



eCOMMONS

Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons

Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

1972

Religious Liberalism-Conservatism and Psychological Health in a Study of the Roman Catholic Priesthood

Mary Jo Kupst
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss

 Part of the [Psychology Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Kupst, Mary Jo, "Religious Liberalism-Conservatism and Psychological Health in a Study of the Roman Catholic Priesthood" (1972). *Dissertations*. 1198.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/1198

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.



This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License](#).
Copyright © 1972 Mary Jo Kupst

Religious Liberalism-Conservatism and
Psychological Health in a Study
of the Roman Catholic
Priesthood

By
Mary Jo Kupst

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate
School of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
February
1972

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer wishes to thank the Loyola University Department of Psychology and the National Opinion Research Center for the use of subject data and facilities. Special acknowledgment is due Dr. Ronald E. Walker, the dissertation director, who provided the opportunity to participate in this research project, and, most of all, for his direction and guidance throughout the past year. Special thanks are also due Dr. Emil Posavac for his invaluable assistance in overall design and statistical analysis through all stages of this research; to Rev. Michael J. O'Brien, C.S.V., for his help in dealing with religious concepts involved as well as for assistance in past research which led to this dissertation; and to Dr. Victor J. Heckler, project director for the Loyola University evaluation for his help in obtaining and coordinating data for use in this research.

Life

Mary Jo Kupst was born on October 4, 1945, in Chicago, Illinois. She attended grade schools in Franklin Park and Chicago, Illinois, and, in 1963 was graduated from Taft High School. She attended Loyola University of Chicago, from which she was graduated in June, 1967, with a Bachelor of Science degree in Psychology. In September, 1967, she entered graduate school at Loyola University, where she served as a graduate assistant, and, in June, 1969, she received a Master of Arts degree in Experimental-Personality Psychology. She worked briefly in advertising, after which she returned to Loyola University to finish her graduate work and serve as Lecturer in Psychology. In February, 1972, she received the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Experimental Psychology. She is currently a postdoctoral resident in Community Psychology at the Medical School of the University of Illinois.

Table of Contents

Chapter

I.	Research in Religious Liberalism-Conservatism	1
II.	Method	15
III.	Results and Discussion	21
IV.	Directions for Further Study	52
V.	Summary.	57
	References	58
	Appendix	64

List of Tables

Table 1.	Means, Standard Deviations and Item-Test Correlations for the Religious Liberalism- Conservatism Scale.	25
Table 2.	Rotated Factor Matrix	33
Table 3.	Means and Standard Deviations for Reli- gious Liberalism-Conservatism, POI Sub- scales and Leaving the Priesthood	41
Table 4.	Intercorrelations among Conservatism, Psychological Health, and Leaving	42

Chapter I

Research in Religious Liberalism-Conservatism

Historical View

Much of the recent turmoil in various institutions stems from heightened ideological splits within the institutional membership. In the politico-economic sphere, this is often reflected in a "whose-side-are-you-on?" attitude, where one is often forced to declare his identity as a conservative, liberal, radical, or some similar label which denotes his attitude towards change in governmental structure and functioning. This is also true in the area of religion, where almost every sect and denomination has to deal with conflict between those who cling to the status quo and those who want to alter or replace it. A great deal of space in the religious press is devoted to those who are leaving organized religion. Some leave because they dislike the changes being made and feel that the Church is being corrupted. Others leave because they feel that changes are not coming fast enough and that the Church is incapable of dealing with a changing world. Those who remain, however, often do not do so out of satisfaction with the way things are, but rather because they want to stay and fight. Nowhere is this more true than with the clergy, whose work is made or broken by what

happens in the Church. Hadden (1969) sees members of the clergy as being caught in a dilemma between holding to a doctrine which is thought to transcend temporal considerations and being forced to adapt this doctrine to a changing world in which it might be relevant. (One of the most damning indictments one can make of a person or institution today is to say they are irrelevant.) After Vatican II, Greeley (1967) saw two camps emerging in the Catholic clergy: a liberal elite who opted for changes to deal with the demands of the world, and a conservative elite who felt that the Church has no business trying to adjust to the modern world. It certainly would seem that the churches are in a state of crisis. The membership is often confused as to what it should believe, how it should act, and why people should belong at all. And when these people look to their leadership, the clergy and religious for direction, they find that this leadership is as fragmented and divided as they are.

In order for organized religion to become (or remain) a force for moral leadership in our time, this problem must be resolved. Many commissions and studies have been and are being created to study the various issues confronting the churches, clergy, and laity, and a great deal of it is based on the way people view the purpose of the Church. This purpose can be quite different depend-

ing upon the orientation of the person: Does he use or exploit the Church for his own gain (Cline and Richards, 1965)? Does he see the Church's primary purpose as effecting his own salvation above all (Rokeach, 1970)?

Or does he see the Church in the role of "compassionate Samaritan" (Cline and Richards, 1965), with emphasis on interpersonal and social humanitarianism? This difference in purpose, according to Dittes (1968) seems to represent what we usually call liberalism and conservatism. Conservatives generally restrict spontaneity, rely on authority and legalism, and resist change. Liberals generally respect flexibility, rely on interpersonal values and humanitarianism, and often welcome change. Ranck (1961) sees liberalism-conservatism as a continuum with conservatives being theistic, God-centered, supernaturalist, and absolutist in dogma. Liberals are seen as more humanistic, man-centered, naturalist, and anti-dogmatic.

In general, religious conservatives studied seemed to possess less desirable psychological characteristics than did religious liberals. Dittes (1968), in his summary of research in religion, found generally consistent results indicating that religious conservatives had more defensive and constricted personalities than did religious liberals. Weima (1965) found conservatives to be rigid

in adhering to traditional ideas and customs, strong in emphasizing externals, and rejecting of all that endangered or questioned the established church. They were also largely unwilling to admit deficiencies. Rokeach (1970) found that conservatives did not want the Church (a number of organized religions) to be involved with social or political issues, but rather they placed the highest value on salvation, especially salvation of their own souls. Liberals, on the other hand, tended to stress personal freedom, responsibility, and an openness to the world (McGloughlin and Bellak, 1968). Description of these two orientations sounds like Allport's (1959) continuum of extrinsic and intrinsic religion. People who were extrinsic tended to be utilitarian, self-centered, and opportunistic, while those who were intrinsic tended to be more understanding of other people, other-centered, and humanistic.

An investigation of the debates which took place during the Second Vatican Council reveals very strong differences of opinion among those present (Rynne, 1965). Certain trends did emerge, however, and are resisted by more tradition-minded clergy: more respect for personal responsibility, stress on persons rather than on structure and legalism, tendency toward alternate understanding of

dogma, the idea that authority is not above criticism, emphasis on community and interpersonal relationships, willingness to live and participate in the modern world, new expressions of liturgy, the idea that God is accepting and merciful, and stress on the humanity of Christ (Feiner, Trutsch, & Bockle, 1955; Kennedy, 1968; Kung, 1970). Sister Marie Augusta Neal (1970), in a survey on contemplatives, saw a division between pre-Vatican attitudes (God as remote from man, emphasis on His authority and on His Divinity, Christians as a group set apart from others, and the idea that one should have as little to do with the evil world as possible) and post-Vatican attitudes (God present among his people, emphasis on transformation of the world through human effort, and the humanity of Christ).

Generally, the research in this area tends to support the intrinsic, post-Vatican II, liberal orientation as being the more desirable of the two, especially with regard to psychological and social variables. Barron (1968) found significant correlations between personally evolved and reaffirmed beliefs and inner-directedness, independence, growth orientation, and ego strength. Similarly, Keene (1967) compared the "personal" religious orientation, defined as preference for inner, personal experience as the primary force in religion, with the

orthodox (or fundamentalistic or conservative) religious orientation, defined as flat affirmation of conventional orthodox beliefs. It was concluded that an orthodox experience of religion is related to maladaptive behavior. (In Catholics, the orthodox orientation was significantly correlated with neuroticism.) Using projective techniques, Dreger (1952) had found that liberals were more mature in areas of perceptual keenness and insight, while conservatives were more dependent. With regard to social variables, conservatives were highest in concern for social status (Putney & Middletown, 1961), authoritarianism, and prejudice (Ranck, 1961; Rokeach, 1968).

Most researchers in the politico-economic dimension of liberalism-conservatism have obtained similar results with regard to personality factors. Some saw liberals as being higher in emotional and rational maturity than conservatives (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). McClosky (1958) used scales constructed for an earlier study in political orientation and found conservatives scored consistently at the undesirable end of social-psychological continua. Dandes (1966) related scores on the Personal Orientation Inventory (Shostrom, 1963), a measure of self-actualization, to liberalism-conservatism and found that liberals scored highest on the subscales dealing with

Inner-Directed Support, Existentiality, Spontaneity, Self-Acceptance, and Capacity for Intimate Contact. Gunnison (1967) also compared liberalism-conservatism with self-actualization and concluded that liberalism was social growth in the same way that self-actualization was personality growth. It would seem, then, in religion, as well as in politics and economics (with the exception of a recent study by Elms (1970) in which he found relative absence of pathology in right-wing extremists), that liberalism is related more to psychological health than is conservatism.

The ongoing controversy in the Catholic Church over issues brought out during the Second Vatican Council presents a good opportunity for study of religious liberalism-conservatism. While there is much discussion and confusion among the laity regarding these trends, the tension is just as evident in the clergy. Perhaps it is more salient for them because these issues hit directly at the meaning of the priest's life and work, while religion is often of lesser importance in the everyday life of the layman. Whether this is true or not, selection of clergymen or others who are actively involved in church activity has certain advantages. It has been pointed out in studies of political behavior that activists were different from non-activists in socializa-

tion, patterns, current attitudes and values, and intelligence (Kerpelman, 1969; Watts, Lynch, & Whittaker, 1969). Dittes (1968) saw limitation of the sample to active religious members as a statistical way of eliminating the activity dimension as a possible contaminant. He also felt that there is a likelihood that active members would make more subtle distinctions when confronted with issues.

At times this crisis of belief and attitude may result in an exit from the priesthood; some because they believe the Church is remaining too rigid, others because they believe the Church is becoming too flexible. The priest's acceptance or rejection of changes in the Church will be affected by his perception of what the Church should be, as well as by his psychological makeup. On the basis of previous research cited above, priests who are able to accept necessary change and adapt to it should have a more healthy, integrated personality, while priests who resist change should be less psychologically healthy.

The present study utilized data collected during a national project sponsored by the American Catholic Bishops' Committee on Pastoral Research and Practices. The existence of such a project pointed up the need for understanding what has been called a "vocation under stress."

Meaning and Measurement

A study which intends to investigate the relationship between religious liberalism-conservatism and psychological health is faced with two main problems: definition and measurement (Dittes, 1968). Psychological health can be based on a theoretical viewpoint as to what constitutes health (in this case, Maslow's self-actualization). Health is then defined operationally in terms of the theory. Maslow (1954), in his study of self-actualizing people, found certain attributes to be characteristic of them. Among these are a more efficient perception of reality, acceptance of self, spontaneity, problem-centeredness, independence, transcendence of the environment, creativity, and democracy in values and attitudes. An instrument created to measure this concept would have to include items relevant to these characteristics, and it should tap the degree to which the person possesses them. The instrument is, of course, viewed in terms of the theory, and a person who did not define psychological health in terms of self-actualization might not consider such a test as an indicator of psychological health. Thus, the fact that health is viewed in terms of Maslow's theory must be kept in mind.

Defining and measuring liberalism and conservatism involves still more speculation and inference. When li-

beralism-conservatism was thought to be a global factor, largely defined as a view regarding change in the status quo, studies were carried out to relate this factor to other indices of psychological functioning (Adorno, et. al.; McClosky, 1958; Rokeach, 1960). These studies ignored a point that was becoming increasingly clear, however, and it was that liberalism-conservatism should be studied as a multidimensional variable (Kerr, 1946; Kimbrough & Hines, 1963). Hicks and Wright (1970) factor-analyzed five existing measures of liberalism-conservatism and concluded that liberalism-conservatism is a factorially complex attitude dimension, composed of at least four independent dimension--economic, political, religious, and esthetic. None of these measures could be regarded as a comprehensive measure; the only dimension to be tapped by all scales was the economic dimension.

The main problem, then, is still that of conceptualizing what is meant by liberalism-conservatism (in the present case, religious liberalism-conservatism) and then constructing a scale to measure it (Dittes, 1963). Most early studies had tried to tap one religiosity factor generalizable across religions, and these have not been very successful (Shaw & Wright, 1967). Later studies found religion or religiosity itself to be multidimensional. Glock's (1962) work in this area is often

cited. Deriving his categories from norms and traditions of world religions, Glock identified five dimensions of religiosity. First, the ideological dimension dealt with content and scope of religious beliefs. Second, the ritualistic dimension dealt with religious practices, such as worships, prayers, participation in sacraments, etc. Third, the experiential dimension dealt with religious feeling, such as trust, faith, and fear. Fourth, the intellectual dimension dealt with religious knowledge, such as knowledge of dogma, tradition, practices and Scripture. Fifth, the consequential dimension dealt with the implications of these dimensions in secular areas. Three dimensions were found by Monaghan (1967): the authority-seeker, the comfort-seeker, and the social-participator. In another factor-analysis study, Broen (1957) had found two main factors: nearness of God, which indicated the immanence, accessibility and mercy of God, and correlated highly with liberalism; and a fundamentalism-humanitarianism factor. In a later study, Allen and Spilka (1967) found two factors that pointed to two types of religious orientation: the committed and the consensual. The committed orientation was abstract, diversity-tolerant, personal, devotional commitment and daily activities being evidence of values. The consensual orientation, on the other hand, was concrete, literal,

vague, restrictive, and was a detached commitment to religious values. Cline and Richards (1965) discovered two similar factors: a) the degree to which one exploits or uses religion, and b) the compassionate Samaritan orientation. Thus, it seems that in looking at religious attitudes, a great deal of evidence points to multidimensionality of attitudes, and that these attitudes and orientations may have different meanings for different religions (Dittes, 1968). A wise approach, then, is to take one religion at a time and examine the liberalism-conservatism dimension in that religion along with issues relevant to it.

The study sponsored by the American Bishops' Committee lent itself to this examination, since the sociological data obtained by the National Opinion Research Center included a scale whose items appeared at face value to tap this dimension. Further refinements of these items was conducted to improve its value as a measuring device for liberalism-conservatism. The research had the conditions that were felt to be most advantageous in this area: a) the study of a single religion, and b) the study of those to whom these issues could be assumed most meaningful, the Catholic clergy.

The hypothesis to be tested is that religious liberals tend to be higher in psychological health than

religious conservatives.

Another area of concern is that of leaving the priesthood and its relationship to liberalism-conservatism. A liberal might leave if he felt the established atmosphere or field of forces would not effect the changes he felt were necessary (Lewin, 1947). On the other hand, a conservative might leave if he felt the changes that were being implemented in the Church and priesthood were altering the institution to such an extent that it was losing its essential meaning. A state of disequilibrium might be aroused where he would find that the field was shifting to an orientation which was contrary to that in which he believed. Thus, a case could be made for either orientation being more prone to leaving the priesthood. Since this is a current phenomenon, and there is a relative paucity of data from which to speculate, the hypothesis must remain exploratory.

Likewise, a third area of concern remains to be explored, that of leaving the priesthood and psychological health. As Maslow (1954) pointed out, self-actualizing people have increased autonomy and are resistant to enculturation. Such people might perceive the priesthood as a restriction on their individual freedom, and could decide to leave. Self-actualizing people, however, also have an increased acceptance of self and others,

which would enable them to be able to tolerate contradictions and inconsistencies in their relationships with others in the priesthood. Thus, they might have less difficulty in accepting the changes and turmoil in the religious life than those who are less healthy.

The relationships, then, to be studied are:

- a) the relationships between liberalism-conservatism and psychological health;
- b) the relationship between liberalism-conservatism and leaving the priesthood; and
- c) the relationship between leaving the priesthood and psychological health.

Chapter II

Method

Subjects

The overall population consists of 60,000 priests participating in a project sponsored by the American Catholic Bishops' Committee on Pastoral Research and Practices. Approximately 1,000 priests selected by stratified random sampling participated in the sociological assessment conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. Loyola University of Chicago conducted the psychological evaluation.

Measures

Psychological health was measured by the Personal Orientation Inventory (Shostrom, 1963), which is concerned with values and behavior relevant to the development of self-actualization. The Personal Orientation Inventory (POI) consists of two scales which together use all 150 items, the Inner-Directed Support Scale (127 items) and the Time Competence Scale (23 items), and ten subscales which measure elements of self-actualization: Self-actualizing Values, Existentiality, Feeling Reactivity, Spontaneity, Self-Regard, Self-Acceptance, Nature of Man, Constructive, Synergy, Acceptance of Aggression, and Capacity for Intimate Contact. Test items appear in Appendix A.

Subscales used in the present study were selected first on the basis of highest reliability. Significant correlations had been found for these subscales with liberalism (positive) and dogmatism (negative) by Dandes (1966). The Inner-Directed Support Scale consists of 127 items and essentially measures the personal orientation of the respondent--self-oriented or other-oriented. A high score (the highest possible being 127) would indicate that the person is guided by his own internalized principles, whereas a low score would indicate that he is guided more by the dictates of others. Test-retest reliability was high ($r = .84$), and correlations with liberalism ($r = .35$) and dogmatism ($r = -.46$) were significant. The Existentiality Scale consists of 32 items and deals with flexibility in applying self-actualizing values (those found to be true of Maslow's self-actualizing people) to one's own life. A high score (the highest being 32) would indicate that the person is able to use good judgment in application of these values, while a low score would indicate that he tends to hold values rigidly and dogmatically. Reliability was high ($r = .85$) and correlations with liberalism ($r = .28$) and dogmatism ($r = -.48$) were significant. The Spontaneity Scale consists of 18 items. A high score (the highest being 18) would indicate an ability to express feelings in spon-

taneous action, while a low score would indicate fear or avoidance of doing so. Reliability was high ($\underline{r} = .81$) and correlations with liberalism ($\underline{r} = .34$) and dogmatism ($\underline{r} = -.37$) were significant. The Self-Acceptance Scale consists of 26 items. A high score (the highest being 26) would indicate that the person is able to accept himself even with his weaknesses and deficiencies, while a low score would indicate inability to do so. Reliability was also high ($\underline{r} = .80$) and there were significant correlations with liberalism ($\underline{r} = .39$) and dogmatism ($\underline{r} = -.43$). The Capacity for Intimate Contact Scale consists of 28 items. A high score (the highest being 28) would indicate that the person is able to develop meaningful, contactful relationships with other human beings, while a low score would indicate difficulty with warm interpersonal relationships. This subscale is also reliable ($\underline{r} = .75$) and significantly correlated with liberalism ($\underline{r} = .24$) and dogmatism ($\underline{r} = -.42$).

Degree of commitment to remain in the priesthood was measured on a 5-point graduated scale, Question Number 75: "Which of the following statements most clearly reflects your feelings about your future in the priesthood?" Responses were: "I definitely will not leave," coded 1; "I probably will not leave," coded 2; "I am uncertain about my future," coded 3; "I will probably

leave," coded 4; and "I have definitely decided to leave," coded 5.

Religious liberalism-conservatism in the Roman Catholic Church was measured by a scale whose 34 items were taken from the 44 items of Question Number 37 of the National Research Center questionnaire. The original scale appears in Appendix B.

Procedure

Of the 1000 subjects given the sociological evaluation by NORC, 462 Ss were given the Personal Orientation Inventory (POI) in the psychological evaluation carried out by Loyola University of Chicago, and 218 of these Ss were given an additional intensive psychological interview. Of these, 166 Ss had completed the POI, the Religious Liberalism-Conservatism Scale and the Leave-Stay Scale. Scale construction was carried out using the 462 POI Ss, of which 348 had fully completed Question Number 37 of the NORC questionnaire. Those who were given the additional interview (N = 166) were used in the correlation of liberalism-conservatism with psychological health and with degree of commitment to remain in the priesthood.

The items for the religious liberalism-conservatism scale had been selected by the National Opinion Research Center on the basis of face validity. To further insure

that these items were measuring liberalism-conservatism, five judges were selected on the basis of their knowledge in the area of religious liberalism-conservatism. They were to rate the 44 items as liberal, conservative, or neutral. A neutral item was one that could not be considered liberal nor conservative or was one that could be considered both liberal and conservative. Items were retained which received a 4/5 rating agreement or better. By inspection, there was little difference in ratings done by raters who saw themselves as conservative and those who saw themselves as liberal. Three were priests, two were laymen; three were from Loyola University, two from NORC. All were professionals in psychology, sociology, and/or religion, since it had been suggested that competent theologians and religious be used in research of this type to insure accuracy of concepts (Klineberg, 1963).

An item-analysis was performed to determine the item-total correlations, and items were rejected which did not correlate significantly with total scores (Anastasi, 1968; Cronbach, 1960). To isolate the factor structure of this measure, a factor analysis was done on the intercorrelation matrix. The squared multiple correlations were used as communality estimates (Kaiser, 1958), and the factor structure was subjected to varimax

rotation, which appears to be the best way to approach Thurstone's simple structure criterion as well as appearing to have the property of invariance (Harman, 1960).

Pearson product-moment correlations were performed to determine relationships between: (a) liberalism-conservatism and psychological health; (b) leaving the priesthood and health; and (c) conservatism and leaving the priesthood.

Chapter III

Results and Discussion

Measurement of Liberalism-Conservatism

After ratings were made by the five judges of the original liberalism-conservatism scale as it appeared in Question Number 37 of the NORC questionnaire (Appendix A), items were retained whose content was agreed to be either liberal or conservative by at least four out of the five judges. Items rejected because of failure to meet this criterion were:

2. What is lacking today is that closeness among priests that used to be so evident.

3. The basic values of the Church remain the same, but their expression is changing.

9. I often feel that many things the Church stood for are now disintegrating.

27. I feel that the most important thing to recognize about the sacraments is that they are channels for receiving grace.

33. People can be good Christians without spending much time in solitary reflection and prayer.

42. The turmoil following Vatican II is resulting in a gradual weakening of my own religious beliefs.

From the ratings, a person's agreement or disagreement

with these items would not necessarily indicate whether he was liberal or conservative.

The remaining 38 items were subjected to an item-analysis. Items were retained which had significant correlations with the total score. A high positive total score indicated religious conservatism, while a high negative score indicated religious liberalism.

An explanation of the scoring procedure is in order. An inspection of the original scale as the subjects saw it (Appendix B) indicates that some items are coded from 1-5 and others are coded from 5-9. For uniformity, the constant 4 was subtracted from items coded 5-9; thus, all items had a coding from 1-5. Moreover, since some items were liberal and some conservative, it was necessary to adjust the scores for directionality. First, order of coding was reversed for all items so that a high score (5) would mean agreement with that item. Second, coding of liberal items became negative so that strong agreement was shown by a score of -5; agree somewhat by a score of -4, uncertain by a score of -3, disagree somewhat by a score of -2, and disagree strongly by a score of -1. Coding for conservative items remained positive and ranged from +5 for strong agreement to +1 for strong disagreement.

Some examples may be of help in illustrating this procedure. Item 1 ("The important thing in the Church today is that people are really examining what has meaning for them") was initially coded from 1-5, where 1 meant strong agreement and 5 meant strong disagreement. Order was reversed so that 5 meant strong agreement and 1 meant strong disagreement. Since liberal items were scored in the negative direction, and Item 1 had been labeled a liberal item by the judges, coding was prefaced by a negative sign.

Item 2, on the other hand, ("The relationship between laity and priests was much better before Vatican II when everyone knew just how he was supposed to act") was considered by the judges to be a conservative item. Since it was initially coded from 5-9, the constant 4 was subtracted making the code from 1-5, where 1 indicated strong agreement and 5 strong disagreement. Order was reversed so that +5 meant strong agreement and +1 meant strong disagreement. Scores remained positive.

After this was done for each of the 38 items, scores were added and each individual's total score was computed. The highest possible scores were +170 (extremely conservative) and -170 (extremely liberal). Scores in this study ranged from +12 to -12, with a

mean of mean of -7.09 and a standard deviation of 9.04. Table 1 shows the means for each item, along with standard deviations and item-test correlations. Liberal or conservative rating by the judges is included as well.

TABLE 1

Means, Standard Deviations and Item-Test
Correlations for the Religious
Liberalism-Conservative Scale
(N = 348)

Item	Mean ^a	S. D.	r ^b
1. The important thing in the Church today is that people are really examining what has meaning for them. (Liberal)	2.077	1.139	.267
2. The relationship between the laity and priests was much better before Vatican II when everyone knew just how he was supposed to act. (Conservative)	3.592	1.387	-.463
3. With the new roles for everyone in the Church that have developed since Vatican II, the relationships between priests and laity are much better. (Liberal)	2.557	1.133	.293
4. Everything changes so quickly in the liturgy these days that I often have trouble deciding what rules to follow. (Conservative)	3.526	1.536	-.414

(Table continued on next page)

TABLE 1 - CONTINUED

Item	Mean ^a	S. D.	r ^b
5. The trouble with the Church today is that most people really don't believe in anything. (Conservative)	4.028	1.157	-.037
6. There is more opportunity now than before for real friendship for priests. (Liberal)	2.511	1.213	.060
7. The diversity of liturgy provides a real choice which I enjoy. (Liberal)	1.979	1.206	.195
8. I feel that everything that has value in human life will somehow be retained in heaven. (Liberal)	1.912	1.056	.216
9. The mystery of the Trinity is so profound and so central that I feel I should humbly accept it as given and not seek to plumb its depths. (Conservative)	3.028	1.551	-.507
10. The experience of dialogue among persons who are open and trusting provides the human analogy for understanding the Trinity as a life of communication and communion. (Liberal)	2.132	1.027	.245

(Table continued on next page)

TABLE 1 - CONTINUED

Item	Mean ^a	S. D.	r ^b
11. I think of God primarily as the Supreme Being, immutable, all-powerful, and the Creator of the universe. (Conservative)	2.709	1.544	-.539
12. The Catholic Church is the one true Church established by Christ with St. Peter and his successors as its head. (Conservative)	1.629	1.017	-.265
13. For me, God is found principally in my relationships with people. (Liberal)	2.497	1.316	.123
14. God's word comes to us through some of the great prophetic men of our times, such as Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King. (Liberal)	2.382	1.356	.486
15. I think of Jesus Principally as the man who has given me my ideals for truly human living. (Liberal)	2.341	1.424	-.115
16. Today's Christian must emphasize more than ever openness to the Spirit rather than dependence on traditional ecclesiastical structures. (Liberal)	2.160	1.239	.4616

(Table continued on next page)

TABLE 1 - CONTINUED

Item	Mean ^a	S. D.	r ^b
17. If God has meaning I can recognize Him only in Jesus the Christ who makes God plausible and credible. (Liberal)	2.479	1.402	-.067
18. The important thing to stress when teaching about Jesus is that He is truly God, and, therefore adoration should be directed toward Him. (Conservative)	2.913	1.487	-.472
19. I feel that diversity in individual men, among peoples, and in many cultures helps me appreciate the meaning of the Incarnation. (Liberal)	2.169	1.119	.076
20. The principal meaning for me of Christ's resurrection is that it proved his Divinity. (Conservative)	2.686	1.500	-.330
21. I think of Jesus Christ as the God who humbled Himself by becoming man and dying for my sins. (Conservative)	1.729	1.075	-.387
22. To doubt one article of faith that is <u>de fide</u> is to question the whole of revealed truth. (Conservative)	3.241	1.647	-.364

(Table continued on next page)

TABLE 1 - CONTINUED

Item	<u>Mean</u> ^a	<u>S. D.</u>	<u>r</u> ^b
23. I think of heaven as the state in which my soul will rest in blissful possession of the Beatific Vision. (Conservative)	2.448	1.450	-.559
24. I think of the Mass as a sacramental event which anticipates heaven as the joyous union of humanity: risen, redeemed and glorified in Christ. (Liberal)	1.965	1.120	-.290
25. I think that priests who feel called to do so ought to be witnessing to Christ on the picket line or speaking out on controversial issues. (Liberal)	2.140	1.265	.526
26. A Christian should look first to the salvation of his soul; then he should be concerned with helping others. (Conservative)	3.278	1.565	-.616
27. When I experience moments of deep communication and union with other persons, these strike me as a taste of what heaven will be like. (Liberal)	2.117	1.081	.254
28. The contemplative and mystical life is	2.474	1.365	-.288

(Table continued on next page)

TABLE 1 - CONTINUED

Item	<u>Mean</u> ^a	<u>S. D.</u>	<u>r</u> ^b
absolutely essential for Christianity. (Con- servative)			
29. In a secular age like our own, the Church must abandon much of its past emphasis on the sacred. (Liberal)	3.666	1.403	.099
30. The Church should be a place of refuge and of quiet reflection away from the world. (Conservative)	3.914	1.260	-.283
31. The primary task of the Church is to encour- age its members to live the Christian life ra- ther than to try to re- form the world. (Con- servative)	3.031	1.484	-.479
32. For the most part, the Church has been in- adequate in facing up to the civil rights issues. (Liberal)	2.123	1.226	-.486
33. Faith means essen- tially belief in the doctrines of the Cath- olic Church. (Conser- vative)	3.367	1.528	-.646
34. Faith is primarily	2.068	1.266	.473

(Table continued on next page)

TABLE 1 - CONTINUED

Item	Mean ^a	S. D.	r ^b
an encounter with God in Christ Jesus, rather than an assent to a coherent set of defined truths. (Liberal)			
35. The creative ferment in the Church today is bringing about a deepening of my Christian faith. (Liberal)	2.071	1.184	.221
36. The problem with the Church after Vatican II is that many of the certainties we used to have have been taken away. (Conservative)	3.359	1.397	-.118
37. There are times when a person has to put his personal conscience above the Church's teaching. (Liberal)	2.703	1.561	.511
38. One's faith may be jeopardized by studying Protestant theologians. (Conservative)	3.887	1.264	-.441

^aScores indicate amount of agreement, ranging from 5, indicating strong agreement, to 1, indicating strong disagreement.

^bA correlation of 1.38 achieves significance at the .01 level; a correlation of .105 achieves significance at the .05 level.

The following items were dropped because of insignificant correlations with the total:

5. The trouble with the Church today is that most people don't really believe in anything.

6. There is more opportunity now than before for real friendship for priests.

17. If God has meaning, I can recognize Him only in Jesus the Christ who makes God plausible and credible.

19. I feel that diversity in individual men, among peoples, and in many cultures helps me to appreciate the meaning of the Incarnation.

The final scale consisted of the remaining 34 items.

The scale used in this study initially appeared to be tapping a single dimension. Judges, also, seemed to have little difficulty fitting them into a liberalism-conservatism continuum. The factor analysis was performed to see if this was indeed the case. The varimax rotation method was performed and 22 factors were included in rotation; those with negative values were considered imaginary factors (Harman, 1960). Table 2 shows the rotated factor matrix for these 38 items. Three factors emerged, which accounted for 50.3% of the total variance and 86.1% of the original communality.

TABLE 2
Rotated Factor Matrix

Item	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III
1	-.214	-.367	-.242
2	.322	.188	.620
3	-.060	-.200	-.476
4	.319	.062	.443
5	.047	-.042	.352
6	-.083	-.293	-.374
7	-.154	-.242	-.456
8	-.012	-.371	-.222
9	.312	.050	.451
10	-.032	-.501	-.348
11	.511	.081	.369
12	.627	.190	.024
13	-.266	-.604	-.052
14	-.423	-.400	-.439
15	-.117	-.466	.158
16	-.481	-.550	-.209
17	-.059	-.497	.030
18	.687	.078	.409

(Table continued on next page)

TABLE 2 - CONTINUED

Item	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III
19	-.033	-.524	-.274
20	.596	.093	.331
21	.576	.068	.168
22	.650	.154	.187
23	.693	.115	.296
24	.420	-.031	-.029
25	-.480	-.286	-.371
26	.636	.100	.359
27	-.032	-.563	-.323
28	.376	.018	-.080
29	-.450	-.402	.129
30	.418	.130	.354
31	.389	.094	.238
32	-.366	-.288	-.210
33	.657	.227	.347
34	-.383	-.459	-.246
35	-.200	-.516	-.466
36	.259	.088	.290

(Table continued on next page)

TABLE 2 - CONTINUED

Item	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III
37	-.670	-.362	-.104
38	.432	.298	.294
Total contribu- tion of rotated factor to common variance	6.54	3.84	3.82
Percent of total original commu- nality	39.6	23.3	23.2

Items with high loadings on the first factor were:

11. I think of God primarily as the Supreme Being, immutable, all-powerful and the Creator of the Universe (.511).

12. The Catholic Church is the one true Church established by Christ with Saint Peter and his successors as its head (.627).

18. The important thing to stress when teaching about Jesus is that He is truly God, therefore, adoration should be directed toward Him (.687).

20. I think of Jesus Christ as the God who humbled Himself by becoming man and dying for my sins (.596).

21. The principal meaning of Christ's resurrection for me is that it proved His Divinity (.576).

22. To doubt one article of faith that is de fide is to question the whole of revealed truth (.650).

23. I think of heaven as the state in which my soul will rest in blissful possession of the Beatific Vision (.693).

26. A Christian should look first to the salvation of his soul; then he should be concerned about helping others (.636).

33. Faith means essentially belief in the doctrines of the Catholic Church (.657).

The content of these items reveals an adherence to dogma

(the Divinity of Christ, the Trinity, de fide pronouncements, etc.). A very high negative loading on Item 37:

37. There are times when a person has to put his personal conscience above the Church's teaching (.670) points out the other end of the dimension which could be seen as representing the antidogmatism (Ranck, 1961), personal freedom (McGloughlin and Bellak, 1968), and flexibility (Barron, 1968) of religious liberals. This factor seems to resemble Ranck's dogmatic absolutism, Roach's (1960) dogmatism, Keene's (1967) orthodox religious orientation, and was labeled Acceptance of Orthodox Doctrine vs. Individual Conscience.

Items with high loadings on the second factor were:

10. The experience of dialogue among persons who are open and trusting provides the human analogy for understanding the Trinity as a life of communication and communion (-.501).

13. For me, God is found principally in my relationships with people (-.604).

16. Today's Christian must emphasize more than ever openness to the Spirit rather than dependence on traditional ecclesiastical structures (-.550).

19. I feel that diversity in individual men, among peoples, and in many cultures, helps me to appreciate the meaning of the Incarnation (-.524).

27. When I experience moments of deep communication and union with other persons, these sometimes strike me as a taste of what heaven will be like (-.563).

These items were mainly concerned with spiritual insight and faith through other persons. Thus, this factor seems to resemble Monaghan's (1967) social participator and Cline and Richards' (1965) compassionate Samaritan orientation. Since these were negative loadings, the factor was labeled Rejection of Human Sources of Faith.

The only item that loaded above .50 on Factor III was:

2. The relationship between laity and priests was much better before Vatican II when everyone knew just how he was expected to act (-.550).

Highest loadings were on items:

3. With the new roles for everyone in the Church that have developed since Vatican II, the relationships between priests and laity are much better (-.476).

4. Everything changes so quickly in the liturgy these days that I often have trouble deciding what rules to follow (.443).

5. The trouble with the Church today is that most people really don't believe in anything (-.451).

35. The creative ferment in the Church today is bringing about a deepening of my Christian faith (-.466).

Items related mainly to ambiguity concerning roles and rules, and this factor was thus labeled Desire for Traditional Forms and Roles.

The existence of three factors suggested that religious liberalism-conservatism, as well as being one dimension of liberalism-conservatism (Hicks & Wright, 1970), might be multidimensional itself. The case can be made that since the first factor accounts for most of the variance and has the highest factor loadings that this scale is essentially measuring one dimension. Kimbrough and Hines (1963) constructed a politico-economic liberalism-conservatism scale using a similar procedure (judges' ratings, item-test correlations, factor analysis). They, too, found the first factor to have high loadings and to account for most of the variance. The existence of a few high loadings in other factors did not prevent them from concluding that they were measuring a single factor. A similar situation may exist in the present study. The fact that the other factors did have some high loadings cannot be overlooked, however. Other researchers (Allen & Spilka, 1967; Brown, 1952; Cline & Richards, 1963; Glock, 1962; Monaghan, 1967) had studied what was termed religion or religiosity and found it to be multidimensional. In this case, study of religious liberalism-conservatism seems to be mainly concerned with an

orthodox doctrinal aspect of religion, and to a lesser extent, with human sources of faith and traditional forms and rules.

Once the scale was refined, the next step was to relate religious liberalism-conservatism to psychological health and degree of commitment to remain in the priesthood.

Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations for 166 subjects with regard to the Religious Liberalism-Conservatism Scale, the Personal Orientation Inventory subscales (Inner-Directed Support (I), Existentiality (Ex), Spontaneity (S), Self-Acceptance (Sa), and Capacity for Intimate Contact (C) and Degree of Commitment to Remain in the Priesthood (Leaving).

Table 4 shows the intercorrelations among these variables. It will be noticed that intercorrelations between POI subscales are quite high, indicating a possible violation of the convergent-discriminant validity criterion proposed by Campbell and Fiske (1959). Since these subscales consist of overlapping items, these high correlations are not surprising. According to Shostrom (1963), in the development of these categories, the subscales were not conceptualized as being characteristic of independent dimensions, but were all related aspects of self-actualization. Thus, high intercorrelations would be expected.

TABLE 3
Means and Standard Deviations for Religious
Liberalism-Conservatism, POI Subscales and
Leaving the Priesthood
(N = 166)

Variable	<u>Mean</u>	<u>S. D.</u>
Liberalism-Conservatism	- 3.16	5.03
Inner-Directed Support	82.53	11.81
Existentiality	19.30	4.21
Spontaneity	11.22	2.99
Self-Acceptance	16.50	3.65
Capacity for Intimate		
Contact	16.88	3.77
Leaving	1.81	.91

TABLE 4

Intercorrelations among Conservatism,
Psychological Health, and Leaving
(N = 166)

Variable							
	Cons.	Leaving	I	Ex	S	Sa	C
Cons.		-.29***	-.34***	-.31***	-.32***	-.24***	-.18*
Leaving	-.29***		.27***	.20**	.32***	.20**	.25***
I	-.34***	.27***		.75***	.79***	.78***	.84***
Ex	-.31***	.20**	.75***		.52***	.56***	.66***
S	-.32***	.32***	.79***	.52***		.55***	.66***
Sa	-.24***	.20**	.78***	.56***	.55***		.59***
C	-.18*	.25***	.84***	.66***	.66***	.59***	

*p < .05, two-tailed test

**p < .01, two-tailed test

***p < .001, two-tailed test

Conservatism and Psychological Health

All of the POI subscales correlated negatively and significantly with conservatism. The picture which emerged of the conservative is one of other-directedness, inability to be flexible in applying the values of self-actualization to one's own life, inability to express feelings behaviorally, and difficulty with warm, interpersonal relationships. The other-directed orientation was consistent with descriptions of conservatives mentioned before (Barron, 1968; Keene, 1967, Putney & Middletown, 1961; Weima, 1965). Dandes (1966) had found that the Inner-directed Support Scale correlated positively and significantly with liberalism. Similarly, Inner-Directed Support had the highest negative correlation ($r = -.34$) with conservatism in the present study, which would agree with the rigid adherence to doctrines, rules, and roles which has been ascribed to conservatives. Conservative other-directedness should not be confused with what Allport (1959) meant by the other-centered characteristic of intrinsic religion. Other-directedness refers to concern about the welfare of other persons (which would be true of the intrinsic orientation).

Spontaneity, as well, correlated negatively and significantly with conservatism ($r = -.32$). Conservatives

seemed less able to express their feelings behaviorally, which was the case in previous research, both with political conservatives (Adorno, et. al., 1950; McClosky, 1958) and religious conservatives (Keene, 1967; Ranck, 1961). Conservatives tended to have defensive, constricted personalities (Dittes, 1968), which would have a restrictive effect on expression of feelings. Since they tend to be other-directed and to rely on external forces for their values and modes of behavior, conservatives probably refer to role prescriptions when expressing themselves. This is less threatening than being forced to fall back on one's own inner resources in relating to one's world. If the decision is already made by a person's reference group as to how he should act in various situations, he can be somewhat secure in knowing that he responds to his environment in a way that is appropriate. Since conservatives seem to cling to traditional ways of doing things, it is logical that they should likewise cling to traditional means of expression.

Somewhat related to inner-directed behavior is the Existentiality aspect of self-actualization, which refers to flexibility in applying values to one's life. A negative correlation with Existentiality indicates a tendency to hold values so rigidly that one may be considered

dogmatic or compulsive (Shostrom, 1963). This lack of flexibility in conservatives is in line with definitions of the term "conservatism" (Dittes, 1968; McGloughlin & Bellak, 1968). Conservatives, in previous studies appeared to be more comfortable when values are already given. Liberals, however, tended to be able to handle diversity and ambiguity in situations without relying on rigidity (Barron, 1968; Gunnison, 1967). In fact, Existentiality and liberalism had the highest positive correlation ($r = .39$) according to Dandes (1966).

Conservatives tended to be low in Self-acceptance as well ($r = -.24$) indicating an inability to accept one's own weaknesses. Since it had been found previously that conservatives were more defensive than liberals (Adorno, et. al., 1950; Dittes, 1968; McClosky, 1958), their defensiveness might lead to refusal to see all sides of themselves. Since they tended to structure their world in a black and white manner in which things are either all-good or all-bad (Weima, 1965), it could be quite threatening for these people to admit personal deficiencies. Liberals do not seem to have this problem, since they tend to be more tolerant of ambiguity (Adorno, et. al., 1950) and of diversity (Weima, 1965). They should, then, be able to handle inconsistencies about themselves and others with less anxiety and defensiveness.

Finally, conservatism was negatively related to Capacity for Intimate Contact ($r = .18$), indicating that they found difficulty with warm interpersonal relationships. According to Shostrom (1963), successful relating to others is best achieved when the person doesn't utilize nor overrespond to interpersonal demand expectations and obligations. Other people are seen as ends in themselves, not as means, an outlook that is similar to Maslow's B-love. Relating to others on a plane above need satisfaction is a characteristic of Gunnison's (1967) liberals and of Allport's (1959) intrinsic orientation. Inability to relate to others in this way is characteristic of Dreger's (1952) and McClosky's (1958) conservatives who tended to be isolated, dependent, and socially insecure.

The results support the hypothesis that religious conservatives tend to be lower in psychological health than liberals. The findings are in agreement with Gunnison's (1967) hypothesis that liberalism is characteristic of psychologically healthy people, since it represents social growth in the same way that self-actualization represents personal growth.

Liberalism-Conservatism and Degree of Commitment to Re-
main in the Priesthood

A significant relationship ($r = -.29$) between conservatism and leaving was found, which was the expected outcome. These results are not so surprising if the Church is considered from a social system standpoint. The status quo in the Church has an established set of norms and values with various institutionalized channels through which these ideals can be attained, i.e. salvation through adherence to certain doctrines and practices. Liberals, from definitions made previously, emphasize freedom from rigid dogmatism and structure (Barron, 1968; Dandes, 1966; Hadden, 1969; Neal, 1970; Weima, 1965). In addition to challenging the means of religion, many also question its end, and, more specifically, the ends of the priesthood. Many of the preservers of the status quo still see the Church as being remote from the world (Neal, 1970) and that its role does not include involvement in the world (Greeley, 1967; Hadden, 1969; Rokeach, 1970). A number of people who feel this way are members of the religious hierarchy in positions of power where they can strive to maintain the status quo. The role of the Church that emerges from Vatican II, on the other hand, is one that encourages involvement in the world rather than avoidance or transcendence of it. Humanitarianism, per-

sonal conscience and responsibility, and a critical look at authority are indicative of this viewpoint.

Thus, the liberal orientation often seeks change in the status quo of the system. It has long been considered a principle of group dynamics that when the normative structure begins to be questioned or disputed, those who are a part of it tend to draw the circle even tighter to defend it (Festinger, 1950; Lewin, 1947). The more the liberals press for reforms, the more they may be pressured to hold to the party line. Even if change is admitted necessary by the system advocates, it is to be brought about through institutionalized channels. Exhortation to "work within the system" may merely be another way of stifling innovation, especially if the system does not lend itself to implementing changes. The reforms, consequently, often become buried under a weight of legalism, bureaucracy, and power politics.

Change within a system assumes that the established order and the reformers agree on the ends and merely disagree on the means to attain these ends. But some members of the social system may disagree with primary values that those in positions of power hold to be sacred, i.e. salvation of one's own soul as the prime goal of religion, transcendence of worldly matters, unquestioning beliefs in doctrines and traditions. It is when these

fundamental values clash that the crisis occurs. As previous studies pointed out, the pressure to conform is applied (Lewin, 1947). Superiors may try to get the deviant priest back on the right path. A person who is working within a system such as the priesthood to implement reforms may realize that he is being prevented from achieving his goals by his very adherence to the rules, roles, and practices of that system. Once he realizes that his attempts are relatively fruitless, he may opt to leave the system and look elsewhere for an atmosphere that is more receptive to his values. (It would be useful to find out what these priests intend to do once they leave.) It should be pointed out, however, that the mean of the leave-stay dimension was 1.81, with a standard deviation of .91, indicating that most of the respondents were on the "stay" end of the continuum, either definitely staying or tending to remain in the priesthood.

Degree of Commitment to Remain in the Priesthood and Psychological Health

Tendency to leave the priesthood correlated positively and significantly with psychological health as measured by the POI subscales. The picture that emerged of one who tends toward leaving the priesthood was one of inner-directedness ($r = .27$), flexibility in applying values to one's own life ($r = .20$), freedom in behavioral expression of feeling ($r = .32$), self-acceptance ($r = .20$), and ability to form meaningful relationships ($r = .25$). Why would this be truer of those who tend to leave?

Spontaneity was the aspect that correlated highest with leaving. According to Maslow (1954) self-actualizing people are generally spontaneous. The atmosphere of the priesthood, however, may be more comfortable for those who want their modes of behavior determined by others. Perhaps people who are spontaneous find the rigid role expectations of the priesthood to be restrictive and stifling of their freedom of expression. If the conflict were intense enough, it could lead to consideration of leaving the priesthood.

Self-actualizers usually are more self-accepting, flexible in values, and self-reliant in terms of their

own attitudes and behavior. These characteristics also correlated with leaving (Self-Acceptance, $r = .20$; Existentiality, $r = .20$; Inner-Directed Support, $r = .27$). Reliance on oneself for direction, judgment, and decision is usually considered desirable. The priesthood, however, has long stressed obedience to authority and acceptance of predetermined values. Conflict could occur if a person placed more faith in his own judgment than in what he was told to accept without question. It would not be too difficult to envision this conflict as a possible motivation for leaving.

Self-actualizers are generally better at forming relationships with others and they tend to have a diversity of friends and acquaintances. But priests who are high in this aspect may find it difficult to fulfill because their opportunities for relating to others may be limited to structured or professional contacts. This is especially true with regard to women, whom they are often warned to avoid. Thus, the atmosphere that stifles spontaneity may also stifle development of relationships with others.

It may be that the priesthood, with its present rigid role expectations and values, is not conducive to development of these qualities. Those who strive to fulfill them may seek alternatives for psychological growth.

Chapter IV

Directions for Further Study

A discussion of the overall interrelationships among variables is in order along with suggestions for future inquiry. Results imply that conservatives are less psychologically healthy than liberals and that healthy liberals tend to consider leaving the priesthood. If they are so healthy, why do they consider leaving? Perhaps the dilemma may be, once again, in the area of definition. As was mentioned before, psychological health has been defined many ways, depending upon the theory accepted. It is sometimes synonymous with psychological adjustment, which generally implies a social aspect--conformity to social norms (Freeman & Giovannoni, 1968). Adjustment refers to the extent to which people follow and respond to normative prescriptions and expectations of appropriate behavior. By definition, conservatives should be better adjusted since they espouse conformity. However, the measure of psychological health chosen for this study was the POI, which measures self-actualization. Self-actualizing people are not the norm; indeed, they are relatively rare, according to Maslow (1954). Self-actualization does not mean the same as adjustment or normality. In fact,

growth often means functioning outside the normal, adjusted modes of behavior. It is not being proposed, then, that conservatives are maladjusted, nor that liberals are well-adjusted. It may be the other way around: liberals who are leaving may not be well-adjusted to the priesthood. What the results imply is that liberals tend to be higher in psychological health as viewed from a growth standpoint than conservatives and that those who tend to leave are higher in growth than those who tend to stay.

A related consideration with regard to growth in religion is the place of radicalism in religious attitudes. How different is it from what has been called liberalism? For example, Item 37 of the Liberalism-Conservatism Scale: "There are times when a person has to put his personal conscience above the Church's teaching," was considered highly liberal. McGloughlin and Bellak (1968) would be in agreement, since they saw liberals as stressing personal freedom, responsibility, and openness to the world. Barron (1968) likewise found liberals to have personally evolved their beliefs. Hampden-Turner and Whitten (1971), however, would probably disagree that predominance of personal conscience in moral considerations is characteristic of liberals. In a recent study, they compared political liberals, con-

servatives, and radicals with regard to Kohlberg's (1964) stages of moral development. The stages progressed from the premoral level (moral behavior because of fear of punishment, Stage 1; and primitive, self-centered need to be free from restrictions, Stage 2), to the morality of conventional role-conformity (because of need for good relations with others, Stage 3; and submission to authority, duty, and tradition, Stage 4), and to the highest level, morality of self-accepted moral principles (social contract morality, Stage 5; and morality of personal conscience, Stage 6). Conservatives were rather predictable, falling mainly into Stages 3 and 4. Liberals fell mainly into one stage, Stage 5, the social contract morality. Radicals, however, were in two directions: Stage 2, which represented the primitive need to be free to do what one wants, and Stage 6, which represented the highest form of moral development, individual conscience. It would be informative to see whether this same finding would occur for religious conservatives, liberals, and radicals. The implications would certainly be more relevant in the area of religion, which is an important source of morality. From the standpoint of research and methodology, a more important problem is that what was considered by Hampden-Turner and Whitten (1971) to be a moral stage characteristic of radicals was consi-

dered in the present study and by previous researchers (Barron, 1968; McGloughlin & Bellak, 1968) to be characteristic of liberals. Thus, are the trends mentioned earlier as influences of Vatican II to be called liberal or radical? Is there a conservative-radical dimension as well as a conservative-liberal dimension, or are they all part of the same continuum?

What it means is that the area of religious liberalism-conservatism-radicalism is still relatively undefined. Studies such as this one are undertaken to try to refine the variables so that they can be better understood and more easily related to other variables. In the long run, this seems to be the best way to proceed, methodologically. The crisis still remains, however, and liberals and conservatives clash over ideological and value differences. Priests are leaving, and those who are leaving seem to be those who are growing and healthy--the kind that are need^{ed} in the Church if the institution is to deal with meaningful change.

The turmoil and its aspects (leaving the system, preservation of status quo by those in power, ideological arguments, etc.) is characteristic of transition in any society (Graves, 1970). People within the system who have evolved higher values (similar to the Stage 6 level) find that the older values are no longer appropriate and

try to change the system to be more accommodating. In the meantime, the chaos and upheaval appear to the establishment to be regression to a primitive decadence, while to the innovators it is a progression toward growth which will eventually resolve itself in a healthier and higher form or organization. Graves (1970) saw this as an evolutionary process that is only temporarily held back by the resistance of the older structure. The end of this process is a more desirable society with a higher plane of values. Perhaps this is true of religion, and, more specifically, of the priesthood. It may be, as Rokeach (1968) suggests, that these changes will help to resolve contradictory teachings ("All men are created equal", yet "We are the only true people of God") and will eventually aid in the psychological growth of the members. If these changes are indeed an indication of positive growth, then the exodus may be a temporary, if unfortunate, indication of the larger struggle for reform which will eventually result in a stronger and more growth-oriented Church.

Chapter V

Summary

The relationships among religious liberalism-conservatism, psychological health, and degree of commitment to remain in the priesthood were studied. Ss were 348 priests participating in a research project sponsored by the American Catholic Bishops' Committee on Pastoral Research and Practices. Liberalism-conservatism was measured by a scale constructed using judges' ratings, item-analysis, and factor analysis; psychological health was measured by the Personal Orientation Inventory; and degree of commitment to remain by Question Number 37 of the sociological questionnaire given by the National Opinion Research Center. Significant negative correlations were found between conservatism and psychological health and between conservatism and leaving the priesthood. Significant correlations (positive) were found for POI subscales and leaving the priesthood.

References

- Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D., & Sanford, R. N. The authoritarian personality. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950.
- Allen, R. O. & Spilka, B. Committed and consensual religion: a specification of religion-prejudice relationships. Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion, 1967, 6, 191-206.
- Allport, G. W. Religion and prejudice. Crane Review, 1959, 2, 1-10.
- Allport, G. W. Religion and social attitudes. In Religion and health: selected projects and methods. Proceeding of the 5th Academy Symposium, 1961. New York: Fordham University Press, 1963. Pp. 18-53.
- Anastasi, A. Psychological testing. (3rd ed.) New York: Macmillan, 1968.
- Barron, F. Creativity and personal freedom. Princeton, New Jersey, Van Nostrand, 1968.
- Broen, W. E., Jr. A factor-analytic study of religious attitudes. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1957, 54, 176-179.
- Campbell, D. T. & Fiske, D. W. Convergent and discriminant validation by the multitrait-multimethod matrix. Psychological Bulletin, 1959, 56, 81-105.

- Cline, V. B. & Richards, J. M., Jr. A factor-analytic study of religious belief and behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 1, 569-578.
- Cronbach, L. J. Essentials of psychological testing. (2nd ed.) New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960.
- Dandes, H. M. Psychological health and teaching effectiveness. Journal of Teacher Education, 1966, 17, 301-306.
- Dittes, J. E. Psychology of religion. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson, Eds. Handbook of social psychology. (2nd ed.) Vol. 5, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1968. Pp. 602-659.
- Dreger, R. M. Some personality correlates of religious attitudes as determined by projective techniques. Psychological Monographs, 1952, 66, No. 3 (Whole No. 335).
- Elms, A. C. Right-wingers in Dallas. Psychology Today, 1970, 3 (9), 27-59.
- Feiner, J., Trutsch, J. & Bockle, F. Theology today: renewal in dogma, Vol. 1, Milwaukee: Bruce, 1965.
- Festinger, L. Informal social communication. Psychological Review, 1950, 57, 271-282.
- Freeman, H. E. & Giovannoni, J. M. Social psychology of mental health. In G. Lindzey and E. Aronson, (Eds.)

- Handbook of social psychology. (2nd ed.) Vol. 5, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1968. Pp. 660-719.
- Glock, C. Y. On the study of religious commitment. Religious Educational Research Supplement, 1962, 98-110.
- Graves, C. W. Levels of existence: an open system theory of values. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 1970, 10, 131-157.
- Greeley, A. M. The Catholic experience. New York: Doubleday, 1967.
- Gunnison, H. Some hypotheses regarding psychological health and political-economic attitudes. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 1967, 10-17.
- Hadden, J. K. The gathering storm in the churches. New York: Doubleday, 1969.
- Hampden-Turner, C. H. & Whitten, P. Morals, left and right. Psychology Today, 1971, 4 (10), 39-76.
- Harman, H. H. Modern factor analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960.
- Hicks, J. M. & Wright, J. H. Convergent-discriminant validation and factor-analysis of five scales of liberalism-conservatism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 14 (2), 114-120.
- Kaiser, H. F. The varimax criterion for analytic rotation

in factor analysis. Psychometrika, 1958, 23, 187-200.

Keene, J. Religious behavior and neuroticism, spontaneity, and worldmindedness. Sociometry, 1967, 30, 137-157.

Kennedy, E. C. Comfort my people: the pastoral presence of the Church. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1968.

Kerr, W. A. Tulane factors of liberalism-conservatism. Chicago: Psychometric Affiliates, 1946.

Kerpelman, L. C. Student political activism and ideology: comparative characteristics of activists and non-activists. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1969, 16 (1), 8-13.

Kimbrough, R. B. & Hines, V. A. The Florida scale of civic beliefs. Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida, 1963.

Klineberg, O. Methods of data collection. In Religion and health: selected projects and methods. Proceeding of the 5th Academy Symposium, 1961. New York: Fordham University Press, 1963. Pp. 1-17.

Kohlberg, L. Development of moral character and moral ideology. In M. L. Hoffman and L. W. Hoffman (Eds.) Review of child development research.

Kung, H. Post-ecumenical Christianity. New York: Her-

der & Herder, 1970.

Lewin, K. Group decision and social change. In T. F. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley (Eds.) Readings in in social psychology. New York: Holt, 1947. 1 Pp. 330-344.

McClosky, H. Conservatism and personality. American Political Science Review, 1958, 52, 27-45.

McGloughlin, W. G. & Bellak, R. N. (Eds.) Religion in in America. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1968.

Maslow, A. H. Motivation and personality. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954.

Maslow, A. H. Toward a psychology of being. Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand, 1968.

Monaghan, R. The three faces of the true believer: a motivations for attending a fundamentalist church. Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion, 1967, 6, 236-245.

Neal, M. A., Final report of the survey for contemplatives. Dubuque, Iowa: The Scriptorium, New Melleray Abbey, 1970.

Putney, S. & Middletown, R. Dimensions and correlates of religious ideologies. Social Forces, 1961, 39, 285-290.

Ranck, J. G. Religious conservatism-liberalism and mental health. Pastoral Psychology, 1961, 12, 34-40.

Religion and health: selected projects and methods.

Proceeding of the 5th Academy Symposium, 1961.

New York: Fordham University Press, 1963.

Rokeach, M. Beliefs, attitudes and values. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1968.

Rokeach, M. Faith, hope and bigotry. Psychology Today, 3 (11), 33-58.

Rokeach, M. The open and closed mind. New York: Basic Books, 1960.

Rynne, X. The third session. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1965.

Shaw, M. E. & Wright, J. M. Scales for the measurement of attitudes. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967.

Shostrom, E. Personal orientation inventory. San Diego: Educational Industrial Testing Service, 1963.

Watts, W. A., Lynch, S., & Whittaker, D. Alienation and activism in today's college age youth: socialization patterns and current family relationships. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1969, 16 (1), 1-7.

Weima, J. Authoritarianism, religious conservatism, and sociocentric attitudes in Roman Catholic groups. Human Relations, 18, 1965, 231-239.

Appendix A

Personal Orientation Inventory

(Scale classification given after item content)

1. I am bound by the principle of fairness. (0)
I am not absolutely bound by the principle of fairness. (I, Ex, S, C)
2. When a friend does me a favor, I feel that I must return it. (0)
When a friend does me a favor, I do not feel that I must return it. (0)
3. I feel I must always tell the truth. (0)
I do not always tell the truth. (I, Ex, Sa)
4. If I manage the situation right, I can avoid being hurt. (0)
No matter how hard I try, my feelings are often hurt. (I, Fr)
5. I feel that I must strive for perfection in everything that I undertake. (0)
I do not feel that I must strive for perfection in everything that I undertake. (I, Ex, Sa)
6. I seldom make my decisions spontaneously. (0)
I often make my decisions spontaneously. (I, SAV, S)
7. I am afraid to be myself. (0)
I am not afraid to be myself. (I, Sr)
8. I feel obligated when a stranger does me a favor. (0)
I do not feel obligated when a stranger does me a favor. (I, Ex, C)
9. I feel that I have a right to expect others to do what I want of them. (0)
I do not feel that I have a right to expect others to do what I want of them. (I, Ex)
10. I live by values which are in agreement with others. (0)
I live by values which are primarily based on my own feelings. (I, SAV, Fr)

Appendix A (cont'd):

11. I am concerned with self-improvement at all times. (0)
I am not concerned with self-improvement at all times. (I, Ex, S)
12. I feel guilty when I am selfish. (0)
I don't feel guilty when I am selfish. (I, Sa)
13. Anger is something I try to avoid. (0)
I have no objection to getting angry. (I, Fr, A)
14. For me, anything is possible if I believe in myself. (0)
I have a lot of natural limitations even though I believe in myself. (I, Sa)
15. I put others' interests before my own. (0)
I do not put others' interests before my own. (I, Fr)
16. I sometimes feel embarrassed by compliments. (0)
I am not embarrassed by compliments. (I, Fr, Sr)
17. I believe it is important to understand why others are as they are. (0)
I believe it is important to accept others as they are. (I)
18. I don't put off until tomorrow what I ought to do today. (0)
I can put off until tomorrow what I ought to do today. (I)
19. I have a right to expect the other person to appreciate what I give. (0)
I can give without requiring the other person to appreciate what I give. (I)
20. My moral values are dictated by society. (0)
My moral values are self-determined. (I, SAV)
21. I feel free to not do what others expect of me. (I, Ex, C)
I do what others expect of me. (0)
22. I don't accept my weaknesses. (0)
I accept my weaknesses. (I, Ex, Sa)

Appendix A (cont'd):

23. In order to grow emotionally, it is necessary to know why I act as I do. (O)
In order to grow emotionally, it is not necessary to know why I act as I do. (I)
24. I am hardly ever cross. (O)
Sometimes I am cross when I am not feeling well. (I, Sa, A)
25. It is necessary that others approve of what I do. (O)
It is not always necessary that others approve of what I do. (I, C)
26. I am afraid of making mistakes. (O)
I am not afraid of making mistakes. (I, Sa)
27. I do not trust the decisions I make spontaneously. (O)
I trust the decisions I make spontaneously. (I, SAV, S)
28. My feelings of self-worth depend on how much I accomplish. (O)
My feelings of self-worth do not depend on how much I accomplish. (I, Sa)
29. I fear failure. (O)
I don't fear failure. (I, Sa)
30. My moral values are determined, for the most part, by the thoughts, feelings, and decisions of others. (O)
My moral values are not determined, for the most part, by the thoughts, feelings, and decisions of others. (I)
31. It is not possible to live life in terms of what I want to do. (O)
It is possible to live life in terms of what I want to do. (I, Ex, Sr)
32. I cannot cope with the ups and downs of life. (O)
I can cope with the ups and downs of life. (I, Sr)

Appendix A (cont'd):

33. I do not believe in saying what I feel in dealing with others. (0)
I believe in saying what I feel in dealing with others. (I, Fr, A, C)
34. Children should realize that they do not have the same rights and privileges as adults. (0)
It is not important to make an issue of rights and privileges. (I)
35. I avoid "sticking my neck out" in my relations with others. (0)
I can "stick my neck out" in my relations with others. (I, S)
36. I believe the pursuit of self-interest is opposed to interest in others. (0)
I believe the pursuit of self-interest is not opposed to interest in others. (I, SAV, Ex, Sa, Nc, Sy, C)
37. I have not rejected any of the moral values I was taught. (0)
I find that I have rejected many of the moral values I was taught. (I, Sa)
38. I do not live in terms of my wants, likes, dislikes, and values. (0)
I live in terms of my wants, likes, dislikes, and values. (I, SAV, Fr, Sr)
39. I do not trust my ability to size up a situation. (0)
I trust my ability to size up a situation. (I)
40. I do not believe I have an innate capacity to cope with life. (0)
I believe that man is essentially good and can be trusted. (I, sr, Nc)
41. I must justify my actions in the pursuit of my own interests. (0)
I need not justify my actions in my pursuit of my own interests. (I, S, Sa)

Appendix A (cont'd):

42. I am bothered by fears of being inadequate. (O)
I am not bothered by fears of being inadequate.
(I, Sa)
43. I believe that man is essentially evil and cannot
be trusted. (O)
I believe that man is essentially good and can be
trusted. (I, Nc)
44. I live by the rules and standards of society. (O)
I do not always need to live by the rules and stan-
dards of society. (I, Ex, C)
45. I am bound by my duties and obligations to others.
(O)
I am not bound by my duties and obligations to
others. (I, Ex, C)
46. Reasons are needed to justify my feelings. (O)
Reasons are not needed to justify my feelings. (I)
47. I find it difficult to express my feelings by just
being silent. (O)
There are times when just being silent is the best
way I can express my feelings. (I, Fr)
48. I often feel it necessary to defend my past actions.
(TI)
I do not feel it necessary to defend my past actions.
TC)
49. I like everyone I know. (O)
I do not like everyone I know. (I, C)
50. Criticism threatens my self-esteem. (O)
Criticism does not threaten my self-esteem. (I, Ex,
Sa, A)
51. I believe that knowledge of what is right makes
people act right. (O)
I do not believe that knowledge of what is right
necessarily makes people act right. (I)
52. I am afraid to be angry at those I love. (O)
I feel free to be angry at those I love. (I, Fr, S,
A, C)

Appendix A (cont'd):

53. My basic responsibility is to be aware of others' needs. (O)
My basic responsibility is to be aware of my own needs. (I, Fr, C)
54. Impressing others is most important. (O)
Expressing myself is most important. (I, Ex, S, C)
55. To feel right, I need always to please others. (O)
I can feel right without always having to please others. (I, C)
56. I will not risk a friendship just to say or do what is right. (O)
I will risk a friendship in order to say or do what I believe is right. (I)
57. I feel bound to keep the promises I make. (O)
I do not always feel bound to keep the promises I make. (I, Ex, C)
58. I must avoid sorrow at all costs. (O)
It is not necessary for me to avoid sorrow. (I, Fr)
59. I strive always to predict what will happen in the future. (TI)
I do not feel it necessary always to predict what will happen in the future. (TC)
60. It is important that others accept my point of view. (O)
It is not necessary for others to accept my point of view. (I, Sr, C)
61. I only feel free to express warm feelings to my friends. (O)
I feel free to express both warm and hostile feelings to my friends. (I, Fr, A, C)
62. There are very few times when it is more important to express warm feelings to my friends. (O)
There are many times when it is more important to express warm feelings to my friends. (I, Fr, S)
63. I do not welcome criticism as an opportunity for growth. (O)
I welcome criticism as an opportunity for growth. (I, Sa, A0)

Appendix A (cont'd):

64. Appearances are all-important. (0)
Appearances are not terribly important. (I, Ex)
65. I hardly ever gossip. (0)
I gossip a little at times. (I, Sa)
66. I do not feel free to reveal my weaknesses among friends. (0)
I feel free to reveal my weaknesses among friends. (I, Sa)
67. I should always assume responsibility for other people's feelings. (0)
I need not always assume responsibility for other people's feelings. (I, Ex, C)
68. I do not feel free to be myself and bear the consequences. (0)
I feel free to be myself and bear the consequences. (I, Sr, Sa, SAV)
69. I already know all I need to know about my feelings. (0)
As life goes on, I continue to know more and more about my feelings. (I, Fr)
70. I hesitate to show my weaknesses among strangers. (0)
I do not hesitate to show my weaknesses among strangers. (I, Sa, A, C)
71. I will continue to grow only by setting my sights on a high level, socially approved goal. (0)
I will continue to grow best by being myself. (I, Sa)
72. I cannot accept inconsistencies within myself. (0)
I accept inconsistencies within myself. (I, Sa)
73. Man is naturally antagonistic. (0)
Man is naturally cooperative. (I, Nc)
74. I hardly ever laugh at a dirty joke. (0)
I don't mind laughing at a dirty joke. (I, Ex, S)
75. Happiness is an end in human relationships. (0)
Happiness is a by-product in human relationships. (I)

Appendix A (cont'd):

76. I only feel free to show friendly feelings to strangers. (O)
I feel free to show both friendly and unfriendly feelings to strangers. (I, Fr, A, C)
77. I try to be sincere and I am sincere. (O)
I try to be sincere but I sometimes fail. (I, Sa)
78. Self-interest is unnatural. (O)
Self-interest is natural. (I, Sr)
79. A neutral party can measure a happy relationship by observation. (O)
A neutral party cannot measure a happy relationship by observation. (I, A)
80. For me, work and play are opposites. (O)
For me, work and play are the same. (I, SAV, Ex, Sy)
81. Two people will get along best if each concentrates on pleasing the other. (O)
Two people can get along best if each person feels free to express himself. (I, S, C)
82. I have feelings of resentment about things that are past. (TI)
I do not have feelings of resentment about things that are past. (TC)
83. I like only masculine men and feminine women. (O)
I like men and women who show masculinity as well as femininity. (I, Nc)
84. I actively attempt to avoid embarrassment whenever I can. (O)
I do not actively attempt to avoid embarrassment whenever I can. (I, S, A)
85. I blame my parents for a lot of my troubles. (O)
I do not blame my parents for my troubles. (I, S)
86. I feel that a person should be silly only at the right time and place. (O)
I can be silly when I feel like it. (I, Ex, S)

Appendix A (cont'd):

87. People should always repent their wrong-doings. (TI)
People need not always repent their wrong-doings. (TC)
88. I worry about the future. (TI)
I do not worry about the future. (TC)
89. Kindness and ruthlessness need not be opposites. (I,
SAV, Ex, Sy, A)
90. I prefer to save good things for future use. (TI)
I prefer to use good things now. (TC)
91. People should always control their anger. (O)
People should express honestly felt anger. (I, Fr)
92. The truly spiritual man is never sensual. (O)
The truly spiritual man is sometimes sensual. (I, SAV,
Ex, Nc, Sy)
93. I am unable to express my feelings if they are likely
to result in undesirable consequences. (O)
I am able to express my feelings even when they some-
times result in undesirable consequences. (I, Fr, A)
94. I am often ashamed of some of the emotions that I
feel bubbling up within me. (O)
I do not feel ashamed of my emotions. (I, Fr)
95. I have never had mysterious or ecstatic experiences.
(O)
I have had mysterious or ecstatic experiences. (I,
Fr)
96. I am orthodoxly religious. (O)
I am not orthodoxly religious. (I, Ex)
97. I am completely free of guilt. (O)
I am not free of guilt. (I)
98. I have a problem in fusing sex and love. (O)
I have no problem fusing sex and love. (I, SAV, Ex,
Nc, Sy)
99. I do not enjoy detachment and privacy. (O)
I enjoy detachment and privacy. (I, SAV)

Appendix A (cont'd):

100. I do not feel dedicated to my work. (O)
I feel dedicated to my work. (I, SAV)
101. I cannot express affection unless I am sure it will
be returned. (O)
I can express affection regardless of whether it is
returned. (I, Fr, S)
102. Only living for the moment is important. (TI)
Living for the future is as important as living for
the moment. (TC)
103. It is better to be yourself. (I, C)
It is better to be popular. (O)
104. Wishing and imagining are always good. (TI)
Wishing and imagining can be bad. (TC)
105. I spend more time preparing to live. (TI)
I spend more time actually living. (TC)
106. I am loved because I love. (O)
I am loved because I am lovable. (I, C)
107. When I really love myself, everybody will love me.
(O)
When I really love myself, there will still be those
who won't love me. (I, Sa, C)
108. I can let other people control me if I am sure they
will not continue to control me. (O)
I can let other people control me. (I, C)
109. As they are, people do not annoy me. (O)
As they are, people sometimes annoy me. (I, A)
110. Living for the future gives my life its primary mean-
ing. (TI)
Only when living for the future ties into living for
the present does my life have meaning. (TC)
111. I follow diligently the motto, "Don't waste your time."
(TI)
I do not feel bound by the motto, "Don't waste your
time." (TC)
112. What I have been in the past dictates the kind of per-
son I will be. (TI)
What I have been in the past does not necessarily
dictate the kind of person I will be. (TC)

Appendix A (cont'd):

113. It is of little importance to me how I live in the here and now. (TI)
It is important to me how I live in the here and now. (TC)
114. I have never had an experience where life seemed just perfect. (O)
I have had an experience where life seemed just perfect. (I, SAV)
115. Evil is an intrinsic part of human nature which fights good. (O)
Evil is the result of frustration in trying to be good. (I, Nc, A)
116. A person can completely change his essential nature. (O)
A person can never change his essential nature. (I, Nc)
117. I am afraid to be tender. (O)
I am not afraid to be tender. (I, Fr, C)
118. I am not assertive and affirming. (O)
I am assertive and affirming. (I, SAV, A, Sr)
119. Women should not be trusting and yielding. (O)
Women should be trusting and yielding. (I, Nc)
120. I do not see myself as others see me. (O)
I see myself as others see me. (I)
121. A person who thinks about his greatest potential gets conceited. (O)
It is a good idea to think about your greatest potential. (I, SAV, Sr)
122. Men should not be assertive and affirming. (O)
Men should be assertive and affirming. (I, Nc, A)
123. I am not able to risk being myself. (O)
I am able to risk being myself. (I, SAV, A)
124. I feel the need to be doing something significant all of the time. (TI)
I do not feel the need to be doing something significant all of the time. (TC, Ex)

Appendix A (cont'd):

125. I suffer from memories. (TI)
I do not suffer from memories. (TC)
126. Men and women must not be both yielding and assertive. (O)
Men and women must be both yielding and assertive. (I, Nc)
127. I do not like to participate actively in intense discussions. (O)
I like to participate actively in intense discussions. (I, C)
128. I am not self-sufficient. (O)
I am self-sufficient. (I, SAV, Sr, Sa)
129. I like to withdraw from others for extended periods of time. (TI)
I do not like to withdraw from others for extended periods of time. (TC)
130. I always play fair. (O)
Sometimes I cheat a little. (I, Ex, A)
131. I never feel so angry that I want to destroy or hurt others. (O)
Sometimes I feel so angry I want to destroy or hurt others. (I, Fr, A)
132. I feel uncertain and insecure in my relationships with others. (O)
I feel certain and secure in my relationships with others. (I, Sr)
133. I do not like to withdraw temporarily from others. (TI)
I like to withdraw temporarily from others. (TC, SAV)
134. I cannot accept my mistakes. (O)
I can accept my mistakes. (I, Sa)
135. I never find any people who are stupid and uninteresting. (O)
I find some people who are stupid and uninteresting. (I, A)

Appendix A (cont'd):

136. I regret my past. (TI)
I do not regret my past. (TC)
137. Just being myself is not helpful to others. (O)
Being myself is helpful to others. (I, S, Sy)
138. I have not had moments of intense happiness when I
felt like I was experiencing a kind of bliss. (O)
I have had moments of intense happiness when I felt
like I was experiencing a kind of ecstasy or bliss.
(I, SAV)
139. People have an instinct for evil. (O)
People do not have an instinct for evil. (I, Nc)
140. For me, the future often seems hopeless. (TI)
For me, the future usually seems hopeful. (TC)
141. People are not both good and evil. (O)
People are both good and evil. (I, SAV, Nc)
142. My past is a handicap to my future. (TI)
My past is a stepping stone for the future. (TC)
143. "Killing time" is a problem for me. (TI)
"Killing time" is not a problem for me. (TC)
144. For me, the present is an island, unrelated to the
past and future. (TI)
For me, past, present, and future is in meaningful
continuity. (TC, Sy)
145. My hope for the future depends on having friends. (O)
My hope for the future does not depend on having
friends. (I)
146. I cannot like people unless I also approve of them.
(O)
I can like people without having to approve of them.
(I, Sy, A)
147. People are not basically good. (O)
People are basically good. (I, SAV, Nc)
148. Honesty is always the best policy. (O)
There are times when honesty is not the best policy.
(I, Ex)

Appendix A (cont'd):

149. I feel uncomfortable with anything less than a perfect performance. (0)
I can feel comfortable with less than a perfect performance. (I, Ex, Sr)
150. I can overcome any obstacles as long as I believe in myself. (0)
I cannot overcome every obstacle even if I believe in myself. (I, Sa)

Appendix B

Religious Liberalism-Conservatism Scale

(Original Form)

37. Below are a number of statements which are frequently made today. Please indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement with each of them by CIRCLING ONE CODE ON EACH LINE.

Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Uncer- tain	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly
-------------------	-------------------	----------------	----------------------	----------------------

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

5	6	7	8	9
---	---	---	---	---

1. The important thing in the Church today is that people are really examining what has meaning for them.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

2. What is lacking today is that closeness among priests that used to be so evident.

5	6	7	8	9
---	---	---	---	---

3. The basic values of the Church remain the same, but their expression is changing.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

4. The relationship between laity and priests was much better before Vatican II when everyone knew just how he was expected to act.

5	6	7	8	9
---	---	---	---	---

5. With the new roles for everyone in the Church that have developed since Vatican II, the relationships between priests and laity are much better.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

6. Everything changes so quickly in the liturgy these days that I often have trouble deciding what rules to follow.

5	6	7	8	9
---	---	---	---	---

Appendix B (cont'd):

	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Uncer- tain	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly
	1	2	3	4	5
	5	6	7	8	9
7. The trouble with the Church is that most people really don't believe in anything.	1	2	3	4	5
8. There is more opportunity now than before for real friendship for priests.	5	6	7	8	9
9. I often feel that many things the Church stood for are now disintegrating.	1	2	3	4	5
10. The diversity of liturgy provides a real choice which I enjoy.	5	6	7	8	9
11. I feel that everything that has value in human life will somehow be retained in heaven.	1	2	3	4	5
12. The mystery of the Trinity is so profound and so central that I feel I should humbly accept it as given and not seek to plumb its depths.	5	6	7	8	9
13. The experience of dialogue among persons who are open and trusting provides the human analogy for understanding the Trinity as a life of communication and communion.	1	2	3	4	5
14. I think of God primarily as the Supreme Being, immutable, allopowerful and the Creator of the universe.	5	6	7	8	9

Appendix B (cont'd):

	<u>Agree Strongly</u>	<u>Agree Somewhat</u>	<u>Uncer- tain</u>	<u>Disagree Somewhat</u>	<u>Disagree Strongly</u>
	1	2	3	4	5
	5	6	7	8	9
15. The Catholic Church is the one true Church established by Christ with St. Peter and his successors as its head.					
	1	2	3	4	5
16. For me, God is found principally in my relationships with people.					
	5	6	7	8	9
17. God's Word comes to us through some of the great prophetic men of our times, such as Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King.					
	1	2	3	4	5
18. I think of Jesus principally as the man who has given me my ideals for truly human living.					
	5	6	7	8	9
19. Today's Christian must emphasize more than ever openness to the Spirit rather than dependence on traditional ecclesiastical structures.					
	1	2	3	4	5
20. If God has meaning, I can recognize Him only in Jesus the Christ who makes God plausible and credible.					
	5	6	7	8	9
21. The important thing to stress when teaching about Jesus is that He is truly God, and, therefore, adoration should be directed toward Him.					
	1	2	3	4	5

Appendix B (cont'd):

- | | <u>Agree</u>
<u>Strongly</u> | <u>Agree</u>
<u>Somewhat</u> | <u>Uncer-</u>
<u>tain</u> | <u>Disagree</u>
<u>Somewhat</u> | <u>Disagree</u>
<u>Strongly</u> |
|--|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| 22. I feel that diversity in individual men, among peoples, and in many cultures helps me appreciate the meaning of the Incarnation. | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| 23. The principal meaning of Christ's resurrection for me is that it proved His Divinity. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 24. I think of Jesus Christ as the God who humbled Himself by becoming man and dying for my sins. | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| 25. To doubt one article of faith that is <u>de fide</u> is to question the whole of revealed truth. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 26. I think of heaven as the state in which my soul will rest in blissful possession of the Beatific Vision. | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| 27. I feel that the most important thing to recognize about the sacraments is that they are channels for receiving grace. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 28. I think of the Mass as a sacramental event which anticipates heaven as the joyous union of humanity: risen, redeemed, and glorified in Christ. | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| 29. I think that priests who feel called to do so ought to be witnessing to Christ on the picket line or | | | | | |

Appendix B (cont'd):

	<u>Agree Strongly</u>	<u>Agree Somewhat</u>	<u>Uncer- tain</u>	<u>Disagree Somewhat</u>	<u>Disagree Strongly</u>
	1	2	3	4	5
	5	6	7	8	9
29. speaking out on controversial issues.					
	1	2	3	4	5
30. A Christian should look first to the salvation of his own soul; then he should be concerned about helping others.					
	5	6	7	8	9
31. When I experience moments of deep communication and union with other persons, these sometimes strike me as a taste of what heaven will be like.					
	1	2	3	4	5
32. The contemplative and mystical life is absolutely essential for Christianity.					
	5	6	7	8	9
33. People can be good Christians without spending much time in solitary reflection and prayer.					
	1	2	3	4	5
34. In a secular age like our own, the Church must abandon much of its past emphasis on the sacred.					
	5	6	7	8	9
35. The Church should be a place of refuge and of quiet reflection and prayer.					
	1	2	3	4	5
36. The primary task of the Church is to encourage its members to live the Christian life rather than to try to reform the world.					
	5	6	7	8	9

Appendix B (cont'd):

	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Uncer- tain	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly
	1	2	3	4	5
	5	6	7	8	9
37. For the most part, the Church has been inadequate in facing up to the civil rights issues.					
	1	2	3	4	5
38. Faith means essentially belief in the doctrines of the Church.					
	5	6	7	8	9
39. Faith is primarily an encounter with God in Christ Jesus, rather than an assent to a coherent set of defined truths.					
	1	2	3	4	5
40. The creative ferment in the Church today is bringing about a deepening of my Christian faith.					
	5	6	7	8	9
41. The problem with the Church after Vatican II is that many of the certainties we used to have have been taken away.					
	1	2	3	4	5
42. The turmoil following Vatican II is resulting in a gradual weakening of my own religious beliefs.					
	5	6	7	8	9
43. There are times when a person has to put his personal conscience above the Church's teaching.					
	1	2	3	4	5
44. One's faith may be jeopardized by studying Protestant theologians.					
	5	6	7	8	9

APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by Mary Jo Kupst has been read and approved by members of the Department of Psychology.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Dec 15, 1971
Date

Ronald E Walker
Signature of Adviser