1971

Problems in Athenian Democracy 510-480 B. C.
Exiles: A Case of Political Irrationality

Peter Karavites
Loyola University Chicago

Recommended Citation
http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/1192

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1971 Peter. Karavites
PROBLEMS IN ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY 510-480 B.C. EXILES

A Case of Political Irrationality

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty

of the

Department of History

of

Loyola University

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

Peter Karavites
This thesis is an attempt to evaluate the attitude of the Athenian demos during the formative years of the Cleisthenian democracy.

The dissertation tries to trace the events of the period from the expulsion of Hippias to the Battle of Salamis. Naturally no strict chronological sequence can be followed. The events are known to us only fragmentarily. Some additional archaeological information has trickled down to us in the last two decades which shed light on the existing historical data provided mainly by Herodotus and Aristotle. On other instances the argument ex silentio is employed to supplement the factual material.

The examination of the period demonstrates that there were two strong trends prevalent in the life of the Athenian Democracy: a moderate and an extremist. The success of the Cleisthenian reforms was mainly due to the moderate tone of his legislation. Cleisthenes, who knew the Athenians well, realised that he had to keep the political atmosphere "cool," if his reforms had any chance for success. This is the main reason he deliberately avoided to indulge in the application of ostracism against the relatives of the Pisistratids. When Cleisthenes passed out of the political scene, political fanaticism grew gradually and became the cause for the blunders which the Athenians committed. New men and new issues appeared around 500 B.C. which divided the voters deeply. In the midst of the critical situation the Athenians acted erratically. They failed to formulate any policies that could be characterised either as well-thought out or consistent. Once they had weathered the crisis of 490, they lapsed again to petty hatreds and personal animosi-
ties which further divided them, when greater unity was needed in the face of the grave danger which still threatened them from the East. They gave vent to their pettiness by employing the institution of ostracism for the elimination of their political opponents. Ostracism, which was invented by Cleisthenes for the protection of democracy, was now used by the majority as a political weapon against the leadership of the minority. As a result, political intolerance—so fateful to the Greeks—was increased, and instead of the friends of the tyrants, the friends and relatives of the inventor of ostracism were banished. If Greece was finally saved in 480, this was chiefly due to that maverick who bore part of the responsibility for the events of the previous decade, Themistocles. In the hour of Greece's extreme peril, he applied his supremely practical genius and his brilliant foresight for the salvation of Greece. The political vices which plagued the Athenians before Salamis continued to dog them throughout their lives. Needless to say that the same vices afflicted all the Greeks. Their self was their worst enemy. Had they subdued their self, the face of the Ancient Near East would have been different today.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ....................................... iii
INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 1

Chapter
I. FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS ....................................... 3
II. THE ARISTOCRAT AS A DEMOCRAT ............................. 18
III. DOVES AND HAWKS .......................................... 40
IV. THE IRREPRESSIBLE GENERATION ............................ 48
V. THE RASH OF OSTRACISMS ................................ 81
VI. THE BANDWAGON ............................................. 96

EPILOGUE .......................................................... 107
APPENDIX .......................................................... 111

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................... 115
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ath. Pol.</td>
<td>Athenaion Politeia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAWW</td>
<td>Anzeiger der Oesterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften im Wien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSA</td>
<td>Annual of the British School of Athens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJA</td>
<td>American Journal of Archaeology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJPh</td>
<td>American Journal of Philology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHR</td>
<td>American Historical Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAH</td>
<td>Cambridge Ancient History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJ</td>
<td>Classical Journal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CQ</td>
<td>Classical Quarterly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>Classical Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CW</td>
<td>Classical World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGHist</td>
<td>F. Jacoby, Die Fragment der Griechischen Historiker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GdA</td>
<td>Geschichte des Altertums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG</td>
<td>Griechische Geschichte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hdt</td>
<td>Herodotus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>Inscriptiones Graecae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHS</td>
<td>Journal of Hellenic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Il Mondo Classico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RE</td>
<td>Paulys Realencyclopaedie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFIC</td>
<td>Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzioni Classica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBAW</td>
<td>Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIG</td>
<td>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecorum (ed. Dittenburger), Leipsig, 3d ed., 1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuc.</td>
<td>Thucydides</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

It has been said that individuals who forgive themselves little mistakes often end up forgiving their big mistakes as well with deleterious effects. The same thing is true about nations. Among them the Greeks have overindulged in this practice with nefarious results on their own political existence. Western scholars, dazzled by the striking accomplishments of the Greeks, have often tended to forgive them their political excesses and to disregard Greek political foibles. They often approach Greek political history with an aura of awe. And yet the face of the whole Near East would have been different if the Greeks had mastered the art of self-rule. This paper is an effort to exemplify this facet of history and the inconsistency of Greek political behavior. The period 510-480 B.C. is important because it is the formative period in Athenian Democracy and because of the response of that Democracy to the dangers that threatened her from the outside. There is no intention here to rehash the old arguments about the Cleisthenian reforms. These have been thoroughly investigated by scholars and nothing definitive can be said unless new evidence appears—an unlikely thing. The only exception is the problem of ostracism. Since this question is indispensable to this work I had to examine it in detail. My purpose has been to add my own insights to the period for whatever they are worth. If I have relied to a great extent on historical conjecture, this is due to the fragmentary nature of the information. My only defense is that I am not the only sinner in this respect.
Inevitably a discussion on the period has to revolve primarily on Herodotus. He is indispensable, but not satisfactory. Herodotus makes reference to the domestic affairs of Athens during this period but only in passing. His main interest is the Persian Wars. One would wish that in the place of the numerous stories that he often narrates, he would have given us some pertinent information on the Athenian political scene. Thucydides has almost nothing to say about this period except by accident. Our richest source is Aristotle, or whoever wrote the Athenaion Politeia that goes under his name. But even this source telescopes the events of the period. Besides, it was written a century and a half later and had to be based on others whose reliability escapes us. Plutarch has a lot to say, but he too wrote later and his information must be used with caution. Other fragmentary evidence is available but that does not enable us to draw a definitive conclusion. Recently, archaeological evidence has been produced which is of great value for the historian of this period.

Even though additional footnotes would have given a more "scholarly" appearance to this paper, I have avoided excessive documentation. I footnoted only when absolutely necessary.

I wish to thank Dr. George Szemler for his valuable suggestions that consumed some of his invaluable time; the members of the committee, the Reverend Thomas Hogan and Dr. Hans Gross, who have examined this paper; and Mrs. Christine Karavites who patiently typed and retyped the several drafts of this dissertation.
CHAPTER I

FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS

In the latter part of the first half of the sixth century, B.C.\(^1\) the political divisions in Athens led to some kind of a coup which put an end briefly to the political bickering of the Athenian factions.\(^2\)

The story of Herodotus about Pisistratus' wounds and beating was cleverly exaggerated and exploited by Pisistratus for his political ends.\(^3\) It led to the abolition of the constitution. Thus it was the first time after the modern and compromising legislation of Solom that the political extremism of the Greeks

\(^1\)All dates mentioned heretofore refer to the Before Christ period unless otherwise indicated.

\(^2\)It seems that the coup of Pisistratus was symbolic in some respects of the future trend of Hellenic politics, ancient or modern. Whenever an impasse is reached because of the inability of the Greeks to bury temporarily, at least, their hatchets and proceed with the normal business of the state, a "savior" appears who, in the name of "order," "law," "national dignity," and the "national good," undertakes to suspend or abolish the existing constitution and rule the state in a personal manner. To this "rule" the exception had been the Spartans until their system too was undermined from internal and external developments and caved in after the Battle of Mantinea. Socrates and Plato, Thucydides, and others were not philo-Laconians. They simply admired the orderliness of the Spartan government and they violently disliked the weakness of their own government, a weakness which mainly arose from the fact that any "fool" could decide the affairs of the state without any prior knowledge and thought on the business of state on which he was casting his vote. As long as Pericles was to contain the crowd, the Athenian Democracy, without any strong checks and balances, somehow worked. But when the voice of Pericles was eclipsed, the evils of the system or rather the political weaknesses of the Greeks were made once again manifest.

resulted in an unconstitutional solution of their political affairs.

Pisistratus must have realized that there was no other way of implementing some of the program to which he was committed as the leader of the Poor Party, or of occupying the power to which he openly aspired.\(^1\) It is to his honor that once occupying the government he used power with moderation thereby establishing a precedent that was to be followed by almost all the revolutionary governments in Greece up to this day.

Once in control, Pisistratus proved to be a natural politician who understood power and knew how to use it. He operated from the beginning with a mixture of autocracy and measured democracy.

While Pisistratus' rule was not yet well rooted the erstwhile enemies of Pisistratus, themselves mutual enemies, were temporarily reconciled; they formed a coalition and succeeded in driving Pisistratus out of office.\(^2\) But "it takes only a short

---

\(^1\)Charles Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), p. 109. The author speaks about the three parties of the period. His explanation is at its best conjectural. He makes the Hyperakrioi split away from the Paralioi. The Paralioi were contented with Solon's reforms whereas the Hyperakrioi demanded further Agrarian reforms. Hignett prefers the testimony of Herodotus (Hdt I, 59,3) over that of Plutarch (Plutarch, Solon 13, 1-2) who makes all these parties contemporaries. Other names for the Hyperakrioi are Diakrioi (Ath. Pol. 13,4) and Epakrioi (Plutarch, Moralia 763D).

\(^2\)Hdt I, 59,6; Thuc. VI, 54,6; Ath. Pol. 14,1-2. Examples of the above statements are the government of Four Hundred, Demetrius Phalereus, even the present government of Greece. A notable exception is the government of the thirties after the Peloponnesian War. The fact that they did not stay long in power
time to break up the intimacies of the base."\(^1\) This political symbiosis could not last long, and the two were soon at odds.\(^2\) Perhaps the overbearing Alcmeonids did not find their partner as tractable as they wanted, and out of spite they upset the former alliance of necessity only to form a similar one with the man they had worked to expel. The political "reconciliation" is sealed with what they probably believed to be firmer bonds of union. A marriage was arranged between Pisistratus and Megacles' daughter.\(^3\) The marriage was a marriage of convenience, and Pisistratus, who probably did not trust the Alcmeonids anyway, failed to consummate the "double marriage."\(^4\) Once again the Alcmeonids are estranged, and Pisistratus is forced to take to flight because he lacked the strong basis that was needed and without which he could not easily defy the strength of the Alcmeonids. He is forced to flee for the second time. His second exile forces him to reconsider his position vis-à-vis the politi-

\(^1\) Hdt I, 61,1; Ath. Pol. 14,3. Athenian politics between 510-480 have been the object of many studies conducted by scholars on both sides of the Atlantic. For a guide to earlier bibliography see C. A. Robinson, Jr., "Athenian Politics 510-486," \underline{American Journal of Philology}, LXVI (1945), 243-254.

\(^2\) Hdt I, 60,1 2; Ath. Pol. 14,4.

\(^3\) Hdt I, 61,1; Ath. Pol. 14,4.

\(^4\) Hdt I, 61,1; Ath. Pol. 15,1.
cal realities in Athens. It was clear to him that he ought to broaden his basis, if he were to have any hopes of return. He therefore made alliances outside of Athens and acquired the economic independence that he needed to operate freely.\(^1\) With a band of mercenaries dependent on Pisistratus' pay he landed at Marathon and made his way to Athens with great ease.\(^2\) It was a "Bay of Pigs" operation in reverse. The people in Athens were tired of the political acrobatics of the Alcmeonids and the resultant instability and disorder. They were now ready to welcome a change, and Pisistratus, who was probably well apprized of the political sentiment prevailing in Athens at that time, satisfied the craving. Herodotus sarcastically states: "and while encamped there they were joined by their partisans from the city, and by others who flocked to them from the country demes--men who loved the rule of one more than freedom."\(^3\) Herodotus' sarcasm is only partly justifiable. In a "fine" manner he derides the Athenians because they willingly exchanged their freedom for tyranny --"men who loved the rule of one more than freedom." He fails, however, to note that the worst enemy of freedom and democracy is political instability and disorder.\(^4\) All the Athenians were

1\(^{\text{Hdt I, 61,4; Ath. Pol. 15, 2-3.}}\)
2\(^{\text{Hdt I, 62,1; Ath. Pol. 15, 4-5.}}\)
3\(^{\text{Hdt I, 62,1.}}\)
responsible for this chaotic situation that eventuated into tyranny and more so those who in their capacity as leaders bore on their shoulders the greater weight of responsibility for the preservation of the public trust. In this context, then, his friends, the Alcmeonids, were directly responsible for the tyranny because they had persistently cultivate a climate of political uncertainty.

Pisistratus was responsible for violating the Solonian constitution twice before.\(^1\) Solon's constitution made provisions for the punishment of those who conspired for the overthrow of the state through some kind of impeachment.\(^2\) But then the others, and especially the Alcmeonids, were equally responsible for the violation of the constitution not only as being guilty by association, but because they were directly responsible for the anomalous situation which produced the violent solutions. The people themselves were guilty also because they did not care to argue about "fine" constitutional points as long as their whims were satisfied. Right now, they were simply tired of the political hegemony of the erratic Alcmeonids and welcomed the change, even if it means a violation of the constitution, a violation which they probably did not see or care to regard. It was a clear case of accepting an antidote which led to the opposite extreme, the extreme of violating the legally established order. The solution is so character-

\(^1\)Aristotle, *Politics*, 1315b.5.

\(^2\)Ath. Pol. 8,4. Aristotle does not spell out the exact provisions for the punishment of the offenders. He says that Solon assigned to the Council of Areopagus the duty of superintending the laws, acting as before as the guardian of the constitution in general.
istic of the politically impatient and moody Greeks!

Here one should stop for a minute and pose the question: What was the nature of the Athenian parties? What was the relationship between the members of those parties and their leaders? The pattern does not necessarily conform entirely to anything to which we are accustomed. It exhibits a peculiarity which is, however, consonant with the Greek character, an inconsistency which is consistent with the Greek nature. Party differences and principles are blurred and political behavior typically atypical. Did, for instance, Lycourgus and Megacles agree in principle on the policy affecting their followers when they decided to remove Pisistratus from office? We do not have details of their dealings, and perhaps one could argue that they might have disagreed on policy, but they both agreed in principle against tyranny. But then what of the covenant made by Pisistratus and Megacles which resulted in the return of Pisistratus to power? Again one could argue that Lycourgus and Megacles disagreed on policy, and therefore the return of Pisistratus would be expedient to the followers of Megacles who, after all, stood to suffer from the monopoly of power and privileges exercised by the members of the party led by Lycourgus. But surely the behavior of Megacles which resulted in the second expulsion of Pisistratus stemmed from personal motives\(^1\) to which the followers of Megacles' party were not privy. It is evident then that the Greek "parties" of this period were factions led by noble families resembling

\(^{1}\text{Ath. Pol. 14, 3-4.}\)
somewhat the political factions in the southern states of the United States. The relationship between the leaders and the group members is at the least confusing. These leaders acted on occasions without regard for the wishes of their members. If a party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavor the national interest upon some particular principle on which they all agreed, it is very difficult to see on what principles the parties of Megacles and Lycourgus and Pisistratus agreed except likes and dislikes of one another, sometimes superficial and other times permanent. One could argue in this case that no particular principle serves to bind Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts and James Eastland of Mississippi or on the other side Senator J. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and Edmund Brooke of Massachusetts. Clearly principles vary from one member to another within both parties, and all the members of both parties are united in their desire to win control of the government. They all identify themselves with the party by having a choice within it. But then how much choice did the followers of Megacles have in the dealings of their leader?

If political parties serve to moderate the differences among opposing groups, to stabilize political allegiance and to bring order out of chaos from the multitude of voters, the parties of Lycourgus, Megacles, and Pisistratus did nothing of the sort. They lacked consistency of behavior because of their personal and limited character. Therefore, the consistency in their political manifestations was the irrational manner with which they persist-
ently acted. The divisions among the Athenians mentioned by both Aristotle and Herodotus\(^1\) for the period prior to 510 are politically obscure. There were no hard lines drawn among them and the attitude of their leaders as well as the family descent of the party leaders illustrate this. Herodotus himself alludes very subtly to this in the case of Pisistratus, "in the course of time there was a feud between the Athenians of the coast under Megacles, son of Alcmeon, and the Athenians of the plain under Lycurgus, son of Aristolaides. Pisistratus then, having an eye to the sovereign power, raised up a third faction. He collected partisans and pretended to champion the hillmen."\(^2\) The implication here is that Pisistratus was not necessarily a sincere partisan of his party. His leadership of the Hill party was an historical accident due to the fact that others were already in command of the other parties. Herodotus is biased in favor of the Alcmeonids, but his statement cannot be lightly dismissed on this account. I think it contains a glimpse of the truth and gives us an inkling into the workings of Greek politics. Perhaps the same is true about the position of the Alcmeonids. Their leadership of the paralioi (party of the coast), whoever they were, was motivated neither by economic interests nor by ideology. Herodotus does not tell us how and why Megacles became leader of the paralioi,


\(^2\)Hdt I, 59,3. ...ὅς στασιαζόντων τῶν παράλων καὶ τῶν εἴ την ημερῶν ἄνθρωπων, καὶ τῶν μέλει προεστώτων Μεγαλέος τοῦ Αλκμέωνος, τῶν δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πεδίου Δυνοῦργου (τοῦ) Ἀριστοτολάτης, καταφρονόντος τὴν εὐράνωθα ἑκείρη τρίτην στάσιν, συλλέγοντος δὲ στασιών καὶ τῶν λόγω τῶν ὑπερακρίων προστάσεως μηχανάται τοιόσο.
if ματαφρονήσας τὴν ἀρχήν ¹ as Pisistratus did, or for a more lofty purpose, a desire to serve the public. It too may have been an historical mutation only because the leadership of the nobles was preempted or because of a personal antagonism toward the dominant personalities of the party of the nobles. Anyway, it seems from Herodotus' vantage that the interests of the leaders did not coincide with the interest of the party. The leaders were members of the nobility. They looked upon their followers as the political instrument that would have enabled them to fulfill their personal and political desires, whereas the followers hoped for more concrete political benefits. Yet there was no unanimity about the nature of these benefits.

Pisistratus' return signaled the flight of the Alcmeonids² who in their exile worked for the overthrow of Pisistratus and acquired the title of misotyrannoi.³ The title was so far inappropriate for the collaborators of the tyrant, especially since their present activities had personal motives rather than concern with constitutional orthodoxy. For the rest, the people were contented with the mild rule of Pisistratus,⁴ and if the people are the source of all sovereignty and legitimacy, the constitutional legality or not of Pisistratus' rule at this point is of very little

¹Hdt I, 59,3.  
²Hdt I, 64,3.  
theoretical value. But even from the practical standpoint the
discussion would be of little value, and the first to have recog-
nized the futility of their opposition were the Alcmeonids.

Pisistratus died a peaceful death in 527.\(^1\) His memory
was consecrated in the mind of the people. Modern historians,
overzealous as they often are for constitutional niceties, have
also accepted the rule of Pisistratus as a period of positive re-
turns. Historians chose to overlook their scruples about consti-
tutionalities.

About twenty years after Pisistratus' third rule the
sting was taken out of all opposition and all parties in Athens
usher in the new period of the rule of Pisistratus' sons with a
general reconciliation. An inscription dated from this time and
found in Athens mentions Hippias as Archon in 526/5, Cleisthenes
in 525/4, Miltiades in 524/3.\(^2\) We do not know of any other
Cleisthenes associated with Athenian politics at this time, and
the name itself is not Athenian, hence rare. Archon Cleisthenes
therefore must be the son of Megacles, the Alcmeonid from Alopeke,
who later carried on the reforms of the Athenian state (508/7).\(^3\)
The same course is true about Miltiades, the Philaid. This, if
true, and I accept it as true, destroys the old assumption that

\(^1\)Ath. Pol. 17, 1.

\(^2\)Thuc. I, 20, 2 and VI, 54, 2. B. D. Meritt, "Greek In-
scriptions, an Early Archon List," Hesperia, VIII (1939), 61-62.

\(^3\)The exact dates are points of dispute. They are shifted
one year down or up. I am not interested in the exact dates here
because they have no important bearing on the views expressed.
the Alcmeonids and the other political opponents of the Pisistratids were in exile till the expulsion of Hippias.\(^1\) It points to a possible advice for reconciliation with the families of his opponents left by the mild-mannered Pisistratus to his young sons. This is not uncommon. People who have achieved their aim in life "by hook or by crook" become frequently sensitive about their image, or the lack of it, and they strive later to improve it. The desire is natural and not always hypocritical. Many of the economic tycoons of earlier days ended their lives as philanthropists. The Rockefellers, the Carnegies, the Vanderbilts, in the past century are good illustrations of this mentality. In our own day Onassis is said to have married into the "jetset" to elevate his social prestige.

Pisistratus, who had upset the established order, did his best to legitimize his position once he was in power. It should not seem therefore paradoxical if at his deathbed he enjoined his sons to make a fresh start by reconciling themselves with his former antagonists. Hippias was obviously willing to make this new start because we see him at the outset of his administration granting the highest office in the city to his family's opponents.

We do not know exactly what transpired in the period between 524 and 514 in Athens, except that the friendship between the two houses proved to be temporary.\(^2\) We find the Alcmeonids

\(^1\)Ibid.

\(^2\)The Alcmeonids probably fled the city again after the murder of Hipparchus, although this is not certain. If so, it means that they had become estranged again, unless Cleisthenes
busy against Hippias during the fiasco of Leipsydron,\(^1\) which means that they were out of Athens again some time between 524-514. Perhaps they were expelled because they were involved in the murder of Hipparchus.\(^2\)

When the attempt to dislodge Hippias failed at Leipsydron, the resourceful Alcmeonids turned to another source for support, Delphi.\(^3\) They intended to use the Delphic services and the Delphic connections with Sparta to pursue their goal. In 511 we find them at Delphi with Sparta as their ally attempting to drive Hippias out.\(^4\) The Spartans were not necessarily motivated by a dislike of the Hippias regime, because theirs was not a democracy after all. They were probably moved by a desire to please the oracle; to ingratiate themselves with the Athenians; to break the Pisistratid ties with Argos, an immemorial enemy of the Spartans; to get out of their inactivity and stagnation; harkened to the advice of Cleomenes, their ambitious King who aspired to play a bigger role in the affairs of Greece.\(^5\) They finally came to the support of Cleisthenes. This was what Cleisthenes needed. The time seems to have been ripe for such an enterprise.

The Greeks were always a curious people. They loved to have a say in the public affairs of their city. After all this

---

referred to here is another unknown to us, not from the Alcmeonid family, which is a rather risky hypothesis.

\(^1\)Hdt V, 62,2.\(^2\)Meritt, op. cit., pp. 61-62.
\(^3\)Hdt V, 62,2-3.
\(^5\)Hdt V, 64,2.
is the sort of relationship that the idea of a city-state as exemplified by Athens represented. But the over-preoccupation and meddling in all the details and in all facets and at every step in the conduct of public affairs was recognized to be a deleterious habit by Pisistratus.¹ He tried to channel off their energies from public affairs to more profitable activities because he desired a free hand in the administration of the city. Disgusted as the Athenians were with the antics of the parties, Pisistratus' policy paid dividends. But by 510 conditions internally had changed and so had the political mood of the people. A new generation had grown up since the times of Pisistratus. The elderly probably did not find sons measuring up to their father.² Time had elevated the personality of Pisistratus in the minds of the Athenians to heights not easily attainable by the living. Compared with their father, the sons were found lacking in political stature. The younger Athenians, as it always happens with younger people, were not to be easily satisfied with the status quo which had imposed upon them the sons of their father. Nor did they like things as they were. The sons were not as tactful as their father. Aristotle makes Thessalus, the third son of Pisistratus,³ a headstrong and violent man responsible for the ills of the Pisistratids. Thucydides makes Hipparchus responsible for them.⁴ Which-

¹Ath. Pol. 16,3.
²Victor Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1968), p. 84, claims that Hippias was a lesser man than his father.
³Ath. Pol. 18,2.
⁴Thuc. VI, 54,2-4 and 56,1-3.
ever was the case, some ground for complaint existed. This situation gave rise to a plot whose motive might have been primarily personal. The plot ended in the murder of Hipparchus. Thucydides says that the conspirators were few. Aristotle, who had in mind Thucydides, says that they were many, probably taking into consideration the moral support and approbation that the murderers tacitly received by the underground dissatisfaction that existed. The murder of Hipparchus must have numbed the people's sentiments for a while, because when Cleisthenes invaded Attica in 513 with a small force he received no wide popular support.

The murder of Hipparchus however is important for its long range effects. It was bound to exacerbate affairs. The psychological pressure applied on Hippias was great. He became suspicious and apprehensive and retorted with more violence. The exiles among the higher classes must have multiplied, and it was with the help of these exiles that Cleisthenes managed to unseat

1 Thuc. VI, 56,3.

2 Ath. Pol. 18,4. I think that the numbers seen here by Aristotle have to do with the fact that Harmodius and Aristogeiton had in his time become martyrs. This is not unlike Lincoln's fate who was little respected when he lived but sanctified after his death. The glorification of the tyrannicides has very little bearing on the political realities of their time.

3 Thuc. VI, 59,2-3. τοις δ' Ἀθηναίοις καλεποτέρα μετά τούτο η τυραννίς κατέστη καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας διὰ φόβον ἡν μᾶλλον ὄν τῶν τέ πολιτῶν πολλοὺς ἐκτείνε ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἔξω κακὰ διέσκεψετο, εἰ πάθεν δισφάλειαν τινὰ ἰρήνης μεταβολῆς γενομένης ὑπάρχουσαν οί. Ἦπισθαλον γοῦν τοῖς Δαμφακηνοῦ τυράννου ἰδεντὶ τῷ καὶ ὁ θυγατέρα ἑαυτοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα, Ἀρχεδικην, Ἀθηναίοις γὰρ Δαμφα-κηνίς ἐδωκέν, αἰσθανόμενος αὐτοὺς μέγα παρά βασίλει ἀρατεί ὅνασθαι.
Hipparchus in 510. The combination therefore of internal pressures and the external aid achieved for Cleisthenes what he aimed at, the expulsion of his personal opponent. But it failed to bring him the political power that he expected. The nobles did not explicitly trust his family, and the people had no reason to support him.\(^1\) After all, he too was an aristocrat assisted by and vying for aristocratic support.\(^2\)

\(^1\)The ancient sources agree that the tyrants were not that bad. The story of the idolization of Harmodius and Aristogeiton given by Herodotus (V, 66) is a later invention. Even Herodotus admits that the power of Athens during the administration of the Pisistratids was great (V, 66). See also Aristotle, *Politics*, 1311a,15.

CHAPTER II

THE ARISTOCRAT AS A DEMOCRAT

The Alcmeonids did not immediately attain their goal, the leadership of Athens. It seems that the Aristocrats, who had their grudges against the Alcmeonid family, did not for once go to the opposite extreme of exchanging Hippias for the mischievous Alcmeonids. They groomed Isagoras for the supreme office. Their choice was unfortunate for the party but fortunate for the state. The nobles could have forgotten their grievances against Cleisthenes' family if they really wanted to strike a balance. But they were in no mood for compromise. They elected Isagoras Archon in 508/7. He understood the position as leader of a monolithic faction—but not the subtleties of politics and his position as a state leader. He proceeded to fulfill the demands of his constituents. He revised the citizens rolls, thus striking directly

---

1 Robinson, op. cit., pp. 243-254.
3 Isagoras was one of the nobles that assisted in the expulsion of Hippias. He quarrelled with Cleisthenes after the expulsion and was elected with the help of the other nobles. The interval helped Cleisthenes in two ways. It provided time for thought during which his program matured, and it detached him from the deleterious association of his former allies, the nobles. Ehrenberg, op. cit., p. 86.
at the former paralioi, supporters of the Alcmeonids in previous years and along with the poorer classes the bulk of Pisistratian supporters later.¹

Isagoras' measures succeeded in preparing the ground for Cleisthenes' rule. The extremism of his partisans and his measures drove the people in opposition,² and Cleisthenes who had time to observe was the man to profit from the intervening period of authority enjoyed by the nobles. His motives were personal. He had spearheaded the expulsion of Hippias from purely antagonistic aims, but he had not developed an inflexible political program. He had formulated no rigid political philosophy. He steps in now to exploit the political disenchantment, by placing himself at the head of the people (προστάτης τοῦ δῆμου), the former supporters of Pisistratus. Isagoras was expelled from office the following year, and Cleisthenes took over the government of the city. Thus in a haphazard manner Cleisthenes achieved what the Spartan aid and the support of Delphi were not able to secure for him.³ The Athenians had stamped the reign of Pisistratus with their seal of approval by expelling Megacles from power forty years before. Now they installed into power the son of the

within the Phratry certain "better" families discriminate against others and Cleisthenes tried to abolish this discrimination by juxtaposing the demes next to the Phratries.

³Ath. Pol. 19,2 and 5. Hdt V, 62,2 and 3; 63,1 and 2.
exile. A full swing of the pendulum had been completed, both for the Alcmeonid family and the people!

Isagoras bears his share of the responsibility for his fall because, while in power, he played blindly the game of the people who elected him. He could have needled them a little, that is, he could have tried to broaden the political support by containing the extremism of the nobles. He could have attempted to revise downward the number of families to be stricken from the rolls. We have no indication that he did any of these. He could not please all but at least he should have tried to alienate as few as possible. The lessons of history should have been very fresh in his mind. Hippias' policy after the murder of Hipparchus had resulted in the flight of many individuals from Athens. These joined the ranks of the conspirators and finally proved to be Hippias' undoing. It was a potent argument. A better politician than Isagoras could have used this argument as a weapon to caution his followers. He ignored it, proving once more that people forget easily the lessons of the past. Isagoras and his friends by their foolish behavior in striking seven hundred families from the rolls of citizens added fuel to the fire that spread and devoured them.¹

¹Hdt V, 69,2; 70,1; 72,1 and 2. Ath. Pol. 20. For bibliography on this highly debated period of the Cleisthenian Reforms see Hermann Bengston, Griechische Geschichte ("Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft," 4 aufl.; München: C. H. Beck, 1969), pp. 128-145 and 151-166. Bengston says that the reforms of Cleisthenes were a necessity. If this is true—and it seems from their durability to be true—then it is to the credit of Cleisthenes that he finally saw their need, whereas Isagoras and his friends refused to recognize the hard facts of their times.
It is unnecessary to belabor the Cleisthenian reforms. A great deal has been written on the subject and every reform attributed to him has been questioned at one time or another. What is important to note at this point is that Cleisthenes followed in the footsteps of Solon. His legislation was the logical extension of the legislation of Solon implemented almost a hundred years earlier; it is also written in the same vein of compromise and mildness as Solon's. During the hundred years after the Solonian Constitution a great deal had occurred that made a general overhaul of that constitution imperative. Cleisthenes democratized the regime in the spirit of moderation practiced by Solon. Solon had given the demos more powers but not all they wanted. On the other hand, he cautioned those in power to respect the rights of the people.\(^1\) It seems that the claims of each of the parties were extravagant and impracticable. If Solon were to seek to please either one of them, the city would have found itself in a worse predicament than he had found it.\(^2\) Isagoras failed exactly because he had failed to follow the middle course. His program left

\(^1\) Plutarch, Lives, XVIII, 4.

Δήμω γάρ ἐδωκα τόσον κράτος, ὅσον ἀπαρνεῖ, τιμῆς οἵ τις ἀφελών, οὔτ ἐπορεύσαμεν οὔτ οἷο εἰκόν δύναμιν καὶ χρήματιν ἦσαν ἀγητοί, καὶ τοῖο ἐφρασάμην μηδέν ἀεικὴ ἔχειν ἔστην ἀμψιραλων κρατέρος σάμος ἀμφιτεροῦσιν νικᾶν δ' ὁδὸν ἐλασ' ὀφθετέρους ἀδικώς.

\(^2\) Athen. Pol. 12.

--- εἶ γὰρ ἡθελον ὧ τοῖς ἐναντίοισιν ἤνδανε τότε, ἀδῆς δ' α' τοῦτον διέροις, δρᾶσαι . . . πολλῶν ἄν ἄνδρῶν ὡς ἐχιρώθη πόλις.
no room for compromise. Cleisthenes, like Solon, a practical man, devised an instrument on the basis of which some compromise could be worked out, if only the rival factions showed a trace of good will. Therein lay his weapon of success. It proved therefore more durable than Solon's and extremely modern. The unfortunate interval of Isagoras' archonship proved for Cleisthenes and the state a blessing in disguise. It made Cleisthenes more cautious. It gave him the time to watch and learn from other people's mistakes.

His first and most important step was to break down the old tribal divisions, and from the ashes of the old to create new ones. He did not do away with the tribes since they were something that the people were accustomed to for centuries. But he made them now serve the needs of the times. He established new tribal divisions, not corresponding to the old ones. His purpose was dual: to dilute the hypertrophied loyalty to the old tribes, and to enfranchise a number of new citizens, mostly resident aliens. There would have been endless problems in introducing these new citizens into the old tribes which were organized into clans and families on the old aristocratic basis. Now they were easily included in the new tribes which had no such associations connected with them.

---


2 For bibliography and comments on this subject see Donald Kagan, "The Enfranchisement of Aliens by Cleisthenes," Historia, XII (1963), 41-46. Aristotle, Politics, 1275b.36.

3 For a brief discussion on the significance of this re-
If the reforms did not please everyone, they failed at least to arouse strong animosities to the point that the opposition would react violently against Cleisthenes. Their future was thus secured. The four tribes became ten. Membership in the phratries was, however, retained for social reasons.¹ Cleisthenes made the role of the council probuleutic and gave it control of the Agenda, thereby providing another check against abuses by the demos. In so doing he still retained many of the privileges of the Areopagus, to which he belonged, providing an additional check against precipitous change. As a result these measures eliminated the would be and explainable opposition of the aristocrats. The aristocrats could still enjoy their social and political preeminence within the phratries.

Cleisthenes broke with the old principle that made attendance in the assembly dependent on the ownership of land.² It was a democratic measure fulfilling the demands of the expanding merchant class so vital to the development of Athens. Those who now wanted to venture out in commercial enterprise did not have to own land. Finally, the newly enfranchized citizens, descend-

¹Hignett, op. cit., p. 145. Aischines, περὶ τῆς παραπρεσβείας, ibid., p. 147.
²Ibid., p. 134. At least as much could be surmised from Ath. Pol. 21,6 and from the fact that metics could not own land.
ants of the old metics or perhaps metics themselves did not necessarily own land. Prior to Cleisthenes they were excluded from voting in the assembly. But in actuality the new change was not so radical as it might appear at first hand. Aristotle says that the government of a Greek city was usually conditioned by the character of its principal military force, and the main strength if Athens still lay in its hoplites. The democracy of Cleisthenes still rested with the body of Athenian hoplites. Most of these lived in the countryside of Attica. Their preponderance in the assembly was still safeguarded and that made the acceptance of the Cleisthenian reform easier. That the legislation of Cleisthenes found satisfactory acceptance among these hoplites is to be inferred by the fact that when later Isagoras tried to remove Cleisthenes from office with the aid of Cleomenes, Isagoras was thwarted by the adverse reaction of the people led by the council. Such widespread acceptance had Cleisthenes already found.

Among the laws of Cleisthenes was the law concerning ostracism. Plutarch explains ostracism in these terms, "The

1Aristotle, Politics, 1321a,5-14.

2For details on the incident see Hdt V, 70-73. What is meant by council is not clear. See Hignett, op. cit., p. 128.

3There is no unanimity on this as is true of practically all of Cleisthenes' legislation. Hignet believes that ostracism
method of procedures—to give a general outline—was as follows.

is not Cleisthenic in origin. His basis for his argument is that the Atthidographers do not agree on that. For a discussion of the sources and the confusion arising from them see Hignett, op. cit., pp. 159-173. He agrees that at its best a conclusion must be conjectured. Beloch also thinks that the law must have been a later invention because, if it existed, it would have been used earlier than the 480's, a not too safe conclusion. Beloch, op. cit., p. 332. Aristotle who attributes the law to Cleisthenes is very confused on the chronology especially connected with the oath of the council (Ath. Pol. 22). If correct the event would have taken place in 504 B.C. (Ath. Pol. 22). But that year belongs to another Archon and not to Hermocreon whom he mentions. Secondly, it is inconsistent with his statement below that the Battle of Marathon occurred eleven years later (Ath. Pol. 22). Francis R. B. Godolphin (ed.), Greek Historians (New York: Random House, 1942), II, 694, ftn. 31. Marathon took place in 490 therefore the Archonship of Hermocreon should be assigned to 501 B.C. for which no name occurs in the extant lists of Archons. Donald Kagan, "The Origin and Purposes of Ostracism," Hesperia, XXX (1961), 391-401, finds it surprising that the originator of ostracism would be doubted, though he has been mentioned by four ancient authors as being Cleisthenes (Ath. Pol. 1-4; Aelian, Hist. Var., XIII, 24; Philochorus, FGrHist, ed. Felix Jacoby (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1950-1958), fr. 30; Ephorus in Diodorus, XI, 55). He accepts the expression to mean at that time and not that year (the year 488). He concludes that from Androtion's perspective, who wrote 150 years later to a may as well be 20 years. A. E. Raubitschek, in his "The Origin of Ostracism," American Journal of Archaeology, LV (1951), 221-229, has proposed that the law of ostracism was passed by Cleisthenes later than his other legislation when Cleisthenes came temporarily out of retirement. C. A. Robinson, Jr., "Cleisthenes and Ostracism," AJA, LVI (1952), 23-26, rejects Raubitschek's view. Kagan mentions at least two other traditions attributing ostracism to Hippias and Theseus. The first reference he finds in Herakleides of Pontos (Fr. 6-7 in C. and T. Müller (eds.), Fragmenta Historicorum Graecarum (Paris, 1841-70), II, 208, discussed by J. Carcopino, L'Ostracisme Athenien (2d ed.; Paris: F. Alcan, 1935), pp. 7-10. (See Kagan, "The Origin and Purposes of Ostracism," op. cit., p. 398. Ibid., ftn. 17.) Ἀλλος δὲ ἐστὶν Ἰππαρχὸς ὁ λαρμός, ὡς φησὶ Αὐκοῦργος ἐν τῷ Κατά Δεσμοράτους περὶ δὲ τούτῳ Ἀνδροτίων ἐν τῇ μνήμην ότι οὐγγενῆς μὲν ἢν ἤπειροτήτων τοῦ τυράννου καὶ πρῶτος ἔξωστρακασθή, τοῦ περὶ τὸν ὁστρακισμὸν νόμου τότε πρῶτον τεθέντος διὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν τῶν περὶ ἔπειρασμότων ὤτι γὰς ἐτυράννεσεν.

(FGrHist, 324,16). This view was accepted by Aristotle who followed Androtion (Kagan, "The Origin and Purposes of Ostracism," op. cit., p. 395). Also K. J. Dover, "Androtion on Ostracism,"
Each voter took an ostrakon or potsherd, wrote on it the name of that citizen whom he wished to remove from the city.\(^1\) J. Carcopino has proposed an attractive solution to the problem of ostracism. He sees in it a modification of the severity of earlier legislation, which prescribed that if anyone tried to make himself tyrant or helped another to do so, "he and his descendant will be atimoi."\(^2\) "\(\text{ΑTürkiye}\)" in the sixth century meant that he could be killed with impunity.\(^3\)

There might have been talk of eliminating some of the surviving relatives of Hippias. Reform is a sleeping monster and so are people in areas where emotions predominate. In this climate people are quick to be aroused and easy to forget, especially when they believe they have a righteous cause to be aroused or a good excuse to forget. Not only did Cleisthenes seem to have satisfied many of their grievances, but Hippias himself had run off to the Hellespont where he worked for his return to Athens with the military aid of the Persian court. The net result of this would be either to make Athens a satellite of the Persian

---


\(^2\)Carcopino, op. cit., p. 28. Ulrich Kahrstedt, Staatsgebiet und Staatsangehörige in Athen: Studien zum Öffentlichen Recht Athens (Stuttgart and Berlin: W. Kohlhammer, 1934), I, 118-119.

\(^3\)It is interesting to note that no one was ever killed under this law.
empire or subordinate Athens completely to Persia. This was therefore enough to make the Athenians indignant and forgetful of the former services of the Pisistratids. In this atmosphere, it is understandable that a resolution in the ecclesia against the surviving members of this family might have been proposed, or if proposed had a good chance of being voted upon. Yet I would like to suggest here that such a motion was not made. Cleisthenes, once in power, had nothing to gain by such an extremist attitude. On the contrary, he stood a lot to lose. Aristotle says that the law of ostracism was enacted by Cleisthenes with a specific person in mind, Hippar-chus, the son of Charmus, a nephew of Hippias. Yet Hippar-chus, despite the intentions of Cleisthenes, was not exiled until 487, almost twenty years after the law on ostracism was enacted. If, as Aristotle says, the law was passed to ostracize Hippias, it seems strange that the people would pass Cleisthenes' law, but then they would turn around and deny Cleisthenes the validity of his law by not allowing him to ostracise Hippar-chus. The enactment of the law indicates that Cleisthenes was still at the height of his popularity. Had he wished, he could have easily accomplished his goal to ostracize Hippar-chus. Nevertheless, there is another way out. The other alternative would be that between the time the law on ostracism was passed and the specific proposal for the banishment of Hippar-chus was made the popu-

---

1Hdt V, 66,3; 91,1 and 2; 94,1-2; 96. McGregor, op. cit., p. 73, ftn. 6, gives details of Hippias' movements during his exile.

larity of Cleisthenes had waned, and the proposal had lost steam while the law of ostracism remained. This might be denoted by the following statement of Aristotle\textsuperscript{1} that the Athenians, with the usual leniency of the democracy,\textsuperscript{2} allowed all the partisans of the tyrants who had not joined in their evil deed in the time of the troubles to remain in the city, a curious statement in itself not because Aristotle himself almost fell victim to this type of "leniency" but also because it is not congruent with the realities. The truth is that the Athenian demos was not lenient to its political leaders.\textsuperscript{3} The secret must lie therefore in something else. I propose that the truth lies in Cleisthenes' other considerations. I also believe that Cleisthenes might not have taken the success of his law on ostracism very seriously. Finally, I suggest that ostracism produced the irony of strengthening the tendency toward tyranny rather than lessening its danger. I will try to be more specific. Cleisthenes himself a moderate man and a victim of expulsion along with his family did not wish to condemn an innocent man to exile. For that reason, even though he steered the law through the assembly, he refused to implement it in the case of Hipparchus. He left it there as a Damoclean sword hanging over the head of the would-be-tyrants --or so at least he might have thought.\textsuperscript{4} Thus the old νόμος ἵππος

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{1}Ath. Pol. 22. \textsuperscript{2}Ath. Pol. 22, 4. Italics mine.
\textsuperscript{3}This is an axiom that needs no examples. The people discussed in this paper are only a small example of the fate of Greek political leaders.
\textsuperscript{4}George W. Botsford, "The Development of the Athenian Constitution," Cornell Studies of Classical Philology (New York: Ginn
(law against the whole family) which resembles the Ancient Near Eastern custom of the whole family's association in the crime of one of its members was replaced by a more civilized and humane law \( \psi \nu \delta \omicron \upsilon \omega \mu \alpha \tau \alpha \varepsilon ' \delta \nu \omicron \rho \iota \omicron \) (a bill against a man).\(^1\)

There is also another reason why ostracism would not be as effective a preventive measure as it looked on paper. The person who aspired to offset the constitution would certainly act in a conspiratorial manner. If his coup succeeded, he would not have to worry because he was the supreme law of the land. But if he failed, he very well knew that his actions would have provoked the wrath of his fellow-citizens, and his flight was a natural concomitant. Ostracism was thus superfluous in this occasion.

Outside of the above reason Cleisthenes had a more practical reason why he did not wish to fan the flames of Greek political passions for party or personal grounds. First, such a move would not have helped his reform program, which needed time to

---

\(^1\) Carcopino, op. cit., pp. 35-36. Hignett, op. cit., p. 162, does not agree with Carcopino’s statement. He simply feels that Hipparchus was not banished because he was not a direct descendant of Pisistratus. Ehrenberg, op. cit., p. 87 says that ostracism, its rational clarity, moderation, etc., fits well into the general picture of Cleisthenes’ statesmanship.
strike roots. Secondly, it had to do with Cleisthenes' attitude toward Persia. This brings us to another problem that has also stirred the curiosity of historians and for which there is little information in the ancient sources. This is the question of Persia at this time. I have already mentioned that one of the grudges of some of Hippias' former supporters against him might have been his collaboration with Persia.

M. F. McGregor, in his article under the title "The Pro-Persian Party at Athens from 510-480,"\(^1\) contends first that the Alcmeontids were hostile to the tyrants, and so they must be called anti-Persian, especially after the flight of Hippias to Persia. The second point is that they were anti-Spartan because of the policy of Cleomenes toward the Cleisthenian constitution. Third, the aristocrats who were friends of Isagoras and Sparta were also anti-Persian after 510 because Sparta herself was anti-Persian. Therefore, he concludes, no strong pro-Persian party existed at Athens after 510. When Persia threatened Greece in 490-480 domestic quarrels were put aside by all in favor of a unified foreign policy.\(^2\) Those who could be pro-Persian were the commons, former followers of the Pisistratids. But the commons had gone over to Cleisthenes and later on to Themistocles who was

---


\(^2\) It is an ingenious argument which shows what can be done even with the meager information that we possess if one has a good mind. It is an argument needless to say that has not found general acceptance.
definitely anti-Persian.¹ He disagrees with the logical point of C. A. Robinson, Jr.² who thinks that some nobles who hated the reforms of Cleisthenes could side with Hippias now. He therefore does not accept as true the embassy of Athens to Persia as reported by Herodotus.³ Herodotus himself is not very clear on this point, and his lack of clarity has been correctly interpreted, I believe, as an effort on his part to conceal the role of Cleisthenes in this affair. Herodotus reports that after the second police action of Cleomenes, which resulted in the disgraceful retirement of Cleomenes, and the return of Cleisthenes to Athens along with the seven hundred families exiled previously by Išagoras, the Athenians dispatched envoys to Sardis to make an alliance with Persia because they were sure that the Spartans would return. The ambassadors reached Sardis and delivered the message to Artaphernes. Artaphernes demanded earth and water in exchange for the alliance. The envoys, after consulting together, anxious as they were to form an alliance, accepted the terms, but on their return to Athens, they fell into deep disgrace.⁴ Herodotus does

¹McGregor, op. cit., p. 93.
³Hdt V, 73.
⁴Hdt V, 73. Ἀδηναῦοι δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα Κλεισθένεα καὶ τὰ ἐπτακόσια ἐπιστοία τά διωξόντα ὑπὸ Κλεομένεος μετεπηρόμενοι πέμπωντο ἀγγέλους εἰς Σάρδις, συμμαχήνιν βουλόμενοι ποιῆσαι πρὸς Πέρσας ἡπιστέατο γάρ σφίσι Λακεδαιμονίους τε καὶ Κλεομένεα ἐκπεπολεμώθαι.
not spell out what the role of Cleisthenes was in this muddy affair. He mentions the "Athenians" but does not say under whose influence and suggestion. Yet he does not fail to note that the event happened right after the return of Cleisthenes. At this point Cleisthenes was a popular hero and it is doubtful that the Athenians would have acted contrary to his advice. It was probably at this suggestion that they sent the embassy. It is also probable that the zealous envoys exceeded their instructions and this brought disgrace on them directly as well as on the originator or the supporter of the proposal indirectly. After this, we do not know what happened to the political fortunes of Cleisthenes. We hear about him no more.

I mentioned before that the story of Herodotus has been doubted. Yet we know that Herodotus was a partisan of the Alcmeonid family, and that he would have omitted the story if he had not found some historicity for it. Again, if he thought that the story was a gossip—and the Athenians, like the rest of the Greeks were very prone to political gossip—he would have said so, as he did in the case of the shield after the Battle of Marathon. From the above, it becomes, I believe, rather evident that Cleisthenes was in some form or another associated with the proposal to form an embassy to Persia. What were his motives for supporting such

1 Hdt V, 73,1.


3 Hdt VI, 115; 121,1; 123-124.

4 Walker CAH, IV, 157-158, claims that the embassy to Persia described by Herodotus was sent by Cleisthenes who was well
a proposal? One reason is already given by Herodotus: the danger of another Spartan invasion. It stands to reason that Cleomenes would not let the humiliation he suffered at the hands of the Athenians pass with impunity. After all, it seems that the whole Spartan embroilment in the Athenian affairs at this time was his project. In such a case Cleisthenes needed support from without. He could have applied to Persia for aid in order to contain the Spartan danger. The extravagant Persian demands and the docility of the Athenian envoys wrecked Cleisthenes' policy and his political future. An additional reason for the embassy could have been the desire of Cleisthenes to anticipate and frustrate the plans of Hippias and those who, after the Spartan force had retreated, might have been inclined to machinate with Hippias and Persia in order to succeed where the Spartans had failed. If such were the case we will never know, but again the plan was destroyed for the same reasons. At this point the Persians acted in the least diplomatic manner. It was an excellent opportunity for the Imperial Court to place a wedge in Greece, and to nip the Athenian participation in the Ionian revolt long before the revolt started. By demanding such Punic terms, the Persians forfeited a unique chance.  

aware what the Persian court would demand and willing to concede it, and that Herodotus tries to shift the responsibility on the envoys.

1 Ath. Pol. 19,5; 20,2-3.

2 Herodotus does not say if the embassy was disavowed before Cleomenes' efforts toward revenge were thwarted by the Corinthians and Demaratos, or after. If after, then the disappearance of the danger might have played an important role in the Athenian change of attitude.
That the Athenians therefore did not dare use the law of ostracism until their victory at Marathon gave them confidence is, as Hignett suggests, inconsistent with the above events.¹ Aside from Cleisthenes' moderation with regard to the use of ostracism this policy toward Persia might have been a determinant in his caution.

So far we have accepted with reservations the version of Aristotle that ostracism was invented by Cleisthenes as a weapon to scare the would-be tyrants. A closer evaluation at this point is necessary. It was a curious device as Grote calls it.² It took place once a year, if the assembly so decided. A quorum of six thousand was needed. The man who received the greatest number of votes was to be exiled for ten years. At the end of his ten-year term he could return with full possession of rights. The exile did not carry with it the confiscation of his property. No doubt, Cleisthenes knew the Greeks well enough to know that some one could very well be tempted to try tyranny again.³ It would be naive, however, to believe that someone could be prevented

¹Hignett, op. cit., pp. 179-180.
²George Grote, History of Greece (New York: Collier and Son, 1900), IV, 155-161.
³Hignett, op. cit., p. 186, unlike Aristotle (Politics 1284a,15; 1284b,15; 1302b,15), thinks that ostracism was invented and used from the start as a party weapon by the anti-Persian leaders, but the end which they had in view, the salvation of Athens and of Greece, was patriotic and to that end the banishment of their political rivals was a necessary preliminary. He attributes the ostracism to Themistocles (Hignett, op.cit., p. 188) who also made the Archons subject to lot and brought about the election of Strategoi without limitation in years of service.
from attempting to become a tyrant by the law of ostracism.\(^1\) There is also an irony involved here. A man could not be exiled unless voted upon by the ecclesia. The irony here is that the ecclesia would exile a would-be "tyrant" at the suggestion of the political leader who was uppermost in the ecclesia at that particular period of time. In other words, the people would accept the proposal of the most influential of its leaders against his opponent who happened to be the underdog. The ostracism of Xanthippus, Megacles, and Aristides, to limit ourselves to the period under discussion, are flagrant examples of the fact that they were ostracized because the opposition proved itself stronger by managing to mobilize the vote against them. The occasion of their ostracism denotes that they had fallen in disfavor; hence they could not be strong enough to constitute a danger to Democracy. The spirit of the law of ostracism did not apply to them at the time they were ostracized. Thus, a possible checking force was eliminated, and the politician who spearheaded the ostracism was left even stronger than he was before his opponent's banishment. Who then was the potential tyrant? There are other incongruities here also.\(^2\)

\(^1\) In our times the violation of the constitutional order is supposed to be severely punishable in Greece; yet there have been many cases—including the present—in which the violators were not stopped by the fear of punishment.

\(^2\) Aristotle, *Politics*, 1284a, 15-19 speaks about ostracism and its intention by the legislator to equalize power. While he deplores the fact that ostracism deteriorated to a weapon used for purely factional purposes and also for the elimination of the distinguished members of the state (1284b, 23), he fails to say that ostracism produced also the opposite effects, for a while at
The Greeks loved politics. It was their passion, and they carried it on with all seriousness. They have managed to survive in history, despite the passionate way with which they have indulged in the political games, or perhaps because of it. It has been a thankless task to engage in Greek politics. It brings nothing but bitterness, vituperation, and grief even to the best of the political leaders. The Greeks have been more fanatic and petty in their passion for politics than any other civilized nation in history with the exception perhaps of the Jews. Both peoples have survived in history whereas other great nations of antiquity have forever perished.

The Greeks rival the Jews in being the most politically minded race in the world. No matter how forlorn their circumstance or how grave the peril to their country, they are always divided into many parties, with many leaders who fight among themselves with desperate vigor. It has been well said that wherever there are three Jews it will be found that there are two Prime Ministers and one leader of the Opposition. The same is true of this other famous ancient race, whose stormy and endless struggle for life stretches back to the fountain springs of human thought. No other two races have set such a mark upon the world. Both have shown a capacity for survival, in spite of unending perils and sufferings from external oppressors, matched only by their own ceaseless feuds, quarrels, and convulsions. The passage of several thousand years sees no change in their characteristics and no diminution of their trials or their vitality. They have survived in spite of all that the world could do against them, and all they could do against themselves, and each of them from angles so different has left us the inheritance of its genius and wisdom.¹

Despite these setbacks most of the Greeks have been little politi-

least, it left the leader who rallied the people behind the ostracism of his opponent stronger than he was before, and that was not intended by the originator of ostracism (Aristotle, Politics, 1302b).

cians. In their lifetime they all believe they possess ideas for the solution of their state's maladies, if only they were given a chance to enforce them! They never suspected for once that their excessive preoccupation with politics and their constant and un-called-for meddling in it might have been responsible for some of the maladies. They chose a leader and immediately they proceeded to dictate to that leader what to do and how. Yet, in spite of this odd political behavior, there has been no lack of political leaders. To strike against the political opponent by ostracizing him, as the whole thing deteriorated later, meant perhaps eliminating one of the opponents, but not the opposition. For each head that was cut off many new ones sprang up. The power vacuum created by the forceful withdrawal of a political personality was filled immediately by others who stepped into the picture. Besides, the measure itself pushed the opposition to extremes. So much so that it would stop at nothing until the passion for revenge was satisfied. The opposition would have no scruples about engaging in legal or illegal methods against the establishment. Thus even the constitution itself suffered. The answer to the extreme which resulted in the ostracism of Cimon was the assassination of Ephialtes.

1Ath. Pol. 16,2-3. Pisistratus saw this fanatic preoccupation with politics as injurious and tried to keep the people busy with other things.

2The rash of ostracisms in the 480's exemplifies my point. See my fourth chapter.

For another thing, prosecutors with personal motives could take advantage of ostracism as well as those who were in reality public-spirited citizens.\(^1\) As a matter of fact, it does not take one long to convince himself that he is acting in public spirit, while in reality he is unable to draw the line between personal grudges and public justice. Finally, the Athenian citizens acted as a court of justice in the occasions of ostracism, and they were not necessarily the most objective and just judges. The incident of Aristides comes to mind here, as quoted in Plutarch, which may not be a true event but it was true to the character of the Athenian assembly man.\(^2\) Later on we find many authors complaining about the easiness and the superficiality with which the Athenians decided on many cases. The occasion of the ten \textit{strategoi} after the naval battle of Argynousae is a glaring example. Plato justifiably complains in the \textit{Apology} that the real issue of Socrates' trial was mostly drowned in a load of irrelevancies, purposefully introduced to divert attention and becloud the issues as well as the mind of the jurors.\(^3\) The plaintiff in \textit{Apollo}dor\textit{us v. Stephanus} related how on one occasion the jurors were so inflamed against him by his opponent's speech, that they drove him from the court without listening to him.\(^4\) The example could be multiplied.\(^5\)

\(^1\)Aristophanes, \textit{Plutus}, 900.

\(^2\)For details on this incident see Plutarch, \textit{Aristides}, VII.

\(^3\)\textit{Apology}, 28a.

\(^4\)Demosthenes 45, 6.

The abuses of ostracism would show later in the decade of the 480's, when the old generation would fade away and a new crop of young, ambitious politicians would fight over the issues of the day for control of the assembly and the dominance of their ideas. For the time being ostracism as a political practice lay dormant. This was due to the moderating presence of Cleisthenes, the wounds of recent troubles, the absorption of the Athenians with the reforms, the imminence of Cleomenes¹ and above all the Persian danger. All these factors contributed to a period of good feelings during which ostracism was not practiced.

¹Hdt V, 90, 91, 96, 97.
CHAPTER III

DOVES AND HAWKS

Mention of the Persian danger brings us to our next consideration of the period prior to Marathon and the external as well as internal problems encountered by the city of Athens. Unfortunately, our two main guides on this period, Aristotle and Herodotus, are very uninformative in this sequence of domestic events. Herodotus especially who has expatiated on some of the ramifications of the Ionian revolt and the attitudes of its leaders provides us with information which we would gladly have exchanged for a more cogent description of the internal state of Athens, the personalities, and the political configuration therein. Cleisthenes is not mentioned in connection with the events. If he still lived at this time, he was probably old and retired from politics.

Among the propelling forces of the Ionian revolt were the Milesians Histiaeus and Aristagoras. If we are to believe Herodotus their motives were mainly personal and their role ill-
Aristagoras tried to solicit Sparta's help first since the Spartans had already established a reputation of gallantry. Cleomenes was still the person to reckon with in Sparta. But the ruling circles in Sparta had a lot to say, no doubt, on a question of such major importance.

Aristagoras came to Sparta one hundred years earlier. The Spartan turtle was Peloponnese-oriented and it had no intention of moving out of its Peloponnesian shell. The Spartans had hesitated to follow the ambitious policy of Cleomenes just a little while before in connection with Athens; would they venture to adventures across the sea? Besides, since they too must have held the Persian colossus in awe, would not it be reckless to embark on an enterprise that was bound to activate the Persian dinosaur against them? One may call it a provincial policy, but at least the Spartan policy was the residue of a realistic evaluation of the international and internal exigencies of the time. They politely said "no thanks" and dismissed Aristagoras. Aristagoras did not give up. If he could not get the best, he was willing to settle for the second best. After the Spartan cold-shower he went to Athens. There he mixed myths with realities in order to arouse the Athenians. He told them what bad warriors the Persian soldiers were, how they used "neither shield nor

---

1 Hdt V, 96-126.

2 Lang, op. cit., p. 36, doubts that Aristagoras ever solicited Cleomenes' help.
spear," and "how easy to conquer" they were. Then he reminded them of their common bonds with the Ionians and that Miletus was their colony. There is no doubt that the Athenians had reasons to be displeased with the Persians. The Persians had enslaved the Ionian Greeks; they had extended their sway over the Hellespont, this vital zone for Athens' commercial activities and corn supplies; they had rejected their earlier efforts at some kind of modus vivendi (c. 505); they were lending an ear to Hippias' machinations, and they had rejected the second Athenian overture at reconciliation with the imperious and callous demand that they accept back Hippias, as the prerequisite of any alliance with the Persians. Herodotus does not say it but the Athenians must have been deeply divided over foreign policy, and the coming of Aristagoras opened up the wounds. The Athenians abandoned the Ionians in the middle of the fighting which means that the Athenians changed their policy toward the Ionians in mid-stream. One is led to conclude that their original decision to support the Ioni-

\[1^\text{Hdt V, 97,1-2.}\]

\[\text{Επελθών δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀμον ὧ Ἀρισταγόρης ταῦτα ἔλεγε τά καὶ ἐν τῷ Ἐπάρτῃ περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀσολῇ καὶ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ Περσικοῦ, μὲ οὕτε ἄσπίδα οὕτε ὀδρον νομίζουσι εὐπνέεις τε χειρῳθήναι ἐξήσαν.}\]

\[2^\text{Hdt V, 97,2.}\]

\[3^\text{Hdt V, 96,1-2.}\]

\[4^\text{Hdt V, 103.}\]
as Herodotus says, "at last prevailed and won them over," and then he adds with a touch of irony the dictum that he had formulated from personal observations during his stay in Athens, that sometimes it is "easier to deceive a multitude than one man."  

This statement seems to indicate the struggle in the assembly and the fact that the decision of democracy, regardless of the offshoot of the Persian Wars—something that one could not possibly predict before 490—was precipitous, ill-advised, thoughtless, irrational, and perilous in the context of the international situation in 499.

It is evident that in about 500 there were at least two trends in Athens: one urging rapprochement with the Persians; the other, to put it mildly, was lukewarm to the idea. The diverging trends in the ecclesia are to be seen from what preceded Aristagoras' arrival. The question of foreign policy had come up for discussion in the ecclesia. The Athenian demos decided

---

1Hdt V, 97,2.

Πολλοὺς γὰρ οἶκε εἶναι εὐπετέστερον διαβάλλειν ἡ ἐνα, εἰ Κλεομένεα μὲν τῶν Δακεδαλμόνιον μοῦνον οὐκ οἶδα τε γένετο διαβάλλειν, τρεῖς δὲ μυριάδας Ἀθηναλῶν ἐποίησε τούτο.

2Walker, CAH, IV, 137-139, 168 contends that there was a pro-Pisistratian party during the Persians Wars committed to the to the return of Hippias and that the Pisistratids and Alcmeonids had formed an alliance against aid to Ionia. Robinson disagrees because he thinks that this would mean the end of the Alcmeonids since Hippias and the Alcmeonids hated one another. Only some nobles could be pro-Persian who hated the reforms of Cleisthenes and hence now sided with Hippias—"The Struggle for Power at Athens . . . ." p. 232. Yet it was not unusual for Alcmeonids to make a volte face. They had done it before in the case of Pisistratus.

3Hdt V, 96,2.
to iron out its problems with the Persians in peaceful negotiations. Who the leaders of the proposal were Herodotus does not say. Again, as in the case of the first embassy, he refers generally to the Athenians. It would not be risky to suppose that the leaders who urged negotiations were the Alcmeonids. This is not in itself reprehensible. The Persians, however, overconfident and arrogant made again impossible demands as a result of which no room for maneuvering was left, and the Alcmeonids who may have supported the proposal were now embarrassed.\(^1\) The opposition, no doubt, seized immediately the opportunity to denounce their foreign policy. Herodotus, writing *ex post facto* and when the events were still fresh in the memory of the people, adheres to the Alcmeonid position that the idea of an accommodation with Persia to avoid a confrontation was a valid one before the battle of Marathon. After Marathon and Salamis when the Athenians were basking in their triumph mere mention of such a compromise would have seemed cowardly and pusillanimous. Herodotus here records the events as an historian should do. He supports the policies of the Alcmeonids but fails to mention their name because this would have only added fuel to the fire. The Alcmeonids were already under the cloud of a treason-charge.\(^2\) The arrival of Aristagoras occurred after the dispatch of the second embassy. The Alcmeonids adhered to their earlier position. They had no wish

---

1\(^{\text{Hdt V, 96,2.}}\)

2\(^{\text{Hdt VI, 123. Also Harris Gary Hudson, "The Shield Signal at Marathon," The American Historical Review, XL, 1936-1937), 443-459.}}\)
to provoke the clumsy oriental giant. But the opposition had won its case by default when Artaphernes rebuffed the Athenian embas-
sy. It is also reasonable to accept that Hipparchus and his fol-
lowers sided with the Alcmeonids for the same reasons. This would explain his election to the Archonship in 496 and his later expulsion.¹

There seems to have been not only in Athens but elsewhere in Greece a "peace part:" which demonstrated its pacifism through an avowed hatred of war, which did not necessarily exclude patri-
rotism, as Victor Ehrenberg shows,² but it did not contribute any-
thing positive to it either. Pindar and Theognis would be the most striking representatives of this peaceful movement, and at the same time a shining example that poets do not necessarily make good statesmen, and that politics, as Aristotle said, does not lend itself to poetical and philosophical flights, but is a very mundane and practical science that requires practical lead-
ers. Idealogues can be dangerous in politics.³

Going back to the Ionian revolt, one can be sure that the

¹The fact that Hipparchus was exiled in 487 and refused to take advantage of the amnesty decree shows that he was angry at the Athenians who dealt him an injustice. Therefore, he was not willing to go back. He might have enjoyed seeing his "ras-
cal" compatriots sweat it out, but not the city destroyed. An-
other type of extremism, stemming from spite.

²Ehrenberg, op. cit., p. 123.

³One is tempted here to draw a parallel with modern peace movements organized by intellectuals and student organizations against war, which, however, do not necessarily spell out what should be done in the face of danger or in the case of sustained aggression as the occasion might be.
clash between Greeks and Persians would have come sooner or later even without the revolt which served as pretext rather than the real cause of the Greek-Persian confrontation.\(^1\) The Greeks were too restless a tribe not to needle the Persians occasionally and the Great Empire too great to leave the temptation pass unchallenged of an expansion into the Aegean. Already they had brought Macedonia under their heels.\(^2\) From there Greece was only within a sling's throw. Herodotus is therefore wrong when he makes the twenty Athenian ships the beginning of mischief both to the Greeks and the barbarians.\(^3\) He is right, however, on his evaluation. The Athenians acted without the required bridge-building in the military as well as the political field which would have made their action intelligible. There was no effort on their part to unite the Ionian Greeks or even the Greeks in Greece to face up to the consequence of their policy. The Ionians hardly deserved any help since they had not put aside petty squabbles in order to help themselves. Halicarnassus, for example, Herodotus' own city, stayed out of the revolt and so did the other Dorian cities.\(^4\) The Athenians did not mobilize themselves and their potential for any future action. They only decided to dispatch

\(^1\)Hdt V, 97,3. When Herodotus says that Darius inquired as to who these Athenians were and where they came from (Hdt V, 105,1), he might show the anger of the king but not necessarily his ignorance. Surely, Darius must have been well apprized of the Greeks outside his dominion, especially the Spartans and the Athenians, the two most prominent cities of the Greeks. Hippias and other Greeks were in contact with the Imperial Court, which could not have been so ignorant as to hear about the Athenians now for the first time.

\(^2\)Hdt V, 18,1. \(^3\)Hdt V, 93,3. \(^4\)Hdt V, 103, 104.
twenty ships on the spur of the moment, and then in the face of adversity, after the burning of Sardis and the defeat at Ephesus, they quickly withdrew them as if they had rued their former decision. Their quick withdrawal proved to be as precipitous as their decision to act was. What about the fate of their Ionian "brethren" whom they had incited to revolt with their military presence? Where was their love for "Ionian independence" for which supposedly they decided to send twenty of their ships? No wonder then that the decision of the demos seemed so erratic to Herodotus.

---

1Hdt V, 97,3; 102, 2-3; 103.
CHAPTER IV

THE IRREPRESSIBLE GENERATION

With the collapse of the Ionian rebellion Darius had reached the doorsteps of Greece. The Greeks must have realized their perilous position. Among them, the Athenians had placed themselves in a very awkward spot by so thoughtlessly drawing upon their heads the wrath of the king. We do not know what exactly was going on in Athens. Herodotus again fails to inform us about the various personalities which dominated the political stage and their policies. It is not hard to surmise, however, that the same forces continued to operate on the political scene as before. How strong the opposition was we do not know. The party of "appeasement" capitalized on the Ionian misadventure to get the upper hand again and so in the year 496 Hipparchus, the son of Charmus, a cousin of the Pisistratids, was elected Archon Eponymus.\footnote{McGregor, op. cit., p. 85. McGregor believes that the election of Hipparchus to Archonship in 496 after the Ionian fiasco and before Marathon was an effort to conciliate the Persians. After 490 they expelled Hipparchus to settle the tyrant question by removing all sympathizers with the Pisistratids. This they did by putting in active service the law about ostracism forged by Cleisthenes. See also \textit{Ath. Pol.} 22.} Was Hipparchus pro-Persian? Was he simply for a political accommodation with Persia? Was he elected by the Athenians because he was a relative of Hippias with the tacit understanding to try to reach some sort of a compromise with the Imperial Court? We do not know. We only know that he was exiled three years after Marathon. The reason for his exile is not given.
The explanation given by Aristotle¹ that the law of ostracism was passed by Cleisthenes for Hipparchus may give us a clue to the solution. Hipparchus was not ostracized when he should have been, according to Aristotle, because of the laxity of the demos.² But if Hipparchus had escaped unscathed then, he could not have been ostracized many years later for the same cause, especially if he had withdrawn from politics and preferred for himself anonymity. By the 480's Hipparchus must have been on in years and no one would have bothered with him. The fact therefore that he was ostracized in 487 must have been due to his politics after the era of Cleisthenes.³ In the 490's then Hipparchus must have held

¹Ath. Pol. 22,1. ²Ath. Pol. 22,4. ³The law of ostracism then had run a full swing of the pendulum. Enacted against the possibility of tyranny and the elimination of the strongman, it was actually used as a party weapon against the opposition and the elimination of the weak, for certainly Hipparchus in 487 did not at all pose a peril. He and his policies were completely discredited; so the Athenians threw him away like old shoes. If one demurs to the fact the Athenians were justified because the Persian danger had not entirely disappeared, then the Athenians ought to bear part of the responsibility also because in 496 when they felt they needed him they freely elected him Archon. Anyway, the fact that Hipparchus did not avail himself of the amnesty degree in 481 points to the fact that he must have been displeased with the Athenians and had no wish to return to the besieged city. No doubt he loved his city, but he must not have been altogether grieved to see his "bastard" compatriots "sweat it out." We have no evidence that he helped the Persians, although he is said to have been condemned to death in absentia as a traitor, Lycurgus against Leocrates, 117.¹

"Πιπαρχον γὰρ τὸν Χάρμου, ὁδ' ἡπομείνας, τὴν περὶ προδοσίας ἐν τῷ δήμῳ κρίνειν, ἀλλ' ἔρημον τὸν ἄγνων οὖν ἅλατας ἐκαθέντα, ἔκαθεν τοῦτον τησμοὺς ἐμπλήκας, ἐπειδὴ τὴν ἐφημέραον οὐκ ἐλαμβάνον τὸ δῆμῳ δημοῦ, τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ ἐξ ἀκροφολέως καθέλοντες καὶ συγχωνεύσαντες καὶ πολίσταντες στήλην, ἐζητούσαντες εἰς ταύτην ἀναγράψαντες τοὺς ἀληθεῖσας καὶ τοὺς προδότας καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Πιπαρχος ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ στήλῃ ἀναγέγραπται, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δὲ προδόται.
pro-Persian or rather "appeasement" policies, and he was now elected as Archon because of his political views. It could be that Hipparchus as well as Megacles might have spoken out against the Athenian involvement in the Ionian adventure, and Hipparchus is now elected Archon with an aim to satisfy the Persian Court. Assuming that this is true, it does not necessarily mean that Hipparchus was disloyal to his country. The Athenians would not be the only ones who made overtures to the kings. Many other Greek cities did the same.\(^1\) Megacles, the nephew of Cleisthenes, may have been associated with the appeasement party because he too was exiled after Marathon one year after the ostracism of Hipparchus.\(^2\)

The policies of the party represented by Hipparchus finally failed. The Athenians in 493 elected Themistocles Archon.\(^3\) The election of Themistocles signified the beginning of a more aggressive policy toward Persia. It was in the same year that Phrynichus presented his historical tragedy Μιλήτου Ἀλωσις (The Captive Miletus). Here Herodotus' account is again blurred. "The Athenians," he says, "showed themselves afflicted at the fall of Miletus, in many ways expressing their sympathy, and espe-

\(^1\)Hdt VII, 6,1-2.

\(^2\)Odd as it may seem, it is not impossible. The Alcmeonids, like other typical Greeks, often changed sides. Combining with Hipparchus now would not have been anything abhorrent to them especially if Cleisthenes had been formerly displeased by the demos, something very possible.

\(^3\)Gustave Glotz, Ιστορία τῆς Ἑλλάδος, trans. Takie Tsavea (Athens: Publisher), II, 30. He makes Xanthippus the Archon of 493 by mistake.
cially by their treatment of Phrynichus. For when this poet brought out upon stage his drama, the Capture of Miletus, the whole theater burst into tears, and the people sentenced him to pay a fine of a thousand drachmas for recalling to them their own misfortunes."\(^1\) The Athenians exhibit here an inconsistent behavior indeed. They express their sympathies toward the Milesians in a strange way, by condemning the author of the work. What Herodotus means by the "people," he does not specify.\(^2\) It would not be unsafe, however, to assume that the "people" sentenced him to a fine at the instigation of the "appeasement party," thus taking advantage of the confused popular sentiments to strike at the opposition represented by Themistocles.\(^3\) Phrynichus was finally acquitted, perhaps with Themistocles' assistance.

The third event of importance during this year was the return of Miltiades from the Chersonese which was occupied by the Persians in preparation of their Greek expedition.\(^4\) He was accused immediately upon his arrival in Athens of tyranny in the Chersonese and was acquitted.\(^5\)

---

\(^1\) Hdt VI, 21,2.

\(^2\) Hdt VI, 21,2. It is interesting to note that Herodotus often omits names of persons implicated in actions that he mentions. Instead, he makes a vague reference to the Athenians or the people. It is extremely interesting to see that in the first and second embassy to Persia as well as here, all three cases in which the Alcmeonids could have been implicated, Herodotus is not at all explicit.

\(^3\) DeSanctis, op. cit., p. 364, believes that Phrynichus wrote the tragedy at Themistocles' advice.

\(^4\) Hdt VI, 41,4.

\(^5\) Hdt VI, 104,2. Unfortunately the accusers of Miltiades are not named by Herodotus even though he must have known them.
The accusers of Miltiades could not have been others than the opponents of Themistocles. Miltiades was anti-Persian. His presence at Athens strengthened the hand of the anti-Persian party and the appeasement party jumped on his attack. It cannot be ruled out, of course, that Themistocles viewed the opportune arrival of Miltiades as a favor of the gods, in which case he helped him overcome the trial hurdle and later joined hands with him for a common cause. 1 Themistocles has already been mentioned so many times in connection with his anti-Persian policy that a few further comments on the personality of this intriguing man, as well as the other political leaders, will not be completely out of place.

Themistocles was sui generis a true maverick, restless, brilliant, imaginative, tormented, farsighted, and supremely practical. He is the mad genius, without being demented. Herodotus makes Themistocles a Homo Novus in 480. 2 That he certainly was not. Themistocles was born about 528. In 480 Themistocles was forty-eight years old. It is rather unusual from Herodotus' evi-

So Herodotus by omitting what is very important for us in extricating the political complexities of the period has forced us to indulge in novel-writing which is euphemistically called historical conjecture. Herodotus might not have considered it important, or he could have had an obvious reason. Megacles and Xanthippus are probably implicated in the attack against Miltiades and Herodotus comfortably ignored giving names. The participation of Megacles in the trial of Miltiades can help explain not only his treatment at the hands of the Athenians in 486, but also the attitude of Xanthippus in 489 which led to the condemnation of Miltiades.

1Hignett, op. cit., p. 181, believes that Themistocles helped Phrynichus and Miltiades escape conviction.

2Hdt VII, 143, 1. ἀνὴρ ἐς πρῶτους νεωτὴ παριζών.
dence then that at forty-eight Themistocles was making his debut in politics. We know that in 493 he was already an Archon eponymus, the highest civil official in the state. Before this high honor was bestowed upon him, Themistocles must have been known to the Athenians. He must have spoken in the assembly several times, and he must have identified himself with certain programs and policies. In 493 Themistocles was about thirty-five years old, still a young man. Even if we did not have Herodotus' or Plutarch's information the odds would be that Themistocles because of his youth would be supporting an aggressive foreign policy. Hence he was one of the anti-Persian leaders, and he was elected to office in 493 because the appeasement policy had failed and the Athenians were finally led to believe that they had to change their policies. Themistocles was then overflowing with energy, youth, and ambition. He needed an issue to peg himself on, and what better issue could he find than anti-Persianism in the name of patriotism. The appeasement party already had its leaders. Themistocles then became the most aggressive leader of the opposition. He was a smart and clever man. Plutarch makes frequent

1 R. J. Lenardon, "The Archonship of Themistocles, 493-492," Historia, V (1956), 401-419, examines the question of the chronology of Themistocles' Archonship to conclude that Themistocles was Archon in 493/2 but probably held another office in 482/1, perhaps that of strategos. He was a strategos in 480 and he does not think it impossible that he might have been a strategos in 483 as well.

2 Plutarch, Themistocles, II,5. Ἑν τοῖς πρώταις τῆς νεότητος ὑμαῖν ἀνωμαλοῖς ἦν καὶ δοσιόμετος.

My statement should not be taken to mean that all young people are necessarily liberal or aggressive.
allusions to his cleverness and ambition. He describes him acting\textsuperscript{1} Πανοστραγως. Plutarch says:

Speedily, however, as it seems, and while he was stealing all the ardour of youth, public affairs laid their grasp upon Themistocles, and his impulse to win reputation got strong mastery over him. Wherefore, from the very beginning, in his desire to be first, he boldly encountered the enmity of men who had power and were already first in the city, especially that of Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, who was always his opponent . . . \textsuperscript{2}

which is natural since Aristides was a cautious man by nature and had no liking for the wildcat practices and demagogic manners that stirred up the people's emotions rather than their reason.

I do not know how reliable Plutarch's information always is, but surely we cannot afford to ignore it either. Since the ambition and hastiness of Themistocles is a recurring subject in Plutarch it should not be dismissed lightly. Thucydides, who is a much more cautious man with his statements, does not exclude the possibility that Themistocles might have been implicated with Pausanias in some kind of dubious activities or that he was acting in secret with Pausanias to undermine Sparta's influence in the Peloponnese.\textsuperscript{3} Aeschylus believes the trick of Themistocles

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}Plutarch, \textit{Themistocles}, II, 1.
\item \textsuperscript{2}Plutarch, \textit{Themistocles}, III, 1.
\item \textsuperscript{3}Thuc. CXXXV. \textit{Επιφοιτῶν δὲ καὶ ἐς ἀλλην πελοπόννησον. At this point Thucydides draws the amazing contrast in the workings and the mentality of the two systems and peoples. The Athenians not only had ostracized Themistocles, but upon the request of the Spartans moved quickly to seize him and bring him to trial. The Spartans, on the contrary, though a
just before the battle of Salamis whereby Xerxes was led to believe that he was receiving confidential information and decided to fight before the Greeks escaped from the straits. If other examples of the cleverness and capacity of the man are needed one could easily mention the way he interpreted the mumble-jumble of the Pythian priestess and made it fit his military scheme. He went even further in ousting the cunning priests of Apollo. He turned the prophecy to mean that the Persians were really in trouble rather than the Athenians. The Athenians were probably flabbergasted, but they had no problem being swayed.

Along with this cleverness, Themistocles combined a real far-sightedness which served his party, his country, and indeed the whole of Greece well at this superb hour of danger. First,

---

A totalitarian regime, in spite of the many rumors and information about the treasonable activities of Pausanias, did not move against him until they had almost air-tight evidence of his guilt. Thucydides adds with a touch of irony in his inimical manner (Thuc. CXXXII):

οποφίας πολλᾶς παρετχε, φανερῶν (διως)
σημεῖον ὀδύην εἶχον διὰ τὸν ἄν πιστεύσαντες
βεβαίως ἐτιμωρύντο ἐνδρα γένους τε τοῦ
βασιλικοῦ δύνα καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τιμήν
ἐχόντα.


'When the gloom of blackest night
Will fall, the Greeks will not remain, but leap.
To rowing-bench and each by secret course
Will save his life! And he your son, upon
His hearing this, in ignorance of Greek
Guile and the jealousy of gods,
Harangued his captains publicly.'"

1 Hdt VII, 143,2-3. 2 Hdt VII, 143,2-3.
he persuaded the Athenians to use the money from a mine at Laurion which by happy coincidence was discovered at this time for the construction of a fleet of 200 triremes for use against the Aeginetans, with whom the Athenians were at loggerheads for a long time. It seems that the Athenians again saw the force of his argument and followed his advice, advice which actually proved salutary for the whole of Greece. No doubt, the Persian danger was paramount in his mind. He also perceived the political power and prestige that a strong navy would bring to the city, the jobs and outlets it would create for the multitude of Athenians. If the Persians did not come, the Athenians would be left with a fleet, and Themistocles could further boast that the Persians did not come because of the fear of the Athenian fleet. If the Persians did come, the possibility was that the Athenians would make good use of their navy, and his opponents would be silenced. In such a case his far-sightedness would be totally purged and his opponents discredited. Finally, the Aeginetan War warranted the construction of a strong navy, if the Athenians ever hoped to put an end to this bleeding wound. The correctness of his assessment was proven not only by Salamis but by the Golden Age. Thus in one stroke he transformed the social structure of Athens. He converted the Athenians, as Plutarch, quoting Plato, says, from

1Hdt VII, 144.

"steadfast hoplites" to "sea tossed marines." Hence, again, the saying quoted by Plutarch that "Themistocles robbed his fellow citizens of spear and shield, and degraded the people of Athens to the rowing-pad and the oar." This he did, Plutarch continues, quoting Stesimbrotus, over the public opposition of Miltiades. This man was the living opposition to Aristides, but like him he was the product of his times and of the democratized life as it emerged after Cleisthenes' reforms. Themistocles like Aristides had neither heroes nor gods as his ancestors. Nor was he like Xanthippus allied by marriage to the noblest family in Athens. He was a self-made man not born into a position of leadership by descent or wealth. His father was from a good Athenian family, but his mother was a Thracian, which put Themistocles at a disadvantage. He was not a "pure-blooded" Athenian and the Athenians

---

1 H. Bengtson, Historia, II (1953-54), 485, maintains that the idea was not original with Themistocles, that the Thasians after the siege of Histiaios, ten years before Themistocles' proposal had done the same thing. For the sea strategy in 480 he credits Themistocles. Hdt VII, 144. Victor Ehrenberg, The Greek State (New York: Norton Library Paperbacks, 1964), p. 85, states that Themistocles followed the example here of the island of Thasos earlier.

2 Plutarch, Themistocles, IV, 3.

3 At this point the information of Plutarch is confused. The Archon of 490-489 was Aristides not Miltiades, and in 483 when the proposal for the navy was made Miltiades was long dead. Aristides was exiled by Themistocles and it was probably over this issue. Plutarch, Themistocles, V, 5. Ath. Pol. 22,7.

4 Hdt VI, 35,1. Miltiades was ὅ ἀπὸ Ἀλαυοῦ τε καὶ Ἁγιάνης ἀγονῶς.

5 Themistocles' mother was a foreigner. Plutarch, Themistocles, I, 1-2. Cleisthenes' grandmother was a foreigner and so was Cimon's. Cleisthenes' grandmother, however, was a pan-hellenic
frowned upon "hybrids." It was enough to create in the boy, who must have been reminded of his "impurity" by the others many a time, a strong complex which he tried to overcome later in his life by his bumptiousness, his sagacity, and opportunism.

The opinions of the ancients are divided about him. Herodotus cautiously praised him especially for his role at the Battle of Salamis.\(^1\) Thucydides, in an admirable passage describes the nature of the man in his inimitable brief manner.

For indeed Themistocles was a man who had most convincingly demonstrated the strength of his natural capacity, and was in the very highest degree worthy of admiration in that respect. For by native insight, not reinforced by earlier or later study, he was beyond other men, with the briefest deliberation, both a shrewd judge of the immediate present and wise in forecasting what would happen in the most distant future. To sum up all in a word, by force of native sagacity and because of the brief preparation he required, he proved himself the ablest of all men instantly to hit upon the right expedient.\(^2\)

prize that added to Cleisthenes' descent. Cimon's situation was different. He had grown up in another environment, whereas Themistocles had grown up in Athens. Georg Busolt, Griechische Geschichte (Gotha: Hildesheim, G. Olms, 1893-1904), II2, 640; Jean Hatzfeld, Alcibiaade: étude sur l'histoire d'Athènes à la fin du Ve siècle (2d ed.; Paris: Presses Universitaire, 1951), p. 2, fn. 2.

\(^1\)Hdt VIII, 124,1-2.

\(^2\)Thuc. I, CXXXVIII,3.

\(\text{Η} \text{ν γάρ Θεμιστοκλῆς, βεβαιότατα δὴ φύσεως ἵππον δηλώσας, καὶ διαφερόντως τι ἐς αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἐτέρου ἔξιος ἡμᾶς ὁ δὲ ξυνέσει καὶ οὗτε προμαθῶν ἐς αὐτὴν μηδὲν, ὅτε ἐπιμαθῶν τῶν τε παραχρήματι δὲ ἐλαχίστης βουλῆς κράτιστος γνώμων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπὶ πλείστου τοῦ γεννησομένου ἀριστοκράτους εἰκαστής--- καὶ τὸ σύμπαν εἰπεῖν φύσεως μὲν δυνάμει, μελέτης δὲ βραχύτητι κράτιστος δὴ οὗτος αὐτοκειμένος τὰ δεόντα ἐγένετο.\)
He combined with this ambition for glory and did not hesitate to use all kinds of means to achieve his goal. This does not prevent Thucydides, however, from alluding to his implication in Pausanias' schemes.¹ Aeschylus believes the ingenious story of Themistocles' trick the day before the naval battle of Salamis and some even suspect that the Perae was written to remind the Athenians what they owed to Themistocles.² Others, like Timocreon the Rhodian,³ a contemporary of Themistocles, have no kind words for him, and I am sure that the Carystians, the Parians, and the Adrians would have hated him thoroughly.⁴ In the eyes of Aristides, he must have appeared a slick and unscrupulous opportunist. Yet Themistocles was capable of lifting himself far above petty political squabbles during those crucial junctures of

¹Thuc. I, CXXXV.

²See page 54 above. Plutarch, Themistocles, XXI, 2-3.

³Hdt VIII, 112.

⁴Plutarch, Themistocles, XXI, 1.
history in which the future of the state hung in the delicate balance. He did that promptly at the council before the Battle of Salamis. He resigned any Athenian claims of leadership to the Spartans who seemed set on it, provided that they only listened to his plan. Even now his "knavery" did not entirely leave him. He "allows" himself to be bribed by the Euboean and in turn he bribes Eurybiades and Adeimantus while making a substantial profit. Before leaving Artemisium he contrived a way whereby he tried to detach the Ionian Greeks from the barbarian fleet and sow distrust and suspicion among their navy. He did not hesitate to use reason and blandishment to carry his point through to Eurybiades at the Council of Salamis. After Salamis he was said to have gone to the islands (Andros, Paros, Carystos, etc.) and to have pressured the islanders for money like Miltiades ten years earlier. He had the "nerve" to suggest to the perplexed Athenians the abandonment of their city, their homes, their sanctuaries in order to save themselves, because he be-

1Hdt VIII, 59-60.  
2Hdt VIII, 3-4.  
3Hdt VIII, 23.  
4Themistocles headed an expeditionary force to the islands after Salamis (Hdt VIII, 110-112). His purposes were multiple; first to pay the crews of the fleet (Godolphin, op. cit., p. 698, ftn. 13), especially now that Athens was destroyed, a form of war indemnities for guilt by association. Secondly, to ingratiate himself to the Athenians who had deserted their city at his advice, and now returned to a burned city. Thirdly, he might have intended to make some profit for himself. Such a devious purpose was not certainly below his principles. Hdt VIII, 61-62.  
5Hdt VIII, 112.
lieved that human beings were more valuable than bricks and stones. He could have easily moved the emotional Athenians with a so-called patriotic speech about their hearths and their temples, but he was too much of a practical man to indulge in such insipid sentimentalism. His decree for the return of the exiles just before the Battle of Salamis shows his loftiness and practicality. This was a time for national unity and dedication against the common cause, and he who had caused the exile of his opponents now proposed their recall. Why should he let those resources idle or even tempt them to side with the Persians? This was the man who was charged with the responsibility of leading the state in its hour of crisis.

Themistocles' opponent, Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, from the deme of Alopeke, was a major contrast in temperament. Herodotus does not mention his name nor his policies in the pre-Marathon era, but then Herodotus does not always mention names.

---


2 Kahrstedt, op. cit., sp. 1689 1692, thinks that the destruction of Athens by Xerxes caused his temporary eclipse after Salamis and the emergence of his opposition, Xanthippus, Aristides, Cimon. If this view is correct, and I have my reservations about it, we have no evidence to prove it, outside of the fact that Themistocles did suffer temporary eclipse after 479. Plutarch, Themistocles, XXIV, 4.
even though he must have known them, nor does he give a fair picture of the domestic forces in Athens at this time. We therefore have to depend on Plutarch's biographical sketches. Aristides was born 520 or a little earlier. In the Marathon campaign (490-489) he was a strategos. In 489 he was elected Archon Eponymus. ¹

This means that Aristides was one of the prominent political leaders in the later 490's. Aristides admired and emulated above all other statesmen, Lycurgus the Lacedemonian. ² He, therefore, favored the moderate democracy as it had evolved from the reforms of Cleisthenes and opposed the opportunist Themistocles, especially his political machinations.

All the ancient sources agree that Aristides was the most upright man of his time. ³ He had neither the sharpness of Themistocles nor his far-sightedness, nor his malleableness. He was a "square" who believed in the traditional principles and ultimate goodness of his fellowmen. He had a lofty conception of his obligations as a public official. That he established a high repute of "justness" during his lifetime among a people who loved to find faults with their leaders is in itself a memorial to the man. Herodotus describing him says, "from that which I have learnt of his way of life, I am myself well persuaded that he was the best and justest man at Athens." ⁴ Timocreon the Rhodian, a contempo-

³Ath. Pol. 23.
⁴Hdt VIII, 79.
ary poet, praises Aristides while degrading Themistocles with bitterness. Aristides must have violently disliked the political somersaults of Themistocles as reckless and dangerous for the state. He was guided by his reason and honesty where Themistocles acted on his intuition. Aristides too had ambition. No one without a grain of ambition in him makes politics—especially Greek politics—a career. His ambitions, however, were tempered and circumscribed by his high character. Themistocles was out to win and would let nothing harness his limitless energies. He used his energies to achieve the ends without regard to the means. Aristides would not care to achieve the ends, if the means were not fair. As a result, Aristides faded in his death, while Themistocles was a mystery even in his death.

Themistocles' nature was "unscrupulous" and "easily carried with impetuosity into any and every undertaking. Aristides was a firm character, intent on justice, and admitting no falsity or vulgarity or deceit, not even in any sport whatsoever." Aristides was the exact opposite in character to Themistocles; "Themistocles was a reckless agitator." Aristides was the opposite. The same course happened on the part of Themistocles who opposed the measures of Aristides only because they were his, and Aristides would introduce some of his measures through other men.


2 Plutarch, II, 2.

3 Plutarch, III, 1.

4 Plutarch, III, 2.

5 Plutarch, III, 2.
It seems that he had opposed Themistocles' naval policy for two reasons. First, because of its effects upon the Athenian society. Aristides was a conservative gentleman who saw with suspicion the expansion of democracy not because he disliked democracy but because he feared that it would lead to ochlocracy. Secondly, Athens had repelled the enemy with its hoplite force, and he probably believed that she could do it again. Themistocles, on the contrary, emphasized naval armaments because he perceived that the future of Athens lay in maritime expansion and because this widened his popular basis.

Their exact position as leaders of the "popular party" is not clear. If we have to surmise differences of policy beyond their personal differences in means, it would not be unfair to conclude that prior to 490 Aristides was more of a fundamentalist. He remained truer to the constitution of Cleisthenes whereas Themistocles desired to carry the democratization process started by Cleisthenes a step or two further. There is no doubt that the motives of Themistocles are not entirely non-political, but he was also in accordance with the demands of the times.

About Aristides' foreign policy before Marathon we know nothing. The fact that he was elected strategos in 490 and Archon in 489 indicates that whatever his disagreement with Themistocles,

---

1 That Aristides opposed the Naval Bill is of course a hypothesis but not an unsafe one. See Beloch, op. cit., p. 142 and DeSanctis, op. cit., p. 377. Also Hignett, op. cit., p. 183.

2 I believe that he used the extension of democracy as a whipping issue for the purpose of building up his political basis.
he was not opposed to war. The Athenians would not have elected
to the office of strategos a man who refused to give his total
commitment to the war cause. The friction between the two led
eventually to the ostracism of Aristides in 483. It is the only
instance in which we have a clear statement on the reasons for
the series of ostracisms that took place in the post-Marathon
period. Thus ostracism which was invented earlier as a weapon
against potential tyrants deteriorated from the very beginning to
a means whereby personal rivalries found their base fulfillment.
The story about the boorish and illiterate fellow, who asked Aris-
tides to write Aristides' name on his ostracon, because he was
"tired of hearing him everywhere called 'The Just!'" may not be a
true story but it is true to the nature of petty Greek politics
and the Greek character. The expansion of democracy did very
little to alleviate the evils of intolerance from which Greek
politics suffered and as a token of that the leader of the opposi-
tion was banished because one of his virtues was his proverbial
honesty, the constant mention of which irritated some of his con-
temporaries.

1Plutarch, Aristides, VII, 12, mentions that Themistocles
causde Aristides' ostracism but does not go into details as to the

2Hdt VIII, 79. Herodotus also emphasized the integrity of

3Plutarch, Aristides, VII, 5-6. I can here mention a sim-
ilar modern parallel, P. Canellopoulos, the former leader of the
ERE party in Greece. Mr. Canellopoulos has been known in modern
Greek politics as an extremely honest and straightforward politi-
cal leader. In the elections of 1961 he was elected to parliament
only because of a special law that gave priority in the count of
Aristides returned to Athens in 480 just before the Battle of Salamis, taking advantage of the amnesty decree promulgated by the Athenian demos at the behest of Themistocles. Themistocles was plagued with all kinds of problems and needed all the help he could get. Aristides meanwhile was watching the development of events. He had noticed that the Athenians could not have withstood the Oriental hordes that had descended upon Greece and that Themistocles' navy offered at least a hope. He realized how right Themistocles was, and how wrong he was to oppose the construction of a navy. He was therefore the first to extend his hand of reconciliation, and Themistocles accepted it gladly. From here on Aristides would support Themistocles' "sensible" proposals, but he would not hesitate to oppose him in matters of conscience. In 479, he was elected strategos and commanded the Athenian force that participated in the Battle of Plataea. He exhorted the Athenian soldiers at Plataea to fight gallantly that the world may think that not even Marathon was due to Miltiades alone, or to fortune, but to all the Athenians.

votes to leaders of parties and former Prime Ministers. Though he received fewer votes than another man of the same ticket, Mr. Canellopoulos was elected as the beneficiary of the above law. Some Greek voters of the opposition pointed with delight to the fact that Mr. "Honesty" made it only through the back door. The fact that a mediocre provincial town lawyer did otherwise receive more votes than a distinguished man, they could not see as an affront to the voters' intelligence or their lack of it.


Plutarch, Aristides, XVI, 4. Again this is a possible clue to the fact that at Miltiades' trial his defense had maintained that Marathon was due to him while his opponents deflating his contribution asserted that it was owed to the Athenians and to fortune.
tocrats, wished to abolish democracy. Aristides opposed the abolition of democracy and voted for its expansion. He cooperated with Themistocles for the construction of a wall against the wishes of Sparta, but frustrated the maverick yet ingenious proposal of Themistocles to burn the naval station of the confederate Hellenes, so that the Athenians would remain the only lords of the sea.

Aristides was sent out as general along with the youthful Cimon to persecute the war and expel the Persians from the Aegean Island (478), and Plutarch notes that he used gentleness and humanity, tact and diplomacy to attract the Greek islanders to Athens, especially since the Spartan commanders were being boorish and offensive. He was chiefly responsible for the secession of the Asiatic and island Greeks from Pausanias. He also fixed the quotas for the members of the Delian League in an equitable manner. His statesmanship set an excellent precedent for the Athenian democracy. If the Athenians as leaders of the League

---

had followed his tactful course, instead of a boorish policy, they
could have adjusted themselves to requirements of the leadership
and its responsibilities in the League, and they could have fore­
stalled its inglorious end. This is then the man who in the 490's
often opposed Themistocles. In comparison, Aristides' political
acumen was inferior to that of Themistocles. Aristides was a
decade behind times. It was also fortunate that Themistocles'
rascality prevailed until 480. Greece owes him an eternal debt
for its salvation. His case proved that in history justness and
honesty are not always virtues.

The third political person active during the time men­
tioned by name by the ancient sources is Xanthippus. (The order
in which the four major personalities are described does not neces­sarily imply their age or date of entrance in the political arena.
Miltiades and Xanthippus were older than Themistocles and Aristi­
des. They were also engaged in politics earlier.) He was the son
of Ariphron. He was a friend of Cleisthenes whose niece he had
married. Aristotle 1 makes him the successor of Cleisthenes in the
leadership of the popular party before Aristides and Themistocles.
We have a strange situation here and the above statement of Aris­totle does not clarify things; it befuddles them. Xanthippus may
have been older than the other two, but he was active down to the
470's. 2 Herodotus unfortunately again fails us at this point.
He does not bypass an opportunity to mention his name in relation
with some Athenian accomplishment, but on the question of his

1Ath. Pol. 28,2. 2Hdt IX, 114,2; 120,4.
political orientation prior to the 480's and 490's Herodotus is mute.¹ Xanthippus was married to Agariste, the daughter of Hippocrates. It is interesting to note that from now on the famous house of the Alcmeonids is going to continue its prominence, not by its male line but through its female branch. Herodotus strongly emphasizes this fact not only by his silence concerning the Alcmeonid males, but chiefly with the dream of Agariste just before the birth of Pericles. Another prominent Alcmeonid woman was Isodike, the woman who kept the erotically frivolous Cimon, the son of Miltiades, prisoner to her charms till his death.²

The mother of Alcibiades, that playboy and pest of the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War was a granddaughter of Cleisthenes, the reformer. It is logical to surmise that Xanthippus was a partisan of Cleisthenes and his reforms. As a member of the Alcmeonid family he was an opponent of their rivals, the Philaids.³

In 493 he must have participated in the indictment of Miltiades. What was therefore his relation to the popular party and the other two leaders of that party? What was his attitude toward the Athenian foreign policy in relation to Persia? Strange as it may appear on the surface, Herodotus, the narrator of Agariste's dream, does not say. But the strangeness is only superficial.

¹Hdt VI, 131, 136; VII, 33; VIII, 131; IX, 114, 120.
²Cimon married Isodike, whose father, Euryptolemos, the son of Megacles, was a member of the Alcmeonid clan. Plutarch, Cimon, 4-16. See also Hignett, op. cit., note J, p. 396 for the problems connected with the date of their marriage.
³Ath. Pol. 28,2.
Herodotus who provides valuable tidbits of historical information elsewhere is deliberately silent here. The reason is not hard to surmise. Xanthippus had followed a dovish policy, like Megacles his brother-in-law, and had joined him in the indictment of Miltiades which was mainly a personal vendetta and which further discredited the Alcmeonids. It was probably this muddy affair and his dovish policy during the Ionian debacle that cost Xanthippus his party position. This can explain the general statement of Aristotle who makes Xanthippus leader of the people before Aristides and Themistocles. Xanthippus was exonerated afterwards by his participation in the Battle of Marathon. But even after the Battle of Marathon, while Herodotus seems to go out of his way to mention for us Aristides' ostracism¹ as well as Themistocles',² he says absolutely nothing about Xanthippus' or Megacles' ostracism.³

¹Hdt VIII, 79,1-2. ²Hdt VIII, 109,5. ³It is indeed fascinating to see how human beings succumb easily to nature's frailties. Herodotus' somewhat charming example is simultaneously instructing and amusing. Herodotus gives us as much information as he can on the various facets of his story. He demonstrates his mental and emotional predilections here not by deliberate falsification which would have been reprehensible—and he knows it—but by discreet silence. He mentions, for example, the struggle between Themistocles and Aristides (VIII, 79). In the same place, he also speaks of Aristides' ostracism. Further down (VIII, 109), while describing Themistocles' activities, he interpolates an invaluable piece of information for us but not necessarily indispensable to his story: the ostracism of Themistocles. It is worth noting that he mentions Xanthippus and some of his services on behalf of the city (Hdt VI, 131, 136; VII, 33; VIII, 131; IX, 114, 120). In a masterfully subtle and simple manner, he draws a picture of the unbribable character of Xanthippus (IX, 120) thereby lifting him into spheres far superior in this respect to the vulnerability of Themistocles. Yet in all references he glosses over in silence the ostracism of
I have already made reference to the fourth person dominant in Athens between 493-489. His arrival from the Chersonese in 493 exacerbated the already tense situation. Miltiades was born between 554-550. Thus he was the contemporary of Cleisthenes and Hippias. It seems that he was treated well by Hippias because between 528-516 he is in Athens. In 524 he was "elected" Archon.\(^1\) At this time, with the advice of Hippias he went to the Chersonese to take over the property of his uncle and oikistes, Miltiades Senior.\(^2\) It seems that an adventurer's blood ran in the veins of the Philaids because both Miltiadeses have been political wizards. They were the dare-devil types, the dynamic characters the likes of whom have built empires, conquered frontiers, founded dynasties. They were of the stuff that Zorba the Greek, Sir Francis Drake, etc., were made. If we are to believe Herodotus,\(^3\) Miltiades the younger made himself master of the Chersonese again by ruse. He continued to maintain his position with the aid of a mercenary force and a marriage alliance. In 514 he had advised the Ionian leaders to cut the bridges on the Danube and leave Darius stranded among the wild tribes of the Scythians.\(^4\) The story is of Xanthippus. The same, of course, is true about Megacles, the son of Hippocrates. He brings in his name and his aristocratic lineage as well as his and his family's many services to the state but not a word of his ostracism, even though it was a common secret (Hdt VI, 131).

\(^1\)Wade-Gery, op. cit., p. 156. Also Meritt, op. cit., pp. 61-62.

\(^2\)Hdt VI, 33-39.

\(^3\)Hdt VI, 39.

\(^4\)Hdt VI, 103-104.
course subject to dispute.¹

Wade-Gery suggests that Miltiades had agreed with the Scythians to break off the bridges of Darius. The plan was foiled only because the ruler of the Lamsakene disagreed.² He was loyal to Darius. After Hipparcurs' murder, Hippias allied with Darius through his daughter's marriage to the Lamsakene and broke off with Miltiades. This does not explain, however, why the Lamsakene did not betray Miltiades to Darius. If he did so Miltiades would not have been able to stay in the Chersonese longer. Wells believes the story that Miltiades left the Chersonese and returned there at the time of the Ionian revolt.³ Nepos, who makes Miltiades retire to Athens on the return of Darius from Scythia, is simply not reliable.⁴ The story is not unlike Miltiades' character and Herodotus who is guilty usually for crimes of omission may be right after all.

In 493 Miltiades is back in Athens. He had participated in the Ionian revolt and is forced to flee the Chersonese after the collapse of the revolt.⁵ His adventures in the Chersonese and his contacts with the Persians had enriched his military knowledge. Like Philip of Macedon later he had done his military apprenticeship abroad, and he was going to use that military

---

¹Wade-Gery, op. cit., pp. 158-159, accepts it as true.
²Hdt VI, 41,3.
⁴Nepos, Miltiades, 3.6.
⁵Hdt VI, 104,1.
knowledge for the salvation of Athens. But this is a later story. For the time being he found himself facing a trial because of his behavior in the Chersonese. At least this was the charge. The real motives however were personal. Who were his accusers. We do not exactly know. Herodotus is again silent. If we elaborate on his silence as we have done before, we are forced to conclude that Herodotus is silent on purpose. The purpose of course is that he is covering up for some people in this messy affair, and these people naturally are again the Alcmeonids and their allies. It is otherwise unthinkable that Herodotus who knows and says so many things about the Philaids, some of these of doubtful nature, would have omitted to provide the names in this drama. Besides the Alcmeonids there might have been others. These would be the Athenians who had lived or had interests in the Chersonese and disliked Miltiades' despotic rule. H. Berve does not doubt that Miltiades committed foolish acts when he succeeded to the rule of the Chersonese. Those who advocated a propitiatory policy toward Persia would have a reason to join in the accusation of Miltiades, even though most of them would be the partisans of the Alcmeonids and Hipparchus. Those who must have accused Miltiades for his conduct toward them in the Chersonese had an indirect but

1Hdt VI, 104,2.  
2Hdt VI, 104,4.  
3Hdt IV, 137-138; VI, 34, 39-41, 103, 104, 109, 110, 132, 137, 140.  
5Busolt, op. cit., p. 566; Meyer, op. cit., p. 184; De-Sanctis, op. cit., p. 365; CAH, IV, 189; Beloch, op. cit., p. 20.
pertinent bearing on the case. The nature of his rule in the abstract, despotic or not, had really no legal foundation and could not be adjudicated by an Athenian court. There was no law that defined the nature of government abroad, especially when it concerned a non-Athenian territory, like the Chersonese. But if legally Miltiades' opponents had no case, in reality they fired a warning salvo across the bow of the Athenian political ship. This pertained to Miltiades' despotic tendencies and his identification with a lengthy tyrannical rule. If democracy is a way of life, so is tyranny and so far Miltiades' way of life was dictatorial. A warning was not entirely out of place twenty years after the tyrannies in Athens. The court was not convinced and Miltiades was freed, with the aid perhaps of Themistocles who was the Archon of that year and whose anti-Persian faction must have welcomed Miltiades' presence. He was subsequently elected one of the strategoi by the Athenians till his death in 489.

1 Glotz, op. cit., p. 30, mistakenly says that Xanthippus was the Archon of the year.

2 Berve thinks that after the Archonship of Themistocles the oligarchic party of the μνώτιμοι under Miltiades' guidance became the dominant power in Athens. They turned toward Sparta for help; hence the future philo-Spartan policy of Cimon and the cooling off of the relationship between Miltiades and Themistocles who owed loyalty to no one. Berve, op. cit., p. 70. Wells, op. cit., p. 112, makes Miltiades leader of the paralioi. Berve ascribes to the dominance of Miltiades the decision to go out and fight the Persians at Marathon, instead of staying in the city. This decision was not, he says, a decision to be taken by the generals but by the people. Miltiades in his capacity of a leader of the people urged them to go out and fight (Berve, op. cit., p. 77). That the Spartans were the only Greeks, outside of Plataea, who volunteered to help the Athenians is also attributed to Miltiades' policy (ibid., p. 75). Also the proposal to free the slaves in order to fight and to honor those who would fall in
The Athenians should have deduced from the proceeding of the trial one cardinal lesson. Miltiades was like a stallion whose effervescent power should be harnessed for the welfare of his state and his own well being. They did harness his power during the Battle of Marathon, and it produced marvels. Then, flushed by the effects of victory, they let him loose and an explosion took place.

This brings us to the next important episode of Athenian history, soon after the Battle of Marathon, the Parian Expedition. Even though this affair is not free of dispute, we have more light because Herodotus broke his silence and discussed it. Miltiades was the hero of Marathon. His military astuteness saved Athens from the Persian danger in 490. And so "The fame of Miltiades, which had before been great at Athens, was increased." He told them that he wanted a fleet of seventy ships with an armed force and money, without informing them what he intended to do with this force. He only promised them that he intended to make them rich. Seventy ships, before the construction of their Armada of two hun-

the battle alike with free Athenian citizenship was Miltiades' idea (ibid., p. 77).

1 Hdt VI, 132, 133, 136. Nepos, Miltiades, 7,8.

2 Hdt VI, 132,1.

...καὶ πρῶτον εὐδοκιμεῖν παρὰ Ἀθηναίοις, τότε μᾶλλον αὔεστο.

3 Hdt VI, 132.

αἰτήσας δὲ νέας ἐπιδομῆς καὶ στρατηγοῦ τε καὶ χρήματα Ἀθηναίοις, οὐ φράσας ὥσπερ ὑπὲρ ἐπι-
στρατευόμεν ταὶ καὶ χώρῃσι, ἀλλὰ ϕάσας ἀφοῦ καταπληκτεῖν ἔνοι ἔπωνται Ἀθηναίοι δὲ τούτοις ἔ̶παρθένες πα-
ρέδωσαν.
dred, was probably all the naval force of Athens. They delivered it into the hands of Miltiades. What was the purpose of all this? Herodotus states that the motives of Miltiades were personal.¹

There is also another explanation. There are those who agree with Ephorus that the Parian expedition was an effort on the part of the Athenians to establish their predominance in the Cyclades.² Nepos, who, according to How,³ follows Ephorus, spells out as the motives of the expedition a general commission to punish the islands which had medized and a public policy of establishing Athenian power in the Cyclades. The concealment of the object of the expedition ascribed to Miltiades by Herodotus⁴ would therefore be the only way of preventing its betrayal to the Persians and the islanders and might be absolutely essential to the success of the enterprise.⁵ It is an ingenious argument indeed, but its correctness is to be doubted on two counts. The argument anticipates events that happened a decade later. The Athenians did not have plans of expansion in the Aegean Sea yet. Berve⁶ doubts if the Athenians, who could not defeat the Aeginitans, could hope

---

¹ Hdt VI, 135. A personal vendetta against the Parians.


³ How, op. cit., p. 59.

⁴ Hdt VI, 132.

⁵ How, op. cit., p. 59, does not accept this line of thought.

⁶ Berve, Miltiades, op. cit., p. 77.
to subdue the islands. He does not believe that their navy was strong enough for such an undertaking. We have therefore to accept Herodotus' explanation of the expedition. Miltiades would get his personal grudge satisfied while the Athenians lined their pockets with a few talents. He thought that this was a fair bargain until the scheme collapsed and Miltiades had to pay with his money, his honor, and his life.

It seems that Miltiades had hoped that a show of force would accomplish his goal.\(^1\) To his chagrin, the Parians decided to resist and neither Miltiades nor the Athenian navy were prepared logistically and psychologically for a protracted siege. To make matter worse, Miltiades received a wound and this added to the campaign's ill-luck. Miltiades returned a broken man.\(^2\) There was much resentment against him. Xanthippus exploited the turn of sentiment against Miltiades and called for his punishment.\(^3\) Again I think we should pause here and ponder some of the ramifications of the whole episode because it could provide us with valuable insights to the Greek mentality and the nature of Athenian political "psyche."

The Greeks were an emotional people. They could love one and be blind to all his faults, but with an equal force they could

\(^1\) Hdt VI, 133. 
\(^2\) Hdt VI, 135,1. 
\(^3\) Hdt VI, 136,1.
hate someone and disregard the commands of reason. Immediately after Marathon Miltiades became their idol. He asked them to put at his disposal their entire force, and they did. They were promised money, and they asked no questions. The decision of the Athenians is here of the utmost importance. There is an essential constitutional question involved here for which the democracy of Athens was squarely responsible for the sake of its own welfare. Miltiades may have acted as a "corsair," but Miltiades was the type to behave in this pattern.¹ It can be argued that the Athenians by placing their entire force at his command thoughtlessly placed their constitution also at his mercy. The example of Pisistratus who only with a bodyguard upset the constitution in 562 should not have been lost to them, if they were really constitutionally minded.² I do not doubt that the opposition must have raised this point now as well as in 493, but the Athenians overlooked it. From this vantage, then, the attitude of the opposition could be justified. Miltiades loved power and was exactly the sort of stuff out of which tyrants are made.³ He had made himself tyrant in the Chersonese and there is no reason that he should not try it in Athens. The prosecution had raised that point in the 493 trial against him.⁴ Those who must have objected to the expedition⁵ must have raised this point. The Athenians

¹Glotz, op. cit., p. 39, says that Miltiades acted here, as always, like a corsair.
³Hdt VI, 39, 2.
⁴Hdt VI, 104, 2.
⁵The ancient sources are not clear on this point, but absolute unanimity is well-nigh impossible. Xanthippus must have had his reservations before.
refused to heed the lessons of history. They were overwhelmed by the success of Marathon. They were not willing to listen to the reasonable objection that such an eventuality was possible. Otherwise, they would not have conceded to him without adequate guarantees. Whatever reservations they might have had were overpowered by the thought of money thrown before them by Miltiades. Justly, Herodotus concludes with a slight touch of cynicism that "The Athenians being thus assured, gave him [the ships]."\(^1\) In free states the responsibility for decisions taken collectively is equally universal. The Athenians were asked to decide upon the proposal of Miltiades. The debate was openly conducted in the ecclesia, and the ecclesia adopted the proposal foregoing the moot point, the purpose and destination of the expedition. The responsibility, therefore, is theirs as well as Miltiades'. Xanthippus, if petty, at least was consistent with himself and his family's inveterate hatred of the Philaid.\(^2\) The murmurs, complaints, the gossip of the Athenian citizens about Miltiades' deceitfulness showed only their irresponsibility, irrationality, and erratic behavior. Miltiades was made the sacrificial victim for his own fault as well as the people's superficiality.\(^3\) That some of the rumors about bribe were unfounded can be demonstrated by the inability of the Spartans to unseat Polycrates of Samos

---

\(^1\) **Hdt VI, 132.**
\[Δήμαρχοι δὲ τούτοις ἐπαρθέντες παρέδωσαν.\]

\(^2\) Since he was married to one of the Alcmeonid family, he was part of it.

\(^3\) **CAH, IV, 70.**
which had led to the same accusations of bribery.\(^1\) The Athenians were so anxious to punish the culprit, their former hero, that they would not postpone the trial for medical reasons. Had they been able to wait for a while, nature would have spared them the embarrassment—which they did not feel anyway. Xanthippus, riding high on the public wave of resentment, asked for the penalty of death.\(^2\) So intense were political passions and personal hatred! According to Herodotus, who seems to have no compunctions about naming the role of the Alcmeonids in this case, the Athenians, who were deceived in their hopes for easy wealth, decided to punish their former idol with a fine of fifty talents.\(^3\) Plato gives us a different version, less flattering to the Athenian demos. He says that the Athenians voted to throw Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, into the pit, "and had the president [prytanis] not intervened on his behalf, he would have been thrown in it."\(^4\)

\(^1\)The prosecution may have based its case on certain laws. "You have an ancient law, one held in great respect, that if anyone deceives the people by false promises, he shall be brought to trial, and if convicted shall be punished with death" (ἔστιν ὑμῖν νόμος ἀρχαῖος, τῶν καλῶς ὀνοματικῶν ἔχειν, ἃν τὰς ὑποσχέμενος τι τὸν ὁμον ἐξαπατήσῃ κρίνειν... Demosthenes against Leptines, 135. Also, "There is a law that if anyone deceive the people by false promises he shall be brought to trial" νόμων ὄντων, ἕαν τις τὸν ὁμον ὑποσχεμένος ἐξαπατήσῃ, εἰς-αγγελιάν εἰναι περὶ αὐτόν. J. H. Lipsius, Das Attische Recht und Rechts Verfahren (Leipzig: O. R. Reisland, 1905), I, 180.

\(^2\)Hdt VI, 136,1.

\(^3\)Hdt VI, 136,3.

CHAPTER V

THE RASH OF OSTRACISM

Our condottiero was gathered to his forefathers soon after the trial. His death was a fitting epitome to his turbulent life. He had lived by the sword and died from a campaign wound. The Athenians made him a scapegoat for his Parian miscalculation and their own thoughtlessness and disappointment. The reverberations of the trial, however, were to echo throughout the decade. The Parian fiasco numbed the war party into silence temporarily only. They had no arguments to defend Miltiades' ignominy. Only some of his friends would enumerate his past achievement on behalf of Athens. But the political pot was boiling, and the death of Miltiades was going to exacerbate the political enmities that existed among the Athenians. This is obvious. It is to be deduced from the political events that followed otherwise we have no data on Miltiades. We have no details. Herodotus again is silent about such a politically fertile decade. Two years after the burial of Miltiades, Hipparchus was exiled from Athens by the law of ostracism enacted earlier. Why Hipparchus? We must go back for a while if we are to understand the circumstances of his banishment. Aristotle's evidence is not clear. We can only deduce that if Hipparchus were to be ostracized in the last decade of the sixth century the act would have been completely illogical and unjust, on the evidence of Aristotle. He might have been a relative of

1Hdt VI, 136,2. 2Ath. Pol. 22,4.
Hippias, but Aristotle states categorically that he had not participated in their "evil deeds." How could Cleisthenes then move for the expulsion of an innocent man? He did not. Kagan proposes another solution to the problem.\(^1\) Hipparchus was an active party leader in the time of Cleisthenes and the latter passed the law of ostracism against Hipparchus. Hipparchus, however, was left an alternative. He had the opportunity to cooperate with the party of Cleisthenes and forego ostracism or persist in his opposition and take the risk of exile. Thus with the threat of ostracism hanging constantly over his head Cleisthenes was able to check the political ambitions of Hipparchus and his party and to force him into a coalition based on their mutual opposition to oligarchy. Hipparchus was spared in this manner from ostracism.\(^2\) The argument is an excellent piece of historical conjecture. It goes without saying, of course, that there does not exist even the slightest shred of evidence to support this view. I cannot, however, for one accept it. I must seek therefore the explanation for Hipparchus' expulsion elsewhere. Hipparchus was not, in my estimation, banished, because Cleisthenes, his contemporary, knew fully well that this would have been a grossly unjust act. Hipparchus had done nothing inimical to the Athenian policy.\(^3\) His relation to Hippias was simply an accident of birth. Cleisthenes who was a moderate man and had wished to let sleeping dogs sleep could not arbitrarily submit Hipparchus to such an unfair ordeal. So far the expla-


\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) Ath. Pol. 22, 4.
nation of Aristotle is correct.\(^1\) Aristotle's statement that ostracism was passed with Hipparchus specifically in mind is, at its best, doubtful, and at its worse an ex post facto statement.\(^2\) But then Hipparchus could not have been dragged out of his mothballs in 488/7 to satisfy the revengeful feelings of the political factions in Athens for at least two reasons: first, because the issues of the 480's bore little relation to the issues of the 510's. Secondly, because to condemn a political nonentity would have been no revenge but a "pseudo-revenge." The Athenian politicians were out for blood and not for dead carcasses. If Hipparchus had not been active in Athenian politics for many years he would have been politically decolorized. The Athenians could not have turned their rage against a political nonentity. It follows then that Hipparchus had not been politically inactive. He was an Archon in 496 representing, as I mentioned above, a "rapprochement" policy.\(^3\)

During the events of Marathon, Hipparchus was not mentioned anywhere. This does not constitute an argument against him, but there is a possibility, a possibility which I accept as true, that Hipparchus carried his "propitiatory" policies to the point of non participation. The story of the shield,\(^4\) true or not, was circulated only because there were elements in Athens on whom such an accusation could be ascribed and Hipparchus could have been one

---

\(^1\) Ath. Pol. 22,4.  
\(^2\) Ath. Pol. 22,4.  
\(^3\) See above p. 45; Dionysios Halicarnassus. Antiquities VI, I. Busolt, op. cit., p. 378, fnt. 2.  
\(^4\) Hdt VI, 121,1; 123,1; 124,2.
of them. This is not all. Hipparchus was also a relative of Hippias, and Hippias had accompanied the Persians to Greece. He had conducted them to Marathon, waiting for the fifth-column to join him. It is only natural that the Athenians' hatred for the traitor Hippias reflected on his relatives, especially the most exposed to the public eye. Hipparchus was vulnerable and the war party knew it. They decided to strike at their opposition, and Hipparchus was a logical choice. We do not know who resuscitated the law of ostracism. It would not be out of line to hypothesize that Miltiades' partisans were in agreement with the proposal.

The partisans of Miltiades' party found the opportunity to avenge his condemnation. Professor Kagan describes the judicious use of ostracism as a tribute to Themistocles' political acumen. He considers the choice of Hipparchus as a master stroke that seemed as an act of patriotism. I have already described the choice as an excellent one. That the war party with which Themistocles was also associated was behind this act admits to doubt. But that the rash of ostracisms that took place in this decade were products of political astuteness is a question of debatable nature. Ostracism did not eliminate the opposition but a single leader. Often if misused, and it was misused even in this decade as we

---

1 His father had landed in Marathon where he was joined by groups who came from the city and marched triumphantly in the city to become its tyrants.

2 Hdt VI, 107.


4 Ibid.
shall see, it strengthened political intolerance to a degree that was fateful to the Greeks. Finally, it deprived the individual of ten years of his life for no crime whatsoever, but simply because of his political ideology and his courage to express publicly his ideas.

The next person to be ostracized is Megacles, a nephew of Cleisthenes. The evidence again is meager. The circumstances, nonetheless, point to similar causes for his expulsion. Aristotle\(^1\) makes him a friend of the tyrants. No other information is given by him as to his politics prior to the exile. Herodotus describes\(^2\) him as the son of Hippocrates, grandson of Megacles, brother of Agariste. This definitely identified him as an Alcmeonid—if any identification were needed. Herodotus, however, following his customary discreet silence on many of the facets of the turbulent Alcmeonid history does not mention his ostracism or his political career. He believed that what the people did not know would not hurt them, and that if he kept his peace perhaps posterity might know only the Alcmeonids' contribution.\(^3\) This means that Herodotus did not consider their part during this perilous time something for which History, Herodotus, or the Alcmeonids could feel justifiable pride in recording it in the diptychs of history.

It seems that Megacles subscribed to the policy of accom-

\(^1\) *Ath. Pol.* 22,5-6. \(^2\) *Hist* VI, 131,2. 

\(^3\) How true this could prove is evident from the case of Cleisthenes. We do not know anything about his later years and his death. If Aristotle did not mention in passing the ostracism of Megacles, we would have been equally in the dark.
modation. This is the meaning of Aristotle's categorization of Megacles as the friend of the tyrants. The Alcmeonids had not been the friends of the tyrants before, and they had won for that the designation of misotyrannoi for which they felt proud. Nor is the classification of Megacles among the friends of the tyrants entirely fair. Megacles might have sided with the appeasement party. This, however, does not mean that he was pro-Persian or for tyranny. In retrospect, his foreign policy was a failure, but only in retrospect. Had Athens been defeated historians might have argued—if the Greeks as a subject were worth arguing about—that an accommodation with Persia would not have been such a monstrous idea. The motives of Megacles might have been misguided therefore, but we have no reason to describe them as treacherous. Themistocles, Miltiades, and the other anti-Persian leaders proved to have a better instinct in these matters.2

This is not though the only mistake of Megacles. Megacles became a bitter man and refused to participate in the Battle of Marathon. We have no explicit statement of his non-participation, but the sources that should have mentioned with pride such a patri-

1 Hdt VI, 121,1; 123,1.

2 A similar modern analogue could be drawn in the case of Vietnam and the opposition to the U.S. policy by many so-called liberals. One may disagree with them and the correctness of their attitude, but no one could easily lump them as traitors because they oppose their government's official policy. In the same manner one should not classify Megacles and those who followed a policy of accommodation as traitors. Misguided they might have been but not necessarily traitors. The Athenians did not see things in this light, however, and the persecution of Megacles and the others was a natural result.
otic contribution are again silent. Pindar praises the house of Megacles as the most illustrious in whole Greece.\(^1\) In support of his eulogy he refers to the role of the Alcmeonids in rebuilding the Delphic Temple but says nothing about Marathon. Why? There are two explanations. The first is that Pindar was a pacifist himself and had no liking for war—any war.\(^2\) The other, and the most crucial, is that the Alcmeonids' role in Marathon was nothing to boast about. Pindar was retained by the Alcmeonids to praise their victories and had to sever his ideas from theirs. He would be obliged to mention their part in Marathon as he mentioned Megacles' Pythian victory, but unfortunately there was no part to mention.\(^3\) Lastly, their Pythian victory and their connection with

---

\(^1\)Pindar, *Pythian Ode*, VII; Hdt VI, 121-127.

\(^2\)Another instance that pacifism, even though it might have lofty motives, if it is not based on a realistic appraisal of the situation can be catastrophic.

\(^3\)C. A. M. Fennell, *Pindar Olympian and Pythian Odes* (Cambridge: University Press, 1893), "Pythian Ode," VII. The Pythian in honor of Megacles' victory was written c. 486 only months after Megacles was ostracized, perhaps because of it. Pindar makes no mention of his ostracism. Willamowitz makes the interesting comment about ostracism in connection with Megacles. He says that ostracism did not deprive the ostracized person or his family of their honor or property. On the contrary, it was a mark of personal distinction. In the case of Megacles, it was intended more against his family than his person. This is probably true. I will only add here that Megacles was probably the most active political member of his family and so ostracism was directed against him. In some way the above statement of Willamowitz strengthens my suspicion that the Athenians struck at their distinguished members leaving only mediocre and political non-entities. Fortunately they had no dearth of able men. Willamowitz-Möllendorf, *Pindaros* (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1922), p. 154.

Along with wrangling over Miltiades' affair and the anti-Persian policy, the reforms of 487 may have a lot to do with the intense political feeling that ended up with the multiple ostra-
the medizing Delphians is collateral evidence of their neutrality during the Marathon campaign.

The Marathon episode glossed over in silence, Herodotus takes up the mysterious shield episode. Herodotus oddly enough does not deny it. He grasps the episode to dispel the rumors in connection with the Alcmeonids and to deny the theory that they are friends of the tyrants. The statement that follows gives out more hints than Herodotus intends. "My (one will say), but they bore perhaps some grudge against the Athenian communality, and therefore betrayed their country. But there were none at Athens that were of better repute than they." I think that Herodotus here, by denying it, actually betrays the fact that the Alcmeonids were angry against what they believed to be the ungrateful demos, consequently they abstained from the events of the 490's. Herodotus' arguments against the truth of the charge are not conclusive and have not been accepted by all scholars. I personally believe that the Alcmeonids were not responsible for the shield cisms. In such a case, Hipparchus, Megacles and even Xanthippus might have represented the conservative views.

Raubitschek claims that Xanthippus may have been the leader of the Democratic reforms in 487. Raubitschek, "The Ostracism of Xanthippus," op. cit., pp. 257-262. The fact that Aristides opposed the Naval Bill indicates that he was against reform.

1Hdt VI, 121,1; 123,1; 124,2.

2Hdt VI, 124,1.

3Fennell, op. cit., p. 231.
and they were simply suspected because of their conduct before the war and during it.\(^1\) True or not the story must have been believed by many in Athens and served its purpose, namely to discredit the Alcmeonids. It must have weighed heavily on the minds of those who cast their vote for Megacles' banishment. And so Megacles was made an outcast. Another member of the irrepressible generation that followed Cleisthenes was out of commission. It is an ironic conclusion to the career of the nephew of the man who originated ostracism. It is also an ironic twist of fate for an institution that was invented for the protection of democracy. The instrument devised for the would-be tyrants becomes in the Democracy the organ of the majority for the extirpation of the minority views!

We have to proceed. The decade suffered from an epidemic of ostracism. The next victim of ostracism named by Aristotle was Xanthippus, "who was unconnected with the tyrants."\(^2\) What was responsible for his ostracism? The statement of Aristotle does not give us a clue. Herodotus again remains silent. Xanthippus was not only a member of the Alcmeonid family by marriage but he was also the father of Pericles, a personal friend of Herodotus. So Herodotus has an additional reason to be careful. The fact that Xanthippus was allied to the Alcmeonid family militates against him in the 580's. He could be accused by extrapolation. Xanthippus, however, had in his favor the fact that he was in 490

\(^1\)There is also the possibility that the story of the shield might have been circulated by Miltiades' party in their struggle against the opposition.

\(^2\)Ath. Pol. 22, 7.
connected with the anti-Persian struggle and probably played a prominent role in the battle.¹ This enabled him to take the initiative in 489 against Miltiades. Had he not fought at Marathon, he would not have dared to raise his head against the popular hero. The same fact, however, must have exposed him to the hatred of Miltiades’ party and generally to the anti-Persian party. The beginning of his problems which resulted later in his ostracism lies here.

Xanthippus’ political position is not very clear. Raubitschek makes him definitely belong to the democratic party along with Aristides and Themistocles.² An inscription discovered in the 1949’s complicates further the case of Xanthippus. The inscription reads as follows: \( \chi\sigma\alpha\nu\theta(\iota\pi\pi\omicron\omicron) \) (\( \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha \) \( \phi\epsilon\sigma\iota\nu \) \( \alpha\lambda\epsilon\iota\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu \) \( \pi\rho\upsilon(\tau\alpha) \) \( \nu\epsilon\tau\omicron\nu \) \( \tau^{'\delta\sigma\tau\rho\alpha(\kappa\omicron\nu \ '\alpha\rho\omicron' \ ) \) \( \phi\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \) \( \pi\alpha\tau\delta\alpha \) \( \mu\alpha(\lambda)\iota\sigma\tau^{'\delta\omicron\iota\kappa\epsilon\iota\nu}. \)

Raubitschek suggests that \( \pi\rho\upsilon\tau\alpha\nu\epsilon\iota\omicron \) be taken as the "inner" object of \( \delta\omicron\iota\kappa\epsilon\iota\nu \) substituted for the usual \( \pi\delta\lambda \nu \) (or \( \delta\eta\mu\omicron\omicron \ )) to satisfy poetic diction. He then suggests that Xanthippus may have been attacked for violating the sanctity of the \( \pi\rho\upsilon\tau\alpha\nu\epsilon\iota\omicron \), the Sacred Hearth.³ Oscar Broneer claims that by \( \text{prytaneon} \) here is meant Public Kitchen. Hence Xanthippus became a parasite who ate long at public expense. He notes that there is nothing known about the operation of public meals in the early fifth century to

---


³Ibid., pp. 257-262.
which the ostracon belongs. But at the time of Aristophanes the abuse had become a public scandal. Aristophanes (Knights, 280-281) denounces the Paphlagon, i.e. Cleon, for running to the prytyaneion with an empty belly and coming out with a full stomach. Broneer says that the spectators knew that the public kitchen was referred to here. To dine in the prytyaneion was a coveted reward for Athenian politicians. Xanthippus, who was eating at the prytyaneion is here cursed for his rascality. For a long time he had abused Athenian hospitality. In reference to Raubitschek's Sacred Hearth, Broneer sees no such profanation recorded elsewhere. He surmises therefore that no such meaning was intended by the potsherd.

Eugene Schweigert does not agree with Broneer. He thinks that the text of the inscription is an elegiac couplet. Its style is too lofty for ostraca where in general the writers were illiterate. The crux of the problem lies in the word πρυτανέτον. He believes that it should actually be the genitive plural of this word. Xanthippus becomes "a curse of the leaders," a common poetic usage, he says. The ostracon therefore asserts that Xanthippus, the son of Arriphron, has become especially harmful as a curse of the leaders. The leader that comes to mind is Miltiades. We may then suppose, according to Schweigert, that the writer of the ostracon was a partisan of Miltiades who was now voting for the

---

expulsion of Xanthippus for his role in the trial of Miltiades.¹

The last person mentioned by Aristotle as exiled prior to Salamis was Aristides. In the interval between the banishment of Xanthippus and the ostracism of Aristides an important event occurred which was going to contribute to the salvation of Athens and of all Greece, though the Athenians did not realize it and the other Greeks were not even aware of it. This is the discovery of the mines of Maroneia from where the city made a tremendous profit.² Athenians looking for quick riches even since the time of the Parian expedition, recommended the distribution of money. It was an unorthodox proposal. Themistocles had different ideas, and he blocked it. He counter-proposed that the money be entrusted to the hundred richest men in Athens, one talent each, and if the manner in which the money was spent pleased the people "the investment of the money on behalf of the city was well done; if the people failed to agree with the way the money was invested, then they would return the money to the creditors."³ Regardless of the results that the proposal produced, the proposal itself is a curious one. How did the leader of the popular party convince the people to go along with this puzzling suggestion, Aristotle does

¹Eugene Schweigert, "Xanthippos Ostracon," AJA, LIII (1949), 266-267. This is congruent with my assertion that the partisans of Miltiades were chiefly responsible for the first ostracisms mentioned by Aristotle. Their motives were primarily personal, the revenge of Miltiades' condemnation engineered by the Alcmeonids.

²Ath. Pol. 22,7; Hdt VII, 144,1; Thuc. I, 14.


τῆς πέλεως εἶναι τὴν δαπάνην, εἰ δὲ μὴ κομίσωσθαί τὰ χρήματα παρὰ τῶν δανεισμένων.
not indicate. What the relations were between the leader of the people's party and the great "capitalists," who, one might expect, did not belong to his party is a mystery that only a devilish person like Themistocles could answer. Why did the money men of Athens consent to the scheme, and what profit they believed they would derive beyond the promotion of the state's welfare is to us an enigma. The people adopted Themistocles' advice and a coalition between the people's party and the wealthy Athenians was formed. It shows again that the lines among parties were never rigidly delimited in the Athenian state.

The proposal itself, to say the least, was constitutionally highly ambivalent. But then the Athenian voters were "open-minded" people and never argued over "petty" constitutional points. The case of Miltiades earlier who refused to divulge the purpose of his expedition was not dissimilar to Themistocles' case now, who refused to state the purpose for the distribution of money among the Athenian rich men. Yet the people espoused the proposal. So quickly history's lessons are forgotten! The world goes blundering on!

Themistocles' refusal to explain his plans was due, partly

---

1 Ath. Pol. 22,7.
3 Ath. Pol. 22,7. I think that Themistocles was trying to accomplish two things here. First to ingratiate himself to his natural political enemies by placing his trust in them for the success of his plan, and secondly to convince the people to go along with the plan.
at least, to the well-known fact that Aristides would object to the construction of the navy.\(^1\) No doubt, Aristides must have objected not only to the Navy Bill, but also to the invidious proposal. From hindsight, Themistocles' insight has been justified, and the world is thankful to him. But this is only from hindsight. The proposal may have been comparable to the genius of the man who initiated it. But looked upon from the standpoint of the pre-Salamis period, Aristides was not entirely wrong. It does not matter. Themistocles had his way, and Aristides was ostracized.\(^2\) Later, he may have been the first to admit that he was wrong opposing the Naval Bill.

Now that the fourth person mentioned by Aristotle has been ostracized, I think it behooves us to stop briefly and contemplate what ostracism meant. Hignett believes that the law of ostracism was rightly invoked against Aristides after his ill-timed opposition to the proposal on which the salvation of Athens in the impending war was dependent.\(^3\) It is indeed self-evident that the salvation of Greece was achieved mainly by the Athenian ships. This certain knowledge is, however, from hindsight. I am concerned with the rightness of Aristides' ostracism or not, and the wisdom of ostracism in the 480's. From the very same fact that Themistocles was able to navigate Aristides' ostracism through the Assembly, I am inclined to think that he could have passed his Naval

---

Bill despite Aristides' objections. If so, then why ostracize a man who by character would have abided by the people's decision anyway? One could say at this point that in ostracizing Aristides Themistocles managed to muzzle the opposition with one blow.¹ I must be permitted to have my doubts on this. Greeks are not so easily shaken from their obstinancy. On the other hand, ostracism deprived the state of the services of able men if we are to judge from Aristides' and Xanthippus' post-Salamis performances. What is more important, is the fact that the clause on ostracism as interpreted in the 480's was a flagrant misinterpretation of constitutional theory. Ostracism was not meant to be by its founder a weapon against democracy but an organ for its protection. It was not designed to serve as an instrument against free expression by the opposition, but a shield from the would-be tyrants. We do not have information on Cleisthenes' view, but he might have thought that variety of opinion did no harm to democracy and this is the reason why he did not employ it as a weapon against his opponents. Ostracism, at its worst, increased intolerance; at its best, it is to be doubted for its effectiveness.

CHAPTER VI

THE BANDWAGON

While an ostracophoria was directed against one person or was a contest between two or more, in practice there was no obligation on the part of the voter to cast his ballot against any one of them. He was free to write the name of anyone whom he wished to see banished. The major candidates of ostracism in the 480's are known to us from history, mainly from Aristotle's Athenian Politeia. Besides these historical references, a great number of ostraca dug up since the 1930's have shed ample light to the institution of ostracism. One is virtually faced with a swarm of ostraca that bear names not otherwise known to us from history against whom perhaps only a few votes were cast. The fact that votes were cast against them is in itself evidence that the persons concerned with political men of some prominence in their day.¹

This further proves, if any further proof were needed, that the misapplication of the institution by the erratic Greeks tended to punish prominence and permitted the reign of the mediocre. A great many (524) ostraca were discovered in 1947, nearly as many as in all previous archaeological expeditions. All of them were found in the same general area, the deep valley between the Areopagus and the Hill of Nymphs. Most of the pieces came from a single large group consisting of 491 ostraca, the largest ever dis-

¹Eugene Vanderpool, "Some Ostraca from the Athenian Agora," Hesperia, VIII (Supplement, 1949), 394.
covered. The deposit from which they came was one meter by one and a half meters deep and six to eight meters across. It divided to three layers, all of them judged to be contemporary for ostraca with the same name appear in all three of them and there are instances in which fragments of the same ostraccon were found in different layers. The known names of the ostraca are all persons active in the early part of the fifth century. Among the new ostraca there were three "unique" and tantalizing pieces which bear the names apparently connected with the great Alcmeonid family. One of them reads Κλαλίσενος Κλεστένος which could be Kallixenos, son of Cleisthenes, probably an otherwise unknown son of Cleisthenes, the legislator. Another reads Άριστονύμο Καλ- λίσθένες perhaps a close relative of Kallixenos, son of Aristonymos, whose name appears frequently on ostraca of the late 480's of the fifth century. A third reads Κλισθένες Άρισνύ(μο) and may be interpreted either as Cleisthenes or Kallisthenes, son of Aristonymos.

In a pile of ostraca the name Acharnion Xypetaion appears 'Ἀχαρνίων (Χυπεταιων), a person not otherwise known. His name is unusual, hitherto reported only once. He was evidently active in politics in the 480's of the fifth century, and two ostraca bear his name. The ostraca were found on March 28, 1935,

---

2 Ibid., p. 193.  
3 Ibid.  
4 I. G. II², 7098.  
5 Vanderpool, op. cit., p. 394.
in Section B in the fill of the Porus Building South of the Tholos.  

The pottery from this fill was mostly of the early fifth century, though there were also fragments as late as about 420. The fill was probably a "Perserschutt" that was dug up in the last quarter of the fifth century and re-used as fill in the Porus building. It contained 56 ostraca, all but one of them early. 

These have the names of Themistocles (15), Kallixenos (7), Hipparchos (6), Aristides (6), Xanthippos (5), Boutalion (3), Megacles (2), Hippocrates Alkmeonidon (2), Hippocrates Anaxileo (2), Habron Hierocles, Kydrocles, Eratyllos, Dionysios and Acharnion, one each.

On June 12, 1939, in a deposit of sand in shallow channel in bedrock at the very bottom of the Great Drain which follows the bottom of the valley between the Areopagus and Kolonus Agoraius a deposit of ostraca was found containing the following names: Andronicko(s) (1). This person is not identified, although the name is not uncommon. There is no instances of it known from the fifth century. The circumstances however of finding this single ostracon with the name shows that the man was active in politics in the 480's of the fifth century. The other names that appear on ostraca are Themistocles (69), Kallixenus (45), Hippocrates Alk-

1 H. A. Thompson, Hesperia, Supplement IV (1940), p. 44.
3 Among them one ostracon of the later fifth century with the name of Charias of Paianius which may well have been cast in the ostracophoria of 417 was found in a disturbed part of this fill.
4 Ibid., p. 395.
meonidon Alopekethen (44), Aristides (2), Kyrocles (2), Habron (1), Erytlllls (1), a son of Hippocrates (1), and uncertain (6). 1

Found on February 21, 1938 in Section Z imbedded in the foundation of the North Wall of the Archaic building north of the Tholos was the fragment of an ostracon from the wall of a large closed pot with thin red glaze on the outside. The inscription is scratched on the inside ἈΡΕΧΕΝΩΣ ΦΙΛΟΣΕΝΟ (v) not otherwise known. We only gather that he must have been active in politics in the 480's of the fifth century as the circumstances of the discovery finding the sherd bearing his name indicate. 2

Another sherd was found near the road leading to the southwest corner of the Agora on June 11, 1935, in a mixed fill. The area of the fill produced many early fifth century ostraca. The letter forms suggest early fifth century but the names cannot be restored with certainty (Arist—— Charop – – ). 3 An inscription bearing the name Arista (ichmos?) Timo (Kratcus) is suspected to refer to the brother of Kyrokes mentioned above. 4 Two ostraca have been found for a certain Dionysius --- onou, who cannot be further identified. His own name is clear but that of his father's is doubtful. 5 The archaeological circumstances of finding the ostraca indicate again the 480's of the fifth century. 6 Eight other ostraca found in the

---

1Ibid. 2Ibid., pp. 395-396. 3Ibid., p. 396.
4See p. 98, above.
5Vanderpool (op. cit., pp. 396-397) suggests it could be Antigonos.
6Ibid., p. 397.
same deposit bear the names of Themistocles, Kallixenus, Hippocrates Alkmeonidou, Hydrcles and possibly Megacles. In a pile near the New Bouleuterion (Section B), on April 17, 1934, were found three ostraca the circumstances of which again indicate a date in the 480's of the fifth century. The name on the ostraca is Eartyllus Kattariou. Who this person was is not known. The name itself is rare and reported only once.\(^1\) Kattarias however is not reported, the name is unknown.\(^2\)

The cases can be extended.\(^3\) There are, however, some interesting possibilities that deserve to be mentioned. Hegestratus, son of Basimion who cannot be otherwise identified. The letter forms and the circumstances of the finding of the one of two ostraca with his name indicate a date in the early fifth century. A certain Hegestratus was Archon in 559/8 B.C. As the name is a rare one, it is not improbable that Archon Hegestratus is a descendant, perhaps a grandson of our Hegestratus,\(^4\) who was politically active in the early part of the century.

Three ostraca of the early fifth century mention Melanthius Phalanthou. The nature of the ostraca are common to the early fifth century. According to Herodotus,\(^5\) Melanthius was the name of the leader of the Athenian fleet of twenty ships dispatched to Miletus in 498 in support of the Ionian revolt. The ostraca therefore may refer to him.\(^6\) The 480's will be the logical period

---

\(^1\)Ibid. \(^2\)Ibid. for the details of this excavation. 
\(^3\)See Appendix, pp. 117-122. 
\(^4\)Vanderpool, op. cit., pp. 399-400. 
\(^5\)Hdt V, 97,3. \(^6\)Vanderpool, op. cit., p. 400.
of the ostraca since the other pro-Persian leaders were ostracized during this time. That means that the war party of Miltiades and Themistocles had cause to be displeased with the performance of Melanthius during the Ionian revolt. Of course, it could also be that Melanthius belonged to the appeasement party in the 490's and 480's. This exacerbated further the feelings of the war party against him.

The name most frequently mentioned on the ostraca found so far is the name of Themistocles. This is only befitting the nature of this intriguing man who was finally ostracized in the late seventies of the fifth century.\(^1\) Themistocles' ostracism in 472-1 was hardly the first attempt made to oust him. His turbulent political career as the leader of the popular party and his violent and wily nature brought him into constant clash with the opposing groups headed by men like Hipparchus, Megacles, Xanthippus, and Aristides who all went to exile in the 480's largely with the aid of the machinations of Themistocles and the war group. Ostraca

\(^1\)There is no absolute certainty for the date of his exile. One opinion based on Thucydides (I, 137) is that he was ostracized about 472-1 that the charge of complicity with Pausanias was brought against him about 466 and that he fled to Persia about 465, the year in which Artaxerxes succeeded Xerxes. From the evidence of Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 25, 3-5) on the other hand, it appears that he was in Athens in 462, and his ostracism cannot be consequently placed earlier than 462 and his flight to Persia about 460. This is irreconcilable with the statement of Thucydides (I, 137) that in his flight was almost seized by the Athenians engaged in the siege of Naxos which is generally assigned to the year 466 and most critics reject Aristotle's version. Oscar Broneer, "Excavations on the North Slope of the Acropolis," Hesperia, VII (1938), 242-243. See C. A. Robinson, Jr., "The Date of Themistocles Ostracism," AJPh, LXVII (1964, 265-266.
bearing his name were found also in a well alongside with those of Aristides, which means that he was a candidate alongside with Aristides.

Kallixenos' name, son of Aristonymus from the deme of Xypete, appears on no less than 251 ostraca. He thus ranks second only to Themistocles as the statesman whose name appears most frequently on the ostraca discovered up to 1950. All of the ostraca of Kallixenus were found in the Agora but not all come from a single deposit. The widespread of the ostraca and the large numbers indicate that we deal with a man very active in the political affairs of the city, for whose ostracism a concerted campaign must have been conducted in the ecclesia. In only a few instances the name of Kallixenus appears alone on an ostracon. In the great majority of sherds the name is accompanied by the patronymic, Aristonimou. On one ostracon (Nr. 29) the voter has scratched a head in a profile to the right, a head with a wreath and a long pointed beard. To the right on the head the name has been written in three lines Καλλίς(χοεντος) without the patronymic. The question then can be posed: Who was he? When did he live and why so many votes against him? There seems to be no question about his date. Many ostraca have been found in the same deposit along with ostraca of Aristides, Themistocles, and Hippocrates son of Alcmeonids, to mention only a few. Vanderpool, after close study of the

---


rectangular rock-cup in which the ostraca were found, attempted to fix the date as closely as possible. He suggested that Kallixenus may have been one of the principal "candidates" for ostracism in 483, though votes may have been cast against him on other occasions.¹ To Professor Vanderpool it seems probable that the majority of the ostraca on Kallixenus date from the ostracism of 482.² Another ostracon³ gives evident that enables us to identify his family. The clan or family is (ALK) meon (idou). He therefore belongs to the great and well-known family of the Alcmeonids. From other sources we know that the name Aristonymus was borne by the grandfather of Agariste of Sicyon who was married into the Alcmeonid family in an earlier generation.⁴ The use of the name of a Sicyonian forebearer would be quite a normal parallel in the case of Kleisthenes, the legislator. The precise place of Aristonymus in the Alcmeonid family is not sure, but he could have been an unknown younger brother of Cleisthenes⁵ who had established himself in Xypete some time before the reform of 508/7. There is another alternative that he may be connected with the female line.

Before I close this short excursion into the turbulent

³Thompson, Hesperia, Supplement IV, op. cit., p. 32, fig. 24.
⁴Hdt VI, 126,1.
⁵Stamires and Vanderpool, op. cit., p. 378.
period of 510-480, I would like to mention briefly the problem of Alkibiades the so-called Elder, who was supposedly ostracized in 485 after Megacles. The whole argument has risen from the short and unclear statement of Aristotle, "that for three years they exiled the friends of tyrants, on account of whom the ostracism was intended."\(^1\) The statement is lacking in clarity for several reasons. Aristotle does not say how Megacles and Hippocrates were friends of the tyrant. He names the two ostracized persons but does not name the third, if, that is, the Athenians ostracized three persons in three consecutive years. Further, he does not explain if he means that the interval between the ostracism of Hipparchus and that of Megacles was three years, let us say from 488 to 486, with no one for 487. The situation has produced a great deal of conjecturing, but there is no safe way to establish clear historicity of the facts to date. Vanderpool rejects the notion of the exile for the Elder Alkibiades in 487.\(^2\) He suggests two other possibilities for the year. Archaeological evidence indicates\(^3\) that Boutalion of Marathon and Hippocrates, son of Anaxileos, were both candidates for ostracism in the middle 480's. He rules out Boutalion as an insignificant upstarter. This leaves Hippocrates, the son of Anaxileos, an aristocrat perhaps

\(^{1}\)Ath. Pol. 22,6.


connected with the great Alcmeonid family directly or indirectly. It may well have been then that he was the victim of ostracism in 485 following Megacles in exile. If such is the case then Aristotle's statement above may be taken to mean that in three consecutive years the Athenians banished three alleged friends of the tyrant.

The ostracism of Alcibiades is not, however, certain. Outside of the archaeological evidence\(^1\) we have also written evidence\(^2\). Andocides claims that Alcibiades the Younger's both grandfather were ostracized. If one allows about thirty years per generation, Alcibiades' grandfather must have been a ripe man in the 480's and probably active in politics like many members of the prominent families of Athens. Hence his ostracism in the 480's is a probability. The exact year of his exile remains nevertheless a conjecture. Unfortunately Aristotle's evidence is not clear enough to clarify matters. The reasons for the so-called Alcibiades Elder's ostracism are not given. If one accepts Alcibiades as the third consecutive person to be ostracized in the 480's and Aristotle's nebulous statement that the Athenians exiled for three years the friends of the tyrants, then Alcibiades along with the other Alcmeonids had supported the family's policy vis-à-vis Persia. Andocides states that both grandparents' activities were reprehensible. "Not even he himself would have dared say, that they (his

\(^1\)Vanderpool, "The Ostracism of the Elder Alkibiades," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 4.

\(^2\)Andocides, \textit{Against Alcibiades}, 34.
grandfathers) were not violators of the law.\footnote{Ibid. Translation is mine.} This clearly refers to their public actions, political activities to be specific, since there was no law of ostracism for moral crimes.\footnote{\textit{Kα\'\i\mbox{m} οὐδ' ἄν \textit{αὐτὸς} \textit{ἐπιχείρησεις} \textit{ἀντιλεῖ}ν, ὃς \textit{ο}}\textit{δ' \textit{ἀλλων ἐκείνοι} \textit{παρανομώτατοι} \textit{δυνατός}...} But what was it exactly for which they have been condemned? Andocides does not specify. And so the controversy continued.

\footnote{For Andocies' interpretation of ostracism see \textit{ibid.}, p. 35.}
EPILOGUE

There has been a strong streak of moderation running throughout the entire gamut of Greek political history. Many of the enduring political acts of the Greeks were mainly due to the moderation that prevailed at many critical junctures of Greek political life. The reforms of Solon were the product of a politically moderate man who composed his changes in the spirit of temperance. Solon might not have been able to satisfy all parties concerned, but his work found acceptance because of its temperate nature. Pisistratus' "tyrannical" regime was tolerated at the end exactly because his tyranny was not really tyrannical, in the strict interpretation of the word. His government proved to be mild and moderate. Pisistratus died in his bed. The general consensus among ancient and modern historians of Greek affairs is that his period was a period of positive returns in Athenian political history. Pisistratus has been universally praised in spite of the fact that he was a usurper and his role was unconstitutional. Cleisthenes' reforms were written in the same vein of moderation that distinguished the periods of his two predecessors, Solon and Pisistratus. The result was that Cleisthenes' political acumen paid dividends. His constitution became the basis of the Athenian state during the most glorious period of its history.

There was, on the other hand, an overwhelming trend of political irrationality, political fanaticism, and blind extremism. It manifested itself constantly in Greek life and disturbed deeply
the normal processes of the political functions of the Athenian city-life and for that matter practically all of Greek city-life, with the exception of Sparta. This extremism was chiefly due to the emotional character of the Greek citizen. The Greeks failed repeatedly to harness their emotions for the sake of moderation and reason. As it often happens in such cases, the entire community suffered from the erratic political malady. The common man was hurt as often as were the political leaders. In a puerile fashion, the common voter refused to accept his share of responsibility for decisions which were freely debated and commonly resolved in the *ecclesia*. Consequently, the leader who rode high on the popular wave yesterday found himself the next day deprived of his office and power and was expelled for ten years of his life or variously punished and ridiculed. The Athenians resorted to such extreme measures not for any major constitutional violation, omissions, or deceits but for proposals and bills passed openly by the sovereign body of the *ecclesia* only because these bills did not always measure up to the expectations of the bill's sponsor and the voting assembly. The political leaders themselves were not entirely innocent of the sanctions imposed upon them by the immature citizenry because they inflamed the voters when they should have been soothing them. They exhibited the same weaknesses that the man on the street did, when they were expected to lift themselves above the shortsightedness of the common man.

The political imbroglios of the period following Solon's reforms led to the unconstitutional solution of Pisistratus' re-
gime because this regime provided an alternative to the exasperating behavior of the political factions of the Solonian democracy. Pisistratus provided a break-through in the stalemate to which the Solonian democracy had fallen. He seemed to be able to get the state business moving again after the impasse to which the state had been forced because of the political anarchy and chaos which had been brought about by the constant squabbling of the political parties. Pisistratus struck roots because he used power with moderation. His sons were removed from office because they resorted to political repressions. But Isagoras who succeeded Hippias became guilty of acts of political extremism. He ignored the golden rule of moderation. As a result, he, too, was soon removed from office. The incident served to teach Cleisthenes a lesson. Cleisthenes, undoubtedly, capitalized on Isagoras' errors. His middle-of-the-road reforms created the climate of political tranquility which was so badly needed for the absorption of Cleisthenes' measures. Unfortunately, the political tranquility did not last very long. New issues appeared which stirred up the Athenians. Some of these issues were concerned with foreign policy on which depended the viability of the Athenian Democracy--indeed the survival of the whole of Greece. The Athenians encountered these problems with the same lack of common sense and the same deep passions which had marred their political existence earlier. A new set of political leaders employed the issues of the day to arouse the excitable Athenians. Old personal hatreds, petty jealousies, emotional over-reactions were now intertwined with vital internal and external
lems which fanned the people's political fanaticism. In their anger, the Athenians turned to a dormant political weapon, ostracism, and, as usual, they made excessive and abusive use of it. Ostracism was originally invented to protect the constitution from would-be violators. Now it was used by the stronger to eliminate the weaker. It was thus turned against excellence while leaving mediocrity to reign supreme. It is a wonder that the Athenians were able to weather the crises of the 490's and the 480's as admirably as they did. This feat was due to a great extent to a political leader who finally suffered from the same excesses that he had imposed upon others earlier. His case was a flagrant example of the case that I have tried to build in this paper. The man who saved Greece in her hour of peril almost singlehandedly fell victim to that fanaticism so characteristic of the Greeks.

The Athenians, like the rest of the Greeks, never managed to reach that point of political maturation and composure that would have enabled them to develop their political history in a gradually ascending manner. Because of this weakness, they were never able to evolve some comprehensive political forethought and plan which would have made their life easier and their hold in the geographical area stronger. Had they matured politically with the lapse of time, the history of the Ancient Near East might have taken a different turn.
Supplementary Note A

Vanderpool\(^1\) discusses a sherd found with the name of Pisistratus inscribed on it. The sherd was an eighth-century geometric piece. The filling in which it has been found says nothing helpful toward its identification. Professor Vanderpool thinks that it could belong to the mid-sixth century, referring to Pisistratus the tyrant. Pisistratus went to exile on two occasions, and it may be that he was banished by a vote of the Areopagus.\(^2\) Areopagus would be in this case the logical body to banish Pisistratus, since it was charged under the Solonian Constitution with the duty of protecting the laws and particularly with trying persons who conspired to overthrow the democracy.\(^3\) Since there is no mention of a military coup for the overthrow of Pisistratus, the expulsion must have been done in some legal form, the voting being done on sherds, one of which has been bequeathed to us by coincidence.\(^4\)

The name Aristion appeared on another early sherd. It is

\(^1\)Vanderpool, "Some Ostraca from the Athenian Agora," op. cit., p. 407.

\(^2\)Hdt I, 60,1. \textit{Ath. Pol.} 14,3.

\(^3\)\textit{Ath. Pol.} 8.
\begin{multline*}
\text{καὶ τοὺς ἐκ λαταλῶσαι τοῦ δῆμου συνισταμένου εἰρήναν, ἠλπίνος ἡμῶν νόμον εἰσαγεῖλας περὶ αὐτῶν.}
\end{multline*}

worth recalling that a man named Aristion was one of Pisistratus' supporters, and that it was on his motion that the people voted Pisistratus the bodyguard, which paved the way for the first tyranny. If Pisistratus was exiled, it seems sure that such a supporter would have been exiled along with the tyrant.

1Ath. Pol. 14,1. How and Wells, op. cit., p. 82.

Supplementary Note B

Eukrates. It is not altogether known if the sherd bearing his name is an ostracocon. The name cannot be identified with certainty, but he may possibly be Eukrates the father of Diodotus who spoke in defense of the people of Mytilene in 427 B.C.1 The letter forms suggest a date in the first half of the fifth century, though rather improbable that he was a candidate for ostracism in the 480's. It would be too early a date.2

1Thuc. III, 41.
2Vanderpool, "Some Ostraca from the Athenian Agora," op. cit., p. 400.

Supplementary Note C

Hierokl--Herma- The name cannot be easily identified. It could be Hierokles or Hierokleides. Letter forms and circumstances suggest a date in the early fifth century and probably in the 480's.1 His father's name also is unidentifiable.

1Ibid., p. 400.
Supplementary Note D

Kritias Leaidou is another name that cannot be easily identified. The circumstances of finding one of the ostraca with his name show that he was active in politics in the 480's of the fifth century. The name Kritias is not a common name. It has been reported from only two Athenian families, Plato's family on his mother's side, and Kritias of Aphidnai, father of Apolodoros, who was one of the treasurers of Athens 432/1. It does not seem possible to connect our Kritias with either of the above.

---

1Ibid., p. 399. 2Ibid.

Supplementary Note E

Laispodias of Koile. The name is a common one. Raubitschek suggested that this Laispodias is the son of Spudis who made a dedication on the Acropolis. There is, however, no external evidence for this. Letter forms and circumstances indicate the first half of the fifth century as a date of the ostracon. A date in the 480's is quite appropriate.

---

1A Raubitschek cited ibid., p. 400 ftn. 19. 2Ibid., p. 400.
Supplementary Note F

Table of Ostraca found at the Agora in 1947:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acharnion Xypetaion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alkibiades Cleiniou Skambonides (the elder)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arist. Lysimachou Alopekethen</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charias Ph--dou (A---+)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habron Patrocleous Marathonios</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hippocrates Alkm. Alopekethan</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hippocrates (uncertain)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyperbolus Antiphanius (Perithoides)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kallixenus Aristonymon Xypetaion</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kallixenus (?) Kleisthenous</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kleisthenes (?) Aristonymou</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Megacles Hippocratous Alopelethen</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Themistocles Neocleous Pharrius</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+This name from letter form and circumstances suggests that the person was active in the early fifth century. Not similar to Paianieus.


Berve, H. Das Athen des Peisistratos. Bericht über den VI. Internationalen Kongress für Archäologie. 1940.


Cadoux, T. J. "The Athenian Archons from Kreon to Hypsichides," JHS, IXVIII (1948), 70-123.


Kirchner, Johannes. Prosopographia Attica. Berolini: Typis et Impensis Georgii Reimeri, 1901.


_____. "The Ostracism of Xanthippos," AJA, LI (1947), 257-262.


_____. "Medizing Athenian Aristocrates," CW, XXXV (1941), 39.


The dissertation submitted by Peter Karavites has been read and approved by members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

January 18, 1971
DATE

George [signature]
ADVISOR’S SIGNATURE