Battle for Asia, (Shanghai, 1941), p. 130.

CHAPTER IV

ANTI-AMERICANISM

As soon as the Chinese Communists came into power, their "one-sided" policy was made obvious. In the present China there is no freedom to discuss imperialists except according to Communist interpretation: Russians are China's friends and Americans are imperialists, the enemy of the Chinese people. Before going on to an analysis of the grounds and tactics of the pro-Russian and anti-American policy we might present some description of the Chinese attitude towards Americans.

The Chinese Attitude toward Americans

Simply and generally speaking, the attitude adopted by the Chinese people toward America is both favorable and unfavorable. This idea is not contradictory if certain facts are considered.

It is true that American participation in the suppression of the Boxers' Rebellion and the "open door" policy have not been looked upon by the Chinese intellectuals as desirable events for China. But the Chinese, too, have conceded that the Boxers' Rebellion was not a rebellion of appreciable importance for

China.¹ They also remember that the Boxer indemnity shared by America was returned by America to the Chinese for educational welfare. The open door policy, likewise, no longer is considered by the Chinese as an example of military aggression against China. Therefore, the Chinese people have a rather favorable attitude toward America as compared with other countries such as Britain, France, Japan, and Russia. So in China people commonly say that "America is better than the other countries" when they talk about "foreign imperialists."

During the Kuo Min Tang regime pro-American and anti-Russian policy prevailed. The effects of this policy were significant because the Chinese people saw that there had never been any American concessions and particular privileges in China. On the contrary, the Chinese realized that Russia had important military and political conflicts with China both in the past and the modern times.

Some Chinese folksayings show this distinctive attitude toward Americans. The Chinese used to call America "Ta Lo Mei" (the big America) and American people "Mei Kuo Ta Shao Yeh" (American play-boy). These appellations in the Chinese language have respectful connotations. However, the Chinese used to call the Russians

¹The Boxers' Rebellion is condemned by Chiang Kai-Shek and praised by Mao Tse-Tung. Most of Chinese intellectuals in modern times do not endorse the Boxers' activities.

"Eh-Kuo Ta-Pi-Tze" (Russian big nose) or "Chung Lo Eh" (poor old Russia), both contemptuous terms.

It is also true, on the other hand, that the Chinese have an unfavorable attitude toward Americans. An important factor in the unfavorable attitude is the social gulf between the Chinese and American way of life. The Chinese people have misunderstood the Americans, particularly the American troops who were stationed in China during the last War. The Chinese people, in viewing American customs, complained that "Americans are so free," "so impolite," and "so romantic." Americans seem free because they are more friendly than the Chinese in expressing the "individual manners and attitudes. Americans seem impolite because they are more frank in meeting people than the Chinese are. Americans seem romantic because they do not show embarrassment such as the Chinese do when women and men meet together. Of major importance is that the idea of the American way of life accepted by the Chinese people is that which appeared in Hollywood films. The Chinese people concluded, therefore, that Americans are "not so moral."

An American sociologist has reported that the Chinese anti-American attitude has been influenced by some "concealed contempt" adopted by Americans toward the people of China.² One of the important factors in the "concealed contempt" idea seems to be

²C. F. Marden, Minority in American Society, (New York, 1952), p. 170.

Chinese primitive sanitary conditions.³ When Americans, particularly missionaries and soldiers, went to China and confronted the primitive sanitary conditions, they sometimes did little to conceal their opinion of the Chinese as dirty people. The Chinese people, in turn, reacted against the Americans.

Another psychological factor might be Chinese jealousy of the "luxury" of the American living. Although it is difficult to make a comparison of the Chinese and American living conditions, it must be agreed that in China there is a general poverty. In the Chinese culture, poverty can give people encouragement, while luxury tends to drown people in immorality; if a person lives in the lap of luxury, he cannot withstand hardship of his life and it is difficult for him to know the future. The Chinese people thus regard the American people in general. They say that Americans have money, but they do not have a high moral tone in their society. Concerning the American soldiers, the writer heard from the Chinese that American and British soldiers could not fight a hard battle during the Second World War; they won because they had money and weapons. Also American students have been regarded by Chinese students in China as not working hard in school because their families have "plenty of money."

³A description of Chinese primitive sanitary conditions is in Gerald F. Winfield, "China Basic Problems," Foreign Policy Reports, XXV (March 15, 1949), 2-5.

A common sociological and psychological theory holds that "prejudice against one minority group[is] generally accompanied by prejudice against all other groups."⁴ Thus, the unfavorable attitude adopted by the Chinese people toward Americans might be psychologically influenced by the hostile attitude toward other foreigners. The psychological precept is this: When people fail themselves, they will complain against everything and everybody. So in modern China the Chinese people often say, "Americans are foreigners; foreigners are always pro-foreigners," or "America will stand by another foreign country rather than by China." But, to be sure, the modern Chinese people (except Communists) do not see America as the "imperialist aggressor" against China.

Finally, it must be pointed out again, the unfavorable attitude toward America is less when political issues are considered. The attitude toward other foreign countries, particularly Russia, is rather a traditional resentment, which is more based on international political conflicts. Consequently, the Communists have made efforts to shift resentment from Russia toward America. They have endeavored to promote their one-sided program to the extreme.

The Communist Reasons for Teaching People to Resent
America and Befriend Russia

⁴Jerome Himelhoch, "A Personality type Associated with Prejudice," Race Prejudice and Discrimination, ed. Arnold M. Rose, (New York, 1951), p. 487.

General Observations. Moscow regards the democratic political and economic system of the United States as a paramount threat to the Soviet Union. During the early days of the Chinese Communist movement, following Moscow's instruction, anti-Americanism was promoted, as was seen in the second chapter. Before and during World War II, Mao Tse-Tung did not forget that "American imperialism" was threatening the U.S.S.R. even while he was engaged in an anti-Japanese campaign.

In regard to the Chinese Communist movement there has been a remarkable difference in the policies adopted by Russia and by the United States. For example, during the incident of the 30th Movement of 1925, at Shanghai, which was organized by the Communists, the United States, following the British and Japanese, sent warships to Shanghai.⁵ But Moscow sent several congratulatory messages to China urging the Chinese to continue the struggle until they had completely ousted all foreign imperialists. A typical message, for example, stated that the Soviet Union was closely following the fight of China's workmen and students for emancipation from the yoke of foreign capitalists and imperialists.⁶

For another example, in March, 1927, Nanking was captured by the army led by a Communist leader Lin Pai-Chu, and a violent riot

⁵The New York Times, June 2, 1925, p. 2; June 3, 1925, p. 1.

⁶Ibid., June 8, 1925, p. 4.

against foreign residents and their properties occurred.⁷ The United States, for the protection of its citizens, joined with the British in shelling Nanking, as a result of which, it was reported, 200,000 Chinese were killed.⁸ But Moscow called the Nanking case a "blood bath in Nanking," made by Americans. A Pravda editorial stated: "The country of George Washington and the declaration of Independence now appears before China in the shape of the monster Williams who drowns the independence of the Chinese people in a flood of blood." At the same time a manifesto issued by the Comintern Central Committee said: "The United States, who flirted with the Nationalist movement and coquetted with the Chinese revolution, threw off the rosy mask in one instant and revealed her military leadership in the work of mass murder and the destruction and ruin of Chinese cities."⁹ On the following day the Foreign Minister of Kuo Min Tang sent to the American Consulate regrets for the loss of American life. The Chinese Communists declared America to be "imperialist."

According to Communist political philosophy, the Chinese

⁷Hu Hua, Hsin Min Chu Chu I Ko Ming Shih, p. 86; also see The New York Times, March 25, 1927, p. 1; March 26, 1927, p. 1; March 27, 1927, pp. 1, 3; March 28, 1927, p. 1.

⁸The New York Times, March 25, 1927, p. 20; March 28, 1927, p. 1.

⁹Ibid., March 28, 1927, pp. 1, 3.

revolution is a part of the world revolution. This has been insisted on from the birth of the Chinese Communist Party up to the present time. The anti-Japanese War was viewed by Mao Tse-Tung as a part of war against world imperialists.¹⁰ For solving a "part of the world problem" a unity of China with Soviet Union is indispensable because "the Soviet Union," Mao Tse-Tung asserted, "will be in the vanguard to shake hands with us [Communists]." ¹¹ During the early days of the Communist-Kuo Min Tang campaign, the Communist Party from time to time received practical cooperation from Moscow.¹² At the same time the Kuo Min Tang had friendly relationships with the United States for more than twenty years.

Another assumption regarding the creation of a general hatred for the United States would seem to be that the Chinese Communists hoped to tap and utilize it at opportune movements. It was also important that they try to eradicate any fear of Western countries, particularly of the United States, and to strengthen Chinese

¹⁰Edgar Snow, "Interviews with Mao Tse-Tung" (made on November 5, 1936), Mao Tse-Tung and others, China: The March toward Unity, p. 35; Mao Tse-Tung, Aspects of China's Anti-Japanese Struggle, p. 48; Mao, The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party (a textbook written in December 1939), Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, III (72-101), 96; Mao, Hsin Min Chu Chu I Lun (On New Democracy) (written in January, 1940), (Peking, 1952), pp. 6-12.

¹¹Snow, "Interviews with Mao Tse-Tung," Mao Tse-Tung and others, China: The March toward Unity, p. 40.

¹²Tang Leang-Li, Suppressing of Communist-Banditry, (Shanghai, 1934), pp. 59-61.

feeling of self-respect which might be important for the confidence of the masses in the Communists.

Communist Interpretations. To the Chinese Communist mind Russian policy seeks for a perpetual peace for mankind. When the world accuses Russia of creating social chaos, Mao Tse-Tung is moved to answer in this way:

For a long time the Soviet Union's foreign policy has consistently been a peace policy, which means precisely that the interests of the Soviet Union are interwoven with the interests of the majority of mankind. In the past, the Soviet Union not only needed peace for socialist construction and had to strengthen its peaceful relations with other countries for the prevention of anti-Soviet war, but had to check the aggression of the fascist countries, to curb the war-mongering activities of the so-called democratic countries, and to delay the outbreak of an imperialist world war as long as possible so as to win peace on a world-wide scale. For years the Soviet Union has devoted great efforts to the cause of the world.¹³

In looking, however, at American policy, Mao insisted that when the United States adopted "the policy of nominal non-intervention" toward an aggressive country, it was in reality cooperating in the aggression. Mao, referring to the Japanese war against China, stated that when Japan invaded China the United States and other countries adopted a policy of "non-intervention," but the Soviet union not only followed a policy of non-aggression with China but also actively helped China in

¹³Mao Tse-Tung, "The Unity between the Interests of the Soviet Union and the Interests of Mankind" (written on September 28, 1939), Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, III, 44.

her resistance.¹⁴ Mao Tse-Tung conveniently forgot the non-aggression pact which Soviets and Japanese entered into at the beginning of the Japanese War.

Concerning the Second World War, Mao, in the same statement, said "The governments of Britain, France and the United States had no genuine desire to prevent the great war, but on the contrary precipitated its outbreak." To indicate that the United States, Britain and France desired war, Mao continued: "For they refused to come to terms with Soviet Union, to conclude with it a really effective pact of mutual assistance . . . this proves that they only wanted war and did not want peace."¹⁵

Mao agreed with Stalin that the United States intended to "sit on top of a mountain to watch the tigers fight" and would come down to wind up the whole affair when the Soviet Union and Germany should have worn each other out in fighting.¹⁶ He forgot that the American military supplies and the Second Front opened by Eisenhower saved the Soviet Union from falling into Hitler's hands.

On December 20, 1939, Mao Tse-Tung, while offering congratulations for Stalin's birthday, explained why Stalin's Soviet Union was the true friend of China: "No other country has renounced its

¹⁴Ibid., p. 45.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 46.

special rights and privileges in China; the Soviet Union has done this.

"During the First Great Revolution, all the imperialists were opposed to us; the Soviet Union alone aided us.

"In the Anti-Japanese War, no government of any imperialist country has really given us help; the Soviet Union alone has helped us with aeroplanes and supplies.

"Is this not clear enough?"¹⁷

Mao Tse-Tung in January, 1940, insisted that the Chinese revolution was a "new democratic revolution," based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, that for victory the Chinese revolution must rely on the Soviet Union, and without Russian help, China could not win.¹⁸ Mao also predicted that all countries in the whole world would be swept into either of two camps; that neutrality would be merely a deceptive phrase; that the Chinese must stand at the socialist side.¹⁹

Mao's opinion of the United States became openly more hostile after he came into power. He made a speech before the 28th anniversary meeting of the Chinese Communist Party. Mao's theme was that under the leadership of Soviet Union in the Second World

¹⁷Mao, "Stalin Is the Friend of Chinese People," Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, III, 102-103.

¹⁸Mao, Hsin Min Chu Chu I Lun, p. 23.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 25, 36.

War three big imperialist countries had been defeated and two big imperialist countries had been weakened, and only one big imperialist country, America, continues as a power; "American imperialism intends to enslave the whole world, and she is supplying weapons to Chiang Kai-Shek to kill millions of Chinese people."²⁰

In the same statement Mao indicated that China needs international help from the socialist countries, but she does not want American aid, because American rulers are "imperialists" who can never give "people's country" real aid.²¹ Now, Mao, in this speech, made clear the policy of the Red regime: "Chinese people must either stand at the imperialist side or at the socialist side, there is no neutral road; but we oppose the imperialist side, and we oppose the imagination of neutrality."²² Finally, Mao concluded that "we must unite with the Soviet Union, we must learn from the Soviet Union."²³

During the year 1949, Russian "advisers" began to pour into China, and the Chinese intellectuals, in general, had the feeling that these "advisers" seemed interested only in political affairs. The intellectuals doubted the value of such advisers, and general

²⁰Mao, Lun Jen Min Min Chu Chu'an Chin (On People's Democratic Dictatorship), (Peking, 1949), pp. 3-4.

²¹Ibid., pp. 8, 9.

²²Ibid., p. 7.

²³Ibid., p. 17.

opposition was prevalent. At the same time the Chinese people were aware that Russia had been moving industrial equipment from Manchuria while the United States poured into China a billion dollars worth of relief goods and industrial equipment for reconstruction.

Liu Shao-Chi, then the vice-president of Red Government, made a statement which was characteristic of the attempt to mitigate anti-Russian attitudes and strengthen Sino-Russian friendship. Since he is an important man in shaping the ties of China with the Soviet Union, we quote his article at length:

We specially prize this friendship and cooperation between Chinese and Soviet people because the path traversed by the Soviet people is the path which we Chinese will soon take. The experiences of the Soviet people in national construction are worthy of careful study by the Chinese people. The Chinese revolution attained the victory of today because we learned from the Soviet Union in the past and took "Russia as teacher." Henceforth, we are going to build up the country, and must likewise take "Russia as teacher" and study the experiences in national construction of the Soviet people. The Soviet Union has now much scientific knowledge which is entirely new and unknown to the rest of the world. We can learn such scientific knowledge only from the Soviet Union. For example, in the field of economics, banking, public finance commerce, education, etc., the Soviet Union has an entirely new set of theory which other countries of the world do not have, not to mention her advanced political science and military science. Soviet culture is an entirely new culture. The pressing task before the Chinese people today is to absorb the new culture of the Soviet Union and to make it the orientation for building up the new China. Hence we Chinese are especially in need of friendly aid and cooperation of the Soviet people.²⁴

²⁴Liu Shao-Chi, "Sino-Soviet Friendship", China Weekly Review.

Liu Shao-Chi made another statement of revealing importance. Liu distinguishes the "American imperialist camp" and the "anti-American imperialist camp" more sharply than Mao Tse-Tung. Liu stated:

When these two camps are in sharp conflict, people line up with one side or the other. That is, if one is not in the imperialist camp, if one is not assisting American imperialism and its accomplices to enslave the world or one's own people, then one must be in the anti-imperialist camp assisting all oppressed peoples of the world fighting to achieve liberation, or fighting for the liberation of one's nation against American imperialism and its accomplices---the reactionaries in all countries. This means one is assisting the Soviet Union, the New Democracies of Eastern Europe, the people's democratic forces in the United States and other countries. To remain neutral or sitting on the fence is impossible In order to win its liberation, every oppressed nation has no alternative but to oppose American imperialism and . . . to unite with the Soviet Union . . . No nation can win real liberation any other way.²⁵

In January, 1950, Soong Ching-Ling (widow of Sun Yat Sen), a vice-president of the Red Government, made a comparison of the United States with Russia.²⁶ She particularly pointed out that the Marshall Plan could produce only economic catastrophe for those countries which received American aid. A statistical analysis of Soon claimed that there had been a serious economic crisis and

(Shanghai), CXV, No. 9 (October 29, 1949), 142.

²⁵Liu Shao-Chi, Internationalism and Nationalism (written in 1948), (Peking, 1950), pp. 32-33.

²⁶"The Difference Between Soviet and American Foreign Policies," People's China, I, No. 2 (January 16, 1950), 5-8.

unemployment problem in Italy, France, Britain, and West Germany since these countries received Marshall Plan aid.

Soong's analysis also claimed to show that there had been a great increase of industrial product and economic prosperity in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary, Poland, and Red China, since these received "Stalin Plan" aid. Soong's theory is that the Marshall Plan was mainly aimed to educate people to follow the leadership of the United States; the Stalin Plan, however, was aimed to "sincerely aid the development of the [Red] Countries." Soong concluded that the United States is an imperialist country and the Soviet Union is the democratic.

Propaganda as Means for Training the People

The Chinese Communist movement is a grand propaganda tour, as mentioned previously. According to Mao Tse-Tung every Chinese must be a propagandist: "Who is a propagandist? Not only is the teacher a propagandist, the newspaper reporter a propagandist, the literary writer a propagandist, but all our cadres in all kinds of works are also propagandists. . . . Any person engaged in talking with another person is engaged in propaganda."²⁸ In Red China, therefore, the news, art, literature, mass meetings, and schools,

²⁸Mao Tse-Tung, "Opposing Party Formalism" (a speech made in February, 1942), quoted in Chen Hsi-En, "Education and Propaganda in Communist China", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCLXXII (September, 1951), 113.

are full of propaganda, the propaganda of anti-Americanism. It is worthwhile to introduce a number of examples of this propaganda.

Regarding the defeat of the Japanese in the last War the Chinese people believed that it was the Kuo Min Tang's eight years resistance, America's tremendous aid, and especially the two atomic bombs which forced Japan's earlier surrender. The Chinese people realized that Russian participation in the Japanese War did not play an important role. However, this conviction deviated from the Communist Party Line. Communists through their newspaper and magazines began to reject the "incorrect" viewpoint during the year 1949. One of the interpretations, which was made on August 15, 1949, seems to be typical:

The surrender of the Japanese pirates resulted from the heroic eight-year resistance of the Chinese people, and especially of the Red Eighth Route Army under the leadership of the Communist Party The final factor bringing about the Japanese surrender was the Soviet declaration of war on Japan on August 8, 1945 Within a week the Soviet Red Army, in conjunction with the forces of Outer Mongolia . . . destroyed or captured 764,000 men of the Japanese Imperial Kuantung Army If the Soviet Union had not sent troops into Manchuria, a military decision could not have been reached so speedily, therefore Japan still retained a very powerful army at the time . . . with which it could have continued resistance against the allied forces

The American imperialists, however, with their running dogs, the Kuo Min Tang reactionaries, spread propaganda to the effect that the defeat of Japanese fascism resulted solely from the use of two atomic bombs. Such talk is completely deceptive, for even though Soviet participation in the Japanese war came late, the fact remains that, if the Soviet people had not been ready, with their spirit of lofty self-sacrifice, to resist and destroy Hitler's great armies in the

West, America would certainly have been unable to conduct her offensive against Japan in the Pacific

The purpose of this deceptive talk on the part of the Americans and their running dogs is to conceal their sin of seizing and holding the fruits of victory for themselves alone, and, by exaggerating the power of the atomic bomb, to terrorize the people of the world's various peace-loving countries in order to facilitate their own dark designs for conducting new aggression as conditions permit²⁹

One might wonder how many people were convinced by the communist interpretation. To answer is difficult. An important consideration in any answer would be the success the Communists have in indoctrinating the young generation.

A popular pamphlet in Communist-dominated China is called American Imperialist's Bloody History of Aggression in China, which gives America the dubious credit of having a share in every war against China. A summary of this small book is given below.

In 1842 American soldiers helped English soldiers fight the Opium War. In 1874 an American admiral placed the American flag on Formosa and declared it independent. In 1875, the United States consul at Fukien went to Japan and urged that the United States and Japan take Formosa. In 1884, together with Japan, the United States attacked Korea. Ten years later the United States helped Japan to start the Sino-Japanese War. In 1900 America joined the other imperialists in taking Peking, because of the obstinacy of

²⁹Quoted in Derk Bodde, Peking Diary, A Year of Revolution, (New York, 1950), pp. 237-238.

some missionaries. In 1904 the United States used forty million dollars to help Japan in the war so as to share in the spoils of China's northeast provinces. In 1912, America joined the European Powers in exploiting China after declaring for the "open door." In 1925 American interference stopped the Communist revolution in China and set up a government favorable to America. American relief was given to unload American surpluses and make economic slaves of China after the War. Arms were given Chiang Kai-Shek and his reactionary government, which cost more blood and lives in the Communist revolutionary army fighting to liberate China.³⁰

On the contrary, Russia has no record of any aggression against China as far as the Communists are concerned. When Chinese intellectuals and Western observers viewed Sino-Russian friendship with a doubtful attitude, the vice-minister of the Education Department in Peking stated: "The treaty of Sino-Soviet Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance is based on truth and justice." The imperialists, the vice-minister pointed out, intend to slander and blacken the Soviet and Chinese people when they talk about the questions of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang. Also he added: "The Chinese people have never, under any circumstance, been anti-Russian."³¹

³⁰Referred to by Mark Tennien, No Secret Is Safe, (New York, 1952), p. 128.

³¹Chien Chun Jui, "Let the Imperialists Tremble!" People's China, I, No. 5 (March 1, 1950), 5-7.

Since the Chinese people have been aware of the Russian occupation of Arthur and Dairen, a typical device of Communist interpretation appeared in March, 1950. It indicated that the Russian occupation of Arthur and Dairen was for the liberation of Chinese residents there; the living standards, industrial products, children's education, and women's movement were improved to a great degree after the arrival of "the Soviet protectors," so that the Chinese people "love the Soviet protectors."³²

A book entitled On Americanism was published in 1949. The title of the first chapter asks "What Is Americanism?" and the rest of the volume is devoted to proving that the answer really is fascism. The book attempts to demonstrate that the United States has already become a police state with secret police (FBI) and the "slave labor" Taft-Hartley Law.

The result of the "fascist control of the United States" is a combination of war-mongering and degeneracy. Vyshinsky before the United Nation General Assembly of September 18, 1947, denounced the United States leaders as warmongers. A typical elaboration of the theme appeared in the Peking papers on November 26, 1950:

"There has been a big national boom in caves [in the United States]. Slick real estate merchants are helping to spread panic among the bourgeoisie and cashing in by offering for sale dry, deep, sizable

³²Chow Hsueh-Sheng, "The Story of Port Arthur and Dairen," People's China, I, No. 6 (March 16, 1950), 6-7, 27.

caves in Arizona and other remote spots. A lunatic character named Bobson has built an underground city in Kansas which he has called Eureka. There he is setting up offices and homes, with all modern conveniences."³³

The Chinese Communists seemingly do not dream that the free world might not believe what they say. Thus, Wu Hsiu-Ch'uan, the representative of Red Government invited to attend the United Nations assembly, made a bitter denunciation of the United States before the United Nations on November 28, 1950.³⁴ Referring to the Korean War Wu insisted that it was started by the United States, and that the United States Government was designed solely to furnish a pretext for launching aggression against every Asian country. After the War, Wu pointed out, only because of the efforts and sacrifices of the people of China and Russia the power of Japan in China was weakened; and taking advantage of this opportunity the United States stepped up the execution of its policy of sole dominance over China.

To oppose the general feeling that Americans have been the traditional friends of the Chinese people, Wu asserted that Americans are imperialists who have never been the friends of the

³³Quoted in Richard L. Walker, "Communist China Looks at the United States," Yale Review, XLI (Autumn 1951), 29.

³⁴Text of Wu's speech is in The New York Times, November 29, 1950, Section 1, pp. 14-16.

Chinese; instead they have always been the Chinese enemies as history shows. Wu's attack is not a new thing. Before the Korean War the Communist Party had already made similar charges, but they were hardly noticed in the United States.

Liu Shao-Ch'i in November 1948 made this statement:

Even during the Second World War, the American imperialists had made their plans for plundering and oppressing all the nations of the world. After the war, they put the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan into operation, thus step by step bringing many countries and nations of the world under their own control and rule And their aggressive plans just like those of Hitler, Mussolini and Japanese warlords, are being carried out under the slogan of "defence against the Soviet, defense against Communism."

In order to put their plan for enslavement of the whole world . . . the American imperialists . . . have to carry out propaganda among the American people about the "theory" of the so-called "American Century" and the "theory" of the "superiority of the white race," declaring that the United States should "lead the world"³⁵

The charges about the "American Century," "superiority of white race," "America is the leading country of the world" have been a current phenomenon in China after the War. Liu's charge seems an attempt to regenerate the Chinese traditional self-feeling of "supremacy," in order to conquer a fear of America.

The Nan-Fang Jih-Pao (Southern Daily), official organ of the CCP in Canton, published an article almost at the same time that Wu Hsiu-Chuan was in the United States. This article made an even

³⁵Liu Shao-Ch'i, Internationalism and Nationalism, (Peking, 1949), pp. 27-28.

stronger attack on the United States.

Every Chinese citizen who is willing to recognize facts may discern what kind of country the United States is. This is a country which is thoroughly reactionary, thoroughly dark, thoroughly corrupt, thoroughly cruel. This is . . . the hell of countless millions of poor people. This is the paradise of gangsters, swindlers, rascals, special agents, fascist germs, speculators, debauchers, and all the dregs of mankind. This is the world's manufactory and source of all such crimes as . . . darkness, cruelty . . . oppression of man by man, and cannibalism. This is the exhibition ground of all the crimes which can possibly be committed by mankind. This is a living hell ten times, one hundred times, one thousand times worse than any hell that can be depicted by the most sanguinary of writers Conscientious persons can only wonder how the spiritual civilization of mankind can be depraved to such an extent! Here is the graveyard of truth, righteousness, reason, progressiveness, science and culture Everyone who is conscientious, rational, truth-worshipping, willing to uphold the dignity and morality of mankind and unwilling to see mankind degraded to a level lower than animals, cannot help arising in righteous indignation to condemn the cursed phenomena of this cursed place. Everyone who does not want the people of this beloved fatherland contaminated by these criminal phenomena is charged with the responsibility of arising to condemn her, curse her, and despise her.³⁶

Such charges against the United States deal chiefly with the "American way of life." Since the Chinese Communist view is presented within a Marxist-Leninist framework, the "American way of life" is pictured as a life of increasing oppression of the proletariat by the American capitalists. This is made easier by the fact that the high standards of living in the United States or the freedoms of the people are beyond the understanding of the

³⁶Quoted in Walker, pp. 26-27.

poor Chinese people.

For the young people, songs, cartoons, and small pamphlets are good education devices. One such typical pamphlet is entitled Introducing the Paper Tiger, Imperialist America. The tiger fills Chinese painting and literature and is the "bogy" used to frighten people, as the "big, bad wolf" is used in American children's books. America, in this pamphlet, is called a "paper tiger"---a big bluff-- as Mao Tse-Tung used to use the word to symbolize the "imperialist" country. This pamphlet belittles the American atomic bomb as a weapon of no use against armies, a weapon which can be used only to kill the defenceless civilian populations of large cities. If America should risk bombing China, Russia would immediately carry retaliation to the "American imperialism." The pamphlet also encourages the Chinese youngsters to believe that American soldiers are soft, raised on luxuries, and cannot take the hardship of fighting.

Another booklet for youth bears the title Instruction for Youth at the Age of Reason. On each page it has cartoons. It pictures America as a hog that lives on blood, blood let by war. When business is bad, America starts a war so the capitalists can make money and retain their power.

Another, The Two Fronts, is given over to exposing the "aggression" of America primarily, though a small share in the "sin" is attributed to England and France. The Imperialistic aggression is

compared to the admirable peace front of Russia. Naturally all the conferences, the meetings, the societies, the propaganda and efforts Russia has given for peace are recorded.

The Communists also translated Russian propaganda into the Chinese language. One such translation is called The Living Standards of Russian People, and is designed to attract students of high schools. It pictures Russia as a paradise and her people as living the most comfortable of lives.

An article by Hu Sheng entitled "American Aggression Against China through the Course of History" appeared in a Peking journal on November 20, 1950. The author said: "Showing his white-gloved hand, the American imperialist would say to the Chinese people: 'Look at my hand; how clean it is! I have never taken any aggressive action against China. I have always been China's good friend.'"

"Pulling off his gloves, you will see his blood of the Chinese people, blood of the Asian peoples, which cannot be cleaned."³⁷

To prove the moral decadance of the Americans, one Peking magazine carried the following account under the title "Lying is Wonderful!"

The American Liars Club is twenty years old. In order to celebrate the twentieth anniversary, a lying competition was held to determine the world champion liar. At the beginning of the contest . . . the Chairman of the

³⁷Quoted in ibid., p. 31.

club said: "Lying is a great art, a great movement. We hope to discover many new talents this year." Although the result of the competition has not yet been announced, one thing is certain: the winner of the contest will be assured of finding work with publishers of the yellow press in the United States.³⁸

Communist songs are varied. Most of them are written principally for children and the uneducated masses. One such is "Follow Mao Tse-Tung," which goes:

Follow, follow Mao Tse-Tung!

They cannot be American slaves.

.

another song is called "Party Line":

Party Line, Party Line!

.

The whole world follows party line!

The imperialists are aggressing,

The powerful Russia is insisting peace!

.

Stalin is victory,

Mao Tse-Tung is victory!³⁹

During the Korean War a literary movement to "Resist America, Assist Korea," was promoted by Communist writers. A writer, Ch'en Huan-Mei, made a report before "The Artists Resist America, Assist Korea Propaganda Committee of Middle-South China." Ch'en's report advocated that Chinese writers join the anti-American propaganda

³⁸Quoted in ibid., p. 34.

³⁹Referred to Li Pan-Yu, Ko Ch'ien You Erh (A Chinese translation of Mark Tennien, No Secret Is Safe), (Hong Kong, 1953), pp. 107-110. According to the present writer Tennien's translations of Communist songs are not accurate.

movement. To quote:

Especially American imperialists . . . have engaged in deceptive propaganda against Chinese people for many years. From the American propaganda Chinese people engendered a psychological tendency of pro-America, respecting America, and fearing America; we have to spread our propaganda to correct this wrong trend, and we have to create a psychological wave of hating America, despising America, and belittling America. This propaganda must be taken in forms of arts and literature We have to concentrate all our efforts to the campaign against American imperialists⁴⁰

Similar committees had been formed in other cities. The result of this movement was that new dances and songs were developed. Here is a song entitled "Beat the Mad Dog":

American imperialist is a mad dog.
He'll bite you whenever he sees you;
If you are afraid of him,
His bravery becomes restless,
If you beat him bitterly,
He'll be knocked down.
Beat the mad dog,
Beat the mad dog,
Don't let the mad dog bite you!⁴¹

During the Korean War Chinese peasants under Communist force were "voluntarily" working for control over the Huen River, which had caused catastrophes to farms from year to year. But the Communists conveniently tied up this domestic problem with the Korean War and America. A song was worked out for encouragement of peasants, which ran:

⁴⁰Quoted in Tin Mio, Chung-Kung Wen-Yi Tsung-Pi-Pen (On Chinese Communist Art and Literature), (Hong Kong, 1954), p. 166.

⁴¹Quoted in ibid., p. 167.

American soldiers are mixed-bred sons,
 Their Korean aggression with their defeat will come along,
 The more defeated the madder they become.

.
 They are weak since they are a paper tiger,
 China has full man-power,
 First, we have to control the river.
 Then we can break up the paper tiger.⁴²

Besides the anti-American tones there is also something in praise of Stalin. Thirty-two poems written by Kuo Mo-Jo, a famous scholar and a top official of Peking Government, are the most popular. To show the characteristic tone of pro-Russian art we select several lines:

Stalin, great Stalin!

 Thank you grandpa Stalin,
 Thank you Soviet uncles,
 You have liberated us!

 To you, Stalin,
 Atomic bomb is a child game,
 Germ warfare is a nightmare!
 Your vigor can melt the iceland of the Artic Pole,
 Your kindness can fertilize the Sahara Desert.
 Your wisdom can change a river, move a mountain!⁴³

This sort of songs, or poem, of course is looked upon by the intelligentsia as childish. But children walking in the streets, working on the farms, sing them loudly. For their future the Communists look primarily to the young generation.

American social problems are also used for propaganda material.

⁴²Ibid., p. 168.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 281-282.

The propagandists have learned from the American press the problems of drug addiction, race riots, rape, murder, and particularly statistics, like the statement by the FBI that in 1950 a major crime is committed every 18.7 seconds in the United States. So a Chinese Communist author said "there are at least 80 horror broadcasts per week on the major United States radio network."

They know that juvenile delinquency is a current problem in the United States, and that moving pictures are said by sociologists to have played a part in its development. Therefore, the Chinese Communists waged a campaign against Hollywood films, from the end of 1949 to the end of 1950. Letters from the "readers" of newspapers and magazines blamed the American moving pictures for their "sins against the State" and for children's misconduct. One boy had broken his arm, he said, by trying to imitate Tarzan; another, who staged a daylight robbery, blamed Hollywood gangster films for the suggestion. Murder and detective films, the Communist press said, "are purposely given the American public to distract them from the acute and distressing social problems that confront them."

The Chinese Communist apparently do not tire of ascribing "bestial conduct" to the American troops throughout the world. Every unfavorable incident in which American troops in China were involved during the Second World War has been preserved and elaborated upon. The chronicle given to the Chinese people would

indicate that the American troops limited their activities overseas to pillage, murder, rape, and beating the people of friendly nations. This kind of propaganda is based upon an instruction given by the Communist Party in mid-summer of 1951. The instruction reads: "In certain cities where American troops were stationed during World War II accusation of the United States atrocities should be made. In accusation of the United States . . . inter-ludes of emphatic speeches are necessary to stress the fact that American imperialists are brutal"44

In the United States, of course, as in other countries there are social classes, and unemployment was a problem in the past. But the Communists thrive on exaggeration. A book stated that "the Du Ponts gave a ball that cost a half-million U.S. dollars. The cigars cost \$250 per box for these capitalists, while the income of a poor worker in America is only \$200 a year."45 Mao Tun, Minister of Cultural Affairs, in an article of December 5, 1950, made the absurd statement that there are over 15 million unemployed in the United States and that millions are on the verge of starvation.46

Anti-Christianity as Anti-Americanism

44Quoted in Gretta Palmer, God's Underground in Asia, (New York, 1953), p. 253.

45Tennien, pp. 128-129.

46Walker, p. 27.

Communists know there is an intrinsic contradiction between Christianity and Communism. But they have promised "freedom of religious faith" in their constitution and in their general propaganda. The condition for freedom of religious faith must be based on the Communist Party Line. Mao Tse-Tung in his People's Democratic Dictatorship indicated that a person who follows the Communists has democratic freedom, while a person who does not follow the Communists must be oppressed. To eradicate Christianity, especially the Catholic Church, must inevitably be the Communist aim. However, Communists have insisted that Christianity in China is the result of American imperialist aggression. The Red soldiers were taught that Christianity was invented by Americans.

In the beginning of the Red regime the Communist attitude toward the Protestants was more benevolent than that toward the Catholics. In April 1949, the Minister of Education Department of Peking stated: "The Chinese Communists did not interfere with the missionary schools. For example, the president of Yenching [Protestant] University is still Dr. Lu Chi-Wei. The only exception to this rule is Fu-Jen University [The Catholic University] because the American Catholic priest in charge was very deposite as well as reactionary, he was strongly opposed by the Chinese members of staff, who petitioned that the University should be taken over."⁴⁷

⁴⁷Quoted in Lindsay, Notes on Educational Problems in

China's entrance into the Korean War made things worse for Christian schools. The Communists finally took over Fu-Jen University on October 12, 1950. Following this, anti-Christianity grew fierce. On December 30, 1950, a statement of Red Government was issued:

The Government administrative Council of the Central People's Government yesterday adopted a "Decision on Policies for Dealing with American Subsidized Cultural, Educational and Relief Organizations and Religious Bodies." The policies which are embodied in a report made at the council meeting by Vice-Premier Kuo Mo-Jo, are as follows: First, the Government should plan and assist people in such a way as to make American subsidized cultural educational and religious relief organizations and religious bodies completely self-sufficient. Second, American-subsidized cultural, educational and medical organizations should be . . . taken over by the Government and transformed into State-owned enterprises . . . Third, American-subsidized relief organizations should be completely taken over and run by the People's Relief Administration of China. Fourth, American-subsidized Chinese religious bodies should be brought under the complete management of Chinese believers. The Government should encourage their movement to become independent, self-sufficient.⁴⁸

Following this government policy, in mid-February, 1951, the Baptist University of Shanghai and Roman Catholic Aurora University were officially taken over by Government. On February 12, 1951 Yenching University was seized. Later, the other nine colleges operating with American funds were taken over.

in Communist China, p. 176.

⁴⁸Quoted in Richard Arens, "The Impact of Communism on Education in China," Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, (University of Chicago, Chicago, 1952), p. 88.

The instructions of the Government insisted that all middle schools and universities should systematically expose and criticize the "evil influences of American imperialism's past propaganda activities" in China; and that youthful students were to be enabled to gain a concrete understanding of the "fact" that "American imperialism was a threat to the Chinese people."⁴⁹

From 1951 to the end of 1952 a great deal of anti-Christian literature appeared in magazines and newspapers. A typical article was written by a Chinese protestant leader who was graduated from Columbia University and Union Theological Seminary in the United States. The author stated that American missionaries went to China basically "for political and military invasion." The Boxer Indemnity, the author asserted, was used, under a pretext of generosity, to train Chinese students conversant with Americans, and to prepare them for the role of propagandists of the American way of life.⁵⁰ The author in this same article listed the statistics of the institutions supported by American funds: thirteen universities, 203 hospitals, 300 orphanages, 2,318 churches, and 2,634 American missionaries---all of these were for the purpose of aggression against China, according to the author. He went on in this way: "The American missionary fitted snugly into the imperialist scheme

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 147.

⁵⁰Wu You-Tsung, "New Life for the Chinese Christian Church," People's China, IV, No. 11 (December 1, 1951), 15-17.

of aggression. He lived in a garden-compound with modern facilities. He was boss of his church or Christian organization. . . . because he controlled its finance which came from abroad together with its policies. He walked with an air of superiority to everything around him."⁵¹ The statement quoted above is fairly a general attitude of the Chinese people toward the Church. To use a Chinese Christian leader, a graduate in the United States, to attack Christianity is, for the Communists, a wise scheme.

After September 1950 the Communists created the "Church Independence Movement." This movement demanded that the Chinese Catholics reject the Pope. The Communists declared that the Independence Movement was a patriotic movement and a movement against American imperialism. Therefore, as a part of this movement Communists have acted to force Catholics to sign in support of it.

According to Communist ideology there are close political ties between the Vatican and the White House. In Communist propaganda literature the Pope is called "imperialist," "running dog of American imperialism," or "a good friend of the White House." For example, an article appeared in Wen Hui Pao, April 7, 1950, which stated: "President Truman's special envoy to the Holy See, Myron Taylor, does not believe he needs to make an appointment to see Pope. He may walk into the papal court and say 'Is the Pope at

⁵¹Ibid., p. 16.

home?' The Secretary of the United States in writing to the Pope addresses him simply 'Dear friend.'"⁵²

But there has been more than just propaganda. Violent outrages have taken place since the start of the Christian Independence Movement. In early 1951 an American priest in Honan Province was arrested and was it charged that he had a share in the responsibility for the attack on the Boxers in 1900. The punishment for him was one million U.S. dollars. After the priest sold everything he possessed the Communists forced him to write letters to the Catholic Mission in Hong Kong for money. The result, of course, was life sentence.

On March 11, 1951, five nuns at Canton were arrested and accused of the murder of two thousand infants in their orphanage within one year. Public trial was held to show the "horrors of the orphanage of the mission." Two weeks later, an American priest was put in jail on account of "cruelty" to Chinese children. When a four-year old child died in a Catholic hospital of pneumonia, two sisters were blamed for causing this death, by "allowing scalding water to burn the child."⁵³

A few weeks later, seven European Sisters were arrested and tried by the Communists before a crowd of 3,000 Nanking citizens.

⁵²Quoted in Palmer, God's Underground in Asia, p. 215.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 197, 202.

The Communists displayed one hundred corpses of dead babies, which they had dug up from an orphanage cemetery, before the crowd as "evidence" of the Sisters' "crime." These Sisters were described in the Chinese newspapers as "American sympathizers and murderers." The papers also charged that "imperialist nuns give reactionary propaganda to orphans that America will help Chiang Kai-Shek return."⁵⁴

In April, 1951, an American priest was thrown into jail and in August was put on trial. His "crime" was reported by the Communists as that of having burned bodies alive.⁵⁵ At Pakhai, Kuangtung Province, an American priest and two Sisters were accused of "taking out babies' eyes to make medicine."⁵⁶

There was a more fantastic charge against the Sisters. In early 1952, a trial was conducted against six nuns at Chentu, Szechuan Province. A Chinese servant of the orphanage, under the Communist order, "testified" before an audience of 40,000 citizens that the Sisters "ate two babies a day when they were fat, three when they were skinny." They were also charged with the death of 120,000 orphans.⁵⁷

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 202.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 204.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 205.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 206.

To the Communist mind such charges are not too fantastic to be believed. In rural China there are in circulation superstitious stories regarding people killing people. Witch-like women tell the peasantry that human hearts are sometimes eaten, and human eyes when eaten make another person's sight better. Also infanticide is prevalent. During the beginning of the Red regime the local officials and officers of the cities came largely from the rural areas, had little education; when they tried to do everything in promoting anti-Christianity activities, they were inclined to be superstitious and childish.

It is clear, however, that in the present China the Communist outrages against the Church are fiercer than those which occurred during the earlier period of the Chinese revolution. Formerly under the Communist influence and operation the Chinese people indiscriminately accused all foreign missionaries as imperialists. But now the Communists emphatically teach them that there is close relationship between the American imperialism and Christianity. Practically, the American missionaries in China have suffered the most severe persecutions. Obviously the Communist anti-Christianity movement is following the one-sided policy.

Concerning all the events of the Communist anti-American and pro-Russian program, an expert on the Chinese Communist movement indicated that the Red regime is "the blind alley of totalitarianism," and that at the end of the blind alley of totalitarianism

there is nothing but self-destruction or the darkness of a new barbarian epoch.⁵⁸

⁵⁸Harold R. Issac, "The Blind Alley of Totalitarianism," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCLXXVI (July, 1951), 81-90.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Resume of Chapter I, II, and III

In the first chapter we have described the characteristics of Chinese anti-foreignism. It seems clear that an ethnocentric notion of supremacy made the Chinese, at least from the sixteenth century, reject and fight foreigners. Yet the result was that the foreigners began to infiltrate China, and China had become subject to foreigners since 1842, as history shows.

Through repeated defeats, China's nationalism grew strong, though not too effective. Nationalism brought China to a revolutionary chaos. Following the revolutionary storm anti-foreign movement reached a new high tide as discussed in the second chapter. In the beginning of that chapter we presented an analysis of the teachings of Dr. Sun Yat Sen, founder and leader of the Chinese anti-imperialist revolution. Obviously Sun Yat Sen was influenced by Marxism-Leninism, and he in turn brought his influence to the Chinese intellectuals and revolutionists.

Psychological conditions and historical events so mingled that the Communists' theories, as cited in the second chapter, seemed

rather adaptable and practical to the Chinese revolutionary mind. Thus, the Chinese Communists, with the aid of Moscow, were able to use nationalism as their ally in carrying out Communist objectives.

Communist spirit activities kept alive the spirit of the Boxers during the years before 1928. It is obvious, from Chapter II, that the Communists plotted boycotts and riots in the foreign factories and concessions; they aroused the mobs, soldiers, and students to destroy foreign properties, to murder and expel foreigners, to attack "foreign" Christianity. Revolutionary chaos prevailed, and, a history shows, such condition has always provided an opportunity for the Communist development, particularly so in China.

After the Kuo Min Tang began to suppress them from the summer of 1927, the Chinese Communists went to work underground to continue to fan the anti-foreign movement. For student circles in the cities the Communists spread propaganda tracts and pamphlets to incite a "patriotic" movement. At the same time they started to train and organize the peasantry in rural China to fight foreigners.

In Chapter I and the beginning of Chapter III we have indicated that basically the Chinese people had---and still have---prejudice against the Japanese. Coincidentally, after 1931, Japan began to make her new moves against China, step by step. Henceforth, the anti-foreign movement had been concentrated on Japan, as described in Chapter III.

The Kuo Min Tang Government tried through the League of Nations to restrain Japan at least temporarily. Also Chiang Kai-Shek believed that the first task of resistance against Japan should be to unify China, since there was the existence of the provincialists and the opposition of the Communists. While Chiang was using persuasive tactics to win control of the warlords, he was applying his armed forces in five campaigns against the Chinese Communists. At the same time Chiang followed a policy of mollifying the anti-Japanese movement in the cities. This policy in the face of Japanese aggression did not meet the public liking. The Chinese Communists, therefore, took full psychological advantage in its anti-Japanese campaign. The cry for a "united front against Japan" had become powerful propaganda, both in the cities and countryside.

Before the last War the Communists won the "patriots" in the cities, though the Red Army suffered deeply from the vigorous opposition of the Kuo Min Tang. During the War the Communists again manipulated public opinion, which demanded collaboration of the Kuo Min Tang and Communists for full defense of China against Japan, and, utilizing the peasantry, expanded the Red Army in rural areas. The Red Army, as a matter of fact, had not been wholeheartedly applied to fight the Japanese; instead it had been kept for the bargaining of political power with the Kuo Min Tang after the War. It might be fair to say that the anti-Japanese campaign had

sustained the Chinese Communists through several years of hardship and provided them an opportunity for further development.

Evaluation of the Communist Anti-American Program

Since the Communists came into power they have evolved an anti-American and pro-Russian program, especially a program which is destined to "hate America, despise America, and curse America." In the beginning of the fourth chapter it has been pointed out that the Chinese, in general, have both a favorable and an unfavorable attitude toward Americans. The unfavorable attitude, however, is not rooted in any immediate diplomatic dispute between China and America. It has resulted from the Chinese misunderstanding of American social life; it has been influenced by the "concealed contempt" adopted by Americans in China; and it is partly a psychological inter-playing of the idea that "foreigners are pro-foreigners." Politically, the Chinese people have, at least, a comparatively favorable attitude toward Americans. But the Chinese Communists have indoctrinated the Chinese people to hate Americans, principally on the basis of the Communists' political bias and historical fabrications. If the Communists simply attacked the American way of life, since this has been traditionally misunderstood by the Chinese people, their teachings would probably be more effective.

Moreover, the characteristic of the Communist literature is

over-exaggeration which can be seen in any example cited in the fourth chapter. Even in attacking the American way of life and social problem their teachings have deviated too far from facts and public reasoning. Human knowledge has always rejected a story covered with dubious shadow. If the Chinese Communists should teach their people in seemingly objective and moderate terms and attitudes, they might get more or less credit with the public. As a matter fact, an astonishing rumor, which illustrated the Chinese public wish, was current in Red China during the beginning of the Korean War: "Now, America will come back again!" Of course the rumor was a dream, but a dream which was dreamed in Communist China.

But more important than over-exaggeration is the enforced teachings of the "befriend Russia" idea. Although we did not introduce many examples of the Communist pro-Russian propaganda, the anti-American program is basically aimed to promote the pro-Russian movement, which can be seen in the Communist interpretations cited in Chapter IV. The Chinese attitude toward Russians is rather a resentment that has resulted from a history of Russian hostilities toward China. Russia, though tactically renouncing all unequal treaties with the past China in 1918 and 1919, put new pressure on China to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia and Russian privileges in Sinkiang during the Kuo Min Tang regime. After the World II War the Chinese people have been aware of Communist Russia's activities in Arthur, Dairen, and Eastern Railway. But

the Chinese Communists have contended that Russian privileges in Manchuria and other territories are for the benefit of the Chinese. It is doubtful that such an interpretation could merit credit with the public for the Chinese Communists.

Psychological reaction on the one-sided policy is inevitable. Mao Tse-Tung admitted that a "reactionary" trend is prevalent, and it will continue to exist.¹ A typical reaction is illustrated by a Chinese Communist popular writer, Hsiao Chiun, who devoted himself to the CCP for about twenty years. Hsiao's article "On Various Imperialisms" appeared in his own Wing Hua Pao (Literature News) in early 1949. Hsiao posed one main question in attacking his party: If America represents imperialism, why does not Russia also represent imperialism since she has violated China's sovereignty and she moved away Chinese property from Manchuria?² The result that Hsiao was prosecuted.³ At the same time a general purge has been carried out to conquer any anti-Russian and anti-Communist attitudes.

The Chinese Communists might expect that exaggerated "one-sided" propaganda will achieve success among the second generation.

¹Mao Tse-Tung, Lun Jen Min Min Chu Chuan Cheng, p. 11.

²Ting Miao, Chung Kung Wing Yi Tsun Pi Pen, pp. 111-112.

³Hsiao's fate has not been fully known, but there is a general agreement among the Chinese intellectuals that Hsiao was sentenced to death.

However, how to reform successfully the "reactionary" idea already established is an enormous task for Communists. A crucial purge of "reactionaries" would achieve the reverse in the long run.

Although governmental policies can decrease and increase Chinese anti-foreignism, such policy must be based on reality. During World War II, the Nanking and Peiping puppet governments tried to create a general pro-Japanese attitude, but it was never achieved.

On the other hand, the Chinese Communists presumably decided that since they successfully incited agitations and riots against all foreigners including Americans in early period of the Chinese Revolution, they would achieve similar successes in an anti-American movement at the present and in the future. Nevertheless, people's minds might undergo a change, since the situation in the earlier days cannot be exactly comparable with the present situation. The point is that the judgement of the Chinese people on Communism and Communist activities cannot be always the same. The Communist statement and propaganda were rather consistent with the public demand in view of the former revolutionary chaos. The Communist policy at the present time does not appear to conform to the public's psychological trend.

A more important point is that the Communists have not taught their people in this way that "all foreigners" are imperialists against China. They have singled out that only Americans are imperialist aggressors against China. Even Japan, the big enemy

of China as the Chinese people regarded, has been eliminated from the Communists' attack target. For example, when the rearmament pact was performed by the United States and Japan, the Chinese Communists organized student and worker demonstrations in various cities. Among the slogans used for demonstrations we can only find "Down with American imperialism." There is no words like "Down with Japanese imperialism," which had been used by the Chinese Communists as an important propaganda weapon for many years. A current question thereupon has been formed by the Chinese people in Red China: "What do we have to do with Japan since we got nothing, though we defeated her?" If the Communists should indiscriminately act against all foreigners in manifesting Chinese nationalism they might be supported by their people in a program of anti-Americanism. Of course, this is antagonistic to the foreign policy of the Red regime. But a one-sided policy is also an antagonistic to traditional Chinese feeling.

Finally, it is certainly not accurate to insist that Communist propaganda in China gains nothing. One result brought about by the Communist repeated denouncements of the United States should be pointed out. When Wu Hsiu Chuan bitterly attacked the United States in the United Nations, the writer in Hong Kong learned from his countrymen who are not Communists that "Whether Communists are right or wrong, for one hundred years this is the first time China dares to attack a foreign power!" Before the writer came to the

United States, a Chinese scholar suggested to him that the Chinese in the United States would be more respected if they claimed that they have come to the United States from Red China.

Similarly, a Chinese student, who is anti-Communist, advised the writer to adjust himself to live in the United States: "Don't fear Americans. Now the Chinese Communists sound pretty loud against the United States. Americans fear the Communists. We are Chinese!" In the spring of 1954 the writer interviewed a number of Chinese students in Chicago to determine the Chinese intellectuals' attitude toward the Communists and Americans. Persons who are anti-Communists gave some words like: "China has prestige now, because Chinese Communists dare to speak to the world," "China really could fight America, a big Power, in Korea!"

We do not know how many Chinese, inside and outside Red China, hold this nationalistic feeling of self-respect, but we do know there are such Chinese. The Chinese Communist leaders might find that the above attitudes might give satisfaction to their role played in the international sphere of the present day. To those Chinese who dislike Communists and yet feel a gain in prestige caused by the blustering and threats of the Chinese Communists, it is a psychological dilemma. When they think they have gained prestige, they also feel, as often the writer has learned, that China is too dependent on Russia and she has lost something to Russia. By and large, the feeling of national supremacy is still

important among the Chinese people. The question of whether or not the Chinese Communists can perfectly satisfy this feeling is a big task for them.

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