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History, Society, and the Person: The Thought of Don Luigi Sturzo

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HISTORY, SOCIETY, AND THE PERSON:
THE THOUGHT OF DON LUIGI STURZO

by
R. Eugene Mellican

A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
June 1971
Don Luigi Sturzo (1871-1959) has been acknowledged by historians of Italian politics as an effective social reformer, an astute politician, and a great statesman. This active phase of Sturzo's career has been well documented and his name assured a permanent and honored place in the long history of his native country. But the fundamental character and depth of the social theory that also marks the achievement that was his life has not been adequately explored. It is the thesis of this work that the scope of Sturzo's theory embraced nothing less than an integral, concrete and coherent view of being human. The purpose of this study is to serve as an introduction for such an understanding of Sturzo's theory.

Although this is an interpretative and constructive exposition rather than simply a historical or textual analysis of Sturzo's thought, the inner logic of this study remains that of Sturzo's own thought. The movement of this logic is rooted in and follows the realization of the ontological structure of the person in his living, and thereby historical, reality. Since this realization is, in its essence, the concretization of sociality—the associative dimension of man's becoming—the activity through which the person achieves his being is at one with the inward formation of society. The individual person and society are constituted together in a synthesizing relational process of differentiation-in-synthesis in which the closer and more intense the relationship, the deeper and more extensive is the distinct reality of each. The definitive and original irresolvable principle of sociality is rationality, the specifying principle of the person; and it is the projection of consciousness through the inner dynamism of rationality for expression and completion through the mutuality of thought and action that constitutes the concretization of sociality. An analysis of this process from the perspective of both the person and society is the starting point.
Two other essential features of this process provide the focus of attention: its concrete expression in social forms and the regularities of its movement, which Sturzo expresses in the form of "sociological laws." While the social process is pluralistic in its structure, polarity is the dominating feature of it in its concrete process. Both characteristics have their ontological basis in the sole substantive and efficient principle animating the process, the individual person.

Just as it is history, as the constitutive activity of man, that manifests the inner laws of man's associative nature—laws which reveal that man in and of himself cannot effect a totalizing and conclusive pacification of the tendencies that give rise to the laws—so is it history and history alone that reveals the presence of a personal, transcendent, unifying principle within the historical process. Therefore, not only is Sturzo's theory of history the foundation of all his thought, but it is also the culminating point of his thought wherein he works out and brings together the implications of his integral social theory in all of its aspects. He bases his integral social theory on an open-ended historicism that is able to account for both transcendent and immanent factors within the historical process, to preserve their intrinsic unity within a single process, and yet uphold the substantive reality of each. This study therefore concludes with an exposition of the main features of his theory of history.
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INTRODUCTION

In view of certain trends and categories of contemporary thought the relative obscurity of the theory of Don Luigi Sturzo is puzzling. In view of the grave socio-political problems pressing in upon mankind from every side today this obscurity is inexplicable. For it is not exaggeration to say that it is precisely the shadow cast over mankind by these problems that measures the stature of Don Luigi Sturzo as a socio-political reformer and theoretician. As one commentator on Sturzo's thought has accurately expressed it:

Don Luigi Sturzo was a man of his times: This is the key to his mind and spirit. His most outstanding characteristic was that historical identity which is the sole basis of greatness. He was of his times,

1 Numerous reasons have been advanced for the neglect of Sturzo's thought. They are sometimes contradictory. For example, as a thinker who is Catholic, Sturzo has had the misfortune to be interpreted as a Catholic thinker. As a result, on the one side there are those who view his thought as simply a statement of "Catholic Neo-Thomistic social philosophy." One critic of Sturzo's thought dismissed it as an instrument of influence of Catholicism, in this instance "based on a Catholic Platonism." Cf. Paul Honigsheim's review of Inner Laws of Society, in Am. J. of Soc., 57 (1945), 160-61. On the other side some tend to find his thought and its expression not "Catholic" enough. One critic finds a strain in his thought "which links him, not to Christian and Catholic traditions, but to the revolutionary thought of post-Reformation times." Cf. Werner Stark's review of Timasheff's The Sociology of Luigi Sturzo in Thought, 38 (Summer, 1963), 318-20. See also Franz Mueller's review of Inner Laws of Society in Am. Cath. Soc. Rev., 6 (1954), 109-11. None of the reasons, whether taken singly or together, provide an adequate account of the lack of attention given to Sturzo's thought. For example, even those, such as Nicholas Timasheff, who find Sturzo's theory "both original and profound" point to methodological and terminological difficulties of an extremely complex theory. But, obviously, these difficulties are not peculiar to Sturzo's theory alone.
moreover, not only because he faithfully reflected their perplexities and problems, but also, because, to a significant degree, he mastered them.2

The problems that were to forge his thoughts and eventually shape his career were those of post-Risorgimento Italy.3 His vigorous and effective response to these problems gradually and laboriously extended itself from social and economic reform on the municipal and provincial level to the organization of a national political party, the Italian Popular Party, with which his name is so closely associated. The eminent historian Federico Chabod has described the birth of this party as "the most noteworthy event in twentieth century Italian history, especially in relation to the preceding century."4 This event occurred on the morning of January 18, 1919 when Don Luigi Sturzo made his historic and dramatic appeal "to all men free and brave" to support the Italian Popular Party. It is here, in the person of Sturzo, that we find the locus of the inspiration, spirit, and thought behind the Popular Party. Just as it marked a new phenomenon in the history of Italy, so too, did Don Luigi Sturzo. He has been acknowledged by historians of


3For an illuminating account of these problems and Sturzo's response to them, see A. Robert Caponigri's article, "The Ethical and Sociological Bases of Italian Politics: Sturzo and Croce," in Ethics, 59 (Oct., 1948), 35-48. The same author presents a fine biographical sketch of Sturzo's development in Review of Politics, 14 (April, 1952), 147-65. For Sturzo's own brief account, see "My Political Vocation," in Commonweal, 34 (Sept. 26, 1941), 537-40.

Italian politics as "un uomo nuovo," a new man.  

Due to a renewed interest in the Popular Party in recent years this active phase of Sturzo's career has been well documented and his name assured a permanent and honored place in the long history of his native country. But it is not merely his image, though it looms large, as refracted through Italian history that marks the achievement that was his life. It is true that Sturzo's thought was formed and his theory articulated in actively coping with the problems of post-Risorgimento Italy. It was from within the context of this active and reflective engagement that his thought matured and his vision expanded. As they did, Sturzo came to see that the problems of Italy were not peculiar to her alone. In fact, he came to see these problems as reflecting an undertow of trends and currents that ran counter to the very values and ideas upon which Western civilization had been built. His sense of history told him that the solution to these problems was not to push the clock back, nor was it the formulation and enactment of novel, counteracting theories. Rather, it lay in reenforcing and injecting new life into the basic values of Western civilization by integrating them with the positive values emergent in modern culture. And Sturzo saw the convergence of both old and new in the single value, basic and transcendent to all others, of the free and autonomous individual person.

Very early in his career, in fact many years before the

founding of the Popular Party, Sturzo diagnosed the ills afflicting Italy, and all of modern society, as not mere surface phenomena of particular social structures, but as lethal fissures in the social order reaching down to that which is at the basis of all social forms, the individual person.

The social order violated in its very essence: here is the problem in synthesis. It is not the case of individual violations or of simply false applications to concrete cases, but of social violations founded on the false and erroneous conception of the nature of man.6

It is this determination of the fundamental character and depth of the problems confronting modern society that defined the level of Sturzo's vision and from that level only can one adequately understand and evaluate the theory his vision engendered. It is the thesis of this work that the scope of Sturzo's vision embraced nothing less than an integral, concrete and coherent view of being human.

Sturzo's active and reflective concern with the problem of "being human" is the unifying theme of his diversified writings. It is a concern that focuses on this problem not as it presents itself in abstract form, but in the concreteness and particularity which is the reality of history. It is, then, a concern for the individual person. With this leitmotiv in mind one is able to move through his writings without the disorientation and discontinuity which may otherwise follow as a result of the diversity of form and the varying levels of theorizing they express.

Sturzo saw it as no historical accident that the twentieth century has witnessed the rise of personalist oriented theories. Just as the nineteenth century gave emphasis to individual liberty because it had been denied in the name of authority, so it is the reassertion of the primacy and autonomy of the individual person that the twentieth century calls for since "this is denied in the name of the State and of the collective entity--race, nation, or class--that each State strives to express in a most tangible manner." Consequently, Sturzo's own socio-political activity and theory revolve around the individual person. It is here that he finds the effective counterpoint, both practically and theoretically, to the modern state, in its tendency towards a social, political, economic and even ethical monism and to the attendant movement of society towards a reductive secularism. In the first instance, as the practical counterpoint, it is the autonomous person that was the basis and vitality of the Popular Party; and in the second instance it is the person that stands at the core of his socio-political theory. Sturzo himself states, "We must take a new road, leading to the revaluation of the human person, above and beyond individualism, which considers persons as so many numbers, and statism, in which they are swallowed up in the whole."

The primary aim of this study is to present an interpretative and constructive exposition of Sturzo's "revaluation of personalism in society."  

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8Ibid., p. 56.
the human person." A few preliminary observations are in order for the proper understanding of this endeavor. The form and content has been imposed by what I consider to be the initial and most urgent task if Sturzo's theory is to merit the attention it deserves: to plumb as deeply as possible toward the center of his theory to lay bare that fundamental orientation of his thought and the potent ideas intrinsic to it which together give to that theory an enduring historical life of its own. Whatever criteria one may use to determine the historical significance of a theory on man surely first and foremost must be that quality which follows from effectively engaging the dominant human problems of a given era in such a way as to reflect the consciousness of that era and yet at the same time to transcend it by touching in some fundamental way essential features of human reality. In this way it never loses its initial vital quality of immediacy whereby it remains not only a line of thought which merits intrinsic consideration in its own right, but also a fund of ideas for further creative theorizing. The purpose of this study is to serve as an introduction for such an understanding of Sturzo.

It is by reason of, and to emphasize, what I consider to be this dual dimension of value in Sturzo's theory that I have undertaken an interpretative and constructive exposition rather than simply a historical or textual analysis of his thought. This does not mean that the interpretation presented here is not based on a close and thorough textual analysis of Sturzo's writings. What it does indicate is that in my textual analysis
I have focused as much on the implications and ramifications of Sturzo's ideas as their explicit formulation. Many of the ideas rendered explicit here are either a complementing or a reinforcing of what are fragmentary indications of ideas and directions of thought in Sturzo's writings. A prime example of this is my treatment of Sturzo's theory of history because, although he intended to, Sturzo never had the opportunity to work into an explicit theory of history the historicism that underlies all of his thought. The operative criteria throughout my work has been not only the spirit or cognitive orientation of Sturzo's thought, but also, and especially, its intrinsic logical structure. Therefore, the inner logic of this study remains that of Sturzo's own thought.

The movement of this logic is rooted in and follows the realization of the ontological structure of the person in his living, and thereby processive, reality. Since this realization is, in its essence, the concretization of sociality—the associative dimension of man's nature—the activity through which the person achieves his being is at one with the inward formation of society. An analysis of this process is the subject matter of the first chapter. Two other essential features of this process provide the focus of attention in the next two chapters: its concrete expression in social forms and the regularities of its movement. Since it is in and through history that the inner reality of man realizes and manifests itself, it is in his theory of history that Sturzo grounds his theory and brings it to completion. This study therefore
concludes with an exposition of the main features of his theory of history.

One further point that is basic both to my interpretation of Sturzo's theory and to an appreciation of its encompassing contemporaneity must be clarified: Why did Sturzo express his revaluation of the person in sociological terms? Through his sense of history Struzo knew that if this revaluation was to have meaning, validity and power for the present, it must be formulated in response to and in terms of the present. Thus, by reason of the radical socio-political and secularized character of the problematic of contemporary man Sturzo approached and expressed his revaluation in terms of a social theory that is itself radical and fundamental.
REFERENCES

References to the works of Sturzo which are directly cited in the text are to the following editions, according to these abbreviations:

C. & P.: **Coscienze e politica.** Brescia: Marcelliana, 1953.


These abbreviations and page references are given in parentheses.
within the text. References to the articles of Sturzo and to the works of other authors are cited in footnotes. The more readily available English translations of Sturzo's writings have been used wherever possible, but they have been checked against the latest approved Italian editions. The translations from Italian editions are my own.
CHAPTER I

PERSON AND SOCIETY: A SOCIO-PERSONALISM

When Don Luigi Sturzo returned to his beloved native Italy after World War II, in recognition for what his career, and he himself as a person, represented to the Italian people, the National Council of Christian Democrats honored him with these words: "You symbolize a deeply moral conception of political and social life in the service of man and for the protection of his dignity...."¹ For no less an authority than the eminent French thinker, Maurice Vaussard, these words synthesize the essential characteristics of Sturzo's career.² Sturzo initiated and carried out his social and political activity always "in the service of man and for the protection of his dignity."

Just as the individual person stands at the center of his social and political activity, so does the person stand at the heart of Sturzo's social theory. In fact, his theory both begins and culminates in the concrete person. Yet, this does not mean that Sturzo's theory undercuts the reality of society. With the term "society" we arrive at the second of the two terms

¹These words were spoken by Adone Zoli in the name of the National Council of Christian Democrats, September 20, 1946. See Maurice Vaussard, Il pensiero politico e sociale di Luigi Sturzo (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1966), p. 15.
²Ibid.
around which all social thought revolves—the individual and society. Just as the problem of the one and the many has dominated all Western speculation into the nature of reality, so has the social dimension of this problem dominated all investigation into the structure of social reality.

The human community is indeed a mysterious reality, exhibiting a wholeness that far transcends a pure and simple atomism, a real unity which is yet a multiplicity and which obliges us to rethink the very notion of the individual and the way in which he is related to society. The fact remains, and cannot be cancelled out through a desire for a simplistic solution, that while society is real qua society, it is still a communion of individuals considered in their individual-social being.\(^3\)

In grappling with this problem an array of conflicting and irreducible theories have marked social and political theory from its inception. Within the welter of these theories the limiting alternatives have been either to assign an ontological priority to one or the other of the two members, and thereby ultimately reducing the opposing member, whose reality, if it is upheld, is secondary, mediate, and consequential, into the ontological primacy of the other or else to view the two terms synthetically as constituting two interdependent aspects of the reality. The attempt here is not to simplistically categorize or "pigeon-hole" specific theories that have enriched the tradition of social thought, but merely to provide the limiting positions within this tradition.

Among these positions, Sturzo's theory at first sight appears to fall within those which view the reality of the

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individual and society as indivisible. It is true that Sturzo is absolutely explicit in his opposition to any theory that views the individual and society as two distinct entities. In the concrete, to use Sturzo's favorite expression, the person and society are two integrating components of the "concrete real." It is only through conceptual analysis that we can treat them as distinct. To project the results of this conceptual analysis as a reflection of reality is to be guilty of what Sturzo aptly terms "abstractionism." This fallacy consists "of presenting as concrete what is a mental abstraction of their own." (T.L. 9)

In this instance it means that in analyzing the factors of an ongoing and unified process, we then proceed to hold that the factors were antecedently separated.

But to categorize Sturzo's theory within the theoretical framework of other relational or synthetic social theories is to run the risk of overlooking not so much the distinguishing features of Sturzo's theory but, more importantly, its radical originality and difference. The terminology and mode of expression may appear similar but the entire cognitive orientation

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5 It is worthy of note that abstractionism which Sturzo considers to be the basic fallacy of social theory includes what John Dewey has called "the philosophic fallacy," that is, "the conversion of eventual functions into antecedent existence." See Dewey's Experience and Nature (New York: Dover, 1958), pp. 261 and 68.
could well be different. An equivalent example in the history of philosophy would be a comparative analysis of the metaphysics of Aristotle with that of St. Thomas Aquinas without taking into account or perceiving the fundamentally different cognitive orientation of the two thinkers. The result would be to interpret the two systems in terms of the external modes of expression alone apart from the animating spirit that invests the terminology of each thinker with its specific meaning. It comes down to the difference between comparing two systems which can be distinguished, but both within the essentialist tradition, or comparing two systems which are not only distinguishable, but reflecting two irreducible orientations towards reality—the essentialist and the existentialist.

Sturzo's terminology may correspond to that of relational or synthetic theories, but the difference in the underlying meaning spans a cognitive distance as great as that between an essentialist and an existentialist metaphysical system. Two brief examples will serve to clarify this and prevent the attempt to reduce Sturzo's theory to that of other similarly articulated theories. A central notion to Sturzo's theory and to any synthesizing social theory is that of relation. For both, relations are real. But whereas for synthetic theories the relational aspects of social reality flow out of already constituted natures, for Sturzo, the very ontological structures of both the person and society are constituted by relations.

In real life all that exists is the social concretion—concrete relations. (I.C. 144)

The whole world is an immense system of syntheses and
and relations. Every being is a synthesis, and all beings are relational. Because of this the world is organic. It is organic because every synthesis making up the world takes and gives; it takes by resolving the kindred activities radiating from other syntheses into itself; it gives radiating round itself a part of its activity.6

Sturzo points up this distinction himself. He quotes a definition of society from Robert McIver's *Society: Its Structure and Changes*: "Society is the system of social relationships in and through which we live." Sturzo's view of this definition is that it "is acceptable to a phenomenologist, but it is only an observation of a fact without any explanation which could be philosophical, and therefore should be avoided." (M. 31-2) The significant term in Sturzo's comment is the word "phenomenologist." Sturzo uses the term "phenomenology" to indicate simply a direct analysis of facts as they manifest themselves in immediate perception. Such an analysis would never reveal the internality and constitutive reality of relations. Therefore, such a definition as McIver's is only descriptive.

Another essential difference between Sturzo's theory and other theories relates to the temporal dimension of social reality, the function of time. In metaphysical terms the difference is between viewing social reality in terms of being or in terms of process. Sturzo's theory considers the person and society not so much something that is, no matter how closely interdependent their realities are, as something in continual becoming. Social reality, grounded on the interaction of persons within and with the social framework, is viewed neither in terms of

substance nor of being, but as process. It is only the processual perspective "which carries us to the heart of reality...." "The social structure of mankind is one with its concretization, and this is processive in time, that is historical." (I.L. xi-xii) As will become clear in the unfolding of Sturzo's theory, this processual view follows from a recognition of temporality as an internal, necessary, and constitutive dimension of social reality. The originality of Sturzo's theory has been characterized as:

...a new vision of major size, distinctly sociological. Its primary characteristic is the notion of process, which embraces a radical temporalism, more sophisticated by far than the nineteenth century temporalisms of Hegel, Marx, Durkheim, or of Sturzo's own contemporary, Bergson. It is a new conception of time as the basis of social life which contains the seed of a sociological relativity, the social equivalent of Einstein's magnificent general relativity.?

Sturzo's social theory begins with the problem of the inward formation of society. The terms "inward" and "formation" carry a significant denotation for the correct pre-analytic perspective on Sturzo's theory. The word "inward" signifies that the emphasis of Sturzo's theory is on discovering the inner structure and laws of social reality. His concern in investigating the data of various social phenomena is to lay bare the inner reality that manifests itself through these phenomena. The approach toward the study of society in terms of its formation indicates Sturzo's historical methodology. It is important to preface an analysis of the components involved in this formation, the person and society, with a reiteration

7Gioscia, "Discussion of Timasheff's Paper," p. 37.
of this methodology. To view these terms abstractly and analytically is to view them not only as separable, but separate; however, when they are viewed in the concrete dialectic of the historical process, they reveal themselves as reciprocal conditions of each other's reality. Analysis is a necessary methodological procedure for separating out in order to understand the synthesizing elements of the social process, but it cannot be over-emphasized that all analysis means abstraction so that "reality is very different from what it appears in analysis." (I.L. 252) Thus, the results of analysis, as not only a step removed from reality but also "frozen" in the distorting immobility of concepts, elucidate only insofar as they presuppose, are grounded in, are constantly referred back to, and prepare for the dialectical synthesis out of which they were abstracted.

The synthetic processual view of social reality presents methodological difficulties which are never satisfactorily solved because they arise from the conceptual mode of our knowledge. But what can be done is to so recognize these difficulties as to not allow the limitations of the conceptual formulation to become more than that—precisely limitations of the theory and not of the contours of the reality under investigation. In regard to our specific area of concern here, the person and society, we are forced to distinguish between them, in order to understand something of them, because all reality becomes intelligible only through differentiation. Yet, the reality of each is not only determined by, but constituted in, relation to the other.

In the consideration of the individual person, we distin-
guish between his individual and social life. This leads us to characterize these two aspects of the one personal life with terms which are classically set in opposition to each other because they have been viewed abstractly and analytically, and not concretely and synthetically. The life of the individual person is one, not two, unifying the entire range of personal activity, whether individual or social.

We often speak of the individual and the social as though of inner and outer, but in reality the inner, too, is social. Or they are taken as the subjective and objective, but nothing is objective that is not subjective also. Or at other times they serve to distinguish the idea from its realization, but every realization contains the idea and is the fruit of individual activity. The analytical forms of speech are always incomplete; they elucidate only insofar as they presuppose or prepare the synthesis. (T.L. 42-3)

Thus, it is from the matrix of the socio-historical process that Sturzo unweaves the pattern of social reality.

In the structural formation of society the individual person is the active and efficient principle. Society is "the multiple, simultaneous, continuative projection of individuals in their activity." (I.L. xvii) This follows from the fact that the person is at once individual and social.

He is so individual as not to partake of any life but his own, as to be an incommunicable personality. He is so social that he could not exist or develop any faculties not even live his life outside the social forms....It is evident that in the concrete we find neither individuals apart from society, nor society apart from individuals. In the concrete, there are only individuals in society. The associative principle in the individual is an inner principle, while it completes his individual reality. There does not exist an extra-individual and, hence, extra-human associative

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principle, self-subsistent and as such informing social life. (I.L. xiv)

It may appear that Sturzo is simply stressing the social nature of man which clearly places the historical and ideal origins of his thought in the tradition of classical humanism. In a sense this is true because assuredly it is within this tradition that the social dimension of man's nature is highlighted. For an integral facet of this tradition is its emphasis that only within society does man achieve the depth and extension of his being. But in the historical development of the philosophical study of man, this insight has not borne the fruit it should have, mainly because only lip-service has been paid to it. This is manifest in the attempt to fix the nature of man apart from the social process. There is also a deeper reason. Within the tradition of classical humanism, when they speak of man's nature as essentially social, it is precisely that—a nature which has a social dimension; that is, man's sociality, the associative aspect of the individual, is viewed as flowing out of an already constituted structure—"already" indicating not a temporal or empirical priority, but both a logical and ontological priority. To say that the individual does not have a temporal or empirical priority to society means that the individual never actually develops outside of the social relations and forms that are generated and crystallized by his sociality, or if he ever did, it would be in an anomalous condition such as that of the "feral man," projected by anthropologists and social psychologists. But in the logical order, the person is prior to society. The concept of the individual is a logical
presupposition of the concept of society. Sturzo agrees with both of these points, but not with attributing an ontological priority to man's nature apart from the realizing of its sociality. That the classical tradition of humanism opts for the grounding of man's sociality in an ontologically prior structure is indicated by such classical notions as "the state of nature," "the isolated man," or "the man on an island." Here is the precise point where Sturzo goes beyond classical humanism.

First of all, it is important to note that Sturzo deals with the concrete, existing individual man, not with man or humanity in the abstract. But he goes beyond this. He looks on man not primarily as an individual, but above all as a person. As individuals, all men are equal by reason of their common humanity, but it is only as persons that the depth of their reality is fathomed in its vital and qualitative uniqueness. Considering men as individuals results in the tendency to either reduce man to the level of nature, or at least to view him in the same terms as other natural organisms, but with his own specifying properties. The consequence is, and has been, to either fall into naturalistic dilemmas, which are often only pseudo-dilemmas, or to undercut the uniqueness of man which manifests itself only in the personal dimension. Ultimately, it can have no other result than the alienation of man from himself since it is only in the personal field that he comes to realize, and recognize, the spiritual dimensions of his own subjectivity. It is precisely on the basis of these insights that Sturzo rejects in social theory such comparisons as that between animal groupings and human society. (cf. M. 32-3;
In regard to Sturzo's focus on the personal dimension of man, there is a terminological difficulty that has to be clarified. Sturzo uses the terms, "the personal," "the person," "personality," and "human personality" interchangeably. The term that most frequently appears in his writings is "human personality." But in technical use today these words have come to assume quite different meanings. The difficulty revolves around the fact that both of the terms "personal" and "personality" relate to the person and would seem to denote those qualities or set of characteristics by which a person is a person and distinguished from all beings which are not persons. But the term "personality" has generally taken on a more specific meaning to denote the sum total of attitudes, traits, or behavioral patterns which distinguishes one person from another. Sturzo uses the term "personality" in its wider denotation.

The crux of the problem we are considering concerns the metaphysical implications of Sturzo's theory. It is a question of whether his theory just fits within the tradition of classical humanism or whether his relational processual view extends to the ontological level. There is textual evidence that it does. He states that "without a society any human activity would be impossible. Society is always operating from the moment that there are individuals. It may lack a stable and purposeful organization;...but from the fact that there are individuals who

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seek to achieve something new through their own activities, sociality in the concrete exists." (I.L. 12) "Society is not an entity or an organism outside and above the individual, nor is the individual a reality outside and above society." (I.L. xiv) Although Sturzo is careful to maintain the reality of both the individual person and society, he views the reality of each not in terms of being, which would make of them two distinct entities, but in terms of a relational process out of which the distinct reality of each evolves only as relational to the other. They are two factors or elements of a single synthesizing process. Man is at once individual and social: he is essentially individual and necessarily social. Man "is so individual as not to partake of any life but his own, as to be an incommunicable personality. He is so social that he could not exist nor develop any faculties nor even live his life outside the social forms." (I.L. xiv; 206)

What we are trying to determine is the ontological relationship between these facets of the person. Sturzo gives "to the associative instinct its full value as an ever-developing exigency and social impulse, and by this very fact we resolve the individual into society." (I.L. xvi) It should be noted that Sturzo says "resolve," not dissolve the individual into

10 For some other pertinent passages exemplifying Sturzo's relational processive view of the person, see: I.L. xix, 13-15, 162, 210, 301, 307; T.L. 45; I.C. 44-45, 49-50; N.&I. 132; "History and Philosophy," Thought, 21 (March, 1946), 56.

11 Sturzo unfortunately uses the term "instinct" for the natural and primordial tendencies and aptitudes of the person.
society. But the basic sociological resolution\(^{12}\) is the resolution of society into the individual person. What Sturzo is indicating in this reciprocal resolution of individual into society and society into the individual is the continuous cycle of the syntheses involved in human becoming, "a cycle that runs from the person to the collectivity and from the collectivity to the person, a cycle of inward thought finding outward expression, of practical activity conceived and actuated." (I.L. 300)

The social process is so co-natural to us that society is simply the externalization of our own inner reality joined in a dynamic synthesis. Thus, as Robert Pollock states in his acute analysis of Sturzo's thought, "society is not an accidental attribute of man, but rather a necessary aspect of his individual essence," so that "the personal life and the life of society are not two separate lives, but the one individual-social life."\(^{13}\)

For Sturzo, then, the very ontological structure of the person is constituted in and through his sociality. Sociality is an ontological structure because it is the act by which the person achieves his own being. That is to say, the activity by which sociality is concretized in social forms is the activity by which the personal is established together with the "concrete real," or in other words, its actual world. The nature of man, that is, the personal, is not in any way pre-existent to the

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\(^{12}\)Sturzo's theory of sociological resolution will be discussed later. For now it is sufficient to note that he takes the term from the physico-mathematical sciences. It indicates the reduction to the primary elements that do not permit any further resolution. Cf. I.L. 8.

\(^{13}\)Pollock, "L'uomo nella società e nella storia," p. 194.
actual process of the concretization of sociality. Social life is not "as a voluntary choice posterior to individual existence, but necessary and co-existent with it from the time of the first appearance of human life on the earth." (I.C. 143) It is entirely immanent to that concrete process itself. By this I mean that the person is not an entity distinct from the process itself, but the process itself is actually internal to and constitutive of the person. Prior to and apart from the concretizing process of sociality the person is not. It attains its being only in actualizing this process. This means that in the dimension of being the person is open-ended because it is always becoming--"always" because the plentitude of its being in its depth and extension opens onto the infinite contours of reality, and "becoming" because these two dimensions of its existential concreteness, its depth and extension, are each constituted by the other in a reciprocal process, which together form the concretization of sociality, "without which the human individual is inconceivable." (I.L. 5)

Since the person is characterized by the quality of open-endedness, so also is the process whereby he is generated. Therefore, by reason of this self-generative dynamism within the process, the process never achieves a closed or completed facticity, but rather is always tendential. This process through which the existence of the person is established is the one and the same process whereby society, or more specifically, the social forms are established. "Sociality cannot remain a matter of merely individual relations, but tends of itself to some form--it may be elementary--of organization, that is, to the estab-
lishment of a hierarchy of forces." (I.C. 48) It is only in generating these concrete forms of society that the person is generated. And it is these concrete social forms themselves that reveal the emerging of the inward structure of the person. "Society with its variety and its perennial process, is nothing but the manifestation, ever in becoming, of an inner reality." (I.L. xiii) Thus, society is not something that is exterior to the person in the sense that it is to be set off from the interior dimension of the person. For as we are now indicating, this interior dimension is itself social in a concretely constitutive mode of the person. The person's mode of being is social because his ontological structure is social. Thus, within the totality—a totality not of facticity but tendential—of human reality society, too, is interior to the person. Its externality consists only in the extent to which the inner reality of the person has been achieved. The entire span of human civilization gives awe-inspiring evidence of degrees to which the field of the personal has developed within the self-generative emergence of the person.

All that crystallizes outwardly as language, traditions, institutions, laws, all that incorporates itself with places—towns, streets, labors, monuments, records, temples, and churches—or with forms of costume of intercourse, of living all that is expressed by works of thought and art, and that which develops with time, namely history—all are the personal activity of man.... (T.L. 186)

All of the achievements of the human spirit within the person are not "outside of" or exterior to that spirit, but are the expression of that spirit seeking to obtain the fullness of its being.
The transitive aspect of human activity tends to obscure the fact that spiritual activity is not transitive. But within the framework of Sturzo's thought, personal activity in its most intimate character as personal is centered in the spiritual dimensions of that activity. In personal activity, then, and to the degree that it is personal, nothing other than the person himself is discovered and defined, since it is the human spirit generating its own presence to itself in which its reality as spirit consists. This does not mean that all activity in which the person engages is necessarily generative of his own being, any more than in classical thought did anyone hold that all the activity of man, just by the mere fact of having been performed by a man, was thereby human activity. The delimitation of such activity in either case has to be set. The activity under consideration here is limited to that activity in which the person gives form to his own being. And the active and creative principle of that activity is the human spirit, which as immanent to the process is itself embodied in the external crystallizations of the process. This process within which the person emerges is clearly not a physical or mechanical process that characterizes the physical order, but rather it is a creatively --in the richest meaning of that word--self-generative process in which the person comes to be.

Out of the dialectical synthesis of this concrete process, it is necessary to disengage the elements involved through the process of abstraction and conceptualization, not only in order to better understand the process itself but also to form the logical concepts necessary for a viable social theory. Yet,
here such a procedure not only carries its usual inbuilt limitations and risks of distortions, but is extremely difficult. Everyone recognizes the legitimacy and necessity of studying man according to the formality of one of the facets of his being for theoretical and scientific purposes, whether it be the biologist or doctor viewing him as a biological organism, or the psychologist studying only the psychological aspects of his being, or the anatomist analyzing his physiological structure. Here it may be thought that we are considering another distinguishable aspect of man, his social dimension. But within the context of Sturzo's theory, not only is this dimension necessary and intrinsic to man, but constitutive of him in his totality as a person. Thus, it not only influences and includes the other formalities of his being, but is their underlying ontological structure.

While Sturzo is at pains to preserve the reality of both the person and society, yet the reality of the person embraces within itself the reality of society in a reciprocal relationship of dependence. That is why he holds that sociology, the study of society, is really nothing other than social anthropology. (I.L. xvii) This is also why he demands that man must not be viewed "as an abstract formula in a world of abstractions, but as a truly living being whose consciousness develops only with his experience, and insofar as he lives his life in the social and historical complexity of his existence." In addition to this, the person is a synthesizing reality, embracing

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[14] Ibid., p. 175.
within itself "spirit and sense, individual life and social life, culture and religion, earthly interests and supernatural life." (P. & M. 57) The person not only is a synthesizing reality in itself, but as the locus of intelligibility within the world, is also the grounding principle for the reality of the world.

Natural history is distinguished from human history for objective and didactic reasons; not certainly for the reality of the human concrete, because the nature and history of the complex we call nature are perceived and appraised only insofar as they are perceived and realized by man. Everything that does not enter into that human sphere is for us as if non-existent; the day that it enters into that sphere, either through observation or possession and transformation, it becomes history, our history.15

Although we still have to go into some detail to clarify the human process, we have already indicated that for Sturzo the person has no existence apart from the concretizing process of sociality and, as immanent to this process, he is both the subject and term of the process. The very nature of this process as process and as constitutive of the person, reveals the historicity of human reality. Just as the social order is not extrinsic and alien to man, so the historical process is not so much that in which man assimilates an external and alien world of nature, as rather that through and by which he defines his own being.

This history is not extraneous to our life, but like land transformed from stumps into flowering gardens and fertile fields, it is our life. Our history is the search into the bowels of the earth for materials that are transformable and transformed by the hand of

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15 Sturzo, "Historicist Sociology," Cross Currents, 9 (Fall, 1959), 334.
man; it is the study of the stars, towards which today we reach out as towards zones to be explored, by drawing near to them. This life, insofar as it is realized and remembered, is history, and insofar as it is fixed in our culture, in our institutions, in our industries and activities, it is the life of society.16

What has been established thus far has important methodological implications both for and beyond an understanding of Sturzo's own theory. From a methodological point of view it means that in order to grasp Sturzo's concept of the person, since it is the ultimate object of his theory, the entire system has to be presented; and yet, at the same time, the concept of the person is at the basis of the theory. In order to arrive at an understanding of that reality out of which the theory arises and in which it terminates we have to give an exposition of the entire system. The difficulties arising from the necessity of having to present piecemeal and successively what can only be understood in its totality and simultaneously are inherent in both the formulation and exposition of any encompassing theory. But these difficulties are infinitely increased with a theory that has a processual, relational and synthesizing perspective. Thus, a philosophical understanding of man demands a socio-historical understanding of man, "because the individual man is of such a nature that he cannot be known without his historical development, his present activity, his possible future. His life unfolds in time; man is not a fossil in a museum, nor a slab in a pavement."17 This methodological procedure in the

16 Ibid.
17 Sturzo, "History and Philosophy," p. 56.
study of man is a clear demarcation between Sturzo's view of man's "social nature" and that of classical humanism. Classical humanism holds that man is social by nature and yet attempts to determine the ideality of this nature independently of the social structures which arise out of the determinations of this nature. For Sturzo this can only lead to a misunderstanding of both man and society since the structure of each determines the structure of the other within a dialectical historical process that generates both together.

The light this sheds on Sturzo's own methodology is noteworthy. Although the concrete individual person stands at the center of Sturzo's theory of society, he does not begin his theory by presenting a theory of human nature and then deducing the structures, laws and finalism of society from it. To do so would indicate that the structure of human nature is ontologically antecedent to both society and history. This is clearly contrary to Sturzo's position since the person is both the subject and term of the social and historical process. Hence, Sturzo's historical method is not imposed on his subject matter, but rather follows from the socio-historical ontological structure of "the reality of the human concrete." He does derive his theory from an analysis of human nature, but not in an *a priori* and apodictic way as independent of the socio-historical process within which it appears and which in fact is its concretization. He rather focuses on human nature as it manifests itself in process.

Thus far we have only adumbrated a positive concept of the person in his sociality. We have seen that the person and
society are not distinct entities, irreducible and set in opposition to one another, but rather two synthesizing realities established by a dialectic of a reciprocal dynamic process. Through this perspective the person is discerned in his self-creating activity as the existential agent of society. Prior to a more thorough analysis of this concept of sociality we are confronted with the fundamental problem of whether this dynamic processual view of the person does not ultimately presuppose a personal reality which is already differentiated. We have already indicated that for Sturzo the person is not pre-existent to this process which is constitutive of his very being. Yet, as to the question whether this process does not presuppose an already differentiated reality, Sturzo answered that it does "to us who admit the separate creation of each human soul." (T.L. 45) At first sight this seems to either conflict with our interpretation of Sturzo's theory or else Sturzo himself is inconsistent. This is an essential problem and demands a careful analysis, because Sturzo's statement seems to make the person ontologically prior to the process.

We could say that man as a natural being is a presupposition of the process. But this is unsatisfactory for three reasons. First of all, this would be looking at man in terms of being and not in terms of process. Secondly, this would constitute man as an entity distinct from society, which Sturzo clearly rejects. As a logical abstraction it is possible to consider the individual as distinct from society in order to try to determine its constitutive and fundamental elements.
But what aspect of the concrete individual is there that is not touched by and thereby affected by the socio-historical process.\textsuperscript{18} Thirdly, this would be reducing man to the level of other natural entities which is the alienation of man from himself.

It is important to remember that we are dealing with the field of the personal, that is, with man as person. The two dimensions of the person involved here are his individuality and his sociality, which is the associative aspect of the individual person and which concretizes itself in social forms.

These two aspects of the person, it is true, have their primordial origin in a physio-spiritual unity. "Man is at once individual and social. His individual potentiality and his social potentiality have a single root in his sensitive-rational nature." (I.L. xiv) "Individual" in this instance refers to not just the \textit{de facto} differentiation of man, but more strictly to "personal individuality," since Sturzo relates the term to man as "an incommunicable personality." The term "potentiality" in this case should not be confused with the traditional notion of potentiality. Whereas potentiality is traditionally set in opposition to, but ordered to act so that pure act excludes potentiality, it here carries the activistic signification of a dynamic and creative principle that generates and supports both the

\textsuperscript{18}The theological doctrines of the Fall of man through Original Sin and his redemption through the historical events of the Incarnation, Death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ indicate the extent to which the soul of man is touched by the socio-historical process.
person and social forms together in its own creative process. Thus, this physio-spiritual unity, or in other words, man's "sensitive-rational nature" is presupposed by the process, but only as the active immanent principle of the process. It is a "personal reality already differentiated" in the active signification of potentiality.

The **de facto** differentiation of the unique personal reality is established at the moment of inception of the physio-spiritual unity within the socio-historical process which grounds the creative process of the personal individuality of just this person who is determined by, and in turn determines, other personal and social realities within the socio-historical process. This physio-spiritual unity is determined by the socio-historical process even prior to its conception to the extent that it reflects the socio-historical determination of its genealogical heritage.

Sturzo also provides another set of concepts which may serve to further clarify the relation of the person's "sensitive-rational nature" to the relational-processual development of the person. Sturzo uses these concepts in elaborating the nature of society, but since society is simply the crystallization of the social dimension of the person, they can equally as well apply to the person. He states that what he means by society in the concrete is simply society in its own dimensions: the structural and the temporal dimension. "Society, if it did not have a structure, would not be able to move and live; but if it did not move, if it did not develop its own energies, it would
not be able to exist." These words are also applicable to the person. The structure of the person consists in his sensitive-rational nature, without which he would not become. The temporal dimension is the becoming itself. But it is Sturzo's understanding of the word "structure" that reveals the radicalness of Sturzo's process view. Structure generally implies the notion of fixity, stability, immobility; not for Sturzo. Structure itself is "mobile, it is a process." But later in the passage he distinguishes between structure and process when he speaks of the "study of society as structure and process, that is to say, in its synthesis of existence and history." (H.S. 333)

These passages, I believe, can be explained in this way. Structure indicates those aspects of the person, and thereby society, that persist in the constitution of the person. But these permanent elements—permanent only in the sense that they are always present as necessary components of the person, not in the sense that they are unchanging or not subject to process—are themselves process. As Vico puts it, "The nature of things is nothing but their coming into being at certain times and in certain fashions." As an example we can take the ability to think as one of the structural aspects of the person. This

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20 Ibid.
ability is a permanent characteristic of the person, a presupposition for becoming a person, and yet the ability itself, as principle of thinking, is not ontologically prior to or distinct from the process of thinking, but is ontologically constituted only in the process of thinking. This ability is the initial actualization of an inner exigency for (still further) concrete realization. We can go beyond thinking to the very core of the person, his consciousness. Although we will later more fully elaborate this central notion in Sturzo's system, nevertheless, within the context of the present discussion, Sturzo's processive view applies to consciousness as it does to the ability to think. Consciousness attains actuality only in process. It is only in the process of "inter-individual relationships and the outward, common activity of men," that "the consciousness of each has found the possibility of becoming actual, of evolving and perfecting itself." (I.L. 301) This is why Sturzo relates structure and process in a "synthesis of existence and history." Existence in this context in no way connotes the passive overtones of "being there," signifying a foothold in reality, but rather evokes the dynamic and causative signification of its etymological roots.

With its conception, the sensitive-rational nature of man "stands forth" as an intrinsic need to further actualize itself; that is, it exists as the principle of its becoming. Structure is the "rational, volitive, and active power" of man to "stand forth" and it is real, i.e., exists, only as "standing forth." Man exists, or creates himself not all at once, but through time, processually. Therefore, man's existence and
history are one. That is why Sturzo speaks of the "synthesis of existence and history." Man's coming to be, i.e. his "standing forth" as an independent interdependent reality--independent in that he is an autonomous being, interdependent in that this autonomous being is gained only through mutual relations with other persons and other realities--is nothing else than history, and history is nothing else than man's coming to be. Since the limits of this nature, or structure, cannot be fixed, neither can its existence, that is, its actualizing process. Thus, the person is an open-ended being because it is a being that exists or becomes.

In traditional terminology, it may seem as though we have identified essence and existence. In actual fact we have not. Essence corresponds to the ideality of man, that is, man as a "simultaneous and perfect whole."\(^{22}\) The physio-spiritual nature of man as concretized in the concrete individual embraces this within itself as a potentiality which is actualized through and with its act of existing. But the actualization, its act of existing, never achieves the complete realization of this potentiality. "Neither the individual taken in himself, nor society as the outcome of its individuals can be said to possess themselves wholly, and, hence, to be able to rest on the realization of the moment as final and definitive." (I.L. 13) Thus there is a basic distinction to be made within the concrete individual:

\(^{22}\)Sturzo, "Maurice Blondel's La Pensée; the Philosophy of 'L'elan spiritual,'" Hibbert Journal, 34 (April, 1936), 347.
the nature as realized is nothing other than its existence, but between this nature as realized and the nature in the fullness of its potentiality as a dynamic and creative principle, there is a distinction that can only be adequately described as "real." The reality of this distinction expresses itself within man as an inward exigency for further realization.

Up to now we have sketched some of the broad contours of the relationship between the individual and society. We have discovered that for Sturzo this relationship is so basic to both as to be ontologically constitutive for each. When Robert Pollock compared the relationship between the individual and society to that between the body and soul within the concrete existing individual—an inextricably intertwined relationship of reciprocal and intimate compenetration—he was not giving expression to an exaggerated metaphor, but to an analogical reality.23

The individual human being becomes a person only through relationship with another person. His very existence consists not in mere "being-for-another," but in the complex mutuality of "being-for-each-other." As we plumb the depths of the self-consciousness we discover, as Hegel has expressed it, not the "I" but the "We," the ego that is "We" and the "We" that is ego.24 The problem confronting Sturzo was not only to discover the nature of this union, but to determine how this union can


be adequately symbolized in reflection.

In his attempt to articulate the nature of this union, Sturzo first explained it in terms of the relational nature of man. Then with the publication of *Essai de sociologie* in 1935, his emphasis shifted from relations to the individual-social consciousness of the person. The words "his emphasis shifted" are chosen with care because in his later stress on consciousness Sturzo in no way "dropped" his relational perspective. Timasheff incorrectly interprets Sturzo in this fashion. In discussing Sturzo's earlier relational view, Timasheff states that "unfortunately Sturzo dropped this line of investigation altogether and did not coordinate it with the newly acquired insight that consciousness was the key to the problem (of what is the nature of the unity of society and the individual)."\(^{25}\)

It would have been contradictory for Sturzo to do so because consciousness itself is essentially relational, in its origin, its development and fulfillment. (cf. I.L. 175, 301, 306) The relational view was not dropped, in fact it can hardly be said to be in the background. A number of significant topics are explicitly handled relationally. The value of one's own personality is deepened through the widening of the circle of personal relationships. Knowledge only arises out of an interpersonal relational context. The relational nature of the person finds expression in social groups. Mutual relationships "have value as a society insofar as they resolve themselves into the formation of personalities spiritually and morally richer and more

complete than they would have been had such relationships not been experienced." (I.L. 303; cf. 20, 207, 255)

In addition to these topics that Sturzo explicitly handles relationally in *Inner Laws of Society*, the entire thrust of the work is rooted in a relational perspective not only of the person and society, but of all of reality. This relational perspective on reality was most explicitly expressed some five years earlier by Sturzo in his analysis of Mario Sturzo's theory of Neo-Synthetism. Although he is presenting Mario's own theory, the entire tone of the article makes it clear that Sturzo's own position concurs with that of Mario. The processive relational character of reality provides the ontological foundation of Mario's theory of Neo-Synthetism. "The whole world is an immense system of syntheses and relations. Every being is a synthesis, and all beings are relational." Reality, then, presents itself as a kind of Hegelian "altogetherness of everything." If all of reality is relational in character, then the relationship between individuals cannot alone be the specifying element of human society as distinct from animal groupings. Sturzo saw early in the development of his sociological theory, that the specifying element in human society is its rationality. As he focused his attention more and more on the place and function of rationality within the complexity of society and its movements, Sturzo came to see that the determining factor of society is collective consciousness. The insight into the

formation and function of collective consciousness became, in Sturzo's own words, "the theory on which I built the whole social edifice," "the key of my sociological theory." 27

It is in his second work published during his exile, in 1929, The International Community and the Right of War, that Sturzo stresses the relational character of man in explaining the person-society unity. The entire life of man is a life of social concretion, that is, concrete relations. Man exists socially by reason of the fact he is relational. Human society is the expression of this human relativity—the interrelational-co-existence of men. Therefore, society in general, apart from any particular form of society, follows from the relational nature of man as "a necessary natural datum." "Every human society is nothing else than a relationship between individuals in some way grouped together." (I.C. 23; cf. 36, 45, 144) Every person develops as a radiating nucleus of relationships, acting and reacting with other nucleated networks, "so that there comes to be a continual multiplication of each in others and of others in each." (I.C. 45) Each nucleated network of relationships radiates a two-fold motion that is at one and the same time centripetal and centrifugal. This reciprocating, relational activity arises from the two-fold dimensionality of the person, his "individuality" and "sociality." Both of these dimensions are dynamic tendencies, each of which is reciprocally established through the dynamism of the other and both together

have as their end-in-view the achievement, expansion and perfection of the person.

The reciprocal relationship between these two factors constitutes what Sturzo views as the intrinsic law of the genesis and development of both the individual person and society: "The more individuals increase in conscious personality, the fuller the development of their associative qualities and forces; the fuller the development of such associative forces, the more the individuals develop and deepen the elements of their personality." (I.C. 45; cf. 49-50) The depth and autonomy of the person is acquired in proportion to the extent that the person extends himself in relation to others. In the development of the associative aspects of the person, they become externalized in the form of particular societies. "Thus by continual action and reaction society comes to be individualized in types, institutions, moral bodies, and the individual to be socialized in the institutions circumscribing his life." (I.C. 45) As the dimension of sociality becomes externalized in organized society, the feedback from the process itself as well as from the society formed thereby deepens the individuating elements of the person. This reciprocating, intrinsic law of "individuality-sociality" "is always in force and functions according to the stage of development attained by the individual and social factors." (I.C. 50)

This relational perspective of Sturzo as presented in The International Community and the Right of War contains within itself several fundamental ideas that led Sturzo to see that
the primary datum in the concretization of sociality which effectuates the unity between the person and society is individual-social consciousness. First, he saw that society evolves in conjunction with the development of the individual consciousness. Secondly, he saw that the relational existence of man is primarily rational and communicative, and not merely physical so that the specifying element in human society is its rationality. Thirdly, he saw that the whole social process is not a dialectic of blind, extra-human forces, such as physical or historical conditioning, without outcome, but is rational and finalistic. And it is precisely in focusing his attention on these factors in an attempt to coordinate and determine their role within the matrix of the entire socio-historical process that led Sturzo to recognize that collective consciousness was the key to the problem of the nature of the union between the individual person and society. (M. 17-19; cf. I.C. 55, 36, 49-50) The term "collective consciousness" is a comprehensive formula to indicate the consciousness of each of us which is reflected in the consciousness of others in the mutual process of determining and realizing a common end. (M. 19)

The unity between the individual person and society is established in the process called by Sturzo the concretization of sociality. Sturzo also calls this process "the concretization

\[28\] In addition to the term "collective" consciousness, Sturzo also uses the terms "individual-social," "inter-individual," "group," "national," "social," or "historical" consciousness—all referring to the same reality, but stressing different aspects of it "according to the various shades of language." Cf. I.L. 4; M. 19, 91.
of society." The first phrase refers to an analysis of the process in terms of the individual person, the second looks at it from the viewpoint of society. Sociality is the ability of the person to generate and support social forms. (I.C. 48) The specific, definitive and original principle of sociality is consciousness. (M. 97) Within the development of conscious activity, there are two interdependent processes that constitute consciousness and thereby both the person and society: the processes of projection and internalization. Sturzo does not actually use the term "internalization," but rather uses the terminology of the "deepening of consciousness," or the "deepening of personality." The social dimension of this "deepening of consciousness" is the synthesizing of society into the individual person. I have used the generally accepted term "internalization" to encompass every aspect of what Sturzo calls the "deepening of consciousness." These two processes correspond to the dimensions of extension and depth of the person that we referred to previously in this chapter in discussing the person as open-ended. For the person confronts infinity whether he turns toward the bottomless vortex of his own being or the limitless reaches of reality. Internalization is the process of receiving and assimilating socio-historical facts and values, or any aspect of reality that constitutes the human and natural world, in such a way that they become part and parcel of his own becoming as realities which he has made his own. (I.L. 300-301)

Internalization as a process of receiving and assimilation conveys the connotation of being a passive process on the part
of the person, while the projection of consciousness denotes a
dynamic activity. In actual fact both reveal the person as an
active and dynamic center. This is indicated in regard to in-
ternalization by the fact that no social value or pattern of
social conduct, for example, can simply and completely be im-
posed from without by any form of coercion. The most that can
be produced by factors of coercion, whether they are legal or
illegal, is external conformity, unless these factors are not
imposed but arise from within the spirit animating the social
life. And mere conformity is recognized as not being able to
sustain social life since it neither is an expression of the
animating forces of social life in the individual person nor
does it reinforce these forces. To internalize a social value,
then, is not a passive receptivity or undergoing of exerted
influences, but is to actively assimilate it whereby it in turn
becomes an active and effective principle of activity. For
example, a person becomes "just" and is recognized as such by
others only when he acts justly, not by reason of any factors
external to him, but by an inward movement of his own personality.

Correlative to internalization is the projection of con-
sciousness. It is precisely in this projection of consciousness
that Sturzo locates the concrete sociality of the individual
person. (I.L. 5) This projection of consciousness not only
gives rise to the structural formation of society which becomes
individuated into specific social forms, but it is also a bio-
physical, psychological, ethical, and socio-historical datum
"without which the human individual is inconceivable." (I.L. 5)
This concept of projection recurs repeatedly throughout Sturzo's
writings and it is in terms of this notion that he most frequently explains the formation and nature of society. But in most passages other than the above one where he locates the principle of the concretization in consciousness, Sturzo relates the notion of projection not to consciousness, but to the entire person, and especially the person in his activities. Here are some representative passages:

The whole of society is the projection of individuals in their relationships and inter-activity. (T.L. 4)

But there is no activity, not even thought, which does not project us into society; which is not effectively social. (T.L. 178)

Society is nothing but the projection of single activities in the interweaving of all activities. (T.L. 186)

Society is essentially the coexistence of individuals and the projection of human personality. (I.L. 299)

The social instinct, that projection of the ego into an environment necessary for action....(I.L. 311)

Society is only the simultaneous and progressive projection of the activity of man's personality concretized in the multiplicity of individuals who, either necessarily or voluntarily, cooperate among themselves.29

The significance of these passages lies not only in what they reveal about Sturzo's understanding of the unity between society and the individual person in terms of his key concept of projection, but more importantly they give a clue to his understanding of consciousness and its relation to both the person in his activity and to human activity itself. Since the emphasis in these passages is on activity, they may seem to diminish the importance of consciousness within Sturzo's

system. Actually, the contrary is true. To determine this requires a careful analysis of what Sturzo understands by consciousness. As mentioned above, these passages give some indication of this. Closely centered around the one process of projection we find consciousness, the person and activity. Our task is to determine their precise relationship; and in doing so, we should be able to arrive at a clearer understanding of all three.

We have seen that consciousness is the principle of sociality and that the projection of consciousness is the concretization of sociality within each individual person. This process as simultaneous and continuous among a number of persons brings about the realization, or formation, of a particular society. Yet, Sturzo also views society as the projection of the entire person and of the activities of the person. This does not mean that Sturzo identifies the person with consciousness; but he does hold that the individual is a person through consciousness. (I.L. 300-301) Although Sturzo limits the notion of consciousness to the human level, and for this reason denies that any animal grouping is a society, (cf. M. 21-22) he does not set up a dichotomy between consciousness and the rest of reality. Rather, he subscribes to Blondel's theory of "Cosmic Thought" and its evolution through the levels of reality to reach its apex in conscious thought. He thus extends the roots of consciousness back into the whole of reality. There is "a process of thought intrinsic to reality, leading to the flowering of conscious thought as active intelligence, for which unconscious creation is the preparation, the conditioning environment and
Consciousness involves much more for Sturzo than a simple "psychic awareness." Nor is it limited to thought. In fact, it is a single synthetic process that embraces within itself the cognitive and volitional, the theoretical and practical dimensions of human activity. I use the term "dimensions" to indicate the indivisible unity of these aspects of human activity. This does not mean to imply that these are not able to be distinguished theoretically. But it does mean that they are not separable within the synthesis of conscious activity. In trying to grapple with the reality of consciousness, we encounter a mysterious vortical process of synthesis which surpasses everything that it unites. Some of the phrases Sturzo uses to describe consciousness are: "the intelligence and will united together in an operative synthesis directed to action"; "the synthetic function of the internal faculties of man"; "knowledge of that which one desires to obtain and the relative determination to obtain it, forming the synthesis which precedes the personal human act." (C. & P. 13; 17; 22-23; 9; cf. also M. 96) As will become clear in determining the nature of the inward synthesis of consciousness, the term "precedes" must not be understood in a temporal sense, but within the order of existential causality. The inward synthesis of consciousness sustains the human act and in sustaining it is itself constituted as such. The dynamism of consciousness, then, extends beyond

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30 See also, "Maurice Blondel's La Pensée: the Philosophy of 'L'elan spiritual,'" pp. 344-45; T.L. 90, 294; I.L. xxi.
the synthesizing of the cognitive and volitional dimensions of
the person to the realization of their object through action.

We find here, then, within a synthesizing process the unity of
thought, "which is the rationality of action," action, "which
is the realization of thought," and consciousness, "taken as
the presence of rationality and activity to themselves." (I.L.
xxix) Each of these calls for fuller elaboration in order to
better understand the unity they achieve within Sturzo's theory,
although this very unity renders an analysis of each separately
extremely difficult.

In accord with his entire methodological procedure, Sturzo
approaches knowledge as it functions within the concrete dialec­
tic of the human process. To do otherwise, that is, to approach
it as an abstract problem of an analytic situation is contra­
dicted by the human experiential process, "which is not separa­
tive or analytic, but unitive and synthetic."31 It is in rela­
tion to the totality of human experience that Sturzo makes an
analysis of knowledge. "In the concrete, there is never any
knowledge of reality which does not, at the same time, imply the
coeexistence of other beings which, taken together with the
knowing subject, can be considered as a totality." (S.P. 27; cf.
T.L. 214) Encompassing every particular act of knowledge there
is an implicit cognitive situation that includes within it an
indefinite totality which embraces both the knower and object
and at the same time transcends them. Sturzo goes on to make
a careful analysis of this totality and its relation to knowledge.

It suffices for our immediate purposes, now, to merely call attention to the totality within which knowledge functions, because in view of this totality we are prima facie confronted with the incompleteness of any particular act of knowledge and thereby at the same time its processual character through its inherent dynamism toward further completion.

Within this processual prospective, Sturzo always keeps in the forefront of his theory the proposition stressed so much by St. Thomas Aquinas—but how much more it needs to be constantly reiterated!—that it is the entire man who knows and not his faculties. And man always acts within a unitive and synthetic process. It is out of and within this synthetic process that knowledge arises and functions. "The basis of cognition, indeed, is an experience simultaneously sensitive and classificatory, affective and volitional, theoretical and practical." But as rooted within and part of a synthetic process, the knowledge process itself must be synthetic. Thus, for example, in the classical distinction between the sensitive and intellectual process, there are not two processes with each taking place by means of a separate faculty, which are juxtaposed and co-ordinated by the knower, but rather there is the synthesis of two tendencies or powers in a single synthetic process.

This synthetic process embraces within itself not only the cognitive powers of man, but also the will. The will synthetically enters into the cognitive functions just as the cognitive

32 Ibid., p. 288.
powers synthetically enter into the function of willing. There is never a purely intellectual act unassociated with an act of the will, or vice versa.

Even the coldest and most arid speculation is in itself an act of will, containing affective values whether direct or indirect. We call it an intellective act because it is mainly theoretical, just as we call a primarily practical act an act of the will.33

Thus, there is no such phenomenon as pure speculation apart from practical overtones, just as there is no practical activity that is completely devoid of theory. One or the other prevails in a single synthetic process according to the direction given to his activity by the individual person. This synthesis of the internal powers of man has its ontological basis in the seamless integrity of the life of the human spirit in which body and soul are joined through a mysterious synthetic union. It is the entire human person that is the single multi-dimensional principle of activity by means of various capacities which are operative, not as juxtaposed or concomitant, but as inwardly synthetic within consciousness. As multidimensional its powers are distinguishable theoretically, but not in fact. They achieve reality only in the monolithic integrity of the life of human person.34

It follows from this synthetic view of knowledge in which the cognitive faculties are united together with the will in the operative synthesis of consciousness that knowledge is not, for Sturzo, a purely representational activity in which the

33Ibid., p. 287; S.P. 27.
34Ibid., pp. 286 and 288.
person reproduces or assimilates in himself the ideality of the external world. The knowing process comes to achieve its full reality in fact only as joined to, and completed by, willing and action.

Those who make of knowledge a purely representational faculty, those who translate it into an existential judgment, without cleaving heat or without repulsion, abstract from reality, ignoring the finalistic character of knowledge, leaving out of count the movement of sympathy towards truth, of recoil from error as such, and the desire to seek that grain of truth that every error contains. (T.L. 86; cf. I.L. xxix; S.P. 33)

Knowledge, just as sociality, is an ontological structure of the person because it, too, is an activity through which he comes to realize his own being as a person which is constituted as a radiating and receptive principle of presence. For the mode of being proper to the person as such is that of presence. Presence is both manifested in and generated by the reciprocally interdependent activities of knowing and loving. These activities find their principle and term in the presence of the person because presence is most intimately and constitutively characterized by an ontological "openness" toward all of reality. This openness consists in more than an active "facing outward" which, in opening out onto the rest of reality, at the same time is filled by the radiating activity emitted by that reality. In addition to this dimension of openness, presence is also marked by another dimension that opens onto itself in an immediacy that transcends all mediation. It is this that ontologically constitutes the person as such in its spirituality and subjectivity.

Both knowledge and love arise out of, generate and terminate
in this openness of presence because on the ontological level
they are equivalents. All three encompass the totality of
personal reality. Within the operative process of human activ-
ity knowledge and love are mutually dependent activities.
Each is the principle and condition of the other because each
provides the openness of being that makes the other possible.
In a sentence that is pregnant with meaning, Sturzo states that
"loves makes reality an experience." (T.L. 99) Reality becomes
an experience for us--it takes on meaning--as we open ourselves
up to it. And it is love that gives us that receptivity and
transparency, as it were, of being whereby we are able to ac-
tively assimilate--actively in the sense of "reaching out" and
"making our own"--the reality that confronts us. That movement
of being that allows for the understanding embrace of something
is precisely the stirring of love. And in so moving love itself
is deepened and expanded.

The development of the altruistic tendencies, by moder-
ating innate egoism, awakens that understanding sympathy
which is fundamental for a full knowledge of the world
in which we live....It is fundamental in any sane theory
of knowledge that we succeed in knowing only what we
love.35

"The deeper the knowledge, the stronger the love; the keener the
love, the more intimate and close-cleaving the knowledge." (T.L.
86) Only to the extent that one "opens up" through knowledge
and love is he able to love and know. Each, and both together,
provide for an ontological metamorphosis--as radical as that in
the biological transformation from caterpillar to butterfly--

whereby the individual is able to "step outside" of the indurated and closed larva of egoism, and in so "stepping out" to achieve his personal being. For egoism, as a constricting movement turned exclusively inward, is, from an ontological viewpoint, pure negation because it is the alienation of the person from himself. (I.L. 306)

Since the mode of being of the person is that of presence, knowledge, love and life are convertible terms on the personal level. "Knowledge is experience, it is life, it is love. We may invert the terms: love is knowledge and it is life; life is knowledge and love." (T.L. 87) Thus, knowledge, for Sturzo, in its full significance, is not mere awareness nor a representational activity. Any type of "spectator" theory of knowledge is completely alien to the entire orientation and spirit of his thought. Knowledge is a generative and creative process of the person, and together with him, his world. Knowledge is not a passive mirroring of the world, nor is it an adjustment, passive or even active, to the world. Rather, as ineffably joined with the will in the inward synthesis of consciousness, it is the active and creative manipulation of reality which man transforms, and in transforming discovers both himself and his world. (I.L. xix, 220)

The historical source for Sturzo's view of the active and creative character of knowledge is the theory of Giambattista Vico, "who best saw the intimate relationship between doing and knowing; who threw into relief the value of thought as lived in

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36Cf. also "Historicist Sociology," p. 334.
Vico's doctrine on the unity of thought and action is epitomized in his famous dictum that man only knows what he makes. This dictum is rooted and takes its fundamental meaning from Vico's entire theory of man. But for our purposes here it is sufficient to note that aspect of it that is operative within Sturzo's own theory in terms of our present discussion on knowledge. This aspect is, for Sturzo, Vico's theory that

...man does not acquire knowledge through 'simple and clear ideas'...but by becoming himself in a manner the cause of the fact into which the true is convertible. ...Man really knows what he makes (which is history) because he makes it. Man knows nature through what he is able to make or recreate of nature by his experience and activity. (C. & S. 354; cf. T.L. 87)

The difference between this type of theory of knowledge and any kind of "spectator" theory is equivalent to the distance between simply observing the moon, or actually going to the moon and bringing it in its totality within the human sphere. In the first instance, the moon is "known" only "from afar" and in an external and superficial manner as an object "out there." But man's knowledge in the full sense of the word only occurs in the second instance in which he "makes" the moon "his own" and masters it by his activity. To speak of knowledge "in the full sense of the word" is to indicate that Vico's, and Sturzo's, theory does not mean there is not knowledge in the first instance. This relates to a distinction Vico makes in his theory between "coscienza" and "scienza." The distinction involved


38 Vico, De Italorum Sapientia, p. 138.
here is that between a mere awareness of something and a genuine understanding of it. It is the distinction between "looking at" the moon and "understanding" it. In this latter instance, the moon is not simply, nor even primarily, an object "out there" to be looked at, observed and studied; it is rather "an element of human conquest and creativity," as Vico would put it, or "a conditioning of the creative energy of man" as Sturzo would view it. (C. & S. 354) Genuine understanding calls for direct participation and total involvement on the part of the knower.

It must be noted that the term "makes" as it is used in Vico's dictum, and as correctly interpreted by Sturzo, is not used in the same sense as a machine "making" a product as something completely distinct from the movement of the machine and with the product totally other than the machine. The term has reference to an activity such as that of an artist in which the finished work of art contains within itself and thereby expresses the creative activity that effectuated it. Thus, the relationship between the artist and his work of art is not one of alienation and complete otherness, but rather one of discovery and recognition precisely because it is the expression of his own spirit as the immanent principle of it. It is used in the sense in which man "makes" history. The full significance of this will be brought out in the exposition of Sturzo's theory of history.

Although Sturzo's perspective on the participatory and creative nature of knowledge has its direct historical source
in Vico's theory, the historical roots of this view extend as far back as the Hebrews of Biblical times. In his epistle to the Philippians St. Paul says of Christ, "I want to know him in the power of resurrection and to share his sufferings and even his death, in the hope of attaining resurrection from the dead." The Hebrew idea of "to know" is not the reception of intellectual information but to accept vital participation; the Hebrew "knows" his wife and a baby, not an idea, results. To know Christ, then, is, for St. Paul, to accept vital participation in Him and to experience in oneself the power of the transformation. According to the Hebraic mentality truth is something which is lived. As Sturzo says, it is a matter of experience and not only of pure speculation. Man knows God "insofar as he can succeed in experiencing the Godhead in himself." Knowledge, "insofar as it is real and full knowledge, is undoubtedly love. To know God is equivalent to establishing a relationship with Him...." (T.L. 87, 86) St. John urges us to "live the Truth" because it belongs to the existential experience of Christian living. For the Hebrews as it is for Sturzo, loving and knowing are correlatives.

It was to communicate their love of Truth (to the Semitic mind, loving and knowing are correlatives) that the inspired writers undertook their task. Their primary purpose was not the propagation of truths, the composition of a body of doctrines, but the attraction and conversion of men by exhortation, consolation, reprimand, and encouragement, so that they might

40 Philippians, 3:10-11.
As Sturzo expresses it, "the knowledge of truth is a cleaving of the will, an operative act," (T.L. 89) because truth must be loved or it loses, for us, the character of truth. Therefore, "the fixed point of departure (for education) is the search for and adhesion to truth as life and truth as good." Thus any purely intellectualist approach to truth as implying a separation from "a cleaving of the will," can only result in the evasion of the truth sought, because, as sought without the sense of love, it can only continually recede into nothingness before the act that seeks it, much like vapor on a hot summer day.

We have seen that the historical origin of Sturzo's perspective on the nature of knowledge is Vico's theory, but it has its theoretical and ideal basis within Sturzo's system in his concept of rationality, because it is rationality that is the principle of knowledge. But it is much more than this. Sturzo states that his concept of consciousness is the key to his sociological theory. This is true, yet, it is equally accurate to state that the concept of consciousness is the lock to his theory and his notion of rationality is the key that opens this lock. In many respects it is just as fundamental to his theory as the notion of consciousness. Sturzo, in fact, sometimes tends to identify consciousness with rationality (T.L.


Nevertheless, within his overall theory, there is a theoretical distinction between them. Consciousness is more basic and extensive in that rationality is an aspect of consciousness, but it is that determining factor which makes it to be what it is—a human consciousness. In fact, it is so intimate to the nature of consciousness that to lack rationality is to lack consciousness. Therefore, there can only be human consciousness because it is rationality that constitutes man as a man. (I.L. 11) The dominating motif of Sturzo's social theory, especially as elaborated in the Inner Laws of Society, is the function of rationality in the concretization of sociality in the historical actuation of the social forms and in the formation and dynamism of the social synthesis. (M. 79)

A concept as pervasive and fundamental as that of rationality calls for a careful analysis in order to pinpoint exactly what Sturzo means by it. Unfortunately, Sturzo does as most major thinkers do with the concepts that are central to their thought: He uses the term "rationality" with a number of different meanings. The uses may in no way be contradictory to one another, but that makes them no less different. The basic differences in the meaning of the term can be reduced to four:

First, a concrete principle of knowledge and activity within the individual person (I.L. xxiii and 11); second, the ontological character of reality as intelligible (I.L. xxix); third, thought itself inasmuch as it is systematic (I.L. xxvii); fourth, the ideal order transcending the defects and imperfections of present reality (I.L. 210). All of these uses of the term
"rationality" find their logical, ideal and historical locus in the concrete nature of the human person. The full significance of these various meanings of rationality for Sturzo can be elaborated only with the entire exposition of his social theory, especially as it applies to the dynamism of the social process. Within the context of the present discussion on the unity of thought, action and consciousness, the first, and primary meaning of rationality as 'an essential principle individualized in each man' is what concerns us here.

Sturzo emphasizes that rationality is not a generic and abstract element, but rather is "a concrete factor in the individual, in whom this light shines making him what he truly is, man." (I.L. 11) Within rationality, then, we touch the very nerve center of the person. It is this that expresses, in the deepest sense, the human spirit. The focal point of man's nature, then, is his spirit, and the attainment of rationality is the movement over materiality, which encompasses the physical aspects of man's nature, toward its spiritualization. The prepositions "over" and "toward" must be stressed. In emphasizing rationality, Sturzo makes it quite clear that he is not implying a movement away from sense reality in the sense of evading it, but rather a transformation of it by ordering it toward a higher finalism. In this process, the physical dimensions of man's life find their fulfillment and completion at the same time they are raised to a higher level and his spiritual dimensions are deepened and enriched. (I.L. 34-36; T.L. 83)

The form that this concrete factor takes within the indi-
individual is that of "both an intellective-discursive faculty and a projection bringing about the social activity of men." (M. 80) These words of Sturzo are of the utmost importance for understanding not only his concept of rationality, but the entire thrust of his socio-personalism. We are uncovering here the nerve center of his entire theory. We must therefore backtrack over the trail we have traveled to be sure we bring into sharp focus this nerve center.

The overall context of our present exposition is the concretization of sociality. The principle of this process is consciousness. Consciousness is achieved and consists in the activities of internalization and projection, the latter of which is the concretization of sociality. But Sturzo's explanation of this process of projection made it quite clear that it involved not just consciousness, but the entire person in his activity. This called, then, for an investigation into what Sturzo's concept of consciousness involved. Within the transparent immediacy of consciousness we found the synthesizing unity of thought and action. The analysis of thought led us to its principle, the faculty of rationality. With rationality we have come full circle back to the activity of projection. It is extremely important, then, to determine exactly the relationship between rationality and projection. In doing this, we will not only reveal the ultimate principle of projection and the nature of rationality, but also the extent to which thought and action are united in the theory of Sturzo and the ultimate basis for this unity.
The first fact to note is that the process of projection is not an activity that follows from the activity of rationality such as a wake following from the movement of a ship; nor is it concomitant with the activity of rationality. Rather, it is a process that is ontologically constitutive of rationality itself. Projection in the form of activity is the realization of rationality itself. Rationality as a concrete and essential factor of the individual is not "something that is there" antecedent to the progress of projection itself. It consists precisely and wholly in the process of expression and completion. Human action, and insofar as it is human, expresses and completes rationality in its "inner exigencies." Sturzo states that "rationality, by its inner necessity for expression and fulfillment, urges to an action that will surmount the conditioning limits." (I.L. 11) With the phrase "inner necessity" Sturzo is not indicating the presence of a deterministic principle at the core of rationality. This would be contradictory since rationality is the principle and ground of freedom for Sturzo. Rather, he is giving expression to the inherently dynamic, processual character of rationality by pointing up "the nature of the rational in the concrete as something that cannot remain potential, but must find fulfillment in a continuous succession of voluntary acts." (I.L. 11) We, therefore, find rationality realizing itself only in a process of projection which consists in "a continuous succession of voluntary acts." In order to delineate the nature of this process, we should set it within the concrete context of its occurrence—the human process.
The human process is, for Sturzo, "an activity essentially of mind and will, in the psycho-physical complexus of man's existence." (I.L. xxi) The immanent principle of this process is rationality "as an essential principle individualized in each man, so that each man's own experience and personal activity does not pass to others except by way of knowledge and effects." Then Sturzo goes on to state that "knowledge and purpose are features of human rationality but it is through rationality that unification comes." (I.L. xxiii) These passages, all within the context of a single discussion, reveal the terminological difficulties in a close textual analysis of Sturzo's thought, because we have placed together so many culturally freighted words—mind, will, knowledge, purpose, rationality—without a clarification as to their precise meaning or relationship. What we are especially interested in here are the statements that "knowledge and purpose are features of human rationality" and that rationality expresses itself by means of "knowledge and effects." From them we see that rationality embraces within itself the entire rational dimension of the person in his knowing and willing, as would be expected within the synthesizing perspective of Sturzo's integral realism. It also follows from the inherent dynamism of rationality toward expression and completion. Rationality expresses itself through "knowledge and effects." What Sturzo is indicating by these terms is the distinction between knowledge and other kinds of human activity, which could all be subsumed under the one term of "action." Sturzo uses the term "action," or "effects" as in the above sentence, with the realization that
knowledge itself is action. We have already seen Sturzo's view of knowledge as an ontological structure of the person is a creative-participatory activity in which the person achieves that presence which is commensurate with the person as such in his subjectivity. Doing or acting holds the same constitutive relationship to the person since it is doing that brings about the realization of knowledge. The principle of this action is the will, in the same sense in which rationality is the principle of knowledge. But as doing is itself the realization of knowledge, the will is itself identical with that inner urge of rationality toward realization through action. It is the active sustaining principle of rationality itself. It is for this reason that Sturzo can say that knowledge and purpose, that is to say, willing, are "features" or dimensions of rationality.

It must be reiterated here, in accord with Sturzo's integral realism, that as dimensions of rationality they are inseparable aspects of rationality and not separable elements in a complex. In separation from one another they are abstractions. The only distinction between them is formal. They are dimensions of rationality only in their mutual relation through rationality, which in turn finds reality through its constitutive activities of knowing and willing. "Human process is fundamentally the continuous striving towards the integral and most intimate possession of rationality; and towards the transformation of every element external to us into the reason of our being and of our activity, by means of knowledge and purpose." (I.L. xxiv)

We thus discover that the mutuality of thought and action and their basic unity is ontologically rooted within the constitu-
tive activity of the person which has rationality as its principle and term.

We have already encountered the inward synthesis of the cognitive and volitional faculties of man in treating of consciousness, knowledge, and here again, with rationality. We must here examine the actual processes of thought and action in their mutuality so that this mutuality of thought and action in the realization of rationality will be specified more completely. In our analysis of knowledge we have seen that it achieves reality in fact only through willing and action. In accord with the Vichian inspiration of his thought, Sturzo holds that reality reveals itself to us not through mere speculation, but "gradually as the human will and action realize, in fact, the truths which are known." (S.P. 40) The metaphysical basis for this is the corporeal nature of the external world. In order to be known it must be spiritualized, and since the knowing process is itself wholly immanent, material reality must be spiritualized as it is touched and transformed through human, that is rational, activity. In this one and the same process, rationality in the mutuality of knowledge and action achieves reality and reality becomes rational.

All things touched by man bear his hallmark; the worked stones, like the tilled fields, the printed papers, like the quarries and mines, all speak of this living flame that is human rationality, wherever the foot of man has rested, transforming the outer world and making it his own. (I.L. 14)

As transformed material reality embodies rationality as an immanent principle. But it is an immanence that is only progressively relational and transitory because the reality transformed
through rationality "no longer contains the value of the rationality communicated to it unless it is renewed from that undying fount of vital reality that is man." (I.L. 14-5)

As we penetrated deeper into the analysis of knowledge, we discovered the ultimate basis for its realization in action lay in the very nature of its principle, rationality. Therefore, Sturzo rightly emphasizes that "there is no science however speculative—not even metaphysics, mathematics, or astronomy—which is not ordered to practical ends, whether individual or general, subjective or objective." (S.P. 27) This follows from the nature of rationality, so that "knowledge of truth is never purely speculative because it does not reach, as such, the inner finality of man, who is impelled by nature to transform the truth into living reality as good and love." (S.P. 69)

Since knowledge, as a dimension of rationality, is inseparable from action, ideas or theories, as the results of knowledge, are not mere objects of contemplation, but rather contain within themselves the call to action whereby they, and thereby rationality, are realized in fact. They are a call to action because it is the idea that moves the will toward action. Neither can be taken in abstraction from the other since the reality of the idea is determined by the extent to which it sustains the will in action.

In the mutuality of thought and action within the structure of rationality, this mutuality must also be viewed from the side of action itself, as theoretically distinguished from the specific activity of knowledge, so that the fullness of the reciprocal relationship and unity may be validated. There are
two principles of human activity: the interior principle of rationality which is both the efficient and final principle of action, and the principle of conditioning, which may be interior, such as ignorance or prejudice, or exterior, such as physical or historico-social conditioning. It is conditioning that provides the material for action and as such is an absolute necessity for action, and therefore for man himself if he is to live and work. Sturzo emphasizes the ambivalent character of conditioning in that it must not be considered just as a bond, restriction, obstacle, or a limiting of human action, but conditioning also functions as an urge and stimulus to action as something to be surmounted, dominated and transformed. Conditioning may be a positive or negative factor to action according to the individual and to the circumstances. Taken in its totality, as internal and external, as physical and historico-social, conditioning forms a kind of co-existential solidarity with the individual. Whatever the force exerted by conditioning an action it is never complete because at the very heart of action as human stands freedom—always freedom as condition to be sure, but never entirely absent so long as it is genuinely human action. Since conditioning factors are co-existential with the individual, "freedom cannot be conceived of as an unconditioned state or as a process towards an unconditioned state." (I.L. 162) The inner freedom of human action remains untouched by conditioning because the ultimate, immanent principle of action remains rationality and free will "is connatural to any essence as spiritual, intellectual beings." (T.L. 68)
In fact, it can be said without fear of contradiction that freedom of the will follows from the inner necessity of rationality for expression and completion. We have already seen that due to this inner necessity rationality "urges to an action that will surmount the conditioning limits." Now the action that "will surmount the conditioning limits" is precisely "a continuous succession of voluntary acts." Sturzo emphasizes that this inner necessity of rationality cannot be separated from the voluntary character of its acts of realization. The constitutive form of rationality, then, is precisely that of freedom. It is freedom that defines rationality in its ontological character.

It is rationality that gives to man "the faculty of determining himself" (M. 16) and it is precisely in auto-initiative, in the auto-decision of our action, and in the power to attain dominion over oneself and over the situation conditioning the achieving of the autonomy of personality that free will manifests itself. Since rationality is something to be attained, and in attaining exists, so too is its dimension of free will. Free will manifests itself in the striving for self-determination of the individual and it is in this striving that it consists. "What shows free will is the attainment of self-mastery, in whatever circumstances we may find ourselves....Thus we come to a progressive liberation of ourselves, an achievement of freedom of will...." (T.L. 66-7) It is here in free will that is the locus for the originality, creativity and indeterminate-ness—in the sense of open possibilities--of human experience.
"...within the laws and limits of his being and of the conditioning factors about him, he (man) is not determined but self-determining, and by this very fact may be considered a creator of his own experience." (I.L. xix) Between freedom, then, as individual initiative, and conditioning there is a continuous interlinking and interaction. "The interweaving of initiative and conditioning factors makes up man's experience in his striving for any immediate goal." (T.L. 199; I.L. 11) But through the freedom of his activity—and the more so the more he is free—man is so able to overcome the conditioning factors of his existence that they "cease to be a bond and an obstacle and become a means and a coefficient of realization." (T.L. 198)

It must be stressed that it is only through his activity, as free and conditioned, that man masters the conditioning forces of the natural and socio-historical world and makes them his own and in this process his action becomes more free than conditioned. Man is able to extend this process even to the depths of nature whereby through a creative transformation even the laws of nature become self-laws.

The very laws of his being and the limits set by his psychophysical conditioning (the outer world and even the human body) become in man experiences of his own and phases of his own process. Thus the natural laws, objective though they are, become auto-laws, and psychophysical limitations become transformed into motives of human activity and experiences. (I.L. xix)

Sturzo states that "in a philosophic analysis of human action we find at the root the tendency of each man to make himself the center of his own inner and outer activity, to

43Pollock, "L'uomo nella società e nella storia," p. 22.
expand, to realize himself and his own faculties, to seek within himself and outside for that which corresponds to his needs, his aspirations, his life." (T.L. 68) The efficient and final principle of this tendency is rationality. We are here touching on the entire thrust of Sturzo's social theory because rationality "as the moving force and finality of action, expresses itself in truth and love, so that truth and love always remain the sole and perennial factors of individual and social perfection." (M. 80) The use of the term "finality" is highly significant because it denotes the always incomplete, or deficient, expression of rationality. Human action never terminates in rationality as an end that can be grasped in its fullness, but only as an end-in-view. This important aspect of Sturzo's theory will be elaborated more fully in dealing with the dynamism of the concretization of sociality. Also, the term "finality" emphasizes that rationality as the final principle of action is not distinct from the process achieving it.

Although rationality in projecting itself is the principle of both knowledge and action, their unity, which constitutes rationality, is more complex than simply one of equilibrium. Rationality does not stand in exactly the same relation to action that it does to knowledge. Sturzo provides us with the clue for this insight when he states that thought "is the rationality of action" and action "is the realization of thought." (I.L. xxix) Rationality more immediately expresses itself in knowledge than in action, but action is no less commensurate with rationality and constitutive of it, as has already been noted. Rationality is the efficient principle of action through
knowledge, whether this be in the form of ideas or ideals; and it is in action that knowledge, and thereby rationality, achieves the fullness of its reality. Human action is such insofar as it is informed by rationality and thereby illuminated by its inner light. Rationality in the form of knowledge is that in a human act which makes it a human act and not simply blind activity. The common expression of "an enlightened act" for an act in which the light of rationality is especially intense reveals this fact.

In order to further specify the relationship between knowledge and action, the concept of action must be further delineated, not in its logical form, but in the form of its actuality. One aspect of its actuality has already been determined—knowledge. It is in this that its rationality consists. But action has been defined as the realization of thought. All the other aspects of action in which knowledge is concretized or externalized can be subsumed under the one term of "doing." Action, then, as the realization of thought, consists in the unity of knowledge and doing. The unity of these two aspects of action cannot be over-emphasized. They are abstractions in separation from one another. They must be viewed as inseparable within the structure of action as action and knowledge are within the structure of rationality. It may appear that action can be broken down into two further activities, the one subjective, knowledge, and the other objective, doing. As so analyzed they are abstractions. "The analytic forms of speech are always incomplete; they elucidate only insofar as they presuppose or
prepare the synthesis." (T.L. 43) Also, these distinctions, subjective and objective, are operative only from the standpoint of reflection, not of action. And reflection is secondary to and derivative of action. In addition to these objections, and more basic to them, is the fact that as aspects of a single process, their reality consists only in their mutual relation within the process. Knowledge achieves the fullness of its reality only through the doing of action and the reality of doing is the externalization and realization of knowledge. It is well to recall here that when we say that knowledge achieves the fullness of its reality only through doing, the idea, for Sturzo, contains within itself the power for action, or, more specifically, doing is the expression of the inner necessity of rationality for completion. As Sturzo puts it, one cannot "distinguish the idea from its realization, but every realization contains the idea and is the fruit of individual activity." (T.L. 42-3)

Sturzo states that there is a "reciprocal flux between thought and action." (P.P.I., Vol. I, 104) In another instance, in discussing the reciprocal influence between theory and practice, he speaks of "a mutual action and reaction between fact and idea, for the fact is the fulfillment of the idea and the idea the classification of the fact." (I.C. 17) On the level of our present analysis, this mutuality between knowledge and doing can be expressed in several ways. Knowledge enables one to "see" what he is doing, and doing enables one to bring into reality what one sees. More basically, knowledge is doing
itself realized in its spiritual inwardness and doing is knowledge itself realized in its external concretization. Knowledge is the interiorization of doing whereby it is illuminated by the inner light of rationality and doing is the externalization of knowledge whereby it is concretized in lived events. Although the unity between knowledge and doing in action is an inseparable unity, it is not for this reason a static union, but a dynamic one within which there is a mutual action and reaction. In the concretizing of a particular idea through doing, the feedback from the process alters the idea which in turn reacts on further doing. This becomes clear when knowledge and doing are viewed within the matrix of the total lived experience of the individual.

In this long exposition of Sturzo's understanding of knowledge and action and the nature of their unity, we have discovered that the basis for their unity lies in the very ontological structure of the person as rational. It is in rationality that is the locus for the ultimate quality of being for the person and it is rationality that expresses the mutuality and basic unity of thought and action because it, rationality, is ontologically constituted only in its two-fold dimensional projection of knowledge and action. The inward dynamism of rationality extends beyond thought to the realization of thought through action. This requires a radical shift in perspective on the nature of rationality, and therefore, on the nature of man who is viewed as such in terms of his rationality. Traditionally, rationality is viewed as the capacity for thinking
and since rationality is the specific difference that determines man as such, man was studied in terms of this essential difference and therefore viewed as primarily and essentially a thinker. Of all the errors and dilemmas this perspective has given rise to, the basic result is the alienation of man from himself and his own realization because thought is realized only through action. Therefore, basically and ultimately rationality is not the ability to think, but the power to act, that is, to give real life to thought. Man, therefore, is primarily and essentially an "actor" and is only secondarily and in a derivative sense a thinker. This shift in perspective in no way degrades the value that has traditionally been attributed to thought. It has just the opposite effect of enhancing its value because by overcoming the traditional cleavage between thought and action, knowledge ceases to be viewed as something extraneous to daily human life, but rather is seen to be precisely that which is of worth and value concretized in lived experience. It also ceases to be viewed as merely the principle and term of speculation, but rather is seen to be the principle and term of lived experience. In fact, it is the theoretical separation of thought from action that undermines the value of thought. This perspective leads to an indifference towards knowledge since it is not seen in its actuality within the living matrix of personal action. It becomes divorced from the practical life of the person and thus results in the condemnation of the practical life itself. The separation of thought and action is the virtual absence of the person from himself
because it rips asunder personal life as a coherent unity of thought and action. It is the alienation of the person from himself because his inmost nature is constituted in and through this union, so that "the man of thought and the man of action are interwoven in the living reality which is one, single, and collective, a reality that can be analyzed but never divided."\(^{44}\)

The present analysis of this living reality, in an attempt to determine the nature of its constitutive process which has already been discovered to be constitutive of both the individual person and society, has moved in a full circle with the concept of projection as its starting and finishing point. We began our analysis with the projection of consciousness, because it is this that is the concretization of sociality—the process in which both the person and society are constituted. This process *prima facie* presented itself as involving not just consciousness, but the entire person in his activity. The reason for this can now be determined with some accuracy: the inner dynamism of rationality—which is the specifying principle of the person—for expression and completion through thought and action. The projection of consciousness can also be defined more precisely; it is the expression and realization of rationality through thought and action. Rationality embraces within its constitutive process knowledge and action as inseparable components. Rationality itself is rooted within the more primitive activity of "that one individual—social consciousness hence, as from a living spring, comes the whole complex and dynamic

\[^{44}\text{Sturzo, "History and Philosophy," p. 62.}\]
mode of life of man." (I.L. 60)

Consciousness, as rationality, achieves actuality only in rational activity, that is, thought and action. (I.L. 301)\(^4^5\)

It is for this reason that Sturzo stresses activity in his description of society.

Society is nothing but the projection of single activities in the interweaving of all activities. (T.L. 186)

Society is a kind of multiple, simultaneous and continuous projection of individuals in their activity. (I.L. xvii)

Society is only the simultaneous and progressive projection of the activity of man's personality concretized in the multiplicity of individuals who...cooperate among themselves.\(^4^6\)

Since, as has been noted, rationality, and therefore consciousness, finds fulfillment only when thought is realized in action, it is action, as rational, and the conditions necessary for it that carries the ultimate significance in the defining process of the person, and together with him, society. It is primarily to meet the demands of action--always understood as the means of realizing rationality in the world and thereby transforming that world through the creative touch of rationality--that the necessity of society as conatural to the person is made evident.

"The activity of men postulates association between them, postulates order in such association, postulates the guaranteeing of this order." (I.L. 60) For this reason Sturzo defines the social instinct of the person as "that projection of the ego into an environment necessary for action." (I.L. 311)

\(^{4^5}\)See also the very significant article of Sturzo, "The Influence of Social Facts on Ethical Conceptions," Thought, 20 (March, 1945), 110.

Since the projection of consciousness is the concretization of sociality in each individual, it follows that this process at one and the same time gives rise to the concretization of society. Yet, it is clear that although the concretization of society is simultaneous with the concretization of sociality, yet sociality of the individual is not commensurate with society. In the concrete individual consciousness there is a twofold, opposing directionality in its activity: a personal directionality and a social one. Under the movement of the personal directionality the person views himself as the center of his surrounding world and feels that everything around him resolves itself into his life and whose value is determined in terms of his own life. Under the movement of his social directionality, the person has the instinctive and reflective conviction that his thoughts, aspirations and activities belong to others and the world just as they and it belong to him. It is an "instinctive" conviction because it arises out of his very nature and it is at the same time reflective because as the individual reflects upon himself, and his own life, he becomes increasingly aware of his own indigence in separation from association with others. (I.L. 4, 5, 300)

It must be noted that this twofold directionality is related to but not equivalent to the processes internalization and projection. The latter processes are ontologically constitutive of the individual consciousness, the twofold directionality is not. The evidence for this is that internalization and projection are never in opposition to one another. In fact, they are mutually interdependent whereas there can be and often times is
an opposition between the personal and social directionality of conscious activity. An example of this would be the domination of one movement to the stifling of the other. The danger here is usually on the side of the personal directionality when it develops into an individualistic egoism, but there can be a movement towards the social group without a corresponding gain in depth and strength of personality. When these two movements do not stand in opposition, they may "now integrate, now counteract each other, now act as a mutual stimulus, now are combined." (I.L. 156) These two movements are reflected in the directionality of social dynamism, where the movement to a widening and amplification of social nuclei is generally the positive moment in the social process, while the movement back towards the personal world of the individual, as often marked by egoism, violence, and intransigence, is usually the negative moment in the process. Although often in opposition to one another, these counteractive movements within the social process generate a thrust that "makes possible the great social achievements, which could not come about in a society where all dynamism is artificially prevented." (I.L. 157)

Now that the development of the individual consciousness through the processes of internalization and projection has been adumbrated, the factors involved in the concretization of sociality from the perspective of the individual person have been determined. Since society as well as the individual is formed in the concretization of sociality, this process must be approached from the viewpoint of society in order to fully articulate the nature of the union between the individual and society.
Our investigation has focused on the actuation of consciousness since it is in this process that is the locus for the union between the individual and society inasmuch as it is constitutive of each and both together. From what has already been said about sociality as an ontological structure of the person, it follows that since it is through consciousness that the individual is a person, the determining element of society is also consciousness. "The element of consciousness is so necessary to animate society and to render it effective that without it there cannot exist a true human society." (M. 19, 22, 91) "Just as without consciousness of self, human individuality cannot be appraised...so without consciousness of the society in which we live, of its value and continuity, there can be no true society but only approaches, conjunctions brought about more or less by chance or force." (I.L. 6) Society in the concrete essentially involves a cooperation or communion among individuals for the attainment or preservation of a common end. The formality of society consists in the consciousness of this communion as it is interreflected among the members of the groups in thought and action. This consciousness as interreflected in thought and action forms the collective consciousness, and through it society. A society is organized through the formation of a collective consciousness "which alone can give it being and functionality." 47 The problem confronting us now is to determine the process whereby this collective consciousness is formed, the exact nature that Sturzo assigns to it and

its relationship to the individual personal consciousness.

The problem of the nature of collective consciousness and its relationship to the individual consciousness is inseparably tied up with its formation. The reason for this is clear from what already has been stated concerning the processual nature of both the individual and society. The nature of each is process and both are constituted together in a single process. Although the reality of each is constituted only in a reciprocal relation with the other so that each is the sine qua non condition for the reality of the other, even to the extent that person and society constitute together a single reality, nevertheless, these two "components" of the socio-historical process cannot be resolved into a unity of identity. Sturzo is very positive in his affirmation that collective consciousness is not something that is ontologically distinct from the consciousness of those who together make up the collectivity (I.L. 4; T.L. 203; C. & P. 55) At the same time, he is equally clear that society, and therefore, collective consciousness does have a reality of its own which cannot be reduced to a relation of identity with the individual consciousness. (I.L. 303) Thus, the individual consciousness and collective consciousness stand in a complex dialectical relationship of reciprocity and differentiation, or more precisely, of differentiation-in-synthesis. The more the individual and society reflect and reveal the reality of each other, the more they are differentiated. There is no release for the tension that develops in this dialectic of differentiation-in-synthesis because it is rooted in the ontological structure of the individual person.
This relationship between collective consciousness and the individual consciousness is a manifestation of a fundamental Blondelian thesis that reality cannot be explained by the principle of identity. The attempt to reduce reality to identity "far from satisfying the mind...is a counterfeit of any explanation." Sturzo's theory is in too close a contact with reality to be prone to the danger of such a counterfeit. His theory faithfully mirrors the complexity and diversity of reality; but, as a result, just as physical reality yields its treasures only with great labor, so does it require no less exertion to mine the insights of Sturzo's theory.

Out of this dialectic, the collective consciousness stands in a paradoxical relationship with the individual consciousness. It at one and the same time is formed in the same developmental process of the individual consciousness and is a presupposition for this process. It is the former in the fact that its formation is simultaneous to and coterminus with the projection of the individual consciousness. It is the latter in that the development of the individual consciousness presupposes the collective consciousness of society as a sine qua non condition of its development. There are several factors that give evidence to the fact that social life is a precondition for the development of individual consciousness. Most immediately is the fact that the individual comes to self-awareness only in relation to another person, and in terms of the entire milieu of limiting and determining concrete factors which mark this

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48 Sturzo, "Maurice Blondel's La Pensée: the Philosophy of 'L'elan spiritual,'" p. 343.
relationship. "Human coexistence is as necessary for individual existence as air is necessary for respiration. Even before a child has a notion of himself he has an idea of the other--of a mother, foster mother, nurse, playmate." Knowledge, too, is social in its origin. It arises only within a social context. A language structure, for example, is an expression of an aspect of a collective consciousness that precedes the development of the individual consciousness and influences the formation of the individual consciousness. The total social environment, in its tradition, institutions, laws, language, all that goes to make it up, provides the necessary matrix within which the individual consciousness develops. As Sturzo puts it, social life, "as it fulfills itself, is knit up (even while it modifies them) with traditions, doctrines, and theories that through the ages often form strata in the consciousness of associated members." (I.L. 4; cf. 207, 210)

But while collective consciousness is a precondition for the individual consciousness to become present to itself, to develop and perfect itself, at the same time collective consciousness is dependent on the individual consciousness for its life. As Blondel puts it, society is at once the mother and daughter of thought. Sturzo describes this relationship as "fulfilling a cycle that runs from the person to the collectivity and from the collectivity to the person, a cycle of inward thought finding outward expression, of practical activity

conceived and actuated." (I.L. 300)

In tracing this cycle from the person to the collectivity, it should be clear that just as the development of person consciousness is rooted in and realized through action, so also is collective consciousness. It has already been indicated that a society is such not through just the association of its members in cooperation for a common end, but through the consciousness of this association and common end as it is mutually reflected among the members. But this consciousness is mutually reflected only through the social activity of the individual members. Without this activity one could say at most that there is only an individual orientation in sympathy with that of others.

"The collective consciousness may be considered a resultant of the individual consciousness only when the individuals express in facts, in however inchoate a fashion, the ends of their association." (I.L. 254; M. 92) An essential fact to note about character of the collective consciousness which is formed is that it does not mean that all the members of the group understand their association and ends in exactly the same way. In fact, it is essential to the vitality of the collective consciousness that some understand the ends of society "in a different way and dissent therefrom, so that in the end there comes about that maximum and that minimum of consent and of reciprocal influence which create action." (N. & I. 17)

In order to indicate both the reality and the vitality of

50Cf. also Sturzo's, "Maurice Blondel's La Pensée: the Philosophy of 'L'elan spiritual,'" p. 351.
of collective consciousness, Sturzo poses that through its collective consciousness a particular society achieves a social personality analogous to that of the level of the individual person. The term "personality" indicates the active consciousness of a group, giving it a spontaneity, vitality and autonomy of its own. (N. & I. 13) The use of the term "personality" in this instance is in no sense a mere figure of speech, a metaphor, but neither does it indicate an entity standing by itself above individuals, whether it be a bio-physical or spiritual reality. It is a reality, a moral socio-historical reality that is "born of consciousness and developed through consciousness, resolves itself into consciousness as its natural center." (I.L. 300)

Although the social personality, or society, formed through collective consciousness is not a tertium quid, neither is it a merging of the many into one, nor yet can it, as a vital unity, be dissolved into its components. Collective consciousness is the vital bond that unites and organizes the members of a society, while it at the same time transcends them, much in the same way that the individual consciousness inwardly synthesizes all the faculties of the person while at the same time transcending them. Although Sturzo views society in terms of social personality to point up its character as a vital reality, he nevertheless warns against viewing particular societies analytically as individualities in a conventional framework. Such a perspective is an abstraction from reality. Societies must be viewed in their activity.

From within this perspective their reality will be revealed
as "a particularizing through means and ends, a converging, a
dualizing, a grading." (I.L. 255, 301) Although the full signifi-
cance of this will be brought out later in an analysis of the
social syntheses, it is clear in the light of what already has
been said that what Sturzo means by these words is that the
conjunction of persons in society is at one with the development,
a "particularizing" of their own personality.

The unity of the collective personality is not a psycholo-
gical or mechanical unity, "but moral-historical, founded on an
intercommunication of consciousness." (T.L. 201) This unity is
primarily achieved through the development of an historical
consciousness through which its continuity is established and
those values expressed that form the nexus of the intercommuni-
cation of consciousness. Just as the individual "preserves and
recognizes his identity through his consciousness of himself and
of his past, so society in the concrete, that is, a given society,
through the succession of years and generations preserves its
identity through the consciousness formed among all its members
that it is the same society as in the beginning." (I.L. 3) This
historical consciousness gradually comes into being as a society
little by little evolves and extends itself from the initial
consciousness of the elementary fact of association to "the
consistency of several families bound together by a bond that
unites, organizes and transcends them." (T.L. 204) This bond
is the collective consciousness of the group. The development
of collective consciousness, then, contains within itself the
movement to transcend a given social nucleus to a new sphere of
relationships, which coexists with its composing nuclei but is
not commensurate with them as it always reaches beyond them. "The transcendence is achieved when the collective personality is felt simultaneously by its diverse components, in their common activities and in their conflicts of interests and dominion." (T.L. 205)

The moving force behind this transcendence of social nuclei in the development of collective consciousness, ever impelling it toward unification and a better future, is a collective finalism, which through the strengthening of inner forces engenders the spirit of achievement. Just as the individual seeks ends that transcend himself in the very process of fulfilling and perfecting himself, so does the collective activity of the group ever strive towards a goal that transcends the present situation. This impulsion generates the spirit of achievement that "gives vitality and unification to the collective personality." This spirit of achievement is the expression of the "desire for greater welfare, seen each time as a necessity or an enhancement of life." The term "welfare" must not be restricted to the plane of material interests, although these are certainly to be included, and not just as "a necessity" for life but also for "an enhancement" of life since they furnish the foundation for man's moral, intellectual and religious life. It includes the entire range of man's needs, feelings, and aspirations, "from the most primitive to the loftiest." (T. L. 202)

As collective consciousness takes shape the past is experienced as the present "in tradition, language, customs, continuity of place, and representative symbols." (I.L. 3) These
embrace within themselves those values, idealized as a reality to be preserved and defended or yet to be attained, which unify and express the collective consciousness. For the collective consciousness is unified and formed by that past which continues to live in the present as the principle of life and collective activity. This past that continues to live in the present is that which corresponds to the present situation and needs of the collective consciousness. Just as the memory of the individual is selective, so is the contact of collective consciousness with the past filtered through the mesh of its present needs, circumstances and popular orientations. "The systematizing of these memories is not theoretical and abstract, but realistic and concrete like social life itself." (I.L. 4)

Just as the life of the individual person follows a path from birth through periods of maturation, and then to decline to death, so does the life of the social personality. The social personality formed through the collective consciousness continues to live as long as its past continues to animate its present and provide an orientation towards the future. It is this inward vitality and continuity, rather than simply outward events, that makes the life of a social personality. Events are a potent influence in increasing or diminishing the vitality of the collectivity, but the principle of this vitality is not in outward events but in the collective consciousness. This continues to exist and survive the greatest cataclysms, "so long as the people concerned maintain the consciousness of its own continuity." (T.L. 206-7) An example of this is Ireland
which maintained its consciousness as a nation throughout its
subjection to England even though it lost its language and did
not have its own independent political configuration for cen-
turies. Whereas on the other hand, the collective consciousness
of ancient Greece was not reborn with the modern Greece because
there is no continuity of consciousness. Despite the same
approximate territory and even a similarity of language, the
collective consciousness of modern Greece is not animated by
the past of ancient Greece. This past no longer lives in the
present as the source of collective activity, but is only pre-
served as a pure memory of something that once had life, but
now is in a state of petrifaction. The same holds true for
Rome and Italy today. Its collective personality, that is, its
active collective consciousness, is other than that of ancient
Rome. Each has their own rhythm of life, their own finalism
and spirit of achievement, their own institutions and culture,
in a word, their own history. As Robert Pollock has acutely
pointed out, this originality reveals itself in the difficulty
every epoch encounters in trying to imitate the works of another
--works which so many could produce at one time, even with a
certain natural facility. 51 Therefore, the collective person-
ality that objectivates human action and makes it lasting lives
and has value insofar as it is animated by a collective conscious-
ness and its processive continuity. Once this continuity is
broken, so is its life-line.

232-33; T.L. 207; 200-01.
What gives collective personality its specific determination is its ethico-organic nature. The term "ethico-organic" indicates the finalistic and, therefore, ethical character of society and its organic structure which follows from the coordinated activities of the associated individuals. Although the social personality does have a life of its own, it is the individual that gives it this life and its ethico-organic structure.

In the development of collective consciousness, and hence the social personality, there is no factor that is external to the individual that brings about this movement from the individual to the formation of a collective consciousness. This should be clear from the fact that sociality is an ontological structure of the person. However, in tracing the formation of the collective consciousness we have spoken of a collective finalism, which is sometimes interpreted to be extraneous to the individual. It is true that the movement from the individual to the formation of an organized society there is always functioning a common end which gives impetus to, and thereby organizes around it, a whole complexus of personal activities. But this collective finalism is intrinsic to the individual person. In fact, it is his very nature "considered as a tendency or exigency to seek fulfillment and perfection." (I.L. xv) Since the person achieves his own reality in the concretization of sociality into social forms, social finality is the inner finality of his own activity. (I.L. xvi) In view of this, since it is the human person that is realized in society, it is the individual person that is the end of society and not vice-versa.
Society is the means whereby the individual is able to attain his end. "Such expressions indicate the theoretical and practical value of the unicity of the consciousness and of the end which from individuals passes to society." (I.L. 7)

This position does not undercut the reality of social ends; but it does emphasize that their reality is rooted in and arises from the interior finalities or coordinated personal activity. Finality is the conscious rationality that directs—and in directing is itself realized—personal activity; and there is no extra-social personal activity. It is clear from the ontological structure of the person, in which the individual and society form one constitutive process, that there is no aspect of personal activity which, although originally individual, does not have a social character. "Without society there is no life. Pain is personal as thought is and like thought it is at the same time social. Neither the experience nor the overcoming of pain are so personal as not to be at the same time a collective experience, a collective victory." (T.L. 166) The same applies equally as well to personal finality. Society is the projection of personal activities, which of themselves involve a network of inter-individual relationships, so that within this process it attains its own reality, not apart from or above individuals, but consisting of individuals united together. It is a reality that is collectively produced, and exists only as collectively maintained, but it is not for this reason any less real than something that is produced by a single person. Its reality is manifested in the fact that it cannot
be dissolved into the single and isolated individuals that together constitute it. It is a whole that transcends the sum total of its parts. Social ends hold the same relationship to personal ends. But to try to determine the reality of society apart from the individuals that compose it, is to move as far into the realm of abstractions as it is to try to determine the reality of individual persons apart from society. As Sturzo states, ordinary language is delusive when it opposes individual to society, the individual good to the common good. (M. 86) The reality of each is constituted together. However, this fact does not lessen the dynamic interplay and tension between the two. The situation can be summed up in this way: individual ends and social ends are both real, but only as they together form a single reality. Within this single reality they do not stand in opposition to one another and neither can they be reduced to identity.

In regard to the general end of any society, this has traditionally been designated as the common good. Sturzo generally does not use this traditional term, but rather the terms "social ends," "finality," or "finalism." There are two reasons for this. One is his effort to clarify the specific end of every social form according to their intrinsic characters as they correspond to the natural requirements of human nature. (M. 84-5) Another is the more active and processive connotations conveyed by the term "finality" or "finalism." And the social ends are never attained in their fullness, but only partially and temporarily within the flow of the human process. Therefore, instead of speaking of a common good, Sturzo prefers to
talk of "a collective finalism which is the welfare of the group and its members, and which, taken as a whole, transcends the exigencies of individuals and even present life, pressing forward into the future." (T.L. 201)

But by combining the few statements Sturzo does make about the common good with those he makes in terms of a collective finalism we can get some picture of the relationship between the individual personal good and the common good. In view of the fact that the collective finalism is the nature of the individual person considered as a tendency toward fulfillment, the relationship between the individual good and the common good is not one of a lesser good, the individual, and a greater good, the common good, but rather that in which the one, the individual good, finds its realization in the other, the common good. Yet, the end of society is the individual person, and the common good is real and effective, that is, achieved within a society only to the extent that it is resolved into the individual good, that is, becomes a good actually participated in by the individual persons united together. Although the individual, personal good, which of itself is individual-social, becomes through itself the common good, and although the end of society is the individual person, yet the common good, taken as a whole, transcends the exigencies of the individuals taken singly, and cannot be dissolved into the individual good. Sturzo states the relationship in this way:

Collective consciousness is based on two value judgments which are correlative: 'The community is worth more than the individuals who compose it—insofar as it provides them with a common good; 'The individuals
are worth more than the Community—insofar as they are the end for which the Community is formed.52

The organic structure arises from the coordination of individual activities for the attainment of the social end. The individuals themselves are the organs of society as they participate in the pursuit of the social end. They are the functional organs taken either individually as mother and father within the family, or as united into intermediate groups within a larger society, such as towns and classes within the state. Since not all participate in the social finalism in the same way, this specification of functions makes up the organic structure of society. This organic structure is essential both from the perspective of society and of the individual person. On the level of society intermediate organizations are necessary to meet the complex needs of social life. On the level of the individual, it is only in an organic social life, that is, a social life which each contributes to, that individuals are able to achieve consciousness of their own being (I.L. 175)

Considered in the abstract, social organs are distinguished from social ends. But within the concrete process of social life, they are the processive realization of the social end. The end is the conscious rationality of the practical action of individuals and the social organ is processive actuation of this conscious rationality through the coordinated activities of individuals. Therefore, social ends and organs are simply the practical manifestation of "the consciousness of individuals

In discussing the organic structure of society, Sturzo frequently uses the term "organism." Sometimes he uses it where he means the organization of a particular society. "Societies are usually distinguished by the end and by the organism of each." (I.L. 6) Other times he uses it to refer to social units composed of various organs, as when he states that the members of a family "all together form a single organism." (I.L. 174; cf. I.L. 175; M. 35) The use of this term is not compatible with his strong rejection of any organistic view of society, either in the sense of viewing society as a real organism with its own structure and life independent of the individual composing it or in the sense of building up a theory of society on the basis of similarities drawn between social and biological organisms. "The play of analogy, however, cannot create a science. To speak, for instance, of social biology reduces itself simply to transporting biological data into the social field, on grounds of analogical or imaginary resemblances." (I.L. xii; M. 33–4) Sturzo's opposition to a social theory modeled on a natural science such as biology has its roots in his historico-processive view of society. The tendency of an organistic perspective is "to consider society as morphologically fixed, once and forever, and not to observe it historically, both in its progressive phases or sudden arrests, and in its variable forms according to time, place, and civilization." (M. 33; I.L. xii) The error of viewing society
as a self-subsistent reality also follows from not viewing it in its processive activity. In addition to these objections to the biological model, there is also the factor that the model of a biological organism presents a totality that is relatively colored in its structure, whereas the wholeness proper to society is equivalent to that on the personal level—open-ended, as is evident in the continual emergence of new social groups. In view of these objections, Sturzo's use of the term "organism" should be interpreted not as an unfortunate figure of speech, but as indicating the importance he placed on the organic structure of society and the autonomy of intermediate social groups within a larger society, such as the state. To call these intermediate groups "organisms" served to emphasize their natural origin and autonomy in opposition to any theory of both individualism and statalism. (I.L. 175)

In tracing the growth and development of society through the formation of collective consciousness, Sturzo sought to pinpoint the definitive and original irresolvable principle of this process that would include all social forms and resolve them into itself. In this quest, Sturzo discovered it to be rationality, as concretized in the individual, and thereby threaded his way between the protruding shoals of determinism and voluntarism. The exponents of determinism place the origin of society in bio-psycho-physical conditioning or in such forces as the instinct of self-preservation or the preservation of the species. Although Sturzo recognizes the presence and necessity of conditioning factors in the development of social life, as
well as the function and value of such elementary forces, yet they can never of themselves give rise to true social living which transpires only when "there comes to be a true mental communion among those associated in an active convergence lit by the ray of human reason." (I.L. 10)

Within a voluntaristic social theory, a social contract, either tacit or explicit, is considered to be the source of society. Sturzo raises several objections to this theory, but they all have their ultimate basis in his theory that sociality is an ontological structure of the person. In view of this, there could be no human situation, such as an alleged state of nature on which voluntaristic theories are founded, that is extra-social. Also, whereas there are no necessary societies for social contract theories, within Sturzo's theory not only are there necessary societies, but society in general is correlative to the field of the personal. Sturzo recognizes the function and value of the voluntary factor in the origin and development of society, but as has already been noted, this voluntary aspect in the process is rooted in the inner exigency of rationality to seek expression and fulfillment "in a continuous succession of voluntary acts." Since sociality is part of man's rational nature, it too is caught up in this incessant dynamism of rationality, and it is this that brings it to fruition. Thus the original irresolvable principle of sociality is "the rational capacity of individuals to acquire consciousness of their associative nature, and this they actuate endlessly by their own individual voluntary activity." (I.L. 13; cf. 8-13)
It is precisely this inner dynamism of rationality for completion that renders the concretization of sociality processive and dynamic. As Sturzo states, "it is realized through time." (I.L. 13) It is important here to determine the exact relation between the inner dynamism of rationality and this fourth dimension of society—time. We have already seen how rationality as a concrete and essential principle of the individual person consists entirely in its impelling drive for expression and completion. This process, in which the person and society are constituted together, is a process of unceasing becoming because

...in no moment does rationality find adequate and entire expression in the human concrete....Neither the individual taken in himself, nor society as the outcome of its individuals can be said to possess themselves wholly, and, hence, to be able to rest on the realization of the moment as final and definitive. (I.L. 13)

Rationality continually realizes itself through the process of projecting itself and, in this process, it becomes objectified as language, institutions, laws, cities, monuments, works of art, all as the objectified outcome of rationality seeking realization. All these are expressions of the activity of rationality which in generating them is itself realized. But they are never exhaustive of that activity; and, although they are concrete embodiments of rationality seeking completion, they are never adequately expressive of that urge that gave rise to them. As mentioned previously, the various meanings assigned to rationality by Sturzo have their ideal and historical locus in the concrete rational nature of the person. It is here in the inner dynamism of the concrete individualized rationality
that the world in its intelligibility is rendered intelligible to us, and it is here that individualized rationality is related to rationality "conceived as an absolute" or as an ideal order transcending the defects and imperfections of present reality; for this ideal order is both the presupposition and term of this inner dynamism. It is a presupposition as latent within this dynamism seeking to burst forth in the grandeur of its actuality. It is this which gives the thrust to this inner dynamism and the orientation of its creative energy, incessantly impelling it toward further realization. This ideal order is also the term of this dynamism of individualized rationality as that in which it finds completion.

The process of rationality is marked by two dialectical moments, the negative and the positive. The negative moment reveals the incommensurability of the concrete embodiments of rationality with its creative energy, while the positive moment reveals the continued thrust of this creative energy in the form of "the idea to be realized which will supply the lacks, the incompletenesses and the limits of what has already been achieved." (I.L. 14) The negative moment of this process is the result and manifestation of the finitude of man's being. If man were infinite, he would at once and in a single act achieve the fullness of his being. But this is not the human situation. Man's being consists in an unceasing becoming through a succession of acts. In no single act does he possess himself wholly and entirely, with the result that it always includes an element of otherness which must yet be cancelled out.
or transformed into his own being.

In addition to this metaphysical viewpoint, the negative moment in the process of rationality can also be considered from the perspective of the dialectic of human action and from the ethical standpoint. Both of these are rooted in man's finitude. Within the confines of this finitude, human rationality can realize itself only in dialectic with material reality through human action. In this dialectic of human action the negation of rationality is that moment in which a concrete embodiment of rationality has become separated from the source of rationality and thereby becomes an obstacle to further activity. That which has been rationally achieved retains its value of rationality only as it continues to be renewed "from that undying font of vital reality that is man." From an ethical viewpoint, the negative moment is manifested "as the erroneous and faulty actuation of rationality when the end to be attained and good to be realized have presented themselves to human action in defective or equivocal guise." (I.L. 15)

This too comes about as a result of man's finitude which means that rationality as concretized is always limited and relativistic in character. The further achievement of rationality is always the urge to action. Yet, due to the limited scope of the rationality already achieved, we often are unable to distinguish true rationality from semi-rationality, which is rational only in certain aspects and in an incomplete fashion, or from pseudo-rationality, which is rational in appearance only. (I.L. 17)
It should be noted here that Sturzo uses these terms, the semi-rational and the pseudo-rational, to refer to the rational element contained in the negative moment. For in regard to the overall process of rationality, the rational element contained in the negative moment always is the semi-rational or the pseudo-rational in comparison with the rational element contained in the succeeding positive moment.

This negative moment, whether viewed in its metaphysical roots or from its dialectical or ethical aspects "unfolds in its true value man's continuous endeavor to win for himself his own rationality." (I.L. 15) This endeavor consists in overcoming the negative moment and resolving it into the positive. It is a continuous effort because just as the rational element contained in the negative moment is revealed to be the semi-rational, or even the pseudo-rational, in the light of the ideality of the positive moment, so in turn will the deficiencies of the rationality achieved through this identity eventually become manifest. Although within the concrete flow of the human process, whether on the level of the individual person or society, one or the other moments may dominate, nevertheless, there is for Sturzo no relaxation of the tension between these two moments, and most assuredly there is no denouement to it. Since the term of this process is absolute rationality, in which the process finds its unification, the inward drive of the concrete individualized rationality for completion is continually frustrated by its negation.

The claim to a human society founded on pure reason, overcoming once for all any admixture of the irrational,
lacks a realistic basis, for it presupposes the transformation of the dynamism of human process into a rationalistic staticism which, being against nature, is fundamentally irrational. (I.L. 16)

The dynamism of the human process is that inner necessity of individualized rationality for completion in absolute rationality. It is precisely here in the inner dynamism of rationality that Sturzo locates the origin of time.

We need points of reference in order to establish time. But it is not the clock that makes time, nor the rising and setting of the sun that makes the succession of things, nor the material evolving of our aging body, nor the succession and pressing on of the generations, which arise and vanish, nor the succession of Kings and governments. These are outward indications of a consciousness that is never exhausted, and that finds realization at every instant of its inner process while, projecting itself into the outer world, it gives it its imprint. (I.L. 14)

Although Sturzo uses the term consciousness, it has already been explained how, within the inward synthesis of consciousness, it is the projection of rationality that constitutes its most primitive activity and marks the ultimate quality of its being. This is clear from the continuation of the passage: "All things touched by man bear his hallmark;...this living flame that is human rationality." Since rationality is the essential principle of the human person, this drive of rationality is the constitutive activity of the person, and thereby society. Therefore, the most intimate reality of the person consists in this movement from the present, but partial concretization of rationality towards its complete realization. And the present actuality of the person resides in the tension between the negative and positive moments of the process. It is precisely this tension that constitutes time.
Time is the very form of the personal field as the modality according to which the individual person constantly moves from his present actuality toward the further realization of rationality—a movement that finds no cessation short of absolute rationality. Sturzo states that "we need points of reference in order to establish time." Time marks the rhythm, or more exactly, is this rhythm, of the inner dynamism of rationality toward absolute rationality and it is this absolute rationality that in turn ultimately measures time. It is in terms of absolute rationality that there is the unceasing movement of individualized rationality; and this movement is the essence of time.

In uncovering Sturzo's theory of time, we, at the same time, lay bare the theoretical basis for his most basic understanding of the person that is the supposition for his entire social theory. For it is here, in the essence of time, that the process that is human reality reveals itself to be fundamentally and constitutively a tendency towards absolute rationality, or in a word, "rational becoming." (I.L. xxiii-xxiv; 16-17)

It is precisely this that defines the person in his ultimate character: the tendency towards absolute rationality in time. Time is the inner rhythm of this tendency that is the person. Temporality, then, as the internal, necessary and constitutive dimension of the person is that which defines the person in its ontological character.

In arising from within the dynamic structure of the rational nature of the person, temporality is also an intrinsic element of sociality as an ontological structure of this nature.
Society, then, as the concrete outcome of sociality, has temporality as one of its essential factors. This is the theoretical basis for Sturzo's insistence that "to fulfill its scientific purpose sociology should carry the study of society in the concrete into the fourth dimension, that of time...." (T.L. 3) To do otherwise is to be guilty of abstractionism. Time, as an inward dimension of the person, is the inner life of society. To study society outside of time, therefore, is to study a nonexistent abstraction.

Since sociality is an ontological structure of the person, the tendency towards rationality embraces within the totality of its dimensions both the person and society. Or more exactly, this movement towards rationality is the realization of individuality in sociality. (I.L. 36) At the beginning of our analysis of collective consciousness it was noted that the individual consciousness and collective consciousness stand in a complex dialectical relationship of differentiation-in-synthesis, and that in the working out of this dialectic, the collective consciousness develops together with the individual consciousness and at the same time is a presupposition for the formation of the individual consciousness. We have already seen an articulation of this differentiation-in-synthesis relationship between the person and society from the side of the person in Sturzo's formulation of the law of "individuality-sociality." The nature of this relationship can now be more specifically determined through Sturzo's theory of sociological

53 See p. 41 of this chapter.
In tracing the contours of the realization of individuality in sociality, we have seen that the person is constituted in the concretization of sociality and yet that there is a feedback from both the process itself and the social forms that are the result of this process—a feedback which has a formative and determining efficacy that functions both internally and externally upon the individual. Within the concrete historical process the individual comes into an already formed society. However, we have already seen that society is as open-ended in its structural process as the individual person, so that "never is society so complete that a new existence can add nothing to it." (I.L. 302) The individual penetrates into an already existing social structure in a way that can be figuratively, but concretely, pictured as similar to that of a fish breaking through the surface of the water that contains him. The person is born into and immersed in a social environment in the same life-giving and determining way as the fish in water. And as the fish draws the strength from within its aqueous environment not only to move within it, but even to rise up out of it to penetrate back within it, causing an ever-expanding sphere of ripples in the surface of the water, so the individual through the radiating vitality of his thought and action ripples the surface of his social environment in an ever-expanding sphere of influence, even to the extent of transforming it. The social environment in its turn, even while being modified, pours back upon the individual the complex values, attitudes, beliefs, all,
in a word, that has been formed within it through collective activity.

Within the socio-historical process, then, the dialectical coexistence of the person and society is such that the more they influence one another and interpenetrate to form together a living synthesis, the more they develop and deepen their own reality. This is explained by the fact that their coexistence "is a continuous succession of resolutions." (I.L. 300) The process of sociological resolution is that whereby "all that is produced as social returns to the individuals according to the capacity of each, and such capacity is more or less developed according to the greater or lesser participation in social life, in its ends and its values." (I.L. 305) Sturzo uses the term resolution, which is derived from the physio-mathematical sciences, to indicate that social values are such only insofar as they pass into the consciousness of each individual to form a deeper and more complete personality. Since the synthesizing resolution transpires in the individual consciousness, it is fundamentally "a deepening of consciousness." This resolution takes place according to the capacity of the individual consciousness and this capacity is in proportion to "the greater or lesser participation in social life, in its ends and its values." Thus, there is between the individuals and society a reciprocating vital cycle in which the closer and more intense the relationship, the deeper and more extensive is the reality of each. The more the individual participates in the social life the more vigorous the social life becomes and the deeper and richer is the personality of the individual. This is the
result of a feedback from both the process of participating in the social life and its ensuing results. From the process itself the individual has a greater capacity to receive the feedback of the resulting social values because he feels the social life to the extent he participates in it and makes it his own. And the more intensive the social life, the greater the feedback of values and advantages upon the individual.

We have seen that the point of contact between the individual and society is on the level of consciousness, understanding that term now in all the richness of its meaning for Sturzo, and that just as it is consciousness that specifically determines the individual as a person, so is it collective consciousness that determines society. Since resolution transpires in the individual consciousness, when Sturzo states that it is accomplished "as a deepening of consciousness," he is referring to the individual consciousness. But it is clear that there is a feedback onto society from this process so that collective consciousness itself becomes deeper and more extensive. Since this resolution takes place according to the degree of the active synthesis between the individual and society, their relationship as one of differentiation-in-synthesis therefore clearly manifests itself.

Although the process of resolution makes it ever more clear that the individual person is the efficient and final principle of collective consciousness, nevertheless, it at the same time gives further evidence of the reality of the collective consciousness. For in this process whereby social values and factors
are resolved into the individual consciousness there are always remainders. This is the term Sturzo uses to denote those permanent elements of society that cannot be resolved into the individuals of society taken singly and persist beyond the collectivity that has produced them. These are such objectifications of collective consciousness as traditions, language, beliefs, laws, institutions, all that goes to make up the living heritage of a civilization. Since these permanent elements constitute the social nucleus that is the socio-historical presupposition for the process of resolution, without them "there could not be that very resolution into personality which thus would not be able to achieve its ends." (I.L. 303)

In this chapter we have traced Sturzo's theory on the inward formation of society. It began with the individual person as the active and efficient principle of this process, since society, for Sturzo, is the simultaneous and interweaving projection of individuals in their activities. His theory of sociological resolution is rooted in this conception of society and reveals the person as "the term towards which the social complexus is directed." (I.L. 303; cf. M. 88) Hence, the emergence of the person, then, is the end of society so that it is efficacious in its social values to the extent that they resolve themselves into the individual consciousness to form a more complete and a spiritually and morally richer personality. "Without such resolution, the whole effort of social activity would be in vain and incomprehensible, and man would be out of place in an absurd complexus of impenetrable elements." (I.L. 303) In the formation of society, then, the person stands
revealed as the efficient and final principle.

The entire thrust of Sturzo's theory, therefore, is directed toward unveiling the reality of the person because it is this that realizes itself in society. The ultimate basis for this lies in the very ontological structure of the person which is constituted in and through sociality. It is in the concretizing of sociality that men win their personality. "Therefore, we say that sociality starts from the individual person and resolves itself into the individual person, like the continuous cycle of the synthesis of human becoming." (I.L. 302)
CHAPTER II

SOCIAL FORMS: THE STRUCTURAL PROCESS OF SOCIETY

The inward formation of society is at one with the process whereby the individual person achieves his own being. For the ultimately constitutive act of the person is the concretizing of sociality, that is, the associative dimension of his nature. And the concretizing of this is constitutive of the person because as we have seen in articulating Sturzo's theory of this process, the intrinsic determinant of this process is the inward synthesis of consciousness with rationality, "either as principle of communion or as unifying value or as finalistic tendency." (I.L. 19) As society takes shape, then, it reveals the emerging of the inner reality of the person since its concretization is the realization of this inner reality. From the point of view of the structural formation of society, there are several significant factors in this process that must be noted. First of all, the associative nature of the person never realizes itself through just random individual relations, but tends rather in the formation of its own structural process through these relations to generate nucleated clusters of relations that become concrete forms of organization.

The social tendency is towards the organization of every special associative trend. (I.L. 174)

Human society seeks to give form to the constant or semi-constant elements in human relations. That is,
it tends to create and develop social types justifying their demands, molding their customs and enforcing their laws, so that by a kind of gradual crystallization institutions emerge able to withstand the flux of events and the anarchial forces of destruction. (I.C. 36)

Yet, while on the one hand, the concretization of the relational nature of the person does not remain a matter of unorganized individual relations but rather gives shape to concrete organizational structures, on the other hand, "not all social relations, even if indefinitely repeated, succeed in forming a concrete society, but only those relations to which the historical process has given prevailing significance in the social structure. These relations acquire such significance when they express a group of general interests—in the sociological and not the economic sense; only then do they materialize as social institutions with an autonomy and personality of their own." (I.C. 37) These general interests are generated by natural needs and historical developments, function in the concrete formation of specific kinds of society and social institutions and also to their continued development and modification within the complexity of human society. (I.C. 37-8)

There are two ways in which one can view this complexity of human society that embrace the earth in a web of consciousness. It can be viewed either as a multiplicity of interacting societies, each of which is individuated but all joined together in a vital network of relations, or in terms of its totality as constituting a single complex society composed of many individualized, but interrelated social forms. (I.L. 22) In either case, whether one gives emphasis to the complexity as in the
first instance, or to the totality, as in the latter, it is clear that sociality, although common to all men, is not concretized as a single homogeneous society that embraces within its monolithic structure all men. Rather, it is concretized as specific individuated societies or social groups within a larger society. The differentiation of societies is the negative moment in the concretization of sociality that is necessary for social unification. We have already seen indications of the individuation of society in dealing with its organic-finalistic character. In organizing together around a common end, a group of individuals distinguishes itself from every other group in terms of its organizational structure and finality. The differentiation of the group is the negative moment in the formative process of the social group and the positive moment is the actuation of the unitive principle, the collective consciousness. (I.L. 19, 20; cf. also p. 174)

Only as individuated can society "respond to the need inherent in each individual not to lose his own individuality by his association with others." (I.L. 20) This need is rooted in the nature of sociality as an ontological structure of the person. Since it is in the concretizing of the associative dimension of his nature that the individual achieves the autonomy and the individuality of his own personality, the social groups formed in this process reflect, in projecting, this inner reality. "In the differentiation of his own society from every other, that is, in the group consciousness and in its unity, the individual feels not the suppression of his own personality, but
its projection, reflection, enlargement." (I.L. 20) The individuation of society is another aspect of the differentiation-in-synthesis relationship between the individual and society. For, as has already been seen it is the social consciousness of those who belong to a group that its reality consists in and by which it is therefore individuated. The individuation of society, then, is an expression of this relationship on the social level, viewed from the angle of the society as thus differentiated from other social units. The nature of this differentiation must be examined in order to understand Sturzo's theory of the structural process of society and thereby shed further light on the more basic differentiation-in-synthesis relationship, or in other words, the field of the personal.

Every concrete society is individualized, and it is individualized through a form. Just as every individual entity is such through a form, so, too, do collective realities, "in order to be realities, call for a form that will embody them in their being and in their activity." (I.L. 23) By a social form Sturzo means "the mode or specific reason of the concretizing of society." Since society is the projection of interrelated persons in their activities, the social forms, then, will be "the projection of the finalism of human action." The formation of the collective consciousness, in which the reality of a particular society consists, is in terms of a common finality "which invests the whole complexus of individual-social activities." In fact, Sturzo calls this common finality "the soul of society." Thus the structural concretization of society is "an immanent actuation of this finalism." (I.L. 23) This structural concretization is
a social form. Since it is through a form that a society is individualized, Sturzo uses the term "social form" as synonymous with the terms "social group" and "society", understood as individualized "society in the concrete," although in a strict sense "social forms" refers to the kinds of concrete society, such as family, state, class, township, nation.

This terminology of Sturzo, "the structural concretization of society," is highly significant in revealing his processual perspective. We have already seen that even in dealing with society in terms of its structure, Sturzo views it as process.\(^1\) He speaks of the social form as the cooperative prosecution of a common end "in a direction that we may call structural." (I.L. 23) The term "structure," then, within Sturzo's theory does not carry its usual connotations of a rigid or fixed stability. There is a certain stability to the social forms, but it is a stability of process, not of form. A distinction in Sturzo's social theory, such as Timasheff makes in his analysis,\(^2\) between "social morphology" and "social dynamics" is misleading, because the social forms themselves are marked by an intrinsic dynamism that manifests itself in several ways, as will become clear in the course of this chapter. Sturzo's social theory is grounded in the thesis that reality is process. Therefore, the distinction that should be made is not in terms of social structure and process, but rather between structural

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\(^1\) See chapter I, pp. 33-35.

\(^2\) Timasheff, The Sociology of Luigi Sturzo, cf. Chapters V and VI.
process and dynamic process. The first regulates the dynamism of the second, both by tending to function as a brake for its dynamism, but only by offsetting it with a different rhythm, and by channelling its fluctuations into a patterned flow, while it itself is undergoing modifications due to this more dynamic process.

The meaning and function of social forms is grounded in the inward synthesis of consciousness with rationality as realized in action. Since the concretizing of sociality is the active realization of this inward synthesis, the social forms that are concretized in this process must be explained in terms of human activity. In relation to individual action the social forms are through consciousness the conditioning factors and means, associative organs and ends. In explicating these aspects of social forms Sturzo relates them to physical and mental habits on the level of individual action. These habits are forms of action through which the individual expresses his meaning, his will, his ability. They are intrinsically finalistic in that they are ordered to the end of human action. Before they are acquired as habits, they are themselves the end of a particular activity. Once they are achieved they serve as a means for attaining further ends. The social forms function in a parallel fashion on the social level. A social form starts out as a cooperative working towards an essential end, around which the activities of the associated individuals are coordinated. As the end becomes actualized in and through the coordinated activity, this activity takes on an organic structure
that in turn becomes a means for realizing further ends, or
the further actuation of the essential end. As the social form
takes on an organizational structure with a relative stability
it will also be a conditioning factor for the activity engaged
in within this structure. "The social form therefore, starts
as an end, and becomes a means for a further end, for it be­
comes structure, organization, continually readjusting itself
for new realizations in the direction of new ends, or better,
in the direction of an end, its proper end, and finding endless
actuations." (I.L. 23-4)

In this passage Sturzo speaks of the social form "continu­
ally readjusting itself for new realizations." He also speaks
of "their transformation if they are no longer adapted to
man's incessant urge to act." (I.L. 25) Although it is the
form that specifically differentiates a given society from
another society, and although Sturzo recognizes certain funda­
mental forms, the family, political and religious forms, as
present in all social life, these forms cannot be interpreted
within Sturzo's theory as constituting unchangeable and fixed
types. Social forms, for Sturzo, are structural processes
within the dynamic matrix of the human process so that every
form has its own inner dynamism and its adaptation to the dyna­
mism of both other social forms and the total social process.
Within such a dynamic conception of social life the social
forms are perpetually becoming and being modified. The law of
human evolution cannot "be evaded even by the societies that
appear to be fully formed and definitive, such as political
society as represented by certain individual States. Just as political society today is in a process of evolution, with its rhythm, crises, involutions, so also are the family and religious forms. Therefore, even in its fundamental forms human society is not fixed in concrete types that, while channelling the social process, are not themselves subject to the process. Sturzo goes so far in his processual stance as to state that "everything is a flux and reflux among the forms themselves, within each form and in the various social agglomerations, on the margins of the separate forms or of several forms together." (I.L. 157; cf. I.C. 40-1)

Such a processual view prima facie seems to give such a protean character to the social process as to deprive the social forms of the minimum of consistency and stability required if one is to properly designate them as structural processes. Sturzo recognizes this objection and answers it by reminding us that "the axis of this dynamism is the social consciousness, which is what makes every society coherent and stable, and makes it evolve in a process realized by immanent forces unified in rationality." (I.L. 24) True, social consciousness is not only the wellspring for the inner dynamism of the social forms but also the unifying principle and stabilizing factor. This stabilization by social consciousness manifests itself concretely in the fact that every society has its external features such as traditions, beliefs, rights, customs, laws. Sturzo presents two reasons for these external features which clearly show the stability of the social forms. The fundamental reason lies in the inner necessity of rationality to
project itself so that "every fact of consciousness...must find embodiment, for its explication, just as our soul, in order to live and act, must form a single personal principle with the body." (I.L. 32) In addition to this reason arising from the nature of consciousness, there is another reason following from the nature of the social forms themselves. As formed by social consciousness the social forms have a nuclear development consisting of a network of intersecting and interacting relations. This kind of nucleated structure with its inner dynamism generated by the social consciousness has no fixed, enclosing frames. Since the social forms are set within the dynamism of a wider social process, if they are to maintain their own autonomous movement, they must be circumscribed and guaranteed, both from within and by the other interacting social forms. Such objectification of social consciousness as laws and traditions do this.

Since the activity by which the social forms are established is the activity by which the person achieves his own being, there are certain fundamental social forms that correspond to the permanent and irreducible exigencies of human nature. In the light of evidence from historical, experiential reality Sturzo discerns three such basic requirements: affective-procreative communion, the guaranteeing of order and defense, and finalistic-ethical principles. To each of these basic needs the family, political and religious forms of sociality, respectively, correspond. (I.L. 25, 51; T.L. 262; M. 34)

It is important to note that although these fundamental forms are, for Sturzo, co-relative to permanent aspects of
human nature, he arrives at designating these three forms "from historical, experimental reality," and not by deducing them from an antecedent theory of human nature. The reasons for this have already been suggested in that human nature is not even logically prior to the socio-historical process. Its ideality is established in and through this process and it is from here that it must be derived. Although in view of the aims of this essay it is sufficient here for our purposes to briefly indicate more the conclusions of Sturzo's argumentation than its historical evidence, nevertheless, he does present an extensive historical analysis of the fundamental social forms in the *Inner Laws of Society* in order to establish them as fundamental, as well as coeval and irreducible.

Since the fundamental forms do correspond to the permanent exigencies of human nature, it follows that they are, in their essentials, at least, present in all ages and all civilizations. This may not appear to be actually the case historically since a clear-cut distinction between the social forms belongs to a fairly advanced stage in the developmental process of human society. In fact, it was only with the appearance of Christianity that there was produced a clear-cut distinction between all three fundamental forms. Thus it may seem that a kind of temporal linear progression characterizes the respective emergence of the different forms, beginning with the family, then the religious form and finally the political form. It is true that the family appears as the first fully articulated social form, but even where it appears in primitive societies as the prevailing
the other two subsist in an embryonic state and tend to evolve and win a physiognomy of their own as little by little the family nuclei interweave and multiply, and, ceasing to be nomadic, become stable, forming widespread tribes and creating villages and towns." (I.L. 25; cf. 68, 87-8) Just as only gradually did the various kinds of families take concrete expression, so only gradually did concrete political and religious forms take shape. But these forms were also present from the beginning of the first familial social form, if only tentatively and in an embryonic stage, though always towards a positive and autonomous concretization. Even in an elementary and primitive state a social form requires a guaranteeing of order and defense—a function it may initially perform itself but contemporaneously giving rise to a distinct political form. (I.L. 50) Also, it is only in its religious expression that the primitive family was able to subsist as a stable and continuative social form. And this religious bond, although initially coinciding with the family, at the same time reached beyond it towards the formation of an autonomous form. Therefore, these fundamental social forms cannot be interpreted as appearing in a progressive temporal sequence even though they do not simultaneously appear as clearly distinct from one another. But when the one, that is, the family, does emerge as a definite, even if elementary and primitive, form, the others are also present in an inchoative manner. As projections of innate exigencies of human nature, the fundamental forms are coeval to one another. One can say that by definition they,
individually and together, traverse the entire span of the human process so that they are not temporally related to one another as different moments in a linear development of human society.

The contemporaneous coexistence of the three fundamental social forms, as well as their close connection, is also manifested in the three kinds of guarantees that have always and everywhere ensured the autonomy of the family. One is intrinsic to the family consciousness, that is, the pervasive awareness of belonging to each other and expressed "by the trepidation and reserve of a rite responding to the instinct of pudency." (I.L. 32) The second guarantee is the recognition by a wider human group that what has been formed is an autonomous family unit, to which the children to be born will belong. In this public recognition the family receives from the existing political form the legal guarantees necessary for its stability, its social status, and economy. (I.L. 93) The third guarantee is provided by the religious consecration of the family. This may not be distinguishable in rite and spirit from the other two, but it is none the less present, giving the family its stability and the ethical elevation of its natural end, which results in a stronger and more respected moral and social union.

"What reaches beyond the historical fact and touches the root of the nature of the family as institution, is the constant exigency of these guarantees which, whatever concrete form they may take, in their essentials are never absent." (I.L. 33; cf. p. 324)
Even if one accepts the contemporaneity of the three fundamental forms, the question remains as to how one form, that is, the family, could be the undifferentiated organ of the other two if they are fundamental and irreducible to one another. First of all it is recognized that in primitive society the ends proper to each of the three forms were achieved through the one familial form, as in the patriarchal family in which the paterfamilias was also law-giver, judge, ruler and priest. This historical fact indicates that human consciousness had not developed to where it felt the diversity even of social relations that are substantially diverse, and therefore the merging or the confusion of social functions in a single organ did not create inner disturbance. In these elementary circumstances the fields of activity were limited and the margins of freedom restricted so that the finality proper to each fundamental form did not require an autonomous sphere of activity of its own in order to insure the freedom necessary for its realization. In these rudimentary conditions human consciousness was not able to differentiate its projections beyond the family form. But once any social relation, and especially those that are fundamental, comes to be experienced as autonomous, then "a stage of historic evolution is reached in which the need is felt for the corresponding distinction of social organs and then activities." (I.C. 40; I.L. 76) Once the autonomy of a social form has been asserted by its members with the differentiation of its organic-finalistic character, any suppression or confusion of its organs and ends is a regression in the social process. (I.L. 118)
Also, in considering this problem of the irreducibility of the primary forms of sociality and their original—original in a temporal and not ideal sense—lack of differentiation and their continuing movement of interference after they do achieve an autonomous form, an analytical distinction may be made in each social form between form and content. The form is the organic-finalistic structure that the interrelated activities of associated individuals assumes. It is the modality of this activity. Content is "the whole practical activity in which men engage within the various forms." (I.L. 51) There can be a transposition of the content, or activities, of one form into another one. Thus, in the example of primitive society when the family was the only prevailing form, it carried out the functions of the other two. Another example would be a theocracy such as that of the Hebrews at certain periods when it assumed the functions of the political form. Today there is a transposition of activities to the political form from the other social forms, both primary and secondary. (I.L. 51-2) The reason why this transposition of content continues even today after the social forms are differentiated is that the dynamism of collective consciousness tends to outstrip the relative stability of the historically established forms. This process tends to bring about modifications in the structure of the form. If there is no change in the form, a dualism is created between form and content, which leads to the great crises and revolutionary moments of history. "Yet, never can content and form be really separated, so that, even through analytical disintegration, they come always to new unifying syntheses." (I.L. 57)
In the dynamic flow of the socio-historic process there is a continuous dialectical movement by the social forms, tending on the one hand towards autonomy and on the other towards reciprocal interference and the predominance of one form over the others. The limiting points in this fluctuating motion are, on the one side, an autonomy that is never totally achieved, and, on the other, an interference that never succeeds in merging and suppressing the others. All social forms, even if they have not in fact actually achieved it, tend to individuation and autonomy. This tendency to autonomy by the social form is rooted in the very thrust of the concretization of sociality, since it is in this act that the individual achieves his own personal autonomy. Therefore, this tendency can never be completely suppressed, although the counteracting movement of interference between social forms may, in certain instances, appear to have done so. It is this constant tendency toward autonomy that provides the dynamism to the social processes which makes possible human process. (I.L. 118)

Given the character of the social process, it is clear that the term "autonomy" does not mean a separation from other social forms nor even from other social relations. It does refer to the self-dependent existence of one social form from another and the independence of activity, but it is not the self-dependent existence or independence of a biological organism, but rather of a "specific and characteristic personality." (I.C. 37) That is, the term must not be interpreted in a biological sense, but rather in a personalistic, and therefore, relational sense.
The autonomy of the social forms is not that of a self-contained, complete, and self-subsistent reality such as a biological organism. The reality of the social forms is a nucleated network of relations bound together by a collective consciousness, so that sociological autonomy, the autonomy of a social form, is achieved once there is the consciousness that a communion of interests and ends has been created. "Just as for an autonomous society to affirm itself its members must be conscious of it as such the moment that this consciousness is formed, autonomy is affirmed." (I.L. 88) This is true for all forms of sociality, whether fundamental or secondary; but since the fundamental forms are original and irresolvable into any other, the consciousness that constitutes their autonomy includes a recognition of their originality and irresolvability.

That the autonomy of the social forms is never complete or self-contained is due to the fact that it is the individual person that is the efficacious and vivifying element of the social forms. The relational nature of the individual person extends beyond the confines of any one social form to help give shape to several according to the various needs of his own life. The social complexus that arises from the interaction of individuals involves, then, the intertwinnings and interferences among the social forms. It is only by reason of a logical or legal abstraction that we think of social forms as complete, self-contained realities. "Thus we speak of the family, but no one thinks that the whole category of the relationships of those persons constituting a family is exhausted within its
circle. It is the same when we speak of tribe, village, city, state, Church." (I.L. 245)

Within the social process the collective consciousness of a larger society will encompass various social forms that express all the spheres of the interrelated activity of the associated members. According to the times and circumstances, there will be a transposition of content from one to another, or to one from all the others, or even a confusion of organs and ends depending on the orientation of the collective consciousness. These interferences among the social forms are regulated by the consciousness of autonomy the members of these forms have. "If this consciousness is keen on both sides, there arises a tension that may become a conflict. If, on the contrary, it is weak on the one side, the weaker side suffers an interference that may become a superposition or a confusion of organs and ends." (I.L. 92)

In this two-fold movement towards autonomy and interference, history presents an undulating series of combinations with one of the other of the three fundamental forms predominating. As Sturzo states, "the sociological problem of interference of forms is highly complex and can be clarified only on the historical plane, in which all experiences have their concrete expression." (I.L. 51) It is sufficient for our purposes to note three historical experiences that mark salient phases in this movement and at the same time cover its range.

The first experience is that which we have already noted in the case of the family in primitive society in which one
contains within itself the other forms. The second experience is "that of the nearly always unequal development of the three forms with a marked tendency towards autonomy." (I.L. 26)

In this instance two of the forms struggle with each other in seeking their own autonomy, while the third is subordinate to them and develops within them. The third experience is "the semi-autonomous development of all three forms, with juridical ties, tending towards unification on a higher plane," either on the religious plane as in the Middle Ages or on the political level as in the modern period. (I.L. 27)

Several important conclusions can be drawn from this fluctuating movement of the social forms towards autonomy and reciprocal interference. First of all, as each fundamental form achieves its own autonomy, this disengagement brings about a greater sense of autonomy in the others, with a clarification of their own intrinsic value, organic structure and raison d'être. But at the same time the tendency towards autonomy never attains the stage of complete independence or unrelatedness to the other forms. Even at the maximum degree of autonomy they ever achieve in the socio-historical process they are always relative to one another within the sphere of a collective consciousness that is differentiated according to the exigencies of human nature.

Even when the domestic form contains within itself all other forms, it remains inwardly bound and bounded by them, while the other two forms, tending in their turn to evolve and to assume their own structure and organs, permeate the further evolution of the domestic form, with a mutual exchange of influence. (I.L. 27; cf. 93)
Thus, these forms at any moment in the social process never attain more than a relative autonomy. They form a complex network of relations with one another in which they give even further expression of the inexhaustible capacities of the individual person. For, as the religious and political forms are articulated they develop a wider social complexus that weaves a web of relationships around and through these differentiated semi-autonomous forms. This continuing process brings about a transformation in each while at the same time it receives from each its unique imprint in its always present autonomous movement. Therefore, the second general conclusion that can be made of this two-fold movement is that the fundamental social forms can never be merged, or one totally suppressed or absorbed in another because even in their interrelations and transposition of functions, each always tends towards its own autonomy. For example, even in the fiercest persecutions of the religious form, when it is held in complete subjection to one or the other fundamental form, its continuing trend to its own autonomy manifests itself in its eventual reemergence. A third conclusion that can be drawn from historical experience is that there is never a stabilizing balance or moment of perfect equilibrium between the three primary forms. Rather, one of the three always attempts to predominate over the others, to resolve them into itself and unify them. This produces either a temporary period of social stasis and recession or an immediate or eventual counter-movement by the others towards a reaffirmation of their own autonomy because one form cannot resolve into itself the intrinsic value and raison d'être.
of the other two. The reason for this lies in what constitutes the central theorem of Sturzo's social theory, namely, that the one and only substantive principle of society is the individual person so that "it is the individual consciousness alone, that is, rational man, that effectually resolves into itself every social form, and which in its autonomy unifies all the various elements of human sociality. It grades the ends of the various social forms within which it unfolds its activity, since metaphysically it is the term and end of society itself." (I.L.55)

Although the fundamental forms express permanent and irreducible dimensions of human consciousness, they by no means exhaust its power, depth and range. In addition to these fundamental social forms there are also other secondary or derivative forms. The term "secondary" as applied to these forms does not imply that they are not essential to the social structure or are not significant in the social process, but rather signifies that they are not original and irresolvable into the fundamental forms, from which they derive the elements for their constitution and development. As a sociological classification, the secondary forms are reducible to the three fundamental areas. They function as a "structural nexus of society, develop its contingency, and create particular states of consciousness...but as a whole they serve as a mediation between one form and the other, giving a fuller development to their dynamism." (I.L. 156; cf. pp. 157 and 129) They are vital ligaments that form the connecting tissues, as it were, between the fundamental forms, integrating them and conditioning their development.
Among the secondary forms, one of the most important is economy of which Sturzo makes an extended analysis. Economy may be considered from two points of view, either as a conditioning of social life or as a special social form. The first refers to its function of providing means of subsistence, the second to the communal labor and organization that is required to obtain the means of subsistence. This latter requirement is part of the two-fold aspect of economy that transforms its crude materiality into a social value of unquestionable worth transcending its physico-hedonistic nature and becoming a moral factor of communal life. This two-fold aspect of economy is that of solidarity, in that those who are able provide for those who cannot, and this in turn leads to the second aspect, the tendency to establish an economy in common as a sharing in the material resources made available by communal living. These two aspects together "represent the ethico-social tendency of economics as such." (I.L. 97; cf. pp. 95-7) Economy is one of the immediate ends of all human activity, even religious, since the material means for living is obviously an indispensable aspect of any social form. Therefore, it is not a fundamental social form, for Sturzo, because it "is not autonomous and has not a finalism of its own, but it shares in the nature and finalism of the fundamental forms of sociality." (I.L. 97;98) It depends on the fundamental forms, but at the same time is a necessary element in them "as conditioning the manner in which these can develop and attain their end." (I.L. 26) It must be emphasized that economy is only "one of the immediate ends" of social activity. There is always the danger
of an inversion of ends within a social form so that the quest
for and accumulation of material goods becomes the primary and
prevailing end, in which is the negation of the very essence
of the social form in which this inversion of ends occurs.

As with all social structures, the economic structure
should be organic. This means that within a given society the
economic structure should be assimilated into the total com-
plexus of the society so that in functioning through its or-
ganic structure the materiality of economics would be transformed
into its ethico-social value, "through the creation of a com-
munion and solidarity in the production and distribution of
goods." (I.L. 124) In doing this the economic organs function
as instruments for the social forms and as a co-ordinating link
between them. At the same time the economic structure of a
social form is closely associated to the autonomy of the social
forms since it is this that allows for an indispensible margin
of freedom within each social form. For Sturzo, a margin of
freedom is never lacking in any social form, "but the question
is whether it be sufficient or not to create the necessary
social dynamism." (I.L. 119) The economic structure helps
provide for this.

Economy is so basic to individual and social life and its
influence so pervasive, that the misinterpretations of its
nature and role abound. Among these, two are of special theor-
etical and historical significance. One is the interpretation
of the economic structure as a tertium quid whose process is
governed wholly by deterministic laws. Sturzo admits to the
causal role and influence that physical elements and forces play in economics, but there are also functioning such human factors as ethical, psychological and political considerations. The primary agent in economic causality remains the individual person who regulates it and makes it serve his needs. "The synthesis of the two factors, man and nature, gives us human economics neither wholly free nor wholly deterministic." (I.L. 97) The other error, of which the historical materialism of Marx is representative, consists in making economics the single fundamental law of history, which means that all ethico-social factors are materialistically resolved into the material factor, and thereby giving rise to a fundamental determinism. This theory is a prime example of the fallacy of abstractionism, inasmuch as it presents "an interpretation of concrete reality which makes abstraction of its essential factors and their concrete syntheses." (T.L. 9) For what this theory does is to overestimate one of the factors—as important and indispensable as it is—as of human life and to give it the value of a synthesis, resolving in it all the complexity of human reality in its socio-historical process. Sturzo himself, as has been indicated, emphasizes the economic influence on society, but he denies "that it forms the sole social, historical causality, and that it is a deterministic causality." (I.L. 101)

Other examples of secondary forms besides economy which are considered by Sturzo are the international community, class organizations, political parties and religious sects, labor organizations, racial, national, or religious minorities, universities, the organs of local government such as villages,
cities, regions, federated States, all of which have their own historico-ethical personality, so that they are not just political units of a State. "Their moral reality is greater than their political character." (I.L. 154; cf. pp. 129-58) All of these forms, with the exception of the international community, which is an amplification in extension and depth of the three fundamental forms, are either "intermediate forms between the totality of a society and the elementary nucleus, or remaining on the margins of the various forms, or grouping men together in special categories." (I.L. 153)

All of these concrete social forms, both primary and secondary, can be considered in two ways: either in terms of their individual character, which constitutes their positivity, or more importantly, as process, that is, the dynamic intertwining of relationships and activities by which they sustain a continuity and thereby establish a socio-historical complexus, which embraces all the social forms together while at the same time stretching beyond them. The term that Sturzo uses to explain this process whereby the primary and secondary forms are united in socio-complexus is "sociological synthesis," which itself constitutes a wider social unity in the context of which all the social forms may be viewed in their relations to one another. (N. & I. 13) Sturzo also uses the term "synthesis" to apply to specific synthesizing aspects of sociality: liberty-authority, law-morality, duality-diarchy. Each of these is a social force within the structure of a special form and in their dualistic polarization they bring about the social syntheses that give to the social forms their cohesion, movement
and continuity (I.L. 158; 189) In either use of the term, Sturzo does not explicitly explain it nor does he coordinate the two uses. But in the present context its meaning is clear as referring to a wider social unity that embraces smaller social units while these maintain their own individuality and autonomy.

Sturzo applies the term "society" to both the wider social unity and to smaller social units that compose it. One place where he clearly distinguishes these is in discussing the secondary forms as "intermediate forms between the totality of a society and the elementary nucleus." (I.L. 153) The "totality of a society" is a higher social unity such as an ethnic group or nation. He also uses the term "human society as a whole" or simply "human society" as distinct from its concrete expressions in specific social forms or groups. For example, in discussing the alternation of dynamic and stabilizing currents in society, he states, "It is to be found in all social groups that are really alive; and it is in human society as a whole, in the continual movement of groups and development of activities." (I.L. 256) In International Community and the Right of War he distinguishes between "the generic concept of human society" or "human society in general" and its concrete materializations, i.e. family, city, nation, etc. (I.C. 36; 39)

The social groups which compose this higher totality are not by this fact dissolved into the totality so as to form one overall homogenous society. Society cannot be interpreted in a holistic sense. The "totality of a society" that Sturzo speaks
of is not any kind of closed totality, but rather is a tendency within a process. It is the constant process of the emergence of social groups each with the two-fold tendency towards autonomy and interference. "No one therefore, can doubt that outside the circle of his own particular nucleus... there are relations perpetually developing in a two-fold sense, both individual and collective, which tend to acquire juridical status and to give birth to incipient institutions." (I.C. 39) They are not absorbed by the tendency to complexity and totality. Society, then, is structurally pluralistic, composed of a multiplicity of social groups each with their own individuality and ends. This structural pluralism contains within itself a principle of social organicity because a plurality of social groups cannot exist without organic structural co-ordination.³

But pluralism, for Sturzo, not only is an analytical formula of the nuclear and organic structure of society, but also is expressive of "the need of individual initiative to form always a new series of nuclei, in agreement or in opposition. This is a centrifugal dynamism truly necessary to counterbalance centripetal dynamism."⁴ The character of society, whether on the level of particular social forms taken singularly or on the level of wider social unities, "is not static and final, unable to overstep the limits of a determined order that in substance is nothing more than the quasi-present, or that which we have


known and experienced." (I.C. 39)

Since it is the individual person that is the efficient
principle of society, this continual expansion of society indi-
cates on the part of the individual person "a continuous
aspiration to transcend the concrete experience of actual life
in wider participations...."(I.L. 310) We have seen that the
individuation of society is that aspect of the differentiation-
in-synthesis relationship between the individual person and
society that corresponds to the attaining of personal individu-
ality and autonomy. This aspect of the concretizing of sociality
limits him to those determined societies to which he belongs.

But that basic thrust of sociality, or the other side of the
differentiation-in-synthesis relationship, by which the person
attains his individuality precisely in and through relationships
impels the individual beyond the limits of those societies. The
reason for this has already been suggested. The projection of
rational consciousness, although the generative principle of the
concrete social forms, is not identical with these forms whether
taken in their specific and diversified positivity or in the
fullness of their higher synthesis. It is the inexhaustible
principle of these forms, which are expressive of, but never
adequate to, that fundamental act. The thrust of this act then,
whereby the individual person and the social forms are consti-
tuted together, extends to an ever greater sphere of relation-
ships--greater not only in extension but also in intensity,
whereby there is effected a higher synthesis of values--and
by that very fact deepening the value of the individual person-
ality.
This process constitutes a basic sociological law, the law of transcendence, which Sturzo formulated as "the transcendence of a given social nucleus through the formation of a wider collective consciousness." (T.L. 204) This law has already been indicated when we were dealing with the development of collective consciousness and its unification. The term "transcendence" in this instance simply means "the progressive passage to another term that elicits it," or in other words "the overstepping of the limits of one stage into another."

This law encompasses several processes. It involves the initial projection of the individual into society, the passage of consciousness from one group to another, the interference among the social forms in the transposition of content and the formation of a wider social synthesis. The progressive passage from primitive man to ourselves is also considered by Sturzo as the process of transcendence.

Primitive man is, for us, on the border of animality; the distance between him and ourselves is almost immeasurable. The process between these two terms, a process made up of the strivings of ages, has been a continuous surmounting of the predominance of animal nature with its strong instincts so as to make possible life in common in kindred nuclei. In the face of primitive man, society presents itself as a transcendence with intellectual and ethical characters. (I.L. 309)

It has already been established how this process has a reciprocating movement so that its outward current flows back upon the smaller social units to the source of its movement, the individual person, who is thereby able to further project himself. "The sphere of human personality may thus widen out into immense cycles which we call civilizations, transcending
single peoples, particular languages, geographical and political barriers and even oceans." (T.L. 208) Sturzo, however, holds that the formation of ever wider social synthesis arising out of the process of transcendence terminates "on the threshold of the society of mankind." (I.L. 21) The reason why Sturzo denies the possibility of a social synthesis that would embrace all of mankind is that on this level there would not be the differentiation that is the negative moment necessary not only for a social unification, but also for the dynamism of the social process. Sturzo rejects any hypothesis that would bring the dynamism of the social process to any kind of teleological staticism. The theoretical basis for this rejection lies, as has been suggested, in his theory of rationality. Although Sturzo denies that a universal social synthesis is a concrete possibility, nevertheless, he recognizes the idea itself both as an efficacious ideal and as expressive of the actual orientation of mankind. "Within the active totality of men we may conceive of a web of individuated societies, with ever widening relationships, so as to touch the idea of universality, without ever wholly achieving it." (I.L. 21)

The most concrete expression of this idea of universality was achieved with the advent of Christianity. The reason for this does not lie solely on its unique and transcendent characteristics, although it is through these that the orientation of mankind towards universalism and solidarity above families, classes, nations, and races is actualized, but in the very nature of religion as a social form. In fact, it is religion
that is the moving force of sociality and its ultimate expression. It is both the presupposition of the other social forms and an irreducible form in its own right. As mentioned previously, it was only with the advent of Christianity that there was a clearcut distinction between the three fundamental social forms. These factors make it imperative to present the role that religion plays in the structural process of society according to Sturzo's social theory.

The originality and irreducibility of religion as a social form is indicated by the fact that whereas the family is rooted in man's affective procreative need and the polity on the need for order in his social life and its defense, religion is grounded in "the exigency of an absolute principle, and the consequent projection of sociality towards the absolute which commands the present reality." (I.L. 66) This exigency does not follow simply, or even basically, from the contingency of human existence, but rather is inherent in our very nature as persons. It is for this reason that this need of the absolute is concretized in a distinct and fundamental social form. If this exigency were a consequence simply of the contingency of our existence, it would not give rise to a distinct social form that is common to every human society from the most primitive to the most advanced, while, yet at the same time, there is no analogue to it on any other level of reality. As John Macmurray has pointed out, this indicates that "the universal, common root of religion in human experience is definitely personal. Religion is bound up with that in our experience which makes
us persons and not mere organisms."5

It has already been established that, for Sturzo, the process constitutive of the person is the concretizing of sociality, so that it is only in transcending himself that the individual actualizes his personal nature. This process finds the ultimate expression of its dynamism in religion. The constitutive principle of this process, as has been determined, is rationality. The interior necessity of rationality for fulfillment generates a movement that draws in its wake the need for the infinite and the absolute. The only spark that can ignite that movement and have the power to sustain it is the obscure, but concrete conscious exigency for the absolute.

This relationship with the absolute reveals itself in the modality of our knowledge. In every act of knowledge there is an intuitional awareness of a totality that encompasses within itself both the subject and object while at the same time transcending them. This totality cannot be identified with the spatial-temporal whole that constitutes our existential world.

Beyond space and time there is still a comprehensive and transcendental totality that calls us, making us feel the finite place we occupy and the infinite towards which we ascend....Nor should it be said that we have no consciousness of such a religion as emergent with every act of knowing, because it is implicit in us and may become explicit whenever we attempt to search more deeply into the object known and the value of knowing. (T.L. 214-5)

When Sturzo states that the consciousness of our relationship with the totality is "emergent with every act of knowing," he is referring to the fact that it is not antecedent to the act

5Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 156.
of knowing, nor a product of experience, but is present in and concomitant with every act of knowledge. Just as we only gradually come to an awareness of ourselves, so do we only gradually come to an explicit awareness of our relationship with the totality.

But as we only achieve self-awareness in the presence of others, the primary and basic relationship must be to a Personal Absolute, so that a primitive awareness of this Absolute is the ground for self-awareness; it is within the ambit of the primary relationship to this Absolute that the relationships with other persons are established. Thus, this relationship to the Absolute, as intrinsic to the process constitutive of the person

is connatural to the thinking subject in such a way that it must be attained in some manner or other by every subject in its intuition (or awareness) of itself. In such an act, the subject forms a distinct idea neither of the absolute nor of the contingent, nor of their connection; but it understands the necessity of a stable reality to which it is related and in which in a certain manner it participates. The intuition of the "whole" as we have explained and discussed it is a movement of interior necessity towards the absolute. (S.P. 39)

It is precisely this movement that is the inner impulsion of rationality toward expression and fulfillment. It is this relationship with the Absolute that gives to the tendency of rationality its inexhaustible dynamism.

With all its superstitions, aberrant and false beliefs, and perverse deviations in its historical realizations, religion is the social embodiment of this relationship with the Absolute. The distortions and erroneous paths that the projection of
this need has given rise to are simply a manifestation of the constitutive finitude that generates this need. By reason of this finitude the absolute "reveals itself to us gradually as the intellect understands particular reality in its essences and individualizations, in its systemizations and in its relations; it reveals itself gradually as the will and human action realize, in fact, the truths which are known." (S.P. 40) Religion, then, even in its primitive and instinctive forms in its aberrations and errors, is essentially, as a tendency in process, "the transcendent expression of the truth thought and of the good willed." (T.L. 209)

Since the irrepressible tendency of rationality is revealed to be essentially a movement toward the Absolute, religion is revealed to be the root and ultimate expression of this movement and thereby the concretization of sociality. Religion, then, is the focal point of the unification of consciousness, both individual and collective, and of the convergent activity of associated efforts, giving value and stability to the development of collective consciousness. "At bottom, the elements that may draw the people together in mutual understanding and fruitful contact are only the ethico-religious; and on these, through practical collaboration, a historical consciousness and a wider civilization may be created." (T.L. 211) Since religion is the focal and stabilizing point of the concretization of sociality, human solidarity and universalism can only be realized and preserved through a universalizing religion, which is Christianity alone.
In pre-Christian times the religious orientation of consciousness was expressed in attributing to the family, the tribe, the dynasty, the empire perpetuity and even an absolute quality so that they became divine manifestations. Although they were not commensurate with religious consciousness, it was through these other social forms that it expressed itself, so that they became the expression of religion. Religion, then, and the unification of consciousness was particularistic and split-up. The concretization of religious consciousness was always restricted to the collective personality of specific social groups, each with their own cult and gods. Religion was considered to be the relationship between the particular social group and its gods, because there was no direct sociological resolution beyond the group itself. As sharing in and manifesting the divine, each unifying group, whether it was the family, tribe, or an empire, was looked upon as an entity complete in itself, the end of all collective endeavors. In order for there to be a universal religious social form which would transcend the boundaries of every group personality there had to be affirmed not simply the idea of one true God who supplanted all particular deities, but rather one God in whose presence all men stand in a direct and personal relationship. The Hebrew people arrived at the conception of one God but the religion founded on this belief did not establish a direct relationship between the individual and God, but between the Chosen People and God so that this relationship was exclusive to the chosen people. They, therefore, had no sense of solidarity with other
peoples. It is only in the direct and personal relationship with one God that men acquire the sense of equality, solidarity and universality above classes, nations, and races, because concomitant with the recognition of this relationship there is an awareness that all men stand together in the same order of being. It is precisely Christianity that effected this relationship and it is this that is at the basis of its originality from the viewpoint of a social theory. "The novelty of Christianity, from the sociological standpoint, as compared with other religions, lay in its breaking down every obligatory relationship between religion and the family, tribe, or nation, founding it on the personal conscience." (I.L. 81) Christianity has released the personal conscience from the external chains of the family, tribe, caste, or nation, by giving to it the primacy of value and responsibility. This is a permanent and always present liberation placed at the base of every liberty. But at the same time it imposes on the individual the obligation to unite with others in a joint embrace of free men because all are bound by a mutual love, a single love with a two-fold object: God, in Whose presence all stand together as brothers, and one's neighbor. This shifting of the center of gravity of religious experience from the mediation of other social forms to the individual person is at the foundation of the slow penetration into the social structure of the spirit and ethics of Christianity, which has left an indelible imprint on the socio-historical process, transforming and elevating it without any comparison to all preceding and concomitant social forms. (cf. C. & P. 61)
The universality of Christianity, which is another component in its sociological uniqueness, logically follows from its foundation in a direct and inviolable personal relationship with an all-embracing God. As St. Paul states it, "For in Christ Jesus you are all sons of God through your faith. For all of you who have been baptized into union with Christ have clothed yourselves with Christ. There is no room for 'Jew' and 'Greek'; there is no room for 'slave' and 'freeman'; there is no room for 'male' and 'female'; for in union with Christ Jesus you are all one." 6 For Christianity, then, Christ has destroyed the ancient boundaries and divisions of religion or race or social stature and replaced them by Himself in Whom all men must come together. Only with the preaching of the Gospel was there a moral spirit capable of unifying different peoples and making effective the principles of human solidarity and universality to be extended to all classes, races and peoples. The unifying and transforming power of this Gospel lies in the spirit of love on which it is based as a personal religion. As such, it makes a direct appeal to men for an acceptance in the inner freedom of their own consciences. "In this inner freedom the moral act and the religious act coincide and complete each other. Any external and imposed morality and any purely formalistic religion would never be able to reach man's inner life and bring the sense of universality." (T.L. 254) It is only as rooted in this inner freedom that the spirit of love can draw the strength and vitality to extend to all men.

It may be objected that Christianity itself does not overcome the particularism of other social forms and previous religions since it does not in fact embrace all men. But since the reality of a social form consists in the associated consciousness of its members, it is from this consciousness that it derives its characteristic features. Universality characterizes it "if the consciousness of the members of a society affirm it as a special characteristic, as a belief, as a mission. Such is the Christian consciousness; it is and cannot but be catholic, that is, universal." (I.L. 89; cf. T. L. 247) It is a dynamic universality that is a tendency in process. It would not be brought to completion even if all men were in fact Christians because it has a two-dimensional directionality, not only extending outward toward all men in every generation but also penetrating inward into the hearts of men. It is a universality that is open-ended in both directions because it extends outward only to the extent that it penetrates inward.

A third social innovation effected by the advent of Christianity was the complete disengagement of the religious form from the other social forms, establishing a complete, permanent, and universal religious organization that is independent of any and all domestic and political institutions. This does not mean that the pre-Christian religions had no autonomy of their own; for this would run counter to the nature of religion as a fundamental form. Even in the merging and superimposing of forms there is always operative an intrinsic tendency towards autonomy. What it does mean is that it is only with Christianity that the
religious form achieved autonomy in both its content and organizational structure. The reason for this lies in the same fact that gave all pre-Christian religions their particularistic character:

...no pre-Christian religion, not even that of Israel, was founded on human personality in its spiritual value, so as to reach society as a unitary complexus through personality and only through it. On the contrary, all the pre-Christian religions were founded on society as a unitary complexus without any direct resolution into human personality. Such resolutions were always indirect and incomplete. (I.L. 85; cf. 81-2; C. & S. 21; T.L. 245-6)

In the intertwining and compenetrating influence of the social forms, the positive actuation of Christianity with the uniqueness of its socio-historical features has worked a truly transformative effect on the entire structural process of human society and its relation to the individual. The first consequence of the advent of Christianity was the humanization of the other social forms. They were no longer considered as divine manifestations, and therefore, ends unto themselves to which the individual was subordinated. As they lost their religious expression in the light of Christianity, domestic and political forms were reduced to the level of purely human forms, becoming means for man and not ends unto themselves. Yet, while Christianity did remove all prestige of participating in the divine from the social forms, reducing them to their human relativity, it at the same time "gave them new life by its ethical inspiration and unified them in a religious spirit and purpose." (I.L. 83; cf. p. 82; C. & S. 21)

This overthrowing of old social conceptions brought about
a fundamental revaluation of the human person as the center of gravity of the socio-historical process shifted from the social forms to the individual person. "Human personality, until then ignored or unappreciated, became the center and end of all collective activity, in virtue of a religious recognition. It was called to reconstruct society from the beginning, as though by a rebirth." (I.L. 83; C. & S. 22) Since society is in fact grounded in the individual person toward whom all social values are ordered, the subordination of the individual to the social form, as in pre-Christian societies was a distinction of the social order. The reordering of society toward the individual person, then, was in effect a conversion and restoration.

Through its religious elevation of the individual person and in establishing the equality of all men before a single God, Christianity effected a transformation in all social relationships throughout every level of society, modifying the entire social process. To point out a few examples, beginning with that basic unit of every society, the family, Christianity removed the ethical basis of the polygamous family because such a family structure is based on the inequality of the sexes. Christianity made effective the basic equality of the sexes in their mutual relationships because it established it on the spiritual solidarity of every man and woman before God. If it has taken centuries for this equalitarian concept to take root in social consciousness and acquire an ethical and social efficacy, it is because domestic, economic, and juridical traditions
and legislation have perpetrated the inferiority of women in all areas of activity. Christianity also cut at the root of the notion that the inequality between different social orders was one of nature, gave the concept of justice its firmest foundation and widest extension, removed the ethical basis of slavery, although its economic basis remained, and every other form of social oppression or injustice (I.L. 46-7, 83, 112; C. & S. 22)

Finally, another effect that resulted from the advent of Christianity was, as noted previously, the clarification of the specific functions, organs and ends of the fundamental social forms, bringing about an increased sense of autonomy in each of them. "Sociologically, the disengagement of one social form develops a greater sense of autonomy in the others." (I.L. 93) Since it was only with Christianity that the religious form assumed its own autonomy, only then was there a clear-cut distinction between the three primary forms. As separated from a religion of their own, the domestic and political forms were more able to define and develop their distinctive consciousness since their own content and organization were both more clearly distinguishable from those of the religious form. Also, in the Church's struggle for its own autonomy whereby its members acquire an ever clearer and deeper consciousness of it as such—which is precisely what constitutes its autonomy--this struggle produces a similar result in the other forms from which it is disengaging itself. The fact that this struggle is never-ending, especially with the political form, simply gives evidence
that an autonomous religious form has arisen because, as such, in the counterpuntal movement of interference between the forms, it limits the political form and is itself in turn limited by the political form. (I.L. 88)

In Sturzo's theory of the structural formation of society, then, the social forms are the concrete expressions of the concretizing of sociality. As such, they express the individual person seeking to define himself in the multi-dimensional structure of his nature. Since they unfold together on the level of human activity, they are processual in nature, being shaped by their own inner dynamism as well as that of the other social forms and of the total socio-historical process. Therefore, in accordance with the fundamental cognitive orientation of his theory, Sturzo states that, "so long as we consider groups and groups of groups analytically as individualities by themselves, or as individualities in a conventional framework, we are simply dealing with an abstraction. The reality is otherwise. We must consider them in their activity." (I.L. 255)

Therefore, it is to their activity we must now turn.
CHAPTER III

SOCIETY IN DYNAMIC PROCESS

An "open pluralism" is the phrase that best characterizes the structure of society. This holds true both in the constitution of its totality as composed of a multiplicity of social nuclei, with each conscious of its own autonomy and purpose, and in the make-up of its composing social forms. Collective consciousness of its very nature, is, for Sturzo, intrinsically pluralistic, whether it is considered on the level of associated individuals or on the level of a higher social unity, composed of associated groups. The principle of differentiation-in-synthesis is a principal leitmotiv in Sturzo's theory that is operative on every level of society, from the individual person to the widest social unity because it flows from the very nature of sociality as an ontological structure of the person. As a result, the entire thrust of his theory runs counter to any monistic view of society in which the composing units, whether individuals or groups, are viewed as merging into the collectivity like drops of rain falling on the ocean.

Nevertheless, the term "pluralism" carries a certain negative connotation in Sturzo's social theory. To view society as pluralistic is, for Sturzo, to view it abstractly, analytically, and statically because it denotes a static, "snapshot" picture of society either of its structure alone as separated
from its process, or of its process as frozen in a moment of disintegration. Society in the concrete is set in the matrix of a continuous process and is itself an expression of this process—the life of the individual person seeking to define himself, or, in other words, an expression of the tendency towards rationality in time. We have already established that the processive and dynamic character of sociality flows from the inner urge of rationality for expression and fulfillment.

The constant element in the historical process and in the social forms—the rationality that becomes collective consciousness—is never full and entire, never static and definitive; it is a trend towards rationality, the practical attainment of rationality, the surmounting of the irrational, the correction of the pseudorational. (I.L. 216)

Society, then, as the concretization of this vital and dynamic trend, is itself a living being marked by its own rhythms of life, continually changing or renewing its vital energies, either perfecting itself or deteriorating in moments of stasis, either progressing or regressing according to the given directionality of the social forces released by the activities of its vital components, the associated individuals. In this process there is a continuous polarization of the social forces at work in any given social form and between the forms, moving toward two antagonistic terms, either for struggle or for collaboration. This polarity of forces is not a mere transient stage in the social process, but is rather a constant social phenomenon. When we view society not analytically and abstractly but as it manifests itself in its concrete process, "then we shall see that in each group the forces coalesce into two, in
each association of groups the forces coalesce into two, and so on, until the widest ambit of society is reached. No individual can escape this continuous dualizing of forces, through the rhythm within which he lives." (I.L. 255-6) Consequently, polarity or duality, and not plurality, is the keynote to society in its concrete process.

As the manifold forces on any level of society, and in every sphere of activity, become polarized in two directions, two focal points of power take shape around which the various social forces gather. This crystallization of the social forces into two focal points of power, which occurs both within each social form and in society as a whole, constitutes what Sturzo calls "sociological diarchy." The word "diarchy" is the most apt for expressing the idea of a social duality, finding concrete manifestations in two forms of power, whatever their sphere, whether moral, political or religious." (I.L. 249) As crystallized into diarchy the basic polarization of social forces tend toward a further synthesis whereby one or the other forms of power becomes the unifying center, so that every society is always, at one and the same time, dualistic in the practical working out of its social process and unitary in its directionality. In the totality of its reality, then, as a structural process, society may be viewed "either as a plurality, in the multiplicity of social nuclei conscious of their individuality and purpose, or as a duality, in the affirmative and negative positions taken up in the contest of action, or as one, in its unifying and transcendental orientation." (T.L. 248; cf. I.L. 242)
Our task here is to trace out the main lines of this process according to Sturzo's theory, the sociological laws that are operative in the social process and the theoretical underpinnings of the laws. In order to avoid any misunderstanding here at the heart of Sturzo's processual view of society, we must briefly clarify what Sturzo means by the term "law" as applied to the social process. Sturzo is quite well aware of the risks involved in formulating laws that govern the human process, as the history of human thought is littered with their residue. Yet, at the same time, he recognizes that if we lack any kind of schematization of the social reality of man according to rules, norms, constants, laws--whatever one designs to call them--we would not be able to render this reality intelligible to us. We would be limited to handling it only through statistical methods which tends to reduce it to the level of quantitative facts. But even these are not intelligible in and of themselves, but are rendered such only through evaluation and interpretation, so that even the statistical method demands an underlying interpretative theory, at least in the form of working hypotheses. (M. 39) But Sturzo is convinced that in the flux of the social process there are constants that are operative. For if one considers the imposing complex of social phenomena from the perspective of psychic-social movements, there are some which are beyond individual free will on the one side, and the limitations of conditioning on the other, and therefore, appear as constant aspects of these phenomena. Sturzo uses both the term "sociological constant" and "sociological law" in his writings and sometimes with a similar meaning,
although generally, the term "constant" refers only to those perennial aspects of the structure of society, whereas the term "law" is reserved for the permanent regularities in the social process. For example, the familial form is a "constant fact" of human life. (I.L. 31; 49) But he maintains the use of the term "law" rather than "constant" as applied to the social process in order to "indicate both a human fact--individual and associative--and a normative fact of an intrinsically finalistic order." (M. 37)

Sturzo stresses that while sociological laws are analogous to physical or mathematical laws, they are not of the same nature. Rather, sociological laws correspond to historical and moral laws. They are based on the nature of man not in the abstract, but in its processual realization as living and acting on both the individual and social level, as single and associated, free and conditioned, orderly or tumultuous, intelligent or instinctive. These laws are not external laws that are imposed on man from the outside, but rather are the inner laws of the associative nature of men. (M. 26-7; 63) The interiority of these laws cannot be over-emphasized because as such they cannot be viewed as subjecting the individual person and the entire human process to a deterministic pattern. It must be remembered that the function of freedom in the social process was one of Sturzo's initial concerns in the formulation of his social theory and it remained a dominant theme because it touches the human person at the innermost principle of his uniqueness and creativity. Any deterministic theory of the human process
deprives man of that very quality of his being that precisely makes his process human. To insure this freedom, both theoretically and practically, was an integral part of Sturzo's effort to restore the individual person to his proper place in society, to reorient the direction of modern society.

Every determinism, whether external and environmental or internal and instinctivist, would reduce human society to a fixed agglomeration without self-determination, without creative activity, without intellectual and moral idealities. The individual man, dethroned by modern anthropological and sociological science, ought to be returned to his place as author and organizer of society in which and through which he lives.

(M. 33)

As a result Sturzo is extremely careful to avoid the snares of a deterministic social theory. It is to be expected that his sensitivity to this problem is most obvious in the formulation of laws he discovers as operative in the social process. Mindful that the laws of his theory may be interpreted as deterministic, he reiterates throughout the Inner Laws of Society, in which he presents his most extensive treatment of these laws that they must not be understood in this way, while at the same time insisting on their constancy as inherent in the nature of the human process.

If the social laws, when examined in the abstract, may have an appearance of determinism, this should not make us falter in our judgment that, like economic and moral laws, they are laws expressed and actuated by men with their free nature and their necessary conditioning. It would be a mistake to think that there are no sociological and historical laws because man if free, or that such laws are deterministic because human conditioning is a necessary datum. (I.L. 258; cf. 16; 90; 220; 241)

As Sturzo himself also states, his concept and formulation of sociological laws must be viewed within the systematic complexus
of his entire social theory, while keeping in mind the cognitive orientations that animate it. From this perspective it is clear that Sturzo is not going to set up any barricades to the play of freedom.

In fact, as the inner laws of man's associative nature, the sociological laws must not be considered in the same light as the limiting factors of freedom, such as the conditioning elements of human experience, whether they are physical or historico-social. We have already examined the interplay between freedom and conditioning and have seen that while conditioning factors do limit freedom, man at the same time can master them by his activity and make them his own. Now the sociological laws must be clearly distinguished from such factors because they do not mark the limits of freedom, but rather they mark the paths according to which freedom is enacted in the social process. Men do not suffer these laws which they therefore must strive to overcome, as they do in the case of the conditioning factors of their experience. They act according to these laws. This is the significance of the interiority of these laws. But this must not be interpreted as meaning that man's freedom consists in conforming his actions to these laws. It means, rather, that in their constitutive activity, that is, in the concretizing of sociality, men follow certain general trends that give rise to regularities of action in the social process. The sociological laws express these regularities. Sturzo emphasizes the distinction between sociological laws and conditioning factors when he points out that the conditioning factors of human experience are not even regulated by the
sociological laws, but by physical and historical laws according to the manifold nature of the conditions which function as material for human action. (M. 63)

The interiority of the sociological laws reveals the chasm that separates Sturzo's theory from those that pattern the human process on the model of nature. The human process, for Sturzo, is not governed by objective laws which are analogous to, much less identical with, the laws of nature, and to which man must submit. This would reduce history to a determined succession of events devoid of every human value.

In addition to their interiority, another aspect of Sturzo's understanding of sociological laws is worthy of attention, and that is their practical orientation as rooted in action. This is evident from the fact that they are the laws of man's associative nature and this nature is realized only in and through action. It is for this reason that Sturzo states that "sociological laws are always laws of action in society." (M. 63) They express the regularities and trends of the activities that are constitutive of this nature.

This practical orientation of the sociological laws also provide a clue as to how Sturzo arrived at formulation of them. In his treatment of the sociological laws in Del Metodo Socio-ologico he states:

In every scientific analysis, one always makes a distinction between the active element and the receptive or passive element and then puts in relief their reciprocal reactions in order to determine their natures and characteristics. This must also be done in the investigation of society. It is known that the active and finalistic factor of society is the individual man. And man is not an abstract idea but a living reality.... (M. 28)
In *Inner Laws* he states that "ours is a sociological vision of laws derived from human nature, from its rationality, from its mode of action, from its social effectiveness." (I.L. 258) It is of extreme significance to note that Sturzo makes this statement in considering the objection that his laws constitute an aprioristic pattern "into which we are trying to force all social phenomenology." This objection runs counter to the entire methodology of Sturzo's theory. We have already seen that human nature for Sturzo is not an antecedent structure from which one can deduce the sociological laws. Rather, human nature realizes itself only in action so that it is only in examining history that the laws of its constitutive activities become manifest. "It is precisely history—-not the outer history of the material facts but their inner reason, their logical connection, the metaphysic to which they give birth—-that enables us to learn the laws of our social nature." (T.L. 5) This is in consonance with Sturzo's historical method and also provides an effective counter-thrust to the objection that he is presenting an aprioristic picture of reality. The risk of presenting a pre-established scheme is lessened according to the extent that those patterns which appear to be always present in the socio-historical process are presented in matrix of that process. We find Sturzo carrying out this form is historical testing in his monumental work, *Church and State*.

Given the open possibilities of human experience, due to the unceasing thrust of rationality, whereby man has the power to transcend his own history, Sturzo moves very cautiously in
assigning a definitive character to his sociological laws before there has been sufficient verification of them. Thus, he views them as working hypotheses or as points of orientation. As he states, "The search for sociological laws is a very delicate task, given the lack of a clear scientific tradition and of a rigorous methodology." (M. 63) Due to the fact that the sociological laws are based on the open-ended nature of man, or what Vico aptly calls man's "indefinite nature," Sturzo warns that the inner laws of this nature as living and acting in society are so complicated and complex and have so many different aspects, that it is difficult to explain the bonds and coordination between them and to place their significance in proper perspective. (M. 27) The cautious, open-minded spirit with which he articulated his own theory is revealed in the following statement he made concerning his basic theory on the polarization of social forces and their diarchic crystallization. "In such terms, we analyze the reality, seeking its general lines, but the reality is very different from what it appears in analysis, nor does it lend itself to generalization. None the less, this attempted analysis helps us to form an approximate idea of it." (I.L. 252) It is this task that we now undertake.

The process that is at the base of all sociological laws, and is itself a fundamental law, is the movement towards rationality. This is clear from the fact that this is the process that is constitutive of the person and society together. Rationality is the moving spring of the social process because it is
the ultimate generative principle of the concretization of sociality. As individualized in the concrete person, rationality is marked by the inherent finitude of human existence, but it retains its orientation towards, and dynamic energy for, complete and perfect realization. Since it is individualized rationality that constitutes the essential nature of man, this means that man is fundamentally a being that not only opens out onto the absolute, but also tends towards it with the inner impulsion of his very being. In fact, it is precisely this movement that constitutes his being.

But it is also a movement that contains within itself the principle of its own contravening movement—the movement towards animality. This principle is the principle of materiality. Rationality is the determining principle of human existence, but as it takes concrete shape it is limited by another principle, the principle of materiality. These two principles together constitute the concrete individualized rationality that is the individual person, with the result that rationality is touched in its very core by this limiting principle. This generates a struggle within the individual person that spreads outward throughout the entire ambit of society. For whereas our essential nature lies in the movement of rationality towards completion, which is the realization of individuality in sociality, there flows from within this very same movement, through the principle of materiality, a counteracting movement toward self-contained egoism. These two principles vie with one another for domination within the individual person.
The movement toward rationality is toward the affirmation and attainment of one's personality, the movement of materiality is toward animality and the negation of one's personality. Whereas the movement of rationality is outward and unifying, the movement of materiality is inward and divisive. The movement of rationality is a centripetal force, generating a dialectic of differentiation-in-synthesis, in which our being is increased and deepened as we move toward convergence—Sturzo uses this term with all the richness of meaning it conveys in a Teilhardian Weltanschauung. The movement of materiality is a centrifugal force, generating an egoistic tendency that lessens and constricts our being as we move toward an antagonistic plurality.

The polarization of forces, to use a physicist's image always takes place in social form. The syntheses are rational in character and indicate the movement towards rationality. The disintegrations are always in the domain of materiality, and indicate egoistic regression. There is a struggle which, from within the individual, develops in all the forms of sociality, even the loftiest, even those imbued with supernaturalism. (I.L. 127)

Although the movement of materiality is away from the fulfillment of our personal being to its diminution, this does not mean that it is any less real than the movement of rationality. "The world of oppositions is as real, in every sense and on every plane of concrete existence, as the world of convergences." (I.L. 127) The "world of oppositions" is simply the reflection of the finitude of our being, which ontologically is the limitation of rationality by materiality. This limiting factor of materiality is as real as rationality itself, as the condition and modality of its being. Its reality is manifested in the field of the personal in both a negative and positive manner.
For although it does generate a countervening movement to that of rationality—a movement that results in now absence and alienation from oneself, now lack, insufficiency, defect—nevertheless, as the limiting factor of rationality that marks it with a fundamental deficiency from within its concrete individualized being, it is that deficiency that gives rise to the inner dynamism of rationality to overcome it. This brings about within the process of rationality two dialectical moments, the negative and the positive. We have already dealt with these two moments, and the process as a whole, in discussing the concretization of sociality as the constitutive process of the individual person. Now the ontological basis for what Sturzo calls the sociological law of the trend toward rationality lies in the ontological structure of the individual person as rational; and it is in these terms that the law includes the constitutive process of the person.

But this law also relates to this process in another way. Since it is the tendency towards absolute rationality in time that defines the person in the ultimate character of his being, in establishing the trend toward rationality as a law of the social process, Sturzo is also affirming not just that the person defines himself in the social process, but more fundamentally that he generates the social process in defining himself. This law, then, is also the formal articulation by Sturzo that the individual person is the efficient and final principle of the social process.

There is another aspect to this law that manifests the
depth and internal consistency of Sturzo's theory: its role as the fundamental sociological law. For in setting this law of the trend toward rationality at the basis of all the sociological laws, Sturzo is establishing not only the fact that the socio-historical process is rooted in the ontological structure of the person, and that its laws are generated in and by the constitutive activity of the person, but also, and ultimately, that the emergence of the person in the plentitude of his being is the final term of this process and the ultimate criterion of its rationality.

In viewing the entire socio-historical process, Sturzo finds an ever rising level of rationality, which is the expression of the trend toward rationality on the social level. This trend toward rationality that originates in the individual person seeking to realize himself, reverberates throughout the entire temporal-spatial span of the socio-historical process, giving it in the entirety of its process the continuously upward movement toward an increasing personalization of the process. That is, in the reciprocating and constitutive dialectic of differentiation-in-synthesis that is operative between the individual and society, the overall socio-historical process reveals an ever fuller and deeper amplification of the field of the personal, within which the social order more adequately corresponds, and responds, to the drive of rationality for completion.

The whole thrust of the human process is to transcend the limitations of the present in every sphere of human endeavor, to overcome and eliminate the deficiencies and evils that are
encrusted in the social order, to break through the bonds of oppression in any form that breaks the weak, deforms the strong and keeps whole peoples shackled to a state of remorseless squalor and constant human degradation. This unremitting finalistic impulse awakens within any society or social form a spirit of achievement, which is the vitalizing and unifying factor of the collective personality. This ever-present urge to achievement is itself a sociological law, the law of achievement or conquest, "which informs the course of all history, in large or in little. But in large or in little, in every field and sphere, collective activity must either be directed towards achievement or fail....the renunciation of all conquest, insofar as it denotes pure acquiescence in the present state, petrifies and dissolves that personality." (T.L. 202-3) There have been and will be specific and short term failures. Particular societies may fall into such prolonged and widespread periods of stasis and inertia that the spirit of achievement atrophies and is finally extinguished, bringing about the collapse of that society; nevertheless, that spirit is still at work in the broad sweep of the socio-historical process, and its impelling surge will sweep over the ruins of that society, giving rise to another one.

Without actually designating it as a sociological law, we have already referred to this urge to achievement in explaining Sturzo's theory on the development of collective consciousness and the transcendence of social nuclei, which itself constitutes a sociological law, as we have indicated in the pre-
These two laws are related on the social level, as has been noted, in a collective, finalistic impulse which takes concrete expression as the spirit of achievement and, as such, is the moving force behind the transcendence of social nuclei. This collective finalism is an expression of and is sustained by the trend to rationality that is operative on the social level. The laws of achievement and transcendence, then, are corollaries of the law of rationality. They can be viewed either simply as expressions of the law of rationality as presented from different perspectives, or as means of separating out and giving formulation to the various processes that are involved in the trend to rationality.

But the law of rationality cannot be reduced to these two laws. For it includes the affirmation that in the striving for conquests, in the various processes of transcendence taking place in the social process, there is an actual increment of rationality in the socio-historical process.

Man as he gains in self-consciousness, in consciousness of the world and its causes, takes his own inward progress as the measure for a better estimation of humanity in its past and present. He thus rejects as repugnant and inadequate to human nature many practical beliefs, rules, and criteria that in another age or another environment, were judged to correspond to the greatest individual and social good, and hence to the intimate laws of nature. (I.C. 144)

The entire endeavor of the human process has been to overcome the predominance of animality in social life, to storm the citadels of irrationality or pseudo-rationality that have held sway over the process as ingrained social phenomena. To mention a few of the more obvious and notable conquests, there have been those over polygamy, the family vendetta, serfdom,
and slavery.

Conquests such as these have modified and uplifted the entire social process, sending shock waves throughout the remaining strongholds of irrationality in the social process. It may take generations for the effects of these reverberations to surface and shake the foundations of these strongholds, but once a practical, rational trend is set in motion, its finalistic impulse releases a dynamism which moves inexorably towards goals not yet attained, and which gains impetus in the face of resistance, as it is now slowed down, now vitiated and turned aside. And "the more important is the practical, rational trend, the greater the reactions that it determines in the irrational substratum of human life." (I.L. 146) A prime example in our day is the civil rights movement in America which is penetrating through the irrational incrustations of social consciousness that remain a hundred years after the abolition of slavery. But it will prevail because the gains it has achieved as well as "other moral conquests, which in our times from the realm of ideals and theories have affirmed themselves in that of practice, becoming laws and customs, and from the domain of pure aspirations have passed into vast realizations, correspond to the unceasing trend towards rationality." (I.L. 146)

And so will the trend towards rationality prevail over such institutions now under attack, as for example, the death penalty and war. The possibility of eliminating the death penalty has already passed from "the stage of Utopian idealism to that of practical realization"; that is, it has become a "sociological
problem." "Sociologically, a problem is such when it is raised by the social conscience as a practical problem to be solved, or when, though it has been solved in one manner, it comes up again for discussion for a further solution." (I.L. 230)² The question of the legitimacy and juridical propriety of war, and thereby the necessity of eliminating it, is today in the process of transversing that passage in social consciousness from the realm of Utopian idealism to being grappled with as a sociological problem. This is a step of the utmost importance because once a question becomes for collective consciousness "a practical problem to be solved" that signifies that the trend of rationality has already been set in motion in that direction.

As in the case of the abolition of war, so in that of the death penalty, the public conscience is not yet formed and decided, and hence has not reached a complete solution; it has merely covered the intermediate stages.... Only the far-sighted, the bold, the reformers have the courage of great ideas, and outstrip the common world by tens of years or even by centuries.... but it is impossible for the trend towards rationality to be wholly arrested. When the death penalty (like war) will have been abolished, then it will no longer be legitimate, nor will the attempt be made to present it as necessary. (I.L. 231)

As these conquests of rationality little by little penetrate into human consciousness, there is a greater awareness of, and sensitivity to, the intrinsic value of the human person. "The value of human personality is like a hidden treasure that must be sought, like a vein of gold that must be laid bare and purged of dross." (I.L. 217) The needs of the person, therefore,

become more strongly felt, the social customs and institutions are continually reformed to meet the demands of these needs, and thus the potentiality that is in the human person is able to reach out to higher levels of achievement.

Even where some institutions are only tolerated in order that some ethical norms are functioning to bridle the forces of animality released by the principle of materiality, the slow and laborious process towards rationality is not lacking. It extends into every sphere of social activity, bringing about what Sturzo terms "the pseudo-rational or semi-rational institutions" towards a deeper rationality. (I.L. 101) For example, the material basis of society, its economic structure, is formed, continually modified, and reformed by the trend towards rationality, always pointing towards—even when not in practice actually moving towards—a better distribution of the material goods of the society.

The optimistic hue of Sturzo's theory is clearly tempered by a vivid pragmatic realism, shaped on the anvil of practical experience. In fact, it is precisely by reason of the difficulties involved, the efforts exerted, and the obstacles to be surmounted in attaining the gains of rationality that Sturzo calls them "conquests." "Any creation of welfare insofar as it implies activity, efforts, failures, crises, the overcoming of difficulties, cannot but be called a conquest." (T.L. 203) For Sturzo, social progress is born in struggle, conflict, opposition. But even here, Sturzo does not view the forces of opposition to social progress as having only a negative function in the social process. This they do have in a very real
sense, but they also play an extremely positive role. For one thing, their very resistance to the trend of rationality is a generating factor in the dynamism of the social process, whereby this resistance is overcome. It is conflict that polarizes the social forces, giving rise to the progressive movement of the social process. "Without conflicting finality there would not be struggle, and without struggle society would never overcome the pluralistic stage which is chaotic and non-progressive."

(M. 17) Also it's through struggle with the moral and material obstacles to a social transformation that this transformation takes root in the social consciousness with an ever clearer and deeper consciousness of it.

Sturzo was personally aware that the conquests of the trend toward rationality are slowly and laboriously achieved. The pace of achievement more often than not must be measured not by years, but by generations and even centuries. The achievements of rationality do not take root everywhere at once. There always remain the backwaters of the human process which the currents of rationality reach only tardily and with diminished force. It is only with great difficulty that the gains of rationality are preserved and equally herculean is the effort required to attain the full import of their social effects.

As any form of welfare won (freedom, for instance) must be guaranteed, defended and re-lived, so its conquest is always a becoming, in the continuity of action.... The achievement of welfare is always partial, never entire. It is precarious, never conclusive. To be defended, it must be renewed, augmented, restored. In a word, the good won must be continually re-experienced so as to ensure its existence, continuity and development. (T.L. 203)
Any stable ethico-civilized achievement of its very nature must be rooted in the collective consciousness. In accordance with his relational, integral realism, Sturzo stresses that any change in the orientation of collective consciousness calls for concurrent changes in all the conditioning and shaping factors of consciousness, social, political, and economic "because the factors of our everyday lives are deeply engraved in the mind of each one of us." (N. & I. 267) Sturzo lists four requirements that are necessary to bring about, maintain and make effective the conquests of rationality: an educational preparation and formation to open the way for it and establish its foundations; a political order to recognize it and guarantee its stability; a social maturation in which it takes root; and a continual process of acquisition and readaptation whereby it is maintained in and responds to the changing conditions of the social process. These four requirements, each and all together, indicate the difficulty and slowness with which gains in rationality are achieved. These factors also point to the very real sense in which Sturzo grounds the achievements of rationality in the total matrix of socio-historical process. Thus, for example, in regard to the overall human process, that which is seen to be less rational, such as the polygamic family as compared to the monogamic, may be relatively more rational as set within the total context of a particular environment. Sturzo states that "this fact may be noted even today in semi-barbarous countries when Christianity is introduced. It is here not enough to prescribe that the family should be mono-gamic, but it must be given an enabling environment by an
adequate transformation of political and economic society."  
(I.L. 18)

Sturzo's law of the trend toward rationality seems prima facie to align his position with theories of progressivism, which hold that there are linear and inwardly determined trends unfolding in time towards ever higher forms of human progress. As will become clear in the next chapter, Sturzo's theory is far removed from a strictly humanistic progressivism in which there is no principle other than men operative in the human process, so that human rationality would be considered to possess within its own power the resources needed to overcome the contravening force of materiality in attaining its ideal and actualization. Although Sturzo does posit the need of a transcendent principle operative within the human process, nevertheless, be that as it may, the fact that Sturzo views the trend towards rationality as a law of the social process in which there actually is an ever increasing realization of rationality seems to indicate a movement that is intrinsically progressive.

It must be acknowledged that the radical optimism of Sturzo does verge on overflowing into progressivism. In fact, in his early writings he views the human process more in terms of its progressive character than its processual flow. He speaks of "humanity in its historical ascension towards progress," and even of "the historical law of progress." "Human thought does not stop before any obstacle; it is the law of progress, which pursues us even if we are unwilling, which drags us along even if we want to resist, or it at least moves on over us. This is
history." (L.C. 207, 203) One of his major early essays is entitled, "Social Conflict as a Law of Progress." (cf. S.S. 24–56) What prevents the optimistic orientation of Sturzo's thought from actually falling into any form of progressivism is the determinism that underlies such theories. And any form of determinism is radically opposed to the fundamental thesis of Sturzo's social theory: that the efficient principle of the social process is the autonomous, free individual person, whose freedom is rooted in the ultimate quality of his being, rationality. Since the individual person is the sole substantive principle of the socio-historical process, just as freedom stands at the heart of human action on the individual level, so must it necessarily characterize the human process in its collective activity. In fact, it was Sturzo's concern to avoid any deterministic overtones of his theory that led him to shift the emphasis of his early speculation on human reality from the notion of progress to that of process. It is for the same reason that he purposely avoids using the term "evolution," substituting in its place the term "development" as characterizing the historical becoming of human reality. "Human reality is process. We say process, that is, succession, and not progress, nor evolution, because all human activity is individual, even if developing, as it does, collectively or by groups."

(I.L. xvii; cf. M. 14) It is significant to note that Sturzo's aversion to a deterministic theory of the human process lies in the fact that it undermines the historical efficacy of personal experience because it shifts the locus of the dynamism of the process from the individual person to the deterministic
forces of the process. This in turn ultimately undermines the reality of the individual, submerging it in the deterministic flow of the process itself.

Just as human process cannot be called progress, so it cannot be called evolution in the sense of a reality contained in a germ and developing from it according to a law of maturation and continuity....But, underneath, both ideas of evolution and progress presuppose a deterministic conception. This as such denies the idea of individuality and of personal experience, and, hence, the idea of liberty, reducing the whole of human activity to a more or less unconscious necessity. (I.L. xix; cf. T.L. 198)

This does not mean that Sturzo does not admit to the evolutionary or progressive character of the human process. He clearly does, as has been indicated, although "not indeed as deterministic and absolute elements, but as relative elements of appraisement of the past and orientation of the future." (I.L. xix) "While we cannot admit a deterministic human progress, we must grant the fact that humanity makes progress in its experiences." In a continuous flow of intertwining personal experiences there is a rising level of rationality that becomes the common patrimony of succeeding generations, so that "the new men who come forward in making their own experiments start from a determined common level, which they insensibly will have reached." (I.L. xviii) Yet, given the limited and processual nature of human experience, as well as the relative character of the gains in rationality and their tenuous and precarious foothold in the onflow of the human process due to the counteracting forces of materiality, each generation must make its own achievements of the past to insure their continuity and development. And it does this only on the individual level by

reason of the personal character of experience so that it is the individual person alone that is the "undying fount of vital reality."

Thus, in associated life there were contemporaneously developments, arrests, renewals, involutions, all the stages that experience implies. Hence, there is not always progress, never a real regression, but in a relative sense both progress and regression, that is, experimentation and achievement. (I.L. xviii)

Sturzo also argues against a constant, progressive motion to the trend of rationality by reason of the relative character of rationality.

Between the idea of a constant rational becoming and that of a process not intrinsically progressive, there might seem an irreducible conflict. But, once the purely rational and the purely irrational are excluded by concrete reality, the movement falls within relativistic lines, in which, besides the true rational, what we have called the semi-rational and the pseudo-rational have their function, now positive, now negative. (I.L. 17)

Thus we may conclude that although Sturzo is clear in his affirmation of the ultimately progressive movement of the socio-historical process, he is equally clear in affirming that it is not a direct, linear and inwardly determined movement, but rather it is marked by uncertain steps, with regressions, deviations, and periods of immobility. There is always and only particular and relative progress, now in one direction, now in another.

The trend of social consciousness towards rationality is not direct, nor swift, but slow and uncertain, with pauses and with backslidings. Today, through the advent of the authoritarian governments, in this matter as in many others a backward step has been taken, but it is impossible for the trend towards rationality to be wholly arrested. (I.L. 231; cf. 16-7, 36, 90, 220; M. 104)

Before we conclude our exposition of the trend towards
We should note several other aspects of this trend in order to avoid any misinterpretations of this most basic sociological law. First of all, the trend towards rationality can be conceived of as a continuous surmounting of the principle of materiality, with its contravening movement towards animality, which is an egoistic disintegrative force within the social process. Yet, the movement towards rationality must not be understood as an escape from materiality, but rather as its fulfillment and spiritualization through a higher finalism and inner purification. Since the individual is composed of both material and rational principles, the purification and spiritualization of the material principle are essential features of the concretization of sociality and therefore "aspects of rationality that give meaning, end and unity to all human activity." (I.L. 36) This does not mean that in stressing the predominant role of rationality in sociality Sturzo ignores or even undervalues the positive function of the sensible and emotional substratum of human experience. He clearly acknowledges this substratum as an integral part in the fabric of communal living. For example, he states that "since we are sensible beings, it is the life of feeling that makes a community effective and practical, increasing acquaintanceship, stimulating affections releasing energies and helping to give the spiritual basis of society the natural means of affinity and consolidation." (T.L. 83)

It is this bipolarity of the spiritual and the material which constitutes the nature of man that is the metaphysical basis for the incessant polarizing of forces in every sphere of
activity. For this bipolarity constitutes the radical finitude of concrete individualized rationality, always aborting its movement towards absolute rationality. The concrete realization of rationality is always partial, insufficient, and marked by an inherent deficiency that is an urge for us to overcome it. There is always a gap between the concrete realization of rationality and its ideal actuation in every sphere of human endeavor on both the individual and associated levels. This divergence between the ideal and the real is a metaphysical, ethical, and intellectual vacuum that draws rationality on to overcome it, creating in the social process currents of reform and renewal. Within the present temporal-spatial sphere, our efforts to overcome this vacuum, the limitations, evils and errors of the present will always be only temporally and partially successful. The resulting and alternating ups-and-downs of life are formulated by Sturzo in the law of "critical cycles." "What we may call a 'critical cycle' is overcome by passing to a higher 'critical cycle' and so on, in a continual relationship between individuals in the singular and society in the whole....Mankind and its history cannot be conceived outside pain and limitation, in the continual effort of confronting them." (T.L. 167) The "critical cycle" Sturzo is referring to here is the dialectic in the trend toward rationality between the negative and positive moment, or, in other words, between the deficiency of achieved rationality and the effort to resolve it. The synthesis achieved is never definitive, but is itself insufficient, giving rise to a dialectic on a higher level, which in turn calls for a further synthesis.
Whatever the limitations, whatever the sphere of activity, whether the "critical cycle is confined to the individual person or involves an entire people, what is constant in the dialectic is the polarizing of forces reaching for a resolution of the critical cycle. Although the duality will take a variety of forms, it fundamentally "presents itself to us as an opposition between the ideal and the real, between the spiritual and the material." (I.L. 240) It must be reiterated that this is how the duality presents itself in its fundamental form. We must avoid a simplistic interpretation of it as though it always took shape in such clear-cut terms, any more than that it always involves a conflict between good and evil. In the manifold forms it takes in every sphere of human endeavor the polarization can take on a myriad of shadings, and is seldom, if ever, free from ambiguities. The polarization of forces may not even be simply one of antagonistic opposition, conflict, and struggle, but may even enter into collaboration. Therefore, to say that the polarization is fundamentally an opposition between the ideal and the real, between the spiritual and the material simply means that "the forces of consciousness and of individual activities become oriented towards one of two terms in such fashion that the one may represent the rational, spiritual and ideal element, the other the practical, the material, the realistic." (I.L. 240)

This basic duality is always tending towards unification, reaching out for a "further resolution, a further synthesis, otherwise it would be barren." (I.L. 240-1) This tendency towards unification is rooted in and is an expression of the
very ontological structure of the person, his sociality, and therefore constitutes a fundamental sociological law. It, too, is a corollary of the law of rationality, since it is "through rationality that unification comes. There can be no unifying element that does not resolve itself into rationality." (I.L. xxiii) In fact, the tendency towards unification ultimately reduces itself to the tendency towards rationality, as viewed from the perspective of its finality because the end to be attained is the unifying term and this end is always represented in terms of its rationality. More precisely, it is a unifying term to the extent that it conforms to absolute rationality. It is clear from the preceding exposition of sociality and rationality that the unification sought is at one and the same time inward and social, but it is fundamentally personal since the person is the term of every social resolution. This means, then, that all social values resolve themselves into the individual person.

It is also a unification that is at the same time immanent and transcendent, since the tendency towards rationality that constitutes the person is a tendency towards absolute rationality. Therefore, the thrust of our own being towards completion never finds pacification short of this unification with absolute rationality. It is only there that the movement of our being finds that higher unification that comprehends, and pacifies it, while still transcending it. "This unification in rationality, which is immanent in us, would lead us to an exasperating rational anthropocentrism (pseudo-humanism) if it were not for the unification that makes us transcend it in the
absolute, the unification of the human in the divine." (I.L. xxiv) This unification of the human in the divine, and its implications will be the area of our concern in the next chapter, because, as Sturzo himself states, "since this unification, though essential in the idea of creatureliness, in order to find fulfillment with its cognitional value in each man, must in some way be inserted into the human process, it will be well first of all to make it clear what human process means." (I.L. xxiv) And this is the aim of the present chapter as it has been in the two preceding ones.

The tendency towards unification manifests itself in the concretizing of sociality whereby social life always tends towards a spiritual unification on a higher plane than that of particular economic and political interests and aspirations. The movement toward a transcendent unification in absolute rationality reflects itself on the social level, in "the rational movement towards order and peace, and the need, inherent in nature, for human, peaceable and useful relationships between peoples. This tendency actually is elaborated through the unifying tendency of every civilization, which is what gives the moral structure to any international community, transcending particular, economic and political egoism and the intolerance of castes, classes or national religions." (I.L. 141)

Just as the tendency towards rationality is frustrated by the contravening movement of materiality, so is the tendency towards unification. The unification achieved, both personally and socially, are always partial, temporary, and contested. Thus it must continually be augmented, restored, and defended.
We therefore find in the tendency towards unification a tendency that is always more or less unsatisfied. It is always a case of a unification in process, never final, but always a tendency, a dynamism. (I.L. xxiii) Thus, "every society that grows up out of human relationships is always practically dualistic and tendentially unitary." (I.L. 242—italics in the text; cf. xxiii)

When Sturzo states that society is always "practically dualistic" he is pointing up not only that its movement actually is so in fact, but also that the dualistic orientation is a practical orientation, rooted in action. It is only in action that society takes shape, develops and continues, and it is only through this action that social forces are generated. It is precisely in their generation that they are polarized in a two-fold directionality. What allows for the polarization of forces in action is that which is at the source of all action that is human: freedom. "For me, the first element of individual and social dualism is free will." (M. 100) It is personal freedom that makes possible for the free play between the principles of materiality and of rationality, which gives rise to the fundamental option that orients individual activity, and thereby social life, towards the materializing of life or of making it ever more rational. It is interesting to note that Sturzo places freedom at the source of the dualistic nature of the social process because it is precisely this which others maintain calls for, and results in, the pluralistic nature of society. Sturzo's rejection of this theory has been indicated and his reasons will become manifest as we elaborate his own theory.
This polarization of forces, both within the individual and throughout every aspect of social life is inherent in the creative process that gives rise to the continuous development of the individual person and society together, and it is this polarization that generates the dynamism necessary for the process.

In no moment of history, in no social concretization whatever its aspects, religious, political, juridical or cultural, shall we fail to find not only traces of a duality of grouped forces, but also the dualistic elements of the different social syntheses. If this were not so, the spiritual process of mankind would stagnate, motionless, the movement towards rationality would stop short at the irrational, ethical values, law would lack its historical relativity, and institutions would not be able to take form. (I.L. 245-6)

It is well to note that the dualistic polarization of social forces which must develop dynamically in the realization of social forms, providing for their continued development and movement, occurs not only within the particular social forms, but also in the relationships between them in their movements towards autonomy and interference, which we examined previously. The entire range of the social process then, reveals a constant dynamic pattern of movement—a pattern that is generative of the continuous dynamic movement—"the dualization of forces, in the name of one or the other social form, the unifying tendency, expressed in the prevalence of one form over the rest, the falling asunder of such unification, making a new duality, the drop into temporary pluralities, which will be polarized anew in a two-fold sense, and tend towards a oneness never perfectly to be attained." (I.L. 245)

Although this polarization does generate a powerful dynamism
on every level of human experience, the most significant and basic expression of this polarization of forces is in the moral sphere. This follows from the fact that all human activity can ultimately be reduced to morality, since morality is simply the actuation of rationality in human action. Thus, "man acts ethically whether his purposes are economic, political, artistic, cultural, recreational or what not. The ethical urge, that is to say, simple moral reason in action, is inherent in all human behavior and is revealed in every social fact."4 But, given the negative moment in the achieving of rationality, there is always a disparity between the ethical ideal and its social realization of such a distance as to justify a continuous revision of traditional norms and to call for an unrelenting advancement of "the frontiers of reform."5

The whole of human activity may be said to be a continuous process of reform, correction and integration of what is by what should be. The should-be (the deontological) presses upon us in the guise of rationality, that is, of a laudable, desirable, attainable ideal. The should-be is the spirit that quickens the letter and the reality having become open to criticism, is the letter that has lost part or the whole of its spirit. Hence the dialectic of the negative and positive moments gains an endless potentiality. (I.L. 15)

In the movement of the social process the most fundamental and concrete expression of the polarization of the social forces is that between the forces directed toward the conservation of the status quo in the social order and the opposing forces directed toward the transformation of the social order. The


5Ibid., p. 112.
former are a reflection of the social process in its crystallization in stable social institutions while the latter manifest its unceasing becoming even within its already established institutional forms, impelled onward towards a better future by moral and material exigencies. These two asynchronous rhythms of the social process give rise to two broad currents of social forces which Sturzo calls, respectively, the organizational and the mystical. Two currents, then, are always at work and interacting with one another, both within the complexity of the individual social forms and throughout the entire social complexus: the reforming and renewing mystical current and the stabilizing and consolidating organizational current.

These two currents constitute the fundamental and perennial polarization of social forces for three reasons. First of all, they reflect two opposing tendencies within the person. One flows from the inner urge of rationality for completion which gives rise to the inherent sense of process and of the urgency for further actuation. An opposing tendency is derived from the limiting principle of materiality which defuses the thrust of rationality and manifests itself within the person in an innate dread of change and a need for resting in the reality attained, which is viewed as definitive: hic manebimus optime. (I.L. 221-2) Secondly, they reflect the two asynchronous rhythms that are inherent in the social process, that of the collective consciousness and that of its structural concretization in social forms. The movement of collective consciousness continues to flow at a faster pace and is much more mobile and flexible than that of its structural concretizations. Collective
consciousness, then, tends to outdistance the developmental process of the social forms which, as the stabilizing factors of a reality in process, have to overcome more resistances before it can be transformed. (I.L. 221) Finally, the organizational current tries to establish and concretize ideal values and the benefits accrued to the social process in social institutions; but since this will be only partially successful at any given time, the mystical current will always be at work, pushing towards renewal and the realization of a better future.

Sturzo indicates three liberating or reforming currents which are operative in every society and which, needless to say, can be expressed in a multitude of ways: the rational which is the natural movement from an established past and deficient present towards a better future; the artistic which gives expression to beauty containing the true and good and as such directs the spirit of man towards the true and good; and the religious current without which "it would be impossible to restore the human solidarity shattered by the spirit of evil.... In it the rational and artistic currents are completed and transformed...." (T.L. 190-1) Of the interaction between these reforming currents that between the rational and religious is of the utmost importance.

The point at which rationality and religious feeling converge lies in the condemnation of evil; the point at which evil may be overcome lies in the legal recognition of given acts as evil, and therefore punishable; and social progress consists in the effort to eliminate evil. But till rationality and religion unite in recognizing that a given social fact is evil, the elimination of that social fact is impossible. Religion is necessary as a social premise and as the ethical application of rationality on a plane of obligations transcending ethics and society. (I.C. 203)
There are several miscellaneous aspects of these currents that should be clarified in order to avoid misinterpretations of Sturzo's position on them. There is, first of all, the terminology involved. Sturzo was dissatisfied with the appellation of mystical for the reforming current, but he preferred it to the term, ideal. "Whereas the word, ideal, generally signifies something intellectual and rational, perceived as an idea, the word, mysticism, has a sense of faith, adherence, affection, and, at the same time, hints at something mysterious, like a higher force with a compelling power." (I.L. 247) But Sturzo did refer to these currents in one of his writings as the "organizational" and the "idealistic."6 When he first formulated his theory on these two trends in society, he called them, respectively, the conservative and the progressive currents. This is also the terminology he used in one of his last writings. (M. 9; cf. also S.S. 48) He has also spoken of the static and dynamic phases of the social process, which correspond to the two currents. (I.L. 16; 221-2) In summation, we can conclude that Sturzo remained generally dissatisfied with his terminology for these two currents; but since he uses the terms "organizational" and "mystical" most frequently in his writings, we will also.

Also, one must be careful not to identify these two currents with the negative and positive moments in the trend towards rationality. Both currents represent the trend towards rationality and there is always a negative element operative in both currents. In regard to social progress, the roles of these two currents should not be categorized in negative and positive terms, with the organizational current playing the negative

6Ibid., p. 115.
role and the mystical the positive role. Only a superficial analysis of the socio-historical process could lead to this conclusion. Both are equally necessary for social progress and both perform positive functions, while at the same time either one may impede progress or even cause a backward step to be taken. "Both among conservative organizers and idealistic reformers there are always some who are moved by selfish interests or false conceptions; but equally in both there can always be found a fundamental ethical drive urging them in the direction of the common good." In fact, their roles may actually be reversed, "so that the organizational current expresses itself in mystical terms and the mystical current in organizational terms." (I.L. 247) This is not surprising since the two currents do not represent two logical positions, but are composed of individuals, "both sides expressing what they can of ideal or organizational factors, in order to resist and conquer." (I.L. 248)

The essential fact to remember is that unless both of these currents are efficaciously operative within a society, there cannot be orderly, constructive and lasting progress. It is the organizational current that concretizes the ideals of the social process into the institutional structure of society, consolidates the benefits accrued to the social process, and conserves what has been achieved and constructed in the past. It also functions as a stabilizer for social transformation so that it remains an orderly process and a lasting achievement, deeply rooted in the collective consciousness. "In this sense,

7Ibid.
even so-called 'reactionaries' can fulfill the necessary ethical function of serving as a bit and bridle to a 'changing' world, provided only they do not try to rein back all social progress by putting a soulless, formalistic Pharisaic ethic in the saddle.\(^8\) It is the mystical current that makes the social institutions living and dynamic, taking on the rhythm of progress, renewing the ideal values of society and rendering them fruitful when they cease to be efficacious, orienting the collective consciousness towards reform by arousing it to a lively awareness of the incompleteness, deficiencies and evils of the existing social structure.

Given the differential velocity of the two currents, and the unifying tendency of dual forces, there is constant tension and interference between them. But if there is not an active, fluctuating equilibrium between the two currents, the social process either on the one side falls into stagnation and becomes sterile, or on the other is ripped asunder by the convulsive crises of revolution and war. In their extreme and perverted forms, the organizational current becomes a stultifying reactionary force in society, trying to hold back all social progress, while the mystical current becomes a violent, revolutionary force, seeking not to renew and reform the existing social structure, but to destroy it. Sturzo compares the interference between the two currents to the interplay between the motor and the brake.

There must be a margin for movement unimpeded by the brake. If this margin is harmonic, the movement

\(^8\)Ibid., p. 116.
proceeds regularly, that is, it becomes rational. If it is restricted, at the expense either of the dynamic or of the static side, then we find either immobilized situations, as in regimes of closed castes, or revolutionary or disorderly ones, as in all periods of great upheavals. (I.L. 222; cf. M. 9)

Since every form of duality always tends toward unification, either in the direction of one or the other of the dual factors, depending on which one is able to predominate, the same unifying tendency applies to the polarization between the organizational and mystical currents. At one time the organizational forces will prevail so that the stabilizing forces of the institutional side of the social complexus will mark the rhythm of the social process. At another time it will be the mystical current, pushing ahead for reform and the transformation of the present social structure. It is the variance of these organizational and mystical forces, as the concrete expression of the tendency toward rationality, in the ebb and flow of their reciprocal influence that produces the dynamism of the socio-historical process, making of it a continual and creative process. "It is inevitable that in this rhythm of mutual contact or conflict there should emerge those decisive 'movements' that make for the progress of humanity."9

It is of the utmost significance to note that, for Sturzo, in order for these currents to be effective within the social process, at whatever level of society and in whatever sphere of activity they are operative, they must take up a position "in the realm of organizational reality." (I.L. 248) That is, they must take on an organized form in such a way as to both enter

9Ibid., p. 115.
into and share in the power structure that forms the active foundation of a social complexus and the institutions within it. It is precisely through the autonomous participation in social power by the forces that compose the organizational and mystical currents that a sociological diarchy is formed. By diarchy Sturzo means the more or less stable organization of the dualistic polarization of social forces into two concrete, contending principles of power. All the manifold social forces within a social complexus overcome their chaotically non-progressive state, acquire a continuative stability, and become effacacious factors in social life only by passing through a dualistic polarization to its diarchic concretization. "The emergence of the diarchy may be considered as the consolidation of the dualistic movement. The organized diarchy should stand for order, the duality for its dynamism." (I.L. 252)

What are the conditions that account for the transition from the relatively unorganized duality of social forces to their diarchic systematization? Whatever form the diarchy takes, the important fact to remember in explaining this transition is that the basic polarization of social forces is into the organizational and mystical currents, so that the sociological diarchy is always the organized concretization of these two currents. The two powers forming the diarchy, then, will always manifest themselves as the focal points of the two currents, so that they must be considered, "the one as the guarantor and defender of the status quo, the other as the motive-power of changes." (I.L. 251; 249)

The essence of diarchic power lies in its organico-social
function, so that it must have an autonomous participation in the social power structure. There is no difficulty involved for the organizational current assuming "its position in the realm of organizational reality," and becoming a principle of power in the power structure of society. Of its very nature it is already functioning within the existing social structure, with its forces actually dominating, or even in some instances constituting, the power structure. Therefore, the clue for accounting for the transition form duality to diarchy lies with the mystical current. This transition, then, actually occurs when the mystical current is so penetrated by rationality (or pseudo-rationality) and responds to such needs, spiritually felt, as to form the consciousness of power. Only then is an antagonistic power created, and given a certain structure. Placed face to face with the reality, the new power limits that which already existed and forces it to share with it or to oppose it. The diarchy has been formed. (I.L. 254)

There are several noteworthy factors that must be emphasized in this process. First of all, this transition to a diarchic power by the mystical current does not necessarily mean that it actually becomes an internal part of the power structure, in an authoritative and juridical form. It may legally remain extraneous to the power structure and yet function as an effective diarchic power. For "the reality of power resides less in the form than in the consciousness of possessing it. The diarchy is above all a consciousness of the social duality and of the power which it releases." (I.L. 253) An example of this would be the diarchic power of the Church that continues to function in a totalitarian regime that seeks to become, and is actually conceived of as the absolute, unlimited, absorbing
power of the State. The Church may continue to exist and function only in the consciousness of the faithful without any institutional structure. Yet, as long as the faithful maintain a consciousness of its autonomy and power, it continues to exert an ethico-social limitation on the power of the State.

Also, this process of the dualistic polarization of forces and the formation of a diarchy must not be interpreted as consisting in a linear movement; neither is it contemporaneous in all the branches of social life, nor is its pattern rigorously fixed. It may happen that unification would precede the diarchy or that a diarchy would subsist during the process of disintegration. "There may be periods in which the consciousness of power has not awakened or has not fully found its orientation in the two dualistic terms. There may then be a prolonged lethargy, or else disorderly and convulsive agitations." (I.L. 253; M. 99) The polarization of forces and the formation of a diarchy occurs in that sphere of social life and over that area of concern that sufficiently moves the collective consciousness to act on it. Generally, the dualizing forces arise out of the existing social institutions and struggle within the framework of these institutions, although this is not always the case. New social organizations may take shape by extraneous forces which assume the aspects of a reforming and liberating current. The Reformation and French Revolution provide historical examples of this phenomenon. Once the diarchic powers are formed, they must keep pace with the orientation and needs of the collective consciousness. "Otherwise there will arise a third force
in opposition to them which, creating a new duality, will prepare the advent of another power." (I.L. 251)

The tendency towards unification takes on the character of an irrepressible, powerful drive in the diarchy, because "power by its nature is a unifying force." (C. & S. 560) Each of the two powers tries to unify in itself the other diarchic power. But this attempt is always only partially and temporarily successful. It may give rise to cooperative action on the part of the two powers, or result in a bitter struggle for control. What generally occurs, in either case, whether it is collaboration or conflict, is a gradation of powers. "In these various stages, the unification often comes about in a practical fashion, now through one, now through the other of the two diarchic centers, now in legal form, now in ethical form, now on the political plane, now on the religious or social one." (I.L. 252)

It may happen that a given diarchy collapses, through a variety of reasons. Another one will rise in its place, either directly through another polarizing of forces, or indirectly and in another form when there is such a crisis of power that the entire power structure of a social complexus disintegrates, dissolving into a semi-anarchic pluralistic state of social forces. These in their turn will develop other effective dualities, creating new diarchies with their own unifying tendency. But in whatever way the unifying tendency manifests itself, and whatever its outcome, the diarchy is never completely suppressed. "In history, we find neither the pure suppression of the diarchic antagonist, nor an ironic immobility in cooperation.
On the contrary, what happens is that the victor undergoes a dichotomy, or the vanquished regains strength, or a third current supervenes when the diarchy has collapsed. (I.L. 256)

Even the modern tyrannies of the right or the left fail to achieve a definitive unification of the social powers. Even in the most rigorous and oppressive of such regimes there are interior forces of opposition at work that produce margins of evasion and resistance to the attempted unification of the power structure.

We say that the attempt is made to cancel this polarization because actually it is impossible to do so.... What happens in the totalitarian State cannot be more than a phase of reaction, which will last as long as the outward movements that accompany it withstand internal criticism and the expenditure of the centralizing forces, and as long as the successes which excite the popular imagination have not shown their vanity or a cost in excess of social capacity. The passage from the totalitarian State to normality may come either by an evolution or in a catastrophic manner, but it can never fail, whatever the conditions in which a modern totalitarian State has come into being. (I.L. 189)

Whatever the nature of these forces, whether they are moral and religious, or whether they are intellectual, they diminish the ethical, social and political effects of such regimes, stir up healthy reactions and keep alive a current of opposition that sooner or later will regain a social and political efficacy. The Middle Ages is oftentimes presented as an example of an historical period of social unification, in which Western civilization was unified into the politico-ecclesiastical unity of Christendom. Sturzo points out that in actual fact there was not complete unification on any level of society, whether it be ecclesiastical, political, social, moral, or juridical unity. (M. 101)
Another factor which must be mentioned that is involved in the transition of the social forces from a chaotic pluralistic state to its dualistic polarization and diarchic crystallization is the process of mediation. At each stage of transition there is a mediating element functioning that actually effects the transition. This mediating element is one of the social currents, which may be or become a member of the duality or diarchy. In the process of the diarchic crystallization of a duality, which we described above, it is the mystical current that is the mediator. Once a diarchy is formed, the mediator will usually be that current of protest or renewal arising from within either one of the diarchic powers or outside of them. It will either just stir up the two powers or cause a shift in the balance of power and then lose its efficacy, or replace the one which is absorbed by the other in a power struggle or supplant one of them, or bring about a complete collapse of the diarchy. In all of these possibilities the essential fact to keep in mind, so far as Sturzo's theory is concerned, is that "the mediating element cannot be considered as a third, coexisting factor that will remain such, forming a permanent triad.... It is always a mode of transition from one combination of the prevailing social forces to another." (I.L. 256-7)

This aspect of the mediating element in the social process is extremely important in Sturzo's theory on the diarchy of Church and State. As opposed to Sturzo's theory, some interpret the movement of Western civilization in terms of three focal points of power: State, Church, and People. This interpretation gives the impression that the Church and State are
themselves substantive principles of power, independent of the citizens and faithful that compose them. This, of course, runs directly counter to Sturzo's theory in which the social forms are the outcome and objectivation of the projection of the individual person. The widest dimensions of this projection are covered by the diarchy of Church and State. Therefore, in accord with this basic thesis of Sturzo's social theory, the people cannot be considered as "a third force between State and Church, for we cannot conceive of either State or Church without people, that is, of a State without subjects and a Church without faithful. Nor can the people act, as such, without either resting on a social structure or creating a fresh one." (I.L. 257)

It is in his historical and sociological research on the relations between Church and State that Sturzo derives much of the concrete historical and experimental data in the formulation of his theory of diarchy. At the same time it is in this area that he makes the most thorough and significant application of his theory, as the one most in keeping with the reality of the socio-historical process. The State and Church, ever since the appearance of Christianity, constitute a permanent diarchy in the socio-historical process. For the Church is the positive actuation of Christianity and the entry of Christianity into the socio-historical process released within this process a fundamental and indissoluble duality of forces. It brought into "the social-organic plane the dualism between the kingdom of this world and the Kingdom of God, which is not of this world yet is in the world; for the Church is a social organism,
standing by itself, speaking in the name of God and as the visible embodiment of Christianity through the ages." (T.L. 246)

Underlying the experience of Western civilization lies the admonition: "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's." By the very fact of its existence as a religion which is based on personal consciousness and which becomes concretized as an autonomous and independent social form, the Church, Christianity limits the power of the State and in turn has its own social power limited by the State. Whatever form the relations between Church and State take on the juridico-political plane, and whether society tends to be unified now in the Church, as in the Middle Ages, now in the State, as in modern times, this mutual limitation of powers persists. For the Church-State diarchy has roots extending to a level deeper than that of politico-legal bonds: the individual consciousness which projects itself simultaneously into the Church and State and is the substantive principle of both. "It is not a case of political and juridical relations between two entities, nor of an interference of content between the religious and political forms of sociality, but of the formation of an individual consciousness which expresses itself simultaneously in both Church and State, in accordance with the ends of the two organizations." (I.L. 260)

Therefore, even in those states where the Church has no juridical personality and has lost all organizational autonomy, or where there is a complete separation between Church and State, the diarchic power of the Church remains operative in that State through the individual consciousness. As long as
the faithful retain a consciousness of the autonomy and power of the Church, this consciousness effects an ethico-social limitation on the power of the State. Even if the Church retains only her spiritual means of exerting her influence within a given State, nevertheless, the moral efficacy of her diarchic power remains intact. "And no one can doubt that such efficacy has social and political effects." (C. & S. 548)

It consists in the individual diarchy which prevails, in the persuasive power of consciences which carries weight in the efficacy of the Christian citizen who succeeds in bending the power of the State, or else in opposing it in the name of Christian morality, that is, in the name of an ethical principle that touches collective life and which cannot be other than inward and conducive to a State with a Christian civilization. (C. & S. 551)

The more active and effective this consciousness is, the more efficacious is the diarchy. Sturzo calls this type of diarchic position of the Church "individualist" or "indirect" because the diarchic power of the Church is expressed as a moral and religious power over its members as individuals, and not in an authoritative and juridical form over the states. (C. & S. 547; T.L. 262; I.L. 267)

There is between the diarchic powers of State and Church a continuous and irreducible tension which is now latent, now open, breaking out into violent conflict. The significance of this tension extends beyond the power structure of society, because it reflects a fundamental tension within the individual person, of whom the State and Church are dual projections. The conflict between State and Church signifies not merely a struggle between diarchic powers, but rather it more basically points to a permanent and irreducible opposition between two
principles, the material and spiritual, "the immanent and the transcendent, the naturalistic and the supernatural, with their mutual influence and mutual strife, not formal but substantial, taking place within our very consciousness." (C. & S. 556; cf. P.P.I., Vol. I, 107; I.L. 262) These two principles reflect the presence of Christianity in the socio-historical process and, as projected into the State and Church, they generate a permanent duality of forces in this process.

Every duality tends towards unification and the same law applies to the duality released by Christianity in the dialectic of history. But Christianity contains within itself a unifying principle that is able to effect a unity that extends beyond the limits of every social and political unification in a personal and transcendental unity.

The very expression of the socio-historical process in these laws, rooted in and expressive of the tendency towards absolute rationality, reveals that the social process is not a dialectic closed in on itself, exhausting its dynamism within itself in a kind of cycle of blind forces without interior finality. (M. 14) Rather, the socio-historical process reveals the urge of individuals to transcend this very process in a personal and transcendental unity. But at the same time they reveal the fact that without the introjection of a transcendental unifying principle within these processes, not only would the finalism of these processes never be fulfilled, but there would be no intrinsic meaning to the processes themselves in their very actualization. These laws point to the fact that the processes of themselves do not have the means immanent to them to ever
attain the ultimate fulfillment of their drive. There would be the "continuous immanent repetition of human activity without resolution." (T.L. 231) But the fact is that these human processes have been Christianized and, touched by the transforming power of Christianity, they now contain within themselves the power to transcend themselves and attain ultimate completion.

This transcendent element must be accounted for within Sturzo's theory of socio-personalism. In fact, it can be said that Sturzo's theory is an articulation of the plentitude of personal existence, and it is this transcendent element that makes manifest this plentitude.
CHAPTER IV

HISTORY: A DIALECTIC OF IMMANENCE—TRANSCENDENCE

Just as it is history, as the constitutive activity of man that manifests the inner laws of man's associative nature—laws which reveal that man in and of himself cannot effect a totalizing and conclusive pacification of the tendencies that give rise to the laws—so is it history and history alone that reveals the presence of a personal, transcendent, unifying principle within the historical process. Therefore, not only is Sturzo's theory of history the foundation of all his thought, but it is also the culminating point of his thought wherein he works out and brings together the implications of his integral social theory in all of its aspects.

It is in the long introduction to his major work, The Inner Laws of Society, that Sturzo initially describes the historicist system that is the matrix of his social theory. In his presentation, he makes it clear that his aim is to base his theory on an open-ended historicism that is able to account for both transcendent and immanent factors within the historical process, to preserve their intrinsic unity within a single process, and yet uphold the substantive reality of each. In this way he sharply distinguishes his historicist system from both an immanentistic theory which a priori rejects the possibility of any transcendent factor in history and any transcendental theory
which either undercuts the reality of the immanent factors or subordinates them to transcendent factors, or else dismisses the notion of historicism altogether as being immanentistic by definition.¹ Sturzo's theory, which he does not hesitate to term "historicism," is, by contrast, immanent-transcendent. He defines his historicism as "the systematic conception of history as human process, realized by immanent forces, unified in rationality, yet moving from a transcendental and absolute principle towards a transcendental and absolute end." (I.L. xxx)

The first task in elucidating the full meaning of this definition, its place and implications within Sturzo's overall theory, and the consequences that follow from it, is to determine the meaning of history within Sturzo's system. Sturzo begins his own exposition with a clarification of the different meanings that can be attached to the term "history" by delineating its various meanings which refer to the basic idea of human process. These are:

1) history as the sequence of events;
2) history as the rational systematization of remembered events;
3) history as the recollection of the collective past of a particular human group. (I.L. xxvi)

The second meaning is the basic denotation of the term from which the first and third are derived. Therefore, it is more precise to use the adjective "historical" when referring to the first and third meanings, signifying in the first case, an

historical process, and in the third, historical consciousness.

This provides a clue as to how the three meanings are unified. In distinguishing these denotations of the term "history," Sturzo does not mislead one into thinking that the factors they refer to are, just because they are separable, in reality separated. They are in fact inseparably united. This is an extremely important point and calls for a careful analysis because the three meanings are in fact expressive of the dimensions of the synthesizing process of rational consciousness and so become concretely unified "in thought, which is the rationality of action; in action, which is the realization of thought, and in consciousness, taken as the presence of rationality and activity to themselves." (I.L. xxix) As we have seen, this process and its unity is absolutely fundamental to Sturzo's theory and an analysis of his treatment of it from the perspective of history will reveal both another facet of it and the convergence of his insights into a coherent theory.

Of the three meanings of history it is in the second meaning that they are unified. The first, the process of events, is the material element of history and actually becomes history only as it undergoes a rational systematization. The key word in this first meaning of history as "the course of events" is "events." Sturzo is using this term with the same pregnant significance that John Dewey does in Experience and Nature. Notice also that Sturzo says "the course" and not simply "a course" of events. Human happenings are history not simply because they are external occurrences but because they are occurrences-animated-by-thought, that is, events. History is
not made up of a blind flow of happenings but rather consists in a clear-sighted and ordered flow of rational acts, or events—clear-sighted and ordered to the extent that the acts are rational; acts that are the incarnation of ideas and ideals.

"No historical fact is a purely external matter; facts have for their soul that element of rationality which men, acting and reacting in the external world that surrounds them, have put into the facts as a reflection of that consciousness which their actions have actualized."² "Every material datum of history resolves itself into a complex of thoughts, sentiments and purposes...."³ For the processive and living reality of human activity, which, once accomplished, becomes the material element of history, to maintain the impact of its concretized rationality and not to petrify as a fossilized residue of the past, it "must undergo a spiritual elaboration through the convergent and divergent thought and feeling of a group of persons, and penetrate not only into their memory but into their convictions and sentiments." (I.L. xxvii-xxviii) It is only in this transformation effected through consciousness that past events, as reconstructed by consciousness and thereby revitalized, live on in the present. In other words, they are historicized to the extent that they enter into and constitute the on-going awareness of a given historical consciousness.


³Sturzo, "History and Philosophy," p. 60.
In this way, then, the first meaning of history as "the course of events" is intrinsically connected with the third meaning of history as the consciousness of the past as well as being a derivative of the second and essential meaning. The third meaning that Sturzo gives for history flows from the second as expressive not only of the recalling and reconstruction of events but also of their inner and continued efficacy among determined groups in building the present and directing the future. The significance of this understanding of historical consciousness will become clearer with an explication of the fundamental meaning of history. We can see, then, the intertwining connection between the three meanings, rooted in the basic denotation, the rational systematization of remembered events. An amplification and explanation of what Sturzo means by this will reveal a further unification of these meanings and draw us into the core of his historicism.

At first sight, in view of Sturzo's stress on the historicity of human reality, it would seem logical that the first meaning of history as simply the historical process would be the basic meaning of history for Sturzo, because the historical process is for him that through and by which man defines his own being. Thus, reduced to its simplest significance, history is nothing other than simply man's coming to be. It is expressive of the total, processive, multidimensional reality of human existence. As Sturzo reiterates throughout his writings, "history is not extraneous to our life...it is our life."  

Robert Pollock, in analyzing Sturzo's theory, remarks that
history is "a manifestation, always in becoming, of an interior
reality, that of man himself." In pointing to "an interior
reality" Pollock indicates precisely why the historical pro-
cess itself is not the primary designation of the term "history"
for Sturzo. Sturzo himself states, "history is not to be con-
founded with human process, but brings its experiences into a
rational system." (I.L. xxix) It is the interior dimension of
man's being that is the locus for his most significant and
specifying feature, rationality. As a rational being man is
distinguished from non-rational creatures not only in terms of
his relationship with the rest of reality, but also and more
specifically in his relationship to himself. Not only is his
surrounding reality present to him, but he himself stands in
his own presence. The locus for man's own being stands at the
interface of this twofold directionality of his rational con-
sciousness, projecting outward and turning inward, in its drive
for realization and completion. As we saw earlier in develop-
ing Sturzo's notion of the person, it is this thrust of the
individualized rationality toward the plenitude of its being in
absolute rationality that defines man's coming to be. Also,
since this act which is man's being never exhausts the power
that generates it, it never is, but ceaselessly becomes. It
is this incommensurability of the human spirit with itself, in
seeking itself, that is the generative principle of history as
process. Since history is expressive of the coming-to-be of

man's interior reality, his rational consciousness, the fact that this interior reality is rational means that the full significance of the term "history" does not lie in just designating the actual becoming of individualized rationality, but also must include the presence of rational consciousness to its own becoming.

By his reason, man is aware of outward reality and inward consciousness, both of which are formed out of the accumulation of a past that has realized itself in them. The connection between these two aspects of being, outward reality and inward consciousness, is so close that the more we know of reality which reveals itself as the persistence of the past in the present, the more we deepen our own inner being, which is, as it were, rooted in a past living within us and yet mysteriously remote. (S.P. 10)

It is the orientation of his theory around the key concept of rationality that underlies Sturzo's insistence that it is not the simple flow of the human process that constitutes history, but rather the rational systematization of that process. The individual concrete rationality that is the constitutive principle of man does not, in realizing itself, produce simply a series of external facts, it produces itself. And as spirit, the measure of its own reality is precisely the extent to which it is present to itself. Therefore, in its most profound significance, history is man's presence to himself. In this understanding of history, then, the extent to which man is ignorant of the past, to that extent is man absent from himself. And he will be absent from himself not only in the existential concreteness of his present existence, but also in the ideality of his nature. "Actually, we should never be able to understand our own reality if we could not relate it to the spiritual greatness which mankind has achieved in the course of history." (T.L.
Two significant themes in Sturzo's position are indicated in this passage. One is that although history ultimately resolves itself into the individual person as the sole substantive principle of history, the making of history is the doing of collective consciousness. The other theme is the contemporaneity of the three moments of the temporal process, past, present, and future in a multidimensional present.

The self-awareness that history gives rise to is not that of the isolated individual self, but of the self in the fullness of all its dimensions, or, in other words, of the person. Thus, it is not the truncated awareness characteristic of egocentricity, which is a denial of the self in its personhood, but rather is the open-ended awareness of the social self, which is the enrichment and enlargement of the self in its personhood. It is this expansion of the self into solidarity with the collectivity that history in the fullness of its meaning gives us. It must not be forgotten that this expansion of the self into the collectivity is not a merging of the self with the collectivity, but the further deepening and enrichment of each in the differentiation-in-synthesis dialectic at work between them.

In substance, history is consciousness of our own being and of our own continuity—a continuity not merely individual but collective, so that we feel ourselves parts of a whole, living elements in a life surpassing the individual, common sharers in something that will continue when we are no more...We feel that the more our knowledge widens and our feelings deepen, the greater the enrichment of our being with what was not ours and has become ours. Consciousness of our own being transforms itself into consciousness of human solidarity and of spiritual communion. This forms in us a present that may repeat itself indefinitely in our spirit, in a striving toward a continuity that will have no end. (S.P. 4-5)
It may initially appear inconsistent for Sturzo to insist on the individual person as the animating principle of history and at the same time equally insist on it being a fact of collective consciousness. But in view of his theory of socio-personalism it is not. In the intrinsic, reciprocating interdependence between the individual person and society that is constitutive of each and both together, just as the individual begins to exist in his personhood in the transcending of himself, so that his very individuality as a person is intrinsically social, so it is in this "moment of sociality" that history begins. "For ours is not an isolated, narrowly individual life, but an associated life, that is, a life by nature sociological. Our individual continuity is intrinsically social." (S.P. 3)

Since the ontological structure of the individual person incorporates sociality within itself, historical reality, as the processive realization of that structure, is itself intrinsically social. Consequently, the historicization of the material elements of history, human events, is a process engaging collective consciousness. Sturzo's statement on this social character of historicization deserves to be quoted in full.

The historical datum, even if expressed by a single individual, in order to be historical must find its repercussions in an ever-widening circle of individuals and assume a collective character. The historical datum becomes a social element, inasmuch as either actually or as symbol or attribution it represents that human experience and activity which once posited, continues to be experienced and reexperienced by a group in its further process. Every happening is in itself capable of being historicized, but such historicization is the doing of the collective consciousness. The historicization of a happening will

last the longer, the deeper the repercussion of the fact in the collective consciousness and the wider the circle of those who feel its effects. (I.L. xxviii)

The theoretical basis for Sturzo's position expressed in this passage lies in his theory on the projection of rationality as the constitutive activity of the person. The individualized principle of rationality, which is the essential principle of man, achieves reality only by being incarnated within the world through the mutuality of thought and action. The modes of this fundamental drive of rationality for expression are variable and innumerable, but they all together make up the process we call history. But precisely because of the intrinsic historicity of rationality as individualized within man, rationality as realized within the expressions of man remains immanent within these expressions only if they are incorporated within the on-going realization of rationality. (I.L. 15)

To be historicized means to be caught up in the continuing and processive becoming of rationality so as to become a part of the present experience of man. It is consciousness, and more specifically, collective consciousness that connects the past to the present. It is well to recall here that collective consciousness for Sturzo does not indicate a reified entity substantively independent of those individual consciousnesses that go together to make it up. Rather, it is the consciousness of each member of a given group which is reflected in the consciousness of others in a mutual process of determining and realizing a common end. (M. 19) Historical consciousness, then,

7See Chapter I, pp. 61 ff.
is of its very nature collective consciousness and vice versa. Here, in the integral realism of Sturzo's theory, we find a dovetailing of perspectives. Both historical and collective consciousness are rooted in and expressive of the projection of rationality, with the first giving emphasis to the intrinsic temporality of the projection and the second denoting its intrinsic social character.

It is significant to note that the specific element in the trend to rationality that actually gives rise to both an historical and collective consciousness together is the emergence on the social level of a collective finalism that unifies the convergent activity of associated efforts "in a higher affirmation of collective life."

The history, written or oral, which we know as such is made up of events that concern not this or that family or economic craft or trade group or class or tribe, as groups living their own particular life, but that part of the population, however it may be grouped or organized, which has gained consciousness of its personality over and above domestic and economic contingencies, in a higher affirmation of collective life. It is the transcendent and unifying personality that history alone reveals to us. What has been already noted as collective purpose, as spirit of achievement, as welfare to be won, is here presented from another angle, as the transcendence of the social nuclei through the development of the collective consciousness. When this transcendence begins, history begins....(T.L. 205)

The importance of this lies in the implications that follow from it in Sturzo's historicism. With his view of history as the processive emergence of rationality it is natural that finality should weigh heavily in his theory. What is noteworthy is the way in which he handles this finality. As will be further explicated, it is an open-ended finality that leaves the directionality, possibilities and scope for the future completely
In terms of the concreteness of Sturzo's thought it should be noted that it is more precise to speak of open-ended finalities rather than finality in the singular, because Sturzo does not allow for a single finality in the concrete that would encompass all of mankind. A single concrete finality would give rise to a universal history of mankind, which Sturzo rejects. "There is no true universal history; but only particular histories of different social groups. What are called universal histories are nothing more than collections of particular histories, combined together from a given angle, which can never unify them....Every history indicates the consciousness of a group in the concrete." (I.L. 21) Sturzo's rejection of the universal history relates to his denial of the possibility of a universal society, which we dealt with earlier. A single finality would undercut the open-ended possibilities of history and defuse the dynamism of the historical process which is charged by the myriad diversities of these possibilities.

This view of finality and its implications gives to Sturzo's theory a definite futuristic orientation. It also allows for both the genuine emergence of completely new forms of human expression in the present and the inexhaustibility of the past which makes for an open, never ending systematization of the past. However, these features of Sturzo's theory are dependent upon his understanding of the contemporaneity of the past, present and future.

The contemporaneity of the temporal moments of history is

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8 See Chapter II, p. 134.
implicit in the description of history as the rational systematization of remembered events. The clue to these implications is contained in two further statements Sturzo makes about history in discussing the convertibility of history and philosophy. "History is the rationality of existing reality, systematized according to the general laws of human thought and action."

Or again, history is human activity "systematizing reality in accordance with ideas." (I.L. xxix) These statements are significant because they clearly indicate two important features of history that point to the synthesis of the moments of time.

The first of these features is that the doing of history is not an academic and theoretical enterprise, but is rather a practical and concrete endeavor that has to do with life itself, the systematizing, ordering, or, in other words, the giving of shape to reality. When Sturzo speaks of "systematizing" reality he is not referring to the formulation of a theoretical system about reality, but the actual "making" of reality, the rationalizing or "historicizing" of it. The term "systematization," as Sturzo uses it here, must be interpreted in light of one of the basic meanings he gives to rationality: thought itself inasmuch as it is systematic. (I.L. xxxvii) This is indicated in the above quotations by the fact that Sturzo first states, "history is the rationality of existing reality,..." and then, a few lines later, saying it is human activity "systematizing reality...." In other words, Sturzo's use of the term "systematization" does not refer to any purely theoretical process of "system" building in the classical meaning of the term. Rather, he is using it in reference to the essential
character of thought as rational, that is, as ordered. To know something is to systematize it. To systematize something is
to make it rational, that is, to order or structure it by bring-
ing it within the light, or structure, of rationality. In this
way man "makes it his own" and it, in turn, is "historicized."
"The non-human, when it is made human, is 'historized'; it
becomes history. The discovery of electricity by the effort of
human science transported that natural force into the common
life of man. Electricity entered the stream of history; that
is, it became all that man has been able to make of it. And
thus with all discoveries." (S.P. 8)

The second aspect of history, which follows from the first
and is also indicated by these statements is that the "Archime-
dian" or reference point for this systematization is the concrete
present and not the past. In the light of these quotations,
then, we see not only that the doing of history, i.e., "the
rational systematization," is a present activity, but also that
the subject matter of history, i.e. "remembered events," is
not the past as past, but the past as present. For Sturzo
directly relates history to "the rationality of existing reality"
which "reveals itself as the persistence of the past in the
present." (S.P. 10) Sturzo exhibits the same perspective on
reality, and history, in his statement that "there is no living
reality which is not at once concreteness and process, that is,
history." (I.L. xi) Now, the "concreteness and process" of liv-
ing reality, referred to in the second quotation carries the
same meaning as "the persistence of the past in the present."
Viewing the moments of time in terms of their reality, it is the
present alone that exists. And it is the continuation of the past into the present, i.e. "process," that gives to the present its structure, form or content, or to use Sturzo's term, its "concreteness."

Every moment of the process is reality inasmuch as it is present. The past is merely the accumulation of human experiences which give value to the present. The present is therefore, the existence or coexistence of beings; the past is the process which has brought them to existence in the concreteness of their reality. (I.L. xxv)

In order for the past to enter into and constitute the concreteness of the present it must be ordered to the present. That is, the past is history and can only be history to the extent that it participates in the concerns, needs and issues of the present. To the degree, then, that the past resolves itself into the present, to that degree it is historicized and continues to exist. "What went before resolves itself into what comes after, the present always being enriched by the past. Hence, the past may be said to exist after its fashion in the present, forming one with it in a kind of simultaneity." (S.P. 6)

The presentness of the past as history is indicated by Sturzo when he refers to the subject matter of history as "those events that are known," (I.L. xxvi) because he states elsewhere that "the past is, and is known, in so far as it is actualized and conceived in the present." (S.P. 10) In interpreting Sturzo, I prefer to use the term "remembered" rather than simply "known" to more clearly indicate the acknowledged pastness of the event and yet its connection to the present. It brings out more explicitly the synthesis of the past with the present in history.
A "remembered" event is one which, although having occurred in the past, remains tied to the present, whereby it is released from the mere facticity of its pastness to share in the life of the present. This connection can be maintained in any number of ways, either directly through traditions, written or oral records, individual or collective memory, or indirectly through related evidence that points to a given event as having occurred. In any case, it is the presentness of the event that is important and that constitutes its historicity, not the particular way this presentness is maintained.

Sturzo sums up these ideas by stating that history involves "two things in synthesis: the reality of the past in the present, and actual, present memory of the past." (S.P. 4) The historicity of its pastness as having occurred and the reality of that pastness in the present. It must be emphasized that Sturzo views these two elements "in synthesis" so that from the perspective of his integral realism the categories of object, i.e. "the reality of the past in the present," and subject, i.e. "the actual, present memory of the past" are not adequate to the synthesizing unity of this situation. The synthesizing factor in history, or more precisely, the historicizing factor that renders the continuity of the temporal process always present, is the inward synthesis of consciousness. In fact, it is consciousness that constitutes the present. "The present then is nothing other than consciousness itself. Without this there could be no present and no history, only the materiality of crude facts that in themselves are neither consciousness nor history." (S.P. 9)
It is here, from the point of view of the present as consciousness, that the theoretical basis and full force of the contemporaneity of the past, present and future come out. We have already seen that time is the rhythm of the inner movement of consciousness, as "the presence of rationality and activity to themselves," toward realization and concretization. Within the inward synthesis of consciousness, the moments that mark this rhythm are not separate and autonomous, but intrinsically imply each other in a specific order. It is precisely in the contemporaneity of these moments that consciousness generates its own presence to itself, which constitutes its reality as spirit. "Insofar as men live simultaneously these three moments of their existence, in unceasing process, insofar have they consciousness of their own reality." (I.L. xxvi) It is the living synthesis of the present, as consciousness, that the bond between these moments is forged. "Only the present exists, that in which the consciousness of each may feel the throb of the life accumulated through the ages and may divine the throb that will continue in the future. There is nothing else, as living consciousness, than the temporal present." (T.L. 224)

The actual movement of rationality toward realization constitutes the historical present that distinguishes the human process from the process of nature on the one hand, and from the eternal "now" of infinite consciousness on the other hand. The process of nature is simply a uniform sequence of natural occurrences made up of a series of neutral "now's." Although each

9See Chapter I, pp. 100-101.
neutral "now" may be distinguished from its "before" and "after," each is qualitatively indifferent to its "before" and "after." It opens out to neither one in its presentness. (I.L. xxvi)

The eternal "now" of infinite consciousness is one of pure actuality, a total and simultaneous present, embracing within itself the absolute immediacy of its complete presence to itself. (S.P. 6) The historical present arising out of the successive and always partial realization of rational consciousness is multidimensional, taking up within itself both its past as its constitutive and sustaining element and the future as its inherent drive for further realization. We must examine more carefully the synthesis of these moments within consciousness in the constitutive activity of the person.

History, in Sturzo's view, is the actual becoming of the constitutive principle of the human person, his rational consciousness. It is the concrete, processive occurrence of the projection of rationality in the mutuality of thought and action. As the immanent principle of history, rationality is not in any way extraneous to the historical process, but is the process itself in both the multiplicity of forms it gives rise to and the full range of its movement. Since the reality of rational consciousness as spirit and subject is commensurate with its presence to itself, it is precisely in rendering present to itself its own becoming that it attains the fulness of its reality. Thus, the reality of rationality will be commensurate with the totality of its becoming in the synthesis of its past and present, and future too, because, as we have already seen, the self-generative dynamism of rationality for realization, in its
opening out onto the infinite, is never commensurate with the concrete forms in which it expresses and, in expressing, realizes itself. Its present actuality, then, contains within itself its future as the efficacious beginning of further realization.

And the future world? And the after life? For human thought and activity these two constitute a present. The significance of the future for a man depends on just how far he feels the effective reality of that future within himself, that is, on how far he believes and feels his existence to be projected into the future....The future therefore finds realization in the present as effective beginning. Otherwise it would not exist for man; it exists only in so far as it is transformed into thought and activity, that is, in so far as it becomes for us a present. Only then can we achieve it. The man without faith in himself, the man who does not think, has no future; for the future is in ourselves. (S.P. 10-11; cf. also T.L. 215, I.L. xxv)

What the multidimensional present of human consciousness is expressive of is the dialectical tension between the negative and positive moments of the process of rationality. This tension is ontologically grounded in the finitude of rational consciousness and it is this finitude that gives rise to the factors in the becoming of rationality that makes the past a necessary, integral dimension of its present. These factors are the processive, transitive and material features of human activity through which rationality is realized. The negative aspect of these factors is related to the fact that rationality is entirely immanent to its own becoming; and these features of human activity are disruptive of that immanence, because each cuts across that immediacy of presence through which that...

10See Chapter I, pp. 97-100.
Immanence is preserved.

Since rationality can realize itself only through a succession of acts, a continuity must be maintained in such a way that its accumulated achievement in which it is expressed will be resolved into, thereby constituting and enriching, what comes after. Due to the fact that rationality is incarnated within a body to form a single personal principle, it can therefore realize itself only in dialectic with material reality, within which it is concretized. Given the transitive character of the activity that is necessary to transform material reality into the embodiment of rationality and the material character of this objectification, the immanence of rationality is precariously relational and transitory. The material features of embodied rationality can maintain their existence independently of the activity that produced them. But not its spiritual, or rational, dimension. If these products of human activity are to remain expressive of the spirit that produced them, their lifeline to that spirit must remain intact. In other words, concretized rationality must be continually reexperienced so as to maintain its continuous existence and development.

The orientation of rationality in maintaining this contact with its becoming is not towards the past as given, but the present.

To attain this spiritual continuity we ourselves need to be initiated into a sure grasp of the present in which we live and in which the whole of the historical past is reconcentrated and exists as its fruit..., so that we can ask of the present the title-deeds of its reality, the meaning of its existence, and bid it unveil to us its mysterious face. The answer, if it is entire, cannot but illuminate the whole of history....(T.L. 229)
Historical consciousness, then, is not so much directed toward the systematizing of the past, as it is toward the synthesizing of the present with the past and future.

The act of penetrating into the past by which the encrustations of age are scraped off the achievements of rationality to restore and renew the light of rationality within them is not one of simple recall or reproduction. It is a constructive act, bringing about a deeper and more complex realization of rationality. There are two reasons for this: first, because the original impulse of rationality is not immediately given in its objectification; and second, because the reference point of this recovery of the past is the present, namely, the reality that forms the present actualization of rationality. Therefore, although the form of rationality already objectified may appear fixed and static, the light of rationality refracted from the present rather than the past will reveal another facet of its content. This will at the same time deepen the present content of rationality as the well-springs of its own vitality are tapped.

Such contact with the past is not a repetition or a copying; it is a rebirth, a creation of the spirit reintegrating what others produced under different circumstances—a rebirth which at a given historical moment responds to the need of the collective consciousness. (T.L. 208)

This passage points to the problem of what makes the past present. To state the problem more fully; In the process of reconstructing the past, through which man makes his own being present to himself, historical consciousness clearly does not integrate into the present every event and fact of the past. On the part of past events and facts, what is there that some
are historicized, that is, live on in the present, while others fall into oblivion, either temporarily or possibly permanently? On the part of historical consciousness, what criterion is at work to distinguish between them? The problem under consideration here is not how a past event or fact is historicized--this occurs through collective consciousness--but why one and not another. What makes one fact historically relevant and another not? Clearly, for Sturzo, whatever enters into the matrix of the concrete living present, or consciousness, is historicized. "Inasmuch as it is historicized, it is felt in the historical consciousness of the time." (I.L. xxviii) But just as clearly, there is for him no effective practical criterion operative at the level of reflective consciousness to determine in any given moment exactly what of the past is truly historicized, or creatively synthesized with the present, and what remains a residue of the past and possibly an obstacle to the possibilities of the present. What facts are not directly or explicitly operative within consciousness, whether individual or collective, at a given stage in history, does not exclude the possibility of their having "practical effects in the formation of the concrete and processive reality, for in human consciousness everything has its repercussions as language, custom, tradition, institutions, religion, art and so on, in continual becoming." (I.L. xxviii) The basis for Sturzo's position here is the intrinsic socialization of consciousness in its origins and the on-going dialectic between consciousness and every form of its objectifications whereby from these latter, the products of consciousness,
there is in turn a feedback into the continual structuralization of consciousness. Or as Sturzo puts it, they "often form strata in the consciousness of associated members." (I.L. 4)

In other words, these "strata" are located within the prerelative level of consciousness, which in turn arises out of and is grounded in the infrastructures of a given collective consciousness. Sturzo therefore draws the following conclusion:

It is difficult to take a true inventory of what lives and what dies, so closely is all that forms the present knit with a long historical continuity. If we go back and back into the furthest-known centuries, we find indelible traces of the reality living and throbbing today. It is our way of understanding the past of our brief personal experience that we think the greater part of it is dead. We forget much, or think we have forgotten, because much of our past is no longer actual to our memory. And yet that past is so transformed into our present, so actual and so intimately belonging to us, that it cannot be distinguished from what we are today. (S.P. 2-3)

What historical consciousness does become aware of in its reconstruction of the past will depend on its practical needs, interests, and emotional and cognitive orientations of the present. (I.L. 4; S.P. 3)

The other side of this question of the rebirth of the past in the present is that status of what is not in accord with the present state and needs of consciousness. This issue revolves around the fact that the crystallizations of rationality, once formed through human activity, acquire a reality of their own distinct from the original impulse of rationality that gave shape to them. They thus tend to persist within the flow of history whether they remain expressive of rationality in its historically advanced forms or not. In view of this fact, there are two possible theoretical paradigmatic situations
which cover the relationship of these persisting residues to a collective consciousness. There is, first of all, the situation in which a collective consciousness in no sense remains in vital contact with these residues and so either implicitly, on the operative level, or explicitly, on the reflective level, acknowledges that they are no longer consonant with its present impulse and form of rationality. Then there is the situation in which, of the differing currents of thought within any given collective consciousness, some are directed toward maintaining or reasserting these persisting residues, even though, or more accurately, because the present direction of collective consciousness is moving "away from" or, from the perspective of other currents, "beyond" the values of rationality contained in these residues. This is a general situation within any active, complex collective consciousness and is another aspect of Sturzo's theory of the polarization of social forces into a duality of organizational and mystical currents. In regard to this matter of historical residues, it can often be a polarizing issue between the two currents, generating a tension that will vary in intensity according to the value assigned to the residue and the organized vigor of the two currents.

In both instances it must not be thought that the residues themselves, in whatever form they are, are inert and passively slip into oblivion. No, even when detached from the lifeline of rationality, they remain active as conditioning factors, determining the course and mode of the further realization of

rationality. As with all conditioning factors of human activity, the historical conditioning of these residues can function as either impulse or check to either facilitate or hinder, spur-on or retard the continuing process of rationality. In either case, by reason of his fundamental view that the historical process is the becoming of rationality and therefore intrinsically free, Sturzo emphasizes that the conditioning is never deterministic. These residues fall within the setting of all conditioning, which is necessary for all human activity. They do not lessen the autonomy of man, who, as the individualized principle of rationality, is the principle of history and always remains a self-determining force.

Historians often call such antecedents causes, but they are not true causes at all. There are no determinist causes of our action outside ourselves; we are the cause of our own activity. Every physical or moral reality in existence and the mode of our apprehension of it, conditions our activity, helping or hindering it....Man alone, therefore, with his mind and will, is the true author of the historical process. (S.P. 8-9)13

This whole discussion of those forms of the past that are revitalized in the present, as opposed to the residue which is not, points to the ambiguous and complex character of the past-present relationship. If at a given moment in history a higher form of rationality is attained, in this enlightened state of collective consciousness aspects of the past which were formerly held to be rational will now manifest themselves as the pseudo-rational. Also, since the realization of rationality is often partial and marked by deficiencies, even those historical forms

12 See Chapter I, pp. 65-68.

13 To see what a recurring theme this is in Sturzo's writings, cf. also I.L. xix, 89-90, 220; C. & P. 18; T.L. 198-99; M. 63.
that embody a genuine spark of rationality will in many instances have to be purified of these blemishes, or, more simply, "updated" in their historicization. It is thus neither possible nor desirable to resolve the entire past into the present. Not only if there has been a genuine growth of rationality, but also to nourish it, the extirpation of the unauthentic expressions of rationality, or aspects thereof, is as equally important in the reconstruction of the past as the reintegration of its authentic expressions. Since both kinds of expressions have followed together from the drive of rationality to realize itself, the task of exorcising part of its own becoming is very seldom easily accomplished by collective consciousness and is one calling for an effective and highly critical acumen at work within it. Thus, Sturzo's position on the relationship of the present, or consciousness, to the past is neither revolutionary, insofar as this is not sufficiently discriminating in its eradication of the past, nor progressive, since the movement of history is never linear, but reflectively critical.

Before concluding our treatment of the relationship between the past and present in Sturzo's theory of history, it is important to point out another aspect of it that follows from what has already been explicated about it. This is the unconditional openness of the past which makes the systematization of it open-ended. Many contemporary thinkers are insistent on the unconditional openness of the future, being careful in the development of their theories to preserve this openness and categorically rejecting anything that may endanger it. Sturzo's
theory allows for the same view of the future, but he views the past in the same way.

This is a corollary of the contemporaneity of the historical moments, and for several reasons. In the first place, it follows from the fact that in their contemporaneity the past, present and future remain irreducible historical moments. We have seen that their contemporaneity consists in the fact that it is actual and processive consciousness that constitutes the present, so that the inner synthesis of its actuality, the present, takes up the past and future as the irreducible, positive dimensions of that actuality. Since the past and future are irreducible dimensions for Sturzo, this means that in positing their contemporaneity he does not mean they are absorbed into the present. Although they do exist only in the present, they retain their own integrity which is in no sense restricted to or exhausted in their actuality within the present. Therefore, when Sturzo states that "past and future do not exist in themselves, but in the present," (I.L. xxv) he does not mean they exist as the present. They exist as the past and as the future. It is precisely this "real" or specifying differentiation of the past and future within the present actuality of consciousness that distinguishes the consciousness of finite temporal being from that of infinite being. The absorption of the past and future into the present constitutes the "total and simultaneous present, pure actuality" of infinite consciousness. (S.P. 6)

In regard to the relationship of the past to the present, a similar situation holds as that between social facts and values and the individual person. In the latter instance we have seen
that Sturzo explains the intrinsic dialecticity between society and the person in terms of "a continuous succession of resolutions," setting up a reciprocating vital process in which the reality of each is constituted together.\(^{14}\) It should be observed that Sturzo uses the same term, "resolve," in describing the actuality of the past in the present. "The past resolves itself into the present, and becomes present to us through that of which we are conscious." (T.L. 215) "What went before resolves itself into what comes after, the present always being enriched by the past." (S.P. 6) In using this term he is indicating that the past, though actualized in the present, is not dissolved into the present—just as society is not dissolved into individual consciousness—but retains its specifying quality as the past. And just as there are always remainders in the process of sociological resolution, so in the historicization of the past only a portion of the past is revitalized in any given present, "and this never accurately and never completely, so that critical revision is continuous and necessary." (I.L. xxvii) As already indicated, this reconstruction varies according to the present needs, interests and orientations of consciousness. Since these are always undergoing modification and revision, so, too, does the interpretation and systematization of the past. "Thus, history is always being made and re-made, its material is always being elaborated and refashioned, and it is always being tested by existing reality and its finalism, ever reborn in the various phases of human process." (I.L.

\(^{14}\)See Chapter I, pp. 104-106.
Another aspect of the contemporaneity of the historical moments that makes for an open-ended and on-going reconstruction of the past is that the unconditional openness of history in one direction, the future, opens it up in the other direction, the past. For within the synthesizing matrix of the present the past is reciprocally linked to the future. They are "reciprocally linked" in that the past is known and actualized in the present from a position of openness to the future, the specific directionality of which is in turn determined by the past. A knowledge of the past, then, can open up new possibilities for the future. Sturzo does not allow for a radical discontinuity between past and future, such as would characterize a revolutionary stance toward the past, because both arise out of and are expressive of the tendency of rationality toward absolute rationality. It is precisely through the continuity established within the synthesis of consciousness that the thrust into the future is generated out of the achievements of the past in the one movement toward absolute rationality.

It is also by reason of the fact that the historical moments are expressive of the becoming of rationality that the future is the focal point of history, and the ultimate locus of its meaning. It is the frame of reference from which we understand and evaluate the past and present. Since it is a rational process, it is only in the light of its overall finality that the meaning of its particular events is made manifest. Its

\[\text{xxviii-xxix}\]^{15}

\[\text{Cf. also "History and Philosophy," p. 48; I.L. xxvii.}\]
later development unveils the hitherto unperceived connections of the earlier events and thereby uncovers their meaning. The pull of this finality as felt within consciousness is what constitutes the future. "The human present, however, is not something static and definitive; it is, on the contrary, dynamic. It projects itself into the future, which presses on to become present and lose itself in the past. The dynamism towards the future in human process translates itself into finalism..." (I.L. xxv; cf. also S.P. 10-11; T.L. 215) It is the ever-receding temporal horizon of rationality's drive for completion that comprehends the entire span of its realizations and provides the backdrop that reflects their meaning. It is "ever receding" because it stretches out to contours of absolute rationality, which is never attained within the confines of the historical process. If it were, this would transform "the dynamism of human process into a rationalistic staticism which, being against nature, is fundamentally irrational." (I.L. 16) This means that the meaning of the past is in turn never closed off.

16 Edward A. Tiryakian has recently expressed a similar position: "The historian's fundamental endeavor is to make visible anew that present which once was visible but which tends to become invisible once it is engulfed in historical time. The historian, thus, may be properly called the discoverer of the past. The act of historical discovery is one of meaningful perception....For the past to be exhausted as an object would necessarily imply that the future is exhausted, that is, that historical time would no longer have any possibilities of becoming. The ultimate meaning of historical events, therefore, can only be transhistorical, that is, it can only be perceived after all historical possibilities have been actualized and that can only be after there is no more history." "Socio-historical Phenomena: The Seen, the Unseen, the Foreseeable," mimeographed paper, prepared for a meeting of the American
It is here in the linking of the past to the future through the present that the range of Sturzo's historicist system is encompassed.

Therefore, when we wish to make a thorough study of the elements of human activity, no matter from what standpoint, while starting from the present, that is, from the reality that forms our personal experience, we seek in the past the laws of formation and development, and try to fix for the future the ideal, deontological element, the 'should-be', that corresponds to human purposes. On this conception of human process and of its substantial comprehensivity is based what we call the historicist system. (I.L. xxvi)

The futuristic stance of Sturzo's historicism is explicitly brought out in his treatment of the historical sense within a given people. He states that "if history is the consciousness of collective and processive existence, and this consciousness seeks a unification in rationality and in religion, then to have the historical sense is to reflect on this consciousness, to bring it out, to make use of it in all its bearings and all its complexity." (T.L. 220) The historical sense, then, is an active, and practically oriented, reflection on the historical consciousness of a people. It is important to note that within this description of the historical sense, as practically oriented, Sturzo includes the teleological orientation of historical consciousness, its seeking "a unification in rationality and in religion." Now, since the historical sense is the reflective and practical working out of the historical consciousness of a people, obviously a people without a history will be without a historical sense. Significantly, Sturzo allows for this possi-

bility. His statement on this is worth quoting in full as it sums up the themes we have been discussing.

It (the historical sense) is not found in a people that has no history, but if a people has no history it is not because it has not had important events in its past, but because it has not felt the fundamental unity between the present and the past, and has not arrived at creating a course for the future. Thus we find the historical sense more highly developed in prophetic Hebraism, which lived by the thought and expectation of the Messias, than among other people of the time. We find it in Rome at the height of her grandeur, and therefore conscious of the roads traversed and of her mission in the world. In both peoples the past was linked to the future, and the historical sense reflected the motives of expectation and of action. (T.L. 220)

The perspective of history, then, is not one of looking back over one's shoulder nor even simply of peering beyond the immediate horizon, but in its fullest sense is one of actively moving towards and giving shape to that horizon. Within this framework of history the historical sense ceases to mean adherence to the past and becomes a liberating power; it means not conformity but transformation, not the old but the new, not custom but progress. Through an historical sense we do not merely preserve our world, we create a new one. It is not a mere accumulation of knowledge whereby we are enabled to meet with a situation; it is a power whereby we can anticipate the situation and transform it. The basic posture of man in history, then, is one of "creative expectation," engendering action in the present to fashion his future.17

Another passage that brings out the futuristic slant of Sturzo's position is one in which he is considering what it is

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in the flow of events that constitutes them as history. It is not simply their significance within the affairs of men, such as the succession of rulers. We have already seen that an event is historicized inasmuch as "it is felt in the historical consciousness of the time." (I.L. xxviii) Although, as has been indicated, Sturzo holds we cannot on the reflective level determine what is "felt"—that is, operative—in a given historical consciousness, nevertheless, the question remains as to what Sturzo means by the term "felt." In other words, in what manner are events operative when they are historicized. Sturzo answers:

The changes that have been mentioned will become history when they come to reveal fresh aspects of life, to create new spiritual exigencies, to arouse the feelings of social groups and stir them to action, to feed revolution, first in the mind, then in events.

Why are the historicized elements effective in this way? Because "there is no history without the manifestation of a truth to be actuated, and without the impulse of a love to be communicated...." (T.L. 227) The wording here, "of a truth to be actuated...of a love to be communicated," clearly indicates the practical, futuristic thrust of history.

We have indicated that Sturzo is at pains to preserve the open possibilities of the future. Since he does emphasize the finalism of history and positively designates the goal, we must carefully determine how and for what reasons he works this out. It is of the utmost importance to correctly understand Sturzo's position on the form and nature of the finalism of history because it is here that the final rectifying principle of the drive toward absolute rationality, which defines the person in
his most intimate character, is made manifest.

Since history is a rational process, its movement must be teleological. The future will then resolve itself into the telos or aim of the human activity making up this process. (S.P. 11) Yet, for Sturzo the very notion of finalism is an open concept because for him it "implies free initiative and co-ordination to a further reality." 18

There are two fundamental reasons which are intrinsic to Sturzo's whole theory that require the future to be unconditionally open in its possibilities for determination. The first is the dynamism of the human process arising out of the finitude of man's nature and its drive for completion. If the future were not open, this would imply that the human process, and man within it, is able to realize itself fully. With the completion of its being there would then be no exigency for further realization. This would result in an antivital stasis, which is contradictory to the inherent dynamism of the human process, and of all reality. "In every concrete reality there is always something wanting; and by this want it is incessantly impelled to fresh realisations." 19

The second and most important reason is that man is the sole substantive and efficient principle of history, which is the coming-to-be of his own nature. And since this nature in its most intimate and fundamental character is an individualized.

18 Sturzo, "Maurice Blondel's La Pensée: the Philosophy of 'L'elan spiritual,'" p. 346.

19 Ibid., p. 347.
principle of rationality seeking realization, man, although limited by the physical, moral and socio-historical conditioning factors of his existence, is an autonomous, self-determining creator of his own life.

Man could not act were he not physically conditioned; such is his nature. But geographic and physical conditions will reveal themselves as such when man makes them an element in his life, when he transmutes them from something purely material into a spiritual factor, an object of knowledge and action, thus creating his human environment out of the very conditions offered him by the physical world. But man's creative act—and we may call it creative by analogy, in so far as he makes his life—is nothing other than a continuous activity of his mind and will. It is this only that produces the process that we call history. (S.P. 7; cf. also p. 9)

Since this autonomous self-determining activity, or freedom, is ontologically rooted in and expressive of rationality, it is not characterized by chaotic, arbitrary and total indeterminancy of expression, but rather is patterned according to the laws and limits of the rationality of which it is expressive. And when Sturzo, in his statement of the historicism at the basis of his theory, describes history as the human process "realized by immanent forces," the immanent forces he is referring to are the inner laws of man's nature, individualized rationality. One commentator on Sturzo's thought has already pointed this out. "Thus those immanent forces that propel the march of humankind are to be identified only within the deep and intimate laws of spiritual being which can have only a moral, not a physical character, consonant with the spirituality and rationality of the subject."20 Thus to say that the future is

completely undetermined in its possibilities does not mean it can be realized in any possible way and still be expressive of the becoming of rationality. What it does mean is that there are no determining factors extrinsic to the subject and efficient principle of history, man himself. If man is to be true to himself in the realization of himself, the pattern of his life must conform to the inner laws of his nature. And it is only in this sense, that is, normatively, that these inner laws are the determining--determining in the sense of regulatory--factors in the shaping of his future. For as operative from within a rational subject, their enactment remains dependent on the freedom of that subject. The complete autonomy of man in the realization of himself is manifested in the fact that he can operate, and therefore shape his future, even against the laws of his own being. (I.L. xxxii)

It is the autonomy of man and the subsequent originality of individual experience as the basis of history that underlies Sturzo's rejection of every deterministic view of history. In summation he states: "The fundamental error of determinism lay in seeking the unifying force of the historical process outside the makers of history, that is, outside men themselves, and in envisaging nature as a purely material force." (S.P. 7) The logical consequence of every deterministic view, whether materialistic or spiritualistic, is the placing of the locus of reality in a principle outside of man and of which man and his world are but the mere phenomena.
In both cases, we could no longer speak of human process as the experience of free and reasonable individuals, but of a succession of either material or spiritual phenomena which would present none of the originality of a human personal cast, and none of the value of experience as we conceive of it for ourselves and through history. (I.L. xxi)

This result would be the same if we accepted the idea of immanent Spirit or universal Mind as the sole conscious reality, of which individual men were but the phenomena; it would be the end of the personal individuality of each, which is what constitutes the originality of human life and experience. (I.L. xxii)

At the same time, the logical consequence of the autonomy of man and the originality of his experience is the openness of the future. For since the immanent forces by which history is realized are self-determining forces, genuine self-determinancy is possible only when the future is not fixed a priori. Since freedom is intrinsic to the nature of rationality, the attainment of rationality can only be through the expression of freedom in activity. The very possibility of free decision and its enactment includes within it openness for the future. With freedom at its core, then, the movement towards rationality cannot be a movement towards some more or less clearly discernible goal which is fixed prior to the movement itself.

Sturzo does point to a definite unifying principle of history, rationality, both as immanent in human rationality and as transcendent in the Absolute Mind. This two-fold unifying finalism of history must be viewed in the light of the very nature of history, which is man in search of himself. Thus, the goal of history is the very nature of the subject of history considered as an exigency to seek realization and fulfillment. And since Sturzo views man as an open-ended or "unfinished"
creature, he does not assign a predetermined form or facticity to the unifying principle of rationality as immanent, inasmuch as this is the specifying element in man's nature. The specific concrete content or facticity of rationality must be determined through each person's own experience and personal activity. "It is always a case of a unification in process, never final, but always a tendency, a dynamism." (I.L. xxiii) The reason for this, which is the theoretical basis for man's open-ended nature, is that the thrust of the rational principle of man's nature for completion extends to unification in absolute rationality. Although Sturzo does hypostasize absolute rationality into the Christian notion of God, this still does not close off the possibilities of the future because here too the relationship between man and the transcendent unifying principle of absolute rationality is intrinsic to and grounded in the ontological exigencies of man's own nature. We must now carefully elaborate Sturzo's position on this relationship.

In the definition of his historicism Sturzo states that history moves "from a transcendent and absolute principle towards a transcendental and absolute end." He states elsewhere that history, "whatever history it be...carries us to the fundamental problem of living and journeying humanity in relation to its unifying finalism." (T.L. 214) As we have traced the main lines of Sturzo's theory, we have frequently referred to man's orientation towards absolute rationality. It is within his theory of history that Sturzo draws out the full implications of this, both in respect to the orientation itself and the form
of absolute rationality as it has presented itself in history. Thus, we must now examine the full scope of the relationship Sturzo finds between a transcendent and absolute principle and man as it arises within history.

The question of the absolute arises from the pressure of man's search for himself in the present historical moment, because it is a question that has its ground in the very structure of man's being, his sociality and its consequent projection, which extends "towards the absolute which commands present reality." (I.L. 66) It is precisely from within the actuality of its own experience, the present, that the human spirit grasps the root of its own actuality, its tendency towards an absolute in the form of absolute rationality. "But the present, that of our living experience, is not at all an 'ourselves,' it is not our knowledge of it, but it is a totality that absorbs us and transcends us in a striving towards the infinite." (T.L. 215)

The key concept in Sturzo's historicism that brings to the fore the full range of implications in the concrete relationship that he finds between the question of the absolute and the question of man as it arises in history is the notion of transcendence. For in the concrete employment of this concept by Sturzo it is expressive both of the tendency within man toward the absolute and the absolute itself. In the most generic meaning Sturzo assigns to the term, transcendence means "the processive passage to another term that elicits it" or "the overstepping of the limits of one stage into another." (I.L. 308-9)
since it is the tendency of rationality for absolute rationality that constitutes the nature of the person, the person is transcendent in the interiority of his own nature. In view of the generic meaning of the term, this transcendence as inherent in the nature of the person may still be interpreted as a wholly immanent process, that is to say, as a continual passage from one stage of realization to another in an on-going overcoming of limits, but all within the immanent order of man's own becoming.

However, as Sturzo applies this term to the concrete becoming of the person in history, several specifically different, but interrelated meanings become manifest which rule out the wholly immanent interpretation. The term "transcendence" refers to the dynamic openness-towards-absolute rationality, which ontologically constitutes rational consciousness, the actual process of "going beyond" oneself, or more accurately, one's given state of actuality generated by this dynamic openness, and the goal of this process. "Men, taken as an historical whole and in their process, feel, more or less intuitively, that the urge to a transcendence in a rational ideal, an ideal of good, will not be arrested until a goal is reached that comprehends everything and transcends everything." (I.L. 312)

We must bring into clearer focus the features of this goal because here in his historicism within the dynamics of the notion of transcendence, Sturzo moves from an abstract metaphysical finalism to a concrete historical finalism. In the concrete of history, the absolute rationality towards which the person tends reveals itself as a personal absolute, "a God with whom it
(society) can enter into communion through knowledge and love." (I.L. 313) The total context of Sturzo's theory of socio-personalism provides the theoretical foundation for a personal absolute. We have already mentioned one feature of Sturzo's theory, the social grounding and context of self-awareness, that points to a personal absolute. But even more basic than this, since this transcendent principle enters into the ontological structure of the person both as its underived source and ground and its ultimate unifying finalism, it, too, must be personal. For in both aspects it is an immanent constituent of the person as such and consequently must itself be personal. This could be demonstrated in terms of several fundamental features of the person. The most basic one within the framework of Sturzo's theory is that of consciousness.

A conscious being such as man cannot be resolved into or unified with anything but another conscious being, so that ultimately either we think of a personal God or of a universal consciousness, whether this be the logos of the Platonist, the potential intellect of the Averroists, the Mind of the Idealists, or other similar hypotheses. Yet which is the more contradictory, an infinite personality or an impersonal consciousness? If personality is consciousness of self, impersonality is incompatible with the concept of consciousness. A personality that has consciousness of its infinite contains nothing contradictory. (S.P. 62)

To avoid any misinterpretation of Sturzo's position on personal absolute, or God, it must be made unequivocally clear there is a basic and essential difference in his use of the term "transcendence" as applied to the constitutive process of the person and the finalizing principle of this process, God.

21 See Chapter II, pp. 136-137.
The difference in his use comes down to one between absolute ontological transcendence and relative processive transcendence. The former refers to the absolute ontological transcendence of God's activity and the latter refers to the various processes of transcendence that flow from and are constitutive of the ontological structure of the person. Thus, in view of the absolute transcendence of God's activity, the concepts that are used to designate the reality that is one with that activity, such as conscious and personal, are applied only in an analogous sense. What the human person is through a dynamic tendency and partial attainment, God is as complete and perfect actuality.

In Sturzo's own words:

A personal God is in no wise an anthropomorphic conception, but a superhuman one, beyond the bounds of our comprehension. We can only lay hold of the negative elements of this infinite existence and express them in a positive mode so as to affirm their reality. We do not reduce the personality of God to a human mode, but transfer to God a predication of conscious man, inasmuch as we wish to deny that God is either an impersonal universal consciousness, or a non-consciousness. We mean to affirm that God is the real, absolute, infinite, super-existence; of a thought and a will always in act, entirely; pure and without inward or outward limits. (S.P. 63; cf. p. 61)

The reasoning behind Sturzo's diversified use of the term "transcendence" must be clearly understood. It does not signify a careless or indifferent use of a culturally freighted term that is itself highly ambivalent in its historical significations. Rather, the diversified meanings he attaches to the term have a signal function within his thought: they convey the full significance of the ontological tension that constitutes the person. As Sturzo himself states, "We use the word,
transcendence, which inspires so much mistrust among experimen-
talists and positivists, not assuredly from a wish to bring con-
fusion into our terminology, but because we find no other word
that renders the meaning we seek to convey." (I.L. 309)

A preliminary fact that should be kept in mind in consider-
ing Sturzo's diversified use of the term is that this occurs
within a relational, processive perspective. Thus, transcendence
must be interpreted not substantively, but relationally. The
underlying concept that unifies the divergent use of the term
is that of relation. It is within the one world of relation
that transcendence takes place. Transcendence is a single term
covering a variety of relational activities, all of which, from
the perspective of man, involve "the processive passage to ano-
ther term that elicits it." It is from the view of His rela-
tional activity with man in history that God is said to be trans-
cendent. And since the relational activity of God is at one
with His being, from the level of man's perspective, God is
transcendent in His being. In contrast, man is a transcending
being. Also, whereas in the transcendent activity of man there
is a reciprocating interdependence between that activity and
its term, God's transcendence is such that His activity touches
man's life but man's activity cannot of itself alone touch His.
In other words, God's activity within history is beyond all that
is possible to man through his own power.

One of the reasons Sturzo uses the same term for two funda-
mentally different significations is to point up that man in
realizing himself must go beyond himself in an upwardly—with no spatial connotations, of course, but ontologically "upwards" towards a higher grade of being—directed finalism that opens out onto the infinite horizon of absolute transcendent being, which, being the goal of a relative transcendent movement, continually remains unattainable. In this way, Sturzo clearly preserves the essential otherness of God which differentiates His being from everything in the world and within history, and yet at the same time points to a genuine transcendence that takes place within history, or more exactly, IS history as constitutive of man in the plenitude of his being.

In the single designation of a relative and absolute reality Sturzo is able to emphasize the intrinsic constituting—for the relative reality—relationship between the two and, at the same time, the inherent and fundamental tension in the ontological structure of the relative that this relationship generates. This tension marks the incommensurability between the positivity of this structure and its ideality. Since this incommensurability cannot be surmounted by man himself, in order for there to be an actual movement towards the ideality of his own being, there must be a power present capable of spanning the magnetic field between the poles of man's being. Only then is it possible for the movement towards the absolute to be initiated and sustained. Thus, the very designation of the movement of man's being toward realization as transcendent points to the presence of the transcendent principle within man's nature that generates the transcendent movement of his self-realization.
Another reason why Sturzo applies the term "transcendence" to the various phases of man's becoming is that it underscores the efficacious reality of the immanent order of man's own nature, and attributes full value to its processive character by calling attention to the fact that there is a genuine emergence of higher levels of being within that immanent order. Robert Pollock, in his usual trenchant manner, has commented on this aspect of Sturzo's thought:

Limitation is intrinsic to the idea of creature; nevertheless, within the immanent order there is always the stimulus to overcome it, by passing continually from one limit to another. But each new position attained is not simply a manifestation of that which pre-exists in germ; it is not only the moment of an intrinsic dialectic, or merely the phase of a process of 'self-realization'; it is a real transcendence, manifesting the relation which exists between the immanent level of development and the transcendental Being.²²

We have said that God is both the ontological ground and ultimate unifying principle of the ontological structure of the person, so that we must conclude that He is both immanent and transcendent to the becoming of man. He is immanent in His activity, or at least in one dimension of it, and transcendent in the modality of that activity. This immanence of God within history must be more fully elaborated.

That God is the ontological ground of the person can be seen in the inexhaustible dynamism of the person's constitutive principle, rationality, for completion, which is expressive of "a movement of interior necessity towards the absolute." (S.P. 39) That God ontologically grounds this inner dynamism follows

from the fact that the person cannot of himself alone originate or sustain the thrust of this dynamism towards the absolute. The person cannot of himself alone even initiate the actual movement of his being toward fulfillment because there is an ontological incommensurability between the constitutive principle of his being and its own inner exigency for completion. This incommensurability is experienced on the conscious level as an ever present disquiet, which points to an insatiable void between the positivity of its present actualization and the fullness of its ideality towards which it tends. In the face of this void and the intrinsic limitations of his own being, man experiences a profound disquiet and dissatisfaction with himself rising up from the depths of his own being, taking on and manifesting itself in a variety of forms.23

23 In view of the complexity of this phenomenon and the great variety of interpretations which have been given to it, the reference to it obviously does not mean to imply that it necessarily, in and of itself, verifies the argumentation here. Marx's interpretation of this experience of disquietude, to name one prominent example, stands in direct opposition to the one given here, namely, that there is a fundamental anxiety arising from the ontological structure of man and as such inescapable, which may be termed "the appeal of transcendence." Also, as Gabriel Marcel warns, if "the need for transcendence presents itself above all...as a kind of dissatisfaction," not every kind of dissatisfaction "implies an aspiration towards transcendence." Cf. The Mystery of Being, Vol. I: Reflection and Mystery, trans. by G. Fraser (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1951), p. 42. Therefore, granted that the interpretation here demands, and merits, more attention and careful analysis than the scope of this essay allows, nevertheless, it clearly does remain a viable position with a vast body of literature supportive of it, the essence of which Henri de Lubac epitomizes when he states, "It would be a very poor observer who thought that it was just an anomaly, a passing disease, a sort of excrescence which could be removed altogether one day, a phantom of the mind which could be dissipated, a strange voice which could be reduced to silence. It would be most unrealistic to imagine that physical or social health or the progress of science were
The power of a finite being is proportionate only to a finite term. (T.L. 30; S.P. 41) Therefore, the activity of a finite being can explicitly be directed only toward a finite term. If there is an actual movement of man toward the ideality of his nature, this would be indicative of the operative presence of a transcendent principle, which is not subject to the limits of finitude, within the depths of man's own being. For Sturzo, the actual movement of history testifies to this presence. It has been the effort of his thought to document this movement. "After studying the unification in rationality in all the stages, and in all the guises of sociality and in its process and resolution, we cannot but reach a transcendence towards an absolute end." (I.L. 313) It is precisely the grounding of man's nature by God that makes the immanent realization of that nature an inherently transcendent movement.

Just as man alone cannot be the initiator of the movement toward the fulfillment of his nature in the absolute, so neither is he of himself alone able to maintain it in a sustained development of his being. This fact, too, has its root in man's own being in the principle of materiality with its movement contravening that of rationality. The dynamism of rationality toward completion in absolute rationality is the immanent source of the transcending movement towards God in man. But as we have already seen, the specifically human rationality is not pure the cure. That would be to misconceive all that is most human in the human being and which 'makes him more than man.' " de Lubac, The Discovery of God (New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1960), p. 176 [Trans. of: Sur les chemins de Dieu (Paris: Aubier, 1956)].
rationality; it is limited by the principle of materiality, whose natural movement is towards an individualistic self-contained egoism. Consequently, the movement of rationality towards completion, which is a natural and spontaneous converging projection of the self outward in unifying association with others—a projection extending to what Sturzo calls a "communicative union" with God—contains within itself a countering movement. 24

The concrete individual rational consciousness, then, is a consciousness in tension between the polarizing forces of its constitutive principles. Since this polarization arises from its own immanent constituents, it is complete and unavoidable. Inasmuch as the two principles together constitute the seamless reality of the ego, the movement toward the ideality of man's nature does not involve a denial or rejection of the pull of materiality, which is an impossibility, but does call for a conscious redirection and spiritualizing of it by ordering it towards a higher collaboration with and integration in the movement of the rational principle, so that there is achieved "the obedience of the lower faculties, their docility, their adaptability, their decisive subjection to spiritual impulses." (T.L. 41) It, too, must be caught up in the movement of rationality for completion if this movement is to be maintained. Otherwise, its equally compelling pull within the individual consciousness will cut across the path of this movement, short-circuiting its

24 See Chapter III, pp. 157-158.
thrust and deflecting its flow into a regressive slide towards a constricting egocentricity. It is this equally compelling pull of materiality that is the root of man's incapacity for a sustained movement toward absolute rationality. There are no resources wholly immanent to the person that would provide him with the means for permanently reordering its natural movement toward coordinating with and reinforcing the movement of rationality. The principle of materiality obviously does not provide the means for subverting its own natural movement; and the fact that individualized rationality is itself limited by this principle means that it cannot completely dominate the force of its own intrinsic limiting principle. Thus, if man is to be actually successful in realizing the exigencies of his own nature for completion, the fulfilment of the conditions that make this possible is not immanent to that nature. There must be a principle of reconciliation between the principles of his being if the demands of their contravening movements are to serve as a stimulus for a transcending development and not be lost in a sterile inner struggle. This principle of reconciliation will have to be both immanent and transcendent at once. It will be immanent in that its conciliating activity will be indissolubly woven into the fabric of man's becoming and it will be transcendent in that it itself, as its conciliating activity testifies, will be beyond the limitations of that becoming.

Here, of course, within the context of this specific discussion on the conditions necessary for sustained development on the part of man, the logic of Sturzo's position only points
to the inherent need for such an immanent-transcendent principle but not its actual presence. This must rest on an appeal to facts that would verify that the sustained development has or does take place. In this particular issue of sustained development there is no direct empirical way of substantiating its actuality. Nevertheless, in drawing from the evidence culled from other features of man's becoming that do indicate the actual presence of this transcendent principle within man's becoming, we can at least affirm that the conditions for its possibility are actually present and that in terms of these conditions the transcendent principle is operatively present as a principle of reconciliation between the contravening movements of man's own being.

The tendency towards unification is a law of life. We seek it all the more in that, formed of sense and spirit, we have within us two laws that are often in conflict, disturbing even natural activities. A principle that pacifies the finite with the infinite is in itself vital and unifying; it is the new order, penetrating the spirit and reverberating through the whole of human activity. (T.L. 41)

There is another aspect of God's immanence in history that must be considered. This is as the ulterior unifying principle of man's becoming. Viewing God from the aspect of man's finalism also provides another approach for demonstrating that the absolute towards which man tends is in fact a personal absolute. At first sight it may not seem correct to speak of God's immanence in history in terms of man's unification with Him. It would seem that precisely as the ultimate goal of man's finalistic striving God transcends history. In the definition of
his historicism Sturzo says that history moves "from a transcendental and absolute principle towards a transcendental and absolute end." Thus, the primordial source and ultimate end of the human process "are not historical, but extra-historical." (I.L. xxx and xxxiv) Sturzo also appears to rule out any immanence to this unification when he compares it with the unification in rationality. "In our personal experience, the unification in rationality is inward and immanent; the same could not be said of the unifying relationship between the contingent and the absolute." (I.L. xxxi) And again, "this unification in rationality, which is immanent in us, would lead us to an exasperating rational anthropocentrism (pseudo-humanism) if it were not for the unification that makes us transcend it in the absolute, the unification of the human in the divine." (I.L. xxiv) Thus, it would seem that whereas the unification in rationality is immanent, the unification in the absolute is transcendent. Yet, Sturzo goes on to say that in the unifying relationship between man and God, "we find an initial immanence that suffices for unification without falling into immanentism." (I.L. xxxi)

In view of the absolute ontological transcendence of God, a question more pressing than that of the immanence of any unification between man and God would seem to be how any such unification is in any way possible, given the ontological incommensurability between the two. Even if one admits to the possibility of a unifying relationship between man and God, at least as a hypothesis, in view of their ontological incommensurability there is the added difficulty of how it could be effected without
the total absorption of the finite, the individual person and the human process as a whole, into the infinite reality of God.

Actually, all three difficulties stemming from the question of God as the finalistic principle of man's becoming and of the historical process as a whole are closely intertwined because the solution to them lies within the context of Sturzo's theory of the person. In explaining this theory we arrived at the basic definition of the person as "the tendency towards absolute rationality in time."25 We can now more accurately and concretely designate the objective of the tendency that constitutes the person as a personal absolute, or God. And we have seen that since the person cannot initiate this tendency, God is operatively immanent with the ontological structure of the person as its source and ground. This is the "initial immanence" Sturzo referred to which "suffices for unification without falling into immanentism." (I.L. xxxi) The other aspect of this divine activity within man's becoming is that now under consideration as the ultimate unifying principle of that becoming. Actually, in distinguishing between God as the creative ground of the person and as the finalistic term, we are assuming two different perspectives on the single operative presence of one and the same principle. From the perspective of man this latter divine activity relates to his finalistic striving, of which God is the unifying principle.

It is important to clarify here that we are not considering God as an extrinsic final cause, but as the unifying principle

of a finalism that is not external to the person but rather is "the very nature of the subject considered as a tendency or exigency to seek fulfillment and perfection." (I.L. xv) As the unifying principle of this finalism God is an inner constitutive dimension of the person. Before we experience the fullness of the unification within us as reality, we experience the force of its pull as the finalistic demand of our nature. This is the sense in which God is immanent as the finalistic term. The extent that we respond to this pull by striving to actualize the finalistic drive of our nature is the extent to which the unifying presence of God is actually historicized. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the individual person must of himself respond to this pull. It is not an extrinsic, determining force, but is intrinsic as the finalistic demand of a rational nature. As such, it operates not merely in accord with, but from within the instrumentality of human freedom.

We mentioned above that it is within the total context of his theory of the person that Sturzo theoretically works out the problem of the unifying relationship between man and God. To properly comprehend the full force of his position it is well to recall that the basic metaphysical categories in his theory are relation and process. The person in his ontological structure is relational and processual. It is this that brings out the full force of both the immanence and transcendence of the unifying relationship between man and God. Robert Pollock has also suggested these implications for the processive character of human reality.
Once there is given to contingency its full value of process and it is studied integrally, it is impossible to abstract it from its concrete relation with transcendentental Being. This affirmation is also valid for those who, while affirming transcendence, do not appreciate the concrete and vital character of the relation which ties the finite with the infinite. To those we say this happens because they, by considering contingency too abstractly and statically, make the distinction between Absolute Being and the contingent so rigid as to end in separation. We should not minimize contingency by stopping there in its processual character; and if we conceive it adequately we should see that it is not otherwise intelligible than in terms of the dialectic of immanence-transcendence. 26

What we have here in the human-divine relationship is the grounding and vertical component of the basic differentiation-in-synthesis dialectic that constitutes the field of the personal. This is the primordial relationship that grounds and subsumes under its scope the total range of all horizontal relationships in the personal field. (T.L. 97) 27 This is so because it is the relationship that most intimately and constitutively establishes the basic ontological structure of sociality. As


27 Again, the spatial imagery of the terms "vertical" and "horizontal" is not to be interpreted literally, but figuratively to denote, in the first instance, a relationship between different levels of being, and in the second instance, relationships on the same level of being. The imagery is not entirely precise because even in the establishing of "horizontal" relationships is an "upward" movement ontologically for the persons concerned in the increase of the depth and extension of their personhood. Nevertheless, relatively speaking, the imagery does connote the qualitative difference between the two kinds of relationships. As with all concepts applied to God, the vertical difference-in-synthesis dialectical relationship is only analogous to that operative between human persons. In its vertical dimension it takes on a different character in that it does not work itself out in a reciprocating interdependent dialectic. The ontological determination and dependence is only on the side of the human person.
a result, the constitutive activity of the person is directed in principle towards God. The determination and individuality of the person, then, is by definition established in direct proportion to the movement of his being towards the transcendent being of God. The apex of that determination and individuality is reached in union with God. Thus, it is by reason of the fundamental ontological structure of the person that the reality of the person is not submerged into the higher reality of God but rather is accentuated and further differentiated according to the closeness of the union with the divine reality. This is the precise point in Sturzo's theory that forms the basis for his opposition to any immanentistic theory of history. Such theories, by seeking all spiritual values and meaning in the historical realization of human activity as a strictly immanent process, depersonalize the process and consequently the values and meaning that are realized in it.28

Sturzo terms the kind of union attained between man and God a "communicative union" (T.L. 98), which consists in a contact of presence between persons. This is in fact the only kind of union that is constitutive of the person because in it alone is there a contact of spirit to spirit of which the incommunicable reality of the person consists. The only way in which the vital and synthesizing center of the person can be touched, and thereby further deepened, is in and through a "communicative union," namely, one that is effected through the mode

28 Sturzo, "History and Philosophy," p. 53.
of being proper to the person as such, presence. Only in this mode of being is there the two-way kinetic transparency of being—directed inwards and outwards—that provides that immediacy of being in which spirit is able to touch spirit.

It is by reason of the conditions necessary for this union that the contact between man and God in the historical realization of man's being is a contact of freedom. The very nature of presence as expressing and revealing the inner dimension of the person, which is the locus of his reality, demand that it arise from within the person through the autonomy of his own being. Although the operative presence of God is necessary to initiate and sustain the constitutive activity of the person, the power of this presence only takes effect through the autonomous activity of the person. As Robert Pollock has pointed out, it is necessary for us to consider the relation between man and God "more concretely as a real cooperation." This cooperation, as constitutive of the person, or lack thereof, marks the rhythm of history.

The contact between man and God is a contact of freedom. Without freedom there would be neither the quest for truth nor the union through love, there would not be life. A deterministic, compelling force exercised upon us would not be a contact of spirit between us and the

29 If we emphasize the role of freedom from the side of the human person in effecting this union, it obviously follows that equal stress must be given to the play of divine freedom, so that whatever in this process flows from the divine dispensation, whether in the order of nature or the theological doctrine of grace, clearly does so through divine freedom, allowing for whatever theological distinctions must be made in each order.

On the same principle, history is our free activity, it is human realization, though it is the result of the initiative and intervention of God. It represents the alternatives of acceptance or rejection of the divine which come to us and which dwell within us. (T.L. 232)

This passage indicates the way in which the contact of freedom between man and God is historically effected, and the communicative union established insofar as it depends on man's own endeavor, namely, through "the quest for truth" and "the union through love." The full sentence reads, "Without freedom there would be neither the quest for truth nor the union through love, there would not be life." The "life" Sturzo is referring to is that of personal selfhood. Only through knowledge and love is this life realized and in being realized moves towards God. Since the communicative union between man and God is a contact of presence, it is clear, from our previous analysis of presence, that it can be achieved only through the reciprocally interdependent activities of knowing and loving. Since both knowledge and love are the principle and condition of the other, Sturzo explains our relationship to, movement towards and union with God in terms of both, giving emphasis to one or the other depending on the formality of the perspective.

That Sturzo would explain the historical working out of our relationship to God under the formality of knowledge and truth is clear from his position on the participatory and creative nature of knowledge with its theoretical basis in his central, and integral, concept of rationality. In the synthetic process

[31 See Chapter I, pp. 51-53.]
of its realization the intentionality of knowledge embraces the finalism of the will. Consequently, knowing encompasses the personal field as completely as loving. We have already seen that within the personal field this works itself out as a reciprocal dialecticity of knowledge and love. How much more this holds true when the relationship is with God, who is the true-good! "Knowledge is a principle of love; the knowledge of the true good, insofar as it is real and full knowledge, is undoubtedly love. To know God is equivalent to establishing a relationship with Him, inasmuch as we recognize Him as our Creator, our first principle and our last end." (T.L. 86)

The concrete and particular truths that we actualize in the realization of rationality participate in Truth itself who is God, so that the movement of rationality towards the true—that is, towards its own realization—is at the same time a movement towards, and participation in, Truth itself. For Sturzo this implicitly expresses itself in every act of knowledge as an intuitional awareness of an all-embracing totality that transcends the duality of subject and object. 32 It is also manifest in every act of knowledge in that in the actual process of mastering a given truth, which as known is only relative, we grasp it under the formality of absoluteness—this despite the fact that we are not in a position to coordinate it, as a relative truth, to absolute truth. (S.P. 45-6)

Sturzo calls this "the mystical" dimension of the strivings

of our spiritual life because "it is a drawing near to and almost a partaking of the absolute, which, through the values of truth and goodness, comes into communication with us." Even when there is a falsification of values, this contact with the absolute cannot be evaded because the concrete and particular values are still sought under the formality of truth and goodness. In addition, by reason of God being the creative ontological ground of all reality, "there shines out from the various forms of the contingent an unseizable element, which is the imprint of the absolute, the mark of the creative force, the value of the thought of the Spirit, the supreme reality which is God." Sturzo therefore concludes, "It is impossible to live our relative, contingent life, and to live it as knowledgeable beings and not as brutes, without feeling the reality of the Absolute as present." (S.P. 46)

In accounting for the communicative union between man and God, Sturzo gives emphasis to love. There are several reasons for this. The most significant one is to emphasize that the absolute towards which we tend is, and has to be, a personal absolute with whom there is a genuine communion, or touching of spirit to spirit. In other words, it highlights the "communicative" aspect of the union because communion can occur only between autonomous centers of presence, namely, persons. Communion involves a reciprocal dialecticity with love in that each is the principle and term of the other. Out of this reciprocal dialecticity a communicative union is established. Correlative to these constitutive activities of the person, then, "in the
spiritual and historical life of man, God cannot be other than unfolding truth, compelling, winning love." (T.L. 225) This clearly removes man's relationship to God from the abstract and metaphysical realm in which the relationship is reduced to a metaphysical dependency and God to an abstract metaphysical principle, and sets it in the concrete process of history in which the becoming of personal selfhood is realized through an existential relationship to a living, personal absolute.

Those philosophers who conceive of a strictly rational God, as prime mover, as creator or rather as architect of the universe, reduce the relationship of man with God to a metaphysical dependency. This relationship is stripped of any cleaving will, of any sense of love; there is no communion in it. (T.L. 86)

The true absolute is God. If he were merely a physical or metaphysical principle, the logical primary, the unmoving first mover, we should have no communion with him that could induce us to love, no love that could arrive at communicative union. (T.L. 98)

Giving emphasis to love also calls attention to the intimacy of the union by indicating that the union attained by man with God unites, and in uniting further deepens, the innermost depths of man's being to the ineffable center of God's being. As Teilhard has so incisively expressed, "Love alone is capable of uniting living beings in such a way as to complete and fulfil them for it alone takes them and joins them by what is deepest in themselves."33

When we began our treatment of God's immanence in terms of man's finalism, we mentioned that this aspect of His relationship

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to man demonstrates that the absolute rationality towards which the person tends is in fact a personal absolute. In view of what we have already said, we can summarize the main lines of the argumentation. Finalism is the nature of the subject considered as a tendency towards fulfillment. But the fulfillment of the person can be achieved only through a communicative union with a personal absolute. It must be a communicative union because only this is constitutive of the person. It must be with an absolute by reason of the unconditional nature of love through which a communicative union is attained. "Love by its very nature seeks to become absolute, and for that very reason it seeks God, is transformed in God, has peace in God alone. When God is lacking we seek the absolute love in ourselves or in something extraneous to complete ourselves. But any such attempt must fail." (T.L. 97) It must be with a personal absolute because a communicative union can only be established with another person.

In view of the absolutely transcendent character of God's being, the human-divine union remains "something towards which we tend, and the experience we may have of it is not direct and intuitive." (I.L. xxiii) Since the being of God transcends history, the full actualization of man's union with Him will also transcend history as its transcendent end. With the active presence of this transcendent principle as an inner constitutive dimension of the person, history, whether viewed as the concrete becoming of the individual person or in its totality as embracing all of mankind, can not be conceived as a wholly
immanent dialectic which is able to find realization within the contours of its own process. It is this ontological relationship to God as an inner constitutive dimension of his being that makes the person, and history, open-ended realities.

Nevertheless, to say that the unification with God is "something towards which we tend" and is actually achieved in its fullness only in some sense "beyond" history, whatever light this may shed on the nature of man and history, it does not add any clarification to its nature and place within history. If this unification with God does pertain to history, and Sturzo very definitely holds that it does, the difficulty still remains of determining further in what sense and how it is effected within history since it is with the transcendent reality of God. Although of its very nature this unification can be achieved "in its fullness" only "beyond" history, Sturzo still maintains that it must at the same time be historicized, or to use his words, "inserted into human process." This is necessary in order that the unification will "find fulfilment with its cognitional value in each man." (I.L. xxiv) What Sturzo means by this is suggested in another passage where he discusses those who "have had only a glimmer of the divine idea in the world." "Indeed it is a spiritual necessity to find a historical center that will give an orientation towards truth. A subjective idea is not enough, the voice of conscience is not enough; we need in addition something that has found realization in life—that has been embodied, 'incarnated,' as some say in the widest sense of the word." (T.L. 226) The same
"spiritual necessity" applies to the fundamental movement towards unification with God in order for there to be an orientation of consciousness in regard to it that would become an explicit and permanent value of life.

To understand the significance of this passage in this context it is important to keep in mind that the unification with God and the orientation towards truth are not secondary or accidental features of the person, but together are constitutive of the person as such. Rationality, the constitutive principle of the person, is consubstantial with truth. It is constituted in its tendency towards absolute truth and exists only through it. Therefore, as grounding the reality of the person, the absolute can not be merely the ideal projection of the processive reality of the person, but, as reflected in the depths of that personal reality, must itself be personal. The constitutive activity that rises out of these depths is, then, in its initiating movement and most basic character a personal and freely constituted response to the magnetic pull of that personal absolute. In Sturzo's own words, it is a case of "a freedom that seeks and of a truth-and-love that attracts." (T.L. 225)

From an analysis of the factors involved, we see that this determining tendency towards absolute rationality manifests itself as a relationship with a personal absolute, and the actualization of this determining relationship takes the form of a communicative union.

From the nature of the person as a conscious being whose spirituality and subjectivity ontologically consist in the
immediacy of presence, it follows that the communicative union with God, as an immanent determinant of this presence, cannot lie beyond the present reality of this consciousness, but must make itself felt in his present experience of himself. (cf. S.P. 60-1) This does not mean that the communicative union, as an existential fact of the person's concrete nature becomes a direct and explicit experience through introspection. Nevertheless, as coextensive with our spiritual activity we are indirectly and implicitly conscious of it, before any objective grasp of it, simply in being conscious of ourselves. 34 But, although this union is implicitly posited in the act of self-knowledge, for it to "find fulfilment with its cognitional value for each man," it must become the explicit objective of the reflectively conscious strivings of man's spiritual life. Only then is it able to take firm root and blossom forth from the subterranean levels of man's being into the clear light of consciousness where its transformative power can take full effect on that consciousness.

The reason for this lies in the fact that this union is a contact of presence and presence involves the total dimensions

34I am indebted to the insights of Karl Rahner in his explanation, as a theologian, of the supernatural a priori of our spiritual being. In the course of his exposition he states, "Man lives consciously even when he does not 'know' it and does not believe it, i.e. cannot make it an individual object of his knowledge merely by introspection. This is the inexpressible but existing ground of the dynamic power of all spiritual and moral life in the actual sphere of spiritual existence founded by God, i.e. supernaturally elevated, a 'merely a-priori' existing ground, but still existing, something of which we are conscious of in being conscious of ourselves, not as an object, but nevertheless existing." Karl Rahner, Nature and Grace (London: Sheed and Ward, 1968), p. 31.
of the person. A contact of presence is not something that can be fully achieved on only one level of personal activity through implicit consciousness. We have seen that the personal activity of the human person in establishing that contact of presence is a response to the presence of a personal absolute—a presence that has a stimulus and profundity to it alone. This is the exact locus of the difficulty since the presence here in question is that of the transcendent personhood of God.

How can there be a contact of presence with this transcendent reality on the experiential conscious level of man? The conditions for this can be determined with some accuracy because a model for it is provided in every contact of presence between two persons, which is itself a process of transcendence. Any contact of presence between two subjects can occur only to the extent that they manifest their inwardness to one another in their actions towards and communication with each other. Our knowledge of other persons always involves and is dependent upon the self-manifestation of their subjectivity since it lies hidden beyond what is directly available to our experience of them. A contact of presence, then, is always a transcendent process, occurring beyond the limitations of our direct experience through the self-manifestations of the persons involved.

Such interpersonal communion provides the model for determining what is required for a divine-human communion to take place within the conscious experience of man, at least as an hypothesis. Just as the transcendent reality of the subjectivity of a person can be known only through the self-communication
of that subjectivity, so also does this hold true for a knowledge of the transcendent reality of God. In both instances, within the paradigmatic situation of interpersonal communion, the category that is correlative to transcendence is that of self-manifestation, or revelation. Therefore, on whatever level there is effected a contact of presence with God, it is primarily and essentially dependent on God's self-manifestation.

We have already seen this self-manifestation reflected through the various forms of His immanent activity which bears witness to "a presence in a certain fashion self-revealing." (S.P. 53; cf. also p. 46) But the contact of presence resulting from this manner of revelation clearly does not attain that level of unification Sturzo maintains is necessary for it "to find fulfilment with its cognitional value in each man." The exact words of Sturzo are: "But, since this unification, though essential in the idea of creatureliness, in order to find fulfilment with its cognitional value in each man, must in some way be inserted into human process, it will be well first of all to make it clear what human process means." (I.L. xxiv) The significant word in Sturzo's statement is "inserted" and it is clear from the context that what he wants to accent with this term is that the level of unification referred to is transcendent not merely to the human process, but even to the total intrinsic intelligible structure of the human process. Since it is a unification that occurs within the human process and yet transcends the intelligible structure of that process, it will consequently be a unification in which God acts towards
and communicates with man in a special manner that cannot be derived from a rational analysis of the human process. And it will be more revelatory of God's presence than is possible to the receptive dimensions of rational consciousness. Therefore, in order for the human person to enter into a new and higher communicative union with God, this contact of presence will have to take place through an added dimension in the subjective structure of rational consciousness through which he is able to be aware of the mysterious reality of God more directly and fully. The awareness which makes possible this higher and yet more fundamental contact of presence--more fundamental because only it can fill the depths of the human spirit--can only occur through an illumination of faith in which God is the principal agent.

Given the need for a higher unification with God and the conditions necessary for it, the inescapable question we are now confronted with is whether it is something that has "found realization in life--that has been embodied, 'incarnated'? This raises the question of "the historical problem of Jesus, of His influence, of the realization of His word through the centuries," because it is the Christian claim that in the person of Christ the unification of the human in the divine has in fact found "a historical center" for the fullness of its realization. It is a phenomenon that rests entirely on the historical fact of the Incarnation of Jesus Christ.

The historical fact of Jesus, His preaching, His miracles, cannot be separated from His affirmation that He is the Son of God, that He and the Father 'are one.'
They must either be accepted together or denied together. But to deny them is not to solve the historical problem of Jesus, of His influence, of the realization of His word through the centuries. It would have the unforeseen yet logical result: that of depriving history of any intrinsic meaning, reducing it to an interplay of facts without outcome, to a continuous immanent repetition of human activity without resolution. (T.L. 231)

This is what Sturzo maintains will be the consequence of denying the Christian claim because the communication of God to man through Jesus Christ is integrally connected with every historical manifestation of God. But through this communication in which the divine has become a part of history in a special way, it has been revealed that mankind does exist on another level of participation in and unification with divine reality within history—a level that has traditionally been termed "supernatural".

Sturzo also uses the traditional natural-supernatural terminology in bringing his immanent-transcendent theory of history to completion. But it must be definitely established that he is not developing his theory within the framework of a dualistic, bifurcated view of reality, the natural and the supernatural, which is common to the traditional use of the terms. For Sturzo, the two-world view of the natural-supernatural dualism flows from the fallacy of abstractionism.

Others, brought up to consider the two domains from the point of view of abstract speculation and not in concrete reality, end by unreflectingly transforming the distinction between natural and supernatural into a kind of intellectual separatism. The non-existence of pure nature, the close interweaving of nature with the supernatural, through a mysterious and absorbing fact, is not made the basis of a thoroughgoing scrutiny of reality. (T.L. 46)

Therefore, the natural-supernatural terminology that Sturzo employs does not signify a metaphysical dualism of two worlds,
but rather two dimensions of a single reality which in its fundamental character can only be adequately described as 'historical.' This historical reality has two dimensions and both are necessary for the historicity of man and the world. Neither dimension is secondary to or reducible to the other, but rather both together constitute the single reality of the historical process. Or conversely, the historical process is the very reality in which the divine and human come together. One of the fundamental points for Sturzo in articulating his historicism was to clearly establish the intrinsic **unity** of these two dimensions of the historical process. For in doing this he was directly engaging the prevailing immanentistic theories of history, and more importantly, was showing the theoretical inadequacies and, consequently, the practical dangers of secularism in all its forms.

Nevertheless, the acceptance of the supernatural fact as an integral dimension of the human process raises some serious problems. For example, to mention one, it poses a serious methodological problem for every investigation of human reality in its socio-historical process, that is, as it is concretely and existentially, that aims to be scientific. If this supernatural factor does pervade the whole of this reality as an integral dimension of it, then, as transcendent and acknowledged only through the vision of a faith that is itself transcendent, how can it be accounted for scientifically? Yet, Sturzo insists that "to dwell as many do on rational and natural motives, either through speculative abstractionism or in accordance simply with methodological criteria (with the praiseworthy
aim of not confusing the two planes, the natural and the supernatural), renders them inapt to see the synthetic values of reality and to fight the original separatism that is at the bottom of the modern crisis." (C. & S. 559) Just as history presents to the thinker "the historicization of the divine as a constant datum," so also "society in the concrete historicizes such problems, too, with all their various consequences, be they in the scientific, cultural, ethical or religious fields."35

Thus, despite the manifold problems the presence of the divine within the structure of concrete reality presents to one who is trying to account for all the dimensions of it, if the insertion of the divine into the human process is a historical and social phenomenon, he cannot ignore it nor undervalue its influence. Both factors, the human and divine, must be considered in any analysis of the "concrete real," if they are present, or else one will fall guilty of "abstractionism."

In order to be able to understand and analyze society in the concrete, the sociologist cannot ignore the insertion, or, better, the historicization of the divine in life. While admitting that this fact, of exceptional as well as perennial importance in the history of humanity, has been and may be interpreted in diverse and even opposite ways, yet if those who treat of society in the concrete in its morphological complex and in its becoming omit or undervalue the religious factor in its historic worth, they fail in the task they have set themselves and distort human reality.36

Consequently, in the development of his integral, historicist sociology, Sturzo was inexorably drawn into the problem of the historicization of the divine, and more specifically, in

36Ibid., p. 335.
its Christian form.\textsuperscript{37} To say that Sturzo was "inexorably" drawn into dealing with this problem is to indicate that he is not guilty of the charge that he started from a ready-made thesis and sought "to introduce an extraneous dogmatic element into sociology, thus falsifying a science grounded on experiment and induction." (T.L. 12) It was only his attempt to develop a truly experimental, four-dimensional science of society in the total complexity of its concrete existence and historical development that brought him to the problem of the Christian presence in history.

Although I wished to establish the natural data of society and keep to historical experience, I could not but bring into light what history itself teaches us about Christianity in its special characteristics, not to be confounded with those of any other religion. In doing this I started from no dogmatic preconception, but from historical elements, elements which I interpreted from a strictly sociological viewpoint, as every author has the right to do. My theory of historicist sociology obliged me to study the thesis of supernaturalism in history, given that this is accepted and professed by the Christian peoples, whose number, geographical extent and continuity in time surpass those of any other human experience historically known. (T.L. 13)

As the intricacies of Sturzo's theory become unravelled, it is clear that the movement of his thought is from a consideration of the socio-historical process in its natural dimension to its supernatural dimension. The pivotal concept in this movement, as we have seen, is the concept of transcendence, and the various meanings and degrees Sturzo assigns to it indicates the shifts of perspective in his theory. It is only in his last

\textsuperscript{37}This, of course, is not to deny the non-Christian forms of an awareness of the divine in history.
major work, The True Life: Sociology of the Supernatural, that Sturzo undertakes a thorough exposition of the problem of transcendence in its Christian meaning of the supernatural. Since it is the supernatural that integrates and transcends nature, a sociological study of the supernatural presupposes an analysis of the natural. (T.L. 17-18; I.L. xxiv)

It is evident, then, that the inclusion of the religious-Christian understanding of transcendence within Sturzo's analysis of the socio-historical process cannot be construed as an a priori or dogmatic factor in his theory, nor can his theory be viewed, and dismissed, simply as an apology for Christianity by setting up in sociological idiom as the anthropological model, the classical "homo religiosus." In the first place, both of these views are contrary to his historicist methodology and the cognitive orientation of his thought. In view of both it should be apparent that, for Sturzo, there can be no such theoretical construct as the anthropological model. In his integral, historicist approach he is simply attempting to determine, through a deepening of sociological-historical research, human reality as it is so that the indeterminancy of the human process may be directed toward a broader, deeper and richer future.

Any kind of Christian apology stands as much in opposition to Sturzo's thought as an a priori rejection of transcendence or the supernatural by a reductive naturalistic position. In regard to this, Sturzo says, "I feel bound to point out that the historicization of the religious fact cannot be examined by the sociologist as a unilateral or particularist vision of
society, nor in a polemical position allied with those who deny the supernatural or those who assert a natural religiosity." 38

As A. R. Caponigri has pointed out, Sturzo had no sympathy for efforts to reconstruct history from the point of view of Christianity. All that the recognition of the presence of a divine, transcendent factor within history does mean for him is the need to formulate "a theory of history wide enough and dynamic enough to embrace in a complex unity this duality of presence without the undue subordination of one element to the other." 39

Since Sturzo's theory of history is an essential component of his comprehensive sociological theory, it is important in understanding both to determine his perspective on the science of sociology and how it can incorporate transcendent factors within its study of the socio-historical process. Sturzo himself provides this information in the "Introduction" to The True Life in order to establish the methodological and formal distinction between his theory of society, termed by him "integral sociology," which remains open to every detail of reality, and others, which, by contrast, are either abstractionist, analytical, morphological, or particularist. For our purposes here it is enough to emphasize that in Sturzo's understanding of sociology it is a study of society in the concrete, in its historical development, and directed toward discovering "the inner laws that are bound up with its very nature." (T.L. 3)


39 A. R. Caponigri, "Introduction" to Sturzo's Church and State, p. xii.
By contrast, for other sociologists, especially those influenced by positivism, sociology is a study of society in the abstract, in its fixed morphology, and directed toward the gathering of external facts. Methodologically, Sturzo's view of sociology differs from other views in his emphasis on bringing the results of analysis into synthesis so that society is approached and understood in its living, concrete complexity. Consequently, if a transcendent factor is at work within the human process, it must be accounted for within a study of society "in the concrete." Otherwise, it is "either simply analytical (presupposing 'the synthesis' with the supernatural), or is falsified by the omission of essential data on the social reality." (T.L. 14) Another distortion that follows from an a priori rejection of the supernatural is the reduction of religion, as a social fact, to either a closed naturalism or to a political moralism, which is preservative of the status and privileges of the ruling classes. All of these errors "spring from considering sociology an experimental science of external facts, and eliminating both philosophy, as a metaphysical construction, and history, as the inner process of society." (T.L. 5)

But for Sturzo, developing his historicist social theory in accord with his historical method, the empirical data of history, "not the outer history of the material facts but their inner reason, their logical connection, the metaphysic to which they give birth," does in fact point to the intervention of special divine action within the temporal process. The factual elements that reflect a human-divine synthesis at work
within the temporal process revolves around the transformation
effected through Christianity in the history of man.

The sociologist cannot deny the transformation effected
by Christianity, whether he regards it from the histori­
cal point of view, or compares Christian societies with
non-Christian, or truly Christian societies with those
which are Christian in name only or which have degener­
ated in faith and morals. All the naturalistic explana­
tions cannot suffice to elucidate the reason for such
a transformation." (T.L. 5; 12)

Two difficulties immediately present themselves. Has
Sturzo confused those factors of reality that can be acknow­
ledged only with the vision of faith with those that can be
subjected to a strictly rational, scientific explanation? If
he has not done this, how can the transcendent character of the
socio-historical process be present to the sociologist as such,
that is, as a scientist? The emphasis which Sturzo gives to
the transcendence of the supernatural dimension of history makes
it clear that he has not attempted to reduce what can be acknow­
ledged only through faith to rational analysis. As transcen­
dent the divine activity in history manifests very little of
its transcendental character in any single event. And as trans­
cendent it can never be reached or recognized by adding the
empirical data of the historical process. (T.L. 228) The his­
torical process can never directly reveal divine activity within
it, but to the extent that it is immanent within the process,
the process does function as a refracting medium of this divine
action. What Sturzo does maintain is that no reductive, natur­
alistic approach to history can provide the context of meaning
for interpreting, and thereby making intelligible, the histori­
cal process which includes the transformation wrought by Christianity.

In regard to the second difficulty, namely, how a sociologist as such can handle transcendent facts within his discipline, Sturzo affirms:

The supernatural is not made a separate section of social life, something juxtaposed to the natural, which individuals may accept or reject at will. In studying society in its complex wholeness, in the concrete, it is found to exist within the atmosphere of the supernatural, and to act and react to it according to the sociological laws which are at its natural basis. (T.L. 18)

Since the individual forms the constitutive principle of society in all its forms, all that touches the spirit of man, whether naturally or supernaturally, will manifest itself in society. "In the concrete" there is no such thing as a "purely natural" life. There is only a dual-dimensional, natural-supernatural, life in which the latter dimension raises the former to itself, "coordinates its values and ends, and synthesizes it in its own form." (T.L. 26) Thus, the sociologist who views sociology as "the science of the concrete" and wishes to investigate social phenomena as they are "in the concrete" cannot view the results of his research as "purely natural" facts. To do so is to reduce the results of his research to "a mental or methodological abstraction." (T.L. 1)

The natural and supernatural are so intertwined in all social life that in the concrete of history it is hard to discern where one is at work without the intervention of the other. The facts themselves, in their complexity, show the imprint of a higher value as soon as we discern the motives of faith and love that have shaped them." (T.L. 12)
Consequently, in his work, *The True Life*, Sturzo examines the nature, value, and influence of the supernatural dimension of the human process on society as it exists concretely. The notion of a close interweaving of the natural with the supernatural, with one influencing the other and vice versa, forms the basis of this work.

Within the scope of this essay, a central question remains to be answered in view of the acknowledgement of the special divine dispensation made manifest through the Incarnation of Christ. If this essay accurately portrays the logical movement of Sturzo's thought, what effect does the acknowledgement of this new dispensation, which admittedly can be grasped in its true and full historical value only through faith, have on the rational presentation of his theory. In other words, what readjustments, if any, must be made in that theory in view of the fuller picture provided by the light of faith? Sturzo himself provides the answer to this question within the context of his discussion of the movement towards, and attainment of, truth by those peoples who were outside Israel in pre-Christian times.

When at last these peoples (and similarly each individual) arrive at a knowledge of the substantial truth, the Word of God in His Incarnation, then all their past conquests (of truth) are lit by a new life, the glimmerings of truth grow bright, everything is reoriented and coordinated, and their history reveals itself as a hesitant journey in the dark towards this term, a secret symbol which is now unveiled.... (T.L. 239)

Conclusion

In arriving at and acknowledging the historicization of
God's own divine nature in the person of Christ, Sturzo's theory of socio-personalism and this essay have come full circle. We began our treatment of Sturzo by stating that the individual person was the central concern of both his socio-political theory and activity--of his theory to uncover the nature of the person and the conditions necessary for its realization, and of his activity to create the economic and socio-political conditions that are commensurate to that nature, preserving its innate dignity and enhancing the possibilities for its completion. Since the person, for Sturzo, is ultimately and essentially constituted in his primordial relationship to and movement towards God, and since Christianity, as the historical prolongation-participation in the divine person of Christ, has fully revealed and brought about the fullness of this relationship, the insight into the nature of the person is basically and essentially a Christian insight. And due to the nature of both the person and Christianity, it is an insight that is only mediated through history. Thus, it is also history that testifies that "the fundamental error is to conceive of Humanism and Christianity as separate, to keep their values distinct and often to oppose them, and finally to eliminate one of the two from the redeeming synthesis." (C. & S. 560) With his theory of history, consequently, Sturzo's socio-personalism is brought to completion, and reveals itself to be in its most fundamental character a Christian-humanism.
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The dissertation submitted by R. Eugene Mellican has been read and approved by members of the Department of Philosophy.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation, and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the dissertation is now given final approval with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

May 24, 1971
(date)

Dr. Robert Barry
(signature)