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A Critique of the Family as Envisaged in the Teachings of Confucius

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A CRITIQUE OF THE FAMILY AS ENVISAGED
IN THE TEACHINGS
OF CONFUCIUS

by

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VITA AUCTORIS

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PREFACE

This thesis, an evaluation of the teachings of Confucius on the family in the light of rational principles, is written in response to a request of the rector of the Catholic University in China, and as a result of the writer's own increasing realization of the disintegrating effects of divorce upon civilization. While the original plan was to compare the doctrine of Confucius with that of St. Thomas on the family with all its relationships, the writer found it necessary to restrict the topic to a treatment primarily of the family as a unit.

Considerations of expediency have induced the author to use English translations of the Chinese Classics.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In our critique of the family as envisaged in the teachings of Confucius, the doctrine of Confucius concerning marriage will be evaluated in the light of a rational interpretation of marriage, particularly as found in the teachings of Saint Thomas Aquinas.

As the spirit of the family is the most powerful influence for the reconstruction of the social order, and we are witnessing a rapid decay and disintegration of the home and family life, the writer welcomed the opportunity of writing this thesis on the family.

Two factors seem to be responsible for the rapid disintegration of the family and for the destruction of the spirit of the family in our day: divorce and the usurpation by the State of those rights peculiar to the family. The latter practice can be observed especially in those unfortunate countries behind the "Iron Curtain". However, if we were to search out the ultimate cause of both evils, we would very probably find

1 Pope Pius XIIth, Summi Pontificatus, Huntington, Ind., Sunday Visitor Press, 1939, 47.
that it is simply the denial and rejection of a universal norm of morality as well for individual and social life as for international relations, the forgetfulness of the natural law itself, which has its foundation in God.2

The history of the Roman Empire as also that of countless other nations records the hard fact that "No nation can survive the destruction of its home life....In our own country divorce threatens to do what Hitler and his armies were unable to do in central Europe."3

By nature man and the family are anterior to the State.4 If the State lays claim to the family, this primary and essential cell of society, the family, is damaged to the detriment of the public good, by being wrenched from its natural surroundings, that is, from responsible private action.5 Further, there would be danger lest the family, with its well-being and its growth, should come to be considered from the narrow standpoint of national power.6

In defense of the rights of the family, Pope Pius XIIth writes:

In any case, the more burdensome the material sacrifices demanded of the individual and the family by the State, the more must the rights of conscience be to it sacred and inviolable. Goods, blood it can demand; but the soul redeemed by God, never. The charge laid

2 Pope Pius XIIth, Summi Pontificatus, 20.
4 Pope Pius XIIth, Summi Pontificatus, 34.
5 Ibid., 33-34.
6 Ibid., 36.
by God on parents to provide for the material and spiritual good of their offspring and to procure for them a suitable training saturated with the true spirit of religion, cannot be wrested from them without grave violation of their rights."

The importance of the family both for the individual as also for society, can scarcely be overestimated. The family is the nursery of those virtues which gives society its fragrance. The family is also the ideal environment in which the individual can develop emotional stability.

Since marriage is the efficient cause of the family, we will consider first the nature, purpose and essence of marriage; thereafter, a theory of self-control needed for working together harmoniously. In chapter four we will consider the duties of parents towards their children; in chapter five, the duties of children towards their parents. Our conclusion will be an evaluation of the Confucian doctrine on the foregoing points in the light of Thomistic doctrine and principles. Throughout our thesis the doctrine of St. Thomas will be placed in juxtaposition to that of Confucius.

Since Confucius lived in the distant past, more than a century before the time of Plato and Aristotle, and since his doctrine is not usually woven into the courses of study offered in Occidental countries, as is the doctrine of St. Thomas, the writer feels obliged to give Confucius a brief introduction.

7 Pius XIIth, Summi Pontificatus, 36.
8 Ibid., 34.
Confucius is the Latinized name of the person who has been known in China as K'ung Tzu or Master K'ung; (Tzu is a polite suffix added to names of most philosophers of the Chou Dynasty, such as Chuang Tzu, Hsun Tzu, etc.). His family name was K'ung and his personal name Ch'iu. He was born in 551 B.C. in the State of Lu, in the southern part of the present Shantung Province in eastern China. His ancestors had been members of the ducal house of the State of Sung, which was descended from the royal house of Shang, the dynasty that had preceded the Chou. Because of political troubles, the family, before the birth of Confucius, had lost its noble position and migrated to Lu.

The most detailed account of the life of Confucius is the biography which comprises the forty-seventh chapter of the Shi Chi or Historical Records, (China's first dynastic history, completed 86 B.C.). From this we learn that Confucius was poor in his youth. His father, Shu-Liang Heih, was an officer in charge of the district of Tsow in the State of Lu. Since Shu-Liang Heih had but one son among his ten children,

10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
and the son was a cripple, he sought a wife, at the age of seventy, in the Yen family where there were three daughters.16 While the two elder of them demurred when apprised by their father of the old man's suit, the youngest, Chingtsai, only seventeen years of age, offered to abide by her father's judgment.17 A year later Confucius was born; and only three years thereafter, his mother became a widow.18 Thus, Confucius was the child of Shuliang Heih's old age. Moderate writers trace his ancestry back to the commencement of the Chou dynasty, B.C. 1121. Some even trace it as far back as B.C. 2637.19 His birth was surrounded with many prodigious occurrences.20

We have few notes of Confucius' early years; at nineteen he married a lady from the State of Sung, of the Chien-Kwan family, and in the following year his son, Li, was born.21 About this time Confucius took his first public employment as keeper of the stores of grain, and in the following year he was put in charge of the public fields and lands.22

16 Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, xvii.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 35-36.
21 Ibid., 37.
22 Ibid., 38.
At the age of twenty-two Confucius commenced his labors as a public teacher, and his house became a resort for young and inquiring spirits who wished to learn the doctrines of antiquity. Regardless of how small a fee his pupils could afford, Confucius never refused his instructions. All that he required was an ardent desire for improvement, and some degree of capacity. We have some idea of what he expected of his pupils from his words: "I do not open up the truth to one who is not eager to get knowledge, nor help out anyone who is not anxious to explain himself. When I have presented one corner of a subject to anyone, and he cannot from it learn the other three, I do not repeat my lesson." 

In about 517 B.C. Confucius had several interviews with Lao-Tsze, the founder of Taoism, who, however, was of the next previous generation. Although Confucius was poor, he entered the government of Lu and by the time he was fifty had reached high official rank. As a result of political intrigue, however, he was soon forced to resign his post and go into exile. For the next thirteen years, that is, between the ages of fifty-six and sixty-nine, he traveled from one state to another, always hoping to find an opportunity to realize his ideal of political and social

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23 Brown, Story of Confucius, 39.
24 Ibid.
25 Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, xviii.
26 Feng, Short History of Chinese Philosophy, 38.
27 Ibid., 38.
reform.\textsuperscript{28} Nowhere did he succeed and finally as an old man he returned to Lu, where he died three years later.\textsuperscript{29}

Confucius was the first person in Chinese history to teach large numbers of students in a private capacity.\textsuperscript{30} With the practice of private teaching the rise of philosophic schools began.\textsuperscript{31} During his lifetime Confucius had about three thousand disciples and about seventy or eighty of these he esteemed very highly.\textsuperscript{32} He was accompanied during his travels in different states by students whom he taught in a private capacity.\textsuperscript{33}

The Six Classics, which included the five King and the four Shoo (Shoo–writings or books), of which more will be said later, had existed before the time of Confucius; they constituted the cultural legacy of the past, and had been the basis of education for the aristocrats during the early centuries of feudalism of the Chou dynasty.\textsuperscript{34}

As Confucius wanted his disciples to be "rounded men" who would be useful to the state and to society, he taught them various branches of knowledge based upon the different classics.\textsuperscript{35} He felt that his primary

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{28} Feng, \textit{Short History of Chinese Philosophy}, 38.
  \item \textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 39.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 38.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} Dawson, \textit{Ethics of Confucius}, xvii.
  \item \textsuperscript{33} Feng, \textit{Short History of Chinese Philosophy}, 39.
  \item \textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 40.
  \item \textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
function as a teacher was to interpret to his disciples the ancient cultural heritage. For this reason, as we know from his own words in the Analects, he was a "transmitter and not an originator". However, while transmitting the traditional institutions and ideas, Confucius gave them interpretations derived from his own moral concepts. We can observe this in his interpretation of the old custom that on the death of a parent, a son should mourn three years. Commenting on this Confucius said: "The child cannot leave the arms of his parents until it is three years old. That is why the three years' mourning is universally observed throughout the world.

In other words, since the son was utterly dependent upon his parents for at least the first three years of his life, he should, upon their death, mourn them for an equal length of time in order to express his gratitude. Confucius also gave new interpretations to the Classics when teaching them; for example, in speaking of the "Book of Poetry", he stressed its moral value by saying: "In the 'Book of Poetry' there are three hundred poems. But the essence of them can be covered in one sentence: 'Have no depraved thoughts'. In this way, Feng says, Confucius was more than a mere transmitter, for in transmitting, he originated something new.

This spirit of originating together with transmitting was perpetu-

36 Feng, Short History of Chinese Philosophy, 40.
37 Confucius, Analects, VII,1, cited in Feng, Short History of Chinese Philosophy, 40.
38 Feng, Short History of Chinese Philosophy, 40.
39 Confucius, Analects, XVIII,21, cited in Feng, Short History of Chinese Philosophy, 40.
40 Feng, Short History of Chinese Philosophy, 40-41.
ated by the followers of Confucius, by whom, as the classical texts were handed down from generation to generation, countless commentaries and interpretations were written.42

It was this spirit of originating through transmitting that set Confucius apart from the ordinary literati of his time, and made him the founder of a new school.43 Since the followers of this school were at the same time scholars and specialists on the Six Classics, the school became the School of the Literati.44

Besides the new interpretations which Confucius gave to the Classics, he had his own ideas about the individual and society, heaven and man.

In regard to society, Confucius held that in order to have a well-ordered one, the most important thing is to carry out what he called the rectification of names. Things in actual fact should be made to accord with the implication attached to them by names. Every name contains certain implications which constitute the essence of that class of things to which the name applies. Such things should agree with this ideal essence; for example, the essence of a ruler is what the ruler ideally ought to be, or what, in Chinese is called "the way of the ruler".45 If a ruler acts according to this way of the ruler, he is then truly a ruler, in fact as well as

42 Feng, Short History of Chinese Philosophy, 41.
43 Ibid.
44 Feng, Short History of Chinese Philosophy, 41.
45 Ibid., 42.
in name; there is then an agreement between name and actuality. If he does not, he is no ruler, even though he may popularly be regarded as such. Every name in the social relationships implies certain responsibilities and duties. Ruler, minister, father and son are the names of such social relationships, and the individuals bearing these names must fulfill their responsibilities and duties accordingly. Such is the implication of Confucius' theory of the rectification of names.46

With regard to the virtues of the individual, Confucius emphasized human-heartedness and righteousness, but especially the former. The righteousness referred to here means the "oughtness" of a situation; it is analogous to Kant's categorical imperative. Confucius maintained that every one in society has certain things which he ought to do, and which must be done for their own sake, because they are the morally right things to do. He taught a theory of "doing 'for' nothing", that is, what one does for another he does "for nothing", in the conviction that the value of doing what he ought to do lies in the doing itself, and not in the external result.47

Confucius' own life is certainly a good example of this teaching. He lived in an age of great social and political disorder and tried his best to reform the world.48 He traveled everywhere, and like Socrates, talked to everybody. Although his efforts were in vain, he was never disappointed. He knew that he could not succeed, but kept on trying.

46 Feng, Short History of Chinese Philosophy, 41.
47 Ibid., 45.
48 Ibid.
In reference to himself Confucius said: "If my principles are to prevail in the world, it is 'Ming'. Ming is often translated as Fate, Destiny or Decree. To Confucius, it meant the decree of Heaven or Will of Heaven; in other words, it was conceived of as a purposeful force. 49

Concerning his spiritual development Confucius said: "At fifteen I set my heart on learning. At thirty I could stand. At forty I had no doubts. At fifty I knew the Decree of Heaven. At sixty I was already obedient (to this Decree). At seventy I could follow the desires of my mind without overstepping the boundaries (of what is right)." 50

The statement of Confucius, that at forty he had no doubts, means that he had then become a wise man, for previously he had said, "The wise are free from doubts." 51 Perhaps up to this time of his life Confucius was conscious only of moral values, but at the age of fifty and sixty he knew the Decree of Heaven and was obedient to it. In other words, he was then also conscious of super-moral values. 52 In this respect Confucius was like Socrates. Socrates thought that he had been appointed by a divine order to awaken the Greeks, and Confucius had a similar consciousness of a divine mission. When he was threatened with physical violence at a place called K'uang, he said: "If Heaven wished to let civilization perish, later

49 Feng, Short History of Chinese Philosophy, 45.
50 Confucius, Analects, II, 4, cited in Feng, Short History of Chinese Philosophy, 45.
51 Feng, Short History of Chinese Philosophy, 46.
52 Ibid.
generations (like myself) would not have been permitted to participate in it; but since Heaven has not wished to let civilization perish, what can the people of K'uang do to me?  

That Confucius was not without human sorrows is evident from the fact that in 482 B.C. he lost his only son; then in 481 B.C. he lost his favorite student, Yen Hwuy, and in 478 B.C. Tsze-lu, another of his favorites passed away. This was the same year that Confucius himself died at the age of seventy-two. One morning shortly before his death Confucius got up, and with his hands behind his back, dragging his staff, he moved about by the door crooning the words:

The great mountain must crumble;
The strong beam must break;
And the wise man wither away like a plant.

The following text gives some of the last words of this great sage, and those words included an expression of regret that his teachings were not being accepted, though the latter were not without their tremendous influence after the death of Confucius. The text reads:

After a little he entered the house and sat down opposite the door. Tsze-kung had heard his words, and said to himself, 'If the great mountain crumble, to what shall I look up? If the strong beam break, and the wise man wither away, on whom shall I lean? The master, I fear is going to be ill.' With this he hastened into the house. Confucius said to him, '...last night I dreamt that I was sitting with

53 Feng, Short History of Chinese Philosophy, 46-47.
54 Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, xviii.
55 Brown, The Story of Confucius, 78.
offerings before me between the two pillars. No intelligent monarch arises; there is not one in the kingdom that will make me his master. My time has come to die.' So it was. He went to his couch, and, after seven days, expired.56

Thus the last words of Confucius were regrets that none of the rulers then living possessed the sagacity requisite for a proper appreciation of his ethical philosophy and teachings.57 His end was melancholic; disappointed hopes made his soul bitter.58 Neither his wife nor child was at hand to do the kindly offices of affection for him.59 He had no expectations of another life as he passed through the dark valley, and he uttered no prayer; yet he betrayed no apprehensions.60 Deep in his heart he may have had the thought that he had endeavored to serve his generation by the will of God, even though he gave no sign.61 The expression, "the will of God", as used here, the writer thinks, must be interpreted to mean what Confucius meant by such expressions as the Decree of Heaven or the Will of Heaven. By these terms he meant a certain "purposeful force".62

Although Confucius died unhonored, he probably felt in the flickering beats of his failing heart that his inspiring pleas for truth and justice, industry and self-denial, moderation and public duty, would yet

59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
stir the depths of the social life of his land, even though they had not
too greatly influenced the minds of men during his own lifetime.

Confucius was primarily a practical man; he was neither a theor-
ist nor a philosopher. He cared but little for discussions or for meta-
physics and spoke little of the supernatural. He did not claim to be
divine, or to found a religion. Rather, he taught human relations and their
duties and maintained that human conduct was the all important thing. He
was a modest man of few words and reverential toward the Supreme Power. He
was interested in politics and good government. He emphasized three virtues
in particular: propriety, filial duty and respect for tradition. Love for
man was the cardinal virtue of his teachings. These teachings, whether a
system of ethics or a philosophy, became the dominant religion of China in
which Confucius was worshipped. Confucius seems to have had a saying to
meet every occasion. His portrait adorns almost every Chinese home, no
matter how humble; and his tomb in the town of Chufou, where he was born
and where he died, is a national shrine. Confucius is also regarded as
a "Prophet of Peace".

Many of the lofty ideals to which Confucius gives utterance did
not originate with him; rather, he gleaned them from Chinese tradition.

In accordance with this tradition, the family is the social unit, the foun-
dation stone on which Chinese society is built. Since sons remain in the family even after marriage, three or four generations often live in the same "compound". The latter is a series of buildings grouped around a court and enclosed within a wall. A pattern of well-established rules of conduct govern the relationships among the generations.67 China is referred to as the paradise of the aged because the greatest virtue is filial piety, respect for one's elders, which is designated by a character (hsao) composed of "son" supporting "old age".68 Children learn while yet very young how to get along with others because of the large number of relatives whom they must obey and respect.69 Individual ownership is discouraged at an early age; even toys are group property.70

One's highest loyalty, according to Chinese tradition, is to one's family, and this acts as a social check: if a person commits a wrong, the reputation of his entire family, even of the ancestors long dead, is at stake.71

A sense of belonging and fitting into the scheme of things comes out of this family system, as also a strong family solidarity.72 All this is fostered by the gayety in family life in China; a good deal of time is spent in visiting relatives; and births, weddings, and funerals are all events of highest importance, with special rituals and lavish feasts.73

67 People of China, 3.
68 Ibid., 3-4.
69 Ibid., 4.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
Unfortunately, much of this is quickly passing out of the picture; the impact of Western ideas and the recent war, if not also the war currently raging in the orient at the time of this writing, are factors responsible for the breaking up of the traditional family system in China. However, its roots are deeply imbedded and some of the ideas are bound to linger on, even among the Chinese living in this country. One can observe the great family solidarity among the Chinese people by such gatherings as the Wong family convention, representing ten thousand persons bearing that name, which was held in San Francisco as late as July, 1942, in order to bring about greater "family and patriotic unity." 74

According to the Chinese tradition, the kings educated their people by their own exemplary conduct, and the most perfect of all the laws were thereby produced. The most ancient kings of China were philosophers. 75 Plato thought that the welfare of the state depended on the rule of philosophers. 76 The People of China were the practicers of this principle, and in this way China became the first country of Enlightenment. 77

The social philosophy of China as propounded by her ancient sages is also essentially a doctrine of universal love, but, unlike Christianity, it is purely a working principle of mundane life, without pretension to super-

74 People of China, 4.
75 Kung Chuan Hsiao, Ph.D., China's Contribution to World Peace, 8.
77 China's Contribution to World Peace, 8.
natural religion. This difference, however, has not prevented it from becoming a spiritual force which enriched and ennobled the civilization of China.

Although the conception of love might have existed since China's antiquity, it was Confucius who first gave it a profound meaning and developed it into a coherent philosophy. That universal love or 'jen', (in Confucian parlance) is the core of Confucius' social and moral teachings. The meaning which Confucius gave to the word, "jen", was "to love your fellow men". The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of 'jen'. 'Jen' is human-heartedness pure and simple; it is the inborn altruistic feeling which distinguishes man from brutes. The practice of 'jen' begins with the purification of one's own mind and the cultivation of one's own character; when these are achieved, the next step is to apply one's benevolent deeds to his fellow beings.

The conception of universal love logically culminates in the ideal of Universal Communion (TaTung). Perhaps one of the most sublime
teachings of Confucius was his doctrine that all under heaven (t'ien hsia) constitute one family, and that all "Within the four seas are brothers". 87 Confucius also said that all, from the Son of Heaven (T'ien Tsze) to the common people, must consider the cultivation of the person to be fundamental. 88 His "Great Learning", which is one of the chapters of the "Le Ke" or "Record of Rites", teaches men to exemplify illustrious virtue, to love the people, and to rest in the highest good. 89 To rest in the highest good that is the supreme ideal to which all persons must aspire. 90 In order to achieve this ideal, it is necessary to dismiss all considerations of utility or material gains. All virtue must consist in disinterested performance of righteous actions, since 'jen' is simply articulate human-heartedness. Tung Chung-shu aptly expressed this thought in the words: "Be correct in righteousness without considering the profitableness of the result of the action; be pure in one's principles without considering whether they bring material return. 91 This philosophy of self-denial is an integral part of the doctrine of Confucius; it invariably set itself against any theory that took utility and profit into consideration. 92 In the opinion of Kung-Chuan Hsiao, Confucius and his disciples were the most eminent propounders of the

87 Hsiao, China's Contribution to World Peace, 15.
88 Ibid., 17.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., 18.
doctrine of universal love. The Confucian doctrine of universal love or 'jen' seems to be based on the following reasoning: those who hate and injure others are partial in their love. Now partiality against one another is the cause of the major calamities in the world; consequently partiality is wrong. (That Confucius lacked a grasp of an objective moral law seems apparent here; he fails to see that an offence against one's fellowmen is simultaneously an offence against a Supreme Being.) Partiality, he maintains, is to be replaced by universality, and when everyone regards the states of others as he regards his own, no one would attack the states of others. "...Whoever loves others will be loved by others, and whoever benefits others will be benefited by others. Whoever hates others will be hated by others, and whoever injures others will be injured by others." Thus the principle of universality implies the principle of reciprocity, and the love of fellow beings is the best and most profitable investment that the individual can make in society.

The words of Confucius in the Analects will help one in getting an understanding of the meaning of his doctrine on universal love or 'jen'. There he says, "The man of 'jen' is one who, desiring to sustain himself,

93 Hsiao, China's Contribution to World Peace, 18.
94 Ibid., 19.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., 20.
97 Ibid.
sustains others, and desiring to develop himself, develops others. To be able from one's own self to draw a parallel for the treatment of others; that may be called the way to the practice of 'jen'.

Thus, the practice of 'jen' consists in consideration for others; in order to sustain oneself, one sustains others, and in order to develop oneself, one develops others. The positive aspect of the practice is given in the words, "Do to others what you wish yourself." Confucius calls this 'chung' or "conscientiousness to others." The negative aspect contained in the words, "Do not do to others what you do not wish yourself", Confucius referred to as 'shu' or "altruism." The practice as a whole is called the principle of 'chung' and 'shu', which is the way to practice 'jen'.

This principle is sometimes spoken of as the "principle of applying a measuring square"; that is, it is a principle by which one uses oneself as a standard to regulate one's conduct.

While Confucianism is sometimes called a religion, it is first of all a system of ethics and political philosophy designed to keep society

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98 Confucius, Analects, VI,28, cited in Feng, Short History of Chinese Philosophy, 43.

99 Feng, Short History of Chinese Philosophy, 43.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid.

103 Ibid.
Confucius taught that the ruler was to be virtuous in his behavior toward the people, and the people in turn were to be submissive to authority. The training ground for the obedient subject was the family which Confucius also considered as the foundation of the State. In the family children were taught to show filial piety toward their parents and to revere the aged. Ancestors were worshipped; family ties were closely knit; unfortunately, however, the status of women was strikingly inferior to that of men.

A study of China, particularly its cultural heritage of which the doctrine of Confucius is definitely a significant part, is of tremendous importance and value for the reasons that China is the outstanding type of Eastern civilization, just as America is considered to be the outstanding type of Western civilization; and China, as well as America, is considered to be an important history making nation of the next few centuries.

Then, too, there may be considerable truth in these words of far reaching implication uttered by the Secretary of State in the McKinley administration, John Hay: "The world's peace rests with China and whosoever understands China socially, politically, economically, religiously, holds the key to the world's politics during the next five centuries."

104 Lawrence K. Rosinger, Forging a New China, Foreign Policy Association, 1948, 6.

105 Ibid.


107 Ibid.
Confucius profoundly influenced every phase of Chinese life with his practical philosophy. Up to the year 1912 particularly the Chinese social and political institutions were very greatly influenced by Confucianism. "The men who mold conduct (if such were possible) of the Chinese people in general—the governors, the magistrates, and the officials—were men of letters," 108 writes a present day missionary after his return from China. He says, further, "In order to qualify for these positions, candidates read Confucius and commentators on Confucius, and the commentators on the commentators; and then in turn they wrote essays on topics which dealt with Confucian thought. In this way the doctrines of Confucius must be regarded as an important source of Chinese thought. Without doubt they helped to create 'public opinion'." 109

Right after 1912, this same missionary observes, there was a sharp break; "New China" wanted nothing to do with Confucius. 110 The students especially, Father Healy, O.S.B., writes, would not even read the Classics; they blamed them for China's all too obvious backwardness. 111

The change of policy in China right after 1912 was no doubt a result of the Chinese Revolution which began on October 10th, 1911, a day

109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
now celebrated as China's Fourth of July.112 On this day the Ch'ing or
Manchu Dynasty was overthrown, and the Chinese Republic was set up under the
leadership of Sun Yat-sen, its first president.113

Another factor influential in undermining Confucian thought in
China is the Communist propaganda, as we can observe from the following
words of the recently returned missionary from China:

The Communists with their usual adroitness were quick to seize upon
this weapon [discontent with Confucianism] so valuable for their
purposes. Their aim of course is a destruction of all institutions
that tend to stabilize the Government and the national life. Perhaps
the most deadly attacks on Confucian influence in China at the present
come from Communist propaganda. Without doubt their efforts will
hasten the day when Confucius will be completely discredited and
disowned by China.

In conclusion, I would say: Confucius and his doctrines still
have much influence in China since they helped to build up a social
order. It will take a long time to upset such a strong tradition.
But the process is under way. The impact of Western thought and the
relentless attacks of the Communists on Confucianism are the chief
agents in the process.114

Father Healy, O.S.B., asserts, on the basis of his own experience
and the theories he evolved more or less from those experiences, that with­
out doubt Confucianism is influential in China.115 "We might even say it's
influence was predominant, but solely on account of the past."116

112 East and West Association, People of China, 12.
113 Ibid.
114 Letter from the Rev. Father Sylvester Healy, O.S.B.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
While the ethical and political precepts of Confucius are not well known in Occidental countries, some are of the opinion that these ethical teachings have for more than 2,000 years been accepted by a larger number of human beings than those of any other teacher.  

Confucianism stood for a rationalized social order through the ethical approach, based on personal cultivation. It aimed at political order by laying the basis for it in the moral order and sought political harmony by trying to achieve moral harmony in man himself. In this aim as expressed here, there is evidence of a profound insight into the root cause of political disorder. However, the problem of correcting social evil is made more acute by the absence in Confucianism of any sharp sense of what evil is. Confucius believed that there was widespread goodness in the past, and that it would take only a few true gentlemen with knowledge of ritual to set the country right once again. He saw no seriously entrenched obstacles such as greed, covetousness, or ego, against which his Taoist contemporaries railed.

Confucianism was fundamentally a humanist attitude which brushed

117  Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 37.
119  Ibid.
120  Ibid.
121  Ibid.
122  Ibid.
aside all metaphysics and mysticism and was interested chiefly in human relationships rather than in the world of spirits or in immortality. Perhaps the strongest doctrine of this particular type of humanism is the doctrine that "the measure of man is man," a doctrine which makes it possible for the common man to begin somewhere as a follower of Confucianism by merely following the highest instincts of his own human nature, and not by looking for perfection in a divine ideal. This doctrine seems to suggest that truth is relative. One observes here also a similarity between this doctrine and that of the Sophist, Protagoras, whose best known statement is: "Man is the measure of all things, of those that are that they are, of those that are not that they are not." 

There has been much controversy regarding the interpretation of the foregoing famous saying of Protagoras. Some maintain that by the term "man" in the above quotation Protagoras does not mean the individual man, but man in the specific sense. If this were so, then the meaning of the dictum would not be that "what appears to you to be true is true for you, and what appears to me to be true is true for me," but rather that the

124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid., 87-88.
community or group or the whole human species is the criterion and standard of truth. Concerning the meaning of the word "things" in the same quotation from Protagoras, there are also divergent opinions. Some hold that it should be understood exclusively of the objects of sense perception only; others think it should be extended to cover the field of values as well.

Although there appears to be a similarity between the doctrine of Confucius, that man is the measure of man, and the above referred to doctrine of Protagoras, in reality there may be less similarity than at first appears.

A consideration of the texts from the writings of Confucius, which will appear in the following chapters, will clarify our concept of Confucius and give us a better understanding of his fundamental ideas.

Saint Thomas Aquinas, one of the greatest philosophic minds that ever lived, whom the writer regards as the greatest medieval philosopher and theologian, needs no lengthy introduction to Westerners, to those of us living in Occidental countries. His doctrine is more frequently disseminated in our schools than is the doctrine of Confucius.

In the mind of Pope Leo the XIIIth, St. Thomas Aquinas towers above all the other Scholastic Doctors as being "their master and prince."

129 Copleston, History of Philosophy, I, 88.
130 Ibid.
Cognizant of the dangers threatening family life and even civil society itself, Leo the XIIIth, seventy years ago, made the following observation relative to the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas:

Truly all civil society would be much more tranquil and much safer if healthier teaching were given in universities and schools, a doctrine more in unison with the perpetual teaching office (magisterium) of the Church, such as is contained in the volumes of Thomas Aquinas.  

Perhaps, to a limited extent, the writer has experienced the truth of the foregoing statement of Leo XIIIth, having experienced an unspeakable tranquillity of soul in consequence of reading the volumes of St. Thomas Aquinas, particularly his Summa Theologica. Without doubt all civil society would be much more tranquil and much safer if the healthier teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas were taught in the schools.  

While the writer is not aware of any previous studies having been made containing an evaluation of the teachings of Confucius on the family in the light of rational principles, particularly as based on the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas, the writer found Norbert A. Dentinger's thesis, The Natural Unity and Indissolubility of Marriage, very helpful in the editing of this thesis. In his thesis Dentinger arrives at the conclusion that the properties of unity and indissolubility are essential to marriage.

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133 Ibid., xv.

134 Norbert A. Dentinger, The Natural Unity and Indissolubility of Marriage, St. Louis, St. Louis University, 1929.
From her previous studies, particularly in the fields of religion and psychology, the writer has gleaning much of the theory of self-control (or "constitutional control") included in this thesis. This theory takes into consideration the nature of man as he truly is, a contingent and composite being with a hierarchy of powers. The nature of man was treated at length in such valuable and helpful courses as: "Character Education", "Social Philosophy and the Guidance Program", "Moral Content of Secondary School Religion" and others which the writer had pursued previously. The writings of St. Thomas form the basis of the theory of self-control to be presented in this thesis, and much of it is contained in such works as: Character Formation in College, God Is Its Founder and The Missing Value.

Since Confucius did not consistently uphold the unity and indissolubility of marriage, as evident from his toleration of the institution of concubinage as also divorce, it is doubtful whether he had a true concept of marriage. If we are to admit that he had a concept of true marriage, we must admit that he certainly had an incomplete view thereof. Further,

135 Course taught at St. Louis, St. Louis University, 1942-1945.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
140 Claire A. Peugnet, The Missing Value in Medical Social Case Work, St. Louis, School of Social Service, St. Louis University, Studies No. 1.
his view of the family seems to have been distorted by his doctrine on ancestor worship. To his mind, the prime purpose of children was to ensure the continuation of the ancestral rites.

While the original writings of Confucius are no longer extant, the available evidence seems to show that we have in the Classical Books of China what the great sage of China and his disciples gave to their country more than two thousand years ago. 141

Amid the disorder and collision of the warring States (B.C. 480-221) the literary monuments were destroyed by fire in order to keep the people in ignorance. 142 It was the founder of the Ts'in Dynasty who ordered the burning of the ancient books in B.C. 212; this was three years before the death of the tyrant who commanded it. Eleven years after this order, the Han Dynasty began its reign, that is, two centuries before Christ. The latter dynasty, as also the successive dynasties, took great pains to find and preserve the Classics or writings of Confucius. 143 In fact, the Han Dynasty took over Confucianism as state doctrine. 144 "In slightly modified form it so continued, even at times when Buddhism or Taoism replaced it as the state religious cult, until the 1911 overthrow of the Ch'ing Dynasty." 145 Perhaps the chief reason for its longevity was its preoccupation with stability and order. 146

142 Ibid., 3.
143 Ibid., 5.
144 Mauer, "Trouble With China Is Confucius," Fortune, XXXV, 158.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
Under the name of the Chinese Classics are included the follow-
books: the five King and the four Shoo (Shoo-writings or books).\textsuperscript{147} However, the oldest enumerations of the Classical books specify only the five
King which are: Yih, "The Book of Changes"; Shoo, or "Book of History";
She, or "Book of Poetry"; Le Ke, or "Record of Rites"; Ch’un Ts’ew, or
"Spring and Autumn" (which was a chronicle of events from 721 to 480 B.C.).

Legge asserts that there is adequate evidence to show that the
Classical Books of China have come down from at least a century before our
Christian era, substantially the same as we have them at present.\textsuperscript{149} As
regards the condition of the books when the scholars of the Han Dynasty
commenced their labors upon them, the scholars admit that the "slips and
tables" which they collected were mutilated.\textsuperscript{150} However, Legge claims
that there is nothing in the nature of the case to interfere with our
believing that the materials were sufficient to enable the scholars to
execute the work entrusted to them.\textsuperscript{151}

Here we will proceed by means of an objective research, making a
collection and an analysis of the various texts containing the doctrine of
Confucius regarding marriage and the family, for the purpose of evaluating

\textsuperscript{147} Legge, Chinese Classics, 1861, I, I, 1.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.
them in the light of rational principles governing the family. These rational principles governing the family, in other words, a rational interpretation of the family, will be taken chiefly from the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, particularly from his *Summa Theologica*\(^{152}\) and his *Summa Contra Gentiles*.\(^{153}\) For the doctrine of Confucius our main source will be the *Chinese Classics*, particularly as translated by James Legge, D.D.

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* Reference to the *Summa Theologica* is customarily by abbreviation. As an example, the first reference to the *Summa Theologica* occurring in our thesis is in Chapter II. It reads: "S.T., III, Suppl., Q. 65, a.1" and means that it is in the "Supplement", question sixty-five, article the first. Reference to the *Summa Contra Gentiles* will be made by Roman numbers indicating the Book (there are four) and Arabic numbers indicating the chapter of that Book, e.g., the first reference in the thesis is in chapter II and reads: III, 123, meaning Book Three, Chapter 123.

CHAPTER II

MARRIAGE AND ITS PROPERTIES

In order now to come to grips with the problem of our thesis, it is proper to consider the nature and purpose of marriage, as also to make an analysis of the marriage contract so as to discover its conditions and requirements. We will first present the doctrine of Confucius; thereafter, that of St. Thomas. In the light of the latter's principles governing marriage and the family, the doctrine of Confucius will be evaluated.

Confucius defines marriage as a union of two surnames in friendship and love, as we observe in the text:

It (marriage) is the union of two surnames in friendship and love, to continue the posterity of the sages of old, to supply those who shall preside at the sacrifices to Heaven and Earth, at sacrifices to ancestors, at sacrifices to the spirits of the land and grain....

The purpose of marriage, in the mind of Confucius, was to ensure the posterity for the continuation of ancestral rites. The only inexorable rule which Confucius put down as regards marriage was that, "A man in taking a wife does not choose one of the same surname as himself." In other words, he insisted on exogamy. This rather than any other rule based on kinship, was enforced because the wife was considered to merge herself

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1 Confucius, Li Ki, XXIV, 10, cited in Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 143.

2 Ibid., XXVII, 34, cited in Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 141.
in her husband's family, to join in the sacrifices to his ancestors and to give her life over to the bearing and rearing of sons to continue his race and to preserve his ancestral temple. She thus lost her relationship to her own kindred; during the continuance of the marriage relation and permanently unless it were dissolved by divorce; and therefore relatives on her mother's side, however near, were not considered to be within the prohibited degree of consanguinity, while relatives on the father's side, however remote, were so esteemed. Confucius seemed to think that if the husband and wife were of the same surname, their children would not do well and multiply.

While one can scarcely deny that Confucius had reason at work in the formation of his concept of marriage and the family, yet he seems to have been led astray by the doctrine of ancestor worship. Devotion to ancestors seems to distort his whole view of the family.

Then in defining marriage as a union of two surnames in friendship and love, Confucius does not seem to give one a concept of the true nature of marriage, its essential properties, conditions and requirements. According to Confucius, husband and wife, though wedded, were free to separate at will and without constraint, save as the authority of the husband's

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3 Confucius, Ia K1, XXVII, 34, cited in Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 141.

4 Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 141.

5 Ibid.
parents over him—not relaxed upon his marriage—might restrain him.  

Marriage was treated as a contract which was at all times mutual, binding only as the parties continued to consent that it should bind. With a mere word, either party could dissolve it.

Although Confucius endeavored to inculcate the permanency of the marriage bond and counselled that it be enduring, he did not consistently maintain and assert that indissolubility was an essential or even necessary property of marriage. His emphasis on fidelity is apparent in the text:

"Faithfulness is requisite in all service of others and faithfulness is especially the virtue of a wife. Once mated with her husband, all her life she will not change her feeling of duty to him; hence, when the husband dies, she will not marry again."

Confucius counselled that the marriage bond be enduring in the text:

"The rule for the relation of husband and wife is that it should be enduring."

The lack of consistency on the part of Confucius becomes apparent in the following texts relative to divorce, that is, complete divorce with the consequent permission to remarry:

When a feudal lord sent his wife away, she proceeded on her journey to her own state, and was received there with the observances

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6 Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 147.
7 Ibid., 147.
8 Ibid.
10 Confucius, Yi King, appendix VI, sect. ii, 32, cited in Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 151.
due a lord's wife. The messenger accompanying her then discharged his commission, saying: 'My poor master, from his want of ability, was not able to follow her and to take part in the services at your altars and in your ancestral temple. He has, therefore, sent me, so-and-so; and I venture to inform your officer, appointed for the purpose, of what he had done.' The officer presiding on this occasion replied: 'My poor master in his former communication to you did not inform you about her and he does not presume to do anything but to receive your master's message, respectfully.' The officers in attendance on the commissioner then set forth the various articles sent with the lady on her marriage and those on the other side received them.

When the wife went away from her husband, she sent a messenger and took leave of him, saying: 'So-and-so, through her want of ability, is not able to keep on supplying the vessels of grain for your sacrifices; and has sent me, so-and-so, to presume to announce this to your attendants.' The principal party bowing to him and escorting him. If the husband's father were living, he named himself as the principal party; if he were dead, an elder brother of the husband acted for him and the message was given as from him; if there were no elder brother, it ran as from the husband, himself.11

In the above rules of the ceremony for divorce we observe the utter absence of recrimination and abuse, due to the circumstance that charges of evil conduct were not required as a condition to the divorce being allowed and that, instead, the mere will of either party was enough.12 This contrasts sharply and strongly with the invasion of family privacy, the exposure of family shame, and the defamation of character which accompany divorce proceedings under the laws of the advanced civilization of Occidental countries.13

12 Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 148-149.
13 Ibid., 149.
Although the Confucian concept of marriage tolerated divorce, there was much moral restraint upon the wife to continue such, even though not satisfied with her lot.\textsuperscript{14} Her prospects of a second and happier marriage were not very alluring, for it was contrary to Confucian doctrine and contrary to the prevailing custom for women ever to remarry, even though their husbands died.\textsuperscript{15} Then, too, the reception which a wife could expect at her home, in the event of a divorce, was not likely to be a warm welcome; often it was not only cold, but even harsh.\textsuperscript{16} Further, if she had any children, her lot was even more deplorable, for, very early after infancy, they became members of her husband's family and were lost to her forever.\textsuperscript{17} In many cases there would also be the prosaic bread-and-butter question; this was presented in an aggravated form in a country where by general consent a virtuous woman's place was in the home.\textsuperscript{18}

Finally, not the least of the mother's hardships if she was the mother of the eldest living son, who became, after his father's death, the head of the family, was that after her death he could not go into mourning for her if divorced; for he was too completely identified with the service of the departed ancestors of the family of which he was the head and which she had abandoned.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{14} Dawson, \textit{Ethics of Confucius}, 149.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 149-150.
The hardships inflicted upon the husband by divorce, on the contrary, were not so serious. While he had to return the dower, he retained the more precious fruits of the marriage, his children. However, the consciousness of this very inequality, coupled with the traditional protective attitude toward the women of one's own family, acted upon the husband as a powerful deterrent, especially in view of the fact that he could seek through concubinage, of which we will treat next, a more acceptable consort and mother for his children, without thus entirely displacing, humiliating, and perhaps greatly injuring his spouse. In accord with the age-old standards, the doctrine of Confucius regarding marriage permitted divorce for the following causes: disobedience to parents-in-law, failure to bear a son, adultery, jealousy of her husband, leprosy, garrulity and theft.

However, the husband was not free to divorce his wife whenever any one of the following three conditions obtained: if she had no home to return to, if she had mourned three years with him for his parents, or if his condition had formerly been poor and mean and was now rich and honorable.

The above rules concerning divorce are also contained in the code of the Manchu Dynasty.

20 Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 150.
21 Ibid.
22 Elder Tai, Record of Rites, lxxx, cited in Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 150.
23 Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 150.
24 Ibid.
In practice the only restraints upon the husband, other than that he return the dower, were first, that he obtain the approval of his father, if living, or his elder brother, if the father were dead; and second, that his wife be permitted through her ranking male relative, to appeal to the court if one of the three conditions under which divorce was not permissible was alleged to exist. The husband and his father or elder brother were the sole and final judges as to whether or not one of the seven causes for divorce were present. The wife could divorce her husband with his consent, which meant, again, with the consent of his father or elder brother, also; and, since she had to return to her father or elder brother, she first had to obtain their consent and approval. Divorce was by the parties themselves, and not by a court, though under certain circumstances it was subject to judicial review.

From the foregoing it is clear that the Confucian concept of marriage lacked the property of indissolubility. Failing to understand that marriage was founded by God and that the laws governing it were fixed by the Author of Nature, Confucius seemed to think that the marriage bond was binding only so long as the parties to it continued to consent that it should bind, and that either party could with a word dissolve it.

25 Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 150-151.
26 Ibid., 151.
27 Ibid., 151.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., 147.
Not only did the Confucian concept of marriage lack the property of indissolubility, but it also lacked the property of unity, as evident from the fact that Confucius gave the institution of concubinage (which existed in China before the time of Confucius) his stamp of approval by laying down rules for its regulation. Concubinage, it must be remembered, is a form of polygyny, and as such, is opposed to the unity of marriage. By the term "unity" here is meant the union of one man with one wife.30 Among the regulations for the institution of concubinage which Confucius promulgated are these:

If a son have two concubines, one of whom is loved by his parents, while he himself loves the other, yet he should not dare to make this one equal to the former whom his parents love, in dress, or food, or the duties which she discharges, nor should he lessen his attentions to her after their death. If he very much approves of his wife, and his parents do not like her, he should divorce her. If he do not approve of his wife, and his parents say 'she serves us well', he should behave to her in all respects as his wife,—without fail even to the end of her life.31

Besides indicating very clearly that Confucius tolerated the practice of concubinage, the foregoing text also gives us a further insight into the deplorable condition of the wife under the influence of Confucian thought; she possessed none of that dignity and respect with which the office of wife and mother is wrapped in a more rational view of marriage.

30 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, III Suppl., Q. 65, a. l.

While the text to follow gives further evidence of the institution of concubinage being tolerated by Confucius, it also gives evidence of the foresight and wisdom of Confucius in providing a specific place in the home for the child:

A special apartment was prepared in the place for the child, and from all the concubines and other likely individuals there was sought one distinguished for her generosity of mind, her gentle kindness, her mild integrity, her respectful bearing, her carefulness and freedom from talkativeness, who should be appointed the boy's teacher; one was next chosen who should be his indulgent mother, and a third who should be his guardian mother.\(^{32}\)

Although concubinage was treated as not less regular than marriage, it involved a lower standing for the concubine and her offspring.\(^{33}\) Frequently the wife's younger sister became the concubine, but not without the active connivance of the wife, lonely amid unfamiliar surroundings and longing for the companionship of her own kin.\(^{34}\)

"The wife had dominion in the home over concubines and their children."\(^{35}\)

While the double standard was known and its consequences openly accepted, one wife reigned supreme in the majority of homes. It was the felicity of such a home which Confucius portrayed in the following tribute to the marriage relation, wherein he seems to give evidence of the fact that he preferred the monogamous form of marriage:

"It is said in the Book of Poetry: 'A happy union with wife and children is like the music of lutes and harps! When there is concord

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\(^{33}\) Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 144.

\(^{34}\) Ibid.

\(^{35}\) Ibid.
among brethren, the harmony is delightful and enduring. Thus may you regulate your family and enjoy the delights of wife and children! The Master said, 'In such a condition parents find perfect contentment.'

One of two motives was usually operative in a man's acquisition of a concubine: the desire to obtain a son in the event that his wife failed to bear one, or in case his wife's sons died; or his marriage having been a matter of family convenience and having failed to result in binding love, he acquired a concubine because of her personal attractiveness. Strange as it may seem, concubinage was not only permissible but commendable when the wife remained barren or even when there were daughters but no son to perpetuate the name of the husband and maintain the altars of devotion to his ancestors. Were it not for the institution of concubinage, undoubtedly divorces, with their hardships, would have been more common and would have extended to most cases of infertility, even though no personal incompatibility accompanied it. Although concubines were, as a rule, chosen from families socially and economically inferior to that of the wife, sometimes a husband took one or more of his wife's sisters as a concubine.

36 Confucius, Doctrine of the Mean, XV, 2-3, cited in Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 139.
38 Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 144.
39 Ibid., 144-145.
40 Latourette, The Chinese, Their History and Culture, 672.
The foregoing exposition of the Confucian doctrine on marriage leads one to the conclusion that Confucius failed to make the properties of unity and indissolubility essential or even necessary to the marriage contract. His whole view of marriage seems to be distorted by his doctrine on ancestor worship. Confucius thought that the primary purpose of marriage was to ensure posterity to continue the ancestral rites.
ST. THOMAS ON MARRIAGE

St. Thomas speaks at greater length than does Confucius concerning the nature and purpose of marriage, as also regarding its conditions and requirements. Marriage, in the mind of St. Thomas, is first and foremost a "union of souls by which husband and wife are pledged by a bond of mutual affection that cannot be sundered..."41 Since the union or bond of affection is love itself,42 as St. Thomas observes, one can say that the primary meaning of marriage is love.43 St. Thomas elucidates further the meaning of the foregoing definition of marriage by saying that marriage is not essentially the carnal union itself, but a certain joining together of husband and wife ordained to carnal intercourse, and a further consequent union between husband and wife, in so far as they each receive power over the other in reference to carnal intercourse, which joining together is called the nuptial bond.44

In explaining further how the souls of the parties to a marriage are united, St. Thomas says:

Now things directed to one purpose are said to be united in their direction thereto, thus many men are united in following one military calling or in pursuing one business, in relation to which they are called fellow-soldiers or business partners. Hence, since by marriage

41 St. Thomas Aquinas, S.T., III, Q. 29, a. 2.
42 Ibid., I-II, q. 28, a. 1 c.
43 Dietrich von Hildebrand, Marriage, New York, [1942], iv.
44 S. T., III, Suppl., q. 48, a. 1.
certain persons are directed to one begetting and upbringing of children, and again to one family life, it is clear that in matrimony there is a joining in respect of which we speak of husband and wife; and this joining, through being directed to some one thing, is matrimony; while the joining together of bodies and minds is a result of matrimony.45

Matrimony is essentially a "union of souls". Carnal union is not the essence of matrimony but rather the result of matrimony.46 The term, "one", before the terms "begetting" and "family life" in the above text has reference to the property of unity pertaining to marriage, of which property we will treat later.

The souls of the contracting parties are joined and knit together more directly and more intimately than are their bodies by matrimony, and that not by any passing affection of sense or spirit, but by a deliberate and firm act of the will; and from this union of souls, by God's decree, a sacred and inviolable bond arises.47

Further, marriage is the closest and most intimate of all earthly unions in which, more than in any other, one person gives himself to another without reserve, where the other in his complete personality is the object of love, and where mutual love is in a specific way the core of the relationship.48 In its nature, marriage is principally a communion of love; the meaning of physical consummation is not restricted only to its

45 S.T., III Suppl., q. 44, a.1.
46 Ibid.
48 Dietrich von Hildebrand, Marriage, New York, 1942, 2.
function as a means of procreation. 49 In the natural order of things there is no greater mystery than the fact that this closest of all unions procreates a human being with an immortal soul—although the soul, in each case, is a direct creation of God—that it brings a new being into existence destined to adore Him. 50 While love is the primary meaning of marriage, the birth of new human beings is its primary end. 51 However, this primary end is not the only meaning of the physical act; subjectively speaking it is not even its primary meaning. 52 Its meaning is primarily the realization of the sublime communion of love in which, according to the words of Our Saviour, "two shall be in one flesh." 53 By the mystery of love God wishes that one be made from the other. That a new human being should issue from this supremely intimate union is certainly part of the solemn grandeur of it. The divinely appointed relationship between the mysterious procreation of a new human being and this most intimate communion of love (which by itself alone already has its full importance), illuminates the grandeur and solemnity of this union. In order to preserve the reverent attitude of the spouses toward the mystery in this union, this general connection between procreation and the communion of love must always be maintained even

49 Dietrich von Hildebrand, Marriage, New York, 1942, 2.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., 4.
52 Ibid., 21.
53 Ibid.
subjectively, at least as a general possibility of this act.\textsuperscript{54} It is difficult to imagine a greater lack of reverence toward God than interfering with this mystery with desecrating hands in order to frustrate this mystery.\textsuperscript{55}

St. Thomas makes a distinction between the purposes of marriage and its meaning. He emphasizes the primacy of procreation and rearing of children among the ends of marriage, as we observe in the text:

Now marriage has for its principal end the begetting and rearing of children, and this end is competent \textsuperscript{(appertains)} to man according to his generic nature, wherefore it is common to other animals, \textsuperscript{(Ethic.viii.12)}, and thus it is that the offspring is assigned as a marriage good. But for its secondary end, as the Philosopher says \textsuperscript{(ibid.)}, it has, among men alone, the community of works that are a necessity of life....And in reference to this they owe one another fidelity which is one of the goods of marriage. Furthermore, it has another end, as regards marriage between believers, namely the signification of Christ and the Church: and thus the sacrament is said to be a marriage good. Wherefore the first end corresponds to the marriage of man inasmuch as he is an animal: the second, inasmuch as he is a man; the third, inasmuch as he is a believer.\textsuperscript{56}

The secondary purposes of marriage, according to St. Thomas, are "community of life" and the sacrament. Sometimes it appears as though St. Thomas thinks that procreation was the only work for which the woman was given to man to help him, for he says: "the woman is taken into partnership with the man for the purpose of procreation."

\textsuperscript{54} Von Hildebrand, Marriage, 23.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{56} S.T., III Suppl., Q.65, a.1.

\textsuperscript{57} St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 123; S.T., Q. 44, a. 2 ad 1.
In addition to the social purpose of marriage, generation in the broadest sense of the word, there is an individual purpose which consists in the spiritual and physical fulfillment through the happiness which husband and wife give each other. Nevertheless, as St. Thomas maintains, the social purpose must ever be regarded as principal. On this point St. Thomas says:

Marriage is chiefly directed to the common good in respect of its principal end, which is the good of the offspring; although in respect of its secondary end it is directed to the good of the contracting party, in so far as it is by its very nature a remedy for concupiscence.58

Now the dominant purpose of every institution, of every sort of structure, must be found in that purpose which cannot be realized without it.59 It is only through unity in marriage that procreation can be realized in a manner worthy of man; whereas, mutual help and fulfillment can be found in a friendship in which no sexual intercourse takes place.60

In the mind of St. Thomas, procreation is never a secondary thing; he seems, at times, to put too much weight upon the relationship of sexual love to procreation. He does not seem to emphasize adequately the inherent value, proper meaning and the immediate purpose of love between man and woman, yet, particularly when he says that husband and wife are made one, not only in the act of carnal intercourse, but also as partners in the

58 S.T., III Suppl., Q. 67, a.1 ad. 4.
60 Ibid.
whole intercourse of daily life, he seems to give evidence of the fact that he is aware of it. It seems that any actual realization of the nature of marriage is in itself a value.

While it is true that the procreation of children is only the natural result of the act of marital union, provided that the act is surrounded by certain favorable circumstances, one cannot deny that the propagation of children is also the first purpose of the sexual act. Any artificial intervention in the procreative process is an evil not so much because living matter is wasted or because another person's right to existence is violated as because of the voluntary attack on vital processes in which man has no right to interfere. Such intervention is perversive of a natural good, which is the preservation of the species. After the sin of murder, whereby human nature is deprived of actual existence, says St. Thomas, this kind of sin, whereby the generation of human nature is hindered, holds, seemingly the second place. It is contrary to both the law of God and of nature, as we know from these weighty words of Pope Pius XI:

Any use whatsoever of matrimony exercised in such a way that the act is deliberately frustrated in its natural power to generate life is an offense against the law of God and of nature, and those who indulge

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61 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 123.
62 Doms, Meaning of Marriage, 65.
63 Ibid., 73.
64 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 122.
in such are branded with the guilt of a grave sin. 65

The sin involved is not against a human person who does not exist, but rather against the sovereign rights of God Himself. 66

One's striving after the fulfillment of the "secondary purpose" or purposes of marriage can only have meaning if done in the course of one's striving after the "primary purpose" thereof, according to St. Thomas, that is, sexual intercourse (copula carnalis) can only have its full natural meaning when it is a means to children, the "primary purpose" of marriage.

When, for example, conception is impossible in concrete, a perfectly natural sexual act has another objective purpose, namely, the representation and realisation by husband and wife of their state of "two-in-oneship" or "zweinigkeit," that is, their being "two in one flesh." 68

This actually comes about by the use of marriage, 69 and this act is of itself a thing of the deepest significance, quite apart from its further results. Thus, there is a meaning immanent in marriage, which meaning includes the performance of the sexual act, even though there is not conscious interest in procreation. The primary and secondary purposes of marriage are fulfilled through the realisation of its meaning. Marriage

66 Doms, Meaning of Marriage, 73.
67 Ibid., 84 and xi.
has had an extra purpose since the "Fall", namely the natural and super-
natural remedy of concupiscence.70

Marriage, then, is not a union of two persons merely in order to
serve a purpose outside of themselves for which they marry.71 It consists,
rather, in a constant vital ordination of husband and wife to each other
until they become one.72 If this is so, says Dr. Herbert Doms, there can
no longer be sufficient reason from this standpoint, for speaking of pro-
creation as the primary purpose (in the sense in which St.Thomas uses the
phrase)73 and for dividing off the other purposes as secondary.74

In the writings of St.Thomas there seems to be evidence for the
contention that marriage is not a union of two persons merely in order to
serve a purpose outside of themselves for which they marry. One can observe
this in his definition of marriage as being primarily a "union of souls",
as also in the text quoted earlier wherein he says that things directed to
one purpose are united in their direction thereto,75 thus implying this
intimate union or fusion of souls.

70 Doms, Meaning of Marriage, 87.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 S.T., III Suppl. q. 67, a. 1 ad 4.
74 Doms, Meaning of Marriage, 87.
75 S.T.,III, Suppl., Q. 44, a. 1.; supra, 43.
Perhaps one reason why St. Thomas speaks of the child as the primary purpose of marriage is that the child, a person created to see God, is a creature who transcends the finality immanent in marriage, and of all the goods of marriage, the child is the most important for society, as also the chief good sought from marriage. Since, in accordance with God's plans, the child should only come lawfully into the world through marriage, society is quite right in being interested in marriage chiefly because of the child. Nevertheless, it would scarcely be rational to disregard the profound meaning immanent in marriage, since marriage "is" a deep and real thing in itself, quite apart from the fact that it exists "for something else" outside of itself. St. Thomas does seem to be mindful of this since he considers marriage to be primarily a certain "union of souls" and maintains that any physical union to which certain persons are directed by marriage is the result of matrimony, not its essence. Then, too, he seems to say in effect that marriage can mean love, since he asserts that the union or bond of affection (by which husband and wife are bound in marriage) is love itself. There is further evidence of St. Thomas' awareness of the meaning immanent in marriage when he speaks, as he often does, of that unique unity which husband and wife are to achieve in their lives—they are to be

76 DeTr., Meaning of Marriage, 87.
78 DeTr., Meaning of Marriage, 88.
79 Ibid.
80 S.T., III Suppl., Q. 44, a. 1.
81 S.T., III Suppl., Q. 29, a. 2.
82 S.T., I-II, Q. 28, a.1 c.
"two in one flesh,"83 thus also representing the indissoluble union of Christ and the Church, which is a union of one with one.84 In comparing marriage to the union of Christ with His Church, St. Thomas has reference to a text in St. Paul (Ephes. v, 32) the meaning of which Vermeersch explains by saying that marriage between Christians reproduces the perfect union which exists forever between Christ and His Church, and this reproduction is achieved in its perfection in marriage between baptized persons which has been consummated.85 By the use of the conjugal right marriage receives a sort of completion; something irreparable has taken place; the affective and verbal self-surrender has been supplemented by an actual physical one which justifies the expression, very significant in itself, of "consummated marriage."86 It is consummated not only in the physical order, but also in the symbolical and mystical order, in which it represents the indefectible union between Christ and His Church.87 Vermeersch concludes by saying that in a perfect representation of this union, the indefectibility of the union must have its own symbol; and it has it in the absolutely indissoluble marriage.88

84 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 123.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
Whether St. Thomas should have placed still greater emphasis on the meaning immanent in marriage is certainly a debatable question. In emphasizing the primacy of procreation and rearing of children among the ends of marriage, St. Thomas is definitely putting first things first. Perhaps by the use of an analogy taken from dogmatic theology one can better understand the relationship existing between the meaning and the purpose of marriage.

There seems to be an analogy between the meaning and purpose of marriage and the meaning and purpose of the Sacrifice of the Mass. The Eucharistic Mystery is, firstly, the real presentation in the sacramental order of the Sacrifice of Christ on the Cross. This sacramental presentation is in itself rich in meaning and of vital importance. The realization of the meaning results in benefits for the celebrant, for those for whom the Mass is offered, and for the whole Church, in whose name every Mass is celebrated. Now the sacramental realization of the meaning—the Sacrifice of Christ on the Cross—is also the preparation for a further sacramental benefit—communion. As we inquire into the primary purpose of marriage, so we may also inquire into the primary purpose of the Eucharist. We can find a meaning of the Eucharistic Presence of the Flesh and Blood of Our Lord in the preparation (of the Sacrament by consecration) of the Eucharistic Food quite apart from any further purpose which it may serve.

89 Doms, Meaning of Marriage, 90.
90 Ibid., 91.
91 Ibid.
It would still have this meaning if Christ had not intended it to be food for our souls, as evident from the text:

The Eucharistic Presence—the Sacrifice of the Cross in our midst—is in itself, because of its profound sacramental meaning, a very exalted act of expiation and glorification. It would still be this if we did not receive the Eucharist as spiritual food. 92

It is perhaps far more true to say that Holy Communion is the fruit and the consummation of the Eucharistic Sacrifice than to say that the determining purpose of the Sacrifice of the Mass is the "preparation" and consecration for the Eucharistic feast. 93

One might here make a similar statement as regards marriage. One can distinguish the meaning from the purpose, or purposes, of marriage and say that the immediate purpose of the marriage ceremony and of the permanent legal bond is the realisation of this meaning. 94

Unlike so many modernists, St. Thomas, in making a distinction between the meaning and purpose of marriage, does not deny that the primary end or purpose of marriage is the procreation and education of children. He teaches that the secondary ends of marriage are essentially subordinate to the primary end. His doctrine is upheld in a recent decree of the Holy Office, 95 according to which one can no longer deny that the primary end of

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92 Doms, Meaning of Marriage, 91.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid., 95.
95 T. Lincoln Bouscaren and Adam C. Ellis, Canon Law, Milwaukee, 1946, 40.
marriage is the procreation and rearing of children, nor teach that the secondary ends of marriage are not essentially subordinate to the primary and, but are equally principal. 96

In his doctrine on marriage St. Thomas considers three things: first, the essence of matrimony which, he says, is a joining together, and in reference to this it is called a conjugal union; secondly, its cause, which is the wedding and is called the nuptial union. 97 Thirdly, St. Thomas considers the effect, which is the offspring, and in reference to this it is called matrimony, because a woman's sole purpose in marrying should be motherhood. 98

St. Thomas gives his reasons for thinking that matrimony is fittingly named in the following words:

Matrimony may also be resolved into matris munium, i.e., a mother's duty, since the duty of bringing up the children chiefly devolves on the woman; or into matrem munies, because it provides the mother with a protector and support in the person of her husband; or into matrem monens, as admonishing her not to leave her husband and take up with another man; or into materia unius, because it is a joining together for the purpose of providing the matter of one offspring as though it were derived from ὑδρός and materia; or into matre and nato, as Isidore says (Etym. iv), because it makes the woman the mother of a child. 99

In response to the objection that matrimony is unfittingly named since it is named after the mother instead of the father who,

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96 Bouscaren and Ellis, Canon Law, 40.
97 S.T., III Suppl., Q. 44, a. 2.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
St. Thomas maintains, ranks above the mother, St. Thomas says that although
the father ranks above the mother, the mother has more to do with the off-
spring than the father has. In reality, the mother does have a closer
relation to the nature of marriage, as St. Thomas explains, than the father

In the names which St. Thomas cites for matrimony, the term for
mother predominates. In response to the objection that a thing should be
named from that which is essential to it, St. Thomas says that sometimes
essentials are known by accidentals; and that, consequently, some things
can even be named after their accidentals, since a name is given to a thing
for the purpose that it may become known.

Matrimony, according to St. Thomas, is the marital union of man
and woman involving their living together in undivided partnership.
As a result of marriage two human beings come to live a life single in
everything from religious community to sexual; however, the presence of
sexual community is what expressly constitutes marital community, for every
other community can be realised outside of marriage.

St. Thomas observes that there are many reasons why men marry, as
evident from the following text and others:

100 S.T., III Suppl., q. 44, a. 2 ad 1.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid., q. 44, a. 2.
104 Ibid., q. 44, obj. 3.
105 Doms, Meaning of Marriage, 94-95.
The final cause of marriage may be taken as twofold, namely essential and accidental. The essential cause of marriage is the end to which it is by its very nature ordained, and this is always good, namely, the begetting of children and the avoiding of fornication. But the accidental final cause thereof is that which the contracting parties intend as the result of marriage.  

While the accidental causes of marriage may be varied, St. Thomas seems to think that the chief accidental reason why men marry is to bind mankind together and to extend friendship, as he points out in the text:

But the accidental end of marriage is the binding together of mankind and the extension of friendship: for a husband regards his wife's kindred as his own. Hence it would be prejudicial to this extension of friendship if a man could take a woman of his kindred to wife since no new friendship would accrue to anyone from such a marriage.  

Another very important point to which St. Thomas gives emphasis, of which Confucius scarcely seems to be aware, is that marriage is always "from God."  

Confucius seems to have had only a secular view of marriage, which perhaps accounts at least in part for his tolerating divorce with all its attendant and consequent tragedies. He seems to look upon marriage as a purely individual affair to be dissolved at the whim of individuals. He seems to lack a profound realisation of the sanctity and indissolubility of the marriage contract. However, there is evidence to show that he had

106 S.T., III, Suppl., Q. 48, a.2.
107 Ibid., Q. 54, a. 3.
108 Ibid., Q. 48, a.2 ad 2.
109 Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 147.
some concept of the sacredness of the marriage contract, since he rebukes those who saw in marriage "a mere ceremony, conformity with which added no element of sacredness to a natural and necessary relation." Confucius rebukes these in the words:

He who thinks the old embankments useless and destroys them, is sure to suffer from the desolation caused by overflowing water; and he who should consider the old rules of propriety useless and abolish them, would be sure to suffer from the calamities of disorder. Thus if the ceremonies of marriage were discontinued, the path of husband and wife would be embittered and there would be many offences of licentiousness and depravity.

Primitive peoples and the pagans of Greece and Rome in their own way held the marriage contract to be sacred.

St. Thomas, insisting upon the fact that marriage is "from God," also treats at length of the marriage consent, its voluntariness and its object. He says that it is the consent that really makes the marriage.

Although the consent makes the marriage, matrimony is not the consent itself, but the union of persons directed to one purpose, and this union is the effect of the consent, St. Thomas says. In clarifying his doctrine on this point St. Thomas brings in an analogy which he draws from faith. He

110 Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 140.
111 Confucius, Li Ki, XXIII, 7,8, cited in Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 140.
113 S.T.,III Suppl., Q. 42, a. 1.
114 Ibid., Q. 45, a. 1, ad 2.
says the consent, properly speaking, signifies not the union of Christ with the Church, but His will whereby His union with the Church was brought about. 115

In explaining the matter on which the consent devolves, St. Thomas says, "by marriage certain persons are directed to one begetting and upbringing of children, and again to one family life." 116 The term, "one", in the foregoing text refers to the singleness of the object of the marriage consent, as we learn from the following words of St. Thomas:

Just as marriage is one on the part of the object to which the union is directed, whereas it is more than one on the part of the persons united, so too the consent is one on the part of the thing consented to, namely, the aforesaid union, whereas it is more than one on the part of the persons consenting. Nor is the direct object of consent a husband, but union with a husband on the part of the wife, even as it is union with a wife on the part of the husband. 117

The direct object, then, of the marriage consent is the union of husband and wife for the purpose of begetting and rearing children, as explained in the canon: "Consensus matrimonialis est actus voluntatis quo utraque pars tradit et acceptat ius in corpus, perpetuum et exclusivum, in ordine ad actus per se aptos ad prolis generationem." 118 ("Matrimonial consent is an act of the will by which each party gives and accepts a perpetual and exclusive right over the body, for acts which are of themselves

115 S.T., III Suppl., Q. 45, a.1 ad 2.
116 Ibid., Q. 44, a. 1.
117 Ibid., Q. 45, a.1 ad 3.
118 Codex Iuris Canonici, Canon 1081, part 1.
suitable for the generation of children."\(^{119}\)

Although there is a difference between marriage as a natural contract and Christian marriage, (it is of the latter kind to which St. Thomas generally has reference), this distinction does not touch the consent or its properties essentially, but merely in degree.\(^{120}\) A marriage between non-baptized persons is as essentially one and indissoluble as between baptized persons, but there are degrees of stability in so far as a non-consummated marriage can more easily be dissolved.\(^{121}\)

Cognizant of the fact that there is no room for consent where fear or compulsion enters in, St. Thomas says that matrimony cannot result from a compulsory consent.\(^{122}\) The marriage consent must be "completely voluntary," St. Thomas maintains, since it has to be perpetual; and, he adds, it is invalidated by violence of a mixed nature.\(^{123}\) No power on earth can supply the consent needed to produce a marriage, as we learn from a canon upholding the doctrine of St. Thomas on this point: "Matrimonium facit partium consensus inter personas iure habiles legitime manifestatus; qui nulla humana potestate suppleri valet."\(^{124}\)

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119 Bouscaren and Ellis, *Canon Law*, 47.


121 Ibid., 17.

122 *S.T.*, Suppl. III, Q. 47, a. 3.

123 Ibid., Q. 47, a. 3 ad 2.

124 *Codex Iuris Canonici*, can. 1081.
St. Thomas' doctrine regarding the marriage consent contrasts sharply with that of Confucius, in accordance with which the consent of the parents practically stood for the consent of their children. Although, it is true, a child could, if he wished, go contrary to his parents' choice of a mate, he seldomly did, due to such social pressures as the prevailing custom in accordance with which children usually acquiesced in their parents' choice in this matter, and due to the exaggerated notion of filial piety with which children were indoctrinated.

Further, children were not free to abstain from marriage if they so desired, according to the teachings of Confucius, for the failure to have sons was considered a major offense against filial piety.125

Contrary to the above doctrine of Confucius, St. Thomas says that parents do not have the right to command a child to marry, as evident from the text, "A son may lawfully enter religion though his father command him to marry. Therefore he is not bound to obey him in this."126 Elsewhere St. Thomas says that children are not bound to obey their parents in the question of contracting marriage or of remaining in the state of virginity or the like.127

The precept to marry is binding on the race and not on the individual, St. Thomas asserts in the following text, which includes an objection and a response:

125 Latourette, The Chinese, 669.
126 S.T., III Suppl., q. 47, a. 6.
127 Ibid, II-II, Q. 104, a. 5.
Objection: It would seem that matrimony still comes under a precept. For a precept is binding so long as it is not recalled. But the primary institution of matrimony came under a precept;...; nor do we read anywhere that this precept was recalled.128

To this objection St. Thomas replies:

This precept has not been recalled, and yet it is not binding on each individual,...except at that time when the paucity of men required each one to betake himself to the begetting of children.129

St. Thomas further teaches that if a conditional consent be given to marriage, and the condition involved is contrary to the marriage blessings, the marriage would be invalid.130 The marriage blessings to which St. Thomas here has reference are three: offspring, conjugal fidelity and the sacrament.131 While St. Thomas usually speaks of the "marriage blessings" as being "marriage goods" (Bona matrimonii), the terms are synonymous; another term which might be used is "advantages of marriage."132

By the term "sacrament" as listed among the marriage blessings, St. Thomas says we are to understand not only indivisibility, but all those things that result from marriage being a sign of Christ's union with the Church.133 On this point St. Thomas again seems to be taking his doctrine from faith.

129 Ibid., Q. 41, a.2 ad 1.
130 Ibid., Q. 47, a. 5.
131 Ibid., Q. 49, a. 2.
132 Ibid., Q. 49, footnote *.
133 Ibid., Q. 49, a. 3 ad 4.
St. Thomas' doctrine regarding the marriage consent is contained in the canon which reads: "...if one or both parties, by a positive act of the will, would exclude marriage itself or the right to the conjugal act, or an essential property of marriage, the contract would be null." 134

This canon is clarified further in the text:

The positive act of the will may exclude marriage itself. If one would contract a union merely for the sake of carnal gratification, it would be no marriage. Or if two persons would marry purely for friendship or for literary cooperation, there would be no marriage. 135

How a positive will act could exclude an essential property of marriage is explained in the text:

The positive act of the will may exclude the indissolubility and unity of marriage. Indissolubility excludes the positive will to contract marriage with the right to divorce. Unity excludes polygamy. Opposed to this essential property of marriage would be the positive will to deliver the wife, or (if the woman would make the resolution) to deliver herself, to prostitution or adultery for lucre's sake. 136

St. Thomas, when speaking of a Christian marriage, insists that there can be no matrimony without inseparability, since by the marriage compact man and wife give to one another power the one over the other in perpetuity; consequently, they cannot be put asunder. 137

Here St. Thomas also has reference to the law of perpetuity which, like the laws of unity and indissolubility, are written in man's

134 Augustine, Commentary on the New Code of Canon Law, V, 240.
135 Ibid., 242.
136 Ibid., 243.
137 S.T., III Suppl., q. 49, a. 3.
very nature.\textsuperscript{138} The natural law of perpetuity can be proved by the natural aspiration of the sentiment of love which desires to last forever; by the irrevocable character of mutual self-surrender, which takes away from the woman her integrity; by the duty of education, which by its very nature requires years, and which goes on indefinitely, being renewed at every birth; finally by the duties of mutual upbuilding which are implied in marriage and which do not cease until death.\textsuperscript{139}

Again speaking of Christian marriage St. Thomas points out that as there can be no matrimony without inseparability, so neither can there be matrimony without faith (the word here signifies the suiting of the deed to the word by keeping one's promises)\textsuperscript{140} and offspring, as St. Thomas explains in the text:

\begin{quote}
[T]here is no matrimony without inseparability, whereas there is matrimony without faith and offspring, because the existence of a thing does not depend on its use; and in this sense sacrament is more essential to matrimony than faith and offspring. Secondly, faith and offspring may be considered as in their principles, so that offspring denote the intention of having children, and faith the duty of remaining faithful, and there can be no matrimony without these also, since they are caused in matrimony by the marriage compact itself, so that if anything contrary to these were expressed in the consent which makes a marriage, the marriage would be invalid.\textsuperscript{141}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{138} Vermeersch, \textit{What Is Marriage?}, 11.

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{140} \textit{S.T.}, III Suppl., q. 49, a. 3.

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
Thus, each party to a marriage must hand over and accept a perpetual and exclusive right over the body, for acts which are of themselves suitable for the generation of children;\textsuperscript{142} however, it is not essential for the existence of the marriage contract that the parties to it make use of or exercise the rights which they mutually hand over and accept.

When St. Thomas says, "If...it [the consent] be contrary to the marriage blessings, the marriage is invalid,"\textsuperscript{143} he is also saying in effect that the properties of unity and indissolubility (of which we will treat at length later) are essential to the marriage contract which is involved in a Christian marriage.

St. Thomas himself elucidates the meaning of the terms signifying the marriage blessings referred to in the above quoted text. He explains the term, offspring by saying:

"Offspring signifies not only the begetting of children, but also their education, to which as its end is directed the entire communion of works that exists between man and wife as united in marriage, since parents naturally lay up for their children (2 Cor. xii, 14); so that the offspring like a principal end includes another, as it were, secondary end.\textsuperscript{144}"

St. Thomas' explanation of faith in the following text implies that unity is an essential property of a Christian marriage. He says:

\textsuperscript{142} Codex Iuris Canonici, Canon 1081, pt. 1; Bouscaren and Ellis, Canon Law, 47.

\textsuperscript{143} S.T., III Suppl., q. 49, a. 3.

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., q. 49, a. 2 ad 1.
Matrimony is instituted both as an office of nature and as a sacrament of the Church. As an office of nature it is directed by two things, like every other virtuous act. One of these is required on the part of the agent and is the intention of the due end, and thus the offspring is accounted a good of matrimony; the other is required on the part of the act, which is good generically through being about due matter; and thus we have faith, whereby a man has intercourse with his wife and with no other woman.\textsuperscript{145}

Finally, St. Thomas explains the meaning of the term sacrament in the words: "By sacrament we are to understand not only indivisibility, but all those things that result from marriage being a sign of Christ's union with the Church."\textsuperscript{146}

While the natural law pure and simple ("do good and avoid evil"), that is, the primary natural law, cannot be proved to condemn either polygyny or divorce, nevertheless, they are opposed to the natural law if by the latter terms we mean the conclusions or deductions derived or drawn from the original or primary law.\textsuperscript{147} St. Thomas gives several reasons for this opposition; first we will consider his arguments against polygyny in favor of unity.

Polygyny, St. Thomas observes, impedes the training of children, which not only belongs essentially to the purpose of marriage, but also forms a substantial care of the father.\textsuperscript{148}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{145} S.T. III Suppl., Q. 49, a. 2. \\
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., Q. 49, a. 2 ad 4. \\
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., Q. 65, a. 2; Q. 67, a. 2; Vermeersch, \textit{What Is Marriage?}, 10. \\
\end{flushright}
St. Thomas' arguments in favor of unity of marriage are very clearly set forth in the following texts:

In the human species, the offspring needs not only nourishment for its body, as with other animals, but also instruction for its soul. For other animals have their natural forethought which enables them to provide for themselves: whereas man lives by reason, which can attain to forethought only after long experience: so that children need to be instructed by their parents who are experienced.

Moreover children are not capable of this instruction as soon as they are born, but only after a long time, and especially when they reach the age of discretion. Besides, this instruction requires a long time. And even then, on account of the assaults of the passions whereby the judgment of prudence is perverted, they need not only instruction but correction. Now a woman is insufficient for these things, in fact there is more need for a man for such things, for his reason is more perfect for instruction, and his arm is stronger for punishment. Consequently a short space of time such as suffices for birds is not sufficient for the education of the offspring in the human species, and a great part of life is required for the purpose. So that, as in all animals it behooves the male to remain with the female as long as the father is needed by the offspring, it is natural in the human race that the man should have not a short-lived but a lasting fellowship with a definite woman: and this fellowship is called matrimony.\textsuperscript{149}

Then in another text St. Thomas says:

In every animal species where the father has a certain care for his offspring, the one male has but one female, as may be seen in birds, where both unite in feeding their young: for one male would not suffice to rear the progeny of several females. On the other hand where the male animal has not the care of the offspring, we find indifferent union of one male with several females, or of one female with several males: such is the case with dogs, hens, and so forth. Since then of all animals the male of the human species is pre-eminent in the care of his offspring, it is clearly natural to man that one man should have one wife and vice versa.\textsuperscript{150}

The foregoing arguments lead one to the conclusion that it is imperative for the child to have his parents united in order that together

\textsuperscript{149} St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 122.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., III, 124.
they be able to give him adequate care, instruction as also correction. Usually where there is unity of marriage, there is uniform and tender care of offspring. 151

By polygyny, too, the equality of woman, especially as to mutual rights and love, is lessened; the wife is little more than a slave, and the dignity of womanhood is lowered. 152 St. Thomas says:

Equality is a condition of friendship. Hence if a woman may not have several husbands, because this removes the certainty of offspring; were it lawful for a man to have several wives, the friendship of a wife for her husband would not be freely bestowed, but servile as it were. And this argument is confirmed by experience: since where men have several wives, the wives are treated as servants.

The foregoing argument will perhaps be better understood if we refer to what St. Thomas had previously said about the existence between husband and wife of the greatest friendship. He said:

Now, seemingly between husband and wife there is the greatest friendship: for they are made one not only in the act of carnal intercourse, which even among dumb animals causes an agreeable fellowship, but also as partners in the whole intercourse of daily life: so that, to indicate this, man must leave father and mother (Gen. 11.24) for his wife's sake. 154

St. Thomas also is aware of the fact that divided love cannot be so intensive and lasting as love centered on one. 155 In perfect friendship it is impossible to be friends with many, he says in the text:

151 Augustine, Commentary on the New Code of Canon Law, V, 18.
152 Ibid.
153 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 125.
154 Ibid., III, 124.
155 Augustine, Commentary on the New Code of Canon Law, V, 18.
In perfect friendship it is impossible to be friends with many, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi.). Hence if the wife has but one husband, while the husband has several wives, the friendship will not be equal on either side; and consequently it will not be a freely bestowed but a servile friendship as it were.156

This argument touches the indissolubility of the marriage tie and the education of children.157

St. Thomas also gives the following arguments based on good morals in defense of the unity of marriage:

[Matrimony among men should be so ordered as to be consistent with good morals. Now it is contrary to good morals that one man have several wives, for this leads to discord in the family, as shown by experience. Therefore it is not right for one man to have several wives.158

St. Thomas' main arguments from reason, as distinct from those based on revelation, in favor of the unity of marriage have reference to the needs and the requirements of the offspring. He is cognizant of the fact that there could not easily be peace in a family where several wives are joined to one husband,159 and that an environment of discord would certainly not be one favorable for the rearing of children.

From the very beginning marriage had the property of unity, St. Thomas explains in the text:

156 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 124.
158 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 124.
159 S.T., III Suppl., Q. 65, a. 1.
That which was instilled into man at the formation of human nature would seem especially to belong to the natural law. Now it was instilled into him at the very formation of human nature that one man should have one wife, according to Gen. ii, 24, *They shall be two in one flesh*. Therefore it is of natural law.

Further, it is contrary to the law of nature that man should bind himself to the impossible, and that what is given to one should be given to another. Now when a man contracts with a wife, he gives her the power of his body, so that he is bound to pay her the debt when she asks. Therefore it is against the law of nature that he should afterwards give the power of his body to another, because it would be impossible for him to pay both were both to ask at the same time.

Further, Do not to another what thou wouldst not ware done to thyself (Cf. Tob. iv. 16.) is a precept of the natural law. But a husband would by no means be willing for his wife to have another husband. Therefore he would be acting against the law of nature, were he to have another wife in addition.

Further, whatever is against the natural desire is contrary to the natural law. Now a husband's jealousy of his wife and the wife's jealousy of her husband are natural, for they are found in all. Therefore, since jealousy is love impatient of sharing the beloved, it would seem to be contrary to the natural law that several wives should share one husband.

St. Thomas then gives the following explanation of the term, "natural law" to which he so frequently alludes in the above text:

All natural things are imbued with certain principles whereby they are enabled not only to exercise their proper actions, but also to render those actions proportionate to their end, whether such actions belong to a thing by virtue of its generic nature, or by virtue of its specific nature: thus it belongs to a magnet to be borne downwards by virtue of its generic nature, and to attract iron by virtue of its specific nature. Now just as those things which act from natural necessity the principle of action is the form itself, whence their proper actions proceed proportionately to their end, so in things which are endowed with knowledge the principles of action are knowledge and appetite. Hence in the cognitive power there needs to be a natural concept, and in the appetitive power a natural inclination, whereby the action befitting the genus or species is rendered proportionate to the end. Now since man, of all animals, knows the aspect of the end, and

160 S.T. III Suppl., q. 65, a. 1.
the proportion of the action to the end, it follows that he is imbued with a natural concept, whereby he is directed to act in a befitting manner, and this is called the natural law or the natural right, but in other animals the natural instinct. For brutes are rather impelled by the force of nature to do befitting actions, than guided to act on their own judgment. Therefore the natural law is nothing else than a concept naturally instilled into man, whereby he is guided to act in a befitting manner in his proper actions, whether they are competent to him by virtue of his generic nature, as for instance, to beget, to eat, and so on, or belongs to him by virtue of his specific nature, as for instance to reason and so forth.161

Natural law, then, is nothing else than a concept naturally instilled into man, whereby he is guided to act in a befitting manner in his proper actions.

In order to understand St. Thomas' conclusion to the effect that a plurality of wives is in a way against the law of nature, and in another way it is not, we must understand what he means when he says something is contrary to the natural law. He continues the foregoing text with the following explanation:

Now whatever renders an action improportionate to the end which nature intends to obtain by a certain work is said to be contrary to the natural law. But an action may be improportionate either to the principal or to the secondary end, and in either case this happens in two ways. First, on account of something which wholly hinders the end; for instance a very great excess or a very great deficiency in eating food, and aptitude for conducting business, which is its secondary end. Secondly, on account of something that renders the attainment of the principal or secondary end difficult, or less satisfactory, for instance eating inordinately in respect of undue time. Accordingly if an action be improportionate to the end, through altogether hindering the principal end directly, it is forbidden by the first precepts of the natural law, which hold the same place in practical matters, as the general concepts of the mind in speculative matters. If, however, it

161 S.T., III Suppl., q. 65, a. 1 c.
162 Ibid.
be in any way improporionate to the secondary end, or again to the principal end, as rendering its attainment difficult or less satisfactory, it is forbidden, not indeed by the first precepts of the natural law, but by the second which are derived from the first even as conclusions in speculative matters receive our assent by virtue of self-known principles; and thus the act in question is said to be against the law of nature. 163

St. Thomas concludes that a plurality of wives is improporionate to the end which nature intends to obtain through marriage; he explains, however, that it is not opposed to the primary end of marriage, but rather to the secondary end. His reasoning continues as follows: a plurality of wives neither wholly destroys nor in any way hinders the first end of marriage, (namely the begetting and rearing of children), since one man is sufficient to get children of several wives and to rear the children born of them. 164 However, although it does not wholly destroy the second end, (namely the community of works that are a necessity of life), nevertheless, it hinders it considerably, for, as St. Thomas observes, there cannot easily be peace in a family where several wives are joined to one husband. 165 Thus he concludes that in so far as a plurality of wives considerably hinders the secondary end of marriage, the community of works that are a necessity of life—causing quarrels and jealousies, it is against the natural law; however, in so far as it neither wholly destroys nor in any way hinders the first end of marriage, (since one man is sufficient to get children of

163 S.T., III Suppl., q. 65, a.1 c.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid.
several wives, and to rear the children born of them), a plurality of wives is not against the law of nature.\textsuperscript{167}

The precept of nature in the matter of having one wife, says St. Thomas, is a conclusion derived from the primary precepts of the natural law, and while custom does not prejudice the law of nature as regards the first precepts of the latter, which are like general concepts of the mind in speculative matters, custom does enforce or weaken those precepts which are drawn as conclusions from these; and St. Thomas adds, "Such is the precept of nature in the matter of having one wife.\textsuperscript{168}

The derived, or secondary, precepts of the natural law, for example, the matter of having just one wife, St. Thomas adds, do not have the binding force of an absolute commandment, as can be gathered from the following objection and response:

Obj. 2. Further, whoever acts in opposition to the natural law, disobeys a commandment for the law of nature has its commandments even as the written law has. Now Augustine says...that it was not contrary to a commandment to have several wives, because by no law was it forbidden. Therefore it is not against the natural law to have several wives.\textsuperscript{169}

To this objection St. Thomas replies:

As Tully says...fear of the law and religion have sanctioned those things that come from nature and are approved by custom. Wherefore

\textsuperscript{167} S.T., III Suppl., q. 65, a.1 c.
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., q. 65, a.1 ad 1.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., q. 65, a.1 obj. 2.
it is evident that those dictates of the natural law, which are derived from the first principles as it were of the natural law, have not the binding force of an absolute commandment, except when they have been sanctioned by Divine or human law. This is what Augustine means by saying that they did not disobey the commandments of the law, since it was not forbidden by any law.170

A plurality of wives is contrary to "natural right", says St. Thomas, both because it is forbidden by Divine Law and because it is contrary to that which is instilled by nature, according to which man, as every animal, acts in a manner "befitting his nature."171

The unity of marriage, St. Thomas maintains, is also based upon a "natural instinct," as evident from the text:

[All animals that are used to copulate, have a natural instinct to resist another's intercourse with their consort: wherefore animals fight on account of copulation. And as regards all animals there is one common reason for this, because every animal desires to indulge at will in the pleasure of copulation, even as in the pleasure of eating: and this freedom ceases if many males have access to one female, or vice versa: just as an animal is deprived of the free enjoyment of its food, if another animal depeil its of the food it desires to consume. Hence animals fight both for food and for copulation. But with regard to men there is a special reason: because, as already stated, man naturally desires to be assured of his offspring: and this assurance would be altogether nullified in the case of promiscuous copulation. Therefore the union of one man with one woman comes from a natural instinct.172

Even certain animals, the rearing of whose offspring demands the care of both, namely the male and female, "by natural instinct" cling to the union of one with one, St. Thomas observes, for instance the turtle-dove and the dove.173

170 S.T., III Suppl., q. 65, a.1 ad 2.
171 Ibid., q. 65, a.1 ad 4.
172 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 124.
173 S.T., III Suppl., q. 65, a.1 ad 4.
The foregoing argument in favor of unity based on natural instinct, will carry even greater weight when we realize the significance and importance which St. Thomas attaches to natural instinct, as can be gathered from the text:

[As the law is made for the common good, whatever regards procreation should be regulated, before other things, by laws both divine and human; even as in demonstrative sciences, all human discoveries must needs be founded on principles naturally known. And if they be divine not only do they express the instinct of nature, but they also supply the defect of natural instinct; even as the things that God reveals, are beyond the grasp of natural reason.]

Here St. Thomas says that even divine laws express the instinct of nature and also supply the defect of natural instinct.\(^\text{175}\)

In addition, St. Thomas gives an argument based on the original endowment of human nature in defense of the unity of marriage in the text:

Human nature was founded without any defect, and consequently it is endowed not only with those things without which the principal end of marriage is impossible of attainment, but also with those without which the secondary end of marriage could not be obtained without difficulty and in this way it sufficed man when he was first formed to have one wife....\(^\text{176}\)

While admitting that a plurality of wives neither wholly destroys nor in any way hinders the first end of marriage, St. Thomas asserts that it does hinder the attainment of the secondary end of marriage, namely, the "community of works that are a necessity to life,"\(^\text{177}\) giving rise to corro-

\(^\text{174}\) Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, III, 123.

\(^\text{175}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{176}\) *S.T.*, III Suppl., q. 65, a.1 ad 6.

\(^\text{177}\) Ibid., q. 65, a. 1.
sive jealousies and discord.¹⁷⁸ St. Thomas definitely maintains that unity is at least a necessary property of marriage.¹⁷⁹

The very nature of conjugal love, apart from considerations pertaining to the well-being of the child, demands that marriage have the property of unity, since conjugal love shared with another excites jealousy and divides the heart.¹⁸⁰ Under the pain of dissolving itself conjugal love must be exclusive.¹⁸¹ The total self-surrender which the conjugal union implies can only be realized between two people.¹⁸² The primary meaning of marriage, enabling it also to serve as an image of the relationship between the soul and God, consists in that closest communion of love whereby two persons become one—one heart, one soul, one flesh.¹⁸³ Conjugal love also implies an intention of going beyond even beyond the giving of self, which is inherent in love as such.¹⁸⁴ "It desires an objective self-giving once and forever, an irrevocable giving which persists independently of all subjective inconstancy. Here we touch the intrinsic superabundance of this love, the heroic element proper to it."¹⁸⁵ A similar superabundant love impels certain persons to give themselves once and forever exclusively to God; they desire to bind themselves by eternal vows in

¹⁷⁹ S.T., III Suppl., q. 47, a.5; q. 49, a.2; q. 65, a.1; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 123, 124.
¹⁸² Ibid.
¹⁸³ Von Hildebrand, Marriage, 47-48.
¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 49.
¹⁸⁵ Ibid.
order to effectuate this self-bestowal objectively and irrevocably, which, once established, is independent in its validity of all our wishes and feelings. 186

While St. Thomas realizes that the nature of conjugal love implies that marriage have the property of unity, he seems to place greater emphasis on the arguments pertaining to the needs of the child, in favor of the unity of marriage. Likewise, in his defense of the indissolubility of marriage, St. Thomas places greater emphasis on the arguments based on the needs and requirements of the child than on those based on the nature of conjugal love which seem to point to the necessity of an indissoluble union.

St. Thomas frequently gives as the reason for his insistence on the indissolubility of marriage, the child's need of his parents' care and guidance; however, it is difficult for some to see in the need that the child has of support and education, the essential determining reason for the indissolubility of marriage. 187 Doms cannot see clearly why the needs of the child should necessitate a man and a woman to give themselves exclusively to each other in a marriage which cannot be dissolved and is lifelong; yet he concedes that the duration of marriage until the death of one of the parents for the sake of the children is rightly considered as a norm or rule. 188

186 Von Hildebrand, Marriage, 49.
187 Doms, Meaning of Marriage, 74.
188 Ibid., 76-76.
There seems to be some basis in the doctrine of St. Thomas for the contention that such utilitarian considerations as the prevention of decay of society, or even the safeguarding of the education of the children only pertain indirectly to indissolubility, and that the radical indissolubility of marriage flows from its nature as an intimate communion of love.\textsuperscript{189} As observed earlier, St. Thomas does say, in effect, that marriage means love. Then, treating of love, St. Thomas says that every love is a unitive force,\textsuperscript{190} in other words, that love tends towards or seeks unity, as he explains at length in the following text concerning the relation between love and union.

\begin{quote}
Every love is a \textit{unitive force}.
\end{quote}

The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the lover.---The second is union of affection: and this union must be considered in relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement of the appetite follows apprehension. Now love being twofold, viz., love of concupiscence, and love of friendship; each of these arises from a kind of apprehension of the oneness [unity] of the thing loved with the lover. For when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to our well-being. In like manner when a man loves another with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself; wherefore he apprehends him as his other self, in so far, to wit, as he wills good to him as to himself. Hence a friend is called a man's other self (Ethic. ix.4), and Augustine says (Confes. iv.6), Well did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul.

The first of these unions is caused \textit{effectively} by love; because love moves man to desire and seek the presence of the beloved, as of something suitable and belonging to him. The second union is caused \textit{formally} by love; because love itself is this union or bond. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. viii. 10) that love is a \textit{vital principle} uniting, or seeking to unite two together, the lover, to wit, and the beloved. For in describing it as uniting, he refers to the union of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{189} Von Hildebrand, \textit{Marriage}, 47-48.
\item \textsuperscript{190} S.T., I-II, q. 28, a.1.
\end{itemize}
affection, without which there is no love; and in saying that it seeks to unite, he refers to real union. 191

In the foregoing paragraph St. Thomas explicitly says that "love itself is this union or bond," meaning the "union of affection" referred to in the first paragraph of the above quoted text. "Love," he says, "is a vital principle uniting or seeking to unite two together, the lover...and the beloved." 192

Thus, the very nature of love with its tendency to unite the lover and the beloved, seems to demand that marriage be indissoluble. Love tends toward unity rather than towards dissolution. The complete trust which husband and wife should have for each other supposes the indissolubility of their union; nevertheless, the "natural basis for the indissolubility of marriage" seems to lie in the need to educate the child. 193 The child needs instruction which cannot be given to him immediately after birth, but only after a long time, as also correction, as we observed earlier in an argument in defense of the unity of marriage. Since the child needs the parents' care for a long time, St. Thomas observes, there exists a very great tie between male and female to which even the generic nature inclines, as he points out in the text:

Man's nature inclines to a thing in two ways. In one way, because that thing is becoming to the generic nature, and this is common to all animals; in another way because it is becoming to the nature of the difference, whereby the human species in so far as it is rational overflows the genus; such is an act of prudence or temperance. And just

191 S.T., I-II, q. 28, a.1.

192 Ibid.

as the generic nature, though one in all animals, yet is not in all in the same way, so neither does it incline in the same way in all, but in a way befitting each one. Accordingly man's nature inclines to matrimony on the part of the difference, as regards the second reason given above; wherefore the Philosopher (loc.cit.; Polit.i) gives this reason in men over other animals; but as regards the first reason it inclines on the part of the genus; wherefore he says that the begetting of offspring is common to all animals. Yet nature does not incline thereto in the same way in all animals; since there are animals whose offspring are able to seek food immediately after birth, or are sufficiently fed by their mother; and in these there is no tie between male and female; whereas in those whose offspring needs the support of both parents, although for a short time, there is a certain tie, as may be seen in certain birds. In man, however, since the child needs the parents' care for a long time, there is a very great tie between male and female, to which tie even the generic nature inclines. 194

St. Thomas strongly emphasizes the child's need of the care and guidance of both parents for its proper development in the physical, intellectual and moral spheres. Perhaps at the age of adolescence the child needs its parents most, and to break up the marriage union at any point in that grave period of the child's career would be to inflict a very great injustice which could never afterwards be rectified. The child is the chief loser through the divorce of husband and wife; we know this both from reason and experience with children of divorce parents. The child is the one who pays in the event of a divorce, while the man and the woman go their way separately, and forget or stamp on the head of remembrance. 195 Finding new interests in life, they stifle their conscience and find new

194 S.T.,III Suppl., q. 41, a.1 ad 1.
love. While in other connections before a contract is voided by the courts, even at the instance of the framers of the contract, the interests of third parties are always considered, in the divorce court, the interest not of a third party but of the first party, and the only first, the party to whose good the marriage contract is in the order of nature itself wholly subordinate—that interest is not only left unprotected but is even contemp­ tuously ignored; only the passions and the feelings of the parents are considered. The marriage union brings the child into existence; in the order of nature it is for the sake of the child that marriage as an institution exists at all, and from the day, then, that marriage is entered upon, the first responsibility of the parents is not to one another but to the child. However, at divorce we witness that awful tragedy of the child's life and interest being completely ignored and its future sacrificed to the convenience of its parents. The greatest tragedy that can happen to a home is this tragedy of the betrayal of the child by divorce.

As a result of divorce the child is deprived of its strict right; its guidance is destroyed; and its whole outlook on life is altered. In effect, the child is taught that moral effort is not to be put forth when there is the easier way of escape. Reverence and filial

196 Cronin, Science of Ethics, II, 434.
197 Ibid., 435.
198 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
200 Ibid.
202 Ibid.
affection are impossible on the part of the child for both parents,203 and just this alone, the fact that the child cannot give reverence and filial affection to both parents, can be the source of untold anguish in the heart of a child. The child's character is thus impaired, and a conflict, or the ready breeding ground for a conflict, is thus presented to the child.204

Since marriage implies a particular kind of companionship directed to a common action or end, it is always indivisible, St. Thomas explains in the text:

Just as the civic life denotes not the individual act of this or that one, but the things that concern the common action of the citizens, so the conjugal life is nothing else than a particular kind of companionship pertaining to that common action; wherefore as regards this same life the partnership of married persons is always indivisible, although it is divisible as regards the act belonging to each party.205

While St. Thomas uses an argument from an analogy based on the life of those animals among which male and female stay together for a long time because it is necessary for the support of their young, in order to show that marriage should last for the whole of life, Doms thinks it should not be necessary to have to use an argument which disregards the distinctive marital dignity of human beings, that which lifts them far above the animal world.206 St. Thomas' reasoning based on the analogy runs as follows:

203 Morrison, S.J., Marriage, 207.
204 Ibid., 207-208.
205 S.T., III Suppl., q. 44, a.3 ad 3.
206 Doms, Meaning of Marriage, 75.
It must be observed that in those animals in which the female alone suffices for the rearing of the offspring,—dogs for instance—the male and female do not remain together after coition. On the other hand, in all cases in which the female does not suffice to rear the offspring, the male and female remain together after coition, as long as may be necessary for the rearing and development of the young. We have an instance of this in certain birds, whose young are unable to seek food as soon as they are hatched. For since the bird does not feed its young on milk,—which is ready at hand through being prepared by nature, as in the case of quadrupeds—and needs to go in search of food for them, and besides this fosters them by incubation; the female alone would not suffice for all this. Wherefore divine providence has given the male of such animals the natural instinct to remain with the female for the rearing of the offspring.—Now it is clear that in the human species the female is far from sufficing alone for the rearing of the children, since the needs of human life require many things that one person alone cannot provide. It is therefore in keeping with human nature that the man remain with the woman after coition, and not leave her at once, indulging in promiscuous intercourse, as those do who have the habit of fornication. 207

Finally, St. Thomas appeals to the child's right to inherit the possessions of his parents, which also requires parents to remain together, as St. Thomas says in the text:

By the intention of nature marriage is directed to the rearing of the offspring, not merely for a time, but throughout its whole life. Hence it is of natural law that parents should lay up for their children, and that children should be their parents' heirs (2Cor.xii.14). Therefore, since the offspring is the common good of husband and wife, the dictate of the natural law requires the latter to live together for ever inseparably; and so the indissolubility of marriage is of natural law. 208

St. Thomas uses another line of reasoning to show that the father's care for his son demands that the parents remain together to the end of life; his argument runs as follows:

207 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 122; cf. S.T., III Suppl., q. 65, a.3; Doms, The Meaning of Marriage, 75.

208 S.T., III Suppl., q. 67, a. 1.
For possessions are directed to the preservation of the natural life: and since the natural life which cannot be preserved in the person of an undying father, is preserved, by a kind of succession, in the person of the son, it is naturally befitting that the son succeed in things belonging to the father. Therefore it is natural that the father's care for his son should endure to the end of his life. If, then, the father's care for his son causes, even among birds, the continued fellowship of male and female, the natural order demands that in the human species father and mother should remain together to the end of life. 209

St. Thomas maintains that parents have duties towards their children as long as they live, as can be observed in the text:

Since a father stands in the relation of principle, and his son in the relation of that which is from a principle, it is essentially fitting for a father to support his son: and consequently he is bound to support him not only for a time, but for all his life, and this is to lay by. 210

Even though children are fully trained and independent of their parents, as it were, if for any reason they should meet with misfortune or should become a charge on others, that charge falls first of all on the parents. 211 For this reason their union should continue to the end. 212

While the child's need of an education, of care and guidance speaks eloquently enough in defense of the indissolubility of marriage, there are also other arguments based on the parents' need of each other and on the nature of conjugal love which demand that marriage have the property of indissolubility.

209 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 123.

210 S.T., II-II, q. 101, a.2 ad 2.

211 Cronin, Science of Ethics, II, 438.

212 Ibid.
It would be contrary to natural equity, says St. Thomas, if a man could take a woman while she is yet fair and fruitful, and put her away when she has aged.\(^{213}\) She has a right to the support and fidelity of her husband to the end after having given herself to him during the whole period of fertility, and for as long as youth and beauty remain. She has given him her whole life in so far as it could have value for him. In return she must get love and protection for her whole life. The man who stays with his wife while she is young and beautiful, and throws her aside when she is old, has never loved her in a human way, but as an animal only. An animal thinks only in the present, and as soon as the present attractiveness of the object of its love ceases, its love for it perishes. Human thought and feeling, however, are not confined to the present but travel back into the past and forward to the future.

Then, too, in view of the fact that between husband and wife there exists the greatest friendship,\(^{214}\) they ought to love each other with the love of friendship. "That which is loved with the love of friendship", St. Thomas observes, "is loved simply and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the love of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, but for something else."\(^ {215}\)

\(^{213}\) Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa Contra Gentiles}, III, 123.

\(^{214}\) Ibid.

\(^{215}\) \textit{S.T.}, I-II, q. 26, a. 4.
Pursuing the thought of Aristotle, St. Thomas gives five things which he says are proper to a friendship, and since between husband and wife there exists the greatest friendship, these five things ought to be characteristic of the friendship between husband and wife. St. Thomas says:

In the first place, every friend wishes his friend to be and to live; secondly, he desires good things for him; thirdly, he does good things to him; fourthly, he takes pleasure in his company; fifthly, he is of one mind with him, rejoicing and sorrowing in almost the same things.

Needless to say, in the event of divorce, for example, these five things proper to a friendship cannot obtain. Husband and wife will not be likely to "take pleasure in each other's company," nor be able to be of one mind, "rejoicing and sorrowing in almost the same things." Even the first mentioned property of a friendship will scarcely obtain, for when husband and wife are divorced, they are not apt to be concerned about whether or not their respective spouses are alive, particularly not about whether they are living in an environment of happiness and contentment. When St. Thomas says that a friend wishes his friend to be and to live, he does not mean that a friend wishes his friend merely to exist, but to live in a manner conducive to his well-being.

As it would not be proper for a man to put away his wife, so also, St. Thomas adds, it is unfitting that the woman be allowed to put away the

216 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 123.
217 S.T., II-II, q. 25, a. 7.
man. 218 St. Thomas maintains that the woman is naturally subject to man's authority. 219 It would be contrary to the natural order if a wife could leave her husband. 220 If the husband could leave his wife, there would not be just fellowship between husband and wife, St. Thomas continues, but a kind of slavery on the part of the latter. 221

Then, too, St. Thomas says that there is a certain "natural anxiety" in man to be assured of his offspring, and this is necessary, because the child needs the father's authority for a long time. 222 Hence, he continues, whatever prevents him from being assured of having children, is contrary to the natural instinct of the human species. Now, if the husband may put away his wife, or the wife leave her husband, and take another man, thus being copulated first to one and afterwards to another, the certainty of offspring would be hindered. Therefore, concludes St. Thomas, it is contrary to the natural instinct of the human species that husband and wife be separated: and in consequence the union of male and female in the human race must be not only lasting but indissoluble. 223

As in defense of unity, so in defense of the indissolubility of marriage, St. Thomas has an argument based on "natural instinct," which is a weighty argument since even divine law expresses the instinct of nature. 224 St. Thomas speaks with eloquence on this point when he says:

219 Ibid.  
220 Ibid.  
221 Ibid.  
222 Ibid.  
223 Ibid.  
224 Ibid.
Positive laws should be based on natural instinct, if they be human: even as in demonstrative sciences, all human discoveries must needs be founded on principles naturally known. And if they be divine, not only do they express the instinct of nature, but they also supply the defect of natural instinct: even as the things that God reveals, are beyond the grasp of natural reason. Since, then, the natural instinct of the human species is that the union of male and female be indissoluble, and that one man be united to one woman, it behooved this to be ordered by human law. Moreover, the divine law adds a kind of supernatural reason taken from the representation of the indissoluble union of Christ and the Church, which is union of one with one (Ephes.v. 32). 225

St. Thomas also makes an appeal to good manners in his defense of indissolubility in the words:

Since in man all other things should be subordinate to what is best in him, the union of male and female is ordered by law not only in the point of its relation to the procreation of children as in other animals, but also in its relation to good morals, which right reason regulates, both as regards man in himself, and considered as a member either of a private family, or of the civil community. Now, the indissolubility of the union of male and female belongs to good morals. Because their mutual love will be the more constant if they know that they are indissolubly united. They will also be more carefully provident in the conduct of the household, when they realize that they are always to remain together in possession of the same things. Again, this precludes the origin of quarrels which must needs arise between the husband and his wife's relatives, if he were to put his wife away: and those who are connected through affinity have a greater regard for one another. Moreover it removes the occasions of adultery which would occur, were the husband free to put away his wife, or vice versa: for this would encourage the seeking of further marriage. 226

Hence it is said (Matth. v. 31; xix.9; I Cor. vii. 10): But I say to you that the wife depart not from her husband.* 227

225 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 123.

226 Ibid.

227 Ibid. *("The quotation combines the text of the Gospels with that of the Apostle.")
In the foregoing text St. Thomas asserts that indissolubility of marriage also belongs to "good morals." He also observes that husband and wife will be apt to take better care of their household furnishings when they realize that they are always to remain together in possession of the same things. The latter realization prevents the origin of many quarrels and removes occasions for adultery.

Speaking further on the thought expressed in the beginning of the foregoing text, regarding the order which man ought to establish within himself, St. Thomas says:

Just as the mind of man is subordinate to God, so is the body subordinate to the soul, and the lower powers to reason. Now, it belongs to divine providence, which God sets before man under the form of the divine law, that everything should retain its order. Therefore man should be directed by the divine law, in such wise that the lower powers be subject to reason; the body to the soul; and external things be employed for man's needs.228

St. Thomas seems to maintain that the property of indissolubility, like unity, is a necessary property of marriage; he means that these properties are necessary for the realization of the purposes of marriage. Only when speaking of Christian marriage does St. Thomas, at least implicitly, say that the properties of unity and indissolubility are essential to marriage.229 His failure to make these properties essential to every true marriage, is difficult to explain. From Christian revelation we know that Christ restored the original idea of marriage with its properties of unity and indissolubility, of which we will speak a bit later; and from that time on

228 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 121.
229 S.T., III Suppl., q. 49, a. 3.
unity and indissolubility were the properties of every true marriage, whether Christian or non-Christian. 230 That these properties are essential to marriage, whether Christian or non-Christian, is also the opinion of Augustine. 231 St. Thomas' apparent failure to make these properties essential to every true marriage seems to suggest that at least on this point he is philosophizing as though no Christian revelation has occurred.

Christian revelation has profoundly modified the conditions under which reason has to work, and once one is in possession of that revelation one can no longer philosophize as though he had never heard of it. 232

Perhaps a possible explanation or reason for St. Thomas' failure to make the properties of unity and indissolubility essential to every true marriage is that he merely intended to give a rational basis for the doctrine of the essential unity and indissolubility of Christian marriage by indicating the necessity of these properties for the realization of the purposes of marriage.

An objection arises as to the Old Testament; Lamech, a great-grandson of Cain, took two wives (Gen. 4:19) and the holy patriarchs followed his example. 233 Polygamy (or polygyny) and divorce seem to have been legalized by the law of Moses (Deut. 17:17; 21: 15f; 24:1). 234


231 Augustine, Commentary on the New Code of Canon Law, V, 17.


234 Ibid.
Cognizant of the fact that the Old Law mentions a plurality of wives without any prohibition thereof, as also of the fact that divorce was allowed under the Mosaic Law, St. Thomas gives a careful reply to the objections that might be brought to bear against his doctrine regarding the unity and indissolubility of marriage, in view of the above referred to facts. He replies:

[Plurality of wives is said to be against the natural law, not as regards its first precepts, but as regards the secondary precepts, which like conclusions are drawn from its first precepts. Since, however, human acts must needs vary according to the various conditions of persons, times, and other circumstances, the aforesaid conclusions do not proceed from the first precepts of the natural law, so as to be binding in all cases, but only in the majority; for such is the entire matter of Ethics.... Hence, when they cease to be binding, it is lawful to disregard them. But because it is not easy to determine the above variations, it belongs exclusively to him from whose authority he [the law] derives its binding force to permit the non-observance of the law in those cases to which the force of the law ought not to extend, and this permission is called a dispensation. Now the law prescribing the one wife was framed not by man but by God, nor was it ever given by word or in writing, but was imprinted on the heart, like other things belonging in any way to the natural law. Consequently a dispensation in this matter could be granted by God alone through an inward inspiration, vouchsafed originally to the holy patriarchs, and by their example continued to others, at a time when it behooved the aforesaid precept not to be observed, in order to ensure the multiplication of the offspring to be brought up in the worship of God. For the principal end is ever to be borne in mind before the secondary end. Wherefore, since the good of the offspring is the principal end of marriage, it behooved to disregard for a time the impediment that might arise to the secondary ends, when it was necessary for the offspring to be multiplied; because it was for the removal of this impediment that the precept forbidding a plurality of wives was framed....235

In the foregoing text St. Thomas explains that a plurality of

235 S.T.,III Suppl., q. 65, a. 2.
wives is not against the natural law as regards its primary precepts, but only as regards its secondary precepts which like conclusions are drawn from the primary precepts. These conclusions, St. Thomas maintains, do not proceed from the primary precepts of the natural law so as to be binding in all cases, but only in the majority, since human acts must needs vary according to the various conditions of persons, times, and other circumstances. Consequently, when they cease to be binding, it is lawful to disregard them. However, since it is not easy to determine the above variations, it belongs exclusively to him from whose authority the law derives its binding force to permit the non-observance of the law in those cases to which the force of the law ought not to extend, and this permission is called a dispensation. Now the law prescribing the one wife was framed by God and imprinted on the heart, like other things belonging in any way to the natural law; consequently, only God could grant a dispensation in this matter through an inward inspiration. This was granted originally to the holy patriarchs, and by their example it continued to the others, at a time when, for a very good reason, God permitted the non-observance of the law prescribing one wife.

There are divergent opinions regarding the reason for the above permission. Augustine thinks that the explanation offered by Innocent the IIIrd is the best solution to the problem.\textsuperscript{236} The latter says that the patriarchs and the Chosen People as a whole had by divine revelation obtained permission to have several wives, and the reason for this permission

\footnotesize{236 Augustine, Commentary on the New Code of Canon Law, V, 17.}
was the more rapid increase of God's people, and, in general, of the human race. However, this concession ceased under the new dispensation after Christ had restored the original idea of marriage.

Christ restored the original idea of marriage in His reply to the question: "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause?" Our Lord replied:

Have ye not read, that he who made man from the beginning, Made them male and female? And he said:

For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they two shall be in one flesh.

Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let no man put asunder.

They say to him: Why then did Moses command to give a bill of divorce, and to put away?

He saith to them: Because Moses by reason of the hardness of your heart permitted you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it was not so.

And I say to you, that whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and he that shall marry her that is put away, committeth adultery.

In the foregoing passage wherein Our Lord restores both the conjugal unity and indissolubility, He also gives us the reason why polygamy

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238 Ibid.
239 Matthew, 19:3.
240 Ibid., 19:4-9.
and repudiation were tolerated in virtue of a Divine dispensation. He
gives but one reason for it: that the dispensations had been a concession
to the moral weakness of the Jewish people.241

The divorce which Moses permitted was absolute or complete, that
is, with the permission to remarry.242 In view of this, the dispensation
permitting divorce simultaneously permitted the practice of polygyny.
The reasons given by Dr. Paul Heinisch243 and the Reverend
Thomas Higgins, S.J., 244 for the dispensation permitting the practice of
polygyny seem to imply that the latter was a concession to the moral weak-
ness of the Jewish people.

Heinisch says that when Yahweh ratified the covenant with the
Chosen People, many of their habits were so deeply ingrained as to make
changes very difficult.245 Moses had to take these habits into considera-
tion as also the customs current in the neighboring nations.246 Only gradu-
ually did the Israelites accept the precepts of Yahwistic religion and
develop a full and true moral sense, and in this way, Dr. Heinisch claims,
may some of the cruelties and improprieties, as well as the practice of

242 S.T., III Suppl., q. 67, a.5.
243 Dr. Paul Heinisch, Theology of the Old Testament, Trans.,
244 Rev. Thomas Higgins, S.J., Man as Man, Milwaukee, [1949], 386.
246 Ibid.
polygamy, be explained. 247

Higgins' reasoning is very similar to that of Dr. Heinisch, for he seems to think that the referred to permission was granted in order to preserve the true religion among the Chosen People by allowing them to follow the marital customs of the surrounding nations. 248 "It were better, he says, "that God should grant them a dispensation from the original unity and indissolubility of the marriage tie, rather than that they should take it upon themselves and thus lapse from the true religion...." 249

St. Thomas is of the opinion that the above referred to dispensation permitting polygyny in the Old Law was granted in order to ensure the multiplication of the believers, that is, the multiplication of offspring that would be brought up in the worship of God—in the true religion. 250

The explanations offered by St. Thomas, Dr. Heinisch and Reverend Thomas Higgins, S.J., seem to agree in this—that the dispensation permitting polygyny in the Old Testament was granted in order to preserve the true religion, though they differ in their interpretations of the means for the preservation of the same.

248 Higgins, Man as Man, 386.
249 Ibid.
250 S.T., III Suppl., q. 65, a. 2.
Without doubt, the best reason one can give for the dispensation permitting polygyny in the Old Law was the one given by Our Lord Himself, namely—that it was a concession to the moral weakness of the Jewish people; however, the reason given by Innocent the IIIrd, quoted earlier, to the effect that the dispensation was granted in order to increase God's people, and in general, the human race, also seems rational.

St. Thomas maintains that the dispensation of which we are speaking is not a contradiction to the principles which God has implanted in nature, but rather an exception to them; and such an exception was never lawful without a Divine Dispensation.

Further, St. Thomas holds that it was never lawful to have a concubine outside of wedlock, since it is against the primary precepts of the natural law which admit of no dispensation, as evident from the text:

Things opposed to the precepts of the decalogue were never lawful. Now to have a concubine is against a precept of the decalogue, namely, Thou shalt not commit adultery. Therefore it was never lawful.

Since it is against the natural law to have a concubine outside wedlock, it is never lawful either in itself or by dispensation.

For...intercourse with a woman outside wedlock is an action improportionate to the good of the offspring which is the principal end of marriage; and consequently it is against the first precepts of the natural law which admit of no dispensation.

St. Thomas brings out another significant point which might very easily be overlooked by other writers, and that is this: when certain

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252 S.T., III Suppl., q. 65, a.2, ad 2.
253 Ibid., q. 65, a. 5.
men in the Old Testament took concubines, and yet did not sin in so doing, those concubines had something of the character of a wife and something of a concubine.\textsuperscript{254} The bondswomen were wives as regards the principal end of marriage, but not as to the other union which regards the secondary end of marriage.\textsuperscript{255}

Besides replying to the objections which might be raised against his doctrine on the unity of marriage, St. Thomas also answers the objections which might be raised to his doctrine on the indissolubility of marriage. Like polygyny, divorce was also permitted under the Mosaic Law, but only by a dispensation granted by God. This dispensation, like the one permitting polygyny seems to have been, was "a concession to the moral weakness of the Jewish people.\textsuperscript{256} St. Thomas condemns the custom of putting a wife away, which, he says was permitted to the Jews in the Old Law by reason of the hardness of their heart (Matt. xix. 8); because they were prone to wife-murder.\textsuperscript{257} Here is a case where God allows a lesser evil in order to avoid the greater.\textsuperscript{258}

Divorce, like polygyny, is not opposed to the primary precepts of the natural law, which admit of no dispensation, but rather is it opposed

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{254} S.T., III Suppl., q. 65, a. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{255} Ibid., q. 65, a. 5 ad 2.
\item \textsuperscript{256} Vermeersch, \textit{What Is Marriage?} 12.
\item \textsuperscript{257} Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa Contra Gentiles}, III, 123.
\item \textsuperscript{258} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
to the secondary precepts of the natural law, which, as mentioned above in connection with polygyny, are like conclusions derived from the primary precepts. While God could grant a dispensation from the first precepts of the natural law, as He did in permitting Abraham to kill his son, such dispensations are not granted to all generally, but only to certain individuals, as also happens in regard to miracles. 259

Conceivably divorce could be opposed to the primary precepts of the natural law also, as it would be in the event that it occurred before the essential needs of the child are met. These essential needs which St. Thomas says belong to the first intention of nature include: procreation, nourishment, and instruction only until the offspring comes to perfect age. 260 That provision be made for the children by bequeathing to them the inheritance or other goods belongs, St. Thomas says, to the second intention of the natural law. 261

The term, "dispensation," used above, is explained in the following text:

Abraham carnally knew Agar with the disposition of a husband towards his wife....Now by Divine command he sent her away, and yet sinned not. Therefore it could be lawful by dispensation for a man to put away his wife.

I answer that, In the commandments, especially those which in some way are of natural law, a dispensation is like a change in the natural course of things: and this course is subject to a twofold change. First, by some natural cause whereby another natural cause

259 S.T., III Suppl., c. 67, a.2.
260 Ibid., q. 67, a.2 ad 1.
261 Ibid.
is hindered from following its course: it is thus in all things that happen by chance less frequently in nature. In this way, however, there is no variation in the course of those natural things which happen always, but only in the course of those which happen frequently. Secondly, by a cause altogether supernatural, as in the case of miracles: and in this way there can be a variation in the course of nature, not only in the course which is appointed for the majority of cases, but also in the course which is appointed for all cases, as instanced by the sun standing still at the time of Josue, and by its turning back at the time of Ezechias, and by the miraculous eclipse at the time of Christ's Passion.* In like manner the reason for a dispensation from a precept of the law of nature is sometimes found in the lower causes, and in this way a dispensation may bear upon the secondary precepts of the natural law, but not on the first precepts because these are always existent as it were, as stated above (Q. 65, a. 1) in reference to the plurality of wives and so forth. But sometimes this reason is found in the higher causes, and then a dispensation may be given by God even from the first precepts of the natural law, for the sake of signifying or showing some Divine mystery, as instanced in the dispensation vouchsafed to Abraham in the slaying of his innocent son. Such dispensations, however, are not granted to all generally, but to certain individual persons, as also happens in regard to miracles. Accordingly, if the indissolubility of marriage is contained among the first precepts of the natural law, it could only be a matter of dispensation in the second way; but, if it be one of the second precepts of the natural law, it could be a matter of dispensation even in the first way. Now it would seem to belong rather to the secondary precepts of the natural law. For the indissolubility of marriage is not directed to the good of the offspring, which is the principal end of marriage, except in so far as parents have to provide for their children for their whole life, by due preparation of those things that are necessary in life. Now this preparation does not pertain to the first intention of nature, in respect of which all things are common. And therefore it would seem that to put away one's wife is not contrary to the first intention of nature, and consequently that it is contrary not to the first but to the second precepts of the natural law. Therefore, seemingly, it can be a matter of dispensation even in the first way.262

262 S.T., III Suppl., q. 67, a. 2 c.

* Jos. x. 14; 4 Kings xx. 10; Isa. xxxviii. 8; Matth. xxvii. 15.
Indissolubility, then, St. Thomas says, is not directed to the
good of the offspring, which is the principal end of marriage, except in
so far as parents have to provide for their children for their whole life,
by due preparation of those things that are necessary for life; and this
preparation, St. Thomas adds, does not pertain to the first intention of
nature, in respect of which all things are common. In effect, St. Thomas
here is saying that the primary end of marriage, the good of the offspring,
is attainable despite divorce. By the term, the good of the offspring,
St. Thomas means procreation, nourishment and instruction until the offspring
comes to perfect age, as observable in the text:

The good of the offspring, in so far as it belongs to the first
intention of nature, includes procreation, nourishment, and instruction,
until the offspring comes to perfect age. But that provision be made
for the children by bequeathing to them the inheritance or other goods
belongs seemingly to the second intention of the natural law.

St. Thomas concludes that to put away one's wife is not contrary
to the first intention of nature, and that, consequently, it is contrary
not to the first but to the second precepts of the natural law. For this
reason, he says, "seemingly" indissolubility can be a matter of dispensation
even in the first way mentioned in the foregoing text, that is, by some
natural cause whereby another natural cause is hindered from following its
course: "It is thus in all things that happen by chance less frequently in
nature."

263 S.T.,III Suppl., q. 67, a. 2.
264 Ibid., q. 67, a. 2 ad 1.
265 Ibid., q. 67, a. 2.
In the above referred to text it is important that we note that St. Thomas uses the word "seemingly" when speaking of indissolubility being a matter of dispensation "even in the first way." He is thus giving evidence of the fact that he has not arrived at certainty in the matter. If he were to say with certainty that indissolubility could be a matter of dispensation even in the first way, implying no divine dispensation, then he would be giving evidence of an inconsistency, since elsewhere he insists that it is only in virtue of a divine dispensation that divorce and polygamy were permitted, and as a consequence, the writer would be faced with a very great difficulty.

In the case of sacramental marriage, however, St. Thomas is certain that indissolubility could not be a matter of dispensation except "by a cause altogether supernatural," that is, by God Himself. Such a cause is implied in the "second kind of dispensation" to which St. Thomas refers in the text:

Although indissolubility belongs to the second intention of marriage as fulfilling an office of nature, it belongs to its first intention as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, from the moment it was made a sacrament of the Church, as long as it remains such it cannot be a matter of dispensation except perhaps by the second kind of dispensation.

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266 S.T., III Suppl., q. 67, a.2; supra, 99.
267 Ibid., cf. supra, 99.
268 S.T., III Suppl., q. 67, a.2 ad 3.
While granting that indissolubility could be a matter for dispensation, as explained above, St. Thomas maintains that divorce (with the permission to remarry), as ordained by Moses in the name of God, always was and "remained inordinate." The power of putting away the wife did not render the act licit, according to St. Thomas, but merely exempted it from legal and eternal punishment. This power was accorded only to prevent a greater evil, that is, the murder of the wife. St. Thomas does not think that the hardness of heart of the Jews was excused from sin, but that the permission given on account of that hardness excused them from further sin in the matter of divorce, as he explains in the words:

> Although their hardness of heart excused them not from sin, the permission given on account of that hardness excused them. For certain things are forbidden those who are healthy in body, which are not forbidden the sick, and yet the sick sin not by availing themselves of the permission granted to them.

Our Lord Himself teaches that divorce was forbidden in the Old Law, but that it was thought to be permitted on account of the precepts being incorrectly explained, as evident from the text:

> Our Lord shows the superabundance of the New Law over the Old in respect of the counsels, not only as regards those things which were forbidden in the Old Law, and yet were thought by many to be permitted on account of the precepts being incorrectly explained,—for instance that of the hatred towards our enemies; and so is it in the matter of divorce.

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270 S.T., III Suppl., q. 67, a.3, ad 5.
271 Ibid., q. 67, a. 3.
272 Ibid., q. 67, a.3 ad 4.
273 Ibid., q. 67, a.4 ad 3.
The following text gives us an insight into the circumstances which prompted Moses to allow divorce in certain cases. From it we also learn that divorce was "illicit" from the beginning, even though it was allowed or merely tolerated later. The text reads:

In spite of the Divine law of the indissolubility of marriage, in the course of time divorce, in the sense of complete dissolution of marriage, became prevalent to a greater or less extent among all nations. Moses found this custom even among the people of Israel. As lawgiver, he ordained in the name of God (Deut., xxiv, 1): "If a man take a wife, and have her, and she find not favour in his eyes, for some uncleanness: he shall write a bill of divorce, and shall give it in her hand, and send her out of his house." The rest of the passage shows that this divorce was understood as justifying the wife in her marriage with another husband, hence as a complete annulment of the first marriage. Some regard it only as a freedom from penalty, so that in reality the remarriage of the divorced wife was not allowed, and was adultery, because the bond of the first marriage had not been dissolved. This opinion was held by the Master of the Sentences, Peter Lombard (IV Sent., dist. xxxiiii, 3), St. Bonaventure (IV Sent., dist. xxxiiii, art.3 Q.1), and others. Others again, however, believe that there was a real permission, a dispensation granted by God as otherwise the practice sanctioned in the law would be blamed as sinful in some part of the Old Testament. Moreover, Christ (loc.cit.) seems to have rendered illicit what was illicit in the beginning, but what had really been allowed later, even though it was allowed "by reason of the hardness of your heart" (St. Thomas, III, Supplem., Q. lxvii, a.3;....This second opinion maintains and must maintain that the expression "for some uncleanness" does not mean any slight cause, but a grievous stain, something shameful directed against the purpose of marriage or marital fidelity. A separation at will, and for slight reasons, at the pleasure of the husband, is against the primary principles of the natural moral law, and is not subject to Divine Dispensation in such a way that it could be made licit in every case. 274

In the above we observe that even when divorce was allowed by Moses, permission for the same was not granted for any slight cause; husband and wife could not separate at will, as they practically could according to the doctrine of Confucius. Polygamy and repudiation were tolerated

only in virtue of a Divine dispensation, as being reconcilable, strictly speaking, with the essential demands of nature. 275

The laws of marriage, namely the law of unity, of indissolubility, and also that of perpetuity, 276 are equally unchangeable by human authority, as evident from the text:

Man, being subject to the rational moral order can in no case derogate from it even for purposes which he thinks good. But God, the Author of nature and of order, can without offense to His own wisdom make some exceptions to laws other than the most principal or most essential ones. This He may do by positive authorization of the exceptions, for ends worthy of Himself, or by tolerating them through consideration of the weakness of human nature, with due regard to all the circumstances. Never has He permitted adultery or fornication; but He did tolerate among the Jews a certain polygamy, and even in certain cases the repudiation of the wife. 277

Thus, as far as the parties are concerned, and even as far as any human power is concerned, every validly contracted marriage is indissoluble. 278

However, God, the Author of order and of the law, can in His wisdom, for the sake of a higher good, make exceptions, 279 as explained in the foregoing text.

Unlike blasphemy, lying, rape, robbery, brutality or the defrauding of the laborer of his hire, all of which are wrong in themselves, the matter of a plurality of wives, or even divorce, is not wrong in itself.

276 Ibid., 9.
277 Ibid., 9-10.
278 Ibid., 25.
279 Ibid., 26.
280 Higgins, MAN As MAN, 387.
that is, "in se." It is wrong because of the circumstance that it is forbidden by Divine positive law, and God could change it. Thus it is not wrong "in se", but "secundum quid."

A thing is wrong in itself when it has only one use, and that is an evil thing. Those things which in themselves are wrong may never be permitted, no matter what benefits may reasonably expected to follow on their performance. 281

Now, neither divorce nor polygyny could be wrong in themselves, since God permitted those practices in the Old Testament, as we have just seen. Divorce and polygyny are usually opposed to the natural law and wrong because of that opposition. 282 God could not go against nature, since the nature of a thing is what God does therein, as St. Thomas points out in the text:

Even as God does nothing contrary to nature (since the nature of a thing is what God does therein,... and yet does certain things contrary to the wonted course of nature; so too God can command nothing contrary to virtue, since virtue and rectitude of human will consist chiefly in conformity with God's will and obedience to His command, although it be contrary to the wonted mode of virtue. Accordingly, then, the command given to Abraham to slay his innocent son was not contrary to justice, since God is the author of life and death. Nor again was it contrary to chastity that Osee was commanded to take an adulteress, because God Himself is the ordainer of human generation, and the right manner of intercourse with woman is that which He appoints.

281 Morrison, Marriage, 7.
282 S.T.,III Suppl., q. 65, a. 1; q. 67, a. 2; Vermeersch, What Is Marriage?, 10.
283 S.T., II-II, q. 104, a. 4 ad 2.
Now, conceivably divorce could be evil for other reasons than that it is contrary to Divine positive law, since it is a violation of a promise, and it may also be opposed to the well-being of the child or even of the parents.

That divorce is not wrong in itself seems evident from the fact that marriage is dissoluble under certain conditions, for example, in cases to which the Pauline privilege is applied. In such cases a marriage which has been contracted between two unbaptized persons, may, after the baptism of one of them, be dissolved in favor of the Faith, as explained in the text:

If the spouse who has not been baptized refuses to cohabit with the party who has been converted to Christianity, under conditions which are acceptable to the latter, the Christian party can marry a Catholic and from the time of this new marriage the former marriage is dissolved, and the unbaptized party is also free from the bond.284

This is also expressed in the canon which reads: "Legitimum inter non baptizatos matrimonium, licet consummatum, solvitur in favorem fidei ex privilegio Paulino."285

Secondly, a non-Christian marriage can also be dissolved by Papal authority, for example, a marriage between a non-baptized person and a baptized Protestant; while this marriage is valid, it is a non-sacramental marriage and can be dissolved. The famous Helena case286 is a case

285 Codex Iuris Canonici, Canon 1120.
286 T. Lincoln Bouscaren, S.J., Canon Law Digest, Milwaukee, I, (1934), Canon 1125; 552-553.
in point.

Thirdly, a Christian marriage before consummation can be dissolved by solemn profession in a religious order, or by an act of Papal authority, as evident from the canon:

Matrimonium non consummatum inter baptizatos vel inter partem baptizatam et partem non baptizatam, dissolvitur tum ipso iure per sollemnem professionem religiosam, tum per dispensationem a Sede Apostolica ex iusta causa concessam, utraque parte rogante vel alterutra, et si altera sit invita. 287

All the above referred to types of marriages which can be dissolved need the concurrence of Papal authority for their dissolution, as the marriage bond cannot be dissolved by mere human authority. When the Pope, exercising Papal authority, dissolves a marriage bond, he acts in virtue of Divine authority. Thus, the dissolution of a marriage bond by Papal authority occurs through a cause altogether supernatural, to which St. Thomas has reference when he speaks of the "second kind of dispensation".

Divorce, by an act of Papal authority, is impossible for only one type of marriage, and that is when two validly baptized persons contract a valid marriage and their marriage is consummated; no power on earth can break that bond, except the death of one of the parties. 288 This doctrine is also contained in the canon: "Matrimonium validum ratum et consummatum nulla humana potestate nullaque causa, praeterquam morte, dissolvi potest." 289

287 Codex Iuris Canonici, Canon 1119.
289 Codex Iuris Canonici, Canon 1118.
The following text of St. Thomas presents a difficulty. In it he seems to suggest that the indissolubility of marriage might even be a matter of dispensation "in the first way", mentioned earlier, that is, without a Divine dispensation or the operation of a supernatural cause.

The text is:

Although indissolubility belongs to the second intention of marriage as fulfilling an office of nature, it belongs to its first intention as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, from the moment it was made a sacrament of the Church, as long as it remains such it cannot be a matter of dispensation except perhaps by the second kind of dispensation.

The second kind of dispensation referred to above results from a cause altogether supernatural, as explained in the text of St. Thomas on dispensations presented earlier. The writer finds it difficult to determine exactly what St. Thomas means by the suggestion implied in the above text, to the effect that the indissolubility of marriage might even be a matter of dispensation "in the first way", that is, without a Divine dispensation or the concurrence of a cause altogether supernatural.

Only the death of one of the parties to a Christian marriage that has been consummated, as we observed in a canon quoted above, can dissolve the marriage. That the marriage tie ceases with death is also the doctrine of St. Thomas, for he says: "since the marriage tie ceases with death, no injury is done to the sacrament if a woman marry again after her husband's death."

290 cf. supra, 98-99.
291 S.T., III Suppl., q.67, a.2 ad 3.
292 Ibid., q. 63, a.2 ad 1.
Although certain non-Christian marriages and certain Christian marriages before consummation can be dissolved by an act of Papal authority, this does not in any way touch or change the essential properties of unity and indissolubility, inherent in the marriage contract. These properties are essential to the marriage contract, as mentioned in the canon: "Essentiales matrimonii proprietates sunt unitas ac indissolubilitas, quae in matrimonio christiano peculiarem obtinent firmitatem ratione sacramenti." In a Christian marriage these properties obtain a certain "firmness" by reason of the sacrament; however, they are essential to every marriage whether Christian or non-Christian.

When St. Thomas says, "there is no matrimony without inseparability," he means that there may not be anything in the marriage consent contrary to perpetuity, that is, no conditions may be set up so as to limit the duration of the marriage bond. The marriage consent must contain the intention of having the marriage last "till death do us part." Even though under certain conditions a marriage bond might subsequently be dissolved, and that only by Divine authority (as exercised by the Pope, for example), the marriage consent must contain the property of indissolubility.

293 S.T., III Suppl., q. 63, a.2 ad 1; Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 123, 124.

294 Codex Iuris Canonici, Canon 1013, pt.2.


296 S.T., III Suppl. q. 49, a.3.

St. Thomas' doctrine on the unity and indissolubility of marriage can perhaps best be observed from the following text given earlier, and from the reference following it:

Since, then, the natural instinct of the human species is that the union of male and female be indissoluble, and that one man be united to one woman, it behooved this to be ordered by human law. Moreover, the divine law adds a kind of supernatural reason taken from the representation of the indissoluble union of Christ and the Church, which is union of one with one.298

Immediately after the above text St. Thomas refers to the following Scriptural reference regarding the union of Christ with His Church, which union marriage symbolizes:

For no man ever hated his own flesh; but nourisheth and cherisheth it, as also Christ doth the Church:

Because we are members of his body, or of his flesh, and of his bones.

For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh.

This is a great sacrament...299

The words: "They shall be two in one flesh," in the above text, are interpreted to mean that they shall be "not more than two" in one flesh.300 Thus, all polygamy or polyandry is unlawful, even for unbaptized persons.301

299 Ephesians 5:29-32.
301 Ibid.
The doctrine of St. Thomas seems to be that the properties of unity and indissolubility are necessary for the realization of the purposes of marriage. St. Thomas does not seem to see that these properties are inherent in every marriage contract, that is, essential properties of it. However, he does say, at least implicitly, that these properties are essential to a Christian marriage. St. Thomas also insists on the fact that the marriage consent must be "completely voluntary" in order to have a valid marriage.

In comparing the doctrine of St. Thomas with that of Confucius on the unity and indissolubility of marriage, as also on the matter of the marriage consent, we observe that the Confucian concept of marriage is certainly incomplete, if we are to admit that he had a concept of true marriage at all. While counselling that marriage should have the property of unity and that marriage should be enduring, Confucius also tolerates concubinage and divorce which could be had almost at will. In accordance with the doctrine of filial piety, a man's decision in the matter of divorcing his wife depended upon the attitude of his parents towards her; if the latter was favorable, he was not to divorce her; if unfavorable, he was expected to divorce her, even though he himself may have loved her dearly.

St. Thomas seems to regard the properties of unity and indissolubility so necessary to marriage that they could only be dispensed with by

302 S.T., III Suppl., q. 47, a. 5.
a Divine dispensation. When by Papal authority certain types of marriages are dissolved, they are dissolved in virtue of Divine authority which the Pope exercises. Only one type of marriage cannot be dissolved by any power on earth, and that is a Christian consummated marriage, as pointed out earlier.

While St. Thomas usually insists on the fact that only by Divine dispensation can the properties of unity and indissolubility be dispensed with, there are two passages in his writings which seem to suggest that St. Thomas thinks that indissolubility could be a matter of dispensation without a Divine dispensation or the concurrence of a cause altogether supernatural, that is, in "the first way" mentioned earlier. In this latter referred to passage on dispensations there is one difficulty which the writer has been unable to solve. After saying that divorce is contrary, not to the first precepts of the natural law, but contrary to the secondary precepts thereof, which are derived from the primary precepts as conclusions from first principles, St. Thomas says "seemingly it [namely, the indissolubility of marriage] can be a matter of dispensation even in the first way." However, the term, "seemingly", here indicates that St. Thomas has not arrived at absolute certainty in the matter.

Then, a little later in the same question, there is a passage which presents a still greater difficulty. Here St. Thomas seems to speak

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303 S.T., III Suppl., q. 67, a. 2.; cf. supra, 99.
304 Ibid.
305 S.T., III Suppl., q. 67, a.2 ad 3.
with even greater certainty on the matter of indissolubility being a matter of dispensation by some natural cause, distinct from a Divine dispensation. In saying that the indissolubility of a sacramental marriage cannot be a matter of dispensation except perhaps by the second kind of dispensation, (implying a cause altogether Supernatural), St. Thomas seems to be saying implicitly that the indissolubility of a non-sacramental marriage can be a matter of dispensation in a way other than by a Divine cause. 306

Thus far the writer has been unable to find a satisfactory solution to the difficulties presented in the two passages referred to on the previous page; they seem to imply the possibility of a dispensation from the indissolubility of marriage (when the latter is non-sacramental) even without a Divine dispensation.

On the matter of the marriage consent, Confucius and St. Thomas seem to hold divergent views. Unlike St. Thomas, Confucius fails to emphasize the fact that the marriage consent must be "completely voluntary" in order that the marriage contract be valid. In accordance with an exaggerated notion of "filial piety" which Confucius had, it was very difficult for children to refuse to abide by their parents' decision in the matter of choosing a mate. Neither were children free to abstain from marriage if they so desired. They were influenced by such undue social pressures as the prevailing custom according to which children seldom, if ever, would

306 S.T., III Suppl., q. 67, a.2 ad 3; cf. supra, 108.
307 S.T., III Suppl., q. 67, a.2; q. 67, a.2 ad 3.
refuse to abide by their parents' choice of a mate for them, and by an exaggerated notion of "filial piety" with which they were indoctrinated.

St. Thomas' doctrine admits of the dissolution of the marriage bond in certain instances when certain conditions are verified; however, he seems to hold that such a dissolution could only occur by Divine intervention, that is, by a Divine dispensation or from a cause altogether supernatural. The difficulty presented in the two referred to passages makes it impossible for the writer to say with certainty what the exact position of St. Thomas really is this matter. This much is certain—that St. Thomas emphasizes the unity and indissolubility of marriage to a far greater extent than does Confucius.

As pointed out earlier, a supernatural cause is operative in the event of the dissolution of a marriage by the application of the Pauline privilege or by some other act of Papal authority. In these instances the Pope acts not with human but with Divine authority.

As far as the parties are concerned, and even as far as any human power is concerned, every validly contracted marriage is indissoluble. 308

Although unity and indissolubility belong only to the second intention of marriage as fulfilling an office of nature, they belong to the first intention of marriage from the moment it was made a sacrament of the Church, according to St. Thomas. 309 His doctrine in part is

309 S.T., III Suppl., q. 63, a.2 ad 2; q. 49, a.2 ad 4; Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 123.
Although indissolubility belongs to the second intention of marriage as fulfilling an office of nature, it belongs to its first intention as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, from the moment it was made a sacrament of the Church, as long as it remains such, it cannot be a matter of dispensation, except perhaps by the second kind of dispensation.³¹⁰

The above is one of the difficult passages to interpret. By the term, "the second kind of dispensation", St. Thomas means a cause "altogether supernatural". Such a cause was operative when, in the Old Testament, when divorce and polygyny were tolerated or permitted; they were permitted in virtue of a Divine dispensation.³¹¹ However, concubinage in the sense referred to in the doctrine of Confucius, was never lawful; St. Thomas says that when the patriarchs of old, by virtue of a Divine dispensation which allowed them to have several wives, approached their bondswomen, they did so "with the disposition of a husband."³¹²

St. Thomas says, further, that these women were wives as regards the principal end of marriage, but not as regards the secondary end of marriage. Neither was divorce permitted at will, as it practically was in accordance with the doctrine of Confucius; the Divine dispensation permitting divorce under the Mosaic Law was strictly limited.

³¹⁰ S.T., III Suppl., q. 67, a.2 ad 3.
³¹² S.T., III Suppl., q. 65, a.5 ad 2.
The whole concept of marriage and the family as envisaged in the teachings of Confucius seems to be distorted by the Confucian doctrine on ancestor worship. Confucius seemed to think that the only purpose of marriage and the family was to ensure offspring who would carry on the ancestral rites. From this we can also conclude that Confucius had an erroneous concept of the ultimate purpose of man.

That the purpose of man is to worship God, in order thus to attain to the possession of Him from which perfect happiness results, was clear in the mind of St. Thomas.\(^\text{313}\) However, there is no evidence that Confucius had this insight or understanding of the purpose of man. Whether or not Confucius already in the sixth century before Christ could reasonably have been expected to have arrived at such refinements and ramifications of the natural law which would indicate that unity and indissolubility and the other requirements of the marriage contract are essential or necessary to it—is a question, the answer to which would take us beyond the scope of this thesis.

\[\text{313 S.T.,III Suppl., q. 65, a.2 ad 5.}\]
CHAPTER III

A THEORY FOR WORKING TOGETHER HARMONIOUSLY

Self-control and the ability to influence others are needed for the harmonious interaction of personalities in marriage. The Confucian theory of self-control, as also that for influencing others, is based on the cultivation of the person. The same might be said of the theories of St. Thomas concerning the matter under consideration; however, Confucius and St. Thomas have divergent views regarding the method to be used for self-cultivation. Their differences seem to stem from their divergent views of human nature; Confucius does not seem to view human nature in its essential relationships, particularly in its relationship to God, man's Creator or the First Cause. As a consequence Confucius fails to realize that there is an unchangeable and universal norm of morality; his norm of morality seems to be rather subjective, based chiefly on the principle of reciprocity—couched in the words: "...What you do not like when done to yourself, do not do to others."¹

One inspiring point which one can observe throughout the theory of Confucius on self-control or self-cultivation is his constant emphasis

¹ Legge, Chinese Classics, 1861, I, I, 48.
upon sincerity. His theme of sincerity seems to have been pursued by Augustine of Hippo about a thousand years after the time of Confucius; St. Augustine's distaste for the insincerity of his day led him to write his famous book, *The City of God*. There is no doubt about the fact that "Sincerity breeds truth." The cultivation of the person, Confucius maintains, results from the rectification of the heart or mind, and the latter is achieved when the thoughts are made sincere; this implies the eradication of all self-deception.

In his theory of self-control, Confucius places great emphasis upon the observance of numerous rules of propriety instead of on moral principles. His "sumnum bonum" is knowledge or "great learning;" whereas the "sumnum bonum" of St. Thomas is an Uncreated Good to which man attains by works of virtue, concerning which more will be said later.

In his theory for influencing others Confucius seems to think that example is all but omnipotent, that one is influenced chiefly by example; whereas, St. Thomas maintains that several factors may influence a man or move him to act, namely, external stimuli, that is, sense impressions and attractions, as also his power of thought and his imagina-

2 Rev. Bakewell Morrison, S.J., *Course: "City of God", St. Louis University, St. Louis, 1943.*

3 *Course in Philosophy, St. Benedict's College, St. Joseph, Minn., 1935-1936.*

4 *Legge, Chinese Classics, I, I, 31-32.*

5 *Ibid., 28.*
tion, as will be explained in the second part of this chapter. Not realizing so clearly, as does St. Thomas, that man can be moved to activity by his internal powers, that is, from within, Confucius apparently seemed to think that man is moved to action only by external stimuli; perhaps this accounts for his great emphasis of the power of personal example, as we shall observe later.

First we will present the theory of self-control which Confucius taught, as also his theory for influencing others. Thereafter, we will consider a theory of self-control, as also the art of influencing others, which is contained in, or derived from, the doctrine of St. Thomas. In the light of the latter, the theories of Confucius will be evaluated.

The basic texts containing the above referred to theories of Confucius are found in "Great Learning", one of the chapters of the "Le Ke" or "Record of Rites;" the latter is one of the Chinese Classics which are considered to be the writings of Confucius.

The root of the Confucian theory of self-control, as also of his theory for influencing others, is the cultivation of the person. In accordance with the Confucian doctrine, one reaches from the cultivation of the person to the tranquillization of the empire through the intermediate steps of the regulation of the family and the government of the State. Confucius links his theory of self-control with his theory for influencing others, and both theories are based on the cultivation of the person, as

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6 Legge, Chinese Classics, 1861, I, I, 22.
7 Ibid., 29.
we observe in the text:

What the "Great Learning" teaches, is—to illustrate illustrious virtue, to renovate the people: to rest in the highest excellence.

The point where to rest being known, the object of pursuit is then determined; and, that being determined, there will succeed a tranquil repose. In that repose there may be careful deliberation, and that deliberation will be followed by the attainment of the desired end.

Things have their root and their completion. Affairs have their end and their beginning. To know what is first and what is last will lead near to what is taught in the "Great Learning".

The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the empire, first ordered well their own States. Wishing to order well their States, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they sought to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things.

Things being investigated, knowledge became complete. Their knowledge being complete, their thoughts were sincere. Their thoughts being sincere, their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being rectified, their persons were cultivated. The persons being cultivated, their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their States were rightly governed. Their States being rightly governed, the whole empire was made tranquil and happy.

From the emperor down to the mass of the people, all must consider the cultivation of the person the root of everything besides.

It cannot be, when the root is neglected, that what should spring from it will be well ordered.8

The following seven steps are involved in the foregoing doctrine of Confucius which contains his theory of self-control, as also his theory for influencing others:

The investigation of things,
The completion of knowledge,
The sincerity of thoughts
The rectifying of the heart
The cultivation of the person,
The regulation of the family and
The government of the State.

Even the tranquillization of the empire can result, according to Confucius, from the cultivation of the person.

Before offering some observations on these seven steps, we will separate them into those preceding and those following the cultivation of the person, and deal with the latter first. Supposing that the cultivation of the person is all attained, and every discordant mental element having been subdued and removed, Confucius "assumes" that the regulation of the family will necessarily flow from this. He thinks that once the family is regulated, the State will be rightly governed. He maintains that the virtues taught in the family have their correspondencies in the wider sphere. Without doubt, there is some truth to his doctrine on this point. Filial piety, he says, will appear as loyalty; fraternal submission, he adds, will be seen in respect and obedience to elders and superiors; and kindness, he believes, is capable of universal application. 10 From the loving

9 Legge, Chinese Classics, 1861, I, I, 29

10 Ibid., 30
example of one family a whole state becomes loving, according to Confucius, and from its courtesies the whole State becomes courteous.\textsuperscript{11} When the state is rightly governed, the whole empire will become peaceful and happy, says Confucius; however, there seems to be little connection between the premise and the conclusion,\textsuperscript{12} an indication of rather poor logic. Confucius says nothing about the relation between the whole empire and its component States, or any one of them. He says at once:

What is meant 'by making the whole empire peaceful and happy depends on the government of the State,' is this.—When the sovereign behaves to his elders as elders should be behaved to, the people learn brotherly submission; when the sovereign treats compassionately the young and helpless, the people do the same.\textsuperscript{13}

Since, as Confucius informs us, the chapter, "Great Learning," quoted above,\textsuperscript{14} is handed down by the Philosopher Tsang,\textsuperscript{15} we shall turn to the commentary of Philosopher Tsang for further interpretations of the text. Therein, regarding the meaning of the term, "self-cultivation," he says, "If you can one day renovate yourself, do so from day to day."\textsuperscript{16} In other words, one must be persistent in striving after perfection.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Legge, \textit{Chinese Classics}, 1861, I, I, 30\textsuperscript{j}.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Cf. supra, 120.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 114.
\end{itemize}
Then, suggesting the need of ideals or standards of excellence, the Philosopher Tsang continues:

In the Book of Poetry it is said, "Profound was King Wan. With how bright and unceasing a feeling of reverence did he regard his resting places! As a sovereign, he rested in benevolence. As a minister, he rested in reverence. As a son, he rested in filial piety. As a father, he rested in kindness. In communication with his subjects, he rested in good faith." 17

These comments elucidate the meaning of the first and second paragraphs of the chapter from "Great Learning" given above, particularly the words, "the point where to rest being known." Such points of rest as benevolence, filial piety, kindness and good faith, seem to be certain excellences to be aimed at in our dealings with others. They are the virtues or ideals in accordance with which Confucius would have us regulate our dealings with our fellow men. Concomitantly with the achievement of those perfections for which we strive, we experience a certain "rest" or calmness, resulting from our desires being at rest. Here we observe a similarity between the doctrine of Confucius and that of St. Thomas, which we will examine later, for the attainment of internal peace.

Interpreting further the meaning of the term, self-cultivation, the Philosopher Tsang says:

In the Book of Poetry, it is said, "Look at that winding course of the K'ei, with the green bamboos so luxuriant! Here is our elegant and accomplished prince! As we cut and then file; as we chisel and then grind; so has he cultivated himself. How grave is he and dignified! How majestic and distinguished! Our elegant and accomplished prince never can be forgotten." That expression—"as we cut and then

file," indicates the work of learning. "As we chisel, and then grind," indicates that of self culture. "How grave is he and dignified!" indicates the feeling of cautious reverence. "How commanding and distinguished," indicates an awe-inspiring deportment. "Our elegant and accomplished prince never can be forgotten" indicates how, when virtue is complete and excellence extreme, the people cannot forget them. 18

Tsang's comments point to the emphasis placed on the need of learning which, he says, is analogous to "cutting and filing." The persistence with which we are to strive after our ideals is suggested by the phrase, "as we chisel and then grind."

Although Confucius seemed to be aware of the need of certain moral principles for the guidance of conduct, as evident from the following comment of Tsang, his principles seem inadequate for the purpose of mental and moral discipline. The text reads:

The Master said, "In hearing litigations, I am like any other body. What is necessary is to cause the people to have no litigations. So, those who are devoid of principle find it impossible to carry out their speeches, and a great awe would be struck into men's minds—this is called knowing the root." 19

Confucius considers "faithfulness and sincerity" to be first principles in the practical order; he does not investigate far enough to discover in man those first principles of the practical order which are "naturally known." 20 Confucius considers "sincerity" as the root and basis of self-cultivation. He also maintains that self-cultivation is achieved

18 Legge, Chinese Classics, 1887, pt. I, 114, citing Tsang, Commentary, chap. III.
20 S.T., I-II, q. 94, a. 2.
by music and ceremonies. He did not know of the first principles of the practical order that are "naturally known," since he speaks of the means to be used to acquire "sincerity" which, for him, was a first principle of the practical order. If man were naturally in possession thereof, he would not need to take steps to acquire it.

That Confucius recognized man's need of knowing his end is evident from his words: "If a man do not understand what is good, he will not attain sincerity in himself." Unfortunately, he had an inadequate concept of the "good" for man; he thought it consisted chiefly in the acquisition of knowledge, especially of music and ceremonies.

Confucius seems to realize, at least to some extent, that principles are the source or innersprings of one's actions, and that as we think, so we tend to act. He seems to refer to knowledge of moral principles as "knowing the root." The above excerpts from Tsang's Commentary explain the root and the issue, the latter being dignified and cultured deportment, or conduct. Knowing the root or cause of things, according to Confucius, implies the perfection of knowledge.

The fifth chapter of the Philosopher Tsang's Commentary explaining the meaning of "investigating things and carrying knowledge to the utmost extent," is lost; however, Legge accepts the views of the scholar, Ch'ing, to supply it as follows:

21 Confucius, Doctrine of the Mean, chap. XIX, 17, cited in Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 32.
The meaning of the expression, 'The perfecting of knowledge depends on the investigation of things' is this:—If we wish to carry our knowledge to the utmost, we must investigate the principles of all things we come into contact with, for the intelligent mind of man is certainly formed to know, and there is not a single thing in which its principles do not inhere. But so long as all principles are not investigated, man's knowledge is incomplete. On this account the learning for adults, at the outset of its lessons, instructs the learner, in regard to all things in the world, to proceed from what knowledge he has of their principles, and pursue his investigation of them, till he reaches the extreme point. After exerting himself in this way for a long time, he will suddenly find himself possessed of a wide and far-reaching penetration. Then the qualities of things, whether external or internal, the subtle or the coarse, will all be apprehended and the mind, in its entire substance and its relations to things, will be perfectly intelligent. This is called the investigation of things. This is called the perfection of knowledge. 22

Confucius says here that the perfection of knowledge implies the investigation of things in order to discover their principles and constituent elements, as also in order to see their relation to other things. By exerting himself in this way, investigating things, man will eventually acquire a wide and far-reaching penetration. Confucius is cognizant of the fact that the mind of man is made to know, that is, for truth. On this point he is in perfect agreement with St. Thomas and other Scholastic philosophers. Incidentally, his method of scientific research, indicated above, is practically identical with that of the greatest Greek thinker, Aristotle, who lived about a century after him, as we can observe from these opening lines of Aristotle's *Physics*:

> When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles, conditions, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge, that is to say scientific knowledge, is attained. For we

do not think that we know a thing until we are acquainted with its primary conditions or first principles, and have carried our analysis as far as its simplest elements.23

The cultivation of the person, Confucius maintains, results from the rectifying of the heart or mind, as evident from "Great Learning"24 quoted above. Further, the rectification of the mind is achieved when the thoughts are made sincere; and the thoughts are sincere, when no self-deception is allowed and we move without effort to what is right and avoid what is wrong, "as we love what is beautiful and as we hate a bad smell."25 Tsang calls this self-enjoyment.26 Here one observes a certain appreciation of moral goodness as also of the happiness consequent upon the realisation that one is doing the right thing, or that one has a "good conscience."

However, to say that one can "move without effort to what is right and avoid what is wrong," seems a little wide of the truth and contrary to the facts of experience; in order to be able to do the right thing consistently, constant and persistent effort is required. Nevertheless, it is true that after one acquires habits of virtue, virtuous actions can be performed with greater ease, facility and joy.

In order to attain to this state of "self-enjoyment" in which one performs virtuous actions with great facility and ease, Tsang says, man must be watchful over himself when he is alone.27 In giving this

25 Ibid., 321.
27 Ibid.
suggestion, Tsang does not explicitly tell us how to achieve it. However, Confucius mentions nine things regarding which man must keep watch over himself; they are contained in the text:

The superior man has nine things which are subjects with him of thoughtful consideration. In regard to the use of his eyes, he is anxious to see clearly. In regard to the use of his ears, he is anxious to hear distinctly. In regard to his countenance, he is anxious that it should be benign. In regard to his demeanour, he is anxious that it should be respectful. In regard to his speech, he is anxious that it should be sincere. In regard to his doing of business, he is anxious that it should be reverently careful. In regard to what he doubts about, he is anxious to question others. When he is angry, he thinks of the difficulties his anger may involve him in. When he sees gain to be got, he thinks of righteousness.28

In addition to the foregoing nine things which Confucius commands to man for his careful consideration, there are certain essentials of right-living on which Confucius would have man concentrate. They are listed in the text:

What are the things which men consider right? Kindness in a father, filial piety in a son; gentleness in an elder brother, obedience in a younger; righteousness in a husband, submission in a wife; kindness in elders, deference in juniors; benevolence in a ruler, loyalty in a minister. These ten are things which men consider right. To speak the truth and work for harmony are what are called things advantageous to men. To quarrel, plunder, and murder are things disastrous to men.29

Tsang continues saying that as a result of making one's thoughts sincere, the mind is expanded and the body at ease.30 Virtue, he maintains, adorns the person as riches adorn a house.31

28 Confucius, Analects, XVI, x, cited in Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 72.
29 Confucius, Li Ki, VII., sect.11.,19, cited in Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 73.
30 Legge, Chinese Classics, 1887, pt.1, 116, citing Tsang, Commentary, IV,4.
31 Ibid.
In order to make one's thoughts sincere, it seems as though one is required to make an indefatigable search for truth, since one must perfect his knowledge through an intense investigation of things and allow no "self-deception," as Tsang informs us. Without truth, one is certainly to be deceived.

The making of one's thoughts sincere would, it seems, also imply a proper orientation towards the First Cause and Principle of one's being. There seems to be some evidence in the writings of Confucius pointing to the fact that he seemed to have been aware of this, for he does say that "He who sins against Heaven" (Heaven is a word he often uses for God) "has no one to whom he can pray." However, Confucius does not seem to see clearly man's obligation to embrace truth and to bring his thoughts in conformity with objective truth, as also his duty to accept the universal moral law which is also objective. On the contrary, Confucius clings to the humanist dictum to the effect that "the measure of man is man," thus suggesting a subjective norm of morality.

The next step in self-cultivation, on which the cultivation of the person really depends, is the rectifying of the mind. This implies the achievement of a rational control over the passions, and, according to Tsang, may be illustrated thus:


If a man be under the influence of passion, he will be incorrect in his conduct. He will be the same if he is under the influence of terror, or under the influence of fond regard, or under that of sorrow and distress.\textsuperscript{34}

Even Confucius seems to realize that man, when emotionally disturbed, cannot think clearly nor act prudently.

Tsang, in his explanation of the text, "The regulation of one's family depends on the cultivation of his person," refers to that partiality which, he observes, a man frequently shows towards those he loves. He says that there are few men in the world, who love, and at the same time know the bad qualities of the object of their love, or who hate, and yet know the excellences of the object of their hatred.\textsuperscript{35} Here the philosopher points to the fact that the passions when aroused hinder the formation of accurate judgments. Thus, self-control is needed in order to achieve the cultivation of the person, and the regulation of one's family depends on the cultivation of the person. Apparently Confucius realizes that one must achieve a certain amount of self-mastery before he can effectively help others to achieve the same.

The theory of Confucius on self-control, contained in his doctrine on self-cultivation with its profound emphasis upon the acquisition of knowledge, seems to be based on the assumption that knowledge is virtue. To


\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 117, citing Tsang, Commentary, VIII, 1.
say that knowledge is virtue would be to make the same error that Socrates allegedly made; however, while it may not be correct to say that knowledge is virtue, one can scarcely deny that knowledge can and does influence a person, and that instruction of the proper kind at least gives one a certain "momentum in the right direction."

We will now turn our attention to the Confucian doctrine for influencing others, which can best be seen in his doctrine on the government of the State which doctrine he very closely connects with the doctrine concerning the regulation of the family. The regulation of the family Confucius makes dependent on the cultivation of the person, as observed earlier.

Confucius based his theory for influencing others largely on the power of example and instruction, as evident from the following excerpt from chapter nine of Philosopher Tsang's Commentary:

1. What is meant by "In order rightly to govern his State, it is necessary first to regulate his family," is this:—It is not possible for one to teach others, while he cannot teach his own family. Therefore, the ruler, without going beyond his family, completes the lessons for the State. There is filial piety:—therewith the sovereign should be served. There is fraternal submission:—therewith elders and superiors should be served. There is kindness:—therewith the multitude should be treated.

2. In the Announcement to K'ang, it is said, "As if you were watching over an infant." If a mother is really anxious about it, though she may not hit exactly the wants of her infant, she will not be far from doing so. There never has been a girl who learned to bring up a child, that she might afterwards marry.

3. From the loving example of one family, a whole State becomes loving, and from its courtesies, the whole State becomes courteous, while, from the ambition and perverseness of the one man, the whole State may be led to rebellious disorder:—such is the nature of the
influence. This verifies the saying, "Affairs may be ruined by a single sentence: a kingdom may be settled by its one man."

4. Yao and Shun led on the empire with benevolence, and the people followed them. The orders which these issued were contrary to the practices which they loved, and so the people did not follow them. On this account, the ruler must himself be possessed of the good qualities, and then he may require them in the people. He must not have the bad qualities in himself, and then he may require that they shall not be in the people. Never has there been a man, who, not having reference to his own character and wishes in dealing with others, was able effectually to instruct them.

5. Thus we see how the government of the State depends on the regulation of the family.

6. In the Book of Poetry, it is said, "That peach tree, so delicate and elegant! How luxuriant is its foliage! This girl is going to her husband's house. She will rightly order her household. Let the household be rightly ordered, and then the people of the State may be taught.

7. In the Book of Poetry, it is said, "They can discharge their duties to their elder brothers." Let the ruler discharge his duties to his elder and younger brothers, and then he may teach the people of the State.

8. In the Book of Poetry, it is said, "In his deportment there is nothing wrong; he rectifies all the people of the State." Yes; when the ruler, as a father, a son, and as a brother, is a model, then the people imitate him.

9. This is what is meant by saying, "The government of his kingdom depends on his regulation of the family."36

In the above quoted chapter of Tsang's Commentary, explaining the regulation of the family and the government of the kingdom, one can get some insight into the theory of Confucius for influencing others; his theory is chiefly based on the assumption that knowledge is virtue, and that example is extremely powerful in the matter of influencing others.

36 Legge, Chinese Classics, 1887, pt.I, 117-118, citing Tsang, Commentary, III.
In paragraphs four and six of the above text one can observe the thought of Confucius regarding the influence of instruction. Paragraphs seven and eight reveal the doctrine of Confucius regarding the power of example; there we observe that Confucius thinks that the ruler can rectify all the people of the State by merely being correct in his own deportment. He assumes that the people will automatically follow his good example. Here there is evidence that Confucius has an inaccurate concept of human nature. He seems to consider human nature to be essentially good and apparently fails to realize that somewhere along the line something has happened to it, making it difficult for human nature to follow the good consistently and to resist the inclinations to evil. That something has happened to human nature seems observable without adverting to the fact of Original Sin.

The one rule or principle (sometimes referred to as a measuring square) which Confucius emphasizes in his theory of self-control for the purpose of achieving harmony in human relations, is RECIPROCITY;\(^{37}\) this principle or rule is analogous to, if not identical with, the Golden Rule. The meaning of this rule becomes apparent from the following text of the Philosopher Tsang’s Commentary which again shows the Confucian doctrine on the power of example:

What is meant by "The making the whole empire peaceful and happy depends on the government of his State," is this:—When the sovereign behaves to his aged, as the aged should be behaved to, the

\(^{37}\) Legge, Chinese Classics, 1887, pt. I, xi.
people become filial: when the sovereign behaves to his elders, as elders should be behaved to, the people learn brotherly submission; when the sovereign treats compassionately the young and helpless, the people do the same. Thus the ruler has a principle with which, as with a measuring square, he may regulate his conduct.

What a man dislikes in his superiors, let him not display in the treatment of his inferiors; what he dislikes in inferiors, let him not display in the service of his superiors; what he hates in those who are before him, let him not therewith precede those who are behind him; what he hates in those who are behind him, let him not therewith follow those who are before him; what he hates to receive on the right, let him not bestow on the left; what he hates to receive on the left, let him not bestow on the right:—this is what is called "the principle, with which, as with a measuring square, to regulate one's conduct."

... When a prince loves what the people love, and hates what the people hate, then is he what is called the "parent" of the people.38

Although the Confucian rule of reciprocity is practically the same as the golden rule, it is not a safe one to follow; neither is the "golden rule", for conceivably two or more persons could agree to a line of conduct which is not in accord with reason and, consequently, not in accord with the natural moral law. The mere agreement on the part of two wills in regard to a certain line of action does not necessarily justify the placement of the actions contemplated, nor mean that the line of conduct can safely be pursued.

Granting that Confucius recognized the need of something from within, that is, principles for the purpose of regulating conduct, nevertheless, he fails to be clear on the matter of how man can regulate his powers from within; he does not seem to know nor understand the laws according to which human nature operates. Before one can know the laws according to

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38 Confucius, Great Learning, X. 1-3, trans. Legge, Chinese Classics, 1887, p. 119.
which human nature operates, one must know the powers and faculties which man possesses. Confucius seemed to think that it belongs to human nature to be still at birth and to be influenced only by external things, as evident from the following text which also gives us some insight into his concept of human nature:

It belongs to the nature of man, as from Heaven, to be still at birth. His activity shows itself as he is acted on by external things, and develops the desires incident to his nature. Things come to him more and more, and his knowledge is increased. Then arise the manifestations of liking and disliking. When these are not regulated by anything within, and growing knowledge leads more astray without, he cannot come back to himself, and his Heavenly principle is extinguished.

Now there is no end of the things by which man is affected; and when his likings and dislikings are not subject to regulation (from within), he is changed into the nature of the things as they come before him; that is, he stifles the voice of the Heavenly principle within, and gives the utmost indulgence to the desires by which men may be possessed. On this account we have the rebellious and deceitful heart, with licentious and violent disorder. The strong press upon the weak; the many are cruel to the few; the knowing impose upon the dull; the bold make it bitter for the timid; the diseased are not nursed; the old and young, orphans and solitaries are neglected:—such is the great disorder that ensues.39

The term, "the voice of the Heavenly principle" used in the foregoing text perhaps expresses the Confucian concept of conscience. The above text indicates that Confucius thought man to be chiefly influenced by external things; he says that the activity of human nature shows itself as man is acted on by external things.

Confucius seemed to take great pains to see to it that only good example was given, as we observe in the continuation of the above quoted text which reads:

Therefore the ancient kings, when they instituted their ceremonies and music, regulated them by consideration of the requirements of humanity. By the sackcloth worn for parents, the wailings, and the weepings, they defined the terms of the mourning rites. By the bells, drums, shields, and axes, they introduced harmony into their seasons of rest and enjoyment. By marriage, capping, and the assumption of the hair-pin, they maintained the separation that should exist between male and female. By the archery gatherings in the districts, and the feastings at the meetings of princes, they provided for the correct maintenance of friendly intercourse.

Ceremonies afforded the defined expression for the (affections of the) people's minds; music secured the harmonious utterance of their voices; the laws of government were designed to promote the performance (of the ceremonies and music); and punishments, to guard against the violation of them. When ceremonies, music, laws, and punishments had everywhere full course, without irregularity or collision, the method of kingly rule was complete.40

The emphasis of Confucius on music and ceremonies for the purpose of influencing others can at least in part be understood if we keep in mind his concept of human nature as being influenced chiefly by "external" things.

Even music, Confucius explains, is influenced by external things in so far as the latter influence the mind. Music, he maintains, is the production of modulations of the voice, and all the modulations of the voice arise from the mind, and the various affections of the mind are produced by things (external to it).41 The affections thus produced are mani-

40 Confucius, Li Ki, XVII. 13-14, ed. Muller, Sacred Books of the East, XXVIII, 97.
41 Confucius, Li Ki, XVII. I. I, ed. Muller, Sacred Books of the East, XXVIII, 93.
fested in the sounds that are uttered, says Confucius. How music is influenced by the impressions produced on the mind by external things is explained in the text:

When the mind is moved to sorrow, the sound is sharp and fading away; when it is moved to pleasure, the sound is slow and gentle; when it is moved to joy, the sound is exclamatory and soon disappears; when it is moved to anger, the sound is coarse and fierce; when it is moved to reverence, the sound is straightforward, with an indication of humility; when it is moved to love, the sound is harmonious and soft. These six peculiarities of sound are not natural; they indicate the impressions produced by (external) things. On this account the ancient kings were watchful in regard to the things by which the mind was affected.

And so (they instituted) ceremonies to direct men's aims aright; music to give harmony to their voices; laws to unify their conduct; and punishments to guard against their tendencies to evil. The end to which ceremonies, music, punishments, and laws conduct is one; they are the instruments by which the minds of the people are assimilated, and good order in government is made to appear.

Music, as also ceremonies, punishments and laws were instruments by which the minds of the people could be assimilated, according to Confucius.

Confucius does not give evidence of knowing how man can govern his own little world of varied powers and potencies. Confucius thinks that the knowledge of music leads to the subtle springs that underlie the rules of ceremony. He goes so far as to say that, "He who has apprehended

42 Confucius, Li Kí, XVII, I. 1, ed. Muller, Sacred Books of the East, XXVIII, 92.

43 Confucius, Li Kí, XVII. I.3, ed. Muller, Sacred Books of the East, XXVIII, 93.
both ceremonies and music may be pronounced to be a possessor of virtue. 

Virtue means realisation (in one's self)."44

In the continuation of the foregoing text we can observe the regulating effect which music and ceremonies were thought to have; in it Confucius says:

Thus we see that the ancient kings, in their institution of ceremonies and music, did not seek how fully they could satisfy the desires of the appetite and of the ears and eyes; but they intended to teach the people to regulate their likings and dislikings, and to bring them back to the normal course of humanity.45

The ideal of human character to be aimed at, according to Confucius, was a certain state of harmony resulting from human nature responding to external stimuli with various emotions so as always to hit the mark, as explained in the text:

While there are no movements of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, we have what may be called the state of equilibrium. When those feelings have been moved, and they all act in due degree, we have what may be called the state of harmony. This equilibrium is the great root of the world and this harmony is its universal path. What is here called the state of equilibrium is the same as the nature given by Heaven, considered absolutely in itself, without deflection or inclination. This nature acted on from without, and responding with the various emotions, so as always to hit the mark with entire correctness, produces the state of harmony, and such harmonious response is the path along which all human activities should proceed.46

In accordance with the Confucian ideal of human character, one

44 Confucius, Lii Ki, XVII, 8, ed. Muller, Sacred Books of the East, XXVIII, 95.


achieves a certain equilibrium when he experiences no movements of pleasure, anger, sorrow or joy, and one arrives at a certain state of harmony when these same feelings (or passions) are moved in due degree. This state of equilibrium is the great root of the world, according to Confucius, and this state of harmony is the universal path. If the states of equilibrium and harmony exist in perfection, Confucius says, a happy order will prevail throughout heaven and earth, and all things will be nourished and flourish. All human activities, Confucius urges, should proceed along the path of such harmonious response, in which various emotions respond correctly to stimuli impinging from without, so as to hit the mark.

In the mind of Confucius, the path of duty lies in action in accordance with nature, and the regulation of the path is by instruction, as observable in the text:

What Heaven has conferred is called THE NATURE; an accordance with this nature is called THE PATH of duty; the regulation of this path is called INSTRUCTION.

The path may not be left for an instant. If it could be left, it would not be the path. On this account, the superior man does not wait till he sees things, to be cautious, nor till he hears things, to be apprehensive.48

Here one can observe the great emphasis on instruction as a means by which to achieve virtue.

47 Legge, Chinese Classics, 1861, I, I, 46.

The basic ideas around which Confucian thought is woven are these: man has received from Heaven a moral nature by which he is constituted a law unto himself. In this latter point the doctrine of Confucius is similar to that of the philosopher, Kant. Secondly, over this nature man is required to exercise a jealous watchfulness; thirdly, as he possesses it, absolutely and relatively, in perfection or attains to such possession of it, he becomes invested with the highest dignity and power and may say to himself—"I am a god, and sit in the seat of God."  

The doctrine of Confucius on self-cultivation for the purpose of achieving self-control seems unfit for the purposes of mental and moral discipline, since it fails to take cognizance of human nature as, in fact, it really is. He does not give evidence of knowing the various powers and potencies of man, nor the laws according to which they operate. In order to achieve perfection, man must govern himself according to the laws that govern both his powers and potencies, as also in accordance with the laws that govern him. Man cannot expect to achieve perfection by setting himself up as an autonomous being, without recognizing the Supreme Being and Legislator, and his relationship with Him.  

One point for which Confucius deserves a great deal of credit, is his emphasis on sincerity. Perhaps one may hope that if his doctrine

49 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Chicaog, 1943.  
50 Legge, Chinese Classics, 1861, I, I, 42.
concerning the achievement of sincerity is carefully pursued, a certain degree of human perfection might be achieved, in spite of the vagueness of the theories of Confucius concerning such perfection.

Then, in his theory for influencing others, Confucius seems to give undue emphasis to the power of sheer example. That example is very potent for the purpose of influencing others cannot be denied, for example, when one sees an example of human kindness, one is prompted to perform a similar action. However, it seems somewhat wide of the truth to say, as Confucius does, that people will automatically follow a good example when given. In saying this Confucius shows a lack of understanding of human nature, as in fact it really is.
St. Thomas' theory of self-control, as also his theory for influencing others, is based on the Aristotelian concept of man, or of human nature, in which one can observe a hierarchy of powers within man. This hierarchy of powers within man is indicated in a text from Aristotle, following the latter's discussion of the fact that in all things which form a composite whole and which are made up of parts, whether continuous or discrete, one can observe a distinction between the ruling and the subject element. Such a duality, he says, exists in living creatures, but not only in them; it originates in the constitution of the universe; even in things which have no life there is a ruling principle. Aristotle limits his discussion by saying:

We will therefore restrict ourselves to the living creature, which, in the first place, consists of soul and body: and of these two, the one is by nature the ruler, and the other the subject. But then we must look for the intentions of nature in things which retain their nature, and not in things which are corrupted. And therefore we must study the man who is in the most perfect state both of body and soul, for in him we shall see the true relation of the two; although in bad or corrupted natures the body will often appear to rule over the soul, because they are in an evil and unnatural condition. At all events we may firstly observe in living creatures both a despotical and a constitutional rule; for the soul rules the body with a despotical rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional and royal rule. And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind and rational element over the passion-

ate, is natural and expedient; whereas the equality of the two or rule of the inferior is always hurtful.52

Man has a dual nature consisting of soul and body, according to the foregoing doctrine of Aristotle, which St. Thomas accepts; the higher powers are to rule the lower. The soul rules the body, Aristotle says, with a "despotical rule"; whereas, the intellect rules the appetites with a "constitutional and royal rule." Aristotle observes, further, that it is both natural and necessary that the soul rule over the body, and that the mind and rational element rule over the passionate element.

Commenting on the above quoted text of Aristotle, St. Thomas tells how the intelligence, or reason, rules the irascible and concupiscible powers. This, he says, is done by means of "constitutional control" rather than by despotic control, because a sensible power "has something of its own wherewith to resist" reason, as we observe in the text:

The intelligence, however, or reason is said to be master of the irascible and concupiscible with constitutional control because a sensible appetite has something of its own wherewith to resist. Nature has arranged the sensitive appetite to be activated not only by the estimative power in other animals and the power of thought in man but also by the imagination and by sensation. This explains why it is that we experience the rebellion of the irascible and concupiscible against reason in, for example, experiencing some pleasurable sensation or imagination which reason forbids. Yet, though the irascible and the concupiscible powers sometimes rebel, nevertheless, they can be brought to obedience.53

The irascible powers referred to in the above text are the pas-

52 Aristotle, Politics, 1254a 29-34, Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. McKeon, 1132.

sions of love, desire, joy, hatred, aversion and sorrow. The intellect, or reason, rules over and controls the irascible and concupiscible powers by a "Constitutional control." The meaning of the term "constitutional control" will become clearer after reading St. Thomas' own explanation of it in the text to follow:

As the Philosopher says (Polit. 1.2.): We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul dominates the body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the appetite by a politic and royal power. For a power is called despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, since they have nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which they can resist a despotic power, because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, but at the soul's command both hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement are moved at once. But the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite has something of its own by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason. For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative power in other animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we sense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the fact that the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something, we must not conclude that they do not obey.

In the foregoing text St. Thomas explains how reason can control the irascible and concupiscible powers with "Constitutional control," that is, in accordance with the laws according to which man's powers operate. Man must take cognizance of the fact that the sensitive appetite,

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54 S.T., I-II, q. 23, a.1 and a.2.
55 S.T., I-I, q. 81, a.3 ad 2.
which is divided into the concupiscible and the irascible powers, has something of its own by virtue of which it can resist the commands of reason. He must realize that "Every appetite has to do what it has been made to do when stimulated;" it cannot not do what it is made to do when stimulated.

The sensitive appetite, St. Thomas observes, is moved or stimulated by the power of thought, which the universal reason guides, as also by the imagination and by sensation. The reason that, in our experience, the irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason, St. Thomas explains, is that the sensitive appetite in man can be moved by the imagination and sense; and the above resistance to reason comes about when we sense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. However, the irascible and concupiscible powers can be brought to obedience, St. Thomas observes, but not by means of a despotic rule by which men rule their slaves; on the contrary, man must deal with those powers according to their constitution.

There is an analogy between the nature of man and the nature of the Greek State, at the time of Aristotle, which will help us to understand the procedure we are considering, namely, "constitutional control." The analogy is contained in the text:

56 Claire A. Peugnet, B.S.M.S.W., The Missing Value in Medical Social Case Work, St. Louis, St. Louis University, [1943], 32.
Athens was ruled by a constitution and the Athenians were proud of their rights as free men. Their freedom, clarified and guaranteed by the Constitution, gave each citizen something of his own where-with to resist despotic or absolute control. And the likeness of the human being to the state was seen in this that man could not despotically rule his members, his capacities, but must deal with them according to their constitution. The nature of the case with man was fixed and determined, as was the nature of the state with its citizens. In each case there would be things to do which the nature of the case would require, and, if they were not done, there would be anarchy. Each party—the state and the individual—had to respect the other and act according to the nature of himself and of the other.57

As the nature of the Greek state with its citizens was fixed, as pointed out above, so is the nature of man fixed or determined. As the ruler could not despotically rule his subjects, for their freedom was clarified and guaranteed by the Constitution, so neither can man despotically rule his members and capacities; rather he must deal with them according to their constitution, as explained above. As the state and the individual had to respect each other and act according to the nature of himself and the other, so must man have regard for the laws which govern him as also take into consideration the laws according to which his members and powers operate. In accordance with this line of reasoning, one cannot just "will" something and therefore have it work, any more than a motorist with a flat tire can fix it by sitting still and willing the tire—not-to-be-flat!58

St. Thomas gives us an important clue as to how man is to exercise control over his powers, (which control we have referred to as "constitutional control") when, as seen above,59 he informs us that the sensitive

58 Ibid.
59 S.T., I-I, q.81, a.3 ad 2.; cf. supra, 144.
appetite is naturally moved, not only by the cogitative power (that is, by the power of thought) which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and sense. In order to exercise "constitutional control," then, man must exercise a rational control over his power of thought, as also over his imagination and sensation. To do the latter effectively, he must become acquainted with the laws according to which his power of thought, his imagination and sensation operate.

The irascible and concupiscible powers obey the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the will, says St. Thomas, in two ways. Here we will first consider how these lower powers obey reason; thereafter, we will consider how they obey the will. While in other animals, such as wolves and sheep, the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by the estimative power, for example, a sheep judging the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man the estimative power is replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by some the particular reason. This particular reason is naturally guided and moved according to the universal reason. In syllogistic matters particular conclusions are drawn from universal propositions. So we see that the universal reason directs the sensitive appetite, which is divided into the concupiscible and irascible powers; and the sensitive appetite obeys the universal reason. However, St. Thomas

60 S.T., I-I.q. 81, a.3.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
adds, since to draw particular conclusions from universal principles is not the work of the intellect as such, but of the reason, it is more fitting to say that the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason than to say that they obey the intellect. 64 Anyone can experience this, for by applying certain universal considerations, St. Thomas observes, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited. 65

We will now turn our attention to the matter of how the sensitive appetite, that is, the lower appetites, obey the will. The sensitive appetite, St. Thomas says, is subject to the will in execution, (that is, in its acts), and this subjection of the sensitive appetite is accomplished by the motive power. 66 In other animals, St. Thomas observes, movement follows the concupiscible and irascible appetites at once, for instance, the sheep fearing the wolf, flees at once, because it has no superior counteracting appetite. 67 Here we can observe St. Thomas' doctrine on the power of motives or motivation. Man, unlike other animals, is not moved at once according to the irascible and concupiscible appetites, St. Thomas says, but he awaits the command of the will, which is the superior appetite.

64 S.T., I-I, q. 81, a. 3.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
Wherever there is order among a number of motive powers, St. Thomas says, the second is moved only by virtue of the first. The lower appetite, then, is not sufficient to cause movement, unless the higher appetite consents. In this way the irascible and concupiscible powers are subject to reason, St. Thomas observes. In accordance with this reasoning, in order to get the lower powers to obey the will, man must give his will adequate and worthwhile motives to move or motivate it. The lower powers in man cannot move at once, but they must await the command of the will. Thus if the will is given adequate motives, (particularly motives with an adequate intellectual content), the movement of the lower powers will very likely be in accordance with reason.

In explaining other factors entering in the matter of "constitutional control," St. Thomas says that the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason, in so far as it (the sensitive appetite) is in our power. The sensitive appetite is a power of a corporeal organ; whereas the will is not. Every act of a power that uses a corporeal organ depends not only on a power of the soul, but also on the disposition of that organ. Consequently, the act of the sensitive ap-
tite depends not only on the appetitive power, but also on the disposition of the body. 75

Now, the part which the power of the soul takes in the act follows apprehension; and the apprehension of the imagination being a particular apprehension, is regulated by the apprehension of reason which is universal, just as a particular active power is regulated by a universal active power. 76 Consequently, in this respect, the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason; whereas, the conditions or disposition of the body is not subject to the command of reason. 77 In this respect, the movement of the sensitive appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to the command of reason. 78

Sometimes the sensitive appetite is aroused suddenly, St. Thomas observes, and that happens as a consequence of an apprehension of the imagination of sense. 79 Such a movement occurs without the command of reason, he says, although the reason could have prevented it had it foreseen. 80

The reason, then, governs the irascible and concupiscible powers, not by a "despotic supremacy," which is that of a master over his slave; but by a "politic and royal supremacy," whereby the free are governed, who are not wholly subject to command. 81

75 S.T., I-II, q. 17, a. 7.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., q. 28, a. 7.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
That a man lusts even though he wills not to do so, is due, St. Thomas says, to a disposition of the body, whereby the sensitive appetite is hindered from perfect compliance with the command of reason. Perhaps a clear statement of this difficulty is the one of the Apostle, Paul, wherein he says, "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind."82

The condition of the body, St. Thomas adds, stands in a twofold relation to the act of the sensitive appetite.83 First, as preceding it; secondly, as consequent to it.84 Now the condition that precedes the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to the command of reason, since it is due to nature, or to some previous movement which cannot cease at once,85 but the condition that is consequent, follows the command of reason.86

St. Thomas also distinguishes two kinds of acts: those proceeding from the natural appetite and those proceeding from the animal or intellectual appetite.87 In order to exercise constitutional control, one must understand the cause or source of one's actions. Now every agent desires an end in some way,88 St. Thomas observes, for no organ, no function of any

82 Romans 7:33; S.T., I-II, q. 17, a. 7 ad 1.
83 S.T., I-II, q. 17, a. 7 ad 2.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid., q. 17, a. 8.
88 Ibid.
organ, and no appetite is without purpose in the whole where it is found naturally. Each organ and appetite immediately looks only to its own purpose and its own satisfaction.

Now, the natural appetite, St. Thomas says, does not follow from some apprehension as do the animal and intellectual appetite. The reason, however, commands by way of the apprehensive power. Thus, those acts that proceed from the intellective or animal appetite, can be commanded by reason, but not those acts which proceed from the natural appetite, such as generation, nutrition, the pulse, reflexes and the healing that goes on in one's own body; these latter are not subject to the command of reason.

The more immaterial an act is, the more noble it is, the more is it subject to the command of reason. From the fact that the vegetative powers in man do not obey reason, we know that they rank lowest in the hierarchy among the powers of man.

The mind commands the movement of the hand, St. Thomas says, and the hand is so ready to obey that one can scarcely discern or distinguish obedience from the command. The members of the body are organs of the soul's powers; consequently, according as the powers of the soul stand in respect

89 Morrison, Character Formation in College, 29.
90 Ibid.
91 S.T., I-II, q. 17, a. 8.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid., q. 17, a. 8 ad 1.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., q. 17, a. 9.
of obedience to reason, so do the members of the body stand in respect thereof. 97

Since the sensitive powers are subject to the command of reason, while the natural powers are not, St. Thomas concludes that all movements of members that are moved by the sensitive powers are subject to the command of reason; and those movements of members, that arise from the natural powers, are not subject to the command of reason. 98

An important observation of St. Thomas in the matter of constitutional control, is this, that although the movements of the heart and of the organs of generation are involuntary, these members are stirred at the occasion of some apprehension, in so far as the intellect and imagination represent such things as arouse the passions of the soul, of which passions these movements are a consequence. Thus, for the purpose of exercising "Constitutional Control" one must understand the relationship existing between thought and actions, namely, that thoughts tend to go out into action; and as a man thinks, so he acts. Thus, one can observe the necessity of cherishing only such thoughts as are in accordance with reason, if one is to succeed in the business of exercising "Constitutional Control", and of excluding the development of those thoughts contrary to reason. Perhaps the best way of achieving this is by developing an ardent devotion to an ideal, particularly a personal ideal (that is, a personality) in whom one's highest ideals are realized. 99

97 S.T. I-II, q. 17, a. 9.
98 Ibid.
From the foregoing discussion on the tremendous power of a mere apprehension and on the steps involved in constitutional or self-control one can reason to the conclusion that a rational theory of self-control will require an ideal which one desires to realize, a resolution to possess that ideal, as also practical steps towards the realization of that ideal.\textsuperscript{100}

An example of constitutional control in action may help in the understanding thereof. As an example, we will here consider the matter of the preservation of conjugal chastity. That there is need for the exercise of constitutional control for the preservation of the same is pointed out in these words of Cardinal Mercier:

Even in marriage husbands and wives must place restraint upon their inclinations.

Every husband should have that respect and regard for the constitution of his wife which prudence and delicate consideration demand; for a day may come when the necessity of preserving the health of one or the other will place an obstacle between them—even, it may be, for a considerable time. What attention, think you, are they likely to pay to this obstacle, if the very elements of self-restraint are lacking to them? Conjugal chastity is the more necessary inasmuch as the impulses it (marriage) arouses and regulates are more blindly imperious ...\textsuperscript{101}

If man were merely composed of matter, as the exponents of a materialistic philosophy would have us think, all his functions would be organic; they would belong to one and the same order.\textsuperscript{102} If that were really the case, it would be hard to see why a man should be reckoned as foul and degraded because he yields without restraint to one of these functions.


\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
rather than to another. In any materialistic conception of Nature, resistance to the peremptory demands of passion—in other words, virtuous endeavor to overcome Nature—becomes an utterly senseless proceeding.

Even Aristotle in the fourth century before Christ, gives us a happier view of human nature than that; in his De Anima he exalts the almost unlimited power of the human "mind"—thus assuring us that man is not merely "animal." Speaking of the mind, Aristotle says:

"Mind as we have described it is what it is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is another which is what it is by virtue of making all things: this is a sort of positive state like light: for in a sense light makes potential colors into actual colors.

Mind in this sense...is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity (for always the active is superior to the passive factor, the originating force to the matter which it forms).

Since, then, man does have a spiritual side to his make-up, virtuous endeavor is not a senseless proceeding. In the matter of preserving conjugal chastity, man needs an "ideal," since, according to St. Thomas, the will follows the lead of the intellect. Further, in the choice of ideals, those are best which are self-discovered and self-chosen, for as long as a man is working for something imposed on him as a goal, he is apt to put little heart into it. However, if he chooses his own ideal, he will put his heart into it and make it his very own.

103 Mercier, Duties of Married Life, 11.
104 Ibid.
106 Morrison, Character Formation in College, 64.
Without ideals no one will ever amount to anything; nor will anyone succeed without motives. One needs a star to guide him and a model to inspire him and an exemplar to nerve him. When one has a vibrant, live, and well-loved image in mind, one can stir himself in that august company to heights of endeavor, one can steel himself to endure beyond even his own imagining.

An ideal to be aimed at in the preservation of conjugal chastity may be "moral integrity." By "moral integrity" here we mean the capacity for feeling and doing things reasonably. This ideal may be embodied in a loved example of excellence. However, before one chooses an ideal one needs motives for choosing one, for it is thus that the will is moved, according to St. Thomas. Motives for the ideal of conjugal chastity, for example, can be the realization of the very deteriorating effects of the contrary of "conjugal chastity," namely, the disorder brought to the higher powers of reason and will, and the desire to maintain order within oneself, that is, within one's mental powers and faculties. St. Thomas explains the deteriorating effects of the contrary of chastity in the text:

When the lower powers are strongly moved towards their objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and disordered in their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that the lower appetite, namely the concupiscible, is more vehemently intent on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of the vehemence of the pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely the reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by lust.

110 S.T.,II -II, q. 153, a. 5.
In the above text St. Thomas is saying that any strong or intense movement on the part of the lower powers of man interferes with or hinders the functions of the higher powers. Then he goes on to explain which four functions of reason are hindered by the intense movement of the lower appetite. First, he says, simple understanding, which apprehends some end as good, is hindered by lust, and blindness of mind results. Secondly, counsel about what is to be done for the sake of the end is hindered by the concupiscence of lust which, as Terence says, admits neither of counsel nor moderation. In this respect there is rashness, which denotes absence of counsel. Thirdly, judgment about things to be done is also hindered by lust; as an example, St. Thomas here refers to the lustful men spoken of in the story of Susanna of whom we read: "They perverted their own mind... that they might not... remember just judgments." In this respect there is thoughtlessness. Fourthly, reason's command about things to be done is also impeded by lust, in so far as through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is hindered from doing what his reason ordered to be done. Thus, there is inconstancy. St. Thomas again quotes Terence in this connection as having said of a man who declared that he would leave his mistress:

One little false tear will undo those words.

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111 S.T.,II-II,q. 153, a. 5.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Daniel 13:9, cited in S.T.,II-II,q. 153, a. 5.
116 S.T.,II-II, q. 153, a. 5.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
As a consequence of carnal pleasures, there are also two inordinate acts that result on the part of the will, as pointed out in the text:

Ex parte autem voluntatis consequitur duplex actus inordinatus. Quorum unus est appetitus finis. Et quantum ad hoc ponitur "amor sui", quantum scilicet ad delectationem quam inordinate appetit; et per oppositum ponitur "odium Dei", inquantum scilicet prohibet delectationem concupitam. Alius autem est appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem. Et quantum ad hoc ponitur "affectus praeentis saeculi," in quo scilicet aliquis vult frui voluptate; et per oppositum ponitur "desperatio futuri saeculi," quia dum nimis detinetur carnalibus delectationibus, non curat pervenire ad spirituales, sed fastidit. 120

One inordinate act on the part of the will, resulting from carnal pleasure, is in regard to the end; self-love is placed before everything else. There is also hatred of God by reason of His forbidding the desired pleasure. "With regard to this," St. Thomas says, "There is love of this world, because through being held back by carnal pleasures he cares not to obtain spiritual pleasures, since they are distasteful to him. 121

Following Aristotle, St. Thomas concludes that intemperance is the chief corruptive of prudence, and that the vices opposed to prudence arise chiefly from lust, which is the principal species of intemperance. 122

From the foregoing, it is evident how the mind of man is beclouded and befogged, as also how man's reason is hindered in its operations as a result of the contrary of conjugal chastity. Just the desire for moral

120 S. Thomae, De Aquino, Summa Theologiae, Secundam Secundae, Ottawa, Canada, MDCCCCXLII, q. 153, a. 5.

121 S.T., II-II, q. 153, a. 5.

122 Ibid., q. 153, a. 3 ad 1.
integrity, or the desire to keep one's intellectual powers free to operate in accordance with reason are in themselves, apart from supernatural motives (which are, indeed, very impelling), strong incentives for the preservation of conjugal chastity. With such motives clearly in mind, man can readily take the second step in the matter of constitutional control—namely, a firm resolution to follow a particular course of action. Resolutions are the tools with which a man fashions himself, and without them he is like a rowboat without oars, or like a steamer without a propeller. 123

In addition to choosing an ideal, which in this case may be that of moral integrity, and the making of a firm resolution, certain practical steps are involved in any rational theory of self-control. These latter steps, St. Thomas says, involve the following elements: experience and time, memory of the past to supply one with examples, intelligence with which to work them over and to sift them for their real meaning; and thus the future can be forecast with some degree of reasonableness.

In order to go into action prudently, then, one needs to have a memory of the past, and understanding of the present, and shrewdness in considering future outcomes. This all requires time and study based on one's own experience as also on vicarious experience gleaned from schooling, advice.... 124 Reason compares the past, present and the projected future. Docility is also needed to accept the opinions of others. 125

123 Morrison, Character Formation in College, 47-48.
124 S.T.,II-II, q. 153, a. 3; Morrison, St.Louis, St.Louis University, Course: "Character Education."
125 Ibid.
As regards the resolution resolved upon, one must endeavor to foresee the occasions in which it is to be carried out; in this way one connects in his imagination the occasions that will arise in the future with the resolution one is determined to keep.126

As a consequence, when these occasions become a reality or present themselves, the appropriate resolution will readily be recalled. Here we can also observe the work of reason in comparing one thing with another.

The most effective remedy against intemperance, St. Thomas says, is "not to dwell on the consideration of singulars,"127 but rather to dwell on universal considerations or principles.128 This is also in accord with St. Thomas' doctrine to the effect that the apprehension of reason, which is universal, regulates the apprehension of the imagination which is a particular apprehension.129 Thus, by applying certain universal considerations one can divert his mind from the contemplation of some particular undesirable course of action to a more wholesome one, and thus be exercising constitutional control. An ardent devotion to an ideal which befits human nature considered in its essential relationships will hinder, if not prevent, the development of a less worthy ideal. In order to achieve any worthwhile change in manners and ways of action or habits, time and continued effort are required.

126 Course: "Personality Problems and Mental Health", Loyola University, Chicago, 1947.
127 S.T., II-II, q. 142, a.3.
128 Ibid., I-II, q. 17 a. 7.
129 Ibid.
Now, there are eight ways of expressing constitutional control in action, or ways in which another's motive or information or knowledge or bent may be modified, improved or deteriorated by someone; they are also eight ways in which one can change himself. These eight ways also point out or suggest the tremendous moving power of "mere apprehension," and, consequently, the importance of apprehending or viewing things rationally. St. Thomas maintains that whatever part the power of the soul takes in an act, follows apprehension. The eight ways of changing oneself or another are:

1. Making over wrong and hurtful ideas.
2. Re-interpreting experiences and portions of mental content.
3. Cultivating frankness, thus removing mental blocks and conflicts.
4. Changing the connotation of words and imaginations.
5. Supplying satisfactory answers to doubts and questions.
6. Replacing undesirable elements of mental life—substituting for familiar habits of thoughts and patterns of desire more reasonable ones.
7. Finding new outlets of activity.
8. Getting new attitudes and a new outlook on life; taking to heart new ideals and new resolutions, new principles.

The making over of wrong and hurtful ideas, mentioned first in the list above, is very important; if, for example, one has an erroneous concept of God, he is not helped very much, as we know from the experience of St. Augustine. His own distorted and erroneous concept of God was really hurtful to him, as he, himself, tells us in the words:

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130 Morrison, God Is Its Founder, 50-59.
131 S.T.,I-II,q. 17, a. 7.
132 Morrison, Syllabus used in "Character Education" course.
"I thought of Thee...
Thou weret not Thyself...
but a mere phantom,
and my error was my god.
If I offered to discharge my load thereon,
that it might rest, it glided through the void
and came rushing down on me again..."

As regards the second point, the re-interpretation of experiences and portions of mental content, can often remove misunderstandings, which frequently cause a lot of trouble. Fears also can be dissipated by being understood, and prejudices can be removed by being properly evaluated and having Truth substituted.

The cultivation of frankness, mentioned thirdly, and the consequent removal of mental blocks is another point deserving great emphasis, for unless such mental blocks are removed, one cannot give his undivided attention to his duties and one's intellectual powers are hindered in their proper operations, that is, they tend to become disordered in their acts. The observation of this third point does much, incidentally, for the preservation of mental health. Both husband and wife should cultivate frankness and have complete confidence in each other so that each can ask anything at all, can show doubts that are half sensed or doubts that are just doubts of doubting, with no stiffness or sense of inferiority, since between

133 St. Augustine, Confessions, IV,vii, 12, cited in Morrison, God Is Its Founder, 53.
134 Morrison, God Is Its Founder, 51.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid., 53.
husband and wife there ought to be a "total community of life." A similar relationship should exist between children and their parents, for without it children are apt to feel very insecure and be deprived of that guidance which they need for both their mental and moral development. Often the guidance they need is best received from their own parents whom God gave them for that purpose. Unless parents have and cherish their child's confidence, they will not be able to impart effectively the guidance and instruction of which their child stands in dire need.

The fourth way of changing oneself, the changing of the connotation of words and pictures, or imaginations, can be a very important one both for helping one develop more wholesome attitudes and for the preservation of mental health.

The fifth way, the supplying of satisfactory answers to doubts and questions, is in accord with a very real need of man, namely, the need which man has of knowing truth. One can suffer greatly as a result of not having the truth.

Perhaps one good way of applying the sixth way mentioned by which one can change himself or another, that of replacing undesirable elements of mental life and substituting for familiar habits of thought and patterns of desire more reasonable ones, is by the acquisition of a thorough education, one which is concerned with the education of man's moral and spiritual

137 Morrison, God Is Its Founder, 53.
powers, as well as with the education of his intellectual and physical powers.

Unfortunately today we are witnessing an undue emphasis on the education of man's physical powers, almost to the neglect of all the other powers of man, particularly man's moral and spiritual powers.

That undesirable elements of mental life be supplanted by newer and more wholesome and gripping interests is very important; it aids in the reduction of daydreams to their proper number and function. Animosities, hunches, and attractions not in accordance with reason must be brought into focus, and previous morbid interests must be replaced with wholesome ones.

The seventh way, that of furnishing new outlets for activity, is a very helpful one in the matter of exercising constitutional control, as it offers one the opportunity to channel his energies, as it were, in another direction—from a less wholesome to a more wholesome one. Here one's needs, interests and wishes ought to be considered. The best way to break with one habit is to replace it with another; the furnishing of new outlets of activity can be the practical step which needs to be taken in order to break with an old undesirable habit.

The eighth way, that of getting new attitudes and a new outlook on life, and the taking to heart of new ideals and new principles, can scarcely

138 Morrison, God Is Its Founder, 53.
139 Ibid.
be overemphasized, since our thoughtways influence our actions tremendously as we think so we act. The acquisition of wholesome attitudes founded on truth is essential for true happiness and harmonious living. The same might be said as regards an outlook on life. So much of one's happiness depends upon one's acquisition of a rational outlook on life, one again founded on truth. Such an outlook will include a proper scale of values one in which moral virtue will have the highest place. Second in the scale of values will be things of the mind (intellectual virtues, an education, etc.); thirdly, physical well-being (health of body); fourth and lastly, external goods, (wealth, money and material possessions).

Many persons are not achieving happiness in their lives today because they have reversed the order of the above value scale, ranking external goods (money and material goods) first in their scale of values, and perhaps secondly, health of body, thirdly, things of the mind, and lastly (if at all) moral virtue or goodness. Neither happiness nor peace can result from such a disordered state of affairs. St. Thomas, developing the thought of Aristotle, places the four different kinds of goods in the following order: moral virtue, things of the mind, physical well-being (health of body), and lastly external goods—money, wealth, possessions, etc.

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141 S.T., II-II, q. 104, a. 3.
In reading the works of St. Thomas, particularly his *Summa Theologica*, the writer is impressed with his constant insistence on the fact that the proper orientation of human beings is under God's Providence by way of religion.\(^{142}\) This same truth was recently expressed by a contemporary Thomist, Dr. Pegis, President of the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, when he said: "Man is not himself unless he is a God-centered being," and that "Rationality is the life in man which in its movements and sensibility is God-centered."\(^{143}\) "Man," he says further, "is best defined as a religious animal."\(^{144}\) Previously man was defined as a "rational animal" by both Aristotle and St. Thomas,\(^ {145}\) pursuing the thought of Aristotle. Pegis maintains that man is not turned to that which makes him a human being unless he is turned towards that which gives him his freedom.\(^ {146}\) Man alone, he adds, among all other animals, is a religious animal.\(^ {147}\)

Although St. Thomas does not explicitly define man as a "religious animal," there is a basis for the statement that man is by nature "religious," in the writings of St. Thomas. The following is one of the many passages in the writings of St. Thomas in which he refers to man's orientation towards God:

\(^{142}\) S.T., II-II, q. 10, a. 12 ad 4; III Suppl. q. 65, a.2 ad 5; Morrison, *God Is Its Founder*, 54.

\(^{143}\) Dr. Anton C. Pegis, Toronto, Lecture in Chicago, 1949.

\(^{144}\) Ibid.


\(^{146}\) Dr. Pegis, Lecture, 1949.

\(^{147}\) S.T.
Now the universe of creatures, to which man is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is ordained to God, as to its last end.

Man's need of a proper orientation towards God, as also his very real need of Truth, is expressed in the words:

[A] creed, given man by God, guides his conduct and keeps him aware of where his true and essential values lie in the world of conduct and of action. A cult keeps him mindful of his true needs and his true position in the universe, because the cult is given him by God. That, as expressed, is quite simple. However patriotism, morale, a rational grasp on principles which can give him firmness and clarity in the face of present bewilderment and wild fumbling in the social and economic worlds are applications of the creed and code which are most important. Until the mind of man finds a meaning in life and a meaning in the obligations and duties which life and especially, marriage impose, he is a lost soul, subject to vagaries and fads and panaceas and propaganda. Ideals, resolutions, rules—these three are constitutional control's mainstays for human conduct. They are at the bottom of the eight ways.... The solution, for the individual, is going to remain either hidden or known according as he has, or has not, an adequate grasp on the Truth."149

In the foregoing text the author also points out the essential relationship between the three elements—ideals, resolutions and rules, and the exercise of constitutional control; these three elements must be contained in any rational theory of self-control; they are also at the bottom of the eight ways of changing oneself or another, which are listed above. Those same eight ways are expressions of constitutional control in action. Before all else, man has need of truth in order to be able to exercise constitutional control successfully. That the mind of man is made for truth, is also the thought expressed in the writings of St. Thomas.150

148 S.T., I-II, q. 2, a. 8 ad 2.
149 Morrison, God Is Its Founder, 54-55.
150 S.T., I-II, q. 2, a. 8 et passim.
Expressing so well the thought of St. Thomas are these memorable words of St. Augustine: "There, where I found truth, I found God!"^151

While there are eight ways of changing oneself, or ways in which the motive or information or knowledge or bent of another may be modified, improved or deteriorated by someone, there are nine ways in which one can express his effort to influence another. In this matter of influencing another, there are three main avenues which one may take: by persuasion directed to the intelligence; by suggestion to the emotions and mind; or by compulsion, that is, by an emphasis of duty.^152

The nine ways of influencing another are also nine ways in which husband and wife can help each other or share responsibility; they can be applied by oneself to oneself. The ways in which one can influence another are:

1. By Command.
2. By Counsel.
3. Sharing—giving psychological backing by congenial mind-set and perhaps physical cooperation.
4. Policy—determination or law-making, or morale building; use of praise.
5. Being a place of refuge, either providing a harbor, a hiding place physically or psychically.
7. Not criticizing when it is your job to give criticism;

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151 St. Augustine, Confessions, X, 24, cited in Morrison, God Is Its Founder, 55.

152 Morrison, Course: "Social Philosophy and the Guidance Program," St. Louis University, St. Louis, 1943.
8. Not speaking when it is time to speak.
9. The biggest of all—by being a friend, another-self. 153

Since one can provoke by what one does not do as well as by what one does, one's expression of effort to influence another can be negative as well as positive. 154

In regard to influencing another by commands in the family, St. Thomas definitely maintains that the husband or father is the head of the family and that authority resides in him. As a consequence he can command and his commands must be obeyed by the other members of the family. His doctrine on this point is expressed in several texts as: "The wife is under her husband's authority, as united to him in marriage...." 155

Then, thinking that men are better fitted by nature to be the head of the family, St. Thomas says:

For good order would have been wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason predominates. 156

That there should be some subordination in the human family for the sake of good order, is only rational; however, this subordination should be "suave and gentle." 157 St. Thomas also tells us about the manner

154 Ibid.
155 S.T.,II-II,q. 154, a.8 ad 3.
156 Ibid.,I-I,q. 92, a.1 ad 2.
157 Vermeersch, What Is Marriage?
in which the head of the family ought to command, when he says: "Just men command not by the love of domineering, but by the service of counsel; ...The natural order of things requires this; and thus did God make man." 158

St. Thomas is saying in effect that a command is not any the less real because it is given tactfully and so gracefully and acceptably; that it merely seems more in keeping with the dignity of human nature to issue commands in a gentle manner. Needless to say, the one giving commands should study carefully the subject he is commanding and the commands he intends to issue. There are certain things touching the internal movement of the will in which parents have no right to command their children, for example, in things pertaining to the matter of contracting marriage or of remaining in the state of virginity or the like. 159

Pope Pius Xth seems to be interpreting or explaining the thought of St. Thomas regarding the subjection of the woman to her husband when he says:

This subjection, however, does not deny or take away the liberty which fully belongs to the woman both in view of her dignity as a human person, and in view of her most noble office as wife and mother and companion; nor does it bid her obey her husband's every request even if not in harmony with right reason or with the dignity due a wife; nor, in fine, does it imply that the wife should be put on a level with those persons who in law are called minors, to whom it is not customary to allow free exercise of their rights on account of their lack of mature judgment, or of their ignorance of human affairs. But it forbids that exaggerated license which cares not for the good of the family; it forbids that in this body which is the family, the heart be separated from the head to the great detriment of the whole body and the proximate danger of ruin. For if the man is the head, the

158 S.T., I-I, q. 96, a. 4.

159 S.T., II-II, q. 104, a. 5.
woman is the heart, and as he occupies the chief place in ruling, so she may and ought to claim for herself the chief place in love. 160

St. Thomas definitely names the husband as the head of the family. 161 He charges the father with the duty of maintaining order in the household in the words:

On the father of a family depends the order of the household, which order is contained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the ruler of the city; while this last order depends on that of the king, by whom the whole kingdom is ordered. 162

St. Thomas further points out that the only purpose for which a man is the master of a free subject, as for example, the husband is of the wife, is for the subject's own well-being or for the common good, as indicated in the text: "a man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either towards his proper welfare, or to the common good." 163

Perhaps one reason why St. Thomas places the family under the headship of one parent, rather than under that of both, is that he, too, realized the dangers and very real harm that can result from divided authority. When only one is the head of the family, the possibility of having divided authority therein is reduced. Divided authority hinders the proper rearing of the child; when parents disagree, the child is often left to himself to do as he pleases. Psychologists inform us that when parents disagree, they are preparing the child for a nervous breakdown. The child will have difficulties of no small measure in the process of growing up if he is left undisciplined when a small child.

160 Pius X1th, Christian Marriage, 9.
161 S.T., I-I, q. 92, a. 2.
162 Ibid., q. 105, a. 6.
163 Ibid. q. 96, a. 4.
In the text to follow St. Thomas points out the advantages of having authority residing in one rather than in several:

We must of necessity say that the world is governed by one. For since the end of the government of the world is that which is essentially good, which is the greatest good; the government of the world must be the best kind of government. Now the best government is government by one. The reason of this is that government is nothing but the directing of the things governed to the end; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to the idea of goodness, as Boethius proves (De Consol. iii. 11) from this, that as all things desire good, so do they desire unity; without which they would cease to exist. For a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence we observe that things resist division, as far as they can; and the dissolution of a thing arises from some defect therein. Therefore the intention of a ruler over a multitude is unity, or peace. Now the proper cause of unity is one. For it is clear that several cannot be the cause of unity or concord, except so far as they are united. Furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause of unity than several things united. Therefore a multitude is better governed by one than by several. From this it follows that the government of the world, being the best form of government, must be by one. This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph. xii. Did. xi. 10): Things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler.

Here St. Thomas points out that what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause of unity than several things united; from this, as also from the following text, we can understand why St. Thomas prefers to have authority reside in one rather than in several. St. Thomas says:

[He]an is naturally a social being. . . . Now a social life cannot exist among a number of people unless under the presidency of one to look after the common good; for many, as such, seek many things, whereas one attends only to one. Wherefore the Philosopher says, in the beginning of the Politics, that wherever many things are directed to one, we shall always find one at the head directing them. Secondly, if one man surpassed another in knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these gifts conduced to the benefit of others, according to 1 Pet. iv. 10, As every man hath received grace, minister.
St. Thomas is convinced that for the sake of peace, unity, order and harmony in the home, one should be the head, having the duty of looking after the common good.

Counselling, the second way of influencing another, can be very effective, particularly if one takes into consideration the researches made in the field of non-directive counselling, by Dr. Carl Rogers¹⁶⁶, Dr. (Father) Charles Curran,¹⁶⁷ and others.

As to the rest of the nine ways of influencing another, most of them are self-explanatory. Some are more effective than others, as for example the third way—that of giving psychological backing; and the fourth of being instrumental in policy-making. There is some overlapping among these nine ways; the fifth way, being a place of refuge by providing a harbor or a hiding place either physically or psychically, and perhaps even the ninth way—that of being a friend, another self—might be included under the first one listed, namely, that of influencing another by counsel.

By being a true friend, another self, is perhaps one of the most effective ways of influencing another. The possible influence of a friend seems to be suggested by these familiar words of Cardinal Newman: "Persons

¹⁶⁵ S.T., I-I, q. 96, a. 4.
¹⁶⁶ Dr. Carl Rogers, Counselling and Psychotherapy, Boston, 1939.
¹⁶⁷ Dr. (Father) Charles Curran, Personality Factors in Counselling, New York, 1945.
influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, and deeds inflame us!\textsuperscript{168}  

In the use of the above referred to nine ways of influencing another, one will be travelling on one or more of the three avenues referred to earlier—persuasion of the intellect, suggesting to the emotions, or appealing to a sense of duty. Since people more often than not are influenced or guided by their "feelings," one cannot overlook the value of utilizing the emotional appeal. However, for effecting a lasting influence on another, the persuasion to the intellect seems best; something with a certain amount of intellectual content is bound to be more lasting than the mere stimulation of the emotions.  

When we compare the theory of Confucius on the matter of influencing others, with that of St. Thomas based on an accurate concept of human nature, one cannot help but think that Confucius overemphasizes the power of sheer example; he seems to fail to realize that men do not automatically follow a good example when given. One of the best ways in which one can exert a permanent influence on others is by utilizing the first of the three avenues of approach mentioned earlier, that of persuasion to the intellect. If one succeeds in getting moral principles firmly imbedded in the intellect, the person influencing another can expect to be exerting an influence upon him even when one is no longer present with him; thus he would be effecting a more lasting influence. Example does not seem to exert such a permanent influence as something with intellectual content.  

Perhaps the chief reason why the theory of Confucius for influencing others, as also his theory of self-control, is inadequate is that it is based on an inaccurate concept of human nature and its varied powers and potencies. Confucius fails to understand how the powers of man interact and influence one another and how they exert an influence on man himself. They operate in accordance with certain laws that must be understood if man is to manage himself successfully. Then, too, Confucius fails to see human nature in its essential relationships, particularly does he fail to understand man's relationship with God, the Cause and Preserver of his existence. Man cannot be fully human unless he is properly orientated towards God from Whom he receives his freedom. The proper orientation of human beings under God's Providence is by way of religion. Neither is man truly human unless he is God-centered.

Not viewing man in his essential relationships, Confucius failed to see the true end of man; yet, in one or two instances his doctrine seems to point in the right direction. Although the end of man is last in achievement, it is the first in intention, according to St. Thomas. Man must know his end in order to be able to direct his actions in accordance with that end.

Since Confucius failed to understand human nature with its varied powers, and the laws according to which those powers operate, as also the laws in accordance with which man must govern himself, his theory of self-control seems unfit for purposes of mental and moral discipline. To understand human nature fully one must view it in all its relationships,
particularly in its essential relationship to God, the Cause and Preserver of man's existence as also his last end. To be fully human man must commit himself to his destiny.

That Confucius may have had some insight into the end of man seems apparent from the text: "What the Great Learning teaches, is— to illustrate illustrious virtue; to renovate the people; and to rest in the highest excellence." The highest excellence or the "sumnum bonum" of the Chinese was "Superior Learning"; this also seems to be the thought of Confucius. Confucius considers the man virtuous who possesses a knowledge of ceremonies and music. Now the knowledge to which Confucius refers as being the sumnum bonum, is knowledge particularly of ceremonies and music, and as such, that knowledge is a created good and cannot, therefore, constitute man's happiness, as we know from these lines of St. Thomas:

Augustine says (De Civ.Dei XIX. 26): As the soul is the life of the life of the body, so God is man's life of happiness; of whom it is written: "Happy is the people whose God is the Lord" (Ps. cxliii.15).

I answer that; It is impossible for any created good to constitute man's happiness. For happiness is the perfect good which lulls the appetite altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e., of man's appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man's will save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Therefore God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of Ps cii. 5: Who satisfieth thy desire with good things. Therefore God alone constitutes man's happiness. 171

170 Legge, Chinese Classics, 1861, I, I, 28.
171 S.T., I-II, q. 2, a. 6.
From the above text we see that no created good can constitute man's true happiness. This same truth is expressed so well in these famous lines of St. Augustine: "...secisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te."172 (Thou hast made our hearts for Thee, O God, and restless are they until they rest in Thee.)

Confucius also seemed to think that as a result of the acquisition of knowledge, man would attain great peace and a tranquil repose.173 However, it is difficult to see how man could arrive at true peace by following the Confucian theory of self-cultivation or self-control, particularly since he had no concept of the true end of man and no sharp sense of what constitutes evil.174 Confucius thought that not only would the individual achieve great peace from the pursuance of his theory of self-control, based on self-cultivation, but that the entire empire even would become tranquil and peaceful, through the intermediate steps of the regulation of the family and the government of the State. How one could attain true peace by following the Confucian theory of self-cultivation, is very difficult to see, particularly when we consider what St. Thomas says regarding peace and the means by which it is to be achieved.

Perfect peace, according to St. Thomas, consists in the perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and, further, it unites all one's desires by giving them rest in one object. This perfect peace St. Thomas also regards as man's last end, as evident from the text:

Since true peace is only about good things, as the true good is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly, so there is a twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists in the perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all one's desires by giving them rest in one object. This is the last end of the rational creature, according to Ps. cxlvii. 3: Who hath placed peace in thy borders. The other is imperfect peace, which may be had in this world for though the chief movement of the soul finds rest in God, yet there are certain things within and without which disturb the peace. 175

True peace, St. Thomas says, implies a union of both the sensitive and rational appetites, and excludes the possibility of either appetite tending to diverse objects of desire, which it cannot obtain all at the same time. 176 Accepting the thought of Augustine, St. Thomas says, further, that "peace is the tranquillity of order..." 177

Now a man's heart is not at peace, St. Thomas observes, so long as he has not what he wants, or if, having what he wants, there still remains something for him to want, and which he cannot have at the same time. 178 Consequently, since there remains something for man to want, even after

175 S.T., II-II, q. 29, a. 2 ad 4.
176 Ibid., q. 29, a. 1.
177 Ibid., q. 29, a. 1 ad 1.
178 Ibid.
acquiring that peace of which Confucius speaks (since man still does not come to the possession of God, according to the Confucian doctrine, and thus he would still be wanting something) it is difficult to see how man could possibly enjoy that tranquil repose and experience a calm unperturbedness of which Confucius speaks. 179

Peace, St. Thomas says, includes concord which merely denotes the union of appetites among various persons. Consequently, where people achieve peace (which in addition to concord implies the union of the appetites even within the individual man) 180 there would also be concord.

Peace results from one's own appetites being directed to one object and from one's own appetite being united with that of another, as St. Thomas explains in the text:

Peace implies a twofold union,...The first is the result of one's own appetites being directed to one object; while the other results from one's own appetite being united with the appetite of another; and each of these unions is effected by charity:—the first, in so far as man loves God with his whole heart, by referring all things to Him, so that all his desires tend to one object:—the second, in so far as we love our neighbor as ourselves, the result being that we wish to fulfill our neighbor's will as though it were ours: hence it is reckoned a sign of friendship if people make choice of the same things (Ethic.ix.4)....181


180 S.T.,II-II,q. 29, a. 1.

181 Ibid., q. 29, a. 3.
In another text St. Thomas points out that peace is the work of justice indirectly, but of charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature causes peace, since love is a unitive force, as we observed earlier, and as we read in the text:

Peace is the work of justice indirectly, in so far as justice removes the obstacles to peace; but it is the work of charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature, causes peace. For love is a unitive force... and peace is the union of the appetite's inclinations. 182

Thus, in order to achieve true peace, man must love God with his whole heart, "by referring all things to Him, so that all his desires tend to one object" and he must love his neighbor as himself. 183

The perfections of knowledge of which Confucius speaks can never fully satisfy man's heart nor constitute his sumnum bonum, which, according to St. Thomas, consists in the perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good; only the latter unites all one's desires by giving them rest in one object, from which results perfect peace. 184 Virtue is not the last end; rather, it is the way thereto. 185

In the text to follow St. Thomas explains in what sense man's last end is uncreated and in what sense it is created:

[Man's last end is the uncreated good, namely God, who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man's will. But in the second

182 S.T., II-II, q. 29, a. 3 ad 3.
183 Ibid., q. 29, a. 3.
184 Ibid., q. 29, a. 2 ad 4.
185 Ibid., q. 29, a. 4.
way, man’s last end is something created, existing in him, and this is nothing else than the attainment or enjoyment of the last end. Now the last end is called happiness. If, therefore, we consider man’s happiness in its cause or object, then it is something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something created.186

Here St. Thomas is saying that in its cause or object, man’s end is uncreated, but if we consider it as to the very essence of happiness, namely the attainment or enjoyment of the last end, then it is something created. Happiness, then, is the last end of human life, and man is moved towards and approaches the happy end by works of virtue.187 Explaining in what the above referred to happiness consists, St. Thomas says:

As God’s substance is His act, the highest likeness of man to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as we have said above (Q.3, A. 2), happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in an operation.188

To say that an entire empire might become tranquil as a result of the cultivation of the person, appears to be an unjustifiable assumption; however, if all the people of the empire would endeavor to achieve that self-cultivation explained in the doctrine of Confucius, without doubt at least a certain imperfect peace might be attained.

Although the Confucian doctrine regarding self-control, based on self-cultivation, is inadequate due to the failure of Confucius to understand human nature as in fact it is, as also his failure to see it in its

186 S.T., I-II, q. 3, a. 1.
187 Ibid., q. 69, a. 1.
188 Ibid., q. 55, a. 2 ad 3.
essential relationship to God and his lack of a sharp sense of what constitutes evil, Confucius is certainly to be commended for his profound emphasis on learning, his teaching of the scientific method of research to be used in the perfection of knowledge, as also for his great emphasis on the cultivation of sincerity. His emphasis on instruction seems to indicate that he did have some realization of the need of ideals for the practice of self-control. Then, too, instruction of the proper kind does give its recipient a certain "momentum in the right direction." As a result of failing to see human nature in its essential relationships, particularly in its relation to God, and the consequent failure to have any clear concept of evil, the doctrine of Confucius is scarcely fit for purposes of mental and moral discipline. Nevertheless, sincerity, upon which Confucius places such great emphasis, seems very closely allied with truth; it seems to dispose one for the acceptance of truth where found. Here the unforgettable words of Augustine seem to ring in one's ears: "There, where I found truth, I found God!"189

189 St. Augustine, Confessions, X, 24, cited in Morrison, God Is Its Founder, 55.
CHAPTER IV

DUTIES OF PARENTS TOWARDS THEIR CHILDREN

The child, in the Confucian concept of the family, was a sort of a servant of his parents for life, due to an exaggerated notion of parental authority.

By permitting divorce and tolerating concubinage, as we observed earlier in chapter two, Confucius denied the child the right to the "mutual love of his parents;" the child's first need seems to be to have united parents.\(^1\) The child is entitled to have parents who so love each other as to make of this love the foundation of the common life in the home.\(^2\) Where divorce obtains, as in the Confucian theory of marriage, the child remains in the possession of the father, and the mother loses all contact with it. The disorder, confusion, and jealousies which usually result from concubinage prevents the child from having "united parents," that is, the mutual love of his parents.

Confucius fails to give adequate emphasis to the child's right to life as also the consequent right to those things necessary to preserve

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\(^{2}\) Ibid.
that life—food, clothing, shelter and such development for girls as well as for boys, as can be obtained through an education in accordance with their respective needs.

That it is the duty of the parents to love, nourish, guide, protect and educate their children, is the emphatic teaching of St. Thomas, as evident from the text:

Since a father stands in the relation of principle, and his son in the relation of that which is from a principle, it is essentially fitting for a father to support his son; and consequently he is bound to support him not only for a time, but for all his life, and this is to lay by. On the other hand, for the son to bestow something on his father is accidental, arising from some momentary necessity, wherein he is bound to support him, but not to lay by as for a long time beforehand, because naturally parents are not the successors of their children, but children of their parents.³

In the above text St. Thomas points out that it is essential that a father support his son; whereas, it is merely "accidental" for a son to support his father, arising out of some momentary necessity, as we shall see later.

In another text St. Thomas again emphasizes the duties of a father; he says, "...a father is the principle of generation, of education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the perfection of human life...."⁴

Here we will again first consider the doctrine of Confucius; thereafter, that of St. Thomas concerning the duties of parents towards their children.

³ S.T., II-II, q. 101, a. 2 ad 2.
⁴ Ibid., q. 102, a. 1.
Although Confucius counsels that a father be "a loving-guardian," a "hero in his son's eyes," and that he view his son's shortcomings in a charitable manner, now ature does he give adequate emphasis to the positive duties of parents towards their children. In accordance with Confucian thought, girls were considered to be less valuable than boys, and the killing of female infants seems to have been tolerated. Unlike the boys, the girls only relatively infrequently were taught to read.

Confucius reveals the ideal attitude of a father in the words, "as a father he rested in kindness." Fathers were very fond of their sons. In accordance with the Confucian doctrine, it was considered right for a father to conceal the misconduct of his son and for the son to conceal the misconduct of the father. Thus, it seems as though Confucius condones a certain amount of deceitfulness; however, when he says, "A boy should never be permitted to see an instance of deceit," it seems as though he contradicts himself. The inconsistency is apparent.

5 Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 153.


7 Confucius, Great Learning, III, 3, cited in Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 152.


Boys were taught to be filial at home and abroad, respectful to their elders, earnest and truthful; as also to love everyone and to cultivate the friendship of the good. When a boy had time and opportunity, after the performance of these things, he was to employ them in polite studies. The text to follow again points out that deep appreciation of "learning" or of the "things of the mind" which Confucius possessed, which things also constitute the second highest value in a rational value scale: "Hard is the case of him who will stuff himself with food the whole day, without applying the mind to anything."

Confucius teaches that the young should be treated with tenderness.

According to Mencius, the great follower of Confucius, who lived in the fourth century before Christ, a father was to keep a distant reserve towards his son in order to safeguard the latter's reputation. Thus, Mencius insists that the father should not be his son's tutor, for fear that the necessary discipline estrange the father and the son, as evident from the text:


11 Ibid.


14 Ibid., Analects, XVI, c.xiii., v. 5.
"The ancients exchanged sons, and one taught the son of another.

"Between father and son, there should be no reproving admonitions to what is good. Such reproofs lead to alienation, and than alienation there is nothing more inauspicious."15

Although the psychology underlying the above doctrine, (namely, that parents should not set up a negative relationship with their children), seems to be sound, it does not seem to coincide with the sound Thomistic doctrine to the effect that the father has a natural right and duty to administer "corrections", to which we shall refer again later.

The exaggerated notion of parental authority which Confucius apparently had, permitted parents even to choose a mate for their child.16

Although the Chinese girl was brought up with matrimony in view as her goal and trained with an eye to subjection to her husband in the regulation of the family and to obedience to her husband's mother in the home, she was not trained in the rearing of children; she seems to have been left to her own resources, as evident from the text:

If a mother is really anxious to do so, though she may not hit precisely the wants of her child, she will not be far from it. There has never been a girl who learned to bring up a child, that she might afterwards marry."17

Schools were generally considered to be for boys only, and rarely was a tutor employed in the home for girls.

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16 Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 146.

17 Confucius, Great Learning, c. IX, v. 2, cited in Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 143-144.
One of the most distressing customs, if not also shocking to those of us fortunate enough to be reared in a country and civilization in which woman is regarded with respect, is that of selling daughters of poorer families into what is a little better than slavery, or even into prostitution. 18

While Confucius counsels that a rational and harmonious relationship exist between father and son, he does not seem to emphasize sufficiently the duties of parents towards their daughters. Parents have the duty of caring for all of their children, not merely for their sons; they have the duty of providing them with their physical needs as also the necessary education, moral training and religious guidance.

Confucius also failed to realize the value of introducing order and regularity in the child's life by having regular times set aside for the functions of eating, sleeping, playing and working, as evident from the text in which he says, "[C]hildren go earlier to bed, and get up later, according to their pleasure." 19 He asserts that "[T]here is no fixed time for their meals." 20 Regularity in physical habits, such as the ones mentioned above, can, as a result of transfer of training, aid in the building up of good moral habits; it can be helpful in bringing about the regular observance of these latter habits.

18 Latourette, The Chinese, Their History and Culture, 675.
19 Confucius, Li Ki, X, 6, ed. Legge, Sacred Books of the East, 1885, XXVII, 452.
20 Ibid.
As a means of preserving premarital chastity, Confucius recommends a complete separation of the sexes, with the result that the very opposite very frequently obtained.
DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS

In order to be able to make an evaluation of the doctrine of Confucius, we will next examine the doctrine of St. Thomas regarding the duties of parents towards their children, as also Catholic doctrine consistent with that of St. Thomas. St. Thomas teaches that the child has a right to the care of both parents. This is not assured where divorce or concubinage obtains, as they do in the Confucian theory of the family. In the instance of concubinage, the care of the child usually falls exclusively to the mother. Concerning this point St. Thomas says: "The upbringing of a human child requires not only the mother's care for his nourishment, but much more the care of his father as guide and guardian, and under whom he progresses in goods both internal and external." 21

Contrary to the doctrine of Confucius, St. Thomas maintains that it is only "accidental" for a son to bestow something on his father, arising from some momentary necessity, wherein he is bound to support his father but not to lay by as for a long time beforehand, because naturally parents are not the successors of their children, but children of their parents. 22 If a father is poor, St. Thomas says, it is fitting that the children support him. 23 The father, however, is bound to support his son, St. Thomas

21 S.T., II-II, q. 154, a. 2.
22 Ibid., q. 101, a. 2 ad 2.
23 Ibid., q. 101, a. 2.
says, not only for a time, but for all his life; this, he says, is "to lay by." 24

In a rational order of things, a son may be expected to become self-supporting in due time; however, if for any reason he should meet with misfortune or should become a charge on others, that charge falls first of all on the parents. For this reason, St. Thomas adds, a father ought "to lay by," that is, to make provision for any such possible unforeseen future eventualities. A father is bound to support his son if for any reason he is in need of such support, even though the son be fully matured or of age.

The father not only has the right and the duty to provide for the physical needs of the child, but he also has the right and the duty to educate, guide and protect the child. 25

Finally, parents also have the right and the duty of orientating a child properly towards God, as St. Thomas mentions in the text:

"Man is directed to God by his reason, whereby he can know Him. Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the natural order of things, is directed to God by its parents' reason, under whose care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose of the child in all matters relating to God." 26

Speaking more emphatically, St. Thomas says, "...it is the parents duty to look after the salvation of their children, especially before they come to the use of reason." 27

24 S.T., II-II, q. 101, a. 2 ad 2.
25 Ibid., q. 102, a. 1.
26 Ibid., q. 10, a. 12 ad 4.
27 Ibid., q. 10, a. 12 c.
Explaining the rights of parents over their children, as also that moral union which they with their children form, St. Thomas says:

[A] child is by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not distinct from its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its mother's womb: and later on after birth, and before it has the use of its free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is like a spiritual womb,... [A]ccording to the natural law, a son, before coming to the use of reason, is under his father's care. Hence it would be contrary to natural justice, if a child, before coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from its parents' custody, or anything done to it against its parents' wish. As soon, however, as it begins to have the use of its free-will, it begins to belong to itself....

Interpreting this passage of St. Thomas, Le Clercq says:

Just as the child is physically linked to his mother as long as she carries him in her womb, so he is morally linked to his parents as long as he does not have the use of reason. Only by degrees does the child detach himself from his parents. He is, as it were, a portion of themselves who detaches himself little by little until he ends by becoming a distinct entity; but while this evolution remains incomplete he continues in some degree to form part of his parents.

It is therefore right that as long as the child does not have the use of reason, his parents' will should be regarded as his own."29

The authority which parents exercise over the child is essentially a consequence of their duty to raise him.30 The child owes obedience in so far as his education requires it, and only for a time—during the period when he is incapable of managing himself.31 Further, the degree of obedience due will change as the young man grows; it will become zero at the

28 S.T.,II-II, q. 10, a. 12.
29 Le Clercq, Marriage and the Family, 353.
30 Ibid., 354.
31 Ibid.
time of his establishment in a separate residence, and with all the more reason if he marries and founds a household in his turn.32

The child has the right of self-determination; his parents cannot dispose of him to suit themselves, or arrange his marriage or life for him.33 While parents ought not to take the initiative in the matter of choosing a mate for their children, as they did in accordance with the Confucian doctrine, but rather leave that to those about to marry, parents do have a very real responsibility to give their children a real character education that will prepare them to accept and fulfill the duties that will be theirs in marriage. Parents must make home a place where their daughters can welcome and meet enough friends so as to be at ease over their chances of meeting the right men.

As regards their sons, parents have the duty of helping them develop their characters so that they will be good risks in marriage, and have the qualities which a bride has a right to look for in the one who proposes to her. Then, too, parents have the obligation of giving them the guidance they need during their adolescent years. All of this implies that the parents themselves have the proper attitude towards marriage for their child; this attitude can best be gained from a realization of the purpose and need for marriage. Marriage is a necessity for mankind, a necessity arising out of man's nature, and it is willed as such by God, the Author of nature.34

32 Le Clercq, Marriage and the Family, 354.
33 S.T., II-II, q. 104, a. 5.
34 S.T., III, q. 65, a. 1 c.
As a general rule, to which exceptions are always to be found, men and women have a definite need to beget offspring if they are to be at their best and to realize their best. It is in the child that the married couple's unity is realized in an absolute fashion; the child is the couple's unity realized and projected outside themselves. Each spouse redisCOVERs the other in the child, and also finds himself anew; and the desire for offspring is the natural, normal and spontaneous result of love. The child gives greater depth and breadth to married love; he compels the husband and wife to reach beyond themselves, to rise above the sole pursuit of their own contentment by orientating their life toward other beings—toward other beings who at the same time are in a sense themselves, the prolongation of themselves. The child imparts a purpose to life. Thanks to the child, a parent has something that goes on after he is dead. Through the child alone the love union takes on its full value.

Man's development also requires that he transcend and reach out beyond himself by dedicating himself to a task, to an undertaking, to some creative activity external to himself. Man must devote himself with energy to this work, the successful outcome of which affords him a sense of

35 Le Clercq, Marriage and the Family, 10.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
his worth.\textsuperscript{41} To live a self-centered life, to be intent only upon oneself is a degradation for man.\textsuperscript{42}

In addition to having a proper attitude towards marriage, parents ought also to understand the profounder purpose of marriage, which is a certain mutual interior molding, as Pope Pius the X\textsuperscript{1}th, of happy memory, points out in the text:

This outward expression of love in the home demands not only mutual help but must go further, indeed must have its primary purpose that man and wife help each other day by day in forming and perfecting themselves in the interior life; so that through their partnership in life they may advance ever more and more in virtue, and above all that they may grow in true love towards God and their neighbor....

This mutual inward molding of husband and wife, this determined effort to perfect each other, can in a very real sense...be said to be the chief reason and purpose of matrimony, provided matrimony be looked at not in the restricted sense as instituted for the proper conception and education of the child, but more widely as the blending of life as a whole and the mutual interchange and sharing thereof.\textsuperscript{43}

In designating the mutual formation of the spouses, their efforts to perfect each other, as one of the primary causes and reasons for marriage, Pope Pius the X\textsuperscript{1}th is saying in effect that the spouses can in their union make this their chief purpose.\textsuperscript{44} Vermeersch continues his interpretation of the foregoing passage by saying that the community of life between the spouses is providentially directed by God to this last end, which, being the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} Le Clercq, \textit{Marriage and the Family}, 10.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Pius X\textsuperscript{1}th, \textit{Christian Marriage} (\textit{Casti Connubii}), 8.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Vermeersch, \textit{What Is Marriage}? 25.
\end{itemize}
supreme end of man, occupies the first place in the Divine Will.45 This supreme end, however, says Vermeersch, can never justify relations between the spouses which are artificially prevented from resulting in children, not even in cases where motherhood would be fatal to the woman, or would supply none but blighted members to society.46 Such relations are intrinsically vicious, wrong, and the circumstances mentioned, being merely accidental and extrinsic, cannot alter this.47 Besides, such a moral disorder, Vermeersch says, could never conduce to perfection nor even serve the purposes of true love, for true love is partly founded on mutual respect, which moral disorder must necessarily weaken.48

Pius Xith says, further, that matrimonial faith demands that husband and wife be joined in an especially holy and pure love, not as adulterers love each other, but as Christ loved the Church.49 "By this same love", he adds, "it is necessary that all the other rights and duties of the marriage state be regulated so that the words of the Apostle, 'Let the husband render the debt to the wife, and the wife also in like manner to the husband," express not only a law of justice but a norm of charity."50

46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Pius Xith, Christian Marriage, 8.
50 Ibid.
In order, then, to realize the profounder purpose of marriage, parents must see life and "see it whole," that is, in the light of eternity. Viewing life in this manner, they will strive to perfect themselves in their "interior life" to which Pope Pius the X1th refers. Matrimony can be viewed, Pius X1th says, as "the blending of life as a whole and the mutual interchange and sharing thereof." 52

In fulfilling their duty of educating their children and developing their characters, parents would do well to observe the following nine simple rules:

1. Clarify in their own mind what they wish to teach the child.
2. Be consistent in their behavior toward their child.
3. Learn his virtues and his failings.
4. Make sure that all commands given are understood.
5. Permit no questioning of orders given.
6. Make certain that every command given is executed.
7. Avoid threats and bribes.
8. Be courteous in commanding.
9. Do not discourage.

All commands should be reasonable, and unless unavoidable, a child should not be asked to do what will cause him great embarrassment. Often it is better merely to express a preference that a certain action be performed, instead of commanding. 55

51 Pius X1th, Christian Marriage, 8.
52 Ibid.
54 Ibid., 235.
55 Ibid.
A child should be taught to obey because obedience is a virtue and not because he fears the consequences of disobedience. In exceptional cases, however, where a threat is justly made, it should invariably be carried out after an act of disobedience. Unreasonable threats cannot be carried out and should never be made.

Since fear has such detrimental effects on the child, as the child responds to it with a marked responsiveness, it should seldomly be used. Fear reacts on a child in a manner analogous to a drug or dope in that one has to use an increasing amount of it, that is, keep on increasing the dose in order that it take effect. Besides, fear is essentially negative; one uses up a great deal of energy in combating it, which energy is needed to carry on the life processes. When fear is used on a child, the child has very little energy left for living.

Parents must also be careful not to nag by giving too many commands or by repeating a request too often. If the order given is not obeyed at the determined time, the parents ought quietly to punish the child without further ado. This is in accordance with the teachings of St. Thomas, for he definitely maintains that "... a parent can lawfully strike his child

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56 Healy, Marriage Guidance, 235.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Course: "Personality Problems and Mental Health", Chicago, Loyola University, 1947-1948.
60 Healy, Marriage Guidance, 236.
in order that instruction may be enforced by correction. However, to punish a child while in a rage or in a fit of anger, is the height of stupidity and may even do irreparable harm to the child's delicate nervous system.

The rules listed above for the proper rearing of children are consistent with the doctrine of St. Thomas. Those rules must be observed in order to achieve that "perfection of human life" of which perfection St. Thomas names the father as the principle.

Although a child should be reproved for his faults, it is well to call attention frequently to some favorable point in his conduct and to commend him for that, for prudent encouragement serves as a strong stimulus for the child. Corrections as a rule should be given to the child in private, as the child's feelings should be respected. Further, parents ought to adopt a single standard for the child, that is, insist on the same courtesies being shown at home as are desired outside the family circle.

Parents should be alert for signs of a disease of the imagination, especially prevalent during the early years of adolescence, namely, daydreaming. In the daydream control of the imagination is surrendered to

61 S.T., II-II, q. 65, a.2; q. 65 a.2 ad 2.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., q. 102, a. 1.
64 Healy, Marriage Guidance, 237.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Rev. Raphael C. McCarthy, S.J., Training the Adolescent, Chicago,
the guidance of "animal" appetites. A child must also be instructed to the 
effect that he has not the right to follow vividly, even in a daydream, an 
act to which he is not entitled; and that indulgence in unwholesome day-
dreams weakens his ideals, pampers him in his flight from reality, hurts him 
in his dynamic grip on correct principles of conduct, as also delays him in 
his arrival at full maturity. 68 For many adolescents daydreaming constitutes 
a genuine danger since it is so easily indulged in and so personally satisf-
fying. The best preventive against the formation of the habit and the most 
effective means of breaking it is active work, the arousal and fostering of 
wholesome interests, or, briefly, keeping the adolescent busy.69

In the light of the doctrine of St. Thomas regarding the duties of 
parents towards their children, it seems as though the Confucian doctrine 
on this point is inadequate, particularly since Confucius does not give 
adequate emphasis to the duty of parents to care for, nourish, and educate 
their daughters as well as their sons, and since he fails to mention the 
duty of parents to orientate the minds of their children towards God, the 
very cause of their existence.

Confucius also tolerated divorce as a result of which children 
were often deprived of the care and guidance of both parents to which gui-
dance they had a natural right; then, too, in cases where concubinage ob-
tained, which Confucius also tolerated, there the child was left almost ex-
clusively to the care of the mother.

68 Morrison, God Is Its Founder, 115.
69 McCarthy, Training the Adolescent, 42.
While Confucius counsels premarital chastity, he lacks an adequate theory or method for ensuring the same. He recommends a complete separation of the sexes before marriage; thus those about to marry do not even see their future mates until the day of their marriage. Perhaps the best safeguard of premarital chastity is an adequate character education along with the inculcation of sound moral principles and impelling motives for rational conduct. The latter is in accord with a more adequate theory of self-control. The strongest motive that Confucius has to offer is regard for one's parents; this, however, does not seem to be a strong enough motive in all cases and in all circumstances.

In permitting parents to take the initiative in the matter of choosing the life partners for their children, Confucius fails to see a rational limit to parental authority.

Finally, the education which Confucius advocates, with its insistence on the observance of numerous rules of propriety, does not seem to meet the needs of a growing child. Confucius fails to realize, too, that it is the duty of the parents to discipline their children when necessary, and that this duty cannot well be delegated.
CHAPTER V

DUTIES OF CHILDREN TOWARDS THEIR PARENTS

Perhaps the most touching point in the doctrine of Confucius concerning the duties of children towards their parents, is the part referring to the tender regard and solicitude which Confucius taught that children should have for their parents. While one must admit that Confucius has an exaggerated notion of the duties of children towards their parents, the writer thinks that there is much to be gained, particularly in our day of lawlessness and disorder, by a very careful examination of the doctrine of Confucius concerning the child-parent relationship. Points that are not in accord with reason are the Confucian idea of worshipping parents above (if not instead of) God, as also the doctrine of Confucius concerning the observance of such mourning rites as led to a great injury of the mourner’s health.

Some of the important points of the Confucian doctrine concerning the duties of children towards their parents are found in the text:

The superior man while his parents are alive, reverently nourishes them; and when they are dead, reverently sacrifices to them. His chief thought is how, to the end of life, not to disgrace them.\(^1\)

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\(^1\) Confucius, Li Ki, XXI, sect.1, 5, cited in Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 170.
Children were expected to support their parents, as also to have a profound respect and reverence for them. Filial piety, meaning chiefly the duties of children towards their parents, is exalted by Confucianism as one of the cardinal virtues; however, by the term, "filial piety", Confucius implied not only the duties towards the members of one's family, but also the duties towards friends. Briefly, it included the duties of older brothers towards younger brothers, the deference which younger brothers owe to older brothers, the relations between husband and wife, and those between friend and friend.

St. Thomas, like Confucius, teaches us to honor our parents; however, he maintains that it is only "accidental" that children are bound to support their parents, as we know from the text:

Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways, according to their various excellence and the various benefits received from them. On both counts God holds first place, for He is supremely excellent, and is for us the first principle of being and government. In the second place, the principles of our being and government are our parents and our country, that have given us birth and nourishment. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents and his country, after God. Wherefore just as it belongs to religion to give worship to God, so does it belong to piety, in the second place, to give worship to one's parents and one's country.

In the foregoing text St. Thomas says that the duties we owe to parents come second, that is, after those we owe to God; Confucius, however,

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3 Ibid.
4 S.T., II-II, q. 101, a. 1.
places the duties we have towards our parents above those we owe to God. The meaning of the above text as also of the one to follow will be clarified in the second part of this chapter.

St. Thomas very definitely says, in the text to follow, that it is only "accidental" that children are bound to support their parents, that is, if they are ill or poor and in need of the children's support:

We owe something to our parents in two ways: that is to say, both essentially, and accidentally. We owe them essentially that which is due a father as such, and since he is his son's superior through being the principle of his being, the latter owes him reverence and service. Accidentally, that is due a father, which it befits him to receive in respect of something accidental to him, for instance, if he be ill, it is fitting that his children should visit him and see to his cure; if he be poor, it is fitting that they should support him;...

For St. Thomas, piety includes both duty and homage, duty referring to service, and homage to reverence or honor. Giving Our Lord's interpretation of honor, St. Thomas says it includes whatever support we owe our parents.

Gratitude for the gift of life seems to be the motive for filial piety in the Confucian doctrine, as evident from the text:

Our bodies, to every hair and shred of skin, are received from our parents. We must not presume to injure or to wound them. This is the beginning of filial piety. When we have established our character by the practice of this filial course, so as to make our name famous in future ages and thereby glorify our parents, this is the end of filial piety."

5 S.T., II-II, q. 101, a. 1.
6 Ibid., q. 101, a. 2 ad 1, citing Matt. XV. 3-6.
The piety of the ancient Chinese did not solely or even primarily consist in sacrifices to the spirits of the dead. It also called for the greatest reverence and devotion while the parent is yet living. Its most important phase was the obligation it imposed to live an honorable and creditable life, that the parents might not have occasion to blush for their offspring. This feature cannot be overemphasized, since it is the chief sanction for ethical conduct, according to the morals of Confucius, aside from the ambition to become a superior human being as an end in, and of, itself. In the "Li Ki" this view is ascribed directly to Confucius, in the words:

I heard from Tsang-Tsze that he had heard the Master say that of all that Heaven produces and Earth nourishes there is none so great as man. His parents give birth to his person all complete and to return it to them complete may be called filial duty.

Filial piety as a motive for desirable conduct is inculcated frequently, as evident from such texts as:

The superior man's respect extends to all. It is at its greatest when he respects himself. He is but an outgrowth from his parents; dare he do otherwise than to preserve his self-respect? If he cannot respect himself, he injures them.

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9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
12 Ibid., Li Ki, XXIV., 12.
The following text points out the many duties implied in the Confucian concept of filial piety:

The body is that which has been transmitted to us by our parents; dare anyone allow himself to be irreverent in the employment of their legacy? If a man in his own house and privacy be not grave, he is not filial; if in serving his ruler he be not loyal, he is not filial; if in discharging the duties of office he be not sincere, he is not filial. If he fail in these five things, the evil will reach his parents; dare he then do otherwise than reverently attend to them?13

Filial piety, then, according to Confucius, demands that one have a certain self-respect, that he be grave in his manner, loyal to superiors, sincere in his work and brave in battle. Here again Confucius emphasizes sincerity which seems to be the keynote of all his writings.

In the following passage from the "Li Ki" one can observe just how filial piety operates as a motive of well-doing as also the inspiration it affords:

The superior man, going back to his ancient fathers and returning to the authors of his being, does not forget those to whom he owes his life; and therefore he calls forth all his reverence, gives full vent to his feelings, and exhausts his strength in discharging this service—as a tribute of gratitude to his parents he dares not but do his utmost.14

Here we also have evidence of the fact that fear of offending parents rather than the filial fear of offending an Almighty and Good God, seemed to be the strongest motive that Confucius had for righteousness.


The greatest possible offence that one could commit, according to the mind of Confucius, was an offense against filial piety, as evident from the text: "There are three thousand offenses against which the five punishments are directed; there is none of them greater than to be unfilial."\(^{15}\)

The following dialogue indicates very clearly that Confucius places allegiance to parents above everything else, even above allegiance to God:

The disciple Tsang said, "I venture to ask whether in the virtue of the sages there was not something greater than filial piety?" The Master replied, "Of all creatures produced by Heaven and Earth, Man is the noblest. Of all man's actions there is none greater than filial piety."\(^{16}\)

In the mind of Confucius there are three degrees of filial piety; the highest is being a credit to our parents; the next is not disgracing them; and the lowest is merely being able to support them.\(^{17}\)

The nature of filial piety towards living parents is further explained in the words:

He [a son] should not forget his parents in the utterance of a single word and therefore an evil word will not issue from his mouth and an angry word will not react upon himself. Not to disgrace himself and not to cause shame to his parents may be called filial duty.\(^{18}\)

The constant remembrance of parents, which filial piety, according

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16 Ibid., Hsiao King, C.IX.


to Confucius, implies, is analogous to that mindfulness of God which St. Thomas would have us have in all that we do, directing all our actions to Him, our last end.

Confucius goes so far as to say that, "While his parents are alive, a son should not dare to consider his wealth his own nor hold it for his own use only." 19 Even for the lowest order or degree of filial piety Confucius commands the sacrifice of personal comforts as necessary; 20 besides this, he also demands reverence, love and obedience, in order that there might truly be a sentiment of pious regard and not a mere counterfeit of it. 21

According to the mind of Confucius, filial piety is more than just relieving elders of burdensome duties, or of setting wine and food before one's elders, if one has those things available. 22 He criticized those of his day who thought that filial piety meant only the support of one's parents. 23 He points out that dogs and horses are also able to do something in the way of support, and that without reverence, there is nothing to distinguish the one from the other. 24


21 Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 160-161.


Confucius also points out that there are times when mere obedience and respect are not enough, as when there is unrighteous conduct on the part of parents. In that event, Confucius insists that a son do not refrain from remonstrating with his father. 25 The rule to be observed in the matter is given in the text:

In serving his parents, a son may remonstrate with them, but gently; when he sees that they are not disposed to acquiesce, he should show increased reverence but not give up; and, should they punish him, he ought not to murmur.

Thus a son should not carry his remonstrance to excess, and he must constantly maintain a reverent attitude towards his parents.

There were five things which were commonly recognized as being unfilial: first, laziness about employing legs and arms, resulting in failure to support parents; secondly, gambling and chess-playing and fondness for wine, with the same result; thirdly, prizing goods and money and selfish devotion to wife and children, with the same result; fourthly, giving way to the temptations that assail one's eyes and ears, thus bringing his parents to shame; and fifth, reckless bravery, fighting and quarrelling, endangering thereby the happiness and the support of one's parents. 27 All of these things mentioned hinder the support of the parents and may possibly cause them grief.

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26 Confucius, Analects, IV,c.xviii, cited in Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 162.
Mencius, the great follower of Confucius, says there are three things which are unfilial, and to have no posterity is the greatest of them. In accordance with this ethical principle, early marriages became the custom; the average age for marriage varied from seventeen and a half to twenty years. In order that the family honor be maintained and parents be assured of a continuation of the line and of proper honor to themselves after death, there was much social pressure for male progeny.

As a motive for charity towards a younger brother, regard for the toil of parents in bringing up their children is emphasized in the "Shu King."

Filial piety is also the root of other virtues, as evident from the following text replete with a certain amount of spiritual wisdom:

He who serves his parents, in a high situation will be free from pride; in a low situation, will be free from insubordination; and, among his equals, will not be quarrelsome.

Confucius observes that a son has joy because his parents are still with him, but at the same time he has fear that he will not long have them; this thought is expressed in the words: "The ages of parents may by no means not be kept in the memory, as an occasion at once for joy and for fear."
In order that a son be available in the hour of need, Confucius commands that, "While his parents are living, a son must not go abroad to a distance; or, if he should do so, he must have a fixed place to which he goes."33

According to the testimony of a noted historian,34 sons took seriously their duty of supporting their parents; in times of adversity it was by no means an uncommon sight to see a humble peasant, a famine refugee, carrying an aged father or mother on his back, "wandering from Hsien to Hsien in search of food."35

The tenderness with which parents were to be treated can be gathered from certain other rules of propriety which were to be followed in the fulfillment of the duties of filial piety. In accordance with these rules, when one went to take counsel with an elder one had to carry a stool and a staff with him for the elder's use.36 Also, before replying to a question asked by an elder, one had to acknowledge his incompetency and endeavor to decline answering.37 In winter sons were to warm the bed for their parents, and in summer they were expected to cool it.38 In the even-

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34 Latourette, The Chinese, 675.
35 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
ing they were to adjust everything for their repose, and in the morning inquire about their health. 39 Wives of the son were expected to serve their parents-in-law as they served their own. 40 They were to go before or follow after their parents when they left or entered the apartment. 41 They were to ask them whether they wanted anything, and then respectfully bring it. 42 All were to aim at making their parents feel at ease. 43 Confucius also laid down detailed rules to be followed in the preparation of foods and in serving the same to parents. At dawn the son, even after having received an official appointment, was to pay his respects to his father and express his affection by the offer of pleasant delicacies; at sundown, the son was expected to pay his evening visit in the same manner.

In the foregoing, as also in the text to follow, we have evidence of that lifelong devotion to parents which is characteristic of the Confucian ideal of filial piety. Apparently commenting on this point, Le Clercq says: "...In China, especially, children were bound to obedience throughout their entire life. Not even marriage emancipated the son; nay more, his wife fell under the authority of his father..." 44


41 Ibid., Confucius, Li Ki, sect. I, Bk. X, 4.

42 Ibid., 451.

43 Ibid.

44 LeClercq, Marriage and the Family, 365-366.
The profound reverence which children were to have for their parents, analogous to that which in a rational scheme of things one should have for God and the things pertaining to Divine worship, is suggested by the text:

(Sons and their wives) should not move the...fine mats,...pillows, and(other belongings) of their parents; they should reverently regard their staffs and shoes, but not presume to approach them; they should not presume to use their vessels for grain, liquor, and water....

Then, from the text to follow one can gain an insight into the family discipline:

While the parents are both alive, at their regular meals, morning and evening, the (eldest) son and his wife will encourage them to eat everything, and what is left after all, they will themselves eat. When the father is dead, and the mother still alive, the eldest son should wait upon her at her meals; and the wives of the other sons will do with what is left as in the former case. The children should have the sweet, soft, and unctuous things that are left.

The children's diet apparently did not receive adequate attention, since their diet consisted only of leftover "sweets," according to the above text.

Confucius inculcates prompt obedience in the text: "Sons and sons' wives, who are filial and reverential, when they receive an order from their parents should not refuse, nor be dilatory, to execute it."
In the following text one can observe certain extreme views which Confucius held regarding parental authority and the duties of filial piety:

When sons and their wives have not been filial and reverential, (the parents) should be angry with them. If that anger do no good, they can then drive out the son, and send the wife away, yet not publicly showing why they have so treated them.

If a parent have a fault, (the son) should with bated breath, and bland aspect, and gentle voice, admonish him. If the admonition do not take effect, he will be the more reverential and the more filial; and when the father seems pleased, he will repeat the admonition. If he should be displeased with this, rather than allow him to commit an offense against anyone in the neighborhood or countryside, (the son) should strongly remonstrate. If the parent be angry and (more) displeased, and beat him till the blood flows, he should not presume to be angry and resentful, but be (still) more reverential and more filial.

If parents have a boy born (to the father) by a handmaid, or the son or grandson of one of his concubines, of whom they are very fond, their sons should after their death, not allow their regard for him to decay so long as they live.

If a son have two concubines, one of whom is loved by his parents, while he himself loves the other, yet he should not dare to make this one equal to the former whom his parents love, in dress, or food, or the duties which she discharges, nor should he lessen his attentions to her after their death. If he very much approves of his wife, and his parents do not like her, he should divorce her.

The position of the wife, as indicated in the above text, certainly appears deplorable to Western readers. The "wife's want of accordance with her husband's parents" is the first of the several grounds of divorce that Confucius mentions. Apparently Confucius approved of parental interference with the married lives of their children in a manner which is

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49 Elder Tai, Record of Rites, Bk. lxxx, cited in Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 150.
contrary to right reason and the natural order of things. At times the perpetuity of the marriage contract, or at least the fulfillment thereof, was made to depend solely on the changeable whims, feelings and fancies of parents.

In the Chinese family, authority always resided in "the elder", that is, the husband's father if living; otherwise, his mother. Even the wives were to ask for and receive directions from the mother-in-law; they scarcely had any liberty whatsoever to live their own lives as they chose; wives did not even have the liberty to come and go from their own apartments without the permission of her parents-in-law. It is difficult to see how human nature could endure such tyranny, without rebelling. Children, though married, were not free to develop their adult personalities.

That "filial piety" also implied certain observances after the death of parents is evident from the texts: "Filial piety is seen in the skilful carrying out of the wishes of our forefathers and the skilful carrying forward of their undertakings." 

In another text Confucius points to the duty of being attentive to a father's wishes while living, and to follow his example after he is dead; Confucius says: "While a man's father is alive, look at the bent of his will; when his father is dead, look at his conduct. If for three years he does not alter from the way of his father, he may be called filial."

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50 Muller, Sacred Books of the East, 1885, XXVII, 457-458.
51 Confucius, Doctrine of the Mean, C. XIX., V. 2, cited in Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 165-166.
52 Confucius, Analects, Bk.I, c.xi, cited in Dawson, Ethics, 166.
Here, again, we observe that Confucius thought children owed their parents obedience all their life-long.

Confucius also maintained that a son had the duty, never to be shirked, of avenging his father if slain by the hand of an enemy.\textsuperscript{53} If the execution of the criminal law did this, well and good; but if not, the responsibility rested with the son.\textsuperscript{54}

Otherwise, the immediate duty of the son was fully performed by his grief, by proper burial, and the prescribed period of retirement and mourning, as indicated in the "Hsi\'ao King": "The services of love and reverence to parents when alive, and those of grief and sorrow for them when dead—these completely discharge the duty of living men."\textsuperscript{55}

While the period of mourning for a father had been fixed at three years—interpreted as twenty-seven months—before the time of Confucius, Confucius seems to approve of the same period of time as evident from his statement: "It is not till a child is three years old that it is allowed to leave the arms of its parents. And three years' mourning is universally observed throughout the empire."\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{53} Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 167.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{55} Confucius, Hsiao King, C. XVIII, cited in Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 167-168.

\textsuperscript{56} Confucius, Analects, XVII, c. xxi., v. 6, cited in Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 168.
During this period of mourning the son, if he can afford it, lives retired from the world, leaves the management of his affairs to others and abandons himself to meditation, spiritual communion with the departed, and grief. 57 At this time he utterly eschews every alleviation of his sorrow, including very particularly the solace of music. 58 Needless to say, this is scarcely in accord with a rational view of life and death.

The extreme practices observed by a son at the death of a father, for example, included the abstinence from food for three days, with the result that his health was injured. 59 Neighbors would prepare for him gruel and rice-water, which were his only meat and drink. 60 On the third day, at the moving of the corpse, the son would wail and leap, times without number. 61 He would sleep on the rushes, with a clod for his pillow, lamenting that his parent was in the ground. 62 He wailed and wept, without regard to time; he endured the toil and grief for three years. 63

Confucius seemed to think that men best revealed their characters on the occasion of their mourning for their parents after their death; 64

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57 Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 168-169.
58 Ibid., 169.
60 Ibid.
61 Confucius, Li Ki, XXXII, 3, Ibid., 377.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
however, in a more rational view of life, it seems as though men show best
"what is in them" by their conduct towards their parents while they are
still alive.

The greatest of all filial obligations to deceased parents is
creditable conduct, for by that only can their son worthily represent what
they have sought to accomplish in the world through him.65 The importance
of this phase of the Confucian conception of filial piety derives from the
fact that it is the sanction most relied upon to enforce all the unjunctions,
whether directly regarding self-development or its concomitant essential,
propriety in relations with other human beings.66 This devotion both to
living and to departed parents—the so-called ancestor worship of the Chin­
ese—scarcely extends beyond three generations in any case; and as regards
the lowly, not beyond one. It is the chief incentive, other than self-re­
spect and the innate desire to grow and to become and to be a superior human
being, to which Confucius appeals.67

Perhaps the best words expressing the tender solicitude of Chinese
children for their parents are contained in these memorable lines from the
"Shi King", "The Book of Odes":

"When early dawn unseals my eyes,
before my mind my parents rise."68

65 Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 169.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., 169-170.
68 Confucius, Shi King, The Book of Odes, Minor Odes, Decade V.,
Ode 2, quoted also in the Li Ki, bk.xxi, sect.1,7,cited in Dawson, Ethics of
Confucius, 171.
DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS

On certain points one can observe a similarity between the doctrine of Confucius and that of St. Thomas regarding the duties of children towards their parents, yet there are also very marked differences, due primarily to the fact that St. Thomas sees human nature in its essential relationships, that is, in its proper orientation towards God. This orientation towards God seems utterly lacking in the doctrine of Confucius. As a result of this difference of a point of view, one finds a profound difference in the motive for the performance of the duties of filial piety, as also a great difference in loyalties. Confucius places allegiance to parents above every other allegiance, even that which one owes to God, as evident from his words: "Of all man's actions there is none greater than filial piety." 69 St. Thomas, on the contrary, places allegiance to God above every other loyalty; this is observable throughout almost all of his writings.

The motive which Confucius presents for the fulfillment of the duties of filial piety, is that of gratitude for the benefits received from parents; he fails to see the added, if not a more important one, derived from the fact that a father is analogous to the divine power from which all things derive their being, as St. Thomas explains in the text:

69 Confucius, Hsiao King, C. IX, cited in Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 159.
The prince is compared to the father as a universal to a particular power, as regards external government, but not as regards the father being a principle of generation: for in this way the father should be compared with the divine power from which all things derive their being. 70

The mutual duties of parents and children are emphasized in the text:

As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i. 32) God loves us for our good and for His honor. Wherefore since our father is related to us as principle, even as God is, it belongs properly to the father to receive honor from his children, and to the children to be provided by their parents with what is good for them. Nevertheless in cases of necessity the child is bound out of the favors received to provide for his parents before all. 71

From the above text we know that children have the duty of honoring their parents, and in cases of necessity they must provide for their parents before anyone else. Children owe their parents love, reverence and obedience on account of the special relationship in which parents stand towards them. 72

St. Thomas teaches that there must be a special virtue which regulates the mutual obligations of parent and child; it is called piety. 73 It regulates not only the mutual offices of parents and children towards each other, but also our duty to other near relatives, and to our country

70 S.T., II-II, q. 102, a. 3 ad 1.
71 Ibid., q. 101 a. 1 c.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
and fellow-countrymen. 75 Although it is a virtue similar to charity, it binds more strictly, so that while charity prescribes a general love for all mankind, piety obliges us to a special love for those who are near to us, and for the country in which we were born, 76 as observable in the text from St. Thomas quoted above. 77

While the obligations which children have to love and reverence their parents are permanent and last as long as life, the obligation of obedience ceases with their emancipation. 78 As soon as they have attained the age of puberty they are independent of their parents in what concerns the salvation of their souls and the choice of a state of life. 79

The triple obligation of children towards their parents, as also that of parents towards their children, are explained in the text:

Quoniam triplex respectum habent parentes ad filios, nempe ratione causae, ratione praeseminentiae, et ratione regiminis, tria sunt officia, quae filii præstare debent parentibus titulo piétatis, salicet amorem, reverentiam et obedientiam. Quare amare eos debent ut suæ existentiae actores, reverendi ut superiores, eisque tanquam rectóribus a Deo delegatis obedire.—Igitur:

Filii parentes amare debent amore tum interno, ipsos pio et benevolo cordis affectu prosequentes; tum externo, omne malum et injuriam ab ipsis propulsantes, necnon externæ benevolentiae signa iis exhibentes, iisque in necessitate constitutis pro facultate subvientes. 80

75 Slater, Manual of Moral Theology, I, 270.
76 Ibid.
77 Supra, 203; S.T., II-II, q. 101, a. 1.
78 Slater, Manual of Moral Theology, 271.
79 Ibid.
From the foregoing text we know that, in addition to love, reverence and obedience, parents also have a right to their children's internal affections. This is explained further in the words: "Filii exhibere debent parentibus reverentiam, tum internam tum externam, debent scilicet eos agnosere et tum verbis tum factis tractare ut superiores; etenim sunt tales designati ab ipsa natura."

St. Thomas emphatically teaches that it is the duty of the parents to provide for their children; as a consequence of this duty, they (meaning more especially the father) have a right to a living wage so that they can fulfill this duty which nature imposes upon them.

After pointing out that God is the first principle of our being and government, St. Thomas adds that, "[In the second place, the principle of our being and government are our parents and our country, that have given us birth and nourishment. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents and his country, after God."82

There is a probability that Confucius realized that God, in addition to parents, is a principle of our being; however, even if he realized this, his concept of God is somewhat different from that of St. Thomas. He did not seem to know a "Personal God", "the Creator of all existence" and "the ultimate Consummator of the history of the world."83 The idea that


82 S.T., II-II, q. 101, a. 1 c.

83 Pope Pius Xith, Mit Brenneder Sorge, (Germany and the Church), New York, 1937, 4.
Confucius might have had an insight or an understanding of God's part in
the creation of new human beings, is suggested by such texts as:

I heard from Tsang-Tsze that he had heard the Master say that of
all that Heaven produces and Earth nourishes there is none so great as
man. His parents give birth to his person all complete and to return
it to them complete may be called filial duty.84

Some commentators say that by "Heaven", used in the above text,
Confucius means God; however, even if by the term "Heaven", Confucius means
God, his concept of Him is not that of a "Personal God" but rather of a
certain "purposeful force."

A point which St. Thomas repeatedly emphasizes is the fact that
children owe more to their parents than to anyone else on earth, and that
they must love and honor them even more than certain virtuous persons who,
considered in themselves, are more worthy of honor, as he explains in the
text:

The rendering of honor or worship should be proportionate to the
person to whom it is paid not only as considered in himself, but also
as compared to those who pay them. Wherefore, though virtuous persons,
considered in themselves, are more worthy of honor than the persons of
one's parents, yet children are under a greater obligation, on account
of the benefits they have received from their parents and their natural
kinship with them, to pay worship and honor to their parents than to
virtuous persons who are not of their kindred.86

84 Confucius, Li Ki, XXI, sect. ii., 14, cited in Dawson, Ethics
85 Yu-Lan Feng, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, New York,
1948, 45.
86 S.T.,II-II, q. 102, a. 3 ad 3.
St. Thomas places great emphasis on the honor due to parents in certain texts which appear in his discussion of the matter of derision. After saying that it is a grievous sin to deride God and the things of God, St. Thomas says next to that comes the derision of one's parents. According to him, it is a grievous sin to deride God and the things of God. Afterwards, he states that "When the eye that mocketh at his father, and that despiseth the labor of his mother in bearing him, let the ravens of the brooks pick it out, and the young eagles eat it." 88

In another text St. Thomas says the following emphatic words: "He that curseth his father, or mother, dying let him die." 89

The parents' right to honor and affection, as also the child's right to parental influence and care, are again stressed in the text:

The debt due a principle is submission of respect and honor, whereas, that due to the effect is one of influence and care. Hence the duty of children to their parents consists chiefly in honor; while that of parents to their children is especially one of care. 90

Both Confucius and St. Thomas inculcate obedience to parents; however, Confucius seems to think that children owe obedience to their parents all their life long; whereas, St. Thomas holds a contrary view. St. Thomas grants that a child, before it has the use of reason, is completely under the care of his parents 91 and that their will is to be accepted by the child as its own. 92 Later the child owes his parents less and less obedience,

87 S.T., II-II, q. 75, a. 2.
88 Ibid., citing Prov. xxx, 17.
89 S.T., II-II, q. 76, a. 3.
90 Ibid., q. 26, a. 9, ad 1.
91 Ibid., q. 10, a. 12.
92 LeClercq, Marriage and the Family, 353.
according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, that is, only in so far as his education requires it. 93 St. Thomas does not maintain that the child owes his parents obedience all his life, that is, after he is married or emancipated, unless he should still be residing under the roof of his parents. Even in this latter instance, parental authority is limited, as pointed out earlier.

St. Thomas' doctrine may be further clarified by the text:

[A] child is by nature part of its father: thus, at first it is not distinct from its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its mother's womb; and later on after birth, and before it has the use of its free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is like a spiritual womb. According to the natural law, a son, before coming to the use of reason, is under his father's care. Hence it would be contrary to natural justice, if a child, before coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from its parents' custody, or anything done to it against its parents' wish. As soon, however, as it begins to have the use of its free-will, it begins to belong to itself, and is able to look after itself.... 94

Before a child has the use of reason, it is rational that his parents' will be regarded as his own; however, to say that children owe their parents obedience all their life long, is not in accordance with right reason. Children owe their parents obedience in so far as their education requires it, 95 as explained in the text: "Filii parentibus obedientiam praestare debent in omnibus lictis et honestis ad eorum educationem pertinentibus, dum sub eorum potestate versantur. 96

93 Le Clercq, Marriage and the Family, 353.
94 S.T.,II-II, q. 10, a. 12.
95 Le Clercq, Marriage and the Family, 353.
Children attain the age of reason when they are able to grasp the bearing of their acts. Nature bestows on the child a right to dispose of himself, and this right progressively develops as he advances in age. The child has the right to dispose of himself; his parents cannot dispose of him to suit themselves, or arrange his life for him.

Maintaining that a man's soul is his own, St. Thomas says, "in matters touching the internal movement of the will man is not bound to obey his fellow-man, but God alone." Then, explaining further the matters in which one man can have authority over another, St. Thomas says:

[Man is bound to obey his fellow-man in things that have to be done externally by means of the body: and yet, since by nature all men are equal, he is not bound to obey another man in matters touching the nature of the body, for instance in those relating to the support of his body, or the begetting of his children. Wherefore servants are not bound to obey their masters, nor children their parents, in the question of contracting marriage or of remaining in the state of virginity or the like. But in matters concerning the disposal of actions and human affairs, a subject is bound to obey his superior within the sphere of his authority; for instance a soldier must obey his general in matters relating to war, a servant his master in matters touching the execution of the duties of his service, a son his father in matters relating to the conduct of his life and the care of the household; and so forth.]

Unlike Confucius, St. Thomas holds that a child has the right to self-determination. In accordance with the Confucian doctrine, it was a

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98 Ibid., 356.
99 Ibid.
100 S.T., II-II, q. 104, a. 5 c.
101 Ibid.
duty of filial piety to marry, since to have no posterity was considered to be the greatest offense against filial piety. 103 This made it practically impossible, morally speaking, for a child to remain in the state of virginity, if he so desired, or even to become a priest. St. Thomas maintains that a child is bound to obey his parents "in matters relating to the conduct of his life and the care of the household," as pointed out above. 104 It is also in accordance with his doctrine that a child, even though married or emancipated, obey his parents, in those matters in which parents have a right to command him, for as long a time as he remains under the roof of his parents. 105

While a consideration of the doctrine of Confucius might well serve as an antidote for the disrespect so frequently shown parents today, there are certain extremes in the doctrine of Confucius that are certainly to be condemned, for example, the worshipping of parents as though they themselves were God, the irrational elements in the mourning rites taught by Confucius which led to a great injury of health, and the idea of almost unlimited parental authority. Only God has authority over life and death; parents are usurping His authority in doing away with their female infants.


104 S.T., II-II, q. 104, a. 5.

105 Le Clercq, Marriage and the Family, 357.
In a rational view of life, parents have no right to interfere with the lives of their married children, as Confucius seemed to permit them. Then, too, such interferences no doubt were fostered by the closeness of the living quarters among the Chinese. According to their custom, the married sons with their wives continued to live under the parental roof. As a result of parental domination, the adult and matured children were not free to develop their adult personalities.

The tender solicitude of children for parents, which Confucius taught in his doctrine on filial piety, to a certain extent is certainly to be commended, not, of course, the extreme manifestations thereof which led to the neglect of other duties, for example the adequate nourishment of the children, or the proper care for the wife. The removal of the burdens from the shoulders of parents, in so far as is reasonably possible, is certainly praiseworthy, as also the ideals of self-respect, loyalty, sincerity and courage which were promoted by filial piety.

Confucius seemed to think that the support of parents by their children was absolutely essential; whereas, St. Thomas says very clearly that it is only "accidental" that children are bound to support their parents, due to some momentary necessity. According to the mind of Confucius, the main purpose which children had in living was to support their parents, regardless of their circumstances. St. Thomas strongly emphasizes the duty of parents to provide for their children, as observed earlier.106

106 Cf. supra, 184; S.T.,II-II, q. 26, a. 9 ad 3.
As St. Thomas views man in his essential relationships, including his relationship to God, he is able to view parents and the duties of children towards them in their proper perspective. For him, God and the duties which man has towards Him come first, while the duties towards parents are only secondary, though also very important. Instead of recommending a constant remembrance of parents, or a recollection of them, St. Thomas would have us ever be mindful of God, Who is man's last end, in all that we do.

St. Thomas also recognizes a rational limit to parental authority, which allows children to develop their adult personalities. Rather than approve of irrational carrying-ons at the death of parents, St. Thomas counsels burial for the dead,107 as also prayer, asking for help from God.108

That parents are to be honored, is the constant teaching of St. Thomas; in fact, he says that children owe more to their parents than to anyone else in the world, regardless of how virtuous and otherwise worthy of honor other persons may be. St. Thomas condemns in no uncertain terms those who do not show due honor towards their parents.109

Perhaps the reason why Confucius felt the need of insisting that children support their parents, was that poverty seemed to have been a constant condition or circumstance of parents in China. The custom of early

107 S.T., II-II, q. 32, a. 2 ad 1.
108 Ibid., q. 32, a. 2 c.
109 Ibid., q. 75, a. 2.
marriages, even before young people were economically ready to set up a family, no doubt contributed to this condition of poverty. The idea that it was the greatest offense against filial piety not to have posterity, was a determining factor leading to early marriages. Poverty was the usual concomitant. Some are of the opinion that the reason for such great poverty in China is that the Chinese, as a consequent of being influenced by Confucian ways of thinking, have grown accustomed to thinking in static terms; they think in terms of Confucian thought, and, unfortunately, Confucianism has no methodology for change.\(^{110}\) If in the Confucian thought provision were made for change, the Chinese people would sooner be ready to adopt more modern methods of production, for example, and as a result would produce and manufacture on a much larger scale, and thus alleviate the condition of poverty and famine so widespread in China.

As a result of being influenced by Confucian thought, the Chinese people look backward to their ancestors and their primitive methods of doing things, rather than forward. However, a gradual evolution is under way in China, particularly since 1912. The Chinese are gradually being influenced more and more by Western ideas; they are experiencing the impact of the latter, especially as a result of World War II, and no doubt, also as a result of the conflict now raging at the time of this writing.

While certain things in the Confucian doctrine are to be condemned, there are many edifying, noble and inspiring ideals expressed therein.

The following poetic lines, expressing best the thoughtfulness of parents which Confucius taught children should have, are truly filled with inspiration:

When early dawn unseals my eyes,
before my mind my parents rise.

111 Confucius, Shi King, Minor Odes, Decade v., Ode 2; Li Ki, XXI., sect. i., 7, cited in Dawson, Ethics of Confucius, 171.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In our evaluation of the doctrine of Confucius concerning marriage and the family in the light of rational principles governing the same, particularly as enunciated in the writings of St. Thomas, we observe that Confucius had a distorted view of marriage and the family due to his doctrine on ancestor worship and his failure to see human nature in its essential relationships, particularly as related to God. Confucius seemed to think that the only purpose for the lives of children was to carry on the ancestral rites; he failed to see that the purpose of man's life was to worship God, thus to attain to the possession of Him, from which happiness results.

Secondly, the doctrine of Confucius regarding marriage scarcely seems rational for the reason that he fails to make the properties of unity and indissolubility essential, or even necessary, to the marriage contract.

Unity and indissolubility are properties essential to marriage, whether Christian or non-Christian, ever since Christ restored the original idea of marriage with its essential properties of unity and indissolubility. In restoring the original idea of marriage, Christ abrogated all dispensa-

1 Matth. 19:4-9; cf. supra, 93; Augustine, Commentary on the New Code of Canon Law, V, 17; Bouscaren, What is Marriage?, 12; and 25.
Now St. Thomas definitely holds that the properties of unity and indissolubility are essential to Christian marriage; however, his position regarding non-Christian marriages is not so clear. He does seem to say consistently that the above named properties are at least necessary for the realization of the purposes of marriage, but in regard to non-Christian marriages, he does not say that those properties are essential. His failure to hold these properties essential to every true marriage, is very difficult to understand. He certainly seems to be in possession of the Christian revelation, (if anyone was), and yet on this point he almost seems to philosophize as though no such revelation had occurred. According to Gilson, when one is in possession of that revelation, one can no longer philosophize as though he had never heard of it.

The writer is led to think that either the writings concerning the properties of marriage, appearing in the Supplement part of the Summa Theologica, (compiled by a friend after St. Thomas' death), do not represent accurately the thought of St. Thomas; or St. Thomas was inconsistent in his treatment of the properties of marriage, since in one question in the Supplement he apparently regards the properties of unity and indissolubility so

3 S.T., III Suppl., q. 49, a. 3; cf. supra, 89-90.
4 Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, 5.
necessary to marriage that they could only be a matter for dispensation in virtue of a Divine cause, that is, a Divine dispensation. Then, in two passages in the second question thereafter St. Thomas seems to say that since indissolubility is contrary not to the primary but to the secondary precepts of the natural law, it could be a matter of dispensation "even in the first way," implying no Divine dispensation. The inconsistency is apparent; in one instance St. Thomas is saying that an exception to the properties of unity and indissolubility "was never lawful without a Divine dispensation," then soon thereafter he says that "seemingly" indissolubility could be a matter of dispensation even without the concurrence of a cause altogether Supernatural.

According to an editor's note, it is probable that Fra Rainaldo da Piperno, the friend of St. Thomas who compiled the Supplement part of the Summa Theologica after the latter's death, "was badly acquainted" with the rest of the Summa Theologica. However, assuming that the Supplement does represent accurately the thought of St. Thomas, we observe that even the language in the above referred to difficult passage suggests that St. Thomas is speaking by way of "conjecture" and not with certainty, and that he is walking on insecure ground. The word suggestive of a mere conjecture, is

5 S.T., III Suppl., q. 65, a. 2 ad 2; cf. supra, 96.
6 Ibid., q. 67, a. 2, cf. supra, 99.
7 Ibid., q. 65, a. 2 ad 2.
8 Ibid., q. 67, a. 8.
9 S.T., III Suppl., 'Editor's Note', 2573.
"seemingly."\textsuperscript{10} In this passage concerning dispensations, after observing that divorce is contrary only to the secondary precepts of the natural law, and not contrary to the first, St. Thomas says: "...seemingly, it [indissolubility] can be a matter of dispensation even in the first way."\textsuperscript{11} The "first way" which he explains in the beginning of the same passage, implies the operation of "some natural cause whereby another natural cause is hindered from following its course," and, he adds, "it is thus in all things that happen by chance less frequently in nature."\textsuperscript{12} The meaning of this passage is also somewhat obscure. The second way, to which St. Thomas refers, is one in which "a cause altogether supernatural, as in the case of miracles\textsuperscript{13} ...." is operative. Such a cause was operative in the event of polygyny and divorce being permitted in the Old Testament in virtue of a Divine dispensation. A similar cause is operative in the event of the dissolution of a marriage bond by Papal authority, as is possible in certain cases of non-consummated Christian marriages and in certain non-Christian marriages. When the Pope acts to dissolve a marriage bond, he does so in virtue of the Divine authority vested in him. Also in the application of the Pauline privilege, referred to earlier,\textsuperscript{14} a Divine cause is operative.

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\textsuperscript{10} S.T., III Suppl., q. 67, a. 2.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} cf. supra, 106.
The second passage, which presents even a greater difficulty than the first one, is the passage in which St. Thomas speaks of the indissolubility of a sacramental marriage. The indissolubility of such a marriage, he says, cannot be a matter of dispensation "except perhaps by the second kind of dispensation," \(^{15}\) (meaning the intervention of a Divine Cause). In this same passage St. Thomas seems to be saying, at least implicitly, that the indissolubility of a non-sacramental marriage could be a matter of dispensation in some other way, that is without the concurrence of a cause altogether supernatural. St. Thomas' words are:

Although indissolubility belongs to the second intention of marriage as fulfilling an office of nature, it belongs to its first intention as a Sacrament of the Church. Hence, from the moment it was made a sacrament of the Church, as long as it remains such it cannot be a matter of dispensation except perhaps by the second kind of dispensation.\(^ {16}\)

Although St. Thomas does not explicitly say that the properties of unity and indissolubility are essential to non-Christian marriages, he does seem to say that those properties are necessary for the realization of the purposes of marriage. In no uncertain terms he says that those properties are essential to Christian marriage.

In view of the foregoing, there is a marked difference of attitude between Confucius and St. Thomas concerning the properties of marriage. St. Thomas places by far greater emphasis upon the unity and indissolubility of marriage than does Confucius. St. Thomas seemed to regard these proper-

\(^{15}\) S.T., III Suppl., q. 67, a. 2 ad 3.

\(^{16}\) Ibid.
ties so necessary that a Divine dispensation was required to be dispensed from them, and this dispensation was not granted for any slight cause. Whereas, according to the Confucian doctrine, husband and wife could almost separate at will, though in accordance with "filial piety" the final decision in the matter of divorcing a wife depended largely upon the attitude of the husband's parents towards her. If the parents were pleased with her, he was not to divorce her; if not, the husband was expected to divorce her, even though he himself may have loved her dearly. Then, too, divorce could be sought for such slight reasons as "disobedience to parents-in-law, failure to bear a son," or talkativeness on the part of the wife.¹⁷

Needless to say, there was no Divine cause operative in the event of divorce and polygyny spoken of in the doctrine of Confucius.

Perhaps the main reason for the distorted view of the family, which Confucius seemed to have, as also for his failure to emphasize to a greater extent the unity and indissolubility of marriage is that he was not operating within a metaphysical framework in which the concepts of God as the Supreme Being, First Cause and the ultimate end of man, the spirituality of man's soul, as also its immortality are essential elements.

Confucianism stood for a rationalized social order through the ethical approach, based on personal cultivation; fundamentally it was a humanist attitude, brushing aside all metaphysics and mysticism, interested chiefly in such human relationships as the relationship between husband and

¹⁷ cf. supra, 37.
wife; parent and child; elders and young folks; ruler and subject; and friend and friend. 18

That the essential human relationships are ultimately metaphysical did not seem to enter the mind of Confucius; not having a metaphysical framework in which to operate, he failed to see man in his essential relationships. This seems to account for his distorted view of marriage and the family.

Since Confucius understood neither the purpose of human existence, nor human nature itself with its varied powers, and the laws according to which it operates, his theory of self-control is scarcely fit for purposes of mental and moral discipline.

An adequate theory of self-control demands first of all an accurate view of human nature, an understanding of it, as also of the laws that govern man's powers and man himself.

Nevertheless, the Confucian theory of self-control does have certain commendable points, for example, its emphasis upon learning, as also its emphasis upon the acquisition of sincerity. By learning one stocks his mind with ideas and ideals. In addition to ideals, resolutions, and practical steps for the execution of the resolutions made, are needed.

The Confucian theory for influencing others is based chiefly on the power of example; however, it is difficult to say just how effective example is. It would seem as though the "persuasion of the intellect" might

18 H.T. Morgan, Chinese Religious Beliefs, 1941, 11.
be more effective, in the matter of influencing another; it would be
effective even in the absence of the one exerting the influence.

The failure of Confucius to see clearly the duties of parents
towards their children is no doubt due to his lack of a knowledge of a
"Personal God" and man's relationship with Him. In tolerating divorce
freely and for a slight cause, he was depriving children of the care and
guidance to which they had a natural right.

The tender regard which Confucius taught that children should
have for their parents is indeed very edifying and inspiring, although at
times one may be somewhat amused at the numerous very detailed regulations
which Confucius set down for observance in the fulfillment of the duties
of filial piety.

Certain extremes, however, one could not within reason approve,
as the worshipping of parents as though they were God, the observance of
such mourning rites as led to the ruin of health, as also the exaggerated
notion of parental authority. The exercise of the latter as also the in-
fluence of an exaggerated notion of "filial piety" could easily have hin-
dered even the marriage consent of the children from being "completely
voluntary," as St. Thomas says it ought to be in order to be valid.

Particularly since Confucius merely "counseled" that marriage
have the properties of unity and indissolubility, but did not insist upon
those properties, it seems as though his concept of marriage, if we are to
admit that he had a concept of true marriage at all, was certainly incom-
plete.
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The thesis submitted by Caroline Elizabeth Prom has been read and approved by three members of the Department of Philosophy.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

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