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The Role of the Vis Cogitativa in the Prudential Syllogism According to St. Thomas Aquinas

Joseph A. Muenzer

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THE ROLE OF THE VIS COGITATIVA IN THE
PRUDENTIAL SYLLOGISM ACCORDING
TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

by

Joseph A. Muenzer, S.J.

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements of the Degree of
Master of Arts

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1952
LIFE

Joseph A. Muenzer, S.J. was born in Toledo, Ohio, October 23, 1922.

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INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE AND METHOD OF THIS THESIS

Man, they tell us, is a rational animal. Nothing seems more trite to a mind trained in philosophic parlance. Yet the implications of this definition are many and profound. And nowhere do these implications need to be stressed more than in the field of human knowledge. In explaining how a man knows, it must never be forgotten that we are explaining how a rational animal knows. Too much emphasis placed on either part of the definition results in a distorted theory of knowledge, if not in down right nonsense. The investigation ends with a type of knowledge fit only for the angels; or else man is classified as a rather highly organized bit of protoplasm, one step removed from his tree-dwelling ancestors.

Now the rarified atmosphere of the Thomist theory of knowledge with its species, its intellects, agent and possible, might seem to tend toward an excessively rationalistic explanation of knowledge. St. Thomas is, indeed, an intellectualist; but he does not cut himself off from the true source of cognition in sensation, nor does he fail to consider the complete sensitive
knowledge which man possesses with brutes. In fact, he makes human cognition that of a man using his faculties of intellect and sense. For him, man is one being with one soul in which are radicated all the powers of growth, being, life, sensation, and intellect. Though the operations of the intellect are spiritual and essentially different from those of sense, St. Thomas is careful to show how intellect and sense work together in our human cognition. The continuity, the oneness of the cognitional process, is preserved, and the distinction between faculties, some of which are intrinsically independent of matter, while others are dependent on matter, is likewise firmly maintained. This cardinal point of Thomist psychology is nowhere better illustrated than in the Angelic Doctor's teaching on the internal sense in man which is known as the *vis cogitativa*. A careful study of the place of this sense in the Thomist theory of knowledge will show the completeness and consistency with which the Angelic Doctor expounds the cognition of a being that is at once animal and rational.

An adequate and thorough treatment of this sense would however, take us far afield, so that it is necessary at the outset to delimit the problem and subject matter of this thesis. Stated simply, the problem of the thesis is to determine the precise role of the *vis cogitativa* in the formation of the minor proposition of the practical or prudential syllogism. Allowing
the definition of terms to wait until each point of the problem is taken up in order, indication must be made of scope of the thesis by noting the presuppositions of the problem and the related aspects of it which will not be treated.

The problem of the thesis as stated presupposes the entire Thomist theory of knowledge involving the distinction between external senses, internal senses, and intellect. The further division of intellect into the rationally distinct functions of speculative and practical knowledge is likewise presupposed. The concern of the thesis is with practical knowledge. Another aspect of intellect which is basic to this thesis is the theory of intellectual virtues comprehending on the speculative side, understanding, science, and wisdom, and on the practical, art and prudence.

The last mentioned practical virtue enters directly into the matter under consideration, but again only under one precise aspect. As is clear from the statement of the problem, this aspect is one of the operations of prudence as seen in the practical syllogism, by which its general principle is reduced to action in a given singular instance. This restriction on the consideration of prudence in the thesis means that much of the Thomist theory on this virtue is also presupposed. It will be granted that St. Thomas considers prudence one of the two virtues or habits of the practical intellect whose special function is
stated succinctly in the familiar definition of recta ratio agibilium. Prudence is concerned with the rectitude of human actions, guiding the moral virtues in the proper choice of means to man's end. Its position as dominatrix of the moral virtues makes it at once intellectual and moral. The involved process by which prudence guides human action, taking in as it does the elements of both cognition and appetite, will not enter into the matter of this thesis. The further complications which arise when prudence is considered as one of the infused virtues will also be prescinded from. For the purpose of the discussion it seems adequate to look upon prudence as that virtue of the human intellect which gives reason's guidance over the method of procedure in the multitude of actions of which man is capable. Since for St. Thomas no human action in concrete circumstances is indifferent, careful precision must be made from the attendant moral goodness or badness of an act; it is to be considered psychologically, as an act. The simplest expression of the act of prudence is seen in the prudential or practical syllogism, the specific subject of this thesis. From the statement of the problem it is likewise clear that the vis cogitativa has something to do with the formation of the minor of the prudential syllogism and as such enters into the thesis as its second element.

While the place of the vis cogitativa is thus summarily stated, there are a number of presuppositions and prescisions which must be made with regard to the proposed treatment of this
internal sense. The aspect under which the *vis cogitativa* will enter into the thesis is that of its conjoint operation in the formation of the minor of the prudential syllogism. Such treatment prescinds from the analogous position of the cogitative in relation to the *vis aestimativa* in brutes. St. Thomas nearly always mentions these two powers together. Also presupposed is the doctrine on the animal estimative sense and the existence in man of an estimative sense whose operations in some cases are not essentially different from those of the animals. St. Thomas places the estimative sense in brutes to explain their instinctive reactions under definite circumstances in a way that tends to the preservation of the individual animal or the species. Without previous knowledge animals flee from their natural enemies, build nests, provide for their offspring, and do numberless other marvelous things grouped under the general name, instinct. They have a kind of fore-knowledge of certain sensible goods and evils and a tendency of appetite toward them or away from them. The animal cannot obtain this relation of suitability or unsuitability from the three internal senses of imagination, common sense, or memory. St. Thomas therefore places a fourth, distinct internal sense in brutes.\(^1\)

Purely instinctive reactions on the part of man are few.

and simple in comparison with the brutes. But their presence in very young children or in the insane leads St. Thomas to posit a purely estimative internal sense in man. With the dawn of the use of reason, man's estimative sense gradually takes on a number of functions which transcend anything attributed to the animal estimative. By reason of its affinity to the intellect, the highest of the internal senses carries on under the guidance of reason a comparison of sensible goods or evils and reasons about particulars. It is this activity of the **vis cogitativa** which is of moment for the matter of the thesis.

The above mention of the guidance offered to the cogitative sense by the intellect is more precisely put if one adds the term practical intellect. Clearly, in the statement of the problem of the thesis, we are prescinding from the speculative intellect, and therefore, from any activity of the **vis cogitativa** which may be concerned with speculation as such. That such a precision is not only allowable but valid, is one of the major conclusions of what is perhaps the only definitive work written on the **vis cogitativa**. This is the study of the Reverend George P. Klubertanz, S.J., *Vis Cogitativa According to St. Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Doctrine*, written as a doctoral dissertation

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2 *S.T.*, I-II, 77, 1 c.
3 *S.T.*, I, 78, 4 c.
in 1947 at the University of Toronto. Mention of this work leads naturally to a discussion of the literature related to the problem of this thesis.

The above mentioned work is the most important item in the related literature. As its title indicates, it takes in not only the doctrine of St. Thomas on the *vis cogitativa*, but also the historical sources of his position. The historical part of the thesis, roughly half of the work, covers every major opinion on internal sensation and its gradual development from Aristotle to St. Albert the Great with special emphasis on the Arabians, Averroes and Avicenna. This portion of the thesis is valuable for fixing the meaning of terms over the centuries and the acceptance given to them by St. Thomas. The doctrinal part of the work follows the textual, historical method, giving a thorough treatment of the cogitative sense as seen first in the early works, the *Commentary on the Sentences*, secondly in the commentaries on Aristotle's works, and finally in the mature work of St. Thomas in the *Summa Theologiae*. The author joins the strands of the historical, textual treatment together in a final chapter of conclusions, many of which have already been accepted as presupposed to this thesis.

Prudence and the role of the *vis cogitativa* receives frequent attention in Father Klubertanz's work, but the treatment is necessarily brief because of the scope of the whole thesis.
The writer of the present thesis feels that he can expand the treatment of the prudential syllogism and the role of the cogitative in it in such a way as to avoid a mere restatement of the definitive work. It is hoped that the conclusions of the present thesis, though they will be in substantial agreement with Klubertanz, will in some small way supplement what he has already said.

Among the occasional articles dealing with the cogitative or touching on it, the most authoritative is that of Father Julian A. Péghaire, *A Forgotten Sense, The Cogitative, According to St. Thomas*. This long article is valuable for its collation of numerous texts in St. Thomas. Its treatment is chiefly historical and textual, but controversy enters the picture when the argument for distinct potencies, and therefore for the very existence of the cogitative, is questioned. Scholastic opinions contrary to that of St. Thomas are also introduced and an attempt is made to answer them. None of these points is relevant to the present thesis. On the point of the prudential syllogism and the role of the cogitative in its formation, the treatment is brief enough to allow a separate and more expansive study in the present work.

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There are a number of other articles which border on the matter of this thesis and which have proved more or less helpful. Among these are "Knowledge and Perception in Aristotelian-Thomistic Psychology" by Cornelius Fabro. In one section dealing with the cogitative in the Thomist theory, the author makes the assertion that the cogitative furnishes reason with the minor for the prudential syllogism, but does not develop the manner of this furnishing. Rudolph Allers has written two articles which cast some doubt on the very process which forms the subject of this thesis. In "The Vis Cogitativa and Evaluation" he brings together many of the key texts on the prudential syllogism and related points, but seems to find difficulty in St. Thomas' explanation of the co-operation between reason and the cogitative. The other article, "Intellectual Cognition of Particulars," stresses what Allers considers to be obscurities in St. Thomas, chief among which is Allers' difficulty with the term "continuation" as an explanation of the co-operation between the intellect and the internal sense.

6 Ibid., 353.
Pégaire has written a longer book, *Intellectus et Ratio Selon S. Thomas D'Aquin*, which in its thorough treatment of the terms *intellectus* and *ratio* necessarily touches on their application to the cogitative in the works of St. Thomas. The work is helpful for the great number of texts collated, but since the emphasis is on the strictly intellectual meaning and use of the terms, there is room for development and explanation of the doctrine as applied to the cogitative.

The dissertation of Sister M. Rose Emmanuella Brennan, *The Intellectual Virtues According to the Philosophy of St. Thomas*, approaches the subject matter of this thesis from the prudential aspect and gives a brief treatment to the prudential syllogism formed with the help of the cogitative sense. There is, however, a good deal of room left for a textual study of this problem. William A. Gerhard draws together both aspects of this thesis, the activity of the cogitative sense and that of prudence, into a unified treatment in two articles, "Instinctive Estimation of Practical Values," and "The Intellectual Virtue of

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prudence. The former of these articles contains much infor-
mation about modern theories of emotion and instinctive evalu-
ation, attempting to find parallels in St. Thomas and his com-
mentators, where they treat of the cogitative sense. The latter
is a good treatment of the prudential syllogism with pertinent
and clear examples; but the nature of the co-operation between
prudence and the cogitative, specifically as seen in St. Thomas,
is not presented with any degree of definiteness. Thus there is
some justification for the proposed treatment of this thesis,
precisely because of the incomplete treatment of this problem in
the related literature.

There remains a discussion of the method to be followed
in the proposed study of the problem in the works of the Angelic
Auctor. Primarily the method will be textual, presenting perti-
ment passages from St. Thomas in such a way as to allow him to
settle the question himself. Interpretation will be kept to a
minimum, except where there is some doubt occasioned by the use
of terms. The thesis of Father Klubertans will be followed
closely, when such questions arise.

The presentation of the texts will follow the accepted
chronological order, beginning with the early works, proceeding

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11 William A. Gerhard, "Instinctive Estimation of
Values," and "The Intellectual Virtue of Prudence," The Thomist,
VIII, (1945), 185-232, 413-456.
through the major commentaries on Aristotle, and ending with the *Summa Theologica*. The intention in following this method is to facilitate notice of any development in the doctrine of St. Thomas. Father Klubertanz has used this approach with happy results, so that the writer feels he can follow his lead even to the point of accepting his verdict on the chronology, where there is some disagreement among the authorities.

The subject matter of the thesis divides itself nicely into three sections. In the first chapter of the thesis, the nature of the prudential syllogism in St. Thomas will be treated. The activity of the cogitative sense in this syllogism will be studied in the second chapter. The third and final chapter will, by way of summary draw together the two aspects of the question in deciding the nature of the connection between the intellectual virtue and the sense power. More specifically, this chapter will try to determine the type of causality involved in the composite operation of forming the prudential syllogism.

With this as the general chapter division, it must be pointed out that the development of each chapter will repeat the chronology of early, middle, and late works. This means that the three divisions of the problem will undergo a somewhat arbitrary separation so that each one may be followed through all the major works. The alternative method would be to study the whole problem as it appears in the *Commentary on the Sentences*, repeat
this in the *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*, and do the same on through all the works. The writer feels that this would lead to useless repetition and a fragmentary presentation. The method chosen will, indeed, result in small segments of text being cut off from portions which deal with the other two divisions of the problem; but a certain unity of treatment will also be attained, since one point of discussion will be emphasized in each chapter.

With the problem, scope, related literature, and method of the thesis briefly delineated, the writer proceeds to the first consideration, the nature of the prudential syllogism in the works of St. Thomas.
CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF THE PRUDENTIAL SYLLOGISM

The subject matter of this chapter has been very briefly delimited in the introduction. A definition of terms is now in order. To define the prudential syllogism with any degree of definiteness, the nature of prudence itself must be investigated a bit more thoroughly. St. Thomas' position on prudence in general must be clear, in order to understand at what point in the complicated process of prudential action the mind is syllogizing.

The attempt to give St. Thomas' general position on prudence in the compass of a few pages is perhaps ambitious in view of the conclusions of a recent investigation. If there is any significant development of prudence from the early to the later works, it lies principally in the portion of the doctrine to be discussed in this thesis. In the three major treatments of prudence, the following points appear to be consistent and common Thomist positions. First of all, prudence is looked upon

1 George P. Klubertanz, 259-260.
as an intellectual virtue, one of several habits which St. Thomas, following Aristotle, places in the intellect. Three of the habits are considered as belonging to the speculative intellect; that is, science, understanding, and wisdom. Prudence and, along with it, art is said to belong to the practical intellect. This distinction of the intellectual virtues into those which pertain to the speculative intellect and those which pertain to the practical does not mean that there are distinct or diverse potencies in the intellective part of the soul. There is no diversity in the formal object of these two aspects of


3 S.T., I-II, 57, 5 c., "Et ideo necesse est in ratione esse aliquam virtutem intellectualem, per quam perficitur ratio ad hoc quod convenienter se habeat ad ea quae sunt ad finem. Et haec virtus est prudentia."

4 S.T., I-II, 57, 3, sed contra, "Philosophus... ponit has solum tres virtutes intellectuales speculativas, scilicet sapientiam, scientiam, et intellectum."

5 In VI Eth., 3, n. 1150, "Determinat de habitibus qui perficiunt intellectum circa contingenta. [As opposed to the three above mentioned virtues which perfect the intellect in regard to necessaria.] Dicit... quod contingens... dividitur in duos; scilicet in aliquid quod est agibile, [the work of prudence] et aliquid quod est factibile ejus. [the work of art] Hence the familiar definitions of art and prudence: recta ratio factibilium; recta ratio agibilium."
the soul, for both have truth as their object. It happens that an object apprehended by the intellect may be directed to action. As Thomas explains it definitively in the *Summa Theologicae*:

Accidit autem alicui apprehenso per intellectum, quod ordinatur ad opus, vel non ordinatur. Secundum hoc autem different intellectus speculativus et practicus. Nam intellectus speculativus est, qui quod apprehendit, non ordinat ad opus, sed ad solam veritatis considerationem; practicus vero intellectus dicitur, qui hoc quod apprehendit, ordinat ad opus. . . . Unde a fine denominatur uterque.7

Thus it is the end which distinguishes the two so-called intellects. The distinction based on contingent and necessary is not absolute. "Eadem intellectiva potentia cognoscit necessaria et contingens."8 This is so, because contingents can be taken in two ways:

Secundum rationes universales; alio modo secundum quod in particulari. Universales quidem igitur rationes contingentium immutables sunt. . . . Unde patet quod contingens sic considerata ad eandem partem animae intellectivae pertinent ad quam et necessaria.9

In understanding contingents according to universal aspects, St. Thomas means that there are certain necessary things which are

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6 *S. T.*, I, 79, 11 ad 2: "O bjectum intellectus practici est bonum ordinabile ad opus, sub ratione veri. Intellectus enim practicus veritatem cognoscit, sicut et speculativus; sed veritatem cognitam ordinat ad opus."

7 *Ibid.*, c.

8 *In VI Eth.*, I, n. 1121.

true even about contingents. Granted, he would say, that So-
ocrates is sitting, he must necessarily be doing just that. Deeds
already done have this necessity; they are what they are and
cannot be undone. The intellect gets at these necessary aspects
of contingents so that it is one power which knows both univer-
sals or necessaries and contingents thus understood.

The distinguishing feature, therefore, of the practical
intellect and its two virtues, art and prudence, is the ordi-
nation to contingent, particular, operables, with this mutual
difference, that prudence is directed to action which remains
immanent to the agent, while art is directed to activity which
is external to the agent.\footnote{Ibid., n. 1151: "[A]ctio manens in ipso agente
operatio dicitur ut videre, intelligere, et velle. . . . Sed
factio est operatio transiens in exteriorem materiam ad aliquod
formandum ex ea, sicut aedificare et secare. . . . habitus qui
est activus cum ratione quae est prudentiae, sit alius ab habitu
qui est factivus cum ratione qui est ars."}

This explains the ordination to
the end found in the familiar definitions of prudence -- \textit{recta
ratio agibilium}, and of art -- \textit{recta ratio factibilium}.\footnote{S. T., I-II, 57, 4 o.} The
part of right reason needs some amplification, because the very
term \textit{recta ratio} implies that reason is the measure of the
rightness, the goodness or badness of an act. This is to say
that the virtue of prudence enters into the realm of morality.
It is noteworthy\(^{12}\) that St. Thomas distinguishes art from the moral virtues; but leaving this difficult question, let us examine briefly how prudence is both an intellectual and a moral virtue.

Nothing is more common than the well-known division of the cardinal moral virtue into prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice. St. Thomas treats prudence as one of the moral virtues in his \textit{Commentary on the Sentences} and in the \textit{Summa Theologiae}.\(^{13}\) A complete treatment of this collocation is not in order. Yet the mere statement that there can be no prudence without the moral virtues and equally no moral virtues without prudence, is the simplest explanation.

There can be no prudence without the moral virtues because the prudential process cannot ratiocinate about means to a

\(^{12}\) \textit{In VI Eth.}, 4, n. 1172.

\(^{13}\) \textit{S. Thomas Aquinatis Scriptum Super Sententiis Magistri Petri Lombardi}, eds., Pierre Mandonnet, O.P., M. F. Moos, O.P., Paris, 1929-1947; \textit{In III Sent.}, 33, 2, 5 sol.: "Prudentia inter alias virtutes cardinales principalior est, et ad ipsam reducuntur omnes aliae quasi ad causam." The first three books and the first part of the fourth book of St. Thomas' \textit{Commentary on the Sentences} will be quoted from the above mentioned edition. Cf. also S.T., II-II, 47, 4 c: "Prudentia non solum habet rationem virtutis quam habent aliae virtutes intellectuales; sed etiam habet rationem virtutis quam habent aliae virtutes morales, quibus etiam connumeratur."

\(^{14}\) S.T., I-II, 58, 5 ad 1: "Ratio, secundum quod est apprehensiva finis, praecedet appetitum finis; sed appetitus finis praecedet rationem ratiocinantem ad eligendum ea quae sunt ad finem, quod pertinet ad prudentiam."
given end, unless the desire for the end precedes it. And this desire for the end cannot come into the realm of prudence unless it is modified by the moral virtues. These latter regulate and bring into line the natural inclinations of man's appetitive powers toward individual goods. The converse statement of this relation, that there is no moral virtue without prudence, is proved by the fact that man cannot rightly accept the means which lead to a given end, unless his reason rightly takes counsel about these means, judges them, and gives its precept. These three functions, consiliative, judicative, and preceptive pertain to prudence. Thus the direction of prudence correctly applies the principles of right reason to the consideration of the many possible means which a man can use to achieve a given end. Prudence judges of the goodness or badness

14 S.T., I-II, 58, 5 ad 1: "Ratio, secundum quod est apprehensiva finis, praecedit appetitum finis; sed appetitus finis praecedit rationem ratiocinantis ad eligendum ea quae sunt ad finem, quod pertinet ad prudentiam.

15 S.T., I-II, 58, 5 c: "[A]d hoc quod recte se habeat homo circa principia particularia agibilium, quae sunt fines, oportet quod perficitur per aliquos habitus secundum quos fiat quodammodo homini connaturale recte judicare de fine. Et hoc fit per virtutem moralem."

16 Ibid., 4 c: "[V]t homo recte accipiat ea quae sunt ad finem; . . . non potest esse nisi rationem recte consiliantem, judicantem, et praeicipientem; quod pertinent ad prudentiam." Cf. also In III Sent., 33, 2, 5 ad 1; In VI Eth., 11, n. 1289.
of these means, supposing that the tendency of the appetite is
toward a good end. The complete appreciation and understanding
of the definition of prudence, recta ratio agibilium, is ex-
pressed in fuller terms by St. Thomas in the question concerned
with the virtues in general:

[6] postet quod ratio practica perficiatur aliquo habitu
ad hoc quod recte diiudicet de bono humano secundum singula
agenda. Et haec virtus dicitur prudentia, cujus subjectum
est ratio practica; et est perfectiva omnium virtutum
moralium quae sunt in parte appetitiva, quarum unaquaque
facit inclinationem appetitus in aliquod genus humani
boni.17

Thus connected are prudence, the practical reason, and the a-
genda.

For all of the necessary relations between prudence
and the moral virtues St. Thomas considers that prudence has
functions which pertain to it alone in its primary capacity as
an intellectual virtue.18 Thus in terms of formal object, pru-
dence and the moral virtues are distinct, though their material

17 De Virtutibus in Communi, 6 a. Quotations from
the above work are taken from Quaestiones Disputatae, Marietti,
Taurini-Romaes, 1931, II. The entire corpus of article six is
an excellent summary of the whole matter under discussion, the
relation of prudence and the moral virtues.

18 In III Sent., 33, 2, 3 sol.: "Sed actus prudentiae
sibi proprius est distinctus ab actibus aliarum virtutum." S.T.,
II-II, 47, 5 a.: "Sed a virtutibus moralis distinguitur pru-
dentia secundum formalem rationem potentiarum distinctivam:
silicet intellectivi, in quo est prudentia; et appetitivi, in
quo est virtus moralis. Unde manifestum est prudentiam esse
speciem virtutem ab omnibus aliis virtutibus distinctam."
objects coincide. 19 There is textual justification, therefore, in prescinding from prudence as a moral virtue.

One other aspect of the virtues needs mention, that of virtues which are infused by God. St. Thomas clearly holds that God does infuse habits or virtues in man, 20 both intellectual and moral. 21 Further mention of such infused virtues, especially infused prudence, is obviated by the fact that infused virtues differ specifically from the acquired virtues. 22 There is evident ground for prescinding altogether from prudence as an infused virtue.

19 S.T. II-II, 47, 5 ad 3: "[A]gibil[ia sunt quidem materia prudentiae secundum quod sunt objectum rationis, scilicet sub ratione veri. Sunt autem materia moralium virtutum secundum quod sunt objectum virtutis appetitivae, scilicet sub ratione boni."

20 S.T., I-II, 51, 4 c.: "[D]uplici ratione aliqui habitus homini a Deo infunduntur. Prima ratio est, quia aliqui habitus sunt quibus homo bene disponitur ad finem excedentem facultatem humanae naturae. . . . Alia ratio est, quia Deus potest produere effectus causarum secundarum absque ipsis causis secundis."

21 S.T., I-II, 63, 3 c.: "Unde oportet quod his etiam virtutibus theologis proportionaliter respondant alii habitus divinitus causati in nobis, qui sic se habeant ad virtutes theologicas sicut se habent virtutes morales et intellectualles ad principia naturalia virtutum."

22 Ibid., 4 c.: "Et per hunc etiam modum differunt specie virtutum morales infusae, per quas homines bene se habent in ordine ad hoc quod sint gives sanctorum et domestici Dei; et aliae virtutes acquisitae, secundum quas homo se bene habet in ordine ad res humanas."
The intent of the present thesis and this chapter in particular is to consider the prudential process in itself. The entitative consideration of prudence as an act of the intellect will not be of primary concern, nor will the ethical or theological aspects, from which precision has been made. The prudential process is to be examined psychologically. A study will be made of its component parts by assigning each distinguishable feature of the process to its proper power.

Three aspects of this process have already been noticed, the consiliative, judicative, and preceptive. Two things must be kept in mind about these three divisions. First they have to do with the application of general and universal principles to a given singular action to be placed here and now by the agent. Secondly, it follows from the first that they imply a syllogistic reasoning process, one of whose terms must always be singular. In other words the prudential process is best exemplified in the practical syllogism. The psychological consideration of this syllogism must be located for the sake of preciseness and clarity among the various parts, integral, sub-

23 Cf. note 16 above.

24 In VI Eth., 6, n. 1194: "Prudentia enim non solum considerat universalia in quibus non est actio; sed oportet quod cognoscat singularia eo quod est activa, id est principium agendi." Cf. also S.T., II-II, 47, 3 c. "[A]d prudentiam pertinat non solum consideratio rationis, sed eam applicatio ad opus, qui est finis practicae rationis." Cf. Ibid., 1 ad 3.
jective, and potential, of prudence as assigned by St. Thomas.

Without prejudice to the subject matter of this chapter, the discrepancy in the parts of prudence as seen in the Commentary on the Sentences, and the Ethics, and in the Summa can be noted. 25

Taking the Summa as definitive, the cognoscitive integral parts are memory, understanding, reason, docility, and the ability to conjecture well and correctly. The preceptive integral parts are providence, circumspection, and caution. 26 The subjective parts are prudence strictly considered as directive of one's own actions, and less strictly as directive of those of others. The latter has three subdivisions, military, domestic,

25 Cf. In III Sent., 33, 3, 1. The only significant omission is reason. St. Thomas' eventual understanding of ratio and intellectus as they enter into the prudential process will become clear in the conclusions of the thesis. In the Commentary on the Ethics St. Thomas is restricted to the treatment of Aristotle. In general most of the parts as given in the Summa appear in one form or another. A detailed study of the matter is beyond the province of the present work. Cf. Book VI, Lessons 8, 9, and 10. Rubulius is treated under the notion of consilium and electio in conjunction with the voluntary act of the will in Book III, Lessons, 4, 7, 8, and 9.

26 S.T., II-II, 48, 1 o.: "Triplex est pars: Scilicet integralis, ut partes, tectum et fundamentum sunt partes domus; . . . ad similitudinem partium integralium: . . . illa dicantur esse partes virtutis allciuus quae necessa est concurrere ad perfectum actum virtutis illius. Et sic . . . possunt accipi octo partes prudentialae. . . . Quorum octo quinque pertinent ad prudentiam secundum id quod est cognoscitiva, scilicet memoria, ratio, intellectus, docilitas et solertia: tria vero alia . . . secundum quod est praeceptiva, applicando cognitionem ad opus, scilicet providentia, circumspectio, et cautio."
and political. The last mentioned is termed regotive when possessed by the ruler of a state. These subjective parts of prudence are species of the virtue related to the genus as the lion and the cow are species of brutes. They need not concern us here, since no matter what subjective species may be considered, psychologically, the prudential process or syllogizing will be the same. The potential parts—contained in the whole as the nutritive and sensitive parts are contained in the soul—are three, good counsel, good judgement, and a special perspicacity in judging by higher norms. The integral parts and the potential parts therefore call for brief discussion in that order.

There are further divisions of the integral parts. Where cognition itself is concerned, memory of past experiences and understanding of things present, either contingent or necessary, come into play; in the acquisition of knowledge, docility

27 Ibid.; "Partes autem subjectivae . . . prudentiae sunt prudentia per quam aliquis regit seipsum, et prudentia per quam aliquis regit multitudinem, . . . quae . . . dividitur in diversas species . . . prudentia militaris . . . prudentia oeconomica; . . . et [quae est] directiva in principe [dicitur] regativa, in subditis autem politica simpliciter dicta."

28 Ibid.; "Partes autem potentiales . . . dicuntur virtutes adjunctae quae ordinantur ad aliquos secundarios actus vel materia, quasi non habentes totam potentiam principalis virtutis. Et secundum hoc ponuntur partes prudentiae subulia, quae est circa consilium; et synesis, quae est circa judicium eorum quae communi acident; et gnome, quae est circa judicium eorum in quibus oportet quandoque a communi lege recedere."
to direction, and the ability to conjecture well and correctly are called into play; and finally in the use of the knowledge, reason conducts its discursive function and judges rightly. In judging rightly reason attains the essential act of prudence and commands, aided by providence, circumspection, and caution.

In order to locate the syllogistic process in this multiplicity of parts, we must analyse the separate articles, which determine whether and how each part belongs to prudence. Special attention will be given to those which the writer considers as belonging particularly to the syllogistic process.

The memory assigned to prudence is the sensitive knowledge of the past as past. A great number of such memories are needed to form the experience vital to the generation of the intellectual virtues. Once prudence is had, memory aids its syl-

logistic process by affording instances of similar past actions. These, through experience, have been reduced to universal principles, the major propositions in the syllogism. The memory can also offer past actions for comparison on the sense level to clarify the concept of the singular term in the minor proposition.30

Understanding is the next part of prudence to be considered by St. Thomas. Because a clear notion of the meaning of this term, as he uses it in this context, is needed, the whole of this article is given:

[...]ntellectus non sumitur hic pro potentia intellectiva, sed prout importat quandam rectam asestimationem alicuius extremi principii quod accipitur ut per se notum: sicut et prima demonstrationum principia intelligere dicimur. Omnis autem deductio rationis ab aliquibus procedit quae accipiuntur ut prima. Unde oportet quod omnis processus rationis ab aliquo intellectu procedat. Quia igitur prudentia est recta ratio agibilium, ideo necesse est quod totus processus prudentiae ab intellectu derivetur. Et propter hoc intellectus ponitur pars prudentiae.31

This much is clear enough, but leaves one with an idea of this term, as applied to the parts of prudence, which is only half correct. \textit{Intellectus} in this reply stands revealed as another aspect of the true intellectual virtue of first principles. It is only in the answers to the objections in this article that there appears another aspect and, indeed, another meaning for

\begin{itemize}
\item[31] \textit{S.T.}, II-II, 49, 2 c.
\end{itemize}
In the first objection understanding is said to be the intellectual virtue posited as distinct and divided from the intellectual virtue of prudence. As such it cannot be a part of prudence. In the answer to this objection the point to be noted, at this stage of the discussion, is the clear statement of the nature of the prudential syllogism:

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio prudentiae terminatur sicut ad conclusionem quandam, ad particulare operabile, ad quod applicat universalem cognitionem. . . . Conclusio autem singularis syllogizatur ex universalis et singulari propositione. Unde oportet quod ratio prudentiae ex duplici intellectu procedat. Quorum unus est qui est cognoscitivus universalium, quod pertinet ad intellectum qui ponitur virtus intellectualis; quia natura-liter nobis cognita sunt non solum universalia principia speculativa, sed etiam practica, sicut nulli esse male-faciendum. . . . Alius autem intellectus est qui, . . . est cognoscitivus extremi, id est alicuius primi singularis et contingentis operabilis, propositionis scilicet minoris, quam oportet esse singularem in syllogismo prudentiae, ut dictum est. Hoc autem primum singularis est alicuius singularis finis, . . . Unde intellectus qui ponitur pars prudentiae est quaedam recta aestimatio particulari fine. 32

In the third objection it is denied that understanding whose object is universals and immaterial things can be a part of prudence which deals with singular operables. The reply forms a basis for appraising the place of a sense power in the prudential process:

Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsa recta aestimatio de fine particulari et intellectus dicitur, in quantum est alicuius principii; et sensu, inquantum est particularis. Et hoc est

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32 Ibid., ad 1., Italics not in original.
quod Philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic. Horum, scilicet singularium oportet habere sensum; hic autem est intellectus. Non autem hoc est intelligendum de sensu particulari quo cognoscimus propria sensibilia; sed de sensu interiori quo de particulari iudicamus. 33

These texts make it clear that intellectus, understanding, has two meanings; first, the intellectual grasp of the universal principles from which reason proceeds in the syllogistic process, and secondly, the grasp of the singular operable in so far as it is the particular end of the action or an extreme, that is, the singular term in the prudential syllogism. Worthy of note in passing is that intellectus in this secondary meaning is termed a sensus, in so far as it knows the singular operable as such. Clearly in this text intellectus is an interior sense by which we judge about singular operables. Thus understanding in both of its meanings is essential to the prudential syllogism.

Docility and the ability to conjecture well and quickly pertain only extrinsically to the prudential syllogism. The former is needed, because of the multitude and diversity of ends which can come under consideration in prudence. Everyone must have his prudential reasoning helped along by the practical experience of older and wiser heads. 34 The ability to conjecture well is a facility in prudential reasoning which one ac-

33 S.T., 49, 2, ad 3.
34 Ibid., 3 a.
quires with repetition and broad experience. Its presence cuts
down or shortens some of the steps in taking counsel with one-
self, but does not essentially change or affect the process.35

That reason should be an essential element of the pru-
dential syllogism is self-evident, because the syllogistic pro-
cess is of its nature ratiocinative. For in the syllogism, the
mind searches for the connection between terms by seeking to
equate them with a third. Thus man’s knowledge increases from
the known to the unknown, and from the more universal to the less
universal, and in prudence from the universal principle to its
application in a given singular instance. Reason is all the more
needed in prudence, because singular actions with all their at-
tendant circumstances are almost infinitely variable and uncer-
tain.36

In answering the third objection in the article on

35 S.T., 49, 4 c.

36 Ibid., 5 c et ad 2: "opus prudentiae est esse
bene consiliativum. . . . Consilium autem est inquisitio quae-
dam ex quibusdam ad alia procedens. Hoc autem est opus rationis.
Unde ad prudentiam necessarium est quod homo sit bene ratiocina-
tivus. . . . Ad secundum dicendum quod certitudo rationis est
ex intellectu, sed necessitas rationis est ex defectu intellectu:
. . . Particularia autem operabilia, in quibus prudentia
dirigit, recedunt praecipue ab intelligibiliti conditione: et
tanto magis quanto minus sunt certa sua determinata. . . . Et
ideo quamvis in quibusdam aliis virtutibus intellectualibus sit
certior ratio quam prudentia, tamen ad prudentiam maxime re-
quiritur quod homo sit bene ratiocinativus, ut possit bene ap-
plicare universalia principia ad particularia, quae sunt varia
et incerta."
reason as a part of prudence, St. Thomas indicates that the term reason is to be understood as denoting an act of the intellectual power which differs from the act of understanding, though both have one and the same intellective principle. This is added textual confirmation of the assertion made above that intellectus as a part of prudence denotes a strictly intellectual activity as well as the sensitive activity which grasps the singular operable as singular. But the term ratio, as used in this article, is not to be understood in two sense, as denoting a strictly intellectual process of comparison and a similar process on the sensitive level, often termed by St. Thomas ratio particularis.

The three remaining integral parts pertain to prudence in so far as they help in the rectitude which reason must achieve in the use of cognition, that is in judging and giving its command. Providence enables the prudent man to look ahead at the contingent future actions as referable to man's general end and the particular end in each action. Inasmuch as all actions

37 S.T., II-II, 49, 5, ad 3: "[E]tsi intellectus et ratio non sunt diversae potentiae, tamen denominantur ex diversis actibus; nomen enim intellectus sumitur ab intima penetrations veritatis; nomen autem rationis ab inquisitione et discursu."

38 Ibid., 6 c: "[P]rudentia proprie est circa ea quae sunt ad finem; et hoc ad eius officium proprie pertinet, ut ad finem debite ordinentur. . . . [H]umanae tamen prudentiae non subiiciuntur nisi contingentia operabilia quae per hominem pos- sent fieri propter finem. . . . Unde consequens est quod con- tingentia futura, secundum quod sunt per hominem in finem humanae
are contingent futures without the necessity of past events or present circumstances which cannot be otherwise, providence, the ability to conceive just what the future action will be, enters into every prudential process or syllogism. So much is this true that St. Thomas puts providence down as the formal or predominate part of prudence. 39

Circumspection makes the prudent man mindful of the circumstances attendant on actions or means, which may be perfectly good in themselves. Such circumstances may render an action or means bad here and now. 40 In order to avoid extrinsic impediments to a good action or evils that may be mingled with it, the prudent man must exercise caution. His discursive process must always examine the possibility of evil in the proposed means or action with the intention of renouncing it or making it

vitae ordinabilia, pertinent ad prudentiam. Utrumque autem horum importatur in nomine providentiae. . . . Unde providentia est pars prudentiae."

39 S.T., II-II, 49, 6 ad 1: "[P]rovidentia est principalior inter omnes partes prudentiae; quia omnia alia quae requiruntur ad prudentiam ad hoc necessaria sunt ut aliquid recte ordinatur in finem. Et ideo nomen ipsius prudentiae sumitur a providentia, sicut a principaliori sua parte."

40 Ibid., 7 c: "[Q]ua prudentia, . . . est circa singularia operabilia, in quibus multa concurrent, contingit aliquid secundum se consideratum esse bonum et conveniens fini, quod tamen ex aliquibus concurrentibus redditur vel malum vel non opportum ad finem. . . . Et ideo necessaria est circumspectionem ad prudentiam ut scilicet homo id quod ordinatur in finem comparet etiam cum his quae circumstant."
less harmful. 41

In retrospect it is clear that if any of the integral parts of prudence are lacking, the application of right reason to a given singular action or means to the end can fail of its purpose. Yet all the parts are not evidently operative in each process. Those which pertain essentially to the formation of the prudential syllogism, which is the prime concern of this study, are again intellectus and ratio.

While the subjective parts of prudence can be passed over, it is necessary to consider its so-called potential parts. Good counsel, or eubulia, good judgment in routine matters, or synesis, and good judgment in extraordinary matters, gnome, are adjuncts of prudence which are directed to certain secondary acts not having the entire potency of prudence. They form the consiliative and judicative parts of prudence which are preliminary to the preceptive or principle part of prudence. 42

Good counsel then enters into the syllogistic process

41 Ibid., S c.: "[E]a circa quae est prudentia sunt contingentia operabilia, in quibus sit ut in verum potest admiseri falsa, ita et malum bona, propter multiformitatem huiusmodi operabilia, in quibus bona plerumque impediantur a mala, et mala habent speciem boni. Et ideo necessaria est cautio ad prudentiam, ut sic accipientur bona quod videntur mala."

42 Cf. note 28 above and also In III Sent., 33, 3, 1, sol. 3: "Sed quia in operabilibus cognitio ordinatur ad opus, idem consilium et judicium de consiliatis ad praecipuum de opere reducitur siut in finem; et propter hoc prudentia est usualis et principalis respectu aliarum."
by inquiring among the possible means which may be subsumed under the universal principle as conducive to the end desired. Synesis and gnome enter in as judicative of the suitability of these means.

With the nature of prudence and its parts thus briefly established, a definition of the prudential syllogism is in order. The syllogism in general is a process of the mind by which man, starting from knowledge already acquired, arrives at new knowledge by seeing the connection or disjunction between two terms in their common identity or lack of identity with a third or middle term. St. Thomas thus expresses it: "Rationcinari est procedere de uno intellecto ad alium, ad veritatem cognoscendam." The speculative process of reasoning has as its end the knowledge acquired. The practical process of reasoning on the other hand has as its end the knowledge of a singular action as operable. Thus by reason of their ends the speculative differs from the practical intellect, but does not thereby imply a distinction of powers. The fact that what is apprehended by the speculative intellect is not directed to action, while that which is apprehended by the practical intelle-

43 S.T., I, 79, 8 o.
A lect is so directed, is something that merely happens.45

By way of example, here is a purely speculative syllogism, adapted from St. Thomas: "Id quod habet superficiem est finitum; sed omne corpus habet superficiem. Ergo omne corpus est finitum."46

The major and minor of this syllogism are universal truths deduced in previous reasoning processes. The new knowledge is arrived at by grasping the identity between every body and the quality of finitude through the middle term, to have a surface.

An example of the practical or prudential syllogism from St. Thomas is the following:

\[
\text{Ratio autem practica quaedam est universalis, et quaedam practicularis. Universalis quidem, sicut quae dicit, quod oportet tale agere, sicut filium honorare parentes. Ratio autem particularis dicit quod hoc quidem est tale, et ego talis, puta quod ego filius et hunc honorem debeo nunc exhiberi parenti.} \]

Of importance here is the fact that the major premise of the syllogism is universal, while the minor is particular. This must be so in the practical syllogism, because it is directed to

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45 Ibid.

46 S.T., I, 7, 3, sed contra.

action, and action is always singular. The practical or prudential syllogism may, therefore, be defined: it is that discursive process of reason by which a universal truth is seen as applicable in a given singular instance. Beginning with a universal truth in the major proposition as its principle, it descends to its term in the conclusion involving the singular instance expressed in the minor proposition. This syllogism results in the cognition of a particular truth here and now directed to action under the aspect of a good end.

To introduce the notion of the good end into the prudential syllogism is merely to recall a point made above, that prudence, and therefore, its expression in the form of the practical or prudential syllogism, is concerned with means to an end. Since prudence is concerned with a good for the end proposed, morality, though it enters into most actions, is not necessarily involved in every prudent action. The prudential process is also under the guidance of reason and is therefore a voluntary act. Thus, while it is difficult to distinguish prudent action from moral and free action, we can do so by considering the prudential process as the intellectual side of an act that is free and generally moral.

The intention now will be to show through further textual evidence what St. Thomas has to say about this prudential syllogism. Especially to be looked for are the distinguish-
ing marks of a universal truth applied to a particular action. The manner in which the intellect knows the singular operable, which stands as the subject of the minor proposition and one term of the conclusion, will be discussed in the second chapter. From the evidence so far presented it is clear that the intellect does know this singular and does reason about it. The texts to be studied shall be presented in their accepted chronological order, the better to notice any significant development in doctrine.

In the early works the examples of prudential syllogism are few. The following occurs in the Commentary on the Sentences:

[C]um ratio in operandis quodammodo syllogizet, inventur judicium rationis in majori propositione quae universalis est; in minori autem propositione, quae particularis est, admiscetur passio, quae circa particulare viget; unde sequitur corruptio rationis in conclusione electionis. Verbi gratia, si dicatur: Nulla fornicatio est committenda, in hoc judicium rationis est perfectum. Item proponatur alia: omnis fornicatio est delectabilis. Sub quibus duabus assumatur una particularis, haec scilicet: accedere ad hanc mulierem est fornicatio. Si ratio sit fortis ut nec etiam in particulari passione vincatur, eliciet conclusionem negativam, eligens fornicationem non committere. Si autem passione vincatur, eliciet conclusionem affirmativam, eligens in fornicatione delectare, et sic sumitur hic esse peccatum in ratione; qua scilicet post rationis deliberationem, eo quo ratio in particulari corrumpitur per passionem, sequitur prava electio.46

46 In II Sent., 24, 3, 3 sol.
The context here is the question whether sin can be in reason. In explaining how this is possible, St. Thomas gives us an example of the prudential syllogism. The major is universal; the minor is singular; the conclusion, to commit the act or not to commit it, refers to the action here and now by the individual making this judgment. Prudence gives its command in accord with right reason, if the action is decided against. In the alternative case, passion will have inserted the opposing major premise, which can then determine the will and result in a bad action.

It is noteworthy then that this prudential syllogism has four terms in so far as two different major propositions are at hand under which the singular minor can be subsumed. Worthy of mention also is the fact that the singular term *accedere ad hanc mulierem* is taken as known in its particularity, though there is no mention of precisely how this takes place.

Further light is thrown on the prudential process by this text from the same section in the *Sentences*:

Ratio in eligendis et fugiendis quibusdam syllogismis utitur. In syllogismo autem est triplex consideratio, secundum tres propositiones ex quarum duabus tertia conclauditur. Ista etiam contingit in proposition, dum ratio in operandis ex universalibus principiis circa particularia judicium assumit. . . . Synderesis in hoc syllogismo quasi majorem ministrat, cujus consideratio est actus synderesis; sed minorem ministrat ratio superior vel inferior. . . . sed consideratio conclusionis elicitae, est consideratio conscientiae. Verbi gratia, synderesis hanc proponit;
Omne malum est vitandum, ratio superior hanc assumit: Adulterium est malum quia lege Dei prohibitum; sive ratio inferior assumere illum, quia est malum, quia injustum, sive inhonestum; conclusio autem, quae est adulterium hoc esse vitandum, ad conscientiam pertinet et differenter sive sit de presenti vel praeterito vel de futuro.49

The context of this quotation is the question as to whether conscience is an act. It involves the notion of synderosis treated by St. Thomas in a previous question. Synderosis is the habit of first principles of the practical intellect or of morality. In the syllogism given it supplies the quasi-major. The terms ratio superior and inferior mean rather consistently in St. Thomas, a reasoning based on eternal motives, here "quia lege Dei prohibitum," as opposed to reasoning based on merely human or natural motives, "quia injustum sive inhonestum." Neither of these reasoning processes attains the singular in the example, for the proposition "Adulterium est malum" is still universal. It would seem that St. Thomas here combines a previous speculatively practical syllogism with the more proximately practical syllogism of conscience. Actually the conclusion of the syllogism should be "Adulterium est vitandum." With this secondary principle of the practical science of morality as the new major, the agent subsumes a singular instance "Hic actus est adulterium," and then reaches the practical conclusion to which St. Thomas seems to descend rather rapidly, namely that "adulterium

49 In II Sent., 24, 2, 4 scil.
hocos est vitândum." This conclusion is still a step removed from the ultimate judgment which will determine whether a man commits the act or not; provided passion does not introduce another major which can bind the man's reason and destroy the prudent line of right reasoning, he will issue the command, "Do not do it." It is noteworthy that conscience can evoke its judgment about acts which have been performed or are yet in the future.

This leaves the syllogism of conscience partly in the speculative order since there may be no notion of performing the act, but merely of deciding whether it would be good or bad if done. In the case of an act already posited, nothing can be done to change the fact; but reason passes judgment on its goodness or badness.

Thus the syllogism of conscience, when joined with the efficacious will to act here and now, can be the same as the prudential or practical syllogism; but in itself it remains partly speculative. We note the distinguishing features of the prudential syllogism as it is found latently in this text: universal major, singular minor, particular conclusion ordered to act here and now.

Verification of the above position is found in another work of St. Thomas which rightly belongs to the early period of his works. In question 17 of the De Veritate, when treating of
the act of conscience, he answers an objection that the judgment of free will and of conscience are the same, thus making a potency of conscience. The Angelic Doctor has to admit that the two are the same in one respect:

Convenient eum quantum ad hoc quod utrumque est de hoc particulari actu; competet autem judicium conscientiae in via quae est examinans; et in hoc differt judicium utriusque a judicio synderesis et different judicium conscientiae et liberis arbitrii, quia judicium conscientiae consistit in pura cognitione, judicium autem liberis arbitrii in applicatione cognitionis ad affectionem; quod quidem judicium est judicium electionis. Et ideo contingit quandoque quod judicium liberis arbitrii pervertitur, non autem conscientiae; sicut cum aliquis examinat aliquid quod imminet faciendum, et judicat, quasi adhuc speculando per principia, hoc esse malum, utpote fornicari cum hac muliere; sed quando incipit applicare ad agendum, occurrunt unique multae circumstantiae ad ipsum actum, utpote fornicationis delectatio, ex cujus consupiscientia ligatur ratio, ne ejus dictamen in ejus rejectionem prorumpat. 50

The distinction is substantially the same as that given above. When it is decided to follow the judgment of conscience, this judgment will be the same as the conclusion of the practical syllogism. The notes of the syllogism are again identifiable.

Another text in the De Veritate is more explicit on the nature of the prudential syllogism:

Universalis vero sententiam quam mens habet de operabilibus, non est possible applicari ad particularem actum nisi per aliquam potentiam medium apprehendentem singulare, ut sic fiat quidam syllogismus, cujus major sit universalis, quae est sententia mentis; minor autem singularis, quae est ap-
This is perhaps the clearest statement of the nature of the prudential syllogism in the early works. The notes of universal major, singular minor, and conclusion related to action are all here. The reference to the third book of the De Anima is to the example of the practical syllogism quoted above.

The other important early work of St. Thomas, the Summa Contra Gentiles, does not seem to offer any pertinent texts on the practical syllogism. This work shall be made use of later, however, when there is question of the vis cogitativa.

The various commentaries which St. Thomas wrote on the works of Aristotle must be consulted next. Care should be taken in citing these commentaries, because there is often question whether St. Thomas is speaking for himself or merely repeating and commenting on the Philosopher. Despite this reservation, it is impossible to overlook the agreement of St. Thomas with Aristotle. The few texts given above contain references to two of Aristotle's works. The passage from the De Anima, referred to above, is preceded by another which clarifies the difference between speculatively practical and strictly practical syllogising. The intellect can consider an operation speculatively, if there

51 De Ver., 10, 5 c.
is no intention of giving its *imperium* leading to action.\(^{52}\)

The continuation of the text giving the example of the practical syllogism emphasizes the necessity for the singular proposition, if the universal is to be applied. The context here is one of motion proceeding from the intellect to the singular action. This idea of motion is central to the syllogistic process:

\[\text{Haec autem opinio movet, sed non autem illa quae est universalis. Aut si utraque movet, illa quae est universalis, movet ut causa prima et quiscens, particularis vero ut causa proxima, et quodammodo motus sequatur, nam operationes et motus in particularibus sunt; unde oportet hoc quod motus sequatur, quod opinio universalis ad particularia appli-} \]

\[\text{cetur.}^{53}\]

Again notable are the two propositions, both of which are necessary to the prudentia action.

The other great commentary on Aristotle, that on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, contains substantially the same doctrine which has been seen above in the earlier works. When commenting on Aristotle's treatment of incontinence, St. Thomas has this

\(^{52}\text{In III de An., 13, n. 814: "Aliquando autem intellectus considerat aliquid agibile, non tamen practice, sed speculative, quia considerat ipsum in universalis, et non secundum quod est principium particularis operis. Et de hoc consequenter dicit, quod neque intellectus, 'cum fuerit speculatus, "id est speculative consideraverit," aliquid hujusmodi, 'id est aliquid agibile, nondum praecipit prosequi, vel fugere: sicut cum multoties intelligimus terrible aliquod vel delectabile, sed intellectus non jubet timere vel desiderares."}^{53}\text{Ibid., 16, n. 846.}\]
to say about the practical reason:

[D]uo sunt modi propositionum quibus utitur ratio practica, scilicet universalis propositio et singularis; nihil autem prohibere videtur, quod aliquid operatur praeter scientiam, qui habitu quidem cognoscit utramque propositionem, sed in actu considerat tantum universalem et non particularem. Et hoc ideo, quia operationes sunt circa singularia.\textsuperscript{54}

This is a mere statement that two propositions are involved, one universal and the other singular. In a subsequent paragraph, St. Thomas explains what he means by considering the universal in act but not the particular. Fundamentally the explanation is the same as that given above in the text from the Commentary on the Sentences. The incontinent man has two syllogisms to contend with.

If reason has only the universal truth and the particular application of it here and now, it must conclude at once to do or not do the action. If for example, the universal truth is that all candy should be tasted, the agent will immediately taste anything shown him which he knows to be candy, unless he is in some way hindered. Granted such a general principle both the temperate and the intemperate man will act in this case.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{In VII Eth., 3, n. 1339.}

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Ibid.,} mm. 1345-1346: \textquotedblleft [3] i aliquis velit considerare causam, quae incontinentes praeter scientiam agent secundum naturallem processum scientiae practicae, oportet scire quod in ejus processu est duplex opinio. Una quidem universalis, puta, omne inhonestum est fugiendum. Alia autem Singularis circa ea quae proprie secundum sensum cognoscuntur, puta, hoc est inhonestum. Cum autem ex his duabus opinionibus fiat una ratio, necesse est quod sequatur conclusio. Sed in speculativis anima solum
St. Thomas goes on to propose another case involving different syllogisms for the intemperate and the temperate man:

Sit ergo ita, quod ex parte rationis proponatur una universalis prohibens gustare dulce inordinate, puta si dicatur, nullum dulce est gustandum extra horam. Sed ex parte concupiscentia ponatur quod omne dulce est delectabile, quod est per se quassitum a concupiscentia. Et quia in particulari concupiscentia ligat rationem, non assumitur sub universali ratione, ut dicatur et hoc est praeter horam; sed assumitur sub universalis concupiscentia, ut dicatur hoc esse dulce. Et ita sequitur conclusionis operationis. Et sunt in hoc syllogismo incontinentis quattuor propositiones. 56

The intemperate man removes the proper universal major proposition for one proposed by his sense passion and subsumes under it. Once again noteworthy are the two propositions of the practical syllogism and the conclusion in the election of a particular act.

In this work St. Thomas introduces the term operative syllogism in a way which identifies it with the prudential syllogism: "Intellectus quid est in practicis, est alterius modi extremi, scilicet singularis et contingenti, et est alterius propositionis, id est non universalis quae est quasi major, sed

dicit conclusionem. In factivis autem statim operatur ea. Ut si opinio universalis sit quod omne dulce oportet gustare, opinio autem particularis sit quod hoc, demonstrato aliquid particulari, sit dulce, necessa est quod illa qui potest gustare statim gustet, nisi sit aliquid prohibens. Et hoc quidem fit in syllogismo temperati, qui non habet concupiscentiam repugnantem rationi proponenti quod omne in honorem est vitandum. . . . Et similiter in syllogismo intemperati, cujus ratio concupiscentiae non repugnat proponenti, quae inclinat ad hoc quod omne delectabile sit sumendum."

56 Ibid., n. 1347.
singularis, quae est minor in syllogismo operativo."\(^{57}\) This is a reference to the integral part of prudence which St. Thomas terms *intelluctus*. Basing his opinion on the words of Aristotle in this part of the *Ethics*, St. Thomas maintains that this *intelluctus* is a grasp of a singular extreme in the practical syllogism, the term which appears in the minor proposition and in the conclusion. This is a hint as to how the mind knows the singular operable, but the concern here is with the clear description of the syllogism.

In delineating the work of prudence St. Thomas expresses again the two-fold knowledge involved:


The work of prudence can go wrong in two ways. A man can use a wrong major or universal truth through incorrect knowledge as well as through passion. He can be mistaken about the particular thing or act to the subsumed. Thus prudence is not the intellectual virtue of science; for "Scientia enim est universalium, . . . pruentia autem extremi, id est singularis, quia est opera-

\(^{57}\text{In VI Eth.}, 9, n. 1247.\)

\(^{58}\text{In VI Eth.}, 7, n. 1212.\)
Prudence, he insists, is of an extreme, that is the singular operable on which the whole process depends as its principle. This is to make of the singular operable the end of the action, the goal which the will intends. It is first in the order of intention, and (because it has yet to be realized in the real order) last in the order of execution. This is further corroboration that the prudential process essentially involves singular operables, which are known and expressed as singular terms in the minor of the syllogism and in the conclusion.

The other great Aristotelian commentary, that on the Metaphysics, contains little of importance about the prudential syllogism. The later works are therefore next in line for consideration. First among these are the Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo. In this work is found a general statement of the two-fold knowledge which is directive in prudent or moral activity. The context is the question whether ignorance is a cause of sin:

\[ \text{Duplex scientia dirigit in moralibus actibus, quae prohibere potest peccatum; una scilicet universalis per quam judicamus aliquem actum esse rectum vel deformem. \ldots Alia vero scientia quae diriget in moralibus actibus, et prohibere potest peccatum, est scientia particularis, scilicet circumstantiarum ipsius actus; universalis enim scientia non} \]

59 Ibid., n. 1213.
movet sine particulari, ut dicitur in III de Anima. 60

A treatment somewhat parallel to that given above from the Ethics concerns the possibility of acting through weakness against one's knowledge of right and wrong. Of importance for the purpose at hand is the syllogizing involved:

[C]um actus peccati et virtutis sit secundum electionem, electio autem est appetitus praeconsiliati, consilium vero est quaedam inquisitio; necessae est quod in quolibet actu virtutis vel peccati sit quaedam deductio quasi syllogistica. . . . Temperatus enim movetur tantum secundum judicium rationis; unde utitur syllogismo trium propositionum; quasi sic deducens: Nulla fornicatio est committenda; hic actus est fornicatic, ergo non est faciendus. Intemperatus vero totaliter sequitur concupiscentiam, et ideo etiam ipse utitur syllogismo trium propositionum, quasi sic deducens; Omni delectabili est fruendum; hic actus est delectabilis, ergo hoc est fruendum. . . . Unde uterque [temperatus et intemperatus] utitur syllogismo quatuor propositionum, sed ad contrarias conclusiones. Continens enim sic syllogizat: Nullum peccatum est faciendum; et hoc proponit secundum judicium rationis; secundum vero motum concupiscientiae versatur in corde ejus quod omne delectabile est prosequendum; sed quia judicium rationis in eo vincit, assumit et concludit sub primo: Hoc est peccatum; ergo non est faciendum. Incontinentes vero, in quo vincit motus concupiscientiae, assumit et concludit sub secundo: Hoc est delectabile; ergo est prosequendum; et talis proprie est qui peccat ex infirmitate. 61

This text states categorically that in every act of virtue or vice there is a quasi syllogistic deduction. From the familiar examples given, it is clear that this process is the prudential syllogism, involving the usual notes. It is worth mention that the

60 De Malo, 3, 6 c., in Quaestiones Disputatae, Tautini-Romae, Marietti, 1931, II.

61 De Malo, 3, 9, ad 7.
syllogism of the temperate man, who follows right reason, also expresses in its conclusion the act of conscience. Because there is question of action here and now, the dictate of conscience does not remain partly speculative, but is identified with the conclusion of the prudential syllogism and with the election to abstain from the evil deed in question. Clearly in evidence here are the usual notes of the prudential syllogism.

In treating the virtues in general, St. Thomas places the virtue of prudence in the practical intellect. He is careful to point out, however, that prudence implies more than mere practical knowledge:

[P]rudentia plus importat quam scientia practica; nam ad scientiam practicam pertinent universale judicium de agendis; sicut fornicationem esse malam, furtum non esse faciendum, et hujusmodi. Qua quidem scientia existente, in particulari actu contingit judicium rationis intercipi, ut non recte dijudicet; et propter hoc dicitur parum valere ad virtutem, quia ea existente contingit hominem contra virtutem peccare. Sed ad prudentiam pertinent recte judicare de singulis agibilibus, prout sunt nunc agenda; quod quidem judicium corrum-pitur per quodlibet peccatum. Et ideo prudentia manente, homo non peccat; unde ipse non parum sed multum confort ad virtutem; immo ipsam virtutem causat, ut dictum est. 62

This text is the first to shift the emphasis of prudence from its purely intellectual and universal aspect, as seen in the major of the syllogism, to the particular seen in the minor. St. Thomas has insisted in the texts quoted above that prudence is concerned
with operations and that these are always singular, but this text clarifies the point. The distinction between speculatively practical and purely practical reasoning is more sharply defined.

The most definitive work of St. Thomas, the *Summa Theologiae*, must now be considered. It contains the same consistent doctrine, with perhaps more concern for the singularity of the prudential process. By way of prelude, the following is a text from question 14 in the first part. When talking of God's speculative knowledge of things, St. Thomas has this to say about human speculative knowledge:

[A]liqua scientia est speculativa tantum, aliqua practica tantum, aliqua vero secundum aliquid speculativa et secundum aliquid practica. . . . Scientia igitur quae est speculativa ratione ipsius rei scitae, est speculativa tantum. Quae vero speculativa est vel secundum modum vel secundum finem, est secundum quid speculativa et secundum quid practica. Cum vero ordinatur ad finem operationis, est simpliciter practica. 63

Where there is question of the manner of knowing, we have speculatively practical reasoning. If a builder considers the idea of a house by defining it, dividing it into its kinds and its properties, his knowledge is practical only in so far as it is about a thing which can be made. True operation demands the application of the form to the matter. Again with relation to the end intended, if a builder considers how a house can be made, without any

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63 *S.T.*, I, 14, 16 c.
intention of building it, his reasoning is speculative, even
though concerned with something practical. Thus, to fulfill the
requirements of a true practical or prudential syllogism, a rea-
soning process must presuppose the efficacious intention of the
will. For St. Thomas the conclusion of the operative syllogism
specifies the choice of means by the will; this is clear from the
following text: "Conclusio etiam syllogismi qui fit in operabi-
libus, ad rationem pertinet; et dicitur sententia vel judicium,
quam sequitur electio. Et ob hoc ipsa conclusio pertinere videtur
ad electionem tanquam ad consequens." The context here is an
article to show that the election is an act of the will. In so
far as the will is an intellectual appetite, it makes its choice
under the guidance of reason. It is reason which prefers the for-
mal part of the election for the matter of the will's act. The
act is substantially an act of the will, since it is possible
only under the original supposition of the efficacious desire put
forth by the will to attain the good end. It follows as soon as
reason forms the conclusion that this must be done or not done,
that this and not that means must be used. "Electio consequitur
sententiam vel judicium quod est sicut conclusio syllogismi opera-
tivi. Unde illud cadit sub electione, quod se habet ut conclusio

64 Ibid.
65 S.T., I-II, 13, 1 ad 2.
The terminology here is important. The conclusion of the so-called operative syllogism will always be singular. Though an example would clarify things, St. Thomas is clearly referring to the prudential syllogism with its singular minor and singular conclusion. The close connection between the conclusion of the syllogism and the choice, and between the other parts of prudence with the free will act, is brought out by a text from the formal treatment of prudence in the *Secunda Secundae*:

[E]a quae considerat prudentia ordinantur ad alia sicut ad finem. Eorum autem quae sunt ad finem est consilium in ratione et electio in appetitu. Quorum duorum consilium magis proprie pertinet ad prudentiam; . . . Prudens est bene consiliatuvus. Sed quia electio praesupponit consilium, est enim appetitus praeconsiliati, . . . ideo enim eligere potest attribui prudentiae consequenter, inquantum silicet electionem per consilium dirigit.

Here we find St. Thomas identifying the good counsel or *eubulia*, which is a potential part of prudence, with the *consilium* needed to specify the rational appetite.

The deliberation which is part of the prudential process is directly concerned with means to the end intended and is therefore concerned with singular operations. The expression of this is found in the two propositions of the prudential syllogism, when the mind is subsuming a given action under one of two dif-


67 *S.T.*, II-II, 47, 1 ad 2.
ferent majors; as noted often above, or in the consideration of several means to an end. St. Thomas clarifies the notion of deliberation in these words:

Electio, ... consequitur iudicium rationis de rebus agendis. In rebus autem agendis multa incertitudo invenitur: quia actiones sunt circa singularia contingentia, quae propter sui variabilitatem incerta sunt. In rebus autem dubii et incertis ratio non profert iudicium absque inquisitione praecedente. Et ideo necessaria est inquisitio rationis ante iudicium de eligendis: et haec inquisitio consilium vocatur.

The special point of interest here is that actions are concerned with singular contingencies. The deliberation will always have a singular proposition expressing the action under consideration. It is clear from St. Thomas that deliberation about several indifferent means will first result in a consent by the will to all these means. He gives no example of this deliberation, but it would seem to be in polysyllogistic form, subsuming various singular means under the major proposition. Because the mind can not decide at once, the will consents to all the means and the final practical syllogism is then formed to specify choice. On occasion, where only one means is conducive to the end, the consent and the election will be really identified and only

68 S.T., I-II, 14, 1 c.

69 Ibid., 15, 3 ad 3: "Potest enim contingere quod per consilium inveniantur plura ducentia ad finem, quorum dum quaslibet earum placet, in quodlibet eorum consentitur; sed ex multis quae placent, praeehipimus unum eligendo."
rationally distinct. 70

This discussion of the prudential process in its relation to the voluntary act has shown the connection between deliberation and judgment, and the eubulia and synesis of prudence. The consiliative and judicative parts of prudence are not, however, accorded prime importance in this virtue. St. Thomas makes this clear in more than one place:

[F]rudentia est recta ratio agibilium, . . . Unde oportet quod ille sit praecipuus actus prudentiae qui est praecipuus actus rationis agibilium. Quorum primus est consiliari; quod pertinet ad inventionem, nam consiliari est quaerere, . . . Secundus actus est iudicare de inventis; et hic sistit speculativa ratio. Sed practica ratio, quae ordinatur ad opus, procedit ulterior, et est tertius actus eius praecipere; qui quidem actus consistit in applicatione consiliatorum et iudicatorum ad operandum. Et quia iste actus est propinquior fini rationis practicae, inde est quod iste est principalis actus rationis practicae, et per consequens prudentiae. 71

The speculative reason then, can go so far as to direct deliberation and judgment. Does this mean that the prudential syllogism can be the work of the speculative intellect? A reference to the distinction given above on page 36, note 63, seems to show that St. Thomas here speaks of the speculatively practical knowledge which is a step removed from action by reason of its manner or its intention. The syllogism of conscience can remain nothing

70 Ibid., "Sed si inveniatur unum solum quod placeat, non different re consensus et electio sed ratione tantum."

71 S.T., II-II, 47, 8 c.
more than this; and the deliberation about means, which precedes consent, can be partly on the speculative level, if the intention to achieve the end is not efficacious. This text proposes another problem. Is the conclusion of the practical syllogism, as determining choice, to be identified with the praecipere of prudence? For example, is the conclusion, "Therefore, I must here and now honor my father," an instance of prudence's command, or must this conclusion be re-expressed in the form of that further act of reason, the imperium: "Honor him now."

St. Thomas distinguishes the command of prudence from the command of reason in one place, but in the text just cited above, there is no mention of the imperium. A decision as to

72 S.T., I-II, 17, 1 c: "Sed ratio potest aliquid intimare vel denuntiare dupliciter. Uno modo absolute; quae quidem intimatio exprimitur per verbum indicative modi; sicut si aliquis dicat, Hoc tibi faciendum. Aliquando autem ratio intimat aliquid aliqui, movendo ipsum ad hoc; et talis intimatio exprimitur per verbum imperativi modi; puta cum aliqui dicitur, Fac hoc."

73 Cf. Dom Odon Lottin, Principes de Morale, Editions de L'Abbaye du Mont Cesar, Louvain, 1946, I, note 2, page 254. On this point the remark of Lottin is noteworthy. "Plusieurs auteurs identifient cet acte du commandement, praecipere, avec l'imperium dont il a été question lors de la description de l'acte humain... Il est cependant remarquable que, dans ses exposés sur la vertu de prudence, saint Thomas ne fait jamais allusion à la notion d'imperium. Et même, tandis que l'imperium est présenté comme consécutif au choix... l'acte de praecipere est au contraire, présenté avec les deux autres actes de la prudence, le consilium et le judicium, comme condition préalable requise pour la restitution du choix... Saint Thomas, parlant de la prudence en général, la considère comme directrice du choix, per prudentiam dirigitur electio, In I Ethic. Lect., 1.
the relation between the praecipere of prudence and the imperium of the will act is not essential to this thesis. Yet the problem has one interesting point, the singularity of both the command of prudence and the imperium. With this, let us move on to three final texts of the Summa which delineate the prudential syllogism and insist on the singular minor and singular conclusion.

In speaking about ignorance as a cause of sin, St. Thomas has the following passage on the nature of the prudential syllogism pertinent here:

[Ratio secundum duplicem scientiam est humanorum actuum directiva; scilicet secundum scientiam universalem, et parti-
culares. Conferens enim de agendis, utitur quodam syllogismo, cuius conclusio est judicium seu electio vel operatio. Actiones autem in singularibus sunt. Unde conclusio syl-
logismi operativi est singularis. Singularis autem pro-
positio non concluditur ex universali nisi mediante aliqua propositione singulari, siout homo prohibetur ab actu parri-
cidii per hoc quod sit patrem non esse occidendum, et per huc quod sit hunc esse patrem. Utriusque ergo ignorantia potest causare parricidii actum; scilicet et universalis
principii, quod est quaedam regula rationis; et singularis

Toutefois quand, dans son dernier ouvrage, il précise sa pensée, il dit que c'est par l'acte de délibération que la prudence dirige le choix, prudentia electionem per consilium dirigit. II-
II, 47, 1, ad 2. Quoi qu'il en soit de la pensée de Saint Thomas, on peut certainement maintenir, avec les savants auteurs cités plus haut, que le commandement prudential se poursuit après le choix, pour l'exécution rationnelle de celui-ci." This can be taken in the light of a decisive text on this problem, a text in the formal discussion of prudence, which seems to allude to the imperium: "Movere absolute pertinet ad voluntatem. Sed praeci-
pere importat motionem cum quadam ordinaciones. Et ideo est actus rationis, ut supra [I-II, 17, 1,] dictum est." S.T., II-II, 47, 8, ad 3.
circumstantiae. 74

Thus the singular minor is insisted upon. Ignorance of a circumstance, which will change the judgment in the singular minor proposition, can cause an act which is wrong, as can ignorance of a general moral principle in the major. But the necessity for knowledge of the singular is the important point.

In a parallel treatment soon after this text, we find out how passion can overcome reason against its own knowledge. This is a doctrine familiar in many texts quoted above:

Cum enim ad recte agendum homo dirigitur duplci scientia, scilicet universalii et particularii; utriusque defectus sufficit ad hoc quod impediatur rectitude operis et voluntatis, . . . Contingit igitur quod aliquis habeat scientiam in universalii, puta nullam fornicationem esse faciendam; sed tamen non cognoscat in particularii hunc actum qui est fornicatio, non esse faciendum. Et hoc sufficit ad hoc quod voluntas non sequatur universalem scientiam rationis. Iterum considerandum est quod nihil prohibet sciri in habitu, quod tamen actu non consideratur. Potest igitur contingere quod aliquis etiam rectam scientiam habeat in singularii, et non solum in universalii, sed tamen in actu non consideret. Et tunc non videtur difficile quod praepter id quod actu non considerat, homo agat. 75

Here again are the same notes of the prudential syllogism with emphasis on the universal principle, which either may not be known or may simply be overlooked. St. Thomas goes on to explain how passion can make a man fail to consider the particular

74 s.T., I-II, 76, 1 c.
75 s.T., I-II, 77, 2 c.
application of a universal proposition which he actually knows at the moment. 76

Another text serves to solidify the contention that the prudential syllogism contains a singular minor proposition and singular term in the conclusion. This is the first time St. Thomas has devoted an entire question to the knowledge which prudence must have of singulants:

\[
\text{[A]d prudentiam pertinet non solum consideratio rationis, sed etiam applicatio ad opus, quae est finis practicae rationis. Nullus autem potest convenienter aliquid alteri applicare nisi utrumque cognoscat, scilicet et id quod applicandum est et id cui applicandum est. Operationes autem sunt in singularibus. Et ideo necesse est quod prudens et cognoscat universalia principia rationis, et cognoscat singularia, circa quae sunt operationes.}
\]

\[
\text{[R]atio primo quidem et principaliter est universalium; potest tamen universales rationes ad particularia applicare (unde syllogismorum conclusiones non solum sunt universales sed etiam particulares.)}
\]

The reasoning here is all but self-evident. If the text seems somewhat incomplete, part of it is withheld here as essential to subsequent chapters of this thesis.

As a conclusion to this study, a portion of a text quoted in the consideration of intellectus as a part of prudence must be repeated. It is the best analysis of the prudential syl-

76 Ibid.

77 S.T., II-II, 47, 3 c., et ad l.
logism and will serve as an introduction to chapter two:

[R]atio prudentiae terminatur, sicut ad conclusionem quan-
dam, ad particulare operabile, ad quod applicat universalem
cognitionem, . . . Conclusio autem singularis syllogizatur
ex universali et singulari propositione. Unde oportet quod
ratio prudentiae ex duplici intellectu procedat. Quorum
unus est cognoscitivus universalium. Quod pertinet ad intel-
lectum qui ponitur virtutis intellectualis; quia naturaliter
nobis cognita sunt non solum universalia principia specu-
lativa, sed etiam practica, sicut nulli esse malefaciendum,
. . . Alius autem intellectus est qui . . . est cognos-
citivus extremi, id est aliculius primi singularis et con-
tingentis operabilis, propositionis scilicet minoris quam
opertet esse singularem in syllogismo prudentiae, . . .
Hoc autem primum singular est aliquis singularis finis.
. . . Unde intellectus qui ponitur pars prudentiae est
quaedam recta aestimatio de aliquo particulari fine.

There is no doubt in these words about the component parts of
the prudential syllogism. The universal principle or major pro-
position is proffered by understanding in its intellectual sense,
that is, as the strictly intellectual grasp of a universal
principle. The necessary singular, minor proposition, is at-
tained through the intellectus which is of sense, knowing an
extreme, the singular term of the prudential syllogism. It will
be pointed out that this intellectus is the familiar ratio parti-
gularis or via cognitiva, an all important link in the operation
of the intellectual virtue of prudence and its syllogistic pro-
cess. The burden of proof for this statement rests with chapter
two. Noteworthy is the use here for the first time of the actual

78 S.T., II-II, 49, 2, ad 1.
words *syllogismus prudentiae*.

The conclusions which appear justifiable from the study made in this chapter are chiefly two. In the first place from the doctrinal standpoint St. Thomas is consistent in his delineation of the prudential syllogism. It is a discursive process of the mind by which it goes out to things—to singular actions and operations, and to the use of means to ends—which are so much a part of every-day life. In this process reason offers guidance through universal principles. Seeing the particularization of these principles in a given singular instance, reason judges that an operation or a means is according to right reason and is therefore to be done or chosen. It can also offer the negative conclusion to shun what would be evil or even less good. The syllogism has been seen to take two forms, one somewhat more speculative than practical when conscience gives its dictate, the other more immediately concerned with action which results in the *precipere* of prudence and the *imperium* of the reason.

The textual study, in the second place, brings to light a slight shift of emphasis. The necessity for knowledge of the singular operable is not as apparent in the *Commentary on the Sentences* as it is in the *Commentary on the Ethics* or the *De Anima*. The necessity is even more explicit in the *Summa Theologiae*. That the knowledge of the singular in the minor proposition
requires a sense power does not appear at all in the early works, but receives some attention in the Aristotelian commentaries. The full flowering of this all important phase of doctrine has been hinted at in passages from the *Summa*. It remains to study the *vis cogitativa* briefly in itself and more at length in its role in the prudential syllogism.
CHAPTER II

THE OPERATION OF THE VIS COGITATIVA

IN THE PRUDENTIAL SYLLOGISM

Two things have been demonstrated textually, the nature of the prudential syllogism, and the fact that the singular operable must be known in the minor and conclusion of this syllogism. The question immediately arises: how is this singular known? St. Thomas' answer seems to be that the particular to be done is known through the mediation of the sense power variously termed the vis cogitativa, ratio particularis, and even occasionally, the intellectus passivus. Precisely what does St. Thomas mean by the vis cogitativa? He himself describes it in the first part of the Summa Theologiae: "... est in homine, ... vis cogitativa, quae dicitur a quibusdam ratio particularis, quod est collativa intentionum individualium."¹ In the context of this passage, as in most of his references to this power, St. Thomas speaks of it analogously to the vis aestimativa in brutes: "... appetitus sensitivus in aliis quidem animalibus

¹ S.T., I, 81, 3 c.
natus est moveri ab aestimativa, sicut ovis aestimans lupum ini-
micum, timet. Loco autem aestimativae virtutis est in homine,
sicut supra dictum est, vis cogitativa.2 Thus the necessary
knowledge of the cogitative sense can come only from considering
it as analogous to the estimative sense in brutes. Should any-
one wonder why this analogy is not reversed, it must be pointed
out that instinct is more evident in the animal kingdom than it
is in the actions of men. Instinct in animals must be explained;
to do so St. Thomas finds it necessary to posit in them a special
internal sense, the estimative:

3[i animal moveretur solum propter delectabile et contris-
tabile secundum sensum, non esset necessarium ponere in ani-
nalni nisi apprehensionem formarum quas percipit sensus, in
qibus delectatur aut horret. Sed necessarium est animali
ut quaearet aliqua vel fugiat, non solum quia sunt convenien-
tia vel non convenientia ad sentiendum, sed etiam propter
aliquas alias commoditates et utilitates, sive documenta:
sicut ovis videns lupum venientem fugit, non propter inde-
centiam coloris vel figureae, sed quasi inimicum naturae. . .
Necessarium est ergo animali quod percipiat huiusmodi inten-
tiones, quas non percipit sensus exterior. Et huius percep-
tionis oportet esse aliquod aliud principium: cum perceptio
formarum sensibilium sit ex immutacione sensibili, non autem
percepio intentionum praedictarum. . . -- Ad apprehensionem
autem intentiones quae per sensum non accipiuntur, ordinatur
vis aestimativa.3

This line of argumentation, which is found consistently in all
the works of the Angelic Doctor,4 is clear and to the point.

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., 78, 4 c.
4 Cf. Q. D. de An., 13, c.; De Virtut. in Comm., 6, c.;
De Ver. 11 c.; In I Met., 1, n. 14; In III Sent., 26, 1, 1 sol.
Animals perform instinctive actions which cannot be explained by anything that they receive from external sensation. An internal sense which perceives a concrete relationship of good or evil must therefore account for this instinct. The three internal senses, imagination, common sense, and memory cannot account for it, or for the natural estimation by the lamb that the wolf is to be avoided. Hence there must be a fourth internal sense, the estimative, which does so.⁵

There are several other characteristics of the estimative sense which are enlightening, because they bring up a kind of reverse analogy to aspects of the human estimative. The analogy brings out the sameness between the two faculties and also the basic differences between man's estimative and that of the animal. First of all, instinct is determined by the Author of nature, who has placed in brutes what St. Thomas calls a natural judgment. The animal has definite judgments suited to its particular species, but has no power of collating the work of his estimative sense, or of knowing why it makes such judgments.⁶ Secondly, since this judgment is put in animals by God, there is no freedom involved in instinctive activity on the part of brutes.⁷ Thirdly, instinct involves a sameness of action; for

⁵ S.T., I, 78, 4 c.
⁶ De Ver., 24, 2 c.
⁷ Ibid., 1 c.
brutes perform their instinctive work in a never-varying pattern.\textsuperscript{8} The final point is that the estimative endows the animals with a kind of prudence.\textsuperscript{9}

Now in considering the estimative in man, the sameness between this power in its pure state and the animal's instinct is the first point. Whatever purely instinctive actions man has, will be very similar to those of brutes. But the fact that man has reason joined to his estimative sense means that his activity will not be restricted to a few natural judgments. From the mere description of the cogitative sense given here, it is clear that man can compare individual impressions. Man's estimative-cogitative will also have the freedom of his reason by participation, and will not be held to a sameness of activity. The activity of the cogitative will indeed enter into true prudent action.

In order now is a study of the above mentioned points. First of all, however, if the analogy between the animal's estimative and man's counterpart is to have any validity, it must follow that man does have some activities which are purely instinctive. St. Thomas maintains this from his earliest to his latest works. The example he adduces is unique, but suffices to prove this point:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{8} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{9} \textit{In I Met., I, n. 11.}
\end{itemize}
[A]lia animalia non prosequuntur conveniens et fugiunt nocivum per rationis deliberationem, sed per naturalem instinctum aestimativae virtutis; et tali naturalis instinctus est etiam in pueros; unde etiam mamillas accipiant, et alia eis conventientia, etiam sine hoc quod ab aliis docentur.10

There is no need to conjecture what some of the other instinctive actions found in the young might be. It is notable that St. Thomas restricts purely instinctive action to young children. His reason for this will become clear as the transformation of the pure human estimative into the cogitative sense is examined. It should be clear from the many texts cited above that the cogitative is distinguished by an activity of which it is capable under the guidance of reason.11 This activity is termed a comparison of individual intentions. It is this discursive function which is of direct concern in this chapter, because the work of the cogitative sense in the prudential syllogism is surely an example of comparing singular operables. There are a number of related problems and terms which need some attention before we turn to the work of the vis cogitativa in prudence.

10 In II Sent., 20, 2, 2 ad 5. Cf. also S.T., I, 99, 1 c: "[F]ueri mox nati non habuissent sufficientem virtutem ad movendum membra ad quoslibet actus; sed ad actus pueros convenientes, puta ad sugendum ubera, et ad alia huiusmodi." III Sent., 15, 2, 2 ad 3: "$[I]n hominibus appetitus sensibilis moveetur ex apprehensione imaginationis aut aestimationis immediate; sed mediate etiam ex apprehensione rationis, in quantum ejus conceptio in imaginatione imprimitur."

11 Cf. especially S.T., I, 78, 4 c.
The transformation which the human estimative undergoes with the influence and guidance of reason is perhaps best exemplified in the so-called *experimentum*. This is a process proper to man by which sense knowledge is raised to the level of intellectual principles of the practical sciences. Man compares through his cogitative sense many singulars which have been received in the memory. Though this activity is reflected in the animal's estimative sense, the activity of the cogitative in man is compared to the operation of his reason:

Experimenterum enim est ex collatione plurium singularium in memoria receptorum. Hujusmodi autem collatio est homini propria, et pertinet ad vim cogitativam, quae ratio particularis dicitur; qua est collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio universalis intentionum universalium. Et, quia ex multis sensibus et memoria animalia ad aliquid consuescunt prosequendum vel vitandum, inde est quod aliquid experimenti licet parum, participare videntur. Homines autem supra experimentum, quod pertinet ad rationem particularum, habent rationem universalum, per quam vivunt, sicut per id quod est principale in eis.\(^{12}\)

From renewed encounters with singulars man gains practical knowledge, the "know-how," which serves him in good stead both in the field of art and in that of prudence. St. Thomas goes on to explain in a further number of his *Commentary on the Metaphysics* that there is some difference in the knowledge attained through the *experimentum* and that proper to art. In the matter of operation, of using this knowledge, there is no difference between

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\(^{12}\) *In I Met.*, I, n. 15.
the universal principles of art and the practical knowledge of experience, except that the efficiency of operation will vary. The artisan who has the universal principles of his craft but lacks experience will often make mistakes. The man of experience will perhaps fare better than the artisan. He knows how to do a thing, but not necessarily why it is done in a precise way. The artisan who has acquired the practical experience is, of course, the wiser man, and should be capable of a better job. 13 The whole tenor of this passage leads to the remark that much human activity remains on the level of sense memory and the operation of the collative-estimative. This is not to say that some human activity is not intellectual, because the operation

13 *Ibid.*, nn. 17-24; *[*E]* x multōs memorīs unus rei accipit homo experimentum de aliquo, quo experimento potens est ad facile et recte operandum. . . . Nam sicut ex multōs memorīs fit una experimentalis scientia, ita ex multōs experimentis apprehensis, fit universalis acceptio de omnibus similibus. Unde plus habet hoc ars quam experimentum: quia experimentum tam- tum circa singularia versatur, ars autem circa universalia. . . . Cum enim ad actionem venitur, tollitur differentia, quae inter experimentum et artem erat per universale et singulari; quia sicut experimentum circa singularia operatur, ita et ars; unde praedicta differentia erat in cognoscendo tantum. . . . Nam experti magis proficiunt in operando illis qui habent rationem universalem artis sine experimento. . . . Cum ars sit univer-
salium, experimentalium singularium, si aliquis habet rationem artis sine experimentia, erit quidem perfectus in hoc quod uni-
versale cognoscat; sed quia ignorant singulari, cum experimento careat, multōtiens in curando peccabit. . . . Illi, qui sciunt causam et propter quid scientiores sunt et sapientiores illis qui ignorant causam, sed solum sciant quia. Experti autem sciant quia sed nesciunt propter quid."
of the *vis cogitativa* in the *experimentum* is possible only under the guidance of man's reason.

But in many cases the further step of universalizing the practical knowledge is not made. Both the knowledge and the operation remain on the sense level, under the guidance of reason. Though it is doubtful whether the intellectual virtue enters into such knowledge and operation, it is clear that the *vis cogitativa* is needed both to prepare the way for knowledge of the intellectual principles of the practical intellect and for their application.

Another term which calls for comment is *intellectus passivus*. St. Thomas apparently uses it on occasion as interchangeable with *vis cogitativa* and *ratio particularis*. *Intellectus* as an interior sense power was placed among the integral parts of prudence in the first chapter. Father Klubertanz is of the opinion that in the earlier works, in the *Commentary on the Sentences*, the *De Veritate*, and the *Contra Gentiles*, St. Thomas indeed meant *intellectus passivus* to be the equivalent of the cogitative sense.\(^\text{14}\)

In the *Commentary on the De Anima*, however,

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\(^\text{14}\) *In IV Sent., 50, 1, 1, ad 3, Parma VII, 1248:* "\textit{Passivus intellectus, de quo Philosophus lequitur, non est intellectus possibilis, sed ratio particularis, quae dicitur vis cogitativa.}" Cf. also C.G., II, 60: "\textit{Non igitur est possible quod per virtutem cogitativam, quae dicitur intellectus passivus, homo speciem sortiatur, per quam ab aliis animalibus differat.}"

The same usage occurs also in *In VI Eth., 9, n. 1249:* "\textit{Quod homo . . . habeat sensum . . . interiorem, . . . scilicet vim cogitativam, sive aestimativam, quae dicitur ratio particularis. . . . Et hunc Philosophus vocat intellectum passivum, qui est corruptibilis.}"
the terms are not used interchangeably. The passive intellect is termed rational by participation and is connected with the passions. It seems to mean here the whole sensitive apparatus from phantasm to appetite:

Passivus vero intellectus corruptibilis est, id est pars animae quae non est sine praeditis passionibus, est corruptibilis; pertinet enim ad partem sensitivam. Tamen haec pars animae dicitur intellectus, sicut et dicitur rationalis, inquantum aliquiliter participat rationem, obediendo rationi, et sequendo motum ejus, . . . Sine has autem parte animae corporalis intellectus nihil intelligit. Non enim intelligit aliquis sine phantasmate.15

The term appears again in the Commentary on the Metaphysics in the context of mathematical imagination. Reference is made to the familiar third book of the De Anima which has been quoted above.16 The term does not appear in the later works. When intellectus is used by itself, it can mean either the intellectual virtue or the sense power which is involved in prudence. In this latter sense it means the cogitativa, but the significant adjective passivus is not used with it in the later works, especially the Summa. Father Klubertanz's conclusions on this point are as follows:

15 In III de An., 10, n. 745.

16 In VII Met., 10, n. 1494: "Quod autem in mathematicis considerantur aliqua singularia, ex hoc patet, quia considerantur ibi plura unius speciei, sicut plures lineae aequales, et plures figures similis. Dicuntur autem intelligibilia, hujusmodi singularia secundum quod absque sensu comprehenduntur per solam phantasmam, quae intellectus vocatur secundum illud in tertio de Anima: 'Intellectus passivus corruptibilis est.'"
Generally speaking we may say that before the Commentary on the De Anima was written, St. Thomas thought that the term "passive intellect" designated the vis cogitativa; in this commentary, and occasionally later, he gives it a wider meaning, approximately equivalent to "the complex of sense powers associated with the phantasm." As such, it is a vague and general term, for which St. Thomas no longer has much use.¹⁷

In the light of this some tentative conclusions on the nature of the vis cogitativa or ratio particularis can now be drawn.

First of all, it may be said that man's discursive-estimative as an analogue to the instinct of the brute has some purely sensory activity, but that under the guidance of reason it soon rises to the level of comparing individual sense experiences in the process which has been termed the experimentum. Secondly, this activity places it in the realm of the practical intellect, in so far as, through the vis cogitativa, the practical intellect is enabled to act in and upon singular contingents. Thirdly, to place the collative-estimative in the realm of the practical intellect is to give it a function in the intellectual virtues which pertain to that intellect. It has been seen that the experimentum is not proper to art. This leaves the work of the cogitative power as a part of the virtue of prudence.

From a textual study of St. Thomas the attempt will now be to show that the precise role of the vis cogitativa is to

¹⁷ Klubertanz, 194; but see especially S.T., I-II, 51, 3 c, where intellectus passivus equals the vis cogitativa with memory and phantasm.
attain the singular operable which figures so strongly in the application of prudence and in the minor and conclusion of the prudential syllogism. It will be indicated in the various passages whether St. Thomas is using the term intellectus passivus as the equivalent of ratio particularis and vis cogitativa, or in the wider sense in which Father Klubertanz wishes it to be taken. The order to be followed will again be the early, middle, and later works of the Angelic Doctor.

First to be considered is the Commentary on the Sentences. A clear grasp of the import of the first quotation demands the presentation of the objection to which St. Thomas is making answer:

Praeterea, nullus potest disponere de his quae ignorant. Sed anima in corpore existens per intellectum disposit de his quae circa singularia sunt agenda. Ergo etiam in corpore existens singularia cognoscat per intellectum. Cum ergo intellectus in anima separata integer, maneat, videtur quod anima separata singularia cognoscat. 18

St. Thomas' answer centers around the manner in which the intellect disposes of singulars even in this life. With this properly understood the objection vanishes:

Ad tertium dicendum, quod intellectus practicus ad hoc quod de singularibus disponat, ... indiget ratione particulari, qua mediante, opinio quae est universalis (quae est in intellectu) ad particulare opus applicetur; ut sic quidem fit

18 In IV Sent., 50, 1, 3, sed contra 3. Texts from the last part of the Commentary on the Sentences are taken from the Parma Edition. Here Volume VII, 1250.
Here are seen first the familiar notes of the prudential syllogism, universal major, particular minor, and conclusion in the election of the thing to be done. The important point is the statement that the *ratio particularis* makes an estimation of or formulates the minor proposition of the syllogism. This, on the face of it, seems to be a strong wording. Is it that the *vis cogitativa* makes the judgment of the singular minor entirely of its own power? Is this to make knowledge of the singular the work of sense alone? Does the prudential syllogism start on the plane of the intellect, descend to the level of sense for the minor, and then revert to intellect in the choice? There is ample evidence even in the *Sentences* that St. Thomas does not maintain this position. He teaches that the intellect uses the cogitative sense to form the minor.

A further text from this same treatise in the *Commentary on the Sentences* identifies *intellectus passivus* with the


20 Cf. *In III Sent.*, 23, 2, 2, sol. 1 ad 3: "[I]llo potentia quae a Philosophus dicitur cogitativa, est in confinio sensitivae et intellectivae partis, ubi pars sensitiva intellec-tivam attingit. Habet enim aliquid a parte sensitiva, scilicet quod considerat formas particulares et habet aliquid ab intellec-tiva, scilicet quod confert. *Unde et in solis hominibus est.*"
cogitative sense. Since the cogitative sense is here given almost the same function as the phantasm, all the terms involved are to be taken in the wider sense indicated above:

[P]assivus intellectus, de quo Philosophus loquitur, non est intellectus possibilis, sed ratio particularis, quae dicitur vis cogitativa, habens determinatum organum in corpore, scilicet medium cellulam capitis, ut Commentator ibidem dicit; et sive hoc anima nihil intelligit; intel- liget autem in futuro, quando a phantasmatisbus abstrahere non indigabit.21

Apart from the peculiar work assigned to the cogitative in this passage, the point of interest is the insistence on the material and corporal nature of the vis cogitativa.

There is one other text from the Sentences which shows that intellect is involved in knowledge of the singular and therefore has a part in the singular minor of the prudential sylle- gism. It helps to blunt the unqualified statement of the first passage noted above:

[Intelligentia hic dicitur cognitio eorum quae ad opus eligibile accommodata sunt. Et quia intelligentia propri- est universalium quae sub tempore non cadunt et ita quodammodo presensit formam retinet; ideo intelligentia dicitur præsentium non solum universalium quibus indiget prudentia ad recte ratiocinandum de agendis, sed etiam singularium quae nunc sunt.22

This passage would seem to reflect the later use of intellectus in the Summa, where it is to be taken in the sense of the intel-

21 In IV Sent., 50, 1, 1 ad 3, 1249.
22 In III Sent., 33, 3, 1, sol. 1 ad 1.
leotual virtue and also as the immediate grasp of a singular term in the prudential syllogism. If so, it shows a long sweep of consistency in the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor.

A final text from the Commentary on the Sentences will be delayed until a more formal discussion of the sensible per accidens is given in the presentation of texts from the De Animali. In place now, therefore, is a discussion of the Quaestion-Disputatae De Veritate.

The key text in this work is contained in the question as to whether the intellect knows singulars. St. Thomas explains how knowledge of the singular gets into the intellect by reflection on the phantasm. He continues with a mention of the opposite notion, how the intellect moves and acts upon singulars:

Alio modo secundum quod motus qui est ab anima ad res, incipit a mente, et procedit in partem sensitivam, prout mens regit inferiores vires; et sic singularibus se immiscet mediante ratione particulari, quae est potentia quaedam individualis quae alio nomine dicitur cogitativa, et habet determinatum organum in corpore, scilicet medium cellulum capitis. This much is established by the above lines; the activity of intellect on the singular operable, which is self-evident, takes place through the mediation of the this individual sense power, the ratio particularis.

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23 De An., 13, nn. 387-398.
24 De Ver., 10, 5 c.
The continuation of the above passage gives a description of the process of mediation by the *ratio particularis*. This is achieved when the universal opinion of the mind is applied to a singular in a syllogism whose minor is singular and whose conclusion is the choice. The phraseology, *minor autem singularis, quae est applicatio particularis rationis*, again seems to imply strongly that the singular minor is the work solely of the *vis cogitativa*. This is softened somewhat by the answers to objections in this same article. The mind makes its disposition of singulars through the mediation of the cogitative sense. The intellect does the composing in the singular proposition, because of the reflection which it can make on the data presented by the senses. The intellect knows the end to which it orders the acts of the passions only in a universal way, until, through the mediation of the cogitative sense, it applies this knowledge to singulars.

25 *De Ver.*, 10, 5 c.

26 *Ibid.*, ad 2: "[D]ispositio sapientis de singularibus non fit per mentem nisi mediante *vi cogitativa*, cuius est intentiones singularis cognoscere."


A further text from the De Veritate repeats the idea of motion proceeding from the mind through the cogitative to singulars; but the phantasm is significantly added to this:

\[\text{[N]on solum intellectus est movens in nobis, sed etiam phantasma, per quod universalis cognitio intellectus ad particularare operabile applicatur; unde intellectus est quasi movens remotum; sed ratio particularis et phantasmata sunt movens proximum.}\]

This is said in answer to the objection that unless the intellect knows singulars, it cannot move and direct the choice, as it obviously does. St. Thomas says that the intellect is only the remote mover of singulars, even though the intellect is, as will be seen, the principle cause of the choice. Both the cogitative sense and the phantasms contained in imagination are the proximate movers; or, as we shall see, the instrumental causes. The fact that phantasms are here mentioned along with the ratio particularis can be explained in the first place from the context, because St. Thomas is merely trying to prove his doctrine of reflection on phantasms as the means whereby the intellect knows singulars. Secondly, if an interpretation may be allowed, there is question here of the cognition of the thing to be done or the end to be achieved. To know the singular operable, that is, simply to look at it as present, a reflection upon the image of it in the imagination is needed. If there is to be efficac-

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29 Ibid., 2, 6, ad 2.
cious intention to do the act or achieve the end, something more
must be added. This something more is the work of the *vis cogi-
tativa*. It must add a relation of goodness or badness here and
now for the cognizing subject. The cogitative sense would ap-
parently not formulate a separate image of its own, but merely
add this note of fitness or unfitness in this given singular
operable to the image already present in the imagination for the
purpose of mere cognition. The fact that both the phantasm and
the cogitative sense are movers in the practical order can thus
be accounted for.

In this same article St. Thomas enunciates a general
principle which concerns the *vis cogitativa* in a broad sense.
"Homo cognoscit singularia per imaginationem et sensum, et ideo
potest applicare universalem cognitionem, quae est in intellectu,
ad particulare; non enim proprie loquendo, sensus aut intellectu-
us cognoscunt, sed homo per utrumque." 30 The objection here
again is that man obviously applies his universal knowledge to
singulars which, St. Thomas maintains, the intellect knows only
by reflection. The "per sensum" of this statement includes, of
course, the *vis cogitativa*. The same may be said of two other
passages which broaden this principle and speak only of the

senses in general.\footnote{De Ver., 8, 11 c: "[N]on potest aliquid ad alterum applicari nisi illud alterum sit aliquid praeognitum; sicut nos universalem cognitionem singularibus applicamus, quae in cognitione nostra sensitiva praeexistent." And also cf. Ibid., 9 c: "[N]on nobis providit naturae Conditor sensitivas potentias, in quibus formae sunt medico modo inter modum intelligibilem et modum materialem. Conveniunt siquidem cum formis intelligibili-bus inquantum sunt formae sine materia, cum materialibus vero formis, inquantum nondum sunt a conditionibus materiae denudatae et idem potest esse actio et passio suo modo inter res materiales et potentias sensitivas, et similiter inter has et inter intel-llectum."}

Early in this chapter mention was made of the term "natural judgment." St. Thomas applies this to the estimation of the animal's \textit{vis aestimativa} or instinct. This terminology is made easier to understand by a reading of the articles in the \textit{De Veritate} on whether there is truth and falsity in the senses. These articles will also throw some light on the judgment or comparison which is attributed to the \textit{vis cogitativa} in man. Truth, St. Thomas tells us, is in the senses as a consequence of their acts, provided that the judgment of the sense is about the thing as it really is.\footnote{Ibid., 1, 9 c: "[V]eritas est in sensu sicut consequens actum ejus; dum si licet judicium sensus est de re secundum quod est, sed tamem non est in sensu sicut cognita a sensu; si enim sensus vere judicat de rebus, non tamem cognoscit veritatem qua vere judicat; quavis enim sensus cognoscat se sentire, non tamem cognoscit naturam suam, et per consequens nec naturam actus ejus, nec proportionem ejus ad res, et ita nec veritatem ejus."} Although the sense knows that it senses, it cannot know the truth of its judgments. Distinctions must be made in considering falsity in the senses, because the
the senses can be considered in two ways, according to their relation to the intellect, and according to their relation to things.\textsuperscript{33} As referred to the intellect, sense can be again considered in two ways. As a thing in itself, related to the intellect, the sense can have no falsity.\textsuperscript{34} The sense presents to the intellect whatever disposition it has in itself. When it is compared to or known by the intellect in its capacity as representative of things, there can obviously be falsity in the sense.\textsuperscript{35} It can represent things otherwise than they really are, and thus cause falsity in the intellect, which judges about the data offered to it by sense as it does about things. The senses therefore always cause a true judgment in the intellect of what is properly contained in themselves; the intellect will

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{De Ver.}, I, 11 c: "[I]n sensu dicitur esse veritas vel falsitas dupliciter. Uno modo secundum ordinem sensus ad intellectum: et sic dicitur sensus falsus vel verus sicut res. . . . Alio modo secundum ordinem sensus ad res; et sic dicitur esse veritas vel falsitas in sensu, sicut in intellectu."

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., "[S]i ergo comparatur ad intellectum prout est res quaedam, sic nullo modo est falsitas in sensu intellectui comparato: quia secundum quod sensus dispositionis, secundum hoc dispositionem suam intellectui demonstrat."

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., "Si autem comparetur ad intellectum secundum quod est representativum alterius rei, cum quandoque representat ei aliter rem quam sit, secundum hoc sensus falsus dicitur, in quantum natus est facere falsam existimationem in intellectu, quamvis non necessario faciat, sicut et de rebus dictum est: quia intellectus sicut judicat de rebus, ita et de his quae a sensibus offeruntur. Sic ergo sensus intellectui comparatus semper facit veram existimationem in intellectu de dispositione propria, sed non de dispositione rerum."
know precisely what appears to the eyes. But what appears to the eyes may not be a true picture of the thing as it is.

On the other hand, if we consider the senses as compared to things, truth or falsity will be found in them as in the intellect. Thus since the truth or falsity of the intellect is apparent principally in judgment, and in the concept only as referred to judgment, only in its judgment about sensibles is there properly speaking any truth or falsity in sense. The falsity or truth latent in the apprehension of sense is termed such only with reference to the judgment which follows on such an apprehension.

This long paraphrase has been given in preparation for the concluding portion of this article, which broadens the idea of truth and falsity in the judgment of sense to include the judgment of the vis cogitativa. It is not clear whether St. Thomas pushes the parallelism between the judgment of the intel-

36 De Ver., 1, 11 c: "Si autem consideretur sensus secundum quod comparatur ad res, tunc in sensu est falsitas et veritas per modum quo est in intellectu. In intellectu autem primo et principaliter inveniuntur falsitas et veritas in judicio componentis et dividentis, sed in formatione quidditatum non nisi per ordinem ad judicium quod ex formaciones praedita consequitur; unde et in sensu proprie veritas et falsitas dicitur secundum hoc quod judicat de sensibilibus; sed secundum hoc quod sensibile apprehendit, non est ibi veritas et falsitas proprie sed solum secundum ordinem ad judicium quod ex formaciones praedita consequitur; prout scilicet ex apprehensione talis cum est sequi tale judicium."
lect and that of sense to the point of saying that the senses compose and divide. The collation or comparison instituted by the cogitative sense and the other internal senses, in the process of attaining the common sensibles and those termed per accidens, is the closest approach to such a parallelism:

Sensus autem judicium de quibusdam est naturale, sicut de propriis sensibilibus; de quibusdam autem quasi per quandam collationem, quam facit in homine vis cogitativa, quae est potentia sensitivae partis, loco cujus in aliis animalibus est existimatio naturalis; et sic judicat vis sensitiva de sensibilibus communibus et de sensibilibus per accidens. . . . [S]ensus judicium de sensibilibus propriis est semper verum, nisi sit imperimentum in organo, vel in medio; sed in sensibilibus communi bus et per accidens interdum judicium sensus fallitur.31

The important point here is the insistence on the judgment of the vis cogitativa, the comparison or collation by which, along with the other internal senses, it attains the common sensibles and those known as per accidens sensible. The doctrine here offered leaves a question in the matter of the thesis and of this chapter. Can the judgment of the vis cogitativa here described by St. Thomas be the singular minor of the prudential syllogism? Or is it only the preparation on the level of sense for this judgment? It would seem best to say that the latter is true. To venture an example: the doctor who is looking for signs of life in an injured person, before proceeding with his treatment, will make several judgments on the level of the cogitative

37 De Ver., 1, 11 6.
sense. These will serve as a sensible basis for the minor of his syllogism: "This person is or is not alive." The choice would follow some such line as this: "Therefore he is to be treated in this fashion." Apropos here is the formula of the prudential syllogism: "Ratio autem particularis dicit quod hoc quidem est tale, et ego talis, puta quod ego filius, et hunc honorem debeo nunc exhibere parenti." This formula strongly implies that there is something of sense and something of intellect in the singular minor. The cogitative sense collates the recognizable notes of the father and of the son so that the intellect can use such singulars in the minor proposition. Just how such close co-operation is possible must await an explanation in the next chapter. From all that has been said, the role of the cogitative sense in the prudential syllogism, the fact that it does have an important part to play, is assured.

The last of the early works of St. Thomas which demands attention is the Summa Contra Gentiles. The major treatment of the vis cogitativa lies in the chapters dealing with the position of Averroes that man is specified by his intellectus passivus. Of note is the fact that Averroes and St. Thomas both take intellectus passivus as the equivalent of the vis cogitativa throughout the discussion. In refuting Averroes, St.

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38 In III de An., 16, n. 845.
Thomas does admit the validity of his doctrine on the nature and activity of the cogitative sense. St. Thomas reiterates the analogy between the *vis aestimativa* and the *vis cogitativa*; he admits the function of the cogitative sense whereby it distinguishes individual intentions and compares them with each other. A further point is the admission that the *vis cogitativa* along with memory and phantasy also helps to prepare phantasms for the abstraction by the agent intellect.\(^{39}\) It must be mentioned that these admissions are part of the first paragraph in which St. Thomas states the doctrine of Averroes preparatory to refuting it. Subsequent sections of his refutation contain notions which are important for the point under consideration.

Primum autem movens in homine est intellectus; nam intellectus suo intelligibili movet voluntatem. Nec potest dici quod solus intellectus passivus sit movens; quia intellectus passivus est solum particularium; in movendo autem accipitur et universalis opinio, quae est intellectus pos- sibilis, et particularis, quae potest esse intellectus passivi.\(^{40}\)

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39 C.C., II, 60; Quotations from the *Summa Contra Gentiles* are taken from: S. Thomas De Aquino *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Editio Leonina Manuallis, Desclée et C. Herder, Romae, 1934. "Dicit enim praedictus Averroes . . . quod homo differt specie a brutis per intellectum quem Aristoteles vocat passivum, qui est ipsa *vis cogitativa*, quae est propria homini, loco cuius alia animalia habent quandam aestimativam naturalem. Huibus autem cogitativa virtutis est distinguere intentiones individuales, et comparare eas ad invicem. . . . [P]er hanc virtutem, simul cum imaginativa et memoriativa, praeparantur phantasmata ut recipiant actionem intellectus agentis, . . . praedicta virtus vocatur nomine intellectus et rationis, de qua medici dicunt quod habet sedem in media cellula capitis."

40 Ibid., "Amplius."
The context here is one of motion from the intellect to operables. Basically the doctrine reflects the same position referred to above in quotations from the De Veritate. The intellectus passivus attains the particulars necessary for operation. This is again a statement of the activity of the cogitative sense in the prudential syllogism; a statement which suffers some reservation only by the use of the words "potest esse intellectus passivi."

A further reference to the vis cogitativa occurs when St. Thomas proves Averroes wrong in maintaining one intellectus possibilis for all men. Man cannot be specified by the powers in which phantasms reside, that is, in the imagination, memory and cogitative sense, any more than he can be by the mere phantasms. Happily in showing why this presents a difficulty, St. Thomas refers only to the cogitative sense:

[C]um virtus cogitativa habeat operationem solum circa particularia, quorum intentiones dividit et componit, et habeat organum corporale per quod agit, non transcendit genus animae sensitivae. Homo autem ex anima sensitiva non habet quod sit homo, sed quod sit animal.

Here again is the strong formula that the cogitative sense has the function of dividing and composing its individual intentions. The somewhat significant inclusion of the imagination elsewhere

41 Cf. above, page 61.
42 C.G., II, 73.
in this text, leads to the proposition that the composing and dividing is nothing more than the composing and dividing of images which the phantasy is without doubt capable of performing. Certainly this is but another example of the judgment of the *vis cogitativa* referred to above. Although St. Thomas will be found claiming some rather startling functions for the cogitative sense, he insists here and in other texts on the materiality, sensitivity, and indeed animality of this power of man.

In this same chapter and context St. Thomas refers again to the operation of the *vis cogitativa* in the preparation of phantasms for the abstraction of the agent intellect. This presents no special problem for the matter of this thesis, but brings up a question as to whether the cogitative sense is to be restricted in its activity to the practical intellect, or has some function in the realm of the speculative intellect. More precisely, does the cogitative sense have a definite part in the speculative knowledge of the singular material? Or are we to restrict its work to practical knowledge of the singular operable? Father Klubertanz is of the opinion that the *vis cogi-

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43 C.G., II, 71: "[H]omo non sortitur speciem ab ipsis phantasmatibus, sed a virtutibus in quibus sunt phantasmata."

44 Ibid., "Adhuc. Virtus cogitativa non habet ordinem ad intellectum possibilem, quo intelligit homo, nisi per suum actum quo praeparatur phantasmata ut per intellectum agentem fiant intelligivilia actu et perficiencia intellectum possibilem."

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that tativta does not enter into the speculative knowledge of the singular:

Two texts in the Contra Gentiles show that the reflection upon the imagination and the discursive power (as well as memory) is to be taken disjunctively. By this is meant: the intellect knows singulars by reflection upon the inner senses; by reflection upon the imagination it knows singulars in the speculative order and without time reference; by reflection upon the discursive power it knows singulars in the practical order; whenever time enters in, both the discursive power and memory will come into special relation with the intellect.

There is one other passage of the Contra Gentiles which puts the operation of the intellectus passivus (here again the equivalent of the vis cogitativa) in the syllogistic process:

Scientia est de conclusionibus demonstrationum; nam demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire, . . . Conclusiones autem demonstrationum sunt universales, sicut et principia. Erit igitur in illa virtute quae est cognoscitiva universalium. Intellectus autem passivus non est cognoscitivus universalium sed particularium intentionum.

45 C.G., II, 80, 191a, ca. med; "Indiget etiam anima ad intelligendum virtutibus praeparantibus phantasmata ad hoc quod fiant intelligabilia actu, scilicet virtute cogitativa et memorativa." Ibid., 81, 192b; "[C] peratio propria ejus animae, quae est intelligere, etsi non dependeant a corpore quasi per organum corporale exercita, habet tamen objectum in corpore, scilicet phantasma. Unde quandiu est in corpore, non potest intelligere sine phantasmate; nec etiam reminisci nisi per virtutem cogitativam et memorativam, per quam phantasmata praeparantur."

46 Klubertanz, 252-253.

47 C.G., II, 73. 174 a-b, "Aehuc."
While St. Thomas removes the cogitative sense from the realm of science, which is a virtue of the speculative intellect, he does assign the usual knowledge of particular intentions to the so-called *intellectus passivus*.

This concludes the texts from the *Contra Gentiles* found to be pertinent to the present purpose. Next in line are the Aristotelian Commentaries. The treatment of the *experimentum* in the *Commentary on the Metaphysics* has already been mentioned in the prefatory remarks of this chapter. The other significant works must be reviewed now, first the *Commentary on the De Anima* in the problem of the *sensibile per accidens*, and secondly the *Commentary on the Ethics*.

The problem of the *sensibile per accidens* presented itself in the study of earlier texts from the *Sentences*. By way of preface to the whole discussion, here is a text from that work:

> Per accidens autem sentitur illud quod non infert passionem sensui neque inquantum est sensus, neque inquantum est hic sensus, sed conjungitur his quae per se sensui inferunt passionem: sicut Socrates, et filius Diaris, et amicus et alia huusmodi; quae per se cognoscuntur in universali intellectu; in particulari autem in virtute cogitativa in homine, aestimativa autem in aliis animalibus. Huusmodi autem tunc sensus exterior dicitur sentire, quamvis per accidens, quando ex eo quod per se sentitur, vis apprehensiva, cujus est illud cognitum per se cognoscere statim sive dubitatione et discursum apprehendit; sicut vidimus aliquid vivere ex hoc quod loquitur. 48

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Much of the doctrine herein contained will find clarification in the treatment of the accidental sensible in the Commentary on the De Anima. This much is of interest now; the vis cogitativa is the internal sense which attains the sensible per accidens. The context here is not one of application to particular operables, but rather of mere cognition of singulars. This is not to deny the position taken above, that the cogitative sense does not enter into speculative knowledge of the singular. It remains to be seen that this cognition, effected in and by the cogitative, is indeed referred to action, and precisely in the operation of the prudential syllogism.

Turning now to the De Anima, we must paraphrase several numbers leading up to the capital text. By way of contrast, per se sensibilia are those which make a definite impression on the senses. To sense, according to St. Thomas, is to suffer or to be altered. Now the per se sensibilia can obviously be divided into proper sensibles and common sensibles. The former are obtained by only one sense, such as color by the eye; the latter are apprehended by more than one sense. Among the common sensibles number, motion, and rest are common to all five external senses; while figure and size are apprehended only by touch and sight. St. Thomas explains the twofold impression made by the per se sensibles. Where the thing acting on the senses is different in itself, you will have proper sensibles, for example,
color, sound, taste; where only the manner of the action differs, you will have common sensibles, such as motion, rest, and number. As for per accidens sensibles, in general they do not make any difference in the senses; that is to say they do not make any impression on the senses. 49 Now for the explicit doctrine on this last type:

[Ad hoc quod aliquid sit sensibile per accidens, primo requiritur quod accidat ei quod per se est sensibile; sicut accidit albo esse hominem, et accidit ei esse dulce. Secundo requiritur, quod sit apprehensum a sentiente; si enim accideret sensibili, quod lateret sentientem, non disceretur per accidens sentiri. Oportet igitur quod per se cognoscatur ab aliqua alia potentia cognoscitiva sentientis. Et hoc quidem vel est alius sensus, vel est intellectus, vel vis cogitativa, aut aestimativa. 50

This is clear enough and contains nothing of special import, other than the insistence that the per accidens sensibles must be bound up with something sensed or known per se. The second condition is that the object must merely be known under its own formality by some other power of the sensing subject, not necessarily through his senses. St. Thomas goes on to explain what he means by saying that the object must be known per se by another sense. This is fairly obvious in the piece of sugar which happens to be white. Now in the case of the per se knowledge obtained by the intellect, there is need of further explanation:

49 In II de An., 13, nn. 383-394.
50 Ibid., n. 395.
Sed, ut propriae loquamur, hoc non est universaliter sensibile per accidentes, sed per accidentes visibile, sensibile autem per se. Quod ergo sensu proprio non cognoscit, si sit aliquid universale, apprehenditur intellectu; non tamen omne quod intellectu apprehendi potest in re sensibili, potest dici sensibile per accidentes, sed statim quod ad occursum rei sensatæ apprehenditur intellectu. Sicut statim cum video aliquem loquentem, vel movere seipsum, apprehendo per intellectum vitam ejus, unde possum dicere quod video sum vivere.\(^5\)

St. Thomas here provides for the case in which the *per accidens* aspect of the object known is not attained by a sense. If this aspect is universal, only the intellect can attain it; this is a point not insisted on in the earlier text. The final point, that the apprehension of the universal note occurs just as the object sensed is making its impression on the senses, is common to both texts. It is significant that St. Thomas says *possum dicere quod video sum vivere*. I can say that I see a person to have life, but more accurately, I understand that the external notes, which I sense properly and *per se*, are clear proof of the presence in this individual of the universal note of life.

St. Thomas continues with the work which is of most interest; the *per accidens* aspect apprehended by the *via cogitativa*:

Si vero apprehendatur in singulari, ut puta cum video coloratum, percipio hunc hominem vel hoc animal, hujus modi quidem apprehensio in homine fit per vim cogitativam, quae dicitur ratio particularis, eo quod est collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio universalis est collativa

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rationum universalium.52

Here is the most satisfying formula for the familiar grasp of
singulars, particulars, and operables, which has so often been
attributed to the *vis cogitativa*. This internal sense does not
operate in a vacuum, but in conjunction with the other senses,
external and internal, and with the intellect. In the same ob-
ject intellect will find life, the eye will find color, figure,
motion and other sensibles, and the *vis cogitativa* will recog-
nize this particular friend, or dog. One could wish that St.
Thomas had added the phrase: "I can say that this is my friend."
For the intellect can and does make use of these immediate data
of the cogitative sense. So close is the co-operation between
the work of the cogitative and the intellect in forming the
singular judgment, that the name *ratio particularis* is assigned
to the former. Yet St. Thomas is quick to explain that it is
nevertheless a sense:

Nihilominus tamen haec vis est in parte sensitiva; quia vis
sensitiva in sui supremo participat aliquid de vi intellec-
tiva in homine, in quo sensus intellectui conjungitur. In
animali vero irrationali fit apprehensio intentionis in-
dividualis per aestimativam naturalem, secundum quod evis
per audition vel visum cognoscit filium, vel aliquid hujus-
modi.53

The familiar analogy with the aestimative sense in brutes is

52 Ibid., n. 396.
53 Ibid., n. 397.
reiterated. It is important in light of what St. Thomas goes
on to say in the concluding number of this lesson:

Differenter tamen circa hoc se habet cogitativa et aestima-
tiva. Nam cogitativa apprehendit individuum, ut existens
sub natura communi; quod contingit ei, inquantum unitur
intellectivae in eodem subjecto; unde cognoscit hunc hominem
prout est hic homo, et hoc ligum prout est hoc ligum.54

There are several new notions in this short passage; the appre-
hension of the individual as existing is one. This should be
taken to mean that the object is here and now affecting the
senses. A second notion is that the individual is known as so
existing under a common nature. This explains how a universal
is known as particularized in a given singular. As far as it
goes, the passage seems to add nothing to the concept of in-
direct knowledge of a singular material by reflection on the
phantasm. This would put the cogitative in the realm of mere
speculation on a singular. There are two clues to show that St.
Thomas is here speaking of the operation of the cogitative in its
proper sphere of activity, in the practical intellect, and there-
fore in the virtue of prudence. Knowledge of a man, prout est
hic homo, is of value only if we suppose that some activity of
the knowing subject will take place with regard to this man, and
precisely because he is recognized or known as this man. One
can go even further and say that the knowledge of an individual
as existing under a common nature is the sensitive and necessary

54 Ibid., n. 398.
groundwork for the formation of the singular minor and singular conclusion of the prudential syllogism. This operation of the cogitative sense may be immediate, or may take the form of a discourse or comparison; hence the added name applied to the *vis cogitativa*, that of ratio particularis.

The second clue is the doctrine of the analogy to the *vis aestimativa* in brutes, which St. Thomas goes on to explain in the balance of the text now under consideration:

*Vis aestimativa* autem non apprehendit aliquod individuum, secundum quod est sub natura communi, sed solum secundum quod est terminus aut principium aliquid actionis vel passionis; sicut ovis cognoscit hunc agnum, non inquantum est his agnus, sed inquantum est ab ea lactabilis; et hanc herbam, inquantum est ejus cibus. Unde alia individua ad quae se non extendit ejus actio vel passio, nullo modo apprehendit sua aestimativa naturali. Naturalis enim aestimativa datur animalibus, ut per eam ordinentur in actiones proprias, vel passiones, prosequendas, vel fugiendas. 55

This is a succinct summary of the entire Thomist doctrine on the *vis aestimativa*. The important point is this: while St. Thomas denies to the animal's estimative sense any cognition of the individual as existing under a common nature, he does maintain that the animal knows the singular as the term or principle of its instinctive actions. Now if the analogy between cogitative and aestimative has any validity, man's analogue to brute instinct must also be capable of knowing the singular as the term or principle of his actions. Actions, terminating in singular

operables, belong to the practical intellect in man; the necessary sensitive groundwork for acting, the cognition of the term supplied by the *vis cogitativa*, must also pertain to the practical intellect. Man therefore has all the equipment of the animal suited for action, but because of his intellect, his field of action is of almost infinite extension. He can know universals particularized in this or that given singular. The animal is restricted to knowing the singulars which the Creator wants it to know in order that it might use them or avoid them to maintain itself and its species.

By way of summary we quote again from Father Klubertanz:

No one can doubt that one of the ways in which a particular stands under a universal is precisely the way in which a particular practical proposition stands under a universal. This relationship in the practical order is often expressed by St. Thomas in terms of the "practical syllogism," which expression is also to be found in the Commentary on the De Anima. Taken in this sense, the *cogitative* knows the individual, not only with reference to merely physical action and passion, but precisely as standing under the intelligible light and direction of intellect.56

The final major commentary on the works of Aristotle, that on the *Ethics*, is next in line for consideration. This commentary offers a rich field for the matter of the thesis and of this chapter in particular, because of its explicit treatment

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56 Klubertanz, 202-203. The reference to the *De Anima* is to nn. 845-846 quoted above on page 69; cf. also in VI *Eth.*, 7, nn. 1214-1215.
of the virtue of prudence. In this context St. Thomas proves that prudence is not to be identified with science, a virtue of the speculative intellect. Prudence, he tells us, is of an extreme, that is of a singular in so far as it is operable. Science is only of universals; hence the lack of identity between the two. If one compares these two virtues to understanding, taken here as the habit of first principles, both have some likeness to it, but each in a different way. Intellect attains the terms or extremes, that is the indemonstrable principles about which one does not reason, simply because they are self-evident. Now prudence resembles intellectus because:

Prudentia est extremi, scilicet singularis operabilis, quod oportet accepere ut principium in agendis; cujus quidem extremi non est scientia, quia non probatur ratione, sed ejus est sensus, quia aliquo sensu percipitur; non quidem illo quo sentimus species propriorum sensibilium, puta coloris, soni, et suavismodi, qui est sensus proprius; sed sensu interiori, quo percipimus imaginabilia, sicut in mathematicis cognoscimus trigonum, idest singularem triangulum imaginatum, quia etiam illic, idest in mathematicis statur ad aliquod singulare imaginabile, sicut etiam in naturalibus statur ad aliquod singulare sensibile.

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57 In VI Eth., 7, n. 1213: "Scientia enim est universali\; . . \; prudentia autem extremi, id est singularis, quia est operabilis quod est singulare. Et sic patet, quod scientia non est prudentia."

58 Cf. Ibid., n. 1214: "[T]am scientia, quam prudentia . . . habent aliquam convenientiam cum intellectu, qui . . . est quorundam terminorum sive extremorum, idest principiorum indemonstrabilium, quorum non est ratio, quia non possunt per rationem probari, sed statim per se innotescunt."

59 Ibid., n. 1214.
The passage discusses the nature of prudence and the importance of understanding the operation of prudence. It explains that the concept of prudence plays a crucial role in exercising good judgment. The author outlines the principles that underlie the operation of prudence, emphasizing the need for external considerations, external demonstrations, and the role of universal principles in shaping the reasoning process. The text argues that prudence is a process that helps to determine the absolute principle of the action, leading to a better understanding of the nature of prudence as a term and concept.
cet eorum cognitio ab homine non potest removeri. Sed intellectus qui est in praeclis, est alterius modi extremi, scilicet singularis et contingens et est alterius propositionis, idest non universalis quae est quasi major, sed singularis quae est minor in syllogismo operativo.\footnote{Ibid., 9, n. 1247.}

This repeats what was seen above, but adds the note of the operative syllogism. The singular minor of this syllogism has been put down as the work of the cogitative sense in past texts. How is this new use of terminology, attributing this minor proposition to a sensitive \textit{intellectus} to be understood? St. Thomas' answer is two-fold. Singulares are principles in action after the manner of final causes. The power which attains them in this capacity can then be termed \textit{intellectus}.\footnote{Ibid., n. 1248: "Quare autem hujusmodi extremi dicatur intellectus, patet per hoc quod intellectus est principiorum. Hujusmodi autem singularia, quorum dicimus esse intellectum, principia sunt ejus quod est gratia cujus, idest sunt principia ad modum causae finalis."} Secondly, singulares have the character of principles, because the universal is received from the singular; for example, the curative powers of a single herb may be extended to all herbs of that species. St. Thomas goes on to tell us just which sense gets the extreme which appears as the singular operable in the minor of the prudential syllogism:

\begin{quote}
Et quia singularia proprie cognoscuntur per sensum, oportet quod homo horum singularium, quae dicimus esse principia et extrema, habeat sensum non solum exteriorem sed etiam in-
\end{quote}
Once again the *vis cogitativa* is the sense which attains the extreme of practical reasoning. Here too *intellectus passivus* is used in its restricted meaning, as exactly equivalent to *vis cogitativa* and *ratio particularis*.

In a further lesson St. Thomas draws two corollaries from the fact that older men are considered more prudent than younger. The first repeats the notion that the singular operable has the force of a final cause, and strengthens the interpretation of the practical syllogism:

[Intellectus, qui est bene discretivus singularium in practicis, non solum se habet circa principia, sicut in speculativis, sed etiam sicut finis. In speculativis enim, demonstrationes procedunt ex principiis quorum est intellectus; non tamen demonstrationes dantur de eis. Sed in operativis, demonstrationes et procedunt ex his scilicet singularibus, et dantur de his scilicet singularibus. Oportet enim in syllogismo operativo, secundum quem ratio movet ad agendum, esse minorem singulararem, et etiam conclusionem quae concludit ipsum operabile, quod est singulare.]

The second corollary is based on the notion of *intellectus* as the interior sense which attains the singular extreme. Because this power is strengthened with age, experience, and growing

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63 Ibid., n. 1249.
64 Ibid., n. 1253.
prudence, we should listen to older, more experienced men in practical matters. 65

In the concluding portion of this lesson, St. Thomas gives a basis for distinguishing between the two familiar names of the cogitative sense, *vis cogitativa* and *ratio particularis*, and therefore a distinction between two different functions of this power.

[8] sicut pertinet ad intellectum in universalibus judicium absolutum de primis principiis, ad rationem autem pertinet discursus a principiis in conclusiones, ita et circa singula *vis cogitativa* vocatur intellectus secundum quod habet absolutum judicium de singularibus. Unde ad intellectum dicitur pertinere prudentiam et synesim, et gnomen. Dicitur autem *ratio particularis*, secundum quod discurrerit ab uno in alium. Et ad hang partiniet eubulia, quam Philosophus his non connumeravit. 66

The understanding of first principles in the absolute judgment of the habit of understanding is paralleled by the certain grasp of the cogitative sense on the singular extreme of prudential reason. This is the function of the cogitative sense which was seen briefly in the previous chapter. *Intellectus*, taken as a sense power with an absolute judgment about singulars, was put down as one of the parts of prudence. The second function men-

65 Ibid., n. 1254: "[0]portet attendere his quae opinantur et annunciant circa aigilibia homines experti, et senes, et prudentes; quamvis non inducant demonstrationes, non minus quasi ipsis demonstrationibus, sed etiam magis. Hujusmodi enim homines, propter hoc quod habent experientiam visuum, ideat rectum judicium de operabilibus, vident principia operabilium. Principia autem sunt certiores conclusionibus demonstrationum."

66 Ibid., n. 1255.
tioned here, the discourse of the *ratio particularis*, is again compared to the inquisition instituted by the reason; it is made somewhat clearer by the terminology *discurrere ab uno in alium*. The fact that St. Thomas applies this discursive function of the *vis cogitativa* to the habit of *sutura*, would seem to indicate that it is the search, on the level of sense knowledge, for suitable means to an already efficaciously intended end.

One bit of terminology in the above passage calls for discussion. What is meant by the words *judicium absolutum de singularibus*? Father Klubertanz has this to say:

The *vis cogitativa* is called either an *intellectus* or a *ratio*, but from different points of view. It is called *ratio*, when the discursive process used by it is the main element in view. When, however, there is a non-discursive apprehension of a sensory good as presented by the imagination, it is called *intellectus*. This is all that is meant by the phrase "*judicium absolutum de singularibus."*

This offers some clarification, but the question arises: what of the estimation made by the cogitative sense after its comparison or quasi reasoning process is completed? Referring back to the discussion of falsity in the senses, it is recalled that falsity can appear in the judgment of common sensibles and of the accidental sensibles which appear to be the object of the cogitative sense. To use an example: if a golfer has only one wood club in his bag, the judgment regarding the use of this particular club

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67 Klubertanz, 218.
for a shot that demands a wood club, would be absolute. His eyes would show him this one club, and the cogitative sense would give it the added note of being a sensible good here and now, indeed, as the only means possible for the desired end. But if the golfer has a set of four wood clubs, there may arise in his mind a discursive process in which the cogitative sense would present the good aspects of each of the means in turn. The sensory data of wind, distance, pitch of the club, and so on, would lead to a judgment on the sense level, that one of the four clubs is the best for the intended shot. Is this final judgment absolute in the same sense that the former judgment was absolute? It would appear that the intellect must accept the sense data presented to it as here and now desirable by the cogitative sense. In this way, the judgment would be absolute. But where there are several means available, the chances for error in the discursive process are more apparent. The eyes might deceive one as to the distance, the wind, or even as to number of the club chosen. What the senses, external and internal, offer to the intellect as matter for its choice, would appear to have a very definite and absolute character, which the intellect can use but not change.

Having discussed the pertinent texts from the Commentaries on Aristotle's works, the last step is to proceed to the later works of St. Thomas, principally, of course, to the *Summa Theologicae*. The passages in this crowning effort of the Angelic Doctor which pertain to the problem of this chapter are many and
scattered. The order of presentation cannot therefore follow anything like the orderly array of questions in the Summa itself. Most of the texts to be reviewed will reflect the salient points of doctrine seen so far. Among them three main points seem to stand out. First, the fact that the prudent man must know the singular operable is again insisted upon. Second, that he knows this operable precisely in the singular minor and conclusion of the prudential syllogism is restated. Third, the cogitative sense, in its capacity of "understanding," as seen in the Ethics, is again the sense power which apprehends the singular extreme or term of the prudential process.

The first point, that prudence involves knowledge of the singular operable, restates the conclusion of chapter one; but it remains to be seen that it is the via cogitativa which attains this particular for the intellectual virtue. The first and most general text is from a question on whether there is love in God. In answering the first objection that love cannot be in God, because it is a passion, St. Thomas introduces his response with a discussion of passion or sense appetite. His first few words are significant:

\[ \text{[V] is cogitativa non movet, nisi mediante appetitiva. Et sicut in nobis ratio universalis movet mediante ratione particulari, ut dicitur in III de Anima; ita appetitus intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas, movet in nobis mediante appetitu sensitive.} \]

68 S.T., I, 20, ad 1.
This passage reflects the concept of motion from intellect to things as noted before in this chapter in quotations from the *De Veritate*. The motion of the intellect, which is possible only through the mediation of the *ratio particularis*, is of course the work of the practical intellect. The parallel to the sense appetite, appealed to here, means clearly that the *ratio particularis* is the sense power also called the *vis cogitativa*. The cross reference to the *De Anima* is to a portion of Book III which has been seen before. The exact reference to St. Thomas’ commentary is to the familiar example of a prudential syllogism, in the course of which the cogitative sense, under its other name, *ratio particularis*, is prominently mentioned.69 This term as it appears in the text above is marked for reference to the *ex professo* treatment of the cogitative sense in question 78, article 4, of this same first part. In such general terms the place of the *vis cogitativa* in the practical order is restated. Another such general statement is found in the definitive treatment of the virtue of prudence. "[P]rudentia applicat universalem cognitionem ad particularias, quorum est sensus, inde multa quae pertinent ad partem sensitivam requiruntur ad prudentiam."70 Naturally the best explanation of this application and how it is

69 *In III de An.*, 16, n. 845.

70 *S.T.*, II-II, 49, 1, ad 1.
achieved will appear in the article dealing with the knowledge of singulars had by prudence. This leads to the second point of interest in the doctrine of the Summa.

St. Thomas tells us in the body of this article that prudence must include knowledge of singulars, because application to the operable is the very end of practical reason. Operables are always singular. And nowhere is this application more apparent than in the syllogistic process of prudential reasoning.71 The reply to the first objection brings into focus the work of the vis cogitativa in the prudential syllogism:

[R]atio primo quidem et principaliter est universalium; potest tamen universalis rationes ad particularia applicare (unde syllogismorum conclusiones non solum sunt universalis, sed etiam particularum); quia intellectus per quandam reflexionem se ad materiam extendit, ut dicitur in III de Anima.72

The important notes here are the ideas of reflection and the extension of intellect to matter. This is St. Thomas' usual way of explaining knowledge of the singular. Is the reflection here mentioned of the speculative order or of the practical? The context of the whole article speaks of the practical order, but the editors refer us to a section of the De Anima in which St. Thomas speaks only of reflection on the phantasm.73 Even if this re-

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71 S.T., II-II, 47, 3 c: For the text of this answer see page 44 above.

72 Ibid., ad 1.

73 In III de Anima, 8, n. 712-713. "[N]on possemus
ference is correct, the general term, reflection may still be taken in the reduplicative sense maintained by Father Klubertanz. The key to this general terminology is contained in the response to the third objection. It becomes clear just what sense power is involved in the reflection for knowledge of the singular operable, as St. Thomas explains how prudence is in the senses:

Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., prudentia non consistit in sensu exteriori, quo cognoscimus sensibilia propria; sed in sensu interiori, qui perficitur per memoriam et experimentum ad proupte iudicandum de particularibus expertis. Non tamen ita quod prudentia sit in sensu interiori sicut in subjecto principali: sed principaliter quidem est in ratione, per quam autem applicationem pertingit ad huiusmodi sensum.

There is no doubt in the above words that we are dealing with the practical order. The sense involved is interior and is perfected by memory and experience. With this conclusive reference to the treatment of the experimentum, as contained in the first book of the Metaphysics, it is clear that the interior sense is the vis cognoscere comparationem universalis ad particularis, nisi esset una potentia quae cognosceret utrumque. Intellectus igitur utrumque cognoscit, sed alic at alic modo. Cognoscit enim naturam speciei, sive quod quid est, directe extendendo se ipsum, ipsum autem singulari per quamdam reflectionem, inquantum reedit super phantasmata, a quibus species intelligibles abstrahuntur.

74 Cf. quotation above on page 73.
75 S.T., II-II, 47, 3 ad 3.
The reference to the sixth book of the Ethics is again corroborative. The passage contains in germ the important ideas of the concluding chapter; but for the present attention is drawn only to the fact that the cogitative sense attains the singular operable, and indeed judges promptly about particular experiences. An article dealing with the intellect's knowledge of singulares throws further light on this matter of judgment of singulares, as it pertains to the practical syllogism. In answering the objection that the intellect directs to actions on singulares and must therefore know them, St. Thomas replies:

Ad secundum dicendum quod electio particularis operabilis est quasi conclusio syllogismi intellectus practici, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ex universalis autem propositione directe non potest concludi singularis, nisi mediente aliqua singulari propositione assumpta. Unde universalis ratio intellectus practici non movet nisi mediente particulari apprehensione sensitivae partis, ut dicitur in III de Anima.77

This is perhaps the clearest exposition of the practical syllogism, with the universal major and the singular minor assumed under it to reach the conclusion of the election. The mediation by the particular apprehension of the sensitive part is the crux of this passage. Can this mediation be applied to the vis cogit-

76 Cf. above, page 53 and In I Met., 1, n. 15: "Experimentum enim est ex collatione plurium singulorum in memoria receptorum. Rujusmodi autem collatio est homini propria, et pertinet ad vim cogitativam, quae ratio particularis dicitur."

77 S.T., 86, 1 ad 2.
tative, or must imagination and memory be included? The reference to the seventh book of the *Ethics* is to a passage dealing with the operative syllogism and its four propositions.78 The term *sensus* is used in this passage, and offers a clue: "[p]repospositio et opinio ultima, scilicet singularis, accipitur per sensum et principaliter in actionibus quae sunt circa singularia."79 Failure to obey the universal proposition of reason is not traceable to the principles of science itself; for passion is a thing of sense. A second point is that the "universale quod per scientiam comprehenditur, non est extremus terminus operabilium."80 It is clear, however, what power gets at the term or extreme of prudential reasoning; according to an earlier treatment of the *Ethics*, it is the *vis cogitativa* in its capacity of grasping the singular at the end of operation.81 The final clue to the interpretation of the passage is the reference to the *De Anima*. This again is to the familiar example of the prudential syllogism with its clear mention of the particular reason.82 It therefore is a safe conclusion that the apprehension in question is the

78 This reference is given by the editors.
79 *In VII Eth.*, 3, n. 1352.
80 Ibid.
81 *In VI Eth.*, 9, nn. 1247-1255; cf. above, pp. 82-86.
82 *In III de An.*, 16, n. 845; cf. above p. 69.
work of the cogitative sense.

To return again to the realm of the motion imparted to the sensitive appetite by reason, further light is cast on the work of the cogitative sense in prudential reasoning. St. Thomas is answering the question as to whether the passions obey reason, and in part has this to say:

Rationi quidem obediunt \([\text{irascibilis et concupiscibilis}\]\) quantum ad ipsos actus. Cuius ratio est, quia appetitus sensitivus in aliis quidem animalibus natus est moveri ab aestimativa virtute; sicut ovis aestimans lupum inimicum, timent. Loco autem aestimativae virtutis est in homine, sicut supra dictum est, vis cogitativa; quae dicitur a quibusdam \textit{ratio particularis}, ea quod est collativa intentionum individualium. Unde ab ea natus est moveri in homine appetitus sensitivus. Ipsa autem ratio particularis nata est moveri et dirigi secundum rationem universalem; unde in syllogisticis ex universalibus propositionibus concluduntur conclusiones singulares. Et ideo \(83\) [tet quod ratio universalis imperat appetitui sensitivo.]

This altogether familiar exposition of the cogitative sense uses another idea, the motion of the sense appetite by this power.

Of more import is the obvious example of practical reason in which the singular proposition is again attributed to the work of the \textit{ratio particularis}. The motion proceeding from universal reason through particular reason is basic to the explanation of how the intellect and the sense power co-operate in prudential reasoning. This brings up a problem related to the prudential syllogism: how to explain the formation of the singular propositi-
tian in the syllogism?

Some light on this point can be gained from a reading of another late work of St. Thomas, The Quaestio de Anima. In asking whether the separated soul knows singulars, St. Thomas poses the following apparent reason in favor of his affirmative response:

Sed contra, formare propositiones non est nisi intel-
lectus. Sed anima etiam conjuncta corpori, format proposi-
tionem cujus subjectum est singulare, praedicatum universale;
ut cum dico: Socrates est homo; quod non possum facere nisi
cognoscerem singulare, et comparisonem ejus ad universale.
Ergo etiam anima separata per intellectum cognoscit singu-
laria. 84

But the Angelic Doctor sees fit to answer this proposition, be-
cause its conclusion is not entirely true:

[Anima conjuncta corpori per intellectum cognoscit singu-
lare, non quidem directe, sed per quamdam reflexionem; in
quantum scilicet ex hoc quod apprehendit suum intelligi-
bile, revertitur ad considerandum suum actum, et speciem
intelligibilem quae est principium suae operationis; et
ejus speciei originem; et sic venit in considerationem
phantasmatum, et singularium, quorum sunt phantasmata. Sed
haec reflexio compleuri non potest nisi per adjunctionem
virtutis cogitativaet imaginativa, quae non sunt in
anima separata; unde per modum istum anima separata singu-
laria non cognoscit. 85

A new problem arises here, because both the imagination and the
cogitative sense are given place in the reflection needed to form
a singular proposition. This again can be answered by means of
the reduplicative reflection spoken of above; that is to say, re-

84 Q.D. de Anima, 20, sed contra 1.
85 Ibid., ad 1 in contra.
flection upon the phantasm gives one merely the speculative knowledge of the singular, while reflection upon the vis cogitativa gives one practical knowledge. Thus, one should take the reflection mentioned in the above passage as pertaining both to speculative and to practical knowledge. In the parallel treatment of this question in the Summa, where there is concern only for speculative knowledge, there is a significant omission of the cogitative sense. After denying direct knowledge of the singular to the intellect, because it abstracts from individual matter, which is the principle of singularity, St. Thomas states how the intellect does know the singular indirectly:

[F]er quandam reflexionem [intellectus noster] potest cognoscere singulare: ... quia, sicut supra dictum est, etiam postquam species intelligibles abstraxit, non potest secundum eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibles intelligit, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Sic igitur ipsum universale per speciem intelligibilem directe intelligit; indirecte autem singularia, quorum sunt phantasmata; et hoco modo format hanc propositionem, Socrates est homo.

The doctrine here is familiar enough; if to understand any idea at all, I must revert to the phantasm whence I abstracted it, a like reflection must be made to form a singular proposition. In looking back on my phantasm of Socrates, whether he is present or not at the moment, I am able to state that he possesses the notes

86 Cf. above, page 73.
87 s.T., 86, 1 c.
of human nature. This would be merely speculative knowledge, leading to a conclusion dependent on the major under which the singular proposition is subsumed. If I had been thinking that men have the power of speech, I could conclude that Socrates also has this power. In the practical order I would have a major such as this: "Friends are to be greeted." Then knowing Socrates here and now as a friend and so judging in my reflection on the data of the _vis cogitativa_, I would conclude that Socrates should here and now be greeted. The cogitative sense adds the notes of this individual as having a special relation to me and as therefore to be greeted.

The third and last point to be substantiated from the _Summa_ is the use of the term _intellectus_ to mean the sensitive grasp of the singular term or extreme of prudential reasoning. Without any qualification, _intellectus_ is put down as one of the cognoscitive parts of prudence. In the article devoted to this term, it is made clear why it must belong to the intellectual virtue. The term is to be taken, not as the intellective potency itself, but as a certain correct estimation of some extreme principle which is known _per se_. The parallel drawn is

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86 _S.T._, II-II, 48, 1 c: "[Q]uinque pertinent ad prudentiam secundum quod est cognoscitiva, scilicet _memoria_, _ratio_, _intellectus_, _docilitas_ et _solutia_.

89 _S.T._, II-II, 49, 2 c: "[I]ntellectus non sumitur hic pro potentia intellectiva, sed prout importat quandam rectam aessmentionem alicuius extremi principii quod accipitur ut _per se_..."
based on the understanding of first principles from which all deductions proceed. Because the realm of prudence is that of right reasoning in regard to activity, its process must also depend upon an understanding of principles. The first response clarifies the precise meaning of the term. Intellectus, it is objected, is the intellectual virtue counterdistinquished to prudence, and cannot therefore be a part of prudence. This is not so, St. Thomas tells us, because there are two propositions in the syllogism of prudence and therefore two meanings to be assigned to the intellectus which is a part of prudence.

The universal practical principles are known to man through the habit of the intellect which is often termed synderesis. The other meaning to be assigned to intellectus is that of a power;

notum, sicut et prima demonstrationum principia intelligere dicitur."

90 S.T., II-II, 49, 2 ad 1.
91 S.T., II-II, 47, 6 c; I, 79, 12 c.
est quaedam recta aestimatio de aliquo particulari fine.92

In this entire passage there is no mention of the word sensus; but it can be argued to from the references given. The passage of the Ethics is the same treated extensively above. The mention of the finality of the singular extreme is another clue. The intellectus spoken of here is cognoscitive of the contingent in the prudential syllogism. Obviously in question here is the *vis cogitativa* in one of its functions. But conclusive evidence is given in the response to the third objection:

[Y]psa recta aestimatio de fine particulari et intellectus dicitur, inquantum est aliquid principii; et sensus inquantum est particularis. Et hoc est quod Philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic.: Horum, scilicet singularium, oportet habere sensum; hic autem est intellectus. Non autem hoc est intellectum de sensu particulari quo cognoscimus propria sensibilitia; sed de sensu interiori quo de particulari judicamus.93

The power in question is definitely an interior sense. Although it is called *intellectus*, this is by analogy to the true intellectual virtue by which we know first principles. In its own right it is a sense power which apprehends the particular as such. There is little doubt that St. Thomas is here referring to the *vis cogitativa* in one of its functions, the power to apprehend the singular extreme of the prudential syllogism. Added and final proof is furnished by the exact quotation from the

92 S.T., II-II, 49, 2 ad 1.
93 S.T., II-II, 49, 2 ad 3.
Ethics. St. Thomas' own words on this text have been seen above in their fullness. From these statements of St. Thomas the place of the *vis cogitativa* in the prudential syllogism seems assured.

The conclusions proper to the *Summa* reflect in large measure the conclusions proper to this entire chapter. The *vis cogitativa* is man's interior sense analogous to the instinctive-estimative in brutes. Though man has some purely estimative and instinctive functions of the *vis cogitativa*, this power soon rises, under the guidance of reason, to a higher activity which is termed the *experimentum*. With the aid of memory, and after repeated contacts with singulars, the cogitative sense compares and collates these singulars to enable the mind to formulate the principles of the practical sciences. In making its comparison, the cogitative sense formulates a true sense estimation of singulars. Its proper object seems to be a *per accidens* sensible aspect of singulars, their individuality. Under the rule of reason the cogitative sense apprehends the individuality of things in so far as this very individuality is of importance to the knowing subject. That is, the cogitative sense makes it possible for man to evaluate singulars as such. This activity puts the cogitative sense in the realm of the practical intellect. In this capacity it co-operates with the prime virtue of this intellect in the prudential reasoning process. It offers to the virtue of prudence its absolute estimation of the singular as the extreme or term of activity. This function merits for the cogi-
tative sense the name *intellectus (passivus)*. In the case of several means to a given end, the *vis cogitativa* compares and collates them and offers the results to the intellect perfected by the virtue of prudence. This function merits for it the name *ratio particularis*.

All of the foregoing is but a preparation for the most important work of the *vis cogitativa*. Its work is the necessary sensitive groundwork which enables the intellect to impart its motion to sense and to things. Through the cogitative sense the virtue of prudence extends itself to sense and applies its universal principles to activity on given singulars. This is achieved by a reflection which the intellect must make on the senses to know the singular, whether speculatively or practically. In this reflection the intellect is enabled to formulate the singular proposition and conclusion of the prudential syllogism. Practical intellect and cogitative sense are both in operation in this formation of the singular minor and conclusion. Without the close co-operation between these two powers of the human soul, there is no explanation in the principles of St. Thomas for an activity which is altogether evident. Because there is something of intellect and something of sense in the prudential reasoning process, it remains to show, according to the principles of the Angelic Doctor, how this close co-operation is possible. The answer to this problem is the burden of Chapter III.
CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF THE CAUSALITY IN THE COMPOSITE OPERATION OF INTELLECT AND VIS COGITATIVA IN THE PRUDENTIAL SYLLOGISM

The aim of this chapter is to explain how intellect and sense can co-operate in the formation of the singular proposition of the prudential syllogism. This will mean an investigation of the causality involved in the composite operation. Viewed in the light of causality, the problem resolves itself into a study of one effect, the singular judgment, which has two causes. Both causes are necessary to the effect, but in different ways. The intellect makes the judgment a real work of the mind; the sense power involved gives the intellect the particularity and desirability of the singular operable. In the broadest terms, this is an example of instrumental causality; that is, the intellect, as principle cause, uses the sense as its instrument. St. Thomas's way of putting the co-operation is expressed in a variety of ways. In order to understand them better in the context of the problem, the basic principles which lie behind the varied terms employed by the Angelic Doctor must be noted.
The most obvious principle in any discussion of man is his essential unity. Man, for St. Thomas, is an unum per se, in which the intellective soul is the form related to the matter of the body.¹ This position allows St. Thomas to maintain the unity of man, while still adhering to the composition in man's essence. The intellective soul contains all the forms of man in potency, and is such that by its very nature it must be united to the type of body which we find man to have. The matter—from composition in man in no wise destroys the essential unity, but makes possible the evident diversity in man's potencies and operations. There also follows from this that some of man's potencies are contained in the soul and others in the composite.² The various acts and objects of man's potencies serve to establish a real distinction between these potencies. Those operations which are carried on without corporal organs are intrinsically independent of matter; those which need such organs are just as intrinsically dependent on matter.³ This diversity of potency and operation leads to a

¹ S.T., I, 76, 1; parallel discussions are found in
  C.G. II, 56, 57, 59, 68-70; G.D. de An., I, 2; In II de An., 4,
  In III de An., 7, nn. 675-687.

² Cf. S.T., I, 76, 4 & 5; 77, 2 c & ad 3; 77, 5 c.

³ S.T., I, 77, 5 c: "[Q]uaedam operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur sine organo corporali, ut intelligere et velle. Unde potentiae quae sunt harum operationum principia, sunt in anima sicut in subjecto. — Quaedam vero operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur per organa corporalia. . . . Et ideo potentiae quae sunt talium operationum principia, sunt in conjuncto sicut in subjecto, et non in anima."
problem in the realm of cognition. How is the experimental unity of cognition, the fact that the actions of man are those of a supposit, that the man knows through his intellect and sense, \(^4\) to be reconciled with the given diversity?

St. Thomas answers the problem through the concept of order. This is found to be three-fold, according to the order of nature, the order of generation, and that of objects. According to the first, the intellective potencies are prior to the sensitive as being more perfect and as commanding the sensitive; the sensitive in their turn are prior to the nutritive. In the second the order of generation, the opposite is true. Nutritive precedes sense, and sense, intellect from a temporal standpoint. \(^5\) The third order is not of moment for us.

The order which is of interest is that which obtains in the realm of operation proper to man, the order of intellection. Two things are of concern here: the order on the way up to intellection, or the acquiring of knowledge, and the order on the way down, or the use of knowledge in the practical sphere. In both aspects of cognition St. Thomas posits an ordination of man's powers. This ordination is referred to under the terminology of conjunction and continuation among the several powers of man, and can be broken down into four different ordinations.

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\(^4\) De Ver., 2, 6 ad 3.

\(^5\) S.T., I, 77, 4 c.
The first ordination, and perhaps the most fundamental, is the order of finality. The end in the acquiring of knowledge is the very act of understanding, and all the powers are directed to this end. External sense is for internal, and internal sense in its own right is directed to intellect.\(^6\) In the use of knowledge the end is the singular operable which has been seen to bear the character of an end.\(^7\) The practical intellect is ordered to the internal senses for operation, and the internal sense uses the external sense for knowledge of a here-and-now-singular. Clear proof of this ordination is found in St. Thomas placing an internal sense as a part of prudence.

Another way of looking at the ordination of potencies is through their emanation from the essence of the soul or form of man. In view of the principle that the potencies of the soul are either in the soul itself or in the composite, St. Thomas says:

Compositum autem est in actu per animam. Unde manifestum est quod omnes potentiae animae, sive subjectum earum sit anima sola, sive compositum, fluunt ab essentia animae sicut a principio; quia iam dictum est quod accidens causatur a subjecto secundum quod est actu, et recipitur in eo in quantum est in potentia.\(^8\)

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6 S.T., I, 65, 2 c; 77, 7, c.
7 In VI Eth., 9 n. 1248.
8 S.T., I, 77, 6 c.
In addition to the fact that all the potencies of the soul flow from it, one potency of the soul can arise from another. This is the basis for another doctrinal position:

\[ \text{[P]osterior potentia supponit in definitione sui priorem, et actus posterioris dependet a priori. Si enim definiamus intellectum, definitur per sumum actum, qui est intelligens, et in definitione actus ejus cadet actus prioris potentiae, et ipsa potentia.} \]

Another way of looking at this order of emanation is to state that the higher potency according to perfection and nature is a principle for the lower potencies after the manner of an end and of an active principle. This reflects the order of finality, but adds the note that the senses are a certain deficient participation in the perfection of intellect.

This last notion of participated perfection is the third type of ordination found in the cognoscitive faculties of man. St. Thomas appeals in all his works to the principle of Dionysius that the highest power in one order partakes of the perfection of the order immediately above in the hierarchy of being. For example, the senses participate in intellect and reason in some way, so that one can speak of a kind of animal

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9 \text{In I Sent., 3, 4, 3 sol.} 

10 \text{S.T., I, 77, 7 c: "[P]otentiae animae quae sunt priores secundum ordinem perfectionis et naturae, sint principia aliarum per modum finis et activi principii. Videmus enim quod sensus est propter intellectum, et non e converso. Sensus etiam est quasdam deficiens participatio intellectus: unde secundum naturalem originem quodammodo est ab intellectu, sicut imperfectum a perfecto."}
prudence. In just the same way one can think of man in the light of contemplation as something super-human; in the simple vision of his intellect, man approaches to the pure spirits or angels.\textsuperscript{11} The reverse participation is also adduced at times,\textsuperscript{12} and forms the basis for St. Thomas’ argument that the intellective soul is rightly joined to the human body in man.\textsuperscript{13} It is this principle which St. Thomas has used very often, in texts presented in the previous chapters, to explain the remarkable work of a true sense power, the \textit{vis cogitativa}. The fourth type of ordination found in human cognition is dependent on the three previous principles but takes us into the order of motion, and therefore into the order of dynamic operation which is of concern to the problem of this chapter.

Man’s diverse and distinct cognoscitive faculties are related or continued to one another according to the two-fold

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{11} \textit{In III Sent.}, 35, 1, 2 sol. 2 ad 1: "[\textit{R}]omo in quantum est contemplativus, est aliud supra hominem; quia in intellectus simplici visione continuatur homo superioribus substantiis quae intelligantiae vel angeli dicuntur, sicut animalia continuantur hominibus in vi aestimativa quae est supremum in eis, secundum quam aliquid simile operibus rationis operantur."

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{C.C.}, II, 91: "Natura superior in suo infimo contingit naturam inferiorem in ejus supremo."

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{S.T.}, I, 76, 5 c: "Anima autem intellectiva habet completissime virtutem sensitivam; quia quod est inferioris prae-existit perfectius in superiori, ut dicit Dionysius in libro de \textit{Div. Nom.} Unde oportuit corpus cui unitur anima intellectiva, esse corpus mixtum, inter omnia alia magis reductum ad aequalitatem complexionis."
\end{quote}
motion in human cognition. In the first instance, the motion begins with the external object to be known. There is a line of causation involving the external sense which is first affected by the object and the phantasm, which is the internal sensible image of the object. St. Thomas argues that we get intellectual cognition from sensible objects, and therefore, that "ex parte phantasmatum intellectualis operatio a sensu causatur; ... non ... quod sensibilis cognitio sit totalis et perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis quodammodo est materia causae." 14 So close indeed is the co-operation between phantasm and agent intellect in the process of intellectual cognition, that the conscious understanding of any idea requires a conversion to the phantasm: "[I]mpossible est intellectum nostrum, secundum praesentis vitae statum, quo passibili corpori coniungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata." 15 Two reasons bolster this statement. Intellection would not be disturbed by a bodily lesion unless it were dependent in some way on the body. Secondly, a man will attempt to understand something by proposing phantasms to himself in which he may look at what he wishes to grasp. This second reason leads into the realm of motion from the intellect to things, or at least into a consideration of the use of knowledge.

14 S.T., I, 84, 6 c.
15 Ibid., 7 c.
In the use of knowledge once acquired there is a distinction to be made in the relation between intellect and phantasm.

Alio ergo modo se habet intellectus possibilis ad phantasma quo indiget, ante speciem intelligibilem; et alio modo post-quam recepit speciem intelligibilem. Ante enim, indiget eo ut ab eo accipiat speciem intelligibilem; unde se habet ad intellectum possibilum ut objectum movens. Sed post speciem in eo receptam, indiget eo quasi instrumento sive fundamento suae speciei; unde se habet ad phantasmata sicut causa efficiens; secundum enim imperium intellectus formatur in imaginatione phantasma conveniens tali speciei intelligibili, in quo resplendet species intelligibilis sicut exemplar in exemplato sive in imagine.  

The important point here is the note of efficient causality in the motion of the intellect; add to this the note of instrumentality in the phantasm which the intellect uses. The doctrine here allows the position that conversion to the phantasm may be conscious. In the act of re-understanding an idea, the proper phantasm must be called up, and specifically a phantasm which particularizes the universal idea. This is true because the proper object of the human intellect is a nature existing in corporeal matter. Such a nature is always particularized in matter; therefore, "necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum objectum proprium, quod convertat se ad phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem."  

A further distinction must be made where there is

16 G.G., II, 73.

17 G.T., I, 84, 7 a.
question of reflection on the phantasm for the indirect knowledge of singulars. This is not the same act as the conversion mentioned above for the original understanding of an idea or for the re-understanding of it as particularized in a phantasm. The universal in the particular is not the concern here, but the singular viewed as an object of speculation. To achieve this indirect knowledge of the singular, the intellect again uses the phantasm as its instrument. The process is the termination of the original motion from the external object to the mind. As St. Thomas puts it in the De Veritate:

\[\text{Mens per accidens singularibus se immiscet, inquantum continuatur viribus sensitivis, quae circa particularia versantur. Quae quidem continuatio est dupliciter. Uno modo inquantum motus sensitivae partis terminatur ad mentem, sicut accidit in motu qui est a rebus ad animam; et sic mens singularis cognoscit per quandam reflexionem, prout scilicet mens cognoscendo objectum suum, quod est aliqua natura universalis, redit in cognitionem sui actus, et ulterior in speciem quae est actus sui principium, et ulterior in phantasm a quo species est abstracta; et sic aliquam cognitionem de singulari accipit.}^{18}\]

The main point here is that the reflection is upon the phantasm alone, and that the knowledge is merely speculative. This becomes clear when one examines the second way in which the mind mingles with singulars.

\[\text{Alis modo secundum quod motus qui est ab anima ad res, incepta mente, et procedit in partem sensitivam, prout mens regit inferiores vires; et sic singularibus se immiscet mediante ratione particularis, quae est potentia quaedam in-}\]

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18 De Ver., 10, 5 c.
dividualis, quae alio nomine dicitur cogitativa. . . .
Universalem vero sententiam quam mens habet de operabilibus,
non est possibile applicari ad particularem actum nisi per
aliquam potentiam medium apprehendentem singulare, ut sic
fiat quidam syllogismus, cujus major sit universalis, quae
est sententia mentis; minor autem singularis, quae est
applicatio particularis rationis; conclusio vero electio
singularis operis, ut patet per id quod habetur in III de
Anima. 19

This familiar passage sets the stage for an argument from analogy.
If in the conversion to the phantasm for use of universal know-
ledge, the phantasm stands as the quasi-instrument to the effi-
cient causality of the intellect, so here the ratio particularis
stands as the instrument to the efficient causality of the intel-
lect in the practical order. If to know the singular specula-
tively, the intellect must reflect on the phantasm, to know it in
the practical order, it must reflect on the sensible data of con-
crete particularity and operability which the cogitative sense
adds to a given phantasm. There seems to be some difference in
the effects produced by these various causalities. In the con-
version to the phantasm for the use of universal knowledge, the
effect seems to be the actually understood universal concept.
The reflection for knowledge of the singular in either the prac-
tical or speculative order, on the other hand, seems to result in
a singular judgment. As far as the effect in the practical order
goes, there is no doubt that it is a judgment -- "minor autem
singularis quae est applicatio particularis rationis." This

19 De Ver., 10, 5 c.
judgment is to be understood, however, as one act of the mind in which two causes co-operate. The composition of this judgment is achieved by equating the singular operable subject and the universal predicate. This composition is possible because the singular operable stands as an individual good here and now known by the cogitative sense. The instrument gives something very definite to this judgment, the individuality and desirability of the operable, just as the phantasm in the process on the way up to the intelligible species gives a particular nature. The idea is that of a man or a horse, because the image of a man or a horse happens to be presented to the intellect in the phantasm. The cogitative sense gives to the intellect the subject of its singular propositions as this particular man, or way of acting, or means to an end, and precisely as this man, or act, or means. The subject of the proposition is the direct work of the cogitative sense. The total effect, the entire proposition, is attributable to the higher efficient cause, the intellect. Thus there does not arise the difficulty of saying that the judgment is partly on the sense level and partly on the intellectual level. The act is that of the mind, but the work of sense is necessary to it. As a man performs the one act of writing by using a pencil, and cannot write without the instrument, so the mind uses sense to produce the one effect, which is the singular proposition of the practical syllogism. As the act of writing will vary when a pen is used instead of a pencil, so the subjects of the minor pro-
positions will vary according to the determination given to the act by the cogitative sense. The instrumentality in this case may be viewed in another light. The sense power of itself could never enter into the act of a spiritual power without the motion it receives from the higher cause, just as the pencil cannot draw a straight line of itself. This in the notion of instrumentality is found an answer to the problem of this chapter, and, indeed, of the entire thesis.

It is necessary, however, to point out that the notion of instrumentality, as it has been applied here, is analogous to strict instrumentality. A brief note on this concept, as St. Thomas develops it, is necessary to make this analogy clear. A treatment of the instrumental cause is found in various sections of St. Thomas' writings, but principally in those dealing with the sacraments as the instruments of grace, and with all creatures as secondary causes under God, the prime cause.20 Properly speaking, an instrument is a distinct substance which is moved by another substance, as, for example, the saw is moved by the carpenter. In a broader sense of the term, whatever is moving as moved by another is also an instrument. This includes the actions of man as under the motion of God.21 There are in

20 Cf. especially In IV Sent., 1, 1, 4; sols. 2, 3, 4; In IV Sent., 8, 2, 3; De Ver., 27, 4 of 24, 1 ad 5; De Pot., 3, 7, c; S.T., I, 45, 5 c; III, 62, 1 ad 2 & 4 c.

21 De Ver., 24, 1 ad 5.
question in this causality, two motions — that proper to the instrument in itself, and the motion which it has in virtue of the principle agent. The best expression of St. Thomas' general doctrine is contained in the Summa in its treatment of sacramental instrumentality:

Instrumentum enim, ut dictum est, non operatur nisi inquantum est motum a principali agente, quod per se operatur. Et ideo virtus principalis agentis habet permanens et completum esse in natura; virtus autem instrumentalis habet esse transiens ex uno in aliud, et incompletum; sicut et motus est actus imperfectus ab agente in patiens.

The added note here of transient action is central to strict instrumental causality.

Now in applying these concepts to cognition several points of analogy are of note. In cognition there are not distinct substances or supposita, but only the distinct potencies of the cognizing subject. The action or motion involved in cognition, or as it is being considered in the practical judgment, is strictly immanent to man. Even here some transient motion or influence of intellect over sense might be admitted. Viewing the problem of the chapter entitatively, therefore, it can be held that the intellect and cogitative sense, standing in relation to one another, as principle agent or cause and as quasi-

22 S.T., III, 62, 1 ad 2.

23 Ibid., 4 c.
instrument, efficiently produce the one effect of the singular judgment of the prudential syllogism. This one effect has an intentional mode of existence in the intellect, which can be attributed only to the power of the principal agent. It contains a determining grasp of the singular operable which is the proper work of the cogitative sense as instrumental cause.

While the problem of the chapter is answered in this way, it remains to substantiate this doctrine with a textual reference to a cross section of St. Thomas' works. It must be admitted at once that the precise terminology used above is not often found in St. Thomas, when he is speaking about the *vis cogitativa*. Rather St. Thomas explains the co-operation between sense and intellect in terms of continuation, motion, union, extension, reflection, mediation of the sense power, and application of universal reason to particular. Besides the texts dealing with the cogitative sense, corroboration may also be found in passages touching on the related motion of reason toward sense appetite.

In the *Commentary on the Sentences*, there occurs this text on the motion toward sense appetite rather than toward sense apprehension. The particular way of expressing this motion can also be applied to the *vis cogitativa*: "[I]n homine appetitus sensibilis movetur ex apprehensione imaginationis aut aestimationis immediate; sed mediate etiam ex apprehensione rationis,
in quantum ejus conceptio in imaginatione imprimitur."24 Thus sense powers are closer to the external object and move it more immediately. Reason still has its more remote motion by virtue of what it can produce in the imagination. In the practical order reason has its motion by reason of what it can produce in the cogitative sense.

The De Veritate provides the notions of mediation by the particular reason, application of the particular reason, and a mediating potency which apprehends the singular. In the same article, one finds that the intellect does not make disposition of singular objects, except through the mediation of the vis cogitativa, whose job it is to know such singular intentions.25 That the intellect makes singular propositions is possible only because it knows the singular indirectly by reflection. This is not clearly a reflection on the cogitative sense, but a generic sort of reflection, which could result either in a speculative judgment or in one that is practical.26 A further text from the same work repeats the idea of motion as proceeding from the remote mover intellect, and the proximate mover, the ratio particularis.27

24 In III Sent., 15, 2, 2, sol. 3 ad 3.
25 De Ver., 10, 5 c. and ad 2. Text quoted above pp. 111-112.
26 Ibid., ad 3.
27 De Ver., 2, 6 ad 2.
St. Thomas often proves free will in man by appealing to his freedom of judgment, especially in the order of acting on particulars. Here man is not restricted in his judgments as are the brutes. But, as St. Thomas says:

A conceptione universalis non sequitur motus et actio nisi mediate particulari apprehensione: eo quod motus et actio circa particularia est. . . . Oportet quod universalis intellectus conceptio applicetur ad particularia. Sed universale continet in potentia multa particularia. Potest igitur applicatio conceptionis intellectualis fieri ad plura et diversa. Judicium igitur intellectus de agibilibus non est determinatum ad unum tantum. Habent igitur omnia intellectualia liberum arbitrium.28

St. Thomas does not actually refer the mediation of the particular apprehension to the cogitative sense, but from previous texts it is easily inferred. There is a new way here of looking at the application by universal intellect to particulars. The universal is said to contain them in potency. When this potency is actuated, however, and a judgment made, the indetermination is removed. Man will act upon this given singular. His intellect obtains this singular in its individuality and desirability, as was seen above, through the mediation of the via cogitativa.

The treatment of prudence in the Commentary on the Ethics lends force to the idea of instrumentality and mediation by the particular reason. Prudence is said to perfect the particular reason in its proper activity of judging about singular

In the operative syllogism according to which reason moves to action, there must be a singular minor and conclusion. The grasp of this singular term, or the search for it, is specifically attributed to the cogitative sense. Thus the singular minor and conclusion depend on the two causes, intellect and sense. The familiar notion that universal reason does not move without particular reason is repeated in this work, with a reference to a text of the De Anima. Part of this text is the already familiar example of the prudential syllogism. The concluding paragraph contains notions which are a clear statement of the instrumentality of particular reason:

Haece autem opinio singularis movet, sed non autem illa quae est universalis. Aut si utraque movet, illa quae est universalis, movet ut causa prima et quiescens, particularis vero ut causa proxima, et quodammodo motui applicata. Nam operationes et motus in particularibus sunt; unde oportet ad hoc quod motus sequatur, quod opinio universalis ad particularia applicetur.

The terminology of first cause and proximate cause as applied to the motion, can easily bear the interpretation of principle and instrumental cause. There is simply no motion to operation without the instrumental mediation of the particular reason.

29 In VI Eth., 7, n. 1215.
30 Ibid., 9, nn. 1253-1255.
31 Ibid., 2, n. 1132.
32 In III De An., 16, n. 846.
Texts from the *Summa Theologicae* often occur in line with the analogy of motion to sense appetite. Thus in proving that sense appetite and intellectual appetite are diverse potencies, St. Thomas has this to say: "[O]pinio universalis non movet nisi mediate particulariter et similiter appetitus superior movet mediate inferiori. Et ideo non est alia vis motiva consequens intellectum et sensum."\(^{33}\)

Yet another way of looking at the problem of co-operation between intellect and sense is the consideration of how the virtues and habits are found on both levels of cognition. This is a consideration of how prudence is at once in the intellect and in the sense power. In this static view, the context is generally one of formal and material cause, but some of St. Thomas' statements throw light on the problem of this thesis. In explaining how one person can understand the same thing better than another, St. Thomas attributes this in part to better disposed inferior powers: "Alio modo contingit hoc ex parte inferiorum virtutum, quibus intellectus indiget ad sui operationem: illi enim in quibus virtus imaginativa et cogitativa et memoroativa est melius disposita, sunt melius dispositi ad inteligendum."\(^{34}\) In discussing whether acquired habits of science remain in the separated soul, St. Thomas affirms that these habits

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33 *S.T.*, I, 80, 2 ad 3.

34 *S.T.*, I, 85, 7 c.
are partly in the sensitive powers. Acts of the intellect by which science is acquired demand a conversion to the phantasm, and by a repetition of these acts a facility is built up in the intellect and a corresponding ability in the sense powers. But, says St. Thomas, "sicut actus intellectus principaliter quidem et formaliter est in ipsa intellectu, materialiter autem et dispositio in inferioribus viribus, idem etiam dicendum est de habitu." The term principaliter is especially applicable to the principle-instrumental relation between intellect and cogitative sense.

Many of the basic metaphysical doctrines of the Angelic Doctor come into play in the Prima Secundae, where he is explaining the voluntary act. Using the matter-form composition of man, he shows how the imperium and the actus imperatus are one; the notions are easily applicable to the problem: "in actibus humanis, actus inferioris potentiae materialiter se habet ad actum superioris, inquantum inferior potentia agit in virtute superioris moventis ipsam; sic enim et actus moventis primi formaliter se habet ad actum instrumenti." The reply to the first objection re-emphasizes the notion of powers related to one another to produce one act. "[S]i essent potentiae diversae ad invicem non ordinatae, actus eorum essent simpliciter diversi. Sed quando

35 S.T., I, 89, 5 c.
36 S.T., I-II, 17, 4 c.
una potentia est movens alteram, tune actus earum sunt quodammodo unus." 37 Certainly the way in which the act of two diverse potencies is one, is through their ordination to one another as principal and instrumental cause.

The mediation or instrumentality of the cogitative sense appears again in the context of sense appetite and desirability. This is to be expected, because the work of the cogitative sense is to present the suitability or unsuitability of a given singular. "[I]n homine non solum est ratio universalis, quae pertinet ad partem intellectivam; sed etiam ratio particularis, quae pertinet ad partem sensitivam. . . . Et secundum hoc, etiam concupiscientia quae est cum ratione, potest ad appetitum sensitivum pertinere." 38 In this same context, St. Thomas places habits of a kind in the sense powers, both in the appetitive and apprehensive. His reason for doing this is again that the sense powers obey reason and receive some motion from it:

[I]n ipsis interioribus viribus sensitivis apprehensivis possint poni aliqui habitus, secundum quos homo fit bene memorativus vel cogitativus, vel imaginativus; . . . quia etiam istae vires moventur ad operandum ex imperio rationis. 39

37 Ibid., ad 1.
38 S.T., I-II, 30, 3 ad 3.
39 S.T., I-II, 50, 3 ad 3.
A final text dealing with virtues in themselves will pave the way for the discussion of how prudence extends itself to singulants. St. Thomas enunciates a general principle in explaining how a virtue can be in several powers at once, and he does this in such a way that his words can be applied to the principal-instrumental explanation of the co-operation between intellect and sense:

Alio modo potest esse aliquid in duobus vel pluribus, non ex se quocum, sed ordine quodam. Et sic una virtus pertinere potest ad plures potentias; ita quod in una sit principali-ter, et se extendat ad alius per modum diffusionis, vel per modum dispositionis, secundum quod una potentia moveatur ab alia, et secundum quod una potentia accipit ab alia. 40

All the familiar expressions of instrumentality are here: ordina- tion, principal, extension, disposition, motion, and influence received from a higher power.

That prudent action requires knowledge of the singulants in which action terminates should be abundantly clear. The manner in which the intellectual virtue attains to singulants is again through the instrumentality of the cogitative sense. The intellect with its universal principles can apply them to singulants because "per quandam reflexionem se ad materiam extendit." 41 This reflection is simply the use by the intellect of the instrument of sense. For prudence does not consist of an external sense, but:

40 S.T., I-II, 56, 2 a.
41 S.T., II-II, 47, 3 ad 1.
in sensu-interiori, qui perfectur per memoriam et experim-
entum ad promtue iudicandum de particularibus expertis.
Non tamen ita quod prudentia sit in sensu interiori sicut in
subjecto principali; sed principaliter quidem est in ra-
tione, per quamam autem applicationem pertingit ad huius-
modi sensum.\footnote{Ibid., ad 3.}

The full activity of prudence demands that it use the internal
senses by way of instrumentality. Or, one may look upon prudence
as being formally in the intellect and materially or dispositive-
ly in the internal sense. It is noteworthy that St. Thomas in-
cludes memory and experience here. That the particular reason
belongs to the \textit{experimentum} has been demonstrated before.\footnote{Cf. above page 54.}
The virtue of prudence is, therefore, principally in the intellect
and instrumentally in the \textit{vis cogitativa}. This relationship is
especially verifiable in a conjoint operation of intellect and
sense. It is this conjoint operation which results in the ap-
plication of reason's universal propositions to the singular in-
stance as set forth in the minor proposition.

The conclusions arrived at in this chapter can now be
briefly stated. The problem of explaining how sense and intel-
lect combine in formulating the singular minor of the prudential
syllogism is resolved by the notion of principal-instrumental
causality applied analogously to this act of cognition. The
basis for this notion is found in St. Thomas in the essential
unity of man, who is a composite of matter and form. The composition in essence accounts for the diversity of potencies and operations proper to man. This diversity is yet not in opposition to the given unity of perception and apprehension. For diversity in the potencies of one form are resolved by the concept of order. The potencies of the soul, some residing in the soul alone as subject, and others in the composite as subject, are related to one another by the order of finality, by their common origin in the soul, and by the fact that they arise one from the other. Another order or hierarchy is found in the participation by the lower powers in the perfections of the higher powers. Finally, in the realm of act and operation, the diverse potencies are related to one another as matter and form, but more specifically as principal and instrumental cause. The latter relationship prevails especially when one views the cognoscitive powers of the soul as efficient causes of the various acts of the mind. It is in this way that two distinct potencies of man can cause one act of judgment. The singular minor proposition of the prudential syllogism is the act of a man using his intellect and the extraordinary sense power, variously termed by St. Thomas, the vis cogitativa and the ratio particularis.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The problem of this thesis was to discover, through a textual study of St. Thomas, his doctrine on the role of the vis cogitativa in the formation of the singular minor proposition of the prudential syllogism. The problem divided itself into three considerations. First, the nature of the prudential syllogism itself was studied. Careful precisions were made to indicate the one aspect of the virtue of prudence which was to be considered. Prudence was taken as an intellectual virtue. Special attention was paid to its integral parts concerned with the cognition of means to the end. This was in line with one part of prudential cognition, the reasoning process involved in its operation.

The textual study shows that this reasoning process is a practical syllogism involving generally two contrary major propositions offered by universal reason, and a singular minor proposition presented by particular reason. The singular operable, which is a necessary part of prudent action, stands as the subject of this singular minor proposition. Since this proposition is attributed in part to the particular reason or the cogitative sense, it was necessary to make a study of this internal sense.

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In Chapter II, after a brief study of the nature of the *vis cogitativa* in St. Thomas, a textual search indicated that this internal sense obtains the singular operable by an absolute estimation of it as the term of action. When several means to an end are concerned, the *vis cogitativa* as *ratio particularis* "reasons" about them, that is, collates and compares them. This sense evidence is then offered to the intellect to be used in the prudential reasoning process. The *vis cogitativa*, being man's analogue of brute instinct, presents singulars as individual good or bad actions or means. That is, it establishes a concrete relation of suitability or unsuitability between the operable and the knowing subject.

The *vis cogitativa*, then, is found to be a necessary part of prudential or practical reasoning. For the mind cannot apply its universal principles to singular instances, unless it reflects on the data of the *vis cogitativa*. In so doing the mind can formulate the singular minor proposition of the prudential syllogism. This reflection of intellect upon sense means that both powers co-operate to produce one act. Just how this is possible remained to be studied in Chapter III.

The problem was resolved by an appeal to the notion of principal-instrumental causality. According to this notion, the intellect as principal cause, and the *vis cogitativa* as instrumental cause produce one act. The background of this analogous
application to cognition was found to be St. Thomas' doctrines on
the unicity of man and on the composition in man's essence, with
the resulting diversity in potencies. The diversity is resolved
by the concept of order. This arises from the finality which
relates the various potencies to the end of cognition, from the
emanation of the potencies out of one soul, and from the partic-
ipation of one power in the perfection of a higher power. Finally,
in the order of dynamic operation, the potencies are related
to one another as principal and instrumental cause. When two
cognoscitive powers of man are viewed in the light of this re-
lationship, as efficient causes of one operation of the mind, the
problem of the thesis has been resolved. The role of the vis
cogitativa in the formation of the singular minor proposition of
the prudential syllogism is the role of an instrument. The sense
power presents the necessary knowledge of the singular operable
to the intellect. Using this determining knowledge in its re-
fection on the data of the vis cogitativa, the intellect, as
principal cause, then makes its singular judgment. The operation
is truly that of a rational animal, of a man using his spiritual
intellect and his corporeal sense power to achieve knowledge of
the world of individual goods and evils. Thereby the prudent
man directs his life in all its details. He puts the stamp of
right reason on all of his activities, rendering them of moment
for time and for eternity.
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APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis submitted by Joseph A. Muenzer, S.J. has been read and approved by three members of the Department.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

January 16, 1952

Signature of Adviser